Unresolved Border, Land and Maritime Disputes in Southeast Asia : Bi- and Multilateral Conflict Resolution Approaches and ASEAN's Centrality [1 ed.] 9789004312180, 9789004312159

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Unresolved Border, Land and Maritime Disputes in Southeast Asia

Studies on East Asian Security and International Relations Series Editors Rüdiger Frank (University of Vienna) Alfred Gerstl (University of Vienna)

VOLUME 4

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/seas

Unresolved Border, Land and Maritime Disputes in Southeast Asia Bi- and Multilateral Conflict Resolution Approaches and asean’s Centrality

Edited by

Alfred Gerstl and Mária Strašáková

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Gerstl, Alfred, 1971- editor. | Strašáková, Mária, 1980- editor. | Title: Unresolved border, land and maritime disputes in Southeast Asia : biand multilateral conflict resolution approaches and ASEAN’s centrality / [edited] by Alfred Gerstl, Mária Strašáková. Description: Leiden : Brill, [2017] | Series: Studies on East Asian security and international relations ; volume 4 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016042756 (print) | LCCN 2016044572 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004312159 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004312180 (e-book) | isbn 9789004312180 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Conflict management--Southeast Asia. | Conflict management--South China Sea. | Southeast Asia--Boundaries. | South China Sea--International status. | ASEAN. Classification: LCC JZ5584.A785 U57 2017 (print) | LCC JZ5584.A785 (ebook) | DDC 341.4/2--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016042756

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 2213-1051 isbn 978-90-04-31215-9 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-31218-0 (e-book) Copyright 2017 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Acknowledgements vii List of Abbreviations viii List of Contributors xi Maps xiv The Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the South China Sea, July 2016 XVI Introduction 1 Alfred Gerstl and Mária Strašáková 1 Boundaries and Frontiers in Southeast Asia: Fences Have Made Fretful Neighbors 21 Petra Andělová 2 Border Disputes in Southeast Asia and Their Impact on the Regional Integration Process 46 Filip Kraus 3 ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Conflict: The Final Stage at Preah Vihear? 83 Richard Q. Turcsányi and Zdeněk Kříž 4 Claiming Phu Quoc/Koh Tral: Irredentism as a Recurrent Theme of Cambodian Domestic Politics 110 Mária Strašáková 5 Multitrack Diplomatic Approaches to Border and Territorial Disputes in Southeast Asia and Soft Balancing 143 Alica Kizeková 6 The South China Sea Conflict: Ten Thousand Stones and a Nine-DashLine – Rethinking Maritime Space Concepts 168 Padraig Lysaght 7 The South China Sea Dispute: A Shift to a More Proactive Role in ASEAN’s Discourse and Policies since 2012? 183 Alfred Gerstl

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contents

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 he Logic of Strategic Restraint and Prospects for Joint T Development in the South China Sea 231 Truong-Minh Vu

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 essons to be Learned: A Neorealist Assessment of the L HYSY-981 Standoff and Its Implications for Vietnam’s South China Sea Strategy 250 Jörg Thiele

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 he Spring 2014 Incidents in the South China Sea: Trigger of a More T Intense and Assertive Security Discourse in China? 278 Josef Falko Loher



Conclusion 307 Mária Strašáková and Alfred Gerstl

Index 313

Acknowledgements First of all, the editors wish to express their gratitude to all contributors who made this volume possible. The cooperation was excellent. The editors are also grateful for the comments of two anonymous reviewers that have significantly improved the quality of the individual chapters and the overall book. This book was published as a part of a research project of Metropolitan University Prague (mup) “Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies (cips)” financed by institutional support for long-term conceptual development of research organization in 2016. The University of Vienna also granted financial support for copy-editing and proof reading. For the latter, the editors want to thank Prudence Willats. Alfred Gerstl and Mária Strašáková Vienna and Prague, June 2016

List of Abbreviations A2/ad Anti-Access/Area Denial adiz Air Defense Identification Zone admm asean Defence Ministers Meeting amm asean Ministerial Meeting (Foreign Ministers) apec Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation apt asean Plus Three arf asean Regional Forum Asian Relations Conference arc asean Association of Southeast Asian Nations asean-isis asean Institute of Strategic International Studies asean-pmc asean Post-Ministerial Conference asem Asia-Europe Meeting aspa Asia and Pacific Council bbc British Broadcasting Corporation bbl billion barrels bldp Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (Cambodia) cbms Confidence-Building Measures cica Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia clcs United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf cnooc China National Offshore Oil Company coc Code of Conduct cpc Communist Party of China cpp Cambodian People’s Party cscap Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific dk Democratic Kampuchea doc  a sean-China Declaration of Conduct on the Parties in the South China Sea drv Democratic Republic of Vietnam edca Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement eez Exclusive Economic Zone eu European Union fdi Foreign Direct Investment funcinpec National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia

L ist of Abbreviations GoV Government of Vietnam icg International Crisis Group icj International Court of Justice ir International Relations kpnlf Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (Cambodia) itlos International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea jmsu Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking mcedsea Ministerial Conference on Economic Development of Southeast Asia M(O)FA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China) mou Memorandum of Understanding pacom us Pacific Command pbec Pacific Basin Economic Council pdk Party of Democratic Kampuchea pla People’s Liberation Army pnoc Philippine National Oil Company mod Ministry of National Defense (China) nacc National Anti-Corruption Commission (Thailand) nlf National Liberation Front of South Vietnam nm Nautical miles oda Official Development Assistance osce Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe pad People’s Alliance for Democracy pca Permanent Court of Arbitration pm Prime Minister pnoc Philippine National Oil Company rov Republic of Vietnam sea Southeast Asia seato Southeast Asia Treaty Organization scmp South China Morning Post scs South China Sea sgi Service Geographique de l’Indochine sloc Sea-lines of communication sncba Supreme National Council on Border Affairs som Senior Officials Meeting srb Sam Rainsy Party tac Treaty of Amity and Cooperation tpp Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement tbms Trust-building measures

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x un unclos unesco untac vcp ZoPFF/C

List of Abbreviations United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Vietnamese Communist Party Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation

List of Contributors Petra Andělová is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Asian Studies at Metropolitan University Praque, Czech Republic. She received her m.a. in sinology at the Institute of Far East, Faculty of Arts and Letters, Charles University Prague and defended her Ph.D. thesis “China’s Transformation in the 90s” at the Institute of Political Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague. Her research focuses on Chinese politics as well as on current issues of human geography of the Asia-Pacific. Alfred Gerstl is an Austrian political scientist, specialized on International Relations in the Asia-Pacific. Being a postdoc researcher at the Department of East Asian Studies (University of Vienna), he previously taught International Relations and Political Science at the Departments of Politics and International Development (both University of Vienna) from 2001 on. From 2007–2009, he lectured International Security Studies at Macquarie University, Sydney. His research interests combine regional cooperation and the changing notion of security from traditional to human security in East Asia, asean’s integration process, political and economic systems in Southeast Asia, regional and regional effects of China’s rise, notably in the South China Sea and Beijing’s One Belt, One Road initiative, as well as Australian politics. Alica Kizeková holds an Honorary Adjunct Research Fellowship at the Center for East–West Cultural & Economic Studies at Bond University, Queensland, Australia. She is the Adviser to the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies at the Parliament of the Czech Republic. Previously she worked as a Head of Department of Asian Studies at Metropolitan University Prague, a Teaching Fellow at Bond University and she was a National contact point for the Slovak Republic in the European Union communitary programme – idabc (Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services to public Administrations, Businesses and Citizens). She is the author of Soft Balancing in the Indo-Asia-Pacific: from asean to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Routledge, forthcoming 2017. Her research interests include Shanghai Cooperation Organization, soft power, soft balancing, security, Russian regional politics, Chinese regional politics, the European Union, Track Two Diplomacy, regionalism and great power relations in the Greater Central Asia and the Indo Pacific.

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Filip Kraus is a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate Institute of Social Research and Cultural Studies at National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan. In his research interests in colonial and postcolonial studies he focuses especially on former French Indochina and the colonial legacy in contemporary Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laos societies. His contemporary research splits to four directions: international politics and problems in international relations of Southeast Asian states (border conflicts and their impact on the process of the Southeast Asian integration); Vietnamese colonial literature; nationalism and identity problems in contemporary Southeast Asia, especially in the nations of former French Indochina and the Peoples Republic of China (prc); and last but not the least Vietnamese diasporas living abroad – particularly in the Europe and East Asia (Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and the prc). Zdeněk Kříž is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies and at the International Institute of Political Science at Masaryk University, Brno. In the past he was an Assistant Professor at the Department of Social Science Military Academy Brno and served as the Head of Department of Social Sciences. He specializes in international relations history, international security and civil military relations. Josef Falko Loher is Ph.D. candidate at the Chair of East Asian Economy and Society and at the same time employed with the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is currently writing his PhD thesis on Multi-Level Climate Change Governance in East Asia. His research interests include environmental politics and political systems in East Asia as well as Austrian companies’ investment in environmental technologies in both North and Southeast Asia. Josef Falko Loher received a m.a. degree in East Asian Economy and Society and a b.a. degree in Sinology, both from the University of Vienna. He studied Chinese intensively at Leiden University, the Netherlands, and Fudan University, People’s Republic of China. He spent over two years living and working in China. Padraig Lysaght is working as Project Manager with Eurasia-Pacific Uninet and the Confucius Institute at the University of Vienna, focusing on scientific cooperation ­between Europe and Eastern Asia. He holds a m.a. in Global Studies and Global History, a b.a. in Sinology and is presently concluding his PhD Thesis ­concerning the history of the South China Sea, his main research focus being Insular Studies. After having graduated from the Diplomatic Academy of

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Vienna, he spent one year in the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for which he continues to work occasionally as China expert. Mária Strašáková is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Asian Studies at Metropolitan University Prague as well as at the Institute of Far East, Faculty of Arts and Letters, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic, where she received her m.a. and Ph.D. Her research focuses on Vietnamese history, politics and culture as well as current security issues in Asia-Pacific. Her recent publications include: Dějiny Vietnamu [History of Vietnam] (with Lucie Hlavatá, Petra Karlová and Ján Ičo, Praha: nln 2008), [Dictionary of Vietnamese Literature]. Jörg Thiele holds a m.a. title in East Asian Economy and Society (EcoS) from the University of Vienna, and two b.a. degrees in Sociology and Political Science from the University of Innsbruck (both Austria). He is currently a non-affiliated researcher and focuses closely on the issue of internationalization in International Relations, particularly on its impacts on national and regional security dynamics in the South China Sea. Further research interests include SinoTaiwanese relations, the entanglement of science, technology and international relations and energy security in Southeast and East Asia. Richard Q. Turcsányi is an Assistant Professor at Mendel University in Brno, where he teaches courses on international relations, globalization, and Chinese political economy. He is also a Deputy Director at Institute of Asian Studies in Bratislava and Research Fellow at Institute of International Relations in Prague. In the past, he studied or conducted research stays at University of Toronto, Peking University, National Chengchi University, lse, and European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels. He published in Energy Policy, Czech Journal of Political Science, Springer, or The Diplomat. Truong-Minh Vu Dr. Truong-Minh Vu is the director of the Center for International Studies (scis) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City. He has published articles in numerous academic and policy journals, including Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, The National interest, Global Asia, East Asia Policy, E-International Relations, The Diplomat, asien etc. He is co-editor of the book “Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters – Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea” (Springer, 2016).

Maps

map 1

Political Map of Southeast Asia

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M aps

map 2

Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea

The Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the South China Sea, July 2016 On 12 July 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (pca) in The Hague issued an award in the matter of South China Sea arbitration, brought forward by the Philippines against China in January 2013. The award was made unanimously by five independent international judges. It is, despite Beijing’s refusal to participate in the arbitration and its rejection of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over this case, in accordance with Art. 296 and Art. 11 of Annex vii of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) final and binding. The diligent reasoning – a 500 pages document – is a treasure chest for international law and international relations scholars as well as historians (Gerstl 2016). The Philippines made 15 submissions concerning its dispute with China to the Arbitral Tribunal. As unclos does not address matters of sovereignty, Manila sought clarifications concerning other legal and technical issues. Yet, they have crucial implications for the implementation of unclos and indirectly for territorial demarcation and thus sovereignty. The main decisions of the Arbitrational Tribunal can be summarized in four categories: (1) There is “no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights, or sovereign rights and jurisdiction beyond those provided for in the Convention, in the waters of the South China Sea encompassed by the nine-dash line” (pca 2016a: §§631 and 692). The Tribunal argues that even in case China would have established “historic rights”, they would have become invalid after the adoption of unclos. The nine-dash line, which encompasses 80–90 percent of the South China Sea, is therefore legally void. (2) Legally, no land feature in the Spratly Group is an island. Therefore, no feature can generate an entitlement to a 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (eez), only a 12 miles zone, if the feature is a rock. Also collectively, the Spratly Islands do not generate an eez (pca 2016a: §626). (3) Even though the Tribunal did not decide on sovereignty issues, declaring Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank as submerged at high tide and being part of the Philippines’ eez and continental shelf, it argues: unclos “(…) is clear in allocating sovereign rights to the Philippines with respect to sea areas in its exclusive economic zone.” In prohibiting fishing by Filipino fishermen or constructing installations on

The Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration

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these features and at Scarborough Shoal, China has violated Manila’s sovereign rights. In addition, Beijing’s actions impacted negatively on the marine environment, inter alia, its “large scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands has caused severe harm to the coral reef environment” (pca 2016b: 10). (4) Finally, China has not halted its land reclamation and construction of artificial islands after the beginning of the arbitration – despite “a duty on parties engaged in a dispute settlement procedure to refrain from aggravating or extending the dispute or disputes at issue during the pendency of the settlement process” (pca 2016a: §1169). While Manila’s legal victory was anticipated, the ruling goes much further than expected, in particular in rejecting China’s nine-dash line. Nevertheless, the Philippines applauded the decision without being triumphant. Whether the new President Rodrigo Duterte will really initiate bilateral negotiations with China over the South China Sea remains to be seen (Larano 2016). Not surprisingly, Beijing rejected the award (Panda 2016). However, so far it has restrained from taking actions that could intensify the tensions in the South China Sea. Vietnam welcomed the decision, but also deployed mobile rocket launchers, acquired from Israel, on at least five Spratly islets in August 2016 (Rist 2016). In a statement in July 2016, the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) did not address the award, but once again emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution in accordance with international law, notably unclos (asean Ministerial Meeting 2016, §§ 174–181; South China Morning Post 2016). Alfred Gerstl Bibliography Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting (AMM) (2016): Available at: http://asean.org/storage/2016/07/Joint-Communique-of-the-49th -AMM-ADOPTED.pdf. Gerstl, Alfred (2016): “Recht oder Macht im Südchinesischen Meer.” Der Standard, 18 July, p. 19. Available at: http://derstandard.at/2000041259548/Recht-oder -Macht-im-Suedchinesischen-Meer. Larano, Chris (2016): “Philippines’ Duterte Says Arbitration Ruling to Be Basis of South China Sea Talks.” The Wall Street Journal, 2 September. Available at: http://www .wsj.com/articles/philippines-duterte-says-arbitration-ruling-to-be-basis-of-south -china-sea-talks-1472822919.

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Panda, Ankit (2016): “International Court Issues Unanimous Award in Philippines v. China Case on South China Sea.” The Diplomat, 12 July. Available at: http://thediplomat .com/2016/07/international-court-issues-unanimous-award-in-philippines-v-china -case-on-south-china-sea/?utm_content=bufferb17d2&utm_medium=social &utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer. Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (2016a): PCA Case N° 2013–19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China. The Hague, 12 July. Available at: https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712 -Award.pdf. PCA (2016b): “Press Release. The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China).” The Hague, 12 July. Available at: https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press -Release-No-11-English.pdf. Rist, Manfred (2016): “Spannung im Südchinesischen Meer. Vietnam ist Diplomatie nicht genug.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12 August, p. 5. Available at: http://www.nzz .ch/international/asien-und-pazifik/spannung-im-suedchinesischen-meer -vietnam-ist-diplomatie-nicht-genug-ld.110506. South China Morning Post (2016): “Most Asean countries ‘want to stay out of Beijing’s South China Sea dispute with the Philippines’.” 28 July. Available at: http:// www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1995991/most-asean -countries-want-stay-out-beijings-south-china.

Introduction Alfred Gerstl and Mária Strašáková The Southeast Asian region grows increasingly together, highlighted by the establishment of the asean Community at the end of 2015. Barriers for the free flow of goods and services will be, according to blueprints of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean), further dismantled in the near future, aiming to establish a single market and production base in Southeast Asia (asean 2015, p. 5). Within the asean Community the Economic Community is far more advanced than the Political-Security or the Socio-Cultural Community. Security collaboration is very limited (Jones and Jenne 2016), and there are also currently no plans for a free movement of people, as it has been realized in the European Union (eu). In other words: Borders still matter in Southeast Asia, and so does national sovereignty. Though, it needs to be emphasized that the current refugee crisis and the fear of terrorism in Europe led to a revival of national sovereignty and border protection. The creation of a new “fortress Europe” seems a possibility, challenging the very idea of an open, borderless and interconnected Europe. While even certain land borders are due to topography difficult to protect, the main challenge for the eu is the control of its maritime borders in the Mediterranean Sea. In the South China Sea (scs), the maritime borders are not even demarcated yet. So far, the claimants – the People’s Republic of China (prc), Taiwan (Republic of China), Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam – failed to settle their overlapping territorial claims. These territorial rows of the four Southeast Asian nations with China are prominently covered in the media and academic literature. Yet they overshadow two important issues: Firstly, the dispute in the South China Sea is not only between China and “Southeast Asia” – the Southeast Asian governments could so far also not resolve the overlapping claims among themselves. Secondly, in addition to this dispute over maritime borders, there are significant land border disputes between Southeast Asian countries. In 2011, for instance, a border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple spiraled into an armed skirmish, which claimed dozens of casualties and displaced tens of thousands villagers. The significance of this clash lays in the fact that it revealed an overlooked and often underestimated threat to asean’s internal cohesion: the multitude of unresolved border, land

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004312180_002

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and maritime disputes that linger beneath regional cooperation and integration. As this publication seeks to demonstrate, firstly, many of these conflicts can be rooted back to the region’s colonial past and, secondly, the parties concerned failed so far to utilize the existing asean conflict mediation mechanisms (cf. asean Charter 2008, Chapter 8). When the European colonial powers Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, England and France arrived in Southeast Asia from the 16th century on (the United States took possession of the Philippines in 1898), they came across a different concept of state and sovereignty than that they had known from Europe – the notion of mandala. In this model, originated in India and coined by O.W. Wolters, a ruler dispersed his influence in the form of concentric, weakening circles from the center to the periphery. Mandala resembles a sphere of influence with fluid borders (Gerstl 2015, pp. 157–159). This notion prevailed among the insular states and most states on the land, the prominent exception being Vietnam, which adopted the Chinese model of the “Mandate of Heaven” and had a relatively clear notion of territorial boundaries (Acharya 2012, Chapter 3). During the first stage of European Colonialism until the early 19th century, the Dutch and British East India Company were the main agents of Colonialism, not their respective governments (Reid 1993; Hall 1955). Due to limited financial and administrative resources, they were content to control smaller territorial parts of their Southeast Asian possessions, in particular strategic important features such as ports, e.g. Singapore. Even after the governments taken over due to economic problems of the companies, they established a sphere of influence rather than a clearly demarcated Colonial empire. This order was sponsored by England, the dominant global power at this time. Therefore, the Colonial powers respected the various spheres. The process of drawing fixed borders similar to those in Europe occurred only in the second half of the 19th century and gained pace after France’s occupation of Indochina since the 1850s, when power politics became more complex (Gerstl 2015, pp. 159–162). When drawing borders, the Colonial powers rarely took into account overlapping ethnic, religious, social and/or linguistic identities, creating a host of potential future political and boundary disputes. Migratory movements during the Colonial era, both actively steered by the Europeans and spontaneous processes (notably during World War ii), contributed further to the ethnic diversity of the region (Tarling 1999, p. 5). As the subsequent chapters of this book will demonstrate on the cases of Preah Vihear or the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island – the largest island in the Gulf of Thailand with a size of 574 square kilometres –, many of these border and territorial disputes still continue to linger since this period. Their resolution is further complicated by the ambiguity of

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these boundaries, additionally exacerbated by the vagueness of legal and topographical terms and unclear geographical features, e.g. river streams changing course over time or the disappearance of border pillars making delimitation even more difficult. Furthermore, as shall be discussed below, many of these latent and manifest conflicts not only carry historical baggage, but are also susceptible to nationalist manipulations. After gaining independence after the Second World War the political elites of the newly nascent states were more than aware of the problem of unclear borders and boundaries. However, to question the inter-state borders would have meant to open the Pandora’s box in a region that is characterized by multi-ethnic, multi-cultural und multi-religious states. The acceptance of the territorial borders drawn by the Westerners seems, therefore, a deliberate, pragmatic political decision made by the governments to secure peace with their neighbors. However, certain boundary and territorial disputes continued to resurface even in the postwar period. Especially worth mentioning is Indonesia’s konfrontasi (1963–1965) directed against the newly established Malaysian Federation. Jakarta sponsored incursions in Malaysian Sabah (North Borneo), a territory it aimed to annex. Based on a contested interpretation of a treaty with the British North Borneo Company in 1878, the Philippines claimed Sabah, too. Manila did not recognize Malaysia diplomatically until 1966, but took no military actions (Mackie 1974). The Sultans of Sulu, though, kept their claim to Sabah where approximately 800.000 Filipinos live. In 2013, a failed military invasion of 100–300 followers of the Sultanate of Sulu caused a brief irritation between Malaysia and the Philippines (Villanueva 2013). This is only one example for the continuation of territorial and border disputes in Southeast Asia even after the creation of asean in 1967. The Southeast Asian governments deliberately accepted the principles of Westphalian sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs (as well as dialogue and consensual decision-making) as the key norms of the Association, codified in the asean Way. asean thus acted both as a forum for the members to insulate themselves from interferences from distant and close neighbors through cooperation and an umbrella for bilateral talks to resolve disputes, among them border issues. Thus, many of the existing boundary discrepancies did not only lead to territorial conflicts, but also subsequent negotiations. Since 1976, there exists a legal base for an involvement of asean: the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (tac), which created a dispute settlement mechanism (specified in an amendment in 2001), but lacks enforcement capacities. All decisions of the High Council, consisting of a minister from each asean member, are consensual and need to be accepted by the dispute parties. Though

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this mechanism has to be invoked by the direct involved parties – which has so far not happened. Thus, there exist no practical experiences with asean mediation. It was no coincidence that asean agreed in 1976 on the tac. The newly unified Vietnam posed in the view of the pro-Western governments a considerable ideological and military threat. The Association criticized Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 as a breach of Cambodia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Caught in the black-or-white logic of the Cold War, the Western world also failed to acknowledge that the Vietnamese troops had ousted the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime and supported asean’s diplomatic isolation of Hanoi (Acharya 2012, pp. 189–195). Though, the Association was, together with the United Nations, highly successful in negotiating Vietnam’s troop withdrawal and monitoring the democratization process in Cambodia in the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia significantly changed the political landscape in the region. With the gradual withdrawal of the Soviet troops and fears the United States might follow suit, Southeast Asia was yet again ­confronted not only with its institutional deficit, but also with a rich legacy of interstate conflicts, many of which had been subdued in the previous era. Thus, the acute question confronting Southeast Asia was how to resolve these ­lingering conflicts. Therefore, the track-one asean Regional Forum (arf) was founded by asean in 1994 as a security dialogue network with the intention to diffuse the growing tensions. However, one of the primary goals of the arf was to involve Japan, the us and China in the regional consultation processes (Khong 1997, p. 290; Leifer 1996). In the first half of the 1990s many Southeast Asian states perceived the People’s Republic of China (prc) as a threat partially due to its conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea and its past support of Communist insurgencies. At that time, the arf was also complemented by the track-two Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (cscap), which was founded in 1993 with the objective of intensifying the track-two processes in the region and creating links to the arf. Both aim to build trust among the dispute parties, thus enabling them to gradually resolve issues of contention. Even though there have been disagreements about the strength of intraasean relations, most analysts agree that especially after 1997 its stability and credibility has been threatened by a series of new developments. First, it was the membership expansion, with Vietnam joining in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999, increasing the Association’s political and economic heterogeneity. Second, asean’s stability was endangered by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98, triggered by the fall of the Thai baht and spilling over to Northeast Asia, too. Thus, the new membership as well as the economic

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crisis damaged not only asean’s regional and international reputation, but also brought new divisions and exacerbated the latent ones between old and new, more and less advanced, more and less liberal as well as the continental and maritime members. Yet, the regional financial and economic crisis was also a catalyst for institution-building: asean Plus three (apt) was established in 1997, closely involving Beijing, together with Tokyo and Seoul, in the institutional architecture of East Asian regionalism. Another important step was taken in 2005 with the establishment of the East Asia Summit (eas) that brings together the heads of states of asean and its main dialogue partners, ­including China and the us. It is must be highlighted that in the 1990s many of the land boundary disputes within asean receded into the background, but their place was taken by conflicting claims over the South China Sea. The prc, alongside with Taiwan and followed by Vietnam, has the most extensive claims in this maritime space. China’s claim is the most contentious one as it claims sovereignty over all geographical features in the South China Sea on the basis of the controversial nine-dashed line map, first issued by Chiang Kai-shek’s government in 1947 in the form of eleven dashes (Tønnesson 2002, p. 11). The nine dashes include virtually all of the semi-enclosed sea as well as the geographical features of Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Reed Bank and Scarborough Reef. Apart from these conflicting claims, the South China Sea has also become a “flashpoint”, a “hot spot”, or a “dangerous ground” of Southeast Asia for several crucial reasons. First, the South China Sea is a key junction of maritime trade as the sea-lines of communication (sloc) that pass through it and other surrounding seas function as the main connecting lines of world trade. It is the shortest maritime conjunction between the northern Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Important routes, such as the Palawan and others, link together the largest and most important ports in the region of Southeast and Northeast Asia: Singapore, Hong Kong and Shenzhen in China, Kaohsiung in Taiwan, Port Kelang and Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia, Tanjungpriok in Indonesia, Laem Chabang in Thailand and Manila in the Philippines. Furthermore, over half of the world’s international trade tonnage (worth more than US$5.3 trillion) is transported through its waters (Cronin 2015, p. 25), ranking it as one of the world’s busiest international shipping lanes. The significance of the sloc is further accentuated by the fact that the major economies of Northeast Asia (Japan, China and South Korea) and Southeast Asia all depend on resources supplied from the Middle East and Africa, especially crude oil, liquefied natural gas, coal and iron ore – but also on safe export routes (Djalal 2000, p. 10). Moreover, the world’s most important maritime

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chokepoints can be found in close vicinity of the South China Sea, such as Malacca, Luzon or Taiwan Straits. Thus, free and safe passage through the sloc in the South China Sea is crucial for the main naval powers (or those on the rise): the United States, China, Russia, India and Australia. Military presence along these routes is key not only for protection of vital transport channels but also for controlling the access of others. Thus, in the last few years the region has witnessed a systematic military build-up of most countries in the region (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [sipri] 2014). Apart from the vital strategic importance of the South China Sea, the disputes have also been triggered by the economic potential of the area. Firstly, the South China Sea provides food and employment for the populations of the neighboring littoral countries, as its waters are rich in fauna and abound in tropical fish (Jiang and Xue 2015). Thus, maintaining and preserving the fishing industry has turned into a point of friction among the claimant countries since 1999, after the prc had imposed an annual fishing ban lasting from June to July for the first time, arguably in order to preserve its fishing fleet (Buszynski 2012, p. 143). In addition, secondly, the South China Sea is perceived as an important source of hydrocarbons, such as and natural gas, turning the dispute into a “scramble for resources”. However, the individual estimates of the oil and gas reserves differ substantially in various sources. According to the most optimistic Chinese estimates, there are potential resources of 213 billion barrels (bbl) of oil in the South China Sea (Klare 2002, p. 119). On the other hand, according to the us Energy Information Administration there are over 11 billion bbl of oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves in the South China Sea (us Energy Information Administration 2013). Most Northeast and Southeast Asian economies depend on the stable supply channels of energy and various natural resources (mainly oil and natural gas) in order to maintain their economic growth. This is particularly true for China. Until 1993 China was a net oil exporter. However, by 2003 it became the world’s second-largest oil consumer after the United States. The need to secure energy supplies has, therefore, become a key concern for Chinese leadership. It is noteworthy to say that other countries in the region or in close vicinity share the same concerns, especially Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Japan and South Korea (Andělová and Strašáková 2013a, p. 16). Just like the land and border disputes in Southeast Asia, the roots of the South China Sea dispute can also be traced back to the colonial era and the emerging European presence in the region. The Europeans brought not only the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and territoriality to Southeast Asia but differentiated between land and sea borders. As Stein Tønnesson (2002, p. 8) emphasizes: “They drew a crucial distinction between land and sea. Land was to be divided into territories with mapped and demarcated borders.

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The sea should be free for all, except a narrow band of territorial waters along the coast.” Freedom of navigation remains a key principle in international law, today most prominently advocated by the United States. Until the 1950s the nascent independent states of Southeast Asia had been dealing with their internal problems triggered by the decolonization process, thus the South China Sea and its demarcation remained peripheral to their interests. Nonetheless, the situation changed dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s due to a series of new developments. First, a 1969 geological survey definitely confirmed the long assumed presence of abundant oil and gas deposits in the region triggering renewed interest and territorial claims of all the countries in the region. Second, in 1972 negotiations on the Third United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (unclos iii) were commenced. Its outcomes were crucial especially for all the littoral states due to the international recognition of their territorial claims. Moreover, in 1973 and 1979 the world was hit by severe oil crises, and states became even more aware of the significance of oil and other natural resources for sustaining economic growth and development (Fravel 2008, p. 289). During this period, in 1974 to be exact, China seized from South Vietnam the Paracel Islands, which it occupies until today, despite Hanoi’s ongoing protests. Since the early 1980s, Beijing has also begun to systematically strengthen its navy capabilities (Guan 1999, p. 6). One of the objectives was to build up the Chinese fleet to such an extent that it would be able to defend Chinese territorial claims also on distant islands in the South China Sea. It must be noted that at this time the prc lacked the capacity to physically occupy the Spratly Islands. The Chinese navy gained the capacity to reach the Spratly Archipelago only in 1987 (Guan 1999, p. 6). A more pronounced Chinese presence in the area escalated by a military clash between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces in the western part of the Spratly Islands in March 1988 (Guan 1999, p. 6). It was Beijing who won the friction, in which 74 Vietnamese sailors had been killed. It is worth mentioning that prior to the military clash with the Vietnamese, the prc did not physically occupy any of the islands in the Archipelago (Guan 1999, p. 5). Yet, the Chinese navy subsequently occupied other features of the Spratlys (Buszynski 2010, p. 88). However, Vietnam still controls more islands in the Spratlys than China. After the end of the Cold War, the prc undertook several steps that once again resulted in deteriorating mutual relations not only with Vietnam but also with asean members. First, on 22 February 1992 Beijing ratified the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas, in which it reasserted its claims on the whole South China Sea and even stipulated its right to resort to military power in defending its islands (including the Spratly Archipelago) and contiguous waters (Amer 1999, p. 74). Second, in

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March 1992 the prc occupied Gaven Reef (Nanxun Jiao) from Vietnam (Kenny 2002, p. 67). Hanoi officially protested against such a step, demanding the prc to withdraw from the seized feature (Koo 2010, p. 155). Third, in May 1992 Beijing signed a contract with the American Crestone Energy Corporation concerning oil and gas exploration survey in the South China Sea (Koo 2010, p. 155; Tønnesson 2003, p. 61). Vietnam protested again, pointing out to the fact that the area of exploration was in its continental shelf (Amer 2002, p. 9; Guan 1998, p. 8). Fourth, in June 1992 China deployed several drilling ships into Vietnamese territorial waters. In July 1992 Vietnam announced that it had seized three Chinese fishing boats that, according to the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had been fishing in Vietnamese territorial waters in the vicinity of the Bach Long Vi Island in the Gulf of Tonkin (Andělová and Strašáková 2013b, pp. 140–141). As can be deduced from the above-mentioned list of incidents, until 1992 the disputes in the South China Sea could be perceived as a solely China-Vietnam affair. However, this began to change, as other Southeast Asian countries also staked their claims in the area in the early 1990s (Guan 1999, p. 8). Given the escalating tensions, the asean members signed a Declaration of the South China Sea in July 1992 and signaled an effort to implement a Code of Conduct (coc) in the South China Sea. In addition, all the parties concerned (Vietnam became asean member in 1995) pledged to resolve all the contentious issues of suzerainty “by peaceful means, without a resort to force” (Buszynski 2010, p. 88). In addition, unclos iii was brought into effect on 16 November 1994 and in its accordance the Southeast Asian states set out to demarcate the o­ therwise fluid sea borders to claim a 200 nautical mile wide Exclusive Economic Zone (eez). Given the fact that in the borderline seas many of the claimed sectors overlapped – new sources of inter-state conflicts began to appear. In February 1995, the situation in the South China Sea escalated again, after China occupied the Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao) in the eez of the Philippines. It was the first time that the prc had seized a territory claimed by an asean member. This step also had a salient impact on the Philippines, as it revealed its vulnerability after the withdrawal of the American troops from Subic Bay base. The Philippine President, Fidel Ramos, criticized China for its aggressive behavior and Manila sought multilateral support and strove to undertake several retaliation steps, such as destroying the Chinese boundary markers or arresting Chinese fishermen. asean responded with a comparatively strong statement, supporting Manila (see Gerstl in this volume). The dispute was finally resolved after the prc and the Philippines had signed a bilateral agreement, in which both parties had renounced using force and pledged to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict (Andělová and Strašáková 2013b, p. 143).

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After the Mischief Reef incident, Chinese foreign policy strove to maintain the status quo and not to subvert the international order. In addition, during the Asian Financial Crisis Beijing’s supportive policies changed the perceptions of the prc as a “threat”. Since then, the regional states started to see China’s rise as an opportunity for their own economic development. “As a result of these developments, the ‘China Threat’ receded” (Thayer 2012, p. 5) – at least for one decade. Thus, the period to 2007 was marked by a relaxation in tensions and cooperation over confrontation. For example, in 2000 China and Vietnam succeeded in signing two crucial documents: the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin and an Agreement on Fishing Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin, as well as issued a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century, which outlined the structure of bilateral relations through a long-term framework for cooperation (Thayer 2011). On a regional level, in May 2000 the asean-China Working Group on the Code of Conduct convened a meeting in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the issue. After almost two years of further negotiations, the two sides signed the asean-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (doc) on 4 November 2002, at the 8th asean Summit in Phnom Penh. The document was perceived as a political and necessary step towards establishing a coc. Some of the key principles that the document contained were: the prohibition of the use of force and threat of force; self-restraint of the parties involved; peaceful settlement of international disputes; search for and adoption of confidence-building measures; cooperation; consultations; and last but not the least respect for the freedom of international air and maritime navigation (Nguyen Hong Thao 2009, pp. 209–219). All in all, the legally binding coc should establish a rules-based order for the South China Sea. The signature of the document was soon followed by a series of Chinaasean declarations relating to the South China Sea. Worth mentioning are: the China-asean Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the China-asean Joint Declaration in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues of 2002. In 2003 China also became the first dialogue partner to the Treaty Amity and Cooperation, opening the door for membership in the East Asia Summit (admitted in 2005), and last but not least asean and China issued their Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. In addition, Beijing and asean agreed on a Plan of Action (2005–2010), which implemented their new strategic partnership, including security collaboration (Thayer 2015). Even on a bilateral level cooperative steps between countries continued, e.g. on 30 June 2004 China and Vietnam signed an Agreement on the Demarcation of the Beibu Gulf and the Beibu Gulf Fishery Cooperation

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Agreement came into force. A year later, China, Vietnam and the Philippines also signed the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (jmsu) in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea. It was, though, not renewed in 2008. Furthermore, the significance of the doc was soon devalued by the overall reluctance of all the parties to respect the code (Koo 2010, p. 155). Since 2008/09, the situation in the South China Sea started to deteriorate, given several reasons. Firstly, growing popular nationalism, especially in the People’s Republic of China, Vietnam and the Philippines, has been used by domestic politicians to legitimize not only their claims, but also their regimes. As Cheol Hee Park points out, depending on the leadership of the country, boundary/territorial conflicts can be controlled, subdued or on the other hand intensively politicized as most territorial conflicts are linked to pride and prestige of nations (Park 2010, p. 45). Secondly, all claimants have started strengthening their sovereignty and jurisdictional claims, through national legislation and by making submissions to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs) (Storey 2013, pp. 24–25). Thirdly, the disputes have been further exacerbated by the growing competition over maritime resources, as all claimants have stepped up their exploration and drilling activities in their often overlapping eezs. Fourthly, all the countries have accelerated the building of their naval capabilities. In its consequences, the rising number of vessels, either military, maritime enforcement ships or fishing craft, have increased clashes and incidents on the sea, triggering further mutual apprehensions among China and Southeast Asian claimants (Storey 2013, p. 25). China has been especially active in upgrading its military and navy since the early 1980s (Guan 1999, p. 6). One of its objectives is to build up the Chinese fleet to such an extent that it would also be able to defend Chinese territorial claims to the distant islands in the South China Sea. The process has gained momentum in the past few years with the establishment of a naval base on the island of Hainan, the existence of which was revealed by aerial photographs leaking to the public in 2008 (Ciorciari and Weiss 2012, p. 63). China has also moved to build a number of military and quasi-military outposts on a number of Paracel and Spratly Islands in order to enhance its power projection in the South China Sea. This military build-up can be perceived as a potential threat by Southeast Asian countries, especially by Vietnam and the Philippines. However, the base and the prc navy presence in the South China Sea can also pose a threat to other naval powers, notably the us, Japan, India and Australia, which perceive the freedom of navigation through the sea as strategic to their security. The “Impeccable Incident” in spring 2009, i.e. an instigation of Chinese navy ships with the American submarine usns Impeccable, can be viewed as another proof of the growing Chinese influence and assertiveness in the South

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China Sea. The incident highlighted the lack of trust in the Sino-American relations, aggravated the concerns of Sino-American competition in the South China Sea and had a negative impact on the stability in Southeast Asia. The “Impeccable Incident” also exposed the rarely highlighted problem of different interpretations of unclos by China and the us (Valencia 2009, pp. 26–32). The incident has also led to a gradual increase of American presence in the region as the us has been promoting freedom of navigation around the world. The South China Sea together with the Malacca and Singapore Straits represent a vital passageway for regular reinforcement of us military presence in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. Thus, maintaining stability in the region is crucial for maintaining their strategic presence in the region. Obama’s “pivot policy” (Ross 2012) means that the us has been trying rebuild its “lost” position in Asia under the administration of president Obama. Renewing “traditional” ties with the “old” allies, such as Thailand, Philippines or Japan, and forging new ties with Myanmar, Malaysia or Vietnam is the core of this “new” trend of us foreign policy towards Asia Pacific. For example, the us has rekindled its interest in Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay naval base, which would allow its stronger power projecting in the South China Sea. Moreover, the navies of Vietnam and the United States have been holding annual non-combat training exercises in the South China Sea since 2010 (Andělová and Strašáková 2013a, p. 15). The latest developments in the region, especially the HYSY 891 oil-rig standoff between China and Vietnam from May to July 2014 and the extensive land reclamation activities of the prc in the Paracel and Spratly Archipelagoes since 2014 indicate that the waters of the South China Sea have become more troubled than ever and that the resolution of the dispute is still far from sight. In addition, as time has shown and as shall also be highlighted in the subsequent chapters the enmeshment and hedging strategies of Southeast Asian states, e.g. Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as the American efforts to persuade Beijing to renounce its “salami slicing” strategy in the South China Sea have fallen flat. As aerial photos released in March 2015 indicate, the prc has set out to construct a new runway on the Fiery Cross Reef, to create landmasses in the Subu Reef of the Spratly Archipelago and build additional airstrips in the Paracel Islands, yet again raising concern among the other claimants. These developments have also triggered a heated debate in the us on “whether it should adopt a more hardline policy towards China” (for a discussion see Storey 2015, p. 10). To conclude, it is highly probable that until the us is capable of “matching its rhetoric with actions”, be willing to intervene in the region and prove its credibility as an ally, i.e. avoid the Georgia scenario, China is going to become the dominant player in the South China Sea with the rest of the claimants accommodating to a greater or smaller extent to its interests.

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The political and legal reasons for the ongoing dispute as well as the most recent developments in the South China Sea, notably the internationalization and militarization, will be analyzed in detail in this volume.

Overview of the Chapters of This Volume

As has been discussed above, it is evident that border and territorial disputes in Southeast Asia vary from case to case. Though, as this volume aims to demonstrate, there exist also many similarities. Most of the disputes originated from colonial domination, some were dormant but emerged more recently because of the discovery of natural resources, and some have arisen out of different interpretations of the law of the sea and exclusive economic zones. While most attention of Southeast Asian states – and the international community in general – has been focused on resolving the contentious maritime zones of the South China Sea, the other conflict in Southeast Asia that is most likely to escalate in an international crisis is the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple. It shall be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, revealing that there still exist other dormant and unresolved issues among the asean-10 that can mar relations among states as well as endanger the cohesion of the Association. In addition, these longstanding issues often fueled by the intensive and emotional responses of the public are a stark warning that asean’s long-term strategy of shelving “bones of contention” in order to preserve peace and harmony among member states may no longer be an effective strategy (Wain 2012, p. 39). Hence, the main aim of this study is to provide the reader with an overview of the most pressing ongoing unresolved land and maritime disputes in Southeast Asia. Despite the fact that at first sight globalization may have undermined the importance of borders, it seems that land borders and maritime zones within Southeast Asia are as prominent as ever, yet the existing bi- and multilateral approaches for resolving these conflicts have been far from efficient. The aim of this publication is to demonstrate the need for – but also the difficulty of – multilateral resolutions or at least dispute management promoted by asean. The overall hypothesis poses that in order to achieve such a solution, deeper cooperation among the involved parties, based on the implementation of confidence building measures leading to shared perspectives and eventually the “socialization” of states in the asean Way norms, is necessary. For this, however, a deeper integration of asean itself is a prerequisite, as otherwise the individual members might have too different, i.e. national, interests. Consequently, the Association could not speak with one strong voice. asean’s lack of an active dispute management practice is therefore not necessarily the

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organization’s fault, but mostly due to the different national interests of its individual members. In analyzing the concrete reasons for the border disputes, their historic roots and proposed resolution mechanisms, the many different case studies of this book draw a comprehensive picture of selected, complex ongoing land and sea territorial disputes in Southeast Asia and the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations therein. It is exactly this complexity of events and actors in Southeast Asia that gives reason to be simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic in regard to the peaceful future of the region. The first chapter of the monograph “Boundaries and Frontiers in Southeast Asia: Fences Have Made Fretful Neighbors” by Petra Andělová discusses the concepts of boundaries and frontiers in Southeast Asia from a theoretical and historical perspective. It argues that before the arrival of colonial powers, “states” of Southeast Asia had not been of exactly delimited territory, and an exact boundary concept was alien to the region. In addition, in Southeast Asia as well as elsewhere in the world, the sea played both dividing and uniting roles. The sea was perceived as a common property, so until the “modern era” there was no need to partition it. Through maritime trade, an important source of wealth for states, companies and individuals, not only material goods were exchanged but also religions and cultures disseminated. The aims of this chapter are firstly to sum up the arguments for the main hypothesis that the “Western” concept of exact borders (borderlines) is alien to Southeast Asia and as such one of the main sources of disputes among states of the region. Secondly, it seeks to define main areas of border disputes. The second chapter by Filip Kraus entitled “Border Disputes in Southeast Asia and Their Impact on the Regional Integration Process” further discusses the roots, developments and the impact of border disputes in Southeast Asia by tracing the origins of territorial disputes back to the pre-colonial and colonial times, especially emphasizing how this colonial legacy had been conserved and even exacerbated during the Cold War era. The author argues that these legacies reveal themselves in a lack of willingness among regional elites to quickly and resolutely solve these recurrent border issues demanding certain compromises to national pride of a given nation. The lack of will for compromises stems from domestic politics where the strong nationalist feelings are utilized in political competition. As a result, these border disputes may lead into a situation where state-to-state relationships are charged and thus slow down the integration process in the region. In the third chapter, titled “Thai-Cambodian Conflict: Approaching the Final Stage at Preah Vihear?” Richard Turcsányi and Zdeněk Kříž address in greater detail some of the arguments put forth in the preceding chapter, shedding

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light on the persistent conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple and surrounding areas. The article discusses the historical legacies of the conflict including the original judgment of the International Court of Justice (icj) in 1962. It further argues that the escalation of the conflict in 2008 was not a result of a mutual misunderstanding rather than of deliberate policies of politicians on both sides to exploit the case for domestic political goals. Thirdly, the authors also scrutinize the possible outcomes and their impacts on the relations between the two countries as well as the role of asean, which has been widely criticized for failing to address the conflict between its two member states. However, as they emphasize, domestic rivalries in Thailand and Cambodia may lead to mounting willingness of their respective leaders to use the conflict for domestic purposes again. Thus their interest in utilizing asean as mediator seems limited. The fourth chapter “Claiming Phu Quoc/Koh Tral: Irredentism as a Recur­ rent  Theme of Cambodian Domestic Politics” by Mária Strašáková further elabo­ rates some of the topics discussed in the previous three chapters, especially the role of historical legacies, as well as growing nationalism and the deliberate exploitation of the disputes for domestic political purposes. However, the chapter shifts the attention from land to maritime disputes by analyzing Cambodia’s claims to Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island in the Gulf of Thailand, an extended branch of South China Sea. The objective of this chapter is not only to analyze the history of the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam, but also to seek an answer to what extent is the issue “an anachronistic political debate” or a political calculation of Cambodian parties in their quest for power and public support through stirring strong nationalist feelings against the Vietnamese. Thirdly, the paper investigates the main turning points in the attempts of both the countries to resolve this sensitive issue as well as prospects for future development and resolution of the dispute. While the resolution of the above-mentioned territorial disputes remained mostly bilateral, the fifth chapter of this monograph by Alica Kizeková, titled “Multitrack Diplomatic Approaches to Border and Territorial Disputes in Southeast Asia and Soft Balancing”, shifts the attention to the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea and multilateral and multitrack diplomatic approaches. This chapter investigates the use of asean-led government-togovernment (Track i) and non-official (Track ii) multilateral structures as part of the soft balancing strategy aiming to “socialize” China towards regionally responsible behavior and a commitment to shared norms. Reviewing the concept of soft balancing, Kizeková concludes that it deserves to be ranked among the main alignment strategies: Soft balancing is a safer, more subtle, and an indirect alternative to hard balancing, minimizing the possibility of

Introduction

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counter-reaction from the state against which it has been mobilized. The author tests the validity of this approach using asean’s dealing with a re-emerging China of the early 1990s in the context of the South China Sea dispute. In this case, soft balancing in form of multitrack confidence-building and dialogues impacted on the decision by Chinese elites to increase their country’s engagement in multilateral discussion in areas of common interest. Yet, asean failed to convince Beijing to resolve the South China Sea dispute, despite the doc of 2002. According to Kizeková, China developed a tendency to opt for a neorealist approach to multilateral cooperation, while embracing cooperation solely in spheres, which do not compromise its main national interests. The sixth chapter “The South China Sea Conflict: Ten Thousand Stones and a Nine-Dash Line – Rethinking Maritime Space Concepts” by Padraig Lysaght discusses the concepts of borders and spaces from a Chinese point of view, illustrated by the notion of “historic waters”. Tracing back the history of the Chinese nine-dash-line, Lysaght shows that historic maps of the South China Sea, e.g. the Kunyu Wanguo Quantu map drawn by Matteo Ricci in 1602, are rather informative than political maps, as they do not make reference to the ownership of the islands. He views the South China Sea as a sphere of hegemony for a dominant power, thus a peaceful resolution of the existing “insular anarchy” is as likely as a war between the hegemons China and the us. Actions and results arising from the South China Sea will set a precedence for a new way of thinking about and handling maritime borders in general, the author concludes. Alfred Gerstl’s chapter “The South China Sea Conflict: A Shift to a more proactive Role in asean’s Discourse and Policies since 2012?” demonstrates that the failure of the asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (amm) in July 2012 has triggered a cautious, but gradual securitization process of the South China Sea dispute. Applying the constructivist Copenhagen School’s securitization approach and discourse analysis on the discourse (“speech act”) of the asean Summit, the amm and the asean Regional Forum from 1992 until 2015 reveals that the three discourses are very consistent. asean’s declaratory policy, notably in the amm, but also, albeit to a lesser extent, in the asean Summit, has become more robust since 2014. Yet, both do not view the dispute as an “existential threat” (a key concept of the Copenhagen School). Though, as Gerstl argues, the Copenhagen School’s criteria for qualifying a threat as existential are too strict, making this approach almost impossible to apply. An intriguing finding is that the broader arf’s discourse strongly resembles that of the amm, while the speech acts of the asean Summit and amm vary significantly. Unlike asean, the arf, though, has not securitized the South China Sea dispute, even if less strict criteria were adopted. In general, as Gerstl elaborates, asean’s discourse and policies on the South China Sea are consistent and in

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line with each other. The same applies for Vietnam, though the government, not satisfied with asean’s reaction to the oil rig standoff in 2014, further internationalizes the dispute – outside asean. Gerstl concludes that even though a speech act alone is not sufficient to explain asean’s dispute management, it is still important, as it reveals the narrative and logic behind the Association’s policies and provide insights in its future policies. Truong-Minh Vu’s chapter “The Logic of Strategic Restraint and Prospects for Joint Development in the South China Sea” further elaborates on some of the ideas discussed in the preceding part by posing a question: Why have some states accepted China’s proposal to set aside disputes and pursue joint development in the South China Sea in one case, but not the other? The supposed answer is that the change of balance of power and the ways China utilizes its growing power caused problems of cooperation. Especially since 2009 China has failed gaining followership of Southeast Asian countries because it has been unwilling to solve the South China Sea disputes through multilateral rules and agreements. The lack of a rule-based order in the South China Sea, which can turn a hegemonic power to become more predictable and controlled, leads to the fact that China’s cooperative projects receive little sympathy from Southeast Asian states. Based on this point, he concludes that the joint development can only be feasible, when China accepts to bind itself within institutions or legal agreements. The ninth chapter of the monograph “Lessons to be Learned: A Neorealist Assessment of the HYSY-981 Standoff and Its Implications for Vietnam’s South China Sea Strategy” by Jörg Thiele sheds light on the most recent developments in the South China Sea, especially the deployment of the prc’s first indigenous deepwater oil-rig, the Haiyang Shiyou 981, within Vietnam’s eez, on 2 May 2014. This action provoked the tensest standoff between Vietnam and China since 1988. Soon the largest anti-China protests in the history of Vietnam turned violent. Academic analyses, though, have more focused on China’s actions and reactions and paid less attention to understand the effects and implications of the deployment for Hanoi’s bilateral relations with Beijing and its wider South China Sea strategy. Applying a neorealist approach on the deployment of HYSY-981 from a Vietnamese perspective, Thiele aims to close this gap. His results suggest, that while it is still too early to assess sustainable impacts on Vietnam’s South China Sea strategy, there are several important implications to derive from the oil rig standoff. This concerns particularly the enmeshment approach, which according to Thiele, Hanoi must strengthen to make it effective. Similarly, the opportunity for balancing with Washington against Beijing increased, although this strategy is limited by Hanoi’s vital economic relations with Beijing. The tenth chapter of the monograph “The Spring 2014 Incidents in the South China Sea: Trigger of a more intense and assertive security discourse in China?” by Josef Falko Loher addresses also the oil rig incident from May to July 2014, yet by

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analyzing China’s security discourse. He assesses to what extent the demonstrations and actions against Chinese in Vietnam were followed by a more intense and assertive security discourse by Chinese government institutions and officials, which then could lead to a more assertive and aggressive stance in Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea. For this, the author, a Mandarin speaker, analyzed Chinese online articles, press releases and press conference transcripts by ministries, state agencies and Xinhua journalists. Identifying six separate discourse streams, the differing security dimensions in these streams point to a constructed, well-composed and partly downplayed security discourse, which emphasizes notions of comprehensive security, with traditional stances of security (such as national or territorial security) being at least less visible. Overall, as Loher demonstrates, the spring 2014 security discourse fits well into China’s general understanding of security and its positioning in the South China Sea conflict: The message is that Beijing worries about the life and property of Chinese citizens, that it will continue to stick to its territorial claims and that it will attempt to further frame the conflict with regard to its own national interests. In the conclusion, the editors emphasize the similarities and differences between the recent border disputes in Southeast Asia, be it land or maritime border ones. One of their key arguments is that the differences are unlikely to be resolved soon, but it is possible either for the conflict parties or asean (if involved) to manage the disputes, as the Association possess the required norms and institutions for dispute settlement. However, there remain question marks in regard to the political will of domestic politicians in Southeast Asia, as most conflicts can be instrumentalized for national or personal political interests. The obstacles for establishing a true rules-based order in Southeast Asia reside not only in China, but in Southeast Asia, too. Alfred Gerstl and Mária Strašáková Vienna and Prague, October 2016 Bibliography1 Acharya, Amitav (2012): The Making of Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). Amer, Ramses (1999): “Sino-Vietnamese Relations: Past, Present and Future.” In Thayer, Carlyle A. and Amer, Ramses (Eds.): Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition. Singapore: ISEAS, 68–129.

1 All internet sources have last been accessed on 1 October 2016.

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Amer, Ramses (2002): The Sino-Vietnamese Approach to Managing Boundary Disputes. Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU). Andělová, Petra and Strašáková, Mária (2013a): “Introduction.” In Andělová, Petra and Strašáková, Mária (Eds.): South China Sea Dispute in International Relations. Prague: Metropolitan University Press, 13–19. Andělová, Petra and Strašáková, Mária (2013b): “The Spratly Islands: Yet Another Bone of Contention between China and Vietnam.” In Andělová, Petra and Strašáková, Mária (Eds.): South China Sea Dispute in International Relations. Prague: Metropolitan University Press, 13–19. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (2008): The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN (2015): A Blueprint for Growth. ASEAN Economic Community 2015: Progress and Key Achievements. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Buszynski, Leszek (2010): “Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: Prospects for a Resolution of the Issue.” Security Challenges, 6(2), 85–104. Buszynski, Leszek (2012): “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry.” The Washington Quarterly, 35(2), 139–156. Ciorciari, John D. and Weiss, Jessica C. (2012): “The Sino-Vietnamese Standoff in the South China Sea.” Conflict and Security (Winter-Spring), 61–69. Cronin, Patrick M. (2015): “The Military Balance and Regional Order in the South China Sea.” In Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong and Poling, Gregory, B. (Eds.): Examining the South China Sea. Washington, D.C.: Rowman and Littlefield, 24–30. Djalal, Hasjim (2000): “South China Sea Island Disputes.” The Raffles Bulletin of Zoology, Supplement no. 8, 9–21. Fravel, Taylor M. (2008): Strong Borders, Secure Nations: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gerstl, Alfred (2015): “Von Westfalen nach Südostasien: Die Verortung der Prinzipien Souveränität und Territorialität in einer außereuropäischen Weltregion.” Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte, 16(2), 155–179. Guan, Ang Chen (1998): Vietnam-China Relations Since the End of the Cold War. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. Guan, Ang Chen (1999): “The South China Sea Dispute Re-visited.” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Working Paper no. 4. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. Hall, Daniel George Edward (1955): A History of South-East Asia. London: Macmillan. Ji, Guoxing (1990): “The Spratly Islands: China’s Dispute with Vietnam.” Indochina Report, 24, 1–22. Jiang, Yuhuan and Xue, Xiongzhi (2015): “Building a cross-strait cooperation mechanism for the conservation and management of fishery resources in the South China Sea.” Ocean & Coastal Management, 116, 318–330.

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Jones, David Martin and Jenne, Nicole (2016): “Weak states’ regionalism: ASEAN and the limits of security cooperation in Pacific Asia.” International Relations of the AsiaPacific, 16(2), 1–32. Kenny, Henry (2002): Shadow of the Dragon. Vietnam’s Continuing Struggle with China and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy. Sterling: Brassey’s. Khong, Yuen Foong (1997): “Making bricks without straw in the Asia Pacific? Review article.” The Pacific Review, 10(2), 289–300. Klare, Michael T. (2002): The Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Holt Paperbacks. Koo, Min Gyo (2010): Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between Rock and a Hard Place. New York: Springer. Li, Jinming and Li, Dexia (2003): “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note.” Ocean Development and International Law, 34, 287–295. Mackie, James Austin Copland (1974): Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963–1966. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nguyen Hong Thao (2009): “The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Vietnamese Perspective, 2002–2007.” In Bateman, Sam and Emmers, Ralf (Eds.): Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime. New York: Routledge, 209–219. Park, Cheol Hee (2010): “Nationalism, Historical Legacies and Territorial Disputes as Obstacles to Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” In Flake, Gordon (Ed.): Toward and Ideal Security State for Northeast Asia 2025. Washington, D.C: The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, 45–52. Reid, Anthony (1993): Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce. 1450–1680. Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Ross, Robert S. (2012): “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy is Unnecessary and Counterproductive.” Foreign Affairs (November/December). Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2012-11-01/problem-pivot. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2014): SIPRI Yearbook 2014. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Storey, Ian (2013): “The South China Sea Dispute: Background, Recent Developments and Future Prognosis.” In Andělová, Petra and Strašáková, Mária (Eds.): South China Sea Dispute in International Relations. Prague: Metropolitan University Press, 20–47. Storey, Ian (2015): “China’s Terraforming in the Spratlys: A Game Changer in the South China Sea?” ISEAS Perspective, no. 29. Tarling, Nicholas (1999): “The Establishment of the Colonial Régimes.” In Tarling, Nicholas (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Vol. 3. From c. 1800 to the 1930s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–74. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2011): “The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33(3), 348–369.

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Thayer, Carlyle A. (2012): “The Rise of ayChina and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia.” IDE-Jetro, 8 February. Available at: http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/ Download/Seisaku/120208.html. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2015): “China and ASEAN.” C3S Paper no. 0022, 4 February. Available at: http://www.c3sindia.org/china/4797. Tønnesson, Stein (2002): “The History of the Dispute.” In Kivimäki, Timo (Ed.): War or Peace in the South China Sea? Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 6–23. Tønnesson, Stein (2003): “Sino-Vietnamese Rapprochement and the South China Sea Irritant.” Security Dialogue, 34(1), 55–70. US Energy Information Administration (2013): “South China Sea.” 7 February. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=SCS. Valencia, Mark (2009): “The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences.” China Security, 5(2), 26–32. Villanueva, Kevin H.R. (2013): “ASEAN all quiet on the Sabah front.” East Asia Forum, 25 March. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/25/aseanall-quiet-on-the-sabah-front/. Wain, Barry (2012): “Latent Danger: Boundary Disputes and Border Issues in Southeast Asia.” Southeast Asian Affairs, 38–60.

chapter 1

Boundaries and Frontiers in Southeast Asia: Fences Have Made Fretful Neighbors1 Petra Andělová Introduction Southeast Asia is a very complex and diverse region, which precludes the possibility of making broad generalizations regarding its characteristics. Nonetheless, a handful of common features among the eleven states of Southeast Asia can be found. Southeast Asia is quite a mountainous region, with only a “few fertile plains or valleys capable of supporting a dense population” (Solomon 1969, p. 14). The physical geography of the region has thus created a pattern of core areas separated by buffer zones – spaces less favorable for human settlement. The significance of fresh water resources must also be stressed due to the rice-based agriculture predominantly practiced in the region as the main source of human livelihood. These core areas became cradles of future “states”, whilst “uplands” became “frontiers”. As Robert L. Solomon argues, the basic ethnic cleavage is between “lowland” and “hill” peoples – with the latter historically regarded as “wild” and of lesser importance (Solomon 1969, p. 15). Frontiers were often not considered as a part of the “proper state” – although, in the case of precolonial Southeast Asia, it is quite difficult to exactly define the limits of a “proper state”. A proper state’s territory included the capital and its immediate surroundings, but how far that inner space reached depended on many factors which cannot be easily generalized. Thus, before the arrival of colonial powers, the territory of Southeast Asian “states” had never been officially demarcated, and the concept of precisely delimited boundaries was alien to the region. In some cases “hill” peoples of the frontiers had dual loyalty to two (or more) political centers (such as the Shans of Burma/Myanmar; see Thant 2012, pp. 77–78). The artificial division of Southeast Asian territory among colonial powers and subsequently among succession states (based on the principles of the “Western” model of a state) created “fretful neighbors” and boundary disputes have become one of the key triggers of regional disputes right up to the present day. 1 This chapter was published as a part of a research project of Metropolitan University Prague (mup).

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This chapter has two basic goals: Firstly, to summarize the arguments for the main hypothesis that the “Western” concept of exact borders (borderlines)2 is alien to pre-colonial Southeast Asia and as such has been one of the main sources of disputes among states of the region (and its neighbors); secondly, to define the main areas of border disputes among Southeast Asian states (and their neighbors).

Definition of Terminology and Theoretical Approach

Terms such as “boundary”, “territory” or “frontier” are very frequently used in academic research ranging from the fields of archeology to zoology – and political science is no exception. It seems that boundaries are omnipresent, yet different everywhere. The analysis of boundary issues in Southeast Asia in this chapter is grounded in the traditional or classic approach – i.e. in the sense of the state’s significance and as such from the territorial point of view. As such, complex postmodern approaches and conceptualizations of boundaries, territoriality, the construction of socio-spatial identities and the modernity – identity construct will not be reflected in the following analysis. Few territorial parallels can be drawn to the fading boundaries of Western Europe and North America. The “disappearance of boundaries” is definitely not the case in Southeast Asia. The disappearance of boundaries is an unheard-of concept for most of the world. Moreover, the peacefully shared sovereignty over territory (suzerainty) between two or among several states is an “ideal concept”, which is almost impossible to achieve. But as the East China Sea Peace Initiative proposed by Taiwan in 2012 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [mofa] Taiwan 2012) and subsequent fisheries agreement between Taiwan and Japan (mofa Taiwan 2013) has shown, sharing (at least some) resources and general usage of a disputed area is possible.3 Every event takes place at a certain location. Thus, in order to conduct a comprehensive analysis, it is necessary to take into consideration not only what happened but also where it took place – and in order to define where, we need space that is territorially defined. “Classical” political geography requires a multidisciplinary approach incorporating relevant concepts from the fields 2 The term “line” is misguiding because borders are in fact two-dimensional planes intersecting Earth’s surface and reaching as low as to the Earth core and as high as roughly to the first orbit. 3 Even if this agreement excludes territorial waters and the question of sovereignty over disputed islands, it can be considered as a first step towards the territorial dispute peaceful solution.

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of geography, history and political science. Hence, there is no need to adopt and/or add any other approach. Political boundaries are inseparably linked to the state. The state is (still) a dominant actor in international relations and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. This is demonstrated by the fact that before the Second World War less than 70 states (including empires) existed, whereas today more than 190 such units exist and more can reasonably be expected – Timor Leste, for example, came into existence as late as 2002. Modern states are perceived as territorial political units and as such definition of territory is the most essential condition of existence of any state, as boundaries represent the limits of its sovereignty. In order to avoid getting enmeshed in the “marshes of taxonomy”, it is useful to clarify the “modern state” as a territorial state in the sense of a lasting political unit regardless changes concerning type of a government or regime. The state is thus perceived territorially: it should have several distinctive features such as precisely defined territory, inhabitants-citizens, government, economy and both internal and international sovereignty and recognition. The territorial condition means that a state should effectively control a defined part of the earth’s surface – which does not mean that boundaries are indisputable or agreed upon by all states. The concept of the territorial state was first developed in Europe after the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) – a conflict which culminated in with the execution of Charles i of England and signing of the Peace of Westphalia. This event was very important for the perception of state, with the inception of a new concept of statehood summarized in the proclamation “the king is dead, long live the state”. The Thirty Years War also marked the end of an era characterized by the prominence of the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church as powerful, unifying political institutions in Europe. Thus, the territorial state has existed in Europe for more than 300 years, and the colonial powers conquering Southeast Asia were already “modern territorial states”.4 That does not mean that the Westphalian concept of statehood was immediately applied to the dependent Southeast Asian territories. The “territorial concept” was not applied until the beginning of the 19th century. In the first phase of colonial expansion (the dates and definition of which are questionable), the main objective of colonial powers was trade and profit. Direct control over territory was of secondary significance until the second half of the 19th century. For Southeast Asia the concept of statehood differed – the Mandala model prevailed among the insular states and most states on the land, with the only 4 To be exact, colonial powers came to Southeast Asia much sooner but “institutional” division of Southeast Asia among them came roughly around that time.

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exception being Vietnam, which adopted the “Chinese model” of the Mandate of Heaven (Acharya 2012; for more about the adoption of the “Chinese model” in Vietnam see e.g. Woodside 1988). In addition, Acharya (2012) also distinguishes two other models of state in the region, the “galactic polity” and “theatre state”, as far as territory is concerned. With the exception of the “Chinese model”, the above-mentioned models are basically the same. All three concepts have three common features: Firstly, the state was identified with a ruler; secondly, the state had a “concentric” nature meaning that the power of the center weakened with distance – the power of the state became particularly diffuse around frontiers. As an Asian “proved” proverb states: “Heaven [God] is high above, the emperor [tsar] is far away.”5 Finally, thirdly, the state had no fixed boundaries. In Southeast Asia as well as elsewhere in the world, the sea played both a dividing and uniting role. The sea was perceived as common property, so until the “modern era” it was not deemed necessary to partition it. Maritime trade – an important source of wealth for states, companies and individuals – not only facilitated the exchange of material goods, but also saw the wide dissemination of foreign ideas, religions and cultural practices. Bisecting the seas can also be identified as another “Western” concept. One of the first boundaries demarcated in Southeast Asian territory was the maritime boundary delimited in the Treaty of Zaragoza, signed in 1529 by the colonial powers Spain and Portugal (Klíma 1999, p. 61). So paradoxically, it could be argued that sea was actually divided before the land. The debate over ownership of seas intensified in the 17th and 18th centuries (Vieira 2003, pp. 364–373). In the 19th century, maritime areas were parceled out as well as land areas. Maritime borders became a focus in the second half of the 20th century, in the “formative years” of new Southeast Asian states. After World War ii, negotiations on the delimitation of seas were initiated under the auspices of the United Nations. Discussions on the sovereignty of states in territorial seas resulted in the acceptance of the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos i) at the first such un conference in 1958. This can be considered as a significant step, but this convention did not determine the maximum breadth of the territorial sea (United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958). Due to the international situation, the second round of discussions of unclos ii (1960) did not result in any agreement. Furthermore, the subsequent unclos iii (1973–1982), which came into force twelve years later, marked the start of a new era of maritime delimitation, as states scrambled to gain or maintain control over maritime areas. 5 In Chinese “Tian gao, huangdi yuan”; in Russian “Bog vysoko, car daleko.”

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Since the 1990s, the lines dividing maritime areas (not only) in Southeast Asia have become more and more important due to the “addiction” of the Asian states to vital imports, especially of energy resources. Whilst the land borders are (more or less) settled – or at least defined – maritime boundaries (and the sovereignty of seas and surface units) have remained contested and undefined. The political function of boundaries as a marker of the limits of a state’s sovereign territory is one of the most important roles of boundaries. In fact, boundaries are the most visible features on (political) maps, as they form the “body” of a state and are a condition for the political geography taxonomy. For the purpose of this text the term “boundary” will be used in the sense of the Roman “limes” definition and not in any other metaphorical sense. “Boundary” and “border” will be used as synonyms, in opposition to “frontier”. For the purpose of this chapter, frontiers are defined as territorial “belts”6 inside a territory of a state or straddling the border or borders between/among states, as a liminal space dividing “proper states areas”. Maps and Mapping Borders Every person perceives the space he or she inhabits in a distinct manner, and creates their own mental maps (see e.g. Pocock 1976, pp. 493–512). These maps differ greatly on the basis of different perception patterns formed by historical, political, economic, cultural, and religious patterns. Maps are inextricably connected with borders, and borders in the mental maps were (not only) in the case of Southeast Asia very hollow and vague. It should be stressed that there were no “natural” political boundaries anywhere. A political border concept is inherently artificial. “Nature made division lines” – rivers, mountain ranges, coastlines – are not transferable to the political level and to perceive them as “natural state boundaries” is a misleading simplification. However these physiographic boundaries are often used as such and do not correspond with mental maps. To give an example: to mountain-dwelling peoples, mountain ranges do not constitute the unconquerable barriers they may seem from the lowlands. Moreover, with the exception of certain parts of a few great rivers, even watercourses rarely constitute a serious obstacle for connection. On the contrary – “people who share one stream, those from opposite banks often have more in common with each other even if they are considered to be of different nationalities than with their highlands compatriots” (Solomon 1969, p. 18). In the case of the Mekong River, strict political division meant only that yesterday’s 6 More pecisely those “belts” should be defined as three-dimensional objects intersecting the earth’s surface in the form of two-dimensional planes.

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trading abruptly changed into today’s smuggling after the boundary line was enacted, as was the case of, for example, the Dutch/Anglo frontier at the end of the 19th century (Tagliacozzo 2007, pp. 53–76). Surveying and mapping became a priority of colonial powers both on land and on the sea in the last decades of the 19th century. “The world existed to be conquered, known, classified and subdued to taxonomy and divided” (Tagliacozzo 2007, p. 28). In the era of “direct administrative imperialism between 1880 and 1914, colonial boundary commissioners and imperial surveyors tramped around the non-Western world” with the aim of “three Ds: definition, delimitation and demarcation” (Clad 2011, p. 4). Along with known and conquered centers, new frontiers were created and perceived as terra incognita, mostly deep inland areas or tiny islands away from the main archipelagos. Remaining zones categorized by Europeans as terra incognita were further and further afield and difficult to reach, and by the end of the first decade of the 20th century terra incognita in Southeast Asia had ceased to exist (Tagliacozzo 2007, p. 29). Contemporary Southeast Asia is comprised of states with officially delimited (although sometimes still disputed) borders, including maritime borders – the Treaty of 1871 bisecting the Malacca Straits, the Anglo-Siamese Treaty set the borders on land in 1909, the Boundary Commission fixed division lines on Borneo in 1889, the French incorporated Laos into French Indochina in 1893, respectively after 1898 with Guangzhou Wan in southern China etc. However, efficient control of the frontiers did not exist until the emergence of present states (and even now not in full extend). Frontiers served as “shared space” up until the emergence of independent states in the 20th century and in many cases even after that, as can be demonstrated by the examples of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the South China Sea or the Golden Triangle.7 Thus, “recklessly” drawn maps (Lee 1982, p. 15) frequently became yet another source of future tensions. Frontiers When Europeans first came to Southeast Asia, there had been no unifying force such as the church or a homogenous type of political administration, and the region had been “extremely dynamic and heterogeneous” (Solomon 1969) in comparison with the “settled” Europe. At that time, Southeast Asian states were engaged in constant warfare – not much different from Europe – but what differed was the nature of such conflicts in terms of the concept of territory applied by the feuding states. Frontiers were perceived not only as desirable 7 This statement can be proved by illicit trade or activity prohibited by laws of particular states, see South China Morning Post (scmp) 2013; Kleinen-Osseweijer 2010; Asia Times 2009; British Broadcasting Corporation (bbc) 2007.

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but also necessary for the coexistence of Southeast Asian states, and neither national political units or sub-units were precisely defined in the region. In Southeast Asia, frontiers within a state were perceived as “less civilized” (as well as economically unattractive and poor) and not as a “land of opportunity” as in, for example, the usa (Lee 1982, p. 2). After mapping and finishing the colonial division of Southeast Asia, the old frontiers de jure ceased to exist but remained in de facto force. “Most of the boundaries were not demarcated and indigenous people did not recognize the line” (Lee 1982, p. 5). The common use of so-called “territorial diplomacy” – typical at the state level in political relations in Southeast Asia before the arrival of colonial powers – underscores the significance of frontiers in pre-colonial Southeast Asian society even further. Territorial diplomacy played a crucial role in pre-colonial times, because it gave the state strong means to protect the “core area” – or the “proper” part of the state’s territory. Conquered peripheral areas could be and were exchanged for other benefits, and destructive warfare was not conducted on “domestic ground” (Solomon 1969, pp. 20–25; Lee 1982, p. 30). The loss of such territories was not perceived as of vital importance or as endangering the sovereignty of the center. One of the last examples of properly used territorial diplomacy is the case of Thailand (Siam) after wwii – the territory lost to France and Britain at the turn of the 19th and 20th century was partly regained in wwii only to be ceded back to comply with the demands of the victors. Thailand lost virtually all frontiers but the “proper” area remained untouched. Territorial diplomacy relies on the clear distinction of core and frontier (Lee 1982, pp. 12–13; Solomon 1969, pp. 20–25) but with vague “division lines”. The old frontiers in Southeast Asia can represent either the area of another country (to Europeans quite an alien concept), of a vassal (suzerainty) or of a remote (mainly mountainous areas or small, distant islands) area nominally within the state itself. Following the European definition (which was also the approach taken by the Ottoman Empire, and has proved to be the main source of territorial disputes of successive states up to the present), most of the Southeast Asian states would be thought of as centers with wide and variable spheres of influence rather than as contemporary (modern) states for most of their pre-colonial existence. The “diffusion” among different groups of peoples, which resulted in the interweaving of peoples, beliefs and languages in Southeast Asia, can be cited as another phenomenon related to the above-mentioned characteristic and was also common for virtually all Southeast Asian states. Such a diffusion also meant that sovereignty was not perceived in a territorial sense. Peripheral acquisitions or concessions (sometimes vast areas of territory) were not viewed as of vital importance as long as the “nucleus” was not endangered.

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Borders and Boundaries There are two different ways of thinking about boundaries: from the premise of either territory or sovereignty. Western and Southeast Asian approaches to this issue differ significantly due to both socio-historical and geographical context. Boundaries and their meanings are historically contingent and are a part of the political institutionalization of territories and territoriality. The Western concept is based on the premise that “it is necessary and desirable for every state to have boundaries exactly defined, delimitated and demarcated, strictly codified in treaties and sanctioned by law” (Solomon 1969, p. 4). On the contrary, frontiers were perceived under the Western model as vaguely defined zones of transitory character that it was necessary to clearly divide by “proper” boundary lines. Another “Western” quality of current boundaries should be mentioned: the former “spatial scale” i.e. three levels can be distinguished: international (inter-state or external), local (administrative or internal) and metropolitan (Newman-Paasi 1998, p. 193). On the state level, it is visible that sub-state units straddling external borders are successors of former frontiers and as such are often sources of disputes – both internal and international ones. This is the case of, for example, the Vietnam–Cambodia border disputes. Since the times of the Roman Empire and subsequent Holy Roman Empire, Europe had had boundaries, with both external, and more importantly also internal boundaries already in existence when modern states began to emerge, which again cannot be said about Southeast Asia. In Europe the internal boundaries, for successor states even more important than external limes, were even more accurately done due to the unifying role of one belief and to the feudal system of rule. This is not to argue that European borders were permanent or without disputes, but Europe was used to the existence of clear division lines. In Europe the concept of clear cut division of territory was adopted early, and only particular and defined parts of this territory were the subject of dispute. The present boundaries of all Southeast Asian countries are the result of colonial powers’ efforts to divide and rule the region. “The coming of the Europeans saw the advent of straight-line boundaries” that made “a revolutionary change” and became the basis of the “Balkanization” of the region (Lee 1982, p. 29). Colonial boundaries were an alien concept in Southeast Asia – clear-cut divisions, maps, treaties and boundaries were created for the needs of colonial powers. Border lines were drawn for colonial powers’ purposes and bore only “a superficial resemblance to the outlines of earlier indigenous states” in the influence of “riverine and sea routes” (Lee 1982, pp. 4–5), which had shaped the pattern of pre-colonial state boundaries and were also reflected in colonial borderlines.

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Furthermore, boundaries were constructed in Southeast Asia primarily from a maritime perspective, as the colonial powers had come from the sea and primarily wished to develop trade via sea routes. The territorial acquisition in terms of land “was at first of secondary interest, which became more and more important for both economic and security reasons” (Solomon 1969, p. 5). Land boundaries were constituted sooner than maritime ones purely for the practical needs of colonial powers, but frontiers remained. “The economic incentive in form of quest of stable and profitable flow of resources was matched by colonial powers’ territorial drive” (Solomon 1969, p. 6). Competing colonial powers wished to avoid costly colonial wars and direct contact, so buffer zones or “secondary” frontiers were again an important part of the new political geography pattern of Southeast Asia. The best-known example of this is the agreement between Siam and the Anglo-French colonial powers in 1904 (Lee 1982, p. 12). There were virtually no colonial wars (between competing colonial powers) in Southeast Asia over territory after roughly 1650 and colonial powers exhibited a level of restraint often absent in other colonial settings. It can be argued that the creation of the colonial border system had a temporarily stabilizing effect within the region. Even “territorial barter” occurred – the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 18248 could be mentioned as an illustrative example. Thus, after 1945 all successor states in Southeast Asia inherited a poorly demarcated boundary system. Territorial definition was satisfactory for newly born states in terms of international law but they lacked internal integrity and mutual agreement. More or less all of them wished to demonstrate that they were worthy successors of ancient (pre-colonial) mighty empires and intended to prove their legitimacy by regaining “long lost territory”. The trouble stemmed from the above-mentioned “diffusion” (or seepage effect), the tradition of frontier areas, nonexistence of pre-colonial boundaries and thus the lack of exactly defined, delimitated or demarcated borders, which led to overlapping territorial claims. Wars over territories had been frequently fought until the territorial kaleidoscope of Southeast Asia slowed down after current states emerged. The most visible (and violent) was the undeclared “war” (konfrontasi) led by Indonesia in reaction to the establishment of Malaysia and its incorporation of the territories (British colonies) of North Borneo and Sarawak, which 8 The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 was designed to solve issues that had arisen in the colonial Far East due to the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. It provided a clearer division of the British and Dutch spheres of influence on the Indian subcontinent and in the Malay world. The separating line was set on the Strait of Malacca.

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consequently reshuffled the island of Borneo (Kalimantan). During this struggle Singapore also emerged as an independent state, with Brunei following 19 years later, and finally Timor Leste, which gained independence in 2002. The map of Southeast Asia became more settled in the late 1970s. The unification of Vietnam in 1975 brought no major “new” international border disagreements in comparison of former “divided” Vietnams, with the exception of the maritime borders (caused by rising importance of maritime resources and sea-lanes). Currently, territorial and border disputes are often considered as a means of gaining domestic political support, or as an attempt to divert attention from more serious internal problems. Borders have also been brought into focus by the “heightened concern about terrorism” after 2001 (Clad 2011, p. 2). An important similarity between discourses of “the nation” in post-colonial Southeast Asia and Europe can be seen in the narrative of the formation of “new and former” states after a long period of political separation, for example in the creation of Italy and Germany in the second half of the 19th century. This narrative is evident in frequently cited maxim of Massimo Tarappeli, one of the founding fathers of modern Italy: “Fatta l’Italia, bisogna fare gli Italiani.”9 This maxim could easily be applied to the majority of contemporary Southeast Asian states as well to the formation of “regional identity” in Southeast Asia, but this not the topic of this text. As Acharya (2012) argues, “identity building” in Southeast Asia is a “self-conscious effort”, which does not negate territorial claims and the “alien” concepts inherent within territorialization processes. Border Conflicts and Disputes A comprehensive analysis of boundary phenomena and disputes and conflicts in Southeast Asia cannot be achieved in one chapter, as all the boundaries in the region are unique, except for the above geographical generalizations on some common features. Any generalization of “common features” of border conflicts and disputes would be more artificial than the boundaries themselves. Only an attempt to achieve it could be made. Lee (1982, pp. 17–25) divides border disputes into “positional” (uncertain border) and “territorial” (claims of other state territory) issues and gives several examples of each. One of the “territorial” disputes is that over the state of Sabah in Malaysian Borneo, and the “inconvincible solution” made in the name of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) in 1977 when president Ferdinand E. Marcos gave up the claim to Sabah in order to “eliminate one of the burdens of asean” (Severino 2011, p. 54). However, the reemergence of the 9 “We created Italy, now we have to create Italians.” However, the real authorship of this maxim remains in doubt (see Hom 2013, pp. 1–16).

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dispute in 2013 (see British Broadcasting Company [bbc] 2013; New Mandala 2013; PhilStar 2013; Pryce 2013) showed that there was no clear division line between “positional” and “territorial” border disputes, as can be clearly seen from the claimants’ respective arguments. The “proper” taxonomy can also distinguish “maritime”10 and “land” borders, but this seems to be artificial and purposeless because all Southeast Asian disputes stem from the Gordian knot of the “three unclearnesses”, i.e. a) unclear delimitation (and maps); b) unclear “legal” status (of “agreement” parties); c) unclear “status” of contested territory. Border conflicts can also be divided according to the means used to resolve them: (a) by agreement; (b) by higher authority (un); or (c) by force. But it is highly uncertain how to distinguish between “enforced” agreements and solutions by force so this classification will also not be applied in this text. Factors that might escalate situations into armed conflicts (solution by force) are, according to Mancini (2013, p. 7), “geopolitical shifts, competition over scarce natural resources and environmental degradation”. In Southeast Asia those three factors are intertwined and again cannot be clearly distinguished (and used for unambiguous classification). In this case we can mention the Spratly Island dispute, which has been caused by geopolitical shifts (e.g. growing global political and economic importance of Southeast states) and/or competition over resources (gas and oil) and/or environmental degradation (overfishing and pollution of the sea, which is pushing fishermen over the limits of their usual hunting-ground often into the exclusive waters of other states).

Shatterbelts of Southeast Asia

Shatterbelts can be defined differently. The most commonly accepted definition is that of Cohen (2003, p. 43), i.e. that shatterbelts are the “strategically orientated regions that are both deeply divided internally and caught up in competition between Great Powers of the geostrategic realms”. Even though his definition was related to the global context, it can also be applied to Southeast Asia as a region. For the purpose of this text, shatterbelts are defined on the “subregional” level as strategically located areas, which have a high potential for conflict and are of contested status, caught up in competition between 10 Until the unclos was accepted, the terminology could be misguiding. Since unclos the territory of a state consists also of “territorial sea” up to 12 nm; also limits (borders) of exclusive economic zones are important and are a frequent source of disputes among states (unclos 1982).

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neighboring states and their allies. In this case, the criteria for determining “shatterbelts” are mostly geographical and they are perceived as external borderlands of colonial entities. Territorial disputes related to the inner divisions of former colonial empires are not included, e.g. Malaysia-Singapore, VietnamCambodia, etc., as given their origin they represent a different topic. Six main colonial frontiers on the international (state) level (theatres of possible conflict) can be distinguished: (A) between (former) British and French territories in continental Southeast Asia; (B) between (former) British and Dutch territories in insular Southeast Asia; (C) both maritime and continental frontiers between (former) French and Chinese domains; (D) multilateral land frontiers of Southeast Asia among Southeast Asian states and China, plus multilateral maritime areas in the South China Sea among Southeast Asian states and China; (E) between (former) Spanish (later us) and British territories; (F) between (former) Dutch and us territories. All of these frontiers have been “regional shatterbelts” – i.e. sources of political friction, both internal and international. These six theatres have been on the international level since at least colonial times. “New” international (formerly inner) boundaries arose after decolonization, notably: (a) inside French Indochina (Laos-Cambodia; Cambodia– Vietnam); (b) inside British Malaya (Malaysia–Singapore, Brunei–Malaysia). These formerly internal boundaries, however, are different to those on which arose on a current international level and thus will not be examined in depth here. The six “theatres” of possible conflict on the international level can be classified as Theaters A-F. Theatre A consists of the former frontiers within continental Southeast Asia, within which Thailand is used as a buffer zone between the former French and British domains in the region. In this theatre, maritime and land border issues are of different intensity and different solutions have been reached. The “Golden Triangle” is singled out as an example sui generis, as it is not a borderland dispute, but a “border area”, that is (still) not under effective control of any state (theater D). In theatres B and E, conciliatory attitudes can be expected because of the emergence of the “common” enemy (China) and because of regional Southeast Asian identity building. In theatre C only one of the South China Sea disputes (over the Paracels) is listed and not the more complex dispute over the Spratlys. The Paracels can be labeled as a Sino-Vietnamese dispute, but the issue of the Spratly Islands is a more complex issue involving multiple players. The Spratly Archipelago is an area where literally all of the Southeast Asian colonial empires were “in touch”, and thus the Spratly Islands, along with the Golden Triangle, are yet another example of a multilateral land “frontier”, as listed in a separate “theatre” (D). The most problematic area seems to be the

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latter “theatre”: the land area within the region will probably sooner or later come under the “rule” of China (which has been working to consolidate its territory using the “Western” conceptualization of borders), whilst the maritime area – i.e. the South China Sea – has been a source of ongoing friction. The Sino-Philippine dispute over the Macclesfield Bank in the Western part of the South China Sea is mentioned as an example. However, “hot” conflict in this area will cause serious damage to all claimants, as well as other regional powers, so it is not in any state’s best interests.

“Theatre” A (between Former British and French Domains in Southeast Asia) Myanmar (Burma) and Thailand11 (see International Boundary Study no. 63): Large areas of the border are currently still not demarcated and boundaries are not fully accepted by either state. In fact, “Thailand and Myanmar do not even agree on the length of their common border” (Wain 2012, p. 42). The Joint Boundary Committee was established as early as 1967, but up to the present border disputes have still been mostly caused by the above mentioned “three unclearnesses” (for more see Wain 2012, pp. 38–60). The armies of both states concerned are engaged in border maintaining processes through three other institutions: the Regional Border Committee (chaired by the Thai Army Third Division and Myanmar Army Southeast Division); the Township Border Committee (as a forum for township leaders to address border issues) and the HighLevel Committee, which started as late as in 2013, (the Republic of the Union of Mynmar [rum] President Office). The maritime border between the countries in the Andaman Sea was settled in 1980 (Amer 2000, p. 33). Myanmar (Burma) and Laos: The current border agreement between the two countries was reached in 1994 (Amer and Nguyen 2009, p. 55). It is worth mentioning that the convention concerning the “tri-junction” where the three states of Laos, China and Myanmar all meet was reached sooner than the LaosMyanmar agreement (Amer and Nguyen 2009, p. 55). Thailand – Malaysia: Land and maritime borders have been settled with the exception of the continental shelf and Golok River (see International Boundary Study 1965) and the interstate conflict with Pattani Malays in Thailand. The land border is quite unique because it is one of the few examples of fortified

11

Thailand poses an “exception that proves the rule”; it has never been colonized in the sense of other Southeast Asian states so it could be labeled as “the frontier state”; in fact Thailand is the only case within the region in which an entire state could be classed as a “frontier”, so for the purpose of this chapter, it is categorized into the British-French land frontier. For the history of Thailand see for example Wyatt 2003.

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borders: in the 1970s both countries built their own border-walls, which would later be replaced by a single wall (Borneo Post 2014; Samui Times 2013). Thailand-Laos: The boundary demarcation is 96% complete but 17 (small) areas still remain to be demarcated (Bangkok Post 2012). Thailand-Cambodia: the conflict along the 807 km border is concentrated on the Preah Vihear Temple area, but border skirmishes have also taken place near Ta Krabey Temple (bbc 2011), which both sides claim. The main contested claims concern not only the Preah Vihear temple itself, but also the exact borderline between the two states. This conflict should be labeled as “symbolical”, because not only is ownership of the territory itself in question, but the dispute is also deeply connected to the domestic political situation (and orientation) in both countries (Ngoun 2012). The International Court of Justice ruled twice to resolve the issue, in both cases in favor of Cambodian claims (1962, 2013 – icj Request). However, the dispute is still far from being settled (nyt 2013). With regard to the violent nature of the conflict (Aljazeera 2012), it remains a challenge to the asean goals and proclaimed principles. “Theatre” B (between Former Dutch and British Domains) Indonesia and Singapore: The crucial border agreement between Indonesia and Singapore was signed in 1973 (un bulletin no. 68), the second concerning the western segment in 2009 (Jakarta Post 2009) and the third agreement was signed in September 2014 (Jakarta Globe) concerning the 9.5 kilometer boundary line between Changi and Bantam Island in Riau Island Province. The eastern segment still remains open because of the Singapore-Malaysia dispute.12 Indonesia and Malaysia have both common land and maritime borders. The land border demarcation and survey was completed in February 2000 (Nordin 2006); the dispute over two small islands (Sipadan and Ligitan) in the Celebes Sea was resolved by the icj in 2002 (icj 2002) in favor of Malaysian claims. As in the case of Preah Vihear, the icj’s ruling does not mean the end of the dispute and maritime border issues still remain unresolved. The contested area has also witnessed skirmishes between navies of the two states in recent years (Butcher 2013, pp. 247–251). “Theatre” C (between China and the Former French Domain) China and Vietnam: This theatre is also composed of land and maritime borders. After a “punitive war” fought mainly in the frontier area in 1979, a major breakthrough between China and Vietnam was reached in March 1999. The 12

This dispute is not a topic of this paper, along with disputes between the former “states” of French Indochina.

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Land Border Treaty in December 1999 opened new avenues for cooperation – particularly in the border areas (Amer 2002, p. 34). A year later a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century was signed, serving as a framework for the bilateral relationship up to the present (Amer 2002, p. 34). Another year later, the two sides also signed an Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves of the Beibu/Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf and Agreement on Fishing Cooperation in the Beibu/Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf, successfully concluding their maritime disputes in this area (Amer 2002, p. 34). The land border was demarcated in 2009 (Xinhua 2009). Nevertheless, the situation in the maritime area remains tense due to the unresolved question of the Paracels (under Chinese control from 1974) and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The maritime disputes over the Paracel Islands escalated over the last few years after several incidents (Buszynski 2012, pp. 140–141). The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas (Asian Legal Information Institute 2016), in which the prc reasserted its claims on the whole of the South China Sea and stipulated its right to resort to military action in defending its islands and contiguous waters was followed in 2012 by laws enabling boarding and searching “intruder” foreign vessels passing through Chinese waters (wsj 2012). These rules can be applied only in the areas with officially announced baselines, i.e. for the Chinese mainland, Hainan Island and the Paracels, but not for the Spratlys (wsj 2012). China also took other steps to impose its control on the contested islands: On 21 June 2012 China announced the establishment of a prefecture-level city, Sansha,13 on the Paracel’s Woody (Yongxing) Island, which was to administer the Paracels, Spratlys and the Macclesfield Bank (International Crisis Group [icg] 2012, p. 5; Scott 2012, p. 1029). A recent example of tensions between China and Vietnam in the vicinity of the contested islands is the Haiyang 981 oil-rig “crisis” (South China Morning Post [scmp] 2014b). It seems that the main bones of contention are related to (over)fishing – as the frequent skirmishes among Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen testify (e.g. Financial Times [ft 2014]; scmp 2014a) – and issues relating to gas and oil resources near the disputed islands. Problems connected with the utilization of resources clearly stem from makeshift maritime borders and unclear territorial sovereignty. 13

Sansha literally means “three sands (or sandbanks)” and the name of the city refers to Chinese claims in the South China Sea, as the disputed archipelagos in the South China Sea are known in Chinese as Zhongsha (Middle Sands or sandbank, referring to the Macclesfield Bank), Xisha (Western sands or sandbank, referring to the Paracels) and Nansha (Southern Sands or sandbank, referring to the Spratlys).

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China and Laos: The survey and demarcation of the Chinese-Laotian boundary was completed in April 1992 (St. John 1998, p. 45). The border is not contested (asean Center – China 2010) but remains in the shadow zone of “frontier neglect”.

“Theatre” D (China and Myanmar; the Golden Triangle; the Spratly Islands) China and Myanmar: The current border is based on the border agreement of 1960 (Far Eastern Economic Review [feer] 1960). The Border Treaty contains a very detailed definition of the borderline on the basis of the border treaty signed between Britain and China in 1941. It is quite surprising that in the case of Myanmar, part of the McMahon line (refused by China in Tibet) was accepted (International Boundary Study 1964). The China–Myanmar border can be used as an example of a highly porous border in the area, where a frontier in fact still exists although effective control of territory on the Chinese side has been growing over the last few decades. The border was brought into focus in 2009 due to the surge of Burmese refuges crossing into China (Economist 2010). The physical demarcation has caused problems (small land transfers) up to the present (Democratic Voice of Burma 2014). The Golden Triangle is a loosely defined area located in the frontier area where the borders of China, Myanmar, Laos and Thailand all meet. It has long been infamous for illegal narcotics production (unodc 2013) and has been known as a “lawless region”. The Chinese response to the killing of 13 of its citizens on the upper Mekong inside the Golden Triangle (Reuters 2013) can be seen as a breakthrough. The Chinese search for the suspected murderers was conducted in the territories of Laos and Myanmar by Chinese armed forces and the “bandits” were handed over to the Chinese criminal justice system and tried for their criminal acts before Chinese court and under Chinese law – even though they were not Chinese citizens (Times of India 2012). China’s efforts to curb river piracy resulted in the formation of joint patrols with neighboring states under Chinese leadership (Storey 2012; Piracy Law 2011). Chinese engagement in the Laotian Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone and Bokeo sez (and in other Laotian sez) (Radio Free Asia 2013; scmp 2011) are also evidence of the growing Chinese presence in the region and an attempt to impose controls on this territory – as well as safeguarding its own borders. The Spratly Islands are situated in the southern part of the South China Sea context (see also Lysaght, Gerstl, Vu, Thiele and Loher in this volume). Joyner claims that the Spratly archipelago is made up of about 100–230 islands, islets, small atolls, cays and reefs of volcanic origin, which are spread over a territory of almost 180.000 km2 (Joyner 1998, pp. 56–57). According to Dzurek and

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Schofield, the Spratly Islands comprise more than 170 surface features (Dzurek and Schofield 1996, pp. 1–5) but only 36 “islands” appear above water at high tide. Overlapping claims to exclusive economic zones in this maritime area have made this frontier into a focus of academic and political debate. It is clear that claims based on discovery are unconvincing and because the majority of the islands are uninhabitable, efficient administration is also hard to prove (discovery and administration are the most cogent arguments for an assertion of a territorial claim; see “theatre” F). Many experts in International Law believe that the arguments of all claimants are unconvincing.14 The Spratly Island dispute resurfaced again after the Philippine government renewed its claims in 2012 (scmp 2012) after a lengthy maritime stand-off with China concerning the Scarborough Shoal (Castro 2013). The Scarborough Shoal is in fact an atoll within the Macclesfield Bank15 and was not included within Philippine claims in the South China Sea before 1997 (Zou 1999, p. 75). Tensions further escalated after China formally created Sansha City (Xinhua 2012) and the Philippines announced its “new” name for the Eastern part of the South China Sea, renamed as the “West Philippine Sea” to enhance Philippine claims (scmp 2012). The Philippines brought the South China Sea dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2014 (pca 2014a). The Tribunal declared 15 December 2014 as the date for China to submit its counter-memorial after the prc had rejected and returned the Philippines’ notification (pca 2014b). In a position paper (mofa prc 2014) China argued that the Philippines’ delineation claims were mere territorial sovereignty claims and as such are “beyond the scope of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal”. It should be stressed that all claimant parties – China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia – have been pursuing “uncompromising” stands, which probably means that the Spratly Archipelago will continue to be a “grey frontier zone” for some time befor the issue can be resolved. “Theatre E” (the Philippines and Malaysia) The territory in dispute is Sabah, and with certain exceptions the dispute has been shelved. The core of this dispute is the Sulu Sultanate’s claim (for the Philippine view see Fernandez 2007). This dormant territorial feud re-emerged in 14

15

For a detailed analyses summarizing muniments, i.e. legally admissible evidence that indicates ownership of an asset, in the South China Sea see us State Department series Limits in the Seas (1970–2014) (us point of view); Castro 2013 (Philippine point of view); mofa prc 2014 (Chinese point of view) and mofa Vietnam 2014 (Vietnamese point of view). There are even disputes about the geographical affiliation of the Scarborough Shoal – it could be also regarded as a separate archipelago (see Zou 1999, p. 71).

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2013 (Time 2013) and as with many others is also based on the heritage of both the colonial presence and subsequent unclear agreements (Severino 2011, pp. 5–22 and 39–65). This conflict should not be underestimated because of the cleavage between Christians and Muslims (mainly southern island of Mindanao) and recent escalation of this conflict. “Theatre” F (Indonesia and the Philippines) Disputes started soon after the cession of the Philippines to the United States at the beginning of the 20th century. In fact the situation at that time was very similar to the one that arose in other areas several decades later, when new states started to emerge after the decolonization process. In this case the dispute over the tiny Island of Palmas (Miangas) was solved by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague) in 1928. The award (pca 1928) settled “basic principles” of sovereignty arbitration (not useful for uninhabited islands): Firstly, “discovery alone, without any subsequent act cannot at the present time suffice to prove sovereignty” (p. 15). Secondly, “among the methods of indirect proof, not of the exercise of sovereignty, but of its existence in law (…) there is the evidence from maps” (p. 20). Thirdly, nonexistence “of a rule of positive international law to the effect that islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a State from the mere fact that its territory forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable size)” (p. 24). And, fourthly, “peaceful and continuous display of State authority” (p. 33) is a crucial factor. After signing a maritime border accord in May 2014, delineating the boundaries of both nations’ overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (eez) in the Mindanao and the Celebes Seas (bbc 2014; Jakarta Post 2014), issues in this “theatre” are currently settled. Conclusion All generalizations about Southeast Asia have failed so far. In all of the six “theatres” a number of distinguishing characteristics can be found. The main root of border disputes in Southeast Asia is the “forced” application of alien border concepts on this region since the colonial era. Southeast Asia was not prepared for “inorganic” and “Western” clear-cut borders. The above-mentioned “three unclearnesses” have made the situation even worse. Border “fences” are clearly a foreign concept in Southeast Asia, but new non-traditional security threats have been making borders and border monitoring more important. In this short review only international disputes relating to external borders between former colonial states have been discussed. That does not mean that the nature of disputes regarding borders which were internal to former colonial

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states and empires are not important. Disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam or Singapore and Malaysia could serve as illustrative examples. It is clear from the previous discussion that Southeast Asian states embraced the Westphalian concept, together with their postwar independence, as an attribute of their equal membership in the international community. Because Southeast Asia is one of the most dynamic regions of the world (with the South China Sea as one of the busiest traffic crossroads for maritime transport) the influence of non-regional players is unavoidable. The declared us “pivot to Asia”, India’s economic and population growth and the rise of China (“strong” China and India are historically nothing new in Southeast Asia but over several centuries they were relatively weak, only regaining economic might over the last few decades), together with the rise of Southeast Asian states themselves, have shown the growing importance of the region over the last two decades. As summarized above, the exact boundaries (lines and limes) are necessary for limitations of the exercise of states’ jurisdiction, particularly in the scramble for natural resources. This “foreign” (or Western) concept was accepted in Southeast Asia on the level of international law but the application of this “rule” is still not well rooted in the region. The “white places” in the 19th century and the “grey places” of the “neglected” frontiers of the 20th and 21st centuries are quickly shrinking and disappearing, but some of them still remain and some are even being resurrected – the successful East China Sea Initiative (mofa Taiwan 2012) can be perceived as a return to the precolonial approach to frontier areas.16 Southeast Asia is definitively one of the new driving forces in global politics and industry, but it would be a mistake to consider it as a homogenous unit – it is as heterogeneous and fractured as any other supposedly “unified” or “integrated” part of the world. Bibliography17 Acharya, Amitav (2012): The Making of Southeast Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore. (Kindle edition). Al Jazeera (2012): “Thai, Cambodian Troops Leave Disputed Area.” 18 July. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/201271845840265105.html.

16

The South China Sea Peace Initiative (on the same basis as the East China Sea one) followed in May 2015 (mofa Taiwan 2015) and Taiwan offered to act as a mediator in the South China Sea disputes.

17

All internet sources have last been accessed on 1 October 2016.

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Piracy Law (2013): “Chinese Drones and Mekong Piracy.” 21 February. Available at: http://piracy-law.com/2013/02/21/chinese-drones-and-mekong-piracy/. Pocock, Douglas C.D. (1976): “Some Characteristics of Mental Maps: an Empirical Study.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers: New Series, 1(4), 493–512. Pryce, Paul (2013): “The Sabah Conflict: Grim Vision for ASEAN Security Community?” China Institute of International Relation, 26 April. Available at: http://www.ciis.org .cn/english/2013-04/26/content_5908749.htm. Reuters (2012): “Special Report: In Mekong, Chinese Murders and Bloody Diplomacy.” 27 January. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/ us-special-report-mekong-idUSTRE80Q00G20120127. Radio Free Asia (RFA) (2013): “Laos Unveils Chinatown Market in Bokeo Economic Zone.” Radio Free Asia, 15 August. Available at: http://www.rfa.org/english/news/ laos/sez-08152013175604.html. Republic of the Union of Mynmar (RUM) (2014): “Senior General Says relations with Thai Army Forces Improved a Great Deal.” 21 August. Available at: http://www .president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/national-security/id-4043. Scott, David (2012): “Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea.” Asian Survey, 52(6), 1019–1042. Sean M. and Vaughn, Bruce (Eds.): The Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization.Washington, D.C.: NDU Press 1–23. Severino, Rodolfo C. (2011): Where in the World Is the Philippines? Debating Its National Territory. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Solomon, Robert L. (1969): Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia. Memorandum RM-5936-1-ARPA: RAND Corporation: California. Available at: www.dtic .mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0704566. South China Morning Post (SCMP) (2011): “High Stakes as Laos Turns to Casinos.” 23 January. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/article/736471/high-stakes-laos -turns-casinos. SCMP (2012): “Philippines Renames Coast ‘West Philippine Sea’.” 12 September. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1035119/philippines-tags-coast -west-philippine-sea. SCMP (2013): “It’s Happy Hour for the Heroin Traffickers of the Golden Triangle.” 26 September. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1317745/ its-happy-hour-heroin-traffickers-golden-triangle. SCMP (2014a): “Philippines, Vietnam Condemn China’s Fishing Law.” 11 January. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1403099/philippines-vietnam -condemn-chinas-fishing-law. SCMP (2014b): “Anti-China Riots in Vietnam Ease after 1,400 Protesters Arrested.” 17 May. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1513906/anti-china-riots -vietnam-ease-after-1400-protesters-arrested.

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St. John, Ronald B. (1998): “The Land Boundaries of Indochina: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.” Boundary and Territory Briefing, 2(6), IBRU: Durham. Available at: https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/view/?id=213. Storey, Ian (2012): “Mekong Patrols in Full Swing but Challenges Remain.” China Brief, 12(4), 13–15. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_02_09.pdf. Tagliacozzo, Eric (2007): Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and states along Southeast Asian frontier, 1865–1915. NUS Press: Singapore. Tarling, Nicholas (Ed.) (1993): The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume 1: From Early Times to c. 1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thant, Myint-U (2011): Where China Meets India: Burma and the new crossroads of Asia. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. The Borneo Post (2014): “Malaysia-Thai Border Security Fencing to be Upgraded.” 22 February. Available at: http://www.theborneopost.com/2014/02/22/malaysia -thai-border-security-fencing-to-be-upgraded/. The Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) (1960): “The Sino-Burmese accord.” 11 February, 292–293. The Jakarta Globe (2014): “Indonesia, Singapore Agree on Border between Bantam Island and Changi.” 9 September. Available at: http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/ news/indonesia-singapore-agree-border-batam-island-changi/. The Jakarta Post (2009): “Ri, Singapore Sign Maritime Boundary Agreement.” Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/03/11/ri-singapore-sign-maritimeboundary-agreement.html. The Jakarta Post (2014): “Philippines, Indonesia Sign a ‘Model’ Maritime Border Accord.” 23 May. Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/05/23/ philippines-indonesia-sign-model-maritime-border-accord.html. The New Mandala (2013): “ASEAN Non-Interference and the Sabah Conflict.” 22 March. Available at: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2013/03/22/asean-non -interference-and-the-sabah-conflict/. The Philippine Star (2013): “Sultanate of Sulu Wants Sabah Returned to PHL.” 23 February. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/02/23/912045/ sultanate-sulu-wants-sabah-returned-phl. The Samui Times (2013): “Thailand Agree to Malaysian Plan for Border Wall to Curb Criminal Activity.” 19 September. Available at: http://www.samuitimes.com/ thailand-agree-malaysian-plan-border-wall-curb-criminal-activity/. The Star (2013): “Zahid Hamidi: 141km-long Electric Fence Planned along M’siaThai Border.” 30 November. Available at: http://www.thestar.com.my/News/ Nation/2013/11/30/zahid-electric-fence-thai-msia/. The Time (2013): “Waging War at the Court of the Sultan of Sulu.” 10 April. Available at: http://world.time.com/2013/04/10/waging-war-at-the-court-of-the-sultan-of-sulu/.

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The Times of India (2012): “Chinese Court Upholds Death penalty for Mekong Pirates.” 27 December. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/ Chinese-court-upholds-death-penalty-for-Mekong-pirates/articleshow/17776454. cms. United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958): “Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.” Available at: http://legal .un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_territorial_sea.pdf. United Nations Convention on the Law on the Seas, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (1982): “United Nations Convention on the Law on the Seas.” Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/ UNCLOS-TOC.htm. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs (2008): “Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of Singapore and Indonesia in the Strait of Singapore.” Law of the Sea Bulletin 68, 17–19. Available at: http://www .un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin68e.pdf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2013): “Golden Triangle Opium Production Rises 22 percent in 2013, Says UNODC.” Available at: http://www.unodc .org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/December/golden-triangle-opium-production -rises-22-per-cent-in-2013-says-unodc.html. United States Department of State (1970–2014): Limits of the Seas. Available at: http:// www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/c16065.htm. Vieira, Monica B. (2003): “Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden’s Debate on Dominion over the Seas.” Journal of the History of Ideas, 64(3), 361–377. Wain, Barry (2012): “Latent Danger: Boundary Disputes and Border Issues in Southeast Asia.” In Singh, Dalgit and Thambipillai, Pushpa (Eds.): Southeast Asian Affairs. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 38–60. Woodside, Alexander B. (1988): Vietnam and the Chinese Model. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. Wyatt, David K. (2003): The Short History of Thailand. London: Yale University Press. Xinhua (2009): “China and Vietnam Settle Land Border Issues.” 23 February. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/23/content_10878785.htm. Xinhua (2012): “China establishes Sansha City.” 24 July. Available at: http://news .xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-07/24/c_131734893.htm.

chapter 2

Border Disputes in Southeast Asia and Their Impact on the Regional Integration Process Filip Kraus Introduction Unresolved land border disputes, overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea and the rising power of the People’s Republic of China (prc) are considered the main regional security challenges for Southeast Asian states that could have global consequences (Sothirac 2013; Mazza 2011). The prc in particular is depicted by certain Western media as a hegemonic power (Keck 2014) with neo-imperial ambitions that could potentially instigate a resurgence of Cold War-style tensions (Koike 2011). It is true that border disputes affect not only the diplomatic relations of regional states, but also their domestic situation – especially their economic development. Moreover, if we take into consideration that border disputes in the region are mainly inherited from the colonial and Cold War eras, we can easily decipher a pattern typical of “Third World” nations – a pattern depicting the region as a victim of colonization that still bears many post-colonial burdens, a region abandoned by those who are responsible for the situation and at the mercy of those who may harbor neo-imperial tendencies. Yet, the reality is always more complicated. Border disputes, as much as nationalism, are colonial legacies exacerbated by the Cold War. But it is also clear that these legacies are utilized and exploited by local politicians in populist rhetoric and domestic policy. In many cases, prolonged border disputes are a result of the complicated domestic situation in these countries. Care must also be taken in assessing what are considered as hegemonic acts and neo-imperial tendencies of newly emerging regional superpowers – in this case the prc – as these acts and tendencies may also be a part of the colonial legacy and not the result of hegemonic aspirations of regional powers. In order to show how these colonial legacies function in Southeast Asia, this chapter aims to first highlight the roots of the problem in the colonial past; second, by tracing the historical trajectories of border settlements, prove that – at least in the case of land boundaries – the problems of border settlements lie mainly in domestic political situations, wherein some political forces utilize nationalistic sentiment against their rivals; and third, this chapter will

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004312180_004

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show that in contrast with land boundaries, solutions to maritime border disputes are still far away. Due to the economic potential of these maritime areas, no claimant state is willing to make the concessions necessary to resolve these disputes, and the lack of good will between states makes the settlement of such disputes highly problematic. This is clearly visible in the case of the South China Sea (scs) where the extremely unbalanced power relationship between the prc and Southeast Asian states leaves no other option for the smaller countries but to internationalize the issue. Naturally, the prc seeks to counter the trend of gradual internationalization of the dispute by weakening the international platforms that are involved in its resolution – in this case asean. This argument will be tested using the example of Cambodia, which has potential – through its almost unconditional support of the prc’s interests to slow down the Southeast Asian integration process. In order to explain all of the above-mentioned problems, this chapter will examine three cases concerning the settlement of land borders disputes between Vietnam and Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, and Cambodia and Thailand. These cases are contrasted with the unresolved maritime boundaries of the South China Sea.

Tracing the Roots of Contemporary Border Disputes in the Colonial and Cold War Eras

The French conquest of territories in Southeast Asia started in 1858 with the capture of the Vietnamese cities Da Nang and Saigon. After four years of fighting, in 1862 the Vietnamese Emperor Tu Duc (r. 1847–1883) ceded three southeastern provinces to France and recognized Cochinchina as a French protectorate (Brocheux and Hemery 2010, pp. 20–27; Stewart 2007, pp. 18–19; Cooper 1997, pp. 10–12). In 1863, hoping to protect his country against the threat of Vietnamese and Siamese incursions into his territory, the Khmer King Norodom requested the establishment of a French protectorate over the Khmer Kingdom. The French accepted the King’s offer, but it was not until 1867 when, in exchange for control of Battambang and Siem Reap, Siam officially recognized the French protectorate over Cambodia, and it was another twenty-one years until the French decided to fully integrate Cambodia into French Indochina (Brocheux and Hemery 2010, pp. 26–27; Stewart 2007, p. 9). The “easy access” into the Khmer Kingdom created an opportunity for the French to solidify their gains in the region and France decided to seize southern Vietnam by force. As a result, the entire Mekong River delta had fallen

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under French control by January 1869 (Stewart 2007, p. 20). Colonial control in the region was expanded when French forces captured the city of Hanoi on 26 April 1882 and continued to conquer the rest of Tonkin. After a short war with the Vietnamese emperor Tu Duc, supported by Chinese Black Flag forces, the two sides signed the Treaty of Hue which established a French military, diplomatic, and financial protectorate over Tonkin, granted France rights to intervene in Vietnamese affairs, and recognized Cambodia as a French protectorate (Brocheux and Hemery 2010, pp. 44–45; Stewart 2007, pp. 24–26; Cooper 1997, pp. 115–118). Finally, after the Franco-Siamese “War” of 1893, the French unified and integrated Laos into Indochina.1 Furthermore, the French continued to pressure Siam and, in 1904–1907, Siam had to concede other provinces of western Cambodia – Angkor Wat, Angkor Thom, Battambang, Siam Reap, Sisosphon, Siam Pang and associated provinces – to French Indochina. These territorial gains were institutionalized in a 1907 Franco-Siamese border agreement that replaced the 1904 Treaty.2 Within these borders, Indochina lasted until 1954 – with an important interlude during World War ii when, after the Franco-Thai War of 1940–41, France was forced to cede certain Khmer3 and Laotian4 provinces of French Indochina to Siam through a peace treaty orchestrated by Imperial Japan. The treaty was considered by the Thai as “merely an equitable correction in terms of Thailand’s boundaries with French colonialists”, but the Cambodians perceived the territorial changes as Thailand simply “taking advantage of wartime conditions to invade Cambodia and make a deal with the French when the latter were weak.” The territories were again ceded to French Indochina after the end of World War ii by the 1946 Treaty of Washington, which restored the pre-war status quo in Indochina (Bruce 1998, p. 40) – “an outcome which Thais might chafe over but which Cambodians might see as simple justice” (Chambers and Wolf 2010, pp. 5–7). 1 Since 1830, Laos had been divided between Vietnam and Siam. France got its chance to occupy the country with an orchestrated 1887’s request of the king of Luang Prabang, Oum Kham, for French protection. 2 The treaty of 1904, forced Siam to cede the territory at the west bank of Mekong River to Laos, but leave some territories, historically belonged to Lao or Khmer kingdoms, under the Siam control. 3 Phra Tabong (Battambang, Pailin), Phibunsongram (Siem Reap, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey), Nakhon Champassak (Preah Viehear). 4 Koh Kong (Xiangnabouli including some part of Luang Prabang) and Champassak province.

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The borders of the French Indochina had been drawn on the Bonne map published by France’s Service Geographique de l’Indochine (sgi) but the map had never been authorized by Siam. After the dissolution of French Indochina, the Bonne map, together with generally tolerated border delimitations in current usage in the modern states, laid a foundation for national border negotiation among the former states of Indochina and their neighbors. Apart from the above-mentioned ambiguous borders, the colonization of Indochina left yet another legacy – nationalism. It was primarily directed against the colonizers, but was quickly utilized against other nations in the region. Virtually all of the states that are subjected to analysis in this chapter (i.e. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and China) are multicultural and multiethnic social entities where it is necessary for elites to create certain preconditions for their diverse social groups to become nations in a modern sense. In these cases, the preconditions for nationality5 (which have also been used to define “others” against whom national sentiments are usually directed) were created during the colonial era. Cristopher Goscha identified three “great” debates6 that laid foundation for later nationalistic animosity among the indigenous peoples of Indochina. The first, “Great” Sino-Vietnamese debate (1919–1923), focused on Chinese ascendancy in the Vietnamese colonial economy. In order to facilitate the colonial economy, the French encouraged Chinese and Indian immigration. Chinese merchants in particular held a virtual monopoly on the trade of rice, and also dominated other spheres of the colonial enterprise. The Chinese ascendancy in the economy provoked a fierce debate in the Vietnamese press wherein “Chinese men were portrayed as stealing ‘Vietnamese women’ from the nation and growing fat off of the blood, sweat and tears of the downtrodden peasant” (Goscha 2009, p. 15). Despite the fact that anti-Chinese sentiments and violence had existed even before the colonial era, “the modern press, boycotts and the political cartoon accelerated the ‘othering’ of the Chinese along racialist, exclusive lines” (Goscha 2009, p. 15). This anti-Chinese narrative was incorporated into the national identity through the creation of a narrative of national history in which leaders of antiChinese uprisings were portrayed as national heroes. The construction of the

5 For example invention of a national language, construction of a common history or specification of a national interest. 6 The Great Sino-Vietnamese Debate of 1919–1923; Long Vietnamese-Cambodian Debate of 1930s; and “A Veritable Indochinese Wild Debate” over the decree issued by Louis Marty on 31 May 1935.

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Chinese as the “Others” was catalyzed by the third Indochina War of 1979 and the consequent debate accompanying anti-Chinese purges. Vietnamese nationalists were also engaged in the second “Long VietnameseCambodian Debate of the 1930s”, which centered around “the Cambodian legal right to assimilate the Vietnamese into Cambodian nationals” where “the Vietnamese attempted to block this Cambodian assimilation by advocating a wider, inclusive Indochinese citizenship based on the colonial model” that “would allow the Vietnamese to live, work and move in western Indochina free of Cambodian and Lao assimilation.” The problem with this policy was the large number of Vietnamese citizens who had been part of the former colonial administration, as well those engaged in trade and construction work, in Cambodia.7 Cambodian elites called for the assimilation of these Vietnamese into a wider Cambodian nationality.8 Finally, the debate led to a nationalistic imperative that “Cambodia belonged to the Cambodians: ‘Cambodia to the Cambodians and Cambodians for Cambodia’” (Goscha 2009, p. 24). The birth of Cambodian nationalism was accompanied by the creation of the Khmer historical narrative of Cambodian origins in the great times of Angkor Wat. This narrative portrayed the Khmer as a formerly superior nation currently facing decline and decay. National animosity was primarily directed against the Thai and the Vietnamese, who were portrayed as the two main threats to the nation and its territory. The territorial animosity against the Vietnamese was revealed during the colonial era, when the Khmer requested the return of lower Cambodia (Cochinchina), an area that they considered had been usurped by the Nguyen lords during the 17th century. Moreover, during World War ii, as Siam managed to wrestle back the “eastern provinces” ceded to the French Indochina in 1907, national hatred of the Thais was also revived. These nationalistic, especially anti-Vietnamese, feelings were further exacerbated during the era of Lon Nol and perfected under the Khmer Rouge, who actually clashed with all of their neighbors – Thai, Lao, and Vietnamese. Moreover, as has already been mentioned, even ethnic Chinese were considered as “Others” (Kierman 2001, pp. 187–195). The Vietnamese-Cambodian debate was supplemented by “a veritable Indochinese wild debate” over the decree issued by Louis Marty on 31 May 1935 “that changed legal status of ethnic Vietnamese living in Laos” and placed the 7 As a result, Vietnamese migration to Cambodia rose from initial 4.452 in 1874 to vertiginous 140.225 in 1921 when the Vietnamese represent as much as 64% of Phnom Penh’s population (Goscha 2009, p. 5). 8 Trough learning Khmer language that should be supplemented by elevation of Khmer literature and subjection of all “Annamese” to the Khmer courts.

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ethnic Vietnamese/Annamese villages with their native leadership under the legal supervision of Lao authorities (Goscha 2009, p. 31). Many contemporary intellectuals believed that the decree “was a landmark in identity making in colonial Indochina, for it laid the legal foundations for defining and constituting membership along national lines” (Goscha 2009, p. 32). The Lao national animosity towards the Vietnamese was shelved during the Laotian civil war of 1953–1975, when Vietnam supported Pathet Lao forces in a Communist takeover of the country. In any case, the anticolonial movement in the former Indochina that took place during – and was part of – the Cold War left a strong legacy in the “discourse of protecting Khmer, Lao, and Vietnamese identities against the ravages of globalization” (Sidel 2012, p. 139), and against the interference of global superpowers with their neo-imperialistic ambitions. Albeit never colonized as such during the colonial era, Siam experienced unequal treatment from the Western powers – its sovereignty was compromised and it was forced to cede certain portions of its territory to the French. Within Thai nationalism, the master narrative of Thai royal-nationalism emerged after, and as a reaction to, the Franco-Siamese “War” of 1893. This narrative centered around a monarchic history that portrayed the Siamese kings with “their” army as securing the country’s independence and then defending it since the birth of the nation in the 12th to 13th centuries.9 In this story, Siam’s early identity was formed in opposition to the aggressive Other Burma. But, with the “crisis of 1893” and the loss of substantial parts of Thai-controlled territory to the French, the major colonial powers (Great Britain and France), along with their vassals (and rival kings of pre-modern polities such as Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam), were all turned into enemies of the Siamese nation (von Feigenblatt et al., 2010, p. 295). The previously spiritual nationalism was transformed during wwii into an aggressive nationalism directed against the French protectorates in Indochina. The change revealed itself in an enforced handover of the earlier territorial gains of the French to Siam in 1941 (Kobkua 1982, p. 95). After the end of World War ii, the Thai national mentality was “reshaped” by “the communist threat” (von Feigenblatt et al., 2010, pp. 295–296; cf. Kobkua 1982, p. 95), which only deepened Thai national animosity towards Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia and increased the prestige of the Thai armed forces as the guardians of the nation (Puangthong 2010). It was also during this time that the stigma of territorial loss became one of the factors defining Thai national interest.

9 The Thai nationalism is sometimes also described as a struggle for national sovereignty against Western imperialism (Kobkua 1982, p. 95).

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The origins of nationalistic sentiments in China can also be retraced to the colonial era. “Albeit not colonized directly, since the first Opium War, the country undergone a long century of humiliation during which China had been forced to sign number of unequal treaties, cede control over a series of its ports, open its economy to foreign exploitation (…) and lost control over a third of its territory” (Kraus 2014). Since then, Chinese elites have attached great value to sovereignty and hard power, and are increasingly sensitive to international power structures – especially to the presence of another power in the region (Kraus 2013, p. 69). After the end of the Chinese civil war, the historical narrative of the Century of Humiliation became “a legitimizing narrative for the ccp and pla” (Kaufman 2011, p. 2) which focuses on “three kinds of loss during the Century of Humiliation: a loss of territory; a loss of control over its internal and external environment; and a loss of international standing and dignity.” Each of the three kinds of losses “represents an injustice to be rectified” (Kaufman 2011, p. 4). As a result, the three main colonial legacies, i.e. the need for economic prosperity, the resurrection of Chinese influence in the international arena, and a re-conquest of “sacred territory”, all intersect in contemporary strategic thinking within the prc and can complicate the problem of the prc’s territorial claims. The idea of the re-conquest of “sacred territory” is exemplified by the prc’s One China Policy, which China claims is one of its core interests. The prc has already reasserted its control over Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, but according to Beijing rhetoric, the rectification of national pride will not be complete without the reassertion of the prc’s control over Taiwan and a number of disputed islands located in the South China Sea and other maritime areas (Kaufman 2011, pp. 4–5). As shall be discussed in greater detail below, these strong national feelings – in many cases attached to the supposedly lost territories – have created a condition wherein certain political elements can exploit unsettled border disputes. To show the consequences of this, the current analysis will start with the case of Vietnamese-Laotian border and then proceed to the more complicated cases of Vietnam-Cambodian and Cambodia–Thailand’s land borders. The chapter further argues that it is domestic political issues that make the resolution of land border disputes difficult. Settlement of the Lao–Vietnam Border “Dispute” By 1916, some 2.095 km of the borderline between Vietnam and Laos had been delimited (International Boundary Study [ibs] 1966a, p. 8), but as “the border was generally located in a remote, lightly populated area and posed no

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particular problem, French colonial authorities did not bother to demarcate the Laotian-Vietnamese frontier” (Bruce 1998, p. 31). After gaining independence from French colonial rule, both Vietnam and Laos were expected to settle possible border disputes. However, as a result of the complicated political situation during the first and second Indochinese War, all negotiations in the 1950s and 1960s failed (Vu 2007, p. 9).10 In 1975, after the reunification of Vietnam and the stabilization of the political situation in Laos under the leadership of Pathet Lao, supported by Vietnam, the situation had changed and the two sides were ready to start talks on the border disputes. At that time, the problems stemmed from the fact that the Vietnam-Laos border had been delineated merely as an administrative frontier within the French colony and not as a “de jure” border between two independent countries. Vu identifies two main obstacles for the smooth delimitation of the border. Firstly, the two sides were unable to approve basic principles for further negotiation. It was mainly because of this insufficiency that the initial negotiations failed, but there also existed another, equally serious problem stemming from the administrative character of the border. As the border was only insufficiently delineated and France had no interest in effectively controlling cross-border migration,11 “constant changes to and misperception of the border” occurred between Vietnam and Laos. As a result, the populations of the two states mingled together in the border areas regardless of their national belongings (Vu 2007, pp. 9–10). After further negotiations the two sides accepted the French Bonne map, together with some supplementary documents, as the main basis for negotiations about the border demarcation. On 10 February 1976,12 the two sides signed an agreement on the re-demarcation of the border. Vietnam agreed to return areas that had served as military bases to Laos and both sides agreed to respect the doctrine of uti possedetis as the operative principle for the delimitation of the border (Bruce 1998, p. 31). Also a “choice of nationality and living place of the border people” was guaranteed (Vu 2007, p. 11). During several rounds of bilateral negotiations that took place by December 1976, “the two countries smoothly made mutual compromises and finished negotiating on the whole 2.067 km long border.” It is worth noting that almost 1.734 km of the border was “kept in accordance with the Bonne maps” and “the 10 11 12

This was especially due to the domestic situation in Laos and the fact that the forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam occupied certain areas in the country. Especially during the American War and Laotian Civil war, the civil people sought asylum in Vietnam and dvr military forces settled some military bases in the Laotian territory. At the annual meeting of the two communist Politburos in Hanoi.

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remaining 333 km was drawn from original maps”13 (Vu 2007, p. 11). As a result of the bilateral negotiations of 1976, the two sides signed a treaty delimiting the land boundary on 18 July 1977, and demarcation of the border could start. To show how large a role the good relationship between the two countries played in the process of the negotiations, it should be mentioned here that the treaty concerning the delimitation of the Vietnam-Laos boundary had been signed on the same day as “a 25-year treaty of friendship and cooperation” that was seen as a formalization of the close fraternal ties between Vietnam and Laos that had existed since the end of World War ii (Bruce 1998, p. 32). After nine years of demarcating the border and planting markers, Vietnam recognized Laos as being disadvantaged in the land transfers under the 1977 Treaty and a supplementary agreement was signed on 24 January 1986. As a result, Laos obtained an additional 320.5 square km (still 197.5 square km less than Vietnam) (Vu 2007, p. 15).14 To maintain a good relationship between the two states, an Agreement on Vietnam-Laos Border Statutes – which set up a mechanism of managing crossborder disputes and preventing/addressing non-traditional security threats – was enacted on 1 March 1990. In May 1996, the two sides signed an agreement on cross border transport (Bruce 1998, p. 32) and, finally, they also agreed on visa exemptions for all citizens on 5 April 2004.15 In this instance, the good relationship between the two Politburos seems to be the main positive factor behind the smooth negotiation process. In the joint statement issued after the signing ceremony for the 1977 Treaty, the two sides expressed their joint view that the treaty is “a fine example of smoothly integrating national interests into legitimate nationalism and pure proletariat internationalism, and a symbol of the friendship and neighborliness policy pursued by the two countries.” We can see that Vietnam and Laos “did not officially refer to any border dispute between them” and differences on the areas of overlapping claims identified in the demarcation process were resolved through negotiation and flexible compromises (Amer and Nguyen 2010, p. 60; Vu 2007, 13

14 15

The only remaining problem was the determination of the border formed by rivers and streams. The problem was resolved when Laos finally agreed to apply the universal Thalweg principle – a modern international law principle with a view to facilitating the use of water resource by local population – on 21 June 1984. A supplementary protocol wrapping up the border demarcation and marker planting process was signed on 16 October 1987. The agenda regarding remaining disputes of demarcation (the area from Marker U6 to the Vietnam–Laos–Cambodia border) was shifted to trilateral negotiations between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, or in other instances with China, about the demarcation of their respective borders (Vu 2007, p. 15).

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p. 12). In addition, “no considerable opposition within Laos was lodged against the legitimacy of the border agreements with Vietnam” (Vu 2007, pp. 12–14). But the smooth settlement of the border issue between Laos and Vietnam is rather exceptional. In contrast, as a result of unstable political relations – and Thailand’s dominant position – the demarcation of the Thai–Laos and Thai– Cambodia borders has proved to be much more difficult. The settlement of border disputes between Vietnam and Cambodia, examined in the next section, have also been a source of considerable difficulties for the states involved. A More Problematic Vietnam–Cambodia Border The common border between Cambodia and Vietnam is 1.137 km long. During colonial times, the borders consisted of two legally distinct parts, which were delimited between 1869 and 1941 (Bruce 1998, p. 22). The border between Cambodia and Cochinchina was demarcated by the French as an administrative division between the French colony (Cochinchina) and its protectorate (the Khmer Kingdom) in a Convention from 9 July 1870. Consequently, an agreement between the Khmer King and the Governor General of Indochina was signed on 15 July 1873 (ibs 1976, pp. 10–11). Legally more problematic were the borders between the French protectorates, which were considered merely as an administrative division that was not governed by legal agreements or officially demarcated. In 1874 and 1875, Annam recognized French hegemony over all of Cochinchina and over its own territory. The treaty covering this was authorized in June 1884, by another treaty signed between Annam and France that left all boundaries to be delimited through internal decree (ibs 1976, pp. 11–12). Finally, the protectorates were divided by a boundary delineated on the Bonne map – which became a matter of objection immediately after its first publication by the French sgi.16 From the beginning, the Khmer Kings continuously objected to the Bonne map, claiming that borders had been delineated in favor of Vietnam, and they immediately changed the map in nine places. The changed map became a basis for King Norodom Sihanouk to articulate his territorial claims during the 1960s. At that time, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (drv) had adopted the “as you possess principle” and refused any attempt to renegotiate the status quo. Sihanouk was concerned by the possibility of an invasion from the Saigon regime, i.e. Republic of Vietnam, and restrained himself from any further acts. “This negotiation stance made up the main thread of Cambodia’s subsequent territorial claims, including that of the dk [Democratic Kampuchea], and 16

Bruce is dividing the Cambodia–Vietnam boundary into four distinct sections – according to the phase of their delimitation. For further information see Bruce (1998, p. 22).

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thwarted all efforts to reach an agreement on this thorny issue” (Vu 2007, p. 18). The relationship between the Saigon and Phnom Penh improved after the Lon Nol coup of 1970, but the two military regimes17 were already preoccupied with their internal matters – as the Khmer Rouge rose into power, the Cambodian government gradually lost control over the country. Similarly, especially after 1973, the South Vietnamese regime gradually lost its control over significant portions of its territory, particularly the border areas that had never been under the firm control of Saigon (Spector 1993, p. 290). The two regimes had both been removed by communist forces by 1975. Almost immediately after their removal, the Khmer Rouge deployed troops along the border and announced their intention to reoccupy Kampuchea Krom. On 1 May 1975, Cambodian forces invaded Vietnam, but were repelled by the Vietnam People’s Army (Bruce 1998, p. 25). Finally, the conflict led to the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia and the overthrow of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge government in late January 1979 (Amer 1997, p. 81). After the establishment of the Vietnamese-sponsored Heng Samrin government, Hanoi applied pressure on the Government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (prk) to settle border issues. But it was not until the latter half of the 1980s that sound relations between the two parties opened the way for further negotiation, in which the two sides agreed to use the original sgi maps18 as the legal base for delimitation of the national border. The final resolution of the border issues was signed as the Treaty on the Delimitation of the VietnamKampuchea Frontier on 27 December 1985 in Phnom Penh (Bruce 1998, p. 29; Amer 1997, p. 81).19 But, after the Cold War, as various factions in Cambodia utilized “an often virulent anti-Vietnamese sentiment (…) fueled by resentment of Vietnam’s expansion over the centuries” (Dosch and Vu 2006 in Vu 2007, p. 22) the final settlement proved to be more complicated. Problems started in 1989 after the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, when the latter unilaterally withdrew from further demarcation. The reason behind Hun Sen’s decision was to provide a more independent image of his government during the 1991 17 18 19

Lon Nol’s junta in the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic and Nguyen Van Thieu’s military government in South Vietnam. I.e. without Cambodia’s unilateral adjustments. Finally, the two sides accepted the land border as delineated by the us Army’s utm map, which itself was based on the sgi maps – both maps were given the same legitimacy. The Treaty completely avoided the Thalweg principle, instead delimiting the borderline as naturally created by rivers, canals and streams – as had the original French map. By 1988, the two countries had demarcated more than 200 km or their border and planted 72 markers (out of the estimated total number of 322) (Vu 2007, p. 20).

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Paris Conference and to increase the chances of the Cambodian People’s Party in the general elections of 1993 (Vu 2007, p. 21). Nevertheless, the two sides continued border negotiations. As a result, during the Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet’s visit to Cambodia in February 1994, the two sides issued a joint communiqué where they agreed to establish working groups to discuss and resolve the “border disputes”. But shortly after the visit, King Norodom Sihanouk accused Vietnam of “nibbling away” Cambodian territory (by moving the border demarcation markers) and his accusations triggered anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Phnom Penh. At the same time, the border issue was also brought up by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge), whose members accused Vietnam of seizing Cambodian land (Amer 1997, p. 82). Especially after 1994, it became fashionable among Cambodian opposition leaders to accuse Hun Sen’s government of selling out Cambodia. These complaints have always led to the outbreak of nationally motivated anger against Vietnam and the Vietnamese. In January 1996, when Prince Ranariddh accused Vietnamese farmers of violent encroachment on to Cambodian territory in three of Cambodia’s border provinces (Svay Rieng, Prey Veng and Kompong Cham), reports were made of military clashes along the land border (Bruce 1998, p. 29; Amer 1997, p. 82). The accusations became more frequent after “the coup of 1997” and during the 1998 election campaign. Prince Norodom Ranariddh repeatedly accused Hun Sen of “ignoring Vietnam’s violation of the border while inciting terror attacks against the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia.” The border issue had also been broadly exploited during the 2003 election campaign when both the royalist funcinpec and the Sam Rainsy Party (srp), “pledged to reclaim all territories lost to neighbouring countries and criticized the Hun Sen government for succumbing to the neighbours’ aggressiveness.” A year later, the srp’s leader Sam Rainsy announced that, under the terms of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, the border agreements signed with Vietnam should be regarded “null and void” (The Cambodia Daily 2005). He suggested that only Cambodia’s altered maps, published between 1963 and 1969, should be used (Vu 2007, pp. 22–24). King Norodom Sihanouk also urged a boycott of the land border agreements with Vietnam from the 1980s and insisted on using the Cambodian border, internationally recognized in the 1960s, as a basis for further negotiation. On 31 March 2005, Sihanouk sent an open letter to the governments of Vietnam, Laos and Thailand where he “unceremoniously accused” these countries of “nibbling away” at Cambodian territory. “This unexpected move coupled with Sihanouk’s earlier abdication in 2004 was seen as his strategy of forcing Hun

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Sen government to discuss and deal with ‘an issue that was on the Cambodian People’s Party (cpp) back burner’” (Vu 2007, pp. 23–24). As a result of these attacks, Hun Sen realized that border issues had become a political weapon used by anti-Vietnamese opposition, and a comprehensive resolution of the border issues (especially with Vietnam) became of “vital significance” for Hun Sen. This paved the way for further progress. In order to resolve the problem and to create conditions for a successful resolution of remaining problems, Hun Sen dusted off an old initiative of King Sihanouk to set up Supreme National Council on Border Affairs (sncba). As a result, a seven-member council headed by Norodom Sihanouk was formed under the decree of King Sihamoni on 17 April, 2005. The subsequent standing of the council – which consisted of politicians from across political parties – clearly showed the inability of royalists and Sam Rainsy’s opposition to consistently work together on the border issue. This provided Hun Sen and National Assembly President Prince Norodom Ranariddh with leverage, under which King Sihamoni signed a royal decree to dissolve the sncba. The political maneuver with snba “had neutralized the role of former King Sihanouk as one of the biggest obstacles” in negotiating process and opened a way for further negotiation with Vietnam. As a result, a Supplementary Treaty to the 1985 Treaty was signed on 10 October 2005 in Hanoi.20 The supplementary treaty opens a way for the further demarcation of the boundary, which is expected to be completed in 2015 (Xinhua 2013). If we look at this case, the positive factor in the negotiation process was a relatively good relationship between the two leading factions in Vietnam and Cambodia (Biedermann 2010, p. 148). On the other hand, the main problem during the negotiations was and is the political activities of various political factions in Cambodia, who often accuse Vietnam of occupying Cambodia’s territory to “evoke historical animosities and ultra-nationalist feelings in order to attract votes of the intelligentsia prior to every general election” (Vu 2007, p. 17). Unresolved Thai–Cambodia Borders As has been discussed above, border disputes are rooted in the often unclear border demarcations of the French Indochina colony and protectorates. 20

The supplementary Treaty consists of six articles that correct some anomalies of the 1985 Treaty. Above all, Article One applies the “median line” as stipulated in the Thalweg principle. Article Two adjusts the direction of the border delimited in six specific locations and Article Three addresses technical aspects in the process of marker planting. Moreover, the two sides pledged to publish an official map of national borders between the two nations.

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As a result, Cambodia has border disputes not only with Vietnam, but also with both Laos and Thailand. At present, border disputes – especially those with Thailand – are considered as the main security threat to Cambodia (Sotharith 2011, p. 98). It was not until 1997 that the two countries established the “ThaiCambodian Joint Commission on Demarcation for Land Boundary”, which deliberated for another three years until a “Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land Boundary” was signed (icj 2013, p. 13). Even after that, the process of demarcation was disturbed by a peculiar relationship between the two countries. The relatively good relationship between the two countries deteriorated after Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was expelled from his position and sought asylum in Cambodia (icg 2011, p. 3; Sotharith 2011, p. 99; Biederman 2010, p. 147). Since then the border issue has been frequently misused by Thai’s domestic opposition, which has occasionally played the nationalist card to expel pro-Thaksin politicians from the government. But to understand the problems of Thai-Cambodian border demarcation, we have to go back to its roots. The gist of the problem will be demonstrated by the case of Preah Vihear Temple – a 10th century temple perched on top of a steep cliff on the Thai–Cambodian border – and the adjacent area.

Preah Vihear, a Point of Friction between Cambodia and Thailand – Borders or Domestic Politics? On 13 February 1904, French colonial authorities concluded a “convention for the regulation of certain difficulties” with Siam that, together with its protocol from 29 June and a treaty (signed 23 March 1907) between France and Siam (with a protocol concerning the delimitation of frontiers), determined the boundary between Siam and the Khmer Kingdom (ibs 1966b, pp. 7–8). In the treaty, the border had been prescribed as following the watershed line of the Dangrek mountain range, and the two countries established a Mixed Commission responsible for the demarcation of the frontiers that produced a series of eleven maps sketching out the borderline. The line demarcated on these maps passed to the north of Preah Vihear, showing the Temple on the Cambodian side of the border.21 The maps were duly communicated to the Siamese Government in 1908, but as the Mixed Commission ceased to function some months before the production of the maps, the draft was never officially verified by Siam (icj 2013, pp. 11–12; Yoosuk Ming, 2012, p. 3; von Feigenblatt 2011, p. 36). Nevertheless, it should be noted that Thailand used the map showing the temple on the Cambodian side of the border for most of the early 20th century, 21

On the grounds that the Preah Vihear temple is an essential component of Cambodian cultural heritage.

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which seemed to prove that Thailand had accepted Cambodia’s ultimate sovereignty over the area (von Feigenblatt 2011, p. 36; Chan 2004; Bruce 1998, p. 40; Cuasay 1998).22 A year after Cambodia gained independence, Thailand claimed Preah Vihear as Thai territory and dispatched troops to occupy the disputed area in 1954. After five years of unsuccessful protests, Cambodia took Thailand to the International Court of Justice (icj), which determined in 1962 that – on the basis of colonial-era treaties, maps and other documents – the temple is “situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia” and ordered the Thai side to withdraw its troops, police and guards from the temple and “its vicinity” (icg 2011, p. 3; icj 2013, p. 13). Following this decision, “Thailand acknowledged the judgment and withdrew its troops and police soon after the decision had been published” (icg 2011, p. 3). Nevertheless, the 1962 icj decision did not clearly determine the frontiers around the cliff-top site near the temple. These discrepancies left an area of 4.6 square km in dispute that has been exploited by nationalists on both sides in their domestic struggle against their respective political adversaries. During the next decades, the case of Preah Vihear remained, together with the maritime boundary, the main territorial dispute between the two countries. But, due to the complicated domestic situation in Cambodia, the problem did not receive a great deal of attention during the 1990s. The situation remained relatively stable until 2007, when Cambodia requested that the Preah Vihear Temple be listed as a United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (unesco) World Heritage site. Initially, the Thai government refused the Cambodian application on the ground that the border demarcation around the temple was still incomplete. But, later in June 2008, the two countries signed a communiqué formalizing Thailand’s support for the World Heritage listing (Chambers and Wolf 2010, p. 17). After the World Heritage Committee announced that the Preah Vihear Temple would be recognized as a World Heritage Site, Thai ultranationalists invaded the area surrounding the Temple and clashed with locals, “prompting troop build-up and armed confrontation” (Sotharith 2011, p. 99; Van Nevel 2011).23 22 23

This changed in the second half of the 20th century. Until the end of 1990s, the maps produced in Thailand showed the temple in Thai territory (Chambers and Wolf 2010, p. 17). As a consequence, both sides sent their troops to the disputed territories and occupied other minor temples on the border. The first clashes occurred on 3 October “with an exchange of rifle and rocket fire that wounded one Cambodian and two Thai soldiers.” Due to the Thai election, the Thai public overlooked the incident, but the clashes continued on 15 October when the two sides “again exchanged rocket-propelled grenades and mortars

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It is clear that these actions resulted from Thailand’s internal political struggle against the Samak Sundaravej government, which was seen as Thaksin’s proxy and thus strongly opposed by pro-establishment movements (Chambers and Wolf 2010, p. 21). Samak’s government took office in January 2008, and the first attempt to use nationalistic rhetoric against it took place in March during the anti-Thaksin People’s Alliance for Democracy (pad)-sponsored street protests, in which demonstrators demanded “a rescue of the nation” with the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple as one among many other complaints to the government. In June 2008, when the two countries finally signed a communiqué formalizing Thailand’s support of the World Heritage listing, the Democrat Party moved a no-confidence motion against Samak’s government, accusing Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama of acting in haste while making the agreement with Cambodia and putting Thailand at risk of losing territory. The opposition accused the government, and especially its foreign minister, of signing the mou in violation of Article 190 of the Thai constitution, which requires parliament to approve all treaties that cause a change to Thai territories or have extensive social and economic impacts. The pad also filed a complaint at the Central Administrative Court against Samak’s cabinet,24 together with a criminal complaint to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (nacc).25 On 27 June 2008 the court granted an injunction to halt any use of the cabinet resolution from 17 June that endorsed the signing of the communiqué and on 29 September, the nacc voted to file criminal charges against Samak and Noppadon,26 under which they were found negligent under the less serious charges of wrongful or dishonest exercise of authority. On 13 November the same commission found Samak’s cabinet ministers guilty of violating Article 190 of the constitution for endorsing the joint communiqué without parliamentary approval. Noppadon tried to explain that the communiqué should not be considered as a binding treaty, but the court rulings and the decision of the commission were political victories for the opposition. In order to save the rest of Samak’s government, Minister Noppadon resigned from his position on

24 25

26

as well as machine-gun and other small-arms fire over an apparent misunderstanding about a Thai troop rotation” (icg 2011, p. 5). Essentially asking the court to prohibit the government from supporting the listing. It asked that the entire cabinet and six other senior government officials be investigated under Section 119 of the criminal code for undermining the independence of the state (punishable by death), as well as under Section  157 for wrongful or dishonest exercise of authority by an official that causes personal harm (punishable by up to ten years in prison) (icg 2011, p. 10). For their role in the June 2008 joint communiqué.

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10 July – almost immediately after his return from the unesco meeting (icg 2011, pp. 9–11). As a direct consequence of the conflict, Thai Prime Minister Samak took a more nationalist position towards the problem and, in his correspondence with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, stated that Thai troops could reside at Keo Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda because this part of the temple was on Thai soil. He also made clear that “the establishment of the Cambodian community, including construction of a temple and houses, and the presence of the Cambodian military personnel in the area was a continuing violation of Thai sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Chambers and Wolf 2010, p. 22). As a result of the more nationalistic Thai rhetoric, the meeting between senior Cambodian and Thai military officials from 20 July 2008 failed to resolve the military stand-off. Noppadon’s resignation encouraged the Thai opposition to increase its pressure on the government, eventually leading to the removal of Prime Minister Samak from his office by the Constitution Court.27 Prime Minister Samak was replaced by Thaksin’s brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat, but the new government was pushed from power again28 and the leader of the opposition Democrat Party, Abhisit Vejjajiva, supported by the Thai Army, came to power on 17 December 2008. “The change in government meant talks and joint activities with Cambodia were again put on hold, as the new cabinet had to grant fresh authority to proceed with negotiations” (icg 2011, pp. 9–13). Sotharith and other analysts hold that the pad used Preah Vihear as a weapon to attack the government. In this situation, Article 190 of the Thai constitution served as “a good place for a constitutional ambush”, within which the Thai opposition, the pad, and other “anti-Thaksin” forces, “exploited deeprooted nationalism” against the Thai government and Cambodia (icg 2011, pp. 9–11; Sotharith 2011, p. 99). By October 2009, the Thai Abhisit government was taking a more conciliatory position towards the problem than it had whilst it was in the opposition, but the pad, nationalist elements of civil society, rightist military officials, royalists, and many in the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party continue to sap any hope for reconciliation. Some pad leaders went as far as to declare that Preah Vihear and adjoining areas belonged to Thailand and a group of pad militants attempted to storm the 4.6 kilometer disputed area, demanding that all 27 28

On the grounds that the Prime Minister violated the constitution – through the trivial indiscretion of accepting payments for a cookery show during his tenure. In December the Thai Constitutional Court dissolved the ppp (and two smaller parties) based on the argument that their executive members were involved in electoral frauds.

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Cambodians immediately depart. They “even provoked some violent clashes with Thai villagers in the area as they tried to make their advance” (Chambers and Wolf 2010, p. 24). On the Cambodian side, the Thai domestic political situation was taken advantage of as well. In October 2009, possibly as a result of longstanding animosity or in reaction to the nationalistic rhetoric of the Thai Democratic Party, Hun Sen announced the appointment of Thaksin as his personal economic adviser. The appointment had a negative impact on bilateral relations and on the resolution of the border conflict – ambassadors from both countries were recalled to their respective home countries, Thailand announced its intention to terminate the 2001 mou formalizing a “new area of cooperation between the two countries to the exploitation of petroleum resources in the area of their overlapping maritime claims to continental shelf” (Sotharith 2011, p. 102). The armed clashes on the Thai-Cambodian border broke out again and continued until February 2011, when the un Security Council called for a permanent ceasefire (icj 2013, pp. 14–15). At the beginning of 2011, the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen realized that the appointment of Thaksin was a political mistake. Thaksin had been forced to resign from this position, which opened the way for a de-escalation of the political conflict, but the Thai–Cambodia relations were already seriously affected and negotiations on the “border issues” effectively ceased. On 28 April 2011, to bypass the deadlocked negotiations and in order to resolve the dispute over the temple, Cambodia requested the International Court of Justice to interpret its judgment from 15 June 1962. On the same day Cambodia also called for the indication of provisional measures29 that might help to cease “incursions [by Thailand] onto its territory” (icj 2013, p. 5). In its final judgment on 11 November 2013, the court30 concluded that Cambodia had sovereignty over the whole territory comprising the promontory of Preah Vihear,31 and ordered “Thailand to withdraw from that territory the Thai 29

30 31

According to the provisional measures, both parties had to withdraw their military personnel from the area; Thailand would not obstruct Cambodia’s free access to the Temple of Preah Vihear; the parties would continue the co-operation which they had entered into within asean and allow observers to have access to the provisional demilitarized zone; and the parties would refrain from any action which might aggravate the dispute (icj 2013, p. 7). After rejecting Thailand’s request for the case to be removed from the General List of the Court and promotion of the provisional measures. The promontory of Preah Vihear ends at the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap where the ground begins to rise from the valley. In the north, the limit of the promontory is the Annex i map line, from a point to the north–east of the Temple where that line abuts the

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military or police forces, or other guards or keepers, that were stationed there” (icj 2013, p. 36). As has been discussed above, the conflict over the competing territorial claims is, more than anything else, related to Thai domestic politics (Krumova 2011). This can be verified by the requirements, statements, and opinions of opposition leaders, demonstrators, and academics and journalists, who were also involved in the debate about this issue. As Chambers and Wolf argue, the pad in particular adopted a very nationalistic position towards the dispute. The pad strongly criticized the Samak government for agreeing to Cambodia’s listing of Preah Vihear as a unesco World Heritage site. They did not hesitate to characterize the political representatives of the Samak government as traitors who sold out the nation, and led thousands of people to Thailand’s Temple of the Emerald Buddha to pray for the restoration of Preah Vihear to Thailand. Interestingly, pad activists consider the Khao Preah Vihear as a victim of French colonial expansion. In their opinion, it was France who delineated the unfair map and who forced Thailand to sign unfair treaties and accept these maps. The idea is shared by some members of the academic community who would agree with the nationalists: In March 2008, Noppadon Pattama said that the Thai people should cooperate and have Cambodia get a unesco inscription over Khao Preah Vihear. We can’t believe Noppadon. It is not true what the Samak government said about Khao Preah Vihear. The Ministry of Defense initially just wanted opponents to shut up. Some Europeans mapping mainland Southeast Asia in the past have indeed included Khao Preah Vihear on the Thai side of the frontier. And, if you talk to people living in the area of Khao Preah Vihear, they will tell you that Khao Preah Vihear is Thailand’s lost land. The unesco inscription by Cambodia is assisting in this. If former Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama is not a traitor or corrupt, what is he? As for villagers living nearby Khao Preah Vihear, they are worried that the opening up of Khao Preah Vihear will mean that cheaper rice will be dumped into Thailand from Cambodia here. Clearly [the pro-Thaksin] ppp and Hun Sen’s cpp have a conflict of interest – a deal regarding Khao Preah Vihear. The deal over Khao Preah Vihear would have simply helped ppp. ppp tried to fool everyone. National security should be the most important goal. Cambodia’s unesco listing of Khao Preah Vihear does not assist Thailand’s national security. By the way, the World Court failed to

escarpment to a point in the north-west where the ground begins to rise from the valley, at the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap (icj 2013, p. 34).

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rule on the exact Thai-Cambodia boundary back in 1962. How then do we resolve the Thai-Cambodian border problems?

walwipa charoonroj, a professor of history at Thammasat University, quoted in Chambers and Wolf 2010, p. 35

This unexpectedly nationalistic position from a professor of a national university is not necessarily shared by all Thai intellectuals. His colleagues Charnvit Kasertsiri and Akharapong Khamkoon, both also from Thammasat University, hold very different opinions. They believe that Thailand and Cambodia need a peaceful reconciliation rather than an armed dispute. For them, the dispute is only “a tool of Thailand’s traditional forces to destroy Thaksin.” Many media outlets and journalists, who believe that Khao Preah Vihear was not an issue at all in the past, share this opinion. According to them, the temple issue became part of the anti-Thaksin campaign wherein “Preah Vihear is only relevant as a “trigger issue” to get society mobilized against the government” (Chambers and Wolf 2010, pp. 36–38). It is also evident that the nature of the conflict has changed over time. A senior Thai military official, General Channa Samudvanija, explained that in the 1980s, the Thai policy towards Cambodia – beside the territorial dispute – was to support those forces within Cambodia that opposed the existing government. “The rationale behind such a policy was the Realpolitik view of seeking to weaken a neighbor with which Thailand had substantial policy differences: Thailand supported United States policies in Southeast Asia and Cambodia did not.” Now, the situation has changed. “Now we can see that the conflict that erupted in July 2008 is in part a problem of domestic Thai politics where the Thai opposition had sought to undermine the Samak government by criticizing its readiness to support Cambodia’s wish to see Preah Vihear inscribed on unesco`s world heritage list” (Osborne 2008, p. 3). As mentioned above, the conflict was also exploited by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who used the case to build support before the general elections of 2008. At that time, the border dispute with Thailand became a major part of his “electoral campaign on nationalistic feelings to divert voters from domestic issues.” As a result, the Cambodian People’s Party won 90 out of the 123 seats in the National Assembly (Yoosuk Ming 2012, p. 2; Biedermann 2010, p. 150). Wagener identifies more reasons for Hun Sen’s “cultivation” of the dispute. According to him, the conflict was also used to launch a new campaign for recruiting soldiers and to increase the Cambodian defense budget.32 Moreover, 32

He is using information from Chinese press to demonstrate that the draft budget bill for 2009 had been increased by 60% in compare with its proposal.

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the continuation of the dispute provided an opportunity for Hun Sen to distract attention from the Khmer Rouge tribunal, helped the government to charge the opposition leader Sam Rainsy with a crime against state security, and distracted attention from government failures in the border dispute with Vietnam (Wagener 2011, pp. 41–42). Cambodia Maritime Disputes with Thailand and Vietnam The maritime border disputes between Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam can also be considered as a colonial legacy. Somjade holds that the maritime disputes between Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam are the result of different interpretations of the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1907.33 According to the agreement, France, as the protector of the Khmer Kingdom, ceded to Siam every island located south of the Cape of Lemling – as far as and including Kut Island. The treaty stipulated that the frontier between French Indochina and Siam started from the sea at a point opposite the highest point on Kut Island. From this point, the border follows a north-easterly direction to the ridge of PnomKrevanh (Somjade 2009, p. 2). However, no delineation of maritime boundaries had occurred during the colonial era. Moreover, Thailand considered the treaty as having been concluded under pressure “and drew its boundary line between Koh Kut and Koh Kong” (Chambers and Wolf 2010, p. 12). As a result of different interpretations, Cambodia draws its line across Kut Island – which, according to the Thai interpretation,34 lies within Thailand’s territory.35 The problem is that the distance from the shore to Kut Island is approximately 19 nm. At the time of the conclusion of the Treaty, the internationally accepted territorial sea limit was only 3 nm. Thus at present it is impossible to divide a 19 nm maritime span between Kut Island and the land boundary between Siam and Cambodia. France simply could not transfer to Cambodia more rights than it possessed, according to internationally recognized principles as of 1970 33

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The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 was rejected by many Thai politicians who consider it as unfair and imposed by France on Siam at the time against the will of the Siamese. For example, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that “Thailand will reject any move by Cambodia to use maps drawn by France in 1904 as the basis for the demarcation” of the borders between the two countries (KI-Media 2011). Thailand applied the equitable solution principle according to the Law of the Sea. Thailand has also argued that the French/ Siamese attempt to demarcate the maritime border using an imaginary line from the highest point of Kut Island to the land border at the shore is not an applicable solution under the contemporary maritime law. Thailand opposed the Cambodian interpretation on the grounds that the treaty clearly stated that France ceded Kut Island to Siam. In this sense, the island cannot be divided into two parts by the boundary.

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(Somjade 2009, p. 2). Some scholars agree that the French-Siamese Treaty cannot justify the continental shelf and that the treaty does not mean to delimit the maritime boundary between the island of Koh Kut and the Cambodia–Thailand land boundary. Another problem is that maritime jurisdiction surrounding the land boundary extends to Thailand’s claimed internal waters. Despite the lingering disagreement over the interpretation of the 1907 treaty, it was not until the 1960s that Thailand and Cambodia began to lay claims to the area – “perhaps because of the just-settled World Court decision of 1962 and continuing nationalism in both Cambodia and Thailand” (Chambers and Wolf 2010, p. 12). During the past, the tension between the two countries in this area was mainly limited to disputes over fishing boats, but after discovering potentially promising oil and gas-bearing structures in Thai waters, Cambodia allowed some oil companies to examine its own waters as well. “However, commencement of exploration was dependent upon satisfactory resolution by Cambodia and Thailand on their overlapping claims to the area” (Somjade 2009, p. 3). During 1972 and 1973, Cambodia and Thailand officially announced their baseline and Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) claims. Furthermore, both sides extended their claims as much as possible into the other’s territory, basing their claims not on equidistance “but rather sought to benefit as much as possible from potential oil/gas deposits in the Gulf of Thailand” (Chambers and Wolf 2010, p. 13). After the 1975 fall of Lon Nol, the civil war in Cambodia and consequent peculiar status of Hun Sen’s Vietnam-supported government prevented any potential negotiation of the maritime border until the 1990s. In 1995, Thailand and Cambodia agreed to establish a joint commission to resolve the deadlocked situation. But the continuing chaos after the 1997 coup in Cambodia put all negotiations on hold. At the end of the 1990s, Cambodia awarded several licenses to oil companies in areas that Thailand had claimed for oil exploration in 1968. This act caused protests from the Thai side. To solve the problem, in 2000 the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen proposed that the countries work together in the development of the disputed area, but his proposal was rejected by the Thai authorities. Finally, Cambodia and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Area of the Overlapping Maritime Claims to the Continental Shelf in 2001. The intention was to divide the overlapping area into two parts. It was believed that the first area, known as Area i, which formed the northern section of the disputed maritime area, would be relatively easy to divide, and the two sides planned to quickly define maritime border in this part. Regarding the second area, Area ii, the two sides agreed to conclude a treaty of joint development of the hydrocarbon resources located within these southern waters, and designated Area ii as the Joint Development Area (Somjade 2009, pp. 3–4).

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In 2006, Thailand and Cambodia made progress in negotiations over their maritime borders. At the time, Cambodia was planning to begin drilling a number of potentially rich offshore oil and gas fields. The venture had already attracted companies including the us oil giant Chevron, and more talks over the maritime boundary were planned for the fall 2008. Unfortunately, a resurgence of political turbulence in Thailand combined with the Thai–Cambodia crisis of 2008 caused by the listing of Preah Vihear as a World heritage site “placed a delay on them” (Chambers and Wolf 2010, pp. 15–16). After 2008, as part of the Thai strategy regarding the increased tensions between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple, Thailand unilaterally put the agenda of the Joint Development Area on hold. The Thais simply followed through on their warning that if public opinion in Thailand turned against Cambodia, the Joint Development Area projects in the Gulf of Thailand would not go ahead. As a senior official said: “Cambodia would have to decide whether it wanted to share the ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ from cooperation in the gulf or have the right to build a parking lot near Preah Vihear in the disputed 4.6 sq km area” (quoted in icg 2011, p. 7). The problem is also complicated by the fact that neither Thailand nor Cambodia will submit the case to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) for arbitration. Although Thailand may be in an advantageous position to win this case, the Thai experience with the institution from the case of Preah Vihear Temple (…) makes it unlikely that Thailand government will be willing to undergo this risk. Moreover, as Thailand does not declared any means for settlement specified in Article 287 and, according to the Article 298, paragraph 1 does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Part xv, Section 2, with respect to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles, it seems to be that this fact makes the option of settlement thought the icj and itlos invalid. somjade, 2009, p. 4

In the case of the maritime dispute between Vietnam and Cambodia, the two sides initially signed an agreement on “historic waters” on 7 July 1982. The agreement stipulated that the two countries would continue to regard the Brévié Line36 as the dividing line for the islands within the historic waters area. 36

A line projecting seaward from the terminus of the land frontier on the coast at 126° west of the north meridian save for a 3 km belt of jurisdiction around the northern shores of Phu Quoc Island – drawn in 1939.

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Nevertheless, the agreement only confirmed the status quo (Amer 1997, p. 81). With respect to the longstanding objections from the Cambodian side to the Vietnam-Thailand sea border demarcation agreement, Vietnam did not press Cambodia to finalize any formal agreement on sea borders (Sotharith 2011, pp. 98–102). For the sake of practicality, Vietnam also decided to maintain the status quo in delineating the sea border along the median line adjusted in accordance with specific characteristics of each country’s historic waters. Following the Chinese and Thai polices of shelving disagreements and promoting jointexploration of oil and gas reserves in disputed continental shelves, Vietnam responded positively to Thailand’s proposal to share oil revenues with Cambodia in the so-called Joint Development Area, which lies in a disputed area. As a result, in 1982, Vietnam and Cambodia agreed to cooperate in the exploration of potentially rich offshore oil reserves in the disputed maritime area (Vu 2007, pp. 32–33). However, as shall be discussed in the following chapter of the book, the unresolved maritime borders and Cambodia’s claims to the island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) have become a recurring theme of Cambodian domestic political bickering among the ruling and opposition parties, having the potential to not only fuel nationalist ire among the Cambodian population, but also to aggravate relations with Vietnam.

The South China Sea

In order to fully appreciate the potential of unresolved land and maritime boundary frictions to endanger regional integration in Southeast Asia, the case of the South China Sea dispute cannot be omitted and must be discussed in its broader context (see also Lysaght, Gerstl, Vu, Thiele and Loher in this volume). The strategic importance of this semi-enclosed sea stems from two sources. First, the South China Sea is an important transition site connecting industrial seaports – both those of the prc and other Asian states – with the rest of the world, which has played a vital role in the economic prosperity of literally all the Asian states. Secondly, the sea has an enormous economic potential in the form of oil and natural gas deposits and/or fish and sea plant stocks. As the historical trajectory of the South China Sea problem will be traced in greater detail in subsequent chapters by Padraig Lysaght, Alfred Gerstl, Jörg Thiele and Josef Falko Loher the objective here is to elucidate a different aspect of the dispute – China’s so-called aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, its impact on the cohesion of asean, and the role of Cambodia as the prc’s agent (or Trojan horse) on the asean platform. For example, in July 2012 at the asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh, the ministers agreed on key

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elements on the Code of Conduct (coc).37 However, due to the reluctance of Cambodian delegates,38 the asean ministers were unable to reach an agreement on the wording of the paragraph related to the South China Sea in their customary joint communiqué and Cambodia refused to issue it. As Travis shows, officially, the Cambodian government advocates working towards a multilateral, international solution that appeases all parties. The country’s position on the South China Sea dispute is carefully portrayed as neutral. But as tensions between China and Vietnam occasionally arise, Cambodia periodically faces a dilemma as to whether to remain neutral (as part of its obligations to the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and to try not to upset its donors and allies), or take a position that is more relevant to its national strategic interests (Travis 2011, pp. 13–14). This is again a good opportunity for domestic opposition to exploit nationalistic sentiments against the government. For example, in June 2011, the opposition leader Sam Rainsy publicly disagreed with Cambodia’s neutral position and “on behalf of Cambodian people” “his” twenty-eight representatives expressed their support for China’s claims in the South China Sea. The representatives of the Sam Rainsy Party used their parliamentary platform to strongly denounce and condemn “Vietnam’s arrogance and groundless claims to territories belonging to neighboring countries”: The continuous violation of Cambodia’s territorial integrity by expansionist Vietnam and the bellicist position Hanoi is adopting in South East Asia and in the South China Sea constitute a serious threat to peace and stability in the region. We urge Vietnam to stop stirring up tensions with provocative military exercises and to stop using her current position as chair of the Association of South East Asian Nations to try to internationalize any conflict Hanoi wants to exacerbate in the South China Sea. KI-Media 2011a

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Namely: the full implementation of the doc, the Guidelines for the Implementation of the doc, the early conclusion of a regional coc, the full respect of the universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with universally recognized principles of International Law, including the unclos. Cambodian delegates were reluctant to characterize the Scarborough Shoal incident as a Chinese violation of the Philippines exclusive economic zone and continental shelf on the grounds that such a dispute would undermine asean neutrality.

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As has been demonstrated above through the case of Preah Vihear, the steps taken by domestic opposition parties have the potential to alter the position of the government. There is always a threat that, in order to neutralize the opposition, the government is driven to adopt a more nationalistic posture – and this tendency is also visible from the opinions of many of the bloggers and discussants who have joined the discussion. Below is a statement from an anonymous discussant retrieved from the official website of KI-Media, which expresses a very common opinion: This is a critical moment for Hun Sen to decide. I think Hun Sen will side CHINA anyway because China has had pouring a lot of money into the Kingdom. I think this is the time for HUN SEN to say, hey YOU (Vietnam) “look I don’t want you anymore”. I owed a lot to China. On the other hand you have suck up a lot of resources from Cambodia and wanted to swallow us up. This is the time I have new boss. KI-Media 2011a; emphasis in original

Travis believes that the “statement highlights the interconnectedness of the problems in the region, as a conflict between two nations can spill over and affect a third party where Government leaders are experiencing the pressure to pick sides, which can only exacerbate tensions and make it less likely that a suitable regional agreement can be reached” (Travis 2011, pp. 13–14). It is clear that domestic political dynamics are not only a crucial element in any resolution of these conflicts, but are also highly influential in international politics. In this sense, Cambodian alignment with China does offer a multitude of advantages, but it also may increase tensions with Vietnam, perhaps asean and even the United States that has supported a multilateral approach in solving the conflict, and thus this one action could collectively alter the current balance of power. The Cambodian government must be extremely cautious and analytical how they confront this particular issue, and must be careful in responding to the srp, as the international community will still listen and react. travis 2011, pp. 13–14

To better understand the problem of the Sino-Cambodian relationship and its impact on the Southeast Asia integration process, the next section will show that the Cambodia–Thai conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple has already had a negative impact on security cooperation within asean. In order to do so, it is

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necessary to discuss the prc’s dominant position in Cambodia and its negative impact on the unity of asean.

Cambodia–China Relationship and the Southeast Asian Integration Process Undoubtedly, the prc’s engagement in Southeast Asia has grown substantially in the past decade. Especially vis-à-vis weaker states such as Cambodia, Laos or Burma/Myanmar, the country plays the role of the “primary economic patron” (Wainwright 2010, pp. 9–10). However, the dominant Chinese position in combination with the unsolved border disputes can be considered as potentially harmful. If we put the two problems together, we can see how the prc can, by utilizing Cambodia as a vehicle, affect political decision making within the asean platform and endanger the Southeast Asian integration process. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (tac) in Southeast Asia of 1976 established certain fundamental principles and policies of conflict management for its members, among which the “mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations” and “the settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner” are considered the most important. The Declaration of asean Concord also emphasizes peaceful co-operation among the members of asean through political, economic, social, cultural and security programs: “the asean Security Community members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives” (asean 2003, A.1). As we can see, the clashes between Thai and Cambodian forces during the territorial disputes over the adjoining area of Preah Vihear posed a serious challenge to these fundamental asean principles – especially the non-use of force. The conflict also revealed asean’s serious limitations in terms of settling its internal problems, especially an armed conflict. The Preah Vihear incident ended a period of over forty years without interstate armed conflict in the region, within which no asean member states had used violence against one another. The armed conflict “has challenged asean’s credibility as a guarantee of peace in the region.” But even more important is the potential danger for escalation, given the numerous unresolved issues in the region. “Placing aside China’s claims in the South China Sea, and its lack of inhibition to use force, almost every asean member state has unsettled land and maritime border delimitation issues. With reduced confidence, asean will be in danger of losing its role as driver of the regional security architecture, especially at a time of great flux in great power relations in the Asia-Pacific region” (Yoosuk Ming 2012, pp. 5–6). The clashes between Thai and Cambodian forces during the

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­territorial disputes over the adjoining area of Preah Vihear represent an important precedent against the fundamental asean’s principles, but to understand how the prc may exploit the internal division of asean, we have to better understand its role in the region and its special relationship with some member states of the association – in this case Cambodia. Economically, China is Cambodia’s biggest resource of Foreign Direct Investment (fdi) and Official Development Assistance (oda). Politically, Cambodia is China’s close ally and one of the most devoted supporters of Chinese core interests – especially the “One China” policy39 and its claims in the South China Sea. Cambodian support for Chinese claims in the South China Sea can be dated back to October 2010 when, on the sidelines of the asean-related meetings in Hanoi, Premier Minister Wen Jiabao met with Prime Minister Hun Sen and pledged to provide economic assistance to Cambodia, while demanding Cambodian opposition to the internationalization of the South China Sea issue (Somjade 2009). The real crisis, however, occurred at the beginning of March 2012 when, during President Hu Jintao’s visit to Cambodia, the two sides agreed that, “under certain conditions”, “Cambodia would keep the South China Sea issue off the official agenda of an asean Summit convening in Phnom Penh on 3 April and at other asean gatherings later in the year” (Huang and Sutter 2012). The situation escalated in April, when President Hu Jintao promised millions of dollars of aid and loans to Cambodia, whilst demanding in return that Cambodia ensure the South China Sea dispute not be discussed during the 2012 asean Summit in Phnom Penh. The main question of the asean Ministerial Meeting (amm) Retreat was how to respond to what Ciorciari calls “China’s far-reaching claims in the South China Sea” (Ciorciari 2013, pp. 2), which could perhaps be better characterized as the complaints made by Vietnam and the Philippines regarding recent ­Chinese actions in the South China Sea (Thayer 2012). Some asean members – notably Vietnam and the Philippines – wanted to deliver a clear and unified message to China through a joint communiqué. According to certain sources, several asean foreign ministers favored strong language regarding possible Chinese violations of the un Convention on the Law of the Sea and stressed the need for a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. These states also advocated a more specific provision that expressed “serious concern” over Chinese violations of unclos provisions related to the Exclusive Economic Zones, and noting discussions of Scarborough Shoal. Cambodian 39

Cambodia has supported the One China policy since 1997 when it closed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Phnom Penh and banned Cambodian officials from visiting Taiwan in an official capacity (Ciorciari, 2013, p. 28).

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Foreign ­Minister Hor Namhong, however, refused to accept any “strong wording” that could cause an “escalation of the tension.” Without Cambodian approval, the negotiations broke down and “for the first time in 45 years, no joint communiqué was issued.” According to a report “the Cambodians, in a breach of asean protocol, showed it to the Chinese, who said it was unacceptable unless the South China Sea reference was removed. So the Cambodians sent it back for amendment” (Thayer 2012; cf. Ciorciari 2013, pp. 2–4). Two months after the asean deliberations ended in a stalemate, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited Beijing, where his counterpart Wen Jiabao announced more than US$500 million in new soft loans and grants to Cambodia (Ciorciari 2013, p. 4). After the summit, Cambodia was strongly criticized for its unjust chairmanship with regards to the South China Sea dispute. The other members complained that Cambodia, “instead of trying to find a common ground among all concerned parties, decided to put its national interest ahead of the grouping’s solidarity” – a decision that “will backfire on Cambodia and asean as a whole” in the long term (The Nation 2012 quoted in Heng 2012, p. 78). Even after the tempestuous asean ministerial meeting in July 2012, the country’s politicians continued to defend Beijing.40 Moreover, Cambodian support for the policies of the prc was “institutionalized” in April 2013 when Hun Sen and new Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to establish an “­inter-governmental coordination committee” and to take other measures to boost cooperation in international and regional affairs. The term “coordination” implies a step beyond any previous rhetorical commitment to friendship between the two states and “suggests China’s interest in using its clout to shape Cambodian diplomacy on a wider range of issues” – with the prc’s growing economic and strategic interest in the South China Sea as one of them (Ciorciari 2013, p. 35). Some experts believe that Cambodia’s membership in asean is important for China, as a vehicle to shape the behavior of the regional platform to serve Chinese interests (Heng 2012, p. 72). China has a long standing strategy to prevent “asean’s monolithic approach” towards the South China Sea, and has persistently used diplomatic means – including its close relations with certain nations in the region – to oppose the internationalization of the South China Sea dispute. For many political commentators, Cambodia is supporting the prc’s interests “as payback for years of liberal Chinese aid and investment.” 40

For example, at the asean Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2012, to support China’s opposition to the “internationalization” of the South China Sea dispute, the Cambodian foreign ministry spokesman Kao Kim Hourn announced that “asean leaders decided not to internationalize the South China Sea issue from now on” – an assertion that was promptly denied by other claimants, especially the Philippines (Ciorciari 2013, p. 34).

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Regional politicians and diplomats are seeking to de-legitimatize Cambodia’s position on the South China Sea by accusing the country of selling its chair to the prc, and portraying Cambodia as a Chinese client whose officials speak not for themselves but instead as Chinese puppets (Ciorciari 2013, pp. 2–4; Reuters 2012 quoted in Heng 2012, p. 78). Growing Cambodian support for Chinese policies can be explained by two factors: the lax or weak position of neighboring states towards Cambodian behavior and the positive position of domestic opposition with regards to Cambodian support of prc policy. The cpp’s long-time political allies in neighboring Vietnam did not criticize Phnom Penh openly, but many analysts agree that Hanoi has been upset by Phnom Penh’s support of Chinese polices regarding the South China Sea dispute. What is even more interesting is the attitude of the Cambodian opposition. Until very recently, the opposition has not criticized Prime Minister Hun Sen’s support of the prc’s policies.41 Ciorciari identifies several reasons for the paradox that the opposition does not play the “Chinese card”. The first is a good relationship between the prc and the Cambodian royal family that dates back to the King Sihanouk era.42 Another reason is that Cambodia’s ethnic Chinese population has been comparatively well integrated into Cambodian society, and thus closer relations with China have not activated some of the local ethnic tensions sometimes apparent in other states such as Malaysia or Indonesia (Ciorciari 2013, pp. 30–31). Moreover, the good relationship between Cambodia and the prc may be considered a source of influence that can help to constrain Vietnamese political and economic influence over the country. In this situation it can hardly be expected that Cambodia would turn against its “primary economic patron” and political ally. It is only a question to what degree Phnom Penh will be willing to de-legitimatize its position within asean and act as Beijing’s puppet. The answer is evident – to the extent to which cooperation with the prc will be economically profitable and politically bearable. In this sense, the author of this essay does not support Alfred Gerstl’s optimistic outlook – at least until colonial grievances have been rectified. Gerstl (2013, p. 125) identified economic cooperation as the “main facilitator in mitigating nationalism, militarism and political maximum positions in order to guarantee a stable, peaceful and inclusive regional order that promotes 41

42

Even opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who has characterized Hun Sen as a Vietnamese puppet, has been loath to criticize the cpp’s support for China’s core policy concerns – instead reserving his critiques for corrupt economic deals involving Chinese investors and cpp officials (Ciorciari 2013, pp. 30–31). For illustration, when his son Norodom Sihamoni took the throne, his first overseas trip was to China.

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socioeconomic development in an already highly interdependent” region. This assumption is basically correct. But as this chapter has already shown (in the section devoted to Chinese national sentiment and foreign policy priorities), economic prosperity is only one factor in Chinese national thought. Of equal and maybe even greater importance is the re-conquest of “sacred territory”, which the prc strongly believes is a domestic matter that should be handled without any external interference (this view exemplifies the prc’s sensitivity to international power structures – especially to the presence of another power in the region). Moreover, many asean member states currently maintain better economic relations with the prc or other external partners than with other member states, and as we can see from the case of Preah Vihear, where the potential for economic cooperation served as leverage for Thailand to push Cambodia to accept its wishes, we can see that “economic nationalism” can also work in another way. Under these conditions, the so-called stable, peaceful and inclusive regional order that promotes socioeconomic development is only a myth nurtured by the status quo in the region and asean will remain a weak platform that lacks the capacity to play a stronger role in the South China Sea dispute – especially vis-à-vis the prc. Thus, Gerstl is correct in his conclusion that without the prc’s explicitly declared willingness to accept a multilateral conflict resolution, asean cannot succeed as a broker. But so far, the prc behavior proved otherwise. Conclusion The primary objective of this chapter was to shed light on the border disputes in Southeast Asia, which are considered a serious threat to national security by several states in the region (Sotharith 2010, p. 98; Vu 2010, p. 113). This chapter has argued that these disputes are a legacy of Southeast Asia’s colonial past, which has left the region with a dangerous combination of territorial nationalism, an ambiguous delineation of land and sea borders, and a complicated domestic political situation in several countries in the region. Since achieving independence, the respective states have shown good will to settle their border problems. Yet the Cold War not only postponed the resolution of, but also exacerbated, existing problems. This is especially clear from the three cases analyzed above. While Vietnam and Laos smoothly resolved their border disputes, the settlement of the Vietnam–Cambodia border dispute proved to be more complicated, and the most serious problem occurred on the outer borders of the former colony (in this case the Thai–Cambodia

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border) – which also served as a dividing line between various spheres of influence during the Cold War. This changed after the Sino-Russian reconciliation and the end of the Cold War. Despite the changing nature of the problem, the border disputes discussed here have a common denominator – nationalistic sentiments exacerbated by imagined nationally relevant economic or territorial interests that replaced political ideologies as the main resource of political legitimacy and power at the end of the Cold War. This is what has made the situation really complicated – as the disputed maritime areas are considered particularly economically promising, the maritime border disputes have remained mainly unresolved. In a sense, Cambodia became the real scapegoat of the Cold War in the region. Until relatively recently, the country was in a state of civil war: the central government possessed no control over the territory, the national economy had been subverted, and millions of citizens had been slaughtered or died as a result of the policies adopted by the Khmer Rouge (supported by the prc and tolerated by the Western powers and their allies). After decades of fighting, genocide, and foreign occupation, the country managed to escape from its own perdition, but remained desperately vulnerable, poor and underdeveloped. To a high degree, Cambodian economic development depends on foreign aid and investment. This is a good opportunity for the emerging regional superpower – the prc – which has become the country’s main donor in terms of both foreign aid and developmental loans. In exchange, the Cambodian government has become an ardent supporter of Chinese core interests including the South China Sea, and it seems that the prc has utilized this support in its strategy to counter the internationalization of the dispute. To a certain degree, Cambodian support of the prc in the South China Sea dispute, together with its territorial disputes on the Thai-Cambodian borders, are capable of endangering asean’s cohesion – especially when, at the same time, some other states – such as Vietnam and the Philippines – have sought to internationalize the dispute through this platform. All of these issues can be considered as legacies of colonialism in the region. The former colonies are now states burdened by many post-colonial political and economic issues, which in turn slow down their socio-economic development and place them in a comparatively disadvantaged position vis-à-vis not only to their former colonial masters, but also the newly emerging regional superpowers – who may also be, as in the case of the prc, burdened by their own colonial legacies. All of the states examined here need to first deal with their colonial and neo-imperial legacies. Then, it will be much easier to cope with their border disputes and smoothly proceed with the regional integration process.

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Keck, Zachary (2014): “China’s Growing Hegemonic Bent.” The Diplomat, 26 June. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-growing-hegemonic-bent/. Kierman, Ben (2001) “Myth, Nationalism and Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research, 3(2), 187–206. Ki-Media (2011): “Cambodia Supports China in The Defense of Her Sovereignty Over The South China Sea.” 17 June. Available at: http://ki-media.blogspot.tw/2011/06/ cambodia-supports-china-in-defense-of.html. (Accessed 24.2.2014) Kobkua, Suwannathat-Pian (1982): “The development of Thai Nationalism: 1910–1925.” Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics and Strategic Studies, 11, 95–106. Koike, Yuriko (2014): “Chinas neo-imperial swagger need not meant a new cold war.” The Guardian, 15 January. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree /2011/jan/15/china-asia-regional-cooperation. (Accessed 24.2.2014) Kraus, Filip (2013): “China and South China Sea Dispute: From Tributary System to Status Quo.” Andělová, Petra and Strašáková, Maria (Eds.): South China Sea Dispute in International Relations. Prague: Metropolitan University Press, 48–84. Kraus, Filip (2014): “The deployment of the ‘CNOOC 981 rid’ from a Post-colonial Perspective.” An Unpublished paper prepared for the International Conference “Do Good Fences Good Neighbours? Borders and Borderlands in the Asia Pacific.” Metropolitan University of Prague, 7 November. Krumova, Kremena (2011): “Thai-Cambodia Conflict Does Not End at the Border.” The Epoch Times, 13 May. Available at: http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/thai -cambodia-conflict-does-not-end-at-the-border-56260.html. (Accessed 20.2.2012) Mazza, Michal (2011): “The South China Sea and Regional Security.” Speech at Institute for Corean-American Studies Fall Symposium. 14 October. Available at: https:// www.aei.org/publication/the-south-china-sea-and-regional-security/. (Accessed 20.2.2012) McCargo, Duncan (2009): “The Politics of Buddhist identity in Thailand’s deep south: The Demise of civil religion?” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 40(1), 11–32. Narine, Shaun (2006): “The English School and ASEAN.” The Pacific Review, 19(2), 199–218. Nguyen, Tung Vu (2010): “Vietnam’s Security Challenges: Hanoi’s New Approach to National Security and Implications to Defence and Foreign Polices.” In The National Institute for Defense Studies (Ed.): Asia Pacific Countries’ Security Outlook and Its Implications for the Defense Sector. National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS) Joint Research Series, no. 6. Tokyo: NIDS, 108–122. Osborne, Milton (2008): “Preah Vihear: the Thai-Cambodia temple dispute.” openDemocracy, February 8. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/preahvihear-the-thai-cambodia-temple-dispute. (Accessed February 20, 2014) Puangthong, Rungswasdisab (2010): “Thailand’s Response to the Cambodian Genocide.” Cambodian Genocide Program, Yale University. Available at: http://www.yale .edu/cgp/thailand_response.html. (Accessed 20.2.2014)

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Reuters (2012): “ASEAN Way Founders in South China Sea Storm.” 17 July. Available at: www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/17/us-asean-china-idUSBRE86G09N20120717. (Accessed 20.2.2014) Richardson, Sophie (2009): China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Berkeley: Columbia University Press. Shoji, Tomotaka (2011): “Vietnam, ASEAN, and the South China Sea: Unity or Diverseness?” Boei Kenkyusyo Kiyo (NIDS Security Studies), 14(1). Available at: http:// www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2012/bulletin_e2012_2.pdf. (Accessed 20.2.2014) Sidel, John (2012): “The fate of nationalism in the new states: Southeast Asia in comparative historical perspective.” Comparative studies in society and history, 54 (1), 114–144. Somjade, Kongrawd (2009): “Thailand and Cambodia Maritime Disputes.” An Internet Paper. 10 November. Available at: http://www.navy.mi.th/judge/Files/Thailand%20 Cambodia.pdf. (Accessed 20.2.2014) Sotharith, Chap (2010): “Cambodia’s Security Challenges and Implications for Defence Policy.” In The National Institute for Defense Studies (Ed.): Asia Pacific Countries’ Security Outlook and Its Implications for the Defense Sector. NIDS Joint Research Series, no. 6. Tokyo: NIDS, 96–105. Sotharith, Soth (2011): “Cambodia’s Security Challenges and Implications for Defense Policy.” In The National Institute for Defense Studies (Ed.): Asia Pacific Countries’ Security Outlook and Its Implications for the Defense Sector. NIDS Joint Research Series, no. 5. Tokyo: NIDS, 95–110. Sothirac, Pou (2013): “Cambodia’s Border Conflict with Thailand.” Southeast Asia Affairs 2013, 37–100. Spector, Ronald H. (1993) “After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam.” New York: The Free Press. Stewart, Mary L. (2007): “A Frenchwoman Writes about Indochina, 1931–1949: Andrée Viollis and Anti-colonialism.” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association / Revue de la Société historique du Canada, 18(2), 81–102. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2012) “ASEAN’S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 10(4). Available at: http:// www.japanfocus.org/-carlyle_A_-Thayer/3813/article.html. (Accessed 12.11.2016) The Nation (2012): “Cambodia has put Asean’s Future in Jeopardy.” 15 July. Available at: www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Cambodia-has-put-Aseans-future-in -jeopardy-30186182.html. (Accessed 20.2.2014) Travis, Mitchel (2011): “Sino-Vietnamese Relations: A Cambodian Perspective.” The CICP Working Paper, no. 45. Available at: http://www.cicp.org.kh/download/CICP%20 Working%20series/CICP%20Working%20Paper%20No.%2045_Sino-Vietnamese%20Relations.pdf. (Accessed 20.2.2014) Van Nevel, Marily (2011): “The Thai-Cambodian border conflict: a growing role for ASEAN?” European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) Newsletter, March/April.

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Available at: http://www.eias.org/documents/EIAS_Newsletter_MarApr_2011.pdf. (Accessed 20.2.2014) Vu, Le Thai Hoang (2007): “Vietnam’s Quest for Influence and its Implications for the Management of Border Disputes with Laos and Cambodia.” Südostasien Aktuell, 26(2), 6–38. Wagener, Martin (2011): “Lessons from Preah Vihear: Thailand, Cambodia, and the Nature of Low-Intensity Border Conflicts.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 30(3), 27–59. Wainwright, Elsina (2010): “Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.” Internet publication University of New York, April. Available at: http://aid.dfat .gov.au/aidissues/fragility-conflict/Documents/cic-review.pdf. (Accessed 20.2.2014) Winichakul, Thongchai (2012): “A Short History of the Long Memory of the Thai Nation.” Intermet Paper of the Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Available at: http://web.uvic.ca/~anp/Public/posish_pap/Winichakul.pdf. (Accessed, 15.11.2016) Xinhua (2013): “Cambodia, Vietnam to complete overland border demarcation by 2015.” 3 December. Available at: http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/ 2013-12/03/content_30786560.htm. (Accessed 20.2.2014) Yoosuk, Ubonwan and Ming, Yan (2012): “The Thai-Cambodian Border Dispute and Its Implications for ASEAN.” Internet paper, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung City, Taiwan. Available at: http://www.apisa.org/APISA5/documents/Yoosuk.pdf. (Accessed 20.2.2014)

chapter 3

asean and the Thai-Cambodian Conflict: The Final Stage at Preah Vihear?1 Richard Q. Turcsányi and Zdeněk Kříž Introduction While regional integration is becoming a dominant trend in perhaps every corner of the world, not many integration projects are generally viewed as success stories, even by very low evaluating standards. Quite clearly it is the European Union (eu), with all its problems, regarded as number one, followed usually by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) coming second, far ahead of any other organization worldwide. Although asean has reached the point when it is perceived in international relations as (almost) a single actor, its internal dynamics are often overlooked and normally presented as “inefficiencies” resulting from its special “decision making process” termed the asean Way. This chapter is going to dwell on some of these inefficiencies in the sphere of territorial disputes among asean member countries, particularly the Thai-Cambodian conflict over Preah Vihear.2 Southeast Asia is replete with territorial disputes, as this volume clearly demonstrates. While many of them are serious, deadly and having potential for major escalation, the Thai-Cambodian conflict over Preah Vihear temple is still a special case and Amitav Acharya (2009, p. 155) labeled it “perhaps the most serious threat to asean’s internal peace”. After looking into Uppsala Conflict Data Program database (2013), the explanation of this is not too clear. According to its data, the year 2011, has been the most deadly year of the conflict since the 1970s, with 28 casualties. The very same database lists other conflicts from the South East Asia region. To name just a few, the conflict in southern 1 An earlier version of this text was presented at the conferences Political Instability in Southeast Asia in 2013 at Metropolitan University Prague, Czech Republic, and the Southeast Asian Studies Symposium 2014 at the University of Oxford. The text was produced as a part of specific research at Masaryk University: “Current issues of European and International politics” (MUNI/A/0898/2013). 2 In Thailand, the temple is known as Phra Viharn/Phra Wihan. We will use throughout the text the Cambodian name Preah Vihear since the temple has been legally awarded to Cambodia. This is also how vast majority of English literature call it, including the official communication of the United Nations.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004312180_005

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Thailand’s province of Patani shows on average about 100 casualties a year during the past decade; the conflict in Aceh province in Indonesia witnessed also a couple hundred fatalities before 2005; not to mention other Indonesian conflicts which were even more deadly in their hey-days. Looking at the Philippines, a similar picture would appear with a deadly and long conflict on Mindanao Island and a still worse situation would be in Myanmar (Burma) with its number of violent conflicts between the government and some regions and ethnic groups, such as those in Kachin and Shan states or with the Rohingya people. The important difference, however, is that all these conflicts belong to a group of intra-state wars, thus do not involve asean governments fighting each other. To examine interstate conflicts in the region, one could mention the conflict between Thailand and Myanmar in the border regions; the dispute between Singapore and Malaysia over Pedra Blanca together with their water source dispute; an old dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over the latter’s Sabah claims; dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over islands of Ligidan and Sipidan; and also overlapping South China Sea claims between several asean members (see Weatherbee 2009, pp. 137–145). However, none of these inter-state conflicts meet the level/violence of the conflict over Preah Vihear. In most cases, there have been threats of using force and even reported deliberate ramming of boats, but countries eventually did not open fire on each other. In the case of Thailand v. Myanmar, the Thais actually used violence but their goal was more specifically the border drug and migration inflow into Thailand (Bell 2003). In the case of the South China Sea, Vietnam on a couple occasions at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s fired warning shots at Filipino boats and Filipino and Malaysian surveillance planes confronted each other over a disputed reef (cnas 2015). However, this should be perceived as part of a rather complex dispute in which the claimant countries of asean have been becoming step by step closer to each other and forming a more united opposition against China. Thus the characteristic of the Thai-Cambodian dispute around Preah Vihear temple, which is, shortly, that the two asean member states have acted in deliberate ways to use the escalation of the conflict for their domestic goals – as will be argued later – is in the history of asean unprecedented. Hence the two research questions to be answered in this chapter are, firstly, what is the current stage of the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia at the Preah Vihear temple and, secondly, what is the impact of the dispute on asean – the second most successful (regional) integration project worldwide. This analysis begins with a conflict timeline, starting with roots in colonial times and ending with the current status quo after the International Court of

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Justice (icj) November 2013 interpretation of the original decision from 1962. In the second section it will be argued that the conflict and its escalation have not been created and fueled by misunderstandings and misperceptions between the actors, rather than by deliberate moves of politicians on both sides who use it for own domestic political purposes. This shows minimal considerations for the common asean membership and also highly limited role asean can play in such kinds of disputes between its two members with their certain political forces having an interest in sustaining and even escalating the conflict. This is explicitly demonstrated in the next section of the chapter which initially discusses the institutional setting of asean dispute settlement mechanism and consequently proceeds to discuss the role asean played in the conflict dynamics. In the conclusion, answers to the two research questions will be presented based on the collected evidence.

The History of the Preah Vihear Dispute

The Roots of the Conflict Present-day Thailand and Cambodia have a long history of conflicts dating back at least to the 11th century when the Khmer Empire, regarded as a predecessor of modern Cambodia, ruled over most of mainland Southeast Asia, including present day Cambodia and Thailand. The temple of Preah Vihear, which is at the center of recent border disputes, was built during the golden era of Khmer Empire between the late 9th and 12th centuries and was enshrined as a Hindu temple after the predominant religion of the time, though it reflects some signs of Buddhism which was on the rise in this region in later periods (Roveda and Jacques 2012). While the temple has Khmer origins, the borders fluctuated during ancient history and the temple was during some periods under the rule of Kingdom of Siam, which is the ancestor of modern Thailand. Moreover, the region around the temple on both sides of the border is inhabited by people of distinct Kui ethnic minorities, which makes it less valid for either Thailand or Cambodia to claim on the basis of the ancestral heritage (von Feigenblatt 2011). The Khmer Empire started its long decline in 15th century during which it was constantly losing territory to Siam. In the 19th century France became involved in the relations between the two countries and while firstly Siam recognized the French protectorate over the weakened Khmer Empire for an exchange of the territory including the location of Preah Vihear temple, in the end of 19th century the situation changed and the Kingdom of Siam had to pay for its sovereignty with territorial losses.

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This legacy from “pre-modern” time is an important substance of the dispute, as Shane Strate (2013) reminds us. The temple has become a symbol for both Thais and Cambodians, although with differing narratives. For nationalist Thais Preah Vihear symbolizes the territorial shrinking of Siam during colonial times due to Western imperialism, at the time in the form of French Indochina, of which present-day Cambodia was part. For Cambodians the very temple stands also for a symbol of humiliating territorial losses, yet this time it is Siam that is regarded as the imperialist. This is in accordance with the fact that the temple itself is of Khmer origin yet during the long decline of the Khmer state it fell under Thai influence. Hence, we often can see a repeating pattern in the Preah Vihear dispute that the two opposing sides accentuate different time periods to back their historical evidence. The beginning of current territorial dispute is dated to the time, when France and Siam settled their borders in the Boundary Treaty in 1904 and the Mixed Franco-Siamese Commission surveyed the border region in 1906 and 1907. As Siam at that time lacked technological capacities to produce maps, it asked France to do so (icj 1962, p. 20). This led to a production of maps depicting the borders unilaterally by the French who then presented the resulting maps to Siam in 1908, which raised no complaint and in fact started to use the border lines as depicted in the maps. However, while the established general principle of the border line in the area around the temple in the 1904 treaty was to follow the watershed line of the eastern section of the Dangrek Mountain, which would place the temple on today’s Thai side of the border; on a single map produced in 1907, so-called “Annex 1” during the icj ruling, the temple was depicted south of the borders and on today’s Cambodian soil (Saikia 2011). Interestingly, there is no firm explanation for this deviation from the principle by the French. To make matters even less clear, after the resulting maps, which were the products of the French only, were presented to the Siamese government, the Siamese members of the Mixed Commission did not approve the maps, yet Siam (Thailand) never filed any formal complaint or depicted borders in different fashion to the French version (Jayangakula 2013, p. 2). In the beginning of the 20th century the temple was administered as part of French Indochina. During the Second World War, when Japan occupied present day Cambodia, its wartime ally Thailand occupied the temple and surrounding regions, only to be obliged to return the territory after the war to the French. Yet, again, after Cambodia won its independence in November 1953 and France withdrew, Thailand took advantage of the situation and occupied the temple once again. This led to the emergence of a dispute between the two independent countries and Cambodia turned in 1959 to the icj to decide the sovereignty of the temple (Ciorciari 2009). It should be noted that Thailand

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at that time accepted the icj ruling due to its international position in the bipolar international system, when it relied on support of the West against the perceived growing communist threat in its neighborhood and perhaps feared that not allowing the ruling of the court would jeopardize its relations with the West (Bunyavejchewin 2013, p. 23; Strate 2013, p. 64). In the ruling before the court, Cambodia claimed that clearly the temple is located in Cambodian territory as the result of its depiction on the territorial maps from the time of Franco-Siamese border commission and also as the result that since then the temple was shown on numerous maps as being located in Cambodia, including the maps printed in Thailand. There had been also no objection to this from Thailand until 1958. On the other hand, Thailand claimed that it is the principle of the 1904 treaty which should be followed and, accordingly, the temple is in Thailand. It also asserted that the line was only produced by one side of the commission and thus is not binding. Subsequently, Thailand never accepted that the temple had belonged to Cambodia and if it did so, it was on a mistaken belief that line on the map had been drawn in accordance with the principle established in 1904 treaty (icj 1962). The decision of the court came in 1962. The court rejected Thai claims and ruled that as Thailand had never raised any concern since receiving maps in 1908 until 1958, it showed it had respected the line as it was drawn In fact Thailand had even used and produced maps depicting the temple outside of its territory. Even the possible error cannot be accepted as the reason to question the validity of the original line as drawn on the Annex 1 map. Furthermore, Thailand did occupy the temple at least twice in between the border treaty of 1904/1908 and the icj ruling and it could not believe erroneously that it was in Cambodia and still occupied it at the same time (icj 1962). While the court did decide that the temple belonged to Cambodia and even that Thailand was to return all the property it had taken out of it, Thailand has claimed ever since that the decision applied only to the temple itself and the land on which it stands but did not include the whole disputed land. This would create approximately 4.6 km2, which therefore remained, in Thailand’s view, in dispute. It asserts, furthermore, that the court itself, established that it had no jurisdiction over deciding the sovereignty issue over the land surrounding the temple and its decision and jurisdiction has only applied to the temple itself (Pakdeekong 2009). Latest Developments around Preah Vihear For another almost 50 years the dispute seemed to have been overcome with both countries dealing with more serious national security issues, in particular Cambodia. The temple and the whole region of Preah Vihear were during long

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time periods outside of control of the central government of Cambodia and were occupied by rebels. It was only in the early 1990s after Vietnam withdrew and Cambodia regained its full independence when the question of borders around Preah Vihear reappeared. Perhaps the most relevant initiative between the two countries to resolve the border issue was the Thai-Cambodian Joint Commission on Demarcation for Land Boundary established in 1997 with the task of “placing markers in order to indicate the land boundary between the two countries”. The results of their work was the “Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land Boundary” issued in the year 2000 (icj 2013a). In this document the two sides agreed on the basic principles on which borders should be demarcated, primarily the agreements from 1904 and 1907. However, the process of demarcation was not completed. The situation took another turn prior to 2008 unesco listing of the temple, which Cambodia proposed firstly in the year 2001. At the beginning, Thailand was supportive of Cambodia’s application for the listing. At the same time, it made it clear that the joint submission would be preferable due to common cultural and historical background, proximity to the borders, and also for the fears that unesco listing could be used by Cambodia to usurp the land which Thailand considered disputed. More specifically, Thailand was worried, that as the result of the temple being included on the unesco list, a certain buffer protective zone could be created and this would engulf a large part of the disputed area in the temple’s proximity. Furthermore, due to geography conditions, any effective management of the temple requires Thailand’s participation and thus Thailand is the key stakeholder in the issue (Pakdeekong 2009, pp. 235–236). Nonetheless, Cambodia eventually pushed forward for a unilateral application, with the then Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej still supporting the initiative in the Joint Communiqué from 18 June 2008. This however created immense rage in Thailand among nationalist fractions which started to heavily criticize the government’s step and demanded revision. A dead end was reached soon after the Communiqué was declared null and void by the Thai Constitutional Court on 8 July 2008 due to Prime Minister supposedly lacking the authorization of parliament for such an act (Strate 2013, pp. 41–42; Wagener 2011, pp. 31–33). In the following months, the conflict escalated with both sides deploying thousands of troops in the vicinity of the temple. In the conditions of disputed border lines both sides continued to conduct patrols, it remained only a matter of time until clashes occurred. The occasional exchanges of fire then materialized in October 2009, April 2009, January 2010, April 2010, June 2010 and February 2011, with the major escalation occurring between 22 April and 3 May

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2011. Until that day at least 34 soldiers died on both sides and more than 30.000 people were displaced from nearby villages (Wagener 2011, pp. 32–33; International Crisis Group [icg] 2011). On 28 April 2011 Cambodia brought the dispute back to the icj asking for interpretation of the original judgment from 1962 claiming that the decision had not been understood by both sides of the disputes in the same way and thus further clarification was needed (icj 2011a). Cambodia claimed that this step was in accordance with the Statute of the Court, according to which any decision is final, cannot be appealed, but further interpretation in case of conflicted understanding of the meaning or the scope can be requested by either party (see icj 1945). In particular, Cambodia asked the court to rule that the Annex 1 map was taken as the base for awarding the temple to Cambodia and thus the border between the countries is as designed by the map and Thailand must withdraw from this area. Cambodia further asked the court to issue urgent indication of provisional measures to safeguard rights of sovereignty and territorial integrity and prevent aggravation of dispute and any irreparable damage to premises of the temple (icj 2013a). On one hand, Thailand asserted in its declaration that the court should rule that it does not have jurisdiction to respond to the request and/or the request was inadmissible. On the other hand, Thailand claimed that there is no diverging understanding about the original judgment and no country had expressed any doubt about the judgment until recently. Additionally, Thailand demanded that the court explicitly reject that the Annex 1 map was the border line between the countries. The court issued its preliminary decision on 18 July 2011 demanding both sides to withdraw their military, not only from the immediate proximity of the temple but from the wider region and to create a demilitarized zone (icj 2011b). However, the withdrawal of the two militaries has never happened. Exactly one year after the preliminary decision was taken; both sides announced in July 2011 that as the beginning of the withdrawal, they started to redeploy their troops. In February 2013 the foreign ministers met again, this time in the temple Preah Vihear, itself, and announced that they agreed (again) on the redeployment of the troops for police which was to happen by the time icj held the oral hearing in April 2013. There is no evidence this has ever happened. The final judgment of the icj in the form of interpretation of its original decision from 1962 came finally on 11 November 2013, more than two and a half years after Cambodia’s request (see icj 2013a). The court stated first of all, that it did have the jurisdiction over the case, as according to the Article 60 of the Statute of the icj and that the request was admissible. Secondly, the court stated, by the way of interpretation of the original decision of 1962, that .

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Cambodia had sovereignty over the whole territory of the promontory of Preah Vihear, as defined in paragraph 98 of the present Judgment, and that, in consequence, Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw from that territory the Thai military or police forces, or other guards or keepers, that were stationed there. see also icj 2013b

This decision can be approached from several other perspectives. Firstly, the mere fact that the court ruled on the case and issued the interpretation can be regarded as a victory for Cambodia which turned to the court and demanded this act, while Thailand demanded the court to dismiss the case for supposedly lacking the jurisdiction or the case being inadmissible. Secondly, the court clarified what was meant by the “vicinity” of the temple in original judgment of 1962 – the promontory area of Preah Vihear. With this, the court extended the territory belonging to Cambodia from what was accepted by Thailand as the result of the so-called Council of Ministers line drawn in the very vicinity of the temple. The court also clarified, that Thailand must withdraw its personnel from this territory and that it falls under the sovereignty of Cambodia. However, the court did not accept all of the Cambodian demands. First of all, it did not rule that it was Annex 1 map which sets the border between the two countries in the region. This effectively means that the larger portion of the disputed 4.6 square km remains disputed. Moreover, the court did not draw a border line and besides defining the border conceptually it left the exact location of the border ambiguous. Therefore, final border delineation must be made by the agreement of the countries in the future. The court decision can be thus understood as being relatively balanced – although leaning towards Cambodian side. While the court ruled that Thailand is to withdraw from further territory which may be regarded from the Thai perspective as being a loss, it did not award all or even a majority of the disputed territory to Cambodia. In fact, the judgment was welcomed by both sides and was considered as a qualified victory for Cambodia, yet still acceptable to Thailand (Fuller 2013). The then Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra called on her nation to accept the verdict and announced negotiations with Cambodia to take place to discuss the implementation of the judgment, which would only happen after the Thai parliament’s formal decision. Ironically, during the crisis’ spiraling up in Thailand, the former Prime Minister even denied she had ever accepted the icj decision (Raymond 2014). As of November 2015, after more than two years since the court issued the decision, there is not much which has changed. The relations between the two countries seem to be calm with high level politicians exchanging visits and

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friendly gestures, including meeting between the new Thai Prime Minister and his Cambodian counterpart Hun Sen (see e.g. Chongkittavorn 2014; Jenne 2014; Jikkham 2014). The British Foreign Office labeled the site safe for tourist visits in August 2015 (Paris 2015). At the same time, small incidents occurred such as allegations about a fence being built on the Thai side, illegal logging, shooting, and a Thai drone flying over Cambodian territory (see e.g. Jenne 2014; pgi 2014; Xinhua 2014). However, there is no information about Thai implementation of the decision or Thai-Cambodian negotiation over the exact location of the border (see also Burgess 2015). The Role of Thai and Cambodian Domestic Politics It is widely accepted that the reason for prolonging of the Thai-Cambodian border conflict is not the lack of clarity in the legal state of affairs, rather that the conflict has been hijacked by various political forces within the countries concerned. While more often the blame is thrown at the Thai side (see Barlow 2011, p. 4), Cambodia should also be held responsible. It is vital to remember, that the temple itself is not part of the legal dispute and both sides agree that as of the icj 1962 ruling, it is an undisputable part of Cambodian territory. Furthermore, it is accepted by both countries that the recent judgment of icj further extended the vicinity of the temple to entire promontory area, although the line has not been clearly settled. Therefore, only the remaining disputed territory outside of the promontory should be part of the current dispute. Yet the temple itself is a notable symbol for both Cambodian and Thai people and due to interwoven history and the long periods of administering the temple, there are significant portions of the Thai population who believe the temple actually belongs to them rather than to Cambodia. While the official position of the Thai government ever since the decision of 1962 has been to comply with the court’s decision, it nonetheless has kept the doors open. To cite the Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat who following the 1962 ruling announced publicly that “with blood and tears, we shall recover the Phra Viharn one day” (Rand 2011). Yet, the government under various circumstances of the time chose to accept the decision of the Court; it did so, however, by presenting a protest note which stated: [I]n deciding to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the Temple of Phra Viharn, His Majesty’s government desires to make an express reservation regarding whatever rights Thailand has, or may have in the future, to recover the Temple of Phra Viharn by having recourse to any existing or subsequently applicable legal process, and to register a protest against the decision of the

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International Court of Justice awarding to the Temple of Phra Viharn to Cambodia. cited in pakdeekong 2009

These two expressions only point to the popular opinion of the time in Thailand, in which there was nearly unanimity about the question of Thai rightful ownership (Barlow 2011, p. 16). While Thailand now proposes that the 1962 Note is still valid, it counteracts the result of the Memorandum of Understanding which was agreed upon and signed by the Thai and Cambodian governments in 2000. In this document, which was an agreement on the borders between the two countries, it was explicitly stated that both countries agree the results of the 1904 Treaty and consequent work of the Mixed Commission including the maps annexed are the basis of the border demarcation between the two countries. Eventually, this ambiguous and changing position and the actual belief of Thai population have served as ample opportunity for certain political forces in Thai politics to gain additional support in domestic political battles. In recent Thai politics, two forces can be identified: the so-called “yellow shirts” and the “red shirts”. The latter support the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the former is backed by the monarchy and urban elite and enjoys large support from the Thai military (Chachavalpongpun 2009). During the rule of yellow shirts the Thai stance towards the Preah Vihear temple was more nationalist, while the red shirts, whose leaders enjoyed close ties with Cambodia’s leaders, were also the initiators of cooperative mechanisms and were developing warm ties with Cambodia. This perspective is generally confirmed when looking at the timeline of the escalation. The conflict started in 2008 and culminated in 2011 which almost exactly overlaps with the rule of yellow shirts, in which the beginning of the escalation was to large extent caused by the rejection of the red shirt Prime Minister’s Communiqué accepting the Cambodian unilateral application to unesco and the de-escalation was shortly followed by the Thai parliament elections which took place in July 2011 and which brought the Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra to office in August 2011. Clearly, the issue of Preah Vihear had given the yellow shirts an opportunity to present themselves as the real protectors of the Thai nation while the other side should be rejected as collaborators. As mentioned already, also during the mounting protests, which eventually led to the ouster of Yingluck Shinawatra from the position of Prime Minister, the issue of Preah Vihear was used as evidence of losing Thai territory on the part of her government. This, on the other hand, prompted Yingluck Shinawatra to strengthen her position in an attempt to appease the demands, which ultimately proved to be unsuccessful of course.

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Interestingly, the latest policy of Thailand towards Cambodia seems to show a converging trend from the proposed simple duality of yellow shirts and red shirts. After the ouster of Shinawatra’s red shirts government and the establishment of a military controlled regime led by former general Prayut Chan-o-cha, Thailand did not take any openly provocative steps vis-à-vis Cambodia and is attempting to improve and keep stable and friendly relations with its neighbor. At the same time, however, there are no signs that the Thai side will implement the icj decision and the whole issue of Preah Vihear seems to be a toxic topic in Thai political discourse (Jenne 2014). On the other hand, Cambodia has its own domestic political dynamics which equally motivate its leaders to seek a theme which would help them to garner strong public support. Volatile Thai politics and an ambiguous stance towards issues like Preah Vihear temple serves as such a theme and it has allowed Cambodian leaders to create an atmosphere of national insecurity together with the pride of cultural heritage. Cambodia is by far the weaker party in the conflict in most aspects and in any large scale military encounter it could not hope to score any points against the much more populous and developed Thailand with much stronger military might and even enjoying a status of being a us strategic ally (Chanlett-Avery and Dolven 2012). However, Cambodia is advantaged in the dispute as it holds relatively favorable rulings of the icj from 1962 and 2013, which by definition are final and have become international law. As discussed above, Thai internal politics were extremely volatile and particularly the issue of Preah Vihear temple is one of the most popular topics for nationalist segments which have prevailed during certain time periods. However, long-time Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen can be held responsible for responding to the Thai nationalists’ calls and even provoking them. To start with, the recent escalation began with the unilateral application for the unesco listing in 2008. Hun Sen opted for the unilateral move instead of the joint submission as was proposed from the Thai side. Moreover, he did so in times of another volatile period in Thai politics, just two years after the military backed coup deposed former Prime Minister and an election winner Thaksin Shinawatra, who enjoyed close relations with Hun Sen, yet was accused at home by the nationalist forces for compromising on sovereignty issues. Furthermore, Hun Sen used unusually aggressive rhetoric and was discussing “large-scale war” in the region, which was clearly an exaggeration in the situation when relatively minor clashes and random firing occurred from time to time. Another step which was perceived as an open provocation in Thailand at the time was his appointment of ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as his economic adviser in the year 2009, which even happened after Hun Sen arrived late for asean summit held in Thailand (see icg 2011, p. 12).

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Finally, not exactly a provocation, but he sought third party involvement in the conflict from the beginning, which added fuel to the fire over Thai internal political turmoil and may have played into the hands of Thai nationalist forces. Searching for evidence of motivation to escalate the conflict on the Cambodian side, we should definitely focus our attention on Hun Sen himself, who has been the leader and Prime Minister of Cambodia since the fall of Khmer Rouge regime and has overseen the complex process of country transformation from the long war period. There are more possible explanations of his interest in escalation of the conflict. Wagener (2011) presents five reasons: firstly, the initial unesco status and consequent escalation happened only weeks before an election took place and the success of winning the unesco status and the strong stance in the consequent escalation clearly helped to secure additional support among the population. Secondly, with the conflict escalating, Hun Sen was able to push for a rise in military spending for the 2009 budget and this way to secure loyalty of the army, his main supporter. Thirdly, it is said that Hun Sen’s deliberate escalation of the conflict may have some linkage to the proceedings of the tribunal with the late Khmer Rouge leaders, which according to many Cambodians was moving too slowly. As Hun Sen, himself, and a number of other people in his cabinet were members of the Khmer Rouge and only turned away in later years of their rule, it is truly possible that Preah Vihear temple served as a great opportunity for Hun Sen to turn the attention of the public elsewhere. Fourthly, Hun Sen may have acted tough vis-à-vis Thailand to hide his alleged mismanagement of a border dispute with Vietnam. Moreover, he may have even deliberately tried to strengthen the Vietnamese position as the leading power in Indochina by playing on the Thai internal political dynamics with pushing on an issue which clearly was divisive and would weaken Thailand’s position in international affairs. The fifth explanation presented by Wagener is that Hun Sen may have used the conflict for diverting attention from effects of the international financial crisis which were materializing in the region during the period when the dispute escalated. Moreover, another reason can be put forward that during the later military moves, Hun Sen’s son was said to lead the operation and soon afterwards was promoted to the rank of major general (Rand 2011). Thus it can be suggested that perhaps Hun Sen’s is trying to go for a “North Korealike” scenario and by providing his son with an opportunity to gain experience and receive success he wishes to establish another family dynasty in East Asia (Wagener 2011). The recent information from Cambodia especially following the icj 2013 judgment seems to show restraint, on the other hand. In fact, there is

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little division on the issue of Preah Vihear within Cambodian politics, with opposition focusing its foreign policy criticism of Hun Sen on his conduct of relations with Vietnam. At the same time, after the last election the ruling party lost some of its seats in parliament although still controlling a majority. Among its top priorities now are economic growth and job creation for which stable relations with its larger neighbor and economic partner are essential (Jenne 2014). This is a good explanation of the current soft approach of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who seems to be patient with the Thai internal political process and does not push for the immediate implementation of the icj 2013 ruling. Although, there are no signs either that he might be considering the joint development of the temple with Thailand, as was proposed by visiting Thai Prime Minister Prayuth in Phnom Penh in 2014 (Narim 2014). To sum up, both parties of the conflict showed that their internal politics motivated them to escalate the conflict, independently on the other side’s moves and choices. It is clear that for some leaders on both sides the issue of sovereignty over the Preah Vihear temple has meant an ideal opportunity to score some extra points over domestic political competitors rather than an ideological/legal dispute with another country which should be solved effectively.

asean and the Thai-Cambodian Conflict

asean Conflict Resolution Mechanisms The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established on 8 August 1967 by five original member countries, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Today the Association comprises five more countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) and is widely regarded as the world’s second most successful regional integration, and the first in the so-called Third World. It may seem natural for Southeast Asia to be perceived today as a well-defined (sub-)region with more or less clear border delimitation, although with great internal diversities. Yet, it should be kept in mind that this relatively clear regional outward and inward perception may in fact be yet another – or perhaps the major – result of almost 50 years of asean existence. This approach is well described by leading Southeast Asian scholar Amitav Acharya in a number of his works (see e.g. Acharya 2012) who reminds us that various regional integration projects in Asia did not succeeded in the way asean did – such as an attempt of an “Asian nato” in the form of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (seato), Asian Relations Conferences (arc),

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the Bandung process, Colombo Powers grouping, the Asia and Pacific Council (aspa), the Ministerial Conference on Economic Development of South East Asia (mcedsea), Pacific Basin Economic Council (pbec), Association of Southeast Asia (asa) or maphilindo (see Acharya 2011). The reasons why it was asean that “succeeded” (measured firstly, by its mere survival) may be found in its indigenous ideological approach and very strong respect of national sovereignty, far outreaching Western perceptions at the time. It should be acknowledged, that the simple question of “what type of animal is asean?” is in fact not that simple. It is clearly not a military alliance, yet a crucial goal for its foundation was to secure the survival of newly independent states in the region and prevent the spread of communism in mainland Southeast Asia. Secondly, as 1997 and the Asian Financial Crisis showed, asean was neither an economic organization, for it lacked effective ability and instruments to solve the crisis, although economic cooperation and facilitating of growth have clearly played important roles in the creation and institutional development of the organization. Hence, the question here is whether asean is an organization armed with appropriate tools and abilities to solve disputes among its member countries. While the short answer proposed by many here would be just “no”, there are indications in the asean institutional documents about this self-subscribed goal. Already the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 (asean 1967) – the foundation document of the Association – states as one of its goals “to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter”. Another major document of asean (1976) including similar concept is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, whose signatories are not just all asean member countries but also countries from outside the region, including China, India, Russia, Australia, the eu, us and others. This text goes further than the Bangkok Declaration and Chapter 4 is entirely dedicated to the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is well worth citing several of its Articles here: Article 13 The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them should arise, especially disputes likely to disturb regional peace and harmony, they shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations.

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Article 14 To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony. Article 15 In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High Council shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of a deterioration of the dispute or the situation. Article 16 The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance. It should be observed from the Articles above, that signatories of the treaty agree to revoke any use or threat of force in mutual relations and they should form a special body – a High Council – whose purpose is to facilitate the peaceful dispute settlement among signatories. Yet, as Article 16 already shows, this mechanism applies only in those cases, when both parties of a dispute agree on such outside intervention. This provision is perhaps the main reason why asean never established the High Council mentioned in the Treaty which then remained mostly just a concept to which parties have not referred their disputes (Weatherbee 2009, pp. 130–131). It would explain also why asean was not able to intervene effectively in the escalation of the Preah Vihear conflict between Cambodia and Thailand, as we shall see later.

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Another major strategic document of asean we should consider here is the asean Charter (2008) – where, again, the whole Chapter 8 is dedicated to the settlement of disputes. Two of the Charter’s articles, which are here of foremost importance, read as follows: Article 22. General Principles 1. Member States shall endeavour to resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation and negotiation. 2. a sean shall maintain and establish dispute settlement mechanisms in all fields of asean cooperation. Article 23. Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation 1. Member States which are parties to a dispute may at any time agree to resort to good offices, conciliation or mediation in order to resolve the dispute within an agreed time limit. 2. Parties to the dispute may request the Chairman of asean or the Secretary-General of asean, acting in an ex-officio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation. It can be noted that while Article 22 asks member states to resolve peacefully all disputes and states that they shall maintain and establish a specific mechanism for this purpose, Article 23 does a step back and says that they “may” resort to good offices and “may” request asean to intervene in the dispute. In fact, the asean Political-Security Community Blueprint (2009), which sets specific tasks for the Association to be established by the end of 2015, also repeats the statements about the dispute settlement from the tac and asean Charter and mentions “pledge[s] to rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences” (asean 2014). Article B.2. Conflict Resolution and Pacific Settlements of Disputes initially discusses the importance of preserving peace within the Association as well as between its members and third states. Yet, before enlisting specific steps which are to be taken, the document states that “[u]nder the asean Charter, asean may also establish appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms.” The mere possibility that the asean “may” do that significantly downgrades further articles of the document which elaborate on study of current dispute settlements modes and consider establishing them in accordance with previous documents. Finally, asean (2010) issued a specific document during its summit in Hanoi in 2010 titled Protocol to the asean Charter on Dispute Settlement

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­Mechanism. While the scope of the document and the mere fact that asean devoted it to this single topic is notable, the document itself does not go much beyond established principles. While it discusses at length possible procedures of the dispute settlements among asean members and especially arbitration procedure, it falls short of prescribing the application of the mechanism to certain cases. As such, it can be regarded as a middle way between voluntary and compulsory submissions of cases for the arbitration on the side of the member states (Naldi 2014). All in all, it can be concluded, that while in the words of Rodolfo C. Severino – former Secretary General of asean 1998–2002 –, the organization “is not a dispute settlement body […] and there is very little it can do” (cited in Kanparit 2011), we have seen that the major documents of the Association in fact do elaborate on dispute settlements among its members as one of the important activities of asean, and they go as far as establishing specific bodies, which however remain only on paper, so far. Therefore, this ambiguity leads to a situation, not too different from the 1997 crisis, when there was a general perception that expected asean to be able to intervene and provide a solution to the crisis between its members. Moreover, as we will turn to in the next section of this chapter, asean’s specific steps with regards to the escalating conflict at Preah Vihear did fuel further expectations, as it seemed that the Association was willing to take on the role of mediator and provide conflict resolution. asean Involvement in the Preah Vihear Conflict From the beginning of the escalation of the conflict at Preah Vihear in 2008 it seemed natural to many observers that asean would be the ideal mediator in a dispute between two of its members. Until mid-2008 it had been made clear multiple times by the then asean chair, Singapore, as well as other asean member countries that asean was willing to take up a mediating role between its two member countries, however respecting the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of its members it would only act if it is asked to do so. In 2008 when the tensions were growing, Cambodia tried to pursue the issue at the United Nations (un) Security Council. The attempt was promptly stopped by Indonesia backed by Vietnam, who demanded that the issue should be held at existing bilateral forums (icg 2011). In 2009, when Thailand itself was the chair of the Association, the Thai foreign minister announced that he would present a road map to establish a universal mechanism to solve the territorial disputes among asean members, in accordance with the asean Charter provision accepted a year before. This proposal, rather surprising at the time from Thailand, was wholeheartedly accepted by the Cambodian foreign minister, believing that this was an offer of

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multilateral solution of the conflict, which Cambodia had been calling for. Yet, soon after, the proposal was cancelled by the Thai side. The official explanation from the Thai Foreign Ministry was that the Foreign Minister was misunderstood, yet the real explanation would be more likely that the policy change had not been sufficiently negotiated within the state agencies. As a result, Thailand reverted to its policy of demanding bilateral resolution between the two conflict claimants without outside interference, while Cambodia, quite the opposite, was working on bringing in a third authority (icg 2011). In 2010 the asean chair was held by Vietnam who did not pursue the issue of Preah Vihear primarily because of its preoccupation with the South China Sea tensions. It was enough for Vietnam to respond to Cambodian calls for the asean mediation and claims that the bilateral dialogue with Thailand did not work, to check with Thailand about the situation. Thailand responded that it was “business as usual” and no response from asean was needed (icg 2011, pp. 13–15). Therefore the next asean involvement took place only when the dispute turned more violent in the beginning of 2011. In February 2011, after another Cambodian request, the issue was firstly discussed in the un Security Council and the then asean Chair, Indonesia, was invited to this meeting (or session), which marked the first such a visit of asean in the Security Council. While no specific resolution came out of the meeting, the Security Council explicitly asked asean to play a role in the conflict between its two members (un Security Council 2011). Interestingly, while the mere fact of sending the issue to the un instead of dealing with it at the asean level right from the beginning could be regarded as a sign a short coming in the Association, there were voices which on the other hand pointed towards the success of asean to be invited to the un Security Council for the first time and being formally recognized as a regional organization. Following this, Indonesian chair managed to broker a deal between the parties to accept the deployment of Indonesian observers in the area of the temple. This was firstly hailed as a significant success for asean and there was a belief that this would effectively resolve the issue (see van Nevel 2011). Yet soon after the negotiations between Thailand and Cambodia met with new difficulties and were halted altogether, purposely due to Thailand sabotaging the move using various technical obstacles. In July 2011 the provisional measures were issued by the icj which also requested the deployment of the asean observers. However, no asean observers have ever been dispatched since and there are no signs it should happen in the future. It is clear that the conditions of the conflict violate the basic asean principles for interaction between its members, as well as outside countries. The

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dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over Preah Vihear escalated into an open conflict in which both sides deliberately chose to use violence. As have been demonstrated, both sides gave primacy to their domestic politics and used the dispute to achieve domestic political goals. In the situation when at least one of the parties – in this case Thailand – did not agree on outside mediation; asean with its current “dispute settlement mechanism” state of affairs remained basically toothless without any means to address the issue. The weaker side – Cambodia – pushed the case forward to the un Security Council and repeatedly to the icj and, seemingly, this together with the new domestic political situations in both countries helped to terminate the violence, unlike previous asean limited involvement. In the words of Kitti Jayangakula (2013, p. 11): The on-going border battles between Thailand and Cambodia are challenging the very essence of asean’s credibility and its principle of nonuse of force. (…) asean had emerged as a de facto successful security community that no member state has used violence against another. The border clashes [between Thailand and Cambodia] challenged asean’s credibility as a guarantee of peace in the region. With this reduce confidence; asean will be in danger of losing its role as driver of the regional security architecture. To continue on a similar note, the most recent international step to manage the conflict exposes well the “non-involvement” of asean and together with the recent Asia-Pacific regional development, points exactly towards asean losing centrality in regional security architecture. After the October 2014 decision of unesco based on the request of Cambodia, International Cooperation Committee will be formed to coordinate the management of the issues of the temple. There are seven members in the committee which includes European (Belgium, France), American (usa), and Asian (China, India, Japan, and Republic of Korea), with India and China being appointed as co-chairs of the committee. Thailand “may” be invited by Cambodia to participate in the work of the committee, yet, there is no other asean member included in the committee. The first ever meeting of the international committee took place in early December 2013 in Cambodia, where Thailand also participated (Agence Kampuchea Press [akp] 2014). There have been no mentions about other asean countries or the organization regarding the committee or other type of relevant involvement in the dispute recently. It also remains to be seen whether Indonesia’s new president who is more active in international politics, will

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assume a more visible role in this issue, to which Indonesia was previously appointed as a mediator. Hence, while the discussion might be whether asean should or should not deal with the crises like those at Preah Vihear, it had in fact become a defacto security organization in the region, which the widely held perception confirms. Furthermore, it has even to some extent become a de-jure dispute settlement body, as the formal treaties discussed above show. What are missing, though, are the actual technical tools to meet these goals and also existing countering principles – primarily non-interference in domestic affairs – which hold any dispute settlement hostage to the wills of member countries. Therefore, it seems that the principles of non-interference and the strong respect of the national sovereignty are the double-edged swords. While, on one hand, they make the Association and in particular its member countries stronger and have enabled asean to persist for forty years. On the other hand, the same principles also prevent asean from moving to new levels and being able to meet new challenges. asean seems to be somewhat of an institution for good weather. While it is hoping – and perhaps even working – to change the climate, in case bad weather actually comes, it has little to offer, as the Thai-Cambodian conflict among others well demonstrates. Conclusion This chapter dealt with asean’s role in managing the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over Preah Vihear temple and surrounding areas. Two main questions were discussed in the text, firstly, what is the current state of the dispute at the Preah Vihear temple and, secondly, what impact has this dispute had on asean. To provide sufficient answers, firstly historical development of the conflict was shortly presented as a background to the dispute. It was shown that the origin of the modern era conflict lies in the beginning of 20th century, although for centuries before the temple had been on the borders between the two nations and this adds now to emotions and various perceptions on both sides. In 1904 France – under whose protectorate the Khmer state belonged at the time, and Siam – present-day Thailand, concluded a border treaty and produced maps of the bordering areas. The problem later emerged due to the fact, that while according to the accepted general principle in the part of the border where Preah Vihear is situated, the temple would have been on the Thai side of the border, on a single map depicting the temple it is actually placed on Cambodian side, diverging from the principle in this part of the border.

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The icj in 1962 declared that the temple and its vicinity fell under Cambodian sovereignty and Thailand was obliged to withdraw its personnel from this area. The implementation of this decision was never carried out, but due to internal political development, the question of Preah Vihear only emerged after Cambodia regained its sovereignty in 1990s and especially after it applied for listing the temple on unesco’s Heritage List in 2008. Consequent escalation and spread of violence led Cambodia to go back to the icj in 2011 and request interpretation of the original judgment from 1962. The court ruled in 2013 that the disputed area consisted of the whole Preah Vihear promontory. This judgment can be regarded as a qualified victory for Cambodia, as it enlarged the territory under its sovereignty (see bbc 2013). However, still, the larger part of the disputed 4.6 square kilometer territory remains disputed as the court declined to accept the Cambodian demand that based on the Annex 1 map, all the territory in question was awarded in 1962 to Cambodia. Furthermore, it will also have to be established where a clear line of the “promontory” area sits and so to put the judgment of the icj into practice. Moreover, mostly due to the current Thai internal political developments, there has been no development in these regards, and it seems Thailand has still not withdrawn its personnel from the whole promontory area, which they said they would do after negotiating with Cambodia. Clearly, political agreement will have to take place between the two states before the dispute can be regarded as finally resolved. In the second section of the chapter, the current domestic politics in both countries were discussed and it was established that the escalation of conflict after 2008 was not the result of mutual misunderstanding rather than of deliberate policies of politicians at both sides to exploit the case for domestic political goals. More often the blame is put on the Thai side, in which two clearly defined political forces can be observed recently – yellow shirts and red shirts. The issue of Preah Vihear played well with the attempts of the yellow shirts to criticize red shirts using nationalistic rhetoric for allegedly selling Thai land to Cambodia in exchange for economic benefits, or just being too weak, soft and unable to protect Thai sovereignty. This allegation has played well with a large section of the population, which disregards the judgment of 1962 and also the official stance of the Thai government which still feels the temple should belong to Thailand. On the other hand, in Cambodia, the long-time Prime Minister Hun Sen was facing growing opposition in 2008 and uplifting national pride after the unesco listing was supposed to earn additional popularity points. Additionally, supporting nationalism – and additional increases in defense budgets – would also strengthen his strong base in the military. Further motivation and concrete steps of Cambodia were listed and it was established, that Hun Sen also acted deliberately to fuel the conflict and misuse it for his own political goals.

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Thirdly, the text discussed asean’s dispute settlement mechanism among its member countries. It was shown, that there have been explicit mentions about this issue in some of asean treaties, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the asean Charter, which go as far as suggesting the creation of specific bodies to deal with dispute settlement. On the other hand, there have been voices that asean is not supposed to deal with disputes among its member countries. Subsequently, however, it was presented that asean in fact accepted the mediating role in the Preah Vihear conflict and tried to provide for dispute settlement which further increased expectations. The failure was then even more bitter and disappointing than if the Association had stayed out of the issue from the beginning. The whole situation can be in fact likened to the situation of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. The Association was widely expected to act and be able to mitigate the issue – which it failed – yet this failure then led to additional integration and strengthening of institutions and it can be argued that this experience prepared the region better for the global crisis of 2007/08. If the Association could take a lesson from this failed attempt to provide for dispute settlement among its members, perhaps it can address similar issues more effectively in the future. The ThaiCambodian conflict itself is still not over. To sum up, well into 2016 we still find ourselves in the “time in between” – the icj has issued its final word which is now waiting to be put in practice. Sooner or later, there will have to be negotiation and agreement between the countries on how to implement the decision. After the decision is implemented, then the countries can move to the next issue and that is the final settlement of the border issue outside of the promontory area. It is therefore apparent that the dispute is not over, although most media have stopped reporting on it, as if it had been resolved, which is partly understandable taking into consideration major political turmoil in Thailand. From asean’s perspective, this situation might be understood as a second chance to solve the dispute. The failure to act so far sheds negative light on the Association’s abilities and affects its image – notwithstanding whether it actually is or is not designed to deal with such issues. Just when eyes are on the further development of the asean Community, it would be indeed a welcoming sign of its functionality if it could address this open territorial dispute between its members. Nonetheless, this would require at least the same, if not greater, will of asean countries than before to push forward the establishment of the genuine dispute settlement mechanism in particular and to strengthen the ability of the organization to intervene in domestic affairs of its members states in general. Yet, there are no reasons why the member states should be more willing to take this step now, if they had not been willing to do it ever

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before. From an institutional perspective it seems that the major tool used by asean to manage disputes among its members is still mere peer-pressure, which can be nonetheless expected to grow, particularly after the recent establishment of the asean Community. However, in case asean would not be able to transform in this matter or successfully pressured the two sides to accept asean mediation, it is quite likely that the dispute around Preah Vihear will exist for an unlimited period of time and phases of tensions and calm may change repeatedly, according to domestic situations in the related countries and their bilateral relations in general. Bibliography4 Acharya, Amitav (2009): Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. New York: Routledge. Acharya, Amitav (2011): Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Acharya, Amitav (2012): The Making of Southeast Asia. International Relations of a Region. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. Agence Kampuchea Press (AKP) (2014): “First meeting of ICC-Preah Vihear held in Cambodia.” Available at: http://english.cambodiasky.com/news/social/1475.html. Al Jazeera (2012): “Thai, Cambodian troops leave disputed area.” July 18. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/201271845840265105.html. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967): “The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration).” Available at: http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean -declaration-bangkok-declaration. ASEAN (1976): “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.” Available at: http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast -asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-3. ASEAN (2008): “ASEAN Charter.” Available at: http://www.asean.org/archive/ publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf. ASEAN (2009): “ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint.” Available at: http:// www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf. ASEAN (2010): “Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms.” Available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2010%20Protocol%20to%20the%20 ASEAN%20Charter%20on%20Dispute%20Settlement%20Mechanisms-pdf.pdf. ASEAN (2012): “ASEAN Anthem.” Available at: http://www.asean.org/asean/about -asean/asean-anthem. 4 All internet sources have last been accessed on 1 April 2016.

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ASEAN (2014): “ASEAN Political-Security Community.” Available at: http://www.asean .org/communities/asean-political-security-community. ASEAN (undated): “The ASEAN Way.” Available at: http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=linTTWHu1YQ. Ball, Desmond (2003): “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands.” Australian Mekong Resource Centre, Working Paper, no. 9. Sydney, October. Bangkok Post (2013): “Police to replace troops on Cambodian border.” 27 February. Available at: http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/337911/ police-to-replace-troops-on-cambodian-border. Bangkok Pundit (2013): “Will Thailand comply with the ICJ’s Preah Vihear decision?” Asian Correspondent. 11 November. Available at: http://asiancorrespondent .com/115637/will-thailand-comply-with-the-icjs-preah-vihear-decision/. Barlow, Lucas G. (2011): “The Preah Vihear Temple: What’s in a Claim?” Global Security. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2011/ada556128 .pdf. British Broadcasting Company (BBC) (2013): “Preah Vihear temple: Disputed land Cambodian, court rules.” 11 November. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-24897805. Bunyavejchewin, Poowin (2013): “A regional security complex analysis of the Preah Vihear temple conflict, 1953–1962.” Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, 32, 14–26. Burgess, John (2015): “Burgess Documents Cambodian–Thai Conflict at Preah Vihear in Newest Book.” Voice of America Cambodia. 23 July. Available at: http://www .voacambodia.com/content/burgess-documents-cambodian-thai-conflict -at-preah-vihear-in-newest-book/2873563.html. Chachavalpongpun, Pavin (2009): “Diplomacy under Siege: Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign Policy.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 31(3), 447–467. Chanlett-Avery, Emma and Dolven, Ben (2012): “Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations.” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress. Available at: http:// www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf. Chongkittavorn, Kavi (2014): “Hun Sen’s charm offensive in Thailand.” The Nation. 4 August. Available at: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Hun -Sens-charm-offensive-in-Thailand-30240154.html. Ciorciari, John D. (2009): “Thailand and Cambodia: The Battle for Preah Vihear.” Stanford Spice Digest. Available at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/379/Prihear.pdf. Center for New American Security (2015): “Flashpoints. Security in the East and South China Seas.” Available at: http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline. Feigenblatt, Otto von (2011): “Coping with Violence in the Thai-Cambodian Border: The Silence of the Border.” Economía Autónoma, 4(7), 93–100. Available at http://www .eumed.net/rev/ea/07/ofvf.pdf.

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Fuller, Thomas (2013): “U.N. Court Rules for Cambodia in Temple Dispute With Thailand.” New York Times, 12 November. Available at: http://www.nytimes .com/2013/11/12/world/asia/un-court-rules-for-cambodia-in-temple-dispute-withthailand.html?ref=preahviheartemple&_r=5&. International Court of Justice (1945): “Statute of the International Court of Justice.” Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0. International Court of Justice (1962): “Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand).” Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/45/4871 .pdf. International Court of Justice (2011a): “Press release. Cambodia files an Application requesting interpretation of the Judgment rendered by the Court on 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) and also asks for the urgent indication of provisional measures.” Available at: http://www .icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16480.pdf. International Court of Justice (2011b): “Provisional Measures of Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand).” Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/151/16564.pdf. International Court of Justice (2013a): “Judgment. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear. Cambodia v. Thailand.” Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/17704.pdf. International Court of Justice (2013b): “Press Release. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand).” Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/17714.pdf. International Crisis Group (2011): “Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict.” Asia Report, no. 215. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/ media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/215%20Waging%20Peace%20--%20 ASEAN%20and%20the%20Thai-Cambodian%20Border%20Conflict.pdf. Jayangakula, Kitti (2013): “The Impacts of the Temple of Preah Vihear Case Towards the ASEAN Community.” Social Science Research Network. Available at: http://papers .ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2283800. Jenne, Nicole (2014): “Uncertainty at home brings calm to the Thai–Cambodian border.” East Asia Forum, 20 November. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/11/20/uncertainty-at-home-brings-calm-to-the-thai-cambodianborder/. Jikkham, Patsara (2014): “Hun Sen, Prayut to spur border trade.” Bangkok Post, 1 November. Available at: http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/440737/hun -sen-prayut-to-spur-border-trade. Kanparit, Sujane (2011): “A Mediator Named ASEAN: Lessons from Preah Vihear.” ASEAN News, 20 January. Available at: http://www.aseannews .net/a-mediator-named-asean-lessons-from-preah-vihear/.

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Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary (2000). The Mirror, 15, 701. Available at: http://www.cambodiamirror.org/2011/01/24/memorandum-on-cambodian-thai -border-issues-monday-24-1-2011/. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand (2012): “Press Release. Thai Foreign Minister gave press interview on the planned redeployment of military personnel, leading towards the implementation of the ICJ’s Order for provisional measures.” 17 July. Available at: http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/25144 -Thai-Foreign-Minister-gave-press-interview-on-the.html. Naldi, Gino J. (2014): “The ASEAN Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: An Appraisal.” Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 5(1), 105–138. Narim, Khuon (2014): “New Thai Prime Minister Pays Official Visit.” Cambodia Daily, 31 October. Available at: https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/71429-71429/. Nevel, Marily van (2011): “The Thai-Cambodian border conflict: a growing role for ASEAN?” European Institute of Asian Studies, EIAS Newsletter, March/April. Available at: http://www.eias.org/sites/default/files/EIAS_2011-Mar_Thai-Cambodia_ASEAN .pdf. Pakdeekong, Monticha (2009): “Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple? A Thai Position.” Journal of East Asia & International Law, 2(1), 229–237. Paris, Natalie (2015): “Preah Vihear temple in Cambodia now safe to visit.” The Telegraph, 7 August. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/asia/ cambodia/11789905/Preah-Vihear-temple-in-Cambodia-now-safe-to-visit.html. Patrick M. Cronin and Robert D. Kaplan (2012): “Cooperation from Strength: The U.S. Strategy and the South China Sea.” In Cronin, Patrick M. (Eds.): Cooperation from Strength. The United States, China and the South China Sea. Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security. Available at: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/ publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf. Pattaya Mail (2013): “Thai Foreign Minister: Border dispute may not end in Thailand’s favour.” 6 January. Available at: http://www.pattayamail.com/news/thai-foreign -minister-border-dispute-may-not-end-in-thailand-s-favour-20180. People’s Daily (2005): “Indonesian president orders to avoid collision with Malaysia.” 10 April. Available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200504/10/eng20050410 _180297.html. Protection Group International (2014): “Cambodian and Thai troops clash at disputed Preah Vihear temple.” Available at: http://pgitl.com/intelligence/insight/ cambodian-thai-clash-preah-vihear/. Rand, Nelson (2011): “Nationalism and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict.” Asian Conflicts Report. Council for Asian Transnational Threat Reports 16, March–April.

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Raymond, Greg (2014): “Thai–Cambodia relations one year after the ICJ judgement.” East Asia Forum, 11 November. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum .org/2014/11/11/thai-cambodia-relations-one-year-after-the-icj-judgement/. Roveda, Vittorio and Jacques, Claude (2012): Preah Vihear. Bangkok: River Book Guides. Saikia, Panchali (2012): “The Dispute over Preah Vihear. Seen Problems, Unseen Stakes.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) Special Report. Available at: http://www .ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR129-SEARP-Panchali.pdf. Security Council Report (n.d.): “Thailand v. Cambodia.” Available at: http://www .securitycouncilreport.org/thailandcambodia/. Shulman, Katherine (2012): “The Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand): The ICJ Orders Sweeping Provisional Measures To Prevent Armed Conflict at the Expense of Sovereignty.” Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law, 20 (Spring), 555–570. Strate, Shane (2013): “A pile of stones? Preah Vihear as a Thai symbol of National Humiliation.” South East Asia Research, 21(1), 41–68. Touch, Bora (2009): “Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple? A Cambodian Position.” Journal of East Asia & International Law, 2(1), 205–227. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2014): “Establishment of an International Coordination Committee for Preah Vihear Temple, Included in the World Heritage List.” Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0022/002299/229960e.pdf. United Nations Security Council (2011): “Update Report No. 1: Thailand/Cambodia. Security Council Report.” Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-6552935.php. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2013): “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. Available at: http://www .ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php. Wagener, Martin (2011): “Lessons from Preah Vihear: Thailand, Cambodia, and the Nature of Low-Intensity Border Conflicts.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 30(3), 27–59. Weatherbee, Donald E. (2009): International Relations in Southeast Asia. The Struggle for Autonomy. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Xinhua (2014): “Unmanned drone explodes in sky over Cambodia’s Preah Vihear temple area.” 7 December. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/ 2014-12/07/c_133838435.htm.

chapter 4

Claiming Phu Quoc/Koh Tral: Irredentism as a Recurrent Theme of Cambodian Domestic Politics1 Mária Strašáková Introduction The love-and-hate relationship between Vietnam and Cambodia, just like the one between China and Vietnam, has been asymmetrical in nature and plagued by periodical pangs of mutual distrust and conflict. Despite the fact that bilateral relations between both the states have improved rapidly since 1991, tensions still revolve around two issues: first being the status of ethnic Khmer living in Vietnam and ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, the second pertains to the unresolved land border and maritime delineation disputes. On 2 September 2012 in the run up for the July 2013 Cambodian general election, Kem Sokha, the opposition leader to Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party, revived the sensitivities connected to the unresolved maritime disputes by claiming that Vietnam should return the island of Phu Quoc (in Khmer Koh Tral) to Cambodia. In spite of stressing a resolution through legal and peaceful means, he uncovered a dormant and potential source of conflict between the two countries. Furthermore, he unleashed a heated domestic debate, in which the opposition leaders accused Prime Minister (pm) Hun Sen of being responsible of relinquishing the island to the Vietnamese (Lipes 2012). The heated debate over the ownership of the island continued for almost a year. On 17 June 2013 yet another government critic and union leader Rong Chhun went even further by presenting new evidence supporting Cambodia’s ownership of the island Phu Quoc (Koh Tral). At a press conference in Phnom Penh he presented a 7th grade Cambodian geography textbook from 1985, where Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) was shown as Cambodian territory. In addition, Rong Chhun claimed that he would push Hun Sen not to accept Vietnamese ownership of the island. However, Rong Chhun was suspected of seizing the opportunity to stir up anti-Vietnamese rhetoric prior to July’s national election in order to gain votes (Meyn and Aun Pheap 2013).

1 This chapter was published as a part of a research project of Metropolitan University Prague (mup). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004312180_006

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Even though many may consider the territorial disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam as “anachronistic” in nature and the Cambodian stance towards reclaiming the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) as quixotic, the dispute still has the potential to unleash heated discussions and lead to tensions between both countries. Thus, the objective of this chapter is first to analyze the history and nature of the unresolved maritime disputes between both states. The main argument is that the dispute can be perceived as a barometer of relations between both countries, i.e. when relations are functional, the territorial conflict is shelved; on the other hand, when the relationship between the two states deteriorates, the disputes gain momentum again (Farrell 1998, p. 187). As shall be shown below, in Cambodia, land and sea boundary issues are also perceived as highly sensitive given the country’s historical experience of “loss of territory” to much stronger neighbors (Thailand and Vietnam) and are often perceived as a question of national survival. Therefore, the paper seeks to answer to what extent have territorial disputes become a political calculation/ political card played by different political actors (e.g. King Sihanouk’s government, the Lon Nol regime, the Khmer Rouge [kr] regime, political parties of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia [untac] period, and currently the Cambodian National Rescue Party) in their quest for power and public support. Thirdly, the paper investigates the main turning points in the attempts of both countries to resolve this sensitive issue as well as prospects for future development and resolution of the dispute. For a better understanding of the complex issue a chronological approach has been adopted.

Uncertain and Unresolved Borders as Sources of Tension

Uncertain boundaries are an extremely politically sensitive issue that may lead to conflict between nations. As has been discussed in greater detail in proceeding chapters by Andělová and Kraus, in Southeast Asia, border conflicts among states are caused by several factors, the most important being historical controversies stemming especially from the colonial era, the Cold War and nationalism. Furthermore, historical controversies have been further aggravated by the fact that borders among Southeast Asian states were arbitrarily drawn by formal colonial powers, which did not take into consideration ethnic, religious, social or linguistic identities. As has already been stated in the first chapter, the controversies over land and maritime borders can also stem from mistakes in using (1) inappropriate topographical terms, (2) unclear geographical features (e.g. changing river streams); (3) inconsistent or contradictory statements (e.g. the adoption and contested interpretation of Article 56 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (unclos) has led to the emergence of overlapping territorial

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claims and intensified the disputes in semi-enclosed seas, which is also the case of maritime conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam); and last but not the least (4) intricate human and cultural diversity (Mancini 2013, pp. 3–5). These inconsistencies fueled by intensive and emotional responses of the public play an important role in escalating territorial disputes and make consequent resolution futile. Furthermore, as Park points out depending on the leadership of the country, these conflicts can be controlled, subdued or on the other hand intensively politicized as most territorial conflicts are linked to pride and prestige of nations (Park 2010, p. 45). Thus, in case of Southeast Asia Innenpolitik plays a significant role in foreign relations. Internal factors, such as political and economic ideology, socio-economic structure, national character as well as partisan politics determine how a country will act “beyond its borders” (Rose 1998, p. 148). This is particularly true for Cambodian nationalism, which stems from four recurring, concurring and contra-concurring themes, motives, impulses and historical moments: the grandeur of Cambodia’s past and moral superiority of the ethnic Khmer over their historical adversaries – the Vietnamese and Thais. This imagined superiority, however, was seriously jolted by more recent historical events when the two “less advanced” nations partitioned the country and almost incorporated its remains into their own domains. As David Chandler (1983, p. 5) also noted, the Vietnamese were more successful in the colonization of the old Khmer Empire, and were at the same time more culturally distinct, thus, the transformation of the Vietnamese into a national enemy, together with the Khmer imagination of Cambodia as a powerful and important state in world politics, became two other major themes fueling Cambodia’s national sentiment. As shall be discussed below, irredentism – the reclamation of long-lost territory, i.e. also of the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) and other island features in the Gulf of Thailand – and the transformation of the Vietnamese as “hereditary enemies” seeking to “nibble away” Cambodian territory have become a recurring theme of Cambodian domestic politics fueling territorial disputes with Vietnam as well as souring of mutual relations.

Setting the Scene – Maritime Boundaries and Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island

Vietnam and Cambodia have adjacent sea areas in the Gulf of Thailand, a semienclosed extension of the South China Sea, of approx. 320.000 square kilometers. The Gulf of Thailand is bordered by Thailand (1.560 km) and Malaysia (150 km)

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in the southwest through north, and Cambodia (460 km) and Vietnam (230 km) in the north and northeast. The Gulf of Thailand is 500 to 560 km (300 to 350 nautical miles) wide and 725 km (450 nm) long. It is narrow with an average width of 385 km (215 nm). In comparison with the South China Sea dispute, there are only four claimant states to the maritime delimitation – Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam. Nonetheless, the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Gulf has shown to be a slow process marked by ongoing disputes among littoral states given their geopolitical disagreements as well as lingering legacies of their colonial experience, especially the still existing contradictory interpretations of colonial treaties – i.e. the role of the 1939 Brévié Line in case of Cambodia and Vietnam. The claims of both the states are further complicated by the fact that they claim territorial seas 12 nm wide, a contiguous zone of 24 nm, and eezs measuring 200 nm from the baseline. Thus, maritime boundary discussions need to take place to separate the two zones. In addition, the two states will have to resolve their joint claim to historic waters (Prescott and Schofield 2001, p. 15). Furthermore, the existence of many island features in the Gulf make the boundary delimitation process all the more difficult (Nguyen Hong Thao 1999, p. 79). At present, Vietnam and Cambodia have a historical dispute not only over their land boundaries, as discussed by Kraus in the previous chapter, but also maritime boundaries, overlapping territorial sea, exclusive economic zones, continental shelf, and several island features, Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) being one of them. Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) is the largest island belonging to Vietnam and along with 21 other island features is part of the Phu Quoc district (an area of about 574 square kilometers) belonging under the jurisdiction of the Kien Giang province. Phu Quoc lies 15 km south of the Cambodian coast, west of Kampot, and 40 km west of Ha Tien, the nearest coastal town in Vietnam. Phu Quoc is roughly triangular in shape and is 62 km long from north to south and 3–28 kilometers wide from east to west. A mountainous sandstone ridge known as “99 Peaks/Mountains” runs from the north to the south, the longest being Ham Ninh (c. 30 km) with its highest peak called Mount Chua (603 m) (Abramov, Kalinin and Morozov 2007, p. 40). The island covers an area of 585 square kilometers and together with Hon Thom and Hon Roi islands is inhabited by 91.241 people (Su 2012, p. 11). In general, the island’s importance stems from economic, political and strategic factors. Its economic significance arises from its rich habitats and marine life resources. The adjacent waters can be characterized as “a biodiversity hot spot” and are rich in many commercially important fish species. The island is also known for its traditional fish sauce “nuoc mam”, which is an

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important export article from the region (Su 2012, p. 11). It is worth mentioning that Vietnam is the biggest producer and exporter of pepper in the world, whilst over 400 tons of best quality black pepper are produced on the island. Furthermore, in 2013 black pepper was identified as one of the key economic strengths of the island and a traditional local specialty, the production of which should contribute to the development of the local economy (Vietnam News Agency 2013). Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island also holds a great potential for the development of tourism and ecotourism given its beautiful, pristine beaches and the Phu Quoc National Park covering almost 70% of the island. In addition, the shelf of the Gulf of Thailand, just like the South China Sea, is rich in natural resources (oil and gas). The island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) is located in the Phu Quoc basin, which forms a 100–150 km broad belt stretching from the central part of the Gulf of Thailand about 500 km northwards to central Cambodia. Despite the fact that it still belongs among one of the least explored basins in the region (Fyhn et al., 2010, pp. 91–92), the potential existence of deposits has added further heat to the dispute and turned into yet another “scramble for resources”. History of the Dispute Territorial disputes in Cambodia–Vietnam relations have always been sensitive given the historical relations of both the states. During the golden era of the Khmer empire (802–1431 a.d.) contacts between Khmers and Viets were limited only to occasional military conflicts. Furthermore, since the 17th century the ailing Cambodian kingdom was exposed to the territorial expansion of the Viets, who accelerated their Southern March (Nam Tien)2 “swallowing up” (using the Cambodian expression) the land that had belonged to the Khmers – the Kampuchea Krom territory (i.e. the Mekong Delta region) (Pouvatchy 1986, p. 440). While the Vietnamese historiography perceives the Southern March as a fulfillment of Vietnamese destiny, a collective act and collective success, for the Khmers it represents a historical trauma, which gave rise to their desire for rectification and revenge (Tran and Reid 2006, p. 12). These feelings of resentment were further deepened by the subsequent colonization of Cambodia in 1835–1841 by the Vietnamese king Minh Mang (ruled 1820–1840) and the forceful “Vietnamization” of Khmer population living in the southern provinces (McHale 2013, pp. 370–371).

2 Nam Tien (Southern March/Marching) refers to the southward expansion of the territory of Vietnam. The process slowly began during the Ly Dynasty (1010–1225) and continued until the 18th century. It resulted in the overthrow of the Champa Kingdom and Vietnamese ­occupation of the Mekong Delta.

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The French Colonial Period (1863–1954) Vietnamese expansion to Cambodia was slowed down by French colonization of the region in the second half of the 19th century.3 However, the French colonial rule had in its consequences aggravated the relations between the Khmers and the Vietnamese in an unintended way. On the one hand, the French were responsible for increasing the numbers of Vietnamese in the colonial apparatus in Cambodia4 deeming that the Khmers were under-educated and also too “lazy” to fill these positions. On the other hand, the French officials and scholars extolled “Khmer altruism, moral superiority, innocence and peacefulness” (Edwards 1996, p. 54). Colonial propaganda went even further asserting that the “poor, sweet, gentle” Khmer “needed” French protection against the “malicious, dirty, thieving” Vietnamese (Edwards 1996, p. 54). In addition, during the First Indochina War (1946–1954) the French were deliberately stirring anti-Vietnamese sentiments among the Khmer. For example in 1948 tracts distributed by French units castigated the Khmers for becoming “valets” of the Vietnamese and delivering themselves to their “hereditary enemy” (McHale 2013, p. 382). This propaganda has also contributed to fueling the perception that Cambodia was under constant threat from Vietnamese expansion, which would become a recurring topic of Cambodian nationalism and its relation to Vietnam. As Kraus has already discussed above, land and maritime borders between Cambodia and Vietnam that were delimitated during the French colonial rule were to become yet another bone of contention between these countries. According to Cambodian official rhetoric, historical evidence proves that Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) as well as other small features in the Gulf of Thailand were always part of Cambodian territory. The earliest Cambodian references to Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) are found in royal documents dating back to 1615 (Mudrick 2014). Furthermore, Cambodian sources claim that French maps of the region dating back as far as 1686 designated delta territories and Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island as part of Cambodia (Mom 2005, p. 29). Cambodians also argue that when colonizing the region of Indochina, the French attempted to obtain Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) from the Khmer Kingdom and not from Vietnam. According to some sources, until the French conquest of Indochina, Cambodia had sovereignty over the islands in the Gulf of Thailand such as islands of Koh Ta Kiev (Baie), Koh Thmey (Milieu), Koh Ses (Eau), Koh Tonsay (Pic), and Koh Po (the Northern Pirate) (Mom 2005, p. 29; International Boundary Study 1976, p. 9). 3 By the end of the 19th century Vietnam (divided into the colony Cochinchina, and the protectorates of Annam and Tonkin), Cambodia and Laos became part of the French Indochina. 4 By 1945 more than 300.000 Vietnamese settled in Cambodia, mostly in Phnom Penh and border provinces with Vietnam (McHale 2013, p. 371).

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These claims, however, prove to be problematic as the Khmers have never been a maritime nation. Secondly, other sources bring contradictory information. Around 1680 Khmer kings granted authority to settle and develop large areas of the Cambodian coast to a Chinese merchant and explorer, Mac Cuu, who established Ha Tien and six other villages, one of them being on the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island, as trading centers concentrating mainly Chinese and Portuguese merchants. However, in 1714 Mac Cuu recognized the authority of the Vietnamese Nguyen lords, who ruled southern Vietnam and gained the right to oversee his lands as a fiefdom (Mudrick 2014). Between the 1760s and 1780s French bishop Pigneau de Behaine established a seminary on the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) with the objective of expanding his missionary activities. Prince Nguyen Phuc Anh – the future emperor Gia Long (ruled 1802–1820) of the Nguyen Dynasty – also took refuge on the island in 1782–1786 during the Tay Son rebellion and rule (1771–1802) (Taylor 2013, pp. 373–374). At that time the island seems to have been inhabited mainly by Vietnamese and Chinese fishermen and merchants. After the French had established a protectorate over Cambodia in 1863 and the colony of Cochinchina in 1864, the island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) and other features in the Gulf of Thailand were incorporated into Ha Tien province of Cochinchina, i.e. South Vietnam (International Boundary Study 1976, p. 9). Nonetheless, Cambodian kings continued to claim the island features in the Gulf. It is, however, very problematic to trace proofs of these claims. In the 1870s the French concluded several agreements with them delimitating the land borders between Cambodia, Annam and Cochinchina. However, the maritime boundary itself was delineated almost seventy years later by the infamous Brévié Line promulgated by the Governor General of Indochina Jules Brévié (in office from 1936–1939). In 1939, in his letter to the governor of Cochinchina Brévié stated that (…) he decided that all the islands located north of the line perpendicular to the coast starting from the border between Cambodia and Cochin China and making a 140 grade angle with the north meridian, in accordance with the attached chart, will be from now on administered by Cambodia. The Protectorate will, in particular, take over the police of these islands. All the islands south of this line, including the islands of Phu Quoc, will continue to be administered by Cochin China. It is understood that the demarcation line thus made will make a line around the north of the island Phu Quoc, passing three kilometers from the extreme ends of the north shore of this islands. quoted in mom 2005, p. 106

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He also stated that the issue of jurisdiction remained reserved. The Brévié Line did not discourage the Cambodian kings from continuing to claim their territories in line with their conviction that the border treaties imposed on them by the French had been unfair and favored the Vietnamese (Vu 2007, p. 18). For example, when Japanese troops occupied Indochina during World War ii, King Norodom Sihanouk5 did not hesitate to inform the Japanese of the Cambodian claim to the maritime features in the Gulf of Thailand in his letter of 25 June 1945 (Mom 2005, p. 31). The end of World War ii in 1945 created a new situation in Indochina as the legacy of the Japanese presence in the region reflected in triggering local national movements and aided the process of decolonization. Vietnam took the lead, when Ho Chi Minh proclaimed independence and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (drv) on 2 September 1945. However, the French were unwilling to give up their colony and several rounds of failed negotiations in 1946 sparked the First Indochina War. The communist victory in the prc in 1949 and the fear of the spread of Communism resulted in the subsequent us support of the French in Indochina. American intervention in the region later escalated into the eruption of the Second Indochina War (1964–1975). In this context boundary and territorial issues between Cambodia and Vietnam were to a certain extent sidelined given their joint struggle against French colonialism and later American intervention in the region. Nonetheless, the disagreements over the islands between both the states continued to resurface. The dispute flared up with greater intensity in 1953 as the French, after having recognized Cambodia’s independence, handed over all the islands north of the Brévié Line to the Associated State of Vietnam6 (Vu 2007, p. 18). In reaction, King Norodom Sihanouk restated Cambodia’s claims at the Geneva Conference concluding the First Indochina War in a Memorandum of 24 April 1954 (Mom 2005, p. 31). 5 Norodom Sihanouk (31 October 1922 until 15 October 2012) was a prominent Cambodian leader and politician. He served as king of Cambodia from 1941–1955 and 1993–2004. However, during his long political career he also held the post of prime minister, head of state and president. In those functions, he used the title “Prince”. 6 Associated State of Vietnam was established by the French in March 1949 as a counterbalance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, established by Ho Chi Minh on September 2, 1945. The drv gained recognition by France on 6 March 1946. However, France acknowledged it only as a “free state” within the French Union. A series of negotiations followed but they all ended in failure, as both the sides were not capable to reach a consensus and First Indochina War broke out in December 1946.

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The Kingdom of Cambodia (1953–1970) The relations between Cambodia and Vietnam were strained even after the Geneva Conference as Norodom Sihanouk remained anxious of a constant Vietnamese threat of encroachment of Cambodian territory. Furthermore, he deliberately manipulated the fear of the Vietnamese to serve his own political agenda through stirring nationalist sentiments by making inflammatory statements. Thus, the disagreements over maritime issues and border disputes between both the sides quickly resurfaced. In 1958, Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of the newly established Republic of Vietnam (rvn), sent an official note to Cambodia “reasserting” Vietnamese claims to the islands of Baie (Koh Ta Kiev), Milieu (Koh Thmey), Eau (Koh Ses), Pic (Koh Tonsay), and the Northern Pirates (Koh Po). rvn claimed the islands on the basis of first colonization, administration, and sovereignty. Cambodia reacted by rejecting the Vietnamese arguments (International Boundary Study 1976, p. 9). Furthermore, in 1960 prince Norodom Sihanouk made an unsuccessful attempt to regain the island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) from the Vietnamese claiming that “The loss of the island and the territorial waters surrounding them would lead to the stifling of the port of [Kompong Som] (…) and very soon to the end of our dependence” (quoted in Chanda 1986, p. 13). Sihanouk’s statement most probably reflected his conviction that rvn strove to strangle the port of Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) with the objective of keeping Cambodia dependent on Vietnam, as in 1956 Ngo Dinh Diem’s government in an effort to force Cambodia to recognize the newly established state, forbid the use of the lower reaches of the Mekong river for vessels going to Phnom Penh (Farrell 1998, p. 188). Therefore, aiming to secure the free transit to the port of Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) between January 1956 and April 1960 the Sihanouk government took a more aggressive approach and occupied seven islands north of the Brévié Line and adopted this Line as the official maritime border (International Boundary Study 1976, p. 9). The maritime disputes thus also contributed to the subsequent breakdown of Cambodia–Republic of Vietnam (rvn) relations in August 1963 (Farrell 1998, p. 188). In addition, in 1965 Sihanouk broke off relations with the United States.7 With the Vietnam War (1964–1975) escalating in Indochina and following the dictum “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” Sihanouk turned to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South 7 The immediate cause, why Sihanouk broke off relations with the us, was yet another American cross border incursion and air attack on a Cambodian village. However, the main reasons were his conviction that American intervention in Vietnam was a mistake as well as the detrimental consequences it had on Cambodia (Clymer 2013, p. 3).

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Vietnam (nlf). He allowed the drv to use Cambodia’s territory to re-supply the nlf and its regular troops fighting in the south via the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail. The port of Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) was used as an important transit for Chinese and Soviet aid heading to the North Vietnamese (Chanda 1986, p. 61). In exchange for granting such favors he sought their firm commitment to respect Cambodia’s “existing” borders. Negotiations with the nlf began in 1964, continued through 1966 resulting in nlf’s public announcement on 31 May 1967 that it recognized the existing borders of Cambodia, which were to be demarcated, after the Vietnam War would have been over. In the statement, nlf also accepted Cambodian sovereignty over the islands north of the Brévié Line then claimed by the rvn. The drv followed suit by a similar statement issued on 8 June 1967, in which it also recognized the Brévié Line as a maritime border (Farrell 1998, p. 189). However, in June 1977 Phan Hien, the vice-minister of foreign affairs of the drv, admitted in an interview given to Nayan Chanda in Paris that “at that time we agreed to the Brévié Line, we were not aware of the problems of territorial waters, continental shelf, etc. – those new phenomena”, hinting that with the discovery of natural resources in the Gulf of Thailand Hanoi had reconsidered its stance on maritime borders with Cambodia (quoted in Chanda 1986, p. 33). The Khmer Republic (1970–1975) In 1970 general and former Prime Minister Lon Nol, a fervent anti – communist and a strong ally of the us against the drv, overthrew Prince Norodom Sihanouk and established the Khmer Republic on 9 October 1970. This had a salient impact on Khmer-Vietnamese relations (as well as territorial disputes), as Lon Nol pursued a series of anti-Vietnamese policies. His ethnocentrism resulted in frequent pogroms aimed against the Vietnamese (and Chinese), when his army units massacred thousands of Vietnamese civilians. Furthermore, thousands of Vietnamese, who had lived in Cambodia for generations, fled the country to South Vietnam, resulting in frequent border clashes between both the states (Berman 1996, pp. 830–831). Lon Nol’s ethnocentric and anti-Vietnamese government also added further heat to the maritime dispute by offering oil concessions to foreign investors in 1970 (Van Ginneken 1983, p. 140). On the other hand, rvn also aggravated the dispute by issuing the Petroleum Law of 1 December 1970, in which it provided its definition of Vietnam’s continental shelf, according to the 200 meter depth and exploitability criteria, i.e. in compliance with the Article 76 of unclos iii. Furthermore, on 9 June 1971 in its implementing decree of the above – mentioned law, rvn reasserted its claims by unilaterally defining limits of the continental shelf claiming

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sovereignty over Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island, the Phu Du group (Koh Thmei and Koh Ses) to the northwest as well as other island features in the eastern part of the Gulf of Thailand south of latitude 10° north. By doing so rvn also opened the bidding for foreign oil companies (Nguyen Hong Thao 1999, p. 81). The Khmer Republic followed suit and on 3 July 1971 announced the coordinates of its continental shelf.8 A year later, i.e. on 1 July 1972, Cambodia issued Presidential Decree or Kret No. 439-72/PRK, in which it unilaterally defined the boundary of Cambodia’s continental shelf. In the document the Khmer Republic also stipulated sovereignty over Phu Quoc (Koh Tral), the Phu Du group as well as the Poulo Wai and Poulo Panjang archipelagoes. Furthermore, on 10 August 1972, the Cambodian Ministry of Industry and Mining Resources officially opened new bidding to foreign companies for both on-shore and offshore areas (Siddayao 1978, pp. 77–79). The increased controversies over maritime claims and oil exploration brought the representatives of both the countries to the discussion table in 1973. In May a round of talks was held in Phnom Penh but no resolution was reached (Vu 2007, p. 18). Hence, both countries continued to offer concessions to foreign investors. At this time the most heated discussions revolved around the ownership of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral), which was occupied by South Vietnamese forces. It was thought that a resolution could be reached by leaving the island out of the concession area offered to foreign companies (Siddayao 1978, pp. 81–82). In February 1974 the rvn made a cautious conciliatory move towards its neighbor as the South Vietnamese Petroleum Board put forth a proposal to its counterpart, the Cambodian Directorate of Mines, to equally divide the area of overlap with Cambodian sovereignty over Poulo Wei and Vietnamese ownership of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) and Tho Chu. The Cambodian side “informally rejected” the proposition. Thus, by mid-1974 the dispute as well as negotiations were at a standstill (Siddayao 1978, p. 82). The Khmer Rouge Period (1975–1979) Disputes over the maritime boundary and the ownership of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) and other island features continued even during the Khmer Rouge regime. After the withdrawal of the American troops from Vietnam in 1973, the overthrow of the Khmer Republic and the establishment of the Republic of Democratic Kampuchea (dk) by the Khmer Rouge and the reunification of Vietnam in April 1975, new and divergent political vistas opened before the former comrades-in-arms. Unconstrained by the previous need to cooperate, 8 They were defined as “102–deg., 54–min. E. Long., and ll–deg., 38–min., N. Lat.”, excluding the island of Koh Kut.

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both Vietnam and the newly established dk were no longer hesitant to re– assert their territorial claims that had been shelved during the long years of conflict. Yet at this point neither of the states was willing to engage in another open and full-scale conflict (Chanda 1986, p. 11). However, as the time passed both the sides had escalated their antagonist rhetoric. The seizure of Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975 gave kr leader Pol Pot the opportunity to realize his radical ideas as well as his deep antipathy to the Vietnamese, which manifested in his eight–point directive as the last two points stipulated the expulsion of the entire Vietnamese population from Cambodia as well as the dispatch of troops to the borders, particularly the Vietnamese one (Robinson 1998, pp. 10–11; Chanda 1986, p. 13). Thus, by the end of 1975 most ethnic Vietnamese had fled Cambodia for Vietnam. In addition, in their quest to establish control over the whole territory, the kr revived an old claim to Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island by occupying it on 4 May 1975. Six days later its troops also invaded Tho Chu Island (also known as Paolo Panjang, or Koh Krachak Ses in Khmer) killing over 500 Vietnamese inhabitants. On 12 May 1975 the Khmer Rouge seized the us merchant ship ss Mayaguez off Poulo Wai (Koh Wai) (Farrell 1998, p. 199; Chanda 1986, p. 13). The situation was brought under control on 2 June 1975 after Nguyen Van Linh, a Vietnamese Politburo member, had arrived to Phnom Penh to discuss the issue. Pol Pot, probably aware of the possible negative consequences of his hasty moves, pleaded guilty claiming that the “painful, bloody clashes” were caused by his subordinates’ “ignorance of local geography.” The Vietnamese reacted by mounting a combined air and naval assault on the Poulo Wai Island, which they seized on 12 June coinciding with Pol Pot’s secret “fraternal” visit to Hanoi (Chanda 1986, p. 14). There are divergent accounts of the June 1975 discussions concerning border and maritime issues. According to Nayan Chanda, Foreign Minister Ieng Sary claimed that the Cambodians had tried in vain to raise border issues at the meeting calling for the Vietnamese to respect the 1967 drv declaration, in which it had vowed to recognize the “present borders” of Cambodia. According to the Cambodian representatives, the Vietnamese resolutely refused to discuss the issue. On the other hand, the Vietnamese claimed that the Cambodians sought to sign a treaty of friendship, which would encompass trade, consular issues as well as border demarcation, but did not seem keen on calling for any immediate discussions concerning joint territorial disputes. Nonetheless, the maritime disputes subsided for a while after the Vietnamese had returned Poulo Wai to the Cambodians in August 1975 (Farrell 1998, p. 199; Chanda 1986, pp. 14–15). A relatively stable situation was maintained during the second half of 1975 and in 1976.

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In May 1976 the two parties made another attempt to start negotiations in Phnom Penh concerning sea and land border issues, but the discussions yet again broke down at the preparatory meeting due to divergent opinions concerning who could propose alterations to the delimitation of the common borders. The Cambodian side claimed to have the unilateral right to propose alterations and stated that Vietnam violated this right by putting forward proposals (Pouvatchy 1986, p. 447). Furthermore, contradictions also arose concerning the choice of maps on the basis of which demarcation should be carried out. The Vietnamese proposed to use pre-1954 French maps to demarcate the borders. The Cambodians agreed on the condition that they had the right to amend borderlines (Chanda 1986, p. 32). Concerning the maritime boundary the kr abandoned its claims to the islands south of the Brévié Line. Nonetheless, the kr insisted on accepting the Brévié Line not only as the dividing line for islands in the Gulf, but also as a maritime boundary. The Vietnamese side rejected this proposition. Phan Hien, the Vietnamese vice-minister of foreign affairs, did agree to settle the question of the ownership of the islands in accordance with the Brévié Line, i.e. he conceded that the islands north of the line were to belong to Cambodia, while the islands south of the line (i.e. including the Phu Quoc [Koh Tral] Island) were to be Vietnamese (Prescott 1981, p. 28). However, he also proposed that the line be redrawn with respect to the question of territorial waters, i.e. the Vietnamese hoped to readjust the Brévié Line in the vicinity of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island so as to gain better access for Vietnamese vessels. As Prescott (1981, p. 29) points out the Vietnamese reluctance to accept the Brévié Line as a maritime border stemmed from the simple fact that it would gain a vaster area of sea and seabed – more than 860 nautical square miles – by applying the equidistance principle. Unsurprisingly, this proposition was refused by the kr, who accused the Vietnamese of “plans of annexation of a big part of the seas of Kampuchea” (quoted in Chanda 1986, p. 33). Given these insurmountable differences the talks were postponed, never to be resumed again. Furthermore, as early as 1977, armed clashes along the land border erupted once more with dk taking the initiative in a move to assert its claim to territory under Vietnamese control (Amer 1997, p. 80). The upsurge of armed clashes along the land borders coincided with Vietnam’s statement on the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of 12 May 1977. In the document, Vietnam established 12 nm of territorial sea, 12 nm of contiguous zone, 200 nm of exclusive economic zone and 200 nm of continental shelf, measuring from the baseline (Mom 2005, 41). On 28 may 1977 Democratic Kampuchea reacted by publishing a list of 44 islands under

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Cambodian sovereignty. However, the list did not include the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island (Farrell 1998, p. 197; Prescott 1981, p. 29). Three days later, dk also issued a unilateral statement on the establishment of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf (Farrell 1998, p. 197; Prescott 1981, p. 28). In the statement the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea reaffirmed Kampuchea’s claim to 12 nm of territorial sea, 12 nm of contiguous zone and 200 nm of exclusive economic zone and 200 nm of continental shelf. Furthermore, he reiterated Democratic Kampuchea’s full and entire sovereignty over its territorial sea, its airspace and its seabed and subsoil as well as its exclusive rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing all their natural resources of the superjacent water and the bed and subsoil of its exclusive economic zone. In addition, Democratic Kampuchea reserved its rights to resolve any territorial disputes with any party according to each specific situation (Statement Issued by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1978). The final attempt to resolve territorial issues was made on 5 February 1978, when the Vietnamese side put forth a three-point proposal, in which it demanded an immediate termination of hostilities, called for a general treaty of respect and non-interference as well as required a conclusion of a new border treaty, which would respect the existing borders. Nonetheless, the Vietnamese continued to reject the Brévié Line as a maritime boundary. On 15 May 1978 the Democratic Kampuchea reacted with its own proposal, which called for the cessation of violations and provocations in Cambodian territorial waters and also of intelligence gathering on the islands as well as in its territorial waters (Farrell 1998, p. 197). However, the deteriorating relations between both states aggravated by the kr incursions into Vietnam as well as the slaughter of Vietnamese still living in dk led to Vietnam’s military intervention in late December 1978 and the overthrow of the kr government and subsequent establishment of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (prk) under Vietnamese tutelage. People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979–1989) The period of Vietnam’s presence and influence in People’s Republic of Kampuchea between 1979 and 1989 has been subject to much controversy both in international politics and scholarly debates. After the fall of Phnom Penh and the overthrow of the kr regime, on 8 January 1979 the Vietnamese installed a pro-Vietnamese government with Heng Samrin as president of the newly established People’s Republic of Kampuchea. By 1980 there were more than 150.000 Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia (Berman 1996, p. 836). Despite the

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fact that the Vietnamese imposed a relationship of dependency on Cambodia, it was a period of overall “friendly relations” between the two states, which were able to overcome their differences over a series of issues – one of them being resolving their joint borders (Amer 2010, p. 95). The border issue was first mentioned in the Article 4 of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, which was signed on 18 February 1979 in Phnom Penh by Pham Van Dong and Heng Samrin. Article 4 asserts that “the two parties will proceed on negotiations to sign a treaty defining the national boundaries between the two countries on the basis of the current borders and they are resolved to make this border one of peace and lasting friendship between the two countries” (quoted in Pouvatchy 1986, p. 448). Thus, on 7 July 1982 both countries signed an Agreement on Historic Waters. According to this document Cambodia’s waters included the coast of Kampot province and Poulo Wai Islands, while Vietnam’s waters encompassed the coast of Kien Giang province and Phu Quoc and Tho Chu Islands (Thayer 2012, p. 68; Amer 2010, p. 96). The agreement stipulated that “at a suitable time” negotiations were to take place to determine the maritime boundary. Until then the two sides agreed to respect the Brévié line, “a line projecting seaward from the terminus of the land frontier on the coast at 126° west of the north meridian save for a 3 km belt of jurisdiction around the northern shores of Phu Quoc island” (quoted in Amer 1997, p. 81) as the line dividing the islands within the historic waters. The exploitation of the overlapping zone was to be decided by “common agreement” (Amer 2010, p. 97). However, until this day both sides have failed to conclude the process of establishing a maritime boundary and the overlapping claims remain unresolved (Thayer 2012, p. 68). The second agreement, Treaty on the Principles for Border Resolutions between People’s Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, was signed on 20 July 1983 in Phnom Penh and delineated the land border. The document stipulated that both the sides were to regard as the national border the present line between both the states as defined on 1:100.000 scale map published by the Geographic Service of Indochina before 1954 or at a date very near 1954 (Thayer 2012, p. 68; Amer 2010, p. 97). Article 2 and 3 of the document focused also on the delimitation of maritime borders stating that the two parties would negotiate at convenient time to delimit the sea border of each country in the historic waters. It also stipulated that the two countries would establish a joint committee with representatives of both sides to delimit the land border and sea border and to draft a treaty on the border delimitation between both countries (Mom 2005, p. 32). The process of negotiations was concluded on 27 December 1985, when Cambodia and Vietnam adopted the Treaty on the Delimitation of Vietnam

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and Kampuchea Frontier. The Council of the State of Vietnam ratified the document on 30 January 1986, while the Assembly of the prk approved it a week later (7 February 1986) (Amer 2010, p. 97). According to the treaty, the demarcation line copied the borderline at the time of Cambodia’s independence.9 Concerning the maritime borders the treaty provided that (1) The national sea border between the two countries originate from the farthest point of the land border as found in the 1:100.000 and 1:50.000 scale maps attached to the Treaty; (2) The national sea border continue to follow a path to be agreed upon by both sides to ensure to compute the division of islands as stipulated under the agreement on the historical water of the srv and prk; (3) This border line will go through point 0, the adjoint point of the two baseline used to compute the width of the territorial sea of each country and this border will stretch to a point on the external border line of the each country’s territorial sea; (4) The official sea maps attached to the Treaty on the delimitation of the national sea border between the two countries will be the sea map of hydrology agency of French printed 1956 on 182.650 scale sea map bearing numbers 5394 and 5395. mom 2005, p. 34

Thus, at first sight one could evaluate the cooperation between both the countries in concluding three border treaties as successful. However, according to Evan Gottesman, Vietnamese leadership exerted pressure upon the prk government through its special advisors and especially then Foreign Minister (and current Prime Minister) Hun Sen to make compromises and settle the maritime and border issues. According to Gottesman, there were four main reasons for Vietnamese determination to push for the resolution of common borders. Firstly, Vietnam wanted to avoid being accused of “absorbing Cambodia”. Secondly, it wanted to resolve lingering disputes from the dk era. Thirdly, it strove to present an impression of a normal bilateral relationship of the two states. Lastly, it was a test of Cambodian leaders as credible and reliable allies of the Vietnamese regime (see Gottesman 2004, pp. 209–211 cited in Vu 2007, p. 19).

9 In line with this treaty in between 1985–1988 the two sides erected 72 border markers out of the planned 322 along a 200 km stretch of the 1,137 km common border (Thayer 2012, p. 68). However, Cambodia stalled the demarcation process in 1989 on the basis of technical problems. The demarcation process was revived only in 2005 after the signing of the Supplementary Treaty to the “Treaty on the Delimitation of the State Border of 1985” (Vu 2007, p. 21).

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Cambodia’s Maritime Disputes with Vietnam since 1993 After the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989 and the establishment of the Kingdom of Cambodia in 1993 differences over maritime and border issues reemerged given the fact that all the political parties vying to win over more voters revived the myth of the “others” threatening Cambodian existence. The Cambodian People’s Party (cpp), the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (pdk), the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (kpnlf) and Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (bldp) as well as the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (funcinpec) all revived the myth of Cambodia’s extinction. While cpp accused all the other parties of being a genocidal clique intending to destroy Cambodia, the funcinpec, bldp and dpk claimed that the State of Cambodia (1989–1993) with the Cambodian People’s Party were mere “Vietnamese puppets”. Press campaigns in the country also predicted that if funcinpec won, the ethnic Vietnamese would have to immediately leave the country (Berman 1996, p. 840). Furthermore, the last four mentioned parties went on to depict Vietnam as the main villain responsible for the social, economic and development failure in Cambodia (Edwards 1996, pp. 56–57). Tensions between the Khmers and the Vietnamese were further escalated by the renewed migration of Vietnamese (many former residents, who had fled the country during the kr regime) to Cambodia (Berman 1996, p. 839). It was the funcinpec that won the elections in 1993 and under the leadership of King Sihanouk border disputes between both the states reemerged. Article 2 of the 1993 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia declared that “the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia shall absolutely not be violated within its borders as defined in the 1:100.000 scale map between the years 1933–1953 and internationally recognized between the years 1963–1969” (Kingdom of Cambodia 1993). As a result, the new Cambodian coalition government toughened its stance on the resolution of the border issue (Vu 2007, p. 21). Furthermore, King Norodom Sihanouk and Prime Minister Norodom Ranarridh both publicly rejected the three above–mentioned treaties that had been concluded by Heng Samrin’s government. In addition, in May 1994 King Sihanouk accused Vietnam of “nibbling away” Cambodian territory by moving the border demarcation markers. Vietnam denied those accusations and emphasized its readiness to resolve border problems by peaceful means (Amer 1997, p. 82). Given the ongoing tensions related to contested territories, on 25 February 1995 King Norodom Sihanouk signed a Royal Decree No. 0295/19, in which he established the Supreme National Council on Border Affairs. The newly set up body was entrusted with the following functions: Firstly, to compile and prepare all normative documents relating

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to land and maritime boundary delimitation. Secondly, to study and analyze the selected maps for delimitation purpose of land and maritime boundary between Cambodia and its neighboring countries. Thirdly, with due approval from the Royal Government, to conduct negotiations, to make necessary arrangements, settlement, and decisions on the boundary issues and other border related matters. And, fourthly, to implement the border treaties ­(Sotharith 2007, p. 7). However, the Supreme National Council on Border Affairs did not prove effective and accusations against Vietnam by Cambodian high-level ­politicians continued in the first half of the following year. Especially the First pm Ranariddh was the most vocal about Vietnamese encroachment of ­Cambodia’s territory (Amer 2010, p. 97). Border disputes subsided for a short time in 1997–1998 after prince Norodom Ranariddh had been deposed by the Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, who subsequently offered the post to Ung Huot (in function from August 1997 – November 1998). During his office the relations between Cambodia and Vietnam improved substantially, which also reflected in more efficient handling of the land and maritime disputes. On 1–3 June 1998 Ung Huot made an official visit to Hanoi, where he affirmed that the Cambodian government would continue to uphold border agreements with Vietnam (Vu 2007, p. 22). Both sides also agreed to strengthen cooperation in order to overcome lingering bilateral issues via peaceful dialogue. Expert level talks were held in Phnom Penh on 18–20 June 1998 resulting in an agreement to establish a joint-border commission to resolve the dispute (Amer 2000, p. 40). However, the discussions were put on hold given the Cambodian parliamentary elections planned for 26 July 1998. In their run-up border issue became a hot topic again, as the opposition leaders took the opportunity to play on the anti-Vietnamese sentiments among the population claiming that the Vietnamese were encroaching on Cambodian territory. For example, in June 1998 the deposed Prince Ranariddh accused Hun Sen of inaction in the face of Vietnam’s infringement. Furthermore, he described the preceding round of border talks concerning maritime boundary that had been held in Phnom Penh from 16–20 June 1998 as a “complete failure” claiming that the 1982 treaty on historic waters was not only “against the interest of Cambodia” but also against international law, “real history” and Cambodian constitution (Wikfalk 1998). During the campaign both Prince Ranariddh, but also Sam Rainsy from the Sam Rainsy Party (srp), pushed for the recognition of the Brévié Line as a maritime boundary between both the states. This proposal was rejected by the Vietnamese side as it preferred to determine a new maritime boundary based on the 1982 un Convention of the Law of the Sea, as it gave coastal states not only the right to extend their territory 12 nm from

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their coastlines, but also to exploit resources within 200 nm from the coast (Wikfalk 1998). Within these discussions, the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island came to the fore as the most controversial issue. Prince Ranariddh went so far as to claim that the legal ownership of the island had never been settled. As has been mentioned above, the Vietnamese side rejected the Brévié Line as its acceptance would give Vietnam 10.35 nm less of territorial water around Phu Quoc than if they applied the equidistance principle under unclos iii regulations. The distance between Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) and Cambodia’s coast also posed another problem for the delimitation, as it is too short to allow both countries full territorial sea in this area. Territorial water around the island thus reduced Cambodian territorial claims (Wikfalk 1998). These differences over maritime jurisdiction have persisted up to the present. The bilateral discussions concerning border disputes were resumed after pm Hun Sen had made an official visit to Hanoi in December 1998. On this occasion both the sides agreed to settle their border differences before 2000. Furthermore, they agreed to establish an inter-governmental commission for border issues, which held its first meeting in Ho Chi Minh City in March 1999 (Amer 2000, pp. 40–41). In spite of setting up the Joint Border Commission, no further development was reached until 2005. The 2005 Supplementary Treaty Despite the ongoing tensions on the domestic political scene, Hun Sen continued to strengthen Cambodia’s relationship with Vietnam and showed more flexibility in resolving the land and maritime disputes. However, his moves stirred strong criticism from representatives of the opposition parties. For example on 18 May 2005 in an interview for the pro-opposition newspaper “Moneaksekar” Sam Rainsy announced that under the terms of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, all the border agreements signed with Vietnam should be regarded as null and void. Furthermore, he called for the usage of Cambodia’s altered maps that were published between 1963 and 1969 and deposited at the United Nations (Vu 2007, p. 22). Three weeks later, i.e. on 6 June 2005, Hun Sen’s cpp published its own statement on border disputes, in which it claimed that all the border agreements with Vietnam signed under the prk regime in the 1980s had been concluded on the status quo basis and that legal maps were not against the 1991 Paris Agreements. Therefore, these treaties were recognized in the 1993 Constitution and did not contribute to any land concessions to Vietnam (Vietnam News Agency 2005, quoted in Vu 2007, p. 24).

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In response to the above–mentioned domestic pressures, Cambodia negotiated and signed a Supplementary Treaty to the “Treaty on the Delimitation of the State Border of 1985” on 10 October 2005 in Hanoi (Thayer 2012, p. 69). Yet again, the treaty stirred much turmoil on the Cambodian political scene. On 11 November 2005 members of the Cambodian parliament from the two main political parties (Cambodian People’s Party and funcinpec) voted to approve the treaty with Vietnam after a seven hour long discussion, during which the members of the Sam Rainsy Party walked out in protest before the final vote. The remaining 97 representatives voted unanimously to approve the supplemental treaty.10 The treaty came into force on 6 December 2005 after the exchange of ratification documents by both the countries (Amer 2010, p. 100). The text of the treaty was virtually identical to that of the 1985 treaty. However, it helped resolve six out of seven disputed border areas with Vietnam in the Central Highlands. The last area of contention was a 50 sq. km piece of territory in Dak Dam commune, Orang district, Mondulkiri province, which both the parties pledged to resolve (Vong Sokheng 2005). Despite the ongoing grievances of Cambodian opposition leaders that “Cambodia lost its sovereignty to Vietnam”, the 2005 treaty helped not only to diffuse much of the tension concerning land border issues in the bilateral relations, but also aided the expansion of economic cooperation in many spheres (see Thayer 2012). The problem is that the October 2005 Supplementary Treaty did not relate to the maritime issues between the two countries (Amer and Nguyen Hong Thao 2007, p. 310).

Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) as a Lingering Hot Topic on Cambodia’s Domestic Political Scene As has been mentioned above, the maritime disputes over the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island reemerged as a “hot topic” on the Cambodian political scene again in the run up to the July 2013 general elections. On 9 August 2012 pm Hun Sen gave a five-hour speech before the National Assembly, in which he justified his position as well as clarified the contentious issues of land and maritime

10

The new King Norodom Sihamoni was also lobbied from several quarters (especially the Sam Rainsy Party) not to approve the treaty. He also found himself under the pressure of Hun Sen, who had warned that the monarchy might be abolished if it was “difficult to sign” the treaty. He continued to assert that the government would continue its work on border demarcation, including the installation of border markers, as well as on the negotiations with Vietnam over both land and sea borders (Vong Sokheng 2005).

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borders. Concerning the maritime dispute with Vietnam, Hun Sen claimed that in 1999 King Sihanouk had told former Vietnamese pm Pham Van Dong that Cambodia no longer demanded Koh Tral back relinquishing Cambodia’s right to the island. (Meas Sokchea and Boyle 2013). However, his speech failed to convince the opposition. On 2 September 2012 the opposition leader to pm Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party, Kem Sokha, revived the unresolved maritime dispute again by claiming that Vietnam should return the island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) to Cambodia. He also stressed that “the National Salvation Party’s policy is to solve the issues of national territorial integrity with nonviolence. Not through war, but according to law.” He also added that he believed “the case of Koh Tral can be settled in our favor through the law with the help of legal experts” (quoted in Lipes 2012). The reaction of the ruling party cpp was fast, whereas Tit Sothea, its spokesman, accused Kem Sokha of stirring nationalist sentiments in order to gain support ahead of the 2013 elections by “misleading” the Cambodian people. He also stressed that even if Kem Sokha were fortunate enough to win the election and become the prime minister “he would still be unable to solve the problem through legal and historical means” (quoted in Lipes 2012). The political bickering over Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) in the run up for elections continued until June 2013. For example, on 9 June 2013 Yim Sovann, spokesperson for the cnrp, told the “Cambodian Post” that one of the objectives his party was to retrieve the island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) from the Vietnamese, as well as to remove border demarcation posts across the Cambodia – Vietnam border (i.e. in the Svay Rieng, Takeo, Mondulkiri, Ratanakkiri and Kampong Cham provinces) (Cheang Sokha Ponniah 2013). On 17 June 2013 Rong Chhun, the president of the Cambodian Confederation of Unions and of the Cambodian Independent Teachers Association (cita), also revived the dispute by presenting new evidence supporting Cambodia’s ownership to the island Phu Quoc (Koh Tral). At a press conference in Phnom Penh he presented a 7th grade Cambodian geography textbook from 1985, where Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) was shown as Cambodian territory. In addition, Rong Chunn pledged to push Prime Minister Hun Sen to undertake steps to regain the island from the Vietnamese. He was immediately criticized by Phay Siphan, spokesman for the Council of Ministers, for seizing the opportunity to stir anti-Vietnamese sentiments in the run-up for the elections (Meyn Aun Pheap 2013). Hun Sen’s Cambodia’s People’s Party won the 2013 elections in a narrow victory, in which it gained 68 parliamentary seats out of 123, while the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (cnrp) led by Sam Rainsy won 55 seats (Eimer 2013). According to the National Election Commission, 3.2 million

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citizens voted for Hun Sen’s Cambodia People’s Party (cpp) and 2.9 million for the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party. Hence, the difference was only 300,000 votes (Brinkley, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the results sparked allegations that the elections had been manipulated. The cnrp claimed that not only were thousands of citizens erased from electoral registers, but also that the cpp members voted several times. Hence, riots broke out in the streets of Phnom Penh reflecting the growing frustration of Cambodia’s young population (two thirds of the population are under thirty) with Hun Sen’s rule and glaring issues associated with it, such as illegal land grabs, labor rights abuses, corruption, cpp’s control of the media and last but not the least Hun Sen’s tight relations with Vietnam (Eimer 2013). Criticism of Hun Sen for the rigged elections and his close relations with Vietnam continued for the next few months and culminated during his visit to Vietnam on 26–28 December 2013. During the visit Hun Sen met with the Chairman of the Vietnamese National Assembly Nguyen Sinh Hung, President Truong Tan Sang, and the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Phu Trong and signed seven agreements related to the cooperation in public security, trade, education, and information as well as a treaty on extradition (Ponnudurai 2013). Even though trade with Vietnam has been beneficial for Cambodia (see Thayer 2012), most of the Cambodian population still feels that Hun Sen has been ceding Cambodian territory to Vietnamese–backed interests (Sainsbury, 2013). Furthermore, the opposition presented his trip as an effort to seek Vietnamese support to hold on to power (Ponnudurai 2013). Anti-government and anti-Vietnamese demonstrations as well as controversies over the territorial losses to Vietnam continued even after Hun Sen’s visit to Vietnam. For example, on 3 February 2014 Neang Sokhu, the president of the Khmer Youth Federation of Patriots, accused pm Hun Sen of illegally relinquishing the island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) and Tho Chu (Koh Krachak Sek) to Vietnam by filing a complaint against him at the Phnom Penh Municipal Court. Furthermore, he stated that he had enough evidence to do so claiming that he possessed “some documents that [Hun Sen] signed with the yuon [Vietnamese] prime minister in 1982” (quoted in Meas Sokchea 2014a). However, after Neang Sokhu had failed to provide additional evidence, on 25 March 2014 the Phnom Penh Municipal Court decided not to pursue the case (Meas Sokchea 2014b). In May 2014 the Cambodian police arrested another youth activist Im Nam Kea. He was found in possession of a box of cds containing songs about Phu Quoc (Koh Tral). The Cambodia National Rescue Party was suspected of wanting to use the cds in its campaign for the upcoming district and provincial council elections. However, after an hour of questioning the activist

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was released and officials stated different reasons for his detention (Vong Sokheng 2014). The situation culminated on 4 June 2014, i.e. on the commemoration day of the French official return of Cochinchina (which included the former Kampuchea Krom provinces as well as the Phu Quoc [Koh Tral] Island) to Vietnam in 1949, Sam Rainsy took the opportunity to accuse Hun Sen and his party of enabling Vietnamese encroachment of Cambodian territory through economic land concessions referring to the raising number of Vietnamese companies setting up businesses in Cambodia. As Rainsy pointed out, “What is happening now in Cambodia is reminiscent of the Vietnamese colonization of Kampuchea Krom [until the 20th century] when more and more foreign settlers were occupying a Khmer land, which was finally annexed by Vietnam following a dramatic change in the demographic balance” (quoted in Lipes 2014). pm Hun Sen’s administration reacted by accusing its political rivals of “playing politics” (Lipes 2014). Land and maritime disputes as a recurrent topic of domestic Cambodian politics have continued until 2015. Border tensions resurfaced again in May 2015, after the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party had launched yet another campaign to address the alleged Vietnamese encroachment of Cambodia’s territory (Strangio 2015a). On 12 and 14 June, Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation addressed two diplomatic notes to protest Vietnam’s alleged encroachment (Vannarith Chheang 2015). This marks an historical moment, as it was for the first time in years that the Foreign Ministry chose to undertake such as a step (Strangio 2015a). Vietnam, however, refrained from reacting, and blamed Cambodian “extremist groups” of the provocations and tensions at the borders (Vannarith Chheang 2015a). The mounting tensions culminated on 28 June 2015 in a clash between Cambodian activists and monks, led by two members of the Cambodia National Rescue Party, and Vietnamese authorities and villagers along the contentious borders of the Svey Rieng Province (Strangio 2015a). One of the key issues that had dominated the heated discussions among the opposition parties were allegations that the maps used by the current Cambodian government in its border negotiations with Vietnam were fake or inaccurate. Given the renewed tensions and clashes, the Cambodia–Vietnam Joint Border Committee convened a meeting in Phnom Penh from 6 to 8 July 2015 to address the contentious borders. During the negotiations the Vietnamese side agreed to halt the construction of roads, a police station and irrigation ponds in disputed areas. The two sides also pledged to continue with border demarcation and consultations and decided upon a creation of a joint technical border team, which would “cooperate to eliminate any problem along the

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border in order to prevent any complications that might affect the good status of bilateral relations” (Radio Free Asia 2015a). However, the opposition lead by the Cambodia National Rescue Party labeled the agreement as “unacceptable” stressing yet again that Cambodia would be losing too much land to Vietnam. Furthermore, Um Sam An, the Cambodia National Rescue Party parliamentarian, went as far as to reiterate the call of the opposition to bring the border dispute to the International Court of Justice for arbitration, as has been done with the case of the Preah Vihear temple (Radio Free Asia 2015a), discussed in great detail in Turcsányi and Kříž’s chapter. Thus, in mid-July 2015, in order to prove the authenticity of the maps used for demarcation Hun Sen sent letters to us President Barack Obama, French President François Hollande and u.k. Prime Minister David Cameron to ask for their “cooperation and assistance on an important issue about territory integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia” requesting them to provide him with the original maps that were prepared by France during the colonial period (Radio Free Asia 2015b; Vannarith Chheang 2015). In the letter, he further reiterated that “the request is based on national interests…and to avoid any incitement from extremists who would devastate Cambodia” and is “aimed at building a peaceful border with neighboring countries” (Radio Free Asia 2015b). However, at the same time on 16 July, he claimed that there existed a possibility that some border markers may have been placed incorrectly and vowed to demand corrections if it were true (Strangio 2015a). However, upon receiving the verification of maps from United Nations and the United Kingdom the Cambodian government confirmed the authenticity of the maps (Vannarith Chheang 2015). Nonetheless, clashes on the borders continued, when on 19 July 2015, a 2,500-strong group engaged in another tense skirmish with Vietnamese villagers and Cambodian security forces further aggravating the situation. The heated debate culminated in Hun Sen’s subsequent crackdown on opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party members, who continued to use unresolved border issues as a playing card against the government as well as stirring anti-Vietnamese sentiments. For example, on 15 August, Hong Sok Hour, a longserving Cambodian opposition senator, was arrested and charged with treason, after he had posted a fake section of a 1979 border treaty with Vietnam on Facebook. By doing so, he yet again implied that Hun Sen’s government had been ceding too much territory to Vietnam (Strangio 2015b). His arrests followed the 21 July conviction and jailing of other 11 opposition party members party on the charge of “insurrection” resulting from a minor clash with security forces at the Phnom Penh’s Freedom Park in July 2014 (Meas Sokchea 2015). As can be seen from the discussion above, nationalism fueled by the opposition parties has put Hun Sen under a lot of pressure. In addition, in order to

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neutralize the accusations that he is a Vietnamese lackey, Hun Sen has adopted the border issue as his own, protesting possible encroachments by sending diplomatic notes to Hanoi. As Carlyle Thayer commented, “For Hun Sen, you have to be posturing against the Vietnamese up to a certain point to deflate the sails of the opposition” (quoted in Strangio 2015a). This change of stance stems from the changing political climate in Cambodia, where Hun Sen’s cpp has witnessed a gradual loss of support to the Cambodia National Rescue Party, which has been inciting anti-Vietnamese sentiments as well as highlighting the weaknesses of Hun Sen’s political regime, such as deeply-embedded corruption, land grabbing and last but not least, deforestation. Hence, Hun Sen’s recent crackdown on the Cambodia National Rescue Party leaders serves his ultimate objective, i.e. securing the victory for the cpp in the upcoming 2017 and 2018 elections (Strangio 2015b). In addition, Hun Sen’s change of attitude also signals yet another important shift in Cambodian domestic politics towards China, which has already been partially addressed in the preceding chapter by Kraus. As he has already highlighted above, the dominant Chinese position in combination with the unsolved border disputes can be considered as potentially harmful. The prc by utilizing Cambodia as a “Trojan horse” has been capable of affecting not only the political decision making within the asean platform, endangering the Southeast Asian integration process but also possibly straining bilateral relations between states. This also holds true for Cambodia–Vietnam relations. According to analysts, Hun Sen has been able to benefit from the growing Chinese support in two ways. First, he has benefited from China’s hundreds of millions of dollars in loans and investments escaping the pressure of good governance and human rights demands of the traditional Western donor countries. Second, Chinese aid has lessened Cambodia’s dependence on economic cooperation with Vietnam (Strangio 2015a), providing Cambodian leaders with greater leverage against Vietnam when dealing with sensitive issues. Yet, despite these developments, both Cambodia and Vietnam have succeeded in not letting the lingering land and maritime disputes as well as Cambodia’s orientation on China damage their bilateral relationship. As Carlyle Thayer states, at present Hanoi’s main interest is for a “stable border”, being land or maritime, with Cambodia (Strangio 2015a).

Possible Resolution of the Dispute

Taking the complexity of the dispute into consideration, how can the conflict be resolved? What can be done and what circumstances does the solution depend

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on? As Farrell points out, maritime disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam can be perceived as “secondary and symptomatic of larger differences” (Farrell 1998, p. 187). Just like in other maritime and border conflicts, the dispute can be characterized as a litmus paper or a barometer of relations between neighboring states. When relations are functional, the territorial conflict is shelved; on the other hand, when the relationship between the two states deteriorates, the disputes gain momentum again. Vietnam’s position towards territorial disputes with its much weaker neighbor has been relatively stable as there is only one source of authority generating foreign policy, i.e. the Vietnamese government and the Communist Party of Vietnam (Amer 1997, p. 87). Since the 1990s the objectives of Vietnam’s strategy to resolve the ongoing border disputes with Cambodia were threefold: first, to safeguard the demarcated areas; secondly, to maintain the status quo; thirdly, to uphold the agreements signed with the People’s Republic of Kampuchea in the 1980s (Vu 2007, p. 26). After having signed the Supplementary Treaty to the “Treaty on the Delimitation of the State Border of 1985” in 2005 to this day Vietnam has also embraced the following attitude in resolving its territorial disputes with Cambodia: firstly, to apply the appropriate principles of international law, e.g. the uti possidetis, Thalweg11 principle or the 1982 unclos. Secondly, to defend the agreements signed with Cambodia in the 1980s, i.e. 1982, 1983 and 1985, as well as taking into consideration Cambodia’s 1993 constitution, which espouses the Bonne maps and the Brévié Line. And, thirdly, to lobby with the cpp and the Cambodian King to support a mutually acceptable border treaty (Vu 2007, pp. 26–27). In Cambodia, however, the situation is more complex as there are more actors influencing not only the domestic political scene but also government’s policies. Given the fact that border issues have been used as a political card by Cambodian politicians in their quest for power and influence in elections, undoubtedly the future of the maritime disputes will be dependent on the stance of the Cambodian government and its relations with Vietnam. If the Cambodian government maintains friendly relations with Vietnam, the border and maritime disputes will not become an irritant in their relations. On the other hand, if the Cambodian government maintains fragile relations with Vietnam and contests the agreements signed in the previous periods, the new

11

The exact meaning of Thalweg varies in different conventions and treaties. Nonetheless, most often it refers to firstly, the deepest part of the river that (sometimes) follows the main navigable channel and, secondly, a median line (ligne médiane) of the river or around the area most suitable for navigation.

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situation will call for an overall reassessment of maritime delimitation between both the countries via bilateral negotiations (Johnston and Valencia 1991, p. 139). At present the 1982 Agreement on Historic Waters still remains in force. Furthermore, article no. 2 stipulates that “at a suitable time” negotiations are to take place to determine the maritime boundary. Until then the two sides agree to respect the Brévié Line (Amer 1997, p. 81). If negotiations are to take place, it is probable that Cambodia will push for the acceptance of the Brévié Line as a maritime boundary between both the countries as it would be more advantageous for Cambodia. If the Brévié Line remains in force, then Cambodia would be entitled to 70% of the joint historic waters area, while Vietnam would gain the remaining 30%. As has been stated above, during the first round of discussions on maritime borders that took place after 1993 Vietnam promoted the acceptance of the equidistance principle under unclos iii regulations. It is highly probable that it will continue to push for the application of the strict equidistance line, as it would gain 57% of the waters, while Cambodia only 43% (Prescott and Schofield 2001, p. 18). The delimitating process is also further complicated by the geographic position of the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) in the Gulf. Even in this case, Cambodia would push for the maintaining of the Brévié Line in force, as it provides the island only with 3 nm of territorial waters. Vietnam, on the other hand, would probably call for the acceptance of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) as a fully-fledged island under the definition provided by Article 121 of unclos iii as it would be entitled to 12 nm of territorial sea (Prescott and Schofield 2001, p. 19). This would however be disadvantageous for Cambodia. If the bilateral negotiations fail, both the countries can (upon mutual agreement) also turn to the International Court of Justice (icj) to settle the issue, just like Malaysia and Indonesia had done with their dispute over Ligitan and Sipadan Islands at the end of 2002. Only if both governments agree to accept the icj’s resolution, it is binding for both. The question is whether the documents and arguments provided by Cambodia would be sufficient to convince the court as sovereignty claims based only upon discovery and contiguity are not considered as sufficient. Vietnam’s long-term display of sovereignty and “effective occupation” is likely to be more convincing (Mudrick 2014). To illustrate the situation better, we can use the example of the above-mentioned dispute over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands. In their case, the icj awarded the islands to Malaysia on the basis of “effective occupation” displayed by the latter’s predecessor, i.e. Great Britain, Malaysia’s former colonial power (icj 2002).

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Conclusion Relations between Cambodia and Vietnam can be characterized as a love-hate relationship. Since the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989 and the normalization of the two countries’ relations, two major concerns have dominated their dynamics: the status of Vietnamese living in Cambodia and unresolved border and maritime issues. Furthermore, as it was argued, the border disputes which are symptomatic of larger differences, could also be perceived as a litmus test of relations between both the countries, i.e. when relations are functional, the territorial conflict is shelved; on the other hand, when the relationship between the two states deteriorates, the disputes gain momentum again. The objective of this article was to shed light on the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island dispute arguing that it has been seized by different domestic players – Norodom Sihanouk’s government, the Lon Nol regime, the Khmer Rouge regime, political parties of the untac period, and currently the Cambodian National Rescue Party – in order to gain public support by playing on anti–Vietnamese sentiments among the population. After Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party had gained a much stronger foothold on the domestic political scene, he concluded the groundbreaking Supplementary treaty to the “Treaty on the Delimitation of the State Border of 1985” with his Vietnamese counterparts. The treaty provided a legal status to the previous agreements and laid the foundation not only for the physical demarcating of the border, but also for the improvement of bilateral relations especially in the economic sphere – as Vietnam is currently Cambodia’s fifth most important investor (see Thayer 2012), currently Vietnam’s total capital investment in Cambodia exceeds US$3.3 billion. In addition, in 2014, bilateral trade volume reached US$3.2 billion, and is expected to top US$5 billion in 2015 (Strangio 2015). However, the problem is that the above–mentioned treaty does not resolve the delimitation of maritime boundaries as well as the ownership of the island features in the Gulf of Thailand. Undoubtedly these issues will need to be addressed in the future as they may become an irritant in relations between both the nations. Furthermore, as time has shown, the question of ownership of the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island has been misused by opposition parties (especially the Sam Rainsy Party and Cambodian National Rescue Party), which take advantage of the Cambodian historical experience of “loss of territory”, the population’s nationalist ire and anti-Vietnamese sentiments in their quest for power by promising to gain the island back (through peaceful means) from the Vietnamese. However, these proclamations are seen by many as quixotic.

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For example the French historian Henri Locard labeled these discussions of the ownership of the island as “anachronistic political debate” stating “Imagine an electoral campaign in England right now where political parties are talking about the Hadrian wall. These are not the orders of the day” (quoted in Meyn and Aun Pheap 2013). While discussions over maritime delimitation will indubitably need to take place in the future, the return of the island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) to Cambodia is less probable given the effective Vietnamese control of the island for more than 150 years. It seems that the Cambodians are dreaming a forlorn dream of a paradise lost that so far has not damaged political, economic and defense relations with Vietnam but could have the potential to do so in the future. Bibliography12 Abramov, Alexei, Kalinin, Alexei A. and Morozov, Petr N. (2007): “Mammal survey on Phu Quoc Island, southern Vietnam.” Mammalia, 40–46. Amer, Ramses (1997): “Border Conflicts between Cambodia and Vietnam.” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (Summer), 80–91. Amer, Ramses (2010): “Cambodia and Vietnam: A Troubled Relationship”, in Ganesan, Narayanan and Amer, Ramses (Eds.): International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 92–116. Amer, Ramses and Nguyen Hong Thao (2007): “Regional Conflict Management: Challenges of the Border Disputes of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.” Austrian Journal of South–East Asian Studies, 2(2), 53–80. Berman, Jennifer, S. (1996): “No Place Like Home: Anti–Vietnamese Discrimination and Nationality in Cambodia.” California Law Review, 84(3), 817–874. Brinkley, Joel (2013): “Another Stolen Election for Cambodia.” World Affairs, 20 September. Available at: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/joel–brinkley/another –stolen–election–cambodia. Chanda, Nayan (1986): Brother Enemy. The War after the War. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers. Chandler, David P. (1983): “Seeing Red: Perceptions of Cambodian History in Democratic Kampuchea”, in Chandler, David P. and Kiernan, Ben (T.): Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 34–56.

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www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/24/Cambodia-Hun-Sen-offensive-arrest -opposition-senator.aspx. Su Thi Oanh Hoa (2012): “To Preserve or Not to Preserve the Natural Area? A Valuation Study Applied to Phu Quoc Island, Vietnam.” Master’s thesis, Universidade do Minho. Taylor, Keith W. (2013): History of the Vietnamese. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2012): “Cambodia and Vietnam: Good Fences Make Good Neighbours.” In Sothirak, Pou, Wade, Geoff and Hong, Mark (Eds.): Cambodia: Progress and Challenges Since 1991. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 62–80. Touch, Bora (2002): “Cambodian Title to Khmer Krom Territories.” Available at: http:// www.khmerinstitute.org/articles/art09.html. Tran Tuyen Nhung and Reid, Anthony (2006): “The Construction of Vietnamese Historical Identities.” In Tran Tuyen Nhung and Reid, Anthony (Eds.): Viet Nam Borderless Histories. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1–22. Van Ginneken, J. (1983): The Third Indochina War and the Conflicts between China, Vietnam and Cambodia. Amsterdam: Jaap Van Ginneken. Vietnam News Agency (2013): “Phu Quoc Island Promotes Black Pepper.” Vietnam News Agency, 9 June. Available at: http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Phu–Quoc–Island –promotes–black–pepper/20136/35383.vnplus. Vannarith Chheang (2015): “How Cambodian Nationalism is Driving Border Disputes with Vietnam.” East Asia Forum, 16 October. Available at: http://www .eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/16/how-cambodian-nationalism-is-driving-border -disputes-with-vietnam/. Vong Sokheng (2005): “National Assembly Approves Border Treaty.” The Phnom Penh Post, 19 November. Available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/ national–assembly–approves–border–treaty. Vong Sokheng (2014): “Opposition Youth Detained.” The Phnom Penh Post, 6 May. Available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/opposition–youth–detained. Vu, Le Thai Hoang (2007): “Vietnam’s Quest for Influence and its Implications for the Management of Border Disputes with Laos and Cambodia.” Südostasien Aktuell, 26(2), 6–38. Wikfalk, Martin (1998): “Opposition Takes Issue with VN Border Talks.” The Phnom Penh Post, 17 July. Available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/opposition –takes–issue–vn–border–talks.

chapter 5

Multitrack Diplomatic Approaches to Border and Territorial Disputes in Southeast Asia and Soft Balancing1 Alica Kizeková

Multitrack Diplomacy and Security in Southeast Asia

Conducting security dialogues through multilateral frameworks in Southeast Asia has been a rather recent development. During the Cold War, the Asian security environment was poised with ideological divisions dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States, lingering deep-seated historical animosities among states and great differences in economic development. There was not adequate confidence and trust to engage in any major multinational ­regional cooperation in the security arena. On the other hand, the strategic environments of post-Cold-War Southeast and East Asia have been in a situation when various proposals for a more structured and inclusive institutional security architecture were designed to encourage an increased confidence among states and the overall readiness to conduct multilateral consultations. These processes have been in particular driven by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean), which faced a dilemma of how to position itself in the region in the early 1990s. The pressing concerns were the uncertainty of us presence and Washington’s future commitment to the region, in addition to apprehension over a rising China. At that time, asean was not fully accommodating to us requests with regard to basing rights (as in the case of the Philippines not renewing the us lease at Subic Bay in 1991), and it was not fully engaging China within its frameworks (Acharya 2014; Emmers 2003; Simon 1996).2 In response to these uncertainties, the asean Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (asean-isis) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (cscap) were established to enable regional confidence-building through informal track-two mechanisms and to contribute to state-centric 1 This chapter was published as part of a research project of Metropolitan University Prague (mup)’s “Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies (CIPS)”, financed by institutional support for longterm conceptual development of research organization in 2016. 2 asean acted in accordance with the 1967 Bangkok Declaration which stipulated that the foreign bases would be temporary and only the host countries would decide when to end the agreement. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004312180_007

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interests within asean, as well as to the newly created track-one framework – the asean Regional Forum (arf) in 1994. Thus, this proliferation of channels of multilateral discussions opened an opportunity for member states to mode­ rate great power interests and create a more predictable and stable regional security environment, though both the United States and China were skeptical of these processes at the beginning (Kuik Cheng-Chwee 2005; Mack in Malone and Yuen 2003; Leifer 1996; Garrett and Glaser 1994; Shirk 1994; Yan and Chu 1994). The primary focus of this chapter is testing whether asean through its government-to-government and non-official multilateral structures began to “socialize” China towards regionally responsible behavior and a commitment to shared norms. Consequently, this work contributes to a better understanding of contemporary soft balancing behavior, which is used when states try to limit the power of a hegemonic actor or a state perceived as threatening. It further provides a case study of the use of regional organizations and the extent to which the engagement of regional powers, China in particular, is based on multilateral regional frameworks. The case of China’s change of policy from bilateral to multilateral involvement and engagement of the “asean Way”,3 as a distinctive set of norms upon which decision-making and consensus building are based, in the 1990s is striking. It demonstrates an altered approach to Beijing’s interactions in forums where it is active.4 China has benefited from its participation in the arf and cscap by creating networks of dialogue and gaining multiple opportunities to discuss economic cooperation with asean member states. The discussion below directly responds to the major debate as to whether China was socialized and gradually internalized asean’s norms of behavior (Hines 2013; Ba 2006, pp. 157–179), or whether China cleverly manipulated its relations with Southeast Asian nations to reshape the regional order (Wuthnow, Li and Qi 2012; Goldstein 2007; Johnston 2004; Mearsheimer 2001). It concludes that China initially embraced multilateralism as a measure to improve its image in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, and asean (Brunei, Indonesia, 3 “asean Way”, a style of diplomacy or code of conduct, evolved in intra-asean. It is characterized by soft institutionalization, with six norms: sovereign equality, the non-recourse to use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict, non-interference and non-intervention, the non-involvement of asean to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, quiet diplomacy, mutual respect and tolerance (see Connors, Davidson and Dosch 2004, p. 81). 4 For China, the most important forums are the meetings of asean + 3 and those under the umbrella of the arf, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (cica).

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Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore and Thailand) had an impact on the decision made by a group of Chinese elites to increase their country’s engagement in multilateral discussion in areas of common interest. However, asean did not succeed in convincing China to resolve the South China Sea dispute, despite the 2002 non-binding political Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Beijing developed a tendency to opt for a neorealist approach to multilateral cooperation and embraces cooperation solely in spheres which do not compromise its main national interests.5 This was noticeable in a series of drilling and exploration disputes between China and Vietnam between 1992 and 1997. The period of this case study is the 1990s; however, reference is made to ASEAN-China relations post 2001 in relation to the South China Sea dispute. This allows one to trace the behavior of the asean member states from the end of the Cold War, when the organization became more proactive in increasing its role in managing regional security and alleviating the possibility of a major conflict with China in the South China Sea. This chapter adopts T.V. Paul’s definition of the concept of soft balancing as involving: (…) tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states gene­ rally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms build-up, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening. paul 2004, p. 3

This definition goes beyond the traditional view of state balancing strategy to identify balancing behavior that takes place when hard balancing is too risky or costly. We need to look at alternative categories of security behavior when states use tacit means and avoid an open build-up of arms. Thus, in this case, the primary goal of such regional soft balancing is to make sure that the great 5 The term “core interests” would only be formally mobilized later on. One key 2011 usage notes: “China is firm in upholding its core interests which include the following: state sove­ reignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development” (Xinhua 2011).

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powers (China) involved in the region do not destabilize the status quo by undertaking revisionist or aggressive policies toward their neighbors. While assessing the viability of the selected theoretical framework in relation to the use of organization for soft balancing, the author assessed the policies of individual states and the asean policy.

Soft Balancing and Threat Perceptions

There are four main non-military mechanisms that enable the strategy of soft balancing: refusal to use territory that is vital for the operations of the superior state’s ground, air or naval forces; entangling diplomacy by which states undermine the plans and policies of the superior state, especially using international institutions; economic statecraft by strengthening the regional economic blocs and diverting trade from non-members; and finally, coordination of mutual commitment to resist policies of the superior or threatening state. What is, in effect, a collective disposition, is built over time through repeated participation in non-military mechanisms and increasing trust among the members of the soft-balancing coalition. The ambition of a coalition that resolves to soft balance is to attract more states so as to weaken the operational capability of the superior state (Pape 2003). asean’s threat perception6 can be understood through four factors outlined in Stephen Walt’s Origins of Alliances: the aggregate power possessed by the threatening state, that state’s geographical proximity, its offensive power, and the aggressive intentions of the state (1990, p. 5). The last point relates to a country’s reputation and the more threatening this reputation is, the more inclined asean is to use soft balancing against that state, which in this case is China (Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu 2001; Katzenstein 1996, pp. 14–17). China has gone through modernization of its national defense, which is one of its Four Modernizations, introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. With the receding threat from the Soviet Union, strategies for dealing with forces moving far into China’s hinterland were required and thus, Beijing strategists started to prepare for a new doctrine calling for deployments on China’s periphery (Godwin 1996; Dellios 1989). The aim was to prepare a more mobile, lethal and professional force, which was further reconfirmed after the 1991 Gulf War in 6 Comparative study of “threat perceptions” of individual states showed that the term “threats” was often avoided in official statements and documents and instead the terms “potential flashpoints” (the Philippiness) or “challenges” (Malaysia) were used to avoid tensions with neighboring states or China, in particular (see Berry 1997).

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which the us used advanced military technology (You Ji 1999, p. 9). Unable to produce such modern weaponry, China managed to acquire state-of-the-art hardware from Russia throughout the 1990s (Ming-Yen Tsai 2003, pp. 117–152). It was reported that almost 97 per cent of China’s arms imports valued at us$1.75 billion during 1992–1994 came from Russia (Holloway and Bickers 1997, pp. 20–21). These reforms required substantial funds; therefore, China increased its defense spending by double-digit percentage rates every year and officially reported an increase from us$6.06 billion to us$12.6 billion between 1990 and 1999. These estimates were scrutinized overseas, with some defense specialists arguing that the actual level of defense spending was two to three times the reported figures (Bitzinger and Chong-Pin Lin 2011, pp. 43–44). asean members recognized China’s right to modernize its national defense. However, the lack of transparency, and the use of its military capabilities in the contest over competing claims in the South China Sea, heightened legitimate concerns and resulted in soft balancing efforts to restrain China in the region (Khong 2014; Storey 2013). asean responded to a rising China and the “China threat theory” in the 1990s by seeking to socialize China towards regionally responsible behavior and a commitment to shared norms through membership in the arf and via other mechanisms such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (tac) and an intensified bilateral dialogue. This was an indirect soft balancing strategy with the aim of constraining China. This argument will be explored through analysis of China’s engagement in the asean-led7 arf and asean’s dialogue with China over the South China Sea issue. asean employed two major strategies for dealing with strategic insecurities, including the fear of China revising regional rules of the game, in the 1990s: institution-building and soft balancing. It is arguable that even today, asean continues using “institution-building” as a protective mechanism from external interferences. However, this author agrees with the proposition that the asean members have engaged in hedging when dealing with the great powers in the region in the contemporary era (Ciorcari 2009; Goh 2005). This was demonstrated during the cscap General Conference on the theme of “Great powers in the region”, which the author attended, in Jakarta in December 2007. One conclusion made by a representative from Southeast Asia was that the asean member states tend to sit and wait for China and the us to decide on major issues, and then the asean members can act. Hedging is a safe strategy for weaker players, small and middle powers (but it is not necessarily supported

7 asean-led does not necessarily mean that asean member states drive the agenda; however, they facilitate the meetings and dialogue among external powers in the region.

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by great powers), as the immediate post-Cold War strategic environment has shown (Dacanay 2012; Razali 2012; Sutter 2012). The occurrence of a balancing strategy against the stronger power, the us, in the 1990s was dismissed, and instead, the weaker China has been viewed as a threat (Khong 2004, pp. 172–208). Although Malaysia and the Philippines shared some ambivalence towards China’s intentions with regard to territorial claims in the South China Sea, they preferred the use of multilateral frameworks to encourage China to behave more responsibly. During this period, there was some evidence of soft balancing, especially in the use of bilateral memorandums of understanding (mou) and visiting forces agreements between the us and individual states, such as the mou between Singapore and the us from November 1990, which allowed the us to use the facilities in the old British wharves at Sembawang. Moreover, the influence of an anti-China political culture under a generation of strong leaders in the asean helps to explain the uneasiness concerning the rise of China. Not only was China so recently an ideological opponent whose political influence among illegal local communist parties was feared politically, but the role of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asian economies was also a source of apprehension (Cho and Park 2013). On the other hand, asean leaders had no interest in giving the United States a free hand in their region of vigorous nation-building. It will be recalled that before asean was formed the us-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (seato), which only two Southeast Asian nations joined, the Philippines and Thailand. seato was ineffective and it is widely perceived as a failure (Acharya 2014; Buszynski 1983). Critics of soft balancing contend that broadening the definition of balancing leads to conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970, pp. 1033–1053), and that in fact the term is too similar to normal diplomatic friction. Soft balancing’s proponents, they say, do not provide sufficient evidence that would distinguish these terms accordingly, thus any “discussion of soft balancing is much ado about nothing” (Lieber and Alexander 2005, p. 109). Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth (2005) point out that the primary cases of soft balancing are relatively recent, and that therefore, it might be impossible to find enough evidence. Kai He and Huiyun Feng address the methodological deficiencies of the soft balancing concept in “If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and us Policy Toward China”. They note that “the higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security” (He and Feng 2008, p. 363) and assess the post-Cold War us policy toward China. He and Feng redefine the concept of balancing by dividing it into military and non-military hard balancing, in

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order to enhance a state’s own power vis-à-vis the opponents; and military and non-military soft balancing, to weaken the opponent’s relative power and gain security. Under the umbrella of military soft balancing, the authors assess the us-Taiwan policy. Although the us declared in the 1982 Joint Communiqué it would not provide Taiwan with advanced fighter aircraft, it did in fact sell 150 of such aircraft, the F-16A/B, to Taiwan a decade later in 1992. China responded by terminating its participation in the Arms Control talks in the Middle East and by selling M-11 short-range ballistic missiles to Pakistan in November 1992. In their conclusions, He and Feng acknowledge that although hard balancing against the us has not taken place and that soft-balancing actions did not stop the us from initiating war on Iraq, several states have been united in their refusal to follow the us and have thus curtailed to an extent its freedom of action (He and Feng 2008). He and Feng successfully enhance the understanding of soft balancing, and apply the concept in more detail to us policy toward China. Their typology of state balancing strategies needs more clarification, however. While strategic technology transfers and economic aid are part of their description of nonmilitary hard balancing, these can also be viewed as soft balancing tools. Economic sanctions and embargos can, on the other hand, be part of non-military hard balancing if conducted openly. Kai He further redefines the concept of balancing in his book, “Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic interdependence and China’s Rise”, where he critiques the ability of a single theory to explain the reality of security relations in the Asia-Pacific and the functions of institutions there. He proposes a new institutional theory or institutional realism, by linking the neorealist balance of power with neoliberal interdependence, from which position he stipulates that the high level of economic interdependence between states leads to “institutional balancing” rather than the traditional hard balancing which occurs when states fear or feel pressure in the international system. This balancing takes place either via inclusive or exclusive balancing. In the former instance, the target state is bound by the norms of this institution, while in the latter case, the members of the institution aim to keep a target state out and resist the outsider by harmonizing their own policies in the economic and political spheres. When this theory is applied to the current us-dominated system, He argues, the “only option for other states to counter the pressure from the hegemon is to conduct exclusive balancing through forming multilateral institutions without the hegemon” (He 2009, p. 12). What He has done in his study was to focus on one soft balancing mecha­ nism and name this balancing behavior “institutional balancing”. It should

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be noted that Paul, in his soft balancing case studies, discusses cases of inclusive balancing: with the United Nations and the resistance to supporting the us-backed resolution to authorize the use of force in Iraq in 2002. While this chapter acknowledges He’s contribution to a broadening of the balancing concept – this author remains committed to the soft balancing terminology and will derive the definition to be employed here from the works of T.V. Paul, Robert A. Pape and Stephen Walt.

Shaping China’s Behavior in the arf and cscap

The argument made here is that asean, insecure about China’s intentions, facilitated China’s membership in the arf and engaged Beijing in dialogue on security issues and shared norms. This made it more costly for China to pursue its own interests without considering the impact on the region. Successful soft balancing further reduced potential for regional conflicts because all parties claim to adhere to the same norms in their relations. Even if mainly declarative, such codes set the groundwork for diplomatic debate on disputes which can be channeled via multilateral fora. This cooperation in the multilateral framework should be viewed in the context of China’s increased interest in multilateralism. The arf’s creation is also seen as a historical milestone in the Asia-Pacific because it paved the way for the establishment of the very first regional security dialogue form, which involves asean member states side by side with all major powers of the region, as well as the European Union. The arf was established with the aim of enhancing security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The origins of the arf lie in a series of proposals from asean member states and non-asean states. One serious proposal to use the asean Post-Ministerial Conference (asean-pmc; meetings between asean members and external countries) came from the asean Institute of Strategic International Studies, a Track ii framework, in 1990. This initiative received negative responses from Indonesia and Malaysia that did not wish to widen the scope of the asean-pmc beyond economy to include regional security. Then Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama proposed in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 to convert asean-pmc into a formal security dialogue forum (Ball and Kerr 1996). Over the following three years this proposal gained support from Japan, Australia and Canada as the way to enhance regional cooperation. This proposal was met with opposition from the us who saw multilateral organizations as threats to the us bilateral alliances (Emmers 2003, p. 113).

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Eventually, the agreement to create the arf came during the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Singapore in 1993. The participating nations agreed that this collaboration would bring more predictable patterns into their security relations. asean wanted to balance the three major powers in the region: the us, which withdrew from Subic Bay military base in the Philippines; Japan, which had the potential to remilitarize; and re-emerging power of China. In Michael Leifer’s (1996, p. 19) words: “asean’s goal was to create conditions for a stable balance of power (…) which would enable the Association to maintain its operational security doctrine.” The members of the arf Concept Paper set out a three-stage development process for the new body: Stage i: Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures (cbms) Stage ii: Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms Stage iii: Elaboration of Approaches to Conflict The first stage deserves particular attention. During the initial arf ministerial meeting in Bangkok in July 1994, participants established that the main objective should be to enhance regional confidence-building and preventive diplomacy (Garofano 2002, pp. 502–521). This, however, proved to be a complex task overshadowed by differences between two groups of states. Countries such as Australia, Canada and the us supported concrete cbms, which would increase military transparency, and this was in opposition to a more informal approach from asean countries and China, that emphasized declaratory measures, based on voluntary steps (Yuzawa 2007, p. 65). In light of mutual threat perceptions, and with the aim to socialize China into becoming a more predictable and regionally friendly actor, the asean member states supported measures which would increase trust. The first major dialogue with regard to regional trust-building measures (tbms) took place in Canberra during the arf inter-sessional seminar in November 1994. These measures were outlined by Paul Dibb, who suggested that a combination of military and non-military tbms ensures more confidence and reduction of suspicion and uncertainty in the region. They additionally minimize the potential for armed conflicts. Dibb divided the tbms into two major groups: information sharing and measures of constraint (1995, p. 4). He further distinguished the likelihood of achieving specific tbms. The un Conventional Arms Register, military-to-military contacts and allowing observers at military exercises are the least difficult tbms to accomplish. More challenging tbms relate to publishing defense white papers and creating a regional arms register and maritime information databases. The most difficult tbms

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include maritime surveillance cooperation and major military exercises (Dibb 1995, p. 5). Participants at the second arf Ministerial Meeting agreed to a mix of more modest tbms, such as participation in the un Register of Conventional Arms and sharing defense white papers. These submissions were to be made on a voluntary basis. The proponents of these measures argued that they were different from cbms because they were gradually building trust rather than focusing on immediate results (Evans and Dibb 1994, p. 1). Critics could not see how cbms and tbms were different, other than bringing an alternative perspective because they both imitate concepts already in use in other parts of the world and in security processes (for example, the Helsinki Process and later osce mechanisms) (Capie and Evans 2006, p. 246). One function of the newly established arf that asean desired was to engage China within this multilateral, trust and confidence-building forum. China historically did not support mechanisms which would constrain its operability and cause Beijing to become dependent on practices which could undermine its autonomy. asean and arf’s ability to maintain weak institutionalized structures in the presence of consensus decision-making, created a sense of non-intrusiveness, which was appealing to Chinese officials responsible for arf policy in China (Johnson 1999, pp. 290–291). China responded by publishing a white paper on arms control and disarmament in November 1995, which was the first defense-related paper produced since 1949. This was followed in 1998 by China’s first official defense white paper, entitled China’s National Defense. While in the West publication of defense white papers promoting greater transparency is common practice, in China military transparency is viewed as undermining national security and rendering the country vulnerable (Zhang 2012, pp. 881–898). The strategic benefits of “deception”, when faced with potential adversaries in possession of superior military capabilities, are known to military planners around the world but China in particular is noted for a strategic culture in which “deception” has been given special attention as an asymmetric tool (Sun Tzu in Cleary 2003; Weitz 2007). Irrespective to the limitations of China’s defense white papers (they are not as transparent as their Western counterparts), China’s participation in the arf since 1994 contributed to socializing Chinese policy elites into a better understanding of the China threat theory and concerns in relation to China’s military modernization (Ba 2006). Thus, as a result of these external pressures, Beijing began to publish defense white papers and thus contributed to regional confidence-building. China also gained more confidence in sharing its perspectives on security topics, especially in informal settings. During a

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Canada-China seminar in Toronto in 1997, the Chinese delegate explained the subtle difference between the terms “confidence” and “trust”. He argued that they are not used “interchangeably” in China. Trust (xinlai) is considered as the final destination and confidence (xinren) is the process towards attaining this end goal (Capie and Evans 2007, p. 246). Apart from the official channels, discussions were conducted within less formal settings, in second track and track one-and-a-half meetings. Organizers also hoped they could shape China’s disposition to discuss more sensitive security issues. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific is the most known and developed non-governmental process in the Asia-Pacific. It is disputed whether this cooperation falls under the second track or track oneand-a-half category. One way of assessing this is through the agenda and the participants at specific workshops and meetings. If the officials in their nonofficial capacity outnumber journalists, analysts and academics in particular meetings, then there is a likelihood that the track is more official, therefore, one-and-a-half; and there is a chance for the outcomes to be delivered to governmental officials and be translated into policies. If, however, non-officials form the majority, there is a lower chance for proposals to be accepted by policy-makers. Although framed as a Track ii mechanism, with later meetings attended by academics, non-government experts, activists and youth leaders, cscap’s membership committees included research centers and institutes from the Asia-Pacific region, providing strong conduits to influence government and igo policies. The original mission of cscap, established in 1992–93, was to provide “a more structured regional process of non-governmental nature (…) to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation” (Ball 2000, p. 1). cscap was quite crucial at formulating the trust-building measures and the memorandum on preventive diplomacy. It contributed by drafting the working definition of “preventive diplomacy” for the arf. The cscap member committees recognized that China’s membership was crucial if viable pan-regional security architecture was to be established (Ball 2000, p. 13). China hesitated to join the cscap until an agreement on Taiwan’s involvement was reached in 1996, whereas the Taiwanese delegates could only participate in meetings in a private capacity. The level of organization of specific working groups (now called study groups) made it difficult for China to resist; it did not want to be left out of major debates (Taylor 2008). arf and Track ii mechanisms have played a vital role in asean’s soft balanc­ing strategy towards China. asean nations were not able, nor willing, to engage in countering China’s power through conventional methods by using

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hard power. They utilized institutional frameworks to engage China in cooperative security arrangements, which constrained China by adopting shared principles, norms and rules of conduct. China benefited from its participation in cscap and arf by creating networks of dialogue and improving its image vis-à-vis the negative perception based on the China threat theory. It also gained multiple opportunities to discuss economic cooperation with asean member states. These trends would help lay the basis for future cooperation on non-traditional security issues, anti-drug measures and dialogue on transborder issues (Lim 2008; Emmers 2007; Wong 2007). asean states, however, discovered that China resorted to more assertive policies when it pursued its national interest (Emmers 2001). The limitations of arf’s constraints on China’s behavior are discussed below in relation to China’s claims in the South China Sea.

Limits to Soft Balancing: The South China Sea Dispute

This case study seeks to assess China’s willingness to engage with asean in talks in an effort to resolve the South China Sea dispute through the 1990s. If the soft-balancing strategy worked, then China would have been successfully conditioned by asean to internalize established norms and share the same understanding of codes of conduct in disputed areas. On the other hand, China’s cooperative approach to this dispute could be attributed to its efforts to reduce the chances of an anti-China alliance led by the us and asean members who are driven by the fear of a rising China, plus the prospect of us containment of its primary competitor in the region (Hung 2006). The variable in this case is the “degree of cooperativeness” with asean in regard to South China Sea negotiations and compared with China’s unilate­ ral activities in the disputed areas. Cooperativeness would mean a gradual change in approach and eventual alteration in policies regarding the dispute, which would be more favorable to all parties involved. This means a reversal of China’s insistence on its claim to all disputed waters, based on its U-shape line map, produced by the Republic of China in 1947 and later adopted by the People’s Republic of China (Keyuan 1999, p. 29). On the other hand, a lack of cooperativeness would be evident if China continuously ignored the other claimant states´ interests and built new or upgraded the existing structures in disputed areas, or drilled and fished in disputed waters. In recent years (2014–2015), in particular, China has carried out all these actions, as seen via Haiyang Shiyou 981 standoff with Vietnam or the construction of artificial islands.

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Conflict Dynamics The South China Sea dispute refers to a complex range of overlapping territorial and maritime jurisdiction claims and interests in controlling sea lanes and acquiring resources (fishing and energy) among China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei (Valencia, Van Dyke and Ludwig 1999; Mito 1998; Catler and Keliant 1997). The dispute is primarily over the Spratly Islands and the Paracels.8 China claims undefined “adjacent waters”, based on their historical usage, which dates back to the Han dynasty (206–220 a.d.) (Guoxing 1994; Haller-Trost 1994). China’s thinking is said to be influenced by Confucian political thought, in which the rule is over “men and not space” and the claim is over territory where individuals reside and maintain influence, not over “linear boundaries” (Valero 1994, pp. 314 and 323). However, this thinking is not unique to China. Traditional Southeast Asia also regarded people’s allegiance to a ruler rather than territory as a deciding factor in the extent of a kingdom’s domain. Ian Mabbett has written on early Southeast Asian polities not being geographic or cartographic: “The orientation implied is related to the dimensions not of space but of politics, and diplomacy (…)” (Mabbett 1971, pp. 38–39, cited in Stuart-Fox 1996, p. 136). Thus, “Khmer villages acknowledged that they formed part of the Khmer kingdom. A Vietnamese village situated between them did not” (Mabbett 1971, p. 7). This means that traditional usage and access, perceptions of vulnerability, and historical conflicts remain part of the deeper political engagement in these disputes (Thayer 2011; Emmers 2010; Rosenberg 2010). China has approached the South China Sea dispute through the combination of an inflexible definition of territorial sovereignty, based on historical rights to claimed areas, and pragmatic participation in multitrack frameworks, with an agreement on establishing a non-binding code of conduct. China’s Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Ying-fan, expressed China’s willingness to shelve the dispute and resolve it at a later date through gradual negotiations (Garver 1992; Lanying 1991). In discussions with fellow asean members, Indonesia proposed the South China Sea Workshop initiative, a Track ii gathering only for asean government officials in their personal capacities, technical experts and academics. This initiative was supported by Malaysia. However, nonclaimant asean member states, Singapore and Thailand, pressured Jakarta to open up the forum to involve external parties, in order to disperse tensions created by the perception that this “asean only” framework was too exclusive, 8 Each claimant uses its own national name for these islands. The use of names in this work reflects the most common usage in academic literature and media and does not reflect a point of view with regards to specific sovereignty claims of any participating claimant.

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and therefore would not contribute adequately to a constructive regional dialogue. As a consequence, in 1991, China, Laos and Vietnam joined this workshop (Djalal 2001). All parties agreed that the mandate of the South China Sea Workshop would not be one of conflict resolution, but rather a discussion forum to preserve opportunities for claimants to negotiate their bilateral deals with fellow claimant parties. Singapore did not want to create diplomatic tensions with Beijing, considering it had established diplomatic relations only the previous year. The purpose of the Workshop was, therefore, to discuss areas of co-operative marine management and build a political environment more agreeable to resolving jurisdictional conflicts (Djalal 1999 in Ball and Acharya 1999). Despite these efforts, on 25 February 1992 China passed a Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China in the National People’s Congress. As stated in Article 3 of the Law: The land territory of the People’s Republic of China includes the mainland of the People’s Republic of China and its coastal islands; Taiwan and all islands appertaining there to including the Diaoyu Islands; the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha Islands; the Xisha Islands; the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands; as well as all the other islands belonging to the People’s Republic of China.9 This was a strategic maneuver on China’s behalf to formalize its claims. In response to this assertive move, asean issued the asean Declaration on the South China Sea in July 1992, the so-called Manila Declaration, and outlined the norms of regional conduct in this matter. The Association did not seek a resolution to these disputes, as not all asean members were involved (Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand) and previously the issue was mainly viewed as a China-Vietnam conflict. However, in light of China’s 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the member states shared an intensified understanding that there should be a peaceful resolution and avoidance of the use of force (asean 1992). The asean foreign ministers approached the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, who was attending as a guest, to sign this declaration, but he refused to do so, explaining that the leadership in Beijing was not going to sign a document the drafting of which had not involved Chinese diplomats. He, however, reassured the asean delegates that China 9 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, adopted at the 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 25 February 1992.

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adhered to the declaration’s principles (Severino 2002, p. 42). Following these Chinese reassurances, a climate of cooperative engagement prevailed. These regional events encouraged further dialogue with regard to jurisdictions and rights over ocean areas. China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef, a small atoll near Palawan Island and within the Philippines’ claimed 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (eez), in January 1995, was a turning point in Beijing’s apparent disregard of regional rules of conduct. This incident occurred a year after Foreign Minister Qian Qichen rejected the use of force as a means of dealing with the South China Sea dispute during the arf’s first meeting in July 1994 (Whiting 1997, p. 301). A novelty factor was also that China engaged in an incident with an asean member state, while previously it acted more assertively towards Vietnam that was not a member of asean (Valencia 1997, pp. 6–7). Filipino fishermen alerted authorities about a steel structure holding a Chinese concrete construction and a parabolic antenna (Joyner 1999).10 This move was condemned by Filipino President Fidel Ramos who accused China of violating the spirit of the 1992 asean Declaration on the South China Sea (Philippine Daily 1995). A military response to this incident was not viable. The Armed Forces of the Philippines would not have been able to challenge China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. Therefore, President Ramos pressured the asean members to draft a statement, in which the foreign ministers urged: (…) all concerned to remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the Manila Declaration on the South China Sea which we issued in July 1992 and which has been endorsed by other countries and the Non-Aligned Movement. The Manila Declaration urges all concerned to resolve differences in the South China Sea by peaceful means and to refrain from taking actions that de-stabilize the situation. We call upon all parties to refrain from taking actions that destabilize the region and further threaten the peace and security of the South China Sea. We specifically call for the early resolution of the problems caused by recent developments in Mischief Reef. We urge countries in the region to undertake cooperative activities which increase trust and confidence and promote stability in the area. We encourage all claimants and other countries in Southeast Asia to address

10

China built a five-storey, fortified concrete building that it maintained as a shelter for fishermen by 1999. There are two platforms that can accommodate vessels up to 40-feet long, a helicopter landing pad and parabolic antennas (see Joyner 1999).

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the issue in various fora, including the Indonesia-sponsored Workshop Series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. Asean 1995

asean unity demonstrated its disapproval of China’s actions at Mischief Reef. This coordination of policies and restatement of norms showed that asean was able to act as a diplomatic entity; however, it does not demonstrate that asean was acting as a “community”; the member states did not express their support for the Philippines’ claims in this incident. China was surprised to see this unprecedented public disapproval from asean. In support of China’s negotiation style, Beijing did not wish to resolve the issue in an open multilateral forum, rather by bilateral informal negotiations (Baviera 2001, p. 22). Under external pressure though, China agreed to conduct an annual consultation on political and security issues in the Senior Officials Meeting (som). While the arf was the main “international” soft balancing tool for asean to constrain China’s behavior, the som became a mechanism for “inclusive balancing” and facilitated practical consultations over the South China Sea issue (He 2008, pp. 494–505; Heller 2005, pp. 123–145). asean’s collective response was again tested in March 1997 when China decided to locate an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam (which joined asean in July 1995). asean showed solidarity with Vietnam and prepared a joint position for the upcoming som in April 1997 (Wurfel 1999). In this particular instance, the asean member states not only adhered to their shared meaning of structure (declarations of codes of acceptable conduct) and restated their commitment to regional norm compliance; they also identified with asean and generated a strong sense of “we-ness”. China decided to withdraw the rig, in light of this collective opposition from asean. This was a successful case of asean using the soft-balancing strategy when challenged by China’s assertive behavior in the region (Nischalke 2002). After 1996, China showed a more proactive approach to regional diplomacy and security (such as the establishment of asean Plus Three forum between asean and China, Japan and South Korea), demonstrated by its New Security Concept. This called for ending the “Cold War mentality” and dismantl­ ing military alliances, asserted that conflicts between states should be dealt with  peacefully, and states should work towards common security through multilateral cooperation and economic integration. China had an opportunity to contribute to regional economic development during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which destabilized many asean member states (though less so Malaysia, which instituted currency controls). China provided economic and

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medical aid to its neighbors and decided not to devaluate the yuan. Retaining the value of the yuan disadvantaged China’s exports; however, it did not lead to further currency devaluations in Southeast Asia (Storey 2013, pp. 56–59; Nischalke 2002, p. 104). During this time (1995–2002), asean member states tried to negotiate a multilateral code of conduct in the South China Sea with China (proposed by the Philippines in April 1999), but due to dependence on China’s economic aid and China’s opposition toward this document, the initiative was delayed (Thayer 1999, p. 37). The later signing of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (doc) in 2002 was a step forward in that it emphasized peaceful resolution of disputes “without resorting to the threat or use of force”, and a commitment to further develop cooperation, trust and confidence among the parties. However, in 2012, the internal disunity of asean over the South China Sea during the 45th asean Ministerial Meeting prevented signing a joint statement for the first time. Subsequently, the Philippines, without consulting asean partners, lodged a formal claim with the United Nations to establish an arbitral tribunal under unclos.11 In response, China showed more willingness to improve dialogue on a code of conduct in the South China Sea and agreed with establishing the asean-China Joint Working Group (jwg) on the Implementation of the doc on 7 December 2004. By October 2015, 10 aseanChina som meetings on doc and 15 asean-China jwg took place. So far, two preliminary documents were formulated covering a list of crucial and complex issues and a list of elements for the outline of the code of conduct (eas 2015). Conclusion asean was driven by China threat perceptions and created opportunities to engage China in formal and informal discussions about regional issues in the 1990s. Beijing gradually established diplomatic ties with individual Southeast Asian nations and upgraded its relationship with asean onto a more formal level as asean’s dialogue partner. The prc agreed to join the asean Regional Forum and sign the tac, which outlined the guiding principles for inter-state and inter-regional collaboration: that is, respect each other’s sovereignty and

11

The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs has set up a regular update – a newsletter – informing the public about the Sea Arbitration case http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/ west-philippine-sea-arbitration-updates.

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territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, renunciation of the use of force and states should resolve their disputes amicably and effectively. However, on several occasions, China projected more assertive policies and lowered its degree of cooperativeness with its asean dialogue partners. This has been particularly true in the case of China’s insistence on its claims to disputed waters in the South China Sea. asean showed the unity of its disapproval with China’s actions and has insisted on resolving this ongoing issue within the multilateral forum. asean encouraged a three-stage developmental process to achieve a stable and a more predictable regional balance of power. It was successful in engaging China in this framework and finalizing agreements on regional confidence-building measures. This was the first step in reduction of mistrust and minimizing the chances for regional conflicts. The second stage, related to the development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms, however, has not been very successful. Conflicts in the South China Sea were not averted, for example, the Mischief Reef incident between China and the Philippines. asean’s response and the outcome of the 1997 oil rig dispute between China and Vietnam was more successful. Even though China repeatedly challenged the status quo and acted in contradiction to the norms of regional conduct, with asean unable to prevent this incident, enough united pressure was generated to convince Beijing of wrongdoing and led to China’s withdrawal of the rig. In recent years, asean and China managed to engage in more constructive discussions through foreign ministers meetings and the jwg on the Implementation of the doc. asean’s ability to use the soft-balancing strategy vis-à-vis China, however, is rather limited. A case in point was the surprising unilateral action by the Philippines when Manila filed a legal claim with the United Nations to establish an arbitral tribunal to adjudicate on the application of unclos to the West Philippine Sea. On 29 October 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled it had jurisdiction in this case and the final decision was expected in 2016.12 As such, the international law may determine the future outcome of the dispute. asean’s role is to make sure that the dialogue with China continues and the claimant states consult other asean members should they decide to solve their disputes with China via an international dispute-settlement mechanism. Otherwise their actions could undermine the organization’s efforts to engage China on the regional code of conduct. 12

The Press Release can be found here: http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1503.

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Whiting, Allen S. (1997): “ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension.” Asian Survey, 37(4), 299–322. Wong, Lai Foon (2007): “China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Relations during the PostCold War Era.” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 1(3), 373–404. Wurfel, David (1999): “Between China and ASEAN: the dialectics of recent Vietnamese foreign policy.” In Thayer, Carlyle A. and Amer, Ramses (Eds): Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Wuthnow, Joel, Li, Xin and Qi, Lingling (2012): “Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China’s Multilateral Diplomacy.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 17, 269–290. Xinhua (2011): “China’s Peaceful Development.” 6 September. Available at: http://news .xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329.htm. You, Ji (1999): The Armed Forces of China. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. Yuzawa, Takeshi (2007): Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific. London and New York: Routledge. Zhang, Jian (2012): “China’s Defense White Papers: a Critical Appraisal.” Journal of Contemporary China, 21(77), 881–898.

chapter 6

The South China Sea Conflict: Ten Thousand Stones and a Nine-Dash-Line – Rethinking Maritime Space Concepts Padraig Lysaght Introduction Territorial claims to a certain space are older than mankind itself. Spaces have been marked out by all kinds of life forms throughout millions of years, yet it is only mankind that will go to the most extreme measures to defend its artificially created boundaries. Space is a vital factor for every community and the definition of it can be as simple as “mine and thine” or as complex as legal documents dozens if not hundreds of pages thick, including legal expertise, cases filed and International Court of Justice (icj) verdicts. Over the centuries a, not always reliable, but generally recognized system of defining community borders and thus spaces has evolved. While there are serious regional differences on the interpretation of the meaning of borders or even their existence, modern rules generally apply – for the land case at least. Born from the relative ease with which space on land can be occupied by one group or another, possession could even just follow the concept of “I am here, you are not” to provide some measure of lawfulness. History shows a record of conquest of space on land via three main courses of action: First the most blunt – martial force. Whether actually by fighting or only through the threat of defeat looming over the opponent – martial force has been an extremely successful instrument in the acquisition of space on land. Second on the list is trade, and third marriage and inheritance. All of these apply to land borne spatial concepts. The sea however is different business altogether. By virtue of not being the primary habitat for humans the necessity of really owning the sea has for a long period of time not been given much thought, much less the real possibility – save for a theoretical frame of mind, as for example one can today buy stars via internet. True possession or control of a body of water was different to land. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) from 1982 goes a long way back in its sources and is the closest attempt up to now for a codified piece of law concerning “possession” of sea water areas (as opposed to bodies of water inland – lakes or rivers, etc. – where control can be claimed by

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004312180_008

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simply surrounding the body of water). What the convention does, is that it essentially measures spheres of influence away from land – land as small as little islets or even rocks and shoals. The idea of controlling the space of water bodies in the sea is linked to the control and possession of the corresponding spaces these are areas or even only “patches” of land (see unclos Part viii, Article 121). For the case of the South China Sea (南海/Nán Hǎi), these “patches” of land are the two island groups the Spratly Islands (南沙群岛/Nánshā Qúndǎo) and the Paracel Islands (西沙群/Xīshā Qúndǎo), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (黄岩岛/Huángyán Dǎo) and the mainland coasts of the adjacent or littoral countries which are Brunei, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and the Republic of China. The islands themselves feature a very high amount of insignificance during the course of the past centuries and actually were considered more of an obstacle than anything worth possessing by any littoral group of interest (not to say states).1 unclos simplifies coastlines and provides us with a set of guidelines, albeit of quite limited scope of influence over the space of the sea. Away from a mainland coast the sea is divided into quasi borders of 12, 24, 200 and 350 nautical miles with vexing and waning rights, powers and possible influence over the ocean territory including the bottom of the sea and what lies below (see unclos Parts ii and v). This flimsy set of rules has led to the declaration of certain spheres of interest, aviation control zones, secure zones, extended zones with special security interest and so forth, not only in the South China Sea but worldwide. One of the more significant cases in the South China Sea is the so-called Nine-Dash-line drawn on a map of the region which was published in the late 1940s and later submitted to the General Secretariat of the United Nations by China.2 From an international law point of view there is a number of factors that have to be taken into account when dealing with the South China Sea. Starting with the basis of international law for seaborne questions, the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea of 1982 is the main tool utilized. The convention has been ratified by all littoral countries to the South China Sea and provides the definitions and structures that are used in virtually all arguments concerned with the issue. Next to the natural zones of 1 This only began to change after in the 1960s first speculations about natural oil and gas reserves in South China Sea were made. 2 The original map created in 1947 by the then Republic of China featured an Eleven-Dash-line which was in 1949 published and changed into the Nine-Dash-line, losing two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin. This map has been with China for some time now and at the time up to the submission to the un by the prc was unchallenged by any of the littoral countries.

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influence of the littoral countries and issues of measuring them, the unclos also provides for relative uncertainty with regard to the islands and rocks in the South China Sea. This uncertainty is founded in the simple, but important point of interpretation of the unclos itself, especially Part xiii Article 121 Point 3 “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation of economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf” is somewhat of a problem for the South China Sea case. While a number of countries argue that the Spratly Islands for instance are uninhabited, others point out that there in fact is a human population in the form of military garrisons and that human population of the islands in easily possible in light of modern engineering efforts. Thus both points of view make use of the same paragraph of unclos to their respective end. To further increase the difficulties for practitioners of international law there are a number of claims by littoral countries alongside certain activities of third countries in the South China Sea that are per se not covered in the convention as such or again give rise to different modes of interpretation of the convention. First in line is of course the so-called Nine-Dash-Line drawn by the People’s Republic of China and demarking a significant area of the South China Sea. The meaning of the Line itself is disputed by numerous scholars of international law (see Rosenberg 2013 and Zou 1999). International law provides a system of measurement for state influence or even sovereignty over parts of the sea. Ownership and rights are closely tied to the distance from either the mainland – i.e. the continental shelf or the distance from islands, as per the definition from unclos article 121 as mentioned above, or even to some extent rocks. To summarize the definitions of island, rock and shoal let it be said that: An island (岛/dǎo) is an inhabitable area of land in the sea with no above water connection to continental mainland. Whereby for the sake of simplicity, island structures like keys often are measured as a straight line in international law – a so-called “base line”.3 The above-mentioned issue with the island definition is that it is quite open to interpretation, as unclos does not specify the means and prerequisites of inhabitation. In further reasoning we make the jump to an uninhabitable area of land, which at all tides, is at least partially above the water surface – the rock (“不能维持人类居住或其本身的经济生活的岩礁,不应有专属经济区或 大陆 架。”) (see unclos Part viii, Art. 121, §3, Chinese version). Most of the Paracel and Spratly Islands are actually rocks. Some of them are covered with

3 Baselines are only a limited issue for the South China Sea question and therefore will be only addressed when it seems necessary.

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platforms or dock installations and even buildings – most of them are of military nature and a few of them are being dubbed islands.4 The next and for this work, last type of land area next to genuine continental mainland are shoals (浅礁 /qiǎn jiāo). Such a shoal is part of or forms in itself a shallow in the sea and at low tide is at least partially above water, while at high tide it is usually completely submerged. The island groups in the South China Sea each consist of all the three above mentioned types of land area. The importance of definition of these land areas lies mostly with the second concept of international law of the sea, which is of great importance to the South China Sea case – namely the mile zones. unclos provides for four distinctive zones of influence over the sea and seabed adjacent to the different types of land area. There is a 12 mile zone, measured from the shore of the respective mainland, island or rock – not from shoals – in which the country enjoys sovereign rights to any and all actions, including police rights, fishery, exploitation of any resources and all waterborne activities.5 These rights have only one exception, which is marked as the right of innocent passage (see unclos Article 7 and the following). This concept allows for a foreign vessel to pass through these waters unharmed and unhindered, as long as it does not stop its passage for any reason and in case being a military vessel, showing any sign of aggression towards the littoral country.6 The next zone is the 24 mile zone and includes the water area and seabed between the 12 mile zone and the distance of 24 nautical miles from the baseline of any given mainland shoreline, island or rock but does not include shoals. The rights of the littoral country in the 24 mile zone are still significant, yet somewhat reduced in this so-called Contiguous Zone (see unclos Article 33). Part v of the unclos provides for the Exclusive Economic Zone which for the South China Sea is the pivotal zone. The Exclusive Economic Zone – furthermore eez - stretches up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the mainlands shore or a given island, not from rocks or shoals. While the littoral state does not enjoy the same policing, immigration and security rights in its eez as in its respective Territorial Waters or Contiguous Zone, it still holds a monopoly for the exploitation of sea resources in the waters, seabed and the subsoil within its eez (see unclos Article 55 following). A country’s eez ­extends up to 200 nautical miles from its baseline again generated only by 4 Examples include: Fiery Cross Reef永暑礁 (Yǒngshǔ Jiāo) or Johnson Reef赤瓜礁 (Chìguā Jiāo). 5 The so called Territorial Waters – see unclos Article 3. 6 Classically even the direction of on board weaponry towards the coast counts as aggressive move. See unclos Article 19 and 30 following.

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mainland or islands, not by rocks or shoals. When eezs of multiple countries clash against another usually an equidistance line is used to define the total extent of each of the eezs. This usually means that both countries gain an eez, which has the same distance from their respective baselines, but below the 200 nautical mile maximum extent. If the distance between the baselines for instance were to be 300 nautical miles, then both countries would gain a respective eez of 150 nautical miles each, except they do reach another agreement which is mutually accepted by both parties (see unclos Article 74). The final zone that unclos does provide for is the Continental Shelf which basically is a submarine extension of the eez and cannot go further than 350 nautical miles from the respective baseline of the mainland or island, again not rocks or shoals. Having examined these various zones it is clear that the littoral countries to the South China Sea do covet the islands and rocks in the region and will, depending on their own control of the areas of land define them as islands or as rocks in order to get as great an eez as possible in the region. Going back to the Nine-Dash-line at first it might seem that it would reflect the maximum extent of the eezs or Continental Shelf that the People’s Republic of China is able to claim, provided both the Paracel islands and the Spratly Islands are fully prc territory. Interestingly however this is not the case. The Nine-Dash-line includes more of the water space than could be normally claimed under the unclos regime and thus poses a problem for international law. The prc’s representatives who have up to now commented upon the Nine-Dash Lines significance have used only vague descriptions concerning its significance as well as the term of “historic waters” which is not used in international law. The definition of this term and its interpretation are very interesting issues and will take up some space within this work. Away from the Nine-Dash-line there also are extensive claims from the side of Vietnam, which also do not match the unclos regime. The claims on islands and respective zones made by the other actors in the Region such as the Philippines, Malaysia or Brunei all are in accordance to unclos standard regulations. A special case is the Republic of China on Taiwan, furthermore Taiwan or roc, whose claims are identical to the prc’s. Other actors of importance for the South China Sea do not make claims to any areas of land, i.e. islands, rocks or shoals within the sea. Some however have strong positions on rights of passage and use of certain sea-lanes, as well as resource exploitation. The most important two countries in the present context here are the United States of America and Japan. The roles of Singapore and Indonesia will not be addressed for simplicity’s sake, as their impact on the questions asked in this contribution is not significant. Noteworthy is the role of the European Powers – ­especially Spain, France and the Netherlands have played in the

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region and their impact on the international law situation. An interesting observation to be made in international law of the sea and its regime concerning islands is that jurisprudence traditionally follows rather the Anglo-Saxon case law system rather than the Roman law system, which the rest of international law is based upon. Thus rulings and precedence’s from centuries ago, such as rulings from Kings and Queens of Spain for instance, who served as arbiters in conflicts past still are regarded as valid arguments for current cases. Summing up all of the claims and concerns the South China Sea comprises a very difficult and challenging environment for international law and its practitioners. Although all of the littoral countries are parties to the unclos, most of them have joined with reservations, thus only accepting parts of the convention or extending and amending certain articles, while ignoring others. A further and most important fact is that the United States of America are not a party to unclos. The competence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) and the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (pca) are also an issue. Only recently the Philippines have filed a suit against the prc with the court, alas the prc has not recognized the competence of the court for this case. Only in October of 2015 has the Permanent Court of Arbitration declared itself competent in the matter following an extended examination of its own competence and thus proceedings will eventually issue a ruling on the case, which in turn will not be binding unless the prc recognises the courts competence. A ruling would however set down some principles to be applied in the region and possible future cases and massively influence future argumentation for any of the littoral countries’ causes. Coming back to the Nine-Dash-line map, the trouble with such a map of course was and remains that of any and all maps: it is highly subjective. As Karl Schlögl observes in this work Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit, maps have to be the subject of the scrutiny of scientific questions – just like any other historical document, be it ancient or contemporary. In more detail for the Nine-Dashline map the usual questions to be asked about maps are extended by two more which by themselves give rise to even more follow-up questions. These two questions are “Why a Dash-line?” and “What does the Dash-line mean?” These questions seem to be the same at a first glance but are vastly different in nature. The first question has been analysed by experts in international law with defacto as many results as experts, but boiling down to the simple facts that there has not yet been such a demarcation of sea territory before and that therefore the experts did side with whatever implication they chose to follow, partially based on their favoured theoretical or in some extreme cases even political background – namely that the Nine-Dash-line was altogether invalid

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or that it constitutes a real demarcation of some sort (see for instance Chamey 1995, Shambaugh 2005 or Gao and Jia 2013). The issue of the “Why?” question remains unsolved as of now, as questioning the quasi cartographer brought forth no conclusive official answer but ­conveyed more of a spirit, which the Dash-line should reflect, leading to the second question: “What does it mean?”.7 The implication of drawing a line with or without dashes on a map always indicates a type of border. This also is the case with the Nine-Dash-line which as following the official statement of the spokespersons of the People’s Republic of China indicates the “historical waters” of China in the South China Sea.8 This statement of course was the cause of great confusion among scholars and practitioners of international law and especially those focusing on the law of the sea, as there is no official term in the unclos called “historic waters”. Again it gave rise to speculation and dispute, claims of insignificance and true meaning – rendering it anything from legally useless to the absolute truth of international law (Charney 1995 pp. 736–737). This however again is precisely where the “stepchild” of modern day legal science – history comes in. While often all to easily dismissed by scholars of law, history has the potential to answer certain questions which normal international law and unclos cannot answer in the case of the South China Sea concerning both the Nine-Dash-lines meaning(s) and an even greater legal so to speak “heresy”: the question of sea borders. The Nine-Dash-line today is often regarded as a unilateral declaration of a sphere of influence by the prc. Of course this assessment is not without value, but it is at best incomplete, especially if one takes into account Chinese foreign policy at the time the map was drawn up, which usually is not done today. The map from the late 1940s is still influenced by various phenomena. One of them is the cultural hegemony that was projected from China to the South China Sea region over the centuries and which has influenced each and every one regional country and costal community alike. Chinese influence has been there for far too long to be simply ignored within one generation or two since the downfall of the Chinese Empire in 1912. Granted, European interests and colonial powers had taken hold of the region for some time, but the roots of 7 The interpretations of this “spirit” range from all but complete possession of the marked territory up to certain possession of the island groups but not the space of water around them right to a statement of general interest in the area. 8 For instance in 2012 the Minister of foreign affairs, Yang Jiechi, argued “plenty of historical and jurisprudence evidence to show that China has sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters.”

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many cultural aspects of everyday life stayed at the very least intrinsically connected to some Sinic influence. True enough – the political influence of China was all but diminished in the early 20th century and, due to self-imposed isolation, also vastly reduced at the start of the second half of the same century, but it still remained as a part of the  local cultural mind or better local cultural space.9 Space is intimately connected to time in the field of history and the space that is the South China Sea is no exception to this rule. The concept of “historic waters” for the maritime area encompassed by the Nine-Dash-line means no more or less, than that China has for a very long time had interests in this area and that for most of this time it also had the means of protecting its interests in said space. While naturally all other littoral powers and even alien powers had their share of influence, their actual claim of control of the region is, historically speaking linked to hegemony. The European colonial powers came and went again and the us may have interests and allies, but are by no means a littoral country to the South China Sea. Thus the argument can be made that the one power that has always had an interest in and upheld its grip on the islands, rocks and shoals by and large was China. The problem with the historic border argument remains. “Whose border at what time?” is the question to be asked when historic arguments are fielded and it remains one of the favorite arguments legal scholars use to dismiss history and the evidence it provides in the face of border disputes. For the case of the South China Sea the answer to this question is no less complex than for any other border dispute. China had held and again does hold great influence and power in and over the region – both hard and soft. Every one of the littoral countries involved have held some amount of power and influence over parts of the region as well at some point in time – as did various European powers as well as the United States of America. Alas whom does the international community believe to be the true heir to the waters and all related exploits?10 Lobbying for the one case or for the other remains strong and international law is all but powerless to find a solution for the situation, which would even be accepted by all actors. At the end of the day we are left with a situation that can best be called “insular anarchy” and leaving no one in the right or

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See Assmann (2007). In support of the notion that the Chinese hegemonic influence on the region was not merely one of military strength, but more importantly a cultural one as suggested by Zhang and Buzan (2012). And in extension is it relevant what the international community believes?

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wrong of their actions.11 Answers may be easily sought by rethinking the concept of borders and extending them to maritime areas – not as international law in form of the unclos currently tries – as extension of mainland power projection. This seems absolutely ridiculous once one understands that the old mile zones actually are range suggestions for military weaponry usable in the defense of such a sea area – as modern day weapons achieve intercontinental range with ease. Access to the sea has been an issue for countries with coastline for centuries and even for landlocked countries it has always had an enormous appeal. Control of the South China Sea and its islands, rocks and shoals is already managed in a contained anarchic fashion – those interested have their stakes set – so the Spratly Islands are home to military installations of the prc, roc, Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia. New frontiers and spaces have been established long since and still continue to do so – lest one only need mention cyberspace – why should the sea – a lifelong companion of humanity – be any different in the means of a more direct control and border system?. Technological means make survival at sea or on a rock little more than an exercise in innovative engineering and thus the dependence from the space of land should no longer have to be regarded as the major factor in such an equation.12 The English School of International Relations provides an exciting tool for the South China Sea case. Especially the international society concept is of great value for the region. As opposed to the more general use of the international society like introduced by Bull in the Anarchical Society I will use the same concept but on a smaller scale – i.e. the regional level and not the world. Naturally states have interests and even so naturally also pre state countries did have interests. Yet these interests, as important they may be or have been, are not situated in a political vacuum, but in an international regional theatre populated by other actors who all make up a regional system. The interactions of the actors involved in the South China Sea region were evidently not only determined by realistic motivations but by a grander variety of factors. Thus what I will call a regional international society comes into play. The international society, which is guided by the states or countries motivation to adhere to some concept of rules, often out of fear of what would happen without them, is as I will try to show for the South China Sea case slightly different. The usual 11 12

Going along the lines of Hedley Bull’s “Anarchical Society”, a similar system on a smaller scale is probable for the islands and actors in question. This gives rise to the idea that rocks may under circumstances be classified as islands – as is currently done and from there arguing that the sea itself may be a human habitat – given the appropriate technical attention – and therefore were worthy of a new set of rules without total dependence of above water land.

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factors that make up the instruments of the international society would classically be international law, diplomatic relations, the impact of great powers and armed conflict. Eastern and South Eastern Asia provide for more than for the classical approach to the international society. The aspect of culture plays a far more important role here. Cultural concepts and systems are similar or the same and can be derived from just a few sources, with every regional group adding their own peculiarities to the general concepts. Thus a solid basis for understanding the thinking and acting of the other regional actors is provided and fosters an even greater opportunity for the regional international society. The South China Sea area would have provided a rich and fruitful set of these instruments, which would closely be connected to hegemonic facts in the region. A major or even, at least for the region, great power like imperial China would perfectly fit the role of the great power instrument mentioned above. But not only fear of military intervention of this regional great power would have cemented its status as hegemon, but also the cultural hegemony wrought by China would have played a major role in the local international society. As opposed to the concept of armed conflict or outright war it can be proposed that the “Pax Sinica” would also serve as a desirable tool for the South China Sea. China, though, is not the only side interested in the islands or littoral country to make disputed claims in the waters of the South China Sea. Vietnam for instance boasts claims, which, quite similarly to those of China, are open to different kinds of interpretation. Arguments brought forth for the Vietnam case are quite similar to the ones brought forth by the other claimants, a unique one might be the commissioning of a small group of persons, who were tasked with scavenging the waters around the Paracels in the hopes of finding still intact goods or other spoils from shipwrecks. Further historical arguments for the Vietnam case include French statements made prior to and after the Second World War, reaffirming French colonial territory. Likewise the use of the islands and rocks by fishermen has been made an argument for state sovereignty over land, sea and reef in the area. It also is true that no opposition was made to Vietnam’s claim of the Paracel Islands during the San Francisco Conference, yet it is necessary to bear in mind that due to conflicting interests between Britain and the us on which Chinese government to invite to the conference, there were neither representatives of the People’s Republic of China nor of the Republic of China present at the conference to voice any opposition. French support of the case is a meaningful asset; yet again France at that time was more likely interested in reclaiming a former colonial territory for herself and not in refortifying local claimants. “At the 1951 San Francisco Conference – attended by 51 countries – on the Peace Treaty with Japan, the

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Head of the Delegation of the State of Vietnam under French patronage in a statement reaffirmed Vietnamese sovereignty over the two archipelagos. No objections were raised nor any reservations made against his statement at the Conference” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1975, p.7). From the freedom of the seas to seaplots? The old freedom of the seas system is long gone. Even the unclos stating rights and freedoms in international waters is subject to certain practical exceptions and execution of de facto acts of sovereignty by military vessels (see unclos Part vii). No matter what conventions and treaties did state, at sea and on islands and rocks the concepts of “first come first serve” as well as the “bigger fish” have prevailed. Why do islands belong to some countries? Because they extended their power and their local hegemonic field to them. To who do sea routes belong? To the force that controls them. Borders have always been fickle mistresses changing their allegiance permanently. A static system of land borders up to today is not fully functional, much less the theoretic projection of control from a mainland’s coast over the sea. The answers may lie in “regional hegemony” within a system of a “regional anarchical society” as per Bull. I address this “regional anarchical society” for the South China Sea case as “insular anarchy”. As shown above this regional system can be observed throughout the course of history with the islands and interests concerning the islands of the South China Sea as playing ball of regional actors. While the interests of these players may lay with another theme altogether the South China Sea, insular question has always shown a huge amount of “insular anarchy” – i.e. interest of regional powers with unclear possession status of the islets and rocks of the area. While this situation was well ignored to frankly unimportant before the alleged prospect of vast natural resources – save fish – no power sought to dominantly claim the islands, that were up to then considered more as a nuisance than an asset, as explained above. The only limited interest there in the islands was twofold, but by far not a matter of national policy as such. First there were local fishermen of many of the littoral countries, who may have used the islands as refuge from sudden storms, as landmarks or as short-term refuge or drying place for their nets. Secondly and more importantly the islands are depicted and addressed in quite early maps and navigational charts. To contribute to the anarchical status of the islands, it seems these were more included as navigational hazards and landmarks with possession neither necessary or being an actual aspect of deliberation. But of course the case is not as simple as may be presented. The maps created even long ago of course had several meanings, as did hegemonic ideas and systems. To not overextend this idea, I shall give another short example of such a map

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and its importance for the early South China Sea case, today also popularly referred to as Nán Hǎi Wenti (南海问题) i.e. South China Sea question. The first reference may be found above in the address of the Nine-Dash-line map. A great number of different assessments have been delivered and I already have addressed the issue here. The origin of the line, however, is far less known and worth a short glimpse into the past century. In fact, as already elaborated, the Nine-Dash-line in the South China Sea was an eleven-dash-line. This line or demarcation was created by the then Republic of China in the year 1947. The eleven-dash-line was presented in form of an official map and at first did not spark any kind of controversy. After major political changes in China – namely the founding of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国/Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó) – the line was revised and shaped into its current form – the Nine-Dash-line. The Kunyu Wanguo Quantu is a famous map drawn by the Jesuit priest Matteo Ricci in 1602. The drawing of the map was aided by the Chinese scholar Zhong Wentao and the famous geographer and translator Li Zhizao.13 The map was requested by the Wanli Emperor (萬曆/Wànlì) of the late Ming Dynasty (明朝/Míng Cháo). It is the first of its kind and with a size of roughly 1.5 m × 3.6 m a rather large map. The map is divided into two halves with the Chinese Empire located in the centre of the map. The Americas are also shown on this map, making it the first map of the whole world to have China in its middle.14 Printing of the map was done via wood print of 6 blocks of wood onto paper using ink. There are several original prints of the map, one of which is located in the Austrian National Library in Vienna. All of the original prints of the map share the same size but not the same all over design. Especially the images drawn on the map as often can be found, such as sea monsters, i.e. vary from print to print or are completely missing. There has been ample work conducted on the map and its significance. While there are many angles of it to study, it does also show the South China Sea and even makes mention of the islands in it. As a more informative than actually political map it does not make reference to ownership of the islands themselves. The political motivation of the

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Li Zhizao (李之藻/Lǐ Zhīzǎo), who lived from 1565–1630, was converted to Christianity by the Jesuits and together with two other literati officials played a major role in the catholic Christianisation of eastern China with a focus on Shanghai and Hangzhou during the late Ming era. He also translated many texts of Western science into Chinese and is also known by his Christian name of Leon. Naturally given the time of its publication it lacks mention of Australia.

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map being kept in mind, it seems fair to closely examine the references on the other littoral countries of the South China Sea in relation to China. The map itself was thoroughly researched at the time and was the product of a series of maps that were printed before by Ricci in China. The Kunyu Wanguo Quantu was meant as a means to Christianise the Chinese, as the Jesuits found an approach via science useful to this end. Ricci had come to China in 1582 at which time he already was a cartographer of some skill and in 1584 drew the first of his China centred world maps.15 This example is useful for at least two reasons. Firstly being a map not created by a person or institution from the region, it would be less prone to misrepresent possessional aspects. As the intention of the map is known to us, we can quite safely assume to what degree political interests and spheres of influence would be served and adjust our perception accordingly. For the South China Sea case, the conclusion on the status quo is a simple one: the South China Sea has always been and remains until today in the matter of its borders a subject to hegemony and the projection of power. At present this hegemonic impact of the powers active and interested in the region is in motion and is shifting in the direction of China once again. Its general hegemonic phases having been: Imperial China, Europe, Japan and the us.16 While the situation is still unstable and a renewed Chinese hegemony over the sea area of the South China Sea has not yet fully been established, there remains “insular anarchy” which has the full potential to lead to peaceful resolutions of differences or to outright war between the parties involved, as the spheres of hegemony between the “outgoing hegemon” – the us and its successor China clash against each other. China’s Nine-Dash-line encompassing the Ten Thousand Stones which are the Spratly and Paracel Islands goes a big step into a new spatial order and conception of maritime space – following the concepts of so called “historic waters” on the one hand and simple hegemonic power on the other. The other littoral countries are stepping up and do try to concede any ground or better “water” to these claims by presenting their own claims which are partially in line with proposed compromise solutions or are equally daring. What concrete actions and results will arise from the South China Sea conflict is still unclear – but it is likely that they will set precedence for a new way of thinking about and handling maritime borders in general.

15 16

No print of this first map remains to today. See my upcoming work “Insular Anarchy and the History of Hegemony in the South ­China Sea”.

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Bibliography17 Assmann, Jan (2007): Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen. München: Verlag C.H. Beck. Bull, Hedley (2002): The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Buzan, Barry (2010): “Culture and International Society.” International Affairs 86(1), 1–5. Charney, Jonathan L. (1995): “Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea.” The American Journal of International Law, 89(4), 724–749. Da, Xiang (1961): Liangzhong Haidao Zhenjing. [向达, 两种海道针经, 中华书局.] Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Gao, Zhiguo and Jia, Bing Bing (2013): “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications.” The American Journal of International Law, 107(1), 98–124. Luo, Hongxian (1579): Guang Yu Tu. [廣與圖.]. (Enlarged terrestrial Atlas.) US National Central Library. Available at: https://www.wdl.org/en/item/7093/. Mills, John V.G. (1970) : Ying-yai Sheng-lan: ‘The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores’. (Translated from the Ma Huan’s 1433 text, edited by Feng Ch’eng-Chün with introduction, notes and appendices by John V.G. Mills.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Avaiable at: http://faculty.washington.edu/qing/huan_ying-yai_sheng-lan %5B1%5D.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam (MoFA) (1975): “White paper, The Hoang Sa (Paracel) And Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelagos And International Law.” Saigon. Available at: http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/download/doc_download/132-whitepaper-on-the-hoang-sa-paracel-and-truong-sa-spratly-islands-part-1. Pressat, Roland (1983): “Premiers résultats du recensement de la Chine.” Population, 38(2), 403–409. Available at: http://www.persee.fr/doc/pop_0032-4663_1983_num _38_2_17860. Rosenberg, David (2013): “The Paradox of the South China Sea Disputes.” The China Story Journal, 23 April. Available at: http://www.thechinastory.org/2013/04/ the-paradox-of-the-south-china-sea-disputes/. Schlögel, Karl (2003): Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit: über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik. Munich et al.: Hanser. Shambaugh, David (2004): “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order.” International Security, 29(3), 64–99. United Nations (UN) (1982): “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/ unclos_e.pdf. 17

All internet sources have last been accessed on 1 October 2016.

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Wang, Yuan-Kang (2012): “Managing regional hegemony in historical Asia: The case of early Ming China.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), 129–153. Zhang, Yongjin and Buzan, Barry (2012): “The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(1), 3–36. Keyuan Zou (1999): “The Chinese traditional maritime boundary line in the South China Sea and its legal consequences for the resolution of the dispute over the Spratly Islands.” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 14(1), 27–55. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249571014_The_Chinese _Traditional_Maritime_Boundary_Line_in_the_South_China_Sea_and_Its_Legal_ Consequences_for_the_Resolution_of_the_Dispute_over_the_Spratly_Islands.

chapter 7

The South China Sea Dispute: A Shift to a More Proactive Role in asean’s Discourse and Policies since 2012? Alfred Gerstl Introduction Despite previous incidents in the South China Sea (scs), which have intensified since the 1970s, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) did not issue guidelines for managing the complex dispute until 1992, namely the asean Declaration on the South China Sea (Manila Declaration) (asean Foreign Ministers Meeting [amm] 1992a). Since this time, however, the asean foreign ministers have dealt each year with the dispute, as it involves its members Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as the People’s Republic of China (prc) and Taiwan (e.g. amm 1992a, 1992b, 2015). asean aims to establish a framework for dispute management, leading to a legally binding Code of Conduct (coc) that the dispute parties would be bound to utilize. These efforts have become verbally stronger since 1995 and in particular since 1999, after Manila submitted a draft regional coc (amm 1999). After negotiations between asean and China, the two sides agreed in 2002 on first issuing a political document, the asean-China Declaration of Conduct (doc) on the Parties in the South China Sea (asean 2002a), and bridging the remaining differences on a binding code in subsequent talks (Thayer 2012, p. 2). Since 2004 China has worked – hesitantly and with interruptions – with asean on creating a general framework for resolving the territorial disputes, i.e. the legally binding coc based on the doc (Emmers 2014; asean 2013, §16; Pal 2013). So far, the asean-China Joint Working Group to Implement the Guidelines of the doc has met 15 times, but the process has so far not yielded tangible results (Emmerson 2016; Xinhuanet 2015). Concrete asean-China consultations on the coc started only in September 2013 in Suzhou (Fravel 2014, p. 65). Criticism within asean on Beijing’s tactic to gain time has increased (Parameswaran 2015a; Tiezzi 2015). A legal or political resolution for the various bilateral territorial disputes and the dispute as a whole seems unrealistic in the near future. Despite continuously addressing the South China dispute, asean was – due to a lack of consensus among its members – a reluctant mediator until mid-2012, even though it is fully aware that the crisis challenges its centrality in © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004312180_009

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East Asia (Gerstl 2013; Storey 2013a). Complicating the situation even further, the Association’s two key partners, the us and China, give exactly opposite recommendations as to how it should strengthen its regional centrality: While Washington urges asean to play a stronger leadership role in the South China Sea conflict, i.e. to oppose Beijing, the prc argues that asean has no role to play in its “near seas”, as the disputes are bilateral in nature (Valencia 2015). To make matters worse, since 2009 Southeast Asian and foreign observers have noticed an increasing assertive pattern of behavior from China in the South China Sea (Cronin 2015; Yahuda 2013; International Crisis Group [icg] 2012a). Coincidentally, in this year us President Barack Obama announced his pivot to Asia strategy. The aim of this chapter is not to trace the reasons for the territorial rows and the legal and historical justifications of the various claims of the littoral states, but to analyze whether a fundamental change in asean’s notion of the conflict and its role therein has started to occur since the debacle of the 45th asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012. It was the first time ever in asean’s history that no communiqué was released after an official meeting due to a lack of consensus among the members. This failure proved to be a turning point: Exactly two decades after issuing the Manila Declaration, the Association came under internal and external political pressure to take a stronger stance in the disputes between its members and China. Whether asean’s discourse since 2012 reflects a change in approach, and whether this rhetoric has been implemented in concrete policies, will be examined in detail. Previous studies conducted by the author that have applied the theoreticalmethodological framework provided by the Constructivist Copenhagen School in analyses of asean’s discourse on climate change and counter-terrorism and its actual policies have yielded convincing results (Gerstl and Helmke 2012; Gerstl 2010). This contribution will therefore demonstrate whether this approach is also appropriate for an assessment of the Association’s declaratory policy, i.e. speech act (see below), and concrete policies in the South China Sea. To reveal patterns and possible changes since the early 1990s, the statements of the asean Summits and the asean Ministerial Meetings of the foreign ministers since 1992 concerning the South China Sea issue will be scrutinized. Furthermore, to assess whether asean’s view reflects a broad consensus in East Asia, the South China Sea discourse of the asean Regional Forum (arf) since 1995 will be assessed. It will thereby demonstrate whether the wording of the asean Summit and/or amm is reflected in the arf chairman’s statements. Another aim of this contribution is to examine Vietnam’s South China Sea discourse and internationalization strategy, and whether they have in 2014 and 2015 ­influenced asean’s discursive and actual policies. For this, Hanoi’s statements concerning the oil rig incident in 2014 are embedded in its general South

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China Sea narrative. Over the last few years Hanoi and also Manila have internationalized their conflict with Beijing: Vietnam by forming closer security and economic partnerships with external partners, particularly through collaborating in oil and gas exploration activities; the Philippines since 2013 by pursuing international arbitration according to the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (unclos) (Carpio 2015; Emmers 2014), while additionally upgrading its bilateral security partnerships. It is also worth noting that the us, India and Japan have recently been keen to deepen their strategic engagement with Vietnam and the Philippines, aiming to counterbalance the rising power of the Chinese state (Gady 2016; Scott 2013). It can be assumed, however, that these actions on the part of Vietnam and the Philippines must cause a significant political headache for asean, in that two of its members – rather than the Association itself – have aimed to establish the rules of engagement of external actors, whilst clearly pursuing their own national interests over those of the region as a whole. For a better understanding of the historic background of the South China Sea dispute, this chapter will start with a brief overview of the main events from 1933 until today. The primary focus, though, rests on how current events impact the discourse and policies of asean and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam. In particular, certain recent incidents – such as China’s deployment of a mobile oil rig in waters within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) from May until July 2014 (see Thiele and Loher in this volume), as well as its ongoing land reclamation activities – will be analyzed. Subsequently, the South China Sea discourse of asean and the arf will be assessed and patterns highlighted, followed by an analysis of Vietnam’s discourse and internationalization strategy and how they have impacted on asean’s discourse and policies. In the conclusion, the main findings will be  discussed and the theoretical-methodological approach critically reflected upon.

Overview over the South China Sea Dispute since 19331

The two main island groups in the South China Sea are the Spratly Islands, stretching over 425.000 square kilometres, and the Paracel Islands (over 15.000 square kilometers). Both contain hundreds of small islands, islets, shoals, reefs and rocks. Their strategic value became evident during World War ii. 1 Information on when a certain island or land feature in the South China Sea was seized, or when a country deployed a military force, is in many cases ambiguous. Despite meticulous research by the author, he is nevertheless responsible for possible false dates listed in this subchapter.

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Even though France claimed the Paracel and Spratly Islands on behalf of its Indochinese colony in 1933 (Buszynski and Sazlan 2007, p. 145), Japan was the first power that actually controlled the entire South China Sea. It occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands from February 1939 until August 1945, administering them via Hainan and Taiwan. China, Vietnam and France, though, reiterated their claims to sovereignty over both island groups. Concerned about Japanese plans to occupy Hainan Island, France had already in 1938 sent a police force to a few Paracel Islands and built two lighthouses, a meteorological station and a radio station (Neue Zürcher Zeitung [nzz] 1938a, 1938b). In addition to local fishermen, the police force encountered 20 Japanese workers but did not take action against them. At this time guano was – apart from fish – the main commodity, and was already being exploited by Japanese firms on the Paracel Islands in the late 1920s, with permission of the French colonial administration (nzz 1938c). Overall, however, the economic potential of the islands seemed low before oil and gas resources were discovered after wwii. At the Cairo Peace Conference in 1943 China, represented by Chiang Kaishek, repeated its territorial claims. After the end of the war, in December 1946, Chiang’s troops seized Itu Aba (Taiping Island), the largest of the Spratly Islands, but did not deploy troops until 1956. In 1947, China’s nationalist government published a U-line shaped, eleven-dotted map to illustrate its territorial claims. Communist China still uses the same map, although since 1949 the markings have been reduced to nine dashes. In Chapter 2, Article 2(f) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands” (United Nations Treaty Series 1952). The treaty, however, failed to make provisions as to which governments should control which parts of the South China Sea, or to establish a mechanism to resolve the contested territorial claims. The Vietnamese delegation stated its claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands, while China, not invited to the treaty talks, reiterated its territorial claims to all major island groups in a statement (Yahuda 2011, pp. 143–144). The tensions among the claimants increased in 1956, when Tomás Cloma, a Filipino adventurer, lawyer and businessman, occupied uninhabited islands in the western Spratlys (“Freedom Islands”). South Vietnam immediately reacted by sending naval troops to islands in the Crescent group (Spratly Islands). After the partition of Vietnam in 1954, South Vietnam administered the Paracel Islands, as they lie below the new border with North Vietnam along the 17th parallel. Also in reaction to Cloma’s move, Taipei occupied Itu Aba (Elleman 2013, p. 274; Buszynski and Sazlan 2007, p. 146); the military garrison there is still the largest in the South China Sea. In 1969, Washington-backed South V ­ ietnam sent

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troops to the western parts of the Paracels. China had already (in 1955) seized the eastern parts (Amphitrite Group) but deployed troops only on Woody Island. Despite these actions, no armed skirmish took place until the 1970s. The final phase of the Vietnam War after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, however, created new dynamics, and the pattern of action and counter-action emerged again: Despite the lack of strong us military support after Washington’s gradual withdrawal from Vietnam from 1969, in 1973 and 1974 Saigon sent troops to the Spratly Islands, among them Spratly Island itself. The prc felt provoked and seized the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands from Saigon by force in January 1974 (Battle of the Paracel Islands), and has since then controlled all of the Paracel Islands (Kux 1974). About 70 Vietnamese troops died in the fighting, as well as Chinese fishermen and soldiers. Due to the Sino-Soviet border dispute and the Senkaku Island row, the Soviet Union and Japan were worried about possible Chinese territorial claims. Washington, concerned because of China’s possible control of the assumed oil and gas resources, did not intervene either (New York Times 1974a, 1974b). In February 1974, in reaction to its loss of the Paracels, South Vietnam sent troops to Sin Cowe Island, also in the Spratlys, and reiterated its sovereignty over the archipelago. At the same time, Beijing emphasized its sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The Philippines protested, too, urging the parties to bring the dispute to the attention of the United Nations (nzz 1974). Manila had already (in 1971) occupied six islands in the Spratlys, formally claiming them in 1978. The Philippines were also the first country to start oil and gas exploration activities in the 1970s. In addition, the Philippines had also established a comparatively strong military presence on at least six islands by the mid-1970s (Pao-Min 1990, p. 23). After its reunification under Communist rule, Vietnam – North Vietnam had previously not challenged China’s territorial claims (Buszynski and Sazlan 2007, p. 146) – started to take a stronger stance against Beijing. In 1975 it took over six islands in the Spratly group from South Vietnam, including Spratly Island, where it built an airstrip. In 1976 Hanoi occupied an additional seven islands (Pao-Min 1990, pp. 22–23). After these incidents the overall situation in the South China Sea remained relatively calm until 1988 – at least there were no reports about military clashes. In March 1988 China and Vietnam fought briefly over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly group. Vietnam lost 72 sailors after three vessels were destroyed by China (Burgess 2003, p. 9). Since then, China has also built up a military presence in the Spratly Islands, occupying nine islands in total by 1992 (The South China Sea 2011; Buszynski and Sazlan 2007, p. 149). The end of the Cold War led to the retreat of the Soviet Union, and there were question marks concerning

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the future military presence of the United States in the region. Consequently, there were fears China might fill the potential vacuum. In 1992 China passed the national Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, declaring sovereignty over its territorial sea and control over its contiguous zone. Article 2 explicitly lists Dongsha (Pratas) Islands, Xisha (Paracel) Islands and Nansha (Spratly) Islands as China’s territorial land. Two years later a new severe crisis between Beijing and Hanoi broke out. This was caused by joint exploration activities of the China National Offshore Oil Company (cnooc) with the us Creston Energy Corporation in a block near the Vanguard Bank (Spratly Islands) and within Vietnam’s 200 nautical miles eez. Chinese and Vietnamese ships each aimed to disturb the exploration activities of the other side, though the situation did not escalate (Buszynski and Sazlan 2007, p. 158 and map 2). In August 1994, Beijing and Hanoi discussed for the first time the sovereignty issue of the Paracel and Spratly Islands at a viceministerial meeting. In November 1995 a bilateral Joint Working Group on the Spratlys was established. In July 1995, Vietnam joined asean and normalized its relations with the us (Ang 1998, pp. 1128–1129). Since the mid-1990s, China and the Philippines have been in a dispute over the Mischief Reef, which lies 250 kilometers west of Palawan and is also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. In late 1994 Beijing seized the reef and built military structures – it was the first confrontation in the South China Sea with an asean member (Hayton 2014, p. 87). This incident marked a turning point in Sino-Philippine relations. As a consequence, Manila started to multilateralize the dispute within asean (Baviera 2002, pp. 257–258). asean “surprised the prc by strongly supporting the Philippines” in this dispute in 1995 (Tønnesson 2002, p. 18; cf. amm 1995a, but also the less robust 1995b, §9). At the same time, a severe crisis between China and Taiwan broke out after Chinese missile tests. Beijing eventually backed off in 1996, as the United States sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait in support of its Taiwanese ally (Chen 1996). In the mid-1990s China realized that it needed asean strategically and economically (Buszynski and Sazlan 2007, p. 151). It further deepened its cooperation, which had already been developing positively after the normalization of diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Singapore in 1990. At this time, Beijing was still isolated in the Western world due to the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. The establishment of the arf in 1994, the Asia-Europe Meeting (asem) in 1996 and notably asean Plus Three (apt) in 1997 intensified cooperation. In 2003, China signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (tac) and was thus eligible to become a member of the East Asia Summit (eas). One year earlier asean and Beijing had agreed on the doc, though the negotiations on a rulesbased, legally binding and operational coc have not yet yielded results.

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From 2004/05–2008 China, Vietnam and the Philippines aimed to initiate multilateral confidence building measures in the form of the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (jmsu). Yet this agreement was not renewed, due to the deterioration of Chinese-Philippine relations, strong criticism from the Philippine opposition on the lack of transparency in the decision-making processes of the Arroyo cabinet, involving allegations of corruption, and questions concerning its constitutionality in the Philippines (icg 2016, pp. 18–21; Baviera 2012, pp. 11–18). In the last two decades all claimant nations except Brunei have built military structures on land features in the South China Sea which they control. In addition, minor incidents have occurred regularly, e.g. China’s Marine Surveillance Force disturbed Vietnamese and Philippine seismic boats within their eez in 2006 (Fravel 2011, p. 306). In 2009, according to Washington, five Chinese vessels harassed the ocean surveillance ship us Impeccable 75 nautical miles south of Hainan. China declared the ship has violated international and domestic law (Valencia 2009). There was severe tension between Beijing and Manila in April 2012 over an incident at the Scarborough Shoal, when Chinese vessels hindered the Philippine navy in their attempt to arrest Chinese fishermen who were presumably fishing illegally within the Philippine eez (Emmers 2014, pp. 66–67). In May 2013 the killing of a Taiwanese fisherman by the Philippine coast guard led to Taiwanese sanctions on Philippine migrant workers, lifted in August 2013 (Perlez 2013). In 2014, tensions between China and the Philippines grew at the Second Thomas Shoal (Glaser 2014). The deployment of a temporary Chinese oil rig in Vietnam’s eez in 2014 and the acceleration of Chinese land reclamation activities since the same year, though, mark a new phase in the South China Sea dispute. Another recent development with potentially far reaching effects is international arbitration, as filed by the Philippines under Annex vii of unclos on 23 January 2013 (Permanent Court of Arbitration [pca] 2016a, case number 2013–19). Manila, though, asked the judges of the Arbitral Tribunal not to “(…) determine who is sovereign over any of [the contested] features. The Philippines asks only that you determine their character – that is, whether they are low-tide elevations or islands; and, if the latter, whether they are rocks – and their maritime entitlements under the Convention”, as a Philippine legal representative declared in the first hearing in The Hague in July 2015 (pca 2015, p. 47). Manila’s legal approach deliberately leaves sovereignty questions aside. China argues that the South China Sea dispute is about territorial sovereignty and thus “beyond the scope” of unclos (prc/Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, §3). It thus refused to participate in the arbitration process and has made clear that it will not accept the verdict. In July 2016, the Arbitrational Tribunal of the PCA found “no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights, or sovereign rights

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and jurisdiction beyond those provided for in the Convention, in the waters of the South China Sea encompassed by the nine-dash line” (PCA 2016: §§631 and 692). The U-line is therefore legally void.

China’s Claims and the Most Recent Developments in the South China Sea China is the main claimant state in the South China Sea. It justifies its claims with discoveries and historical connections with the islands, speaking of “historical waters”. The nine-dotted U-line of 1949 illustrates these claims. In narrow definitions of the geographical limits of the South China Sea, it covers approximately 80 to 90 per cent of the sea. According to a broader definition, the Chinese claims comprise 62 per cent (us Department of State 2014, footnote 11). Beijing has so far not clarified whether it demands full sovereignty over the whole area covered by the U-line or just certain sovereign or control rights (icg 2012a, pp. 3–4). In 1996, Beijing signed unclos, but – along with many other treaty parties – also stated its reservations2 and, in 2006, added a self-exemption from unclos dispute settlement.3 In 2009, it submitted the nine-dotted U-line map to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs) – a direct response to Vietnam and Malaysia’s individual and joint ­submission of their territorial claims to the clcs, which Beijing has criticized. Due to the contested nature of the claims, the clcs could not consider and qualify the submissions (Kingdon 2015, pp. 133–134; icg 2012b, p. 4). Overall, the Chinese territorial claims and their justifications remain “ambiguous” (Fravel 2011, p. 294). Despite signing the doc in 2002 and in general following a pattern of multilateralism and close collaboration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in the case of the South China Sea the prc has always rejected a 2 Upon ratification of unclos on 7 June 1996 China, along with most other treaty parties, made a series of statements. In the third of its four statements it reaffirmed Article 2 of the Law of the prc on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone (25 February 1992). Therein it states that Taiwan “and all islands appertaining thereto including the Diaoyu Islands, the Penghu Islands [Pescadores Islands]; the Dongsha Islands [Pratas Islands]; the Xisha Islands [Paracel Islands]; the Zhongsha Islands [including Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal] and the Nansha Islands [Spratly Islands]; as well as all the other islands belonging to the People’s Republic of China)” (United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 2013). 3 Beijing’s declaration under article 298 concerning dispute settlement states: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part xv of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention” (us Department of State 1996, Annex 2).

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­ ultilateral dispute settlement and the internationalization of the conflicts m (Gerstl 2013). Since 2009, China’s harsh words have been increasingly accompanied by ­assertive deeds, directed mainly against Vietnam and the Philippines. In addition, in 2014, Beijing started employing a “cabbage strategy”, attempting to “take one layer of sea at a time, first by sending [civilian] fishing ships to the area, then marine surveillance ships, and finally warships” (Panda, R. 2014, p. 2). Also in 2014, it initiated new land reclamation projects on at least four islands. At the end of 2015, Chinese land reclamation activities were taking place on seven islands, namely Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross, South Johnson, Subi, Gaven, Hughes and Cuarteron (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative [AMTI] 2015). On Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Subi and Woody Island in the Spratlys the Chinese have built or extended airstrips of up to 3000 meters (Lee 2015; Hardy and O’Connor 2014). On three other reefs (Itu, Gaven and Johnson South) the Chinese have built supply, docking and other facilities (Hunt 2015). In April 2015, the Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman emphasized the civilian dimension of these activities but also acknowledged that they serve “necessary military defense requirements” (quoted in Glaser 2015). In early 2016, Beijing announced plans to provide via Sansha City, its Hainan-based administrative hub in the South China Sea, more civilian services to inhabited and uninhabited islands, including civilian aircraft flights (Tiezzi 2016). In February 2016, China deployed surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels (Forsythe 2016). Accordingly, there is speculation that China plans to announce an Air Defense Identification Zone (adiz) in the South China Sea – similar to the controversial one in the East China Sea (Parameswaran 2015b). It is, however, crucial to note that according to the unclos provisions most of the Chinese occupied “islands” are either rocks or low tide elevations – features that Beijing aims to transform into artificial islands. Even though according to international law the initial legal status of an island or rock is decisive, if a certain number of states accept the new man-made islands over a considerable period of time, this might lead to a new international customary law norm concerning artificial islands and their legal entitlements. Vietnam, on the other side, started its own land reclamation projects – on Sand Cay in 2011, and West Reef in 2012 – although it has thus far less land reclaimed than China (amti 2015). The number of occupied island features in the Spratly group is contested. According to the us government in 2015, 48 island features were occupied by Vietnam, eight by China and the Philippines each, five by Malaysia and one by Taiwan (Austin 2015). According to another estimate Vietnam occupied 21, the Philippines nine, China seven, Malaysia five and Taiwan one territorial feature (Chubb 2015).

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Claiming to secure freedom of navigation, Washington has since 2015 pursued a “fly and sail” strategy, involving navy patrols within the 12 nautical miles zone and overflights of military planes over Chinese claimed islands in the South China Sea. Washington, which is neutral in the territorial disputes, but emphasizes the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight, has criticized Beijing for militarizing the South China Sea (Pham 2016; Commander/us 7th Fleet 2016). In the following, the asean response, primarily via discourse, to such recent developments – in particular the oil rig crisis and Vietnam’s internationalization strategy – will be examined. To identify whether the discourse has changed since 2012, the speech act analysis of the asean Summit and amm as well as the arf covers an extensive time frame (1992–2015).

The South China Sea in the Discourse of asean and the arf (1992–2015) Every year the joint communiqué has a paragraph on the South China Sea, [some are] stronger and [other(s) are] milder.

Vietnamese foreign minister pham binh minh on the amm communiqués (quoted in Thayer 2012, p. 12; additions in original)

Theoretically and methodically, the discourse analysis of asean’s speech act on the South China Sea builds on the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). According to this constructivist approach, a security actor needs to convince a target group, i.e. a predefined audience, through a socalled speech act that a certain threat poses an existential danger to a certain referent object; be it for instance the state, the economy, collective identities or the environment. The process of convincing the audience is also labelled a “securitization move”. After its successful securitization, the issue is regarded as standing above traditional politics, meaning that the government can apply “extraordinary measures” to resolve the problem in a faster and more efficient manner, diminishing the influence of the traditional political and legal checks and balances. In Southeast Asia most regimes are (semi-) authoritarian and therefore already enjoy a political and discursive dominance, i.e. they have more power and resources to frame an issue according to their political intentions as other domestic actors (cf. Floyd 2007, p. 41). Accordingly, this analysis focuses on the speech acts of the main securitizers – the political leaders (heads of government and state, foreign and defense ministers, and senior diplomats) at regional level, rather than the domestic political discourses. For this,

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the public statements of the asean Summit, the asean Ministerial Meetings (Foreign Ministers) as well as the asean Regional Forum meetings have been analyzed. The presumed audiences of the speech acts of these three institutions are both political decision-makers and the general public in East Asia. The time frame is from 1992, when the South China Sea dispute was first mentioned in the amm (cf. amm 1990, 1991, 1992a) until 2015 (asean 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003–2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2208, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014a–c, 2015; amm 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996–2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; arf 1995–1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001–2015). At first glance, the comparison of two asean fora and an asean-led institution with enlarged membership may raise methodological concerns. Unlike the arf, the asean Summit and the amm consists solely of the ten asean members. While asean is in the driving seat of the arf, 17 other members participate, reducing the Association’s influence. Thus the arf cannot be regarded as representative for asean’s speech act. To overcome such concerns, statements of the asean Summit and the amm will first be compared in a speech act analysis. Subsequently, the statements of the arf will be scrutinized, showing whether their wording resembles that of the asean Summit and/or amm, and reasons for an overlap or differences will be discussed. This contribution, however, makes an important caveat when applying the methodology of the Copenhagen School: Unlike this approach, the author believes that security is not purely about survival but also about severe threats. One reason is that “existential” is difficult to define – it is not only related to physical but also political survival. To give an example, an existential threat for asean would be a war that involves China and the us. Even if no asean member was involved militarily, the Association would have to politically and diplomatically support one side, which would most likely lead to its breakdown due to opposing views. Consequently, the author believes that the speech act methodology can also be applied in cases when the securitization actors do not view a threat as existential but, for instance, “only” profound, severe or serious (cf. Gerstl and Helmke 2012). This approach also takes into account the inevitably diplomatic wording of the asean documents. For instance, if the foreign ministers in the arf “reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace, security and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and over-flight” (arf 2015, §12), then different dimensions of security were regarded as threatened, namely regional, economic and maritime security. These dimensions are addressed in International Relations literature in general and not directly related to the five security sectors identified by the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998).

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The reason is that the securitization process of the South China Sea dispute was not regarded as comprehensive enough to justify the application of these dimensions, because in the current phase they do not provide an added analytical value. The main research question was whether asean and the arf have securitized the South China Sea dispute. Therefore it was checked how often certain security-related key terms and phrases have been used in the discourse in order to find patterns and deviations. As the diplomatic texts dealing with the South China Sea issue are rather short, this empirically oriented approach seemed more useful than defining categories in advance. asean Fora: asean Summit and asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Among the political asean fora that deal regularly with the South China Sea conflict are the asean Summit and the asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. The asean Summit brings together the heads of state or governments of the asean-10. Usually held in October or November, the days before and after the Summit are used for regular meetings with the dialogue partners, notably in the form of meetings of apt and eas, but also with the heads of state of individual dialogue partners, e.g. China or India (asean+1 format). With the exception of 2006 (no meeting) and 2009 (two meetings), the asean heads of states and governments have met annually since 2001. In general, they discuss the same range of topics as the foreign ministers, albeit at a more abstract level. Sometimes a meeting is devoted to present a new asean initiative, thus international relations are not addressed. The asean foreign ministers come together at least once every year, usually in July, but also at various other times throughout the year for informal meetings and retreats. They also regularly meet with their counterparts from apt and eas. The ministers and their staff prepare the gatherings of the heads of state and governments and of the arf.4 ASEAN-led Mechanism: arf Established in 1994 by asean, the asean Regional Forum is, in terms of membership, the largest security dialogue forum in the world, including, inter alia, 4 More detailed discussions than in the asean Summit, the amm and arf take place at the regular asean Defense Minister Meetings (admm) and the admm plus, i.e. asean plus its dialogue partners, and the Senior Officials Meetings (som). Talks and collaboration are also conducted on the level of Senior Officials between asean and China, as well as experts in workshop and seminar settings (track 2). Since 1990 the Association holds annual meetings of the so-called Workshop Process on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. Its aim is to build trust and lay the basis for cooperation among littoral (including Taiwan) and non-littoral states, but not to resolve the sovereignty claims. The participants are governmental and military officials who attend the meetings as private persons and scholars (Song 2013). This track 2 mechanism goes back to an Indonesian initiative (amm 1992b).

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the asean-10, the us, China, Russia, Japan, South and North Korea, India, Australia and the European Union (eu). The foreign ministers of the 27 members discuss current crises and conflicts, yet they do not directly negotiate, let alone resolve conflicts in a structured and formalized manner, as for example with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce). The arf is usually held a day after the amm and presided over by the asean chair, supported by the asean Secretariat. As the media coverage of the gatherings is broad, politicians have a public stage – the meetings, though, are not open to the media. For instance, then us Foreign Minister Hillary Clinton made a remarkable statement in front of the press before the arf meeting in 2010 (quoted in Thayer 2011): The United States, like every other nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. We share these interests with not only asean members and asean Regional Forum participants but with other maritime nations and the broader international community.5 The arf is also consensus-oriented: each participant possesses a de facto veto right. Consequently, even countries that have breached international law are not publicly named and shamed. Nevertheless, in regard to the South China Sea the Southeast Asian claimant nations can argue to their domestic audiences that China has been at least implicitly criticized, in particular if “land reclamation activities” (arf 2015, §12) are emphasized.

Analysis of the Declaratory Policies of the Three Fora

The analysis of the speech acts of the asean Summit, the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and the asean Regional Forum since the early 1990s reveals constant and consistent patterns in the declaratory policies of both the Association and the arf: All three view the South China Sea dispute as a security threat that needs to be resolved through diplomatic means for the sake of peace and stability in the region, though none of them frame it as an 5 Emphasizing its “national” and “vital interests” in the South China Sea, American politicians might prepare their citizens and the international community through verbal and written statements that “extraordinary measures”, including the use of force, might be applied in case of rising tensions. To explain and justify a policy through a speech act, i.e. to establish discursive legitimacy at home and abroad, seems a necessary act for democratic and authoritarian states alike.

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“extraordinary threat”. Adjectives such as “profound” or “severe” to describe the potential impact of the conflict have been avoided in all three. The strongest term is “serious”. In other words: The wording used by the asean Summit, the amm and the arf is not strong enough to speak of securitization according to the Copenhagen School’s terminology. However, if less strict criteria are applied – and concrete policies included – the picture looks different. Moreover, surprisingly, the following analysis will demonstrate that the amm and arf statements are very similar, while those of the asean Summit differ significantly from both. asean’s discourse shows that the Association has remained strictly neutral in the territorial disputes, yet has since the early 1990s positioned itself as a mediator, attempting to build a framework for further negotiations between the conflict parties. Since the 1992 asean Declaration on the South China Sea (amm 1992a) the Association has aimed to establish a multilateral, asean-led normative and rules-based framework for conflict management. Accordingly, asean’s declaratory policy makes references to international law and regional treaties, notably the un Charter, asean Charter, the tac,6 China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the doc, as well as the established regional cooperation mechanisms and the principle of asean’s centrality. For the actual resolution of the contested claims about sovereignty and territoriality, though, responsibility rests with the directly involved countries – “(…) territorial and jurisdictional disputes are best addressed bilaterally or amongst the parties concerned” (asean 2011, §127). The failure of the amm Summit in July 2012 is not mirrored in the 2013 statements of asean and the arf. Even though Brunei, the 2013 Chair, and the new Secretary General Le Luong Minh declared the coc to be a priority for asean in 2013 (Storey 2013b, p. 5), the statements of that year are less robust, both in the Summit and the amm. The statements on the South China Sea from asean, however, changed significantly in 2014 – although those from the arf did not. For Myanmar, the asean chair in 2014, the management of the South China Sea dispute enjoyed high priority (asean 2014a). Its official position was that “peace and stability are essential for assuring regional security” (Maung Shein 2014, p. 3; translation A.G.). By using this stronger formulation, Myanmar may also have been ­indicating its political emancipation from its long-term ally China. Malaysia, the chair in 2015, chose the approach of clearly stating the differences among the asean and arf foreign ministers on the South China

6 The rules of procedure of the tac High Council have been specified in an amendment in 2001 (asean 2001a).

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Sea dispute. The Philippines had already utilized this technique in 1999: The Chairman’s Statement of the 6th arf was the first one that highlighted “that some arf countries were concerned that there could be increased tensions”. asean Summit The speech act of the asean Summit differs significantly in quality and form from the amm and arf.7 Firstly, the asean heads of state or government have neither consecutively nor comprehensively securitized the South China Sea issue. In certain years the Summit has not even addressed the dispute at all, e.g. at the 10th, 14th, 15th and 16th Summit (asean 2004; 2008; 2009a; 2009b). The reason for this was that these meetings were dedicated to ambitious asean plans or concrete projects, e.g. the asean Charter or the Hanoi Plan of Action. In these cases, the phrasing is very declamatory. In general, though, the asean Summit deals with the same range of regional and international topics as the amm and arf.8 Secondly, the statements concerning the South China Sea are much shorter and, thirdly, usually the heads of state and government merely referred to meetings of ministers and experts related to the South China Sea, without adding additional comment. For example, in 2007 they “welcomed the steady progress” made in the asean-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the doc, and listed meetings of other fora (asean 2007). The pattern of the asean Summit’s speech act on the South China Sea remains stable: It stresses the need for regional stability and peaceful conflict settlement with recourse to international law, in particular unclos, the “full and effective implementation of the doc in its entirety” (asean 2013, §54), as well as the importance of an early conclusion of the coc. These elements can also be found in the chairman’s statement of 2014 and 2015, yet they vary significantly from the previous statements: At the two summits held under Myanmar’s chairmanship in 2014, the asean heads of state and governments expressed for the very first time “serious concerns” (asean 2014b, §64; cf. amm 2014b) and “remained concerned over the situation” in the South China Sea (asean 2014c, §86). The first statement was issued one day after the asean foreign ministers released a strong statement solely dealing with the South China Sea dispute (amm 2014). 7 A noticeable exception is the 18th asean Summit in 2011 (asean 2011) where the phrasing is in accordance with the statements of the amm and arf. 8 The statements of the asean Summit meetings are shorter than those of the amm but longer than those of the arf, ranging from five to almost thirty pages. A statement of the arf Chair is on average ten pages long. One exception is the 15th arf Meeting of 2008, with 40 pages (asean 2008). The amm statements are usually more than 10 pages, and can reach up to 55 pages.

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Concerns, though, are also expressed in the Malaysian chairman’s statement of 2015: The Summit as a whole “shared the concerns expressed by some Leaders”, precisely “on the increased presence of military assets and the possibility of further militarization of outposts in the South China Sea” (asean 2015, §107). The more robust wording of the asean Summit since 2014 is obvious – however, the next years will show if the Summit has really embarked on a securitization move. amm Since 1992 the asean foreign ministers have dealt regularly with the South China Sea dispute, both at the regular meetings and at informal retreats. As the membership of the asean Summit and the amm is open to the asean-10 only, a more robust wording than in the much broader arf – where the spectrum of opinions is even broader – was expected. This hypothesis was not borne out under closer examination of the evidence. Overall, the ministers have since 1992 framed the South China Sea dispute as a threat to regional stability and security. How severe it is in asean’s view, though, remains unclear; “serious concern over recent developments which affect peace and stability in the South China Sea” was first mentioned in 1995 (amm 1995a) – but was only clearly repeated in 2011 (amm 2011, §22). The Manila Declaration of 1992 and the amm statement of March 1995 remain the strongest so far. In 1992, the foreign ministers “(…) expressed their view that any adverse development in the South China Sea directly affects the peace and security in the region” (amm 1992a, §17). It was a reaction to Beijing’s adoption of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone three months earlier. Three years later, reacting to the Mischief Reef confrontation between China and the Philippines, the ministers called “(…) upon all parties to refrain from taking actions that destabilize the region and further threaten the peace and security of the South China Sea. We specifically call for the early resolution of the problems caused by recent developments in Mischief Reef” (amm 1995a). Such a concrete reference to incidents is, however, rare. In general, neither the amm nor the arf statements provide accounts of actual incidents. Despite the 1994/95 dispute between China and the Philippines over Mischief Reef and the Sino-Vietnamese tensions caused by the Crestone Affair, the amm only welcomed the exercise of self-restraint and the ongoing Workshop series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (amm 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996–1998; similar arf 1995–1998). According to the foreign ministers’ joint communiqués, individual members also present position papers during the discussions (e.g. the Philippines in 2014; amm 2014a, §155). With the exception of the amm statement of 2015

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under Malaysian chairmanship, however, the paragraphs reflect a common denominator. Their wording is highly analogous or even identical to the previous year, sometimes with only a slight change to the adjectives in a sentence to qualify a situation from year to year, for instance, “early” (amm 2009) into “eventual” adoption (amm 2010) and “expeditious establishment” of the coc (amm 2015, §154). Since the Manila Declaration of 1992 the discourse of the foreign ministers is consistent, but has gradually become both more comprehensive and more precise in wording. They regularly stress the need for peace and stability in the South China Sea and a resolution to the conflict based on peaceful means, emphasizing International Law, unclos and, since 2002, the doc as the key guidelines (since 2007 labelled a “milestone document” – arf 2007, §30). The exercise of self-restraint and confidence-building measures are regarded as important tools – a varied standard sentence in the foreign ministers’ communique is: “They urged all parties concerned to exercise self-restraint with a view to create in a positive climate for the resolution of these disputes” (amm 1992a). Since 2006, and even more strongly since 2010, asean’s centrality in the East Asian security architecture is highlighted (amm 2006, §7; 2015, §). That the inability to manage the South China Sea dispute endangers this centrality, however, is never mentioned. Since the failure of the amm of 2012, there are signs that the amm – as the most outspoken of the three analyzed fora – is in the process of securitizing the conflict in a stronger manner. This new momentum has become clearly visible in 2014. Under Myanmar’s chairmanship the asean foreign ministers expressed in a separate statement “serious concerns over the on-going developments in the South China Sea, which have increased tensions in the area” (amm 2014b). This statement deals exclusively with the South China Sea, thus giving it higher visibility. In 2015, under Malaysian chairmanship, the amm’s wording also reflects this shift. The respective paragraphs in the amm statements have also grown in length in the last years (e.g. amm 2015, §§150–156; 2014a, §§149–155). All in all, the current amm speech act on the South China Sea qualifies as securitization move. arf Despite the participation of 17 non-asean members, including the prc and the us, the statements of the amm and arf addressing the South China Sea dispute are in general very much alike. This is probably not least due to the fact that the amm and arf were established and are still led by asean, notably the Secretariat which is, together with the rotating asean chair, responsible for the wording of the drafts. Guiding principles are the asean Way values, in ­particular

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consensus and compromise. In addition, the amm are usually held the very day before the arf meetings, and thus need to be organized at the same time. The arf statements on the South China Sea are usually slightly shorter than those of the amm. The arf has dealt with the South China Sea dispute since its first regular meeting in 1995. However, its statements up until 1999 are both brief and do not seem very concerned about the negative impacts of the conflict on regional security. Since 1999, however, they have grown in length. In addition to the wording, it is important to take the context of the paragraph(s) addressing the South China Sea into account: It is usually the first concrete dispute that has been singled out, in most cases followed by the situation on the Korean peninsula. The headings are always neutral, e.g. “regional and international security issues” (arf 2009). The analysis of the speech acts of the arf on the South China Sea reveals five constant patterns that can also be found in the amm discourse: Firstly, no conflict party is ever singled out by name; instead “all parties concerned” are urged to retreat from the use of force, to exercise self-restraint and to engage in confidence-building measures. The second pattern is the reference to the need for a peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes by the directly involved parties “in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law”, including unclos, and, since 2002, the doc. Thirdly, ever since 2002 the doc is regarded as a key mechanism – since 2007 even as “a milestone document” (arf 2007, §17) – and the basis for the creation of the coc, to be negotiated by asean and China. Consequently, all arf Chairman’s Statements highlight its importance for conflict settlement (arf 2002–2015). Another recurrent pattern, emerging in 2006 after the initial optimism over the adoption of the doc in 2002 had faded (arf 2002–2005), is the emphasis on an early conclusion of the coc and the necessity of trust and confidence building and the promotion of cooperation among the parties concerned (arf 2015, §12; amm 2014, §12). The fifth pattern is the emphasis on freedom of navigation and, since 2014, of overflight in the South China Sea (arf 1999, §11; arf 2014, §12). amm and arf: Similarities and Differences The similarity of the discourse produced by the amm and arf on the South China Sea is surprising. Both regard regional peace and stability as being endangered by the South China Sea dispute, but also since 2011 the regional economy (arf 2011, §12), notably trade (arf 2014, §12) and commerce (arf 2015, §12). Freedom of navigation and overflight are both prerequisites for peaceful relations and economic exchange and can be subsumed under maritime s­ ecurity. For example, in 2001 the 34th amm (23/24 July) and the 8th arf (25 July) in Hanoi released an almost identical communiqué and chairman’s statement:

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20. We reviewed developments in the South China Sea and welcomed the progress in the consultations between asean and China towards the adoption of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. We encouraged the continued exercise of self-restraint by all the parties concerned and the promotion of confidence building measures in this area and welcomed their commitment to resolving disputes in the South China Sea by peaceful means in conformity with recognized principles of international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) as well as to ensuring the freedom of navigation in the area. Amm 2001

16. The Ministers noted that the situation in Southeast Asia on the whole has been peaceful and stable. The Ministers exchanged views on the recent developments in the South China Sea and welcomed the progress in the consultations between asean and China to develop a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The Ministers encouraged of self-restaint by all countries concerned and the promotion of confidence-building measures in this area, and welcomed the commitment of countries concerned to resolve disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the recognised principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos), as well as to ensure the freedom of navigation in the area. arf 2001

Yet, sometimes the differences in wording of the amm and the arf are very telling: We hoped that with the effective implementation of the doc, asean and China would move towards the early adoption of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. amm 2006; emphasis added A.G.

The Ministers expressed their hope that with the implementation of the doc, asean and China would move towards the eventual adoption of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea arf 2006; emphasis added A.G.

The most significant difference between the amm and the arf is that the arf as a whole has so far not expressed “serious concerns” about the situation in the South China Sea. The amm has used a stronger wording since 2014 (amm

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2014b), while the wording of the arf became considerably stronger only at the 22nd arf meeting in 2015: 12. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace, security and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and over-flight, including in the South China Sea. The Meeting discussed matters relating to the South China Sea and took note of the serious concerns expressed by some Ministers over the recent and on-going developments in the area, including land reclamation which have resulted in the erosion of trust and confidence amongst parties, and may undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea. (…). Arf 2015

What is striking is that the arf used the almost identical wording of the asean foreign ministers in their more detailed joint communiqué from August 2015 (amm 2015).9 This indicates a strong consensus among the arf members with asean’s majority view. Even China surprisingly did not contest the sentence on the negative impacts of the ongoing land reclamation activities in the arf statement. Thus either asean’s wording reflects a consensus that is also acceptable for all other arf members, in particular China and the us. Or the organization takes Beijing’s concern into account as a precautionary measure when drafting its own statements. Or China has – due to its allies and partners within asean – indirect influence on asean discussions. In general, the Association has demonstrated “a solicitous concern for China’s reactions”, believing “that avoidance of diplomatic confrontation would promote a favorable environment for negotiations” (Buszynski and Sazlan 2007, p. 153). In fact, there is a clear pattern of asean not taking sides in the disputes in order to preserve its neutrality (Emmers 2014, p. 62), an approach that is mirrored in the asean Summit and amm communiqués. Despite the close resemblance of arf and amm statements – and in ­particular the listing of potential negative impacts of the dispute (notably on peace and stability, trade, and freedom of navigation and overflight), the

9 “150. We discussed extensively the matters relating to the South China Sea and remained seriously concerned over recent and ongoing developments in the area. We took note of the serious concerns expressed by some Ministers on the land reclamations in the South China Sea, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea” (asean 2015, §150).

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s­ ecurity forum has so far not explicitly securitized the South China Sea dispute according to the Copenhagen School’s terminology. In addition to the avoidance of the term “existential threat” the second important deviation from the Copenhagen School is the attempt on the part of both asean and the arf to refrain from arguing for the need for “extraordinary measures” to resolve the South China Sea conflict. On the contrary: ­a sean and the arf, including China, promote existing legal instruments, above all unclos and doc, and the already established workshop mechanism. Despite these references, Manila’s involvement of the Permanent Court of Arbitration amounts, at least in Beijing’s eyes, almost to “extraordinary measures”. asean does neither support nor criticize Manila’s legal internationalization strategy.

asean’s Concrete Policies in the South China Sea Dispute

The discourse analyses of the speech acts of asean and the arf have identified important patterns and an overall continuity in the discourse of both institutions. Clear differences between the discourse propounded by the asean-10 in 2012 and that of 2015 have been identified. Yet, a discourse analysis alone is not sufficient to examine asean’s actual policies in the South China Sea dispute, and to understand why the Association has since 2012 put more emphasis on its management. The following assessment provides the background to understand the intriguing changes in asean’s stance on the South China Sea, which has become steadily stronger since 2014. The failure of the amm in July 2012 made the political divisions within the organization public and caused concerns about its ability to manage an important security threat. Cambodia, the asean chair in 2012, was under Chinese pressure to prevent mention of the concrete territorial disputes between China, Vietnam and the Philippines within the ministerial discussions. While Hanoi wished to refer to cnooc’s invitation for bids for nine oil and gas blocks within Vietnam’s eez, Manila lobbied for the inclusion of the Scarborough Shoal incident (Emmers 2014, p. 67). According to Thayer (2012, p. 12) there was a “majority consensus” among the members to include references to the Philippine and Vietnamese disputes with China (cf. Thearith 2014). Phnom Penh, however, argued that those conflicts were of bilateral nature, not an international or asean-China conflict (Bower 2012). Cambodia’s foreign minister stated: “I have told my colleagues that the meeting of the asean foreign ministers is not a court, a place to give a verdict about the dispute” (quoted in bbc 2012). In addition, he claimed that the asean statements had always used the

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­ mbrella term “South China Sea”, but never mentioned concrete island groups u or land features (Thayer 2012, p. 11). Shortly after the meeting Indonesia’s then Foreign Minister Marty ­Natalegawa started a mediation campaign that involved the Southeast Asian littoral states and Cambodia. The result was the Six-Point Principles adopted by asean (amm 2012), summarizing the previous asean statements and thus reflecting the lowest common denominator but functioning as a catalyst for further talks within asean (Simon 2012, pp. 1016–1017).10 Thailand, as asean’s country coordinator for China (2012–2015), also contributed to forging a consensus among asean (Pitakdumrongkit 2016). The asean chairs of 2013 and 2014, Brunei and Myanmar, received also good grades for their respective performance in priorizing and managing the South China Sea dispute (Tin 2015, p. 191; Credo 2014; Prakash 2013; Severino 2013; Sun 2014). However, there is still no strong consensus among the asean-10 regarding the South China Sea. Malaysia’s approach of expressing differences in the politicians’ and diplomats’ statements made the twofold division within asean in 2015 visible: firstly between the four claimant nations (Vietnam joined the Association in 1995) and the members who are not directly affected. Yet even if they do not make their own claims, due to the South China Sea’s strategic relevance for the overall security in the Asia-Pacific and its importance for trade and thus economic development all asean members are affected by the dispute. The second division runs between those members that have close relations with the us, in particular Singapore and the Philippines, and those who rely more on the prc, e.g. Laos and Cambodia. In traditionally pro-Western Thailand there are question marks concerning its future strategic orientation after the coup in May 2014 (Cruz 2015). On the other hand Malaysia, which is usually close to China and not fully opposed to bilateral talks to resolve the South China Sea dispute, has become more critical of China’s behavior (Embassy of Malaysia in Beijing 2012).11 Malaysia has recently been deepening its 10

11

Jakarta could also build on the agreement that asean had reached with China during the renewed discussions on the implementation of the guidelines of the doc in January 2012, namely to establish four expert committees for maritime scientific research, environmental protection, search and rescue and transnational crime (China Daily 2014). Yet, “due to its contested nature” (Thayer 2012), no committee was set up for the fifth cooperation activity singled out in the doc, namely “safety of navigation and communication at sea” (asean 2002a, §6c). Two events illustrate the deterioration of Sino-Malaysian relations: In June 2015, a Chinese coast guard ship entered waters in the South Luconia Shoals (Bentley 2015). In September 2015, the Chinese ambassador in Kuala Lumpur caused a stir in Sino-Malaysian ­relations,

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relations with the us, ­agreeing on a “comprehensive partnership”, announced during President Obama’s visit to Malaysia in April 2014 (Rinehart 2014; Sullivan 2014).12 asean and its members, though, rely on friendly and comprehensive relations with both the us and China. Courting Washington for security guarantees, while pursuing an economically-oriented partnership with Beijing seems a short-sighted hedging strategy (Emmerson 2016). Apart from alienating the us, a refusal to manage the dispute would send the message to Vietnam and the Philippines that they need to pursue their interests unilaterally. Each of these countries has already applied a distinct internationalization strategy, even though both have for a long time been “particularly keen to use aseanderived regional diplomacy to embed China in a regional maritime consensus” (Simon 2012, p. 1000). Concerning asean’s decision-making on the South China Sea, China has both indirect and direct possibilities to influence the process. As a member of the arf and eas, Beijing can directly discuss the topic in these fora, and it also has indirect leverage on asean due to its close relations with the Association and its individual members. For instance, there exists a structured comprehensive asean-China dialogue with regular meetings of the heads of state, various ministers and senior officials in areas ranging from strategic relations to technical, economic and security cooperation. Notably, there is a history of strong collaboration in the realm of non-traditional security (Zimmerman 2014, p. 161). China was also the first asean dialogue partner to sign the tac – a key treaty for asean – in 2003; the us did so only in 2009. Thus there are plenty of formal and even more informal mechanisms to discuss the South China Sea under the asean umbrella. An open question, though, is whether asean’s new rhetoric is credible enough to convince Hanoi and Manila to pursue their conflict resolution strategies inside asean frameworks rather than solely going it alone. The framing of the South China Sea dispute by Vietnamese decision-makers will be examined in the following sub-chapter.

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as he undiplomatically uttered China’s opposition to “any form of discrimination against races and any form of extremism” (quoted in The Straits Times 2015). This remark was regarded as criticism of Prime Minister Nazak’s attempt to use the anti-Chinese race card to bolster his domestic standing. According to D.S. Pradhan (2014, pp. 175–176), Carlyle Thayer divides asean into three categories: firstly, the claimant states (further divided in Vietnam and the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia); secondly, the other maritime states (Singapore and Indonesia); and, thirdly, the mainland states (Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar).

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Vietnam’s South China Sea Narrative and Internationalization Strategy

Relations between Vietnam and China date back more than two thousand years. Still today, Chinese dominance over Vietnamese territory from 3 b.c. to 938 ce and subsequent indirect rule and dependency cause ongoing resentments among many Vietnamese citizens. Accordingly, the “official emphasis” in the national narrative rests on Vietnam’s longstanding resistance to foreign aggression, notably from China (MacLean 2014, p. 384). Since the end of wwii, the South China Sea dispute has complicated Sino-Vietnamese relations. Hanoi’s close partnership with Moscow led to a further deterioration. In 1979, China and Vietnam fought against each other in a brief border war with no clear victor. The attack was launched by Beijing in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, which ousted the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime but also laid the ground for Vietnamese occupation until 1991 (Anderson 2014, p. 28). Nominally, both China and Vietnam are Communist regimes, yet both have, since 1978 and 1986 respectively, conducted profound neoliberal economic reforms, whilst still resisting political liberalization. Despite the normalization of bilateral relations between the two states in 1991, distrust remains. Their trade volume is significant (c. 60 bio. usd in 2014), though Vietnam fears its growing economic dependency on its powerful neighbor, with its massive trade surpluses (c. 30 bio. usd 2014). Beijing and Hanoi first talked about a resolution of the Spratly Islands dispute in 1994 and agreed on establishing an expert working group which first met in 1995. Despite annual meetings, tangible results never materialized in these first years (Ang 1998, pp. 1128–1129). In order to resolve new bilateral tensions which had arisen between 2008 and 2011, Hanoi and Beijing achieved a six-point agreement in October 2011 – “a de facto bilateral code of conduct” (Amer 2014, p. 28). Regarding content and wording, the agreement is fully in line with the doc of 2002. Accordingly, it stresses a peaceful dispute settlement through friendly consultations and the promotion of maritime cooperation in less sensitive areas. Yet, even the scope of the discussions remains controversial, as for Hanoi the inclusion of the Chinese-occupied Paracel Islands is vital (Amer 2014, p. 18).13 In this period, both the prc and Vietnam were seemingly interested in improving their overall links. In order to achieve this, they built a broad variety of mechanisms for diplomatic talks on governmental, party and military level, even including a hotline (Thayer 2014a). High-level visits in 2013, notably

13

The provision of the fourth point is most striking: “If the disputes involve other countries, the consultations shall include all other parties concerned” (quoted in Amer 2014, p. 39).

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of Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, led to a number of economic and infrastructure agreements. With regard to the overlapping territorial claims, a pragmatic step-by-step approach to resolve easier problems first was chosen, ­leaving questions of sovereignty aside (Thayer 2014b, p. 14). The official Chinese news agency Xinhua (2013) celebrated the plans for joint maritime development “in waters out of the mouth of the Beibu Bay” as a “breakthrough”. New incidents, though, occurred in the following months, culminating in the oil rig crisis of mid-2014 (see Thiele and Loher in this volume). From May until mid-July 2014, cnooc moved an oil rig (Haiyang Shiyou 981) into contested waters. Initially, it announced that the deployment would last until midAugust, but removed it earlier. Whether this was due to protests from Vietnam or concessions made by Hanoi remains contested (cf. Thayer 2014c; Vuving 2014). cnooc started its drilling activities at a distance of 130 nautical miles from the Vietnamese mainland, i.e. within the Vietnamese eez, but also 180 nautical miles from Hainan and 17 nautical miles from Chinese occupied Triton Island, i.e. within China’s U-line. More than 100 Chinese fishing boats and Coast Guard vessels protected the oil rig, and water cannons were used against the Vietnamese coast guard which tried to remove the platform. Nationalist and anti-Chinese demonstrations in Vietnam led to the killing of at least five Chinese citizens on 13 May and inflicted severe damage on persons and property of Chinese, Taiwanese, Singaporean and South Korean companies (Malesky and Morris-Jung 2015, pp. 166–167; Tiezzi 2014). The majority of the Western media viewed China’s move as provocative, and in Brussels, Prague, Vienna and other European cities anti-Beijing demonstrations – organized by local communities of overseas Vietnamese, rather than the local embassies – took place.14 China severely criticized the demonstrations in Vietnam (see Loher in this volume), but refused to engage in talks with Hanoi in May 2014. As Vietnam was keen to improve its relations with Beijing, the oil rig crisis put the regime in a difficult position. The 9th Plenum of the Central Committee (8–14 May 2014) did not officially mention the incident. Yet public outrage broke out on social media, leading to the first demonstrations on 11 May. On the very same day China-critical Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, attending the 24th asean Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, spoke in favor of peaceful conflict resolution (Malesky and Morris-Jung 2015, p. 168). This, as well as the attempts 14

An official of the Vietnamese embassy in Vienna confirmed in a personal communication with the author (20.5.2014) that the embassy was surprised by the demonstrations, though he stressed that the civil society character of the protests was in fact positive for the Vietnamese government, as it was seemingly not involved in organizing the demonstrations. Another beneficial side effect was that even very regime-critical overseas Vietnamese rallied in support of their nation.

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made by the leadership to restore friendly relations after the withdrawal of the oil rig, illustrates that the target audience of Hanoi’s speech act on the oil rig crisis was the international community.15 Conversely, the Chinese leadership had an interest in normalizing the relationship to restore its influence on Vietnamese politics. In particular, it wanted to have an informal say in the planned personnel changes at the state and party level in Vietnam in 2016 (Loidl 2015). The Vietnamese government answered the incident with a comprehensive securitization discourse that is embedded in a broader narrative seeking to justify the country’s territorial claims: The placement of the oil rig was portrayed as a serious threat to national sovereignty as well as “to peace, stability, security, safety and freedom of navigation and aviation, cooperation and development in the region and [it] badly affected the national socio-economic development” (Government of Vietnam [GoV] 2014a; cf. GoV 2014b).16 This argumentation is fully consistent with its previous discourse on the South China Sea: The government has repeatedly stated in the last years that it has “sufficient historical evidence and legal foundation to prove Vietnam’s undeniable sovereignty over water areas and islands in the East Sea,17 including the Paracels and the Spratlys (…)” (GoV 2009, p. 18; cf. GoV/Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; GoV 2004; Amer 2014). The negative security and economic impacts of the conflict for Vietnam were highlighted in the 2009 Defence White Book (GoV 2009, p. 18). China’s land reclamation activities are regarded as an attempt to change the so-called status quo of the island features in Beijing’s favor (Chubb 2015). Hanoi has in the last two decades always verbally stressed its willingness to enter, for the sake of the common security, “into peaceful negotiations to settle the problem”, based on international law, unclos and doc, notably through agreeing on the coc (GoV 2004, p. 17; cf. GoV 2009, p. 18). The official aim is to turn “the East Sea into a sea of peace, friendship, and development” (GoV 2009, p. 19). Interestingly, there is no direct reference to asean as mediator or 15

16 17

Another piece of evidence that the audience of the governmental speech act was primarily the outside world, not the Vietnamese population, is the strong condemnation of the killings of ethnic Chinese in May 2014: “(A) few demonstrators in some localities, incited by bad persons, took extremist behaviors and violation activities against the law, affecting security, social order, production, business and investment environment of Viet Nam” (GoV 2014b). According to Malesky and Morris-Jung (2015, p. 169), “More clearly than divisions within the Politburo, the oil rig crisis high-lighted a growing gap between state leadership and the wider Vietnamese society. The leadership’s difficulty in resolving the rig dispute and its harsh response to domestic protests seemed only to stoke further discontent.” The discourse analysis is built on a comparatively small sample of English texts, yet as they were issued by the government, they are of high representativity. Vietnam avoids the term “South China Sea”, preferring “East Sea”. Likewise, Manila refers to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea”.

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­facilitator. This despite the fact that Vietnam needs to react both to China’s actions and asean’s conflict management strategy. An analysis of both the speech act and Vietnam’s concrete policies in the South China Sea, notably its internationalization strategy, shows that they complement each other. While stressing the principles of peaceful dispute settlement and international law, Hanoi has in its speech act strongly securitized its South China Sea dispute with China, emphasizing threats to the comprehensively defined national and regional security. The discourse analysis also demonstrates that a new feature of the internationalization strategy – the possible promotion of international legal arbitration – is already mirrored in the speech act: Amid the oil rig crisis, Prime Minister Dung declared on 22 May 2014 that “Vietnam is considering various defense options, including legal actions in accordance with international law” (quoted in Francisco and Mogato 2014). The avenue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) figured implicitly in Hanoi’s speech act in 2014 as part of the reference to unclos. The government hesitated to take this step, both because the prc viewed it as an affront, and also because it feared an unfavorable verdict (Nguyen 2015; Vuving 2014). In light of China’s land reclamation activities since 2014, however, Vietnam’s submission of a statement of interest to the pca in December 2014 did not come as a surprise.18 In this statement Hanoi recognized the Court’s jurisdiction, asked that it pays “due regard” to Vietnam’s legal rights and interests and “fully” rejects China’s nine-dash line (Panda, A. 2015; cf. GoV/Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; Parameswaran 2014). The next logical step for Hanoi would be the submission of its own statement of claims to the pca, which would, however, be a provocation to China. It would deepen the partnership with Manila, but would also put asean under pressure to form an opinion on the usefulness of international arbitration and defend it against China. In general, Vietnamese-Philippine relations are in the process of being strengthened: In May 2014 Vietnamese Prime Minister Dung and Filipino President Benigno Aquino iii announced plans for a strategic partnership (Amador iii and Credo 2015; Robles 2015). 18

On the very same day (5 December 2014) the us Department of State/Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs published the report “Limits in the Seas” on the South China Sea. It concludes that the nine-dash line “does not accord with the international law of the sea” (p. 24). This coincidence gave rise to rumors about previous consultations between Washington and Hanoi (Thayer 2014d). Two days later, on 7 December, Beijing released a position paper on the South China Sea but did not formally submit it to the pca, whose jurisdiction it disputes (People’s Republic of China 2014). Nevertheless, even though this was an informal act, one can argue that it did respect the deadline of submission given by the pca to clarify its position (15 December 2014).

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Fearing a lack of solidarity among asean, Vietnam has pursued an active, deliberate internationalization of its territorial dispute with China. As the multilateralization and settlement of the conflict within asean and the asean-led institutions has so far not led to tangible results, Hanoi has further internationalized the conflict, instrumentalizing bilateral strategic and economic partnerships. It utilizes multilateral cooperation with Asian and nonAsian partners in oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea as a means; until 2013 it had signed almost 100 joint exploration contracts with foreign companies (icg 2016, p. 12). In addition, Hanoi has increased its military collaboration with external partners. Thereby the “three nos” set the frame: no military alliances, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory and no reliance on any country to combat others (Nguyen 2015). Deeper partnerships and weapons purchases are the most tangible evidence for Vietnam’s securitization and internationalization of the South China Sea dispute. It has in the last years invested heavily and wisely in upgrading its air force, navy and coast guard. Between 2004 and 2013 military spending increased 113 per cent, amounting to US$3.2 bio. in 2013 (1.87 per cent of the gdp). (The Philippines also spent US$3.2 bio. or 1.18 per cent of the gdp in 2013.) Vietnam has strengthened cooperation with its traditional partner Russia, but also with Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Israel as well as Japan and the United States after the lifting of the embargo on lethal weapons in 2014 (Bräuner 2014; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [sipri] 2014). Yet, despite its 36 Su-30 MK2 jets with anti-ship missile, in addition to approximately 50 older Su-27 and Su-22 jets, and the deployment of coastal missile and long-range surface-to-air missile systems, Vietnam cannot match China’s maritime power (Hiebert and Nguyen 2015). According to Carlyle A. Thayer, however, Vietnam’s six conventional Kiloclass submarines, bought from Russia in 2009 and to be operational by 2017 (Murdoch 2016; Panda, A. 2014), could form a potential threat to Beijing. ­Beijing is of course aware of this situation, which makes it likely that the gap will further widen, as Beijing is committed to further increase its military spending – 10 per cent in 2015 after 12.2 per cent in 2014 –, prioritizing the navy (The State Council Information Office of the prc 2015; Wong and Buckley 2015). Individually and collectively the asean members lack sufficient maritime power projection capabilities in the South China Sea to take on the prc (cf. Till 2013, pp. 326–334). For an effective military posture they would need the support of the 7th us Fleet. Most likely the us, but also Japan, India and Australia – all promote their very own strategic interests in the region – will in the near future become the strategic core partners for Hanoi.

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Deepening of existing and creating new security partnerships with Chinacritical countries, notably Japan (Cruz de Castro 2015), is also part of Manila’s dual internationalization strategy; the main one is seeking international arbitration. Although security-wise Manila still mainly relies on the Defense Treaty with the us of 1951, the scope of this treaty is disputed, and thus it remains unclear if the provisions apply to contested territories in the South China Sea. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (edca) between Washington and Manila, signed in 2014 and in force since early 2016, gives the us access to Philippine military bases and the right to store defense material (except nuclear weapons) in mutually agreed locations on Philippine territory. These measures “are vital to giving the Philippines – still one of Asia’s weakest militaries – what defense planners call ‘minimum credible deterrence’” (Parameswaran 2015c). However, Washington has emphasized that the edca “is not tied” to the South China Sea (Lee-Brago 2015).

Box 1 Internationalization As Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (1996, p. 3) state with regard to the usage of the term internationalization in International Political Economy: “‘­Internationalization’ is a broad concept used by a variety of writers in a variety of ways.” While in economics, criteria such as openness to trade and Foreign Direct Investment (fdi) or the number of trade agreements are excellent measurements for the degree of internationalization of a country, there are no clear indicators in International Relations theory. A simple working definition of “internationalization” developed in this contribution is: If a government cannot deal with a domestic policy issue or event, e.g. a natural or man-made disaster or a political or economic crisis or a dispute with another country, and thus actively seeks assistance from foreign state actors or International Organizations, the issue has been internationalized (active or voluntary internal internationalization). Consequently, it is moved from domestic politics to the realm of international relations, as the government cannot steer the further development of the issue alone anymore. In the case that a relevant actor successfully engages an international player in domestic matters (regardless of the reason and purpose), the criteria of internationalization is also fulfilled. The support from the external partner can be in economic, diplomatic or military terms (ranging from arms sales to a military alliance).

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Gerstl There can also be cases wherein a foreign actor engages with the domestic affairs of another country against the explicit will of the respective government (forced external internationalization). Japan’s Meiji restoration (starting in 1868) is an example of initially forced, but subsequently voluntary internationalization, and also exemplifies how pervasive international influences were in shaping modern Japan. Engagement with others includes the opening up to foreign political, economic and cultural influences – influences that can lead to the adoption and even internalization of international norms and standards. Closely related with but distinct from “internationalization” is “multilateralism” which “(…) refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles” (Ruggie 1992, p. 568). “Internationalization”, though, does not necessarily imply a peaceful conflict settlement: It can promote a non-violent resolution but can also aggravate a dispute. The key reason is that the internationalization actor might lose control of an engaged actor as it pursues its own national interests, creating a sorcerer’s dilemma for the former.



Discussion of Findings and Conclusion

In 1992 asean publicly addressed the South China Sea dispute in a standalone statement for the first time. Southeast Asian foreign ministers have been dealing with this conflict ever since, and the pattern of the speech act in 1992 runs through all their statements up until today. The amm in July 2012, though, proved to be a turning point. Aware of the loss of face caused by the failure of the meeting due to a lack of consensus among the asean-10, the Association intensified its verbal and actual dispute management. The analysis of asean’s discourse on the South China Sea dispute reveals that asean has since 2014 been in the process of securitizing the South China Sea dispute as a threat to regional security and stability. Even though adjectives such as “existential”, “profound” or “severe” are avoided, the comprehensive threat perception justifies the qualification as securitization: asean has addressed the regional, maritime and economic security threats of the South China Sea dispute. In addition, it is also aware of the negative impacts of a failure of its dispute management on asean’s regional centrality, which would lead to a further internationalization and militarization of the South China Sea dispute. The amm acts thereby as the key political forum, whilst the asean Summit has only cautiously started to securitize the dispute.

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Another key finding of this contribution is that the speech acts of the amm and the asean Summit vary considerably, while the speech acts of the amm and the arf overlap. The key difference, though, is that the arf, usually held one day after an amm, has addressed the dispute with an almost identical wording, but overall has not demonstrated serious concern. Thus the arf has not securitized the dispute, but did use a more robust wording in 2015. Another important, albeit not surprising result is that Vietnam has in its discourse securitized the dispute even more and in a more comprehensive manner than the amm, addressing national and regional security as well as maritime and economic security. Yet, even Hanoi has not framed the dispute as an existential threat – not even during the oil rig incident of 2014. However, as this contribution has demonstrated, even without this (hard to define) category, the logic of the securitization concept of the Copenhagen School is applicable to assess the discourse of securitization actors – without rendering the analysis arbitrary. The Copenhagen School approach and the analyses of asean’s speech acts with regard to its counter-terrorism approach and environmental policies have revealed asean’s attempt to depoliticize terrorist and environmental threats in order to resolve them through non-political, i.e. technical, rather than extraordinary means (Gerstl and Helmke 2012; Gerstl 2010). In the case of the South China Sea, asean has also rejected extraordinary measures to resolve a threat which it has not defined as existential – arguing instead that existing “ordinary” principles should be applied, above all international law, unclos, the asean Way norms and the doc. Yet, asean does not endorse the Philippines’ international legalization strategy which is highly political – and can be interpreted by Beijing as an extraordinary means. The speech act is – deliberately – not precise enough to trace back the interests and motivations of asean and the individual members. Therefore the author believes that the methodology of the Copenhagen School needs to be embedded in a broader theoretical framework. Combined with a neorealist, notably neoclassical realist, analysis of the security situation in East Asia, as well as an analysis of the national interests and concrete policies of the main claimant states and core actors such as the us, India and Japan, the analytical power of the Copenhagen School seems particularly strong. It shows that China’s actions in the South China Sea, but also Hanoi’s and Manila’s internationalization strategies – which are a reaction to both Beijing’s and asean’s policies – have put asean under pressure to act after the debacle of the amm in July 2012. Despite these limitations, a speech act analysis has proved highly useful, as it reveals the logic and narrative behind asean’s policies in the South China

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Sea dispute, connecting the individual statements and actions of different asean fora to a comprehensive picture, and showing that statements made by asean – as well as those made by the government of Vietnam – are both discursively and practically (in terms of actual policies) in line with each other. As this contribution has demonstrated, to analyze asean’s discourse on the South China Sea since its beginnings in 1992 is crucial to understand asean’s past, current and future approach towards dispute management in the area. Any new policy promoted by asean will have been previously developed and tested in the Association’s discourse, notably in the amm. It remains therefore worth listening to asean and being sensitive to even minor changes in its public discourse. Bibliography19 Amer, Ramses (2014): “China, Vietnam and the South China Sea: Disputes and Dispute Management.” Ocean Development & International Law, 45(1), 17–40. Anderson, James Adams (2014): “Creating a Border between China and Vietnam.” In Walcott, Susan M. and Johnson, Corey (Eds.): Eurasian Corridors of Interconnection. From the South China to the Caspian Sea. New York/Oxon: Routledge, 15–32. Ang, Cheng Guan (1998): “Vietnam-China Relations since the End of the Cold War.” Asian Survey, 38(12) 1122–1141. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (2015): “Island Tracker.” Available at: http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1992): “Singapore Declaration of 1992.” (4th ASEAN Summit.) Singapore, 28 January. Available at: http://www.asean .org/?static_post=singapore-declaration-of-1992-singapore-28-january-1992. ASEAN (1995): “1995 Bangkok Summit Declaration.” (5th ASEAN Summit.) Bangkok, 15 December. Available at: http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1995%20Bangkok%20 Summit%20Declaration-pdf.pdf. ASEAN (1998): “Hanoi Plan of Action, adopted by the Heads of State/Government at the 6th ASEAN Summit.” Hanoi, 15 December. Available at: http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/ pdf/1998%20Ha%20Noi%20Plan%20of%20Action-pdf.pdf. ASEAN (2001a): “2001 Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Adopted by the Foreign Ministers at the 34th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi.” Hanoi, 23 July 2001. Available at: http://cil .nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2001%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20of%20the%20High%20 19

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chapter 8

The Logic of Strategic Restraint and Prospects for Joint Development in the South China Sea1 Truong-Minh Vu Introduction In recent years, the South China Sea (scs)2 has become one of the “flashpoints” of conflict in East Asia. One of the policies which has caused a great deal of concern for the nations of Southeast Asia is “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development”. The origin of this concept can be traced back to the Deng Xiaoping period. On 11 May 1979, Deng suggested this concept in relation to China’s territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs China 2000). This policy was further strengthened in June 1986, during Deng’s visit to the Philippines, when it was connected to efforts to solve the issue of the Nansha Islands. Deng’s strategy aimed to avoid military conflict and to pursue an approach of joint development. Meeting with Filipino Vice President Laurel, Deng stated that: “We should leave aside the issue of the Nansha Islands for a while. We should not let this issue stand in the way of China’s friendship with the Philippines and with other countries” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs China 2000). As China’s influence in Southeast Asia began to grow after 1990, this initiative became a key part of China’s incessant quest both for a leadership role in the region, and as an avenue to settle South China Sea disputes in a peaceful way. However, despite China’s efforts to establish new cooperative initiatives in the South China Sea, attempts have generally hit a brick wall. The cooperative initiatives began as a bilateral arrangement between the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (cnooc) and the Philippine National Oil Company (pnoc), which Vietnam initially protested, but later joined. In 2005, pnoc, 1 Parts of this chapter are based on my Inaugural Dissertation “China as an emerging regional leader? Analyzing China’s leadership projects in Southeast Asia” (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn 2015), available at http://hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de/2015/3914/ 3914.pdf. 2 It should be noted that there are many names for the sea depending on the view of the respective claimants. China calls it the “Southern Sea” (Nánhǎi), Vietnam calls it the “Eastern Sea” (Biển Đông), and the Philippines calls it the “West Philippines Sea” (Dagat Kanlurang Pilipinas).

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cnooc and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (Petro Vietnam) signed a tripartite agreement on a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (jmsu) to jointly acquire geoscientific data and assess the petroleum resource potential of certain areas in the South China Sea. Since 2008, China has repeatedly brought up the topic of joint development in the South China Sea. Although Southeast Asian countries including the Philippines and Vietnam have not officially rejected the possibility of joint development, they have showed little sympathy with China’s viewpoints. Thus the questions arises as to why Southeast Asian countries in an earlier period (2005–2008) accepted China’s proposal to set aside disputes and pursue joint development in the South China Sea, but later (since 2009) recanted this position and have become more confrontational in their relationship with China regarding disputes. The obvious answer is that a shifting power balance and the ways in which China has utilized its growing power have caused problems in terms of regional cooperation. Whilst it seemed like China would accept limitations being placed on its power, as embedded in agreed-upon rules and institutions, the country’s leadership was broadly acknowledged. After Beijing signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002) and asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (2003), the South East Asian states were more willing to accept and work with Chinese cooperative initiatives (for example, the jmsu). China has failed to gain the support of Southeast Asia countries since 2009 because it is unwilling to solve disputes regarding the South China Sea though multilateral rules and agreements. The lack of a “rulebased order” in the South China Sea, which would delimit and control China’s hegemonic power in the region, has led to a lack of enthusiasm for Chinese-led cooperative projects from Southeast Asian states. Thus we conclude that joint development will only be feasible when China accepts the binding limitations of institutions or legal agreements. This chapter is divided into four parts. Firstly, the analytical framework with regards to the relationship between power and institutions, as supposed by International Relations theory, will be introduced. By applying this framework we aim to explain how rising power can negatively impact the promotion of cooperation between countries, and how rising powers must thus find alternate means to stimulate weaker countries to cooperate with them. From this perspective, the two periods of joint development in the South China Sea, between 2005 and 2008 and since 2008, will be examined. Empirical evidence will be used to explain how the ways China has managed its growing power in an attempt to become more credible and connected to Southeast Asia countries has led to the success or failure of joint development projects. The final part of the article will summarize major findings and discuss joint development project scenarios in the South China Sea, taking into account the interaction between power and institutions.

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Analytical Framework: Rising Power and the Logic of Strategic Restraint

Possible avenues of joint development in the South China Sea can be analyzed using one of two distinct analytical frameworks already put forward in earlier research. The first highlights technique-based factors (based on international law); the other emphasizes factors relating to claimants’ domestic political situations (Innenpolitik). The first approach states that joint development can be seen as a feasible solution to foster cooperation among the claimants. However, the question remains as to how this is to be implemented in practice. Researchers such as Valencia and Hong (2013), Valencia, Van Dyke and Ludwig (1999), Keyuan (2006), Lee and Shaofeng (2009) or Duong (2011) have gone into more depth, questioning four main points, namely: Where and how is the joint development going to take place? What is to be jointly developed and who who is going to do it? Answers for these questions are an important precondition for putting joint development projects into practice. The second approach argues that joint development in the South China Sea results from domestic political struggle (Chung 2007, 2004). From the perspective of the various Southeast Asian states, conducting joint development projects with China has been viewed in different ways. In the view of Vietnam, accepting joint development projects proves the victory of the “anti-imperialist” faction within Vietnamese domestic politics, who advocate pursuing pro-China policies, vis-à-vis the “integrationist” approach favouring Western-integration policies (Vuving 2009, 2006). In other cases, such as that of the Philippines, joint development with Beijing is explained as a tradeoff for the economic benefits of cooperating with China (Baviera 2014; Goh 2011a). These researchers have provided different views on the possibilities for joint development between China and Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea. However, they are of limited value when applied to the particular research question under examination here. For instance, in terms of timing, the approach focusing on technique-based factors does not provide a convincing argument as to why the jmsu in 2005 was approved. On the other hand, since 2009, Vietnam has repeatedly expressed doubt about or outright rejected Chinese proposals for joint development (Duong 2011, 2010; Tran 2009), which can be interpreted, following this analytical framework, as resulting from a prevalence of integrationists in contemporary Vietnamese politics. However, it is not possible to verify this assessment with concrete evidence from contemporary Vietnamese politics. In addition, the Innenpolitik approach is inherently not specific enough, stating that Southeast Asian countries accept the Chinese policy of “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development” to gain some benefits from trade, investment or Official Development Assistance (oda)

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from their rising neighbor. Advocates of this approach have cited evidence demonstrating that since 2009, economic relations between China–Vietnam and China–Philippines have been developing rapidly, particularly with regards to trade, investment and oda. In 2012 China offered 3 billion yuan (c. US$475 million) for a maritime cooperation fund (sina English 2012). These expressions of goodwill, however, have not been enough to persuade the countries to accept China’s proposals for cooperation. Whilst not entirely repudiating the arguments of the Innenpolitik approach or the approach focusing on technique-based factors, this article aims to provide another perspective, which will contribute to current research by seeking an answer to the question of the different responses of Southeast Asian states towards China’s proposal to set aside disputes and pursue joint development in the South China Sea. The main argument is that the power differential (particularly military) between China and Southeast Asian states should result in increased cooperation, as weaker states are incentivized to accept the position of a more powerful state (in this case, China). The concentration of power is a double-edged sword in international politics. Balance-of-power and balance‐ of‐threat theory predict that states will try to prevent the rise of a power or external security threat. States in such a position will try to balance internally by extensively increasing their own material capabilities, or externally by allying and forging close strategic partnerships with extra-regional powers (Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). Especially in the case of a region with an asymmetrical power balance between big countries and smaller ones, power sharing is understood as a prerequisite. A big country needs to temper its leading position by managing the asymmetry of physical capacity, which in turn reduces fears from lesser states about the use and abuse of growing resource powers of big states. Therefore, power sharing techniques of rising powers can be seen as a useful method to avoid the scenario of smaller states becoming frustrated or taking steps to rebalance power relations in the region. It is also a long-term regionalist strategy, utilized in order to build a stable politico-economic order in which relations are regulated by laws and institutions (Pedersen 2002). Institutional theory identifies two mechanisms which can be utilized by regionally hegemonic powers in order to manage such power asymmetries and thus encourage other states to comply with cooperative projects. The first is the credible exercise of institutionalized self-restraint from a big state. In a widely cited book, Ikenberry (1999) posits a “strategic restraint hypothesis”, in which he explores the choices of great powers that emerge after hegemonic wars, and generates new insights into America’s “constitutional order” created after World War ii. He argues that from the perspective of the hegemon, the creation of a constitutional order organized around agreed-upon legal and

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­ olitical institutions is on the one hand an investment in the long-term future p in case of a decline of power, and on the other hand a tool to lower overall “enforcement-cost” in maintaining order. Binding itself though institutions or legal agreement does not mean the reduction of the hegemon’s power, but it implies at least a legal limitation on strategic choices about how to use and exercise power in a way that is less endangering to secondary states (Ikenberry 1999, p. 57). It follows that rational weaker states might be willing to participate in the hegemon’s projects (with the risks that they forsake some autonomy in decision making) in exchange for the credibility and the “institutional opportunities to work and help influence the leading states” (Ikenberry 2012, p. 106). The underlying logic behind maintaining a generally positive disposition toward the restraint and commitment of a hegemon’s power also aims to make hegemonic power more predictable and “user-friendly”. An underlying cause of this trade-off is that “The more that a powerful state is capable of dominating or abandoning weaker states, the more the weaker states will care about constraints on the leading state’s policy autonomy” (Ikenberry 2012, p. 195). If rising powers want to employ their supremacy to gain followers, they have to operate through the provision of rules and institutions, which institutionalize and thus limit the ways the hegemonic state can use its power. The more rising powers agree to restrain their power and bind themselves within institutions and a set of rules and rights, the greater is the probability that weaker states will enter into projects under their leadership. Another way of using institutions as a tool of political control derives from the weaker states. On the one hand, they can use institutions and institutionalization as a method to ensure that their own disadvantages in power resources are balanced by the limitations on the ways in which more powerful states can use their powers, as in the above argument proposed by Ikenberry (2012). On the other hand, institutions can be utilized to form a specific diplomatic influence. Secondary powers’ choices can be explained by the question whether their quest for “greater symmetry in voice opportunities” can be fulfilled. Based on the empirical record of the Economic and Monetary Union (emu) adopted by the European Union (eu) in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, Grieco (1996, p. 36) has pointed out: “States – and especially relatively weak, but still necessary partners – will seek to ensure that any cooperative arrangement they construct will include effective voice opportunities.” The decision of the French government to adopt the emu can be interpreted as a way to influence its policies and thus attempt to counteract the hegemonic role of the German Bundesbank (Grieco 1995, 1996). Assessing the role of asean in the creation of a new stable regional s­ ociety, Goh (2011b) argues that this regional origination and its asean “+” m ­ echanisms

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have helped to institutionalize “the voice of smaller states in regional security management”. Faced with a set of asymmetric bargaining powers, the weaker states’ position within asean ensures that their voices are heard and allows them to “make known their interests and seek for political partners” in a given issue through what might be termed “insider-activism” within multilateral institutions (Hurrell 2002, p. 15). When secondary states try to make a proposal, all member states are forced to listen to their voices. The risks associated with continued “exclusion” from the formulation of regional security policies also creates an incentive for weaker states to join multilateral security pacts. To domestic audiences, participation in such hegemon-led forums and organizations provides a forum through which weaker states can legitimate their relationship with rising powers. In sum, it is not only the problem of growing capabilities per se, but also the changes in the application of this power that can lead to assumptions regarding a rising power’s intentions. Seeing the rising power as a revisionist power reduces the willingness of the secondary states to support and join in the emerging rising power-led cooperative projects. This unwillingness might be understood as the weaker states’ fear of domination by stronger states. In order to gain the support of the weaker states, the stronger states are expected to limit their power. This leads to increased willingness on the part of rational weaker states to participate in the hegemon’s projects (acknowledging the risk of forsaking some autonomy in decision making) in exchange for the credibility and institutional opportunities for exercising some political control. The joint development projects in the South China Sea promoted by China in the two periods of 2005–2008 and since 2009 can be explained using this logic.

Joint Development in the South China Sea

doc and jmsu (2005–2008) After a long period of discussion and negotiation, the Philippines and China signed a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking on 1 September 2004, covering a total area of 142.886 square kilometers of the South China Sea (The Tripartite Agreement for jmsu 2005). jmsu included the implementation of a three-year oil research exploration project around the waters in the Spratlys3 and a separate agreement on fishery cooperation (The Philippine Star 2004). As Cronin

3 See more in Annex “A” of The Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (2005).

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and Dubel (2013, p. 24) have noted, “it involved exploratory surveys of the seabed off of the Philippines to lay a framework for potential future joint development”. This marked a milestone in regional relations on issues pertaining to the South China Sea and a “diplomatic breakthrough” for both the Philippines and China, since the two countries had reached a contemporary consensus for pursuing joint development in the South China Sea. Following the successful conclusion of this bilateral agreement, the Vietnamese government decided to join the Philippines and China and agreed a Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea. On 14 March 2005, pnoc, cnooc and PetroVietnam signed a tripartite agreement for a jmsu to jointly acquire geoscientific data and assess the petroleum resource potential of certain areas in the South China Sea (pnoc 2013). Under the tripartite agreement, the three countries, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam agreed to temporarily set aside their territorial disputes over the Spratlys and pursue development with a view to transforming the South China Sea into an area of peace, stability, prosperity and cooperation. The importance of jmsu is clarified by Lucio Blanco Pitlo iii’s assertion that the trilateral jmsu could have been “the most ideal platform from which an all-encompassing multilateral joint development arrangement for the South China Sea could be anchored upon” (Pitlo iii 2012). Although considered to be a tripartite agreement among the states companies, jmsu was promisingly “conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea” (Storey 2008) and seen as a way of calming down tensions and promoting peace in the region. Since then, jmsu has served as a mechanism for China to encourage a peaceful approach and peaceful settlement to issues affecting the South China Sea region. In 2008, the jmsu expired and was not extended. Why did the Philippines and Vietnam join the jmsu? The argument followed here suggests that this agreement was a “trade-off” for both sides. The Philippines and Vietnam were willing to participate in a Chinese-led project in exchange for the credibility and institutional opportunities afforded through such cooperation. From the late 1990s until 2007–2008, China changed its strategy towards the South China Sea issue. Instead of resorting to military power domination,4 China has sought to settle disputes by advocating institutions and initiating dialogues with relevant states. This act of (self-)restraint is 4 In the past, China has in many instances used military force to resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea. In 1974, the Chinese military fought with the navy of South Vietnam, officially the Republic of Vietnam, and occupied the Paracels. In 1988, China and Vietnam clashed over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands.

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e­ vident in the m ­ ultilateral relationship between China and asean, which was underscored by the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (doc) signed at the end of the Sixth China-asean Summit (10 + 1) in 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The basic principles of the doc are outlined in four points: (i) peaceful solution for disputes in the South China Sea, (ii) trust and confidence, (iii) recognition and respect of the provisions of the us for freedom of navigation and overflight, (iv)maintaining the status quo, and the completion of new occupations of islands in the South China Sea. Essentially, in practice, the doc has served as the “management mechanism” with the aim of restraining China and promoting cooperative activities between countries in the South China Sea. Despite being considered as a compromise document without binding legal force,5 the doc was designed as an interim measure with the ultimate goal of forming a more formal binding code of conduct in the South China Sea (coc). Nevertheless, the agreement was significant because, with the world watching, there was a lot at stake (Buszynski 2003). Indeed, many saw the guidelines as just the first step towards a binding code of conduct. Thus, the doc was a milestone in the process of regional cooperation on South China Sea issues and signaled that China was willing to engage in a regional process to enhance the peaceful resolution of South China Sea issues. As outlined in the provisions of the doc, all countries concerned should show restraint and avoid carrying out activities which could further aggravate and complicate the disputes and affect peace and stability in the South China Sea (asean 2016a). In addition, the countries concerned should find a way to resolve the dispute in a peaceful and constructive way (Nguyen and Amer 2009, pp. 339–340). According to the Beijing Times, the doc was the first time that China had agreed to join asean in signing a multilateral document which offered “a new security concept with mutual trust, mutual benefit, quality and coordination at its core” (Beijing Times 2002). Hence, although the terms are not legally binding as in a law, the doc can be regarded as a way for rising powers like China to practice self-restraint. By signing the doc, China agreed to partially limit its power, and as a consequence “weak and secondary states might agree to become more rather than less entangled with such a potential hegemon” (Ikenberry 1999, p. 43). In 2003, China became the first outside actor in the region to become a signatory to the asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (tac), which included essential clauses that stipulated “mutual respect for the sovereignty and equality of asean countries”, “non-interference in the 5 A legal scholar Nguyen Hong Thao stated: “(doc is) not a legal instrument and thus is technically not legally binding and is even less persuasive than the code of conduct that many countries in the region had desired” (Nguyen-Thao 2003, p. 281).

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internal affairs of one another” and/or “settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means” (asean 2016b). Since 2002, Southeast Asian states have reacted positively to the joint ­actions and interactions of China in South China Sea disputes. The “glue” that holds leadership relationships together here is the relatively credible commitment of dominant states not to abuse their power resources over subordinates. By signing the doc and tac, an “informal contract” between China and Southeast Asian states was established. Thanks to the features of the doc and tac, which contained provisions of “mutual restraint in the conduct of activities” and “cooperative activities”, weaker states such as Vietnam or the Philippines have become less intimidated by their stronger neighbor. At this point, the only cost that China has borne has been a reduction of its unilateralist capacities and policy autonomy. In return, it has reduced concern amongst the smaller states. It has been argued – in the case of Vietnam for example- that Vietnam chose a rapprochement approach to the Chinese proposal mainly for the reason that China, through the doc (and the expected coc in the near future), would be obliged to exercise restraint (interview by the author with Vietnamese scholars and senior officials in Hanoi in 2011 and 2012). More importantly, the doc was merely a political statement (as will likely be the coc, expected in the near future). It was not binding and had no legal basis. It provided the normative basis for the jmsu, which allows Vietnam and the Philippines to change their multilateral stance towards Chinese cooperation proposals. Likewise, “joint exploration” among China, Vietnam and the Philippines was stimulated. The Department of Energy (doe) Secretary of the Philippines, Vicente Perez, believed that this would mark a new stage for both China and that Philippines and said that it (the agreement) was “the first concrete manifestation of the asean-China Declaration of Conduct for the South China Sea” (The Philippine Star 2004). As Dosch (2010) has noted, the jmsu was regarded by the Philippine Foreign Minister, Alberto Romulo, and the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Dy Nien, as a “significant measure to strengthen asean-China cooperation and possibly paved the way for settlement of the South China Sea disputes”. The Lack of “constitutional order” since 2008 and Its Implications Since 2008, there has been a rise in the level of concern exhibited by actors with a stake in South China Sea disputes, which accompanies a general rise in geopolitical and military tensions in the region. At the international conference in 2009, Ji Guoxing, former head of the Asia-Pacific Department at the Institute for International Strategic Studies, repeatedly emphasized Chinese guidelines for “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development” (­Duong  2010).

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Ji Guoxing suggested that claimants pursue the overall framework for exploiting resources in the South China Sea. Along with this proposal, he was also keen to explore the possibility of China and Vietnam working together to jointly develop the Vanguard Bank, based in the Spratly Islands. Although he admitted that it is not a permanent solution to the problem, he considered “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development” to be “a practical, realistic, wise and feasible approach” at that time (Duong 2010; Tran 2009). The proposal for “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development” was also suggested by Chinese leaders in formal meetings. Speaking at a press conference held in Hanoi, the Chinese Ambassador to Vietnam, Sun Guoxiang, stated that “China’s senior leaders have taken the initiatives to solve the South China Sea issue, especially in setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development”. The objective of this approach is for both parties to ignore disputes and jointly conduct activities for social and economic development (Tien Phong 2010). In an interview with the Philippine Daily Inquirer editorial team in December 2012, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Ma Keqing suggested that “joint cooperation” would be the best way to solve sovereignty disputes. “I think it is still a very valid formula pending the solution of the disputes. We can have cooperation with each other to [explore] the resources because we cannot see in the near future (…) that we can solve all the disputes”, the Chinese ambassador stated (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2013). Although China has frequently raised the topic of joint development in the South China Sea, Southeast Asian countries including the Philippines and Vietnam have responded only cautiously to the Chinese proposal. On the jmsu between the Philippines, China and Vietnam, President Benigno Aquino iii stated that “we will not inflame tension in the Spratly Islands Group or the Kalayaan Island Group. We will always work to achieve diplomatic solutions to all these contending claims on the Kalayaan Group of Islands”. Affirming the Philippines’ peaceful and sincere approach towards the South China Sea issue, he stated that the jmsu “should not have happened”, saying it encroached on the country’s territorial waters (abs-cbn News 2011). At a bilateral meeting with Vietnamese partners, Philippine Foreign Minister Del Rosario even confirmed that the Philippines would not be cooperating with China on joint projects such as oil exploration if Beijing continued to insist on its sovereignty over all waters of the South China Sea (The Philippine Star 2013). Taking China’s proposal for joint resource development in disputed waters into consideration, Vietnam has shown neither official opposition nor explicit support. Luong Thanh Nghi, the spokesperson of Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry, stated that “Viet Nam is not opposed to the idea of developing resources in disputed waters with neighboring countries, but says such cooperation has to be

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carried out in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea that was adopted in 1982”. However, Nghi stressed that Vietnam would not cooperate with China in areas claimed by Vietnam. Along with this clear message to China, Vietnam further called for the establishment of an active partnership with India, China’s rival, which could be interpreted as an rejection of Chinese overtures regarding cooperation. On 12 October 2011, during the visit of Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang to India, both countries signed six agreements, including ones on joint resource development. These examples show how Southeast Asian states have refused to accept China’s proposal to set aside disputes and pursue joint development since 2008. Why? Based on our analytical framework, we argue that China is becoming too powerful and has increasingly possessed more hard power such as economic and military capability, but has refused to limit its power through the implementation of institutional frameworks. Contrary to the peaceful approach towards the South China Sea issue before 2008, China has raised concern of other claimants when it competed for sovereignty, jurisdiction and control of the South China Sea. Over the past decades, the rapid expansion and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (plan), which has been criticized for its lack of transparency, has led to concerns amongst China’s neighbors in the sea region. Since 2007, China tried to base its Type 094 nuclear powered ballistic submarines on Hainan Island, an indication that the Chinese navy is strengthening its patrol activities in the South China Sea (us Office of the Secretary of Defense 2010). The growing concerns of claimants over South China Sea issues were worsened by the aggressive behavior exhibited by China during an incident in March 2009, wherein five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively harassed the unarmed usns Impeccable in the South China Sea (International Crisis Group [icg] 2012a, 2012b). The rate of collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese civilian boats and Chinese surveillance vessels also notably increased in 2009. On 26 May 2011, two Chinese maritime surveillance vessels for oil and gas exploration were spotted in Vietnam’s eez some 120 kilometers off the southern Vietnamese coast. Videos of a Chinese vessel breaking the cable attached to the Vietnamese vessel “Binh Minh” were later released by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry (Energy-Pedia News 2011). The Philippines also clashed with China during this time period. In an incident on 2 March 2011, in the Philippine-claimed zone 250 kilometers west of Palawan, an oil exploration ship was harassed by two Chinese patrol boats. However, China denied this story and even accused the Philippines of “invading” its waters (Buszynski 2012, p. 142). The tensions between China and the Philippines escalated in April 2012 in a dispute over the sovereignty of the

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­Scarborough Shoal. The fracas began when a Filipino vessel discovered Chinese fishermen poaching protected species in the areas. Relations between the two sides became tense as they both sent further forces to the area without showing intention to withdraw. Lasting for nearly two months, the standoff over the Scarborough Shoal has been one of the longest standoffs in the South China Sea in the past two decades (Fravel 2012). From the point of view of asean, the doc was designed as an interim measure with the ultimate goal of forming a more formally binding coc. The nonbinding declaration states that the claimants should comply with the spirit of pursuing comprehensive settlement and cooperative solutions by further agreeing to legal commitments which were expected to follow the doc. But China has not accepted to bind itself through a coc. China and asean only reached an agreement on the Guidelines for the Implementation of the doc in 2011, and these Guidelines remain tentative and nonbinding (Thayer 2011, p. 91). China also opposed the Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFF/C) proposed by the Philippines in 2011. More importantly, despite attempts by asean to foster coc negotiations, China still seems skeptical. In early 2013, a positive indicator appeared when China proposed consultations through the asean-China Joint Working Group (jwg) to Implement the doc Guidelines. Consultations on the coc are conducted within the framework of the jwg. However, the timeline for the successful completion of the consultations – which asean has stated it expects to be finished within the current year – is not clear. During his official visit to asean countries in 2013, the new Foreign Minister of China, Wang Yi, stated that asean should have “realistic expectations” and take “a gradual approach” in searching for a coc consensus (South China Morning Post 2013). There are, however, examples of China operating in a more cooperative manner. In 2011, Vietnam and China signed a bilateral agreement on six basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime disputes, including seeking “a basic and long-term approach to resolve maritime issues” and conducting “friendly consultations between the two countries on handling maritime issues” (Xinhua News 2011; cf. Nhandan 2011). However, this agreement does not meet the required conditions for the establishment of a “constitutional order”, which China has thus far avoided. China prefers bilateral negotiations as a method which increases the likelihood of individual states’ eventual submission. The objectives of such strategy are to “bring its strength to bear on the Southeast Asian countries and impose its own rules, rather than internationally accepted ones from international law on these waters” (Duong and Le 2010). Furthermore, as Vietnam made clear at the time the agreement was signed, “any cooperation for mutual development would occur only in areas of

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bilateral disputes, which mainly referred to the waters at the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin” (icg 2012b, p. 5). The area mentioned by both sides was not directly related to the islands and water around the Spratly Islands. As mentioned above, China has been attempting to avoid limiting its ability to use its own power through participation in institutional frameworks. Another example of China’s non-cooperative approach within an institutional framework is their objection to un-led arbitration of disputes in the region. In 2013, the Philippines was the first Southeast Asian nation to initiate court proceedings with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos), asking the Tribunal to declare that the nine-dash line had no basis in international law. In January 2013, the Philippines officially sued China at the un Court in The Hague. Immediately following this, Philippine Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario announced the move to the media prompting China to recall their Ambassador from Manila. In April, 2013, the Filipino government officially opposed China’s claim before the un. According to the Philippines, China’s U-shaped line, which is based on “historic rights” has violated Philippine territory under international law and is not consistent with the unclos. Foreign Minister del Rosario said that Manila will bring the case against China to arbitration under the provisions of unclos, a treaty that both sides signed in 1982. The Philippines has been taking steady steps to further the case. In January 2014, the country asked a un Permanent Court to consider its case. A month later, it amended its arbitration pleading to “get a favorable decision soonest” (Bloomberg 2014). In March 2014, it submitted 40 maps and a 4,000page document to the court. In response these actions by the Philippines, China has said that it has sufficient historic and legal evidence to prove its sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal. Chinese Ambassador in Manila Ma Ke-qing reiterated Beijing’s position and stressed that China has indisputable sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea and its adjacent waters. The Ambassador said “the Chinese side strongly holds that the disputes on the South China Sea should be settled by parties concerned through negotiations” (quoted in bbc 2013). Therefore, China refused to join the arbitration case and warned that it could damage bilateral relations. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei reaffirmed Bejing’s stance on 30 March 2014. “China cannot accept the international arbitration sought by the Philippines, and the Philippines occupies some islands in the South China Sea ­illegally.” Moreover, the Philippines should be on the “‘right track’ of using bilateral talks to resolve territorial disputes, Hong said in the statement” (Bloomberg 2014). Despite China’s rejection of un arbitration, the arbitration court is still carrying out procedures. In response to the first procedural order issued by the court, dated 17 August 2013, the Philippines

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submitted the Memorandum on 30 March 2014. In its second procedural order, the tribunal issued a note f­ixing 15 December 2014 as the deadline for China to submit its counter-memorial (Permanent Court of Arbitration [pca] 2016). In sum, the Chinese approach to foreign policy in the South China Sea since 2008 has caused its neighboring countries to fear that the country is now merely unilaterally affirming its national interests. The lack of a “constitutional order” that can make hegemonic powers more predictable has led to the fact that China’s cooperative projects have received little sympathy from Southeast Asian countries. Although countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have agreed that joint development may be a solution, their actual views – as reflected by public opinion and in academic circles – holds that the Chinese proposal is in fact a conspiracy to enhance its de jure access to the “disputed areas” while maintaining its de facto control of the South China Sea. Joint Development Possibilities: Bringing “rule-based order” Back in The change in the regional balance of power in favor of China, and the ways it has utilized its growing power, have affected the secondary strategic choices of Southeast Asian states in response to the Chinese proposal. Following the signing of the doc in 2002, China and asean agreed to solve the disputes through negotiations. Whilst China and asean were unlikely to reach an agreement that would satisfy both sides, the act of strategic restraint in participating within the framework of the doc led to more positive engagement between China and the Southeast Asian states, as China, although an emerging power, showed its willingness to play by the rules of the game. In contrast, since 2008 the situation has changed to another path, which is demonstrated by the fact that Southeast Asian states have continuously refused China’s proposal to cooperate in the joint development of the region. As such, China has not achieved its goal of constructing a cooperative mechanism in the South China Sea because it is unwilling to solve the conflict through multilateral rules and agreements. Instead, China began to pursue a series of unilateral power policies, which triggered widespread opposition from neighboring states, as well as refused to bind itself with any institutions or legal agreements. As previously mentioned, balance-of-power and balance‐of‐threat theories predict that states will try to prevent the emergence of a rising power or an external security threat by extensively increasing their own material capabilities, or by allying and forging close strategic partnerships with extra-regional powers (Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). If China continues to increase its capabilities but is unwilling to bind itself under legal and political frameworks in the South China Sea, a classic “security dilemma” will arise within the Southeast Asian region. Other countries in the region will have to choose to follow self-help principles of either depending on their own capabilities for security by increasing

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their military budgets or seeking strategic cooperation with security guarantors as a hedge against growing Chinese power. Unwillingness to exercise strategic restraint of its power may prevent China from achieving acceptance of its leadership by other regional players. China’s economic dominance has not transformed into political leadership in terms of gaining a following from amongst the Southeast Asian countries regarding regional cooperation in South China Sea disputes. Indeed, improving the state’s capabilities in terms of “hard power”, along with bearing international responsibilities, is the principal challenge for China to become a hegemonic leader. In this context, Robert Beckman (2007) suggested an approach to enhance joint development, arguing that “before meaningful discussions can take place on the creation of joint development zones, it may be necessary to first negotiate a framework document that ‘shelves’ or ‘freezes’ existing claims and sets out the principles upon which cooperation and joint development can proceed”. The lack of a “constitutional order” guiding the resolution of these issues could become an important impediment to China’s successful effort in managing territorial conflicts. Thus, when examining the potential of China’s leadership performance in this issue, the underlying question is how China engages other claimants such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia to accept its approach. In this sense, the asymmetry of physical capacity between China and secondary states in sea not only matters in terms of the prospects for joint development in the South China Sea, but also matters in terms of the evolving regional security order in which the shift of power is taking place. We assume that whether or not states conduct joint development projects (either bilaterally or multilaterally) in the South China Sea is influenced by many factors, particularly the interrelation between power, technique and domestic politics within the respective claimants’ states. Some factors are necessary preconditions of joint development and some factors only start to affect the issue after the claimants agree to negotiate. Taking into consideration these preexisting conditions, an ideal solution for tackling these issues at the next negotiation of new joint development agreements would be to divide the negotiations into two major parts. Firstly, it is process-based part. The second one should be aimed at seeking consensus with regards to the essence of the issues (issues-based). We believe that the regional structure, formed by balance of power between regional and external countries such as, in the process-based period plays a crucial role. asean states will not agree to take part in the joint development if the balance of power leans toward China without control mechanisms or counterweights (both from inside or outside the region). The imbalance of power may lead asean countries to be suspicious about joint development proposals as a plan of China to turn the undisputed areas into disputed ones, to encroach their exclusive economic

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zones. In the meantime, technical factors are more highlighted in the contentbased period. The factors will help the claimants to identify in which area to conduct joint development, what to jointly develop and how to do it. The technical choices will be affected by domestic politics and interests of the claimants, which are reflected by efforts to control the process and content of policy as much as possible of different interest groups in their countries. Bibliography6 ABS-CBN News (2011): “PNoy: JMSU with China, Vietnam shouldn’t have happened.” 4 January. Available at: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/01/04/11/pnoy-jmsu -china-vietnam-shouldnt-have-happened. ASEAN (2016): “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia.” February 24, 1976. Available at: http://www.asean.org/treaty-amity-cooperation -southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976/. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (2016): “Declaration on the ­Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” Phnom Penh, 4 November 2012. Available at: http://www.asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of -parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2. Baviera, Aileen (2012): “The Influence of Domestic Politics on Philippine Foreign Policy: The case of Philippines-China relations since 2004.” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Working Papers, no. 241. Beckman Robert C. (2007): “Joint Development in the South China Sea: Time for ASEAN and China to. Promote Cooperation?” RSIS Commentaries, no. 46. Beijing Times (2002): “China offers new security concept at ASEAN meetings.” 2 August. Bloomberg (2014): “Philippines Sues China to Assert Claim Over Gas-Rich Waters.” 30 March. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-30/ philippines-calls-china-threat-to-security-over-isles-squabble. Buszynski Leszek (2003): “ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25(3), 343–346. Leszek Buszynski (2012): “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S. – China Strategic Rivalry.” The Washington Quarterly, 35(2), 139–156. Chung, Chien-Peng (2004): Domestic Politics, International Bargaining, and China’s Territorial Disputes. London and New York: Routledge. Chung, Chien-Peng (2007): “Resolving China’s Island Disputes: a Two-Level Game Analysis.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 12(1), 49–71. 6

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs China (2000): “Set aside dispute and pursue joint development.” 17 November. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/ t18023.htm. Nguyen H. Thao (2003): “The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Note,” Ocean Development & International Law, 34(3–4), 27–28. Nguyen, H. Thao and Amer, Ramses (2009): “A New Legal Arrangement for the South China Sea?” Ocean Development & International Law, 40(4), 333–334. Nhandan (2011): “Vietnam-China agree on basic principles to resolve maritime issues.” 12 October. Available at: http://en.nhandan.org.vn/en/politics/external-relations/ item/1808602-vietnam-china-agree-on-basic-principles-to-resolve-maritime -issues.html. Pedersen, Thomas (2002): “Cooperative Hegemony. Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration.” Review of International Studies, 28(4), 677–696. Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (2016): “The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China.” Available at: http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7. Philippine Daily Inquirer (2013): “China open to joint oil development in Recto Bank.” 7 January. Available at: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/61007/china-open -to-joint-oil-devt-in-recto-bank. SINA English (2012): “China unveils 3-billion-yuan maritime fund for ASEAN.” 8 October. South China Morning Post (2013): “Beijing tells ASEAN to be realistic in hopes for South China Sea code of conduct.” 6 August. Storey Ian (2008): “Trouble and Strife in the South China Sea Part 1 + 2: The Philippines, Vietnam and China.” China Brief, 8(9), 28 April. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2011): “Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 30(2), 77–104. The Philippine Star (2004): “RP, China approve joint oil exploration in Spratlys.” 2 February. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/263251/rp-china -approve-joint-oil-exploration-spratlys. The Philippine Star (2013): “Philippines, Vietnam discuss sea feud with China.” 2 August. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/world/2013/08/02/1043091/philippines -vietnam-discuss-sea-feud-china. Tien Phong (2010): “Gác lại tranh chấp Biển Đông, chờ điều kiện chín muồi” (Set aside dispute and wait for the right time.) 10 June. Available at: http://www.tienphong.vn/ xa-hoi/182662/Gac-lai-tranh-chap-Bien-Dong-cho-dieu-kien-chin-muoi.html. Tran, Truong Thuy (Ed.) (2009): “The South China Sea: Cooperation for regional security and development.” Proceedings of the International Workshop. Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, 26–27 November, 34–35. United States Office of the Secretary of Defense (2010): “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010: Annual Report to Congress.” Washington, D.C..

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Valencia, Mark and Nong, Hong (2013): “Joint Development Possibilities: What, Where, Who and How?” Global Asia, 8(2), 102–109. Valencia, Mark and Van Dyke, Jon and Ludwig, Noel A. (1999): Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. VietNamNet (2009): “Giải quyết tranh chấp Biển Đông trong mắt học giả Trung Quốc” (Solving the disputes of the East See in the eyes of Chinese scholar.) 7 December. Available at: http://www.tuanvietnam.net/2009-12-04-giai-quyet-tranh -chap-bien-dong-trong-mat-hoc-gia-trung-quoc. Vuving Alexander L. (2006): “Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China Policy: A Changing Mixture of Pathways.” Asian Survey, 46(6), 805–824. Vuving Alexander L. (2009) “Grand Strategic Fit and Power Shift: Explaining Turning Points in Vietnam-China Relations.” In Tang, Shiping, Li, Mingjiang and Acharya Amitav (Eds.): Living with China: Regional States and China through Crises and Turning Points. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 229–245. Walt, Stephen M. (1987): The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Waltz, Kenneth (1979): Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Xinhua News (2011): “China, Vietnam sign accord on resolving maritime issues.” 12 October. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/12/c _131185606.htm. Zou, Keyuan (2006): “Joint Development in the South China Sea: A New Approach.” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 21(1) 83–109.

chapter 9

Lessons to be Learned: A Neorealist Assessment of the HYSY-981 Standoff and Its Implications for Vietnam’s South China Sea Strategy Jörg Thiele Introduction According to the Vietnamese origin myth, the Dragon Lord Lac Long Qan and the fairy Au Co founded Vietnam (Kaplan 2014, p. 59). Together they had 100 children: Half of them went with their mother to the hills in the north; the other half went with their father to the Sea in the South. Having dominated politics for decades, “It is the father’s legacy that now seems central to Vietnam’s destiny” (ibid). While this sounds poetic, the deployment of Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY-981), China’s first deep-water oil rig operated by its National Offshore Oil Company (cnooc), on 2 May into Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (eez), represents a further illustrative example in a long line of events that proves the seriousness of this argument. The South China Sea (scs)1 is home to one of the world’s most important trade routes, seeing nearly 50% of global merchant and energy trade passing through the maritime space between the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Taiwan (eia 2013). This maritime space is bordered by seven nations (hereinafter referred to as the littorals): China, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam. With the exception of Indonesia, all littorals have territorial disputes in the South China Sea, particularly with China. This dispute revolves around several islands, rocks and shoals, and is a competition for the natural resources of the region and its vital Sea Lanes of Communication (sloc). Having failed on numerous occasions to settle the territorial disputes and the relatively imprecise regulation and implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos), competition between the littorals has grown fiercer particularly since Malaysia and Vietnam submitted its territorial case to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2009 (UN-I 2009).

1 This chapter will use the internationally common term instead of the Vietnamese name “East Sea”.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004312180_011

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The deployment of HYSY-981 has provoked the most intense anti-China protest in Vietnam since normalization started in 1991. Hundreds of foreign companies, allegedly owned by ethnic Chinese were looted and burned to the ground, several ethnic Chinese were killed during the riots and hundreds of Vietnamese, Chinese and Taiwanese people were injured. On the sea, HYSY-981 was protected by a large flotilla of fishing boats, coast guard and military vessels. During the standoff, Chinese and Vietnamese vessels were rammed more than 1.000 times, which represents one of the tensest standoffs between both countries since the skirmish at Johnson Reef in 1988. The attention this event has drawn from regional experts led most to conclude that China’s actions were illegal, unprovoked and the scope of territorial infringement committed unprecedented (Panda 2015 and 2014a; Dingding 2014; Godement 2014; Storey 2014; Thayer 2014a and 2014b; Tiezzi 2014c; Vuving 2014; Want China Times 2014). While there is very few to argue against this, the discourse should be embedded in a theoretical frame to understand China’s actions and the implementations for Hanoi’s approach to the South China Sea. Against this background, this chapter aims to assess the implications that the deployment of HYSY-981 has on Vietnam’s approach to the South China Sea from a neorealist perspective. This shall avoid a normative and perceptionbased Vietnamese assessment of China’s actions and produces a picture that comes closer to China’s recent and current behavior in the South China Sea. Doing so, this chapter is complementary to the subsequent chapter by Josef Falko Loher. While he focuses closely on the security discourse that evolved in Chinese newspapers, this chapter will primarily pay attention to Vietnam. Therefore, the next section will outline a brief overview of the major events that took place between 2 May and 15 July 2014. Thereafter, the applied neorealist perspective is outlined and the implications of the deployment of HYSY-981 for Vietnam’s foreign policy discussed. A concluding section will summarize the central points of this chapter.

A Brief Recap of the Major Events between 2 May and 15 July 2014

One day after HYSY-981 had been deployed on 2 May 2014, the Maritime Safety Administration in Hainan province publicly declared that the HYSY-981 oil-rig had started its oil “drilling operations inside the contiguous zone of China’s Xisha [Paracel] Islands” (fmprc 2014; own addition). More precisely, the “two locations of operation are 17 nautical miles from both the Zhongjian Island of China’s Xisha Islands and the baseline of the territorial waters of Xisha Islands,

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yet approximately 133 to 156 nautical miles away from the coast of the Vietnamese mainland” (fmprc 2014).2 Within 24 hours, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Le Hai Binh issued a statement signaling to Beijing that Hanoi perceived the deployment of HYSY-981 “illegal and void” (MoFA 2014a).3 On 7 May, an international press conference was convened to clarify the events that evolved since 2 May, and to make public Vietnam’s position (MoFA 2014c). At this conference, Tran Duy Hai, Vice Chair of the National Boundary Commission, declared that Vietnamese authorities had been aware of the deployment already by 1 May and had acted accordingly to condemn China’s behavior and signal Vietnam’s unease with the situation. According to his remarks, Vice Minister and Chief of the Vietnamese Government Negotiation Delegation on border and territory of Vietnam Nam Ho Xuan Son had a phone call with his Chinese counterpart on 4 May, vocally protesting against the deployment of HYSY-981 deep within Vietnamese territory. On the same day, the Chinese ambassador was summoned by Vietnam and received a note verbale that highlighted Vietnam’s protest (ibid). While this (…) note affirmed that the activities of China’s drilling rig HYSY-981 and vessels seriously infringed Viet Nam’s sovereignty, sovereign right and jurisdiction over Viet Nam’s Hoang Sa archipelago, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. It also seriously violated agreements reached by the two countries’ leaders and went against the spirit and wording of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (doc) and related regulations in international law. MoFA 2014b

On 6 May, Pham Binh Minh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, had a phone call with Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi stressing

2 In the very same statement, the mfa argues, “The waters between China’s Xisha Islands and the coast of the Vietnamese mainland are yet to be delimited. The two sides have not yet conducted delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) and continental shelf in these waters. Both sides are entitled to claim eez and continental shelf in accordance with the unclos. However, these waters will never become Vietnam’s eez and continental shelf no matter which principle is applied in the delimitation” (mfa 2014). Moreover, the mfa claims to have conducted communication with Vietnamese authorities but Vietnam did not respond to any, which, though, contradicts Vietnam’s position. 3 The Taiwan-based Want China Times published an Editorial on 13 May, claiming that Hanoi has not issued protest until 7 May, and argued that this “was done on the instructions of the United States” (Want China Times 2014).

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“(…) that China’s unilateral bringing of the rig and a large number of vessels, including military ships, to operate in oil and gas Lot 143 on Viet Nam’s continental shelf since May 1 is illegal and runs counter to international law and practice” (MoFA 2014a). One day later, the Vietnamese government issued a note verbale to the United Nations strictly opposing the Chinese actions within Vietnam’s eez (Tuoitre 2014a). Parallel to these events, maritime skirmishes between the large Chinese protection flotilla and the Vietnamese coast guard occurred in the area of deployment. Contrary to international law, China declared a 3nm security radius for its US$1 billion oil-rig – 500 meters are common for such features (Panda 2015 and 2014b; Thayer 2014a). An armada of at least 80 Chinese vessels protected this security circle by the time HYSY-981 left Hainan (Tisdall 2014). This armada grew to numbers well beyond 100 at peak and consisted of fishing vessels, coast guard boats, and a small number of warships (Want China Times 2014, Ito 2014, Panda 2015). From the time of deployment to the withdrawal of HYSY-981 on 15 July, thousands of deliberate rammings occurred and injured several dozen Chinese and Vietnamese (Thayer 2014a, Panda 2014b). Despite Hanoi’s unease with China’s behavior, the upcoming 9th plenary session of the Vietnamese Communist Party (vcp) Central Committee from 8 to 14 May was nothing extraordinary (Thayer 2014b). On 10 May, the asean Foreign Ministers issued a statement in which they “expressed their serious concerns over the on-going developments in the South China Sea” (asean 2014). Although not criticizing Beijing’s actions directly, the published statement condemned China’s behavior as a clear breach of International Law and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC) (Storey 2014). At the same time, protests started in Hanoi, Hue and Da Nang, and continued for the second day in a row in Ho Chi Minh City (Tuoitre 2014b). Within days, these protests have spread to other parts of the country, and on 12 May, thousands of people gathered together in the provinces of Can Tho, Binh Duong and Da Nang (Tuoitre 2014c). In general, the Vietnamese authorities are rather reluctant to permit anti-China protests but given the behavior of Beijing in the prior days, protests were allowed, probably as a means to pressure China and sensitize other countries to the current events in the South China Sea (Associated Press 2014). However, intended or not, on 13 May the peaceful protests turned into violent riots when Vietnamese workers started to loot and set fire to foreign companies in the industrial parks of Binh Duong, Dong Nai and Ha Tinh (Tiezzi 2014a). Alarmingly, rioters not only hit businesses from China, but also companies form Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan and South Korea (ibid). As a consequence, Chinese and Taiwanese authorities started to evacuate their

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citizens from Vietnam on 14 May.4 One day later, newspapers reported several deaths and injuries during an attack on two Taiwanese companies. According to Bloomberg, one Chinese citizen died in an attack on the Formosa Plastics Group steel mill in Vung Ang, while another Chinese citizen was choked to death in violent riots at ddk Group’s factors north of Ho Chi Minh City (Bloomberg 2014).5 Depending on the source, between 440 and 600 Vietnamese protesters were detained by the police. A scheduled protest for 18 May was quickly denied by Vietnamese authorities to avoid further escalation of the crisis (Tiezzi 2014b). The violent riots occurred while the Chief of General Staff of the pla Fang Fenghui visited Washington. us officials used his visit to vocally protest China’s actions, blaming Beijing to have caused the standoff (Spetalnick 2014). Several days later, on 21 May, in an unprecedented but certainly not unsurprising move, Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh was invited to Washington, d.c. by Secretary of State John Kerry (Press Trust of India 2014, Vuving 2014). This invitation, which was not accepted until 2 October with the purpose of not heating up the standoff with China, came just days after Pham phoned Yang requesting China to reply to Vietnam’s request of removing HYSY-981 from its eez (Tuoitre 2014d). While Pham’s call had not achieved its initial target it is a further example that communication between Hanoi and Beijing existed, contrary to some experts’ perception (Thayer 2014b).6 The visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Xuan San to China, from 13 to 15 May, represents another case that at least part-to-party channels continued to exist, despite the rigor of China’s position. This rigor has led Vietnam to take some bold measures, including amongst others the threat of submitting its territorial dispute with China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (pca) – something that Hanoi

4 According to a news report published on Xinhua.net from 19 May, 3.553 Chinese people had been brought home in the past days and many more fled to Cambodia (Xinhuanet 2014). 5 Writing in an article for The Guardian, Hodal and Kaiman (2014) claim that at least 21 peoples have been killed during the attacks on the Taiwanese steel mill. Storey (2014) claims five Chinese deaths in total. 6 According to Vuving (2014), China issued four preconditions for talks with Hanoi: “The first was that Vietnam must stop harassing China’s oil-rig and vessels. Second, Vietnam must not dispute China’s ownership of the Paracel Islands. The third condition was that Vietnam must not pursue legal proceedings against China’s claims and actions in the South China Sea. And finally, Vietnam must not involve third parties, particularly the United States and the West, in this bilateral issue.”

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still regards as a means of last resort (Keck 2014; International Crisis Group [icg] 2015, p. 22). On 23 May, Hanoi issued a second note verbale to China in front of the United Nations “demanding the latter withdraw the oil-rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 before both sides can negotiate to define the legal status of the location where China installed the oil-rig” (Embassy of Vietnam in Germany 2014). A third note verbale was sent to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 June. This note demanded that China (…) seriously observe international law, immediately end acts of violating Viet Nam’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction within Viet Nam’s continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, immediately withdraw the oil-rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 and its escort vessels from the Vietnamese waters, and not repeat similar actions in the future (ibid). Three days later, the Vietnamese fishing boat DNa-90152-TS, while operating about 17 nm off the oil-rig, was rammed and sunk by Chinese vessel 11209 (ibid). This marked one of the most serious incidents throughout the standoff. One day later, HYSY-981 was moved to a second drilling spot that was still located well within Vietnam’s eez (Vietnam News 2014). On 15 June, during the 24th meeting of State Parties to unclos at the United Nations in New York, Ambassador Le Hoai Trung opposed China’s position in the South China Sea, calling on the unclos members to denounce Beijing’s actions and repeated the undisputed Vietnamese sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) (Tuoitre 2014e). On 18 June, however, the standoff began to end when Yang participated in the annual session of the Vietnam–China Joint Steering Committee (Thayer 2014b). This marked the first direct high-level contact since the beginning of the standoff. On 4 July, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung published a US$750 million plan to upgrade the Vietnamese coast guard in order “to better protect fishermen amid China’s rising aggression in the East Sea” (Vu 2014). A fortnight later, China announced the completion of HYSY-981 drilling activities and withdrew the rig from the region one month before the actual plan (Thayer 2014b). Also on 15 July, China released the thirteen Vietnamese fishermen that had been arrested during the standoff (Vuving 2014). From there on, Beijing was quick on repairing its damaged bilateral relations with Vietnam. From 26 to 27 August, a special envoy of the vcp’s General Secretary Le Hong Anh finally visited Beijing (Thayer 2015). This visit marked the first of three high-level and four minor-level meetings between Beijing and Hanoi until the end of 2014 (ibid).

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The Neorealist Paradigm – Content and Discontent

The widespread discourse that the deployment of HYSY-981 has generated focused on several puzzling questions aiming to understand China’s behavior (icg 2015; Panda 2015; Dingding 2014; Godement 2014; Thayer 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Tuan 2014; Vuving 2014). Despite all academic diligence, this discourse is missing two things: Firstly, a wider recognition of Hanoi’s perspective, and secondly, an analysis that is embedded in a theoretical context. With respect to the latter, neorealism has something to say about the disturbing standoff that took place between May and July 2014. For the purpose of this chapter, neorealism is operationalized according to its basic assumptions. The idea is not to present a offensive/defensive neorealist analysis of the deployment of HYSY-981, but a more general discussion of the causes, their impacts and implications for Hanoi’s South China Sea approach from a neorealist induced perspective. Thereby, the pitfalls of a perception and intentions-driven analysis are avoided and a picture is drawn that is closer to the reality of Southeast Asia. Basically, neorealism is based upon five core premises (Lebow 2010, p. 61; Mearsheimer 2010, pp. 79–80 and 1995, p. 10; Burchill 2001, p. 70; Waltz 1979, pp. 88–89 and 102): Firstly, States are the central actors in an international system that is marked by anarchy (the absence of a higher order). Secondly, the relation among states in this system is characterized by distrust of mutual intentions. Thirdly, states have to act according to the self-help principle with the prime objective of securing one’s own survival. Fourthly, conflict and war are permanent features of the international system. And, fifthly, the cause for conflict is the imbalance of power7 between states in the international system. This does not mean that cooperation to overcome the general mistrust among states cannot be achieved, or that peace is a condition that cannot be upheld. But in an international system that is marked by anarchy and driven primarily by the power considerations of the great powers, neorealists are pessimistic about the outcomes of such processes, particularly as this would put states in a vulnerable position. Therefore, states are better off if they take their security in their own hands. Three basic strategies have emerged over time that states apply: balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing. Given its centrality to the security dilemma,8 7 Power in the neorealist context is defined primarily by economic (e.g. labor force, economic growth, social welfare, etc.) and military capabilities (strength of army, navy, and air force, technological level, etc.). 8 The security dilemma is a situation “in which the means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others” (Taliaferro 1999, p. 136).

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balancing is the preferred strategy to approach any revisionist power for defensive neorealists (Waltz 1979, p. 127). As Pape has put it in a nutshell: Balancing is about equalizing the odds in a contest between the strong and the weak. States balance when they take action intended to make it hard for strong states to use their military advantage against others. The goal can be to deter a strong state from attacking or to reduce its prospects of victory in war. pape 2005, p. 36

The reason for this is simple: As states act in a self-help system, they take any measure necessary to provide their foremost objective, which is to survive. In this regard, power is seen as a means to achieve security, not as an end (Wang 2004, p. 180). In a system with two or more states, any attempt of one state to achieve more power compared to the other states in the system will provoke an act of correction by the weaker and threatened states. This act of correction is called balancing. States can balance internally by strengthening their own capabilities, or externally in the form of formal and informal alliance building with other states, primarily the stronger and preponderant states in the international system (Roy 2005, p. 306). In reality, internal and external balancing occurs similarly. Beside balancing, defensive neorealist consider bandwagoning as a second choice for states to approach a revisionist power. By bandwagonging states either align with the aggressor, or turn towards the winning side to secure their survival and the best outcome, once the revisionist power achieves supremacy (ibid). Unlike the defensive neorealist emphasis on the security dilemma, offensive neorealists argue that In a system where there is no high authority that sits above the great powers, and where there is no guarantee that one will not attack another it makes good sense for each state to be powerful enough to protect itself in the event it is attacked. mearsheimer 2010, p. 78

From an offensive neorealist perspective, great powers strive toward the realization of four decisive goals: Regional hegemony, wealth maximization, land power dominance, and nuclear superiority (Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 140–145). The ultimate aim great powers pursue is to become the strongest state in the international system, because unipolarity provides a secure order and hierarchy. It is doing so at least until a revisionist power emerges. This assessment

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already illustrates that offensive neorealism spent prior attention to the behavior of great powers, whereby it tells us something about top tier states in the international system but very little about those in the lower tiers. While defensive neorealists prefer balancing, offensive neorealists emphasis buck-passing as the preferred strategic choice of states, “because the successful buck-passer does not have to fight the aggressor if deterrence fails” (ibid, p. 267). Moreover, “if the aggressor and the buck-catcher get bogged on in a long and costly war” (ibid), the successful buck-passer can gain extra profit. Therefore, to put it simply, by buck-passing states attempt to let other states do “the dirty work” and only step in if they feel the strategic necessity to do so. Which paradigm scholars utilize in their analysis, however, should not be seen as an orthodox theoretical and methodological question. Both paradigms have their advantages and disadvantages and application should depend on a careful examination of the case to investigate, and not on a predetermined paradigmatic worldview that sees defensive neorealism supreme to offensive neorealism and vice versa. For this reason, the upcoming discussion will neither draw exclusively on insights derived from either of the two neorealist paradigms, but from the shared assumptions on the international system and the behavior of states. It is important to keep in mind that states act according to their capabilities. These capabilities locate the state in the international system in the small, middle or great power tier, which is accompanied to certain goals and considerations. In this context, Vietnam is a middle power consistently engaged in efforts of internal and external balancing to position itself in the great power spectrum between the United States and China. While the former is the preponderant power in the international system, the latter can be characterized as the revisionist power, particularly with respect to the status in the South China Sea. How Southeast Asian nations are dealing with these two great powers ­expresses further concerns that a rigid application of defensive or offensive neorealism fails to picture the applied strategies and approaches appropriately.9 According to Goh, the behavior of Southeast Asian nations is “not easily characterized using the prevailing lenses in international relations theory” (Goh 2008, p. 114). As she continues to emphasize, neither have the countries of Southeast Asia chosen a clear-cut strategy of balancing, nor are they 9 Since the mid-1990s, a vivid debate evolved that centered itself around the question of whether or not Western international relations theories are applicable on the Asian context without the recognition of the distinct historical experiences of the region (Kang 2013 and 2003; Johnston 2012; Yahuda 2008; Acharya and Buzan 2007; Wang 2004; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003).

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b­ andwagoning with China or the United States (ibid, pp. 131–132). Instead, most countries have and remain engaged in a strategy of omni-enmeshment, whereby they aim to engage other states “into deep involvement into international or regional society, enveloping it in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, with the long-term aim of integration” (ibid, p. 121). This approach shall avoid a bipolar order and improve the leeway of action that states can exert in regard to its international relations. Beside the Philippines, Vietnam is an illustrative example of this enmeshment strategy, having reached out to numerous states on a series of important issues.10

The Deployment of HYSY-981: Implication for Vietnam’s South China Sea Policy

Beyond doubt, the deployment of HYSY-981 must have given the Vietnamese authorities quite a headache. China has sent an ambiguous signal to Vietnam about its intentions in the South China Sea and the value of its relation with Hanoi. Moreover, it illustrated again that there is a gap between China’s words and deeds that adds to the complexity and arcane situation in the region. With respect to Vietnam’s preference to enmeshment, the modest response by other countries Hanoi perceived to be on close terms has highlighted flaws of this strategy. Against this background, the following sections will assess several implications that can be derived from China’s behavior. HYSY-981: The End of China’s “charm offensive” to Vietnam? Several scholars have pointed out that the deployment of HYSY-981 was unprovoked by Vietnam (icg 2015, Storey 2014, Thayer 2014a). Therefore, a simple explanation according to which China only reacts to perceived provocations by other countries is insufficient. This assessment is based on the relatively good relationship between China and Vietnam prior to the HYSY-981 standoff. Having failed to decisively court the Philippines, since 2013 Hanoi 10

These issues include traditional as well as non-traditional security threats such as disaster relief and anti-terrorism. Most notable, however, are the purchases of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, several patrol boats from Japan, maritime defense equipment from the United States and BrahMos cruise missiles from India. In addition to this, India and Russia are important partners with respect to technical training of the military personal. On other fields such as economic cooperation, Vietnam called upon a series of foreign actors to internationalize its energy exploration and exploitation activities. The majority of those firms are located in Malaysia, Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia.

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became the primary target of Beijing’s “charm offensive”11 (icg 2015, p. 20).12 While Vietnam interpreted the Chinese efforts as an act to boost bilateral relations, the deployment of HYSY-981 has halted, if not preliminarily ended the Chinese caresses to Vietnam. This development has at least two important implications. First, the hope that Sino-Vietnamese relations will now initiate a new ­chapter remains premature. Particularly since normalization began in 1991, deference to China has been a traditional foreign policy strategy of Vietnam to accommodate its northern neighbor (Vuving 2006, p. 809).13 Against Vietnamese expectations and wishes, however, China has frequently refused to upgrade the bilateral relations to anything formally significant. Moreover, the behavior of China in the past decade, especially since 2009, suggests a disturbing picture of defiance to vocally uttered moves. To put it bluntly, it seems that what China is saying is not what it is doing. The Philippines, who became before Vietnam the first priority of China’s “charm offensive” after Benigno Aquino iii took over in 2010, have learnt this lesson particularly well during the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 (icg 2015, p. 20, Leaf 2014). Therefore, as recent history has shown, being on good terms with Beijing has never restricted them from taking up a more assertive position to its regional claims. China’s charm offensive, however, must be considered from a larger perspective. For decades Beijing has applied an approach that “alternates between assertive, at times aggressive, actions to gain control of islands and waters and ameliorating gestures to lower tensions and consolidate gains” (icg 2015, p. 9). These aptly termed “cycles of tension and calm” (ibid, p. 8) have become shorter and tenser. Although this development is disturbing for the region, it is congruent to neorealist assumptions of great power behavior. In this context, China’s assertive behavior is determined by its increasing economic and military capabilities. The more they increase, the higher are China’s objectives in the international system. Accompanied to this development is the significance that the South China Sea contains for Beijing, as it presumes that hegemony 11

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Since the early-2000s, “China aggressively pursued warmer relations with many Southeast Asian nations, using a combination of diplomacy, aid, and soft power to woo its neighbors” (Kurlantzick 2015). Thayer noted “Vietnam and China developed a dense network of party, state, and defence mechanisms to manage their bilateral relations under the umbrella of the Joint Steering Committee at deputy prime minister level” (Thayer 2015c, p. 9). An interesting note in Vuving’s well-thought analysis of Sino-Vietnamese relations highlighted that Hanoi requested a military alliance with Beijing in 1991. The latter’s response was brief and simple: We can be “comrades but not allies” (Vuving 2006, p. 814).

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in Southeast Asia can only be achieved by controlling its Southern backyard.14 Therefore, putting too much “hope” into China’s shifting diplomatic language is at best ill-conceived (icg 2015, p. 20), particularly as neorealists emphasize the fact that states can never be sure about the true and full intentions of other countries. Related to this is the second lesson to be learnt from the deployment of HYSY-981: Perceptions and intentions are weak but, if applied, high-risk indicators in international politics. Despite all odds, there exists at least one event that could have functioned as a pretext for China’s actions. In late April 2014, Vietnam offered two further exploration sites to India’s ongc Videsh (Jayaswal and Chadhury 2014). Given Vietnam’s longstanding internationalization efforts with respect to its national offshore oil and gas blocks, and taking into account that China has protested most of these efforts but never applied such drastic measures to irritate Vietnam, it seems arbitrary that this event would justify the quantity and quality of territorial infringement committed by China. And yet, China’s understanding or “perception” of provocation is actually difficult to measure.15 In this context, it is compelling to illustrate the deployment of HYSY-981 as “the culmination of a long process of salami-slicing” (Vuving 2014). By applying such a tactic, China sets incremental moves, none of which is a casus belli, to extend its influence in the area, whereby over time the balance of power and strategic situation in the region will change (Haddick 2012). There are several events that support this line of thinking. In 2009 and 2012, China has forced bp respectively ConocoPhillips to withdraw from their economic interests in Vietnamese territory (Brown 2014). Additionally, China has frequently discommoded Vietnamese survey vessels and issued a public tender for oil and gas blocks, which had already been offered to foreign companies by Vietnam (ibid). The founding of Sansha City on Woody Island in early 2012 is another illustration of China’s salami-slicing tactic. With respect to the Philippines, the numerous skirmishes that occurred since 2010 are a further indication of China’s salami slicing that must have set the Vietnamese authorities on an alarming level, particularly if they really have interpreted its environment 14

15

According to Keohane, a “Hegemonic power must have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods” (Keohane 1984, p. 32). As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China has made it clear, the deployment of HYSY-981 was in its view in territory that belongs to China. Therefore, Hanoi’s immediate deployment of vessels was recognized as “illegally and forcefully disrupting the Chinese operation and ramming the Chinese government vessel on escort and security missions there” (fmprc 2014).

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“according to the realist approach” (Blazevic 2012, p. 81). The crux, however, which might worry Vietnam the most, is the fact that the deployment of HYSY981 was maybe not primarily aimed at Hanoi, but at the United States. Test Object Vietnam, Main Target usa? With due respect to the diligent work of numerous scholars who have tried to understand China’s behavior at this particular point in time, it seems compelling that the deployment of HYSY-981 was primarily a pre-planned decision to rebuff Obama’s “reassurance tour” to Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea (Thayer 2014a; Tisdall 2014). While this represents the immediate object of HYSY-981, the deployment had two further purposes: To upset the pro-us camp within the Vietnamese Communist Party, and to present the United States pivot to Asia as a lame duck. The provocative argument this section outlines is that the us was the initial target, and Vietnam represented a calculated and well-chosen object to hit them. Since Washington has announced its pivot to Asia, China has tested the ­willingness of the United States to uphold the accompanied allegiances on numerous occasions.16 One central aim of China’s behavior is simple: By confronting America’s “friends with force, China confronts America with the choice between deserting its friends and fighting China” (White 2014). Thus, while threatening states with diplomatic means is one thing, deploying a large flotilla of vessels, deliberately ramming and destroying property of foreign countries is something different. In this context, and adding up to the argument that the deployment of HYSY-981 was pre-planned, Godement pointed out that “the level of presence makes it impossible that this was a decision taken only by bureaucrats or interests groups” (Godement 2014).17 This suggests a certain influence by high party cadres, which increases the significance of China’s action. As it was already mentioned, from a neorealist perspective China aims to establish hegemony in its Southern backyard. Hegemony would include among others the recognition of the nine-dash line, bilateral rather than multilateral relations to Southeast Asian nations and the control of the vital Sea 16 17

See Clinton (2011) for further information on the concrete politics of the pivot. Panda argued similarly saying “cnooc may be a state-owned enterprise but the decision to move this US$1 billion asset into an area with questionable hydrocarbon reserves while also inciting a diplomatic crisis speaks to the planned, political nature of this move. The fact that approximately 80 plan and Chinese coast guard ships accompanied the rig reinforces the notion that China was making a strategic push to assert its territorial claims in the region” (Panda 2014a).

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Lines of Communication in the South and East China Sea. China’s motives runs contrary to the purposes of the United States, who also aim to continue its preponderance in the region. This contrast is best explained by the remarks of Wu: The South China Sea is a natural line of defense for Chinese national security, an important strategic waterway, and a strategic must-have for it to become a maritime power. For the u.s., controlling the South China Sea and maintaining its presence there is indispensable for its dominance in the Asia-Pacific based on its bilateral alliances formulated in the post-war era. wu 2015

Aiming to undermine the us position in Southeast Asia, China is keen to present the United States as a “paper tiger” (Thayer 2014). Doing so, Beijing aims to challenge the credibility of the United States “by demonstrating to regional states the limitations of Washington’s security commitments and its unwillingness to risk a military clash with China over disputed rocks” (Storey 2014, p. 3). This development was certainly accelerated by Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”, and has contributed to an increased level of assertiveness, whereby slowly but surely, decision makers in Beijing discard Deng Xiaoping’s advice of keeping a low profile in favor of “a new model of great power relations” (Kim 2015, p. 122). Related to the opposing objectives in the South China Sea is the fact that this new model is based on a vague and contrary interpretation by Beijing and Washington of the current power distribution in the international system (White 2014a). China feels to have the capabilities to oppose a us aggression, including the possibility of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), and assumes that Washington understands it cannot easily win or limit a military conflict. Without surprise, Washington has a contrary understanding of its own capabilities and those of China (ibid). Against this background, if the aim of the deployment of HYSY-981 was to further test the United States, “Vietnam was perhaps the most fitting candidate” (Panda 2014a). Such an argument is based on at least three aspects. First, since Vietnam submitted its territorial case to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2009 (un-i 2009), China “aimed to achieve de facto hegemony over the South China Sea, and Vietnam’s offshore oil sector has been a prime target” (Brown 2014). As it was mentioned earlier, accompanying this development was an extension of “physical disruption of energy surveys undertaken by foreign firms exploring under license within the eezs of Vietnam and the Philippines” by China (Graham 2014). In this context, Vietnam

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became a well-known target for China’s salami-slicing tactic and Beijing certainly believed to be able to assess and control the responses its actions would provoke in Hanoi prior the deployment of HYSY-981. Therefore, second, Vietnam is a “pragmatic victim” to illustrate the limitations of us devotion to the region. Beijing has gambled on repairing bilateral relations by party-to-party talks after a certain time period. Hence, its policy makers turned towards the extreme, showing strong fortitude of its position to Hanoi, the South China Sea littorals and the world. The high-level meetings that took place in the post-HYSY-981 period that had its peak with Truong Tan Sang’s visit to Beijing in September 2015, and Xi’s visit to Hanoi in November 2015 are indicators of this strategy. The problem of this evaluation, however, is that China has put its chips on a reiteration of Hanoi’s reluctance towards the permission of anti-China protests. Thus, the fierce protests that caused the death of numerous ethnic Chinese must have hit decision makers in Beijing unprepared. However, to what extent this circumstance had an impact on the bilateral relations between both states and the unfolding events remains debatable. The third aspect refers to the intra-party split within the vcp. For decades, the vcp has been split into two major camps: The anti-imperialists are preoccupied with defending socialism and combating Western influence; the integrationists are primarily concerned with economic development and national modernization. The antiimperialists pursue a strategy of solidarity with China because it fits into their vision of the world. […] The integrationists developed their grand strategy out of the realization that falling economically behind other countries in the surrounding region is Vietnam’s largest danger. vuving 2006, p. 821

For that reason, while discrediting the United States as a reliable partner was the primary objective of China’s actions, the other major recipient were those members in the vcp who supported a diversified foreign policy and a strong relationship with the United States (Dingdong 2014; Panda 2014a; Thayer 2014b). For them, the relative moderate protest issued by countries perceived to be on close terms with Vietnam, foremost Russia and India must have been frustrating. It remains too early to assess the effects of Beijing’s actions on the intra-party split. The preparations for the upcoming Twelfth National Party Congress, however, indicate, “that consensus on how Vietnam should manage its relations with China and the United States has not been reached” (Thayer 2015c, p. 18). Vietnam’s scope of actions is determined by

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its vital economic relations with China and the anxiety to get too close to either side, as this would increase the level of tension with Beijing respectively Washington. Failed Enmeshment? Beside deference to China, enmeshment is the second cornerstone of Vietnam’s foreign policy (Vuving 2006, p. 810). As mentioned above, Vietnam has so far avoided a clear-cut balancing against or bandwagoning with China or the United States. However, with respect to its enmeshment strategy, Vuving states that Hanoi’s efforts have been “half-hearted” (ibid, p. 821). While this might be true until the mid-2000s, since 2009 Vietnam has become very active in the process of engaging as many outside actors as possible in national and regional affairs. One particular issue that became central to this strategy was energy exploration and exploitation. In 2009 alone, Vietnam signed at least 14 new contracts with foreign firms to extend its energy cooperation (Thiele 2015). The rationale for these efforts of internationalization is simple: By encouraging Russia, India and other countries to join in energy exploration in the South China Sea, they are also increasing the number of non-claimant states with an economic stake in unresolved sovereignty disputes. icg 2012a, p. 22

The most prominent cooperation partners in Vietnam are companies from Russia, Australia, Malaysia, the United Kingdom and the United States. However, beside the United States the response of each of these countries to China’s actions was rather modest. This is neither surprising for countries like the United Kingdom who have not even significantly protested bps forceful withdrawal in 2009, nor for countries like Malaysia who so far maintain more pragmatic relations with China. The one state that Hanoi certainly thought of replying more decisively was Russia. Being a close partner since the Cold War, Russia is a vital partner for Vietnam’s defense modernization plans (Thayer 2013). Moreover, between 2009 and 2014, the majority of energy cooperation contracts related to the offshore oil and gas blocks were signed with companies from Russia. Contrary to this, however, is Moscow’s determination on its Eastern border. Until now, Russia has applied a similar approach to the South China Sea like most of the littorals: Being anxious to upset its bilateral relations with China and aiming to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States, Russia has presented itself as an important and welcomed partner to countries like Vietnam without

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a strong devotion and commitment to the region (Chunshan 2014). However, as the Cam Ranh Bay incident in March 2015 has shown, it seems certain that Moscow cannot be permanently unaffected by the territorial disputes in the South China Sea (Thayer 2015a).18 While Hanoi certainly understands Moscow’s position, two other countries have become the focal point of Vietnam’s enmeshment efforts: India and Japan. New Delhi has strong geo-economic and geopolitical interests in the region that drives its Southeast Asia strategy. One central rationale for this strategy is China’s expansion to the Indian Ocean via the Maritime Silk Route initiative (Yale 2015; Jenny 2014; Scott 2013). Moreover, as Moss highlighted it, the (…) status as Asia’s tertiary superpower is enabling India to play a kind of avuncular strategic role, giving it a platform on which to team with the Southeast Asians on their military development without bringing any of the perceived strategic baggage that comes with dealing with the Chinese or the Americans. moss 2012

Therefore, unlike Russia, India is actively trying to get engaged in the affairs of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. It seems as if India is applying a similar strategy to China’s charm offensive, whereby courting other countries for the sake of its national interests in the region (Ghosh 2014). Since both countries signed a strategic partnership in 2007, India has become a significant partner for Vietnam on numerous issues but especially with regard to military training and exercises (Thayer 2014d). Additionally, India is one of the few states that made it clear that the economic assets of its national oil and gas company, ongc Videsh, are regarded as assets of national interest. The statement of then Indian Navy Chief, D.K. Joshi, illustrate this: 18

Hanoi was asked by the United States not to refuel a Russian Tu-95 ms strategic bomber and uphold its commitment to Russia. Vietnam has not immediately responded to Washington’s request, which illustrate Hanoi’s position of avoiding an alignment with any great power. A fortnight later, in a talk with his us counterpart to Vietnam, the Vietnamese ambassador to the United States, Pham Quang Vinh, stated that “his country has not yet had information on the matter and will discuss with us officials so that the two sides can understand each other” (TuoiTre 2015). While not complying with the us request, he assured the world that no third-party will be harmed by Vietnam’s agreement and urged Moscow not to “use the agreements signed with Vietnam to take part in actions that can trigger regional tensions” (ibid).

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Not that we expect to be in those waters very frequently, but when the requirement is there for situations, where the country’s interests are involved, for example ongc Videsh, we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that. cited in sandeep 2012

Certainly, deeds and words are two different things, but India seems to be determined to play an active part in the South China Sea in the future. Similarly to India, Japan has a strong geopolitical and geo-economic interest in the region (Sato 2013; Storey 2013). To be more precise, “Japan is concerned that the dispute has the potential to undermine sea lane security in the South China Sea” (Storey 2013, p. 14). Therefore, having missed to issue a clear South China Sea strategy, Japan now seems to be keen on playing a more active role in the region. This is illustrated among others in the aim to conduct a joint naval exercise with Vietnam and the Philippines (Pollmann 2015). However, whether or not Tokyo will exert a proactive role in the dispute depends on its interpretation of the review of Article 9 (Fatton 2014). De facto, the scope of action for policy makers in Tokyo has been increased by this review. The significant question related to enmeshment, however, concerns the expectations that states have when they aim to engage numerous outside actors in close cooperation. To put this more bluntly, what have policy makers in Hanoi thought of how countries like Russia, Australia or the United States would respond to the deployment of HYSY-981. While this question is interesting from an academic perspective, it is vital for states that apply such a comprehensive enmeshment strategy. The scope of actions state can exert in conducting its international relations is determined by domestic and international factors (Putnam 1988). As it has already been mentioned above, Russia’s focus on its Eastern borders and since autumn 2015 on Syria, is one example that enmeshment has its limitations. The deployment of the Chinese oil-rig Kantan-iii in the Gulf of Tonkin in March 1997 – the claimed territory between China and Vietnam in this region was not demarcated by then – provides an illustrative example (Vuving 2006, p. 814). Vietnam claimed that the oil-rig was deployed in its Exclusive Economic Zone and summoned the asean ambassador to explain Hanoi’s position. As China has not immediately changed its course of action, on 22 March, “the commander of u.s. forces in the Pacific, Joseph Prueher, went to Hanoi, becoming the highest u.s. military official to visit Vietnam since normalization” (ibid). Days later, on 1 April, China withdrew the oil-rig “and agreed to resolve the problem through consultation with Hanoi” (ibid). Whether or not there

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exists causality between the us visit and the withdrawal can be discussed but it is fair to assume that the us move had a decisive impact on Beijing’s calculation. Such kind of actions and impacts are certainly at the heart of what states expect when they apply an enmeshment strategy. The problem, however, is the changing power capabilities in the region and the relative few number of “low politic” issues that could produce such significant impact. It is doubtable that if Admiral Harry B. Harris, the current Commander of the us Pacific Command (pacom), would have visited Hanoi in May 2014 a similar development were to unfold. This has at least three important reasons: China’s increased capabilities and how Beijing assess Washington, the current attitude of the United States towards the South China Sea dispute, and the economic dependence on China that forces most littorals to carefully weight up their international actions. The fact that Pham’s visit to Washington was postponed until October 2014, with the intention of avoiding an upset in Beijing, adds further support to this evaluation. While an intensification of a us engagement in the region might be limited, extending the enmeshment process to countries like India or Japan is congruent to Vietnam’s purpose and the neorealist strategy of external balancing. If mistrust among states is a central feature of a neorealist world, then external balancing should always occur with as many states as possible to balance defiant behavior by any state once the chips are down. However, external balancing should not occur at the expense of genuine efforts to improve Vietnam’s defense capabilities. The announcement to strengthen its coast guard and fishing fleet by a US$750 million upgrade program is one indicator that Hanoi is willing to invest in its own defense capabilities (Vu 2014). Conclusion For Thayer, “China’s placement of the giant state-owned oil-rig HD-981 in Block 143 inside Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) on 2 May was unexpected, provocative and illegal” (Thayer 2014a). However, as this chapter has shown, there is ample room to argue against this evaluation, if the deployment of HYSY-981 is approached from a neorealist perspective that closely considers China’s behavior since 2009 produces a less puzzling picture of the standoff that took place between May and July 2014. While its actions have sent numerous disturbing signals to the littorals, China’s behavior is congruent to an increasingly confident great power. Against this background, as this chapter

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argued, the deployment of HYSY-981 has several important implications for Vietnam. First, the Chinese charm offensive to Vietnam has ended, and although Beijing continues to court Hanoi, it would be ill-conceived to perceive these efforts as one of seriously improving the bilateral relations between the two countries. As long as the Vietnamese Communist Party is divided over the direction of its foreign policy and no course is set towards balancing with the United States, Beijing has very little to gain from improved relations, and Hanoi much to lose from a deterioration in its relations with China, given its vital economic interests. Second, Hanoi must understand that its strategic leeway is particularly determined by the Sino-American supremacy in the South China Sea. While this sets limits to Vietnam’s scope of actions, it also suggests that Vietnam can be, if not already is, a plaything in the game of the great powers. In this context, there is no great difference between Vietnam and the Philippines, the two most active littorals in the South China Sea dispute. Whether or not Hanoi will one day follow the Philippines example and submit its own legal case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration depends certainly on the upcoming ruling on the Philippines vs. China case, but will also suggest a change in direction within the Vietnamese Communist Party. Counting on good partto-party relations will not evidently avoid Chinese provocations. Related to this, third, Vietnam should continue its efforts of enmeshment but should also consider the geopolitical and geo-economic interest of other states. Here, reaching out to India and Japan makes much sense, as the former has already issued its interest in the region, and the latter seems to be finally ready to take a more active stance in the dispute. Certainly, enmeshment will always include the risk of harming Hanoi’s relations with Beijing, which is one reason why Vietnam, fourth, should continue its path of military modernization. Although the strengthening of Vietnam’s military capabilities will not directly affect the current balance of power in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, it is a signal of determination that similarly contributes to please the growing number of nationalists within the vcp and the Vietnamese population. This last aspect is likewise important to be considered by decisionmakers in China. Events like the deployment of a giant oil-rig into the Exclusive Economic Zone of Vietnam puts pressure on the vcp and increases the chances of a government overturn, because it endangers those who believe good relations with China will protect the state and encourage the opposition. Therefore, China does not only risk damaging its international reputation but also the political stability in a country that might do more harm to China without a fraternal communist party in charge.

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London, Jonathan and Viet, Vu Quang (2015): “Time for Vietnam to reassess its South China Sea strategy.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 November. Available at: http://cogitasia.com/time-for-vietnam-to-reassess-its-south-china-sea-strategy/. Luedi, Jeremy (2014): “Tensions flare in Vietnam-China Oil Rig dispute.” Freedom Observatory, 26 August. Available at: http://www.freedomobservatory.org/tensionsflare-in-vietnam-china-oil-rig-dispute/. Mearsheimer, John J. (1995): “The false promises of International Institutions.” International Security, 19(3), 5–49. Mearsheimer, John J. (2001): The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. Mearsheimer, John J. (2010): “Structural Realism” In Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja and Smith, Steve (Eds.): International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 77–94. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) – People’s Republic of China (2014): “The operation of HYSY 981 drilling rig: Vietnam’s provocation and China’s position.” 8 June. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163264.shtml Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam (MoFA) (2014): “Remarks by FM Spokesman Le Hai Binh on 4th May 2014.” 4 May. Available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/ tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns140505232230 MoFA (2014a): “Viet Nam demands China withdraw from territorial waters.” 6 May. Available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr111027144142/ ns140508010729?b_start:int=15 MoFA (2014b): “International press conference on May 7th.” 7 May. Available at: http:// www.mofa.gov.vn/en/ns140508040804 Moss, Trefor (2012): “India’s ‘Look East’ power play.” The Diplomat, 23 February. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/indias-look-east-power-play/. Miyoshi, Masahiro (2012): “China’s “U-shaped Line” claim in the South China Sea. Any validity under International Law.” Ocean Development & International Law, 43(1), 1–17. Ngyuen, Chau Bao (2015): “How should Vietnam respond to China’s South China Sea Oil Rig return?” The Diplomat, 24 July. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/ how-should-vietnam-respond-to-chinas-south-china-sea-oil-rig-return/. Panda, Ankit (2014a): “Why did China set up an Oil Rig within Vietnamese waters?” The Diplomat, 13 May. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/ why-did-china-set-up-an-oil-rig-within-vietnamese-waters/. Panda, Ankit (2014b): “Chinese, Vietnamese coast guard boats collide.” The Diplomat, 4 June. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinese-vietnamese -coast-guard-boats-collide/. Panda, Ankit (2015): “1 year later. Reflections on China’s Oil Rig ‘sovereignty – ­making’ in the South China Sea.” The Diplomat, 12 May. Available at: http://thediplomat.

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com/2015/05/1-year-later-reflections-on-chinas-oil-rig-sove areignty-making-in-the -south-china-sea/. Pape, Robert A. (2005): “Soft balancing against the United States.” International Security, 30(1), 7–45. Pollmann, Mina (2015): “Japan wades into the South China Sea issue.” The Diplomat, 6 February. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/japan-wades-into-south -china-sea-issue/. Putnam, Robert D. (1988): “Diplomacy and domestic politics. The logic of two-level games.” International Organization, 42(3), 427–460. Psaki, Jen (2014): “Daily press briefing.” U.S. Department of State, 2 October. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/10/232495.htm Press Trust of India (PTI) (2014): “Kerry invites Vietnamese counterpart to US for talks on China.” The New Indian Express, 22 May. Available at: http://www.newindianexpress .com/world/Kerry-Invites-Vietnamese-Counterpart-to-US-for-Talks-on -China/2014/05/22/article2238694.ece Roy, Denny (2005): “Southeast Asia and China. Balancing or Bandwagoning?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27(2), 305–322. Sandeep, Unnithan (2012): “Indian Navy prepared to defend its interest in South China Sea, says Admiral DK Joshi.” India Today, 3 December. Available at: http:// indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-prepared-to-intervene-in-south-china-sea-navy -chief/1/235881.html. Sato, Yoichiro (2013): “Japan aid to the Philippines a Warning to China.” East Asia Forum, 29 August. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/29/japan -aid-to-the-philippines-a-warning-to-china/. Scott, David (2013): “India’s role in the South China Sea. Geopolitics and Geo-economics in play.” India Review, 12(2), 51–69. Spetalnick, Matt (2014): “U.S. Warns China its actions in Sea Disputes are straining relations.” Reuters, 16 May. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/16/ us-vietnam-china-usa-idUSBREA4E0TR20140516 Storey, Ian (2013): “Japan’s maritime security interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea Dispute.” Political Science, 65, 135–156. Storey, Ian (2014): “The Sino-Vietnamese Oil Rig Crisis. Implications for the South China Sea Dispute.” ISEAS Perspectives No. 52. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (1999): “Security seeking under anarchy. Defensive Realism revisited.” International Security, 25(3), 128–161. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2012): “Russian Subs in Vietnam.” USNI News, 20 February. Available at: http://news.usni.org/2012/08/20/russian-subs-vietnam. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2014a): “China’s Oil Rig gambit. South China Sea game-changer?” The Diplomat, 12 May. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil -rig-gambit-south-china-sea-game-changer/.

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Thayer, Carlyle A. (2014b): “China’s Oil Rig Gambit. South China Sea Game-Changer?” The Diplomat, 12 May. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil -rig-gambit-south-china-sea-game-changer/. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2014c): “4 reasons China removed Oil Rig HYSY-981 sooner than planned.” The Diplomat, 22 July. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/ 07/4-reasons-china-removed-oil-rig-hysy-981-sooner-than-planned/. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2014d): “The US lifts arms embargo. The ball is in Vietnam’s court.” The Diplomat, 6 October. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/ the-us-lifts-arms-embargo-the-ball-is-in-vietnams-court/. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2014e): “India and Vietnam advance their strategic partnership.” The Diplomat, 11 December. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/ india-and-vietnam-advance-their-strategic-partnership/. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2015a): “China and Vietnam eschew megaphone diplomacy.” The Diplomat, 2 January. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china -and-vietnam-eschew-megaphone-diplomacy/. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2015b): “Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay caught in US-Russia crossfire.” The Diplomat, 13 March. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/ vietnams-cam-ranh-bay-caught-in-us-russia-crossfire/. Thayer, Carlyle A. (2015c): “Not too hot, not too cold. A Vietnamese perspective on China-U.S. relations.” Paper presented to International Conference on China-US Relations in Global Perspective. Wellington, 8–9 October. Available at: http://viet-studies. info/kinhte/Thayer_NotTooHotTooCold.pdf Thiele, Jörg (2015): Conceptualizing “Internationalization” in International Relations Theory. The Case of Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea. M.A. Thesis, University of Vienna. Tiezzi, Shannon (2014a): “Rioters in Vietnam attack Chinese, Taiwanese factories.” The Diplomat, 14 May. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/rioters-in -vietnam-attack-chinese-taiwanese-factories/. Tiezzi, Shannon (2014b): “China, Taiwan evacuates citizens as Vietnam tightens security.” The Diplomat, 20 May. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/ china-taiwan-evacuate-citizens-as-vietnam-tightens-security/. Tiezzi, Shannon (2014c): “So China moved its Oil Rig. What now?” The Diplomat, 17 July. A ­ vailable at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/so-china-moved-its-oil-rig-what -now/. Tisdall, Simon (2014): “Vietnam’s fury at China’s expansionism can be traced to a troubled history.” The Guardian, 15 May. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/may/15/vietnam-anger-china-expansionism-troubled-history Tuan, Ha Anh (2014): “China’s big strategic mistake in the South China Sea.” The National Interest, 16 May. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ chinas-big-strategic-mistake-the-south-china-sea-10477

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TuoiTreNews (2014a): “Live Report. Vietnam holds press conference on China’s illicit Oil Rig.” 15 May. Available at: http://tuoitrenews.vn/politics/19659/ hanoi-holds-intl-conference-on-chinas-illicit-oil-rig TuoiTreNews (2014b): “Protests staged in Vietnam against China planting Oil Rig in Vietnamese waters.” 11 May. Available at: http://tuoitrenews.vn/politics/19579/ vietnamese-people-in-big-cities-demonstrate-to-protest-against-china. TuoiTreNews (2014c): “Protesters request China withdraw Oil Rig from Vietnam’s waters.” 13 May. Available at: http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/19622/protestors -demand-that-china-remove-oil-rig-from-vietnams-waters TuoiTreNews (2014d): “Vietnam demands reply from China over Illegal Oil Rig.” 16 May. Available at: http://tuoitrenews.vn/politics/19675/vietnam-demands -reply-from-china-over-illegal-oil-rig. TuoiTreNews (2014e): “Vietnam opposes China at UN Conference over Oil Rig.” 15 June. Available at: http://tuoitrenews.vn/politics/20341/vietnam-opposes-china -at-un-conference-over-oil-rig TuoiTreNews (2015): “Vietnam’s cooperation with other countries in Cam Ranh doesn’t harm any third party: Ambassador.” 27 March. Available at: http://tuoitrenews.vn/ politics/27035/vietnams-cooperation-with-other-countries-in-cam-ranh-doesnt -harm-any-third-party-ambassador. United Nations (UN) (N-I) (2009): “Receipt of the joint submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.” Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ mysvnm33_09/mysvnm_clcs33_2009e.pdf UN (UN-II) (2009): “CML/18/2009.” Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_ new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf Vietnam News (2014): “China moves Oil Rig within VN waters.” 28 May. Available at: http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/255443/china-moves-oil-rig-within-vn -waters.html Vu, Anh (2014): “Vietnam to spend $750mil upgrading coast guard and fishing fleet.” ThanHien News, 4 July. Available at: http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/ vietnam-to-spend-750-mil-upgrading-coast-guard-and-fishing-fleet-28051.html Vuving, Alexander L. (2006): “Strategy and evolution of Vietnam’s China policy. A changing mixture of pathways.” Asian Survey, 46(6), 805–824. Vuving, Alexander L. (2014): “Did China blink in the South China Sea.” The National Interest, 27 July. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/did-china-blink -the-south-china-sea-10956?page=show. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theory of International Politics. Reading et al.: AddisoneWesley. Wang, Yuan-kang (2004): “Offensive Realism and the rise of China.” Issues & Studies, 40(1), 173–201.

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Want China Times (2014): “Timing of flareups in South China Sea is no coincidence.” Want China Times Editorial, 13 May. Available at: http://www.wantchinatimes.com/ news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1701&MainCatID=17&id=20140513000104 White, Hugh (2014): “Explaining China’s behavior in the East and South China Seas.” The Interpreter, 22 May. Available at: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/05/22/ Explaining-Chinas-behaviour-in-the-East-and-South-China-Seas.aspx. Wu, Shicun (2015): “US ambivalence in the South China Sea.” Institute for China-America Studies, 9 July. Available at: http://www.chinaus-icas.org/node/96 Xinhua (2014): “Chinese ships ferrying evacuees home from Vietnamese port.” 19 May. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/19/c_133345097. htm Yahuda, Michael (2008): “Looking ahead. A new Asian order?” In Shambaugh, David and Yahuda, Michael (Eds.): International Relation of Asia. Lanham et al.: Rowman and Littlefield, 341–358. Yale, William (2015): “China’s maritime Silk Road gamble.” The Diplomat, 22 April. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-maritime-silk-road-gamble/.

chapter 10

The Spring 2014 Incidents in the South China Sea: Trigger of a More Intense and Assertive Security Discourse in China? Josef Falko Loher Introduction The month of May 2014 saw heated events in the South China Sea (scs): After the deployment of the Chinese oil rig Haiyang shiyou 981 140 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coastline, Chinese and Vietnamese vessels collided, followed by both sides mutually blaming each other. Only few days later a Chinese vessel was seized by the Philippine police and Chinese fishermen were arrested and later sentenced to severe prison sentences. In mid-May 2014, massive protests in Vietnam rose against China’s action in the South China Sea with Chinese property being looted and Chinese as well as other countries’ citizens injured and even killed, thousands others were evacuated from the country. Being mostly unrelated to each other, some of these events (such as the arrest of fishermen or the collision of boats) were recurring and often to be observed in the past, others were new – even in these troubled waters: The South China Sea conflict has never seen such a massive uprising by citizens against one country with an outburst of violence aimed directly at the country itself and its citizens. All these events – be they old or new – triggered a security discourse by the Chinese government that will be the center of this paper. It aims at assessing to what extent these events initiated an intense and more assertive security discourse which could lead to a more assertive behavior by China in the South China Sea conflict. The underlying assumption of this paper is that “securitizing” the events in spring 2014 might help Beijing to legitimize further action both internally and externally. Or in other words: If the events in the South China Sea and Vietnam are sufficiently framed as immediate threats to China’s national security (or other security dimensions), the government might find enough grounds to eventually dispatch its military into its proclaimed territorial waters of the South China Sea and rage war against other claimants involved in the conflict. This paper therefore asks the following research question: How did the events in Vietnam and the South China Sea in spring 2014 influence the security discourse in China? The research question is followed by several sub-

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questions. Firstly the paper asks: Which types of security discourses unfolded in the course of the events? Here, it aims at identifying dominant discourse streams. Is each event represented by its own discourse stream or are certain events either omitted or amalgamated with other events? Secondly, the paper asks: Which dimension of security prevailed for each type of discourse? This sub-question inquires whether either one security dimension (i.e. that of national security) dominates the discourse or whether one can speak of a comprehensive security discourse. Thirdly and fourthly, the author inquires: Can the events be seen as a trigger of a more intense and assertive security discourse in China? How does the discourse fit into China’s current understanding of security in the context of the South China Sea? Here, the paper aims at grasping the intensity of the discourse and estimating the consequences of the concrete security discourse by embedding it into China’s long-term security strategy in the South China Sea. In order to adequately answer all research questions, the author will pursue the following structure within this paper. It will elaborate briefly first on the theoretical and methodological frame of this analysis to then introduce six discourse streams that could be extracted in the wake of the spring 2014 events. It will further closely look at the basic notions and security implications of each of these streams, before assessing which dimension of security dominated the discourse. Finally, we will embed the discourse into the broader picture of China’s security strategy in the South China Sea and discuss whether or not the events did trigger a more intense and assertive security discourse.

Theoretical Framework: Security, Comprehensive Security and Securitization

This paper follows a constructivist tradition regarding International Relations. It rather places a strong emphasis on ideational instead of material aspects of international politics. It claims that there is no objective knowledge and reality, as this reality is historically and socially constructed. As for the notion of security, this paper likewise follows a constructivist path and disagrees with the traditional schools of Realism and Neo-Realism which understand security primarily as related to the state and military. As Buzan (1991) argues, security needs to be understood also under socio-economic aspects and the subjective feeling of security or insecurity of individuals within a society. Buzan’s arguments rather privilege concepts like identity and integration instead of material and objective means of security. This concept of comprehensive security therefore adds an economic, environmental, human and individual dimension

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to the notion of security. Moreover, it entails a shift away from the state to individuals as the central unit of analysis (Hsiung 2004, pp. 3–4). This paper further sticks to the Copenhagen School’s stance of securitization, a constructivist concept developed and advanced by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998). According to the Copenhagen School, the task of a securitizing actor is to convince a target group through a “speech act” that a particular threat poses an existential danger to a certain referent object. To constitute something as a threat is to “securitize” it, meaning that if the issue is not tackled it implies fatal consequences. Having securitized a threat grants the issue heightened priority and might justify further possible action. This means that the actor would be able to break free from procedures that restrict them and to apply extraordinary means (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, pp. 22–24).1 For Balzacq, effective securitization is heavily context-dependent, naturally powerladen and always targets an audience directly (Balzacq 2005, p. 171).2 The act of securitization builds on the assumption that security is a self-referential practice in which the issue in question is presented as a security issue. In this sense, security threats can be discursively constructed or at least exaggerated or downplayed by securitizing actors. Yet, a securitizer does not necessarily need to be the discourse leader. In some cases, the securitizer intentionally leaves the discourse for other actors in order to successfully downplay a discourse (as can be observed in this study). For Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, p. 25) the way to extract securitization moves is to study discourses and ask at which point an actor achieves sufficient effect for a target audience to accept certain violations of rules which they normally would not have tolerated. A discourse in this context can be understood as “a broader matrix of social practices which generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained” (George 1994, pp. 29–30). It embeds the underlying assumption that all objects and actions are meaningful. With regard to foreign policy, a discourse therefore constitutes the means by which an actor’s identity is equipped with meaning. Societal discourses fulfill the functions of forming political discussions, describing 1 2

1 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) remain vague in what they understand as extraordinary action. In the case of the South China Sea conflict, extraordinary measures could entail military action, the installation of an Air Defense Identification Zone (adiz) or also the organized evacuation of Chinese citizens from Vietnam. 2 Discourses in the case of the South China Sea can either target Chinese citizens directly or – alternatively or at the same time – be aimed at external regional or global actors, such as nation-states, supra-national organizations or individuals.

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political events, justifying political action, (re)interpreting historical memories and (re)constructing national identities. They constitute the frame for foreign policies and determine the parameters for foreign policy options. Therefore, they need to be regarded rather as reason for action than as cause of action (Nadoll 2000, pp. 7 and 12). A discourse analysis is usually seen as the practice of analyzing empirical material and information as discursive forms by making use of a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic data. According to Howarth and Stavrakakis these data can include speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, organizations and institutions (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, p. 4). For this paper, I argue that China’s government is – similar to the economic realm – output-oriented and utilizes speech acts to convince their audience about the need of securitization of a certain threat. This paper aims at finding out whether the developments in the South China Sea and the Vietnamese mainland in spring 2014 are framed in a certain way in order to convince a target audience of a threat to the security of the Chinese state, nation or citizens. Method: Security Discourse Analysis The analysis of China’s security discourse in the wake of the events in spring 2014 will focus on the immediate discourse right after the events as it can be assumed that threats will be immediately framed as such. Therefore, the period of analysis in principle focuses the period of 1 May to 1 June. The beginning of this period is marked by the deployment of the oil rig 981 and thus the trigger of some of the subsequent events, the end date is set to 1 June as it is regarded as end of immediate action. However, as the 981 oil rig had not been removed before mid-July and as boat collisions and verbal provocations still occurred in June and July, one single discourse stream looks into discourses which took place between 2 June to 17 July, the day of the removal of the oil rig. Subject to analysis were 195 reports, statements, transcripts of press conferences or articles by Chinese state and government institutions as well as politicians and officials.3 The majority of data was obtained from the websites of five state institutions and one state-owned enterprise. The main state or governmental institutions involved in speech acts were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3

3 These 195 articles on the one hand include replicas with the same or similar content published on different platforms and on the other hand articles which feature multiple aspects of security in one article and therefore represent different streams of security within the same text.

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(mfa), the Ministry of National Defense (mod), the State Council, the Communist Party of China (cpc) and the State Oceanic Administration (soa). The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (cnooc) was added as important state-owned actor which – as the owner of the 981 oil rig – has its own stakes in the South China Sea. The websites of these six institutions were searched manually for speech acts that point to perceived threats to China’s security on different dimensions.4 Besides this first layer of official discourses, the author decided to include a second layer in order to fully grasp the discourse and also understand the differences in speech acts between official and semi-official sources. Among the data analyzed on this layer were articles published by Xinhua News Agency5 and blog entries by high-ranking officials. The author intentionally only referred to data in Chinese language as to guarantee that the discourse was not only used to target an external audience, but – even maybe more importantly – an internal audience. With regard to the limited time frame, the range of sources was limited as it did not include certain sources typically involved in discourse analyses. Interviews or security white papers were not published within the given time frame and could not be included. In addition to the qualitative discourse analysis described above, the author also conducted a quantitative research aimed at assessing the frequency of certain security discourses within the given time frame. For this an explorative approach was taken. The author first extracted possible speech acts either as compound words or units of meaning6 and then clustered them to five meaningful security dimensions: Individual security (or security of citizens), economic security, maritime security, energy security and national security. For each of these clusters, the number of speech acts was calculated and covered in Figure 10.1. 4 5 6

4 The respective wording not only included key terms such as threat (威胁) or threat to security (安全威胁), but moreover different dimensions of security, such as maritime security (海 上安全), national security (国家安全) or energy security (能源安全). Besides these different dimensions, data was also scanned for unstated threats. In order to avoid omitting certain security dimensions or terms, first the terms “security”, “threat” and “danger” were searched for in order to extract the most striking speech acts. These were then subsequently searched for with other institutions and in different contexts. 5 Most of these articles were either written by Xinhua journalists and then republished in the Global Times (环球时报) and the Beijing Times (京华时报) or vice versa. 6 Compound words, for example, were “national security” or “energy security”. Units of meaning entail speech acts such as “Vietnam’s action poses a serious threat to the security of our territorial integrity”.

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Dominant Discourses on the Spring 2014 Events: Basic Notions and Security Dimensions

The events of spring 2014 on the first glance appear as yet another sequence in a well-known game. They seem to reflect the complexity and disparity in issues, tensions and claims of past events in the South China Sea. Ever since China and Vietnam firstly clashed over claims on the Paracel Islands 40 years ago and especially since China pursued a more assertive strategy in the South China Sea from the mid-1990s onwards, the world was able to observe tensions in 2008, 2010 and 2012 when the actors involved constantly renewed their territorial claims and did not flinch from violent action (Storey 2014, pp. 2–5; Taylor 2014, p. 99). Incidents included the seizure of uninhabited shoals and reefs, ramming of boats, the deployment of oil rigs within the exclusive economic zone (eez) of their respective neighbors or the arrest of fishermen. In this respect, the initial events of spring 2014 do not constitute a great exception: On 2 May, the Chinese state-owned oil cooperation cnooc deployed an oil drilling rig within Vietnam’s eez and started activities. This action was immediately condemned by Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh as provocation and attack on Vietnam’s sovereignty. In the following days, Vietnamese and Chinese vessels deliberately rammed each other several times in nearby waters, using water cannons and barriers. On 6 May, the Philippine National Police seized the Chinese fishing boat Qiongqionghai 09063 nearby Half Moon Shoal and arrested eleven Chinese fishermen who were caught fishing endangered sea turtles (Mullany 2014). All of these events triggered – partly fierce – responses not only by involved states, but also by neighboring stakeholders and the United States. A new dimension was added to the conflict in mid-May: Only shortly after China and Vietnam seemed to have found an at least temporary agreement on the oil rig, fierce protest against China’s oil rig involving thousands of Vietnamese citizens unfolded in industrial zones of several Vietnamese cities leading to the rampage of Chinese (as well as Taiwanese, Korean and Singaporean) factories. Hundreds of Chinese workers were injured during these events; some were alleged to be killed. It was not before 20 May that protests were successfully stopped by Vietnamese police and that more than 4000 Chinese citizens were returned to China via planes and ships (Ives and Fuller 2014). These incidents mark a new chapter in tensions in the South China Sea as – for the first time – Chinese citizens were injured and killed by protesters on foreign soil as a direct response to action in the region. All of these events were continuously reported on in Chinese media and via Chinese official communication channels. This chapter channels the various reports and classifies them into six separate streams. The first four streams

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appear in chronological order depending on the respective first appearance. Except for the sixth stream, all streams focus events and incidents which happened within the month of May. The first of these streams deals with reports on the deployment of the cnooc 981 oil rig. Surprisingly, the subsequent boat collisions were reported on separately. Thus, a second stream was extracted for reports on the boat collisions. The third stream entails the official discourse dealing with the seizure of Qiongqionghai 09063 and the arrest of the Chinese fishermen. A fourth stream dealt with the discourse on the protests against China in Vietnam. A fifth discourse stream displays opinions and statements on the general situation and the role of China itself as well as other involved actors. This stream features articles covering the entire month of May. Finally, a last, separate discourse spans over the period of 2 June to 16 July and aims at observing how discourses continued after the end of the immediate incidents. The following sections will introduce all of these six streams and their basic notions as well as security dimensions in detail. Stream 1: The Deployment of 981 Oil Rig The deployment of the cnooc oil rig 981 was widely perceived as trigger for a worsening of the Chinese and Vietnamese relations in the South China Sea. The oil rig therefore took a rather prominent position in both media reports and official statements outside of China (just to name some: cnn 2014; csis 2014; Da Nang Today 8 May 2014; Ives and Fuller 2014). In China, however, the oil rig was only marginally dealt with in official reports. The only immediate reference on the deployment of the oil rig was made at a mfa press conference on 6 May. A journalist inquired on the Chinese position on Vietnam’s allegations that 981’s activities took place on Vietnamese territory. Spokeswoman Hua Chunying answered with the following words: “According to my understanding, the prc Maritime Safety Agency has released a report on the operations of the 981 oil rig which states that operations relating to the oil rig take place entirely in the territorial waters of China’s Paracel Islands”7 (mfa May 6 2014). This reactive statement is – like the other few statements on the oil rig – rather short and bland. It clearly points to the assumption that the activities took place within the Chinese-claimed territory and therefore were to be regarded as legal. Only one report is more direct and condemned Vietnam’s reactions to the deployment. Du Chaoping, a Chinese military commentator, wrote in an article which was published both on the mod website and in the National 7

7 据了解,中国海事局于5月3日为中国981平台作业发布了航行通告。有关作业完全 位于中国 的西沙群岛海域。[All translations from Chinese into English were done by the author.].

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Defense Paper: “Vietnam is making trouble without reason and is barbarously obstructing regular operations of cnooc’s oil platform 981 which is located south of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea”8 (mod 14 May 2014b). Remarkable on this reference to the platform is that Du remains somewhat vague about what he means by “barbarously obstructing regular operations”. Like in this case, other reports or articles do not make a clear connection between the deployment of the oil rig and the boat collisions and rammings in the days after the deployment. Reports either focus on the legitimate deployment of the oil rig or its importance for China’s oil industry or solely emphasize the boat collisions and then do not make a clear reference to its original trigger, the 981 oil rig.9 Apparently, China wanted on the one hand to position the deployment of 981 as legitimate act and on the other hand frame the boat collisions as irrational and provocative action by Vietnam (dealt with more intensely within the next sub-chapter). Besides this reference on Vietnam’s “barbarous obstructions”, this discourse stream does not entail any security dimension. There are no references made to security threats or any specific security dimension. This is barely surprising as it lacks any reference to the boat collisions which instead were framed much more as a threat to China’s security. Stream 2: Boat Collisions The Chinese discourse on the collision of Vietnamese and Chinese boats in the South China Sea differs to Western media reports. Similar to the first discourse stream, all boat collisions allegedly happened on Chinese territory and could therefore be framed as an attack against China and Chinese economic activities. The collisions were said to be initiated by Vietnam and were thus irrational, groundless and provocative. The entire discourse had a prominent security dimension: The majority of reports issued by state ministries dealing with the incidents emphasized that the collisions posed a threat to various aspects of security. A 9 May mfa statement exemplifies not only the wording, but more importantly the different dimensions of security tackled by the Chinese government (mfa 9 May 2014b):

8 9

8 先是越南无理取闹 , 野蛮干扰我海洋石油 981 钻井平台位于西沙中建岛以南海域的正常 作业。

9 Especially by avoiding the term “cnooc 981” or “981 oil rig”; many articles dealing with the boat collisions instead only talk about the “platform” or “economic activities”.

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During the five days between May 3 and 7, Vietnam dispatched 35 vessels of all categories in order to intentionally collide with Chinese ships 171 times. China had commercial and civilian vessels at the scene. Among the boats dispatched by Vietnam, however, were many equipped with arms. In the course of the collisions, Chinese boats (…) discovered frogmen as well as a large quantity of fishing nets and large scale obstacles deployed by the Vietnamese. This poses a security threat for Chinese boats, facilities and personnel as well as for regular navigation safety. Vietnam took the initiative to come to the location to start provocations and cause trouble. This poses a threat to Chinese regular activities and even to the security of the lives of Chinese employees.10 This statement – like others – frames the “Vietnamese attacks” as imminent threat for several reference objects: The Chinese economy (vessels, facilities, activities and personnel), maritime safety (navigation safety) and the security of Chinese individuals (lives of personnel) (mfa 12 May 2014; State Council 9 May 2014). Another important stance in the discourse on the boat collisions was the emphasis on China’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity. Foreign Minister Wang Yi in a statement stated that Vietnam infringed on Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction and violated international agreements related to maritime security (mfa 14 May 2014). Especially the People’s Liberation Army (pla) and the mod tackled the boat collisions through a wider lens by focusing the security situation in the South China Sea in general. One striking example was the May 12 joint press conference of pla Chief of Staff Fang Fenghui and Martin Dempsey, us Army Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a meeting in the Pentagon in Washington. Fang took a very clear position on Vietnam’s alleged attacks. He said that all drilling activities took place on Chinese territorial waters and that no obstruction from foreign countries would be tolerated. “We are neither causing trouble nor are we afraid. We are unflinchingly defending our own sovereignty, security and territorial integrity; we will not lose an inch of the territory our ancestors left behind”11 (Xinhua 16 May 2014). We can find 10 11

10

11

从5月3日到7日短短5天内,越南已经派出35艘各类船只对中方船只进行了171次主动的冲 撞。中方在现场的只有公务船和作业的民船,也就是民 用船只。而越南方面出动的船只 中包括了多艘武装船。在冲撞过程中,中方[…]发现了越方派出的潜水蛙人,越方还在水 中释放了大量 渔网和大型障碍物。这对中国船舶设施和人员构成了安全威胁,也对正常 的航行安全构成了威胁。越方主动到这个海域来进行挑衅和滋事,对中方的正常作业甚 至对中方人员的人身安全构成了威胁。 我们不惹事,但是也不怕事,我们在维护自己的主权、安全和领土完整上是坚定不移的,老 祖宗留下的土地一寸也不能丢!

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this last emphasis on the historical claims of the territorial waters in many articles emphasizing this dimension of national or territorial security. The stance on China’s sovereignty can also be found with other pla officials, often using harsher wordings: For instance, pla General Geng Yansheng states in a mod press conference on May 29: “In this question [of national sovereignty] there is absolutely no room for negotiations; we will not tolerate whatever provocative action”12 (mod 9 May 2014). However, pla officials refrained from launching threats or discussing possible further action. To sum up, the discourse on the boat collision has a clear comprehensive security dimension. The discourse in the first days after the first wave of collisions (around 4 May) focuses on different dimensions which we fashionably define as non-traditional security. This dimension entails threats to economic, individual and maritime security. The predominant communication channels of these threats were the mfa and State Council websites. However, the overall discourse also included notions of national security: Especially pla officials framed the Vietnamese “attacks” as threat to China’s national sovereignty via mod communication channels. These references were predominantly made in in the middle and end of May, shortly before and after the second wave of boat collisions. Both dimensions – one on non-traditional and the other on traditional security – were not intertwined. This points to a coordinated and constructed security discourse, closely aligned between different securitizing actors. Stream 3: Abduction of Fishermen The seizure of the Chinese fishing boat Qiongqionghai 09063 in the waters nearby Half Moon Shoal on 6 May by the Philippine police triggered various responses in China’s official discourse. We can determine different stances between the official and semi-official sources: Whereas semi-official sources responded immediately through news articles and extensive coverage, official institutions did not officially react to the incident until 9 May and remained bland and formal in wording. The government’s first official reaction was made in the mfa’s 9 May press conference when spokeswoman Hua Chunying – after being questioned on several other issues extensively – was asked about the abduction incident. Hua stated that the area around the waters in question indisputably belonged to China and that its embassy demanded that the fishermen be immediately released. She demanded the Philippines to guarantee the safety and property 12

12 […]在这个问题上绝对没有讨价还价的余地,也决不允许任何挑衅行为。

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of Chinese citizens. She further stated that China retained the right to forego further measures (mfa May 9 2014a). Hua’s demand towards the Philippines to guarantee the life and property of Chinese citizens clearly points to an emphasis of an individual security dimension. It is the first of a series of similar references, most of which are made within the fourth discourse streams. Other official reports repeated the notion of an illegal arrest through the Philippine police. The mod website published a report (which was then republished in the People’s Liberation Army Daily) stating that the Philippine’s accusation of “illegal fishing of turtles” would be inverting right and wrong and used as an excuse for illegally entering Chinese territory, seizing the vessel and thus violating international maritime law (mod 13 May 2014). This strategy of referring to international law and its support of China’s argumentation is a strategy which could also be observed in stream 2 (mfa 14 May 2014). Additional to this reference to international law, the discourse repeatedly emphasized that the fishing grounds were “historical waters” in order to legitimize the claim of it being Chinese territory. The mod on 14 May issued a report stating that “(…) Half Moon Shoal is a traditional Chinese fishing spot; fishermen have been fishing here on a regular basis for over 500 years”13 (mod 14 May 2014b). Although the argument of the Philippine police illegally seizing Chinese property is central to this stream, the notion of national sovereignty and territorial integrity – contrary to stream 2 – is not overemphasized. Only one article published on the mod website vividly refers to the Philippines infringing on China’s sovereignty. With a clear reference on the Philippines and its actions within the Spratly Islands, the author states: “No foreign country shall wish for China to make deals with its core interests and to swallow the bitter pill of harming its interests on national sovereignty, security and development”14 (mod 14 May 2014a). Second-layer sources such as Xinhua News Agency or pro-government newspapers, took a different stance on the issue by immediately reporting after the seizure of the vessel and focusing on the fishermen and their circumstances: Xinhua on 7 May released a detailed report on the “abduction” focusing on the victims’ lives, their relatives and the businesses they pursued. The report included pictures of name lists, interviews with the respective fishermen’s association staff as well as a detailed report on the history of fishermen abduction cases by Philippine authorities (Xinhua 7 May 2014). Detailed follow-ups included interviews with scholars assessing the situation and condemning the 13 14

13 (…) 半月礁为中国渔民的传统渔场,500多年来他们一直在此常态化捕鱼。 14 任何外国不要指望中国会拿核心利益做交易,不要指望中国会吞下损害国家主权安全发 展利益的苦果。

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Philippines for its “provocative action” as well as reports on possible prison sentences (Xinhua 8 May 2014; 12 May 2014a). Comparing the basic notions in first and second layer sources, one must say that most Xinhua reports try to deliver a close picture of the fishermen’s circumstances and trigger emotions with the reader. First layer sources complete the picture by delivering “hard facts” and emphasizing that the arrest was illegal and thus took place on Chinese territory. Both layers therefore work hand in hand. Interestingly and contrary to stream 2, there has only been a marginal security discourse. Sources from both layers refrained from using terms like “threat” or “security”. Whenever the incidents were framed as security threat, the focus was drawn both on the national security dimension and the security of the individual fishermen. Also contrary to stream 2 there was no direct reference to the arrests being a threat to China’s economy (i.e. fishing activities) or maritime security (i.e. free passage of fishing boats) within the official discourse. The author argues that this is mainly done to focus on the claim that the waters in question are (and have always been) Chinese territory. Constructing a threat by foreign countries could constitute an infringement on this claim. Stream 4: Protests in Vietnam The protests against China, its economic activities in the South China Sea as well as Chinese enterprises were intensely dealt with in Chinese discourses, both in first and second layer sources. It was by far the most intense of all six streams, both in quantity and in intensity. The discourse was multilayered and multifaceted, with the result that further classification is needed. The discourse can be roughly classified into four sub-streams all of which deal with different notions of the incidents. The first sub-stream started immediately after the first protests erupted on 12 May and includes safety warnings by Chinese embassies. The second sub-stream focuses on detailed reports as well as concise warnings and demands towards Vietnam in order to alleviate the situation. These events took place between 15 and 22 May. The third sub-stream includes detailed follow-ups dealing with implications of the incidents. Those took place mostly between 16 and 18 May. Lastly, the fourth sub-streams deals with Chinese action to help solve the issues in Vietnam and the return of more than 4000 Chinese citizens. Here, most reports were issued between 17 and 21 May. We will now focus on the basic notions and security dimensions of each of these four sub-streams. Safety warnings issued by the Chinese Embassy were published both on the embassy’s website and on other governmental websites. Even in the first warning, the protests were framed as organized by “anti-Chinese forces” and

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directed against Chinese enterprises and their staff (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Vietnam 13 May 2014). The second safety warning already included precise demands to Vietnam: The Vietnamese Public Security Bureau should adopt measures to guarantee the security of the lives of Chinese citizens (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Vietnam 15 May 2014). Interestingly, the respective reference objects are Chinese citizens, not enterprises and their staff. After these initial warnings in the wake of the immediate protests, a different safety notice was issued days later by the Chinese embassy in the Czech Republic. The embassy issued a security reminder for Chinese tourists, Overseas Chinese, Chinese enterprises and organizations and exchange students to pay attention to the security of life and property. This was done due to protests by Vietnamese citizens in Prague (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Czech Republic 21 May 2014). The incidents in the South China Sea herewith reached a global dimension which triggered a wider response by Chinese authorities. This response, however, was short, calm and unemotional. Detailed summaries as well as warnings and demands towards Vietnam made up most of the reports issued on the protests in Vietnam. Most of these reports demand Vietnam to immediately adopt effective measures, appropriately deal with the victims, punish all offenders and compensate Chinese enterprises for all losses (Xinhua 21 May 2014a). Typical wordings with regards to security threats are reflected in the following State Council statement from 16 May: “China demands Vietnam to immediately adopt serious and effective measures, stop all violent activities and ensure the safety of Chinese lives and property as well as Chinese enterprises”15 and “Vietnam must ensure the safety of lives and property of Chinese personnel and organizations”16 (State Council 16 May 2014). Striking in both cases is the coexistence of two security dimensions, that of economic and individual security. Similar wordings can be found in mfa press conference transcripts or a statement by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security (ccp 17 May 2014; mfa 16 May 2014). Only very few articles refer to the dimension of national security. One of these was a blog entry by Luo Yuan, a Chinese author, commentator and Major General with the pla Navy. He stated that a Chinese response to the protests shall “directly attack anti-Chinese elements and steadily defend our national and territorial security”17 (Luo 17 May 2014). Although he refers to China’s national security, 15 16 17

15 16 17

中方郑重要求越方立即采取坚决有效措施,制止一切暴力行为,确保所有在越中国企业和 人员的生命和财产安全。 越方将 [] 保护在越中国人员和机构的生命和财产安全。 既给反华分子以迎头痛击,又维护国家和地区的安全稳定 (…)。

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he still strongly emphasizes the prominence of the individual dimension of security: “Men’s lives come first, no matter which strategies are adopted by diplomacy, no matter whether ‘hard’ or ‘soft’; it must not be at the cost of the lives and property of Chinese [citizens] in Vietnam. As long as we efficiently protect the security of the lives of Chinese in Vietnam, it is good diplomacy”18 (Luo 17 May 2014). Several articles by the State Council and sub-national authorities published around 16 May deal with further implications and effects of the incident and reflect the immediacy of the events. Some articles for instance deal with the following: The Jiangxi Ministry of Commerce reports on the involvement of enterprises and its personnel originating from Jiangxi province. The incidents could be regarded as serious threat to the security of enterprises and the lives and property of their employees (Ministry of Commerce 16 May 2014). Other reports stress the effects of the events on either Vietnamese-Chinese economic cooperation (State Council 18 May 2014) or on Vietnam’s “economic lifeline” (Fujian Province Governmental Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 26 May 2014). Other articles by second-layer sources emphasize further economic implications for certain branches, i.e. the mahogany industry. Also these reports stress the threat to the lives of Chinese citizens and the personnel of Chinese businesses (Zhuzhou News Agency 16 May 2014). Most of these articles dealing with possible effects and consequences have a strong emphasis on economic issues. Likewise, all of these articles entail an economic security dimension. They stress possible threats for Chinese enterprises, their personnel and economic activities. Lastly, the fourth sub-stream deals with official reports and articles scrutinizing Chinese action to help solve the issues in Vietnam. Around 17 May, the government first stated that several government departments were in talks with Vietnamese authorities to assist in ending violent action against Chinese citizens. Two days later, a government task force was sent out to investigate the circumstances of the events and prepare further measures to evacuate Chinese citizens from Vietnam. The mfa emphasizes that “the party and government absolutely cares for the safety of Chinese personnel”19 (mfa 19 May 2014). The evacuation of more than 4000 Chinese citizens via ships and airplanes is fully covered both by Xinhua-affiliated media and in official reports. Both first and second layer articles are supported by pictures of Chinese vessels carrying 18 19

18

人的生命是第一位的,不论我们外交上采取什么手段,不论是“硬”是“软”,都不会以中国在越 人员的生命财产为代价,只要是能有效地保护在越人员的生命财产安全,就是好外交。 19 (…) 中国党和政府十分关心中方人员安危。

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the evacuated personnel waving to coast guard vessels and happily leaving the ships onto Chinese soil (State Council 21 May 2014; Xinhua 21 May 2014b). This extensive coverage of the successful evacuation implies that the government wants to be regarded as a successful securitizer able to counteract immanent security threats. With regard to securitization theory, we can here assess that the successful return of Chinese citizens constitutes the adoption of special and extra-ordinary action which was preceded and pronounced by the speech acts displayed in this stream. Analyzing the speech acts of this fourth discourse stream regarding its security dimensions, we must assess that reports focus on threats on either the security of Chinese citizens or enterprises and their personnel. They therefore tackle the dimension of individual and economic security with the last dimension in number even outnumbering the first. Obvious here are the recurring references to an imminent threat to China’s economic security and the “safety of lives and property of Chinese enterprises and their employees”. Striking within this stream is certainly rather what has not been mentioned instead of that being said. Aside from some exceptions, the discourse did not tackle the dimension of national or territorial security: The government did not frame the incidents as a threat to China’s sovereignty or even to the security of the East Asian region. It is moreover striking that despite the discourse being ­intense and multi-faceted, top-level government officials such as Prime Minister Li Keqiang or President Xi Jinping were not displayed as prominent “speech actors” in the discourse. It was rather led by institutions as the mfa or mod themselves, each represented by the respective spokespersons. To conclude, this fourth stream represents a vivid example of a comprehensive security discourse. Stream 5: The South China Sea Conflict – the Broader Picture Within this heated month of May, the official discourse did not only focus on singular events but also focused on the broader picture and the implications of the crisis in the South China Sea in general. Reports within this last stream can broadly be separated into three different sub-streams: Firstly, China’s role in the conflict; secondly the role of the Association of South East Asian Nations (asean) and thirdly the role of extra-regional actors in the conflict. Discussing China’s role in the conflict, commentators focus on China’s actual behavior and possible further action. In an article published on the mod website, author Du Chaoping emphasizes that China’s government was not causing trouble, but rather calmly and unflinchingly observing other actors’ provocative behavior. While Vietnam and the Philippines would constantly provoke and interfere, China would stick to international norms (here referring to the

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asean-China Declaration of Conduct) and remain calm (mod 14 May 2014b). pla representative Fang Fenghui – interestingly while visiting the usa on 15 May – emphasizes that provocations in the South China Sea did not come from the side of China. Some countries were striving to seize the opportunity to profit while China attempted to establish stability. He explicitly blamed regional actors in causing provocations while being lenient toward the United States (State Council 17 May 2014). In a similar stance, military expert Yao Yunzhu added that in all major regional conflicts it was the “third party factor” that worsens us-Chinese military relations (State Council 17 May 2014). With regard to China’s response to apparent provocations, Chinese officials call for a firm yet peaceful response, as in this comment on the ccp website: “China must firmly respond to provocative behavior which aims at destroying peace and stability in the South China Sea”20 (ccp 12 May 2014). In sum, Chinese officials of all institutions draw the picture of being provoked and attacked by its regional neighbors with China itself responding in a calm, considerate and peaceful way. The State Council even viewed this behavior as a role model for other countries: With regard to the Fourth Conference on Interaction and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Asia (cica) Summit, held in Shanghai on 21 May, the State Council issued a statement claiming that other countries shall listen to “China’s voice” with regard to security issues (State Council 28 May 2014). Communicating a clear picture of China’s assessment of its own behavior, various reports – primarily communicated via Xinhua – also explicitly deal with the role of asean in the conflict: Firstly, a Xinhua report claims that other nations’ behavior leads to a worsening of the situation in the South China Sea and that those nations attempt to “hijack asean”. Individual arrangements between states would harm the process of China-asean integration (Xinhua 15 May 2014). In general, China wishes asean to take a neutral, yet not silent role in the conflict. China’s and asean’s standpoints were neither opposed nor irreconcilable: “As it is a test for China, it is also a test for asean when it comes to how to handle the South China Sea issue”21 (Xinhua 12 May 2014b). It therefore becomes clear that China expects asean to take an impartial, rather passive role. It is interesting to note that reports on asean through first layer communication channels are rather rare. The following statement by the mfa spokesperson from 12 May, however, clearly exemplifies China’s expectations towards asean and its member states (mfa 12 May 2014): 20 21

20 (…) 对破坏南海和平稳定的挑衅行为,中方会果断回应。 21 如何处理好南海问题,既是对中国的考验,也是对东盟的考验。

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The South China Sea issue is not an issue between China and asean. There is a consensus that China and the asean member states collaborate on maintaining peace in the South China Sea. China wishes that all asean member states together continue to effectively implement the “South China Sea Declaration of Conduct” and – in the process of doing this – steadily carry forward the consultation process on the “South China Sea Code of Conduct”. China and the asean member states thereupon keep close contact. At the same time, we hope that respective asean member states can earnestly respect and implement the “asean Declaration of Conduct” and together with China work actively and diligently in order to protect maritime security as well as peace and stability in the South China Sea.22 This statement clearly shows that China is expecting asean to cooperate with China and at the same time the respective member states to respect China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Thirdly, the Chinese discourse on the South China Sea conflict also makes references to extra-regional actors not directly involved in the conflict. Here, especially the United States are perceived as a directly involved actor. mod spokesperson Geng Yansheng sees the “provocations” of countries like Vietnam or the Philippines in the light of the us strategic rebalance towards Asia. He claims that countries heavily relying on the us would continuously attempt to cause trouble and provoke and thus contribute to this originally peaceful and stable situation to becoming turbulent. He therefore urged the United States to approach the issue objectively and avoid encouraging individual countries to cause trouble and provoke (mod 29 May 2014). Saying this, Geng assigns the usa a key position in the conflict. China’s main desire of course is to keep the United States out of the region and out of the conflict. The discourse takes a similar stance towards Japan. After Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo met Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister Vuc Du Dam in Tokyo on 22 May, mfa spokesperson Hong Lei swiftly announced that China does not wish any interference in the conflict. Japan shall stop any provocative behavior and rather contribute to the protection of regional peace and stability (mfa 23 May 2014). As for this fifth stream’s security dimension, we can assess that it rather aims at communicating China’s position in the conflict and its expectations towards external actors. Of course, it entails an implicit security dimension by framing foreign provocations and actions as danger to regional stability and 22

22 (…)

南海问题不是中国与东盟之间的问题。中国和东盟国家就共同努力维护好南海和 平与稳定是有共识的。中方愿意同东盟国家一道,继续全面有效落实《南海各方行为宣

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peace. It, however, refrains from proactively stating threats to certain security dimensions. Stream 6: Continuation and Closure This last stream deals with the security discourse covering the aftermath of the immediate crisis between June 1 and the day of the removal of the 981 oil rig, 16 July. As noted above, the analysis of this last stream also aims at validating whether the discourse was perpetuated after the immediate incidents of May 2014 have ended. While reports on the removal itself did not feature any direct notions on security (mfa 16 July 2014), the period until mid-July sees a continuation of the before-mentioned security discourses, especially right after subsequent incidents which were perceived as continued provocations by claimant states in the South China Sea. In all, this sixth stream can be separated in two sub-streams, one featuring reactions to these incidents, the other one referring to assessments of the general conflict in the South China Sea. Within the first sub-stream the discourse features statements of reactions to incidents which happened either after 1 June (such as the recurring collision  of vessels on 4 June) or refer to incidents which happened during the month of May. These statements share that they all entail a clear security ­notion, albeit referring to different dimensions of security. For instance, mfa spokesman Hong Lei in a press conference on 6 June states that the renewed collisions “seriously threaten the safety of Chinese boats and personnel”23 (mfa 6 June 2014). Hong’s colleague Hua Chunying on 24 June likewise emphasizes that the incidents caused by the Vietnamese had troubled and obstructed regular activities and urged the Vietnamese to immediately withdraw ships and personnel (mfa 24 June 2014). The stance on events of May 2014 is similar: When asked on the violent protests in Vietnam Hong stated on 5 June that the protests “heavily violated Chinese sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction. This endangers the security of Chinese people and facilities (…) and destroys the freedom and security of maritime navigation”24 (mfa 5 June 2014). These statements all share that the reactions to perceived provocations by Vietnam continue to be harsh, direct and reproachful. They can also be seen as continuation of above-mentioned security discourse. 23 24

言》,在此过程中,稳步推进“南海行为准则”磋商进程。中国与东盟国家就此保持着密切 沟通。同时,我们也希望有关东盟国家能够切实尊重和落实好《南海各方行为宣言》,与 中方一道,为维护南海和平稳定和海上安全做出积极努力 (…)。 23 (…) 严重危害中方船只和人员安全。 24 (…) 严重侵犯了中方主权、主权权利和管辖权,危及中方人员和 设施安全,[违反了国际法 和国际关系基本准则],破坏了该海域航行自由与安全。

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The second sub-stream tackles rather the conflict in general and shows a different face compared to statements before 1 June. Questioned on a joint maneuver of the usa and the Philippines on 20 June, Hua Chunying states: “We hope relevant countries in the region will do more to promote national security and mutual trust; this is conducive to safeguarding regional peace and stability”25 (mfa 20 June 2014). In a similar way, Foreign Minister Wang Yi states in an interview with an Indian tv station on 10 June that the overall situation in the South China Sea was stable and peaceful and that China was willing to negotiate through equal consultations and then seek proper solutions to the conflict (mfa 10 June 2014). These stances differ from those which directly condemn claimant states for their apparent provocations in so far as they firstly refer to the South China Sea conflict as a whole, secondly that the wording is calmer and less reproachful and thirdly that they at least point at possible ways to alleviate the tensions. The aftermath of the immediate conflict of May 2014 shows that China in principle decided to continue its before-applied security discourse, at least with regard to condemning provocative action by neighboring states. However, when it comes to the assessment of the general situation of the conflict, we observe clear signs towards an easing of tensions and prospects towards possible solutions – if yet very carefully.

China’s Comprehensive Security Discourse of Spring 2014

All six discourses presented in this paper were security discourses to a certain extent, except for the first discourse dealing with the deployment of the 981 oil rig. The second stream on the collision between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels highlighted the threat boat collisions meant to the security of the Chinese economy, maritime safety and the safety of Chinese individuals. It therefore exemplifies a comprehensive security discourse. It furthermore constitutes a vivid example of a security discourse that is deliberately constructed to frame the collisions as active and willful provocation of the Vietnamese government. The third stream on the arrest of Chinese fishermen by the Philippine police entails less a security dimension than in the previous stream, but still emphasizes the threat the arrest poses for China’s national security and the security of Chinese citizens. The fourth and most intense stream on the protests in Vietnam focuses on threats to Chinese enterprises, its personnel and Chinese 25

25 []我们希望有关国家多做促进本地区国家安全互信,有利于维护地区和平稳定的事情。

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Figure 10.1  Different types of discourses for the period 1 May to 1 June 2014 (own graph)26

citizens in general. Also, we can here assess a comprehensive security dimension. The fifth stream rather aims at framing China’s position in the conflict and the actions of other claimants and actors. Here, notions of security only play a secondary role. The sixth and last stream proves that the security discourse assessed in the previous streams continued after the immediate incidents had ended. Looking at the entire period of analysis we can assess: Most discourse streams tackle a variety of security threats which we can summarize as a comprehensive security discourse with a strong focus on the dimension of “individual” security. This is also exemplified by the number of single findings for each wording or unit of meaning (see Figure 10.1). Here we can determine that 26

This quantitative survey aimed to uncover trends of distribution of different security dimensions. To achieve this, first an explorative approach was taken: Certain compound words or units of meanings with reference to security were extracted and grouped into five clusters of security (security of citizens, economic security, maritime security, energy security and national security). These references were then searched for in the context of the May 2014 events for first layer sources for the period 1 May to 1 June, the period of immediate events within the spring 2014 crisis. Figure  10.1 therefore depicts all references on security made for each security cluster, covering all streams mentioned above. Please note that only those compound words which refer to findings are depicted in Figure  10.1. For instance, five terms were searched for in the case of national security (national security 国家安全, regional security 地区安全, territorial security 领土安全, territorial security 国土安全 and security of our country 我国安全), but only one wording within this cluster (national security 国家安全) showed relevant findings.

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most references to the terms security or safety focused on notions of individual and economic security. Here, the wordings “security of life and property of Chinese”, “security of Chinese citizens” and “security of Chinese personnel” dominated. The third cluster extracted from the discourses focused maritime security. Surprisingly, direct references to energy security and national security were very low. Apparently, national security and energy security were not part of the visible discourse. How can this best be described, especially with China historically claiming to safeguard its territorial integrity and sovereignty (Wang 2011)? The author attempts to give two explanations: Firstly, this quantitative compilation of data omits wordings that frame the national security dimension in other terms. There are many examples for references to the conflict posing a threat to China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty without directly stating the terms security or safety (mod 14 May 2014b; State Council 28 May 2014; Xinhua 16 May 2014). Secondly, in many of the discourse streams stated before the reference to national security is already implicit and taken for granted. Or in other terms: Chinese officials intentionally refrain from referring to national security as the respective territory in question (for example the Spratly Islands fishing grounds) were claimed by China anyway. Had China overemphasized this notion of sovereignty and territorial integrity, it would put this claim into question. These two reasons lead to the conclusion that the cluster of national security is in fact part of the comprehensive security discourse applied by Chinese officials and institutions. Despite being able to detect a clear and distinct security discourse for the entirety of the events, I argue that this discourse does not constitute a dominant discourse. This is firstly because the discourse was not led on the highest levels of politics. Most of the official statements, reports and articles were issued by the mfa, mod and State Council with the first preferring press conferences, the latter two using reports or articles as their preferred means of communication. The press conferences were mostly held by spokespersons. With only few exceptions, references to the South China Sea conflict in general and the security situation in detail were never made by high-ranking leaders and officials. For instance, President Xi Jinping never made any statements with regard to the conflict within the given time frame and communication channels. However, he did comment on the security situation in Asia several times, without directly referring to the conflict itself (ccp 22 May 2014). The only high-rank government official attending a press conference was Foreign Minister Wang Yi when being questioned on the protests in Vietnam on 15 May (State Council 16 May 2014). I argue that the discourse was intentionally displayed to be led by the ministries and their respective spokespersons in order

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to not appear as to be of highest priority or – in other words – to “downplay” the discourse. The key securitizer therefore is still – as Swaine puts it – a collective leadership “(…) centered on a party-based, oligarchic, consensus-driven structure” (Swaine 2012, p. 10). Secondly, the discourse on the spring 2014 events in the South China Sea did not take a prominent position in foreign policy and security discourses in China within the given time frame. Reports focusing on other aspects of security in different regions outweighed the South China Sea discourse both in number and intensity. Especially the East China Sea conflict provoked a more intense security discourse with harsher wordings and heightened priority for instance in press conferences. The issue of internet security was likewise discussed very prominently – especially through semi-official channels. Both discourses entailed harsher wordings with regard to security threats: One example is the recurring reference to a “serious threat”27 in both discourses (i.e. mod 17 May 2014; Xinhua 26 May 2014). This harsh stance was only seldom used in the spring 2014 event discourses. To sum up, for the time of spring 2014 we can observe a moderate yet existing security discourse focusing multiple dimensions of security with an emphasis on the socio-economic dimension and (rather implicitly) the traditional security dimension. We can assess that the securitizer (in this case the Chinese government or leading officials) is not necessarily the discourse leader (rather specific ministries and their spokesperson as well as commentators and Xinhua journalists). This points to a downplayed and at the same time wellconstructed security discourse which aims at firstly pronouncing securitizing acts (such as the return of citizens to China), secondly promoting China’s claims and position in the South China Sea both to a Chinese and external target audience and thirdly emphasizing the notion of comprehensive security, a concept which is key to China’s understanding of security since the mid-2000s.

Conclusion: Embedding the Security Discourse into China’s Security Framework in the South China Sea

What does this moderate security discourse now mean with regard to the security framework in the South China Sea until spring 2014? This section will first discuss China’s overall strategy in the South China Sea, then elaborate on the 26

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country’s understanding of security in the Asia-Pacific and finally answer the research questions raised in the introductory part. China’s behavior in the South China Sea conflict in spring 2014 has been labeled aggressive, assertive or provocative by many observers (i.e. Pedrozo 2014; Voice of America 2014). I rather argue that the Chinese government follows a coordinated strategy with the overall aim of increasing its power in the region and keeping extra-regional powers from intervening. Beijing overall refrains from efforts at conflict resolution and regularly engages in assertive action which is often perceived as provocative and excessive. Only occasionally China converges with its neighbors, i.e. by intensifying diplomatic ties with Vietnam in October 2014 or with Japan during the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (apec) summit in November 2014 (Thayer 2014; The Economist 2014). Fravel summarizes this dual strategy as follows: “China’s emphasis on consolidation and deterrence seeks to maintain the status quo in terms of the control of contested features while strengthening China’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over the waters it claims” (Fravel 2011, p. 313). This strategy is backed by Beijing’s understanding of security. The government clearly emphasizes in respective white papers that it still strongly believes that military action might be necessary if the country’s security was in danger: “We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will surely counterattack if attacked” (State Council 2013). It also makes clear that it will safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity whenever it sees the necessity to do so. However, China’s understanding to security is not limited to these notions of traditional security: It clearly understands that traditional and nontraditional security are interwoven (Liu 2008) and that it therefore needs to react adequately to both traditional and non-traditional security threats by “(…) (f)ormulating the concept of comprehensive security and effectively conducting military operations other than war” (State Council 2013). This concept has been applied by China since the late 1990s and entails the notions of military, political, economic, environmental, energy, resource and finance security (Ong 2002, pp. 18–31; State Council 2006). With this security strategy at the back of one’s mind, we can assess that the Chinese discourse on the spring 2014 events does not form an exception with regard to its security dimensions, but also concerning intensity and wordings. To answer the research questions and conclude: We can observe a security discourse that does not deviate from China’s current understanding of security and that only partially “securitizes” the spring 2014 events in order to prepare or justify further action. The only act of securitization observed was the successful return of Chinese citizens from Vietnam. Rather, the discourse can be understood as narrated continuation of China’s current security understanding

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and as clear message to both Chinese citizens and foreign actors: On the one hand China will not retreat from its claims in the South China Sea and is willing to continuously reference on that both through action and word. On the other hand, China reserves the right to frame the discourse autonomously and – without foreign interference – exert the decisive power over discursive practice in the South China Sea. Bibliography28 Balzacq, Thierry (2005): “The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context.” European Journal of International Relations, 11(2), 171–201. Buzan, Barry (1991): “New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century.” International Affairs, 67(3), 431–451. Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, and de Wilde, Jaap (1998): Security: a new framework for analysis. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cable News Network (CNN) (2014): “How an oil rig sparked anti-China riots in Vietnam.” 19 May. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/19/world/asia/china-vietnam -islands-oil-rig-explainer/. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) (2014): “China-Vietnam Tensions High  over Drilling Rig in Disputed Waters.” 7 May. Available at: http://csis.org/ publication/critical-questions-china-vietnam-tensions-high-over-drilling-rig -disputed-waters. Da Nang Today (2014): “China’s oil rig violates Viet Nam’s sovereignty.” 8 May. Available at: http://baodanang.vn/english/politics/201405/chinas-oil-rig-violates-viet-nams -sovereignty-2326938/. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Vietnam (2014a): “Reminder for Chinese enterprises, organizations and personnel in Vietnam to pay attention to the security of life and property.” [“提醒在越南中资机构和人员注意人身财产安全.”] 13 May. Available at: http://vn.china-embassy.org/chn/lsyw/t1155617.htm. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Vietnam (2014b): “Special notice: Renewed reminder for Chinese citizens in Vietnam to pay attention to the safety of life and property.” [“特别提示:再次提醒在越南中国公民注意人身财产安全.”] 15 May. Available at: http://vn.china-embassy.org/chn/lsxx/t1156169.htm. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Czech Republic (2014): “The (Chinese) Embassy at the Czech Republic reminds Chinese citizens travelling the Czech Republic to pay attention to security.” [“驻捷克使馆提醒旅捷克中国公民注意安全.”] 21 May. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/fuwu/2014-05/21/content_2683529.htm. 28

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Fravel, M. Taylor (2011): “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 33(3), 292–319. Fujian Province Governmental Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (2014): “China returns 3860 enterprise employees home after Vietnamese bandits’ riots and looting – ­China demands Vietnam to compensate all losses.” [“越南暴徒打砸抢烧中国接回3860 名企业员工 中方要求越南赔偿一切损失.”] 26 May. Available at: http://www.fjqw.gov .cn/hqwh/hrsj/201405/t20140526_60452.htm. George, Jim (1994): Discourses of global politics: a critical (re)introduction to international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Howarth, David and Stavrakakis, Yannis (2000): “Introducing discourse theory and political analysis.” In: Howarth, David, Norval, Aletta J. and Stavrakakis, Yannis (Eds.): Discourse theory and political analysis – Identities, hegemonies and social change. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1–23. Hsiung, James C. (2004): Comprehensive Security: Challenge for Pacific Asia. Indianapolis: University of Indianapolis Press. Ives, Mike and Fuller, Thomas (2014): “Anger Grows in Vietnam Over Dispute With China.” New York Times, 14 May. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/ world/asia/anger-grows-in-vietnam-over-dispute-with-china.html. Liu, Xuecheng (2008): “The formation of an Asian-Pacific security framework and China’s diplomacy in Asia.” [“形成中的亚太安全架构与中国的亚洲外交.”] Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, 6, 83–94. Luo, Yuan (2014): “Jointly against a common enemy, defend foreign disgrace together.” [“同仇敌忾,共御外侮.”] 17 May. Available at: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_ 549c1d970101itmt.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) – People’s Republic of China (2014): “The MAF responses to the withdrawal of the 981 oil drilling platform from the Paracel Islands: Unrelated to external factors.” [“外交部回应981钻井平台撤离西沙:与外 部因素无关.”] 16 July. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-07/16/c _126761715.htm. MFA (2014a): “On June 5 MFA Spokesperson Hong Lei holds a routine press conference.” [“2014年6月5日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会.”] 5 June. Available at: http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedz/chn/fyrth/t1162553.htm. MFA (2014b): “The MFA answers questions on the 70th commemoration ceremony of the landing in the Normandy in the Second World War and more.” [“外交部就 二战诺曼底登陆70周年纪念仪式等答问.”] 6 June. Available at: http://news.sina.com .cn/c/2014-06-06/193730309872.shtml. MFA (2014c): “The Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi gives an exclusive interview to the Indian TV station CNN-IBN.” [“王毅外长接受印度CNN-IBN电视台专访.”] 10 June. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1164161.shtml.

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MFA (2014d): “The MFA answers questions on the visit of the President of Myanmar and the Vice-President of India as well as related issues.” [“外交部就缅甸总统 和印度副总统访华有关情况答问.”] 20 June. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-06/20/content_2705308.htm. MFA (2014e): “The spokesperson of the MFA answers questions on video footage released by Vietnam showing boat collisions in the South China Sea.” [“外交部发言 人就越南公布南海撞船视频等问题答问.”] 24 June. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/ xinwen/2014-06/24/content_2707480.htm. MFA (2014f): “On May 6 MFA Spokesperson Hua Chunying holds a routine press conference.” [“2014年5月6日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会.”] 6 May. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn//wjdt_611265/fyrbt_611275/t1153069.shtml. MFA (2014g): “On May 9 MFA Spokesperson Hua Chunying holds a routine press conference.” [“2014年5月9日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会.”] 9 May. Available at: http://www.chinaembassy.at/chn/wjbfyrth/t1154410.htm. MFA (2014h): “MFA Spokesman: Vietnam interfered with our ships 171 times within five days.” [“外交部官员:越南5天内171次冲撞我国船只.”] 9 May. Available at: http://news .sina.com.cn/c/2014-05-09/015930089473.shtml. MFA (2014i): “On May 12 MFA Spokesperson Hua Chunying holds a routine press conference.” [“2014年5月12日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会.”] 12 may. Available at: http://ml.china-embassy.org/chn/fyrth/t1155040.htm. MFA (2014j): “On May 14 MFA Spokesperson Hua Chunying holds a routine press conference.” [“2014年5月14日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会.”] 14 May. Available at: http://www.chinaembassy.at/chn/wjbfyrth/t1155978.htm. MFA (2014k): “On May 16 MFA Spokesperson Hua Chunying holds a routine press conference.” [“2014年5月16日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会.”] 16 May. Available at: http://fm.china-embassy.org/chn/fyrth/t1156836.htm. MFA (2014l): “On May 19 MFA Spokesperson Hong Lei holds a routine press conference.” [“2014年5月19日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会.”] 19 May. Available at: http:// gn.china-embassy.org/chn/fyrth/t1157357.htm. MFA (2014m): “On May 23 MFA Spokesperson Hong Lei holds a routine press conference.” [“2014年5月23日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会.”] 23 May. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cglagos/chn/xwfb/fyrth/t1159051.htm. Ministry of Commerce – People’s Republic of China (2014): “Our office reminds Jiangxi enterprises investing and cooperating with Vietnam to increase attention to security.” [“我厅提醒我省对越南投资合作企业加强安全防范.”] 16 May. Available at: http:// www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/difang/jiangxi/201405/20140500590337.shtml. Ministry of National Defense (MOD) – People’s Republic of China (2014): “Who is destroying peace and order in the South China Sea?” [“谁在破坏南海和平秩序.”] 13 May. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.cn/intl/2014-05/13/content_4508440.htm.

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MOD (2014a): “Expert: The Philippines shall better not hope for China to swallow bitter fruits.” [“专家:菲律宾别指望中国会吞苦果.”] 14 May. Available at: http://www.mod.gov .cn/intl/2014-05/14/content_4508700.htm. MOD (2014b): “China firmly sticks back provocations in the South China Sea – we are neither causing trouble nor are we afraid.” [“中国坚定反击南海挑衅 不惹事 也不怕事.”] 14 May. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.cn/intl/2014-05/14/content_ 4508900.htm. MOD (2014c): “Lifting the ban on collective self-defense, Japan will undoubtedly destroy regional peace.” [“日本解禁集体自卫权势必破坏地区和平.”] 17 May. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.cn/opinion/2014-05/17/content_4509407.htm. MOD (2014d): “Ministry of Defense: China holds conclusive evidence of dangerous action by Japanese aircrafts.” [“国防部:中方掌握日军机危险行为确凿证据.”] 29 May. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2014-05/29/content_4515908.htm. Mullany, Gerry (2014): “Philippines Jails Chinese Sailors in Fish Dispute” New York Times, 10 May. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/world/asia/ raising-stakes-in-fight-with-china-philippines-jails-fishermen.html. Nadoll, Jörg (2000): “Diskursanalyse und Außenpolitikforschung.” PAFE-Arbeitspapier 2 (University of Trier). News of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (2014): “Wang Hailou: The South China Sea problem is testing ASEAN.” [“望海楼:南海问题考验东盟.”] 12 May. Available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0512/c78779-25004980.html. News of the CPC (2014a): “Guo Shengkun demands Vietnam to guarantee the safety of life and property of Chinese enterprises and personnel in Vietnam.” [“郭声琨要求 越方确保我在越企业和人员生命财产安全.”] 17 May. Available at: http://cpc.people.com .cn/n/2014/0517/c64094-25029996.html. News of the CPC (2014b): “The implications of Xi Jinping’s six proverbs on security at the ‘Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia’.” [“习 近平亚信峰会谈安全“六引谚语”寓深意.”] 22 May. Available at: http://cpc.people.com .cn/n/2014/0522/c241220-25052606.html. Ong, Russell (2002): China’s security interests in the post-cold war era. New York City: Routledge. Pedrozo, Raul (2014): “Stop China’s Unlawful ‘Great Wall’ in the South China Sea.” The National Interest, 3 September. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/ feature/stop-china%E2%80%99s-unlawful-great-wall%E2%80%9D-the-south -china-sea-11182. State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (2006): “China’s National Defense in 2006.” 29 December. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ china/2006-12/29/content_771191.htm. State Council of the PRC (2013): “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.” 16 April. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013 -04/16/c_132312681.htm.

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State Council of the PRC (2014a): [“China demands Vietnam to stop interference of whatever form concerning the activities of Chinese enterprises.” “中方要求 越方停止对中方企业作业任何形式干扰.”] 9 May. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/ xinwen/2014-05/09/content_2675983.htm. State Council of the PRC (2014b): “China puts forward solemn protest after Chinese enterprises were severly attacked in Vietnam.” [“中方就中国在越企业遭严重暴力 袭击提出严正抗议.”] 16 May. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-05/16/ content_2680470.htm. State Council of the PRC (2014c): “Reach a consensus, extend contacts and settle concerns: Deciphering People’s Liberation Army’s Chief of Staff visit to the USA.” [“达 成共识 广泛接触 妥处干扰-解读解放军总参谋长访美.”] 17 May. Available at: http://www .gov.cn/xinwen/2014-05/17/content_2681148.htm. State Council of the PRC (2014d): “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman: China stops projects on bilateral contacts with Vietnam” [“外交部发言人:中方暂停与越南 部分双边交往计划.”] 18 May. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-05/18/ content_2681583.htm. State Council of the PRC (2014e): “The passenger ship returning Chinese personnel from Vietnam has safely reached Haikou.” [“赴越接返中方人员客轮全部安全抵达海 口.”] 21 May Available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-05/21/content_2683372 .htm. State Council of the PRC (2014f): “China’s “host diplomacy” at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia attempts to unravel the security dilemma in Asia.” [“亚信峰会中国“主场外交” 尝试破解亚洲安全困局.”] 28 May. Available at: http://www.chinanews.com/hb/2014/05-22/6199435.shtml. Storey, Ian (2014): The South China Sea Dispute: How Geopolitics Impedes Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management. Paper presented at the FLACSO-ISA conference: Global and Regional Powers in a Changing World. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 23–25 July. Swaine, Michael D. (2012): “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy.” China Leadership Monitor, 36, 1–17. Taylor, Brendan (2014): “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint.” The Washington Quarterly, 37(1), 99–111. Thayer, Carl A. (2014): “China-Vietnam Defense Hotline Agreed: What Next?” The Diplomat, 20 October. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/china-vietnam -defense-hotline-agreed-what-next/. The Economist (2014): “Bridge over troubled water – The APEC summit and the Pacific rim.” 15 November. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21632452 -weeks-summit-beijing-helped-great-power-rivalry-still-threatens-pacific-bridge. Voice of America (2014): “Kerry: China’s Oil Rig in South China Sea ‘Provocative’.” 13 May. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/kerry-chinas-oil-rig-in-south -china-sea-provocative/1913329.html.

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Wang, Jisi (2011): “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way.” Foreign Affairs, 90(2), 68–79. Xinhua (2014a): “Family members of eleven fishermen from Qionghai in Hainan impatiently hope for their relatives to return home soon.” [“海南琼海11名渔民家属心 急如焚盼亲人早归.”] 7 May. Available at: http://www.hq.xinhuanet.com/news/2014 -05/07/c_1110586251.htm. Xinhua (2014b): “The Philippines have repeatedly disturbed Chinese fishermen – Scholar implores to firmly respond to these dirty methods.” [“菲多次骚扰中国渔民 学者吁坚决回应此下三滥做法.”] 8 May. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ mil/2014-05/08/c_126474193.htm. Xinhua (2014c): “Eleven fishermen from China will today stand trial in the Philippines – facing prison terms of up to 20 years.” [“中国11名渔民今日将在菲受审 刑期最长可达20 年.”] 12 May. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2014-05/12/c_126486969 .htm. Xinhua (2014d): “The South China Sea problem is testing ASEAN – it needs to take a neutral, yet not silent role.” [“南海问题考验东盟 需拿捏好“中立但不沉默”的尺度.”] 12 May. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-05/12/c_1110634664.htm. Xinhua (2014e): “The South China Sea ‘has fever’: Who intends to kidnap ASEAN?” [“南海 “发烧”,谁在意图绑架东盟?”] 15 May. Available at: http://www.xj.xinhuanet .com/2014-05/15/c_1110699590.htm. Xinhua (2014f): “Fang Fenghui talks on the East China Sea and South China Sea: We will not lose an inch of the territory our ancestors left behind.” [“房峰辉谈东海南 海:祖宗土地一寸不能丢.”] 16 May. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2014 -05/16/c_1110731533.htm. Xinhua (2014g): “China demands Vietnam to stop violent actions and compensate all losses.” [“中方要求越南制止暴力行为 赔偿一切损失.”] 21 May. Available at: http://www .js.xinhuanet.com/2014-05/21/c_1110790807.htm. Xinhua (2014h): “China demands Vietnam to compensate all losses of Chinese enterprises and individuals.” [“中方要求越南赔偿中国企业和个人一切损失.”] 21 May. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2014-05/21/c_126527999.htm. Xinhua (2014i): “The USA monitors citizens globally – a serious threat for internet security of all countries.” [“美国监控全球民众　严重威胁世界各国网络安全.”] 26 May. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-05/26/c_1110863655.htm. Zhuzhou News Agency (2014): “The true reasons for the rapidly falling market price of Vietnamese mahogany.” [“越南红木市场价格急剧下滑的真正原因.”] 16 May. Available at: http://www.zznews.gov.cn/news/2014/0516/10485.html.

Conclusion Mária Strašáková and Alfred Gerstl Borders still matter in Southeast Asia. Due to growing traditional and nontraditional threats measures to protect the national borders increased – despite the deepening of regional integration in Southeast Asia. As the contributions in this edited volume demonstrate, most borders were drawn – more or less – artificially by the Western Colonial powers. “Land boundaries were constituted sooner than maritime ones purely for the practical needs of colonial powers (…)”, argues Petra Andělová (p. 29). They were primarily constructed from a maritime perspective, as the Westerners arrived from the sea and were primarily interested in trade, as she highlights. Despite their alien character, the Western concept of borders, sovereignty and territorial integrity have been accepted and form, together with non-interference in domestic affairs and consensual decision-making, the key principles of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) since its establishment in 1967. Nevertheless, some land and maritime borders are still contested. Embedded in a general discussion on borders and boundaries (Petra Andělová) as well as maritime spaces (Padraig Lysaght), this volume analyzed three major territorial and border disputes in detail: the Preah Vihear temple dispute between Thailand and Cambodia; the Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island dispute, involving Vietnam and Cambodia; and the South China Sea (scs) dispute, contested among the six claimants Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The authors highlighted similarities, but also differences: Each border dispute involves (at least) one great or middle power and one or more small powers. Non-regional actors are involved in the first (Internationial Court of Justice) and the third dispute (China, Taiwan, us, Japan, India, Australia, the Permanent Court of Arbitration and others). In all cases, the contributors have emphasized the considerable influence of domestic power logics and nationalism – in addition to global and regional developments, notably China’s rise and its geostrategic rivalry with the United States. There are several reasons for the failure to resolve these disputes. First, despite proposing a number of initiatives to lower tensions concerning border disputes in general, the national and asean initiatives have met with mixed success. Secondly, asean has kept a low profile in all these disputes. This is due to asean’s principle of not intervening in domestic affairs, but also the lack of strong consensus among the asean members which stems from their national interests and stakes in the conflicts. Thirdly, asean’s unity has also been ­weakened by the Sino-US rivalry in the region, as its members cannot © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004312180_013

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find a consensus on the role of the two major powers in the region. As was discussed in the previous chapters, countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines have welcomed the us presence, on the other hand, other members of the Association are concerned that the growing us role could generate friction with China and destabilize the region even further, for instance the TransPacific Partnership (tpp) agreement. In general, however, the majority of the Southeast Asian nations seem to wish reliable security relations with Washington and economic relations with Beijing and therefore promote a hedging strategy. Due to asean’s lack of unity Filip Kraus is pessimistic in regard to the resolution of the ongoing border disputes. He is critical of asean’s performance and capability to deal with territorial disputes in general. Richard Q. Turcsányi and Zdeněk Kříž emphasize that even though asean is usually not regarded as forum to resolve disputes among its members, there exist provisions in its treaties and in particular the dispute settlement mechanism of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (tac). asean’s failure, however, they claim is not least due to domestic interests of the involved member states and their unwillingness to engage asean. Kraus also puts the finger on another main reason for asean’s shortcomings in regard to dispute management and settlement: The border disputes have “a common denominator – nationalistic sentiments exacerbated by imagined nationally relevant economic or territorial interests that replaced political ideologies as the main resource of political legitimacy and power at the end of the Cold War” (p. 77). Turcsányi, Kříž and Mária Strašáková support this view: In their case studies on Preah Vihear temple and Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island nationalism as well as domestic and party interests play an inglorious role in aggravating the territorial disputes. Strašáková examines the current anti-Vietnamese sentiments among political actors in Cambodia, but also highlights the troubled historic Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. The small Cambodian nation traditionally fears a “loss of territory”, as it is militarily much weaker than its big neighbours Thailand and Vietnam. To protect its territory is regarded as a question of survival. However, as Strašáková concludes, a return of the island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) to Cambodia seems unrealistic, as Vietnam effectively controls the island for more than 150 years. While Turcsányi and Kříž criticize asean’s low profile in managing the dispute of two of its members, they highlight the role of the International Court of Justice (icj). However, they also stress that the icj’s decision has yet to be implemented by the Thai and Cambodian governments. Theoretically, international arbitration is also a possible path for resolving the South China Sea dispute. Yet, as Beijing’s harsh reaction to Manila’s involvement of the Permanent

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Court of Arbitration in January 2013 demonstrates, a resolution of territorial disputes solely based on international law is neither realistic nor sufficient. Required is a political consensus – and the will to make compromises. To build trust and engage in confidence-building measures is a first step in this process. As Alica Kizeková shows, asean has been successful in integrating China in the multilateral regional architecture through a three-stage developmental process in the 1990s. This process proved as a win-win situation, because the People’s Republic of China (prc) was adamant to diminish the “China threat”. Despite many multilateral asean-China channels, in case of the South China Sea, though, Beijing was in general less cooperative and more assertive. Nevertheless, Kizeková argues: “asean’s role is to make sure that the dialogue with China continues and the claimant states consult other asean members should they decide to solve their disputes with China via an international dispute-settlement mechanism. Otherwise their actions could undermine the organization’s efforts to engage China on the regional code of conduct” (p. 160). A concrete collaboration agreement was the Joint Seismic Maritime Undertaking (jmsu) between China, the Philippines and Vietnam (2004–2008). Truong-Minh Vu stresses that the asean-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (doc) of 2002 has facilitated this confidencebuilding measure. At this time, the prc was willing to stick to the rules of the game. In 2008, though, the jsmu was not renewed, due to severe criticism in the two Southeast Asian nations. According to Vu, one reason was Beijing’s failure to exercise strategic restraint and create an accepted multilateral concept for joint development of the region, rather it opted for going it alone. The asymmetric power relations between China and the Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea are also the focus of Padraig Lysaght’s contribution. He utilizes a historic perspective to analyze China’s current behavior in the South China Sea. For him, “the South China Sea has always been and remains until today in the matter of its borders a subject to hegemony and the projection of power” (p. 180). Lysaght also embeds China’s territorial claims in the broader analysis of China’s conception of maritime space. It includes the notions of “historic waters” and simple hegemonic power. He concludes: “What concrete actions and results will arise from the South China Sea conflict is still unclear – but it is likely that they will set precedence for a new way of thinking about and handling maritime borders in general” (p. 180). Similar to other contributions in this volume, Kizeková points out that the required rules and institutions for dispute settlement are in place, most of them created and sponsored by asean, notably the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the asean Regional Forum (arf). Yet, there remains a lack of trust and strong national interests that do not necessarily overlap with the

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common asean interests. asean has nevertheless dealt with the South China Sea since 1992. As Alfred Gerstl demonstrates, asean has since 1992 continously and consistently addressed the dispute, notaby the asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (amm). Since 2014 both the amm and the asean Summit use a stronger wording to qualify the situation in the South China Sea as a threat to regional security and stability. Reading the asean statements in the context of asean’s and Indonesia’s active attempts to promote a consensus on the south china sea since the failure of the amm meeting in Cambodia in 2012, asean’s discourse can be qualified as securitization process, argues Gerstl. However, it remains open whether this new wording is sufficient to convince Vietnam and the Philippines to pursue their South China Sea strategies inside rather than outside asean. In his contribution Truong-Minh Vu points out the logic behind Hanoi’s and Manila’s internationalization strategies. He warns: “If China continues to increase its capabilities but is unwilling to bind itself under legal and political frameworks in the South China Sea, a classic ‘security dilemma’ will arise within the Southeast Asian region. Other countries in the region will have to choose to follow self-help principles of either depending on their own capabilities for security by increasing their military budgets or seeking strategic cooperation with security guarantors as a hedge against growing Chinese power” (p. 244–245). It is in other words China’s behavior in the South China Sea as well as the overarching geopolitical Sino-American rivalry in East Asia that has forced the small and middle powers in Southeast Asia, but also Japan, India and Australia to adjust their policies. While the Philippines and Vietnam increased their economic and security collaboration notably with the us, Japan, India and Australia to counterbalance China, smaller nations such as Laos (the asean chair of 2016), Cambodia and even Brunei seem to bandwagon with Beijing. As Filip Kraus’ chapter demonstrated, especially Cambodia, a major recipient of Chinese loans and investments, has been perceived as a Trojan horse, having the capacity to undermine the unity of asean. This has been demonstrated in July 2012 during Cambodia’s asean chairmanship, when it strove to keep the issue of the South China Sea of the formal agenda. As a consequence, asean failed to issue a final communiqué and Cambodia was accused of promoting China’s interests before those of asean (Storey 2013, p. 41). In May 2016 Brunei, Cambodia and Laos agreed in a common statement with China that the South China Sea dispute is not a matter between asean and China and should not affect their relations (Kundu 2016). Therefore, as the latest developments in the South China Sea have shown so far, firstly, the Southeast Asian states have not been capable of forming a united front vis-à-vis China. Secondly, it was exactly Beijing’s overtly pressure

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on then asean chair Cambodia in 2012 that initiated Indonesia’s mediation efforts to sponsor a common asean position on the dispute. Moreover, both the Philippines and Vietnam increased their internationalization attempts of the dispute due to China’s unwillingness to engage in multilateral dispute management efforts. Thus, Beijing’s intransigence has nolens volens led to a further internationalization and militarization of the dispute. Jörg Thiele and Josef Falko Loher examine one of the most severe incidents in the South China Sea in the last decade: the temporary deployment of the Chinese oil rig HYSY-981 in 2014. China’s behavior, Thiele claims, “is congruent to an increasingly confident great power” (p. 268). Thiele analyzes the dispute from the Vietnamese point of view. His suggestion: “(…) Vietnam should continue its efforts of enmeshment but should also consider the geopolitical and geo-economic interest of other states. Here, reaching out to India and Japan makes much sense. Certainly, enmeshment will always include the risk of harming Hanoi’s relations with Beijing, which is one reason why Vietnam (…) should continue its path of military modernization” (p. 269). In his brief analysis of Hanoi’s security discourse in 2014/15, Gerstl showed its consistency. Vietnam’s government has securitized its dispute with China both in a stronger and more comprehensive manner than asean and China, regarding national, economic, maritime and regional security as threatened. Loher also highlights the consistency of China’s discourse on the oil rig incident which he embeds in Beijing’s overall security discourse since the 1990s: Military action is legitimate for the prc, if the nation’s security is endangered. Loher claims that “the Chinese government follows a coordinated strategy with the overall aim of increasing its power in the region and keeping extraregional powers from intervening. Beijing overall refrains from efforts at conflict resolution and regularly engages in assertive action which is often ­perceived as provocative and excessive” (p. 300). Both contributions emphasize the high degree of consistency of asean’s and China’s discourse over the years, underlying the importance of listening to politicians and diplomats in order to reveal the narrative behind their words and deeds and get insights into the planned future policies. In analyzing the concrete reasons for the border disputes, their historic roots and proposed resolution mechanisms, the many different case studies of this book draw a comprehensive picture of selected, complex ongoing land and sea territorial disputes in Southeast Asia and the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as well as external and domestic players therein. It is exactly this complexity of events and actors in Southeast Asia that gives reason to be simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic in regard to the peaceful future of the region.

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Bibliography Kundu, Sampa (2016): “China divides ASEAN in the South China Sea.” East Asia Forum, 21 May. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/21/china -divides-asean-in-the-south-china-sea/. Accessed at 29 May 2016. Storey, Ian (2013): “The South China Sea Dispute: Background, Recent Developments and Future Prognosis.” In Andělová Petra and Strašáková Maria: South China Sea Dispute in International Relations. Prague: Metropolitan University Press, 20–47.

Index Abe, Shinzo 295 Abhisit Vejjajiva 62 Africa 5 Agreement on Vietnam-Laos Border Statutes 54 Air Defense Identification Zone (adiz) 191, 280n1 Andaman Sea 33 Angkor Thom 48 Angkor Wat 48, 50 Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1824) 29, 29n7 Anglo-Siamese Treaty 26 Annam 55, 115n3, 116 Aquino, Benigno 209, 239, 240, 260 Arabian Sea 11 arf Concept Paper 151 asean 1–9, 12, 14–17, 30, 34, 47, 63n29, 69, 70n38, 71–77, 83–85, 95–105, 134, 143–148, 150–160, 183–185, 188, 192–205, 207–210, 212–214, 232, 235, 236, 238, 239, 242, 244, 245, 267, 293–295, 307–311 asean Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanism 99 asean Charter 98–104 asean, Bangkok Declaration 96–97 asean-10 12, 194, 195, 198, 203, 204, 212 asean-China Declaration of Conduct on the Parties in the South China Sea (doc) 9, 10, 15, 70n37, 159, 160, 183, 237, 239, 293–295 asean Community 1, 98n4, 104, 105 asean conflict resolution mechanisms 95–99 asean Declaration on the South China Sea (Manila Declaration, 1992) 156, 157, 183, 196, 198, 199 asean Declaration on the South China Sea (with China, 2002) 9, 15, 145, 159, 183, 190, 199, 200, 206, 232, 244, 253, 309 asean Defence Ministers´ Meeting (admm) 194n4 asean Foreign Ministers´ Meeting (amm) 15, 69, 151, 184, 194–214, 310 asean Institute of Strategic International Studies (asean-isis) 143, 150

asean Ministerial Meeting (Foreign Ministers) (see also amm) 73, 74, 159, 184, 193 asean-China Joint Working Group (jwg) 159, 160, 242 asean-China, Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity 9 asean Policies in the South China Sea dispute 203–205 asean Regional Forum (arf) 4, 15, 144, 144n4, 147, 150–158, 184, 188, 192–2013 309 asean Plus Three (apt) 5, 188 asean Post-Ministerial Conference (asean-pmc) 150 asean Political-Security Community (apsc) 98 asean Summit 9, 15, 73, 74n40, 93, 184, 192–212, 238, 310 asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (tac) 3, 4, 72, 98, 147, 159, 188, 196, 205, 238, 239, 308 asean Way 3, 12, 83, 144, 144n3, 199, 213 Asia and Pacific Council (aspa) 96 Asia-Europe Meeting (asem) 188 Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998) 4, 9, 96, 104, 158 Asian Relations Conference (arc) 95 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec) 300 Asia-Pacific 72, 101, 149, 150, 153, 204, 263, 300 Association of Southeast Asia (asa) 96 Australia 6, 10, 96, 150, 151, 195, 210, 259n10, 265, 267, 307, 310 Bach Long Vi Island 8 Balancing 16, 256 hard balancing 14, 145, 148, 149 institutional balancing 149 soft balancing 14–15, 143–160 Bali (Concord) 72 Bandung process 96 Bandwagoning 256, 257, 259, 265 Bantam Island 34

314 Bangkok 96, 143n, 151 Bantam Island 34 Battambang 47, 48, 48n3 Beijing 5–9, 11, 15–17, 52, 74, 75, 144–146, 150, 152, 156–160, 183–185, 187–192, 198, 202–210, 213, 232, 233, 238, 240, 243, 252–255, 260, 263–265, 268, 269, 278, 300, 308–311 Binh Duong 253 Black Flag forces 48 Bonne map 49, 53, 55, 135 Borneo 3, 26, 29, 30 Borders 1–3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 22, 25, 26, 28–38, 48, 49, 52, 54n, 55, 58, 59, 66n, 68, 69, 76, 77, 85, 86, 88, 92, 102, 111–136, 168, 169, 174, 176, 178, 180, 267, 307, 309 Boundary 2, 3, 8, 10, 13, 21, 22, 25, 28–30, 34, 36, 38, 54, 55, 58, 59, 65, 66, 66n35, 111, 113, 117, 120, 127 Land boundary 5, 54, 66, 67, 88 Maritime boundary 24, 60, 67–69, 113, 116, 120, 122–124, 127, 136 Brévié Brévié Jules 116 Brévié Line 68, 113, 116–119, 122–124, 127, 128, 135, 136 British Malaya 32 British Petroleum (bp) 261, 265 Brussels 207 Buck-passing 256, 258 Cairo Peace Conference 186 Cam Ranh Bay 11, 266 Cambodia 1, 4, 14, 28, 32, 34, 39, 47–77, 83–104, 110–138, 203–206, 238, 254n4, 307, 308, 310, 311 1982 Agreement on Historic Waters 127, 136 2005 Supplementary Treaty 128–129 Anti-Vietnamese sentiments 115, 127, 130, 133, 134, 137, 308 Cambodian Peoples´ Party (cpp) 58, 64, 75, 75n41, 126, 128, 131, 134, 135 Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam (rvn) relations 308 Cambodia-Thailand Preah Vihear dispute 85–95 Cambodia-Thailand relations 83–105 Cambodia-Thailand, Memorandum of Understanding on the Area of the

Index Overlapping Maritime Claims to the Continental Shelf 67 Cambodia-Thailand, Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land Boundary 59, 88 Cambodia-Vietnam borders 76, 110–138 Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Border Committee 132 Cambodia-Vietnam maritime disputes 66–69 Cambodia-Vietnam relations 47–50, 110–138 Maritime Claims to the Continental Shelf 67 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 132 National Assembly 58, 65, 129 National Rescue Party (cnrp) 130, 131 Supreme National Council on Border Affairs 58, 126, 127 Treaty on the Delimitation of the State Border of 1985 125n, 129, 135, 137 Cameron, David 133 Can Tho 253 Canada 150, 151, 153 Canberra 151 Cape of Lemling 66 Celebes Sea 34, 38 Changi Island 34 Channa Samudvanija 65 Charles I 23 Chiang Kai-shek 5, 186 China 1, 4–17, 26, 32–39, 46, 49, 52, 52, 54n15, 69–75, 84, 96, 101, 110, 134, 143–160, 169, 170, 172, 174, 175, 177, 179, 180, 183–214, 231–245, 250–269, 278, 279, 281–299, 300–301, 307–311 Disputes 1, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 32, 34–37, 46, 70, 70n38, 72–76 Charm offensive 259–262, 266 Cabbage strategy 191 Central Committee 207 Century of humiliation 52 Communist Party of China (cpc) 282 Comprehensive security discourse 279, 293, 297–299 Defense white paper 152 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 196 China and Laos, boundary 36

Index Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 7, 156, 188, 198 Marine Surveillance Force 189 Maritime claims 4, 5, 7, 10, 17, 155, 156, 160, 186, 187, 190–192, 254n, 262n, 295, 299–301, 309 Maritime Safety Agency 285 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mofa) 252n, 255, 261n15, 281, 282, 285, 286, 288, 291–298 Ministry of National Defense (mod)  282, 285, 287–289, 293, 295, 298 China-Myanmar, Border Treaty 36 China National Offshore Oil Company (cnooc) 188, 203, 207, 231, 237, 250, 262n16, 282, 284, 285, 286n10 National People´s Congress 156, 156n9 Peoples´ Liberation Army (pla) 287, 288, 291, 293 People´s Republic of China (prc) 1, 4, 46, 184, 309 Republic of China (Taiwan) 1, 5, 22, 39n15, 52, 73n39, 149, 153, 154, 169, 169n2, 177, 179 Salami-slicing tactic 11, 261, 264 State Council 282, 288, 291, 292, 294, 298 China Threat 9, 147, 152, 154, 156, 159, 172, 183, 186, 188, 190n2, 191, 194n4, 207, 250, 253, 254, 284, 307, 309 U-line map 186, 190 China-Vietnam relations 8, 206–209, 250–269 China-Vietnam, Agreement on Fishing Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin 9 China-Vietnam, Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin 9 China-Vietnam, Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century 9, 35 China-Vietnam, Land Border Treaty 35 Chinese Coast Guard 204n11, 262n17 Clinton, Hillary 195 Cloma, Tomás 186 Cochinchina 47, 50, 55, 115n3, 116, 132 Code of Conduct (coc) 8, 9, 70, 70n37, 183, 188, 196, 197, 199–201, 208, 238, 239, 242 Cold War 4, 7, 13, 46, 51–56, 76, 77, 111, 143, 145, 148, 158, 187, 265, 308

315 Colombo Powers grouping 96 Colonialism 2, 6, 12, 13, 21, 23–32, 38, 46, 47–55, 59, 60, 64, 66, 75, 77, 117 Conference on Interaction and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Asia (cica)  144n2, 294 Confidence Building Measures (cbm) 12, 151–152, 189, 201 ConocoPhillips 261 Constructivism 15, 184, 192, 279, 280 Contiguous zone 24, 113, 122, 123, 171, 188, 251 Continental shelf 8, 33, 63, 67, 70n, 113, 119, 120, 122, 123, 170, 172, 252, 252n, 253, 255, 263 Copenhagen School 15, 184, 192, 193, 196, 203, 213, 280 Council for Security Cooperation in the AsiaPacific (cscap) 4, 143, 144, 147, 150–154 Da Nang 47, 253, 285 Dangrek 59, 86 de Behaine, Pigneau 116 Del Rosario, Albert 240, 243 Delimitation 3, 24, 26, 31, 49, 53–56, 59, 68, 72, 95, 113, 122, 124–128, 136–138, 252n2 Dempsey, Martin 287 Deng Xiaoping 146, 231, 263 Democratic Kampuchea (dk) 55, 120–125 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (drv) 53n10, 55, 117, 117n6, 118, 119, 121 Dong Nai 253 Du Chaoping 285, 293 East Asia Summit (eas) 5, 9, 188 East China Sea 191, 263 East China Sea (Peace) Initiative 22, 39, 39n, East China Sea conflict 299 East Timor see Timor Leste Eleven-dash-line (map) 169n2, 179 England 2, 23, 138 English School of International Relations 176 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (edca) 211 Enmeshment 11, 16, 256, 259, 265–269, 311 Equidistance line 136, 172 Europe 1, 2, 22, 23, 26–30, 64, 101, 172, 174, 175, 180, 207

316 European Union (eu) 1, 83, 150, 195, 235 Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) 8, 9, 10, 16, 38, 67, 113, 157, 171, 172, 185, 188, 189, 203, 207, 241, 250, 252n2, 253–255, 263, 268, 284 Fang Fenghui 254, 287, 293 Fiery Cross Reef 11, 171n4, 191 France 2, 27, 47, 48, 48n1, 49, 51, 53, 55, 59, 64, 66, 66n33, 66n34, 66n35, 85, 86, 101, 102, 117n6, 133, 173, 177, 186 France-Siam, Boundary Treaty (1904) 29, 48, 48n2, 86, 87, 92, 102 Franco-Siamese “War” (1893) 48, 51 Franco-Siamese treaty of 1907 66, 66n33 Franco-Thai War (1940–41) 48 Fish(eries) 22, 31, 69, 113, 171, 178, 186, 236 Fishing 6, 8, 31, 35, 67, 155, 189, 191, 268, 284, 286, 288–290, 298 Freedom of navigation 7, 10, 11, 192, 193, 195, 200–203, 208, 283 Frontier 13, 21–39, 53, 56, 59, 60, 64, 66, 68n36, 124, 125, 176 Gas 6, 7, 8, 31, 35, 67, 68, 69, 114, 169n1, 185, 186, 187, 203, 210, 241, 253, 261, 265, 266 natural gas 5, 6, 69 Geneva 24 Geneva Conference 117, 118 Geng Yansheng 287 Georgia scenario 11 Gia Long 116 Golden Triangle 26, 32, 36–37 Golok River 33 Government of Vietnam (GoV) 57, 153, 207n14, 208, 237, 253, 297 Great Britain 51, 136 Guangzhou Wan 26 Gulf of Thailand 2, 14, 67, 68, 112, 113–117, 119, 120, 137 Gulf of Tonkin 8, 9, 169n2, 243, 267 Ha Tien 113, 116 Ha Tinh 253 Hainan 10, 35, 186, 189, 191, 207, 241, 251, 253 Hanoi 4, 7, 8, 16, 48, 53n12, 56, 58, 70, 73, 75, 99, 119, 121, 127–129, 134, 184, 185, 187, 188, 197, 200, 203, 205–210, 213, 240, 251,

Index 252n3, 253–256, 259, 260n13, 261n15, 262, 264–269, 310, 311 Hedging 11, 147, 205, 308 Helsinki Process 152 Heng Samrin 56, 123, 124, 126 Historic Waters 15, 68, 69, 113, 124, 136, 172, 174, 175, 180, 309 Ho Chi Minh 117, 117n6 Ho Chi Minh Trail 26, 119 Ho Xuan Son 252 Holland, Francois 133 Holy Roman Empire 23, 28 Hong Kong 52 Hong Lei 243, 295, 296 Hong Sok Hour 133 Hor Namhong 73 Hu Jintao 73 Hua Chunying 285, 288, 296 hysy-981 16, 154, 207, 250–269, 278, 281, 282, 284, 285–286, 286n10, 296, 297, 311 Ieng Sary 121 Impeccable Incident 10, 11 India 2, 6, 10, 39, 96, 101, 185, 194, 195, 210, 213, 241, 259n10, 261, 264–269, 307, 310, 311 Indian Ocean 5, 266 Indochina 2, 26, 32, 34n11, 47–51, 55, 58, 66, 86, 94, 115–118, 124 Indonesia 5, 34, 37, 75, 84, 95, 99–102, 136, 145, 150, 155, 156, 172, 188, 205n12, 250, 310, 311 Claims 43, 84 Indonesia and Malaysia, dispute 3, 29 Indonesia and Singapore, dispute 34 Innenpolitik 112, 233, 234 International Cooperation Committee 101 International Court of Justice (icj) 14, 33, 34, 60, 68, 85, 86–95, 100, 101, 103, 104, 133, 136, 168, 173, 308 International Crisis Group (icg) 35, 89, 184, 241, 255 International Relations (ir) 23, 83, 176, 193, 194, 211, 232, 258, 259, 267, 279 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) 68, 173, 209, 243 Internationalization 12, 47, 73, 74, 74n40, 77, 184, 185, 191, 192, 203, 205, 206–214, 261, 265, 310, 311 Itu Aba (Taiping Island) 186

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Index Jakarta 3, 147, 155, 204n10 Japan 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 22, 48, 86, 101, 117, 150, 151, 158, 172, 177, 180, 185–187, 195, 210–213, 231, 253, 262, 266–269, 295, 300, 307, 310, 311 Ji Guoxing 239 Johnson Reef 251, 171n4, 187, 191, 237n4 Joint development 16, 67, 68, 69, 95, 231–246, 309 Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (jmsu) 10, 189, 232, 233, 235, 235n3, 236–240, 309 Kalayaan 240 Kampuchea Krom 56, 114, 132 Kampuchea, People´s Republic of 56, 123–125, 135 Kaohsiung 5 Kem Sokha 110, 130 Keo Sikha Kiri Svara Pagoda 62 Kerry, John 254 Khmer Empire 47, 85, 112, 114 Khmer People´s National Liberation Front (kpnlf) 126 Khmer Rouge (kr) 4, 50, 56, 57, 66, 77, 94, 111, 120–123, 137, 206 Khmer Youth Federation of Patriots 131 Kien Giang 113, 124 Koh Kut (also Kut Island) 66, 67, 120n8 Konfrontasi 3, 29 Korea 200 North, Democratic People's Republic of 195 South, Republic of 5, 6, 101, 158, 207, 253, 262 Kuala Lumpur 9, 150, 204n11 Kunyu Wanguo Quantu (map) 15, 179, 180 Laem Chabang 5 Laos 4, 26, 32, 33, 34, 36, 47–59, 72, 76, 95, 115n3, 156, 204, 205n12, 310 Laos-Myanmar agreement 33 Laotian Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone 36 Le Hoai Trung 255 Li Keqiang 207, 293 Li Zhizao 179, 179n13 Ligitan Island 34, 136 Lon Nol 50, 56, 56n17

Luang Prabang 48n1, 48n4 Luzon 6 Ma Keqing 240 Mac Cuu 116 Macclesfield Bank 5, 33, 35, 35n12, 37, 190n2 Malacca 6, 11, 26, 29n7, 250 Malaysia 1, 3, 5, 6, 11, 29, 30, 32–34, 37–39, 75, 84, 95, 112, 113, 136, 145, 145n6, 148, 150, 155, 158, 196, 172, 179, 183, 190, 191, 196, 198, 199, 204, 205, 244, 245, 250, 253, 259n10, 262, 265, 307 Mandala 2, 23 Mandate of Heaven 2 Manila 3, 5, 8, 156, 157, 160, 183–189, 203, 205, 208n17, 209, 211, 213, 243, 308, 310 maphilindo 96 Marcos, Ferdinand E. 30 Maritime Silk Road 266 Marty, Louis 49n6, 50 Mekong 25, 36, 47, 48n2, 114, 114n2, 118 Memorandum of Understanding (mou) 59, 61, 63, 67, 88, 92, 148 Middle East 5, 149 Mindanao 38, 84 Ming Dynasty 179 Minh Mang 114 Ministerial Conference on Economic Development of Southeast Asia (mcedsea) 96 Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao) 8, 9, 157, 158, 160, 188, 191, 189 Mixed Franco-Siamese Commission (on border demarcation) 86 Moscow 206, 265, 266, 266n18 Multilateralism 144, 150, 190, 212 Multitrack diplomacy 143–161 Myanmar 4, 11, 21, 33, 36–37, 72, 84, 95, 196, 197, 199, 204, 205 Myanmar-Thailand, Joint Boundary Committee 33 Myanmar-Thailand, Regional Border Committee 33 Myanmar Army Southeast Division 33

318 National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (nlf) 118, 119 National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (funcinpec) 126, 129 Nationalism 3, 10, 14, 46, 49–51, 54, 62, 67, 75, 76, 103, 111, 112, 115, 133, 307, 308 Nay Pyi Taw 207 Neang Sokhu 131 Neorealism 256 defensive neorealism 258 offensive neorealism 258 Netherlands 2, 173, 210 New Delhi 266 Ngo Dinh Diem 118 Nguyen Dynasty 116 Lords 116 Nguyen Dy Nien 239 Nguyen Phu Trong 131 Nguyen Phuc Anh 116 Nguyen Sinh Hung 131 Nguyen Tan Dung 207, 255 Nine-Dash Line 13, 165, 169, 169n2, 167, 171, 172, 175, 177, 190, 209, 209n18, 243, 262 Noppadon Pattama 61, 64 Norodom Ranariddh 57, 58, 127, 128 Norodom Sihamoni 75n42, 129n10 Norodom Sihanouk 55, 57, 58, 117, 117n5, 118, 119, 126, 137 Obama, Barack 133 Official Development Assistance (oda) 73, 233, 234 Oil 5–7, 8, 11, 16, 31, 35, 67–69, 114, 119, 120, 158, 160, 169n1, 184–189, 192, 203, 207–210, 213, 236, 240, 241, 250–255, 261, 263, 265–269, 278, 281, 282, 284–286, 296, 297, 311 One China Policy 52, 73n39 ongc Videsh 261, 266, 267 Opium War 52 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce) 152, 195 Pacific Basin Economic Council (pbec) 96 Palawan 5, 157, 188, 241 Palmas (Miangas) Island 38 Paracel Islands 7, 11, 35, 169, 172, 177, 180, 185–187, 190n2, 206, 254n6, 255, 283, 285

Index Paris 57, 119 Paris Peace Accords/Agreements 57, 128, 187 Party of Democratic Kampuchea (pdk) 57, 126 Pathet Lao 51, 53 Pattani Malays 33 Pax Sinica 177 Peace of Westphalia 23 People’s Alliance for Democracy (pad) 61, 61, 64 Perez, Vincente 239 Permanent Court of Arbitration (pca) 37, 38, 160, 173, 190, 203, 209, 243, 254, 269, 307, 308 Persian Gulf 11 Pham Binh Minh 192, 252, 254, 284 Pham Van Dong 124, 130 Phan Hien 119, 122 Phay Siphan 130 Philippines 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 37, 38, 70n38, 73, 74, 77, 84, 95, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 155, 157–160, 169, 172, 173, 176, 183, 185, 187–189, 191, 197, 198, 203–205, 210, 211, 123, 231–234, 236, 237, 239–245, 250, 295–263, 267, 269, 288, 289, 293, 295, 296, 307–311 Philippine National Oil Company (pnoc) 231, 237 Phnom Penh 9, 50n7, 56, 57, 69, 73, 74, 75, 95, 110, 115n4, 118, 120–124, 127, 130–133, 184, 203, 238 Phra Viharn see Preah Vihear Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island 2, 14, 68n36, 69, 110–138, 307, 308 Pnom-Krevanh 66 Pol Pot 121 Port Kelang 5 Portugal 2, 24 Poulo Wai 120, 121, 124 Pratas Islands 5, 190 Prayut Chan-o-cha 93 Preah Vihear 1, 2, 12, 14, 43, 59–68, 71–73, 76, 83–105, 133, 308 Preventive diplomacy 151, 155, 160 Qian Qichen 156, 157 Ramos, Fidel 8, 157 Realism 279

Index institutional realism 149 Regional integration 2, 46, 69, 77, 83, 95, 307 Regionalism 5 Riau Island Province 34 Ricci, Mateo 15, 179, 180 Roman Catholic Church 23 Romulo, Alberto 239 Rong Chhun 110, 130 Russia 6, 77, 96, 147, 195, 210, 259n10, 264, 265, 266, 266n18, 267 Sabah 3, 30, 37, 84 Saigon 47, 55, 56, 187 Sam Rainsy 57, 58, 66, 70, 75n41, 127–130, 132, 137 Sam Rainsy Party (srp) 7, 70, 127, 129, 129n10, 137 Samak Sundaravej 61, 88 Samak government 64, 65 San Francisco Conference 177 Peace Treaty 186 Sansha (City) 35, 35n12, 37, 191, 261 Sarawak 29 Sarit Thanarat 91 Scarborough Reef (Shoal) 169, 189, 190n2, 203, 241, 242, 243, 260 Sea lines of communication (sloc) 5, 6, 250, 263 Second Indochina War 117 Securitization 15, 192, 193, 196, 198, 199, 208, 210, 212, 213, 279–281, 292, 301, 310 Security dilemma 244, 256, 256n8, 257, 310 Senior Officials Meeting (som) 158, 159, 194n4 Service Geographique de l’Indochine (sgi) 49, 55, 56, 56n16 Severino, Rodolfo C. 99 Shatterbelt 31–32 Shenzhen 5 Siam 27, 29, 47–51, 59, 66, 67, 85–87, 102 Siam Pang 48 Siam Reap 47, 48n3 Sihanoukville 118, 119 Singapore 2, 5, 11, 30, 32, 34, 39, 84, 95, 99, 145, 148, 151, 155, 156, 172, 188, 204, 205n12, 207, 253, 284 Sino-Vietnamese debate (1919–1923) 49 Sipadan Island 34, 136 Sisosphon 48

319 Somchai Wongsawat 62 South China Sea (scs) 1, 4–12, 14–16, 26, 32, 33, 35–37, 39, 46, 47, 69–70, 72–74, 84, 100, 112–114, 145, 147, 178, 153–160, 168–180, 183–214, 231, 232, 236, 243, 250–260, 263–269, 278, 279, 281–285, 287, 290, 291, 293–301, 307, 309, 310 Southeast Asia (sea) 1–8, 10–14, 16, 17, 21–33, 38, 39, 46, 47, 64, 65, 69, 71, 72, 76, 83, 83n1, 85, 95, 96, 111, 112, 143, 147, 155, 157, 159, 192, 201, 231–324, 239–245, 256, 258, 260n11, 261, 263, 266, 269, 307–311 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (seato) 95, 148 Sovereignty 1–6, 10, 22–28, 35, 37, 38, 51, 51n9, 52, 60, 62, 63, 72, 85, 87, 89, 90, 93, 95, 96, 103, 115, 118, 119, 120, 123, 129, 136, 145n5, 155, 155n8, 159, 170, 174n8, 177, 178, 186–190, 194, 196, 207, 208, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 252, 255, 265, 284, 287–289, 293, 296, 298, 300, 307 Soviet Union 4, 143, 146, 187 Spain 2, 24, 173 Speech act 15, 16, 184, 192, 193, 195, 197, 199, 200, 203, 208, 208n15, 209, 212, 213, 280, 281, 282, 282n4, 282n6, 293 Spratly Islands 7, 10, 11, 31, 32, 35, 36–37, 155, 169, 170, 172, 176, 180, 185–188, 190n2, 191, 206, 208, 236, 237, 240, 243, 289, 298 ss Mayaguez 121 Sulu Sultanate 37 Sun Guoxiang 240 Ta Krabey Temple 34 Taipei 73n39, 186 Taiwan see China, Republic of Taiwan Strait 6, 188 Tanjung Pelepas 5 Tanjungpriok 5 Temple of the Emerald Buddha 64 Territorial Sea 24, 66, 113, 122, 123, 125, 128, 136, 188 Terrorism 1, 30, 184, 231, 259n10 Thai 48, 50, 51, 72, 73, 112, 308 Thai Army 33, 62, Thai nationalism 51, 51n9 Thai-Cambodia borders 1, 14, 34, 55, 58–59, 59–66, 77 Thai-Laos borders 34

320 Thailand 1, 5, 11, 14, 27, 32, 33, 33n10, 34, 36, 48, 49, 55, 57, 59–69, 76, 111, 112, 113, 145, 148, 155, 156, 204, 205n12, 308 Democrat Party 61, 62 National Anti-Corruption Commission (nacc) 61 Thai-Cambodian Joint Commission on Demarcation for Land Boundary 88 Thailand – Malaysia, land and maritime border 33–34 Thailand-Cambodia, dispute 34, 83–105, 307 Thailand-Laos, land and maritime border 34 Thaksin Shinawatra 59, 92, 93 Thalweg (principle) 54n13, 56n19, 58n20, 135, 135n11 The Hague 38, 160, 189, 243 Thirty Years War (1618–1648) 23 Tho Chu Island (also known as Paolo Panjang, or Koh Krachak Ses in Khmer)  121, 124, 131 Tiananmen incident 144, 188 Tibet 36, 52 Timor Leste 23, 30 Tit Sothea 130 Tokyo 5, 267, 295 Tonkin 35, 48, 115n3 Tran Duy Hai 252 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (tpp) 308 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (tac) 3, 4, 72, 98, 96, 104, 147, 159, 188, 196, 196n6, 205, 232, 238, 239, 308, 309 Treaty of Hue 48 Treaty of Zaragoza 24 Trojan horse 69, 134, 310 Truong Tan Sang 131, 241, 264 Trust-building measures (tbms) 151, 152, 153 Tu Duc 47, 48 Um Sam An 133 Ung Huot 127 United Kingdom 133, 259n10, 265 United Nations 4, 24, 83n3, 99, 128, 133, 150, 159, 160, 169, 187, 253, 255 un Charter 96, 196 un Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs) 10, 190, 250, 263

Index un Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) 7, 8, 11, 24, 31n9, 37, 70n37, 73, 111, 119, 128, 135, 136, 159, 160, 168–174, 176, 178, 185, 189, 190, 191, 197, 199, 200, 201, 203, 208, 209, 213, 250, 252n2, 255 un Conventional Arms Register 151 un Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (unesco) 60, 62, 64, 65, 88, 92, 93, 94, 101, 103 un Permanent Court 37, 38, 160, 173, 203, 209, 254, 269, 307, 308 unesco World Heritage site 60, 64, 68 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (untac) 111, 137 un Security Council 63, 99, 100, 101 United States of America (us) 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 38, 65, 71, 118, 143, 144, 148, 172, 173, 175, 188, 193, 195, 210, 252n3, 254n6, 258, 259, 259n10, 262–269, 284, 294, 295, 307 Creston Energy Corporation 8, 188 Pivot Policy 11 Policy toward China 11, 148, 149 us Pacific Command (pacom) 268 us-Taiwan policy 149, 188 Uti possedetis (principle) 53 Vanguard Bank 188, 240 Vienna 179, 207, 207n14 Vietnam 1, 2, 4–11, 14, 16, 17, 23, 24, 28, 30, 32, 34–35, 37, 73n17, 39, 47–59, 66–71, 73, 75–77, 84, 88, 94, 95, 99, 100, 110–138, 145, 154, 155, 156, 158, 160, 169, 172, 176, 177, 178, 183–192, 198, 203–214, 231, 231n3, 232, 233, 234, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 250–269, 278, 280, 281, 282n6, 283–288, 290–293, 295–297, 299–301, 307–311 Anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam 251, 253, 254 China´s deployment of Hai Yang Shi You (hysy 981) oil rig 11, 16, 35, 154, 207, 210, 250–259, 261–264, 267–269, 278, 281, 282, 284, 285–286, 297, 311 Coast Guard 207, 210, 251, 253, 255, 268 Communist Party of Vietnam (vcp) 253, 255, 264, 269 Democratic Republic of (drv), also North Vietnam 55, 117, 117n6, 119, 121 Enmeshment strategy 16, 259, 265, 266, 268, 269, 311

321

Index National Boundary Commission 252 Republic of Vietnam (rov) also South Vietnam 7, 55, 56, 56n17, 119, 120, 186, 187, 237n4 Southern march 114, 114n2 Speech act 208, 208n15, 209 Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (Petro Vietnam) 232 Vietnam People’s Army 56 Vietnamese Foreign Ministry 240, 241 Vietnam War, also Second Indochina War (1964–1975) 117, 118, 119, 187 Vietnam-China Joint Steering Committee 255, 260n12 Vietnam-Laos border 53, 54 Vietnam-Laos relations 52–55 Visiting forces agreement 148 Wang Ying-fan 155 Wanli Emperor 179 Washington 16, 48, 143, 184, 186, 187, 189, 192, 205, 209n18, 211, 254, 262, 263, 265, 266n18, 268, 287, 308

Wen Jiabao 73, 74 Woody Island 35, 187, 191, 261 World War ii (ww ii) (also Second World War) 2, 3, 23, 24, 48, 50, 51, 54, 86, 117, 185, 234 Xi Jinping 74, 263, 293, 298 Xinjiang 52 Xisha Islands 35n12, 156, 188, 190n2, 251, 252n2 Yang Jiechi 147n8, 252 Yim Sovann 130 Yingluck Shinawatra 90, 92 Zhong Wentao 179 Zhongjian Island 251 Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (Zopff/C) 242