Unplanned Wars: The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars 3110155648, 9783110155648

Table of contents :
Abbreviations
Maps
Prologue
I. Before
1. The Romans and the Carthaginians
2. Two treaties, and one fake
3. Pyrrhus’ war
II. Preparations for War?
1. Post-Pyrrhic consolidations
2. Plans for a war?
3. The Romans and Sicily
III. The Mamertine Appeal
1. Difficulties with dates
2. The ungrateful Mamertines
IV. Debating the Appeal
1. The Mamertines’ deditio
2. The Romans’ debates
3. The Roman war-aims in 264
4. Course of the debates
5. Time-span of the debates
V. The Punic-Syracusan Alliance
1. Messana vacated
2. Alliance of old foes
VI. An Unwanted War
1. Appius at the straits: discrepant sources
2. Appius’ offer of talks
3. The sea-fight and aftermath
4. Crossing to Messana
5. Appius in battle
VII. Escalation
1. Ap. Claudius against Syracuse
2. Valerius and Otacilius against Syracuse
3. Valerius in the west
VIII. From Enmity to Goodwill
1. Wartime talks
2. The peace of Lutatius
3. A season of goodwill
4. Family politics in the 230s and 220s?
IX. The Rape of Sardinia
1. How it was done
2. Why it was done
X. Imaginary Confrontations in the 230s
1. Fictional clashes
2. Envoys to Hamilcar?
XI. Hasdrubal’s Accord
1. The Barcid ascendancy
2. The accord with Hasdrubal: date
3. The accord: arguments about content
4. The aim of the accord: competing views
XII. Saguntum
1. Friendship or alliance?
2. The Saguntine connexion: date
3. Saguntines in crisis
4. The Saguntines’ neighbours
5. Saguntines request arbitration
6. The Romans arbitrate
XIII. Hannibal and the Ambassadors
1. The embassy of 220: aims
2. Disputed datings
3. The Roman démarche
4. The ambassadors at Carthage
XIV. Saguntum Besieged
1. The Saguntines on their own
2. The Romans in debate
XV. War to Save Face
1. The ultimatum
2. Could the embassy declare war?
3. Roman envoys to Punic senate
4. Punic senate to Roman envoys
5. War declared
6. From diplomacy to warfare, 218 B.C.
XVI. Conclusions
1. A Roman expansionist war?
2. Punic plans and prospects
3. Punic wars and Roman imperialism
4. Avoidable wars?
XVII. The Major Sources
1. Lost accounts
2. Surviving sources
3. Bias and inaccuracies the problem of Polybius
4. Problems with the later sources
Bibliography
Index I. Names and Topics
Index II. Passages Cited

Citation preview

Β. D. Hoyos Unplanned Wars

w DE

G

Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte Herausgegeben von Winfried Bühler, Peter Herrmann und Otto Zwierlein

Band 50

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 1998

Unplanned Wars The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars by

B. D. Hoyos

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York

1998

® Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Data

Hoyos, Β. D. (Β. Dexter), 1994Unplanned wars : the origins of the First and Second Punic Wars / von B. D. Hoyos. p. cm. — (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte ; Bd. 50) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 3-11-015564-8 1. Punic War, 1st, 264-241 B. C. - Causes. 2. Punic War, 2nd, 218-201 B. C. - Causes. I. Title. II. Series. DG243.2.H69 1998 937'.04-dc21 97-39785 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek — Cataloging in Publication Data Hoyos, Β. Dexter: Unplanned wars : the origins of the first and second Punic wars / von B. D. Hoyos. - Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter, 1997 (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte ; Bd. 50) ISBN 3-11-015564-8

© Copyright 1997 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printed in Germany Printing: W Hildebrand, Berlin Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin

Jannae Camillaeque carissimis meis

Preface The question of why the First and Second Punic Wars occurred illustrates, perhaps more starkly than any other in ancient history, the interdependence of historical and historiographical analyses. Documentary evidence — inscriptions, coins, papyri — is sparse, the literary sources variegated and often excerpted, or fragmentary. Literary and historiographical assumptions, even generalisations, thus often colour judgements both of particular issues and of general ones. This work seeks to explain the origins of both wars as objectively as possible; and necessarily also to assess the quality of the ancient sources on the topic. Modern studies are numerous and full of contrasts, while tending to concentrate on the origins of one or the other war, or dealing relatively briefly with both. A third aim therefore is to survey, succinctly but comprehensively, modern scholarship in this field. It is a very pleasant task to acknowledge the help and encouragement that I have received over this work. The University of Sydney and the Australian Academy of the Humanities in Canberra have made its publication possible through generous funding grants. The interest and support over many years of my colleagues in Classics, Archaeology and Ancient History, and of the Faculty of Arts at Sydney, has been invaluable. I owe a particular debt to my colleague Terry Roberts, who voluntarily compiled the Index of Passages Cited. A good part of my research was carried out on periodic visits to the Haverfield Library of Ancient History in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, whose unfailing helpfulness to scholarly visitors is greatly appreciated. In turn, the prompt and friendly guidance of my publishers, W. de Gruyter & Co., in the preparation of the formatted text has been invaluable. Finally but very importantly, I would like to acknowledge the understanding and support of my wife Jann and daughter Camilla throughout my long and often unsociable labours on this study. To them it is now dedicated. Sydney: August 1997

B.D.H.

Contents Abbreviations

xiii

Maps

XV

Prologue I.

Before 1. 2. 3.

1 264 The Romans and the Carthaginians Two treaties, and one fake Pyrrhus' war

5 5 7 11

II.

Preparations for War? 1. Post-Pyrrhic consolidations 2. Plans for a war? 3. The Romans and Sicily

17 19 28

III.

The Mamertine Appeal 1. Difficulties with dates 2. The ungrateful Mamertines

33 40

IV.

Debating the Appeal 1. The Mamertines' deditio 2. The Romans' debates 3. The Roman war-aims in 264 4. Course of the debates 5. Time-span of the debates

47 51 53 57 64

V.

VI.

The Punic-Syracusan Alliance 1. Messana vacated 2. Alliance of old foes An Unwanted War 1. Appius at the straits: discrepant sources 2. Appius' offer of talks 3. The sea-fight and aftermath 4. Crossing to Messana 5. Appius in battle

67 73 82 86 88 91 93

17

33

47

67

82

χ VII.

Contents Escalation 1. Αρ. Claudius against Syracuse 2. Valerius and Otacilius against Syracuse 3. Valerius in the west

VIII. From Enmity to Goodwill 1. Wartime talks 2. The peace of Lutatius 3. A season of goodwill 4. Family politics in the 230s and 220s?

100 100 104 108 116 118

123 127

IX. The Rape of Sardinia 1. How it was done 2. Why it was done

140

X. Imaginary Confrontations in the 230s 1. Fictional clashes 2. Envoys to Hamilcar?

144 147

XI. Hasdrubal's Accord 1. The Barcid ascendancy 2. The accord with Hasdrubal: date 3. The accord: arguments about content 4. The aim of the accord: competing views

150 154 158 166

XII.

Saguntum 1. Friendship or alliance? 2. The Saguntine connexion: date 3. Saguntines in crisis 4. The Saguntines' neighbours 5. Saguntines request arbitration 6. The Romans arbitrate

XIII. Hannibal and the Ambassadors 1. The embassy of 220: aims 2. Disputed datings 3. The Roman démarche 4. The ambassadors at Carthage XIV. Saguntum Besieged 1. The Saguntines on their own 2. The Romans in debate

116

132 132

144

150

174 175 178 184 187 191 193 196 196 202 204 212 219 219 226

Contents XV. War 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

to Save Face The ultimatum Could the embassy declare war? Roman envoys to Punic senate Punic senate to Roman envoys War declared From diplomacy to warfare, 218 B.C.

xi 233 233 240 244 248 254 255

XVI. Conclusions 1. A Roman expansionist war? 2. Punic plans and prospects 3. Punic wars and Roman imperialism 4. Avoidable wars?

260 265 270 274

260

XVII. The Major Sources 1. Lost accounts 2. Surviving sources 3- Bas and inaccuracies the probiemcfPdybius 4. Problems with the later sources

280 282 284 291

280

Bibliography

297

Index I. Names and Topics

315

Index II. Passages Cited

321

Abbreviations Ancient works cited are abbreviated in readily recognisable form. Modern works listed in the Bibliography are cited in the footnotes by author's name and date of publication, or in a few cases by author's name and the work's abbreviated title. [Bibl.] below denotes a work listed in the Bibliography. AÉ AHB AJAH AJP ANRW ASNP CAH CQ FC FGrH FHA FIRA GP Gr. & R. GRBS HRR HSCP HWCR HZ IG ILLRP

L'Année Épigraphique The Ancient History Bulletin American Journal of Ancient History American Journal of Philology H. Temporini & al. (edd.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt [Bibl.] Annali della Scuola Normale di Pisa (3rd series) The Cambridge Ancient History [Bibl.] The Classical Quarterly E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae [Bibl.] F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente Griechischer Historiker [Bibl.] Α. Schulten, Fontes Hispaniae Antiquae [Bibl.] S. Riccobono & al., edd., Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani, 2nd edn., 3 vols. (1940-41, repr. Florentiae 1968-72) F. Cassola, I Gruppi Politici Romani nel III Secolo a.C. [Bibl.] Greece & Rome Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies H. Peter, ed., Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae [Bibl.] Harvard Studies in Classical Philology E.S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome [Bibl.] Historische Zeitschrift Inscriptiones Graecae A. Degrassi, ed., Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Ret Publicae, 2 vols. (Firenze 1963; vol. 1, 2nd edn., Firenze 1965)

xiv

ILS JRS KS LCM LSJ MÉFRA MRR PACA ΡΡ RE RÈA RhM ROL SEG Seibert, Fzh SVA TLL ZPE

Abbreviations

H. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, 3 vols. in 5 (Berlin 1892-1916) Journal of Roman Studies Kleine Schriften Liverpool Classical Monthly Liddell & Scott (rev. Jones), Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edn. with Supplement (Oxford

1968)

Mélanges de l'École Française à Rome T.R.S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic [Bibl.] Proceedings of the African Classical Associations La Parola del Passato Paulys Realencyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswisschenschaft Revue des Études Anciennes Rheinisches Museum für Philologie E.H. Warmington, Remains of Old Latin [Bibl.] Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum J. Seibert, Forschungen zu Hannibal [Bibl.] Die Staatsverträge des Altertums [Bibl.: see Bengtson, Schmidt] Thesaurus Linguae Latinae Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

Prologue The First and Second Punic Wars were the fiercest perhaps of all ancient history. The historian Polybius reckoned the First, from 264 to 241 B.C., 'the longest, most intense and greatest' of all wars. The Second was fought from 218 to 201 across the Western Mediterranean world and has immortalised the Carthaginians' war leader Hannibal. In their effects too they were momentous. The First initiated the Romans' empire with the takeover of Sicily, or most of it, and — a few years on — of Sardinia. The Second made them dominant over the Western Mediterranean and poised them for dominance over the Eastern.1 And yet these wars surprise. Romans and Carthaginians were not enemies before 264. The reverse: for two centuries and a half they had been linked by a series of treaties, not to mention by trade. In 279 they had agreed on possible joint action against their common threat King Pyrrhus of Epirus, the would-be saviour (and ruler) of the western Greeks. Why then a war of twentythree years, especially when the collision that sparked it was incidental, as will be shown, to a crisis between two other states altogether? Further surprises followed the first war. The two ex-enemies enjoyed three and a half years of renewed goodwill. A promising start, which abruptly turned to bitterness when the Romans seized the island of Sardinia from the Carthaginians out of the blue. Polybius saw this act as the prime cause of Hannibal's War (but he fails to explain the act's motive). And yet over nearly two more decades the political and diplomatic paths of Carthage and Rome crossed only on occasion. One or two diplomatic encounters in the 230s and 220s merely emphasized their basic lack of interest in each other's doings. Then suddenly they squabbled over a small Spanish town and plunged into one of the most destructively memorable of history's wars. 2

1

Pol. 1.63 (cf. 5.39 4). 2 Seizure of Sardinia: Pol. 3.10.4 (the 'second and greatest' of the three causes).

2

Prologue

For these events historians, ancient and modern, offer very varied explanations. Polybius, and surviving ancient historians generally, ascribe the First Punic War to aggressive Carthaginian expansionism that threatened Italy, the Second to Carthaginian vengefulness and anger over their defeat in the First and the loss of Sardinia. Modern explanations canvass themes of self-defence or defensive imperialism (mainly Roman, at Punic expense), mutual suspicions, or deliberately aggressive expansionism (Roman again) — this last currently the most widely accepted. This variety of theses, in the case of the First and Second Punic Wars and their diplomatic background, is due in great part to the limitations and, at times, silences in our sources. Many surviving ancient writers narrate, or at least touch on, the dealings between Rome and Carthage; though none on the Carthaginians' side. But most are brief, or fragmentary, or brief and fragmentary. Only Polybius and the Byzantine epitomator Zonaras offer connected narratives; and all the sources diverge, depressingly often, from one another in what they do report. Startling accusations against them have inevitably been made, even against Polybius, normally one of the more reputable classical historians but, on these topics, often the target of bitter censure. Not just for mistakes or for slanting the truth at key points (and that would be bad enough) but for misrepresenting earlier authorities wholesale too, and suppressing facts, and lying outright. Of the extant sources, not one was contemporary with the events. Polybius, the earliest, wrote in the middle decades of the next century. Two others, Diodorus the Sicilian and the Roman Livy, flourished in the time of Caesar and Augustus; and on the third century B.C. only extracts from Diodorus' history remain, in two separate collections, of Livy only epitomes until we reach the year 219- After these authors, a string of historical writers often following in Livy's footsteps but more compressed — Florus' résumé of Roman wars and Appian's ambitious history of them (but with nothing on the First Punic and only a few pages on the background of the Second), both composed in the second century A.D.; Cassius Dio of the third century A.D. with his lengthy history of Rome which for our period, all the same, offers only a few extant extracts plus Zonaras' epitomized version; the fourth-century Eutropius' sketch of Roman history and Orosius' pious fifth-century catalogue (much of it again drawing on the Livian tradition) of the world's and Rome's past disasters. Not to mention the long and

Prologue

3

laborious — and, some would say, lamentable — epic poem on the Second Punic War by Silius Italicus, put together in the late first century A.D. and occasionally used by scholars to help buttress an unconventional solution to this problem or that. And the short biographical sketches called De Vins Illustribus, perpetrated by an unknown hand in the fourth century, that offer a treacherously entertaining blend of facts, confusions and wild imaginings.3 Polybius and Diodorus apart, these sources are Roman though not all are Latin. All, in their varying ways, reflect patriotic Roman tradition. Nor do Polybius and Diodorus escape the influence of this, although both make use too of other — including Carthaginian — source materials. The pro-Punic histories which once existed have perished, notably that of Philinus the Agrigentine on the first war and the ones by Sosylus (all but one papyrus fragment) and Silenus on the second. What is known of them comes from citations, and possible citations, in surviving authors: Polybius and Diodorus especially. Hence the further, much-argued questions of just how much of those lost accounts can reliably be traced in the surviving ones, and how much of that in turn can be trusted after allowing for pro-Punic bias. Paradoxically, then, the sources are essential for, and are the chief obstacle to, understanding Roman-Punic relations and the causes of the great wars. Another obstacle is modern. Relations between the two states are seldom studied over the entire period. Studies, long and short, of the origins of the first war are many; likewise of the second; but few look at the overall run of events from the antecedents of 264 to the war-declaration of 218. Yet, in contrast with the Third Punic War of 149 to 146 which stemmed from mid-second-century Roman rancour and unscrupulousness, the answers to why the First and why the Second are intertwined. As Polybius recognised, the Second grew out of the First — even though, as we shall see, the line of descent was not as direct as he maintains. And the concentrated two and a half generations of war contrast strikingly with the two and a half centuries of peaceful relations preceding. Again, it is more fruitful to test various explanations against both wars: Roman or Punic

3 Silius: called into service by, e.g. K.-H. Schwarte (1983).

4

Prologue

expansionism, defensive imperialisms, mutual suspicions, miscalculation, even accident.^ This study will offer answers both to these major questions and to the many smaller ones of detail that arise from them. Unexpectedly coherent reconstructions of several crucial episodes can be made: notably the events of 264, the Sardinia crisis of early 237 (not 238), the nature of the Ebro 'treaty' of 225 (and not 226), and the contacts between Rome and Carthage from 220 to 218. Polybius does prove to be an exasperation at times, fallible and selfrighteous, but not to be a purveyor of fictions. Again, several disputed or misconstrued statements in the sources are clarified, and various clashes (real or supposed) between two or more of them. Finally, the study seeks to give an idea of the range of scholarly views on these topics as impartially and concisely as it can. The conclusions are undogmatic, if cynical in places. No single factor, however profound or generalised, can be offered as the cause of the conflicts. Expectations on both sides collided, as did hesitations. Saving face immediately could outweigh long-term preferences and even common sense. Third and fourth parties got entangled, unforeseeably sometimes but with decisive effect. Not only were fears as influential as hopes, if not more so, but hopes and plans backfired. Above all, accident and miscalculation — the inevitable companions of great events — played an important part. In these ways the background and origins of the First and Second Punic Wars hold a lesson even for this age.

4 See Pol. 3 9.6—10.6 on the three causes of the Second Punic War: Hamilcar's anger at defeat in the First, the Roman seizure of Sardinia, Punic imperialism in Spain (cf. 3.13.1, 15.10, 30.4).

Chapter I Before 264 1. The Romans and the Carthaginians They were both old and established powers when they came to blows in 264. Supposedly the cities had been founded within decades of each other, Carthage in 814, Rome in 753 or thereabouts. Over the centuries, with many ups and downs, the Romans extended their dominance over the peninsula of Italy, the final stage completed by 270 with the capture of Rhegium on the straits of Messina. By contrast the Carthaginians had fashioned a coastal empire or rather hegemonic network of allied trading cities, mostly Phoenician-founded, and lesser posts around the southern shores of the Western Mediterranean. There were also some island territories, above all in Sicily. Sicily had old Phoenician cities like Panormus and Soluntum in the west, while its eastern parts were heavily settled by Greeks. Carthaginians and Greek Sicilians were often at war from 480 on: the Carthaginians seldom won, but never lost so badly as to forfeit dominance over the western third of the isle. In 264 they controlled about as much as they had one hundred and two hundred years before. 1 Both Rome and Carthage were republics, with executive officials elected to power for a limited term and given wide, but conventionally defined, duties and powers. By convention again, these officials carried out their tasks in consultation with other experienced and reputable citizens appointed to a council of elders. The Romans' political system struck the historian Polybius as all but ideal. The ruling élite was based on wealth, birth and high office, and it flexibly allowed capable newcomers into its ranks.

1

Carthage founded 814 B.C.: Timaeus, FGrH566 F60; cf. Warmington, Carthage 22-27; G. and C. Picard, WC28-35; S.-E. Tlatli, 33-54. The Carthaginians and Sicily: L.-M. Hans (1983).

6

I.

Before 264

By 264 what was left of the old, patrician oligarchy shared supremacy with these more recent plebeian arrivals.2 For the Carthaginian republic details are much sparser. Its senate, or council of elders, was (it seems) formed of two components, a large outer body and a small inner one. Two chief magistrates, the 'sufetes' (sptm, 'judges'), held office each year; generals commanded the Punic state's forces; and the 'king' sometimes mentioned in Greek accounts may have been a separate functionary, or perhaps was a sufete under another name. How these executives related to one another and to the Punic senate can only be guessed. Obscure again the part played by the ordinary Carthaginian citizens in the affairs of their city, though a citizen assembly did exist and was consulted. Then there was the Court of One Hundred and Four, which supervised (and when necessary punished) generals. 3 In practice Carthage, like Rome, was ruled by a socially dominant minority. Unlike Rome, the oligarchy's origins, recruitment and internal relationships remain mostly mysterious. A crucial distinction supposedly was that its status and wealth came chiefly from commerce, while at Rome these lay largely in land. Yet it now looks as though Roman trade and trading contacts in the early third century were much more developed than usually thought; and on the Punic side, scraps of information suggest that landowning had came to form a bigger part of aristocratic wealth by the end of the fourth century.^ Aristotle, in the later fourth century, stressed that Carthage was ruled by an oligarchy, with some tiresome deviations towards democracy. Polybius attests an oligarchy in control in the third century, then comments that by 218 the place had indeed degenerated into democracy. One distinctive trait (both writers em-

2 Pol. 6.11.1, 18.1 on the quality of the Roman political system — also 6.57.1-9 (deterioration bound to set in one day) and note 5 below. 3 On the Carthaginians' political system: see especially Aristotle, Politics 2.11, 1272b-1273b; Pol. 6.51.1-2, 51.6-7; Gsell, HAAN 2. 183-252; Warmington, Carthage 143-50; G. Charles-Picard (1963), and (1968) mainly on the third century; E. Bacigalupo Pareo (1977); Szyncer, 550-85; Huss (1983); H.H. Scullard, CAHl2 (1989) 486-93; Lancel, 124-37. ^ F. Cassola, GP 25-49, with rather imaginative political inferences; Starr, 27-42, 45-47. Punic landed wealth: Tlatli, 118-19; Whittaker, 88-89.

I.

Before 264

7

phasize) was the open bribery by candidates for Carthaginian office. You never saw that sort of thing at Rome, Polybius avers.5 Again in contrast to the Romans, not much can be made out about Carthaginian political history until the 230s. Generals and admirals, and sometimes other officials, are mentioned in ancient accounts but political and family connexions remain vague. Surnames did not exist, and the Punic élite, for its own good reasons, used a remarkably narrow range of available personal names. Hanno, Hasdrubal, Hannibal, Himilco and Hamilcar are frustratingly common. Adherbal, Bomilcar, Carthalo, Gisgo, and Mago account for nearly everybody else. The Punic commander who sailed to Ostia in 279 to offer the Romans help against Pyrrhus was a Mago; so too one of the great Hannibal's brothers. In 264 alone, the known Punic commanders were a Hannibal, a Hanno, and a Hanno son of Hannibal. During the Roman siege of Agrigentum in 262-261, this second Hanno is later found cooperating as general with a Hannibal who may (or may not) be the same Hannibal as in 264. Three or four further Hannos, two more Hannibals and two Hamilcars appear between 261 and the war's end. These officers account for well over half the senior Carthaginians that we know of. Yet it would be rash to suppose that we are looking at a group of blood relations. Details of the background and recruitment of the Punic élite thus remain largely unknown. If wealth spoke as loudly as worth, as Aristotle claims, it was indeed open to new members — those who could afford the costs of buying their way in. Among the Romans there was an élite within the élite — the nobiles, holders of curule offices like the consulate and praetorship (or, later, of the consulate alone). Conceivably ex-generals and exsufetes enjoyed similar esteem at Carthage.^ 2.

Two treaties, and one fake

Romans and Carthaginians were no strangers to one another. Polybius has state relations at the very start of the Roman republic: 5 Bribery: Aristotle 1273a; Pol. 6.56.1-4. Much later Polybius is less enchanted with Roman mores: 18.35.1-2, 31.25.3-7. 6 Punic names: cf. Szyncer, 550-51. Wealth and worth at Carthage: Aristotle 1273a.

8

I.

Before 264

he dates to 509 a treaty between them, largely on trade topics. Around the middle of the fourth century a second treaty replaced it, again largely about trading. Polybius supplies a Greek translation of both7 Like the first, it stressed more what either signatory must not do. Romans were 'not to maraud, trade or found a city' beyond Fair Cape (Cap Bon on the Tunisian coast?) or 'Mastia of the Tarseians' which, it seems, was on the coast of southern Spain and is usually identified with the later New Carthage, modern Cartagena. Again, Romans were not to found a city or to trade in Sardiniaand Africa, except at Carthage itself; or stay on in either territory, if they found themselves there, longer than it took to provision or repair a ship — five days at most. More generously, 'in the area of Sicily governed by Carthage, and at Carthage', a Roman may 'do and sell whatever is allowed to a [Carthaginian] citizen', just as a Carthaginian may do at Rome. Carthaginians may keep the booty and prisoners from 'any city in Latin territory not subject to the Romans' which they capture, but must hand over the city itself to the Romans. They may not bring into Roman harbours a prisoner from any people who have a treaty with Rome, or else a Roman may lay hold of him and free him. The same caveat applies to Romans coming into Punic harbours. Neither side must abuse the right to water and provision a ship by mistreating people with whom the other party has 'peace and friendship'.^ This treaty was renewed, in Livy's report, in 306. But if so there is one obvious oddity. By then Roman interests and power were spread well beyond Latium; and besides, all of Latium itself

7 First treaty: Pol. 3.22, dating it to the consulate of L. Brutus and M. Horatius, i.e. to 509; cf. now P. Barceló (1988) 90-92; T.J. Cornell in CAH1.22 (1989) 253-57, (1995) 210-14; Scullard, ibid. 520-26; B. Scardigli, 26-33, cf. 55-75. Α. del Castillo implausibly supposes that it was really a treaty between Carthage and Caere in Etruria, later appropriated by the Romans: Athenaeum 82 (1994) 53-60. Second treaty: 3.24 (no dating). Diodorus dates what he calls the first Roman-Punic treaty to 348 (16.69.1), and Livy first mentions one in 348 too (7.27.2), then reports a Punic embassy coming to congratulate the Romans in 343 (7.38.2) — presumably for defeating the Samnites. Hence the view that Polybius' first two treaties really date to 348 and 343. But see, e.g., Walbank, Comm. 1. 337-38; Scullard, CAH 7.2 2 . 517-32. — 'Renewal' in 306: Livy 9.43.26. 8

On these terms:also R. Werner in Bengtson, StVA 2. 306-309, no. 326.

I.

Before 264

9

was now under Roman control, most of it in fact absorbed into the Roman state. Why should either side renew the 'Latin territory' clause? Many scholars thus infer that, in reality, what was struck in 306 was an entirely new treaty: the so-called 'Philinus' treaty. In fact the 'Latin territory' clause is not a big problem. In the second treaty there is no other mention of Latin territory, and none to any other sector of Italy. The renewal in 306 could conceivably have omitted 'in Latin territory' (the Greek syntax would not be affected and it is hard to see that the original Latin and Punic ones need have been) or have changed it to 'in Italian territory' in a re-engraved version. Polybius, who quotes the original mid-fourth-century text, would hardly find this exciting enough to point out to readers — if he noticed it. Both the second treaty as a whole, and this clause if modified, kept their value after 306. The Romans could not readily prevent the Carthaginians from capturing Italian coastal towns not under treaty to Rome; but if they did, the clause could ensure that the Romans gained the long-term benefit. In effect it enrolled the Carthaginians as aides in spreading Roman power (although no actual case is recorded).9 Now the early Sicilian historian of the First Punic War, Philinus of Agrigentum, insisted that in 264 the Romans broke a treaty by crossing over to Sicily. For it enacted that 'the Romans must keep away from Sicily entire, the Carthaginians from Italy.' Moderns who accept Philinus' treaty mostly date it to 306, whether as a sep-arate new pact or an addendum to Polybius' second. Arguably the Romans would have good reason after 264 for covering up the existence of such an accord. Equally, of course,

9 For possible emendations in the second treaty cf. Badian in Misc. Manni 1. 16168; Hoyos, CQ1985, 104-105. From the elogium of an unnamed 3rd-century person, found at Brundisium, R. Develin infers a Carthaginian intervention in south-eastern Italy in 307 with a treaty-renewal ensuing in 306 (Historia 1976, 484-87). But if so, all Roman historical traditions forgot this mini-Punic War and the amazing fact of an earlier Punic invader, also named Hannibal, being beaten by a Roman hero; yet the events were remembered at Brundisium. Most likely the inscription concerns a participant, probably Brundisine, in Hannibal's War.

10

I.

Before 264

the pro-Carthaginian Philinus would have sound reason to put such a claim no matter what. 1 0 Polybius insists that the claim is fiction, and he is to be preferred. True, some later writers show signs of knowing about the 'Philinus' treaty — but very probably they knew of it from Philinus and believed him. Polybius' history did not eclipse his: Diodorus, for instance, drew pretty heavily on it a century after Polybius. But by Polybius' time, there was plainly no text of Philinus' treaty outside Philinus' own work. By then the best-informed Romans and Carthaginians were not aware of even the Polybian treaties (this though their engraved texts were stored on the Capitol). So it is virtually impossible that Livy and later authors learned of Philinus' treaty from independent sources. Polybius firmly indicates that people in his time who did accept the 'Philinus' knew of it from Philinus. 11 Nor do the political and military situations in Italy and Sicily around the year 306 back up Philinus, though this is at times asserted. The Carthaginians enjoyed old relations with many Italian communities, and not just in the Greek south: around 500 the Etruscan city of Caere had Phoenician or Carthaginian links, as an inscription shows. Why sacrifice these contacts now (as Philinus' treaty required) to prevent Roman military or diplomatic involvement in Sicily when there was no sign — and no practical chance — of this occurring soon? By 306 the Romans were (it is true) close to dominating the north and centre of the Italian peninsula, but their diplomatic dealings with Italian states south of Campania and Samnium were limited. Roman power would remain distant from the straits of Messina for decades. 1 2 Philinus did not know details of the genuine Roman-Punic treaties. So at least says Polybius, and if he were lying he could The 'Philinus'-treaty: Pol. 3-26.3-5 (his rejection at 26.4); see more fully Hoyos, CQ 1985. For modern views for and against, Hoyos, 92 η. 6; Heisserer, 135-37; Huss (1985) 204-206; Eckstein (1987) 77-78; Barceló (1988) 140-41; Scullard, CAH 1.2, 532-36; Lancel, 380-83. Of these only Eckstein disbelieves it. Philinus' floruit around 2 4 0 - 2 3 0 : R. Laqueur, RE 19 ( 1 9 3 8 ) 2180-93; La Bua (1966) 255-62. 11

3.26.5;

Romans' and Carthaginians' ignorance of the extant pre-264 treaties,

26.2.

International situation in 306 supporting Philinus: R. Mitchell, 643-44. Punic (or Phoenician) relations with Caere, via its port of Pyrgi: J. Ferron, ANRWl.l. 189-216; D.R. Vance, Biblical Archaeologist 57 (1994) 114-15.

I.

Before 264

11

easily be found out by anyone with a text of his predecessor. Now probably the latter had gathered that treaties, or a treaty, had once existed, with bans on either signatory in the other's territories. After 264 that might well be interpreted by a proCarthaginian as a ban on the signatories encroaching on Sicily and Italy respectively. To anyone who read the genuine treaties, this notion would be nonsense. Polybius is right: 'there has been and there is no document of this kind at all.' 1 ^

3- Pyrrhus' war After 304 the Romans controlled Latium, Campania and southern Etruria. Their Italian alliances stretched across the centre and north of the peninsula. Naturally they developed contacts farther south. At some date, perhaps in 303, they struck a treaty with Tarentum. In 291 they founded Venusia, a large colony of Latin status, in northern Apulia. But not until the later 280s was there Roman intervention in the south. There the meddler, till he died in 289, was Agathocles king of Syracuse. Ruler of much of Sicily after a momentous war against Carthage and other Sicilian Greeks, he extended his power into the peninsula of Bruttium — as had Dionysius I, lord of Syracuse eighty years before. The Romans showed little concern. By 291 they were fighting their Third Samnite War: Venusia was aimed strategically to the north, against the Samnites. 1 ^ The Carthaginians too, it appears, were quiescent until after 289. Then the breakup of the Syracusan dominion after Agathocles' death prompted them to try afresh for wider power in Sicily. That prompted the Sicilian Greeks' appeal to Pyrrhus in 279, when he was fighting in Italy against the Romans. Of official contacts between Carthage and Rome in the nearly three decades after 306 no mention is found. Trade of course continued. The so-called 'Campanian' black-figured pottery of early third-century date — a Roman product — crops up all

13

^

3.26.4. Roman treaty with Tarentum: Schmitt, St VA 3· 6 0 - 6 l , no. 444. Venusia: Salmon ( 1 9 6 9 ) 60, 62. Agathocles' interventions in Italy: Diod. 21.4.8; Strabo 6.1.5 = 256C.

12

I.

Before 264

around the Western Mediterranean, not least in Carthaginian home territory and Punic territories e l s e w h e r e . 1 5 The decade from 280 brought a change. Pyrrhus arrived in Italy to make war and build kingdoms. At first he was victorious against the Romans, in the unprofitable battles of Heraclea in 280 and Ausculum in 279. But Roman strength dismayed him and Sicily beckoned. He opened negotiations with the one so as to get away to the other. To this period dates the next renewal of the second Roman-Punic treaty, this time with a military pact attached. The pact specified how Romans and Carthaginians might — in certain circumstances — help each other against the king of Epirus. Polybius' dating 'about the time of [Pyrrhus'] crossing to Italy' means 280 — either the roughest of estimates or a mistake. Diodorus tells of a Roman-Punic 'alliance' struck just before a Punic foray from Sicily into southern Italy, and this minor expedition took place probably in early 278 as an effort to obstruct Pyrrhus' move to Sicily. The epitome of Livy places 'the treaty renewed with the Carthaginians for the fourth time' (306 having been the third time) after Pyrrhus' second pyrrhic victory, thus late summer or early autumn in 279. Justin, epitomator of the Augustan-age historian Pompeius Tragus, records how, after Ausculum again, a Punic fleet 120 strong under one Mago arrived at Ostia (the port of Rome at the Tiber's mouth) to offer help. The Senate proudly declined the offer, so Mago sailed away after a few days to sound Pyrrhus out on his Sicilian schemes. Much the same tale is given, undated, in Valerius Maximus' compilation of famous deeds and sayings, produced in the reign of Tiberius. ^ Neither Justin nor Valerius mentions a treaty being struck: but both writers are interested in the offer of practical Punic aid and the Senate's principled refusal ('the Roman People fights its own wars'), not in a technical treaty-renewal or attached pact. The pact's wording indicates that Romans and Carthaginians were, or

15

Carthaginian doings in Sicily after 289: 23.2.13; Goldsberry, 1. 98 n.4 and 1. 204. Starr, 32-33, 49.

Diod. 21.18.1, 22.10.1; cf. Justin 'Campanian' ware: Morel, 59-117;

16

For Roman-Punic relations in 279-278: Pol. 3.25.1-5 (the pact); Livy, Per. 13; Diod. 22.7.5; Justin 18.2.1-3; Val. Max. 3 7.10. Pyrrhus' negotiations with the Romans: Schmitt, StVA 3. 106-109, no. 467; cf. Hoyos, Historia 1984, 402-17.

I.

Before 264

13

soon would be, each negotiating with Pyrrhus. That too fits the situation after Ausculum. The new agreement — Polybius treats it as a separate, third treaty — renewed the previous one, then set out the military pact in very provisional terms. First, 'if they make a written alliance with Pyrrhus, they shall make it jointly, so that it may be permitted to render each other aid in the territory of the party warred on'. Not an exciting clue to the genuineness of the 'Philinus' treaty (supposedly releasing either power from the ban on entering Italy or Sicily) but evidence that both signatories were anxious lest Pyrrhus win over the Romans for a war against the Carthaginians, or vice versa. If he wanted an alliance with either, he would have to take both: thus the emphatic 'they shall make it jointly', pact Pretty clearly this proviso was intended to deter the king from making peace with one and turning on the other. Military co-operation, should he be undeterred, was not viewed enthusiastically. Aid would be rendered 'in the territory of the party warred on' — by implication, only if that party were under direct attack on its own (not its allies') ground. As it turned out, the Romans turned down Mago's practical offer of aid; nor did the Carthaginians in 278-277 call on the Romans when hard pressed by Pyrrhus in Sicily. The remaining clauses of the pact reinforce this impression of caution. The Carthaginians would supply the seatransport for troops whether they or the Romans were sending aid (the Romans had no navy and few naval allies to speak of at this period) but each side must pay its own costs. Again, the Carthaginians would aid the Romans 'by sea also' if need be but the ships' crews must not be forced to serve by land. Caution was to be expected. Until now Romans and Carthaginians had operated in different military spheres. Neither would want to commit troops and funds in open-ended fashion. In fact neither was keen to have forces from the other roaming around its territory — notice the Roman refusal to Mago and the Punic lack of interest in Roman help. 17 ^

Heisserer, 133-35, argues that the much-debated phrase συμμαχίαν πρός Πύρρον (Pol. 3.25.3) renders amicitiam ad Burrom (i.e. Pyrrhum), '(if they make) friendship with Pyrrhus'; but amicitia ad nowhere occurs in extant Latin (cf. TLL 1. 1891-98) and in any case it would be very odd for Polybius to use συμμαχία to render amicitia (Heisserer, 135, does not accept that 'foedus' stood in the Latin original). .

14

I. Before 264

Were the Romans worried about possible Punic intervention in Italy even without Pyrrhus? The citizens of Rhegium on the straits of Messina had called in a Roman protective garrison, according to Polybius, 'for fear of the Carthaginians' as well as of Pyrrhus. If Pyrrhus was causing fear, this should date to 280 or soon after. But in reality it probably occurred in 282 (Dionysius of Halicarnassus' date) and from fear of the Lucanians and Bruttians of their hinterland. Tying it in with Pyrrhus — and the Carthaginians, who were then his foes — looks like erroneous Polybian hindsight. Even if the Rhegines were worried about the Carthaginians that is no proof of the Romans being worried too. Their garrison at Rhegium shows only that they were willing to use an ItalianGreek city's alarms to further their own influence in the region. That was a tendency already in evidence. From 285, the Romans had been protecting Thurii in south Italy against the Lucanians, an involvement that helped spark the war with Tarentum. 1 ^ As mentioned above, a Punic expedition in 278 moved via Rhegium into southern Italy. As a Roman garrison occupied Rhegium, the venture must have had Roman agreement. But no sign that it had Roman participants. Only five hundred troops were involved, it seems, who to start things 'crossed over' (writes Diodorus) to Rhegium: a crossing pretty clearly from Sicily — so the force not was Roman. The episode does show that the Romans were prepared to co-operate with a Punic effort against the common enemy, if rather passively. Not under the terms of the recent pact, though. That applied only if either state struck an alliance with the king, which had not happened (nor would it). The expedition achieved little. It tried and failed to take a town allied with Pyrrhus. Thereafter Punic warships patrolled the narrows on the lookout for his fleet. Pyrrhus crossed safely all the same. He left the Tarentines still at war with the Romans, for his negotiations had come to nothing.19 Roman garrison at Rhegium: Pol. 1.7.6-7; Diod. 22.1.2-3; Dionysius Halic. 20.4. Likely date 282: Walbank, Commentary1. 52; Càssola, Gruppi Pol. 171. On Rome and southern Italy: e.g. Scullard, HRW140; Salmon (1967) 280-84; P.R. Franke, CAH7.22. 456-57. ^Against Roman participation in the Punic raid in 278: Mitchell, 650; more fully Hoyos, Historia 1984, 432-34. Ironically enough, whether the Romans had agreed to the raid or not later Roman historians could have painted it as a Punic breach of the 'Philinus treaty' — had they remembered it. Contra most

I.

Before 264

15

The following year, 277, with nearly all their region of Sicily occupied by the king, the Carthaginians offered him terms to leave the island. We do not hear of them sending this news to Rome, or of these sending back an offer of aid. The crisis for the Carthaginians passed as Pyrrhus antagonized the Sicilian Greeks. He went back to Italy to face the Romans, and suffered defeat. Carthage and Rome went their separate ways after all. The pact of 279 was never activated. A murky event a few years later marked the next contact (if it can be called that) between the two. During 272 the consuls were besieging Tarentum, still garrisoned by Epirot troops. A Punic fleet appeared on the seas— so affirm several Roman sources. Supposedly it meant to succour the straitened city, but found the task impracticable and sailed away. Livy and company congratulate themselves that by this action the Carthaginians breached 'the treaty' years before the crisis of 264. 'The treaty' can only be the spurious one claimed by Philinus: Roman historical tradition, believing Philinus, was keen to find a way of turning his claim to Roman advantage. Orosius even has an actual sea-battle between the Punic fleet and a Roman one — which the Punic side prophetically loses. This fatuous invention is to be ignored. Yet the fleet itself may not be a fiction. Apart from Orosius, its treacherous intent towards the Roman cause is simply asserted and its behaviour feeble: the fleet sails up, does nothing much, then sails off. This is a poor answer to the landing of a consular army in Sicily in 264, the Romans' breach of treaty according to Philinus. But if a Punic fleet, or a squadron, did appear off Tarentum, the consuls' later report to the Senate could have mentioned it and the item then have found its way into the annalistic records of Rome. One or other Roman historian, aware of Philinus' accusation and keen to match it, would be happy to pick it up and 'interpret' the Punic fleet to suit. An imagined battle was not needed (that would be a later decoration). By sending ships to Tarentum the Carthaginians had failed to 'keep away from Italy'. Such a force would not turn up to help the hapless Tarentines — there was no gain in that. Nor to help the Roman besiegers scholars, Huss (1985) 212 still holds that Rhegium was the place attacked and there were Roman participants. Franke, 478, and Scardigli, 176-79 likewise think the 500 troops were Romans.

16

I.

Before 264

under the pact of 279 as sometimes suggested: that pact was irrelevant. Neither signatory had allied with Pyrrhus after all, and by now he was back in Greece and may even have been dead, for in 272 itself he was killed at Argos. The Punic ships may indeed have been sent over when that news arrived, to see how things stood at Tarentum. Its Epirot garrison was likely to give up once the king who had left them there was dead, and the surrender of Tarentum, likely in itself, was going to make the Romans supreme over southern Italy (apart from the mutinous legion occupying Rhegium). A reconnaissance at so momentous a season may have seemed a good idea at the time. Ancient ships were not well-equipped to spend days and nights at sea. A squadron crossing from North Africa can hardly have sailed without a halt, observed from a distance and then turned about to sail all the way home again. A landing for a night or a few nights, and some reprovisioning, can be supposed. The coasts were under Roman power and that sort of landing was implicitly allowed in the second treaty with Rome, which had been reconfirmed in 279· Thus the consuls could learn where the ships were from. Orosius not only conjures up a fight between Romans and Carthaginians; he later on has the Romans send an embassy to Carthage to complain of 'the broken treaty', only for the Carthaginians to perjure themselves. Orosius' source must have meant that they falsely swore that the fleet had no hostile intent. These details are fanciful but the embassy itself possibly did take place. Embassies were not quite as inventable as sea-battles. Better records of them were kept; after all they were solemn emissaries of Senate and People. Another, seemingly authentic, embassy of this period struck an enduring treaty of friendship with the Ptolemies of Egypt in 273- An embassy to Carthage in 272 or 271 would conceivably have taken the news that the long war with Tarentum, which had occasioned the most recent Roman-Punic agreement, was victoriously ended. Some later embroidery of such a delegation too, as reflected in Orosius, would be no surprise.

20

Tarentum incident: Livy, Per. 14, and 21.10.8; Dio, frg. 43.1; Zonaras 8.6.1213; Oros. 4.3.1-2, 4.5.2. Cf. Hoyos, Historia 1984, 434-37. Embassy to Carthage: Oros. 4.5.2. To Egypt: MRR 1. 197.

Chapter II Preparations for War? 1. Post-Pyrrhic consolidations Over the next several years no more diplomatic contacts are known between the two states. Both were busy in their own areas of interest. The Romans brought their rebel legionaries at Rhegium, a body of Campanians, to heel in 270 — it took a consular siege — and tamed the Sallentini in the peninsular heel of Italy. They established new Latin colonies: Beneventum in central Italy, Ariminum on the Adriatic coast to the north, and Firmum in Picenum. In 265 they fought a rather one-sided, and short, war with the single but defiant Etruscan city of Volsinii. Meanwhile the Carthaginians again became busy in Sicily after Pyrrhus went away in 276. Success was limited, all the same, to recovering their lost lands in the west. 1 This amounted to about the western third of the island. Halaesa halfway along the north coast was a Mamertine ally, or vassal, until 264 and so looks like the westernmost point of Mamertine dominance earlier. A little to its west lay Cephaloedium, modern Cefalù: this the Romans were to capture from the Carthaginians in 254, so it was quite likely under Punic hegemony before the First Punic War. In the south-east quarter of the island, the town of Echetla some sixty-five kilometres or 40 miles west of Syracuse lay 'midway between Syracusan and Carthaginian territory' in 264. This implies both that Echetla was independent, as in earlier times (though the Roman attack on it in 264 indicates that it was allied with Syracuse), and that Punic or pro-Punic ground began to its west. Now earlier that year Agrigentum, some one hundred kilometres to the west, had formally allied with 1

For these events: MRU 1. 198-202; E.S. Staveley, CAH1.22. 422-25. Punic recovery: Plut. Pyrrh. 23 5; Goldsberry, 1. 205 on Pausanias' claim (6.12.3) that by 264 the Carthaginians held more than half® of Sicily.

18

II.

Preparations for War?

the Carthaginians. The territory of so important a city very likely covered a good deal of central Sicily, possibly up to the neighbourhood of Echetla. 2 On the other hand Enna, fifty kilometres north-west of Echetla in the centre of the island, would not be in the Punic fold. It had thrown out a Punic garrison in 278 to welcome Pyrrhus and early in the First Punic War (in 260) was to be captured anew by the Carthaginians. So the Punic area of dominance can be estimated as stretching from the coast opposite Africa to a line roughly from Cephaloedium to the source of the river Halycus and then southwestwards down that river to the sea. This had been the Carthaginians' area for much of the fourth century.^ Polybius avers that by 264 the Romans were seriously worried at the growth of Punic power in Sicily and elsewhere. He does not say what made them think that it was growing. And, in fact, it was not. Even Agrigentum had not yet enrolled on the Carthaginians' side when the Roman People voted to aid Messana. The Punic sector of Sicily was much as it had been at the time of the second treaty with Rome. True, the Carthaginians did snap up Messana — facing the toe of Italy — when they got the chance. All the same no Roman leader can have seen that as the latest stage of Punic imperialist growth: no growth had been taking place before it. The same outside Sicily. In Spain, where 'many parts' (Polybius insists) were under Punic rule, the Carthaginians had a few trading-posts and were friends with Phoenician foundations like Gades and Malaca. As for holding 'all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas' (Polybius once more), some coastal tracts of Sardinia, and some towns, were held by them; no footholds in other islands, like Corsica or Elba. Again, that was how it had long been. In 264 a Punic fleet did make use of the isle of Lipara, just north of Mylae and Messana, and during the war the Carthaginians controlled Lipara till 252. Even if a recent gain and not a long-standing possession, it was a small one. Lipara

Halaesa and Cephaloedium: Diod. 22.13.2, 23.18.3, cf. 22.13.7 (Lipara by 264). Echetla: Pol. 1.15.10 from Philinus; the town had been autonomous in 309 (Diod. 20.32.1-2). Rizzo (1973) 75 guesses Agrigentum, Phintias and Camarina as Punic allies from 275, implausibly. 3 Enna: Diod. 2210.1 (in 278), 23.9.4 (in 260). 2

II.

Preparations for War?

19

scarcely worried the Romans — they made no move against it until half a dozen years after the war had started. ^

2. Plans for a war? Many moderns see the Romans as expecting a Punic war after 270 — or even as planning one. The evidence invoked is varied and could impress. Thus in 267, or so it was held until recently, they improved their capacity for a naval war by replacing the old, ad hoc institution of duoviri navales with four new and annually elected 'fleet quaestors' (quaestores classici). All the same it may well be that the sixth-century A.D. author Johannes Lydus, the only source for this, is simply reporting the creation of two new and non-naval quaestorships. Even if the quaestores classici return to acceptance, they are to be connected with the war against the Sallentini in 267-266, in that distant stretch of Italy. 5 Apart from Beneventum, Ariminum and Firmum already mentioned, Latin colonies were founded at Cosa and Paestum in 273. This was late in the war with Tarentum, but on Italy's west coast — facing North Africa, in other words. Another sign of anti-Punic planning? Coastal colonies were a measure more defensive than offensive; they also buttressed Roman control over a district. Both Etruria, where Cosa lay, and the Greek south (the site of Paestum) were now under Roman domination. Coastal security was more important than ever to the Romans when their network of alliances and hegemony extended the length of the peninsula: sea-communications were faster and easier than by land, but re4'

Many parts' of Spain: Pol. 1.10.5; but see Whittaker, 69-71; Barceló (1988) 26-43, 63-85, 133-43; R.J. Harrison, Spain at the Dawn of History (London 1988) 80, 89-90. Sardinia: Dyson, 242-44; Barceló, 63-85. Lipara: Diod. 22.13 7 (in 264); in First Punic War, e.g. Pol. 1.21.5, 1.39.13, Diod. 23.20.1, Zon. 8.14.7. 5 T. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht 2. 270-72 (for quaestores classici), relying on Livy, Per. 15, Tacitus, Ann. 11.12, and Lydus, De Magistr. 1.27. New quaestorships indicate Punic-war plans, Cassola, GP 179; defensive planning, J.H. Thiel (1954) 147 and Cary and Scullard, 116. By contrast Staveley (n. 1 above) 438 sees 4 new quaestors to handle increased revenues and newlyinnovated coinage; D.C. Chandler, Historia 27 (1978) 328 η. 27, suggests 4 new quaestors created in 267 but later lapsing; while L. Loreto (1993) argues for only one new quaestorship in 267 for 'rapporti con gli alleati', dating the other three to c. 240, 232 and 210. Cf. W.V. Harris (1976) 92-106; H.B. Mattingly in Hommages à M. Renard (Bruxelles 1959) 2. 509-11.

20

II.

Preparations for War?

quired secure positions along the shore — hence the value of Cosa and Paestum. By contrast, if these two reveal plans for a war against the Carthaginians or even an expectation of it, Ariminum and Firmum on the east coast should point to intended warfare in the Adriatic. Few would believe that.6 imperialism, imperialistsA number of prominent Roman gentes or family groups in the first half of this century supposedly had close links with southern Italy, notably Campania, a region of commercial wealth whose inhabitants were cives Romani sine suffragio, non-voting citizens. Supposedly then these families had a special interest in overseas trade. Carthage, the greatest trading power of the western Med-iterranean, dominated rich regions like western Sicily, Punic North Africa and south Spain. Commercially aware circles at Rome, like these 'Campanian' gentes, were (on this hypothesis) eager for a war in order to loot Carthaginian territories and take away the Carthaginians' markets. A prominent 'Campanian' family was the Atilii, with consuls in 294 and 267. The poet Silius Italicus, three hundred and fifty years on, depicts the famous M. Atilius Regulus, consul in 267 and once more in 256, urging war 'with fell mien' against the Carthaginians in the fateful year 264, and the Atilii are often seen as the main proponents of war. The consul who actually launched the fighting in 264, Ap. Claudius Caudex, has been readily enrolled in the ranks of the overseas-expansionists at Rome too, for various members of the gens Claudia show Campanian links. Also keen on conflict (it is argued) were Appius' successors in office in 263, M'. Valerius Maximus and M'. Otacilius Crassus. After all they prosecuted the war energetically during that year — anyway Valerius did — and Otacilius' family very tellingly was south Italian, from Brundisium7 6 Cosa and Paestum: Salmon (1969) 62-63. Indicators of war-planning: Harris (1979) 183 'in all likelihood'. To help keep watch over Etruria and southern Italy: E.T.Salmon, The Making of Roman Italy (London 1981) 64-65; Dyson, 25. ^ Silius, Punica 6.658 — a painting of First Punic War heroes, among whom 'primus bella truci suadebat Regulus ore'. Roman links with Campania and southern Italy as key to the war: F. Münzer, Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien (repr. Stuttgart 1963) 78, and in RE 18 (1942) 1857; Heurgon (1942) 283-94, cf. (1973) 217-18; Thiel (1954) 134-37; Lippold (1963) 114 n.50, 116-18,120; G.C. Picard (1967) 46-54; G. and C. Picard, LDC 187-88; J.-P. Brisson, 19-20. On commercial expansionism at Rome: E Meyer, 376-80; on its contribution to the First Punic War, Cassola, GP 178-209Claudii and Campania: e.g. M. Corsaro, 1006-7. The Otacilii from Brundisium: Münzer, RE

II.

Preparations for War?

21

These inferences are circumstantial, some of them coincidental. How a given Atilius or Claudius or Valerius, at a given moment, viewed the prospect of a war (even if that can be guessed) is fragile evidence for how other family members felt, not all of them close relatives. In better-documented periods family divisions can be documented: Iulii Caesares were on both sides in Caesar the Dictator's civil wars, for instance. Nor is it certain that the Atilii did derive from or had special links with Campania. The names Calenus and Caiatinus, borne by notable Atilii of the time, quite likely resulted from military exploits against the Campanian towns Cales and Caiatia — rather than from family ties to those places. Campanian Atilii, known from much later inscriptions, will have stemmed from clients or freed slaves of the Roman aristocratic house: no proof of the aristocrats' own connexions.^ Even where a Campanian or south Italian connexion did exist, it hardly proves that southern, or commercial, interests shaped that person's attitudes to public issues, or that he belonged to an expansionist or imperialist faction. Eminent gentes would have ties to many parts of Italy (and even beyond) almost of necessity. Claudii had links with Etruria too, for instance, and had originated in the Sabine country north of Rome. A Ti. Claudius of Antium has turned up at Entella in Sicily, probably in the third century. There is no sign that these varied links turned the Claudii into multidirectional expansionists, or paralysed them with conflicting attractions. The great patrician family of the Fabii has been judged hostile to southward-directed and commerce-inspired expansion, and instead as strongly in favour of pushing Roman power and possessions overland to the north so as to open new opportunities for the man on the land. Yet Fabii had also been active in the south: for instance Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus, consul five times between 322 and 295, who had warred against the Samnites as well as in Etruria. And they were reputedly linked by marriage with the Otacilii who, as mentioned above, hailed from Brundisium. The great Q. Fabius Maximus the Delayer, Hannibal's patient adversary, owned at least one estate in Campania: Hannibal tried to sow suspicion by not ravaging it. In 18 (1942) 1856-58. M\ Otacilius a hawk: RE 18. 1857; Thiel (1954) 73, 136-37, 162; Càssola, 186 n . l 4 l . 8 M. Frederiksen, 231.

22

II.

Preparations for War?

the First Punic War, three Fabii operated as successive consuls in Sicily, from 247 to 245 — with no great glory, but no recorded reluctance either. One of them (it may be added), M. Fabius Licinus in 246, had as his colleague the supposed 'hawk' of 263, M'. Otacilius Crassus.9 Were there some Roman leaders who can be identified as keen on a Punic war — for whatever reasons — around 264? Some nominees have already been mentioned: M'. Otacilius, M'. Valerius Maximus Messalla, Regulus, Ap. Caudex. We shall see that Caudex pretty certainly was eager for a war — though not a Punic one. On the others, doubts arise. The supposed warmongers were not greatly successful in affairs after 264-263Otacilius had to wait seventeen years for his just-mentioned second consulate; it can have been only small consolation that his brother held the office in 261. His colleague in 263, M'. Valerius, was granted a triumph for victories in Sicily, even took a new surname (Messalla), but never again held the fasces — and that even though second tenures were fairly common for successful generals during the war. In fact after L. Valerius Flaccus in 261, not a close relative, no Valerius reached the consulate until Q. Falto in 239 — and he was no close relative of Messalla either. And the Atilii had to wait until 258 and 257 for their first consulates of the war. Even then it was not M. Regulus of the fell mien who was elected, but his relative A. Caiatinus and then his brother C. Regulus. Marcus Regulus' own second consulate, in 256, came about only because one of the consuls originally elected for that year died and he was chosen as replacement. The poet Silius names other war-mongers of 264 along with Regulus and Ap. Caudex, but they are not very convincing. Thus 'Duillius' — C. Duillius, consul in 260 (the first consular Duillius

9 Rullianus: RE 6 (1909) 1800-11. Fabii linked by marriage to Otacilii: Festus 174 L (dating it to the fifth century B.C.); Münzer, RE 18. 1860-61, 1866 (early third); Cassola, 20 (late third); Salmon (1967) 187 n.l. Active in southern Italy: Frederiksen, 231-32. The Campanian estates: Livy 22.23.4-8 and 25.7. Fabii opposed Punic war: Lippold (1963) 115-20; cf. G. and C. Picard, LDC 189-90, and Brisson, 19, 62. Fabii consuls in Sicily in 247-245: MRR1. 216-17. Sound doubts about seeing family or 'faction' groups espousing particular policies: Develin, 59-88, 261-65, 277-315. I® Falto was Q.f. P.n. (son of a Q. Valerius, grandson of a P.); Messalla M.f. M.n.; L. Flaccus P.f. L.n. (see MRR sub annis). Regulus suffect consul in lieu of Q. Caedicius: MRR sub a. 256.

II.

Preparations for War?

23

since 336) and victor over the Carthaginians in the Romans' firstever naval battle, was at most an ex-praetor four years earlier. 'Scipio', presumably L. Cornelius Scipio the consul of 259 (his brother, consul in 260, was an incompetent whom even Silius would scarcely admire), would have been still more junior although at least he belonged to a leading patrician house. And 'Lutatius' — C. Lutatius Catulus, consul in 242 and victor in the last and decisive battle of the war in March 241 — must have been in his teens or twenties twenty-three years earlier, quite possibly not yet even a senator. Silius is not giving a genuine list of 'hawks' but a gallery of war heroes to teach Hannibal (gazing at them in a temple painting) that he has no hope of ultimate success. 11 Was the Roman People unappreciative of and ungrateful to a bellicose circle of leading men, like Ap. Caudex, M'. Valerius, M'. Otacilius and M. Regulus, who had engineered the war? Little identifies these worthies as specially bellicose. Conceivably Valerius and Otacilius supported intervening in Sicily when the question arose in 264 (not that their election for 263 proves this). The evidence, as we shall see, indicates a strong number of senators ready to intervene when the chance came, and several later consuls may well have been among them. Nothing supports moving beyond that to infer, in the years down to 264, a warelement in the Senate structuring public policy towards a clash with the Carthaginian republic. Ancient writers had their own, quite different explanations for the war. They follow three main themes. Best known is Polybius' depiction of the 'Punic threat' looming over Italy and justifying the Romans' actions in 264. The Romans saw how the Carthaginians had taken over so much of the western Mediterranean and how they now had a chance to take over Messana. Next would follow the conquest of all Sicily, and Italy in danger. 12 Another theme, predictable in pro-Roman traditions, is chivalrous Rome coming to rescue imperilled allies — the Mamertines of Messana. Rescuing allies was a standard Roman justification for starting wars and the Romans did use it in 264, to judge from comments by Hiero of Syracuse reported by Diodorus. At times it

11 12

Silius 6. 660-68. Pol. 1.10.5-9.

24

II.

Preparations for War?

might even be true, though (as we shall see) 264 was not one such time. 1 3 More interesting is a third theme: Roman and Punic acquisitiveness. Polybius notes, very briefly, ordinary Romans' eagerness at the time for 'obvious and great benefits' from a war — obviously meaning great booty — as the other factor impelling the Roman People to vote aid to the Mamertines. Diodorus records Hiero of Syracuse accusing the Romans of pretending loyalty to allies as a cover for plain greed for Sicily. Floras too stresses this interest in booty; and after him Dio broadens both the 'threat' theme and that of acquisitiveness. Each power feared the other, and each at the same time coveted the other's territory. ^ Diodorus probably drew Hiero's accusation, with that section of narrative in general, from Philinus. It is a theme to be expected in a pro-Carthaginian writer: no doubt Philinus built it up as the explanation for why the Romans broke the alleged ban on crossing to Sicily. But rarely commented on is how some later Roman writers plainly accepted the idea that the Romans were not innocent in the imbroglio of 264. It deserves note. We may not automatically assume (though often it is assumed) that Roman tradition distorted everything about 264 into pro-Roman shape, twisting or omitting inconvenient facts and inventing more agreeable items as needed. Did the acquisitiveness-topic in the Roman historians come from Philinus? Possibly — but it is hard to believe that Roman historians would care to transmit from him such a critique of their ancestors. Later Roman attacks on national decadence normally dated this from the growth of empire in the second century and after, while the Punic wars were supposed to belong to the era of heroic virtue. But this edifying idea was not universally shared. In the later first century B.C. the moralising historian Sallust described concord and virtue as prevailing among the Romans only between the Second and Third Punic Wars, and some years later a distinguished ex-consul, L. Arruntius, produced a history of Diod. 23.1.4. Mamertines as allies being aided: Livy 30.31.2; Florus 1.18 [2.21.3; Oros. 4.7.1; Zon. 8.8.4 and 6 from Dio. On Pol. 3.26.6 cf. η. 25 below. On the general theme of wars undertaken 'sociis defendendis' and 'pro fide' see Schwarte (1983) 98-104. 1 4 Pol. 1.11.2; Diod. loc. cit.; Florus 1.18 [2.21.2-4; Dio, frg. 43.2 = Zon. 8.8.3; likewise, very briefly, Ampelius, Liber Memorialis 46.2 (the two powers fought for Sicily as their 'booty', praeda)·, cf. Hoyos (1989 [1991]) 51-53.

II.

Preparations for War?

25

the First Punic War in Sallustian style. He overdid Sallustian mannerisms to the point of ridicule (we are told); but if Arruntius, a man famed for sobriety and 'old-style gravitai, under Sallust's influence depicted the Romans of 264 as flawed, he may be the common fount for Florus' and Dio's r e m a r k s . 1 5 A tradition of Roman eagerness for plunder and possessions in Sicily: does this support the theory that they were planning war? It might seem plausible. But eagerness for booty can exist without expansionism; nor is there much to back up the notion that the Romans in 264 aimed at annexing (not just looting) Sicily. That idea did not take root until 26l, as we shall see; and even when they did acquire the island, at the peace of 241, it was fourteen further years before they thought of anything to do with it — and not much even then. Polybius sees the Romans as purposeful in a more geopolitical way. For him, they followed a soundly-based and tenacious aim: first to impose their dominance over the rest of Italy, then to master the world abroad. Sicily as the first extra-Italian step in this grand scheme is no surprise. Ironically, when discussing the origins of some wars — including that of 264 — he still insists on portraying his purposeful Romans as being forced into fighting by intransigent foes. No doubt his admiration for them and their political system made him susceptible to their self-justifications. Yet he was aware of less estimable factors too. The outbreak of war in 264 was due in part (so he records) to Roman material greed and to them aiding an unsavoury crew of 'kinsmen', the Mamertines. Of Hannibal's War the main cause, he states, was the unjust exaction of Sardinia and money from the Carthaginians in 237. Like Thucydides and many others he takes it as obvious that powerful states invariably aim to extend their power. The Romans might at times be provoked by equally ambitious rivals, but whenever that happened they were ready to fight. ^ 15

Arruntius: Seneca, Epistulae 114.17, cf. Vellerns 2.86.2; R. Syme, Tacitus (Oxford 1958) 1. 200, identifying him with the consul of 22 B.c.; Hoyos (1989 [1991D 59-66. Sallust on the period 218 to 146 as the age of virtus: Hist. 1.11M, cf. 1.7M (= 1.9-11 McGushin).

Polybius' determinist view of Roman expansion: (e.g.) 1.3-6, 1.6.6, 1.63-9, 2.1.1, 3-2.6; 3-4.3, after 167 'it was universally accepted as a necessary fact that henceforth all must submit to the Romans and obey their orders' (Paton's Loeb tr.) ; 9-10.11-13, 15.9-4-5See, e.g., F.W. Walbank, fliS 53 (1963) 1-13, and (1972) l60; E. Gabba, Athenaeum 55 (1977) 62-74; D. Musti (1978); Harris

26

II.

Preparations for War?

Undeniably the Romans were a bellicose people. Both aristocrats and ordinary citizens were attuned to warfare and the benefits of successful warfare: booty, slaves, renown. Often ignored or played down, this truth has been forcefully reemphasized in recent years. The manpower resources of the Romans and their Italian allies could encourage Senate and People to military ventures which smaller states might shun: of Roman males alone there were 292,000 in 265, with perhaps twice as many allies. At the same period the citizen population of Carthage may have been 250,000 of both sexes, with perhaps another three or four hundred thousand in the Punic countryside; allies and subjects are an unknown quantity. But neither bellicosity nor manpower on their own can explain every Roman war. Choice of enemy, timing of hostilities, diplomatic and strategic conditions could not automatically be controlled from Rome. Roman initiative was best served by wars short and localised — no wonder then that Roman annals are studded with precisely such struggles. In bigger wars, by contrast, the Romans' bellicosity can have been only one, though an important one, among various causes. 17

(1979) 107-17; J.S. Richardson (1979); Musti (1984) 35-54; D.W. Baronowski (1995) 26, 30-31. Roman greed in 264: 1.11.2; see Chap. IV. Rights and wrongs over Hannibal's War: Chaps. XI §3 and XVI §2. Consistency in Polybius' analysis of the origins of Roman wars: P.S. Derow, ß t S 6 9 (1979) 1-15 (provocative enemies did not absolve Roman responsibility); cf. Baronowski (1995). 1 7 Bellicosity: Harris (1979) 9-53, (1984) 13-15; R. Sailer, JRSS1 (1991) 161-62, reviewing C4//7.2 2 and 8 2 . J. Rich (1993) 38-68 cautions against 'mono-causal' explanations, like bellicosity, for wars. Census for 265: Eutropius 2.18 (292,334), cf. P.A. Brunt, Italian Manpower, 225 B.C.-A.D. 14 (Oxford 1971) 13. For 225 Polybius gives 273,000 Romans and Campanians of military age, out of a grand total of 770,000 fighting men for all Italy (2.24; cf. Diod. 25.13): though the figures for all censuses probably need modification in detail (Brunt, 15-60) the general proportions are acceptable. The geographer Strabo gives a total of 700,000 for the city of Carthage alone in the year 149 (17.3.15 = 833 C), a figure widely doubted though U. Kahrstedt's estimate of 125-130,000 for the city is unpersuasively low (Kahrstedt, 23-24). Warmington estimates nearly 400,000 in the early third century, with maybe 300,000 more in its adjoining territory ( C a r t h a g e 150); Tlatli, from a close knowledge of both the ancient city and the Tunisian countryside, about 230,000 and 400,000 respectively (107-9, 115-24). Scullard, CAH 7.12. 502-3 guesses about 400,000. Estimates for the Punic empire are further guesswork.

II.

Preparations for War?

27

Moderns like ancients tend to study events from a Roman angle, even when the Romans' actions are criticized. Yet another question is worth asking too, though it seldom is. Were the Carthaginians aiming at a Roman war in 264? Much that the Carthaginians did might suggest so. They launched an attack against the Mamertines of Messana as soon as these were accepted by the Romans as allies. The Punic commander rejected the consul Ap. Claudius' offers to negotiate, then attacked his ships in the straits of Messina. He did hand back the ships captured, but with arrogance and menaces. Willingness to conciliate was in short supply. Prewar Punic moves too could excite suspicion. Why did they reconfirm the second treaty in 279 — rather than make the provisional military pact alone: was it because the treaty had a clause allowing them to capture cities not subject to or allied with the Romans, a clause that one day might be convenient for engineering a clash? And why should a Punic naval force be in Italian waters in 272, when merchants or a diplomatic mission could have kept the authorities at Carthage informed? As discussed earlier, there are more natural explanations for the Carthaginians' moves, like those of the Romans. None the less, how the Carthaginians acted in 264 towards their old treaty-partners implies an attitude to the Romans rather unlike earlier times. It is worth looking at the Roman phenomenon from the opposite side of the Mediterrannean. The Senate and People had come a long way even since 306. Now they had control of the entire Italian peninsula. Peoples and cities with whom the Carthaginians had had separate relations for centuries — Etruscans and Italian Greeks especially — were now spoken for by the Roman republic. Nothing like it had ever happened before. And the Romans had shown that they could withstand the onslaught of a master of Hellenistic warfare and then beat him. This was an altogether different power from the geographically limited, though strong, state of 306, not to mention 348. The recent treaty of friendship with Egypt marked its new level of eminence. Any policy-maker at Carthage would keep a careful eye on the Romans, who by 270 were a strait's (a very narrow strait's) breadth away from Sicily; and who, that very year, may well have struck up friendly contact with Hiero, the leader of Carthage's ageold Sicilian enemy Syracuse.

28

II.

3.

Preparations for War?

The Romans and Sicily

The Romans were well acquainted with Sicily. Political and diplomatic relations may not have developed before 270, or at any rate are not recorded earlier, but as early as 493 Sicilian grain was being bought by the Roman authorities. Again, a document of about that era attests a 'Romis' at Camarina south of Syracuse who might be a Roman and a trader. Sometimes less honourable contacts are heard of. A Greek pirate fleet, which Livy thinks was from Sicily, harassed the coast of Latium in 346.; a pirate whom Diodorus terms Etruscan, but whose name Postumius is Roman (and patrician too), was captured in Syracusan waters in 342 and executed by Timoleon, the liberator of Greek Sicily. Postumius the pirate has been seen, in rather roundabout fashion, as a sign of Roman trade with Sicily in that age. More reliable evidence, the Roman-Punic treaty of 348, takes for granted that the Romans do business with Punic Sicily as with other Punic lands. ^ Trade was not the only contact. Campanian mercenaries had served in Sicily, employed by various régimes Greek and Punic, since the late fifth century. Often they chose to settle there — at times by the uncivil method of seizing a likely city, driving out the adult males and appropriating their wives and children. The Mamertines did so at Messana around 288 (and the mutinous Campanian legion at Rhegium in Italy a few years later). Campania had become part of the Roman state in the mid-fourth century, its people in the special category of voteless citizens, cives sine suffragio — with no noticeable effect on the mercenaries' manners. One of the towns made Campanian, as early as 404, by this arbitrary technique was Entella over in the west of the island. A remarkable set of inscriptions has recently been published from there, one of them of relevant interest. The documents show a city being re-established after disaster. There had been a Carthaginian war, in which Entella was aided by troops from other

Sicilian grain in 493: Livy 2.34.4; cf. R.M. Ogilvie, Commentary on Livy Books 1-5 (Oxford 1965) 321. Fifth-century 'Romis' at Camarina (a name? a nationality?): M. Gras, Kokalos 1980-81, 185; G. Colonna, ibid. 190 (he thinks a Roman). Greek pirate fleet: Livy 7.25.4, 26.13-15. Postumius: Diod. 16.82.3; Cassola, GP 28 (cf. 28-34 on piracy and commerce); Starr, 30. Treaty of 348: Chap. I §2.

II.

Preparations for War?

29

cities. But later (this seems the run of events) the townsfolk had suffered expulsion — a rather ironic fate for these Campanian Sicilians. Later still they returned to re-establish their community with help from many cities in central Sicily. Most of the documents are formal commemorations of help from others, past and present. A different one spells out a complex procedure at Nacone, a town nearby, for ending internal strife. And another honours the man 'appointed superintendent (epimeletas) of the city' during its resettlement — one Tiberius Claudius, son of Gaius, from Antium. With that name and origin, this is a Roman. Antium on the coast of Latium, today's Anzio, had been a Roman colony since 338. ^ The date or dates of the Entella decrees are in dispute (partly because the bronze documents themselves are not publicly available). If they refer to the First, or Second, Punic War, the rôle of Ti. Claudius the epimeletas is readily explained and is without relevance to pre-First Punic War links between the Roman republic and Sicily. A late date has been inferred by some scholars from another decree mentioning beneficence to Entella from one Minatus Curvius or Curius 'the Mamertine'. The notorious Mamertines took that name, according to Polybius, after occupying Messana around 288. On the other hand earlier Campanian mercenaries may likewise have styled themselves Mamertines — it means simply 'men of Mamers' the Campanian god of war (Mars to the Romans). Worth noting, though hardly decisive, is that no document in the group refers to the Roman state or Roman authorities. And Minatus Curius resided at Petra in central Sicily, not at Messana. More important is that all the documents, though meant for display in various public buildings around Entella and at Nacone, were found (so it seems) in one hoard on the site of Entella. That implies fresh turbulence overtaking the town before the inscribed plates could be distributed to their proper sites. Thus the Entellans' troubles may date to earlier than 288, even to the fourth century Campanians in Sicily: Colonna (prev. note), 172-80. Seizure of Entella in 404: Diod. 14.9.8-9. The Entella decrees, 'di provenienza clandestina', were published by G. Nenci (1980), added to by G. Daux (1982), and elaborately studied by Nenci and others (1982); cf. Nenci again, (1982-83) 281-83- A ninth document is published by V. Giustolisi (1985); cf. Manni (1987), Hoyos (1988). Ti. Claudius: doc. IV, lines 4-5 Τεβέριο? Κλαύδιο? Γαίου ulòs- ' Αντίατας·. Antium: Strabo 5-3.5 = 232 C; Livy 8.14.8.

30

II.

Preparations for War?

and its multitude of Sicilian wars. Then Ti. Claudius would be a mercenary officer in the service of some foreign power of the day. 2 0 Other Roman adventurers turn up abroad during the third century, in the service of Ptolemaic Egypt for instance. Ti. Claudius might have been an employee of Agathocles, Pyrrhus or one of the Sicilian dynasts — or even of the Carthaginians. He is not a likely member of either the patrician or the plebeian Claudii at Rome, aristocratic gentes both: rather he was a client with their nomen, like one or two other known dependents of the Claudii. Nor is he evidence for expansionist interest at Rome in the direction of Sicily. A Roman record of efforts to intervene in Sicilian upheavals, or (at the least) of diplomatic contacts with Sicilian states, would be a clearer index, but nothing offers. 21 Ti. Claudius none the less illustrates Romans' venturousness in the third century, and how and where they might range abroad. He helps to draw the correct picture of a society not rustically simple and self-enclosed but vigorous in foreign dealings and ready to reach out for opportunities and profit. On the other side of that ledger, the Romans had now driven off — at some cost — their first challenger from overseas; any fresh development abroad which possibly foreshadowed problems for them would be watched with care. Into this category would pretty surely fall Hiero's increasingly successful warfare during the 260s against the Mamertines. Hiero, son of Hierocles, was a youthful general who around 275 had made himself leader of the much-stressed Syracusan state and restored a measure of stability and strength to it. The Carthaginians had interfered neither in the civil dissensions that brought him to prominence nor in his ensuing struggle against the Mamertines of Messana. It was at some stage in this struggle that he and the Romans reportedly became friends. 22

Minatus: doc. V. 27-28 Μινάτο? Κόρουίος· Μαμερτϊνο?. Nenci (1982) 107172 argues that 'Mamertine' could have been used by Campanian mercenaries earlier. Cf. G. Manganare, Kokalos 1980-81, 183-84; Hoyos (1988) 36. Third-century Roman traders and mercenary officers overseas: L. Folius or Olius in Greece; Dinnius, ca. 252, and Lucius son of Gaius ca. 220/210, both in Egyptian service (E.S. Gruen, HWCR 1. 302, 2. 675 n.l6). 2 2 The rise of Hiero: Pol. 1.8.3-9.8, 7.8.1-4; Diod. 22.13; Justin 23.4; Zon. 8.6.15 (from Dio); de Sensi Sestito (1977) 9-62; Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 32-56. 20

II.

Preparations for War?

31

According to Dio's epitomator Zonaras, during the siege of the mutinous Campanian legion in Rhegium in 270 the Romans suffered hardships which Hiero relieved by sending over grain and soldiers. Hence an alliance between him and Rome. Later, when introducing the First Punic War, Zonaras and (in a surviving extract) Dio himself claim that the Carthaginians' pretext for fighting the Romans was their friendship with Hiero. It is in fact unlikely that the Romans and Hiero had a formal link, whether alliance or friendship, before 264. If they had, we should expect to hear more about it — for instance in Hiero's trenchant criticism of the Romans in 264 for acting in bad faith, or in Zonaras' own lengthy narrative of Roman-Punic pourparlers at the straits. On the other hand, contacts between the besieging consuls and Hiero in 270, even a gesture like a shipload of grain, are plausible. (He will hardly have sent troops: these he needed at home against the Mamertines.) Hiero had that other Campanian plague, the Mamertines, perplexing him in Sicily and might well bless a move which cut off encouragement to them from their kin across the straits. As for the Romans, they were keen to stress their loyalty, fides, towards their dispossessed allies the citizen-exiles of Rhegium. They would welcome a sign of approval from the premier Greek state of the west. Friendly pre-war Roman-Syracusan relations are often judged a fiction: but a fiction-maker could easily have fashioned a different and more pointed Punic grievance. Hiero did later on become the exemplar of enduring friendship with the Romans, but only after warring with them in the 260s. When the enduring friendship is mentioned by ancient writers, the episode in 270 is never adduced. Thus Zonaras' story probably embellishes a genuine contact which perhaps an annalistic source recorded, or perhaps an aggrieved Agrigentine.2^ Zonaras has the Romans make an 'agreement' with the Mamertines too, lest they send help to the besieged in Rhegium. Zon. 8.6.14. Roman concern to display their fides on behalf of the ejected Rhegines (Pol. 1.7.12) is illuminated by coins around 272 from Locri, a Roman ally not far away: the staters with the legends ΠΙΣΤΙΣ (= fides) and ΡΏΜΗ {Roma): C.M. Kraay, Greek Coins (London 1966) pi. 293r. Roman-Syracusan alliance, Zon. 8.6.15; friendship (φιλία), 8.8.3 = Dio frg. 43.1. Contact between Hiero and the Romans in 270 is seen by K.J. Beloch, 4.2. 483; G. de Sanctis, 2. 122; Walbank, Comm. 1. 53; Berve, 13-14; de Sensi (1974) 20, (1977) 53-54; Rizzo (1980) 1913; Eckstein (1987) 78 η. 20.

32

II.

Preparations for War?

Some scholars infer an actual Mamertine-Roman alliance before 264 from a casual phrase in Polybius. But we shall find that the phrase has a much simpler explanation. In 270 the consuls perhaps advised the Mamertines against aiding Rhegium, but equally possibly Zonaras is conveying an annalist's guess as to why the besieged Campanians failed to get help from an obvious source. Of course trade and other dealings between Romans and Mamertines can be assumed (legally many Mamertines were, or had been, Roman citizens) — and likewise an interest by the Senate in the Mamertines' relations with the Sicilian Greeks and the Carthaginians. But of interests of state, no evidence until, in the year 264, both a challenge and an opportunity dropped into the Romans' laps.

Zon. 8.6.14; Pol. 3-26.6 — the Romans took the Mamertines 'into friendship, and after that sent them aid; below, Chap. Ill §2, and cf. Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 41-42.

Chapter III The Mamertine Appeal In about the first half of May 264, an anxious body of Mamertine envoys arrived in Rome with a tale of disaster and an appeal. The Mamertines, one-time mercenaries of Agathocles and unemployed after his death, had compensated themselves by seizing Messana and expelling its male citizens in about 288. They were aggressive and rapacious: pillaging Gela and Camarina in the south in the 280s, allying with the Carthaginians against Pyrrhus, then after 276 raiding their recent allies' area of dominance. A Mamertine hegemony emerged in north-eastern Sicily, vassal and tributary towns mainly over the country west of volcanic Etna and along the north coast to Halaesa. Hiero of Syracuse had to confront these pests. At first things did not go too well: he met with a defeat at the Cyamosorus river, near Centuripa south-west of Etna. But the Mamertines could not exploit their victory and Syracusan success followed a few years later. No doubt to Hiero's own surprise, it produced the First Punic War.1

1. Difficulties with dates Thé chronology of events is crucial, but much disputed. The sole connected narrative, Polybius', is a two-page summary of Hiero's earlier career to explain why the Mamertines were appealing to the Romans. They had been defeated by Hiero: who 'not a long time before' had become strategus or general at Syracuse and, after recovering from the setback at the Cyamosorus, marched out again to win a crushing victory over them at the Longanus river. He then returned to Syracuse to be acclaimed king. Meanwhile, shut

1 The Mamertines and Hiero: Hoyos, Antichthon of earlier literature.

1985, 32-56, with bibliography

34

III. The Mamertine Appeal

up in Messana, the Mamertines turned to the Carthaginians and the Romans for help. 2 An incomplete extract from Diodorus gives several details of Hiero's campaigning, culminating in the battle at the Longanus. But then comes an item not in Polybius. The Mamertines, on the point of surrendering their city to 'the king', were saved by the commander of a Carthaginian fleet anchored at the isle of Lipara, one Hannibal — who first lulled 'the king' into inaction with congratulations on his victory, then put some troops into Messana. Hiero gave up the siege and went home.3 Other ancient writers add this or that. In an idyll datable to around 274 Hiero's contemporary and fellow-Sicilian, the poet Theocritus foretells the new hero's victories against the quaking Carthaginians — an inaccurate prophecy, for no hostilities followed. Justin and Zonaras have Hiero becoming Syracusan leader after Pyrrhus left Sicily, and Pausanias the second-century A.D. travel writer offers an actual and compatible date for it: 275/274.4 But there are problems. Polybius' account has none of the military details in Diodorus but only a report of the Longanus victory. Nor does he note Hannibal's ensuing rescue mission. Diodorus in turn says nothing of any Mamertine appeals after the Longanus — even Hannibal simply arrives on the scene — yet his details of Hiero's campaigning suggest an informed original source: probably Timaeus' history of Greek Sicily down to 264, or Philinus. Polybius has Hiero's acclamation as king, and the Mamertines' recourse to Carthage and Rome, result directly from the Longanus — yet six books later in his obituary of Hiero, who died in his nineties in 215, he gives the old king a 'reign' of fifty-four years, making 269 or (by inclusive reckoning) 268 the date for the Longanus and Hannibal's rescue. If so there was no direct connexion with the Roman intervention in 264 and the outbreak of the First Punic War. 5 Polybius looks self-contradictory on other points too. He seems to link the Mamertines' disaster closely in time to the one 2

Pol. 1.8.1-10.2. Diod. 22.13.1-8. 4 Theocr. Idyll 16.76-78, 102-3, cf. A.S. Gow, Theocritu? (Cambridge 1952) 307, 326; Justin 23.4.1; Zon. 8.6.15; Paus. 6.12.2 (126th Olympiad, year 1). 5 Hiero's obituary: Pol. 7.8.1-8. Date of death: de Sanctis (1967-68) 3.1. 317-22; Berve, 7, 84-85. 3

III.

The Marnatine Appeal

35

which befell their fellow-Campanians at Rhegium in 270: deprived of support from these because the Romans were besieging them, the Mamertines (he writes) were 'very promptly' chased into Messana by the Syracusans. He makes a later remark about the Romans taking the Mamertines into friendship 'and after that' going to their aid. He writes that among the Mamertines 'some' turned to the Carthaginians for help while 'others' sent envoys to Rome — two seemingly separate groups, each simultaneously and successfully committing the whole community to different allies.^ So Polybius is widely suspected of covering up something, not very efficiently. The Longanus, on this hypothesis, had nothing to do with the Mamertine appeal to the Romans five years later. By then the Mamertines were seeking Roman help not against Syracuse, but against their no-longer-welcome protectors the Carthaginians. Indeed the summariser of Roman wars, Florus, frames their appeal thus. In either case (especially the second) the Romans by agreeing to the appeal were offering a deliberate challenge to the Carthaginians. When Polybius and Zonaras present the Mamertines' appeal as due to the danger from Hiero and the Syracusans, it is a Roman cover-up. From the start, Roman tradition was anxious to veil the nakedness of Roman aggression towards the Carthaginians, the blatant greed Roman for Sicilian booty, and the brazen breach of the Philinus treaty. The veil was applied by combining some events of 269 with some in 264: pretending that the Longanus caused the Mamertines to appeal to the Romans, that the Carthaginians had no precedence in patronage over Messana, and that the war was due to Punic hostility.? In a variant theory, Hiero followed up his Longanus triumph in 269 with a second attack on Messana in 265 or 264: only to prompt the Carthaginians to a second rescue, but this time also prompting the Mamertines to appeal to the Romans. This might indeed allow Hiero to become king in 269 while still preserving the rest of Polybius' account. But it requires implausibly many 6 Timaeus' history went down to 264: Pol. 1.5.1. 'Very promptly': 1.8.2, cf. η. 10 below. 'And after that': 3-26.6, see §2 below. 'Some ... others' (ol μέν ... ol Sé): 1.10.1-2. 7 A small majority of scholars prefers 270/269 for the Longanus, notably G. de Sensi Sestito (1977) 223-32; also Meitzer, 2. 249-50, 552-55; Thiel (1954) 14548; Hoffmann (1969) 153-80; de Sensi (1971) 516-24; Molthagen (1975) 89127; Welwei (1978) 573-87.

36

III.

The Mamertine Appeal

events to occur in both 269 and 264: two nearly-successful attacks by Hiero, two swift Punic rescues, two separate Punic garrisons installed at Messana, two Syracusan retreats homeward. The theory is best left alone.^ Even if the Carthaginians did rescue the Mamertines in 269 and station a garrison there, it would not explain why the Romans should feel a need to contort chronology to justify their own actions in 264. They could just as well paint a propaganda picture of the faithless Africans abusing their position at Messana to rivet a cruel occupation on their hapless protégés, till finally, after five years, they drove them to appeal to the nearby champions of good faith, etcetera. One author indeed holds that 'the Carthaginians' misbehaviour' caused the appeal in 264. If there had been two Punic rescues and two garrisons between 269 and 264, the propaganda would be still easier — the first garrison forced to leave because they tried to transform rescue into rule; the second brought in to try the same trick anew, thus justifying to perfection the Mamertines' appeal to their kinsmen the Romans. That would be in line, too, with all the sources' assumption that aiding Messana meant fighting the Carthaginians. If, on the other hand, the Romans felt it essential to cover up a five-year gap, stitch together events of 269 and 264, and distort others, why then did they allow their enemies any justification at all for being in Messana? Yet even Zonaras' Dionic version, though careful to have the first Mamertine appeal go to Rome, allows the next to go to the Carthaginians on the ground that the Romans did not react promptly enough. Polybius also has the Mamertines in dire straits, even if not actually under siege: reason again for accepting the quickest aid. There is a further curiosity. While Roman authors from Fabius Pictor on were supposedly conflating and distorting the events, the detailed and respected histories of Philinus and Timaeus continued to circulate. Polybius in the mid-second century could consult both without trouble and both were being read generations later still. Yet Polybius, who is hard on other alleged mistakes and misrepresentations by Philinus and thinks very poorly of Timaeus, is silent on their versions of events from 269 to 264. Was this because he knew that theirs were true and his was false, but hoped 8

The theory of P. Meyer, 11-12, 32-34, 39; Berve, 14-15, 20-27; Petzold,149-53, 160-62, 176-77; Meier-Welcker, 25-27; implicitly too Huss (1985) 217. Against it, Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 35.

III. The Mamertine Appeal

37

that if he kept silent his résumé would one day outweigh their detailed narrative? That is unconvincing, to say the least. 9 Time-phrases in Polybius are often elastic. The Mamertines' débâcle followed the Roman siege of Rhegium in 270 'very promptly'; but the Campanian legionaries' seizure of Rhegium, after 282 (he dates it to 280), also 'very promptly' followed the Mamertine seizure of Messana in about 288. The Mamertine coup de main, in turn, happened 'not long before' both the Romans' war with Tarentum (begun in 281) and the siege of Rhegium. Polybius, cursorily surveying events down to 264, wants to depict the fortunes of the two contingents of Campanians in parallel, both in their rise and in their fall. Other ancient writers can be equally fuzzy with time-terms: for instance Justin, who writes of an event in the year 316 happening 'soon' after one in 323 and for whom Hiero became king 'soon' after becoming general although five years at a minimum separated these promotions (275/274 and 269 if not 264). 10 Worth noting is how, two chapters on and no longer practising parallelisms, Polybius writes that the Mamertines, 'after previously being deprived of support from Rhegium', had now suffered utter disaster: meaning at the Longanus. Here his phrasing denies a parallel in time. Hardly a decisive indicator, but it reinforces the point that such terms are flexible.11 Polybius does not mention the Carthaginians intervening after the Longanus — a serious problem for many. Now his narrative is very concise. The digression about Hiero and the Mamertines is put in to explain why the latter appealed to Rome, and with Hiero's victory and the Mamertines' desperate condition stated, he returns to his main theme: the Mamertines turned to the Carthaginians and the Romans, with momentous consequences. Straightaway the Punic presence at Messana is reported: 'some 9 'The Carthaginians' misbehaviour': Florus 1.18 [2.2],3 'Poenorum impotentia.' Polybius' criticisms of Philinus: 1.15.1-11, 1.58.5, 3-26.2-5 (this last on the 'treaty'); ofTimaeus: 12.3-16, 12.23-28a. Cf. Κ. Meister (1975) 3-55, 127-42. Pol. 1.7.5 (Rhegium seized 'very promptly', παρά πόδα?, after Messana; on the date cf. Chap. I n. 18) and 1.8.2 (Mamertine débâcle 'very promptly' after siege of Rhegium). 'Not long before': Pol. 1.7.1. Justin 15.2.3-4 (the year 316 'soon', mox, after 323), 23.4.2. On such casual or careless time-phrases: Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 37-42. 11 'Previously': 1.10.1. Ruschenbusch (1980-81) 72-73 sees this item as decisive for a 'later' Longanus.

38

III.

The Mamertine Appeal

[Mamertines] had recourse to the Carthaginians, and to these entrusted themselves and their citadel.' The phrasing should be noted: it fits Hannibal's intervention whether he acted on his own initiative (as Diodorus seems to indicate) or was responding to a rushed appeal from Messana which Diodorus' excerpt conceivably left out. 12 Diodorus in turn says nothing of the Mamertines appealing to Rome, but surviving extracts from his later books were roughly handled by the excerptors. The sizeable extract on Hiero's campaigns up to the Longanus begins in fragmentary fashion, and closes bizarrely with an item occurring after the Punic garrison's expulsion from Messana in summer 264. (Or, according to the excerpt, after the Carthaginians' and Hiero's expulsion.) The extract starts calling Hiero 'the king' after a while without explanation, and it pretty clearly covers two campaign years with only the barest hint of a break. Conceivably Diodorus reported the Mamertine embassy to Rome after narrating Hannibal's rescue of Messana and Hiero's return to Syracuse, for convenience or in accord with the actual order of events, only for the excerptor to end his extract with Hiero's return. Or else Diodorus' context for the appeal was quite different. A few paragraphs later, in his next book, w e find the Roman People sending a force to aid Messana on learning that the city was besieged by Carthaginians and Syracusans together. That is at a much later moment than Polybius and Zonaras report, and few moderns prefer Diodorus' version. But it implies that the Mamertines in Diodorus appealed to Rome likewise at a later moment than in Polybius and Zonaras. 1 3 12

'Some had recourse ... and entrusted' (1.10.1); see Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 42-43, 54-55; for this sense of the first verb cf. LSJ, 919 s.v., §§3-4. A literal meaning, 'some fled to/took refuge with' the Carthaginians, is plainly wrong here. Petzold, 147-48 oddly regards only 1.11.4 (where the Mamertines expel the Punic garrison) as Polybian evidence for the Carthaginians having put a garrison into Messana.

Close of Longanus extract, Diod. 22.13 9; Hiero 'king', n. 15 below. Two campaign years: Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 43-44, with references to earlier scholarship. Roman aid only on news of siege: 23.1.4. Ruschenbusch (198081) 65-66 stresses the inadequacies of the Hoeschelian set of excerpta; he suggests that Diodorus, with Philinus as his source, did report a Mamertine embassy to Rome straight after the Longanus, but the Hoeschelian excerptor left this out and produced a distorted order of events — i.e. postdating the Roman decision on aid (68, 70 n.13)·

III. The Mamertine Appeal

39

That Hiero 'reigned' for fifty-four years need mean only that he held practical supremacy for that period, as was long ago pointed out. Polybius makes it plain that Hiero was leader but not allpowerful in his early years. For instance he ran the risk that the Syracusans might 'make innovations' — that is, depose him as strategus — while he was away at war. Only after he got rid of his troublesome mercenaries at the river Cyamosorus could he 'carry on his rule in safety'. Conceivably, then, he used the defeat at the Cyamosorus to justify taking the special office of strategus autocrator, general with full powers, which commonly marked out an absolute ruler in a Greek republic; and that the year was 269 or 268. If some five years later he took the title of king, then for forty-nine of his fifty-four years of supremacy he did technically reign. Polybius could use the term without qualm. ^ Diodorus, who calls Hiero king even before the Longanus, may be anticipating the title, or Hiero may have been acclaimed king by his army on campaign (after returning home, he was so acclaimed 'by all the allies', according to Polybius). Ironically, to buttress 270/269 as the date for the Longanus moderns must view Diodorus as fallible here and Polybius as precise, whereas the rest of Diodorus' excerpt and the sequence of events in Polybius incur the opposite verdict — to the same end. 1 5 In sum, efforts to discredit the sequence of events in Polybius and Zonaras, by separating the Mamertine débâcle at the Longanus from their appeal to the Romans, founder on unconvincing evidence. If Hiero's campaigning in Diodorus covered two seasons, these in all likelihood occupied the year 265 and the first half of 264, with the Longanus fought probably in April or early May of 264. At Rome, May opened the year of office of the consuls Ap. Claudius Caudex and M. Fulvius Flaccus. It was Ap. Claudius

^ 'Reigned' = governed: Beloch, 4.2. 281; accepted by A. von Stauffenberg, 33; Heuss (1970) 16 n.22; Rizzo (1971) 101-103; see Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 3840. Ruschenbusch thinks that two separate traditions about Hiero's early years are reflected in the sources ([1980-81] 72-74). But all surviving evidence sets his rise to power in the middle 270s save for Polybius' phrase about a 54-year reign. 15 'King': Diod. 22.13.3-8, cf. de Sensi (1977) 61; Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 53. But 'irrig' to Luterbacher, 398, and Berve, 17-18 ('fälschlich' in his Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen [München 1974] 2. 734) — and tacitly unacceptable to all who accept Pol. 1.9.8 as recording the title being granted only after the victory.

40

III.

The Mamertine Appeal

who in the 129th Olympiad — after June 264 — led the legions into Sicily.

2. The ungrateful Mamertines Catastrophically beaten at the Longanus, the Mamertines — those who survived and got back to Messana, luckily only thirty kilometres away over the hills — prepared to beg for terms. The king, it seems, went on to put Messana under siege. But fate stepped in, rather predictably garbed as the Carthaginian commander Hannibal who 'happened' (Diodorus' word) to be at Lipara with a fleet, no doubt keeping an eye on Hiero's military progress. Hannibal with specious congratulations tricked him into inactivity, then entered Messana and persuaded the Mamertines to take in a Punic garrison. No doubt his fleet was anchored in the harbour by now. Hiero, content with the 'outstanding success' he had won, 'gave up the siege and returned to Syracuse'. It was the second time in half a century that the Carthaginians had saved Messana from Syracusan a t t a c k . 1 7 Hiero was surely not taken wholly by surprise. The stronger he grew, the keener would be the interest of Syracuse's old enemies. He had still won substantial successes: Mamertine might was smashed, their empire conquered and Syracusan outposts kept watch on Messana (as we learn later). The Carthaginian garrison was small; clearly they had no wish to launch a war so long as he left Messana itself alone. Content therefore with his 'outstanding success', as Diodorus puts it, 'he gave up the siege and returned to Syracuse'. There he was confirmed as king. But if the Mamertines were now safe — and under Punic protection — why send an embassy to Rome asking for help?

^ Date of the Longanus: Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 44-45 with n. 44. Consuls at this period entered office around 1 May: Beloch, 4.2. 271-73; de Sanctis, 3-1· 241; M. Gwyn Morgan, 90-91. 129th Olympiad, i.e. mid-264 to mid-260: Pol. 1.5.1; Hoyos, 44 η. 42. Diod. 22.13.6-8; Hoyos, 53-55. Punic rescue of Messana in 315: Diod. 19.65.5. 1 8 Diod. 22.13 7-8. Small garrison of probably 900 ( V or φ ' ) rather than the 40 (μ') of Diodorus' clearly corrupt text: Hoyos, 54 η. 80. 17

III. The Mamertine Appeal

41

It was not that they were already Roman allies (as some believe). True enough, Polybius does remark in a later book that the Romans, though not blameworthy on the ground of violating a nonexistent 'Philinus' treaty, could be faulted for the fact that 'they took the Mamertines into friendship and after that sent them aid on their appeal'. This has been seen as an unwary admission that before 264 the freebooters of Messana were already under Roman protection. Diodorus is called in to confirm this. As shown earlier, he writes that the Romans decided to send aid to Messana when they learned of the Carthaginians and Hiero besieging the place. Yet before this he reports that these two, moving up to besiege Messana, struck an alliance 'to make war on the Romans unless they vacated Sicily forthwith'. This reveals Roman forces already in the island, presumably at Messana: so it has been argued. Extra confirmation is sought from the Roman historical tradition. Livy, Florus and Orosius all term the Mamertines 'allies' when the aid was sent. Zonaras' epitome of Dio has the Romans vote aid but not send it: thus forcing the new allies to turn to the Carthaginians. In a narrow sense at least this claim had to be true. The natural order of events is that the Romans accepted the Mamertines' appeal, which meant accepting them as allies, and followed up by sending Ap. Claudius with an army to the straits. Obviously Roman tradition had an interest in presenting the Mamertines as allies first and aid recipients second, while blurring just when each occurred. This is scarcely evidence for the freebooters of Messana becoming allies months or years before they sent their appeal. Polybius and Livy stress that the Senate was seriously divided over aiding the Mamertines. That is odd if these were already allies. Alliance with the Mamertines should have concentrated the senators' minds wonderfully — should in fact have left little room for debate at all, however unsavoury the allies were. They had after all been unsavoury from the start.

19

Pol. 3.26.6; Diod. 23.1.2; cf. Chap. II n. 25. Mamertines already allies by 264: Reuss, 105-107; Luterbacher, 399; P. Bung, 145; Walbank, Comm. 1. 355, cf. 60, and in Calderone et al. (1981) 46; Hoffmann (1969) 172-74; Molthagen (1975) 100-103; Orzhenovsky, 11-26; Eckstein, GRBS1980, 176 n,4, and (1987) 91-92, 335-37.

42

III. The Mamertine Appeal

Rather than seeking to cover up the alliance, it would have been more relevant (and perhaps easier) for Polybius or his Roman source to cover up the character of the allies. It would have been hard for the Romans to choose more unedifying partners for their first venture outside Italy — as Hiero would soon remind them. Polybius underlines this aspect and virtually agrees with the king's strictures, both in his narrative and later on in the passage which supposedly reveals the alliance. Nor was there reason for Polybius to keep quiet about it for fear that revealing it would also reveal that the Romans had breached the treaty claimed by Philinus. For him there was no 'Philinus treaty' to b r e a k . The later passage occurs in a combative context: the question of this 'treaty'. In contexts combative or hasty, Polybius can be imprecise. Here, on Philinus' allegation, he affirms that Ί mentioned the topic in the introductory part of this work' — but it is other delicts of Philinus that he has mentioned earlier, nothing on the alleged treaty. And the Mamertines here astoundingly become the ones 'who seized by treachery not only Messana but also Rhegium'. That would truly revolutionise understanding of the affair at Rhegium, were it true. Of course it is not. In his first book again, Polybius has stated that the Mamertines 'had committed similar acts' (of treachery) 'not only towards Messana, but towards Rhegium' like the Campanian legion there. Their example had encouraged the Campanians, and Diodorus does report them helping these in some way — though not to the extent of taking part in the coup at Rhegium, far less of carrying it out themselves as Polybius might seem to imply. Polybius seems to be recalling his earlier remark in his later one, but very inaccurately. When he mentions a Roman-Mamertine alliance first, and Roman aid 'after that', nothing should be read into this beyond the plain fact noted above: that by accepting the Mamertines' appeal in 264 the Romans made them their allies, and the military aid followed afterwards. 21 Philinus as Diodorus' source at 22.13-23-1: so too La Bua (1966) esp. 231, 275 (utilised via Silenus of Cale Acte: a unique theory) and (1981) 242-43, 258; de Sensi (1977) esp. 197-99. Timaeus the source: P. Pédech (1952) 247, 249 n.l; Rizzo (1981) esp. 1916-20. 21 3.26.5-6 (in Paton's Loeb translation), 1.10.4; cf. Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 4142. The mistake about the Mamertines at 3-26.6 has rarely if ever drawn comment, perhaps because so blatant. Mamertine help to Campanians at Rhegium: 1.7.8; Diod. 22.1.2. Rich (1976) 121-23 similarly suggests that

III.

The Mamertine Appeal

43

Diodorus, as mentioned earlier, seems to have the Romans active in Sicily even before they aid Messana. Then he has the Roman People vote aid only on learning of the city being besieged by the Carthaginians and Syracusans. So late a timing for the vote is dubious. By the time Ap. Claudius arrived at Rhegium with his legions, the siege would have been going on for a good two months — an endurance surprising in the depleted Mamertines against the combined powers of two armies plus a Punic fleet offshore. Nor does Diodorus' version complement the revisionist thesis, in which the Romans aggressively sought to overturn a peaceable and unbroken Punic protectorate over Messana and thus provoked the Carthaginians (and Hiero) into besieging the place. But this is the order of events that Polybius is accused of covering up. 2 2 Diodorus' source, Philinus or another, may not been well informed about what went on at Rome. But there may have been a Roman representative in Messana when the Carthaginians and Hiero joined forces for the siege, as we shall see. By then, in any case, these new allies all but certainly knew that the Romans had accepted the Mamertines' appeal. Either item would explain Diodorus' comment about the Punic-Syracusan alliance aiming to force the Romans 'to evacuate Sicily'. Misdating the vote on aid could be a simple mistake or a faulty guess made by Diodorus' source, or by Diodorus recasting or misunderstanding his source, or by a far from faultless excerptor. In sum Polybius' account of events, despite being compressed, makes sense and can be supplemented from Diodorus'. In 264 the Mamertines, after being shattered at the Longanus, were rescued by Hannibal's intervention and garrison. They also sent an embassy to Rome with an appeal for aid which eventually succeeded. Of course this leads to more questions. Did the barbarians (as Greeks called them) really appeal to both states at once? Would they need — or be allowed — to appeal to Rome once they had accepted Hannibal's help? Surely they would realise that you cannot be allied to two great powers at once? Polybius either is careless or merely distinguishes in thought between the two stages; rejected by Eckstein (1987) 336 n. 5 (despite his n. 4), for whom the aid 'implies a separate and later diplomatic interaction', with Polybius' seeming reports of the Mamertines twice handing their city over to the consul (1.11.4, 1.11.9) taken as supporting evidence. On this see Chap. VI §1. 2 2 Minima for levy and marching to Rhegium: Chap. IV §4.

44

III. The Mamertine Appeal

The barbarians were in a bad plight and they may have been less sensitive to alliance-conventions than they should be. No doubt they remembered being allied with the Carthaginians against Pyrrhus only fifteen years before: just like the Romans who were still linked on paper in 264 to the Carthaginians under the treaty renewed in Pyrrhus' time. The Mamertines might reckon on becoming cosy protégés of both. An objection is that 'some' Mamertines (in Polybius' account) accepted Punic help for the whole community while 'others' sent a request for Roman aid. The more puzzling because otherwise the surviving Mamertine community acts as one in Polybius, in Diodorus, even in Zonaras. Most probably Polybius' meaning is compressed again: some Mamertines proposed accepting Hannibal's rescue, others proposed sending an embassy to Rome, and both proposals were acted on. Factions or civil discord are not to be inferred. Though defeated and desperate, the Mamertines could still calculate. Only Carthaginian forces could and did act instantly to save Messana; no doubt both Hiero and the Mamertines knew of the Punic fleet nearby. An embassy to Rome would take time and Roman aid — if they got it — even more time. Sending the embassy, in other words, had a different aim from 'having recourse' to the Carthaginians: Polybius indeed uses two separate terms. The Mamertines aimed at a more enduring association with the Romans whereas (it pretty certainly follows) they were not keen on it with their rescuers. A lasting Punic alliance would have drawbacks. The Carthaginians were a Sicilian power: so no more Mamertine raids into Punic Sicily, or against other Sicilian states friendly with the Carthaginians, like Agrigentum at this period. Worst of all, the protégés had no guarantee that their patrons would not, one day, find it more profitable to come to an understanding with the implacable Hiero at their expense. A Roman connexion promised fewer problems and larger opportunities. The Romans could readily cross to Sicily, yet were 23

United action: Diod. 22.13.6-7; Pol. 1.11.4; Zon. 8.8.7-9.3, cf. Dio, frg. 43.510. Factions and civil strife: Walbank, 1. 57; Cassola, GP179-80; Petzold, 166-67; de Sensi (1977) 63-66, offering an elaborate reconstruction (but see Hoyos, Antichthon 1985, 41 n.38); Frézouls, 971. Agrigentum well-disposed to Carthage in 264: Diod. 23.1.2. Perhaps attacked in Pyrrhus' time by the Mamertines: Walbank, 1. 108 on Pol. 1.43.2.

III. The Mamertine Appeal

45

based far away and had never shown interest in Sicilian powerpolitics. Thus they could provide help but would be less fussy about the Mamertines indulging their old habits (so these might well suppose). If anything the Romans might consider joining in, given their zeal for booty in war. And the promise of rich plunder became indeed one of the chief arguments used at Rome to win a vote for aid. No Mamertine alliance with the Carthaginians is attested. Had they struck one, we ought to have some hint of it — if only as echoes from a furious Philinus. Zonaras does report that the Carthaginians 'made peace' with Hiero 'both for themselves and for [the Mamertines]', but this is no sound support. It wrongly implies that Carthage and Syracuse were still at war (Hannibal's congratulations to Hiero after the Longanus, however insincere, disproves that idea) and in any case says nothing for a PunicMamertine alliance. If the Carthaginians, via Hannibal or the garrison-commander, did try to persuade their new protégés to agree to one, they failed. The Carthaginians faced the prospect of the Mamertine appeal to the Romans without alarm. At all events they made no recorded effort to obstruct the Mamertine embassy. They could hardly be ignorant of it: the Punic garrison probably entered Messana before the Mamertines sent off their envoys. But no Punic counter-move is reported — no message warning the Romans that Messana was now a Punic ally, for instance, or one sent under pressure by the Mamertine citizenry recalling their envoys.26 If the Carthaginians had made such an effort, Roman historical tradition would surely have let us know. It would have usefully reinforced the picture of Punic high-handedness and hostility. Two inferences follow. The Carthaginians made no formal agreement with the Mamertines, and at this stage they were not hostile to the Romans sending military aid to Messana. By implication they were prepared to co-operate with these, or at least to wait and see. They had troops in Messana and a naval squadron in the

25

Zon. 8.8.6. Cassola, GP 205, and Ruschenbusch (1980-81) 62-71 hold that the Punic garrison was not at Messana when the envoys set out for Rome, hence the Romans acted in ignorance of it; Lippold, Orpheus 1954, 155 implies the same.

2i>

46

ΠΙ. The Mamertine Appeal

straits; they would have a powerful voice in whatever might develop. Yet not long after, the Carthaginians were warring on their protégés and facing a fight with the Romans too. A total volte-face had occurred.

Chapter IV Debating the Appeal 1.

The Mamertines' deditio

Once at Rome (it should now have been about mid-May) the Mamertine envoys were most likely taken up by one of the new consuls, Ap. Claudius Caudex. His colleague, M. Fulvius Flaccus, was in Etruria besieging rebellious Volsinii. In their appeal the Mamertines 'handed over their city and asked for help on the ground of being kinsmen' — they were Campanian by origin. Like Polybius, Zonaras too has this bit of ethnic sentimentality. This most scholars agree, was an offer of deditio, a formal surrender of the Mamertine community and all its goods into the power of the Roman People: the Roman and Italic form of a custom common enough in the ancient world because it arose from a common enough situation.1 An earlier reported deditio in Italy deserves notice. In 343, so Livy narrates, the Campanians fell into dispute with the Samnites over the small community of the Sidicini but were defeated. Capua, chief city of Campania, was threatened with capture. So they sent envoys to Rome to appeal for friendship and help — only to be turned down by the Senate because the Romans were allied with the Samnites. Undeterred, the Campanians made a deditio oí themselves to the Roman people, thus becoming Roman subjects 1

Mamertine appeal: Pol. 1.10.2; Zon. 8.8.4. Cf. Frederiksen, 190 on the rather over-debated and over-subtilised concept of deditto. Deditio: E. Täubler (1913) 90-91; Dahlheim (1968) 56-58; Petzold, 168-69, 177-78; Schmitt, SVA 3. 135-37, no. 478; Molthagen (1975) 103 n.95; Rich (1976) 120; Harris (1979) 189 n.5; Eckstein (1987) 75-76. Scullard, CAH1.21 542-43. In Sicily in 344 Mamercus, Campanian tyrant of Catana, 'yielded himself into alliance' with Timoleon the liberator (Plutarch, Timol. 13.1). Petzold thinks that the Mamertines were unfamiliar with this 'spezifisch römischen Rechtsinstitut'; but Campanians, or many of them, had been Roman citizens for nearly a century by 264. War with Volsinii: MRR 1.202-203.

48

IV.

Debating the Appeal

and their goods Roman property, and impelling the Romans to warn the Samnites off this new possession. When the warning failed, the First Samnite War resulted. Whether all this really happened can be doubted. Clearly enough the episode has been well worked up by Livy, perhaps by his annalistic predecessors too. The details of the story (it has been suggested) were elaborated by annalists from the authentic deditio made by the Capuans in 211, after their failed rebellion during Hannibal's War. On the other hand the details of that deditio are very different: above all, in 211 the dediticii themselves had been at war with the Romans, but not so their ancestors in 343A closer model may be the Mamertine démarche in 264.2 Here the basic elements are very similar. A military defeat, ruin looming over the petitioners, envoys to Rome begging for aid, the Senate hesitant towards the Mamertines (in Polybius and Livy) just as in Livy towards the Campanians. The petitioners surrender themselves to the Roman People and now their appeal is accepted. Then a warning to their attackers to cease and desist, and war ensuing when these persist. Naturally differences remain. The Carthaginians — allies, nominally at least, of Rome like the Samnites in 343 — were not attacking Messana or even threatening the city, but on the contrary were protecting it from Hiero. Nor in 264 was there anyone in the rôle of the Sidicini. The order of events and some details differ: in 343 the Senate hesitates, the Campanians make a deditio, then the Senate agrees to send help; in 264 the deditio is made or at any rate offered first, the Senate hesitates, then the People vote to send help. Still, the most imaginative of annalists would not fashion the two sets of events in precise parallel from start to end. It remains a plausible possibility that Roman annalistic tradition fleshed out the Campanian appeal in 343 with items from the better-remembered appeal of the Mamertines. And if so, a few other items from Livy's report of 343 could throw light on 264. 2

Livy 7.29.3-31.12; see,e.g. J. Heurgon (1942) 157-58, 167-74 (disbe-lieves); Salmon (1967) 195-97 (ditto); Dahlheim (1968) 59-63 ('glaubwürdig'); Flurl, 10 n.l,184-88; Frederiksen, 180-90 (noting how the Mamertine deditio is 'strikingly similar', 189). K.F. Eisen, 161-62 sees the similarity only as illustrating the sorts of arguments deployed for such situations; cf. Petzold, 178 n. 1. Capuan deditio of 211: Livy 26.14-16.

IV.

Debating the Appeal

49

The Campanians declare that, by handing themselves and their city over to the Romans, they have become Roman subjects and a Roman responsibility. The Mamertines will have known well enough that, however the Campanian connexion with Rome had started in 343, their forebears had emerged after a while as Roman citizens, if without voting rights at Rome. They may have had hopes of the same in due course, and certainly that would put them in a powerful position in Sicily. In any case, an association with the Romans would have value. Livy's Campanians arrive asking for both aid and friendship; Roman aid to Messana led before long to a historic treaty between the two states. 3 It has been suggested that the Romans were looking merely to round off their interests in the south by taking the Italic-born Mamertines under their wing. On this view the deditio had a particular import: to accept the Mamertines as dediticii achieved the desired extension of hegemony without offence to the Romans' newly-acquired Greek allies, who would have been upset had the freebooters become allies, socii. War then followed because the Carthaginians and Syracusans were alarmed at this move into Sicily and the Romans' refusal to back down from it. Besides (the thesis adds) many individual aristocrats were in favour of a war, notably Ap. Claudius, even though the bulk of the Senate was not.4 3 Friendship (amicitia) and aid (auxilium): Livy 7.30.1. Treaty with Messana: Schmitt (η. 1 above). Citizens sine suffragio, cf. A.N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizensbip2· (Oxford 1973) 39-43. For Petzold, 177-78, and de Sensi (1977) 76, the Romans on accepting the appeal maintained that Messana was now Roman territory. Eisen, 163-64, following an earlier scholar, M. Schermann (Der erste punische Krieg im Liebte der livianischen Tradition [Diss. Tübingen 1905], 17), infers that prointervention Roman senators argued that Sicily entire belonged to Italy. These theories draw on Florus, 1.18 [2.2],2 — Sicily as 'opulentissimam in proximo praedam quodam modo Italiae suae abscissam et quasi revolsam'. But 'praeda', booty, is not rightful property, and Florus' comments on Roman and Punic expansionism reflect a later era's moralising interests (Chap. II §2). ^ Petzold, 175-79; 'das Ziel konnte nicht die Eroberung Siziliens sein, auch nicht der Krieg gegen Syrakus, sondern zunächst nur die Übernahme Messanas und der Vollzug der in Zusammenhang mit der deditio stehenden Maßnahmen' (179). Similarly Schwarte (1972) 217-18; Dahlheim (1977) 12-16; cf. R.M. Errington (1971) 16. Earlier views of this sort in P. Meyer, 43, 79; T. Frank, CAH1 (1928) 671-72; Staufenberg, 24-28, 31; P. Bung, 137; Thiel (1954) 129, 135-36; Walbank, Comm. 1. 60. Eckstein (1987) 91 holds that the aid-decision 'must remain to some extent a mystery to us' but was largely motivated by fides towards an ally (cf. η. 10 below, and Chap. Ill n. 19).

50

IV. Debating the Appeal

The first interpretation would prefer dating the battle at the Longanus to 270/269, with the Mamertines no longer under military threat in 264: otherwise the Romans could hardly suppose that they could peaceably embrace the Mamertines under Hiero's victorious nose. In fact the battle (we have seen) was fought probably in early to mid-264 itself. In any case the Mamertines did become proper socii before long: so the supposed tenderness for Greek allied sensitivity must have been shortlived to say the least. Worst of all, the thesis can be accepted only by jettisoning much else that our sources report. Polybius and some of the Roman tradition notice Roman acquisitiveness; all sources make it clear that the Romans expected war if they accepted the appeal from Messana. Nor was this hidden from the voters. Another theory is that the Roman authorities did expect a war — but misled voters into accepting the Mamertine appeal by suggesting that war would not result. Yet one main enticement to them, as Polybius makes clear, was the promise of 'obvious and sizeable benefits to each person individually' — in a word, booty. 5 The Mamertines could hardly reckon on winning help simply with sentimental rhetoric about kinship or about Messana becoming Roman property. One good way to a Roman's heart was to mention plunder, preferably easy and plentiful — a topic on which the Mamertines were Sicily's experts. (On the other hand, it was not the sort of topic to borrow for the Campanians' appeal in 343.) It certainly appealed to the ordinary citizens of Rome when it was put to them. Polybius stresses how the Romans were in need of 'every sort of repair' after the damage done by past wars — Pyrrhus' comes most readily to mind. This has been doubted. The Romans' booty from Sicily in 264 and 263 was not all that large, so a few moderns have held. Nor was the war-indemnity imposed on Hiero in the peace of 263: only a hundred talents over fifteen years. Hence (it is argued) their original reason for intervening must have been political and strategic. This is not persuasive. The Romans were not prescient, even about booty. Besides, Hiero's indemnity is no guide to the preceding quantity of plunder; the town of

5

Pol. 1.11.2. Voters misled: de Sanctis, 3-1. 95-99; Cassola, GP182.

IV.

Debating the Appeal

51

Hadranum was stormed, and Catana on being taken surely yielded up more than a famous sundial mentioned by Pliny the E l d e r . 6 The envoys could add other points. Livy has the Campanians in 343 stress how risky for Rome it will be if Campania is taken over by the Samnites, and how advantageous if by the Romans: 'if you defend us, we shall belong to you; if you desert us, to the Samnites', and so on. Now Polybius conveys that the 'obvious and sizeable benefits to each person individually' did not alone prompt the Roman People in the end to vote aid. Another motive was the safety of the Roman state. Taken together, Livy on 343 and Polybius on 264 would indicate that the Mamertine envoys also claimed that their plight represented a Punic threat,' to Italy itself.7 Whether or not they did, Polybius certainly affirms it. For him, in fact, it is the crucial factor in the thinking of the Romans in 264, especially in the Senate. And the threat was posed by the Carthaginians.

2.

The Romans ' debates

The Romans, writes Polybius, were caught between (on the one hand) the 'illogic' of helping the disreputable Mamertines despite punishing their counterparts at Rhegium and, on the other hand, the need to stop the Carthaginians from becoming masters of Messana. For the Carthaginians 'had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides,' and 'were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas'; thus 'once Messana had fallen into their hands, they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily.' Then they could use Messana as a bridge to Italy.

^ Hiero's indemnity: Chap. VII §2 below. Hadranum: Diod. 23-4.1. Catana 'capta' and its sundial 'deportatum' (suggesting military capture and looting): Pliny, NH 7.214. Small-booty thesis: Molthagen (1975) 126 n. 223; rather differently de Sanctis, 3.1. 97 (booty not a factor, because at the time of the appeal Hiero was still friendly with Rome, and later booty from Punic Sicily was small). 7

Livy 7.3O.9-IO, 17-19; Pol. 1.11.2. The Campanians argue too that nothing in the Romans' treaty with the Samnites forbids accepting other allies too (Livy 7.30.4); this might echo another Mamertine point, but need not as it is an obvious one in the situation pictured for 343·

52

IV.

Debating the Appeal

This 'Punic threat' is stated by Zonaras too, thus was in Dio's account — even though the other Dionic theme is the territorial acquisitiveness of both the Romans and the Carthaginians. It remains the accepted view that in 264 the Romans were expecting — or even seeking — a Punic war.® Still, Polybius' analysis calls for cautious appraisal. As noted earlier, the Punic 'empire' was not in fact expanding. Nor was it as big as Polybius claims; he exaggerates the size even of their Sicilian dominion. That Punic expansionism existed, or was seriously alarming the leading men of the Roman republic, in 264 is hard to believe. If it is nevertheless true, the sequel is odd. When hostilities ensued, even after a stiff battle with the Punic forces outside Messana they directed themselves vigorously, first in 264 and then during 263, to warring against Syracuse. And once Hiero made peace, they cut their forces in Sicily by half.9 Rescuing the Mamertines from Hiero did not, in itself, give the Carthaginians a diplomatic or logical right to fight any third party whom the Mamertines might also call in. The Carthaginians might be annoyed, might protest, might try to put pressure on the Mamertines to withdraw the call (in fact they did none of these things): but if the Romans accepted the appeal they were not thereby walking automatically into a state of war against the Carthaginians. For that further steps would be necessary — most obviously some sort of provocation, like attacking and massacring the garrison in the citadel of Messana while blaming it for the affray. Yet no provocation took place. Soon the garrison was induced to leave the citadel by a mixture of threats and cajolery from the Mamertines. It marched out of Messana unmolested. Its one

8

Pol. 1.10.3 (άλογίαν)-10.9, tr. Paton; Zon. 8.8.4-5. Ruschenbusch (1984) 26365 suggests an echo, at 1.10.5-9 (Punic expansionism and the threat to Italy), of Thucydides 6.90 (Alcibiades' claim that if she conquers Sicily, Athens will then attack the West and after that the Peloponnese) — and takes it for granted that it was Timaeus in his account of 264 who echoed Thucydides, with Fabius Pictor faithfully echoing Timaeus in turn, and Polybius in third place echoing Fabius equally faithfully. (This assumes Timaeus covered the Mamertine appeal and subsequent developments.) Such mechanical repetition is quite implausible in Polybius at least: cf. Hoyos, Antichthon 1989 [1991] 54-56. If he echoes Thucydides deliberately, he is even more probably imposing his own ideas of who the expected enemy was in 264, and what the arguments.

9

Chap. VII.

IV. Debating the Appeal

53

known casualty was its commander, executed by his superiors for spinelessness. Next and interestingly, the Carthaginians launched a sea and land siege of the city they had just been protecting. When a Roman army arrived at Rhegium and its commander, the consul Ap. Claudius, tried to bring it over to Sicily, they moved to prevent this by force. Hostilities ensued. Did the Romans already know, when they debated the Mamertine appeal, that the Carthaginians would react thus — that they would, in effect, do the Romans the favour of launching the war which the Romans wanted? There are more oddities. When the consul reached Rhegium with his legions and found Punic and Syracusan forces besieging his new protégés, he offered talks. Ap. Claudius himself, we have seen, had pretty certainly supported the Mamertine appeal. Even if he and like-minded senators backed aid because they expected it to result in a Carthaginian war, the appeal had been against Syracuse. Appius could not be surprised to find Syracusan forces also besieging Messana. Unless he and his friends had meanwhile forgotten about Syracuse, like our sources. Was the offer of talks a mere stratagem to cover his crossing from Rhegium? None of the sources suggests this, aware though they are of the consul's problems in getting across. Frontinus records a stratagem that he did use, but it was not the offer of talks (though, as will be seen, it can imply that talks had preceded). Polybius treats the offer as serious: Appius, he writes, made it because of the strength of the allies' positions by land and sea. Ap. Claudius, it should follow, was a poor leader politically and also militarily, and an easily discouraged one. But this judgement does not fit his decisive actions once the talks failed. His offer to talk makes more sense if the number of his expected antagonists had doubled since aid was voted. Many Romans, in sum, may have been looking for a war in 264, Ap. Claudius among them. But not with the Carthaginians.

3• The Roman war-aims in 264 The Romans' dominance over Greek Italy was recent and they had not gained it without a fair amount of bloodshed. The Mamertines were not the sole community that could send appeals for rescue to neighbouring kinsmen. In 264 it was only sixteen

54

IV.

Debating the Appeal

years since Italian Greeks had summoned the king of a relatively small Greek state to their aid against the Romans, with much resulting damage to the Roman people. Epirus was now out of the power-equation, but there were other possibilities. Hiero's Syracuse cuts no great figure in third-century power relations — barely able to cope with the Mamertines, no match for two consular armies in 263, later the Romans' loyal mini-ally. Probably our ancient sources, Polybius included, saw it so too. Yet only recently Syracusan power had been on a par with Punic. Agathocles had invaded North Africa less than fifty years before and had got very near to crushing the age-old enemy; in his later years he had extended Syracusan influence even into southern Italy. Hiero's victory over the Mamertines and near-capture of Messana made the Syracusans stronger than at any moment since 289. Given time and more success, what might he try — and how might the Greeks in southern Italy react? These could be grounds for acting promptly to curb him, before he did grow too strong. His present military forces were limited (he had fewer than 12,000 men at the Longanus) and Messana offered itself as a bridgehead, an ally with a Syracusan score to settle. The war could be sharp but short. A victorious bellum Syracusanum would in turn mean honour and profit for the general, booty and benefits for everyone. Later that year Hiero himself accused the Romans of nefarious designs on Sicily. By contrast a conflict with Carthage, even if confined to Sicily — and even the most hopeful hawk could scarcely guarantee that — would hardly be short or cheap.1® 10

So too Heuss (1970) 27-28, 35-40; Molthagen (1975) 89-106, 121-26, but with a good many unconvincing additions, especially chronological. Against both, H.H. Scullard, CAH122. 541. For Lippold ( oiv καθολικώτερόν πως έχρήσαντο κτλ.; Casaubon and Schweighaeuser < ο&τω > καθολικώτερόν πως. Better perhaps < οΐιτοι μέν > καθολικώτερόν πως, to contrast with ήμίν δ' [21.9].) Hoffmann's thesis (prev. n.) refuted by Eucken, 109-14; cf. Rich (1976) 35 n. 50; Mantel, 78-79, 103-104; Seibert, FzH 139-43. Evidence for war being declared before Hannibal crossed the Ebro is plausibly adduced by Eckstein (1983) 255-67: the Po-valley Latin colonies Placentia and Cremona were founded after war had been declared and word had arrived of the Ebro crossing (Pol. 3.40.2-3), on 31 May 218 (Asconius, In Pisonianam 3C). Cf Chap. XV §1 with n. 8.

224

XIV.

Saguntum Besieged

Moreover, if the war-embassy in 218 was due to Hannibal's Ebro-crossing or his preparations for it, then Polybius must be wrong — or lying — when he reports him learning of the declaration of war 'early in the spring' and at New Carthage, with his army not yet out of winter quarters. He must be lying earlier too, in having Fabius Pictor base the ultimatum on the sack of Saguntum. These would presumably be farther examples of his often-inferred unscrupulousness, once more done in the teeth of plenty of other narratives freely available to his readers; much as though he expected his version to become ultimately the only one read, or at least the one which readers would always believe (even his mis-citations of other writers). This is, to say the least, unconvincing. Again, he has Hannibal announce his plan for invading Italy to the troops assembled at New Carthage in spring 218: another supposed falsehood, because Hannibal supposedly cannot have conceived his plan so early or would not have stated it publicly if he had. Yet Hannibal had had up to three months, during the winter, to plan his moves if the Romans should react adversely to the fall of Saguntum, and he was addressing the troops who very soon had to carry his plan out. Polybius' report involves nothing implausible.^ He is also consistent in his ordering of events. According to him, the news of Hannibal's Ebro-crossing reached Rome not long after the war-embassy returned from Carthage. Why that embassy took so long (if it did) to come home is part of the chronological maze of early 218, to be looked at in due course; but the item confirms that, for Polybius, the declaration of war was over Saguntum, not the E b r o . 9 Quite another explanation for why the Romans failed to help the besieged needs mention. The Senate supposedly was postponing action until the next consuls entered office — that is, until the new year 218. The current consuls had, pretty certainly, already sailed to teach Demetrius of Pharos his lesson when news of the Saguntine siege arrived; and the Senate is known to have ® 'Early in the spring', Pol. 3-34.6; just after hearing of the declaration of war, 34.7; Saguntum as Pictor's reason for Roman ultimatum, 3.8.7-8. Hannibal had not yet conceived the invasion plan etc.: Schwarte (1983) 54-55; cf. Walbank, 1. 365-66, who holds that Hannibal cannot yet have heard of the war-declaration (dating this between mid-March and June 218) so that his speech in Polybius must be fiction. 9

Pol. 3.40.2; Chap. XVI §1.

XIV.

Saguntum Besieged

225

deferred a war for various reasons 'to the new consuls', ad novos cónsules, in 172 and probably in 150. 1 0 Notable differences, though, separate those situations from that of 219- Against Macedón in 171, and in 150 against Carthage (this only after strong debate), senators were agreed on war, and solely concerned to initiate war at Roman convenience. No less important, their prospective enemies were almost pathetically anxious to avoid it. Contrastingly in 219 Hannibal was ready to push the matter of Saguntum as far as war — whereas, as will be seen, the Senate was far from agreed on action. Nor would it have been all to Roman advantage to delay a Punic war to 218: the strategic advantage of a Hannibal bogged down for months outside Saguntum was lost once he took the town and refreshed his forces in winter quarters. Why, in any case, should Roman annalists and Polybius himself ignore a Senate decision confirming, for all to see, what Polybius himself claims — that from autumn 220 the Romans were resolved on war if Hannibal molested Saguntum' Not to mention that that would have averted any need to fiddle with chronology and content in Valerius' and Baebius' embassy. This theory likewise fails to persuade. 11 One reason why the Romans failed to act was, very likely, the war in Illyria as Polybius claims. News of Hannibal besieging Saguntum probably did arrive only after the consuls had gone to war, for afterwards, with fighting ended and Illyrian affairs all settled, it was still only 'as summer was ending' that L. Aemilius Paullus returned (Polybius ignores his colleague M. Livius Salinator's participation). While they were away, the Senate could hardly decide on military measures that effectively entailed a new war with the Carthaginians. Nor could it be predicted when they would return. Still this cannot be the whole story. The consuls' early victories could have freed at least one for recall (a praetor could Rich (1976) 38-44, 116-18; cf. Sumner (1966) 11, (1967) 244; Eckstein (1983) 267; Briscoe, CAH 8 2 .45. Postponement in 172 and 150 ad novos cónsules. Livy 42.18.2 (Rich thinks from Polybius) and per. 48; Rich, 48-49, 99-100. 1 1 Debate in 152-151: Pol. 36.2.1-4; A. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (Oxford 1967) 276-80; Cato the Censor (Oxford 1978) 128-29, 283-84; Walbank, Comm. 3 (1979) 650-55; Harris, CAH82 (1989) 127-28. Rich (1976) 111 both insists that in 218 the Senate had resolved on war and yet believes Dio's story of serious debate when news of the sack then arrived (see below) — conceding that a debate at such a stage was 'unusual, if not unique'. 10

226

XIV.

Saguntum Besieged

replace him). Any action against Hannibal would have to be prompt, for the Romans could hardly be sure of the Saguntines holding out indefinitely, perhaps into 218, and after Aemilius' return it was not yet too late to act if the Senate wanted war. in 218, although the consul P. Scipio's original forces were switched to dealing with rebellion in Cisalpine Gaul and he had to levy fresh legions for Spain, he still managed to set forth during the summer. Another factor must have contributed to inaction in 219. 12 2.

The Romans in debate

Roman hesitation during the siege is suggested by various sources. Appian, for instance, alleges a debate at Rome following Valerius' and Baebius' return (in 219, of course): some wanted to help the besieged, others opposed this — because the Ebro accord had guaranteed freedom to the Saguntines and 'people even when besieged were still free'. The opponents won. Livy, as noted earlier, has an embassy decreed before the siege but rescinded when news of the siege arrives, then a full-scale Senate debate before Valerius' and Baebius' mission is decreed. Florus insists on the Romans' attachment to diplomatic propriety, thus accounting both for the alleged embassy in 219 and, implicitly, for the lack of practical aid.1^ Roman temporising is understandable, even if later tradition felt it needed embroidering. Valerius and Baebius would hardly hide their mission's ill-success; but there was no point sending another with a similar agenda once sailing resumed, and surely no interest in a more conciliatory embassy. Across the Adriatic, too, Demetrius of Pharos had begun to attract Roman notice. Therefore, as suggested earlier, in early 219 the Senate might well be waiting to see what move Hannibal made, if any. News of the 'As summer was ending', Pol. 3.19.12. Second Illyrian War a factor: Meitzer, 2. 442-44; Pareti (1932) 41; Astin (1967) 595-96; Badian, Studies (1964) 15-16; Picard (1967) 142, 144; Errington (1970) 51-52; Meister (1975) 145; Welwei (1977) 167-69; Scullard, CAH82. 35-36; Briscoe, ibid. 45. P. Scipio in 218: Sumner (1966) 15; Proctor, 52-62; Lazenby, 49-51; Eckstein (1987) 27-29. App. Iber. 11.43; Livy 21.6.4-8, cf. 7.1 'dum ea Romani parant consultantque, iam Saguntum summa vi oppugnabatur'; Florus 1.22 [2.61.5; cf. Chap. XIII §2 with η. 8.

XIV.

Saguntum Besieged

227

siege would then prompt renewed discussions. Some leading men would certainly demand action to save the Saguntines and, more than that, to discipline the Carthaginians. Just as Demetrius was being punished for unruly and suspect behaviour, so too must Hannibal and his countrymen. Others might counter that the Saguntines' value to Roman interests was really marginal — they had counted for little enough before 220 — and any use that they did have could quite well be taken over by Emporiae, especially now that Punic Spain extended to the Ebro. One key feature of course differentiated Hannibal from Demetrius of Pharos: the Carthaginian was leader of a major power. After the strains of the earlier war, to many it must seem less than politic to leap lightly into a second. Some senators may well have thought or hoped that Hannibal was acting without authority from Carthage. So Q. Fabius Maximus urges in Silius' and (in effect) Zonaras' Senate debate over peace or war in 218. More significantly, so argued Fabius Pictor, contemporary and fellow-senator, when he came to write his history.1"* It is widely held that Dio and Zonaras correctly report the Senate debating, in 218, how to react to Saguntum's sacking. If so Polybius again errs — or lies — when he denies this. The sponsor of immediate war in Zonaras is L. Cornelius Lentulus, and both Dio's own fragmentary text and Silius' verses call him 'Lentulus'. His opponent, urging caution and the merits of peace, is Q. Fabius Maximus (the later Delayer against Hannibal) in Zonaras, 'Fabius' in Silius. Lentulus, at any rate, is seen as proof of the post-sack debate: L. Cornelius Lentulus, though consul in 237, was not a prominent figure by 218 whereas (it is argued) a fictitious debate would have had a more notable protagonist. And since Silius, a

Fabius Maximus: Silius 1.679-86; Zon. 8.22.3. Pictor: Pol. 3.8.6-9, cf. 3.9.4. The Romans uncertain or divided in 219 over Saguntum: Meyer, 2. 365 (sense of guilt plus influence of northward-looking continental expansionists); de Sanctis, 3.1. 415; Täubler (1921) 75-80; Groag, 70-72; Otto, 513; Treves, 33; Kolbe, 38; Kramer, 23; Warmington (1964) 211; Picard (1967) 142, 144, and (1969) 247; Astin, 595; Meister (1975) 145; Schwarte (1983) 65 (all infer dissensions of one sort or other between pro-war and anti-war circles); Eucken, 115-18 (sense of fides towards Saguntines balanced by wish to avoid breach with Carthaginians); Scardigli, 274, 277 (uncertainty because Saguntines not formal socii). Twyman's and Seibert's views: Chap. XIII n. 4.

14

228

XIV.

Saguntum Besieged

hundred years before Dio, mentions the debate too, arguably it went back to annalistic s o u r c e s . 1 5 A debate on the Saguntum question is indeed likely — but during the siege. Livy states this, although he first dates everything (siege and all) to 218 and realises the impossibility of this only later. In turn he knows nothing of one after Saguntum's fall, even though he is eloquent about senators' grief, shame and alarm when they hear of the sack and foresee another Punic war. Appian too sets it in 219 — and, though not often stressed, so does Silius. He has the senators meet to hear an appeal for help from besieged Saguntum, listen to Lentulus' and Fabius' arguments, and send stern envoys to the besieger and the Carthaginians. Logically enough in an epic poem, this embassy on proceeding to Carthage metamorphoses into the war-embassy of 218. In fact Silius' blending extends to naming the envoys 'Fabius' (after the leader of the war-embassy) and 'Poplicola', meaning a Valerius, presumably referring to Valerius Flaccus, although Silius cheerfully renames him; and they declare war at Carthage well before Hannibal captures Saguntum. Again — a point rarely noted — Zonaras places the debate not at the news of the sack of Saguntum but later: when Hannibal is marching for Italy. This looks like the work of a dramaticallyminded, and chronologically inept, source of Dio's, with either the source or Dio exploiting a crucial moment of history to draft some sententious and long-winded orations. That there was debate during 219 over how to react to the siege is thus not only probable

The debate in 218: Dio, frgs. 55.1-10, 57.12 (perhaps three speeches, cf. Patón in Loeb edn., 2. 71 n. 1; all largely platitudes on war and peace; 'Lentulus' addressed at 55.5); Zon. 8.22.1-3; Silius, 1.609-94 ('Fabius', 679, 686). Accepted by (e.g.) Gilbert, 203, 207-208; Meitzer, 2. 449-51; Drachmann, 17; Täubler, 79-80, 84-86, 89-90; Meyer, 2. 347-48, 365; Schnabel, 115; Mazzarino, 146; Bung, 33-34; Walbank, 1. 332-34; Dorey, 7-9; Cassola, GP 236-38; Lippold (1963) 139; Pédech (1964) 185-86; Sumner (1966) 16-24; Astin, 579-80, 582, 586; Gauthier, 97; Scullard (1973) 40-41, and CAH 8 2 (1989) 36-38; Meister (1975) 168; Rieh, 38-44, 109-17; Sancho Royo, 101-102; Welwei (1977) 156-57, 172-73; Schwarte (1983) 1-4, 12-13, 65-70; Caven, 91; Develin (1985) 264, but sceptical of Q. Fabius' involvement; Scullard, CAH 8 2 . 36-38; Briscoe, ibid. 45; Vollmer, 138; Scardigli, 111 (implies); Seibert, Hann. 80-82. No debate: Pol. 3.20.1-2; Livy 21.16.2, 17.1 (implies); Groag, 70-71; Warmington (1964) 211; Harris (1979) 203-204, 269-70, arguing Dio's almost certain lack of reliable sources and the limpness of the speeches, plus the absence of any such debate in Livy.

XIV.

Saguntum Besieged

229

in itself but reported by writers earlier than Dio. But annalists with a dramatic and sententious bent could be tempted to highlight the really historic moment, when the Senate met to decree the ultimatum after the sack of Saguntum. That peace and war were debated then — even perhaps for the first time — would be an easy assumption. ^ Nevertheless Lentulus as a spokesman in 219 could be genuine. His name might have been preserved with the memory of a debate occurring at some stage. Not so Q. Fabius Maximus: his peacespokesman's rôle overlaps with the stories discussed earlier about him sending a letter to the Carthaginians 'about peace terms', or an ultimatum via a spear and herald's staff — stories entangled with confused traditions about the Sardinia crisis of 237, his own first consulate in 233, and the war-embassy of 218. Still more surprisingly, no such debate figures in Plutarch's biography of him. Yet reports of it, if available to Silius and Dio, were available to other writers, and Livy and Plutarch — both of them fond of moral comment and dramatic anecdote, and both full of admiration for old Roman heroes in general and Fabius Maximus in particular — could be expected to mention his rôle if it was plausibly recorded. 'Q. Fabius' first turns up in Livy as one of the five ultimatumbearers to Carthage in 218. But even this seems mistaken. If one scene in the traditions about the Punic wars captured ancient memories and imaginations, even Polybius', it was the dramatic exchange between the chief Roman ambassador and the Carthaginian senators: how he held up a fold of his toga to offer peace or war, they shouted to him to give what he wished, and he let fall war. Yet neither Plutarch nor the laudatory inscription set up to Fabius Maximus by the emperor Augustus — nor even that miscellany of biographical tidbits, the De Vins Illustribus — knows of him as the envoy.

Livy 21.6.3-4, 15.3-6; Silius, 2.270-390 (Roman declaration of war), 650-95 (sack of Saguntum); Zon. 8.22.1-2. Schwarte (1983) 14-15, 30-31, 34-35 holds that Silius followed Valerius Antias, who deliberately switched the debate from 218 to 219; but see Hoyos (1985) 135-38; J. Küppers, 110-14. Vollmer, 99, sees the conflation as Silius' own doing. Silius' envoys, 2.1-10. Debate in 219: Otto, 503, 512; Groag, 70-73, but with fresh Roman hesitation and a new debate after the sack; Warmington (1964) 211; Staveley, CAH1.22. 451, 453. Seibert, Hann. 60-62, infers a debate when Valerius and Baebius returned (as well as one in 218).

16

230

XIV.

Saguntum Besieged

Dio, plainly following a different tradition, names the envoy Marcus Fabius and, for once in a discrepancy between earlier and later writers, the later looks more reliable. It was likely enough M. Fabius Buteo, consul in 245 and by now probably the most senior ex-consul living (by 216 he was the most senior ex-censor). Buteo is historically rather an obscure Fabius, rather like L. Lentulus among the Cornelii; even as consul he had scarcely shone. It need cause little surprise if some writers assumed the ambassador to be the much more famous Delayer. Quite likely the main speaker in 219 for caution and delay was equally obscure to later annalists. Possibly an obscure Fabius, since Silius uses the name — we might wonder about Buteo again — whereas in the Senate sat, as later writers well knew, the man who would be the exemplar of caution and delay, not only in the field but in debates on strategy, as in 205 when he opposed P. Scipio's proposal for invading Africa because Hannibal was still at large in Italy. Conceivably he did support the spokesman urging caution. That M. Buteo later headed the war-embassy need not rule out his being the peace protagonist; in 218 he would be doing his duty as the republic required. Interestingly L. Lentulus, bellicose though he was, was not a war envoy. ^ What attitude the consuls Aemilius and Livius held is unknown. They would have been absent for the debate, if this was held soon after news of the siege arrived; by then they had left for the Adriatic. But on their return in late summer, if not earlier, by letter, they would have to express an opinion. A negative inference can be made: they did not both back Lentulus' demand for war. If they had, as consuls in office and victorious consuls at that, the proponents of restraint — even if Fabius Maximus was one — would have had little chance of frustrating action. More likely, at least one of the consuls favoured restraint or sat on the fence. Livius certainly had other things on his mind: on his return he faced prosecution for mishandling Illyrian booty (and in

Envoys in 218: Livy 21.18.1 and 3. Fabius Maximus' Augustan inscription: ILS 56. Marcus Fabius: Dio, frg. 55.10 = Zon. 8.22.7. Buteo oldest living censorius in 216: Livy 23.22.10-11. See de Sanctis, 3.2. 1 n. 1; MRR 1. 241 n. 7; Walbank, 1. 333; Càssola, GP 279-81; Scullard (1975) 42, 274; Rich, 28 n. 26; Seibert, Hann. 82-83. Q. Fabius' spear-and-staff messages: Chap. X §1. Fabius in 205: Livy 28.40-42; Plutarch, Fabius 25-26.

XIV.

Saguntum Besieged

231

218 he was convicted). Aemilius suffered damage too from the affair. 18 Little can be surmised about other senators' attitudes without making arbitrary assumptions. All Cornelii Scipiones have been judged 'hawks' because of a supposed association with aggressive commercial interests keen to take over Punic markets and perhaps Punic possessions also, like Spain. Arguably too the energetic C. Flaminius, consul in 223 and again in 217, would have pressed for a confrontation. These are guesses. That the Scipiones did champion commercial expansionism, or did habitually think and act in one bloc (any more than any other family group), rests on small actual evidence. That Flaminius backed action in 219 could seem likelier — though the thesis which most stresses the Scipiones' commerce-driven expansionism sees Flaminius as their opponent in alliance with Q. Fabius Maximus. What is close to certain is that the Senate did debate during 219 what to do about Hannibal's attack on the Saguntines; and it came to no d e c i s i o n . 1 9 This remains surprising. Not only was the attack a challenge to the Romans' earlier warning, but they did declare war after he took the town some months later. In 219, however, while pressure for action may have indeed been sharp, it was conceivably blunted by the opposition of some eminent and cautious senators and (on their return) by the consuls' lukewarmness or worse. Argument and counter-argument were similarly to hold up moves against the far weaker Carthaginians of the late 150s. In a political body which relied on consensus for its decisions — especially when a first-class war loomed — probably no more was needed to make the discussion

Livius' case: Livy 22.35.3 (Aemilius damaged too), 27.34.3, 29 37.9; Frontinus, Strat. 4.1.45; De Vir. III. 50.1; de Sanctis, 3·1· 316; Rich, 31; Briscoe (1989) 72. 1 9 Cassola, GP 233-44, 275-84 (Scipiones, Flaminius and Fabius in 219-218). Families acting as blocs are a mainstay of much theorizing about Roman politics in the Republic: on this period cf. Lippold (1963) 136-47 (Cornelii, Aemilii, Valerii and other expansionist gentes dominant from 225); Scullard (1975) 31-38 (Scipiones and Aemilii dominant and bellicose around 220-216, temporarily eclipsing the more peaceable Fabii); echoed for instance by Warmington (1964) 211; Caven, 83, 91-92, 96. 18

232

XIV.

Saguntum Besieged

inconclusive. If the Senate did ever postpone action over Saguntum ad novos cónsules, this was the likely moment.2^ Similarly, a change in only a small number of influential viewpoints could change the Senate's position. And a switch one way or the other — to take up the Carthaginians' challenge, or to decide to ignore it — was on the cards: the consuls would change in due course, and so might the news. Both did, early in the new year.

On the pressures for consensus in Senate debates even in the last century of the Republic, and therefore the obstructionist power of a minority, see E. Badian, ANRW1.1 (1972) 690-94.

Chapter XV War to Save Face 1. The ultimatum The deadlock was broken by word that Saguntum had fallen, and Polybius stresses how promptly the Romans reacted. They 'to be sure did not hold a debate about war, as some writers state. For how was it possible for the Romans, after warning the Carthaginians a year earlier of war if they set foot on Saguntine territory, with the city itself taken by force then to assemble and debate whether to go to war or the reverse?' No, 'the Romans at once appointed ambassadors and sent them post-haste to Carthage.'1 Many scholars hold that Polybius is again lying on behalf of his Roman friends or else has judged reports of such a debate as simply wrong; he could not admit that, even now, the Romans had not made up their minds whether to fight. To back up his denial of any debate, he offers merely a rhetorical question, but — as is often emphasized — the question rests on flawed assumptions. Even if Valerius and Baebius in 220 explicitly threatened war if Hannibal attacked Saguntum (and their message, in his own account, had not explicitly stated a threat), this could not prove that the Romans failed to debate war a year and a half later. Nor does Polybius help his case by deriding two predecessors who did report a debate, Chaereas and Sosylus, for telling how teenaged sons accompanied their fathers to the Senate meeting and afterwards preserved total discretion about it. This, he sniffs, is mere 'common barbershop gossip'; yet it has been noted that sons of senators were indeed allowed to attend Senate sessions, at any rate in earlier times — as an anecdote of the elder Cato, Polybius' own contemporary, shows.2 1 Pol. 3.20.1-2 (my translation), 20.6 (Paton's); for sceptics see Chap. XIV n. 15. 2 Chaereas and Sosylus: 3.20.1-5. Chaereas is unknown otherwise; on Sosylus of Sparta, Chap. XIII n. 21. Senators' sons at meetings: Cato in Gellius 1.23.4 (banned, ibid. 13); Macrobius, Saturnalia 1.6.18-25; Walbank, 1. 332-33; Meister (1975) 169. Papirius: MRR 1. 198.

234

XV.

War to Save Face

But Polybius' scorn is not so mistaken. Whether the custom had existed earlier is irrelevant: according to Cato again, the Senate banned it when Papirius Praetextatus, the hero of his story, was a boy. Papirius had died when censor in 272; Chaereas and Sosylus portrayed boys being taken to a Senate debate in 218. And while insisting that these children — and, a fortiori, their fathers too — kept their mouths shut afterwards, they supplied the speeches made at the meeting. 3 Arguably not just the Greeks Chaereas and Sosylus, but also a respectable Roman tradition going back to Fabius Pictor recorded debate in 218 — a tradition which Polybius chose to reject but which shows itself in Silius and Dio. Yet if Fabius, whose authority with readers Polybius acknowledges elsewhere, or any other well-regarded Roman did report such a debate at such a moment, the Megalopolitan would be unduly optimistic to expect people to believe his own denial of it instead. In reality, as was shown earlier, Roman tradition remembered debate occurring during the siege of Saguntum and Silius' and Dio's postponements of it to 218 are thoroughly suspect.^ Saguntum fell at the end of 219 or the start of 218, and almost certainly the new Roman embassy sailed for Carthage after the following Ides of March. Livy names the five ambassadors: Q. Fabius (probably in reality M. Fabius Buteo, as shown earlier), M. Livius, L. Aemilius, C. Licinius and Q. Baebius — perhaps Baebius Tamphilus one of the previous envoys in late 220, while the second last was probably C. Licinius Varus, consul in 236. M. Livius and L. Aemilius were very probably the consuls of 219, M. Livius Salinator and L. Aemilius Paullus; in this era, perhaps from the 220s, consuls entered office on the Ides (the 15th) of March instead of 1 May as earlier. Livy attests it for 217 without comment, which suggests that this was not the first time. Admittedly both men now faced trouble in the courts, over the question of Illyrian booty. Livius, though, seems to have been found guilty only later in 218: when

3 On this last point cf. Walbank, ibid. On secrecy in Senate debates — especially those about making war — see Harris (1979) 255. 4

Fabius Pictor's authority: Pol. 3 9.4-5, cf. 1.14.1-2. Polybius at 3-20 implicitly criticizing him and perhaps other Roman historians: Meitzer, 2. 597; Täubler (1921) 84-87; Rich (1976) 110-11; Schwarte (1983) 2-3, 67-68. Criticizing not Fabius, but others like Cincius Alimentus or Postumius Albinus: Walbank, 1. 332-33. Only Chaereas and Sosylus: Meister (1975) 167-72.

XV.

War to Save Face

235

recalled from exile early in 210, he was 'in almost the eighth year after his conviction' — thus it had occurred more than seven, but not quite eight, years before. In early 218 his prosecutors may not even have lodged their charges. After the Ides of March, then, he and Aemilius were quite likely available.5 At this period, Roman Ides of March does not unambiguously mean 15 March in real time, for the Roman year may have been ahead of the solar. Estimates vary from eleven days or so to about a month ahead; on the lower estimate, the Ides would in reality have fallen on 3 or 4 March, around 11 February on the higher. This is not certain — on another view the Roman calendar was more or less correct in 218 — but at any rate nothing suggests that it lagged behind the solari Hannibal learned from Carthage of the Roman declaration of war as he assembled his army out of winter quarters in the south of Spain, 'early in the spring' — around 1 April in real time, by one estimate. A date in April does seem plausible, since his march to Italy very probably began in May or June. Then the Roman embassy to Carthage would have executed its mission sometime during March: word can scarcely have taken more than some days to reach New Carthage by sea. If the Ides of March actually fell in mid-February, an embassy which included the previous consuls could set off late in February or early in March. If instead the Ides fell on 3 or 4 March or 15 March, real time, this would mean only that the Senate reacted even more swiftly to the news about 5 The five envoys: Livy 21.18.1; MRR 1. 239. On Livius and Aemilius: MRR 1. 241 n. 8; Scullard (1975) 42, 274; Rich (1976) 31. 'In almost the eighth year': 'octavo ferme post damnationem anno' (Livy 27.34.5-6); probably in the first half of 210, as the consuls then campaigned actively (MRR 1. 278) and one of the censors died before he and his colleague had completed any of their tasks (27.6.17-18). Consular year opened on Ides of March probably from 222: de Sanctis, 3 1 . 107; cf. Livy 22.1.4 (consuls in 217). A different M. Livius and L. Aemilius: E. Meyer, 2. 366 n. 3; Groag, 72 n. 5, dating the embassy to late in 219; Münzer, RE 13. 893-94; Sumner (1966) 24 n. 63; Hampl (1972) 436; Vollmer, 137-38, dating the embassy to December 219 or the beginning of 218 and suggesting L. Aemilius Papus, consul in 225, and M. Livius' father and namesake (known, however, only as a decemvir sacris faciundis in 236: MRR 1. 223). 6 Eleven or so days ahead: Sumner (1966) 12 and n. 38, cf. (1972) 478-80. A month or so: Derow (1976) 272 (table), 274-79, for whom the Kalends (1st) of March fell in reality on 28 January; the Ides (15th) would then correspond to 11 February. Seibert, FzH 346-52, holds that the Roman calendar at this period did generally correspond to the solar or Julian, though with some fluctuations.

236

XV.

War to Save Face

Saguntum. The trip required perhaps a week's sailing. The sailing season properly opened towards mid-March, but for this mission the envoys might be prepared to venture forth rather sooner.7 The picture is coherent: the news arriving in January or even February, when winter word from distant places would be slower by sea or land; the new embassy sailing as soon as the risk became bearable, in early or mid-March; and Hannibal learning of the outcome sometime in April. Even if Aemilius and Livius were still in office when word arrived, it would be so near to the start of the new consular year that the question might indeed be put off till after the Ides of March — becoming the new consuls' prime topic when they first convened the Senate. Technically, therefore, postponement ad novos cónsules, but with none of the implications present in 172. Equally possibly, the news arrived soon after P. Scipio and Sempronius Longus entered office. In either case, the Romans sent their embassy, in effect to declare war, as soon as travelling conditions allowed.** Any senatorial debate preceding this can only have been short. Polybius rebuts tales à la Chaereas and Sosylus of a debate 'whether to go to war or the reverse', of senatorial gloom and hesitation, and of Roman youngsters solemnly looking on at their deliberating fathers. He cannot be interpreted as denying any Senate meeting at all on the news about Saguntum; for if he meant that, then he meant readers to suppose that M. Fabius and his fellowambassadors appointed themselves for the mission, gave themselves their official instructions, and at Carthage committed their country to war on their own authority. Clearly what Polybius leaves implicit for readers to infer is that the Senate did meet to decree the embassy, decide its terms of reference and choose the envoys. 7 'Early in the spring', Pol. 3.34.6-7; Sumner, ibid, (around 1 April). Proctor, 48-51 (followed tentatively by Lazenby, 26, 49), neglects Polybius' phrase and dates the war-embassy to late May — relying on 3-40.2 where the envoys return to Rome at the same time as news arrives of Hannibal crossing the Ebro; but cf. Rich, 3334; below, §6. Timing of Hannibal's expedition: §6. Swift reaction: note too how in 168 senatorial envoys set out 'within three days' of being appointed (Livy 44.20.1). Sailing season: R. Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy (Cambridge 1990) 19-20, 25-29 (25-26 on near-shutdown of winter seacommunications) . ® Eckstein (1983) 267 also supposes a short deferment 'ad novos cónsules', without discussing when their office would have opened by the correct calendar.

XV.

War to Save Face

237

Yet during 219 the Senate had left the question of doing something about Saguntum and Hannibal in the air. Now when Saguntum's fall was announced, he insists, it promptly voted an ultimatum. Surely some discussion took place to bring senators around to this new attitude? It was suggested earlier that the Romans' failure to act during the siege stemmed from the objections of a significant, though maybe small, number of leading men. Should these shift their view, a consensus for action would appear when the question again arose. Moreover that question was all but certainly put, and the ultimatum decreed, under the aegis of the new consuls. That both P. Scipio and Ti. Sempronius favoured firm action is altogether likely — Sempronius in particular showed dash and pugnacity in the coming campaign, not always with fortune's favour. With both consuls and, at the very least, a substantial part of the Senate urging an ultimatum, discussion at the fateful meeting need not have been lengthy. Nor need it have touched on 'whether to go to war or the reverse'. Something had to be done about the sacking of Saguntum; otherwise the Romans must accept a potentially dangerous loss of face. To acquiesce in Hannibal's success risked the loyalty of other overseas friends and allies, like the Emporitans. North-eastern Spain would now in any case be a concern. Acquiescence would only encourage the Punic general and his countrymen to flout the other Roman demand put in 220, to stay south of the Ebro. For all that senators knew, he might already be planning to march across it (they would be right). Any more hesitation would be disastrous; no surprise if opinion came down firmly for an ultima tum.9 Not for an instant declaration of war — the Carthaginians were to be allowed the chance to disavow their general and give him and his advisers up to punishment. Polybius, like the later pro-Roman sources, makes this clear; he does not claim or imply that the Senate simply voted war. It may be that one proposal put at the meeting was to declare war straightaway, like in 237; another was to send the ultimatum. Of course, it was quite unlikely that the Carthaginians would opt to disavow Hannibal and not many senators in 218 can seriously have thought otherwise — even

9

Similarly Astin, 596.

238

XV.

War to Save Face

if Fabius Pictor implied a different view, from bias or wishful hindsight, when he came to write his history. 10 Conceivably the question of ultimatum versus instant war-declaration was debated, but the debate would surely be brief. Polybius could then be criticized for not letting us know of it, but it is a relatively minor point: he could reasonably see both alternatives as mere variants on the overall determination to fight unless the Carthaginians backed down. His emphasis is that there was no peace-or-war debate, and to warn against embellishers like Chaereas and Sosylus. It does not much help either of these, as political historian or analyst, that a fragment from Sosylus' histories offers a competent narrative of a sea-battle. 11 One view is that the ultimatum accused Hannibal of breaching the peace of 241, which guaranteed either side's allies. After all the Carthaginians would respond to it by reading out the text of Lutatius' treaty to the envoys, to show that this nowhere mentioned the Saguntines as Roman allies. But this does not in fact demonstrate that the ultimatum alleged a treaty-breach; nor does the subsequent remark by the envoys about Saguntum being 'treacherously seized' (as was noted earlier). It is noteworthy that no ancient source links Lutatius' guarantee and Saguntum's sack; not even the pro-Roman sources, who certainly see the Saguntines as formal Roman allies yet insist that their protection was a clause in Hasdrubal's accord. Even Livy so insists, aware though he is of the Carthaginians' use of Lutatius' treaty, and though adopting Polybius' refutation of it as his own. Besides which, Lutatius' treaty was an unreliable help, for the Saguntines were not allies proper — something which (so the Romans must reckon) the Carthaginians might know already or might soon find out. 1 2 What then did the envoys mean by remarking that Hannibal had seized Saguntum treacherously? To some it does imply that the Rich (1976) 111-16, holds that Fabius Maximus in 218 argued for maintaining peace but only if the Carthaginians conceded Roman demands; so too Scullard, CAH82. 37-38; cf. Seibert, Hann. 80-81. 1 1 Sosylus' fragment: FGrH 176 Fl; cf. Walbank, 1. 430-31. 1 2 The ultimatum based on the 241 guarantee of allies: Astin (1967) 588, tentatively; Girardet, 106-108. Saguntum 'treacherously seized': Pol. 3.21.7, cf. Chap. XII §1 with n. 3· The sack a breach of Hasdrubal's accord: Livy 21.10.5-8, 18.9, 19.4-5 (adapting Pol. 3.29.4-10), 44.5-6; Florus 1.22 [2.61.4; App. Iber. 11.40-41 (cf. 7.25-27), Hann. 3.10, Lib. 6.23; Zon. 8.21.4; cf. Strabo 3.4.6 = C159, merely 'against the agreement' — but just after mentioning the Ebro.

XV.

War to Save Face

239

Romans saw him as breaking some agreement, and with no PunicSaguntine agreement known (had there been one, Roman propaganda and tradition would never have let anyone forget it), the only item that would fit is Lutatius' peace. But this notion should not be pressed. As pointed out earlier, the Greek for 'seize treacherously' does not necessarily imply treachery to an agreement. The envoys, equally or more likely, had in mind Hannibal's overall behaviour towards the Saguntines: first his pretended concern over the alleged Roman injustices there, then maybe an offer to judge fairly between them and the Turitani, then in the end his destruction of the city and its p e o p l e . 1 3 Of course once the Carthaginians appealed to Lutatius' peace, the Romans came to feel that they had to reply to this, just as they felt they must to the Punic rejection of Hasdrubal's accord. But their reason for objecting to the sack of Saguntum was different, and rawer, as Polybius' account shows well enough. In 220 they had made it plain that they had a friendly, or fides, connexion with the Saguntines and that the Carthaginians should respect this. The Carthaginians had not. That defiance sparked the confrontation: now they must purge it, and their mistreatment of the Saguntines, by surrendering the guilty men. If they refused it would be war; that is, they would have to pay for their misdeed. The Romans could perhaps have added (like Polybius) that the Carthaginians had accepted the Roman-Saguntine connexion until late 220. But the treaty of Lutatius, and legalisms based on it and on the precise form of the Saguntine-Roman link, were strictly irrelevant. The envoys were not sent to debate such topics. Some senators, it has been suggested, hoped that an ultimatum would provoke the Carthaginians at home to cast off Barcid dominance. Then the Romans could move against Hannibal in Spain without interference. Maybe some did hope so, but if so their hope was based on wishful thinking rather than sound information (a phenomenon that still occurs today). Others too, however, probably thought an ultimatum worthwhile. Offering a choice, however nominal, to the Carthaginians gained an obvious propaganda advantage; and if these did then give way, they would become little more than Roman satellites in foreign affairs. Nor 13

Envoys meant the Lutatius-treaty: Astin, 577, 588; Huss (1985) 291-93 (holding that they brought it in after the Carthaginians ruled Hasdrubal's accord out); Girardet, 107. Walbank, 1. 336, thinks the Ebro accord was meant (cf. Comm. 2. 442-43).

240

XV.

War to Save Face

would time be lost in comparison with an instant declaration of war. If war was declared, an embassy would still have to sail south, as in 237, to let the Carthaginians know.1'* The Senate, then, resolved early in 218 that the just-reported sack of Saguntum would be treated as a casus belli. Five ambassadors, an unusually large number, would require the Carthaginians either to hand over Hannibal and his councillors in redemption for his 'wrongdoing', or else accept war. This demand was not totally unreasonable from a Roman viewpoint: peccant Romans were (now and then) handed over to their victims, and the Carthaginians notoriously were ruthless with generals who upset them — like the hapless garrison-commander chased from Messana in 264 and the Hanno who lost the battle of the Aegates in 241, both crucified. But there was nothing about compensation or restoration for the Saguntines, the nominal cause of the ultimatum, although some survived as slaves or refugees (some years later the Roman generals P. and Cn. Scipio re-established survivors at the town). The Romans' silence in 218 confirms their utilitarian attitude to them. What mattered was not their fate but Hannibal's defiance of Valerius' and Baebius' solemn injunction.15

2. Could the embassy declare war? Every ancient writer on the topic tells how the leader of the Roman embassy climaxed the confrontation with the Carthaginian senators: holding up a fold in his toga to symbolize that he bore peace and war for them to choose and, at their challenge, letting war fall. Polybius records them telling the Carthaginians that 'either they must hand over Hannibal the general and his councillors to the Romans or they [the Romans] would declare war'. Dio, rather similarly, has the Senate deciding that war be declared only if the Ultimatum might lead to coup: Rich, 114-16. Handovers: like M. Claudius Clineas to the mistreated Corsicans in 236/235 (Val. Max. 6.3.3; Zon. 8.18.8); other examples in Walbank, 1. 312; A. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (Oxford 1967) 132 n. 4, on C. Hostilius Mancinus' handover to the Numantines in 137. Hanno in 241, Zon. 8.17.3. Size of embassies: P. Willems, Le Sénat de la république romaine (Paris 1883-85) 2. 503, 508; Rich, 109. Saguntines restored, Livy 24.42.9-11 Oquos ex iis vis reliquerat belli'), 28.39.1-18 (Saguntine envoys to Rome in 205); the restoration dated by Livy to 214, but thought by Lazenby (129) likelier in 212-211; Seibert judges it a fiction iFzH 256-58).

XV.

War to Save Face

241

Carthaginians fail to give satisfaction. There is doubt, nevertheless, over whether Fabius Buteo did, or could, offer a choice between peace and war. Livy earlier on has the Roman People authorise the military provinces and armies, and formally vote war, before the envoys set off. If this is right, the envoys should have had nothing to do at Carthage except announce that war existed. If Livy is wrong and Fabius announced it to the Carthaginians before the People had voted it, he was to say the least presuming on the People's compliance. 1 ^ Many another Roman war did start without the People being consulted at all — as did the First Punic War in practice. On the other hand, as argued earlier, the Romans had not then expected a war with the Carthaginians at all, though Ap. Claudius probably received authority to declare it on 'the Syracusans and their allies'. But comitial authority is known for several major war-declarations between 237 and 107, at any rate wars in areas where no permanent Roman province existed and wars against developed states. This authority was not always obtained with ease, incidentally; in 200 the citizens revolted against following the just-ended Second Punic with a Second Macedonian War, and had to be lectured into it by a consul. But in 218 no major war had just ended and no popular unrest is known against a war with the Carthaginians. If the war-vote was taken only after the envoys came home from announcing war, its timing was unique. 1 7 Livy has the consuls' provinces and forces being allocated before the Senate's decree of the ultimatum and embassy, and even before the People vote for war. This odd sequence might imply that Livy or his source got the entire voting-order wrong. Still, rather similarly in 200 the Senate first decreed the military provinces, one of them 'Macedonia' (that is, war against Philip V), next the People was lectured into voting war, then an embassy was appointed to let Philip know of things; only the troop-levies followed.1® In 237 the Romans had declared war first and talked business second, but they were not obliged to do so again. In 237, in iniPol. 3-20.6-8, 33.2-4; Livy 21.18.13-14; App. Iber. 13.49-50; Dio, frg. 55.10 = Zon. 8.22.7; Silius 2. 382-89. Provinces, armies and war voted earlier, Livy 17.14. Embassy did not declare war: Drachmann, 20-23; Sumner (1966) 16-24. 1 7 Rich, 13-17, cf. 29 and (on the authorisation in 264) 119-27; above, Chap. VI §4. Livy's order of votes in 218 curious: Sumner, loc. cit. (η. 6). War-declaration in 200: Livy 31.5.1-8.1, cf. Briscoe (1973) 70-71; Hoyos (1984) 92-93. 16

242

XV.

War to Save Face

tially claiming that the Carthaginians were readying an attack, they obviously intended to shock them into complying with Roman demands. There was no such claim in 218 (ironically it would now have been less untruthful), nor could the Carthaginians be shocked anew into compliance. A looming real war required a different approach — one which would make the Romans look as irreproachable as possible when their demands were turned down. The truth then may be that, with the embassy decreed but before it set out, the Comitia Centuriata voted that there should be war with the Carthaginians if they did not accept those demands. In a later age a proposal put to the Comitia required a pause of three marketdays (a trinundinum, seventeen or twenty-five days) before it could be voted on, but — as shown earlier for 264 — in the third century this rule probably did not apply. The comitial vote could have swiftly followed the Senate's decree of an ultimatum and embassy. The military dispositions were perhaps authorised about the same time, rather as in 200, or afterwards while the envoys were away. For Polybius to omit such details hardly surprises. Livy narrates the war-embassy afterwards, but his arrangement of items need only reflect over-tidiness (his or his source's) or narrator's licence. Introducing the embassy separately allows him to focus on proceedings at Carthage, where the envoys arrive after one introductory s e n t e n c e . This conditional war-vote would not be unique. Forty-seven years later the People ratified a Senate decree couched in just such terms: 'because Perseus, son of Philip, king of the Macedonians, contrary to the treaty struck with his father Philip and renewed by him after the latter's death, had made war on allies of the Roman People, ravaged their territory and seized their cities, and because he had entered on designs of making war with the Roman People and had for the purpose procured arms, troops and a fleet: unless he gave satisfaction over these matters war with him should be entered upon.' Instances like this suggest that the Romans in the third and second centuries sometimes declared war on states overseas under a conditional procedure, which preserved the religious requirement to seek reparations from the prospective foe first. Despite scepticisms, it remains likely that such a procedure was used at any rate in 171, and for a sound enough reason — the No trinundinum in 218: Rich, 30; cf. Seibert, Hann. 79 η. 29. IV and η. 32 there.

See also Chap.

XV.

War to Save Face

243

Romans' own convenience. They held the initiative and were keen to put themselves as fully in the right as they could. In 218 they were no less keen, and they imagined that they held the initiative.^20 Livy's report of the comitial vote in 218 is summary: 'it was then put to the People whether they willed and bade war to be declared on the Carthaginian people'. He plainly indicates that the motion was carried. Whether he is abbreviating a lengthier account or took it like this from whatever source he followed, it does not rule against a conditional war-declaration such as the envoys' conduct at Carthage implies.21 In 171, moreover, after the conditional war-vote no later vote confirming it is recorded; quite likely Perseus' failure to supply the satisfaction demanded meant that, in Roman eyes, war existed. Similarly in 264, as was argued earlier: the People's vote to aid the Mamertines against their enemies meant that Ap. Caudex could, indeed had to, 'announce' war against the Carthaginians, in the poet's phrase. A further comitial vote to affirm that war existed may well have been unnecessary, and, even if one did occur, later writers might well consider it not worth mentioning. It does look as though, once M. Fabius shook war from his toga at Carthage, both the Romans and the Carthaginians regarded war as in being.

2®

Livy 42.30.10-11 (my translation). Then followed the comitial vote, allocation of military provinces and authorisation of troop levies, in that order (42.30.1131.1). Rich (1976) 88-99 defends Livy's account against (e.g.) de Sanctis, 4.1. 280 n. 116. 2 1 Livy 21.17.4. Conditional war-resolutions: Walbank (1937) 192-97; Comm. 1. 334, inferring a 218 resolution much like the one offered here. Criticisms by Rich, 58-64, 90-99, who nevertheless does not rule out a conditional resolution in 171. Coelius Antipater is often judged Livy's immediate source for early Book 21 at least, partly because Livy followed him for Hannibal's famous dream (21.22.6-9, cf. Cicero, de Divin. 49): thus P.G. Walsh in his commentary (London 1971) 163, cf. 38-41; Luce, 178-79. Schwarte (1983) 35-36, 93-96 infers Coelius and Valerius Antias. Even if Livy were following a source for Roman affairs in 218 — like Antias — who also narrated those in 171, it would be robust Quellenkritik indeed to argue that, had there been a conditional war-resolution in 218, his source would indubitably have given it; and that, because Livy does not mention one, therefore there had been no resolution for his source to mention.

244

XV.

War to Save Face

3. Roman envoys to Punic senate On reaching Carthage, the envoys were no doubt given a prompt audience with the Carthaginian senate. Polybius' report of this fateful confrontation has fair claim to be the most debated and difficult part of his much-argued-over account of the origins of the Second Punic War. His irritating narrative-layout has understandably aroused suspicion. Fabius and his fellows arrive and put the Roman ultimatum. The ablest speaker for the Carthaginians responds by impugning Hasdrubal's accord (its first mention in 218) and insisting on his country's freedom to attack Saguntum. The envoys demand a yes or no to their ultimatum — whereupon Polybius embarks on his notorious and long digression, first on the Roman-Punic treaties down to 225 (supplying text and commentary), then on the Romans' later arguments countering what the Punic spokesman in 218 said to the envoys, following all this with pronouncements on the practical value of historical knowledge. Only then does he return to describe the climax of the confrontation, with 'the most senior envoy' (in other words M. Fabius) announcing war. 2 2 Next, why is Hasdrubal's accord brought in? Not only does the Punic spokesman refer to it — with an abruptness which can mean only that the Roman envoys had mentioned it first (without Polybius recording this) — but there follows Polybius' notorious comment about Carthaginian responsibility for the war under both Lutatius' treaty and the accord. As shown earlier, this is very probably neither crux nor involuntary revelation, but clumsy phrasing, but that does not explain why (or how) both sides in 218 brought the accord into proceedings. The embassy's complaint after all was about Saguntum being sacked. The most recent explanation is the most original. It sees, not the sack in 219, but Hannibal's Ebro-crossing in 218 as prompting the embassy, and the entire Saguntine issue as nothing but a smokescreen puffed out by Polybius himself for tendentious purposes. Polybius, on this thesis, was anxious to justify the Romans' savage destruction of Carthage in his own time, and therefore needed to convict the Carthaginians at home, as well as Hannibal in Spain, of provoking the war of 218. His difficulty was that the true

22

The confrontation at Carthage: 21.8-32.10.

Pol. 3.20.6-21.8, 33.1-4;

the digressions,

XV.

War to Save Face

245

cause of the war, Hannibal's Ebrocrossing, no longér held legal water even in 218. The Barcid generals had been legally as well as practically independent from their home state, so that the Ebro accord had bound only them; but in 219 the home state legally reclaimed its overseas offshoot. Hannibal's message to Carthage, after Valerius and Baebius had seen him, was really an overture for reconciliation, and it succeeded. The legal result was momentous. The Carthaginian state could not be bound by the accord which — as the Punic spokesman in 218 insisted — it had not made. This therefore lost all validity: the sole basis on which the Romans could now deal with the Carthaginians was Lutatius' treaty, which knew nothing of Saguntum. Hannibal could cross the Ebro in arms with perfect legality, even if it did outrage the Romans. Saguntum itself was no better as a casus belli, according to this thesis. True, Hannibal could not justify annexing the place under the accord, as this had disappeared from the scene. But Lutatius' treaty expressly forbade signatories to interfere in each other's territories: and Spain as a whole counted as Punic territory, the Carthaginians having long laid claim to it. These uncongenial truths Polybius supposedly had to hide. In 218 the Carthaginians made them clear by repeatedly reading out the terms of Lutatius' peace, but he distorted their point by pretending that they meant to show only that the Saguntines were not covered by Lutatius' guarantee of either side's allies. 2 3 Skilful though it is, this reconstruction rests on several unsatisfying assumptions. An autonomous Barcid Spain, it is virtually certain, never existed — rather the generals there were the elected strategi of the Carthaginian state which, in practical politics, they dominated. And even if in 219 Barcid Spain was in some sense reclaimed by the Punic state, that scarcely compelled the Romans to accept this unilateral interpretation. Again, if reclaiming Spain abolished the validity of the accord, other and more uncomfortable inferences follow too. Hasdrubal — and Hamilcar before him — had struck many agreements with Spanish peoples; Hasdrubal's expansion of Punic power through diplomacy is particularly celebrated by the sources. Even Hannibal probably had some agreements to his name: the 'Torboletae' or Turitani, for instance, were 23

Schwarte (1983) 9-11, 42-48, 53-55, 61-74 ('die Verletzung der Ebrogrenze durch Hannibal kam somit als rechtliche Begründung der römischen Kriegserklärung an Karthago nicht in Betracht', 71). For more detailed critique, Hoyos, LCM1985, 153-56.

246

XV.

War to Save Face

not annexed by force yet were Punic subjects by 220. If the Barcid generals were legally autonomous, they cannot have referred such agreements to Carthage for ratification (the Ebro accord was not). Thus if reclaiming Spain dissolved the accord, it dissolved all their other agreements too, and a sizeable proportion of the Punic empire in Spain legally disappeared. Of course there is no evidence for this. Besides, Hannibal and his home state (the thesis implies) mutually agreed on the reclaiming; in such situations it would be normal for the new sovereignty to honour the arrangements formed by the old — as in fact the reconstruction assumes for all the Barcid arrangements save Hasdrubal's accord. It also treats Saguntum as belonging to Barcid Spain because the Carthaginians had long had claims to the Iberian peninsula; scarcely a reading of international law to appeal to the Saguntines, nor did Hannibal put it to them in 219, or to his own countrymen in the message he sent to Carthage late in 220. Legal authority is not conferred by claim alone, nor does any evidence attest Punic control extending as far north as the Spanish Levant before Hannibal's campaigns. The thesis implicitly assumes that neither Polybius nor later proRoman historical forgers could conceal the Punic rejection of the Ebro accord, even though supposedly they lied and invented generously on practically everything else. Polybius supposedly invented Hannibal's colloquy with Valerius and Baebius in 220 and these envoys' visit to Carthage afterwards; concealed that the Romans declared war because Hannibal crossed the Ebro in 218; and claimed instead — twisting chronology and facts — that it was because he sacked Saguntum in 219- And yet something made him (and later historians too) truthfully report the Carthaginians' comments in 218 on the accord. Somehow he could not, instead, pretend that they had admitted its validity, nor could he even pass silently over their rejection; he and others haplessly recorded the Carthaginians' true viewpoint in their pages, and thereby found themselves forced to distort and misrepresent other items massively to compensate. This thesis fails to convince. The question of how the Ebro accord came to be mentioned in 218 remains. Now Polybius nowhere reports the Romans claiming that Hannibal in attacking the town breached the accord. True, the Punic spokesman opened his reply to the ultimatum by denying that the accord bound his state. True again, in after times (so Polybius reports) the Romans made counter-arguments both to this

XV.

War to Save Face

247

denial and to the other Punic argument of 218, that the Saguntines were not protected under Lutatius' guarantee of allies. Most moderns therefore infer that the Roman envoys in 218 did link Saguntum and the accord, with implications we have already surveyed, or else suppose some sort of mistake in Polybius' account, if not lies and a cover-up. The solution is simpler. Whatever M. Fabius and his confrères said before being received by the Carthaginian senate, and to whomever they said it, we can be sure that on entering the senate chamber they did not, in their very first sentence, baldly state that the Carthaginians must hand over Hannibal and his councillors or else there would be war. That is not only undiplomatic, it is not even natural. To begin with, they had to explain themselves and their mission: for example, that the Romans had learned of the sack of Saguntum with surprise and indignation, seeing that just over a year earlier Roman envoys had informed both Hannibal in Spain and the Carthaginians here, surely this very senate, that the Saguntines lay in Roman good faith and must not be molested. (Interestingly Livy, opening his version of the scene with a speech by the Carthaginians' spokesman, makes him start by referring to the previous embassy — illustrating how natural or even necessary such a reference would be.) It would be natural or even inevitable for the Roman ambassadors to recall the previous envoys' requests (as Livy makes his Punic speaker do) and complain of how both Hannibal and the authorities at Carthage had failed to give any guarantees about either the Ebro or Saguntum So, the envoys might go on, the Romans were forced to conclude that the sack of their friends had been done deliberately to provoke them, and indeed they would not overlook it.2^ To remind their hearers of Valerius' and Baebius' mission was not irrelevant. The Romans in 220 had been at least as much concerned about the Ebro limit as about their clients at Saguntum; Hannibal's treatment of the latter was a disquieting indication (the envoys might quite properly add) of how he might now treat the former. If the Carthaginians surrendered him and his councillors, that would not only symbolically compensate for the sack of Saguntum but, very practically, ensure that the Ebro limit remained unbreached. Livy 21.18.4; based on Pol. 3-29-4-10, but a Livian composition.

248

XV.

War to Save Face

M. Fabius, no doubt the envoys' spokesman, would be reminding his hearers of what they knew already, so his exordium did not need to be lengthy. But short or long, any exordium was easy for historians, pro-Roman or pro-Punic, to omit — and especially in view of the Carthaginian reply. This was both novel and, to Romans, startling. 4. Punic senate to Roman envoys The Carthaginians must have reckoned that a Roman protest over Saguntum was likely; though how far it would go, after the inactivity of 219, they could not forecast. Quite possibly too they would expect the envoys to mention Valerius' and Baebius' other topic, the Ebro accord. So their position on both topics was probably worked out well before the envoys' ships moored in the commercial harbour at Carthage. As noted earlier, Hannibal and his home authorities had had good reason for saying nothing to Valerius and Baebius about the Ebro. Nor can the Punic position on this have changed, for even if the Romans merely protested about Saguntum, Hannibal's future options were the same — advance beyond the Ebro or a peaceful life south of it. His choice was foreseeable, and it meant that the Carthaginians had to denounce or deny the accord. The evidence indicates that Hannibal now expected war and planned to conquer north-eastern Spain before invading Italy. Already he had sent out agents to make contact with the peoples along the invasion route through southern Gaul and the Alps. They returned with encouraging results, just about the time that he learned of the Roman war-declaration: thus around the start of April 218.25 Significantly too, he arranged exchanges of troops between Spain and Africa so as to improve the military security of both parts of the Punic empire, and appointed his brother Hasdrubal to govern Spain 'if he himself happened to be away'. Polybius has 25

Pol. 3.34.1-7; cf. Livy 21.20.8, 23.1. Proctor, 22-24, dates the agents' return to late May; he assumes that Hannibal sent them off at the end of 219. But the various agents' missions should not have taken five to six months even if begun during the winter; Sumner (1966) 11-12 reasonably estimates three. The agents, or at least those who had farthest to travel, surely moved not on foot (so implicitly Proctor, 24-25), but on horseback.

XV.

War to Save Face

249

the troop-movements done while Hannibal was in winter quarters. But they were sizeable and involved long sea journeys; much likelier they took place when sea travel became safe again from early March 218, although Hannibal probably initiated them during the winter. His contacts with the southern Gauls, he must reckon, could easily come to the notice of the Massiliots and thus the Romans. There was obviously no benefit in giving these any advance hint of invasion, but he presumably saw it as a necessary risk. The gamble proved justified: the Romans did not imagine that he would attack Italy. ^ In sum, under Hannibal's leadership the Carthaginians had decided to drop Hasdrubal's modus vivendi with the Romans and assert total independence over their own foreign affairs, including their territorial expansion. It could lead to war; but if anything is certain about Hannibal's attitude it is that he did not fear war. He would wage it in unorthodox style, win it fast, and then preside over Carthaginian domination of the western and central Mediterranean. Then the Romans brought things to a head: lodging not just a protest over Saguntum, but an ultimatum. The issue of RomanPunic relations and suspicions thus climaxed. Just as M. Fabius surely prefaced his complaint about Saguntum with introductory remarks about the earlier Roman démarche, so too the Punic spokesman's answer embraced both the Ebro and the Saguntines. 'The accord with Hasdrubal they refused to discuss, as either not having occurred or, if it had occurred, as irrelevant to themselves through having been made without their assent.' The first verb more commonly translates as 'kept silent about' or 'omitted', but hardly so here: for Polybius soon narrates what was evidently the Punic spokesman's explanation of why the accord was irrelevant. That here he means 'refused to discuss' is confirmed later, when he writes that he will give the answer to the Carthaginians which the envoys themselves were too angry to make: he answers both the disavowal of the accord and the argument about Saguntum's absence from the Lutatius treaty. 3-33-5-16. Troop-exchanges from early March: likewise Proctor, 21-22, who need not assume (24) that they were complete by the time Hannibal's agents returned. 'Refused to discuss' (παρβσιώπων) etc.: Pol. 3.21.1-5. Envoys too angry: 29.1. LSJ, 1324 s.v. gives only 'pass over in silence', 'omit'; but 'refused to discuss' or the like is urged by Drachmann, 7, 13-15; Täubler (1921) 58-61; Groag, 74-76;

250

XV.

War to Save Face

Theories that defend the interpretation 'they kept silent about' or 'omitted' the accord are not compelling — that, for instance, the Carthaginians omitted or kept silent about it in 218 because, in 220, they had fully explained to Valerius and Baebius why they rejected it (we have seen that this is quite improbable on other grounds); or said nothing about it because it would have obscured the controversy over Saguntum to no purpose; or (an older view) were trying to do the stubborn Romans a diplomatic favour by ignoring an issue — the Punic right to all Spain-below-Ebro — on which the Romans were squarely in the wrong. Did the Carthaginians in reality argue that they no longer accepted Hasdrubal's accord, since Roman friendship with Saguntum had breached its implicit concession of Spain-below-Ebro to them? If so, Polybius' version of their statement would be mere fiction. This in turn would imply that what they really said about the accord was unanswerable, yet he felt it impossible simply to omit all reference to the topic — even though, in his own narrative, the Carthaginians had received a protest solely about Saguntum. The solution is more straightforward, as already shown. The Ebro accord was a hindrance to Hannibal and, unlike in 220, nothing would be gained from being non-committal about an accord which would soon be broken. To deflect any later charge of ill-faith, he had the home authorities pronounce it invalid. Next, the Carthaginian spokesman justified the action against the Saguntines: more precisely, argued that the Romans lacked the right to protest about it. 'In all their plea of justification they founded and insisted on the last treaty, made in the war for Sicily, in which they said there was no mention of Iberia, but it was expressly set down that the allies of each power should be secure from attack by the other. They pointed out that at that time the Saguntines were not the allies of Rome, and to prove their point they read aloud several times from the treaty.' Not the most obvious or logical of justifications; as often pointed out, Hasdrubal's Walbank, 1. 335; Musti (1974) 119-20; Schwarte (1983) 42 η. 50, 55, 70. Compare the pregnant use of another verb at 1.88.9, των 8è Καρχηδονίων άνανακτοΰντων. ώς κτλ.: not merely 'when the Carthaginians were angry on the ground that sovereignty over the Sardinians belonged rather to them' (though άγανακτεϊν primarily means 'be angry'), but surely implying that they notified the Romans of their angry objection ('when [they] objected on the ground that sovereignty [etc.]'; Paton's tr.), since these promptly responded by declaring war. 28

E.g. Eucken, 32-35; de Sanctis, 3 2. 3; Groag, 74-76.

XV.

War to Save Face

251

accord would have done much better, implicitly conceding as it did all Spain-below-Ebro to the Carthaginians. But these could scarcely reject the accord in one breath and, in the next, demand that the Romans respect it 2 9 Some do see validity in the argument from Lutatius' treaty. This document very probably listed the then allies of both states in an annex, even if Polybius omitted it from his text. On one theory, the Carthaginians viewed the list as exclusive (no future allies could benefit from its guarantee) whereas the Romans saw it as merely clarifying the guarantee. Others consider the Punic argument logical and proper — military action outside territories guaranteed by Lutatius' peace did not constitute an act of war. Yet the logic of the Carthaginians' case in 218 is not greatly furthered by the list. In effect they were claiming the right to attack any Roman ally not in Lutatius' treaty who might fall into dispute with them, without the Romans interfering. This made nonsense of every postwar alliance. A Punic fleet could blockade Massilia, and the Romans must stand by and let it happen. They with equal logic could send forces into Spain — Hasdrubal's accord having bound only him — to fall unimpeded on the Turitani or any other community which had become a Punic ally since 241. It would be equally unconvincing if what the Carthaginians really cited was Lutatius' clause banning interference in territories dominated by either side, to show that the Saguntines lay either in Punic territory or at any rate not in Roman, and that therefore the Roman protest was unjustified (not that there is evidence for any such Punic argument). The Saguntines had never been Punic subjects; and they did not need to qualify for Roman interest under the terms of a past treaty before the Romans could complain on 2 9

Pol. 3.21.3-5, tr. Paton with emendations (cf. Walbank, 1. 336). Allies' list: Chap. VIII §2 with n. 10. Conflicting Carthaginian and Roman interpretations: Täubler (1921) 63-66, 110. The Punic argument accepted by Gilbert (1876) 153-56 Oda nach den Bestimmungen [des Friedens] Sagunt nicht in die dort garantierte άσφάλεια eingeschloßen war, ein Angriff an die Stadt also durch nichts verboten war', 156); de Sanctis, (1932) 163-64, the Romans used the guarantee as justification for declaring war; Groag, 74-76; Otto, 511-12 (a brilliant Punic move); Mazzarino, 137, 142 ('ogni azione di guerra fra Cartaginesi e i Romani, fuori del territorio garantito dal trattato di Lutazio, non poteva considerarsi un' azione di guerra tra Cartagine e Roma'). On much the same logic it was illegal for Britain and France to go to war with Germany in 1939 over Poland, for Poland had been allied to neither power at the time of the Treaty of Versailles — indeed was not a British ally even in 1939.

252

XV.

War to Save Face

their behalf. That Roman tradition invented a protective clause for them in Hasdrubal's accord suggests, in itself, that Lutatius' territorial clause had not been exploited for or against t h e m . Bringing Lutatius' treaty into the discussion was a Punic move, not one by the envoys. Fabius Buteo, replying, stated in effect that debate on such questions would have been possible while Saguntum stood unharmed, but now they had come simply to give the other side the choice between peace or war. Of course the Romans would probably not have been interested in debating the question earlier on; the remark reads like a debating riposte — 'the time for talk was then, not now' — to refocus attention on the ultimatum, and would scarcely suit if the envoys themselves had earlier raised points of debate. They had been sent purely to get a decision on war or peace. If peace, it meant that the Carthaginians accepted the lesser position which the Romans had tried to prod them into a year and a half earlier — only now it would be a far more invidious inferiority. If war, the Romans (as their initial strategic plans show) expected to win, and then there would be no more Punic pretensions and provocations. But the arguments put by the Carthaginians made an impression. Polybius stresses that the counter-arguments he gives were being stated often at Rome, implying in his own day at least. (In the 150s the question of a new war against the Carthaginians was highly topical). The Romans were a legal-minded community, always anxious to claim the iusta causa in war — above all against the greatest of their foes. Hasdrubal, they insisted, had made the accord 'without qualification', unlike Lutatius whose initial peace terms had been explicitly conditional on ratification by the Roman People. As for Lutatius' final version, to claim that its guarantee of allies covered only the ones allied at the time was logically untenable, as Polybius — imitated by Livy — takes pleasure in pointing out. Of course the Saguntines had not been formal allies, but (as noted earlier) at this time the distinction may well not have been that great between an ally and a friend; and by the 150s when the Punic case was being discussed, the Romans would not concede

Territory-clause argument, suppressed or misunderstood by Polybius: Schwarte (1983) 71-73; Girardet, 110-13See Chap. VIII, Addendum, and XII n. 7; Hoyos, LCM1985, 153.

XV.

War to Save Face

253

that the Saguntines had lacked an alliance. Many may well have come to believe the opposite, like later Roman historians.^2 In any case the Carthaginians cannot have known for certain what the link was. The Romans' approach to them over Saguntum, now as in 220, was very like that of an authentic ally. Certainly they had not sent the Saguntines any help in 219; but for a senior ally to temporise over the interests of a lesser was hardly unheard of. For all the Carthaginians knew, Buteo if challenged might produce the text of alliance from his famous toga. Yet they could not concede the entire case over Saguntum: they would be conceding that Hannibal had attacked it without legal justification. At the same time, they could not base a justification on the Ebro accord, having denied its validity. So they did what they could with the treaty of 241 — ironically and appealingly, a treaty which the Romans had imposed. These Punic arguments were essentially superficial. Why — to adapt Polybius' comment on Hannibal's outburst to the envoys in 220 — no rehearsal of real grievances: no accusation that the Romans' real aim was to undermine the Punic empire, their interest in the Ebro suspiciously episodic, their tears over the Saguntines crocodile? Did the Carthaginians make these charges only for Polybius to suppress them? It would be improbable, seeing that he not only records Hannibal's fulminations about Roman hypocrisy to Valerius and Baebius but also supplies the 'correct' charges that the general ought to have made. More likely the Carthaginians felt about these items rather as the Roman envoys did about the Roman case: they were grievances that could only be stated, not backed by provable arguments. Essentially the Romans were seeking, as in 220 under less challenge, to impose a greatpower superiority over the Carthaginians and the Carthaginians were refusing to buckle, even under threat of war. At this crucial level neither was right or wrong; both were acting as great powers. Lutatius' peace, by contrast, enjoyed a legality which the Romans themselves accepted. A case based thereon offered propaganda possibilities at least. The Carthaginians hardly expected to convince the Romans to rescind their ultimatum or offer talks; arCounter-arguments, 3.29.1-10; put in Polybius' day, 29.1 ('it is stated often' — present tense); Livy 21.19.1-5. On 'allies' and 'friends' in the third century cf. Chap. XII $1, with n. 8. Roman strategy at the start of the war: one consular army and matching fleet to Africa, the other to Spain — no doubt seen as sufficient to debellare superóos.

254

XV.

War to Save Face

guments on treaties and legalities were for the outside world. Like Hannibal in 220, so too in 218 the Carthaginians responded with propaganda to a Roman démarche on great-power realities. Maybe they felt that this was the only way to win the argument. 5.

War declared

Polybius' account now seemingly poses a fresh problem. To the Carthaginian riposte the Roman envoys seem to make two different replies. First, they refuse to offer counter-arguments: the time for debates has passed and now the Carthaginians must decide for war or peace. At this dramatic point the historian freezes the action to launch his long and variegated digression on the treaties between the two states and so on. When the narrative resumes, we read that 'the Romans, after listening to the case put by the Carthaginians, said nothing else, but the oldest' — presumably Buteo — told the Punic senators that they must choose between the war and peace that he bore in his toga; bidden to give his choice, 'he let fall war'.33 Thus Polybius' envoys both comment on the Punic arguments before putting the choice of war or peace, and yet (seemingly) 'say nothing else' to those arguments save that the choice now lies between war and peace. In Livy a rhetorical and combative Punic speech is followed simply by Fabius' blunt demand that they choose either war or peace: Livy is rehandling elements of Polybius' account — omitting his first version of the envoys' reply (though he soon imitates Polybius' argument concerning the allies-guarantee in Lutatius' treaty). Are the envoys' contradictory replies in Polybius a further clue that he, or his Roman source, has been fiddling with what was really said? 34 Hardly; for the envoys, in his reprise of their answer, 'said nothing else'— a taut but reasonable reference back to his earlier statement of their answer. There the key point was that, with Saguntum now destroyed, the Carthaginians must do as the Romans demanded 'or accept war'. This is, in effect, the choice put to 3.21.6-8, 33.1-4; cf. Livy 21.18.4-14. 34 Schwarte (1983) 9 sees more evidence of Polybius' 'redaktionelle Umgestaltung'. Polybian self-contradiction: Bung, 39-40. Walbank, 1. 361, partly relies on Livy's version to suggest separate and mutually exclusive sources for the two Polybian passages. 33

XV.

War to Save Face

255

them by the senior ambassador after Polybius' lengthy digression. Clumsy or careless follow-up after long digressions is typical of Polybius, as we have seen several times already; here he sums up, at worst a little clumsily, what went before and then goes on to Buteo's dramatization of the alternatives.35 There is no sign of the Punic senate debating the ultimatum — further indication that the Carthaginians had decided on their reply in advance. Their statement of justification, delivered by 'the most suitable person among them', was in practice a rejection. But they left it to the ambassadors to perform the final formal act. When Fabius theatrically pointed to his toga and declared that in its folds he bore war and peace for them to choose, the sufete told him to let fall whichever the envoys determined. 'When the Roman said that he would let fall war, many of the senators shouted out that they accepted it.' And thus the Carthaginians confirmed their independence as a great power, and sealed their own doom. 6. From diplomacy to warfare, 218 B.C. Ambassadors who had just committed their state to war would (we might expect) return home directly. The Senate and People needed to be told what had taken place. Instead another chronological puzzle arises: both Polybius and Livy delay their return until close to mid-year. Polybius follows the drama at Carthage with Hannibal's preparations and his march from New Carthage, over the Ebro and the Pyrenees, towards the river Rhône; then leaves him to digress amply on the importance in historiography of knowing one's geography, topography and distances; and when the narrative resumes, Hannibal is again about to cross the Pyrenees. 'Around the same time' the Romans both learned from their ambassadors of what happened at Carthage and also received news 'sooner than they expected' of Hannibal crossing the Ebro; therefore 'they decided to send with armies [the consuls] Publius Cornelius to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius to Africa', and to get

35 36

Cf. Täubler (1921) 56-57; Sumner (1966) 16. Pol. 3.33.1-4; on the sufete (βασιλεύς) cf. Huss (1983); also Chap. I $1.

256

XV.

War to Save Face

on with establishing two planned colonies, Placentia and Cremona, on the river Po in Cisalpine Gaul.3? This could suggest the envoys returning to Rome together with, or maybe just before, the news of Hannibal crossing the Ebro. Now the crossing was made in mid-July or so, for the expedition had left New Carthage probably in June — as seen earlier, well after Hannibal learned of the war-declaration — and by early November it had reached northern Italy after an epic five-month march. News of the Ebro-crossing would take a month (at the longest) to reach Rome: thus in early to mid-August. On this reckoning the envoys would have got home over four months after Buteo cast war to the Punic senate in March. Things are not that much improved if an earlier chronology for Hannibal's march is preferred, sending him off from New Carthage in April to cross the Ebro a few weeks later and descend on Italy late in September 218. News of him crossing the river would still have come in around mid-year, along with or not far behind the envoys: still a sizeable gap since delivering the war-declaration.38 Livy has the envoys travel from Carthage to north-eastern Spain to try to win over Spanish hearts and minds. Meeting with contemptuous rebuffs despite a promising start, they move on to southern Gaul — only to meet rebuffs again, and no solace or cooperation until arriving at Massilia. Their eventual return to Rome was 'not so long after the consuls had set out' on campaign (here Livy contradicts Polybius) and after word had arrived 'that the Carthaginians had already crossed the Ebro'. This tale is widely, though not universally, disbelieved. The envoys had to report at Rome that they had declared war; why do the rounds of barbarian tribes? At best the tour is credited to earlier ambassadors, perhaps

3 7

Pol. 3.31.5-35.8 (Hannibal's preparations), 36.1-39.12 (digression), 40.1-3 (narrative resumed). Chronology of Hannibal's march: (e.g.) de Sanctis, 3-2. 77-81; Walbank, Comm. 1. 365, 390-92, 538; Sumner (1966) 11-13, 27-30; Proctor, 13-80; Rich (1976) 33-34; Lazenby, 29, 32-33, 275-77; Schwarte (1983) 53-55; Huss (1985) 298 n. 35; Vollmer, 136-41; Seibert, FzH 176-79- Scholarly consensus is for an 'early' march (April/May to September/ October); by contrast Proctor and Lazenby argue convincingly (cf. Dorey, 8; Ridley, 154; Briscoe, CAH 8 2 . 47; Seibert, ibid.) for a 'late' one, early or mid-June to early or mid-November. The Ebro-crossing would then fall in mid-July (Proctor, 35; Lazenby, 33, 275).

XV.

War to Save Face

257

P. Valerius and Q. Baebius after their rencontre with Hannibal; annalists supposedly transferred it mistakenly to the war-embassy. 39 Yet it is a little odd to be a Roman fantasy — nothing but a sequence of wasted effort, with a wise old Spaniard making a telling hit at the Romans blatantly leaving their Saguntine protégés in the lurch. Besides, Valerius and Baebius so late in 220 could have made thé tour only if they did not go to Carthage after seeing Hannibal, a thesis rejected earlier; otherwise the season would prevent them. Nor would any prospect of a Punic war have prompted a diplomatic drive in those regions in 220: none was then in sight. At best only long-range anti-Punic considerations might have — but then it is hard to see why a misdating to 218 should occur, or why the misdated version should be unflattering. The envoys must of course report to the Senate and People that war had been declared. But (as we saw earlier) these expected nothing else in practice. The consuls had been given their provinces and were making preparations, if in no hurried fashion, to invade Spain and Africa. It would certainly help the thrust into Spain if friendly relations could be struck with communities en route. (Livy supposes that one aim of the tour in 218 was to impede Hannibal's invasion: but that Hannibal would invade was not known then.) The report did not have to be taken ceremoniously home by all five ambassadors together. M. Fabius (their spokesman, and fairly elderly) and a couple others could do so; the rest might have been authorised to return via north-eastern Spain and southern Gaul. Since at least one envoy of eminence was surely desirable for the task — not simply a lesser-ranking senator like Baebius Tamphilus or the obscure Licinius — the exconsuls Aemilius and Livius, or one of them with Baebius or Licinius, would fit the need (Livius' prosecution for misconduct in the Illyrian campaign did not begin, apparently, until late in 218). It would not be the sole example of ambassadors being detached

39

Livy 21.19.6-20.9 (cf. Dio, frg. 56). Accepted by Picard (1967) 162; Proctor, 4951; Ebel, 24-25; Lazenby, 49-50 (tentatively); cf. Scardigli, 257 (implying a separate Roman mission to Gaul). Rejected by de Sanctis, 3-2. 174-75; E. Meyer, 2. 366 n. 1; Sumner (1966) 25 n. 66, (1967) 241-42, 246, (1972) 477-78; Rich, 33 n. 45; Eckstein (1983) 265 n. 30, 269 n. 40; Twyman (1987) 80 n. 34. Sumner, Rich and Twyman suggest that maybe the earlier envoys made the tour (for Sumner, Valerius and Baebius did not go from New Carthage on to Carthage in Africa: Chap. XIII §3)· Seibert, Hann. 73-74, posits a separate embassy during 219.

258

XV.

War to Save Face

on further business. At the end of the Second Punic War M. Aemilius Lepidus, youngest of three appointed to traverse the eastern Mediterranean as far as Egypt, was sent off en route to confront King Philip of Macedón. In 185 another one of three sent to deal with Philip intervened in Peloponnesian affairs on his return journey — apparently on his own initiative and without great success. This could account for Polybius announcing the envoys' return before, and Livy after, the consuls set out. Envoys who sailed directly back from Carthage should have arrived, at latest, by early April in the Roman calendar; they had left Rome soon after the Ides of March, and would hardly spin out their mission. Polybius records 'the envoys' returning, and then has the colonists for Placentia and Cremona being instructed to be at those sites in thirty days. The later commentator Asconius gives the colonies' foundation-date as 31 May, so the announcement to the colonists can be dated Roman 1 May. Whatever the real calendar dates, Polybius' sequence is obviously consistent. Livy's report of 'the envoys' returning only after the consuls had set out could then fit those arriving home from Spain and Gaul. One consul, Sempronius, almost certainly left Rome before his colleague, probably in June or July real time — Scipio apparently not until August or September (being delayed by the Senate diverting his original forces to cope with rebellion in Cisalpine Gaul). These complications, with envoys returning and consuls leaving, might well become blurred into all the envoys returning after or before both the consuls had gone. Polybius himself soon afterwards seems to have both consuls leave simultaneously for opera-

4 0

Embassy of 201-200: MRR 1. 321, 322 n. 4, 325; discussed by Rich (1976) 7387; cf. R.M. Errington, CAH82, 255-60. Q. Metellus at Argos in 185: Pol. 22.10; Pausanias 7.8.4, 7.9.1 (imagining the entire embassy involved); MRR 1. 373; Walbank, Comm. 3. 192-95; Gruen, HWCR2. 121 n. 130, 234-35, 485-86. 41 Placentia and Cremona: Pol. 3-40.3-5 (Chap. XIV n. 7); Sumner (1966) 15, cf. 12 η. 38; Derow (1976) 272 (table, with 1 Mains worked out as 29 March). Eckstein (1983) 257-66 notes the significance of Asconius for dating the envoys' return, treating Roman 1 May and 31 May as correct dates. Incidentally Silius Italicus knows or supposes that Buteo returned straight home (2.390). Livius' prosecution: n. 5 above.

XV.

War to Save Face

259

tions 'during the summer' — probably another item of blurred recall, though the broad time-phrase cannot be pressed.^2 True, Polybius links the envoys' return with the news arriving of Hannibal's Ebro-crossing, thus (on the above chronology) implying a return in August. But he likewise records envoys and news arriving before the consuls departed and before the announcement to the colonists, which cannot be right. Different solutions are offered: the mention of the Ebro-crossing may be a mistake, his introductory phrase 'around the same time' may not be used in a precise sense, or he may intend it to accompany solely the main statement in the sentence — that the Romans 'decided to send Publius Cornelius to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius to Africa' — even though the returning envoys and the Ebro news are mentioned in between. As likely, or more so, he and other writers were caught up in the inferred blurring of envoys' returns and consuls' departures. It is notable how Polybius' unsatisfactory handling of the Roman sequence of events in 218 contrasts with his consistent and clear chronology for Hannibal's doings. Roman historical tradition's chronology or chronologies for 218 were certainly messy, as shown by the efforts to squeeze events of 219 also into 218. So the answer may well be that all 'the envoys' were thought to have come home before 1 May — as suggested above, some of them had — while the consuls were preparing their forces; news of Hannibal's Ebro-crossing, and the remaining envoys, reached Rome close together during August, but were associated in later memory with the earlier items.

Consuls depart: Pol. 3.41.2 (farò τήν ώραίαν; cf. Chap. XIV η. 4); Livy 21.20.9. The MSS. reading èirl τήν ώραίαν, kept by Büttner-Wobst and by Walbank, 1. 377, makes the meaning 'during the summer' still clearer. Sempronius earlier than Scipio: e.g. Sumner (1966) 15, 26-27, 29; Astin, 583-84; Proctor, 56-57, 5962; Rich, 36-37; Eckstein (1983) 268-72; Seibert, FzH 178. E.g. Sumner (1966) 14, 'around the same time' has broad sense and mention of Ebro-crossing is mistaken anticipation; Eucken, 109-10, phrase refers to main statement; Schwarte (1983) 53, mention of the crossing is 'eine kompositionelle Lizenz'. 44 Polybius' unsatisfactory Roman sequences: Sumner, ibid. Chronological puzzles of 219-218: cf. above, Chap. XIII §2. 42

Chapter XVI Conclusions 1. A Roman expansionist war? The Carthaginians insistent on their right to do as they chose in Spain, the Romans outraged at this defiance and hostile to the resurgence of Punic confidence and power: these then were the immediate impulses to the Second Punic War. But did deeper factors underlie them — economic rivalry, burgeoning imperialism? That the Romans, at any rate, were driven by acquisitive greed for the wealth of Spain is widely held. Polybius' view, that Punic aggressiveness was responsible, has adherents too. 1 1 War engineered by the commercial, southern-expansionist interests at Rome: Cassola, GP 233-44, 393-96; another product of the Romans' militarism and eagerness for booty and other 'economic' returns, Harris (1979) 68-70, 200-205. Roman expansionism: also Gsell, 3- 137-38; Otto, 493, 508, 513-15 (deepseated, not deliberately aggressive Machtstreben)·, Huss (1985) 293; Seibert, FzH 336, Hann. 86 ('Streben nach der Vorherrschaft' and 'wirtschaftlichen Interessen', cf. 44-46). — Romans aggressive: Gilbert, 177-84; Kromayer, 255, 261; de Sanctis, 3.1. 413; Lenschau, RE 10 s.v. 'Karthago', 2230-31; Ehrenberg 32; Groag, 51-52, 59-65, 67-76 (the aggressive element won out in 218); Treves, 31-32, 34 ('Roma volle la guerra'), 36; Picard, LDC 244, 247-48 (Senate hesitant, public opinion aggressive); Schwarte (1983) 69-70, 72-74. — Romans went to war to avert a supposed Punic menace: Drachmann, 21-23; Holleaux, 136-37, 170-71; Täubler (1921) 74-80; Schnabel, 115 (Romans 'rein passiv und defensiv'); M. Geizer, Gnomon 1931, 370 (= KS 2. 36), and (1933) 163-66 (principle of 'Sicherheit und Ehre des Staates'); Kolbe, 33-34, 3940; Sumner (1967) 245; Eucken, 116-18, 120; Lazenby, 27-28; Richardson (1986) 29; Barceló (1989) 184 (implied). Carthaginians sought war: E. Meyer, 362, 367, 400; Schnabel, l l 6 (after fall of Saguntum); de Sanctis (1932) 169-79 (because Romans intervened at Saguntum); Mazzarino, 101,141-44, 146-151 (at instigation of Hannibal); Salmon (I960) 131, 136; G.H. Donaldson, 'Modern idiom in an ancient context: another look at the strategy of the Second Punic War', Greece & Rome 9 (1962) 135; Scullard (1973) 40, (1980) 201-202; Nicolet (1977) 613-14; Schwarte (1983) 59-66 (because of Roman intervention south of the Ebro); Barzanò, 198 (Hannibal provoked war). — Carthaginians acting in self-defence: also Meitzer, 2. 431, 439-41, 444-45; Kromayer, 253, 260, 263-66; Täubler (1921) 73-75;

XVI.

Conclusions

261

The Romans made no annexations in Africa at the end of the war. Even Carthage was spared a garrison. It is not likely that at the start of the war they intended annexing North African territory but, after sixteen years of near-disastrous struggle, changed their minds. Even half a century after peace in 201, the ultimatum to the Carthaginians in 149 would have moved them from their city but left them their territory, such as it was after the Numidian king Masinissa's annexations. Perhaps this really aimed at provoking the Carthaginians to resist, as Livy states; but adding a demand for territory would hardly have weakened that aim. In North Africa the great gainer from Hannibal's War was Masinissa, of whom the Romans in 218 had probably never heard.2 Were the Romans in 218 coveting Spain? Trade existed, maybe substantial trade, but that does not by itself prove or even imply annexationist designs. The Romans traded with Gaul, North Africa and other Mediterranean lands too. True, they did keep Punic Spain after the war — its most developed parts anyway, the southern and Mediterranean coastlands and the interior some distance up the Ebro basin and north of the river Baetis. No doubt many Romans did reckon in 218 that victory would entail stripping the Carthaginians of their Spanish empire, especially if nothing in Africa was taken: victory would hardly be lasting otherwise. The empire there — as Polybius argues — had restored Carthaginian spirits and strength after 241, thus making Egelhaaf (1922) 9-10; Momigliano (1932/1975) 340; Kolbe, 10, 36-38, 40; Walbank, Comm. 1. 322-23, 329; Picard (1967) 143-46, (1969) 245, 244, 248; Christ, 19; Lazenby, 25, 27; Caven, 90-93Both states responsible: Hallward (1930) 29-31 (mainly the Romans); Pareti, 41-42; Lippold (1963) 147 (militaristic elements); Hampl (1972) 430, 438-40 (perhaps Punic resentment of Roman actions); Astin, 593-96 (both powers mutually suspicious, and unwilling to back down over Saguntum); Errington (1970) 48-53 (mutual suspicion and misunderstanding over Saguntum); Welwei (1977) 156-73, especially 163-64, 172-73 (mistrust and misunderstandings). — War unexpected and accidental: Drachmann, 21-23; de Sanctis (1932) 178-79; Bengtson (1967) 94-95; Hoffmann (1951), and (1962) 4447 (caused by Hannibal crossing the Ebro in 218 to annex north-eastern Spain); Vollmer, 130-31, 133-34 (series of separate actions since 231 led to unintended war). 2

Terms of the peace: Pol. 15.18.1-19.1 (no garrison, 18.2); Livy 30.37.1-6; App. Lib. 54.234-238; Dio, frg. 57.82 = Zon. 9.14.11; Schmitt, SVA 3. 296-308 (earlier negotiations, 291-96) no. 548; Lazenby, 228-32; Huss (1985) 421-24; Scardigli, 297-345. Ultimatum of 149: Livy, Per. 49; Pol. 3-5.5, cf. 36.11.3-4. Harris, CAH 8 2 . 152-57; Baronowski (1995) 29-30.

262

XVI.

Conclusions

Hannibal's War practicable. Both Hannibal and later his brother Hasdrubal had marched from Spain, backed by Spanish wealth and manpower, to fall on Italy. Those were negative reasons to annex. ^ In Spain as elsewhere, the Romans showed their usual eagerness for plunder and military gloria. Public exploitation is not so evident until well after 201; they were not much prompter about organizing administration and taxes there than they had been in Sicily forty years before. At first they sent no regular governors, but instead an ad hoc sequence of specially commissioned senators, two at a time, in effect the wartime arrangement prolonged. Two new praetorships, the first since those for Sicily and Sardinia in 227, were created in 197 for Spain. Among the first two praetors' duties was to establish a clear border between their provinces, an administrative measure only now thought desirable.^ Organized financial exploitation of the Spains is not attested until 195, when the consul M. Porcius Cato, after crushing a serious rebellion, laid imposts on iron and silver mines, apparently in the north-east. Before and after 195, varying quantities of gold, silver and coined money were indeed hauled off to Rome by returning governors — Livy supplies plentiful details — but at best these were unsystematic exactions in a country partly and precariously subdued; some at least were plain booty. Regular taxation, and likewise further exploitation of mining output, came it seems only later, much of it probably thanks to Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and L. Postumius Albinus, governors in 180-179, who not only settled the long wars with the Celtiberians of the Ebro uplands and the Lusitanians of central and western Spain, but also carried out administrative measures within the provinces. This was a quarter of a century after the expulsion of the Carthaginians.

3 Pol. 3-10.5-7. On the extent of the Spanish provinces after the war see (e.g.) Knapp, 29-30, 32-35; A. Montenegro Duque, Historia de España 2.12. 54-55, 5860; Harris, CAH82. 121, 127-28. 4 Commissioners: G.V. Sumner, 'Proconsuls and provinciae in Spain, 218/7-196/5 B.C.', Arethusa 3 (1970) 85-92; Richardson (1986) 64-75. The new praetors, Livy 32.27.6, 28.2, 28.11; Briscoe (1973) 220, 224, 345; Richardson, 75-78; Harris, CAH82.122. Sumner, 92-98 argues that no new gubernatorial arrangements were made from 197 on or province-boundaries defined.

XVI.

Conclusions

263

Before 179 the Romans obviously did gain 'great and obvious benefits' (to borrow Polybius' phrase) from Spain: booty and other moveable assets like slaves. These will all have fluctuated in quantity and value, were unpredictable and were costly to the state: the provinces saw much hard fighting and killing, Roman troops included, in the first thirty years of the republic's rule. Such costs would not deter Roman imperialists — even Roman economic imperialists, if these existed. Yet overall the Romans' activities do not suggest a sustained drive to annex and exploit Spanish lands (in one view, they even briefly thought of evacuating their forces after 201). Rather they displayed a blend of occupiers' obstinacy — to ensure that they and no one else controlled the civilised (or semi-civilised) parts of Spain — and aggressive opportunism: ready to react with force to challenges real, implied or imagined and looking for military renown and plunder at the Spaniards' expense, themselves notably always ready for a fight.5 Judged by their pre-war actions too, the Romans in no way look as though they sought a war; not, that is, until provoked by Saguntum's sack. After the Gallic menace of 225 was checked, they again lost interest in things Punic. They paid no attention to the repeated messages from Saguntum. But Hannibal's successes in 221 and 220 renewed their attention, thanks to more Saguntine prodding, and his refusal either to guarantee safety to the Saguntines or inviolability to the Ebro kept Spain on their minds — unenthusiastically, to judge from their debating and temporising and ultimate inaction during the siege of Saguntum, but with suspicion of Punic motives reawakened. Just what they should

5 Cato's 'magna vectigalia' from mines, Livy 34.21.7, with implication that these imposts were the first regularly laid down Cquibus tum institutis locupletior in dies provincia fuit'); E. Badian, Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in the Service of the Roman Republic (Oxford 1972) 32-33, 126; Richardson, JRS 66 (1976) 139-47; (1986) 90-91. Romans thought of evacuating Spain: Knapp, 6263. Regular taxation from 180-179: Richardson, ß(S 1976, 147-51; (1986) 9093, 115-17, 120-23; Lintott, 72-74. By contrast, Dyson, 187, thinks it started in 199-196; Knapp, 170 η. l6, and Harris (1984) 18 and CAHS2. 122, 129-30 think from 206. On the proverbial bellicosity of the Spaniards and other westerners, cf. Vellerns 2.90.2-4; Silius 1.225-28; Juvenal, Satires 8.116-24.

264

XVI.

Conclusions

do about it they found hard to decide: throughout 219 their Punic 'policy' was, in practice, a blank.6 The loss of their suddenly valued Saguntine amici — or, more accurately, the loss of face over these — and the studied Punic defiance thus implied then transformed irritated suspicion into hostility. They foresaw a straightforward and no doubt profitable war (with Spain and Africa to plunder) or else, if the Carthaginians improbably yielded to their ultimatum, the effective crippling of the Punic republic as a great power. The ultimatum itself paraded Roman priorities: self-centredly outraged, they made no demands on the Saguntines' behalf, advisable as this would have been at least for public relations. The Carthaginians, as noted earlier, were only one of many exenemies whom the Romans at times treated as less than full equals. They were, though, the first outside Italy (except perhaps for Syracuse); and thus such treatment was not only unacceptable to Hannibal and his countrymen but, probably, incomprehensible too. Not until another half-century had gone by — Polybius' famous fifty-three years from 219 to 167 — did the whole Mediterranean world, east as well as west, learn the lesson. 7 Yet the Romans did not seek to direct or rule their ex-enemies (or indeed past or present allies) on a regular basis. Their interventions were on specific matters, normally after some more interested party had appealed to them — the affected cities and the king of Pergamum in 185 against Philip V, for instance; the Egyptian king against Antiochus IV in 168. Significantly, too, these interventions were sporadic. The Romans' basic concern, it seems likely, was to fix a problem and free themselves from having to worry any more about it. That done, they could show goodwill, indifference or animosity. Perseus of Macedón, at the outset of his reign, enjoyed good relations with them. After 168, they let Antiochus and his successors go about their business with only occasional interference. The Carthaginian republic, shorn of empire and pathetically subservient to their behests, for fifty years

6 That 'by 221 B.C. ... Rome began to use Saguntum as a tool to undermine Punic power ... and to loosen the hold of Carthage on the enviable wealth of Spain' (Hallward, 28) moves far ahead of all evidence. 7

Chap. XIII §1.

XVI.

Conclusions

265

after 201 they noticed only when it or Masinissa appealed over yet another dispute about territory.® And this was not simply a second-century phenomenon. Between 241 and 220 four diplomatic approaches were made to the Carthaginians: first over the arrested traders, then the rape of Sardinia and the further indemnity, next the accord struck with Hasdrubal, finally the mission to Hannibal. Two if not three followed promptings by others: in 237 the mercenaries expelled from Sardinia, in 220 the Saguntines, and, over the traders in about 240, quite possibly patrons and associates of these (as in the first confrontation with the Illyrians in 230). Until 220, the Romans repeatedly found the other side complying more or less quickly. Unsurprisingly, in 220 they seem to have expected the same again.9 The new Punic leader was extending Punic power fast and far and had already reached the topographical limit agreed with his predecessor. He needed — Roman leaders may well have thought — early and firm guidance about how to keep the goodwill of the western Mediterranean's major power; good reason then to put a firm demand for the integrity of both Saguntum and the Ebro line. That would keep the Punic empire within limits satisfactory to the Romans, and satisfactorily compliant to Roman pressures. Then they could relegate Punic affairs to the shelf again. The Carthaginians' refusal to do as expected was a setback to which, at first, they were unsure how to react. But Hannibal's calculated snub of sacking Saguntum fixed them in their chosen stance — meaning an ultimatum and then, ultimatum rejected, war.

Attitudes after 185 to Philip V and Perseus, after 168 to Syria: Gruen (1984) 2. 402-406, 660-71 ('so long as Seleucid imperialism directed itself away from the West, Rome remained indifferent', 671); C. Habicht, CAH82. 354-62. In 190 the Senate restored to Philip his hostage son Demetrius and relieved him of further indemnity payments, in recognition of his co-operation against Antiochus III: Pol. 21.3.3 and 11.9; Livy 37.25.12; Appian, Macedonica 9.5, Syriaca 23.110; Plutarch, Flamininus 14.5; cf. Gruen, in Harris (1984) 63Romans, Carthaginians and Masinissa after 201: e.g. Gsell, 3. 297-335; Walsh (1965) 156-60; de Sanctis, 4.3. 1-31; Huss (1985) 425-35; Harris, CAH82. 14251. 9 Pressure on Senate in 230: Pol. 2.8.3. 8

266

XVI.

Conclusions

2. Punic plans and prospects Hannibal and his countrymen in 218 were equally ready to fight. Yet it does not follow that before 218 they wanted war either. Certainly they would be on their guard in case the Romans once more tried to interfere with their doings or their lands: they could not do otherwise, after the experience of 237, stressed by Polybius (and Livy), allied to memories of how the Romans had backed the Mamertines against them in 264; not to mention the blatant Roman mistrust shown during the Gallic invasion in 225. Even a Punic leader without an oath-enshrined aversion to Romans would have seen their sudden interest in the Saguntines and the Ebroline, in 220, as alarming and a threat. 10 The notion of the 'wrath of the Barcids' fuelling a long-planned war of revenge is unconvincing, but such experiences well account for the animosity felt by Hamilcar and Hannibal for the Romans — and, surely, by other Carthaginians too. To infer that most Carthaginians by 218 felt even more embittered, mistrustful and suspicious of the Romans' attitudes than vice versa is entirely likely. They could obey Roman directives neither in 218 nor earlier in 220 without effectively giving up their freedom to run their own foreign affairs. In 218, unlike 237, they had wealth and strength, and a dynamic military leader with a bold strategic scheme for victory should the other side force confrontation. He and they chose to stand firm. The Carthaginians' war-aims, in the earlier years of war anyway, can be inferred in outline. Negotiating in late 215 or early 214 to bring the Syracusan king Hieronymus into the war, the authorities at Carthage (Hannibal had sent Hieronymus' envoys there) agreed to the Syracusan proposal that, after victory, everything west of the river Himera should become Carthaginian. Most or all of Sicily west of the Himera had been controlled by the Carthaginians for centuries before 264: the Syracusan offer and their prompt acceptance suggest that recovering it was a prime war-aim of theirs. Hannibal, of course, wanted to draw the Syracusans into the Punic war-effort, so when Hieronymus stepped up his demands to embrace all Sicily, merely promising the Carthaginians to second their efforts in Italy, they agreed; no doubt a reckoning 10

Livy 21.1.5.

XVI.

Conclusions

267

with the Syracusans would have come in due course. The concession is no evidence that Hannibal really aimed at annexations in Italy. Punic efforts to intervene in Sardinia likewise suggest interest in regaining that island.11 Another war-aim was surely to remove any Roman threat forever. The Roman republic would survive, but in no position to make future trouble. The Cisalpine Gauls, many of whom Hannibal had recruited as allies, would no doubt remain free from Roman control. Within Italy too, the states that had come over to Hannibal would presumably remain Punic allies and protégés; some others — in Etruria, for instance — might well be added to the number, whether they liked it or not, for strategic security. What remained would be a rump Roman state while Carthaginian power, direct and indirect, would ring the western Mediterranean.

11

Pol. 7.4.1-3, 4.7-8; Livy 24.6.1-3, 7-9; cf. de Sanctis, 3-2. 256-57; Schmitt, SVA 3. 251-52 no. 529; Eckstein (1987) 137-38. Polybius does not report Hieronymus agreeing that 'Carthage could have Italy' while he took Sicily (as Hallward, 64; de Sanctis, 257); Livy has the king opine that 'Italiae imperium proprium quaeri Carthaginiensi populo' (24.6.8) — his, or a Roman source's, interpretation of 'promising to assist them in their Italian campaign' (Pol. 7.4.7, Paton's tr., though 'Italian dealings' might be better). Sardinia in Second Punic War: Dyson, 251-54.

Hannibal's overall aims: variously Kromayer, 248-50 (Punic empire and alliances over North Africa, Spain and much of Italy, but still a 'Gleichgewichtzustand' with the Roman republic); Gsell, HAAN 3· 144-46 (Rome to be rendered incapable of challenging Carthage); Egelhaaf (1922) 1216, 38-40 (Rome to be only a central Italian power, as before 343, Carthage to dominate western Mediterranean); Groag, 79-5*6 (recovery only of lands lost to the Romans, and mastery of sea-lanes); Momigliano (1932/1975) 340-45 (Hannibal lacked statesmanship to match military genius); Mazzarino, 148-51 (imperialist aim of bringing western Mediterranean 'sotto l'egemonia marinara di Cartagine', with Rome a centrai Italian power); Hoffmann (1957/1974) 57-60 (Hannibal lacked any clear aims beyond victory), (1962) 65-66, 74-75, 81-86, 133-35 (aimed to break Roman power, then come to an accommodation — but 'wir können nur noch fassen, was er getan, nicht was er gewollt hat', 135); Picard (1967) 236-40, 247-50 (a loose Punic hegemonial empire under Hannibal's own leadership — but with inherent weaknesses); Huss (1985) 34243 ('Rom sollte wohl auf den Stand einer italischen Mittelmacht gebracht worden' while the Carthaginians would regain their lost lands); Seibert, FzH 159-61; Hann. 64-65, 253, 543 (recover lost territories, reduce Rome to a Kleinstaat and establish Punic hegemony over Italy; but this might not have endured).

268

XVI.

Conclusions

Punic power would, it seems, have been exerted as hegemony rather than annexation. Hannibal struck treaties with various communities in Italy: former Roman allies, like Capua and the Greek city of Locri in 216 and 215. The Capuans were guaranteed their freedom under their own laws and magistrates, and immunity from Punic conscription or other compulsory service; the Locrians much the same — 'they should live free under their own laws' — but with a formal alliance for peace and war, on nominally equal terms. His treaty with the Tarentines some years later again recognised political freedom along with immunity from Punic imposts and orders. Such terms matched his propaganda gestures: he released non-Roman prisoners unransomed, and claimed that he had come to Italy simply to free the Italians from Roman tyranny. 13 Propaganda hardly counts as unvarnished truth. Hannibal also promised (Livy writes) to make Capua the head of all Italy — a promise which, if kept, would have endangered Carthaginian dominance. He himself showed on occasion how promises could be broken and mildness replaced by brutality. On the other hand, if he did succeed in raising Italian expectations, then clearly his plans must take account of these — even if, as some think, he also meant to settle veterans of his at strategic sites. In any case, direct rule over regions of Italy was hardly practicable: welldeveloped and organized, the Italian states were a different proposition to the Spanish peoples.1^ In fact Hannibal expected the Roman state to survive, as his treaty with Philip V makes plain. It promised that a Punic peace with the Romans would safeguard Macedonian interests, and 'if ever the Romans make war on you or on us, we will help each other in the war as may be required on either side'. (Livy's Livy 23.7.1-2 (treaty with Campanians of Capua), 24.1.13 (with Locrians, cf. ibid. 9 'foedus ... aequis legibus'); Pol. 8.25.1-2, Livy 25.8.8 (Tarentine treaty, 212); Schmitt, SVA 3. 242, 244-45, 254-55 = nos. 524, 527, 531. Propaganda: Pol. 3.69 2-3, 77.3-7 (the most detailed statement on freeing the Italians), 85.2-4; Livy 21.48.10, 22.7.5, 22.13.2, 22.58.1-2, 23.15.4 and 8, 24.13.1, 25.10.8-9 (cf. 23.42.4, 23.43.10-11). Broken promises: for instance the attempt to arrest a leading pro-Roman Capuan, Decius Magius, before the ink of the Punic-Capuan treaty was dry (Livy 23.7.4-7,10.3-13). Examples of brutality: Briscoe, CAH82. 76-77; cf. Salmon (1967) 300; more sceptical, Seibert, Hann. 531-33Plans for veteran settlements: Seibert, FzH\6\, Hann. 65.

XVI.

Conclusions

269

version, promising that after the war 'all Italy with the city of Rome itself shall belong to the Carthaginians and Hannibal' whereas Greece will belong to Philip, is plain Roman historiographie fiction.) Hannibal thus envisaged the Roman state not only still existing after the war, but capable of making war against a major power. Of course a diplomatic document, like propaganda, need not be taken as fully revealing either side's intentions. As noted long ago, the annihilation of Roman power, with a resulting increase in Carthaginian, would not be welcome to Philip. But no document could veil that a Punic victory, even without Rome's annihilation, would mean Punic dominance from Spain to the Adriatic. For a proviso on mutual support against a postwar Rome to be added simply to make Philip think that Hannibal's aims were modest is unconvincing; the clause had real point. Again, Hannibal told his Roman captives after Cannae that he was not waging war to the death but was fighting 'for honour and dominion'. Hardly another hostile fiction, for Roman tradition preferred a Hannibal of sworn mortal hatred against the Romans; and again it implies that his aims were more nuanced than mere destruction.1^ Both he and his countrymen would take for granted that final victory would bring economic benefits too. Hannibal knew the value of money, in fact was highly interested in acquiring it, according to Polybius on the evidence of many (Carthaginians inTreaty with Philip V: Pol. 7.9 (the relevant clauses, 7.912-15 [§15 tr. Paton]); Livy 23.339-12; F.W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedón (Cambridge 1940, U.S. repr. 1967) 70-72, 76; Comm. 2. 2, 42-56; Bickerman (1952); Picard (1967) 2635; Schmitt, S VA 3. 245-50 no. 528; M.L. Barré, The God-List in the Treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedonia (Baltimore and London 1983); Huss (1985) 341-43; Hammond and Walbank (1988) 393-94; Briscoe, CAH 8 2 . 46; Errington, ibid. 96-98. Philip would not want to see Roman power annihiliated or Punic power hugely strengthened: so Groag, 89. — Hannibal to his captives, Livy 22.58.2-3; cf. Hoyos (1983) 173-74. Doubted by Groag, 90, because not in Polybius, but Polybius' detailed account of events after Cannae does not survive — his later description (6.58.2-13) of how the Romans refused to discuss even ransoming the captives is an item specially to illustrate Roman strength of principle (cf. Walbank [1972] 133). He does not mention Hannibal's envoy Carthalo, sent along with the captives' spokesmen (Livy 22.58.7-9), but Carthalo, despite de Sanctis (3.2. 216 n. 33, 364), Groag (90 n. 4), and Seibert {Hann. 203), need not be doubted (Kromayer, 247; Hoffmann [1962] 74; Huss [1985] 334): the variant given by Dio, frg. 57.36 = Zon. 9.6.11 (Zonaras under the year 210, but not necessarily Dio) looks like an annalist's — or a compiler's — error.

15

270

XVI.

Conclusions

eluded) who had known the great man. In any case, states that extended their power dramatically would expect tangible benefits as well as honour and renown: indemnities, for instance, and perhaps enhanced trading privileges (though, interestingly, the Romans made no such requirement in 201). That Hannibal had deliberate economic plans, however, like controlling the traderoutes and tin-routes between northern Europe and the Mediterranean, and achieved this by occupying key sites en route to Italy, is unconvincing. His plans can be inferred only from his actions; but supposed Hannibalic garrisons in southern Gaul are hard to infer from various third-century Punic goods found there — Punic wine-jars at Ruscino (Perpignan), a deity's statuette from the Gallic town at Ensérune — and from the reported drop in his army's strength from 59,000 horse and foot at the Pyrenees to 46,000 at the Rhône. Nor does his brother Hasdrubal's peaceable passage through the region ten years later add much support, even if (as some argue) it points to such Punic garrisons along the route. Punic trade and contacts had long existed with Gaul, as with many other lands, so Punic finds should be expected. As for any garrisons, they must have kept discreetly clear (to say the least) of the Roman armies that travelled from Italy to Spain during the war — certainly they never sought to impede them, decisive though that might have been for Punic interests in Spain. Nor did the Romans in turn ever seek to attack the supposed garrisons, despite it being obvious that these would assist Hasdrubal's eventual march to Italy. The transmitted figures for Hannibal's strength at points along his famous march are too debatable to be any support for the garrisons-theory either. That no source or recorded event hints at them simply reinforces disbelief. If Hannibal did have (unattested) plans for cornering the markets of Celtic Europe, they would be implemented after victory. For wealth and trading opportunities on a grander scale than ever would inevitably flow from the mastery of the western Mediterranean.1^ Hannibal fond of money: Pol. 9-25.1-4, 26.11 (doubted by Seibert, Hann. 53334). Grand economic scheme and conquest of Transalpine Gaul in 218: Picard (1961) 186-87, 242 [= (1983) 193-95, 252-531; (1967) 160-67; (1968) 248, 250, 26O-6I. Lazenby, 34, tentatively accepts Punic occupation of Gaul; Seibert (1989) 218-20, also FzH 211-12, Hann. 110, infers forces stationed along the route by agreement with the Gallic tribes.

XVI.

Conclusions

271

3- Punic wars and Roman imperialism Polybius' opinion, that the Romans from early on aimed at bringing the inhabited world under their domination, was noted in a previous chapter. Roman imperialism is a widely debated question, all the more as European imperialisms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been called on for illumination. Argument centres on how intentional the growth of empire was, and what sort (or sorts) of domination the Romans were seeking. The First and Second Punic Wars put them on the imperial path outside Italy, but that they deliberately planned this is unconvincing. An intention in 264 to annex Sicily was (we saw) altogether unlikely: holding Sicily was not accompanied by direct rule or, seemingly, exploitation until around 228/227 — if not 210. Similarly enough, even if annexing Punic Spain was desired in 218 (at least by some), Roman thinking, on the evidence, did not then go beyond the goals of ending Punic rule and gaining booty; probably it did not go much further until the 190s, as noted above. Empire-building through annexations was slow in developing. It is worth recalling that, apart from reconquering Cisalpine Gaul in the 190s, the Romans' next acquisitions were not made until the 140s.17 Annexing territory was only one form of Roman domination; the subordination of their allies in Italy, self-governing but obedient, was another. Polybius' idea of Roman dominance included such non-annexationist supremacy. The Romans' sense of superiority too towards defeated ex-enemies (not to mention small neighbours) was noted earlier. Their preference was for states and peoples in the lands with which they had dealings to do what

Control over central Spain eventually reached approximately the river Tagus and the uplands around the upper Ebro; this made good strategic sense and was implicit from the start — essentially the Punic frontier in Hasdrubal's time plus Hannibal's extension to the Ebro and then the Pyrenees. There it remained for the next century and a half (not that that prevented many forays beyond Tagus): cf. B.D. Hoyos, 'The dediticii of the Tabula Alcantarensis', ZPE 78 (1989) 43-44 (cf. ZPE 83 [1990] 93-94). Harris, CAH 8 2 . 127-28 infers incomplete control by 174 as far north as the Vaccaei; but any control beyond Tagus was conspicuous more by its absence, save when a Roman army was in the area.

272

XVI.

Conclusions

they, the Romans, wanted, when they wanted it — and in no case do anything to damage or even annoy them. Hiero of Syracuse from 263 on obeyed this unwritten axiom admirably. Demetrius of Pharos in 219 found that he had disobeyed it. In 240, 237, 225 and, disastrously, 220-218 the Romans sought to impose it on the Carthaginians. This style of dominance, neither annexation nor regular and close control, can conveniently be called hegemony. To an extent, it resembled in the second century B.C. what historians of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European imperialism term informal empire: the sort exerted over, for instance, Persia or Egypt, Argentina or post-1898 Cuba. With the Romans' Italian allies, a more suitable parallel might be the autonomous princely states of British India: these, too, ran their own internal affairs (if, un-Romanly, under the eye of British Residents) while following their imperial suzerain in foreign affairs and w a r . 1 9 Whatever the nature of their domination abroad, the Romans' Italian experience was their backdrop: hence one reason for their undecided treatment of the Sicilians. The Mamertines — Italians by origin — did acquire an alliance of similar sort, and a few other communities enjoyed some form of allied status; but by 241 there was no question of making most Sicilians into military allies, probably because of distance and dubious reliability. Yet organizing them into what later became the norm, a 'province', was a proPolybius' opinion of the nature of Roman domination: Derow (1979) 4-6; Richardson (1979) 1-11, holding that for Polybius it was quasi-monarchic. Formal and informal empire: so formulated in several studies by R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, notably in Africa and the Victorians (2nd edn., London 1982); discussed in Imperialism: the Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, ed. W.M. Louis (New York 1976). On modern imperialism useful surveys are: W. Baumgart, Imperialism: the Idea and Reality of British and French Colonial Expansion, 1880-1914 (Eng. tr., Oxford 1983); M. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, N.Y., & London 1986). Imperialism over millennia is interestingly scrutinised by M.A. Barrali, Towards a General Theory of Empire (New School for Social Research [U.S.A.], Diss. 1976); in Greece and Rome by Doyle, Empires 25-28, 54-102. Hegemony is usefully distinguished from imperialism by, e.g., R. Werner, 'Das Problem des Imperialismus und die römische Ostpolitik im zweiten Jahrhundert', ANRW 1.1 (1972) 522-23. On the Indian princely states (one-third of the Indian Empire): e.g. V.A. Smith, The Oxford History of India (4th edn., revised by P. Spear: Delhi-London-New York 1981) 629-32, 740-49. On early Roman 'imperialism' within Italy: R.J. Rowland, Latomus 42 (1983) 749-62. On later Roman expansion cf. G. Woolf and M. Fulford in World Archaeology 23 (1992) no. 3, Archaeology of Empires, pp. 283-93 and 294-305 respectively.

XVI.

Conclusions

273

cess slow to evolve — it took perhaps until 210. By the time they conquered Punic Spain, the Romans had clearer ideas about handling subjects and satellites: regular administration took only a decade or so from 205 to start up, though again, as noted above, it spent decades developing further. Yet the outcomes of the two wars were not why the wars were begun. In 264 it had been not a question of the Romans seeking empire at Punic expense; it was not originally a question of confronting the Carthaginians at all. Roman concern and covetousness then centred on the Syracusans, in 264 arguably the one expansionist power. These were a good foe to have: rich, renowned, a potential peril to the new status quo in southern Italy, yet still militarily manageable. By contrast, the Carthaginians were the Syracusans' enemies and — by treaty anyway — the Romans' friends. In 218 the Romans had more immediate and truculent aims: to avenge outraged Roman dignity and squash the reborn, defiant and potentially dangerous power of their ex-enemies. Hannibal may well have looked like a Demetrius of Pharos on a grander scale, to be combated correspondingly. The Carthaginians had their own ambitions in 264 but, it seems, limited ones: to check Syracusan expansion and benefit Punic interests by gaining a grip on Messana. This might count as a species of expansionism — a sharply restricted type if so, since the Mamertines could and did undo it at short notice. Against the Romans the Carthaginians were planning nothing. Yet they showed suspicion and alarm at the prospect of Roman entry into Sicily; not from any earlier tension between the two powers, but rather from what they had seen happen in Italy over the previous half-century: Roman control spreading from Latium irresistibly over the whole peninsula. Punic actions, and reactions, towards the Romans in 264 were essentially defensive. Three years later, the Romans' decision to drive them out of Sicily was understandable, given the steady escalation of the war. Necessarily it implied Roman surveillance of the island in future, otherwise there would be a power-vacuum (or a Syracusan takeover): in essence, therefore, another negative decision. Negative too their demand for Sardinia during Regulus' peace-talks in late 256, a demand prompted most likely by Punic raids on Italy from that island. By 241, raids from Sardinia having long ended, the demand had been dropped and the Romans limited their take to Sicily.

274

XVI.

Conclusions

In 264, then, an onrushing, combative force (to adapt a metaphor of Florus') ran unexpectedly into an established, unyielding mass, and a twenty-three years' war resulted. In 218 two vigorous, mutually suspicious powers clashed on an issue symbolic and relatively sudden, rather than solid or longstanding, to unleash one of the greatest wars of the ancient world. Unplanned, unwanted: could the wars have been avoided? 4. Avoidable wars? Arguably not: it is unusual in history for two energetic and military-minded states to remain on peaceable terms long after their fields of interest have moved fairly close to each other. The very nature of the Roman state and society, populous, prone to warfare, touchy about territorial security, suggests a dynamic which very likely or certainly would in the end have propelled Roman power across the straits of Messina and later across the Mediterranean. Ancient historians assumed as much — Polybius with his Romans consciously planning to impose mastery on the inhabited world, Florus with his rhetorical images of the Roman People as a lustily aggressive youth and an unstoppable blaze, and Dio depicting the Romans as no less imbued than the Carthaginians with acquisitive eagerness. Had Ap.Claudius Caudex succeeded in settling the Messana crisis, it might only have put off a Roman-Punic clash. Had the Carthaginians held themselves totally aloof in 264-263 and left it to the Syracusans to battle alone, Roman hegemony would very probably have been established over eastern Sicily, practically side by side with the Punic-dominated west. Would they have coexisted peaceably for long?2^ Driven by the results of the first war, the Carthaginians in turn developed a dynamic of expansion and aggrandisement by land — land at first far from areas of concern to the Romans. Thus the verdicts of 241 and 237 did give rise to overt aggressive imperialism in virtually every sphere, economic and military and social — among the Carthaginians. By the irony of fortune, by 218 the two powers' fields of dominance were again relatively close, at any rate in the north. A new war was perhaps only a matter of time. 20

Florus 1.18 [2.21.2-4; Dio, frg. 43.2 = Zon. 8.8.3; cf. Chap. II §2.

XVI.

Conclusions

275

Yet these are not the sole possibilities. True, ambition and bellicosity, greed and fear — on one side or both — are in varying degrees the roots of most wars. But the outbreak and shape of wars, and often their outcomes, depend on more factors than general potential. Were ambition and its fellow-impulses the sole governing elements, were the historical factors so irresistible, it must surprise that the movements into the First and Second Punic Wars were so clumsy and hesitant. Both states were warlike, the Romans notoriously so. But not every war was the same: combatting a Syracusan kingdom or barbarian Illyrians, Numidian tribes or the Vaccaei in central northern Spain were moves more readily made than confronting a great Mediterranean power. It is striking how both in 264 and in 219 (or, for some scholars, in 218 itself) the Romans in particular showed hesitation, and how ruthlessly swift they were in 237 by contrast — when they knew that the other side was weak. Rather similarly, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the European powers indulged often enough in military action against opponents abroad who could put up only limited resistance — or were expected to, as Italy inaccurately expected of Ethiopia in 1896, and the British of the Boers a few years later — but remained highly circumspect in committing themselves to fighting one another. Had a Punic war not been sparked in 264, Roman attention might well have shifted elsewhere (to northern Italy, for instance, or across the Adriatic) with no inevitability of a Punic war by 260 or 250. Had one still come eventually, it would have blown up from a different spark, and its end conceivably might not have been the same. Might there then have been a second war at all? 21 In practice, other crucial factors contributed in 264 and 218 as on many other occasions (for instance in 1870, 1914 and 1939): misjudgement and miscalculation. Misreading signs, situations and adversaries is a regular human pursuit, and Romans and Carthaginians showed no great skills in assessing each other. As early as 279 in the war against Pyrrhus, each was wrong about the

Roman bellicosity: Chap. II §2 with nn. 17-18. The Carthaginians were not notably pacific either, at any rate in Sicily from 480 on and in Spain under the Barcid generalissimos. Cf. W. Ameling, Karthago: Studien zur Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft (München 1993) 180-81.

276

XVI.

Conclusions

other's readiness to strike a bargain with him. Fear of this prompted their pact seeking to prevent either being recruited as his ally against the other — a dead letter pact, it turned out, for neither acted as the other feared. In the Messana crisis the Romans thought to fight Hiero of Syracuse, and have a swift and profitable war. They did not reckon with a hostile Carthaginian reaction. In 264 the decisive miscalculations were again not solely Roman. Those of the Carthaginians are not to be undervalued. Despite garrisoning Messana, they made no move to block or nullify the Mamertines' embassy to Rome; yet reacted furiously to these bloodlessly dismissing Hanno I and his men. Hanno II, besieging the city afterwards with Hiero, in turn would not talk with a consul eager (so he claimed) for talks. Supposed masters of supple bargaining, the Carthaginians flatly rejected not just compromise but discussion of compromise. So did Hiero, but at least his miscalculations had some excuse: he was the prime object of Roman intervention and had to keep in step with his allies. Yet if Ap. Claudius was bluffing, Hanno and Hiero could have called his bluff for the world to see; and if he was not, they and he might have worked out a settlement after all that averted a Roman crossing to Sicily, curbed the Mamertines, and brought muchneeded security to both Sicily and themselves. Political and military miscalculations persisted on both sides. The Carthaginians got wrong how much resistance Hiero would put up by himself and when to send him help. M'. Valerius Maximus went badly astray in 263, reckoning that a show of strength in Punic Sicily would browbeat them into seeking terms. Later still, in North Africa, Regulus presumed on his supposed mastery of the military situation in 256-255 and was brought low. The two republics were not notably more perceptive about each other after 241, on the few occasions when they paid each other attention. Extorting Sardinia and the extra indemnity aimed, as was argued earlier, to avert a feared Punic move to recover their losses from Lutatius' peace — a serious overestimate of the Carthaginians' strength and serious misjudgement of their plans. Twelve years later the Romans feared a Punic territorial coup in the train of the Gallic invasion of Italy; another possibility which existed, almost certainly, in Roman imaginations alone. Then between autumn 220 and spring 218 mutual mistrust, misinterpretations and misjudgements crowded one on another to

XVI.

Conclusions

277

produce war, even though the two powers' political and diplomatic contacts had been so intermittent, over an issue which had only now been raised. Coexistence might have been feasible. Whatever Polybius and others believed, Hamilcarand Hasdrubalpretty certainly were not interested in a new fight with the Romans, while Hannibal kept away from Saguntum, at any rate until the Romans drew his attention to it. No more were they, to judge from their actions and inaction, proposing to provoke war; they were not even much interested in monitoring what their former foes were up to, as their one embassy in seventeen years of strenuous Punic activities between 237 and 220, and their lack of interest in Saguntine messages until 220 again, both confirm. Coexistence, friendly or at least diplomatically correct, had gained a practical start with the settlement of the traders-dispute around 240. The Romans could then have treated the Carthaginian republic with more restraint in 237 and, even after the Sardinia crisis, could have built on the relations established with the affable Hasdrubal. They might certainly have treated the new Barcid leader with greater tact in 220, and in 218 could have avoided laying so much stress on the treatment of Saguntum (Emporiae would have served no less well as a listening post if they wanted one, nor did they show themselves concerned for the Saguntines' own welfare). Hannibal for his part could have responded to their démarche of 220 a little more constructively than by sacking Saguntum. All such subtleties were overriden by mutual mistrust, faulty judgements, and resulting overreactions. Whereas in 264 the most crucial such flaws were on the Carthaginian side, in 237 they blatantly marked the Roman. In 219-218 each side overreacted equally mistakenly to the other's moves. For this the Romans arguably deserve the lion's share of blame: for, as Polybius stresses, exacting Sardinia and the extra indemnity was the chief cause of the war. Yet the affair of 237 in turn was a result, direct or indirect, of their experience of the first; and the first they had not planned. The Carthaginians were long saddled with the guilt for both wars, thanks to Roman historical tradition and the ultimate disappearance of pro-Punic accounts, but scholars have shown that verdict to be inadequate. The Romans' actions were no less and maybe were more significant, especially for the outbreak of the

278

XVI.

Conclusions

second war. Of course neither saw themselves acting improperly during the decades from 279 to 218 (if some Romans felt qualms over the Sardinia affair, they kept quiet about it). Each side could picture itself as the innocent party and likewise as the fearless champion of right against wrong — pictures that survive to varying extent in later polemics. Polybius, the historian of Roman expansion and of Mediterranean states' resistance to it, captures this ambiguity, however imperfectly. Over the events of 264 he underlines both the Romans' fears for the security of Italy (though supposing that the threat was Punic) and their keenness for the profits of war: both calculations persuaded the People to send aid to unsavoury clients. The origins of the second war he shares out between Hamilcar and his countrymen on the one hand — Hamilcar's resentment at the outcome of the first, and his and his countrymen's anger over the rape of Sardinia — and, on the other, the Romans who without justice or cause seized that island and squeezed a fresh indemnity out of their former enemies. That misdeed was the chief reason for the war, and therefore it was with good reason that the Carthaginians went to war. 2 2 A particular blend of factors was necessary to produce the First and Second Punic Wars: factors deep-rooted (the Romans' bent for warmaking, Carthaginian defensive pugnacity), recently engendered (their mutual mistrust after 264 the most obvious) and new — in 264 Hiero's Mamertine victory, the Punic rescue of Messana, and the opportunity for the Romans to move against Syracuse with a good pretext; in 221-220 the acquisition of power in the Punic state by an energetic military genius, the resulting Punic expansion in Spain, and the existence of an informal Roman tie with the previously ignored Saguntines. Moralists, ancient and modern, might well find things to condemn in the actions of both powers, not to mention in those of the smaller states. Pragmatiste and cynics hold that a state does what it judges to be in its own interests or in accord with its needs. Great powers, by definition perhaps, are mistrustful even amid success and they overreact. Similar events in later eras may come to mind: notably perhaps those of 1914, when — along the lines

22

On Roman calculations in 264, Pol. 1.10.5-11.2 (see Chap. IV); causes of Second Punic War, 2.36.6, 3 9.6-10.6, 3.30.3-4. Note that both Hamilcar's and his fellow-citizens' anger, όργή, over Sardinia is stressed: 3-10.5, 13.1. See Chap. XI §§1 and 3, with nn. 5, 9, 30 and 31.

XVI.

Conclusions

279

of 264 — a dispute between two central European states abruptly and to everyone's surprise sucked in all the great powers on the continent; and reminiscent of 218, the sudden falling-out over Cuba which touched off the Spanish-American War of 1898 (though this proved far briefer than Hannibal's). The wars were not wanted by either Carthaginians or Romans, any more than the huge losses and damage which both wars inflicted. But, faced with situations which each state judged it could not tolerate, both accepted war. So, of the two sides in 264 and 218, who was more right to take up arms? Both were; or neither.

Chapter XVII The Major Sources For the origins of the First and Second Punic Wars we must rely on a handful of ancient writers; of inscriptions and papyri very little survives. Even the writers are few compared to what once existed, but they now and again quote or paraphrase from their lost predecessors. Of course they often show biases, real or presumed, and discrepancies: hence a thriving art of historiographical detection, sometimes persuasive. 1. Lost accounts The annalistic chronicle of the priestly college of pontiffs at Rome does not survive, but later Roman historians consulted it. Philinus of Agrigentum (Acragas), seemingly a contemporary of the First Punic War, and Q. Fabius Pictor, a Roman senator known to have lived during the Second, were the earliest authorities of the war of 264: Philinus in a work dedicated to it, Fabius as part of his general Roman history. Around 200 the Latin poet Naevius produced a verse account of it, short extracts from which survive in Latin grammarians and the like.1 1

On Philinus, e.g. Laqueur, RE 19 (1938) 2180-93; Walbank (1945) 1-18; La Bua (1966) passim. On Fabius, especially his treatment of the Punic Wars: Gelzer (1933) 129-66 = (1964) 51-92; Bung, passim-, K. Haneil, 'Zur Problematik der älteren römischen Geschichtsschreibung' in Entretiens Hardt 4: Histoire et historiens dans l'antiquité (Vandœuvres-Genève 1956) 149-70 (discussion, 17184); B.W. Frier, Libri Annales Pontificum Maximorum: the Origins of the Annalistic Tradition (Rome 1979) 225-84; E. Badian, 'The early historians' in T.A. Dorey, ed., Latin Historians (London 1966) 2-7, cf. LCM1 (1976) 97-98; D. Flach, Einführung in die römische Geschichtsschreibung (Darmstadt 1985) 6l67; cf. also G.P. Verbrugghe, 'Three notes on Fabius Pictor and his history', Misc. Manni, 6. 2157-73. On both Philinus and Fabius: Meister (1975) 127-49. Naevius' fragments: Warmington, ROL 2. 46-73; see also Schwarte (1972). Pontifical annals: Frier, 83-178 holds that the contents of the annual tabula

XVII.

The Major Sources

281

There was greater variety on the second war. Companions of Hannibal, faithful 'so long as fortune allowed' (Cornelius Nepos' rather gnomic comment), Sosylus of Sparta and Silenus of Caleacte in Sicily, wrote accounts of him. So too did three now virtually unknown writers: Chaereas (sneered at, along with Sosylus, by Polybius), Eumachus of Naples, and one Xenophon. Hannibal himself supplied an itemisation of his military arrangements at the outset of the war of 218, written in Punic and Greek on a bronze tablet fixed to a column of the temple of Hera at Cape Lacinium in southern Italy; conceivably too a summary of his achievements. After Fabius Pictor a prisoner of Hannibal's, L. Cincius Alimentus, produced an account of the war. The first Roman to write history in his own language, M. Porcius Cato, consul in 195, had fought in the war as a young man; his Origines went down to 149. Around 120 B.C. the first historical monograph in Latin, by Coelius Antipater, narrated the war in seven books. 2 Polybius and Livy supply most of the surviving citations from these writers (save Cato), as in Polybius' waspish résumés of Philinus' account of the battles outside Messana in 264 and Fabius' thesis on the origins of Hannibal's war. Some of the Agrigentine's work may also be reflected in Diodorus' account of the first war and its Sicilian antecedents; but here Diodorus himself survives only in disconnected excerpts and his Philinian elements are contentious. Of Sosylus' Hannibalic history there is only a papyrus fragment, describing a sea-battle between Punic and Roman forces and giving most attention to the Massiliot allied contingent. 3

were early on put into book form; on the annalistic tradition generally, ibid. 201-84. 2 Historians of Hannibal: Nepos, Hann. 13.3 Cquamdiu fortuna passa est'); Meister (1975) 150-72; also Κ. Meister, 'Annibale in Sileno', Maia 23 (1971) 3-9. Hannibal's inscription: Pol. 3 33 17-18, 56.4; cf. Livy 28.46.16. On Cincius, Cato and Coelius: Badian, 6-11; A.E. Astin, Cato the Censor (Oxford 1978) 21139. 3 Philinus in Diodorus Bks. 22-24: Chaps. III η. 20, VI η. 7; Jacoby, FGrH 2.BD. 598. Sosylus: FGrH 176 Fl, with commentary in Jacoby, 2. BD. 603-605; Walbank, 1. 332-33, 430-31; C.W. Fornara, The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome (Cambridge 1983) 104, l60.

282

XVII. 2.

The Major Sources

Surviving sources

In first place, just a few inscriptions. Among the bronze tablets of the Entella hoard is the record of honours from the grateful townsfolk to their (apparently) Roman superintendant, Ti. Claudius of Antium — an appointee most likely of Agathocles or else Pyrrhus. A Roman milestone, in western Sicily again, mentions a consul Cotta: maybe C. Aurelius Cotta, who as consul first in 252 and then in 248 operated in the island, though possibly put up by another Cotta decades later. Diplomatic and religious ties in the late 240s linking the cities of Syracuse, Camarina and Phintias in Sicily with the isle of Cos, in the Aegean, are attested via inscriptions.^ Of extant written accounts the earliest is Polybius', originally forty books long and written during the middle decades of the second century. His main interest was the epoch from 219 on, the years when the Romans spread their domination over the Mediterranean world; the period of the First Punic War and its aftermath he treats as essentially a prologue, though fortunately in some detail. After Book 5 his history survives only in extracts, compiled in Byzantine times notably about personalities, diplomatic exchanges, military actions and dramatic episodes. Nevertheless his account is the single most important one wherever it survives. Diodorus' Library of History comes from a century later, around the time of Julius Caesar. Of its forty books, from mythological times to his own, the final twenty on the period from 300 survive — like Polybius' later books — only in Byzantine extracts. Some are lengthy, like the account of Hiero's campaigns against the Mamertines; most are short. Diodorus clearly drew on good predecessors, so the truncated remnants of his account of the third century are valuable. The brief Ineditum Vaticanum, offering various sententious reflexions on Roman history, includes comments made to Punic envoys in 264 in language very close to those in Diodorus. On the third century Livy's narrative too exists only in part. Books 21 to 30 record Hannibal's War; but Books 11 to 20, treat-

4

Ti. Claudius of Antium: Chap. II §3- Milestone with '[C. Aulrelius [?L. f.] Cottas [clonsol': ILLRP 1277, with Degrassi's commentary; Verbrugghe, 19-22; MRR 3. 30-31; cf. Corsaro (1982) 1032. Sicilian cities and Cos: Chap. VII η. 22.

XVII.

The Major Sources

283

ing the years between 292 and 219 (and including a survey of previous Punic history and civilisation in Book 16) are gone save for one-paragraph epitomes made in late Roman times. On the origins of the two Punic wars he offers limited but useful, and sometimes revealing, material. Writers of the imperial age do offer something. Notable among them is Appian of Alexandria, of the later second century A.D.: his history of Roman wars, treating different regions or topics in turn, includes the Spanish events of the Second Punic War in the book on Spain {Iberica), Hannibal's own operations in Italy in another (Hannibalica) the North African campaigns of Regulus and — in far more detail — Scipio Africanus likewise in the appropriate book (Libyca, which concludes with a lengthy account of the Third Punic War), and would have dealt with the First Punic War largely in the Sicilian book (Sicelica) of which only fragments remain. The Roman history of the early third-century A.D. senator and consul L. Cassius Dio is fully extant only for the late Republic and early Empire, leaving only excerpts mostly of the moralising kind for earlier times including the third century B.C. But the Byzantine historian John Zonaras abbreviated Dio to produce his own account of these times, and reasonably faithfully (so the overlaps between his work and surviving Dionic fragments show).5 Minor sources and occasional references are numerous enough, though not much use except for particular points. Thus Florus' second-century A.D. epitome of Roman Republican and Augustan wars, largely based on Livy, and Orosius' fifth-century Christian world history (again heavily Livian for the Republican past). Serviceable is Justin's epitome of the work of the Augustan-age historian Pompeius Tragus; less so, but unfortunately not to be ignored, is the fourth-century compilation of famous Republican lives, De Vins Illustribus·, and worth mention, though seldom to be trusted independently, is the versifying consular Silius Italicus' epic on the Second Punic War, apparently based (with plenty of artistic licence) again on Livy's masterpiece.

5

On Ineditum Vat. (= FGrH 839) cf. Chap. V §1 with n. 3A military discharge-certificate of A.D. 229 supplies Dio's full name (M. Roxan, Roman Military Diplomas 1978-84 [London 1985] no. 133; J.W. Rich, Cassius Dio: The Augustan Settlement [Warminster 1990] 1 n. 1).

284

XVII. The Major Sources

Help comes now and then from such writings as Theocritus' Idylls, contemporary with Hiero II whom the poet lavishly and hopefully lauds in one poem of about the year 270; Ennius' poetic history of Rome the Annales, of early second-century B.C. date; the Elder Pliny's encyclopedic Naturalis Historia of the 70s A.D.; Frontinus' collection of military stratagems composed towards the year A.D. 100; and the second-century A.D. collection of miscellaneous antiquarian learning by Gellius, Nodes Atticae. On the origins and outbreak of the wars, all the same, the total of evidence is limited. Certainly many of the above have something to say about, for example, the crisis at Messana in 264. But Polybius' account both of the preliminaries (Hiero versus the Mamertines), the crisis itself and the first two years of war totals no more than nine chapters, or substantial paragraphs — though to that can be added the later excursus on the early Roman-Punic treaties — while Diodorus on Hiero's Mamertine war, the Messana crisis and the bellum Syracusanum of 264-263, and Dio and his epitomator Zonaras on the same, together amount to only a little more than Polybius. All the minor sources together come to hardly half a dozen pages in Greek and Latin. For the doings of Hamilcar and his successors in Spain, their dealings with the Romans, and the crisis over Saguntum the quantity of evidence is similarly compact. And, in places, similarly contradictory. 6

3. Bias and inaccuracies: the problem of Polybius Notoriously the sources do not complement, or supplement, one another much more often than they contradict. We have seen Polybius' Mamertines, shattered at the Longanus, simultaneously turning for help to the Carthaginians and sending envoys to the Romans; but Diodorus' Mamertines being rescued by the Punic general Hannibal and thus left in peace by Hiero, with Roman aid to them being voted only later when Syracusans and Carthaginians launch the joint siege of Messana. Polybius' Roman Senate fails to decide about sending aid and his Roman People acts (like Diodorus' later); by contrast Livy's, or more correctly his epitome's, Senate does authorise aid; and so on. Treating the 6

Pol. 1.7.1—16.11; early treaties, 3.22—26; Diod. 22.13.1—23.4.1; Dio, frg. 43-115; Zon. 8.8—9.

XVII.

The Major Sources

285

years after 241, Polybius differs sharply from Appian and Zonaras on the details of the rape of Sardinia, and from every other source on the content of the Ebro accord of 225 — not to mention over Valerius' and Baebius' embassy to Hannibal half a decade later. Polybius' reputation for accuracy and impartiality, once impressive, has sunk amid greater awareness of his pro-Roman and proAchaean biases, his sometimes extravagant criticism of previous historians, and his own mistakes and obscurities. On the events just before and during 264, the likelihood that Diodorus reflects an almost contemporary narrative (probably Philinus') earns him some scholars' preference wherever he and Polybius clash. Elswhere too the preference often goes against Polybius, as over the Romans' reaction to Hannibal sacking Saguntum: his insistence that no debate took place has been largely discounted — in favour, ironically, of what a late Roman historian affirms. One tendency in analysing extant accounts is to infer that, in a given statement or section, the writer is following one predecessor and doing so fairly closely. Philinus may well be the authority behind Diodorus' narrative of Hiero of Syracuse's victorious war against the Mamertines; because Diodorus does not report the Mamertines appealing to the Romans, some hold that Philinus did not report an appeal either. Supposedly then it was not sent until later, and Polybius, depicting 'some' Mamertines as turning to the Carthaginians for rescue while 'others' send envoys to Rome, has been fooled by (or is collaborating with) a blatant Roman cover-up by Fabius Pictor. Much is assumed here — that Diodorus' fragmented account must nevertheless have included an appeal to Rome had there been one then; that Polybius' 'some' and 'others' must be self-contradictory (despite the use of different verbs with differing implications); that a Roman account here (though not later) wanted to cover up a Punic presence at Messana prior to the Roman decision on the appeal. Hannibal mentioned to the Roman envoys in 220 an 'ancestral Carthaginian principle' of avenging persons wronged. This echo of Roman mos maiorum betrays, supposedly, a Roman source at that point in Polybius' narrative; which then switched to a pro-Hannibalic source for the next sentence, about Hannibal's message to his home government seeking instructions for dealing with the vexatious Saguntines; then doubled back to a Roman for the departure of Valerius and Baebius and their opinion that war

286

XVII.

The Major Sources

was inevitable. A historiographie quilt of a narrative, in effect, each patch easily detachable for identification.? But sentence-by-sentence, or even paragraph-by-paragraph, reproduction of a predecessor is implausible save perhaps in some epitomes (like Zonaras') — and some other epitomes can be unreliable, like that of Livy. Livy using Polybius is almost the only case of one extant main source drawing, partly at least, on another — but his methods are (variously) close adaptation, fairly thorough recasting and exensive abridgement. Adaptation can involve interweaving Polybius' record with what Livy read in annalistic or other predecessors: thus his laboriously complicated version of how and why, and when, P. Valerius and Q. Baebius were appointed envoys to Hannibal (allegedly in 218). Even Diodorus' deployment of varied source-material has been shown to be more complex and interwoven than his old reputation as the scissorsand-paste compiler par excellence would suggest. Some moderns nevertheless assume that the combatively opinionated Polybius

7 On these examples see Chaps. Ill §1, XIII §2. Thus for instance the dissection of Polybius' Book I by Bung, 4 0 - 1 4 3 , and La Bua ( 1 9 6 6 ) 2 3 - 1 7 4 , 2 5 3 - 7 6 ; and of Livy's Hannibalic War narrative (Books 2 1 - 3 0 ) by U. Kahrstedt, 1 4 3 - 3 6 2 , and A. Klotz, Livius und seine Vorgänger ( 1 9 4 1 , repr. Amsterdam 1 9 6 4 ) 1 0 1 - 2 0 0 ; P.G. Walsh breaks down Livy Bk. 2 1 on similar principles ( [ 1 9 7 3 ] 3 8 - 4 1 ) . Other recent examples of extensive Quellenkritik on the events of 2 6 4 and 2 2 0 - 2 1 8 include de Sensi ( 1 9 7 4 ) and ( 1 9 7 7 ) , whose work has contributed greatly to the study of Hiero and his era; Rizzo ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Frézouls ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Ruschenbusch (1980-81); Schwarte ( 1 9 8 3 ) , in a study both controversial and stimulating. Reservations about over-rigid Quellenkritik. Luce, 185-87; Hoyos (1989 H991D 54-59.

For a striking example of Polybius (and Fabius Pictor) treated as simple copyists of earlier material: Chap. IV n. 8. Again, strict Quellenkritik deduces Pol. 1.16.1 and 16.3-17.2 (Roman operations in Sicily in 263) to be Fabius' work but 16.2, briefly describing the makeup of two consular armies, as Philinus' clarification to his Greek readers because Fabius had no need to tell his: La Bua (1966) 41 η. 6. But Pölybius himself might well see a use for so advising his readers. And again, differing references to the same items supposedly mean different sources (ibid., 203); for R. Laqueur, whenever Polybius wrote 'Mamertines' in these chapters he was using Fabius because to Fabius the Mamertines were respectable Roman allies; when 'barbarians', he was copying Philinus to whom they were obnoxious: RE (1938) 2181-82; also de Sensi (1977) 210-11.

XVII.

The Major Sources

287

practised a much more mechanical piety towards his sources than Diodorus did.** Polybius aimed to analyse, as well as narrate, events down to 146 and (clearly enough) to show how superior his analysis was by contrast with earlier historians'; he was practically bound to read widely in the available sources. His writing in turn — in the concise introductory books as well as the detailed narrative from Book 3 on — at any given point much more probably reflects his own choice of details and emphases, drawn from more than a single predecessor and combined with inferences of his own, rather than more or less mechanically relaying Philinus or Fabius, Silenus, Sosylus or some other informant. Thus his picture of the Romans in 264 as worried about the 'Punic threat': clearly from a Roman viewpoint, maybe from a Roman source like Fabius, but very probably coloured by his own preconceptions. As we have seen, Fabius himself presumably judged the issue in 264 as Romans versus Carthaginians (or Romans versus Carthaginians and, subordinately, Syracusans); Polybius himself judged the Romans' first venture out of Italy a step momentous enough in history to open his work, the first external step in their drive — he affirms — to master the world. Hardly a notion to be looked for in Fabius, it colours Polybius' depiction of events from 264 on. His compressed and interwoven narrative of the Mamertines and of Hiero's rise may well draw on two or three sources: perhaps Timaeus, certainly Philinus and Fabius. Timaeus took his detailed history down to 264 and apparently praised Hiero; Philinus began his second book with the events of 264 and so probably recorded their antecedents in his first; Fabius must have said something about the Mamertines and about the mutinous Campanian legion at Rhegium. All the same Polybius' rendition owes its shape and emphasis, neither wholly satisfying, to himself.9 Later on he berates Chaereas and Sosylus for having the Roman Senate gloomily debate peace or war on the news of Saguntum's sack. Here we have named sources once again, and ones 8 Diodorus as more than mere copyist: R. Drews, 'Diodorus and his sources', Aß3 83 (1962) 383-92; E. Badian (1968) 207-208, 210; Sacks, passim, and especially 83-159 (127-37 on the first two Punic Wars). Livy: Luce, 188-29. 9 Chaps. II-IV.

288

XVII.

The Major Sources

contemporary — Sosylus certainly, Chaereas probably — with events. Sosylus could write a good battle-narrative too. Many scholars therefore prefer to berate Polybius and believe them. Yet we have seen that Polybius has good grounds, not just a priori assumptions, for being sceptical, even if he puts his case pugnaciously and elliptically.10 Nevertheless he has plenty to answer for. Often he expresses his thought loosely or carelessly: the Mamertines had seized Rhegium as well as Messana, for instance, and Hannibal breached both the Ebro accord and Lutatius' peace in sacking Saguntum He offers vague time-indications at points where precision is vital (for instance in his excursus on Rhegium, the Mamertines and the rise of Hiero). Often again the way he constructs — or fails to construct — his account exasperates the reader. Ap. Claudius is last seen besieging Syracuse in 264, only for the consuls and the campaign of 263 to appear after a lengthy historiographical digression, with only an unexplained reference to Appius' 'successes'. The Sardinia crisis is reported in five different places, each illustrating a different aspect. The chronology, nature and development of the Romans' link with the Saguntines are irritatingly compressed and unclear, given that (in Polybius' own view) the sack of Saguntum was a crucial event. Hannibal's interview with the envoys in 220 breaks off after his outburst, with Polybius preferring to do some pontificating of his own; then their trip to Carthage gains a bare mention without details. The warembassy to Carthage, in turn, is paused in mid-altercation with the Punic senate so that the historian can spend eleven chapters on all the treaties between the two states down to that time, on the question of war-guilt over Saguntum, and on remarks about the (hardly disputable) importance of understanding why things happen in history. The war-envoys, to judge by his narrative, then depart from Carthage while Hannibal's troops in Spain are still wintering, and yet arrive back in Rome only as he is about to pass over the Pyrenees. It is no surprise that every one of these examples, save the generally ignored first, has been seen at one time or other as evidence — or proof — of malice and mendacity, prompting scepticism over other parts of his narrative and varied reconstructions of events and motives. Some indictments virtually presume that 10

Chaereas, Sosylus and the Senate in 218: Chap. XV §1.

XVII.

The Major Sources

289

Polybius already foresaw his account being the earliest one extant in the end, immune to disproof from any predecessors; despite which, he made careless and revelatory slips over and over. On crucial issues his own report is regularly rejected in favour of Philinus' or Fabius' (whose reports we know from his citations). On occasion, scholarship ventures to supply what the lost source really wrote, correcting or replacing Polybius' supposedly falsified citation: as in Philinus' account of the battles outside Messana, and Fabius' on the envoys Valerius and Baebius' movements in 220 and what attitude the ruling élite at Carthage did take to Hannibal's measures in 219 and 218. Some provocative and surprising revision has resulted: Philinus was the true paragon of 'pragmatic' historiography, not the unscrupulous Megalopolitan; Fabius Pictor did not make the sack of Saguntum the Romans' justification for war in 218 though Polybius tells us that he did, and he was overall far more honest than Polybius about the war's origins; Polybius himself was a ruthless distorter and forger, if not fantasist, crusading to paint the Romans white and the Carthaginians black, especially over the causes of the Second Punic War. Here scepticism of his trustworthiness is so thoroughgoing as to raise the question whether he should be used as a source at all. 11 In practice scholarship — even the most sceptical — applies scepticism to only some issues in Polybius. How much scepticism is proper, and over which Polybian statements, will always be debated. Close analysis reveals that his narrative, for all its organizational flaws, stands up to scrutiny most of the time. His events from the battle at the Longanus to Ap. Claudius' retreat from Syracuse, for example, fit coherently into the one year 264: Diodorus' fragmentary narrative does not contradict but supplements his, and Zonaras' account of C. Claudius' doings at Messana and Ap. Claudius' battles against the Carthaginians and Syracusans does not justify preferring Philinus' version — still less an expanded reconstruction of it. Again, Polybius does not unguardedly let a Roman cat out of the bag in his account of the debate at Rome

11

Cf. the remarks by Hoyos (1985) 137, à propos Schwarte (1983); G. Schepens, 318-19. What Philinus and Fabius 'really' wrote: La Bua (1966) 29-33, 181-83, 186, (1981) 263-65; Schwarte, 56-74, 78. Philinus the supreme exponent of 'prammaticità' in historiography: La Bua (1966), especially 258-72.

290

XVII.

The Major Sources

over aiding the Mamertines: the People did vote aid (so indeed Philinus reported, if he is Diodorus' source) when the Senate was deadlocked, not the Senate itself when a majority vote broke the deadlock. Nor later does he invent Barcid dominance over Punic public affairs after 237, or cover up extra provisos in the Ebro accord, leaving us to flush these out of a later unguarded phrase with help from Appian and Dio. His account of Roman-Punic dealings between the autumn of 220 and the spring of 218 is acceptable, including Valerius and Baebius going on to old Carthage after seeing Hannibal at the New, and the Senate resolving promptly on an ultimatum in early 218. Ironically, while the details of his narratives are largely sound, not all of his broad verdicts are. His (and other sources') belief that the Romans saw a Punic menace in 264 is unconvincing. Likewise his idea that the war of 218 was essentially the fruit of Hamilcar's wrath against the Romans, and that Hannibal thereby was simply his father's executor; or that Roman passivity over the attack on Saguntum was due solely to the Romans' new and short war across the Adriatic. In places Polybius fails to offer analysis at all, even of momentous developments. To depict the Romans debating a Punic war, when the Mamertines were calling for aid against Hiero, at least deserved comment, but he seems not to notice the non sequitur. Similarly the Carthaginians' adamant refusal to talk with Ap. Claudius at the straits, when talking would (arguably) have done them no harm. He is silent over the Romans' reasons for seizing Sardinia and exacting a fresh indemnity, limiting himself to forceful moral condemnation; yet by his own verdict this was the chief cause of the war of 218. And he offers no explanation for why they rather suddenly decided to pay heed in 220 to the Saguntines and their messages, after long inattention. By contrast both moves later evoked Roman self-justification, however spurious: Sardinia and the money as compensation for the Carthaginians mistreating the Italian traders, the embassy of 220 as prompted by good faith, fides, towards an endangered ally.

XVII.

The Major Sources

291

4. Problems with the later sources Unsatisfactory though he often is, Polybius emerges from analysis in better shape than the later sources. Of them the best is Diodorus: he preserves important — but not infallible — earlier material, while abbreviating each predecessor and probably blending two or more in places. Diodorus was plundered in turn for Byzantine excerpts, now the only remnants of his later books; thus it is impractical to assume that these remnants are faithful reproductions of his sources (but it is sometimes assumed). Where Diodorus contradicts or seems to contradict Polybius, for instance on what followed Hiero's Mamertine victory and on Appius' overtures to the besiegers of Messana, identifying his source is only one stage in the process of assessing which account is preferable — or whether a contradiction exists. With Livy, except where he draws on Polybius or names another authority (a rare event in his early books on Hannibal's War), his sources are still harder to be sure of. Much of Books 21 and 22 depends on Polybius, but blended as a rule with other material. Hence a widespread opinion that he is really reproducing a forerunner like Coelius Antipater who, in turn, drew on Polybius, Roman writers like Fabius and Cincius, and pro-Punic writers like Silenus for his monograph. Or (a recent view) Livy reproduces a more corrupt predecessor, the first-century annalist Valerius Antias. Such opinions deny Livy himself much wide-ranging consultation of earlier sources — partly because he wrote so much (one hundred and forty-two sizeable books from the origins of Rome to his own time) that arguably he had no time for wide research; also because in Books 21 and 22 he cites Coelius Antipater in four different places but other early authorities, like Fabius and Cincius, only once each. Surviving authors are rarely credited with wide consultation anyway: this is often reserved to lost sources, whereas the surviving ones are generally supposed to draw on one predecessor at a time. ^

12

Coelius cited in Livy 21-22: 21.38.7, 46.8, 47.4; 22.31.8-9; notice 21.22.6-9, the 'dream of Hannibal', a close reworking of Coelius (cf. Cicero, De Divinatione 1.49) as shown by Walsh (1973) 163· Schwarte urges Valerius Antias as Livy's main source: (1983) 17-25,31-36,93-96. Cincius, Livy 21.38.7; Fabius, 22.7.4.

292

XVII.

The Major Sources

None of this is certain, or even clearly implied in any surviving evidence. It is just as conceivable that Livy regularly consulted two or more predecessors for a section of narrative (even if there was no time or enthusiasm for looking up every source). Of course the bulk of those predecessors will have been Roman: their patriotic sympathies suited his own, nor was Livy a superior historical analyst — his genius was literary. Hence his anti-Punic and pro-Roman tone in the preliminaries to Hannibal's War, his enlivening the story with speeches and dramatic incidents, and such grotesqueries as dating Hannibal's attack on Saguntum to the year 218 — only to realise later that this was impossible — and sending Valerius and Baebius to Hannibal during the siege of Saguntum. With examples like these to go on, it calls for very strong arguments to make a Livian item preferable where it contradicts a Polybian. Appian, like other late sources, at times wins high modern regard when Polybian statements seem hard to swallow: for instance on Hamilcar's rise to supremacy after the Mercenaries' War, on the Ebro accord, and on what preceded Hannibal's attack on Saguntum. But Appian's performance in general compellingly suggests that if ever he is right in a clash with Polybius he owes it to luck. His version of the peace of 241 blends items from the earlier draft with items in the later. The Roman-Punic dispute over the traders, in about 240, is confounded with the rape of Sardinia in 237 (a confusion that Dio makes as well, so here earlier propaganda may be blamed). Appian identifies Tagus and Ebro; repeatedly puts Saguntum north of the Ebro — but still confuses it with New Carthage which, he tells us, Hannibal afterwards founded — and follows Ro man tradition in dating the embassy of 220 to 219- Earlier he sup plies a version of the background and content of the Ebro accord that is circumstantial, complex, and altogether unconvincing; and in one place dates it to Hamilcar's time. Incidentally he offers an account of Hamilcar's death in battle which conflicts dramatically with Diodorus' but is not to be preferred (Diodorus' summary of Hamilcar's activities, though short, is plainly w e l l - i n f o r m e d ) . 1 ^ Appian on the peace terms in 241, Sic. 2.1-4; Saguntum north of Ebro, Iber. 7.25 (and implying near Emporiae), 10.36 and 39, Hann. 3-10 and 12, cf. Lib. 6.23; as New Carthage, Iber. 12.47, 19.74; Ebro as Tagus, Iber. 6.24; traders' dispute and Sardinia crisis conflated, Chap. IX §1; embassy to Hannibal during siege, Chap. XIII §2; Ebro accord in Hamilcar's time, Hann. 2.6; death of

XVII.

The Major Sources

293

Appian draws heavily on a well-developed stage of Roman historical tradition. His version of Hannibal's boyhood oath is the same as Livy's first version and in the same context, when Hamilcar is setting out for Spain. His Ebro accord resembles Livy's in guaranteeing the Saguntines as well as fixing the Ebro-line, but imagines that the line was the guarantee for them and that there were 'other Greeks' in Spain so protected. The Roman envoys supposedly sent to Hannibal to protest at his siege are trailed by Saguntine ones, who also accompany them to Carthage and there have a lively exchange with the Punic authorities. Like Livy he indicates that during the siege there was debate at Rome over what to do, but once again adds improbable details. 14 Roman tradition was not wrong all the time. Vigorous debate in 219 about Hannibal's siege of Saguntum is entirely likely, and many other items in Appian look plausible — for instance the Romans allowing their ex-enemies to recruit Italian mercenaries during the Mercenaries' War, and Hannibal's public-relations offer to the Saguntines to arbitrate between them and their neighbours. Each item needs assessment on its merits. Likewise with Dio and his epitomator Zonaras, where at times an apparent discrepancy with Polybius proves less discrepant than first supposed: like the battles outside Messana. Details in Dio, but not in Polybius or Diodorus, may also sometimes be acceptable, like some of Regulus' reported peace-demands in 256. At other times Polybius' account remains the one to follow, for instance on the circumstances of the seizure of Sardinia and the content of the Ebro accord; nor is the full-dress debate between Lentulus, Fabius and others in the Senate in 218 (while Hannibal marched towards Italy) convincing, despite its broad modern acceptance. Dio got the tradition of a debate right, but its date, and Fabius Cunctator as a protagonist, w r o n g . 1 5 Items only in Dio are not automatically to be rejected, but care is needed. His notion that, before the Mamertine appeal, war had

Hamilcar, Iber. 5.19-21 (probably originating with a Roman annalist, cf. Frontalis, Strat. 2.4.17, Zon. 8.17); contrast Diod. 25.10.3-4; Huss (1985) 27374. 1 4 Hannibal's oath, Iber. 9 34, Hann. 3.10; Livy 21.1.4 (contrast Pol. 3-11.7, Livy 35.19.3). Debate in 219: Chap. XIV §2. On the debate question see Chaps. XIV §2—XV 51.

294

XVII.

The Major Sources

existed between Romans and Carthaginians is obvious fantasy. The tale of the tribune C. Claudius is implausible; likewise the supposed confrontations between Romans and Carthaginians after 237, and the alleged embassy to Hamilcar. All these stories have the same general trait — mistaken distortions or inventions by later writers keen to add drama to their account. The various versions of the spear-and-staff 'ultimatum' in Frontinus, Gellius and Zonaras illustrate this. On the other hand, Zonaras' details of Ap. Claudius' battles outside Messana can be believed; often seen as contradicting Polybius, in fact they do not. And the name that Dio gives to the leader of the war-embassy of 218, Marcus Fabius, is probably correct. Silius, the versifier of Hannibal's War, calls for notice because his usefulness as a source has recently been urged. Supposedly he does not versify Livy, as generally held, but Livy and he separately transmit a later, more contaminated stage of Roman historiography — Valerius Antias — than do Appian and Dio (Coelius Antipater). In Silius' Punica the Lentulus-versus-Fabius debate takes place during the siege of Saguntum, and the ensuing Roman embassy goes first to Spain to admonish the besieger and then on to Carthage to declare war. But rather than an unscrupulously misleading annalist, a likelier origin of this conflation is that Silius, in his epic effort, used poetic licence to combine and telescope material without sticking strictly to chronology — or even to historical logic. It is hardly probable that Valerius (or any historical writer except maybe the perpetrator of De Vins Illustribus) would have sent the same embassy to Spain on one errand and then to Carthage on another, entirely different one. Or, if he did and Livy was following him, that Livy would then produce two separate and successive embassies. Still Silius' evidence has some value. His Senate debate does not come from Livy, who makes no mention of Lentulus or Fabius, but like Livy's it takes place during the siege — extra evidence for Roman tradition recalling debate over Saguntum and dating it to 219. Nepos' lives of Hamilcar and Hannibal, roughly contemporary with Diodorus, would be valuable were they more detailed; but they do supply a few welcome items, for example on Silenus and

16

Silius and Valerius Antias, Schwarte (1983) 13-17, 30-36; and the debates of 219, Chap. XIV §2; and embassies, ibid, with n. l6; Küppers, 111-13 emphasizes Silius' use and reshaping of Livy.

XVII.

The Major Sources

295

Sosylus. Other sources are mainly epitomes or excerpts, notably Frontinus' compilation of stratagems, Florus' résumé of Roman wars and the compressed histories of Eutropius and Orosius. These seem to draw largely on Livy, directly or via intermediate writers; occasionally they supply credible details not found elsewhere, for instance Frontinus' anecdote of how Ap. Claudius made it across the straits (unlike Polyaenus' tale of a Punic stratagem to foil Hiero's 'fleet' in the harbour of 'Mesene'); similarly Eutropius' date, 10 March 241, for the battle of the Aegates. Kaeso, Ap. Claudius' spokesman (according to the Ineditum Vaticanum) to the Punic envoys after the naval skirmish, may well be genuine too. 1 ^ Where a minor source contradicts a fuller or earlier account it needs cautious treatment. To believe the Livian epitome's claim, that the Senate in 264 initiated aid to the Mamertines, requires assuming that the epitome faultlessly transmits Livy here (although it makes errors elsewhere) and then that Livy's source was superior to Polybius'. The item has often been used as another stick to beat Polybius with, but it is really a broken reed. Overall the minor sources' value for the origins of the wars is to corroborate some items in the major ones, and illustrate varying developments in Roman tradition and biases. Polybius' faults of commission are fewer than often thought, although faults of omission and misinterpretation occur too. Despite his largely pro-Roman viewpoint, he can admit Roman misbehaviour; nor is he instinctively anti-Carthaginian or anti-Barcid. While on the origins of the First Punic War presenting an almost wholly Roman picture, he brings in unflattering tints too — the unsavoury quality of the friends to be aided and the element of greed that influenced the aid-decision. On the origins of the Second, he virtually concedes justification to the Carthaginians after highlighting the Romans' unjust behaviour over Sardinia. Not only does he show himself less than unquestioningly pro-Roman in these judgements but, for him, the most outstanding figure in the First Punic War was Hamilcar Barca; and along with his high regard for the Roman hero of the Second, Scipio, he much Polyaenus' item: Strategemata 6.16.4; cf. Hoyos, Antichtbon 1985, 47. Nepos: E. Jenkinson in T.A. Dorey (ed.), Latin Biography (London 1967) 1-15, and ANRW13 (1973) 703-19- Florus and Eutropius: W. den Boer, Some Minor Roman Historians (Leiden 1972). Orosius: B. Lacroix, Oróse et ses idées (Montréal-Paris 1965).

296

XVII.

The Major Sources

admired Hannibal. There were only a few points to criticize: Hannibal's fondness for money and his haste in going to war before (so Polybius holds) he was fully prepared.1** It would obviously be mistaken to see the Megalopolitan as a ideal historian, one 'che non erra' (as Dante rather inappropriately judges Livy).!9 But scrutiny of his history of the background to these wars does not reveal the often-inferred liar and distorter, unscrupulously rewriting events and earlier historians' versions of events; nor a stolid and sometimes uncritical copyist of earlier accounts. With all its flaws, quirks and irritations, Polybius' narrative remains the most coherent and conscientious basis for investigating the origins of the two most momentous wars in Roman history.

I® Polybius' praise of Hamilcar, 1.64.6, cf. 11.2.3 (amid praise of his second son Hasdrubal); Hannibal's character, 9-22, 9-24-26 (with an effort to explain even his acts of cruelty, cf. Walbank, Comm. 2. 153-54), 11.19, 23.13 (n.b. 11.19.6-7: had Hannibal fallen on the Romans after completing other conquests, he would have won). Cf. also Pédech (1964) 212, 215-19, 226, 511. An opposite interpretation of Polybius' assessment of father and son: Eckstein (1989) 1-15 compares other contexts where words like θυμός, όργή, έχθρα and άλογία are used of persons and policies of which Polybius disapproves; but concedes that όργή in places is ascribed to the Romans or the Senate, e.g. 21.25.10, 21.31.3, 30.4.2, 33.7.3, 38.18.10 (where also θυμός). Note also that aiding the Mamertines is classed as άλογία (1.11.1) yet the Romans resolve to do so, partly at least for good reason in Polybius' view. Dante, Inferno Canto 28,1. 12 (Dante wrote before the days of Quellenskepsis).

Bibliography Scholarly works listed below are cited in the footnotes by author's name, date where appropriate, and page(s); otherwise by abbreviated title (e.g. Seibert, Hann.). Journals are abbreviated as in L'Année Philologique. Other abbreviations (e.g. ANRW, ASNP) are listed on the Abbreviations page. Items cited only once in the footnotes are as a rule not listed.

Alföldy, A. (1976): Römische Frühgeschichte (Heidelberg) Altheim, F. (1961): 'Polybios und seine Vorgänger', in Untersuchungen zur römischen Geschichte, ed. F. Altheim and D. Felber, vol. 1 (Frankfurt-am-Main) 131-46 Arnim, H. von (1892): 'Ineditum Vaticanum', Hermes 26, 118-30 Astin, A.E. (1967): 'Saguntum and the origins of the Second Punic War', Latomus 26, 577-96 Bacigalupo Pareo, E. (1977): Ί supremi magistrati di Cartagine', Contributi di Storia antica in Onore di Albino Garzetti (Genova) 61-87 Badian, E. (1958): Foreign Clientelae (264-70B.C.) (Oxford) (1964): 'Kaeso and the Carthaginian', CQ 14, 139-40 (1964): Studies in Greek and Roman History (Oxford 1964) (1968): Review of V. La Bua (1966), in Rivista di Filologia e Istruzione Classica 96, 203-11 (1980): 'Two Polybian treaties', in Miscellanea Manni [see Manni (1981)], 1. 159-69 Barceló, P.A. (1988): Karthago und die iberische Halbinsel vor den Barkiden: Studien zur karthagischen Präsenz im Mittelmeerraum von der Gründung von Ebusus (VII. Jhr. v. Chr.) bis zum Übergang Hamilkars nach Hispanien (237 v. Chr.). Antiquitas, Reihe 1: Abhandlungen zur Alten Geschichte, Band 37 (Bonn)

298

Bibliography

(1989): 'Beobachtungen zur Entstehung der Barkidischen Herrschaft in Hispanien', Studia Phoenicia 10 [cf. Devijver & LipiAski], 167-84 Baronowski, D.W. (1995): 'Polybius on the causes of the Third Punic War', CP 90 (1995) 16-31 Barzanò, A. (1987): Ί1 confine romano-cartaginese in Spagna dal 348 varr. al 218 a.C.', Contributi del Istituto di Storia antica dell' Università del Sacro Cuore (Milano) 13, 178-99 Bejor, G. (1981): Review of De Sensi Sestito (1977) in Athenaeum 59, 516-18 (1982): 'Città di Sicilia nei decreti di Enteila', ASNP 12 [see Entella Papers], 815-40 Beloch, K.J. (1925-27) Griechische Geschichte, vol. 4, parts 1 and 2 (2nd edn.: Berlin) Bengtson, H. (1952): 'Zur karthagischen "Strategie" ', Aegyptus 32, 158-62 (= Kleine Schriften zur Alten Geschichte [München 1974], 110-14) (1962): Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, vol. 2: Die Verträge der Griechisch-Römischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr. (München-Berlin) (1967): Grundriß der Römischen Geschichte mit Quellenkunde, vol. 1: Republik und Kaiserzeit bis 284 n.Chr. (München) Berve, Η. (1959): König Hieron II. (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Abhandlungen N.F., 17: München) Bickermann, E. (1936): 'Sur les origines de la deuxième guerre punique', Revue de Philologie 10, 284-88 [as Bickerman, E.J.] (1952): 'Hannibal's covenant', AJP 73, 1-23 Brind'Amour, P. (1983): Le Calendrier romain: recherches chronologiques (Ottawa) Briscoe, J. (1973): A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI—XXXIII (Oxford) (1981): A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXIV—XXXVII (Oxford) (1989): 'The Second Punic War': Chapter 3, CAH2 7.2, 44-80 Brisson, J.-P. (1973): Carthage ou Rome? (Paris) Brizzi, G. (1983): 'Ancora su Annibale e l'ellenismo: la fondazione di Artaxata e l'iscrizione di Era Lacinia', 1° Congresso

Bibliography

299

Intemazionale di Studi Fenici (Roma 1979), 3 vols. (Roma): 2. 243-51 Broughton, T.R.S. The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, 2 vols. (New York 1951-52); vol. 3, Supplement (Atlanta 1986) Bung, P. (1950): Quintus Fabius Pictor, der Erste Römische Annalist (Diss. Köln) Calderone, S. (1977): 'Di un antico problema di esegesi polibiana: 1,11,1-3,' Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 25, 383-87 , I. Bitto, L. de Salvo and A. Pinzone (1981): 'Polibio 1,11,1 ss.', Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica N.S. 7, 7-78 The Cambridge Ancient History, 1st edn., vols. 7-8 (Cambridge 1928-30) , 2nd edn., vol. 7 part 2: The Rise of Rome to 220 B.C. (Cambridge 1989) , 2nd edn., vol. 8: Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C. (Cambridge 1989) Carcopino, J. (1961): Les Étapes de l'impérialisme romain (Paris) Cary, M. and Scullard, H.H. (1975): A History of Rome (3rd edn., London) Casson, L. (1971): Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World (Princeton) Cassola, F. (1962): I Gruppi Politici Romani nel III Secolo a.C. (Trieste: reprinted Roma 1968) (1982): 'Diodoro e la storia romana', ANRWvol. 2.30.1, 724-73 Caven, Β. (1980): The Punic Wars (London) Charles-Picard: see Picard Christ, K., ed. Hannibal (Wege der Forschung, 371: Darmstadt 1974) (1974): 'Probleme um Hannibal', in Christ, Hannibal, 339 Chroust, A.-H. (1954): 'International treaties in antiquity', Classica etMedievalia 15, 60-107 Colonna, G. (1980-81): 'La Sicilia e il Tirreno nel V e IV secolo', Kokalos 26-27, 157-91 Cornell, T.J. (1995): The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC) (London)

300

Bibliography

Corsaro, M. (1982): 'La presenza romana a Entella: una nota su Tiberio Claudio di Anzio', ASNP 12 [see Entella Papers], 9931032 Cuff, P.J. (1973): 'Polybius III, 30, 3: a note,' Rivista Storica d'Antichità 3, 163-70 Curchin, L. (1991): Roman Spain: Conquest and Assimilation (London and New York) Dahlheim, W. (1968): Struktur und Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts im 3• und 2. Jahrhundert vor Chr. (München) (1977): Gewalt und Herrschaft: das Provinziale Herrschaftssystem der römischen Republik (Berlin) Daux, G. (1982): 'Un septième decret inédit d'Entella', Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique 106, 317-18 Derow, P. (1976): 'The Roman calendar, 218-191 B.C.', Phoenix 30, 265-81 (1979): 'Polybius, Rome and the East', JRS 69, 1-15 De Sanctis, G. Storia dei Romani, vol. 2 (Torino 1907); vol. 3, parts 1 and 2 (2nd edn.: Firenze 1967-68); vol. 4, part 1 (2nd end.: Firenze 1969), part 2 tomes 1 and 2 (Firenze 1953 and 1957), part 3 (Firenze 1964) (1932): Problemi di Storia Antica (Bari) De Sensi Sestito, G. (1971): 'La politica di Gerone II dal 275 al 269 a.C.', in Umanità e Storia: Scritti in Onore di Adelchi Attisant (Messina), 1. 497-536 (1974): 'Il problema della αίτια della prima guerra punica nella tradizione antica', Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale 70, 7-44 (1977): Gerone II: un Monarca Ellenistico in Sicilia (Palermo) Develin, R. (1985): The Practice of Politics at Rome 366—167 B.C. (Collection Latomus, 188: Bruxelles) Devijver, H. & Lipinski, E., edd. (1989): The Punic Wars (Studia Phoenicia, 10: Leuven) Dorey, T.A. (1959-60): 'The treaty with Saguntum', Humanitas (Coimbra) N.S. 8-9, 1-10 Drachmann, A.B. (1920): 'Sagunt und die Ebro-Grenze in den Verhandlungen zwischen Rom und Karthago 220-18', Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab: Historisk-Filologisk Meddelelser III, 3 (K0benhavn) Drews, R. (1962): 'Diodorus and his sources', AJP 85, 383-92

Bibliography

301

Dubuisson, M. (1979): 'Procédés de la diplomatie romaine: l'annexation de la Sardaigne et le sens de ΣΥΝΚΑΤΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ (Polybe, III, 10, 1)', RÉL 57, 114-25 (1985): Le Latin de Polybe: les implications historiques d'un cas de bilinguisme (Paris) Duncan-Jones, R. (1990): Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy (Cambridge) Dyson, S.L. (1985): The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton) Ebel, C. (1976): Transalpine Gaul: the Emergence of a Roman Province (Leiden) Eckstein, A.M. (1980): 'Perils of poetry: the Roman "poetic tradition" on the outbreak of the First Punic War', AfAH 5, 174-92 (1980): 'Polybius on the role of the Senate in the crisis of 264 B.C.', GRBS 21, 175-90 (1980): 'Unicum subsidium populi Romani: Hiero II and Rome, 263 B.C.—215 B.C.', Chiron 10, 183-203 (1983): 'Two notes on the chronology of the outbreak of the Second Punic War', RhM 126, 255-72 (1984): 'Rome, Saguntum and the Ebro Treaty', Emerita 52, 51-68

(1987): Senate and General: Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 B.C. (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London) (1989): 'Hannibal at New Carthage: Polybius 3-15 and the power of irrationality', CP SA, 1-15 Egelhaaf, G. (1885): 'Analekten zur Geschichte des Zweiten Punischen Krieges', HZ 53, [N.F. 17], 430-69 (1922): Hannibal: ein Charakterbild (Stuttgart) Ehrenberg, V. (1928): Carthago, ein Versuch weltgeschichtlicher Einordnung (Leipzig) Eisen, K.F. (1966): Polybiosinterpretationen: Beobachtungen zu Prinzipien Griechischer und Römischer Historiographie bei Polybios (Heidelberg) [Entella Papers (1982)] 'Materiali e contributi per lo studio degli otto decreti da Entella', ASNP12, 771-1102: see Bejor, Corsaro, Lejeune, Lombardo, Nenci Errington, R.M. (1970): 'Rome and Spain before the Second Punic War', Latomus 29, 25-57

302

Bibliography

(1971): The Dawn of Empire: Rome's Rise to World Power (London) Eucken, H.-C. (1968): Probleme der Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Punischen Krieges (Inaugural-Diss. Freiburg im Breisgau) Ferrary, J.L. (1988): Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique (Rome 1988) Finley, M. (1979): Ancient Sicily (2nd edn.: London) Flurl, W. (1969): Deditio in Fidem: Untersuchungen zu Livius und Polybios (Inaugural-Diss. München) Foucault, J.-A. de (1972): Recherches sur la langue et le style de Polybe (Paris) Frederiksen, M. (1984): Campania (Rome) Frézouls, E. (1980): 'Polybe ou Philinos?: Hiéron, Carthage et Rome', in Miscellanea Mannt [see Manni (1981)], 3. 963-80 Garnsey, P. & Whittaker, C.R., edd. (1978): Imperialism in the Ancient World (Cambridge) Gauthier, P. (1968): 'L'Èbre et Sagonte: défense de Polybe', Revue de Philologie 42, 91-100 Gelzer, M. (1933): 'Römische Politik bei Fabius Pictor', Hermes 68, 129-66 (= ÄS vol. 3 [Wiesbaden 1964] 51-92) (1943): 'Der Rassengegensatz als geschichtlicher Faktor beim Ausbruch der römisch-karthagischen Kriege', in Vogt (1943) 178-202 Gilbert, O. (1876): Rom und Karthago in ihrer gegenseitiger Beziehungen, 513-536 u. c. (241-218 v. Chr.) (Leipzig) Girardet, K.M. (1992): 'Die Sicherheitsklauseln des Lutatiusvertrages (241 v. Chr.)', in Zum Umgang mit Fremden Sprachen in der Griechisch-Römischen Antike (Kolloquium ... 21. u. 22. November 1989 in Saarbrücken), ed. C. Werner Müller, K. Sier, J. Werner (Stuttgart), 97-113 Giustolisi, V. (1985): Nakone ed Enteila alla luce degli antichi decreti recentemente apparsi e di un nuovo decreto inedito (Sicilia archeologica che scompare, 7: Palermo 1985) Goldsberry, M.A.S. (1973): Sicily and its Cities in Hellenistic and Roman Times, 2 vols. (Diss. U. of North Carolina) González Wagner: see Wagner Groag, E. (1929): Hannibal als Politiker (Wien)

Bibliography

303

Gruen, E.S. (1984): The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, 2 vols. (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London) (1984): 'Material rewards and the drive for empire', in Harris (1984), 59-82 Gsell, S. (1920-30): Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord, 8 vols. (Paris) Guadan, A.M. de (1969): Numismática Ibérica e Ibero-Romana (Madrid) Hahn, I. (1974): 'Die Hellenisierung Karthagos und die punischgriechischen Beziehungen im 4. Jahrhundert v. u. Ζ.', in Hellenische Poleis, ed. E. Welskopf, 4 vols. (Berlin), 2. 841-54 Hallward, B.L. (1930): 'Hannibal's invasion of Italy': CAH 8 [1st edn.] 25-56 Hammond, N.G.L. & Walbank, F.W. (1988): A History of Macedonia, vol. 3: 336-167 B.C. (Oxford) Hampl, F. (1972): 'Zur Vorgeschichte des ersten und zweiten Punischen Krieges', ANRWl.l. 412-41 Hans, L.-M. (1983): Karthago und Sizilien: die Entstehung und Gestaltung der Epikratie auf dem Hintergrund der Beziehungen der Karthager zu den Griechen und den nichtgriechischen Völkern Siziliens (VI.-III. fahrhundert v. Chr.) (Hildesheim) (1985): 'Theokrits XVI. Idylle und die Politik Hierons II. von Syrakus', Historia 34, 117-25 Harris, W.V. (1976): 'The development of the quaestorship, 267-81 B.C.', CQ70, 92-106 (1979): War and Imperalism in Republican Rome, 32770 B.C. (Oxford) , ed. (1984): The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome (Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, 29: Rome) 'Current trends in the study of Roman imperialism', in Harris (1984), 13-31 (1989): 'Roman expansion in the West': Chapter 5, CAH 82. 105-62 Heichelheim, F. (1954/55): 'New evidence on the Ebro treaty', Historia 3, 211-19 Heisserer, A.J. (1985): 'Polybius 3-25.3 ("An alliance concerning Pyrrhus")', Gerión 3, 125-39 Hesselbarth, H. (1889): Historisch-kritische Untersuchungen zur Dritten Dekade des Livius (Halle)

304

Bibliography

Heubner, F. (1991): 'Hannibal und Sagunt bei Livius', Klio 73, 7082 Heurgon, J. (1942): Recherches sur l'histoire, la religion et la civilisation de Capone préromaine (Paris) (1973): The Rise of Rome to 264 Β. C. (London) [originally Rome et la Méditerranée occidentale jusqu'aux guerres puniques (Paris 1969)] Heuss, A. (1943): 'Die Gestaltung des römischen und des karthagischen Staates bis zum Pyrrhos-Krieg', in Vogt (1943), 83-138 (1970): Der Erste Punische Krieg und das Problem des Römischen Imperialismus (zur politischen Beurteilung des Krieges) (3rd edn.: Darmstadt) [= HZ 169 (1949) 457-513] Historia de España (1982): Montenegro Duque, Α., Blázquez Martínez, J.M., Mangas Manjarrés, J. & al., Historia de España vol. 2, parts 1-2: Hispania Romana (2nd edn.: Madrid) Hoffmann, W. (1951): 'Die römische Kriegserklärung an Karthago im Jahre 218', RhM 94, 69-88 (1962): Hannibal (Göttingen) (1969): 'Das Hilfegesuch der Mamertiner am Vorabend des ersten Punischen Krieges', Historia 18, 153-80 (1957/1974): 'Hannibal und Rom', in Christ, Hannibal, 40-74 [= Antike und Abendland β (1957) 7-26] Holleaux, M. (1921): Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques (Paris) Hoyos, B.D. (1983): 'The Carthaginian and Roman commanders in 264: who was who', LCM8, 120-22 (1983): 'Hannibal: what kind of genius?', Gr. & R. 30, 171-80 (1984): 'Polybius' Roman ol πολλοί in 264 B.C.', LCM 9, 88-93 (1984): 'The Roman-Punic pact of 279 B.C.: its problems and its purpose', Historia 33, 402-39 (1985): 'The rise of Hiero II: chronology and campaigns, 275-264 B.C..', Antichthon 19, 32-56 (1985): 'Treaties true and false: the error of Philinus of Agrigentum', CQ 35, 92-109 (1985): 'Polybius mendax?': review-discussion of Schwarte (1983), LCM 10, 135-39, 153-56 (1987): 'Cato's Punic perfidies', AHB 1, 112-21

Bibliography

305

(1988): Ά new historical puzzle: the Entella documents', Prudentia [New Zealand] 20, 30-43 (1989 [published 1991]): Ά forgotten Roman historian: L. Arruntius and the "true" causes of the First Punic War', Antichthon 23, 51-66 (1990): 'Cato's "duovicesimo anno" and Punic treatybreaches in the 230s B.C.', AHB 4, 31-36 (1994): 'Barcid "proconsuls" and Punic politics, 237-218 B.C.', RhM 137, 246-72 Huss, W. (1979): 'Die Stellung des rb im karthagischen Senat', Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 129, 217-32 (1983): 'Der karthagische Sufetat', in Althistorische Studien H. Bengtson zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht, ed. H. Heinen (Wiesbaden), 24-43 (1985): Geschichte der Karthager (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Abt. 3, Teil 8: München) Jacoby, F. (1926-58): Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker [several vols.] (Berlin) Kahrstedt, U. (1913): Geschichte der Karthager, vol. 3 (Berlin) [cf. Meitzer] Klotz, A. (1952): 'Studien zu Polybius', Hermes 80, 325-43 Knapp, R.C. (1977): Aspects of the Roman Experience in Iberia, 206-100 B.C. (Valladolid) Kolbe, W. (1934): Die Kriegsschuldfrage von 218 v. Chr. Geburt (Heidelberg) Kramer, F.R. (1948): 'Massilian diplomacy before the Second Punic War', AJP 69, 1-26 Kromayer, J. (1909/1974): 'Hannibal als Staatsmann', in Christ, Hannibal, 241-71 [= HZ 103 (1909) 237-731 Küppers, J. (1986): Tantarum Causas Irarum: Untersuchungen zur einleitenden Bücherdyade der Punica des Silius Italicus (Berlin-New York) La Bua, V. (1966): Filino-Polibio Sileno-Diodoro: il Problema delle Fonti dalla Morte di Agatocle alla Guerra Mercennaria in Africa (Sikelika III: Palermo)

306

Bibliography

(1981): 'Cassio Dione-Zonara ed altre tradizioni sugli inizi della Prima Guerra Punica', in Scritti sul Mondo Antico in Memoria di Fulvio Grosso, ed. L. Gasperini (Roma), 241-71 Lancel, S. (1992) Carthage (Paris) Laqueur, R. (1913): Polybios (Berlin) Lazenby, J. (1978): Hannibal's War (Warminster) Lejeune, M. (1982): 'Noms grecs et noms indigènes dans l'épigraphie hellénistique d'Entella', ASNP12 [see Entella Papers], 787800 Lévèque, P. (1957): Pyrrhos (Paris) Liebmann-Frankfort, T. (1971): 'Du traité de l'Èbre à la paix de Dardanos: variations romaines sur le respect dû à la parole donnée', Latomus 30, 585-97 (1972): 'Le "traité de l'Èbre" et sa valeur historique', Revue Historique du Droit Français et Étranger 50, 193-204 Lintott, A. (1993): Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration (London and New York) Lippold, A. (1954): 'Der consul Appius Claudius und der Beginn des ersten Punischen Krieges', Orpheus 1, 154-68 (1954): 'Die Darstellung des ersten Punischen Krieges in den "Historiarum adversus paganos Libri VII" des Orosius', RhM 97, 254-86 (1963): Cónsules: Unterschungen zur Geschichte des Römischen Konsulates von 264 bis 201 v. Chr. (Antiquitas, Abhandlungen zur Alte Geschichte 8: Bonn) Luce, T.J. (1977): Livy: the Composition of his History (Princeton) Luterbacher, F. (1907): 'Beiträge zu einer kritischen Geschichte des ersten Punischen Krieges', Philologus 66 [N.F. 20], 396-426 Manni, E. (1981): Geografia Fisica e Politica della Sicilia Antica (Testimonia Siciliae Antiqua 1,1: Roma) (1981): ΦΙΛΙΑΣ ΧΑΡΙΝ: Miscellanea di Studi Classici in onore di Eugenio Manni, 6 vols. (Roma) (1987): 'Annotazioni sulle tabelle enee di Entella', Kokalos 33, 3 - 1 0 Mantel, Ν. (1991): Poeni Foedifragi: Untersuchungen zur Darstellung römisch-karthagischer Verträge zwischen 241 und 201 v. Chr. durch die römische Historiographie (Münchener Arbeiten zur Alten Geschichte, 4: München) Marino, R. (1988): La Sicilia dal 241 a 210 a. C. (Testimonia Siciliae Antiqua I, 12: Roma)

Bibliography

307

Mauersberger, A. (1956-75): Polybios-Lexicon, fascicles 1-4 [ a~o ] (Berlin) Mazzarino, S. (1947): Introduzione alle Guerre Puniche (Catania) McGushin, P. (1992): Sallust: The Histories, vol. I: Books ί - π (Oxford) Meier-Welcker, Η. (1979): Karthago, Syrakus und Rom: zu Grundfragen von Frieden und Krieg (Göttingen) Meister, K. (1975): Historische Kritik bei Polybios (Wiesbaden) Meitzer, O. (1879-96): Geschichte der Karthager, vols. 1-2 (Berlin) [cf. Kahrstedt] Meyer, E. (1924): 'Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des zweiten Punischen Krieges', KS 2 (Halle), 331-461 Meyer, P. (1908): Der Ausbruch des Ersten Punischen Krieges (Inaugural-Diss., Berlin) Miscellanea Mannt: see Manni (1981) Mitchell, R.E. (1971): 'Romano-Carthaginian treaties: 306 and 279/8 B.C.', Historia 20, 635-55 Molthagen, J. (1975): 'Der Weg in den ersten Punischen Krieg', Chiron 5, 89-127 (1979): 'Der Triumph des M'. Valerius Messalla und die Anfänge des ersten Punischen Krieges', Chiron 9, 53-72 Momigliano, Α. (1932/1975): 'Annibale politico', in Quinto Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici e del Mondo Antico (Roma 1975), 1. 333-45 [= La Cultura N.S. 11, fase. 1 (1932) 61-72] Mommsen, T. (1901): History of Rome, tr. W.P. Dickson, 5 vols. (London) Morel, J. (1969): 'L'atelier des petites estampilles', MÉFR 81, 59-117 Morgan, M. Gwyn (1977): 'Calendars and chronology in the First Punic War', Chiron 7, 89-117 Musti, D. (1966). 'Problemi polibiani (Rassegna di studi 19501964)', PP 20, 380-426 (1972): 'Polibio negli studi dell'ultimo ventennio (19501970)', ANRW 1.2. 1114-81 (1974): 'Polibio e la storiografia romana arcaica', Entretiens Hardt (Vandoeuvres-Genève), voi. 20: Polybe, 105-39 (1978): Polibio e l'Imperialismo romano (Napoli) (1984): 'Aspetti economici ed aspetti politici dell'espansione romana nella storiografia polibiana', in Harris (1984) 3554

308

Bibliography

Nenci, G. (1958): 'Le relazioni con Marsiglia nella politica estera romana (dalle origini alla prima guerra punica)', Rivista di Studi Liguri 24, 24-97 (1964): 'La testimonianza di Catone sulla "Decessio de foedere" saguntina (Fr. 84 Peter2)', in Studi Annibalici: Atti del Convegno svoltosi a Cortona—Tuoro sul Trasimeno—Perugia, Ottobre 1961 (Cortona), 71-81 (1980): 'Sei decreti inediti da Enteila', ASNP 10, 1271-75 (1982): 'Considerazioni sui decreti da Entella', ASNP 12 [see Entella Papers], 1069-83 (1982-83): Ά proposito delle tabelle di Entella', Kokalos 28-29, 281-313 Nicolet, C, ed. (1977): Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen, 2 vols. (Paris): vol. 2, Genèse d'un empire 'Les guerres puniques', in Nicolet (1977), 2. 592-626 'L' "impérialisme" romain', in Nicolet (1977), 2. 882-920 Niese, Β. (1899): Geschichte der Griechischen und Makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaironeia: vol. 2 (Gotha) Oertel, F. (1932): 'Der Ebrovertrag und der Ausbruch des zweiten Punischen Krieges', RhM 81, 221-31 Orzhenovsky, O.S. (1976): 'K Istorii Messanskogo konflikta' ['The conflict over Messana'], Vestnik Drevnej Istorii 137, 118-28 [in Russian; English résumé, p. 128] Otto, W. (1932): 'Eine antike Kriegsschuldfrage: der Vorgeschichte des 2. Punischen Krieges', HZ 145, 489-516 Pais, E. (1916): 'Lo scoppio della prima guerra Punica e le gesta dei consoli Appio Claudio e Manio Valerio nel 264-263 a.C.', Ricerche sulla Storia di Roma, voi. 4 (Roma), 339-74 Pareti, L. (1932): 'Ancora sulle cause della seconda guerra punica', Atene e Roma 12, 39-43 Pédech, P. (1952): 'Sur les sources de Polybe: Polybe et Philinos', Revue des Études Anciennes 54, 246-66 (1964): La Méthode historique de Polybe (Paris) Pelletier, A. (1986): 'Sagontins et Turdétans à la vieille de la deuxième guerre punique', RÉA 88 (1986) 307-15 Peter, H. (1906-14): Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae, 2 vols. (Leipzig)

Bibliography

309

Petzold, K.-E. (1969): Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historische Auswertung (Vestigia: Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte, 9: München) Picard, G. Charles (1961): Daily Life in Carthage at the Time of Hannibal (Daily Life Series, 4: London) [cf. Picard, G.Charles and Colette (1983)] (1963): 'Les sufètes de Carthage dans Tite-Live et Cornelius Nepos', Revue des Études Latines 41, 269-81 (1966): 'Le traité romano-barcide de 226 av. J.-C.' Mélanges d'archéologie, d'épigraphie et d'histoire offertes à f . Carcopino (Paris), 747-62 (1967): Hannibal (Paris) (1968): 'La révolution démocratique de Carthage', Conférences de la Société des Études Latines de Bruxelles 1965-66 (Bruxelles), 113-30 Picard, G. Charles, and Picard, Colette (1969): The Life and Death of Carthage (New York) , (1983): Karthago: Leben und Kultur (Stuttgart) [revised edn. of Picard (1961)] Proctor, [Sir] D. (1971): Hannibal's March in History (Oxford) Reid, J.S. (1913): 'Problems of the Second Punic War', JUS 3, 17596 Reuss, F. (1909): 'Der erste Punische Krieg', Philologus 68/N.F. 22, 410-27 Rieh, J.W. (1976): Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmanne Expansion (Collection Latomus 149: Bruxelles) (1993): 'Fear, greed and glory: the causes of Roman war-making in the middle Republic', in Rich & Shipley, 38-68 and Shipley, G., eds. (1993): War and Society in the Roman World (London & New York) Richardson, J.S. (1979): 'Polybius' view of the Roman empire', PBSRA1, 1-11 (1986): Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism, 218-82 B.C. (Cambridge) (I99I): 'Imperium Romanum: empire and the language of power', JRS 81, 1-9 Ridley, R.T. (1987): History of Rome: a Documented Analysis (Problemi e Ricerche di Storia Antica, 8: Roma)

310

Bibliography

Rizzo, F.P. (1971): 'L'ascesa al trono di Gerone II', Kokalos 17, 97104 (1973): La Sicilia e le Potenze ellenistiche al Tempo delle Guerre Puniche (Palermo) (1980): 'La prospettiva diodorea sugli inizi del primo conflitto punico', in Miscellanea Manni [see Manni (1981)], 6. 1897-1920 Robinson, E.S. (1956): 'Punic coins of Spain and their bearing on the Roman Republican series', in Essays on Roman Coinage presented to H. Mattingly, ed. R.A.G. Carson and C.H.V. Sutherland (Oxford), 34-53 [reprinted separately, Chicago 1978] Rouillard, P. (1982): 'Les colonies grecques du sud-est de la péninsule ibérique: état de la question', PP 37, 417-31 Roussel, D. (1970): Les Siciliens entre les Romains et les Carthaginois à l'époque de la première guerre punique (Paris) Ruschenbusch, E. (1978): 'Der Beginn des 2. Punischen Krieges', Historia 27, 232-34 (1980-81): 'Der Ausbruch des 1. Punischen Krieges', ΤΑΛΑΝΤΑ 12-13, 55-76 (1984): 'Ein literarisches Vorbild für die Senatsdebatte über das Hilfegesuch der Mamertiner', RhM 127, 263-65 Ryder, T.T.E. (1965): Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece (London-New York-Toronto 1965) Sacks, K.S. (1990): Diodorus Siculus and the First Century (Princeton) Salmon, E.T. (I960): 'The strategy of the Second Punic War', Gr. & R. 7, 131-42 (1967): Samnium and the Samnites (Cambridge) (1969): Roman Colonization under the Republic (London) Sancho Royo, Α. (1976): 'En torno al tratado del Ebro entre Roma y Asdrubal', Habisl, 75-110 Sanctis, G. de: see De Sanctis, G. Scardigli, Β. (1991): I Trattati Romano-Cartaginesi: Introduzione, edizione critica, traduzione, commento e indici (Pisa) Schepens, G. (1989): 'Polybius on the Punic Wars: the problem of objectivity in history', in Devijver & Lipiñski, 317-27

Bibliography

311

Schmitt, H.H. 0969): Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, vol. 3: Die Verträge der Griechisch-Römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr. (München-Berlin) Schnabel, P. (1926): 'Zur Vorgeschichte des zweiten Punischen Krieges', Klio 20 [N.F. 11], 110-17 Schulten, A. (1934-35): Fontes Hispaniae Antiquae, vol. 2: Avieno, Ora Maritima.; Vol. 3: Las Guerras de 237—154 a. de J. C. (Barcelona) Schwarte, K.-H. (1972): 'Naevius, Ennius und der Beginn des ersten Punischen Krieges', Historia 21, 206-23 (1983): Der Ausbruch des Zweiten Punischen Krieges — Rechtsfrage und Überlieferung (Historia-Einzelschriften, 43: Wiesbaden) Scullard, H.H. (1951): 'Rome's declaration of war on Carthage in 218 B.C.', RhM 95, 209-16 (1973): Roman Politics, 220-150 B.C., 2nd edn. (Oxford) (1980): A History of the Roman World, 753 to 146 B.C., 4th edn. (London) (1989): 'Carthage and Rome': Chapter 11, CAH 2 7.2. 486-569 (1989): 'The Carthaginians in Spain': Chapter 2, CAH82. 17-43 Seibert, J. (1989): 'Zur Logistik des Hannibal-Feldzuges: Nachschub über die Alpen?', in Devijver & Lipinski, 213-21 (1993): Forschungen zu Hannibal (Darmstadt) (1993): Hannibal (Darmstadt) Sensi Sestito, G. de: see De Sensi Sestito, G. Skutsch, O. (1985): The Annals of Q. Ennius (Oxford) Staatsverträge des Altertums, Die: see Bengtson, H., and Schmitt, H.H. Starr, C.G. (1980): The Beginnings of Imperial Rome: Rome in the Mid-Republic (Ann Arbor) Stauffenberg, A. Schenk von (1933): König Hieron der Zweite von Syrakus (Stuttgart) Staveley, E.S. (1989): 'Rome and Italy in the early third century': Chapter 9, CAH2 7.2 420 55 Sumner, G.V. (1966): 'The chronology of the outbreak of the Second Punic War', PACA 9, 5-30 (1967): 'Roman policy in Spain before the Hannibalic War', HSCP12, 205-46

312

Bibliography

(1972): 'Rome, Spain and the outbreak of the Second Punic War: some clarifications', Latomus 31, 469-80 Sznycer, M. (1977): 'Carthage et la civilisation punique', in Nicolet (1977), 2. 545-93 Täubler, E. (1913): Imperium Romanum (Leipzig) (1921): Die Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Punischen Krieges (Berlin) Temporini, H., & al., edd. (1972— ): Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt (Berlin-New York) Thiel, J.H. (1954): A History of Roman Sea-Power before the Second Punic War (Amsterdam) Tlatli, S.-E. (1978): La Carthage punique: étude urbaine (Paris and Tunis) Toynbee, A.J. (1965): Hannibal's Legacy, 2 vols. (Oxford) Treves, P. (1932): 'Le origini della seconda guerra punica', Atene e Roma 13, 14-39 Twyman, B.L. (1987): 'Polybius and the annalists on the outbreak and early years of the Second Punic War', Athenaeum 75, 67-80 (1988): 'Cato, Origines 4, fragment 84 Peter: "duovicesimo anno'", AHB 2, 99-106 (1992): 'The influence of the northern Italian frontier on Roman imperialism', The Ancient World 23, 91-106 Uroz Saez, J. (1982): '¿Turbuletas o Turdetanos, en la guerra de Sagunto?', Lucentum 1, 173-82 Vallejo, J. (1954): 'Polibio e la geografía de España', Emerita 22, 278-82 Veyne, P. (1975): Ύ a-t-il eu un impérialisme romain?', MÉFRA 87, 793-855 Verbrugghe, G.P. (1976): Sicilia (Itinera Romana, ed. G. Walser, vol. 2: Bern) Vogt, J., ed. (1943): Rom und Karthago (Leipzig) Vollmer, D. (1990): Symploke: Das Übergreifen der Römischen Expansion auf den Griechschen Osten. Untersuchungen zur römischen Aussenpolitik am ende des 3• fahrhunderts v. Chr. (//ermes-Einzelschriften, Heft 54: Stuttgart)

Bibliography

313

Wagner, C. González (1989): 'The Carthaginians in ancient Spain: from administrative trade to territorial annexation', in Devijver & LipiAski, 145-56 Walbank, F.W. (1945): 'Polybius, Philinus and the First Punic War', CQ 39, 1-18 [= Selected Papers, 77-98] (1957, 1967, 1979): A Historical Commentary on Polybius, 3 vols. (Oxford) (1972): Polybius (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London) (1974): 'Synchronisms in Polybius, Books 4 and 5', in Polis and Imperium: Studies in Honour of Edward Togo Salmon, ed. J.A.S. Evans (Toronto) [ = Selected Papers (1985) 298-312] (1983): 'Polybius and the αΐτίαι of the Second Punic War', LCM 8, 62-63 (1985): Selected Papers: Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography (Cambridge) Walsh, P.G. (1963): Livy: his Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge) (1965): 'Massinissa', JRS 45, 149-60 (1973): T. Livi Ab Vrbe Condita Liber XXI [edn. and commentary] (London) Warmington, B.H. (1964): Carthage (Harmondsworth; originally pub. London I960) Warmington, E.H. (1934-38): Remains of Old Latin (Loeb Classical Library, 4 vols.: London and Cambridge, Mass.) Welwei, K.W. (1977): 'Die Belagerung Sagunts und die römische Passivität im Westen 219 ν. Chr.', ΤΑΛΑΝΤΑ 8-9, 156-73 (1978): 'Hieron II von Syrakus und der Ausbruch des ersten Punischen Krieges', Historia 27, 575-87 Whittaker, C.R. (1978): 'Carthaginian imperialism in the fifth and fourth centuries', in Garnsey & Whittaker, 59-90 Wilson, R.J.A. (I99O): Sicily under the Roman Empire (Warminster)

I.

Index of Names and Topics

The names of the major sou indexed, as they o Abacaenum: 109 Achaean League: 221 acquisitiveness: 24-26, 50, 52, 14041, 260, 274 Adranon village: 108 Aegates islands: 118, 119, 128, 240, 295 Aemilii: 127 Aemilius Lepidus, M. (envoy 201199): 258 Aemilius Papus, L. (cos. 225): 157 Aemilius Paullus, L. (cos. 219): 225, 230, 231, 234, 236, 257 Aetna, Mount: 105 Agathocles: 11, 30, 33, 54 Agathyrnum: 109 aggression, defensive: 25, 278 aggressiveness: 2, 26-27, 35, 56, 68, 72, 111, 141, 196, 217, 260, 263, 266, 275 Agrigentum: 7, 17-18, 44, 73, 76, 80, 100, 106, 109, 110-13, 128, 151 Aluntium: 109 Anas: 187 Antiochus III: 6l, 152 Antiochus IV: 201, 205, 264 Antium: 29 Apollonia: 177 arbitration: 179-81, 185-86, 189-90, 192-193, 209, 220 Argentina: 272 Ariminum: 17, 19, 20, 129 Aristotle: 6 Arruntius, L. (lost historian): 24-25 Ascelus: 108 Atilii: 20-21, 129 Atilius Bulbus, C. (cos. 245, 235): 129 Atilius Caiatinus, Α.: 21

;, e.g. Polybius and Livy, are not • throughout the work. Atilius Calenus, M.: 21 Atilius Regulus, C. (cos. 225), 156 Atilius Regulus, C. (cos. 257): 22 Atilius Regulus, M. (cos. II 256): 20, 22, 116-18, 129, 273, 276, 283, 293 Atilius Regulus, M. (cos. 227): 129 Augustus: 2, 229 Aurelius Cotta, C. (cos. 252, 248): 129, 282 Ausculum: 12 Austria: 132 Baebius Tamphilus, Q. (envoy 220, 218): 204-7, 209-12, 214-16, 218, 225-26, 233-34, 240, 245-48, 250, 253, 257, 285-86, 288-90 Baetis river: 187, 261 Bastetani: 188 Beneventum: 17, 19 Boers: 275 booty, plunder: 50, 262-64 Brundisium: 20 Bruttium: 11 Caecilius Metellus, L. (cos. 251, 247): 129 Caecilius Metellus, Q. (envoy 185): 258 Caere: 10 Caesar: see Julius Caesar, C. Caleacte: 109, 281 Camarina: 28,106,114, 122, 282 Campania: 10, 20-21, 28, 51 Cannae: 269 Cantabrian mountains: 208 Capua: 47, 268 Carpetani: 211 Catana: 51, 105-6, 108 Celtiberians: 262 Centuripa, 33, 105

316 Cephaloedium: 17-18 Chaereas (lost historian): 233-34, 236, 238, 281, 287 Chalcidian Mount (Messana): 75, 81 chronology: 33-34, 35-40, 64-65, 92, 163, 179-80, 182-84, 192, 202-4, 221, 224-25, 228, 234-35, 255-56, 258-59, 288 Cincius Alimentus, L. (lost historian): 152, 281, 291 Claudii: 21, 30, 69, 101, 104, 127 Claudius, C. (mil. trib. 264): 67, 68, 71, 74, 79, 81, 87, 90, 91, 289, 294 Claudius Caecus, Αρ.: 97 Claudius Caudex, Ap. (cos. 264): 20, 22, 27, 39, 41, 43, 47, 49, 53, 55, 57-58, 61, 63-65, 67-68, 70, 72, 74, 79, 80-83, 85-88, 90, 92, 94-95, 97-98, 100-4, 110-11, 114, 133, 241, 243, 274, 276, 288-290, 295 Claudius Centho, C. (cos. 240): 128, 141 Claudius of Antium, Ti.: 21, 29-30, 282 Claudius Pulcher, P. (cos. 249): 129, 141 Coelius Antipater: 281, 291 Comitia Centuriata: 62, 65, 131, 136, 241-43 Comitia Tributa: 62 commercial interests: 120, 127, 231, 260, 270 Concilium Plebis: 62 conditional war-vote: 243 Corcyra: 177 Cornelii Scipiones: 127, 128, 231 Cornelius Biasio, Cn. (cos. II 257): 128 Cornelius Lentulus, L. (cos. 237): 128, 227, 230, 293-94 Cornelius Lentulus, P. (cos. 236): 128 Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P.: 117, 156, 159, 175, 214, 283, 295 Cornelius Scipio, Cn.: 240 Cornelius Scipio, Cn. (cos. 260): 23 Cornelius Scipio, L. (cos. 259): 23 Cornelius Scipio, P. (cos. 218): 226, 236-37, 240, 256, 258-59 Corsica: 18, 116, 127

Index I Cos: 114, 122, 282 Cosa: 19, 20 Court of One Hundred and Four (Carthage): 6 Cremona: 256, 258 Cuba: 272, 279 Cyamosorus river: 33, 39, 105 Dante: 296 dediticii: 48-49, 177 deditio: 47-48, 177 Demetrius of Pharos: 201, 222, 224, 226-27, 272-73 Dionysius I: 11, 113

dogma: 58, 135

Drepana: 106, 113, 118 Duillius, C. (cos. 260): 22

duoviri navales: 19

Ebro 'treaty': 4, 127, 149, 153-55, 157-58, 163-64, 166-68, 174, 176, 181, 184, 194, 197-99, 202, 205, 207-8, 210, 212, 214, 216-17, 21920, 223, 226, 238-39, 244-47, 24953, 285, 288, 290, 292-93 Echetla: 17-18, 96, 101-4 Edeta, Edetani: 188 'Egesta': 102; see also Echetla Egypt: 16, 27, 30, 206, 264, 272 Elea: 92 Emporiae, Emportons: 170-71, 182, 199-200, 208, 227, 237, 277 England: 132 Enna: 18, 72, 104, 106 Ennius: 79, 83, 284 Ensérune (Gallic site): 270 Entella: 21, 28, 74, 122, 282 Epidamnus: 177 Ethiopia: 275 Etna, 33 Eumachus (lost historian): 281 'Euneis': 75; see also Syneis expansionism, expansionists: 2, 4, 20-21, 25, 30, 35, 52, 56, 140, 142, 172, 183-84, 208, 231, 273, 287 Fabii: 21 69, 127, 151 Fabius, 'Q.' (alleged envoy 218): 229, 234 Fabius Buteo, M. (envoy 218): 145, 230, 234, 236, 241, 244, 247-49, 252-57, 294 Fabius Licinus, M. (cos. 246): 22

Index I Fabius Maximus Rullianus, Q.: 21 Fabius Maximus the Delayer, Q.: 21, 127-28, 145, 151, 227, 229-31, 293 Fabius Pictor, Q.: 36, 55-57, 70, 101, 120, 136, 150-51, 155, 163, 203, 212-14, 220, 222, 224, 227, 234, 238, 280, 285, 287, 289, 291 Falerii: 129 fides: 60, 105, 176-77, 179, 181, 194, 200, 206, 210-11, 215, 218, 221, 239, 290 Firmum: 17, 19, 20 Flaminius, C: 60, 127, 231 France: 132 'freedom for the Greeks' (slogan): 114 Fregellae: 123 Frontinus: 83 Fulvius Flaccus, M. (cos. 264): 39, 47, 62, 65 Gades: 18, 191 Gauls: 123, 127, 129, 144, 154, 156, 169, 170, 173, 180, 196, 198, 226, 249, 263, 266-67, 276 Gela: 33, 113 Gelo: 113 Germany: 132 Great War (1914-1918): 114 Greece: 6l guarantee of allies (241): 119, 121, 147, 161-62, 178, 212, 223, 238, 245, 247, 251-52 Hadranum: 51, 105, 108 Halaesa: 17, 33, 105 Halicyae: 105, 108 Halycus river: 18 Hamilcar Barca: 118, 121, 127, 13133, 135, 138-39, 142-43, 146-51, 154, 167-70, 172, 179, 181-82, 184, 246, 266, 277-78, 284, 290, 292-95 Hannibal (officer 264): 34, 40, 4345, 73, 284 Hannibal (admiral in 263; same as previous?): 108, 111 Hannibal (son of Hamilcar Barca): 7, 23, 102, 127, 145-48, 150-51, 155, 158-59, 161-63, 165, 167-68, 174-77, 179-84, 186-89, 191-92, 194-13, 215-20, 222-23, 225, 227-

317 28, 230-31, 233, 235-37, 239-41, 244, 245-50, 253-57, 259, 262-66, 268-70, 273, 277, 283, 285, 288, 290, 292-93, 296 Hanno (I) (commandant 264): 7, 53, 67-68, 71-74, 77, 80, 83, 89, 93, 114, 240, 276 Hanno (admiral 241): 240 Hanno (envoy 237): 134, 137-38, 146 Hanno (II), son of Hannibal (264): 7, 27, 73, 76-78, 80, 85-87, 89-90, 92, 94, 97-98, 151, 276 Hanno the Great: 135, 138 Hasdrubal (son of Hamilcar Barca): 249, 262, 270 Hasdrubal (son-in-law of Hamilcar Barca): 123, 127, 139, 148, 15051, 153, 155, 159, 162-63, 167-73, 177, 179, 181-84, 190-92, 194, 196-97, 200, 205, 210, 212, 214, 246, 249, 252, 265, 277 Hasdrubal's accord: see Ebro 'treaty' hegemony, hegemonialism, 25, 56, 249, 253, 268, 272, 274 Hera, temple of (Cape Lacinium), 281 Hiberus: see Iber Hiero II: 23-24, 27, 30, 33-45, 48, 50, 52, 55-56, 60, 63, 65, 67, 7374, 76-78, 82-86, 88, 91-94, 97, 100, 104, 106, 109-10, 112-14, 116, 119, 121-22, 124, 126, l65, 195, 272, 276, 278, 282, 284-85, 287-88, 290-91 ally of Romans: 107 Hieronymus: 266 Himera river: 266 boipolloi (in Polybius): 57-58, 66 Iber (Ebro) river: 154-55, 158-59, 161-63, 166-71, 175, 181, 183, 188-92, 197-200, 202, 204-205, 207-9, 212, 214, 217, 219-20, 22224, 227, 237, 244-50, 253, 255-56, 259, 261-63, 265-66, 292-93 Ilarum: 108-9 Ilergetes: 183 Illyrians: 127-28, 153, 156, 177, 22021, 225, 235, 265, 275

318 imperialism, imperialists: 2, 4, 19-21, 184, 260-61, 263, 271, 274

imperituri: 130

indemnity: 119-20, 125, 132, 135, 141-42, 147-49, 265, 270, 276-78, 290 Hiero's (263): 50, 106 India, British: 272 indicta pugna (in Silius): 94 Ineditum Vaticanum: 68, 70, 84-86, 90, 282, 295 inscriptions: 280, 282; see also Aurelius Cotta, Cos, Entella Istria: 196

iustitia: 206

Janus, Temple of: 123, 130, 140 Julius Caesar, C: 2, 21, 191, 282 Kaeso (Fabius?): 69-70, 74, 91, 295 Lacinium, Cape: 281 Latium: 8, 29, 273 Leontini: 105-6 Licinius Varus, C. (cos. 236): 234, 257 Ligurians: 127, 144-45, 147, 170 Lilybaeum: 73, 106, 111-13, 117, 122 Lipara: 18, 34, 40, 119 Lissus: 201 Livius Salinator, M. (cos. 219): 225, 230-31, 234, 236, 257 Locri: 92, 268 Longanus river: 33-35, 37-40, 43, 45, 50, 54, 64-65, 67, 73, 78, 86, 108, 195, 284, 289 Lusitanians: 262 Lutatius Catulus, C. (cos. 242): 23, 119, 121, 125, 176 Lutatius Cerco, Q. (cos. 241): 119, 122, 128 Lutatius' peace: see treaty of 241 Lutatius' treaty: see treaty of 241 Macedón: 59, 183, 225, 241; see also Philip V, Perseus Macella: 108 Mago (admiral 279): 7, 12, 13 Malaca: 18 Mamertines: 23, 25, 27-31, 33-37, 40-45, 47-56, 58, 6l, 63, 65, 67, 70-72, 74, 76-78, 87, 90, 93, 95, 98, 101, 107-108, 110, 114-15,

Index I 165, 205, 243, 266, 272-73, 276, 282, 284-85, 287-88, 290, 293, 295 Mamilius Turrinus, C. (cos. 239): 128 Mamilius Vitulus, Q. (cos. 262): 109, 110, 112, 128 Manlius Torquatus, A. (cos. 244, 241): 128 Manlius Torquatus T. (cos. 235): 128, 140 Manlius Vulso, L. (cos. 256): 117 marching rates, Roman: 65 Masinissa: 261, 265 Massilia, Massiliots: 167, 169-71, 187, 198, 208, 249, 251, 256, 281 Mastia (Spain): 8, 167, 178 mercenaries: 28, 79, 119, 123-24, 132-33, 135, 137-38, 141, 147-48, 150, 205, 265, 293 'Mesene' (in Polyaenus): 295 Messalla (cognomen)· 22, 100 Messana: 18, 23, 28, 33-37, 40-45, 51-57, 62-67, 71, 73-74, 77-78, 8082, 85-88, 90-91, 93, 95-97, 99, 100-5, 111, 115, 205, 240, 273-74, 276, 278, 281, 284-85, 289, 291, 293-94 Minatus Curvius (or Curius): 29 Monti Peloritani: 80, 97 Mylae: 18, 116 Nacone: 29 Naevius: 110, 122, 280 Naples: 92 New Carthage, 8, 123, 154, 158-59, 162-63, 169, 178, 182-83, 185, 193, 195, 197, 202-5, 212-13, 224, 235, 255-56, 290, 292 Numidians: 275 oath, Hannibal's: 152, 293 Olcades: 190 Ostia: 7, 80, 191 Otacilius Crassus, M'. (cos. 263): 20, 22, 97, 100-3, 105-6, 110-11, 288 Pachynus: 106 pact of 279: 12, 14; see also treaty of 348 Paestum: 19-20 Panormus: 5, 73, 106, 111, 113, 129, 131

Index I Papirius Praetextatus, L. (censor 272): 234 papyri: 3, 280-81 Pelonas, Cape: 75, 80, 93 Perseus (king of Macedón): 242-43, 264 Persia: 272 Philinus' treaty: 9-10, 12, 15, 41-42, 55, 70, 85, 146,160, 164 Philinus: 3, 9, 24, 34, 36, 42-43, 45, 55-56, 59, 69-70, 78, 82-83, 85-86, 93, 95-98, 100-4, 111, 121, 131, 136, 280, 285, 287, 289, 290 Philip V of Macedón: 61, 151, 159, 200, 241-42, 258, 264, 268 Phintias: 114, 122, 282 Piso (annalist): 56, 92 Placentia: 256, 258 plunder: see booty, plunder Popillius Laenas, C. (envoy 168): 201, 205 'Poplicola' (in Silius Italicus): 228 population (Roman and Carthaginian): 26 Porcius Cato, M.: 121, 146, 154, 175, 233, 262, 281 treaty-breaches, 146 postponing war 'to the new consuls': 225, 232, 236 Postumius (pirate): 28 Postumius Albinus, L.: 262 Postumius Megellus, L. (cos. 262): 109-10, 112 Prussia: 132 'Punic threat': 23, 51-52, 55, 287, 290

Pyrrhus, 1, 11-15, 17, 27, 30, 33-34, 44, 50, 54, 72, 112-13, 121, 276 quaestores classici: 19 Rhegium: 13-14, 17, 28, 31, 35, 37, 42-43, 53, 57, 61, 64-65, 67, 71, 80-81, 83-84, 86-89, 90, 92-93, 165, 287-88 Rhodae (Spain): 171 Rhodians: 186 'Romis' (at Camarina): 28 Ruscino: 270 Saguntum, Saguntines: 145, 150, 152, 154-56, 158-64, 166, 168-69, 171, 173-76, 178, 180-82, 184,

319 186-200, 202, 204-5, 207-17, 21920, 222-28, 231, 233-34, 236-40, 244-52, 255, 257, 263-65, 277, 284-85, 288, 290, 292-94 civil strife, 185-87, 191-92; neighbours, 187, 190-92, 206, 210, 220, 293 sailing times and conditions: 138, 156, 182, 191-92, 236, 249, 258 Sallentini: 17 Samnium, Samnites: 10, 47^Í8, 51 Sardinia crisis: 4, 25, 125, 127, 13233, 137-40, 146, 153, 165, 229, 242, 266, 275, 277-78, 288 Sardinia, 1-2, 8, 25, 112, 116, 119, 123, 125-26, 129, 131-37, 139-47, 152-53, 156-157, 159, 162, 167, 169, 205, 207-8, 262, 265, 267, 273, 276, 285, 290, 292-93, 295 Segesta: 102, 105, 108 Sempronius Blaesus, C. (cos. 253, 244): 128 Sempronius Gracchus Ti. (cos. 238): 128, 139, 141 Sempronius Gracchus Ti. (cos. 177): 139, 262 Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (tribune 133): 61 Sempronius Longus, Ti. (cos. 218): 236-37, 256, 258-59 Sempronius Tuditanus (annalist): 118

Sempronius Tuditanus, M. (cos. 240): 128, 141 Servilius Geminus, P. (cos. 252, 248): 129 Sicily: 1, 5, 8-9, 12-13, 15, 21, 23-25, 28-29, 34, 40, 43-44, 49, 56, 61, 64, 71, 73-74, 76-78, 89, 92, 95, 102-3, 106, 108, 112-20, 122, 126, 142, 146, 150, 153, 156, 167, 169, 207, 250, 262, 266, 271, 273-74, 276, 282 Sidicini: 47 Silenus (historian): 3, 152, l60, 281, 287, 291, 294 Sinnius Capito: 139 Soluntum: 5, 73-74, 111, 117 Sosylus (historian): 3, 152, l60, 233, 236, 238, 281, 287, 295

320 Soviet Russia: 78, 132 Spanish provinces: 262, 273 straits of Messina: 27, 82, 85, 88, 91, 93, 274, 290 strategi: 60-61, 245 strategus autocrator: 39, 167 Suero river: 162, 190-91 sufete: 6, 255 Sulpicius Galba, P.: 136 sundial (Catana 263): 105 Syneis: 75, 80-81; see also 'Euneis' Syracuse: 11, 17, 27, 35, 38, 51-54, 72-73, 82, 96-97, 99-102, 105-6, 108, 110, 113-15, 121, 133, 151, 264, 273-74, 278, 282, 287-89 Tader river: 162 Tagus river: 172, 190, 192, 197, 208, 292 Tarentum: 11, 15-16, 37, 92, 156, 268 Tauromenium: 105-6 Teuta: 205 Theocritus: 34, 113, 284 Third Punic War: 3, 24, 252, 283 Thurii: 14 Timaeus: 34, 36, 78, 287 Timoleon: 28, 113 Torboletae, Torboletes: 188-89, 220, 246; see also Turbóla trade: 1, 6, 8, 11, 20, 28, 32, 131, 169, 261, 270 traders, Roman and Italian: 124-25, 127, 134, 136-37, 142, 146, 167, 171, 178, 182, 265, 277, 292 Traiectus (Sicily): 80 treaty of 241: 119-20, 124, 127, 13033, 135, 137-38, 143, 146, 155-56, 159, 161-64, 167, 175, 194, 212, 219, 238-39, 244-45, 250-52, 254, 276, 288, 292 treaty of 348: 27-28, 166, 178; see also pact of 279 treaty of 509: 8 treaty with Macedón, Hannibal's (215): 268 trinundinum: 65, 242 Turbóla: 188; see also Torboletae, Torboletes Turdetani: 187 Turduli: 187

Index I Turis, Turitani: 188, 190-91, 239, 246, 251 Tyndaris: 106, 108-9 Tyrittus: 108 Utica: 125-26, 132, 143 Vaccaei: 198, 211, 275 Valentía: 188 Valerius Antias (annalist): 291 Valerius Falto, P. (cos. 238): 128, 139, 141 Valerius Falto, Q. (cos. 239): 22, 128, 141 Valerius Flaccus, L. (cos. 261): 22 Valerius Flaccus, P. (cos. 227, envoy 220): 204-12, 214-16, 218, 225-26, 228, 233, 240, 245-48, 250, 253, 257, 285-86, 288-90 Valerius Maximus Messalla, M'. (cos. 263): 20, 22, 97, 100-3, 105-6, 108, 110-12, 276, 288 Varrò (encyclopedic scholar): 105, 145 Venusia: 11 Volsinii: 17, 47, 62 'wrath of the Barcids': 152, 266 Xanthippus: 118 Xenophon (lost historian): 281 Xiphonia: 108, 111

321

II. Index of Passages Cited I am very grateful to my colleague, Mr Terry Roberts, for his kindness and skill in compiling this Index of Passages. The names of authors and works are given in their most convenient forms. Source-references are in italics·, pages of the text and footnotes are in the form '24.14, 119.6' (= p. 24 note 14, p. 119 note 6).

Liber Memorialis 46.2: 24.14, 119.6. APPIAN Bella Civilia 1.12.50-51: 61.23. Hannibalica 2.4: 150.1. 2.4-7: 147.7. 2.6:149.11, 292.13. 2.67: 157.14. 3-10: 153.7, 157.14, 238.12, 292.13, 293.14. 3-12: 292.13. Iberica 4.15: 124.14, 134.4. 5.17: 150.1. 5.17-21:147.7. 5-19-21: 292.13. 6.22: 151.2. 6.24: 151.3, 170.41, 292.13. 7.25-27: 157.14, 238.12. 7.27: 166.34. 8.29:151.2. 934. 153 7, 293.14. 10.36: 188.27, 292.13. 10.3639: 189-29. 10.37: 210.21, 210.22, 218.38, 220.2. 10.3839 : 220.3. 10.39: 292.13· 11.40-41: 238.12. 11.40-43: 202.9· 11.41: 207.18. 11.4142: 215.33. 11-43: 157.14, 166.34, 226.13. 12.47: 157.14, 292.13. 13-48-50: 145.2. 13-49-50: 241.16. 19.74: 157.14, 292.13. Libyca 5.19: 125.15, 134.4. 5.2122: 124.14. 6.23: 157.14, 238.12, 292.13 . 54.234-38: 261.2. 86.407: 124.14. Macedonica 9.5: 265.8. Sicelica 1: 125.16. 2.1: 125.16. 2.1-4: 119.6, 292.13. 2.2: 107.11. 2.5: 122.12. 2.10: 124.14. 2.11: 125.15. AMPELIUS

Syriaca 23-110: 265.8. Politics 2.11, 1272b1273b: 6.3. 1273a: 7.5, 7.6. A S C O N I U S In Pisonianam 3C: 223.7. AVIENUS Ora Maritima 481-82: 189.28. CATO Origines, Frgmt. 84 Peter: 147.6, 175.2, 221.4. Frg. 132P: 131. C I C E R O Ad Familiares 7.24.4: 140.15. De Divinatione 1.24.49. 152.5, 291.12, 243.21. De Inventione 1.27: 80.25. DeSenectute 4.1. 128.22. II Verrines 2 53-131-55.137: 106.9 . 43-6: 101.3. 5.19.5020.51: 63.27. Philippics 5.10.27: 202.9, 204.13. COINS: C . M . Kraay, Greek Coins, pl. 293R 3123. DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS Roman Antiquities 20.4:13.17. DIO Roman History, Frgmts.: 43.1. 14.19, 31 23. 43-1-15: 284.6. 43-2: 24.14, 274.20. 43-3:69.5. 43 5: 69 5. 43 5-6: 87.9. 43-510: 44.23, 68.1. 43.7: 90.15. 43-8: 55.11, 69 5. 43-10: 69.5. 43-11: 81.28. 43-11-12: 82.1. 43-22-23. II6.I, 117.2. 43.26: 118.4. 46.1: 134.5, 141.18. 48: 146.5, 147.7,147.8. 55.1-10: 228.15. 55-9-10: 145.2. 55-10. ARISTOTLE

322

Index II 2 3 0 . 1 7 , 241.16.

107.10.

257.39·

56:

57.12: 228.15. 57.36: 269.15. 57.82: 261.2. Rom. Hist. 43.42.3:192.34. D I O D O R U S SICULUS:

3.54.6: 87.9. 13-43-2: \TI.6. 14.9.8-9: 29.19. 16.691: 8.7. 16.82.3: 28.18. 19.65.5: 40.17. 19 86.5: 87.9. 20.32.1-2: 18.2. 21.4.8: 11.13. 21.18.1: 11.14. 22.1.2: 42.21. 22.1.2-3: 13-17. 22.7.5: 11.15. 22.10.1: 11.14, 18.3,

72.11.

38.13,71.9,

77.19.

76.18.

23-2.2:

2 3 . J - 5 : 85.6.

130.25.

22.13-9-

3-2.2: 3-3-·

3 7: 202.9,

207.18,

214.29.

140.15.

F/Ä4 1.423-24, no. 75:190.31. FLORUS

1.18 [2.21.1-2:

49.3.

[2.21.2:

24.13,37.9.

59-19-

118

1.18 [2.21.2-4:

24.14, 2 7 4 . 2 0 .

1.18

[2.2].3:

1.18 [2.21.6: 221.4.

118 [2.21.23-26: 118.4. 7.22 [2.61.2: 153.7. .7.22 [2.61.4: 157.14,238.12. 1.22 [2.61.5: 202.9, 2 2 6 . 1 3 . -7.22 [2.61.35: 140.15.

FRONTINUS

Stratagems 1.4.11: 83-3,

93-19-

Í . I Í . 4 : 145-3-

292.13.

4 . Í . 4 5 : 231.18.

GELLIUS

41.19,

2.4.17:

Í . 2 3 . 4 : 233.2.

1.23.13:

7.4.1: 118.4.

10.27.2-5:

233.2.

23--7-2.· 83-2. 23.Í.2.

118.4.

FESTUS De Verborum Significatif ed. Lindsay, 174L: 22.9. 430L

30.22.

22.13:

22.13.1-8: 34.3. 22.13-23-1: 42.20,78.21. 22.13-1-23-4.1: 284.6. 22.13.2: 18.2. 22.13-38: 39.15 . 22.13.4: 78.22. 22.13.6-7: 44.23. 22.13-6-8: 40.17. 22.13.7: 18.2, 19-4. 22.13.7-8: 40.18. 2213-9:

2.24:

119.6,134.4,138.12.

145.3.

44.24, 7 1 . 9 , 76.17.

23-1.2-3:

HERODOTUS

73.13.

23-7.4:

HORACE ODES 3-5- Í 3 - 5 6 · 118.4.

2 3 . Í . 3 · · 75.16.

24.13, 38.13, 56.14, 59.19, 71.9, 23.I.4-3.I:

79.23, 8 7 . 8 , 89.13.

82.1.

23.2-3: 83.3.

69.3.

23-2.1:

2 3 . 3 · 89.13, 96.24, 103-4.

23.4.I: 50.6, 96.24, 105.7, IO6.8, 106.9, 1 0 7 . 1 0 , 1 0 8 . 1 2 , 110.17.

23.4.2-5.1: 86.7.

109.13.

23.9.4.·

23-8.1:

18.3,

24.Í3:

119.6, 121.10.

147.7.

25.6·

151.2.

25-10.1:

25-S:

139.14, 151.2.

25.10.3: 292.13.

1 3 9 . 1 4 , 151.2,

25.12:

166.34, 167.35. 26.3:

2 5 . Í.·

138.12.

25.10.2-3: 151.3. 151.2. 25.10.3-4:

25.13:

230.17. 5 9 4 7 · 190.31.

ILS56:

SEG 12.370, 12.379-80:114.22. Ineditum Vaticanum (= FGrH 839) 83-3-

3:69-3,

JUSTIN

4.· 92.17.

15.2.3-4:

37.10.

18.2.1-3:

11.15.

23-2.13:

30.22.

2 3 . 4 . 7 : 34.4.

11.14.

23.4: 23-4-2:

37.10. JUVENAL

8.116-24:263-5.

LIVY 1.19-3:

130.25, 140.15.

2.34.4:

7.25.4: 28.18.

7.26.13-

28.18.

15: 28.18.

7.27.2: 8.7.

31 12: 48.2.

26.17.

7.30.4: 51.7.

151.2.

2.2:

Entella Documents, IV.4-5: 29.19. V.27-28: 30.20. ILLRP 1277: 282.4.

151.3,

ENNIUS Annales 223 Vahlen: 80.25. 225V = Warmington 248: 89.14. EUTROPIUS

INSCRIPTIONS

106.8.

23.12.15: 117.2. 23.153: 117.2. 23. J 7: 86.7. 23.18.3: 18.2. 23-18.5: 131. 23.20.1: 19.4. 24.11.1: 86.7. 24.12: 118.4.

6.108:177.6.

7.29.3-

49-3-

7.30.I:

7 . 3 0 . 9 - I O : 51.7.

7.30.17-19: 51.7. 7.38.2: 8.7. 8. 14.8: 29.19. 9.43.26: 8.7. 10.31.4: 131. 10.37.6-12:

124.14.

2.17.2:

104.5.

119.5.

2 . J S : 26.17.

2.ÍS.3··

500/FE 2.7:

104.5.

2.19.1:

106.8, 106.9,

293.14.

1.3-2.2: J.5:

152.6.

134.4,

Í.4:

141.18,

323

Index II 266.10. 1.7: 157.14. 2.3:139.14. 2.7: 166.34, 168.36. 31: 1 5 1 . 2 , 1 5 1 . 2 . 4.1-8: 167.35. 5 3-4: 190.32. 6: 212.25 . 6.1: 187.26. 6.1-8: 190.30. 6.2: 187.26. 6.2-8: 202.9. 6.3:193 38. 6.3-4:229.16. 6.3-8: 203.10. 6.4-8: 226.13. 6.8: 204.13. 93-11-2: 190.30, 202.9. 9-3-4: 207.18. 10.1-11.2: 217.36. 10.5-8: 238.12. 10.8: 14.19. 11.2: 217.37. 12.5: 187.26. M 153.7. 15-3-- 221.4. 75-3-6. 202.9, 229.16. 16.2: 228.15. 77.7: 228.15. 77.7-4: 241.16. 17.4: 243.21. 7S.7: 230.17, 235.5. 18.3: 230.17. 18.4: 247.24. 18.4-14: 254.33. 7S.9: 238.12. 18.13-14: 145.2, 241.l6. 19-1-5: 253.32. 79.4-5: 238.12. 19-6-20.9: 257.39. 20.&· I69.39, 248.25. 20.9: 259.42. 27.7-9: 204.12. 22.3: 183.17. 22.6-9: 243.21, 291.12. 23.2: 183 17. 38.7: 291 12. 40.5.· 119.6, 134.4. 41.6: 131. 47.7-122.12. 44.5-7: 166.34. 46.S: 291.12. 47.4: 291.12. 4S.70: 268.13. 22.7.4: 235.5. 22.7.4: 291.12. 22.7.5: 268.I3. 2213-2: 268.13. 22.195: 169.39. 22.23-4-8: 22.9. 22.23.6: 118.4. 22.25.7: 22.9. 22.31.8-9: 291.12. 22.35.3: 231.18. 22.54.11: 119.6,134.4. 22.58.1-2:268.13. 22.58.2-3: 269.15. 22.58.7-9: 269.15. 23-7.1-2: 268.13. 23.7.4-7: 268.14. 23-10.3-13: 268.14. 23-15.4: 268.13. 23.15.8: 268.13. 23.22.10-11: 230.17. 23339: 151.3. 23 33-9-12: 269.15. 23-34.15: 140.15. 23-42.4: 268.13. 23-43-10-11: 268.13. 23.48.7: 122.12.

24.7.9: 268.13. 24.1.13: 268.I3. 24.6.1-3: 267.11. 24.6.7-9: 267.11. 24.13 1: 268.13. 24.42.9-11: 240.15. 24.42.10: 187.26. 189.28. 25.«.«· 268.13· 25.10.8-9: 268.13. 26.14-16:

48.2. 26.40.14: 106.9. 27.6.1718: 235.5. 27-16.5:151.4.

27.7.7: 192.34. 27.34.3: 231.18.

27.34.5-6: 235.5. 157.14.

28.39.14: 187.26.

28.39.8:

28.40-42. 230.17. 28.46.16: 281.2 . 29 12.16: 62.26. 29.3 7.5>: 231.18.

30.16.5: 117.2.

151.4.

30.16.14-15: 117.2.

30.21.11-12:

3O.3I.2. 24.13. 30.37.1-6: 261.2. 30.43.2: 62.26. 31.518.1: 242.18.

31-5-8-8.1:

59.19.

31.59-6.1: 61.22. 31-6.1-8.4: 136.7. 31-7.1-2: 66.31. 32.27.6: 262.4.

32.25.2: 262.4.

32.28.11: 262.4. 33.25.6: 62.26. 33-45.6-47.9: 151.4. 3413-7: 157.14 .

34.21.7:

35-19-2-7:

1537.

263.5.

35-19-3:

293.14.

36.1.6:

61.22.

37.25.12:

265.8.

42.18.2:

225.10. 42.3O.IO-31.1: 243.20. 42.47.5: 94.21. 43.15.1: 65.30. 44.20.7: 236.7. 45.29.9:178.7.

Periocha (Epitome) 13. 11.15. 74. 14.19. 75- 19.5. 76· 56.13, 58.16. 7 « · 1 1 7 . 2 , 118.4. 20: 122.12. 37: 59.19. 4 « · 225.10. 49:261.2. 55.189.28.

Lydus De Magistratibus 1.27:19 5. Macrobius Saturnalia 1.6.18-25: 233-2. 7.6.26· 101.3. Naevius Fragmt. 35 Baehrens=2930 Warmington: IIO.16. F/g. 47 KeÄfew = 41-43W: 122.11. Nepos Cafó 3 3· 154.10. Hamilcar 1.5: 119.6. //«m. 4: 147.7. Ham. 4.2-3: 153 7. Hannibal 1.3-2.6: 1537. //an«. 3 7: 151.2, 167.35. Hann. 13-3-209.20, 281.2. O r o s i u s 4.31-2: 14.19. 4.5.2: 14.19. 4.7.7: 24.13, 56.13. 4.7.3: 107.10. 4.70.7: 118.4. 4.77.7: 119.6. 4.77.2: 134.4. 4.72.2:130.25. 4.12.2-3:134.4, 134.5. 4.12.3: 137.10. 4.72.4. 130.25. 4.72.7 140.15. 4.74.7:

324

Index II

4.14.2: 4.14.3:153.7. PAUSANIAS 6.12.2: 221.4.

17.1.

7.S.4:

202.9,207.18. 34.4.

6.12.3:

258.40.

7.9.2:

56.13,92.17.

Nil 2.122: 138.13.

110.15.

2.225:

57.15,

56.13.

93.19.

19.4:138.13. 35.22:101.3. PLUTARCH Cato Maior 8: 121.10. Fabius 25-26: 23 0.17. Flamininus 14.5: 265.8. Nutria 20.2: 130.25, 1 4 0 . 1 5 . Pyrrhus 23 5: 17.1. Ti. Gracchus 11.3: 61.23. Timoleon 13.1:47.1. POLYAENUS Stratagems 6.16.4:

89.14.

51.6,

105.7.

106.9.

16.192:

3-6: 25.16. 3-8-10: 134.3.

Bookl: 5.2:

34.6, 40.16, 64.29.

25.16.

284.6.

7.1-16.11: 7.5:

61.24.

7-63:

37.10.

7.20.134.3.

61.24.

8.1-10.2: 34.2.

7.S.-

7.12:31.23, 5.2:34.6,

30.22.