Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe: On Growth, Trajectory and Aftermath (The Urban Book Series) 3030654842, 9783030654849

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Contents
About the Authors
Abbeviations
1 Introduction on the Urban Economic Informality Context
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Structure of the Book
References
Part IHistory of Urban Informality and Urban Planning Debates
2 Historicising Urban Economic Informality
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Urban Informality in Post-Independence Southern African Cities
2.3 Reflections on the Historicity of Urban Informality
2.4 Conclusion
References
3 Modernity, Urban Planning and Informality
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Exclusionary Nature of South African and Zimbabwean Urban Planning Regimes
3.3 Urban Planning and the Vulnerability of Urban Informality
3.4 A Call to a New Turn in African Urban Planning
3.5 Conclusion
References
Part IIUrban Informality Experiences from Selected South African and Zimbabwean Cities
4 International Migrants and Urban Economic Informality in South African Cities
4.1 Context: International Migrants and Urban Informality
4.2 The Rise of Urban Informality in South African Cities
4.3 Regarding Mixed Embeddedness and International Migrants in the Urban Informal Economy in Johannesburg
4.4 Some Characteristics of Foreign Migrants’ Urban Economic Enterprises
4.5 The Challenges and Struggles of Foreign Migrant Enterprises in Johannesburg Inner City
4.6 Conclusion
References
5 Spatial and Compositional Formality–Informality Interfaces in the City of Harare, Zimbabwe
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Characteristics of Informal Economic Activities and Growth Within Sub-sectors
5.3 Spatial Configurations of Informal Economic Categories
5.4 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises in Harare During the 1980s
5.5 The Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 1990s
5.6 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 2000s
5.7 Compositional Formality–Informality Interfaces in Harare City
5.8 Conclusion
References
6 Rising Informality and Role in Shaping Economies in Johannesburg City
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Urban informality and the Johannesburg City Economy: Sectoral Dimensions of Informal Livelihood and Economic Activities
6.3 On the Debate on Urban Informality and Employment Creation
6.4 Rejuvenation or Degeneration of the Johannesburg City Economy?
6.5 The Formality–Informality Interface in Johannesburg City
6.6 Conclusion
References
7 The Spatial Configuration and Reconfiguration in Bulawayo City: Regarding the Impact of Politico-Economic Ideologies
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 1980s
7.3 The Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 1990s
7.4 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 2000s
7.5 Impact of Ideology Change on Location of Informal Economic Enterprises
7.6 Informal–Formal Spatial and Functional Linkages
7.7 Conclusion
References
8 The Changing Shape of Economic Informality in Durban
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Compositional Characteristics of Urban Economic Informality in Durban
8.3 Spatial/Locational Characteristics of Urban Economic Informality in Durban
8.4 Urban Economic Informality and Employment Creation in Durban
8.5 Rejuvenation or Degeneration of the Durban City Economy?
8.6 The Formality–Informality Interface in Durban City
8.7 Conclusion
References
Part IIIUrban Informality Governance
9 Urban Informality Policies and Regulatory Frameworks in South African and Zimbabwean Cities
9.1 Introduction
9.2 The South African Policy Response to Urban Informality
9.3 The Zimbabwean Policy Response to Urban Informality
9.4 Some Reflections on Urban Informality Policies and Regulatory Frameworks in South African and Zimbabwean Cities
9.5 Conclusion
References
10 Political Dimensions of Urban Informality in South African and Zimbabwean Cities
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Regarding Power, Informality and the Right to the City
10.3 Informality and Political Turn in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
10.4 Regarding Street Politics in Johannesburg City
10.5 Conclusion
References
Part IVAftermath
11 The Aftermath
11.1 Introduction of Capitalism, Formalisation of Economic Activities and the Construction of Urban Informality
11.2 On Urban Planning and Urban Informality
11.3 Urban Informality and the Compositional, Spatial and Structural Transformations: Regarding the Aftermath
References
Index

Citation preview

The Urban Book Series

Inocent Moyo Trynos Gumbo

Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe On Growth, Trajectory and Aftermath

The Urban Book Series Editorial Board Fatemeh Farnaz Arefian, University of Newcastle, Singapore, Singapore; Silk Cities & Bartlett Development Planning Unit, UCL, London, UK Michael Batty, Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis, UCL, London, UK Simin Davoudi, Planning & Landscape Department GURU, Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK Geoffrey DeVerteuil, School of Planning and Geography, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Andrew Kirby, New College, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA Karl Kropf, Department of Planning, Headington Campus, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK Karen Lucas, Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Marco Maretto, DICATeA, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Parma, Parma, Italy Fabian Neuhaus, Faculty of Environmental Design, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada Steffen Nijhuis, Architecture and the Built Environment, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands Vitor Manuel Aráujo de Oliveira , Porto University, Porto, Portugal Christopher Silver, College of Design, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA Giuseppe Strappa, Facoltà di Architettura, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Roma, Italy Igor Vojnovic, Department of Geography, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA Jeremy W. R. Whitehand, Earth & Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK Claudia Yamu, Department of Spatial Planning and Environment, University of Groningen, Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

The Urban Book Series is a resource for urban studies and geography research worldwide. It provides a unique and innovative resource for the latest developments in the field, nurturing a comprehensive and encompassing publication venue for urban studies, urban geography, planning and regional development. The series publishes peer-reviewed volumes related to urbanization, sustainability, urban environments, sustainable urbanism, governance, globalization, urban and sustainable development, spatial and area studies, urban management, transport systems, urban infrastructure, urban dynamics, green cities and urban landscapes. It also invites research which documents urbanization processes and urban dynamics on a national, regional and local level, welcoming case studies, as well as comparative and applied research. The series will appeal to urbanists, geographers, planners, engineers, architects, policy makers, and to all of those interested in a wide-ranging overview of contemporary urban studies and innovations in the field. It accepts monographs, edited volumes and textbooks. Now Indexed by Scopus!

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14773

Inocent Moyo · Trynos Gumbo

Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe On Growth, Trajectory and Aftermath

Inocent Moyo Department of Geography and Environmental Studies University of Zululand KwaDlangezwa, South Africa

Trynos Gumbo Department of Town and Regional Planning University of Johannesburg Johannesburg, South Africa

ISSN 2365-757X ISSN 2365-7588 (electronic) The Urban Book Series ISBN 978-3-030-65484-9 ISBN 978-3-030-65485-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to all informal economic actors whose struggles are not only legendary, but that also continue to inspire and support millions if not billions in all the three worlds; developing, transitional and developed.

Foreword

There is a growth of academic literature on urban informality and this corresponds with the growth in the phenomena, particularly in cities of the Global South. Urban informality plays an important role in terms of socio-economic development, by providing sustainable livelihoods, among others. This book, entitled Urban informality in South African and Zimbabwean cities: On growth, trajectory and aftermath is an important contribution to the burgeoning research, conceptualisation and theorisation of urban informality in the Global South. The significant argument of this book is the presentation of urban informality as an issue of the political economy. In addition to this, the book is a welcome critique of colonial and modernist urban planning, which has attempted, without any success, to model African cities along European and North American cities. Colonial urban planning has reduced urban informality to a transgression which deserves total decimation or obliteration. Herein lies the problem, which this book attempts to project; that urban informality is an essential part of the urbanisation process in the Global South, in general and Southern Africa, in particular. This is demonstrated by the historical continuities of the phenomena and its enduring presence, which has transformed the urban form and structure, such that the informal and the so-called formal economic activities are inextricably linked in a complex and enduring way, which undermines the classification of the formal, as the first economy, and, the informal, as the second economy. These linkages spatially manifest in the successful invasion and transformation by informal economic activities of spaces and places in most South African and Zimbabwean cities which, hitherto, were the preserve of formal economic activities. Besides, people involved in urban informality have invoked overt and covert strategies of resisting the modernist regulatory approaches. The totality of all this, is a revolution in the urban form and structure. This book successfully debates this observation and reality. In the Global South, in general, and South Africa and Zimbabwe in particular, it is imperative to begin to look into urban informality differently—that, it is not an exception, but a feature of urbanisation which should be neither ignored nor wished away. Urban informality, perhaps, should be integrated in urban planning and

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Foreword

practice, beyond just tokenism; currently it seems misplaced as regards, response to the phenomenon. To this extent, the book calls for a decolonised urban planning around and in response to urban informality. Thus, this book is a valuable resource for activists, academics, policy-makers, politicians and urban planners in the needed engagement on the subject under consideration. October 2020

Professor Innocent Chirisa Dean of the Faculty of Social Studies Department of Rural and Urban Planning University of Zimbabwe Harare, Zimbabwe

Acknowledgments

We first met in July 2013 at the Sandton Convention centre, Johannesburg, South Africa as the International Geographical Union (IGU) Commission on Urban Geography conference delegates and paper presenters. After our presentations (which were organised into one session, one after the other) we noticed that we were both working on similar issues but, in different settings. One (Trynos) was working on urban informality in the Zimbabwean cities of Bulawayo and Harare and the other (Inocent) was researching on similar work, focusing specifically on Johannesburg, South Africa. From this, the idea of the book was conceived in July 2013 and it has been a long journey to see the idea being transformed into a book. For these reasons, we are truly grateful to people who immensely contributed to this book, such as the informal economic operators whom we engaged and had interesting and fascinating conversations about their operations in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Likewise, we acknowledge the inputs of the three anonymous peer reviewers who assisted us to refine our ideas and in the process deepen the analysis presented in this book. We are also grateful to the Series editor, who provided useful feedback and as well as guidance on useful source materials and case studies on urban informality. Nonetheless, it is important to state that, reasonable efforts have been made to present the material in this book through a deeper distillation of existing literature and more so uncovered insights during data collection and analysis. In cases where there have been any oversights, such mistakes remain our own and we are ready to correct such, if the need arises.

October 2020

Inocent Moyo, Ph.D. Trynos Gumbo, Ph.D.

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Contents

1

Introduction on the Urban Economic Informality Context . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Structure of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part I 2

3

History of Urban Informality and Urban Planning Debates

Historicising Urban Economic Informality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Urban Informality in Post-Independence Southern African Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Reflections on the Historicity of Urban Informality . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15 15

Modernity, Urban Planning and Informality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Exclusionary Nature of South African and Zimbabwean Urban Planning Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Urban Planning and the Vulnerability of Urban Informality . . . . . 3.4 A Call to a New Turn in African Urban Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 29

Part II 4

1 1 5 8

18 23 25 26

31 33 35 36 37

Urban Informality Experiences from Selected South African and Zimbabwean Cities

International Migrants and Urban Economic Informality in South African Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Context: International Migrants and Urban Informality . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Rise of Urban Informality in South African Cities . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Regarding Mixed Embeddedness and International Migrants in the Urban Informal Economy in Johannesburg . . . . .

41 41 42 45 xi

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4.4

Some Characteristics of Foreign Migrants’ Urban Economic Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 The Challenges and Struggles of Foreign Migrant Enterprises in Johannesburg Inner City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

6

7

Spatial and Compositional Formality–Informality Interfaces in the City of Harare, Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Characteristics of Informal Economic Activities and Growth Within Sub-sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Spatial Configurations of Informal Economic Categories . . . . . . . 5.4 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises in Harare During the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 The Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 2000s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 Compositional Formality–Informality Interfaces in Harare City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rising Informality and Role in Shaping Economies in Johannesburg City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Urban informality and the Johannesburg City Economy: Sectoral Dimensions of Informal Livelihood and Economic Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 On the Debate on Urban Informality and Employment Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Rejuvenation or Degeneration of the Johannesburg City Economy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 The Formality–Informality Interface in Johannesburg City . . . . . 6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49 51 53 54 59 59 64 68 70 71 74 77 79 79 83 83

84 88 90 91 93 94

The Spatial Configuration and Reconfiguration in Bulawayo City: Regarding the Impact of Politico-Economic Ideologies . . . . . . . 97 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 7.2 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 7.3 The Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Contents

Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 2000s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Impact of Ideology Change on Location of Informal Economic Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 Informal–Formal Spatial and Functional Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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7.4

8

The Changing Shape of Economic Informality in Durban . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Compositional Characteristics of Urban Economic Informality in Durban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Spatial/Locational Characteristics of Urban Economic Informality in Durban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Urban Economic Informality and Employment Creation in Durban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 Rejuvenation or Degeneration of the Durban City Economy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 The Formality–Informality Interface in Durban City . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

104 107 108 109 110 113 113 115 115 116 117 117 119 120

Part III Urban Informality Governance 9

Urban Informality Policies and Regulatory Frameworks in South African and Zimbabwean Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 The South African Policy Response to Urban Informality . . . . . . 9.3 The Zimbabwean Policy Response to Urban Informality . . . . . . . 9.4 Some Reflections on Urban Informality Policies and Regulatory Frameworks in South African and Zimbabwean Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10 Political Dimensions of Urban Informality in South African and Zimbabwean Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Regarding Power, Informality and the Right to the City . . . . . . . . 10.3 Informality and Political Turn in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . 10.4 Regarding Street Politics in Johannesburg City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

123 123 124 128

130 131 132 135 135 138 140 146 148 149

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Contents

Part IV Aftermath 11 The Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Introduction of Capitalism, Formalisation of Economic Activities and the Construction of Urban Informality . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 On Urban Planning and Urban Informality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 Urban Informality and the Compositional, Spatial and Structural Transformations: Regarding the Aftermath . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

153 153 156 158 161

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

About the Authors

Dr. Inocent Moyo is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of Zululand, South Africa. Inocent is a Human Geographer with a deep interest in the interface between people and the environment, particularly within the broader fields of Political Geography, Political Economy, Political Ecology, Migration, Regional Development and Integration in Africa, Borders and Cross Border and Urban Informality and Governance. Inocent is the founding Chair of the International Geographical Union Commission on African Studies (IGUCAS). Professor Trynos Gumbo is an Associate Professor and Head of the Urban and Regional Planning Department within the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment at the University of Johannesburg. Prof Gumbo is a professional urban and regional planner registered with South African Council for Planners (SACPLAN). His research interests are in sustainable urban planning and development, where he specifically focuses on the application of appropriate technologies and systems to provide novel insights in innovative urban transport systems, green buildings, renewable energy and urban informal economies and informal housing.

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AEC AeT AIPPA ANC AsgiSA ASPEF AU BACOSSI BBP BP CBD CEN-SAD CIPC COMESA CSC CZI DRC DTI DVDs EAC ECCAS ECOWAS ESAP FEEs FELOPADs FES FFYNDP FOLIWARS FTLRP GDP GDS GEAR

African Economic Community Asiye eTafuleni Access to Information and Protection and Privacy Act African National Congress Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility African Union Basic Commodities Supply-side Intervention Facility Better Buildings Programme Botswana Pula Central Business District Community of Sahel–Saharan States Companies and Intellectual Property Commission Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Cold Storage Commission Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries Democratic Republic of the Congo Department of Trade and Industry Digital Video Discs East African Community Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme Formal Economic Enterprises Foreign Exchange Licensed Outlets for Petrol and Diesel Formal Economic Sector First Five Year National Development Plan Foreign Exchange Licensed Warehouses and Retail Shops Fast Track Land Reform Programme Gross Domestic Product Growth and Development Strategy Growth, Employment and Redistribution xvii

xviii

GEC GEMINI GIS GIT GNU GoZ GPA GPS GTZ GWE GYB HB ICs IDC IEEs IEEs IEOs IEOs IES IGAD ILO IMF INSTRAN IYB JMPD LED MBDC MDC MDGs MERO MLGRUD MPF MPSLSW MSMEs NEDPP NERP NIBDS NORAD NVUZ ODA OECD OR POSA PSF

Abbeviations

Global Environmental Change Growth and Equity through Microenterprises Investments and Institutions Geographic Information Systems Geographic Information Technology Government of National Unity Government of Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement Global Positioning System German Technical Cooperation Agency Growth with Equity Generate Your Business Idea Home Based Industrial Centres Inter-Ministerial Deregulation Committee Informal Economic Enterprises Urban Informal Economic Operations Informal Economic Operators Informal Economic Operations Urban Informal Economy Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund Training and Resource Network Improve Your Business Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department Local Economic Development Micro Business Development Corporation Movement for Democratic Change Millennium Development Goals Millennium Economic Recovery Programme Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development Macroeconomic Policy Framework Ministry of Public Service Labour and Social Welfare (Zimbabwe) Micro and Small to Medium size Enterprises National Economic Development Priority Programme National Economic Revival Programme National Informal Business Development Strategy Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation The National Vendors Union Zimbabwe Official Development Assistance Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development Operation Murambatsvina Public Order Security Act Productive Sector Facility

Abbeviations

RBZ RDP RECs RO RSA RTGs SADC SAITF SAPs SAR SATEP SDF SDF SI SIASV SMMEs SPSS SSCs SSS STAEP Stats SA SWW SYB TCs TNDP TOT UDHR UMA UNDP USA USAID USD USSR UTM VAT WB WIEGO ZANU-PF ZCIEA ZCTU ZDERA ZEDP ZIMCORD ZIMPREST ZIMRA

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Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Regional Economic Community Restore Order Republic of South Africa Real Time Gross Rate Southern African Development Community The South African Informal Traders Association Structural Adjustments Programmes South African Rand Southern African Team for Employment Promotion Social Dimension Fund Spatial Development Framework Statutory Instrument StreetNet International Alliance of Street Vendors Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Suburban Shopping Centres Social Assistance Scheme Southern African Team for Employment Promotion Statistics South Africa Second World War Start Your Business (SYB) Transportation Centres Transitional National Development Plan Train the Trainer Universal Declaration of Human Rights Arab Maghreb Union United National Development Programme United State of America U.S. Agency for International Development United States Dollars Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Universal Transverse Mercator Value Added Tax World Bank Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act Zimbabwe Enterprise Development Programme Zimbabwe Conference Reconstruction and Development Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation Zimbabwe Revenue Authority

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ZISA ZISO ZNCC ZUPCO

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Zimbabwe International Students Alliance The Zimbabwe Informal Sector’s Organization Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce Zimbabwe United Passenger Company

Chapter 1

Introduction on the Urban Economic Informality Context

Abstract This chapter engages in a brief but in-depth discussion and rundown of the key conceptual and theoretical approaches to the understanding of urban informality in Africa in general and South Africa and Zimbabwe specifically. The book adopts a political economy approach, in which urban informality is defined as a variety of economic activity in which many actors converge so as to meet their needs, including inter alia, laying claim to livelihoods, accessing various types of goods and services as well as generating profits. It is posited that attaining all this, is influenced by and it in turn impacts political and socio-economic histories and developments, with implications on among others, spatial and economic planning particularly at city levels. Keywords Urban informality · South Africa · Zimbabwe

1.1 Introduction The concept of urban economic informality (UEI) is difficult to pin down as demonstrated by several scholars (see e.g. Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2006; Perry et al. 2007; Chen 2005, 2007; Kanbur 2009; Heintz 2012). Various scholars and institutions at global, regional, national and local levels have diverse views about what constitutes urban economic informality (see e.g. International Labour Organisation (ILO) 2003, 2013; Schneider et al. 2010; Sinha and Kanbur 2012; Heintz 2012; Brown and McGranahan 2016; Bromley and Wilson 2018). Even at the “birth” of the UEI concept in the early 1970s; the phenomenon was defined using descriptions of its characteristics, like the legal and illegal activities that were undertaken either by the urban poor who were unemployed in order to generate income for survival, or by the underemployed to supplement their low wages (Hart 1970, 1973; Peattie 1987). The trend of using characteristics of UEI to define it was also picked up and popularised by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in its maiden study on UEI in Kenya (ILO 1972). In this way, UEI is often described as all the ways of surviving or generating income that are outside the formal economic sector (FES) (Bromley and Gerry 1979). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6_1

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It is worth noting that urban economic informality has existed in their current forms even before the advent of capitalism that formalised production systems (Gumbo and Geyer 2011; Onyebueke and Geyer 2011). Currently, there are four main perspectives, which characterise the emergence and existence of the phenomenon and these are; dualism (residual thesis), structuralism (by-product or exclusion thesis), legalism (alternative or exit thesis) and the poststructuralist (complementary or social relations thesis). Early studies of urban economic informality gave rise to dualistic perceptions of the phenomenon (Furnivall 1939, 1941; Geertz 1963a, b). UEI was seen as traditional, backward, insignificant and separate from the FES. It was felt that UEI would diminish and eventually cease to exist (Boeke 1953; Lewis 1954; Geertz 1963). Follow up studies on the phenomenon from the early 1970s also confirmed that UEI was separate from the FES but comprised of pertinent economic activities (Hart 1970; 1973; ILO 1972) for the survival of hundreds of thousands in developing countries and contributing to national growth and development (Moser 1978; Peattie 1987; Blunch, Canagarajah and Raju 2001; Gerxhani 2004; Chen 2005, 2007; Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur 2006; Aksikas 2007; Williams 2010). During the 1980s, an alternative view emerged that, rather than being transitional and peripheral, the phenomenon had become permanent, penetrated the modern industrial sector and had spread to industrialised nations (Portes, Castells and Benton 1989). It was also proved that, instead of it being considered distinct and separate from the FES, the two sectors had strong linkages (Blunch, Canagarajah and Raju 2001). Studying the UEI in South Africa, Geyer (1989) demonstrated through the reciprocal-supportive model that the two sectors were linked and could not be considered separate. This led to the emergence of other perspectives, like structuralism (Meagher 1995; Chen 2005). Structuralists identified sections of UEI that had linkages with formal economic enterprises (FEEs). Subcontracting part of the work and employing lowly paid casual workers was found to be common during the periods of massive competition and recession in the late 1970s and early 1980s in most industrialised nations (Portes, Castells and Benton 1989; Meagher 1995; Williams 2010). Backward and forward linkages also existed between the two economic sectors as formal businesses procured intermediate inputs and final goods from informal businesses that also purchased their materials and inputs from FES businesses (Peattie 1987; Arimah 2001; Aksikas 2007). Such relationships between the two economic sectors had been grossly missed by the dualist thesis. Structuralism also incorporates informal economic operators (IEOs) who are forced to join the sector to survive after being retrenched by the FES counterpart; hence either the growth or decline of UEI is directly linked to the performance of the FES (Portes, Castells and Benton 1989). Although the structuralist thesis is mostly applicable to heavily industrialised countries which had experienced widespread informalisation during the economic crisis; it is also notated that economic structural adjustment policies, adopted particularly in African countries during the 1980s and 1990s; led to millions joining the informal sector after widespread retrenchments. However, in some less industrialised countries that did not have widespread informalisation of formal businesses; the thesis cannot explain the presence of the

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UEI (Sassen 1988, 1989; Schneider 1997). Socialist countries with low industrial production also experienced a sharp increase in UEI particularly due to rapid urbanisation and small economies that could not absorb migrant labour (Kim 2002, 2003, 2005; William and Round 2007a, b). Both dualism and post structuralism missed out a section of the UEI that existed as a result of stringent, cumbersome and stifling regulatory frameworks (De Soto 1989). This led to the formulation of the legalist perspective of the phenomenon (World Bank 1989; ILO 1993; Meagher 1995). Reformists and radical neo-liberalists assert that urban IEOs choose to voluntarily exit the FES that has stringent regulations for registering and operating a business (Harding and Jenkins 1989; Gumbo and Geyer 2011). However, this view has been found too narrow as it is only relevant to ownaccount informal operators with relatively high incomes, better education and skills, but is not applicable to informal waged employees and petty traders (Williams and Windebank 1994; Chen 2005, 2006). It has been repeatedly proven that giving the UEI autonomy, flexibility and freedom alone, without active support by the state and the FES counterpart is not enough (Gumbo 2010a, b; Gumbo and Geyer 2011). According to Williams (2010), the three common views that have been discussed so far left out parts of UEI that were carried out to strengthen social relations, mostly in urban low income communities. Some UEI activities were done outside the FES by kinsmen; friends and neighbours for reasons that were not related to economic gain (Williams 2010). This led to the formulation of the poststructuralist or postcapitalist or postcolonial perspective. What is common to all the four perspectives is that UEI is significant in the creation of employment and the provision of livelihoods to large numbers of urban residents across continents (De Soto 1989). It is characterised by a variety of activities and strategies (see e.g. Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Roy 2005; Müller 2017; Crush and Young 2019; Skinner 2019; Moyo et al. 2016, 2018, Moyo 2017, 2018; Gumbo and Geyer 2011; Gumbo et al. 2020). The focus of this book is on this broader spectrum of the activities in UEI in Southern Africa, but with a specific analysis of South African and Zimbabwean cities. But, the broader spectrum granted, the analysis of this book is limited to all legitimate economic activities that observe the national legalities but only flout labour, taxation, regulatory or licensing and operational regulations, whether for survival or profit-making purposes (Kesteloot & Meert 1999). The book therefore excludes all illegal and underground activities such as drug peddling and human trafficking. This is important to highlight, because “in business and the culture hospitable to it, not much is more important than the moral state of entrepreneurship” (Manchan 2002: 1). Thus, “individualism, overcoming obstacles and endeavour might characterise entrepreneurship, but the manner of doing, the means and ends do not fit with an ideology of value creation. Criminality, perhaps entrepreneurial in scope is not entrepreneurial in spirit, it lacks social legitimacy” Anderson and Smith (2007: 486). In the light of this, we define urban economic informality as all legal economic activities that are operated either for survival or profit-making purposes or both; but may not meet the requirements of the law in respect of among others production and distribution regulations (see e.g. Kesteloot and Meert 1999). These activities include

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among several others; street trading, welding, carpentry, tailoring, food preparation, car repairs, selling building materials and traditional medicines, grocery shops, knitting, welding, carpentry, photocopying, typing and printing, selling firewood, fruit and vegetables, clothing shops, electrical installations, brick laying, plastering, tiling and flooring etc., straddling the formal–informal economy dichotomy which operate both within and outside state regulation. State regulation or lack of it may be due to either political or economic considerations or both. For instance, some states suspend laws which restrict UEI if it is convenient and likewise do the opposite if it is economically and/or politically expedient (Banks et al. 2019). The point is that UEI still operates, whether or not it is regulated and in doing so connect the formal and informal economies in both conventional and unconventional ways. In all this, the book adopts a political economy approach, in which UEI is viewed as a political and economic activity/issue in which many actors converge so as to meet their needs, including inter alia, laying claim to livelihoods, accessing various types of goods and services as well as generating profits. It is posited that attaining all this, is influenced by and in turn impacts political and socio-economic histories and developments, with implications on among others, spatial and economic planning particularly at city levels. Differently stated, “informality is not a separate sector but rather a series of transactions that connect different economies and spaces to one another” (Roy and AlSayyad 2004 cited in Roy 2005: 148). This is because, UEI is a site utilised socially, economically, politically and spatially by both the urban elite and urban poor and with differentiated social, economic and political consequences (Vasudevan 2015; Varley 2013; Roy 2009, 2011; Müller 2017). The political economy approach is adopted specifically to analyse how the political and economic history of South Africa and Zimbabwe have influenced and continue to influence the growth and operations of UEI, particularly in cities of these two selected Southern African states. We therefore posit that, the South African and Zimbabwean historical and/or ideological and contemporary political and economic trajectories have had implications on the ever changing nature of the UEI, both spatially and structurally and/or compositionally; thus resulting in unique urban materialities. Viewed through this prism, UEI lies at the confluence or intersection of political influences and/or ideologies (past or present or a combination of the both) and economic factors and or considerations and determinants (past or present) and involves a gamut of economic activities by both the rich and poor in their continuous, dynamic and agentive ways to survive or make profit or achieve the both. Therefore, the central question, which comes to the fore is; how have the political and ideological, economic and urban histories of the two countries influenced the evolution, characteristics, nature and composition of UEI in Zimbabwean and South African cities? This overarching question is tackled progressively in this book as highlighted in the section which is considered next.

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1.2 Structure of the Book This book is constituted of eleven chapters. After this introduction, Chapter 2 historicises UEI (urban informality herein after) by showing that, its pre-industrial and/or pre-capitalist origins in Africa are variable based the differentiated nature and temporalities of urban development. Parts of West Africa have old cities, in which urban informality was established by the time of and thus survived colonial conquest and the subsequent Eurocentric urban planning laws. The same cannot be said about some Southern African cities like those in South Africa and Zimbabwe, in which it was colonialism which actually led to the growth of cities, in which urban informality was easy to disrupt and tame because of the unmitigated enforcement of Eurocentric planning standards. It was the end of white settler colonialism and the fall of apartheid in Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively, which allowed UEI to become more visible because the ferocity of the enforcement of previous legal restrictions on migration and informal work was ended, and many of the laws (but far from all of them) were repealed. It must be noted that it would have been politically impossible to retain such laws at that point, since in both countries the liberation struggles sought to reduce such restrictions (among many other aims, of course). This is despite the fact that, after independence and the fall of the apartheid regime in Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively, Eurocentric models of urban planning have relatively prevailed (Chapter 3). The point we are making is that the end of apartheid and colonialism did not mean however that Eurocentric urban planning ideas and frameworks were removed so there was (and is) tremendous tension between those and the political need to accommodate the realities of urban livelihood options. But, in Chapter 3, we are not repeating what has been discussed and even better presented elsewhere on the Eurocentrism of urban planning in Africa in general and South Africa and Zimbabwe in particular but rather, add that, urban informality has “contributed” to notions of urban planning in an African context in terms of bottom up processes which challenge the apparatus of the state from below (in some instances, this has forced some governance powers in cities under consideration to attempt to integrate the place of urban informality in urban planning and development). Another important development in urban informality in South African and Zimbabwean cities is the role of international migrants (Chapter 4). Like urban planning and the relationship between the state and the urban informal economy, the issue of international migrants in the informal economy is influenced by the urban and political and economic history of the countries in question. For example, in the case of South Africa, the political and economic development of the country and the former white minority apartheid regime and culminating in the 1994 election which resulted to a democratic dispensation has contributed to the character of urban economic informality by international migrants in South African cities. This is precisely because, migration to South Africa after 1994 has been higher than any country in the Southern African region. This is clearly attributable to the political and economic developments of the country following the fall of the apartheid regime

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in 1994. This, among others, created the general democratic conditions that led to deracialisation of cities and the opening up of economic spaces and opportunities in cities, which attracted international migrants. The point is that from 1994 there was more opportunity for immigrants to look for employment within cities (although they always had done so) and that they could engage in informal work if they had to (which would have been much more difficult before). As a result, the participation of international migrants in urban economic informality in South African cities is more pronounced. These developments are predicated on the general and broader historical and political and economic conditions and policies within the country and the region at large. But, beyond this, the question of how these international migrant informal enterprises impact on and contribute to urban informality is also discussed in the book (Chapter 4). Hence, the central question which is addressed in Chapter 4 is; what is nature, characteristic, contribution and importance of IEOs owned and operated by international migrants in South African cities? In pursuit of the central question which underpins this book, in terms of the impact of colonial minority regimes on the evolution of urban informality, Chapters 5–8, discuss the urban informality experiences from selected South African and Zimbabwean cities. Hence, Chapter 5 engages with the compositional formality– informality interfaces in Harare (Zimbabwe). In this respect Chapter 5 highlights the fact that, the Zimbabwean urban informal economy has been evolving since the country attained independence in 1980. In response to political and economic transformations, the phenomenon has been occupying places that were regarded as the preserve of its formal economic sector counterpart. These changing characteristics of urban informal economic activities in Harare demonstrates how they have assumed features of formal businesses resulting in the compositional linkages. Thus, Chapter 5 illuminates the importance of the historical and politico-economic factors in shaping the compositional formality–informality interfaces in Harare city. Chapter 6 discusses the rising informality and its role in shaping economies in Johannesburg (South Africa). Emphasis is made that urban informality has not only created employment opportunities for the rising urban population but also contributed to the growth of the city of Johannesburg’s economy and also significantly contributed to the livelihoods of many people, especially the unemployed and urban poor. There is also an attempt to provide some insights into the sectoral dimensions of informal livelihoods and economic activities. For example, the question of whether informal workers are engaged only in specific job sectors is tackled. In addition, the demographic skew in terms of the involvement of women for example in urban informality is also discussed. As a result, the question of whether or not there are economic activities in which women are the main sectors is addressed. Similarly, the temporality of the economic activities in the UEI and evidence of the formal/informal interfaces of the economic activities in question are discussed. In addition, Chapter 7 examines the spatial configuration and reconfiguration in Bulawayo (Zimbabwe). The chapter achieves this by examining the linkages between urban informal economic operations (IEEs) and formal economic enterprises (FEEs) and the impact of political and/or economical ideological shifts and/or changes in this regard, in Bulawayo. Chapter 8 analyses the changing shape of urban informality

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in Durban. It discusses the growth trajectory of urban informality in Durban as well as its compositional and spatial/locational characteristics and how the phenomenon has contributed to employment creation. The interface between urban informality and formality is also analysed. The chapter amplifies the view that, the regulation of urban informality illustrates a troubled relationship between the city authorities and some of the informal economic actors. This, because, of the endurance of colonial urban planning regimes in which urban informality must abide by urban planning laws, which has led to blitzes and confiscation of goods from street traders as they would have violated the City laws. The connecting thread in all these chapters is the implication of the democratic governments’ political and economic ideologies on the current composition, characteristics and spatialities (even if it is a revolution or configuration and reconfiguration of urban places and spaces that were designed by colonial governments) of urban informality. This is the context within which, questions relating to the impact of urban informality on the spatial organisation and land use in South African and Zimbabwean cities arises and is investigated in this book as highlighted here. Beyond the spatial configuration of the city, another issue worth discussing is urban governance and political impacts of urban informality. Hence, Chapter 9 engages with the issues of urban governance in which the role of central and local government persuasions in urban informality management is discussed (Chapter 9). Thus, the chapter analyses the policies and regulatory frameworks which guide and/or govern informality in South African and Zimbabwean cities. Hence in Chapter 9 there is a discussion of the policy response at different levels of government such as the national and local in South Africa. Likewise, in Zimbabwe there is a consideration of the national approach and response to urban informality. In addition to this, the chapter reflects on these responses to urban informality by the two countries and amplify that the colonial and apartheid legacies seem to always prevail in terms of disrupting any well-meaning plan to enhance urban informality. Therefore, the point is made that, all policies designed to annihilate urban informality and create space and an environment for the rich investors are not only doomed to fail, but also misunderstand the nature, depth and operation of urban informality. Chapter 10 that focuses on the politics of resistance. Regarding this politics of resistance, it is then possible to ask; is urban informality a site of political mobilisation and if so, why and how? How does this materialise and dematerialise? Can we even talk of “street politics” (Bayat 1997, 9.63; Bayat 2012: 119) that can be linked to urban informality? For example, in Bulawayo and Johannesburg inner city the informal economic actors defied the authorities by operating in undesignated trading zones and in some cases paid bribes to the municipality police who were supposed to enforce municipality laws. However, strategies of resistance have graduated to “street politics” whenever quiet attempts failed. And in both cities the informal economic actors have openly defied the municipalities and also invoked the rights to trade on the streets by taking legal action against the regulatory regimes. For these reasons, actors in the informal economy appear to be politically conscious and active to the extent of demonstrating that they have power which they can politically and legally exercise so as to defend their economic activities on the streets.

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Although the municipalities may have mightier power, this is not always enough to impose their will on the informal actors, who have successfully challenged such power. In this sense we are reminded of Foucault (1998)’s assertion that power is everywhere and can be reproduced from one moment to another. In this regard, an effort is made to show that, the struggles by people involved in urban informality are quintessentially struggles for inclusion and this speaks to issues of the urban development decisions and experiences both historical (exclusive) and contemporary (exclusive/inclusive) of the cities under consideration. But, the enduring, if nothing else, persistent presence of urban informality in many African cities, should lead scholars of Urban Economic Informality to think about the extent to which, in many African cities informality has transformed the notion of work and locational discourses overtime. Many people in urban Africa actually depend on informality for inter alia, livelihoods, economic and spatial development. In an African setting, which is characterised by urbanisation without industrialisation (Potts 2012), could this transition be indicative of a post work society? In Africa, what exactly does this mean? How does it materialise? What about its nature and dynamics? The issues, are posed in Chapter 11, in which the aftermath of urban informality is discussed more as a form of revolution, which cannot be stopped, but where progressive urban governance regimes and people-driven paradigms have to be embraced in pragmatic and transformative ways so as to respond to the political economy of everyday existence in Southern African cities under examination.

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Portes A, Castells M, Benton LA (eds) (1989) The informal economy: studies in advanced and less advanced countries. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Roy A (2005) Urban Informality: toward an epistemology of planning. J Am Plan Assoc 71(2):147– 158 Roy A (2009) Why India cannot plan its cities: informality, insurgence and the idiom of urbanization. Plan Theory 8:76–87 Roy A (2011) Slumdog cities: rethinking subaltern urbanism. Int J Urban Reg Res 35:223–238 Roy A, AlSayyad N (eds) (2004) Urban informality: transnational perspectives from the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America. Lexington Books, Lanham, MD Sassen S (1989) New York City’s informal economy. In: Portes A, Castells M, Benton AL (eds) The informal economy: studies in advanced and less developed countries. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 41–59 Sassen S (1988) New York’s informal economy. Working papers 4/9. Institute for Social Science Research, Los Angeles Schneider F (1997) The shadow economies of Western Europe. Blackwell, Oxford Schneider F, Buehn A, Montenegro CE (2010) Shadow economies all over the world: new estimates for 162 countries from 1999 to 2007. Policy research working paper 5356. https://documents.wor ldbank.org/curated/en/311991468037132740/pdf/WPS5356.pdf. Accessed 20 May 2020 Sinha A, Kanbur R (2012) Introduction: informality—concepts, facts and models. Margin: J Appl Econ Res 6:91–102 Skinner C (2019) Contributing and yet excluded? Informal food retail in African cities. In: Battersby J, Watson V (eds) Urban food systems governance and poverty in African cities. Routledge, London, pp 104–115 Varley A (2013) Postcolonialising informality? Environ Plan D 31:4–22 Vasudevan A (2015) The makeshift city: towards a global geography of squatting. Prog Hum Geogr 39:338–359 Williams CC (2010) Retheorising participation in the underground economy. Labour Stud J 35:246– 267 Williams CC, Round J (2007a) Re-thinking the nature of the informal economy: some lessons from Ukraine. Int J Urban Reg Res 31:425–441 Williams CC, Round J (2007b) Entrepreneur and the informal economy: a study of Ukraine’s hidden enterprise culture. J Dev Entrep 12:119–136 Williams CC, Windebank J (1994) Spatial variations in the informal sector. Reg Stud 28:819–825 World Bank (1989) Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth. The World Bank, Washington, DC Young G, Crush J (2019) Governing the informal food sector in cities of the Global South. Discussion paper no. 30. Hungry Cities Partnership, Cape Town and Waterloo

Part I

History of Urban Informality and Urban Planning Debates

Chapter 2

Historicising Urban Economic Informality

Abstract This chapter examines the historical emergence and evolution of urban economic informality in general and in the African continent as well as South African and Zimbabwean cities in particular. Parts of Africa with a long history of precolonial urban development, such as West Africa had entrenched urban economic informality which survived colonial conquest. However, the same cannot be said about much of South Africa and Zimbabwean cities, which grew after and as a result of colonial conquest. The consequent colonial and apartheid planning laws meant that it was easy to disrupt and tame urban economic informality during the colonial period. In post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwe, the growth of urban economic informality suggests the interplay of a complex myriad of factors and processes deeply embedded in the political economy of these nation states in an enduring way. These observations unsettle some of the enduring assumptions around the development and characteristics of urban informality in the cities under consideration. Keywords Urban informality · Formal economic activities · Legalism · Dualism · Structuralism · Post colonialism

2.1 Introduction The concept of informality as it is generally known currently, is only relational to the standards and levels of formality which is a relatively recent ideal or measure. In pre-industrial and capitalist cities in Africa and other parts of the world, like the sixteenth-century Britain, economic activities discussed in this book were not conceptualised as informal, because such a standard did not exist. It was the norms about what constituted work and employment which emerged as capitalism progressed and proletarianisation deepened, which provided the circumstances in which petty trade, low income self-employment, and non-registered enterprises, etc. came to be seen as abnormal, informal or even wrong. Thus, the depiction of these economic activities as informal should be seen to be relational to the practice/existence/ideas of formal sector activities. To reiterate, the broad characteristics of what is now termed urban © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6_2

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economic informality were common in pre-capitalist cities everywhere. It was the mass emergence of formal sector activities in cities affected by the Industrial Revolution and capitalist mode of production which was new; eventually these came to be understood (in Europe and North America) as the norm and the next step was to depict the older types of work and employment as different (informal). In Africa such economic activities can be traced to the precolonial and preindustrial periods (Onyebueke and Geyer 2011; Gerry 1987). But, it is important to note that the urban history of Africa is variable in terms of the fact that there are some cities which are old and others which are relatively young. A case in point is West Africa, which between 1200 and 1800 had relatively well-developed urban centres (Fourchard 2005). The implication on the economic activities under discussion is that, even though the phenomenon has a long history in Africa its development and patterns across the continent’s cities are not the same. For example, in what is now called Ghana and Nigeria, these economic activities were well developed; for instance, the Igbos in South East Nigeria engaged in economic activities, such as trade and manufacturing before the region was colonised (Onyebueke and Geyer 2011). Consequently, when these West African regions were colonised, the urban economic activities which were now seen to be informal were well established and it was difficult to tame or bring them under control by the colonial administrators. Regarding the historical variability in urban development in Africa, the point worth emphasizing is that, in those parts of Africa, in which urban development was limited or non-existent and the colonizers were the first to establish towns and cities, it means that even if informal economic activities existed, they were easy to discipline, if nothing else disrupt, using European planning codes. And this seems to be the case in Southern Africa, in which colonial conquest effectively led to the growth of towns. Many examples abound, such as Harare in Zimbabwe, whose origins are directly linked to the British colonization. This came into effect when the colonial white settlers hoisted the Union Jack flag on a hill in September 1890 and named it Fort Salisbury (Good 1973) and the city which grew thereafter was called Salisbury until independence in 1980. The hoisting of the Union Jack flag at Fort Salisbury was followed by the spatial growth and planning of the city which was modelled along the British cities (Zinyama 1993; Zinyama et al. 1993). The same can be said of Bulawayo, the second largest city in Zimbabwe, which was built on the ruins of the Ndebele kingdom, after a fierce battle, following which the British raised the Union Jack flag above the Ndebele king’s tree of justice in November 1893 (Ncube 2020). What followed thereafter is essentially a city which was planned along the British standards. Likewise, many South African cities also developed after colonial conquest. A case in point is Johannesburg, which initially grew as a result of the discovery of gold in the 1880s, which led to a booming mining industry and economy which sustained further growth of the city (Beavon 2004). This essentially means that, the planning standards which were followed were European and over the years, the city became divided because of colonial and apartheid policies which produced a divided city (Beavon 2004). Another example is that of Durban, which was first named Rio de Natal, in December 1497 by Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama. But the area was

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effectively colonised by the British in 1824 who named it Port Natal. In 1835, the Port Natal was named Durban after the governor of the Cape Colony Sir Benjamin D’Urban (EThekwini Municipality 2011). The planning and growth of the Durban city is therefore clearly linked to the British colonial conquest of the area. It is worth noting that regulations against informality in economic activities were in existence in most of colonial Africa; they just were not enforced in the very vigorous way (for example in Zambia, the controls were not being enforced successfully because there was no sufficient determination or resources made available from the colonial government to stop informality emerging and in Botswana, urban informality was present although the urban population was tiny and in the huge agro-villages like Serowe most non-farming activity were informal for example small retail training) typical of white minority ruled South Africa and Zimbabwe. Thus, within the planned and formal areas of the city (including townships which were built and maintained by the government) there were indeed strict rules which were implemented, making these areas very different from other African cities. However, concerning some types of informality such as housing, there were periods in these countries when informal housing was common in many urban areas. This was periodically clamped down upon and eventually controlled fairly successfully for a few decades, but in South Africa in particular, in the years before democracy was achieved these informal settlements became increasingly common again as controls on migration became impossible to maintain; in South Africa they were abolished in 1986 as a result of the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activities Act [Act No 87 of 1986] (RSA 1986). In such settlements it was extremely difficult to prevent informal activities and so these also developed. Thus, although during the colonial period in South African and Zimbabwean cities, urban informality was strictly regulated in line with the preservation of standards of the modern European city, this was not always successful. The expectation was that, urban economic informality would finally dissipate and/or be integrated into the formal sector (Furnivall 1939, 1941; Boeke 1942, 1961; Lewis 1954). For example, in Zimbabwe, various legislative apparatuses stifled the growth of urban economic informality. These include the Town and Planning Act of 1946, the Vagrancy Act of 1960, the Urban Councils Act of 1973 and the Vendors and Hawkers Bylaws of 1973 (Chirisa 2009; Gumbo 2013). However, this began to change around 1975 when the Rhodesian economy was negatively impacted by the liberation war, necessitating a relaxation on the restrictions on the urban economic informality (Gumbo and Geyer 2011). On this basis, Davies, (1978), states that, by the late 1970s, the informal sector in many cities in the then Rhodesia actually employed a significant number of people. In South Africa, although urban economic informality predates the 1994 democratic dispensation, (Rogerson 1996; Geyer 2009), it was also limited and legally restricted to White people, based on various pieces of legislation such as the Urban Areas Act of 1945 which enforced this status (Geyer 1989; Hart and Rogerson 1989). This explains why urban economic informality was developed in a limited way before 1994 (Rogerson 1996; Geyer 2009); for example, informal enterprises in Johannesburg numbered less than 300 in 1979–1980 (Manning 1993, cited in Rogerson 1996).

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2.2 Urban Informality in Post-Independence Southern African Cities Different country experiences in the Southern African region suggest that, it was only in the post-independence period that urban informality increased. There are many reasons which account for this and they appear to vary from one country to the other. Starting with Zambia, the significant growth in urban informality can be explained by the decline in the economic performance of the country after independence. In fact, “Zambia has experienced serious economic decline since the mid-1970s. A combination of extremely negative terms of trade, and being landlocked in a region where the death throes of white settlerdom and the subsequent destabilization of black-ruled southern African countries imposed huge restrictions and costs on its transport for decades, did indeed ‘transform’ its economy, but in quite a different direction from that supposed under ‘modernization’” (Potts 2005: 3). In particular, the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) sponsored Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs) such as reduction in government spending, devaluation of the currency; price and wage deregulation and trade liberalisation did not resuscitate the Zambian economy as anticipated (Potts 2005; Mubita et al. 2017). For example, the reduction in government spending and the privatisation of parastatals resulted in loss of jobs and massive retrenchments, the affected people of whom joined the informal sector, particularly in many urban areas (Mubita et al. 2017). The impact of the SAPs on the Zambian economy in terms of loss of the formal jobs and the growth of urban informality is shown by that, the percentage of people in formal employment in towns and cities decreased from “24% to 10% between 1980 and 1990” and those involved in the informal sector increased by “49% between 1986 and 1993 whilst formal sector employment fell by 7%. Formal mining employment fell by 7% from 54,400 to 50,700, formal manufacturing jobs by 8.5% from 59,900 to 54,800, formal utility jobs by 40% and formal construction jobs by 47%” (Potts 2005: 8). But, beyond these structural economic issues, Mubita et al (2017), has advanced the view that, the Zambian government policy and the regulatory frameworks have also played an important role in the growth of urban informality. For example, Mubita et al, (2017) notes that, the Zambian government generally has a positive attitude towards and plays a supportive role of the informal sector. And it recognises the role it plays in among others, poverty reduction and securing livelihoods. In this regard, the government has implemented policy frameworks in an effort to enhance this sector. There are several of these measures, including Small Industries Development Act (1980s and 1990), Commercial Trade and Industrial policy (1991–1995), Small Enterprises Development Act (1996–2005). From 2006 to date, the following have been enacted; Zambia Development Agency Act, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy of 2009, The CEE Act, TEVET Act (Mubita et al. 2017). The intention of all these policies and Acts range from providing infrastructure and financially assisting the informal economic sector to capacity building. The question

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of whether or not these policies have worked is beyond scope of the present contribution, suffice to say that, the intention was to briefly discuss the factors which explain the growth of the urban informal economic sector in Zambia after independence. As for Zimbabwe, the dawn of independence had varying consequences on the informal sector, which are well documented (see e.g. Stoneman 1992; Dhemba 1999; Brett 2005; Gumbo and Geyer 2011; Gumbo 2013; Moyo 2018; Average 2019; Mkandawire 2020). In fact, Brett (2005) has provided a historical and political economic analysis of the transformation in Zimbabwe and how this had impacts on urban informality, among other consequences. In this regard, the historical and politico-economic overview of Zimbabwe can be divided into three phases which are, first, the corporatist socialist ideology phase (1980–1989), second, the era of neoliberal economic ideology (1990–1997), third, the return to restrictionism and reign of predatory politics and the “political economy of disorder” (1998–present) (Chabal and Daloz 1999, cited in Brett 2005: 91). The first phase was characterised by that, after inheriting and maintaining a “corporatist policy regime that had been created by its settler based predecessor”, in 1980, the government of Zimbabwe also added a socialist redistributive element to it (Brett 2005: 95). Although Brett (2005) states that, these policies failed to grow the economy, Stoneman (1992), has convincingly shown that, the left nationalist policies were relatively successful, given the challenges which faced the country, such as apartheid South Africa’s destabilisation policies which led to significant expenditure on defence, drought and the withdrawal of international aid. In addition, Zimbabwe’s economic growth was higher than the African average during the 1980s which displeased the World Bank, because the country’s economy was performing better, despite the fact that it had not adopted World Bank and IMF policies. This led to a concerted effort by the World Bank and other international funders to undermine Zimbabwe’s economic efforts and indeed its success, in the form of blocking development aid, for example. This set the scene for the World Bank and IMF imposition of its policies on Zimbabwe. But, it was the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), coupled with external pressure from the World Bank and internal factors like corruption in Zimbabwe, which necessitated the country to implement the Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990 (Stoneman 1992). Even at this, Zimbabwe tried to adopt a cautious approach. For example, when ESAP began, the World Back had promised limited conditionalities and a Zimbabwean managed trade liberalisation programme which protected local industries and poor people. But, after one year six months, this never happened, with the result that, Zimbabwe was in financial need and therefore “cornered” to accept IMF aid conditionalities, like devaluing the currency and trade liberalisation, which had negative consequences on the economy (Stoneman 1992). In this sense, Stoneman’s (1992) analysis exposes the nuances in Zimbabwe’s adoption of the ESAP—that the country was pressured and locked into the World Bank and IMF aid conditionalities as opposed to a failure of the left nationalist policies which the Zimbabwean government had followed between 1980 and 1990. Mkandawire (2020) characterises these complexities and nuances as the Zimbabwean transition overload, in an attempt to illuminate that Zimbabwe’s political economy in the period after

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independence, particularly its descent into an economic quagmire is multifaceted, if nothing else, multi-layered. Despite the divergence of views between authors like Stoneman (1992) and Brett (2005) around the performance of the Zimbabwean economy in the 1980s and how and why ESAP was adopted, there is a general consensus that ESAP had disastrous impacts on the economy. These included declining economic growth to levels which can only be described as disastrous, at least, such as among others, decreasing industrial production, leading to the closures of industries, retrenchments and unemployment which pushed many people to join urban informality (Dhemba 1999). These consequences provided a breeding ground for the growth of opposition political movements such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (see Brett 2005; Kamete 2006). This had implications on the power of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and the government, in that, the rise and popularity in opposition political parties actually indicated that they were losing support. This is why the ruling party ZANU–PF and the government then invoked predatory politics and the politics of disorder so as to maintain power (Brett 2005). But, as will be shown below, the invocation of predatory politics and politics of disorder further shattered the economy and left it in tatters, again raising a number of many unemployed people in Zimbabwe, who joined the urban informal sector. The predatory politics and the politics of disorder that the Zimbabwean government engaged in towards the end of the 1990s, suggests that Zimbabwe had entered a period or “a zone of indistinction. This is a space set outside human jurisdiction where the frontiers between the rule of law and chaos disappear, decisions about life and death become entirely arbitrary, and everything becomes possible. The descent into indistinction is marked by an unprecedented degree of torture, mutilation, and mass killing” (Mbembe 2002: 267). This was demonstrated in “ZANU-PF’s most militant, often virulent strain of nationalist demagoguery, attempting as time ran out to simultaneously ‘solve’ the long-standing distribution problem, terrorise supporters of the opposition, and pass the buck for its own failings to, variously, the country’s small white population, foreign countries (especially Britain and the US), imperialism in general and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular” (Bond 2001: 59). The totality of all this chaos has been characterised as Mugabeism which is a representation “of many issues and its operation as a nest of contradictions is part of its character and survival strategy, through totalising and articulation of various longings, demands and claims of different constituencies either as aspects of decolonisation or as a politics of victimhood and redemption” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 1154). As the preceding, shows, the predatory politics and the politics of disorder took many forms. A few examples will be discussed in this chapter and they include the 1997 decision, to pay gratuities to War Veterans, so as to pacify them and ensure that they continued to support ZANU–PF (Musemwa 2011). Another was participation in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), so as to assist in fighting rebels against Laurent Kabila’s government (Johwa 2004). In this war, there have been suggestions that top Zimbabwean government officials and military elites benefitted by looting mineral resources in the DRC. This happened at the expense of the Zimbabwean economy, which was already

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crumbling, which means the war worsened and/or accelerated the disintegration. This, because it cost about a billion United States Dollars (US Dollars) (Johwa 2004). Therefore, payment of gratuities to War Veterans and participation in the DRC war, demonstrated fiscal indiscipline which “drained the already dwindling national treasury and led to unprecedented inflation and poor economic performance” and thus forcing many people to join the informal sector (Gumbo and Geyer 2011: 55). In addition, predatory politics and the politics of disorder also manifested in the violent land reform programme, which also weakened the economy (Raftopoulos 2006), because most industries linked to agriculture closed down leading to unemployment and general economic collapse (Fontein 2009). The point we are making here is that, the political economy of disorder shattered the economy into smithereens, leading to many people joining the informal sector. Further, there are views that, predatory politics and the politics of disorder have continued in Zimbabwe. A case in point is the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 2007, which on paper was designed to benefit Zimbabweans, but in practice is an institutionalised system of patronage designed to maintain the ZANU– PF government in power, without real benefit to the people (Moyo and Moyo 2015). It is on this basis that, from 1998, up to now, as the Zimbabwean government has faced mounting opposition, it has invoked “increasingly contradictory attempts to satisfy the demands of a growing number of stakeholders with very contradictory needs” (Brett 2005: 95). This generated tensions and the collapse of the economy (Brett 2005) leading to many people engaging in the informal economic sector (Gumbo and Geyer 2011; Moyo 2018). What is striking is that, the ouster of President Robert Mugabe in a coup d’état, in November 2017, does not seem to have improved the political and economic conditions for many people in Zimbabwe. Indeed, the coup was followed by elections in July 2018, in which Emmerson Mnangagwa emerged as president of Zimbabwe, but many Zimbabweans feel that many things have not changed (Mataranyika 2018). Differently stated, the predatory politics and politics of disorder have mutated and taken other forms and the elites are not concerned about the material conditions of people, but power. As a result, the economic and political conditions have degenerated into levels which are relatively similar to those during the reign of Robert Mugabe. This is manifested by shortages of money in banks, fuel shortages as well as the limited and erratic supply of some basic commodities, among others (Mataranyika 2018). This demonstrates that the economy is not properly functioning as many people continue to be unemployed, which has forced them to join urban informality so as to earn a living. In South Africa, it was the relaxation of apartheid laws between 1986 and 1991, that urban informality by black South African nationals made an impact in South African cities. As a result, there was increased in-migration which occurred in the few years before 1994 after influx controls ended and apartheid was evidently coming to an end (Crankshaw and Parnell 2002). The other increased migration by black South African citizens into the city such as Johannesburg so as to engage in informal economic activities occurred after 1994 as a result of the democratic dispensation and the accompanying deracialisation of urban areas (Rogerson 1996; Rogerson and Rogerson 1996, 1997). Indeed, Rogerson (1996, 1997), has shown that, there

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are other factors which explain this development. First, is the failure of the formal economy to absorb all job seekers in the labour market. At a national level, this has been linked to government policies such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The objective of the RDP programme was to broadly establish a more equal society through the reconstruction development of the nation, as well as by strengthening democracy in the country. The RDP can be seen as a tool used by the post-1994 government to strengthen the social contract it entered with its citizens. The programme was aimed at redressing the social, economic and spatial inequalities inherited from apartheid (Corder 1997). The RDP is mainly criticised for not achieving its economic development goals of massive job creation in the formal economy. However, it is applauded for introducing intensive welfarism in the country as was necessary to achieve its social development goals aimed at bridging gaps created by the apartheid regime. The above outcome of the RDP programme coupled with an increasing number of labour force entering the labour market in an economy whose job creation did not match the labour force led to the growth of the informal economy. In other words, the failure of the formal economy to absorb many people led to the growth in urban informality (Rogerson 1996, 1997; Rogerson and Rogerson 1996, 1997). As Lewis (2001) notes, by 1996, the new government of South Africa was faced with problems of high inflation, declining GDP growth, and a large fiscal deficit; coupled with the shortcomings of the RDP, the government introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro framework in 1997. The rationale behind GEAR was to restore people’s confidence in the government and to enhance the credibility of the same. Therefore, the framework built upon the strategic vision set out in the RDP. By the GEAR, the government committed itself to specific macro targets which included a plan to phase fiscal deficit. Although the implementation of the GEAR framework is often credited for achieving tangible results such as reduction in the central budget deficit from 10 percent to less than 3 percent of GDP, a fall in inflation and a rise in foreign exchange reserves, it is also criticized for pushing for global competitiveness, a drive whose downturn can be explained through the stagnation of the employment of low skilled workers thus leading to increased rates of unemployment and social exclusion of large sections of the economically active population (Plagerson et al. 2019: 3) and this led to the growth of the informal economy. It is in this context, that it has been argued that, the post-apartheid South African socio-economic development policies was never matched with increased employment (Plagerson et al. 2019). The failure of the formal economy has been characterised by retrenchments and economic recessions, which has pushed significant numbers of South African into the informal economy. A study by Funani et al (1994), cited in Rogerson (1996) noted that in the mid-1990s, many South Africans entered into the informal economy out of necessity than choice owing to the failure of the formal economy to absorb all job seekers and or retain those that were employed and became victims of retrenchments. This view is echoed by Aardt et al (2008); Hewitt (2011), who observe that currently South Africans become entrepreneurs because they cannot obtain formal employment.

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Second, is the informalisation of the formal economy (Rogerson 1996; Rogerson and Rogerson 1996). This has involved the development of linkages between the formal and informal economy in the sense that; “formal work is increasingly displaced by jobs in unregistered plants, by contractors and by homework. The advantages of contracting work to microenterprise producers are to circumvent labour regulation and to lower labour costs” (Rogerson 1996: 176; Rogerson and Rogerson 1997: 89). These economic activities are well developed in the inner city regions, which led Rogerson (1996), Rogerson and Rogerson (1996, 1997), to advance the metropolis incubator theory in relationship to Johannesburg inner city. This theory borrows from the work by Lee (1989, 1983), who argues that inner city areas provide a locational environment for the formation and growth of small enterprises and the informal economy. Therefore, in the context of Johannesburg inner city, this suggests that, the area is an incubator for informal activities (Rogerson and Rogerson 1997). This is the zone where different types of urban informal activities are booming, from survivalist, to micro and small enterprises (Rogerson and Rogerson 1997).

2.3 Reflections on the Historicity of Urban Informality In our brief attempt to historicize urban informality in selected Southern African cities, several themes emerged. One issue, which has come to the fore is that informality can only exist relationally (to formality). For instance, there is evidence that such economic activities existed in precolonial Africa and therefore, during the colonial era, although such activities were disrupted, they were by no means destroyed. This statement needs to be qualified in that, the development or lack of development of urban economic informality in precolonial Africa varied in resonance with the history of urban development. Areas with a long history of urban development such as those in West Africa had a well-developed informal economy which colonial conquest failed to tame. The same cannot be said about much of Southern Africa, such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, in which significant urban development was a direct product of colonial conquest leading to colonial planning laws which did not recognise and thus suppressed or outlawed these economic activities. This is why in Southern African cities such as those in South Africa and Zimbabwe, urban informality was stifled and/or disrupted by colonial and in some cases by racist regulatory regimes. This logic of the colonial enterprise is not surprising, because it fitted nicely to the colonizers’ objective of suppressing the development of black African enterprise which was seen or perceived to be threat to the establishment (Potts 2005). This suppression did not completely eradicate urban informality as it continued under the radar of the state. But, what is particularly striking about urban informality in this environment is that, it was integrated to the formal sector. For example, some of the black people who were involved in informal economic activities bought their goods from formal businesses (Hansen 1980; Menyah 2009). This shatters the dualist perspective of urban informality, which assumes that these economic

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activities were separate and that, the informal sector would soon diminish and cease to exist (Furnivall 1939, Furnivall 1941; Boeke 1953; Lewis 1954; Geertz 1963). This limitedness, if nothing else, fallacy of the dualist perspective on urban informality has been made by several other scholars (see e.g. Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Potts 2005; Roy 2005) and it is repeated here for the sake of emphasis. On the factors that have led to the growth of the informal sector in postindependence Southern African cities like those in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the prominent ones include the changing political and economic ideologies. Several cities demonstrate this, for instance, Zambia attained independence in 1964 and this led to a new era in which the colonial laws where changed and this allowed many black Africans to migrate to towns and cities and also start informal enterprises (Hansen 1980; Mubita et al. 2017). Similar patterns unfolded in Zimbabwe in 1980, when the colonial laws were repealed and thus allowing many black people to migrate to and live in cities and those who could not get employed generally resorted to the informal sector (Dhemba 1999; Gumbo and Geyer 2011). In South Africa as well, the demise of apartheid resulted in the deregulation of urban space leading to the growth of urban informality particularly that which was owned by black people (Rogerson 1996; Rogerson and Rogerson 1996, 1997). Focusing on Johannesburg, Rogerson (1996, 1997), has shown that the informalisation of the formal economy has significantly contributed to the growth of urban economic informality. This demonstrates two issues; first is that, urban informality is inextricably linked to the formal sector and this undermines the dualist explanations of this phenomenon as discussed in the preceding sections in this chapter. Secondly, that, urban informality is not a sector in which, only poor people engage. This is precisely because even big formal businesses can sometimes take advantage of this sector by informalising their business. This is aptly demonstrated by big formal businesses in Johannesburg inner city who engage in informality so as to bypass government regulations and in the process realise big profits (Rogerson 1996, 1997). The case of formal businesses informalising their operations is a clear case of their incentivising urban informality, which means that these two economies are not only not separated but linked in deeply intricate ways (Banks et al. 2020). The same can also be said about political and economic developments that have occurred in some Southern African countries and how these have had implications on urban informality. For example, the introduction of SAPs in Zambia and ESAP in Zimbabwe. Further, the invocation of predatory politics and the politics of disorder in Zimbabwe from the late 1990s to the present seem to suggest that, urban informality is a complex politico-economic issue more than it is a sector, setting or outcome (Banks et al. 2020). This, to the extent that, in the Zambian and Zimbabwean examples in the foregoing, we see the interface of different factors and actors, including both formal companies, the rich people and urban poor.

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2.4 Conclusion The intention in this chapter was to foreground the already known fact that urban economic informality has a long history and more so that, this long history is variable and contingent on the extent of precolonial or pre-industrial urban development in Africa. In the case of post-apartheid South Africa and post-independence Zimbabwean cities, the conditions which have led to the proliferation of urban informality or the causes of this phenomenon seem to point to a combination of the dynamism of ideological and politico-economic factors and processes within and those external to these states. For example, in South Africa, it is the post-1994 democratic dispensation and deracialisation of the city, which has led to an increase in urban informality. This was accompanied by the movement out of the city centre by whites, which opened up space for informal economic activities by black South African nationals (Rogerson 1997). But urban informality is not only limited to the city centres but also other parts of cities like Soweto and Khayelitsha in South Africa and Mbare (and other parts) in Harare and several parts of Bulawayo in Zimbabwe. In addition, the economic development/problems in terms of the incapacity of the formal economy to employ people or deliberate efforts by the so called formal businesses to take advantage of the informal economy has significantly contributed to the growth of the informal economy in South Africa in a city like Johannesburg (Rogerson 1996, 1997; Rogerson and Rogerson 1996, 1997; Ihenduru 1998). And these are diametrically opposed to what obtained during the Industrial Revolution in England for example. These different historical moments and their implications on urban informality is different and therefore the generalisations about urban informality in developed countries of Western Europe and North America cannot be applied to Africa or the Global South. Not only are such generalisations in themselves flawed, but they cannot fully explain the African circumstances of urban informality. Thus, the point we are making is that these generalisations were thought up in the Global North but do not make sense for anywhere (not just Africa). A case in point is the dualist framework which posits that urban informality is a backward economic activity which is separate from the formal economic sector and in the process of time should phase out (Furnivall 1939; Furnivall 1941; Boeke 1953; Lewis 1954; Geertz 1963). As the examples from South African, Zambian and Zimbabwean cities have shown, this is too simplistic and glosses over a complex reality around the intricate networks and connections between urban informality and the so called formal sector. And in some cases, the formal sector in the form of big and rich companies and/or individual representing them, actually incentivise or sponsor urban informal activities. They do this, for several reasons such as avoiding government regulations or taking advantage of the “rules” of/in the informal sector and thus making profit beyond the gaze of the state. For these reasons, we reiterate in this chapter that, urban informality in Southern African and Zimbabwean cities is a complex politico-economic process or phenomenon, which is deeply embedded in the political economy of states in an enduring way. As Roy (2005), have correctly observed,

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urban informality can and should be regarded and seen as the mode of urbanisation in the Global South.

References Aardt IV, Aardt C, Bezuidenhout S, Mumba M (2008) Entrepreneurship and new venture management, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Cape Town Average C (2019) Contestations for urban space: informality and institutions of disenfranchisement in Zimbabwe—the case of Masvingo City. Geo Journal. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-019-100 22-4 Banks N, Lombard M, Mitlin D (2020) Urban informality as a site of critical analysis. J Dev Stud 56(2):223-238 Beavon K (2004) Johannesburg: the making and shaping of the city. University of South Africa Press, Pretoria Boeke JH (1942) The structure of the Netherlands Indian economy. Institute of Pacific Relations, New York Boeke JH (1953) Economics and economic policy of dual societies as exemplified by Indonesia. International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York Boeke JH (1961) Indonesian economics: the concept of dualism in theory and policy. W van Hoeve, The Hague Bond P (2001) Radical rhetoric and the working class during Zimbabwean nationalism’s dying days. J World-Syst Res 7(1):52–89 Brett EA (2005) From corporatism to liberalisation in Zimbabwe: economic policy regimes and political crisis, 1980–97. J Int Polit Sci Rev 26(1):91–106 Chirisa I (2009a) The geography of informal economic sector operations (ISOs): a perspective of urban Zimbabwe. J GeogrReg Plan 2:66–79 Corder CK (1997) The reconstruction and development programme: success or failure? Soc Indic Res 41:183–203 Crankshaw O, Parnell S (2002) Urban change in South Africa. Urban Change Working Paper 4. IIED, London Davies R (1978) The informal economic sector. A solution to unemployment. Mambo Press, Gweru Dhemba J (1999) Informal sector development: a strategy for alleviating urban poverty in Zimbabwe. J Soc Dev Afr 14(2):5–19 EThekwini Municipality (2011) Introduction to the history of Durban. https://www.durban.gov. za/Discover_Durban/History_Communities/Durban_History/Pages/Introduction_to_the_His tory_of_Durban.aspx. Accessed 23 Mar 2020 Fontein J (2009) Anticipating the Tsunami: rumours, planning and the arbitrary state in Zimbabwe. Africa 79(3):370–398 Fourchard L (2005) African urban history: past and present perspective. Lagos Hist Rev 5:1–21 Funani L, Zobani S, Ndlovu J (1994) Micro-enterprises and support services in the PWV Area. Unpublished report for the EU Micro-Enterprise Sector Study Furnivall J (1939) Netherlands India: a study of plural economies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Furnivall J (1941) Progress and welfare in Southeast Asia: a comparison of colonial policy and practice. Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York Geertz C (1963) Peddlers and princes: social change and economic modernization in two Indonesian towns. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Gerry C (1987) Developing economies and the informal sector in historic perspective. Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci 493(1):100–119

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Geyer HS (1989) The integration of the formal and informal urban sectors in South Africa. Dev South Afr 6:29–42 Geyer HS (2009) Notes on spatial-structural change in urban South Africa-The 1990s. J Urban Reg Anal 1:27–39 Good RC (1973) UDI: the international politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion. Princeton University Press, Princeton Gumbo T (2013) On ideology change and spatial and structural linkages between formal and informal economic sectors in Zimbabwean cities (1981–2010). PhD Thesis, Stellenbosch University Gumbo T, Geyer M (2011) Picking up the pieces: reconstructing the informal economic sector in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. J Town Reg Plan 59:53–64 Hansen KT (1980) The urban informal sector as a development issue: poor women and work in Lusaka Zambia. Urban Anthropol 9(2):199–225 Hart DM, Rogerson CM (1989) Towards accommodationist planning in South Africa’s secondary centres: the case of Hawker deregulation. Dev South Afr 6:161–172 Hewitt G, Van der Bank J (2011) Entrepreneurship defined. In: Hewitt M, Bezuidenhout S (eds) Entrepreneurship and new venture management, 4th edn. Oxford University Press, Cape Town, pp 3–14 Ihenduru I (1998) Black entrepreneurship in post-apartheid South Africa. In: Spring A, MacDade BE (eds) African entrepreneurship: theory and reality. University Press of Florida, Gainesville, p 69–92 Johwa W (2004) Zimbabwe’s secret war in the DRC. https://mg.co.za/article/2004-09-11-zimbab wes-secret-war-in-the-drc. Accessed 4 Mar 2017 Kamete AY (2006) The return of the jettisoned: ZANU PF’s crack at re-urbanising in Harare. J South Afr Stud 32:255–271 Lee K (1983) Decentralisation trends of employment and spatial policies in LDC cities. Discussion Paper, No 20. World Bank Urban Development Department, Washington, DC Lee K (1989) The location of jobs in a developing metropolis: patterns of growth in Bogota and Cali, Colombia. Oxford University Press, New York Lewis WA (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour. Manchester School 22:139–191 Lewis JD (2001) Policies to promote growth and employment in South Africa, trade and industry policy strategies. World Bank Mataranyika M (2018) Zimbabwe’s economy is worsening. City Press. https://www.fin24.com/Eco nomy/zimbabwes-economy-is-worsening-20180923-2. Accessed 15 Mar 2019 Mbembe A (2002) African modes of self-writing. Public Culture 14(1):239–273 Menyah D (2009) The informal sector revisited: Botswana’s developmental state and microenterprise development. PhD Thesis, The University of Minnesota. https://conservancy.umn.edu/ bitstream/handle/11299/58643/Menyah_umn_0130E_10844.pdf?sequence=1. Mkandawire T (2020) Zimbabwe’s transition overload: an interpretation. J Contemp Afr Stud. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2020.1746751 Moyo I (2018) Resistance and Resilience by Informal Traders in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: beyond Weapons of the Weak. Urban Forum 29(3):299–313 Moyo G, Moyo I (2015) The shadow of leadership and the state of the economy in Zimbabwe: beyond the cloak of economic nationalism. Paper presented at the UJ/SAAPS Colloquium Conference: progress or Stagnation: Quo Vadis Southern African Politics? 31 August–1 September 2015, Hosted by the UJ Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg’s APK Campus, Johannesburg, South Africa Mubita A, Mulonda M, Libati M, Nawa SM, Kanyamuna V (2017) Urban Informality and Small Scale Enterprise (SME) Development in Zambia: an Exploration of Theory and Practice. J Behav Econ, Financ, Entrep, Account Transp 5(1):19–29 Musemwa M (2011) Reflection: Zimbabwe’s war veterans: from demobilisation to re-mobilisation. Transformation 75:122–131

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Ncube E (2020) Robert Mugabe, KCB: black supremacist. Xlibris, Bloomington Ndlovu-Gatsheni SJ (2009) Making Sense of Mugabeism in Local and Global Politics: ‘So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe.’ Third World Q 30(6):1139–1158 Onyebueke V, Geyer M (2011) The IES in urban Nigeria: reflections from almost four decades’ research. Town Reg Plan J 59:65–76 Plagerson S, Patel L, Hochfeld T, Ulriksen MS (2019) Social policy in South Africa: navigating the route to social development. World Dev 113:1–9 Potts D (2005) All my hopes and dreams are shattered: urbanisation and migrancy in an imploding African economy: the case of Zimbabwe. Geoforum 37:536–551 Raftopoulos B (2006) The Zimbabwean crisis and the challenges for the left. J South Afr Stud 32(2):203–209 Rogerson C (1996) Urban poverty and the informal economy in South Africa’s economic heartland. Environ Urban 8(1):167–179 Rogerson M (1997) International migration, immigrant entrepreneurs and South Africa’s small enterprise economy. Migration Policy Series, No 3. IDASA, Cape Town Rogerson C, Rogerson J (1996) The metropolis as incubator: small scale enterprise development in Johannesburg. GeoJournal 39:33–40 Rogerson C, Rogerson J (1997) The changing post-apartheid city: emergent black owned small scale enterprises in Johannesburg. Urban Stud 34(1):85–103 Roy A (2005) Urban informality: toward an epistemology of planning. J Am Plan Assoc 71(2):147– 158 Roy A, AlSayyad N (eds) (2004) Urban informality: transnational perspectives from the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America. Lexington Books, Lanham, MD RSA (1986) Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activities Act No 87. Government Printers, Pretoria Stoneman C (1992) The World Bank Demands Its Pound of Zimbabwe’s Flesh. Rev Afr Polit Econ 53:94–96 Zinyama LM (1993) The evolution of the spatial structure of Greater Harare: 1890–1990. In: Zinyama LM, Tevera DS, Cumming SD (eds) Harare: the growth and problems of the city. University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare Zinyama LM, Tevera DS, Cumming SD (1993) Harare: the growth and problems of the city. University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare

Chapter 3

Modernity, Urban Planning and Informality

Abstract It has been a few decades after both South Africa and Zimbabwe attained independence, but sadly, colonial approaches still determine urban planning policy. These have continued to view urban informality as a spatialised aberrant, which deserve annihilation. This chapter discusses the nature of urban planning in South African and Zimbabwean cities and how such a planning practice is in conflict with the context in which it is being applied. This critical disjuncture between urban informality and planning creates sites for criminalisation, which does not help the cause of the urban poor, thus bringing to the fore urban planning and urban informality crisis in South African and Zimbabwean cities. Keywords Urban informality · Ideology · Modernity · Planning

3.1 Introduction From the early years of its emergence, urban planning was perceived as a spatial instrument for administrating order and organising space (the positivist rational process model) with a mandate characterised by a “unitary public interest”. Such a perception was held until the 1980s when a dissenting planning theory emerged, one that challenged the so called “unitary public interest” or anchor of urban planning by exposing the role that capital played in commanding planning activities through the state (Kamete 2013a: 641). Challenging the positivist rational process model of planning led planning to be criticised for defending and promoting the needs of the elites of society only, leaving behind the interests of the poor and going so far as excluding the poor in the process of administering order and of managing the urban space. As Kamete (2013a: 642) notes, planning serves the interests of the state and capital. This is evident in the negative response of planning to informal economic activities such as street trading in different cities in South Africa and Zimbabwe for example. These responses are often in the form of campaigns underscored by extreme approaches that deny “an economic and social resource to people who operate in public space” (Arias 2019: 1) as in the case of the City of Johannesburg’s Operation Clean Sweep “determined policy of displacement” (Lindell et al. 2013 cited in Arias 2019: 1). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6_3

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Taken together, this suggests that, the context within which urban planning unfolds has historical, socio-economic, political and environmental dimensions to it. In other words, urban planning “involves taking purposeful action to shape urban space and deploys policies, plans, and other tools in pursuit of specific ends and the logic that links those means and ends can be understood as a rationality” (Rivero et al. 2017: 174). Concerning the political context (current or historical) in which planning is operated, the legitimisation of planning is the first thing to be considered. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, and in those countries with functioning planning systems, urban planning legitimacy is provided by constitutional mandates given either to the local government (as is the case in South Africa) or to provincial government (as is the case in the Democratic Republic Congo) but in most of these cases, the central government plays a very controlling role in the undertaking of urban planning with the exception of South Africa where municipalities/local governments enjoy some degree of autonomy (see e.g. Republic of South Africa 1994, 1998a, b, 2000a, b, 2001). Further, legitimacy cannot be considered in isolation from rationality in regulations, rules, processes and procedures. Rationality involves determining and defining what should be acceptable and what should not be acceptable (Rivero et al. 2017). In the case of South Africa and Zimbabwe and Southern Africa in general, this is usually a function of political determinism deeply entrenched in modernist planning theory, technicality and practice. Therefore, determining what is acceptable is not always a product of free-will planning ingenuity fuelled by the socio-economic conditions on the ground such as the need to solve socio-spatial and economic problems that face societies in the most inclusive way. But rather, it is about determining what should be legitimate urban planning practice and outcome, which unfortunately, is to a large extent, a function of Eurocentric-inspired planning rationality (Kamete 2013b; Ngau 2014). Consequently, urban planning education in Africa can and should change so that the nature and extent of urban informality in African cities is specifically understood and embraced in planning practice (Ngau 2014). In this can be seen that the urban history of both South African and Zimbabwean cities is important, in terms of the extent to which entrenched Eurocentric models of planning which were imposed and enforced by the white minority settler regimes are still pervasive today. This is because of the inclination in urban planning towards modernist conservatism whereby planners (compelled by political power and the technicality of their knowledge) are always trying to catch up with the West or at least are always trying to preserve the order inherited from colonial planning practice (Watson 2009). For example, Zimbabwean urban centres were modelled according to British land use planning standards, and the colonial form and structures were mostly preserved particularly during the 1980s (Kamete 2006, 2007; Potts 2007, 2008). The colonial structures depicted the CBD as the hub of commercial activity (Hoyt 1939; Harris and Ullman 1945) in line with global modern urban structure and form. Land uses were separated, with the industrial sites located on the western sides of the cities and also close to the zone of working class people’s residential areas (Mann 1965). Strict centralised planning ensured the dominance and superiority of formal commercial businesses within the city centre (Burgess 1925).

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It should be remembered that, urban planning arose as a reformist and progressive societal project in response to the societal challenges created by the industrial city (Kamete 2007: 155). Since then planning has developed to become a tool for “social organization and political governance” (LeGates and Stout 2000: 299) and now with an inclination towards fulfilling a modernist agenda. The full implication of urban planning as a political, economic and social tool, among others, is that the urban planners and political elites who mimic their erstwhile European colonisers determine how the city is planned and the powerless or weak members like actors in the urban informal economy are excluded. For instance, if South African and Zimbabwean cities demonstrate a huge appetite to create modern and North American and European cities, there is bound to be exclusion of the informal economy. This is because of the different social, political, cultural and economic conditions in South African and Zimbabwean cities or indeed African cities to which European and North American urban planning standards are, as Kamete (2013b) argues unquestioningly applied. The nuances we are attempting to project here are that both South African and Zimbabwean cities’ urban planning was shaped by racist imperatives before the fall of apartheid in the former and independence in the latter. The implication of this is that, it was after the 1990s that neoliberal values within capitalism began to hold sway in either country’s urban planning. This shows that, while urban planners do indeed serve capitalism and the state, both of these do change over time. For example, during colonialism and apartheid in Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively, urban planners served the state (racist imperatives) and did not always serve capitalism well, although this is a matter of debate. This changed with the advent of majority rule in both countries as a result of the importance of the neoliberal paradigm in urban planning. Therefore, white minority ruled states in South Africa and Zimbabwe had different needs (even if they were racist) than subsequent majority-ruled states. In all this, the urban history as well as the political and economic developments (past and current) in both South Africa and Zimbabwe comes to bear in terms of impacting the trajectory of and the contestations that it generates around urban planning. Consequently, South African and Zimbabwean urban planning is characterised by neoliberal policies, processes and procedures, which have been enforced to the disadvantage of those who are considered not to belong to the city (Kamete 2013b). The implication of this is that, urban planning in this sense generates conflicts to the extent that “contestations arise when competing rationalities differ in their specification of goals and the means to achieve them” (Rivero, et al. 2017: 174).

3.2 The Exclusionary Nature of South African and Zimbabwean Urban Planning Regimes With increasing rates of urban unemployment coupled with haunting inherited planning systems (instrument of colonialism/segregation) and ideologies, South African and Zimbabwean cities among others in Southern Africa have now found themselves

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in a situation of ongoing planning crises (Chirisa 2009). This is because city planners continue to stick to conservative planning approaches instead of re-imagining a new way of doing planning which does not exclude informal livelihoods. The following observation on Cape Town is instructive in this respect, because: The City has a largely technocratic, functionalist and capital-based mentality that is driven by engineering standards which are in line with national policy documents, budgets, mandates and targets. Also, the City has modernist ideas of how cities should appear and function which has meant that the formalised settlements in Cape Town have not been designed with the largely social and cultural mentality of the residents in mind. While the City’s mentality, based on managerial and administrative systems and planning, seems wholly logical in its own right, and is seen to be based on best practice and sound planning principles, it unfortunately has unintended and negative outcomes for residents. (Massey 2014: 1)

All this shows the power of the past/colonial planning, in terms of a modernist outlook which favours formality at the expense of urban informality. Even in cases were there have been attempts to include urban informality, the underlying Eurocentric urban planning approach always prevails or disrupts such inclusive attempts. For example, some South African and Zimbabwean cities have attempted to integrate urban informality in their planning, but they are always restrained by their conservative approach to planning. This is demonstrated in the case of urban planning in Masvingo City, Zimbabwe, in which “there is space for informal integration in the city, but the existing regulatory framework is stifling the growth and development of the informal sector in the city of Masvingo” (Average 2019: 1). The same was evident in the early years of democracy in Johannesburg, South Africa with the passing of the Business Act in 1991, recognising street trading as a legitimate business activity. The act lifted the requirement for street vendors to hold licenses. Surprisingly, one year after the passing of the Business Act and the recognition of street traders, the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) was created as a means of supporting formal businesses leading to a “crack-down on illegal informal trade throughout the city” (Arias 2019: 3). The CJP led to the introduction of “City Improvement Districts (CIDs)”, a variation of the Canadian Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) (Arias 2019). These were a planning initiative referred to as “a geographic area within which property owners and/or tenants agree to pay for certain services supplementary to those supplied by the Local Authority and which will enhance the physical and social environment of the area” (CJP 2001 cited in Peyroux 2008: 138). The introduction of CIDs is an example of both the exclusionary and Eurocentric response of the South African urban planning to informal economic activities and street trading in particular. CIDs meant no informality was allowed in city improvement districts as informal economic activities in these areas would imply a decrease in property values for formal business actors. As a result, planning plays a protective role of the formal sector by approaching informality as an obstacle to the survival of modern capitalism and to the attainment of the modern city (Massey 2014). As a result, operating legislative instruments disenfranchise informal sector operators from their rights to the city. This practice of exclusion precludes the prospect of achieving sustainable development in city like that of Masvingo in Zimbabwe,

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because of its exclusion of pro-poor development initiatives (Average 2019). But, the impossibility of getting rid of urban informality, suggests the need for urban planning in South African and Zimbabwean cities to honestly and seriously integrate this phenomenon, than pretending that it is a peripheral phenomenon, which does not deserve full attention and consideration. Such a deception lies in the perception of or the desire for a city whose foundation is laid on the concept of formal order that cannot coexist with the “disorder” and spatial “unruliness” of informality (Kamete 2013b: 28). All this preference for the formal and orderly economy shows the historical continuities of Eurocentric urban planning even in the so called postcolonial states in both South Africa and Zimbabwe.

3.3 Urban Planning and the Vulnerability of Urban Informality Urban informality should not be perceived as a matter of non-conformity but as one of livelihoods. People involved in urban informality are excluded by urban planning and thus denying them the right to the city and the subsequent right to livelihoods. This makes urban informality vulnerable to abuse. The vulnerability of the urban poor is further exacerbated by authorities’ disinclination towards “serious and openminded reflection to grasp the peculiarities” of the city as lived and experienced by all inhabitants, even after attempts to deliver the “desired city” have failed time and time again (Kamete 2013b: 20). Instead of reviewing their approach to development and embracing the realities of their cities, city authorities implement restrictive and sometimes violent measures to restrain practices of informality. Thus, informality and the urban poor who operate in the sector are perceived as both “obstacles to the attainment of the desired city” and “threats to the little that has purportedly been gained” (Kamete 2013b: 20). Perhaps a good example out of several others of the response of cities and governments in Southern Africa to urban informality is that of Zimbabwe in the form of Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order, which was carried out in 2005. As the same suggests, the operation was about driving out the rubbish and/or cleaning Zimbabwean cities or restoring order (Potts 2006). The “campaign truly was ‘massive’nothing on this scale in such a short duration has ever been witnessed in urban Africa, not excluding apartheid South Africa- and spread right throughout the urban hierarchy from the capital city down to small ‘growth centres’ in communal areas. The government was as good, or rather as bad, as its word: the vast majority of the informal sector enterprises and trading locations and houses (and other buildings) that were destroyed had contravened some by-law or another although, as the condemnation of the campaign mounted, many were swift to point out that some ‘legal’ buildings were being destroyed too” (Potts 2006: 275). Given the brutality of the operation, the “the term ‘Operation Tsunami’ was also popular [by] local people because of the speed and ferocity of the exercise, which resulted in the destruction

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of houses, business premises and vending sites in Zimbabwe’s towns and cities” (Chibisa and Sigauke 2008: 39). However, the aim of Operation Murambatsvina, as presented by the government of Zimbabwe, was “to rid the country of illegal structures, crime, filthy stalls and squalor”. This resulted in the eviction of “thousands of people deemed to be illegal squatters country-wide, particularly in urban centres [so as to] restore order in the country since hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the 1970s war of independence had settled illegally in urban centres and commercial farms”. Some of the people who needed to the removed were “squatters and vagrants in Epworth, Mbare Musika and other parts of greater Harare” (Musiyiwa 2008: 65). From the description one can clearly see the obsession with modernism by the Zimbabwean government, which results in the exclusion and characterisation of that which does not conform to a modern city as filth deserving annihilation. This can be seen in the declaration by the Zimbabwean government that, the operation targeted “arresting disorderly or chaotic urbanisation including its health consequences; stopping illegal, parallel market transactions, especially foreign currency dealing and hoarding of consumer commodities in short supply; and reversing damages caused by agricultural practices” (United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat 2005, cited in Chibisa and Sigauke 2008: 39). Differently stated, the government of Zimbabwe perceived that, urban informality resulted in a disorderly city and by these means led to urbanisation that was chaotic. The chaos in urbanisation, in this respect was because of informality. The implication of this is that, orderly urbanisation is one where formality reigns supreme and this is informed by colonial and modernist urban planning precepts (Kamete 2013b). In the case of Zimbabwe, Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) led to total destruction of urban informality in that, a total of 92 460 housing structures were demolished, directly affecting 133,534 households. At the same time 32 538 premises/structures of small, micro and medium size enterprises were demolished as per government figures released on 7 July 2005. The UN Special Envoy, however, put the total figure of those who lost homes and businesses at 650 000 to 700 000 people and a total of 2.4 million people who were directly or indirectly affected by Operation Murambatsvina. (UN Habitat 2005; Ncube and Phillip 2006, cited in Chibisa and Sigauke 2008: 40)

In some Zimbabwean cities, the operation left many people destitute and homeless. For instance, in Mutare, a city which is close to the border between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, informal structures were reduced to the ground and different types of goods which were sold by the informal economic actors were either confiscated or destroyed as well. A case in point is “the demolition of Murahwa Green Market resulting in hundreds of informal traders being stranded” (Chibisa and Sigauke 2008: 40). Operation Murambatsvina can also be seen as constituting what Kamete and Lindell (2010) refer to as “non-planning interventions”. Non-planning interventions are spontaneous “sanitising measures” undertaken by cities, after planners have lost control of the urbanisation process and then feel the need to market their cities and project an image that can sell at the international level. As a result, the urban poor, who are always involved in activities and characterised by lifestyles that feed on

3.3 Urban Planning and the Vulnerability of Urban Informality

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informality, find themselves vulnerable to the lack of “comprehensive long-term planning and the consistent enforcement of planning codes” (Kamete and Lindell 2010: 911).

3.4 A Call to a New Turn in African Urban Planning With the stubborn commitment to holding fast to inherited planning approaches with their resulting planning crises in the face of increased urban informality as emanating from high rates of urbanisation, economic decline and political crises, it is becoming more clear that there is need to rethink and re-imagine planning theory and practice that would work in the South African and Zimbabwean contexts. In light of the above statement, Watson (2009) argues that cities have changed significantly over the three decades or so in both the Global North and South but changes in planning systems have not paralleled changes that have been experienced in cities, especially in the Global South where some have not changed but deteriorated instead. In addition, older forms of planning transferred to the Global South through colonialism and globalisation continue to persist and such forms/ideas of planning borrowed out of context constitute, in part, the reason behind the ongoing planning crises experienced in the global South and in Southern African cities in particular such as those of South Africa and Zimbabwe. This is particularly in relation to these cities’ inabilities to develop or conceptualise planning systems and processes that incorporate the realities on ground in responding to twenty-first century issues of increased informality (Watson 2009). This, then, can be said to constitute a call for a new turn in southern African urban planning and in African urban planning at large. Attempting a new turn in urban planning in the countries under consideration cannot be effectively done without acknowledging the fact that planning ideas from the Global North have been spread to the Global South and, in most cases, they continue to be adopted out of context. Another starting point should be the realisation that there is no need for the Global South to try and catch up with the planning ideals of the West (Watson 2009). Instead, there is need for understanding the contexts, that is socio-economic, political and environmental contexts, in which urbanisation is unfolding in the Global South, and particularly in southern Africa, as the starting point in introducing a new turn in southern African urban planning. In addition to this, borrowing planning ideas from the North should not be rejected completely, but this should be done with caution as those ideas emerged out of the need to solve Western urban problems and not the southern ones. However, because of the emancipatory/regulation norm that characterise most Western planning ideas, borrowing such planning ideas should be preceded by a desire to place the emancipation of the urban poor at the centre of planning processes and systems in southern African urban planning (Watson 2009). Such an entry point to a new reality of South African and Zimbabwean urban planning would automatically require that modernist conservatism or conservatism of modernist urban planning be dealt away with as it constitutes a hindrance to

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inclusive innovative urban planning practices in the Global South. It also means that urban planning would no longer be negatively reactive and protective in the face of urban informality while trying to advocate for the achievement of a modernist utopia at the expense of the urban poor. Rather, the state’s vision of a desired city would be shaped in agreement with all urban inhabitants, taking into consideration everyone’s interests. This, even if it should mean that informality has to be accommodated while undertaking an urban emancipatory process that would improve peoples’ lives in the long run without sudden instances of destroying livelihoods of the urban poor. Further, in giving birth to a new turn in urban planning to suit the circumstances of countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is worth noting that there is increasing awareness among urban scholars about the fact that the “negative impacts of modernist urban planning on the poor” is not solely explained by “wrongly appropriated, misunderstood or inefficient planning systems” (Watson 2009: 177) but also the abuse of planning systems for political domination which has been a driving factor of the negative impacts of modernist urban planning on the poor, among other factors. For this reason, institutional reforms are deemed crucial to the new turn in urban planning. Institutional reforms referred to, here, are nothing less than reforms driven by shifts in power relations (Kamete 2011). An emphasis should also be put on transforming institutional cultures so as to embrace democratic values of transparency, accountability, participation, etc. in urban planning systems.

3.5 Conclusion In conclusion, this chapter has amplified the idea that urban planning in Africa and in southern Africa, in particular, is Eurocentric. This is precisely because of coloniality which is embedded in urban planning in the region and this is informed by the urban and colonial and racial histories of both South Africa and Zimbabwe. Cities in these countries grew as a result of European colonisation and city planning and growth did not include urban informality. This is codified in the colonial urban planning statutes, which have survived the end of direct colonialism. The said coloniality had led to urban informality being viewed as being not an integral part of the urbanisation process, but a spatialised aberrant, which deserve annihilation (Kamete 2013a, b). The chapter suggest that, this critical disjuncture between urban informality and planning creates sites for criminalisation, which does not help the cause of the urban poor and this illuminates the crisis of urban planning in Africa. On this basis, the argument was made that the colonial present in urban planning in Southern Africa needs to be decolonised. This was done by exposing the mismatch between the current practice of urban planning in southern Africa and the context in which planning is practised; a description which led to the unravelling of the exclusionary nature of urban planning and its associated vulnerability of the urban poor. This, especially when considering the conservative tendency that characterise urban planning with planners and politicians always seeking to materialise a desired city whose vision has been captured by a modernist sense of what a city should be

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while turning a blind eye to realities facing cities. Thus, this chapter advocated for a new turn in urban planning as a solution to resolving planning crises experienced in the countries under consideration.

References Arias J (2019) Informal vendors in Johannesburg, South Africa. Penn Institute for Urban Research. https://penniur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/05_Arias.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2020 Average C (2019) Contestations for urban space: informality and institutions of disenfranchisement in Zimbabwe—the case of Masvingo City. GeoJournal. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-019-100 22-4 Burgess E (1925) The graph of the city. In: Park R, Burgess E, McKenzie RD (eds) The city. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp 47–62 Chirisa I (2009) The geography of informal sector operations (ISOs): a perspective of urban Zimbabwe. J Geogr Reg Plan 2(4):66–79 Chibisa P, Sigauke C (2008) Impact of Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) on flea markets in Mutare: implications for achieving MDG1 and sustainable urban livelihoods. J Sustain Dev Afr 10(1):31–65 Kamete AY (2006) The return of the jettisoned: ZANU PF’s crack at re-urbanising in Harare. J South Afr Stud 32:255-–271 Harris JC, Ullman E (1945) The nature of cities. Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 242: 7–17 Hoyt H (1939) The structure and growth of residential neighbourhoods in American cities. Federal Housing Administration, Washington, DC Kamete AY (2007) Cold-hearted, negligent and spineless? Planning, planners and the (r)ejection of “filth” in urban Zimbabwe. Int Plan Stud 12(2):153–171 Kamete AY (2011) Interrogating planning’s power in an African city: time for reorientation? Planning Theory. 11(1):66–88 Kamete AY (2013a) Missing the point? Urban planning and the normalization of ‘pathological’ spaces in Southern Africa. Trans Inst Br Geogr 38(4):639–651 Kamete AY (2013b) On handling urban informality in Southern Africa. Georafiska Ann Ser B, Hum Geogr 95(1):17–31 Kamete AY, Lindell I (2010) The politics of ‘non-planning’ interventions in African cities: unravelling the international and local dimensions in Harare and Maputo. J South Afr Stud 36(4):889–912 LeGates RT, Stout F (2000) Modernism and early urban planning 1870–1940. In: LeGates RT, Stout F (eds) The city reader, 2nd edn. Routledge, New York Lindell I, Hedman M, Verboomen K (2013) The World Cup 2010, “world class cities”, and street vendors in South Africa. In: Hansen KT (ed) Street economies in the urban global south. School for Advanced Research Press, Santa Fe, New Mexico, pp 179–199 Massey RT (2014) Cape Town’s informal settlements the same, despite facelift, Groundup. https:// www.groundup.org.za/article/cape-towne28099s-informal-settlements-same-despite-facelift_ 1855/. Accessed 10 October 2019 Musiyiwa K (2008) Eschatology, magic, nature and politics: the responses of people of Epworth to the tragedy of Operation Murambatsvina. In: Vambe M (ed) The hidden dimensions of operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe. Weaver, Harare, pp 65–74 Ngau P (2014) For town and country: a new approach to urban planning in Kenya. Africa Research Institute, London Peyroux E (2008) City improvement districts in Johannesburg: an examination of the local variations of the BID model. In Business Improvement Districts. http://www.urban-improvement-districts. de/files/File/Peyroux_CID_Johannesburg.pdf Accessed 30 June 2020

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Potts P (2006) Restoring order? Operation Murambatsvina and the urban crisis in Zimbabwe. J South Afr Stud 32(2):273–291 Potts D (2007) The state and the informal in Sub-Saharan urban economies: revisiting debates on dualism. Cities and Fragile States, Crisis states working papers series 2. Working paper No 18. Crisis States Research Centre, London Potts D (2008) The urban informal economic sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: From bad to good (and back again). Dev South Afr 25:152–167 Republic of South Africa (1994) RDP white paper. Discussion document: provincial and local government. South African Parliament. CTP Book Printers, Cape Town Republic of South Africa (1998a) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No. 108 of 1996). https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act108of1996s.pdf. Accessed 20 Oct 2019 Republic of South Africa (1998b) White paper on local government (Notice 423 of 1998). Government Printer, Pretoria. http://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/whitep aper_on_Local-Gov_1998.pdf. Accessed 20 Oct 2019 Republic of South Africa (2000a) Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000). https://www.gov.za/ documents/local-government-municipal-systems-act. Accessed 20 Oct 2019 Republic of South Africa (2000b) Department of provincial and local government. A policy paper on integrated development planning. Department of Provincial and Local Government, Pretoria Republic of South Africa (2001) Batho Pele principles. Government Printer, Pretoria Rivero JJ, Teresa BF, West J (2017) Locating rationalities in planning: market thinking and its others in the spaces, institutions, and materials of contemporary urban governance. Urban Geography 38(2):174–176 UN-Habitat (United Nationals Human Settlements Programme) (2005) Global report on human settlements 2005—Financing Urban shelter. UN-HABITAT Watson V (2009) The planned city sweeps the poor away: urban planning and 21st century urbanisation. Prog Plan 72(3):151–193

Part II

Urban Informality Experiences from Selected South African and Zimbabwean Cities

Chapter 4

International Migrants and Urban Economic Informality in South African Cities

Abstract This chapter posits that, the political and economic development of South Africa and the former white minority apartheid regime, which collapsed in 1994 has contributed to the character of urban economic informality by international migrants in South African cities. This is precisely because, migration to South Africa after 1994 has been higher than any country in the Southern African region. This is clearly attributable to the political and economic developments of the country following fall of the apartheid regime in 1994. This, among others, created the general democratic conditions that led to the deracialisation of cities and the opening up of economic spaces and opportunities in cities, which attracted international migrants. As a result, the participation of international migrants in urban economic informality in South African cities is more pronounced. These developments are predicated on the general and broader historical and political and economic conditions and policies within the country and the region at large. The urban economic informality experiences within the Johannesburg inner city are discussed in this chapter. The case study demonstrates the nature and character of urban economic informality operated by international migrants and there is evidence that the activities vary based on the mixed embeddedness of city conditions, both political and economic. Keywords International migrants · Urban informality · South Africa

4.1 Context: International Migrants and Urban Informality The growth in the involvement of international migrants in urban economic informality in host countries and cities is a global phenomenon, characteristic of both developed and developing countries (Ram and Smallbone 2003 as cited in Parker 2009). A study of why there is the predisposition in international migrants to engage in the informal economy or to become entrepreneurs in host countries was pioneered by Light (1972). The author attempted to explain why some foreign migrant groups were more entrepreneurial than others. From the 1990s there has been a growth in such a related research, particularly focusing on among others; conditions for the © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6_4

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growth of migrant enterprises, cultural and structural factors (Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp 2009). In southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, there has been a growth of enterprises by international migrants. This has been facilitated by the existence of a thriving informal economy in these countries, which has provided a conducive environment for international migrants to start their businesses (Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp 2009). In other European cities, the growth of enterprises in the recent past which were formed by international migrants has occurred because of increased rates of migration, which in turn led to an expansion in the immigrant population in many European countries and a concomitant rise in the number of immigrant enterprises (Borjas 1986). Factors which explain this, include the fact that, international migrants were exposed to unemployment than the native population (Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp 2009) and also suffered discrimination in the labour and capital market, which forced them to engage in small scale business enterprises (Parker 2009; Blevis and Pezet 2012; Perret et al. 2012). As a result, there are many enterprises owned by migrants in many European countries like Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom. In Australia, the issue of discrimination in the labour market, leading to international migrants engaging in urban informality has also been recorded. This is demonstrated by a study by Collins and Low (2010) of 80 Asian female entrepreneurships in Australia. The majority of these had no previous experience and engaged in informal economic activities or similar enterprises after migrating to Australia. Involvement in these economic activities was influenced by non-recognition of foreign qualifications, language and accent, the total effect of which devalued the human capital of the international migrants. The study by Collins and Low (2010), illustrates that, “accent ceiling” was a barrier to employment and promotion in particular jobs because the Asian migrants in question were viewed as incapable of multilingual abilities and this led to the assumption that, they could not effectively communicate in a work environment. These actual and symbolic acts of discrimination and/or exclusion forced many Asian migrants to engage in urban informal economic activities, where the “accent ceiling” was not much of an issue or did not always negatively impact on the business of the international migrants.

4.2 The Rise of Urban Informality in South African Cities The increase in the number of international migrants in South Africa after the democratic dispensation in 1994 is well documented (see e.g. Manghezi 1998; Sinclair 1998, 1999; World Migration Report 2000; Adepoju 2010, 2003; Crush et al. 2006; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Landau 2005; Campell 2010; Moyo et al. 2016, 2017). In particular, the Immigration Act of 2002 (Act 13 of 2002) (RSA 2002) signalled a significant break from apartheid immigration laws to the extent that it generally encouraged immigration, particularly of skilled migrants (Crush et al. 2006; Peberdy 2009). Similarly, the successive immigration laws such as the Immigration Act of

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2004 (Act 19 of 2004) (RSA 2004), Immigration Amendment Act of 2007 (Act 3 of 2007) (RSA 2007), Immigration Amendment Act of 2011 (Act 13 of 2011) (RSA 2011) are assumed to encourage immigration to South Africa. However, it has been argued that, there is an underlying selectivity in the South African immigration policy to the degree that, there is preference for skilled at the expense of those who are not skilled (Peberdy 2009). And therefore, the assumption that after 1994 immigration to South Africa was easy or open is too simplistic as it glosses over realities of exclusion of migrants by the same immigration policies (Peberdy 2009; Moyo 2019). It is on this basis of that, the increase in the number of these migrants have been met with attempts by the South African state to limit such, but without any success (Peberdy 1998; Peberdy and Crush 1998; Peberdy and Rogerson 2000) and this has provided a site for undocumented migration into South Africa (see e.g. Moyo 2019). In any case, migration to South Africa for work was common and indeed encouraged by both apartheid South Africa and colonial authorities in sender countries within the southern African region, for over a hundred years before democracy was achieved. As long as they were on contract this was accepted by South Africa although many undocumented migrants also came. This created a predisposition to migrate there for many young people and a deep familiarity with South Africa. It has evidently shaped the post-1994 flows too although many new factors also then came into play (Crush et al. 2005, 2006). The factors which initiate migration to South Africa, in the first instance are many and is not the subject of the present contribution. But just to emphasise that, in the case of many countries in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular, the neoliberal economic ideologies which were adopted by many countries have contributed to migration to countries like South Africa. The prescriptions of these neoliberal economic models in the form of Structural and Adjustments Programmes (SAPS) in countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia had a debilitating impact on the economies of the countries in question (Brett 2005; Potts 2007; Mubita et al. 2017). As discussed in Chapter 2, the adoption of SAPs in many Southern African countries actually led to economic regression (Stoneman 1992; Brett 2005; Potts 2007; Mubita et al. 2017). Consequently, some industries either closed or scaled down, both impacts leading to; inter alia, unemployment and poverty which led people to engage in informality in their countries of origin or migration, particularly to South Africa (Moyo 2016, 2017a, b, 2018a, b, 2019; Moyo et al. 2017, 2018, Moyo and Nshimbi 2017; Nshimbi and Moyo 2017, 2018). What is even interesting is that, the South African immigration laws are hostile to the small business, like those in the informal economy and consequently, few international migrants qualify for business permits. But this has not stopped those international migrants without permits from setting up businesses in South African cities (Peberdy and Rogerson 2000; Moyo 2017a, b). Such international migrants have entered the country on temporary visas that do not explicitly allow them to trade or do business (Peberdy 2000). And this raises the question of the factors and/or conditions which have led to the growth of international migrants in the informal economy of a city like Johannesburg, for example. We will return to this question later in this section.

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Back to the issue of migration to South Africa and the rise of informal economic activities by international migrants, there is need to establish the connection between the two. Studies by Moyo (2016, 2017a, b; Moyo et al. 2018) suggest that the link between migration into South Africa and the rise in informal economic activities by international migrants is based on many factors. For instance, migrants from many African countries and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region migrate to South Africa to look for employment, only to meet several obstacles. These relate to among others; non-recognition of qualifications, such that migrants end up resorting to the informal economy (Moyo 2016, 2017a, b). These studies have detailed examples of migrants from countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe who have suffered deskilling as a result of the non-recognition of their qualifications. These findings confirm the Middleman Minority theory, which was propounded by Bonach (1973) and Light and Bonach (1988). According to this theory, foreign migrants experience structural impediments which limit their participation in and competition with the native population in the labour market economy in the host country (Zhou 2004). The effect of this is that some migrants are pushed into self-employment (Vinogradov and Kolvereid 2007). In addition, different forms of discrimination against foreign immigrants force them to engage in self-employment strategies (Bonach 1973; Light and Bonach 1988; Vinogradov and Kolvereid 2007). Indeed, a survey of foreign migrant enterprises in countries like Sweden, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp 2009) confirm the middleman minority theory. However, in some countries the middleman minority theory seems to be the exception than the rule (Vinogradov and Kolvereid 2007). Also linked to the above is the issue of lack of employment. Some people migrate to South Africa with the hope of getting jobs only to realise that, this is not feasible as South Africa has unemployment problems of its own. Like those who suffer deskilling, others who fail to get jobs would initially engage in menial and manual jobs so as to raise capital and then engage in urban informality (Moyo 2016, 2017a, b). This notwithstanding, there are some migrants from countries like Ghana and Nigeria, who specifically came to South Africa to set up businesses and not look for jobs (Rogerson 1997; Peberdy and Rogerson 2000; Moyo 2017a, b). However, several issues need clarification and contextualisation here. The fact that international migrants failed to secure employment or suffered deskilling upon arrival in South Africa and therefore decide to engage in urban informality does not actually mean or follow that they can or always do engage in this activity. This similarly, applies to those who leave their countries of origin to specifically set up businesses in the urban informal economy in Johannesburg. This in itself raises the question of why in a city like Johannesburg, the will/decision of migrants to engage in this economic activity actually materialises. There are many explanations, which have been proffered to explain this development. The main reason is that, the relaxation and lifting of racial restrictions on movement, residence and urban economic activity in South Africa’s cities, which occurred between 1986 and 1991, opened up new retail, manufacturing and residential spaces for urban informality (Rogerson 1996; Rogerson and Rogerson 1996; Rogerson 1997; Rogerson and Rogerson 1997;

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Rogerson 2000; Ihenduru 1998; Peberdy and Rogerson 2000). A direct consequence of this, was the “white flight” from the city centre of Johannesburg which opened up space for urban informality in general and that by international migrants (Rogerson 1997). The discussions in this part illuminate one main issue and that is the impact of historical or political factors on the rise of international migrants in South African cities. Taking into consideration that the fall of apartheid did not open the floodgates for migrants to enter South Africa, the general democratic outlook of the country as well as the level of economic development, which make the country an economic hegemon in Southern Africa made it to be a destination of choice, even though migrants still suffered discrimination and exclusion. Thus, there is no contradiction in the observation that after the collapse of apartheid, South Africa attracted many migrants, but at the same time immigration into the country was exclusive. The issue is that, despite the stringent immigration policy pursued by South Africa soon after the fall of apartheid, many people found South Africa attractive and still migrated, the draconian immigration policy notwithstanding. The same cannot be said about Zimbabwe, which has “exported” many of its citizens to many countries in Africa, including South Africa and beyond, based on the history and political economy as discussed in Chapter 2. The pertinent issue to emphasise here is that, there are many countries in the Southern African region which have attained independence and they have not attracted as much migrants as South Africa, based on the reasons indicated in this section. The point we are making here is that, the impact of the white minority regime and its collapse in South Africa in 1994 have led to many migrants some of whom have engaged in urban informality. In this we see a connection between the urban history of South Africa in terms of colonial and apartheid planning and immigration law whose disintegration led to new political and socio-economic ideologies which resulted in increased international migration. This makes urban informality by international migrants (a direct outcome of both the historical political economy, urban and racial history of South Africa as well as post-apartheid democratic policies) a particular feature of the urban informal economy in South African cities. Of course, there are local factors which have led to the specific patterns of urban informality by international migrants in South African cities like Johannesburg, a theme which is tackled in the next section.

4.3 Regarding Mixed Embeddedness and International Migrants in the Urban Informal Economy in Johannesburg Beyond the desegregation of urban space as a result of the demise of apartheid, which generally created conditions for urban informality, Moyo (2014) utilised the notion of mixed embeddedness (Kloosterman 2010; Kloosterman and Rath 2001,

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2003; Kloosterman et al. 1998, 1999) to explain factors in the wider environment in Johannesburg inner city which promote the rise of urban informality by international migrants (Moyo 2014). In this regard (Moyo 2014: 251) asserts that in the case of Johannesburg inner city, the concept of mixed embeddedness assists in bringing to the fore the “interplay between the individual resources of immigrant entrepreneurs such as human, financial, and social capital and opportunity structures like market and legislative framework conditions”. Concerning the legislative conditions, it was noted that, in general, the South African government was supportive of its own citizens in engaging in small enterprises as expressed in the National Small Business, Co-operatives, Companies Acts (Integrated Small Enterprise Development Strategy 2005). In addition to this, people were required to register with the Municipality of Johannesburg for them to be allocated trading licenses and/or stalls in Johannesburg inner city. It is this environment which international migrants have exploited, in that some have managed to register companies and others have secured trading licences (Moyo 2014). It should be noted that, although there were instances of xenophobia and discrimination against international migrants, such as those from African countries, “what is instructive is that there are opportunities for Black African immigrant entrepreneurs to register their businesses and others operate without registration due to a generally permissive legislative framework, which allows the informal economy to grow” (Moyo 2014: 255). For this reason, there is no contradiction in saying that, the legislative environment allowed for urban informality to grow, but at the same time state that, there was xenophobia. But rather, the issue is that, even in the face of xenophobia and other forms of discrimination, the fact that the South African government supported urban informal economic activities for its citizens, meant that those international migrants actually exploited this environment to set their business and operate without licences (Moyo 2014). Exploitation of this regulatory environment assumed many dimensions. One example is that of corruption, in which international migrants managed to bribe officials who regulated activities on the streets. These officials included the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) who regularly patrolled the streets of Johannesburg inner city checking among others, business registration licences by the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) or trading licences from the Municipality of Johannesburg. The fact that international migrants managed to bribe these officials meant that they secured the right to trade on the streets, even if the right was illegally secured. All these provided a ground for illegal activities to proliferate, because, if the migrants paid bribes to operate on the streets meant that they could trade in anything, including drugs. And this was difficult to control as the people who needed to eradicate this were complicit and compromised by soliciting for and accepting bribes (Moyo 2014, 2016, 2017a, b; Moyo et al. 2018). In addition, the international migrants brought into Johannesburg inner city their capital, networks and previous business skills and thus easily started small businesses in the informal economy. The networks which existed in Johannesburg inner city included the existence of a significant population of migrants from the African

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continent into which international migrants were immersed. This point is amplified by the following observation; In inner city Johannesburg, it appears as though it is more than coethnics but the existence of co-immigrants, which provide the necessary networks for the growth of immigrant entrepreneurships. There is limited cultural distinctiveness in terms of goods sold and the target market–the diverse Black African immigrant entrepreneurships are involved in a bit of everything, and both the Black African immigrants and South African citizens are the market for these various goods. On the basis of this, it is possible to suggest that in inner city Johannesburg, there seems to exist the immigrants enclave scenario more than the ethnic one. This perspective needs further development—a possible area for research. (Moyo 2014: 267)

This effectively means that the Ethnic Enclave Theory (which argues that a high number of migrants from the same country promotes self-employment) offers limited insights into the rise of the involvement of international migrants in the informal economy in a setting like Johannesburg inner city. For example, a study by Zhou (1992) revealed that a concentration of migrants from the same country in one location is associated with the rise of self-employment activities. Furthermore, Vinogradov and Kolvereid (2007) note that ethnic resources can provide the foundation for entrepreneurial activities, leading to the development of ethnic enclaves. Cross and Moore (2002: 13) observe that an area with a concentration of immigrants may also stimulate ethnic entrepreneurships as well as providing a market for commodities from the entrepreneurships. In this regard, Cross and Waldinger (2002) have shown that Koreans in the USA have mobilised ethnic distinctiveness as a method of providing community strength. The ethnic enclave theory has some limited applicability because ethnic enclaves are not a widespread phenomenon (Light et al. 1994). A study of foreign migrants in Norway by Krogstad (2002) cited in Vinogradov and Kolvereid (2007) revealed differences in the sense that immigrants from Tunisia, Morocco, Palestine and Greece avoided association with people from their own countries, but Pakistanis relied heavily on co-ethnics to start their businesses. It can therefore be added that there seems to be more than just the concentration of foreign migrants in one geographic place which leads to the growth of urban informality and this is the point, which the study of urban informality by Moyo (2014) has shown. Another issue in the wider environment is that, the international migrants, particularly those who were undocumented could buy goods from wholesalers, without facing any constraints. In other words, there were no documents which were required when they bought goods in bulk from wholesalers. Such migrants had established strong links with the suppliers of their goods on the basis of which there were good and strong and lasting relationships. On the streets these migrants managed to pay bribes, which thus suggests that such migrants had also established networks with the law enforcement regimes. The effect of this is that, these international migrants could successfully exist and trade outside lawful recognition and regulation (Moyo 2014). Furthermore, and in financial terms, international migrants could easily set up small businesses in the informal economy in Johannesburg inner city because, it was relatively easy to do so. Studies by Moyo (2014, 2017a, b; Moyo et al. 2016),

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show that relatively small amounts of capital were need by international migrants from African countries to set up business in the informal economy because the financial demands were not prohibitive. For example, people who started off as manual labourers saved a few thousand South African Rands from which they managed to buy goods and then started trading on the streets. There were also personal characteristics of international migrants, which made them to be relatively successful, whether or not their businesses were registered. These included working extremely hard and over longer hours including weekends and holidays. This ensured that these migrants actually reached a wider market, which assisted them to realise profits in their enterprises. The ethic of working hard also included spending several hours moving from one wholesaler to the other, looking for and finding those wholesalers which sold goods in bulk at lower prices. Buying goods at a lower price from the wholesalers meant that, the price of goods from international migrants in the end of retail chain were lower than the others. As a result, the consumers preferred to buy from international migrants than other retail outlets (Moyo 2014). But all this was possible because of the regulatory or lack of regulatory mechanisms described in the preceding part. For example, no matter how hard, the international migrants worked, for as long as there were strict restrictions and tougher monitoring of urban informal economic activities, success (measured in terms of international migrants realising profits and continuing in their business and also remitting goods and money back to their countries of origin) will be limited. On this basis, this challenges the assumptions of the cultural theory by Light (1972). This theory advances that certain foreign migrants have a propensity to engage in self-employment more than others. But the point is that, cultural factors may need a set of conditions for them to flourish and advance self-employment and entrepreneurship. Besides, it is difficult to assess the cultural attributes and their significance in foreign migrant enterprises (Kloosterman 2010). Similarly, the argument that demographic characteristics of foreign migrants, such as among others education levels, gender, and shorter duration of residence predispose them to selfemployment is also limited. A major proponent of this theory is Hammarstedt (2004, 2006), who asserts that, foreign migrants with higher educational qualifications, who have stayed for longer periods in the host country, for example, do not engage in entrepreneurial activities (Li 2001). This theory may apply in certain contexts, but again, it is challenged by the concept of social embeddedness (Cahn 2008; Kloosterman 2010), which posits that migrant enterprises are affected by a host of factors beyond individual attributes and these may include social, human and financial capital. The concept of social embeddedness can further be broken down into relational embeddedness and structural embeddedness (Granovetter 1995), where relational embeddedness refers to personal relations between the migrant business owners on the one hand and customers, suppliers, banks and law enforcers on the other. Structural embeddedness goes beyond personal relations in entrepreneurial activities (Granovetter 1995). Likewise, there exists an assumption that, foreign migrants from countries with an experience of self-employment will engage in urban economic informality because such immigrants have experience and are better prepared for business after they

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migrate (Vinogradov and Kolvereid 2007). However, such assumptions are limited and context-specific, because it depends on a variety of factors such as host country unemployment rates and the changes in the performance of the economy of the host country (Vinogradov and Kolvereid 2007). Furthermore, the analysis of social embeddedness, structural and relational embeddedness challenges this theory for failing to consider a complex range of factors. Thus suggesting that, a mixed embeddedness approach, which includes all these conditions/factors is more informative in an analysis of conditions which influence foreign migrant informal enterprises. Therefore, the deployment of the notion of mixed embeddedness by Moyo (2014), in the study of the rise of the involvement of international migrants in the informal economy in Johannesburg inner city demonstrates that, migration to host countries and cities and unemployment in these destinations, are not enough to explain why migrants engage in and relatively succeed in urban informality. But that, such a rise is “contingent on factors that transcend the innate characteristics of individual entrepreneurs and their cultural attributes. These include political, economic, legislative, and institutional regimes that Black African immigrant entrepreneurs are embedded in” (Moyo 2014: 270). These explain the rise in the number of and activities by foreign migrants in the urban economic sector in Johannesburg inner city. The matter of political and legislative regimes illuminates the central thesis of this book and that is the history as well as the current political economy of a country could contribute to the emergence and rise of urban informality and in this case, the involvement of international migrants in urban informality. The existence of a permissive regulatory regime in Johannesburg inner city could be attributed to the fall of apartheid policies and the introduction of democratic policies which have created general conditions in which urban informality by international migrants could thrive. Thus, we posit that the mixed embeddedness which has promoted international migrants in urban informality in Johannesburg inner city is predicated on the post-apartheid policies which were a response to a racial and apartheid past in South Africa. And this has given urban informality in Johannesburg inner city a strong international character in terms of the involvement of migrants from many Africa countries and beyond.

4.4 Some Characteristics of Foreign Migrants’ Urban Economic Enterprises As a result of the conditions and factors that have promoted the rise of urban informality, Johannesburg has assumed a new physical and business character, with streets lined with informal economy entrepreneurs, young and old, women and men, who sell fruit, vegetables, bags, shoes, clothes, cooked foods and other goods occupying space which was left by white enterprises (Rogerson 1997; Peberdy 2000; Moyo et al. 2016, Moyo et al. 2018; Moyo 2017a, b). What is worth mentioning is that in this economic activity, there is mix of nationalities within the African continent and beyond. For

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instance, Moyo et al. (2016, 2017); Moyo (2017a, b) studied informal enterprises which were owned and operated by African migrants from countries like Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Similarly, studies by Grant and Thompson (2015); Peberdy (2017) established that there was a mix of nationalities from the African continent in areas such as Jeppe Street and Delvers, Eighth Avenue, Mayfair and in Yeoville. In addition to immigrants from Africa, there has been an increase of Asian migrants, such as Chinese, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis as well as some Europeans, who were also involved in urban informality in Johannesburg inner city (Peberdy 2017). Some of the features of enterprises operated by foreign migrants are the same (in terms of operation, goods sold etc.) as those of South African citizens and therefore, will be discussed in Chapter 6, under the general rubric of the Johannesburg urban economy. Similarly, other characteristics of these enterprises, will feature in other chapters in book, to the extent that they illuminate the themes in this book. And therefore, this chapter attempts to capture those aspects which appear to be characteristic of foreign migrant enterprises. Such as the transnational character of the enterprises under consideration. Interview data which was gathered by the authors showed that, some of the migrants had transnational networks in their business operations. And this validates studies by Rogerson (1997), Peberdy and Rogerson (2000), and Peberdy (2000) which demonstrated that, some of the foreign migrant enterprises in Johannesburg inner city also operated beyond the national borders into countries in the SADC, Africa and beyond. This is because they brought goods into South Africa for sale and from such proceeds bought goods from Johannesburg inner city for resale in their home and other countries. As Peberdy and Rogerson (2000), have argued, the transnational character of some foreign immigrant entrepreneurs means that South African goods are exported to other countries, hence “‘these networks not only provide capital, but also involve the import and export of wholesale goods and inputs for business in South Africa and elsewhere. For non-SADC entrepreneurs, these networks extend beyond continental boundaries to Europe, North America and the Far East’” (Peberdy and Rogerson 2000: 36). Some of the foreign migrants had enterprises in the informal economy in more than one country and city. A case in point is that of Zimbabweans and Mozambicans who were interviewed, who stated that, they also had shops in Bulawayo and Harare and Maputo, respectively. In this case one not only sees the transnational character of urban informality as described in this section, but also cross border networks of these businesses which were owned by the same individuals. Other features of the foreign owned enterprises in the informal economy is that, they brought an international flair into the product diversity in Johannesburg inner city. This was evident in many ways such as shops which sold West, East and Central African attire. In addition to this, authors also noted that, there was a significant rise in the number of foreign enterprises, particularly those owned by black Africans, which specialised in dishes specific to countries and regions in Africa. For example, there were restaurants in Johannesburg inner city which specifically prepared and sold Nigerian, Somalian and Zimbabwean dishes. Discussions demonstrated that, this was a strategy of claiming a certain segment of the market, such as Zimbabweans

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eating from restaurants which sold some Zimbabwean dishes and Nigerians doing the same. But although this did happen, it was not this simple and given, as there were cases of Zimbabweans actually frequenting restaurants which sold Nigerian food. This shows the complexity of the interaction and relations within and between foreign migrant business owners in the informal economic sector in Johannesburg inner city.

4.5 The Challenges and Struggles of Foreign Migrant Enterprises in Johannesburg Inner City The international migrants operating within the urban economic informality space in Johannesburg inner city faced a variety of challenges which are beyond the focus of this contribution. But suffice to state that, the most common include lack of business permits/registration, harassment/intimidation and xenophobia. But all these challenges are interlinked or connected. Concerning lack of business permits for small enterprises, these were difficult to secure because of the stringent immigration regime as discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter. This actually means that very few foreign migrants actually get business permits (Peberdy 1998; Peberdy and Rogerson 2000). This has forced these migrants to actually operate without permits, in that they enter the country on visitor permits, but actually engage in buying and selling of goods (Peberdy and Rogerson 2000). This is suggesting undocumented migration as well as operating businesses outside the law. Further, it was also difficult to get a street trading permit from the Municipality of Johannesburg, which forced many foreign migrant informal businesses in Johannesburg to operate illegally (Moyo et al. 2016, 2017). This opened these migrants to harassment and exploitation by law enforcement agents such as the JMPD for instance. Those without street trading licences suffered the confiscation of their goods. To avoid this, these traders had resorted to paying bribes to the JMPD and as indicated earlier. This provided a context for underground economic activities in Johannesburg inner city. For instance, because the migrants could easily bribe the law enforcement agents, they literally trade in anything including drugs and other unlawful goods (Moyo 2017a, b). Indeed, this was observed over two decades ago by Rogerson (1996) who stated that, some migrant traders were involved in selling stolen goods, drug peddling among others. Moyo (2017a, b) also noted that some international migrants in the Johannesburg inner city economy actually sold pirated goods and fake brands. Such migrants always either paid bribes during JMPD patrols or successfully evaded the police by closing their shops whenever the police approached. In fact, a whistle was enough to alert the whole street to close off their shops, whenever the JMPD approached (Moyo 2017a, b). As a result, this has created controversy around the practices of international migrant enterprises, precisely because, it is accepted that “any business venture is part of the general community and that it is jointly responsible for solving the social

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problems of that community. This is because land, labour, consumers and some of the input for the business come from the community it operates in” (Aardt et al. 2008: 267). Which means that any informal activity, which assaults these values, no matter how entrepreneurial it is, can be considered as destructive. This is amplified by Anderson and Smith (2007: 486), who assert that “individualism, overcoming obstacles and endeavour might characterize entrepreneurship, but the manner of doing, the means and ends do not fit with an ideology of value creation. Criminality, perhaps entrepreneurial in scope is not entrepreneurial in spirit, it lacks social legitimacy”. On the matter of xenophobia, foreign migrants involved in the informal economy have been victims as well. A clear example of this is the killing of three street traders in Pretoria in 1998 by a group claiming to represent unemployed people in South Africa (The Star, 4 September 1998 cited in Peberdy and Rogerson 2000). Protests in August 1997 against foreign street traders led by various hawkers’ associations which resulted in violence and intimidation of foreign migrants and the looting of their goods. This continued to up to 1999 (The Star, 14 August 1997 cited in Peberdy and Rogerson 2000; Peberdy 2000). Similar incidents have been reported in other parts of South Africa. Such as attacks, some of which were fatal against black African foreign small business owners in Olievenhoutbosch near Centurion in 2005 to 2006 and Motherwell in Port Elizabeth in 2007 (Landau and Polzer 2007). In the Motherwell incident, Somalis were attacked and their businesses ransacked. The police did little to assist the victims and there are accusations that the police vehicles were used to carry away the loot from Somali shops. Another incident took place outside Knysna in July 2006 where Somalis were chased out of their businesses and 30 spaza shops were destroyed (Landau and Polzer 2007). In June 2011 Somali shops were attacked by residents of Ramaphosa (Germaner 2011). Harassment of foreign traders in Reiger Park, Erkurhuleni, Soweto and other townships around Johannesburg was led by the Gauteng Business Forum (Molosankwe 2011). The xenophobic attacks have continued, such as the attacks of foreign owned small businesses in Durban in 2019 (Njoli 2019). In Eastern Cape, shops owned by foreign nationals were closed down and the owners of these shops were required to pay a protection fee. In addition to this, these shop owners were required to pay their South African employees wages which complied with the South African laws on minimum wages (Ntshongwana 2019). Other attacks of foreign owned shops occurred in Soweto (SAPeople 2018). Foreign shop owners who were subjected to these xenophobia attacks have responded in various ways. For example, those who were attacked in Durban in 2019, decided to go back to their countries of origin, because they were afraid of eventually losing their lives. A case in point is that, some Malawians in Durban decided to go back to Malawi (Njoli 2019). In the case of Eastern described here, some of the business owners have had to pay protection fees so as to continue operating (Ntshongwana 2019). This is similar to paying bribes which occurs in Johannesburg as described in the preceding sections of this chapter. Moyo et al. (2018), proposed a Migrant Calculated Risk and Adaptation Framework, which attempts to analyse the agency of African migrants in the Johannesburg inner city urban informal economy. By employing the notion of tactical cosmopolitanism Moyo et al. (2018),

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suggests that, in face of xenophobia and discrimination among other challenges, which are faced by foreign migrants in this set up, such migrants are not passive. But, invoked dynamic and agentive ways including learning South African languages, paying bribes and acquiring resident and trading permits, even if doing so (acquiring resident and trading permits) involved illegal methods.

4.6 Conclusion The involvement of international migrants in the urban economic informal is a global phenomenon, but an explanation of the conditions or factors which lead to their growth demands a nuanced analysis as they would vary from country to another. In the case of South Africa, the advent of a new dispensation in 1994, generally encouraged migration which led to an increase in the number of migrants in the country. However, the view that immigration into South Africa after the fall of apartheid was encouraged needs to be qualified because it is overly simplistic and hides the selectivity of the immigration regime (Peberdy 2009). That notwithstanding, people still enter South Africa as undocumented migrants (see Moyo 2019). Some come to South Africa looking for jobs, failing which they resort to the urban informal economy. Others come to South Africa specifically to set up businesses in urban informal economy such as that of Johannesburg inner city. But the fact of the matter is that, after arriving in South Africa and resorting to the urban informal economy does not actually mean that this will materialise. It is in this view that, in Johannesburg inner city, we have attempted to show that the desegregation and deracialisation of urban space, when apartheid was dethroned, which led to the migration of whites out of the city centre (Rogerson 1996; Rogerson and Rogerson 1996; Rogerson 1997; Rogerson and Rogerson 1997; Rogerson 2000; Ihenduru 1998; Peberdy and Rogerson 2000), just created an environment for urban informality. And we have argued that, the mixed embeddedness of the conditions in Johannesburg inner city have promoted the growth of urban informality. These range from the government support for the informal economy in South Africa by its citizens, which has created a generally permissive environment within which informal activities by international migrants can occur. Therefore, despite the fact that there is xenophobia and indeed different forms of discrimination, foreign migrant traders have been able to exploit the regulatory or lack of regulatory mechanisms in order for them to operate. Differently stated, it is an inadequate explanation to say that increased migration had led to increased urban economic informality in a city like Johannesburg and in particular its inner city. But that, it is reasonable to say that, increased migration plus a plethora of factors ranging from regulation regimes to social, economic, political and personal factors have created conditions for urban informality in Johannesburg inner city. Most striking in this phenomenon is the cross border networks of the activity. For example, foreign migrant traders who had shops in Johannesburg inner city also had similar operations in their countries of origin. Such as Zimbabweans and

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Mozambicans who had shops in Johannesburg inner city and others in cities like Bulawayo and Harare (Zimbabwe) and Maputo (Mozambique). This in itself further demonstrates the complexity of the phenomenon of urban informality, in that, it defies narrow compartmentalisation and classification into a setting, scene or sector. As Roy and AlSayyad (2004), Potts (2008), and Roy (2005), have observed, this speaks more to urban informality as political economy issue. As such, it needs to be seen and viewed as a phenomenon which have and operates by its own set of rules (Banks et al. 2019). And so, the involvement of foreign migrants in urban informality in Johannesburg inner city, the actors of whom have active connections in their countries of origin and beyond, seem to demonstrate this point. In all this, we suggest that the political and economic development of South Africa and the former white minority apartheid regime, which collapsed in 1994 has contributed to the character of urban informality by international migrants in Johannesburg inner city. This is precisely because, migration to South Africa after 1994 more than any country in the Southern African region is high. This is based on the political and economic development of the country as well as the fall of the apartheid regime in 1994. This, among others, created the general democratic conditions, led to deracialised cities and opened up economic space and opportunities in cities, which attracted international migrants. As a result of this, the involvement of international migrants in urban informality in South African cities is more pronounced. But, beyond and even though still predicated on the general and broader historical and political and economic conditions and policies, as the example of Johannesburg inner city as discussed in this chapter shows, the nature and character of urban informality by international migrants varies based on the mixed embeddedness of local conditions of a city.

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Chapter 5

Spatial and Compositional Formality–Informality Interfaces in the City of Harare, Zimbabwe

Abstract The Zimbabwean urban informal economy has been evolving since the country attained independence in 1980. In response to political and economic transformations, the phenomenon has been occupying places that were regarded as the preserve of its formal economic sector counterpart. This chapter focuses on the changing characteristics of urban informal economic activities in Harare and demonstrates how they have assumed features of formal businesses resulting in the compositional linkages. In doing so, the chapter illuminates the importance of the historical and politico-economic factors in shaping the compositional formality-informality interfaces in Harare city. Keywords Urban informality · Formality-informality interface · Harare city

5.1 Introduction It was highlighted in the preceding chapters (see e.g. Chapter 2) that the urban and political and economic history of Zimbabwe explains the evolution and character of urban informality in the country. To reiterate, the changing political and economic ideologies in Zimbabwe have affected urban informality spatially, functionally and compositionally as discussed in the following parts. In 1980, the government did not immediately seek to promote and support urban informality. In pursuit of its Marxist-Leninist ideology that had informed the liberation struggle, the government adopted the growth with equity (GWE) economic policy in 1981 that paved way for the implementation of the transitional national development plan (TNDP) (GoZ 1982; Sylvester 1985). The TNDP sought to achieve the twin objectives of economic growth and wealth redistribution in response to gross inequalities, hence the adoption of the socialist public expenditure programme by the new government (Chattopadhyay 2000; Grant and Palmiere 2003). According to Sachikonye (2003), the plan aimed at creating formal employment and economic opportunities for the previously marginalised black population. In the quest to achieve an egalitarian society and improve the ownership as well as access to means of production

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and survival, the government removed all restrictive regulations that had discouraged blacks from moving into urban areas. The abolishment of segregative pass laws opened the flood-gates to rural migrants. The government also implemented the growth point policy that sought to avoid rapid urbanisation by investing heavily in rural town centres (GoZ 1982). Unfortunately, rural growth point centres failed to attract people from surrounding rural communities as they left their impoverished rural homes in large numbers to move to urban centres in search of better living standards. Regrettably, the urban centres and their economies had been developed and designed to cater only for privileged whites and a few blacks in permanent formal employment (Colquhoun 1993; Gumbo and Geyer 2011). As a result, the high numbers of migrants put massive pressure on government resources, services and formal economy employment (Dhemba 1999). However, the economy expanded during the first five years after independence. Between 1980 and 1981 the economy recorded growth rates of between 10 and 11% gross domestic product (GDP) due to international financial aid and supportive economic conditions (Kanyenze et al. 2011). The government did not immediately seek to promote and support the operations of informal businesses actively during this period. Of particular note was the discouragement of informal transport businesses, commonly known as auxiliary taxis during the 1980s (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1993) in order to protect a national public transport company, the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO). The government however actively implemented policies on co-operative business formation which indirectly led to the growth of informality as most of the enterprises failed to observe formal regulations (Chirisa 2009). Urban residents that could not be absorbed by the formal economy continued to work in the informal economy by default. In 1986, the government adopted the First Five Year National Development Plan (FFYNDP) to continue with its socialist political and economic ideology. It promoted three major sources of formal employment and income, which were the public sector, secondary industries such as manufacturing, processing and primary industries such as agricultural production and mining (GoZ 1986). Although the country experienced some bad drought years during the decade, generally, the performance of economy was positive (Kovacic 1992; Kinsey 1999; Sachikonye 2003). The strong linkages between agriculture and industrial manufacturing as well as processing activities also led to increased economic growth. According to Kanyenze et al. (2011), economic growth averaged 4.6% per annum during the period of the FFYNDP. On average, formal economy employment grew at 2.2% per annum during the 1980s, while the population increased at an average rate of 3% per annum, outpacing job creation. For example, during the late 1980s the country was churning out 200,000 school leavers every year while the economy was only creating between 20,000 and 30,000 jobs in the formal economy annually (Kovacic 1992; Bjurek and Durevall 2000; Grant and Palmiere 2003). This resulted to high unemployment rates

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and poverty levels. The government sadly maintained its strict control1 of urban informality (Rakodi 1993) although it was clear that the formal economy could not provide all the needed jobs. The relatively poor performance of the formal economy is attributable to a number of factors.2 The country’s external debt had increased due to borrowing large sums of money during the decade at very high interest rates, particularly after the billions of dollars pledged at the Zimbabwe Conference Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) failed to materialise. The government realised that the situation could be ameliorated by shifting towards a market political and economic ideology. It must be remembered that, the economic problems which now affected the country had been blamed on the socialist political and economic ideology of the 1980s. The country’s strong bias towards centralised political and economic planning and protectionism had been blamed for the economic performance, hence economic liberalisation had been offered as the alternative (Chattopadhyay 2000; Grant and Palmiere 2003). This created the conditions for the adoption of neoliberal economic reforms in 1991 to deal with a myriad of constraints to economic performance and to solve structural economic problems that discouraged investments (Carmody 1998; Brett 2005). The decision was also made due to pressure3 from the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, it needs emphasis that, the underlying conditions which led to the adoption of neoliberal economic policies are more nuanced and complex as discussed in Chapter 2 and will not be repeated here. Back to the issue of the neoliberal economic reforms, they did not lead to the economic resuscitation as expected, because the economy shrank and formal employment creation was adversely constrained. Reduction in government spending resulted in high costs of living as subsidies were removed and the removal of price controls led to increases in the prices of food and other basic commodities. Other economic reform conditionalities such as currency devaluation, negatively affected the country’s economic standing as it was degraded from a middle income to a low income country. Trade liberalisation led to stiff competition between local companies that had previously been heavily protected, forcing them to retrench thousands of workers to remain viable. Poverty levels in the country rose from 40.4% in 1990 to 63.3% by 1995, while 39% of urban households were poor by 1995 (Dhemba 1999; Kanyenze et al. 2003). Massive layoffs were adopted to survive the offensive by foreign businesses that had created stiff competition to local companies with their cheap imports. 1 Its strong adherence to the British planning ideology led to a continued bias towards public health

and strict zoning regulations and registration; hence it could not break with the past to accommodate the IES. 2 Excessive public spending and labour protectionism forbade dismissals of employees resulting in production inefficiencies (Grant and Palmiere 2003). The economy was over protected from both domestic and international competition (Bjurek and Durevall 2000). About 80% of all items that were being made in the country were being manufactured or processed by three or fewer companies (Kovacic 1992). 3 Liberalisation and deregulation reforms were economic conditions for the government to access financial support.

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Labour intensive firms such as textiles, clothing and footwear retrenched their unskilled and semi-skilled workers, replacing them with casual labour. About 20,000 workers had been retrenched by 1995 and between 1991 and 1992 alone, the number of non-agricultural employees declined from 929,800 to 844,000 (Kanyenze et al. 2011). Some formal firms were completely forced out of business. The informal economy continued to swell during the decade as retrenchees were forced to join the sector (McPherson 1991, 1993, 1998; Chiumbu and Musemwa 2012). The majority of business start-ups took place in the trade and commerce sub-sector that demanded less capital, as the economy was performing badly. These businesses were merely a response to severe poverty after getting retrenched and an attempt to utilise the time by engaging in low paying informal activities to avoid starvation. The poor social and economic performance of ESAP resulted in the government doubting the efficacy of market systems in solving the country’s problems. The government nevertheless once again resolved to continue with trade, financial, labour and price liberalisation prescriptions. These were however abandoned as the government started over spending. For instance, on the 14 November 1997, the Zimbabwean government approved and granted lump sum gratuities of Z$ 50,000 (USD 4,167) and monthly pensions of Z$ 2,000 (USD 140) to war veterans (Kanyenze et al. 2011). This led to the first crash of the Zimbabwean dollar, a situation that has been commonly referred to as “Black Friday”. Participating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war in 1998 also worsened the economic situation. It is believed that except for a few individuals, the nation did not benefit. The war cost the government about USD 33 million a month (Kanyenze et al. 2011). Since then the Zimbabwean dollar was on a free-falling spree until it completely lost its value by the end of 2008 and was replaced by the USD as the main currency, and other complementary currencies such as the South African Rand (SAR) and the Botswana Pula (BP). The public sector continued to lose its vigour and attractiveness as the dominant employment sector due to low salaries and incessant retrenchments. The manufacturing and processing sector also continued on the path of low sales and productivity due to stiff competition from cheap imports, and high costs of raw materials as a result of currency devaluations. Mounting economic problems of the 1990s led to constant fights between the major social groups such as university students, civil servants, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the government. The complex interplay of policy overtones led to the current crisis the country finds itself in (Michael and Masunungure 2006; Ranger 2007; Fontein 2009). Lack of commitment and seriousness by the government to finding solutions to political and socio-economic problems and ways of improving the plight of the urban poor led to serious unrests and demands by the united front of social groups (Ranger 2007). This culminated in the formation of an exceptionally strong opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) led government dumped the capitalist ideologies of the 1990s and adopted an authoritarian political and economic ideology at the beginning of the new millennium. Indigenisation and black empowerment purported to liberate blacks from white land and business owners who continued to enjoy the country’s wealth at their expense

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was now the main political narrative. ZANU–PF partnered with war veterans and communal farmers to invade productive land that was owned by white commercial farmers, and they were dispossessed without compensation. The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) was dubbed the Third Chimurenga, in an attempt to reveal its revolutionary nature (see e.g. Raftopoulos 2006). The seizures were sanctioned in April 2000 and official legislation was only passed in June 2001. The party chose to engage in violence, mass killings and torturing of members of opposition parties to retain power for the greater part of the 2000s (Michael and Masunungure 2006). Citizens’ fundamental human rights were violated through the enactment and implementation of the Public Order Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection and Privacy Act (AIPPA) in January 2002. ZANU–PF used its majority in parliament to push through these two sets of legislation as a way of consolidating its power, usurping the people’s rights of association and access to information which are spelt out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948. Although land redistribution was a noble and just cause, the manner in which it was approached and implemented led to a serious economic crisis as agricultural production was disrupted, resulting in reduced investor confidence, credit flows and input supplies (see e.g. Helliker and Murisa 2011; Chiumbu and Musemwa 2012). The FTLRP resulted in the displacement of thousands of white commercial farmers and their workers. Of the 300,000 farm workers at the time, more than 200,000 lost their jobs and only 5% were resettled under the fast-track programme, while a few were absorbed by the new black farmers (Sachikonye 2003). The majority were forced to leave the commercial farms and move to urban centres in search of alternative livelihoods, particularly in the informal economy. The economy that had largely depended on commercial agricultural production and the industries that had survived on processing agricultural products during the 1990s suffered a huge blow during the new millennium (Magure 2008). The production of commercial agricultural products such as tobacco, cotton, wheat, soya beans and maize that had largely contributed to the country’s exports and foreign currency generation, started to decline rapidly from 2001, worsening the economic situation (Sachikonye 2003). The impact of political wrangles and contestations was more severe than that of ESAP of the 1990s as most companies, shops and businesses closed4 and investment was withdrawn, leading to massive retrenchments and subsequently unprecedented unemployment figures (Magure 2008; Fontein 2009; Masaka 2011). By July 2008, inflation had reached 231 million and economic growth recorded the lowest figure of -14.8% (Kanyenze et al. 2011). The economic meltdown in the new millennium led to incessant closures of formal businesses and thousands of people were retrenched every year forcing them to join the informal economy. Most 4 According

to Kanyenze et al. (2011) 400 manufacturing firms wrapped up their operations in 2000 and most reduced their capacity utilisation, in 2001 there were about 3,500 retrenchments as companies rationalised their operations whilst formal employment was reduced by 16% in 2003. According to Luebker (2008) FES employment declined from 1,241,500 in 1998 to 1,012,900 in 2002.

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manufacturing industries performed below full capacity and the situation kept deteriorating during the years. In 2006 only 27% of the industries operated at full capacity. The situation continued to worsen as capacity dropped to 13% in 2007. By 2008, industries operated at 5% capacity (GoZ 2012). Textiles, clothing, wood and furniture, metals and metal products, leather and footwear firms were the most affected. Inflationary conditions of the economy made the local currency worthless, such that those who were formally employed and received regular wages and salaries felt the brunt and chose to operate in the informal economy where they could generate income every day, as well as find ways of circumventing the negative conditions. Extreme political and economic instability throughout the new millennium exacerbated retrenchments and food and basic commodity shortages, committing several households into abject poverty and desperate situations. It is however the informal economy that boomed during the economic crisis as the majority of former employees of both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors could only generate income outside the defunct formal economy. In 2006 the informal economy provided employment to over 80% of the actively employed population and poverty levels were around 76% of the population, particularly the urbanites (MPSLSW 2006). However, it needs to be mentioned that statistics and particularly the use of numbers such as the percentage of people in the informal economy is problematic at many levels such as undercounting. The problem of numbers is that they do not always provide a more accurate picture of the dynamics in the urban informal economy. In some cases, numbers may either be manipulated and also misleading. Therefore, being cognisant of the problems of the use of numbers or figures, in this chapter and elsewhere in the book, they are used to the extent to which they are indicative of matters under consideration. Back to the issue of the impact of neoliberal economic reforms of the 1990s is that they set conditions that forced the growth of the informal economy, but it is the political and economic crises of the decade after 2000 that led to the collapse of the formal economy and its almost complete replacement by the informal economy in virtually all sectors. It is against this background that in this chapter we analyse the impact of the changing political and economic ideologies on the spatial organisation of urban informality and the formality–informality interfaces in Harare city, bearing in mind the colonial and racial history of the city.

5.2 Characteristics of Informal Economic Activities and Growth Within Sub-sectors This data analysis is based on research that included survey and phenomenological case studies, which applied a methodological, time, spatial and theoretical triangulation to illuminate the nature of urban economic informality in Harare (Cohen et al. 2011). Harare is not only the capital, largest commercial and industrial city in Zimbabwe but also the seat of government (Yoshikuni 2006). The primary research

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on urban economic informality was conducted over a period of 3 years, from 2010 to 2012. First, secondary data was obtained from literature on Zimbabwean and international experiences of the urban informality and linkages with the FES counterpart. Longitudinal data for the three decades under study were obtained from archived sources of data and documents that were collected from a variety of institutions that deal with both economic sectors. Archival sources assisted in revealing the performance variations of the two economic sectors overtime (Dale et al. 2008). Cross-sectional data was obtained with primary data collection techniques that among others included observations and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) surveys. A hand held global positioning system (GPS) was used to capture the locations of informal businesses in the two cities. A total of 1164 Universal transverse Mercator (UTM) waypoints were captured in Harare. Locations of formal economic enterprises (FEEs) were digitised from the shapefiles, to reveal the spatial distribution of formal businesses. Waypoint locations of IEEs were exported to GIS maps of the city. The waypoints were further analysed to reveal the density and concentration of IEEs within the city. Besides applying GIS, there was also the use of historical data to show locational changes over time. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal spatial rare data sets were obtained through the adoption of mixed methodologies. Interviews with key informants that included senior officials from local authorities, relevant ministries and departments and associations representing informal economic operators yielded very valuable information. The key informants have served their organisations for very long periods. Also questionnaire surveys that were conducted with informal economic operators that have been in business for varying periods provided vital historical information of the spatiality of their economic activities. The spatial location of FEEs on base maps were also confirmed and complemented by checking and verifying their physical addresses in business directories, and databases of companies from relevant organisations such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC). Observations of the visual appearances and state of informal market structures, helped to confirm the historical provision of operating premises and their spatial layering over time. A cross tabulation of the location and the various categories of informal economic businesses was done. Sectoral aggregation involved the grouping of economic activities into five sub-sectors, which include manufacturing and processing, trading and commerce, personal services, transportation and communication and lastly building and construction (Table 5.1). On the other hand, spatial aggregation involved dividing locational areas of both FEEs and IEEs into five categories that included the (CBDs), suburban shopping centres (SSCs), industrial centres (ICs), and transportation centres (TCs) and home based (HB) and open air markets (Table 5.1). A cross tabulation of formal business categories and their locational places was also run in the SPSS to give a summary of the different formal activities that are dominant at different locations. Hence, categories of formal economic businesses that included trade and commerce, manufacturing and processing, personal services, transportation and communication and building and construction were maintained for the study of the

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Table 5.1 Categories of informal economy operations Locational place

Informal economic sector sub-sector

Informal economic enterprises

Central business districts (CBD) Dominance by almost all except Construction

Fruit and vegetables, clothing, tailoring, hair salons, internet cafes, taxis, photocopying, leather products, flowers and meat

Suburban Shopping Centre (SSCs)

Dominance by almost all except Construction

Fruit and vegetables, clothing, push carts, taxis, shoe repairs, hair salons, flowers photocopying, typing and printing, arts and crafts, curios, chickens

Industrial centres (ICs)

Dominance by almost all except construction and transportation and communication

Welding, carpentry, tailoring, leather products, food preparation, car repairs, snacks, drinks, photocopying, car parts, building materials, heavy vehicles, traditional medicines, chickens

Transportation and Communication Centres (TCs)

Dominance by almost all except construction and personal services

Taxis, commuter omnibuses, fruit and vegetables, clothing, push carts, welding, carpentry, food preparation, odds and ends, traditional medicines and chickens

Homes/open spaces and Roads (HB)

Dominance by almost all (mostly in high density residential areas)

Peanut butter processing, tailoring, grocery shops, knitting, welding, carpentry, taxis, commuter omnibuses, photocopying, typing and printing, firewood, fruit and vegetables, clothing, electrical installations, brick laying, plastering, tiling and flooring

formal sector, while five functional land uses that included the city centres (CBDs), industrial centres (ICs), suburban shopping centres (SSCs), transportation centres (TCs), homes and open air markets were studied. Observations of the spatial linkages between the two economic sectors were also made, while the spatial location of businesses was captured using a global positioning system (GPS). Geographic information technology (GIT) was used to overlay spatial data to reveal the locational linkages that have been created between the two economic sectors over time. All unremunerated activities such as donations that were made for social redistribution purposes and work that was done for community building were excluded. All informal economic activities that had no formal equivalents or that were not tolerated in the formal economy such as money laundering, dealing in drugs, illegal

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Fig. 5.1 Compositional changes of the informal economic sub-sectors in Zimbabwe between 1981 and 2010 (Source Authors)

foreign currency exchange, prostitution and music pirating were excluded from the list of activities. Other economic activities that have always existed but that do not fall neatly within the informal economy were considered formal and were left out of the analysis. A time series analysis helps to demonstrate the transformation (compositional changes) of these business categories in line with political and economic fundamentals (Fig. 5.1). This figure reveals that during the 1990s, most of the business start-ups in the informal economy were in the manufacturing and processing (71.6%) sub-sectors. Only a few were in among others, commerce (21.1%), service (2.9%) and transportation and communication (0.1%) as most of these sub-categories were dominated by formal businesses that were thriving under stable political and economic environments. It should be noted that some informal manufacturing economic activities exited in the Zimbabwean urban informal economy during the colonial period that ended with independence in 1980 and this continued until the late 1990s. The informal manufacturing and processing sub-sector (20% by 2004) was however overtaken by the trading and commercial sub-sector (60% by 2004) during the 2000s. The trading and commerce sub-sector (69.5% by 2010) proved to be most popular and dominant in cushioning the urban poor from the throes of economic decline. The informal manufacturing and processing sub-sector declined to 17.3% by 2010. The sub-sector employed thousands of retrenched people and providing opportunities for business start-ups. Trading in fruit and vegetables, clothing and footwear and electrical and electronics products, was popular. In construction, there was a change from almost 6.4% in 2004, according to the 2004 LFS (Luebker 2008), to about 0.7% in 2012. It is important to note this denotes compositional change and that the sector appears to have been surpassed by other sectors which would have grown faster. One sub-sector of the informal economy that has shown tremendous change is transport and communication. The sub-sector grew from a low figure of 0.1% (McPherson 1991) in the early 1990s to 5.2% in 2010 (Luebker 2008). Differently stated, what Fig. 5.1 illustrates is that the compositional

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changes of the informal economic sub-sectors in Zimbabwe between 1981 and 2010 was in response to the political and ideological changes in the country. For example, as the economy descended into paralysis in the late 1990s and 2000s informal economic activities in trade and commerce grew, because more and more people joined the urban informal economy. In addition to this, is that, although urban planning was and is still Eurocentric, the growth in urban informality put pressure on the Zimbabwean government to reform its urban planning regime to accommodate urban informality. For example, the Inter-Ministerial Deregulation Committee (IDC) of the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) recommended the relaxation of 28 Acts, particularly stringent licensing requirements and use of urban space by informal and small-scale economic activities. The parliament of Zimbabwe also enacted a statutory instrument (SI) 216 that deregulated the operations of urban informal economic activities in residential areas and the CBDs in 1994.

5.3 Spatial Configurations of Informal Economic Categories As a result of the political and economic changes that have happened in Zimbabwe as discussed in the preceding parts, urban informal economic activities have spread and occupied various spaces within the Zimbabwean cities. As a result, the Harare CBD now accommodates 22.3% of the urban informal economic activities, most of them favouring central places such as trading and commerce and personal services subsectors. The CBDs provide access to threshold markets that sustain urban informal economic activities. Also, productive informal economic activities such as tailoring and those that specialise in leather products favour the CBDs due to their being convenient for accessing the markets and their raw materials that are normally found in the city centre. Such productive activities do not require large spaces to operate and do not produce a lot of waste. Other productive activities such as arts and crafts as well as curios favour mostly upmarket places with ample space for both production and marketing. This confirms several studies on central place formation and business location (see e.g. Burgess 1925; Hoyt 1939; Harris and Ullman 1945; Christaller 1966). More than that, the invasion of the CBD by urban informality shows the impact of the collapse of the white minority settler regime as a result of the Zimbabwean independence in 1980. Although Eurocentric and colonial planning laws are in place in Zimbabwean cities, their rigid application and enforcement has waned. In this respect, the urban history of Zimbabwe has come to bear in that significant urban informality in the CBD of a city like that of Harare is a recent phenomenon. This, because it was the fall of colonial rule in 1980 as well as the political and economic changes which have occurred in the country, which have made the presence of informality in the CBD (and other parts as discussed further below) of the city Harare inevitable, even if

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it is undesirable (judging by the planning statues and standards and how the city authorities always respond to urban informality as an aberration). SSCs are favourite locational places for operators in the informal economy who live within the vicinities, particularly the urban poor in low income neighbourhoods who prefer operating from places adjacent to their homes. The majority of urban informal economic activities (42.3%) were located on SSCs. Activities that produce high quality products favour places that are frequented by tourists and high income residents, hence they are commonly found in upmarket SSCs and high income areas. The same applies to trading in perishable and high value products such as flowers. Such tendencies are influenced by the desire to reduce costs of transport and improve the profitability of urban informal economic activities (Weber 1929). ICs are the preferred locational places of people involved in the informal economy who require large spaces for their operations and those who seek to benefit from agglomeration economies (McCann 2002). The ICs contained 11.8% of the urban informal economic activities. Informal small-scale producers generally favour home industries and informal markets that are mostly situated in high density residential suburbs (Kamete 2004). Low income residential areas are normally located close to industrial areas to improve the access of workers to their places of employment (Mann 1965). Residents take advantage of their access to industrial areas by engaging in urban informal economic activities that develop linkages with formal economic enterprises, particularly in as far as access to inputs is concerned. Productive activities that also generate a lot of waste and noise are located in these areas. The activities normally cluster at these places, forming informal industrial districts and centres. Classic examples in Harare include Siyaso Magaba in Mbare high density residential areas that is located adjacent to Graniteside industrial areas, and Glenview and Gazaland in Highfields that are located close to Willovale industries. TCs are mostly chosen by informal businesses that require huge concentrations of clientele and lastly homes or open spaces and roads that are normally favoured by informal economic operators that try to avoid rental payments but need ample space that is free and closer to their homes. About 9.2% of urban informal economic activities are located at TCs. Although the geographical distribution of urban informal economic activities cannot neatly and easily be differentiated and explained (Williams and Windebank 1993; Kesteloot and Meert 1999), there are five clear categories of urban informal economic activities in Harare that favour certain locations over others as explained in the preceding parts. There are also interrelationships between different categories and activities of the informal economy in terms of their choice of location. For example, informal markets specialising in fruit and vegetables, new and second hand clothes accommodated 14.3% of the urban informal economic activities and these were commonly found on open spaces within residential areas, such as Mbare retail and farmers’ markets.

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5.4 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises in Harare During the 1980s During the 1980s, the government provided people’s markets in low income residential areas predominantly for fruit and vegetables trading, and recognised the operations of home industries. Informal markets were properly planned following uniform designs and standards signifying the influence of central and local government urban planning standards. The vending stalls were provided with water and toilet facilities for hygienic purposes. The strict adherence to static regulations during the decade was largely informed by urban managerialism and the quest to conceive urban space usage as mechanistic (Harvey 1989; Lefebvre 1991; Becker et al. 1994; Harrison 2006). High income residential areas and formal industrial sites did not have any semblance of the urban informal economic activities during the decade. In Harare, informal markets for vending purposes were built on neighbourhood shopping centres in the western high density residential areas which, among others include Mbare, Mabvuku and Dzivarasekwa (Fig. 5.2). Besides the influence of representations of space by urban planning professionals (Harvey 1973; Merrifield 1993) on the location

Fig. 5.2 Density of informal economic enterprises in Harare between 1980 and 1990 (Source Authors)

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of urban informal economic activities, concentration also resulted from the desire to secure stable markets for goods. As a result, it is clear from Fig. 5.2, that the density of urban informal economic enterprises in the 1980s, was very low compared to the subsequent years, as will be shown in the following parts.

5.5 The Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 1990s The neoliberal economic policies that were adopted by the Zimbabwean government at the beginning of the 1990s resulted in the deregulation and liberalisation of urban informal economic activities operations, leading to their spatial spread (Mhone 1993; Dhemba 1999). A total of 28 Acts that inhibited the operations of urban informal economic activities were reviewed during the 1990s to give latitude to urban informal economic activities (Kanyenze et al. 2003). Specifically, statutory instrument (SI) 216 was passed by parliament in 1994 to deregulate the operations of urban informal economic activities in residential areas and within the CBDs. The urban informal economic activities started invading CBDs and at the same time, emerging in medium and high income areas. GIS analysis revealed increased concentration of urban informal economic activities in residential areas and their spread in new places. The highest density of urban informal economic activities changed from 900 (urban informal economic activities/ha) in the 1980s to 1900 (urban informal economic activities/ha) during the 1990s. This shows substantial change in the concentrations of urban informal economic activities by 111% (Fig. 5.3). The lowest concentration also changed from 120 urban informal economic activities/ha to 150 urban informal economic activities/ha, which was a very low percentage change of 25%. Meanwhile the cities continued to suffer from over-urbanisation. Unskilled people continued to flow into the cities adding to the already large pool of urban labour force compared to the deteriorating formal economy. During the 1990s, the deregulation of the operations of urban informal economic activities such as trading in fruit and vegetables and running tuckshops on residential plots led to the sprouting of HB activities. Poor neighbourhoods remained popular with the urban informal economic activities during the 1990s as high population concentrations within the high density suburbs provided a reliable market for goods and services from urban informal economy. Former employees of the formal economy, who had been retrenched as companies adjusted to neoliberal economic reforms, started operating informal businesses on their residential plots and on open spaces and roads adjacent to their homes. The informal economic operations mostly specialised in carpentry, mechanics, tailoring, metal works, building materials production and hair salons. During the 1990s, most informal trading took place outside designated and legalised sites, making the administration of the activities very difficult. Contrary to in the 1980s

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Fig. 5.3 Density of informal economic enterprises in Harare between 1990 and 2000 (Source Authors)

when there were few urban informal economic activities in the CBDs, the 1990s witnessed widespread spatial location of urban informal economic activities within the Harare city centre, territories which were formerly reserved for the operations of the formal economy. In the context of this discussion, one is reminded of Park’s (1936), human ecology theory which invokes the concepts of invasion, domination, resistance and succession to explain changes in urban land uses. On this basis, Park (1936) asserted that before a land use or activity in an urban area can assert its existence, there were processes of invasion, resistance, succession and domination. A case in point is that, “the so-called natural or functional areas of a metropolitan community - for example, the slum, the rooming-house area, the central shopping section and the banking centre - each and all owe their existence directly to the factor of dominance, and indirectly to competition” (Park 1936: 8). As a result, “the struggle of industries and commercial institutions for a strategic location determines in the long run the main outlines of the urban community” (Park 1936: 8). As a result of this invasion and succession, 22% of the urban informal economic activities were established in the Harare CBD in the 1990. Interviews revealed that informal economic operators preferred to relocate to the city centre as a strategy to increase their market share against the backdrop of stiff competition from new entrants in the sector at SSC (Senior Officer D). The flea markets specialised in selling clothing and footwear, hats, blankets, duvets, bags and hair products. Other markets were established for trading in fruit and vegetables, flowers and curios and crafts.

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Within home industrial centres, 46% of the urban informal economic activities were established during the 1990s. Indigenisation and empowerment policies of the 1990s resulted in increased congestion on existing informal home industrial markets, spatial spread of urban informal economic activities and the extension of the markets. Informal markets such as Siyaso Magaba, Koffman, Marlborough, Gazaland and Warren Park home industries recorded a surge in the number of informal economic operators. Other informal economic operators that specialised in food production, trading in raw materials and spare parts joined traditional informal activities such as carpentry, welding and car repairs, thus transforming the hubs into strong informal ICs. The Harare City Council also responded by establishing home industries in a number of residential areas to relieve congestion. In Harare, Marlborough Home Industry was established to provide space for informal operators in high income residential suburbs that specialised in productive urban informal economic activities such as carpentry, welding and food processing such as milling. This spatial spread of urban informal economic activities witnessed in the 1990s was marked by supportive initiatives of the government in terms of enactment of policies and regulations that encouraged the growth and expansion of informal urban economic activities in urban centres. However, there is need to qualify the evaluation that the government was supportive of the urban informality. In so doing, it is important to state that, the government appeared to be supportive of urban informality because of the economic pressure as a result of the economy which was in tatters. This reality implied that the formal economy drop-outs had to be accommodated in the informal economy, a process facilitated by the state turning a blind eye to urban planning regulations to some extent. However, turning a blind eye did not imply cancellation of the Eurocentric policies and regulations because the same were used by government to justify their brutal responses to urban informality in the 2000s and wherever it becomes convenient and/or politically expedient to do so. In all this we see that the urban history of Zimbabwe, in terms of the colonial and Eurocentric planning laws, which are effectively in place has not only influenced the trajectory of the development of urban informality, but also influences the relationship between the state and actors in the informal economy. For instance, the government of Zimbabwe through the city authorities like that of Harare relies on Eurocentric planning apparatus to regulate the informal economy and by extension relate with the people involved in the economic activity. In one instance, the government can choose to pass a Statutory Instrument (SI) and pretend to be supportive of urban informality at another, they can reverse the statutory instruments and attack the urban informal economy. The classic example of the latter is the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina which literally destroyed the urban informal economy. Therefore, the colonial and urban history of Zimbabwe still lingers to the extent of determining the spatial order and character of urban informal economy (under)development in Zimbabwe. This urban and colonial history is a default urban planning position to which cities always revert to, in case of an upset in the form of the urban informal economy.

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5.6 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 2000s The economic crisis of the 2000s forced informal economic operators (IEOs) to spread out and strategically locate their operations in almost all functional areas of the city, leading to high competition in business and also to unprecedented congestion, particularly in the city of Harare (Fig. 5.4). Most retrenchees operated in the informal economy and also most volunteered to leave their formal jobs to join the informal economy during this decade. It has been very difficult for the Harare city authorities to control trading on undesignated places within the city centre. City authorities responded by creating operating spaces using the powers accorded to them by the Regional, Town and Country Planning (RTCP) Act, chapter 29:12 of 1996 and the Urban Councils Act (ACA), Chapter 29:15 of 197 (GoZ 1996a, b) (Senior Officer E). The RTCP and the UC Acts regard local planning authorities as entities that are independent and empowered to run their own affairs in line with decentralisation and devolution principles (Chatiza 2010; Machingauta 2010; Mushamba 2010). Sections 10 and 11 that falls within part 111 of the RTCP Act (1996) empowers the local authorities to develop and implement master and local plans within their areas

Fig. 5.4 Density of informal economic enterprises in Harare between 2000 and 2020 (Source Authors)

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of jurisdiction (GoZ 1996b). Part V also empowers these city councils to control and guide development in the interest of the public. Also the UC Act (1996) empowers the city councils to make by-laws that regulate the affairs of the cities (GoZ 1996a; Chatiza 2010; Mushamba 2010). GIS analysis reveals that the highest concentration of urban informal economic activities increased from 1900 urban informal economic activities/ha during the 1990s to 2500 urban informal economic activities during the 2000s while the lowest concentrations also changed from 150 urban informal economic activities/ha to 250 urban informal economic activities/ha (Fig. 5.4). In highly congested informal markets, densities increased by 33%, while in previously lowly congested markets the changes were high as they reached 66%. There was also a spatial spread of urban informal economic activities to newly opened markets by various stakeholders in the quest to accommodate the informal economy. The urban informal economic activities are found on almost all functional areas of the cities that include CBDs, residential areas, industrial areas, SSC, open spaces and transportation centres (Fig. 5.4). The spatial spread of the urban informal economic activities can be explained as attempts by operators to maintain distance by locating far away from rivals that specialise in similar products and services, as suggested by literature (Hotelling 1929; Lerner and Singer 1967). In other circumstances, the urban informal economic activities tend to cluster together to take advantage of the market (Eaton and Lipsey 1975). The 2000s witnessed the explosion of urban informal economic activities and their spatial spread to most residential suburbs of the city of Harare. Individuals, private institutions and charity organisations joined the city councils in providing operating space to IEOs. Open spaces, predominantly in the poor neighbourhoods were occupied for the purposes of operating urban informal economic activities. The area around the famous roundabout close to Boka Tobacco Auction was turned into an urban informal economic activities hub. International and local transport operators and the nearby farmers transformed the place into an informal commercial and industrial centre. In Mbare, numerous informal markets were developed during the decade to accommodate farmers and retailers of farm produce. However, the operators have no choice as they face economic hardships and have the responsibility to fend for families, and the need to survive (Zimbabwe Health Matters 2011). During the 2000s the number of urban informal economic activities operating at ICs expanded. This was common at home industry centres such as Siyaso Magaba and Gazaland home industries. Harare City Council leased more land to co-operatives for the purposes of expanding operating spaces and providing space to 47% new urban informal economic activities. In 2005, Glen View 7 home industry was established close to Willovale, a large formal industrial area. The Micro and Small to Medium size Enterprises (MSMEs) partnered with the Harare city council to accommodate victims of operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order (OM/OR). The CSC has been facing serious variability problems; hence part of the premises is currently being used by urban informal economic activities that specialise in carpentry, industrial, chemical, electronic and mechanical engineering (Senior Officer O). The informal operators are former employees of large industrial companies that have closed down in the city.

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The invasion of CBDs by the urban informal economic activities worsened during the 2000s as the formal economy continued to shrink. Foreign migrants that included Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese and Nigerians dominated the trading and commercial urban informal economic activities within the CBD of Harare. They mostly operated semi-formal businesses in compartmentalised and refurbished buildings such as the Gulf Complex. Common goods sold included electrical and electronic goods and clothes. Although sometimes registered and licensed, such urban informal economic activities used informal ways of marketing and displaying their goods, mostly outside their small shops and charged very low prices. About 75% new urban informal economic activities were established during the 2000s within the CBDs. Although such flea markets were a new phenomenon in Zimbabwean urban centres, they are becoming very popular. IEOs also complained of high levies they were asked in order to secure a stall during the weekend. There is also a proliferation of private vehicles that operate as unregistered taxis from city centres servicing areas that are not served or underserved by the formal transportation system, and registered and licensed taxis. Based on the research that was conducted between 2010 and 2012 in Harare, the city had an estimated 5,000 commuter omnibuses of which only 1 835 are registered with the council, and the rest operate informally and this was also confirmed (The Herald 2012). The private sector, particularly property developers also supported efforts of the government to provide working space to the urban informal economic activities. About 75% new urban informal economic activities were established at SSCs in the 2000s. Upmarket shopping centres such as Avondale identified spaces for the urban informal economic activities and at Semi Levy shopping mall the concept of weekend flea markets was adopted for purposes of accommodating urban informal economic activities that sold clothing and footwear. Only a very few shopping centres including High Glen, Westgate and Borrowdale Brooke, still shunned urban informal economic activities. The Harare City council also converted former bus termini at neighbourhood and district shopping centres into informal operating spaces. As a result, 58% of new urban informal economic activities were established at transportation centres during the 2000s. The trend is very common in high density residential areas where there is a high demand for operating spaces. Common urban informal economic activities at these termini are clothing and footwear items and carpentry businesses. Bus termini were used for picking up and dropping workers to and from work by the Zimbabwe Passenger Company (ZUPCO). It was a vibrant national public transport company during the 1980s when formal industries were at their peak. The company and the bus termini lost their vibrancy and relevance after the collapse of the industry after the neoliberal economic reforms of the 1990s. Public transport is currently dominated by the private commuter omnibuses that do not use suburban termini for picking up and dropping passengers, hence their conversion to operating spaces for the informal economy. The main long distance bus termini have also accommodated hundreds of IEOs that sell traditional goods such as agricultural products, simple farming implements, spare parts and odds and ends that are popular with communal farmers. The indigenisation and empowerment policy that were adopted by the government since the late 1990s (DSEI 1997) and was made into law in the 2000s (Kanyenze

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et al. 2011) made it possible for the urban informal economic activities to spread throughout the cities. The laws are sometimes interpreted and implemented on a partisan basis, leading to chaos in the management of operating spaces and the maintenance of order and cleanliness in the cities, particularly in Harare. Such unreasonable interpretation and implementation of laws are what Kamete and Lindell (2010) describe as “the politics of ‘non-planning’ interventions” whereby a planning system with lost potency resorts to non-planning interventions such as the demolition of informal structures in urban areas and the eviction of informal economy operators with the hope of effecting the vision of a context-blind modernist city (Kamete 2017). Such operations are also a result of globalisation in which cities are viewed as economic engines of nations and the associated competition that comes with this reality. Globalisation then forces authorities to use urban planning as a means of preserving and presenting cities as appealing to foreign investors, even at the expense of the livelihoods of locals. This results in “competition states” and “entrepreneurial cities” as the logic of proactive promotion of global economic spaces and places in African cities (Jessop 1997). This generates tension between presenting an appealing self-image of urban economic spaces and the sanitization of urban spaces polluted by urban informal economic activities on the one hand and yet the promotion of local economic development would imply tolerance of urban informal economic activities on the other. Hence, there are instances where authorities have used urban planning rigidity to justify sanitization campaigns and some other times the same authorities would pretend to develop urban spaces for urban informal economic activities.

5.7 Compositional Formality–Informality Interfaces in Harare City The 1990s neoliberal economic reforms resulted in the invasion and spatial spread of urban informal economic activities within city centre of Harare, territories of the formal economy during the 1980s and before independence. The invasion of CBDs generated resentment and repulsion that triggered the “flight” of formal economic enterprises to the edges of the cities. Push factors such as congestion and competition caused by lowly priced informal goods and services, forced large and powerful firms to migrate. Deregulation of urban informal economic activities within city centres resulted in constant modifications of the structure and form of Harare. This resulted in complex characteristics and urban forms of modernism and post-modernism being played out within the city, something which is well established in several studies (see e.g. Harris and Ullman 1945; Herbert and Thomas 1982; White 1987; Paddison 2001; Kaplan et al. 2004; Pacione 2009). The first to react to the invasion of CBDs were retail shops, particularly those that traded in grocery and clothing. Such shops lost customers to informal traders, and later financial, insurance and other office and light industrial businesses also felt the heat.

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In Harare city it was established that 4.7% of the formal economic enterprises were located in upmarket SSCs that include Semi Levy, Borrowdale Brooke, Westgate and High Glen in Harare. The enterprises comprised of 64.3% trade and commerce, 7.1% manufacturing and processing, 21.4% personal services and 7.1% transport and communication sub-sectors. The shopping complexes were mostly built in high income suburbs to target the rich who live there. Only a few of the SSCs were built in medium and low income residential areas. The invasion of CBDs prompted formal economic enterprises to leave, which in turn resulted in the CBDs losing firms to other functional areas of the city. It was found in the study that CBDs were host to 35.7% of the formal economic enterprises. The city centres accommodated 55.1% of the trade and commerce businesses, 27.2% of personal services, 8.4% of manufacturing and processing, 6.8% of transport and communication and 1.9% of construction enterprise in the formal economy. Industrial centres are traditional sites for formal economic enterprises, as a result 48% of them still operated from industrial centres. They accommodated 47.9% of the manufacturing and processing, 27.1% trade and commerce, 16% personal services, 6.3% transport and communication and 2.8% construction enterprises in the formal economy. However most of the manufacturing and processing and also construction and building enterprises are operating below capacity, most of them at less than half of their 1980s status (GoZ 2012). As the traditional land zones such as the CBDs were invaded by the urban informal economic activities, 8.3% of the formal economic enterprises found refuge within suburbs adjacent to the city centres. Mostly medium density houses were converted to office use due to their proximity to the CBDs and environments conducive to doing businesses. The suburbs accommodated 16% of the manufacturing and processing, 36% of the trade and commerce, 40% of the personal services as well as 8% of the transport and communication sub-sectors of the formal economy. Innovative operating spaces for the formal economic enterprises outside the CBDs also included business, office and industrial parks. These accommodated 3.3% of the formal economic enterprises. In Harare, industrial parks such as the Prospect and Bluffhill, business parks such as Mt Pleasant, and office parks such as Arundel were developed for the purposes of providing operational space to formal economic enterprises. However, in a notable development, 20% of the manufacturing and processing businesses, 40% of the trade and commerce enterprises, 30% of the personal services in the urban informal economy were located within the business, office and industrial parks. All this demonstrates not only the compositional formality–informality interfaces in Harare city, but also the spatio-temporal dimension integral to these transformations. For these reasons, it is suggested that, in Harare, the informal economy has been changing over time, not in terms of location but also in terms of composition. These changes have had a fundamental bearing on many facets of the structure of informal businesses and their functions. In turn, the changes have led to the blurring of the distinction between formal and informal urban economic activities.

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5.8 Conclusion The Zimbabwean urban informal economy has been evolving since the country attained independence in 1980. In response to political and economic transformations, the phenomenon has been occupying places that were regarded as the preserve of its formal economic sector counterpart. The spatial restriction of economic activities was based on colonial urban planning laws in which urban informality was considered to be an exception. And these colonial urban planning apparatuses have continued in the post-independence period in Zimbabwe. But it is the devastating impacts of the economic collapse in Zimbabwe leading to the growth of urban informality which has meant that even if Eurocentric planning regimes has endured in postindependence Zimbabwe, urban informality has been difficult to tame and spatially confine, hence the phenomenon is everywhere. In this we posit that, in the case of Zimbabwe and Harare city specifically, its urban and colonial history together with the post-independence ideological and political and economic policies have mutated to determine how and where urban informality develops. In other words, there is a spatial dimension to the changing characteristics of the urban informal economic activities in Harare city. And this spatial dimension of urban informality is linked to the changing political and economic history, which is generally classified into; spatial spread of informal economic enterprises in Harare during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. This shows that urban land uses are inherently mobile in behaviour, which materialises in various ways under different contexts (Sangwan and Sangwan 2016). Thus demonstrating how the temporal, spatial and structural linkages between the urban informal economic activities and their formal economic counterparts have evolved, grown and spread in and their impact on shaping and restructuring urban economies in Harare. Thus, urban informality in Harare in particular have evolved in tandem with political and economic changes and this has implicated not only on the spatial characteristics, but also on the compositional formal–informality nexus. In doing so, the chapter illuminates the importance of the historical and politico-economic factors in shaping the spatiality and compositional formality-–informality interfaces in Harare city.

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Chapter 6

Rising Informality and Role in Shaping Economies in Johannesburg City

Abstract In this chapter, we emphasise that urban informality has not only created employment opportunities for the rising urban population but also contributed to the growth of the city of Johannesburg’s economy and also significantly contributed to the livelihoods of many people, especially the unemployed and urban poor. There is also an attempt to provide some insights into the sectoral dimensions of informal livelihoods and economic activities. For example, the question of whether informal workers are engaged only in specific job sectors is tackled. In addition, the demographic skew in terms of the involvement of women for example in urban informality is also discussed. As a result, the question of whether or not there are economic activities in which women are the main sectors is addressed. Similarly, the temporality of the economic activities in this UEI and evidence of the formal/informal interfaces of the economic activities in question are discussed. Keywords Urban economy · Urban informality · Urban formal economy · Johannesburg

6.1 Introduction In chapters two and four, we discussed the factors which have led to the rise of urban informality in Africa in general and South Africa and Zimbabwe specifically. The discussion on South Africa focused on few selected examples of cities such as Johannesburg. Regarding Johannesburg, it was outlined that before 1994, urban informality was limited and an economic activity which was preserved for whites (Rogerson 1996; Rogerson and Rogerson 1996, 1997). This segregated urban space was deregulated in 1994, leading to the emergence of urban informality in areas such as Johannesburg inner city by black people. At the same time, the post-apartheid dispensation, also led to an increase in the number of foreign migrants who could participate in urban informality based on that, generally, there was increased migration into South Africa after apartheid was dethroned (Rogerson 1996, 1997; Rogerson and Rogerson 1996, 1997; Ihenduru 1998).

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6_6

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Therefore, it is important to stress that in this chapter the growth in urban informality in Johannesburg city generally refers to the urban informal economic activity as practiced by both foreign nationals and South African citizens. And it should also be understood that while in areas like Johannesburg inner city foreign migrants are of a significant proportion, this activity has also involved black South Africans after 1994 (Rogerson 1997). On this basis, in this chapter we are therefore not repeating what has been discussed particularly in chapters two and four, or even better presented elsewhere, but reiterate that, while in South Africa and Zimbabwe urban informality continues to be regarded as the second economy, the role that it plays in the economy of cities is significant. With particular reference to Johannesburg city, we emphasise that urban informality has not only created employment opportunities for the rising urban population but also contributed to the growth of the city of Johannesburg’s economy and also significantly contributed to the livelihoods of many people, especially the unemployed and urban poor. In addition, there is an attempt in this chapter to provide some insights into the sectoral dimensions of informal livelihood and economic activities. For example, the question of whether informal workers engaged only in specific job sectors is tackled. Similarly, the demographic skew in terms of the involvement of women for example in urban informality is also discussed. As a result, the question of whether there are economic activities in which women are the main actors is addressed. Similarly, the temporality and evidence of the formal/informal interfaces of the economic activities in question are discussed.

6.2 Urban informality and the Johannesburg City Economy: Sectoral Dimensions of Informal Livelihood and Economic Activities Over two decades ago, Rogerson and Rogerson (1997), noted that in Johannesburg city areas like the Johannesburg inner city were characterised by booming and different types of enterprises from survivalist, to micro and small enterprises. A study which was done about two decades later actually established that currently there was a stratospheric rise in urban informal activities by both South African citizens and foreign migrants (Moyo 2017). In addition to this, there was in some cases a strong and positive relationship between some of the foreign migrant enterprises and those of South Africans. This was demonstrated by among others, that some South African citizens had been assisted by foreign migrants from countries such as DRC, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe to set up business in the Johannesburg inner city economy (Moyo 2017). These business engaged in making beadwork and manufacturing of items like sandals as well as the buying and selling of various goods such as cosmetics, vegetables, electrical goods and kitchenware, clothes and consumable goods and vegetables. This on its own suggests an expansion of the informal economy in Johannesburg inner city (Moyo 2017).

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Given the meteoric rise in urban informality, it is relevant to briefly discuss the sectoral dimensions of these informal economic enterprises in Johannesburg inner city. Both foreign migrants and South African citizens operated enterprises which specialised in a wide variety of activities. That said, it needs highlighting that there were differences and similarities between enterprises operated by foreign migrants and South African citizens just as much as there were differences within foreign migrants and South African citizens themselves (Moyo 2017). There are many cases which can be provided to illustrate this point, such as beadwork, embroidery, handmade sandals and traditional clothes, cell phones and cell phone accessories, trade in ladies‘ shoes and hair products as well as different types of bedding, which were associated with foreign migrant enterprises (Moyo 2017). Explanations for this include the fact that, some of the foreign migrants indicated that, the chosen lines of business were informed by previous experience in the country of origin. This particularly applied to the enterprises which repaired cell phones and sold cell phone accessories. In the case of enterprises owned by South African nationals, they generally traded in spices, Compact Discs (CDs) and Digital Video Discs (DVDs), earrings, electrical appliances, sunglasses and hair braiding products and the explanation for engaging in this line of business was that it was easy to start (Moyo 2017). Other differences between enterprises owned and operated by foreign migrants and those by South African nationals is that the former operated mostly from rented shops, whereas the majority of South Africans operated from trading stalls. This was one of the reasons why some of the South African nations were unhappy that foreign nationals who had shops from which to operate had an advantage in that customers tended to prefer buying from them. There were also reports that some of the foreign nationals actually owned some buildings and therefore rented space to fellow migrants, which created unhappiness of the part of South African informal economic actors in Johannesburg inner city (Moyo 2017). During field surveys and observations by the authors, it was gathered that in areas around Bree and Jeppe Streets in Johannesburg inner city, Somalis and Ethiopians owned some of the buildings and on the basis of this rented to their fellow compatriots, which explains why in this part of Johannesburg inner city there was a characteristic concentration of Ethiopians and Somalis who operated in the informal economy. Further, the matter of foreign migrants owning and operating from shops and/or buildings against their South African counterparts actually made the latter to be unhappy. They questioned where the foreign migrants sourced the money to not only rent shops but also owned buildings, when South African did not (Moyo 2017). Since, urban informality in areas like Johannesburg inner city involved predominantly black South African citizens, we posit that the lack of financial capacity is historical because of apartheid discrimination and marginalisation, which led to limited access to financial resources by black people even after 1994. Thus, even if space was desegregated in 1994, that did not always translate to financial access by black South African citizens leading them operating from stalls and with limited capital. In this, we see the impact of the urban and political history of South Africa implicating on the characteristics of urban informality by black South African citizens in Johannesburg inner city. As for the foreign migrants, a significant number of

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them had migrated with financial resources into a space which had been desegregated leading to them using their financial resources to outcompete South African citizens in terms of access to and operating from shops. The legacy of the apartheid minority regime on the financial capacity and participation of black South African citizens considered, there were also similarities between the enterprises owned by foreign migrants and South African citizens, such as selling clothes and consumable goods. In the case of clothes both foreign migrants and South African citizens stated that they imported these at a relatively lower price which allowed them to trade and make a profit. On the matter of consumable goods, it needs emphasis that “African immigrant traders mostly served dishes that catered for their fellow countrymen, whereas South African traders catered for a large customer base, including hundreds of taxi drivers and other street traders and indeed African immigrant traders as well”. And this is why there were more South African nationals who operated shops selling foods as compared to those of foreign migrants (Moyo 2017: 113). Beyond these general differences between enterprises operated by foreign migrants and South African nationals, there were also differences within what foreign migrant businesses actually sold. A case in point is that “cell phone and cell phone accessories shops were operated by Nigerians, beadwork and embroidery by Ghanaians and Tanzanians. Somalis mostly specialised in selling clothes, blankets and a variety of household goods. It would seem as though these had had previous experience in their countries of origin. Somalis claimed that they imported their goods (clothes, blankets, shoes and different types of household goods) from China in larger quantities, which explains why they sold them at very low prices” (Moyo 2017: 113). In addition to this, it is instructive to note that, some migrants from countries like DRC, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe were not associated with any particular product, because they traded in almost everything in an attempt to catch as many customers as was possible on any given day (Moyo 2017). Concerning differences and similarities within enterprises operated by South African citizens, the study by Moyo (2017) demonstrates that in Johannesburg inner city informal economy, all South African provinces were represented as described in the preceding part, but some characteristic features were that women from the Province of KwaZulu-Natal specialised in selling food and spices and men from Limpopo who repaired radios. It is also relevant to add the gender dimension in the analysis of the similarities and differences between and within enterprises owned by foreign migrants and those of their South African counterparts. A few examples will be used to demonstrate this theme. First, the aspect of foreign migrants, in which it was noted that, in general, there were more men than women whom were involved in the informal economy in Johannesburg inner city (Moyo 2017). But this general pattern hides specific details which need commentary, so as to highlight and qualify the stated general gender patterns and dimensions. For example, while foreign migrants from West Africa who engaged in urban informality in Johannesburg inner city were mostly men both women and men from the SADC region were significant in this activity. A possible explanation for this could be that distance and cost influenced decision for men to migrate more than women, whereas for migrants from the SADC region, the distance was less and the cost relatively low, which influenced both men and women to migrate.

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Besides, the SADC region is characterised by a long history of migration, both into an out of South Africa (Crush et al. 2005). This suggests a well-established pattern of migration in the region and thus the increased numbers of men and women who migrate to countries like South Africa should not be suprising (Crush et al. 2005). The question of what male and female foreign migrant enterprises specialised on arises and need consideration. It was noted that women tended to dominate in those enterprises which specialised in hair products as well as selling vegetables. In these lines of business migrants from the DRC, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were leading in this sector in Johannesburg inner city (Moyo 2014, 2017; Field observation and interviews, July 2019). It was noted that this was the case because it was relatively easy to start these enterprises. In fact, some of the female migrants actually either sold hair products from the pavements or attended to their customers on the same pavements. This contributed to congestion on the streets as well as making the streets dirty and in addition also violated municipal regulations on the prohibition of any trading activity within five metres of any road intersection (Moyo 2017). This has led to the accusation that foreign migrants in Johannesburg inner city have led to the degeneration of the area and/or its ghettoization, which asseveration only partially captures the dynamics, because South African nationals also did the same (Moyo 2017). However, some women from countries like Somalia and Ethiopia dominated selling of different types of clothes. For example, a significant number of shops along Jeppe street in Johannesburg inner city were operated by female Somali and Ethiopian migrants. In addition, some of the women also worked with their husbands and/or male relatives and friends (Field observation and interviews, July 2019). On the matter of male foreign migrant enterprise owners in Johannesburg inner city, it was noted that they specialised on a wide variety of activities. Male foreign migrants from countries like, Zimbabwe, DRC, Malawi and Tanzania operated barber shops. Like their female counterparts, they indicated that it was relatively easy to start this type of business. In addition to this, a significant number of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans also operated car repair/maintenance workshops and interviews established that this is what such migrants trained for or used to do back in their countries of origin. Added to this category were Ghanaians and some Nigerians who explained that they had previously been involved in and understood this line of business (Field observation and interviews, July 2019). Some male Ethiopians, Ghanaians and Nigerians also ran big shops which sold different types of clothing, blankets, kitchenware and groceries. But some of the distinctive shops which sold clothing were those which were owned by Ghanaians. These shops sold traditional West African attire. In addition, some of the men, such as Nigerian and Ghanaians had shops which made sandals (Moyo 2017). Further, other foreign migrant men had businesses which offered specialist services such as a Nigerian man who owned a courier company. This company focused on the remittances of goods and money to West Africa as well as other parts of Africa. The Nigerian owner asserted that, he was making good profits because his services were in high demand as many migrants in Johannesburg city always wanted to remit cash and/or goods back to their countries of origin (Moyo 2017). In the case of South African nationals, there was a significant involvement of both

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men and women in the informal sector activities. But women tended to dominate in the selling of vegetables as well as selling food. As a result, streets like Bree and Jeppe had significant number of South African women who prepared and sold grilled meat and thick porridge (pap) (Moyo 2017; Moyo et al. 2016, 2018). Some South African men operated shops, which also sold a variety of goods such as clothing. Just like the foreign migrant men, South African men also operated shops which made and sold traditional attire. Others also made sandals, just like their West African counterparts (Moyo 2014, 2017). A final comment on the gendered dimension of the informal sector generally reveals that there was a variety of products in which men were involved in trading, whereas there was a generally limited range for female foreign migrant enterprise owners.

6.3 On the Debate on Urban Informality and Employment Creation As a consequence of urban informality, Johannesburg has assumed a new physical and business character, with streets lined with informal sector entrepreneurs, who sell fruits, vegetables, bags, shoes, clothes, cooked foods and other goods occupying space which was left by white enterprises (Rogerson 1997; Peberdy 2000; Rogerson and Rogerson 1997). The question which then arises is the extent to which these informal enterprises contributed to the economy of the city in terms of employment creation and sustenance of livelihoods, among other aspects which are in the following parts. There is a significant amount of literature which suggests that urban informality in general creates employment (Bridges et al. 1998; Spring and MacDade 1998; MacGaffey 1998; Rogerson 2000; Parker 2009). Since in Johannesburg city, there is mixture of informal enterprises by both South African nationals as well as foreign migrants from Africa and beyond (Rogerson and Rogerson 1997; Rogerson 1997; Moyo et al. 2016, 2018; Moyo 2017), there is need to understand the patterns of employment in terms of who South African and foreign migrant enterprises involved in urban informality actually employed. Several studies in Johannesburg inner city have demonstrated that foreign migrant enterprises actually provided employment for South African citizens as well as other fellow migrants (see, e.g., Rogerson 1997; Rogerson and Rogerson 1997; Moyo et al. 2016, 2018; Moyo 2017). For example, in a study of 70 immigrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg Central Business District (CBD), Rogerson (1997) discovered that migrant informal enterprises had created 227 jobs. Likewise, Kalitanyi and Visser’s (2010) study in Cape Town shows that migrant informal enterprises actually created employment. Similarly, studies by Moyo (2017), Moyo et al. (2016, 2018) in Johannesburg inner city show similar results. The implication of this is that, these informal enterprises actually provided livelihoods for a significant population of South African citizens in the Johannesburg city generally and Johannesburg inner city specifically (Moyo 2017).

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This is important to highlight in that, field observations by the authors which is corroborated by other studies (see, e.g., Rogerson 1997; Moyo 2017) appear to suggest that in Johannesburg inner city, foreign migrant informal enterprises appear to be significantly higher in number than those of their South African counter parts. And this suggests the impact of these informal enterprises in terms of employment creation may be significantly high (Moyo 2017). Even though the salaries may be low and the working conditions and benefits below standard when compared to the big companies, this criticism must not be overdone (Parker 2009), because these jobs support families and can improve household incomes and the quality of life (Spring and MacDade 1998) and over time these enterprises can grow into big businesses (Cross and Waldinger 2002). Indeed, Cross and Waldinger (2002) argue that the portrayal of migrant enterprises as places where there is rampant exploitation is unwarranted because of the positive impacts that they have. In fact, a study which deployed a Deridian deconstructivist approach in the study of informal enterprises in Johannesburg inner city by Moyo (2017) appears to show that although the issue of employment creation by foreign migrants and in particular those from the African continent was complex, in that it was accompanied both positive and negative aspects, some of the South African citizens were grateful for the employment which these actors provided. This is precisely because urban informality by these means actually supported livelihoods of a segment of the South African population. In addition, informal enterprises by South African citizens themselves also played an equally important role in terms of the creation of employment as well as sustaining livelihoods. One feature around urban informality and employment creation, which deserves consideration is the demographic characteristics of the employees in the informal sector. It was noted that, it was mostly the youth, both male and female South African citizens and foreign nationals whom were employed in the informal sector. It was observed by the authors during the filed survey in July 2019, that most of the Somali and Ethiopian shops on the most crowded parts of Jeppe and Bree streets actually employed young boys, but in the “quieter” parts of these same streets, it was not uncommon to find young female employees. It can be suggested that, this was based on the perceived ability of the younger men to handle many people including identifying and assisting in apprehending shoplifters. That aside, the provision of employment for the young people, appears to illustrate that the informal sector actually played an important role in terms of tackling unemployment in a country like South Africa, which suffers from high levels of youth unemployment (Daniel 2018).

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6.4 Rejuvenation or Degeneration of the Johannesburg City Economy? Moyo (2017) demonstrated a complex scenario on whether foreign migrant enterprises rejuvenated or debilitated the Johannesburg city economy. The author illustrated that as a result of the presence of foreign migrants from many African countries, some buildings which had gone into dilapidation had either been bought or renovated by the foreign migrants such as the Ethiopians and Somalis. The renovated buildings were converted into shops, which provided a variety of goods to the consumers in the area in question. And this stirred a hive of trading activities in an area which could have easily gone into a slum. But the underside of this is that, there are some activities which actually undermined efforts at the rejuvenation of the Johannesburg inner city economy. These included illegal activities as well as land pollution, among others (Moyo 2017). This also applied to those which were operated by South African citizens, which meant that it was too simplistic to accuse foreign migrants of running down the Johannesburg inner city (Moyo 2017). That notwithstanding, it has been noted that urban informality has indeed revitalised the economy in terms of increasing the volume and magnitude of economic activity. This is measured by the sheer numbers of informal enterprises which have significantly increased in size as well as scale of operations. This is worth noting because business activities in the Johannesburg inner city were operative throughout the year. In other words, there was no seasonality to the operation of the enterprises, which means that the booming economic activities were an all year round phenomenon and so were the benefits to the economy of the city of Johannesburg. Further, urban informality has also introduced a variety of goods from many parts of Africa and the world and by extension provided choice for South African consumers. The same study by Moyo (2017) also showed that on the issue of the provision of choice for consumers, some members of the population in Johannesburg inner city such as South African citizens were happy that they now had access to a variety of goods and they could afford the same because of the relatively lower prices at which these goods were sold. But of course there was the assertion that these goods were of a lower quality, which is why they were cheap. However, the urban poor who bought these goods were of the view that quality was relative and they were happy with the quality of the goods which they bought (Moyo 2017). Therefore, while it is accepted that the issue of the extent to which urban informality has rejuvenated or debilitated areas like Johannesburg inner city is debatable, just as much as it is complex, the reality on the ground is increased economic activity as well as the provision of a variety of goods at relatively lower prices to the consumers the majority of whom are the urban poor. This developmental impact of urban informality resonates with the conclusion which was made by Rogerson (1997), that foreign migrant informal enterprises played an important role in revitalising the inner city businesses. Similarly, Bates (2006) also asserts that migrant enterprises have the capacity of promoting economic development in poor neighbourhoods.

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6.5 The Formality–Informality Interface in Johannesburg City In a study of urban informality in the DRC, MacGaffey (1998) illustrated that there was an inextricable link between the so-called formal economy and the informal economy or the first economy and second economy, respectively. Likewise, Rogerson (1997) also suggested similar patterns in Johannesburg. It is therefore important for this chapter to reflect on this, in terms of how it materialised in a place like Johannesburg inner city for example. There is a close link between urban informal economic enterprises in Johannesburg inner city and the formal economy. These connections exist at various levels. Enterprises selling different types of fruits and vegetables actually sourced their agricultural produce from formal outlets such as the agricultural markets in Johannesburg. Other enterprises such as those which traded in cosmetics, hair products and kitchenware among other products actually bought their goods from the many wholesalers around the city of Johannesburg (Moyo 2014, 2017). The important point to highlight in this regard is that the informal economy actually injected significant amount of money into the formal economy and by these means, existence of the latter was directly linked to the former (Moyo 2017). This observation resonates with comparable findings such as those of Cohen (2010), Dwyer (2010), and Mapadimeng (2011). In addition, the fact that informal economic enterprises bought their goods from formal wholesalers around Johannesburg suggests a contribution to the economy of the city of Johannesburg economy in terms of revenue generation such as Value Added Tax (VAT). This is a type of indirect tax levied on goods and services by the national government (Black et al. 1999, 2003). It is a way of collecting revenue from people with small incomes and those who are not captured by the tax bracket with the aim of making all the people in a country contribute to “the upkeep of the government” (Black et al. 1999: 196; 2003: 198). Research suggests that VAT has the capacity to generate more revenue compared to the old sales tax, hence Black et al. (1999: 199; 2003: 201) argue that VAT has attained the reputation of being a “money machine". Revenue raised in this way is very vital in terms of financing government expenditure and correcting problems linked to market failure as well as providing public goods like roads, street lighting, law and order and defence. These services are needed for an economy to function properly and for that to happen revenue is needed to finance government intervention. Such are not provided by the private sector because of the lack of incentives. These realities dismiss as simplistic the assumptions of the dualist and structuralist explanations of urban informality. As explained in chapter 1, the dualist perspective on urban informality assumes that the phenomenon is primitive, backward and separate from the formal sector and it was expected that, in the process of time this would fade away and eventually disappear (Furnivall 1939, 1941; Boeke 1953; Lewis 1954; Geertz 1963). But evidence in Johannesburg inner city indicate and illustrates the opposite in terms of a strong linkage between the two sectors, such that they are mutually dependent. Likewise, the structuralist conceptualisation

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of urban informality views it as a product of the failure of the formal economy (Portes et al. 1989; Meagher 1995, 2008; Williams 2010). Based on the evidence presented in this section, that the urban informal sector was dynamically linked to the formal economy and that the linkage was mutually beneficial suggest a strong existence, which is neither dualistic nor structural. In addition, and as discussed in Chapter 4, there is evidence that, in Johannesburg inner city some foreign migrant enterprises such as those owned by Nigerians, Tanzanians, Ghanaians, Malawians and Zimbabweans were transnational in terms of buying goods from Johannesburg city and reselling them in different parts of Africa (Moyo 2017). What is clear in this transnational pattern is that foreign migrants exported goods which they bought from wholesalers in and around the Johannesburg inner city. As Peberdy and Rogerson (2003) have correctly observed, this provided easy channels for export of South African goods to the African market. In this scenario; it is not the government, South African companies and/or wholesalers that were importing and exporting these goods, but African immigrant traders in the Johannesburg inner city. On a very small scale, this demonstrates a positive economic benefit to those wholesalers and industries in the Johannesburg inner city from which goods are exported. Furthermore, the consumers in general also benefited from tastes (imports) from other countries on the African continent. This aspect suggests that the import and export activities of the African immigrant traders are integrated with the economies of the Johannesburg inner city, thus further highlighting an interface between the formal and informal economy. (Moyo 2017: 144)

In addition to this, “the importing of goods from other African countries to and exporting of goods from South Africa demonstrates that the African immigrant traders were integrating the economic activities of the African countries concerned. This seems to be in keeping with the stated objectives of the African Union as highlighted in the Abuja Treaty” (Moyo 2017: 145). The Abuja Treaty declares the objective of the African Union (AU) to establish an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028 and this is predicated on Regional Economic Community (RECs) such s Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 1991). As a result, “when African immigrant traders from Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe import goods from their countries and also export South African goods, this can be considered as integrating the SADC region economically. This enhances functional interdependency between the South African companies in the Johannesburg inner city and consumers in other African countries. This is because these African immigrant traders sell their goods from their own countries in South Africa and they do the same to South African goods in their countries. Such is grassroots economic integration and this is in line with the both the objectives of the AU and SADC” (Moyo 2017: 145). For this reason, urban informality should of necessity be seen as “a series of transactions that connect different economies and spaces to

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one another” (Roy and AlSayyad 2004 cited in Roy 2005: 148). In Johannesburg inner city, we see this connection unravelling in the manner that informal actors buy from formal establishments and the businesses of these actors exist on the basis of mutual business transactions and engagements. In addition, the government through revenue generation also benefit from the urban informal economic sector as explained in this section. This therefore means that, the so-called formal, informal, the poor and the elite are drawn together, intentionally or unintentionally into an assemblage of activities and transactions in the economy of Johannesburg city.

6.6 Conclusion This chapter set out to illustrate and amplify the arguments which were introduced in the previous chapters about the growth of urban informality in Johannesburg city and how this has implicated on the economy of the city. Drawing on case studies of the Johannesburg inner city, this chapter showed that urban informality in this region is dominated by both foreign migrants as well as South African nationals. And the significant increase in this activity was recorded soon after 1994 as a result of the desegregation of urban spaces consequent upon the demise of the apartheid legislation which had enforced separate development. As a result of this, many towns and cities in South Africa including Johannesburg were forbidden places and spaces. The change in 1994 as indicated earlier led to the proliferation of urban informality such that the physical appearance of Johannesburg inner city changed dramatically. In a short period of time, the streets were lined with a variety of informal business ranging from survivalist to small enterprises (Rogerson and Rogerson 1996, 1997; Rogerson 1997; Ihenduru 1998). Taken together, all this shows that there is indeed an apartheid legacy in the nature of current growth and manifestation of urban informality in a setting like Johannesburg inner city. It was also noted that urban informality is linked to the formal sector at the level of buying and selling of goods. This can be taken to suggest that some formal businesses in Johannesburg city actually stood on the foundation and support and patronage of the informal sector. This challenges the facile assumptions of the dualist and structuralist conceptualisations of urban informality which see the activity as separate from the formal sector and an outcome of the failure of the formal economy, respectively. What is even significant is the cross-border dimension of informality which connects cities, countries and actors, both poor and rich, formal and informal. This further suggests that urban informality is a phenomenon, that is characteristic of the urbanisation process in the Global South (Roy 2005) more than a setting, outcome or sector (Banks et al. 2019).

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Chapter 7

The Spatial Configuration and Reconfiguration in Bulawayo City: Regarding the Impact of Politico-Economic Ideologies

Abstract This chapter examines the spatial linkages of urban formal–informal economies in a post-colonial setting such as that of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe‘s second largest city. The aim in this attempt is linking the temporal, spatial and structural linkages between the informal economic enterprises (IEEs) that have grown and spread in urban centres and their formal economic enterprises (FEEs) to political and economic ideological changes. In this context, it is argued that, the linkages between the IEEs and FEEs shows that, the ideological changes and/or shifts in Zimbabwe largely explain the spatial configuration and reconfiguration in Bulawayo city in terms of the relationship between the urban formal and informal economy. Keywords Urban informality · Ideology · Spatial configuration · Reconfiguration · Bulawayo city

7.1 Introduction This chapter examines the spatial linkages of urban formal–informal economies in a postcolonial setting such as that of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe‘s second-largest city. The aim in this attempt is linking the temporal, spatial and structural linkages between the informal economic enterprises (IEEs) that have grown and spread in urban centres and their formal economic enterprises (FEEs) to political and economic ideological changes. In other words, how have the urban history, the political economy and the current political and economic policies shaped and restructured urban informality in relationship to the urban formal economy in Bulawayo? Consequently, the focus is on the growth of the phenomenon and the spatial linkages that were created with the formal counterpart over a period of 30 years, from 1981 to 2012. This chapter utilises the spatial triad or triadic theory by Henry Lefebvre (Lefebvre 1991), to analyse the usage of and changes in space and linkages between the IEEs and their formal counterparts. Three main concepts are central to the triadic theory and these are conceived space/representation of space, perceived space/spatial practices and lived space/spaces of representation (Watkins 2005; Zhang 2006; Jabareen 2014). Conceived space is the space “constructed out of symbols, codifications, and abstract © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6_7

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representations” and are “thus the manifest representation of our mental constructs of the spaces of our rational, abstract understandings” (Watkins 2005: 212). This means that “conceived space is entirely ideational, made up of projections into the empirical world from conceived or imagined geographies” (Jabareen 2014: 420). The implication of this is that urban planners and informal actors may have different conceived spaces, because “conceived and abstract space subsumes ideology and knowledge within its practice” (Jabareen 2014: 420). If this is the case, urban planners may have scripts about concepts of space that are different from those of informal actors and this may lead to clashes and conflict. This occurs because “informality is a product of the people, […but planners…] plan and build informality according to their desire and conception”. This may be a source of tension as “there is a conflict between the state (with its experts and planners) and the people concerning the manner in which each party perceives these places”. The result is that “informal spaces are perceived by the state and its formal institutions as illegal entities. Because of their illegal status, they are ‘punished’ or even demolished” (Jabareen 2014: 420). Concerning this chapter, the concept of conceived spaces or abstract spaces is used to understand how urban planning and management officials represent and portray maps and documents about the use of space in urban centres for both the formal economic sector (FES) and the urban informal economy. In this context, we are led to ask if the conceived space of urban planners includes informality or such conceptions have clashed or indeed reached a compromise with that of the informal actors. In the case of clash or compromise, the question of the role that ideology has played and how this has materialised spatially and structurally is examined. Perceived space “is the learnt, but often eventually intuitive, spatial practices that enable individuals to participate effectively in a spatial event” (Watkins 2005: 213). This means that “people’s perceptions condition their daily realities with respect to the usage of spaces; for example, their routes, networks and patterns of interaction link together places set aside for work, play and leisure. Spatial practices structure daily life and the broader urban reality” (Jabareen 2014: 418). In this regard, the perceived space or the spatial practices are the perceptions of the governed that condition their daily reality (Lefebvre 1991; Merrifield 1993; Pacione 2009). This includes people’s networks and patterns of interaction that structure their urban reality. The concept is applied in this chapter to understand the operations of both formal and informal enterprises, particularly their compositional characteristics. In this way, it appears as if perceived space is linked to conceived space to the extent that spatial practices are drawn from “the abstract representations of the spatial event, and the routines and understandings which they serve to shape—[…] spatial practices” (Watkins 2005: 213). In this chapter, we are led to ask what influence the urban planners have on urban informality and whether the informal actors follow their own abstract ideas in engaging in spatial practices. Do the urban planners consider informality to be illegal, which needs to be disciplined and conform to the acceptable form and standards of the city? What effects has this had spatially and structurally?

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Lived space is “the space of lived experience…as such it is the space that overlays physical space as it is lived in the everyday course of life…it is the spaces of representation that forms, informs and facilitates the deviations, diversity and individuality that are a fundamental aspect of any social encounter” (Watkins 2005: 213). This means that spaces of representation as spaces of everyday life should reflect on what people actually do on the ground. The idea of lived space is employed so as to understand the actual responses by both the IEE and FEE to political and economic ideologies during the 30-year period. The urban economic restructuring that was brought about as a result of ideological changes is largely understood through the application of this segment of Lefebvre’s urban theory. Hence we are led to ask, have the activities of formal and urban informal economies been constrained or enabled by urban planners and if not, has this led to the evolution and spatial and structural re-patterning economic activities in Bulawayo? It appears as if the three concepts of conceived, perceived and lived spaces could assist a chapter of this nature to shed light on political and economic processes that are embedded in matters of experiences, perceptions and imaginations to produce and reproduce urban spaces (Merrifield 1993; Pacione 2009). This is important to emphasise because space is socially constructed through processes such as social translations, transformations and experiences over abstract space that is designed by professionals (Bourdieu 2018). This is why data which informs insights in this chapter was gathered through a variety of data collection and analysis methods so as to illuminate the linkages between the two economic sectors from different angles. For instance, a cross tabulation of the location and the various categories of informal economic businesses was done. Sectoral aggregation involved the grouping of economic activities into five sub-sectors, which include manufacturing and processing, trading and commerce, personal services, transportation and communication and lastly building and construction. On the other hand, spatial aggregation involved dividing locational areas of both FEEs and IEEs into five categories that included the (CBDs), suburban shopping centres (SSCs), industrial centres (ICs), and transportation centres (TCs) and home based (HB) and open air markets. A cross tabulation of formal business categories and their locational places was also run in the SPSS to give a summary of the different formal activities that are dominant at different locations. Hence, categories of formal economic businesses that included trade and commerce, manufacturing and processing, personal services, transportation and communication and building and construction were maintained for the study of the formal sector, while five functional land uses that included the city centres (CBDs), industrial centres (ICs), suburban shopping centres (SSCs), transportation centres (TCs), homes and open air markets were studied. Observations of the spatial linkages between the two economic sectors were also made, while the spatial location of businesses was captured using a global positioning system (GPS). Geographic information technology (GIT) was used to overlay spatial data to reveal the locational linkages that have been created between the two economic sectors over the three decades.

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7.2 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 1980s The neat and ordered spatial distributions of IEEs indicate strict adherence to urban planning regulations, in continuity with the British planning system (Rakodi 1995, 2001; Bryceson 2006). This can be demonstrated by a brief discussion of suburban peoples‘ markets and home industries in Bulawayo during the 1980s. During the 1980s, the government provided people’s markets in low income residential areas predominantly for fruit and vegetables trading, and recognised the operations of home industries. Informal markets were properly planned following uniform designs and standards signifying the influence of central and local government urban professionals and technocrats. The vending stalls were provided with water and toilet facilities for hygienic purposes. The strict adherence to static regulations during the decade was largely informed by urban managerialism (Harvey 1989; Lefebvre 1991; Becker et al. 1994; Harrison 2006). High income residential areas and formal industrial sites did not have any semblance of the IEEs during the decade. In Bulawayo; informal markets were provided in old townships such as Makokoba1 and Old Magwegwe. On these markets IEEs trading in fruit and vegetables, traditional medicines, old electrical spare parts and basic agricultural equipment commonly took place. Besides the influence of representations of space by urban professionals (Harvey 1973; Merrifield 1993) on the location of IEEs, concentration also resulted from the desire to secure stable markets for goods. Access to the market of goods and services influenced the location of economic activities. The range and threshold of IEEs are crucial for their operations just like with FEEs, hence they affect their locational decisions (Christaller 1966; Beaumont 1987; Sanders 1987; Dicken and Lloyd 1990). Market requirements were also found to be very useful in the location of IEEs in New York (Sassen 1988) and Brussels (Kesteloot and Meert 1999). The 1980s were characterised by the dominance of small-scale informal productive activities that had been inherited from the colonial era (Riddell 1981). Through the adoption of Small Scale Industries (SSI) in 1983, the government to a large extent recognised the operations of home industries, particularly in poor neighbourhoods, as well as a few people’s markets for fruit and vegetables (Kamete 2004; Potts 2006; GoZ 2010). Figure 7.1 presents the spatial distribution and concentration of IEEs during the 1980s in Bulawayo. High concentrations were common in old high density residential neighbourhoods such as Makokoba in Bulawayo which have had high concentrations of the urban poor since the colonial era. Concerning home industries, they were a common feature of colonial Zimbabwe (Davies 1974; Brand 1986; Mhone 1993; Dhemba 1999) and their operations were crucial in accommodating those that could not secure employment in the FES. The urban poor mostly engaged in activities such as carpentry, welding, car repairs, trading in car parts, and running informal workshops, and these were commonly 1 Makokoba

Township is located close to the city centre. The oldest and busiest long distance bus terminus, commonly known as Erenkin, is also situated close to the suburb. The activities included tailoring, hair care services, welding, carpentry, small grocery shops and chicken trading.

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Fig. 7.1 Density of informal economic enterprises in Bulawayo during the 1980s (Source Authors)

concentrated within old high density residential areas located near industrial areas for easy access to work places. In a way the setup resembled that of British cities (Mann 1965). Proximity to formal industries made the establishment of informal home industry feasible as most of the scrap materials were converted to use. Mashumba in Bulawayo is one of the oldest home industries in Bulawayo. In Bulawayo, small shops were also provided at the back of neighbourhood shopping centres to accommodate informal productive activities. In this can be the representation of space by urban planners and how it influenced the land use by economic activities such as formal and informal enterprises. This is manifest is the strict adherence to urban managerialism in terms of the enforcement of urban planning laws in the City of Bulawayo.

7.3 The Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 1990s The neoliberal economic policies that were adopted by the Zimbabwean government at the beginning of the 1990s resulted in the deregulation and liberalisation of IEEs operations, leading to their spatial spread (Mhone 1993; Dhemba 1999). A total of 28 Acts that inhibited the operations of IEEs were reviewed during the 1990s

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Fig. 7.2 Density of informal economic enterprises in Bulawayo during the 1990s (Source Authors)

to give latitude to IEEs (Kanyenze et al. 2003). Specifically, Statutory Instrument (SI) 216 was passed by parliament in 1994 to deregulate the operations of IEEs in residential areas and within the CBDs. The IEEs started invading CBDs and at the same time, emerging in medium and high income areas. GIS analysis revealed increased concentration of IEEs in residential areas and their spread in new places. According to Fig. 7.2, in Bulawayo concentration of informal businesses is very high in the case of trading and commerce activities that operate from very small spaces that can even be less than 1 m2 . The highest density of IEEs changed from 900 (IEEs/ha) in the 1980s to 1900 (IEEs/ha) during the 1990s. This shows substantial change in the concentrations of IEEs by 111%. The lowest concentration also changed from 120IEEs/ha to 150IEEs/ha, which was a very low percentage change of 25%. Meanwhile the cities continued to suffer from over-urbanisation. Unskilled people continued to flow into the cities adding to the already large pool of urban labour force compared to the deteriorating FES. Regarding home-based informal activities during the 1990s, the deregulation of the operations of IEEs such as trading in fruit and vegetables and running tuckshops on residential plots led to the sprouting of HB activities. Poor neighbourhoods remained popular with the IEEs during the 1990s as high population concentrations within the high density suburbs provided a reliable market for IES goods and services. Former employees of the FES, who had been retrenched as companies

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adjusted to neoliberal economic reforms, started operating informal businesses on their residential plots and on open spaces and roads adjacent to their homes. The informal economic operations (IEOs) mostly specialised in carpentry, mechanics, tailoring, metal works, building materials production and hair salons. During the 1990s, most informal trading took place outside designated and legalised sites, making the administration of the activities very difficult. Contrary to the 1980s when there were few or virtually no traces of the IEEs in the CBDs, the 1990s witnessed widespread spatial location of IEEs within city centres, areas which were formerly reserved for the operations of the FES. The location of IEEs in the CBDs was significant in Bulawayo. Interviews revealed that informal economic operators preferred to relocate to the city centre as a strategy to increase their market share against the backdrop of stiff competition from new entrants in the sector at SSC (Senior Officer D). In Bulawayo for example, the city council responded by partnering with residents and private organisations to establish flea markets within the CBDs. The flea markets specialised in selling clothing and footwear, hats, blankets, duvets, bags and hair products. Other markets were established for in trading fruit and vegetables, flowers and curios and crafts. Within home industrial centres 46% of the IEEs were established during the 1990s in Bulawayo. Indigenisation and empowerment policies of the 1990s resulted in increased congestion on existing informal home industrial markets, spatial spread of IEEs and the extension of the markets. Other informal economic operators that specialised in food production, trading in raw materials and spare parts joined traditional informal activities such as carpentry, welding and car repairs, thus transforming the hubs into strong informal ICs. The city council also responded by establishing home industries in a number of residential areas to relieve congestion. The city council of Bulawayo established home industries mainly for those who specialised in carpentry, welding, tailoring and car repairs in Kelvin industrial areas. This was done to cushion residents from the effects of liberalisation of the economy and to incubate their businesses. This created employment for the retrenched residents who had been managing to generate income for survival since the adoption of the structural adjustment programmes. Most developing countries that adopted neoliberal economic reforms during the 1990s were faced with the same problem. Operations in informal markets also expanded during the decade as many IEOs joined the IES. About 35% of the IEOs within these markets started conducting their businesses during the 1990s. This was common in the people’s markets and other informal markets such as Makokoba in Bulawayo. Markets such as Sekusile in Nkulumane, Bulawayo accommodated informal economic operators that specialised in selling mostly second-hand clothes. Lefebvre‘s triadic theory offers important insights into the developments that took place in Bulawayo in the 1990s. First, can be seen the impact of the conceived space from both the point of urban planners and informal actors. It appears that informal economic activities were following the script that was provided by the City of Bulawayo. For instance, as a result of the deregulation of economic activity, there were spatial changes in the operation of informal economic activities in that they

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started to operate in the CBD for example. In this can be seen the operation of all the three concepts of conceived space, perceived space and lived space.

7.4 Spatial Spread of Informal Economic Enterprises During the 2000s The economic crisis of the 2000s forced IEOs to spread out and strategically locate their operations in almost all functional areas of the city, leading to high competition in business and also to unprecedented congestion. Most retrenchees operated in the urban informal economy (IES) and also most volunteered to leave their formal jobs to join IES during this decade. Almost all functional urban land was invaded. Illegal trading along streets, shop verandahs and pavements is prevalent in the city centre of Bulawayo. City authorities responded positively by creating as many operating spaces as possible using the powers accorded to them by the Regional, Town and Country Planning (RTCP) Act, chapter 29: 12 of 1996 and the Urban Councils Act (ACA), Chapter 29 (GoZ 1996a, b) (Senior Officer E). GIS analysis reveals that the highest concentration of IEEs increased from 1900 IEEs/ha during the 1990s to 2500 IEEs during the 2000s while the lowest concentrations also changed from 150IEEs/ha to 250IEEs/ha (Fig. 7.3). In highly congested informal markets, densities increased by 33%, while in previously lowly congested markets the changes were high as they reached 66%. The decrease in density during the 2000s by almost 78% is explained by the spatial spread of IEEs to newly opened markets by various stakeholders in the quest to accommodate the IES. The IEEs are found on almost all functional areas of the city of Bulawayo that include CBD, residential areas, industrial areas, SSC, open spaces and transportation centres. The spatial spread of the IEEs can be explained as attempts by operators to maintain distance by locating far away from rivals that specialise in similar products and services, as suggested by literature (Hotelling 1929; Lerner and Singer 1967; Eaton and Lipsey 1975). In Bulawayo, this can be shown by such activities as suburban informal markets, home industries, informal markets in city centres suburban shopping centres and informal economic activities at transportation centres during the 2000s. The 2000s witnessed a stratospheric growth in IEEs and their spatial spread to most residential suburbs of the city of Bulawayo. Individuals, private institutions and charity organisations joined the city councils in providing operating space to IEOs. In Bulawayo for example, markets such as the Singwazi in New Lobengula, Mupedzanhamo and Sekusile vegetables and hardware markets were established to accommodate thousands of IEOs. Residents organised themselves into co-operatives that were on land leased by the city council on rent-to-buy terms for the purposes of operating informal markets and overnight parking businesses in their communities. The Bulawayo city council and the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association (ZCIEA) partnered to develop informal markets for the urban poor who were

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Fig. 7.3 Density of informal economic enterprises in Bulawayo during the 2000s (Source Authors)

desperate for operational space and one such is the famous Luveve railway siding flea market. Home-based enterprises also became very fashionable in Bulawayo, particularly during the first half of the decade before the May 2005 Operation Murambatsvina (OM)/Operation Restore Order (OR). Open spaces, predominantly in the poor neighbourhoods were occupied for the purposes of operating IEEs. During the decade the number of IEEs operating at ICs expanded. In Bulawayo city, informal industrial activities such as welding, carpentry and car repairs expanded close to Kelvin North and Thorngrove formal industrial areas. Formal industrial complexes such as the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) also provided working space to the IEEs. The CSC had been facing serious viability problems; hence part of the premises was being used by IEEs that specialised in carpentry, industrial, chemical, electronic and mechanical engineering (Senior Officer O). The informal operators were former employees of large industrial companies that had closed down in the city. The invasion of CBDs by the IEEs worsened during the 2000s as the FES continued to shrink. Foreign migrants that included Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese and Nigerians dominated the trading and commercial IEEs within the CBD. The City council also adopted the concept of weekend flea markets that accommodated IEOs selling clothing, footwear and other basic household items within the CBDs. Although such flea markets were a new phenomenon in Zimbabwean urban centres, they are becoming very popular. IEOs also complained of high levies they were asked in order to secure a stall during the weekend. There was also a proliferation of private

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vehicles that operate as unregistered taxis from the city centre servicing areas that are not served or underserved by the formal transportation system, and registered and licensed taxis in Bulawayo. There is high transport congestion due to informal private vehicles or commuter omnibuses that ply their trade in both low and high income residential areas. The private sector, particularly property developers also supported efforts of the government to provide working space to the IEEs. About 75% new IEEs were established at SSCs in the 2000s. In the city of Bulawayo, partnerships between the city council and private providers of space resulted in the provision of operating spaces for hundreds of IEOs. The Mining Industry Pension Funds (MIPF) that owns Entumbane shopping centre partnered with the city council in developing a secure flea market that accommodates IEOs selling fruit and vegetables, clothing and footwear and dried agricultural products. Similarly, the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) that owns Ascot shopping centre provided operating spaces to IEOs specialising in arts and crafts, curios and crocheting within the centre. At Nkulumane shopping centre, Old Mutual that owns the development were yet to develop official operating spaces for the IEOs although they were already conducting their businesses on the bus terminus adjacent to the shopping complex. The City council have also been converting former bus termini at neighbourhood and district shopping centres into informal operating spaces. About 58% new IEEs were established at transportation centres during the 2000s. The trend is very common in high density residential areas where there is a high demand for operating spaces. Common IEEs at these termini are clothing and footwear items and carpentry businesses. Bus termini were used for picking up and dropping workers to and from work by the Zimbabwe Passenger Company (ZUPCO). It was a vibrant national public transport company during the 1980s when formal industries were at their peak. The company and the bus termini lost their vibrancy and relevance after the collapse of the industry after the neoliberal economic reforms of the 1990s. Public transport is currently dominated by the private commuter omnibuses that do not use suburban termini for picking up and dropping passengers, hence their conversion to operating spaces for the IES (Senior Officers A and F). The main long distance bus termini have also accommodated hundreds of IEOs that sell traditional goods such as agricultural products, simple farming implements, spare parts and odds and ends that are popular with communal farmers. The indigenisation and empowerment policy that were adopted by the government since the late 1990s (DSEI 1997) and was made into law in the 2000s (Kanyenze et al. 2011) made it possible for the IEEs to spread throughout the cities. The laws are sometimes interpreted and implemented on a partisan basis, leading to chaos in the management of operating spaces and the maintenance of order and cleanliness in the cities. The abandonment of the Zimbabwean Dollar (ZD) after the adoption of the United States of America Dollar (USD) as the official currency during the transitional period of the government of national unity (GNU) gave the IES the impetus to grow against the backdrop of the depressed FES. The City council continues to devise ways of accommodating and developing the IES, albeit in the face of critical resource shortages.

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Such efforts represent commitments by government officials to achieve the twin objectives of urban poverty reduction and the maintenance of order in cities. Bulawayo, a former industrial hub of Zimbabwe, is currently a city of empty shells as most firms, particularly in the clothing, auto and construction industry, have closed down, while some downsized their operations or relocated to the capital city Harare (The Sunday News 2011). For example, more than 90 companies closed down in the two years before 2012, resulting in the laying off of more than 20,000 workers (The Sunday News 2012). Lack of funding; old and dysfunctional machinery and infrastructure; incessant losses; high tariffs and failure to meet the operating expenses such as salaries have been identified as the factors behind the decline of formal industrial businesses in Bulawayo. The experiences of the 2000s in the city of Bulawayo demonstrates both cooperation and conflict between the urban professional and informal economic actors. This is illuminated by Lefebvre’s triadic theory. For instance, in some places the City of Bulawayo together with the private sector have partnered to develop operating spaces for the informal economic actors according to the planning regulations of the municipality as the case of Entumbane described in this section shows. However, the informal economic actors have flooded these spaces, sometimes following the regulations provided and in some cases operating outside of the delimitated spaces. This shows that these actors have not kept to the script of the conceived space according to the municipality and their privatesector partners. Therefore, the perceived and lived spaces of the informal economic actors and that of the urban professional and their private partners are not always congruent. The informal economic actors have taken the deregulation of economic activities to mean that they can start their businesses both within and outside the regulation of the City of Bulawayo.

7.5 Impact of Ideology Change on Location of Informal Economic Enterprises In this chapter, the influence of political and economic shifts on the location of IEEs within Bulawayo, was investigated. The results of the longitudinal study that was conducted between 2010 and 2012 indicated that IEEs spread across the city of Bulawayo over the 30-year period. The mean number of years of accommodating IEEs was calculated for all the different locational places. The results revealed that IEEs had been located within the CBDs for an average of 8.6 years, and there was a lower than the 9.5 mean for all the locations. Informal market places such as the people’s markets had the highest mean of 13.3 years. This shows that most IEEs within the CBDs are young while those that are found within poor neighbourhoods are very old. The deregulation of statutes that had previously discouraged the location and operations of IEEs within the CBDs contributed considerably to their spatial restructuring during, particularly since the 1990s (Rakodi 1993; Kamete 2004; Potts 1995, 2007, 2008; Gumbo and Geyer 2011). Using the data that was gathered between

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2010 and 2012; an OLS was also run to investigate the impact of location on profitability of IEEs. The location variable was entered as the independent variable to determine its level of influence on total sales of IEEs. The ANOVA of p < 0.001 evinces that the model is statistically significant to explain the impact of location on total sales levels. The results of the research in 2012 found that the location of IEEs was very variable. The adjusted r square of 0.065, helped to explain about 7% variance in total sales as a result of locational place. This signifies that as IEEs change their current location towards the CBDs, they experience a 7% change in total sales, which is a very low change. The impact of location on sales was poorly explained by one standard model as other factors had influence as well. Ideally, the lower influence of location on total sales can be explained by the almost uniform distribution of IEEs on almost all functional areas of the city. The cities are gradually assuming a poly-centric form and structure where the two economic sectors operate side by side in the CBDs, SSCs, TCs, ICs and HB as well as open air markets. The IEEs are therefore profitable regardless of location, hence current spatial patterning is desirable for the two sectors.

7.6 Informal–Formal Spatial and Functional Linkages Most IEOs (98.2%) preferred to locate their businesses where they could readily access markets for their goods and services. Of these IEOs, 36.7% considered markets for their goods and services as very critical when making locational decisions. Access to the market was crucial to fruit and vegetables, and clothing trading activities that are commonly found within the CBDs and SSCs. Also, IEOs that specialised in arts and crafts, flowers and curios located close to their source of markets, particularly upmarket sites frequented by tourists and high income people. These developments help to highlight the nature of linkages that were created as the IEEs located closer to their source of markets. According to van Eeden (2011), informal traders choose their locational spaces in accordance with the flow of customers. Studying arts and crafts trading in four main cities in South Africa, which are Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria and eThekwini, van Eeden (2011) found that there are spatial correlations between routes that are used by the main customers for this informal sub-sector who are tourists, and the concentrations of these informal businesses. Backward linkages between the two economic sectors were revealed by the preference of IEEs to locate closer to their sources of goods for resale. Accessibility to goods for resale was valued by 11.3% of the IEOs who operated in places such as Fifth Avenue and part of Lobengula Street along Sixth Avenue in Bulawayo where they could easily access supplies from formal fruit and vegetables markets. Also informal traders who sold basic commodities in small repackaged quantities, operated close to their suppliers of goods for sale. These linkages were very strong, such that some IEEs did not need to incur costs of storing their wares as they readily bought and sold just next to their sources in smaller quantities and at cheaper prices.

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IEOs commonly traded after hours when the FEEs had closed their businesses, thus taking advantage of the IEEs’ flexible and long working hours. IEOs also indicated that their locational decisions were influenced by input supplies (8.7%). Such locational decisions and the need for linkages with suppliers of inputs were common with IEOs that specialised in productive activities such as carpentry, welding and tailoring. The same IEOs also cited proximity to utilities such as electricity (4.2%) as some of the factors they considered when locating their businesses. These backward linkages were very strong in most home industries in Bulawayo, particularly the BCC incubator shells. These premises were provided by the city council next to Kelvin industries for the purposes of accommodating semi-formal businesses. Related to supplies of materials were transport demands. Productive IEEs (9%) also valued proximity to transport and took transport costs into consideration, as they require access to reliable and affordable transport in their businesses. The other factor taken into consideration when choosing a location was convenience. This was the situation with 71.5% IEOs that mostly specialised in trading with fruit and vegetables, as well as clothes at neighbourhood shopping centres, termini and informal markets that are located in their suburbs. About 60% of them admitted that the market being situated a convenient distance from their homes, was the strongest motivation when choosing location. Although some IEOs (25.8%) did not have options when choosing their places of business operation, they indicated that their present operating places were enabling them to enjoy mostly backward linkages. These IEOs mostly operated from public spaces provided by the city councils or private spaces owned by either individuals or institutions that lease land from city authorities. Availability of ample space for businesses was considered critical in locational decision making, but generally markets were strategically located. IEOs indicated that proximity to markets, sources of goods for resale, inputs and utilities was very important (61%) while 33.5% said it was very important and only 5.5% considered that it was moderately important. A very small percentage of IEOs evade paying for using spaces, and by so doing, short-change local authorities which have made concerted efforts to generate revenue (see Geyer 2004) for the purposes of financing their operations particularly servicing salaries which they have been failing to pay on time.

7.7 Conclusion Taken together, this means that the urban history of Bulawayo in addition to the changing political and economic ideologies have impacted on the growth of urban informality. At independence in 1980, there was limited urban informality in Bulawayo, but the new democratic government revoked racist laws leading to migration of people to urban areas. These were not always employed and resorted to urban informality. To this could be added the negative impacts of the ESAP, which led to

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industries closing down resulting to unemployment and the growth of urban informality in essentially all parts of the city (the Bulawayo city council could not always manage to stop and/or tame this), which is totally different to the situation before 1980. Although there were some intervening factors like ESAP, it is evident that the legacy of the urban history of Bulawayo, which was predicated on the white minority settler regime has had an impact on the nature, development and spatial trajectory of urban informality. Currently, urban informality in the city is everywhere and there are enduring spatial and functional linkages between the formal and informal economic activities.

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Chapter 8

The Changing Shape of Economic Informality in Durban

Abstract This chapter discusses the growth trajectory of urban informality in Durban as well as its compositional and spatial/locational characteristics and how the phenomenon has contributed to employment creation. The interface between urban informality and formality is also analysed. The chapter amplifies the view that, the regulation of urban informality illustrates a troubled relationship between the city authorities and some of the informal economic actors. This, because, of the endurance of colonial urban planning regimes in which urban informality must abide by urban planning laws, which has led to blitzes and confiscation of goods from street traders as they would have violated the City laws. Keywords Urban informal economy · Durban · Interface · Planning

8.1 Introduction In Chapter 7 the point was made that in the case of Zimbabwean cities such as Bulawayo, the urban history, political and economic policies of the white settler regime as well as those which have been pursued by post-independence Zimbabwe have had a significant impact on urban informality in terms of influencing the spatial, structural as well as compositional dimensions of the phenomenon. In this chapter we carry forward the analysis of the impact of historical and current political and economic policies and their impact on urban informality, but with a focus on Durban, South Africa. The growth trajectory of urban informality in Durban cannot be considered in isolation from the policy context in which urban informality occurs in South Africa. The democratic dispensation contributed to the growth of urban informality in South African cities. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) is probably the best place to start plotting the growth trajectory of urban economic informality in Durban. This Constitution brought changes in the way power was exercised by the three spheres of government during apartheid. The new constitution gave local governments/cities more autonomy. One among many competencies of local governments is to encourage and promote local economic development. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6_8

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Local economy encompasses all economic activities taking place at the municipal or city level and which include both formal and informal economic activities. In terms of informal economic activities, street trading appears to be the most common form of informal economic activity not just in Durban but also in other South African cities. That is why this section looks at the growth trajectory of urban economic informality in Durban from the perspective of street trading. This is because, “the most visible change in the spatial organization of downtown Durban has been the dramatic influx of informal street traders” (Popke and Ballard 2004: 102). Durban experienced rapid growth of street trading in the early years of democracy. According to Skinner and Valodia (2003), a 1996 census identified 20,000 street traders in the metropolitan area of Durban. This number is expected to have increased as a result of many factors, including in-migration from rural areas to cities and migration from other African countries (Tafu and Maharaj 2015). As a result of increasing growth of the informal economy in Durban, the City is recorded as being the first South African city to embrace the reality of informal/street trading by incorporating street traders into city plans. The city established the Department of Informal Trade and Small Business Opportunities in the early 1990s and it has been growing ever since its inception. Further, the city of Durban is also recorded as having allocated more resources to street trading than any other South African city. Most of such resources are spent on the building of shelters for street traders, storage, the provision of water and ablution facilities as well as the maintenance and management thereof. The Warwick Junction Urban Renewal Project is a best example of the city’s response to the growth of urban economic informality in Durban. The Warwick Junction is a transportation interchange and trading hub of Durban. About 450,000 commuters move through the area and approximately 5000 to 8000 traders run their businesses there. The completion of the renewal project resulted into the provision of an attractive infrastructure, which is clean and crime free (WIEGO 2015). However, although the city of Durban demonstrated a relatively positive approach to urban informal economic activities through its concern for street traders as compared to other South African cities, the city has been failing to coordinate these informal economic activities and ever since the time of the renewal of the Warwick Junction the city’s approach to the informal economy has been piecemeal (WIEGO 2015). The informal economy has continued to grow and it has become more and more apparent that there is no consistent platform for negotiations between traders and officials. It is against this backdrop that the Asiye eTafuleni (AeT) was established. AeT is a non-profit organization based in the city of Durban. Its founders were former employees of the City of Durban. Based on their concern for the need to make street traders visible, heard and accommodated in the management of public spaces where street vendors operate, they decided to create this organisation. AeT is not a Membership-Based Organization but has been instrumental in the formation and maintenance of informal workers’ groups (WIEGO 2015). In other words, the informal economic sector of the city of Durban has been growing since the commencement of the democratic dispensation and although the city has been trying to respond to the need of those operating in this sector, there is still ambiguity as to the extent to which the growth of the sector is responded to by the local authority

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and how well operators of the informal economy are integrated into the city’s spatial planning and land use management.

8.2 Compositional Characteristics of Urban Economic Informality in Durban There is limited information on the compositional characteristics of urban informality in Durban. The most comprehensive research that attempted to fill this gap was conducted and published in 2005 by Caroline Skinner. For this reason, the information in this section heavily relies on the findings documented in her research report. In terms of the composition of urban economic informality, the characteristics considered are those pertaining to operators of the informal economy or those owning businesses in this sector of the economy. Therefore, such characteristics include information relating to gender, race, nationality, previous work experience, household size and income. Skinner (2005) conducted interviews with 507 informal economy operators and her findings on the compositional characteristics of urban economic informality in Durban can be summarised as follows; Gender (40% men, 60% women), Race (83% Africans, 17% Asians) Age Average (42 years), Median age (40 years), Youngest interviewee (17 years), Oldest interviewee (79 years), Nationality, South African (99%), non-South African (1%), Previous work experience (Unemployed, 47.5%, Employee in formal enterprise, 21.5%, Employee in informal enterprise, 6.3%, Self-employed, 1.6%, Domestic worker, 1.6%, Scholar/student, 11.2%, Pensioner, 1.8%, Other previous work, 8.5%) Households size (Average number of adults, 4, Average number of children, 3) Monthly income (Average total monthly income, R3228.41) (Skinner 2005: 10). It is worth noting that the information contained above cannot be deemed to reflect the current reality of the composition of urban informality in the city of Durban as this information was produced based on a sample size of 507 people and this was done more than a decade ago. This means that there have been many changes over the years and considering the increasing rates of unemployment at the city and national levels it can be expected that the compositional characteristics of urban economic informality in Durban are now more dynamic than what they used to be fourteen years ago.

8.3 Spatial/Locational Characteristics of Urban Economic Informality in Durban The location of businesses has a potential to promote or preclude their ability to grow. It is in this line of thought that most informal business owners tend to request for municipal facilities and or the creation of spaces that are designed and equipped

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to serve the needs of their businesses within the city. In a study conducted by Skinner (2005) with the objective of determining the locational characteristics of informal enterprises in Durban, 507 business owners were interviewed and 52% of them worked from their home, that is either inside their home or in an outside building on the same property as their residential location. And of those working from home, about 60% were found to be women (Skinner 2005). Further, the streets of urban are a location of informal businesses, especially that of street trading (Popke and Ballard 2004). This observation places streets on the spotlight, in terms of the spatiality of informal economy in the city of Durban.

8.4 Urban Economic Informality and Employment Creation in Durban A field visit to Warwick Junction area in April 2019 and unstructured interviews which were conducted revealed that urban economic informal activities actually created employment in the diversity of enterprises. These included among others those who sold different consumables, vegetables, traditional medicine and some clothes. What also struck the authors was the variety and diversity of goods, which were sold at Warwick Junction area. The conversations with the people actually revealed that some were actually dependent on buying and selling these different types of goods for a livelihood because they could not be formally employed. In fact, some of the respondents revealed that, although there were some struggles in terms of the consistent flow of business, they managed to lead decent lives in which they managed to provide for their families. They stated that this was far much better than being idle and solely dependent on other members of the family. In addition to self-employment, there were also people who were employed to manage the shops or trading stalls on behalf of owners. These observations amplify what has been established elsewhere in other parts of South Africa. An example is that of the research in Johannesburg (Rogerson 1997; Moyo 2017) and other comparable research such as that of Kalitanyi and Visser (2010). In the case of Durban and based on the conversations which the authors had with both the owners of informal enterprises as well as some employees, it became evident that informality actually played an important developmental role in terms of sustaining livelihoods as well reducing poverty. In addition to this, urban informality also provided a variety of goods at affordable prices and as indicated above, this was considered important by the people with whom we had interviews, because they felt that they could access goods, to which they could not have had access, where it not for the urban informal economy. This particular issue resonates with a similar finding by Moyo (2017) on the perception of the people in relationship to the goods which were provided by the urban informal economy.

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8.5 Rejuvenation or Degeneration of the Durban City Economy? The issue of whether or not urban informality has rejuvenated or degenerated the Durban city economy is complex and indeed debatable. For example, conversations by the authors with the people involved in urban informality actually suggested a positive picture. This is because, the people were of the view that without a vibrant informal economy, they would not be employed and therefore would have been living in abject poverty (Interview, Durban City, April 2019). In addition to this, some of the people also indicated that, as a result of urban informality, there was the introduction and availability of a variety of goods, which were affordable to many ordinary and poor people (Interview, Durban City, April, 2019). Differently stated, from the point of view of ordinary people, urban informality in Durban had played an important role in city economy in terms of creating employment and payment of incomes, which allowed people to provide for their families. It also provided access to a variety of goods, some of which were imported. Some of the street traders, particularly those who operated in undesignated trading zones also thought that they contributed to the economy of the city in terms of among others, providing goods. Although the authors did not get the opportunity to interview the municipality officials as well as the police, documented evidence (see, e.g., Groundup 2018), suggests that the municipality was not always supportive of those who operated from undesignated trading zones as well as those who did not have trading or operating permits. These people suffered from the confiscation of their goods and what they considered to be harassment (Groundup 2018). In this respect, such operators in the informal economy (those without permits), were considered to be contributing to the degeneration of the city, which is why they had their goods confiscated and required to abide by the city laws. But, as indicated above, the people involved in this did not think so and herein lies the controversy around the extent to which urban informality contributed to regeneration or degeneration of the economy of the city. Notwithstanding, it should be noted that the city of Durban was the first to develop a framework for recognising and integrating informality into the development plans of the city in the 1990s and this could be taken to explain why there have been some infrastructure which has been built to accommodate urban informality (WIEGO 2015). The issue may be that; this infrastructure is not enough to cater for the needs of all people involved in urban informality.

8.6 The Formality–Informality Interface in Durban City Interview data suggested that there were many and intricate links between the formal and informal urban economies in Durban. A case in point was the relationship at the level of buying and selling of different types of goods. For example, some of the people who sold fruits and vegetables actually bought these in larger quantities from

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formal markets or outlets and then resold these in smaller quantities to consumers. Similar patterns were also observed with people who sold different types of clothes and house hold goods, who explained that these were bought from some of the big formal shops in Durban. Secondly some of the people who owned the informal business enterprises actually had bank accounts into which they deposited their savings/or the money which they realised from the operation of informal enterprises. Third, some of the respondents also explained that the goods which they sold were imported from countries such as China and India. This suggests that the urban informal economic activities were connected to big and formal business outside South Africa. These examples which demonstrate the connectedness of the formal and informal economic sectors in the city of Durban actually dismiss as simplistic assumptions that, urban informality is inferior and separate from the formal sector. Also simplistic, is that, this informal economy would fade away as projected by proponents of the dualist school of thought on informality (see, e.g., Boeke 1953, 1961; Lewis 1954; Geertz 1963). The examples in the case of Durban suggests that the urban informal economic activities are linked with the formal economy in a mutually beneficial manner and these linkages are far from weakening and/or fading away. These linkages even extend to the international scene in the form of importing goods from countries like India and China. This in itself positions urban informality as a mix of strategies and processes, which manifest at the micro, meso and macro levels and involving different actors including the poor and the elite (Banks et al. 2019). In this sense, it can be argued that, the example of the some of the operations of the urban informality suggest that, it is a complex process and phenomenon, such that classifying it as a sector or isolated and fleeting activity obscures than illuminates its dynamism, breath and extent. Further, the uneasy relationship between actors in the informal economy and the City authorities actually amplify the theme of this book, which is the impact and legacy of white minority settler regimes on the characteristics and nature of urban informality in South African and Zimbabwean cities. First, the growth of the phenomenon and particularly the “unrestricted” participation by black people was significant after the end of apartheid rule in 1994. In other words, it was the deregulation of urban space in Durban, like the rest of South African cities which led to many, mainly black people openly participating in this economic activity. Second, the troubled relationship between the city authorities and some of the informal economic actors actually shows the endurance of colonial urban planning regimes in which urban informality must abide by urban planning laws and this has led to blitzes and confiscation of goods from street traders as they would have violated the City laws. This shows the legacy of the urban history, colonialism and apartheid particularly on the problematic history and/or relationship between the regulatory regimes (the city authorities) and the people involved in urban informality.

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8.7 Conclusion The growth of urban informality in Durban is tied to the fall of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, which led to the desegregation of the city (Popke and Ballard 2004). The most striking issue about Durban is that it was the first city to come up with a policy to respond to the needs of urban informality, particularly the street traders in the 1990s (WIEGO 2015). As a result of the broader legislative environment (fall of apartheid) and local framework (Durban city policy response to urban informality), there has been the growth of urban informality whose operations encompasses a variety of activities such as apparel, craft, traditional medicine, spaza1 shops, construction, metal work, shebeens,2 crèches, hairdressing services (Skinner 2005), among others. Some of these operate in designated zones where they are provided with permits, but others trade from undesignated zones. This provides a site for contest and conflict, in which street traders and regulatory authorities fight over the appropriation of the city. The former want to trade without permits and the latter enforce the policies of the city—in this we see the endurance of apartheid and colonial city planning, which has mediated and characterised the relationship between people involved in urban informality and the state, which is represented by the City of Durban. The people involved in urban informal activities in Durban involve the young and old, men and women as well as South African and non-South African citizens and the goods in which they trade in are bought from some of the wholesalers in and around Durban and there were also suggestions that some of the goods sold in the informal enterprises were imported. In all this, what comes to the fore is that urban informality in Durban is inextricably linked to the formal economy in a strong and enduring way. This can be taken to show that our understanding and analysis of urban informality must of necessity move beyond a simplistic and narrow classification (like the structuralists and dualists) of the phenomenon.

1 Jeeva,

M. 2017. “Spaza shops, which began in the mid-1970s, derive the name from vernacular township slangs word meaning an ‘imitation’ of a real shop. From the Zulu verb ‘isiphazamisa’, it also means hindrance or annoyance possibly referring to the way in which these shops were either viewed by privileged segments of society and larger retail outlets or by those that lived close to these shops and became annoyed by foot traffic and noise. Moreover, today, the latter has been reversed as several hindrances or barriers are besieging spaza shop owners” https://www.bizcom munity.com/Article/196/345/157157.html (accessed 2 October 2019). 2 These are “mostly located in traditionally black townships, were started as an alternative to pubs and bars which during apartheid times, black Africans were barred from. Originally shebeens operated illegally, selling home-brewed alcohol and were also meeting places for activists of the struggle against apartheid. As time evolved they also sold commercial beer, spirits, brandy and whiskey” https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/difference-between-tavern-shebeen-1291281 (accessed 1 October 2019).

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References Banks N, Lombard M, Mitlin D (2019) Urban informality as a site of critical analysis. J Dev Stud. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2019.1577384 Boeke JH (1953) Economics and economic policy of dual societies as exemplified by Indonesia. International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York Boeke JH (1961) Indonesian economics: the concept of dualism in theory and policy. W van Hoeve, The Hague Geertz C (1963) Peddlers and princes: social change and economic modernization in two Indonesian towns. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Groundup (2018) Durban street vendors ‘overlooked and undermined’ by government. https:// www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-07-25-durban-street-vendors-overlooked-and-underm ined-by-government/. Accessed 2 October 2019 Kalitanyi V, Visser K (2010) African immigrants in South Africa: job takers or job creators? SAJEMS 13(4):376–390 Lewis WA (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour. Manchester School 22:139–191 Moyo I (2017) African immigrant traders in inner city Johannesburg: deconstructing the threatening ‘other’. Palgrave, London Popke EJ, Ballard R (2004) Dislocating modernity: identity, space and representations of street trade in Durban, South Africa. Feoforum 35:99–110 Republic of South Africa (1996) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2019 Rogerson M (1997) International migration, immigrant entrepreneurs and South Africa’s small enterprise economy. Migration Policy Series, No 3. Cape Town: IDASA Skinner C (2005) Constraints to growth and employment in Durban: evidence from the informal economy Skinner C, Valodia I (2003) Local government support for women in the informal economy in Durban, South Africa. Int J Polit, Cult Soc 16(3):431–444 Tafu A, Maharaj P (2015) On the move: Cameroonian migrants in Durban. In: Crush J, Chikanda A, Skinner C (eds) Mean streets: migration, xenophobia and informality. Southern African Migration Programme, Canada WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing) (2015) Empowering Market traders in Warwick Junction, Durban, South Africa. Inclusive Cities Project, August

Part III

Urban Informality Governance

Chapter 9

Urban Informality Policies and Regulatory Frameworks in South African and Zimbabwean Cities

Abstract This chapter analyses the policies and regulatory frameworks which guide and/or govern informality in South African and Zimbabwean cities. Hence in this chapter there is a discussion of the policy response at different levels of government such as the national and local in South Africa. Likewise, in Zimbabwe there is a consideration of the national approach and response to urban informality. In addition to this, the chapter reflects on these responses to urban informality by the two countries and amplify that the colonial and apartheid legacies seem to always prevail in terms of disrupting any well meaning plan to enhance urban informality. Keywords Regulation · Urban informality · South Africa · Zimbabwe

9.1 Introduction The point has been made in this book that in both South Africa and Zimbabwe the urban histories of the two countries as well as political and economic ideologies have influenced the urban planning approach and response to urban informality as discussed in previous chapters, but particularly chapter three in this book. But, beyond the planning issues, it is important to also consider policy responses to urban informality in cities of the two countries under consideration. This is the context within which this chapter analyses the policies and regulatory frameworks which guide and/or govern informality in South African and Zimbabwean cities. Hence in this chapter there is a discussion of the policy response at different levels of government such as the national and local in South Africa. Likewise, in Zimbabwe there is a consideration of the national approach and response to urban informality. In addition to this, the chapter reflects on these responses to urban informality by the two countries and amplify that the colonial and apartheid legacies seem to always prevail in terms of disrupting any well meaning plan to enhance urban informality.

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9.2 The South African Policy Response to Urban Informality In 1995 the national government in South Africa launched the White Paper on the National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business (Rogerson 2016). This was the national government‘s initial strategy to ensure the growth of small enterprises. The National Small Business Act (No. 102 of 1996) was the first to recognise participants in the informal economy to be included in the umbrella Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs). The effectiveness of such policies can be seen with the shift in spatial planning approaches as SMMEs are now included in municipal spatial development plans. The identification of the spatial challenges which limit growth of the informal economy by the National Planning Commission has led to institutional reforms to address these cross-cutting issues. The recognition by the National Development Plan to invest in unpacking the market forces and economic principles governing the “second economy” as a means to promote inclusive governance to address difficulties faced by many municipalities (National Development Plan, 2030) is a significant development in this respect. Post 2000, the South African national government declared the support for survivalist enterprises through initiatives such as the small, medium and microenterprise economy (Rogerson 2016). The Integrated Development Plan process in South Africa has been utilised in the integration of capital and infrastructure investment plans and spatial planning initiatives at national and local level (Du Plessis 2014), this being in accordance with other international initiatives of encouraging cash-poor communities to develop a new form of tax base that incooperates the “second economy”. Chen et al. (2016) has highlighted that, although operations in the informal economy do not pay taxes directly, they do spend their income in the formal sector, and hence at the end they do pay taxes indirectly. This realisation by local authorities on the efficiency of the “second economy” to spawn employment opportunities at a relatively low start-up cost, while also contributing to the city development has led to an improvement in citizen’s livelihoods. Indeed, in South Africa, urban informality has continued to attract the attention of the government, including the national level. A clear example of this is that, after President Mbeki’s re-election in May 2004, he announced the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) as an approach to address challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment. The AsgiSA consisted of three strategies including the promotion of growth and development of the first economy and increasing its possibility to create jobs, and the implementation of a programme aimed at addressing the challenges of the second economy (McGrath and Akoojee 2007). President Mbeki’s announcement of the AsgiSA brought the concept of “second economy” to the limelight as it drew the attention of policy discourse almost at all levels of government in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) (2004) defined the second economy as being a “mainly informal, marginalized, unskilled economy, populated by the unemployed and those unemployable in the formal sector”. The ANC’s description of the “second economy” was

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very comprehensive as it went on to outline what the government intended doing for the majority of people working in the informal economy (Skinner 2006). The informal economy has also been discussed under the umbrella of Small Business Development in post-apartheid South Africa and in light of that discourse, one outcome of the 2004’s presidential emphasis on the second economy was the launching of a policy framework in 2006, that is, the Integrated Small Business Development Strategy. The framework supported the national SMME economy in three different ways, namely: in expanding access of SMMEs to credit/finance, in extending the access of SMMEs to market opportunities and in promoting the engagement of government with questions of regulatory reform. The strategy also committed the government to support informal economy enterprises as part of the country’s new strategy to support small businesses. Further, another important aspect of the Integrated Small Enterprise Development Strategy was to facilitate the transition of businesses from the informal economy to the formal sector as well as their subsequent development into small enterprises (Rogerson 2016). After five years of implementation, a review of the impact of the Integrated Strategy was conducted and it was found that government programmes aimed at upgrading black-owned small businesses as well as informal enterprises had minimal impact. The problem was not about ambiguity of policies, rather the problem was the failure of government to implement its own programmes and the cause of such a failure could be associated with the absence of clear representation of Small Business Development at higher levels of government (Rogerson 2016). In response to the loophole identified by the report on the impact of the Integrated Strategy, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) established a new directorate, the Informal Business and Chamber Support in 2012. The purpose behind this new directorate was to focus on the development of a National Informal Business Development Strategy (NIBDS) aimed at guiding the intervention of the government in the sector. To this effect, the Department of Trade and Industry outlined that the Informal Business and Chamber Support directorate would seek to “design programmes aimed at uplifting informal businesses in Townships, Rural and other needy areas in South Africa to graduate and be part of the mainstream economy” (DTI 2013: 26), thus making informal businesses central in the drive for the development of sustainable livelihoods and jobs creation. It was envisaged that the NIBDS would address most of the issues that faced informal businesses such as the inability to climb the ladder of integrating into the mainstream economy, the issue of accessing finances and skill development training, and most importantly, the challenge of weaknesses of informal businesses associations especially that relating to informing decisions in urban environments where most of informal business activities occur. To that effect, seeing that the development trajectory of informal businesses is often hindered by ambiguous policies and over-regulation, the guiding vision of the NIBDS strategy was to create “an enabling policy, regulatory, and programming environment promoting and supporting a developmental continuum for the graduation of Informal Businesses into the mainstream

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of the formal economy, with particular focus on uplifting and empowering disadvantaged informal businesses of vulnerable groups like women, youth and disabled persons” (DTI 2013: 27). The implementation of the NIBDS started formally in the year 2014 by supporting municipal Local Economic Development offices to deliver and facilitate access to upliftment programmes to informal businesses and to render support to local Chambers or business associations. However, the implementation of the NIBDS did not cater for the wide range of informal businesses. At the other end of the informal economy gamut are undocumented migrants and rejected asylum seekers who exist on the margins of society with few or no rights, often exploited economically and unable to gain protection from the police or courts in the country where they live (Bloch 2008). Ndiweni and Verhoeven (2013: 9) add that, “in some instances involving cross-border activities, women are vulnerable to sexual abuse, particularly, when seeking accommodation in Botswana or South Africa”. This brings about the linkage between informality and precarity. Although policies recognise the importance of urban informality, little is stated on strategies to ensure that the rights of informal workers are met (Hussmanns 2004). A notable example is how farm workers are at times are payed little wages and their work is precarious. Likewise, few studies dwell on the relationship of the informal and formal economy, as most policies usually represents them as being separate entities. Furthermore, as there are no existing official channels for these businesses to pay taxes, this has led to more governments discouraging their growth and seeking to formalise informal operations. In all this lies the legacy of colonialism and apartheid, in that there is the persistent desire and undertone, even if it is hidden and/or latent to trivialise, if nothing else peripherise the informal economy or attempt to make it formal, Procrustean style. As Rogerson (2016) highlights, the spatial scope of the NIBDS only emphasised the uplifting of township and rural enterprises, thus leaving behind urban informal businesses such as street traders and their associations. Such a gap in the implementation of the NIBDS is probably explained by the fact that the majority of informal businesses in urban areas of South Africa are owned by migrants or foreign nationals. However, this should not be an excuse for the State to neglect such an important section of informal businesses, especially considering that some of those urban informal businesses are owned by individuals who are legal migrants such as refugees having the right to livelihoods as entitled to them by the law (Rogerson 2016). Such a tendency of neglect at the national level of government has also been reflecting at the local level of government whereby there is ambiguity in policies that govern the management of urban public spaces which are spaces used by informal traders and businesses within South African cities. The 2013 Operation Clean Sweep undertaken by the Metropolitan City of Johannesburg, South Africa, is probably the best example of the exclusion of urban informal businesses in upliftment programme. The Operation Clean Sweep attempted the removal of street traders from the inner city of Johannesburg in the face of ambiguous or lack of informal trading regulatory mechanisms (Benit-Gbaffou 2016). It was stated that this operation was based on the need to revamp and rehabilitate the Johannesburg inner city. This, in line with

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the Joburg 2030 Vision, which was implemented in 2006, so as to transform Johannesburg into a world class city by 2030 (which was further refined in 2011, in what is now called the Joburg 2040 Growth and Development Strategy). This was to be achieved by attracting private sector investment and increasing the price of properties. As a result, the Johannesburg inner city gentrification and rehabilitation strategies are part of Joburg 2030 Vision and its successor, the refined Joburg 2040 GDS “that sets its sights on a desired Johannesburg of the future – a Johannesburg in which all will aspire to live and work” (Joburg 2040 GDS 2011). To achieve this, the Johannesburg inner city was declared “as an Urban Development Zone through public and private sector collaboration”, which has involved among other strategies, the identification of “bad buildings” and incentivising the private sector to revamp these, a move called the Better Buildings Programme (BBP) (Winkler 2009: 26). In addition, City Improvement Districts were established so as to achieve the regeneration of the inner city (Winkler 2009; Olitzki and Luiz 2013) and “to stimulate and support area-based economic development initiatives throughout the Johannesburg metropolitan area in support of Joburg 2030” (Luiz 2003: 4). Therefore, Operation Clean Sweep in September 2013, should be seen in this context- cleaning the city so that it conforms to North American and Western European standards. Not only did this operation leave the urban poor to suffer, as urban informality is currently absorbing work seekers which the formal sector is not incorporating (Moyo et al. 2016), but also resulted in a fierce battle to assert control over the trading space on the streets of Johannesburg inner city (Moyo 2015). In December 2013, the Constitutional Court brought the operation to a standstill, declaring it as being an act of “humiliation and degradation” (SERI 2014: 1). The operation was criticised in that the city officials utilised an artificial category of street trade to justify the “formalization” and “regulation” of operations in the inner city. The aftermath of the operation has seen the City management investing in research on how to evolve policy regarding informal trading. The contemporary relationship between City officials and street vendors in the city is not convivial, as street vendors have expressed their willingness to cooperate with city management, however the lack of supporting mechanisms namely infrastructure, support and administrative systems which cater for the informal economy, leads people to operating in undesignated locations (Mitullah 2003). Further, the forced removal of these street traders reveals a lack of cohesion between local and national government policies as Operation Clean Sweep has been likened to apartheid repression (Rogerson 2016). Operation Clean Sweep demonstrated that the City of Johannesburg failed to solve the problem of informal trading in terms of developing best practice (Naidoo 2014). At another level, the lack of effective policies which address urban informality in this regard, could be regarded as symptomatic of a colonial hangover, in which the perception that it (urban informality) should not be recognised still managed to shoot through all promises of and attempts at positive responses to it. In this regard, we posit that, there is the historical present in the policies which have been deployed to respond to and/or address urban informality in a city like that of Johannesburg. The point we are making is that,

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while efforts may be made to promote urban informality, there is the lingering, if nothing else, underlying frame of reference, that it should not be part of the urban economy. Thus, there is no contradiction in our position in this respect. This reveals that despite South Africa’s response and commitment to the improvement of the second economy, the country has not been able to respond to the urban informal economy more effectively.

9.3 The Zimbabwean Policy Response to Urban Informality The Zimbabwean equivalent of the South African Operation Clean Sweep was Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe in 2005. In the Zimbabwean context, Operation Murambatsvina was introduced nation-wide at a time when the formal economy had declined. By 2005 the informal sector accounted for over 70% of workers which translated to as much as 60% of the country’s GDP (Musoni 2010). To launch Operation Murambatsvina, the Regional Town and Country Planning Act of 1996 was utilised to justify the eradication of informal structures. Essentially the Regional Town and Country Planning Act of 1996 targets maintaining among others, “order” (Regional Town and Country Planning Act of 1996), which can be interpreted to mean the preservation of Eurocentric urban and spatial planning standards which do not embrace urban informality. At the centre of operation Murambatsvina, was the ruling political party Zimbabwe African National Union–-Patriotic Front (ZANU– PF) who attributed the decline of the formal sector to rebellion by citizens (Movement for Democratic Change—MDC supporters) in the form of “lawlessness, squalor and landlessness” (Potts 2006; Rogerson 2016). Some scholars have also linked the operation to the 2005 parliamentary elections, by referring to the operation as the government’s response to the near loss (Musoni 2010; Mpofu 2011; Valodia and Devey 2012). An armed police force was dispatched in urban areas of Zimbabwe with the sole purpose of destruction of informal structures. Debates have consequently arisen to identify the true purpose of the operation (Tibaijuka 2005; Mpofu 2011; Valodia and Devey 2012). Also the operation violated the Regional Town and Country Planning Act of 1996 by failing to give notices of at least 21 days before eviction and also an enforcement order if no response was received after serving the notice. The national government had described operation Murambatsvina as an instrument to stamp out informal structures in the country which had the potential to becoming breeding grounds for illegal small and medium enterprises (Musoni 2010; Mpofu 2011). Scholars such as Potts (2006) have highlighted the implications of such drastic operations by national governments, as the urban poor were generally the most affected. For example (although accurate figures/assessments are difficult to get), in Bulawayo, the number of structures in the informal economy which were demolished within some townships as follows; Magwegwe 632, Cowdray Park 141, Lobengula 2494, Sizinda 170, Mzilikazi and Makokoba 3264, Mpopoma 1091, all totalling to 7792 (Mpofu 2011). Other notable losses were related to income source,

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food security and physical assets. Overall, in the case of Zimbabwe and the implementation of Operation Murambatsvina, we see the invocation of planning statues so as to discipline urban informal economic activities. It may be correct that the move was inspired by political motives in the form of reducing and diluting the ascendancy of an opposition political party in Zimbabwe (Tibaijuka 2005; Musoni 2010; Mpofu 2011; Valodia and Devey 2012), but it was also an instrument of urban planning which was used to effect this. In this can be seen that urban planning policies and regulatory regimes or the lack of them always negatively impact on the informal economic activities. The motives and impacts of Operation Murambatsvina as well as the colonial hangover in dealing with urban informality notwithstanding, in Zimbabwe, there seems to be, the recognition of the role of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in employment creation, which has led the national government of Zimbabwe to develop some policies which appear to encourage entrepreneurship and gender sensitive initiatives (Chirisa and Dumba 2012; Ndiweni and Verhoeven 2013). This move by the national government led to the promulgation of an act of parliament which has been regarded as recognition of the informal economy (Chigwenya and Mudzengerere 2013). These initiates by national government included developing enabling legal frameworks such as access to finance (for projects led by young MSMEs); access to markets (creation of pathways to international markets such as China, which later was coined the “Look-east policy”); technology infrastructure support (which developed supporting facilities and centres at educational institutions). The national government even went one step further by encouraging the financial sector to offer financial assistance to MSMEs, these which previously were not given an opportunity to receive financial support (Chirisa et al. 2012; Chaise 2009; Mubaiwa 2014). Other programmes such as Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO) have been developed to support these MSMEs by availing training services on how to manage a business (book keeping, stock taking, accounting and marketing). These programmes are designed to ensure that the MSMEs are able to survive long after support from the national government stops and to ensure they are able to compete with larger organisations. These projects have become beacons to market local produce and compete with other markets. Such initiatives by the national governments have been praised as they allowed the informal economy to participate in government tendering and contracting processes. The recognition of the sustainability and importance of including the informal sector as a livelihood for citizens in urban settings is a reflection of the current urban norm systems ( Chigwenya and Mudzengerere 2013). Consequently, in an attempt to ensure correlation, the national government has tried to mainstream informal activities in municipal plans (Chigwenya and Mudzengerere 2013).

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9.4 Some Reflections on Urban Informality Policies and Regulatory Frameworks in South African and Zimbabwean Cities In South Africa the national government has placed great emphasis on local municipalities to develop integrated planning and service delivery programmes being guided by the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) process. The IDP was introduced under the Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations in 2001 to be a framework to spatially develop municipalities (Republic of South Africa 2001). The challenge however, that local municipality have now is to transform the deep-rooted socio-political aspirations, particularly those of the urban poor and marginalised (workers in the informal sector) into tangible material (Mogale 2005). Other activists have called for more active citizens. The notion of an active citizen is not unique to Southern African cities like those under consideration as throughout history citizens have actively participated in the development of the economy. However historically, local policies have failed to fully tap into this ideology as some participants in the informal economy do not always have the same easy access to resources as their counterparts in the formal sector. The need for the empowerment of local municipalities to govern the growth of their regions has led to the development of Local Economic Development (LED) plans and Spatial Development Framework (SDF) plans. These become an all-inclusive plan by the local municipality which ensures the incorporation of all categories of citizens as active participants in the economic growth of the municipality (Mogale 2005). However, there is still need for more transparent indicators to be developed to monitor the systemtransformation process. This would enhance accountability while also addressing issues of empowering pro-poor developmental outcomes (Mogale 2005). In Zimbabwe the rebuilding operation, which occurred shortly after operation Murambatsvina was commonly known as Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle. The operation was meant to rebuild infrastructure in urban areas, namely homes and vending bays for victims of operation Murambatsvina (Mpofu 2011). The operation led to the creation of committees, which were led by army personnel (who did not have the vital skills or knowledge about the built environment) instructing municipal officials on how to go about the operation. In the City of Bulawayo, the actual implementation of programmes which addressed issues of urban informality were politicised and militarised. The result is that the people who were intended to benefit from the policies and process actually did not (Gumbo and Geyser 2011). For example, the process was led by the ZNU-PF government. Initially city council officials were involved in drawing up the beneficiary list, however it was later amended without consultation with council officials. Allegations have been made that the “new beneficiaries” of the second phase of the operation were not part of the urban poor but were part of a patronage of ZANU–PF (Mpofu 2011). All this can be taken to suggest that urban informality in countries and cities like Zimbabwe and Bulawayo, respectively is not fully incorporated both in policy and

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practice. It seems as though, some policies only appear on paper and in practice, urban informality continues to be regarded as a peripheral aberration. In some cases, the people involved in this are brutalised and harassed despite the fact that they play an important role in the economy of the city and creating employment for those who participate in it. This is a legacy of the urban history of both South Africa and Zimbabwe as well as the racial and apartheid planning integral to it.

9.5 Conclusion There seems to be a colonial present in the policies and regulatory systems which govern urban informality in Southern African cities under consideration. A case in point is that in Zimbabwean cities, such as Bulawayo for example, the policies appear for the most part to inhibit than fully embrace urban informality. For example, Operation Murambatsvina as a government operation and therefore policy, brutalised the people who were involved in the informal sector in an attempt to force them to conform to the so called city standards and/or policies. Some scholars (see, e.g., Tibaijuka 2005; Mpofu 2011; Valodia and Devey 2012) have correctly argued that, beyond forcing such actors to conform to the city standards and policies, which mimic those of North America and Western European cities, there was also the underlying desire to make the people involved in urban informality to support the ruling party ZANU–PF, by punishing them for supporting or having voted opposition political parties. Although there have been policies which are touted as recognising urban informality in Zimbabwean cities, the reality is that, in practice there is no active commitment by the city authorities and government to implement such policies. And therefore, there is no contradiction in stating that, in a country like Zimbabwe there are policies which recognise urban informality or broadly MSMEs, but at the same time argue that, urban informality is not supported. The issue is therefore the reality on the ground more than what exists on paper. It is within this context, that one can invoke the example of the Operation Clean Sweep which was launched in September 2013 in Johannesburg inner city so as to rehabilitate the city and make it attractive for tourists and investors in line with status of a World Class city. This occured against the policies which were generally meant to recognise urban informality. Therefore, policies and regulatory regimes in most cities in South Africa and Zimbabwe appear to favour more the formal businesses and rich investors at the expense of those who are poor. But such an approach misses the fact that urban informality is inextricably linked to both the rich and poor. Therefore, all policies designed to annihilate urban informality and create space and an environment for the rich investors are not only doomed to fail, but also misunderstand the nature depth and operation of urban informality. But in all this, there is the undying impact of the legacy of colonialism and apartheid. These provide the superstructure and/or default position which generally guide approaches and responses to urban informality. Even when there are well meaning policies towards urban informality, these tend to eventually crumble towards

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and retaining the default position—South African and Zimbabwean cities which are colonial products in which their urban histories linger, even when they mutate with current policies.

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Chapter 10

Political Dimensions of Urban Informality in South African and Zimbabwean Cities

Abstract Considering that in Africa, urban informality is constituted by many people, some of whom have failed to secure formal jobs, as a result of political and economic problems afflicting many states, could urban informality be conceived as a site that has been or could be mobilised for political action? If so, how does this materialise and dematerialise? This chapter therefore focuses on and discusses “the politics of resistance” and the political dimensions of the governance of urban informality. For example, in Bulawayo and Johannesburg inner city the informal economic actors defied the authorities by operating in undesignated trading zones and in some cases paid bribes to the municipality police who were supposed to enforce municipality laws. However, strategies of resistance have graduated to “street politics” whenever quiet attempts failed. And in both cities the informal economic actors have openly defied the municipalities and also invoked the rights to trade on the streets by taking legal action against the regulatory regimes. For these reasons, actors in the informal economy appear to be politically conscious and active to the extent of demonstrating that they have power which they can politically and legally exercise so as to defend their economic activities on the streets. Although the municipalities may have mightier power, this is not always enough to impose their will on the informal actors, who have successfully challenged such power. In this sense we are reminded of Foucault (1978)’s assertion that power is everywhere and can be reproduced from one moment to another. Keywords Urban informality · Politics · Resistance · South Africa · Zimbabwe

10.1 Introduction Studies of how people in urban areas have politically or otherwise responded to crisis or taken matters into their hands so as to improve their material conditions are not new. This is evidenced by perspectives such as the “‘passive poor’, ‘survival strategy’, ‘urban territorial movement’ and ‘everyday resistance’” (Bayat 2000: 538). The passive poor constructs people in urban areas as being trapped in a culture of poverty and as a result demonstrated criminal tendencies and fatalism (Lewis 1959, © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6_10

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1961, 1966 cited in Bayat 2000). According to this view, poor people lacked ambition and were generally hopeless and by these means were characterised by a culture of poverty and elements of anomie (Lewis 1959, 1961, 1966 cited in Bayat 2000). Over time, the perspective of the passive poor has been discredited because of its oversimplification and overgeneralisation of the culture of poverty as a dominant feature of the urban poor (Bayat 2000). The concept of survival strategy posits that poor people responded to their conditions by engaging in actions which aimed to better these, such as begging, theft and prostitution, among others (Bayat 2000). The main shortcoming of this perspective is its limitedness in so far as failing to highlight that poor people were not always victims but also engaged in efforts which attempted to create opportunities and improve their conditions and also empower themselves (Friedmann 1992, 1996 cited in Bayat 2000). The notion of urban territorial movement argues that urban poor were involved in social and political movements in the form of organisations which attempted to advocate for political, economic, social and other forms of empowerment and development (Castells 1983 cited in Bayat 2000). Everyday resistance asserts that the urban poor is not always submissive and passive, but engage in different forms of resistance which contest dominant power and control (Bayat 2000). These urban protest movements were based on the notion that “wherever there is power there is resistance” (Bayat 2000: 541) and this results in the unending “dance of control” (Pile 1997: 2 cited in Bayat 2000: 541). What is worth emphasising is that this demonstrates that, the urban poor or subaltern actually do have some level of power with which to respond to greater and mightier power from the urban elites and regulatory regimes (Bayat 2000). This amplifies the observation that “power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere […] One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault 1978: 93). The omnipresence of power and its ability to be reproduced from one moment and situation to the other (Foucault 1978), simply means that, even the urban poor are capable of resisting systems which are unfavourable to them. This resistance may take many forms such as non-collective and surreptitious actions (Scott 1985, 1989). In this sense, the urban poor challenge domination through less visible but powerful forms of resistance such as false compliance, pilfering, smuggling, slander and sabotage, among others. Such actions “are the techniques of ‘first resort’ in those common historical circumstances in which open defiance is impossible or entails mortal danger. When they are widely practiced by members of an entire class against elites or the state, they may have aggregate consequences all out of proportion to their banality when considered singly” (Scott 1989: 34). However, Bayat (2000) warns that there is need to avoid falling into the trap of over reading coping strategies by the urban poor as or equating them to actions of resistance. This means that the perspectives on everyday resistance may not fully capture the agency of the urban poor when faced with different forms of power and this is the context within which Bayat (2000: 545) advanced the notion of “quiet encroachment of the ordinary”. It “describes the silent, but protracted but pervasive advancement of

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the ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in order to survive and improve their lives. This is marked by quiet, largely atomised and prolonged mobilisation with episodic collective action-open and fleeting struggles, without clear leadership, ideology or structured organization” (Bayat 2000: 545–546). The techniques which are employed in this regard are targeted at the governing elites in terms of contesting “many fundamental aspects of the state prerogatives, including the meaning of order, control of public space, of public and private goods and the relevance of modernity” (Bayat 2000: 546). These take many forms such as illegal connection of both electricity and water, illegal construction or trading on the streets in ways which challenge formal businesses, refusal to pay rent and rates to the city authorities, all in an effort to provide for their needs. These seemingly quiet strategies may graduate to contentious politics when states or their delegated authorities confront or evict the urban poor. The results of this are that the latter engage in political exchanges and/or contentions so as to defend whatever they would have gained and by these means become a political force (Bayat 2000). This may lead to “street politics”, which refers to a set of conflicts as well as physical and social confrontation between the urban poor and the state. There is no organising ideology which pulls the urban poor together, but the common circumstances which forge a network on the streets, such that they may resist the state with one voice. This makes the street a site of political action between the state which may attempt to control and regulate activities like urban informality and those who engage in informal activities (Bayat 2000). The intention in reviewing the struggles by people such as informal actors in cities of the Global South as detailed in the preceding parts was to provide a context for this chapter. In other words, in South African and Zimbabwean cities, how do actors involved in urban informality engage in “street politics”? Do they even engage in “street politics”? What trajectory does it take? Does it assume quiet encroachment as advanced by Bayat (2000) or does it follow everyday forms of resistance as posited by Scott (1985, 1989). These questions among others are tackled in this chapter in which we take the view that, informal actors as an example of the disenfranchised attempt to fight for a right to the city. Differently stated, the urban disenfranchised in many cities in South Africa and Zimbabwe fight for right to the city, because in its current form the same city is exclusive, owing to the legacy of apartheid and colonialism which is infused into and mediate current urban planning, policy and governance. And therefore it is not that these encroachers such as urban economic informality “are essentially non- or antimodern, but because the conditions of their existence compel them to seek an informal mode of life. For modernity is a costly affair; not everyone can afford to be modern. Since it requires the capacity to conform to the types of behavior and mode of life (adherence to strict disciplines of time, space, contracts and so on) which most vulnerable people simply cannot afford” Bayat (2000: 549). For these reasons, we deploy the notion of the right to the city in an attempt to understand the political dimensions and “streets politics” by people in the informal sector in South African and Zimbabwean cities.

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10.2 Regarding Power, Informality and the Right to the City In Southern African cities, like those in South Africa and Zimbabwe urban informality is viewed as “spatial disorder” or “spatialized deviance” precisely because it does not conform to the Western European or North American city (Kamete 2013: 17). In other words, attaining the status and/or standard of the cities of developed countries must of necessity involve the evisceration of any form of urban informality. Such an attitude and approach to urban informality which manifests in efforts aimed at its exenteration appear to be informed by simplistic, if nothing else superficial dualistic and structuralist perspectives of urban informality, which see it as backward and separate from the formal economy (Geertz 1963) and a product of economic crisis or the informalisation of the formal economy (Portes et al. 1989), respectively. And yet, and quite disappointingly at that, it seems as though these facile readings of urban informality guide how urban city authorities and governments in Southern African cities respond to the phenomenon in the form of, among others, destroying urban informal structures like what happened in Zimbabwean cities in 2005 (Kamete 2006, 2007; Gumbo and Geyser 2011; Moyo 2018) and in South Africa in 2013 (Moyo 2015). As disappointing and inhuman as these events were, they should not be suprising, because the deeper superstructure in the form of the colonial and racial histories of Zimbabwean and South African cities is pervasive in terms of permeating into and influencing the approaches and responses to urban informality in the contemporary dispensation. To the extent that the past can shape the future, so can the urban history of racial and apartheid governance in which urban informality was regarded as a deviation and abnormality continue long after the demise of these oppressive systems of government. A quick reference to urban planning and policy responses to urban informality—issues which were discussed in-depth in Chapters 3 and 9 amplify this point. Differently stated, this suggests that urban informality and its actors do not belong to the city because they fail to meet the prescribed standards. This necessarily brings to the fore the issues of who or which or what economic activities for instance belong to the city of the Global South like that in South Africa and Zimbabwe? And such a question leads to the invocation of the notion of the rights to the city, a right which “revolves around the production of urban space, [… and that] it is those who live in the city– who contribute to the body of urban lived experience and lived space – who can legitimately claim the right to the city” (Purcell 2002: 102). The right to the city therefore is “like a cry and a demand… a transformed and renewed right to urban life” (Lefebvre 1996: 158) in terms of “full and complete usage” of urban space by the urban citizens (Lefebvre 1996: 179). On this basis, all inhabitants of the city, whom Lefebvre (1968) refers to as the citadins have “the right to participation and the right to appropriation. The right to participation maintains that citadins should play a central role in any decision that contributes to the production of urban space. Appropriation includes the right of inhabitants to physically access, occupy, and use urban space. Not only is appropriation the right to occupy already-produced

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urban space, it is also the right to produce urban space so that it meets the needs of inhabitants” (Purcell 2002: 102–103). It is on the part on the rights of the city dwellers to use urban spaces to satisfy their needs that, the issue of urban informality is implied. This is because some of these actors engage in unregistered businesses enterprises, which means they operate outside of the regulation of the state. But the important point to note here is that, these actors do so in an attempt to meet their needs, based on various and complex factors and conditions which have been explored in preceding chapters (see for example Chapters 2, 4 and 6), which leads to the growth of urban informality. These complex factors appear to highlight the fact that urban informality is the logic of urbanisation in the Global South (Roy 2005), of which South Africa and Zimbabwe are part. If urban informality is an intrinsic and integral part of the urbanisation process, it suggests that there should be no need to engage in policies which try and exclude these, as if they did not deserve to be in the urban areas in the first instance. Therefore, to the extent that city authorities attempt to or indeed annihilate informality suggests that they assault the right to the city of all actors involved in urban informality and simply ignore or are oblivious to the fact that urban “space must be produced in a way that makes that full and complete usage possible” (Purcell 2002: 103). And in this light, “the right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access the urban resources: it is the right to change ourselves by changing the city, the freedom to make and remake our cities” (Harvey 2008: 23). Notwithstanding, some scholars (see, e.g., Purcell 2003; Plyushteva 2009; Merrifield 2011) assert that the right to the city must not be reduced to rights of participation and appropriation or “a politics of turf” because doing so “is clearly insufficient as a horizon for strategic goals and a general framework for thinking and action” (Plyushteva (2009: 317). A further argument against reducing the right to the city to a struggle described in the preceding is that “on the one hand, the city needs to be considered globally because urbanisation is global, masterminded by transnational finance capital. On the other hand, in this global struggle, the city somehow holds the key. The specificity of the city seems to be that there is no longer any specificity; the right to the city is a global struggle for citizenship that needs to be grounded in the city” (Merrifield 2011: 471). This is further complicated by that, as urban areas have expanded to the degree that they are now multi centred, hence, the question of the “right to what city arises” (Merrifield 2011: 471). Consequently, the right to the city; remains at a too high level of abstraction to be anything that is existentially meaningful in everyday life. Put a little differently, the right to the city politicizes something that is too vast and at the same time too narrow, too restrictive and unfulfilling, too empty a signifier to inspire collection retribution. The right to the city quite simply isn’t the right that needs articulating. It’s too vast because the scale of the city is out of reach for most people living at street level; and it’s too narrow because when people do protest, when they do take to the streets en masse, their existential desires frequently reach out beyond the scale of the city and revolve around a common and collective humanity, a pure democratic yearning. (Merrifield 2011: 473)

On this basis, “capitalism and neocapitalism have produced abstract space, which includes the world of commodities, its logic and its worldwide strategies, as well as

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the power of money and that of the political state” (Lefebvre 1984: 53). The essence of this is that, the growth of capitalism has weakened instead of strengthening the city as an autonomous institution (Castells (1977). In this sense, neoliberal capitalism has taken “control over the social production of urban space and their city building prowess to a global scale, leaving the city behind as merely the container or canvas for capitalism’s inscriptions” (Soja 2000: 102). These are legitimate critiques and observations of the notion of the right to the city. Indeed, it may be correct that cities are global and so is informality, but at a most basic level we take the view that, the right to the city is the right to “full and complete usage” of urban space by the citadins (Lefebvre 1996: 179). And while in this chapter we fully recognise these contestations, we utilise the notion of the right to the city to understand how urban informality and in particular the demands of the actors in this economic activity demonstrate fights for basic access to and use of the city space for informal enterprises. This fight for space comes to the fore because of the extensive growth of urban informality such that “slum dwelling, casual work, and street hawking are no longer the characteristics of the traditional poor, but have spread also among educated young people with higher status, aspirations and skills”. This raises the question of how these “growing urban disenfranchised in the Third World respond to the larger social processes that affect their lives, if and when they do” (Bayat 2000: 535). We advance that when the actors involved in urban informality fight for space to operate in the city, this directly or indirectly invokes certain levels of the politics of resistance and the nature and dynamic of these political struggles are the subject of this paper. Likewise, the complexity and dimension of these struggles also come to the fore as well as how and why government and city authorities respond to these. For these reasons, the concepts of the rights to the city demonstrates that, “Lefebvre’s work on ‘the rights to the city’ ‘everyday life in the modern world’, the social struggles over ‘the production of space’ and the need for a ‘specifically urban revolution’, introduced a trenchant new perspective on the politics and ideology of city space, as well as the geohistory of modernity and capitalism” (Soja 2000: 100). Hence in this chapter, we engage with the issue of how and if urban informality can be conceived as a site that has been or could be mobilised for political action. In the case that it is, we tackle the issues of how this materialises and dematerialises.

10.3 Informality and Political Turn in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe Several issues have emerged concerning the informal traders in Bulawayo. But one which provides a point of reference in engaging with the aim of this chapter, concerns the reason which led the people to engage in urban informality. It is because of the economic conditions in the country, which have forced many to join urban informality that, the people involved feel obliged and justified to engage in political activism as detailed in the following parts. The majority of the street traders explained that they

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engaged in informality because of unemployment which was caused by the failure of the government to manage the economy. The views of the informal economic actors such as street traders in Bulawayo on why they engaged in this activity can be summarised by the following; “when the economy collapsed, leading to the closure of industries and/or retrenchment, we lost everything and had no source of livelihood, which forced us, unemployed people to resort to the buying and selling of goods on the streets of Bulawayo”.1 This illustrates that, ordinary people have “taken matters into their own hands in order to earn a living under very difficult circumstance”.2 For these reasons, the informal actors asserted that, they needed to be “treated with respect by authorities who have failed to take care of the needs of its people in terms of providing employment”.3 Taking matters into their hands have also meant that ordinary people traded in undesignated areas or zones on the streets of Bulawayo because the areas which have been earmarked for this, have simply not been enough given the huge numbers of people whom have resorted to street trading so as to earn livelihoods (Moyo 2018). For instance, they did this by “evading the municipality police whenever they were on patrol”4 In addition “in December 2013, it was observed that along Fort Street between 6th avenue to the North and 8th avenue to the South, whenever a municipality police vehicle approached from a distance a whistle from the one of the traders was enough to warn all the traders who would quickly disappear only to appear and continue selling their wares after the police left. This way, these traders have an enduring presence and the municipality police have failed to get rid of them” (Moyo 2018: 308). Further, “a whistle by one street trader to fellow traders when a police vehicle approached could be interpreted as direct communication to the municipality police that the street traders in question were not registered and were prepared to trade on the streets whether or not permission or licences were granted. The traders always managed to fight and bounce back. It appears like a subtle declaration of war by the street traders against the regulatory regimes on streets of Bulawayo” (Moyo 2018: 308). Furthermore, street traders who were not allocated trading stalls had also mobilised their councillors so as to contest what they regarded as harassment and/or victimisation by the police arguing that “the municipality police had no moral grounds to impound our goods”.5 In some instance this resolve by the street traders had led to violent and bloody confrontations. This is best illustrated by the case of a teenage girl, who after wrestling with municipal police who wanted to confiscate her goods, was left with a broken arm and had to be taken to hospital afterwards (Ncube 2016 cited in Moyo 2018). Similar encounters have involved the street traders successfully fight against and managing to chase away the municipal police and by these means get a temporary reprieve from what they considered to be harassment by the municipal 1 Interview

with street trader, August 2013. with street trader, November 2013. 3 Interview with street trader, November 2013. 4 Interview with street trader, December 2013. 5 Interview with street trader, December 2013. 2 Interview

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regulatory regime (Moyo 2018). The argument of the street traders is that “if the local and central government failed to meet our needs, then the same authorities cannot claim authority over us, because we have taken matters into our own hands to meet our employment needs”.6 For this cause they were prepared to “defend these operations and the spaces from which they take place by efforts including; continuing to trade both lawfully and unlawfully, open defiance and paying bribes, applying political pressure and adopting legal actions”.7 As a result of this, among other strategies of resistance by the informal traders the mayor of Bulawayo declared in September 2016, that they should be allowed to trade on the streets (Zhou 2016). In the event that the municipality of Bulawayo attempted to relocate people from trading in designated areas on the streets has led to resistance. This is because such actors were skeptical about the intentions of the City of Bulawayo given that in the past, the government has brutalised them. The said happened during Operation Murambatsvina/Operation Restore Order in which the stalls of many street traders were destroyed and many livelihoods were shattered (Tibaijuka 2005; Michael and Masunungure 2006; Potts 2006; Bratton and Masunungure 2007; Kamete 2006, 2007, 2013; Gumbo and Geyser 2011). A good example of this skepticism relates to informal traders and transporters at Basch Street Terminus (Egodini) who faced or relocates at the end of 31 December 2013. The City of Bulawayo stated that this relocation was motivated by the need to renovate and convert the area into a state of the art regional transport nod, but the traders challenged this move. The informal traders actually mounted a legal challenge through the union of informal traders, the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economies Association (ZCIEA) (Nehanda Radio 2013). The economic actors who were affected by the relocation stated that they did not want to be negatively affected as the relocation would lead to reduced business turnover on account of a limited market away from the Basch Terminus (Moyo 2018). Hence the call on the City of Bulawayo to consider “the right to trade on the streets and especially the issue of evicting them from Egodini, which provided a viable market for products as it was a transport centre in Bulawayo”.8 And for these reasons, the informal traders demanded an alternative trading place and the conflict had not been resolved (Bhebhe 2017). As a result, ZCIEA still continues to represent the informal traders in this regard (Chitumba and Masara 2015). On this issue (Moyo 2018: 307) argues that “by following a legal route to challenge the eviction from Egodini, was tantamount to an announcement to the municipality by the street traders that, they were no longer the weak people who would allow their trading spaces and places to be invaded and destroyed without any consequences on the municipality”. By deploying the notion of the right to the city as discussed earlier in this chapter to understand the situation in Bulawayo, several issues emerge. The first is that the informal traders were fighting for the right to the city in terms of that, they wanted to trade on the streets. They may not be interested in issues of governance per se but 6 Interview

with street trader, November 2013. with street trader, August 2013. 8 Interview with street trader, November 2013. 7 Interview

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all that they were fighting for was a space from which to operate. In other words, they wanted usage of the city so as to sustain themselves. In this sense, the informal street traders in Bulawayo wanted physical access to the city and in the process meet their needs. All this indicates that the notion of the right to the city, when applied at the most basic level to mean access to and utilisation of the physical city by citadins, still allows one to illuminate the nature of conflict in a setting like the one under discussion. Although the argument that cities are global as a result of globalisation, which means the right to the city is no longer relevant because there is now no specific city (Merrifield 2011) is understood, many street traders in the City of Bulawayo were not interested in or aware of the global networks which the city might have established but to be allowed to operate from the streets and thus meet their needs. In this way, the right to city as a struggle for access to the city becomes a pertinent issue for informal economic actors in a Southern African city like of Bulawayo in Zimbabwe. Further, in the case of Bulawayo, one can detect both everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985, 1989) and “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” (Bayat 2000: 545). Concerning everyday forms of resistance, the street traders in Bulawayo engaged in strategies such as evading the police or operating surreptitiously. But what is striking about the case of Bulawayo is that, the strategies which the street traders had invoked so as to fight for the right to the city had graduated to open defiance and confrontation. This manifested in open fights between the street traders and the municipality police. In addition, the open fights also assumed a collective and legal front. For these reasons, Moyo (2018: 509) argues that this demonstrates that the street traders have moved beyond weapons of the weak, because the “articulation of grievances and the commitment to fight for the right to trade on the streets of Bulawayo appear to show people who have drawn clear battle lines against the municipality. Such people have clearly moved beyond weapons of the weak, because they are employing more visible forms of resistance against the authorities”. This resonates with the concept of the silent intrusion of the city by the ordinary people (Bayat 2000). When the urban poor meet opposition to their quiet encroachment of and attempts to earn a living in the city, they engage in evanescent struggles against the regulatory regimes (Bayat 2000). These ephemeral struggles between the informal economic actors and the City of Bulawayo is a form of street politics to the extent that the former want to defend their informal trading spaces and businesses against the latter who are seen as a hindrance in this regard. What is instructive in the case of City of Bulawayo is the mobilisation of the street traders under the ZCIEA. This organisation has actually gone ahead and mounted legal challenges against the City of Bulawayo on behalf of its registered members and those who are not. This is an act of political recruitment in the sense that ZCIEA was growing its political clout by mobilising people involved in urban informality. In turn, this has encouraged the street traders to be determined, if nothing else daring in their defence of the right to trade on the streets, without permits which allow them to do so. For this reason, one can read a political turn in that the street traders are now linking their fights with the City of Bulawayo to the broader political issues in Zimbabwe.

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Interview data as discussed earlier shows that, the street traders argued that the City of Bulawayo was the arm of the central government which was responsible for economic collapse and the resultant problems. The argument was that, if the government had caused and failed to solve the problems which were affecting its citizens, such a government was useless and had no right to attempt to punish or regulate people who had taken matters into their hands, which the government failed to do. As a result, the street traders were prepared to and actually resisted the City of Bulawayo. And from the point of view of street traders fighting the municipality gave them the satisfaction, that they were fighting the government. Interview data presented in preceding parts suggests that, the street traders had managed to force the City of Bulawayo to allow them to trade on the streets, regardless of whether or not they had permits. In this, we see the indication and operation of the Foucauldian theory of power. As Foucault observed, power is everywhere and it can be reproduced from one time to the other. When the street traders individually resisted the City of Bulawayo police, they demonstrated that they also had power which they could use. Even though some of the street traders were bashed by the City of Bulawayo, they demonstrated their power nonetheless. Similarly, when the street traders mobilised under ZCIEA, we also detect the mobilisation and supplication of power, by the street traders to directly resist the City of Bulawayo and the government by these indirect means. Although the City of Bulawayo have shown that they have mightier power against the street traders, the latter have similarly shown that their power (however low) cannot be ignored. These informal traders have successfully defended their right to the City of Bulawayo in the form of conducing informal business, even when the municipality did not either want and/or approve of the business which contravened the city by laws. Beyond this realm of the exercise of politics and power as discussed above, interviews with people involved in urban informality towards the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019 also appear to suggests that, in the case of Bulawayo, this economic activity was also a site for political mobilisation. This appeared to be especially the case with unemployed youth. Both in 2018 and the beginning of 2019, a young man, among others who were involved in buying goods from either Botswana or South Africa and reselling them on the streets in Bulawayo explained that this way of earning a living has forced him to think more deeply about politics with a view to contributing to the change in the way that the country and the economy was run. They explained that it was on the streets that they got to discuss broader political issues and why it was seen as abnormal that people who had university degrees could not be employed. The main point is that the young and old people blamed the government for the economic crisis which affected the country and as a result they had been heavily involved in politics of opposition. Differently stated, it was the everyday challenges on the streets for young people for example, with university degrees which cemented their political beliefs in terms of wanting to change the current government. In this one can see a causal connection between urban informality and political activism in the form of opposition politics in Zimbabwe. It needs emphasis that the turn into active politics by the urban informality business operators under discussion took a complex trajectory in that some actually

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engaged in the politics of patronage in the form of supporting the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). The interviewed participants shared that, based on meetings and discussions that they usually had on the streets of Bulawayo where they operated their businesses, they decided to participate in ruling party so as to position themselves. This is because in Zimbabwe “if you are politically connected to the ruling party, one can have access to many resources”.9 Another added that, his friends on the streets had convinced him that joining ZANU– PF was more about a “survival strategy in the difficult economic times” than fighting for democracy and defending the rights of other people.10 This means that, “I am ZANU-PF to the extent to which, this can facilitate my access to good job opportunities and other privileges, which an educated person like myself deserves”.11 This discussion requires further qualification on several points. First, it needs to be highlighted that there is no attempt to underplay the agency of the youth and other members of the Zimbabwean population in political activism—that people were forced to engage in politics as if they were incapable of political beliefs. The point is that trading on the streets provided opportunities for the youth, among other sections of the population, to either consolidate their long held beliefs or change the same. For example, the young man who was involved in opposition politics have always been involved in politics but his condition of employment intensified his dislike of ZANU–PF ideology and policies. Likewise, some who engaged in the politics of patronage have not always been ZANU–PF, but did so because of the perceived benefits that membership in the said could bring. Second, there is no suggestion that political parties were incapable of mobilising people—that unemployment was responsible for recruiting people for political parties. Rather, the argument is that on the streets of Bulawayo, the message of political parties was easy to spread “in a people who were hungry for political and economic change”.12 In this way, actors involved in urban informality were a site for political mobilisation. The third issue is that, urban informality in cities of the Global South is the logic of urbanisation (Roy 2005) and there are some educated people who have chosen to engage in this activity and actually succeeded and may not need or look for employment. The full implication of this is that, urban informality should not be seen in a negative light—that it was always the resort. Quite to the contrary, for some people it is the first choice as was demonstrated by a study by Moyo (2014) of migrant informal business operators from West Africa who specifically came to open and operate businesses in Johannesburg inner city, South Africa. This contradicts what the people, particularly the youth on the streets of Bulawayo were doing and anticipating. This deserves further investigation, but as a preliminary suggestion, these results which run against the current and logic of urban informality in cities of the Global South, could be indicative of the general macro-economic and political problems that needs addressing in Zimbabwe for people to make free choices 9 Interview

with street trader, January 2018. with street trader, January 2018. 11 Interview with street trade, January 2019. 12 Interview with street trade, January 2019. 10 Interview

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on whether or not to engage in informality. This may be taken to suggest that the economic and related political issues and problems in Zimbabwe are abnormal and hence the contextual specificity of the issues under discussion.

10.4 Regarding Street Politics in Johannesburg City Just like the case of Bulawayo discussed above, in Johannesburg inner city struggles for the right to the city as well as street politics were uncovered by interviews with the informal street traders which were carried out between 2013 and 2017. For the present purposes, some background detail is needful. In September 2013, the City of Johannesburg destroyed stalls which belonged to street traders in what was considered to be an operation to clean the city. The rationale behind such an operation was to rehabilitate and revitalise those parts of the city which had undergone degeneration. The operation should be read as a fulfilment of the objective of making Johannesburg a world class city by 2030 (Luiz 2003; Winkler 2009; Olitzki and Luiz 2013). For some scholars, “the 2030 Vision and the subsequent 2003 Inner City Regeneration Strategy undoubtedly demonstrate a preference for capital accumulation with negligible attention paid to the formulation of social policies” (Winkler 2009: 28). Back to the Operation Clean Up, its outcome was a fierce contest between the informal street traders and City of Johannesburg over the right to trade on the streets of Johannesburg inner city. One street trader declared that “these authorities are heartless because we were told that they were cleaning the city and making it safe. What are they cleaning? Are we trash? There are no jobs and for me this is a way of supporting my family. Who are they making the city clean for? This is wrong. What is clean about not being able to support my family and pay rent? Who needs the cleanliness except the rich and powerful people and tourists?”.13 Form this one can see that, what the informal actors actually wanted was the right to trade on the streets, it was contest over turf and this is why the street traders defied the City of Johannesburg. The following declaration is telling in this regard; as long as there is no immediate plan for me to continue my business, I will illegally trade on the streets. I cannot postpone my life and wait for the municipality to clean the city at their own pace. Life must go on. The buying of food for my children and the payment of their school fees and rent for where I stay is now; it cannot wait or be postponed. What this means is that I will continue to trade on the streets whether I have authority or not, they should be engaging a war against poverty and not a war against poor people who have taken matters into their own hands to provide for themselves14

From this statement one can clearly see a determined resolve by the street trader in question. This informal actor asserted that in terms of whatever plans the City of Johannesburg decided to implement, they needed to consider that the informal street traders, had a claim to the city. If that did not happen, conflict was bound to happen 13 Interview 14 Interview

with street trader Johannesburg inner city, October 2013. with street trader Johannesburg inner city, November 2013.

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as the street traders were not prepared to allow the City of Johannesburg to disrupt their livelihoods. Hence the declaration that; if it was about planning, they should have implemented the new measures without destroying the stalls. Why did they not plan around the stalls, when they built the stalls in the first place and then make the transition? I sell my clothes from this bag and if the police try to catch me, I evade them. In the final analysis I am back on the streets with or without a stall, legally or illegally. I will continue what I am doing. Well if they allocate us the trading stalls, which will be great. Either way, I will continue with my business15

This resistance by the informal street traders led them to approach the South African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA) and the South African Informal Traders Forum, who in turn took the City of Johannesburg to the Constitutional Court. The result was that the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the street traders in December 2013 (Moyo 2015). And by these means the street traders went back to operating on the streets. There are parallels between the City of Johannesburg example and that of the City of Bulawayo in that the people who are usually considered to be poor and weak are not actually that weak. They have power or can invoke power, which amplifies the argument by Foucault (1978), that power is everywhere and everyone has power. In addition to this, we also see in the case of Johannesburg inner city everyday forms resistance (Scott 1985, 1989) as well as street politics (Bayat 2000). Everyday resistance occurred in the form of evading the police for example. Street politics materialised in the form of direct conflicts between the informal actors and regulatory regimes. In both the former and later, the objective was to defend their operating spaces on the streets of Johannesburg inner city which wants to remove informal actors and enforce the standards of a North American and Western European city in South Africa. Therefore, and most importantly the street politics in Bulawayo and Johannesburg and the resultant acrimonious relationship between the people in the informal economy and the regulatory regimes seems to be inevitable until the informal economy is seriously regarded as an integral part of urbanisation. The point we are making here is that, without reforming urban planning and government policies towards informality, the confrontation between on the one hand those regulating urban informality and on the other, those participating in it will continue. Urban planning and policies are informed by the colonial and racist history of these cities, with the result that, those who participate in the informal economy have no/limited/temporary rights to the city, but those in the formal economy have. Consequently, even if there were attempts which tried to accommodate informality, but, without a fundamental overhaul of the preference of the formal economy over the informal economy, it becomes a classic case of addressing the symptoms and ignoring the cause. And by these means, the symptoms can only be addressed temporarily, only to emerge again in the future.

15 Interview

with street trader Johannesburg inner city, October 2013.

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10.5 Conclusion This chapter attempted to analyse the political dimensions or implications of urban informality in South African and Zimbabwean cities. In this effort, the chapter started by reviewing examples of how people involved in urban informality in other parts of the Global South have responded and attempted or failed to negotiate their socioeconomic and political conditions. These include conceptions such as the “‘passive poor’, ‘survival strategy’, ‘urban territorial movement’ and ‘everyday resistance’” (Bayat 2000: 538). For instance, the concept of the passive poor suggests that people involved in urban informality exist in a culture of poverty and as a result hopelessness and fatalism among other typical behaviours hold sway. The notion of survival strategy suggested that the urban poor were victims of unemployment and poverty, among other forces to which they responded by engaging in other vices like theft. The idea of urban territorial movements suggests that the urban poor were involved in advocacy for political, economic and other forms of upliftment (Bayat 2000). In addition, everyday forms of resistance suggest that the urban poor employed weapons of the week so as to surreptitiously contest dominant forms of power and control (Scott 1985, 1989). Bayat (2000), suggests these conceptualisations of how the urban poor and/or those involved in urban informality responded to their circumstances were insufficient to the extent that, they failed to adequately demonstrate the agency of these people. For this reason, Bayat (2000: 545), suggests that, the concept of “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” can be a useful analytical tool. This refers to actions by the poor who contest dominant power by a variety of strategies such as illegal connection of electricity and water. Such people do not disrupt or connect water and electricity from one of their own but they target the government and other urban elites so as to meet their needs. Such strategies/encroachments by the ordinary are initially predominantly atomised and may not always have a clear ideology and leadership structure (Bayat 2000). It is important to add that, when the urban poor/informal economic actors are faced with resistance to the attempts described in this section, this may lead to “street politics” in which they physically or socially confront the government and urban elites. At this level, the organising philosophy are common conditions of those who contest dominant power. Differently stated, what draws these people together are the forces which disrupt their activities as they try to meet their needs on the streets (Bayat). The review of these concepts provided a context within which to analyse the political actions and/or strategies of informal economic actors in Bulawayo City and Johannesburg inner City. In both cases it was suggested that everyday forms of resistance as well as the strategies of encroachment were employed by the actors in the informal economy to different degrees. For example, in Bulawayo and Johannesburg inner city the informal economic actors defied the authorities by operating in undesignated trading zones and in some cases paid bribes to the municipality police who were supposed to enforce municipality laws. However, strategies of encroachment have graduated to “street politics” whenever quiet attempts failed. And in both cities the informal economic actors have

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openly defied the municipalities and also invoked the rights to trade on the streets by taking legal action against the regulatory regimes. For these reasons, actors in the informal economy appear to be politically conscious and active to the extent of demonstrating that they have power which they can politically and legally exercise so as to defend their economic activities on the streets. Although the municipalities may have mightier power, this is not always enough to impose their will on the informal actors, who have successfully challenged such power. In this sense we are reminded of Foucault (1978)’s assertion that power is everywhere and can be reproduced from one moment to another. Above everything else, the legacy of colonialism and apartheid, which still dominated urban planning and policy, in which the formal economy was preferred and not the informal actually provided a site for political and economic struggle and the strained relationships between actors in the informal economy and the city authorities. The corollary of this is that, if urban informality was properly planned for just like the formal economy, such contestations would not arise or they would have different demands.

References Bayat A (2000) From ‘dangerous classes’ to ‘quiet rebels’: politics of the urban subaltern in the global south. Int Sociol 15(3):533–557 Bhebhe N (2017) Egodini vendors vow to resist eviction. Southern Eye. https://www.southerneye. co.zw/2016/02/01/egodini-vendors-vow-to-resist-eviction/. Accessed 5 March 2017 Bratton M, Masunungure E (2007) Popular reactions to state repression: operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe. Afr Aff 106(422):21–45 Castells M (1977) The urban question: a Marxist approach. MIT Press, Cambridge Chitumba P, Masara W (2015) Mixed reaction to 7-day ultimatum. The Chronicle. http://www.chr onicle.co.zw/mixed-reactions-to-7-day-ultimatum/. Accessed 5 March 2017 Foucault M (1978) The history of sexuality: an introduction. Penguin Books, London Geertz C (1963) Peddlers and princes: social change and economic modernization in two indonesian towns. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Gumbo T, Geyser M (2011) Picking up the pieces: reconstructing the informal economic sector in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. SSB/TRP/MDM 59: 53–64. www.ajol.info/index.php/trp/article/dow nload/77221/67669. Accessed 17 July 2014 Harvey D (2008) The right to the city. New Left Rev 53:23–40 Kamete AY (2006) The return of the jettisoned: ZANU PF’s crack at re-urbanising in Harare. J South Afr Stud 32:255–271 Kamete AY (2007) Cold-hearted, negligent and spineless? Planning, planners and the (r)ejection of filth in urban Zimbabwe. J Int Stud 12:153–171 Kamete AY (2013) On handling urban informality in Southern Africa. Geogr Ann: Ser B, Hum Geogr 95(1):17–31 Lefebvre H (1968) Le droit à la ville. Paris: Anthropos Lefebvre H (1984) The production of space (Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith). Blackwell, Oxford Lefebvre H (1996) Writings on cities. Blackwell, Cambridge Luiz J (2003) Progress in the city: based on JDA Indicators for development in Johannesburg’s inner city. An abridged version of a report prepared for the JDA. Johannesburg Development Agency. http://www.jda.org.za/keydocs/progressreport.pdf. Accessed 5 July 2014

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Merrifield A (2011) The right to the city and beyond: notes on a Lefebvrian reconceptualization. City 15(3-4):468–476 Michael B, Masunungure E (2006) Popular reactions to state repression: operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe. African Affairs 106:21–45 Moyo I (2014) A case study of black African immigrant entrepreneurship in Johannesburg inner city using the mixed embeddedness approach. J Immigr Refug Stud 12(3):250–273 Moyo I (2015) Operation clean up in Johannesburg inner city: perspectives on the right to the city and the politics of encounter. Scientific Annals of Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Ia¸si LXI, 1 (IIc): 31–43 Moyo I (2018) Resistance and resilience by informal traders in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: beyond weapons of the weak. Urban Forum. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-018-9333-8 Ncube N (2016) Council cop break teen vendor’s arm. B-Metro. http://www.b-metro.co.zw/?p= 24560. Accessed 6 March 2017 Nehanda Radio (2013) Informal traders threaten Bulawayo council with court action. http:// nehandaradio.com/2013/11/05/informal-traders-threaten-bulawayo-council-with-court-action/. Accessed 10 June 2015 Olitzki J, Luiz J (2013) Evolving strategies in the Johannesburg CBD. J Helen Suzman Found 69:25–31 Plyushteva A (2009) The right to the city and the struggles over public citizenship: exploring the links. Urban Reinventions Pap Ser 3(9):1–17 Portes A, Castells M, Benton LA (eds) (1989) The informal economy: studies in advanced and less advanced countries. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Potts D (2006) Restoring order? Operation Murambatsvina and the urban crisis in Zimbabwe. J South Afr Stud 32:273–291 Purcell M (2002) Excavating Lefebvre: the right to the city and its urban politics of the inhabitant. GeoJournal 58:99–108 Purcell M (2003) Citizenship and the right to the global city: reimagining the capitalist world order. Int J Urban RegNal Res 27(3):564–590 Roy A (2005) Urban informality: toward an epistemology of planning. J A Plan Assoc 71(2):147– 158 Scott JC (1985) Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of resistance. Yale University Press, New Haven and London Scott JC (1989) Everyday forms pf resistance. Cph J Asian Stud 4:33–62 Soja E (2000) Postmetropolis: critical studies of cities and regions. Blackwell, Oxford Tibaijuka AK (2005) Report of the fact finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and impact of operation Murambatsvina by the UN special envoy on human settlements in Zimbabwe. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, New York Winkler T (2009) Believing in market forces in Johannesburg. In: Porter L, Shaw K (eds) Whose Urban Renaissance? An international comparison of urban regeneration strategies. Routledge, New York, pp 25–33 Zhou T (2016) Vendors free to operate in Bulawayo. http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-nat ional-byo-97095.html. Accessed 6 March 2017

Part IV

Aftermath

Chapter 11

The Aftermath

Abstract The totality of issues which have been discussed in this book, appear to point to the fact that, urban informality is a force that has transformed and continues to transform cities of the Global South and those in South Africa and Zimbabwe included. For this cause, could the ubiquity of urban informality allow urban scholars to think of a post work society in a set up where the professionalisation of biographies is still dominant? Has the notion of work as we know it, been transformed? What about the changing character, content and dynamic of the urban landscape as a result of urban informality? These are some of the questions, with which this chapter grapples, so as to position the notion, that, urban informality has left in its wake an enduring and continuing revolution. Keywords Urban informality · Urban planning · Revolution · Evolution · Spatial · South Africa · Zimbabwe

11.1 Introduction of Capitalism, Formalisation of Economic Activities and the Construction of Urban Informality In Chapter 2, we highlighted that what is currently classified as informal economic activities have been in existence for a very long time before key historical moments such as European colonialism, modernisation of economies and the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In countries like Ukraine what is now called urban informality has a very long history (Williams and Round 2007a, b). Similarly, Western European countries and North America also had economic activities that shared characteristics with modern day urban informality before the formalisation and modernisation processes (Gumbo and Geyser 2011). In different parts of Africa, the same phenomenon has a long but variable history which can be traced to precolonial times. This scenario is summarised by Potts (2007) who observes that such economic activities have always been part of human history and also part of pre-capitalist economic activities. In Nigeria for example, the Igbos practised trade and engaged in manufacturing activities before colonialism (Onyebueke and Geyer © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6_11

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2011). Brown et al. (2010) observed that, there has always been a strong historical tradition of trading in countries such as Tanzania, Senegal and Lesotho since time immemorial. In Ghana, matrilineal family structures have always supported trading activities by women in their communities even before colonialism (King 2006). Thus, present day urban economic informality therefore dates back to pre-modernity. To borrow Onyebueke and Geyer’s (2011) characterisation, the coinage of the term informality can be likened to putting “old wine in a new wine skin”, suggesting that it is only the “packaging” of informality that has been transformed, and not its nature. This notwithstanding, the development and patterns of urban informality in precolonial Africa were not the same. In some regions, such as West Africa the phenomenon has a long and entrenched history such that it survived colonial conquest, but in regions like Southern Africa, most cities grew after colonialism, such that informality grew afterwards, with the result that it was easy to tame. We will come back to this issue in the following parts. In any case, this economic activity was classified as informal after the introduction of capitalism and the formalisation of economic activities. Thus, in Africa the concept of urban informality as an economic sector, was only coined and popularised during the early 1970s (Hart 1970, 1973; ILO 1972), long after economic activities with similar characteristics had already existed in pre and colonial cities. As noted in the preceding, although urban informality was suppressed and discouraged by colonial governments the pattern was not the same. In parts of Africa such as West Africa in which informality had existed for longer periods of time, it was difficult to control, but in Southern Africa, in which cities are relatively young and in the most built by the colonizers, this activity was easily subjected to colonial and racist urban planning laws. This is why in South Africa, small informal businesses were the preserve of Whites particularly during the 1950s, and hence the phenomenon was not widespread. Pieces of legislation such as the Urban Areas Act of 1945 were put in place to outlaw black people from owning and operating informal businesses, and hence there were few traces of these informal economic activities (Geyer 1989; Hart and Rogerson 1989). However, high unemployment rates and poverty forced a few blacks to own informal businesses in defiance of the regulatory frameworks (Rogerson 2002). Prohibition of both migrants and their economic activities was common in most colonial cities in South Africa and Zimbabwe before political independence. A number of factors led to the growth of urban economic informality since the attainment of independence in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The factors include the poor performance of the so called formal economic sector, over-urbanisation, poverty, excessive regulations, recessions and government policies, among others. For instance, high urbanisation rates in South Africa after apartheid led to the saturation of the formal job market forcing most blacks to join urban informality. A case in point is that, the formal South African economy generated 1.6 million jobs between 1995 and 2002, while during the same period about 5 million new people joined the labour market, creating an excess of 3.4 million people who could not be absorbed by the FES (Horn 2011). The factors behind the rise in urban informality were discussed in Chapter 2 and will not be repeated here, but except to highlight that, it is clear

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that urban informality was not discovered by Keith Hart in Ghana in the early 1970s, because as shown in this part the phenomenon has been in existence long before the 1970s. The origins and existence of urban informality in the precolonial and colonial era as well as its growth and characteristics in the post-independence and contemporary periods in South African and Zimbabwean cities (Chapters 2 and 4) highlights it as transcendental. This, because it attracted a variety of actors, both rich and poor in an attempt to make both a living and also gain profits and this was predicated on a complex mix of political, economic as well as social imperatives and drivers. This is why in this book our definition of urban informality was informed by a political economy approach. As a political economy issue, urban informality should be seen as what Roy (2005), refers to as the logic of urbanisation. But as the logic of urbanisation and indeed a political economy matter, it was influenced by both past colonial and apartheid and current politico-economic and ideological approaches. A case in point is that in Zimbabwean cities, the growth and trajectory of urban informality reflected the past policies of the white minority settler regime as well as the political and ideological and economic changes during the reign of Robert Mugabe and beyond. Differently stated, urban informality was the product of the intersection between politics (past and present) and economics (past and present). Its activities were inextricably linked with the formal sector in an enduring way. For example, in Harare, in Zimbabwe people involved in urban informality were connected to the formal sector and so was the case in Bulawayo also in Zimbabwe as well as Durban and Johannesburg in South Africa. In similar contexts in other parts of Africa, the informal economy plays an important role in supplying raw materials and intermediate inputs to the formal sector. Sometimes, though usually exploitative, the formal sector buys finished products from the informal economy for sale (Arimah 2001). As a result, informal businesses improved their linkages with formal businesses by progressing towards formality along the formality–informality continuum by gradually assuming some of the characterises that include registration, licensing and employing skilled personnel, huge financial and working capital, advanced technology, operating from fixed places and generating high annual income (Arimah 2001). Such operations between the so called two economies reflect both complementary and competitive markets (Macharia 2007; Potts 2008; Bohme and Thiele 2012). In addition to this, there is an international dimension to informality in South African and Zimbabwean cities in that the people involved in these activities operated in more than one country and such operations connected both formal and informal networks in a strong and lasting way. For these reasons, not only is it futile to classify urban informality as a sector but also that, doing so obscures rather than illuminates the complexity and dynamism of the phenomenon. Likewise, the same criticism can be made on classifying urban informality as a second economy (see Aliber et al. 2006). A most fruitful approach should be to view and conceptualise urban informality as a matter of political economy which is widespread and transcendental.

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11.2 On Urban Planning and Urban Informality In terms of planning, cities in southern Africa appear to be guided by colonial planning apparatuses, which are modelled along European and North American planning standards. Several cases abound which demonstrates this point such as the Zimbabwean cities of Bulawayo, Harare and Masvingo as discussed in this book, whose urban planning was modelled according to British land use planning standards. Such was preserved for the most part in the 1980s well after Zimbabwe attained independence (Kamete 2006, 2007; Potts 2007, 2008). The important issue to emphasise about this nature of planning is that, urban informality therefore becomes an aberration or “spatial deviance”, to use the words of Kamete (2013: 17). This is the context within which cities in the countries under consideration engage in blitzes and urban cleaning operations so as to try and tame spatialised deviance on the urban form and in the process meet and conform to standards of European and North American cities (Kamete 2013). Examples of this include Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe in 2005 and Operation Clean up in Johannesburg in 2013. Notwithstanding, we have attempted to show that urban informality has intentionally and unintentionally defied (even if in some cases this has been unsuccessful) these planning codes, which is tantamount to a bottom up revolution in urban planning in southern Africa. The example of the Zimbabwean city of Bulawayo which was extensively discussed in Chapter 7, illuminated this point. In Bulawayo during the 1980s, the government and likewise the municipality strictly followed the colonial planning laws, which effectively restricted urban informal economic activities. In the 1990s, the economic collapse in Zimbabwe led to the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms, which led to the liberalisation and deregulation of urban informal economic activities (Mhone 1993; Dhemba 1999). The failure of the neoliberal reforms led to unemployment and more growth and spatial spread of urban informal economic activities and this trend has continued after the 2000s (Gumbo 2013). From this, we can suggest that, although there have been attempts to tame and/or restrict urban informality through the colonially inspired urban planning systems, this economic activity has defied these odds and significantly grown, such that some municipalities like Bulawayo, have been forced to accommodate the phenomenon in the form of building stalls and/or trading zones (Gumbo and Geyser 2011; Moyo 2018). In any case in some cities, some of the people involved in urban informality have adopted both covert and overt political responses to the harassment by regulatory regimes in Zimbabwean cities. As detailed in Chapter 7, people involved in street trading in for example, Bulawayo, the second largest city in Zimbabwe have moved beyond weapons of the weak in responding to harassment and confiscation of their goods by the municipality and its law enforcement agents (Moyo 2018). Some have even resorted to operating in undesignated zones and others have taken the municipality to court to challenge the legal basis of the eviction (from operating in undesignated business and/or trading zones) and harassment. In this, we can see the conflict between the people in the urban informal economy and the state. The former has argued that the latter has failed to manage the economy which has led to

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the mushrooming of urban informality as people have taken matters into their own hands so as to meet their needs. On this basis, people involved in the urban informal economy were adamant that, a government which has failed its citizenry had absolutely no business in harassing citizens who had found solutions to their economic challenges (Moyo 2018). This resulted in a stalemate, which is also indicative of the enduring influence of the erstwhile white minority settler regime in Zimbabwe which had literally banned urban informality. Regulatory regimes in Zimbabwean cities are still possessed by this modernist rigidity and this is the source of the tension which characterise the relations between the City of Bulawayo for example and the informal economic actors. The former is not willing to let go of the British planning standards and the latter are refusing to back down. They continue pushing through strategies discussed in this part. The result of this impasse was that, the municipality of Bulawayo declared in 2016, that even those who were unlicensed were allowed to trade on the streets on a temporary basis (Zhou 2016; Moyo 2018). This could be taken to be an admission (even if it is partial) by the City of Bulawayo of the role of urban informality in socioeconomic development in terms of, among others, contributing to the economy of the city as well as being a significant source of livelihood for many people. This admission and/or recognition in itself could be taken to suggest that, urban informality is an integral part of the urbanisation process in Zimbabwean cities and in instances where municipalities pretended that this was not the case, they have been reminded by resistance on the streets. In some cases, this resistance has assumed a political turn, by the people involved in this economic activity taking political action to make their demands known to the regulatory regimes. On this issue of resistance by actors in the informal economy against regulatory authorities, we are reminded of the city of Bogota, in which street vendors bargained with officials for more space and freedom of operation on the streets. This, in exchange for political support, while in Lesotho and Nepal civil unrest among the urban poor forced authorities to allow the spread of urban informality as a way of pacifying the protestors (Brown 2006). Differently stated, the growth in the phenomenon can be regarded as a force or revolution which cannot be ignored. This is why in the case of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, one can find trading stalls which have been built by the municipality so as to cater for these actors. Although these have not been enough to meet the needs of all the informal economic actors, the important point to emphasise is that the municipality is cognisant of the existence of these actors and have taken measures to respond to their existence and by these means accommodate them. And this has configured and reconfigured the city landscape in the Zimbabwean city, with the result that, urban informal economic activities exist side by side with those which are formal. This relationship has been characterised by an intricate an enduring interface along the urban formal–informal economic activities continuum, as described in the preceding and following parts. Therefore, from a planning or lack of planning for urban economic informality point of view, we see urban informality as being a transformative force, which has pressured cities to attempt to adapt, by reforming their colonial planning regimes. Whether or not the municipalities have been successful is a different debate,

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but the salient point for the present purposes is that, these informal economic activities have exerted a push from below by their very enduring existence in cities which fetishise and valorise modernity as the true measure of orderly urbanisation.

11.3 Urban Informality and the Compositional, Spatial and Structural Transformations: Regarding the Aftermath The totality of the issues which have been discussed in this book, appear to point to the fact that, urban informality is a force that has transformed and continues to transform the South African and Zimbabwean cities. For this cause, could the ubiquity of urban informality allow urban scholars to think of a post work society in a set up where the professionalisation of biographies is still dominant? Has the notion of work as we know it, been transformed? What about the changing character, content and dynamic of the urban landscape as a result of urban informality? In this final part we respond to these questions. We have made the point that urban informality has indeed transformed cities spatially and structurally. Spatially, urban informal economic activities have spread to all parts of the city, including those which were reserved for the so called formal activities. This can be seen in the case of both Bulawayo and Harare, in which the CBD, for example, which was space for the so called formal economic activities is now a space which is also occupied by the informal economic activities, specialising in among others, fruit and vegetables, clothing, tailoring, hair salons, internet cafes, taxis, photocopying, leather products and flowers (see, e.g., Chapters 5 and 7). Besides the informal economy invading and in some cases dominating the economic activities in CBDs, these activities have also spread to all parts of the cities in South Africa and Zimbabwe. And so, urban informality is here, there and everywhere in cities in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Again the example of Harare demonstrates this, in that informality has also spread to Suburban Shopping Centre (SSCs), Industrial centres (ICs), Transportation and Communication Centres (TCs), Homes/open spaces and Roads (HB). For instance, SSCs were dominated by informal economic enterprises involved in fruit and vegetables, clothing, push carts, taxis, shoe repairs, hair salons, flowers, photocopying, typing and printing, arts and crafts, curios, chickens. Also, in ICs informal businesses involved in welding, carpentry, tailoring, leather products, food preparation, car repairs, snacks, drinks, photocopying, car parts, building materials, heavy vehicles, traditional medicines, chickens had made a heavy presence. In addition, TCs had enterprises involved in taxis, commuter omnibuses, fruit and vegetables, clothing, push carts, welding, carpentry, food preparation, odds and ends, traditional medicines and chickens. In the HB, informal economic enterprises involved peanut butter processing, tailoring, grocery shops, knitting, welding, carpentry, taxis,

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commuter omnibuses, photocopying, typing and printing, firewood, fruit and vegetables, clothing, electrical installations, brick laying, plastering, tiling and flooring were observed. Structurally, both formal and informal economic activities are inextricably linked. This can be seen in cities like Bulawayo and Harare, in Zimbabwe as well as Johannesburg and Durban in South Africa, for example, in which there is a strong linkage and interaction at the level of buying and selling of goods between the formal and informal economic actors. For instance, in Harare, informal economic operations which specialised in arts and crafts, flowers and curios located close to their source of markets, particularly upmarket sites frequented by tourists and high income people. In addition, informal street traders who sold basic commodities in small repackaged quantities, operated close to their suppliers. Likewise, informal economic operators involved in businesses such as welding and tailoring located close to formal industrial sites. A case in point is Siyaso which operates close to Granite Side and Glenview 7, which is close to Willovale industrial areas. The result of this is that there was a very strong connection in terms of forward and backward linkages between the informal economic operators and their formal counterparts. In South African cities, informal producers bought their raw materials and goods for resale from formal enterprises (Naidoo and Fenyes 2003). They also sold their products to formal businesses. The urban informal economic enterprises in some instances sold products that were secured from the formal economy or vice versa and the two sectors sometimes competed in the market selling the same product. In the majority of cases informal products were cheaper than formal ones. This reciprocal relationship which exists between the formal economy and the urban informal economic operations has been repeatedly proved by the existence of linkages between these economies in other contexts (see, e.g., Gerry 1978; Tokman 1978; World Bank 1989; Barwa 1995; Meagher 1995; Sethuraman 1976; Arimah 2001; Williams 2010). For instance, in Nigeria it was observed that, there were strong backward linkages between the two economies as the urban informal economic operations purchased most of the raw materials and goods for resale from the formal economy (ILO 1985). Most inputs that were used for dyeing and weaving informal art and crafts and ingredients for informal catering businesses originated from the formal economy (Arimah 2001). Forward linkages were also observed, such as subcontracting arrangements which linked the two economic sectors (Pratt 2006). In all this, we see a revolution in the urban landscape in South African and Zimbabwean cities. Therefore, compositionally, spatially and structurally, urban informality in a city like that of Harare has imposed its impact. Differently stated, as the formal and informal economies have interacted, resulting in strong relationships and connections, this has become spatially manifest. Hence, we state that, these structural and spatial developments and changes on the urban characteristics constitute a revolution in the South African and Zimbabwean city scape. Similar structural relationships also existed across borders. For example, informal economic activities in Johannesburg, South Africa, were linked to both formal and informal economic activities in cities like Bulawayo, Harare and Masvingo in Zimbabwe. In this sense, urban informality is also transnational and engages in the import and export of goods, just like its

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formal counterpart. The echoes the observation which was made by Leonard (2000), that, there were strong linkages between urban informality and the so called formal economy that point to the integration of economies at all levels from local, regional, national to international. Indeed, highlighting that urban informality is a political economy issue. All this suggests as futile all attempts which classify and define informality as a sector, because from the spatial spread, configuration and reconfiguration under discussion, we see a political economy phenomenon denoted and dominated by differentiated work streams. Such work streams involve all legal economic activities operated either for survival or profit-making purposes or both. However such economic operations may or may not meet the requirements of the laws differentially in relationship to, among others labour, production and distribution regulations (see, e.g., Kesteloot and Meert 1999). As presented in this book, those who are active or participate in this phenomenon include, the poor and elite at the micro, meso and macro levels who are connected by “a series of transactions that connect different economies and spaces to one another” (Roy and AlSayyad 2004 cited in Roy 2005: 148). And in this respect, it is useful and productive to see urban informality as an essential element of urbanisation in the Global South and not a sector or fleeting development (Roy 2005), which deserve evisceration. What is particularly noteworthy given the historical continuities and as suggested by the material that we have presented in this book is that urban informality is actually increasing in South African and Zimbabwean cities. And there is a growing realisation that in these cities, urban informality is the very essence of urbanisation and not an exception, which has afforded its participants stability and “success” comparable to formal employment (Roy 2005; Kamete 2013). In other words, it is not a past time undertaken by the bored and poor, but also the educated as well as members of the elite who see it as the way to earn a livelihood. For this cause, this suggests that urban informality is the logic or “a mode of Mode of Metropolitan Urbanization” (Roy 2005: 148). If this is the case, we see the revolutionary power of informality to the extent that it is transforming or has transformed work as we know it. And therefore this logic of urbanisation could be indicative of the drive towards a hybrid and differentiated work environment in South African and Zimbabwean cities. This differentiated work society actually seems to amplify and re-echo the observation by Roy (2005), that, urban informality is an essential characteristic of cities of the Global South, itself demonstrating a different trajectory of urbanisation from that of the developed countries of Western Europe and North America. Consequently, governments and cities should start seeing urban informality in this way that it is not an exception, but perhaps the norm or context-specific characteristic of urbanisation, which requires decolonised urban planning regimes which are contextual to the socio-economic and political circumstances and developments in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

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Index

A The Abuja Treaty, 92 Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA), 124 Accent ceiling, 42 Access to Information and Protection and Privacy Act (AIPPA), 63 Actors, 4, 7, 8 Acts, 68, 71 Africa, 15–17, 19, 23, 25 African Economic Community (AEC), 92 African National Congress (ANC), 124 African Union (AU), 92 Apartheid, 5, 7, 31, 33, 113, 118, 119, 123, 125–127, 131 Apartheid minority regime, 86 Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), 92 Ascot shopping centre, 106 Asian migrants, 42, 50 Asiye eTafuleni (AeT), 114 Atomised, 137 Australia, 42 Auxiliary taxis, 60 B Backward linkages, 108, 109 Bangladeshis, 50 Beadwork, 84–86 Benjamin D’Urban, 17 Better Buildings Programme (BBP), 127 Bogota, 157 Boka Tobacco Auction, 75 Borrowdale Brooke, 76, 78 Botswana Pula (BP), 62

British, 16, 17 Building and construction, 65 Bulawayo city, 16, 25, 50, 54, 97, 104, 105, 110, 113, 155–159 C Cape Colony, 17 Cape Town, 108 Capitalism, 15, 139, 140, 154 Capitalist mode of production, 16 CEE Act, 18 Central business districts (CBDs), 30, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 75–78, 88, 99, 102–105, 107, 108, 158 China, 118 Chinese, 50, 105 Citadins, 138, 140, 143 City Improvement Districts, 127 City laws, 117, 118 City of Johannesburg, 29, 146, 147 Clothes, 84–88 Cold Storage Commission (CSC), 105 Cold War, 19 Colonialism, 5, 31, 35, 36, 126, 131, 153, 154 Colonial planning, 156, 157 Colonial urban planning regimes, 118 Commerce, 62, 65, 67, 68, 78 Commercial activity, 30 Commercial Trade and Industrial Policy, 18 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 92 Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN– SAD), 92

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Moyo and T. Gumbo, Urban Informality in South Africa and Zimbabwe, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65485-6

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Index

Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), 46 Compositional, 159 Compositional formality–informality, 59, 77–79 Conceived space/representation of space, 97 Constitutional Court, 147 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 113 Consumable goods, 84, 86 Cosmetics, 84, 91 Cross-sectional data, 65 Cultural theory, 48

Environmental, 30, 35 EThekwini, 108 EThekwini Municipality, 17 Ethnic Enclave Theory, 47 Eurocentric, 5 Eurocentric models, 30 Europe, 16 European, 31, 36, 153, 156 European cities, 42 European colonisers, 31 European countries, 42 Everyday resistance, 135, 136, 147, 148 Evolution, 99

D Da Gama, Vasco, 16 Decentralisation, 74 Degeneration, 87, 90, 117 Delvers, 50 Democratic dispensation, 17, 21, 25, 42 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 30, 44, 50, 84, 86, 87, 91 Denmark, 42, 44 Department of Informal Trade and Small Business Opportunities, 114 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 125, 126 Deregulation, 71, 77 Deskilling, 44 Development Agency Act, 18 Devolution, 74 Discrimination, 42, 44–46, 53 Dualism (residual thesis), 2 Durban, 16, 17, 113–119, 155, 159

F Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), 63 Fifth Avenue, 108 First Five Year National Development Plan (FFYNDP), 60 Foreign immigrants, 44 Foreign migrant enterprises, 44, 48, 50, 51 Foreign migrants, 83–90, 92, 93 Foreign migrants’ urban economic enterprises, 49 Foreign qualifications, 42 Form, 29, 30, 33 Formal economic enterprises (FEEs), 65, 97, 99, 100, 109 Formal economic sector (FES), 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106 Formal economic sector (FES) (Bromley and Gerry 1979), 1–3 Formal industrial areas, 105 Formalisation of economic activities, 154 Formality–informality interface, 117 Fort Salisbury, 16

E East African Community (EAC), 92 Economic, 1–8, 59–79, 97, 99–110 Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), 19, 20, 24 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 92 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 92 Economic informality, 113–116 Economic liberalisation, 61 Eighth Avenue, 50 Electrical goods, 84 Employment, 15, 16, 18, 22 Employment creation, 88, 89, 116 Empowerment, 103, 106 Entrepreneurial, 41, 47, 48, 52

G Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 65, 71, 75 Geographic Information Technology (GIT), 99 Germany, 42, 44 Ghana, 16, 44, 50, 84, 154, 155 Globalisation, 77 Global modern urban structure, 30 Global positioning system (GPS), 65, 66, 99 Global South, 137–139, 145, 148 Government of National Unity (GNU), 106 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 60

Index Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), 22 Growth with equity (GWE), 59

H Harare, 16, 25, 50, 54, 64, 65, 68–70, 72–79, 155, 156, 158, 159 Harare City Council, 73, 75, 76 High Glen, 76, 78 Historical, 30, 33 Home based (HB), 99, 105, 108 Home based industries, 100, 101, 103, 109 Human capital, 42

I Ideological changes, 97, 99 Ideology, 137, 140, 145, 148 Ideology of the 1980s, 61 Igbos, 16, 153 Immigration Amendment Act of 2007, 43 Immigration Amendment Act of 2011, 43 India, 118 Indians, 105 Indigenisation, 62, 73, 76, 103, 106 Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, 21 Industrial centres (ICs), 65, 66, 69, 73, 75, 78, 99, 103, 105, 108, 158 Industrialised nations, 2 Industrial Revolution, 16, 25 Inflation, 63 Informal Business and Chamber Support, 125 Informal economic activities, 29, 32 Informal economic enterprises (IEEs), 85, 91, 97, 99–109 Informal economic operators (IEOs), 2, 3, 6, 74–76 Informal economy, 60, 62–64, 66, 67, 69, 73–78 Informal enterprises, 115, 116, 118, 119 Informality, 15–26, 83–86, 88–93 Informal sector entrepreneurs, 88 Integrated Development Plan (IDP), 124, 130 Integrated Small Business Development Strategy, 125 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 92 Inter-Ministerial Deregulation Committee (IDC), 68

165 International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1– 3 International migrants, 41–49, 51, 53, 54 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 18–20, 61 Invasion, 68, 72, 76–78

J Jeppe, 85, 87–89 Jeppe Street, 50 Joburg 2030 Vision, 127 Johannesburg, 16, 17, 21, 23–25, 43–45, 49–53, 108, 155, 156, 159 Johannesburg city, 83, 84, 87, 88, 90–93 Johannesburg inner city, 46, 47, 49–54, 83– 93 Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD), 46, 51

K Kelvin North, 105 Kitchenware, 84, 87, 91 Koreans, 47

L Labour intensive firms, 62 Labour market economy, 44 Land uses, 30 Language, 42, 53 Lefebvre, Henry, 97–100, 103, 107 Legalism (alternative or exit thesis), 2 Lesotho, 154, 157 Liberation struggle, 59 Licensing requirements, 68 Lived space/spaces of representation, 97 Lobengula Street, 108 Local Economic Development (LED), 126, 130 Locational characteristics, 115, 116 Low-income, 15 Luveve, 105

M Malawi, 50, 52 Mali, 50 Manufacturing, 60, 62, 64, 65, 67, 78 Maputo, 50, 54 Markets, 99, 100, 102–109 Marxist-Leninist ideology, 59 Masvingo, 156, 159

166 Mayfair, 50 Mbare, 69, 70, 75 Membership-Based Organization, 114 Metropolitan City of Johannesburg, 126 Micro and Small to Medium size Enterprises (MSMEs), 75, 129, 131 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy, 18 Middle Man Minority theory, 44 Migration, 42–45, 49, 53, 54 Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), 68 Mixed embeddedness, 45, 46, 49, 53, 54 Mobilisation, 137, 143–145 Modern industrial sector, 2 Modernisation, 153 Modernist planning theory, 30 Modernist rigidity, 157 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 20, 62, 128 Mozambique, 50, 54, 84, 86, 87, 92 Municipality of Johannesburg, 46, 51 N National Development Plan, 124 National Informal Business Development Strategy (NIBDS), 125, 126 National Planning Commission, 124 National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), 106 National Small Business Act, 124 Ndebele kingdom, 16 Neocapitalism, 139 Neo-liberal economic reforms, 71, 76, 77 Nepal, 157 Netherlands, 42, 44 Networks, 46, 47, 50, 53 New Lobengula, 104 Nigeria, 16, 44, 50, 51, 84, 86, 87, 92, 153, 159 Nigerians, 105 Nkulumane, 103 Nkulumane shopping centre, 106 Non-collective, 136 Non-recognition, 42, 44 Non-registered enterprises, 15 North America, 16, 25, 153, 156, 160 North American, 31, 138, 147 O Old Mutual, 106 Open spaces, 66, 69, 71, 75 Operation Clean, 156

Index Operation Clean Sweep, 29, 126–128, 131 Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle, 130 Operation Murambatsvina, 128–131, 156 Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order (OM/OR), 75, 105 P Pakistanis, 47, 50, 105 Passive poor, 135, 136, 148 Perceived space/spatial practices, 97 Personal services, 65, 66, 68, 78 Petty trade, 15 Planning, 123, 124, 128–131 Policy response, 123 Political, 4–8, 30, 31, 35, 36, 59–64, 67, 68, 73, 79, 97, 99, 107, 109 Political determinism, 30 Political economy, 97 Political economy approach, 4 Politico-economic ideologies, 97 Port Natal, 17 Portuguese, 16 Postcapitalist, 3 Postcolonial, 3 Poststructuralist (complementary or social relations thesis), 2, 3 Pre-industrial and capitalist cities, 15 Pretoria, 108 Private sector, 106, 107 Processing, 60, 62, 63, 65–67, 73, 78 Procrustean style, 126 Progressive, 31 Proletarianisation, 15 Public Order Security Act (POSA), 63 R Reconfiguration, 97 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 22 Reformist, 31 Regional Economic Community (RECs), 92 Regional Town and Country Planning (RTCP) Act, 74, 104, 128 Regulatory frameworks, 123 Regulatory regimes, 156, 157 Rejuvenation, 90, 117 Relational embeddedness, 48, 49 Resistance, 135–137, 140, 142, 143, 147, 148 Rhodesian economy, 17 Right to the city, 137–140, 142–144, 146 Rio de Natal, 16

Index S Sectoral dimensions, 84, 85 Sekusile, 103, 104 Self-employment, 15 Self-employment strategies, 44 Senegal, 154 Sixth Avenue, 108 Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO), 129 Small Enterprises Development Act, 18 Small Industries Development Act, 18 Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), 124, 125 Social embeddedness, 48, 49 Socialist, 59–61 Societal, 31 Socio-economic, 30, 35 Somalia, 50, 84, 87 South Africa, 2, 4–7, 17, 19, 21–25, 29–33, 35, 36, 83–85, 87, 89, 92, 93, 108, 113, 116, 118, 119, 123–126, 128, 130, 131, 137–139, 144, 145, 147, 148 South African, 3–7, 16, 17, 21, 22, 25, 30– 33, 35, 84–90, 92, 93, 114, 115, 118, 119, 124, 137 South African cities, 41–43, 45, 47, 50, 54 South African Informal Traders Forum, 147 South African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA), 147 South African Rand (SAR), 62 South East Nigeria, 16 Southern Africa, 16, 18, 23–25, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 154, 156 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 44, 50, 86, 87, 92 Spatial, 59, 64–66, 68, 72, 73, 75, 79, 113– 116, 156, 158–160 Spatial and structural re-patterning, 99 Spatial configuration, 97 Spatial Development Framework (SDF), 130 Spatial instrument, 29 Spatial spread, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 79 Street trading, 29, 32 Structural, 158, 159 Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs), 18, 24, 43 Structural embeddedness, 48 Structuralism (by-product or exclusion thesis), 2 Structured organization, 137

167 Suburban shopping centres (SSCs), 65, 66, 69, 72, 75, 76, 78, 99, 104, 106, 108, 158 Surreptitious actions, 136 Survival strategy, 135, 136, 145, 148 Sweden, 42, 44 T Tanzania, 44, 50, 84, 86, 87, 92, 154 TEVET Act, 18 Third Chimurenga, 63 Third World, 140 Thorngrove, 105 Trade, 62, 65, 68, 78 Trade liberalisation, 18, 61 Transformations, 158 Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP), 59 Transportation and communication, 65–67 Transportation and Communication Centres (TCs), 158 Transportation centres (TCs), 65, 66, 69, 75, 76, 99, 104, 106, 108 Transport businesses, 60 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, 92 Triadic theory, 97, 103, 107 U Ukraine, 153 Undocumented migration, 43, 51 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 19, 153 United Kingdom (UK), 42 United States of America Dollar (USD), 106 United States of America (USA), 47 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 63 Universal transverse Mercator (UTM), 65 Urban Councils Act (ACA), 74, 104 Urban development, 16, 23, 25 Urban Development Zone, 127 Urban economic informality (UEI), 1–6, 8 Urban history, 97, 109, 110 Urban informal economy, 44, 45, 52, 53, 98, 104 Urban informality, 41, 42, 44–47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 59, 61, 64, 65, 68, 69, 73, 79, 123, 124, 126–131, 137–140, 143–145, 147–149, 153–160 Urban informality policies, 123, 126, 127, 131

168 Urbanisation, 60, 71 Urban planning, 5, 7, 29–37 Urban planning laws, 118 Urban territorial movement, 135, 136, 148

V Vegetables, 84, 87, 88, 91

W The Warwick Junction Urban Renewal Project, 114 West Africa, 16, 23, 86–88, 154 Western European, 138, 147, 153, 160 Westgate, 76, 78 White Paper on the National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business, 124 Work, 15, 16, 23 World Bank (WB), 18, 19, 61 World Class city, 127, 131

Index Y Yeoville, 50

Z Zambia, 17–19, 24, 43 Zimbabwe, 4–7, 16, 17, 19–21, 23–25, 29– 36, 43–45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 59, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 73, 76, 79, 83, 84, 86, 87, 92, 113, 118, 123, 128–131, 137–139, 142–146, 148 Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), 20, 21, 62, 63, 128, 130, 131, 145 Zimbabwean Dollar (ZD), 106 Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association (ZCIEA), 104 Zimbabwe Conference Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), 61 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), 62 Zimbabwe Passenger Company (ZUPCO), 106 Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO), 60, 76