Uniform evidence law [Thirteenth edition.] 9780455501024, 0455501025

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Uniform Evidence Law

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Uniform Evidence Law

STEPHEN ODGERS SC

THIRTEENTH EDITION

LAWBOOK CO.

2018

Published in Sydney by Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited ABN 64 058 914 668 19 Harris Street, Pyrmont, NSW National Library of Australia A catalogue record for this book is available from the National Library of Australia ISBN 9780455501024 (paperback) © 2018 Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited

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This publication is copyright. Other than for the purposes of and subject to the conditions under the Copyright Act, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Australian Capital Territory: Copyright of ACT legislative material: © Australian Capital Territory. Copyright is owned by the Australian Capital Territory. All rights reserved. Commonwealth: Copyright of Cth legislative material: All Commonwealth legislative material is reproduced by permission but does not purport to be the official or authorised version. It is subject to Commonwealth of Australia copyright. For reproduction or publication beyond that permitted by the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), permission should be sought in writing from the current Commonwealth Government agency with the relevant policy responsibility. New South Wales: Copyright of NSW legislative material: Copyright continues to reside in the State of NSW. Northern Territory: Copyright of NT legislative material: © Northern Territory Government of Australia. Tasmania: Copyright of Tasmanian legislative material: Copyright is owned by the State of Tasmania. Victoria: All Acts and Statutory Rules © The State of Victoria, the Government Printer (2018). DISCLAIMER: This product or service contains an unofficial version of the Acts and Statutory Rules of the State of Victoria. The State of Victoria accepts no responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or currency of any legislation contained in this product or provided through this service. This edition is up to date as of 1 May 2018. Editorial and Production Team: Angela Bandiera, Paul Godwin, Patrick Harper, Vanessa Schlenert Product Editor: Wyn Diong Content Editor: Rebecca Rayner Product Developer: Paul Gye Publisher: Nigel Royfee Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW This book has been printed on paper certified by the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). PEFC is committed to sustainable forest management through third party forest certification of responsibly managed forests. For more info see www.pefc.org.

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To Saras

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TABLE OF CONTENTS User’s Guide ........................................................................................................................ ix Table of Cases ................................................................................................................... xiv Table of Statutes ................................................................................................................. cv Format of the Commentary .......................................................................................... cxxxii Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1

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EVIDENCE ACT Table of Provisions ............................................................................................................ 34 Chapter 1 – Preliminary ................................................................................................... 43 Chapter 2 – Adducing Evidence ...................................................................................... 79 Chapter 3 – Admissibility of Evidence .......................................................................... 309 Chapter 4 – Proof ......................................................................................................... 1313 Chapter 5 – Miscellaneous ........................................................................................... 1552 Chapter 6 – Transitional matters for Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT only) ............................................................................................... 1606 Chapter 7 – Transitional matters for Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Amendment Act 2013 (NT only) ........................................................................... 1611 Chapter 8 – Transitional matters for Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Amendment (Journalist Privilege) Act 2018 (NT only) ....................................... 1612 Schedule .......................................................................................................................... 1613 Dictionary ....................................................................................................................... 1627 APPENDICES Appendix A – Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth) ........................................................ 1689 Appendix B – Evidence Regulations 2015 (NSW) ..................................................... 1698 Appendix C – Evidence Regulations 2009 (Vic) ........................................................ 1706 Appendix D – Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) ......................... 1715 Appendix E – Rights of a Person Recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ................................................................................ 1804 Appendix F – Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (Annotated Extracts) ............... 1811 Appendix G – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) (Extracts) .................................... 1877 Appendix H – Table of Notices (Commonwealth) ...................................................... 1917 Appendix I – Table of Notices (NSW) ........................................................................ 1922 Appendix J – Table of Notices (Victoria) .................................................................... 1927 Appendix K – Table of Notices (ACT) ....................................................................... 1932 Appendix L – Table of Notices (NT) ........................................................................... 1936 Appendix M – Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) – Related Information ................................ 1941 Index ............................................................................................................................... 1952

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USER’S GUIDE SCOPE OF THIS WORK Uniform Evidence Law 13th Edition is the leading Australian guide to uniform evidence legislation, widely used by practitioners and students alike. Over a quarter of the evidence legislation’s provisions are subjected to significant judicial interpretation each year, making it essential to have a current copy of the annotated Act at hand, to stay abreast of developments. LEGISLATION Uniform Evidence Law 13th Edition contains the following legislation: • Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) • Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) • Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) • Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) • Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT)

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• Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth) • Evidence Regulation 2015 (NSW) • Evidence Regulations 2009 (Vic) • Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) • Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) [Extracts] • Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) [Extracts] CURRENCY The Acts and regulations have been updated to include all available amendments to 1 May 2018. LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS IN THIS EDITION Uniform Evidence Law 13th Edition takes account of the amendments listed below. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) Amending Acts • Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Legislation Amendment Act 2017 – Act 67 of 2017 • Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017 – Act 129 of 2017

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User’s Guide

Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) Amending Acts • Jury Directions and Other Acts Amendment Act 2017 – Act 37 of 2017 • Justice Legislation Amendment (Court Security, Juries and Other Matters) Act 2017 – Act 38 of 2017 Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) Amending Acts • Family Violence Act 2016 – Act 42 of 2016 • Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2017 (No 2) – Act 14 of 2017 • Courts and Other Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2018 – Act 9 of 2018 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) Amending Acts • Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Amendment (Journalist Privilege) Act 2018 – Act 7 of 2018 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic)

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Amending Acts • Justice Legislation (Evidence and Other Acts) Amendment Act 2016 – Act 38 of 2016 • Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2016 – Act 47 of 2016 • Jury Directions and Other Acts Amendment Act 2017 – Act 37 of 2017 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Amending Acts • Justice Portfolio Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2016 – Act 54 of 2016 • Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2016 – Act 55 of 2016 • Justice Legislation Amendment (Committals and Guilty Pleas) Act 2017 – Act 55 of 2017 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Amending Acts • Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2016 – Act 28 of 2016 • Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2016 – Act 47 of 2016 • Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2017 – Act 6 of 2017 • Family Violence Protection Amendment Act 2017 – Act 19 of 2017 • Jury Directions and Other Acts Amendment Act 2017 – Act 37 of 2017 x

Uniform Evidence Law

User’s Guide

• Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims) Act 2018 – Act 5 of 2018 HISTORY NOTES The history notes have been entered into an abbreviated form using the number and year of the amending Act or regulation and a descriptor (eg. “insrt”) to show the effect of the amending Act or regulation. The abbreviations used in the historical notes are as follows: • insrt – inserted • am – amended • subst – substituted • rep – repealed • exp – expired • reinsrt – reinserted • renum – renumbered • reloc – relocated Example: History note under subsection 20(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): [Subs (2) am Act 4 of 2016, s 3 and Sch 4 item 384]

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This note indicates that subsection 20(2) was amended by Act 4 of 2016, Sch 4 item 384. S 3 is a reference to the enacting provision. Details of the short title of the amending Act or regulation, assent/gazettal/ registration and commencement dates are located in the Table of Amending Legislation following the Table of Provisions. FUTURE COMMENCEMENTS Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Future Commencements Amending legisla- Number Date of gazettal/ tion assent/registration Justice Legislation 4 of 2018 21 Mar 2018 Amendment Act 2018

Date of commencement Sch 1.8 commences 2 Jul 2018.

Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) Future Commencements Amending legisla- Number Date of gazettal/ tion assent/registration Oaths and Affırma- 6 of 2018 27 Feb 2018 tions Act 2018

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Date of commencement S 65 commences on a date to be proclaimed, or 1 Mar 2019. xi

User’s Guide

Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) Future Commencements Amending legisla- Number Date of gazettal/ tion assent/registration Independent Com- 3 of 2018 21 Feb 2018 missioner Against Corruption (Consequential and Related Amendments) Act 2018

Date of commencement Amendment made by the Schedule commences on commencement of s 17 of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act (commencement for that Act is to be notified).

Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) Future Commencements

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Amending legisla- Number Date of gazettal/ tion assent/registration Oaths and Affırma- 6 of 2018 27 Feb 2018 tions Act 2018

Date of commencement Ss 53-58, 60-62 and Sch 2 item 51 commence on a date to be proclaimed, or 1 Mar 2019.

Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Future Commencements Amending legisla- Number Date of gazettal/ tion assent/registration Oaths and Affırma- 6 of 2018 27 Feb 2018 tions Act 2018

Date of commencement Sch 2 item 38.1 commences on a date to be proclaimed, or 1 Mar 2019.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) • Civil Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Bill 2017 – debate Senate 5 Feb 2018. Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee report tabled 10 May 2017. Sch 5 item 1 commences day after date of assent. Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) • Statute Law Revision Bill 2017 – passed Legislative Assembly 2 May 2017; 2nd reading speech Legislative Council 9 May 2017. Report of the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee tabled 22 Feb 2017. Sch 2 item 37 commences 1 Sep 2017. xii

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ENQUIRIES Considerable care has been taken in this compilation, but the interpretation and consolidation of the legislation is complex. The Publisher invites feedback on this edition. Correspondence may be addressed to: Thomson Reuters Customer Service Reply Paid 3502 PO Box 3502 Rozelle NSW 2039 Phone from Australia: 1300 304 195, from Overseas: + 61 2 8587 7980

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Email: [email protected]

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TABLE OF CASES [References are to paragraph numbers]

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A A-One Metal Services Pty Limited v AARA. Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 100 ........ EA.144.60 A3 v Australian Crime Commission [2006] FCA 894 ........................................ EA.130.60 AC v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 21 .............................................................. EA.101.190 ACCC v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 491; 59 IPR 435; [2003] FCA 850 ............................................................................................................. EA.97.60 ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448; [2012] FCA 1355 .................................................................................................................. EA.69.120 ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 5) (2012) 301 ALR 352; [2012] FCA 1479 .................................................................................................................. EA.69.120 ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 13) [2013] FCA 577 ................................ EA.108A.60 ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393 ........................... EA.117.120, EA.118.360, EA.118.390, EA.119.120, EA.122.270 ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1269 ........................ EA.135.150 ACCC v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41-650 .............................................. EA.64.150 ACCC v CFMEU [2008] FCA 678 ...................................................................... EA.45.150 ACCC v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; 254 ALR 198; [2009] FCAFC 32 .................................................................... EA.117.120, EA.122.330 ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 562 .......................................... EA.69.120 ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2010) 275 ALR 235; [2010] FCA 1131 ..................................................................................... EA.69.210, EA.76.120 ACCC v Emerald Ocean Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 740 ............................................. EA.79.330 ACCC v George Weston Foods Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 298; 198 ALR 592; [2003] FCA 601 ............................................................................................. EA.122.330 ACCC v Homeopathy Plus! Australia Pty LTd (2014) 146 ALD 278; [2014] FCA 1412 ............................................................................................. EA.79.180 ACCC v Jutsen (No 3) (2011) 206 FCR 264; 285 ALR 110; [2011] FCA 1352 .................................................................................................................. EA.144.60 ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2004) 141 FCR 183; [2004] FCA 1678 .................................................................................................................. EA.87.120 ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2007) 160 FCR 321; [2007] ATPR 42-162; [2007] FCA 794 ................................................................................. EA.87.180 ACCC v Lux Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 89 .................................................................... EA.80.90 ACCC v Lux Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 949 ................................................................ EA.136.90 ACCC v Mayo International Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 327 .................................... EA.87.90 ACCC v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia SRL (No 4) (2012) 298 ALR 251; [2012] ATPR 42-423; [2012] FCA 1323 .................................................. EA.75.60 ACCC v World Netsafe Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 119 FCR 307; [2002] FCA 517 ...................................................................................................................... EA.87.90 ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448; 301 ALR 326; [2012] FCA 1355 ........ EA.57.120, EA.58.60, EA.69.120, EA.69.150, EA.69.210 ACCC v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 280 ALR 97; [2011] FCA 338 ........................................................................................................... EA.57.120 ACN 062 895 774 Pty Ltd v Tyndall [2007] NSWCA 64 ................................... EA.56.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xiv

Uniform Evidence Law

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Table of Cases

AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52 ...................... EA.97.120, EA.98.120, EA.101.120, EA.101.195, EA.101.240 AJE v Western Australia (2012) 225 A Crim R 242; [2012] WASCA 185 ..... EA.141.120 AJW v New South Wales [2003] NSWSC 803 ............................................ EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; 182 A Crim R 262; 82 ALJR 534; [2008] HCA 8 ................................................................................. EA.76.90 AL v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 34 ................... EA.165A.230, EA.46.60, EA.141.150, EA.165.240, EA.165.480 AMP Services Ltd v Manning [2006] FCA 256 .................................................. EA.55.180 ARS v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 266 .......................................................... EA.138.570 ASC v AS Nominees Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504 .................................................. EA.Intro.120 ASC v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 ........................... EA.Intro.300 ASIC v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (in liq) (2015) 105 ACSR 116; [2015] FCA 342 .................................................................................................................... EA.57.120 ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 ..................................................... EA.126K.210, EA.26.240 ASIC v Flugge [2016] VSC 779 .......................................................................... EA.55.180 ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 86 ALJR 522; [2012] HCA 17 ........... EA.55.180, EA.140.60, EA.140.120 ASIC v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 169 FCR 227; 247 ALR 646; [2008] FCAFC 123 ............................................ EA.130.150, EA.130.330, EA.130.420 ASIC v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 183 ............................... EA.130.150 ASIC v Park Trent Properties Group Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 342 ................. EA.122.150 ASIC v Rich (2004) 213 ALR 338; 51 ACSR 363; [2004] NSWSC 1062 ....... EA.55.120, EA.Intro.340 ASIC v Rich [2004] NSWSC 1017 .................................................................... EA.118.330 ASIC v Rich [2004] NSWSC 923 ...................................................................... EA.122.180 ASIC v Rich [2004] NSWSC 934 ...................................................................... EA.122.210 ASIC v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; [2005] NSWSC 149 .................................... EA.79.330 ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 .......... EA.48.210, EA.57.120, EA.58.60, EA.60.60, EA.69.120, EA.69.600, EA.76.120 ASIC v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; [2005] NSWCA 152 ............... EA.79.240, EA.79.300 ASIC v Rich [2005] NSWSC 1015 ...................................................................... EA.39.120 ASIC v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 .......... EA.126K.210, EA.26.240, EA.43.240, EA.44.120 ASIC v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229 .................................... EA.140.120 ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 ............. EA.76.90, EA.79.120, EA.79.150, EA.79.300, EA.80.90 ASIC v Vines [2003] NSWSC 1237 ..................................................................... EA.97.120 ATH Transport v JAS (International) Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 956 .................................................................................................................... EA.125.90 AW v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 1 ............................................ EA.97.480, EA.101.450 AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR 463 ........................................................... EA.131.120 AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; 232 ALR 743; [2006] FCA 571 ......... EA.118.150 AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) [2006] FCA 1234 ........................................................ EA.118.390 Abbosh v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 265 ................................ EA.137.120, EA.137.210 Abdallah v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 34 ...................................................... EA.79.330 Abdel-Hady v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 196 .............................................. EA.165.480 Abdul-Kader v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 281; [2007] NSWCCA 329 .................................................................................................................. EA.108.150 Abigroup Ltd v Akins (1997) 42 NSWLR 623 ................................................ EA.Intro.120 Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104 ............................................................................................ EA.130.180, EA.130.300 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Actone Holdings Pty Ltd v Gridtek Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 991 .................... EA.122.330 Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 ...... EA.Intro.180, EA.38.60, EA.38.150, EA.55.60, EA.55.240, EA.60.60, EA.66.180, EA.81.270, EA.101A.60, EA.101A.120, EA.101A.180, EA.192A.60 Adamson v Ede [2009] NSWCA 379 .................................................................. EA.56.120 Addenbrooke Pty Limited v Duncan (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 76 ......................... EA.55.180 Addenbrooke Pty Ltd v Duncan (No 5) [2014] FCA 625 ................................... EA.69.240 Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360; 152 ALR 418 ..... EA.118.90, EA.122.270 Adlam v Noack [1999] FCA 1606 .......................................... EA.Dict.Pt.1.60, EA.131.390 Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131 .................. EA.55.180, EA.79.120, EA.79.150, EA.79.240, EA.80.90, EA.128.690 Age Co Ltd, The v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; 272 FLR 426; [2013] NSWCA 26 ...................................................................................... EA.81.60, EA.87.90 Ah-See v Heilpern (2000) 115 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWSC 627 ....................... EA.81.60 Ahern v Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1697 ..................... EA.192A.60 Ahern v Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd [2015] NSWSC 19 ............................ EA.97.240 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 ..................... EA.57.210, EA.59.180, EA.87.120, EA.87.180 Ahmad v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 177 ...................................................... EA.131.360 Ahmed v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 260 ...................................................... EA.165.480 Ahmed v The Queen [2012] VSCA 200 .............................................................. EA.55.180 Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 ........................................ EA.91.60, EA.135.150 Airtourer Co-op Ltd v Millicer Aircraft Industries Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 948 ............................................................................................ EA.131.120, EA.131.270 Akcan v Cross [2013] NSWSC 403 ..................................................................... EA.124.60 Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 .............................. EA.118.90, EA.122.330 Al-Hashimi v The Queen (2004) 181 FLR 383; 145 A Crim R 186; [2004] WASCA 61 ................................................................................. EA.114.240, EA.116.90 Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 .................... EA.69.270 Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 ...................... EA.39.210, EA.39.240, EA.43.180, EA.48.120 Alderman v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2011] NSWSC 754 ................. EA.131A.90 Alderton v Department of Police & Emergency Management [2008] TASSC 69 ........................................................................................................ EA.144.60 Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 55 ALJR 355; [1981] HCA 17 ............................................................................ EA.66.60, EA.114.240, EA.115.150 Alfred v Lanscar (2007) 162 FCR 169; [2007] FCA 833 ............... EA.28.120, EA.37.240 Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404; 50 ALR 41 ............. EA.130.120, EA.130.210, EA.130.270, EA.130.390 Allam v Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2012) 95 IPR 242; [2012] FCAFC 34 ...................................................... EA.95.60, EA.97.60, EA.136.270 Allam v Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 75 ........................................................................................................................ EA.94.90 Allen v Robbie [2015] NSWCA 247 .................................................................... EA.79.180 Allen v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 629; 235 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSCA 263 .............................................................................................. EA.165.90, EA.165.240 Allianz Australia Ltd v Sim (2012) 10 DDCR 325; [2012] NSWCA 68 .......... EA.79.240, EA.80.90 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 ............................................................. EA.46.60, EA.46.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xvi

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Table of Cases

Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 3) (1996) 64 FCR 55 ............................................................................................................... EA.75.90 Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 5) (1996) 64 FCR 73 ............................................................................................. EA.76.90, EA.77.60 Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79; 137 ALR 138 .................................................................. EA.79.120, EA.80.90 Alomalu v The Queen (2012) 228 A Crim R 157; [2012] NSWCCA 255 ...... EA.141.150 Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S (2008) 76 IPR 618; [2008] FCA 559 .................................................................................................................... EA.79.270 Alzawy v Coptic Orthodox Church Diocese of Sydney, St Mary and St Merkorious Church [2016] NSWSC 1122 ............................................. EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Amaba Pty Ltd v Booth (2010) 9 DDCR 488; [2010] NSWCA 344 ................. EA.79.120 Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 ...................................... EA.32.180, EA.63.60 Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 97 ...... EA.122.300 Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 ..... EA.26.240, EA.48.60, EA.79.120, EA.189.120 Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 19 FCR 223 .......................... EA.10.60 Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341 ............................................ EA.125.90, EA.125.180 Ames v Ames (2009) 42 Fam LR 95; [2009] FamCA 825 ............................... EA.138.120 Amp General Insurance Ltd v Prasad [1999] NSWSC 349 ....... EA.128.330, EA.128.780 Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 12 .............................................................................................. EA.122.210, EA.122.270 Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 70 ALJR 603 .... EA.122.270 Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha Ltd v Tomar (No 4) [2012] FCA 385 ....... EA.79.300, EA.79.330 Anandan v The Queen [2011] VSCA 413 ........................................................... EA.55.270 Andelman v The Queen (2013) 38 VR 659; 227 A Crim R 81; [2013] VSCA 25 ............................................................ EA.101A.120, EA.100.60, EA.165.480 Anderson, Re; Ex parte Electronic Rentals Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 355 ...... EA.129.180 Andi-Co Australia Pty Ltd v Meyers [2004] FCA 1358 ................................... EA.131.270 Aneve Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2005] NSWCA 441 .... EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.52.30 Ann Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd v KPMG [2011] FCA 453 ................................ EA.131.510 Antoniadis v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Defamation List, Levine J, 10 March 1997) .................................................. EA.182.40 Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2010] ACTCA 28 .................................................................................................... EA.192A.60 Aouad v The Queen (2011) 207 A Crim R 411; [2011] NSWCCA 61 ............. EA.55.180, EA.59.180, EA.114.90, EA.115.180, EA.165.210 Apollo Shower Screens Pty Ltd v Building & Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corp (1985) 1 NSWLR 561 ........................................... EA.140.120 Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 5) (2011) 199 FCR 62; 284 ALR 568; [2011] FCA 1282 ............................................ EA.131.270, EA.131.390 Apple v Wily [2002] NSWSC 855 .................................................. EA.117.90, EA.119.120 Application concerning Section 80 of the Supreme Court Act and Sections 119 and 128 of the Evidence Act [2004] NSWSC 614 .......... EA.128.180, EA.128.780 Aqua-Marine Marketing Pty Ltd v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 194 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 578 ........................... EA.48.210, EA.69.120 Archer v Richard Crookes Constructions Pty Ltd (1997) 15 NSWCCR 297 .... EA.55.180 Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 668; 297 ALR 406; [2013] HCA 21 .......... EA.95.60, EA.97.240 Armstrong v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 323 .................................................. EA.97.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd (2012) 295 ALR 348; [2012] NSWCA 430 ................................................................................................. EA.131A.90 Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 ........................ EA.79.240 Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Merck & Co Inc (2004) 210 ALR 593; [2004] FCA 1131 ........................................................................................... EA.122.210 Artistic Builders Pty Ltd v Nash [2009] NSWSC 102 ...................................... EA.122.150 Asciak v Australian Secured & Managed Mortgages Pty Ltd (2008) 66 ACSR 298; [2008] FCA 753 ............................. EA.121.150, EA.131.450, EA.131.540 Asden Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Dinoris (No 2) [2015] FCA 1025 ........ EA.69.120 Ashby v Commonwealth (No 2) (2012) 203 FCR 440; 290 ALR 148; [2012] FCA 766 ................... EA.126K.90, EA.126K.180, EA.126K.330, EA.131A.60, EA.131A.90 Ashby v Commonwealth (No 3) (2012) 206 FCR 444; [2012] FCA 788 ............. EA.75.90 Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322; 312 ALR 551; [2014] FCAFC 15 ....... EA.46.150, EA.118.600, EA.140.60, EA.140.120 Ashfield Municipal Council v RTA [2004] NSWSC 917 ................................... EA.122.180 Ashley v The Queen (2016) 258 A Crim R 101; [2016] NTCCA 2 ................... EA.66.150 Asim v Penrose [2010] NSWCA 366 ............................................. EA.140.60, EA.165.480 Aslett v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 49 ................... EA.43.180, EA.103.90, EA.165.210 Aslett v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 188 .......................................................... EA.116.90 Astram Financial Services Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2010] FCA 1010 .................................................................................................................... EA.97.60 Atai v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 210 ............................................................ EA.165.90 Athens v Randwick City Council (2005) 64 NSWLR 58; [2005] NSWCA 317 ........................................................................................................... EA.Dict.Pt.1.60 Atkinson, In the Marriage of (1997) 136 FLR 347 .................... EA.128.330, EA.128.360, EA.128.510, EA.128.540 Atlas Financial International Ltd v Nortbale Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 815 .... EA.131.480 Atra v Farmers & Graziers Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281 ................... EA.48.210, EA.69.120, EA.69.240 Attorney-General (Cth) v Foster (1999) 84 FCR 582; 161 ALR 232; [1999] FCA 81 ................................................................................................. EA.143.60 Attorney-General (Cth) v Kevin (2003) 172 FLR 300; [2003] FamCA 94 ........ EA.185.20 Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500; [1985] HCA 60 ..... EA.119.120, EA.125.90, EA.125.120 Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475; 61 ALJR 92; [1986] HCA 80 .......................................................................... EA.122.390, EA.126.60 Attorney-General’ (Tas) v Wright [2013] TASCCA 14 ....................................... EA.138.90 Attorney-General (WA) v Cockram (1990) 2 WAR 477 ................................... EA.128.540 Attorney General v Kaddour [2001] NSWCCA 456 ........................................ EA.130.150 Attorney General v Yau Hang Chan [2011] NSWSC 1315 .................................. EA.91.60 Attorney General (NSW) v Borland [2007] NSWCA 201 ................................ EA.128.540 Attorney General (NSW) v Lipton (2012) 224 A Crim R 177; [2012] NSWCCA 156 ................................ EA.130.60, EA.130.150, EA.130.270, EA.130.390 Attorney General (NSW) v Markisic [2014] NSWSC 1596 ............ EA.144.60, EA.157.60 Attorney General (NSW) v Martin [2015] NSWSC 1372 ..................................... EA.91.60 Attorney General (NSW) v Stuart (1994) 34 NSWLR 667; 75 A Crim R 8 .... EA.130.150 Attorney General (NSW) v Winters (2007) 176 A Crim R 249; [2007] NSWSC 1071 .................................................................................................. EA.26.300 Attwood v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 353 ........................................................ EA.110.60 Audsley v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 506; 247 A Crim R 14; [2014] VSCA 321 ......................................................................................... EA.108C.150, EA.192.100 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xviii

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Table of Cases

Aurousseau v Commonwealth [1998] FCA 1724 ................................................ EA.79.120 Austereo Pty Ltd v DMG Radio (Aust) Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 93; 61 IPR 257; [2004] FCA 968 .............................................................................. EA.66A.90 Austic v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 110 ............................................... EA.141.120 Australian Automotive Repairers Assn (Political Action Committee) Inc v NRMA Insurance Ltd (No 4) [2004] FCA 369 ............................................ EA.106.270 Australian Automotive Repairers Assn (Political Action Committee) Inc (in liq) v Insurance (Aust) Ltd [2006] ATPR 42–111; [2006] FCAFC 33 ........ EA.106.90, EA.106.150, EA.106.270 Australian Broadcasting Corp v McBride (2001) 53 NSWLR 430; [2001] NSWCA 322 ...................................................................................................... EA.55.90 Australian Building & Construction Commissioner v Abbott (No 2) [2011] FCA 308 ........................................................................................................... EA.45.120 Australian Cement Holdings Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Ltd [2001] NSWSC 645 ................................................................................. EA.79.120, EA.79.150 Australian Communications & Media Authority v Clarity1 Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1449 ......................................................................................................... EA.160.90 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Advanced Medical Institute Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 1357 ..................................................... EA.69.240 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 1075 ................................................. EA.192A.60, EA.131.270 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Alvaton Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 760 ........................................................................................ EA.191.20 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Australian Medical Assn Western Australia Branch Inc [2001] ATPR 41–844 ............................ EA.191.20 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) [2002] FCA 1294 ...................................................... EA.131.510 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Bridgestone Corp [2010] FCA 584 ............................................................................................... EA.191.20 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41–650 ..................................................................... EA.64.120, EA.67.60 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 8) (1999) 92 FCR 375; 165 ALR 468 ................................. EA.97.450, EA.135.90 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] FCA 1131 .......................................................................... EA.136.60 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Pratt (No 3) [2009] FCA 407 ....................................................................... EA.81.60, EA.88.60, EA.191.40 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Skins Compression Garments Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 710 ................................................................ EA.191.20 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2017] FCA 1191 ....................... EA.98.60 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v EDirect Pty Ltd (In liq) [2012] FCA 976 ........................................................................................ EA.191.20 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 382 ............................................................................ EA.191.20 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v P & N Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 6 ................................................................................................... EA.191.20 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki Corporation (No 2) (2015) 332 ALR 396; [2015] FCA 1304 .............................................. EA.78.60 Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (2011) 244 CLR 554; 214 A Crim R 538; [2011] HCA 47 ............................................................................ EA.18.60 Australian Federal Police, Commissioner of v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501; 91 A Crim R 451; [1997] HCA 3 ...... EA.118.220, EA.125.180 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Australian Gift and Homewares Assn Ltd v Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Trust (Ruling No 1) [2014] VSC 481 ........................................... EA.75.120 Australian Medic-Care Co Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (No 4) (2008) 170 FCR 9; 249 ALR 381; [2008] FCA 1038 ................................... EA.69.240 Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Parnell Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 537; 159 ALR 477; [1998] FCA 1580 ................ EA.26.60, EA.56.60, EA.69.390, EA.169.60 Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 253; [1999] FCA 1061 ...................................................................................... EA.80.90 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 113 114832) (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 ...................................................................................... EA.192.60 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 5) [2008] NSWSC 1169 ..................................................................................... EA.138.120 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 51 ACSR 363; [2004] NSWSC 1062 ............................................................................ EA.189.120 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; [2005] NSWCA 152 ........................................................ EA.135.210, EA.135.300 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 ................................................................................ EA.192.60 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Sigalla (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 792 ....................................................... EA.138.510, EA.138.630, EA.138.660 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Whitebox Trading Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 324 .......................................... EA.192A.60, EA.118.270, EA.122.360 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Geary (Ruling No 3) [2015] VSC 656 .............................................................................................. EA.64.330 Averkin v Insurance Australia Ltd [2016] NSWCA 122 ................. EA.69.240, EA.69.540 Ayad v Australian Postal Commission (unreported, NSW CA, 4 October 1990) .............................................................................................................. EA.136.240 Aylett v Attorney-General (Tas) (2003) 11 Tas R 315; [2003] TASSC 19 ........... EA.75.90 Aytugrul v The Queen (2012) 247 CLR 170; 215 A Crim R 501; [2012] HCA 15 .... EA.103.60, EA.135.210, EA.137.90, EA.137.120, EA.137.150, EA.144.90 Azizi v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 325; [2012] VSCA 205 .................... EA.59.180, EA.65.150 Azzi v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 249 ........... EA.101A.120, EA.108A.60, EA.108B.60 Azzi v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 375; (2007) 71 NSWLR 140 ........................................................................................................ EA.8.90 Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 ..................................................................... EA.20.180, EA.20.210, EA.55.180

B B v Protective Commissioner [2000] NSWSC 882 ........................................... EA.131.510 B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599 ......................... EA.56.60, EA.101.150, EA.101.180 B & M Activities Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [1998] NSWSC 324 .................................................................................................... EA.97.450 BA v The Queen [2012] VSCA 285 ................................................................. EA.Intro.120 BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499; 215 A Crim R 395; [2012] HCA 9 ............................................................. EA.55.60, EA.55.210, EA.101.60, EA.101.210 BC v The Queen (2015) 257 A Crim R 340; [2015] NSWCCA 327 .............. EA.101.190, EA.101.195 BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq) v Binetter (No 4) [2016] FCA 1351 ................... EA.69.240 BD v The Queen [2017] NTCCA 2 .................................................. EA.97.120, EA.97.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xx

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Table of Cases

BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council (2007) 162 FCR 234; 247 ALR 104; [2007] FCAFC 157 .......................................... EA.79.60 BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2000] FCA 1613 ......................................... EA.87.90 BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v University of Adelaide (2008) 6 DDCR 382; [2008] NSWCA 210 ........................................................................................ EA.79.150 BJS v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 239 ........................................................... EA.101.240 BJS v The Queen (2013) 231 A Crim R 537; [2013] NSWCCA 123 ................ EA.41.300 BP v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 303 ......................................... EA.97.120, EA.101.240 BPA Industries Ltd v Black (1987) 11 NSWLR 609 ......................................... EA.128.360 BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275; 95 A Crim R 400 ........ EA.Intro.340, EA.56.60, EA.101.90, EA.101.240, EA.101.300, EA.101.360, EA.110.90, EA.165.480 BSJ v The Queen (2012) 35 VR 475; [2012] VSCA 93 ................................... EA.101.240 BT Australasia Pty Ltd v NSW (No 7) (1998) 153 ALR 722 ........................... EA.122.270 BT Australasia Pty Ltd v NSW (No 8) (1998) 154 ALR 202 ..... EA.122.210, EA.122.270 BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724 .................. EA.128.120, EA.128.360 BZAAG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 217 .............. EA.23.120 Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 .............. EA.117.90, EA.118.540, EA.118.570, EA.122.120, EA.122.180, EA.133.60 Bailey v Director-General, Department of Natural Resources NSW [2015] NSWCA 318 .................................................................................................... EA.55.180 Bailey v Director-General Department of Natural Resources [2013] NSWSC 515 .................................................................................................. EA.192A.60 Bailiff v The Queen [2011] ACTCA 7 ................................................................... EA.52.30 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 .................... EA.117.120, EA.118.60, EA.118.360, EA.118.420 Bakerland Pty Ltd v Coleridge [2002] NSWCA 30 .......................................... EA.135.150 Bakopoulos v General Motors Holden Pty Ltd [1973] VR 190 ....................... EA.106.150 Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498; 282 ALR 336; [2011] NSWCA 226 ..... EA.46.150, EA.140.60, EA.140.120 Ballard v Brookfield Multiplex Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1461 .................... EA.106.120 Bangaru v The Queen (2012) 269 FLR 367; [2012] NSWCCA 204 ................. EA.97.480 Banjima People v Western Australia (2011) 200 FCR 138; [2011] FCA 1454 ................................................................................................................ EA.189.120 Bank of Valletta PLC v National Crime Authority (1999) 90 FCR 565; 165 ALR 60; (1999) 90 FCR 565 .................................................................... EA.76.90 Banksia Mortgages Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 535 ............... EA.118.330, EA.122.180 Banksia Mortgages Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 883 ................... EA.168.60, EA.169.90 Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1; 83 A Crim R 370; [1995] HCA 27 ........................................................................................................................ EA.62.60 Barak v WTH Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 649 ..................................... EA.26.300, EA.79.330 Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82 .......................................... EA.81.60, EA.141.120 Barclays Bank v Eustice [1994] 4 All ER 511 .................................................... EA.125.90 Bare v Small [2011] VSC 639 ........................................................................... EA.125.120 Barescape Pty Ltd v Bacchus Holdings Pty Ltd (No 5) [2011] NSWSC 1307 .................................................................................................................. EA.57.120 Barker v Gifford (2005) 192 FLR 347; 2005] ACTSC 55 .................................. EA.144.60 Barlow v Law Society (ACT) [2012] ACTSC 16 ................................................ EA.144.60 Barnes v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 67 ATR 284; 242 ALR 601; [2007] FCAFC 88 ........................................................................ EA.118.540 Barnes v The Queen (2010) 79 ACSR 164; [2010] NSWCCA 136 ................ EA.165.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd v Dennis Family Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 193 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 276 ................................... EA.131.270, EA.131.480 Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd v Metricon Homes Pty Ltd (2007) 74 IPR 52; [2007] FCA 1509 .................................................................................... EA.135.150 Bartlett v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 60 ............................................................. EA.97.450 Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75 .............................................................. EA.11.90 Bataillard v The King (1907) 4 CLR 1282 ......................................................... EA.20.150 Bates v Nelson (1973) 6 SASR 149 ................................................. EA.48.210, EA.69.120 Bates t/as Riot Wetsuits v Omareef Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1472 ......................... EA.128.780 Batey v Potts (2004) 61 NSWLR 274; [2004] NSWSC 606 ................................ EA.92.60 Bauer v The Queen [2015] VSCA 55 .............................................. EA.97.120, EA.98.120 Bauer v The Queen (No 2) [2017] VSCA 176 ................................ EA.66.180, EA.97.120 Bauhaus Pyrmont Pty Ltd (in liq), Re [2006] NSWSC 543 ............................. EA.122.360 Baulch v Lyndoch Warrnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 30 .......... EA.46.150 Bax Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538 ..... EA.128.330, EA.128.540, EA.128.600, EA.128.780 Bayeh v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 100 FCR 138; [1999] FCA 1194 ......................................................................................................... EA.160.60 Bayley v The Queen (2016) 260 A Crim R 1; [2016] VSCA 160 ...................... EA.137.90 Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1; [1999] VSCA 227 ................................................. EA.46.60 Beattie v Osman (No 3) [2009] NSWSC 824 ....................................................... EA.50.30 Beckett v The Queen (2014) 315 ALR 295; [2014] NSWCCA 305 ................... EA.81.60, EA.138.120 Bective Station Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2006] FCA 1596 ........ EA.97.120, EA.97.300, EA.98.300 Bedford v Bedford (unreported, NSW SC, Windeyer J, 20 October 1998) ........ EA.138.60 Bedi v The Queen (1994) 61 SASR 269 ...................................... EA.165.450, EA.165.480 Bell v The Queen (1985) 7 FCR 555 ................................................................. EA.103.120 Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp (1998) 86 FCR 215 ............ EA.122.330 Bellchambers v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 235 ........................................... EA.165.480 Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 170 A Crim R 1; 207 FLR 20; [2006] TASSC 111 ................................................................................................. EA.101A.120 Bellpac Pty Ltd (in liq), Re [2013] FCAFC 48 ................................................... EA.55.180 Benbrika v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 593; 204 A Crim R 457; [2010] VSCA 281 ...................................................................................................... EA.165.480 Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd v Abdelkodous [2011] NSWSC 32 .................. EA.122.210 Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer of Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; 57 ATR 52; [2004] FCAFC 237 ....................... EA.122.60, EA.122.150 Benson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 51 .............................................................. EA.101.150 Beqiri v The Queen [2017] VSCA 112 .............................................................. EA.141.210 Beslic v MLC Ltd [2015] NSWSC 908 ............................................................ EA.192A.60 BestCare Foods Ltd v Origin Energy LPG Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1304 .............. EA.69.240 Bibby Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd v Sharma [2014] NSWCA 37 ....... EA.140.60 Bin Sulaeman v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 283 ............................................ EA.90.360 Bingul v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 239 ................................... EA.97.480, EA.101.450 Binns v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 280 ............................. EA.165B.180, EA.165B.210 Biovision 2020 Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2010] VSC 589 .................... EA.131A.90, EA.131.270 Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291; [2007] WASCA 29 ................... EA.53.60 Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 1 FCR 526 ......... EA.126D.30, EA.125.90, EA.128.210, NSW.CPA.301.30 Biseja Pty Ltd v NSI Group Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1497 .............................. EA.122.210 Bishop v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 ........... EA.110.60, EA.110.90 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxii

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Table of Cases

Blackrock Asset Management Australia Services Ltd v Waked (No 2) [2011] FCA 479 ............................................................................................. EA.118.540 Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969 ............................ EA.55.180, EA.140.120 Blewitt v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 503 ............................................................ EA.38.60 Bloom v Mini Minors Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, McLelland J, 26 August 1996) ................................................................................................. EA.131.420 Bloss Holdings Pty Ltd v Brackley Industries Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 756 .... EA.131.480 Bobolas v Waverley Council (No 4) [2015] NSWCA 337 .................................... EA.58.60 Bochkov v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 166 ..................................................... EA.59.180 Bodnar v Townsend (2003) 12 Tas R 232; [2003] TASSC 148 ....................... EA.138.120 Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; 249 ALR 300; [2008] FCAFC 63 ........ EA.76.90, EA.79.240, EA.79.270 Boensch v Pascoe [2007] FCA 532 ................................................................... EA.122.210 Bolitho v Cohen (2005) 33 Fam LR 471; [2005] FamCA 458 .......................... EA.144.60 Bolton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 1462 ......................... EA.160.60 Bolus v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 182 ........................................................ EA.165.480 Bond v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2) (1988) 19 FCR 494; 84 ALR 646 .......................................................................................................... EA.26.120 Boney v The Queen (2008) 187 A Crim R 167; [2008] NSWCCA 165 ......... EA.101.150, EA.101.360 Boonudnoon v The Queen (2002) 135 A Crim R 271; [2002] WASCA 313 ..... EA.141.90 Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39; 117 LGERA 168; [2001] FCA 1453 .......................................................................................... EA.140.60, EA.Intro.120 Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2015] VSC 459 .......................................................... EA.66A.60 Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard [2009] ATPR 82-020; [2009] NSWCA 167 .................................................................................................... EA.80.90, EA.87.90 Boston Clothing Co Pty Ltd v Margaronis (1992) 27 NSWLR 580 .................. EA.46.150 Botany Bay City Council v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure (No 2) ) [2014] NSWLEC 101 ................................................................................ EA.50.30 Boyer v The Queen [2015] VSCA 242 ...................... EA.66.180, EA.165.90, EA.165.330, EA.165.450 Bradford v Bradford (1996) 19 Fam LR 488 ...................................................... EA.133.60 Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 .................................................................. EA.55.180 Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 ..................... EA.46.120, EA.116.90, EA.116.150 Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 1; 190 ALR 1 ....................... EA.75.60 Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 317; [2003] FCAFC 153 ...................................................................................................................... EA.75.60 Bray v The Queen (2014) 246 A Crim R 47; [2014] VSCA 276 ..................... EA.137.120 Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41 .................................................... EA.185.20 Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177 .............................................. EA.128.120, EA.128.360 Brendas v Genter [2018] NSWCA 8 ................................................................... EA.81.120 Brett v Beales (1830) 10 B & C 508; 109 ER 539 ............................................... EA.74.60 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34 ........................ EA.140.60 BrisConnections Finance Pty Ltd v Arup Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1268 ................. EA.79.210 Briscoe v Briscoe [1966] 1 All ER 465; [1966] 2 WLR 205; [1968] P 501 ..... EA.26.120 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158 ................... EA.118.240, EA.122.240, EA.122.420 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283; 85 ALJR 348; [2011] HCA 2 ...................................................... EA.125.180 Britt v Britt [2017] FamCAFC 27 .................................... EA.55.60, EA.76.90, EA.97.240 Broke Hills Estate Pty Ltd v Oakvale Wines Pty Ltd (2005) 23 ACLC 1266; [2005] NSWSC 638 .............................................................................. EA.75.180 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (No 2) (2009) 180 FCR 1; [2009] FCA 449 ........................................... EA.117.90 Brooks v The Queen (2012) 36 VR 84; [2012] VSCA 197 .............. EA.55.330, EA.81.60 Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 119 FCR 269; [2002] FCA 318 .... EA.189.120 Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 47 ATR 178; 187 ALR 714; [2001] FCA 596 ............................................................... EA.131.150, EA.131.480 Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 119 FCR 269; 49 ATR 301; [2002] FCA 318 .................................................................................... EA.131.270 Brown v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian (2012) 10 ASTLR 164; [2012] NSWCA 431 ........................................................................................ EA.140.60 Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570 ............................................................... EA.141.90 Brown v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 69 ...... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.135.150, EA.165.180, EA.165.210, EA.165.270 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 ................. EA.46.60, EA.46.120, EA.46.150, EA.135.150, EA.136.60 Bruinsma v Menczer (1995) 40 NSWLR 716 ................................................... EA.131.510 Bryant v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 531; [2011] NSWCCA 26 ............ EA.100.60, EA.101.150, EA.139.60 Buchwald v The Queen (2011) 38 VR 199; [2011] VSCA 445 ........ EA.46.60, EA.46.120 Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 .......................................................................... EA.79.240 Building Insurers’ Guarantee Corp v A & MI Hanson Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 381 ................................................................................................... EA.118.360 Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375 ............ EA.114.330, EA.116.90, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689 ................................................ EA.122.360 Bull v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 443; [2000] HCA 24 .................................. EA.59.180 Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 ................................................... EA.46.60, EA.46.150 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; [1978] HCA 22 ............... EA.138.60, EA.138.210, EA.138.420, EA.138.570, EA.138.690 Burg Design Pty Ltd v Wolki (1999) 162 ALR 639; [1999] FCA 388 ............. EA.131.390 Burke v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 40 VR 161; 237 A Crim R 130; [2013] VSCA 351 .................................... EA.20.180, EA.165.270, EA.165.540 Burns v The Queen (1975) 132 CLR 258; [1975] HCA 21 ............................. EA.165.480 Burnside Sub-Branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 324 ................................................................... EA.48.210, EA.69.120 Burr v Ware Rural District Council [1939] 2 All ER 688 ................................... EA.87.90 Burrell v The Queen (2007) 190 A Crim R 148; [2007] NSWCCA 65 ............ EA.38.270, EA.135.270, EA.137.60, EA.141.120 Burrell v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 163 .......... EA.38.270, EA.141.120 Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty; Harkins v Butcher (2002) 55 NSWLR 558; [2002] NSWCA 237 ........................................ EA.Intro.120, EA.9.90, EA.81.180 Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; 212 ALR 357; [2004] HCA 60 .................................................................................... EA.Intro.120 Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180; 30 A Crim R 417 ............................................. EA.29.180, EA.31.60, EA.48.180, EA.79.150 Butler v The Queen (2011) 216 A Crim R 215; [2011] VSCA 417 .................. EA.20.180, EA.55.330 Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 74 NSWLR 469; [2009] NSWSC 225 ......................................... EA.117.120, EA.119.120 Byrd v The Queen [2018] VSCA 42 .................................................................... EA.137.90 Byrne v Javelin Asset Management Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 214 ......................... EA.69.180 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxiv

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Table of Cases

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C C, In the Marriage of (1995) 20 Fam LR 24 ........................................................ EA.27.60 CA v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 324 ...................................... EA.101.150, EA.137.210 CDD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 65 ...................................................................................................................... EA.97.120 CEG v The Queen [2012] VSCA 55 .................................................................... EA.97.120 CGL v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 24 VR 486; [2010] VSCA 26 .................................................................. EA.55.420, EA.97.120, EA.98.120 CJ Redman Constructions Pty Ltd v Tarnap Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 173 ..... EA.131.270 CMG v The Queen [2011] VSCA 416 ............................................................ EA.165A.210 CMG v The Queen (2013) 234 A Crim R 455; [2013] VSCA 243 .................... EA.46.150 CSR Ltd v Amaca Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 320 ..................................................... EA.63.100 CV v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] VSCA 58 ................. EA.98.120, EA.98.150 CW v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288 ....... EA.98.60, EA.98.120, EA.101.180, EA.101.190 Cabal v United Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311; [2001] FCA 427 ............ EA.4.150, EA.4.180 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719; [2006] FCA 363 .......................................................... EA.80.150 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159 FCR 397; [2007] FCAFC 70 ............... EA.79.240, EA.79.300, EA.80.150, EA.135.210 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 323 .......................................................................................... EA.126.60 Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd (2001) 189 ALR 370; [2001] NSWSC 1193 ...... EA.79.180 Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328 ............................................ EA.55.180 Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 ...................................................... EA.130.150 Calderwood v The Queen (2007) 172 A Crim R 208; [2007] NSWCCA 180 .................................................................................................................... EA.137.60 Calleija v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 391; [2012] NSWCCA 37 ......... EA.128.600 Cambridge v Anastasopoulos [2012] NSWCA 405 ............................................ EA.79.240 Camm v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1133 ............................. EA.138.120 Campaign Master (UK) Ltd v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 181 FCR 152; [2009] FCA 1306 ........................................................ EA.64.150 Campbell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIRComm 148 ........ EA.57.120, EA.58.60, EA.59.150, EA.147.60 Campbell v The Queen (2014) 312 ALR 129; [2014] NSWCCA 175 .............. EA.79.120, EA.80.150, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 Campton v Centennial Newstan Pty Ltd (No 1) [2014] NSWSC 304 ............... EA.79.330 Can v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 176 .......................................................... EA.137.210 Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas (2010) 188 FCR 140; 273 ALR 601; [2010] FCAFC 125 ..................................... EA.26.150, EA.41.150 Cannar v Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 ................ EA.118.240, EA.122.180, EA.122.240, EA.122.420 Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Andreasen [2005] NSWSC 579 ............. EA.55.510, EA.97.60, EA.100.60 Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26 ........... EA.48.60, EA.48.150, EA.48.180, EA.58.60, EA.69.170, EA.69.180, EA.69.540, EA.135.150, EA.135.300, EA.183.80 Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151 ............................... EA.125.90 Cargill Australia Ltd v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 99 ..... EA.122.120, EA.122.150 Carlton v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 591; [2010] NSWCCA 81 .......... EA.138.690 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247 ..................... EA.117.120, EA.118.220, EA.118.360, EA.122.300 Carney v Newton [2006] TASSC 4 ...................................................................... EA.140.60 Carr v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 314 ........................................................... EA.165.420 Carr v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 439 ........................................................... EA.116.90 Carroll v Western Australia [2004] WASCA 254 ........................................... EA.165B.240 Carter v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 121; [1995] HCA 33 ........... EA.118.60, EA.123.60 Carter Holt Harvey Wood Products Australia Pty Ltd v Auspine [2008] VSCA 59 .................................................................................. EA.118.360, EA.118.390 Case Stated by Director of Public Prosecutions (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 66 A Crim R 259 ................................................................................................ EA.165.450 Casey v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 77 ............................................................. EA.38.60 Casley-Smith v Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 ................ EA.79.120, EA.80.150 Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (No 2) (2000) 181 ALR 108 ................ EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.Dict.Pt.2.60, EA.63.60, EA.64.120, EA.64.150 Cawthray v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 105 ................................................. EA.165.480 Ceedive Pty Ltd v May [2004] NSWSC 33 ......................................... EA.73.60, EA.73.90 Century Yuasa Batteries Pty Ltd v Martin [2002] FCA 722 .............................. EA.97.120 Ceva Logistics (Aust) Pty Ltd v Redbro Investments Pty Ltd (2010) 24 VR 486; [2010] VSCA 26 ....................................................................................... EA.60.60 Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 1) [2012] NSWSC 1476 ................................................................................................ EA.192A.60 Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 9) [2013] NSWSC 212 .................................................................................................. EA.122.150 Chand v Azurra Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 227 ........................................ EA.55.180 Chand v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 53 ......................................................... EA.101.150 Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 2) (2000) 100 FCR 229; [2000] FCA 1010 ....................................................... EA.8.60, EA.130.60, EA.130.180, EA.130.300 Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 3) (2000) 104 FCR 368 ................................... EA.36.30 Chapmans Ltd v Davey [1998] NSWSC 148 ........................................................ EA.75.90 Charara v Grewal [2013] NSWSC 1015 ............................................................ EA.169.60 Charltons CJC Pty Ltd v Fitzgerald [2013] NSWSC 350 .................................. EA.55.180 Cheers v El Davo Pty Ltd (in liq) [2000] FCA 144 .......................... EA.26.150, EA.42.60 Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 56 .......................... EA.91.60 Chen v City Convenience Leasing Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 297 ...................... EA.122.90, EA.122.150 Chen v New South Wales (No 2) [2016] NSWCA 292 ....................................... EA.140.60 Chen v Zhang [2009] NSWCA 202 ..................................................................... EA.140.60 Cherry v Steele-Park [2017] NSWCA 295 .......................................................... EA.55.510 Chevalley v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2011) 82 NSWLR 634; 217 A Crim R 240; [2011] NSWCA 357 ....................................................... EA.178.30 Chidiac v The Queen (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 120 ............... EA.Dict.Pt.1.60, EA.65.180 Chief Executive Offıcer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 77 ALJR 1629; 201 ALR 1; [2003] HCA 49 ............................ EA.Dict.Pt.1.60 Chisari v The Queen (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 325 ............................................. EA.33.30 Choi v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 150 ..................... EA.41.300, EA.55.340, EA.56.60, EA.164.180 Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 ..... EA.46.90, EA.46.150, EA.55.180, EA.81.60, EA.128.690, EA.140.60 Chotiputhsilpa v Waterhouse (2005) 44 MVR 456; [2005] NSWCA 295 ........... EA.53.60 Christian v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 370; [2012] NSWCCA 34 ........ EA.60.150, EA.118.600, EA.165.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxvi

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Table of Cases

Christian v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 98 .................................................... EA.101.150 Christophers v The Queen (2000) 23 WAR 106; 116 A Crim R 280; [2000] WASCA 308 ................................................................... EA.137.60, EA.165.450 Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25 ................................. EA.130.210 Cioban v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 265; [2003] NSWCCA 304 ........ EA.165.270 Citibank Ltd v Liu [2003] NSWSC 69 ........................... EA.62.60, EA.64.150, EA.64.180 Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 1364 ......................................................................................................... EA.79.300 City Elevator Services Pty Ltd v Burrows [2004] NSWCA 26 ...................... EA.Intro.350 Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 ........... EA.76.90, EA.79.120, EA.79.150, EA.79.180, EA.80.90, EA.80.150 Clark v The Queen (2008) 185 A Crim R 1; [2008] NSWCCA 122 ................ EA.29.150, EA.37.240 Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 ............................................................................................... EA.26.120 Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 260 .............................. EA.124.60 Clarke v The Queen [2009] HCATrans 336 ........................................................ EA.141.90 Clarke v The Queen [2013] VSCA 206 .......................................................... EA.165A.120 Clarke v The Queen [2017] VSCA 115 ........................................... EA.65.180, EA.137.90 Clay v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 405; [2014] VSCA 269 ................ EA.55.60, EA.66.180 Clayton Utz v Dale [2015] VSCA 186 .............................................................. EA.128.120 Clegg v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 49 .......................................................... EA.101.190 Clegg v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 125 .......................................................... EA.110.90 Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 .............................................................. EA.90.60 Clifford v The Queen (2004) 12 Tas R 415; [2004] TASSC 16 ......................... EA.116.90 Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; 74 ALJR 1348; [2000] HCA 47 ........... EA.97.480, EA.101.450 Col v The Queen (2013) 237 A Crim R 67; [2013] NSWCCA 302 ................. EA.103.90, EA.106.90 Col v The Queen [2014] HCATrans 236 ............................................................. EA.106.90 Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v Tormey [2009] NSWCA 135 .............. EA.55.180 Collaroy Services Beach Club Ltd v Haywood [2007] NSWCA 21 ................... EA.76.90, EA.135.300, EA.136.300 Collins v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 162 ...................................................... EA.165.510 Collins Thomson v Clayton [2002] NSWSC 366 .......................... EA.79.300, EA.131.270 Colne Valley Water Co v Watford & St Albans Gas Co [1948] 1 KB 500 .... EA.126D.30, EA.125.90, EA.128.210, NSW.CPA.301.30 Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Donnelly (1998) 82 FCR 418 ...................................................................................................................... EA.38.60 Colquhoun v The Queen (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190 ................................... EA.101.150 Combined Insurance Co of America (t/as Combined Insurance Co of Australia) v Trifunovski (No 4) [2011] FCA 271 ............................................. EA.97.90 Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australasia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 ................................................................................... EA.55.180 Commonwealth v Fernando (2012) 200 FCR 1; 287 ALR 267; [2012] FCAFC 18 ........................................................................................................ EA.140.60 Commonwealth v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 ...................... EA.46.150, EA.135.150, EA.136.60 Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604; 67 ALJR 405 ............................. EA.130.60, EA.130.180, EA.130.210, EA.130.270, EA.130.390 Commonwealth v Riley (1984) 5 FCR 8 .......................................... EA.26.270, EA.55.540 Commonwealth v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 107 ................... EA.122.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; [2005] ACTCA 35 .................. EA.117.60, EA.118.240, EA.118.330 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v McConnell (unreported, NSW SC, Rolfe J, 10 July 1997) ................................................................................... EA.122.390 Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2002] NSWSC 980 ..................................................................... EA.26.300, EA.79.330 Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466; 242 ALR 643; [2007] FCAFC 132 ............................................................. EA.55.180, EA.140.60 Compass Airlines Pty Ltd, Re (1992) 35 FCR 447 ............................................. EA.125.90 Comptroller-General of Customs v Kingswood Distillery Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sully J, 11 February 1997) ............................... EA.Dict.Pt.1.60 Connect TV Pty Ltd v All Rounder Pty Ltd (No 5) [2016] FCA 338 ................ EA.66A.60 Connex Group Australia Pty Ltd v Butt [2004] NSWSC 379 ............ EA.76.90, EA.78.60 Constantinou v The Queen [2015] VSCA 177 ...................................................... EA.66.60 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (2018) 351 ALR 168; [2018] FCAFC 4 ...................................................................................................................... EA.128.120 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v De Martin & Gasparini Pty Limited [2017] FCA 856 ....................................................... EA.118.540 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2017] FCA 1166 ................................ EA.191.60 Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385; 59 ALJR 254 ............................................................. EA.128.330 Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 ....................................................................... EA.130.60 Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204; 172 ALR 185; [2000] FCA 461 .................. EA.55.150, EA.65.60, EA.65.120, EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.65.210, EA.101.150, EA.165.360, EA.165.450 Conway v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 203; 76 ALJR 358; [2002] HCA 2 .... EA.164.90, EA.165.210 Cook v The Queen [2016] VSCA 174 ................................................................... EA.55.60 Cooke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 51 ATR 223; [2002] FCA 1315 ......................................................................................................... EA.79.210 Cooper v Hobbs [2013] NSWCA 70 ........................ EA.55.180, EA.118.600, EA.122.150 Cooper v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 258 .................................... EA.79.240, EA.97.120 Cooper v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 190 ............................................. EA.141.150 Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1981) 147 CLR 297 ..................................................................................... EA.106.270 Copley v The Queen [2000] FCA 994 ............................................................... EA.110.120 Copmanhurst Shire Council v Watt (2005) 140 LGERA 333; [2005] NSWCA 245 .................................................................................................... EA.106.90 Cordelia Holdings Pty Ltd v Newkey Investment Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1018 .... EA.57.120, EA.58.60 Coretell Pty Ltd v Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 54 ......... EA.191.20 Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; 81 ALJR 840; [2007] HCA 12 ........................ EA.48.270, EA.128.90, EA.128.120, EA.128.600, EA.128.660, EA.128.720, EA.Intro.270 Cornwell v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 59 ............................... EA.138.150, EA.141.120 Coshott v Burke [2013] FCA 513 ........................... EA.131.150, EA.131.270, EA.131.510 Coshott v Prentice (2014) 221 FCR 450; 311 ALR 428; [2014] FCAFC 88 .................................................................................................................... EA.140.120 Coshott v Prentice [2016] FCA 702 .................................................................... EA.167.30 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxviii

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Table of Cases

Cotic v The Queen (2000) 118 A Crim R 393; [2000] WASCA 414 ............... EA.165.480 Cotter v The Queen [2011] VSCA 240 ................................................................ EA.141.90 Council of the New South Wales Bar Assn v Franklin [2014] NSWCA 329 .... EA.64.150, EA.64.180, EA.64.240, EA.68.90 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135 ................................................................ EA.55.180 Cox v New South Wales (2007) 71 NSWLR 225; [2007] NSWSC 471 .............. EA.13.90 Cox v The Queen [2015] VSCA 28 ..................................................................... EA.98.120 Crampton v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 161; 117 A Crim R 222; [2000] HCA 60 ............................................................ EA.165B.270, EA.165.450, EA.190.120 Crawley v Vero Insurance Ltd (No 7) [2014] NSWSC 80 ................................... EA.91.60 Creditors Trust Deed Established in the Administration of Bevillesta Pty Ltd, Re [2011] NSWSC 1419 ....................................................................... EA.122.360 Creighton v Barnes (No 2) (unreported, NSW SC, Cohen J, 18 September 1995) ................................................................................................................ EA.69.240 Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offıces Ltd [1972] Ch 553 ........ EA.125.90 Crime Commission (NSW) v Cassar (2012) 224 A Crim R 448; [2012] NSWSC 1170 ................................................................................. EA.57.120, EA.75.90 Crime Commission (NSW) v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349 ........................................ EA.75.120 Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232; [1996] HCA 22 ......... EA.101.150, EA.164.90, EA.165.450, EA.165.480, EA.165.540, EA.165.570 Crown Glass & Aluminium Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2005] NSWCA 195 ................ EA.144.60, EA.144.120 Cruz v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 48 ........................................... EA.137.90, EA.137.120 Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1; 174 ALR 97; [2000] FCA 1084 .................................................................................................................. EA.140.60 Cumberland v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 377 .......................... EA.116.90, EA.165.210 Cureton v Blackshaw Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 187 ........................... EA.128.540 Custom Coaches (Sales) Pty Ltd v Frankish [2002] NSWSC 781 ...................... EA.83.60 Cutts v Head [1984] 2 WLR 349 ...................................................................... EA.131.420 Cvetkovic v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 329 ............... EA.65.60, EA.65.300, EA.73.60, EA.157.30, EA.157.60 Czako v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 202 ......................................................... EA.79.120

D D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171 ............................................................................... EA.130.180 DAO v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; 278 ALR 765; [2011] NSWCCA 63 ...................................... EA.97.120, EA.97.480, EA.98.450, EA.101.450 DAO v The Queen [2011] HCATrans 298 ..................................... EA.97.480, EA.101.450 D’Arrigo v Carter, in the matter of Gartner Wines Pty Ltd and the Corporations Act 2001 [2003] FCA 5 ............................................................ EA.186.20 DEF and the Protected Estates Act 1983, Re [2005] NSWSC 534 ................... EA.185.20 DF v The Queen [2011] ACTCA 11 .................................................................... EA.141.90 DJF v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 412; [2011] NSWCCA 6 .................. EA.20.270, EA.55.180, EA.165.480 DJS v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 200 ..................................... EA.101.360, EA.141.120 DJV v The Queen (2008) 200 A Crim R 206; [2008] NSWCCA 272 ............ EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 DJW v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 164 ................................... EA.101.190, EA.101.240 DJZ Constructions Pty Ltd v Paul Pritchard t/as Pritchard Law Group [2010] NSWSC 1024 ........................................................................................ EA.87.90 DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 ..................................................... EA.97.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

DLJ v The Queen [2011] VSCA 389 ................................................................. EA.101.360 DPP v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3 .............................................. EA.192.40, EA.192.100 DR v The Queen [2011] VSCA 440 .................................................................... EA.97.120 DRE v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 400; [2006] NSWCCA 280 ............ EA.165.330 DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499; [2003] FCA 384 ..................................................... EA.117.90, EA.118.330, EA.122.60, EA.122.150 DSJ v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 758; 215 A Crim R 349; [2012] NSWCCA 9 .......................................... EA.97.150, EA.98.120, EA.98.150, EA.137.90 DTS v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 204; [2008] NSWCCA 329 ............. EA.165.480 DV v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 276 ................................................................ EA.66.60 DW v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 192; [2014] NSWCCA 28 ............... EA.138.450, EA.138.570 Dahlenburg v Dahlenburg (1996) 7 BPR 14,885 ................................................. EA.51.60 Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492; [2001] NSWCA 87 ................. EA.140.120 Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; [2000] FCA 858 ................... EA.76.90, EA.79.240 Daniel v Western Australia (2001) 186 ALR 369; [2001] FCA 223 ................... EA.82.30, EA.87.90, EA.136.180 Daniels v Western Australia (2000) 173 ALR 51; [2000] FCA 413 .................... EA.64.90 Daniels v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 372 ....................................................... EA.79.150 Daniels v The Queen [2016] VSCA 291 ............................................................. EA.137.60 Daniels v Western Australia (2012) 226 A Crim R 61; [2012] WASCA 213 .................................................................................................................... EA.97.120 Darlaston v Parker (2010) 189 FCR 1; 196 IR 307; [2010] FCA 771 ............... EA.67.60 Darwiche v The Queen (2011) 209 A Crim R 424; [2011] NSWCCA 62 ......... EA.55.180 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; [2011] HCA 21 ....................... EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.270, EA.55.270, EA.56.120, EA.76.90, EA.79.180, EA.79.240 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993) ................... EA.79.120, EA.79.180, EA.79.300 Daunt v Daunt [2015] VSCA 58 ........................................................................... EA.91.60 Davidson v The Queen (2009) 75 NSWLR 150; 195 A Crim R 406; [2009] NSWCCA 150 ................................................................................... EA.141.120 Davies v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] AC 378 ............................... EA.165.360 Davies v Nyland (1974) 10 SASR 76 .................................................................... EA.81.60 Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 ................. EA.114.240, EA.114.300, EA.115.360, EA.116.90 Davies v The Queen [2014] VSCA 284 .............................................................. EA.20.180 Davis v Council of the City of Wagga Wagga [2004] NSWCA 34 .................... EA.46.150 Davis v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 258 ........................................................ EA.141.120 Davis v The Queen [2016] VSCA 272 .............................................................. EA.165.570 Davis v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 257 .......................................................... EA.97.240 Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd (2001) 21 NSWCCR 389; [2001] NSWCA 25 ........................................................................................................ EA.60.60 Dawson v The Queen [1990] 2 WAR 458 ......................................................... EA.114.240 Day v Couch [2000] NSWSC 230 ......................................................................... EA.73.90 Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 731; [2005] NSWCA 110 .................................................................................................................. EA.103.120 Daya v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1621 .......................... EA.131.120 Daya v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1622 ............................ EA.79.150 De Bortoli Wines Pty Ltd v HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) (2011) 200 FCR 253; 281 ALR 454; [2011] FCA 645 ........................ EA.4.150, EA.69.240, EA.75.120 De Rose v South Australia (No 4) [2001] FCA 1616 ...................... EA.64.150, EA.64.180 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxx

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Table of Cases

De Silva v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 236 A Crim R 214; [2013] VSCA 339 ....................................................................... EA.108C.90, EA.79.90 De Vries v The Queen [2013] VSCA 210 ........................................................... EA.46.150 Dean-Willcocks v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2003) 45 ACSR 564; [2003] NSWSC 466 .............................................................. EA.79.300, EA.80.90 Debresay v The Queen [2017] VSCA 263 ........................................................ EA.165.270 Decision restricted [2016] NSWCCA 202 ......................................................... EA.141.120 Decision restricted [2016] NSWCCA 92 ......................................... EA.66.180, EA.137.90 Decision restricted [2016] NSWCCA 98 ............................................................. EA.97.120 Decker v State Coroner (NSW) (1999) 46 NSWLR 415; [1999] NSWSC 369 ...................................................................................................... EA.4.180, EA.8.90 Dennis v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 120 ...................................................... EA.141.120 Deokinanan v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 20 .......................................................... EA.85.120 Dept of Community Services v D (2006) 66 NSWLR 582; [2006] NSWSC 827 ....................................................................................... EA.126B.150, EA.126B.210 Derbas v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 118 ....................................................... EA.165.90 Derbas v The Queen (2012) 221 A Crim R 13; [2012] NSWCCA 14 ........ EA.131A.120, EA.130.150 Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72 .................... EA.98.120, EA.98.420, EA.101.185, EA.101.190, EA.101.195, EA.101.330 Desane Properties Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2018] NSWSC 173 .......... EA.131A.180, EA.118.220, EA.130.180, EA.130.210, EA.130.300 Destanovic v The Queen [2015] VSCA 113 ...................................................... EA.102.120 Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 41; 77 ALJR 1433; [2003] HCA 40 ............................................. EA.81.60, EA.116.90, EA.165.480, EA.Intro.350 Diaz v The Queen [2004] NSWCCA 251 .......................................................... EA.165.450 Dibbs v The Queen (2012) 225 A Crim R 195; [2012] VSCA 224 .................. EA.97.480, EA.98.450 Dickman v The Queen [2015] VSCA 311 .............. EA.114.180, EA.114.240, EA.137.210 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; [1992] HCA 57 .............................. EA.11.90 Dimkovski v Ken’s Painting & Decorating Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 50 ..................................................................................................... EA.119.120 Director, Offıce of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2013) 231 IR 278; [2013] FCAFC 8 ...................................................... EA.46.60, EA.55.180, EA.140.120 Director Public Prosecutions v Curran (No 2) [2011] VSC 280 ......................... EA.32.90 Director of Public Prosecution (Vic) v Massey [2017] VSCA 38 .................... EA.137.150 Director of Public Prosecutions v Azizi (No 2) [2012] VSC 600 ........................ EA.67.90 Director of Public Prosecutions v BB (2010) 29 VR 110; 204 A Crim R 85; [2010] VSCA 211 .................... EA.Intro.270, EA.59.180, EA.65.270, EA.135.150, EA.137.60 Director of Public Prosecutions v Carr (2002) 127 A Crim R 151; [2002] NSWSC 194 ................................. EA.138.120, EA.138.150, EA.138.540, EA.138.570 Director of Public Prosecutions v Coe [2003] NSWSC 363 ............................ EA.138.150 Director of Public Prosecutions v Curran (No 1) [2011] VSC 279 ................... EA.65.150 Director of Public Prosecutions v Donald [1999] NSWSC 949 ...................... EA.114.180 Director of Public Prosecutions v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3 .... EA.38.150, EA.137.60 Director of Public Prosecutions v Gibson (2012) 61 MVR 261; [2012] VSC 297 .............................................................................................................. EA.8.90 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kaba (2014) 44 VR 526; 247 A Crim R 300; [2014] VSC 52 ...................................................................................... EA.138.150 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468 ..... EA.122.210, EA.123.90 Director of Public Prosecutions v Langford [2012] NSWSC 310 ................... EA.138.540 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Director of Public Prosecutions v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227; [2001] NSWSC 797 ..................................................................... EA.81.60, EA.138.570 Director of Public Prosecutions v MD (2010) 29 VR 434; [2010] VSCA 233 ............................................................................................ EA.138.540, EA.138.720 Director of Public Prosecutions v Marijancevic; Director of Public Prosecutions v Preece; Director of Public Prosecutions v Preece (2011) 33 VR 440; 219 A Crim R 344; [2011] VSCA 355 .... EA.138.60, EA.138.210, EA.138.240, EA.138.540, EA.138.570, EA.138.720 Director of Public Prosecutions v McRae [2010] VSC 114 ........... EA.38.300, EA.55.180 Director of Public Prosecutions v Nair (2009) 170 ACTR 15; 236 FLR 239; [2009] ACTCA 17 ................................................................. EA.38.60, EA.38.150 Director of Public Prosecutions v Nicholls (2001) 123 A Crim R 66; [2001] NSWSC 523 ................................................. EA.59.180, EA.66.60, EA.138.570 Director of Public Prosecutions v Nicholls (2010) 204 A Crim R 306; [2010] VSC 397 ...................................................................................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Director of Public Prosecutions v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248 ...................... EA.18.60 Director of Public Prosecutions v The Queen [2007] EWHC 1842 ................... EA.13.90, EA.13.240 Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Hiep (1998) 86 FCR 33 ...................... EA.75.90 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Fattal [2013] VSCA 276 .................. EA.141.120 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Galloway (2014) 245 A Crim R 427; [2014] VSCA 272 ................................................................ EA.123.60, EA.123.90 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468 ............. EA.Intro.120 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Larson [2017] VSCA 292 ................ EA.138.570 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v AM (2006) 161 A Crim R 219; [2006] NSWSC 348 ................................................................. EA.138.120, EA.138.150 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Alderman (1998) 45 NSWLR 526; 104 A Crim R 116 ................................................................................... EA.90.120 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v CAD [2003] NSWSC 196 ............. EA.138.120, EA.138.420 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Earl Burns (2010) 207 A Crim R 362; [2010] NSWCA 265 ............................................................................ EA.27.120 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Elskaf [2012] NSWSC 21 .................. EA.26.60 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Gramelis [2010] NSWSC 787 ....... EA.144.120 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v JG (2010) 220 A Crim R 19; [2010] NSWCCA 222 .................... EA.137.60, EA.137.120, EA.137.150, EA.137.210 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Pinn [2015] NSWSC 1684 ................. EA.58.60 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Tong (2004) 151 A Crim R 296; [2004] NSWSC 689 ........................................................................................ EA.79.240 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Zhang (2007) 48 MVR 78; [2007] NSWSC 308 ........................................................................................ EA.189.40 Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234; [2006] TASSC 75 .......................................................................... EA.81.60, EA.85.300 Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Lynch (2006) 166 A Crim R 327; [2006] TASSC 89 .......................................................................................... EA.114.240 Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Boardman [1975] AC 421 ................ EA.101.120 Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 ................. EA.165.330 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Alexander [2016] VSCA 92 ................ EA.98.120 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v BB (2010) 29 VR 110; [2010] VSCA 211 ...................................................................................................... EA.165.270 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Bass [2016] VSCA 110 ....................... EA.114.90 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Byrne (No 2) [2016] VSC 345 ......... EA.115.150, EA.118.220 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxxii

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Table of Cases

Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Garrett (2016) 257 A Crim R 509; [2016] VSCA 31 ............................................................................ EA.38.60, EA.38.150 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Martin [2016] VSCA 219 ................. EA.101.150 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Massey [2017] VSCA 38 .................... EA.55.330 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Newman [2015] VSCA 25 ................... EA.55.60, EA.110.60 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Pace [2015] VSCA 18 ........................ EA.55.270 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Wearn [2018] VSCA 39 ................... EA.114.240, EA.135.150, EA.137.90, EA.137.120 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Wise [2016] VSCA 173 ...................... EA.79.300, EA.137.60, EA.137.150 Divall v Mifsud [2005] NSWCA 447 ........................................... EA.122.210, EA.165.450 Dixon v Whisprun Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 344 ............................. EA.55.270, EA.79.240 Doble v The Queen [2015] VSCA 265 ........................................ EA.165.240, EA.165.450 Dodds v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 408; [2009] NSWCCA 78 ............... EA.33.30, EA.79.120 Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343; 182 ALR 1; [2001] HCA 46 .... EA.165B.240, EA.165.330, EA.165.450 Doklu v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 333; [2010] NSWCCA 309 ............ EA.85.210 Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; [1992] HCA 13 .... EA.114.240, EA.116.90, EA.165.210, EA.165.300, EA.165.480 Domican v The Queen (No 3) (1990) 46 A Crim R 428 .................................. EA.104.180 Donaghey v Donaghey (2011) 45 Fam LR 183; [2011] FamCA 13 .................. EA.144.60 Donaghy v Wentworth Area Health Service [2003] NSWSC 533 ...................... EA.28.120 Donai v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 173 ............ EA.137.60, EA.137.120, EA.Intro.350 Donohoe v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 176 .................................................. EA.101.185 Donohue v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 17 ............. EA.101.150, EA.101.190, EA.101.240 Doolan v Renkon Pty Ltd (2011) 21 Tas R 156; [2011] TASFC 4 .................... EA.55.180 Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 158 .................................................................................................... EA.55.180 Dorajay Pty Ltd v Aristocrat Leisure Ltd (2008) 67 ACSR 1311; [2008] FCA 1311 ......................................................................................................... EA.160.90 Doran Constructions Pty Ltd, Re (2002) 168 FLR 116; 194 ALR 101; [2002] NSWSC 215 ........ EA.4.150, EA.118.90, EA.122.210, EA.122.480, EA.124.60 Douglas v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 419 .................................................... EA.165.480 Douglass v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 1086; 290 ALR 699; [2012] HCA 34 .................................................................................................................... EA.141.150 Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317; [2003] HCA 51 ..................... EA.81.210 Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2009) 182 IR 28; [2009] FCA 339 ............................................................................................................. EA.27.60 Downes v Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (2014) 313 ALR 383; [2014] VSCA 193 ................................................................................... EA.55.180 Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4 ...... EA.11.60, EA.38.60, EA.46.60, EA.101.360, EA.103.120, EA.108.150, EA.141.120 Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] NSWSC 765 ........... EA.39.120 Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] NSWSC 975 ......... EA.122.300 Drambo Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp Ltd (1996) 33 ATR 255 ................ EA.135.210 Drash v The Queen [2012] VSCA 33 .................................................................. EA.46.150 Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517 ................................ EA.137.150, EA.165.450 Dubbo City Council v Barrett [2003] NSWCA 267 ......................................... EA.122.330 Duke v The Queen (1989) 63 ALJR 139 ............................................................... EA.90.60 Duke of Buccleuch v Metropolitan Board of Works (1871) LR 5 HL 418 ...... EA.129.180 Dumoo v Gardner (1998) 143 FLR 245 .............................................................. EA.90.260 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Duncan v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 84 ........................................................ EA.69.180 Dunks v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 134 ....................................................... EA.108.150 Dunn v The Queen [2017] VSCA 371 ............................................................... EA.101.150 Dunstan v Orr (2008) 217 FCR 559; 171 IR 135; [2008] FCA 31 ................ EA.121.150, EA.122.210 Dupas v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 237; 203 A Crim R 186; [2010] HCA 20 .............................................................................................................. EA.11.90 Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 .................. EA.Intro.270, EA.Intro.300, EA.101A.90, EA.101A.120, EA.108C.60, EA.108C.90, EA.108C.120, EA.79.120, EA.80.150, EA.135.270, EA.137.90, EA.165.210, EA.165.390, EA.190.120 Dupont v Chief Commissioner of Police (2015) 295 FLR 283; [2015] FamCAFC 64 ...................................................... EA.131A.60, EA.130.60, EA.130.120 Dutton v O’Shane [2002] NSWSC 1086 ............................................................... EA.4.180 Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124; [2008] HCA 13 ........ EA.101.450, EA.137.210 Dyball v The Harden Shire Council [2004] NSWSC 486 ................................ EA.118.390 Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285; 76 ALJR 1552; [2002] HCA 45 .... EA.20.300, EA.20.420, EA.55.180 Dyldam Developments Pty Ltd v Jones [2008] NSWCA 56 ....... EA.135.150, EA.135.210 D’Apice v Gutkovich – Estate of Abraham (No 1) [2010] NSWSC 1336 ......... EA.121.90

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E E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 31 FCR 299 ....................................... EA.80.150 EI Dupont de Nemours & Co v Imperial Chemical Industries PLC (2002) 54 IPR 304; [2002] AIPC 91-788; [2002] FCA 230 ................ EA.Intro.120, EA.55.90 ER v Khan [2015] NSWCCA 230 .......................... NSW.CPA.299B.30, NSW.CPA.296.30 ES v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197 ........................... EA.101.150, EA.137.120 ES v The Queen (No 2) [2010] NSWCCA 198 ........................... EA.101.150, EA.101.360 Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 .......................................................................... EA.79.120 Earl of Dunraven v Llewellyn (1850) 15 QB 791; 117 ER 657 .......................... EA.74.60 Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 ................ EA.46.150, EA.48.180, EA.79.150, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.112.60, EA.116.90, EA.130.60, EA.136.60, EA.165.300, EA.192.40 Easwaralingam v Director of Public Prosecutions (2010) 208 A Crim R 122; [2010] VSCA 353 ..................................................................................... EA.67.60 Ebatarinja v Deland (1998) 194 CLR 444 ............................................................ EA.30.60 Eden Productions Pty Ltd v Southern Star Group Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1166 ................................................................................................................ EA.122.210 Edmunds-Jones Pty Ltd v Australian Women’s Hockey Assn Inc [1999] NSWSC 285 ................................................................................. EA.69.240, EA.190.80 Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 ALJR 40; 68 A Crim R 349 ....................................................... EA.55.330, EA.81.60, EA.165.270, EA.165.480 Edwards v Transport Accident Commission [2013] VSC 557 .......................... EA.131.480 Edwards v Vic Land Rehabilitation [2012] VSC 188 ................... EA.117.120, EA.122.60, EA.122.360 Eire Contractors Pty Ltd v O’Brien [2012] NSWCA 400 .............................. EA.Intro.340 El-Azzi v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1056 ................................. EA.103.60 El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10 .................... EA.95.60, EA.97.120, EA.98.120, EA.98.180, EA.101.150, EA.101.190, EA.101.360 El-Hilli v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 289 ..................................................... EA.101.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxxiv

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Table of Cases

El-Zayet v The Queen (2014) 88 NSWLR 556; [2014] NSWCCA 298 ........ EA.131A.90, EA.122.120, EA.122.180 Elias v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 365 ....................................... EA.97.240, EA.97.450 Ellis v The Queen (2010) 30 VR 428; [2010] VSCA 302 ................................ EA.165.480 Elmaghraby v The Queen [2016] VSCA 326 ................................ EA.165.90, EA.165.240 Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 .................. EA.55.330, EA.87.120, EA.97.60, EA.101.150, EA.137.60 Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46 ............ EA.90.60, EA.90.90, EA.90.150, EA.90.180, EA.90.330, EA.90.360, EA.138.60, EA.138.720, EA.165.270 Employment Advocate v Williamson (2001) 111 FCR 20; 185 ALR 590; 50 AILR 4–498; [2001] FCA 1164 .................... EA.138.60, EA.138.510, EA.138.690, EA.140.60 Enoch and Zaretzky, Bock & Co Arbitration, Re [1910] 1 KB 327 .................. EA.26.120 Ensham Resources Pty Ltd v Aioi Insurance Co Ltd (2012) 209 FCR 1; [2012] FCAFC 191 .......................................................................................... EA.133.60 Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 ............................................................................. EA.128.300, EA.187.20 Environment Protection Authority v Queanbeyan City Council (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 159 ................................................................................... EA.131A.90 Environment Protection Authority v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2009] NSWLEC 152 ...................................................................................... EA.191.60 Environment Protection Authority v Unomedical Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWLEC 111 .................................................................................................... EA.53.60 Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 47 ALD 555; 150 ALR 397 ........................ EA.Dict.Pt.1.30, EA.4.150, EA.5.30, EA.8.60 Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2009) 175 FCR 508; [2009] FCA 240 ......................................................................................................... EA.118.220 Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2011) 274 ALR 705; [2011] FCAFC 11 ........................................................................................................ EA.55.270 Erohin v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 102 .............................. EA.165B.270, EA.101.360 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 ......... EA.118.90, EA.118.360, EA.118.390, EA.118.570 Evans v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 489; [2006] NSWCCA 277 ........... EA.37.120, EA.165.450 Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59 ......... EA.165B.210, EA.52.30, EA.53.60, EA.53.90, EA.53.120, EA.55.60, EA.55.210, EA.55.300, EA.56.210, EA.114.240, EA.137.120, EA.165.180 Ewen v The Queen (2015) 250 A Crim R 544; [2015] NSWCCA 117 ............ EA.141.90, EA.165.480, EA.165.540 Ewin v Vergara (No 2) (2012) 209 FCR 288; [2012] FCA 1518 ..................... EA.128.450 Executor Trustee & Agency Co of SA v Insurance Offıce of Australia [1949] SASR 337 .............................................................................................. EA.87.90 Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 .................................................................. EA.122.120, EA.122.180

F FB v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 217 ..................... EA.27.120, EA.97.120, EA.101.240 FDP v The Queen (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; 192 A Crim R 87; [2008] NSWCCA 317 ............................. EA.Intro.350, EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313; [2008] WASCA 47 ...... EA.165.450 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33 ..................................... EA.79.300 FH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 231 ........................................ EA.55.180, EA.101.360 FMJ v The Queen [2011] VSCA 308 ........................... EA.85.300, EA.90.360, EA.137.60 FV v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 237 .............................................................. EA.191.20 Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 ........................................................... EA.55.180 Facton Ltd v Seo (2011) 91 IPR 135; [2011] FCA 344 ..................................... EA.79.150 Fadel v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 134 ........................................................ EA.114.240 Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 499; [2014] FCA 404 .................................................................................................................... EA.81.240 Fairall v Hobbs [2017] NSWCA 82 .................................................................... EA.79.120 Falcon v Famous Players Film Co Ltd [1926] 2 KB 474 .................................. EA.81.180 Falzon v The Queen [2017] VSCA 74 .................................................................. EA.55.90 Farkas v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 141 .......................................................... EA.4.270 Farquharson v The Queen (2012) 36 VR 538; [2012] VSCA 296 .................... EA.55.330 Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; 155 ALR 652; [1998] HCA 50 .... EA.79.300, EA.80.150, EA.106.240, EA.165.480 Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 .................................................................................................................. EA.122.360 Farrugia v Jindi Woraback Children’s Centre Inc [2011] VSC 250 ................ EA.79.300, EA.80.90 Faucett v St George Bank Ltd [2003] NSWCA 43 ............................................... EA.80.90 Feltafield Pty Ltd v Heidelberg Graphic Equipment (1995) 56 FCR 481 ......... EA.69.120 Fenwick v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 353 .... EA.118.150, EA.122.210, EA.122.270 Ferguson v The Queen [2015] VSCA 279 ................... EA.55.60, EA.101.360, EA.137.60 Fermiscan Ltd v James [2009] NSWSC 462 .................................................... EA.131.450 Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 975 ............................................................. EA.130.60, EA.130.300 Ferrall v Blyton (2000) 27 Fam LR 178; [2000] FLC 93-054; [2000] FamCA 1442 ...................................................... EA.128.120, EA.128.150, EA.128.780 Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 ..... EA.101.150, EA.101.210, EA.114.240, EA.114.330, EA.115.300, EA.116.90, EA.116.120, EA.137.120, EA.137.150, EA.165.300, EA.165.450 Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [1998] NSWSC 293 ....................... EA.27.60 Field v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285; [1957] HCA 92 ............................................................... EA.131.120, EA.131.210, EA.131.270 Filippou v The Queen (2015) 89 ALJR 776; [2015] HCA 29 .......................... EA.165.150 Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1389 ...................................................................................... EA.193.60 Finchill Pty Ltd v Abdel-Messih (unreported, NSW SC, Levine J, 13 July 1998) .................................................................................................................. EA.26.60 Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166; 153 A Crim R 503; [2005] HCA 34 .......................................................................................................... EA.190.120 Finlay v The Queen [2009] HCATrans 17 ......................................................... EA.165.300 First Capital Partners Pty Ltd v Sylvatech Ltd (2004) 186 FLR 266; [2004] NSWSC 846 ...................................................................................... EA.131.150 Fitness Australia Ltd v Copyright Tribunal (2010) 89 IPR 442; [2010] FCAFC 148 ........................................................................................................ EA.76.90 Fitz-Gibbon v Wily (1998) 87 FCR 104 ...................................................... EA.Dict.Pt.1.60 Fleet v District Court of NSW [1999] NSWCA 363 ........................................... EA.46.150 Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250; 103 A Crim R 121; [1998] HCA 68 .......................................................................................................... EA.165.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxxvi

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Table of Cases

Fleming v The Queen (2009) 197 A Crim R 282; [2009] NSWCCA 233 ........ EA.138.60, EA.138.120, EA.138.720 Fletcher v The Queen [2006] HCATrans 127 ..................................................... EA.97.480 Fletcher v The Queen (2015) 45 VR 634; 252 A Crim R 11; [2015] VSCA 146 ............ EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.18.150, EA.108A.60, EA.103.120, EA.137.90 Flora v The Queen (2013) 233 A Crim R 320; [2013] VSCA 192 ................... EA.55.330 Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773 ............................................................................. EA.46.60, EA.46.150 Flowers v The Queen (2005) 153 A Crim R 110; [2005] NTCCA 5 ................. EA.81.240 Foley v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 156 ...................................... EA.130.210 Fonterra Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd v Viropoulos (No 2) [2015] FCA 974 ..... EA.79.180 Food and Beverage Australia Ltd v Andrews [2017] VSCA 258 ......................... EA.46.60 Forbes Engineering (Asia) Pte Ltd v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675 .............. EA.69.210 Foreign Media Pty Ltd v Konstantinidis [2003] NSWCA 161 ........ EA.48.180, EA.55.90, EA.191.20 Forge v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 213 ALR 574; 52 ACSR 1; [2004] NSWCA 448 ............................................................ EA.80.90 Formosa House Pty Ltd v Ming Chien Chang (2010) 246 FLR 136; [2010] VSC 474 .............................................................................................. EA.160.60 Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) [2010] VSCA 195 .................................................... EA.131.510 Foster v The Queen (1993) 67 ALJR 550 ............................................................. EA.90.60 Fowkes v Parker [1999] NSWCA 442 ................................................................ EA.55.480 Freeman v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 78 FCR 91 ........................... EA.55.180 Frengos v The Queen [2012] VSCA 18 ........................................... EA.41.300, EA.55.180 Friend v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 41 ............. EA.106.120, EA.108.120, EA.108.180 Fulham Partners LLC v National Australia Bank Ltd (2013) 17 BPR 32709; [2013] NSWCA 296 ...................................................... EA.135.150, EA.136.90 Fuller-Lyons v New South Wales (2015) 89 ALJR 824; [2015] HCA 31 .......... EA.140.60 Fuller-Lyons v New South Wales (No 1) [2013] NSWSC 411 ............................. EA.55.90

G G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387 ............................................................................... EA.140.120 GAR v The Queen (No 3) [2010] NSWCCA 165 .......................... EA.165.90, EA.165.240 GB by his tutor FB v Western Sydney Area Health Service [2010] NSWSC 181 ................................................................................................ EA.126B.420 GBF v The Queen [2010] VSCA 135 ....................... EA.97.120, EA.101.180, EA.136.300 GD v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 18 ............................................................. EA.165.540 GHI, Re [2005] NSWSC 466 ............................................................................. EA.135.180 GO v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 132 ...................................... EA.27.60, EA.41.90 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 ...................................................................................................... EA.26.150 GPI Leisure Corporation Ltd (In Liq) v Yuill (1997) 42 NSWLR 225 ........... EA.131.270 GW v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 15 ........................................... EA.165.450, EA.165.480 Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279 ....................................... EA.110.90, EA.112.60 Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119; 17 BPR 33013; [2014] NSWCA 190 ................................... EA.131.60, EA.131.270, EA.131.480, EA.131.540 Galea v Bagtrans Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 350 .................................................. EA.55.180 Galea v Farrugia [2013] NSWCA 164 ........................................... EA.97.120, EA.97.450 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 ............................................................... EA.27.120 Gall v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 69 ............................................................ EA.165.480 Gallant v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 339 ....................................................... EA.110.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Galvin v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 449; [2006] NSWCCA 66 .......... EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.135.150, EA.136.210, EA.137.60, EA.137.120, EA.164.180 Gardiner v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190 ...... EA.97.180, EA.116.90, EA.130.150 Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695 ................................................................... EA.81.240 Garning & Director-General, Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) [2012] FamCAFC 35 ....................................... EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.21.210 Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Limited (in liq) v Gate Gourmet Holding AG [2004] NSWSC 768 .......................................................................................... EA.50.30 Gately v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 208; 82 ALJR 149; [2007] HCA 55 .... EA.165.480 Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 78 ALJR 394; 204 ALR 258; [2004] HCA 6 ....................................................... EA.144.60, EA.144.90, EA.Intro.120 Gedeon v The Queen (2013) 237 A Crim R 326; [2013] NSWCCA 257 ....... EA.128.510, EA.128.540, EA.138.210, EA.138.540, EA.138.570 Geitonia Pty Ltd v Inner West Council [2016] NSWCCA 186 .......................... EA.55.180 Gentry v The Queen [2016] VSCA 54 ........................................... EA.55.340, EA.164.180 Georgeski v Owners Corp SP49833 [2004] NSWSC 945 .............. EA.11.90, EA.125.120 Geyer v Redeland Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 338 ............................................... EA.140.120 Ghazal v GIO (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 ................................................................ EA.46.150 Ghebrat v The Queen (2011) 214 A Crim R 140; [2011] VSCA 299 ................. EA.60.60 Giallombardo v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 25 ............................................. EA.165.480 Gilham v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131 ............. EA.38.60, EA.55.60, EA.55.90, EA.56.90, EA.79.180, EA.137.60, EA.137.150 Gillett v Murphy [2001] NSWCA 199 ................................................................... EA.54.60 Gillett v Nelson [2014] NSWSC 115 ................................................................... EA.121.90 Gillies v Downer EDI Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1323 ........................ EA.122.180, EA.122.330 Gilmour v Environment Protection Authority (2002) 55 NSWLR 593; [2002] NSWCCA 399 ........................ EA.18.120, EA.18.180, EA.135.150, EA.137.60 Giourtalis v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 216 ................................................... EA.46.150 Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106; 72 ALJR 1012; 155 ALR 15 ......... EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 Gladio Pty Ltd v Buckworth [2015] NSWSC 922 ........................ EA.131.60, EA.131.120, EA.131.270 Glass v DeMarco [1999] FCA 482 .............................................. EA.131.480, EA.131.540 Glass v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 8 .......................................... EA.101.360, EA.165.480 Global Medical Imaging Management Ltd (In Liq), Re [2001] NSWSC 476 .................................................................................................................. EA.119.120 Global Medical Imaging Management Ltd (in liq) v Australian Mezzanine Investments Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 430 ..................................................... EA.122.210 Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1) [2003] NSWSC 160 ................ EA.76.90, EA.79.120, EA.79.150 Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83; [1995] HCA 39 ......................................... EA.122.60 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 76 ALJR 1024; 190 ALR 370; [2002] HCA 31 ....................................................................................................... EA.101A.120 Goldsworthy v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 290 ....................... EA.48.180 Gondarra v Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] FCA 185 ............................................................. EA.192A.60 Gonzales v Claridades (2003) 58 NSWLR 188; [2003] NSWSC 508 ................ EA.92.90 Gonzales v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 321 ...... EA.41.300, EA.Intro.350 Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186; [2006] NSWCA 187 .................................................................................................. EA.165.450 Goodridge v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 37 .................................................... EA.79.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xxxviii

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Table of Cases

Gordian Runoff Ltd v Price [2004] NSWSC 600 ............................................. EA.122.240 Gordon v Ross [2006] NSWCA 157 ................................................ EA.69.120, EA.69.150 Gorman v Cook [2002] NSWSC 1149 ......................................... EA.118.360, EA.119.120 Grace v Grace [2010] NSWSC 1514 ................................................................ EA.122.210 Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438; [1998] HCA 1 ..... EA.Intro.180, EA.66.180, EA.81.60, EA.89.150, EA.101.450, EA.108.150, EA.108.210, EA.137.210, EA.192.100 Granada Tavern v Smith (2008) 173 IR 328; [2008] FCA 646 ......................... EA.140.60 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 51 ALJR 198; [1976] HCA 63 ........... EA.118.360, EA.118.390, EA.118.540 Grant v The Queen (1975) 11 ALR 503 ........................................................... EA.141.120 Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95; 65 A Crim R 12 .............. EA.114.300, EA.115.360, EA.116.90 Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co [1981] 1 WLR 529; [1981] 2 All ER 485 ...................................................................................... EA.122.180 Great Southern Managers Australia Ltd (in liq) v Clarke (2012) 36 VR 308; [2012] VSCA 207 ................................................................................... EA.124.60 Greek Case, The (1969) 12 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 186 ............................................................................................. EA.84.60 Green v AMP Life Ltd [2005] NSWSC 95 .................................. EA.118.150, EA.121.150 Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28 ............................................................. EA.141.90 Green v The Queen (1999) 73 ALJR 575; [1999] HCA 13 ................................. EA.81.60 Greenough v Eccles (1859) 2 CB (NS) 786 .......................................................... EA.38.60 Greensill v The Queen (2012) 37 VR 257; 226 A Crim R 416; [2012] VSCA 306 ............................. EA.165B.150, EA.165B.210, EA.165B.300, EA.165.480 Greenwood v Harvey [1965] NSWR 1489 .......................................................... EA.137.60 Grey v The Queen (2001) 75 ALJR 1708; [2001] HCA 65 ............................. EA.165.450 Griffın v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209; 207 ALR 169; [2004] FCAFC 113 ....... EA.4.150 Griffıth v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2003] NSWSC 483 ......... EA.48.180, EA.51.60, EA.55.90 Grosvenor v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 5 ............................................................ EA.81.60 Groundstroem v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 237 ............... EA.165B.210, EA.165B.300 Gruber v Blake (2003) 39 MVR 465; [2003] NSWCA 256 .............................. EA.46.150 Grubisic v Western Australia (2011) 41 WAR 524; 210 A Crim R 457; [2011] WASCA 147 ....................................................................................... EA.165.450 Grundy v Lewis (unreported, FCA, Cooper J, 14 September 1998) ............... EA.122.330, EA.122.390 Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596 ................................................................................................... EA.118.390 Gudjala People # 2 v Native Title Registrar [2008] FCAFC 157 ...................... EA.79.240 Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Assn Inc v Guide Dog Assn (NSW & ACT) (1998) 154 ALR 527 ............................................................. EA.76.90, EA.78.60 Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027 ................................................................................ EA.118.360, EA.118.390 Gul v The Queen [2017] VSCA 153 .................................................................. EA.165.570 Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; 218 ALR 292; [2005] FCA 50 ........................................................... EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.74.60, EA.79.300 Gusdote Pty Ltd v Ashley (2011) 193 FCR 227; 277 ALR 579; [2011] FCA 250 ........................................................................................................... EA.160.60 Guthrie v Spence (2009) 78 NSWLR 225; [2009] NSWCA 369 ........................ EA.60.60, EA.136.180 Guy v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2017] FCA 1104 ................................................. EA.79.330 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

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H H v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 849 ......................... EA.48.210, EA.69.120 HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; [1999] HCA 2 ............ EA.55.270, EA.79.120, EA.79.180, EA.79.240 HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq), Re [2015] NSWSC 790 .......................... EA.91.60, EA.92.70 HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; 82 ALJR 723; 245 ALR 204; [2008] HCA 16 ......... EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.101.210, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 HMP Industries Pty Ltd v Graham (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 17 July 1996) ........................................................... EA.128.120, EA.128.330, EA.128.540 HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Clements [2014] NSWSC 213 .............. EA.168.60, EA.169.120 HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Clements [2014] NSWSC 290 ............... EA.69.150, EA.69.180, EA.169.90, EA.169.120 Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 ................................................................... EA.84.60, EA.84.90, EA.84.120 Habib v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 261 ......................................................... EA.110.60 Hadchiti v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 63 ....................................................... EA.141.90 Haddara v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 53; 241 A Crim R 93; [2014] VSCA 100 ................................... EA.11.90, EA.81.60, EA.90.300, EA.137.240, EA.Intro.120 Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2006) 152 FCR 560; [2006] FCA 941 ............................................................................... EA.38.60 Hadid v Australis Media Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 5 November 1996) ....................................... EA.26.150, EA.32.60, EA.32.90, EA.39.120 Hadid v Australis Media Ltd [No 2] (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 28 October 1996) ................................................................................................ EA.108.150 Hague v Commissioner of Corrective Services (2008) 216 FLR 271; [2008] NSWSC 253 ........................................................................................... EA.11.60 Haidari v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 126 ................................................... EA.Intro.350 Hakim v Waterways Authority (NSW) (2006) 149 LGERA 415; [2006] NSWCCA 376 ................................................................................................. EA.55.180 Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 .................................................. EA.75.90 Halverson v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307 .......................................................... EA.26.300 Hamberger (Employment Advocate) v Williamson and CFMEU (2000) 102 IR 297; [2000] FCA 1644 ............................................................................. EA.138.390 Hamilton v New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1213 ................... EA.117.120, EA.122.360 Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486 ...................... EA.11.60, EA.128.90, EA.128.600 Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] FCA 1551 ................................... EA.26.270, EA.55.540 Hammond v Hammond [2010] NSWSC 331 ....................................................... EA.55.180 Hammoud Brothers Pty Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd [2004] NSWCA 366 .................................................................................................................... EA.140.60 Hamod v New South Wales (No 10) [2008] NSWSC 611 .................................. EA.136.60 Hamod v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] NSWCA 243 ........................ EA.79.120 Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Ltd (2011) 80 NSWLR 43; [2011] NSWCA 11 .......................................................................................... EA.79.240 Hancock v Rinehart [2013] NSWSC 1978 ........................................................ EA.122.150 Hancock v Rinehart [2016] NSWSC 12 .............................................................. EA.133.60 Hanna v The Queen [2014] VSCA 187 ............................................................. EA.101.360 Hannaford v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NSW) [2013] NSWSC 1708 ................................................... EA.118.330, EA.122.330 Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373 ..... EA.8.60, EA.37.90, EA.37.180, EA.39.180, EA.55.180, EA.79.60, EA.79.180, EA.79.240, EA.137.120, EA.141.90, EA.141.120, EA.Intro.270 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xl

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Table of Cases

Hansen Beverage Co v Bickfords (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 406 .................... EA.69.120 Haoui v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 331; [2008] NSWCCA 209 ........... EA.79.300, EA.135.210, EA.137.60, EA.137.120 Harbours Corporation (Qld) v Vessey Chemicals Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 60 .............................................................................................. EA.130.210, EA.130.300 Harcourts WA Pty Ltd v Roy Weston Nominees Pty Ltd (No 6) [2016] FCA 1492 ....................................................................................................... EA.131.510 Harden Shire Council v Curtis [2009] NSWCA 179 .................. EA.118.220, EA.119.180 Hargraves v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 257; 218 A Crim R 123; [2011] HCA 44 ............................................................... EA.104.120, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590; 43 A Crim R 221; [1989] HCA 50 .................... EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.101.180, EA.101.185, EA.101.195, EA.136.60 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82; [2002] FCA 934 ................................................................ EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.21.210, EA.26.150 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 ....... EA.55.60, EA.79.60, EA.79.240, EA.79.270, EA.136.180, EA.Intro.350 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 ........................................................................................................... EA.55.270 Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 4) (2003) 197 ALR 131; [2003] FCA 17 .................................................. EA.67.90 Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 7) [2003] FCA 893 ................................................................................. EA.136.180 Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 8) [2004] FCA 338 ............................................................... EA.67.90, EA.135.150 Harris v Bellemore [2009] NSWSC 1497 ........................................................ EA.108C.90 Harris v The Queen (2005) 158 A Crim R 454; [2005] NSWCCA 432 ........... EA.65.150 Harris v The Queen [2006] HCATrans 247 ........................................................ EA.65.150 Harris v The Queen (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112 ............ EA.98.60, EA.98.120, EA.101.190 Harris/D-E Pty Ltd v McClelland’s Coffee & Tea Pty Ltd (1999) 149 FLR 204; [1999] NSWSC 36 .................................................................................. EA.194.20 Hart v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 131 FCR 203; 53 ATR 371; [2003] FCAFC 105 ................................................................................... EA.46.60 Hart v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2016] FCA 897 .................. EA.79.180 Hartmann v Commissioner of Police (1997) 91 A Crim R 141 ........................ EA.128.90, EA.128.600 Hastie Group Ltd (in liq) v Moore [2016] NSWCA 305 ........... EA.118.540, EA.122.150, EA.122.300 Hatchet v U S 293 F 1012 (1923) ....................................................................... EA.79.120 Hatziandoniou v Ruddy [2015] NSWCA 234 ...................................................... EA.79.180 Hawker v The Queen [2012] VSCA 219 ............................................................. EA.38.150 Hawksford v Hawksford [2008] NSWSC 31 ....................................................... EA.117.90 Hazledine v Arthur J Gallagher & Co Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 1271 ................... EA.8.60 Healey v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 235 ................................................... EA.165B.270 Hearne v Street (2008) 82 ALJR 1259; 248 ALR 609; [2008] HCA 36 .... EA.Dict.Pt.1.60 Heaton v Luczka [1998] NSWCA 104 .................................................................. EA.46.60 Heaton v Luczka (unreported, NSW CA, Cole, Beazley, Stein JJA, 3 March 1998) .................................................................................................... EA.46.150 Henderson v Queensland (2014) 89 ALJR 162; [2014] HCA 52 ...................... EA.140.60 Hennessy v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1926) 38 CLR 342 ................................. EA.129.180 Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd [1999] AIPC 91–530; [1999] FCA 1561 ......................................................................... EA.79.120, EA.79.180 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington (2005) 2 DDCR 271; [2005] NSWCA 42 .................................................................................................. EA.79.240, EA.144.60 Heyward v Bishop [2015] ACTCA 58 ............................................................... EA.138.150 Hickey v The Queen (2002) 136 A Crim R 150; [2002] WASCA 321 ............ EA.101.240 Higgins v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 56 ....................................... EA.84.60, EA.90.270 Higgins v The Queen [2016] VSCA 47 ............................................................. EA.101.150 Hill v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 136 ........................................................... EA.165.480 Hinton by his Tutor Leslie Melba Hinton v Valiotis (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 7 March 1997) .............................................................................. EA.32.180 Ho v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1998) 102 A Crim R 37 ............ EA.138.120 Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572; [2001] NSWCA 168 ............................ EA.140.120 Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50 ........ EA.98.120, EA.101.120, EA.101.150, EA.101.180, EA.101.210, EA.101.240, EA.101.300, EA.110.90 Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2011] VSC 272 ................................................................ EA.76.90 Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (2012) 264 FLR 1; [2012] VSC 94 ............ EA.57.210, EA.87.180 Hoefler v Tomlinson (1995) 60 FCR 452 ............................................................ EA.131.60 Holloway v Commonwealth (2016) 50 VR 417; [2016] VSC 317 .................. EA.130.360, EA.130.390 Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 237 A Crim R 589; [2014] HCA 29 ................................................... EA.76.90, EA.79.120, EA.79.150, EA.79.180 Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Murphy (1992) 28 NSWLR 512 ............ EA.131.300 Hoogwerf v The Queen (1992) 63 A Crim R 302 ............................................... EA.80.150 Hothnyang v The Queen [2014] VSCA 64 ........................................................ EA.101.150 Housden v Boral Australian Gypsum Ltd [2015] VSCA 162 ............................. EA.46.150 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 ............... EA.65.240, EA.90.360, EA.97.480, EA.98.450, EA.101.450, EA.130.420, EA.135.300, EA.136.300, EA.137.210, EA.138.720 Howell v Macquarie University [2008] NSWCA 26 .......................................... EA.55.180 Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie (No 2) (1996) 41 NSWLR 542 ................. EA.160.60 Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314; [2008] FCA 369 .......... EA.Dict.Pt.1.150, EA.59.120, EA.81.60, EA.81.120, EA.87.90 Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26; [2013] FCA 1124 ..... EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1Div.1.60, EA.52.30, EA.128.330 Hudson v The Queen [2017] VSCA 122 ................ EA.165.240, EA.165.450, EA.165.570 Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (Ruling No 8) [2014] VSC 567 .................................................................................... EA.79.330 Huges v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 ........................................................................ EA.110.90, EA.112.60 Hughes v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 330 ............... EA.41.300, EA.97.60, EA.101.240, EA.101.450 Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 .............. EA.55.90, EA.97.60, EA.97.120, EA.97.150, EA.97.180, EA.97.480, EA.101.190, EA.101.195, EA.101.360 Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 40 .................................................................. EA.97.120 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (No 3) (1997) 76 FCR 151 ....................................................................................... EA.135.180 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (No 3) (1997) 80 FCR 276 .......................................................................... EA.76.90, EA.77.60 Hull v Thompson [2001] NSWCA 359 ................................................................ EA.46.150 Humphreys v Humphreys [2016] VSC 637 .............. EA.131.60, EA.131.150, EA.131.540 Humphries v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 319 ............................................... EA.141.120 Hunt v The Queen [2017] VSCA 196 .................................................................. EA.98.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xlii

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Huon Aquaculture Group Ltd v Secretary, Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment [2017] FCA 1615 ....................... EA.136.60 Huy Vinh Quach v The Queen (2011) 35 VR 71; [2011] VSCA 390 ................ EA.55.180

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I IBM Global Services Australia Ltd, Re (2005) 144 IR 389; [2005] FCAFC 66 ........................................................................................................................ EA.52.30 ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (NSW) (2004) 60 NSWLR 18; [2004] NSWCA 55 .................................................................... EA.144.60 IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 .... EA.Intro.270, EA.55.60, EA.56.60, EA.66.60, EA.66.180, EA.79.300, EA.97.120, EA.97.480, EA.98.120, EA.101.120, EA.101.150, EA.101.185, EA.101.240, EA.102.100, EA.114.240, EA.137.90 ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v O’Shea [2010] NSW ConvR 56–259; [2010] NSWCA 71 ........................................................................................................ EA.54.60 IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 .............. EA.118.330, EA.118.360, EA.118.390, EA.118.480, EA.118.540, EA.118.570 ISJ v The Queen (2012) 38 VR 23; 226 A Crim R 484; [2012] VSCA 321 ..... EA.66.180 Ibrahim v Pham [2004] NSWSC 650 .................................................................. EA.97.120 Ibrahim v Pham [2007] NSWCA 215 .............................................. EA.97.120, EA.97.480 Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd v Robalino [2009] NSWSC 969 ............................ EA.79.300 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 ................ EA.79.180 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640; [2000] NSWSC 1077 ............................................. EA.79.480, EA.80.90, EA.Intro.120 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 ............... EA.79.150, EA.79.180, EA.79.240 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 222 ............... EA.75.120, EA.118.360, EA.125.90, EA.125.120, EA.135.150 Idoport Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 524 ............................................................... EA.60.60 Idoport Pty Ltd (In Liq) (Recs Apptd), Re [2012] NSWSC 58 ........................ EA.122.150 Idylic Solutions Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 568 ................................................. EA.50.30 Ilioski v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 164 .............. EA.114.180, EA.116.90, EA.165.480 Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, Minister for v Baker (1997) 73 FCR 187; 153 ALR 463 ............................................................................................. EA.48.60 Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, Minister for v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 ............................................................................... EA.97.480 Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, Minister for v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77; 171 ALR 53; [2000] FCA 377 ................................................................. EA.160.60 Imnetu v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 203 .................................. EA.110.60, EA.141.120 Industrial Equity Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 171 CLR 207; 65 ALJR 1 .................................................................................... EA.165.480 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1084 .............................................................................. EA.122.180 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 40 ............................................................ EA.119.120, EA.122.330 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [No 4] [2006] NSWSC 90 .................................... EA.87.60, EA.87.90, EA.135.90 Insurance Australia Ltd v Checchia (2011) 80 NSWLR 1; [2011] NSWCA 101 ............................................................................ EA.135.210, EA.135.300 Insurance Australia Ltd (t/as NRMA Insurance) v Asaner [2016] NSWSC 614 .................................................................................................................... EA.81.210 Insurance Commissioner v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39 ......................................... EA.55.180 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Interchase Corp Ltd, Re (1996) 68 FCR 481 ........................................................ EA.4.150 Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379 ........................... EA.79.120 International FinanceTrust Co Ltd v NSW Crime Commission [2008] NSWCA 291 ...................................................................................................... EA.9.180 Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v MDS Diagnostics Pty Ltd (2010) 85 IPR 525; [2010] FCA 108 ......................................................................... EA.69.240 Investa Properties Pty Ltd v Nankervis (No 6) [2014] FCA 804 ..... EA.26.150, EA.29.90 Irani v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 125; [2008] NSWCCA 217 .............. EA.79.150 Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375; [2010] TASCCA 11 ..................... EA.29.90, EA.32.90, EA.165.480 Iskandar v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 256 ................................................... EA.141.150 Italiano v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 260 .............................................. EA.46.120 Ith v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 70 ........................................ EA.101A.120, EA.110.60 Ivanoff v The Queen [2015] VSCA 116 ............................................................. EA.101.150

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J J v D (2006) 36 Fam LR 206; [2006] FamCA 729 .................... EA.128.150, EA.128.780 JA Westaway & Son Pty Ltd v Registrar General (1996) 7 BPR 14773 ........... EA.38.150 JB v The Queen (2012) 83 NSWLR 153; [2012] NSWCCA 12 ........................ EA.90.270 JC, Re [2010] ACTSC 134 ................................................................................... EA.37.270 JCS v Tasmania [2014] TASCCA 6 ................................................................... EA.165.450 JCS v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 1; [2006] NSWCCA 221 ................... EA.43.180, EA.141.120 JD v Director-General of Department of Youth & Community Services [1998] NSWSC 353 ........................................................................................ EA.26.150 JD v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 274 ............................................................ EA.108.150 JDK v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 333; [2009] NSWCCA 76 ............... EA.101.360 JJB v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 187; [2006] NSWCCA 126 .......... EA.165B.210, EA.165B.270, EA.165.450 JLS v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 328; 204 A Crim R 179; [2010] VSCA 209 .............................................................................................. EA.97.120, EA.101.190 JP Morgan Australia Ltd v Consolidated Minerals Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 3 ........................................................................................................ EA.55.180 JRD Ghalloub Pty Ltd v Eltobbagi [2013] NSWSC 56 ................................ EA.128A.120 JWM v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 248 ............................................... NSW.CPA.300.30 Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto-Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417 .................... EA.55.390, EA.97.450 Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 ............................ EA.97.60, EA.97.120, EA.97.240, EA.97.480, EA.103.60 Jackson v Lithgow City Council [2008] NSWCA 312 ........................................ EA.140.60 Jackson v Macek (2015) 296 FLR 219; [2015] FamCAFC 114 ........................ EA.144.60 Jackson v TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1229 .................................. EA.87.150 Jackson v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 411 ................................................... EA.Intro.350 Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 3) [2017] FCA 1045 ............ EA.69.120, EA.77.60 Jaffarie v Director General of Security (2014) 226 FCR 505; [2014] FCAFC 102 ........................................................ EA.130.210, EA.130.360, EA.130.390 Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23 ................................................ EA.11.90 Jamal v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198 ............ EA.53.120 James v Launceston City Council (2004) 13 Tas R 89; [2004] TASSC 69 ........ EA.77.60, EA.136.60 James Hardie Industries NV v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2009] NSWCA 18 ............................ EA.46.60, EA.135.120, EA.135.300 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xliv

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Table of Cases

Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 ........................................ EA.79.240 Jango v Northern Territory (No 4) [2004] FCA 1539 ..................... EA.60.120, EA.80.90, EA.136.180 Jardein Pty Ltd v Stathakis [2007] FCAFC 148 ................................................... EA.46.60 Jarrett v The Queen (2014) 86 NSWLR 623; [2014] NSWCCA 140 .......... EA.165B.180, EA.165B.210, EA.165B.240, EA.165.540 Jarvis v Pike (2013) 50 Fam LR 593; [2013] FamCAFC 196 ........................ EA.128.120, EA.128.360 Jenkins v Repatriation Commission (1996) 41 ALD 540; 137 ALR 729 .......... EA.144.60 Jenkins v The Queen (2004) 79 ALJR 252; [2004] HCA 57 ..... EA.165.240, EA.165.360, EA.165.480 Jess & Jess [2015] FamCA 822 ........................................................................... EA.124.60 Jiang v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 277 ................................... EA.101.150, EA.101.360 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346 .......................... EA.130.120 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Abernethy [1999] NSWSC 826 ............. EA.125.120, EA.125.210 Johnson v Page [2007] FLC 93-344; [2007] FamCA 1235 ............................... EA.140.60 Johnson v Western Australia (2008) 186 A Crim R 531; [2008] WASCA 164 .................................................................................................................. EA.141.150 Johnston v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150 ............ EA.46.60, EA.81.210 Johnston v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 133 ..................................................... EA.20.180 Johnston v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 148 ............................................. EA.46.150 Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422; [2010] NSWCA 70 ................................................................................................ EA.56.60, EA.Intro.340 Johnstone v The Queen (2011) 31 VR 320; [2011] VSCA 60 ......................... EA.165.480 Jones v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2010) 189 FCR 390; [2010] FCAFC 136 ........................................................................ EA.55.180 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; 32 ALJR 395; 76 WN (NSW) 278; [1959] ALR 367 ..................................................... EA.46.60, EA.55.180, EA.Intro.120 Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 .................................. EA.81.180 Jones v The Queen (1989) 41 A Crim R 1 ........................................................ EA.114.330 Jones v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 538; [1997] HCA 12 ......... EA.165.450, EA.165.540 Jones v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 443 ............................................................ EA.89.90 Jones v The Queen (2014) 246 A Crim R 425; [2014] NSWCCA 280 ........... EA.101.240 Jones v Toben (2002) 71 ALD 629; [2002] FCA 1150 ....................................... EA.144.60 Jones Lang LaSalle (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taouk [2012] NSWCA 342 ................... EA.55.600, EA.56.120, EA.56.210, EA.58.60 Jung v Son [1998] NSWSC 698 ............................................................................ EA.84.60 Jurj v The Queen [2016] VSCA 57 ................................................................ EA.165B.270

K K v The Queen (1997) 22 Fam LR 592 .............................................................. EA.140.60 K v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 157 ..................................... EA.46.120, EA.46.150 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501; 192 A Crim R 501; [2009] HCA 4 ...................................................................... EA.130.300 KC v Shiley Inc (unreported, FCA, Tamberlin J, 11 July 1997) ..................... EA.121.150, EA.131.450, EA.131.480, EA.131.510 KC v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 61; 207 A Crim R 241; [2011] VSCA 82 ....... EA.46.120 KH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 294 ............................................ EA.38.60, EA.38.150 KJM v The Queen (No 2) [2011] VSCA 268 ................................ EA.97.480, EA.101.450 KJR v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 226; [2007] NSWCCA 165 ............. EA.101.360 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

KJS v The Queen (2014) 86 NSWLR 603; [2014] NSWCCA 27 .................... EA.101.150 KMB v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 212 ................................................. EA.141.120 KNP v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 227; [2006] NSWCCA 213 ............... EA.108.120, EA.165.210 KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; 118 A Crim R 262; [2001] HCA 11 ................................................. EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.165.480, EA.Intro.340 KS v Veitch (No 2) (2012) 84 NSWLR 172; 229 A Crim R 46; [2012] NSWCCA 266 ........... NSW.CPA.299D.60, NSW.CPA.299D.90, NSW.CPA.299D.150, NSW.CPA.299D.210, NSW.CPA.299D.300, NSW.CPA.299D.330, NSW.CPA.296.30, NSW.CPA.298.30 KSC v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 179 .......................................................... EA.101.150 KTR v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 271 ................................. EA.101A.120, EA.101.150 Ka Chung Fung v The Queen (2007) 174 A Crim R 169; [2007] NSWCCA 250 ................................................................................................. EA.110.60 Kaifoto v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 186 ............................... EA.101.150, EA.165.480 Kalbasi v Western Australia (2013) 235 A Crim R 541; [2013] WASCA 241 .................................................................................................................. EA.165.480 Kamasaee v Commonwealth (No 2) [2016] VSC 404 ...................................... EA.118.220 Kamasaee v Commonwealth (No 3) [2016] VSC 438 ...................................... EA.130.390 Kamasaee v Commonwealth (No 4) [2016] VSC 492 ................. EA.130.180, EA.130.390 Kamleh v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 541; [2005] HCA 2 ............................... EA.59.180 Kanaan v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 109 .............. EA.38.60, EA.116.90, EA.165.210, EA.165.360, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 697 .................................................................... EA.119.180 Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 ...... EA.118.240, EA.118.360, EA.122.90, EA.125.90, EA.125.120, EA.125.180, EA.125.210 Kang v Kwan (2002) 11 BPR 20623; [2002] NSWSC 1187 .............................. EA.69.240 Kang-Kem v Paine [2003] NSWSC 916 ...................................... EA.128.480, EA.128.540 Kanthal Australia Pty Ltd v Ministry for Industry Technology & Commerce (1987) 14 FCR 90 ....................................................................... EA.130.300 Kantor v Vosahlo [2004] VSCA 235 ................................................................... EA.140.60 Kapanadze v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 69 ................................................. EA.101.150 Kaperonis v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (unreported, NSW SC, Badgery-Parker J, 2 February 1996) ................................................................. EA.67.90 Karam v The Queen [2015] VSCA 50 ........................ EA.62.60, EA.137.60, EA.137.210, EA.Intro.120 Karmas v New South Wales Land & Housing Corp [1999] NSWSC 157 ....... EA.129.180 Karpany v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315 ..................................................... EA.165.480 Kaye v Woods (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 87 ....................................... EA.125.90, EA.125.180 Keane v Caravan City Cowra Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 942 .............................. EA.69.240 Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204 ................. EA.79.120, EA.79.240, EA.79.300, EA.79.480, EA.80.90, EA.165.450 Kelly v The Queen (2002) 129 A Crim R 363; [2002] WASCA 134 .............. EA.114.240, EA.116.90 Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; 78 ALJR 538; [2004] HCA 12 ....... EA.84.150, EA.85.150, EA.139.60, EA.165.420, EA.Intro.180 Kelly v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 221 ................................................. EA.138.120 Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; [2004] FCAFC 337 ..... EA.46.60, EA.118.360, EA.118.540, EA.118.570 Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424; [2004] FCA 332 ................................. EA.75.90 Kent v Wotton & Byrne Pty Ltd (2006) 15 Tas R 264; [2006] TASSC 8 .......... EA.144.60 Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179 ........... EA.46.60, EA.46.120, EA.46.150, EA.46.180 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xlvi

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Table of Cases

Kheir v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 308; 244 A Crim R 231; [2014] VSCA 200 ............................................................................ EA.78.60, EA.79.150, EA.137.120 Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460; 47 ALJR 369; [1973] HCA 30 ..... EA.165.450, EA.165.540, EA.165.570 Kimberly-Clark Worldwide Inc v Goulimis (2008) 253 ALR 76; [2008] FCA 1415 ......................................................................... EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.21.210 King v Collins [2007] NSWCA 122 .................................................................... EA.55.180 King v The Queen (1986) 15 FCR 427 ................................................................. EA.89.90 King v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 423 ........................................................... EA.101.150 Kingham v Sutton (No 3) [2001] FCA 1117 .......................................................... EA.48.60 Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 221 ..................................... EA.136.60 Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 323 ..................................... EA.136.60 Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gee Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485 .................................................................................................... EA.79.300 Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; 190 IR 437; [2010] HCA 1 .......................................................................... EA.17.60, EA.42.60 Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW [2009] HCATrans 93 ............... EA.17.60 Kirk Pty Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1998] NSWSC 1 ....................................... EA.87.90 Klein v Bryant [1998] ACTSC 89 ........................................................................ EA.138.60 Klewer v Walton [2003] NSWCA 308 ............................. EA.38.60, EA.43.90, EA.136.60 Knight v Maclean [2002] NSWCA 314 ............................................. EA.46.60, EA.46.150 Knight v The Queen (1992) 66 ALJR 860 ........................................................ EA.141.120 Knowles v The Queen [2015] VSCA 141 ................. EA.37.270, EA.138.120, EA.165.450 Kong v Kang [2014] VSC 28 ................................. EA.131.150, EA.131.270, EA.131.390 Konia v Morley [1976] 1 NZLR 455 ................................................................. EA.118.390 Konigsberg, Re [1989] 3 All ER 289 ................................................................ EA.122.360 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 90; [2000] FCA 876 ................................................... EA.135.210 Korean Air Lines v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701 ........ EA.131.150, EA.131.270, EA.131.480 Korgbara v The Queen (2007) 71 NSWLR 187; 170 A Crim R 568; [2007] NSWCCA 84 .................................................................. EA.137.60, EA.165.450 Kosciusko Thredbo Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 329 ............ EA.131.390, EA.131.480 Kosian v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 40 VR 335; 237 A Crim R 156; [2013] VSCA 357 ............................................................................... EA.79.480 Kotvas v The Queen [2010] VSCA 309 ............................................................ EA.141.120 Koushappis v Western Australia (2007) 168 A Crim R 51; [2007] WASCA 26 .................................................................................................................... EA.141.150 Kozul v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 221 ............................................................ EA.53.180 Kraus v Menzie [2012] FCAFC 144 ...................................................................... EA.46.60 Ku-ring-gai Council v West [2017] NSWCA 54 ....................... EA.131A.180, EA.130.60, EA.130.240, EA.130.420, EA.Intro.270 Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11 ....................................... EA.46.60, EA.55.180, EA.81.60, EA.140.120 Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363; [2004] HCA 34 ......................... EA.140.60 Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 US 137 (1999) ............................................. EA.79.120 Kutschera v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 150 ....... EA.165.90, EA.165.240, EA.165.360 Kwan v Kang [2003] NSWCA 336 ............................ EA.56.120, EA.56.210, EA.125.180 Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Offıce of Environment and Heritage (2013) 298 ALR 532; [2013] NSWCCA 114 ......... EA.79.240, EA.79.300, EA.79.330 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

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L L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381; [2006] TASSC 59 ................. EA.97.480, EA.98.450, EA.101.450 LAB v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 517; [2006] NSWCCA 202 ............. EA.165.210 L’Estrange v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 89; (2011) 214 A Crim R 9 ......... EA.41.300, EA.101.150 LGM v CAM (2006) 200 FLR 360; [2006] FamCA 435 .................................... EA.20.180 LGM v CAM [2008] FamCA 185 ........................................................................ EA.26.150 LGM v CAM (2011) 46 Fam LR 118; [2011] FamCAFC 195 ........................ EA.128.420, EA.128.780, EA.132.60, EA.138.120, EA.138.150, EA.138.600 LJW v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 114 .......................................................... EA.101.150 LMD v The Queen [2012] VSCA 164 ................................................................. EA.66.180 LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 ......... EA.21.210, EA.26.270, EA.29.90, EA.29.120, EA.29.150, EA.55.540 LS v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2011) 81 NSWLR 551; [2011] NSWSC 1016 ......................................................................................... EA.19.30 La Trobe Capital & Mortgage Corp Ltd v Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 299; 273 ALR 774; [2011] FCAFC 4 ..... EA.76.90, EA.135.150, EA.135.180, EA.135.300 Lactalis Jindi Pty Ltd v Jindi Cheese Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 475 ...................... EA.122.270 Ladd v The Queen (2009) 27 NTLR 1; [2009] NTCCA 6 ................................. EA.141.90 Lakatoi v Walker [1999] NSWSC 1088 ............................................................... EA.26.150 Lakatoi v Walker [1999] NSWSC 156 ............................................................... EA.122.300 Lambert Leasing Inc v QBE Insurance Australia Ltd [2012] NSWSC 953 .... EA.192A.60 Lamers v Lamers [2017] VSC 760 .................................................................... EA.122.150 Lancaster v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 820; 247 A Crim R 165; [2014] VSCA 333 ....... EA.69.90, EA.69.120, EA.69.180, EA.69.210, EA.76.120, EA.79.120 Landini v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 259 ............................................... EA.87.120 Lane v Jurd (No 2) (1995) 40 NSWLR 708 ......................................................... EA.11.60 Lane v The Queen (1996) 66 FCR 144 ....................................... EA.165.450, EA.165.480 Lane v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 317; [2013] NSWCCA 317 ..................... EA.38.60, EA.38.210 Lane v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 46 ............................................................. EA.141.90 Lane Cove Council v Geebung Polo Club Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 167 FLR 175; 41 ACSR 15; [2002] NSWSC 118 ......................................................... EA.160.60 Langbein v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 378; [2008] NSWCCA 38 ........ EA.66.180, EA.108.150, EA.165.480 Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1 .................... EA.55.270, EA.79.240, EA.79.300, EA.136.60, EA.136.180, EA.137.150 Lardil Peoples v State of Queensland [2000] FCA 1548 ................. EA.60.60, EA.79.270, EA.135.150, EA.136.180 Larrakia People, The v Northern Territory [2003] FCA 1175 ........................... EA.136.60 Latorre v The Queen (2012) 226 A Crim R 319; [2012] VSCA 280 ............... EA.43.210, EA.137.60, EA.165.450 Lau v The Queen (1991) 6 WAR 30; 58 A Crim R 390 ..................................... EA.13.210 Lawcover Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (unreported, NSW SC, Hodgson J, 28 November 1997) .................. EA.125.210, EA.131.60, EA.131.570 Lazaris v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 163 ................................................... EA.Intro.350 Lazenby v Zammit [1987] Tas R 54 ................................................................... EA.119.120 Le v McElwee [2008] ACTSC 55 ........................................................................ EA.143.60 Leahy v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1980) 11 ATR 145 ..................... EA.119.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xlviii

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Table of Cases

Lederberger v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd (2012) 38 VR 509; [2012] VSCA 262 ............................................................................................ EA.46.150 Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 305 ............................................................................................ EA.58.60 Lee v NSW Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; 87 ALJR 1082; [2013] HCA 39 .............................................................................................. EA.128.540 Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60 ................ EA.59.90, EA.59.120, EA.60.60, EA.60.90, EA.81.60, EA.Intro.180 Lee v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 259 ........................ EA.38.60, EA.38.150, EA.38.330 Lee v The Queen (2013) 232 A Crim R 337; [2013] NSWCCA 68 ................ EA.165.480 Lee v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 455; 237 A Crim R 436; 88 ALJR 656; [2014] HCA 20 .............................................................................................. EA.128.540 Lee, Re (2009) 212 A Crim R 442; [2009] ACTSC 98 .............. EA.138.150, EA.138.540 Lefroy v The Queen (2004) 150 A Crim R 82; [2004] WASCA 266 ............... EA.165.480 Leghaei v Director-General of Security (2007) 97 ALD 516; 241 ALR 741; [2007] FCAFC 37 ................................................................................. EA.130.210 Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Kilpatrick Green Pty Ltd [1992] 2 VR 505 ................................................................................................................ EA.Intro.300 Leonard v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 ............................................................................................... EA.101.150 Lester v The Queen [2011] HCATrans 126 ........................................................... EA.89.90 Lets Go Adventures Pty Ltd v Barrett [2017] NSWCA 243 ........... EA.41.150, EA.41.300 Leung v The Queen (2003) 144 A Crim R 441; [2003] NSWCCA 51 ........... EA.108.120, EA.108.150, EA.108.180 Leveraged Equities Ltd v Goodridge (2011) 191 FCR 71; 274 ALR 655; [2011] FCAFC 3 .............................................................................................. EA.160.60 Lewincamp v ACP Magazines Ltd [2008] ACTSC 69 ........................................ EA.69.240 Lewis v Lamb [2011] NSWSC 873 .................................................................... EA.131.330 Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1083 ...................... EA.69.60, EA.69.240 Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1245 ...................................... EA.131.330 Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 337 .... EA.48.90, EA.48.270, EA.48.360 Lewis v The Queen [2018] VSCA 40 .................................................................. EA.65.150 Lewis Securities Ltd (in liq) v Carter [2017] NSWSC 412 .............................. EA.128.420 Lexcray Pty Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 292 FLR 447; [2015] NTSC 11 ............................. EA.131.150, EA.131.390, EA.131.480, EA.131.510, EA.131.540 Leybourne v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2010] NSWCA 78 ........................... EA.135.150 Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 .................. EA.79.150, EA.79.300, EA.114.240, EA.114.330, EA.165.450 Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507 ..................................................... EA.141.150 Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 283; [2005] FCAFC 3 ............................................................................................ EA.122.330 Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559; 81 ALJR 1309; [2007] HCA 30 ...... EA.41.300 Liesfield v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 348 .......................................... EA.118.390 Lillicrap v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 All ER 724; [1993] 1 WLR 94 ................ EA.122.150 Lin v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 9 ........ EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30, EA.69.180, EA.167.30, EA.167.60, EA.169.60, EA.169.90 Lin v Tasmania (2015) 252 A Crim R 64; [2015] TASCCA 13 ...................... EA.141.120, EA.169.60 Lin v The Queen [2018] VSCA 100 .................................................................. EA.101.150 Lindsay-Owen v Lake [2000] NSWSC 1046 .................. EA.28.120, EA.32.330, EA.34.60 Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Arthur Yates & Co Ltd (2003) 21 ACLC 592; [2003] NSWSC 281 ................................................................................ EA.69.600 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 ..... EA.55.60, EA.56.60, EA.56.90, EA.62.60, EA.69.170, EA.69.180, EA.69.210, EA.69.540, EA.76.90, EA.76.120, EA.78.60, EA.Intro.120 Liu v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2012) 84 NSWLR 547; [2012] NSWSC 1352 ............................... EA.131.120, EA.131.150, EA.131.360, EA.131.540 Liu v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2012) 91 ACSR 158; [2012] NSWSC 900 .................................................... EA.131A.180, EA.131.360, EA.131.540 Liu v The Age Co [2010] NSWSC 1176 .............................................. EA.75.60, EA.75.90 Llewellyn v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 66 ............... EA.46.60, EA.46.120, EA.46.150, EA.165.480 Lo Presti v The Queen (1994) 68 ALJR 477 ...................................................... EA.27.150 Lockwood v Police (2010) 107 SASR 237; [2010] SASC 120 .......................... EA.27.120 Longhurst v Hunt (2004) 42 MVR 267; [2004] NSWCA 91 ........................... EA.135.150 Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; [1989] HCA 60 ...................... EA.165B.270, EA.164.90, EA.165.330, EA.165.360, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 ................................................................... EA.81.240 Lord Buddha Pty Ltd v Harpur (2013) 41 VR 159; [2013] VSCA 101 ............ EA.46.150 Louizos v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 223; [2009] NSWCCA 71 ............ EA.55.180 Love v Roads Corp (2014) 200 LGERA 76; [2014] VSCA 30 ............................ EA.76.90 Lowe v Lang [2000] NSWSC 309 ......................................................................... EA.34.60 Lowe v The Queen [2015] VSCA 327 ............................................. EA.20.180, EA.20.420 Lucire v Health Care Complaints Commission [2011] NSWCA 99 .................. EA.55.180 Luna v The Queen [2016] VSCA 10 .............................................. EA.65.270, EA.137.120 Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1935) 54 CLR 134; [1935] HCA 71 ....................... EA.81.120 Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 ..................................................................... EA.140.60 Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29465; [2011] NSWCA 303 ...................... EA.55.180, EA.55.510, EA.56.60, EA.83.60, EA.Intro.350 Lyndon v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 112 ..................................................... EA.101.360 Lysle v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 20 ............................................................. EA.46.150

M M v Ryan (1997) 143 DLR (4th) 1 ..................................................... NSW.CPA.299D.150 MA v The Queen (2011) 31 VR 203; [2011] VSCA 13 .................................... EA.114.240 MA v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 564; 226 A Crim R 575; [2013] VSCA 20 .... EA.55.150, EA.79.120, EA.79.450, EA.103.60, EA.137.60 MAH v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 226 ................. EA.38.120, EA.38.150, EA.141.120 MAJW v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 255 ...................................................... EA.104.120 MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 61 FCR 236 ..... EA.122.390 MIH v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 199 ............................................................ EA.90.360 MK v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 274 ......................................... EA.13.210, EA.13.300 ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577; [2007] NSWSC 859 ................................................................................ EA.126.60 MM v The Queen (2012) 232 A Crim R 303; [2012] ACTCA 44 ................... EA.101.150 MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 243 .................................................................................................. EA.189.120 MR v The Queen [2011] VSCA 39 ...................................................................... EA.97.120 MSPR Pty Ltd v Advanced Braking Technology Ltd [2013] NSWCA 416 ........ EA.55.180 MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74 .............. EA.46.60, EA.46.120, EA.46.150 Mabo v Queensland (1890) 25 QBD 494 .......................................................... EA.130.150 Mabo v Queensland [1992] 1 Qd R 78 ................................................................. EA.74.60 Mac v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 24 ............................................................ EA.101.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers] l

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Table of Cases

MacLennan v Hastings Transport Pty Ltd [1969] VR 376 ................................ EA.87.180 MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 .................................................. EA.84.90 Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar (2006) 66 NSWLR 112; [2006] NSWCA 160 ................................... EA.122.210 Mackenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348 .............................. EA.114.240, EA.116.90 Macquarie Bank Ltd v Arup Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 117 ................................ EA.122.150 Macquarie Bank Ltd v Fociri Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 203 ...................... EA.Intro.300 Macquarie Bank Ltd v McCann & Associates Pty Ltd (unreported, FCA, Moore J, 2 December 1998) ......................................................................... EA.122.330 Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District (No 10) [2016] NSWSC 1587 ............................................................. EA.55.60 Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687 ........... EA.126K.210, EA.126K.220, EA.126K.270, EA.126K.330, EA.126K.360, EA.126K.390 Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651 ........................................................ EA.36.30 Maddock v Maddock [2005] FamCA 868 .............................................................. EA.67.90 Magill v The Queen (2013) 42 VR 616; 235 A Crim R 53; [2013] VSCA 259 .................................................................................................................. EA.165.480 Mahlo v Westpac Banking Corp (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 21 November 1996) ................................................................................................ EA.55.60 Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; 180 A Crim R 142; [2008] HCA 1 ......................................................... EA.55.180, EA.81.240, EA.165.480 Maiden Civil Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 1618 ................................................. EA.57.120 Makarov v The Queen (No 3) [2008] NSWCCA 293 ......................................... EA.137.60 Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 ................. EA.Intro.330, EA.55.270, EA.79.180, EA.79.240, EA.79.300, EA.80.90 Mallala District Council v Livestock Markets Ltd (2006) 94 SASR 258; [2006] SASC 80 .............................................................................................. EA.133.60 Maluka v Maluka (2011) 45 Fam LR 129; [2011] FamCAFC 72 ................... EA.144.120 Mamo v Surace (2014) 86 NSWLR 275; [2014] NSWCA 58 ........................... EA.55.180 Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 ........................ EA.122.390 Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123 ...................................................... EA.55.180 Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 168 ALR 86; [1999] HCA 66 ................. EA.122.60, EA.122.120, EA.122.300 Mannella v The Queen [2010] VSCA 357 ........................................................ EA.141.120 Manton v Commonwealth (1981) 34 ALR 342 ............................... EA.48.210, EA.69.120 Markby v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 108; 52 ALJR 626 .............................. EA.101.190 Markoff v Lautogo (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 5 March 1997) ................. EA.67.90 Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304 ................................. EA.55.510 Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 ................... EA.131.510 Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 404; [2001] NSWSC 448 ................................................................................ EA.79.120 Marra Developments Ltd (No 2), Re [1979] 2 NSWLR 193 ............................. EA.69.120 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1155 .... EA.126B.150, EA.122.390 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 259 .... EA.125.210 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 284 .... EA.130.330 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 55 .......... EA.73.60 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 670 .... EA.106.150 Marsh v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 154 ........................................................... EA.98.60 Martelli, Re (1995) 83 A Crim R 550 ............................................................... EA.138.150 Martin v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 449; [2013] VSCA 377 ..................... EA.165A.120, EA.165A.150, EA.37.270, EA.138.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Martin v Police Service Board [1983] 2 VR 357 ........................ EA.126D.30, EA.125.90, EA.128.210, NSW.CPA.301.30 Martin v Tasmania (2008) 190 A Crim R 77; [2008] TASSC 66 ...................... EA.97.240 Martin v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 579; [2010] VSCA 153 .............................. EA.141.90 Martin v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 38 ................... EA.97.300, EA.98.300, EA.101.270, EA.137.60, EA.138.150 Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389; [2007] WASCA 143 .................................................................................................................... EA.55.330 Masoud v Masoud [2016] FamCAFC 24 ............................................................ EA.55.180 Masri v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 243 ........................................................ EA.101.150 Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 234 .............. EA.46.60 Mather v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192 .............................................. EA.34.150, EA.34.180 Mathis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 118 ............................................................... EA.110.60 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 33 ......................................... EA.122.180 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 7) [2013] VSC 553 ........ EA.119.180, EA.126.60 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 10) [2014] VSC 44 ........................... EA.122.180 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 17) [2013] VSC 146 ........................... EA.45.120 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 34) [2014] VSC 40 ............................... EA.54.60 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 35) [2014] VSC 59 ........... EA.57.120, EA.58.60, EA.69.540, EA.69.570, EA.135.150 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 36) [2014] VSC 82 ............................... EA.41.90 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 38) [2014] VSC 102 ........................... EA.79.240 Mazzitelli v The Queen (2002) 135 A Crim R 132; [2002] NSWCCA 436 .... EA.141.120 McCarthy v Camil Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 235 ........... EA.131.150, EA.131.270, EA.131.450 McCartney v The Queen (2012) 38 VR 1; 226 A Crim R 274 [2012] VSCA 268 ........................................................... EA.114.240, EA.137.210, EA.190.120 McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 ......................................................... EA.90.60 McDonald v Girkaid Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-768; [2004] NSWCA 297 .................................................................................................. EA.140.120 McDonald v Livestock Transport (Sydney) Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 166 .......... EA.46.150 McDonald v The Queen [2014] VSCA 80 ..................................... EA.101.150, EA.137.60 McFadden v Snow (1951) 69 WN (NSW) 8 ..................................................... EA.131.480 McGavin v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 171 .................................................. EA.165.360 McGregor v McGregor (2012) 47 Fam LR 498; [2012] FamCAFC 69 ............. EA.79.60, EA.144.60, EA.144.120 McIntosh v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 184 .................................................. EA.101.240 McKey v The Queen (2012) 219 A Crim R 227; [2012] NSWCCA 1 ............. EA.165.480 McKinney v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468; [1991] HCA 6 ........................ EA.165.420 McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 27 June 1996) ................................................................................................................ EA.108.90 McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] NSWSC 218 .................................................................................................................... EA.103.90 McNeil v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 54 ATR 1; 202 ALR 35; [2003] FCA 958 .......................................................................................... EA.55.90 McNeill v The Queen (2008) 168 FCR 198; [2008] FCAFC 80 .... EA.8.90, EA.Intro.120 McPhillamy v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 130 ................................................ EA.97.120 Mead v Mead (2007) 81 ALJR 1185; 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25 ............ EA.118.450 Meade v The Queen [2015] VSCA 171 ....................... EA.79.120, EA.79.150, EA.79.180 Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney (2003) 130 FCR 182; 198 ALR 630; [2003] FCAFC 151 .................................................................................................... EA.140.120 Mees v Roads Corp (2003) 128 FCR 418; [2003] FCA 306 ................................ EA.10.60 Meko v The Queen (2004) 146 A Crim R 131; [2004] WASCA 159 .................. EA.81.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lii

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Table of Cases

Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465; [1999] HCA 32 ......................................................... EA.43.210, EA.101.210, EA.106.90, EA.110.60 Melrose Cranes and Rigging Pty Ltd v Manitowoc Crane Group Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 904 ........................................................................... EA.118.60 Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 511; 145 ALR 391 ......................................................................................... EA.122.210 Melville Homes Pty Ltd v Prime Ceramics Services Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 211 ................................................................................................................ EA.Intro.300 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422; 77 ALJR 356; [2002] HCA 58 ............................................ EA.Dict.Pt.1.180 Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151 .................................................................. EA.122.360, EA.124.60 Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104 .................................... EA.39.210, EA.39.240 Merrey v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 62 .................................................. EA.46.150 Messiter v Hutchinson (1987) 10 NSWLR 525 ................................................ EA.131.420 Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; 224 ALR 588; 56 ACSR 487; [2005] NSWCA 444 ................. EA.4.150, EA.8.60, EA.9.90, EA.117.90, EA.118.210, EA.Intro.120 Micar Group Pty Ltd v Insul-Trade LLC (2010) 244 FLR 403; [2010] NSWSC 1391 ................................................................... EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.21.210 Microsoft Corp v CX Computer Pty Ltd (2002) 116 FCR 372; 187 ALR 362; [2002] FCA 3 .......................................................................................... EA.187.20 Mid-City Skin Cancer & Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak [2006] NSWSC 615 ...................................................................................................... EA.62.90 Middleton v The Queen (1998) 19 WAR 179 ..................................................... EA.81.240 Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 141; [2000] WASCA 200 ......... EA.41.300 Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 258; [2000] WASCA 213 ........ EA.79.480, EA.165.450 Miladinovic v The Queen (1993) 47 FCR 190; 71 A Crim R 478 ................... EA.114.330 Milano Investments Pty Ltd v Group Developers Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 13 May 1997) ................................................................. EA.26.120 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 ............................ EA.74.60, EA.79.240 Miller v Ruscio [2003] NSWSC 372 ................................................................. EA.138.150 Miller v The Queen [2011] VSCA 143 .................................................................. EA.66.60 Miller v The Queen (2015) 252 A Crim R 486; [2015] NSWCCA 206 ........... EA.55.270, EA.57.120, EA.114.330, EA.137.60 Mills v Wojcech [2011] NSWSC 86 .................................................................. EA.122.240 Minassian v Minassian [2010] NSWSC 708 ............... EA.48.270, EA.51.60, EA.140.120 Mindshare Communications Ltd v Orleans Investment Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 976 ............................................................................................ EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 55 ............................. EA.135.300 Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 ........................ EA.56.60 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co v Tyco Electronics Pty Ltd (2002) 56 IPR 248; [2002] FCAFC 315 ...................................................................... EA.80.90 Minniti v The Queen (2006) 159 A Crim R 394; [2006] NSWCCA 30 .......... EA.141.120 Mitchell v The Queen [2016] VSCA 197 ............................................................ EA.46.150 Mitsubishi Electric Australia Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (Vic) (2002) 4 VR 332; [2002] VSCA 59 .................................................... EA.118.390, EA.119.120 Mkari v Meza [2005] NSWCA 136 ....................................................................... EA.46.60 Mokbel v Attorney-General (Cth) (2007) 162 FCR 278; 244 ALR 517; [2007] FCA 1536 ............................................................................................. EA.143.60 Mokbel v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 625; 230 A Crim R 523; [2013] VSCA 118 ........................................................................................................ EA.176.30 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Mol v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 76 ............................................................. EA.101.190 Monte v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 318 ............ EA.138.150 Montgomery v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 73 ......................... EA.103.120, EA.103.150 Moore v Moore [2014] FLC 93-595; [2014] FamCAFC 113 ............................. EA.55.180 Moore v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 185 ......................................................... EA.141.90 Moran v Amoret Installations Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 106 ................................ EA.60.60 Moran v Moran (No 3) (2000) Aust Torts Reports 81-556; [2000] NSWSC 151 ............................................................................. EA.131.150, EA.131.480 Moran v Moran (No 9) (2000) Aust Torts Reports 81–558; [2000] NSWSC 219 .................................................................................................. EA.122.390 Morey v Transurban City Link Ltd [1997] ATPR 43,923 ..................................... EA.36.30 Morgan v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 33; [2011] NSWCCA 257 ........... EA.79.180, EA.79.300 Morgan v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 25 ........................................................ EA.79.150 Morley v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2010) 247 FLR 140; 5 BFRA 364; [2010] NSWCA 331 ...... EA.55.180, EA.140.60, EA.140.120 Moroccanoil Israel Ltd v Aldi Foods Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 823 ......................... EA.97.180 Morony v Reschke [2014] NSWSC 359 ........................................................... EA.131A.90 Morris, Re; Ex parte Donnelly (1997) 77 FCR 303 ......................................... EA.135.210 Mortada v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 36 ..................................................... EA.101.360 Mortgage Results Pty Ltd v Millsave Holdings Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 704 ......... EA.133.60 Moti v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 456; 218 A Crim R 204; [2011] HCA 50 ........................................................................................................................ EA.11.90 Mouroufas v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 58 .................................................... EA.116.90 Mulcahy v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 3 ............................................................. EA.136.60 Muldoon v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 105; [2008] NSWCCA 315 ....... EA.79.240, EA.137.150 Mule v The Queen [2002] WASCA 101 ............................................................ EA.165.480 Mule v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 1573; [2005] HCA 49 ........ EA.81.240, EA.165.270, EA.165.480 Mulkearns v Chandos Developments Pty Ltd (No 4) (2005) 12 BPR 22993; [2005] NSWSC 511 .......................................................................... EA.131.480 Mulvihill v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 259 ............................... EA.55.330, EA.141.120 Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 ............................................... EA.10.60, EA.81.60 Mundine v Brown (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 515 .................................. EA.69.90, EA.69.120 Munro v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 11 .................... EA.65.150, EA.65.210, EA.135.150, EA.137.60, EA.137.120, EA.141.120, EA.165.240 Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd v Secretary to Department of Business and Innovation [2011] VSC 436 .................................................... EA.130.210, EA.130.300 Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574 ...................................................................... EA.104.240 Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 ............. EA.114.240 Murdoch v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 451; [2013] VSCA 272 ........................ EA.101.150, EA.101.240, EA.101.360 Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corp (1995) 62 FCR 424 ......... EA.77.60, EA.136.60 Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 ..................................... EA.80.150, EA.106.240 Murray v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 193; 131 A Crim R 215; [2002] HCA 26 .......................................................................................................... EA.141.150 Murrell v The Queen [2014] VSCA 334 ........................................................... EA.137.120

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N NA & J Investments Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (No 4) [2012] NSWLEC 120 ................................. EA.192A.60 NAM v The Queen [2010] VSCA 95 ................................................................... EA.98.120 NAR v PPC1 (2013) 224 A Crim R 535; [2013] NSWCCA 25 ......... NSW.CPA.299D.60, NSW.CPA.299D.90, NSW.CPA.299D.330, NSW.CPA.300.30 NJB v The Queen [2010] NTCCA 5 ............................................................... EA.165A.210 NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1036 .... EA.167.30 NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2010] NSWSC 921 ..... EA.79.210, EA.79.330 NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2011] NSWSC 106 ......... EA.53.60 NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2011] NSWSC 203 ....... EA.38.240 NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 7) (1999) 161 ALR 576 .............. EA.79.180 NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 8) (1999) 161 ALR 581 ............. EA.26.150, EA.26.180 NOM v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 38 VR 618; [2012] VSCA 198 .................................................................................................................... EA.140.60 NRMA v John Fairfax [2002] NSWSC 563 ............................. EA.126A.30, EA.126B.360 NRMA Ltd v John Kerin Morgan t/as Allen Allen & Hemsley (unreported, NSW SC, Hunter J, 23 August 1996) ....................................... EA.122.270, EA.126.60 NRMA Ltd v Morgan (unreported, NSW SC, Giles CJ Comm D, 1 September 1998) .............................................................................................. EA.79.240 NRMA Ltd v Morgan (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 694 ............................................ EA.122.270 NSI Group Pty Ltd v Mokas [2006] NSWSC 1077 .......................................... EA.131.450 NSW Bar Assn v Somosi (2001) 48 ATR 562; [2001] NSWCA 285 ............... EA.135.150 NSW Crime Commission v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349 ............................................. EA.75.60 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power & Water Authority [1999] FCA 1549 .................................................................................................................. EA.69.120 Nader v Sutherland Shire Council [2008] NSWCA 265 .................................. EA.131.480 Nagle v Lavender [2002] NSWSC 611 ............................................................... EA.140.60 Nankivell v Insurance Commission of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 143 ...................................................................................................................... EA.46.60 Nash v Glennies Creek Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2014] NSWIRComm 36 ............................................... EA.122.150, EA.122.270, EA.130.240 Nasrallah v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 188 ................................................... EA.79.150 National Australia Bank v Caporale [2012] NSWSC 509 .............................. EA.108C.90 National Australia Bank Ltd v C & O Voukidis Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 258 .................................................................................................. EA.122.150 National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309; [1999] NSWSC 539 ............................................. EA.48.60, EA.57.120, EA.58.60, EA.142.60 National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (unreported, NSW SC, 6 April 1998) .... EA.128.330 National Auto Glass Supplies (Australia) Pty Ltd v Nielsen & Moller Autoglass (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 5) [2007] FCA 569 ........................................ EA.41.240 National Crime Authority v S (1991) 29 FCR 203; 54 A Crim R 307 ............ EA.118.220 National Employers Mutual General Insurance Assn Ltd v Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Ltd (1988) 17 NSWLR 223 .............................................. EA.157.60 National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer) (No 1) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 .................................. EA.79.330 National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (2001) 183 ALR 700; [2001] FCA 237 ........................................................................ EA.91.60 National Telecoms Group Ltd v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 455 ........................................................................................... EA.80.90 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Neal v The Queen [2005] TASSC 70 ................................................. EA.55.60, EA.55.330 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170; 110 ALR 449; [1992] HCA 66 ....................................................................... EA.140.60 Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2 ..................................................... EA.141.120 Nestle Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1986) 11 FCR 453 ......................................................................................................... EA.130.210 Neubecker v The Queen (2012) 220 A Crim R 585; [2012] VSCA 58 .......... EA.101.360, EA.141.120 New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 ........................................... EA.119.120, EA.119.180, EA.122.180 New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd (2009) 180 FCR 543; [2009] FCAFC 160 ...................................................................... EA.118.330, EA.118.480, EA.122.120 New South Wales v Bitsikas [2010] NSWSC 773 ............................................... EA.79.330 New South Wales v Fuller-Lyons [2015] Aust Torts Reports 82-189; [2014] NSWCA 424 ........................................................................................ EA.140.60 New South Wales v Hathaway [2010] NSWCA 184 ........................................... EA.140.60 New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226; [2014] NSWCA 47 ............. EA.46.60, EA.140.120 New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 ...................... EA.117.120, EA.119.120, EA.133.60 New South Wales v Kuru [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-893; [2007] NSWCA 141 ...................................................................................................... EA.34.60 New South Wales v Mannall [2005] NSWCA 367 .......................... EA.69.210, EA.69.240 New South Wales v Public Transport Ticketing Corp [2011] NSWCA 60 .... EA.131A.120, EA.7.30, EA.130.60, EA.130.180, EA.130.210, EA.130.240 New South Wales v Ryan [1998] FCA 1057 ...................................................... EA.130.210 New South Wales Commissioner of Police v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2007) 70 NSWLR 643; [2007] NSWCA 366; ............................................ EA.130.420 New South Wales Police Force v Winter (2011) 10 DDCR 69; [2011] NSWCA 330 ...................................................................................................... EA.46.60 Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulation (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 .................................... EA.118.210, EA.122.210, EA.Intro.120 Nezovic v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2003) 203 ALR 33 ............................................................................. EA.155.30 Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes [2008] NSWCA 246 ........................................ EA.140.60 Nguyen v Nguyen & Vu Publishing Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1166 .................... EA.79.240 Nguyen v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 557; [2007] NSWCCA 249 ......... EA.79.120, EA.79.480, EA.165.450 Nguyen v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 4 ..................... EA.20.180, EA.55.270, EA.78.60, EA.79.150, EA.Intro.120 Niaros v The Queen [2013] VSCA 249 ............................................................. EA.108.240 Nichia Corporation v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2016) 240 FCR 13; [2016] FCA 466 .......................................................................... EA.63.60 Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2012] NSWCA 383 ..................... EA.79.180, EA.79.240 Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 ...EA.101A.120, EA.59.180, EA.106.90, EA.106.120, EA.106.150, EA.138.300, EA.165.420 Nicopoulos v Commissioner for Corrective Services (2004) 148 A Crim R 74; [2004] NSWSC 562 .................................................................................. EA.130.90 Nikolaidis v Legal Services Commissioner [2007] NSWCA 130 ....................... EA.69.240 Nikolaidis v The Queen (2008) 191 A Crim R 556; [2008] NSWCCA 323 .... EA.108.150 Nine Films & Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd (2005) 65 IPR 442; [2005] FCA 356 .................................................................................... EA.122.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lvi

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Table of Cases

Ninyette v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 184 .............................................. EA.97.120 Nisan v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 265 .......................................................... EA.79.240 Niven v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 513 ........................................ EA.43.210, EA.106.90 Nobrega v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church (Sydney) (No 2) [1999] NSWCA 133 .................................................................................................. EA.131.510 Nodnara Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 140 FLR 336; 38 ATR 527 ........................................................ EA.55.60, EA.57.90, EA.131.270 Nokia Corp v Truong (2005) 66 IPR 511; [2005] FCA 1141 ............................ EA.79.150 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 ...................................... EA.108.150 Nominal Defendant v Ismail (2014) 69 MVR 343; [2014] NSWCA 432 .......... EA.79.120 Nominal Defendant v Saleh (2011) 57 MVR 412; [2011] NSWCA 16 ............ EA.46.150, EA.55.270, EA.79.240 Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; [1986] HCA 17 .............. EA.97.480, EA.101.450, EA.138.720 Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (2013) 84 NSWLR 697; [2013] NSWCA 145 ......................................... EA.144.60, EA.Intro.120 Norris v The Queen (2007) 176 A Crim R 42; [2007] NSWCCA 235 ............ EA.165.480 North Sydney Leagues’ Club Ltd v Synergy Protection Agency Pty Ltd (2012) 83 NSWLR 710; [2012] NSWCA 168 ............................................... EA.146.60 Northern Inland Council for the Environment Inc v Minister for the Environment (2013) 218 FCR 491; [2013] FCA 1419 .................................. EA.136.60 Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553; 161 ALR 318; [1999] HCA 8 .............................................................................................................. EA.118.90 Norton v Long [1968] VR 221 ........................................................................... EA.106.270 Norton v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 115 ................................................ EA.20.180 Notaras v Hugh [2003] NSWSC 167 .................................................................. EA.79.240 Nuclear Utility Technology & Environmental Corp Inc v ABC [2010] NSWSC 711 ........................................................... EA.55.90, EA.135.180, EA.135.210 Nye v New South Wales (2002) 134 A Crim R 245; [2002] NSWSC 1268 ...... EA.69.240 Nye v New South Wales (2003) 58 NSWLR 152; [2003] NSWSC 610 .............. EA.46.60

O O’Brien v Gillespie (1997) 41 NSWLR 549 ............................... EA.79.150, EA.Intro.120 O’Donnel v Dakin [1966] Tas SR 87 ............................................... EA.48.210, EA.69.120 O’Keefe v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 121 ......... EA.97.120, EA.101.185, EA.101.195, EA.101.450 O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566; [1946] ALR 535 ...... EA.Intro.120, EA.55.360, EA.101.150 O’Meara v Dominican Fathers (2003) 153 ACTR 1; [2003] ACTCA 24 ........ EA.55.180, EA.57.120 OPEL Networks Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (2010) 77 NSWLR 128; [2010] NSWSC 142 ...................................................................................................... EA.10.60 O’Reilly v Commissioners of State Bank of Victoria (1982) 153 CLR 1; 44 ALR 27 ..................................................................................................... EA.118.420 Obacelo Pty Ltd v Taveraft Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 518 ................................... EA.26.120 Obeid v Ipp [2015] NSWSC 1755 ..................................................................... EA.130.300 Obeid v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 221 ........................................................... EA.76.90 Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Assn (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd (2000) 120 FCR 146; [2000] FCA 1463 ................. EA.79.240, EA.79.390, EA.183.80 Odisho v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 19 .......................................................... EA.38.210 Offıcial Trustee v Pastro [1999] FCA 1631 ........................................................... EA.46.60 Okwume v Commonwealth [2016] FCA 1252 ....................................................... EA.97.90 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Oldfield v The Queen (2006) 163 A Crim R 242; [2006] NSWCCA 219 ........ EA.46.150, EA.165.480 Oliver v Lake Side Resort Development Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 501 ............ EA.131.390 Oliveri v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 38 .................................. EA.165.240, EA.165.360 Ollis v Melissari [2005] NSWSC 1016 ............................................................. EA.128.120 Omot v The Queen [2016] VSCA 24 ................................................................... EA.110.90 1165 Stud Road Pty Ltd v Power [2015] VSC 476 ............................................ EA.69.510 Oneflare Pty Ltd v Chernih [2017] NSWCA 195 ................................................. EA.46.60 Optimisation Australia Pty Ltd, Re [2016] NSWSC 1581 ................................ EA.118.220 Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Gilsan (International) Ltd [2006] NSWCA 171 ...... EA.176.30 Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 422 .............. EA.122.150 Orchard v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114 .......................................................... EA.33.30 Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180 ............................................................. EA.135.150 Osadebay v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 6 ......................................................... EA.165.210 Osborne Metal Industries v Bullock (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 636 ...................... EA.64.300 Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2008) 82 ALJR 1288; 249 ALR 1; [2008] HCA 37 ......................................................................... EA.122.120 Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; 159 ALR 170 .......... EA.79.120, EA.165.270, EA.165.480 Osman v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 157 ........................................................ EA.55.180 Owens v Lofthouse (2007) 5 ABC(NS) 465; [2007] FCA 1968 ......................... EA.55.510 Owens v Repatriation Commission (1995) 59 FCR 559 ..................................... EA.144.60 Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland (No 13) [2016] FCA 1153 ..... EA.79.120

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P P v Tasmania (2009) 19 Tas R 266; [2009] TASSC 81 ..................................... EA.137.60 PA v The Queen [2012] VSCA 294 ..................................................................... EA.137.60 PCR v The Queen (2013) 235 A Crim R 302; [2013] VSCA 224 ..................... EA.97.120 PGM v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 426; [2006] NSWCCA 310 ............ EA.110.90, EA.137.60 PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88 ................................................................ EA.97.480, EA.98.120, EA.101.450 PPC v Williams (2013) 238 A Crim R 25; [2013] NSWCCA 286 ..... NSW.CPA.299D.90, NSW.CPA.299D.150 PQ v Australian Red Cross [1992] 1 VR 19 ....................................................... EA.79.240 PT v The Queen [2011] VSCA 43 .................................................................. EA.165B.210 Pace v The Queen (2014) 247 A Crim R 1; [2014] VSCA 317 ...................... EA.114.240, EA.115.120 Pacer v Westpac Banking Corp (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 15 April 1996) .................................................................................................................. EA.91.60 Packard v The Queen [2018] VSCA 45 .............................................................. EA.97.120 Page v McKensey [2004] NSWCA 437 ............................................................... EA.140.60 Page v The Queen [2015] VSCA 357 .............................................. EA.97.120, EA.98.120 Paino v Paino [2005] NSWSC 1313 ................................................................... EA.79.210 Paino v Paino (2008) 40 Fam LR 96; [2008] NSWCA 276 .............................. EA.79.210 Palmer v Dolman [2005] NSWCA 361 ............................................................... EA.140.60 Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; 151 ALR 16 ............. EA.101A.120, EA.41.300, EA.55.60, EA.103.120, EA.106.150 Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Selim [2008] FCA 416 ............................... EA.79.300 Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274 .................... EA.66A.60, EA.101A.180, EA.55.60, EA.55.90, EA.55.120, EA.55.240, EA.59.180, EA.101.150, EA.135.150, EA.136.60, EA.136.150, EA.137.120, EA.165.90, EA.Intro.270 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lviii

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Table of Cases

Papazoglou v The Queen [2014] VSCA 194 ...................................................... EA.106.60 Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85; [1985] HCA 58 ............................................................. EA.55.270, EA.79.240 Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs (2007) 232 FLR 362; 243 ALR 574; [2007] NSWCA 348 .............. EA.138.60, EA.138.120, EA.138.240, EA.138.570, EA.138.630, EA.138.660 Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs (2009) 83 ALJR 494; [2009] HCA 7 ................................................................... EA.138.90, EA.138.120, EA.138.240 Parkin v O’Sullivan (2009) 260 ALR 503; [2009] FCA 1096 ........................ EA.130.210, EA.130.390 Parkinson v Alexander [2017] ACTSC 201 ..................................... EA.97.120, EA.100.60 Parkinson v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 133 ................................................... EA.55.360 Parkview Qld Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] NSWSC 1599 ................................................................................................................ EA.122.150 Parsons v The Queen [2016] VSCA 17 ...... EA.46.60, EA.46.150, EA.110.60, EA.110.90 Partington v The Queen (2009) 197 A Crim R 380; [2009] NSWCCA 232 ...... EA.76.90, EA.78.60 Pasqualotto v Pasqualotto [2013] Aust Torts Reports 82-125; [2013] VSCA 21 .......................................................................................................... EA.46.150 Pate v The Queen [2015] VSCA 110 .......................................... EA.165B.270, EA.66.180 Patel v The Queen [2012] HCA 29; (2012) 247 CLR 531; 86 ALJR 954 ........ EA.137.60 Patents, Commissioner of v Sherman (2008) 172 FCR 394; [2008] FCAFC 182 ...................................................................... EA.8.60, EA.8.90, EA.79.270 Paterson v The Queen [2004] WASCA 63 .......................................................... EA.46.150 Pathways Employment Services v West (2004) 186 FLR 330; [2004] NSWSC 903 ................................. EA.122.240, EA.128.150, EA.128.600, EA.128.780 Paton v The Queen [2011] VSCA 72 ................................................................ EA.101.360 Patrick v Capital Finance Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1249; (2004) 211 ALR 272 ................................................................................................. EA.122.360 Patrick v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 651; 241 A Crim R 153; [2014] VSCA 89 ........................................................................ EA.55.60, EA.76.90, EA.78.60 Patterson v The Queen [2001] NSWCCA 316 ............................ EA.135.150, EA.165.270 Pattison v Tasmania [2017] TASCCA 13 ........................................ EA.97.120, EA.98.180 Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd v Sporte Leisure Pty Ltd (2012) 202 FCR 286; [2012] FCAFC 51 ............................................................................................ EA.55.180 Pavicic v Webb [2010] ACTSC 37 .................................................................... EA.135.150 Pavitt v The Queen (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88 ............... EA.90.60, EA.90.270, EA.108.150 Payce Properties v BBC Hardware [1999] NSWSC 968 ................................... EA.55.510 Payless Superbarn (NSW) Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551 ..................... EA.46.150 Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 ............................................................... EA.55.180 Payne v Rowe (2012) 16 BPR 30869; [2012] NSWSC 685 ............................ EA.131.480 Payne v The Queen [2015] VSCA 291 .............................................................. EA.165.480 Peabody Resources Ltd v Macquarie Generation (unreported, NSW SC, Einstein J, 23 November 1998) ...................................................................... EA.55.510 Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619 .......................................................... EA.141.120 Peacock v The Queen (2008) 190 A Crim R 454; [2008] NSWCCA 264 ..... EA.101A.90, EA.101A.120, EA.106.120 Pearson v The Queen [2016] VSCA ................................................................... EA.98.120 Peck v WA [2005] WASCA 20 ............................................................................. EA.116.90 Pedler v Richardson (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 16 October 1997) ......... EA.140.60 Penfold v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 101 ....................................................... EA.116.90 Penney v The Queen (1998) 72 ALJR 1316; [1998] HCA 51 .......................... EA.141.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Pennington v WA [2013] WASCA 98 ................................................................ EA.165.480 Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd v Brown [2004] NSWSC 1182 ....................... EA.130.60 Penza v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 21 .................................... EA.55.330, EA.Intro.350 Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1995) 62 FCR 289; 31 ATR 445; 132 ALR 632 ............. EA.Intro.120 Perazzoli v BankSA [2017] FCAFC 204 .................... EA.117.90, EA.118.390, EA.133.60 Perish v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 89 ........................................................... EA.106.90 Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Gillett (2004) 145 A Crim R 220; [2004] NSWSC 278 ...................................................................................................... EA.91.60 Perpetual Nominees Pty Ltd v Masri Apartments Pty Ltd (2004) 183 FLR 142; 49 ACSR 714; 22 ACLC 971; [2004] NSWSC 500 ............................. EA.160.60 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v George; Estate of Conacher (No 2) (unreported, NSW SC, Einstein J, 28 November 1997) .................................. EA.77.60 Perpetual Trustees (WA) Ltd v Equuscorp Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 925 ................. EA.122.90 Perry v Powercor [2011] VSC 308 .................................................................... EA.118.390 Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580; 57 ALJR 110; 44 ALR 449; [1982] HCA 75 ....................................................... EA.98.60, EA.101.180, EA.101.190 Peterson v The Queen (1979) 41 FLR 205 ......................................................... EA.20.150 Peterson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 111 ................. EA.114.180, EA.114.240, EA.137.60 Petrolink Pty Ltd, Re [2014] FCA 1024 ............................................................ EA.131.600 Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; 55 A Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34 ........................................................................................................................ EA.89.90 Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; 69 ALJR 147; [1995] HCA 7 ..... EA.101.60, EA.101.180, EA.101.195, EA.101.210, EA.101.450, EA.137.60 Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals v Samsung Bioepis AU Pty Ltd (2017) 351 ALR 103; [2017] FCAFC 193 .................................... EA.9.180, EA.59.180, EA.76.90 Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45 ..................................... EA.104.180, EA.112.60 Phillips v The Queen (2005) 225 CLR 303; 80 ALJR 537; [2006] HCA 4 ..... EA.55.420, EA.98.120, EA.101.185, EA.101.210 Picker v The Queen [2002] NSWCCA 78 ....................................... EA.41.300, EA.46.150 Pigot’s Case (1614) 11 Co Rep 26b; 77 ER 1177 ................................................ EA.51.60 Pihiga Pty Ltd v Roche (2011) 278 ALR 209; [2011] FCA 240 ..................... EA.131.450, EA.131.540 Pinot Nominees Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 181 FCR 392; [2009] FCA 1508 ......................................................................... EA.131.510 Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd v Catchklin Pty Ltd (unreported, FCA, Finn J, 6 May 1998) ...................................................................................... EA.118.210 Pitkin v The Queen (1995) 80 A Crim R 302; 130 ALR 35 ....... EA.115.300, EA.116.120 Pittard v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 126 .............................................. EA.165.480 Pitts v Adney [1961] NSWR 535 ....................................................................... EA.131.480 Platcher v Joseph [2004] FCAFC 68 .................................................................. EA.37.240 Pledge v Roads & Traffıc Authority; Ryan v Pledge (2004) 78 ALJR 572; [2004] HCA 13 .................................................................................................. EA.54.60 Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234 ......................................................... EA.141.120 Police v Dunstall [2015] HCA 26 ...................................................................... EA.137.240 Police v Jervis (1998) 101 A Crim R 1 ............................................................... EA.90.300 Police v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243; 193 A Crim R 490; [2009] SASC 66 .......................................................................................................... EA.55.180 Police, Commissioner of v Fandakis [2001] NSWSC 586 ............................... EA.130.390 Police (NSW), Commissioner of v Guo [2016] FCAFC 62 .............. EA.4.150, EA.130.90 Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397 ................. EA.126D.30, EA.125.90, EA.128.210, NSW.CPA.301.30 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lx

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Table of Cases

Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177; 64 A Crim R 393; [1992] HCA 69 ........................................................................................ EA.90.60, EA.138.540 Pollard v The Queen (2011) 31 VR 416; [2011] VSCA 95 ............................. EA.137.120 Pollard v Wilson [2010] NSWCA 68 ................................................................... EA.79.120 Polley v Johnson [2013] NSWSC 543 .............................................................. EA.130.390 Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558 ................... EA.59.180, EA.59.210, EA.65.210, EA.165.210, EA.165.390 Pomeroy v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd (1973) 5 SASR 191 ...................... EA.87.90, EA.87.180 Poniris v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 100 .................................................... EA.Intro.350 Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 99 ................................................................. EA.140.120 Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282; [1940] HCA 43 .......................................... EA.56.120 Potts v The Queen (2012) 227 A Crim R 217; [2012] NSWCCA 229 .......... EA.Intro.350 Power v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 261; 242 A Crim R 553; [2014] VSCA 146 .................................... EA.38.210, EA.83.60, EA.101A.120, EA.60.90, EA.60.150 Powercor Australia Ltd v Perry (2011) 33 VR 548; [2011] VSCA 239 ........... EA.55.180, EA.118.360, EA.118.540 Prasad v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 23 ALD 183; 101 ALR 109 ................................................................ EA.69.270 Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217; [2004] FCAFC 122 .... EA.118.60, EA.118.360, EA.118.390 Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir [1975] HCA 27; 132 CLR 362 .................. EA.46.150 Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67; [2002] FCA 1503 ................ EA.144.90, EA.144.120 Prentice v Cummins (No 6) (2003) 203 ALR 449; [2003] FCA 1002 .............. EA.26.150, EA.40.60, EA.55.180 Presbyterian Church of Victoria Trusts Corp v Anstee [2014] VSC 426 ......... EA.122.150 Price v The Queen [1981] Tas R 306 .................................................................. EA.79.150 Priest v New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1281 .............................................. EA.118.330 Prior v Wood [2017] FCA 193 ........................................................... EA.71.60, EA.75.120 Prodduturi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 144 ALD 243; [2015] FCAFC 5 .......................................................................... EA.140.120 Protective Commissioner v B (unreported, NSW SC, Hodgson J, 23 June 1997) ............................................................................................. EA.28.120, EA.59.240 Prothonotary of the Supreme Court (NSW) v Livanes [2012] NSWCA 325 ...... EA.91.60, EA.92.60 Prothonotary of the Supreme Court (NSW), The v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341 .................................................................................................... EA.91.60, EA.92.60 Prothonotary of the Supreme Court (NSW) v Gregory [2017] NSWCA 101 ...... EA.91.60 Proud v The Queen (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 44 ............................................. EA.165.360 Public Transport Ticketing Corp v Integrated Transit Solutions [2010] NSWSC 607 .................................................................................................. EA.130.240 Puchalski v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 220 ..... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.65.270, EA.67.60, EA.141.120 Punch v Council of the NSW Bar Assn (2007) 69 NSWLR 485; [2007] NSWCA 93 .......................................................................................................... EA.8.90 Punna-Ophasi v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 46 ................................................ EA.141.150 Purcell v Cruising Yacht Club of Australia [2001] NSWSC 926 ....................... EA.48.180 Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328 ..... EA.126D.30, EA.125.90, EA.128.210, NSW.CPA.301.30 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Q QBE Insurance (Aust) Ltd v CGU Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd (2012) 83 NSWLR 589; [2012] NSWSC 377 ....................................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537; 247 ALR 273; [2008] FCAFC 69 .................................................................................. EA.140.60, EA.140.120 Qoro v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 220 ....................................... EA.56.60, EA.114.240 Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 ........ EA.97.450, EA.101.150, EA.101.360 Quarrell v The Queen [2011] VSCA 125 ............................................................ EA.98.120 Queen’s Case (1820) Br & B 284; 129 ER 976 ................................................... EA.44.60 Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; [1998] FCA 1200 .... EA.55.270, EA.60.60, EA.76.90, EA.79.180, EA.79.240, EA.136.60 Quinlan v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 106; [2006] NSWCCA 284 .......... EA.81.60, EA.137.120 Quintano v BW Rose Pty Ltd (2008) 186 A Crim R 448; [2008] NSWSC 1012 ........................................................................................ EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.67.90

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v A2 (No 4) (2015) 253 A Crim R 574; [2015] NSWSC 1306 ...................... EA.18.120 v A2 (No 14) [2015] NSWSC 1544 ................................................................... EA.42.60 v A2 (No 21) [2016] NSWSC 24 .................................................... EA.37.270, EA.42.60 v AB [2001] NSWCCA 496 .......................................................... EA.97.180, EA.98.180 v AB [2011] ACTSC 204 .................................................................................. EA.65.150 v AGJ (unreported, NSW CCA, 30 October 1997) ................... EA.164.90, EA.165.210 v AGJ (unreported, NSW CCA, Hunt, Hulme, Graham, 31 October 1997) .............................................................................................................. EA.165.480 v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563; 159 A Crim R 327; [2005] VSCA 288 ................. EA.39.120 v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176; [2000] NSWCCA 372 ............ EA.97.180, EA.98.180, EA.101.150 v ATM [2000] NSWCCA 475 ......................................................................... EA.101.360 v Abdallah [1999] NSWCCA 380 .................................................................... EA.60.150 v Abdallah [2001] NSWCCA 506 .................................................................... EA.46.150 v Abdul-Razzak [2006] NSWCCA 195 ............................................................ EA.137.60 v Abdullah [1999] NSWCCA 188 .................................................................. EA.130.150 v Abebe & Mulugeta (unreported, WA CCA, 26 April 1994) ....................... EA.106.150 v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 ......... EA.55.360, EA.81.60, EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.141.120, EA.Intro.120 v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; [1999] NSWCCA 197 ............... EA.38.60, EA.60.60, EA.66.180 v Adams [2004] NSWCCA 279 ............................. EA.114.240, EA.116.90, EA.116.120 v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; 116 A Crim R 38; [2000] NSWCCA 357 ....................................................................... EA.79.180, EA.114.330, EA.Intro.120 v Afu, R v Caleo (No 11) [2018] NSWSC 190 .............................................. EA.114.240 v Ahmadi [1999] NSWCCA 161 ...................................................................... EA.139.30 v Ahmed [2001] NSWCCA 450 ..................................................................... EA.165.480 v Al-Harazi (No 6) [2017] ACTSC 63 ............................................................. EA.37.270 v Albu (1995) 65 SASR 439; 84 A Crim R 11 .............................................. EA.138.150 v Alchin (2006) 200 FLR 204; [2006] ACTSC 53 .................................. EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 ................................................................ EA.103.120 v Ali [2000] NSWCCA 177 ............................................................................ EA.108.120 v Ali (2001) 122 A Crim R 498; [2001] NSWCCA 218 ................................. EA.116.90 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Ali [2015] NSWCCA 72 ........................................................ EA.101.190, EA.137.150 Ali [2015] QCA 191 ...................................................................................... EA.66.300 Allen [1989] VR 736 ..................................................................................... EA.46.150 Allen (unreported, NSW CCA, 1 December 1996) ...................................... EA.137.60 Ambrosi (2004) 144 A Crim R 67; [2004] NSWCCA 23 ......................... EA.165.360, EA.165.480, EA.192.80 v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386 .... EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.65.270 v Anderson [2000] 1 VR 1; (2001) 111 A Crim R 19; [2000] VSCA 16 ..... EA.79.480, EA.141.150 v Anderson (2001) 127 A Crim R 116; [2001] NSWCCA 488 .................... EA.141.150 v Anderson [2002] NSWCCA 141 ..................................................................... EA.89.90 v Anderson (unreported, Vic FC, 2 April 1992) ............................................ EA.165.330 v Andrews [1987] 1 AC 281 ............................................................................. EA.65.150 v Andrews [2003] NSWCCA 7 ....................................................................... EA.101.150 v Andrews (2010) 107 SASR 471; [2010] SASCFC 5 .................................. EA.130.390 v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412 .................................................... EA.90.260, EA.139.150 v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; 15 A Crim R 88 .................. EA.26.120, EA.55.180 v Appleby (1996) 88 A Crim R 456 ............................................................... EA.165.480 v Arnott [2009] VSCA 299; 214 A Crim R 500 ............................ EA.46.60, EA.46.120 v Arthurell (unreported, NSW SC, Hunt CJ ................................................. EA.108A.60 v Arvidson (2008) 185 A Crim R 428; [2008] NSWCCA 135 ...................... EA.137.60, EA.137.150, EA.137.210 v Asfour (1992) 60 A Crim R 409 ................................................................. EA.165.420 v Ashcroft [1965] 1 Qd R 81 .......................................................... EA.80.90, EA.80.150 v Ashley (2014) 253 A Crim R 285; [2014] NTSC 15 ................................... EA.65.150 v Ashley (2014) 286 FLR 226; [2014] NTSC 26 ......... EA.56.60, EA.66.60, EA.66.150 v Ashton (2003) 143 A Crim R 354; [2003] TASSC 140 ............................... EA.38.150 v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 ................................................................ EA.104.120 v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 ............ EA.126D.30, EA.125.90, EA.128.210, NSW.CPA.301.30 v Associated Northern Collieries (1912) 14 CLR 387; [1911] HCA 73 ........ EA.57.210 v Atallah [2001] 3 VR 437; (2001) 125 A Crim R 463; [2001] VSCA 194 .................................................................................................................... EA.87.210 v Atroushi [2001] NSWCCA 406 ................................................................... EA.101.150 v Attalah [2004] NSWCCA 318 ..................................................................... EA.165.360 v Attallah [2005] NSWCCA 277 ..... EA.106.120, EA.108.90, EA.108.180, EA.137.120 v Ayoub [2004] NSWCCA 209 ....................................................... EA.46.60, EA.141.90 v Azzopardi (unreported, NSW CCA, Spigelman CJ, Sully, Hidden JJ, 1 October 1998) .................................................................................................. EA.110.60 v B (1993) 66 A Crim R 192 ....................................................................... EA.165A.150 v B O (No 2) (2012) 15 DCLR (NSW) 317; [2012] NSWDC 195 ................ EA.18.150 v BAZ [2005] QCA 420 ............................................................ EA.165.450, EA.165.480 v BBR [2010] 1 Qd R 546; 195 A Crim R 330; [2009] QCA 178 ................. EA.13.210 v BCQ (2013) 240 A Crim R 153; [2013] QCA 388 .................................... EA.165.480 v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 ............... EA.55.240, EA.60.60, EA.66.60, EA.108.150, EA.135.90, EA.135.150, EA.136.150, EA.137.60, EA.137.120 v BDX (2008) 24 VR 288; 194 A Crim R 57; [2009] VSCA 28 ................ EA.103.120, EA.106.150, EA.141.150 v BFG (2013) 115 SASR 499; 229 A Crim R 510; [2013] SASCFC 24 ..... EA.165.480 v BL [2015] NTSC 85 ...................................................................................... EA.85.210 v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; [2002] NSWCCA 60 ................................. EA.165.450 v Baartman [2000] NSWCCA 298 ........................................... EA.165.450, EA.165.480

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R v Bacash [2001] 3 VR 428; (2001) 124 A Crim R 535; [2001] VSCA 193 .................................................................................................................... EA.87.210 R v Baden-Clay [2015] QCA 265 ........................................................................ EA.55.330 R v Baden-Clay (2016) 90 ALJR 1013; [2016] HCA 35 ................ EA.20.180, EA.55.330 R v Bailey (1993) 97 Cr App R 365 .................................................................... EA.90.270 R v Bajic (2005) 12 VR 155; 154 A Crim R 196; [2005] VSCA 158 ............... EA.41.300 R v Baker [1999] NSWCCA 277 ......................................................................... EA.41.300 R v Baker [2001] NSWCCA 151 ................................................. EA.165.240, EA.165.360 R v Baladjam (No 19) [2008] NSWSC 1441 .................................. EA.57.210, EA.87.180 R v Baldwin [2004] NSWCCA 21 ..................................................................... EA.101.360 R v Balogun [2004] NSWCCA 72 ....................................................................... EA.116.90 R v Baltensberger (2004) 90 SASR 129; 151 A Crim R 265; [2004] SASC 392 ................................................................................. EA.165.450, EA.165.480 R v Banic [2004] NSWCCA 322 ......................................................................... EA.46.150 R v Barakat (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 1256 ........................................................... EA.18.120 R v Barbaro (2000) 112 A Crim R 551; [2000] NSWCCA 192 ...... EA.59.180, EA.66.60 R v Barbaro (unreported, NSW CCA, 20 July 1998) ....................................... EA.128.600 R v Barker (1988) 34 A Crim R 141 ..................................................................... EA.76.90 R v Barker [2010] EWCA 4 ............................................................................ EA.165A.210 R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; 171 A Crim R 315; [2007] VSCA 95 ............... EA.89.90, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 R v Barron [1975] VR 496 .................................................................................. EA.20.150 R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 ................. EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.110.90 R v Bartlett (unreported, Vic CCA, 14 September 1994) ................................. EA.165.420 R v Barton [2004] NSWCCA 229 ..................................................................... EA.101.185 R v Basanovic (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 1100 ............................................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 ...................................................................... EA.165.360 R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 ............................................. EA.165.240, EA.165.420 R v Beck [1990] 1 Qd R 30 ................................................................................. EA.81.240 R v Belford (2011) 208 A Crim R 256; [2011] QCA 43 ................. EA.90.270, EA.90.360 R v Bell [2002] NSWCCA 2 .................................................................................. EA.98.60 R v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141; [1980] HCA 26 ...................... EA.121.120 R v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282; [1999] NSWCCA 163 ..................... EA.137.150, EA.165.450 R v Bennett (2004) 88 SASR 6; 144 A Crim R 215; [2004] SASC 52 ............. EA.116.90 R v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153; 176 A Crim R 195; [2007] VSCA 202 ............ EA.137.150 R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 ................................................................ EA.141.150 R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603; (1998) 102 A Crim R 56 ....................................... EA.141.120 R v Betancur-Galvis (2003) 142 A Crim R 527; [2003] NSWCCA 333 ......... EA.141.120 R v Bevan [2002] NSWCCA 224 ........................................................................ EA.44.120 R v Bikic [2001] NSWCCA 537 ........................................................................ EA.128.360 R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 ...................................................... EA.46.90, EA.46.150 R v Bisht (2013) 234 A Crim R 309; [2013] QCA 238 ...................................... EA.66.300 R v Blackburn [2005] 2 Cr App R 30 ................................................................. EA.85.210 R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326; [2000] NSWCCA 61 ......... EA.114.240, EA.116.90, EA.137.60, EA.137.210 R v Bolte [2010] SASC 112 ................................................................................. EA.55.180 R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 ....................................................................... EA.79.120 R v Booty (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, Abadee, Simpson JJ, 19 December 1994) ......................................................................... EA.41.300, EA.104.120 R v Bormann (2010) 244 FLR 105; [2010] ACTSC 145 ................................. EA.138.120 R v Boskovitz [1999] NSWCCA 437 ................................................................. EA.101.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxiv

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v Bourchas (2002) 113 A Crim R 413; [2002] NSWCCA 373;at [14] ............ EA.4.270 v Bowhay (No 3) [1998] NSWSC 660 ............................................................. EA.137.60 v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311; 121 ER 730 .................................................... EA.128.360 v Bozatsis (1997) 97 A Crim R 296 ............................................................... EA.138.420 v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 ........................................................................ EA.90.60 v Braham [1976] VR 547 ............................................................................... EA.117.120 v Braun (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 24 October 1997) ........................ EA.85.210 v Brdarovski (2006) 166 A Crim R 366; [2006] VSCA 231 ........................ EA.165.450 v Bretherton [2013] NSWSC 1247 .................................................................. EA.137.60 v Bridgeman (1980) 24 SASR 278 ................................................................ EA.137.150 v Briske [2007] SASC 314 ............................................................................. EA.141.150 v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121; 102 A Crim R 367 .................................... EA.13.210 v Brooks [2017] NSWSC 188 ..................................... EA.55.90, EA.55.330, EA.184.20 v Brooks (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 261 ........................................... EA.66.120, EA.66.150 v Brown [2011] QCA 16 ................................................................................. EA.101.210 v Browne (1987) 30 A Crim R 278 ................................................................ EA.114.240 v Brownlow (2003) 86 SASR 114; 142 A Crim R 201; [2003] SASC 262 .................................................................................................................... EA.112.60 v Brownlowe (1987) 7 NSWLR 461 .............................................................. EA.114.330 v Bruno (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson CJ, Powell JA, Studdert J, 7 July 1997) ........................................................................................................ EA.116.90 v Buchanan (2004) 152 A Crim R 302; [2004] NSWSC 816 ..................... EA.114.180, EA.114.240 v Buckland [1977] 2 NSWLR 452 ................................................................... EA.20.300 v Buckley (2004) 149 A Crim R 122; [2004] VSCA 185 ............................... EA.41.300 v Bueti (1997) 70 SASR 370 .......................................................................... EA.114.330 v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 .................................................................. EA.46.150 v Burns (2001) 123 A Crim R 226; [2001] SASC 263 ................................. EA.165.480 v Burns (2003) 137 A Crim R 557; [2003] NSWCCA 30 ............................ EA.103.120 v Burrell [2001] NSWSC 120 .......................................................................... EA.137.90 v Burt (2003) 140 A Crim R 555; [2003] NSWCCA 248 ............................ EA.141.150 v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335 .......... EA.55.60, EA.55.90, EA.90.270, EA.137.90 v C (1993) 60 SASR 467 ................................................................................. EA.79.120 v C, CA [2015] SASCFC 143 ........................................................................ EA.101.360 v CBK [2014] QCA 35 ..................................................................................... EA.141.90 v CHS (2006) 159 A Crim R 560; [2006] VSCA 19 .................................... EA.101.360 v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 21; [2004] NSWCCA 280 .... EA.97.240, EA.97.450, EA.135.270 v Calides (1983) 34 SASR 355 ...................................................................... EA.141.150 v Callaghan [2001] 4 VR 79; (2001) 124 A Crim R 126; [2001] VSCA 209 .................................................................................................................. EA.114.330 v Camilleri (2001) 127 A Crim R 290; [2001] NSWCCA 527 .................... EA.165.450 v Camilleri (2007) 169 A Crim R 197; [2007] NSWCCA 36 ..................... EA.138.450, EA.138.510, EA.138.540, EA.138.570 v Campbell [2004] NSWCCA 314 ................................................................... EA.55.150 v Campbell (2007) 175 A Crim R 79; [2007] VSCA 189 ....... EA.115.300, EA.165.450 v Campbell (unreported, Vic CCA, 14 November 1994) .............................. EA.165.480 v Capaldo [2015] SASCFC 56 ......................................................................... EA.27.120 v Carbone [2016] NSWSC 1591 ............................................................. EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 v Carpenter (2000) 117 A Crim R 272; [2011] ACTSC 71; 212 A Crim R 1 ......................................................................... EA.114.150, EA.114.240, EA.116.90 v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 .................................................................. EA.79.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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R v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; 136 A Crim R 167; [2002] HCA 55 .......... EA.97.390, EA.101.420 R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 .............................................. EA.114.240, EA.115.150 R v Cassar [1999] NSWSC 436 .......................................................................... EA.79.150 R v Cassar, Sleiman and Kalache (Judgment No 12) [1999] NSWSC 352 .... EA.108.120, EA.108.150 R v Cassar (Judgment No 28) [1999] NSWSC 651 ............................................. EA.32.90 R v Cassar and Sleiman (Judgment No 17) [1999] NSWSC 436 ...................... EA.48.180 R v Cassebohm (2011) 109 SASR 465; 209 A Crim R 496; [2011] SASCFC 29 ................................................................................................. EA.165B.210 R v Cavkic (2005) 12 VR 136; [2005] VSCA 182 ............................................. EA.141.90 R v Cavkic, Athanasi and Clarke (No 2) [2009] VSCA 43 .............................. EA.141.120 R v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341; [2009] VSCA 43 ................ EA.55.330, EA.141.90 R v Ceniccola [2010] NSWSC 1554 ................................................................... EA.110.60 R v Centraco [2005] NSWCCA 11 .................................................................... EA.101.150 R v Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis & Francis [1989] AC 346 ....... EA.125.90 R v Cerullo [2003] NSWCCA 201 .................................................................... EA.101.150 R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; 60 A Crim R 305 ....................................... EA.165.360 R v Chai [2002] NSWCCA 512 ....................................................................... EA.Intro.350 R v Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 ................................................................. EA.20.150 R v Chami [2004] NSWCCA 36 ........................................................................ EA.137.120 R v Chan (2002) 131 A Crim R 66; [2002] NSWCCA 217 ...... EA.101.150, EA.165.330, EA.165.450 R v Chanthovixay [2004] NSWCCA 285 ..................... EA.55.60, EA.55.330, EA.137.120 R v Chapman [2002] NSWCCA 105 ................................................................... EA.110.60 R v Chase [2018] NSWCCA 71 ........................................................................ EA.101.190 R v Chen (2002) 130 A Crim R 300; [2002] NSWCCA 174 ....................... EA.101A.120, EA.141.150, EA.165.210 R v Cheng [2015] SASCFC 189 .......................................................................... EA.66.300 R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 ......................................................... EA.43.210, EA.106.90 R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263 ............ EA.55.330, EA.81.60, EA.165.480 R v Cittadini (2008) 189 A Crim R 492; [2008] NSWCCA 256 ..................... EA.101.150 R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 .... EA.101.150, EA.101.270, EA.135.150, EA.135.210, EA.165.90, EA.165.360 R v Clark [2005] VSCA 294 ................................................................................ EA.190.40 R v Clarke (1995) 78 A Crim R 226 ................................................................. EA.141.120 R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 ..... EA.90.60, EA.90.210, EA.114.240, EA.115.300, EA.116.90 R v Clarke (2005) 159 A Crim R 281; [2005] QCA 483 ................................... EA.141.90 R v Clarke (unreported, NSW CCA, 8 March 1996) .......................................... EA.20.150 R v Cliff [2018] NSWSC 78 ................................................................................. EA.137.60 R v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396; 64 A Crim R 451 ................................... EA.165.390 R v Clout (1995) 41 NSWLR 312 ............................................... EA.165.300, EA.165.450 R v Clune (1999) 72 SASR 420 ....................................................... EA.20.180, EA.39.120 R v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 ........................................................................ EA.39.240 R v Coates (unreported, WA CCA, 1 March 1994) ............................................ EA.116.90 R v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385 ................ EA.41.300, EA.89.90, EA.114.240, EA.116.90, EA.165.270 R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 ....... EA.101.90, EA.101.120, EA.101.240, EA.101.300, EA.101.360 R v Colley [2003] NSWCCA 323 ........................................................................ EA.79.150 R v Collins [2001] NSWCCA 386 ..................................................................... EA.165.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxvi

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v Collisson (2003) 139 A Crim R 389; [2003] NSWCCA 212 .................... EA.128.540 v Colville (2003) 137 A Crim R 543; [2003] NSWCCA 23 ........................... EA.20.180 v Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257 .................................................................... EA.104.240 v Conley (1982) 30 SASR 226 ....................................................................... EA.115.150 v Connors [2000] NSWCCA 470 ............................................. EA.165.210, EA.165.480 v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52 ............. EA.81.60, EA.137.120, EA.137.210, EA.165.480 v Cook (unreported, NSW CCA, 24 August 1998) .................... EA.116.90, EA.116.120 v Coombe (unreported, NSW CCA, Hunt CJ ............................ EA.138.60, EA.138.240 v Cooney [2013] NSWCCA 312 ........................................................................ EA.90.60 v Copeland (1997) 194 LSJS 1 ...................................................................... EA.165.480 v Corak (1982) 30 SASR 404 ........................................................................ EA.104.240 v Cordell [2009] VSCA 128 ........................................................................... EA.141.150 v Corish (2006) 96 SASR 207; 170 A Crim R 162; [2006] SASC 369 ........ EA.55.180 v Corke (1989) 41 A Crim R 292 .................................................................. EA.114.330 v Cornelissen [2004] NSWCCA 449 ...................... EA.83.60, EA.101.150, EA.101.360 v Cornell [2015] NSWCCA 258 ................................ EA.192A.40, EA.95.60, EA.98.90 v Cornwell (2003) 57 NSWLR 82; 141 A Crim R 164; [2003] NSWSC 97 .................................................................................................................... EA.138.120 v Cosford and McDonnell-Smith [2007] SASC 147 ..................................... EA.141.120 v Coss [2015] QCA 33 ..................................................................................... EA.66.300 v Coswello [2009] VSCA 300 .......................................................................... EA.46.120 v Coulstock (1998) 99 A Crim R 143 ............................................................ EA.138.240 v Covill (2000) 114 A Crim R 111; [2000] NSWCCA 231 .......................... EA.165.240 v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153 .............................................................. EA.125.90 v Crampton (1991) 92 Cr App R 372 .............................................................. EA.85.210 v Creamer (1989) 43 A Crim R 92 ................................................................ EA.136.240 v Creed [2000] NSWCCA 280 ....................................................................... EA.165.540 v Crisologo (1998) 99 A Crim R 178 .......................................... EA.66.60, EA.135.270 v Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118; [2007] VSCA 41 ................................................ EA.89.90 v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15; 147 A Crim R 585; [2004] VSCA 164 ........ EA.101.150 v Cunningham (1992) 61 A Crim R 412 ......................................................... EA.26.150 v D (1997) 45 NSWLR 744; 98 A Crim R 151 .............................................. EA.20.180 v D [2008] 2 ACTLR 225; [2008] ACTSC 82 .............................................. EA.114.180 v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227; [2002] NSWCCA 328 .... EA.108.150, EA.136.150, EA.165.210, EA.165.480 v DCC (2004) 11 VR 129; 151 A Crim R 4; [2004] VSCA 230 ................. EA.101.360 v DG (2010) 28 VR 127; [2010] VSCA 173 ................................................... EA.137.60 v DM [2006] QCA 79 ....................................................................................... EA.66.300 v D’Orta-Ekenaike [1998] 2 VR 140; (1998) 99 A Crim R 454 ..................... EA.81.60, EA.165.480 v DRF [2015] NSWCCA 181 ......................................................... EA.90.90, EA.90.270 v DRG (2004) 150 A Crim R 496; [2004] SASC 394 .......... EA.165B.270, EA.101.360 v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31; [1990] 1 All ER 29 ......................................... EA.32.360 v Dalley (2002) 132 A Crim R 169; [2002] NSWCCA 284 ........................ EA.138.150, EA.138.510, EA.138.570 v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 ....................................................................... EA.27.120 v Daniel (2010) 207 A Crim R 449; [2010] SASCFC 62 ............................ EA.141.150 v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185 .......... EA.55.570, EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.135.210, EA.137.60, EA.137.120 v Darmody (2010) 25 VR 209; 213 A Crim R 79; [2010] VSCA 41 .... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.Intro.300 v Darrington (1979) 1 A Crim R 124 ................................................................ EA.80.90 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 ...... EA.59.180, EA.114.90, EA.114.240, EA.115.150, EA.115.180, EA.116.90 R v Davari [2016] QCA 222 .............................................................................. EA.165.480 R v Davies (2005) 11 VR 314; 153 A Crim R 217; [2005] VSCA 90 ............ EA.114.150 R v Davis [1999] NSWCCA 15 ..................................................... EA.20.180, EA.165.480 R v Davis [2007] VSCA 276 ................................................................................ EA.41.300 R v Dawson-Ryan (2009) 104 SASR 571; [2009] SASC 259 .......................... EA.101.240 R v De-Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381 ............................................................. EA.114.240 R v Dean (No 2) (unreported, NSW SC, Dunford J, 12 March 1997) ............. EA.32.180, EA.65.150, EA.65.180 R v Debono (2012) 225 A Crim R 585; [2012] VSC 476 ................................ EA.130.360 R v Debs (2008) 191 A Crim R 231; [2008] VSCA 240 .................................. EA.101.150 R v Delaney (1989) 88 Cr App R 338 ................................................................. EA.85.210 R v Demiroz [2003] NSWCCA 146 ..................................................................... EA.116.90 R v Deng [2001] NSWCCA 153 ........................................................................ EA.139.150 R v Dennis [1999] NSWCCA 23 ..................................................... EA.41.300, EA.46.150 R v Dennis Bauer (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2017] HCATrans 269 ....................... EA.97.120 R v Derbas (1993) 66 A Crim R 327 ................................................................ EA.165.420 R v Diamond (unreported, NSW CCA, 19 June 1998) ..................................... EA.104.180 R v Dickman (2017) 91 ALJR 686; [2017] HCA 24 .................... EA.114.240, EA.137.60, EA.137.90, EA.137.120, EA.137.150 R v Diez-Orozco [2003] NSWSC 1050 ........................................ EA.165.240, EA.165.360 R v Dimian (1995) 83 A Crim R 358 .................................................................. EA.189.40 R v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215 ...................................................................... EA.85.120 R v Dixon [2001] NSWCCA 39 ................................................... EA.101.360, EA.108.210 R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2; [2013] 1 Cr App R 32 .............................. EA.79.120 R v Dodd (2002) 135 A Crim R 32; [2002] NSWCCA 418 ............................. EA.116.120 R v Doherty (2003) 6 VR 393; [2003] VSCA 158 ........................................... EA.141.120 R v Doney (2001) 126 A Crim R 271; [2001] NSWCCA 463 ......................... EA.165.480 R v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432 ....................... EA.85.150, EA.85.210, EA.90.240, EA.189.140 R v Dookheea (2017) 91 ALJR 960; [2017] HCA 36 ........................................ EA.141.90 R v Doolan [2014] QCA 246 ............................................................................. EA.165.480 R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 ................................. EA.55.270, EA.76.90, EA.79.150 R v Duckworth [2016] QCA 30 ........................................................................... EA.55.330 R v Dudko (2002) 132 A Crim R 371; [2002] NSWCCA 336 ........................... EA.69.240 R v Duncan [2004] NSWCCA 431 ................................................ EA.84.150, EA.114.180 R v Dungay (2001) 126 A Crim R 216; [2001] NSWCCA 443 ........................... EA.90.60 R v Dupas (2010) 211 A Crim R 81; [2011] VSC 180 .................. EA.79.120, EA.80.150, EA.135.270 R v Dupas (No 3) [2009] VSCA 202 ............................................. EA.116.90, EA.165.390 R v Duryea (2008) 103 SASR 70; 192 A Crim R 286; [2008] SASC 363 ..... EA.101.150 R v Dwyer [1999] NSWCCA 47 ........................................................................ EA.141.150 R v Dyers (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, Newman, Hidden JJ, 24 October 1997) .................................................................................................... EA.66.60 R v E (1995) 89 A Crim R 325 .......................................................................... EA.141.150 R v EG [2002] ACTSC 85 ................................................................................... EA.13.300 R v ERJ (2010) 200 A Crim R 270; [2010] VSCA 61 ..................................... EA.165.540 R v Eade (2000) 118 A Crim R 449; [2000] NSWCCA 369 ........................... EA.138.240 R v Eade (2002) 131 A Crim R 390; [2002] NSWCCA 257 ............................. EA.37.150 R v Eades [1972] Crim LR 99 ........................................................................... EA.106.240 R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542; 51 A Crim R 397 ................................... EA.90.300 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxviii

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R v Edwards (unreported, Vic CCA, Charles, Callaway JJA, Vincent AJA, 20 December 1995) ....................................................................................... EA.141.120 R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 ....... EA.101.360, EA.103.60, EA.104.90, EA.104.180, EA.112.60, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 R v El-Hayek (2004) 144 A Crim R 90; [2004] NSWCCA 25 ....................... EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.165.480 R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 ........ EA.110.90, EA.112.60, EA.165.480, EA.192.40 R v El Masri [2010] NSWSC 1277 ..................................................................... EA.65.240 R v El Mostafa (2007) 6 DCLR(NSW) 305; [2007] NSWDC 326 .................. EA.115.150 R v Eldridge [2002] NSWCCA 205 ............................................... EA.114.240, EA.116.90 R v Ellem [1994] 2 Qd R 549; (1994) 75 A Crim R 370 ................................. EA.104.120 R v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 747 ............................................................................... EA.Intro.350 R v Ellis (1998) 100 A Crim R 49 ....................................................................... EA.20.180 R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319 .... EA.98.120, EA.101.60, EA.101.180, EA.101.240, EA.101.450, EA.104.180, EA.112.60 R v Ellis (2010) 107 SASR 94; 199 A Crim R 249; [2010] SASC 118 .......... EA.101.240 R v Em [2003] NSWCCA 374 ................. EA.90.90, EA.90.210, EA.137.60, EA.137.150, EA.138.120, EA.138.270 R v Esho; R v Sako [2001] NSWCCA 415 .................... EA.38.150, EA.81.60, EA.192.80 R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 .............. EA.27.120, EA.38.150, EA.66.210, EA.81.60, EA.85.210, EA.85.240, EA.85.270, EA.85.300, EA.135.210 R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 .......................................... EA.116.90 R v Everitt [1921] VLR 245 ................................................................................. EA.110.90 R v Eyles [2002] NSWCCA 510 .......................................................................... EA.97.120 R v F (2002) 129 A Crim R 126; [2002] NSWCCA 125 ........... EA.101.120, EA.101.240 R v FAE [2014] QCA 69 .................................................................................... EA.165.480 R v FD (2006) 160 A Crim R 392; [2006] NSWCCA 31 .................................... EA.53.90 R v FE [2013] NSWSC 1692 ............... EA.90.150, EA.90.210, EA.138.120, EA.138.540, EA.139.120 R v Fahad (2004) 146 A Crim R 169; [2004] VSCA 28 .................................. EA.116.120 R v Fairbairn [2011] ACTSC 78; 212 A Crim R 32 ....................... EA.59.180, EA.66.60, EA.Intro.120 R v Falzon [2018] HCATrans 68 ........................................................................... EA.55.90 R v Falzon (No 2) [1993] 1 Qd R 618 .............................................................. EA.165.360 R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 ...................... EA.89.150, EA.101.210, EA.141.120 R v Farler (1837) 8 C & P 106 ......................................................................... EA.165.360 R v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399; [2001] NSWSC 3 ................................... EA.138.270 R v Favata [2006] VSCA 44 .............................................................................. EA.165.450 R v Feiloakitau (unreported, Qld CA, 14 December 1993) .............................. EA.114.240 R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531; [2009] VSCA 198 ...................... EA.46.120, EA.46.150 R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66 ......... EA.78.60, EA.90.60, EA.165.240, EA.165.270, EA.165.450 R v Fetherston [2006] VSCA 278 ...................................................................... EA.101.360 R v Filitis [2004] NSWCCA 68 ......................................................................... EA.114.240 R v Finlay (2007) 178 A Crim R 373; [2007] QCA 400 .................................. EA.165.300 R v Finn (2014) 119 SASR 207; [2014] SASCFC 46 ................................... EA.165B.210 R v Fish (2002) 131 A Crim R 172; [2002] NSWCCA 196 ............................ EA.164.150 R v Fisher [2001] NSWCCA 380 ............................. EA.114.120, EA.114.240, EA.116.90 R v Flavel [2001] NSWCCA 227 ...................................................................... EA.101.150 R v Fleming [2017] SASCFC 135 ..................................................................... EA.101.150 R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 ....................... EA.97.120, EA.97.480, EA.98.450, EA.101.60, EA.101.195, EA.101.450 R v Fletcher [2015] NSWSC 1630 ...................................................................... EA.18.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Flood [1999] NSWCCA 198 ................................................. EA.165.240, EA.165.330 Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 17 ...................................................................... EA.101.210 Folbigg (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; [2005] NSWCCA 23 ........................... EA.101.360 Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290; (2000) 105 A Crim R 1 ..................................... EA.46.150 Folli [2001] NSWCCA 531 ...................................................................... EA.165B.270 Ford [1998] NSWSC 96 .............................................................................. EA.114.180 Ford [2006] QCA 142 ................................................................................. EA.165.480 Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306 ......... EA.55.390, EA.55.600, EA.97.120, EA.97.480, EA.101.190, EA.101.195, EA.101.450, EA.137.210 v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 .................. EA.101.150, EA.101.180, EA.101.360 v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 ........................................................................ EA.79.240 v Fowler [2000] NSWCCA 142 ................................ EA.38.60, EA.38.150, EA.165.480 v Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166; [2003] NSWCCA 321 ....................... EA.141.120, EA.165.90, EA.165.240, EA.165.270, EA.165.450, EA.165.480, EA.192.100 v Fowler (unreported, NSW SC, 15 May 1997) ........................ EA.103.60, EA.103.120 v Frangulis [2006] NSWCCA 363 ................................................................... EA.90.270 v Franicevic [2010] QCA 36 ............................................................................ EA.116.90 v Fraser [1998] NSWSC 286 ......................................................................... EA.101.360 v Frazer [2002] NSWCCA 59 .......................................................................... EA.184.20 v Frugtniet [1999] 2 VR 293; (1999) 107 A Crim R 161; [1999] VSCA 58 .................................................................................................. EA.85.150, EA.139.90 v Fuge (2001) 123 A Crim R 310; [2001] NSWCCA 208 ........................... EA.165.480 v Fuller [2001] NSWCCA 390 ...................................................................... EA.165.480 v Fulling [1987] QB 426 ................................................................ EA.84.60, EA.85.210 v Fung (2002) 136 A Crim R 95; [2002] NSWCCA 479 ............................. EA.101.150 v G [1997] 2 VR 609 ...................................................................................... EA.101.360 v G [2005] NSWCCA 291 .................................................................................. EA.81.60 v GA (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson CJ, James J, Sperling J, 17 July 1997) ................................................................................................................ EA.85.210 v GAC (2007) 178 A Crim R 408; [2007] NSWCCA 315 ..... EA.101.190, EA.101.450, EA.137.60 v GAC (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson CJ, McInerney, Sully JJ, 1 April 1997) ......................................... EA.38.150, EA.135.90, EA.137.60, EA.192.100 v GAJ [2011] QCA 141 .................................................................................... EA.20.180 v GAO [2012] QCA 54 ................................................................................... EA.165.480 v GAR [2003] NSWCCA 224 ............................. EA.135.180, EA.137.150, EA.165.480 v GED (2003) 141 A Crim R 135; [2003] NSWCCA 296 ............................. EA.46.150 v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419; [2000] FCA 1618 ................................ EA.81.60, EA.84.60 v GJH (2001) 122 A Crim R 361; [2001] NSWCCA 128 ............................ EA.165.480 v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; 125 A Crim R 315; [2001] NSWCCA 413 ..................................................... EA.79.240, EA.137.60, EA.137.120, EA.137.150 v GM [2016] NSWCCA 78 ..................................... EA.97.120, EA.98.120, EA.101.240 v GTN (2003) 6 VR 150; [2003] VSCA 38 ................................................... EA.165.480 v GVV (2008) 20 VR 395; 184 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170 .......... EA.165B.270, EA.101.360, EA.165.480 v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 ............ EA.13.180, EA.13.270, EA.13.330, EA.165.180 v Gale (2012) 217 A Crim R 487; [2012] NSWCCA 174 ............ EA.98.90, EA.98.120 v Galea (2004) 148 A Crim R 220; [2004] NSWCCA 227 ........ EA.103.60, EA.141.90 v Gallagher [1998] 2 VR 671; (1997) 96 A Crim R 300 ................................. EA.89.90 v Gallagher [2013] NSWSC 1102 ................................................................... EA.90.240 v Gallagher [2015] NSWCCA 228 ..................... EA.138.570, EA.138.630, EA.138.660 v Galli (2001) 127 A Crim R 493; [2001] NSWCCA 504 ........................... EA.137.150 v v v v v v v v

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Gao [2003] NSWCCA 390 .............................................................................. EA.81.60 Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439; [2001] NSWCCA 381 ........................ EA.20.270 Garlin (1991) 56 A Crim R 195 ............................................ EA.114.300, EA.115.360 Garth (1994) 73 A Crim R 215 .................................................................... EA.90.240 Gassy (No 3) [2005] SASC 496 .................................................................. EA.141.120 Gazzignato (2004) 143 A Crim R 584; [2004] TASSC 6 ............................ EA.85.210 Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 ............ EA.59.180, EA.66.60, EA.101.360, EA.114.60, EA.114.90, EA.115.60 v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242; [2004] VSCA 72 ............................................... EA.79.480 v George (1981) 4 A Crim R 12 ...................................................................... EA.20.150 v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363; [2001] VSCA 18 ............................. EA.101.150 v Georgiou (2005) 153 A Crim R 288; [2005] NSWCCA 189 ...................... EA.59.180 v Georgiou [2005] NSWCCA 237 .................................................. EA.48.60, EA.48.180 v Gibbs (2004) 154 ACTR 1; 146 A Crim R 503; [2004] ACTSC 63 ........ EA.101.180 v Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim R 180; [1999] NSWCCA 370 ....... EA.59.90, EA.59.180, EA.114.240 v Gibson [2002] NSWCCA 401 ................................................. EA.114.210, EA.137.60 v Gilbert (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, Levine, Dowd JJ, 10 December 1998) ......................................................................... EA.41.300, EA.101.360 v Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479; [1999] NSWCCA 21 ............................ EA.66.180 v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 ..................................................................... EA.79.120 v Giovannone (2002) 140 A Crim R 1; [2002] NSWCCA 323 ..................... EA.48.180, EA.101.150, EA.101.360 v Giri (2001) 121 A Crim R 568; [2001] NSWCCA 197 ......... EA.20.180, EA.165.450 v Gittany (No 3) (2013) 238 A Crim R 149; [2013] NSWSC 1670 ............ EA.122.180 v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465; [2000] NSWCCA 83 ............. EA.8.60, EA.18.60, EA.59.180, EA.165.480 v Glencourse (1995) 78 A Crim R 256 .......................................................... EA.165.480 v Glennon (No 2) (2001) 7 VR 631 ............................................................... EA.101.360 v Glennon (No 3) [2005] VSCA 262 ............................................................. EA.101.360 v Glossop [2001] NSWCCA 165 ................................................................... EA.137.120 v Glover [2002] NSWCCA 376 ..................................................................... EA.165.450 v Goldenburg (1988) 88 Cr App R 285 ........................................................... EA.85.210 v Gonzalez-Betes [2001] NSWCCA 226 ................................. EA.101A.120, EA.108.60 v Goodall [1982] VR 33 ................................................................................. EA.114.240 v Goss [2007] VSCA 116 ............................................................................... EA.165.480 v Gould [2009] VSCA 130 ............................................................................. EA.165.480 v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8; [2000] NSWCCA 303 ............... EA.8.90, EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.65.210 v Graham (unreported, NSW CCA, Newman, Levine, Barr JJ, 2 September 1997) .............................................................................................. EA.89.150 v Grant (2001) 127 A Crim R 312; [2001] NSWCCA 486 ............................ EA.90.300 v Grattan [2005] NSWCCA 306 .................................................. EA.66.60, EA.101.150 v Gray (2004) 150 A Crim R 496; [2004] SASC 394 .................................. EA.165.480 v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 ............................................................ EA.20.150 v Green (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 December 1993) ................................. EA.165.420 v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8 .......................... EA.97.450, EA.101.150, EA.101.360 v Grogan (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1192 ......................................................... EA.137.120 v H (1996) 85 A Crim R 481 ........................................................................... EA.84.150 v H (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; 98 A Crim R 71 .... EA.97.450, EA.101.150, EA.101.180, EA.101.360 v H (1997) 92 A Crim R 168 ........................................................... EA.60.60, EA.66.60 v H [1999] NSWCCA 255 .............................................................................. EA.136.150 v v v v v v v

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HAB [2006] QCA 80 ..................................................................................... EA.66.300 HBO [2017] QCA 18 ................................................................................ EA.165B.270 HJS [2000] NSWCCA 205 .......................................................................... EA.108.210 HMB [2000] NSWCCA 554 ........................................................................ EA.114.240 Hackett [2006] VSCA 138 ........................................................................... EA.116.120 Haddad (2000) 116 A Crim R 12; [2000] NSWCCA 351 ......................... EA.138.150 Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138; [2004] NSWCCA 89 ....................... EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 v Haidley [1984] VR 229 ............................................................................... EA.114.240 v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 ....................................................................... EA.79.480 v Hall [2001] NSWSC 827 ............................................................. EA.48.180, EA.88.60 v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 ............................................................... EA.110.60 v Hamilton (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 March 1996) ................................. EA.141.120 v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503 ............ EA.66A.60, EA.59.210, EA.81.240 v Hanrahan [1967] 2 NSWR 717 .................................................................. EA.103.120 v Harbulot [2003] NSWCCA 141 ........................ EA.165.90, EA.165.240, EA.165.270 v Hare [2007] SASC 427 ............................................................................... EA.165.480 v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427 ..... EA.100.60, EA.101.185, EA.101.190, EA.101.195, EA.101.450, EA.192.40 v Hart (2002) 131 A Crim R 609; [2002] NSWCCA 313 .............................. EA.110.60 v Hartley (unreported, SA CCA, Prior, Ollson, Perry, 6 September 1994) .............................................................................................................. EA.165.450 v Hartwick [2005] VSCA 264 ........................................................................ EA.165.480 v Harvey [1988] Crim LR 241 ......................................................................... EA.85.210 v Harvey (unreported, NSW CCA, Beazley JA, Smart, James JJ, 11 December 1996) ................................................................................................ EA.78.60 v Hasan [2005] 2 Cr App R 22 .......................................................................... EA.81.60 v Haughbro (1997) 135 ACTR 15 ...................... EA.138.150, EA.138.420, EA.138.690 v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 ..................................................................... EA.44.120 v Hawi (No 2) (2011) 216 A Crim R 64; [2011] NSWSC 1648 ................. EA.130.150, EA.130.390 v Heaney (2009) 22 VR 164; 194 A Crim R 562; [2009] VSCA 74; ............ EA.46.150 v Heaton [1993] Crim LR 593 ........................................................................... EA.84.60 v Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444; [2013] SASCFC 97 .......................................... EA.90.60 v Heinze (2005) 153 A Crim R 380; [2005] VSCA 124 ................................. EA.55.180 v Hellwig [2007] 1 Qd R 17; 161 A Crim R 489; [2006] QCA 179 ............. EA.66.300 v Helmhout (2000) 112 A Crim R 10; [2000] NSWSC 208 ........................... EA.90.240 v Helmhout [2000] NSWSC 185 ...................................................................... EA.85.210 v Helmhout (2001) 125 A Crim R 257; [2001] NSWCCA 372 ....................... EA.90.60, EA.138.270, EA.138.420, EA.138.450, EA.138.480, EA.138.540, EA.138.570, EA.138.690 v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269 ........................................................... EA.79.480 v Hennessy [2001] NSWCCA 36 ......... EA.114.60, EA.114.90, EA.115.60, EA.165.450 v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 ............................................................................ EA.114.330 v Heron (The Times, 22 November 1993) ......................................................... EA.84.60 v Hettiarachchi [2009] VSCA 270 ................................................................... EA.110.90 v Heuston (1995) 81 A Crim R 387 ................................................................. EA.116.90 v Heuston (2003) 140 A Crim R 422; [2003] NSWCCA 172 ................... EA.165B.270 v Heyes (2006) 12 VR 401; 160 A Crim R 435; [2006] VSCA 86 ................ EA.81.60, EA.165.480 v Hickey (1995) 89 A Crim R 554 ................................................................. EA.165.330 v Hilder (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 ...................................................................... EA.60.150 v v v v v v v

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Table of Cases

R v Hill [2014] QCA 107 ..................................................................................... EA.55.330 R v Hines (No 2) (2014) 242 A Crim R 316; [2014] NSWSC 990 .................... EA.26.60, EA.26.150 R v Hirst (2013) 116 SASR 300; [2013] SASCFC 54 ..................................... EA.165.480 R v Ho (2002) 130 A Crim R 545; [2002] NSWCCA 147 .............................. EA.165.480 R v Hodge [2002] NSWCCA 10 .......................................................... EA.81.60, EA.89.90 R v Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292 ...................................................... EA.38.60, EA.38.150 R v Holland [2002] NSWCCA 469 ................................................................... EA.165.480 R v Hore [2005] NSWCCA 3 ....................................................... EA.128.540, EA.128.690 R v Horsfall (1989) 44 A Crim R 345 ........................................... EA.137.60, EA.165.450 R v Horton (1998) 104 A Crim R 306 ................................................. EA.56.60, EA.81.60 R v Houssein [2003] NSWCCA 74 ................................................ EA.37.150, EA.104.180 R v Howard (2005) 152 A Crim R 7; [2005] NSWCCA 25 .............. EA.56.60, EA.78.60, EA.79.120 R v Hudson [2016] QCA 80 ............................................................................... EA.165.270 R v Humble (2009) 193 A Crim R 324; [2009] SASC 51 ................................ EA.165.480 R v Hunt [2003] NSWCCA 301 ........................................................................ EA.165.480 R v Hunt (2014) 286 FLR 59; [2014] NTSC 19 ......................... EA.138.120, EA.138.540 R v Hunter [2014] QCA 59 ................................................................................ EA.165.480 R v Hutton (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 282 ................................................................... EA.31.60 R v IK (2004) 89 SASR 406; 147 A Crim R 237; [2004] SASC 280 ............ EA.101.360, EA.141.120 R v Ibrahim [2001] NSWCCA 72 ........................................................................ EA.137.60 R v Ibrahim [2007] NSWSC 1140 ....................................................................... EA.55.180 R v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 ..... EA.114.240, EA.116.90 R v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265; [2009] SASC 89 ........................................ EA.101.240 R v J [2000] NSWCCA 246 ........................................................... EA.101.150, EA.110.90 R v J (2005) 154 A Crim R 139; [2005] VSCA 153 ..................................... EA.165B.270 R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600 .......................................... EA.79.120, EA.79.300, EA.110.60 R v J [No 2] [1998] 3 VR 602 .......................................................................... EA.165.480 R v JBV [2002] NSWCCA 212 .......................................................................... EA.165.450 R v JCG (2001) 127 A Crim R 493; [2001] NSWCCA 504 ............................ EA.165.480 R v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142; [2009] ACTSC 104 ................................................ EA.84.60 R v JGW [1999] NSWCCA 116 ....................................................... EA.184.20, EA.191.20 R v JJN [2003] NSWCCA 402 ............................... EA.165.270, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 R v JK [2005] QCA 307 ..................................................................................... EA.165.480 R v JL [2007] QCA 131 ..................................................................................... EA.165.480 R v JRW [2014] NTSC 52 .................................................................................... EA.97.120 R v JS (2007) 175 A Crim R 108; [2007] NSWCCA 272 .............................. EA.Intro.300 R v JSM (2013) 117 SASR 535; 235 A Crim R 73; [2013] SASCFC 96 ...... EA.103.120, EA.108.60 R v JTB [2003] NSWCCA 295 ........................................................ EA.13.210, EA.13.300 R v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 196 ..................................................................... EA.45.150 R v Jackson (1987) 8 NSWLR 116 ....................................................................... EA.10.60 R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462 ....................... EA.165.210, EA.165.240, EA.165.360 R v Jacobson (Ruling No 5) [2014] VSC 554 ................................... EA.56.60, EA.135.90 R v Jakimov [2007] VSCA 9 .............................................................................. EA.165.480 R v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45; [2000] FCA 1195 .............. EA.114.180, EA.114.240 R v James (unreported, NSW CCA, 30 July 1998) ..................... EA.118.120, EA.118.600 R v Jamieson (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 ............................................. EA.79.120, EA.137.60 R v Jang [1999] NSWSC 1040 .................................... EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.65.210 R v Jarrett [2012] NSWCCA 81 .......................................................................... EA.90.240 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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R R R R R R R R R R R R R

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R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

Jeffrey (1991) 60 A Crim R 384 .................................................................... EA.79.240 Jenkyns (1993) 71 A Crim R 1 ................................................ EA.137.60, EA.165.450 Jennings [2010] NSWCCA 193 ................................................. EA.46.60, EA.101.190 Jensen (2009) 23 VR 591; [2009] VSCA 266 ............................................. EA.55.180 Jiminez (2000) 119 A Crim R 299; [2000] NSWCCA 390 ...................... EA.138.120, EA.165.450 v Johnson [2013] QCA 91 .............................................................................. EA.141.150 v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 ................. EA.165B.270, EA.165.450, EA.165.480, EA.165.540 v Johnston [2004] NSWCCA 58 ......................... EA.165.210, EA.165.240, EA.165.360 v Joiner (2002) 133 A Crim R 90; [2002] NSWCCA 354 ........................... EA.101.210 v Jones [1978] 2 All ER 718 ........................................................ EA.48.210, EA.69.120 v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 .............................................................. EA.165.480 v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 .............................................................................. EA.79.180 v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; 129 A Crim R 408; [2002] VSCA 77 .................. EA.79.240, EA.90.270, EA.137.150 v K (1997) 96 A Crim R 443 .................................................... EA.165.450, EA.165.540 v K (2003) 59 NSWLR 431; 144 A Crim R 468; [2003] NSWCCA 406 ....... EA.9.120, EA.137.60 v KDY (2008) 185 A Crim R 270; [2008] VSCA 104 .................................. EA.141.150 v KH [2002] ACTSC 108 ............................................................................... EA.110.120 v Kalajdic (2005) 157 A Crim R 300; [2005] VSCA 160 ............................ EA.165.480 v Kalazjich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 ............................................................. EA.101.150 v Kaldor (2004) 150 A Crim R 271; [2004] NSWCCA 425 ........................ EA.141.120 v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; [2002] SASC 294 ......................................... EA.79.480 v Kassoua [1999] NSWCCA 13 ..................................................................... EA.101.150 v Kaukura (unreported, NSW SC, Badgery-Parker J, 13 August 1997) ........ EA.32.180 v Kazzi (2003) 140 A Crim R 545; [2003] NSWCCA 241 ................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.65.150 v Keir (2002) 127 A Crim R 198; [2002] NSWCCA 30 .............................. EA.165.480 v Kelsall (No 3) (2015) 249 A Crim R 148; [2015] NSWSC 253 ............ EA.126B.300 v Kemble (1990) 91 Cr App R 178 .................................................................. EA.23.120 v Kennedy [1998] NSWSC 671 ................................................ EA.165.450, EA.165.480 v Kesisyan [2003] NSWCCA 259 .............................................. EA.60.150, EA.165.480 v Khan (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 22 November 1995) ...................... EA.18.120 v Khazaal [2006] NSWSC 1061 .................................................................... EA.130.390 v Kingswell [1998] NSWSC 412 .............................. EA.38.240, EA.38.270, EA.116.90 v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330 .............. EA.53.90, EA.114.90, EA.115.60, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 v Klamo (2008) 18 VR 644; 184 A Crim R 262; [2008] VSCA 75 ............... EA.79.480 v Klobucar [2013] ACTSC 118 .......................................................................... EA.78.60 v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450; [1999] NSWCCA 279 ........ EA.38.60, EA.38.150 v Knight (2001) 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 114 ............................. EA.81.60 v Knight [2005] NSWCCA 241 .......................... EA.137.120, EA.165.240, EA.165.450 v Knight [2010] QCA 372 .............................................................................. EA.165.450 v Koeleman [2000] 2 VR 20; [2000] VSCA 141 .......................................... EA.141.120 v Kolalich (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson CJ, Newman, Hidden JJ, 17 June 1996) ................................................................................................ EA.138.150 v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399; [2002] SASC 326 ............................ EA.101.360 v Kostic (2004) 151 A Crim R 10; [2004] SASC 406 .................................. EA.114.240 v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123; (1999) 105 A Crim R 243; [1999] VSCA 27 .............................................................. EA.79.480, EA.141.120, EA.165.450 v v v v v

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Uniform Evidence Law

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Table of Cases

R v Kovacs (2000) 111 A Crim R 374; [2000] NSWCCA 74 ..... EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.137.60 R v Kragujevic (unreported, SA CCA, Prior, Olsson, Duggan JJ, 17 April 1996) ................................................................................................................ EA.20.180 R v Kranz (1991) 53 A Crim R 331 .................................................................. EA.165.420 R v Krezic [2017] QCA 122 ................................................................................. EA.90.270 R v Kuruvinakunnel [2012] QCA 330 ............................................................... EA.141.120 R v Kuzmanovic [2005] NSWSC 771 .................................................................. EA.65.150 R v L, GA [2015] SASCFC 166 ........................................................................... EA.27.120 R v LB (2011) 246 FLR 466; [2011] NTCCA 4 ................................................. EA.55.180 R v LDV (No 2) [2013] NSWDC 215 ................................................ EA.90.60, EA.90.270 R v LL (unreported, NSW SC, Smart J, 1 April 1996) ......................................... EA.84.60 R v LR [2006] 1 Qd R 435; (2006) 156 A Crim R 354; [2005] QCA 368 ..... EA.165.480 R v LRG (2006) 16 VR 89; 175 A Crim R 404; [2006] VSCA 288 ................ EA.141.120 R v LTP [2004] NSWCCA 109 .................................................... EA.165.450, EA.165.540 R v Ladocki [2004] NSWCCA 336 .............................................. EA.138.150, EA.138.450 R v Lam (2002) 135 A Crim R 302; [2002] NSWCCA 377 ........... EA.79.120, EA.79.150 R v Lamb [2002] NSWSC 323 .......................................................................... EA.101.150 R v Lane (2011) 221 A Crim R 309; [2011] NSWCCA 157 ................................ EA.81.60 R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 ..................................................... EA.26.150, EA.189.40 R v Lau (unreported, NSW CCA, Priestley JA, Abadee, David Kirby JJ, 2 December 1998) ............................................................................................ EA.165.480 R v Lavery (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 ............................................................. EA.39.120 R v Lawrence [1984] 3 NSWLR 674 .................................................................. EA.110.60 R v Lawrence (unreported, NSW CCA, 19 April 1979) ..................................... EA.46.150 R v Laws (2000) 116 A Crim R 70; [2000] NSWSC 885 .................................... EA.9.120 R v Lawson [2000] NSWCCA 214 ........................................................................ EA.60.60 R v Le [2000] NSWCCA 49 ............................................................... EA.55.60, EA.66.180 R v Le [2001] NSWSC 174 .................................................................................... EA.38.60 R v Le (2002) 130 A Crim R 256; [2002] NSWCCA 193 ......... EA.114.240, EA.135.150, EA.165.270 R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186 ....... EA.38.60, EA.38.150, EA.38.210, EA.Intro.350 R v Leak [1969] SASR 172 .................................................................................. EA.41.300 R v Leask [1999] NSWCCA 33 ......................................................................... EA.101.150 R v Lebler [2003] NSWCCA 362 ...................................................................... EA.165.480 R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 .................................................................................. EA.90.60 R v Lee (2000) 50 NSWLR 289; [2000] NSWCCA 444 ........................ NSW.CPA.296.30 R v Lee [2001] ACTSC 133 ................................................................................. EA.79.120 R v Lee (unreported, NSW CCA, Cole JA, Dowd, Sperling JJ, 5 May 1997) ................................................. EA.38.330, EA.115.300, EA.165.450, EA.189.40 R v Lemura [1998] NSWSC 699 ................................................. EA.165.450, EA.165.540 R v Leroy [2000] NSWCCA 302 .................................................. EA.114.180, EA.114.240 R v Lester [2010] QCA 152 ................................................................................... EA.89.90 R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 ............... EA.76.90, EA.78.60, EA.79.150 R v Leung [2012] NSWSC 1451 ................................................. EA.126B.300, EA.90.270 R v Lewis (1987) 29 A Crim R 267; 88 FLR 104 ........................... EA.79.120, EA.79.240 R v Lewis [1998] NSWSC 408 .......................................................................... EA.165.450 R v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180 .... EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.190.120, EA.Intro.350 R v Lewis (unreported, NSW CCA, 8 September 1998) ................................... EA.165.450 R v Lewis (unreported, NSW SC, Dowd J, 25 October 1996) ............................. EA.4.270 R v Li [1993] 2 VR 80 ........................................................................................... EA.90.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

R v Li (2003) 140 A Crim R 288; [2003] NSWCCA 386 ......................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.165.210, EA.165.450 R v Li [2003] NSWCCA 407 ............................................................................. EA.101.360 R v Liddy (2002) 81 SASR 22; [2002] SASC 19 ............................................. EA.165.480 R v Lieske (2006) 166 A Crim R 213; [2006] ACTSC 97 ............. EA.85.180, EA.85.240, EA.90.270, EA.138.450 R v Linehan [1921] VLR 582 ............................................................................ EA.164.150 R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547; [2004] NSWCCA 287 ...... EA.46.120, EA.46.150 R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 ........................................................................ EA.137.150 R v Lister [1981] 1 NSWLR 110 ......................................................................... EA.26.210 R v Livingstone (2004) 150 A Crim R 117; [2004] NSWCCA 407 ................. EA.165.210 R v Livingstone [2018] QCA 3 ............................................................................ EA.137.60 R v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 ............................................................................ EA.27.150 R v Loader (2004) 89 SASR 204; 147 A Crim R 312; [2004] SASC 234 ......... EA.55.90, EA.165.480 R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 ...... EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.101.150, EA.101.180, EA.101.270 R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 ............................................................... EA.101.150 R v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 475; [2006] NSWSC 586 ............................. EA.130.390 R v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 526; [2006] NSWSC 648 ............ EA.59.180, EA.81.90, EA.142.60 R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 328; [2006] NSWSC 638 ...................................... EA.128.540 R v Lonie [1999] NSWCCA 319 ............................ EA.165.210, EA.165.360, EA.165.450 R v Lowe [1997] 2 VR 465 .................................................................................. EA.90.270 R v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 ........................ EA.165.300, EA.165.420, EA.165.450 R v Lozano (unreported, NSW CCA, Hunt CJ ........... EA.38.150, EA.38.330, EA.60.150, EA.165.240, EA.165.450, EA.192.100 R v Lu [2007] NSWSC 1259 ............................................................................. EA.131.360 R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; (1991) 55 A Crim R 361 ...................................... EA.79.120 R v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83 ........................ EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.103.120, EA.114.180, EA.137.120 R v Ly (unreported, NSW CCA, 25 May 1994) ................................................ EA.165.420 R v Lyberopolous [2002] NSWCCA 280 ............................................................... EA.89.90 R v Lynch [1999] NSWCCA 32 ............................................................................. EA.55.60 R v M (unreported, NSW CCA, 19 August 1996) ......................................... EA.165A.150 R v M, RB (2007) 172 A Crim R 73; [2007] SASC 207 .................................. EA.141.120 R v MC [2009] VSCA 122 ................................................................................. EA.165.480 R v MCC [2014] QCA 253 ................................................................................ EA.165.480 R v MCJ [2017] QCA 11 ................................................................................... EA.165.480 R v MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 ............................ EA.165B.270, EA.108.150, EA.192.80 R v MG (2006) 175 A Crim R 342; [2006] VSCA 264 ............... EA.165B.240, EA.46.60 R v MK (2012) 223 A Crim R 572; [2012] NSWCCA 110 ............................. EA.137.150 R v ML [2009] VSCA 106 ............................................................ EA.101.360, EA.141.120 R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519; [2000] NSWCCA 78 ......... EA.101.360, EA.141.120 R v MM [2004] NSWCCA 364 ................................ EA.55.390, EA.138.120, EA.138.510 R v MM [2014] NSWCCA 144 .............................. EA.101.150, EA.101.190, EA.137.150 R v MMJ (2006) 166 A Crim R 501; [2006] VSCA 226 ................ EA.89.90, EA.165.480 R v MMK [2005] NSWCCA 273 ......................................................................... EA.116.90 R v MR [2013] NSWCCA 236 ...................... EA.98.60, EA.98.90, EA.98.120, EA.98.150 R v MRK [2005] NSWCCA 271 .......................................................................... EA.141.90 R v MSK (2004) 61 NSWLR 204; 148 A Crim R 453; [2004] NSWCCA 308 .................................................................................................................... EA.27.180 R v MacDonald (1996) 84 A Crim R 508 ......................................................... EA.165.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxxvi

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Table of Cases

R v MacPherson [2006] 1 Cr App R 30 ................................................................ EA.13.60 R v Macarthur [2005] NSWCCA 65 ................................................................. EA.128.690 R v Macraild (unreported, NSW CCA, Sully, Dunford, Simpson JJ, 18 December 1997) ..................................... EA.59.180, EA.60.60, EA.87.120, EA.135.90 R v Macris (2004) 147 A Crim R 99; [2004] NSWCCA 261 ........ EA.20.180, EA.89.150 R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 ...... EA.55.270, EA.79.150, EA.114.330, EA.136.60, EA.137.60, EA.137.120, EA.165.450, EA.Intro.120 R v Magoulias [2003] NSWCCA 143 ................................................................. EA.144.60 R v Maher [2005] ACTSC 41 .............................................................................. EA.55.240 R v Maklouf [1999] NSWCCA 94 ................................................ EA.115.300, EA.115.330 R v Mallah (2005) 154 A Crim R 150; [2005] NSWSC 358 ............................. EA.90.270 R v Malouf (unreported, NSW CCA, Meagher JA, Studdert, Sully JJ, 1 November 1996) ...................................................................... EA.165.210, EA.165.360 R v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295 ........... EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.65.210, EA.65.330 R v Manning (2014) 239 A Crim R 348; [2014] QCA 49 .................................. EA.55.330 R v Manning [2017] QCA 23 ............................................................................... EA.55.180 R v Mansfield [1978] 1 All ER 134 ................................................................... EA.101.150 R v Mansour (unreported, NSW SC, Levine J, 19 November 1996) ................. EA.38.270 R v Mansour (unreported, NSW SC, Levine J, 26 November 1996) ................. EA.20.150 R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17 ........................................................................ EA.46.150 R v Markuleski (2001) 125 A Crim R 186; 52 NSWLR 82; [2001] NSWCCA 290 ............................................................................................... EA.165.480 R v Marriott (unreported, WA CCA, Pidgeon, Rowland, Owen JJ, 15 November 1995) ............................................................................................ EA.138.150 R v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370 ........................... EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.108.150 R v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 ................. EA.55.270, EA.76.90, EA.78.60, EA.79.150 R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190; [2000] NSWCCA 210 ........................ EA.56.60, EA.114.240, EA.116.90 R v Martin [2006] VSCA 299 ............................................................................ EA.165.480 R v Martin (2007) 99 SASR 213 [2007] SASC 336 .......................................... EA.141.90 R v Martin (No 6) [2017] NSWSC 1344 ........................................... EA.53.60, EA.53.180 R v Mason [2000] NSWCCA 82 .......................................................................... EA.144.60 R v Massey [2009] ACTCA 12 .......................................................................... EA.114.150 R v Matonwal & Amood [2016] NSWCCA 174 .......... EA.97.120, EA.98.120, EA.98.150 R v Matthews [2004] NSWCCA 259 ................................................................. EA.101.360 R v Matthews (unreported, NSW CCA, 28 May 1996) .................... EA.89.90, EA.89.150 R v May (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 595 .................................................................. EA.87.120 R v Mayberry [2000] NSWCCA 531 ........................................... EA.165.450, EA.165.480 R v Mayhew [2010] ACTSC 41 ......................................................................... EA.128.540 R v McBride [2008] QCA 412 ........................................................................... EA.141.150 R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 ............................................................ EA.114.150 R v McCormack (No 3) [2003] NSWSC 645 .............. EA.46.60, EA.46.150, EA.135.150 R v McDonald [2001] NSWCCA 363 ............................................................... EA.114.240 R v McDonald [2011] SASCFC 57 ................................................................... EA.141.120 R v McDowell [1997] 1 VR 473 .......................................................................... EA.46.150 R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 .................................................................. EA.80.150 R v McGibbony [1956] VLR 424 ........................................................................ EA.20.150 R v McGoldrick [1998] NSWSC 121 .................................................................. EA.97.450 R v McGovern (1991) 92 Cr App R 228 ............................................................. EA.85.210 R v McKellar [2000] NSWCCA 523 ................................................................. EA.115.150 R v McKenzie (unreported, NSW CCA, Wood CJ ............................................ EA.165.480 R v McKeough [2003] NSWCCA 385 ................................................................. EA.138.60 R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553; [1999] VSCA 127 ........................................ EA.46.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

R v McLaughlan (2008) 185 A Crim R 97; 218 FLR 158; [2008] ACTSC 49 ...................................................................................................................... EA.85.210 R v McMahon (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 June 1996) ..................................... EA.189.40 R v McNamara (2002) 131 A Crim R 140; [2002] NSWCCA 248 ................ EA.101.150, EA.137.120, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 R v McNamara (unreported, NSW CCA, 15 December 1995) .......................... EA.46.150 R v McNiven [2011] VSC 397 ............................................................................. EA.85.210 R v McSmith [2002] NSWCCA 68 .................................................................... EA.101.150 R v Meakin (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1006 .......................... EA.55.60, EA.66.60, EA.78.60 R v Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 396 ......................... EA.101.360, EA.108.150, EA.165.480 R v Medcalfe [2002] ACTSC 83 .......................................................................... EA.90.240 R v Mendham (1993) 71 A Crim R 382 ............................................................ EA.165.270 R v Mendoza (2007) 173 A Crim R 157; [2007] VSCA 120 ............................. EA.116.90 R v Menzies [1982] 1 NZLR 40 .......................................................................... EA.79.150 R v Merlino [2004] NSWCCA 104 ............................ EA.89.90, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 .................................. EA.55.60, EA.137.60, EA.141.120 R v Milat (unreported, NSW SC, Hunt CJ, 9 April 1996) ............................... EA.101A.90 R v Milat (unreported, NSW SC, 22 April 1996) ............................................... EA.38.240 R v Milat (unreported, NSW SC, 23 April 1996) ............................ EA.20.150, EA.38.270 R v Miletic [1997] 1 VR 593 ............................................................................. EA.165.480 R v Miller (1980) 25 SASR 170 ........................................................................ EA.115.150 R v Miller [2004] 1 Qd R 548; [2003] QCA 404 ................................................. EA.20.90 R v Milton [2004] NSWCCA 195 ............................ EA.97.120, EA.101.450, EA.165.210 R v Mir [1989] Crim LR 894 ............................................................................. EA.104.240 R v Mirza [2004] 2 WLR 201; [2004] 1 All ER 925 ........................................... EA.9.120 R v Mitchell [2008] 2 Qd R 142; (2008) 174 A Crim R 52; [2007] QCA 267 .................................................................................................................. EA.165.480 R v Mitchell (unreported, NSW CCA, 5 April 1995) ....................................... EA.165.480 R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174 .......................... EA.85.210 R v Mohammadi (2011) 112 SASR 17; [2011] SASCFC 154 ............................ EA.27.120 R v Mora (unreported, Vic CCA, Phillips CJ, Southwell, Smith AJJA, 30 May 1996) ........................................................................................................ EA.20.180 R v Moran [1999] NSWCCA 92 ........................................................................ EA.114.360 R v Morgan [2009] VSCA 225 .......................................................................... EA.116.120 R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526; 213 A Crim R 530; [2009] VSCA 291 .......... EA.46.150 R v Moss (1990) 91 Cr App R 371 ...................................................................... EA.85.210 R v Mrish (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 15 August 1996) ............................ EA.73.90 R v Mrish (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 4 October 1996) ........................... EA.65.330 R v Muca (unreported, SA CCA, Millhouse, Olsson, Williams JJ, 26 September 1996) ............................................................................................ EA.165.450 R v Muller [1996] 1 Qd R 74 ......................................................................... EA.165A.150 R v Muller (2013) 7 ACTLR 296; 273 FLR 215; [2013] ACTCA 15 .............. EA.13.180, EA.13.210 R v Munce [2001] NSWSC 1072 ......................................................................... EA.85.210 R v Munday (No 1) [2016] VSC 26 .................................................................... EA.85.210 R v Murch (2014) 119 SASR 427; [2014] SASCFC 61 ................................... EA.135.270 R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 ....................................................................... EA.110.60 R v Murphy [2000] NSWCCA 297 .................................................................... EA.165.330 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12 .................................................................... EA.165.480 R v Murray [2016] QCA 342 ............................................................................. EA.165.480 R v NCT (2009) 26 VR 247; [2009] VSCA 240 ................................................. EA.79.480 R v NJF (unreported, NSW CCA, 5 June 1997) ............................................... EA.108.150 R v NKS [2004] NSWCCA 144 ......................................................................... EA.101.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxxviii

Uniform Evidence Law

Table of Cases

R R R R R R R R R R R

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R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628; [2005] NSWCCA 278 ............. EA.136.240, EA.165.480 Naa (2009) 76 NSWLR 271; [2009] NSWSC 851 .................. EA.85.150, EA.139.60 Nabalarua (unreported, NSW CCA, 19 December 1997) .... EA.138.240, EA.138.420 Namie [2011] QCA 304 ................................................................................. EA.116.90 Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433 ............................. EA.101.60, EA.101.195, EA.137.180 Naudi [1999] NSWCCA 259 ......................................................................... EA.89.150 Navarolli [2010] Qd R 27; (2009) 194 A Crim R 96; [2009] QCA 49 ...... EA.55.180 Ncanana 1948 (4) SA 399 ........................................................................... EA.165.360 Neda (unreported, NSW CCA, 9 December 1994) ........................................ EA.46.90 Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57; (1991) 52 A Crim R 303 ......................................... EA.53.60 Nelson (2004) 41 MVR 10; [2004] NSWCCA 231 .................. EA.90.90, EA.90.240, EA.114.240, EA.137.60 v Nemeth [2002] NSWCCA 281 .................................................................... EA.165.270 v Newland (1997) 98 A Crim R 455 ................................................................ EA.20.300 v Ngatikaura (2006) 161 A Crim R 329; [2006] NSWCCA 161 ................. EA.101.150 v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467; [2001] NSWSC 595 .................................. EA.102.90 v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 .............. EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.114.240, EA.116.90, EA.137.60, EA.137.150, EA.165.210 v Nguyen (2000) 118 A Crim R 479; [2001] VSCA 1 .................................. EA.165.480 v Nguyen [2000] NSWCCA 285 ................................................. EA.114.240, EA.116.90 v Nguyen [2002] NSWCCA 342 ....... EA.20.180, EA.114.240, EA.137.60, EA.165.270 v Nguyen [2003] NSWSC 1068 ................................................ EA.114.240, EA.115.300 v Nguyen [2004] NSWCCA 16 ...................................................................... EA.165.450 v Nguyen [2009] SASC 91 ............................................................................... EA.55.180 v Nguyen [2013] QCA 133 ............................................................................. EA.165.480 v Nguyen (2015) 248 A Crim R 398; [2015] SASCFC 7 ....... EA.138.540, EA.138.570 v Niass [2005] NSWCCA 120 ........................................................................ EA.141.150 v Nikau (unreported, NSW SC, 14 October 1997) .......................................... EA.85.210 v Nona (2015) 254 A Crim R 301; [2015] ACTSC 175 ....... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.75.90 v Noonan [2002] NSWCCA 150 .................................................. EA.20.270, EA.20.300 v O’Brien [2003] NSWCCA 121 ................................................................... EA.165.210 v O’Connor [2003] NSWCCA 335 ............................................ EA.65.300, EA.135.270 v O’Donoghue (1988) 34 A Crim R 397 ....................................................... EA.115.150 v O’Donohue [2001] NSWCCA 458 ................................................................ EA.55.180 v O’Driscoll (2003) 57 NSWLR 416; 141 A Crim R 368; [2003] NSWCCA 166 .............................................................................. EA.43.210, EA.106.90 v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 .................. EA.101.120, EA.101.150, EA.101.240, EA.110.90 v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 ........................................................................ EA.101.210 v OM [2011] NSWCCA 109 ......................................................................... EA.192A.40 v O’Meally [1952] VLR 499 ............................................................................ EA.65.120 v O’Meally (No 2) [1953] VLR 30 ................................................................ EA.101.150 v ON [2009] QCA 62 ...................................................................................... EA.165.480 v OP [2011] QCA 323 .................................................................................... EA.165.450 v O’Sullivan (1975) 13 SASR 68 ..................................................................... EA.184.20 v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 .......................................................................... EA.27.120 v Omar (1991) 58 A Crim R 139 ................................................................... EA.114.330 v Ong (2001) 80 SASR 537; [2001] SASC 437 ........................................... EA.165.480 v Ong (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; [2007] VSCA 206 ............... EA.116.90, EA.116.150, EA.165.450 v Orchard [2013] NSWCCA 342 ..................................................................... EA.46.120 v Ortega-Farfan (2011) 215 A Crim R 251; [2011] QCA 364 ...................... EA.55.330, EA.137.60, EA.137.150 v v v v v v v v v v v

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Orton [1922] VLR 469 .................................................................................. EA.45.150 Osman [1998] NSWSC 13 ............................................................................ EA.97.450 Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188 ........................................................................ EA.90.240 Owen (1991) 56 SASR 397 ......................................................................... EA.141.120 P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 ....................... EA.9.180, EA.79.240, EA.118.220, EA.121.150 v PAH (unreported, NSW CCA, 18 December 1998) .............. EA.141.150, EA.165.480 v PJ [2006] ACTSC 37 .................................................................................. EA.138.120 v PKS (unreported, NSW CCA, 1 October 1998) ........................................... EA.110.90 v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736; [2001] NSWCCA 282 .......... EA.106.240, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 v PMT (2003) 8 VR 50; [2003] VSCA 200 .................................................. EA.165.480 v PWD (2010) 205 A Crim R 75; [2010] NSWCCA 209 ......... EA.97.120, EA.101.190 v Paek [1999] NSWCCA 184 ................................................... EA.165.210, EA.165.480 v Panetta (1997) 26 MVR 332 ......................................................... EA.55.60, EA.78.60 v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 ................................................................. EA.79.480 v Pantoja [1998] NSWSC 565 ....................................................... EA.38.60, EA.38.150 v Pantoja (unreported, NSW CCA, Wood CJ, 30 October 1996) .................. EA.38.270 v Pantoja (No 1) (unreported, NSW SC, 30 October 1996) ........................... EA.38.270 v Papakosmas (unreported, NSW CCA, 10 December 1997) .......................... EA.66.60 v Papamitrou (2004) 7 VR 375; [2004] VSCA 12 ......................................... EA.98.120 v Paris (1992) 97 Cr App R 99 ......................................................................... EA.84.60 v Parker (1989) 19 NSWLR 177 ..................................................................... EA.90.240 v Parkes (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12 ............ EA.29.90, EA.38.60, EA.38.270, EA.66.60 v Parry [2017] SASCFC 66 ..................................................... EA.165B.210, EA.97.480 v Parsons [2015] SASCFC 183 ................................................ EA.104.120, EA.165.450 v Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124 ..................................................................... EA.27.150 v Patsalis [No 3] [1999] NSWSC 718 ....................................... EA.139.30, EA.139.180 v Patsalis and Spathis [No 4] [1999] NSWSC 715 ...................................... EA.101.150 v Pearce (2001) 48 ATR 390; [2001] NSWCCA 447 ................. EA.50.30, EA.139.120 v Pearsall (1990) 49 A Crim R 439 ........................................... EA.90.300, EA.114.240 v Penny (1997) 91 A Crim R 288 .................................................................. EA.114.240 v Perera [1986] 1 Qd R 211 .......................................................................... EA.165.480 v Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 ................................................................... EA.110.90 v Perry (1990) 49 A Crim R 243 ..................................................................... EA.79.240 v Perry (No 4) (1982) 28 SASR 119 ................................................................. EA.76.90 v Peters (1996) 88 A Crim R 585 .................................................................. EA.138.150 v Petroulias (No 22) (2007) 213 FLR 293; 176 A Crim R 309; [2007] NSWSC 692 ..................................................................................................... EA.117.90 v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 ............................................................ EA.90.270 v Pfitzner (unreported, SA CCA, Doyle CJ, Matheson, Millhouse JJ, 20 February 1996) .............................................................................................. EA.165.330 v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 .............................................................................. EA.39.120 v Pham [2004] NSWCCA 190 ......................................................................... EA.137.60 v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; 123 A Crim R 30; [2001] NSWCCA 29 .................................................................................................... EA.90.90, EA.90.210 v Phan [2003] NSWCCA 205 ........................................................................ EA.138.570 v Phillips [2015] SASCFC 67 ........................................................................ EA.165.480 v Phung [2001] NSWSC 115 ......................................................................... EA.138.270 v Phung (2013) 117 SASR 432; 234 A Crim R 520; [2013] SASCFC 91 .............................................................................................. EA.138.540, EA.138.570 v Pimentel (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 ....................... EA.138.150 v v v v v

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Table of Cases

R v Pirrottina (1996) 88 A Crim R 220 .............................................................. EA.189.40 R v Pirrottina (unreported, NSW SC, 20 March 1997) ...................................... EA.29.180 R v Pitts (No 1) (2012) 229 A Crim R 387; [2012] NSWSC 1652 .................... EA.90.60, EA.90.210 R v Player (2000) 217 ALR 578; [2000] NSWCCA 123 ................................. EA.101.150 R v Plevac (1995) 84 A Crim R 570 ............................................... EA.81.240, EA.90.210 R v Plevac [1999] NSWCCA 351 ...................................................................... EA.141.120 R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704 ................. EA.66A.60, EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.65.210 R v Pollitt (1990) 51 A Crim R 227 .................................................................. EA.165.330 R v Popovic (unreported, NSW CCA, 25 March 1996) ..................................... EA.184.20 R v Porter (2003) 85 SASR 581; 138 A Crim R 581; [2003] SASC 233 ......... EA.20.180 R v Powell [2006] 1 Cr App R 31 ....................................................................... EA.13.240 R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 .................................................................... EA.55.330 R v Praturlon (unreported, NSW CCA, No 330 of 1984, 29 November 1985) ................................................................................................................ EA.41.300 R v Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522; [2013] SASCFC 69 ................................. EA.114.240 R v Preston (unreported, NSW CCA, Handley JA, Smart, Preston JJ, 9 April 1997) ...................................................................................................... EA.59.180 R v Pretorius [2007] QCA 432 ............................................................................ EA.116.90 R v Priest (2011) 209 A Crim R 254; [2011] ACTSC 18 ................................ EA.138.120 R v Qaumi (No 61) [2016] NSWSC 1192 ........................................................... EA.110.90 R v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519 ..... EA.90.210, EA.101.150 R v Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218; [2001] NSWCCA 216 ....................... EA.79.120 R v Quinn (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1101 .............................................................. EA.18.120 R v Quist [2017] SASCFC 37 ............................................................................ EA.165.480 R v RAG [2006] NSWCCA 343 ....................................................... EA.13.210, EA.13.300 R v RJC (unreported, NSW CCA, 1 October 1998) ........................................... EA.60.150 R v RJC (unreported, NSW CCA, 18 August 1998) ........................................... EA.110.60 R v RN [2005] NSWCCA 413 ........................................................ EA.97.390, EA.101.195 R v RNS [1999] NSWCCA 122 ........................................................................... EA.66.180 R v RPS (unreported, NSW CCA, No 60583 of 1996, 13 August 1997) ......... EA.26.150, EA.60.60, EA.102.100, EA.103.60, EA.108.150 R v RTB [2002] NSWCCA 104 .................................... EA.55.270, EA.55.570, EA.192.80 R v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 ................................................................. EA.116.90 R v Rae [2009] 2 Qd R 463; [2008] QCA 385 ................................................. EA.141.120 R v Rahme [2001] NSWCCA 414 ................................ EA.81.60, EA.83.60, EA.Intro.340 R v Rajakaruna (2004) 8 VR 340; 146 A Crim R 238; [2004] VSCA 114 ..... EA.101.150 R v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 168 A Crim R 1; [2006] VSCA 277 ................ EA.46.150, EA.141.120 R v Rapolti [2016] NSWCCA 264 ......................... EA.138.150, EA.138.660, EA.138.720 R v Ray (2003) 57 NSWLR 616; [2003] NSWCCA 227 ................................. EA.165.480 R v Razzak [2004] NSWCCA 62 .............................. EA.114.240, EA.116.90, EA.116.120 R v Reardon (2002) 186 FLR 1; [2002] NSWCCA 203 .............. EA.38.270, EA.165.240, EA.165.450, EA.192.80 R v Reed (David) [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 ...................................................... EA.79.120 R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 ................................ EA.89.90, EA.89.150, EA.141.90 R v Reid [1999] NSWCCA 258 ....................................................................... EA.Intro.350 R v Reid [2018] QCA 63 .............................................. EA.55.330, EA.81.60, EA.165.480 R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88; (1996) 88 A Crim R 65 .............. EA.165.270, EA.165.480 R v Reynolds [2013] QCA 338 .......................................................................... EA.141.120 R v Reynolds [2015] QCA 111 ........................................................................... EA.165.480 R v Rhodes (1999) 104 A Crim R 572 .............................................................. EA.165.450 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

R v Rich (1998) 102 A Crim R 165 ............................................... EA.41.300, EA.101.150 R v Richards (2001) 123 A Crim R 14; [2001] NSWCCA 160 ..... EA.11.60, EA.137.120, EA.138.150 R v Richards (2002) 128 A Crim R 204; [2002] NSWCCA 38 ......................... EA.20.180 R v Richards (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, James, Simpson JJ, 3 April 1998) .............................................................................................................. EA.165.480 R v Richardson [1969] 1 QB 299; [1968] 2 All ER 761 .................................. EA.103.120 R v Ridsdale [2009] QCA 188 ........................................................................... EA.165.480 R v Rinaldi (1993) 30 NSWLR 605 ...................................................................... EA.9.120 R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6 ........ EA.55.180, EA.114.330, EA.116.150, EA.Intro.120 R v Rivkin (2004) 59 NSWLR 284; 184 FLR 365; [2004] NSWCCA 7 ....... EA.101A.90, EA.101A.120, EA.102.90, EA.106.240 R v Roberts (2011) 111 SASR 100; [2011] SASCFC 117 .................................... EA.89.90 R v Robertson (1997) 91 A Crim R 388 ............................................................ EA.101.240 R v Robinson [1977] Qd R 3877 ......................................................................... EA.46.150 R v Robinson [1996] 2 Qd R 49; (1995) 80 A Crim R 358 .......................... EA.165A.150 R v Robinson [1999] NSWCCA 172 ................................................................... EA.110.60 R v Rockford (2015) 122 SASR 391; [2015] SASCFC 51 ............................... EA.138.540 R v Roddom [2001] NSWCCA 168 ........................................... EA.165B.270, EA.165.210 R v Rodley [1913] 3 KB 468 ............................................................................... EA.136.60 R v Rodriguez [1998] 2 VR 167 ........................................................................ EA.141.150 R v Rogerson (No 1) [2015] NSWSC 592 .......................................................... EA.18.120 R v Rogerson (No 24) [2016] NSWSC 105 ........................................................ EA.32.150 R v Rogerson (No 31) [2016] NSWSC 195 ...................................................... EA.117.120 R v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 ..................................................................... EA.165.450 R v Romeo (1982) 30 SASR 243 ......................................................................... EA.46.150 R v Rondo (2001) 126 A Crim R 562; [2001] NSWCCA 540 ........................... EA.69.240 R v Ronen [2004] NSWCCA 67 .......................................................................... EA.187.20 R v Rooke (unreported, NSW CCA, Newman, Levine, Barr JJ, 2 September 1997) ............................... EA.85.210, EA.138.60, EA.138.240, EA.189.140 R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701; [2002] NSWCCA 455 ............. EA.59.120, EA.59.180, EA.101.150, EA.114.90, EA.116.180, EA.165.90, EA.165.240, EA.165.300, EA.165.450, EA.165.510 R v Rose [No 10] [2001] NSWSC 1060 ...................................... EA.165.300, EA.165.450 R v Rostom (2007) 98 SASR 528; [2007] SASC 210 .......................................... EA.30.60 R v Roughley (1995) 5 Tas R 8; 78 A Crim R 160 ....................... EA.137.60, EA.165.450 R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444; [2009] VSCA 213 ..... EA.81.240, EA.165.270, EA.165.480 R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 .................. EA.79.120, EA.80.150 R v Rustum [2005] VSCA 142 ......................................................... EA.81.60, EA.165.480 R v Rutherford [2004] QCA 481 ........................................................................ EA.165.450 R v Ryan (2013) 33 NTLR 123; 234 A Crim R 299; [2013] NTSC 54 ............ EA.65.150 R v Ryan [2013] NSWCCA 316 .......................................................................... EA.90.270 R v Ryan (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1034 ............................................................. EA.138.120 R v Ryan (No 7) (2012) 218 A Crim R 384; [2012] NSWSC 1160 .................. EA.103.90 R v Rymer (2005) 156 A Crim R 84; [2005] NSWCCA 310 ..... EA.101A.180, EA.66.60, EA.81.270 R v S [2003] NSWCCA 122 ............................................. EA.37.60, EA.44.90, EA.44.120 R v S (unreported, NSW CCA, 18 December 1997) .................... EA.164.90, EA.165.210, EA.165.480 R v SBB (2007) 175 A Crim R 449; [2007] QCA 173 ..................................... EA.165.480 R v SBL [2009] QCA 130 .................................................................................. EA.165.480 R v SCG (2014) 241 A Crim R 508; [2014] QCA 118 ..................................... EA.165.480 R v SCS [2017] QCA 78 .................................................................................... EA.165.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxxxii

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SG [2017] NSWCCA 202 ................................................................................ EA.55.60 SH (2011) 6 ACTLR 1; [2011] ACTSC 198 ........... EA.38.60, EA.38.150, EA.38.300 SJF [2002] NSWCCA 294 .......................................................................... EA.165.210 SJRC [2007] NSWCCA 142 .................................................... EA.137.60, EA.137.210 SK [2011] NSWCCA 292 ........................................................ EA.97.120, EA.101.190 SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 .................. EA.41.300, EA.46.150 SY [2004] NSWCCA 297 ................................... EA.27.120, EA.101.150, EA.101.360 Sabbah [2004] NSWCCA 28 ........................................................................ EA.20.180 Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; 189 A Crim R 310; [2008] VSCA 198 ............. EA.141.120 Salahattin [1983] 1 VR 521 ............................................................................ EA.89.90 Salama [1999] NSWCCA 105 ........................... EA.165.90, EA.165.240, EA.165.450 Salami [2013] NSWCCA 96 ......................................................................... EA.55.360 Salem (1997) 96 A Crim R 421 ........................ EA.138.60, EA.138.150, EA.138.240, EA.138.420, EA.138.690 Salih (2005) 160 A Crim R 310; [2005] VSCA 282 .................................. EA.165.450 Salindera (unreported, NSW CCA, 25 October 1996) ................................. EA.85.210 Saltan [2002] NSWCCA 423 ...................................................................... EA.165.360 Sarbandi (2012) 229 A Crim R 39; [2012] ACTSC 180 ..................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Sarlija (2009) 3 ACTLR 259; [2009] ACTSC 127 .............. EA.114.150, EA.115.150 Schaeffer (2005) 13 VR 337; 159 A Crim R 101; [2005] VSCA 306 ..... EA.138.300, EA.165.480 Schell [2013] QCA 113 ............................................................................... EA.165.480 Schiavini (1999) 108 A Crim R 161; [1999] NSWCCA 165 ...................... EA.86.120 Schneidas (No 2) (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 .................................................... EA.46.150 Schuurs [1999] QSC 176 ............................................................................... EA.90.300 Schweizer [2007] VSCA 157 ....................................................................... EA.165.480 Sciberras [2001] NSWCCA 514 ................................................................. EA.165.480 Scott (2002) 112 A Crim R 543; [2000] NSWCCA 187 ............................. EA.20.300 Scott [2004] NSWCCA 254 ....................................................... EA.41.300, EA.46.150 Sekrst [2016] SASCFC 127 ......................................................................... EA.165.480 Seller [2015] NSWCCA 76 ................................ EA.117.90, EA.118.600, EA.122.150 Selsby [2004] NSWCCA 381 ................................................... EA.108.120, EA.192.80 Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; [1999] NSWCCA 377 .... EA.65.150, EA.141.120 Serratore [2001] NSWCCA 123 ................................................................. EA.101.150 Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 226; [2006] NSWCCA 112 ...... EA.97.120, EA.98.120, EA.137.90 Sharma [2009] ACTSC 154 .......................................................................... EA.66.210 Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7; [188] 1 All ER 65 .............................. EA.65.240, EA.81.240 Sharp (2003) 143 A Crim R 344; [2003] NSWSC 1117 ........ EA.90.150, EA.117.120 Shea (1978) 18 SASR 591 ............................................................................ EA.44.150 Shephard [1993] AC 380 ............................................................................... EA.79.150 Sibraa [2012] NSWCCA 19 ........................................................................ EA.138.570 Siebel (1992) 57 SASR 558; 59 A Crim R 105 ........................................... EA.20.150 Sievers (2004) 151 A Crim R 426; [2004] NSWCCA 463 ......... EA.55.90, EA.81.60, EA.165.480 Simmons (No 2) (2015) 249 A Crim R 82; [2015] NSWSC 143 .................. EA.90.60 Simmons (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189 .................... EA.90.150, EA.90.270, EA.142.60 Simmons (No 6) [2015] NSWSC 418 ......................................................... EA.128.540 Simpson [2008] QCA 77 .............................................................................. EA.165.360 Sing (2002) 54 NSWLR 31; [2002] NSWCCA 20 ................ EA.79.300, EA.135.150, EA.137.120 Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591 ........................................................................... EA.32.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers]

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Table of Cases

R v Singh-Bal (1997) 92 A Crim R 397 ........................ EA.60.60, EA.88.60, EA.135.180, EA.137.150 R v Sio (2013) 234 A Crim R 508; [2013] NSWSC 1412 ................................. EA.65.240 R v Siulai [2004] NSWCCA 152 ............................ EA.108A.60, EA.108A.90, EA.137.60 R v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37 .................... EA.53.180, EA.89.90, EA.114.240 R v Skaf [2004] NSWCCA 74 .................................... EA.55.270, EA.110.90, EA.115.300 R v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314; [2003] NSWCCA 93 .......... EA.55.150, EA.103.60, EA.190.120, EA.Intro.350 R v Slattery [2002] NSWCCA 367 .................................................................... EA.165.480 R v Sleiman [2003] NSWCCA 231 .............................................. EA.108.120, EA.108.150 R v Sluczanowski (2008) 256 LSJS 277; [2008] SASC 185 ............................ EA.165.480 R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 ............................................... EA.165.240, EA.165.420 R v Smart [2010] VSCA 33 ............................................................ EA.46.150, EA.165.480 R v Smit [2004] NSWCCA 409 ......................................................................... EA.165.480 R v Smith [1981] 1 NSWLR 193 ..................................................... EA.184.20, EA.191.20 R v Smith (1987) 7 NSWLR 444; 23 A Crim R 266 ........................................ EA.114.330 R v Smith (1992) 58 SASR 491 ........................................................................... EA.90.240 R v Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 308 ................................................................... EA.130.150 R v Smith (1999) 47 NSWLR 419; [1999] NSWCCA 317 .............. EA.76.90, EA.114.60, EA.114.90, EA.115.60 R v Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWCCA 388 ............ EA.79.300, EA.80.150, EA.135.210, EA.135.270 R v Smith [2000] NSWCCA 468 .................................................. EA.114.240, EA.165.480 R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299; 196 ALR 421; [2003] HCA 13 ...... EA.9.90, EA.43.210, EA.106.90, EA.Intro.120 R v Sood [2007] NSWCCA 214 ..................................................... EA.137.90, EA.137.120 R v Sood (No 3) [2006] NSWSC 762 ............................................................... EA.108A.60 R v Soto-Sanchez (2002) 129 A Crim R 279; [2002] NSWCCA 160 ................ EA.110.60 R v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 ............................................. EA.38.60, EA.38.150 R v Souleyman (unreported, NSW SC, Levine J, 5 September 1996) ............. EA.106.240 R v Souleyman (unreported, NSW SC, Smart J, 13 May 1996) ....................... EA.165.390 R v Southammavong [2003] NSWCCA 312 ........................................................ EA.141.90 R v Southon (2003) 85 SASR 436; 139 A Crim R 250; [2003] SASC 205 .... EA.115.300 R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 ....................................................... EA.38.60, EA.81.60 R v Spedding (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson, Sully, Abadee, 11 December 1997) ............................................................................................ EA.165.210 R v Spencer [1987] AC 128 ............................................................................... EA.165.360 R v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225; 161 A Crim R 13; [2006] VSCA 58 .................. EA.116.90 R v Spiteri (2004) 61 NSWLR 369; [2004] NSWCCA 321 ............................. EA.106.270 R v Stackelroth (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson CJ, Powell JA, Smart J, 9 April 1997) ................................................................................................. EA.165.480 R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 ........................................................................... EA.110.90 R v Stanley [2004] NSWCCA 278 ................................................. EA.114.240, EA.116.90 R v Stanton (unreported, NSW CCA, 24 July 1998) .................. EA.165.240, EA.165.270 R v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115; [2002] SASC 175 ........................................ EA.13.210 R v Statham (unreported, Qld CA, 28 April 1994) ............................................. EA.46.150 R v Stavrinos (2003) 140 A Crim R 594; [2003] NSWCCA 339 ........................ EA.89.90 R v Steeden (unreported, NSW CCA, 19 August 1994 ..................................... EA.165.480 R v Stevens [2001] NSWCCA 330 ...................................................................... EA.192.80 R v Stewart (2001) 52 NSWLR 301; 124 A Crim R 371; [2001] NSWCCA 260 ............ EA.55.150, EA.165.90, EA.165.180, EA.165.210, EA.165.240, EA.165.360, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxxxiv

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Table of Cases

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Strawhorn (2008) 19 VR 101; 185 A Crim R 326; [2008] VSCA 101 .... EA.165.480 Stubbs (2009) 3 ACTLR 144; 228 FLR 221; [2009] ACTSC 63 .............. EA.138.120 Suckling [1999] NSWCCA 36 ................................................... EA.90.60, EA.101.150 Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54 ....................................................................... EA.101.150 Sullivan [2002] NSWCCA 505 ................................................ EA.55.360, EA.101.150 Sullivan [2003] NSWCCA 100 .......................... EA.55.150, EA.165.210, EA.165.360 Sultana (1994) 74 A Crim R 27 .................................................................. EA.165.420 Sumner [1935] VLR 197 ............................................................................. EA.164.150 Sumner [2001] SASC 261 ........................................................................... EA.165.360 Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 ............. EA.84.60, EA.84.150, EA.90.60, EA.138.390 Suteski (2002) 128 A Crim R 275; [2002] NSWSC 218 .................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.65.120 v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182; 137 A Crim R 371; [2002] NSWCCA 509 ...................................................... EA.65.240, EA.135.150, EA.165.210 v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1 .................... EA.11.90, EA.90.60, EA.90.180, EA.90.270, EA.137.60, EA.138.300 v Syed [2008] NSWCCA 37 ........................................................................... EA.138.690 v Szabo [2000] NSWCCA 226 ......................................................................... EA.110.60 v Szach [1980] 2 A Crim R 270; (1980) 23 SASR 504 .................................. EA.39.120 v T (1997) 92 A Crim R 390 .............................................................................. EA.81.60 v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 .......................................................................... EA.79.120 v T, WA (2014) 118 SASR 382; 238 A Crim R 205; [2014] SASCFC 3 ....... EA.27.120 v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444; 139 A Crim R 30; [2003] NSWCCA 191 ..... EA.41.150, EA.78.60 v TA [2017] NTSC 46 ..................................................................................... EA.138.540 v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 .............................. EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 v TJF (2001) 120 A Crim R 209; [2001] NSWCCA 127 ...... EA.165.210, EA.165.270, EA.165.450 v TR (2004) 180 FLR 424; [2004] ACTSC 10 ............................................. EA.192A.60 v Tahere [1999] NSWCCA 170 .................................................. EA.114.90, EA.114.180 v Tai (2016) 93 NSWLR 404; [2016] NSWCCA 207 .................................. EA.135.150 v Tamotsu (1999) 109 A Crim R 193; [1999] NSWCCA 400 .... EA.98.60, EA.101.120 v Tang [2003] NSWCCA 357 ........................................................................... EA.55.180 v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; 161 A Crim R 377; [2006] NSWCCA 167 ................................................................................................ EA.79.120, EA.79.180 v Tangye (1997) 92 A Crim R 545 ........................................... EA.165.270, EA.165.480 v Taouk (2005) 154 A Crim R 69; [2005] NSWCCA 155 .......... EA.90.90, EA.138.300 v Taousanis [2001] NSWSC 74 .................................................. EA.59.180, EA.114.240 v Taranto [1999] NSWCCA 396 ........................... EA.137.120, EA.165.90, EA.165.240 v Tartaglia (2011) 110 SASR 378; [2011] SASCFC 88 ............................... EA.141.120 v Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232; 168 A Crim R 95; [2007] HCA 11 ...... EA.190.120 v Taufua [1999] NSWCCA 205 ....................................................................... EA.20.300 v Taufua (unreported, NSWCCA, No 60079 of 1996, 11 November 1996) ....................................................................... EA.114.90, EA.114.180, EA.115.60 v Taylor [1999] ACTSC 47 ..................................... EA.85.210, EA.90.260, EA.139.150 v Taylor [2003] NSWCCA 194 ........... EA.38.60, EA.38.150, EA.135.210, EA.135.270 v Taylor (2008) 2 ACTLR 216; [2008] ACTSC 52 ...................................... EA.114.180 v Taylor (unreported, NSW CCA, 28 March 1995) ........................................ EA.189.40 v Taylor (No 2) (2008) 184 A Crim R 77; [2008] VSCA 57 ..................... EA.165B.270 v Telfer (2004) 142 A Crim R 132; [2004] NSWCCA 27 .............................. EA.110.60 v Teys (2001) 161 FLR 44; 119 A Crim R 398; [2001] ACTSC 29 ............. EA.98.180, EA.101.190 v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 2; [2003] VSCA 78 .............................. EA.10.60 v v v v v v v v v v v

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Table of Cases

R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 ............................................. EA.165.300, EA.165.450 R v Thomas [2015] SASCFC 55 ........................................................................ EA.165.480 R v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21; [1999] ACTSC 112 .......... EA.114.90, EA.114.180, EA.114.240 R v Thompson (2000) 130 A Crim R 24; [2002] NSWCCA 149 ....................... EA.27.120 R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; 187 A Crim R 89; [2008] VSCA 144 ......... EA.46.150 R v Thornton (1980) 3 A Crim R 80 ................................................................... EA.20.150 R v Tillman [1999] NSWCCA 164 .................................................................... EA.165.450 R v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 ..................................................... EA.137.60, EA.165.450 R v Tirado (1974) 59 Cr App R 80 .................................................. EA.48.210, EA.69.120 R v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264; [2002] NSWCCA 247 .......... EA.114.210, EA.114.240 R v Tofilau (2006) 160 A Crim R 549; [2006] VSCA 40 ................................. EA.165.270 R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 ..................... EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.101.150, EA.101.190, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 R v Tolmie [2004] NSWCCA 396 ...................................................................... EA.165.480 R v Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1 ...................................................................................... EA.80.90 R v Too (unreported, NSW SC, Badgery-Parker J, 26 July 1996) ..... EA.11.60, EA.26.60, EA.26.120 R v Tran [1997] QCA 170 .................................................................................... EA.116.90 R v Tran (2006) 96 SASR 8; 164 A Crim R 541; [2006] SASC 276 ................ EA.20.210 R v Tran (2011) 109 SASR 595; [2011] SASCFC 51 ...................................... EA.141.150 R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 ...................................................................... EA.110.60 R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239 ....................................................... EA.79.120, EA.79.300 R v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 ......... EA.84.60, EA.85.150, EA.85.180, EA.139.90 R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 ................................................................ EA.114.240 R v Turnbull [1958] Tas SR 80 .............................................................................. EA.10.60 R v Ugochukwu (2003) 138 A Crim R 544; [2003] NSWCCA 104 .................... EA.81.60 R v Uhrig (unreported, NSW CCA, Hunt CJ .................................................... EA.165.480 R v Ul-Haque (2007) 177 A Crim R 348; [2007] NSWSC 1251 ........................ EA.84.60 R v Umanski [1961] VR 242 .............................................................................. EA.104.120 R v Ung (2000) 112 A Crim R 344; 173 ALR 287; [2000] NSWCCA 195 ..... EA.59.180, EA.Intro.120 R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 ........................ EA.101A.120, EA.165.180, EA.165.450, EA.165.480, EA.165.540 R v VAS (2006) 170 A Crim R 452; [2006] VSCA 159 ................................... EA.101.360 R v Vaitaiki (unreported, NSW CCA, 6 October 1993) ...................................... EA.55.180 R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534 ................................................ EA.32.150, EA.44.150 R v Van Dyk [2000] NSWCCA 67 ................................................... EA.78.60, EA.101.360 R v Vaughan (1997) 98 A Crim R 239 ................................................................ EA.20.180 R v Vaughan (No 2) (2009) 105 SASR 532; [2009] SASC 395 ........................ EA.55.600 R v Veitch [1999] NSWCCA 185 ....................................................................... EA.101.360 R v Velevski (No 2) (1997) 93 A Crim R 420 ..................................................... EA.38.150 R v Villalon [2014] NSWSC 725 ....................................................... EA.55.330, EA.97.60 R v Villar [2004] NSWCCA 302 ......................................................................... EA.20.150 R v Vincent (2002) 133 A Crim R 206; [2002] NSWCCA 369 ....... EA.62.60, EA.142.60, EA.165.240 R v Von Rijssen (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 ........................................................... EA.46.150 R v Vu [2005] NSWCCA 266 ....................................................... EA.165.240, EA.165.450 R v Vu Ngoc Pham [2004] NSWCCA 190 ........................................................ EA.102.120 R v W [1999] NSWCCA 112 .......................................................... EA.41.300, EA.165.480 R v W [1999] NSWCCA 116 .............................................................. EA.81.60, EA.81.240 R v W, PK [2016] SASCFC 5 ......................................................................... EA.165B.210 R v WAA [2008] QCA 87 ................................................................................... EA.165.480 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxxxvi

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R R R R

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R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

WAC [2008] QCA 151 ................................................................................. EA.165.480 WB (2009) 23 VR 319; 197 A Crim R 18; [2009] VSCA 173 ................. EA.165.450 WO [2006] QCA 21 ..................................................................................... EA.101.360 WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; [2002] NSWCCA 210 ...... EA.101.120, EA.101.150, EA.101.210, EA.101.240, EA.101.360 v WRW [2001] NSWCCA 466 ....................................................................... EA.165.480 v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 427 ...................................................................... EA.165B.210 v Walbank (1995) 79 A Crim R 180 ................................................................ EA.189.40 v Walker [1998] Crim LR 211 .......................................................................... EA.85.210 v Walker [2000] NSWCCA 130 .................................. EA.85.210, EA.90.90, EA.90.270 v Walters [2002] NSWCCA 291 ............................................... EA.101.150, EA.101.360 v Wanganeen (2006) 95 SASR 226; [2006] SASC 254 .................................. EA.141.90 v Warren (1994) 72 A Crim R 74 ............................................................... EA.165A.150 v Waters (2002) 129 A Crim R 115; [2002] ACTSC 13 ............. EA.85.210, EA.85.300 v Watkins (2005) 153 A Crim R 434; [2005] NSWCCA 164 ........................ EA.97.120, EA.101.190 v Watt [2000] NSWCCA 37 ............................................................................. EA.87.120 v Weaven (No 1) [2011] VSC 442 ................................................................. EA.138.390 v Weetra (2010) 108 SASR 232; [2010] SASCFC 52 .................................. EA.165.480 v Weiss (2004) 8 VR 388; 145 A Crim R 478; [2004] VSCA 73 ................ EA.165.480 v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 ................................................... EA.59.180, EA.60.60 v Werry [2009] VSCA 94 ............................................................................... EA.141.120 v Whalen (2003) 56 NSWLR 454; [2003] NSWCCA 59 ............................. EA.165.300 v Wheeler [2004] SASC 397 .................................................... EA.165.450, EA.165.480 v Wheeler (unreported, NSW CCA, 16 November 1989) ............................... EA.110.90 v White [1969] VR 203 ..................................................................................... EA.110.90 v White (2003) 140 A Crim R 63; [2003] NSWCCA 64 .............. EA.38.60, EA.38.150 v White (2008) 102 SASR 35; [2008] SASC 265 ........................................... EA.116.90 v Whitmore (1999) 109 A Crim R 51; [1999] NSWCCA 247 ....................... EA.66.180, EA.108.150 v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75 ..................................... EA.77.60, EA.78.60, EA.136.150 v Wilkie [2008] NSWSC 885 ............................................................................ EA.123.60 v Williams (1999) 104 A Crim R 260; [1999] NSWCCA 9 ........................ EA.141.150, EA.165.480, EA.165.540 v Willoughby [2000] NSWSC 751 ................................................................... EA.100.60 v Wills (1985) 39 SASR 35; 16 A Crim R 247 ............................................... EA.13.210 v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346; [2005] NSWCCA 20 .......... EA.20.180, EA.165.240, EA.165.270 v Wilson (unreported, NSW CCA, Hunt CJ ...................................................... EA.43.90 v Winters [2010] SASC 100 ........................................................ EA.114.240, EA.116.90 v Wolter [2015] ACTSC 269 ............................................................................ EA.97.450 v Wood (1996) 87 A Crim R 346 ..................................................................... EA.20.180 v Woods (2008) 102 SASR 422; [2008] SASC 335 ................ EA.141.120, EA.141.150 v Workman (2004) 60 NSWLR 471; [2004] NSWCCA 213 ........................ EA.138.120 v Wright (2004) 149 A Crim R 298; [2004] ACTSC 83 ................................... EA.19.30 v Wu (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, Levine, Barr JJ, 12 November 1998) .................................................................................................................. EA.84.60 v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629; [2010] NSWCCA 181 ..................................... EA.66.180 v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363; 231 A Crim R 474; [2013] NSWCCA 121 ........................................................................ EA.Intro.300, EA.90.270, EA.137.90 v Xie (No 12) [2014] NSWSC 1980 .................................................................. EA.26.60 v Y (2007) 178 A Crim R 481; [2007] TASSC 112 ...................................... EA.101.120 v YL (2004) 187 FLR 84; [2004] ACTSC 115 .................................................. EA.19.30 v v v v

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Table of Cases

R v Yammine (2002) 132 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 289 .... EA.20.150, EA.55.150, EA.165.330 R v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 ............................. EA.137.120, EA.137.150, EA.165.210 R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 ................................................... EA.84.60, EA.85.210 R v Yi [1998] NSWSC 39 .................................................................................... EA.38.150 R v Yilditz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115 .................................................................... EA.79.150 R v Young [1999] NSWCCA 166; (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 ................ NSW.CPA.299D.60, NSW.CPA.299D.90, NSW.CPA.299D.150 R v Yuille [1948] VLR 41 .................................................................................... EA.136.60 R v Zaiter [2004] NSWCCA 35 ......................................................................... EA.141.120 R v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489; [1999] NSWCCA 65 ..... EA.137.60, EA.165.450 R v Zampogna (2003) 85 SASR 56; 138 A Crim R 368; [2003] SASC 75 ........ EA.81.60 R v Zhang (2005) 227 ALR 311; 196 FLR 152; 158 A Crim R 504; [2005] NSWCCA 437 .......................... EA.98.120, EA.98.180, EA.98.450, EA.101.60 R v Zhen (1995) 83 A Crim R 572 .................................................. EA.81.60, EA.165.480 R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 ........................................................................ EA.46.150 R v Zurita [2002] NSWCCA 22 ....................................................... EA.110.60, EA.110.90 R L Ralston, In the Estate of (unreported, NSW SC, Hodgson J, 12 September 1996) .............................................................................................. EA.140.60 RA v The Queen (2007) 175 A Crim R 221; [2007] NSWCCA 251 ................. EA.13.270 RBK v The Queen [2004] WASCA 216 .......................................................... EA.165B.240 RELC v The Queen (2006) 167 A Crim R 484; [2006] NSWCCA 383 ......... EA.165.240, EA.165.450 RG v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 173 ............................................................ EA.101.150 RGM v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 89 ............................... EA.101A.120, EA.165A.210 RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71 ...................... EA.97.120, EA.101.190, EA.101.240, EA.101.360 RHB v The Queen [2011] VSCA 295 ............................................ EA.97.120, EA.101.240 RHG Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Ianni [2016] NSWCA 270 ........................ EA.140.120 RHG Mortgage Ltd v Ianni [2015] NSWCA 56 ................................................. EA.55.180 RJ v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 174; [2010] NSWCCA 263 ................. EA.13.180, EA.13.210, EA.13.300, EA.21.60, EA.110.60 RMD v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 70 .................................................... EA.97.480 RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3 ........... EA.20.180, EA.20.300, EA.26.210, EA.55.180 RR v The Queen [2011] VSCA 442 ..................................................................... EA.46.150 RRG Nominees Pty Ltd v Visible Temporary Fencing Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2018] FCA 404 ................................................................................. EA.138.690 RRS v The Queen (2013) 231 A Crim R 168; [2013] NSWCCA 94 .............. EA.165.450, EA.165.480 RWB v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 209; [2010] NSWCCA 147 .............. EA.46.150 RWC v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 332 ......................................................... EA.101.150 RWC v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 58 ........................................................... EA.165.480 Raad v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 268 ......................................................... EA.165.210 Radi v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 265 .......................................................... EA.101.150 Raimondi v The Queen [2013] VSCA 194 .......................................................... EA.60.150 Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 476 ......................... EA.8.90, EA.131.330 Ramey v The Queen (1994) 68 ALJR 917 ........................................................ EA.165.450 Ramirez v The Trustee of the Property of Zoltan Sandor, A Bankrupt (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 22 April 1997) .......................... EA.29.150, EA.36.30 Ramjutton v The Queen (2015) 255 A Crim R 576; [2015] VSCA 309 .......... EA.131.360 Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 .............................................................. EA.79.240 Rana v The Queen [2014] VSCA 198 ................................................................... EA.81.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers] lxxxviii

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Table of Cases

Randall v The Queen (2004) 146 A Crim R 197; [2004] TASSC 42 ................ EA.38.150 Randwick City Council v Minister for the Environment (1998) 54 ALD 682 .................................................................................................................... EA.79.180 Rank Film Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 ....... EA.128.180, EA.128.360 Rataplan Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 674 ....................... EA.190.80 Ratten v The Queen [1972] AC 378 ................................................. EA.59.180, EA.65.150 Rawack v Spicer [2002] NSWSC 849 ................................................................. EA.140.60 Reading v ABC [2003] NSWSC 716 ............................ EA.48.180, EA.55.90, EA.135.180 Reberger v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 132 ..................................................... EA.46.150 Reed v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 314 ................................... EA.103.120, EA.165.540 Rees v Lumen Christi Primary School [2010] VSC 514 ................... EA.79.300, EA.80.90 Rees v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 83; [2010] NSWCCA 84 ................ EA.141.120 Rees v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 66 ............................................................ EA.101.360 Reeves v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 41 VR 275; 236 A Crim R 448; [2013] VSCA 311 .......................................................... EA.97.120, EA.101.240 Reeves v The Queen (2013) 227 A Crim R 444; [2013] NSWCCA 34 ....... EA.165B.120, EA.165.150, EA.165.480 Reeves v The Queen (2013) 41 VR 275; 236 A Crim R 448; [2013] VSCA 311 ........................................................................................................ EA.41.300 Reference of a Question of Law (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 106 A Crim R 408 ..EA.165A.150 Registrar, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Ponto (2012) 208 FCR 346; [2012] FCA 1500 ........................................................ EA.48.180 Registrar of Aboriginal Corps v Murnkurni Women’s Aboriginal Corporation (1995) 58 FCR 125; 137 ALR 404 ........................................... EA.75.120 Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98 ................................ EA.55.180 Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1 .................................................................... EA.128.540 Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 ........................................................ EA.46.60, EA.46.150 Reid v The Queen [2014] VSCA 295 ................................................................ EA.114.240 Rend v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 178; [2006] NSWCCA 41 ................ EA.46.120 Renegade Rigging Pty Ltd v Hanlon Nominees Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 385 ......... EA.160.60 Repatriation Commission v Goulding (2008) 173 FCR 546; [2008] FCA 1858 .................................................................................................................. EA.163.30 Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] 2 EHRR 25 ................................. EA.84.60 Restricted Judgment [2017] NSWCCA 252 ...................................................... EA.101.360 Restricted Judgment [2017] NSWCCA 283 .......................................................... EA.90.60 Restricted Judgment [2017] NSWCCA 288 ............ EA.138.60, EA.138.150, EA.138.210, EA.138.420, EA.138.450, EA.138.570, EA.138.660, EA.138.720 Restricted Judgment [2017] NSWCCA 93 .......................................................... EA.18.180 Restricted Judgment [2018] WASCA 14 ............................................................. EA.79.330 Retravision (NSW) Ltd v Copeland (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 8 October 1996) ............................................................................. EA.117.90, EA.118.270 Reza v Summerhill Orchards Ltd (2013) 37 VR 204; [2013] VSCA 17 ............ EA.46.150 Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 2 All ER 712 ................................... EA.140.60 Rhodes v O’Neill [2017] TASFC 1 ...................................................................... EA.55.180 Rich v Attorney General (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 419 ................ EA.128.540, EA.128.780 Rich v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2005) 54 ACSR 365; [2005] NSWCA 233 ................................................................................ EA.79.240 Rich v Harrington (2007) 245 ALR 106; [2007] FCA 1987 ...... EA.118.330, EA.122.480 Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1403 ................................ EA.97.120 Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 3) (2013) 301 ALR 653; [2012] FCA 1523 .............................................................................................................. EA.Intro.340 Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116 ................................................... EA.55.180 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 984 ............................................................. EA.69.180, EA.69.240, EA.69.540 Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 ....................................................... EA.117.120, EA.119.120, EA.122.360 Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19; [1995] HCA 66 ....... EA.11.90, EA.138.120, EA.138.150, EA.138.210, EA.138.690 Riley v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 238 ..................................... EA.90.240, EA.137.210 RinRim Pty Ltd v Deutsche Bank Australia Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1654 ........... EA.122.270 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 569; [2003] FCA 933 ................................................................................................ EA.69.150, EA.69.210 Rio Tinto Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 64 ATR 63; 235 ALR 127; [2006] FCA 1200 .................................................................. EA.122.480 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 ................ EA.128.360 Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 .................... EA.76.90, EA.79.120, EA.79.240 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 ...................... EA.79.120 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 22) (1988) 14 NSWLR 132 ...... EA.117.120 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 13, 18, 19) (1988) 14 NSWLR 116 .................................................................................................... EA.69.120 Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 ................ EA.77.60, EA.79.270, EA.135.150, EA.136.60, EA.136.180 Roach v Page (No 15) [2003] NSWSC 939 .................. EA.69.60, EA.69.120, EA.136.60 Roach v Page (No 17) [2003] NSWSC 973 ...................................................... EA.118.390 Roach v Page (No 26) [2003] NSWSC 1045 ...................................................... EA.190.80 Roach v Page (No 27) [2003] NSWSC 1046 ............... EA.66A.60, EA.69.60, EA.69.120 Roach v Page (No 37) [2004] NSWSC 1048 ...................................................... EA.46.150 Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; 210 A Crim R 300; 85 ALJR 558; [2011] HCA 12 ...................... EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.101.210, EA.101.360, EA.141.120 Roads & Traffıc Authority of New South Wales v Tetley [2004] NSWSC 925 .................................................................................................................... EA.183.80 Roads and Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Barrie Toepfer Earthmoving and Land Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 916 ............. EA.79.180, EA.80.90, EA.80.150 Robbins v The Queen [2017] VSCA 288 ............................... EA.165B.180, EA.165B.210 Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee & Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 ........................ EA.65.240 Robinson v Goodman [2013] FCA 893 .............................................. EA.55.90, EA.97.450 Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162; 73 ALJR 1314; [1999] HCA 42 .................................................................................................................... EA.165.480 Robinson v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 88; [2006] NSWCCA 192 ...... EA.165.210, EA.165.390 Robinson v The Queen (No 2) (1991) 180 CLR 531; 55 A Crim R 318; [1991] HCA 38 ............................. EA.104.120, EA.141.150, EA.165.450, EA.165.480 Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 158 A Crim R 546; [2005] NSWCCA 426 .................................................................................................................. EA.138.120 Rocco v The Queen [2003] HCA Trans 497 (2 December 2003) ...................... EA.55.180 Rodden v The Queen (2008) 182 A Crim R 227; [2008] NSWCCA 53 .......... EA.101.360 Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608 .......................................................... EA.131.270 Rolfe v Katunga Lucerne Mill Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 252 .............................. EA.41.300 Rolfe v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 168; [2007] NSWCCA 155 ............ EA.101.150 Rolleston v Insurance Australia Ltd [2017] NSWCA 168 .................................. EA.79.180 Romer v HJ & J Wilson Carriers Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 9 August 1996) ......................................................................... EA.157.30, EA.190.80 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xc

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Table of Cases

Ross v Internet Wines Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 436; [2004] NSWCA 195 .................................................................................................................. EA.128.780 Rosseau Pty Ltd (in liq) v Jay-O-Bees Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 50 ACSR 565; [2004] NSWSC 818 .............................................................. EA.4.150, EA.69.240 Rossi v The Queen [2012] VSCA 228 ......................................................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Roth v The Queen [2014] VSCA 242 .................................................................. EA.32.150 Rowley v O’Chee (2000) 1 Qd R 207 ................................................................... EA.10.60 Royal v El Ali (No 4) [2017] FCA 299 ........................................ EA.131.450, EA.131.540 Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533; 126 ALR 481 .......................................... EA.90.300 Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser (2007) 243 ALR 356; [2007] FCA 1535 .................................................................................... EA.87.120 Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280 ................ EA.131.270, EA.131.300 Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387 ................................................................ EA.121.150 Russell v The Queen [2013] VSCA 155 ................................................................ EA.60.60 Russell v Western Australia (2011) 214 A Crim R 326; [2011] WASCA 246 ................................................................................................................ EA.Intro.340 Ryan v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184; [2000] NSWSC 354 ............................. EA.4.150 Ryan v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353 .... EA.130.60, EA.130.180, EA.130.240, EA.130.300, EA.130.390, EA.130.420 Ryan v Watkins (2005) 44 MVR 495; [2005] NSWCA 426 ..................... EA.Dict.Pt.1.30, EA.129.90, EA.129.120 Ryland v QBE Insurance (Aust) Ltd [2013] NSWCA 120 ................................. EA.27.120

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S S1983 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 854 ...... EA.144.60 SAMM Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Shaye Properties Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 132 ............................................................... EA.46.60, EA.46.150, EA.55.180 SBEG v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 291 ALR 281; [2012] FCA 277 ........................................................................... EA.130.210 SG v New South Wales Crime Commission [2016] NSWSC 1615 .................... EA.125.90 SGH v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 161 ................................ EA.46.150, EA.55.330 SH v The Queen (2012) 83 NSWLR 258; 222 A Crim R 43; [2012] NSWCCA 79 ................................................................................................... EA.13.210 SJF v The Queen [2011] VSCA 281 .................................................................. EA.141.120 SKA v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 205 ............... EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.165.480 SLJ v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 514; 233 A Crim R 341; [2013] VSCA 193 .................................................................................................................... EA.37.270 SLS v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 64; 243 A Crim R 318; [2014] VSCA 31 ...... EA.79.180 SM v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 171 ............................................................ EA.165.480 SPAR Licensing Pty Ltd v MIS QLD Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 298 ALR 69; [2012] FCA 1116 ............................................................................................... EA.59.90 SQMB v MIMIA (2004) 205 ALR 392; [2004] FCA 241 ................................... EA.122.60 SS Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyds Rep 288 .................................................................................................................... EA.55.180 STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 528; [2010] FCA 1002 ........................ EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.21.150, EA.21.210 SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best & Less Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1507 ........................ EA.122.270 SW v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 103 ............................................................ EA.165.480 SWC v The Queen [2011] VSCA 264 ................................................................ EA.141.120 SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd (2006) 201 FLR 238; [2006] NSWSC 668 ..... EA.131.450 SY v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 6 ................................................................... EA.46.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

SZGMB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 437 ............................................................................................... EA.163.30 Saffron v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 109 ALR 695 ................. EA.128.360 Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (2011) 16 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-885; [2011] FCAFC 53 ......................................... EA.55.180 Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Westfarmers General Insurance Ltd (No 4) (2010) 268 ALR 108; 55 MVR 391; [2010] FCA 482 .................. EA.8.60, EA.46.150 Salmond v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 141 ................................................... EA.165.480 Salter Rex & Co v Ghosh [1971] 2 QB 597 ......................................................... EA.75.90 Salvati v Donato [2010] FamCAFC 263 ........................................................... EA.144.120 Samadi v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 251; [2008] NSWCCA 330 ........ EA.101.150 Sanchez v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 472; [2009] NSWCCA 171 ........... EA.89.90 Sanderson v Rabuntja (2014) 33 NTLR 205; [2014] NTSC 13 ........................ EA.18.120 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; [1978] HCA 43 .............. EA.126B.270, EA.10.60, EA.130.60, EA.130.120, EA.130.210, EA.130.300, EA.130.330, EA.130.390 Santo v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 269 ............................................................ EA.55.60 Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 ................. EA.55.90, EA.97.120, EA.97.480, EA.98.120, EA.101.190, EA.101.450 Saunders v The Queen (2004) 149 A Crim R 174; [2004] TASSC 95 ............. EA.20.180, EA.66.210 Scalise v Bezzina [2003] NSWCA 362 .............................................. EA.46.60, EA.46.150 Schanker v The Queen [2018] VSCA 94 .................. EA.59.180, EA.136.60, EA.Intro.120 Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 74 ALJR 743; [2000] HCA 18 ........................................................................................ EA.55.180 Schipp v Cameron (No 2) (1997) 38 ATR 1 ....................................................... EA.39.120 Schofield, Re; Ex parte Rangott v P & B Baron Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 280 ........................................................................................................................ EA.8.60 Schulman v Abbott Tout Lawyers [2010] FCA 308 ........................................... EA.122.150 Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Goman (2007) 70 NSWLR 176; 210 FLR 161; [2007] NSWSC 278 ................................................................................ EA.160.60 Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd v Baylily Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 82 ........... EA.75.90 Seafood Imports Pty Ltd v ANL Singapore Pte Ltd (No 1) [2009] FCA 435 ........................................................................................................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Secretary, Department of Health & Ageing v Prime Nature Prize Pty Ltd (in liq) [2010] FCA 597 .................................................................................. EA.191.20 Selby v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 40 ........................................................... EA.114.240 Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd v Hapag-Lloyd AG [1998] NSWSC 644 ...................... EA.69.240 Sellers Pty Ltd v Hapag-Lloyd AG (unreported, NSW SC, Admiralty Div, Giles CJ Comm D, 11 September 1997) ...................................................... EA.118.390 Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 ...EA.Intro.350 Semaan v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 503; 230 A Crim R 568; [2013] VSCA 134 ................................................................ EA.55.360, EA.55.390, EA.97.120 Semaan v The Queen; DPP v Semaan [2017] VSCA 261 ................................. EA.66.210 Sendy v Commonwealth [2002] NSWSC 1109 ............................ EA.118.180, EA.118.220 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2005) 144 FCR 379; [2005] FCAFC 125 .... EA.117.120, EA.128.150 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 864 ........................ EA.117.120, EA.122.210 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 450; [2006] FCA 343 ........ EA.131.120, EA.131.210, EA.131.240, EA.131.270 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 14) [2006] FCA 500 .................................. EA.79.240 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 15) [2006] FCA 515 .................................. EA.79.240 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 8) [2005] FCA 1348 .................................. EA.136.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xcii

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Table of Cases

789TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 131; [2005] NSWSC 123 ....................................................................................... EA.119.120 Sever v The Queen (2007) 179 A Crim R 110; [2007] NSWCCA 339 ............. EA.20.180 Severino v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 80 ............... EA.85.210, EA.89.150, EA.139.60, EA.139.120, EA.Intro.350 Sevic v Roarty (1998) 44 NSWLR 287 ............................................................. EA.122.330 Sexton v Homer (2013) 65 MVR 460; [2013] NSWCA 414 ...... EA.117.120, EA.118.360 Seymour v Attorney-General (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 416 ......................................... EA.90.60 Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 ........ EA.46.150 Seymour v Price [1998] FCA 1224 .................................................................... EA.130.390 Seymour v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 576; [2006] NSWCCA 206 ...... EA.137.120 Sharjade Pty Ltd v RAAF Landings [2008] NSWSC 151 ................................ EA.122.480 Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225; 246 ALR 84; [2008] FCAFC 45 ......... EA.26.120 Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 ........................................... EA.43.210, EA.106.90 Shea v EnergyAustralia Services Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 303 ALR 230; [2013] FCA 937 ............................................................................................. EA.122.180 Sheehan v The Queen (2006) 163 A Crim R 397; [2006] NSWCCA 233 .... EA.165B.270 Sheen v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 208; [2011] NSWCCA 259 ........... EA.165.480 Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236 .............................................. EA.87.120 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 .................................................... EA.141.120 Short v The Queen [2000] NSWCCA 462 ........................................................ EA.141.150 Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 18 FCR 285 ....................... EA.79.120 Sibanda v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 67; 213 A Crim R 303; [2011] VSCA 285 ................................................................................................ EA.89.90, EA.165.480 Silver Fox Co Pty Ltd v Lenards Pty Ltd (No 3) (2004) 214 ALR 621; [2004] FCA 1570 ....................................................................... EA.131.60, EA.131.510 Silvia v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2001] NSWSC 562 ........................ EA.56.60 Sim v Powell (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 10 September 1997) ................. EA.79.150 Simply Irresistible Pty Ltd v Couper [2010] VSC 505 ..................................... EA.131.480 Sims v Thomas (2007) 17 Tas R 114; 179 A Crim R 412; [2007] TASSC 106 .................................................................................................................. EA.138.720 Sindoni v The Queen (2011) 211 A Crim R 187; [2011] VSCA 195 ................. EA.116.90 Singapore Airlines v Sydney Airports Corp Ltd [2004] NSWSC 380 ............. EA.118.390, EA.122.180, EA.122.240, EA.122.270, EA.122.510, EA.133.60 Singh v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2006) 164 A Crim R 284; [2006] NSWCCA 333 .......................................... EA.164.90, EA.165.180, EA.165.480 Singh v Newridge Property Group Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 411 ......................... EA.67.60 Singh v Singh [2007] NSWSC 1357 .................................................................... EA.59.240 Singh v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 263 ................. EA.66.120, EA.66.180 Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston (2011) 81 NSWLR 526; [2011] NSWSC 1083 ............................................................................................................... EA.131A.90 Sio v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 42 ................................................................ EA.65.240 Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32 .................. EA.65.60, EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.65.240 Skinner v The Queen [2015] VSCA 26 ............................................................... EA.41.300 Skipworth v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 37 ..................................................... EA.66.180 Slea Pty Ltd v Connective Services Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 232 ..... EA.131.60, EA.131.120, EA.131.150, EA.131.270, EA.131.480 Slea Pty Ltd v Connective Services Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 361 .......................... EA.117.120 Smale v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 328 ....................................................... EA.137.210 Smart v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 15 ............................................ EA.55.330, EA.137.90 Smith v Aircraft Maintenance Services Australia (AMSA) Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 264 ..................................................................................... EA.135.90, EA.135.150 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Gould (No 1) [2012] VSC 210 ............................................................. EA.131.150 The Queen (1970) 121 CLR 572 ............................................................ EA.29.180 The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588 ....................................... EA.80.150, EA.106.240 The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 ...... EA.55.60, EA.55.90, EA.55.270, EA.56.90, EA.76.90, EA.78.60, EA.114.240, EA.115.300, EA.116.90 Smith v The Queen [2012] VSCA 187 ........................... EA.46.90, EA.46.120, EA.46.150 Smith v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 182 ...................................... EA.55.330, EA.137.90 Smith v Western Australia (2014) 250 CLR 473; 88 ALJR 384; [2014] HCA 3 ................................................................................................................ EA.9.120 Smits v Roach [2006] HCA 36 ........................................................................... EA.190.120 Sokolowskyj v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 .... EA.97.120, EA.101.190, EA.101.195, EA.137.60 Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442; [2010] NSWCA 237 ............................. EA.128.120 Sophie, Re [2008] NSWCA 250 ........................................................................... EA.140.60 Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; 57 ALJR 248; [1983] HCA 10 ............................... EA.128.90, EA.128.150, EA.128.180, EA.128.360, EA.128.600 Soteriou v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] VSCA 328 ...... EA.85.210, EA.85.300 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 ..................... EA.56.210 South Shropshire District Council v Amos [1987] 1 All ER 340 ..................... EA.131.270 South Sydney Junior Rugby Leagues Club Ltd v Gioia [2000] NSWCA 249 ...................................................................................................................... EA.78.60 South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds (2007) 4 DDCR 421; [2007] NSWCA 16 ................................................................................ EA.136.300 Southern Cross Airlines Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Andersen & Co (1998) 84 FCR 472 .................................................................. EA.122.270, EA.122.360 Southern Cross Airports v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2011) 83 ATR 612; [2011] NSWSC 349 ............................................ EA.69.120, EA.192A.60 Southland Coal Pty Ltd, Re (2005) 189 FLR 297; [2005] NSWSC 259 ......... EA.118.480 Southland Coal Pty Ltd (receivers & managers appointed) (in liq), Re (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899 ........... EA.118.150, EA.118.360, EA.118.570 Sovereign v Bevillesta [2000] NSWSC 521 ............. EA.122.90, EA.122.210, EA.122.240 Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322; 138 ALR 735 ........................ EA.118.360, EA.118.390 Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536 ........................................... EA.65.240, EA.81.240 Spence v The Queen [2016] VSCA 113 ................... EA.128.600, EA.128.690, EA.132.90 Spencer v Bamber [2012] NSWCA 274 .............................................................. EA.46.150 Spencer v Commonwealth (2012) 206 FCR 309; [2012] FCAFC 169 ........... EA.130.210, EA.130.240, EA.130.390, EA.133.60 Spencer v Commonwealth [2014] FCA 1288 ...................................................... EA.56.120 Spencer v The Queen (2003) 137 A Crim R 444; [2003] NTCCA 1 ............... EA.165.480 Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 3) (2009) 262 ALR 27; [2009] FCA 1283 ........................................................................................................... EA.10.60 Stack v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 526; 151 A Crim R 112; [2004] WASCA 300 ..................................................................... EA.42.60, EA.165.450 Stafford v The Queen (1993) 67 ALJR 510 ....................................................... EA.165.450 Stambolziovski v Nestorovic [2015] NSWCA 332 .............................................. EA.55.180 Standage v Tasmania [2017] TASCCA 23 ..................................... EA.137.90, EA.137.210 Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Dean [1999] NSWSC 1042 ...... EA.128.690 Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; [2001] HCA 4 ..... EA.192.40, EA.192.80, EA.192.100

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Smith Smith Smith Smith

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Table of Cases

Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 ............ EA.108C.150, EA.16.90, EA.29.60, EA.32.90, EA.32.180, EA.37.150, EA.38.150, EA.39.150, EA.46.180, EA.67.90, EA.104.90, EA.106.120, EA.108.180, EA.110.60, EA.112.60 Stark v The Queen (2013) 230 A Crim R 455; [2013] VSCA 34 ...................... EA.66.300 State Bank of New South Wales v Lo [2000] NSWSC 1191 .............................. EA.59.240 State Central Authority v Blyth [2010] FamCA 90 ........................................... EA.121.120 State Rail Authority (NSW) v Brown (2006) 66 NSWLR 540; [2006] NSWCA 220 ................................................................................ EA.46.60, EA.103.120 State Rail Authority (NSW) v Smith (1998) 45 NSWLR 382 ........................... EA.131.120 Steel v Beks (2010) 245 FLR 212; [2010] NSWSC 1405 .................................. EA.160.60 Steffen v Ruban [1966] 2 NSWLR 622 ............................................................... EA.79.240 Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 192; [2000] FCA 294 ...................................................................................................................... EA.46.60 Steve v The Queen (2008) 189 A Crim R 68; [2008] NSWCCA 231 ............ EA.Intro.350 Stevens v McCallum [2006] ACTCA 13 .............................................................. EA.66.210 Stevens v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 91; 156 A Crim R 487; [2005] HCA 65 .......................................................................................................... EA.141.120 Stewart v Ronalds (2009) 76 NSWLR 99; 232 FLR 331; [2009] NSWCA 277 ...................................................................................................................... EA.10.60 Stirland v Director of Public Prosecutions [1944] AC 327 ............................ EA.Intro.350 Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 323 ................................................................................. EA.79.300, EA.79.420 Stojcevski v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 27 ..................................................... EA.165.90 Strachan v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 322 ............................... EA.55.330, EA.101.150 Straker v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 649; 51 ALJR 690 ................................... EA.81.60 Strauss v Police (SA) (2013) 224 A Crim R 389; [2013] SASC 3 ................. EA.114.240, EA.114.300 Strikers Management Pty Ltd; Australian Securities Commission v Peter Dimitri (unreported, FCA, Burchett J, 18 November 1997) ....................... EA.121.120 Strinic v Singh (2009) 74 NSWLR 419; [2009] NSWCA 15 ............................. EA.144.60 Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; 86 ALJR 267; [2012] HCA 5 .............................................................................................................. EA.140.60 Stuart v The Queen (1959) 101 CLR 1 ............................................................... EA.20.150 Stubley v WA [2011] HCA 7 ................................................................................ EA.184.20 Stubley v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 36 ............................ EA.141.120, EA.184.20 Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374; 207 A Crim R 202; [2011] HCA 7 ....................................... EA.55.90, EA.55.390, EA.97.120, EA.101.185 Su v Chang [1999] FamCA 1203 ....................................................................... EA.190.120 Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 ...................................... EA.59.180 Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 .................... EA.117.120, EA.118.240, EA.126.60 Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319; [1999] NSWCA 338 ..................... EA.144.60 Sumner v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 398; 205 A Crim R 325; [2010] VSCA 221 ...................................................................................................... EA.165.480 Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528 ................................... EA.101.180, EA.101.185 Sutton v The Queen [2015] VSCA 251 ............................................................... EA.37.270 Svajcer v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 587; [2010] VSCA 116 ............... EA.165.540 Svajcer v Woolworths Ltd [2015] VSC 543 ........................................................ EA.135.90 Swan v The Queen (2013) 234 A Crim R 372; [2013] VSCA 226 ...................... EA.55.60 Swann v Spiropolos [2006] NSWSC 461 .............................................................. EA.53.60 Sych v Hunter (1974) 8 SASR 118 ...................................................................... EA.79.240 Sydney, City of v Streetscape Projects (Aust) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 942 ........ EA.44.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Sydney, City of v Streetscape Projects (Aust) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 990 ...... EA.136.90 Sydney Airports Corp Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 ........ EA.118.330, EA.118.360, EA.118.390 Sydney Attractions Group Pty Ltd v Schulman [2012] NSWSC 951 .............. EA.192A.60 Sydney Attractions Group Pty Ltd v Schulman [2013] NSWSC 858 ................. EA.69.210 Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 ....... EA.79.300 Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 354; [2002] FCAFC 157 ...................................................... EA.55.270, EA.79.240

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T T v The Queen (1999) 73 ALJR 460 ................................................................... EA.18.180 T, Re [1980] 1 NSWLR 392 .................................................................................. EA.94.90 TB v New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1145 ....................................................... EA.60.60 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82 ...................................................................................................... EA.79.240 THD v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 106; [2010] VSCA 115 ................... EA.115.300 TJ v Western Australia (No 3) [2015] FCA 1359 .......................... EA.79.270, EA.136.180 TKWJ v The Queen (2002) 212 CLR 124; 133 A Crim R 574; [2002] HCA 46 ..................... EA.192A.40, EA.192A.60, EA.101.150, EA.110.90, EA.137.60, EA.Intro.180 TO v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 12 ................................... EA.165B.150, EA.165B.210 TP v The Queen [2012] VSCA 166 ..................................................................... EA.46.150 TS v Constable Courtney James [2014] NSWSC 984 .......................................... EA.4.180 TWL v The Queen (2012) 222 A Crim R 445; [2012] NSWCCA 57 .............. EA.101.150 Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Victoria [2013] VSC 302 ...... EA.117.90, EA.124.60, EA.133.60 Taber v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 427; [2007] NSWCCA 116 ............. EA.65.270 Talacko v Talacko [2014] VSC 328 .............................. EA.91.60, EA.125.90, EA.125.180 Talbot v NRMA Ltd [2000] NSWSC 602 .......................................................... EA.121.150 Taleb v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) [2014] VSC 285 ........................ EA.55.510 Tambree v Travel Compensation Fund [2004] NSWCA 24 ............................... EA.98.360 Tampion v Anderson (1973) 48 ALJR 11 .............................................................. EA.75.90 Tan v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 310; [2008] NSWCCA 332 ........ EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Tanner v The Queen [2001] WASCA 60 ..................................... EA.101.150, EA.101.360 Tanti v Rothe (unreported, NSW SC, McLelland CJ in Eq, 28 November 1996) ................................................................................................................ EA.79.300 Tarrant v Statewide Secured Investments Pty Ltd (2012) 126 ALD 290; [2012] FCA 582 ................................................................................................. EA.27.60 Tasmania v B (No 2) [2012] TASSC 39 ................................................................ EA.60.90 Tasmania v Bott [2015] TASSC 13 .................................................................... EA.138.120 Tasmania v Crane (2004) 148 A Crim R 346; [2004] TASSC 80 ................... EA.138.150 Tasmania v Dolega [2016] TASSC 65 ................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.62.60, EA.65.150 Tasmania v Farmer (2004) 148 A Crim R 99; [2004] TASSC 104 ................. EA.101.240 Tasmania v Mayne [2009] TASSC 82 ....................... EA.38.150, EA.137.60, EA.137.120, EA.137.150 Tasmania v S [2004] TASSC 84 ........................................................................ EA.101.240 Tasmania v Seabourne [2010] TASSC 35 ......................................................... EA.138.540 Tasmania v Stojakovic (2008) 18 Tas R 96; [2008] TASSC 48 ....................... EA.139.150 Tasmania v Sudani [2011] TASSC 50 ................................................................. EA.85.210 Tasmania v Tu Ai Lin (2011) 225 A Crim R 1; [2011] TASSC 54 .................... EA.69.120 Tate v Tate (2002) 169 FLR 190; [2002] FamCA 356 ............................... EA.Dict.Pt.1.60 Taub v R [2017] NSWCCA 198 ........................................................................... EA.79.240 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Ahern (No 2) [1988] 2 Qd R 158 ........... EA.75.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xcvi

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Table of Cases

Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Clear Blue Developments Pty Ltd (2010) 190 FCR 1; [2010] FCA 1223 ............................................................ EA.160.60 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Currockbilly (2002) 172 FLR 99; [2002] NSWSC 1061 ........................................................................................ EA.4.150 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Law Institute of Victoria (2010) 27 VR 51; 78 ATR 809; [2010] VSCA 73 .................................. EA.130.210, EA.130.390 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Meredith (2007) 245 ALR 150; [2007] ATC 5353; [2007] NSWCA 354 ..................................... EA.160.60, EA.163.30 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Meredith (2007) 69 ATR 876; [2007] NSWCA 354 .................................................................................................... EA.160.60 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Trimcoll Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1324 ............ EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30, EA.167.30, EA.167.60, EA.169.60, EA.169.90, EA.169.150 Taxation, Deputy Commissioner of v Trio Site Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 776 ........................................................................................................... EA.160.60 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Josway Hospitality Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 466 ........................................................................................................... EA.160.60 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 60 ATR 266; 225 ALR 266; [2005] FCA 1247 ................................................. EA.118.390 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341; 229 ALR 304; [2006] FCAFC 86 ......................... EA.122.60, EA.122.90, EA.122.150 Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 149; [2011] FCAFC 74 ....................................................................... EA.Intro.350 Taxation (Cth), Federal Commissioner of v Industrial Equity Ltd (2000) 98 FCR 573; 171 ALR 1; [2000] FCA 420 ..................................................... EA.48.60 Taxation (Cth), Federal Commissioner of v Spotless Services Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 404 ................................................................................................. EA.118.390 Taylor v Burgess [2002] NSWSC 676; (2002) 29 Fam LR 167 ...................... EA.138.120 Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343; 22 ALR 599 ...................................... EA.79.480 Taylor v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 2 ......................................... EA.81.60, EA.138.120 Tedeschi v Singh [1948] 1 Ch 319 ....................................................................... EA.26.150 Tedesco v The Queen [2003] SASC 79; (2003) 85 SASR 66 .......................... EA.101.360 Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 ................. EA.118.210, EA.118.270, EA.118.300 Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 ..... EA.122.240, EA.122.300, EA.Intro.120 Telstra Corp Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152 ........................ EA.122.90 Telstra Corp Ltd v Minister for Communications, Information Technology & the Arts (No 2) [2007] FCA 1445 ............................................................ EA.118.330 Temple v Powell (No 1) (2007) 164 IR 409; [2007] FCA 987 ....... EA.28.120, EA.37.240 Teoh v Greenway (2015) 297 FLR 398; [2015] ACTSC 133 ........................... EA.131.540 Terranora Group Management Pty Ltd v Terranora Lakes Country Club Ltd (in liq) (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 1 December 1997) ................ EA.75.150 Thackray v Gunns Plantations Ltd (2011) 85 ACSR 144; [2011] VSC 380 ....... EA.50.30 Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57 ................................................................ EA.81.60 The Australian Federal Police, Commissioner of v Courtenay Investments Ltd [2016] WASCA 194 .................................................................................. EA.55.180 The Environment, Heritage & the Arts, Minister for v PGP Developments Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 58 ................................................................................... EA.191.20 Theodoropoulos v The Queen [2015] VSCA 364 ................................................ EA.81.240 Thi Dung Ta v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 32 ............... EA.20.90, EA.37.90, EA.76.90 Thomas v New South Wales (2008) 74 NSWLR 34; [2008] NSWCA 316 ....... EA.69.240 Thomas v SMP (International) Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 822 ............................. EA.28.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Thomas v SMP International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 900 .................... EA.26.150 Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584 ........................................................ EA.141.90 Thomas v Van Den Yssel (1976) 14 SASR 205 .................................................. EA.46.150 Thompson v The Queen (1968) 117 CLR 313; 42 ALJR 16 ............................ EA.101.150 Thorne v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 10 ........................................................ EA.165.480 3WJ Pty Ltd v Kanj [2008] NSWCA 321 ........................................ EA.38.150, EA.192.80 Thu v The Queen [2017] VSCA 28 ..................................................................... EA.97.120 Tieu v The Queen (2016) 92 NSWLR 94; 258 A Crim R 546; [2016] NSWCCA 111 ............ EA.102.60, EA.102.100, EA.103.60, EA.103.120, EA.104.180, EA.Intro.350 Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v AMIEU (1979) 42 FLR 331 ........................... EA.101.195 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1070 ............ EA.118.150, EA.122.60, EA.122.240 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1263 ................. EA.80.90 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 637 .................. EA.75.90, EA.189.60 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 654 ................. EA.136.90 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 657 ................... EA.87.90 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598; [2009] NSWSC 769 ..................... EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, EA.63.60, EA.81.240, EA.135.150 Timbery v The Queen (2007) 180 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 355 ...... EA.165.210, EA.165.480 Times Properties Pty Ltd v Challenge Bank Ltd [1996] ATPR 41–455 ............ EA.117.90, EA.118.270 Timms v Commonwealth Bank [2003] NSWSC 576 .... EA.69.120, EA.69.240, EA.69.600 Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (No 2) (1998) 83 FCR 397 .............................................................................................. EA.122.270, EA.126.60 Toalepai v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 270 ................................................... EA.101.360 Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 396; 174 A Crim R 183; [2007] HCA 39 .......................................................................................................... EA.138.390 Toll Pty Ltd v Harradine [2016] NSWCA 374 ................................................... EA.55.180 Tomark Pty Ltd v Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 347 .................... EA.79.180 Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337 ............................ EA.46.150 Ton v The Queen (2002) 132 A Crim R 340; [2002] NSWCCA 337 ............. EA.165.390, EA.165.450 Tongahai v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 217; [2014] NSWCCA 81 ......... EA.53.150 Tony Azzi (Automobiles) Pty Ltd v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 375; (2007) 71 NSWLR 140 ......................................................... EA.131.510 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595 ...................... EA.101A.120, EA.108C.60, EA.106.240 Tootle v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 103 ......................................................... EA.27.150 Towercom Pty Ltd v Fahour [2011] VSC 455 ............................. EA.122.180, EA.122.270 Towney v Minister for Land & Water Conservation (NSW) (1997) 76 FCR 401 ............................................................................................ EA.126.60, EA.Intro.270 Towney v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 65 ......................................................... EA.141.90 Townsend v Townsend [2001] NSWCA 136 ........................................................ EA.97.120 Tozer Kemsley & Millbourn (A/asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384; [1956] HCA 6 .......................... EA.55.180 Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Ice Works (1994) 52 FCR 96 ............. EA.128.300, EA.187.20 Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (1989) 88 ALR 69 ...................... EA.128.360, EA.131.270 [All references are to paragraph numbers] xcviii

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Table of Cases

Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 .................................................................................................................. EA.122.390 Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2013] NSWSC 211 .... EA.122.180 Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 16) [2013] NSWSC 418 ................................................................................................... EA.118.540 Traffıc Calming Australia Pty Ltd v CTS Creative Traffıc Solutions Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 741 .............................................................................................. EA.69.540 Tran v Magistrates’ Court (Vic) [1998] 4 VR 294 ............................................. EA.55.180 Tran v The Queen [2016] VSCA 79 ...................................................................... EA.78.60 TransGrid v Members of Lloyds Syndicate 3210 [2011] NSWSC 301 .......... EA.131A.90, EA.131A.180, EA.117.90 Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 ......................................................................................... EA.79.150, EA.80.90 Traxys Europe SA v Balaji Coke Industry Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1132 ................. EA.58.60, EA.150.90 Trendlen Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 741 ............. EA.125.120 Trimcoll Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NSWCA 307 ...................... EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30, EA.167.30, EA.167.60, EA.167.90, EA.169.90 Trkulja v Markovic [2015] VSCA 298 ................................................................ EA.55.180 Trudgett v The Queen (2008) 70 NSWLR 696; 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62 ............................................................ EA.114.60, EA.114.90, EA.116.90 Trusted Cloud Pty Limited v Core Desktop Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 33 .............. EA.192A.60 Trylow v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 55 ATR 408; [2004] FCA 446 ........................................................................................................... EA.97.240 Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43 .............................................. EA.17.90, EA.18.180 Tsang v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2011) 219 A Crim R 304; [2011] VSCA 336 ................................................... EA.30.120, EA.87.120, EA.165.450 Tsang v The Queen [2012] HCATrans 198 .......................................................... EA.30.120 Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (t/as North West Immigration Services) (1996) 140 ALR 273 .................................................. EA.48.180, EA.59.180, EA.67.90 Tuite v The Queen [2015] VSCA 148 .............................................. EA.79.120, EA.79.300 Tukuafu v The Queen [2014] VSCA 345 ........................................................... EA.165.210 Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; 167 A Crim R 192; 81 ALJR 391; [2006] HCA 56 ............... EA.165B.210, EA.165B.240, EA.101.150, EA.165.480 Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1069 ...................................................................... EA.155A.30, EA.155.30 Tunja v The Queen [2013] VSCA 174 ......................................... EA.165.270, EA.165.480 Turco v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 209 ........................... EA.128.540 Turnbull v Gorgievski [1999] NSWSC 871 ......................................... EA.67.60, EA.67.90 Turnell v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 399 ........................................................ EA.46.150 260 Oxford Street Pty Ltd v Premetis [2006] NSWCA 96 ................................. EA.55.510 Twynam Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2008] FCA 1922 ................... EA.97.120 Tyneside Property Management Pty Ltd v Hammersmith Management Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 395 .................................................................................. EA.79.330

U U v NSW Secretary of Family and Community Services [2017] NSWCA 221 ...................................................................................................................... EA.46.60 Ultrasonic Slimming Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 547 .................................................................................................. EA.131A.90 Ulutui v The Queen (2014) 41 VR 676; 241 A Crim R 574; [2014] VSCA 110 ............................................................................................ EA.101.360, EA.190.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Unilever Australia Ltd v Revlon Australia Pty Ltd (No 6) [2014] FCA 1409 ................................................................................................................ EA.135.150 United Dairy Power Pty Ltd v Murray Goulburn Co-operative Co Ltd [2011] FCA 762 ................................................................................................. EA.75.60 United Group Resources Pty Ltd v Calabro (No 5) (2011) 198 FCR 514; [2011] FCA 1408 ............................................................................................. EA.55.180 United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 870 ..... EA.79.330 Unsworth v Tristar Steering & Suspension Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1081 .... EA.122.210 Unsworth v Tristar Steering & Suspension Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1082 .... EA.133.60 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 287 ..................................... EA.10.60

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V Van Der Lee v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 286 .................... EA.11.90, EA.125.90, EA.125.120, EA.131.570, EA.131.600 Van Doore by his Tutor the Protective Commissioner v Mendez (unreported, NSW SC, Dunford J, 30 June 1997) ....................................... EA.131.510 Van Lan Ha v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 319; 247 A Crim R 462; [2014] VSCA 335 .......................................................................................................... EA.53.60 Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 656; 35 A Crim R 232 ................. EA.90.60, EA.115.150 Van der Vegt v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 279 ................................................ EA.89.90 Varawa v Howard Smith & Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 382 .................................... EA.125.90 Vasil v National Australia Bank Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 207 ..... EA.128.540, EA.128.780 Vata-Meyer v Commonwealth [2015] FCAFC 139 ............................................. EA.140.60 Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4 .......... EA.79.120, EA.79.180, EA.79.480, EA.141.120 Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 .............. EA.66.300, EA.97.60, EA.97.180, EA.98.120, EA.101.180, EA.101.360, EA.Intro.350 Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 45 VR 680 ............................................................ EA.97.120 Vella v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 148 ............................................................. EA.76.90 Vergara v Ewin (2014) 223 FCR 151; [2014] FCAFC 100 ............................... EA.140.60 Verge v Devere Holdings Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 464; [2009] FCA 832 ...... EA.131.480 Verryt v Schoupp (2015) 70 MVR 484; [2015] NSWCA 128 ............................ EA.79.180 Versace v Monte [2001] FCA 1572 ........................ EA.128.360, EA.128.540, EA.128.690 Versi v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 206 ................................... EA.101.360, EA.141.120 Vetrovec v The Queen [1982] 67 CCC (2d) 1 ................................................... EA.165.210 Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd (2015) 321 ALR 191; [2015] VSCA 101 ................................................................................. EA.122.150 Vickers v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60 ............. EA.62.60, EA.137.210 Victoria v Brazel (2008) 19 VR 553; 181 A Crim R 562; [2008] VSCA 37 .... EA.130.210, EA.130.330, EA.130.360, EA.130.420 Victoria v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd [2013] VSCA 180 ........................................... EA.133.60 Victorian Workcover Authority v Elsdon (2013) 42 VR 434; [2013] VSCA 235 ...................................................................................................................... EA.55.90 Vines v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75 .......................................... EA.46.60, EA.140.60 Violi v Berrivale Orchards Ltd (2000) 99 FCR 580; 173 ALR 818; [2000] FCA 797 ............................................................................................................... EA.8.60 Visscher v Maritime Union of Australia (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 1572 .............. EA.39.240 Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303 ........................ EA.69.180, EA.69.240, EA.135.150 Vitek v Estate Homes Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1805 .......................................... EA.81.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] c

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Vo v The Queen (2013) 33 NTLR 65; 229 A Crim R 95; [2013] NTCCA 4 ........................................................................................................................ EA.112.60 Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267 ............................................................ EA.38.90 Volunteer Fire Brigades Vic Inc v Country Fire Authority (No 3) [2016] VSC 621 ................................................................................... EA.131.150, EA.131.270

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W W v The Queen (2001) 115 FCR 41; 124 A Crim R 545; 189 ALR 633; [2001] FCA 1648 ........................ EA.101.120, EA.101.180, EA.101.240, EA.Intro.120 W v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 110 ........................................................... EA.165B.120 W, Re (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; [2004] FamCA 768 ............................................ EA.140.60 W K v The Queen [2011] VSCA 345 .................................................................. EA.90.270 WAC v The Queen [2010] HCATrans 167 ......................................................... EA.165.480 WAQ v Di Pino [2012] QCA 283 ....................................................... EA.46.60, EA.46.150 WC v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 231 ............................................................. EA.55.570 WC v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 52 ........................................................... EA.Intro.350 WFS v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 406; 223 A Crim R 327; [2011] VSCA 347 ............................................................................................ EA.101.150, EA.101.360 WO v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2009] NSWCCA 275 ............ EA.192A.40 Wade v Director of Public Prosecutions (2014) 41 VR 434; 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 .................................................... EA.48.90, EA.48.270, EA.52.30 Wade v Mid North Coast Area Health Service [2004] NSWIRComm 254 ...... EA.85.210, EA.87.90 Wade v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 583; [2006] NSWCCA 295 ........ EA.165B.270, EA.165.210 Wah v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 41; [2014] VSCA 7 ............................ EA.110.90 Wahi v The Queen [2015] VSCA 132 .................................................................. EA.110.60 Wakeley v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 321 ........................................................ EA.26.150 Waldor Development v Riverquay Developments [2005] NSWSC 8 ................ EA.135.150 Walford v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; 217 A Crim R 555; [2012] NSWCA 290 ................................. EA.114.90, EA.114.180 Walford v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 288 .................................................... EA.165.210 Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; [1937] HCA 44 ................. EA.35.60, EA.Intro.150 Wallis v Tasmania [2007] TASSC 4 ............................................... EA.98.120, EA.141.120 Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 ............................................................... EA.11.90 Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 380 ............................................................... EA.11.90 Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283; [1989] HCA 9 ........... EA.59.180, EA.59.210, EA.65.210 Warburton v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2017] NSWSC 69 ....... EA.122.360 Ward v The Queen [2017] VSCA 37 ............................ EA.41.120, EA.42.130, EA.46.130 Warman International Ltd v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 478 .................................................................................................................. EA.128.360 Warner v Women’s Hospital [1954] VLR 410 .................................................. EA.119.120 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; 53 ALJR 293; [1979] HCA 9 ......... EA.65.240, EA.97.480, EA.101.450 Washer v Western Australia (2007) 234 CLR 492; 177 A Crim R 386; 82 ALJR 33; [2007] HCA 48 ............................................................. EA.55.60, EA.55.450 Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 .......................... EA.118.90, EA.119.120 Waterwell Shipping Inc v HIH Casualty & GIO Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Giles CJ Comm D, 8 September 1997) .................................................. EA.69.240 Watharow v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 112 ......................................... EA.165.480 Wati v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1996) 71 FCR 103 ............. EA.140.60 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Table of Cases

Watson v McLearnon [2000] NSWSC 19 .......................................................... EA.125.180 Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 716 .............................................. EA.118.390 Waugh Asset Management v Merrill Lynch [2010] NSWSC 197 .................... EA.131A.90 Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044 .............. EA.118.600, EA.122.150 Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436 .................................................. EA.76.90, EA.79.150 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 ...................................... EA.165.360, EA.165.480 Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 A Crim R 251; [1993] HCA 65 ............................................................................ EA.20.180, EA.20.420 Welsh v Carnival PLC (t/as Carnival Australia) (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1270 .................................................................................................................. EA.39.120 Welsh v Carnival PLC (t/as Carnival Australia) (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 1282 .................................................................................................................... EA.78.60 Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 ...................... EA.39.210, EA.39.240 Wentworth v Wentworth (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 8 April 1997) .......... EA.75.90, EA.79.240 Wentworth District Capital Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 80 ATR 50; [2010] FCA 862 .............................................................. EA.144.60 Werden v The Queen [2015] VSCA 72 .............................................. EA.23.90, EA.27.120 West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24431; [2003] NSWSC 161 ................................... EA.46.60 Westbus Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) v Ishak [2006] NSWCA 198 ....... EA.140.60 Western Australia v Wood [2008] WASCA 81 .................................................... EA.184.20 Weston v Publishing & Broadcasting Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1288 ..................... EA.122.180 Westpac Banking Corp v 789TEN Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 519; [2005] NSWCA 321 ......................................................... EA.117.90, EA.118.390, EA.119.120 Wheldon v Dinh [2010] FamCA 740 ................................................................... EA.144.60 White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18 ........ EA.95.60, EA.97.60, EA.97.120, EA.97.270 White v Taylor (No 2) [1969] 1 Ch 150 ................................................................ EA.74.60 White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) v White [2005] NSWCA 173 ....... EA.55.180, EA.136.60 White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169; [1998] FCA 806 ..................................................................... EA.46.60, EA.55.180 Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 ................................ EA.27.120, EA.41.300 Wilcox v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 42 .......................................................... EA.98.120 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 ................................................................ EA.11.90 Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490; [2000] FCA 1868 .............. EA.65.150, EA.65.180, EA.137.60, EA.137.120, EA.137.150, EA.165.360 Williams Advanced Materials, Inc v Target Technology Company LLC [2004] FCA 1405 ............................................................................................. EA.190.80 Williamson v United States 114 S Ct 2431 (1994) ............................................. EA.65.240 Willis v The Queen (2001) 25 WAR 217; [2001] WASCA 296 ......................... EA.81.240 Willis v The Queen [2016] VSCA 176 .............................................................. EA.138.240 Wilson v Mitchell (No 2) [2014] VSC 332 .......................................................... EA.64.150 Wilson v Tasmania [2017] TASCCA 11 .............................................................. EA.46.150 Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334 ........................................................ EA.101.150 Wilson v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 340; [2011] VSCA 328 ............................ EA.141.120 Wily v Fitz-Gibbon [1998] FCA 121 ...................................................................... EA.84.60 Wily v Terra Cresta Business Solutions Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 949 ................ EA.75.60, EA.75.120 Wimbridge v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196 .......................................... EA.116.90 Wing Cheong Li v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 419; [2010] NSWCCA 40 ................................................................................ EA.59.180, EA.110.90 [All references are to paragraph numbers] cii

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Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) (No 6) [2011] FCA 350 ................................................................................. EA.131.270 Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 ................................................................... EA.115.300, EA.116.90 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 ............................... EA.Dict.Pt.1.60, EA.194.20 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323 ............................... EA.39.240 Wong v Kelly (1999) 43 ATR 436; 154 FLR 200; [1999] NSWCA 439 .... EA.Dict.Pt.1.60 Wood v The Queen [2001] NSWCCA 228 ........................................................ EA.165.360 Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 .................. EA.20.150, EA.79.330, EA.114.240 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9 .......................................................................................... EA.144.90 Woods v Smith [1976] WAR 13 ......................................................................... EA.128.540 WorkCover v Lindores Contractors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWIRComm 422 .......... EA.128.540 WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Tsougranis (2002) 117 IR 203; [2002] NSWIRComm 282 ........................................... EA.128.450, EA.128.540, EA.Intro.120 WorkCover Authority of NSW v Police Service of NSW (2000) 50 NSWLR 333 .................................................................................................................... EA.187.20 WorkCover Authority of NSW, General Manager v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84 ......................... EA.118.330, EA.118.360 Workers Compensation (Dust Diseases) Board (NSW) v Smith [2010] NSWCA 19 .............................................................................. EA.135.150, EA.135.180 Wotton v Queensland (No 4) [2015] FCA 1075 ....................... EA.108C.60, EA.108C.120 Wren v Emmett Contractors Pty Ltd (1969) 43 ALJR 213 .............................. EA.101A.90 Wright v Optus Administration Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] NSWSC 1717 ................. EA.87.90 Wu v Li [2015] FCAFC 109 ................................................................................... EA.81.60

X X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Specialty Network (No 5) [2011] NSWSC 1351 .................................................................................................. EA.79.330 X v X (1999) 26 Fam LR 51; [1999] FamCA 2254 ............................................ EA.144.60 X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; 232 A Crim R 410; [2013] HCA 29 .................................................................. EA.90.120, EA.128.540 Xypolitos v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 423; 247 A Crim R 486; [2014] VSCA 339 .............................................................. EA.89.90, EA.165.270, EA.165.480

Y Yamirr v Northern Territory (No 2) (1998) 82 FCR 533 .................... EA.73.90, EA.74.60 Yara Pilbara Fertilisers Pty Ltd v Oswal [2016] VSC 440 .................................. EA.76.90 Yates, Re; Ex parte Walsh and Johnson (1925) 37 CLR 36 ...................... EA.Dict.Pt.1.30 Yates Property Corp v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84 ................................................ EA.80.90 Ying Mui Pty Ltd v Frank Kiang Ngan Hoh (Ruling No 2) [2016] VSC 531 .................................................................................................................... EA.64.300 Yisrael v District Court (NSW) (1996) 87 A Crim R 63 ....................................... EA.89.90 Youkhana v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 85 .................................. EA.65.150, EA.65.180 Young v Coupe [2004] NSWSC 546 .................................................................... EA.69.210 Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 456 ................ EA.91.60, EA.92.60 Young v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483 ....................................................................... EA.130.390 Young v The Queen [2016] VSCA 149 .............................................................. EA.141.120 [All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Z

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ZL v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 325; [2010] VSCA 345 ................ EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 ................................ EA.97.450 Zanatta v McCleary [1976] 1 NSWLR 230 ...................................................... EA.129.180 Zandipour v The Queen [2017] VSCA 179 ....................................................... EA.165.570 Zemanek v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (unreported, FCA, Hill J, 2 October 1997) .................................................................................................. EA.125.90 Zentai v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2010] FCA 252 ............................ EA.122.120 Zhang, Re [2017] VSCA 171 ............................................................................... EA.174.60 Zhen Chi Chen v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 224 ................... EA.165.210, EA.165.360 Zhu v The Queen (2013) 232 A Crim R 51; [2013] NSWCCA 163 .................. EA.110.60 Zhu v The Queen (2013) 38 VR 77; [2013] VSCA 102 ................... EA.55.330, EA.81.60 Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234; 112 A Crim R 114; [2000] HCA 28 ........................................................................................ EA.81.60, EA.165.480

[All references are to paragraph numbers] civ

Uniform Evidence Law

TABLE OF STATUTES Note: Entries in the Table of Statutes for the Evidence Act 1995 are located under the heading “Commonwealth”, with the exception of those provisions that exist only in: * the NSW Evidence Act 1995, located under the heading “New South Wales” * the Victorian Evidence Act 2008, located under the heading “Victoria” * the ACT Evidence Act 2011, located under the heading “Australian Capital Territory” * the NT Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act, located under the heading “Northern Territory”

Commonwealth Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 15AB: EA.Intro.240 s 29(1): EA.160.60

Australian Federal Police Legislation Amendment Act 2000 s 25: EA.33.30, EA.86.90, EA.115.90, EA.171.60, EA.180.30 s 115(2): EA.115.150

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Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 Sch 2: EA.138.600

Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989: EA.160.60

Bail Act 1977: EA.4.210 s 8(1): EA.4.210 s 8(2): EA.4.210 Pt 3.10: EA.4.210

ss 23C to 23E: EA.84.150 s 23F: EA.84.150 s 23G(3): EA.84.150 ss 23H to 23K: EA.84.150 s 23M: EA.84.150 s 23N: EA.84.150 s 23O: EA.84.150 s 23Q: EA.84.150 s 23V: EA.84.150, EA.86.120 s 23V(5): EA.86.120 Pt 1C: EA.139.30 Pt 1AD: EA.41.330 Pt IC: EA.84.150 Criminal Code Act 1995: TAS.20 Customs Act 1901: EA.Dict.Pt.1.60

Electronic Transactions Act 1999: EA.Dict.Pt.1.90

Evidence Act 1905: EA.69.210

Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 81: EA.4.150 s 81(17): EA.4.150

Corporations Act 2001: EA.8.60 s 109X: EA.160.60 s 596B: EA.4.150 s 1305: EA.69.600 Pt 5.9, Div 1: EA.4.150

Crimes Act 1900 s 80(b): EA.80.150

Crimes Act 1914: EA.84.150, EA.114.150, EA.114.240 s 3ZM: EA.114.120, EA.114.240 s 3ZM(3): EA.114.150 s 3ZM(4): EA.114.150 s 3ZN: EA.114.120, EA.114.240 s 3ZO: EA.115.240, EA.115.300 s 3ZP: EA.114.120, EA.114.240, EA.115.240, EA.115.300 s 4G: EA.20.90

s s s s s s

6: EA.156.60 7B(1)(b): EA.69.120 7E: EA.69.270 10A: EA.159.30 11: EA.157.30 12: EA.186.20 Evidence Act 1995: EA.2.30, EA.4.150, EA.4.270, EA.6.30, EA.8.60, EA.13.210, EA.26.150, EA.29.120, EA.38.60, EA.43.180, EA.55.60, EA.55.180, EA.59.240, EA.69.480, EA.70.150, EA.71.150, EA.79.120, EA.79.150, EA.79.240, EA.80.60, EA.84.60, EA.84.150, EA.90.60, EA.90.240, EA.98.120, EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.101.180, EA.110.90, EA.114.240, EA.118.90, EA.126B.240, EA.128.60, EA.128.150, EA.130.120, EA.136.210, EA.144.90, EA.147.150, EA.149.60, EA.152.60, EA.155A.30, EA.156.150, EA.163.30, EA.164.180, EA.165.480, EA.165.570, EA.165A.120, EA.165B.150,

[All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

cv

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont EA.170.60, EA.182.20, EA.183.40, EA.184.20, EA.185.20, EA.186.20, EA.191.40, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1A.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.60, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.2.30, EA.Dict.Pt.1.30, EA.Dict.Pt.1.60, EA.Intro.30, EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.270, TAS.10, TAS.20 s 3: EA.131A.120 s 3(2): EA.3A.30 s 3(3): EA.38.90, EA.128.180 s 4: EA.4.150, EA.4.270, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.55.120, EA.118.90, EA.142.60, EA.157.60 s 4(1): EA.4.150, EA.8.60 s 4(1)(d): EA.4.270 s 4(2): EA.4.270 s 4(3): EA.4.270 s 4(4): EA.4.270 s 4(6): EA.4.150 s 5: EA.4.150, EA.8.60, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.69.480, EA.70.60, EA.70.150, EA.71.150, EA.147.150, EA.149.60, EA.152.60, EA.156.150, EA.160.120, EA.161.150, EA.162.90, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.60, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.2.30, EA.183.40, TAS.20 s 5(1): EA.5.30, EA.8.60 s 6: TAS.20 s 6(1): EA.98.450 s 7: EA.131A.120 s 8: EA.Intro.120, EA.4.300, EA.8.90, EA.27.180, EA.39.240, EA.43.210, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.51.60, EA.69.600, EA.84.150, EA.85.330, EA.86.60, EA.86.120, EA.190.100 s 8(1): EA.8.60, EA.15.60, EA.41.330 s 8(3): EA.8.60 s 8A: TAS.20 s 9: EA.Intro.270, EA.43.210, EA.81.180 s 9(1): EA.4.240, EA.8.60, EA.9.180 s 9(2): EA.8.60, EA.129.180 s 9(2)(a): EA.8.60 s 9(2)(b): EA.4.210, EA.8.60 s 9(2)(c): EA.8.60 s 9(3): EA.8.60, EA.9.60 s 11: EA.11.90, EA.18.180, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30, EA.26.60, EA.26.120, EA.26.150, EA.26.240, EA.27.60, EA.27.150, EA.29.150, EA.36.30, EA.37.60, EA.41.300, EA.46.150, EA.130.90, EA.136.240 s 11(1): EA.11.90, EA.26.150 s 11(2): EA.Intro.120, EA.11.90, EA.90.300, EA.125.120, EA.131.600, EA.137.240

s 12: EA.Intro.120, EA.8.60, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1Div.1.30, EA.13.180, EA.13.210, EA.18.60, EA.126K.20, EA.190.60 s 12(b): EA.12.60 s 13: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1Div.1.30, EA.12.60, EA.13.210, EA.14.60, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.2.30, EA.21.60, EA.21.120, EA.24.60, EA.31.60, EA.61.30, EA.165.480, EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 s 13(1): EA.Intro.180, EA.13.60, EA.13.210 s 13(2): EA.13.60, EA.13.90, EA.13.120, EA.21.60 s 13(2)(b): EA.13.210 s 13(3): EA.13.210 s 13(4): EA.13.210 s 13(5): EA.Intro.180, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.13.180, EA.13.210, EA.13.270 s 13(5)(a): EA.13.210 s 13(5)(b): EA.13.210 s 13(5)(c): EA.13.210 s 13(6): EA.13.180, EA.13.210, EA.13.270 s 13(7): EA.13.270 s 13(8): EA.13.300 s 14: EA.13.60 s 15: EA.165.480 s 16(2): EA.16.90 s 17(2): EA.17.60 s 17(3): EA.17.60, EA.17.90, EA.55.180 s 17(4): EA.17.60 s 18: EA.Intro.180, EA.18.60, EA.19.30, EA.189.80, EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 s 18(2)(b): EA.18.90 s 18(4): EA.18.90 s 18(5): EA.18.180 s 18(6): EA.18.180 s 18(6)(a): EA.18.120 s 18(6)(b): EA.18.120 s 18(7): EA.18.120, EA.18.180 s 19: EA.12.60, EA.18.60, EA.19.30 s 19(c): EA.19.30 s 20: EA.Intro.180, EA.17.120, EA.20.90, EA.20.150, EA.55.180, EA.190.60 s 20(2): EA.20.120, EA.20.180, EA.20.300, EA.20.360 s 20(3): EA.18.210, EA.20.300, EA.20.360 s 20(4): EA.20.240, EA.20.300 s 20(5): EA.20.120, EA.20.240 s 21: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.13.210, EA.21.210, EA.190.60 s 21(1): EA.21.210 s 21(4): EA.21.150 s 22(1A): EA.22.60 s 22(2): EA.22.60, EA.22.90 s 23: EA.21.60 s 23(2): EA.21.60 s 24(1): EA.21.90

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cvi

Uniform Evidence Law

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 24(2): EA.21.90 s 25: EA.190.60, TAS.20 s 26: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30, EA.26.60, EA.26.120, EA.27.150, EA.29.90, EA.29.150, EA.32.60, EA.41.90, EA.42.120, EA.43.240, EA.44.120, EA.126K.210, EA.190.60, EA.192.60 s 26(a): EA.26.150, EA.37.60, EA.41.300 s 26(c): EA.26.150 s 28: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30 s 29: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30, EA.29.150 s 29(1): EA.27.60 s 29(2): EA.Intro.180, EA.29.90, EA.55.210 s 29(2)(b): EA.29.90 s 29(3): EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.29.60 s 29(4): EA.29.180, EA.48.60, EA.48.180 s 30: EA.13.60, EA.13.150 s 31: EA.13.60, EA.13.150, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30 s 32: EA.Intro.150, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30, EA.32.90, EA.32.210, EA.32.330, EA.32.360, EA.34.60, EA.44.150, EA.122.390, EA.184.20 s 32(1): EA.32.90 s 32(2): EA.32.90, EA.32.150 s 32(2)(b): EA.32.90 s 32(3): EA.32.90, EA.63.100 s 33: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30, EA.33.30, EA.33.60, CTH.TN.10 s 33(1): EA.33.30 s 33(2): EA.33.30 s 34: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30, EA.32.330, EA.32.360, EA.44.150 s 34(2): EA.32.300 s 35: EA.Intro.150, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30 s 35(1): EA.32.270, EA.34.120 s 35(2): EA.32.270, EA.34.120 s 36: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30, EA.36.30, EA.126K.30, EA.190.60 s 36(1): EA.36.30 s 36(2): EA.36.30 s 36(3): EA.36.30 s 37: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.32.60, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.4.30, EA.37.60, EA.37.90, EA.37.150, EA.37.210, EA.37.270, EA.38.270, EA.190.60 s 37(1): EA.39.180 s 37(1)(c): EA.37.90 s 37(3): EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.28.120, EA.29.150 s 38: EA.Intro.150, EA.Intro.330, EA.32.60, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.4.30, EA.37.60, EA.38.60, EA.38.90, EA.38.150, EA.38.270, EA.38.330, EA.39.180, EA.43.180, EA.46.60, EA.55.180,

s s s s s s s s s s s

s s s s s

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

s s s s s s s s s s s s

EA.55.240, EA.165.450, EA.192.100, EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, CTH.TN.10 38(1): EA.38.60, EA.38.150, EA.38.270, EA.39.90, EA.39.300 38(1)(a): EA.38.60 38(1)(b): EA.38.60, EA.38.150, EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 38(1)(c): EA.38.150, EA.43.90 38(2): EA.39.90 38(3): EA.38.210, EA.101A.120, EA.102.90 38(4): EA.38.270, EA.39.300 38(5): EA.38.270, EA.39.300 38(6): EA.38.150, EA.38.240 38(7): EA.38.90 39: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.4.30, EA.38.270, EA.39.90, EA.39.180, EA.39.300, EA.45.150, EA.106.300, EA.108.90, EA.108.210, EA.190.60 39(1)(a): EA.38.150 39(a): EA.39.60 39(b): EA.39.120, EA.39.150 40: EA.26.150, EA.27.60, EA.190.60 41: EA.Intro.180, EA.Intro.210, EA.26.150, EA.41.150, EA.41.300, EA.42.130, EA.195.20 41(1): EA.Intro.210, EA.41.60 41(1)(b): EA.26.150, EA.41.150 41(1)(d): EA.41.210 41(2): EA.Intro.210, EA.41.60, EA.41.120, EA.41.150 41(2)(a): EA.41.240 41(2)(b): EA.41.240, EA.41.270 41(6): EA.41.270, EA.41.360 42: EA.Intro.150, EA.29.90, EA.38.180, EA.41.120 42(1): EA.42.60 42(2): EA.42.60, EA.42.130 42(2)(a) to (c): EA.42.60 42(2)(d): EA.42.60 42(3): EA.42.60 43: EA.43.90, EA.43.180, EA.44.150, EA.45.60, EA.45.150, EA.103.120, EA.104.120, EA.106.210 43(1): EA.38.120, EA.44.90 43(2): EA.43.180, EA.106.90 43(2)(a): EA.43.180 43(3): EA.43.210 44: EA.45.60, EA.45.150 44(2): EA.44.90 44(2)(a): EA.44.90 44(3): EA.43.60, EA.43.240, EA.44.120, EA.44.150 44(3)(d): EA.44.120, EA.45.150 45: EA.43.150, EA.44.180, EA.103.120, EA.104.120, EA.106.210 45(2): EA.43.120 45(3): EA.26.150, EA.39.240, EA.45.120

[All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

cvii

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 45(3)(c): EA.45.120, EA.45.150 s 45(4): EA.45.120 s 45(5): EA.43.150, EA.44.180 s 46: EA.140.120, EA.165.480, EA.190.60 s 46(2): EA.46.90 s 47: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.190.60 s 47(1): EA.48.90, EA.50.30 s 47(2): EA.48.90, EA.48.150, EA.48.240, EA.48.300 s 48: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.48.90, EA.48.270, EA.48.330, EA.50.30, EA.52.30, EA.69.300 s 48(1): EA.48.60, EA.48.90, EA.48.180, EA.48.360 s 48(1)(a): EA.48.120 s 48(1)(b): EA.48.360 s 48(1)(c): EA.48.180, EA.48.360, EA.51.60 s 48(1)(d): EA.48.360 s 48(1)(e): EA.48.210, EA.48.360, EA.69.120 s 48(1)(f): EA.48.240 s 48(2): EA.48.60 s 48(2)(d): EA.48.180 s 48(3): EA.48.120 s 48(4): EA.48.60, EA.48.270, EA.48.300 s 48(4)(a): EA.48.90, EA.48.360 s 48(4)(b): EA.48.270, EA.48.360 s 49: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.48.390, EA.69.300, CTH.TN.10 s 50: EA.Intro.180, EA.50.30, EA.69.300 s 50(1): EA.50.30, CTH.TN.10 s 50(2): CTH.TN.10 s 50(3): EA.50.30 s 51: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.60, EA.48.60, EA.51.60, EA.190.60 s 52: EA.55.300, EA.190.60 s 53: EA.54.60 s 53(2): EA.53.120 s 53(3): EA.53.60 s 54: EA.Intro.150, EA.190.60 s 55: EA.Intro.90, EA.Intro.120, EA.43.180, EA.48.360, EA.51.60, EA.52.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.1.30, EA.55.60, EA.55.90, EA.55.240, EA.56.60, EA.57.210, EA.66A.60, EA.69.330, EA.71.60, EA.78.60, EA.79.60, EA.80.90, EA.89.150, EA.97.120, EA.98.120, EA.101.150, EA.101.185, EA.101A.60, EA.114.60, EA.131.510, EA.136.150, EA.137.90, EA.184.20, EA.190.60 s 55(1): EA.55.120, EA.55.150, EA.137.90 s 55(2): EA.38.210, EA.55.120, EA.55.150, EA.101A.120, EA.102.100 s 55(2)(a): EA.38.210, EA.43.90, EA.55.150, EA.101A.120 s 55(2)(b): EA.81.90, EA.142.60

s 56: EA.Intro.120, EA.26.270, EA.43.90, EA.46.150, EA.51.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.1.30, EA.55.60, EA.55.540, EA.56.60, EA.58.60, EA.62.60, EA.69.330, EA.79.240, EA.80.90, EA.81.60, EA.101A.60, EA.108B.60, EA.136.150 s 56(1): EA.Intro.120, EA.8.60, EA.11.90, EA.80.60, EA.84.60, EA.89.90, EA.90.300, EA.137.240 s 56(2): EA.52.30, EA.55.60, EA.55.90, EA.55.210, EA.55.570, EA.66.300, EA.78.60, EA.189.120 s 57: EA.Intro.330, EA.43.180, EA.48.360, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.1.30, EA.55.60, EA.55.570, EA.56.60, EA.110.120, EA.136.270, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30 s 57(1): EA.57.210, EA.58.60, EA.69.330, EA.142.60 s 57(1)(a): EA.57.120 s 57(1)(b): EA.57.120, EA.57.180 s 57(2): EA.57.210, EA.87.120, EA.87.180 s 58: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.1.30, EA.69.540, EA.71.60, EA.190.60 s 58(1): EA.57.120 s 59: EA.Intro.180, EA.32.180, EA.38.150, EA.48.180, EA.48.360, EA.55.540, EA.56.90, EA.59.90, EA.59.210, EA.59.240, EA.60.60, EA.61.90, EA.63.90, EA.64.90, EA.64.330, EA.65.90, EA.65.150, EA.66.90, EA.66A.60, EA.69.210, EA.69.330, EA.76.90, EA.79.240, EA.79.270, EA.81.60, EA.81.90, EA.81.240, EA.95.60, EA.97.60, EA.98.60, EA.101A.60, EA.101A.150, EA.101A.180, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.115.90, EA.136.60, EA.165.270, EA.165.450, EA.190.60, EA.191.40 s 59(1): EA.59.210 s 59(2): EA.64.330, EA.65.150, EA.69.210 s 59(2A): EA.59.210 s 60: EA.Intro.180, EA.38.60, EA.38.150, EA.43.180, EA.56.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.1.30, EA.59.180, EA.60.60, EA.60.90, EA.60.150, EA.62.60, EA.64.330, EA.65.330, EA.77.60, EA.79.270, EA.81.240, EA.82.30, EA.91.60, EA.95.60, EA.101A.60, EA.101A.150, EA.106.210, EA.108.120, EA.108.150, EA.108.210, EA.136.60, EA.136.150, EA.136.180, EA.165.270 s 60(1): EA.60.90 s 60(2): EA.60.60, EA.62.60 s 60(3): EA.60.60, EA.60.90 s 61: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cviii

Uniform Evidence Law

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 61(2): EA.61.90 s 61(3): EA.61.60 s 62: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.64.330, EA.66A.60 s 62(1): EA.62.90, EA.63.60, EA.63.90, EA.64.90, EA.64.120, EA.65.90, EA.65.300, EA.66.90 s 62(3): EA.62.90 s 63: EA.13.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.90, EA.63.90, EA.63.240, EA.64.90, EA.66.90, EA.135.150 s 63(2): EA.64.330, EA.67.90, CTH.TN.10 s 63(2)(b): EA.63.60, EA.63.120, EA.64.330 s 63(3): EA.64.330 s 64: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.64.90, EA.64.360, EA.65.90, EA.66.90, EA.135.150 s 64(1): EA.64.300 s 64(2): EA.13.90, EA.64.270, EA.64.330, EA.67.60, EA.67.90, EA.68.90, CTH.TN.10 s 64(2)(b): EA.64.120, EA.64.210, EA.64.330 s 64(3): EA.Intro.180, EA.32.240, EA.64.330, EA.65.60, EA.81.270 s 64(4): EA.64.300, EA.64.330 s 65: EA.Intro.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.65.90, EA.65.360, EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 s 65(2): EA.62.60, EA.65.120, EA.65.150, EA.65.210, EA.65.240, EA.65.330, EA.67.90, EA.Dict.Pt.2.30, CTH.TN.10 s 65(2)(b): EA.Intro.120, EA.65.150, EA.81.240 s 65(2)(c): EA.Intro.120, EA.65.150 s 65(2)(d): EA.Intro.180, EA.65.150, EA.65.240 s 65(3): EA.62.60, EA.65.270, EA.67.90, EA.165.270, CTH.TN.10 s 65(7): EA.65.240 s 65(8): EA.62.60, EA.65.60, EA.65.330, EA.67.90, CTH.TN.10 s 65(8)(a): EA.65.330 s 65(8)(b): EA.65.300, EA.65.330 s 65(9): EA.65.330 s 66: EA.Intro.180, EA.32.150, EA.59.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.66.60, EA.66.90, EA.66.180, EA.66.300, EA.102.90, EA.108.60, EA.108.150, EA.108.210, EA.136.150, EA.137.120 s 66(2): EA.Intro.180, EA.32.240, EA.66.180, EA.66.210, EA.81.270, EA.83.60 s 66(2)(b): EA.Intro.120 s 66(2A): EA.Intro.180, EA.66.180 s 66(2A)(a): EA.66.180

s 66(3): EA.66.60, EA.66.210 s 66(4): EA.66.60, EA.66.240 s 66A: EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.180, EA.61.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.62.60, EA.62.90, EA.67.60, EA.72.60 s 67: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.63.150, EA.64.240, EA.65.120, EA.65.240, EA.65.270, EA.65.300, EA.67.60, EA.100.60, CTH.TN.10 s 67(1): EA.167.30, CTH.TN.10 s 67(2): CTH.TN.10 s 67(3): CTH.TN.10 s 67(4): EA.67.90, CTH.TN.10 s 67(5): EA.67.90, CTH.TN.10 s 68: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.64.270, CTH.TN.10 s 68(4): EA.68.60 s 69: EA.48.210, EA.48.360, EA.58.60, EA.69.60, EA.69.210, EA.69.330, EA.69.390, EA.69.480, EA.69.510, EA.69.570, EA.142.60, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30, EA.169.60, EA.169.90 s 69(1): EA.69.60, EA.69.210 s 69(1)(a)(i): EA.69.120 s 69(2): EA.69.60, EA.69.180, EA.69.540 s 69(2)(a): EA.69.180, EA.69.210 s 69(2)(b): EA.69.210 s 69(3): EA.69.240, EA.69.540 s 69(3)(a): EA.69.240 s 69(3)(b): EA.69.240 s 69(5): EA.69.180, EA.69.210 s 70: EA.70.210 s 70(1): EA.70.150, EA.70.180, EA.71.150 s 70(2): EA.70.60, EA.70.180 s 71: EA.Intro.180, EA.71.150, EA.71.180, EA.161.120, EA.162.60 s 72: EA.Intro.180, EA.59.180, EA.62.60, EA.62.90, EA.66A.60, EA.72.60 s 73: EA.74.90 s 73(1): EA.73.60 s 73(2): EA.73.150 s 73(2)(a): EA.73.120 s 73(2)(b): EA.73.120 s 73(3): EA.73.120 s 74(1): EA.74.90 s 75: EA.75.90, EA.75.120, EA.189.60 s 76: EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.180, EA.48.180, EA.55.540, EA.56.60, EA.56.90, EA.75.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.3.30, EA.76.90, EA.76.120, EA.77.60, EA.78.60, EA.79.90, EA.79.300, EA.85.210, EA.97.60, EA.98.60, EA.101A.60, EA.108C.90, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.114.60, EA.136.60 s 77: EA.76.90, EA.76.120, EA.77.60, EA.80.60, EA.101A.150, EA.136.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

cix

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 78: EA.48.180, EA.50.30, EA.55.540, EA.66A.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.3.30, EA.76.90, EA.76.150, EA.77.60, EA.78.60, EA.80.60, EA.80.150, EA.86.60, EA.108C.60 s 78A: EA.Intro.180 s 79: EA.13.300, EA.48.180, EA.55.270, EA.60.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.3.30, EA.76.90, EA.76.120, EA.78.60, EA.79.60, EA.79.120, EA.79.150, EA.79.180, EA.79.240, EA.79.330, EA.79.420, EA.80.60, EA.80.90, EA.80.150, EA.101.195, EA.106.240, EA.108C.60, EA.108C.90, EA.108C.180, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.183.80 s 79(1): EA.79.90, EA.79.120 s 79(2): EA.Intro.180, EA.79.90, EA.79.480 s 80: EA.Intro.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.3.30, EA.79.120, EA.79.480, EA.80.60, EA.80.90 s 80(a): EA.80.90 s 80(b): EA.79.180, EA.80.150 s 81: EA.60.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.90, EA.62.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30, EA.82.30, EA.83.60, EA.85.210, EA.89.90, EA.101A.180, EA.184.20, EA.191.40 s 81(1): EA.60.90, EA.81.240, EA.81.270, EA.83.60 s 81(2): EA.81.240, EA.81.270 s 81(2)(b): EA.81.240 s 82: EA.60.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.90, EA.62.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30, EA.81.60 s 83: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30, EA.81.60, EA.81.180 s 83(1): EA.83.60 s 83(2): EA.83.60 s 83(3): EA.83.60 s 83(4)(a): EA.84.120 s 83(4)(b): EA.84.120 s 84: EA.Intro.330, EA.56.90, EA.81.60, EA.81.90, EA.83.60, EA.84.60, EA.84.150, EA.90.60, EA.101A.60 s 84(1): EA.84.60, EA.84.90, EA.84.120 s 84(1)(a): EA.84.60 s 84(2): EA.84.90, EA.84.120 s 85: EA.Intro.180, EA.Intro.330, EA.56.90, EA.81.60, EA.81.90, EA.83.60, EA.84.60, EA.84.150, EA.85.60, EA.85.150, EA.85.210, EA.90.60, EA.90.90, EA.90.150, EA.90.240, EA.101A.60 s 85(1): EA.85.60, EA.85.150, EA.85.210, EA.89.90, EA.90.60 s 85(1)(a): EA.Intro.180, EA.85.120,

EA.85.150, EA.85.210, EA.85.270, EA.85.300, EA.89.90, EA.139.60, EA.165.420 s 85(1)(b): EA.85.120, EA.85.150, EA.85.210, EA.85.270, EA.85.300 s 85(2): EA.85.60, EA.85.210, EA.85.270, EA.85.300, EA.165.270, EA.189.140 s 85(3): EA.85.60, EA.85.210 s 85(3)(a): EA.85.210 s 86: EA.81.90, EA.86.120, EA.101A.60 s 86(4): EA.86.60 s 87: EA.57.210, EA.60.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30, EA.81.180, EA.83.60, EA.87.60, EA.87.120, EA.142.60 s 87(1): EA.87.150, EA.87.210 s 87(1)(a): EA.87.90 s 87(1)(b): EA.87.90 s 87(1)(c): EA.87.120, EA.87.180 s 87(2): EA.87.90, EA.87.180 s 88: EA.81.60, EA.81.90, EA.85.210, EA.90.90, EA.142.60 s 89: EA.Intro.180, EA.55.570, EA.56.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30, EA.81.60, EA.114.150, EA.128.690 s 89(1): EA.89.150 s 89(1)(a): EA.89.90 s 89(2): EA.89.150 s 89(3): EA.89.150 s 89A: EA.89.60, EA.89A.60 s 89A(1): EA.89A.60 s 89A(2)(a): EA.89A.60 s 89A(2)(b): EA.89A.60 s 89A(2)(c): EA.89A.60 s 89A(2)(d): EA.89A.60 s 89A(5)(a): EA.89A.60 s 89A(5)(b): EA.89A.60 s 90: EA.Intro.120, EA.81.60, EA.83.60, EA.84.60, EA.84.150, EA.90.60, EA.90.90, EA.114.240, EA.137.240, EA.138.270, EA.138.300, EA.138.390, EA.139.30 s 91: EA.56.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.5.30, EA.91.60, EA.92.90, EA.101A.60, EA.125.180, EA.135.150, EA.178.30 s 91(1): EA.91.60 ss 91 to 93: EA.157.60 s 92: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.5.30, EA.91.60, EA.178.30 s 92(1): EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.5.30, EA.92.60 s 92(2): EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.5.30, EA.92.60, EA.92.150, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30 s 92(2)(a): EA.92.70 s 93: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.5.30, EA.91.60, EA.178.30 s 93(c): EA.Intro.120 s 94: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30, EA.94.60, EA.97.330, EA.98.330 s 94(1): EA.98.60, EA.101.120

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cx

Uniform Evidence Law

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 94(2): EA.4.210, EA.4.270 s 94(3): EA.101.150 s 95: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30, EA.94.60, EA.97.270, EA.98.270, EA.101.150, EA.101.360, EA.110.90 s 95(1): EA.97.60 s 95(2): EA.101.60 s 97: EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.180, EA.Intro.340, EA.56.90, EA.92.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30, EA.94.60, EA.97.60, EA.97.180, EA.97.300, EA.97.450, EA.97.480, EA.98.120, EA.98.180, EA.98.300, EA.98.360, EA.98.450, EA.101.60, EA.101.90, EA.101.120, EA.101.150, EA.101.180, EA.101.185, EA.101.240, EA.101.270, EA.101A.60, EA.101A.210, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.112.60, EA.137.120, CTH.TN.10 s 97(1): EA.97.60, EA.101.90, EA.101.150, EA.110.90 s 97(1)(a): EA.97.120, EA.97.180, EA.97.300 s 97(1)(b): EA.97.120, EA.97.300, EA.97.480, EA.98.120, EA.101.240, EA.137.90 s 97(2): EA.97.120, EA.97.180, EA.97.300 s 97(2)(b): EA.97.240 s 98: EA.Intro.180, EA.56.90, EA.92.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30, EA.97.120, EA.97.450, EA.97.480, EA.98.60, EA.101.60, EA.101.120, EA.101.150, EA.101.185, EA.101.240, EA.101.270, EA.101A.60, EA.110.90, CTH.TN.10 s 98(1): EA.98.60, EA.98.90, EA.101.120 s 98(1)(a): EA.98.180, EA.98.300 s 98(1)(b): EA.97.150, EA.98.150, EA.98.300, EA.137.90 s 98(2): EA.98.300 s 98(3): EA.98.180, EA.98.300 s 99: EA.97.180, EA.98.180, EA.100.60, CTH.TN.10 s 100: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30, EA.97.180, EA.98.180, CTH.TN.10 s 101: EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.330, EA.Intro.340, EA.79.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30, EA.97.120, EA.97.390, EA.97.450, EA.97.480, EA.98.120, EA.98.450, EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.101.190, EA.101.240, EA.101.450, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.112.60, EA.137.180, EA.137.210, EA.138.720 s 101(2): EA.97.120, EA.101.60, EA.101.180, EA.101.190,

s s s s

s s s s

s

s s s s

s s s s s s s s s s

EA.101.195, EA.101.240, EA.101.450, EA.110.90 101(3): EA.101.270, EA.101.330, EA.110.90 101(4): EA.101.270, EA.101.330 101(b)(ii): EA.112.60 101A: EA.Intro.180, EA.66.60, EA.94.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.101A.60, EA.102.60, EA.103.120, EA.104.60, EA.104.150, EA.104.210, EA.106.60, EA.106.90, EA.108.60, EA.108A.60, EA.108B.60, EA.108C.60, EA.112.60 101A(a): EA.101A.60, EA.101A.120 101A(b): EA.101A.60, EA.101A.120, EA.112.60 101A(b)(ii): EA.101A.210, EA.104.60 102: EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.180, EA.38.210, EA.39.150, EA.66.60, EA.66.300, EA.101.120, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.101A.60, EA.101A.120, EA.103.60, EA.104.60, EA.106.60, EA.108.150, EA.108.210, EA.108A.60, EA.108C.60, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.112.60, EA.136.150, EA.192.100 103: EA.Intro.150, EA.Intro.180, EA.43.180, EA.79.180, EA.101.195, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.102.90, EA.102.100, EA.103.60, EA.104.60, EA.104.120, EA.104.150, EA.104.180, EA.104.240, EA.106.90, EA.108A.60, EA.108B.60, EA.108C.120, EA.112.60, EA.128.540 103(1): EA.102.100, EA.103.60, EA.103.120 103(2): EA.103.120 103(2)(a): EA.106.270 104: EA.Intro.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.101A.90, EA.104.120, EA.104.180, EA.106.90, EA.108B.60, EA.112.60 104(2): EA.101A.90, EA.104.180, EA.104.240, EA.112.60 104(3): EA.101A.90, EA.104.60, EA.104.120, EA.104.150 104(3)(a): EA.104.120 104(3)(b): EA.106.240 104(4): EA.104.60, EA.104.90, EA.104.150, EA.104.240 104(4)(b): EA.104.180 104(5): EA.104.150, EA.104.180 104(6): EA.104.60, EA.104.90, EA.104.210 105: EA.105.60 106: EA.Intro.150, EA.Intro.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.101A.120,

[All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

cxi

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont EA.102.90, EA.103.90, EA.106.60, EA.106.90, EA.106.240, EA.108.60 s 106(1): EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.106.90, EA.106.150, EA.106.240, EA.106.270 s 106(1)(a): EA.106.60, EA.106.120 s 106(1)(a)(i): EA.106.90 s 106(1)(a)(ii): EA.106.90 s 106(1)(b): EA.Intro.180, EA.106.60 s 106(2): EA.Intro.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.103.90, EA.106.60, EA.106.120, EA.106.270 s 106(2)(a): EA.106.90 s 106(2)(c): EA.106.90 s 106(2)(e): EA.103.90, EA.106.90 s 106(a) to (d): EA.106.270 s 108: EA.37.150, EA.38.210, EA.39.150, EA.39.210, EA.81.270, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.101A.150, EA.102.90, EA.108.150, EA.136.150 s 108(1): EA.106.300, EA.108C.90 s 108(3): EA.102.90, EA.108.90, EA.108.150, EA.108.180, EA.165.480, EA.192.100 s 108(3)(a): EA.108.120, EA.108.180 s 108(3)(b): EA.65.150, EA.108.60, EA.108.120, EA.108.180, EA.108.210 s 108A: EA.Intro.180, EA.55.150, EA.63.210, EA.64.420, EA.65.420, EA.67.60, EA.69.420, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.101A.90, EA.101A.180, EA.102.60, EA.108.120, EA.108.150, EA.108A.60, EA.108A.90, EA.108B.60, EA.108C.180 s 108A(1): EA.108A.60 s 108A(1)(a): EA.108B.60 s 108A(2): EA.108A.60 s 108B: EA.Intro.180, EA.55.150, EA.63.210, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.101A.180, EA.102.60, EA.108A.60, EA.108A.90, EA.108B.60, EA.108C.180 s 108B(3): EA.108B.60 s 108B(3)(c): EA.108B.60 s 108B(4): EA.108B.60 s 108B(6): EA.108B.60 s 108C: EA.Intro.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30, EA.102.90, EA.106.240, EA.108.60, EA.137.60 s 108C(1): EA.108C.60, EA.108C.90 s 108C(1)(b)(ii): EA.103.60, EA.108C.120 s 108C(2): EA.108C.90 s 108C(2)(a): EA.108C.90 s 108C(2)(b): EA.108C.90 s 110: EA.97.330, EA.101.270, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30,

s s s s

s s

s s s s s s s s s s s s s

s s s s s s s s s s s s s

s

EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.8.30, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.110.120, EA.112.60 110(2): EA.110.90, EA.110.120, EA.112.60 110(3): EA.110.90, EA.110.120, EA.112.60 111: EA.97.330, EA.101.270, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.8.30 112: EA.104.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.8.30, EA.110.90, EA.112.60, EA.190.60, EA.192.40, EA.192.100 113: EA.Ch3.Pt.3.9.30, EA.116.90, EA.190.60, TAS.10, TAS.20 114: EA.Intro.120, EA.56.90, EA.Ch3.Pt.3.9.30, EA.114.60, EA.114.90, EA.114.180, EA.114.240, EA.114.330, EA.115.60, EA.115.90, EA.115.300, EA.116.90, TAS.20 114(2): EA.114.150, EA.114.180, EA.115.240 114(2)(a): EA.114.180 114(2)(b): EA.114.180 114(2)(c): EA.114.60 114(3): EA.114.60, EA.114.180 114(3)(c): EA.114.180 114(3)(c)(i): EA.114.150 114(3)(d): EA.114.180 114(3) to (6): EA.115.210 114(4): EA.114.60, EA.114.180 114(5): EA.114.60, EA.114.150 114(6): EA.114.60, EA.114.180 115: EA.Intro.120, EA.56.90, EA.Ch3.Pt.3.9.30, EA.114.90, EA.114.180, EA.114.330, EA.115.60, EA.115.90, EA.115.300, EA.116.90, TAS.10, TAS.20 115(2): EA.115.60 115(3): EA.114.240, EA.115.60 115(3)(b): EA.115.240 115(4): EA.115.60 115(5): EA.114.240, EA.115.60 115(5)(a): EA.114.150 115(7): EA.116.180 115(7)(a): EA.115.330 115(7)(b): EA.115.330 115(8): EA.115.60 115(10)(a): EA.114.90, EA.115.90 115(10)(b): EA.115.60 116: EA.Intro.350, EA.37.120, EA.Ch3.Pt.3.9.30, EA.114.60, EA.114.90, EA.114.120, EA.114.270, EA.115.330, EA.116.90, EA.116.120, EA.116.180, EA.165.210, EA.165.300, EA.190.60 117: EA.117.90, EA.118.210, EA.118.240, EA.118.270, EA.119.180, EA.120.90, EA.121.90, EA.122.240, EA.122.300, EA.123.120, EA.124.60, EA.125.90, EA.190.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cxii

Uniform Evidence Law

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 117(1): EA.117.90, EA.122.90, EA.122.210 s 117(1)(b): EA.122.90, EA.122.210 s 118: EA.Intro.150, EA.Intro.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1.30, EA.117.90, EA.118.90, EA.118.210, EA.118.220, EA.118.480, EA.118.540, EA.119.60, EA.119.180, EA.120.60, EA.122.120, EA.122.360, EA.123.120, EA.124.60 s 118(a): EA.118.210, EA.118.270, EA.118.300 s 118(b): EA.118.210, EA.118.270, EA.118.300 s 118(c): EA.118.60, EA.118.210, EA.118.480 ss 118 to 119: EA.122.60, EA.122.90, EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.125.90, EA.125.120 ss 118 to 120: EA.121.60, EA.122.60, EA.122.90, EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.123.60, EA.123.90, EA.125.60, EA.125.90, EA.125.120 s 119: EA.Intro.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1.30, EA.117.90, EA.118.60, EA.118.210, EA.118.220, EA.118.420, EA.118.480, EA.119.180, EA.120.60, EA.122.120, EA.122.210, EA.122.330, EA.122.360, EA.124.60 s 119(a): EA.117.120 s 119(b): EA.119.180 s 120: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1.30, EA.120.60, EA.122.60, EA.122.90, EA.122.120, EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.125.90, EA.125.120 s 121: EA.121.180, EA.121.210, EA.125.150, EA.131.60 s 121(3): EA.118.420 ss 121 to 126: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1.30, EA.118.510 s 122: EA.Intro.180, EA.117.90, EA.118.210, EA.118.240, EA.122.60, EA.122.90, EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.122.270, EA.122.330, EA.122.360, EA.122.450, EA.126.60, EA.128.450, EA.131.60, EA.131.390 s 122(1): EA.122.60, EA.122.90, EA.122.180, EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.122.330, EA.126C.30 s 122(2): EA.122.60, EA.122.90, EA.122.120, EA.122.180, EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.122.270, EA.122.300, EA.122.330, EA.122.360, EA.131.390 s 122 (2): EA.122.240

s 122(3): EA.122.180, EA.122.210, EA.122.300 s 122(3)(a): EA.122.210, EA.122.240 s 122(3)(b): EA.122.240 s 122(4): EA.122.210, EA.122.240 s 122(5): EA.122.210, EA.122.360 s 122(5)(a)(i): EA.122.180, EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.122.360 s 122(5)(a)(ii): EA.122.210, EA.122.240 s 122(5)(a)(iv): EA.122.210, EA.122.240 s 122(5)(a)(iii): EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.122.330 s 122(5)(b): EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.122.360 s 122(5)(c): EA.122.210, EA.122.240, EA.122.360 s 122(6): EA.32.210, EA.33.60, EA.34.90 s 123: EA.Intro.180, EA.Intro.330, EA.118.90, EA.122.480, EA.123.90, EA.123.150, EA.123.180, EA.126B.90, EA.126B.240, EA.130.90, EA.131.60, EA.131.90, EA.131A.60, EA.131A.90, EA.131A.150 s 124: EA.122.360, EA.124.90, EA.124.120, EA.131.60 s 124(1): EA.124.60 s 125: EA.118.360, EA.121.150, EA.125.90, EA.125.180, EA.131.60, EA.131.570, EA.131.600 s 125(1): EA.125.90 s 125(1)(a): EA.125.90, EA.126D.30, NSW.CPA.301.30 s 125(1)(b): EA.125.90, EA.125.120 s 125(2): EA.91.60, EA.125.180, EA.142.60 s 125(3): EA.125.120 s 126: EA.121.180, EA.122.450, EA.123.150, EA.124.90, EA.125.150, EA.126.60, EA.126D.60, EA.131.60, EA.131.390, NSW.CPA.301.60 s 126(1): EA.126K.30 s 126(4)(e): EA.126B.120 s 126A(1): EA.126B.120 s 126B: EA.126B.240, EA.126B.270, EA.126B.390, EA.126C.30, EA.126D.30 s 126B(1): EA.126B.90, EA.126B.360 s 126B(3): EA.126B.60, EA.126B.90, EA.126B.420 s 126B(4): EA.126B.150 s 126B(4)(f): EA.126B.120 s 126B(5): EA.126B.420 s 126C: EA.126B.270 s 126D: EA.126D.60 s 126D(2): EA.126D.90 s 126F(3): EA.126B.60 s 126G: EA.126K.90, TAS.20 s 126H: EA.131A.60, EA.131A.90, TAS.20

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cxiii

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 126H(1): EA.126K.390, EA.131A.90 s 126H(2)(b): EA.126K.330 s 126H(3)(c): EA.126B.60 s 126J: EA.126K.60 s 126J(1): EA.126J.30 s 126J(2): EA.126J.30 s 126K: EA.126K.30, EA.126K.90, EA.131A.90 s 126K(1): EA.126K.30, EA.126K.210, EA.126K.420, EA.131A.90 s 126K(2): EA.126K.210, EA.126K.390, EA.126K.420, EA.131A.90 s 126K(2)(a): EA.126K.210, EA.126K.390 s 126K(2)(b): EA.126K.210, EA.126K.390 s 126K(3): EA.126K.210 s 127: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30 s 128: EA.Intro.180, EA.Intro.330, EA.4.150, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30, EA.118.90, EA.126B.90, EA.128.120, EA.128.180, EA.128.330, EA.128.360, EA.128.420, EA.128.450, EA.128.510, EA.128.570, EA.128.600, EA.128.660, EA.128.690, EA.128.720, EA.128A.90, EA.128A.180, EA.130.90, EA.131.90, EA.131.180, EA.131A.60, EA.131A.90, EA.131A.150, EA.187.20 s 128(1): EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.128.90, EA.128.120, EA.128.150, EA.128.420, EA.128.660, EA.128.690, EA.128.750 s 128(1)(a): EA.128.360 s 128(1)(b): EA.128.360 s 128(2): EA.128.90, EA.128.180, EA.128.360, EA.128.540, EA.128.660, EA.128.750, EA.128A.270 s 128(3): EA.128.90, EA.128.390, EA.128.660, EA.128.750 s 128(4): EA.128.90, EA.128.180, EA.128.390, EA.128.660, EA.128.750 s 128(4)(b: EA.128A.120 s 128(4)(a): EA.128.480 s 128(4)(b): EA.128.360, EA.128.480, EA.128.540, EA.128A.120 s 128(5): EA.128.660 s 128(6): EA.128.120, EA.128.360, EA.128.390, EA.128.660 s 128(6)(a): EA.128A.270 s 128(7): EA.Intro.270, EA.128.90, EA.128.540, EA.128.600, EA.128.660 s 128(8): EA.Intro.180, EA.Intro.270, EA.128.660 s 128(9): EA.128.600

s 128(10): EA.128.690 s 128A: EA.Intro.180, EA.Intro.210, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30, EA.128A.150, EA.128A.240, EA.131A.150, EA.187.20 s 128A(1): EA.128A.60, EA.128A.90 s 128A(2)(d): EA.128A.120, EA.128A.270 s 128A(2)(e): EA.128A.270 s 128A(6): EA.128A.270 s 128A(7): EA.128A.120, EA.128A.270 s 128A(8): EA.128A.60, EA.128A.120, EA.128A.210, EA.128A.240 s 128A(9): EA.128A.180, EA.128A.270 s 128A(10): EA.128A.120, EA.128A.240 s 129: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30, EA.129.90, EA.129.180, EA.157.60 s 129(1): EA.129.90 s 129(3): EA.157.60 s 129(5): EA.129.90, EA.129.180 s 129(5)(a): EA.129.60 s 129(5)(c): EA.129.180 s 130: EA.Intro.270, EA.7.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30, EA.130.120, EA.130.150, EA.130.240, EA.130.390, EA.131A.90, EA.131A.120, EA.131A.180 s 130(1): EA.130.60, EA.130.90, EA.130.150, EA.130.180, EA.130.210, EA.130.360, EA.130.390, EA.131A.120 s 130(2): EA.130.390, EA.131A.120 s 130(3): EA.130.390 s 130(4): EA.130.120, EA.130.150, EA.130.180 s 130(5): EA.128.540, EA.130.60, EA.130.210 s 130(5)(a): EA.130.240 s 131: EA.11.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30, EA.131.60, EA.131.150, EA.131.330, EA.131.360, EA.131.570 s 131(1): EA.131.60, EA.131.120, EA.131.150, EA.131.270, EA.131.300, EA.131.330, EA.131.480, EA.131.510, EA.131.540, EA.131.570 s 131(1)(a): EA.131.240, EA.131.300 s 131(1)(b): EA.131.120, EA.131.240 s 131(2): EA.131.390 s 131(2)(a): EA.131.240 s 131(2)(b): EA.131.390 s 131(2)(c): EA.131.60, EA.131.390 s 131(2)(d): EA.131.420 s 131(2)(e): EA.131.60 s 131(2)(f): EA.131.450 s 131(2)(g): EA.131.60, EA.131.480 s 131(2)(h): EA.131.420, EA.131.510 s 131(2)(i): EA.121.150, EA.131.540

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cxiv

Uniform Evidence Law

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 131(2)(j): EA.125.90, EA.131.540, EA.131.570 s 131(2)(k): EA.125.120 s 131(5)(b): EA.131.270, EA.131.360 s 131(5)(c): EA.131.180 s 131(5)(d): EA.131.390 s 131A: EA.7.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30, EA.118.90, EA.122.330, EA.123.90, EA.126B.90, EA.126K.20, EA.126K.30, EA.126K.150, EA.126K.420, EA.128.150, EA.130.90, EA.130.360, EA.131.90, EA.131A.60, EA.131A.90, EA.131B.30 s 131A(1): EA.131A.60, EA.131B.30 s 131A(1)(a): EA.131A.60 s 131A(2): EA.131A.60, EA.131A.90 s 131H: EA.131A.60, EA.131B.30 s 131H(1): EA.131A.60 s 132: EA.118.120, EA.118.570, EA.126B.420, EA.128.120, EA.128.420, EA.128.780, EA.130.390, EA.131.630 s 132(2)(k): EA.11.90 s 133: EA.118.570, EA.121.240, EA.122.510, EA.123.210, EA.124.150, EA.125.210, EA.126B.420, EA.126D.120, EA.130.390, EA.131.630, EA.131A.90 s 134: EA.56.90, EA.126B.90, EA.129.150, EA.130.90, EA.131.90, EA.190.60 s 135: EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.270, EA.13.240, EA.18.120, EA.29.90, EA.29.120, EA.29.180, EA.37.60, EA.38.150, EA.48.180, EA.53.90, EA.55.60, EA.55.120, EA.55.210, EA.55.240, EA.55.300, EA.55.330, EA.56.60, EA.57.120, EA.57.150, EA.59.240, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.120, EA.64.150, EA.64.300, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.60, EA.69.600, EA.75.60, EA.79.60, EA.79.180, EA.79.240, EA.79.300, EA.79.330, EA.80.90, EA.80.150, EA.81.240, EA.87.60, EA.97.270, EA.97.450, EA.98.270, EA.101.150, EA.101.195, EA.102.100, EA.104.60, EA.108B.60, EA.108C.60, EA.108C.90, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.111.60, EA.112.60, EA.114.240, EA.126B.60, EA.131.570, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.11.30, EA.135.90, EA.135.120, EA.135.150, EA.135.210, EA.135.270, EA.136.60, EA.136.90, EA.136.120, EA.136.300, EA.137.60, EA.137.90,

EA.137.120, EA.137.150, EA.184.20, EA.189.120, EA.190.60, EA.192.40 s 135(a): EA.135.150, EA.135.270, EA.137.120 s 135(b): EA.135.270 s 135(c): EA.135.270 ss 135 to 137: EA.104.180, EA.108.90 ss 135 to 138: EA.69.570 s 136: EA.Intro.270, EA.29.90, EA.46.150, EA.48.180, EA.56.60, EA.60.60, EA.60.120, EA.60.150, EA.64.330, EA.66.60, EA.76.120, EA.77.60, EA.79.270, EA.81.240, EA.101A.60, EA.101A.120, EA.101A.150, EA.102.90, EA.106.210, EA.108.120, EA.108.150, EA.108.210, EA.108C.90, EA.110.60, EA.110.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.11.30, EA.135.90, EA.135.150, EA.136.60, EA.136.150, EA.136.180, EA.136.270, EA.136.300, EA.137.150, EA.165.480, EA.189.120 s 137: EA.Intro.270, EA.Intro.300, EA.Intro.330, EA.Intro.350, EA.13.240, EA.17.60, EA.18.120, EA.29.180, EA.38.150, EA.48.180, EA.53.90, EA.55.240, EA.55.330, EA.56.60, EA.57.150, EA.60.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.120, EA.64.300, EA.65.270, EA.66.300, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.60, EA.78.60, EA.79.60, EA.79.300, EA.79.330, EA.80.90, EA.80.150, EA.81.240, EA.97.120, EA.97.270, EA.97.450, EA.98.120, EA.98.270, EA.101.60, EA.101.150, EA.101.180, EA.101.190, EA.101.195, EA.101.450, EA.102.100, EA.103.60, EA.104.60, EA.108B.60, EA.108C.60, EA.108C.90, EA.110.90, EA.111.60, EA.112.60, EA.114.180, EA.114.240, EA.115.300, EA.126B.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.11.30, EA.135.90, EA.135.150, EA.135.270, EA.135.300, EA.136.60, EA.136.300, EA.137.60, EA.137.90, EA.137.120, EA.137.210, EA.137.240, EA.138.450, EA.138.720, EA.144.90, EA.184.20, EA.192.40, TAS.10 s 138: EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.330, EA.8.60, EA.56.60, EA.79.150, EA.83.60, EA.84.60, EA.84.150, EA.90.60, EA.90.90, EA.90.150, EA.90.210, EA.90.260, EA.90.300, EA.114.240,

[All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

cxv

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont EA.115.300, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.11.30, EA.135.150, EA.137.120, EA.137.240, EA.138.150, EA.138.270, EA.138.300, EA.138.420, EA.138.540, EA.138.570, EA.138.690, EA.138.720, EA.139.30, TAS.10 s 138(1): EA.114.240, EA.138.60, EA.138.120, EA.138.270, EA.138.330, EA.138.420, EA.138.540, EA.138.690, EA.138.720 s 138(1)(a): EA.138.120 s 138(1)(b): EA.138.150 s 138(2): EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.11.30, EA.138.120 s 138(2)(a): EA.138.360 s 138(2)(b): EA.138.390 s 138(3): EA.114.240, EA.138.60, EA.138.210, EA.138.270, EA.138.420, EA.138.690, EA.138.720 s 138(3)(d): EA.138.690 s 138(3)(e): EA.138.120, EA.138.540, EA.138.570 s 138(5)(a): EA.138.120 s 139: EA.90.150, EA.138.120, EA.190.60 s 139(1): EA.139.60 s 139(1)(a): EA.139.120, EA.139.180 s 139(1)(b): EA.139.60 s 139(2): EA.139.60 s 139(2)(a): EA.139.60 s 139(3): EA.139.150 s 139(5): EA.139.120 s 139(5)(a): EA.139.120, EA.139.180 s 139(5)(b): EA.139.180 s 139(5)(c): EA.139.180 s 139(6): EA.139.120 s 140: EA.Intro.330, EA.51.60, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.1.30, EA.140.60, EA.190.60 s 140(1): EA.140.60, EA.140.120 s 140(2): EA.140.60, EA.140.120 s 140(2)(a): EA.140.60, EA.140.120 s 141: EA.8.60, EA.137.120, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.1.30, EA.141.90 s 141(1): EA.135.270 s 142: EA.48.90, EA.48.270, EA.48.360, EA.66.180, EA.79.60, EA.81.90, EA.87.150, EA.89A.60, EA.125.180, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.1.30, EA.165.330, EA.165A.150 s 142(1): EA.13.270, EA.48.210, EA.48.240, EA.48.270, EA.48.300, EA.59.210, EA.61.60, EA.69.540, EA.84.120, EA.85.300, EA.90.330, EA.118.540, EA.121.210, EA.122.480, EA.123.180, EA.124.120, EA.126B.390,

EA.126D.90, EA.126K.390, EA.128.750, EA.130.360, NSW.CPA.301.90 s 142(2): EA.142.60 s 143: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.2.30 s 143(1): EA.143.60 s 143(2): EA.143.60 s 144: EA.Intro.120, EA.79.60, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.2.30, EA.144.60, EA.146.60, EA.157.60 s 144(1): EA.144.120 s 144(4): EA.144.90, EA.144.120 s 145: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.2.30 s 146: EA.57.150, EA.69.360, EA.146.60 s 146(2): EA.142.60 ss 146 to 152: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.30 s 147: EA.57.150, EA.69.360, EA.146.60, EA.147.150, EA.183.80 s 149: EA.149.60 s 150: EA.8.60 s 150(1): EA.150.60 s 150(3): EA.178.60 s 150(4): EA.178.60 s 151: TAS.20 s 152: EA.152.60 ss 153 to 159: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.30 s 155A: TAS.20 s 156: EA.156.150 s 157: EA.52.30, EA.157.60 s 160: EA.160.60, EA.160.120, EA.163.30 ss 160 to 163: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.30 s 161: EA.Intro.180, EA.71.120, EA.161.150 s 162: EA.71.120, EA.162.90 s 163: EA.160.60, TAS.20 s 164: EA.136.210, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.4.30, EA.165.180, EA.165.210 s 164(3): EA.165.210 s 165: EA.17.60, EA.37.120, EA.38.150, EA.38.330, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.150, EA.108.210, EA.114.120, EA.114.270, EA.114.360, EA.115.330, EA.116.90, EA.116.120, EA.116.180, EA.136.150, EA.164.90, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.5.30, EA.165.90, EA.165.210, EA.165.240, EA.165.270, EA.165.420, EA.165.450, EA.165.480, EA.165B.210 s 165(1): EA.165.90, EA.165.240, EA.165.270, EA.165.300, EA.165.450, EA.165A.150 s 165(1)(a): EA.60.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.150, EA.165.240 s 165(1)(b): EA.116.150

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cxvi

Uniform Evidence Law

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 165(1)(c): EA.165.450 s 165(1)(d): EA.55.240, EA.165.360 s 165(1)(f): EA.165.270 s 165(2): EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.150, EA.165.90, EA.165.180, EA.165.210, EA.165.240, EA.165.270, EA.165.300, EA.165.330, EA.165.360, EA.165.420, EA.165.480, EA.165A.180 s 165(2)(a): EA.165.210 s 165(2)(b): EA.165.210, EA.165.270, EA.165.360 s 165(2)(c): EA.165.210 s 165(2)(f): EA.165.420 s 165(3): EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.150, EA.165.90, EA.165.270, EA.165.360, EA.165B.240 s 165(4): EA.165.210 s 165(5): EA.165.180, EA.165.210, EA.165.480 s 165(6): EA.165.330 s 165A: EA.Intro.180, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.5.30, EA.165.330, EA.165.480, TAS.10 s 165A(1): EA.165A.150 s 165A(2): EA.165.330, EA.165B.210 s 165A(3): EA.165.330 s 165B: EA.Intro.180, EA.Intro.210, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.5.30, EA.165.480 s 165B(2): EA.Intro.210, EA.165B.60, EA.165B.240, EA.165B.270, EA.165B.300 s 165B(3): EA.165B.180, EA.165B.240 s 165B(4): EA.165B.270 s 165B(5): EA.165B.150, EA.165B.270, EA.165B.300 s 165B(6)(a): EA.165B.180 s 165B(6)(b): EA.165B.210 s 165B(7): EA.165B.210 s 166: EA.92.150, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.30, EA.167.30, EA.169.60, EA.169.90, EA.183.60, CTH.TN.10 s 166(c): EA.69.390 s 166(f): EA.63.180, EA.64.390, EA.69.390 ss 166 to 169: EA.56.60, EA.57.120, EA.57.150, EA.58.90, EA.69.390, EA.146.90 s 167: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.60, EA.63.180, EA.64.390, EA.65.390, EA.66.270, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.120, EA.92.150, EA.167.30, EA.167.60, EA.169.60 s 167(a): EA.167.60 s 167(c): EA.167.90 s 168: EA.167.30, CTH.TN.10 s 168(5): EA.69.390, EA.169.60

s 169: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.30, EA.168.60, EA.169.60, EA.183.60 s 169(1): EA.169.60, EA.169.120, CTH.TN.10 s 169(1)(a): EA.169.60 s 169(1)(b): EA.169.60 s 169(1)(c): EA.56.60, EA.169.60 s 169(2): EA.169.60, CTH.TN.10 s 169(3): EA.56.60, EA.169.60 s 169(4): EA.63.180, EA.169.90 s 169(4)(b): EA.169.150 s 169(5)(a) to (h): EA.169.120 s 170: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.30, CTH.TN.10 s 171: EA.48.330, EA.63.240, EA.64.360, EA.65.360, EA.69.510, EA.70.210, EA.71.180, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.60, EA.182.60 s 172: EA.48.330, EA.63.240, EA.64.360, EA.65.360, EA.69.510, EA.70.210, EA.71.180, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.60, EA.182.60, CTH.TN.10 s 173: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.30 s 173(1): EA.48.330, EA.63.240, EA.64.360, EA.65.360, EA.69.510, EA.70.210, EA.71.180, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.60, EA.182.60, CTH.TN.10 s 173(2): EA.48.330, EA.63.240, EA.64.360, EA.65.360, EA.69.510, EA.70.210, EA.71.180, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.60, EA.182.60, CTH.TN.10 s 174: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.30, EA.176.30 s 175: EA.176.30 s 175(1)(b): EA.174.60 s 176: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.30 s 177: EA.79.360, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.30, CTH.TN.10 s 177(2): EA.79.360, EA.177.30 s 177(5): EA.79.360, EA.177.30, CTH.TN.10 s 177(6): EA.79.360, EA.177.30 s 177(7): EA.79.360 s 178: EA.91.90, EA.92.120, EA.157.60, EA.178.30 ss 178 to 180: EA.106.180, EA.106.270 s 179: EA.91.90, EA.92.120, EA.178.30 s 181: EA.48.420, EA.67.60, EA.73.180, EA.97.210, EA.98.210, EA.99.90, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.30, EA.168.30, EA.177.60, EA.190.60 s 182: EA.170.60, EA.190.60, TAS.20 s 182(1): EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.69.480, EA.70.150, EA.71.150, EA.147.150, EA.149.60, EA.152.60, EA.156.150, EA.160.120, EA.161.150, EA.162.90, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.60, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.2.30, EA.183.40 s 182(2): EA.69.480, EA.70.150, EA.71.150

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Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 182(3): EA.70.150 s 182(4)(a): EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.70.150 s 182(4)(b): EA.70.150 s 182(5): EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.69.480, EA.70.150, EA.71.150 s 183: EA.48.210, EA.48.240, EA.48.270, EA.48.300, EA.58.60, EA.69.150, EA.69.330, EA.69.540, EA.71.120, EA.79.390, EA.160.60, EA.183.40 s 184: EA.Intro.180, EA.55.90, EA.191.20 s 184(2): EA.184.20 s 185: EA.4.150, EA.185.20, TAS.20 s 186: EA.4.150, EA.48.330, EA.48.420, EA.97.210, EA.98.210, EA.99.90, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.60, EA.170.120, EA.172.60, EA.177.60, EA.179.60, EA.180.30, EA.181.60, EA.186.20, TAS.20 s 187: EA.4.150, EA.128.300, EA.131.180 s 188: EA.45.120 s 189: EA.13.300, EA.18.180, EA.55.120, EA.75.90, EA.89A.60, EA.101.300, EA.103.150, EA.108.180, EA.118.570, EA.121.240, EA.122.510, EA.123.210, EA.124.150, EA.125.210, EA.126B.420, EA.126D.120, EA.128A.270, EA.130.390, EA.131.630, EA.142.60 s 189(2): EA.84.90, EA.85.270, EA.189.80 s 189(3): EA.84.90, EA.85.210, EA.85.270, EA.189.140 s 189(4): EA.13.300, EA.189.80 s 189(5): EA.13.300, EA.189.80, EA.189.120 s 189(6): EA.84.90, EA.85.270, EA.189.100 s 189(7): EA.55.120, EA.142.60, EA.189.60 s 189(8): EA.55.120, EA.84.90, EA.85.270 s 190: EA.Intro.350, EA.13.300, EA.17.60, EA.26.60, EA.29.150, EA.48.180, EA.56.60, EA.57.150, EA.64.270, EA.65.330, EA.68.90, EA.97.180, EA.98.180, EA.110.120, EA.122.210, EA.144.90, EA.157.30 s 190(1): EA.56.60 s 190(2): EA.190.60 s 190(3): EA.56.60, EA.190.80 s 190(4): EA.190.80 s 191: EA.55.90, EA.81.60, EA.184.20, EA.191.20, EA.191.40 s 191(2): EA.191.20 s 191(2)(a): EA.191.20 s 191(3): EA.191.20 s 192: EA.Intro.330, EA.Intro.350, EA.16.90, EA.26.240, EA.28.90, EA.29.60, EA.32.90, EA.32.180, EA.37.150, EA.38.150, EA.38.240, EA.38.270, EA.38.300, EA.39.150, EA.46.180, EA.64.150, EA.64.330,

EA.67.90, EA.100.60, EA.104.90, EA.106.60, EA.106.120, EA.108.180, EA.108C.150, EA.110.120, EA.112.60, EA.126K.210, EA.168.60, EA.184.20, EA.191.20, EA.192.60 s 192(1): EA.39.150, EA.67.90, EA.126K.210, EA.192.80 s 192(2): EA.16.90, EA.29.60, EA.32.90, EA.32.180, EA.37.150, EA.38.150, EA.46.180, EA.67.90, EA.104.90, EA.106.120, EA.108.180, EA.108C.150, EA.126K.210, EA.168.60, EA.192.40, EA.192.80, EA.192.100 s 192(2)(a): EA.108.150, EA.192.100 s 192(2)(b): EA.38.150, EA.112.60, EA.192.100 s 192(2)(c): EA.108.150, EA.192.100 s 192A: EA.Intro.180, EA.38.300, EA.110.120, EA.192A.60 s 193: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.90, EA.57.150, EA.58.90, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.90, EA.146.90, EA.183.60 s 193(1): EA.193.60 s 197: EA.190.60 s 377: EA.66.300 s 377(6): EA.66.300 reg 5: EA.67.60 r 36.2: EA.157.60 r 36.11: EA.157.60 r 36.15: EA.157.60 Ch 2: EA.43.180, EA.56.60, EA.126K.20 Ch 3: EA.Intro.90, EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.350, EA.8.60, EA.39.240, EA.43.60, EA.43.180, EA.45.120, EA.45.150, EA.48.60, EA.48.120, EA.48.270, EA.48.360, EA.50.30, EA.53.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.1.30, EA.55.60, EA.55.90, EA.55.120, EA.56.60, EA.56.150, EA.125.210, EA.126D.120, EA.126K.20, EA.128.450, EA.142.60, EA.157.30, EA.189.60, EA.190.60 Ch 3, Pt, 3.11: EA.55.60 Ch 12: EA.126K.20 Pt 1.2: EA.8.60, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30 Pt 2.1: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1Div.1.60, EA.12.60, EA.21.210, EA.28.120, EA.52.30, EA.55.210 Pt 2.1, Div 1: EA.8.60, EA.13.300 Pt 2.1, Div 3: EA.29.150 Pt 2.1, Div 5: EA.38.180 Pt 2.2: EA.Intro.150, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.51.60, EA.69.330, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30 Pt 2.3: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30 Pt 3.1: EA.43.180, EA.48.120

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Uniform Evidence Law

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Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont Pt 3.2: EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.150, EA.43.180, EA.56.60, EA.59.90, EA.83.60, EA.101A.60, EA.101A.150, EA.108B.60, EA.112.60, EA.114.90, EA.135.150, EA.165.270, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30, EA.191.40 Pt 3.2, Div 2: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.62.60, EA.65.270, EA.66A.60, EA.67.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.60 Pt 3.2, Div 3: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.60, EA.82.30 Pt 3.3: EA.Intro.120, EA.50.30, EA.101A.60, EA.106.240 Pt 3.4: EA.48.120, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.30, EA.60.90, EA.81.60, EA.101A.60, EA.138.330, EA.191.40 Pt 3.5: EA.97.360, EA.98.390, EA.101.390, EA.101A.60, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30 Pt 3.6: EA.Intro.150, EA.4.210, EA.4.270, EA.92.90, EA.95.60, EA.101.120, EA.101.390, EA.101A.60, EA.101A.120, EA.101A.210, EA.104.60, EA.104.150, EA.104.210, EA.108B.60, EA.112.60 Pt 3.7: EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.330, EA.38.60, EA.39.150, EA.43.180, EA.46.150, EA.55.150, EA.66.210, EA.81.270, EA.94.60, EA.101.120, EA.101A.60, EA.101A.120, EA.101A.150, EA.102.100, EA.108C.60, EA.112.60, EA.195.20, EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Pt 3.7, Div 2: EA.102.60, EA.108B.60 Pt 3.7, Div 3: EA.55.150, EA.108C.180 Pt 3.7, Div 4: EA.102.60 Pt 3.8: EA.101A.210, EA.102.90, EA.104.60, EA.104.150, EA.104.210, EA.108.60, EA.108B.60, EA.112.60 Pt 3.9: EA.Intro.120, EA.37.120, EA.114.240, EA.138.270, EA.165.300 Pt 3.10: EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.180, EA.Intro.210, EA.Intro.270, EA.Intro.330, EA.36.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30, EA.117.60, EA.117.90, EA.118.90, EA.122.420, EA.123.90, EA.126B.90, EA.128.150, EA.130.90, EA.131.90, EA.131A.60, EA.131A.90, EA.131A.150, EA.131A.180 Pt 3.10, Div 1: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30, EA.117.90 Pt 3.10, Div 1A: EA.Intro.210, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30,

EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30, EA.131A.60, EA.131B.30 Pt 3.10, Div 1B: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30, EA.126B.60 Pt 3.11: EA.Intro.120, EA.37.120, EA.38.60, EA.44.120, EA.46.150, EA.48.60, EA.48.180, EA.48.270, EA.51.60, EA.53.60, EA.55.540, EA.55.570, EA.60.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.120, EA.64.300, EA.65.150, EA.65.330, EA.66.60, EA.69.600, EA.79.90, EA.79.240, EA.81.270, EA.87.60, EA.92.90, EA.106.60, EA.106.120, EA.106.240, EA.108.180, EA.110.90, EA.114.60, EA.114.240, EA.114.360, EA.115.60, EA.131.120, EA.189.120, EA.192.100 Pt 4.3: EA.57.120, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.60 Pt 4.3, Div 3: EA.71.120 Pt 4.6, Div 1: EA.63.180, EA.64.390, EA.65.390, EA.66.270, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.120, EA.69.390, EA.92.150, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.6.Div.1.30, EA.169.60 Pt 4.6, Div 2: EA.48.330, EA.63.240, EA.64.360, EA.65.360, EA.69.510, EA.70.210, EA.71.180, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.3.60, EA.182.60 Pt 4.6, Div 3: EA.106.270, EA.176.30 Sch Dict: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30, EA.117.60 Sch 1: EA.21.150, EA.22.60, EA.22.90, EA.Dict.Pt.1.30 Sch 1, Pt 2, cl 4(1)(b): EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Dictionary Dictionary: EA.18.60, EA.26.90, EA.33.30, EA.98.120, EA.115.150, EA.137.60, EA.137.90 Sch Sch: EA.21.150 135 135: EA.69.570 ch 2: EA.32.60 pt 3.2: EA.106.90 pt 3.7: EA.106.90 101A 101A: EA.Intro.120 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 1: EA.146.60, EA.147.90, EA.148.30, EA.155A.30, EA.156.90, EA.158.60 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2: EA.18.60, EA.66.120, EA.118.360 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 1: EA.69.90, EA.70.90, EA.147.120 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 2: EA.28.60, EA.37.60, EA.39.90 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 3: EA.125.90, EA.126D.30, EA.128.210 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 4: EA.63.90, EA.64.90, EA.65.90, EA.66.90, EA.83.60 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 4(1)(b): EA.61.30

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Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 4(1)(f): EA.13.90, EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 4(1)(g): EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 4(2): EA.63.90, EA.64.90, EA.65.90, EA.66.90 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 5: EA.48.270 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 6: EA.44.150, EA.63.60, EA.64.120, EA.65.300, EA.81.60 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 7: EA.26.90, EA.27.90, EA.38.90 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 8: EA.32.60, EA.48.90, EA.69.90, EA.71.90, EA.131.240, EA.146.60, EA.147.90, EA.148.30, EA.155A.30, EA.156.90, EA.158.60 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 8(a): EA.126.60 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 9: EA.138.90 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 9(2): EA.128.180 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 10(1): EA.18.60 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 10(2): EA.18.60 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 11: EA.18.60 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 11(2): EA.Dict.Pt.2.120 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 11(3): EA.Dict.Pt.2.120 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 11(3)(a): EA.Dict.Pt.2.120 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 11(3)(c): EA.Dict.Pt.2.120 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 11(3)(d): EA.Dict.Pt.2.120 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 11(3)(e): EA.Dict.Pt.2.120 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 11(3)(g): EA.Dict.Pt.2.120 Evidence Amendment Act 2008: EA.117.90, EA.122.60, EA.165A.90, EA.165A.150, EA.165B.90, EA.165B.150, EA.165B.270, EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.180

Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2007: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1A.30, EA.Intro.60,

Form 2: EA.179.60 Form 3: EA.180.30 Sch Sch: EA.128A.150 Excise Act 1901: EA.Dict.Pt.1.60 Extradition Act 1988: EA.4.150

Family Court Rules 2004 Pt 15.5: EA.26.300, EA.79.330

Family Law Act 1975 s 79: EA.138.720 s 101: EA.41.330

Federal Court Rules 2011 s 79: EA.79.90 reg 1.32: EA.11.60 r 7.23: EA.9.180 O 10, r 1(2)(j): EA.79.60 O 33, r 11: EA.128.150 O 33, r 19: EA.98.180 O 34: EA.26.120 Pt 23: EA.79.330 Form 146: ACT.TN.10, NT.TN.10 Form 147: ACT.TN.10, NT.TN.10

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976: EA.4.150, EA.131.330 s 131: EA.131.330

Federal Rules of Evidence s 65(2)(c): EA.65.210

Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 s 31(1): EA.8.60, EA.141.90

Foreign Evidence Act 1974 s 7: EA.Dict.Pt.2.30

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 s 46PO: EA.140.120

Judiciary Act 1903: EA.8.60 s s s s

68: EA.8.60 79: EA.8.60, EA.131A.60, EA.141.90 80: EA.8.60 80A: EA.8.60 Jury Directions Act 2015: EA.165B.210

Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 r 61: EA.41.300

Migration Act 1958: EA.Dict.Pt.1.30 s 420(1): EA.4.150, EA.5.30, EA.8.60

National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004: EA.130.450 s 31(7): EA.130.450 s 31(8): EA.130.450

Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987

EA.131A.60 Sch 1: EA.131A.60

Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2011: EA.131A.60, EA.131B.30, EA.Intro.60 Evidence Regulations 1995: EA.128A.150 reg 6: EA.99.60, CTH.TN.10 reg 6(2): EA.97.180 reg 6(3): EA.98.180

s 14(1): EA.15.60 s 16: EA.10.60

State and Territorial Laws and Records Recognition Act 1901 s s s s

8: EA.158.30 9: EA.158.30 17: EA.157.30 18: EA.185.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cxx

Uniform Evidence Law

Table of Statutes

New South Wales

Taxation Administration Act 1953 Pt III: EA.17.60, EA.18.60, EA.109.30 Trade Practices Act 1974: EA.191.20

Australian Capital Territory Court Procedures Rules 2006 Pt 2.12: EA.26.300, EA.79.330

Evidence Act 1971 s s s s s s s

s 21: EA.94.90 Pt 3.6: EA.94.90

Bail Act 2013 s 31: EA.4.210

Children (Care and Protection) Act 1987: EA.19.30

Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987: NSW.CPA.295.60

52: EA.36.30 57: EA.128.90 66(3): EA.19.30 67: EA.184.20 85: EA.195.20 88: EA.188.20 94(3): EA.179.30

s 13: EA.84.150 s 148(4)(a): NSW.CPA.296.30

Civil Procedure Act 2005

Evidence Act 2011:

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Adoption of Children Act 1965

EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1A.30, EA.Intro.60 s 64(2): ACT.TN.10 s 33: ACT.TN.10 s 38: ACT.TN.10 s 49: ACT.TN.10 s 50(1): ACT.TN.10 s 50(2): ACT.TN.10 s 63(2): ACT.TN.10 s 64(2): ACT.TN.10 s 65(2): ACT.TN.10 s 65(3): ACT.TN.10 s 65(8): ACT.TN.10 s 67: ACT.TN.10 s 67(1): ACT.TN.10 s 67(2): ACT.TN.10 s 67(3): ACT.TN.10 s 67(4): ACT.TN.10 s 67(5): ACT.TN.10 s 68: ACT.TN.10 s 97: ACT.TN.10 s 98: ACT.TN.10 s 99: ACT.TN.10 s 100: ACT.TN.10 s 166: ACT.TN.10 s 168: ACT.TN.10 s 169(1): ACT.TN.10 s 169(2): ACT.TN.10 s 170: ACT.TN.10 s 172: ACT.TN.10 s 173(1): ACT.TN.10 s 173(2): ACT.TN.10 s 177: ACT.TN.10 s 177(5): ACT.TN.10 Sch Dict: EA.98.300, EA.101.270

Evidence Regulation 2012 reg 5: ACT.TN.10 reg 6: ACT.TN.10 reg 10: ACT.TN.10

Proceeds of Crime Act 1991: EA.75.90

s s s s s

30: EA.131.330 70(1)(a): EA.75.180, EA.190.80 87: EA.128.150, EA.128.780 87(1): EA.128.150, EA.128.780 128: EA.128.780 Coroners Act 1980: EA.128.540 s 33: EA.8.90

Coroners Act 2009 s 61(4): EA.128.540

Crime Commission Act 2012 s 80: EA.125.90

Crimes Act 1900: EA.8.90, EA.19.30, EA.184.20, EA.Intro.350, NSW.CPA.295.30 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

23A(2): EA.80.120 61B: NSW.CPA.295.30 61C: NSW.CPA.295.30 61D: NSW.CPA.295.30 61E: NSW.CPA.295.30 61I: NSW.CPA.295.30 61J: NSW.CPA.295.30 61K: NSW.CPA.295.30 61L: NSW.CPA.295.30 61M: NSW.CPA.295.30 61N: NSW.CPA.295.30 61O: NSW.CPA.295.30 61JA: NSW.CPA.295.30 63: NSW.CPA.295.30 65: NSW.CPA.295.30 65A: NSW.CPA.295.30 66: NSW.CPA.295.30 66A: NSW.CPA.295.30 66B: NSW.CPA.295.30 66C: NSW.CPA.295.30 66D: NSW.CPA.295.30 66F: NSW.CPA.295.30 66EA: NSW.CPA.295.30 66EB: NSW.CPA.295.30 67: NSW.CPA.295.30 68: NSW.CPA.295.30 71: NSW.CPA.295.30 72: NSW.CPA.295.30 72A: NSW.CPA.295.30 73: NSW.CPA.295.30 74: NSW.CPA.295.30

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Table of Statutes Crimes Act 1900 — cont s 76: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 76A: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78A: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78B: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78H: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78I: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78K: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78L: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78M: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78N: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78O: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 78Q: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 79: EA.80.150, NSW.CPA.295.30 s 80: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 80A: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 80D: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 80E: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 81: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 81A: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 81B: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 86: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 87: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 89: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 90: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 90a: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 91: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 91A: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 91B: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 91D: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 91E: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 91F: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 91G: NSW.CPA.295.30 s 404: EA.184.20 s 407(3)(b): EA.19.30 s 407AA: EA.19.30 s 409: EA.8.90 s 418: EA.33.30

Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 6: EA.101.150

Criminal Procedure Act 1986: EA.20.90, EA.37.270, EA.66.300, EA.76.180, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30, EA.Intro.210, NSW.CPA.296.30, NSW.CPA.299D.60 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

3: NSW.CPA.295.30, NSW.CPA.295.60 41: EA.41.90 41(1)(a): EA.41.90 41(1)(b): EA.41.90 41(5): EA.41.90 105: EA.97.450 131: EA.20.90 132: EA.20.90 133(3): EA.165.150, EA.165B.120 135: EA.103.120 165A: EA.165.540 194M: TAS.10 275A: EA.41.90 279: EA.19.30 279(4): EA.19.30

s 281: EA.Intro.350, EA.81.60, EA.84.150, EA.85.150, EA.86.120, EA.139.60, TAS.10 s 289: EA.8.90 s 289I: EA.66.300, EA.76.180 s 293: EA.97.450, EA.103.120 s 294: EA.165.540 s 294(2)(c): EA.165.540 s 294A: EA.27.180, EA.41.330 s 294AA: EA.165.540, EA.165A.230 s 294AA(2): EA.165.540 s 294AA(3): EA.165.540 s 295: NSW.CPA.297.30, NSW.CPA.299.30, NSW.CPA.299A.30, NSW.CPA.299D.30, TAS.10 s 295(1): NSW.CPA.299D.180 s 296: NSW.CPA.297.30, NSW.CPA.299D.30 s 296(2): NSW.CPA.296.30 s 298: NSW.CPA.299B.30, NSW.CPA.299D.60, NSW.CPA.299D.330, NSW.CPA.300.30, NSW.CPA.301.30 s 299A: NSW.CPA.298.30, NSW.CPA.299D.60, NSW.CPA.299D.330 s 299B: NSW.CPA.298.30, NSW.CPA.299B.30, NSW.CPA.299D.60, NSW.CPA.299D.330 s 299C: NSW.CPA.298.30 s 299C(5): NSW.CPA.299C.30 s 299D: NSW.CPA.298.30 s 299D(1): NSW.CPA.298.30, NSW.CPA.299D.270 s 299D(1)(c): NSW.CPA.299D.240 s 299D(2): NSW.CPA.299D.150, NSW.CPA.299D.180, NSW.CPA.299D.240 s 299D(3): NSW.CPA.299D.180, NSW.CPA.299D.330 s 299D(4): NSW.CPA.299D.330 s 299D(5): NSW.CPA.299D.300 s 301: NSW.CPA.301.60 s 301(2): NSW.CPA.301.90 s 302: NSW.CPA.299D.180, NSW.CPA.299D.240, NSW.CPA.299D.330 s 305: NSW.CPA.298.30 s 306: TAS.10 ss 306A to 306G: EA.12.60 s 306B(4): EA.66.300 s 306V(1): EA.66.300, EA.76.180 s 306X: EA.66.300 Ch 6, Pt 5, Div 1: NSW.CPA.299D.60 Pt 4: EA.65.450 Pt 5: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30 Pt 5, Div 2: NSW.CPA.300.30 Pt 7: EA.Intro.210, NSW.CPA.296.30

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Uniform Evidence Law

Table of Statutes Criminal Procedure Act 1986 — cont Sch 2, cl 25: NSW.CPA.296.30

Criminal Procedure Amendment (Justices and Local Courts) Act 2001: NSW.CPA.299D.60

Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications Privilege) Act 2002: NSW.CPA.296.30 District Court Rules 1973 Pt 53: EA.128.150 Pt 53, r 10C: CTH.TN.10, NSW.TN.10, ACT.TN.10, NT.TN.10

Electronic Transactions Act 2000: EA.161.60, EA.Intro.180 s 5: EA.161.60

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Evidence Act 1898: EA.69.210, EA.118.90 s 8: EA.106.90 s 9: EA.106.90 s 10: EA.127.30 s 14CE(5): EA.69.120 s 14CH: EA.69.270 s 15A: EA.181.30 s 23: EA.178.30 s 43: EA.106.90 s 54: EA.106.90 s 69: EA.69.210 s 69(5): EA.69.210 Ch 2: EA.106.90 Pt 3.3: EA.69.210 Evidence Act 1995: EA.2.30, EA.4.180, EA.8.90, EA.9.90, EA.18.60, EA.24A.30, EA.89.60, EA.106.90, EA.116.180, EA.117.60, EA.128.600, EA.160.60, EA.165.570, EA.165A.90, EA.165A.120, EA.165B.150, EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1A.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.4.30, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.5.30, EA.Dict.Pt.1.60, EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.210, EA.Intro.350, NSW.CPA.299D.60, NSW.CPA.299D.90, NSW.CPA.299D.120, TAS.20 s 3: EA.Intro.240 s 4: EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30 s 8: EA.8.90 s 9: EA.Intro.120, EA.9.90, EA.18.60, EA.39.240 s 9(1): EA.9.90, EA.55.510 s 9(2)(a): EA.75.180 s 9(2)(c): EA.4.240, EA.9.180 s 18: EA.Intro.150 s 19: EA.Intro.150, EA.19.30 s 20: EA.Intro.150 s 23(2): EA.23.60 s 33: EA.8.90, NSW.TN.10 s 34(1): EA.Intro.350 s 37: EA.39.270 s 37(1)(a): EA.39.270

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

38: NSW.TN.10 38(1): EA.38.210 38(3): EA.38.210 48(1): EA.48.60 48(1)(b): EA.48.60, EA.48.180 48(1)(d): EA.48.60, EA.48.180 49: NSW.TN.10 50(1): NSW.TN.10 50(2): NSW.TN.10 53(1): EA.53.120 53(2)(a): EA.53.120 53(3): EA.53.120, EA.53.150 53(5): EA.53.180 55: EA.55.270, EA.59.180, EA.78.60, EA.81.120 56: EA.78.60 56(1): EA.76.120 57: EA.55.270, EA.59.180 59: EA.Intro.120, EA.9.90, EA.56.90, EA.65.240, EA.66.150, EA.69.540, EA.81.60 60: EA.56.90, EA.65.240 63(2): NSW.TN.10 64(2): NSW.TN.10 65: EA.8.90 65(2): EA.65.240, NSW.TN.10 65(2)(b): EA.65.180 65(2)(d): EA.65.240 65(2)(d)(i): EA.65.240 65(3): NSW.TN.10 65(8): NSW.TN.10 66(2)(b): EA.66.120 67(1): NSW.TN.10 67(2): NSW.TN.10 67(3): NSW.TN.10 67(4): EA.67.60, NSW.TN.10 67(5): NSW.TN.10 68: NSW.TN.10 69: EA.48.180, EA.56.90, EA.69.540, EA.76.120, EA.183.80 69(2): EA.69.170, EA.69.540, EA.76.120 69(2)(a): EA.69.180 69(2)(b): EA.69.180 69(5): EA.62.60, EA.69.180 76: EA.56.90, EA.76.90, EA.76.120, EA.78.60 77: EA.56.90, EA.76.90, EA.76.120, EA.76.180, EA.78.60 78: EA.76.90, EA.76.120, EA.76.180, EA.78.60 78(a): EA.62.60, EA.69.180, EA.78.60 78(b): EA.78.60 79: EA.Intro.120, EA.55.270, EA.76.90, EA.76.120, EA.76.180, EA.78.60 80: EA.Intro.120 84: EA.Intro.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30 85: EA.Intro.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30 86: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30 88: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30

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cxxiii

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Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont s 89A: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30, EA.81.60 s 89A(1): EA.89A.60 s 90: EA.Intro.150, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30, EA.90.60 s 91: EA.91.60 s 97: NSW.TN.10 s 98: EA.98.120, NSW.TN.10 s 98(1)(b): EA.98.120 s 98(2): EA.98.120 s 99: NSW.TN.10 s 100: NSW.TN.10 s 101: EA.Intro.150 s 102: EA.38.210, EA.164.180 s 108: EA.164.180 s 110: EA.Intro.150 ss 113 to 115: EA.Intro.150 s 114: EA.115.180 s 114(2)(c): EA.115.180 s 114(3): EA.115.180 s 114(5): EA.115.180 s 115: EA.115.150 s 115(3): EA.115.150 s 115(5): EA.115.150 s 115(5)(a): EA.115.180 s 115(6): EA.115.210 s 117: EA.118.120, EA.119.150 s 118: EA.Intro.350, EA.118.90, EA.119.150, EA.133.60 s 119: EA.Intro.350, EA.119.150, EA.133.60 s 122: EA.117.120 s 123: EA.Intro.150, EA.Intro.210 s 126A: EA.90.270 s 126B: EA.18.60, EA.90.270, EA.130.120 s 126B(3): EA.126B.60, NSW.CPA.299D.180 s 126G: TAS.10 s 126H: NSW.CPA.299D.60 s 126I: TAS.10 s 126K: EA.126B.360 s 128: EA.Intro.150, EA.Intro.210, EA.Intro.350, EA.8.90, EA.128.720, EA.128.780, EA.128A.90, EA.132.60, EA.138.120, EA.138.150, EA.138.600 s 128(1): EA.128.780 s 128(2): EA.128.780 s 128(3): EA.128.780 s 128(4): EA.128.780 s 128(4)(b): EA.128.780 s 128(5): EA.128.780 s 128(7): EA.128.60, EA.128.600 s 128(8): EA.128.720 s 128A: EA.128.150, EA.128.780 s 130: EA.131A.180 s 131: EA.8.90 s 131A: EA.Intro.210 s 132: EA.138.120, EA.138.150, EA.138.600 s 133: EA.128.780, EA.133.60

s s s s s

134: 135: 136: 137: 138:

EA.118.90 EA.Intro.150, EA.53.90, EA.135.150 EA.Intro.150, EA.60.60, EA.65.240 EA.135.150, EA.137.90, EA.138.450 EA.Intro.150, EA.8.90, EA.90.60, EA.115.150, EA.128.780, EA.132.60, EA.138.390, EA.138.420 s 138(1): EA.138.240, EA.138.420 s 138(1)(a): EA.138.150, EA.138.210 s 138(1)(b): EA.138.150, EA.138.210 s 138(2)(b): EA.138.390 s 138(3): EA.138.60, EA.138.420 s 141: EA.194.20 s 142: EA.194.20 s 144: EA.144.60 s 146: EA.Intro.150 ss 146 to 163: EA.9.150 s 147: EA.Intro.150 s 150: EA.143.60 s 150(1): EA.150.90 s 150(3): EA.150.90 s 153(1): EA.143.60 s 153(2): EA.143.60 s 160: EA.160.60 s 164: EA.Intro.150 s 165: EA.Intro.150, EA.165.360 s 165(1)(d): EA.164.180 s 165(2): EA.Intro.350, EA.165.360 s 165(2)(c): EA.165.360 s 165(6): EA.165A.90 s 165(7): EA.Intro.210 s 165A: EA.165A.90 s 165A(1): EA.165A.120 s 165B: EA.165A.90 s 165B(7): EA.165B.60 s 166: NSW.TN.10 s 168: NSW.TN.10 s 169(1): NSW.TN.10 s 169(2): NSW.TN.10 s 170: NSW.TN.10 s 172: NSW.TN.10 s 173(1): NSW.TN.10 s 173(2): NSW.TN.10 s 177: NSW.TN.10 s 177(5): NSW.TN.10 s 183: EA.69.180 s 189: EA.128.780 s 189(1): EA.128.720 s 189(6): EA.128.720 s 192: EA.53.120 s 192(1): EA.53.120 s 194(1)(b): EA.194.20 Pt 3.2: EA.76.120, EA.133.60 Pt 3.3: EA.76.120 Pt 3.4: EA.9.90 Pt 3.10: EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.210 Pt 3.10, Div 1A: EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.150, EA.126B.60, EA.127.30, NSW.CPA.299D.60

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Uniform Evidence Law

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 1995 — cont Pt 3.10, Div 1B: EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.150, NSW.CPA.299D.60, NSW.CPA.299D.90 Pt 3.11: EA.55.480, EA.66.120, EA.76.120 Pt 4.6: EA.135.150 Pt 4.6, Div 1: EA.Intro.150 Sch 1, Pt 2, cl 4(1)(c): EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Sch 1, Pt 2, cl 4(1)(f): EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 1: EA.48.210 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 4(1)(e): EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 4(1)(f): EA.Dict.Pt.2.30 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 4(2): EA.66.120 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 8: EA.48.90, EA.118.90 Dictionary, Pt Dictionary, 2, cl 9: EA.4.60

Evidence Amendment Act 2007: EA.122.330, EA.165B.90, EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.180

Evidence Amendment (Confidential Communications) Act 1997: EA.126B.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1A.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30, EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.210, NSW.CPA.299D.60 Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998: EA.Dict.Pt.2.30

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s 5B: EA.28.150

Evidence (Consequential and Other Provisions) Act 1995: EA.8.90 Evidence Legislation Act Amendment Act 2001: EA.22.60, EA.23.60, EA.24A.30, EA.165A.90

Evidence Regulation 2005 cl 4: NSW.TN.10 cl 5(2): NSW.TN.10 cl 5(3): NSW.TN.10

Evidence Regulation 2010 regs 5-6: EA.99.60 reg 5(2): EA.97.180 reg 6(2): EA.98.180

Evidence on Commission Act 1995: EA.Dict.Pt.2.30

Interpretation Act 1987: EA.89A.30 s 21: EA.89A.30, EA.131A.120 s 21(1): EA.59.150

Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 s 113(2): EA.84.150 ss 114 to 115: EA.84.150 s 122: EA.84.150 s 123 to 124: EA.84.150 s 128: EA.84.150 s 129: EA.84.150 s 130: EA.84.150 s 131: EA.84.150

Pt 9: EA.84.150, EA.90.260

Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2005: EA.84.150 cl 33: EA.84.150

Legal Profession Act 2004: EA.119.120 Legal Profession Uniform Law: EA.117.60 Listening Devices Act 1984 s 13: EA.8.60 Pt 4: EA.8.90

Oaths Act 1900 Pt 5: EA.186.20

Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983: EA.17.60

Supreme Court Act 1970: EA.75.180 s 75: EA.75.180 s 131: EA.131.330 Pt 7B: EA.8.90, EA.131.330 Supreme Court Rules 1970: EA.4.150 r 3K: EA.79.330 r 13: EA.4.150 Pt 38, r 9(1): EA.59.240 Pt 75: EA.128.150 Pt 75, r 3J: EA.26.300, EA.79.330 Surveillance Devices Act 2007: EA.138.660

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005: EA.67.60, EA.79.330, EA.128.150 r 21.3(2)(d): EA.118.570 r 31.4: EA.37.240 r 31.5: CTH.TN.10, NSW.TN.10, ACT.TN.10, NT.TN.10 r 31.17: EA.26.300 r 31.23: EA.26.300 Pt 25: EA.Intro.180, EA.128.150, EA.128A.90 Pt 31, Div 2: EA.79.330 Pt 31, Div 2, Subdiv 5: EA.26.120 Sch 7: EA.26.300, EA.79.330

Northern Territory Evidence (Business Records) Interim Arrangements Act 1984 s 5(1)(b): EA.69.120 s 8: EA.69.270

Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1A.30, EA.Intro.60 s 33: NT.TN.10 s 38: NT.TN.10 s 49: NT.TN.10 s 50(1): NT.TN.10 s 50(2): NT.TN.10 s 63(2): NT.TN.10 s 64(2): NT.TN.10 s 65(2): NT.TN.10 s 65(3): NT.TN.10

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cxxv

Table of Statutes Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 — cont s 65(8): NT.TN.10 s 67: NT.TN.10 s 67(1): NT.TN.10 s 67(2): NT.TN.10 s 67(3): NT.TN.10 s 67(4): NT.TN.10 s 67(5): NT.TN.10 s 68: NT.TN.10 s 97: NT.TN.10 s 98: NT.TN.10 s 98(1)(b): EA.101.150 s 99: NT.TN.10 s 100: NT.TN.10 s 166: NT.TN.10 s 168: NT.TN.10 s 169(1): NT.TN.10 s 169(2): NT.TN.10 s 170: NT.TN.10 s 172: NT.TN.10 s 173(1): NT.TN.10 s 173(2): NT.TN.10 s 177: NT.TN.10 s 177(5): NT.TN.10

Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Regulations 2012

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reg 4: NT.TN.10 reg 6(1): NT.TN.10 reg 6(2): NT.TN.10

Queensland Criminal Code 1899 s 125: EA.164.150

Evidence Act 1977 s 75: EA.71.60

South Australia Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988: EA.78A.60 s 55: EA.78A.60 s 76: EA.78A.60 s 79: EA.78A.60

Evidence Act 1929 s 9(4): EA.13.330 s 53: EA.71.60

Tasmania Criminal Code 1924 s 96: EA.164.150

Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 s 8: EA.85.150, EA.139.60, EA.165.420

Evidence Act 1910 ss 7 to 13: TAS.10

s 25: TAS.10 s 26: TAS.10 s 40C(1)(b): EA.69.120 s 40F: EA.69.270 s 41: EA.71.60 ss 60 to 60B: TAS.10 s 62: TAS.10 s 85(10)(c): TAS.10 s 85A: TAS.10 s 92: TAS.10 s 96: TAS.10 s 102A: TAS.10 s 103AB: TAS.10 s 133: TAS.10 s 134: TAS.10 s 135: TAS.10

Evidence Act 1995 s 134: EA.65.270

Evidence Act 2001: TAS.10, TAS.20 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

1: TAS.20 2: TAS.20 2A: TAS.20 3: TAS.20 3A: TAS.20 3B: TAS.20 3C: TAS.20 3D: TAS.20 4: TAS.20 7: TAS.20 8: TAS.20 9: TAS.20 10: TAS.20 11: TAS.20 12: TAS.20 13: TAS.20 14: TAS.20 15: TAS.20 16: TAS.20 17: TAS.20 18: TAS.20 19: TAS.20 20: TAS.20 21: TAS.10, TAS.20 22: TAS.10, TAS.20 23: TAS.20 24: TAS.20 26: TAS.20 27: TAS.20 28: TAS.20 29: TAS.20 30: TAS.20 30A: TAS.20 31: TAS.20 32: TAS.20 33: TAS.20 34: TAS.20 35: TAS.20 36: TAS.20 37: TAS.20

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cxxvi

Uniform Evidence Law

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Table of Statutes Evidence Act 2001 — cont s 38: TAS.20 s 39: TAS.20 s 40: TAS.20 s 41: TAS.20 s 42: TAS.20 s 43: TAS.20 s 44: TAS.20 s 45: TAS.20 s 46: TAS.20 s 47: TAS.20 s 48: TAS.20 s 49: TAS.20 s 50: TAS.20 s 51: TAS.20 s 52: TAS.20 s 53: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 54: TAS.20 s 55: EA.55.270, TAS.20 s 56: TAS.20 s 57: TAS.20 s 58: TAS.20 s 59: TAS.20 s 60: TAS.20 s 61: TAS.20 s 62: TAS.20 s 63: TAS.20 s 64: TAS.20 s 65: TAS.20 s 66: TAS.20 s 66A: TAS.20 s 67: TAS.20 s 68: TAS.20 s 69: TAS.20 s 70: TAS.20 s 71: TAS.20 s 72: TAS.20 s 73: TAS.20 s 74: TAS.20 s 75: TAS.20 s 76: TAS.20 s 77: TAS.20 s 78: TAS.20 s 78A: TAS.20 s 79: TAS.20 s 80: TAS.20 s 81: TAS.20 s 82: TAS.20 s 83: TAS.20 s 84: TAS.20 s 85: TAS.20 s 85A: TAS.20 s 86: TAS.20 s 87: TAS.20 s 88: TAS.20 s 89: TAS.20 s 90: TAS.20 s 91: TAS.20 s 92: TAS.20 s 93: TAS.20

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

94: TAS.20 95: TAS.20 96: TAS.20 97: TAS.20 98: TAS.20 99: TAS.20 100: TAS.20 101: TAS.20 101A: TAS.20 102: TAS.20 103: TAS.20 104: TAS.20 104(4): TAS.10 104(4)(a): TAS.10 104(4)(b): TAS.10 104(4)(c): TAS.10 106: TAS.20 108: TAS.20 108A: TAS.20 108B: TAS.20 108C: TAS.20 109: TAS.20 110: TAS.20 111: TAS.20 112: TAS.20 116: TAS.20 117: TAS.20 118: TAS.20 119: TAS.20 120: TAS.20 121: TAS.20 122: TAS.20 123: TAS.20 124: TAS.20 125: TAS.20 126: TAS.20 126A: TAS.20 126B: TAS.20 126C: TAS.20 126D: TAS.20 126E: TAS.20 126F: TAS.20 127: TAS.20 127A: TAS.10, TAS.20 127B: TAS.10, TAS.20 128: TAS.20 128A: TAS.20 129: TAS.20 130: TAS.20 131: TAS.20 131A: TAS.20 132: TAS.20 133: TAS.20 134: TAS.20 135: EA.79.300, TAS.20 136: TAS.20 137: EA.79.300, TAS.20 138: TAS.20 139: TAS.20

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cxxvii

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Table of Statutes Evidence Act 2001 — cont s 140: TAS.20 s 141: TAS.20 s 142: TAS.20 s 142A: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 143: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 144: TAS.20 s 145: TAS.20 s 146: TAS.20 s 147: TAS.20 s 148: TAS.20 s 149: TAS.20 s 150: TAS.20 s 152: TAS.20 s 153: TAS.20 s 154: TAS.20 s 155: TAS.20 s 156: TAS.20 s 157: TAS.20 s 158: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 159: TAS.20 s 160: TAS.20 s 161: TAS.20 s 162: TAS.20 s 164: TAS.20 s 164(4): TAS.10 s 165: TAS.20 s 165(1)(f): TAS.10 s 165(3): TAS.10 s 165A: TAS.20 s 165B: TAS.20 s 166: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 167: TAS.20 s 168: TAS.20 s 169: TAS.20 s 170: TAS.20 s 171: TAS.20 s 172: TAS.20 s 173: TAS.20 s 174: TAS.20 s 175: TAS.20 s 176: TAS.20 s 177: TAS.20 s 177A: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 177B: TAS.20 s 177C: TAS.20 s 177D: TAS.20 s 177E: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 178: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 179: TAS.20 s 180: TAS.20 s 181: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 181A: TAS.20 s 183: TAS.20 s 184: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 187: TAS.20 s 188: TAS.20 s 189: TAS.20 s 190: TAS.20 s 191: TAS.20

s 192: TAS.20 s 192A: TAS.20 s 193: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 194: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 194A: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 194B: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 194C: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 194D: TAS.20 s 194E: TAS.20 s 194F: TAS.20 s 194G: TAS.20 s 194H: TAS.20 s 194I: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 194J: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 194K: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 194L: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 194M: TAS.20 s 195: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 196: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 196A: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 196B: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 196C: TAS.10, TAS.20 s 197: TAS.20 s 198: TAS.20 s 199: TAS.20 s 200: TAS.20 Pt 3.10: EA.79.240 Sch 1: TAS.20 Sch 2: TAS.20 Justices Act 1959: TAS.10, TAS.20

Relationships Act 2003 s 4(1): EA.Dict.Pt.2.120

Tasmanian Police Service Act 2003: EA.138.90

Victoria Civil Procedure Act 2010: EA.79.330 s 65H(1): EA.79.450 s 65K(1): EA.79.450 s 79: EA.79.330 Pt 4.6: EA.79.450 Crimes Act 1958: EA.135.60, EA.135.240, EA.Intro.120 s 2B: EA.20.90 s 9AH: EA.79.450 s 9AH(1): EA.79.450 s 9AH(2): EA.79.450 s 9AH(3): EA.79.450 s 37A: EA.103.120 s 61: EA.Intro.120 s 135(d): EA.135.60 s 391: EA.20.90 s 398A: EA.Intro.120, EA.98.120 s 404: EA.Intro.120 s 415: EA.194.40 s 464: EA.85.150, EA.139.90 s 464A: EA.84.150

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cxxviii

Uniform Evidence Law

Table of Statutes Crimes Act 1958 — cont s 464C: EA.84.150 s 464D: EA.84.150 s 464E: EA.84.150 s 464F: EA.84.150 s 464H(1): EA.86.120 s 464H(2): EA.86.120 Pt 1, Div 1, Subdiv 30A: EA.84.150 Pt IC: EA.101.480, EA.135.240 Criminal Procedure Act 2009: EA.37.270, EA.41.330, EA.Intro.120 s 338: EA.66.300 ss 339 to 352: EA.97.450 s 354: EA.27.180 s 356: EA.27.180 s 367: EA.37.270 s 377: EA.66.300, EA.108.210 s 377(2): EA.66.300 s 377(3): EA.66.300 s 377(4): EA.66.300 s 377(5): EA.66.300 s 377(6): EA.66.300 s 377(7): EA.66.300 s 388: EA.108C.210 Pt 8.2: EA.Intro.120, EA.12.60 Pt 8.2, Div 2: EA.41.330, EA.97.450

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Criminal Procedure Amendment (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2009: EA.Intro.120 Evidence Act 1958: EA.66.300, EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.120 s 112: EA.186.20 s 123C: EA.186.20 s 124: EA.186.20 s 125: EA.186.20 s 126: EA.186.20 s 126A: EA.186.20 s 150: EA.194.40 Pt 2: EA.Intro.210 Pt 2, Div 2: EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30 Evidence Act 2008: EA.2.30, EA.4.240, EA.20.60, EA.20.420, EA.22.60, EA.23.60, EA.24A.30, EA.35.60, EA.66.300, EA.79.450, EA.85.210, EA.114.240, EA.128.150, EA.128.600, EA.165B.150, EA.165B.210, EA.165B.270, EA.165B.300, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1A.30, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.4.30, EA.Dict.Pt.1.180, EA.Intro.30, EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.120, EA.Intro.210 s 3A: EA.3A.30 s 4: EA.4.120, EA.4.300 s 4(1): EA.4.120 s 4(5): EA.4.120 s 9(1): EA.Intro.120 s 11: EA.Intro.120 s 17: EA.Intro.210 s 26: EA.Intro.120

s 33: VIC.TN.10 s 37: EA.37.270 s 38: VIC.TN.10 s 41: EA.41.270 s 41(1): EA.41.100 s 41(2): EA.Intro.210, EA.41.100 s 41(3): EA.Intro.210, EA.41.60, EA.41.100 s 41(3)(d): EA.41.210 s 41(4): EA.Intro.210, EA.41.60, EA.41.100 s 41(4)(c)(i): EA.41.240 s 41(4)(c)(ii): EA.41.240 s 41(8): EA.41.270, EA.41.360 s 49: VIC.TN.10 s 50(1): VIC.TN.10 s 50(2): VIC.TN.10 s 55: EA.Intro.120 s 56(1): EA.Intro.120 s 64(2): VIC.TN.10 s 67(1): VIC.TN.10 s 67(2): VIC.TN.10 s 67(3): VIC.TN.10 s 67(4): VIC.TN.10 s 68: VIC.TN.10 s 79: EA.79.450 s 79(1): EA.79.450 s 97: VIC.TN.10 s 98: VIC.TN.10 s 99: VIC.TN.10 s 100: VIC.TN.10 s 101: EA.98.120 s 108C: EA.79.90, EA.79.450, EA.192.100 ss 113-115: EA.Intro.210 s 115(7): EA.116.180 s 116: EA.116.180 s 116(1): EA.116.180 s 116(2): EA.116.180 s 127A: EA.Intro.210 s 128: EA.Intro.120 s 128A: EA.131A.150 s 131(1)(a): EA.131.450 s 131(2)(f): EA.131.450 s 131A: EA.Intro.180 s 137: EA.37.270 s 138: EA.37.270 s 150: EA.Intro.120 s 164(3): EA.164.60, EA.164.120 s 164(4): EA.Intro.210 s 164(4): EA.164.120, EA.165.570 s 164(4) to (6): EA.164.60 s 164(5): EA.164.120 s 164(6): EA.164.120 s 165: EA.164.120, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.5.30, EA.165.570 s 165(1)(a) to (f): EA.165.570 s 165(1)(b): EA.165.570 s 165(1)(f): EA.Intro.180 s 165(3): EA.116.180, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240 s 165(4): EA.165.570

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cxxix

Table of Statutes Evidence Act 2008 — cont s 165(5): EA.165.570 s 165A: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.5.30 s 165A(1): EA.165.570, EA.165A.240 s 165B: EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.5.30, EA.165.540 s 165B(2): EA.165B.330 s 165B(3): EA.20.420, EA.165.570, EA.165B.330 s 165B(4): EA.165B.330 s 166: VIC.TN.10 s 168: VIC.TN.10 s 169(1): VIC.TN.10 s 169(2): VIC.TN.10 s 170: VIC.TN.10 s 173(1): VIC.TN.10 s 173(2): VIC.TN.10 s 177: VIC.TN.10 s 177(5): VIC.TN.10 s 194: EA.194.40 Ch 1: EA.Intro.210 Ch 3: EA.Intro.120 Pt 2.1: EA.Intro.120 Pt 4.5: EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.210 Sch Dict: EA.117.60 Sch 2, Pt 1: VIC.TN.10 Dictionary Dictionary: EA.128.600

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Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958: EA.Intro.120 s 19C: EA.Intro.120 s 19D: EA.Intro.120 s 32C: EA.Intro.120 s 42E: EA.28.150 s 74: EA.Intro.120 s 89B(1): EA.Intro.120 s 89B(2)(e): EA.Intro.120 s 135: EA.Intro.120 Pt IIAA: EA.Intro.120 Pt II: EA.Intro.120 Pt IV: EA.Intro.120 Pt IIA: EA.Intro.120 Pt III: EA.Intro.120

Evidence Regulation 2009 reg 6(2): EA.97.180 reg 7(1): EA.97.180

Evidence Regulations 2009 reg reg reg reg

5: VIC.TN.10 7: EA.99.60, VIC.TN.10 7(2): EA.98.180 9: EA.128.570

Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 s 35: EA.Intro.240 s 158: EA.117.60

Jury Directions Act 2013: EA.165.480 Jury Directions Act 2015: EA.55.180, EA.116.60, EA.116.180, EA.141.120, EA.141.210, EA.164.60, EA.164.120, EA.165.60, EA.165.120, EA.165.240, EA.165.270, EA.165.480, EA.165.570, EA.165A.60, EA.165A.120, EA.165A.210,

EA.165A.240, EA.165B.60, EA.165B.150, EA.165B.180, EA.165B.210, EA.165B.270, EA.165B.300, EA.165B.330, EA.Ch.4.Pt.4.5.30, EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.210 s 5(4): EA.20.420, EA.116.180, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240, EA.165B.330 s 6: EA.20.420, EA.116.180, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240, EA.165B.330 s 7: EA.20.420, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240 s 7(2): EA.20.420, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240 s 10(2): EA.101.480 s 12: EA.20.420, EA.116.180, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240, EA.165B.330 ss 12 to 17: EA.101.360, EA.101.480, EA.165.480 s 14: EA.101.480, EA.116.180, EA.165.240, EA.165.570 s 14(1): EA.20.420, EA.116.180, EA.165.240, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240, EA.165B.330 s 14(2): EA.20.420, EA.116.180, EA.165.240, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240, EA.165B.330 ss 14 to 16: EA.165.570 s 15: EA.20.420, EA.116.180, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240, EA.165B.330 s 16: EA.20.420, EA.101.480, EA.116.180, EA.165.570, EA.165A.240, EA.165B.330 s 18: EA.55.330, EA.165.570 ss 18 to 24: EA.165.270, EA.165.480 s 19: EA.165.570 s 20(1)(b): EA.55.330, EA.165.570 s 21: EA.165.570 s 22: EA.165.570 s 23: EA.165.480, EA.165.570 s 23(2): EA.165.570 s 24: EA.165.570 ss 25 to 30: EA.101.360, EA.101.480 s 26: EA.101.480 s 27(2): EA.101.480 s 27(3): EA.101.480 s 28: EA.101.480 s 29: EA.101.480 s 30: EA.101.480 s 31: EA.165.570, EA.165A.240 s 32: EA.165.570, EA.165A.240 s 32(1): EA.165A.240 s 32(2): EA.165.570, EA.165A.240 s 32(2)(b): EA.165.570, EA.165A.240 s 33: EA.165.570, EA.165A.240 s 34: EA.165.570 s 35: EA.116.180 s 36(1): EA.116.180 s 36(2): EA.116.180 s 36(3): EA.116.180 s 37: EA.116.180

[All references are to paragraph numbers] cxxx

Uniform Evidence Law

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Table of Statutes Jury Directions Act 2015 — cont s 38: EA.165B.330 s 39: EA.165B.330 s 39(1): EA.165B.330 s 39(2): EA.165B.330 s 39(3)(a): EA.165B.330 s 39(3)(b): EA.165B.330 s 40: EA.165B.330 s 42: EA.20.420 s 43: EA.20.420 s 43(2): EA.20.420 s 43(3): EA.20.420 s 44: EA.20.420 s 48: EA.165.570 s 50: EA.165.570 s 51: EA.165.570 s 51(1): EA.165.570 s 51(1)(c): EA.165.570 s 51(2): EA.165.570 s 52: EA.165.570 s 52(4): EA.165.570 s 52(5): EA.165.570 s 53: EA.165.570 s 54: EA.165.570 s 55: EA.55.360, EA.165.540 s 61: EA.141.210 s 62: EA.141.210 s 63(1): EA.141.210 s 63(2): EA.141.210 s 64: EA.141.210 s 87: EA.165.270

Legal Profession Uniform Law: EA.117.60 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 s 61: EA.194.40

Magistrates’ Court Civil Procedure Rules 1999 O 19: EA.79.330

Statute Law Amendment (Evidence Consequential Provisions) Act 2009: EA.Intro.60, EA.Intro.120 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 O 44: EA.79.330

Norfolk Island Criminal Law Act 1960 s 410: EA.8.90

Evidence Act 2004 s 8: EA.8.90 s 138: EA.8.90 Ch 3: EA.Intro.120, EA.8.90

New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 s 68(5): EA.126J.30

United States Federal Rules of Evidence: EA.48.60, EA.65.210, EA.73.60 r r r r r r r r

703: EA.79.240 803(19): EA.73.60 803(20): EA.73.60 804(b)(4): EA.73.60 807: EA.65.210 1001: EA.48.150 1003: EA.48.150 1006: EA.50.30

United Kingdom Civil Evidence Act 1968: EA.67.60, EA.100.60, EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: EA.81.60, EA.84.60 s 76: EA.84.60 s 76(2): EA.84.60, EA.85.210 s 76(2)(b): EA.85.210

Rules of the Supreme Court O 38, rr 21 to 33: EA.67.60, EA.100.60

Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s 53: EA.13.60, EA.13.90

Treaties and Conventions Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

Western Australia

RP.1.10

European Convention on Human Rights Criminal Code 1913

Art 3: EA.84.60

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: EA.138.600 International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948: RP.1.10

s 52: EA.164.150

Evidence Act 1906 s 79F: EA.69.270 s 82: EA.71.60

[All references are to paragraph numbers] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

cxxxi

FORMAT OF THE COMMENTARY This commentary on the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) is designed to provide assistance in the understanding and application of the uniform evidence law. An introduction details the history of the legislation and provides an overview of its structure and operation. The remainder of the commentary follows the order of the legislation. Summaries are provided of the provisions contained in Chapters and Divisions of the Act. However, the bulk of the commentary relates to individual sections.

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First, the particular legislative provision (with statutory notes) is extracted – identified by shading of the text. For the most part, provisions in the Acts are identical. However, there are differences, particularly in Chapter 1 (Preliminary), and where this occurs the provisions are separately extracted. Where the differences relate just to a subsection, only the different subsections are extracted separately. It should be noted that all the Acts except the Victorian Act use the term “defendant” to refer to an accused person in criminal proceedings, while the Victorian Act uses the term “accused”. The provisions are not separately extracted where this is the only difference between them. Secondly, reference is made to those parts of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) reports that relate to the provision (if applicable). References include the 1985 Interim Report (ALRC 26), the 1987 Final Report (ALRC 38) and the 2005 joint Report on Uniform Evidence Law prepared with the NSWLRC and the VLRC (ALRC 102). Thirdly, commentary on the provisions attempts to explain their content, relate them to other parts of the Act, discuss relevant authorities and, where applicable, relate the provisions to aspects of the existing common law which continue to have legal significance. Any differences between the Acts are highlighted and discussed. Reference is made to other legislation that may bear on the operation of the provisions in the Act. Appendices to the commentary contain the Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Regulation 2010 (NSW) and the Evidence Regulations 2009 (Vic). Additional Appendices include a table of notices required by the legislation, and extracts from related legislation. Finally a table indicates the extent to which the Tasmanian Evidence Act 2001 corresponds to the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the other uniform evidence law. That Act may be found in the looseleaf and online version of this book.

cxxxii

Uniform Evidence Law

INTRODUCTION

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[EA.Intro.30]

The law of evidence

When the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) received the Royal Assent on 23 February 1995, having passed through both Houses of the Federal Parliament some weeks before, an important milestone in the development of the Australian legal system was reached. In July 1979 the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) had been given the task of reforming the rules of evidence applicable in federal courts. More than 15 years later, the Commonwealth Act was enacted, to a very significant extent based on the ALRC proposals. It is a substantial piece of legislation – 197 sections, 100 printed pages in length. As the Federal Minister for Justice stated in March 1995, the “Evidence Act 1995 is one of the most important reforms in the administration of justice in Australia”. Its importance is not limited to the federal sphere. Within months of the passing of the Commonwealth Act, virtually identical legislation was enacted in New South Wales. In 2001 Tasmania enacted uniform evidence legislation, as did Norfolk Island in 2004. In 2008, Victoria enacted the Evidence Act 2008 (which came into force on 1 January 2010). In 2011, the ACT enacted its own Act, rather than simply apply the Commonwealth Act, and the Northern Territory adopted the uniform evidence law. It is likely that, in time, most other jurisdictions in Australia will follow the path to a uniform evidence law. The rules of evidence applied in Australian courts serve a number of functions – they regulate what material a court may consider in determining factual issues; how that material is to be presented in the court; and how the court actually goes about the task of deciding the factual issues on the basis of the evidence. They are a central part of the system of procedural justice. Procedural rules are critical to the resolution of disputes and the enforcement of substantive law in the courts. If the procedures are inefficient, access to justice is impaired. If the procedures are unjust, the outcome of the process is likely to be unjust. At the symbolic centre of the system of procedural justice is the trial. While what happens before and after the trial is important, the trial is the central and most public part of the justice system. It is the showcase where the community can observe the law in action and assess whether justice is being done. To a very great extent, trial procedure is determined by the law of evidence. In any trial system, there must be some rules regulating how evidence is produced in the court and how the court is to perform its task of deciding the issues before it. However, this is particularly true in an adversarial system. Australia has inherited the procedural paradigm of the adversarial trial. The parties to the proceeding, not the court, determine the issues which they will fight. The parties, not the court, obtain and produce (“lead”, “tender”, “present”

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[EA.Intro.60]

Introduction

1

or “adduce” ) the evidence in support of their case. The role of the trial judge (or magistrate) is to supervise proceedings, act as umpire, determine questions of law and apply the law to the facts as found by him or her on the evidence (or, if there is a jury, direct them in their task of determining the factual issues). While the adversarial model is modified in the criminal justice context by altering the balance to accord the accused certain procedural safeguards, even there adversarial elements predominate. Rules of evidence provide the legal framework by which the judge determines how evidence may be adduced, whether it will be taken into account (whether it is “admissible”); and how the tribunal of fact, judge or jury, is to decide the factual issues on the evidence (“use” of evidence, and “proof”). Until the enactment of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and its New South Wales counterpart enacted in June 1995, the rules of evidence were largely part of the “common law”, the product of long historical development by the courts themselves, with only limited statutory modification. As a result, they reflected a variety of principles and values. They lacked coherence and structure. They were complex, technical and difficult to find. Substantial reform was long overdue. However, the courts were not prepared to engage in this process, believing that it was best left to the legislature. For many years, no legislature was prepared to take on such a mammoth task. However, the 1979 reference to the Australian Law Reform Commission created the possibility of comprehensive rationalisation and reform of the law of evidence. This legislation is the product of that endeavour.

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[EA.Intro.60]

Historical background

On 18 July 1979 the then Federal Attorney-General, Mr Peter Durack, referred to the ALRC the topic of a “review [of the] laws of evidence applicable in proceedings in Federal Courts and the Courts of the Territories with a view to producing a wholly comprehensive law of evidence based on concepts appropriate to modern conditions and anticipated requirements”. Mr Tim Smith, now Justice Smith of the Victorian Supreme Court, was appointed Commissioner in charge. The ALRC engaged in lengthy consultation and prepared two discussion papers and 16 research papers on aspects of evidence law (some of them written by the author of this commentary). An Interim Report (hereafter referred to in this work as ALRC 26) was produced in 1985 and a Final Report (hereafter referred to in this work as ALRC 38) in 1987. The Final Report included a draft Evidence Bill. In June 1988 the New South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended that, with minor qualifications, the ALRC’s proposals should be adopted in proceedings before New South Wales courts. For several years there was no explicit governmental response. In 1991, however, the New South Wales Government introduced into Parliament its own Evidence 1. In ALRC 38 at para 58, the ALRC commented on the terminology which it had used in the introduction to ALRC 38. It said that it had made use in the draft Bill of a number of commonly used terms and observed: “The bill is drafted on the basis that a witness in the witness box is ‘giving’ evidence. The party who is questioning the witness (whether in examination-in-chief or in cross-examination) is ‘adducing’ the evidence that the witness is giving. It is the court’s function to admit or refuse to admit the evidence so adduced.”

2

Uniform Evidence Law

Introduction

[EA.Intro.60]

Bill, which implemented the majority of the ALRC recommendations. In the same year, the Commonwealth Government produced its own Bill. For various reasons, neither Bill was voted on. However, at the end of 1991, the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General gave in-principle support to substantially uniform evidence laws, based on the New South Wales and Commonwealth Bills. Consultation between New South Wales and the Commonwealth resulted in the production of essentially uniform legislation, represented by the Evidence Bill and the exposure draft Evidence Bill.

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On 10 February 1994 the Commonwealth Bill was referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. The Committee tabled a generally favourable Interim Report on 7 June 1994. The Bill was passed by the House of Representatives on 19 October 1994. After the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs tabled a favourable Final Report on 8 December 1994, the Bill was considered by the Senate and finally passed, with some amendments, on 2 February 1995. The House of Representatives agreed to the amendments on 7 February 1995. The New South Wales Parliament enacted its own almost identical version of the Act soon after. It received the Royal Assent on 19 June 1995. In 2001 Tasmania enacted uniform evidence legislation, as did Norfolk Island in 2004. After the enactment of the Commonwealth and New South Wales Acts, a number of amendments were made to both, largely of a technical nature and largely uniform to both Acts. However, in 1997, the New South Wales Parliament enacted the Evidence Amendment (Confidential Communications) Act 1997, which incorporated into Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) two new Divisions, Divs 1A and 1B. Similarly, in 2002, the New South Wales Parliament introduced amendments to the jury warning provisions, in relation to the evidence of children. No comparable provisions had been introduced into the Commonwealth Act and thus the uniformity earlier achieved has been diminished. In 2007 the Commonwealth did introduce, in the Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2007 (Cth), a Div 1A into Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). However, as the title to that amending Act indicated, the new Div 1A, while expressed in almost identical language to the NSW Division, applied only to confidential communications made to journalists. In that respect, the Division was much narrower in application than the NSW Act. The Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2011 significantly modified the Division but retained its limited application to confidential communications made to journalists. On 12 July 2004 the then Federal Attorney-General referred to the ALRC the topic of “the operation of the Evidence Act 1995”. Subsequently, the NSW Attorney-General gave a similar reference to the NSW Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) and the Victorian Attorney-General gave a reference to the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC), which included the topic of advising the Attorney-General “on the action required to facilitate the introduction of the Uniform Evidence Act into Victoria”. The three Commissions conducted a lengthy joint inquiry into the uniform evidence legislation, culminating in a joint report published in December 2005 entitled “Uniform Evidence Law” (hereafter referred to in this work as ALRC 102). The Report proposed substantial amendments to the Act and included draft amendments in an appendix. It noted © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

3

[EA.Intro.90]

Introduction

that, at the time of publication of the Report, the governments of Victoria, Western Australia and the Northern Territory had indicated their intention to enact the uniform Evidence Act.

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The resulting Model Uniform Evidence Bill was approved by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General in July 2007. In December 2007, the NSW Parliament enacted the Evidence Amendment Act 2007 (NSW). In very large part, the amendments reflected those proposed in ALRC 102. However, s 2 provided that the Act was only to commence on a day or days to be appointed by proclamation. In December 2008, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Evidence Amendment Act 2008 (Cth), which is substantially identical to the NSW amending legislation. Both amending Acts came into force at the beginning of 2009. These changes to the Act are summarised at [EA.Intro.180]. They brought the Commonwealth and NSW Acts close to uniformity, with the primary areas of difference relating to the scope of professional confidential relationship privilege in Div 1A of Pt 3.10 and the application of the privilege provisions in preliminary and ancillary proceedings (see [EA.Intro.210]). On 15 September 2008 the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) was enacted. It was almost identical to the Commonwealth and NSW Acts, notwithstanding some important differences (see [EA.Intro.210]). To give the Victorian Parliament time to repeal relevant parts of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) and to make other relevant amendments and transitional arrangements across the Victorian statute book (see, in particular, the Statute Law Amendment (Evidence Consequential Provisions) Act 2009), it did not come into force until 1 January 2010. However, there have been significant amendments, reducing the level of uniformity. In particular, in 2015 the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) was enacted, which deals comprehensively with warnings to juries in criminal proceedings. The warnings provisions in Pt 4.5 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) were amended so that they only apply in civil proceedings. In 2011, the ACT enacted the Evidence Act 2011 and it came into force on 1 March 2012, after the Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 was amended to delete its general application to ACT courts. The Northern Territory also enacted its own Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) and it came into force on 1 January 2013.

[EA.Intro.90] Outline of the Act The Act is divided into five Chapters, which are themselves divided into Parts and Divisions: Chapter 1 – Preliminary Part 1.1 Formal Matters Part 1.2 Application of this Act Chapter 2 – Adducing Evidence Part 2.1 Witnesses (containing divisions relating to competence and compellability, oaths and affirmations, examination-inchief, cross-examination and re-examination) Part 2.2 Documents Part 2.3 Other Evidence 4

Uniform Evidence Law

Introduction

[EA.Intro.90]

Chapter 3 – Admissibility of Evidence (containing Parts relating to the relevance rule, various exclusionary rules and discretions to exclude evidence) Chapter 4 – Proof Part 4.1 Standard of Proof Part 4.2 Judicial Notice Part 4.3 Facilitation of Proof Part 4.4 Corroboration Part 4.5 Warnings and Information Part 4.6 Ancillary Provisions Chapter 5 – Miscellaneous (including provisions on proof by affidavit, waiver of the rules of evidence and procedure for determining admissibility) This order is consistent with the intentions of the ALRC that the provisions should follow the order in which evidentiary issues ordinarily arise in a typical trial, from the moment that the first witness gets in the witness box to the determination of factual questions on the admissible evidence by the tribunal of fact (judge or jury) at the end of the trial.

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The bulk of the Act (Ch 3) is taken up with the rules relating to the admissibility of evidence. The ALRC explained the structure of this Chapter (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 510): In this part of the legislation, the rules that control the admissibility of items of evidence are set out. It is intended to be an exhaustive statement of the law. It follows what is, on the better view, the existing structure of the law. The rules will apply at each stage of a witness’ evidence — including cross-examination. The legislation commences with the basic rule on which the operation of this part of the Bill rests — all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided in the Bill. All irrelevant evidence is not admissible. There then follow provisions dealing with different types of evidence. In each case, there is a primary rule which operates to exclude evidence of that type and in each case exceptions to that exclusionary rule are set out. The categories of evidence dealt with are documents, hearsay evidence, opinion evidence, admissions, judgments and convictions, character and conduct, identification evidence, privileged communications, evidence included in the public interest — the disclosure of which may endanger State interests, evidence of statements made in settlement negotiations, and evidence of reasons for decision of judge or jury. Finally the legislation contains several discretions [including a “relevance discretion”] to exclude evidence.

To assist in applying the rules of admissibility, the Act includes a flow chart immediately preceding s 55. The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 510) how the rules should be applied in practice: As at present, the rules of admissibility are expressed in terms that relate to evidence and not the questions put to adduce the evidence. Objections relying on the rules of admissibility will be determined, as at present, in the light of the evidence that would be elicited by the question. It is assumed that in the absence of any provisions to the contrary the present approach to the application of the rules of admissibility will continue – ie, it will be for the parties to invoke the rules by objecting to the admission of evidence. As under existing law, the admissibility of a piece of evidence should be © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Introduction

determined by first asking whether it is relevant. If the answer to that question is in the negative it should be excluded. If the answer is in the affirmative, the party against whom it is led would then have to direct the court’s attention to one of the exclusionary rules set out in the legislation. The evidence, for example, may involve opinion and hearsay. It will be excluded unless it comes within one of the exceptions in each of the divisions dealing with such evidence. In cases where the relevance of evidence is tenuous, the courts will be able to exercise the discretion described above as the “relevance” discretion.

[EA.Intro.120]

An Evidence Code?

The Act is not a code of the law of evidence. A number of topics sometimes associated with the law of evidence are not dealt with. The ALRC stated (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 46) in ALRC 26 that: [T]he approach taken to the problem of definition has been to exclude: • Those topics which should be classified as part of the substantive law or which are so linked with the substantive law that they can only properly be considered in that context. These include legal and evidential burden of proof, parol evidence rule, res judicata, issue estoppel, presumptions. • Those topics of adjectival law which should be classified as procedural rather than evidentiary. The result of this distinction is the exclusion of rules such as those relating to the gathering of evidence (including evidence on commission), the perpetuation of testimony, who begins, notice of alibi evidence, no-case submissions and the standard of proof applicable.

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• Topics such as ordering witnesses out-of-court, bans on the publication of evidence, duties of the prosecution in calling of evidence, the powers of judges and parties to call witnesses and the suggestion that there should be changes in the operation of forensic scientific services.

As a result, the Act does not deal with the allocation of the burden of proof in respect of facts in issue, which the ALRC regarded as a matter of substantive law: see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 33. It took the same approach to the “evidential burden” (para 35), conclusive and persuasive presumptions (para 36), the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel, the parol evidence rule and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to assist in the interpretation of wills, deeds and other instruments (para 32). With the exception of provisions dealing with the drawing of inferences from documents and things in order to determine admissibility and a provision forbidding the drawing of an adverse inference from exercise of the right to silence, the Act does not deal with inferences (whether from evidence, or from the absence of evidence).2 Further, the Act is not a “code” in the technical sense since it does not, in general,3 affect the operation of other legislation (see s 8). Accordingly, to give the position in Victoria as an example, evidentiary provisions in the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (formerly titled the Evidence Act 1958) continue to operate. That Act, as substantially amended by the Statute Law Amendment (Evidence Consequential Provisions) Act 2009, contains the 2. Accordingly, the common law principle in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; 32 ALJR 395; 76 WN (NSW) 278; [1959] ALR 367 continues to apply: see ASC v AS Nominees Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504 at 516; Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39; 117 LGERA 168; [2001] FCA 1453 at [41]. 3. The qualification is in respect of the Commonwealth Act and inconsistent State and Territory legislation (see [EA.8.60]).

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Uniform Evidence Law

Introduction

[EA.Intro.120]

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operative Parts and Divisions dealing with such topics as “[t]he means of obtaining evidence”, “Witness Identity Protection”, “Use of Audio Visual and Audio Links”, “Proof of Documents, Proof of Facts by Documents and Document Unavailability”, and “Oaths Affirmations Affidavits Declarations”. While some of these provisions seem to have little or no work to do given the terms of the Evidence Act 2008 and may have been retained out of an excess of caution,4 to a very large extent the provisions of this Act complement the provisions of the Evidence Act 2008, not affecting the operation of the provisions of the latter Act. For example, the provisions in Part IIA, dealing with audio visual and audio links, complement the broad discretionary powers of a court regarding the adducing of evidence from a witness (see ss 11 and 26). Section 19C deals with “incriminating answers” before Royal Commissions but does not modify the operation of s 128 in this Act, since the latter provision only applies to a “Victorian court”, as defined (which does not include a Royal Commission). The same is true in respect of s 19D, which abrogates legal professional privilege before a Royal Commission. Part IV, dealing with “Oaths Affirmations Affidavits Declarations”, complements Division 2 in Part 2.1 of the Evidence Act 2008. Section 135, dealing with the admissibility of certified court transcripts, provides a useful complement of the broad provisions relating to documents and official records in the Evidence Act 2008. However, it should be noted that Division 2A of Part II of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958, creating a privilege in respect of a sexual offence confidential communication, has the effect that otherwise admissible (under the Evidence Act 2008) evidence relating to such communications may not be adduced and, if adduced, is not admissible (s 32C). Similarly, Part IIAA prevents a protected witness’s identity or address from being adduced. Further, Division 9 of Part III confers a broad discretion on a court “to make any ruling or order that the court considers necessary to ensure fairness to all parties to the proceeding” (s 89B(1)) where a party to a civil proceeding has rendered “unavailable” (as defined) a particular document by, for example, destroying it. That discretion, which does not exist in the Evidence Act 2008, extends to making an order that “certain evidence not be adduced” (s 89B(2)(c)) or that “the evidential burden of proof be reversed in relation to a fact in issue” (s 89B(2)(e)). As regards criminal proceedings, the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) contains a significant number of evidentiary provisions (particularly in Part 8.2 Witnesses, introduced by the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2009 (Vic)) which continue to operate, notwithstanding the Evidence Act 2008. Further, while most of the evidentiary provisions in the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) have been repealed (including s 398A dealing with the admissibility of “propensity evidence”), some have been retained.5 As regards the operation of common law (ie non-statutory) rules of evidence in the context of the Act , s 9(1) in the NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts provides: 4. For example, s 74, dealing with evidence of the contents of a will or codicil, appears superfluous, given that such evidence would plainly be admissible under the Evidence Act 2008. The provisions dealing with judicial notice of seals and signatures etc in Division 6 of Part III appear to add little or nothing to s 150 in the Evidence Act 2008. 5. See s 61 Jury warnings, s 404 Proof of marriage on trial for bigamy. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(1) This Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.

For example, it may be assumed that the provisions of the Act do not override “the underlying principle of the accusatorial and adversarial system that it is for the prosecution to put its case both fully and fairly before the jury, before the accused is called on to announce the course that will be followed at trial”.6 Nevertheless, to a significant extent, the Act “covers the field” in a number of areas. Most significantly, it appears that Ch 3 of the Act constitutes a code for the rules relating to the admissibility of evidence, in the sense that common law rules relating to the admissibility of evidence are abrogated. This conclusion flows primarily from the terms of s 56(1), described as the “pivotal provision” by NSW Supreme Court justice McLelland CJ in Eq,7 which provides:

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Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding.

If evidence is “relevant” in accordance with the very general definition in s 55, and not excluded by any provision in the Act, the effect of s 56(1) is that it “is admissible in the proceeding”. Any common law rule of admissibility which would render such evidence inadmissible would be inconsistent with the Act. Consequently, the effect of s 8 in the Commonwealth Act, and s 9 in the other UEL Acts, would be that such a common law rule would have no legal effect: see also below at [EA.8.60] and [EA.9.90]. Similarly, any evidence rendered inadmissible by the Act could not be saved by a common law rule to the contrary.8 While common law principles of admissibility may assist in determination of questions of relevance and discretionary exclusion, they are no longer binding legal rules. This analysis was adopted by the Full Court of the Federal Court in McNeill v The Queen (2008) 168 FCR 198; [2008] FCAFC 80, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Norfolk Island. Discussing Ch 3 of the Norfolk Island Evidence Act 2004, Black CJ, Lander and Besanko JJ stated at [60]–[62]: After the passing of the Norfolk Island Evidence Act the common law rules have no part to play in determining what evidence may be admitted at a trial. The pivotal section in the Norfolk Island Evidence Act is s 56 ... A court must first determine whether the evidence sought to be tendered is relevant. “Relevant evidence” is defined in s 55 of the Norfolk Island Evidence Act. If relevant, evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the Norfolk Island Evidence Act. It is to the Norfolk Island Evidence Act which a court must look to determine whether relevant evidence is admissible in a proceeding. Section 56 not only abrogates the common law rules of evidence, it provides that all relevant evidence will be admissible except as provided in 6. R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299; 196 ALR 421; [2003] HCA 13 at [27]; see [EA.43.210] and [EA.106.60]. 7. See Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 at 349B. 8. For example, s 102 provides that “credibility evidence” (defined in s 101A) about a witness is not admissible. That provision, which the Act describes as “the credibility rule”, is succeeded by three sections in Pt 3.7 containing detailed exceptions to the rule. The Victorian Court of Appeal held in BA v The Queen [2012] VSCA 285 that “Part 3.7 of the Act covers the field by establishing a general rule subject to a number of limited exceptions”, so that any common law rule permitting evidence as to the general reputation for veracity of a witness was ousted (Buchanan AJA at [21]–[25]).

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Introduction

[EA.Intro.120]

Chapter 3. It is clear that the Norfolk Island Evidence Act is intended to cover the field in relation to the admissibility of relevant evidence.

This conclusion reflects the weight of authority,9 notwithstanding the expression of contrary views in the past.10 The position should now be regarded as settled. As stated in ALRC 102 at para 2.9, “[s]tated simply, Chapter 3 of the uniform Evidence Acts governs admissibility issues”, although, of course, rules of admissibility in other legislation continue to apply. However, it is true that dissenting voices continue to be heard. In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21, Heydon J held that the common law “basis rule” (or “proof of assumption rule”), which requires “that the ‘facts’ and ‘assumptions’ [on which an opinion is based] … be proved before the [opinion] evidence was admissible” continues to survive under the Evidence Act (and particularly s 79). Heydon J stated at [110]: The respondent asked: “Does s 79 provide for the common law proof of assumption rule?” That was not the correct question. The correct question was: “Does s 79 abolish that rule?” The Act is far from being a complete code. It often deals with complex and

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9. See, for example, Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 at 349–350; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640; [2000] NSWSC 1077 at [28]; EI Dupont de Nemours & Co v Imperial Chemical Industries PLC (2002) 54 IPR 304; [2002] AIPC 91-788; [2002] FCA 230 at [46]. 10. Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulation (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 at 392F per Smart J; Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468; Abigroup Ltd v Akins (1997) 42 NSWLR 623 at 638–639 per Bainton J; WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Tsougranis (2002) 117 IR 203; [2002] NSWIRComm 282, Haylen J at [35]–[40] ; Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; 224 ALR 588; 56 ACSR 487; [2005] NSWCA 444, Basten JA at [106]–[123]; Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1995) 62 FCR 289; 31 ATR 445; 132 ALR 632 at 643–644 (ALR); O’Brien v Gillespie (1997) 41 NSWLR 549 at 557; R v Ung (2000) 112 A Crim R 344; 173 ALR 287; [2000] NSWCCA 195 at [53]; Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; 212 ALR 357; [2004] HCA 60; Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 558; [2002] NSWCA 237, Handley JA at [15]. In this regard, note should be made of the decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189. The court held (at [25]) that the “res gestae” principle stated by the High Court in O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566; [1946] ALR 535 had not been abolished by the Act. However, in reaching this conclusion, the court applied the test of McLelland CJ in Eq in Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 346. The court considered that evidence of events which form “an integral part of a connected series of events”, including an event in issue, will satisfy the test of relevance in s 55 and will not be excluded by other provisions in the Act (particularly s 97). The significance of the common law principle was to demonstrate how the evidence could be relevant in a non-tendency way (and thus avoid exclusion under s 97 or s 101). Accordingly, the court’s decision is not inconsistent with the view that Ch 3 is, in practical terms, a Code. In ALRC 102, it was noted at para 2.9 that “[r]eference to the common law can facilitate an understanding of underlying concepts and helps to identify the changes brought about by Chapter 3”. Other authorities indicate that, to the extent that the ““res gestae”” doctrine extends beyond elucidation of relevance, it does not survive: W v The Queen (2001) 115 FCR 41; 124 A Crim R 545; 189 ALR 633; [2001] FCA 1648 at [43], [97]; R v Fairbairn [2011] ACTSC 78; 212 A Crim R 32 at [100]. In Karam v The Queen [2015] VSCA 50, the Victorian Court of Appeal stated at [69] that “this doctrine has no application under the Evidence Act” and observed that “it has been replaced by the statutory [hearsay] exception under s 66(2)(b)” of the Act. In Schanker v The Queen [2018] VSCA 94, the Victorian Court of Appeal followed this authority at [48], observing at [49] that “the doctrine of res gestae is embodied, to varying degrees, in a number of the provisions” in Pt 3.2, particularly s 65(2)(b) and (c), s 66(2)(b) and s 66A. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Introduction

important subjects, like expert evidence, in very general words. Sometimes the Act changes the previous law. Sometimes it repeats it. At many points it assumes the continuance of the common law.

Heydon J gave the example11 of “the common law exception to the hearsay rule permitting experts to rely on the writings of others in the relevant area of expertise as a basis for their opinion” and observed that, while s 79 says nothing about that rule, nothing in s 79 has abolished it. However, this analysis is unpersuasive. The reason that experts are permitted to rely on “the writings of others” is that such material is relevant to the opinion expressed (and thus indirectly relevant to a fact in issue) and the hearsay rule in s 59 does not render the writings inadmissible (because the evidence of the writings is adduced for a reason other than “to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the [writer] intended to assert by the representation”: see [EA.59.180]). As regards the proposition that the proof of assumption rule at common law continues to apply under the Act, Heydon J was in dissent and this view should be considered as having been rejected by the other members of the High Court. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ referred to “the basis rule” at [41] as “a rule by which opinion evidence is to be excluded unless the factual bases upon which the opinion is proffered are established by other evidence” and then stated:

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Whether that rule formed part of the common law of evidence need not be examined. It may be accepted that the Law Reform Commission’s interim report on evidence denied the existence of such a common law rule and expressed the intention to refrain from including a basis rule in the legislation the Commission proposed and which was later enacted as the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).

It appears clear that the plurality accepted that s 79 (and the rest of Chapter 3) does not incorporate “the basis rule” and that, as a result, issues of this type are left, as intended by the ALRC, to the discretions in Pt 3.11. Putting that conclusion in different words, the failure to incorporate the common law basis rule in s 79 meant that it had been effectively abrogated by the Act. That is, that common law rule which would render such evidence inadmissible would be inconsistent with the Act and abrogated by s 56(1). Another dissenting voice may be noted. In Nguyen v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 4, Basten JA held that the “general law” relating to voice identification evidence applied to render it admissible in a trial. The other members of the Court did not directly address this issue but proceeded on the assumption that the Act was applicable.12 The reasoning of Basten JA appears to have been that the Act treats “identification evidence as falling outside the exclusionary opinion rule” in s 76 and the general law rules relating to voice identification evidence continue to apply because the exclusionary rules in the Act dealing with 11. It should also be noted that Heydon J at [111] referred to s 80, which expressly abolishes two common law rules, as support for the proposition that, unless expressly abolished, the common law rules of evidence continue to apply. The difficulty with this argument is that the ALRC made it clear in the Interim Report on Evidence at para 743 that the reason for s 80 was “to abolish [the rules], so as to make clear the stance of the draft legislation on the area and to preclude so far as possible re-emergence of the rule via the relevance discretions”. Thus, s 80 is not inconsistent with the proposition that Chapter 3 was intended to codify the rules of admissibility. 12. See RA Hulme J at [83]; Schmidt J at [102].

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Uniform Evidence Law

Introduction

[EA.Intro.120]

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identification evidence (s 114 and s 115) do not apply to voice identification evidence. This reasoning may be criticised on at least two bases. First, it is a fundamental error to assume that the different Parts in Ch 3 are mutually exclusive so that if evidence falls within the definition of “identification evidence” for the purposes of Pt 3.9, it cannot be “opinion evidence” for the purposes of Pt 3.3. As the High Court held in Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [19], the opinion rule in s 76 applies to hearsay evidence (evidence to which Pt 3.2 applies) of opinion. Equally, it would apply to “identification evidence” that falls within the scope of s 76. Second, the fact that s 114 and s 115 do not apply to voice identification evidence does not mean that the common law has application. Rather, the relevance test in s 55 applies and there is the possibility of discretionary exclusion under Pt 3.1113 as Basten JA acknowledged in a different part of his judgment.14 In those circumstances, a common law rule of “admissibility” would be inconsistent with the Act and abrogated by s 56(1). However, there is an interesting question whether s 56(1) distinguishes between inadmissibility rules and “powers to exclude” evidence. Putting the matter more precisely, do the words “is admissible” in s 56(1) mean “is to be admitted” or only “is admissible notwithstanding any common law inadmissibility rule to the contrary but may still be excluded pursuant to a common law power to exclude”? In Haddara v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 53; 241 A Crim R 93; [2014] VSCA 100, Redlich and Weinberg JJA (Priest JA dissenting) held that the common law discretion to exclude any evidence, whether confessional or real, on the ground that to receive it would be unfair to a criminal defendant (in the sense that the trial would be unfair) is not caught by the operation of s 56(1) and, accordingly, continues to apply in UEL jurisdictions. While the common law certainly distinguishes between admissibility rules and exclusionary discretions, it has to be said that it is very difficult to support such an approach in the context of Chapter 3. After all, that Chapter, with its heading “Admissibility of Evidence”, includes within it several provisions which enact not an “(in)admissibility rule” but a “discretion” to exclude evidence (for example, s 90, s 135, s 138). The diagram in the “Introductory Note” at the beginning of the Chapter includes at the bottom a reference to “discretion to exclude” and, if the answer to whether the discretion should be exercised is “no”, the evidence “is admissible”.15 While it is entirely understandable that Redlich and Weinberg JJA were keen to hold that the power of a court to exclude evidence where to receive it would be unfair to a criminal defendant had not been abrogated by the UEL, the fact is that there was a much simpler route to that conclusion than the one adopted. Section 11(2) provides that “the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected” by this Act (see [EA.11.90]). There can be no doubt 13. See R v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; 116 A Crim R 38; [2000] NSWCCA 357 (NSWCCA); R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6 at [34]; R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 at [92]. 14. Nguyen v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 4 at [17]–[18]. 15. Curiously, Redlich and Weinberg JJA at [64] referred to the “Introductory Note” to support their argument, but they made no reference to the diagram. Another interesting consideration that bears on this issue is a significant difference between s 56(1) and the provision proposed by the ALRC: cl 51, Appendix A, ALRC Report No 38, Evidence (AGPS 1987). The latter provision stated that “[e]vidence that is relevant in a proceeding is, except as otherwise provided by this Act, admissible, and shall be admitted …”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.Intro.150]

Introduction

that those powers would extend to exclusion of evidence on the basis that to receive it would be unfair to a criminal defendant (in the sense that the trial would be unfair). Nevertheless, this decision creates a limitation on the operation of s 56(1) in respect of common law discretions to exclude evidence, although the practical significance of that limitation may be doubted given that it is difficult to point to any common law discretions to exclude evidence other than the one applied in Haddara and those actually enacted in the UEL.16 A similar analysis to that adopted in respect of s 56 has led to the conclusion that s 12 indicates a clear legislative intention that the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) abrogate “the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to” the competence and compellability of witnesses.17 Similarly, in Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 78 ALJR 394; 204 ALR 258; [2004] HCA 6 Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Hayne and Heydon JJ observed at [17] that“there would appear to be no room for the operation of the common law doctrine of judicial notice, strictly so called, since the enactment” of s 144.18

[EA.Intro.150]

Differences from the common law

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The Act, as originally enacted, was not a restatement in statutory form of common law and existing statutory rules of evidence. Significant reforms were introduced. Some examples of changes to the then existing common law rules may be noted: • a witness attempting to refresh his or her memory in court does not necessarily have to use a document made when the events were “fresh in the memory”: s 32; • the rule in Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; [1937] HCA 44 (requiring the tender of documents the subject of a “call”) was abolished: s 35; • cross-examination of a party’s own witness is permissible if the witness gives “unfavourable” evidence (without the requirement of a finding that the witness is “hostile”): s 38; • a trial judge may disallow leading questions in cross-examination in appropriate circumstances: s 42; • the “original document” rule for proving the contents of documents was abolished, replaced by a more flexible system: Pt 2.2; • a “view” is to be treated as evidence: s 54; • the hearsay rule was substantially modified in both civil and criminal proceedings: Pt 3.2; • the “ultimate issue” and “common knowledge” rules in respect of opinion evidence were abolished: s 80; 16. In Haddara, Redlich and Weinberg JJA referred at [49] to the situation “where evidence may controvert an acquittal”, but the common law principles in that context are presumably an aspect of the powers of a court with respect to preventing an abuse of process (or perhaps part of the law “relating to res judicata or issue estoppel”: see s 93(c)). 17. See R v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465; [2000] NSWCCA 83 at [39]–[54]. 18. See also Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (2013) 84 NSWLR 697; [2013] NSWCA 145 at [102], [223].

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Uniform Evidence Law

Introduction

[EA.Intro.150]

• “tendency and coincidence” evidence (perhaps better known as “propensity” and “similar fact” evidence) is inadmissible unless prior notice is given and the evidence has “significant probative value”: Pt 3.6; • cross-examination regarding a matter relevant only to the credibility of a witness was only permissible if it had “substantial probative value”: s 103; • the “finality rule” for cross-examination on collateral matters was significantly qualified: s 106 (although the common law itself moved further in this regard in recent years); • the sole purpose test for legal professional privilege (“client legal privilege”) was replaced by a dominant purpose test: ss 118, 119 (which reform has since been adopted by the common law); • a “professional confidential relationship privilege” was created in NSW: Div 1A of Pt 3.10 of the New South Wales Act only; • a witness may be forced “in the interests of justice” to answer questions notwithstanding the privilege against self-incrimination; if so required, the witness is given a certificate providing both use and indirect use immunity: s 128;

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• a court may refuse to admit any evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party; misleading or confusing; or cause or result in undue waste of time (referred to by the ALRC as the “relevance discretion”): s 135; • a court may limit the use to be made of evidence if there is a danger that a particular use of the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party or be misleading or confusing: s 136; • “improperly or illegally obtained evidence” is “not to be admitted” unless the party seeking its admission persuades the court that the balance of “desirability” supports admission: s 138; • the admission of computer produced evidence is facilitated: ss 146, 147; • various procedural safeguards were introduced (including a “request” system): Div 1 of Pt 4.6. There were also important changes specific to criminal proceedings. Some examples are: • the trial judge might permit the spouse, child or parent of the defendant to choose not to testify: s 18, subject to s 19; • the trial judge might comment on a failure of the defendant to give evidence (but the comment “must not suggest that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that he or she was, guilty of the offence concerned”): s 20; • the “voluntariness” rule of admissibility for confessions was abolished, replaced by provisions which focus on extreme misconduct: s 84; reliability: s 85; fairness: s 90; and “improperly or illegally obtained evidence”: s 138; © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.Intro.180]

Introduction

• “tendency and coincidence” evidence (perhaps better known as “propensity” and “similar fact” evidence) is admissible against a criminal defendant if “the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant” (rather than application of the “Pfennig test”): s 101; • where a defendant adduces evidence of good character in a “particular respect”, the prosecution may only rebut with evidence of bad character in that respect: s 110; • legal professional privilege (“client legal privilege”) in respect of particular evidence is lost where the evidence is adduced by a defendant in criminal proceedings: s 123; • a “sexual assault communications privilege” was created in NSW: Div 1B of Pt 3.10 of the New South Wales Act only; • identification evidence is not admissible unless an identification parade was held (with various exceptions, including where it was reasonable not to have held such a parade): ss 113 – 115; • “corroboration” requirements are abolished, replaced by a warning procedure for “evidence of a kind that may be unreliable”: ss 164 and 165.

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[EA.Intro.180]

Amendments implementing ALRC 102

As noted above, in 2007 the NSW Parliament enacted the Evidence Amendment Act 2007 and in 2008 the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Evidence Amendment Act 2008. In very large part, the amendments reflected those proposed in ALRC 102. In addition, the more recent UEL Acts incorporate the same changes to the original uniform legislation. The most important of the changes made to the Commonwealth and NSW Acts (and which form part of the other UEL Acts) may be summarised as follows: • Competence to give evidence (s 13(1)). A witness is no longer required to be “capable of giving a rational reply to a question about a fact”; it is sufficient that the witness has “the capacity to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact”. • Competence to give unsworn evidence (s 13(5)). A court is no longer required to be satisfied that the witness “understands the difference between the truth and a lie”. All that is necessary is that the requirements of s 13(1) in relation to general competence are satisfied and “the court has told the person” a number of specific things (including “that it is important to tell the truth”). • De facto partner (ss 18, 20). The term “de facto spouse” in s 18 (“Compellability of spouses and other in criminal proceedings”) and s 20 (“Comment on failure to give evidence”) is replaced by the term “de facto partner”, which is defined in the Dictionary to the Act. • Evidence in narrative form (s 29(2)). A court may on its own motion (without any application of the party that called the witness) direct that a witness give evidence wholly or partly in narrative form. • Improper questions (s 41). In the Commonwealth, NSW, Tasmania and the ACT, the provision has been made mandatory and the categories of improper questions have been expanded. The provision in Victoria and 14

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the Northern Territory adopts a generally discretionary approach but creates special protections for “vulnerable witnesses”. • Proof of voluminous or complex documents (s 50). The requirement that an application to adduce evidence of the contents of documents in the form of a summary must be made prior to hearing has been deleted. • Definition of hearsay evidence (s 59). Prior to the amendments to s 59, evidence of a previous representation made by a person was only classified as hearsay if the person making the representation intended to assert a fact that was implied in the representation. Now the question is whether “it can reasonably be supposed that” the person intended to assert that fact. • Evidence admitted for a non-hearsay use (s 60). In response to the decision of the High Court in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60, s 60 has been amended to make it clear that the hearsay rule does not apply to such evidence, regardless of whether it is first-hand or more remote hearsay (with the sole exception in criminal proceedings of evidence of an admission).

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• First-hand hearsay in civil proceedings where the person who made the representation “has been or is to be called to give evidence” (s 64(3)). The hearsay rule does not apply to such evidence, with the deletion of the requirement that the occurrence of the asserted fact “was fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation”. • First-hand hearsay in criminal proceedings where the person who made the representation is not available to give evidence (s 65). For statements “against interest” (s 65(2)(d)) there is now an additional requirement that the previous representation had to be “made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable”. • First-hand hearsay in criminal proceedings where the person who made the representation has been or will be called as a witness (s 66). In response to the decision of the High Court in Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438; [1998] HCA 1, s 66(2A) has been introduced to make clear that the quality of “freshness” (in respect of the test “fresh in the memory” in s 66(2)) will not be confined to the time which elapses between the occurrence of the relevant event and the making of a representation about the event. • Contemporaneous representations about health, etc (s 66A). The hearsay exception for evidence of a previous representation that was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind, that was formerly applicable to both first-hand and more remote hearsay (s 72, prior to the amendments), is now only applicable to first-hand hearsay. • Hearsay exception for “electronic communications” (s 71). This provision was amended to replace the words “a document recording a message that has been transmitted by electronic mail or by a fax, telegram, lettergram or telex” with the words “an electronic communication”, as defined in s 5 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• Hearsay exception for Aboriginal “traditional laws and customs” (s 72). A discrete hearsay exception is created for this evidence, as defined in the Dictionary to the Act. • Opinion exception for Aboriginal “traditional laws and customs” (s 78A). A discrete exception is created to the opinion rule in s 76 for this evidence, as defined in the Dictionary to the Act. • Opinion evidence of child development and child behaviour (s 79(2)). This provision “clarifies” that such evidence will not be excluded by the opinion rule in s 76. • Reliability of admissions by defendants in criminal proceedings (s 85). In response to the decision of the High Court in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; 78 ALJR 538; [2004] HCA 12, which interpreted the term “official questioning” narrowly, this provision now applies where an admission was “made … to, or in the presence of, an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence” (s 85(1)(a)). • Evidence of silence (s 89). A reference to silence “in the course of official questioning” has been replaced by a reference to silence in response to “an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence”. • The tendency rule (s 97). The provision has been amended to make it clear that the onus is on the party seeking to have the evidence ruled admissible to persuade the court that “reasonable notice” has been given and that the evidence “will” have “significant probative value”. • The coincidence rule (s 98). The provision has been amended to make it clear that evidence of events that the court concludes were not similar or the circumstances in which they occurred were not similar is still caught by the provision and must comply with its requirements in order to be admissible. In addition, it is made clear that the onus is on the party seeking to have the evidence ruled admissible to persuade the court that “reasonable notice” has been given and that the evidence “will” have “significant probative value”. • Credibility evidence (s 101A). In response to the decision of the High Court in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57, which interpreted the “credibility rule” in s 102 in a very literal manner, s 101A is introduced. It defines “credibility evidence” to include evidence that is relevant because it affects the assessment of the credibility of a witness or person and is also relevant for some other purpose for which it is not admissible. • Credibility evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness (s 103). The test in s 103 of “substantial probative value” is replaced by a test of “could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness”. • Cross-examination of an accused as to credit (s 104). This provision has been amended to avoid confusing overlap with the character evidence provisions. 16

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• Rebutting a denial in cross-examination as to credibility (s 106). This provision now applies not only to a “denial” but also where the witness “did not admit or agree to” the substance of the evidence. Further, such rebuttal may be permitted “if the court gives leave” under s 106(1)(b). There is no longer a requirement for the rebuttal evidence to fit into one of the listed categories in s 106 (those categories are now simply circumstances in which leave is not required – s 106(2)). • Credibility evidence in respect of a person who is not a witness but who made an out-of-court representation that has been admitted into evidence (s 108A). This provision permits such evidence if “the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the person’s credibility”. Section 108B imposes further restrictions on admission of such evidence where the person who made the representation is a defendant in criminal proceedings (who does not testify). • Expert credibility evidence (s 108C). This provision creates an exception to the credibility rule for expert evidence concerning the credibility of a witness. Section 108C is intended to “clarify that evidence can be led under the section in relation to the development and behaviour of children generally and the development and behaviour of victims of child sexual assault”.

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• Legal advice privilege (s 118). The provision has been amended to ensure that privilege attaches to any confidential document prepared for the dominant purpose of legal advice being provided – not just a document prepared by the client or the lawyer. • Loss of client legal privilege: consent and related matters (s 122). The provision has been amended to adopt the common law test of whether the client or party has “acted in a way that is inconsistent with” the maintenance of the privilege. The prior statutory tests of “the client or party knowingly and voluntarily disclosed the substance of the evidence” and “the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party” have become circumstances in which the broader test “is taken to” be satisfied. • Privilege in respect of self-incrimination (s 128). The NSW provision has been amended to ensure that the protection of a certificate extends not only to a proceeding in a NSW court (which includes a person or body that is required to apply the laws of evidence) but also to any proceeding before any person or body “authorised by a law of this State, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence”. A new provision also makes it clear that the protection is maintained even if the granting of the certificate was in error: s 128(8). • Privilege in respect of self-incrimination – application to disclosure orders (s 128A). This new provision creates a mechanism whereby privilege against self-incrimination claims may be determined in respect of information ordered by a court in a civil proceeding to be disclosed in connection with a freezing or search order (or, in NSW, other order under Pt 25 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Introduction

• Privilege in preliminary court proceedings (s 131A). This provision extends the application of the privileges in Pt 3.10 (other than the provisions of ss 123 and 128) to pre-trial stages of civil and criminal proceedings. • Electronic communications (s 161). The provision creating presumptions regarding “telexes” has now been amended to refer to an “electronic communication”, defined in the Dictionary to the Act to have the same meaning as it has in the Electronic Transactions Act 2000. • Jury warning in respect of oral evidence of questioning by an investigating official of a defendant (s 165(1)(f)). In response to the decision of the High Court in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; 78 ALJR 538; [2004] HCA 12, which interpreted the term “official questioning” narrowly, this provision now applies to “questioning by an investigating official”.

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• Jury warning in respect of children’s evidence (s 165A). The terms of ss 165A and 165A have been combined into one provision. One substantive change is that the new provision has been drafted to expressly prohibit the giving of a warning about unreliability “solely on account of the age of the child”. • Jury warning in respect of delay in prosecution (s 165B). This provision (which has some differences between the jurisdictions) imposes significant limitations on a jury warning in respect of forensic disadvantages that may have arisen from delay in prosecution. The warning can only be given where the court “is satisfied that the defendant has suffered a significant forensic disadvantage because of the consequences of delay”. “Significant forensic disadvantage” is not to be regarded as being established “by the mere existence of a delay”. Where a jury warning is to be given, the judge “must not in any way suggest to the jury that it would be dangerous or unsafe to convict the defendant solely because of the delay or the forensic disadvantage suffered because of the consequences of the delay”. • Formal admissions and consents (s 184). The requirement that the defendant in a criminal proceeding have been “advised … by his or her lawyer” to make a particular admission regarding a matter of fact, or to give any consent, is no longer essential. It will be sufficient if “the court is satisfied that the defendant understands the consequences of making the admission or giving the consent”. • Advance rulings and findings (s 192A). In response to the decision of the High Court in TKWJ v The Queen (2002) 212 CLR 124; 133 A Crim R 574; [2002] HCA 46, this new provision permits a court to give advance rulings and findings in relation to evidence (ie before the evidence is adduced in the proceeding).

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Differences between the Acts

The Evidence Acts in the Commonwealth, NSW, Victoria, the ACT and the Northern Territory are almost identical, justifying the title of this work – Uniform Evidence Law. However, there are some important differences: 18

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• Improper questions (s 41). The Commonwealth/NSW/ACT general provision in s 41(1) is mandatory (“must disallow a question put to a witness in cross-examination, or inform the witness that it need not be answered”), in contrast with the comparable Victorian/Northern Territory provision (“may disallow …”). However, the Victorian/Northern Territory provision creates a special category of improper questioning of a “vulnerable witness” (defined in s 41(4)) where the court “must” act “unless the court is satisfied that … it is necessary for the question to be put” (s 41(2)). The Commonwealth/NSW/ACT provision deals only with an improper “question” while the Victorian/Northern Territory provision also deals with “improper questioning” (defined in s 41(3) to mean “a sequence of questions”). The Commonwealth/NSW/ACT provision defines an improper question in terms of the court’s “opinion” that it falls into a specified category (and requires the court to take into account the matters specified in s 41(2) in forming that opinion), while the Victorian/Northern Territory provision defines “an improper question or improper questioning” simply in terms of those categories. • Professional confidential relationship privilege (Div 1A of Pt 3.10). The NSW Act permits a court to “direct that evidence not be adduced in a proceeding if the court finds that adducing it would disclose a protected confidence” or related information. “Protected confidence” is defined to mean a communication made by a person in confidence to another person who was acting in a professional capacity and under an express or implied obligation not to disclose the confidence (for example, doctor/patient; nurse/patient; psychologist/client; therapist/client; counsellor/client; social worker/client; accountant/client; private investigator/client; journalist/source). The court is required to balance the nature and extent of the harm that would or might be caused to a protected confider if the evidence is adduced against the desirability of the evidence being given. The Victorian/ACT/Northern Territory Acts contain no such “privilege”, while the Commonwealth Act defines “protected confidence” in a way that limits the scope of the privilege to communications to journalists (and requires the court to “take into account, and give the greatest weight to, any risk of prejudice to national security”). • Sexual assault communications privilege. This Division was first incorporated in the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) by the Evidence Amendment (Confidential Communications) Act 1997 (NSW). No comparable Division is included in the other UEL Acts. In 1999, the Division was substantially amended by removing the substantive provisions and incorporating them in Pt 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). Similar substantive provisions to those in the NSW Criminal Procedure Act 1986 are found in Div 2 of Pt II of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic). • Privilege in respect of self-incrimination – application to disclosure orders (s 128A). This provision creates a mechanism whereby privilege against self-incrimination claims may be determined in respect of information ordered by a court in a civil proceeding to be disclosed in connection with a freezing or search order. The NSW provision extends © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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•

•

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•

•

Introduction

the application of the provision to any “other order under Pt 25 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005”. Privilege in preliminary court proceedings (s 131A). This provision in the NSW/Victorian/ACT/Northern Territory Acts extends the application of the privileges in Pt 3.10 (other than the provisions of s 123 and s 128) to pre-trial stages of civil and criminal proceedings (“a process or order of a court that requires the disclosure of information or a document”). In Victoria, and possibly NSW/ACT/Northern Territory, it extends to search warrants. The Commonwealth provision is much more limited, only extending the application of the “privilege” in relation to confidential communications made to journalists (Div 1A of Pt 3.10) to pre-trial stages of civil and criminal proceedings (but not to investigatory and other non-curial processes such as search warrants or notices to produce issued by investigatory agencies). Jury warnings generally (Pt 4.5). In 2015, the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) was enacted, which deals comprehensively with warnings to juries in criminal proceedings. The warning provisions in Pt 4.5 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) were amended so that they only apply in civil proceedings. Jury warnings in respect of delay in prosecution (s 165B). In s 165B(2) of the Commonwealth/ACT/Northern Territory Acts, application for the giving of a warning to the jury must be made by “the defendant”, while under the comparable NSW provision it may be made by “a party” (which would include the prosecutor). The NSW/Northern Territory provision, unlike the other UEL Acts (except for Victoria), expressly provides that a “significant forensic disadvantage” includes “the fact that any potential witnesses have died or are not able to be located” and “the fact that any potential evidence has been lost or is otherwise unavailable” (s 165(7)). Definition of person who is “not available to give evidence about a fact”. The NSW, Victorian and Northern Territory Acts provide in cl 4(1) of Part 2 of the Dictionary that, as well as the other circumstances specified in the Commonwealth/ACT Acts, a person is not available to give evidence about a fact if “the person is mentally or physically unable to give the evidence and it is not reasonably practicable to overcome that inability”.

There are also less important differences that should be noted. In the Victorian Act, the defendant in criminal proceedings is referred to as “the accused”.19 There are also necessary differences arising from occasional reference to particular courts and provisions. In particular, there are differences in the terms of the Preliminary provisions in Chapter 1 of the Act. Finally, the Tasmanian Act has a large number of significant differences from the other UEL Acts. There are significant omissions (for example, the Tasmanian Act 19. Curiously, this particular move away from uniformity was not carried through comprehensively. The definition of “admission” in the Dictionary refers to “a defendant in criminal proceedings”. There has also been a failure to ensure that all the statutory Notes in the Act reflect this change in terminology. For example, the Note to s 17 states that “Associated defendant is defined in the Dictionary” when, in fact, the term “associated accused” is defined in the Dictionary to the Act.

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does not include ss 113–115) and there are a number of provisions that are unique to Tasmania (for example, s 127A). Some provisions are similar to other comparable UEL provisions but incorporate significant changes (for example, s 164(4)).

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Policy framework

Given the wide application of the Act and the fact that it constitutes a major reform of the law of evidence, interpretation of individual provisions should occur in the context of the policy framework on which it is built: see s 3 in the NSW Act, s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and s 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic). The Act substantially follows the ALRC proposals and those proposals were based on the policy framework summarised by the ALRC in its ALRC 38 Report. That policy framework has not been changed or qualified by ALRC 102 or the amendments following on that Report. A clear distinction was drawn by the ALRC between civil and criminal trials (ALRC 38, para 34):

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• Fact-finding. Although a civil trial is not a “search for truth” it is nonetheless of critical importance that the courts make a genuine attempt to find the facts. If this is not done, the system will be seen to be at best arbitrary and at worst biased and will lose the confidence and respect of the community. Any limitation on the attempt to find the facts requires justification. • Procedural fairness. The parties must be given, and feel they have had, a fair hearing. This will depend in part on the extent to which they have been able to present their case – “litigant prevented from supporting his case … is bound to feel dissatisfied”. It will also depend upon the extent to which they have been able to challenge and meet the case presented against them. Again, limits require justification. This need has been recognised by the law in its development of the concept of natural justice. It requires that a person is entitled to be given a proper hearing before a determination is made affecting his or her rights. The fairness of the proceeding will also depend on the conduct of the judicial officer – the more arbitrary or subjective it appears to be, the less acceptable to all concerned. It is also important that there be the appearance and, if possible, the reality of control by law rather than judicial whim. Detailed rules of evidence lend to the trial the appearance of proceedings controlled by the law, not by the individual trial judge’s discretion, and reduce the scope for subjective decisions. • Expedition and cost. The parties and the community will judge the civil trial system in part by considering its efficiency. Any rules or proposals must be evaluated in the light of their effect on the time and cost of the trial. • Quality of rules. To the extent that the system operates under rules, the more anomalous, technical, rigid, and obscure the rules seem, the more the system’s acceptability is lessened. The parties in a case can meet the situation by agreeing to ignore or waive the more unsatisfactory rules, as widely happens in the conduct of trials at present, particularly civil trials. This, however, only results in the rules lying in wait for the unwary and the party who does not have legal representation. Any rules or proposals that are complicated, difficult to understand or apply, produce anomalies, lack flexibility where this is needed or are very technical, require justification.

In respect of the criminal trial, the ALRC expressed the view that, like the civil trial, it involves an attempt to establish the facts, and its credibility depends substantially on that attempt being a genuine one. It considered that its credibility © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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also depended on procedural fairness, efficiency and the quality of particular rules. Nevertheless, the ALRC asserted that the nature and purpose of the criminal trial differ significantly from those of civil trials – the accusatorial model requires that the prosecution prove guilt without the accused being obliged to assist and is designed to accord the accused certain procedural advantages over the prosecution. These advantages flow ultimately from the public interest in minimising the risk of convicting an innocent person.20 The ALRC made the following points (ALRC 38, para 35): • Accusatorial system. A criminal trial is not directed to resolving a dispute between parties. Although the Crown makes allegations and these are disputed by the accused, the trial is accusatorial and the accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty and is under no obligation to assist. • Minimising the risk of wrongful convictions. The criminal trial traditionally has been seen to reflect the view that it is in the interest of the community that the risk of conviction of the innocent be minimised even if this may result in the acquittal from time to time of the guilty.

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• Definition of central question. The central question in a criminal trial is whether the Crown has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The purpose of the criminal trial is not “to find out if the accused is guilty”. The primary and specific object of the system is to be able to say with confidence: that if there is a verdict of guilty there can be no doubt that the accused did what was charged with the requisite mens rea. • Recognition of rights of the individual. The convictions of “guilty” persons are not to be pursued and obtained at virtually any cost. The conviction of the guilty is important … but … accused persons are entitled to the benefits of certain rights and protections as a matter of recognition of their personal dignity and integrity, and also, on a far broader scale, as a measure of the overall fairness of the society to the individuals within it. • Assisting adversary contest. It is also important to arm an accused person with some protections to give credibility, if not substance, to the idea of the adversary system as a genuine contest.

Notwithstanding the argument sometimes advanced that the rules of evidence developed largely to keep from juries evidence which may be misused or misestimated by them, the ALRC was generally unwilling to draw any significant distinction between jury trials and trials with a judge sitting alone. It concluded that, on the available evidence, it should not be assumed that there is necessarily such a difference between the abilities of judicial officers and jurors that different rules of evidence should be applied to them.

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The significance of pre-existing law

In Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 the Victorian Court of Appeal considered the operation of s 137 of the Act and observed at [164]: 20. The ALRC considered (ALRC 38, para 35) that this public interest derived from a variety of factors, including the seriousness of the matters involved, the fallibility of any system dependent on human perception and memory, and the imbalance of resources that generally exists in favour of the prosecution.

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It is presumed that a statute is not intended (in the absence of express words) to alter common law doctrines. A strict reading and careful scrutiny of the language of the Act is therefore necessary, in order to determine whether it was the will of the legislature to remove or encroach upon those doctrines.

However, care must be taken with this passage. The authorities relied upon to support it were largely concerned with legislative infringement of “fundamental” or “basic” common law rights and freedoms and it would be too broad to suggest that “common law doctrine” extends to any aspect of the common law rules of evidence. Given that the Act constitutes a major reform of the law of evidence, not a mere restatement in statutory form of common law and earlier statutory rules of evidence, care must be taken in interpreting its provisions in the context of pre-existing law. In Towney v Minister for Land & Water Conservation (NSW) (1997) 76 FCR 401 Sackville J in the Federal Court observed: The task of [a] Court is to apply the statutory language used by Parliament, and not to substitute a different test merely because it reflects the pre-existing law.

As Gleeson CJ and Hayne J have pointed out in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274 at [10] (see also [38]–[40] and [66]), a High Court decision on evidence of “complaint” in sexual offence prosecutions:

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It is the language of the statute which now determines the manner in which evidence of the kind presently in question is to be treated.

In relation to that particular language, the High Court rejected an argument that its meaning and effect should be determined in the light of, and in conformity with, the pre-existing common law. Similarly, in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (Heydon J dissenting) disregarded common law authority on the existence of a “basis rule” relating to the admissibility of opinion evidence, observing at [37] that “one basic proposition” should be “at the forefront of consideration”: The admissibility of opinion evidence is to be determined by application of the requirements of the Evidence Act rather than by any attempt to parse and analyse particular statements in decided cases divorced from the context in which those statements were made.

More recently, and subsequent to the judgment of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Dupas, the High Court emphasised again that “the statute’s language is the primary source, not the pre-existing common law” (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ in IMM v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 at [35]). Indeed, the holding of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Dupas (that judicial assessment of “probative value” for the purposes of s 137 permitted an assessment of the “reliability” of evidence) was held to derive from a view of the common law but not to have any foundation “in textual considerations of the Evidence Act” (at [54]). Of course, in particular contexts the position before enactment of the Act may provide assistance in interpreting the Act. A good example of this is the majority judgment of the High Court in Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; 81 ALJR 840; [2007] HCA 12. In interpreting s 128(8) of the Act (as it existed prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102), Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ emphasised that the interpretation advanced © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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by the accused would involve a radical change to “the long established and widespread statutory regime” that existed prior to the Act. They stated (at [72]): [T]he Commission was normally careful to indicate when it thought that its proposals would change the law significantly and, when it did so, it habitually strove to give very full justifications for making changes of that kind. The likelihood of this practice being followed would have been extremely high in relation to any intention to change the long established and widespread statutory regime to be found in the equivalents to s 1(e) of the 1898 Act, which itself had a long and controversial background of which the Commission is likely to have been aware. If the accused’s construction of s 128(8) were sound, its substitution for any provision equivalent to s 1(e) would have changed the law significantly. The absence of any justificatory material of this kind in the ALRC Reports – or in the Report of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission in 1988, or in the Second Reading Speeches – tells powerfully against the accused’s construction.

Similarly, in interpreting s 128(7), the majority judgment gave considerable significance to the “traditional” position. Chief Justice Gleeson, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ stated at [88]: [E]vidence which traditionally the parties have been at liberty to tender [in a retrial] is evidence of admissions made at the first trial. To construe a statutory provision as negating that traditional possibility would require the identification of clear words to that effect. There are no clear words to that effect in s 128(7).

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Given that there was “nothing in ALRC 26, ALRC 38 or NSWLRC 56 which would support” a conclusion that it was intended to overturn the traditional position, it was concluded that it had not been. Equally, other provisions in Ch 3 are drafted in a way that makes it clear that pre-existing law will assist in informing the content and operation of the provision.21 Nevertheless, as McHugh J pointed out in Papakosmas (at [88]): The Act has made substantial changes to the law of evidence. Notwithstanding s 9, reference to pre-existing common law concepts will often be unhelpful.

As Barr and Hall JJ observed in Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [289]: The Evidence Act reveals a tendency to relax restrictive rules, no doubt based on the proposition that juries (and judges) are better able to assess the weight which should be given to evidence, than was assumed in the past to be the case.

Further, the discretions to exclude evidence in Pt 3.10 must not be used to subvert the intention of the legislature.22 McHugh J explained: Sections 135, 136 and 137 contain powers which are to be applied on a case by case basis because of considerations peculiar to the evidence in the particular case. It may be proper for appellate courts to develop guidelines for exercising the powers conferred by these sections so that certain classes of evidence are usually excluded or limited. But those sections confer no authority to emasculate provisions in the Act to make them conform with common law notions of relevance or admissibility.23 21. A good example is s 130: see Ku-ring-gai Council v West [2017] NSWCA 54, Basten JA at [85]. 22. See Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274 at [10], [38]–[40], [66], [96]–[97]) 23. Papakosmas at [97]. See also Director of Public Prosecutions v BB (2010) 29 VR 110; 204 A Crim R 85; [2010] VSCA 211 at [21].

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The significance of authority in other jurisdictions

Authority on the construction of identical (or very similar) provisions in other jurisdictions should be regarded as very persuasive and, unless plainly wrong, should be followed.24 However, clearly enough, this approach would not be applicable where there are conflicting approaches between intermediate appellate authorities in different jurisdictions (see, for example, the commentary on s 137). Further, particular care should be taken in respect of authorities which interpreted provisions in other jurisdictions that were subsequently amended following on ALRC 102 and accordingly were not, at the relevant time, uniform with the comparable provision under consideration.

[EA.Intro.330]

Current issues arising under uniform evidence law

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Notwithstanding the significant amendments made following ALRC 102, many important issues arising under the uniform evidence law remain. A few may be mentioned: • Evidence “in narrative form”. The practicality of a witness being permitted to give evidence in narrative form remains questionable, except where the witness is an expert witness (see [EA.29.90]). • Refreshing memory of a witness. The availability in UEL jurisdictions of the common law procedure whereby a witness is permitted to stop testifying and attempt to refresh his or her memory from a previous statement (that was not made when the events recounted were “fresh in his or her memory”), before continuing to testify without the benefit of the statement, is unresolved (see [EA.32.360]). • Unfavourable witnesses. Questions remain regarding the appropriateness of permitting the Crown to call a witness expected to give unfavourable evidence (which the Crown regards as unreliable) in order to have admitted a favourable previous representation by that witness (see [EA.38.30]–[EA.38.270]). The way in which s 38, the (amended) credibility provisions in Pt 3.7, the leave requirement in s 192 and the “discretion” in s 137 should interact is yet to be finally resolved. • Circumstantial evidence and the requirement of relevance. The question arises whether circumstantial evidence should be regarded as “not relevant”, and thus inadmissible, if the tribunal of fact could not rationally regard the inference sought to be drawn to a fact in issue as more probable than other available inferences (see [EA.55.330]). 24. ASC v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 at 492. See also Macquarie Bank Ltd v Fociri Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 203 at 217; R v JS (2007) 175 A Crim R 108; [2007] NSWCCA 272 at [87]; Melville Homes Pty Ltd v Prime Ceramics Services Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 211 at 213; Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Kilpatrick Green Pty Ltd [1992] 2 VR 505 at 510; Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 at [222]–[228]; R v XY (2103) 84 NSWLR 363; 231 A Crim R 474; [2013] NSWCCA 121 at [23]–[40]. In R v Darmody (2010) 25 VR 209; 213 A Crim R 79; [2010] VSCA 41 the proper approach was articulated slightly differently at [26] as a trial judge being bound to follow the decision of an intermediate appellate court in another jurisdiction where “there is no reason to doubt the reasoning there applied”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.Intro.330]

Introduction

• Authentication and the requirement of relevance. The application of the provisional relevance provision (s 57) to the question of authentication of documents and things remains controversial (see [EA.57.120]). • Failure of Crown to call a particular witness. There is authority, which may be doubted, that a Jones v Dunkel direction should never be given against the Crown (see [EA.55.180]). • Hearsay exceptions. The scope of the “shortly after the asserted fact occurred” (see [EA.65.150]) and the fresh in the memory (see [EA.66.180]) first-hand hearsay exception in criminal proceedings remains uncertain. • Lay opinion evidence. The practical application of the requirement that the evidence “is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the witness’s perception of the matter or event” continues to cause difficulty (see [EA.78.60]). • Expert opinion evidence. A number of important issues arise. Is expert opinion only admissible where the opinion (or, at least, the field of knowledge from where it comes) is shown to be reliable (see [EA.79.120]–[EA.79.180])? If there is such a requirement, what precisely has to be established for scientific evidence to be regarded as reliable? To what extent is the summary of the law provided by Heydon JA, as he then was, in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 good law in UEL jurisdictions (see [EA.79.240])?

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• Admissions. Is there an obligation on the party seeking exclusion of an admission under s 84 to establish that there was “violent” or similar conduct (or the threat of such conduct) (see [EA.84.120])? Is the test in s 85 which requires determining whether it is “unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected” subjective or objective (see [EA.85.210])? How does that test apply to conduct relied upon to infer “consciousness of guilt”? How does the UEL respond to law enforcement trickery used to obtain admissions (see [EA.90.60] – [EA.90.150])? • Wholly exculpatory previous representations by a criminal defendant. Are such statements generally admissible when adduced by the defence (see [EA.81.270])? • Tendency and coincidence evidence. What are the precise parameters of the test of admissibility in s 101 (see [EA.101.180])? • Identification evidence. When may it be concluded that a suspect has “refused to take part in an identification parade” so that picture identification may be utilised (see [EA.115.180])? • Client legal privilege. What are the precise parameters of the “dominant purpose” test (see [EA.118.390])? What precisely does it mean to act “in a way that is inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing” of evidence (see [EA.122.120])? • Professional confidential relationship privilege. As noted at [EA.Intro.210], the NSW Act extends the “privilege” (better understood as a “judicial discretion”) to a confidential communication made to a 26

Uniform Evidence Law

Introduction

[EA.Intro.340]

person “acting in a professional capacity” while the Victorian Act contains no such “privilege” and the Commonwealth Act limits it to communications to journalists (see [EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1A.30]–[EA.126E.30]). Given the policy considerations supporting the NSW provision, should it be adopted uniformly? • Privilege in respect of self-incrimination. When may it be said that a witness “objects” to giving evidence (see [EA.128.120])? • Privilege in preliminary court proceedings. This provision in the NSW Act and the Victorian Act extends the application of the privileges in Pt 3.10 (other than the provisions of s 123 and s 128) to pre-trial stages of civil and criminal proceedings (“a process or order of a court that requires the disclosure of information or a document”). The Commonwealth provision is much more limited (see [EA.131A.30]–[EA.131A.150]). Should it be amended to reflect the approach adopted in NSW and Victoria? In respect of the NSW provision, it is uncertain whether the privileges in Pt 3.10 apply in respect of the execution of search warrants or to the issue of “inspection” of documents produced to a court (see [EA.131A.90]).

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• Discretion to exclude improperly or unlawfully obtained evidence. Conceptual difficulties arise where the evidence in question (sought to be excluded under s 138) is of an offence which is said to have been “caused” by the impugned conduct (see [EA.138.150]). • Standard of proof in civil proceedings. Does the common law Briginshaw test apply under s 140 (see [EA.140.60])? In particular, how is the gravity of the matters alleged to be taken into account? Is “actual persuasion” of the occurrence or existence of the fact(s) in issue required under this provision? • Standard of proof in criminal proceedings. When is an intermediate circumstantial fact “indispensable” to proof of guilt (see [EA.141.120])? • Unreliable evidence. What are “good reasons” for not giving a jury warning (see [EA.165.240])? • Failure to object. The significance of an absence of objection to the admission of (arguably) “inadmissible” evidence is, particularly in criminal proceedings, uncertain (see [EA.Intro.350]; [EA.190.60]). • Appellate review. The precise nature of appellate review of determinations made under the UEL is, in general, a matter of some controversy (see [EA.55.600], [EA.97.480], [EA.98.450], [EA.101.450], [EA.130.420], [EA.135.300], [EA.137.210], [EA.138.720]).

[EA.Intro.340]

Joint trials

A recurring issue, in respect of the UEL, is the application of the rules in joint trials, where there are multiple parties. When a joint criminal trial is held, involving multiple defendants, in legal theory there is not one trial but several. In a joint trial involving two defendants (D1 and D2), for example, evidence admitted in the trial against D1 may not be admissible for or against D2, and in that situation must be disregarded in the trial of D2 (and if that is impossible, the © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.Intro.340]

Introduction 25

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trials should be separated). For example, where evidence is admitted of an admission by D1 it will not necessarily be an “admission” in the trial of D2, since an “admission” is defined to be a previous representation “made by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding”. Since D1 is not a party in the trial of D2, the evidence of a previous representation by D1 is not an admission in the trial of D2 unless s 87 operates to permit it being treated as an admission by D2. Conversely, testimony by D1 will, if relevant to the trial of D2, be admissible in the trial of D2 (on the assumption that no provision of the Act otherwise provides). To give another example, evidence that D2, charged with murder, has a history of engaging in violent conduct may not be admissible against D2 (on the basis that it is “tendency evidence” rendered inadmissible by ss 97 or 101) but the same evidence may be relevant and admissible in support of a defence of duress advanced by D1, charged with assisting D2 – in a joint trial, the evidence must be disregarded in the trial of D2 (and if that is impossible, the trials should be separated).26 When a criminal trial is held of multiple charges against one defendant, again, in legal theory, there is not one trial but several. Evidence admissible in respect of the trial of one charge may not be admissible in the trial of another. Whether or not it will be depends on the application of the provisions of this Act. In a jury trial, where evidence is admissible in respect of one charge but not another, careful directions to this effect would be necessary.27 It might have been thought that these principles would apply equally to civil proceedings. However, there is NSW authority to the contrary. Austin J in ASIC v Rich (2004) 213 ALR 338; 51 ACSR 363; [2004] NSWSC 1062 stated at [24] “that where evidence is admitted in a proceeding in which there are several defendants, the evidence is admissible in the proceeding against all defendants, subject only to any restricting order that may be made under s 136”. Austin J stated the position rather differently, and arguably more accurately at [22], when he observed that the evidence is “available to be used for any purpose, unless one of the exclusionary rules of the Act … applies, or the court makes use of its statutory discretions to exclude admissible evidence or limit its use”. This latter passage was noted with apparent approval by Beazley JA (Young JA agreeing) in the NSW Court of Appeal: Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422; [2010] NSWCA 70 at [102]. However, more recently, in Eire Contractors Pty Ltd v O’Brien [2012] NSWCA 400, an appeal from proceedings involving allegations of negligence brought by a plaintiff against two defendant companies, Barrett JA (McColl JA and Preston CJ of LEC agreeing) noted the analysis of Austin J in Rich and stated at [109]: The present case was one of a “single proceeding” with the plaintiff suing both [defendants]. Evidence admissible and admitted “in” that proceeding was therefore available for use generally in the proceeding subject to any order under s 136 limiting the use to which it could be put.

It has to be said that, given the analysis in respect of criminal proceedings, this proposition should be regarded as highly doubtful, at least in respect of 25. R v Rahme [2001] NSWCCA 414. 26. See, under the common law, Russell v Western Australia (2011) 214 A Crim R 326; [2011] WASCA 246. 27. BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275; 95 A Crim R 400; KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; 118 A Crim R 262; [2001] HCA 11.

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[EA.Intro.350]

non-testimonial evidence. Of course, as a practical matter, the various rules of admissibility may apply in the same way with respect to the two defendants (as appears to have been the position in Eire Contractors Pty Ltd v O’Brien [2012] NSWCA 400). However, the example of the differential application of the admissions exception to the hearsay rule clearly demonstrates that they may not and this important point of principle should not be forgotten. This point was acknowledged by Reeves J of the Federal Court in Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 3) (2013) 301 ALR 653; [2012] FCA 1523 (decided prior to Eire Contractors Pty Ltd v O’Brien [2012] NSWCA 400) when his Honour noted at [40] that Austin J had not referred to the provisions in this Act applying to evidence of admissions and concluded (at [83]) that it was clear that an admission made by one defendant to civil proceedings would not necessarily be admissible against another party to the proceedings.

[EA.Intro.350]

Absence of objection

Another recurring issue in relation to the UEL, particularly in respect of the application of the admissibility rules in Ch 3, is whether the provisions apply in the absence of objection being taken by a party to the proceeding. On the face of it, they do. There is no explicit precondition to the operation of these provisions that evidence is not admissible “if objection is taken by a party”. However, Spigelman CJ stated:

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In the ordinary course, the words “not admissible” in the Evidence Act, including in the opinion rule found in s 70 to which s 79 is an exception, means “not admissible over objection”, in accordance with the practice of the courts of which the Parliament was aware when it passed the Evidence Act.28

The other members of the Court of Appeal did not address this issue.29 Spigelman CJ had earlier expressed the same view in respect of a provision of the Crimes Act 1900 (which was cognate with, and commenced operation at the same time as, the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)) which rendered certain evidence “not admissible”, with Greg James J agreeing.30 That approach in respect of what is now s 281 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 has repeatedly been followed.31 A similar view has been expressed in respect of the Evidence Act provisions by Santow JA in obiter dicta in City Elevator Services Pty Ltd v Burrows [2004] NSWCA 26 at [17]–[21]. Indeed, in Lazaris v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 163, Bellew J (Hoeben CJ at CL and Adamson J agreeing) stated at [97]: “the words ‘not admissible’ in s 59(1) [of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)] mean ‘not admissible over objection’: Gonzales v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 321 at [22] per Giles JA, Howie and Fullerton JJ agreeing””. There was simply no acknowledgment of the fact that the discussion in Gonzales v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 321 related not to the 28. Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 at [149] per Spigelman CJ. 29. Davies AJA did not refer to the issue; Stein JA stated (at [258]) only that “I do not think that intermediate Courts of Appeal should encourage these kinds of submissions in the circumstance just disclosed. In any event, [the evidence] was … admissible”. 30. R v Reid [1999] NSWCCA 258 per Spigelman CJ (at [5]), Greg James J (at [11]). 31. See Gonzales v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 321 at [26]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.Intro.350]

Introduction

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Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) but rather s 281 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.32 Nevertheless, in WC v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 52, Meagher JA (Simpson and Wilson JJ agreeing) concluded at [20] that “that construction of those words is now well accepted”.33 That construction appears to have been followed by the Full Court of the Federal Court.34 This analysis is highly questionable, at least in relation to the UEL. It may be observed that this construction adds words that were not put there by the legislature. It also appears inconsistent with other provisions in the Act which explicitly require a party to “request” a court to make an evidentiary determination (for example, ss 34(1), 165(2)) and provisions which require an “objection” to be made (for example, ss 37(1)(c), 118, 119, 128). Further, it fails to take into account the existence of s 190, which deals in a comprehensive manner with the issue of “waiver of rules of evidence”. That provision permits a court to “dispense with the application” of various provisions in the Act, including many of the provisions in Ch 3, so long as a number of conditions are satisfied. It is inconsistent with the clear intention behind that provision to hold that the provisions in the Act, which enact that certain categories of evidence are “not admissible”, have no application in the absence of objection by a party.35 It is a different question whether, in a case where objection was not taken at trial, an appeal court will permit a party to advance a ground of appeal contending that certain evidence was not admissible and thus was wrongly admitted (see [EA.190.120]). Where an appeal does proceed, evidence may be regarded as inadmissible notwithstanding the absence of objection. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal (Mason P, Sperling and Bergin JJ) observed in R v Chai [2002] NSWCCA 512 at [41] that it “has long been held that failure by a trial judge to allow inadmissible evidence may give rise to a miscarriage of justice notwithstanding the absence of objection: R v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 747; Stirland v Director of Public Prosecutions [1944] AC 327”. This proposition implicitly recognises that evidence may be regarded as inadmissible notwithstanding the absence of objection and an appeal may succeed notwithstanding that absence. The court observed that “the same principle applies in relation to a failure to limit the use of evidence”. The point was made explicit in R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186 where Heydon JA (as he then was) stated at [47] in respect of ss 137 and 192: [T]he terms of ss 137 and 192 are mandatory. They must be complied with whether or not a party who might gain from their invocation actually invokes them. It is notable

32. It should also be noted that the citation for Gonzalez was erroneous: it is Gonzales v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 321. 33. See also Haidari v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 126 at [42]; Severino v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 80 at [62]. 34. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 149; [2011] FCAFC 74 at [26]. 35. Reference was made to s 190 by Meagher JA in WC v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 52 at [23]–[25] but in the context of an argument that the trial judge did not comply with that provision, rather than an argument that the very existence of s 190 showed a clear legislative intention that questions of waiver of the rules of admissibility in Ch 3 should be dealt with under that provision.

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[EA.Intro.350]

that Pt 3.11 (in which s 137 appears) and Chapter 5 (in which s 192 appears) are not listed as among the provisions which the court may, with the parties’ consent, dispense with: s 190.

Interestingly, in Jackson v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 411, Spigelman CJ appears to have accepted the correctness of the approach taken in R v Chai [2002] NSWCCA 512 given that he held that an absence of objection at trial did not necessarily render the evidence in question admissible although it did, in the particular circumstances, justify a refusal to grant leave to appeal to challenge the admission of the evidence. Rule 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW), for example, expressly requires leave of the appeal court to advance a ground of appeal where objection was not taken at trial. It may be concluded that there was no “miscarriage of justice” if defence counsel saw no reason to make objection (or objection on a particular basis later advanced on appeal).36

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The Victorian Court of Appeal in Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121, after referring to NSW authority and the criticism above (which was said at [199] to appear “to have some force”), observed at [200] that, while the decisions of another intermediate appellate court on the identical provision in uniform legislation ““must be given great weight … in the absence of full and considered argument by this court, we would be reluctant to construe the term ‘is not admissible’ in s 97 (and other provisions of the UEL to the same effect) as meaning that the evidence was admissible in the absence of objection””. The court declined to express a concluded view on the issue. There is no doubt that, at least in criminal proceedings, a trial court may be obligated to act even in the absence of objection. In R v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314; [2003] NSWCCA 93 at [37], Sheller JA (Wood CJ at CL and Smart AJ agreeing) held that a trial judge should have intervened to disallow crossexamination which went beyond the bounds of legitimate cross-examination as to the credibility of a witness, notwithstanding the absence of rejection. At the least, an inquiry of counsel may be required. In R v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180 at [68], Buddin J (with whom Santow JA agreed) observed: [W]here evidence which is clearly prejudicial to the accused is being led, there comes a point in time at which he or she must make due enquiry in order to ascertain the basis upon which the material is said to be admissible. A trial judge is not absolved from responsibility in that regard by simply relying upon the way in which the parties are conducting the matter.

It is true that in FDP v The Queen (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; 192 A Crim R 87; [2008] NSWCCA 317, McClellan CJ at CL and Grove J and Howie J came very close to endorsing the view that s 137 should be interpreted as if the words “if objection is taken” qualified the word “must”.37 However, the prevailing view is 36. See Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [201]–[221]. 37. Reference was made to Reid and Gonzales, discussed above, although not to s 190 or the other authorities discussed above. Reference was also made to the judgment of the High Court in Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 41; 77 ALJR 1433; [2003] HCA 40, discussed at [EA.116.90], where it was held that the judicial obligation to give a warning about identification evidence in s 116 only arises where the reliability of the identification evidence is “disputed”. However, there is a difference between an identification not being disputed and no request being made for a warning. The High Court did not hold that a warning under s 116 need not be given unless requested. It is true that Gleeson CJ and Hayne J referred at [20] to the fact that “the © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.Intro.360]

Introduction

that, at least where the danger of unfair prejudice is manifest, an obligation to exclude the evidence under s 137 may arise in accordance with the trial judge’s overriding obligation to ensure a fair trial according to law.38 As the Victorian Court of Appeal stated in Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [221]: When irrelevant or inadmissible evidence emerges during the examination of a witness, a trial judge may have to intervene, unless it becomes plain that the course is one agreed to by the parties, and that it will not create the risk of an unfair trial. There will be other circumstances in which the trial judge, in the interests of ensuring a fair trial, will be obliged to question the admissibility of evidence although no objection is taken.

However, in civil proceedings the accepted view is that it is not the role of the court to raise questions of admissibility, including any which turn on relevance.39 Where evidence is admitted which the court regards as not relevant under s 55, the court will give the evidence no weight.40 On the other hand, where evidence is admissible for one use but not admissible for another use, absence of objection will usually be understood to apply to the first use, so that the court should not use the evidence in the second impermissible way.41

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[EA.Intro.360]

Overview

Opinions differ on the merits of the uniform evidence law. It certainly has had its share of critics. On a theoretical level, it can be argued that the law in statutory form tends to become more rigid and inflexible, lacking the dynamics of the common law. Courts may have difficulty in developing rules of evidence in response to new types of evidence. The legislation will require more case law to clarify the uncertainties it creates. Amendment is often a difficult process. Injustice may be caused. On a more specific level, particular provisions attract criticism, whether for the principles on which they are based or for the difficulties of interpretation and application they create. Yet, for many, this legislation was welcome. It made the rules of evidence easier to find. It may well have made them easier to understand, and to inter-relate. It Evidence Act applies in an adversarial context” and that defence counsel may have tactical reasons for not objecting to evidence, but this discussion was in the context of demonstrating that a warning about evidence should not be given if it was not disputed. Dhanhoa is certainly not authority for a proposition that the apparently mandatory provisions of the uniform evidence legislation should be read as if the words “if objection is taken” qualify them. 38. Poniris v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 100 at [49]. See also Steve v The Queen (2008) 189 A Crim R 68; [2008] NSWCCA 231, Beazley JA (Hislop and Price JJ agreeing) at [60]; Donai v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 173 at [60]–[66]; Potts v The Queen (2012) 227 A Crim R 217; [2012] NSWCCA 229 at [66]; Penza v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 21; Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [204]–[207]; Tieu v The Queen (2016) 92 NSWLR 94; 258 A Crim R 546; [2016] NSWCCA 111 at [42], [131]–[132], [149]. 39. See Lindgren J in Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [13]. 40. Lindgren J in Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [13]. In Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29465; [2011] NSWCA 303, Campbell JA observed at [103] that, even where no objection has been taken, “it can at least be said that it would be improper for a judge to use, in assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue, evidence that in truth does not rationally affect that probability”. 41. Compare Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29465; [2011] NSWCA 303, Campbell JA at [103].

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[EA.Intro.360]

certainly simplified many of the rules. It facilitated the admission of evidence derived from modern information storing media and copying technologies. It introduced greater flexibility in several areas of evidence law. It hopefully provided a rational and principled system of trial procedure, one aimed at procedural justice. The substantial amendments following on ALRC 102 show that the Act can be improved over time. To the extent that other jurisdictions follow the lead of New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, the ACT and the Northern Territory in enacting parallel legislation, citizens across this country will experience a substantially uniform system of trial procedure.

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Of course, this legislation does not solve all the problems with evidence. Deciding whether evidence is “relevant” to a proceeding, for example, remains a task for which the law can only provide limited assistance. Some “rules” can only be expressed in the most general language, articulating a principle rather than a precise test. While this provides flexibility, the price is uncertainty of result. In many areas, the Act accords considerable “discretion” to trial judges, both expressly and implicitly. However, it attempts to articulate the applicable principles and provide guidance in the exercise of such discretion. Ultimately, it relies on the good sense of judges and magistrates to apply the Act in a way consistent with the policy framework around which the Act is constructed.

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EVIDENCE ACT • Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) [No 2 of 1995] This legislation has been amended up to and including Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Legislation Amendment Act 2017, Act 67 of 2017, date of assent 23 of June 2017, date of commencement 1 Jan 2018. • Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) [No 25 of 1995] This legislation has been amended up to and including Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Legislation Amendment Act 2015, Act 7 of 2015, date of assent 9 Jun 2015, date of commencement 1 Jul 2015. • Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) [No 47 of 2008] This legislation has been amended up to and including Jury Directions and Other Acts Amendment Act, Act 37 of 2017, date of assent 29 Aug 2017, date of commencement 1 Oct 2017. • Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) [No 12 of 2011] This legislation has been amended up to and including Courts and Other Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2018, Act 9 of 2018, date of notification 29 Mar 2018, date of commencement 26 Apr 2018. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

• Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) This legislation has been amended up to and including Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Amendment (Journalist Privilege) Act 2018, Act 7 of 2018, date of assent 19 April 2018, date of commencement 20 April 2018.

Table of Provisions Editor’s note * indicates that the provision appears only in the Commonwealth Act. † indicates that the provision appears only in the NSW Act. ‡ indicates that the provision appears only in the Victorian Act. ◊ indicates that the provision appears only in the ACT Act. ♠ indicates that the provision appears only in the NT Act.

CHAPTER 1 - PRELIMINARY / PRELIMINARY MATTERS♠ Introductory note

Part 1.1 - Formal matters 1 2

34

Short title*♠ / Name of Act†◊ / Purpose‡............................................................45 Commencement [Repealed]◊ / Commencement*† ‡♠....................................... 46

Uniform Evidence Law

Table of Provisions 2A 3 3A 3B

Object of Act♠..................................................................................................... 47 Definitions / Dictionary◊....................................................................................... 47 Notes‡ / Numbering◊...........................................................................................49 Notes◊..................................................................................................................49

Part 1.2 - Application of this Act / Application of Act♠ 4 5 6 7 8 8A 9 10 10A 11

Courts and proceedings to which Act applies..................................................... 50 Extended application of certain provisions..........................................................60 Territories............................................................................................................. 62 Act binds Crown.................................................................................................. 62 Operation of other Acts etc* / Operation of other Acts†◊ / Operation of Acts‡♠............................................................................................ 63 Application of the Criminal Code*♠ / Offences against Act–application of Criminal Code etc◊.......................................................................................... 68 Effect of Act on other laws* / Application of common law and equity.................69 Parliamentary privilege preserved....................................................................... 73 Application of section 127A♠.............................................................................. 75 General powers of a court...................................................................................75

CHAPTER 2 - ADDUCING EVIDENCE / GIVING AND PRESENTING EVIDENCE◊ Introductory note*†♠ / Note‡◊

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Part 2.1 - Witnesses Division 1 / Division 2.1.1◊ - Competence and compellability of witnesses 12 Competence and compellability...........................................................................83 13 Competence: lack of capacity............................................................................. 84 14 Compellability: reduced capacity......................................................................... 98 15 Compellability: Sovereign and others................................................................100 16 Competence and compellability: judges and jurors.......................................... 102 17 Competence and compellability: defendants in criminal proceedings / Competence and compellability–accused in criminal proceedings‡◊♠............ 104 18 Compellability of spouses and others in criminal proceedings generally / Compellability of domestic partners and others in criminal proceedings generally◊...........................................................................................................107 19 Compellability of spouses and others in certain criminal proceedings [Repealed]* / Compellability of spouses and others in certain criminal proceedings†‡♠ / Compellability of domestic partners and others in certain criminal proceedings◊...................................................... 116 20 Comment on failure to give evidence................................................................ 118 Division 2*†‡♠ / Division 2.1.2◊ - Oaths♠ / Oaths and affirmations*†‡◊ 21 Sworn evidence of witnesses to be on oath or affirmation / Sworn evidence to be on oath or affirmation† / Evidence of witnesses to be on oath♠..............................................................135 22 Interpreters to act on oath or affirmation / Interpreters to act on oath♠...........138 23 Choice of oath or affirmation............................................................................. 140 24 Requirements for oaths..................................................................................... 142 24A Alternative oath†‡◊............................................................................................ 143 25 Rights to make unsworn statements unaffected [Repealed]* / Rights to make unsworn statements unaffected............................................... 144 Division 3 / Division 2.1.3◊ - General rules about giving evidence 26 Court’s control over questioning of witnesses*†◊ / Court’s control over questioning of witness‡♠..................................................145 27 Parties may question witnesses........................................................................ 152 © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Evidence Act 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

Order of examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination.............156 Manner and form of questioning witnesses and their responses..................... 158 Interpreters / Interpreter♠.................................................................................. 164 Witnesses who cannot hear adequately or speak adequately* / Deaf and mute witnesses.................................................................................. 166 Attempts to revive memory in court.................................................................. 168 Evidence given by police officers...................................................................... 176 Attempts to revive memory out of court............................................................ 179 Effect of calling for production of documents.................................................... 182 Person may be examined without subpoena or other process........................ 183

Division 4 / Division 2.1.4◊ - Examination in chief and re-examination / Examination-in-chief and re-examination◊ 37 Leading questions..............................................................................................186 38 Unfavourable witnesses.....................................................................................194 39 Limits on re-examination....................................................................................211 Division 5 / Division 2.1.5◊ - Cross-examination 40 Witness called in error.......................................................................................216 41 Improper questions............................................................................................ 217 42 Leading questions..............................................................................................233 43 Prior inconsistent statements of witnesses....................................................... 237 44 Previous representations of other persons / Previous representations of other people◊........................................................243 45 Production of documents...................................................................................248 46 Leave to recall witnesses.................................................................................. 252

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Part 2.2 - Documents 47 48 49 50 51

Definitions / Definitions–pt 2.2◊......................................................................... 270 Proof of contents of documents........................................................................ 272 Documents in foreign countries.........................................................................291 Proof of voluminous or complex documents..................................................... 293 Original document rule abolished......................................................................297

Part 2.3 - Other evidence 52 53 54

Adducing of other evidence not affected / Presenting of other evidence not affected◊.......................................................299 Views................................................................................................................. 301 Views to be evidence........................................................................................ 307

CHAPTER 3 - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE Introductory note / Note◊

Part 3.1 - Relevance 55 56 57 58

Relevant evidence............................................................................................. 313 Relevant evidence to be admissible..................................................................355 Provisional relevance.........................................................................................360 Inferences as to relevance................................................................................ 366

Part 3.2 - Hearsay Division 1 / Division 3.2.1◊ - The hearsay rule 59 The hearsay rule–exclusion of hearsay evidence♠ / The hearsay rule–exclusion of hearsay evidence............................................. 373 60 Exception: evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose.................................386 61 Exceptions to the hearsay rule dependent on competency*†◊ / Exceptions to the hearsay rule dependant on competency‡♠......................... 393

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Uniform Evidence Law

Table of Provisions Division 2 / Division 3.2.2◊ - “First-hand” hearsay / First-hand hearsay*◊ 62 Restriction to “first-hand” hearsay / Restriction to first-hand hearsay◊.............398 63 Exception: civil proceedings if maker not available.......................................... 404 64 Exception: civil proceedings if maker available.................................................407 65 Exception: criminal proceedings if maker not available.................................... 415 66 Exception: criminal proceedings if maker available.......................................... 441 66A Exception: contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc............ 457 67 Notice to be given..............................................................................................460 68 Objections to tender of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings if maker available...............................................................................................466 Division 3 / Division 3.2.3◊ - Other exceptions to the hearsay rule 69 Exception: business records..............................................................................471 70 Exception: contents of tags, labels and writing.................................................494 71 Exception: electronic communications.............................................................. 497 72 Exception: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs..............................................................................................................501 73 Exception: reputation as to relationships and age............................................ 503 74 Exception: reputation of public or general rights...............................................506 75 Exception: interlocutory proceedings.................................................................508

Part 3.3 - Opinion 76 77 78 78A

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79 80

The opinion rule / The opinion rule♠.................................................................515 Exception: evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence.................. 527 Exception: lay opinions......................................................................................529 Exception: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs...................................................................................................... 543 Exception: opinions based on specialised knowledge...................................... 545 Ultimate issue and common knowledge rules abolished.................................. 588

Part 3.4 - Admissions 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 89A 90

Hearsay and opinion rules: exception for admissions and related representations.................................................................................................. 596 Exclusion of evidence of admissions that is not first-hand............................... 611 Exclusion of evidence of admissions as against third parties.......................... 613 Exclusion of admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct..... 616 Criminal proceedings: reliability of admissions by defendants / Criminal proceedings–reliability of admissions by accused‡............................ 624 Exclusion of records of oral questioning........................................................... 638 Admissions made with authority........................................................................641 Proof of admissions........................................................................................... 649 Evidence of silence / Evidence of silence generally†....................................... 650 Evidence of silence in criminal proceedings for serious indictable offences†........................................................................................................... 655 Discretion to exclude admissions...................................................................... 660

Part 3.5 - Evidence of judgments and convictions 91 92 93

Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions........................................676 Exceptions......................................................................................................... 680 Savings.............................................................................................................. 684

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence 94 95 96 97 98

Application / Application-Pt 3.6◊........................................................................ 688 Use of evidence for other purposes.................................................................. 691 Failure to act......................................................................................................693 The tendency rule / The tendency rule♠...........................................................694 The coincidence rule / The coincidence rule♠.................................................. 722

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Evidence Act 99 100 101

Requirements for notices...................................................................................745 Court may dispense with notice requirements.................................................. 746 Further restrictions on tendency evidence and coincidence evidence adduced by prosecution.................................................................................... 750

Part 3.7 - Credibility Division 1 / Division 3.7.1◊ - Credibility evidence 101A Credibility evidence............................................................................................809 Division 2 / Division 3.7.2◊ - Credibility of witnesses 102 The credibility rule............................................................................................. 821 103 Exception: cross-examination as to credibility.................................................. 825 104 Further protections: cross-examination of accused* / Further protections: cross-examination as to credibility.................................... 834 105 Further protections: defendants making unsworn statements [Repealed]* / Further protections: defendants making unsworn statements†♠ / Further protections: accused making unsworn statements‡....................................................................................................... 843 106 Exception: rebutting denials by other evidence................................................ 844 107 Exception: application of certain provisions to makers of representations [Repealed]*† / Exception–application of certain provisions to makers of representations‡♠............................................................................ 856 108 Exception: re-establishing credibility................................................................. 856

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Division 3 / Division 3.7.3◊ - Credibility of persons who are not witnesses 108A Admissibility of evidence of credibility of person who has made a previous representation..................................................................................... 866 108B Further protections: previous representations of an accused who is not a witness......................................................................................................870 Division 4 / Division 3.7.4◊ - Persons with specialised knowledge / People with specialised knowledge◊ 108C Exception: evidence of persons with specialised knowledge........................... 876

Part 3.8 - Character 109 110 111 112

Application / Application–pt 3.8◊........................................................................884 Evidence about character of accused persons*†♠ / Evidence about character of an accused‡ / Evidence about character of accused people◊..... 885 Evidence about character of co-accused.......................................................... 899 Leave required to cross-examine about character of accused or co-accused.................................................................................................... 901

Part 3.9 - Identification evidence 113 114 115 116

Application of Part / Application–pt 3.9◊............................................................906 Exclusion of visual identification evidence........................................................ 907 Exclusion of evidence of identification by pictures............................................933 Directions to jury................................................................................................948

Part 3.10 - Privileges Division 1 / Division 3.10.1◊ - Client legal privilege 117 Definitions / Definitions–div 3.10.1◊.................................................................. 962 118 Legal advice.......................................................................................................974 119 Litigation.............................................................................................................994 120 Unrepresented parties..................................................................................... 1000 121 Loss of client legal privilege: generally........................................................... 1002 122 Loss of client legal privilege: consent and related matters............................. 1007 123 Loss of client legal privilege: defendants / Loss of client legal privilege–accused‡...........................................................1037

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Uniform Evidence Law

Table of Provisions 124 125 126

Loss of client legal privilege: joint clients........................................................ 1041 Loss of client legal privilege: misconduct........................................................1044 Loss of client legal privilege: related communications and documents.......... 1053

Division 1A† / Division 3.10.1A◊ - Professional confidential relationship privilege†◊ 126A Definitions† / Definitions–div 3.10.1A◊............................................................ 1058 126B Exclusion of evidence of protected confidences†◊......................................... 1060 126C Loss of professional confidential relationship privilege: consent†◊.................1070 126D Loss of professional confidential relationship privilege: misconduct†◊........... 1071 126E Ancillary orders†◊............................................................................................ 1073 126F Application of Division† / Application–div 3.10.1A◊.........................................1073 Division 1B - Sexual assault communications privilege† 126G Definitions†...................................................................................................... 1075 126H Exclusion of evidence of protected sexual assault communications†............ 1075 126I Application of Division†................................................................................... 1076 Division 1C*†‡ / Division 3.10.1C◊ - Journalist privilege 126J Definitions*†‡ / Definitions–div 3.10.1C◊........................................................ 1076 Journalist privilege relating to identity of informant*†‡ / 126K Journalist privilege relating to informant’s identity◊.........................................1079 126L Application of Division† / Application–div 3.10.1C◊........................................ 1091

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Division 2 / Division 3.10.2◊ - Other privileges 127 Religious confessions...................................................................................... 1092 127A Journalist privilege♠........................................................................................ 1095 128 Privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings........................1096 128A Privilege in respect of self-incrimination–exception for certain orders etc...... 1132 Division 3 / Division 3.10.3◊ - Evidence excluded in the public interest 129 Exclusion of evidence of reasons for judicial etc. decisions........................... 1144 130 Exclusion of evidence of matters of state........................................................1150 131 Exclusion of evidence of settlement negotiations............................................1169 Division 4 / Division 3.10.4◊ - General 131A Extended application of Division 1C* / Application of Part to preliminary proceedings of courts†‡ / Application of div 3.10.4 to preliminary proceedings of courts◊ / Application of Division to preliminary proceedings of courts♠....................................................................................1196 131B Extended application of Division 1C etc. to all proceedings for Commonwealth offences*................................................................................ 1206 132 Court to inform of rights to make applications and objections........................1207 133 Court may inspect etc. documents..................................................................1208 134 Inadmissibility of evidence that must not be adduced or given / Inadmissibility of evidence that must not be presented or given◊.................. 1211

Part 3.11 - Discretionary and mandatory exclusions 135 136 137 138 139

General discretion to exclude evidence.......................................................... 1213 General discretion to limit use of evidence..................................................... 1227 Exclusion of prejudicial evidence in criminal proceedings.............................. 1237 Discretion to exclude improperly or illegally obtained evidence* / Exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence................................... 1267 Cautioning of persons / Cautioning of people◊............................................... 1303

CHAPTER 4 - PROOF Introductory note / Note◊

Part 4.1 - Standard of proof 140

Civil proceedings: standard of proof................................................................1315

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Evidence Act 141 142

Criminal proceedings: standard of proof......................................................... 1325 Admissibility of evidence: standard of proof....................................................1339

Part 4.2 - Judicial notice 143 144 145

Matters of law.................................................................................................. 1341 Matters of common knowledge....................................................................... 1345 Certain Crown certificates............................................................................... 1352

Part 4.3 - Facilitation of proof

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Division 1 / Division 4.3.1◊ - General 146 Evidence produced by processes, machines and other devices.................... 1354 147 Documents produced by processes, machines and other devices in the course of business................................................................................ 1358 148 Evidence of certain acts of justices, lawyers and notaries public* / Evidence of certain acts of justices, Australian lawyers and notaries public..................................................................................................1362 149 Attestation of documents................................................................................. 1364 150 Seals and signatures....................................................................................... 1365 151 Seals of bodies established under State law.................................................. 1371 152 Documents produced from proper custody..................................................... 1372 Division 2 / Division 4.3.2◊ - Matters of official record 153 Gazettes and other official documents............................................................ 1373 154 Documents published by authority of Parliaments etc.................................... 1378 155 Evidence of official records..............................................................................1379 155A Evidence of Commonwealth documents......................................................... 1383 156 Public documents............................................................................................ 1384 157 Public documents relating to court processes................................................ 1388 158 Evidence of certain public documents.............................................................1391 159 Official statistics............................................................................................... 1394 Division 3 / Division 4.3.3◊ - Matters relating to post and communications 160 Postal articles.................................................................................................. 1396 161 Electronic communications.............................................................................. 1401 162 Lettergrams and telegrams..............................................................................1405 163 Proof of letters having been sent by Commonwealth agencies..................... 1407

Part 4.4 - Corroboration 164

Corroboration requirements abolished............................................................ 1409

Part 4.5 - Warnings and information 165 165A 165B

Unreliable evidence......................................................................................... 1414 Warnings in relation to children’s evidence.....................................................1472 Delay in prosecution........................................................................................ 1481

Part 4.6 - Ancillary provisions Division 1 / Division 4.6.1◊ - Requests to produce documents or call witnesses 166 Definition of request / Meaning of request–div 4.6.1◊ / Definition of request♠...................................................................................... 1501 167 Requests may be made about certain matters............................................... 1504 168 Time limits for making certain requests...........................................................1507 169 Failure or refusal to comply with requests / Failure to comply with requests◊..................................................................... 1511 Division 2 / Division 4.6.2◊ - Proof of certain matters by affidavits or written statements 170 Evidence relating to certain matters................................................................1521 171 Persons who may give such evidence / People who may give evidence mentioned in s 170◊.....................................1523

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Uniform Evidence Law

Table of Provisions 172 173

Evidence based on knowledge, belief or information..................................... 1528 Notification of other parties..............................................................................1529

Division 3 / Division 4.6.3◊ - Foreign law 174 Evidence of foreign law................................................................................... 1530 175 Evidence of law reports of foreign countries................................................... 1533 176 Questions of foreign law to be decided by judge............................................1534 Division 4 / Division 4.6.4◊ - Procedures for proving other matters 177 Certificates of expert evidence........................................................................ 1535 178 Convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings................................... 1539 179 Proof of identity of convicted persons–affidavits by members of State or Territory police forces / Proof of identity of convicted people–affidavits by members of State or Territory police forces◊.................................................. 1544 180 Proof of identity of convicted persons–affidavits by AFP employees or special members of the Australian Federal Police* / Proof of identity of convicted persons–affidavits by members of Australian Federal Police†‡♠ / Proof of identity of convicted people–affidavits by members of Australian Federal Police◊...............................................................................1547 181 Proof of service of statutory notifications, notices, orders and directions.......1549

CHAPTER 5 - MISCELLANEOUS / MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS♠ 182

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183 184 185

186 187 188 189 190 191 192 192A 193 194 195 196 197 198

Application of certain sections in relation to Commonwealth records, postal articles sent by Commonwealth agencies and certain Commonwealth documents* / Application of certain sections in relation to Commonwealth records..............................................................1552 Inferences........................................................................................................ 1555 Accused may admit matters and give consents............................................. 1558 Faith and credit to be given to documents properly authenticated*◊ / Full faith and credit to be given to documents properly authenticated †‡♠........................................................................................... 1561 Swearing of affidavits before justices of the peace, notaries public and lawyers*†◊ / Swearing of affidavits‡♠............................................................. 1562 Abolition of the privilege against self-incrimination for bodies corporate* / No privilege against self-incrimination for bodies corporate........................... 1564 Impounding documents................................................................................... 1566 The voir dire / The voir dire*◊.......................................................................... 1567 Waiver of rules of evidence............................................................................. 1575 Agreements as to facts....................................................................................1581 Leave, permission or direction may be given on terms / Leave, permission or direction may be given on conditions◊......................... 1585 Advance rulings and findings.......................................................................... 1591 Additional powers............................................................................................ 1595 Witnesses failing to attend proceedings [Repealed]* / Witnesses failing to attend proceedings†‡◊♠................................................. 1598 Prohibited question not to be published..........................................................1601 Proceedings for offences [Repealed]*♠ / Proceedings for offences†‡◊......... 1603 Regulations / Regulation-making power◊........................................................ 1604 Savings, transitional and other provisions†.....................................................1605

CHAPTER 6 TRANSITIONAL MATTERS FOR EVIDENCE (NATIONAL UNIFORM LEGISLATION) ACT 2011♠ (NT ONLY) 198 199 200

Definitions♠..................................................................................................... 1606 Application of this Act on commencement day♠.............................................1606 Application of section 128A♠.......................................................................... 1606

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Evidence Act 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213

Application of Part 3.10 to disclosure requirements♠.....................................1606 Identifications already carried out♠................................................................. 1607 Documents and evidence produced before commencement day by processes, machines and other devices♠...................................................... 1607 Documents attested and verified before commencement day♠..................... 1607 Matters of official record published before commencement day♠..................1607 Agreed facts♠.................................................................................................. 1608 Application of Act to improperly or illegally obtained evidence♠.................... 1608 Notification provisions♠................................................................................... 1608 Notice of intention to adduce hearsay evidence♠.......................................... 1609 Notice of intention to adduce evidence as to tendency or coincidence♠.......1609 Time limits for making requests♠.................................................................... 1609 Requests under section 173♠......................................................................... 1610 Transitional regulations [Expired]♠..................................................................1610

CHAPTER 7 TRANSITIONAL MATTERS FOR EVIDENCE (NATIONAL UNIFORM LEGISLATION) AMENDMENT ACT 2013♠ (NT ONLY) 214 215

Definitions♠......................................................................................................1611 Ongoing proceedings♠.................................................................................... 1611

CHAPTER 8 TRANSITIONAL MATTERS FOR EVIDENCE (NATIONAL UNIFORM LEGISLATION) AMENDMENT (JOURNALIST PRIVILEGE) ACT 2018♠ (NT ONLY) -

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216 217 218

Definitions♠..................................................................................................... 1612 Application of section 127A♠.......................................................................... 1612 Application of section 160♠.............................................................................1612

SCHEDULE*♠ / SCHEDULE 1†‡◊ - OATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS / OATHS AND AFFIRMATION♠ SCHEDULE 2 - SAVINGS, TRANSITIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS† / TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS‡ DICTIONARY Part 1 - Definitions Part 2 - Other expressions

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Uniform Evidence Law

CHAPTER 1 – PRELIMINARY CHAPTER 1 – PRELIMINARY MATTERS (NT ONLY) Cth Act: Introductory Note

Outline of this Act This Act sets out the federal rules of evidence. Generally speaking, the Act applies to proceedings in federal courts (see section 4), but some provisions extend beyond such proceedings (see Note 2 to subsection 4(1)). Chapter 2 is about how evidence is adduced in proceedings. Chapter 3 is about admissibility of evidence in proceedings. Chapter 4 is about proof of matters in proceedings. Chapter 5 deals with miscellaneous matters. The Dictionary at the end of this Act defines terms and expressions used in this Act.

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Related legislation This Act is in most respects uniform with the following State and Territory Acts: (a) the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); (b) the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); (c) the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic); (d) the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT); (e) the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT).While these Acts are in most respects identical to this Act, there are differences. The explanatory memorandum to the Civil Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 includes a table setting out the differences as at 8 July 2014. An updated version of the table is maintained by the Attorney-General’s Department on its website (http://www.ag.gov.au). [Ch 1 note am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 4 and 21; Act 100 of 2005, s 3 and Sch 1 item 14]

NSW Act: Introductory note:

Outline of this Act This Act sets out the State rules of evidence. Generally speaking, the Act applies to proceedings in State courts and before other persons or bodies required to apply the laws of evidence (see section 4). Chapter 2 is about how evidence is adduced in proceedings. Chapter 3 is about admissibility of evidence in proceedings. Chapter 4 is about proof of matters in proceedings. Chapter 5 deals with miscellaneous matters. The Dictionary at the end of this Act defines terms and expressions used in this Act.

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Chapter 1 - Preliminary

Related legislation This Act is in most respects uniform with the Evidence Act 1995 of the Commonwealth. The 2 Acts are drafted in identical terms except so far as differences are identified by appropriate annotations to the texts, and except so far as minor drafting variations are required because one Act is a New South Wales Act and one Act is a Commonwealth Act. If one Act contains a provision that is not included in the other Act, the numbering of the other Act has a gap in the numbering in order to maintain consistent numbering for the other provisions. In relation to the taking of evidence outside New South Wales for the purposes of proceedings in the State and in relation to the taking of evidence in the State for the purposes of proceedings outside New South Wales see the Evidence on Commission Act 1995.

Vic Act: Introductory Note

Outline of this Act This Act sets out the State rules of evidence. Generally speaking, the Act applies to proceedings in State courts and before other persons or bodies required to apply the laws of evidence (see section 4). Chapter 2 is about how evidence is adduced in proceedings. Chapter 3 is about admissibility of evidence in proceedings. Chapter 4 is about proof of matters in proceedings.

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Chapter 5 deals with miscellaneous matters. The Dictionary at the end of this Act defines terms and expressions used in this Act. Related legislation This Act is in most respects uniform with the Evidence Act 1995 of the Commonwealth (the Commonwealth Act) and the Evidence Act 1995 of New South Wales (the New South Wales Act). The Acts are drafted in identical terms except so far as differences are identified by appropriate annotations to the texts, and except so far as minor drafting variations are required to accord with the drafting style of each jurisdiction. If one Act contains a provision that is not included in another Act, there is a gap in the numbering of the other Act in order to maintain consistent numbering for the other provisions. The Evidence Act 2001 of Tasmania also largely mirrors this legislation, but there are some departures.

ACT Act: Note 1 Introductory noteThis Act sets out the Territory rules of evidence. Generally speaking, the Act applies to proceedings in ACT courts and before other people or bodies required to apply the laws of evidence (see s 4).

Note 2 Related legislationThis Act

is in most respects uniform with the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Commonwealth Act) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (the NSW Act). The Acts are drafted in identical terms except so far as differences are identified by appropriate annotations to the texts, and except so far as minor drafting variations are required to accord with the drafting style of each jurisdiction.

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Uniform Evidence Law

s1

Part 1.1 - Formal matters

NT Act: Introductory Note

Outline of this Act This Act sets out the rules of evidence for the Territory. Generally speaking, the Act applies to proceedings in Territory courts and before other persons or bodies required to apply the laws of evidence (see section 4). Chapter 2 is about how evidence is adduced in proceedings. Chapter 3 is about admissibility of evidence in proceedings. Chapter 4 is about proof of matters in proceedings. Chapter 5 deals with miscellaneous matters. The Dictionary at the end of this Act defines terms and expressions used in this Act. Related legislation This Act is in most respects uniform with the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). These Acts are drafted in identical terms except so far as differences are identified by appropriate annotations to the texts, and except so far as minor drafting variations are required to accord with the drafting style of each jurisdiction. If one Act contains a provision that is not included in another Act, there is a gap in the numbering of the other Act in order to maintain consistent numbering for the other provisions.

Part 1.1 – Formal matters Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Cth Act: 1

Short title This Act may be cited as the Evidence Act 1995.

NSW Act: 1

Name of Act This Act is the Evidence Act 1995.

Vic Act: 1

Purpose The purpose of this Act is to make fresh provision for the law of evidence that is uniform with Commonwealth and New South Wales law. ACT Act: 1

Name of Act This Act is the Evidence Act 2011.

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Chapter 1 - Preliminary

s1

NT Act: 1

Short title This Act may be cited as the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act.

Cth Act: 2

Commencement

(1) This Part and the Dictionary at the end of this Act commence on the day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent. (2) Subject to subsection (3), the remaining provisions of this Act commence on a day or days to be fixed by Proclamation. (3) If a provision referred to in subsection (2) does not commence under that subsection before 18 April 1995, it commences on that day. NSW Act: 2

Commencement

(1) This Part and the Dictionary at the end of this Act commence on the date of assent. (2) The remaining provisions of this Act commence on a day or days to be appointed by proclamation. Vic Act: Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

2

Commencement

(1) This Part and the Dictionary at the end of this Act come into operation on the day after the day on which this Act receives the Royal Assent. (2) Subject to subsection (3), the remaining provisions of this Act come into operation on a day or days to be proclaimed. (3) If a provision of this Act does not come into operation before 1 January 2010, it comes into operation on that day. ACT Act: 2

Commencement [Repealed]

[S 2 om Act 14 of 2001, s 89(4)]

NT Act: 2

Commencement

(1) This Part and the Dictionary at the end of this Act commence on the day on which the Administrator’s assent to this Act is declared. (2) The remaining provisions of this Act commence on the day fixed by the Administrator by Gazette notice.

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Uniform Evidence Law

s3

Part 1.1 - Formal matters

[EA.2.30]

[EA.2.30] General comments The provisions of the Commonwealth Act and the NSW Act commenced in 1995. The provisions of the Victorian Act commenced on 1 January 2010.

NT Act: 2A Object of Act The object of this Act is to make fresh provision for the law of evidence that is uniform with the following laws of the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Victoria: (a) the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Commonwealth Act); (b) the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (the NSW Act); (c) the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) (the Victorian Act). Cth Act: 3

Definitions

(1) Expressions used in this Act (or in a particular provision of this Act) that are defined in the Dictionary at the end of this Act have the meanings given to them in the Dictionary. Note: Some expressions used in this Act are defined in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, and have the meanings given to them in that Act.

(1A) The Dictionary at the end of this Act is part of this Act. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[Subs (1A) insrt Act 46 of 2011, s 3 and Sch 2 item 566]

(2) Notes included in this Act are explanatory notes and do not form part of this Act. (3) Definitions in this Act of expressions used in this Act apply to its construction except insofar as the context or subject matter otherwise indicates or requires. [Subs (3) am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 22] [S 3 am Act 113 of 2015; Act 46 of 2011]

NSW Act: 3

Definitions

(1) Expressions used in this Act (or in a particular provision of this Act) that are defined in the Dictionary at the end of this Act have the meanings given to them in the Dictionary. (2) Notes included in this Act are explanatory notes and do not form part of this Act. (3) Without limiting the effect of, and subject to, section 34 of the Interpretation Act 1987, material that may be used in the interpretation of a provision of this Act includes any relevant report of a Law Reform Commission laid before either House of the Parliament of the Commonwealth before the provision was enacted. Notes: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s3

Chapter 1 - Preliminary

1 Some expressions used in this Act are defined in the Interpretation Act 1987, and have the meanings given to them in that Act. 2 The Commonwealth Act includes a different subsection (3). This is to the same effect as section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1987. Subsection (3) of the NSW Act is covered by section 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 of the Commonwealth.

Vic Act: 3

Definitions

(1) Expressions used in this Act (or in a particular provision of this Act) that are defined in the Dictionary at the end of this Act have the meanings given to them in the Dictionary. (2) The Dictionary at the end of this Act forms part of this Act. Notes: 1 Some expressions used in this Act are defined in the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 and have the meanings given to them in that Act. 2 Subsection (2) differs from the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act. 3 The Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act include an additional subsection regarding definitions which are unnecessary in Victoria due to the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984.

ACT Act: 3

Dictionary The dictionary at the end of this Act is part of this Act.

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Note 1: The dictionary at the end of this Act defines certain terms used in this Act, and includes references (signpost definitions) to other terms defined elsewhere. For example, the signpost definition “Commonwealth record—see the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), dictionary.” means that the term “Commonwealth record” is defined in that dictionary and the definition applies to this Act. Note 2: A definition in the dictionary (including a signpost definition) applies to the entire Act unless the definition, or another provision of the Act, provides otherwise or the contrary intention otherwise appears (see Legislation Act, s 155 and s 156(1)). Note 3: This section differs from the Commonwealth Act and NSW Act.

NT Act: 3

Definitions

(1) Expressions used in this Act (or in a particular provision of this Act) that are defined in the Dictionary at the end of this Act have the meanings given to them in the Dictionary. (2) Notes included in this Act are explanatory notes and do not form part of this Act. Notes for section 3: 1 Some expressions used in this Act are defined in the Interpretation Act and have the meanings given to them in that Act. 2 The Commonwealth Act and NSW Act include an additional subsection (3) regarding definitions which is unnecessary in the Territory because of section 18 of the Interpretation Act.

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Uniform Evidence Law

s 3B

Part 1.2 - Application of this Act

[EA.3A.30]

Vic Act: 3A Notes Notes do not form part of this Act. Note: This section does not appear in the Commonwealth Act or New South Wales Act.

ACT Act: 3A

Numbering

(1) To maintain consistent section numbering between this Act and the Commonwealth Act— (a) if the Commonwealth Act contains a section that is not included in this Act—the section number and heading appearing in the Commonwealth Act are included in this Act despite the omission of the body of the section; and (b) if this Act contains a section that is not included in the Commonwealth Act—the section is numbered so as to maintain consistency in numbering between sections common to both Acts. (2) A section number and heading mentioned in subsection (1)(a) form part of this Act.

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(3) If a provision of this Act (other than a section) is numbered differently from the equivalent provision of the Commonwealth Act, the provision of this Act may be referred to using the number of the equivalent provision of the Commonwealth Act. Note 1: A note appears under each heading mentioned in s (1)(a) describing the omitted section of the Commonwealth Act. Note 2: A note appears under each section mentioned in s (1)(b) highlighting the non-appearance of an equivalent section in the Commonwealth Act. Note 3: The Commonwealth Act and NSW Act do not include this section.

[EA.3A.30] General comments The Note to this Victorian section is strictly correct in stating that s 3A does not appear in the Commonwealth Act or the NSW Act. However the substance of the section does appear in s 3(2) of both the Commonwealth Act and the NSW Act.

ACT Act: 3B Notes A note included in this Act is explanatory and is not part of this Act. Note 1: See the Legislation Act, s 127(1), (4) and (5) for the legal status of notes. Note 2: The Commonwealth Act and NSW Act do not include this section.

Part 1.2 – Application of this Act Part 1.2 – Application of Act (NT only)

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s4

Chapter 1 - Preliminary

Cth Act: 4

Courts and proceedings to which Act applies

(1) This Act applies to all proceedings in a federal court, including proceedings that: (a) relate to bail; or (b) are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind; or (c) are heard in chambers; or (d) subject to subsection (2), relate to sentencing. Note 2: Federal court is defined in the Dictionary. The definition includes persons or bodies required to apply the laws of evidence. Note 3: Some provisions of this Act extend beyond proceedings in federal courts. These provisions deal with: • extension of specified provisions to cover proceedings in all Australian courts (section 5); • faith and credit to be given to documents properly authenticated (section 185); • swearing of affidavits for use in Australian courts exercising federal jurisdiction or similar jurisdiction (section 186); • abolition of the privilege against self-incrimination for bodies corporate (section 187). Note 4: See section 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 for the application of this Act to proceedings in a State court exercising federal jurisdiction.

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[Subs (1) am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 5–7 and 23; Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 items 1 and 2]

(2) If such a proceeding relates to sentencing: (a) this Act applies only if the court directs that the law of evidence applies in the proceeding; and (b) if the court specifies in the direction that the law of evidence applies only in relation to specified matters—the direction has effect accordingly. (3) The court must make a direction if: (a) a party to the proceeding applies for such a direction in relation to the proof of a fact; and (b) in the court’s opinion, the proceeding involves proof of that fact, and that fact is or will be significant in determining a sentence to be imposed in the proceeding. (4) The court must make a direction if the court considers it appropriate to make such a direction in the interests of justice. (5) Subject to subsection (5A), the provisions of this Act (other than sections 185, 186 and 187) do not apply to: (a) an appeal from a court of a State, including an appeal from a court of a State exercising federal jurisdiction; or (b) an appeal from a court of the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory or an external Territory; or (c) [Repealed] (d) [Repealed] 50

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(e)

a review of a decision or order of a magistrate and any appeal from such a review; except so far as the provisions apply to proceedings in all Australian courts. [Subs (5) am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 8–10; Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 2 item 1; Act 140 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 2 item 1]

(5A) Despite subsection (5), this Act applies to an appeal to the Family Court of Australia from a court of summary jurisdiction of a State or Territory exercising jurisdiction under the Family Law Act 1975. [Subs (5A) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 2 item 1; insrt Act 140 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 2 item 2]

(6) [Repealed] [Subs (6) rep Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 11 and 24; am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 2 item 1; Act 140 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 2 item 3] [S 4 am Act 113 of 2015; Act 135 of 2008; Act 140 of 1995]

NSW Act: 4

Courts and proceedings to which Act applies

(1) This Act applies to all proceedings in a NSW court, including proceedings that: (a) relate to bail, subject to Division 4 of Part 3 of the Bail Act 2013, or (b) are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind, or (c) are heard in chambers, or (d) subject to subsection (2), relate to sentencing.

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[Subs (1) am Act 5 of 2014, Sch 2.18[1]; Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]

(2) If such a proceeding relates to sentencing: (a) this Act applies only if the court directs that the law of evidence applies in the proceeding, and (b) if the court specifies in the direction that the law of evidence applies only in relation to specified matters—the direction has effect accordingly. (3) The court must make a direction if: (a) a party to the proceeding applies for such a direction in relation to the proof of a fact, and (b) in the court’s opinion, the proceeding involves proof of that fact, and that fact is or will be significant in determining a sentence to be imposed in the proceeding. (4) The court must make a direction if the court considers it appropriate to make such a direction in the interests of justice. Notes: 1 Section 4 of the Commonwealth Act differs from this section. It applies that Act to proceedings in a federal court or an ACT court. Some provisions of the Commonwealth Act extend beyond proceedings in federal courts and ACT courts (see sections 5, 185, 186 and 187 of the Commonwealth Act). 2 NSW court is defined in the Dictionary. The definition includes persons or bodies required to apply the laws of evidence. 3 The Commonwealth Act includes 2 additional subsections that exclude the application of that Act to appeals from a court of a State (including appeals from a court of a State exercising federal jurisdiction) and certain other courts. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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4 See section 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 of the Commonwealth for the application of this Act to proceedings in a State court exercising federal jurisdiction. [Subs (4) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[2]] [S 4 am Act 5 of 2014; Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 4

Courts and proceedings to which Act applies

(1) This Act applies to all proceedings in a Victorian court, including proceedings that— (a) relate to bail; or (b) are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind; or (c) are heard in chambers; or (d) subject to subsection (2), relate to sentencing.

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(2) If such a proceeding relates to sentencing— (a) this Act applies only if the court directs that the law of evidence applies in the proceeding; and (b) if the court specifies in the direction that the law of evidence applies only in relation to specified matters—the direction has effect accordingly. (3) The court must make a direction if— (a) a party to the proceeding applies for such a direction in relation to the proof of a fact; and (b) in the court’s opinion, the proceeding involves proof of that fact, and that fact is or will be significant in determining a sentence to be imposed in the proceeding. (4) The court must make a direction if the court considers it appropriate to make such a direction in the interests of justice. (5) In this section, a proceeding that relates to sentencing includes a proceeding for an order under Part 4 of the Sentencing Act 1991. Notes: 1 Section 4 of the Commonwealth Act differs from this section. It applies that Act to proceedings in a federal court or an Australian Capital Territory court. Some provisions of the Commonwealth Act extend beyond proceedings in federal courts and Australian Capital Territory courts (see sections 5, 185, 186 and 187 of the Commonwealth Act). 2 Victorian court is defined in the Dictionary. The definition includes persons or bodies required to apply the laws of evidence. 3 The Commonwealth Act includes 2 additional subsections that exclude the application of that Act to appeals from a court of a State (including appeals from a court of a State exercising federal jurisdiction) and certain other courts. 4 Provisions in other Victorian Acts which relieve courts from the obligation to apply the rules of evidence in certain proceedings are preserved by section 8 of this Act. These include— • section 215 of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005; • sections 8(6) and 13A of the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987; • section 38 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997; • section 127 of the Electoral Act 2002.

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[S 4 am Act 67 of 2013, s 649 and Sch 9 item 17]

ACT Act: 4

Courts and proceedings to which Act applies

(1) This Act applies to all proceedings in an ACT court, including proceedings that— (a) relate to bail; or (b) are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind; or (c) are heard in chambers; or (d) subject to subsection (2), relate to sentencing. (2) If a proceeding relates to sentencing— (a) this Act applies only if the court directs that the law of evidence applies in the proceeding; and (b) if the court states in the direction that the law of evidence applies only in relation to stated matters—the direction has effect accordingly.

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(3) The court must make a direction under this section if— (a) a party to the proceeding applies for the direction in relation to the proof of a fact; and (b) in the court’s opinion, the proceeding involves proof of the fact, and the fact is or will be significant in deciding a sentence to be imposed in the proceeding. (4) The court must make a direction under this section if the court considers it appropriate in the interests of justice. Note: This section differs from the Commonwealth Act, s 4.

NT Act: 4

Courts and proceedings to which Act applies

(1) This Act applies to all proceedings in a Territory court, including proceedings that: (a) relate to bail; or (b) are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind; or (c) are heard in chambers; or (d) subject to subsection (2), relate to sentencing. (2) If such a proceeding relates to sentencing: (a) this Act applies only if the court directs that the law of evidence applies in the proceeding; and (b) if the court specifies in the direction that the law of evidence applies only in relation to specified matters — the direction has effect accordingly. (3) The court must make a direction if: (a) a party to the proceeding applies for such a direction in relation to the proof of a fact; and © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) in the court’s opinion, the proceeding involves proof of that fact, and that fact is or will be significant in determining a sentence to be imposed in the proceeding. (4) The court must make a direction if the court considers it appropriate to make such a direction in the interests of justice. (5) In this section, a proceeding that relates to sentencing includes a proceeding for an order under Part 5 of the Sentencing Act or Part 5, Division 9 of the Traffıc Act.

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Notes for section 4: 1 Section 4 of the Commonwealth Act differs from this section. It applies that Act to proceedings in a federal court or an Australian Capital Territory court. Some provisions of the Commonwealth Act extend beyond proceedings in federal courts and Australian Capital Territory courts (see sections 5, 185, 186 and 187 of the Commonwealth Act). 2 Territory court is defined in the Dictionary. The definition includes persons or bodies required to apply the laws of evidence. 3 The Commonwealth Act includes 2 additional subsections that exclude the application of that Act to appeals from a court of a State or Territory (including appeals from a court exercising federal jurisdiction) and certain other courts. 4 Provisions in other Territory Acts which relieve courts from the obligation to apply the rules of evidence in certain proceedings are preserved by section 8 of this Act. These include, for example: • section 39 of the Coroners Act; • section 93(2) of the Care and Protection of Children Act; • section 257(2) of the Electoral Act; • section 49(2) of the Ombudsman Act; • section 25(2) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act. 5 Subsection (5) is not included in the Commonwealth Act or NSW Act.

[EA.4.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 2.73–2.81; ALRC 38, s 11, para 57.

[EA.4.60] Definitions [Cth Act only] The term “federal court” is defined in the Dictionary: “federal court” means: (a) the High Court; or (b) any other court created by the Parliament (other than the Supreme Court of a Territory); and includes a person or body (other than a court or magistrate of a State or Territory) that, in performing a function or exercising a power under a law of the Commonwealth, is required to apply the laws of evidence.

“ACT court” is defined in the Dictionary: “ACT court” means the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory or any other court of the Australian Capital Territory, and includes a person or body that, in performing a function or exercising a power under a law of the Australian Capital Territory, is required to apply the laws of evidence.

“Australian court” is defined in the Dictionary: 54

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[EA.4.150]

“Australian court” means: (a) the High Court; or (b) a court exercising federal jurisdiction; or (c) a court of a State or Territory; or (d) a judge, justice or arbitrator under an Australian law; or (e) a person or body authorised by an Australian law, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence; or (f) a person or body that, in exercising a function under an Australian law, is required to apply the laws of evidence.

“Australian law” is defined in the Dictionary: “Australian law” means a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.

Clause 9 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides: 9 References to laws (1) A reference in this Act to a law of the Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or a foreign country is a reference to a law (whether written or unwritten) of or in force in that place. (2) A reference in this Act to an Australian law is a reference to an Australian law (whether written or unwritten) of or in force in Australia.

[EA.4.90] Definitions [NSW Act only] The term “NSW court” is defined in the Dictionary to mean: Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

(a) the Supreme Court, or (b) any other court created by Parliament, and includes any person or body (other than a court) that, in exercising a function under the law of the State, is required to apply the laws of evidence.

[EA.4.120] Definitions [Vic Act only] Section 4 of the Victorian Act differs from the NSW and Commonwealth Acts in subsections (1) and (5) and the Notes. The term “Victorian court” is defined in the Dictionary to mean: (a) the Supreme Court, or (b) any other court created by Parliament— and includes any person or body (other than a court) that, in exercising a function under the law of the State, is required to apply the laws of evidence.

[EA.4.150] General comments [Cth Act only] In practical terms, the Commonwealth Act applies to proceedings in the High Court, Federal Court and Family Court and other federal courts. Pursuant to a proclamation made on 9 February 2012, in accordance with s 4(6), it ceased to apply on 1 March 2012 to proceedings in an ACT court, except so far as the provisions of the Act apply to proceedings in all Australian courts (the ACT Evidence Act 2011 came into force on 1 March 2012). Subject to s 8 (see [EA.4.300]), the Commonwealth Act also applies to Commonwealth tribunals © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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2

which are required to apply the law of evidence. It has been held that the Refugee Review Tribunal is not a body that is required to apply the laws of evidence, because s 420(1) of the Migration Act 1958 provides that the Tribunal is “not bound by … rules of evidence”. In so concluding, Finkelstein J observed (at 408–409): In arriving at this conclusion I have ignored the difference in language between s 420(1) which provides that the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and the definitions which refer to a body that is required to apply the laws of evidence. I do not regard this difference in expression as material. Each expression is apt to refer to the same subject namely matters that are or are not admissible in a proceeding and the method by which those matters are placed before a decision-maker … Further, I do not regard the fact that the Tribunal is obliged to observe certain rules that are sometimes called rules of evidence as affecting my conclusion. The rules that I have in mind are the various privileges that may be relied upon to exclude evidence being led before the Tribunal. The privileges are legal professional privilege, the privilege against self incrimination and what was once referred to as Crown privilege but is now known as public interest immunity. While each of these privileges is commonly regarded as part of the rules of evidence, they have application to a proceeding before the Tribunal not because they are rules of evidence but because they are fundamental principles of the common law that are capable of being exercised not only in curial proceedings but in administrative and investigative proceedings as well.

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Similarly, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and this Act does not apply to it (and common law doctrines such as public interest immunity do3). In Cabal v United Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311; [2001] FCA 427, the Full Court of the Federal Court held (at [189]) that proceedings for review in the Federal Court of extradition proceedings under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) were subject to the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995, notwithstanding the fact that the Act did not apply to the initial proceedings brought before a magistrate (since the magistrate was not exercising judicial power but acting as a persona designata in judicial proceedings). The word “proceeding” is not defined in the Act. It has been held that an examination conducted by a court under s 596B of the Corporations Act 2001 (and other similar provisions in Div 1, Pt 5.9) is such a “proceeding” even though it is “not like usual court proceedings and is in the nature of a facilitated investigation by one party”.4 The winding up of an insolvent company by a liquidator appointed by the court is a process which is ultimately subject to the

1. Thus, it does not apply to those tribunals, such as the AAT, which are not required to apply the rules of evidence. 2. See Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 47 ALD 555; 150 ALR 397. 3. See Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Guo [2016] FCAFC 62. 4. Re Interchase Corp Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 481 at 487 per Kiefel J; see also Re Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (2002) 168 FLR 116; 194 ALR 101; [2002] NSWSC 215 at [103] per Campbell J (liquidator’s examination is a “proceeding”); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Currockbilly (2002) 172 FLR 99; [2002] NSWSC 1061 at 108; [48].

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[EA.4.150]

5

control of the court and is a proceeding in the court. However, a narrower view has been taken by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Griffın v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209; 207 ALR 169; [2004] FCAFC 113 when it held that an examination under s 81 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) was not a “proceeding” for the purposes of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Allsop J (with whom Ryan J and Heerey J agreed) stated at 259-260; [198]–[207]:

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The word “proceedings” is capable of wide and flexible application. In the Evidence Act, however, the proceedings contemplated are those conducted by a court, or by a person or by a body who or which is required to apply the laws of evidence. … [Paragraph 57 in] the Final Report of the Australian Law Reform Commission Report on Evidence (No 38) … makes clear that it is proceedings “whenever evidence is to be adduced”. It is not easy to see how an examination under s 81 is such a proceeding. It is not between parties. It is not the resolution or agitation of a lis at which evidence is adduced under the rules of evidence. It does not have parties or witnesses properly so-called. It is an interrogation – a fact-finding exercise of the kind discussed by Lord Hanworth MR in In Re Paget; Ex parte Offıcial Receiver [1927] 2 Ch 85. The notes or transcript of the “evidence given at the examination” (see s 81(17)) can be used as evidence, but the “evidence” is only the answers on oath to an interrogation by the trustee or creditor. … The examination may be a proceeding for the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. It does not follow that it is a proceeding in which it is intended that evidence be adduced from witnesses. … In my view, s 128 of the Evidence Act, along with the other provisions of the Evidence Act, does and do not apply to an examination under s 81.

Allsop J expressly disagreed with the view of Kiefel J in Re Interchase Corp Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 481, noted above, that an examination under s 596B of the Corporations Law was a proceeding for the purpose of the Evidence Act 1995. In Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; 224 ALR 588; 56 ACSR 487; [2005] NSWCA 444 Basten JA noted the differing approaches but concluded at 56 (NSWLR); [76] that it was not necessary to resolve them given the operation of the NSW Supreme Court Rules 1970.6 It has also been held that the Act does not apply to cost assessments by costs assessors where they do not act as officers of the court and have no power to take sworn evidence.7 In ALRC 102, after citing the judgment of Allsop J in Griffın v Pantzer, it was stated at para 2.77: Hence, the present state of the law seems to be that “proceedings” in s 4(1) of the uniform Evidence Acts encompasses any step in a suit or action where there is an issue between parties in dispute and the suit or action involves evidence “adduced under the rules of evidence”.

However, it was proposed that the words “in relation” which appeared in various sub-sections of this provision prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102 5. Rosseau Pty Ltd (in liq) v Jay-O-Bees Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 50 ACSR 565; [2004] NSWSC 818; De Bortoli Wines Pty Ltd v HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) (2011) 200 FCR 253; 281 ALR 454; [2011] FCA 645 at [29]. 6. Rule 13 “applies where a question is put to a person in the course of examination before … any examiner, referee, arbitrator or other person authorised to receive evidence”. However, in De Bortoli Wines Pty Ltd v HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) (2011) 200 FCR 253; 281 ALR 454; [2011] FCA 645 Stone J held at [29]–[38] that while the narrower approach might be appropriate in the context of the application of the privilege against self-incrimination, it should not be applied in the context of the admissibility of business records. 7. Ryan v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184; [2000] NSWSC 354. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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should be deleted on the basis that they are an example of “verbosity in prepositions” (para 2.81). It was observed at para 2.80 that “the evidentiary rules prescribed in the uniform Evidence Acts have been held incapable of application otherwise than in the course of a hearing of a proceeding in a court”, with the consequence that “there is no ‘proceeding’ outside of the courts identified in s 4 to which the ‘proceedings’ can ‘relate’.” This explanation for the deletion of the words is echoed in the Explanatory Memoranda. As indicated in Note 3 to s 4(1), some provisions of the Act apply to all Australian courts. These provisions are: • s 5, considered below, which extends the operation of a number of provisions to all proceedings in an Australian court (as defined); • s 185, which requires “full faith and credit” to be given to “all public acts, records and judicial proceedings of a State or Territory that are proved or authenticated in accordance with this Act”; • s 186, which deals with the swearing of affidavits for use in Australian courts exercising federal jurisdiction or similar jurisdiction;

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• s 187, which abolishes the privilege against self-incrimination for bodies corporate in all proceedings “under a law of the Commonwealth or the Australian Capital Territory or in a proceeding in a federal court or an ACT court”.

[EA.4.180] General comments [NSW and Victorian Acts only] The NSW Act applies to proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court, any other court created by the NSW Parliament (including such a court exercising federal jurisdiction) and any person or body that “in exercising a function under the law of the State, is required to apply the laws of evidence”: see [EA.4.90]. The Victorian Act applies in substantially the same way: see [EA.4.120]. Of course, this is subject to a provision in another Act providing otherwise (see [EA.4.300]). In regard to the meaning of the term “proceeding”, see the discussion in [EA.4.150] above. As to the meaning of the term “court created by the NSW Parliament”, it has been held that the NSW Coroners Court, while it was a court and ultimately had a purely statutory jurisdiction by 1980, is not a “court created by Parliament”: I consider that the phrase “created by Parliament” means “created by Parliament as such” so that it is rather a formal definition than a descriptive one. If this be correct, it is clear from the legislation to which I have referred that the coroner’s court is not created by Parliament in the sense of the definition. Even if the conclusion stated above be incorrect, I do not consider that the termination of the prior jurisdiction of the coroner’s court by the 1980 Act and its replacement involves the creation of a new court. Whilst the substitutionary process is undoubtedly very significant, its demonstration does not conclude the matter. On balance, I am of the view that the characteristic jurisdiction of the coroner’s court was essentially continued although those functions which earlier depended upon the common law (and it may have been that most of them did) were adopted by the statute and given Parliamentary authority. 58

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However, I think that the court as an institution of public justice continued and its legislative history did not lead to the creation of a court by Parliament.8

Even where the Act does not apply to initial proceedings, it may apply to subsequent proceedings by way of review or appeal.9

[EA.4.210] Bail proceedings Under s 9(2)(b) of the Commonwealth Act it is provided that “this Act does not affect a law of a State or Territory so far as the law relates to … bail”. Section 94(2) provides that Pt 3.6 (Tendency and Coincidence) of the Act does not apply so far as a proceeding relates to bail. Section 31 of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) provides that, in general, a “bail authority ... is not bound by the principles or rules of law regarding the admission of evidence”. In Victoria, s 8(1) of the Bail Act 1977 provides that the court “may make such inquiries on oath or otherwise of and concerning the accused as the court considers desirable” (subject to limitations on questioning the accused), and permits the informant or prosecutor to, “in addition to any other relevant evidence, submit evidence, whether by affidavit or otherwise”. However, s 8(2) expressly maintains the application of Part 3.10 (Privileges) of this Act.

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[EA.4.240]

Interlocutory proceedings

While the Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Acts apply to “interlocutory proceedings” and proceedings “of a similar kind”, it should be noted that s 9(1) of the Commonwealth Act provides that the Act “does not affect any Australian law so far as the law relates to a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding”. Similarly, s 9(2)(c) of the NSW Act and the Victorian Act provides that the Act: does not affect the operation of [a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act applies] so far as it relates to … (c) a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding.

See, generally, [EA.9.180]. The term “interlocutory proceedings” is discussed at [EA.75.60].

[EA.4.270]

Sentencing proceedings

Apart from those provisions of the Commonwealth Act which apply to proceedings in all Australian courts, the Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Acts only apply in sentencing proceedings to the extent that the sentencing court directs: s 4(1)(d), (2). Section 4(3) and (4) provide for the circumstances in which such a direction should be made. Considerable discretion is conferred on the sentencing court. It has been held that, where sentencing proceedings follow a trial, the provisions of the Act should apply.10 Section 94(2) provides that Pt 3.6 (Tendency and Coincidence) of the Act does not apply so far as a proceeding 8. Decker v State Coroner (NSW) (1999) 46 NSWLR 415; [1999] NSWSC 369 at [16]–[17] per Adams J. In contrast, the Children’s Court is a court created by Parliament: TS v Constable Courtney James [2014] NSWSC 984 at [20]. 9. Cabal v United Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311; [2001] FCA 427 at [189]; Dutton v O’Shane [2002] NSWSC 1086 at [104]–[106] per James J. 10. R v Lewis (unreported, NSW SC, Dowd J, 25 October 1996). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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relates to sentencing. If a direction is not made under s 4, the common law relating to evidence continues to apply (except to the extent that it has been affected by other statutory provisions).11

[EA.4.300] Other proceedings where the Act does not apply Section 8 provides that this Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act. It follows that the rules of evidence established by this Act will not apply to a proceeding where a provision in another Act provides otherwise. Note 4 to s 4 of the Victorian Act gives specific examples of provisions in other Victorian Acts which relieve courts from the obligation to apply the rules of evidence in certain proceedings.

Cth Act: 5

Extended application of certain provisions

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The provisions of this Act referred to in the Table apply to all proceedings in an Australian court, including proceedings that: (a) relate to bail; or (b) are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind; or (c) are heard in chambers; or (d) relate to sentencing. TABLE Provisions of this Act Subsection 70(2) Section Section Section Section

143 150 153 154

Section Section Section Section Section Section

155 155A 157 158 159 163

Section 182

Subject matter Evidence of tags and labels in Customs prosecutions and Excise prosecutions Matters of law Seals and signatures Gazettes and other official documents Documents published by authority of Parliaments etc. Official records Commonwealth documents Public documents relating to court processes Evidence of certain public documents Official statistics Proof of letters having been sent by Commonwealth agencies Commonwealth records, postal articles sent by Commonwealth agencies and certain Commonwealth documents

11. R v Bourchas (2002) 113 A Crim R 413; [2002] NSWCCA 373; Farkas v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 141 at [14].

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Note: Australian court is defined in the Dictionary to cover all courts in Australia. The definition extends to persons and bodies that take evidence or that are required to apply the laws of evidence. [S 5 am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 25 and 26; Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 2 item 2; Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 items 1 and 2]

NSW Act: 5

Extended application of certain provisions

Note: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision that extends the application of specified provisions of the Commonwealth Act to proceedings in all Australian courts.

Vic Act: 5

Extended application of certain provisions

Note: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision that extends the application of specified provisions of that Act to proceedings in all Australian courts.

ACT Act: 5

Extended application of certain provisions

Note: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision extending the application of stated provisions of the Commonwealth Act to proceedings in all Australian courts.

NT Act: 5

Extended application of certain provisions

Note for section 5: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision that extends the application of specified provisions of that Act to proceedings in all Australian courts.

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[EA.5.30] Definitions [Cth Act only] The term “Australian court” is defined in the Dictionary: “Australian court” means: (a) the High Court; or (b) a court exercising federal jurisdiction; or (c) a court of a State or Territory; or (d) a judge, justice or arbitrator under an Australian law; or (e) a person or body authorised by an Australian law, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence; or (f) a person or body that, in exercising a function under an Australian law, is required to apply the laws of evidence.

It has been held12 that the Refugee Review Tribunal is not a body that is required to apply the laws of evidence, because s 420(1) of the Migration Act 1958 provides that the Tribunal is “not bound by … rules of evidence” (see [EA.4.150]). On the other hand: the Tribunal is a body that is authorised by an Australian law, the Migration Act, to hear, receive and examine evidence: see the discussion of the powers and functions of the Tribunal earlier in these reasons. It follows that the Tribunal is an Australian court in accordance with para (e) of the definition of that court.13 12. Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 47 ALD 555; 150 ALR 397 at 408 per Finkelstein J. 13. Epeabaka at 409. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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However, it was also held that the proceedings of the Tribunal were not governed by the tabled provisions in s 5(1) (see [EA.8.60]).

Cth Act: 6

Territories This Act extends to each external Territory.

[S 6 am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 27]

NSW Act: 6

Territories

Note: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision extending that Act to each external Territory.

Vic Act: 6

Territories

Note: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision extending that Act to each external Territory.

ACT Act: 6

Territories

Note: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision extending that Act to each external territory.

NT Act:

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6

Territories

Note for section 6: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision extending that Act to each external Territory.

[EA.6.30] General comments It follows that those provisions of the Commonwealth Act that extend to all Australian courts apply to courts in each external Territory.

Cth Act: 7

Act binds Crown This Act binds the Crown in all its capacities.

[S 7 am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 28]

NSW Act: 7

Act binds Crown This Act binds the Crown in right of New South Wales and also, so far as the legislative power of Parliament permits, in all its other capacities.

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Vic Act: 7

Act binds Crown This Act binds the Crown in right of Victoria and, in so far as the legislative power of Parliament permits, the Crown in all its other capacities. ACT Act: 7

Act binds Crown

Note: The Commonwealth Act and NSW Act include a provision binding the Crown. The provision is unnecessary in the ACT (see Legislation Act, s 121).

NT Act: 7

Act binds Crown

This Act binds the Crown in right of the Territory and, to the extent the legislative power of the Legislative Assembly permits, the Crown in all its other capacities.

[EA.7.30] General comments

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In New South Wales v Public Transport Ticketing Corp [2011] NSWCA 60 the NSW Court of Appeal held that, taking into account this provision in the NSW Act, the State of New South Wales is a “person” for the purposes of ss 130 and 131A of the Act (Allsop P, Hodgson JA and Sackville AJA agreeing, at [39]).

Cth Act: 8

Operation of other Acts etc.

(1) This Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act, other than sections 68, 79, 80 and 80A of the Judiciary Act 1903. (2) This Act does not affect the operation of regulations that: (a) are made under an Act other than this Act; and (b) are in force on the commencement of this section. However, this subsection ceases to apply to a regulation once it is amended after that commencement. (3) This Act has effect subject to the Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001. [Subs (3) am Act 55 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3 item 174; Act 156 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 12 item 24]

(4) [Repealed] [Subs (4) rep Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 12]

(5) [Repealed] [Subs (5) rep Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 12]

(6) [Repealed] [Subs (6) rep Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 12 and 29] [S 8 am Act 113 of 2015; Act 55 of 2001; Act 156 of 1999] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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NSW Act: 8

Operation of other Acts This Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act.

Note: The Commonwealth Act includes additional subsections relating to the operation of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 of the Commonwealth and certain laws in force in the ACT. It also provides for the regulations to have continued effect (until amended) after the commencement of the Commonwealth section. [S 8 am Act 34 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 4.17[1]]

Vic Act: 8

Operation of Acts This Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act.

Note: The Commonwealth Act includes additional subsections relating to the operation of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 of the Commonwealth and certain laws in force in the Australian Capital Territory. It also provides for the regulations to have continued effect (until amended) after the commencement of the Commonwealth section.

ACT Act: 8

Operation of other Acts This Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act.

Examples:

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1 Bail Act 1992, s 19(2) 2 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991, ch 5 Note 1: This section differs from the Commonwealth Act, s 8. Differences include additional subsections relating to the operation of the Corporations Act and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). Note 2: An example is part of the Act, is not exhaustive and may extend, but does not limit, the meaning of the provision in which it appears (see Legislation Act, s 126 and s 132). [S 8 am Act 40 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 1[1.13]; Act 48 of 2011, s 3 and Sch 1[1.25] and [1.26]]

NT Act: 8

Operation of Acts This Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act.

Note for section 8: The Commonwealth Act includes additional subsections relating to the operation of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) and certain laws in force in the Australian Capital Territory. It also provides for the regulations to have continued effect (until amended) after the commencement of the Commonwealth section.

[EA.8.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 14.

[EA.8.60] General comments [Cth Act only] It is suggested that the Commonwealth provision creates a hierarchy among Commonwealth laws: 64

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[EA.8.60]

1. The provisions of other Commonwealth laws (except ss 68, 79, 80 and 80A of the Judiciary Act 1903) and of regulations which were in force on the commencement of this Act (and until they are amended) prevail over this Act. 2. This Act prevails over ss 68, 79, 80 and 80A of the Judiciary Act 1903, but they continue to operate subject to any inconsistency with this Act.

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In respect of the first point, the meaning of the proposition that the Evidence Act“does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act” (other than parts of the Judiciary Act 1903) was considered by Finkelstein J in the Federal Court in Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 47 ALD 555; 150 ALR 397 at 409 in relation to the possible application of s 150 of the Evidence Act 1995 to the Refugee Review Tribunal by reason of s 5 of the Act, on the assumption that the Tribunal fell within the definition of an “Australian court” (see [EA.5.30]). He observed: Section 8(1) is one of a number of provisions in Pt 1.2 which are concerned with the application of the Evidence Act. The subsection provides that the Evidence Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act. The question thus raised is whether s 8(1) prevents the tabled provisions in s 5(1) having application to proceedings before the Tribunal. The scope of operation of s 8(1) is not clear. There will be no difficulty in applying the sub-section in the case where a provision of the Evidence Act is directly inconsistent with the provision of some other enactment. In that event the provision of that other enactment will prevail. But what if there is no direct inconsistency. Some indication of how s 8(1) is to operate in that circumstance may be gathered from s 9(1). … When s 8(1) and s 9(1) are considered together the legislative intention that is disclosed is that where a court, whether it is an Australian court or a federal court, is not required to observe the rules of evidence the Evidence Act will not operate so as to impose that obligation. Here again reference should be made to s 420(1) of the Migration Act which provides that the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. If a proceeding before the Tribunal was governed by s 150 the Tribunal would be required to receive a particular document as part of the evidence in a proceeding before it when it would not be required to do so if s 420(1) was the sole provision that applied. Thus there is, in a general sense, an inconsistency between the two provisions. It follows, in my opinion, that s 8(1) renders s 5(1) inapplicable to proceedings before the Tribunal.

This analysis was accepted as correct by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Commissioner of Patents v Sherman (2008) 172 FCR 394; [2008] FCAFC 182 at [16]. It follows that the Evidence Act“does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act” (other than parts of the Judiciary Act 1903) where there is any direct or implied inconsistency.14 For further discussion of this issue, see commentary on the NSW provision, below. In respect of the second point, it may be noted that s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 provides: The laws of each State or Territory, including the laws relating to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State or Territory in all cases to which they are applicable. 14. See also Re Schofield; Ex parte Rangott v P & B Baron Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 280 at 285–286 per Finn J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The issue is the extent to which this Act “otherwise provides”. As Basten JA stated in Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; 224 ALR 588; 56 ACSR 487; [2005] NSWCA 444 at 55 (NSWLR); [71]: … the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) may “otherwise provide” in relation to the State Evidence Act. That Act does not, however, apply except in relation to “proceedings in a federal court or an ACT court”: s 4(1). It is not a Commonwealth law which otherwise provides for present purposes.

In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373, Barr and Hall JJ observed at [722] that the requirement in s 31(1) of the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) that “it would be reasonable to conclude” that a person acted for a specified purpose was an example of legislation that “otherwise provides” to s 141 of the Evidence Act (which provides that a prosecution case must be proved beyond reasonable doubt) so that, in that respect, s 141 was not picked up by s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 for the purposes of a federal prosecution in a NSW court. For proceedings in a federal court, in respect of the rules of admissibility it appears clear that this Act effectively covers the field to the exclusion of State and Territory law (including common law) since s 56(1) provides:

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Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding.

See the Introduction at [EA.Intro.120]. Thus, federal courts will only apply the rules of admissibility in this Act. For this reason, Branson J held in Violi v Berrivale Orchards Ltd (2000) 99 FCR 580; 173 ALR 818; [2000] FCA 797 at [45] that the intent behind s 138 (in Chapter 3 of the Act) was inconsistent with the continued operation of s 13 of the Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) in the Federal Court.15 Similarly, the rules relating to the competence and compellability of witnesses (Div 1 of Pt 2.1) cover the field16 since s 12 provides: Except as otherwise provided by this Act: (a) every person is competent to give evidence; and (b) a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is compellable to give that evidence.

See Hazledine v Arthur J Gallagher & Co Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 1271 at [10]. In respect of other areas of evidence law, State and Territory law will not be applied by federal courts where that law is inconsistent with the Act. Other State and Territory courts will apply those parts of this Act which apply to all Australian courts. These general observations must be qualified by those specific provisions in the Evidence Act and regulations which provide that some State and Territory laws continue to operate despite any inconsistency with this Act: • s 8(3) – Corporations Act 2001 and ASIC Law; • s 9(1) – a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding; 15. See also Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Westfarmers General Insurance Ltd (No 4) (2010) 268 ALR 108; 55 MVR 391; [2010] FCA 482 at [151]. 16. See R v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465; [2000] NSWCCA 83 at [50]; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 2) (2000) 100 FCR 229; [2000] FCA 1010 at [84] per von Doussa J.

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[EA.8.90]

• s 9(2) – laws relating to admissibility of evidence of jury deliberations (s 9(2)(a)); bail (s 9(2)(b)); and any requirement for admission of evidence in support of an alibi (s 9(2)(c)); • s 9(3) – laws providing for the operation of a legal or evidential presumption (except so far as this Act is, expressly or by necessary intendment, inconsistent with the presumption); the admissibility of a document to depend on whether stamp duty has been paid; a requirement that notice must be given before evidence may be adduced; the evidentiary effect to be given to a document issued under that State or Territory law; or proof of title to property.

[EA.8.90] General comments [NSW and Victorian Acts only]

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The prevailing view in NSW is that s 8 ensures that this Act does not affect the operation of any other NSW Act, so that in the event that a provision of this Act is inconsistent with the provision of some other enactment, the other enactment will prevail. The same approach has been taken in Victoria.17 Thus, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal rejected an argument that s 409 of the Crimes Act 1900 (which is now found re-enacted in s 289 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)) was impliedly repealed by the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), particularly s 65.18 It has been held that the effect of s 8 is that s 128 of the Act does not apply to coroner’s courts in NSW because s 33 of the Coroners Act 1980 was “in substance inconsistent with the procedure for giving certificates set out in s 128 of the Act”.19 Similarly, it has been held that s 131 (dealing with settlement negotiations) does not apply to “the special process of settlement negotiation provided by a mediation ordered by the [Supreme] Court under the provisions of Pt 7B of the Supreme Court Act [NSW]”.20 In Punch v Council of the NSW Bar Assn (2007) 69 NSWLR 485; [2007] NSWCA 93 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that s 138 (dealing with improperly or unlawfully obtained evidence) did not apply to evidence of “a private conversation [that] has inadvertently or unexpectedly come to the knowledge of a person as a result, direct or indirect, of the use of a listening device pursuant to a warrant granted under Pt 4 of the Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW)”. There is some apparently contrary authority in the Federal Court. In McNeill v The Queen (2008) 168 FCR 198; [2008] FCAFC 80, the Full Court of the Federal Court (Black CJ, Lander and Besanko JJ) heard an appeal from the Supreme 17. See Director of Public Prosecutions v Gibson (2012) 61 MVR 261; [2012] VSC 297 at [24]–[31]. 18. R v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8; [2000] NSWCCA 303 at [19]–[22] per Studdert J. 19. Decker v State Coroner (NSW) (1999) 46 NSWLR 415; [1999] NSWSC 369 at [22] per Adams J. Section 33 provided as follows: “A coroner holding an inquest or inquiry shall not be bound to observe the rules of procedure and evidence applicable to proceedings before a court of law, but no witness shall be compelled to answer any question which criminates the witness, or tends to criminate the witness, of any felony, misdemeanour or offence.” However, the Coroners Act was later amended to adopt the procedure in s 128. 20. Rajski v Tectran Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 476; see also Azzi v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 375; (2007) 71 NSWLR 140. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Court of Norfolk Island. Section 8 of the Evidence Act 2004(NI) is in identical terms to s 8 in the NSW Act. The Full Court concluded that s 410 of the Criminal Law Act 1960 (NI) was inconsistent with the terms of Ch 3 of the Evidence Act 2004 (NI), particularly s 138, and held at [76] that s 410 was impliedly repealed. It has to be said that the analysis of the Full Court is unpersuasive. There was no reference to contrary NSW authority. While some reference was certainly made to s 8 at [53]–[58], the Full Court appears to have relied on general statements of principle regarding inconsistent enactments, without giving effect to the terms of this provision.21 However, in a judgment later in 2008, Commissioner of Patents v Sherman (2008) 172 FCR 394; [2008] FCAFC 182, the Full Court of the Federal Court, without reference to McNeill, accepted at [16] in obiter dicta that the effect of s 8 is that where a provision of this Act is expressly and directly inconsistent with the provision of some other enactment, the provision of the other enactment will prevail.

Cth Act: 8A Application of the Criminal Code Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code applies to all offences against this Act. Note: Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code sets out the general principles of criminal responsibility. [S 8A am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 30 and 31; insrt Act 24 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 25 item 1]

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ACT Act: 8A Offences against Act—application of Criminal Code etc Other legislation applies in relation to offences against this Act. Note 1 Criminal Code: The Criminal Code, ch 2 applies to all offences against this Act (see Code, pt 2.1). The chapter sets out the general principles of criminal responsibility (including burdens of proof and general defences), and defines terms used for offences to which the Code applies (eg conduct, intention, recklessness and strict liability). Note 2 Penalty units: The Legislation Act, s 133 deals with the meaning of offence penalties that are expressed in penalty units. Note 3: This section differs from the Commonwealth Act, s 8A.

NT Act: 8A Application of Criminal Code An offence against this Act is an offence to which Part IIAA of the Criminal Code applies. Notes for section 8A: 1 Part IIAA of the Criminal Code states the general principles of criminal responsibility, establishes general defences, and deals with burden of proof. It also defines, or elaborates on, certain concepts commonly used in the creation of offences. 2 Section 8A is not included in the NSW Act and Victorian Act.

21. It may be noted that s 410 was based on an identical provision in the NSW Crimes Act 1900. There is no doubt that the NSW provision is repealed but not because of any inconsistency with the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The provision was expressly repealed in 1995 by the Evidence (Consequential and Other Provisions) Act 1995 (NSW).

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Cth Act: 9

Effect of Act on other laws

(1) For the avoidance of doubt, this Act does not affect an Australian law so far as the law relates to a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding.

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(2) For the avoidance of doubt, this Act does not affect a law of a State or Territory so far as the law relates to: (a) admission or use of evidence of reasons for a decision of a member of a jury, or of the deliberations of a member of a jury in relation to such a decision, in a proceeding by way of appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence of the relevant court; or (b) bail; or (c) any requirement for admission of evidence in support of an alibi. (3) For the avoidance of doubt, this Act does not affect a law of a State or Territory so far as the law provides for: (a) the operation of a legal or evidential presumption (except so far as this Act is, expressly or by necessary intendment, inconsistent with the presumption); or (b) the admissibility of a document to depend on whether stamp duty has been paid; or (c) a requirement that notice must be given before evidence may be adduced; or (d) evidentiary effect to be given to a certificate or other document issued under that or any other law of the State or Territory; or (e) proof of title to property (other than by a means provided for by this Act that is applicable to proof of title to property). [Subs (3) am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 32] [S 9 am Act 113 of 2015]

NSW Act: 9

Application of common law and equity

(1) This Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), this Act does not affect the operation of such a principle or rule so far as it relates to any of the following: (a) admission or use of evidence of reasons for a decision of a member of a jury, or of the deliberations of a member of a jury in relation to such a decision, in a proceeding by way of appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence of a court, (b) the operation of a legal or evidential presumption that is not inconsistent with this Act, (c) a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s9

Note: This section differs from section 9 of the Commonwealth Act. That section preserves the written and unwritten laws of States and Territories in relation to various matters.

Vic Act: 9

Application of common law and equity

(1) This Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), this Act does not affect the operation of such a principle or rule so far as it relates to any of the following— (a) admission or use of evidence of reasons for a decision of a member of a jury, or of the deliberations of a member of a jury in relation to such a decision, in a proceeding by way of appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence of a court; (b) the operation of a legal or evidential presumption that is not inconsistent with this Act; (c) a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding. Note: This section differs from section 9 of the Commonwealth Act. That section preserves the written and unwritten laws of States and Territories in relation to various matters.

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9

Application of common law and equity

(1) This Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), this Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule mentioned in subsection (1) so far as it relates to any of the following: (a) admission or use of evidence of reasons for a decision of a member of a jury, or of the deliberations of a member of a jury in relation to the decision, in a proceeding by way of appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence of a court; (b) the operation of a legal or evidential presumption that is not inconsistent with this Act; (c) a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding. Note: This section differs from the Commonwealth Act, s 9. That section preserves the written and unwritten laws of States and Territories in relation to certain matters.

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[EA.9.90]

NT Act: 9

Application of common law and equity

(1) This Act does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), this Act does not affect the operation of such a principle or rule so far as it relates to any of the following: (a) admission or use of evidence of reasons for a decision of a member of a jury, or of the deliberations of a member of a jury in relation to such a decision, in a proceeding by way of appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence of a court; (b) the operation of a legal or evidential presumption that is not inconsistent with this Act; (c) a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence or procedure in an interlocutory proceeding. Note for section 9: This section differs from section 9 of the Commonwealth Act. That section preserves the written and unwritten laws of States and Territories in relation to various matters.

[EA.9.30] ALRC references

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ALRC 38, s 15.

[EA.9.60] General comments The Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian provisions make it clear that the Act does not affect existing law relating to a number of matters (including admission of jury deliberations on appeal, presumptions which are not inconsistent with the Act and a court’s power to dispense with the rules of evidence and procedure in interlocutory proceedings). The Commonwealth provision extends this to other matters in s 9(3).

[EA.9.90] Application of common law and equity [NSW, Victoria, ACT, NT, Tas] The effect of s 9(1) is to retain the common law of evidence, “except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment”. It is suggested that the Act does provide otherwise in respect of the areas of competence and compellability of witnesses and admissibility of evidence (see [EA.8.60]). In those areas, the Act is intended to cover the field (to operate as a “code”) and any common law rules are abrogated (see [EA.Intro.120]). In other areas of evidence law, only common law rules of evidence which are inconsistent with provisions of the Act are not retained. Thus, for example, it may be assumed that the provisions of the Act do not over-ride “the underlying principle of the accusatorial and adversarial system that it is for the prosecution to put its case

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s9

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both fully and fairly before the jury, before the accused is called on to announce the course that will be followed at trial”.22 In Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty; Harkins v Butcher (2002) 55 NSWLR 558; [2002] NSWCA 237 at [15], Handley JA (Beazley and Hodgson JJA agreeing) considered that this provision preserved the common law rule relating to an admission by a predecessor in title. As Handley JA observed, the Evidence Act 1995 makes no explicit provision for the reception of such admissions. However, his conclusion appears to be wrong. Part 3.4 of the Act deals with the admissibility of admissions and it is clear that it was intended to cover the field. The fact that there is no provision for admissions by a predecessor in title indicates that it was intended to abolish that hearsay exception. The absence of such an exception in Pt 3.4 has the effect that the evidence is rendered inadmissible by s 59 unless, of course, some other hearsay exception applies. This was certainly the intention of the ALRC (see [EA.81.180]). As regards the content of the principles or rules of common law or equity, Basten JA has observed:

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On one view, s 9 may be understood to refer to the “common law or equity” as understood at the time of its enactment. However, it does not seek to prevent developments in such general law principles, which developments will not be limited to a prospective operation. Nor should the section be understood as purporting to freeze the general law in relation to evidence as at the date of its commencement of operation. Rather, common law principles may continue to develop, subject to the qualification that a development which is inconsistent with the express terms of the Evidence Act, or its necessary intendment, will not have effect “in a proceeding to which [the Evidence Act] applies”.23

[EA.9.120] Deliberations of a jury (s 9(2)(a)) It is a well established common law rule that the deliberations of a jury must remain secret so that a court may only receive evidence of matters which are regarded as “extrinsic” to the jury’s deliberations.24 However, the High Court has held that there are qualifications to this exclusionary rule.25

[EA.9.150] Presumptions Legal and evidential presumptions created by other statutes, or arising under the common law, continue in force except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Act. An example of a common law presumption is the presumption of death where a person has been missing for at least seven years. This Act itself contains a number of presumptions relating to such matters as official records, attestation of documents and various forms of communication (see ss 146 – 163). 22. R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299; 196 ALR 421; [2003] HCA 13 at [27]; see [EA.43.210] and [EA.106.60]. 23. Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; 224 ALR 588; 56 ACSR 487; [2005] NSWCA 444 at [118]. 24. R v Rinaldi (1993) 30 NSWLR 605 at 613; R v Laws (2000) 116 A Crim R 70; [2000] NSWSC 885 at 75; R v K (2003) 59 NSWLR 431; 144 A Crim R 468; [2003] NSWCCA 406; see also R v Mirza [2004] 2 WLR 201; [2004] 1 All ER 925. 25. Smith v Western Australia (2014) 250 CLR 473; 88 ALJR 384; [2014] HCA 3.

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[EA.9.180]

[EA.9.180]

Interlocutory proceedings

The term “interlocutory proceedings” is discussed at [EA.75.60]. This provision does not create an independent statutory basis for dispensing with the operation of the rules of evidence. Rather, it recognises, so as not to affect, any rule of common law or in equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding insofar as it relates to a court’s power to dispense with the operation of a rule of evidence in an interlocutory proceeding.26 The view has been expressed that s 9(2)(c) in the NSW and Victorian Acts (which replicates s 9(1) in the Commonwealth Act): does no more than permit in interlocutory proceedings the admission of evidence which the Evidence Act says is not admissible: it does not overcome provisions of the Evidence Act which actually prohibit the tendering of certain evidence, as is the case with evidence affected by client legal privilege.27

However, no explanation was given for this distinction and it is not apparent from the words of the provision.

Cth Act: 10

Parliamentary privilege preserved

(1) This Act does not affect the law relating to the privileges of any Australian Parliament or any House of any Australian Parliament.

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(2) In particular, subsection 15(2) does not affect, and is in addition to, the law relating to such privileges. NSW Act: 10

Parliamentary privilege preserved

(1) This Act does not affect the law relating to the privileges of any Australian Parliament or any House of any Australian Parliament. (2) In particular, section 15(2) does not affect, and is in addition to, the law relating to such privileges. Vic Act: 10

Parliamentary privilege preserved

(1) This Act does not affect the law relating to the privileges of any Australian Parliament or any House of any Australian Parliament. (2) In particular, section 15(2) does not affect, and is in addition to, the law relating to such privileges.

26. International FinanceTrust Co Ltd v NSW Crime Commission [2008] NSWCA 291, Allsop P at [13] (Beazley JA agreeing at [56]). In Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals v Samsung Bioepis AU Pty Ltd (2017) 351 ALR 103; [2017] FCAFC 193, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that r 7.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) did not render this Act inapplicable (Allsop CJ at [79], Perram J at [156]–[157]). 27. Hodgson JA in R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 at [40]. Hodgson JA added that “in any event, there is no principle or rule of common law or equity that gives a court power in an interlocutory proceeding to dispense with the rules protecting legal professional privilege”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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ACT Act: 10 Parliamentary privilege preserved (1) This Act does not affect the law relating to the privileges of any Australian Parliament or any house of any Australian Parliament. (2) In particular, section 15(2) (Compellability—Sovereign and others) does not affect, and is in addition to, the law relating to those privileges. NT Act: 10

Parliamentary privilege preserved

(1) This Act does not affect the law relating to the privileges of any Australian Parliament or any House of any Australian Parliament. (2) In particular, section 15(2) does not affect, and is in addition to, the law relating to such privileges.

[EA.10.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 16.

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[EA.10.60] General comments Under parliamentary privilege, members of Parliament cannot, without the permission of Parliament, be compelled to testify regarding what happened in the Parliament.28 Further, the courts cannot inquire into the truth of what has been said in Parliament or into the motives of what was said.29 However, Hansard may be tendered to prove what was said in the course of a debate.30 It has been held that one consequence of parliamentary privilege is that Hansard reports of statements made to Parliament can only be tendered for the purpose of establishing that those words were said to Parliament and may not be used to prove the truth of anything stated in them for the purpose of determining the issues before a court.31

28. See Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; [1978] HCA 43 at 36-37 per Gibbs CJ. 29. R v Turnbull [1958] Tas SR 80; Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 287; Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369; Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 19 FCR 223; Stewart v Ronalds (2009) 76 NSWLR 99; 232 FLR 331; [2009] NSWCA 277. See also Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), s 16: Rowley v O’Chee (2000) 1 Qd R 207; R v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 2; [2003] VSCA 78; Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 3) (2009) 262 ALR 27; [2009] FCA 1283; Re OPEL Networks Pty Ltd (in liq) (2010) 77 NSWLR 128; [2010] NSWSC 142. 30. See Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369; R v Jackson (1987) 8 NSWLR 116. 31. Mees v Roads Corp (2003) 128 FCR 418; [2003] FCA 306 at [86] per Gray J.

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s 11

Part 1.2 - Application of this Act

NT Act: 10A Application of section 127A Despite any provision to the contrary in this Act or in any other Act, section 127A applies to all proceedings before the court or a judicial entity, irrespective of whether the judicial entity is required to apply the rules or laws of evidence. [S 10A insrt Act 7 of 2018, s 4]

Cth Act: 11

General powers of a court

(1) The power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by this Act, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. (2) In particular, the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected. NSW Act: 11

General powers of a court

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(1) The power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by this Act, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. (2) In particular, the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected. Vic Act: 11

General powers of a court

(1) The power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by this Act, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. (2) In particular, the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected. ACT Act: 11

General powers of a court

(1) The power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by this Act, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. (2) In particular, the powers of a court in relation to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected.

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s 11

NT Act: 11

General powers of a court

(1) The power of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by this Act, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. (2) In particular, the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected.

[EA.11.30]

ALRC References

ALRC 38, s 17.

[EA.11.60]

Powers of a court

The general powers of a court may be inherent or derived from legislation. The Federal Court, for example, has the incidental power to supervise its own proceedings32 and r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules provides that the “Court may make any order that the Court considers appropriate in the interests of justice”. However, this does not provide any basis for applying evidentiary rules which are inconsistent with other provisions of the Act.33

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[EA.11.90]

Abuse of process

As the majority of the High Court stated in Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, the inherent jurisdiction of a superior court to stay its proceedings on grounds of abuse of process “extends to all those categories of cases in which the processes and procedures of the court, which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness”.34 The jurisdiction has been considered in several High Court decisions.35 In the NSW Court of Appeal case of Van Der Lee v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 286, it was held that the powers of a court with respect to abuse of 32. See Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486 at 498-499, 501-502). 33. See Lane v Jurd (No 2) (1995) 40 NSWLR 708 at 709; R v Too (unreported, NSW SC, Badgery-Parker J, 26 July 1996); R v Richards (2001) 123 A Crim R 14; [2001] NSWCCA 160 at [40] per Grove J; Hague v Commissioner of Corrective Services (2008) 216 FLR 271; [2008] NSWSC 253 at [20] per Fullerton J. There is no inconsistency between a power to recall a witness and the terms of s 46 (which permits recall in a particular situation): Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4 (Bathurst CJ stated at [311]: “It does not seem to me that the conferral of a power to recall witnesses in particular circumstances necessarily implies that there is no power in other circumstances to do so. If the power of the court were to be limited in that fashion, it would be expected that it would be clearly stated”). 34. (1993) 177 CLR 380 at 392-393 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ. Various examples of abuse of process were given at 393. 35. Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75; Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19; [1995] HCA 66; Dupas v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 237; 203 A Crim R 186; [2010] HCA 20; Moti v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 456; 218 A Crim R 204; [2011] HCA 50.

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[EA.11.90]

process include its powers to receive evidence and may over-ride privilege. Hodgson JA (with whom Mason P and Santow JA agreed) held (at [62]):

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I think s 11(2) does have the effect that, when evidence is tendered that could be evidence of an abuse of process, albeit evidence of without prejudice settlement negotiations, the court may receive that evidence on the voir dire; and then, if that evidence does either by itself or in combination with other evidence establish an abuse of process, the court may rule the evidence admissible and make appropriate orders to deal with that abuse of process. In my opinion, the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process include its powers to receive evidence, and in my opinion the authorities relied on by the claimants show that, at common law, communications evidencing abuse of process will not be protected by without prejudice privilege. I do not think that s 131 provides otherwise, either expressly or by necessary intendment, particularly if s 132(2)(k) does not apply in cases of abuse of process.

It may be noted that, in ALRC 102, it was stated at para 2.86 that “[t]he last sentence of the above quotation supports the view that the test used in s 11(1) is to be read by implication into s 11(2)”. It appears to have been accepted that s 11(2) does not provide an absolute rule but, rather, the test used in s 11(1) should be read by implication into s 11(2). See also [EA.125.120] and [EA.131.600]. An attempt was made in Georgeski v Owners Corp SP49833 [2004] NSWSC 945 to extend these principles, beyond applications to stay or dismiss proceedings as an abuse of process, to proof of improper or collateral purpose as something to be taken into account as a discretionary matter in an eventual adjudication on the merits. Barrett J rejected the application of this provision in such circumstances, holding at [7] that “control by the court of ‘the conduct of a proceeding’ … is not apt to describe the process of allowing a proceeding to continue to its natural conclusion in an uninterrupted way”. In ALRC 102, consideration was given to the possible extension of s 11(2) to a general obligation to ensure a fair trial. However, it was stated at para 2.89: [T]he Commissions remain of the view that the obligation to ensure a fair trial is adequately enshrined in the common law and that the inclusion of such an obligation in the uniform Evidence Acts would be redundant and potentially counterproductive. Hence, the Commissions do not consider that an amendment to s 11(2) to ensure a fair trial is necessary.

Nevertheless, a question remains as to the effect of s 11(2). In Haddara v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 93; [2014] VSCA 100, Redlich and Weinberg JJA (Priest JA dissenting) held that the common law discretion to exclude any evidence, whether confessional or real, on the ground that to receive it would be unfair to a criminal defendant (in the sense that the trial would be unfair) continues to apply in UEL jurisdictions, on the basis that it is not caught by the operation of s 56(1). That interpretation of s 56(1) may be doubted (see general discussion at [EA.Intro.120]) but it is likely that the “powers of a court with respect to abuse of process in a proceeding” referred to in this provision would extend to exclusion of evidence on the basis that “it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence”. Thus, the High Court has repeatedly held that the inherent jurisdiction of courts extends to a power to stay proceedings in order “to prevent an abuse of process or the prosecution of a criminal proceeding ... which © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.11.90]

s 11

Chapter 1 - Preliminary 36

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will result in a trial which is unfair”. Further, the High Court has emphasised the “discretion” to exclude evidence to ensure “the fairness of the trial”.37 Even if s 11(2) does not provide an absolute rule, and the test used in s 11(1) should be read by implication into s 11(2)), it should be concluded that this Act does not affect either “expressly or by necessary intendment” a court’s power to avoid an unfair trial for a criminal defendant.

36. Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75 at 95–6. See also Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; [1992] HCA 57 at [7]. 37. R v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1 at 192.

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CHAPTER 2 – ADDUCING EVIDENCE CHAPTER 2 – GIVING AND PRESENTING EVIDENCE (ACT ONLY) Cth Act:

INTRODUCTORY NOTE Outline of this Chapter This Chapter is about ways in which evidence is adduced. Part 2.1 is about adducing evidence from witnesses. Part 2.2 is about adducing documentary evidence. Part 2.3 is about adducing other forms of evidence.

NSW Act: Introductory note:

Outline of this Chapter This Chapter is about ways in which evidence is adduced. Part 2.1 is about adducing evidence from witnesses. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Part 2.2 is about adducing documentary evidence. Part 2.3 is about adducing other forms of evidence.

Vic Act: Note:

Outline of this Chapter This Chapter is about ways in which evidence is adduced. Part 2.1 is about adducing evidence from witnesses. Part 2.2 is about adducing documentary evidence. Part 2.3 is about adducing other forms of evidence.

ACT Act: Note: This chapter • Pt 2.1 is • Pt 2.2 is • Pt 2.3 is

is about ways in which evidence is given and presented. about evidence from witnesses. about documentary evidence. about other forms of evidence.

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[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30]

Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence

NT Act: Introductory note Outline of this Chapter This Chapter is about ways in which evidence is adduced. Part 2.1 is about adducing evidence from witnesses. Part 2.2 is about adducing documentary evidence. Part 2.3 is about adducing other forms of evidence.

Part 2.1 – Witnesses [EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30]

General comments

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This Part is headed “Witnesses” and the Introductory Note to Ch 2 states that this Part “is about adducing evidence from witnesses”. The term “witness” is not defined in the Dictionary to the Act, other than to make clear that it can include a party to the proceedings (see cl 7 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary). Nevertheless, it is apparent that evidence from a “witness” is to be contrasted with “documentary evidence” (dealt with in Pt 2.2) and “other forms of evidence” (dealt with by Pt 2.3). Traditionally, evidence is adduced from a witness orally in court. Such evidence is commonly referred to as “testimony”. However, in civil proceedings it is very common for at least some of the evidence from a “witness” to be received in written form, either in an affidavit or another form of written statement. The question arises whether such affidavit evidence (or other written statement) is subject to the provisions in Pt 2.1. In Aneve Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2005] NSWCA 441, the NSW Court of Appeal upheld a decision to reject affidavit evidence and require the declarant to give evidence orally. Hodgson JA (Santow and Bryson JJA agreeing) stated at [70]–[71]: The use of affidavits for the purpose of evidence is not dealt with by the Evidence Act 1995. It is permissible because of various qualifications to the operation of the Act, particularly s 52, which is in the following terms: 52 Adducing of other evidence not affected This Act (other than this Part) does not affect the operation of any Australian law or rule of practice so far as it permits evidence to be adduced in a way other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence. The Evidence Act, like the common law, requires oral evidence in chief generally to be given in response to non-leading questions; and the desirability of this is particularly strong in the case of conversations where considerations of the type referred to in Watson v Foxman apply. It was open to the primary judge to require evidence of the vital conversations to be given orally, in response to non-leading questions, and to reject the account of those conversations given in the affidavits.

Notwithstanding the reference to UEL provisions with respect to non-leading questions (see s 37 in Pt 2.1), it appears to have been held that affidavit evidence is to be regarded as falling within the scope of Pt 2.3, rather than Pt 2.1 or Pt 2.2, with the consequence that the rules in respect of the adducing of such evidence are to be found not in the UEL but the common law, court rules and other applicable “Australian law or rule of practice”. The proposition that affidavit 80

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[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30]

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evidence may not fall within the scope of Pt 2.2 (documentary evidence) may be accepted because, technically, evidence by affidavit is given by being “read”.1 The document is not (at least usually) “tendered in evidence”.2 However, more problematic is the proposition that affidavit evidence does not fall within the scope of Pt 2.1. After all, the evidence is from a “witness” and it is adduced in court. Neither the heading of Pt 2.1 nor the Introductory Note to Ch 2 refer to “oral evidence from witnesses” or limit the application of the Part to “oral testimony”. It may be accepted that difficulties could arise in applying some of the provisions in Pt 2.1 to affidavit evidence or other evidence from a witness to be received in written form. The competence requirement for unsworn evidence that the court tell the witness certain things (s 13(5)) may present difficulties. There will be no “questioning” which the court can control (s 26). It is not necessarily the same as evidence given “in narrative form” (s 29(3)). However, these difficulties are not insuperable. The provisions of Pt 2.1 are not expressed in a way which clearly excludes affidavit or similar evidence from the application of the Part. Further, there are some Divisions of Pt 2.1 which were likely to have been intended to apply to affidavit or similar evidence. An example is Div 1, dealing with the “competence and compellability of witnesses”. The Division has made significant changes from the common law with respect to the determination of competence and it is implausible that those changes would have no application to a particular witness simply because the evidence of the witness is adduced in affidavit form rather than in oral testimony. It is equally implausible that the rules in Pt 2.1 only kick in when the witness is subject to cross-examination in the courtroom. Reference should also be made to s 37(3), which expressly refers to the possibility of a court “exercising power under rules of court to allow a written statement or report to be tendered or treated as evidence in chief of its maker”, thereby expressly incorporating written statements within the operational scope of Pt 2.1. Further, it should be noted that express provision is made for the competency provision in s 13 to apply to out-of-court hearsay representations (s 61). It was the clear intention that the competency provision in s 13 would apply generally in respect of any evidence of what a person said – whether as a “witness” or where evidence of what the person said is to be admitted into evidence. Finally, it should be noted that it is well established that s 128, which “applies if a witness objects to giving particular evidence” (s 128(1)), has application where affidavit evidence is sought to be read in court (see [EA.128.330]). Nevertheless, in Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26; [2013] FCA 1124, Perram J stated at [5]–[7]: To begin with the Evidence Act does not directly seek to regulate the giving of affidavit evidence. It contemplates three kinds of evidence. The first is the testimonial evidence given by witnesses in court. This is regulated by Part 2.1. Although Part 2.1 does not, in terms, say that it only applies to evidence given by witnesses in court, that is nevertheless a necessary implication from its terms. The part deals with a number of 1. See Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26; [2013] FCA 1124 at [10]. 2. However, see Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26; [2013] FCA 1124 at [14]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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topics which make no sense outside of a curial context (see, eg, those dealing with the compellability of witnesses (ss 12, 14–19)); or which are unworkable unless they take place in a courtroom, such as the provisions dealing with the competence of witnesses (see, eg, s 13(5) which requires the court to tell the witness certain matters); or which are meaningless outside a courtroom such as provisions authorising the court to make orders (s 26); or which simply assume that the evidence is given in a courtroom such as Division 3 (“General rules about giving evidence”), Division 4 (“Examination in chief and re-examination”) and Division 5 (“Cross-examination”). …The second kind of evidence is the admission of documents which is dealt with in Part 2.2 of the Evidence Act. Part 2.3 deals with the third category of evidence which, loosely speaking, is everything else. It is headed “Other Evidence”. Apart from regulating views (in ss 53, 54) Part 2.3 has no substantive content leaving the whole field to pre-existing law or practice. …

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It is suggested that some of these propositions are over-stated. Questions of compellability will simply not arise where a witness has agreed to provide an affidavit or other written statement to a party. A question of competence to give unsworn evidence will only arise where the person is not competent to give sworn evidence (s 13(5)), so the affidavit should not be received on that basis alone. Orders can be made by the court at the time when the attempt is made to adduce the affidavit evidence in court. Divisions 3–5 can be adapted to affidavit evidence.3 Further, Perram J acknowledged that there is conflicting authority. A number of judgments have held that an affidavit must comply with the requirements of s 21 (which requires that, in general, a witness must either take an oath or make an affirmation).4 In Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82; [2002] FCA 934 at [26], Lindgren J held that s 21(1) (which is located in Pt 2.1) applies even if the evidence of a witness is adduced in the form of a written statement – the statement must be sworn or affirmed. Perram J stated at [15] that he “respectfully disagree[d]” with this analysis, observing that “it is more likely, I think, that the requirements for how statements or affidavits are to be prepared is governed by s 52 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, derivatively by the [Court] Rules”. Yet, it is likely that it was the intention behind s 21 that, whenever evidence from a witness is to be given in a proceeding, whether orally or in some other form, the witness should generally be required to have either taken an oath or made an affirmation.

3. See, for example, Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia [2005] FCA 50 at [180]. 4. Kimberly-Clark Worldwide Inc v Goulimis [2008] FCA 1415; 253 ALR 76 at [3]; STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 528; [2010] FCA 1002; Micar Group Pty Ltd v Insul-Trade LLC [2010] NSWSC 1391 at [19]–[27] (although another statutory provision was held to permit receipt of the affidavit). See also Garning & Director-General, Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) [2012] FamCAFC 35 at [65]–[66].

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s 12

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1Div.1.60]

DIVISION 1 – COMPETENCE AND COMPELLABILITY OF WITNESSES DIVISION 2.1.1 – COMPETENCE AND COMPELLABILITY OF WITNESSES (ACT ONLY)

[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1Div.1.30] Summary of this Division This Division deals with the adducing of evidence from witnesses. Section 12 creates a presumption that all persons are competent to testify and may be compelled to do so. However, s 13 provides that certain persons lack the capacity to give sworn evidence although they may give unsworn evidence in certain circumstances. A witness may not be compellable to testify in certain circumstances. Special rules apply to Heads of State, parliamentarians, judges and jurors and, in criminal proceedings, defendants, their spouses, partners, parents and children.

[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1Div.1.60] Affidavits and written statements

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In Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26; [2013] FCA 1124, Perram J stated at [5] that Pt 2.1, including Div 1, only applies to evidence given by witnesses in court. For discussion of this issue generally, see [EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30].

Cth Act: 12

Competence and compellability Except as otherwise provided by this Act: (a) every person is competent to give evidence; and (b) a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is compellable to give that evidence.

NSW Act: 12

Competence and compellability Except as otherwise provided by this Act: (a) every person is competent to give evidence, and (b) a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is compellable to give that evidence.

Vic Act: 12

Competence and compellability Except as otherwise provided by this Act— (a) every person is competent to give evidence; and (b) a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is compellable to give that evidence.

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s 12

ACT Act: 12 Competence and compellability Except as otherwise provided by this Act— (a) every person is competent to give evidence; and (b) a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is compellable to give that evidence. NT Act: 12

Competence and compellability Except as otherwise provided by this Act: (a) every person is competent to give evidence; and (b) a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is compellable to give that evidence.

[EA.12.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 18, para 64; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 525.

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[EA.12.60] General comments The effect of this provision is that, as a primary position in all proceedings, all witnesses are both competent to give evidence and compellable to give evidence. The succeeding provisions (ss 13 to 19) provide exceptions to that general proposition. The words “competent to give evidence about a fact” appear in s 12(b) because such a formulation allows a court to decide, in accordance with Pt 2.1, that a witness is competent to give evidence about some facts but not others. Exceptions to compellability are not found only in the UEL. Other statutory provisions may render a person non-compellable. For example, in NSW5, a complainant in sexual offence proceedings is not compellable to give evidence at a retrial where a recording of his or her evidence from earlier proceedings is available.6

Cth Act: 13

Competence: lack of capacity

(1) A person is not competent to give evidence about a fact if, for any reason (including a mental, intellectual or physical disability): (a) the person does not have the capacity to understand a question about the fact; or (b) the person does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact; and that incapacity cannot be overcome.

5. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 306A–306G. 6. See also Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), Pt 8.2.

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s 13

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

Note: See sections 30 and 31 for examples of assistance that may be provided to enable witnesses to overcome disabilities.

(2) A person who, because of subsection (1), is not competent to give evidence about a fact may be competent to give evidence about other facts. (3) A person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is not competent to give sworn evidence about the fact if the person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence. (4) A person who is not competent to give sworn evidence about a fact may, subject to subsection (5), be competent to give unsworn evidence about the fact. (5) A person who, because of subsection (3), is not competent to give sworn evidence is competent to give unsworn evidence if the court has told the person: (a) that it is important to tell the truth; and (b) that he or she may be asked questions that he or she does not know, or cannot remember, the answer to, and that he or she should tell the court if this occurs; and (c) that he or she may be asked questions that suggest certain statements are true or untrue and that he or she should agree with the statements that he or she believes are true and should feel no pressure to agree with statements that he or she believes are untrue.

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(6) It is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that a person is not incompetent because of this section. (7) Evidence that has been given by a witness does not become inadmissible merely because, before the witness finishes giving evidence, he or she dies or ceases to be competent to give evidence. (8) For the purpose of determining a question arising under this section, the court may inform itself as it thinks fit, including by obtaining information from a person who has relevant specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience. [S 13 subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 3]

NSW Act: 13

Competence: lack of capacity

(1) A person is not competent to give evidence about a fact if, for any reason (including a mental, intellectual or physical disability): (a) the person does not have the capacity to understand a question about the fact, or (b) the person does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact, and that incapacity cannot be overcome. Note: See sections 30 and 31 for examples of assistance that may be provided to enable witnesses to overcome disabilities.

(2) A person who, because of subsection (1), is not competent to give evidence about a fact may be competent to give evidence about other facts. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 13

(3) A person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is not competent to give sworn evidence about the fact if the person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence. (4) A person who is not competent to give sworn evidence about a fact may, subject to subsection (5), be competent to give unsworn evidence about the fact. (5) A person who, because of subsection (3), is not competent to give sworn evidence is competent to give unsworn evidence if the court has told the person: (a) that it is important to tell the truth, and (b) that he or she may be asked questions that he or she does not know, or cannot remember, the answer to, and that he or she should tell the court if this occurs, and (c) that he or she may be asked questions that suggest certain statements are true or untrue and that he or she should agree with the statements that he or she believes are true and should feel no pressure to agree with statements that he or she believes are untrue. (6) It is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that a person is not incompetent because of this section.

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(7) Evidence that has been given by a witness does not become inadmissible merely because, before the witness finishes giving evidence, he or she dies or ceases to be competent to give evidence. (8) For the purpose of determining a question arising under this section, the court may inform itself as it thinks fit, including by obtaining information from a person who has relevant specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience. [S 13 subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]

Vic Act: 13

Competence—lack of capacity

(1) A person is not competent to give evidence about a fact if, for any reason (including a mental, intellectual or physical disability)— (a) the person does not have the capacity to understand a question about the fact; or (b) the person does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact— and that incapacity cannot be overcome. Note: See sections 30 and 31 for examples of assistance that may be provided to enable witnesses to overcome disabilities.

(2) A person who, because of subsection (1), is not competent to give evidence about a fact may be competent to give evidence about other facts. (3) A person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is not competent to give sworn evidence about the fact if the person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence. 86

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(4) A person who is not competent to give sworn evidence about a fact may, subject to subsection (5), be competent to give unsworn evidence about the fact. (5) A person who, because of subsection (3), is not competent to give sworn evidence is competent to give unsworn evidence if the court has told the person— (a) that it is important to tell the truth; and (b) that he or she may be asked questions that he or she does not know, or cannot remember, the answer to, and that he or she should tell the court if this occurs; and (c) that he or she may be asked questions that suggest certain statements are true or untrue and that he or she should agree with the statements that he or she believes are true and should feel no pressure to agree with statements that he or she believes are untrue. (6) It is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that a person is not incompetent because of this section. (7) Evidence that has been given by a witness does not become inadmissible merely because, before the witness finishes giving evidence, he or she dies or ceases to be competent to give evidence.

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(8) For the purpose of determining a question arising under this section, the court may inform itself as it thinks fit, including by obtaining information from a person who has relevant specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience. ACT Act: 13

Competence—lack of capacity

(1) A person is not competent to give evidence about a fact if, for any reason (including a mental, intellectual or physical disability)— (a) the person does not have the capacity to understand a question about the fact; or (b) the person does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact; and that incapacity cannot be overcome. Note: See s 30 and s 31 for examples of assistance that may be provided to enable witnesses to overcome disabilities.

(2) A person who, because of subsection (1), is not competent to give evidence about a fact may be competent to give evidence about other facts. (3) A person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is not competent to give sworn evidence about the fact if the person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, the person is under an obligation to give truthful evidence. (4) A person who is not competent to give sworn evidence about a fact may, subject to subsection (5), be competent to give unsworn evidence about the fact. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(5) A person who, because of subsection (3), is not competent to give sworn evidence is competent to give unsworn evidence if the court has told the person that— (a) it is important to tell the truth; and (b) the person may be asked questions that the person does not know, or cannot remember, the answer to, and that the person should tell the court if this happens; and (c) the person may be asked questions that suggest certain statements are true or untrue and that the person should agree with the statements that the person believes are true and should feel no pressure to agree with statements that the person believes are untrue. (6) It is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that a person is not incompetent because of this section. (7) Evidence that has been given by a witness does not become inadmissible only because, before the witness finishes giving evidence, the witness dies or ceases to be competent to give evidence.

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(8) For the purpose of deciding a question arising under this section, the court may inform itself as it thinks fit, including by obtaining information from a person who has relevant specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience. NT Act: 13 Competence — lack of capacity (1) A person is not competent to give evidence about a fact if, for any reason (including a mental, intellectual or physical disability): (a) the person does not have the capacity to understand a question about the fact; or (b) the person does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact; and that incapacity cannot be overcome. Note for subsection (1): See sections 30 and 31 for examples of assistance that may be provided to enable witnesses to overcome disabilities.

(2) A person who, because of subsection (1), is not competent to give evidence about a fact may be competent to give evidence about other facts. (3) A person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is not competent to give evidence on oath about the fact if the person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence. (4) A person who is not competent to give evidence on oath about a fact may, subject to subsection (5), be competent to give evidence about the fact otherwise than on oath. (5) A person who, because of subsection (3), is not competent to give evidence on oath is competent to give evidence otherwise than on oath if the court has told the person: 88

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(a) (b)

that it is important to tell the truth; and that he or she may be asked questions that he or she does not know, or cannot remember, the answer to, and that he or she should tell the court if this occurs; and (c) that he or she may be asked questions that suggest certain statements are true or untrue and that he or she should agree with the statements that he or she believes are true and should feel no pressure to agree with statements that he or she believes are untrue.

(6) It is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that a person is not incompetent because of this section. (7) Evidence that has been given by a witness does not become inadmissible merely because, before the witness finishes giving evidence, he or she dies or ceases to be competent to give evidence. (8) For the purpose of determining a question arising under this section, the court may inform itself as it thinks fit, including by obtaining information from a person who has relevant specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience.

[EA.13.30] ALRC references

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ALRC 102, paras 4.3–4.89; ALRC 38, s 19, paras 64–65; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 236–245, 521–524.

[EA.13.60] “does not have the capacity to understand a question” (s 13(1)(a)) If a witness is incapable of understanding any questions (and that incapacity cannot be overcome in some way), he or she will not be permitted to testify at all. If a witness is incapable of understanding a question about a fact (and that incapacity cannot be overcome in some way), he or she will not be permitted to testify regarding that fact, but may be permitted to testify as to other facts (s 13(2)). The concept of “the capacity to understand a question” imports an ability to comprehend questions put to the witness.7 It requires only basic comprehension skills.8 A witness may be better able to understand a simple question than one involving complex concepts. Some incapacities may be overcome. As the Note to s 13(1) states, ss 30 and 31 provide examples of assistance that may be provided to enable witnesses to overcome disabilities. Thus, where the incapacity derives from lack of English, it may be easily overcome by use of an interpreter pursuant to s 30.9 Where the incapacity derives from a hearing disability, it may be overcome in an appropriate way pursuant to s 31. The same test of “capacity to understand a question” is adopted in s 53 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (UK) (see [EA.13.90] below) and 7. See the discussion in ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 239, 242. 8. See ALRC 102 at para 4.49. 9. Where it cannot easily be overcome, s 14 may apply. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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authorities in respect of that provision will bear on this provision, notwithstanding some differences in the way that the test is expressed. For example, in R v MacPherson [2006] 1 Cr App R 30, the Court of Appeal observed at [27] that “a young child like the witness in this case, who can speak and understand basic English with strangers would be competent” and rejected submissions that a prospective witness must “be able to understand the difference between truth and falsehood” and understand the “status” of a witness.

[EA.13.90] “does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be understood” (s 13(1)(b)) If a witness is incapable of giving an answer that can be understood to any questions, he or she will not be permitted to testify at all. If a witness is incapable of giving an answer that can be understood to a question about a fact, he or she will not be permitted to testify regarding that fact, but may be permitted to testify as to other facts (s 13(2)). For example, a young child may be able to give an answer that can be understood to simple factual questions but not questions which require the drawing of inferences.

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Prior to amendments to this provision following on ALRC 102, the applicable test was expressed in terms of capacity “to give a rational reply” to a question about a fact. That capacity implied an ability to be appropriately informative, relevant and perspicuous in response to questions.10 The new test requires less. An answer can be “understood” even if it provides little information and appears to have no rational connection to the question. The Explanatory Memoranda of both the Commonwealth amending Act and the Victorian 2008 Act state: The purpose of the revised test of general competence is to enhance participation of witnesses and to ensure that relevant information is before the court.

The current formulation derives from s 53 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (United Kingdom).11 That section provides that in a criminal proceeding “all persons are (whatever their age) competent to give evidence” unless it appears to the court that the person is “not a person who is able to (a) understand questions put to him as a witness, and (b) to give answers to them which can be understood”. In ALRC 102, reference was made to authority on the English provision (at paras 4.53–4.56, paragraph numbers and footnotes deleted): [I]t has been applied in two separate reported cases, both concerning the sexual assault of elderly women suffering from dementia or Alzheimer’s disease. In those cases the test in s 53 was applied in the context of the trial judge’s consideration of the competence of the complainant as a witness when dealing with the issue of the admissibility of video-taped evidence under ss 23 and 26 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK) where the witness was otherwise unfit to attend trial to give evidence. In the more recent of the two cases, Sed v The Queen, the Court of Appeal formed the view, as did the trial judge, that the complainant was a competent witness. In particular, the video of her showed: That she did have some appreciation of why she was being questioned … Whilst she did not always answer the question put to her and sometimes rambled off into other occurrences and places involving other people, her reference to such sexual assault by a man was a strong theme in her discourse with the officers. Sometimes 10. See the discussion in ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 239, 242. 11. See ALRC 102 at para 4.52.

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her answers were hard to understand or bore little relation to the question asked, but at the end of the interview, the abiding picture was of a woman whose account and responses to questions were somewhat patchy, but who was nevertheless complaining repeatedly of a particular recent sexual assault by a man …

The Court of Appeal went on to observe it is for the judge to determine the question of competence: bearing always in mind that, if, on critical matters, the witness can be seen and heard to be intelligible, it is for the jury and no-one else to determine reliability and general cogency.

The Court of Appeal also noted that, “[t]he new s 53 test of ‘competence’ is … concerned at its highest with the degree of mutual comprehension of those questioning and of the person being questioned.” It is apparent that an answer can be “understood” even if it does not “answer the question” asked, appears to “ramble off”, and provides little relevant information. It is enough that it is “intelligible”. In ALRC 102, it was concluded at para 4.57:

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The Commissions favour a test of general competence substantially based on the English provision, which focuses on the ability of the witness to comprehend and communicate. Such a test is flexible, clear and unambiguous. It increases the possibility that a witness’ evidence is heard, requiring mainly that they understand and answer simple questions and communicate what happened.

In Cox v New South Wales (2007) 71 NSWLR 225; [2007] NSWSC 471, Simpson J applied the former test, expressed in terms of capacity “to give a rational reply” to a question about a fact, to hold that a plaintiff who responded to questions about relevant events with the answer that he had no memory of those events was not capable of giving a rational reply to questions about those events (and thus was taken “not to be available to give evidence about a fact” because he was “not competent to give the evidence about the fact”). Justice Simpson stated at [16]: The “rational replies” that the plaintiff was able to give were not replies to questions about facts relevant to his claim, but were about facts relevant to his recollection. Once he replied that he had no recollection of the events, it had to be concluded that he was not capable of giving a rational reply to questions about those facts. That he was capable to giving rational replies to questions about his recollection is beside the point; the argument focused upon the wrong fact.

This analysis is doubtful. It is a rational reply to the question “what happened” to say “I don’t remember”. Such an answer to any other questions about the events would also be a rational reply. The reply may provide no information about the events but it is an informative response. Furthermore, the witness may be able to give evidence relevant to the events even if he or she has no recollection of them – to treat the witness as “not competent to give evidence about the fact” simply because he or she has no recollection of it would be inappropriate.12 However, whatever the correctness or otherwise of the ruling by Simpson J in relation to the old test, it plainly has no bearing on the current formulation. The answer “I don’t 12. While the ruling made by Simpson J was perhaps understandable in the context of determining whether the plaintiff was not available to give evidence about the events (for the purpose of applying the hearsay exception in s 63), alternative approaches might have been to hold that the plaintiff was not available under cl 4(1)(f) in Pt 2 of the Dictionary or, alternatively, relevantly available but subject to a liberal interpretation of s 64(2). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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remember” to the question “what happened” clearly demonstrates a capacity to give an answer that can be understood. In the English case of Director of Public Prosecutions v The Queen [2007] EWHC 1842 (Admin), Lord Justice Hughes considered a case where a severely handicapped witness was declared incompetent because she had no recollection of events and stated at [21]–[22]: This was not a case, on the Justices’ findings, of incompetence. The girl may have had her learning difficulties. Her evidence may have needed treating with some care in consequence, but the problem at trial was not capacity to understand or to give intelligible answers, it was loss of memory. Recollection is quite different from competence. Of course, absence of recollection may, in some cases, co-exist with absence of competence, but they do not necessarily run together. Persons who have no recollection for an event may be perfectly competent. A simple example is the witness who is knocked out in the course of whatever happened which founds the charges, and has absolutely no recollection of what occurred, but is otherwise fully functioning. This girl … could understand the questions and she could give intelligible answers. The problem was that her perfectly intelligible answer was, “I cannot remember”. She was not incompetent.

[EA.13.120]

“… about a fact …” (s 13(1))

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In ALRC 102, it was noted at para 4.70 that the test of general competence provides that if a witness lacks capacity to understand a question or to give an answer which can be understood to a question “about a fact” (and therefore is not competent to give evidence about that fact), nonetheless, subject to comprehending and communicating appropriately to a question about another fact, he or she will be competent to give evidence about that fact. The following passage from another ALRC report was referred to at para 4.72: This is particularly important for children who may have differing language skills, abilities to make inferences, conclusions or estimates or capacities to understand concepts such as time and special perspective. This approach to competency allows a young child to respond under oath to simple questions but not to questions beyond the child’s capacity that cannot be reframed in simpler terms.

Section 13(2) expressly recognises that a person who is not competent to give evidence about a fact may be competent to give evidence about other facts. The Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act states: New subsection 13(2) provides that even if the general test of competence is not satisfied in relation to one fact, the witness may be competent to give evidence about other facts. For example, a young child may be able to reply to simple factual questions but not to questions which require inferences to be drawn.13

[EA.13.150]

“(including a mental, intellectual or physical disability)” (s 13(1))

In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 4.75: [C]ompetence provisions are typically viewed as relevant when assessing the capacity of children to give evidence, and the capacity of persons with an intellectual disability or cognitive impairment to give evidence. The specific reference to “physical disability” is made to ensure that the potential applicability of the competence requirements to witnesses with this kind of disability is not overlooked. 13. Para 13. Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum to the NSW amending Act and the Victorian Act.

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The Note to this provision draws attention to ss 30 and 31, which refer to assistance that may be provided to enable witnesses to overcome disabilities.

[EA.13.180]

“does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence” (s 13(3))

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This provision is based on the original ALRC proposals in ALRC 38. It replaces the old common law test of competence based on understanding of “the nature and consequences of the oath”. The new test focuses on capacity to understand the duty to tell the truth. The ALRC stated that “the test concerns the witness’ ability to understand his obligation to speak ‘the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’”.14 In RJ v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 174; [2010] NSWCCA 263, Campbell JA noted at [20] that the test “is that the person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence” and then observed that “[m]any a lying witness, and many an unreliable witness, has the capacity to understand that he or she is under that sort of an obligation (and thus is competent to give sworn evidence), even though he or she in fact does not give truthful evidence”. “Sworn evidence”, in this context, includes evidence given by way of affirmation.15 The ALRC explained how the application of this test would operate in practice (at para 522): The practice would differ from the present in that it would not be necessary to explore the religious belief and knowledge of the witness. Otherwise it would be similar in that the judge or magistrate, for example, would question a young child about his schooling (if appropriate), his interests and test his ability to understand different types of questions, test whether he understands why he is giving evidence, what is expected of him and what will happen if he does not give accurate answers.

The High Court stated in R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6: “[O]bligation” in s 13(3) is to be understood in its ordinary, grammatical meaning as the condition of being morally or legally bound – in this case, to give truthful evidence. A child may agree that he or she understands that he or she is to tell the truth without having any understanding of what it is to give evidence in a court proceeding, much less of the concept of being morally or legally bound to give truthful evidence.

In consequence, a child’s affirmative answer to the question “do you understand that today in giving evidence you have to only tell us the truth? You have to tell us things that really happened, you understand that?” is not to be understood as necessarily conveying that the child “had the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, she was under such an obligation” (at [26]). Many matters may be relevant, including the age of the child (at [31]), the answers given to such questions and whether the child has some understanding of swearing an oath on the Bible or making an affirmation (at [27]). The court must be satisfied that the witness “does not have” the relevant capacity. It is not sufficient to overcome the presumptions in ss 12 and 13(6) that the court is not satisfied that the witness does have that capacity: R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 14. See ALRC 26, vol 1, para 521. 15. See R v Muller (2013) 7 ACTLR 296; 273 FLR 215; [2013] ACTCA 15, Dowsett J at [39]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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407; [2016] HCA 6 at [14], [28]. Only if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the witness does not have the relevant capacity will the witness not be competent to give sworn evidence about the fact. However, lack of competence to give sworn evidence will not prevent a witness from giving unsworn evidence if the requirements of s 13(5) are satisfied.

[EA.13.210]

Competence to give unsworn evidence (s 13(5))

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The provision is designed to allow young children and others (for example, adults who have an intellectual disability) to testify even though they do not comprehend the concept of an “obligation to give truthful evidence”. Unsworn evidence (that is, evidence given without an oath or affirmation) is still evidence and is treated no differently from other evidence by the Act.16 Prior to amendments to this provision following on ALRC 102, the court was required to be satisfied that the person “understands the difference between the truth and a lie”.17 That is no longer required. All that is necessary is that the requirements of s 13(1) are satisfied and “the court has told the person” the various matters specified in s 13(5)(a), (b) and (c). If those requirements are satisfied, there is no discretionary power to refuse to allow the person to give unsworn evidence notwithstanding the use of the word “may” in s 13(4).18 The provision “requires only that the directions be given, and not that they be understood or even acknowledged”.19 Thus, while it is obviously desirable that the witness understand the directions and “it may be appropriate to ask questions in order to determine whether any further explanation is necessary”, it is clear that “testing of the potential witness’s understanding of the judge’s directions is not part of the process prescribed by s 13(5). No particular level of understanding is required as a condition of admissibility, always assuming that ss 13(1) and 13(3) have been satisfied”.20 Thus, it was held by the ACT Court of Appeal that, when a child responded “I don’t know” to the question “what do you understand by me telling you that it is important to tell the truth? What does that mean to you?”, that answer was “irrelevant” to the question of his competence to give unsworn evidence.21 It has been held that the identical provision to s 13(5)(a) as it now stands (s 13(2)(b) prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102) does not mandate some form of judicial instruction.22 It is enough that the court conveys the information that it is important to tell the truth and it is not necessary that “the authority of the court is brought to bear on the witness by means of an 16. Compare R v Wills (1985) 39 SASR 35; 16 A Crim R 247. 17. See R v RAG [2006] NSWCCA 343. 18. SH v The Queen (2012) 83 NSWLR 258; 222 A Crim R 43; [2012] NSWCCA 79 at [6]–[8]; R v Muller (2013) 7 ACTLR 296; 273 FLR 215; [2013] ACTCA 15 at [40]. 19. R v Muller (2013) 7 ACTLR 296; 273 FLR 215; [2013] ACTCA 15 at [41]. 20. R v Muller (2013) 7 ACTLR 296; 273 FLR 215; [2013] ACTCA 15, Dowsett J at [44]. See also Penfold J at [2]–[3]. 21. R v Muller (2013) 7 ACTLR 296; 273 FLR 215; [2013] ACTCA 15, Dowsett J (Penfold J and Nield AJ agreeing) at [46]. 22. R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121; 102 A Crim R 367 (NSWCCA) per Grove J (at 126), Priestley JA agreeing (at 122), Sperling J dissenting (at 127).

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23

instruction”. The same reasoning would apply to the matters specified in s 13(2)(b). In ALRC 102, it was noted at para 4.45 that: it has been suggested that the following is a simple, convenient form of words: “Tell us all you can remember of what happened. Do not make anything up or leave anything out. This is very important”.

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Failure to tell the person of the matters referred to in s 13(5) will mean that the statutory precondition to the reception of the evidence has not been satisfied and the evidence is not properly before the court.24 The appropriate conclusion is that the witness is not competent to give unsworn evidence because, it having been concluded that the witness did not have sufficient capacity to understand the obligation to tell the truth, the witness was not given the directions required by s 13(5).25 An interesting issue arises if a court permits a witness to give unsworn evidence pursuant to s 13(5) without first having ruled that the witness is incompetent to give sworn evidence by reason of s 13(3). The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held in relation to the provision prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102 that, in this situation, the (unsworn) evidence of the witness was not admissible.26 The effect of s 12 is that all persons (including children) are presumed competent to give sworn evidence: see also s 13(6). Before permitting a person to give unsworn evidence under s 13(5) the court must first be satisfied that the person is not competent to give sworn evidence, that is, that the person “does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence”: s 13(3). Failure to be so satisfied will mean that one of the requirements for the giving of unsworn evidence has not been met. This position has been confirmed in respect of the Act as it stands following the amendments. In RJ v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 174; [2010] NSWCCA 263, Campbell JA (Latham J and Price J agreeing) followed the earlier line of authority and also emphasised at [40] that s 21 permits only one exception to the requirement that a witness in a proceeding must either take an oath or make an affirmation before giving evidence: That exception is if the person “gives unsworn evidence under section 13”. It is possible to give unsworn evidence “under section 13” only if two separate conditions are satisfied. The first is that the presumption of competency to give sworn evidence that arises from section 13(6) has been displaced, through a decision being made that the test for being not competent to give sworn evidence, set out in section 13(3) has been met. In other words, it is possible to give unsworn evidence “under section 13” 23. See R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121; 102 A Crim R 367 per Grove J (at 126F–G), rejecting the view of Sperling J (at 127C–D). 24. SH v The Queen (2012) 83 NSWLR 258; 222 A Crim R 43; [2012] NSWCCA 79 at [33]–[35]; MK v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 274 at [72]–[74]. See also R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121; 102 A Crim R 367; R v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115; [2002] SASC 175; Lau v The Queen (1991) 6 WAR 30; 58 A Crim R 390; R v BBR [2010] 1 Qd R 546; 195 A Crim R 330; [2009] QCA 178 at [19]–[42]. 25. SH v The Queen (2012) 83 NSWLR 258; 222 A Crim R 43; [2012] NSWCCA 79 at [35]. 26. R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121; 102 A Crim R 367. In fact, this term was used only by Priestley JA. Grove J held that “the articulations” of the witness were “unavailable as an evidential resource” (at 125E, 126D) while Sperling J considered that the Evidence Act required evidence to be sworn unless the procedural requirements for giving unsworn evidence were met. See also R v JTB [2003] NSWCCA 295. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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only if there is material that the judge has considered, on the basis of which the judge has decided that the witness does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence. The second condition for giving unsworn evidence “under section 13” is that the judge has informed the witness of the matters in paras (a) (b) and (c) of section 13(5).

Since the trial judge in that case had not addressed the first of these conditions at all, the unsworn evidence contravened s 21 and was not legitimately before the jury (at [42])..

[EA.13.240]

“before the witness finishes giving evidence, he or she dies or ceases to be competent to give evidence” (s 13(7))

While the evidence that has been given by the witness does not become inadmissible “merely” because these circumstances arise, discretionary exclusion (under s 135 or 137) may be appropriate, particularly if an opposing party has had no substantial opportunity to cross-examine the witness.27

[EA.13.270]

Burden and standard of proof

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Given s 13(6), the burden of proof will be on the party asserting that a witness is not competent.28 In accordance with s 142(1), that party will have to prove this “on the balance of probabilities”. The presumption applies to both competence to give evidence and competence to give sworn evidence. In either case, the presumption will be displaced where the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities of the contrary: R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 at [14].

[EA.13.300]

Procedure

Section 13(8) allows the court to “inform itself as it thinks fit”. This permits the court to mould the procedure to determine questions of competence as it considers most appropriate, taking into account the fact that the provisions will be primarily applicable to young children. It could permit the questioning of a young child by a person with expertise in the area or who has trust of the child. The court may permit the parties to question the child, although it is doubtful whether counsel for a criminal defendant should question a child in a competency inquiry.29 An appropriate procedure is suggested at 6.3.2 of the Equality Before the Law Bench Book (Judicial Commission of NSW). There should be some testing of the understanding of the obligation to give truthful evidence by the use of simple and concrete terminology.30 27. Compare English authorities: R v Powell [2006] 1 Cr App R 31 at [33]–[34]; Director of Public Prosecutions v The Queen [2007] EWHC 1842 (Admin) at [15], [22]. 28. See RA v The Queen (2007) 175 A Crim R 221; [2007] NSWCCA 251, decided in respect of the identical provision (s 13(5)) prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102. McClellan CJ at CL stated at [11] that “[n]either the defence nor the prosecution carries an onus” but, since s 13(5) requires that it be “proved” that the witness is incompetent, it must logically follow that there is a “burden of proof” on the party submitting that a witness is incompetent. However, the terms of s 13(7) will impact on how this burden is met (see [EA.13.300]). 29. R v RAG [2006] NSWCCA 343 per Latham J (with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Johnson J agreed) at [46]). 30. MK v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 274 at [69].

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This provision has been utilised to permit consideration of evidence given in other proceedings by the person.31 A judge might be able to satisfy himself or herself of the matters necessary to decide whether a presumption of competency under s 13 has been displaced by listening to a recording of a police interview with the child.32 In a jury trial, s 189 provides that the jury is not to be present during a “voir dire” to determine competence unless the court so orders: s 189(4). Various matters must be taken into account by the court in deciding whether to make such an order: s 189(5). It should be noted that the waiver provision (s 190) does not apply to this Division in the Act (Div 1 of Pt 2.1).33 This provision was amended following on ALRC 102 to expressly permit a court to obtain “information from a person who has relevant specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience”. It was stated at para 4.62: The Commissions considered that a court might benefit from the availability of expert reports in relation to other witnesses whose competence may be in doubt. For instance, the insights of an appropriately qualified expert skilled in determining intellectual functioning may assist the court to assess issues of competence concerning witnesses with an intellectual disability or cognitive impairment. In the absence of such evidence, the assessment would be made through judicial questioning and impressions ascertained in the artificial environs of the courtroom.

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Similarly, the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act states (para 19): This provision is not intended to allow an expert to supplant the court’s role in determining a witness’s competence. Rather it is intended to emphasise that the court may have recourse to expert assistance (for example, to identify any alternative communication methods or support needs which could facilitate the giving of evidence by a person with a disability).

There must be “specialised knowledge” that is “relevant” and “based on the person’s training, study or experience”. These requirements correspond to the requirements of s 79 in respect of opinion evidence. However, in contrast with that provision, the court may obtain “information” as distinct from “opinion” and there is no explicit linkage between that information and the expert’s specialised knowledge (although the courts may well imply a requirement for such a linkage). There is no requirement that the information be obtained directly (that is, by the expert testifying in court).

[EA.13.330]

Jury directions

This provision does not mandate any directions to a jury where a witness who is not competent to give sworn evidence is permitted to give unsworn evidence. In that regard, it may be contrasted with, for example, s 9(4) of the South Australian Evidence Act 1929 which specifically requires that, if unsworn evidence is given in a criminal trial, the judge “must explain to the jury the reason the evidence is unsworn; … and may, and if a party so requests must, warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be 31. R v EG [2002] ACTSC 85 at [10] per Crispin J. 32. RJ v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 174; [2010] NSWCCA 263 at [23]. 33. Compare R v JTB [2003] NSWCCA 295 at [9] and [24]–[36]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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given to it”. The High Court held in R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 that, at least where unsworn evidence is given by a child, there is no requirement either under this Act or the common law for a direction to the jury: The Evidence Act does not treat unsworn evidence as of a kind that may be unreliable. Had a direction been requested under s 165(2), there was no requirement to warn the jury that [the child’s] evidence may be unreliable because it was unsworn. Nor was there a requirement under the common law to warn the jury of the need for caution in accepting [the child’s] evidence and in assessing the weight to be given to it because it was unsworn. Nor was there a requirement under common law, falling short of a warning of that kind, to direct the jury to take into account the differences between sworn and unsworn evidence in assessing the reliability of [the child’s] evidence.

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The argument that the jury should have been informed of the difference between sworn and unsworn evidence and of the reason that evidence is given unsworn as matters material to the assessment of the unsworn evidence was rejected on the basis that “[a]s a matter of practical reality, neither the fact that [the child] did not take an oath or make an affirmation before giving her evidence, nor that she was not subject to the sanctions that may apply to the failure to adhere to the oath or affirmation, was material to the assessment of whether [her] evidence was truthful and reliable such that the jury could accept and act upon it” (at [54]). The High Court did not need to decide whether “different considerations would apply where a witness other than a young child is capable of giving evidence about a fact but incapable of giving sworn evidence because the witness does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence about the fact, he or she would be under an obligation to give truthful evidence”, acknowledging that, “[d]epending on the circumstances, it might prove necessary or desirable to give some further form of direction” in such a case (at [57]).

Cth Act: 14

Compellability: reduced capacity A person is not compellable to give evidence on a particular matter if the court is satisfied that: (a) substantial cost or delay would be incurred in ensuring that the person would have the capacity to understand a question about the matter or to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the matter; and [Para (a) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 4]

(b) adequate evidence on that matter has been given, or will be able to be given, from one or more other persons or sources. [S 14 am Act 135 of 2008]

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NSW Act: 14 Compellability: reduced capacity A person is not compellable to give evidence on a particular matter if the court is satisfied that: (a) substantial cost or delay would be incurred in ensuring that the person would have the capacity to understand a question about the matter or to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the matter, and [Para (a) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]

(b) adequate evidence on that matter has been given, or will be able to be given, from one or more other persons or sources. [S 14 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 14

Compellability—reduced capacity

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A person is not compellable to give evidence on a particular matter if the court is satisfied that— (a) substantial cost or delay would be incurred in ensuring that the person would have the capacity to understand a question about the matter or to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the matter; and (b) adequate evidence on that matter has been given, or will be able to be given, from one or more other persons or sources. ACT Act: 14

Compellability—reduced capacity A person is not compellable to give evidence on a particular matter if the court is satisfied that— (a) substantial cost or delay would be incurred in ensuring that the person would have the capacity to understand a question about the matter or to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the matter; and (b) adequate evidence on the matter has been given, or will be able to be given, from 1 or more other people or sources. NT Act: 14

Compellability — reduced capacity

A person is not compellable to give evidence on a particular matter if the court is satisfied that: (a) substantial cost or delay would be incurred in ensuring that the person would have the capacity to understand a question about the matter or to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the matter; and (b) adequate evidence on that matter has been given, or will be able to be given, from one or more other persons or sources.

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ALRC References

ALRC 102, paras 4.3–4.89.

[EA.14.60] General comments This provision was not proposed by the ALRC in ALRC 38. However, in ALRC 102 it was proposed that it be retained, with amendments to bring it into line with s 13. It empowers the court to allow a witness to choose not to give evidence “on a particular matter” where undue cost or delay would be involved in overcoming some incapacity of understanding. In appropriate circumstances, the witness may not be required to give evidence at all. However, where the witness’s evidence is necessary, because no other evidence on the matter is available (or, what evidence there is, is not “adequate”), all efforts to overcome the incapacity must be taken. Determination of “adequacy” will involve a difficult assessment of evidence already admitted as well as information provided by the parties as to whether other evidence is intended to be adduced.

Cth Act:

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15

Compellability: Sovereign and others (1) None of the following is compellable to give evidence: (a) the Sovereign; (b) the Governor-General; (c) the Governor of a State; (d) the Administrator of a Territory; (e) a foreign sovereign or the Head of State of a foreign country.

(2) A member of a House of an Australian Parliament is not compellable to give evidence if the member would, if compelled to give evidence, be prevented from attending: (a) a sitting of that House or a joint sitting of that Parliament; or (b) a meeting of a committee of that House or that Parliament, being a committee of which he or she is a member. NSW Act: 15

Compellability: Sovereign and others (1) None of the following is compellable to give evidence: (a) the Sovereign, (b) the Governor-General, (c) the Governor of a State, (d) the Administrator of a Territory, (e) a foreign sovereign or the Head of State of a foreign country.

(2) A member of a House of an Australian Parliament is not compellable to give evidence if the member would, if compelled to give evidence, be prevented from attending: (a) a sitting of that House, or a joint sitting of that Parliament, or 100

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(b) a meeting of a committee of that House or that Parliament, being a committee of which he or she is a member. Vic Act: 15

Compellability—Sovereign and others (1) None of the following is compellable to give evidence— (a) the Sovereign; (b) the Governor-General; (c) the Governor of a State; (d) the Administrator of a Territory; (e) a foreign sovereign or the Head of State of a foreign country.

(2) A member of a House of an Australian Parliament is not compellable to give evidence if the member would, if compelled to give evidence, be prevented from attending— (a) a sitting of that House, or a joint sitting of that Parliament; or (b) a meeting of a committee of that House or that Parliament, being a committee of which he or she is a member. ACT Act:

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15

Compellability—Sovereign and others (1) None of the following is compellable to give evidence: (a) the Sovereign; (b) the Governor-General; (c) the Governor of a State; (d) the Administrator of a Territory; (e) a foreign sovereign or the Head of State of a foreign country.

(2) A member of a house of an Australian Parliament is not compellable to give evidence if the member would, if compelled to give evidence, be prevented from attending— (a) a sitting of the house or a joint sitting of the Parliament; or (b) if the member is a member of a committee of the house or the Parliament—a meeting of the committee. NT Act: 15

Compellability — Sovereign and others (1) None of the following is compellable to give evidence: (a) the Sovereign; (b) the Governor-General; (c) the Governor of a State; (d) the Administrator of a Territory; (e) a foreign sovereign or the Head of State of a foreign country.

(2) A member of a House of an Australian Parliament is not compellable to give evidence if the member would, if compelled to give evidence, be prevented from attending: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a) (b)

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a sitting of that House, or a joint sitting of that Parliament; or a meeting of a committee of that House or that Parliament, being a committee of which he or she is a member.

[EA.15.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 20, para 67; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 526.

[EA.15.60] General comments [Cth Act only] Because s 8(1) makes other (Commonwealth) Acts prevail over this Act, the compellability of Commonwealth parliamentarians is governed by the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), s 14(1).

Cth Act: 16

Competence and compellability: judges and jurors

(1) A person who is a judge or juror in a proceeding is not competent to give evidence in that proceeding. However, a juror is competent to give evidence in the proceeding about matters affecting conduct of the proceeding.

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(2) A person who is or was a judge in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not compellable to give evidence about that proceeding unless the court gives leave. NSW Act: 16

Competence and compellability: judges and jurors

(1) A person who is a judge or juror in a proceeding is not competent to give evidence in that proceeding. However, a juror is competent to give evidence in the proceeding about matters affecting conduct of the proceeding. (2) A person who is or was a judge in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not compellable to give evidence about that proceeding unless the court gives leave. Vic Act: 16

Competence and compellability—judges and jurors

(1) A person who is a judge or juror in a proceeding is not competent to give evidence in that proceeding. However, a juror is competent to give evidence in the proceeding about matters affecting the conduct of the proceeding. (2) A person who is or was a judge in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not compellable to give evidence about that proceeding unless the court gives leave.

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ACT Act: 16 Competence and compellability—judges and jurors (1) A person who is a judge or juror in a proceeding is not competent to give evidence in the proceeding. (2) However, a juror is competent to give evidence in the proceeding about matters affecting conduct of the proceeding. (3) A person who is or was a judge in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not compellable to give evidence about the proceeding unless the court gives leave. NT Act: 16

Competence and compellability — judges and jurors

(1) A person who is a judge or juror in a proceeding is not competent to give evidence in that proceeding. However, a juror is competent to give evidence in the proceeding about matters affecting the conduct of the proceeding. (2) A person who is or was a judge in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not compellable to give evidence about that proceeding unless the court gives leave.

[EA.16.30] ALRC references Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

ALRC 38, s 21, para 68; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 247–248, 527.

[EA.16.60] General comments The ALRC explained this provision (at ALRC 26, vol 1, para 527): The proposal introduces a new exception relating to judges and jurors – that they be not competent to give evidence in a trial in which they are acting as judge or juror. ... As to the competence of judges or jurors to give evidence about a past trial in which they acted, it is thought that the general rule should apply and that they should be competent – as at present. There is a risk, however, of judges and jurors being involved unnecessarily in proceedings …. The proposal, therefore, adopts the practical expedient of requiring an application for leave to be made to the judge who is presiding at the trial in which it is sought to call the judicial officer to give the evidence.

The ALRC proposal was modified by permitting a juror to “give evidence in the proceeding about matters affecting conduct of the proceeding”. Thus, if an issue arises in the proceeding as to, for example, the application of the law relating to juries, a juror may give evidence on the issue.

[EA.16.90] “unless the court gives leave” Section 16(2) provides that a person “who is or was a judge in an Australian or overseas proceeding” is not compellable to give evidence about that proceeding “unless the court gives leave”. Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.34

Cth Act: 17 Competence and compellability: defendants in criminal proceedings (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A defendant is not competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution. (3) An associated defendant is not compellable to give evidence for or against a defendant in a criminal proceeding, unless the associated defendant is being tried separately from the defendant. (4) If a witness is an associated defendant who is being tried jointly with the defendant in the proceeding, the court is to satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the jury’s absence) that the witness is aware of the effect of subsection (3). Note: Associated defendant is defined in the Dictionary.

NSW Act: 17 Competence and compellability: defendants in criminal proceedings Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A defendant is not competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution. (3) An associated defendant is not compellable to give evidence for or against a defendant in a criminal proceeding, unless the associated defendant is being tried separately from the defendant. (4) If a witness is an associated defendant who is being tried jointly with the defendant in the proceeding, the court is to satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the jury’s absence) that the witness is aware of the effect of subsection (3). Note: Associated defendant is defined in the Dictionary.

Vic Act: 17 Competence and compellability—accused in criminal proceedings (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) An accused is not competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution. [Subs (2) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.2]

34. See Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ.

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(3) An associated accused is not compellable to give evidence for or against an accused in a criminal proceeding, unless the associated accused is being tried separately from the accused. [Subs (3) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.3]

(4) If a witness is an associated accused who is being tried jointly with the accused in the proceeding, the court is to satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the jury’s absence) that the witness is aware of the effect of subsection (3). [Subs (4) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.4] Note: Associated accused is defined in the Dictionary. [S 17 am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.1]

ACT Act: 17 Competence and compellability—defendants in criminal proceedings (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A defendant is not competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution.

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(3) An associated defendant is not compellable to give evidence for or against a defendant in a criminal proceeding unless the associated defendant is being tried separately from the defendant. (4) If a witness is an associated defendant who is being tried jointly with the defendant in the proceeding, the court must satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the jury’s absence) that the witness is aware of the effect of subsection (3). Note: Associated defendant —see the dictionary.

NT Act: 17 Competence and compellability — defendants in criminal proceedings (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A defendant is not competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution. (3) An associated defendant is not compellable to give evidence for or against a defendant in a criminal proceeding, unless the associated defendant is being tried separately from the defendant. (4) If a witness is an associated defendant who is being tried jointly with the defendant in the proceeding, the court is to satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the jury’s absence) that the witness is aware of the effect of subsection (3). Note for subsections (3) and (4): associated defendant is defined in the Dictionary.

[EA.17.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 22, paras 74–76; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 528.

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General comments

This section only applies in a “criminal proceeding”. That term is defined in the Dictionary: “criminal proceeding” means a prosecution for an offence and includes: (a) a proceeding for the committal of a person for trial or sentence for an offence; and (b) a proceeding relating to bail;

Under s 17(3), the “associated defendant” may choose to give evidence for the prosecution (subject to a warning under s 165 and possible discretionary exclusion under s 137), having been advised by the court (in accordance with s 17(4)) of the right to refuse. “Associated defendant” is defined in the Dictionary: “associated defendant”, in relation to a defendant in a criminal proceeding, means a person against whom a prosecution has been instituted, but not yet completed or terminated, for: (a) an offence that arose in relation to the same events as those in relation to which the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted arose; or (b) an offence that relates to or is connected with the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted.

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The prosecution can ensure that an “associated defendant” is compellable by trying him or her separately from the defendant (and completing that prosecution).35 The question arises whether, in joint proceedings, a defendant may be also regarded as an “associated defendant” for the purposes of s 17(3). When a joint trial is held, involving multiple parties, in legal theory there is not one trial but several. In a joint trial involving two defendants (D1 and D2), for example, evidence admitted in the trial against D1 may not be admissible for or against D2, and must be disregarded in the trial of D2. The question in this context is whether D1 may be regarded as an “associated defendant” of D2, and vice versa. In Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; 190 IR 437; [2010] HCA 1 the High Court rejected this possibility. In that case, summary proceedings under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (NSW) were brought in the NSW Industrial Court against Kirk Group Holdings Pty Ltd (“the Kirk company”) and against Mr Kirk, a director of that company. The charges were heard together. In the course of those proceedings, the prosecution had called Mr Kirk as a witness. The High Court was informed “that Mr Kirk’s giving evidence for the prosecution was a course agreed upon by both sides” (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [50]). Indeed, it appears from the oral argument in the High Court that Mr Kirk wanted to be called as a witness by the prosecution so that he could be “cross-examined” by his own legal representatives (Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW [2009] HCATrans 93 at [238]). Plainly the effect of s 17(2) was that Mr Kirk was not a competent witness for the prosecution in the proceedings against him (and 35. This does not require that the associated defendant be sentenced before being available as a witness for the prosecution, although such a practice is clearly desirable to reduce the danger that the associated defendant perceive some benefit to be obtained from giving evidence supporting the prosecution case.

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his consent could not alter that absence of competence: s 190). Technically speaking, he could be regarded as an “associated defendant” in respect of the prosecution against the Kirk company, but this would present a clear procedural problem. It could be said that any evidence he gave when called by the prosecution would not be admissible against him, but his own trial would still be proceeding – he would be a witness for the prosecution in the joint trial of both defendants even if his evidence was not admissible against him. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ held at [52] (Heydon J agreeing at [116]) that “[i]t is enough to say that where, as was the case here, Mr Kirk and the Kirk company were tried jointly, a distinction of the kind asserted by the second respondent cannot be drawn”. It follows that a defendant in a joint trial with another defendant or defendants is not competent as a witness for the prosecution in that joint trial. Putting the matter differently, the term “associated defendant” should not be understood to extend to a joint trial where the witness is a defendant in the proceedings.

[EA.17.90]

Procedure

The court must satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the jury’s absence) that an associated defendant is aware of the effect of subsection (3). There is authority suggesting that the court must explain the provision to the witness, rather than rely on counsel.37

[EA.17.120]

Inferences from failure to give evidence

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Section 20 deals with “comment” on failure to give evidence.

Cth Act: 18 Compellability of spouses and others in criminal proceedings generally (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A person who, when required to give evidence, is the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of a defendant may object to being required: (a) to give evidence; or (b) to give evidence of a communication between the person and the defendant; as a witness for the prosecution. [Subs (2) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 5]

(3) The objection is to be made before the person gives the evidence or as soon as practicable after the person becomes aware of the right so to object, whichever is the later. (4) If it appears to the court that a person may have a right to make an objection under this section, the court is to satisfy itself that the person is aware of the effect of this section as it may apply to the person. 36. Heydon J provided at [117] an explanation for why a defendant should not be permitted to waive the operation of this provision. 37. See Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43 at 45. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(5) If there is a jury, the court is to hear and determine any objection under this section in the absence of the jury. (6) A person who makes an objection under this section to giving evidence or giving evidence of a communication must not be required to give the evidence if the court finds that: (a) there is a likelihood that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to the person, or to the relationship between the person and the defendant, if the person gives the evidence; and (b) the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of having the evidence given.

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(7) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court for the purposes of subsection (6), it must take into account the following: (a) the nature and gravity of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted; (b) the substance and importance of any evidence that the person might give and the weight that is likely to be attached to it; (c) whether any other evidence concerning the matters to which the evidence of the person would relate is reasonably available to the prosecutor; (d) the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the person; (e) whether, in giving the evidence, the person would have to disclose matter that was received by the person in confidence from the defendant. (8) If an objection under this section has been determined, the prosecutor may not comment on: (a) the objection; or (b) the decision of the court in relation to the objection; or (c) the failure of the person to give evidence. [S 18 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 18 Compellability of spouses and others in criminal proceedings generally (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A person who, when required to give evidence, is the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of a defendant may object to being required: (a) to give evidence, or (b) to give evidence of a communication between the person and the defendant, as a witness for the prosecution. [Subs (2) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]

(3) The objection is to be made before the person gives the evidence or as soon as practicable after the person becomes aware of the right so to object, whichever is the later. 108

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(4) If it appears to the court that a person may have a right to make an objection under this section, the court is to satisfy itself that the person is aware of the effect of this section as it may apply to the person. (5) If there is a jury, the court is to hear and determine any objection under this section in the absence of the jury.

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(6) A person who makes an objection under this section to giving evidence or giving evidence of a communication must not be required to give the evidence if the court finds that: (a) there is a likelihood that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to the person, or to the relationship between the person and the defendant, if the person gives the evidence, and (b) the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of having the evidence given. (7) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court for the purposes of subsection (6), it must take into account the following: (a) the nature and gravity of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted, (b) the substance and importance of any evidence that the person might give and the weight that is likely to be attached to it, (c) whether any other evidence concerning the matters to which the evidence of the person would relate is reasonably available to the prosecutor, (d) the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the person, (e) whether, in giving the evidence, the person would have to disclose matter that was received by the person in confidence from the defendant. (8) If an objection under this section has been determined, the prosecutor may not comment on: (a) the objection, or (b) the decision of the court in relation to the objection, or (c) the failure of the person to give evidence. [S 18 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 18 Compellability of spouses and others in criminal proceedings generally (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A person who, when required to give evidence, is the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of an accused may object to being required— (a) to give evidence; or (b) to give evidence of a communication between the person and the accused— as a witness for the prosecution. [Subs (2) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.5] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(3) The objection is to be made before the person gives the evidence or as soon as practicable after the person becomes aware of the right so to object, whichever is the later. (4) If it appears to the court that a person may have a right to make an objection under this section, the court is to satisfy itself that the person is aware of the effect of this section as it may apply to the person. (5) If there is a jury, the court is to hear and determine any objection under this section in the absence of the jury. (6) A person who makes an objection under this section to giving evidence or giving evidence of a communication must not be required to give the evidence if the court finds that— (a) there is a likelihood that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to the person, or to the relationship between the person and the accused, if the person gives the evidence; and (b) the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of having the evidence given.

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[Subs (6) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.6]

(7) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court for the purposes of subsection (6), it must take into account the following— (a) the nature and gravity of the offence for which the accused is being prosecuted; (b) the substance and importance of any evidence that the person might give and the weight that is likely to be attached to it; (c) whether any other evidence concerning the matters to which the evidence of the person would relate is reasonably available to the prosecutor; (d) the nature of the relationship between the accused and the person; (e) whether, in giving the evidence, the person would have to disclose matter that was received by the person in confidence from the accused. [Subs (7) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.7]

(8) If an objection under this section has been determined, the prosecutor may not comment on— (a) the objection; or (b) the decision of the court in relation to the objection; or (c) the failure of the person to give evidence. [S 18 am Act 68 of 2009]

ACT Act: 18 Compellability of domestic partners and others in criminal proceedings generally (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A person who, when required to give evidence, is the domestic partner, parent or child of a defendant may object to being required— 110

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(a) (b)

to give evidence; or to give evidence of a communication between the person and the defendant; as a witness for the prosecution. (3) The objection must be made before the person gives the evidence or as soon as practicable after the person becomes aware of the right to object, whichever is the later. (4) If it appears to the court that a person may have a right to make an objection under this section, the court must satisfy itself that the person is aware of the effect of this section as it may apply to the person. (5) If there is a jury, the court must hear and decide any objection under this section in the jury’s absence.

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(6) A person who makes an objection under this section to giving evidence or giving evidence of a communication must not be required to give the evidence if the court finds that— (a) there is a likelihood that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to the person, or to the relationship between the person and the defendant, if the person gives the evidence; and (b) the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of having the evidence given. (7) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court for subsection (6), it must take into account the following: (a) the nature and gravity of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted; (b) the substance and importance of any evidence that the person might give and the weight that is likely to be attached to it; (c) whether any other evidence about the matters to which the evidence of the person would relate is reasonably available to the prosecutor; (d) the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the person; (e) whether, in giving the evidence, the person would have to disclose matter that was received by the person in confidence from the defendant. (8) If an objection under this section has been decided, the prosecutor may not comment on— (a) the objection; or (b) the decision of the court in relation to the objection; or (c) the failure of the person to give evidence.

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s 18

NT Act: 18 Compellability of spouses and others in criminal proceedings generally (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A person who, when required to give evidence, is the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of a defendant may object to being required: (a) to give evidence; or (b) to give evidence of a communication between the person and the defendant; as a witness for the prosecution. (3) The objection is to be made before the person gives the evidence or as soon as practicable after the person becomes aware of the right so to object, whichever is the later. (4) If it appears to the court that a person may have a right to make an objection under this section, the court is to satisfy itself that the person is aware of the effect of this section as it may apply to the person.

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(5) If there is a jury, the court is to hear and determine any objection under this section in the absence of the jury. (6) A person who makes an objection under this section to giving evidence or giving evidence of a communication must not be required to give the evidence if the court finds that: (a) there is a likelihood that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to the person, or to the relationship between the person and the defendant, if the person gives the evidence; and (b) the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of having the evidence given. (7) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court for the purposes of subsection (6), it must take into account the following: (a) the nature and gravity of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted; (b) the substance and importance of any evidence that the person might give and the weight that is likely to be attached to it; (c) whether any other evidence concerning the matters to which the evidence of the person would relate is reasonably available to the prosecutor; (d) the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the person; (e) whether, in giving the evidence, the person would have to disclose matter that was received by the person in confidence from the defendant. (8) If an objection under this section has been determined, the prosecutor may not comment on: (a) the objection; or (b) the decision of the court in relation to the objection; or 112

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(c)

[EA.18.60]

the failure of the person to give evidence.

[EA.18.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 102, paras 4.90–4.117; ALRC 38, s 24, paras 79–83; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 256–257, 529–539.

[EA.18.60] Application On the basis that s 12 indicates a clear legislative intention that the provisions of the NSW Act abrogate “the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to” the competence and compellability of witnesses (s 9), it has been held that “there is no room to read down their clear meaning by the application of” the common law principles relating to spousal compellability.38 The same conclusion should be drawn in respect of the Commonwealth and Victorian Acts. This provision only applies in a “criminal proceeding”. This term is defined in the Dictionary: “criminal proceeding” means a prosecution for an offence and includes: (a) a proceeding for the committal of a person for trial or sentence for an offence; and (b) a proceeding relating to bail;

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In addition, it applies only to “a person who, when required to give evidence39 is the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child” of the defendant The term “spouse” is not defined in the Act. However, the term “de facto partner” is defined in cl 11 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary: see commentary at [EA.Dict.Pt.2.90]. “Parent” is defined in the Dictionary: “parent” includes the meaning given in subclause 10(2) of Part 2 of this Dictionary.

That subclause provides: (2) A reference in this Act to a parent of a person includes a reference to: (a) an adoptive parent of the person; or (b) if the person is an ex-nuptial child – the person’s natural father; or (c) the person with whom a child is living as if the child were a member of the person’s family.

“Child” is defined in the Dictionary: “child” means a child of any age and includes the meaning given in subclause 10(1) of Part 2 of this Dictionary.

That subclause provides: (1) A reference in this Act to a child of a person includes a reference to: 38. R v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465; [2000] NSWCCA 83 at [39]–[54]. Similarly, it was held that there was no room for any marital communication privilege (which, in any event, no longer exists under the common law: Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (2011) 244 CLR 554; 214 A Crim R 538; [2011] HCA 47). However, s 126B may have some application. 39. Compare Director of Public Prosecutions v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a) an adopted child and an ex-nuptial child of the person; or (b) a child living with the person as if the child were a member of the person’s family.

Commentary on the meaning of the term “child” may be found in the Dictionary at [EA.Dict.Pt.2.90]. Finally, s 19 (in those jurisdictions where it applies) limits the application of s 18, so that a member of the family of a defendant in criminal proceedings may be compelled by the prosecution to give evidence against the defendant in certain types of proceedings relating to alleged assaults on children and other forms of “domestic violence”.

[EA.18.90] Nature of objection (s 18(2)) Subject to s 18(2)(b), the objection to giving evidence cannot be partial. That is, the witness must object to giving any evidence. As long as the person is aware of the right to object (and he or she should be informed of the right under s 18(4)), the person will not be permitted to give some evidence and then choose to decline to answer further questions (subject to s 18(2)(b)). If the person did not become aware of the right to object until after starting to give evidence, and then is permitted to decline to give any further evidence, the evidence which has been given up to that point continues to be admissible.

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[EA.18.120]

The balancing test (s 18(6))

Given that it will rarely be difficult to demonstrate that it is likely that harm “might” be caused to the relationship between the person and the defendant if the person gives evidence for the prosecution against the defendant (thus satisfying the requirements of s 18(6)(a))40, the critical issue will be the balancing test under s 18(6)(b).41 The ALRC stated (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 529): A right to seek exemption is generally supported on two policy grounds: (a) the undesirability that the procedures for enforcing the criminal law should be allowed to disrupt marital and family relationships to a greater extent than the interests of the community really require; (b) the undesirability that the community should make unduly harsh demands on its members by compelling them where the general interest does not require it to give evidence that will bring punishment upon those they love, betray their confidences, or entail economic or social hardships.

Relevant considerations which must be taken into account are listed in s 18(7).42 The court may take into account that the defendant (and the person objecting) will presumably understand that, if the person objecting is required to give evidence, that will be pursuant to court order.43 Ultimately, however, the issue is 40. See R v Rogerson (No 1) [2015] NSWSC 592 at [78]–[80]; R v Barakat (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 1256 at [26]. Of course, the relevant “harm” that “would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly)” may also be “to the person” objecting to giving evidence: R v Barakat (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 1256 at [27]–[30]. 41. See Sanderson v Rabuntja (2014) 33 NTLR 205; [2014] NTSC 13 at [15]–[16]. 42. See Sanderson v Rabuntja (2014) 33 NTLR 205; [2014] NTSC 13 at [17]–[22]]; R v Quinn (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1101 at [13]–[16]. 43. See R v Fletcher [2015] NSWSC 1630 at [23].

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[EA.18.180]

44

left to judicial discretion. In that context, it would be appropriate for the court to give consideration to the “discretions” in ss 135 and 137.45

[EA.18.150]

“required to give the evidence” (s 18(6))

Section 18(6) states that “[a] person who makes an objection under this section to giving evidence or giving evidence of a communication must not be required to give the evidence if …”. Plainly enough, “giving evidence” would include the person testifying orally in the proceeding. It has been held that this may extend to the playing of a videotape of earlier testimony given by the person.46 It would not extend to a party adducing a written statement made by the person.47

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[EA.18.180]

Procedure

The court must satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the jury’s absence) that a person who may have a right to make an objection under this section is “aware of the effect” of the section as it may relate to that person.48 The person needs to be aware not only of his or her right to object but also that the court will decide whether or not the person will be required to give evidence, that decision will be based upon the court’s findings as to the matters under s 18(6) and taking into account at least the matters referred to in s 18(7).49 Only the person who is sought to be compelled to give evidence may object.50 As regards the determination of issues raised by this section, it does not contain a provision allowing the court to “inform itself as it thinks fit”. Such a provision was proposed by the ALRC51 and it may have been left out by oversight. Nevertheless, given s 11, its absence should not prevent the court from moulding its procedure to determine the relevant questions as it considers most appropriate.52 In any event, s 189 provides a procedure for determining “preliminary facts”, including facts on which the compellability of a witness is dependent. However, in accordance with s 18(5), if there is a jury, it must be sent out of the court while the court hears and determines any objection under this provision. 44. See, for example, R v Khan (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 22 November 1995); R v A2 (No 4) (2015) 253 A Crim R 574; [2015] NSWSC 1306 at [142]–[172]. 45. Compare Gilmour v Environment Protection Authority (2002) 55 NSWLR 593; [2002] NSWCCA 399. 46. See R v B O (No 2) (2012) 15 DCLR (NSW) 317; [2012] NSWDC 195, discussed in Fletcher v The Queen (2015) 45 VR 634; [2015] VSCA 146 at [56]–[58]. 47. Fletcher v The Queen (2015) 45 VR 634; [2015] VSCA 146 at [59]–[61]. 48. Compare T v The Queen (1999) 73 ALJR 460. 49. See Restricted Judgment [2017] NSWCCA 93, Macfarlan JA at [26]–[27] (Schmidt J agreeing, Wilson J dissenting). It was observed by Macfarlan JA at [28] that, where the prospective witness was legally represented, it would “usually be sufficient to confirm that the person is aware of the relevant matters” but where the person is not legally represented, “an explanation of the matters to which I have referred will need to be given”. 50. Gilmour v Environment Protection Authority (2002) 55 NSWLR 593; [2002] NSWCCA 399 at [48]. 51. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 53.8. 52. See Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43 at 45–46 for discussion of a possible procedure. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.18.210]

[EA.18.210]

s 19

Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence

Comment by the prosecutor (s 18(8))

The ALRC proposed that, while the trial judge would be permitted to comment on the fact that a member of the defendant’s family has objected to giving evidence, the prosecution should not be permitted to say anything directly or indirectly about the matter.53

Cth Act: 19 Compellability of spouses and others in certain criminal proceedings [Repealed] [S 19 rep Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 13; am Act 135 of 2008]

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NSW Act: 19 Compellability of spouses and others in certain criminal proceedings Section 18 does not apply: (a) in proceedings for an offence against or referred to in the following provisions of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998: (i) section 222 (Endangering children in employment), (ii) section 223 (Certain employers of children to be authorised), (iii) section 227 (Child and young person abuse), (iv) section 228 (Neglect of children and young persons), or (b) if the person could be compelled to give evidence in proceedings under section 279 (Compellability of spouses to give evidence in certain proceedings) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Note: This section differs from section 19 of the Commonwealth Act. [S 19 subst Act 80 of 2013, Sch 8; am Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.103[1]; Act 94 of 1999, s 6 and Sch 4.21[1]; Act 158 of 1998, s 5 and Sch 2.14]

Vic Act: 19 Compellability of spouses and others in certain criminal proceedings Note: Section 19 of the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act excludes the application of the section in proceedings for certain offences.

ACT Act: 19 Compellability of domestic partners and others in certain criminal proceedings Section 18 does not apply in a proceeding for an offence against or mentioned in the following provisions: (a) an offence against the Crimes Act 1900, parts 2 to 5, that is an offence against a person under 16 years old; (b) an offence against the following provisions of the Children and Young People Act 2008: 53. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 559. See also s 20(3).

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[EA.19.30]

(i) section 423 (Offence—contravene care and protection order); (ii) section 789 (Offence—contravene employment prohibition notice); (iii) section 791 (Offence—contravene employment conditions notice); (iv) section 803 (Offence—employment of child or young person under 15 years old in high risk employment); (v) section 804 (Offence—contravene condition of permit); (c) an offence if the conduct making up the offence is family violence under the Family Violence Act 2016. [Para (c) subst Act 42 of 2016, s 204 and Sch 3[3.60]] Note: This section differs from the Commonwealth Act and NSW Act, s 19. [S 19 am Act 42 of 2016]

NT Act: 19 Compellability of spouses and others in certain criminal proceedings Section 18 does not apply in a proceeding for any of the following offences: (a) [Repealed] [Para (a) rep Act 4 of 2013, s 4(1)]

(b) an offence against a law of the Territory where the alleged victim is a person under the age of 16 years; [Para (b) am Act 4 of 2013, s 4(2)] Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

(c)

an offence that is a DVO contravention offence as defined in the Domestic and Family Violence Act; (d) an offence against section 43BI, or a provision in Part VIII, of the Criminal Code in relation to an offence mentioned in paragraph (b). [Para (d) am Act 4 of 2013, s 4(3)] Note for section 19: This section differs from section 19 of the Commonwealth Act, NSW Act and Victorian Act. [S 19 am Act 4 of 2013]

[EA.19.30] General comments This provision (which is not found in the Victorian Act) limits the application of s 18, so that a member of the family of a defendant in criminal proceedings may be compelled by the prosecution to give evidence against the defendant in certain types of proceedings relating to alleged assaults on children and other forms of “domestic violence”. The offences listed in s 19 of the Commonwealth Act are the same offences (in substance) for which a spouse of a defendant in a criminal proceeding was a compellable witness under s 66(3) of the Evidence Act 1971 (ACT).54 The NSW provision was amended in 2013 (coming into force on 29 October 2013), as a result of the judgment in LS v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) 54. The application of s 19(c) of the Commonwealth Act, as it was formulated prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102, was considered in R v Wright (2004) 149 A Crim R 298; © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(2011) 81 NSWLR 551; [2011] NSWSC 1016. Johnson J observed at [71] that the provision should be amended “so that it provides clearly and simply, and by reference to current legislation, the areas of exception which are to apply to the availability of s 18 of the Act”. The provisions listed in s 19 of the NSW Act re-enacted s 407(3)(b) and s 407AA of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), since repealed. As regards s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (extracted in Related Legislation), which applies to “child assault” and “domestic violence” offences, it provides that the “spouse of an accused person” is compellable unless excused by the court on the basis of conditions contained in s 279(4).

Cth Act: 20

Comment on failure to give evidence

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence. (2) The judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) may comment on a failure of the defendant to give evidence. However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, the comment must not suggest that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant had, or believed that he or she had, committed the offence concerned.

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[Subs (2) am Act 4 of 2016, s 3 and Sch 4 item 384]

(3) The judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) may comment on a failure to give evidence by a person who, at the time of the failure, was: (a) the defendant’s spouse or de facto partner; or (b) a parent or child of the defendant. [Subs (3) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 6; Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 1]

(4) However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, a comment of a kind referred to in subsection (3) must not suggest that the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child failed to give evidence because: (a) the defendant had committed the offence concerned; or (b) the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child believed that the defendant had committed the offence concerned. [Subs (4) am Act 4 of 2016, s 3 and Sch 4 item 385; Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 items 7 and 8; Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 2]

(5) If: (a) 2 or more persons are being tried together for an indictable offence; and

[2004] ACTSC 83 and R v YL (2004) 187 FLR 84; [2004] ACTSC 115. The provisions listed in the ACT provision involve specified offences in the Crimes Act 1900 against a person under 16 years old, specified offences in the Children (Care and Protection) Act 1987 and domestic violence offences.

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(b) comment is made by any of those persons on the failure of any of those persons or of the spouse or de facto partner, or a parent or child, of any of those persons to give evidence; the judge may, in addition to commenting on the failure to give evidence, comment on any comment of a kind referred to in paragraph (b). [Subs (5) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 8] [S 20 am Act 4 of 2016; Act 135 of 2008; Act 34 of 1997]

NSW Act: 20

Comment on failure to give evidence

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence. (2) The judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) may comment on a failure of the defendant to give evidence. However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, the comment must not suggest that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that he or she was, guilty of the offence concerned. (3) The judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) may comment on a failure to give evidence by a person who, at the time of the failure, was: (a) the defendant’s spouse or de facto partner, or (b) a parent or child of the defendant.

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[Subs (3) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[6]]

(4) However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, a comment of a kind referred to in subsection (3) must not suggest that the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child failed to give evidence because: (a) the defendant was guilty of the offence concerned, or (b) the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child believed that the defendant was guilty of the offence concerned. [Subs (4) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]

(5) If: (a) 2 or more persons are being tried together for an indictable offence, and (b) comment is made by any of those persons on the failure of any of those persons or of the spouse or de facto partner, or a parent or child, of any of those persons to give evidence, the judge may, in addition to commenting on the failure to give evidence, comment on any comment of a kind referred to in paragraph (b). [Subs (5) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[7]] [S 20 am Act 46 of 2007]

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s 20

Vic Act: 20 Comment on failure to give evidence Note: Section 20 of the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act requires the judge to give certain directions to the jury relating to the failure to give evidence or call witnesses in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence. Division 6 of Part 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 contains provisions relating to the failure to give evidence or call a witness that apply in criminal trials. [S 20 am Act 14 of 2015, s 70; Act 68 of 2009]

ACT Act: 20

Comment on failure to give evidence

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence. (2) The judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) may comment on a failure of a defendant to give evidence. (3) However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, the comment must not suggest that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that the defendant was, guilty of the offence.

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(4) The judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) may comment on a failure to give evidence by a person who, at the time of the failure, was— (a) the defendant’s domestic partner; or (b) a parent or child of the defendant. (5) However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, a comment mentioned in subsection (4) must not suggest that the domestic partner, parent or child failed to give evidence because— (a) the defendant was guilty of the offence; or (b) the domestic partner, parent or child believed that the defendant was guilty of the offence. (6) If— (a) 2 or more people are being tried together for an indictable offence; and (b) comment is made by any of them on the failure of any of them or of the domestic partner, or a parent or child, of any of them to give evidence; the judge may, in addition to commenting on the failure to give evidence, comment on any comment mentioned in paragraph (b). NT Act: 20

Comment on failure to give evidence

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence. (2) The judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) may comment on a failure of the defendant to give evidence. However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, the comment must not suggest that the 120

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[EA.20.90]

defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that he or she was, guilty of the offence concerned. (3) The judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) may comment on a failure to give evidence by a person who, at the time of the failure, was: (a) the defendant’s spouse or de facto partner; or (b) a parent or child of the defendant. (4) However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, a comment of a kind referred to in subsection (3) must not suggest that the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child failed to give evidence because: (a) the defendant was guilty of the offence concerned; or (b) the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child believed that the defendant was guilty of the offence concerned. (5) If: (a) 2 or more persons are being tried together for an indictable offence; and (b) comment is made by any of those persons on the failure of any of those persons or of the spouse or de facto partner, or a parent or child, of any of those persons to give evidence; the judge may, in addition to commenting on the failure to give evidence, comment on any comment of a kind referred to in paragraph (b).

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[EA.20.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 4.90–4.117; ALRC 38, s 23, s 28.

[EA.20.60] Differences between provisions The Victorian provision was repealed in 2015 and, as the Note in the Victorian Act states, Div 6 of Pt 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 contains provisions relating to the failure to give evidence or call a witness that apply in criminal trials (see [EA.20.420]).

[EA.20.90] Application This provision only applies in “a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence”. “Criminal proceeding” is defined in the Dictionary. While the word “offence” is defined in the Dictionary to mean “an offence against or arising under an Australian law”, the term “indictable offence” is not defined in this Act. However, s 4G of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides: Offences against a law of the Commonwealth punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months are indictable offences unless the contrary intention appears.

The Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) defines an “indictable offence” as any offence which is not required to be dealt with summarily (with most offences punishable by less than two years imprisonment required to be dealt with summarily). Section 131 of that Act provides that “criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court or the District Court are to be tried by a jury, except as otherwise provided by this Part”, while s 132 permits trial by judge alone if the defendant and prosecution consent. In Victoria, s 2B of the Crimes Act 1958 deems offences © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 20

under that Act to be “indictable offences”, unless the contrary intention appears. Section 391 makes it clear that trials of such offences are to be heard by a judge and jury. Notwithstanding the technicalities in the Commonwealth and NSW legislation, it appears to be the clear intention behind s 20 that it applies to criminal proceedings with a judge and jury. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the common law principles that underlie this provision and continue to operate (see discussion below) have application to a trial by judge alone. As regards sentencing proceedings, in Thi Dung Ta v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 32 James J (Hall and Price JJ agreeing) found it unnecessary to determine whether authorities relating to “comment” on the failure of a defendant to testify have any application to such proceedings (at [120]). Clearly enough, for a sentencing judge to take into account the failure of a defendant/offender to testify does not, strictly speaking, involve a “comment” on that failure. On the other hand, the principles that underlie this area of the law may still have application in sentencing proceedings, notwithstanding the differences between a criminal trial before a jury and a sentence hearing before a judge.55

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[EA.20.120]

“comment on the failure of the defendant to give evidence” (s 20(2))

The Act distinguishes comment by the judge, the prosecutor and a co-defendant on the failure of the defendant (in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence) to give evidence: • the prosecutor is generally prohibited from commenting (see [EA.20.150]); • the judge may comment but “must not suggest that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that he or she was, guilty of the offence concerned” (see [EA.20.180]); • “another defendant in the proceeding” may comment (see [EA.20.210]). Under s 20(5), if another person “being tried together” with a defendant “for an indictable offence” comments on the failure of the defendant to give evidence, the judge may comment on that comment (but is still bound by the prohibition in s 20(2)).

[EA.20.150]

Comment by prosecutor on the failure of the defendant to give evidence (s 20(2))

The prosecutor may not “comment” on a failure of the defendant to give evidence. This word is not defined. In R v Villar [2004] NSWCCA 302 at [119], the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal adopted the approach of non–UEL authority, whereby “comment” on the failure of a defendant to give evidence is any statement which directly or indirectly suggests that the defendant could have 55. However, James J noted at [118] that in the Queensland case of R v Miller [2004] 1 Qd R 548; [2003] QCA 404 Holmes J, who delivered the leading judgment with which the other members of the Queensland Court of Appeal agreed, after pointing to various differences between a criminal trial before a jury and a sentence hearing before a judge, said at [27]: “Because of these distinctions, I do not think that the constraints on comment and approach imposed by the Weissensteiner line of authority have any application to fact finding on sentence.”

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given evidence and did not do so. A reference to the first fact will almost always imply the second,57 but a reference to the second alone does not necessarily imply the first.58 In most circumstances, a reference to the failure of the defendant to call any witness is not such a “comment”.59 Similarly, it is not a “comment” to state that the only version of the facts before the court is that proved by the prosecution witnesses and, if counsel for the defence has engaged in speculation as to alternative scenarios, that there is no evidence to support such alternative scenarios.60 It is not clear whether the prohibition on “comment” extends to a prosecutor’s opening address informing the jury of the options open to a defendant.61 As regards final addresses, in R v Milat (unreported, NSW SC, 23 April 1996), Hunt CJ at CL stated:

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It has been the usual practice for Crown prosecutors to refer in their final addresses to the nature of the direction which was given within the limitations imposed by [earlier legislation]. Provided that Crown Prosecutors do not imply that they are adopting the comment inherent in the directions which may now be given, I see no reason why they should not continue to do so – although a high degree of caution is required.

However, it may be observed that it is difficult to see how a prosecutor can avoid implying that he or she is “adopting the comment inherent in the directions” from the judge. In Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held at [618] that a prosecutor’s final address breached the provision where a series of questions were asked and it was said that “the answers all point to the guilt of the accused” – because that indirectly alluded to the failure of the accused to provide any answers (which was compounded by an invitation to pay attention to whether defence counsel provided any answers).

56. Bataillard v The King (1907) 4 CLR 1282 per Isaacs J (at 1291), Higgins J (at 1292); Peterson v The Queen (1979) 41 FLR 205 at 211. See also R v McGibbony [1956] VLR 424 (FC); R v Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 (NSW CCA); R v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 (CCA). 57. See Stuart v The Queen (1959) 101 CLR 1. 58. R v Barron [1975] VR 496 at 502; R v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 (CCA), Street CJ at 471; R v George (1981) 4 A Crim R 12 at 15 per Street CJ (NSW CCA). However, it is suggested that this authority will have to be reconsidered now that the defendant no longer has the right to make an unsworn statement. In those circumstances, a reference to the failure of the defence to call any evidence would appear to be a comment: cf R v Clarke (unreported, NSW CCA, 8 March 1996). In R v Mansour (unreported, NSW SC, Levine J, 26 November 1996) it was held that a Crown reference to the prosecution witnesses being “uncontradicted by other evidence at trial” would point to, or at least carry, a clear implication with respect to the failure of the defendant to give evidence and therefore constitute a prohibited comment under s 20. 59. R v Thornton (1980) 3 A Crim R 80 (VicCCA) per Murray J (at 84), King J (at 86). 60. R v Yammine (2002) 132 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 289 at [57]–[58]; R v Siebel (1992) 57 SASR 558; 59 A Crim R 105 at 109 (SA CCA) per King CJ. 61. See Peterson v The Queen (1979) 41 FLR 205 at 211 (Full Federal Court). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Comment by the judge on the failure of the defendant to give evidence (s 20(2))

As noted in [EA.20.150], “comment” on the failure of a defendant to give evidence is any statement that directly or indirectly suggests that the defendant could have given evidence and did not do so. It would not be “comment” for a trial judge to point out that prosecution circumstantial evidence had not been contradicted by defence evidence.62 There is no doubt that a judge may, and usually should, make a comment on the failure of the defendant to give evidence which is designed to assist the defence by warning the jury against adopting an impermissible chain of reasoning. In Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 the majority of the High Court stated at [51] that:

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… if an accused does not give evidence at trial it will almost always be desirable for the judge to warn the jury that the accused’s silence in court is not evidence against the accused, does not constitute an admission by the accused, may not be used to fill gaps in the evidence tendered by the prosecution, and may not be used as a make weight in assessing whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Such directions, or at least directions which reflect the purpose behind the form of words adopted, will usually be essential to ensure a fair trial,63 even if not requested by defence counsel.64 It may also be appropriate to direct the jury that they “cannot speculate on what the [defendant] could or would have said”.65 Directions pointing out that the defendant was not bound to give evidence and, that there may have been many reasons why he or she did not do so (and the jury should not speculate about those reasons) may also be appropriate.66 62. Compare R v Porter (2003) 85 SASR 581; 138 A Crim R 581; [2003] SASC 233 (SACCA). 63. See R v Macris (2004) 147 A Crim R 99; [2004] NSWCCA 261; see also RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3 at [15] and [43] per Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. Such a direction is desirable unless there is some feature of the case that renders it unnecessary or inappropriate: Burke v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 40 VR 161; 237 A Crim R 130; [2013] VSCA 351 at [69]–[73]. However, the High Court “cannot be taken to have ruled that in every case it is compulsory let alone desirable” for directions to be given to the jury regarding the failure of a defendant to give evidence: R v Richards (2002) 128 A Crim R 204; [2002] NSWCCA 38 at [29] per Levine J; R v Nguyen [2002] NSWCCA 342 at [48]–[52]; Saunders v The Queen (2004) 149 A Crim R 174; [2004] TASSC 95 (Tas CCA) at [29], [77]. Equally, no particular form of words need be used: R v Colville (2003) 137 A Crim R 543; [2003] NSWCCA 23 at [63]–[66]. In R v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346; [2005] NSWCCA 20 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal strongly criticised Macris. Hunt AJA (Grove J and James J agreeing) observed at [34]–[35] that it will not be “desirable” to give particular aspects of the Azzopardi formulation if the direction that is given covers the same ground as that formulation and adequately fulfils the purpose behind that formulation. See also Nguyen v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 4, Basten JA at [71]–[79]. 64. Johnston v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 133; Sever v The Queen (2007) 179 A Crim R 110; [2007] NSWCCA 339; R v GAJ [2011] QCA 141; Burke v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 40 VR 161; 237 A Crim R 130; [2013] VSCA 351 at [73]. 65. R v Vaughan (1997) 98 A Crim R 239 at 243 per Dunford J. 66. While such a direction is appropriate, it will usually not be essential: R v Macris (2004) 147 A Crim R 99; [2004] NSWCCA 261 at [24]–[28]; R v Nguyen [2002] NSWCCA 342 at [51]–[52]; R v Davis [1999] NSWCCA 15; R v Sabbah [2004] NSWCCA 28 at [88], [150]. In R v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346; [2005] NSWCCA 20, Hunt AJA observed at [14] that such a “direction

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The scope of permissible adverse comment by a judge under this provision (and fundamental accusatorial principles) has been considered by the High Court in RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3 and in Azzopardi v The Queen. In respect of the prohibition on any comment which “suggest[s] that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that he or she was, guilty of the offence concerned”, the majority of the High Court stated in RPS:

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Section 20(2) should be given no narrow construction inviting the drawing of fine distinctions. In particular, the prohibition contained in the second sentence (forbidding the judge making a comment that suggests the accused failed to give evidence because he or she was, or believed that he or she was, guilty) must be given full operation. In that respect this prohibition should not be treated differently from the prohibition (still operative in some Australian jurisdictions) against a judge making any comment on the failure of the accused to give evidence. To adopt and adapt what was said by Isaacs J in Bataillard v The King, if comment is made about the accused not having given evidence it must not make any “reference, direct or indirect, and either by express words or the most subtle allusion” suggesting that the accused did not give evidence because he or she was, or believed that he or she was, guilty. It has been said that the line between what is permissible and what is not, under provisions which prohibit any comment on a failure to give evidence, may be a fine one. Whether or not that is so, s 20(2) requires a line to be drawn and it should be drawn in a way that gives the prohibition against suggesting particular reasons for not giving evidence its full operation.67

The majority of the High Court held that a judicial comment to the jury that they were “entitled to conclude, from the accused’s election not to deny or contradict [certain prosecution] evidence that his evidence would not have assisted him in this trial” was in breach of the prohibition, since “any belief which the appellant held, that his evidence would not have assisted him in his trial, could proceed only from a belief that he was guilty; that is, it could proceed only from a belief that he could not deny or contradict at least some of what had been said against him”.68 Callinan J went further, holding that any adverse comment would inevitably breach the statutory prohibition.69 Quite apart from the statutory prohibition, the majority of the High Court held that substantial limitations were imposed by fundamental accusatorial principles applicable to a criminal trial. The majority stated (at [22]–[27]): is … only necessary where” a suggestion has been made “that a failure by the accused to contradict or explain incriminating evidence, in circumstances where it would be reasonable to expect him to do so, may make it easier for the jury to accept, or to draw inferences from, the evidence on which the Crown relies”. 67. RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3, Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [20]. See also McHugh J at [47], where he noted that “for the purpose of the section there is no difference between the judge saying ‘It is plain that …’, ‘You may think that …’ and ‘You are entitled to conclude that …’.” 68. RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3, Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [19]. The majority stated (at [30]) that, if R v D (1997) 45 NSWLR 744; 98 A Crim R 151 is “to be taken as establishing, as a general proposition, that it is proper in cases similar to the present to give directions of the kind given here, it should be overruled”. 69. Callinan J at [108]–[109]. Thus, Callinan J considered that a comment that the jury would be entitled, in certain circumstances, to more readily accept uncontradicted prosecution evidence would be impermissible under s 20(2). This view does not appear to be shared by the majority of the High Court. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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What is presently significant is that a criminal trial is an accusatorial process in which the prosecution bears the onus of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In a trial of that kind, what significance can be attached to the fact that the accused does not give evidence? … In a civil trial there will very often be a reasonable expectation that a party would give or call relevant evidence. … By contrast, however, it will seldom, if ever, be reasonable to conclude that an accused in a criminal trial would be expected to give evidence. The most that can be said in criminal matters is that there are some cases in which evidence (or an explanation) contradicting an apparently damning inference to be drawn from proven facts could come only from the accused. In the absence of such evidence or explanation, the jury may more readily draw the conclusion which the prosecution seeks.

In Azzopardi v The Queen, the majority of the High Court added (at [34]): It is, therefore, clear beyond doubt that the fact that an accused does not give evidence at trial is not of itself evidence against the accused. It is not an admission of guilt by conduct; it cannot fill in any gaps in the prosecution case; it cannot be used as a make-weight in considering whether the prosecution has proved the accusation beyond reasonable doubt.

However, in an earlier decision of the High Court, Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 A Crim R 251; [1993] HCA 65, members of the court had stated (at 227–229 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ):

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[I]n a criminal trial, hypotheses consistent with innocence may cease to be rational or reasonable in the absence of evidence to support them when that evidence, if it exists at all, must be within the knowledge of the accused.

The words “in the absence of evidence to support them” should be noted. Thus, the principle in Weissensteiner may only arise where there is no evidence to support an innocent hypothesis.70 Further, in RPS, the majority emphasised the last words of the sentence, limiting the decision in Weissensteiner to its unusual factual circumstances. In that case, the prosecution case was that the defendant’s guilt was to be inferred from circumstances, particularly the unexplained disappearance of those whom it was alleged he had murdered, and his possession of the boat and equipment which they owned and from which they had disappeared while on a voyage with the accused. Only he knew what had really happened. In those circumstances, unless there were legitimate reasons for the failure to give evidence,71 uncontradicted evidence is easier or safer to accept 70. See Davies v The Queen [2014] VSCA 284 at [117]. 71. For example, the prosecution case may be so deficient that the defence was relying on the burden of proof cast on the prosecution (see Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ in Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 A Crim R 251; [1993] HCA 65 at 228 (CLR)). It may also be observed that concerns about the ability of the defendant to handle cross-examination and reliance on evidence of an account given by the defendant before the trial may also be argued to be legitimate reasons. Indeed, it is arguable that since a judge cannot know what advice the defendant received regarding the strength of the prosecution case and/or his or her ability to cope with cross-examination, the failure of the defendant to give evidence is never “clearly capable of assisting [the jury] in the evaluation of the evidence before them” (Weissensteiner at 228). Compare R v Mora (unreported, Vic CCA, Phillips CJ, Southwell, Smith AJJA, 30 May 1996) (particularly the judgment of Smith J) with R v Wood (1996) 87 A Crim R 346 and R v Kragujevic (unreported, SA CCA, Prior, Olsson, Duggan JJ, 17 April 1996). On the other hand, it has been held that it would only be in a “rare case” that an explanation given by a defendant before trial would make it inappropriate to comment on the failure to give evidence at trial: R v Ellis (1998) 100 A Crim R 49 (SA CCA). Similarly, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has

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72

than contradicted evidence. The trial judge in that case had made no error by directing the jury that they could more safely draw the inferences that the prosecution alleged should be drawn. In Azzopardi, the majority of the High Court reconciled RPS and Weissensteiner in the following way: There may be cases involving circumstances such that the reasoning in Weissensteiner will justify some comment. However, that will be so only if there is a basis for concluding that, if there are additional facts which would explain or contradict the inference which the prosecution seeks to have the jury draw, and they are facts which (if they exist) would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, that a comment on the accused’s failure to provide evidence of those facts may be made. The facts which it is suggested could have been, but were not, revealed by evidence from the accused must be additional to those already given in evidence by the witnesses who were called. The fact that the accused could have contradicted evidence already given will not suffice.73

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If an adverse comment is not permissible, it would be wrong to qualify the comment (discussed above) given to assist the defence by warning the jury against adopting an impermissible chain of reasoning. Thus, for example, in Norton v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 115 the Western Australian Court of Appeal disapproved a trial judge saying the following after giving a favourable direction: “On the other hand, it does nothing to explain, rebut or contradict the evidence presented by the prosecution”. Even if the case is one of those “rare and exceptional” ones74 where the reasoning in Weissensteiner v The Queen would justify some comment, considerable caution must be exercised by the judge. A judgment must be made as to whether, in all of the circumstances, it could fairly be said that a failure to give evidence bears on the probative value of the other evidence which has been given and which the jury is required to consider.75 As was pointed out in Weissensteiner (at 228 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ): rejected a submission that the fact that the defendant participated in a police interview, which is before the jury, “necessarily militates against giving a Weissensteiner direction”: R v Davis [1999] NSWCCA 15 at [49] per Wood CJ at CL. 72. Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 A Crim R 251; [1993] HCA 65 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ (at 227–229 (CLR)); Brennan and Toohey JJ (at 235–236). There is a distinction between drawing an inference of guilt merely from silence and drawing an inference otherwise available more safely simply because the defendant has not supported any hypothesis which is consistent with innocence from facts which the court perceives to be within his or her knowledge. 73. Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 at [64] per Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. Gleeson CJ and McHugh J dissented. See also R v Giri (2001) 121 A Crim R 568; [2001] NSWCCA 197; LGM v CAM (2006) 200 FLR 360; [2006] FamCA 435; Butler v The Queen (2011) 216 A Crim R 215; [2011] VSCA 417 at [140]–[155] (but see Maxwell P at [33]–[37]). 74. See Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 at [68]. See also Burke v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 40 VR 161; 237 A Crim R 130; [2013] VSCA 351 at [47]; Lowe v The Queen [2015] VSCA 327 at [211]–[221]. However, note the High Court’s willingness to draw a “Weissensteiner inference” itself: R v Baden-Clay (2016) 90 ALJR 1013; [2016] HCA 35 at [50]–[51] (ALJR). 75. Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 A Crim R 251; [1993] HCA 65 at 228 (CLR) per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ. See also R v Clune (1999) 72 SASR 420. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Even if there are facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge the deficiencies in the prosecution case may be sufficient to account for the accused remaining silent and relying upon the burden of proof cast upon the prosecution. Much depends upon the circumstances of the particular case and a jury should not be invited to take into account the failure of the accused to give evidence unless that failure is clearly capable of assisting them in the evaluation of the evidence before them.

This is particularly the case where more than one count is charged. As the majority stated in RPS, in such a situation the course which the defendant takes “may very well be affected greatly by whether the denial or contradiction of each charge can be maintained with the same degree of force”.76 As a practical matter, it will often be prudent for a trial judge, before giving directions, to raise with counsel, in the absence of the jury, the question of what direction should be given.77 Further, and more generally, the majority of the High Court in RPS observed that, while it may be open to the judge to comment (adversely to the defence) on this “factual issue” in the particular circumstances of the case: [o]ften, perhaps much more often than not, the safer course for a trial judge will be to make no comment on the facts beyond reminding the jury, in the course of identifying the issues before them, of the arguments of counsel.78

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However, it may be observed that it will be somewhat difficult to apply that principle in the context of the failure of the defendant to testify, given that the prosecution is expressly barred from commenting by this provision. If an adverse comment is to be made on the failure of the defendant to give evidence, it should be expressed in terms of a failure to provide an explanation and not the failure to give evidence as such.79 It should be made plain that it is a comment which the jury are free to disregard.80 It should be placed in its proper 76. RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3 at [34] per Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. In this case, the majority accepted that only the appellant knew what he meant by saying (if he did) that “everything else [the complainant] said is true” (an alleged partial admission). However, they then stated (at [39]): “Even if the evidence of the alleged partial admission were said to require the jury to infer that the appellant meant by his statement, this was not a case in which it was reasonable to expect some denial, explanation or answer by the accused about the alleged partial admission. It is essential to recall that the appellant was charged with eight counts and that there were, therefore, in effect eight different cases which he had to meet. The alleged admission was, at its highest, an admission to some only of the charges alleged against him. That being so, there was no basis for saying that the appellant should reasonably be expected to answer the part of the prosecution case which related to those counts by giving evidence. Once in the witness box the appellant would have been exposed to examination about all of the counts charged and the course which he took must be understood in that light. In particular, he was entitled to say in respect of any one of the charges that the proof by the prosecution was insufficient and, if that were so, no conclusion could safely be reached for his not giving evidence beyond the conclusion that he was content to rest on the need for the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, each of the allegations it made.” 77. R v D (1997) 45 NSWLR 744; 98 A Crim R 151 at 753 (NSWLR) per Gleeson CJ. It should be noted, however, that in significant respects, this decision was overruled by the judgment of the High Court in RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3. 78. RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3, Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [42]. This view was confirmed in Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 at [52]. 79. See Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 at [65]–[66]. 80. See Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 at [67].

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context by identifying the facts that are said to call for an explanation.81 The judge should remind the jury that the defendant is not bound to give evidence, that there may have been many reasons why he or she did not do so (and the jury should not speculate about those reasons), and that the onus remains on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.82 Adequate directions should also be given to the jury that the fact that the accused does not give evidence is not an admission, does not fill gaps in the prosecution’s proofs and is not to be used as a make-weight.83

[EA.20.210]

Comment by another defendant on the failure of the defendant to give evidence (s 20(2))

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Another defendant may comment on the failure of the defendant to give evidence. There is no express prohibition on any comment which “suggest[s] that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that he or she was, guilty of the offence concerned”. It is not clearly resolved whether the substantial limitations imposed by fundamental accusatorial principles on judicial comment also apply in some way to comment by a co-defendant. Observations by the majority of the High Court in Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 strongly suggest that they do not (at [54] per Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ): If only one of two accused persons gives evidence at their joint trial, it is inevitable that the accused who has given evidence will want to urge the jury to contrast that with the course taken by the other accused. It is well-nigh inevitable that in urging that the evidence given by the accused demonstrates innocence, the suggestion will be made, explicitly or implicitly, that the co-accused stayed silent because, unlike the accused who did give evidence, he or she was guilty.

However, in R v Tran (2006) 96 SASR 8; 164 A Crim R 541; [2006] SASC 276 the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal held (in a non-UEL jurisdiction) that another defendant (or his or her legal representative) should not be permitted to make a submission that would, if said by the judge, be a prohibited comment under common law principles: Duggan J at [43], Sulan and David JJ agreeing. If such a submission is made, it should be corrected by the trial judge (at [44]).

[EA.20.240]

“comment on a failure to give evidence by” a spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of a defendant (s 20(3), (4))

The terms “de facto partner”, “parent” and “child” are defined in the dictionary: see also [EA.18.60]. The Act distinguishes comment by the judge, the prosecutor and a co-defendant on the failure to give evidence by a spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of a defendant (in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence): 81. See Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 at [67]. at [67]. 82. Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 A Crim R 251; [1993] HCA 65 at 235 (CLR) per Brennan and Toohey JJ. See also RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3 at [15] and [43] per Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. 83. See Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 at [67]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• the prosecutor is generally prohibited from commenting (see [EA.20.270]); • the judge may comment but “must not suggest that the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child failed to give evidence because the defendant was guilty of the offence concerned or the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child believed that the defendant was guilty of the offence concerned” (see [EA.20.300]); • “another defendant in the proceeding” may comment (see [EA.20.330]). Under s 20(5), if another person “being tried together” with a defendant “for an indictable offence” comments on the failure of the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of the defendant to give evidence, the judge may comment on that comment (but is still bound by the prohibition in s 20(4)).

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[EA.20.270]

Comment by prosecutor on the failure of a spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of a defendant to give evidence (s 20(3), (4))

The prosecutor may not “comment” on a failure of a spouse, de facto partner (see [EA.Dict.Pt.2.120]), parent or child of a defendant to give evidence. The word “comment” is not defined. It has been given a meaning similar to that given in respect of comment on the failure of the defendant to give evidence (see [EA.20.150]) – any statement which directly or indirectly suggests that such a person could have given evidence and did not do so.84 However, it would not be a prohibited comment if what was said only related to the failure of the prosecution to call the person as a witness. It must suggest, directly or indirectly, that the defence could have called the person as a witness.85

[EA.20.300]

Comment by the judge on the failure of a spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of a defendant to give evidence (s 20(3), (4))

Under s 20(3) the judge may “comment” on the failure of a spouse, de facto partner (see [EA.Dict.Pt.2.120]), parent or child of a defendant to give evidence, although, under s 20(4), such a comment “must not suggest that the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of the defendant failed to give evidence because” the defendant was guilty or that person believed the defendant was guilty. There is no doubt that a judge may make a comment on the failure of the defence to call any person as a witness for the defence by warning the jury against adopting an impermissible chain of reasoning. In Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285; 76 ALJR 1552; [2002] HCA 45, Gaudron and Hayne JJ observed at [15]: 84. DJF v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 412; [2011] NSWCCA 6, Giles JA at [3] (RA Hulme J agreeing). See also R v Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439; [2001] NSWCCA 381; R v Noonan [2002] NSWCCA 150. 85. See DJF v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 412; [2011] NSWCCA 6, Giles JA at [3]–[4] (RA Hulme J agreeing).

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[W]here there is evidence that there may be persons who could have, but have not, given relevant evidence, it is almost always desirable to tell the jury that they may not speculate about what those witnesses might have said but must decide the case only on the evidence that has been led.

Such a direction should be given when “it is possible that the jury might think that evidence could have been, but was not, given or called by the accused” (at [5]). Presumably, directions pointing out that the person was not bound to give evidence, that there may have been many reasons why he or she did not do so (and the jury should not speculate about those reasons), that it is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the jury should draw no inference from the person not having given evidence, would also be appropriate and may be essential to ensure a fair trial. As to the scope of permissible adverse comment, it is now clear that the common law principles applicable in respect of the failure of the defence in a criminal trial to call any particular person to give evidence (not just a spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of the defendant) significantly constrain permissible judicial comment: see [EA.55.180].

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In those cases where an adverse inference is open, the principles applicable in civil proceedings to the failure of a party to call particular evidence, where such evidence would reasonably have been expected (see [EA.55.180]), would apply. However, great caution in the making of judicial comment would be required, for similar reasons as the need for caution when adverse comment may be made about the failure of the defendant to give evidence (see [EA.20.180]). Further, as Street CJ explained in R v Buckland [1977] 2 NSWLR 452 at 459: In criminal proceedings … the making of a comment or the indication of the available inference will be attended by a marked degree of caution, inasmuch as in many cases the absence of a witness either for the Crown or the accused might well be explicable upon grounds not readily capable of proof.86

It follows that, if any adverse comment is to be made on the failure of the one or other of these persons to give evidence, it may be that considerable, and complex, guidance to the jury will be required.87 The prohibition in s 20(4) that a comment “must not suggest that the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of the defendant failed to give evidence because” the defendant was guilty or that person believed the defendant was guilty, would require careful consideration, bearing in mind the view of the majority of the High Court in RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3 at [19] that a judicial comment to the jury that they were “entitled to conclude, from the accused’s election not to deny or contradict [certain prosecution] evidence that his evidence would not have assisted him in this trial” was in breach of the comparable prohibition in s 20(2) (since “any belief which the appellant held, that his evidence would not have assisted him in his trial, could proceed only from a 86. This caution has been emphasised in subsequent decisions: R v Newland (1997) 98 A Crim R 455; R v Taufua [1999] NSWCCA 205; R v Scott (2002) 112 A Crim R 543; [2000] NSWCCA 187. 87. See also R v Newland (1997) 98 A Crim R 455 at 461–462 per Gleeson CJ; R v Taufua [1999] NSWCCA 205 at [44]–[51] per Carruthers AJ; R v Scott (2002) 112 A Crim R 543; [2000] NSWCCA 187; R v Noonan [2002] NSWCCA 150. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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belief that he was guilty; that is, it could proceed only from a belief that he could not deny or contradict at least some of what had been said against him”).

[EA.20.330]

Comment by another defendant on the failure of a spouse, de facto partner, parent or child of a defendant to give evidence (s 20(3), (4))

Another defendant may comment on a failure of a spouse, de facto partner (see [EA.Dict.Pt.2.120]), parent or child of a defendant to give evidence. There is no express prohibition on any comment which “suggest[s] that the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child failed to give evidence because the defendant was guilty of the offence concerned or the spouse, de facto partner, parent or child believed that the defendant was guilty of the offence concerned”. Presumably, the content of permissible comment will be influenced by authority relating to the comparable situation of comment on the failure of the defendant to give evidence (see [EA.20.210]).

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[EA.20.360]

Judicial comment on comment by persons “tried together for an indictable offence” (s 20(5))

This provision permits a judge to comment on any comment made88 by persons who are co-defendants to the same indictable offence as a defendant. It follows that the provision does not apply if the co-defendant is being tried for a different offence (or offences), no matter how related. Where a judge is permitted to comment in accordance with this provision, it may be anticipated that the comment should be designed to ameliorate the impact of any adverse comment made by the co-defendant(s).

[EA.20.390]

Comment generally on the failure of the defence to adduce evidence

This provision deals with comment on the failure to give evidence by a defendant or the spouse, de-facto partner, parent or child of a defendant (in a criminal proceeding for an indictable offence). As regards comment on the failure of the defence to adduce other evidence, common law principles apply: see [EA.55.180].

[EA.20.420]

Other provisions: Victoria

As the Note in the Victorian Act states, Div 6 of Pt 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 contains provisions relating to the failure to give evidence or call a witness that apply in criminal trials. The position may be summarized as follows: (1) failure of accused to give evidence or call a particular witness (i) Section 42 provides that “the trial judge, the prosecution and defence counsel (or, if the accused is unrepresented, the accused) must not say, or suggest in any way, to the jury that” the jury may: (a) conclude that the accused is guilty from that fact; or 88. Under s 20(2) in relation to a defendant, or under s 20(3) in relation to a spouse, parent or child of a defendant.

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[EA.20.420]

(b) use the failure of the accused to provide an explanation of facts, which must be within the knowledge of the accused, to more safely draw an adverse inference based on those facts which, if drawn, would prove the guilt of the accused; or (c) draw an inference that the accused did not give evidence or call a witness (as the case requires) because that would not have assisted his or her case. This prohibition applies generally and there is no provision in the Act qualifying it. Accordingly, it has the effect of overturning the common law principle that “rare and exceptional” circumstances may arise where the reasoning in Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 A Crim R 251; [1993] HCA 65 would justify some adverse comment (see Note 1 to s 44)89. If a party breaches the prohibition in this provision, the trial judge must “correct” the “statement or suggestion” (s 7). However, s 7(2) provides that the trial judge need not correct the statement or suggestion “if there are good reasons for not doing so” and gives the example of where “counsel has already corrected a prohibited statement or suggestion at the invitation of the trial judge”. (ii) Section 41 provides that defence counsel may request under s 12 that the trial judge give the jury a direction which “must explain” a number of matters specified in s 41(2): (a) the prosecution’s obligation to prove that the accused is guilty; and

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(b) that the accused is not required to give evidence or call a witness (as the case requires); and (c) that the jury should not guess or speculate about what might have been contained in the evidence; and (d) that the fact that the accused did not give evidence or call a witness (as the case requires)— (i) is not evidence against the accused; and (ii) is not an admission by the accused; and (iii) must not be used to fill gaps in the evidence adduced by the prosecution; and (iv) does not strengthen the prosecution case. Section 14(1) requires the trial judge to give the “requested direction unless there are good reasons for not doing so” (the same formulation as found in s 165B(3): see [EA.165B.240]). Section 14(2) specifies matters the trial judge must have regard to in determining whether there are such “good reasons”. It would also be material to consider the prohibition in s 42. In giving a direction to the jury, the trial judge need not use any particular form of words: s 6 (see also s 5(4)). However, the direction must not breach the prohibition in s 42 (see above). If there has been no request for a direction, s 15 provides that, “[s]ubject to section 16, the trial judge must not give the jury a direction”. Section 16 mandates a direction “if the trial judge considers that there are substantial and compelling reasons for giving the direction” (and certain procedural requirements are 89. See Lowe v The Queen [2015] VSCA 327 at [210]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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satisfied). Any rule of common law under which a trial judge is required to direct the jury regarding the failure of accused to give evidence or call a particular witness is abolished: s 44. (2) failure of prosecution to call or question a particular witness

Section 43 provides that defence counsel may request under s 12 that the trial judge direct the jury on the fact that the prosecution failed to call or question a particular witness. Section 14(1) requires the trial judge to give the “requested direction unless there are good reasons for not doing so” (the same formulation as found in s 165B(3): see [EA.165B.240]). Section 14(2) specifies matters the trial judge must have regard to in determining whether there are such “good reasons”. However, s 43(2) provides that the trial judge may give that direction only if the trial judge is satisfied that the prosecution– (a) was reasonably expected to call or question the witness; and

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(b) has not satisfactorily explained why it did not call or question the witness.

As regards the term of the direction, the Act is not specific, subject to s 43(3) which provides that, in giving the direction, “the trial judge may inform the jury that it may conclude that the witness would not have assisted the prosecution’s case”. In giving a direction to the jury, the trial judge need not use any particular form of words: s 6 (see also s 5(4)). Presumably, the jury should also be directed that it cannot be inferred that the evidence not adduced “would have been unfavourable to the prosecution case” (see [EA.55.180]). Particular care will be needed in the giving of directions where the defence has the onus of proof in respect of a fact in issue. If there has been no request for a direction, s 15 provides that, “[s]ubject to section 16, the trial judge must not give the jury a direction”. Section 16 mandates a direction “if the trial judge considers that there are substantial and compelling reasons for giving the direction” (and certain procedural requirements are satisfied). Any rule of common law under which a trial judge is required to direct the jury regarding the failure of the prosecution to call or question a particular witness is abolished: s 44. Accordingly, the common law principles established in Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285; 76 ALJR 1552; [2002] HCA 45 (see [EA.55.180]) no longer apply.

DIVISION 2 – OATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS DIVISION 2.1.2 – OATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS (ACT ONLY) DIVISION 2 – OATHS (NT ONLY)

[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.2.30] Summary of this Division This Division deals with the general requirement that the evidence of witnesses and interpreters be sworn, either by taking an oath or making an affirmation. Section 13 in Div 1 deals with unsworn evidence from persons lacking competence to give sworn evidence. The traditional right of a defendant in criminal proceedings to make an unsworn statement immune from crossexamination has been abolished in all Australian jurisdictions.

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Cth Act: 21 Sworn evidence of witnesses to be on oath or affirmation (1) A witness in a proceeding must either take an oath, or make an affirmation, before giving evidence. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who gives unsworn evidence under section 13. [Subs (2) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 9]

(3) A person who is called merely to produce a document or thing to the court need not take an oath or make an affirmation before doing so. (4) The witness is to take the oath, or make the affirmation, in accordance with the appropriate form in the Schedule or in a similar form. (5) Such an affirmation has the same effect for all purposes as an oath. [S 21 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 21

Sworn evidence to be on oath or affirmation

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(1) A witness in a proceeding must either take an oath, or make an affirmation, before giving evidence. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who gives unsworn evidence under section 13. [Subs (2) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[8]]

(3) A person who is called merely to produce a document or thing to the court need not take an oath or make an affirmation before doing so. (4) The witness is to take the oath, or make the affirmation, in accordance with the appropriate form in Schedule 1 or in a similar form. (5) Such an affirmation has the same effect for all purposes as an oath. [S 21 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 21

Sworn evidence of witnesses to be on oath or affirmation

(1) A witness in a proceeding must either take an oath, or make an affirmation, before giving evidence. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who gives unsworn evidence under section 13. (3) A person who is called merely to produce a document or thing to the court need not take an oath or make an affirmation before doing so. (4) The witness is to take the oath, or make the affirmation, in accordance with the appropriate form in Schedule 1 or in a similar form. (5) Such an affirmation has the same effect for all purposes as an oath. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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ACT Act: 21 Sworn evidence of witnesses to be on oath or affirmation (1) A witness in a proceeding must take an oath or make an affirmation before giving evidence. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who gives unsworn evidence under section 13 (Competence—lack of capacity). (3) A person who is called only to produce a document or thing to the court need not take an oath or make an affirmation before doing so. (4) The witness must take the oath, or make the affirmation, in accordance with the appropriate form in schedule 1 or in a similar form. (5) An affirmation has the same effect for all purposes as an oath. NT Act: 21

Evidence of witnesses to be on oath (1) A witness in a proceeding must take an oath before giving evidence.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who gives evidence otherwise than on oath under section 13.

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(3) A person who is called merely to produce a document or thing to the court need not take an oath. Note for section 21: This section departs from the corresponding provision in other jurisdictions because of the provisions in the Oaths, Affıdavits and Declarations Act.

[EA.21.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 26, s 29, paras 85–86; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 571–574, 593.

[EA.21.60] General comments In general, a witness may choose to give evidence either on oath or on affirmation (see s 23). The court is to inform the witness of this choice (s 23(2)). However, unsworn evidence may be given under s 13(2) (see [EA.13.210]) and a person called merely to produce a document or thing need not take an oath or make an affirmation. In RJ v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 174; [2010] NSWCCA 263, Campbell JA (Latham J and Price J agreeing) observed at [40] that s 21 permits only one exception to the requirement that a witness in a proceeding must either take an oath or make an affirmation before giving evidence – if the person “gives unsworn evidence under section 13”. It is possible to give unsworn evidence “under section 13” only if two separate conditions are satisfied and, if they are not satisfied, any unsworn evidence given by the witness will contravene this provision and, accordingly, will not legitimately be admitted (at [42]; see further discussion at [EA.13.210]).

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s 21

[EA.21.90]

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

[EA.21.210]

Taking an oath

There is no need to swear the oath on a religious text (see s 24(1)) nor is there any requirement of religious belief or understanding of “the nature and consequences of the oath” (see s 24(2)).

[EA.21.120]

Unsworn evidence (s 21(2))

A person who is not competent to give sworn evidence may give unsworn evidence if certain preconditions imposed in s 13 are satisfied (see [EA.13.210]).

[EA.21.150]

“in accordance with the appropriate form in [the Schedule/Schedule 1] or in a similar form” (s 21(4))

The Sch 1 (in the Commonwealth Act) and Sch 1 (in the NSW and Victorian Acts) include the following oath and affirmation: Oaths by witnesses I swear (or the person taking the oath may promise) by Almighty God (or the person may name a god recognised by his or her religion) that the evidence I shall give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Affirmations by witnesses I solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

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Section 21(4) makes it clear that failure to strictly comply with the wording of the Schedule will not render the swearing invalid. In STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 528; [2010] FCA 1002, Rares J considered whether an affidavit sworn in South Korea in accordance with the law of that country was one which satisfied the requirements of this provision. Applying common law authority, Rares J held at [13] that attestation before a notary public following the procedure required under South Korean law amounted to having made an affirmation “in a similar form” to that required in the Schedule because the attestation was performed “in circumstances that recognised the gravity and importance of the truth being told”.

[EA.21.180]

“called merely to produce a document or thing to the court” (s 21(3))

A person subpoenaed to produce a document or thing need not take an oath or make an affirmation before producing the document or thing, but will have to if he or she is to give evidence about the adequacy of steps taken to comply with the subpoena.

[EA.21.210]

Affidavits and written statements

There is authority that an affidavit must comply with the requirements of s 21.90 In Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82; [2002] FCA 934 at [26], Lindgren J held that s 21(1) applies even if the evidence of the witness is 90. Kimberly-Clark Worldwide Inc v Goulimis (2008) 253 ALR 76; [2008] FCA 1415 at [3]; STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 528; [2010] FCA 1002; © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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adduced in the form of a written statement – the statement must be sworn or affirmed. Presumably, if the witness gives sworn evidence that what is said in the written statement is true, presumably this would not be required.91 However, there is also authority that Pt 2.1 only applies to evidence given by witnesses in court. For discussion of this issue generally, see [EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30].

Cth Act: 22

Interpreters to act on oath or affirmation

(1) A person must either take an oath, or make an affirmation, before acting as an interpreter in a proceeding. (2) The person is to take the oath, or make the affirmation, in accordance with the appropriate form in the Schedule or in a similar form. (3) Such an affirmation has the same effect for all purposes as an oath. NSW Act: 22

Interpreters to act on oath or affirmation

(1) A person must either take an oath, or make an affirmation, before acting as an interpreter in a proceeding.

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(1A) An oath taken, or an affirmation made, by a person before acting as an interpreter on a day is taken for the purposes of subsection (1) to be an oath taken or affirmation made by that person for the purposes of any subsequent proceedings in that court on that day in which the person acts as an interpreter. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 109 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]

(2) The person is to take the oath, or make the affirmation, in accordance with the appropriate form in Schedule 1 or in a similar form. (3) Such an affirmation has the same effect for all purposes as an oath. Note: The Commonwealth Act does not include subsection (1A). [S 22 am Act 109 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]

Vic Act: 22

Interpreters to act on oath or affirmation

(1) A person must either take an oath, or make an affirmation, before acting as an interpreter in a proceeding. (1A) An oath taken, or an affirmation made, by a person before acting as an interpreter on a day is taken for the purposes of subsection (1) to be an oath taken or affirmation made by that person for the purposes of any subsequent proceedings in that court on that day in which the person acts as an interpreter. Micar Group Pty Ltd v Insul-Trade LLC (2010) 244 FLR 403; [2010] NSWSC 1391 at [19]–[27] (although another statutory provision was held to permit receipt of the affidavit). See also Garning & Director-General, Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) [2012] FamCAFC 35 at [65]–[66]. 91. Compare LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 at [6] per Barrett J.

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[EA.22.60]

(2) The person is to take the oath, or make the affirmation, in accordance with the appropriate form in Schedule 1 or in a similar form. (3) Such an affirmation has the same effect for all purposes as an oath. Note: The Commonwealth Act does not include subsection (1A).

ACT Act: 22

Interpreters to act on oath or affirmation

(1) A person must take an oath or make an affirmation before acting as an interpreter in a proceeding. (2) An oath taken, or an affirmation made, by a person before acting as an interpreter on a day is taken for subsection (1) to be an oath taken or affirmation made by the person for the purposes of any subsequent proceeding in the court on the day the person acts as an interpreter. (3) The person must take the oath, or make the affirmation, in accordance with the appropriate form in schedule 1 or in a similar form. (4) An affirmation has the same effect for all purposes as an oath. Note: The Commonwealth Act does not include s (2).

NT Act: 22

Interpreters to act on oath

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(1) A person must take an oath before acting as an interpreter in a proceeding. (1A) An oath taken by a person before acting as an interpreter on a day is taken for the purposes of subsection (1) to be an oath taken by that person for the purposes of any subsequent proceedings in that court on that day in which the person acts as an interpreter. Notes for section 22: 1 The Commonwealth Act does not include subsection (1A). 2 This section departs from the corresponding provision in other jurisdictions because of the provisions in the Oaths, Affıdavits and Declarations Act.

[EA.22.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 26; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 613.

[EA.22.60] Differences between provisions The Commonwealth provision does not include s 22(1A), which was introduced into the NSW provision by the Evidence Legislation Act Amendment Act 2001 (NSW) and included in the Victorian Evidence Act 2008. Subsection (2) in the Commonwealth Act refers to “the Schedule” while the NSW and Victorian Acts refer to “Schedule 1”. However, the content of the Schedules is identical.

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[EA.22.90]

[EA.22.90]

s 23

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“in accordance with the appropriate form in [the Schedule/Schedule 1] or in a similar form” (s 22(2))

The Schedule/Schedule 1 includes an oath and an affirmation for interpreters. Section 22(2) ensures that failure to strictly comply with the wording of the Schedule will not render the swearing invalid.

Cth Act: 23

Choice of oath or affirmation

(1) A person who is to be a witness or act as an interpreter in a proceeding may choose whether to take an oath or make an affirmation. (2) The court is to inform the person that he or she has this choice. (3) The court may direct a person who is to be a witness to make an affirmation if: (a) the person refuses to choose whether to take an oath or make an affirmation; or (b) it is not reasonably practicable for the person to take an appropriate oath. NSW Act: Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

23

Choice of oath or affirmation

(1) A person who is to be a witness or act as an interpreter in a proceeding may choose whether to take an oath or make an affirmation. (2) The court is to inform the person that he or she has this choice, unless the court is satisfied that the person has already been informed or knows that he or she has the choice. [Subs (2) am Act 109 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]

(3) The court may direct a person who is to be a witness to make an affirmation if: (a) the person refuses to choose whether to take an oath or make an affirmation, or (b) it is not reasonably practicable for the person to take an appropriate oath. Note: Subsection (2) differs from section 23 of the Commonwealth Act. [S 23 am Act 109 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]

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[EA.23.60]

Vic Act: 23 Choice of oath or affirmation (1) A person who is to be a witness or act as an interpreter in a proceeding may choose whether to take an oath or make an affirmation. (2) The court is to inform the person that he or she has this choice, unless the court is satisfied that the person has already been informed or knows that he or she has the choice. (3) The court may direct a person who is to be a witness to make an affirmation if— (a) the person refuses to choose whether to take an oath or make an affirmation; or (b) it is not reasonably practicable for the person to take an appropriate oath. Note: Subsection (2) differs from section 23 of the Commonwealth Act.

ACT Act: 23

Choice of oath or affirmation

(1) A person who is to be a witness or act as an interpreter in a proceeding may choose whether to take an oath or make an affirmation.

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(2) The court must tell the person that the person has this choice, unless the court is satisfied that the person has already been told or knows about having the choice. (3) The court may direct a person who is to be a witness to make an affirmation if— (a) the person refuses to choose whether to take an oath or make an affirmation; or (b) it is not reasonably practicable for the person to take an appropriate oath. Note: Subsection (2) differs from the Commonwealth Act, s 23.

NT Act: 23

Choice of oath or affirmation

Note for section 23: This section is not needed because of the provisions in the Oaths, Affıdavits and Declarations Act.

[EA.23.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, paras 85–86; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 265, 566, 569.

[EA.23.60] Differences between provisions The Commonwealth provision does not include the words after “choice” in s 23(2) of the NSW/Victorian provisions, which were introduced into the NSW provision by the Evidence Legislation Act Amendment Act 2001 (NSW) and included in the Victorian Evidence Act 2008. The ACT provision is substantially to the same effect as the NSW/Victorian provision. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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General comments

It must not be suggested that evidence by way of affirmation is inferior to evidence on oath.92 Moreover, different religious beliefs concerning the making of oaths must be respected.93 However, that would not preclude crossexamination of a witness who professes religious beliefs regarding why, given his beliefs, he had not given evidence on oath.94

[EA.23.120]

“not reasonably practicable for the person to take an appropriate oath”

The tenets of a particular religious faith may make it not reasonably practicable to take an appropriate oath.95

Cth Act: 24

Requirements for oaths (1) It is not necessary that a religious text be used in taking an oath.

(2) An oath is effective for the purposes of this Division even if the person who took it: (a) did not have a religious belief or did not have a religious belief of a particular kind; or (b) did not understand the nature and consequences of the oath.

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NSW Act: 24

Requirements for oaths (1) It is not necessary that a religious text be used in taking an oath.

(2) An oath is effective for the purposes of this Division even if the person who took it: (a) did not have a religious belief or did not have a religious belief of a particular kind, or (b) did not understand the nature and consequences of the oath. Vic Act: 24

Requirements for oaths (1) It is not necessary that a religious text be used in taking an oath.

(2) An oath is effective for the purposes of this Division even if the person who took it— (a) did not have a religious belief or did not have a religious belief of a particular kind; or 92. Werden v The Queen [2015] VSCA 72 at [37]. 93. Werden v The Queen [2015] VSCA 72 at [37]. 94. Werden v The Queen [2015] VSCA 72, Osborn JA (Ashley JA agreeing) at [37]. See also Priest JA at [126]–[129]. 95. R v Kemble (1990) 91 Cr App R 178 at 179–180; BZAAG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 217 at [16]–[24].

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s 24A

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

[EA.24.60]

(b) did not understand the nature and consequences of the oath. ACT Act: 24

Requirements for oaths (1) It is not necessary that a religious text be used in taking an oath. (2) An oath is effective for this division even if the person who took it— (a) did not have a religious belief or did not have a religious belief of a particular kind; or (b) did not understand the nature and consequences of the oath.

NT Act: 24

Requirements for oaths

Note for section 24: This section is not needed because of the provisions in the Oaths, Affıdavits and Declarations Act.

[EA.24.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 26, paras 85–86; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 575.

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[EA.24.60] General comments This provision has the effect that evidence is still to be regarded as “sworn” even if common law requirements for taking an “oath” are not satisfied. It also has the effect that s 13 deals exclusively with issues of witness competence (unaffected by common law principles relating to the understanding of the nature and consequences of taking an oath).

NSW Act: 24A Alternative oath (1) A person may take an oath even if the person’s religious or spiritual beliefs do not include a belief in the existence of a god. (2) Despite anything to the contrary in this Act, the form of oath taken by a person: (a) need not include a reference to a god, and (b) may instead refer to the basis of the person’s beliefs in accordance with a form prescribed by the regulations. Note: The Commonwealth Act does not include an equivalent provision to section 24A. [S 24A insrt Act 109 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]

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Vic Act: 24A Alternative oath (1) A person may take an oath even if the person’s religious or spiritual beliefs do not include a belief in the existence of a god. (2) Despite anything to the contrary in this Act, the form of oath taken by a person— (a) need not include a reference to a god; and (b) may instead refer to the basis of the person’s beliefs in accordance with a form prescribed by the regulations. Note: The Commonwealth Act does not include an equivalent provision to section 24A.

ACT Act: 24A Alternative oath (1) A person may take an oath even if the person’s religious or spiritual beliefs do not include a belief in the existence of a god. (2) Despite anything to the contrary in this Act, the form of oath taken by a person— (a) need not include a reference to a god; and (b) may instead refer to the basis of the person’s beliefs in accordance with a form prescribed by regulation.

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Note: The Commonwealth Act does not include an equivalent provision to s 24A.

[EA.24A.30] General comments Only the NSW and Victorian Acts contain this provision. It was not recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission. The provision was introduced into the NSW Act by the Evidence Legislation Act Amendment Act 2001 (NSW) and included in the Victorian Evidence Act 2008.

Cth Act: 25

Rights to make unsworn statements unaffected [Repealed]

[S 25 rep Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 2 item 6]

NSW Act: 25

Rights to make unsworn statements unaffected

Note: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision preserving any right of a defendant under the law of a State or Territory to make an unsworn statement. The right to make an unsworn statement remains in Norfolk Island.

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s 26

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30]

Vic Act: 25 Rights to make unsworn statements unaffected Note: The Commonwealth Act previously included a provision that preserved any right that an accused in a criminal proceeding had under a law of a State or Territory to make an unsworn statement.

NT Act: 25

Rights to make unsworn statements unaffected

Note for section 25: The Commonwealth Act formerly included a provision that preserves any right that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has under a law of a State or Territory to make an unsworn statement. That provision has now been repealed.

[EA.25.30] General comments The traditional right of a defendant in criminal proceedings to make an unsworn statement immune from cross-examination has been abolished in all Australian jurisdictions.

DIVISION 3 – GENERAL RULES ABOUT GIVING EVIDENCE DIVISION 2.1.3 – GENERAL RULES ABOUT GIVING EVIDENCE (ACT ONLY)

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[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.3.30] Summary of this Division This Division deals with procedural rules relating to the adducing of evidence from witnesses in a proceeding. Section 11 in Pt 1.2 of the Act recognises that the general power of a court to control the conduct of proceedings continues, subject to the operation of the Act. However, s 26 specifically gives a court power in relation to a number of aspects of the questioning of witnesses. Section 28 deals with the order of examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination. Sections 29 – 31 deal with various ways of giving evidence (including in narrative form and through an interpreter). Procedures for a witness attempting to revive memory in court are contained in s 32 (and special rules for police officers in s 33). Some regulation of attempts to revive memory outside court is found in s 34. Calling for documents, and their inspection, is dealt with in ss 35 – 36.

Cth Act: 26

Court’s control over questioning of witnesses The court may make such orders as it considers just in relation to: (a) the way in which witnesses are to be questioned; and (b) the production and use of documents and things in connection with the questioning of witnesses; and (c) the order in which parties may question a witness; and (d) the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses.

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s 26

NSW Act: 26 Court’s control over questioning of witnesses The court may make such orders as it considers just in relation to: (a) the way in which witnesses are to be questioned, and (b) the production and use of documents and things in connection with the questioning of witnesses, and (c) the order in which parties may question a witness, and (d) the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses. Vic Act: 26

Court’s control over questioning of witness The court may make such orders as it considers just in relation to— (a) the way in which witnesses are to be questioned; and (b) the production and use of documents and things in connection with the questioning of witnesses; and (c) the order in which parties may question a witness; and (d) the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses.

ACT Act:

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26

Court’s control over questioning of witnesses The court may make the orders it considers just in relation to— (a) the way in which witnesses are to be questioned; and (b) the production and use of documents and things in connection with the questioning of witnesses; and (c) the order in which parties may question a witness; and (d) the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses.

NT Act: 26

Court’s control over questioning of witness The court may make such orders as it considers just in relation to: (a) the way in which witnesses are to be questioned; and (b) the production and use of documents and things in connection with the questioning of witnesses; and (c) the order in which parties may question a witness; and (d) the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses.

[EA.26.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 30, paras 107–108.

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[EA.26.60]

[EA.26.90]

General comments

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The ALRC did not propose a general statement of this nature as to the power of a court to control proceedings, the presentation of evidence or the questioning of witnesses. This was deemed unnecessary given the recognition in s 11 of the general power of a court to control the conduct of proceedings, subject to the operation of the Act. Section 26 is presumably premised on the assumption that some general statement of those powers is desirable. Curiously, the section is not prefaced with an express statement that the powers accorded under the section are subject to the rest of the Act (including the more specific provisions dealing with particular aspects of the questioning of witnesses). However, it is arguable that the section should be interpreted in that way96 and it has been held that “it must be construed having regard, inter alia, to the limited waiver power in s 190”.97 It has also been held that neither this provision nor s 11 create a general power to control the manner of giving evidence in the sense of a power which is not subject to the principles of natural justice98 nor do they circumscribe the right of a party to adduce admissible evidence.99 Other legislation affects the way in which evidence is given by witnesses. For example, legislation in NSW and Victoria permits the evidence of children in certain types of proceedings to be given by way of closed-circuit television facilities or by means of any other similar technology and permits the evidence-in-chief of child witnesses to be given in criminal proceedings substantially by way of the playing of a videotape of an interview between the witness and a police officer. Some of those provisions are discussed below (see [EA.27.180], [EA 28.150], [EA 41.330]). There is no doubt that, if for some reason such a provision does not strictly apply, the procedure may be adopted pursuant to the general power conferred by this provision.100

[EA.26.90] “witness” The term “witness” is defined in the Dictionary to include the meaning given in cl 7 in Pt 2 of the Dictionary: (1) A reference in this Act to a witness includes a reference to a party giving evidence. (2) A reference in this Act to a witness who has been called by a party to give evidence includes a reference to the party giving evidence. (3) A reference in this section to a party includes a defendant in a criminal proceeding. 96. A general principle of statutory construction is that, where there is conflict between general and specific provisions, the specific provisions prevail (generalia specialibus non derogant). The contrary view is that the other provisions are a prima facie guide to the exercise of the general power. 97. Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Parnell Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 537; 159 ALR 477; [1998] FCA 1580 at 543 per Mansfield J. 98. See R v Too (unreported, NSW SC, Badgery-Parker J, 26 July 1996). 99. Finchill Pty Ltd v Abdel-Messih (unreported, NSW SC, Levine J, 13 July 1998); Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Elskaf [2012] NSWSC 21 at [42]–[44]. 100. See, for example, R v Hines (No 2) (2014) 242 A Crim R 316; [2014] NSWSC 990; R v Xie (No 12) [2014] NSWSC 1980. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Calling a witness by the court

It has been held that the “wide powers” given by this provision to a court include a power to call witnesses.101 This is a very broad interpretation of the provision, which seems to be concerned with what is to happen to witnesses after they have been called. In Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225; 246 ALR 84; [2008] FCAFC 45, Besanko J at [48] rejected such authority, observing that “the powers conferred by s 26 extend only to those persons who have been called to give evidence by a party or by the judge in the exercise of a power at general law or under another statute” (the other members of the Court did not disagree with this analysis). Nevertheless, it appears clear that the court may call a witness, in appropriate circumstances, given the court’s general power to control the proceedings: s 11. Existing common law constraints on courts would presumably continue to apply (see also [EA.27.120]). Under the traditional common law approach, as a general rule the parties alone call evidence.102 It is rare for courts to intervene in the decision of parties as to the order in which witnesses are called.103 In criminal proceedings, the trial judge may only call a witness in “most exceptional circumstances”.104 A similar approach has been adopted in civil proceedings.105 Thus, in Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225; 246 ALR 84; [2008] FCAFC 45, Besanko J stated at [52]:

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It was correctly accepted by the parties that at common law the exercise of the power is reserved only for the most exceptional cases and that it would be regarded as highly unusual for a judge to call a witness in a proceeding.

Justice Besanko discussed at length what circumstances might be regarded as “most exceptional” (at [53]–[70]). However, it should be noted that Gray and North JJ stated at [3]: [W]e do not necessarily accept that the common law power is constrained by the principle that Besanko J derives from the earlier authorities. In an age in which the focus of common law courts on ascertaining the truth is increasing, and the gap between the approaches of the common law courts and the “inquisitorial” courts of the Roman law/Napoleonic systems is perceived to be much narrower than previously supposed, we prefer not to express a view that would anchor the exercise of the discretionary power in the particular view of the adversarial system identified by his Honour.

101. Milano Investments Pty Ltd v Group Developers Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 13 May 1997). Compare this decision with the approach taken in R v Too (unreported, NSW SC, Badgery-Parker J, 26 July 1996). 102. See Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 at 567–568 per Powell J. 103. See Briscoe v Briscoe [1966] 1 All ER 465; [1966] 2 WLR 205; [1968] P 501; Bond v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2) (1988) 19 FCR 494; 84 ALR 646 at 514 (FCR) per Wilcox J. 104. R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; 15 A Crim R 88 at 575 (CLR). 105. Re Enoch and Zaretzky, Bock & Co Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327; Obacelo Pty Ltd v Taveraft Pty Ltd(1986) 10 FCR 518 at 536–540; Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 at 567–568 per Powell J.

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Various court rules would impact on the common law principles. For example, a number of court rules permit the appointment of experts on the court’s own motion.106

[EA.26.150]

“the way in which witnesses are to be questioned”

As O’Ryan J stated in LGM v CAM [2008] FamCA 185 at [199]: [I]t is the trial judge’s duty to ensure all parties have a fair trial. Most relevantly, the trial judge must so exercise his [or her] discretion in and about the examination and cross examination of witnesses so that a fair trial is assured.

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The common law may offer some guidance. In general, a witness called by a party can be cross-examined by another party on any matter relevant to an issue in the proceedings.107 An example of a situation where the power conferred in this provision might be utilised is in a civil case where a number of parties have the same interest.108 The court may order that one party cross-examine on behalf of all or allow the others to cross-examine only upon matters not already canvassed.109 There is a rule of practice, designed to prevent oppression of witnesses, preventing two counsel from cross-examining the one witness, although the common law rule is subject to reasonable exceptions.110 Where a party calls another party as a witness, the court may determine the order in which questioning of the party/witness may occur (see s 26(c)) and whether the questioning should be treated as examination-in-chief or cross-examination.111 In Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (2002) 121 FCR 82; [2002] FCA 934 at [27], Lindgren J held that, in an appropriate case, a court might permit witnesses to stand or sit as a group while testifying, and might permit those members of a group who are to testify all to be sworn at the outset and counsel for the party who calls them to question them, switching from one to another, rather than questioning one witness to conclusion before questioning the next one. However, he could not “conceive of circumstances in which the Court would require the 106. Federal Court Rules, O 34; NSW Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, Pt 31, Div 2, Subdiv 5. 107. Prentice v Cummins (No 6) (2003) 203 ALR 449; [2003] FCA 1002 at [25]–[28] per Sackville J. 108. Hadid v Australis Media Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 5 November 1996). However, Sperling J considered that the power in this regard derived from s 11. See also NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd [No 8] (1999) 161 ALR 581 at [16] per Lindgren J; Lakatoi v Walker [1999] NSWSC 1088; Cheers v El Davo Pty Ltd (in liq) [2000] FCA 144 at [15]–[16] per Weinberg J; Investa Properties Pty Ltd v Nankervis (No 6) [2014] FCA 804 at [28]–[33]. 109. GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15. 110. Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas (2010) 188 FCR 140; 273 ALR 601; [2010] FCAFC 125 at [44]–[45]. The Full Court of the Federal Court held that a trial judge had erred in refusing leave to a junior counsel continuing cross-examination of a witness after the senior counsel had ceased to act, where junior counsel “undertook not to ask questions on any topic that his leader had dealt with” (at [41]). The Court held that such an undertaking “was sufficient to ensure that [the witness] was not burdened by unfair cross-examination” (at [46]). There was no need to establish “special circumstances” to justify a departure from the general rule (at [47]). The Court pointed out at [49] that s 41(1)(b) may be utilised to implement this common law principle. Reference was also made to s 40 (see [EA.41.150]). 111. NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd [No 8] (1999) 161 ALR 581 at [15] per Lindgren J (referring to Tedeschi v Singh [1948] 1 Ch 319). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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cross-examiner to do likewise: the cross-examiner should be allowed to question each witness to conclusion in the usual way”. Similarly, it has been held, as under the common law, that a court should not place arbitrary time limits on cross-examination,112 although it would be permissible to impose a time limit on further cross-examination after it had proceeded for some time with little effect.113 In LGM v CAM [2008] FamCA 185, O’Ryan J summarised the applicable principles in respect of not permitting cross-examination of a witness at [207]–[208]: Cross-examination is the testing of a witness as to the facts in issue or credit. There is no right of cross-examination and it is permitted by a Judge in the exercise of his or her discretion to ensure that parties have a fair trial. A witness that is called to give evidence may be cross-examined. In general, the party or the legal representative of the party may cross-examine a witness not called by that party. It is not necessary that the witness has given evidence against the party seeking to cross-examine. It is permissible to ask leading questions in cross-examination but there is no absolute right...

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The Court has a wide discretion to decide whether or not permission will be granted to cross-examine witnesses. There is no right to cross-examine witnesses in the course of a hearing, but rather the right of all parties to a fair trial.

The provision has been given a broad application. Thus, for example, in R v Hines (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 990 it was utilised to permit a witness to give evidence by the playing in court of a pre-recorded interview, before being questioned through a closed circuit television facility. While it might be doubted whether s 26(a) could go so far, that question has no practical significance given the general powers of a court to control its proceedings, specifically preserved by s 11(1). In respect of intervention in the questioning of a witness, the existing common law position is that, in the absence of objection by counsel for any other party, the trial judge should only intervene if there is good reason.114 The power to do so should be exercised with circumspection and should rarely be exercised merely because it appears to the judge that the question calls for an answer which is

112. JD v Director-General of Department of Youth & Community Services [1998] NSWSC 353. Black AJ emphasised the following passage from the High Court judgment in Wakeley v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 321 at 325: “The limits of cross-examination are not susceptible of precise definition, for a connection between a fact elicited by cross-examination and a fact in issue may appear, if at all, only after other pieces of evidence are forthcoming. … Although it is important in the interests of the administration of justice that cross-examination be contained within reasonable limits, a judge should allow counsel some leeway in cross-examination in order that counsel may perform the duty, where counsel’s instructions warrant it, of testing the evidence given by an opposing witness.” 113. For an example of a judge imposing a time limit on further cross-examination after having allowed it to proceed for some time, where the judge was “satisfied that there will be no unfairness … in limiting [further] cross-examination”, see Thomas v SMP International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 900. 114. R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91; R v Cunningham (1992) 61 A Crim R 412 (VicCCA). The principles elucidated in Lars have been adopted under the Evidence Act 1995: see R v RPS (unreported, NSW CCA, No 60583 of 1996, 13 August 1997), p 31 per Hunt CJ at CL. A trial judge may intervene to ensure that the trial is contained within reasonable limits.

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irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible. The Act assumes the continued existence of the adversary system: see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 64. Thus, except where a vulnerable witness is being questioned116, the circumstances in which a question may be rejected without objection are very limited.117 Similarly, adversarial principles would ordinarily preclude the court from requiring a party to adduce particular evidence or ask a particular question although a judge may, in appropriate circumstances, admit evidence which has not been tendered by a party (see, eg, s 45(3)) or ask a question of a witness (see [EA.27.120]). Court Rules have imposed special procedures relating to expert reports and evidence. These Rules will have significant impact on the way in which the expert witness gives evidence (see [EA.26.300]).

[EA.26.180]

“the order in which parties may question a witness”

The court has a broad discretion in this regard. It may take into account efficiency considerations as well as fairness to the parties.118

[EA.26.210]

“the presence … of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses”

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The practice under the existing common law is for the court to order that all proposed witnesses, other than parties and expert witnesses, are to remain outside the court until called to give evidence. Parties, while allowed to remain in court, will almost invariably testify before other witnesses are called.119

[EA.26.240]

“the court may make such orders …”

It has been argued that the making of an “order” under this provision requires consideration of the terms of s 192, which deals generally with a court giving “any leave, permission or direction” under this Act.120 The Court of Appeal (Beazley JA, Giles JA and Santow JA) did not need to determine this issue because it held that the orders made in that case were made under the general powers of the court preserved in s 11 (to which s 192 does not apply). However, 115. Nevertheless, in practice, the judge may properly interrupt counsel and, in the absence of both the witness and the jury, inquire as to the relevance of the particular question or line of questioning. 116. The general reluctance to intervene in questioning does not apply where a vulnerable witness is involved. For discussion of questioning of children and other vulnerable witnesses, see [EA.41.120], [EA.42.130], [EA.46.130]. 117. For example, where a question is offensive or unfair (s 41), or a previous ruling is being flouted. 118. See NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd [No 8] (1999) 161 ALR 581 at [19]–[22] per Lindgren J. 119. R v Lister [1981] 1 NSWLR 110. In RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3 at [8]–[9] and [84], the High Court endorsed the view that a defendant in criminal proceedings does not have to be called first in the defence case but, if called after other witnesses have testified, “comment may be made that he has tailored his own evidence to fit in with theirs”. 120. Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 at [1342]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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subsequently in ASIC v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643, Austin J held at [9] that this provision is subject to s 192. This approach was followed by Jacobsen J in the Federal Court.121

[EA.26.270]

Evidence of a conversation

There is a rule of practice under the common law that evidence of conversations should, if possible, be given by a witness in direct speech.122 However, if the witness is unable to recall the actual words used, he or she may give evidence of the substance or effect of what was said.123 Pursuant to s 56, evidence from a witness of a conversation in indirect speech or as to the substance or effect of what was said will be admissible “except as otherwise provided by this Act” (see [EA.55.540]).

[EA.26.300]

Court Rules relating to expert evidence

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The Federal Court,124 the Family Court,125 the ACT Supreme Court126 and the NSW Supreme Court127 have imposed procedures relating to expert reports and evidence. These Rules will have a significant impact on the way in which the expert witness gives evidence. For example, para 37 of the General Case Management Practice Note for the Common Law Division of the NSW Supreme Court provides that “[a]ll expert evidence will be given concurrently unless there is a single expert appointed or the Court grants leave for expert evidence to be given in an alternate manner”. The experts are sworn together and a directed discussion of issues in dispute takes place, chaired by the judge.128 The experts are encouraged to ask and answer questions of each other.

Cth Act: 27

Parties may question witnesses A party may question any witness, except as provided by this Act.

121. ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 at [7]–[8]. 122. Commonwealth v Riley (1984) 5 FCR 8 at 34; LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 at [8]–[9]; Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] FCA 1551 per Besanko J at [83]. 123. Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] FCA 1551 per Besanko J at [83]. 124. Guidelines for Expert Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia (see “Practice and Procedure in the Federal Court of Australia”, Vol 2, [69,750]). 125. Family Court Rules 2004 (Cth), Pt 15.5. 126. Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), Pt 2.12. 127. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 31.17 and 31.23; Sch 7; Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), Pt 75 r 3J (applying UCPR Sch 7). See also Barak v WTH Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 649; Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2002] NSWSC 980. 128. See Halverson v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307; Attorney General (NSW) v Winters (2007) 176 A Crim R 249; [2007] NSWSC 1071.

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NSW Act: 27 Parties may question witnesses A party may question any witness, except as provided by this Act. Vic Act: 27

Parties may question witnesses A party may question any witness, except as provided by this Act.

ACT Act: 27

Parties may question witnesses Except as provided by this Act, a party may question any witness.

NT Act: 27

Parties may question witnesses A party may question any witness, except as provided by this Act.

[EA.27.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 31, para 111(a).

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[EA.27.60] General comments If a witness refuses to submit himself or herself to cross-examination, the result may be that the court orders the evidence of the witness to be excluded or disregarded.129 If a party wishes to cross-examine a witness on matters in dispute in the proceeding and gives reasonable notice of its intention to do so, it is an incident of the court’s duty to provide a fair trial that, in general, that wish be respected130. However, the right to question a witness is subject to a number of matters, including the power of the court under s 11 to control its proceedings.131 It has been held that, in an interlocutory hearing, time may not permit there to be full or any cross-examination.132 Despite the general statement that a party to proceedings may question any witness in those proceedings, the remainder of the Act substantially controls the nature of that questioning, both by evidentiary rules (for example, s 40) and the conferral of discretion on the court (see, in particular, s 29(1)). In addition, other legislation may impose limits on the ability of a party to question a witness (see [EA.27.180]). 129. See, for example, Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2009) 182 IR 28; [2009] FCA 339 at [13]. However, the evidence may not be excluded and the inability to cross-examine may not cause a miscarriage of justice: see GO v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 132 at [68]–[78]. 130. Tarrant v Statewide Secured Investments Pty Ltd (2012) 126 ALD 290; [2012] FCA 582, Katzmann J at [35]. 131. An example of a case where the right to cross-examine was overridden using s 11 (and the discretionary provisions) is Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [1998] NSWSC 293, where Young J held that he would admit certain affidavit evidence notwithstanding the unavailability of the deponent. However, Young J indicated that “when weighing up that evidence, I will have to discount it on the basis that the witness was not available for cross-examination”. 132. See In the Marriage of C (1995) 20 Fam LR 24 at 32. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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“witness”

The term “witness” is defined in the Dictionary to include the meaning given in cl 7 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary: (1) A reference in this Act to a witness includes a reference to a party giving evidence. (2) A reference in this Act to a witness who has been called by a party to give evidence includes a reference to the party giving evidence. (3) A reference in this section to a party includes a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

[EA.27.120]

Questioning by court

This provision says nothing in regard to the calling or questioning of a witness by the trial judge. As to a court calling a witness, see [EA.26.120]. Under common law principles, as a general rule it is for the parties to question witnesses and the judge asks questions only to remove apparent ambiguities.133 These contraints apply particularly in criminal proceedings with a jury.134 As the Act assumes the continued existence of the adversary system of trial, the common law limitations continue to be applied.135 However, the traditional position has been changing in civil proceedings:

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In civil trials, in the last fifty years in New South Wales, it has become much more common for judges to take an active part in the conduct of cases than was at an earlier time the case. The growth of litigation, the increasing complexity of litigation, and the limited resources of courts and legal aid have made it inevitable that judges must,

133. R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255; R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 (CCA) at 762–763 per Street CJ; Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 at 280–282 per Kirby ACJ. 134. See R v SY [2004] NSWCCA 297. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal referred at [14]–[15] to Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 675 and observed that “[i]t is imperative that the trial judge should not act in the role of prosecutor or appear to do so”. The court added that a “judge might quite properly bring to the prosecutor’s attention some matter which appears to have been overlooked but even this must be done with considerable care and, unless it is completely uncontroversial, in the absence of the jury”. In R v Thompson (2000) 130 A Crim R 24; [2002] NSWCCA 149 at [42], Ipp AJA observed: “[I]ntervention for the purpose of clarification does not necessarily require the judge to question the witness. The judge may readily achieve clarification by pointing out, at an appropriate time, usually in the absence of the jury, evidential ambiguities or obscurities to counsel. This is by far the most desirable course.” However, Ipp AJA acknowledged the right of the judge to ask questions for the purpose of clarification and also held (at [43]) that questions which go beyond clarification do not necessarily make the trial unfair. See also R v Mohammadi (2011) 112 SASR 17; [2011] SASCFC 154 at [24]–[39]; R v L, GA [2015] SASCFC 166 at [4]–[7]. 135. R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27; R v Thompson (2000) 130 A Crim R 24; [2002] NSWCCA 149; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Earl Burns (2010) 207 A Crim R 362; [2010] NSWCA 265 at [28]–[29]; Werden v The Queen [2015] VSCA 72 at [45]–[52].

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within reasonable limits, intervene wherever it is necessary to ensure that the issues are clarified and that justice is dispensed within reasonable limits of effıciency.136

A similar approach may be taken on criminal proceedings without a jury.137 As long as the questions are asked in a moderate manner, they may be asked “for the purpose of clarifying the evidence and understanding more precisely the issues at trial”.138

[EA.27.150]

Questioning by members of jury

This provision says nothing in regard to the questioning of a witness by a member of the jury. However, the trial judge may permit this given the court’s general power to control the proceedings: ss 11 and 26. Nevertheless, the existing common law position is that such is “undesirable”139 and, where permitted, any questions should be asked through the judge.140 This too can be controlled under ss 11 and 26. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has made it clear that the same limitations on questioning by a judge (see [EA.27.120]) apply to questioning by a jury,141 and that a jury should not be encouraged or invited to ask questions.142

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[EA.27.180]

Other provisions

The effect of s 8 is that provisions in other legislation relating to the questioning of witnesses continue to apply. For example, s 294A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) prevents a self-represented defendant on trial for charges of sexual assault from personally asking questions of the complainant.143 Similarly, s 356 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) provides that a “protected witness”, as defined in s 354, “must not be cross-examined by the accused in person”. Specific provisions in both jurisdictions provide for special procedures to be adopted in relation to the questioning of particular vulnerable witnesses (such as child complainants in sexual assault prosecutions).

136. Whealy JA in FB v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 217 at [93]. See also Ryland v QBE Insurance (Aust) Ltd [2013] NSWCA 120 at [18]–[22]. 137. FB v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 217 at [90]–[110]. See also Lockwood v Police (2010) 107 SASR 237; [2010] SASC 120 at [17]; R v T, WA (2014) 118 SASR 382; 238 A Crim R 205; [2014] SASCFC 3 at [37]–[77], [93]–[94]. However, in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Earl Burns (2010) 207 A Crim R 362; [2010] NSWCA 265, in the context of a trial by a magistrate, the NSW Court of Appeal emphasised the proposition that “the task of destroying the credit of a defence witness should always be left by the judge to the Crown Prosecutor”: Beazley JA at [28]. See also R v Capaldo [2015] SASCFC 56 (sentencing proceedings). 138. Whealy JA in FB v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 217 at [109]–[110]. 139. See Lo Presti v The Queen (1994) 68 ALJR 477. 140. R v Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124 (CCA); R v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 (CCA). 141. Tootle v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 103, per Simpson JA at [46], [52]. 142. Tootle v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 103, per Simpson JA at [58]. 143. See R v MSK (2004) 61 NSWLR 204; 148 A Crim R 453; [2004] NSWCCA 308. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 28

Cth Act: 28 Order of examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination Unless the court otherwise directs: (a) cross-examination of a witness is not to take place before the examination in chief of the witness; and (b) re-examination of a witness is not to take place before all other parties who wish to do so have cross-examined the witness. NSW Act: 28 Order of examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination Unless the court otherwise directs: (a) cross-examination of a witness is not to take place before the examination in chief of the witness, and (b) re-examination of a witness is not to take place before all other parties who wish to do so have cross-examined the witness.

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Vic Act: 28 Order of examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination Unless the court otherwise directs— (a) cross-examination of a witness is not to take place before the examination in chief of the witness; and (b) re-examination of a witness is not to take place before all other parties who wish to do so have cross-examined the witness. ACT Act: 28 Order of examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination Unless the court otherwise directs— (a) cross-examination of a witness must not take place before the examination-in-chief of the witness; and (b) re-examination of a witness must not take place before all other parties who wish to do so have cross-examined the witness. NT Act: 28 Order of examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination Unless the court otherwise directs: (a) cross-examination of a witness is not to take place before the examination in chief of the witness; and (b) re-examination of a witness is not to take place before all other parties who wish to do so have cross-examined the witness. 156

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[EA.28.30]

[EA.28.120]

ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 32, para 111(b).

[EA.28.60] Definitions The term “examination-in-chief” is defined in cl 2 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary: (1) A reference in this Act to examination in chief of a witness is a reference to the questioning of a witness by the party who called the witness to give evidence, not being questioning that is re-examination.

The term “cross-examination” is defined in cl 2 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary: (2) A reference in this Act to cross-examination of a witness is a reference to the questioning of a witness by a party other than the party who called the witness to give evidence.

The term “re-examination” is defined in cl 2 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary: (3) A reference in this Act to re-examination of a witness is a reference to the questioning of a witness by the party who called the witness to give evidence, being questioning (other than further examination in chief with the leave of the court) conducted after the cross-examination of the witness by another party.

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(4) If a party has recalled a witness who has already given evidence, a reference in this Act to re-examination of a witness does not include a reference to the questioning of the witness by that party before the witness is questioned by another party.

[EA.28.90] “unless the court otherwise directs” Section 192 deals generally with the giving of directions and permits the court to give a direction “on such terms as the court thinks fit”.

[EA.28.120]

Affidavits and written statements

Although it is not expressly stated, it is clear that the Act does not prevent a court from directing that evidence-in-chief is to be given by affidavit.144 However, it is not clear whether this is because Pt 2.1 does not apply to affidavit evidence at all or because Pt 2.1 permits a court to order that examination in chief may be given in the form of affidavit evidence. For discussion of this issue generally, see [EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30]. Furthermore, given s 37(3), a witness may by way of affidavit swear to or affirm the truth of a previous statement exhibited to the affidavit or to the truth of a transcript of a previous interview so exhibited.145 Of course, it is equally clear that a court may refuse to receive affidavit evidence and require evidence-in-chief to be given orally.146 144. Donaghy v Wentworth Area Health Service [2003] NSWSC 533; Protective Commissioner v B (unreported, NSW SC, Hodgson J, 23 June 1997); Lindsay-Owen v Lake [2000] NSWSC 1046 at [2] per Hodgson CJ in Eq. 145. Alfred v Lanscar (2007) 162 FCR 169; [2007] FCA 833; Temple v Powell (No 1) (2007) 164 IR 409; [2007] FCA 987. 146. See, for example, Thomas v SMP (International) Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 822. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

157

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Other provisions

Other legislation affects the way in which evidence is given by witnesses. For example, s 5B of the Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 (NSW) permits a court to direct that a person (whether or not a party to the proceeding) give evidence by audio link or audio visual link in certain circumstances. A similar provision is found in s 42E of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic). Legislation in NSW and Victoria permits the evidence of children in certain types of proceedings to be given by way of closed-circuit television facilities or by means of any other similar technology and permits the evidence-in-chief of child witnesses to be given in criminal proceedings substantially by way of the playing of a videotape of an interview between the witness and a police officer.

Cth Act: 29 Manner and form of questioning witnesses and their responses (1) A party may question a witness in any way the party thinks fit, except as provided by this Chapter or as directed by the court. (2) A court may, on its own motion or on the application of the party that called the witness, direct that the witness give evidence wholly or partly in narrative form. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[Subs (2) subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 10]

(3) Such a direction may include directions about the way in which evidence is to be given in that form. (4) Evidence may be given in the form of charts, summaries or other explanatory material if it appears to the court that the material would be likely to aid its comprehension of other evidence that has been given or is to be given. [S 29 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 29 Manner and form of questioning witnesses and their responses (1) A party may question a witness in any way the party thinks fit, except as provided by this Chapter or as directed by the court. (2) A court may, on its own motion or on the application of the party that called the witness, direct that the witness give evidence wholly or partly in narrative form. [Subs (2) subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[9]]

(3) Such a direction may include directions about the way in which evidence is to be given in that form.

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(4) Evidence may be given in the form of charts, summaries or other explanatory material if it appears to the court that the material would be likely to aid its comprehension of other evidence that has been given or is to be given. [S 29 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 29 Manner and form of questioning witnesses and their responses (1) A party may question a witness in any way the party thinks fit, except as provided by this Chapter or as directed by the court. (2) A court may, on its own motion or on the application of the party that called the witness, direct that the witness give evidence wholly or partly in narrative form. (3) Such a direction may include directions about the way in which evidence is to be given in that form. (4) Evidence may be given in the form of charts, summaries or other explanatory material if it appears to the court that the material would be likely to aid its comprehension of other evidence that has been given or is to be given. ACT Act:

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29 Manner and form of questioning witnesses and their responses (1) A party may question a witness in any way the party thinks fit, except as provided by this chapter or as directed by the court. (2) The court may, on its own motion or on the application of the party that called the witness, direct that the witness give evidence completely or partly in narrative form. (3) The direction may include directions about the way in which evidence is to be given in that form. (4) Evidence may be given in the form of charts, summaries or other explanatory material if it appears to the court that the material would be likely to aid its comprehension of other evidence that has been given or is to be given. NT Act: 29 Manner and form of questioning witnesses and their responses (1) A party may question a witness in any way the party thinks fit, except as provided by this Chapter or as directed by the court. (2) A court may, on its own motion or on the application of the party that called the witness, direct that the witness give evidence wholly or partly in narrative form. (3) Such a direction may include directions about the way in which evidence is to be given in that form. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(4) Evidence may be given in the form of charts, summaries or other explanatory material if it appears to the court that the material would be likely to aid its comprehension of other evidence that has been given or is to be given.

[EA.29.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 5.6–5.36; ALRC 38, s 33, para 111(c); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 281, 607–609.

[EA.29.60] “except … as directed by the Court” Section 192 deals generally with the giving of directions and permits the court to give a direction “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. Section 29(3) permits the court to include directions as to how in particular the evidence may be given. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.147

[EA.29.90] “narrative form” (s 29(2)) It has been observed that:

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“narrative form” is used in contradistinction to the familiar process by which a witness giving oral evidence is asked questions and the witness’s evidence takes the form of the answers given to those questions. “Narrative form” refers to the situation where a witness stands in the witness box and speaks without being questioned.148

The ALRC explained the philosophy behind this provision as it was originally drafted, prior to amendment following on ALRC 102 (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 607–609): Psychological research lends support to the claim advanced at times by witnesses that being tied to answering designated questions tends to result in the distortion of their testimony. Similarly, the claim that a free report would give a more accurate version of the events in dispute is supported. On the other hand, psychological research also confirms the experience of many legal practitioners: a free report by a witness is usually found to be sketchy or incomplete. .... Obviously, both these techniques have positive and negative attributes and there would be considerable merit in the courts generally adopting a procedure which incorporated the use of each method to its greatest advantage. A free report by the witness would need to be followed by direct examination and cross-examination if the evidence was to be complete. ... It is possible for the parties to present evidence in narrative form and for the judge to suggest it under existing law. What is proposed is the drafting of a proposal which will enable the court to encourage this practice in appropriate cases.

However, the ultimate formulation of s 29(2) prior to amendment did not reflect the intentions of the ALRC since evidence could only be given in narrative form if “the party that called the witness has applied to the court for a direction” permitting it. In ALRC 102, it was concluded that the provision should be 147. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. 148. LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 at [7] per Barrett J.

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amended to permit a court, on its own motion, to direct that a witness give evidence wholly or partly in narrative form (paras 5.32–5.34): Despite concerns from some advocates, the Commissions remain of the view that narrative evidence is an important tool in ensuring that the best evidence is before the court. This has been the view of a number of inquiries, and is supported by a number of submissions received. It is unlikely that such a provision will be used often. It may be used where, for example, a witness is lapsing into narrative evidence and the judge believes this is appropriate, where the court anticipates that a witness will best be able to give evidence in this form, or where a party makes an application that the witness be allowed to give evidence in this way. Relevant considerations include a witness’ age, cultural background and ability to observe warnings about what evidence is admissible. While such a change may not impact on the practice of advocates, it signals a clear legislative intention that the section should be used where it will lead to the best outcome for the court in receiving the witness’ evidence. Should the process of giving evidence in narrative form result in undue delay or inadmissible evidence being given, a judge has sufficient powers under ss 135 and 136 to control the proceedings. The uniform Evidence Acts should therefore provide that the evidence may be given in narrative form, without the need for an application from a party. The court should be able to give a general direction about which evidence is to be given in narrative form and the way in which that evidence may be given.

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Reference may be made to particular categories of witness for which this provision may have particular application: (a) Experts. In ALRC 102, it was noted (para 5.11) that such witnesses tend to be familiar with the rules of evidence and can observe warnings regarding what evidence is or is not admissible. In ALRC 26 it was considered that the court, in deciding whether to direct that evidence be given in narrative form, “would need to consider, amongst other things, whether the witness will be able to observe warnings about what evidence is [and is not] admissible”.149 (b) Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 5.14: The question and answer method for eliciting evidence may be particularly inappropriate for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) witnesses who are not accustomed to this method of communication or to approaching a story in a direct way in response to specific questions. It has been argued that a question and answer method of eliciting information can be socially distressing for ATSI witnesses, because it is antithetical to their culture and style of communication, which emphasises narrative and indirect means of eliciting information. Studies have shown that indirectness is a definitive characteristic of ATSI communicative styles. [footnotes deleted]

(c) Children. In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 5.18 that the “question and answer method of giving evidence may be particularly difficult for witnesses who are children, due to such factors as the formality of the court, legal language and procedures, and the limitations of children’s understanding, experience and language”. (d) Persons with an intellectual disability. In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 5.22: 149. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 609, n 28. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The question and answer method of giving evidence may also be unsuitable for witnesses with an intellectual disability. For example, a person with an intellectual disability may use simple language and non-verbal communication methods. In its submission to the Inquiry, the Intellectual Disability Rights Service notes that difficulties in using numbers or other quantitative means of describing events may be part of a person’s intellectual disability. Therefore if a witness with such a disability is asked questions like “how” or “when”, they might be seen as vague or evasive.

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(e) Unrepresented litigants. In Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375; [2010] TASCCA 11 the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal noted at [78] that this provision “was not inserted with unrepresented litigants’ evidence in mind” and then concluded: “The direction will be required in every case of an unrepresented litigant giving evidence, otherwise he or she will be unable to give it”. In Investa Properties Pty Ltd v Nankervis (No 6) [2014] FCA 804, Collier J granted leave to two unrepresented parties “to give oral evidence in narrative form to complement any written statements they have prepared and which may be eventually accepted into evidence”, subject to certain conditions.150 Where the application is made, the ALRC considered that the court, in deciding whether to direct that evidence be given in narrative form, “would need to consider, amongst other things, whether the witness will be able to observe warnings about what evidence is [and is not] admissible”.151 This is more likely to be the case in respect of witnesses who are familiar with the general rules of evidence (for example, expert witnesses). A concern to avoid inadmissible evidence may discourage courts, particularly in criminal proceedings, from directing that a witness give evidence wholly or partly in narrative form. A more suitable option might be to utilise the powers conferred under ss 26 and 42. Where the court has not made a direction under s 29(2)(b) the witness must give evidence according to the conventional model of answers to questions. If an answer given is not responsive to the question asked it may be “struck out”.152

[EA.29.120]

Conversations reported in indirect speech

Given the view that “narrative form” refers to the situation where a witness stands in the witness box and speaks without being questioned, it has been held that this provision does not apply to evidence from a witness reporting a conversation in indirect speech.153 Barrett J concluded that there is no rule of law,

150. The two unrepresented parties were required to give notice to the other parties of any additional evidence the parties proposed to give by filing an outline of that additional evidence (at [25]), directed that such additional evidence “must be relevant, not hearsay, and not opinion evidence” (at [25]) and directed how evidence that “would usually be given by them under re-examination by their own counsel” might be given (at [27]). 151. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 609, n 28. 152. Compare R v Parkes (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12 at [13]–[26]. 153. LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 at [7] per Barrett J.

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[EA.29.180]

whether under the Evidence Act or otherwise, which makes inadmissible evidence of a conversation given in indirect speech, although discretionary exclusion is possible.154

[EA.29.150]

Affidavits and written statements

It has been held that this provision has no application to affidavit evidence, on the basis that virtually all the provisions of Div 3 are concerned with oral evidence and the psychological considerations which support the giving of narrative oral evidence have “no part to play when affidavit evidence is presented because the witness has the assistance of professional advice in preparing the document”.155 The same view has been taken where the evidence is to be given by statement, which the witness affirms in a compendious way at the start of his or her testimony.156 Further, in Clark v The Queen (2008) 185 A Crim R 1; [2008] NSWCCA 122, it appears to have been accepted at [116]–[121] that, “ordinarily”, in criminal trials, evidence should not be elicited in this way (unless the defendant consents to this procedure pursuant to s 190).

[EA.29.180]

“charts, summaries or other explanatory material” (s 29(4))

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This provision (read in conjunction with s 135) substantially accords with the common law position as articulated by the High Court in Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180; 30 A Crim R 417. The majority of the court, Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ, stated (at 189–190): The adducing of oral evidence from witnesses in criminal trials underlies the rules of procedure which the law ordains for their conduct. A witness who gives evidence orally demonstrates, for good or ill, more about his or her credibility than a witness whose evidence is given in documentary form. Oral evidence is public; written evidence may not be. Oral evidence gives to the trial the atmosphere which, though intangible, is often critical to the jury’s estimate of the witnesses. By generally restricting the jury to consideration of testimonial evidence in its oral form, it is thought that the jury’s discussion of the case in the jury room will be more open, the exchange of views among jurors will be easier, and the legitimate merging of opinions will more easily occur than if the evidence were given in writing or the jurors were each armed with a written transcript of the evidence … The general rule that witnesses must give their evidence orally is not without exception. In Smith v The Queen (1970) 121 CLR 572, a chart had been prepared by a 154. LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688. Barrett J observed (at [8]–[9]): “There are obviously very good reasons why courts have, over the years, been astute to regard the direct speech form as the best form … The possibility that s 135 may be invoked where evidence of a conversation is given in indirect speech is, of course, real. However, the question under that section will not merely be whether there is prejudice, but whether that prejudice is unfair prejudice operating against the opposing party because of a curtailment of the ability to cross-examine. I accept that not all the cross-examination opportunities available in a case of direct speech report will arise in case of an indirect speech report, but the ability to engage in meaningful cross-examination will exist nevertheless. There is also the point that the probative value of the evidence may be diminished by its form.” 155. Ramirez v The Trustee of the Property of Zoltan Sandor, A Bankrupt (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 22 April 1997). Reliance may be placed on s 11, 26, 29 or 37(3). 156. LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 at [6] per Barrett J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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witness to explain complicated business transactions. The chart was admitted in evidence, though what it showed could have been described – albeit laboriously – in oral evidence. This Court agreed with the view expressed by the Court of Criminal Appeal … that the chart was rightly admitted: The chart was nothing but a convenient record of a series of highly complicated cheque transactions which had been proved by other evidence, and was likely to be of considerable assistance to the jury. Had they all been accountants, doubtless after considerable time they could have prepared such a chart for themselves. The use of such charts and other time-saving devices in complicated trials of this kind is a usual and desirable procedure and is encouraged by the courts.

The practice of requiring witnesses to give their evidence orally should not be waived lightly, especially if there is a risk that writing will give undue weight to that evidence to the disadvantage of an accused person. While s 29(4) refers only to the likelihood that material will aid the court’s comprehension of other evidence, the general discretion in s 135 (and s 137 relating to prosecution evidence in criminal trials) allows the court to take into account the considerations referred to above in respect of jury trials.157 For a discussion of the position in relation to written transcripts of tape-recorded conversations, see [EA.48.180].

Cth Act:

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30

Interpreters A witness may give evidence about a fact through an interpreter unless the witness can understand and speak the English language sufficiently to enable the witness to understand, and to make an adequate reply to, questions that may be put about the fact. NSW Act: 30

Interpreters A witness may give evidence about a fact through an interpreter unless the witness can understand and speak the English language sufficiently to enable the witness to understand, and to make an adequate reply to, questions that may be put about the fact. Vic Act: 30

Interpreters A witness may give evidence about a fact through an interpreter unless the witness can understand and speak the English language sufficiently to enable the witness to understand, and to make an adequate reply to, questions that may be put about the fact.

157. R v Pirrottina (unreported, NSW SC, 20 March 1997). In this case, it was held to be inappropriate to allow a chart prepared by the prosecution, where the events sought to be summarised were not matters likely to tax the comprehension of an ordinary juror and where the chart was entirely concerned with the prosecution’s version of events.

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[EA.30.60]

ACT Act: 30 Interpreters A witness may give evidence about a fact through an interpreter unless the witness can understand and speak the English language sufficiently to enable the witness to understand, and to make an adequate reply to, questions that may be put about the fact. NT Act: 30

Interpreter A witness may give evidence about a fact through an interpreter unless the witness can understand and speak the English language sufficiently to enable the witness to understand, and to make an adequate reply to, questions that may be put about the fact.

[EA.30.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 34, paras 111(d), 112(a); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 282–285, 610–611.

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[EA.30.60] General comments This provision deals with a witness giving evidence through an interpreter. It does not deal with other situations in which an interpreter may be required in order to ensure a fair trial (for example, so an unrepresented defendant in criminal proceedings is able to understand the prosecution evidence). Such situations are matters for the common law.158 The ALRC commented on the philosophy behind the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 611): There is evidence that, under existing law where a witness must seek the permission of the court to be allowed an interpreter, there is a reluctance to allow interpreters and that this adversely affects the fact-finding process and is unfair to the parties and witnesses. The proposal changes the onus – a person is entitled to an interpreter unless the court orders otherwise. At present, it is assumed a person either knows English or does not, so that a witness is not allowed an interpreter’s occasional assistance. The proposal will allow the use of interpreters for part of the evidence of the witness... . The possibility of abuse exists whatever approach is taken. The proposal gives the trial judge control over the situation and he can intervene at any time to stop the use of an interpreter.

It should be noted that the ALRC proposal included the word “fully” after the words “to enable the witness to understand”. However, the provision as it stands appears to reflect the intentions of the ALRC. It may be that a witness who has English as a second language could never be in a position to understand “fully” a question, so that the use of an interpreter would be required. Deletion of the word ensures that the court is in a position, as the ALRC intended, to control the use of interpreters. 158. See, for example, Ebatarinja v Deland (1998) 194 CLR 444; R v Rostom (2007) 98 SASR 528; [2007] SASC 210. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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“evidence about a fact”

The use of this terminology permits a court to allow a witness the assistance of interpreter for part only of his or her testimony. It should not be interpreted to prevent evidence through an interpreter which is in the form of an opinion.

[EA.30.120]

Relevance to the credibility of the witness

A ruling pursuant to this provision that a witness may give evidence through an interpreter does not preclude the use (and possible abuse) of an interpreter being taken into account when assessing the credibility of the evidence given by the witness.159

Cth Act: 31

Witnesses who cannot hear adequately or speak adequately

(1) A witness who cannot hear adequately may be questioned in any appropriate way. (2) A witness who cannot speak adequately may give evidence by any appropriate means.

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(3) The court may give directions concerning either or both of the following: (a) the way in which a witness may be questioned under subsection (1); (b) the means by which a witness may give evidence under subsection (2). (4) This section does not affect the right of a witness to whom this section applies to give evidence about a fact through an interpreter under section 30. [S 31 am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 60]

NSW Act: 31

Deaf and mute witnesses

(1) A witness who cannot hear adequately may be questioned in any appropriate way. (2) A witness who cannot speak adequately may give evidence by any appropriate means. (3) The court may give directions concerning either or both of the following: (a) the way in which a witness may be questioned under subsection (1), (b) the means by which a witness may give evidence under subsection (2). (4) This section does not affect the right of a witness to whom this section applies to give evidence about a fact through an interpreter under section 30.

159. See Tsang v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2011) 219 A Crim R 304; [2011] VSCA 336 at [102]–[112] (special leave to appeal refused by the High Court: Tsang v The Queen [2012] HCATrans 198).

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Vic Act: 31 Deaf and mute witnesses (1) A witness who cannot hear adequately may be questioned in any appropriate way. (2) A witness who cannot speak adequately may give evidence by any appropriate means. (3) The court may give directions concerning either or both of the following— (a) the way in which a witness may be questioned under subsection (1); (b) the means by which a witness may give evidence under subsection (2). (4) This section does not affect the right of a witness to whom this section applies to give evidence about a fact through an interpreter under section 30. ACT Act: 31

Deaf and mute witnesses

(1) A witness who cannot hear adequately may be questioned in any appropriate way.

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(2) A witness who cannot speak adequately may give evidence by any appropriate means. (3) The court may give directions about either or both of the following: (a) the way in which a witness may be questioned under subsection (1); (b) the means by which a witness may give evidence under subsection (2). (4) This section does not affect the right of a witness to whom this section applies to give evidence about a fact through an interpreter under section 30. NT Act: 31

Deaf and mute witnesses

(1) A witness who cannot hear adequately may be questioned in any appropriate way. (2) A witness who cannot speak adequately may give evidence by any appropriate means. (3) The court may give directions concerning either or both of the following: (a) the way in which a witness may be questioned under subsection (1); (b) the means by which a witness may give evidence under subsection (2). (4) This section does not affect the right of a witness to whom this section applies to give evidence about a fact through an interpreter under section 30.

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ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 35; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 612.

[EA.31.60] General comments The ALRC explained that this provision was included to “make it clear that the physical disabilities of a witness give rise only to practical problems of presentation and not to competence”.160 However, in extreme cases, the witness may be incompetent to testify: see s 13. This provision does not affect the general desirability that, so far as possible, a witness’s evidence be given orally.161

Cth Act: 32

Attempts to revive memory in court

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(1) A witness must not, in the course of giving evidence, use a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion unless the court gives leave. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give leave, it is to take into account: (a) whether the witness will be able to recall the fact or opinion adequately without using the document; and (b) whether so much of the document as the witness proposes to use is, or is a copy of, a document that: (i) was written or made by the witness when the events recorded in it were fresh in his or her memory; or (ii) was, at such a time, found by the witness to be accurate. (3) If a witness has, while giving evidence, used a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion, the witness may, with the leave of the court, read aloud, as part of his or her evidence, so much of the document as relates to that fact or opinion. (4) The court is, on the request of a party, to give such directions as the court thinks fit to ensure that so much of the document as relates to the proceeding is produced to that party. NSW Act: 32

Attempts to revive memory in court

(1) A witness must not, in the course of giving evidence, use a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion unless the court gives leave. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give leave, it is to take into account: 160. See ALRC 26, vol 1, para 612. 161. Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180; 30 A Crim R 417 at 189–190 (CLR); R v Hutton (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 282 at 287.

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(a)

whether the witness will be able to recall the fact or opinion adequately without using the document, and (b) whether so much of the document as the witness proposes to use is, or is a copy of, a document that: (i) was written or made by the witness when the events recorded in it were fresh in his or her memory, or (ii) was, at such a time, found by the witness to be accurate. (3) If a witness has, while giving evidence, used a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion, the witness may, with the leave of the court, read aloud, as part of his or her evidence, so much of the document as relates to that fact or opinion. (4) The court is, on the request of a party, to give such directions as the court thinks fit to ensure that so much of the document as relates to the proceeding is produced to that party. Vic Act: 32

Attempts to revive memory in court

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(1) A witness must not, in the course of giving evidence, use a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion unless the court gives leave. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give leave, it is to take into account— (a) whether the witness will be able to recall the fact or opinion adequately without using the document; and (b) whether so much of the document as the witness proposes to use is, or is a copy of, a document that— (i) was written or made by the witness when the events recorded in it were fresh in his or her memory; or (ii) was, at such a time, found by the witness to be accurate. (3) If a witness has, while giving evidence, used a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion, the witness may, with the leave of the court, read aloud, as part of his or her evidence, so much of the document as relates to that fact or opinion. (4) The court is, on the request of a party, to give such directions as the court thinks fit to ensure that so much of the document as relates to the proceeding is produced to that party. ACT Act: 32

Attempts to revive memory in court

(1) A witness must not, in the course of giving evidence, use a document to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or opinion unless the court gives leave. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give leave, it must take into account— © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a)

whether the witness will be able to recall the fact or opinion adequately without using the document; and (b) whether the part of the document that the witness proposes to use is, or is a copy of, a document that— (i) was written or made by the witness when the events recorded in it were fresh in the witness’s memory; or (ii) was, at that time, found by the witness to be accurate. (3) If a witness has, while giving evidence, used a document to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or opinion, the witness may, with the leave of the court, read aloud, as part of the witness’s evidence, the part of the document that relates to the fact or opinion. (4) The court must, on the request of a party, give the directions the court thinks fit to ensure that the part of the document that relates to the proceeding is produced to the party. NT Act: 32

Attempts to revive memory in court

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(1) A witness must not, in the course of giving evidence, use a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion unless the court gives leave. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give leave, it is to take into account: (a) whether the witness will be able to recall the fact or opinion adequately without using the document; and (b) whether so much of the document as the witness proposes to use is, or is a copy of, a document that: (i) was written or made by the witness when the events recorded in it were fresh in his or her memory; or (ii) was, at such a time, found by the witness to be accurate. (3) If a witness has, while giving evidence, used a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion, the witness may, with the leave of the court, read aloud, as part of his or her evidence, so much of the document as relates to that fact or opinion. (4) The court is, on the request of a party, to give such directions as the court thinks fit to ensure that so much of the document as relates to the proceeding is produced to that party.

[EA.32.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 36, paras 111(e), 112(b); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 286–289, 614–615.

[EA.32.60] General comments The ALRC explained the proposals on which this provision is based (see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 615): 170

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[EA.32.90]

These proposals are developed from existing law but introduce a greater degree of flexibility. The proposals choose between the differences in the law and address the criticisms made of the law. Leave of the court is required. The specific matters to be considered by the court include whether the document was made or written or verified by the witness as accurate at a time when the facts were fresh in his memory. The concept “fresh in the memory” is used rather than “contemporaneous”. Both have been used by the courts. The former, however, more accurately states the intention of the rule. Also “contemporaneous” literally means occurring at the same time as the other event and would, therefore, if applied strictly prevent the use of material that should be used.

It has been observed that this provision is designed: to facilitate giving of evidence by a witness who, without access to contemporaneous notes of the kind referred to in the section, would be unable to give a full and accurate account of what had occurred from his or her unaided memory. The occasion for the operation of the section commonly arises when a witness’s evidence is being led in chief.162

Chapter 2 of the Act is not a code and it may be that a witness may be permitted to look at a document while giving evidence in chief pursuant to a common law procedure (see [EA.Intro.120] and [EA.32.360]). Furthermore, other provisions in Chapter 2 may result in a witness having their memory “refreshed” (for example, by leading questions pursuant to s 37 or s 38).

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This provision only deals with the use of a “document” to try to revive memory (as distinct from a “thing”). It follows that the use of a “thing” is left to the court’s general power under s 26. The term “document” is defined in the Dictionary: “document” means any record of information, and includes: (a) anything on which there is writing; or (b) anything on which there are marks, figures, symbols; or (c) perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them; or (d) anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else; or (e) a map, plan, drawing or photograph.

In addition, clause 8 of Part 2 of the Dictionary provides: 8. A reference in this Act to a document includes a reference to: (a) any part of the document; or (b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of the document or of any part of the document; or (c) any part of such a copy, reproduction or duplicate.

[EA.32.90]

“leave of the court”

The question of leave arises in two situations. The first is where an application is made while a witness is giving evidence to permit the witness to use a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion: s 32(1). While s 32(2) requires the court to take into account a number of matters in deciding whether to give leave to a witness to use a document to try to revive his or her memory, s 162. Hadid v Australis Media Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 5 November 1996). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.163 It has been suggested by Sperling J in the NSW Supreme Court that it would not be appropriate to grant leave where the document is not one that falls within the terms of s 32(2)(b).164 On the other hand, in another case the same judge permitted a police officer giving evidence of the contents of a motel registration form to refresh his memory from a “running sheet” prepared by another police officer even though s 32(2)(b) was not satisfied.165 He stated: On consideration, I think it would be wrong to hold, as a universal rule, that there is no scope for the operation of s 32 without answering to the considerations mentioned in para (b) of s 32(2).

Evidence was given from the police officer who prepared the running sheet that he incorporated into it information as to the contents of the registration form provided to him by the police officer seeking to refresh his memory. Sperling J explained why leave should be given:

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[T]he document – purportedly and according to the evidence – recorded what [the police officer] had seen when he inspected the registration form. The kind of information recorded in the document was also important. Relevantly, the only material content was a date, a name and the registration number of a motor vehicle. That is not the kind of information likely to be inaccurately transcribed or corrupted in transmission from one police officer to another in the course of a criminal investigation. Evidence given by [the police officer], using the document, was likely to be reliable.

It has been held that it would not normally be appropriate to grant leave during cross-examination of a witness where the cross-examiner has asked the witness not to refer to the document, unless considerations of fairness require the witness to have access to it.166 As regards the situation of an unrepresented litigant, the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal stated in Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375; [2010] TASCCA 11 at [81]: The principal object of s 32 is the giving of leave to a witness to refresh memory from notes made when the events recorded were fresh in the witness’s memory, but that is not its only object and its provisions are sufficiently broad to apply to the situation that arose in this case. Almost invariably, unrepresented litigants are at a disadvantage when giving evidence because they do not have counsel to lead the evidence from them by appropriately worded questions. The risk of an unrepresented litigant forgetting to give evidence of a material fact will be a real one in many cases if he or she does not have recourse to notes. While a trial judge will have an understandable concern to ensure that a witness does not simply read his or her evidence from a prepared document, care 163. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. 164. Hadid v Australis Media Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 5 November 1996). 165. R v Cassar (Judgment No 28) [1999] NSWSC 651. Sperling J noted that evidence was given from another police officer that he incorporated into the running sheet information provided to him by the first police officer. 166. Hadid v Australis Media Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 5 November 1996).

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should be taken before refusing an unrepresented litigant leave to refer to any notes at all when giving evidence. There could hardly be harm to the interests of justice if the notes contain only subject headings or questions that are not in a leading form, the purpose of which is to refresh the mind of the witness of the matters about which he or she should give evidence.

The second situation where the question of leave arises is where a witness, while giving evidence, has used a document to try to revive his or her memory about a fact or opinion and an application is made to permit the witness to read aloud, as part of his or her evidence, so much of the document as relates to that fact or opinion: s 32(3). Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. Section 32 does require the court to take into account particular matters in deciding whether to give leave. However, whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”. One relevant matter would be whether the opposing party would be limited in the ability to effectively test or challenge the evidence by cross-examination if, in fact, the witness has testified that his or her memory has not been revived.167

[EA.32.120]

“copy”

This will have to be established by evidence.

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[EA.32.150]

“when the events recorded in it were fresh in his or her memory”

This test is also adopted under the common law168 and there are common law authorities which have suggested that an event may be “fresh” in the memory days, and possibly even weeks, afterwards.169 However, there are contrary authorities (which have emphasised “contemporaneity”) and an argument can be advanced that an event cannot be “fresh” in the memory more than 24 hours after it occurs.170 ALRC 102 investigated recent research on memory for the purposes of the identical test in the hearsay rule exception in s 66 and concluded that a much more flexible approach is required, taking into account a range of factors (see [EA.66.180]). The Victorian Court of Appeal has doubted whether the term “fresh in the memory” in this provision should be read in the same manner as it has been interpreted for the purposes of s 66, but held that it was open to a judge 167. See Director Public Prosecutions v Curran (No 2) [2011] VSC 280. 168. R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591 at 593 per Sangster J. In R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534 at 537, Sangster J stated that: “[T]he real test is freshness of memory as a question of fact and not the relationship in time, except that shortness of time makes it easier to accept the witness’s assertion that the facts were fresh and length of time more difficult – and a great length of time would undoubtedly lead any court to reject the evidence claiming that the events were fresh in the memory of the witness at the time of making of the memorandum”. 169. R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591; R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534. 170. The ALRC investigated the nature of memory: ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 421, 665–668. It found that memory tends to diminish rapidly at first (and then more slowly) – within hours of an event there is likely to be a substantial loss of memory. In addition, post-event information is likely to quickly contaminate (change) the memory of the event, altering it and filling in gaps arising from the rapid process of “forgetting”. However, for more recent discussion in relation to memory, see [EA.66.180]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.32.180]

s 32

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to grant leave under this provision in respect of a document made 5 years after the relevant events.171 Of course, under s 32(2), whether or not the events were “fresh in the memory” or not is only a factor which the court “is to take into account”.

[EA.32.180]

Reading the document aloud (s 32(3))

Before leave may be granted to read the document aloud, there must be evidence before the court that the witness has used the document in an attempt to revive his or her memory.172 It may not be appropriate to give leave if the document is in objectionable form.173 Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”.174 Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.175 If the document is read out, the evidence is to be treated as testimony by the person reading it, rather than as hearsay evidence (that is, it is treated as in-court evidence rather than “evidence of a previous representation” for the purposes of s 59).176

[EA.32.210]

Consequences of use of document

Under s 122(6) client legal privilege is lost in respect “of a document that a witness has used to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or opinion or has used as mentioned in section 32”.

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[EA.32.240]

Hearsay

This provision does not create a hearsay exception analogous to the common law “past recollection recorded”. However, evidence of a previous representation in a document used to try to revive memory may fall within exceptions to the hearsay rule in ss 64(3) and 66(2).

[EA.32.270]

Consequences of requesting production of document (s 32(4))

Under s 35(1), a party is not required to tender a document only because the party called for the document to be produced to the party or because the party inspected 171. Roth v The Queen [2014] VSCA 242 at [40]. In contrast, in R v Rogerson (No 24) [2016] NSWSC 105, a NSW Supreme Court judge was not satisfied that relevant events were “fresh in the memory” of a witness 12 months later, notwithstanding that the judge took a “generally liberal” approach to the test and the witness “agreed with the proposition the relevant events were fresh in his memory at the time his statement was made”. 172. Hinton by his Tutor Leslie Melba Hinton v Valiotis (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 7 March 1997). 173. R v Dean (No 2) (unreported, NSW SC, Dunford J, 12 March 1997). 174. For examples of the application of s 192 in this context see R v Kaukura (unreported, NSW SC, Badgery-Parker J, 13 August 1997) and Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 at [182]–[183]. 175. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. 176. See Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 at [177]–[178].

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[EA.32.360]

it when it was so produced. Equally, under s 35(2), the party who produced the document is not entitled to tender it on the basis that it has been produced to, or inspected by, another party.

[EA.32.300]

Directions to produce (s 32(4))

It is not clear what is to happen where a party fails to comply with a direction to produce a document. If the direction is made before the witness uses the document in an attempt to revive memory, unreasonable failure to comply would mean that leave would not be given. However, if the request for a direction is made in cross-examination and there is then an unreasonable failure to comply, there is no provision comparable to s 34(2). Presumably the contempt power may be used and strong comment can be made. As a last resort, the trial might have to be aborted.

[EA.32.330]

Affidavits

Clearly this provision does not attempt to regulate attempts to refresh memory out of court (see s 34). It has been held that this provision does not prevent preparation of an affidavit by reference to other documents: Section 32 does not preclude preparation being made for the giving of oral evidence by way of a witness being referred, during that preparation, to all relevant contemporary documents, not limited to the documents made by the witness. I would understand it to be the normal practice for affidavits and witness statements to be prepared in a process in which the witness is referred to and prompted by all available documents. I do not understand there to be any rule of law or professional ethics to the contrary.177

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[EA.32.360]

Alternative common law procedure

This provision deals with “attempts to revive memory in court”, where a witness is “in the course of giving evidence”. However, the English Court of Appeal in R v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31; [1990] 1 All ER 29 approved an alternative procedure whereby a court may, after a witness has commenced giving evidence, permit the witness an opportunity to attempt to refresh his or her memory from a previous statement before continuing to testify without the benefit of the statement: In our judgment, therefore, it should be open to the judge, in the exercise of his discretion and in the interests of justice, to permit a witness who has begun to give evidence to refresh his memory from a statement made near to the time of events in question, even though it does not come within the definition of contemporaneous, provided he is satisfied (1) that the witness indicates that he cannot now recall the details of events because of the lapse of time since they took place, (2) that he made a statement much nearer the time of the events and that the contents of the statement represented his recollection at the time he made it, (3) that he had not read the statement before coming into the witness box and (4) that he wished to have an opportunity to read the statement before he continued to give evidence.178

The requirements of s 32 (requiring consideration as to whether the statement when the events recorded in it were fresh in the witness’s memory) would not apply under this procedure. The proceedings could be adjourned to permit the 177. Lindsay-Owen v Lake [2000] NSWSC 1046 at [3] per Hodgson CJ in Eq. 178. [1990] 1 All ER 29 at 33c. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence

s 33

witness an opportunity to read the statement. Alternatively, the witness might be permitted to read the statement while sitting in the witness box. However, the witness would not be permitted to refer to the statement while testifying. It should also be noted that the procedural safeguards regarding production established in s 34 would apply to use of such a statement in an attempt to revive memory.

Cth Act: 33

Evidence given by police officers

(1) Despite section 32, in any criminal proceeding, a police officer may give evidence in chief for the prosecution by reading or being led through a written statement previously made by the police officer. (2) Evidence may not be so given unless: (a) the statement was made by the police officer at the time of or soon after the occurrence of the events to which it refers; and (b) the police officer signed the statement when it was made; and (c) a copy of the statement had been given to the person charged or to his or her Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel a reasonable time before the hearing of the evidence for the prosecution. [Subs (2) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 11]

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(3) A reference in this section to a police officer includes a reference to a person who, at the time the statement concerned was made, was a police officer. [S 33 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 33

Evidence given by police officers

(1) Despite section 32, in any criminal proceeding, a police officer may give evidence in chief for the prosecution by reading or being led through a written statement previously made by the police officer. (2) Evidence may not be so given unless: (a) the statement was made by the police officer at the time of or soon after the occurrence of the events to which it refers, and (b) the police officer signed the statement when it was made, and (c) a copy of the statement had been given to the person charged or to his or her Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel a reasonable time before the hearing of the evidence for the prosecution. [Subs (2) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[10]]

(3) A reference in this section to a police officer includes a reference to a person who, at the time the statement concerned was made, was a police officer. [S 33 am Act 46 of 2007]

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Vic Act: 33 Evidence given by police officers (1) Despite section 32, in any criminal proceeding, a police officer may give evidence in chief for the prosecution by reading or being led through a written statement previously made by the police officer. (2) Evidence may not be so given unless— (a) the statement was made by the police officer at the time of or soon after the occurrence of the events to which it refers; and (b) the police officer signed the statement when it was made; and (c) a copy of the statement had been given to the person charged or to the person’s Australian legal practitioner a reasonable time before the hearing of the evidence for the prosecution. Note: Paragraph (c) differs from the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act. [Subs (2) am Act 17 of 2014, s 160 and Sch 2 item 39.1]

(3) A reference in this section to a police officer includes a reference to a person who, at the time the statement concerned was made, was a police officer. [S 33 am Act 17 of 2014]

ACT Act:

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33

Evidence given by police officers

(1) Despite section 32, in a criminal proceeding, a police officer may give evidence-in-chief for the prosecution by reading or being led through a written statement previously made by the police officer. (2) Evidence may not be given in that way unless— (a) the statement was made by the police officer at the time of or soon after the events mentioned in the statement happened; and (b) the police officer signed the statement when it was made; and (c) a copy of the statement had been given to the person charged or to the person’s Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel a reasonable time before the hearing of the evidence for the prosecution. (3) A reference in this section to a police officer includes a reference to a person who was a police officer at the time the statement was made. NT Act: 33

Evidence given by police officers

(1) Despite section 32, in any criminal proceeding, a police officer may give evidence in chief for the prosecution by reading or being led through a written statement previously made by the police officer. (2) Evidence may not be so given unless: (a) the statement was made by the police officer at the time of or soon after the occurrence of the events to which it refers; and (b) the police officer signed the statement when it was made; and © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.33.30]

(c)

s 33

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a copy of the statement had been given to the person charged or to the person’s Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel a reasonable time before the hearing of the evidence for the prosecution.

(3) A reference in this section to a police officer includes a reference to a person who, at the time the statement concerned was made, was a police officer.

[EA.33.30] General comments Section 33 was not proposed by the ALRC. It is based upon the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 418. That provision, in almost identical language, was interpreted in Orchard v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114. It was held (at 119 per Newman J) that:

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[T]he subsection itself is expressed in plain words having ... a temporal connotation rather than a qualitative one. It is a question of fact for the court hearing a matter to determine whether a witness’ statement falls within the indefinite time restraints referred to in the subsection. In considering the matter, considerations such as convenience and practicality should not, in my view, play any part in determining whether or not a witness’ statement complies with the section. ... [A] concept of immediacy must be utilised in construing the subsection. While, as I have said, ultimately it is a question of fact for the tribunal to determine, it seems to me that the subsection contemplates days rather than weeks as being a permissible time which is allowed to elapse in order to allow a statement to be read in accordance with the section.

Care will be required in determining what “events” are being referred to in the statement for the purposes of applying the test of contemporaneity.179 If that test is satisfied, the provision does not require police witnesses to assert that they have exhausted their memory or that they need to refer to their notes in order to revive their memory. If the requirements of s 33(2) are satisfied, s 33(1) provides that the police officer “may give evidence in chief for the prosecution by reading or being led through [the] written statement”. This confers a discretion on the court to determine whether the witness should be permitted to read out the statement or be “led through it” (that is, answering questions with the assistance of the statement).180 Where the police officer will be speaking of matters which concerned that officer directly as a victim, the latter course may be more appropriate.181 This provision only applies in a “criminal proceeding”. That term is defined in the Dictionary. A “police officer” may give “examination-in-chief” for the prosecution by reading or being led through a written statement previously made by the police officer. In the Dictionary, “police officer” is defined in slightly different ways in the 179. Dodds v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 408; [2009] NSWCCA 78 at [63]–[68]. 180. Chisari v The Queen (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 325 at [30]. 181. Chisari v The Queen (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 325 at [27]–[30].

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s 34

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[EA.33.60]

Commonwealth and NSW/Victorian Acts. However, in substance it means a member of the Australian Federal Police or a member of the police force of a State or Territory. Section 33(3) extends the term to include a person who was a police officer at the time the statement was made. Section 25 of the Australian Federal Police Legislation Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) provides that this provision applies as if a reference to a police officer includes a reference to “a person who was a member or special member of the Australian Federal Police at any time”.

[EA.33.60] Consequences of use of document Under s 122(6) client legal privilege is lost in respect “of a document that a witness has used … as mentioned in section … 33 (evidence given by police officers)”.

Cth Act: 34

Attempts to revive memory out of court

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(1) The court may, on the request of a party, give such directions as are appropriate to ensure that specified documents and things used by a witness otherwise than while giving evidence to try to revive his or her memory are produced to the party for the purposes of the proceeding. (2) The court may refuse to admit the evidence given by the witness so far as it concerns a fact as to which the witness so tried to revive his or her memory if, without reasonable excuse, the directions have not been complied with. NSW Act: 34

Attempts to revive memory out of court

(1) The court may, on the request of a party, give such directions as are appropriate to ensure that specified documents and things used by a witness otherwise than while giving evidence to try to revive his or her memory are produced to the party for the purposes of the proceeding. (2) The court may refuse to admit the evidence given by the witness so far as it concerns a fact as to which the witness so tried to revive his or her memory if, without reasonable excuse, the directions have not been complied with. Vic Act: 34

Attempts to revive memory out of court

(1) The court may, on the request of a party, give such directions as are appropriate to ensure that specified documents and things used by a witness otherwise than while giving evidence to try to revive his or her memory are produced to the party for the purposes of the proceeding. (2) The court may refuse to admit the evidence given by the witness so far as it concerns a fact as to which the witness so tried to revive his or her memory if, without reasonable excuse, the directions have not been complied with. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 34

ACT Act: 34 Attempts to revive memory out of court (1) The court may, on the request of a party, give the directions that are appropriate to ensure that stated documents and things used by a witness otherwise than while giving evidence to try to revive the witness’s memory are produced to the party for the purposes of the proceeding. (2) The court may refuse to admit the evidence given by the witness so far as it concerns a fact about which the witness tried to revive the witness’s memory if, without reasonable excuse, the directions have not been complied with. NT Act: 34

Attempts to revive memory out of court

(1) The court may, on the request of a party, give such directions as are appropriate to ensure that specified documents and things used by a witness otherwise than while giving evidence to try to revive his or her memory are produced to the party for the purposes of the proceeding. (2) The court may refuse to admit the evidence given by the witness so far as it concerns a fact as to which the witness so tried to revive his or her memory if, without reasonable excuse, the directions have not been complied with.

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[EA.34.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 37, para 111(f); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 616.

[EA.34.60] General comments The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 616): As to out of court revival of memory, the proposal gives the trial judge a discretion to require production of any document or thing which was used to revive memory – whether successfully so used or not. If, without reasonable excuse, the document or thing is not produced the judge may refuse to admit the evidence. This proposal combines aspects of the existing law – the discretion to require production where the memory was revived and the failure to produce the document going to the weight of the evidence; the automatic exclusion of the witness’ evidence where the memory was not revived and the document is not produced. The view is taken that no distinction is warranted – particularly in the light of psychological research on the effect on memory of introducing information. No attempt has been made to specify matters to be considered in the exercise of the discretion.

This provision is not in its terms limited to a witness refreshing memory before giving oral evidence from statements previously made by the witness and would thus apply to any document used by a witness before giving evidence to refresh that witness’s memory.182 However, the reference to “specified documents and 182. Lowe v Lang [2000] NSWSC 309 at [7] per Hamilton J; Lindsay-Owen v Lake [2000] NSWSC 1046 at [5] per Hodgson CJ in Eq.

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s 34

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[EA.34.180]

things used by a witness” means that the provision would not apply if all that was established was that the witness referred “in part at least” to a group of documents.183 This provision does not attempt to regulate how a person (who subsequently becomes a witness) may attempt to refresh his or memory “otherwise than while giving evidence” by using a document or thing. Thus, it may be contrasted with attempts to revive or refresh memory made while the witness is in the course of giving evidence, dealt with in s 32. Accordingly, there is no prohibition on, for example, one police officer using another police officers statement to assist preparation of the first officers own statement, although such conduct may impact on the weight to give the officers evidence.184

[EA.34.90] Consequences of use of document Under s 122(6) client legal privilege is lost in respect “of a document that a witness has used to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or opinion”.

[EA.34.120]

Consequences of requesting production of document (s 34(1))

Under s 35(1), a party is not required to tender a document only because the party called for the document to be produced to the party or because the party inspected it when it was so produced. Equally, under s 35(2), the party who produced the document is not entitled to tender it on the basis that it has been produced to, or inspected by, another party.

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[EA.34.150]

“the court may … give such directions” (s 34(1))

The ALRC was influenced in its view that the court must be given a discretion regarding whether production should be ordered by the following passage from Mather v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192 at 206 per Burbury CJ and Neasey J: [I]t is not possible to lay down a hard and fast rule that the document must always be produced. For example, the document may not be in the control of the witness (as it is when he uses it in the witness box). It may have been destroyed or become unavailable since it was used to refresh memory.

[EA.34.180]

“the court may refuse to admit the evidence given by the witness” (s 34(2))

The ALRC was influenced in its view that the court must be given a broad discretion regarding whether the evidence of the witness should be admitted where the document is not produced by the following passage from Mather v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192 at 206: Upon the assumption … that a document used to refresh memory out of court may be any document (not being confined to a contemporaneous record made by the witness) it may contain matter which it would not be fair to let cross-examining counsel see.

183. Lowe v Lang [2000] NSWSC 309. 184. Compare, in relation to the common law, New South Wales v Kuru [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-893; [2007] NSWCA 141 per Santow JA at [75]–[77]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

181

[EA.34.180]

Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence

s 35

Cth Act: 35 Effect of calling for production of documents (1) A party is not to be required to tender a document only because the party, whether under this Act or otherwise: (a) called for the document to be produced to the party; or (b) inspected it when it was so produced. (2) The party who produces a document so called for is not entitled to tender it only because the party to whom it was produced, or who inspected it, fails to tender it. NSW Act: 35

Effect of calling for production of documents

(1) A party is not to be required to tender a document only because the party, whether under this Act or otherwise: (a) called for the document to be produced to the party, or (b) inspected it when it was so produced. (2) The party who produces a document so called for is not entitled to tender it only because the party to whom it was produced, or who inspected it, fails to tender it. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

Vic Act: 35

Effect of calling for production of documents

(1) A party is not to be required to tender a document only because the party, whether under this Act or otherwise— (a) called for the document to be produced to the party; or (b) inspected it when it was so produced. (2) The party who produces a document so called for is not entitled to tender it only because the party to whom it was produced, or who inspected it, fails to tender it. ACT Act: 35

Effect of calling for production of documents

(1) A party must not be required to tender a document only because the party, whether under this Act or otherwise— (a) called for the document to be produced to the party; or (b) inspected it when it was produced. (2) The party who produces a document called for is not entitled to tender it only because the party to whom it was produced, or who inspected it, fails to tender it.

182

Uniform Evidence Law

s 36

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

[EA.35.60]

NT Act: 35 Effect of calling for production of documents (1) A party is not to be required to tender a document only because the party, whether under this Act or otherwise: (a) called for the document to be produced to the party; or (b) inspected it when it was so produced. (2) The party who produces a document so called for is not entitled to tender it only because the party to whom it was produced, or who inspected it, fails to tender it.

[EA.35.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 39, para 111(g); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 290–291, 617.

[EA.35.60] General comments

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This provision abolishes the common law rule185 that, in a civil trial, a party calling for and inspecting a document in the possession of another party can be required to tender it in evidence by the other party (even if it is otherwise inadmissible). The Explanatory Memorandum to the 2008 Victorian Act states: This clause abolishes the rule in Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; [1937] HCA 44. Under that rule, the party called on to produce a document may require the party who called for and inspected the document to then tender the document. This means that a document that may otherwise be inadmissible could be admitted under this rule. This clause removes the automatic right of either party to tender a document or require the other party to tender a document. The clause does not, however, preclude the tendering and admission of such a document if it is otherwise relevant and admissible.

Cth Act: 36

Person may be examined without subpoena or other process

(1) The court may order a person who: (a) is present at the hearing of a proceeding; and (b) is compellable to give evidence in the proceeding; to give evidence and to produce documents or things even if a subpoena or other process requiring the person to attend for that purpose has not been duly served on the person. (2) A person so ordered to give evidence or to produce documents or things is subject to the same penalties and liabilities as if the person had been duly served with such a subpoena or other process. (3) A party who inspects a document or thing produced to the court because of subsection (1) need not use the document in evidence.

185. See Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; [1937] HCA 44. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

183

Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence

s 36

NSW Act: 36 Person may be examined without subpoena or other process (1) The court may order a person who: (a) is present at the hearing of a proceeding, and (b) is compellable to give evidence in the proceeding, to give evidence and to produce documents or things even if a subpoena or other process requiring the person to attend for that purpose has not been duly served on the person. (2) A person so ordered to give evidence or to produce documents or things is subject to the same penalties and liabilities as if the person had been duly served with such a subpoena or other process. (3) A party who inspects a document or thing produced to the court because of subsection (1) need not use the document in evidence. Vic Act: 36

Person may be examined without subpoena or other process

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(1) The court may order a person who— (a) is present at the hearing of a proceeding; and (b) is compellable to give evidence in the proceeding— to give evidence and to produce documents or things even if a subpoena or other process requiring the person to attend for that purpose has not been duly served on the person. (2) A person so ordered to give evidence or to produce documents or things is subject to the same penalties and liabilities as if the person had been duly served with such a subpoena or other process. (3) A party who inspects a document or thing produced to the court because of subsection (1) need not use the document in evidence. ACT Act: 36

Person may be examined without subpoena or other process

(1) The court may order a person who— (a) is present at the hearing of a proceeding; and (b) is compellable to give evidence in the proceeding; to give evidence and to produce documents or things even if a subpoena or other process requiring the person to attend for that purpose has not been served on the person. (2) A person ordered to give evidence or to produce documents or things is subject to the same penalties and liabilities as if the person had been served with a subpoena or other process. (3) A party who inspects a document or thing produced to the court because of subsection (1) need not use the document in evidence.

184

Uniform Evidence Law

s 36

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

[EA.36.30]

NT Act: 36 Person may be examined without subpoena or other process (1) The court may order a person who: (a) is present at the hearing of a proceeding; and (b) is compellable to give evidence in the proceeding; to give evidence and to produce documents or things even if a subpoena or other process requiring the person to attend for that purpose has not been duly served on the person. (2) A person so ordered to give evidence or to produce documents or things is subject to the same penalties and liabilities as if the person had been duly served with such a subpoena or other process. (3) A party who inspects a document or thing produced to the court because of subsection (1) need not use the document in evidence.

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[EA.36.30] General comments This provision was not proposed by the ALRC. It is based on s 52 of the Evidence Act 1971 (ACT) (and similar legislation in other jurisdictions) which empowers a court to order a person to give evidence and to produce to the court any document or thing which is in court or in the person’s possession or control, if a subpoena could have issued requiring the person to give evidence or produce the document or thing.186 It is irrelevant whether or not the document or thing would be admissible in evidence. It has been held: Under s 36, a court may order a person “to give evidence and to produce documents”. It would seem that by using the word “and” the section is directed to a person who is not already giving evidence. Accordingly, s 36(1) cannot be availed of to order the witness who is in the box to produce a document.187

This is a surprising interpretation of the provision, particularly given the reference in s 36(2) to “a person so ordered to give evidence or to produce documents or things”. It is suggested that it was the intention behind this provision that a court be empowered to order the production of a document or thing regardless of whether the person happened to be giving evidence. The Full Federal Court has in fact held that the power should have been exercised in a case where a call was made during cross-examination of a witness for a document prepared by the witness (but not present in the court at that time).188

186. Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651. 187. Ramirez v The Trustee of the Property of Zoltan Sandor, A Bankrupt (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 22 April 1997). However, Young J proceeded to exercise his “inherent power” (see s 11) and hold, on the basis of an 1852 English authority, that “if a witness in the box proffers a document then the witness should be allowed to produce it to the court and thereby secure the best evidence of its context. Once it is then in the custody of the court the court may give access”. 188. Morey v Transurban City Link Ltd [1997] ATPR 43,923. See also Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 3) (2000) 104 FCR 368 at [16]–[19] per von Doussa J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

185

[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.4.30]

s 37

Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence

Once a document or thing is produced to the court in accordance with this order, it is in the court’s discretion whether to make it available to a party.189 Application of a privilege under Part 3.10 would lead the court to refuse to make it available. If inspection of a document or thing is allowed, s 36(3) makes it clear that this does not require the party inspecting the document or thing to tender it in evidence.

DIVISION 4 – EXAMINATION IN CHIEF AND RE-EXAMINATION DIVISION 2.1.4 – EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF AND RE-EXAMINATION (ACT ONLY)

[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.4.30]

Summary of this Division

This Division deals with procedural rules relating to the adducing of evidence from a witness in examination-in-chief and re-examination. Section 37 prohibits leading questions in examination-in-chief and re-examination unless one of the exceptions applies. Limits on re-examination are contained in s 39. Section 38 permits a party who calls a witness who proves “unfavourable” to question the witness as if in cross-examination.

Cth Act:

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37

Leading questions

(1) A leading question must not be put to a witness in examination in chief or in re-examination unless: (a) the court gives leave; or (b) the question relates to a matter introductory to the witness’s evidence; or (c) no objection is made to the question and (leaving aside the party conducting the examination in chief or re-examination) each other party to the proceeding is represented by an Australian legal practitioner, legal counsel or prosecutor; or (d) the question relates to a matter that is not in dispute; or (e) if the witness has specialised knowledge based on the witness’s training, study or experience—the question is asked for the purpose of obtaining the witness’s opinion about a hypothetical statement of facts, being facts in respect of which evidence has been, or is intended to be, given. [Subs (1) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 12]

(2) Unless the court otherwise directs, subsection (1) does not apply in civil proceedings to a question that relates to an investigation, inspection or report that the witness made in the course of carrying out public or official duties.

189. Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651.

186

Uniform Evidence Law

s 37

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

(3) Subsection (1) does not prevent a court from exercising power under rules of court to allow a written statement or report to be tendered or treated as evidence in chief of its maker. Note: Leading question is defined in the Dictionary. [S 37 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 37

Leading questions

(1) A leading question must not be put to a witness in examination in chief or in re-examination unless: (a) the court gives leave, or (b) the question relates to a matter introductory to the witness’s evidence, or (c) no objection is made to the question and (leaving aside the party conducting the examination in chief or re-examination) each other party to the proceeding is represented by an Australian legal practitioner, legal counsel or prosecutor, or (d) the question relates to a matter that is not in dispute, or (e) if the witness has specialised knowledge based on the witness’s training, study or experience—the question is asked for the purpose of obtaining the witness’s opinion about a hypothetical statement of facts, being facts in respect of which evidence has been, or is intended to be, given. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[Subs (1) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[11]]

(2) Unless the court otherwise directs, subsection (1) does not apply in civil proceedings to a question that relates to an investigation, inspection or report that the witness made in the course of carrying out public or official duties. (3) Subsection (1) does not prevent a court from exercising power under rules of court to allow a written statement or report to be tendered or treated as evidence in chief of its maker. Note: Leading question is defined in the Dictionary. [S 37 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 37

Leading questions

(1) A leading question must not be put to a witness in examination in chief or in re-examination unless— (a) the court gives leave; or (b) the question relates to a matter introductory to the witness’s evidence; or (c) no objection is made to the question and (leaving aside the party conducting the examination in chief or re-examination) each other party to the proceeding is represented by an Australian legal practitioner or prosecutor; or (d) the question relates to a matter that is not in dispute; or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

187

Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence

(e)

s 37

if the witness has specialised knowledge based on the witness’s training, study or experience—the question is asked for the purpose of obtaining the witness’s opinion about a hypothetical statement of facts, being facts in respect of which evidence has been, or is intended to be, given.

[Subs (1) am Act 17 of 2014, s 160 and Sch 2 item 39.2]

(2) Unless the court otherwise directs, subsection (1) does not apply in civil proceedings to a question that relates to an investigation, inspection or report that the witness made in the course of carrying out public or official duties. (3) Subsection (1) does not prevent a court from exercising power under rules of court to allow a written statement or report to be tendered or treated as evidence in chief of its maker. Note: Leading question is defined in the Dictionary. [S 37 am Act 17 of 2014]

ACT Act:

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37

Leading questions

(1) A leading question must not be put to a witness in examination-in-chief or in re-examination unless— (a) the court gives leave; or (b) the question relates to a matter introductory to the witness’s evidence; or (c) no objection is made to the question and (leaving aside the party conducting the examination-in-chief or re-examination) each other party to the proceeding is represented by an Australian legal practitioner, legal counsel or prosecutor; or (d) the question relates to a matter that is not in dispute; or (e) if the witness has specialised knowledge based on the witness’s training, study or experience—the question is asked for the purpose of obtaining the witness’s opinion about a hypothetical statement of facts about which evidence has been, or is intended to be, given. (2) Unless the court otherwise directs, subsection (1) does not apply in a civil proceeding to a question that relates to an investigation, inspection or report that the witness made in the course of carrying out public or official duties. (3) Subsection (1) does not prevent the court from exercising power under rules of court to allow a written statement or report to be tendered or treated as evidence-in-chief of its maker. Note: Leading question —see the dictionary.

188

Uniform Evidence Law

s 37

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

[EA.37.60]

NT Act: 37 Leading questions (1) A leading question must not be put to a witness in examination in chief or in re-examination unless: (a) the court gives leave; or (b) the question relates to a matter introductory to the witness’s evidence; or (c) no objection is made to the question and (leaving aside the party conducting the examination in chief or re-examination) each other party to the proceeding is represented by an Australian legal practitioner, legal counsel or prosecutor; or (d) the question relates to a matter that is not in dispute; or (e) if the witness has specialised knowledge based on the witness’s training, study or experience — the question is asked for the purpose of obtaining the witness’s opinion about a hypothetical statement of facts, being facts in respect of which evidence has been, or is intended to be, given.

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(2) Unless the court otherwise directs, subsection (1) does not apply in civil proceedings to a question that relates to an investigation, inspection or report that the witness made in the course of carrying out public or official duties. (3) Subsection (1) does not prevent a court from exercising power under rules of court to allow a written statement or report to be tendered or treated as evidence in chief of its maker. Note for section 37: Leading question is defined in the Dictionary.

[EA.37.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 40, para 113(a); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 292–293, 618–620.

[EA.37.60] General comments This provision prohibits leading questions (see [EA.37.90]) in examination-inchief and re-examination unless one of the exceptions190 applies. “Examination in chief” is defined in cl 2 of Part 2 of the Dictionary: (1) A reference in this Act to examination in chief of a witness is a reference to the questioning of a witness by the party who called the witness to give evidence, not being questioning that is re-examination.

“Re-examination” is also defined in cl 2 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary. In R v S [2003] NSWCCA 122, an interesting issue arose as to whether a court is permitted to prohibit a question asked in examination-in-chief on the basis that it had already been asked (and answered). Mason P, with whom James and Dunford JJ agreed, observed (at [86]) that “it is open to a trial judge to prevent counsel examining a witness in chief from assuming the role of cross-examiner once 190. Various exceptions are recognised in s 37. In addition, where a witness is “unfavourable” under s 38, the witness may be questioned as if in cross-examination – permitting leading questions. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

189

[EA.37.90]

s 37

Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence

objection is taken (see Evidence Act, s 37)”. This is a curious observation, in that s 37 only prohibits leading questions. It might be that Mason P was relying upon some common law principle (perhaps operative through s 11 or s 26(a)), although he did not say so and there is little common law authority on this particular issue. It was submitted to Mason P by counsel for the appellant that “simply because a question has been previously asked and answered, this is not a proper basis for refusing to permit a question unless the inference is drawn that the repeated asking of the question suggests to the witness that the answer first given was not one desired by counsel” (at [86]). Mason P considered that he did not need to decide “whether or not this is a full statement of the relevant principle”, ultimately holding that the question should have been allowed to be asked again because it had not in fact been answered. If a question has been asked and answered, it is suggested that the proper approach to the asking of the question again should be to determine whether this would involve “leading” the witness and, even if it would not, to consider whether there are discretionary reasons (s 135) for prohibiting the question. As regards the position where a previous representation is admitted as evidence in chief, see [EA.37.270].

[EA.37.90] “leading question” This term is defined in the Dictionary: “leading question” means a question asked of a witness that:

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(a) directly or indirectly suggests a particular answer to the question; or (b) assumes the existence of a fact the existence of which is in dispute in the proceeding and as to the existence of which the witness has not given evidence before the question is asked. The ALRC explained (at ALRC 26, vol 1, para 619) that: The definition of “leading question” is similar to that used in most discussions of the subject. It is intended to cover questions such as: • “Did you see another car coming very fast from the opposite direction?” and • “What did you do after Smith hit you?” put to the plaintiff in an assault action before he has given evidence that he had been hit by Smith. It is also intended to cover suggestive questions such as “how deep was the canal?” instead of “what was the depth of the canal?” or “about how fast was the other car going when it smashed into your car?” instead of “what was the speed of the other car at the time of the collision?” It is also intended to include multi-choice questions.

Where a police officer has testified that a car was searched, to then ask the question “Did you find anything similar to a remote control for a garage door?” is “clearly a leading question; it suggested a desired answer that the witness had indeed found something similar to a remote control for a garage door” and “could not be justified as being merely a question designed to bring the witness’s mind to a particular subject matter”.191 The same evidence could have been elicited by 191. Thi Dung Ta v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 32, James J at [67]. However, the question was not objected to and accordingly it was not a question to which the prohibition in s 37 applied (s 37(1)(c)).

190

Uniform Evidence Law

s 37

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

[EA.37.150]

the breaking up of the single question into two questions along the lines of “Did you find anything?” (and upon receiving an affirmative answer) “What did you find?”.192 In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373, Barr and Hall JJ held at [217]–[225] that the following question (and other similar questions) in the re-examination of a prosecution witness who had given favourable character evidence relating to the accused “would appear to be a leading question”: Would it affect your assessment of Mr Hannes’ character if you knew that on his own account he intended to operate or be a party to operation of a securities trading account in a false name?

The reason such a question was characterised as (apparently) leading, presumably, is not that the question suggests a particular answer but that it explicitly “assumes the existence of a fact the existence of which is in dispute in the proceeding and as to the existence of which the witness has not given evidence before the question is asked”. Certainly it would have been leading to ask the witness questions along the lines: “If Mr Hannes committed the form of illegality with which he is presently charged, how would that affect your assessment of his character?” (as Barr and Hall JJ characterised the questioning in this case) but the difficulty with their analysis is that the questions asked in fact appear to have been based on matters admitted by the accused (and thus not in dispute in the proceeding).

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[EA.37.120]

Identification of a person or thing

Subject to Pt 3.9 and the discretions in Pt 3.11, a witness may be asked a non-leading question as to whether the witness can identify any person in the courtroom, or a thing, as connected with a relevant incident. However, where the witness identifies the defendant in criminal proceedings, the suggestive nature of the circumstances require an appropriate warning to the tribunal of fact (see ss 116 and 165). When showing a thing to a witness for the purposes of identification (or expressing an opinion as to resemblance), it is not essential to show a number of similar things to the witness to avoid the suggestive nature of such a presentation.193 However, non-leading questions should be adopted.194

[EA.37.150]

“(a) the court gives leave”

Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.195 Given the specific categories of permissible leading question listed in s 37, the ALRC gave as examples of situations where leave may be given (see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 620), where: 192. Thi Dung Ta v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 32, James J at [69]. 193. Evans v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 489; [2006] NSWCCA 277 at [138]. 194. Evans v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 489; [2006] NSWCCA 277 at [129]–[139]. 195. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

191

[EA.37.180]

s 37

Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence

• it is necessary to use leading questions to obtain the whole of the witness’ evidence – for example, where the witness has forgotten something, where it is convenient to direct the witness’ attention to some object or topic or for other reasons, is having difficulty giving evidence; • to do so would expedite the trial without being unfair to any other party to the trial. This ground conveniently states the basic competing issues. It would permit questions which identify a person or thing in court and questions put in a form which directs a witness’ attention to particular topics and matters. It would permit leading questions on matters which the court thought had been sufficiently proved.

In R v Houssein [2003] NSWCCA 74, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered that leave was appropriately given in a case where, if non-leading questions were asked about a prior consistent statement (admissible under s 108), the witness was likely to give evidence which was unfairly prejudicial to the appellant and, in addition: “Any attempt to have the witness recount his recollection of what the statement contained, was liable to suffer from the same defects of memory as the witness’ recollection of events which occurred in the 24 hours before the statement was made” (Hulme J at [35]). Where a witness to a conversation is asked a leading question to the effect of whether a recording accurately recorded the conversation, leave will be required.196

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[EA.37.180]

“(c) no objection is made …”

In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373 Barr and Hall JJ stated at [226] that “a criminal trial is not one in which the prosecution is entitled to introduce evidence by what should have been understood to be a patently impermissible course, by taking advantage of the element of surprise and the likelihood that defence counsel may not object to an unexpected and most unusual line of reexamination”.

[EA.37.210]

Consequences of asking leading question

The provision does not spell out the consequences if a leading question is asked (where leave has not been given and the question does not fall within the specific exceptions listed in s 37). This was deliberate. The ALRC explained (at ALRC 26, vol 1, para 619): The consequences that flow from asking a leading question when not permitted or unauthorised are not spelt out. As at present, a party may object and have the court order that the question not be put. If the question is answered, then the form of question will affect the weight of the answer.

However, the position is different where a previous representation is admitted as evidence in chief (see [EA.37.270]).

[EA.37.240]

Written statement or report (s 37(3))

Rule 31.4 of the NSW Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 is an example of a rule of court allowing a written statement or report of a witness to be admitted into evidence and treated as the evidence in chief, or part of the evidence in chief, 196. R v Eade (2002) 131 A Crim R 390; [2002] NSWCCA 257 at [32]–[34].

192

Uniform Evidence Law

s 37

Part 2.1 - Witnesses

[EA.37.270]

of its maker. In Platcher v Joseph [2004] FCAFC 68, Weinberg J observed (at [163]) that “the approach of calling a witness to adopt a previous statement as true and correct is routinely followed” in the Federal Court. Furthermore, a witness may by way of affidavit swear to or affirm the truth of a previous statement exhibited to the affidavit or to the truth of a transcript of a previous interview so exhibited.197 However, in Clark v The Queen (2008) 185 A Crim R 1; [2008] NSWCCA 122, it appears to have been accepted at [116]–[121] that, “ordinarily”, in criminal trials, evidence should not be elicited in this way (unless the defendant consents to this procedure pursuant to s 190).

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[EA.37.270]

Previous representations admitted as evidence in chief

A number of provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) and the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) provide that certain recorded statements by a person who subsequently becomes a witness may be admitted as evidence in chief of that witness. For example, s 367 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) permits a child or cognitively impaired witness to give their evidence in chief in the form of a VARE (Video and Audio Recorded Evidence) interview. It has been held in respect of this procedure that s 37 applies to prohibit leading questions198 but it is apparent that the context is different. There is no possibility of contemporaneous “objection”. Different approaches appear to have been taken in Victoria and NSW. In both jurisdictions it is accepted that, notwithstanding the terms of s 37, there would be no breach of the provision if a question was designed to “clarify” what had already been said.199 However, in Victoria it is considered that, if the provision is breached, the answer would be obtained in consequence of impropriety (and arguably in contravention of an Australian law) for the purposes of s 138.200 There would also be scope for the operation of s 137.201 If the evidence is admitted, a warning may be required.202 On the other hand, in the NSW Supreme Court, s 37 has been applied on the basis that the court can rule that evidence obtained as a result of a leading question is inadmissible where the Court did not give retrospective leave for the leading question.203 In deciding whether to grant such retrospective leave, it is apparent that the circumstances to be taken into account will be somewhat different from

197. Alfred v Lanscar (2007) 162 FCR 169; [2007] FCA 833; Temple v Powell (No 1) (2007) 164 IR 409; [2007] FCA 987. 198. Martin v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 449; [2013] VSCA 377 at [34]–[44]; Knowles v The Queen [2015] VSCA 141 at [72]; R v A2 (No 21) [2016] NSWSC 24 at [27]. 199. S L J v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 514; 233 A Crim R 341; [2013] VSCA 193 at [32]; Martin v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 449; [2013] VSCA 377 at [34]–[44]; Knowles v The Queen [2015] VSCA 141 at [68]; Sutton v The Queen [2015] VSCA 251 at [85]. See also R v A2 (No 21) [2016] NSWSC 24 at [31]–[33]. 200. Knowles v The Queen [2015] VSCA 141 at [72]. 201. Sutton v The Queen [2015] VSCA 251 at [86]–[87]. 202. Knowles v The Queen [2015] VSCA 141 at [79]. 203. R v A2 (No 21) [2016] NSWSC 24 at [34]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

193

[EA.37.270]

s 38

Chapter 2 - Adducing Evidence 204

those that arise where there is contemporaneous objection. has been taken in the ACT Supreme Court.205

The same approach

Cth Act: 38

Unfavourable witnesses

(1) A party who called a witness may, with the leave of the court, question the witness, as though the party were cross-examining the witness, about: (a) evidence given by the witness that is unfavourable to the party; or (b) a matter of which the witness may reasonably be supposed to have knowledge and about which it appears to the court the witness is not, in examination in chief, making a genuine attempt to give evidence; or (c) whether the witness has, at any time, made a prior inconsistent statement. (2) Questioning a witness under this section is taken to be cross-examination for the purposes of this Act (other than section 39). (3) The party questioning the witness under this section may, with the leave of the court, question the witness about matters relevant only to the witness’s credibility. Note: The rules about admissibility of evidence relevant only to credibility are set out in Part 3.7.

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(4) Questioning under this section is to take place before the other parties cross-examine the witness, unless the court otherwise directs. (5) If the court so directs, the order in which the parties question the witness is to be as the court directs. (6) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in determining whether to give leave or a direction under this section, it is to take into account: (a) whether the party gave notice at the earliest opportunity of his or her intention to seek leave; and (b) the matters on which, and the extent to which, the witness has been, or is likely to be, questioned by another party. (7) A party is subject to the same liability to be cross-examined under this section as any other witness if: (a) a proceeding is being conducted in the name of the party by or on behalf of an insurer or other person; and (b) the party is a witness in the proceeding.

204. R v A2 (No 21) [2016] NSWSC 24 at [35]–[45]. 205. Re JC [2010] ACTSC 134 at [27]; R v Al-Harazi (No 6) [2017] ACTSC 63 at [19].

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NSW Act: 38 Unfavourable witnesses (1) A party who called a witness may, with the leave of the court, question the witness, as though the party were cross-examining the witness, about: (a) evidence given by the witness that is unfavourable to the party, or (b) a matter of which the witness may reasonably be supposed to have knowledge and about which it appears to the court the witness is not, in examination in chief, making a genuine attempt to give evidence, or (c) whether the witness has, at any time, made a prior inconsistent statement. (2) Questioning a witness under this section is taken to be cross-examination for the purposes of this Act (other than section 39). (3) The party questioning the witness under this section may, with the leave of the court, question the witness about matters relevant only to the witness’s credibility. Note: The rules about admissibility of evidence relevant only to credibility are set out in Part 3.7.

(4) Questioning under this section is to take place before the other parties cross-examine the witness, unless the court otherwise directs.

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(5) If the court so directs, the order in which the parties question the witness is to be as the court directs. (6) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in determining whether to give leave or a direction under this section, it is to take into account: (a) whether the party gave notice at the earliest opportunity of his or her intention to seek leave, and (b) the matters on which, and the extent to which, the witness has been, or is likely to be, questioned by another party. (7) A party is subject to the same liability to be cross-examined under this section as any other witness if: (a) a proceeding is being conducted in the name of the party by or on behalf of an insurer or other person, and (b) the party is a witness in the proceeding. Vic Act: 38

Unfavourable witnesses

(1) A party who called a witness may, with the leave of the court, question the witness, as though the party were cross-examining the witness, about— (a) evidence given by the witness that is unfavourable to the party; or (b) a matter of which the witness may reasonably be supposed to have knowledge and about which it appears to the court the witness is not, in examination in chief, making a genuine attempt to give evidence; or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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whether the witness has, at any time, made a prior inconsistent statement.

(2) Questioning a witness under this section is taken to be cross-examination for the purposes of this Act (other than section 39). (3) The party questioning the witness under this section may, with the leave of the court, question the witness about matters relevant only to the witness’s credibility. Note: The rules about admissibility of evidence relevant only to credibility are set out in Part 3.7.

(4) Questioning under this section is to take place before the other parties cross-examine the witness, unless the court otherwise directs. (5) If the court so directs, the order in which the parties question the witness is to be as the court directs. (6) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in determining whether to give leave or a direction under this section, it is to take into account— (a) whether the party gave notice at the earliest opportunity of the party’s intention to seek leave; and Note: Paragraph (a) differs from the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act.

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(b) the matters on which, and the extent to which, the witness has been, or is likely to be, questioned by another party. (7) A party is subject to the same liability to be cross-examined under this section as any other witness if— (a) a proceeding is being conducted in the name of the party by or on behalf of an insurer or other person; and (b) the party is a witness in the proceeding. ACT Act: 38

Unfavourable witnesses

(1) A party who called a witness may, with the leave of the court, question the witness, as though the party were cross-examining the witness, about— (a) evidence given by the witness that is unfavourable to the party; or (b) a matter of which the witness may reasonably be supposed to have knowledge and about which it appears to the court the witness is not, in examination-in-chief, making a genuine attempt to give evidence; or (c) whether the witness has, at any time, made a prior inconsistent statement. (2) Questioning a witness under this section is taken to be cross-examination for this Act (other than section 39 (Limits on re-examination)). (3) The party questioning the witness under this section may, with the leave of the court, question the witness about matters relevant only to the witness’s credibility. Note: The rules about admissibility of evidence relevant only to credibility are set out in pt 3.7.

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(4) Questioning under this section must take place before the other parties cross-examine the witness, unless the court otherwise directs. (5) If the court gives a direction under subsection (4), the order in which the parties question the witness must be as the court directs. (6) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give leave or a direction under this section, it must take into account— (a) whether the party gave notice at the earliest opportunity of the party’s intention to seek leave; and (b) the matters on which, and the extent to which, the witness has been, or is likely to be, questioned by another party. (7) A party is subject to the same liability to be cross-examined under this section as any other witness if— (a) a proceeding is being conducted in the name of the party by or on behalf of an insurer or someone else; and (b) the party is a witness in the proceeding. NT Act:

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38

Unfavourable witnesses

(1) A party who called a witness may, with the leave of the court, question the witness, as though the party were cross-examining the witness, about: (a) evidence given by the witness that is unfavourable to the party; or (b) a matter of which the witness may reasonably be supposed to have knowledge and about which it appears to the court the witness is not, in examination in chief, making a genuine attempt to give evidence; or (c) whether the witness has, at any time, made a prior inconsistent statement. (2) Questioning a witness under this section is taken to be cross-examination for the purposes of this Act (other than section 39). (3) The party questioning the witness under this section may, with the leave of the court, question the witness about matters relevant only to the witness’s credibility. Note for subsection (3): The rules about admissibility of evidence relevant only to credibility are set out in Part 3.7.

(4) Questioning under this section is to take place before the other parties cross-examine the witness, unless the court otherwise directs. (5) If the court so directs, the order in which the parties question the witness is to be as the court directs. (6) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in determining whether to give leave or a direction under this section, it is to take into account: (a) whether the party gave notice at the earliest opportunity of the party’s intention to seek leave; and © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) the matters on which, and the extent to which, the witness has been, or is likely to be, questioned by another party. (7) A party is subject to the same liability to be cross-examined under this section as any other witness if: (a) a proceeding is being conducted in the name of the party by or on behalf of an insurer or other person; and (b) the party is a witness in the proceeding.

[EA.38.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 41, para 113(b); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 294–297, 621–627.

[EA.38.60] General comments

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This provision replaces the common law with respect to “hostile witnesses” and was intended to effect a significant change to the common law principles.206 Instead of requiring the party calling a witness to establish that the witness is “unwilling to tell the whole truth” before allowing cross-examination, the provision permits cross-examination if the witness gives “unfavourable” evidence, appears not to be “making a genuine attempt to give evidence” or has made a prior statement inconsistent with his or her in-court testimony. It has been held: Although the heading to s 38 … is “unfavourable witnesses”, the section itself refers to “evidence” given by a witness and … leave can be granted to cross-examine a witness on part only of his evidence if it is unfavourable to the party calling him or inconsistent with a prior statement made by the witness, even though the rest or most of the rest of the witness’s evidence is favourable to the party calling him.207

On a narrow view, cross-examination is only permissible in respect of the evidence which is unfavourable, the “matter” about which the witness has not made a genuine attempt to give evidence or the making of a prior inconsistent statement. This provision does not permit general cross-examination.208 On the other hand, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held in R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186 at [67] per Heydon JA: [L]eave may be granted under s 38 to conduct questioning not only if the questioning is specifically directed to one of the three subjects described in s 38(1), but also if it is directed to establishing the probability of the factual state of affairs in relation to those subjects contended for by the party conducting the questioning or the improbability of the witness’s evidence on those subjects. In establishing the probability or improbability of one or other state of affairs, the questioner is entitled to ask questions about matter going only to credibility with a view to shaking the witness’s credibility on the s 38(1) subjects.209

The term “unfavourable” is not defined in the Act. It is clear, however, that this term imposes a lower threshold than the word “hostile” required at common law. 206. Director of Public Prosecutions v Nair (2009) 170 ACTR 15; 236 FLR 239; [2009] ACTCA 17 at [31], [34]. 207. R v Pantoja [1998] NSWSC 565, p 51. 208. See R v Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292. 209. See also R v White (2003) 140 A Crim R 63; [2003] NSWCCA 64 at [66]–[67] per Smart AJ.

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The ALRC proposed that the law relating to “hostile” witnesses be “abrogated”, partly because a witness was often unlikely to be found hostile where he or she simply gave unfavourable evidence, thereby preventing the testing of evidence.210 The Macquarie Dictionary defines the term as meaning “not favourable, not propitious, disadvantageous, adverse”. It has been held211 not to mean “adverse” but rather “not favourable”. Such an approach reflects the view that: the word “unfavourable” should be given a broad meaning thereby ensuring that in the course of any criminal trial the court would not be denied evidence as to any relevant issue and would not be denied the opportunity for that evidence to be appropriately tested.212

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A ruling consistent with that view, and endorsed by Gaudron J in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57, was that evidence from a prosecution witness that he did not see the defendant or anyone else near the victim at any time proximate to his stabbing was evidence unfavourable to the prosecution case.213 However, it has been suggested214 that such a broad approach to the concept may not be appropriate where the party calling the witness in a criminal proceeding is the Crown, since the Crown has a duty to assist the court in “finding the truth” and not simply to advance a particular theory of the facts. Further, in Klewer v Walton [2003] NSWCA 308 at [20] (and [30]) Hodgson JA, with whom Meagher JA agreed, expressed the view that evidence which was simply “neutral” did not come within the word “unfavourable” as used in s 38(1)(a). The majority judgment in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 touched on this issue, without expressing any final view, when members of the court stated that: there appears much to be said … for the view that to give evidence which, at best, is unhelpful to the party calling it, and to do so without “making a genuine attempt to give evidence”, is to give evidence “unfavourable” to that party.215

It appears to be clear that the judgment was not suggesting that it was essential to conclude, even in a case involving a witness called by the prosecution, that the witness was not “making a genuine attempt to give evidence” (s 38(1)(b)) before a conclusion that the evidence given was unfavourable to a party (s 38(1)(a)) can 210. See ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 294, 295, 625. 211. R v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 at 715; R v Taylor [2003] NSWCCA 194 at [74] per Bell J; Lee v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 259 at [30]. See also Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Donnelly (1998) 82 FCR 418 at 430 (Full Federal Court). 212. R v Le [2001] NSWSC 174 at [15] per McClellan J. 213. At [44] per Gaudron J. The view of the majority is discussed below. 214. R v Pantoja [1998] NSWSC 565, p 3 per Adams J. The other members of the court did not address this suggestion. However, similar comments were made in R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450; [1999] NSWCCA 279 at [54] per Greg James J. Refshauge J observed in R v SH (2011) 6 ACTLR 1; [2011] ACTSC 198 at [31] that he was “not convinced that these are not able to be made consistent with the clearly more widely accepted approach. In particular, it seems to me that to say that evidence that is strictly neutral is not unfavourable, as was suggested in Klewer v Walton, is consistent with the approach in R v Souleyman.” In Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4, Bathurst CJ accepted at [292] that “evidence is not unfavourable simply because it does not fit a particular case theory of the prosecution”. 215. Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 at [27] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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be drawn. The description “unhelpful” was relied upon by Graham J in Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2006) 152 FCR 560; [2006] FCA 941 when he stated at [9]: I must say that I have some difficulty with the proposition that one can characterise evidence given as unfavourable if, to do so, one has to go beyond the pleadings and the evidence itself. I do not think that “unfavourable” should be construed, as suggested by Smart J, as simply “not favourable”. … As I see it, for evidence to be characterised as “unfavourable” it would have to detract from the case of the party calling the witness. I would prefer the approach taken by Hodgson JA with which Meagher JA agreed, in Klewer v Walton [2003] NSWCA 308 at [20] (and [30]) where his Honour expressed the view that evidence which was simply “neutral” did not come within the word “unfavourable” as used in s 38(1)(a). In Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [27] Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ seem to me to be suggesting that for evidence to be characterised as unfavourable, it must have an unhelpful quality about it, as opposed to a neutral quality.

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The full width of any entitlement under s 38 and the criteria for the proper exercise of discretion to permit cross-examination remain to be settled.216 The following comments have been made: [Q]uestions remain as to the appropriateness of calling witnesses known or expected to give unfavourable evidence and the eliciting or refraining from eliciting particular testimony against the interest of or not to the advantage of the party calling the witness. There is much about the application of the section still to be resolved. Interestingly, as a matter of history, the notion of unfavourability was considered by Willes J in Greenough v Eccles (1859) 2 CB (NS) 786 at 805 in the context of the then newly enacted s 22 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854, the ancestor of s 53. That decision became the seminal authority on similar statutory provisions throughout the common law world concerning the rights of a party who had called a witness that proved “adverse”. Willes J rejected the concept of “adverse” under the section as merely amounting to “giving unfavourable evidence” and considered that “unfavourable” could be equated with giving “evidence opposed to the interests of the party who calls him”. Such a test would not extend to failing to give evidence which might have been expected and which would have assisted the calling party’s case and is narrower than those applied in some of the decisions to which I have referred.217

However, Refshauge J in the ACT Supreme Court has persuasively observed that “these issues really go to the exercise of the discretion to grant leave rather than to the meaning of ‘unfavourable’ … [and] the Crown, having laid certain charges, should be able to test the evidence that is inconsistent with those charges … in the interests of truth”.218 In Lane v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 317; [2013] NSWCCA 317 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal saw no unfairness in a prosecutor asking questions tending to discredit an unfavourable prosecution witness (at [161]–[168]). Similarly, in KH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 294, 216. See R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450; [1999] NSWCCA 279 at [55] per Greg James J. 217. R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450; [1999] NSWCCA 279 at [55]. Similarly, the trial judge (Kirby J) in R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 observed that “[s]imply because a witness may add something favourable to an accused does not render the evidence ‘unfavourable’ to the Crown. If the elaboration is patently truthful it could not be so regarded in my view. It is ‘unfavourable’, within the meaning of s 38(1)(a), where it may rationally be inferred that the elaboration may be untruthful, and motivated by a desire to assist the accused.” The Court of Criminal Appeal did not comment on this analysis (at [341]–[346]). 218. R v SH (2011) 6 ACTLR 1; [2011] ACTSC 198 at [35].

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the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal rejected an argument that the use of this provision in respect of prosecution witnesses “who on any view were close to” the defendant “fundamentally altered the adversarial process” – it “was precisely what was contemplated by the Act” (Leeming JA at [26]–[28]).219 In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Garrett (2016) 257 A Crim R 509; [2016] VSCA 31, the Victorian Court of Appeal, after a discussion of authority, concluded as follows (at [64]–[69]): The word “unfavourable” is not defined in the Act. It is an ordinary English word and, on accepted principles of interpretation, should be given its ordinary meaning. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the principal dictionary definition of “unfavourable” is “not favourable”. Other meanings given include “disadvantageous”, “adverse” and “ill-disposed”. In turn, the word “favourable” is defined to mean “affording aid, advantage, or convenience” and “advantageous, convenient; facilitating one’s purpose or wishes; helpful, suitable”. Nothing in the context, either of s 38 or of the Act as a whole, requires any departure from that approach to interpretation. … [T]he phrase “unfavourable to the party” must be taken to mean unfavourable to the case which the party is seeking to advance in the proceeding. Whether evidence is unfavourable to the case that the party is seeking to prove will depend upon the circumstances of each case.

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The party’s case may be discerned from its opening, its pleadings and/or the evidence which the court has already heard or which is proposed to be called. If the evidence of the witness called by that party is inconsistent with, or “likely to be contradictory” of, that identified case, it will ordinarily satisfy the description of “unfavourable”. The inconsistency or contradictory nature of the evidence may arise because the witness asserts a fact – or fails to give evidence of a fact – in circumstances that permit the conclusion that his evidence is unfavourable. Evidence may be unfavourable even if the witness whom it is sought to cross-examine gives no evidence that actually detracts from the case of the party by whom he or she is called. If the party calling the witness contends that the witness should be able to give evidence supportive of that party’s case, and the witness does not give such evidence, that may suffice to make the evidence given by the witness “unfavourable” within the meaning of s 38.220

The point was also made at [70] that the determination of whether evidence is unfavourable “in no way depends upon some objective assessment by the trial judge when the application is made of the truthfulness of the evidence”. The court added at [73]: Where the party’s case is clearly identifiable, the evidence of a witness called by a party will not cease to be unfavourable simply because there is other evidence inconsistent with that party’s case. In order to determine the threshold question, a judge is not called upon to ascertain whether the preponderance of the evidence will substantiate the party’s case, nor to make some objective assessment of all of the evidence to ascertain where the truth lies. 219. See also Kanaan v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [84]–[85]; Gilham v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131 at [405] (unfavourable expert witness).The provision is seen to permit a truer picture to emerge than under the common law, the very purpose underlying the provision: R v Parkes (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12 at [83]; Casey v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 77 at [62]. 220. In this case, the prosecution’s case was that the accused assaulted the complainant; the complainant would so testify; and the evidence which the witness KB was expected to give would be directly to the contrary. The court concluded at [71] that, “plainly enough, that evidence would be unfavourable to the Crown’s case”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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It is clear is that the provision is not limited to “an unexpected eventuality” (that is, to a situation where a witness unexpectedly gives unfavourable evidence)221 nor to a circumstance where the Crown has called a witness at the request of the defence.222 Thus, the High Court has held that the Crown can, subject to a grant of leave, call a witness, known to be unfavourable to the prosecution, for the purpose of adducing evidence of a prior inconsistent statement (see Pt 3.7), which can then be used (pursuant to s 60) to prove the truth of the facts asserted.223 While careful consideration will need to be given by the court to the leave requirement in this provision as well as the discretions in Pt 3.11,224 if the evidence given by a witness was “unfavourable” to a party or the witness has made a “prior inconsistent statement” it is not a necessary element for a grant of leave to cross-examine that the terms of s 38(1)(b) are satisfied nor need there be evidence of a motive or reason for the witness to give untruthful evidence.225

[EA.38.90] “witness” This term is defined in the Dictionary to include the meaning given in cl 7 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary: (1) A reference in this Act to a witness includes a reference to a party giving evidence. (2) A reference in this Act to a witness who has been called by a party to give evidence includes a reference to the party giving evidence.

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(3) A reference in this section to a party includes a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

However, s 38(7) suggests that it was not intended that the term “witness” in s 38 include all parties who are giving evidence.226 It appears to have been intended that only the party specified in s 38(7) be treated as a witness for the purposes of this provision.227 In practice, it is only in respect of such a party that the application of this provision is likely to be considered. 221. R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; [1999] NSWCCA 197 at [99]. This proposition was not challenged in the High Court: see Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57. 222. R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186 where Heydon JA observed (at [68]) that the fact that the prosecution had an obligation to call a witness did not create an obligation to accept whatever the witness says. 223. Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 at [18]–[19]. The High Court held that the decision of Blewitt v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 503, which dealt with the position under the common law, had no application to the operation of the Evidence Act 1995 in this regard (given the existence of s 60). 224. See R v Fowler [2000] NSWCCA 142; Lee v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 259 at [34]. 225. Director of Public Prosecutions v Nair (2009) 170 ACTR 15; 236 FLR 239; [2009] ACTCA 17 at [43]. 226. This provision overcomes the decision in Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267 to the effect that an authorised insurer, who had taken over the conduct of proceedings on behalf of the insured defendant, was not allowed to cross-examine that insured defendant about his earlier inconsistent statement. 227. Thus indicating that the Dictionary definition does not apply: see s 3(3) of the Commonwealth Act.

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[EA.38.150]

“whether the witness has, at any time, made a prior inconsistent statement” (s 38(1)(c))

The comparable terms of s 43(1) are discussed at [EA.43.90]. The absence of any requirement of contemporaneity for the prior inconsistent statement has been emphasised.228

[EA.38.150]

“with the leave of the court” (s 38(1))

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Section 38(6) requires the court to take into account a number of matters in deciding whether to give leave to question a witness as though in crossexamination. The party should give notice at the earliest opportunity that it is proposed to seek leave under this section, although a failure to do so is simply a factor to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion.229 Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.230 Other matters may be relevant. For example, where leave is sought by a party on the basis of s 38(1)(c), that party would need to prove (in the absence of any jury) that the allegedly prior inconsistent statement was made by the witness.231 There is no requirement of contemporaneity for the prior inconsistent statement.232 It has been held that the discretion whether to grant leave “is important and designed to prevent any form of abuse in the administration of the more liberal test of ‘unfavourable’”.233 Some courts appear to have been influenced by the former common law requirement of “hostility” in deciding whether or not to grant leave,234 but care should be taken in importing the common law in this way. If the requirements of s 38(1)(a) or s 38(1)(c) are satisfied, it is certainly not necessary for a grant of leave that the terms of s 38(1)(b) are satisfied nor need there be evidence of a motive or reason for the witness to give untruthful 228. MAH v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 226 at [37]. 229. R v Ashton (2003) 143 A Crim R 354; [2003] TASSC 140 at [27]; Randall v The Queen (2004) 146 A Crim R 197; [2004] TASSC 42 at [27]. 230. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. See also 3WJ Pty Ltd v Kanj [2008] NSWCA 321 at [25]–[28]. 231. R v Yi [1998] NSWSC 39. It was also pointed out that, where the alleged prior inconsistent statement is said to have been made originally in a language other than English, before leave is granted it will be necessary to prove that the English version upon which reliance is placed accurately reflects what the witness said in the other language. 232. MAH v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 226 at [37]. 233. R v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712; R v Fowler [2000] NSWCCA 142. 234. In JA Westaway & Son Pty Ltd v Registrar General (1996) 7 BPR 14773, Young J stated that: “[D]espite the lowering of the barrier against cross examining one’s own witness, it must not be thought that this is something that is likely to be permitted in every case. A lawyer who calls a witness who he or she knows is likely to be in an opposing camp has to make a conscious choice. If the witness shows by the way he or she gives evidence that there is some malice or hostility which is likely to affect the acceptance of the evidence, then it may well be appropriate to grant leave to cross examine to the person who called the witness”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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evidence. On the other hand, where one of the paragraphs of s 38(1) is satisfied, the satisfaction, or otherwise, of the other paragraphs may be a relevant consideration in deciding whether to give leave. It is important to note that this provision does not permit general crossexamination and that each area of cross-examination proposed will require leave.236 As Greg James J has observed in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal: It is necessary, when giving consideration to the grant of leave, to have regard to the effect on the trial of the ambit of questioning and of the matters that might be raised. It is essential when considering the grant of leave to consider how far, at least initially, cross-examination might be permitted to extend, having regard to the bounds set by s 38, to the matters to which regard must be had when granting leave in s 38(6) and s 192 and to whether prejudicial matters to which ss 135 and 137 might apply might be raised.237

On the other hand, Heydon JA stated in R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186 at [73] that, while it will often not be right to grant leave on the widest possible basis at the outset, a court should avoid “distribut[ing] small dollops of leave in response to repeated small-scale applications”. In R v White (2003) 140 A Crim R 63; [2003] NSWCCA 64 Smart AJ observed at [68]: Usually, the Crown should specify the matters on which it is sought to further examine the witness and the judge should require the Crown to do so. Specifications of the omnibus variety will usually not be acceptable. Examinations pursuant to leave under s 38 are not the occasions for “open slather” type cross-examinations.

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However, he also said (at [66]): There may be cases where, in practical terms, because of what a witness has said and the matters he has raised and their width it will be permissible to grant leave to examine at large without departing from the true purpose of s 38. It would be pointless to have a lengthy list of matters about which a witness could be examined if that list covered virtually all the matters (or all the major matters) about which the witness had given evidence. When leave is given to question a witness about matters only relevant to his or her credibility that may permit a fairly wide ranging examination.

An example of the application of this provision is the High Court judgment of Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57.238 It was argued that leave should not have been granted to the prosecution to cross-examine a witness, “TS”, about alleged statements he had made to the police implicating the defendant in a murder, because it would create unfairness to the defendant: s 192(2)(b). The suggested unfairness arose primarily from the fact that TS claimed at trial that he simply reported to police what others had told him and that, as a result, it was very hard for the defence to challenge 235. Director of Public Prosecutions v Nair (2009) 170 ACTR 15; 236 FLR 239; [2009] ACTCA 17 at [43]. 236. See R v Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292; see also R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186. 237. R v Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292 at [80]. 238. See also R v GAC (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson CJ, McInerney, Sully JJ, 1 April 1997); R v Lozano (unreported, NSW CCA, Hunt CJ at CL, Sperling, Barr JJ, 10 June 1997); R v Velevski (No 2) (1997) 93 A Crim R 420; R v Fowler [2000] NSWCCA 142; R v Esho [2001] NSWCCA 415; R v Taylor [2003] NSWCCA 194 at [78]–[87] per Bell J.

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the detail of what he had said to the police. However, the majority judgment concluded that the trial judge was right to conclude that the defence could test the evidence which was to be led and that there was no unfairness.239 Given this, and the fact that the trial judge had examined carefully all of the matters which, at trial, were said by the parties to bear upon the exercise of the discretion to grant leave, there was no basis for concluding that the judge’s discretion miscarried.240 On the other hand, as was pointed out by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of R v Esposito, this provision is not “available to the Crown to introduce potentially unreliable evidence to bolster the ‘credibility’ of a prosecution witness”.241 The matters referred to by Adams J in R v Pantoja [1998] NSWSC 565 and Greg James J in R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450; [1999] NSWCCA 279 (see [EA.38.60]) regarding the special position of the Crown in criminal proceedings may be taken into account in this context. As Refshauge J in the ACT Supreme Court has observed, “[l]eave should not be readily granted to the Crown, particularly where it is simply a matter of a forensic tactic and, unlike this case, not related to a central and critical issue in the case”.242 Thus, for example, the court will need to give careful consideration to the contemporaneity and reliability of any prior statement by the witness sought to be adduced under this provision.243

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Strictly speaking, the question of leave should be kept separate from questions of admissibility and evidentiary exclusion.244 A grant of leave to question a witness in a particular way about particular topics relates to the adducing of evidence rather than the question of admissibility. However, as a practical matter, the questions will often overlap.245 Circumstances may arise in which evidentiary

239. Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 at [29]–[30] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ. 240. Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57. Gaudron J dissented at [76]–[80]. At [76] she stated that “the conclusion by a trial judge that, as a matter of fact, a prior inconsistent statement is probably true is not relevant to a determination whether leave should be granted to cross-examine a witness so as to put an otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement before the jury”. It is not entirely clear what view the majority judgment formed on this issue: see [27]. See also Lee v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 259 at [34]. 241. R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 at 40 per Wood CJ at CL. 242. R v SH (2011) 6 ACTLR 1; [2011] ACTSC 198 at [41]. 243. R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27. It was also pointed out that it will be necessary to identify with precision what fact or facts the existence of which the maker of the representation intended to assert (given the limited operation of s 60). 244. Director of Public Prosecutions v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3 at [50]; KH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 294 at [24]; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Garrett (2016) 257 A Crim R 509; [2016] VSCA 31 at [79]. 245. See Director of Public Prosecutions v Nair (2009) 170 ACTR 15; 236 FLR 239; [2009] ACTCA 17 at [43]. In Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57, Gaudron J said (at [65]) that “the primary consideration in determining whether leave should be granted to a party to cross-examine its own witness should be the legal character of the evidence which it is sought to elicit”, noting that the evidence in question in that case was regarded as potentially unreliable under s 165 and as hearsay under s 59. While Gaudron J was in dissent, such considerations may feed into the discretions in s 135 and s 137. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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exclusion is the appropriate course rather than a refusal of leave. An example of such a case is Tasmania v Mayne [2009] TASSC 82, where Porter J excluded evidence of previous representations by two witnesses ruled unfavourable, primarily on the basis that their claimed loss of memory (which, even if rejected, did not necessarily lead to an acceptance of the truth of the previous representations) precluded detailed cross-examination as to the facts asserted and those matters that adversely affected the probative value of the representations.247

[EA.38.180]

“question the witness as though the party were cross-examining the witness” (s 38(1))

In effect, this applies the provisions of Div 5 (Cross-examination) of Pt 2.1 to the questioning of the witness. Leading questions will, in general, be permitted (s 42).

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[EA.38.210]

“with the leave of the court, question the witness about matters relevant only to the witness’s credibility” (s 38(3))

In this context, s 55(2)(a) should be noted. It provides that “evidence is not taken to be irrelevant only because it relates only to … (a) the credibility of a witness”. As explained at [EA.55.120] and [EA.55.150], the function of s 55(2) is to make clear that evidence which relates only to one of the matters referred to in the provision is not necessarily irrelevant to a fact in issue. Thus, the mere fact that the “only” apparent relevance of an item of evidence is to the credibility of a witness does not mean that it is not relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding. Usually, the reverse will be true. Where a witness has testified in relation to some fact in issue, evidence relating to the credibility of the witness will indirectly affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the fact in issue. The important point in this context is that recognition that the evidence is indirectly relevant to a fact in issue does not mean that it will not be “relevant only to a witness’s credibility”. It is clear that the words “relevant only to the witness’s credibility” must be understood to mean “relevant to a fact in issue only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness”. However, in Odisho v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 19, the members of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal divided on the proper approach to the words “question the witness about matters relevant only to the witness’s credibility”. Price J held that questions of a witness (the victim of an assault) about the reasons why the witness changed his account in a previous statement was not relevant only to the victim’s credibility because “questions by the Crown of the victim about his 246. See, for example, Hawker v The Queen [2012] VSCA 219 at [40] (a case where the unfavourable witness had impaired cognitive capacity at the time of making the alleged prior statement). 247. However, in Director of Public Prosecutions v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3 , the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that, in the circumstances of that case (also one where the witness claimed loss of memory), the trial judge’s refusal of leave under this provision had miscarried. Tennent J (Crawford CJ and Evans J agreeing) rejected the trial judge’s conclusion that there could not be testing by cross-examination, observing at [46] that there could have been cross-examination “to establish that [his] memory was so affected by his drug use that even his statement to police was highly suspect”. However, the court focused on the refusal of leave and apparently left open the possibility of discretionary exclusion on a retrial.

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possible motives to change his position were necessarily indirectly relevant to the facts-in-issue” (at [10]). However, Bellew J disagreed, holding that while questioning “for the purposes of ‘shaking (the victim’s) credibility on the s 38(1) subjects” would not be caught by this provision, questioning that went further than that was (at [56]–[59]).248 Hamill J (in dissent) observed that questioning a witness (the victim of an assault) about a prior statement which implicated the defendant would not be relevant only to the credibility of the witness (at [157]) but that questioning the witness as to reasons why the witness changed his account to exculpate the defendant was caught by this provision (at [158]–[171]). The issue was, accordingly, unresolved, although it is suggested that the analysis of Hamill J was correct. Explaining the proposal for a requirement of leave in this context, the ALRC considered (ALRC 38, para 114) that: circumstances will vary – on the one hand a witness may fail to swear up to a proof of evidence because of bias and a full attack on credibility would be warranted; on the other hand the unfavourable evidence may not be of major importance and the proposed attack on credibility may be insignificant.

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For example, a “questioner is entitled to ask questions about matter going only to credibility with a view to shaking the witness’s credibility on” the subjects in s 38(1) in respect of which leave has been granted.249 In Power v The Queen [2014] VSCA 146, Redlich JA and Robson AJA in the Victorian Court of Appeal held that, while evidence of an alleged co-offender’s plea of guilty was relevant only to that co-offender’s credibility (in a case where the alleged co-offender was a prosecution witness), the prosecution could elicit the evidence because the witness had been declared unfavourable, his evidence was therefore “in issue”, and leave had been granted pursuant to this provision.250 It appears to have been assumed that this provision creates a general exception to the credibility exclusionary rule in s 102.251 However, although it is not stated explicitly, the better view is that s 38(3) does not affect questions of admissibility. That is, if the court gives leave, the questioning must be in accordance with Pt 3.7 of the Act. It is apparent that the purpose of s 38(3) was to impose a leave requirement on questioning that is permissible under Pt 3.7 – not to create a special open-ended exception to s 102. That is consistent with the purpose behind Chapter 2 in the Act. It does not deal with questions of admissibility, which are the province of Chapter 3, but procedural issues relating to the adducing of evidence (in this case testimonial evidence from an unfavourable witness). This 248. Bellew J held that cross-examination suggesting that the victim changed his account because he feared for his safety did not require leave, while cross-examination suggesting he changed his account because he was angry at the police did. Bellew J justified this curious analysis on the basis of the judgment of Heydon JA in R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186 but, as Bellew J noted at [55], Heydon JA did not make specific reference to this provision when discussing a grant of leave under s 38(1). Bellew J held that, although some of the cross-examination in this case required leave pursuant to s 38(3), the appeal should be dismissed on the basis that the failure to grant leave did not result in a miscarriage of justice. 249. R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474; 130 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 186 at [67] per Heydon JA. 250. Power v The Queen [2014] VSCA 146 at [16], [43]–[53]. Priest JA dissented (at [189]–[190]). 251. See Power v The Queen [2014] VSCA 146 at [44], [46], [51]–[53]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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provision imposes an additional leave requirement over and above the rules of admissibility in Pt 3.7 for the purpose of ensuring that questioning is not permitted where the unfavourable evidence is “not … of major importance and the proposed attack on credibility may be insignificant”.252 The fact that a prosecutor wishes to ask questions tending to discredit a prosecution witness is not unfair to the defendant or inconsistent with the general principle that the Crown is obliged to call all relevant witnesses in its case unless the prosecutor concludes that the witness is not credible or truthful.253 Accordingly, it is not appropriate to refuse leave on that basis.

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[EA.38.240]

“questioning … before the other parties cross-examine … unless the court otherwise directs” (s 38(4))

While s 38(6) requires the court to take into account a number of matters in deciding whether to make such a direction, s 192 deals with the giving of directions generally and permits the court to give a direction “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. In a criminal proceeding, where the prosecution calls a witness at the request of the defence although the evidence of the witness is anticipated to be unfavourable to the prosecution case, it would be appropriate for the court to direct that cross-examination by the defence take place immediately after the prosecution calls the witness (eliciting name and address) and then give leave to the prosecution to cross-examine the witness.254 Equally, a direction may be appropriate where unfavourable material emerges during cross-examination by another party (see [EA.38.270]). Other circumstances may arise where a court will make a direction under this provision notwithstanding that cross-examination by other parties has occurred.255

[EA.38.270]

Unfavourable material emerging during cross-examination

Evidence unfavourable to the party that called the witness may emerge in the course of cross-examination. If leave were granted, the party who called the witness would re-examine the witness under s 39 and seek the leave of the court under s 38(1) to question the witness as though in cross-examination. There is no doubt that if circumstances arise during cross-examination of the witness which could not fairly have been predicted, it will often be appropriate to grant leave.256 In deciding whether to grant leave, the trial judge is required (s 192) to take into account “the extent to which to do so would be unfair to a party or to a witness”. It has been held that leave should not be granted where the witness’ 252. If that analysis is correct, and assuming the evidence did fall within the definition of “credibility evidence” (see [EA.101A.120]), the critical question was whether there was an applicable exception in Part 3.7 for such evidence, when elicited to support the credibility of the prosecution witness (as it was in Power). One possible exception would be s 108(1), but that would only permit the evidence to be admitted in re-examination. 253. Lane v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 317; [2013] NSWCCA 317 at [161]–[168]. 254. R v Milat (unreported, NSW SC, 22 April 1996); R v Kingswell [1998] NSWSC 412, p 15. 255. See, for example, NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2011] NSWSC 203. 256. R v Pantoja (No 1) (unreported, NSW SC, 30 October 1996). On appeal it was held that it had not been shown that the trial judge erred in granting leave to cross-examine: R v Pantoja

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evidence-in-chief made it predictable that unfavourable evidence would emerge in cross-examination.257 However, in R v Parkes (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that there was no unfairness in the Crown deferring an application under s 38 until after cross-examination by the defence. The Crown Prosecutor knew that a witness called by the Crown was likely to give unfavourable evidence on a particular issue, after eliciting evidence from the witness on other issues, deliberately refrained from asking about the unfavourable evidence, and when it emerged in cross-examination, made an application under s 38. The Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that there was no unfairness. It was argued that, had the defendant known that a s 38 application was to be made after the witness’ cross-examination, the defendant would have conducted his case differently. However, counsel for the defendant did not suggest how the case could have been differently run, and Ipp JA in the Court of Criminal Appeal could not “think of anything that Counsel for the appellant might have done differently, in any material way”. He added (at [81]–[85]): It may be argued that some unfairness lay in the fact that the Crown, by the procedure it adopted, obtained the best of both worlds, a result far removed from the situation that would have obtained under traditional adversarial processes. But s 38 does have the potential for transforming the traditional procedure; this lies at the very heart of the section. Accordingly, it seems to me, the mere fact that this actually occurred and the Crown was allowed to cross-examine on evidence brought out in cross-examination by the defendant, startling as it may seem to those brought up on more old-fashioned ways, is not enough to constitute unfair manipulation. … I see nothing in the section that prohibits, expressly or impliedly, the course that the Crown adopted. What in fact occurred was that the Crown was allowed to cross-examine [the witness] and water down the effect of the evidence he had given. There was nothing unfair in the cross-examination. The result was that a truer picture of the situation was presented to the jury than would have been the case had the Crown been refused leave to cross-examine. This is the very purpose underlying s 38. … Accordingly, I have come to the conclusion that, although the deliberate decisions taken by the Crown have to be classified as falling into the basket of forensic tactics, they did not lead to the Crown’s application under s 38 being an abuse of the section.

See also Hulme J (at [138]–[140]). The approach taken by Ipp JA was endorsed in Burrell v The Queen (2007) 190 A Crim R 148; [2007] NSWCCA 65 at [246]. In a subsequent rehearing of the Burrell appeal (Burrell v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 163) the Court of Criminal Appeal emphasised (unreported, NSW CCA, Wood CJ at CL, James, Adams JJ, 5 November 1998) per James J (p 52), Wood CJ at CL agreeing. However, Adams J suggested that he might not have granted leave on the basis that the Crown prosecutor had adduced evidence-in-chief which he knew was unlikely to be reliable. 257. R v Mansour (unreported, NSW SC, Levine J, 19 November 1996). See also R v Kingswell [1998] NSWSC 412. In the latter case, Studdert J at pp 15–16, Hidden J agreeing, considered that leave should not be given where the prosecution anticipated that the witness would not testify in accordance with a prior statement (although, in examination-in-chief, the witness did so testify, only giving a different account in defence cross-examination). Smart J took the contrary view, on what appears to be the persuasive basis that “the Crown cannot be expected to explore [in examination-in-chief] avenues which would enable [the witness] to depart from his earlier statement”. Bearing in mind that the court could permit further defence crossexamination, there is much to be said for an approach allowing the prosecution crossexamination in such circumstances. See also R v Reardon (2002) 186 FLR 1; [2002] NSWCCA 203 at [2]–[38]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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the discretionary nature of the grant of leave and the particular circumstances of the case.258 Bearing in mind “the need to ensure that all relevant evidence was available to the jury”, it may be appropriate to grant leave even if the party calling the witness could reasonably anticipate the cross-examination that elicited the unfavourable evidence, if the evidence in question is important and the opponent will have a further opportunity to cross-examine.259 Where leave is granted, the court would have to direct that this questioning could take place despite the fact that it occurs after cross-examination by other parties: s 38(4), (5). Further cross-examination by other parties may subsequently be allowed (with re-examination limited by ss 37 and 39).260

[EA.38.300]

Advance ruling

Section 192A permits an advance ruling on the question whether leave should be given under s 192 and this provision to allow questioning of a witness as though in cross-examination. As Curtain J said in Director of Public Prosecutions v McRae [2010] VSC 114 at [20]: “[s]ection 38 applies in circumstances where it may be anticipated that the witness will be unfavourable”.261

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[EA.38.330]

Jury warning

In a jury trial it may be necessary for the court to warn the jury regarding the evidence of a witness who has been ruled unfavourable under s 38: see s 165.262 However, there is no requirement to warn a jury simply because a witness was cross-examined pursuant to this provision.263 It is not obligatory for the jury to be informed that a ruling has been made under this provision.264 If the jury is informed of this ruling, “care should be taken to avoid the possibility of any implication that the mere making of the ruling is an adverse reflection on the creditworthiness of the witness”.265

258. The Court held that the mere possibility that the defence would follow the same line of cross-examination it had followed in an earlier trial did not require the Crown to deal with that possible issue in chief: at [198]. Similarly, if the witness has given favourable evidence in chief, the mere possibility that unfavourable evidence would be given under defence crossexamination did not require an application under this provision during examination-in-chief. 259. Burrell v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 163 at [212]. 260. R v Milat (unreported, NSW SC, 23 April 1996). 261. See also R v SH (2011) 6 ACTLR 1; [2011] ACTSC 198 at [25]. 262. See also R v Lee (unreported, NSW CCA, Cole JA, Dowd, Sperling JJ, 5 May 1997); R v Lozano (unreported, NSW CCA, Hunt CJ at CL, Sperling, Barr JJ, 10 June 1997). 263. Lee v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 259 at [42] (Grove J, Spigelman CJ and McClellan CJ at CL agreeing). 264. Lee v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 259 at [38] (Grove J, Spigelman CJ and McClellan CJ at CL agreeing). 265. Lee v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 259 at [38] (Grove J, Spigelman CJ and McClellan CJ at CL agreeing).

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Cth Act: 39 Limits on re-examination On re-examination: (a) a witness may be questioned about matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination; and (b) other questions may not be put to the witness unless the court gives leave. NSW Act: 39

Limits on re-examination On re-examination: (a) a witness may be questioned about matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination, and (b) other questions may not be put to the witness unless the court gives leave.

Vic Act:

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39

Limits on re-examination On re-examination— (a) a witness may be questioned about matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination; and (b) other questions may not be put to the witness unless the court gives leave.

ACT Act: 39

Limits on re-examination On re-examination— (a) a witness may be questioned about matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination; and (b) other questions may not be put to the witness unless the court gives leave.

NT Act: 39

Limits on re-examination On re-examination: (a) a witness may be questioned about matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination; and (b) other questions may not be put to the witness unless the court gives leave.

[EA.39.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 42, paras 117–118; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 628–629.

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General comments

The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 628–629): As at present, re-examination will be limited to matters arising in cross-examination. At times it is argued that re-examination is restricted to clearing up ambiguities. This not so: Re-examination is permissible in every case where the answers or account given in cross-examination would, if left unexplained, or uncompleted, not constitute the whole truth. It is proposed to set out the latter view in the legislation. The party re-examining the witness is permitted, to a limited extent, to question the witness for the purpose of eliciting evidence which may not have been admissible in evidence in chief because it was, for example, relevant only to the credibility of the witness. This is permitted under existing law.

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It is important to note that this provision recognises that “re-examination” under this Act is not limited to questions “about matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination” (s 39(a)). Under para (b), it is implicit that “other questions” may be put to the witness if the court gives leave. To give one example, where an attack has been made on the credibility of the witness in cross-examination, evidence supporting the credibility of the witness might be elicited with the leave of the court in re-examination, even if such evidence were not properly described as evidence “arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination” (for further discussion of para (b), see [EA.39.150]).

[EA.39.90] Definitions “Re-examination” is defined in cl 2 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary: (3) A reference in this Act to re-examination of a witness is a reference to the questioning of a witness by the party who called the witness to give evidence, being questioning (other than further examination in chief with the leave of the court) conducted after the cross-examination of the witness by another party. (4) If a party has recalled a witness who has already given evidence, a reference in this Act to re-examination of a witness does not include a reference to the questioning of the witness by that party before the witness is questioned by another party.

“Witness” is defined in the Dictionary to include a party in civil proceedings, and a defendant in criminal proceedings, who has been called to give evidence. “Cross-examination” is defined in cl 2 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary: (2) A reference in this Act to cross-examination of a witness is a reference to the questioning of a witness by a party other than the party who called the witness to give evidence.

Questioning a witness called by a party “as though the party were crossexamining the witness” under s 38(1) is not (s 38(2)) taken to be crossexamination for the purposes of s 39. 212

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[EA.39.120]

“matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination”

Under the common law, re-examination is confined to matters arising out of cross-examination266 – where cross-examination has left an inaccurate, incomplete or unclear picture.267 The re-examination will be permitted to qualify or explain the evidence of the witness in cross-examination.268 This may extend to subjective considerations going to the mental state of the witness at the time of giving the answer in cross-examination.269 The position is the same under this provision.270 It has been observed that:

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[T]he purpose of re-examination is not merely to remove ambiguities and uncertainties, but it is allowed whenever an answer in cross-examination would, unless supplemented or explained, leave the court with an impression of the facts, whether facts in issue or facts relating to credibility, which is capable of being construed unfavourably to the party calling the witness and which represents a distortion or incomplete account of the truth as the witness is able to present it.271

A matter is not one “arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination” where, “in cross-examination, the witness merely confirms or repeats a matter addressed in his evidence in chief, or in the evidence of another witness for the same party, without materially adding to it”.272 In that situation, “the question is about a matter arising, originally, out of the witness’s evidence in chief or previous evidence, rather than evidence given in cross-examination”.273 It follows that it could have been dealt with during the witness’s evidence in chief and, even if leave is sought under para (b), this may not be forthcoming because the cross-examiner may have adopted a forensic strategy different from that which would have been adopted if the evidence had been given in chief. 266. R v Lavery (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 at 435; R v Szach [1980] 2 A Crim R 270; (1980) 23 SASR 504 at 568; R v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 (CCA). 267. Thus, in R v Clune (1999) 72 SASR 420 at [118], it was pointed out by Olsson J that re-examination may arise from the evidence of the witness as a whole, viewed at the conclusion of cross-examination. 268. R v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563; 159 A Crim R 327; [2005] VSCA 288 at [49]–[51]. 269. Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] NSWSC 765 (23 June 1999) at [5] per Hamilton J. 270. Hadid v Australis Media Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 5 November 1996); Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] NSWSC 765 at [5] per Hamilton J; Welsh v Carnival PLC (t/as Carnival Australia) (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1270 at [6]–[8]. But compare Schipp v Cameron (No 2) (1997) 38 ATR 1. In Drabsch, Hamilton J stated (at [7]): “Whilst modern authority rejects the proposition that re-examination is limited to clarifications and explanations of ambiguities, it may be that it is correct that, where the question in re-examination is put upon the basis of making a necessary clarification or explanation, and it appears to the Court that there is no lack of clarity or ambiguity, then the question may be rejected, particularly if the result of allowing it may well be that the Judge would feel obliged in his or her discretion to allow considerable further cross examination as a result of the answers.” 271. Hadid v Australis Media Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 5 November 1996), Sperling J citing Cross on Evidence, para 17605. He stated that re-examination would not be permitted in relation to a matter raised in cross-examination simply on the basis that “the whole of the facts relating to the matter had not been given in the answers adduced in cross-examination”. 272. ASIC v Rich [2005] NSWSC 1015, Austin J at [19]. 273. ASIC v Rich [2005] NSWSC 1015, Austin J at [19]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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“unless the court gives leave”

Under para (b), it is implicit that questions that are not “about matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination” may be put to the witness in re-examination if the court gives leave. To give one example, where an attack has been made on the credibility of the witness in cross-examination, evidence supporting the credibility of the witness might be elicited with the leave of the court in re-examination, even if such evidence were not properly described as evidence “arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination” (it might more accurately be described as evidence arising out of the nature of the cross-examination). It would be appropriate to grant leave bearing in mind that credibility evidence relating to a witness is, for the most part, not admissible through examination-in-chief of the witness – the evidence is caught by the “credibility rule” in s 102 and exceptions created in Pt 3.7 for evidence supporting the credibility of a witness are limited (see s 108).

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Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(1)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.274 Relevant considerations would include any forensic disadvantage suffered by the cross-examiner in having to conduct cross-examination without the evidence having been adduced in chief. Of course, if the evidence in question could not have been adduced in chief (see [EA.39.210]), the argument for a grant of leave would be strong. If re-examination is permitted under this provision, it would be appropriate to permit further cross-examination on the matters which are the subject of re-examination.

[EA.39.180]

Destructive re-examination

Difficulties arise where the purpose of the re-examination is “to destroy the effect of the answers given in cross-examination”.275 Re-examination to undermine the credibility of favourable character evidence elicited from a prosecution witness in cross-examination has been described as being open to the following “fundamental criticism”: The re-examination was not designed to remove ambiguities or uncertainties in the previous evidence of the witness, nor to give the witness an opportunity to explain an answer previously given. Rather, the sole purpose was to destroy the effect of the answers given in cross-examination.276

While the implicit formulation of the limits of permissible re-examination might be regarded as somewhat narrow, the point remains that, if the party who called the witness is in substance seeking to undermine the credibility of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination, the appropriate provision to be relied upon is 274. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. 275. Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373 per Barr and Hall JJ at [219]. 276. Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373 per Barr and Hall JJ at [219].

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[EA.39.270]

s 38, not s 39 (see [EA.39.300] below). Section 38 permits, with the leave of the court, cross-examination (by leading questions: contrast s 37(1); [EA.39.270]) and questioning designed to undermine the credibility of the witness.

[EA.39.210]

Otherwise inadmissible evidence may be adduced

Evidence allowed on this basis will be admissible even if it would have been irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible when examination-in-chief took place. Thus, for example, cross-examination on a prior inconsistent statement in a document may permit re-examination regarding other statements in the document which explain or qualify the apparent inconsistency.277 Similarly, where crossexamination has sought to discredit a witness, evidence may be elicited in re-examination in order to re-establish the witness’s credit. For example, an allegation of recent invention of testimony made in cross-examination will permit evidence of an earlier consistent statement to be adduced in re-examination: see s 108.

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[EA.39.240]

“questioned”

This provision is limited to questioning of the witness who has been cross-examined. Thus it does not in terms permit other evidence to be adduced – whether from other witnesses or in the form of documentary evidence. However, it is suggested that this provision should not be regarded as codifying the law relating to re-examination. Under the common law, cross-examination of a witness may permit the party who called the witness to call other witnesses to qualify or explain matters that have emerged in cross-examination.278 Similarly, documentary evidence (which is otherwise inadmissible) may be admitted into evidence on the same basis.279 Section 45(3) has been held to apply in these circumstances.280 It is also possible that such other evidence may be admissible under Ch 3 of the Act (see, for example, [EA.108.90]). Even if that is not correct, however, the common law in this area should be regarded as continuing to operate (pursuant to s 8 of the Commonwealth Act and s 9 of the NSW/Victorian Acts).

[EA.39.270]

Leading questions

Re-examination is subject to the same rules regarding leading questions as examination in chief: see s 37. Usually, leave would be granted under s 37(1)(a) for leading questions to bring the witness to the area of cross-examination which requires explanation. 277. As under the common law: Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104; Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 409; Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509. 278. R v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723. 279. Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104; Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509; Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323; Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) [1987] 8 NSWLR 398 at 408–409; R v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723. 280. See Visscher v Maritime Union of Australia (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 1572 at [5]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Unfavourable witnesses

Evidence unfavourable to the party that called the witness may emerge in the course of cross-examination. The party who called the witness would re-examine the witness under s 39 and seek the leave of the court under s 38(1) to question the witness as though in cross-examination. The court would have to direct that this questioning could take place despite the fact that it occurs after cross-examination by other parties: s 38(4) and (5).

DIVISION 5 – CROSS-EXAMINATION DIVISION 2.1.5 – CROSS-EXAMINATION (ACT ONLY)

[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.Div.5.30] Summary of this Division This Division deals with procedural rules relating to the cross-examination of a witness called by another party to the proceeding.

Cth Act: Witness called in error A party is not to cross-examine a witness who has been called in error by another party and has not been questioned by that other party about a matter relevant to a question to be determined in the proceeding. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

40

NSW Act: 40

Witness called in error A party is not to cross-examine a witness who has been called in error by another party and has not been questioned by that other party about a matter relevant to a question to be determined in the proceeding. Vic Act: 40

Witness called in error A party is not to cross-examine a witness who has been called in error by another party and has not been questioned by that other party about a matter relevant to a question to be determined in the proceeding. ACT Act: 40

Witness called in error A party must not cross-examine a witness who has been called in error by another party and has not been questioned by the other party about a matter relevant to a question to be decided in the proceeding.

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[EA.40.60]

NT Act: 40 Witness called in error A party is not to cross-examine a witness who has been called in error by another party and has not been questioned by that other party about a matter relevant to a question to be determined in the proceeding.

[EA.40.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 43, para 115(a); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 298–299.

[EA.40.60] General comments The ALRC explained the rationale behind this provision (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 630): A party should be free to withdraw a witness if the party decides that it was mistaken in calling the witness, provided that no evidence-in-chief has been given. The adverse party can always call the witness.

However, the general principle is that a witness called by a party can be cross-examined by another party on any matter relevant to an issue in the proceedings.281

Cth Act: Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

41

Improper questions

(1) The court must disallow a question put to a witness in crossexamination, or inform the witness that it need not be answered, if the court is of the opinion that the question (referred to as a disallowable question): (a) is misleading or confusing; or (b) is unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive; or (c) is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate; or (d) has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the witness’s sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability). (2) Without limiting the matters the court may take into account for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to take into account: (a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the witness of which the court is, or is made, aware, including age, education, ethnic and cultural background, gender, language background and skills, level of maturity and understanding and personality; and (b) any mental, intellectual or physical disability of which the court is, or is made, aware and to which the witness is, or appears to be, subject; and 281. Prentice v Cummins (No 6) (2003) 203 ALR 449; [2003] FCA 1002 at [25]–[28] per Sackville J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(c)

s 41

the context in which the question is put, including: (i) the nature of the proceeding; and (ii) in a criminal proceeding—the nature of the offence to which the proceeding relates; and (iii) the relationship (if any) between the witness and any other party to the proceeding.

(3) A question is not a disallowable question merely because: (a) the question challenges the truthfulness of the witness or the consistency or accuracy of any statement made by the witness; or (b) the question requires the witness to discuss a subject that could be considered distasteful to, or private by, the witness. (4) A party may object to a question put to a witness on the ground that it is a disallowable question. (5) However, the duty imposed on the court by this section applies whether or not an objection is raised to a particular question. (6) A failure by the court to disallow a question under this section, or to inform the witness that it need not be answered, does not affect the admissibility in evidence of any answer given by the witness in response to the question. Note: A person must not, without the express permission of a court, print or publish any question that the court has disallowed under this section: see section 195. [S 41 subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 13]

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NSW Act: 41

Improper questions

(1) The court must disallow a question put to a witness in crossexamination, or inform the witness that it need not be answered, if the court is of the opinion that the question (referred to as a disallowable question): (a) is misleading or confusing, or (b) is unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive, or (c) is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate, or (d) has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the witness’s sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability). (2) Without limiting the matters the court may take into account for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to take into account: (a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the witness of which the court is, or is made, aware, including age, education, ethnic and cultural background, gender, language background and skills, level of maturity and understanding and personality, and (b) any mental, intellectual or physical disability of which the court is, or is made, aware and to which the witness is, or appears to be, subject, and (c) the context in which the question is put, including: 218

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(i) the nature of the proceeding, and (ii) in a criminal proceeding—the nature of the offence to which the proceeding relates, and (iii) the relationship (if any) between the witness and any other party to the proceeding. (3) A question is not a disallowable question merely because: (a) the question challenges the truthfulness of the witness or the consistency or accuracy of any statement made by the witness, or (b) the question requires the witness to discuss a subject that could be considered distasteful to, or private by, the witness. (4) A party may object to a question put to a witness on the ground that it is a disallowable question. (5) However, the duty imposed on the court by this section applies whether or not an objection is raised to a particular question. (6) A failure by the court to disallow a question under this section, or to inform the witness that it need not be answered, does not affect the admissibility in evidence of any answer given by the witness in response to the question. Note: A person must not, without the express permission of a court, print or publish any question that the court has disallowed under this section—see section 195. [S 41 subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; am Act 25 of 2005, s 4 and Sch 2.3]

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Vic Act: 41

Improper questions

(1) The court may disallow an improper question or improper questioning put to a witness in cross-examination, or inform the witness that it need not be answered. (2) The court must disallow an improper question or improper questioning put to a vulnerable witness in cross-examination, or inform the witness that it need not be answered, unless the court is satisfied that, in all the relevant circumstances of the case, it is necessary for the question to be put. (3) In this section, improper question or improper questioning means a question or a sequence of questions put to a witness that— (a) is misleading or confusing; or (b) is unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive; or (c) is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate; or (d) has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the witness’s sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability). (4) For the purposes of subsection (2) a witness is a vulnerable witness if the witness— (a) is under the age of 18 years; or (b) has a cognitive impairment or an intellectual disability; or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(c)

s 41

is a witness whom the court considers to be vulnerable having regard to— (i) any relevant condition or characteristic of the witness of which the court is, or is made aware, including age, education, ethnic and cultural background, gender, language background and skills, level of maturity and understanding and personality; and (ii) any mental or physical disability of which the court is, or is made, aware and to which the witness is, or appears to be, subject; and (iii) the context in which the question is put, including— (A) the nature of the proceeding; and (B) in a criminal proceeding—the nature of the offence to which the proceeding relates; and (C) the relationship (if any) between the witness and any other party to the proceeding.

(5) A question is not an improper question merely because— (a) the question challenges the truthfulness of the witness or the consistency or accuracy of any statement made by the witness; or (b) the question requires the witness to discuss a subject that could be considered distasteful to, or private by, the witness.

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(6) A party may object to a question put to a witness on the ground that it is an improper question. (7) However, the duty imposed on the court by this section applies whether or not an objection is raised to a particular question. (8) A failure by the court to disallow a question under this section, or to inform the witness that it need not be answered, does not affect the admissibility in evidence of any answer given by the witness in response to the question. Notes: 1 A person must not, without the express permission of a court, print or publish any question that the court has disallowed under this section—see section 195. 2 Section 41 differs from the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act.

ACT Act: 41

Improper questions

(1) The court must disallow a question put to a witness in crossexamination, or tell the witness that it need not be answered, if the court is of the opinion that the question (a disallowable question)— (a) is misleading or confusing; or (b) is unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive; or (c) is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate; or (d) has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the witness’s sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability). 220

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Note: An example is part of the Act, is not exhaustive and may extend, but does not limit, the meaning of the provision in which it appears (see Legislation Act, s 126 and s 132).

(2) Without limiting the matters the court may take into account for subsection (1), it must take into account— (a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the witness of which the court is, or is made, aware, including age, education, ethnic and cultural background, gender, language background and skills, level of maturity and understanding and personality; and (b) any mental, intellectual or physical disability of which the court is, or is made, aware and to which the witness is, or appears to be, subject; and (c) the context in which the question is put, including— (i) the nature of the proceeding; and (ii) in a criminal proceeding—the nature of the offence to which the proceeding relates; and (iii) the relationship (if any) between the witness and any other party to the proceeding.

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(3) A question is not a disallowable question only because— (a) the question challenges the truthfulness of the witness or the consistency or accuracy of any statement made by the witness; or (b) the question requires the witness to discuss a subject that could be considered distasteful to, or private by, the witness. (4) A party may object to a question put to a witness on the ground that it is a disallowable question. (5) However, the duty imposed on the court by this section applies whether or not an objection is raised to a particular question. (6) A failure by the court to disallow a question under this section, or to tell the witness that it need not be answered, does not affect the admissibility in evidence of any answer given by the witness in response to the question. Note: A person must not, without the express permission of the court, print or publish any question that the court has disallowed under this section (see s 195).

NT Act: 41

Improper questions

(1) The court may disallow an improper question or improper questioning put to a witness in cross-examination, or inform the witness that it need not be answered. (2) The court must disallow an improper question or improper questioning put to a vulnerable witness in cross-examination, or inform the witness that it need not be answered, unless the court is satisfied that, in all the relevant circumstances of the case, it is necessary for the question to be put. (3) In this section: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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improper question or improper questioning means a question or a sequence of questions put to a witness that: (a) is misleading or confusing; or (b) is unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive; or (c) is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate; or (d) has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the witness’s sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability). (4) For the purposes of subsection (2), a witness is a vulnerable witness if the witness: (a) is under the age of 18 years; or (b) has a cognitive impairment or an intellectual disability; or (c) is a witness whom the court considers to be vulnerable having regard to: (i) any relevant condition or characteristic of the witness of which the court is, or is made aware, including age, education, ethnic and cultural background, gender, language background and skills, level of maturity and understanding and personality; and (ii) any mental or physical disability of which the court is, or is made, aware and to which the witness is, or appears to be, subject; and (iii) the context in which the question is put, including: (A) the nature of the proceeding; and (B) in a criminal proceeding — the nature of the offence to which the proceeding relates; and (C) the relationship (if any) between the witness and any other party to the proceeding. (5) A question is not an improper question merely because: (a) the question challenges the truthfulness of the witness or the consistency or accuracy of any statement made by the witness; or (b) the question requires the witness to discuss a subject that could be considered distasteful to, or private by, the witness. (6) A party may object to a question put to a witness on the ground that it is an improper question. (7) However, the duty imposed on the court by this section applies whether or not an objection is raised to a particular question. (8) A failure by the court to disallow a question under this section, or to inform the witness that it need not be answered, does not affect the admissibility in evidence of any answer given by the witness in response to the question. Notes for section 41: 1 A person must not, without the express permission of a court, print or publish any question that the court has disallowed under this section — see section 195. 2 Section 41 differs from the Commonwealth Act and NSW Act.

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[EA.41.30]

[EA.41.90]

ALRC references

ALRC 102, paras 5.70–5.132; ALRC 38, s 44, paras 115(b), 116(a); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 300–301, 631.

[EA.41.60] Differences between the provisions The principal differences between the provisions are: • The Commonwealth/NSW/ACT provision deals only with an improper “question” (referred to as “a disallowable question”) while the Victorian/NT provision also deals with “improper questioning” (defined in s 41(3) to mean “a sequence of questions”). • The Commonwealth/NSW/ACT provision defines an improper (“disallowable”) question in terms of the court’s “opinion” that it falls into a specified category (and requires the court to take into account the matters specified in s 41(2) in forming that opinion), while the Victorian/NT provision defines “an improper question or improper questioning” simply in terms of those categories.

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• The Commonwealth/NSW/ACT general provision in s 41(1) is mandatory (“must”), in contrast with the comparable Victorian/NT provision (“may”). However, the Victorian/NT provision creates a special category of improper questioning of a “vulnerable witness” (defined in s 41(4)) where the court “must” act “unless the court is satisfied that … it is necessary for the question to be put”.

[EA.41.90] General comments [Commonwealth/NSW/ ACT Acts only] As noted above at [EA.40.60], the general principle is that a witness called by a party can be cross-examined by another party on any matter relevant to an issue in the proceedings. It is a fundamental principle of adversarial litigation that a party’s cross-examination of an opponent’s witness is not confined to the matters addressed by that witness in evidence in chief.282 However, Chapter 3 operates to limit cross-examination to admissible evidence. In addition, s 26 confers a general power on the court to control the way in which witnesses are to be questioned. This provision requires the court to disallow “improper” questions. This provision was amended in accordance with the recommendation in ALRC 102 that s 275A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), which applied to cross-examination in criminal proceedings, should be adopted for both civil and criminal proceedings. In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 5.114: The ALRC and the NSWLRC are persuaded that s 275A of the Criminal Procedure Act provides a comprehensive model for the protection of all witness from improper cross-examination. As well as imposing a duty to disallow improper questions for all witnesses, it sets out a more comprehensive and detailed list of questions that are inappropriate. Whilst it is true that these types of questions could (and should) already be disallowed under s 41, submissions and consultations indicate clearly that the section is currently under utilised. Explicit reference to these types of questions may 282. Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 36) [2014] VSC 82 at [15]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.41.100]

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serve to bring them to judicial attention and provide greater guidance as to how the discretion to limit cross-examination should be exercised.

The ALRC considered that the provision was “designed to prevent crossexamination that is improper and will not unduly hamper the trial techniques of advocates” (ALRC 102, para 5.116). The provision is mandatory (“must” not “may”) and a court must apply it even if no objection is taken to the question (s 41(5)). However, the Commonwealth/ NSW/ACT provision defines an improper (“disallowable”) question in terms of the court’s “opinion” that it falls into a specified category. It follows that the Commonwealth/NSW/ACT provision recognises the subjective nature of the determination (with important implications for appellate review) and the extent to which it is a matter of degree. Further, while a court must disallow a question if it is of the opinion that it is “misleading or confusing” (s 41(1)(a)), the adjectives listed in s 41(1)(b) are preceded by the word “unduly” (see [EA.41.240]).

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It may be noted that this provision, in contrast with the Victorian provision, refers only to a disallowable “question” and makes no express allowance for improper “questioning”. The VLRC recommended the addition of the plural reference to allow a court to intervene in a situation where individual questions are not misleading or confusing, but the order in which they are put is misleading or confusing (see ALRC 102 at para 5.122). However, the better view would be that this provision can deal with such a situation. It would only become apparent that the order in which questions are put is misleading or confusing after one or more proper questions had been asked. It would be the next question that would result in a witness being misled or confused and that question could be dealt with under this provision. There is an increasing tendency for the courts to utilise this provision where the witness is a young child.283

[EA.41.100]

General comments [Vic/NT Acts only]

In ALRC 102, the Victorian Law Reform Commission dissented from the views of the ALRC and NSWLR regarding amendment of this provision and proposed a provision that differed in a number of ways. At paras 5.119 – 5.123 it was stated: The VLRC differs from the other Commissions for several reasons. First, the VLRC believes that it is important to retain the discretion of the trial judge to disallow inappropriate questions, while at the same time introducing a mandatory requirement to protect witnesses who are particularly vulnerable. … A further point of difference from the current NSW provision is that the VLRC model makes provision for both improper questions and improper questioning. This would allow the court to intervene in the 283. As regards the literature on the cross-examination of children, see, for example, Spencer JR and Flin R, The Evidence of Children: The Law and the Psychology (London, Blackstone Press, 1993); Spencer JR and Lamb ME, Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). See also Henderson, “All the proper protections – The Court of Appeal rewrites the rules for the cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses” [2014] Crim LR S29. The Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal observed in GO v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 132 at [81](d) that a cross-examiner of a “child witnesses is expected to conduct his or her cross-examination in a manner appropriate to the age and capacity of the child. Where a child exhibits difficulties during the course of the cross-examination, counsel must do what they can, consistently with their duties to the court and their client to minimise any trauma to the child.”

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situation where individual questions are not misleading or confusing, but the order in which they are put is misleading or confusing. Finally, while the VLRC is not persuaded that the duty should be of general application, it maintains that additional protection must be given by the courts to vulnerable witnesses.

Substantially the same points are made in the Explanatory Memorandum: The adoption, in Victoria, of a two step approach recognises the capacity of the court to control proceedings by enabling regulation of the questioning of all witnesses, without unduly interfering with the trial process. It also acknowledges, however, that special protection is required for vulnerable witnesses and the mandatory obligation to consider all relevant circumstances is designed to facilitate a positive culture of judicial intervention for these witnesses.

It may be noted that the VLRC proposed at para 5.121 that an “improper question or questioning” should be defined as a question or questioning “that is unfair to the witness because” it fell within one of the categories in s 41(3). This requirement of “unfairness to the witness” has not been included in the provision, although it will no doubt still be a matter considered by the courts in the exercise of the discretionary aspects of the provision.

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While the general approach of the Victorian provision is to confer in s 41(1) an explicit discretion on the court to disallow improper questions (the “court may disallow”), s 41(2) creates a special category of improper questioning of a “vulnerable witness”, defined in s 41(4). The VLRC explained at paras 5.125 – 5.126 the approach it had taken to the definition of a “vulnerable person”: The model put forward by the VLRC defines vulnerable witness to make it clear that persons under the age of 18 and persons with a cognitive impairment are to be regarded as vulnerable. This will prevent argument about whether or not the judicial duty applies when the witness is a child or a person with a cognitive impairment. However, the proposed provision will also impose a duty on the judicial officer in relation to other witnesses who may be found to be vulnerable because of other factors. … This model removes the need for argument as to whether a witness is vulnerable in the most obvious of cases, while leaving scope for a witness to be treated as a vulnerable witness in other circumstances. A witness may be vulnerable not because of any inherent attribute he or she may have, but because of the circumstances of the particular offence or a relationship to other parties to the proceedings. Conversely, a witness may not be vulnerable simply because he or she is the victim of a certain type of offence. Judges, therefore, must be given some capacity to find a witness vulnerable for the purposes of limiting cross-examination based on the particular circumstances of the case.

Section 41(2) provides that the court “must” disallow “an improper question or improper questioning put to a vulnerable witness in cross-examination” (or inform the witness that it need not be answered) but this obligation is significantly qualified by the succeeding words of the provision: “unless the court is satisfied that, in all the relevant circumstances of the case, it is necessary for the question to be put”. In ALRC 102, the VLRC explained this qualification at para 5.127: The VLRC considers that the best way to address any issue of unfairness to a party is to provide a mechanism for determining the appropriate limits on cross-examination which focuses on the central issues. It proposes that that the section allow the court not to enforce the section provided it is satisfied in the circumstances that it is necessary that the question be put. The onus will be placed upon the party questioning to justify © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 41

the questioning by demonstrating that it is necessary. This means that the imposition of a duty will not totally remove the judge’s discretion to decide but will require the judge to intervene unless it can be shown by the questioner that the manner of questioning is necessary. The VLRC also believes that this will reduce the scope and opportunity for successful challenges to the judge’s application of the duty.

However, the question arises: “necessary” for what purpose or purposes? Little assistance is provided in the commentary by the VLRC but, presumably, the concept turns on broad conceptions of justice. Considerations of a “fair trial”, the function of cross-examination in “testing” a case and, in criminal trials, the public interest in minimising the risk of convicting an innocent person should all inform the assessment of what is “necessary”. Yet, the difficulty remains that it is very hard to imagine any circumstances where it would ever be “necessary” to ask a question that is “misleading or confusing” or “unduly annoying”, etc, or “put in a manner or tone that … is inappropriate”. Similarly, it is hard to imagine that it would ever be necessary to ask a question that incorporates an unjustifiable generalisation (see [1.2.3812] below).

[EA.41.120]

“(a) misleading or confusing” (s 41(1)(a)/s 41(3)(a))

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A question may be misleading or confusing regardless of who is being questioned. It may, for example, not accurately state a fact (such as the content of evidence already admitted into the trial) or involve illogical reasoning. However, as is explicit in the Commonwealth/NSW/ACT provision (s 41(2)) and implicit in the Victorian/NT provision, a matter that must be taken into account in deciding whether a question is misleading or confusing is any relevant condition or characteristic of the witness being questioned. Thus, for example, a question that would not be misleading or confusing when asked of an adult witness may be misleading or confusing when asked of a young child. Similarly, it may be appropriate to limit “leading” questions of children pursuant to s 42 (see [EA.42.130]). As regards cross-examination of children and other potentially “vulnerable” witnesses, UEL courts have provided limited guidance, in contrast with the position in the United Kingdom. However, in Ward v The Queen [2017] VSCA 37, Maxwell P and Redlich JA of the Victorian Court of Appeal reviewed the academic literature, law reform discussion and the United Kingdom authority at length. It was noted at [100] that “[a] child’s immaturity necessarily limits their capacity to understand the process in which they are participating and to appreciate the importance of what they say when subjected to cross-examination” and the proposition that “children have been shown to experience much higher levels of communication difficulty in the justice system than was previously recognized” was endorsed. Reference was made to various “suggestions” for “providing best practice guidance in questioning a vulnerable person or someone with communication needs” (see [111]–[114]). However, while noting the terms of this provision (and s 42), Maxwell P and Redlich JA were reluctant to be prescriptive. Rather, support was given to such procedures as “witness intermediaries” and pre-evidence hearings “at which the parties can discuss the capacity of the child witness” (at [132]). Then it was observed (at [133]): It may become apparent at the pre-hearing that an expert (to be engaged by the Crown) will assist the Court in better understanding the capacity of the child. The parties may 226

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agree as to what types of questions will be appropriate in cross-examination. Failing agreement, the judge may foreshadow a disposition not to allow certain types of questions. Or, where it is clear from the material available to the judge, including the child’s VARE, the judge may disallow particular questions because of their form or content. Such a pre-trial hearing will in most cases reduce the prospect of the judge having to intervene during the trial. And it will provide defence counsel with guidance as to the form which the cross-examination may take.

[EA.41.150]

“(b) unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive” (s 41(1)(b)/s 41(3)(b))

The adjectives listed in s 41(1)(b) in the Commonwealth/NSW/ACT provision and s 41(3)(b) in the Victorian/NT provision are preceded by the word “unduly”. It might be argued that this word only precedes the word “annoying” and has no application to the words that follow it. Indeed, there is some support for that argument in ALRC 102, where it was stated at para 5.110:

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The ALRC and the NSWLRC hold the view that there are no circumstances in which misleading, harassing, offensive or confusing questions are appropriate for any witness.

This suggests that the terms “harassing” and “offensive” were not intended to be qualified by the word “unduly”. However, the drafting of the provision clearly does not reflect such a view. If that had been the legislative intention, the terms “harassing” and “offensive” should have been included in (a). The fact that they appear in (b), after the words “unduly annoying” is a strong indicator that the word “unduly” was intended to qualify those adjectives as well. That was certainly the view taken of s 41(1)(b) as it stood prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102 and there is no good reason to take a different approach in respect of the current provision. Nevertheless, the observations of Adamson J in Lets Go Adventures Pty Ltd v Barrett [2017] NSWCA 243 at [123] should be noted: Procedural fairness requires more than merely giving each party an opportunity to be heard. It also requires that each witness be permitted to answer questions without being abused in the process. This is not to say that cross-examination cannot be robust, but it must be fair. The latitude commonly afforded to cross-examiners does not amount to a licence to offend, ridicule or vilify. Fairness requires that no proposition, particularly one which is damaging to the witness, be put without a basis. It also requires that questions be asked one at a time and that cross-examination not be peppered with gratuitous and, as in the present case, insulting, commentary to the witness. It requires that the witness be permitted to finish his or her answer and not be cut off or needlessly interrupted. Where a trial judge fails to intervene to stop such egregious conduct, an impression can be created that the judge is endorsing, or even collaborating, in such conduct.

The word “unduly” requires the court to take into account the right of a party in an adversarial system to test an opposing witness’s account and balances that right against the stress experienced by the witness. Effective cross-examination may involve a form of “harassment”. It may cause embarrassment. However, it may be justifiable nonetheless. It will not be “undue” in the particular circumstances of the case. An important consideration in this balancing exercise would be the probative value and importance of the evidence sought to be elicited © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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by the cross-examination. In R v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444; 139 A Crim R 30; [2003] NSWCCA 191 at [12], Spigelman CJ (with whom Dowd J agreed) observed (in respect of s 41(1)(b) as it stood prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102) that, if the probative force of an anticipated answer is likely to be slight, “even a small element of harassment, offence or oppression, would be enough for the Court to exercise its discretion under s 41(1)(b)”. Naturally, as s 41(2) in the Commonwealth/NSW/ACT provision makes clear, the circumstances of the particular witness will be relevant. Some witnesses are less able than others to cope with, and more likely to be traumatised by, intense or embarrassing cross-examination. In TA, Spigelman CJ referred to the “difficulties encountered by complainants in sexual assault cases in the criminal justice system” and the need for a court to consider the effect of cross-examination and of the trial experience upon a complainant when deciding whether cross-examination is unduly harassing, “offensive or oppressive” (at [8], [13]). He observed:

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That role is perfectly consistent with the requirements of a fair trial, which requirements do not involve treating the criminal justice system as if it were a forensic game in which every accused is entitled to some kind of sporting chance. Of course, the public interest in minimising the risk of convicting an innocent person must also mean that the boundaries of legitimate cross-examination should not be circumscribed “unduly”.

In Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas (2010) 188 FCR 140; 273 ALR 601; [2010] FCAFC 125 the Full Court of the Federal Court considered (at [49]) that this provision in the Commonwealth Act may be utilised to implement the common law rule of practice, designed to prevent oppression of witnesses, preventing two counsel from cross-examining the one witness. However, it may be noted that s 26 may also be utilised for the same purpose: see [EA.26.150]. The Court noted (at [45]) that the common law rule is subject to reasonable exceptions and observed that, under this provision, “it may be that the party calling the witness bears the onus of showing that cross-examination is unfair or otherwise should not be allowed”. The Court considered that, if the trial judge had considered the operation of this Act, the trial judge would properly have granted leave to a junior counsel continuing cross-examination of a witness after the senior counsel had ceased to act, where junior counsel “undertook not to ask questions on any topic that his leader had dealt with” (at [41]). The Court held that such an undertaking “was sufficient to ensure that [the witness] was not burdened by unfair cross-examination” (at [46]).

[EA.41.180]

“(c) is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate”

This provision will give courts considerable discretion to disallow a question not because of the content of the question but based on the “manner or tone” with which it is asked. Examples might be a question asked in a loud voice, or asked very quickly, or in a sneering or sarcastic tone.

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[EA.41.300]

“(d) has no basis other than a stereotype …”

It might be argued that the formulation in s 41(1)(d) in the Commonwealth/NSW/ ACT provision and s 41(3)(d) in the Victorian/NT provision will catch any legitimate generalisation put to a witness (for example, “accountants are generally careful”) but it is unlikely that the courts will give the word “stereotype” such a broad meaning. The Australian Oxford Dictionary defines the word to mean “person or thing that conforms to an unjustifiably fixed, usu. standardised, mental picture”. The adjective “unjustifiably” requires emphasis. In the broad context of this provision, it may be expected that this is the meaning that the courts will give to it.

[EA.41.240]

“… of which the court is, or is made, aware …”

These words, which are found in s 41(2)(a) and (b) in the Commonwealth/NSW/ ACT provision and s 41(4)(c)(i) and (ii) in the Victorian/NT provision, indicate that the court does not have to actually observe the relevant condition, characteristic or disability of the witness. As the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act states at para 42:

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The amendments to current s 41(2)(a) and 41(2)(b) clarify that the court can both observe the relevant characteristics of the witness or be advised of them by counsel when determining whether a question should be disallowed.

In National Auto Glass Supplies (Australia) Pty Ltd v Nielsen & Moller Autoglass (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 5) [2007] FCA 569, the court took into account a medical certificate, along with observations of the witness, before concluding that the witness should be excused from answering further questions under crossexamination because of his heart condition.

[EA.41.270]

“A failure by the court …”

Section 41(6) and 41(2)(b) in the Commonwealth/NSW/ACT Act and s 41(8) in the Victorian/NT Act provide that “[a] failure by the court to disallow a question under this section, or to inform the witness that it need not be answered, does not affect the admissibility in evidence of any answer given by the witness in response to the question”. This provision is explained in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act: As specified in subcl (8) a failure by the court to disallow a question under cl 41 will not affect the admissibility of the witness’s answer. The purpose of this clause is not to diminish the duty on the court to effectively regulate improper questions. Rather, it is designed to ensure that such a failure will not render the evidence elicited inadmissible, and therefore the proceeding subject to appeal.

[EA.41.300]

Other examples of “improper” questions

Questions may be “improper” for reasons of substance (for example, they seek evidence which is not admissible under the Act) or form (for example, they are of the type referred to in this provision). Given the general power of the court to control the conduct of a proceeding (s 11) and questioning in particular (s 26(a)), s 41 is not a comprehensive guide to “improper” questions. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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To give some examples, it is impermissible at common law to put to one witness that his or her evidence is to the contrary of others and expressly or impliedly invite an opinion as to the reasons for the contradiction.284 Indeed, it is improper to ask a witness to speculate about the reasons someone else did or said something.285 A witness should not be asked what another person “meant” when he wrote something.286 Unless the witness is permitted to give opinion evidence, a witness should not be asked to respond to a hypothetical question.287 It would 284. R v Praturlon (unreported, NSW CCA, No 330 of 1984, 29 November 1985); R v Booty (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, Abadee, Simpson JJ, 19 December 1994); R v Gilbert (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, Levine, Dowd JJ, 10 December 1998); Hughes v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 330 at [278]. In R v Leak [1969] SASR 172 it was stated: “A witness ought not to be asked whether another witness is telling lies or has invented something. A witness, of course, can be asked if what another witness said is true. He can be asked if he knows of any reason why the other witness should be hostile to him or should tell a false story about him. But if he says that what the other witness has said is not true, he should not be asked to enter into that witness’s mind and say whether he thinks the inaccuracy is due to invention, malice, mistake or any other cause.” However, see also Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; 151 ALR 16 in relation to the propriety of asking a defendant whether he or she can think of any motive for the complainant making false allegations. In R v Rich (1998) 102 A Crim R 165 it was similarly held to be improper to cross-examine the defendant as to whether prosecution witnesses were conspiring to give false evidence against him. See also R v Dennis [1999] NSWCCA 23; R v W [1999] NSWCCA 112 at [86]–[92] per James J; R v Baker [1999] NSWCCA 277; Picker v The Queen [2002] NSWCCA 78; Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 141; [2000] WASCA 200; R v Buckley (2004) 149 A Crim R 122; [2004] VSCA 185. In R v Bajic (2005) 12 VR 155; 154 A Crim R 196; [2005] VSCA 158 the Victorian Court of Appeal reaffirmed the propositions that a witness (including a defendant) should not be asked in cross-examination whether another witness was telling lies and that a defendant should also not be asked whether he or she can think of any motive for the complainant making false allegations (unless the issue has already been raised by the defence). See also R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 at [25]–[34]; R v Davis [2007] VSCA 276 at [22]; Reeves v The Queen (2013) 41 VR 275; 236 A Crim R 448; [2013] VSCA 311; Skinner v The Queen [2015] VSCA 26 at [8]–[11]. However, the principle must be applied with care when the cross-examination relates to out-of-court statements made by an alleged accomplice during the course of what prima facie were common purpose activities: Choi v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 150 at [35]–[45]. Cross-examination may be permissible on the subject where the defendant in evidence in chief has specifically alleged that a witness has been lying: Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 141; [2000] WASCA 200 at [11]; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 at [28]. Furthermore, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal made it clear in Gonzales v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 321 that there was nothing improper in “confronting” a witness with what other witnesses have said and asking whether those witnesses were “wrong”, so long as the cross-examination does not “trespass ... into asking the [witness] to express an opinion on whether the [other] witnesses were lying or had invented their evidence or otherwise why their evidence was incorrect” (Giles JA at [151]; Howie J and Fullerton J agreeing); see also BJS v The Queen (2013) 231 A Crim R 537; [2013] NSWCCA 123 at [192]–[196]; Hughes v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 330 at [280]. 285. Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; 151 ALR 16. The application of this principle may be difficult where the other person is the witness’s lawyer: cf Picker v The Queen [2002] NSWCCA 78; R v Scott [2004] NSWCCA 254. However, the principle must be applied with care when the cross-examination relates to out of court statements made by an alleged accomplice during the course of what prima facie were common purpose activities: Choi v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 150 at [35]–[45]. 286. L’Estrange v The Queen (2011) 214 A Crim R 9; [2011] NSWCCA 89 at [103]. 287. See Rolfe v Katunga Lucerne Mill Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 252 at [117]. However, Santow JA observed that “[i]t is open to a witness to say what he would have done, in relation to a conversation he could not recall, as illustrating, for example, his state of mind, but based upon what he could reasonably assume he would have done”.

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also be improper to ask a question which invited the drawing of an adverse inference from exercise of the common law right to silence.288 Similarly, it would be improper to cross-examine in a way designed to lay a foundation for the drawing of an adverse inference from the failure of the defence to adduce particular evidence.289 An allegation or suggestion should not be made in cross-examination unless it is reasonably justified by the material then available to the cross-examiner.290

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In Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559; 81 ALJR 1309; [2007] HCA 30, Heydon J discussed a number of common law rules relating to cross-examination, pointing out that several rest on the need not to mislead or confuse witnesses. • Compound questions. Heydon J stated at [127]: [S]ome “questions” asked during this cross-examination were not single questions, but were compound questions. “A compound question simultaneously poses more than one inquiry and calls for more than one answer. Such a question presents two problems. First, the question may be ambiguous because of its multiple facets and complexity. Second, any answer may be confusing because of uncertainty as to which part of the compound question the witness intended to address.” But compound questions have additional vices. It is unfair to force a witness into the position of having to choose which questions in a compound question to answer and in which order. Cross-examiners are entitled, if they can, to frame questions so as to seek a particular answer – either “Yes” or “No”. Even though the answers desired by the cross-examiner to a compound question may be all affirmative or all negative, the witness may wish to answer to some affirmatively and some negatively. To place witnesses in the position of having to reformulate a compound question and answer its component parts bit by bit is unfair to them in the sense that it prevents them from doing justice to themselves. [footnotes omitted]

• Questions resting on controversial assumptions. Heydon J stated at [130]: [A] leading question put in cross-examination which assumes a fact in controversy, or assumes that the witness has in chief or earlier in cross-examination given particular evidence which has not been given, “may by implication put into the mouth of an unwilling witness, a statement which he never intended to make, and thus incorrectly attribute to him testimony which is not his”. A further vice in this type of questioning is: “An affirmative and a negative answer may be almost equally damaging, and a perfectly honest witness may give a bad impression because he cannot answer directly, but has to enter on an explanation.” [footnotes omitted]

• Argumentative questions. Heydon J stated at [131]: Another vice in the questioning in this case stemmed from the fact that some of the questions and observations of counsel for the prosecution did not seek to elicit factual information, but rather provided merely an invitation to argument.

• Comments. Heydon J stated at [125]: 288. R v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385. 289. Frengos v The Queen [2012] VSCA 18 at [26]. See also [EA.55.180]. 290. Lets Go Adventures Pty Ltd v Barrett [2017] NSWCA 243 at [121]–[122]. See the Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015, r 61. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The cross-examination also contravened the rules of evidence in that many things said by the cross-examiner were not questions at all. To adopt the language of the Ontario Court of Appeal, counsel for the prosecution infringed the rules of evidence when he “regularly injected his personal views and editorial comments into the questions he was asking”. [footnote omitted]

• Cutting off answers before they are completed. Heydon J stated at [128]: “Evidence should ordinarily be given without interruption by counsel.” The cutting off of an answer by a further question, though always to be avoided as far as possible, can happen innocently when a questioner is pursuing a witness vigorously and the witness pauses in such a fashion as to suggest that the answer is complete; it can happen legitimately if a witness’s answer is non-responsive. But very few of the interruptions here can be explained away on these bases. They were usually interruptions of responsive answers, often by offensive observations. The rule against the cutting off of a witness’s answer follows from the encouragement which the law gives to short, precise and single questions. It is not fair to ask a question which is disparaging of or otherwise damaging to a witness and to cut off an answer which the cross-examiner does not like. [footnote omitted]

Further, the High Court has emphasised on a number of occasions that a prosecutor conducting cross-examination in criminal proceedings is subject to additional constraints.291

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[EA.41.330]

Other provisions

Under Pt IAD of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), restraints are placed on the cross-examination of child complainants and child witnesses in certain sexual offence cases. The operation of s 101 of the Family Law Act 1975 in Family Court proceedings is preserved by s 8(1) of this Act. In NSW s 294A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) imposes restraints on examination by an unrepresented defendant of a complainant in sexual offence proceedings. Division 2 of Part 8.2 of the Victorian Criminal Procedure Act 2009 regulates “cross-examination of protected witnesses”.

[EA.41.360]

Appellate review

As regards a failure by a court to disallow a question, or to inform a witness that a question need not be answered, s 41(6) in the Commonwealth/NSW/ACT Act and s 41(8) in the Victorian/NT Act provide that such a failure will not render the evidence elicited inadmissible. The clear intention is that such a failure will not render the proceeding subject to appeal. As regards a ruling made by a court under the Commonwealth/NSW/ACT provision, disallowing a question or informing a witness that it need not be answered, appellate review will necessarily be very limited because of the fact that it defines an improper (“disallowable”) question in terms of the court’s “opinion” that it falls into a specified category. An appellate court would presumably only be able to set aside a judge’s ruling if the opinion that the judge formed is one that, on the materials available to the judge, a reasonable judge properly instructed could not have formed. Appellate review of a ruling made by a court under the Victorian/NT 291. Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 663–664, 675; Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559; 81 ALJR 1309; [2007] HCA 30 at [34]–[35], [122].

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provision would also be limited. Where a “vulnerable witness” is not involved, and the ruling turns on the exercise of discretion (“may”), the usual limits on appellate review of discretionary determinations will apply. Even where a “vulnerable witness” is involved, the provision permits the court not to enforce the section provided it “is satisfied that, in all the relevant circumstances of the case, it is necessary for the question be put”. This will confer a degree of discretion and, as the VLRC specifically stated in ALRC 102 at para 5.127, “this will reduce the scope and opportunity for successful challenges to the judge’s application of the duty”.

Cth Act: 42

Leading questions

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(1) A party may put a leading question to a witness in cross-examination unless the court disallows the question or directs the witness not to answer it. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to disallow the question or give such a direction, it is to take into account the extent to which: (a) evidence that has been given by the witness in examination in chief is unfavourable to the party who called the witness; and (b) the witness has an interest consistent with an interest of the cross-examiner; and (c) the witness is sympathetic to the party conducting the crossexamination, either generally or about a particular matter; and (d) the witness’s age, or any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the witness is subject, may affect the witness’s answers. (3) The court is to disallow the question, or direct the witness not to answer it, if the court is satisfied that the facts concerned would be better ascertained if leading questions were not used. (4) This section does not limit the court’s power to control leading questions. Note: Leading question is defined in the Dictionary.

NSW Act: 42

Leading questions

(1) A party may put a leading question to a witness in cross-examination unless the court disallows the question or directs the witness not to answer it. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to disallow the question or give such a direction, it is to take into account the extent to which: (a) evidence that has been given by the witness in examination in chief is unfavourable to the party who called the witness, and (b) the witness has an interest consistent with an interest of the cross-examiner, and (c) the witness is sympathetic to the party conducting the crossexamination, either generally or about a particular matter, and © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(d) the witness’s age, or any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the witness is subject, may affect the witness’s answers. (3) The court is to disallow the question, or direct the witness not to answer it, if the court is satisfied that the facts concerned would be better ascertained if leading questions were not used. (4) This section does not limit the court’s power to control leading questions. Note: Leading question is defined in the Dictionary.

Vic Act: 42

Leading questions

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(1) A party may put a leading question to a witness in cross-examination unless the court disallows the question or directs the witness not to answer it. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to disallow the question or give such a direction, it is to take into account the extent to which— (a) evidence that has been given by the witness in examination in chief is unfavourable to the party who called the witness; and (b) the witness has an interest consistent with an interest of the cross-examiner; and (c) the witness is sympathetic to the party conducting the crossexamination, either generally or about a particular matter; and (d) the witness’s age, or any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the witness is subject, may affect the witness’s answers. (3) The court is to disallow the question, or direct the witness not to answer it, if the court is satisfied that the facts concerned would be better ascertained if leading questions were not used. (4) This section does not limit the court’s power to control leading questions. Note: Leading question is defined in the Dictionary.

ACT Act: 42

Leading questions

(1) A party may put a leading question to a witness in cross-examination unless the court disallows the question or directs the witness not to answer it. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to disallow the question or give a direction, it must take into account the extent to which— (a) evidence that has been given by the witness in examination-in-chief is unfavourable to the party who called the witness; and (b) the witness has an interest consistent with an interest of the cross-examiner; and (c) the witness is sympathetic to the party conducting the crossexamination, either generally or about a particular matter; and 234

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(d) the witness’s age, or any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the witness is subject, may affect the witness’s answers. (3) The court must disallow the question, or direct the witness not to answer it, if the court is satisfied that the facts would be better ascertained if leading questions were not used. (4) This section does not limit the court’s power to control leading questions. Note: Leading question —see the dictionary.

NT Act: 42

Leading questions

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(1) A party may put a leading question to a witness in cross-examination unless the court disallows the question or directs the witness not to answer it. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to disallow the question or give such a direction, it is to take into account the extent to which: (a) evidence that has been given by the witness in examination in chief is unfavourable to the party who called the witness; and (b) the witness has an interest consistent with an interest of the cross-examiner; and (c) the witness is sympathetic to the party conducting the crossexamination, either generally or about a particular matter; and (d) the witness’s age, or any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the witness is subject, may affect the witness’s answers. (3) The court is to disallow the question, or direct the witness not to answer it, if the court is satisfied that the facts concerned would be better ascertained if leading questions were not used. (4) This section does not limit the court’s power to control leading questions. Note for section 42: Leading question is defined in the Dictionary.

[EA.42.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 45, paras 115(c), 116(b); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 302, 632.

[EA.42.60] General comments It is suggested that the first issue which the court should consider in deciding whether to disallow a leading question (or direct a witness not to answer it) is whether the facts concerned would be better ascertained if a leading question was not used: s 42(3). If not “satisfied” of this the court should consider the factors in s 42(2). However, in R v A2 (No 14) [2015] NSWSC 1544, Johnson J appears to have proceeded on the basis that even if one or more of the circumstances in s 42(2) are present, a court may not disallow a leading question (or direct that it not be answered) unless the court is satisfied that the facts concerned would be better ascertained if leading questions were not used. That appears to be erroneous. Section 42(3) does not provide that a “court is to disallow” a leading question (or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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direct that it not be answered) “only if unless the court is satisfied that the facts concerned would be better ascertained if leading questions were not used”. Section 42(1) and s 42(2) confer a discretion on the court to disallow a leading question (or direct that it not be answered), while s 42(3) provides that the court has no discretion in one situation. Paragraphs (a) to (c) of s 42(2) indicate that a trial judge would be entitled to disallow leading questions of a witness where there are reasons to believe that the witness is favourably inclined to the cross-examining party.292 Paragraph (d) suggests that, in the circumstances referred to, leading questions should be disallowed where there is a real danger that the witness is unusually susceptible to suggestive questioning so that the testimony of the witness is likely to be unreliable.293 The trial judge may adopt a two-stage approach, initially disallowing leading questions (generally or in respect of a particular topic or topics) and then revisiting the issue with the benefit of the answers to the non-leading questions.294 It is difficult to see how the second type of question in the definition of “leading question” (see [EA.42.90]) can ever be allowed except in the case of expert witnesses, where it is legitimate for the existence of a fact to be assumed in order to express an opinion. Usually, such a question is not only leading but also improper. Except in respect of cross-examination of expert witnesses, it should always be disallowed.

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[EA.42.90]

“leading question”

The term “leading question” is defined in the Dictionary and discussed at [EA.37.90].

[EA.42.120]

“the court’s power to control leading questions” (s 42(4))

This general power is derived from s 26.

[EA.42.130]

Children and other vulnerable witnesses

As noted above, paragraph (d) in s 42(2) suggests that, in the circumstances referred to, leading questions should be disallowed where there is a real danger that the witness is unusually susceptible to suggestive questioning so that the testimony of the witness is likely to be unreliable. There is considerable literature 292. Compare Cheers v El Davo Pty Ltd (in liq) [2000] FCA 144 at [9]–[14] per Weinberg J. In Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; 190 IR 437; [2010] HCA 1, Heydon J expressed the view at [117] that it would actually be in the interests of the cross-examining party not to ask leading questions of a witness who was favourably inclined to that party, since “an inevitable appearance of collusion between an advocate and a client who had many opportunities for pre-trial conferences is suggested by the persistent use of leading questions in these circumstances. It is an appearance which is likely to be ineradicable, and which is likely to cause the value of the evidence to be severely discounted”. 293. Compare Stack v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 526; 151 A Crim R 112; [2004] WASCA 300 at [43], [117]–[127], [140] re the common law position. 294. R v A2 (No 21) [2016] NSWSC 24 at [57]–[59].

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on the potential dangers with cross-examination of children. In Ward v The Queen [2017] VSCA 37, Maxwell P and Redlich JA of the Victorian Court of Appeal reviewed the academic literature, law reform discussion and United Kingdom authority at length (see [EA.41.120]). However, while noting the terms of this provision (and s 41), Maxwell P and Redlich JA were reluctant to be prescriptive. Support was given to such procedures as “witness intermediaries” and pre-evidence hearings where a judge can “foreshadow a disposition not to allow certain types of questions” (at [133]) (see [EA.41.120]).

Cth Act: 43

Prior inconsistent statements of witnesses

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(1) A witness may be cross-examined about a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness whether or not: (a) complete particulars of the statement have been given to the witness; or (b) a document containing a record of the statement has been shown to the witness. (2) If, in cross-examination, a witness does not admit that he or she has made a prior inconsistent statement, the cross-examiner is not to adduce evidence of the statement otherwise than from the witness unless, in the cross-examination, the cross-examiner: (a) informed the witness of enough of the circumstances of the making of the statement to enable the witness to identify the statement; and (b) drew the witness’s attention to so much of the statement as is inconsistent with the witness’s evidence. (3) For the purpose of adducing evidence of the statement, a party may re-open the party’s case. [Subs (3) am Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 3] [S 43 am Act 34 of 1997]

NSW Act: 43

Prior inconsistent statements of witnesses

(1) A witness may be cross-examined about a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness whether or not: (a) complete particulars of the statement have been given to the witness, or (b) a document containing a record of the statement has been shown to the witness.

295. See for example, Spencer JR and Flin R, The Evidence of Children: The Law and the Psychology (London, Blackstone Press, 1993); Spencer JR and Lamb ME, Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). For a suggestion regarding limitations on the form of a leading question, see Wheatcroft J, Caruso D, and Krumrey-Quinn J, “Rethinking Leading: The Directive, Non-Directive Divide”: [2015] Crim LR5. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(2) If, in cross-examination, a witness does not admit that he or she has made a prior inconsistent statement, the cross-examiner is not to adduce evidence of the statement otherwise than from the witness unless, in the cross-examination, the cross-examiner: (a) informed the witness of enough of the circumstances of the making of the statement to enable the witness to identify the statement, and (b) drew the witness’s attention to so much of the statement as is inconsistent with the witness’s evidence. (3) For the purpose of adducing evidence of the statement, a party may re-open the party’s case. Vic Act: 43

Prior inconsistent statements of witnesses

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(1) A witness may be cross-examined about a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness whether or not— (a) complete particulars of the statement have been given to the witness; or (b) a document containing a record of the statement has been shown to the witness. (2) If, in cross-examination, a witness does not admit that he or she has made a prior inconsistent statement, the cross-examiner is not to adduce evidence of the statement otherwise than from the witness unless, in the cross-examination, the cross-examiner— (a) informed the witness of enough of the circumstances of the making of the statement to enable the witness to identify the statement; and (b) drew the witness’s attention to so much of the statement as is inconsistent with the witness’s evidence. (3) For the purpose of adducing evidence of the statement, a party may re-open the party’s case. ACT Act: 43

Prior inconsistent statements of witnesses

(1) A witness may be cross-examined about a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness whether or not— (a) complete particulars of the statement have been given to the witness; or (b) a document containing a record of the statement has been shown to the witness. (2) If, in cross-examination, a witness does not admit that the witness has made a prior inconsistent statement, the cross-examiner must not present evidence of the statement otherwise than from the witness unless, in the cross-examination, the cross-examiner— (a) told the witness enough of the circumstances of the making of the statement to enable the witness to identify the statement; and 238

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[EA.43.90]

(b) drew the witness’s attention to the part of the statement that is inconsistent with the witness’s evidence. (3) For the purpose of presenting evidence of the statement, a party may re-open the party’s case. NT Act: 43

Prior inconsistent statements of witnesses

(1) A witness may be cross-examined about a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness whether or not: (a) complete particulars of the statement have been given to the witness; or (b) a document containing a record of the statement has been shown to the witness. (2) If, in cross-examination, a witness does not admit that he or she has made a prior inconsistent statement, the cross-examiner is not to adduce evidence of the statement otherwise than from the witness unless, in the cross-examination, the cross-examiner: (a) informed the witness of enough of the circumstances of the making of the statement to enable the witness to identify the statement; and (b) drew the witness’s attention to so much of the statement as is inconsistent with the witness’s evidence.

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(3) For the purpose of adducing evidence of the statement, a party may re-open the party’s case.

[EA.43.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 46, para 115(d); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 303–306, 636.

[EA.43.60] General comments This provision deals with the procedure to be adopted in cross-examining a witness about a “prior inconsistent statement”, a previous statement that is inconsistent with evidence given by the witness (see [EA.43.90]). If the witness does not admit making the prior inconsistent statement, evidence of it may be admissible (see [EA.43.180]). However, this provision is subject to the rules of admissibility in Ch 3 and other statutory provisions. If evidence of the statement is inadmissible, the procedure provided for in this provision may not be adopted, since it would necessarily adduce inadmissible evidence. Some other mode of cross-examination (similar to that adopted in s 44(3) in relation to previous representations of other persons) might be available (see [EA.43.240]).

[EA.43.90] “a prior inconsistent statement” (s 43(1)) This term is defined in the Dictionary: “prior inconsistent statement of a witness” means a previous representation that is inconsistent with evidence given by the witness.

At common law, the test of a “prior inconsistent statement” is whether the statement is “capable” of being regarded as inconsistent with evidence given by © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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the witness. The statutory definition of the term does not appear to adopt the same approach. In considering the comparable terms of s 38(1)(c), Hodgson JA in the NSW Court of Appeal judgment of Klewer v Walton [2003] NSWCA 308 at [21]–[22] referred to both “explicit or logical inconsistency” and “implicit or what might be called substantial inconsistency, falling short though of logical or explicit inconsistency”. He expressed the opinion that “inconsistency of that latter kind may be sufficient to enliven s 38(1)(c)”. He concluded that it was not enlivened in the particular circumstances because there was “no difference of substance”. “Previous representation” is also defined: “previous representation” means a representation made otherwise than in the course of giving evidence in the proceeding in which evidence of the representation is sought to be adduced.

Unlike legislation in some jurisdictions, there is no requirement in s 43 that the prior statement be “relative” to the subject matter of the proceedings. It need only be inconsistent with the in-court evidence of the witness.297 However, whether it is relative/relevant directly to a fact in issue will affect the question of how evidence of the statement may be adduced otherwise than from the witness (see [EA.43.180]).

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[EA.43.120]

“whether or not … a document containing a record of the statement has been shown to the witness” (s 43(1)(b))

Although it is not necessary to show the document containing a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness, since production can be required at any stage (under s 45(2)), the document should be in court or readily available when the questioning proceeds.

[EA.43.150]

Production of documents

The production and use of documents containing a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by a witness is dealt with in s 45. Section 45(5) makes it clear that merely showing a document to a witness who is being cross-examined does not require the party to tender the document in evidence.

[EA.43.180]

Adducing evidence of a prior inconsistent statement (s 43(2))

Where the party cross-examining the witness wishes to adduce evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness otherwise298 than from the witness, because the witness does not admit making it, this is not permitted unless: 296. R v Wilson (unreported, NSW CCA, Hunt CJ at CL, Smart, Studdert JJ, 1 February 1996). 297. Of course, to be admissible the evidence of the prior inconsistent statement must be relevant: s 56. Presumably, it will always be relevant because it relates to the credibility of the witness: s 55(2)(a). 298. That is, by tendering a document which contains the statement or calling a witness to testify to the making of the statement.

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(1) the circumstances in which the statement was (allegedly) made are identified to the witness; and (2) the (alleged) inconsistencies are brought to the attention of the witness.

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In Aslett v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 49, Barr J (with whom Spigelman CJ and Howie J agreed) at [75]–[76] explained this provision when rejecting an argument that it had the effect of preventing admission of other evidence of a prior inconsistent statement in circumstances where the witness did admit making it: Section 43 lies in Ch 2 of the Act, which is concerned with adducing evidence. The sections dealing with the hearsay rule and its exceptions fall within Ch 3, which is concerned with the admissibility of evidence. Section 43(2) is not intended to cover every instance of reliance on a prior inconsistent statement of a witness or to deal in general terms with its admissibility. The purpose of the section is to ensure that if a party intends to adduce evidence of a prior inconsistent statement “otherwise than from the witness” that the witness refuses to acknowledge, that party may only do so after drawing to the witness’s attention the circumstances of the statement so that the witness can identify it and the inconsistency the cross-examiner is asserting. The purpose is to ensure that such a witness has a proper opportunity to consider precisely what he or she is asserted to have said and precisely how that is asserted to be inconsistent with what the witness now says. Subsection (2) is in its terms limited to the things that must happen when a witness does not admit having made an inconsistent statement. It says nothing about what may or must or must not happen in other circumstances, for example, where the witness admits having made a prior inconsistent statement. Subsection (2) draws on pre-Evidence Act 1995 law about the use of prior inconsistent statements. Before the commencement of the present Evidence Act such statements, when admissible, were relevant only to the credit of the witness who made them. If their making was admitted, therefore, there was no purpose in tendering them: Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498. Under the modern law, on the other hand, there is a purpose in tendering such statements beyond any attack on credibility, namely proof of the facts asserted: s 60. Nothing in s 43 is directed to the admissibility of any prior inconsistent statement to prove the truth of its assertions. All subs (2) does is ensure that a witness who is about to be attacked on credit is fairly dealt with. Nothing in s 43 purports to limit the effect of s 38, 103 or 60.

Thus, this provision does not deal in general terms with the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement of a witness (see Ch 3 and, in particular, Pts 3.1, 3.2 and 3.7). Rather, it imposes procedural requirements on the cross-examiner in circumstances where the cross-examiner wishes to adduce evidence of the prior inconsistent statement and the witness does not admit making it. Non-compliance with those requirements would, no doubt, mean that the evidence of the prior inconsistent statement “otherwise than from the witness” would not be admissible. The requirement in s 43(2)(a), that the cross-examiner must inform “the witness of enough of the circumstances of the making of the statement to enable the witness to identify the statement”, was referred to in JCS v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 1; [2006] NSWCCA 221. McClellan CJ at CL (James and Hoeben JJ agreeing) referred at [69] to the trial judge ruling that a letter (said to contain prior inconsistent statements by the witness) “was inadmissible because counsel had not informed the witness of the provenance of the letter as required under s 43(2)(a)”. Reference was made at [71] to the fact that there was no evidence regarding from where the document had been obtained, and very limited evidence © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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that it had been written by the witness. However, s 43(2)(a) only requires cross-examination in which the (alleged) circumstances of the making of the statement by the witness are put to the witness so that the witness could (if the witness had indeed made it) “identify” it. Issues of provenance and authorship are more appropriately considered in the context of s 55 and s 57 (see [EA.57.120]).

[EA.43.210]

“a party may re-open the party’s case” (s 43(3))

It is suggested that this provision should be applied in the context of common law principles (see ss 8 and 9). For example, as the High Court observed in respect of a similar Queensland provision, the legislation does not modify “the underlying principle of the accusatorial and adversarial system that it is for the prosecution to put its case both fully and fairly before the jury, before the accused is called on to announce the course that will be followed at trial”.299 Thus, as a matter of practice and procedure, the general principle is that the prosecution must offer all its proof before a defendant is called upon to make his or her defence.300 Although the Queensland provision did not contain a subsection in the same terms as s 43(3), it is suggested that the better view is that this provision should be understood to operate subject to the general common law principle.301

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[EA.43.240]

Other procedures

If evidence of the prior inconsistent statement is inadmissible, the procedure provided for in this provision could not be adopted, since it would adduce inadmissible evidence. Some other mode of cross-examination might be available.302 A court may (pursuant to general common law principles and s 26) permit a party to cross-examine using the procedure of the type provided for in s 44(3) in relation to previous representations of other persons (see [EA.44.120]).303 However, the court is able to supervise the questioning by virtue of the powers conferred on it by s 26 and fairness considerations (for example, any tendency of the cross-examination to reveal the contents of the inadmissible prior representation) may cause the court to override the procedure.304

299. R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299; 196 ALR 421; [2003] HCA 13 at [27]. 300. Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 380; Niven v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 513; R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465; [1999] HCA 32 at [9]; Latorre v The Queen (2012) 226 A Crim R 319; [2012] VSCA 280 at [100]–[110]. 301. Compare Soma at [35]. This appears to have been assumed in R v O’Driscoll (2003) 57 NSWLR 416; 141 A Crim R 368; [2003] NSWCCA 166. 302. ASIC v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643. 303. ASIC v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 at [34]. 304. ASIC v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 per Austin J at [34]–[38].

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Cth Act: 44 Previous representations of other persons (1) Except as provided by this section, a cross-examiner must not question a witness about a previous representation alleged to have been made by a person other than the witness.

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(2) A cross-examiner may question a witness about the representation and its contents if: (a) evidence of the representation has been admitted; or (b) the court is satisfied that it will be admitted. (3) If subsection (2) does not apply and the representation is contained in a document, the document may only be used to question a witness as follows: (a) the document must be produced to the witness; (b) if the document is a tape recording, or any other kind of document from which sounds are reproduced—the witness must be provided with the means (for example, headphones) to listen to the contents of the document without other persons present at the crossexamination hearing those contents; (c) the witness must be asked whether, having examined (or heard) the contents of the document, the witness stands by the evidence that he or she has given; (d) neither the cross-examiner nor the witness is to identify the document or disclose any of its contents. (4) A document that is so used may be marked for identification. NSW Act: 44

Previous representations of other persons

(1) Except as provided by this section, a cross-examiner must not question a witness about a previous representation alleged to have been made by a person other than the witness. (2) A cross-examiner may question a witness about the representation and its contents if: (a) evidence of the representation has been admitted, or (b) the court is satisfied that it will be admitted. (3) If subsection (2) does not apply and the representation is contained in a document, the document may only be used to question a witness as follows: (a) the document must be produced to the witness, (b) if the document is a tape recording, or any other kind of document from which sounds are reproduced—the witness must be provided with the means (for example, headphones) to listen to the contents of the document without other persons present at the crossexamination hearing those contents, © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(c)

the witness must be asked whether, having examined (or heard) the contents of the document, the witness stands by the evidence that he or she has given, (d) neither the cross-examiner nor the witness is to identify the document or disclose any of its contents. (4) A document that is so used may be marked for identification. Vic Act: 44

Previous representations of other persons

(1) Except as provided by this section, a cross-examiner must not question a witness about a previous representation alleged to have been made by a person other than the witness.

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(2) A cross-examiner may question a witness about the representation and its contents if— (a) evidence of the representation has been admitted; or (b) the court is satisfied that it will be admitted. (3) If subsection (2) does not apply and the representation is contained in a document, the document may only be used to question a witness as follows— (a) the document must be produced to the witness; (b) if the document is a tape recording, or any other kind of document from which sounds are reproduced—the witness must be provided with the means (for example, headphones) to listen to the contents of the document without other persons present at the crossexamination hearing those contents; (c) the witness must be asked whether, having examined (or heard) the contents of the document, the witness stands by the evidence that he or she has given; (d) neither the cross-examiner nor the witness is to identify the document or disclose any of its contents. (4) A document that is so used may be marked for identification. ACT Act: 44

Previous representations of other people

(1) Except as provided by this section, a cross-examiner must not question a witness about a previous representation alleged to have been made by a person other than the witness. (2) A cross-examiner may question a witness about the representation and its contents if— (a) evidence of the representation has been admitted; or (b) the court is satisfied that it will be admitted. (3) If subsection (2) does not apply and the representation is contained in a document, the document may only be used to question a witness as follows: (a) the document must be produced to the witness; 244

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(b) if the document is a tape recording, or any other kind of document from which sounds are reproduced—the witness must be provided with the means (for example, headphones) to listen to the contents of the document without other people present at the crossexamination hearing the contents; Note: An example is part of the Act, is not exhaustive and may extend, but does not limit, the meaning of the provision in which it appears (see Legislation Act, s 126 and s 132).

(c)

the witness must be asked whether, having examined (or heard) the contents of the document, the witness stands by the evidence that the witness has given; (d) neither the cross-examiner nor the witness may identify the document or disclose any of its contents. (4) A document used in a way mentioned in subsection (3) may be marked for identification. NT Act: 44

Previous representations of other persons

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(1) Except as provided by this section, a cross-examiner must not question a witness about a previous representation alleged to have been made by a person other than the witness. (2) A cross-examiner may question a witness about the representation and its contents if: (a) evidence of the representation has been admitted; or (b) the court is satisfied that it will be admitted. (3) If subsection (2) does not apply and the representation is contained in a document, the document may only be used to question a witness as follows: (a) the document must be produced to the witness; (b) if the document is a tape recording, or any other kind of document from which sounds are reproduced — the witness must be provided with the means (for example, headphones) to listen to the contents of the document without other persons present at the crossexamination hearing those contents; (c) the witness must be asked whether, having examined (or heard) the contents of the document, the witness stands by the evidence that he or she has given; (d) neither the cross-examiner nor the witness is to identify the document or disclose any of its contents. (4) A document that is so used may be marked for identification.

[EA.44.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 47, paras 115(e), 116(c); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 636.

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General comments

The ALRC explained the rationale behind the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 636):

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It would be most undesirable to permit cross-examination to be carried out using prior statements of persons other than the witness where those statements are not in evidence or will not be admitted in evidence. Where the statement is in evidence or will be received in evidence, there is no reason to prevent cross-examination on the contents of the statements. As to oral statements, no cross-examination will be permitted under the proposal where the statements are not or will not be admitted in evidence. Where the statement is not in evidence or cannot or will not be adduced in evidence, the proposal is for the existing law to continue – the witness will be shown the document, asked to read it and state whether he still adheres to his testimony. Against such an approach, it has been argued that such cross-examination should not be allowed. It may be oppressive to the witness where the document is placed in the witness’ hands and the tribunal of fact may be encouraged to speculate about the content of the document … The danger must be acknowledged. However, there is power to control crossexamination and provided the rules are complied with, the document will not be identified and it will not be possible to infer what is in it. The advantage of this limited cross-examination is that it can, as it has in the past, assist in establishing the facts. The safeguard is provided, however, of empowering the judge to require production to him of any document so used and to the other parties. In particular, where the document used contains statements of persons other than the witness, the judge can use this power to ensure that no false impressions are given about the contents of the document. The judge may make such use of it as he thinks fit.

This provision largely reflects the existing common law position, based on the rule in Queen’s Case (1820) Br & B 284; 129 ER 976. Under that rule, a witness cannot be asked any questions about the contents of a document unless it is admissible in evidence (and the party either reads the statement in its entirety into evidence or undertakes to tender it).305

[EA.44.90] Application of s 44(2) In R v S [2003] NSWCCA 122 Mason P observed at [49]: Subsection (2) of s 44 conditionally lifts the barriers that prevent identification of the document or disclosure of its contents to the jury [pursuant to Subsection (2) of s 44]. It permits the cross-examiner to question a witness about the previous representation and its contents, but only if [s 44(2)(a) or (b) are satisfied].

If s 44(2)(a) is not satisfied, the cross-examiner must satisfy the court that evidence of the representation “will be admitted”. Mason P “flagged”, without deciding: the argument that the latter words might be read as referring to a present, practical reality at that stage of the trial, as distinct from a theoretical admissibility depending on certain additional matters.306

The provision does not prescribe any procedure to be followed if the requirements of s 44(2) are satisfied and the party is permitted to question the 305. See City of Sydney v Streetscape Projects (Aust) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 942 at [24]–[25]. 306. R v S [2003] NSWCCA 122 at [61]. It may be observed that, if (b) cannot be complied with because admissibility depends on certain conditional matters, the witness may have to be recalled for further cross-examination under this provision when those conditions are satisfied.

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witness about the representation and its contents. Presumably the same situation exists as is spelt out in s 43(1) in relation to prior inconsistent statements – “complete particulars of the statement” need not be given to the witness and a document containing the statement “need not be shown to the witness”. If that mode of cross-examination is permissible, it conflicts with the existing common law position (which requires the document to be shown to the witness), but it appears to reflect the intentions of the ALRC.307

[EA.44.120]

Application of s 44(3)

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The procedure specified in s 44(3) may be followed without obtaining the leave or permission of the court.308 However, the court is able to supervise the questioning of witnesses, including questioning in accordance with the procedure in this provision, by virtue of the powers conferred on it by s 26.309 The discretionary provisions in Pt 3.11 may also have some impact.310 Fairness considerations (for example, any unfair surprise of the witness or placing the witness at an unfair psychological disadvantage; any tendency of the crossexamination to reveal the contents of the document) may cause the court to override the procedure.311 While use of the document as prescribed in s 44(3) reflects the existing common law position, it has been argued that it would be almost impossible to avoid suggesting that the document asserts something contrary to the testimony of the witness.312 Nevertheless, it is not clear that such a suggestion would “disclose any” of the “contents” of the document in breach of s 44(3)(d). However, plainly enough, reading out some of the document would disclose some of its contents.313 In ALRC 102, it was noted at para 5.140 that judges could exercise greater control over this type of questioning under the existing provisions. The following points were made at para 5.141: Where a judge is concerned that counsel is confusing or misleading the court or jury by questioning a witness on a previous representation of another person that is inadmissible (or counsel does not intend to tender), he or she may call for the document to be produced under s 45(1)(b) and give directions as to its use. A judge could also presumably refuse to allow the document to be put to the witness under the general power in s 26 to control the questioning of witnesses.

[EA.44.150]

Document used in an attempt to revive memory

A recognised common law exception to the rule in The Queen’s Case is where the document in question was used to refresh the witness’s memory. No such exception appears to have been recognised in the Act.314 This means that, unless 307. See ALRC 26, vol 1, para 636. 308. R v S [2003] NSWCCA 122 at [48]. 309. ASIC v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 per Austin J at [8]. 310. ASIC v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 per Austin J at [14], [32]. 311. ASIC v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 per Austin J at [23]–[31]. 312. See R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294. 313. R v Bevan [2002] NSWCCA 224 at [22]. 314. Of course, where the document was “made” by the witness (as will usually be the case where it is used in an attempt to refresh the witness’s memory), then s 43 applies. The problem only arises where the document (containing the representation) was made by someone else. Under © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 45

the document contains a prior inconsistent statement of the witness or the document is admissible, cross-examination on the document will not be permitted (other than in accordance with s 44(3)).

[EA.44.180]

Production of documents

The production and use of documents containing “a previous representation alleged to have been made by another person” are dealt with in s 45. Section 45(5) makes it clear that merely showing a document to a witness who is being cross-examined does not require the party to tender the document in evidence.

Cth Act: 45

Production of documents

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(1) This section applies if a party is cross-examining or has cross-examined a witness about: (a) a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness that is recorded in a document; or (b) a previous representation alleged to have been made by another person that is recorded in a document. (2) If the court so orders or if another party so requires, the party must produce: (a) the document; or (b) such evidence of the contents of the document as is available to the party; to the court or to that other party. (3) The (a) (b) (c)

court may: examine a document or evidence that has been so produced; and give directions as to its use; and admit it even if it has not been tendered by a party.

(4) Subsection (3) does not permit the court to admit a document or evidence that is not admissible because of Chapter 3. (5) The mere production of a document to a witness who is being cross-examined does not give rise to a requirement that the cross-examiner tender the document.

the common law, a document may be used in an attempt to refresh memory in court where it was “verified” by the witness when the events were “fresh in the memory”: R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534; R v Shea (1978) 18 SASR 591 at 596. Query whether the witness has thereby “made” a previous “representation”: see the definition of “representation” in the Dictionary, as well as cl 6 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary. In any event, neither s 32 nor s 34 imposes a requirement of “made or verified” by the witness. Of course, it is arguable that a cross-examiner should not be permitted to cross-examine a witness in respect of someone else’s representation simply because it is contained in a document which the witness used in an attempt to refresh his or her memory.

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NSW Act: 45 Production of documents (1) This section applies if a party is cross-examining or has cross-examined a witness about: (a) a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness that is recorded in a document, or (b) a previous representation alleged to have been made by another person that is recorded in a document. (2) If the court so orders or if another party so requires, the party must produce: (a) the document, or (b) such evidence of the contents of the document as is available to the party, to the court or to that other party. (3) The (a) (b) (c)

court may: examine a document or evidence that has been so produced, and give directions as to its use, and admit it even if it has not been tendered by a party.

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(4) Subsection (3) does not permit the court to admit a document or evidence that is not admissible because of Chapter 3. (5) The mere production of a document to a witness who is being cross-examined does not give rise to a requirement that the cross-examiner tender the document. Vic Act: 45

Production of documents

(1) This section applies if a party is cross-examining or has cross-examined a witness about— (a) a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness that is recorded in a document; or (b) a previous representation alleged to have been made by another person that is recorded in a document. (2) If the court so orders or if another party so requires, the party must produce— (a) the document; or (b) such evidence of the contents of the document as is available to the party— to the court or to that other party. (3) The (a) (b) (c)

court may— examine a document or evidence that has been so produced; and give directions as to its use; and admit it even if it has not been tendered by a party.

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(4) Subsection (3) does not permit the court to admit a document or evidence that is not admissible because of Chapter 3. (5) The mere production of a document to a witness who is being cross-examined does not give rise to a requirement that the cross-examiner tender the document. ACT Act: 45

Production of documents

(1) This section applies if a party is cross-examining or has cross-examined a witness about— (a) a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness that is recorded in a document; or (b) a previous representation alleged to have been made by someone else that is recorded in a document.

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(2) If the court orders or if another party requires, the party must produce to the court or to the other party— (a) the document; or (b) evidence of the contents of the document that is available to the party. (3) The court may— (a) examine a document or evidence that has been produced under subsection (2); and (b) give directions as to its use; and (c) admit it even if it has not been tendered by a party. (4) Subsection (3) does not permit the court to admit a document or evidence that is not admissible because of chapter 3. (5) The mere production of a document to a witness who is being cross-examined does not give rise to a requirement that the cross-examiner tender the document. NT Act: 45

Production of documents

(1) This section applies if a party is cross-examining or has cross-examined a witness about: (a) a prior inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by the witness that is recorded in a document; or (b) a previous representation alleged to have been made by another person that is recorded in a document. (2) If the court so orders or if another party so requires, the party must produce: (a) the document; or (b) such evidence of the contents of the document as is available to the party; to the court or to that other party. 250

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(3) The (a) (b) (c)

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[EA.45.120]

court may: examine a document or evidence that has been so produced; and give directions as to its use; and admit it even if it has not been tendered by a party.

(4) Subsection (3) does not permit the court to admit a document or evidence that is not admissible because of Chapter 3. (5) The mere production of a document to a witness who is being cross-examined does not give rise to a requirement that the cross-examiner tender the document.

[EA.45.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 48, paras 115(f), 116(d); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 636.

[EA.45.60] General comments This provision deals with the production and use of documents which have been the basis of cross-examination under either ss 43 or 44.

[EA.45.90] Production to another party (s 45(2))

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Although the provision is somewhat ambiguous, it was clearly intended by the ALRC that the document (or evidence of its contents) must be produced to another party if required by that other party.

[EA.45.120]

Production to the court (s 45(2), (3), (4))

The court may order production of the document (or evidence of its contents) to the court. The court may then proceed as stated in s 45(3) although it cannot admit into evidence in the proceeding the document or evidence where it is not admissible under Ch 3 of the Act (s 45(4)). Under s 188 the court may impound the document. In Australian Building & Construction Commissioner v Abbott (No 2) [2011] FCA 308, Gilmour J considered the discretion conferred by s 45(3)(c) to admit a document and observed at [11]–[12] that “it is relevant to consider whether the document or part of it should be admitted by the Court to enable it to fairly consider the cross-examination in this Court of [the witness] upon the content of [part of the document] and to weigh its effect” and “to consider whether the document is required in order to decide whether the prior statement was inconsistent in the way asserted by cross-examining counsel”. On the other hand, in Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 17) [2013] VSC 146 a party sought to have admitted a newspaper article, only a small part of which contained an alleged prior inconsistent statement by a witness (which the witness did not concede had been made). J Forrest J observed that the scope of this provision “is extraordinarily broad: provided there is an ‘alleged prior inconsistent statement’ recorded in a document the Court may, pursuant to s 45(3), admit the document itself or permit its tender” (at [21]). However, his Honour ruled that the article was “inadmissible” because a court should, in exercising its power under s 45(3) “to permit the tender of the article as a whole, © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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be extremely cautious about the admission of such untested and potentially dubious material especially where the contents of the article go far beyond that of the alleged prior inconsistent statement” (at [25]) and because much of the article contained inadmissible hearsay (at [27]–[28]). While the conclusion appears unassailable, perhaps it would have been simpler to note that cl 8 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides that a reference in the Act to “a document” includes a reference “to any part of the document”. Putting to one side the (hearsay) evidence in the document of a prior inconsistent statement, the rest of the document was plainly inadmissible pursuant to Ch 3 and thus s 45(4) precluded admission under s 45(3). As regards the evidence in the document of the (alleged) prior inconsistent statement, it was caught by the hearsay rule since it was a previous representation by the journalist of the statement by the witness, relied on to prove that the witness made the statement. No hearsay exception was relied upon and, again applying s 45(4), even that remaining part of the article could not be admitted under s 45(3). It follows that, notwithstanding the breadth of s 45(3), the effect of s 45(4) was that none of the article could be admitted into evidence.

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[EA.45.150]

Consequences of showing document to witness being cross-examined (s 45(5))

This provision makes it clear that merely showing a document to a witness who is being cross-examined does not require the party to tender the document in evidence.315 However, it does not deal with other possible bases on which tender might be required (or on which the court might admit the document under s 45(3)(c)). For example, breach of the requirements of s 44(3)(d) so that the document in question is identified or its contents disclosed may lead a court to require the document to be tendered316 or itself admit the document into evidence (unless, in the latter case, the document is not admissible under Ch 3 of the Act). It is unclear what other circumstances might require the cross-examining party to tender the document. While re-examination would be permitted under s 39 in respect of those parts of a document which qualified or explained those parts of a document cross-examined upon pursuant to s 43 or 44, s 39 does not provide for the tender of the document (or parts of it).

Cth Act: 46

Leave to recall witnesses

(1) The court may give leave to a party to recall a witness to give evidence about a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party, being a matter on which the witness was not cross-examined, if the evidence concerned has been admitted and: (a) it contradicts evidence about the matter given by the witness in examination in chief; or (b) the witness could have given evidence about the matter in examination in chief. 315. See ACCC v CFMEU [2008] FCA 678, Finn J at [119]. 316. Compare, under the common law, R v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 196; R v Orton [1922] VLR 469 at 470.

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(2) A reference in this section to a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party includes a reference to an inference drawn from, or that the party intends to draw from, that evidence. NSW Act: 46

Leave to recall witnesses

(1) The court may give leave to a party to recall a witness to give evidence about a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party, being a matter on which the witness was not cross-examined, if the evidence concerned has been admitted and: (a) it contradicts evidence about the matter given by the witness in examination in chief, or (b) the witness could have given evidence about the matter in examination in chief. (2) A reference in this section to a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party includes a reference to an inference drawn from, or that the party intends to draw from, that evidence. Vic Act:

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46

Leave to recall witnesses

(1) The court may give leave to a party to recall a witness to give evidence about a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party, being a matter on which the witness was not cross-examined, if the evidence concerned has been admitted and— (a) it contradicts evidence about the matter given by the witness in examination in chief; or (b) the witness could have given evidence about the matter in examination in chief. (2) A reference in this section to a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party includes a reference to an inference drawn from, or that the party intends to draw from, that evidence. ACT Act: 46

Leave to recall witnesses

(1) The court may give leave to a party to recall a witness to give evidence about a matter raised by evidence presented by another party, and on which the witness was not cross-examined, if the evidence has been admitted and— (a) it contradicts evidence about the matter given by the witness in examination-in-chief; or (b) the witness could have given evidence about the matter in examination-in-chief. (2) A reference in this section to a matter raised by evidence presented by another party includes a reference to an inference drawn from, or that the party intends to draw from, the evidence.

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NT Act: 46 Leave to recall witnesses (1) The court may give leave to a party to recall a witness to give evidence about a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party, being a matter on which the witness was not cross-examined, if the evidence concerned has been admitted and: (a) it contradicts evidence about the matter given by the witness in examination in chief; or (b) the witness could have given evidence about the matter in examination in chief. (2) A reference in this section to a matter raised by evidence adduced by another party includes a reference to an inference drawn from, or that the party intends to draw from, that evidence.

[EA.46.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 49, para 115(h); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 308, 633–635.

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[EA.46.60] The rule This provision permits a witness to be recalled where there has been a failure to cross-examine the witness in specified circumstances. It does not preclude the recall of a witness on some other basis.317 It overlaps with the common law rule of fairness usually referred to as the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67.318 It has been held that “the rule in [Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67] remains alive and well under the regime of evidence law introduced by the Evidence Act 1995”. 319 As regards the scope of the common law rule, in MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ stated at [38]: The rule is essentially that a party is obliged to give appropriate notice to the other party, and any of that person’s witnesses, of any imputation that the former intends to make against either of the latter about his or her conduct relevant to the case, or a party’s or a witness’s credit.

The ALRC expressed the rule somewhat differently (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 634–635): 317. Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4 at [311]. 318. For a discussion of the principles behind the common law rule, see Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 23 per Hunt J; Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 373; Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 847; Scalise v Bezzina [2003] NSWCA 362 at [95]–[99]. A somewhat narrow version of the rule is that given in White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169; [1998] FCA 806 at 216 per Goldberg J: “The rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 is a rule of fairness which requires a party or a witness to be put on notice that a statement made by the witness may be used against the party or witness or to be put on notice that an adverse inference may be drawn against the witness or an adverse comment made about the witness in order that the witness may respond to that issue and give an explanation.” See also Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773 at [51]. 319. Heaton v Luczka [1998] NSWCA 104; Jardein Pty Ltd v Stathakis [2007] FCAFC 148 at [33].

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The rule in requiring the cross-examiner to question a witness on particular matters is one of those procedural rules that come into play when a witness steps into the box, and affect and control the presentation of his evidence. … [T]he cross-examiner must put to each of the opponent’s witnesses so much of his own case as concerns that witness or on which that witness could give evidence. Any rule, however, should require no more than that the opponent put the substance of the case to the witness. Otherwise, the requirement would be too onerous, time-consuming and costly.

It is arguable that in one important respect the ALRC’s view of the rule was significantly broader than in fact common law authority supports – the view that the cross-examiner must put to the opponent’s witness any part of the cross-examiner’s case “on which that witness could give evidence”, even if the cross- examiner’s case is not inconsistent with evidence that the witness has given (and thus there is no basis for an “imputation” against the witness). In Buchwald v The Queen (2011) 38 VR 199; [2011] VSCA 445, Redlich JA observed at [12]:

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Where later evidence is to be given of a fact which is not inconsistent with the evidence already given by the witness, the rule in Browne v Dunn does not require the cross examiner to explore that question of fact with the witness because the witness might be able to confirm or deny that later evidence.

However, the formulation in MWJ appears too narrow. For example, it would seem that the rule would extend to requiring “a party or witness to be put on notice that a statement made by the witness may be used against the party or witness”.320 There is also historical support for the broader formulation adopted by the ALRC. In Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367, Wells J articulated the principle as requiring “that a party should put to each of his opponent’s witnesses in turn so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness, or in which that witness took some part” (at 374–5), citing at 373 Odgers, Pleading and Practice (7th ed, 1912). On the other hand, the position in respect of a criminal defendant may be more restrictive (see [EA.46.120]). Whatever the precise position under the common law, this provision allows the witness to be recalled if the conditions are satisfied – even if there has not been a breach of the rule in Browne v Dunn. On the other hand, it should be noted that this provision is, in a sense, narrower in terms of scope of operation than the common law rule. For example, the common law rule may apply to a failure to cross-examine a party’s own witness pursuant to s 38.321 It may operate where the evidence of the particular witness consisted of a written statement simpliciter.322 It has been accepted that there may be a breach of the rule by a judicial officer who makes findings of serious misconduct in respect of a witness without the witness having been given an opportunity to deal with the criticism.323 Further, there is no doubt that possible remedies for breach of the common law rule extend beyond recall of the witness 320. Goldberg J in White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169; [1998] FCA 806 at 216. 321. See R v McCormack (No 3) [2003] NSWSC 645. 322. See Nye v New South Wales (2003) 58 NSWLR 152; [2003] NSWSC 610. 323. Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11 at [67] (CLR); New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226; [2014] NSWCA 47 at [32]–[44]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(see [EA.46.150]). Breach of the rule may cause a substantial miscarriage of justice and require a verdict to be overturned on appeal.324 It follows that the first issue to be addressed is whether there has been a breach of the common law rule. Where it is obvious that the evidence of the witness is challenged, failure to state this expressly will not necessarily involve breach of the rule. Meagher JA of the NSW Court of Appeal has observed: There are many ways in which a party or other witness might sufficiently be put on notice that their evidence on a particular subject or to a particular effect is challenged as untruthful, and as to the basis of that challenge. Depending on the circumstances, those ways include by pleadings, affidavits or statements of evidence exchanged before the hearing, and opening statements made or exchanged at the commencement of the hearing, as well as by cross-examination.325

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There will be no breach if the matter in respect of which there was no cross-examination was not in issue in the proceeding.326 Where the witness has prior notice that there is other material in the proceedings that will be relied upon to contradict the evidence of the witness, it may not be necessary to raise the issue with the witness in cross-examination.327 However, in cases where all the evidence is given orally, even where there is prior notice, that will not ordinarily relieve a party from compliance with the rule.328 Equally, the parties “cannot by an agreement to which the court has acquiesced, authorise a course which denies elementary procedural fairness to a witness”.329 Even when there has been an exchange of affidavits or statements, the rule will require a cross-examining counsel to put to a witness the implications which counsel proposes to submit can be drawn from the evidence, where those implications are not obvious from the evidence, or from other pre-trial procedures, or from the course of the case.330 324. Mkari v Meza [2005] NSWCA 136. See also NU v NSW Secretary of Family and Community Services [2017] NSWCA 221 at [72]. 325. Oneflare Pty Ltd v Chernih [2017] NSWCA 195 at [42] (Gleeson JA and Leeming JA agreeing). It was held at [45] that it was made plain that the truthfulness, not merely the reliability, of the evidence of two witnesses on several matters was challenged, and at [58] that there was no suggestion that there was any particular matter which either witness was not given an opportunity to explain or lead evidence about that was relevant to the issues on which their credibility was challenged. See also Stern v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 192; [2000] FCA 294 at [42]; Nankivell v Insurance Commission of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 143 at [55]–[58]. 326. Director, Offıce of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2013) 231 IR 278; [2013] FCAFC 8, Besanko and Perram JJ at [110], Bromberg at [134]. 327. Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773 at [51]; Offıcial Trustee v Pastro [1999] FCA 1631 at [45]–[47] per Finn J; West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24431; [2003] NSWSC 161 at [95]–[99]; Knight v Maclean [2002] NSWCA 314 at [34] per Heydon JA; Hart v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 131 FCR 203; 53 ATR 371; [2003] FCAFC 105 at [23] per Spender J. 328. Parsons v The Queen [2016] VSCA 17 at [42]. 329. New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226; [2014] NSWCA 47, per Leeming JA at [43] (Barrett JA and Tobias AJA agreeing); SAMM Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Shaye Properties Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 132, per McColl JA at [138] (Gleeson JA and Sackville AJA agreeing). 330. West v Mead [2003] NSWSC 161, per Campbell J at [99]; SAMM Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Shaye Properties Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 132, per McColl JA at [139] (Gleeson JA and Sackville AJA agreeing).

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Nevertheless, where a defendant in criminal proceedings was “under no misapprehension” that the prosecution case was that he had a particular “tendency”, there was “no obligation upon the Crown … to put to the accused in cross-examination that he had the relevant tendency”.331 Such prior notice may emerge with sufficient clarity from the pleadings and particulars332 or from evidence on affidavit given in advance of the trial.333 It may be apparent from a defendant’s record of interview.334 Accordingly, where it is clear that the evidence (in a report) of an expert will be challenged (and how it will be challenged), it will not be necessary for the expert to be cross-examined.335 There will be no breach from failure to cross-examine a party where the “party, in its own case, has adduced evidence which contradicts evidence otherwise given by that party”, since where “there is divergence within the evidence led by a party, the responsibility lies with the party leading it to explain the divergence”.336 Whether there has been a breach of the common law rule will also involve matters of fact and degree.337 A cross-examination that covers all possible contingencies may be impractical or oppressive.338 As noted above, the rule will be complied with where the substance of the version or submission challenging the witness’ evidence is put to the witness. It is not necessary that every detail of the challenge which will be made to the witness’ evidence be put to the witness,339 although sometimes a particular detail may be particularly significant.340 What is required is to give a witness an opportunity to comment on or explain some matter about which the opposing party intends to make comment.341 Where an expert has expressed an opinion on the basis of certain factual assumptions and a party proposes to adduce evidence to challenge those assumptions (that is, undermine the opinion by showing that its factual basis was wrong) it is not necessary to draw that evidence to the attention of the expert and invite him or her to agree that his opinions should be qualified or withdrawn.342 It will be necessary to isolate the precise nature of the comment. Thus, there is a difference between a comment that the account of a witness is unreliable because 331. R v Jennings [2010] NSWCCA 193 at [22]. 332. Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; [2004] FCAFC 337 at [56]. 333. Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 234 at [105]; Johnston v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150 per Beazley P at [72]. 334. R v MG (2006) 175 A Crim R 342; [2006] VSCA 264 per Coldrey AJA at [86]. 335. Compare State Rail Authority (NSW) v Brown (2006) 66 NSWLR 540; [2006] NSWCA 220 at [9]. 336. WAQ v Di Pino [2012] QCA 283 at [31]–[33]. 337. Vines v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75 per Spigelman CJ at [62]. 338. Vines v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75 per Spigelman CJ at [409]. 339. White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169; [1998] FCA 806 at 217 (ALR); Jardein Pty Ltd v Stathakis [2007] FCAFC 148 at [29]; Llewellyn v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 66 at [91]; Kraus v Menzie [2012] FCAFC 144 at [40], [50]; AL v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 34 at [193]–[195]. 340. Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179 at [36]. 341. AL v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 34 at [193]. 342. James Hardie Industries NV v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2009] NSWCA 18 at [24]–[26]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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of possible mistake and unreliable because the witness is untruthful. The nature of the cross-examination necessary to comply with the rule will vary depending on the nature of the comment intended to be made. Further, as Mason P explained in Scalise v Bezzina [2003] NSWCA 362 at [98] (Santow JA and Brownie AJA agreeing):

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The rule does not undermine the adversary nature of proceedings or make one party the other’s keeper. Thus, a party who proves facts sufficient to establish a cause of action or a defence upon which that party bears the onus does not have to confront the other side’s witnesses with the issue if they do not address it in their own evidence. To require this would invert that aspect of the rule grounded in what I have described as judicial economy. There is no unfairness in letting the sleeping dog lie and also invoking Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; 32 ALJR 395; 76 WN (NSW) 278; [1959] ALR 367 so long as the moving party has by pleadings or otherwise signalled the matter sought to be proved and led necessary evidence on the topic. There is no need to confront an opponent’s witnesses by cross-examination if they fail to contradict evidence earlier called by the moving party in support of an issue raised in the pleadings or otherwise.

Thus, usually the rule is applied in favour of a moving party whose witness has established a particular proposition – it throws upon the opponent the burden of contradicting that witness by cross-examination and imposes sanctions necessary to ensure fairness if the rule is breached: Mason P at [96].343 A similar point was made by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Arnott [2009] VSCA 299; 214 A Crim R 500 – there was no breach where the prosecution failed to cross-examine an accused about an aspect of his confession which suggested it was true when the accused made no attempt in his testimony to provide an explanation (see Ashley JA at [105]–[109]).344 Equally, there will not be a breach if a party is in the process of putting its case to an opposing witness in compliance with the rule and is prevented from doing so after an objection by the opponent.345 It has been held that, under the common law, the trial judge decides whether there has been a breach where some judicial order or direction is sought: see [EA.46.150] (a)–(c), (f), (i).346 However, where a jury is asked to take a suggested breach into account (see [EA.46.150] (d)–(e), (g)), it will have to determine whether the breach has occurred. Where no breach has occurred (but a jury may nevertheless draw an adverse inference), the jury should be directed that no such inference may be drawn.347 Breach of the rule should not be assumed or anticipated. It may be appropriate for the court to draw attention to a possible future breach of the rule. However, it would be wrong for a court to require a witness to be cross-examined in a particular way on the assumption that the cross-examiner will subsequently be 343. See also Johnston v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150 Beazley P at [70]–[72]. 344. See also Food and Beverage Australia Ltd v Andrews [2017] VSCA 258 at [172]. 345. New South Wales Police Force v Winter (2011) 10 DDCR 69; [2011] NSWCA 330 at [82]–[86]. 346. See Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1; [1999] VSCA 227. 347. Llewellyn v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 66 at [93]–[96].

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adducing evidence or making a particular submission which the rule would require to have been the subject of cross-examination.348 Where there has been a breach of the rule, it would usually be appropriate to grant leave under this provision in order to remedy the breach. As noted above, however, this provision is available even in circumstances where there has not been a breach of the rule, although the question would be whether a grant of leave was appropriate in such circumstances (see [EA.46.180]).

[EA.46.90]

“matter raised by evidence” (drawing an inference adverse to the witness)

Section 46(2) makes it clear that where, for example, a party intends to suggest the drawing of an inference adverse to the witness from the evidence in the case, the suggested inference should be put to the witness in cross-examination. The position under the common law rule is the same.349 It would be no answer to the absence of any such suggestion that the legal representative of the party has no specific instructions regarding the matter sought to be inferred.350

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[EA.46.120]

Criminal proceedings

There is no doubt that the common law rule applies in criminal proceedings, albeit with some modification in respect of alleged breaches of the rule by the defence.351 The circumstances in which it will be considered that there has been a breach of the rule will be narrower in criminal than in civil proceedings, because of “the obligation of the prosecution to present its whole case in chief and the existence of the unavoidable burden of proof carried by the prosecution”.352 Thus, “it is not for the defence to clear up, or resolve inconsistencies in the case for the prosecution”.353 However, if the defence intends to rely upon an alleged inconsistency in the accounts given by a prosecution witness as undermining the credibility of the witness, and the defence has an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the alleged inconsistency, 348. R v Ayoub [2004] NSWCCA 209 at [36]–[40]. 349. R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 689 per Gleeson CJ; Smith v The Queen [2012] VSCA 187 at [51]; Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [201]. 350. R v Neda (unreported, NSW CCA, 9 December 1994). 351. MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74 per Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [18]–[19], Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ at [38]–[41]. See R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531; [2009] VSCA 198 at [273]–[276]; R v Arnott [2009] VSCA 299; 214 A Crim R 500 at [105]; R v Coswello [2009] VSCA 300 at [49]; K v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 157; Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179; 203 A Crim R 121at [36]. There is no doubt the rule applies to the prosecution: see, for example, Smith v The Queen [2012] VSCA 187 at [49]–[51]. 352. MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74 per Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ at [41]. 353. MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74 at [41]. In R v Coswello [2009] VSCA 300, Nettle JA stated at [4]: “The cases do not mark out clearly how far counsel must go in putting the accused’s case to the witness. Sometimes it will need to be extensive. But where the defence case consists only in a denial of the witness’s allegations, without positive evidence or hypothesis of an alternative version of events, the puttage may not need go far and, possibly, may not be necessary at all if defence counsel has made clear from the manner in which the defence case is conducted that the witness’s evidence will be contested” (footnotes deleted; Williams AJA and Buchanan JA adopted a similar analysis). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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failure to do so may have forensic consequences. It will not prevent the defence from relying on the inconsistency but it may be that, for example, the failure to cross-examine could be taken into account “in assessing the weight to be given to the inconsistencies”.354 The reference to the defence having an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the alleged inconsistency is an important pre-condition. If the alleged inconsistency only emerges after the witness has testified (as it did in MWJ v The Queen), Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ considered that there is no obligation on the criminal defendant to seek the recall of the witness to permit further cross-examination. Rather, they stated at [41] that the prosecution must: offer to tender the [witness] for further cross-examination. Had that happened it would then, and only then have been for the [defendant], to decide whether to embrace the offer or not. If he had not, then and only then would the criticism that the Court of Criminal Appeal made of his conduct have been valid.

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As for any obligation on the defence to put “the defence case” to prosecution witnesses, the fact that there is no (general) obligation on a defendant in criminal proceedings to advance a “defence case” (see [EA.20.180]) raises the issue of whether there is any obligation on a defendant to “put his case” to prosecution witnesses.355 Certainly, if the parties in a criminal proceeding agree that a failure of the defence to challenge a complainant’s honesty and credibility will not preclude the defence from arguing that the events complained of did not occur, the trial judge should not invite the jury to take into account that absence of cross-examination.356 However, it appears clear that if a positive case is in fact called by the defence, and evidence adduced inconsistent with the evidence of a

354. Per Doyle CJ in the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal, implicitly endorsed by Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ at [41]; explicitly endorsed by Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [19]; see also [EA.46.150] at (g). However, there is an argument that the majority of the High Court takes an even more restrictive view of the application of Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 in criminal proceedings. At [41] they stated: “The position of an accused who bears no burden of proof in a criminal trial cannot be equated with the position of a defendant in civil proceedings. The rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 can no more be applied, or applied without serious qualification, to an accused in a criminal trial than can the not dissimilar rule in Jones v Dunkel. In each case it is necessary to consider the applicability of the rule (if any) having regard to the essential accusatory character of the criminal trial in this country”. Given the very restrictive application of the rule in Jones v Dunkel in criminal proceedings (see [EA.55.180] it may be that it would be a very rare case when defence submissions could be undermined and/or an adverse inference drawn from failure to comply with the principle. In Rend v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 178; [2006] NSWCCA 41, James J observed at [79] that “the very existence of the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67, as applying to an accused in a criminal trial, has recently been seriously doubted by a majority of the High Court”. However, the Western Australian Court of Appeal has not doubted the continued operation of the rule as applying to an accused: K v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 157 (defence counsel held to have breached the rule by criticising prosecution witness in final address without having put substance of criticism to witness in cross-examination). 355. R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547; [2004] NSWCCA 287 per Kirby J at [73]–[79]. 356. SY v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 6 at [55]–[56].

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prosecution witness, the rule may be regarded as thereby breached. Equally, it appears clear that the rule may be breached by failure to cross-examine a witness called by a co-defendant.358

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[EA.46.130]

Children and other vulnerable witnesses

In Ward v The Queen [2017] VSCA 37, Maxwell P and Redlich JA of the Victorian Court of Appeal observed that discharge of “counsel’s obligation of fairness as expressed in the rule in Browne v Dunn” (at [119]) “requires that the child be given a fair opportunity to make clear whether he or she adheres to the account” (emphasis added) given to the authorities (at [122]). Since the obligation is an aspect of procedural fairness, “its content varies according to the circumstances of the case”. Thus, while it may be assumed that “an adult witness has the cognition, and the independence of will, to reject questions which contain a suggestion or assertion of the existence (or non-existence) of a particular fact … [s]uch assumptions cannot be made in the case of a child witness” because “a child’s vulnerability and the likelihood that they will assent to suggestive questions increase the risk that the child will give answers that are contradictory” (at [121]). In respect of “a child witness whose age or capacity renders them vulnerable”, while counsel is required “to address those specific allegations made by the child which the defence disputes”, “[s]imply to ‘put’ matters which the child accepts will be unlikely, for the reasons already explored, to discharge” the obligation (at [123]). Thus, in a case of alleged indecent assault of a young child, to simply ask a suggestive “tag question” such as “[Defendant] did not touch you, did he?” is unlikely to discharge the obligation – without also asking the child whether her or his initial account “is true?” (at [123]–[126]).359 For further discussion of questioning of children and other vulnerable witnesses, see [EA.41.120], [EA.42.130].

[EA.46.150]

Consequences of the common law rule

The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 635): As far as consequences are concerned, it is not possible or appropriate to address issues such as the comments that may be made on the inferences that may be drawn from a failure to comply with the rule. The law on this aspect is not affected. From an evidential point of view, the proposal should address the question of the consequences of failure to comply with the rule. One option is that the party who should have cross-examined a witness should be prevented from later leading evidence about the particular matters on which he should have cross-examined. This, however, would deprive the court and the parties of evidence. The issue is best dealt with by a judicial discretion to permit parties to recall the witness who should have been cross-examined.

Mason P observed in Scalise v Bezzina [2003] NSWCA 362 at [97] that, “if it appears during the course of the trial that the rule has been offended and that 357. See R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531; [2009] VSCA 198 at [273]–[276]; Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179 at [36]; KC v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 61; 207 A Crim R 241; [2011] VSCA 82 at [53]; Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 at [21]; Buchwald v The Queen (2011) 38 VR 199; [2011] VSCA 445 at [157]–[161]; R v Orchard [2013] NSWCCA 342 at [43]. See also Llewellyn v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 66. 358. See Italiano v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 260, Mazza J at [114]. 359. Of course, as pointed out by Maxwell P and Redlich JA at [135], if counsel failed to ask the latter question, the prosecutor may ask it in re-examination. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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unfairness may result, the judge has a discretion as to how best to remedy the unfairness so that the trial does not miscarry”. In Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179, Whealy J stated at [42] that “a trial court must always endeavour to demonstrate flexibility in its response to the particular problem before it”. Possible consequences of breach of the rule are: (a) Recall of the witness who was not cross-examined in compliance with the rule. In MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ stated at [40]:

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If the evidence in the case has not been completed, a party genuinely taken by surprise by reason of a failure on the part of the other to put a relevant matter in cross-examination, can almost always, especially in ordinary civil litigation, mitigate or cure any difficulties so arising by seeking or offering the recall of the witness to enable the matter to be put. In criminal cases, in many jurisdictions, the salutary practice of excusing witnesses temporarily only, and on the understanding that they must make themselves available to be recalled if necessary at any time before a verdict is given, is adopted. There may be some circumstances in which it could be unfair to permit the recalling of a witness, but in general, subject to the obligation of the prosecution not to split its case, and to present or make available all of the relevant evidence to an accused, the course that we have suggested is one that should be able to be adopted on most occasions without injustice.

This provision is designed to facilitate such a recall. However, this is a matter of leave (see [EA.46.180]) and, as under the existing common law, if a witness’s views on the contradictory version are already clear or the party which called the witness had knowledge of that version and therefore the opportunity to call evidence about it, there may be no unfairness (and indeed no breach of the rule).360 It would not then be appropriate to grant leave. In a criminal case, it may not be appropriate to grant leave if to do so would breach the obligation of the prosecution not to split its case. Further, recalling the witness for further cross-examination may in some circumstances exacerbate prejudice to the defendant arising from the failure of the defendant’s lawyer to comply with the rule.361 In a jury trial, if the witness is recalled the judge may need to give appropriate directions to the jury.362 (b) Allow party who called the witness to re-open its case to lead evidence to rebut the contradictory evidence or corroborate the evidence of the witness. While not falling within the scope of this provision, there is no doubt that a court may permit this under the common law.363 In a criminal case, it may not be appropriate to grant leave to re-open if to do so would breach the obligation of the prosecution not to split its case. 360. Thomas v Van Den Yssel (1976) 14 SASR 205 (FC); R v Romeo (1982) 30 SASR 243 (FC); Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 23–24; Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 (CA). 361. R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 at [12]. 362. See Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179, Whealy J (Campbell JA and Simpson J agreeing) at [52]. 363. Johnston v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 148 at [108]–[111].

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(c) Excluding evidence adduced by the party in breach of the rule. Under the common law, there is authority that a court may reject evidence adduced by the party in breach of the rule.364 It appears to have been the intention of the ALRC that a court would not be entitled to take this course. However, the provision does not expressly prohibit it and it might be argued that the general powers of a court to control the conduct of a proceeding and ensure fairness (maintained in s 11) would permit evidentiary exclusion (without breach of s 56). Alternatively, reliance might be placed on the discretions to exclude evidence (particularly evidence which might be “unfairly prejudicial”) in Pt 3.11.365 Certainly, the Full Court of the Federal Court has proceeded on the assumption that, in appropriate circumstances, evidence may be excluded on this basis (even where the party in breach of the rule was unrepresented).366 Similarly, the NSW Court of Appeal considers that rejection of evidence is possible, although it has observed that there is no “absolute proposition that evidence may not be called in contradiction of an opponent’s case unless that opponent’s witnesses were relevantly cross-examined”.367 The position in criminal cases was considered by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179, 203 A Crim R 121, where it was held that defence evidence may be excluded where there has been a breach of the rule, but only where alternative less drastic remedies had been considered and rejected on the basis that they could not prevent unfairness (at [45], [48]). It is the “last resort” (at [53]). One situation where it might be appropriate to consider exclusion would be if the witness not properly cross-examined could not be recalled.368 Consideration of alternative less drastic remedies (such as witness recall pursuant to this provision) would also be appropriate in civil proceedings.369 (d) Limiting use of evidence adduced by the party in breach of the rule. For example, where hearsay evidence of a particular event has been admitted and there has been no cross-examination regarding the truthfulness of the person who made the out-of-court representation or 364. Payless Superbarn (NSW) Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551 (CA); Ghazal v GIO (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 (CA). In respect of criminal cases, this course was suggested in R v Schneidas (No 2) (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 (NSW CCA) at 110–111 per the court, but not followed in R v Allen [1989] VR 736 or R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 (CCA). It has been held in Victoria that a court cannot prevent the defence from giving otherwise admissible evidence, even in circumstances where the rule has been breached: Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337. 365. See R v McCormack (No 3) [2003] NSWSC 645. 366. Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 at 101–103 (ALR). Of course, if the evidence sought to be adduced is inadmissible, it cannot be adduced in any event: Heaton v Luczka (unreported, NSW CA, Cole, Beazley, Stein JJA, 3 March 1998). 367. Fleet v District Court of NSW [1999] NSWCA 363 at [64]. 368. See Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179, Whealy J (Campbell JA and Simpson J agreeing) at [52]. 369. See Pasqualotto v Pasqualotto [2013] Aust Torts Reports 82-125; [2013] VSCA 21, Osborn JA at [271]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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the witness giving evidence of it, it may be appropriate to allow contrary evidence of the event but (using s 136) to prevent its use to challenge the truthfulness of either person.370

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(e) Cross-examination of the party in breach. A party who testifies may be cross-examined on apparent differences between his or her evidence and the case as presented in his or her counsel’s cross-examination of opposing witnesses.371 Indeed, in cases where it is intended to contrast that failure with evidence subsequently given by a party (see (h) below), the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 itself makes it obligatory to put to the party the inferences or conclusions which it will be suggested should be drawn, in order that the party may provide such explanation as he or she is able to provide.372 However, the circumstances must justify proposed cross-examination on an apparent inconsistency.373 Further, the cross-examination must be relevant to an issue or, if relevant only to the credibility of the party, there must be compliance with the requirements of Pt 3.7.374 Questions of client legal privilege may arise.375 A suggestion should not be put in cross-examination of the party in breach that the mere failure to cross-examine an opposition witness on some topic necessarily leads to an adverse inference to the party.376 Any cross-examination that has been permitted may require, in a jury trial,

370. See Commonwealth v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 at 400–402; Lord Buddha Pty Ltd v Harpur (2013) 41 VR 159; [2013] VSCA 101 at [210]. On the other hand, it may not be appropriate to prevent the evidence being used to challenge the reliability of the hearsay evidence (as distinct from truthfulness). 371. R v Scott [2004] NSWCCA 254 per Hulme J at [60] (Sully and James JJ agreeing); Paterson v The Queen [2004] WASCA 63; Oldfield v The Queen (2006) 163 A Crim R 242; [2006] NSWCCA 219 at [40]–[45]. However, note that in Llewellyn v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 66, Garling J expressed the view that, in a criminal trial, a prosecutor should only cross-examine a defendant in this way “in the rarest of cases and only where a proper basis exists” (at 137(d)). In Lysle v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 20 at [43]; RS Hulme J (Basten JA and Schmidt J agreeing) disagreed with this observation but stated at [44]: “It may be that the caution that Crown Prosecutors have been told to exercise should inspire them to first raise the issue of any explanation for a contrast between the silence of an accused’s counsel and evidence of an accused in the absence of the jury or, if they do not adopt that course, of going little or no further than drawing the contrast, merely asking an accused if he can give any explanation for the difference, and suggesting he has made up his evidence on the topic”. 372. Lysle v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 20 at [43]; R v Scott [2004] NSWCCA 254 at [62]; R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; 187 A Crim R 89; [2008] VSCA 144 at [66], [116]; Parsons v The Queen [2016] VSCA 17. However, see R v Heaney (2009) 22 VR 164; 194 A Crim R 562; [2009] VSCA 74;, Ashley JA at [129]: “I doubt that the rule could sensibly apply” where the party in breach (the accused) had given evidence that was internally contradictory. 373. R v Dennis [1999] NSWCCA 23; see also Llewellyn v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 66, Garling J at [139]; Lysle v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 20 at [43]. 374. R v Scott [2004] NSWCCA 254 at [72]–[73]. 375. See Llewellyn v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 66, Garling J at [140]; Lysle v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 20 at [33]–[44]. 376. Picker v The Queen [2002] NSWCCA 78.

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careful directions to the jury (see (h) below). Re-examination may be permitted on the issue whether there has been a breach and, if there has, any issue of credibility arising.378 (f) Prevent the party in breach of the rule from relying on the challenge to the testimony not put to the witness in cross-examination.379 It would appear from the judgment of the High Court in MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74 that this consequence would not be available in a criminal proceeding where the defence had failed to cross-examine the prosecution witness in breach of the rule.380 On the other hand, the breach of the rule may be “taken into account” (see below).

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(g) Taking into account the failure to cross-examine. In the absence of a challenge, the court is entitled to treat the party as taking no issue with the accuracy of the witness’s account (thereby adopting it).381 Where evidence is subsequently given contrary to the evidence of the witness, the tribunal of fact should take into account the fact that the witness has been unfairly deprived of the opportunity to give evidence (and the court to receive evidence) dealing with the particular matter not crossexamined upon.382 In MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ stated at [39]: “One corollary of the rule is that judges should in general abstain from making adverse findings about parties and witnesses in respect of whom there has been non-compliance with it”.383 Prima facie, unchallenged evidence should be accepted by a tribunal of fact, although a court is not bound to accept such evidence.384 In Knight v Maclean [2002] NSWCA 314, Heydon JA 377. Paterson v The Queen [2004] WASCA 63. 378. See Llewellyn v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 66 at [58]. 379. Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 375 per Wells J; Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 (CA) at 221–223 per Glass JA; R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 690; Knight v Maclean [2002] NSWCA 314, Heydon JA at [34]; SAMM Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Shaye Properties Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 132, per McColl JA at [140] (Gleeson JA and Sackville AJA agreeing). 380. MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74 per Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [19]; Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ at [39]. See also R v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 168 A Crim R 1; [2006] VSCA 277 at [54] fn 43; CMG v The Queen (2013) 234 A Crim R 455; [2013] VSCA 243 at [64]–[74]. 381. Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [201]–[204]. 382. Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1983] 1 NSWLR 1; R v McNamara (unreported, NSW CCA, 15 December 1995); R v McDowell [1997] 1 VR 473 at 482; R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290; (2000) 105 A Crim R 1; Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773 at [51]–[53] (Fed Ct FC); McDonald v Livestock Transport (Sydney) Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 166 at [25]; R v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 168 A Crim R 1; [2006] VSCA 277 at [49]; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 at [15]; Baulch v Lyndoch Warrnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 30; CMG v The Queen (2013) 234 A Crim R 455; [2013] VSCA 243 at [64]–[74]. 383. See also Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773 at [51]. 384. Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir 132 CLR 362; [1975] HCA 27; Hull v Thompson [2001] NSWCA 359; see also Davis v Council of the City of Wagga Wagga [2004] NSWCA 34 at [38], citing Boston Clothing Co Pty Ltd v Margaronis (1992) 27 NSWLR 580 per Kirby P at 590; © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(with whom Meagher JA and Young CJ in Eq agreed) observed (at [35]) that “it would not be unreasonable” to accept the evidence of a witness who has not been challenged in cross-examination, even if contradictory evidence has been adduced.385 The tribunal of fact may give no, or less, weight to evidence adduced to contradict the witness and no, or less weight to an inference sought to be drawn which was not put to the witness.386 A criticism of the evidence of the witness may be given significantly less weight where it was not raised with the witness.387 Of course, the court is not required to prefer the evidence of the witness to the contradictory evidence.388 Where there is no contradictory evidence, the Victorian Court of Appeal observed in Baulch v Lyndoch Warrnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 30 at [20] that the evidence of the witness “ought” to be accepted, “in the absence of a good reason not to”. As regards such a “good reason”, the opinion evidence of an expert, for example, may be rejected where it is illogical or inherently inconsistent, or where it is based on an incorrect or incomplete history, or where the assumptions on which it is founded are not established.389 However, principles of procedural fairness may require the party that called the witness to be given notice that the unchallenged evidence may be rejected and the reasons for that (so that the party has the opportunity to argue to the contrary.390

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Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322; 312 ALR 551; [2014] FCAFC 15, Mansfield and Gilmour JJ at [78]. In Reberger v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 132 it was stated at [48]: “A court can sometimes reject evidence that has not been cross-examined on, if, for example, it was inconsistent with other evidence that the court accepted, or was inherently incredible”. 385. See also SAMM Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Shaye Properties Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 132, per McColl JA at [140], [145]; Merrey v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 62 at [8]–[11]; K v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 157 at [109]. However, it was held in WAQ v Di Pino [2012] QCA 283 at [31]–[33] that this reasoning did not apply in a case where “a party, in its own case, has adduced evidence which contradicts evidence otherwise given by that party”. 386. Smith v The Queen [2012] VSCA 187 at [53]. See also R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531; [2009] VSCA 198 at [269]; R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526; 213 A Crim R 530; [2009] VSCA 291 at [60]; Drash v The Queen [2012] VSCA 33 at [80]; Lederberger v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd (2012) 38 VR 509; [2012] VSCA 262 at [79], [117]. In some circumstances, a failure to cross-examine may have the result that there is no evidence to support the adverse inference at all: compare SGH v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 161 at [58]–[62], [132]–[134]. 387. Wilson v Tasmania [2017] TASCCA 11 at [41]–[45]. 388. Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 849; Spencer v Bamber [2012] NSWCA 274 at [134]; WAQ v Di Pino [2012] QCA 283 at [30], [37]. 389. Hull v Thompson [2001] NSWCA 359 at [21]; Roach v Page (No 37) [2004] NSWSC 1048 at [374]; Baulch v Lyndoch Warrnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 30 at [20]; Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Westfarmers General Insurance Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 482 at [90]–[91]. In Spencer v Bamber [2012] NSWCA 274, Campbell JA observed at [134] that “a judge can reject evidence that has not been cross-examined on if, for example, it was inconsistent with other evidence that he or she accepted, or if it was inherently incredible”. Similarly, in Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322; 312 ALR 551; [2014] FCAFC 15, Mansfield and Gilmour JJ stated at [77] that “as a general proposition, evidence, which is not inherently incredible and which is unchallenged, ought to be accepted … [although the] evidence may of course be rejected if it is contradicted by facts otherwise established by the evidence or the particular circumstances point to its rejection”. 390. Nominal Defendant v Saleh (2011) 57 MVR 412; [2011] NSWCA 16 at [142].

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On the other hand, where an application was made to have the witness recalled so that the matter could be put to the witness, and the application refused, this must also be taken into account.391 A submission based on a failure to cross-examine will be “very much weakened” if an offer to permit the re-call of the witness for further cross-examination is not taken up.392 A failure by the opposing party to complain about the breach may have implications for how the tribunal of fact approaches the matter.393

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(h) Adverse inferences may be drawn.394 The terms in which a party’s counsel cross-examines a witness for the opposite side may be taken to reveal the version of events with which the party has instructed that party’s counsel. If the party testifies inconsistently with that inferred version, it might then be inferred that the party’s account has changed. However, this should be approached with caution, particularly in criminal trials. In R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 691,395 Gleeson CJ adopted the following remarks of King CJ in R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17 at 23: It is legitimate, of course, to draw appropriate conclusions from counsel’s failure to put in cross-examination some matter to which his client or his witnesses subsequently depose. It is a process of reasoning, however, which is fraught with peril and should therefore be used only with much caution and circumspection. There may be many explanations of the omission which do not reflect upon the credibility of the witnesses. Counsel may have misunderstood his instructions. The witnesses may not have been fully co-operative in providing statements. Forensic pressures may have resulted in looseness or inexactitude in the framing of questions. The matter might simply have been overlooked. I think that where the possibility of drawing an adverse inference is left to the jury, the jury should be assisted, generally speaking, by some reference to the sort of factors which I have mentioned.

The Victorian Court of Appeal accepts that only “rare cases” warrant a direction “suggesting that non-compliance with the rule could support recent invention and thereby affect the credibility of the accused”.396 Thus, a judge should not normally suggest to any jury that the mere failure to cross-examine necessarily leads to an adverse inference to a

391. R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 per Muir J at [38], Pincus JA at [11]. 392. Gruber v Blake (2003) 39 MVR 465; [2003] NSWCA 256 at [16]; Housden v Boral Australian Gypsum Ltd [2015] VSCA 162 at [147]. 393. See Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498; 282 ALR 336; [2011] NSWCA 226 at [62]–[68]. 394. R v Robinson [1977] Qd R 3877; R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 (CCA); R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290; (2000) 105 A Crim R 1; R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526; 213 A Crim R 530; [2009] VSCA 291; Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [203]–[204]. 395. See also R v Von Rijssen (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 (NSWCCA); R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 at [40]–[41] per Muir J; Oldfield v The Queen (2006) 163 A Crim R 242; [2006] NSWCCA 219 at [40]; Turnell v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 399 at [50]; Giourtalis v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 216 at [45]. 396. R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526; 213 A Crim R 530; [2009] VSCA 291 at [62]–[70]; RR v The Queen [2011] VSCA 442 at [68]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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party, for there may be other explanations for the failure. If the suggestion is made to the jury, they should usually398 be warned that other inferences that are not adverse to the defendant (such as misunderstanding or error on the part of the defendant’s counsel) might be drawn.399 Indeed, the defendant’s counsel may submit in final address “that the omission might be explained by oversight or error on his part or by other reasonable explanations that bore upon whether the jury should draw the inference that the applicant’s evidence was an afterthought”.400 The nature of the permissible inference should be carefully identified.401 The jury should not be directed that counsel necessarily is acting on instructions – they should be cautioned that counsel has a wide discretion as to the manner in which a trial is conducted and is not a mere “mouthpiece” for the client.402 They should not be directed that counsel only puts allegations in cross-examination where he or she knows or is confident that evidence will be given to support the allegations.403 The circumstances may also require a jury to be directed that no burden of proof is cast upon the defendant. Where a defendant is not legally represented, it would ordinarily be inappropriate to apply the normal rule.404 Equally, no inferences should be drawn from any such failure by the defence at a committal hearing.405 It would be inappropriate to permit an adverse inference where there was an

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397. R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17 at 23 per King CJ (FC); R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 (CCA); RWB v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 209; [2010] NSWCCA 147 at [101]; Giourtalis v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 216 at [45]. 398. See R v Banic [2004] NSWCCA 322 at [27]; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 at [19]; R v Smart [2010] VSCA 33 at [114]. It was not necessary in TP v The Queen [2012] VSCA 166 where the trial judge explicitly instructed the jury that they could only draw an inference affecting the appellant’s credibility if they were able to exclude beyond reasonable doubt that there was any other explanation for the change in his position in his sworn evidence (at [59]). 399. R v Manunta at 23; R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677; R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553; [1999] VSCA 127 at [50]; R v Abdallah [2001] NSWCCA 506; R v GED (2003) 141 A Crim R 135; [2003] NSWCCA 296; R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547; [2004] NSWCCA 287 at [88]; Oldfield v The Queen (2006) 163 A Crim R 242; [2006] NSWCCA 219 at [40], [50]; R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; 187 A Crim R 89; [2008] VSCA 144 at [123]; RWB v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 209; [2010] NSWCCA 147 at [116]; Drash v The Queen [2012] VSCA 33 at [84]–[88]. In R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; 187 A Crim R 89; [2008] VSCA 144 it was stated at [120] that if a prosecutor is permitted to make a comment on this issue, “he should provide some explanation of the rule and advert to other explanations for counsel’s omission” (see also Drash v The Queen [2012] VSCA 33 at [76]). 400. R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; 187 A Crim R 89; [2008] VSCA 144 at [121]. 401. In R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 the only permissible adverse inference related to the evidence of the defendant’s father, not the defendant. 402. R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 691–692. 403. R v Lawrence (unreported, NSW CCA, 19 April 1979); R v Statham (unreported, Qld CA, 28 April 1994); R v Abdallah [2001] NSWCCA 506. 404. R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91; R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 688 per Gleeson CJ. However, for a far from ordinary case, compare Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 at 82–103 (Fed Ct FC). 405. R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 689 per Gleeson CJ.

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opportunity to put the suggested inference to the party and it was not taken (thus depriving the party of the opportunity to provide such explanation as he or she is able).406 Where there has been cross-examination of the party in breach of the rule, and the party concedes that there was a breach because his or her counsel was not informed of the account ultimately given in evidence, there is no need for cautionary directions.407 (i) Discharge jury. In some circumstances, problems created by breach of the rule may be incurable, so that nothing can be done to prevent a miscarriage of justice arising from the breach.408 In other circumstances, breach of the rule may be curable by, for example, directions to the jury given by the judge.409

[EA.46.180]

“the court may give leave”

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Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.410 In Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179, Whealy J (Campbell JA and Simpson J agreeing) observed at [52] that “[r]elevant considerations would have necessarily included any practical problems in securing the re-attendance of the witnesses, the importance of the evidence and any issue of unfairness to the Crown”.

Part 2.2 – Documents [EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.30]

General comments – application

This Part of the Act deals with the means of proving the contents of documents. The common law rules (including the “best evidence” or “original document” rules) are abolished by s 51. In their place, Pt 2.2 allows proof of the contents of a document in a number of specified ways. In addition, other legislation may also permit proof of the contents of a document in other ways, assuming the continued application of that legislation under s 8. The NSW Act applies “in relation to all proceedings in a NSW court” and the Victorian Act applies “in relation to all 406. R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; 187 A Crim R 89; [2008] VSCA 144 at [66], [116]–[119]; R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526; 213 A Crim R 530; [2009] VSCA 291 at [70]. However, see R v Heaney (2009) 22 VR 164; 194 A Crim R 562; [2009] VSCA 74; at [107] where Ashley JA queried, “if a prosecutor does not comply with the second aspect of the rule in Browne v Dunn, whether there is an absolute prohibition against the jury reasoning” in this way. See also at [128], [132]. 407. Parsons v The Queen [2016] VSCA 17 at [36], [47]. 408. R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 at 76; [24]; Reza v Summerhill Orchards Ltd (2013) 37 VR 204; [2013] VSCA 17 at [46]–[74]. 409. De Vries v The Queen [2013] VSCA 210 at [21]–[39]; CMG v The Queen (2013) 234 A Crim R 455; [2013] VSCA 243 at [194]–[216]; Mitchell v The Queen [2016] VSCA 197 at [74]–[75]. 410. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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proceedings in a Victorian court”: s 4. Similarly, under the Commonwealth Act, in accordance with s 4, the provisions in this Part, in general, only apply to proceedings in a federal court and an ACT court. However, where the document is a “Commonwealth record” (defined in the Dictionary), the Commonwealth Act has a broader application. Section 182(1) operates to apply ss 47, 48, 49 and 51 to: documents411 that: (a) are, or form part of, Commonwealth records; or (b) at the time they were produced were, or formed part of, Commonwealth records

in respect of “all proceedings in an Australian court” under s 5. Section 182(5) ensures that ss 47, 48, 49 and 51 do “not derogate from the operation of a law of a State or Territory that enables evidence of” documents “to be given”.

[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.60]

General comments – “request system”

Since this Part abolishes the “best evidence” rule (s 51), Div 1 of Pt 4.6 of the Act establishes a system whereby a party may request the production of a document, so as to protect parties against whom secondary evidence of the document is proposed to be led. Under s 167, a “reasonable request” may be made “for the purpose of determining a question that relates to: … (c) the authenticity, identity or admissibility of a document or thing”.

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[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.2.90]

General comments – discovery

The Act (s 193) accords power to a court to order discovery in relation to documents. The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 716) that this proposal was designed to extend rules relating to discovery “to include tapes, disks, microfilms and other media” and: … to enable the party against whom the evidence is to be led to examine the record keeping system and to have provided to it all information, materials and equipment needed to understand the way in which the records are kept and compiled and how any visible reproduction of the contents of the record is produced.

Cth Act: 47

Definitions

(1) A reference in this Part to a document in question is a reference to a document as to the contents of which it is sought to adduce evidence. (2) A reference in this Part to a copy of a document in question includes a reference to a document that is not an exact copy of the document in question but that is identical to the document in question in all relevant respects. Note: Section 182 gives this section a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents. [S 47 am Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 3] 411. Section 182(4)(a) defines this word to include “a reference to writing placed on objects”.

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NSW Act: 47 Definitions (1) A reference in this Part to a document in question is a reference to a document as to the contents of which it is sought to adduce evidence. (2) A reference in this Part to a copy of a document in question includes a reference to a document that is not an exact copy of the document in question but that is identical to the document in question in all relevant respects. Vic Act: 47

Definitions

(1) A reference in this Part to a document in question is a reference to a document as to the contents of which it is sought to adduce evidence. (2) A reference in this Part to a copy of a document in question includes a reference to a document that is not an exact copy of the document in question but that is identical to the document in question in all relevant respects. ACT Act: 47

Definitions—pt 2.2

(1) For this part, a document in question is a document as to the contents of which it is sought to present evidence.

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(2) For this part, a reference to a copy of a document in question includes a reference to a document that is not an exact copy of the document in question but that is identical to the document in question in all relevant respects. NT Act: 47

Definitions

(1) A reference in this Part to a document in question is a reference to a document as to the contents of which it is sought to adduce evidence. (2) A reference in this Part to a copy of a document in question includes a reference to a document that is not an exact copy of the document in question but that is identical to the document in question in all relevant respects.

[EA.47.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 123, para 232.

[EA.47.60] General comments The ALRC explained (ALRC 38, para 232) the rationale behind its use of the term “document in question”: We are accustomed to think in terms of “original documents” and copy documents. At times, however, the document, the contents of which must be proved, can be a copy document. If the term “original” was used in the legislation, a definition would be required of “original” to include a copy document where it was the document the contents of which were in question. To avoid this, the simple device was used … of relating the proposals to the proof of the contents of the “document in question”.

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Cth Act:

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48 Proof of contents of documents (1) A party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question by tendering the document in question or by any one or more of the following methods: (a) adducing evidence of an admission made by another party to the proceeding as to the contents of the document in question; (b) tendering a document that: (i) is or purports to be a copy of the document in question; and (ii) has been produced, or purports to have been produced, by a device that reproduces the contents of documents; (c) if the document in question is an article or thing by which words are recorded in such a way as to be capable of being reproduced as sound, or in which words are recorded in a code (including shorthand writing)—tendering a document that is or purports to be a transcript of the words; (d) if the document in question is an article or thing on or in which information is stored in such a way that it cannot be used by the court unless a device is used to retrieve, produce or collate it—tendering a document that was or purports to have been produced by use of the device; (e) tendering a document that: (i) forms part of the records of or kept by a business (whether or not the business is still in existence); and (ii) is or purports to be a copy of, or an extract from or a summary of, the document in question, or is or purports to be a copy of such an extract or summary; (f) if the document in question is a public document—tendering a document that is or purports to be a copy of the document in question and that is or purports to have been printed: (i) by the Government Printer or by the government or official printer of a State or Territory; or (ii) by authority of the government or administration of the Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or a foreign country; or (iii) by authority of an Australian Parliament, a House of an Australian Parliament, a committee of such a House or a committee of an Australian Parliament. (2) Subsection (1) applies to a document in question whether the document in question is available to the party or not. (3) If the party adduces evidence of the contents of a document under paragraph (1)(a), the evidence may only be used: (a) in respect of the party’s case against the other party who made the admission concerned; or 272

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(b) in respect of the other party’s case against the party who adduced the evidence in that way. (4) A party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question that is not available to the party, or the existence and contents of which are not in issue in the proceeding, by: (a) tendering a document that is a copy of, or an extract from or summary of, the document in question; or (b) adducing from a witness evidence of the contents of the document in question. Note 1: Clause 5 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of documents. Note 2: Section 182 gives this section a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents. [Subs (4) am Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 items 4–6] [S 48 am Act 125 of 1999]

NSW Act:

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48

Proof of contents of documents

(1) A party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question by tendering the document in question or by any one or more of the following methods: (a) adducing evidence of an admission made by another party to the proceeding as to the contents of the document in question, (b) tendering a document that: (i) is or purports to be a copy of the document in question, and (ii) has been produced, or purports to have been produced, by a device that reproduces the contents of documents, (c) if the document in question is an article or thing by which words are recorded in such a way as to be capable of being reproduced as sound, or in which words are recorded in a code (including shorthand writing)—tendering a document that is or purports to be a transcript of the words, (d) if the document in question is an article or thing on or in which information is stored in such a way that it cannot be used by the court unless a device is used to retrieve, produce or collate it—tendering a document that was or purports to have been produced by use of the device, (e) tendering a document that: (i) forms part of the records of or kept by a business (whether or not the business is still in existence), and (ii) is or purports to be a copy of, or an extract from or a summary of, the document in question, or is or purports to be a copy of such an extract or summary, (f) if the document in question is a public document—tendering a document that is or purports to be a copy of the document in question and that is or purports to have been printed: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(i)

by a person authorised by or on behalf of the government to print the document or by the Government Printer of the Commonwealth or by the government or official printer of another State or a Territory, or (ii) by the authority of the Government or administration of the State, the Commonwealth, another State, a Territory or a foreign country, or (iii) by authority of an Australian Parliament, a House of an Australian Parliament, a committee of such a House or a committee of an Australian Parliament. (2) Subsection (1) applies to a document in question whether the document in question is available to the party or not.

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(3) If the party adduces evidence of the contents of a document under subsection (1)(a), the evidence may only be used: (a) in respect of the party’s case against the other party who made the admission concerned, or (b) in respect of the other party’s case against the party who adduced the evidence in that way. (4) A party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question that is not available to the party, or the existence and contents of which are not in issue in the proceeding, by: (a) tendering a document that is a copy of, or an extract from or summary of, the document in question, or (b) adducing from a witness evidence of the contents of the document in question. [Subs (4) am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[1]] Notes: 1 Clause 5 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of documents. 2 Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 48 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents. [S 48 am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[2]]

Vic Act: 48

Proof of contents of documents

(1) A party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question by tendering the document in question or by any one or more of the following methods— (a) adducing evidence of an admission made by another party to the proceeding as to the contents of the document in question; (b) tendering a document that— (i) is or purports to be a copy of the document in question; and (ii) has been produced, or purports to have been produced, by a device that reproduces the contents of documents; 274

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(c)

if the document in question is an article or thing by which words are recorded in such a way as to be capable of being reproduced as sound, or in which words are recorded in a code (including shorthand writing)—tendering a document that is or purports to be a transcript of the words; (d) if the document in question is an article or thing on or in which information is stored in such a way that it cannot be used by the court unless a device is used to retrieve, produce or collate it—tendering a document that was or purports to have been produced by use of the device; (e) tendering a document that— (i) forms part of the records of or kept by a business (whether or not the business is still in existence); and (ii) is or purports to be a copy of, or an extract from or a summary of, the document in question, or is or purports to be a copy of such an extract or summary; (f) if the document in question is a public document—tendering a document that is or purports to be a copy of the document in question and that is or purports to have been printed— (i) by a person authorised by or on behalf of the Government to print the document or by the Government Printer of the Commonwealth or by the government or official printer of another State or a Territory; or (ii) by the authority of the Government or administration of the State, the Commonwealth, another State, a Territory or a foreign country; or (iii) by authority of an Australian Parliament, a House of an Australian Parliament, a committee of such a House or a committee of an Australian Parliament. (2) Subsection (1) applies to a document in question whether the document in question is available to the party or not. (3) If the party adduces evidence of the contents of a document under subsection (1)(a), the evidence may only be used— (a) in respect of the party’s case against the other party who made the admission concerned; or (b) in respect of the other party’s case against the party who adduced the evidence in that way. (4) A party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question that is not available to the party, or the existence and contents of which are not in issue in the proceeding, by— (a) tendering a document that is a copy of, or an extract from or summary of, the document in question; or (b) adducing from a witness evidence of the contents of the document in question. Notes: 1 Clause 5 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of documents. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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2 Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 48 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents.

ACT Act:

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48

Proof of contents of documents

(1) A party may present evidence of the contents of a document in question by tendering the document in question or by any 1 or more of the following methods: (a) presenting evidence of an admission made by another party to the proceeding as to the contents of the document in question; (b) tendering a document that— (i) is or purports to be a copy of the document in question; and (ii) has been produced, or purports to have been produced, by a device that reproduces the contents of documents; (c) if the document in question is an article or thing by which words are recorded in a way as to be capable of being reproduced as sound, or in which words are recorded in a code (including shorthand writing)—tendering a document that is or purports to be a transcript of the words; (d) if the document in question is an article or thing on or in which information is stored in a way that it cannot be used by the court unless a device is used to retrieve, produce or collate it—tendering a document that was or purports to have been produced by use of the device; (e) tendering a document that— (i) forms part of the records of or kept by a business (whether or not the business is still in existence); and (ii) is or purports to be a copy of, or an extract from or a summary of, the document in question, or is or purports to be a copy of the extract or summary; (f) if the document in question is a public document—tendering a document that is or purports to be a copy of the document in question and that is or purports to have been printed— (i) by the government printer or the government or official printer of the Commonwealth, a State or another Territory; or (ii) by authority of the government of the Territory, the Commonwealth, a State, another Territory or a foreign country; or (iii) by authority of an Australian Parliament, a house of an Australian Parliament or a committee of an Australian Parliament or of a house of an Australian Parliament. (2) Subsection (1) applies to a document in question whether the document in question is available to the party or not. (3) If the party presents evidence of the contents of a document under subsection (1)(a), the evidence may only be used— 276

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(a)

in relation to the party’s case against the other party who made the admission; or (b) in relation to the other party’s case against the party who presented the evidence in that way. (4) A party may present evidence of the contents of a document in question that is not available to the party, or the existence and contents of which are not in issue in the proceeding, by— (a) tendering a document that is a copy of, or an extract from or summary of, the document in question; or (b) presenting evidence from a witness of the contents of the document in question. Note 1: The dictionary, pt 2, s 5 is about the availability of documents. Note 2: The Commonwealth Act, s 182 gives the Commonwealth Act, s 48 a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents.

NT Act:

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48

Proof of contents of documents

(1) A party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question by tendering the document in question or by any one or more of the following methods: (a) adducing evidence of an admission made by another party to the proceeding as to the contents of the document in question; (b) tendering a document that: (i) is or purports to be a copy of the document in question; and (ii) has been produced, or purports to have been produced, by a device that reproduces the contents of documents; (c) if the document in question is an article or thing by which words are recorded in such a way as to be capable of being reproduced as sound, or in which words are recorded in a code (including shorthand writing) — tendering a document that is or purports to be a transcript of the words; (d) if the document in question is an article or thing on or in which information is stored in such a way that it cannot be used by the court unless a device is used to retrieve, produce or collate it — tendering a document that was or purports to have been produced by use of the device; (e) tendering a document that: (i) forms part of the records of or kept by a business (whether or not the business is still in existence); and (ii) is or purports to be a copy of, or an extract from or a summary of, the document in question, or is or purports to be a copy of such an extract or summary; (f) if the document in question is a public document — tendering a document that is or purports to be a copy of the document in question and that is or purports to have been printed: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(i)

by a person authorised by or on behalf of the Government to print the document or by the Government Printer of the Commonwealth or by the government or official printer of a State or another Territory; or (ii) by the authority of the Government or administration of the Territory, the Commonwealth, a State, another Territory or a foreign country; or (iii) by authority of an Australian Parliament, a House of an Australian Parliament, a committee of such a House or a committee of an Australian Parliament. (2) Subsection (1) applies to a document in question whether the document in question is available to the party or not.

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(3) If the party adduces evidence of the contents of a document under subsection (1)(a), the evidence may only be used: (a) in respect of the party’s case against the other party who made the admission concerned; or (b) in respect of the other party’s case against the party who adduced the evidence in that way. (4) A party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question that is not available to the party, or the existence and contents of which are not in issue in the proceeding, by: (a) tendering a document that is a copy of, or an extract from or summary of, the document in question; or (b) adducing from a witness evidence of the contents of the document in question. Notes for section 48: 1 Clause 5 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of documents. 2 Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 48 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents.

[EA.48.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 125, para 229; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 651, 654–656.

[EA.48.60] General comments This provision deals with the methods by which the contents of writings and modern documents such as tapes and computer disks may be adduced in court. Whether evidence so adduced will be admissible will be determined by the rules of admissibility in Ch 3.412 This provision is based partly on the provisions in the United States Federal Rules of Evidence (see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 651), although the ALRC relied on a variety of sources. The Commission explained 412. Including the requirement of authentication of the document: Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 at [690]; National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309; [1999] NSWSC 539; Kingham v Sutton (No 3) [2001] FCA 1117 at [127]–[128] per Goldberg J.

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[EA.48.60]

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that its proposals were designed to simplify the rules in this area, introduce greater flexibility and take into account modern information-storing media and copying technologies.413 Section 51 abolishes “the principles and rules of the common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents”. Section 48(2) provides that a party may utilise any of the methods of proving the contents of a document specified in s 48(1) whether the document “is available to the party or not”. Section 48(4) provides that a party may utilise any of the methods specified in that provision of proving the contents of a document, but only where the document in question is not available to the party or the existence and contents of the document in question are not in issue in the proceedings. An interesting question arises from the adoption of the word “or” in the initial part of this provision: is it to be read disjunctively? On that approach, a party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question by tendering the document in question or by any one or more of the specified methods, but may not (under this provision at least) tender both the document in question and adduce evidence in accordance with one or more of the specified methods. An argument to this effect was advanced in R v Georgiou [2005] NSWCCA 237 but the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal did not find it necessary to resolve it. It is suggested that the better view is that the provision should be read as if it contained the words “or, or as well,” bearing in mind the facilitative purpose behind it and the statutory context.414 Other than considerations of time and cost, there is no reason why tender of the document in question should automatically preclude the adducing of additional evidence in accordance with one or more of the specified methods. Such time and cost considerations are best dealt with under the discretions in Pt 3.11. However, even if the provision is to be read disjunctively, it should be noted that other provisions may permit the adducing of evidence in addition to the document in question.415 Another question is whether the different parts of this provision may be combined. For example, may evidence of the contents of a “document in question” be adduced by tendering a purported photocopy of a document (s 48(1)(b)) that was purportedly produced by use of a device used to retrieve “an article or thing on or in which information is stored” (s 48(1)(d)). The answer is that they may be combined in this way.416 One reason is that the introductory words of s 48(1) refer to “tendering the document in question or by any one or more of the following methods …”. An alternative explanation is that the two (or more) methods of adducing evidence of the contents of a “document in question” may be used in respect of different documents “in question” (in the example, the first “document in question” is the document that was purportedly photocopied, the second “document in question” is the electronic information purportedly retrieved by the device). 413. See ALRC 26, vol 1, Ch 31. 414. Compare Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Baker (1997) 73 FCR 187; 153 ALR 463 at 194–195 (FRC), 469–470 (ALR); Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Industrial Equity Ltd (2000) 98 FCR 573; 171 ALR 1; [2000] FCA 420 at 577 (FCR), 5 (ALR). 415. For example, s 29(4); R v Georgiou [2005] NSWCCA 237 at [17]. 416. See, for example, Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26, Leeming JA (Basten and Gleeson JJA agreeing) at [79]–[81]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Definitions

The word “document” is defined in the Dictionary: “document” means any record of information, and includes: (a) anything on which there is writing; or (b) anything on which there are marks, figures, symbols; or (c) perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them; or (d) anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else; or (e) a map, plan, drawing or photograph. See also cl 8 of Pt 2 of this Dictionary on the meaning of document.

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The effect of (d) is that, in respect of records kept in computer systems, it is the system itself (hardware and software) that is a document for the purposes of the Act (see [EA.48.360]). In Wade v Director of Public Prosecutions (2014) 41 VR 434; 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 the question arose whether CCTV footage was a “document”. It was argued that it was not because, in order to amount to a “document”, an electronic record must be a “record of information” and that “information” in that context denotes “the use of words, symbols or created images to express a record of information conceived of by a person ... the key aspect being that a document records language of some kind”. This argument was rejected. It was held that, “[a]ccording to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of that definition, CCTV footage of the commission of an offence is a ‘document’ because it is a medium from which images of the offence can be reproduced with the aid of an appropriate play-back machine” (at [24]). It was also observed at [26] that “[s]ecurity camera footage of the commission of a crime is a photograph or perhaps more accurately a series of photographs comprising a ‘visual and permanent record of what could have been seen by a person positioned where the camera was’. …As such, it falls squarely within the conception of ‘photograph’ in para (d) of the definition of document.” Clause 8 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides: 8. References to documents A reference in this Act to a document includes a reference to: (a) any part of the document; or (b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of the document or of any part of the document; or (c) any part of such a copy, reproduction or duplicate.

The term “document in question” is defined in s 47(1) to mean a document as to the contents of which it is sought to adduce evidence. In respect of the phrase “a copy of the document in question”, it is provided in s 47(2) that a “reference in this Part to a copy of a document in question includes a reference to a document that is not an exact copy of the document in question but that is identical to the document in question in all relevant respects”. The phrase “a copy of a document in question” should itself be understood to include the 280

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phrase “a copy of the document in question” used in s 48. It has been held that the phrase “a copy of … the document in question” in s 48(4)(a) extends to the copy of a copy of “the document in question”.417 In that regard, it should be noted that cl 8 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides that a reference to a document includes a reference to “any copy, reproduction or duplicate of the document or of any part of the document”. It should also be noted that the methods specified in s 48(1) for proving the contents of a document which refer to tendering a “copy of the document in question” (see (b), (e) and (f)), specify that it is sufficient if the document “purports” to be a copy. The word “purport” is not defined in the Act. It is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary (when used as a verb) to mean: “1. to profess or claim: a document purporting to be official. 2. to convey to the mind as the meaning or thing intended; express; imply.” In contrast, s 48(4)(a) requires that the document “is a copy of” the document in question, a fact which would have to be proved on the balance of probabilities.418

[EA.48.120]

Section 48(1)(a)

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Section 48(1)(a) permits evidence of the contents of a document in question to be adduced by adducing evidence of an admission made by another party to the proceeding as to the contents of the document in question. As to “document in question”, see [EA.48.90]. The word “admission” is defined in the Dictionary. Whether evidence of the admission is admissible will be determined by Chapter 3 (particularly Pts 3.1 and 3.4). Section 48(3) provides that evidence adduced under s 48(1)(a) may only be used in respect of the cases of the party who made the admission and the party who adduced the evidence of it. Presumably, applying the rules in relation to cross-examination and admissibility generally, a party may be cross-examined in order to obtain an admission as to the contents of a document.419

[EA.48.150]

Section 48(1)(b)

The ALRC explained the philosophy behind the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 651): The accuracy of modern reproduction techniques and the convenience of tendering copies produced by them warrant general recognition. The approach of the US Federal Rules (Rule 1001, 1003) should be adopted, so that a duplicate would be admissible in evidence to prove the contents of the original document, whether the original document is in existence or not.

As to the phrase “copy of the document in question” see [EA.48.90]. In particular, that phrase is defined in s 47(2) to include “a document that is not an exact copy of the document in question but that is identical to the document in question in all relevant respects”. This definition would ensure that a document would not be excluded because it did not reproduce some irrelevant detail on the original (for example, colours on the original). In Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v 417. Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 337 at [11] per Hamilton J. 418. See s 142; Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 337 at [8] per Hamilton J. 419. Under the common law, the scope of permissible cross-examination of this sort is uncertain. In Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 it was held that a party may be required to answer questions as to the contents of an unproduced document made by a third party provided that the contents of the document are within his or her personal knowledge. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26, Leeming JA (Basten and Gleeson JJA agreeing) emphasised at [82] that “admissibility does not depend on the document being an exact copy: … The pages purport to be a copy which is identical in all relevant respects, which is sufficient”. The reference to “device that reproduces the contents of documents” would allow photocopies, micrographs and word processors. It is sufficient that the document “purports”420 to be a copy which “purports” to have been produced by such a device.

[EA.48.180]

Section 48(1)(c), (d)

The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 651): The provision is included to permit the tendering of secondary evidence of the contents of modern information storing media. In particular it deals with: • audio tapes and words stored in codified form (this would include a word processor). It may be given by tendering a transcript; • computers and like devices. It is not necessary to tender the original of the tape, etc, containing the computer instruction or data (this is likely to be meaningless to the court in any event) but the “printout” may be tendered. The printout will have to be authenticated.

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It is sufficient if the tendered document “purports”421 to be a transcript (of a tape or shorthand recording) under (c) or “purports” to have been produced by use of a device used to retrieve, produce or collate stored information under (d).422 However, in applying s 48(1)(c), the Full Court of the Federal Court has expressed the following view: Where, on the evidence adduced in a particular case, there is doubt or disagreement whether the transcript, or part of it, accurately deciphers the sounds captured on the tape, it seems to us that [receiving the transcripts into evidence only as an aide-memoire for the sounds emitted by the playing of the tape etc] should be the role of the transcript, notwithstanding the provisions of s 48(1)(c) of the Evidence Act.423

Presumably the Full Court had in mind the application of the discretionary provisions in the Act (Pt 3.11) in this regard, as well as the common law position established by the High Court in Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180; 30 A Crim R 417. Subsequently, a NSW Supreme Court judge has summarised the position: (a) A document that purports to be a transcript of words recorded on a tape is admissible to prove the conversation: s 48(1)(c); (b) No oral or other evidence is necessary to validate such a transcript, it being sufficient that it purports to be a transcript of the words: s 48(1)(c); 420. The word “purport” is not defined in the Act. It is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary (when used as a verb) to mean “1. to profess or claim: a document purporting to be official. 2. to convey to the mind as the meaning or thing intended; express; imply.” 421. As above regarding the word “purport”. 422. See Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107. 423. Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 at 113.

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(c) Where a tape is indistinct, a transcript may be used to assist the jury in the perception and understanding of what is recorded on the tape: Butera at 187 (CLR); (d) Where a tape is indistinct, a transcript made by an “ad hoc expert”, being a person qualified only by having listened to the tape many times, may be used for this purpose. That is particularly so where the tape needs to be played over repeatedly before the words uttered could be made out unaided: Menzies at 49 cited in Butera at 188 (CLR); (e) If there is doubt or disagreement whether the transcript accurately deciphers the sounds captured on the tape, the transcript should be used only as an aide-memoire. I take that to mean that the jury is to give priority to what they hear (or do not hear) on the tape, if that is not consistent with what appears in the transcript: Butera at 188 (CLR); (f) The jury may have the transcript before them when this tape is played over in court: Eastman [at 111]; (g) The jury should be informed, when the transcript is tendered, as to the use which they may make of it: Eastman [at 112–113]; (h) A transcript may be rejected or its use limited pursuant to ss 135–137.424

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Examples of the application of the discretions in Pt 3.11 may be given.425 Some judges have excluded a transcript as “not relevant”426 but it has to be said that such an approach is problematic (see [EA.55.90]). In R v Georgiou [2005] NSWCCA 237 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered an argument relying on the adoption of the word “or” in the initial part of s 48(1) that, where an original tape recording had been tendered, other evidence could not be tendered under s 48(1)(c). This raised the issue of whether the provision is to be read disjunctively, so that a party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question by tendering the document in question or by any one or more of the specified methods, but may not (under this provision at least) tender both the document in question and adduce evidence in accordance with one or more of the specified methods. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal did not find it necessary to resolve the issue. It is discussed at [EA.48.60] above, with the opinion being expressed that the better view is that the provision should be read as if it said “or, or as well”. However, even if the provision is to be read disjunctively, it should be noted that other provisions may permit the adducing of evidence in addition to the document in question.427 Complications arise where the “transcript” incorporates a translation from one language to another of the sounds captured on the tape. In Foreign Media Pty Ltd 424. R v Cassar and Sleiman (Judgment No 17) [1999] NSWSC 436 at [7] per Sperling J. See also R v Hall [2001] NSWSC 827 at [35] per Greg James J; R v Giovannone (2002) 140 A Crim R 1; [2002] NSWCCA 323 at [61]; Registrar, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Ponto (2012) 208 FCR 346; [2012] FCA 1500 at [38]–[40]. 425. See Goldsworthy v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 290; Purcell v Cruising Yacht Club of Australia [2001] NSWSC 926; Griffıth v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2003] NSWSC 483. 426. Griffıth v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2003] NSWSC 483; Reading v ABC [2003] NSWSC 716. 427. For example, s 29(4): R v Georgiou [2005] NSWCCA 237 at [17]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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v Konstantinidis [2003] NSWCA 161 the members of NSW Court of Appeal adopted somewhat different approaches to the problem. In this case, there was no dispute that the translation was accurate and the issue was whether the transcript of that translation should be admitted into evidence. Handley JA simply held it was admissible “under ss 29(4) and 48(1)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995” (at [4]–[8]). Tobias JA, after observing (at [41]) that s 48(1)(c) makes a transcript of an audio tape in the English language admissible notwithstanding the common law, rejected (at [42]–[47]) a “literal” approach to this provision which would prevent it applying where a translation is involved. Giles JA doubted (at [30]) “that either s 29(4) or s 48(1)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 applied, since the transcripts were neither explanatory material nor transcripts of the Greek words in the tapes of the broadcasts”. However, he concluded that neither provision was needed “because the evidence in the form of the transcripts was relevant, and therefore admissible, and no evidentiary rule excluded it.” (at [31]). It is suggested that the better analysis is as follows: s 48(1)(c) does not apply where a translation of the words contained in an audio tape takes place in order to prepare the “transcript”; such a translation if relevant is not caught by the hearsay rule in s 59428 but is caught by the opinion rule in s 76, which must be rendered inapplicable by the operation of s 78 or 79 or waived under s 190; if the opinion is not inadmissible, the court may permit it to be given in written form (pursuant to common law principles discussed by the High Court in Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180; 30 A Crim R 417 at 190–191 and/or the specific provision in s 29(4): [EA.29.180]) if this would assist the fact-finding process; the court retaining the discretions in ss 135 and 136 (and s 137, where applicable) to ensure fairness in the particular circumstances of the case.429 As regards video recordings, there is no doubt that such a recording is a “document”, as defined (see [EA.48.90]), and s 48(2)(d) would be available to permit a document that “purports” to have been produced by use of a device used to retrieve, produce or collate the information stored in that recording. As regards the application of s 48(1)(d), it was considered by the NSW Court of Appeal in Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26. Leeming JA (Basten and Gleeson JJA agreeing) discussed at [79]–[81] evidence tendered in a trial (a purported photocopy of a 12 page document brought into existence in 2017 in response to a subpoena (by means of “screenshots” from an electronic system whereby a company (“B”) recorded file notes created in 2014 and 2015): [79] To be clear, the pages sought to be tendered were on no view [B’s] actual file notes. They were copies of the pages which had been produced to the Court by [B] in answer to a subpoena. … [80] The original documents produced on subpoena were, likewise, not [B’s] original file notes. … [81] Subsection 47(2) and 48(1) have application here, although they were not drawn to the attention of the primary judge. The fact that the pages produced on subpoena 428. Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (t/as North West Immigration Services) (1996) 140 ALR 273. 429. Where the translation is disputed, it may well be appropriate to exclude the transcript unless the translator testifies, and to limit the use of the transcript to that of an aide-memoire in relation to the oral evidence.

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include some words and numbers which were added in 2017 does not preclude the pages from being copies of [B’s] file notes from 2014 and 2015. The pages produced on subpoena are not exact copies (because of the logo and the heading and the footers), but admissibility does not depend on the document being an exact copy … . The pages purport to be a copy which is identical in all relevant respects, which is sufficient. The heading and footers are not relevant to any issue in the litigation (and indeed were excluded from the tender). The screenshots “purport to have been produced” by use of [B’s] electronic records system, within the meaning of ss 48(1)(b)(ii) and/or 48(1)(d), and the 12 pages purport to reproduce the entirety of the entries in the electronic record system between June 2014 and May 2015, which are identical “in all relevant respects” within the meaning of s 47(2).

As is apparent, the court held that the contents of B’s file notes could be adduced by reliance on a combination of s 48(1)(b) and s 48(1)(d). Whether or not the evidence was admissible turned on the operation of the business records’ exception to the hearsay rule (see s 69).

[EA.48.210]

Section 48(1)(e)

The term “business” is defined in cl 1 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary.

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On the other hand, no definition is provided of the term “record”. Judicial consideration of the same term used in other legislation may be helpful.430 A broad approach would be that adopted in R v Jones [1978] 2 All ER 718 at 721 where it was stated that “although it is not an exclusive definition of the word, ‘record’ in this context means a history of events in some form which is not evanescent”.431 An email may be a “business record” for the purposes of this provision and s 69 of the Act.432 The ALRC explained the proposal on which s 48(1)(e) is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 654–655): It is proposed that the distinction continue to be drawn between copy documents that form part of the records of a business (which should include commercial organisations, government departments and instrumentalities) and those that do not. It is in the business records area that the need for substantial reform of the law is most clearly demonstrated. In the case of business records there is also the further security of the need for accurate and reliable business records, because the business itself relies upon the records. It is proposed therefore that copy documents made and kept by businesses as part of their records should be admissible where the original is in existence without evidence that they are a copy, on proof of the fact that they formed part of its records. The proposal also permits evidence of the business record by tender of a copy …. As an example of the way the clause will operate in practice, consider its application in the 430. See R v Jones [1978] 2 All ER 718; R v Tirado (1974) 59 Cr App R 80; Bates v Nelson (1973) 6 SASR 149; O’Donnel v Dakin [1966] Tas SR 87; Manton v Commonwealth (1981) 34 ALR 342 at 344; H v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 849; Atra v Farmers & Graziers Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281 at 288; Burnside Sub-Branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 324. 431. On the other hand, in H v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 849 it was concluded that the intention of the English legislation was “to admit in evidence records which a historian would regard as original or primary sources, that is, documents which either give effect to a transaction itself or which contain a contemporaneous register of information supplied by those with direct knowledge of the facts”. 432. Aqua-Marine Marketing Pty Ltd v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 194 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 578 at [10]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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case of COM (Computer output to microfilm). If the contents of a computer tape are in issue, the party may – tender the tape itself (this is not likely to be particularly useful); tender COM produced especially for the case; if the COM forms part of the records of a business, it and a print from it may be tendered. As another example, assume that we wish to prove the contents of a credit card transaction slip. The slip is held by the credit company. It has been microfilmed in the ordinary course of the credit company’s business and the microfilm is in constant use. When hard copy is wanted, a microfilm reader is used to produce a photocopy of the particular part of the microfilm reel which relates to the particular slip under consideration. The party wishing to prove the contents of the original slip by secondary evidence has three choices. He can – tender the microfilm itself; tender a hard copy if he can demonstrate that the hard copy was made in the ordinary course of the company’s business; or make a hard copy, lead evidence authenticating it and tender the “hard copy”.

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It will not be necessary, for the admission of microfilm records, to give evidence about the functioning of the equipment, or the accuracy of the copies made and kept as “business” records. It would not be necessary, therefore, to preserve such evidence. This does not mean that it would not be prudent to preserve it. The court will rely more confidently upon records that have been kept and checked systematically. This could be done in the form of records themselves admissible under the proposed legislation. Many businesses already keep registers – some computerised – for indexing microfilm for retrieval. It should not be difficult to record information relevant to the accuracy of the copying – eg, who did it, when it was done, the equipment used, whether it was operating correctly. Standards are available which spell out guidelines that should be followed.

It is sufficient if the document (tendered to prove the contents of the document in question) “purports”433 to be a copy of (or an extract from or a summary of, or a copy of an extract from or a summary of) the document in question. As to the phrase “copy of the document in question”, see [EA.48.90]. On the other hand, it must be established that the tendered document “forms part of the records of or kept by a business”. In accordance with s 142(1) the court must be satisfied that this “has been proved on the balance of probabilities”. However, reasonable inferences may be drawn from the document itself under s 183. In Aqua-Marine Marketing Pty Ltd v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 194 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 578, Collier J noted the following principles at [14], after referring to the judgment of Austin J in ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417: • It is important not to set the bar too high for the authentication of documents, because if too much is demanded, the authentication requirement will fight against the policy underlying the business records provisions. That policy recognises that any significant organisation depends for its efficiency upon the keeping of proper records, to be used and relied upon in the everyday carrying on of the activities of the business and therefore likely to be accurate, and likely to be a far more reliable source of truth than memory (Rich at [116]). 433. The word “purport” is not defined in the Act. It is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary (when used as a verb) to mean “1. to profess or claim: a document purporting to be official. 2. to convey to the mind as the meaning or thing intended; express; imply.”

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• The party tendering the document must establish authenticity, which cannot be achieved solely by drawing inferences from the face of the document where there is no other evidence to indicate provenance (Rich at [117]). • Authentication is about showing that the document is what it is claimed to be, not about assessing, at the point of the adducing of the evidence, whether the document proves what the tendering party claims it proves (Rich at [118]). • There is a distinction between matters of authenticity going to the adducing of evidence and matters going to the credibility and weight of documentary evidence once it has been authenticated and judged admissible (Rich at [118]). The issue of “authentication” as a pre-condition to a finding of relevance is discussed below at [EA.57.120]. Whatever the proper approach in that context, this provision requires that it must be established on the balance of probabilities that the tendered document “forms part of the records of or kept by a business”. In applying that test, s 183 expressly permits a court to “draw any reasonable inferences from” the document. Given that, it is not apparent why “authenticity” (in this context, establishing that the document is a business record) “cannot be achieved solely by drawing inferences from the face of the document …”.

[EA.48.240]

Section 48(1)(f)

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The term “public document” is defined in the Dictionary. The ALRC explained the proposal on which s 48(1)(f) is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 656): The proposals for business records apply also to public documents. It would, however, be more onerous for some public documents than the present law. It would require someone to swear an affidavit authenticating the copy, or deposing to other facts that have to be proved under the proposal. But the trend in legislation specifically dealing with this category of record is to enable certified, sealed, or signed copies to be tendered in evidence and to relieve the party tendering the document of the necessity of proving the authenticity of the certificate, seal or signature or the authority of the person who purported to certify seal or sign the documents before admitting the documents. The proposal (together with authentication proposals) will have a similar effect but applies to a wider group of documents than those dealt with in legislation. It also provides for evidence to be given by copies purporting to be printed by government printer or by authority of government. In conjunction with the definitions of “public documents” and “business” and the proposals outlined in the chapter “Authentication and Identification”, the proposal covers the ground presently covered by a multitude of varying provisions in Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation specifying the means that may be used to prove: • proclamations, commissions, orders; • by-laws and regulations; • court orders, judgments and convictions; • seals and signatures; • gazettes and documents published by the government printer. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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It is sufficient if the document (tendered to prove the contents of the document in question) “purports”434 to be a copy of the document in question and “purports” to have been printed in any of the listed circumstances. As to the phrase “copy of the document in question”, see [EA.48.90]. In particular, the phrase “copy of the document in question” is defined in s 47(2) to include “a document that is not an exact copy of the document in question but that is identical to the document in question in all relevant respects”. This definition would ensure that a document would not be excluded because it did not reproduce some irrelevant detail on the original (for example, colours on the original). However, it must be established that the tendered document is a “public document”, as defined. In accordance with s 142(1) the court must be satisfied that this “has been proved on the balance of probabilities”. However, reasonable inferences may be drawn from the document itself under s 183.

[EA.48.270]

Section 48(4): unavailable document

The ALRC explained this proposal (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 651): [C]opies and oral evidence should be admissible, as at present, where the original cannot be produced. The proposal adopts grounds similar to those in the US Federal Rules, including the provision that prevents tendering of secondary evidence where the original was destroyed in bad faith. No notice or other demand is required to enable secondary evidence to be given of documents in possession of another party at the time of the trial, or at a time when the party knew, or ought to have known, that the contents of the document were likely to be relevant to the trial.

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Clause 5 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides an exclusive definition of when a document “may be taken not to be available to a party”. Where it is sought to adduce from a witness evidence of the contents of the document in question pursuant to s 48(4)(b) on the ground of non-availability, this must be proved on the balance of probabilities (s 142). In Wade v Director of Public Prosecutions (2014) 41 VR 434; 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 the Victorian Court of Appeal accepted that security camera footage of the commission of a crime which had been mistakenly deleted was a “document” (see [EA.48.90]) and that a police officer who had viewed the footage before it was deleted could give evidence of its contents. Where it is sought to tender a document under s 48(4) on the ground of non-availability, it must be established that: (1) the document in question is not available to the party (as defined); and (2) the tendered document is a copy of, or an extract from or summary of, the document in question. In accordance with s 142(1) the court must be satisfied that both conditions have “been proved on the balance of probabilities”. Reasonable inferences may be drawn from the document itself under s 183. As to the phrase “copy of the document in question” see [EA.48.90]. 434. The word “purport” is not defined in the Act. It is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary (when used as a verb) to mean “1. to profess or claim: a document purporting to be official. 2. to convey to the mind as the meaning or thing intended; express; imply”.

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[EA.48.300]

In Minassian v Minassian [2010] NSWSC 708, the meaning of the words “evidence of the contents of a document” were considered. Ball J held at [49]–[50]: That evidence could take the form of evidence from a person who has seen the document and who can give evidence about what it contained. It could also take the form of another document that purported to record the contents of the document that is unavailable: Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 337. However, I do not think that it includes evidence concerning people’s intentions or beliefs from which the contents of the document might be inferred. That evidence is not evidence of the contents of the document. For similar reasons, I do not think admissible hearsay evidence of the contents of a document (such as evidence from a witness that Mr Minas told the witness about the contents of the 1980 agreement) is admissible under s 48(4). That evidence is evidence of what one person said to another concerning the contents of the document in question. It is not itself evidence of the contents of the document.

Some criticism may be made of this holding. First, in Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; 81 ALJR 840; [2007] HCA 12 a majority of the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ) held at [84] that the words “evidence that the defendant … did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue or had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue”:

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are not limited to direct evidence that the defendant did the act or had the state of mind; they extend also to the giving of evidence by the defendant of facts from which the doing of the act or the having of the state of mind can be inferred.

By parity of reasoning, evidence of the contents of a document should not be understood in the limited way adopted by Ball J. Second, it is important to emphasise that s 48 is not a rule of admissibility (see Ch 3) but deals with the methods by which the contents of documents “may” be adduced in court. Third, this part of the Act is not a code. If certain evidence has already been admitted in a proceeding and is relevant for the purposes of establishing the contents of a document in question, s 48 does not preclude other methods of proving the contents of the document in question than those expressly permitted under it. It is designed essentially as a facilitative provision, providing for methods as to how a party “may” adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question, and not prohibiting other methods where the admissibility requirements of Ch 3 have been met. This provision does not confer a discretion on the court. While the party who satisfies the condition of the provision has a discretion to choose to prove the contents of a document by secondary evidence from a witness or by tendering another document, the court has no relevant discretion.435 Of course, the discretionary provisions in Part 3.11 apply in all proceedings.

[EA.48.300]

Section 48(4): collateral document

Section 48(4) permits secondary evidence of a document to be received where the contents of the document are not in issue in the proceeding. When the provision would operate is unclear. The ALRC proposal (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 651) was to permit secondary evidence where: 435. Wade v Director of Public Prosecutions (2014) 41 VR 434; 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 at [39]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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the contents of the document are not closely related to the issues to be tried. Although this introduces a discretionary element, it introduces very little, if any, uncertainty. The issue to be resolved by the exercise of the discretion is whether the original should be required or not. If the original does not exist, the other provisions will operate to enable secondary evidence of the contents to be given.

Where a document is sought to be tendered under s 48(4) on this basis, it must be established that: (1) the existence of the document in question is not in issue in the proceeding; (2) the contents of the document in question is not in issue in the proceeding; and (3) the tendered document is a copy of, or an extract from or summary of, the document in question. In accordance with s 142(1) the court must be satisfied that these conditions have “been proved on the balance of probabilities”. Reasonable inferences may be drawn from the document itself under s 183. The term “copy of the document in question” is defined in s 47(2) to include “a document that is not an exact copy of the document in question but that is identical to the document in question in all relevant respects”.

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[EA.48.330]

Proof by affidavit or written statement (Division 2 of Part 4.6)

Evidence of a fact that is “to be proved in relation to a document or thing” under s 48 may (in accordance with Div 2 of Pt 4.6) be given by a person permitted under s 171 to give such evidence – by affidavit or, if the evidence relates to a public document (see Dictionary), by a written statement. The evidence may include evidence based on the knowledge and belief of the person who gives it, or on information that that person has: s 172. A copy of the affidavit or statement must be served on each party a reasonable time before the hearing of the proceeding: s 173(1). The party who tenders the affidavit or statement must, if another party so requests, call the deponent or person who made the statement to give evidence but need not otherwise do so: s 173(2). Section 186 provides for the swearing of affidavits.

[EA.48.360]

Computer-produced evidence

The definition of “document” includes “anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else”. It follows that a computer system that records information is a document for the purposes of the Act. Therefore, a party may adduce evidence of the contents of that computer record by one of the methods listed in s 48(1). Thus, for example, it may be possible to rely on para (b), (c), (d) or (e) of that provision. Alternatively, where the computer record is not available, or its existence and contents are not in issue in the proceeding, para (a) or (b) of s 48(4) might be utilised. Of course, the admissibility of the evidence so adduced would depend on the application of Ch 3: see, in particular, ss 55, 57, 59, 69. For an example of the application of this Part to computer records, see Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 337. Hamilton J held that evidence of the 290

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Part 2.2 - Documents

[EA.48.420]

contents of a stock list kept as a computer record on a particular date could be adduced under s 48(4)(a) by tendering the hard disk of another computer (MFI 8), insofar as it contained a particular computer file (file 22). It had been proved on the balance of probabilities (s 142) that the original computer was not available (at [19]) and that a copy of the stock list was contained within file 22 in the hard disk of the second computer (at [10]). The fact that it was a copy of a copy of a copy did not prevent it from being a copy for the purposes of that provision (at [11]). Further, the fact that the hard disk of the second computer was unreadable without certain steps having been taken to allow it to be read did not prevent a ruling that the document (the hard disk insofar as it contained file 22) was relevant and admissible (at [16]–[20]).

[EA.48.390]

Documents in foreign countries

Section 49 requires, unless the court directs otherwise, pre-trial service on other parties of a copy of a document that is in a foreign country.

[EA.48.420]

Service

Section 181 permits proof of service of “a written notification, notice, order or direction” by affidavit “of the person who served, gave or sent it”. Section 186 provides for the swearing of affidavits.

Cth Act:

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49

Documents in foreign countries

No paragraph of subsection 48(1) (other than paragraph 48(1)(a)) applies to a document that is in a foreign country unless: (a) the party who adduces evidence of the contents of the document in question has, not less than 28 days (or such other period as may be prescribed by the regulations or by rules of court) before the day on which the evidence is adduced, served on each other party a copy of the document proposed to be tendered; or (b) the court directs that it is to apply. Note: Section 182 gives this section a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents. [S 49 am Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 7]

NSW Act: 49

Documents in foreign countries

No paragraph of section 48(1) (other than paragraph (a)) applies to a document that is in a foreign country unless: (a) the party who adduces evidence of the contents of the document in question has, not less than 28 days (or such other period as may be prescribed by the regulations or by rules of court) before the day on which the evidence is adduced, served on each other party a copy of the document proposed to be tendered, or (b) the court directs that it is to apply. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 49

Note: Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 49 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents. [S 49 am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[3]]

Vic Act: 49

Documents in foreign countries No paragraph of section 48(1) (other than paragraph (a)) applies to a document that is in a foreign country unless— (a) the party who adduces evidence of the contents of the document in question has, not less than 28 days (or such other period as may be prescribed by the regulations or by rules of court) before the day on which the evidence is adduced, served on each other party a copy of the document proposed to be tendered; or (b) the court directs that it is to apply. Note: Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 49 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents.

ACT Act:

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49

Documents in foreign countries No paragraph of section 48(1) (other than paragraph (a)) applies to a document that is in a foreign country unless— (a) the party who presents evidence of the contents of the document in question has, not less than 28 days (or any other period prescribed by regulation or by rules of court) before the day on which the evidence is presented, served on each other party a copy of the document proposed to be tendered; or (b) the court directs that it must apply. Note: The Commonwealth Act, s 182 gives the Commonwealth Act, s 49 a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents.

NT Act: 49

Documents in foreign countries

No paragraph of section 48(1) (other than paragraph (a)) applies to a document that is in a foreign country unless: (a) the party who adduces evidence of the contents of the document in question has, not less than 28 days (or such other period as may be prescribed by the regulations or by rules of court) before the day on which the evidence is adduced, served on each other party a copy of the document proposed to be tendered; or (b) the court directs that it is to apply. Note for section 49: Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 49 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents.

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Cth Act: 50 Proof of voluminous or complex documents (1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the party may adduce evidence of the contents of 2 or more documents in question in the form of a summary if the court is satisfied that it would not otherwise be possible conveniently to examine the evidence because of the volume or complexity of the documents in question. [Subs (1) subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 14; am Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 8]

(2) The court may only make such a direction if the party seeking to adduce the evidence in the form of a summary has: (a) served on each other party a copy of the summary that discloses the name and address of the person who prepared the summary; and (b) given each other party a reasonable opportunity to examine or copy the documents in question. (3) The opinion rule does not apply to evidence adduced in accordance with a direction under this section. [S 50 am Act 135 of 2008; Act 125 of 1999]

NSW Act:

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50

Proof of voluminous or complex documents

(1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the party may adduce evidence of the contents of 2 or more documents in question in the form of a summary if the court is satisfied that it would not otherwise be possible conveniently to examine the evidence because of the volume or complexity of the documents in question. [Subs (1) subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[13]; am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[4]]

(2) The court may only make such a direction if the party seeking to adduce the evidence in the form of a summary has: (a) served on each other party a copy of the summary that discloses the name and address of the person who prepared the summary, and (b) given each other party a reasonable opportunity to examine or copy the documents in question. (3) The opinion rule does not apply to evidence adduced in accordance with a direction under this section. [S 50 am Act 46 of 2007; Act 53 of 2000]

Vic Act: 50

Proof of voluminous or complex documents

(1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the party may adduce evidence of the contents of 2 or more documents in question in the form of a summary if the court is satisfied that it would not otherwise be possible conveniently to examine the evidence because of the volume or complexity of the documents in question. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 50

(2) The court may only make such a direction if the party seeking to adduce the evidence in the form of a summary has— (a) served on each other party a copy of the summary that discloses the name and address of the person who prepared the summary; and (b) given each other party a reasonable opportunity to examine or copy the documents in question. (3) The opinion rule does not apply to evidence adduced in accordance with a direction under this section. ACT Act: 50

Proof of voluminous or complex documents

(1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the party may present evidence of the contents of 2 or more documents in question in the form of a summary if the court is satisfied that it would not otherwise be possible conveniently to examine the evidence because of the volume or complexity of the documents in question.

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(2) The court may only make a direction under subsection (1) if the party seeking to present the evidence in the form of a summary has— (a) served on each other party a copy of the summary that discloses the name and address of the person who prepared the summary; and (b) given each other party a reasonable opportunity to examine or copy the documents in question. (3) The opinion rule does not apply to evidence presented in accordance with a direction under this section. NT Act: 50

Proof of voluminous or complex documents

(1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the party may adduce evidence of the contents of 2 or more documents in question in the form of a summary if the court is satisfied that it would not otherwise be possible conveniently to examine the evidence because of the volume or complexity of the documents in question. (2) The court may only make such a direction if the party seeking to adduce the evidence in the form of a summary has: (a) served on each other party a copy of the summary that discloses the name and address of the person who prepared the summary; and (b) given each other party a reasonable opportunity to examine or copy the documents in question. (3) The opinion rule does not apply to evidence adduced in accordance with a direction under this section.

[EA.50.30] General comments The term “document in question” is defined in s 47(1) to mean a document as to the contents of which it is sought to adduce evidence. The meaning of 294

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[EA.50.30]

“document” is discussed in the commentary on s 48. Section 50 is not based on a proposal of the ALRC. Rather, it is derived from Rule 1006 of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence. It permits a court to allow a party to adduce evidence of documents “in the form of a summary” if the court “is satisfied that it would not otherwise be possible conveniently to examine the evidence because of the volume and complexity of the documents in question” and other parties have been served with a copy of the summary and given a reasonable opportunity to examine or copy the documents.436 In Re Idylic Solutions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 568, Ward J of the NSW Supreme Court stated at [63]: There are three matters to be determined for the purposes of the s 50 application: whether the relevant spreadsheets and tables are summaries of information contained in the underlying documents for the purposes of s 50 (rather than, for example, comprising conclusions or statements of opinion); whether the volume and/or complexity of the underlying documents is such that it would not otherwise be possible conveniently to examine the evidence; and whether a reasonable opportunity has been given to any other party to the litigation to examine or copy the documents in question (and in that regard the fact that there might between now and the trial be a reasonable opportunity to examine or copy the documents is strictly not to the point).

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Prior to amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, s 50(1) required that the application had to made by a party “before the hearing concerned”. It was held in R v Pearce (2001) 48 ATR 390; [2001] NSWCCA 447 at [130] that: [T]he words “before the hearing concerned” mean before the substantive hearing commences. If a party seeks a direction under s 50, a timely application has to be made so that an accused is not taken by surprise and is not put in the position of having to, in the course of a trial, divert his attention from the conduct of the trial and the major issues it poses and consider whether a summary fairly, accurately and sufficiently summarises an appreciable volume of documents and avoids unnecessary complexity.

The requirement for an application “before the hearing concerned” has now been deleted. In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 6.13: The Commissions are of the view that its usefulness will be enhanced if it is amended to allow an application to rely on a summary of documents to be made at any time in proceedings. The Commissions do not see that there will be any resulting prejudice to the party not tendering the evidence arising out of this amendment that could not be overcome by the exercise of judicial discretion, or that outweighs the benefits of the amendment. An application can always be rejected if it is opposed and evidence of prejudice or disadvantage demonstrated.

It is arguable that this provision gives considerable power to judges to keep out what may be important documentary evidence on the basis of “convenience”. While other parties have been given the opportunity to examine or copy the documents, this may not provide a sufficient safeguard in those cases where those parties have limited resources or have failed to take advantage of the “reasonable opportunity”. Given the real possibility that there will be lengthy disputation as to the adequacy of any summary, judges may choose not to take advantage of this provision. The section does not deal with the admissibility of such evidence (except in relation to opinion evidence). Thus it would be relevant to the exercise 436. The effect of s 50(3) might be that the summary need not be prepared by an “expert” or a person to whom s 78 applies. On the other hand, since the provision only deals with the “adducing” of evidence it is arguable that, to the extent that opinion is involved, it must satisfy the rules of admissibility relating to opinion evidence (Pt 3.3). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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of the discretion to consider whether the evidence in the form of the summary would be admissible if tendered (see Ch 3). In Beattie v Osman (No 3) [2009] NSWSC 824, White J adopted a narrow view of the term “summary”, stating at [25] that a “summary of the contents of two or more documents to fall within s 50 should, I think, be an abstract or compendium or epitome or a brief statement of the facts or matters set out in the documents”. White J held at [26] that a “calculation of the total sum stated in each of” a large number of invoice documents was not a “summary” in the sense of “a brief statement of the contents of the invoices”. This seems to be an unduly narrow approach to this provision, particularly bearing in mind the policy behind it and the fact that the provision refers to adducing evidence of the contents of documents “in the form of a summary”. However, it may reflect a judicial disinclination to take advantage of the provision.

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A broader approach was taken by Einstein J in Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Limited (in liq) v Gate Gourmet Holding AG [2004] NSWSC 768 where it was stated at [19] that: there is a misconception in the proposition that a party adducing evidence of the contents of two or more documents in the form of the summary must include in the summary every detail or fact or feature of the documents purported to be summarised. Clearly enough the section is intended to achieve the purpose of permitting summary evidence in the event that the Court is satisfied that it would not otherwise be possible conveniently to examine the evidence because of the volume and complexity of the documents in question, as long as the other party had been served with a copy of the summary and given a reasonable opportunity to examine or copy the documents. This view was preferred by Davies J in Thackray v Gunns Plantations Ltd (2011) 85 ACSR 144; [2011] VSC 380, observing at [67] that “I do not think that s 50 should be construed restrictively to require a summary of each document in question”. Davies J concluded that a “summary” for the purposes of this provision is “intended to be a summary of the evidence sought to be extracted from the documents”. Similarly, in Re Idylic Solutions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 568, Ward J of the NSW Supreme Court accepted that the summary may be a “summary of one aspect or part only of the content of the underlying documents”, unless that would present a misleading picture of the contents of the documents (at [66]) and that a calculation of a total sum of listed amounts falls within the meaning of a “summary”, so long as the calculation does not require the application of any opinion or judgment as to what amounts are to comprised in the calculation (at [77]–[78]). A “summary” may have been prepared by summarising other summary documents of underlying documents, since “summary” in s 50 is “a reference to the nature of the document not to the process by which it was prepared” (at [105]). Ward J observed in Idylic Solutions that what the summary must not do is “interpret the contents of the underlying documents” (at [83]) or involve “an application or exercise of judgment” (at [85]) or a “submission” (at [91], [97]) or “an opinion of an expert” (at [102]). Ward J stated at [63] that the document should not comprise “conclusions or statements of opinion”. However, in Botany Bay City Council v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure (No 2)) [2014] 296

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[EA.50.30]

NSWLEC 101, Beech-Jones AJ observed at [12] that the exemption from the opinion rule in s 50(3) meant that the “mere fact that a summary might involve some opinion does not, of itself, mean that the section cannot be invoked.” He continued at [13]: However, questions of fact and degree are involved. There must be a point at which the level of exercise of any judgment or subjective opinion in the formulation of the alleged summary means that what is really being adduced is not, in fact, a true summary of the contents of two or more documents.437

Cth Act: 51

Original document rule abolished The principles and rules of the common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents are abolished. Note: Section 182 gives the provisions of this Part a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents. [S 51 am Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 9]

NSW Act: 51

Original document rule abolished The principles and rules of the common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents are abolished.

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Note: Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives the provisions of Part 2.2 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents. [S 51 am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[5]]

Vic Act: 51

Original document rule abolished

The principles and rules of the common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents are abolished. Note: Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives the provisions of Part 2.2 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents.

ACT Act: 51

Original document rule abolished The principles and rules of common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents are abolished. Note: The Commonwealth Act, s 182 gives the provisions of the Commonwealth Act, pt 2.2 a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents.

437. Beech-Jones AJ then stated: “In some cases the determination of this may be a matter of form rather than substance”. This is a curious observation. Whether or not “what is really being adduced” is “in fact, a true summary” should not be matter of “form” but a matter of “substance”. The subsequent analysis by Beech-Jones AJ at [14]–[17] in fact indicates that he took that view, focusing on substance rather than form. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 51

NT Act: 51 Original document rule abolished The principles and rules of the common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents are abolished. Note for section 51: Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives the provisions of Part 2.2 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records and certain Commonwealth documents.

[EA.51.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, para 231; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 648.

[EA.51.60] General comments

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The ALRC explained the rationale behind the proposal on which this provision is based: The objective of accurate fact finding warrants rules which recognise the desirability of tendering the original document. Such an approach reduces the chances of error being made by the courts and reflects the tactical pressure on a party to produce the best evidence in its possession. It also helps to guard against fraud and deception. It helps to protect the party against whom the evidence is led. The approach may be more desirable in criminal than in civil trials but there does not appear to be a need to distinguish between the two types of trial in the formation of the rules. The existing law, however, is complex, inflexible and can be costly. While production of the original can reduce argument and, therefore, time and costs, the inflexibility of the requirements of the rule can add significantly to the costs of litigation. These comments apply particularly to modern documents and copying technologies. The criticisms of the law justify reforms.438

Thus, the common law rules dealing with the permissible means of proving the contents of documents (including the “best evidence” and “original documents” rules) are abolished. In their place, Pt 2.2 allows proof of the contents of a document in a number of specified ways. In addition, other legislation (applying under s 8) may permit proof in other ways. In Griffıth v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2003] NSWSC 483, a somewhat curious process of reasoning was adopted by a NSW Supreme Court judge, Levine J, which brought back the “best evidence rule” through ss 55 and 56 of the Act. Levine J accepted an argument that the “best evidence” of a television program was a recording of the program and “the transcript cannot be relevant in these proceedings … because there is no room for its acceptance rationally affecting, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of what is, in reality, not a fact in issue” (at [11], [13]). Since there was no issue that the recording recorded the program, and was the “best evidence” of the program, the transcript was not relevant to a “fact in issue” and thus not admissible. The flaw in this reasoning is that the expression “fact in issue” should be interpreted as referring to the issues in the proceedings defined by substantive law and pleadings (see [EA.55.90]). It is suggested that the transcript was relevant evidence of the contents of the program and indirectly relevant to the 438. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 648.

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[EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.3.30]

fact in issue in the proceeding (whether the program was defamatory). The abolition of the “best evidence rule” and the terms of s 48(1)(c) meant that the (agreed) transcript was admissible evidence of the contents of the program, subject to the discretions in Pt 3.11. It has been suggested439 that s 51“may well have abolished” the rule in Pigot’s Case (1614) 11 Co Rep 26b; 77 ER 1177, which is as follows: [W]hen any deed is altered in a point material, by the plaintiff himself, or by any stranger, without the privity of the obligee, be it by interlineation, addition, rasing or by drawing of a pen through a line, or through the midst of any material word … the deed thereby becomes void.

However, it is difficult to see how this can be correct. That rule is one of substantive law. The effect of s 51 is simply to abolish the rule of procedure that the contents of a document can only be proved by tendering the original. Equally, this provision does not affect the question of proof. In Minassian v Minassian [2010] NSWSC 708, Ball J held at [44]: Although s 51 of the Evidence Act abolishes the common law principles relating to the admissibility of evidence to prove the contents of documents, it does not affect the principle that, at least where property disputes are in question, clear and convincing evidence of the contents of the lost document is necessary.

Of course, such a common law principle must be understood in the context of s 140 (see [EA.140.120]).

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Part 2.3 – Other evidence [EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.3.30]

Summary of this Part

This Part deals with procedural rules relating to evidence other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence.

Cth Act: 52

Adducing of other evidence not affected

This Act (other than this Part) does not affect the operation of any Australian law or rule of practice so far as it permits evidence to be adduced in a way other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence. NSW Act: 52

Adducing of other evidence not affected This Act (other than this Part) does not affect the operation of any Australian law or rule of practice so far as it permits evidence to be adduced in a way other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence.

439. See Dahlenburg v Dahlenburg (1996) 7 BPR 14,885 per Young J (NSW SC). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 52

Vic Act: 52 Adducing of other evidence not affected This Act (other than this Part) does not affect the operation of any Australian law or rule of practice so far as it permits evidence to be adduced in a way other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence. ACT Act: 52

Presenting of other evidence not affected This Act (other than this part) does not affect the operation of any Australian law or rule of practice so far as it permits evidence to be presented in a way other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence. NT Act: 52

Adducing of other evidence not affected This Act (other than this Part) does not affect the operation of any Australian law or rule of practice so far as it permits evidence to be adduced in a way other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence.

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[EA.52.30] General comments Evidence, other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence, is that information perceived directly by the court.440 Examples include physical objects admitted as exhibits and the physical characteristics and demeanour of witnesses and other persons in court.441 Although this provision states that the “Act … does not affect the operation of any Australian law or rule of practice so far as it permits evidence to be adduced in a way” that includes tender of physical objects, it is not clear whether s 56(2) of the Act nevertheless applies.442 In Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59 the members of the High Court assumed that it did and they applied the definition of “relevant evidence” in s 55 (Gummow and

440. See Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [20]–[21]. 441. See, for example, Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59 at 523 (CLR) (a tribunal of fact in a personal injuries matter is entitled to make its own observations about the extent of a plaintiff’s injuries based on the appearance of the plaintiff); Bailiff v The Queen [2011] ACTCA 7 at [16] (court conducting fitness to plead inquiry entitled to take into account “the demeanour of [the defendant] in court and the outbursts or interjections made by him and his interactions with his counsel”). In Wade v Director of Public Prosecutions (2014) 41 VR 434; 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 the Victorian Court of Appeal accepted that security camera footage of the commission of a crime was a “document” for the purposes of s 48 (see [EA.48.90]) but held that, if it was not, it would be “real evidence” and that, “[s]ubject to considerations of reliability, prejudice and the exercise of discretion, it is permissible therefore for a witness who has seen the footage to give evidence of its contents as if the witness had been a witness to the crime” (at [27]). 442. The better view is that it does since the requirement of relevance applies to the admissibility of evidence, not the “way” in which it is “adduced”.

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Hayne JJ at [23]–[24]; Heydon J at [148]; Crennan J at [266]). In any event, under the existing common law, requirements of relevance and authentication apply. In Re IBM Global Services Australia Ltd (2005) 144 IR 389; [2005] FCAFC 66, Moore J in the Full Court of the Federal Court at [87]–[89] raised the possibility that this provision might be utilised to permit evidence in proceedings seeking prerogative relief against the Industrial Relations Commission to be “constituted by the transcript of evidence and documentary evidence before the Commission”. Such an approach appears highly doubtful, given that the provision falls in a Part of the Act dealing with evidence “other” than by documents being tendered in evidence (or witnesses giving evidence). A preferable route to admission is s 157. A similar issue arose in Aneve Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2005] NSWCA 441 where Hodgson JA in the NSW Court of Appeal observed at [70] that this provision permits affidavit evidence. This approach might be thought questionable because an affidavit is a document. However, technically, evidence by affidavit is given by being “read”.443 The document is not (at least usually) “tendered in evidence”.444 On the other hand, the proposition that such evidence does not fall within the scope of Pt 2.1 is more problematic. For discussion of that issue generally, see [EA.Ch.2.Pt.2.1.30].

Cth Act:

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53

Views

(1) A judge may, on application, order that a demonstration, experiment or inspection be held. (2) A judge is not to make an order unless he or she is satisfied that: (a) the parties will be given a reasonable opportunity to be present; and (b) the judge and, if there is a jury, the jury will be present. (3) Without limiting the matters that the judge may take into account in deciding whether to make an order, the judge is to take into account the following: (a) whether the parties will be present; (b) whether the demonstration, experiment or inspection will, in the court’s opinion, assist the court in resolving issues of fact or understanding the evidence; (c) the danger that the demonstration, experiment or inspection might be unfairly prejudicial, might be misleading or confusing or might cause or result in undue waste of time; (d) in the case of a demonstration—the extent to which the demonstration will properly reproduce the conduct or event to be demonstrated;

443. See Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Commissioner of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26; [2013] FCA 1124 at [10]. 444. However, see Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Commissioner of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26; [2013] FCA 1124 at [14]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(e)

s 53

in the case of an inspection—the extent to which the place or thing to be inspected has materially altered.

(4) The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) is not to conduct an experiment in the course of its deliberations. (5) This section does not apply in relation to the inspection of an exhibit by the court or, if there is a jury, by the jury. NSW Act: 53

Views

(1) A judge may, on application, order that a demonstration, experiment or inspection be held.

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(2) A judge is not to make an order unless he or she is satisfied that: (a) the parties will be given a reasonable opportunity to be present, and (b) the judge and, if there is a jury, the jury will be present. (3) Without limiting the matters that the judge may take into account in deciding whether to make an order, the judge is to take into account the following: (a) whether the parties will be present, (b) whether the demonstration, experiment or inspection will, in the court’s opinion, assist the court in resolving issues of fact or understanding the evidence, (c) the danger that the demonstration, experiment or inspection might be unfairly prejudicial, might be misleading or confusing or might cause or result in undue waste of time, (d) in the case of a demonstration—the extent to which the demonstration will properly reproduce the conduct or event to be demonstrated, (e) in the case of an inspection—the extent to which the place or thing to be inspected has materially altered. (4) The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) is not to conduct an experiment in the course of its deliberations. (5) This section does not apply in relation to the inspection of an exhibit by the court or, if there is a jury, by the jury. Vic Act: 53 Views (1) A judge may, on application, order that a demonstration, experiment or inspection be held. (2) A judge is not to make an order unless he or she is satisfied that— (a) the parties will be given a reasonable opportunity to be present; and (b) the judge and, if there is a jury, the jury will be present. (3) Without limiting the matters that the judge may take into account in deciding whether to make an order, the judge is to take into account the following— 302

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(a) (b)

whether the parties will be present; whether the demonstration, experiment or inspection will, in the court’s opinion, assist the court in resolving issues of fact or understanding the evidence; (c) the danger that the demonstration, experiment or inspection might be unfairly prejudicial, might be misleading or confusing or might cause or result in undue waste of time; (d) in the case of a demonstration—the extent to which the demonstration will properly reproduce the conduct or event to be demonstrated; (e) in the case of an inspection—the extent to which the place or thing to be inspected has materially altered.

(4) The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) is not to conduct an experiment in the course of its deliberations. (5) This section does not apply in relation to the inspection of an exhibit by the court or, if there is a jury, by the jury. ACT Act: 53

Views

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(1) A judge may, on application, order that a demonstration, experiment or inspection be held. (2) A judge must not make an order unless satisfied that— (a) the parties will be given a reasonable opportunity to be present; and (b) the judge and, if there is a jury, the jury will be present. (3) Without limiting the matters that the judge may take into account in deciding whether to make an order, the judge must take into account the following: (a) whether the parties will be present; (b) whether the demonstration, experiment or inspection will, in the court’s opinion, assist the court in resolving issues of fact or understanding the evidence; (c) the danger that the demonstration, experiment or inspection might be unfairly prejudicial, might be misleading or confusing or might cause or result in undue waste of time; (d) in the case of a demonstration—the extent to which the demonstration will properly reproduce the conduct or event to be demonstrated; (e) in the case of an inspection—the extent to which the place or thing to be inspected has materially altered. (4) The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) must not conduct an experiment in the course of its deliberations. (5) This section does not apply in relation to the inspection of an exhibit by the court or, if there is a jury, by the jury.

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s 53

NT Act: 53 Views (1) A judge may, on application, order that a demonstration, experiment or inspection be held. (2) A judge is not to make an order unless he or she is satisfied that: (a) the parties will be given a reasonable opportunity to be present; and (b) the judge and, if there is a jury, the jury will be present.

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(3) Without limiting the matters that the judge may take into account in deciding whether to make an order, the judge is to take into account the following: (a) whether the parties will be present; (b) whether the demonstration, experiment or inspection will, in the court’s opinion, assist the court in resolving issues of fact or understanding the evidence; (c) the danger that the demonstration, experiment or inspection might be unfairly prejudicial, might be misleading or confusing or might cause or result in undue waste of time; (d) in the case of a demonstration — the extent to which the demonstration will properly reproduce the conduct or event to be demonstrated; (e) in the case of an inspection — the extent to which the place or thing to be inspected has materially altered. (4) The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) is not to conduct an experiment in the course of its deliberations. (5) This section does not apply in relation to the inspection of an exhibit by the court or, if there is a jury, by the jury.

[EA.53.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 144, paras 243–244; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 309–312, 1027–1031.

[EA.53.60] General comments The heading of this provision is rather misleading. It is not limited to “views”. It applies to any “demonstration, experiment or inspection”. On the other hand, the heading has been taken into account as a factor supporting the conclusion that this provision does not apply to demonstrations, experiments or inspections in the courtroom (see [EA.53.90]). The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 1029–1030): [T]he use of out of court inspection must be subject to limitations to ensure that the tribunal of fact is not misled and to ensure procedural fairness. While it is proposed to permit a court to order such inspections, including appropriate experiments and demonstrations, it is also proposed to provide some guidance as to when such an order should be made. The trial judge should consider such factors as: 304

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[EA.53.60]

• changes in the property, object or locale since the occurrence of the event in dispute; and • whether any proposed demonstration will duplicate the conditions existing at the time of the events in question. If these factors are not present, the trial judge should consider whether they can be overcome by appropriate steps. If not, the inspection should not be held (because it will either be irrelevant, or its probative value will be outweighed by dangers of prejudice and misestimation of probative value). It is proposed that an inspection out of court, whether strictly a view or a demonstration in content, should not be undertaken unless the parties and their counsel have been given an opportunity to attend, and the judge, and jury (if any), is present. … But it should not be necessary that the parties both consent to the inspection, nor that it be inadmissible evidence if one or other party chooses not to attend. Rather the judge should consider whether the absence of that consent or presence is likely to lead to misuse of the evidence. If that danger is real, the inspection should not be held.

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Examples of the application of this provision may be given.445 It may be noted that this provision deals with the making of an “order that a demonstration, experiment or inspection be held”. It does not deal with the admissibility of evidence of a demonstration, experiment or inspection. Thus, if a party does not seek an order under this provision but seeks to adduce evidence of, for example, an experiment conducted out of court (by playing a videotape showing the experiment being conducted), this section has no application.446 The admissibility of such evidence will be determined by the provisions of Ch 3. However, the matters set out in s 53(3) will be relevant in determining whether the discretions in Pt 3.11 should be exercised to exclude the evidence.447 Common law authorities on the admissibility of such evidence may also be of assistance.448 Because an appellate court would not otherwise know what the jury observed (and the manner in which they observed it), it is desirable that a record should be made of the “demonstration, experiment or inspection”, whether by a summary from the judge read into the transcript or by other means.449 The New South Wales Bench Book provides useful guidance and suggests that a video recording should be made if practicable (without disclosing members of the jury).450 The Victorian Court of Appeal has also provided similar guidance.451 445. Ssee Chotiputhsilpa v Waterhouse (2005) 44 MVR 456; [2005] NSWCA 295 at [88]–[89]; Swann v Spiropolos [2006] NSWSC 461 (video of site preferred to actual view); Environment Protection Authority v Unomedical Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWLEC 111; NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2011] NSWSC 106 (limited assistance of inspection outweighed by cost and time considerations, bearing in mind stage of proceedings) 446. Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [30]. 447. See R v Martin (No 6) [2017] NSWSC 1344 at [14], [18]–[22]. 448. See R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57; (1991) 52 A Crim R 303; Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291; [2007] WASCA 29. 449. Van Lan Ha v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 319; 247 A Crim R 462; [2014] VSCA 335.. 450. Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book, 667 [4–340]. 451. Van Lan Ha v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 319; 247 A Crim R 462; [2014] VSCA 335, Priest JA at [31]–[34]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 53

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In-court demonstrations, experiments or inspections

Demonstrations, experiments and inspections are commonly conducted inside the courtroom. For example, a defendant in the witness box may be required to provide a sample of handwriting, wear an item of clothing connected with a crime to see if it fits, or to permit comparison between the appearance of the defendant (wearing the clothing) and a photograph of the offender.452 This provision does not expressly differentiate between demonstrations, experiments and inspections held inside and outside the courtroom. Nevertheless, the High Court has held that this provision does not apply to demonstrations, experiments or inspections conducted inside the courtroom.453 Accordingly, the common law applies (see Heydon J at [224]). However, the practical significance of this approach to this provision is limited since the requirement of relevance must be met (Heydon J at [225]) and s 135 and, where applicable, s 137, allow the court to ensure that unduly prejudicial in-court demonstrations or experiments do not occur: Kirby J at [113]; Heydon J at [225]. Of course, s 135 also has potential application.

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[EA.53.120]

“a judge may, on application, order” (s 53(1))

This provision makes it clear that the order can only be made if a party so applies – the judge cannot act of his or her own volition. Section 53(2) imposes pre-conditions454 on the making of the order (which will only have practical operation in respect of out-of-court demonstrations, etc), while s 53(3) requires the court to take into account a number of matters in deciding whether to make the order. It is unclear whether s 192 has any application here since that provision does not refer to the making of an “order”. However, in Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59, Heydon J at [202] regarded as “sound” a submission that an “application” for an “order” under s 53(1) is an application for “leave” or “permission” or “direction” within the meaning of s 192(1).

[EA.53.150]

Presence of the parties (s 53(3))

While the parties must be given a “reasonable opportunity” to attend, the fact that a party chooses not to attend does not mean that that the demonstration, experiment or inspection should not proceed. Section 53(3) makes it clear that a 452. R v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330 at [47]; R v FD (2006) 160 A Crim R 392; [2006] NSWCCA 31 at [30]–[35]. 453. Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [30]; Kirby J at [63]; Heydon J at [195]; Crennan J at [266]. 454. In Jamal v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that s 53(2)(a) confers an entitlement on the defendant in criminal proceedings (a “party” under s 53(2)(a)) to be present at the demonstration, experiment or inspection (at [26]–[41]). The conduct of a view in breach of the statutory requirement to provide the defendant with a reasonable opportunity to be present constitutes a fundamental flaw in the trial process (at [46]).

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[EA.53.180]

view may proceed even in the absence of a party. Thus, there is no requirement for a defendant in criminal proceedings to attend.455

[EA.53.180]

“the court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) is not to conduct an experiment in the course of its deliberations” (s 53(4))

The word “experiment” is not defined, and given that s 53(5) provides that the section does not apply in relation to the “inspection of an exhibit”, difficult issues of degree are likely to arise in differentiating an “inspection” from an “experiment”. Similar issues under the common law were considered by the High Court in Kozul v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 221. Questions of degree are involved and there are dangers in inviting a jury in a criminal trial to become investigators.456 Jurors should be directed not to conduct experiments.457

Cth Act: 54

Views to be evidence

The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) may draw any reasonable inference from what it sees, hears or otherwise notices during a demonstration, experiment or inspection. NSW Act:

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54

Views to be evidence The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) may draw any reasonable inference from what it sees, hears or otherwise notices during a demonstration, experiment or inspection. Vic Act: 54

Views to be evidence The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) may draw any reasonable inference from what it sees, hears or otherwise notices during a demonstration, experiment or inspection. ACT Act: 54

Views to be evidence The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) may draw any reasonable inference from what it sees, hears or otherwise notices during a demonstration, experiment or inspection.

455. See Tongahai v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 217; [2014] NSWCCA 81, Basten JA at [25]–[26], [37]. The defendant may choose not to attend because, for example, significant security steps may have to be taken to ensure that he or she does not abscond. 456. See R v Martin (No 6) [2017] NSWSC 1344 at [26]–[27]. 457. See R v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37 at [284]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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NT Act: 54 Views to be evidence The court (including, if there is a jury, the jury) may draw any reasonable inference from what it sees, hears or otherwise notices during a demonstration, experiment or inspection.

[EA.54.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 145, paras 243–244; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 309–312, 1027–1031.

[EA.54.60] General comments

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The ALRC proposed that the common law “fiction” that a “view” (unlike a “demonstration”) is not “evidence” should be abandoned. This provision implements that proposal. Its significance was emphasised by the High Court in Pledge v Roads & Traffıc Authority; Ryan v Pledge (2004) 78 ALJR 572; [2004] HCA 13 at [35] and [49] per Callinan and Heydon JJ. However, while a “view” is evidence, there is no obligation on the court to record the substance of what is observed: The court may draw inferences from what it observes at the view. It need not do so. The critical fact, however, concerning this complaint, is that her Honour did not state in her judgment that she drew any inferences from the view. This was not a case where her Honour set out in the judgment inferences from the view, which she had never stated to the parties to enable them to respond. There is no substance in the complaint. The idea that every time a judge holds a view he or she is obliged to record what happened on that view, even if no inferences are drawn, must be rejected.458

On the other hand, while not required, it may be desirable in a trial by judge alone that, after a view, the judge hand down a draft note of his or her observations at the view, hears counsel before settling the final version and then records that note in the transcript or as an exhibit, so that “everyone knows what facts the judge has taken in as a result of the view”459. An unresolved question is whether this provision applies to an in-court “demonstration, experiment or inspection”. As noted above, the High Court has held that s 53 does not apply to demonstrations, experiments or inspections conducted inside the courtroom. On the face of it, this provision applies generally (and that would certainly appear to have been the intention of the ALRC) but it is possible that the courts will limit it in the same way as s 53.460

458. Gillett v Murphy [2001] NSWCA 199 at [55]. 459. ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v O’Shea [2010] NSW ConvR 56–259; [2010] NSWCA 71, Young JA at [114]. 460. See, for example, Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 34) [2014] VSC 40.

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CHAPTER 3 – ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE Cth, NSW, Vic and NT Acts:

INTRODUCTORY NOTE Outline of this Chapter This Chapter is about whether evidence adduced in a proceeding is admissible. Part 3.1 sets out the general inclusionary rule that relevant evidence is admissible. Part 3.2 is about the exclusion of hearsay evidence, and exceptions to the hearsay rule. Part 3.3 is about exclusion of opinion evidence, and exceptions to the opinion rule. Part 3.4 is about admissions and the extent to which they are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule and the opinion rule. Part 3.5 is about exclusion of certain evidence of judgments and convictions. Part 3.6 is about exclusion of evidence of tendency or coincidence, and exceptions to the tendency rule and the coincidence rule. Part 3.7 is about exclusion of evidence relevant only to credibility, and exceptions to the credibility rule.

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Part 3.8 is about character evidence and the extent to which it is admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule. Part 3.9 is about the requirements that must be satisfied before identification evidence is admissible. Part 3.10 is about the various categories of privilege that may prevent evidence being adduced. Part 3.11 provides for the discretionary and mandatory exclusion of evidence even if it would otherwise be admissible. The following diagram shows how this Chapter applies to particular evidence:

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ACT Act: Note: This chapter is about whether evidence presented in a proceeding is admissible. • Pt 3.1 sets out the general inclusionary rule that relevant evidence is admissible. • Pt 3.2 is about the exclusion of hearsay evidence, and exceptions to the hearsay rule. • Pt 3.3 is about exclusion of opinion evidence, and exceptions to the opinion rule. • Pt 3.4 is about admissions and the extent to which they are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule and the opinion rule. • Pt 3.5 is about exclusion of certain evidence of judgments and convictions. • Pt 3.6 is about exclusion of evidence of tendency or coincidence, and exceptions to the tendency rule and the coincidence rule. • Pt 3.7 is about exclusion of evidence relevant only to credibility, and exceptions to the credibility rule. • Pt 3.8 is about character evidence and the extent to which it is admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule. • Pt 3.9 is about the requirements that must be satisfied before identification evidence is admissible. • Pt 3.10 is about the various categories of privilege that may prevent evidence being presented. • Pt 3.11 provides for the discretionary and mandatory exclusion of evidence even if it would otherwise be admissible.

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The following diagram shows how this chapter applies to particular evidence:

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s 55

Part 3.1 - Relevance

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.1.30]

Part 3.1 – Relevance [EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.1.30]

Summary of this Part

The key provision regarding the admissibility of evidence in Ch 3 is s 56. If evidence is not relevant, it is not admissible in a proceeding. If it is relevant, it is admissible, “except as otherwise provided by this Act”. Section 55 defines what is relevant evidence. Section 57 deals with provisional relevance, while s 58 provides that, in determining the relevance of an object (“a document or thing”), reasonable inferences may be drawn from it.

Cth Act: 55

Relevant evidence

(1) The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. (2) In particular, evidence is not taken to be irrelevant only because it relates only to: (a) the credibility of a witness; or (b) the admissibility of other evidence; or (c) a failure to adduce evidence. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

NSW Act: 55

Relevant evidence

(1) The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. (2) In particular, evidence is not taken to be irrelevant only because it relates only to: (a) the credibility of a witness, or (b) the admissibility of other evidence, or (c) a failure to adduce evidence. Vic Act: 55

Relevant evidence

(1) The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. (2) In particular, evidence is not taken to be irrelevant only because it relates only to— (a) the credibility of a witness; or (b) the admissibility of other evidence; or (c) a failure to adduce evidence. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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ACT Act: 55 Relevant evidence (1) The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. (2) In particular, evidence is not taken to be irrelevant only because it relates only to— (a) the credibility of a witness; or (b) the admissibility of other evidence; or (c) a failure to present evidence. NT Act: 55

Relevant evidence

(1) The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding.

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(2) In particular, evidence is not taken to be irrelevant only because it relates only to: (a) the credibility of a witness; or (b) the admissibility of other evidence; or (c) a failure to adduce evidence.

[EA.55.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 50; para 122(a); ALRC 26; vol 1, paras 314–318, 640–642.

[EA.55.60] General comments The key provision regarding the admissibility of evidence in Ch 3 is s 56, whereby evidence that is “not relevant” is never admissible in a proceeding, while evidence that is “relevant” is admissible, “except as otherwise provided by this Act”. It follows that the definition of “relevant evidence” is a matter of considerable importance. The definition in s 55 is very wide.1 The ALRC explained the rationale of the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 641): The definition requires a minimal logical connection between the evidence and the “fact in issue”. In terms of probability, relevant evidence need not render a “fact in issue” probable, or “sufficiently probable” – it is enough if it only makes the fact in issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence – ie it “affects the probability”. The definition requires the judge to ask “could” the evidence, if accepted, affect the probabilities. Thus, where a judge is in doubt whether a logical connection exists between a fact asserted by evidence and a “fact in issue”, he should hold that the evidence is relevant if satisfied that a reasonable jury could properly find such a logical connection. An indirect connection with a matter in issue is sufficient (eg evidence that an accused expressed an intention to kill the victim leads from the 1. R v Le [2000] NSWCCA 49 at [19] per Sully J.

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inference that he did in fact have such an intention to the inference that he is more likely than others who did not express such an intention to have killed the victim). The concept extends to evidence affecting the credibility of a witness (relevant because it affects the weight of testimony) and evidence which relates to the admissibility of other relevant evidence. To remove argument, specific mention is made of such evidence in the legislation. The definition embraces two concepts: (a) the logical connection between evidence and facts; and (b) the requirement that the matter on which the evidence ultimately bears is a matter in issue in the trial. Whether or not a matter is in issue is a question of law, determined by substantive law and pleadings. It is not necessary that it be disputed by the parties.

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Given that, under s 56(2), evidence that is not relevant is never admissible, the courts give the definition of “relevance” a broad interpretation, as was intended by the ALRC.2 In this regard, it is important to note that the reference to “if it [the evidence in question] were accepted”, requires that relevance be determined on the assumption that the tribunal of fact accepts the evidence.3 Also as indicated above by the ALRC, the use of the word “could” rather than “would”, and the recognition of indirect connection with a fact in issue, should be emphasised.4 It has been observed that the use of the word “could” means “it is possible that it may”.5 Where a judge is in doubt whether a connection exists between evidence and a “fact in issue” but is satisfied that a reasonable fact-finder could properly find such a connection, the evidence is relevant evidence (for further discussion, see [EA.55.330]). The bar may be even lower where the evidence is adduced by a defendant in a criminal trial.6 2. This point was made by Kirby J in Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 at [45]. Apart from referring to the intentions of the ALRC, he also noted that for reasons of “legal policy it is undesirable … to set the hurdle of relevance too high”, particularly bearing in mind “the respective functions of the judge and jury in a trial by jury and … the fact that questions of relevance often have to be ruled upon before the judge knows all of the issues that may become relevant in the trial”. It is important to note that Kirby J was in dissent on the application of the test of relevance in this particular case. However, the judgment of the majority of the High Court does not appear to adopt a significantly narrower view of the test. As discussed at [EA.55.30], the differing applications of the test appear to have reflected a different factual assessment. 3. Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 at [22]; IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 at [39]. See also R v SG [2017] NSWCCA 202 at [33]. 4. For example, in R v Chanthovixay [2004] NSWCCA 285 it was held that DNA evidence linking a defendant to a piece of tape created a “possible” (Hulme J at [34]) connection between D and the crime sufficient to make the evidence relevant, notwithstanding the existence of other possibilities consistent with innocence. Similarly, in Neal v The Queen [2005] TASSC 70, a majority of the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal held that evidence that the appellant had “an unhappy or sexless marriage” was relevant, albeit minimally so, to the issue whether the appellant engaged in sexual misconduct with a seven-year-old child, on the basis that it could provide “a reason why the person concerned might have sought sexual relief outside the marriage” (Crawford J at [10]), bearing in mind that the sexual acts alleged “appeared on the face of them designed to obtain sexual gratification for the appellant” (Tennant J at [19]). However, a different majority of the court also considered the evidence should have been excluded in discretion. 5. R v SG [2017] NSWCCA 202, Bellew J at [29]. 6. In Ferguson v The Queen [2015] VSCA 279, the Victorian Court of Appeal stated at [34] that “[t]he threshold for relevance, for an accused, is quite low, because the evidence, to be adduced on behalf of an accused, need only be capable of rationally affecting the probability of the existence © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Nevertheless, there must be a rational connection between the evidence and the facts in issue. Whether such a rational, or logical, connection exists is “an objective test grounded in human experience, on the application of which minds may differ” (Lindgren J in Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [11]). In Washer v Western Australia (2007) 234 CLR 492; 177 A Crim R 386; 82 ALJR 33; [2007] HCA 48, Gleeson CJ, Heydon and Crennan JJ observed at footnote 4 that the definition of relevant evidence in this provision “reflects the common law” and at [5] they stated that determination of relevance: requires consideration of the process of reasoning by which [the] information ... could rationally affect the assessment of the probabilities. The word “rationally” is significant in this context. In order to establish relevance, it is necessary to point to a process of reasoning by which the information in question could affect the jury’s assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue at the trial.

Similarly, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ stated in IMM v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 at [39] that evidence may be:

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...so inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous that it could not be accepted by a rational jury. In such a case its effect on the probability of the existence of a fact in issue would be nil and it would not meet the criterion of relevance.

It is apparent that there is a tension between the statutory reference to “if it were accepted”, which requires that relevance be determined on the assumption that the tribunal of fact will “accept” the evidence, and the proposition that there must be a rational connection between the evidence and a fact in issue so that it “could … be accepted by a rational jury”. That tension may be resolved in the following way. If a witness asserts some inherently incredible fact (“I read the tea leaves and saw the defendant kill the victim”), the relevance of that evidence must be assessed on the assumption that the account of the witness is accepted, that the witness did look at some tea leaves and did form the belief that they showed what he or she claims – that the witness is truthfully and reliably recounting the witness’s belief regarding what was depicted in the tea leaves. However, that belief, derived in the way that it was, would not be regarded by a rational fact-finder as affecting the assessment of the probabilities of a fact in issue. Accordingly, the evidence, even if it were accepted, fails to satisfy the test of relevance (for further discussion of this issue in the context of the assessment of “probative value”, see [EA.137.90]). of a fact in issue by raising a doubt in respect of it”. That may be accepted but it fails to acknowledge how low the bar is in other contexts. Even in a civil proceeding, if evidence is rationally capable of raising a doubt about (the existence of) a fact in issue in the proceeding, then it is capable of affecting the assessment of the probability of the existence of that fact in issue. The point that the Court of Appeal makes has more bearing on the application of the discretions in Pt 3.11 (see [EA.135.270]). 7. See s 57 regarding “provisional relevance”. It has been observed that “it is unfortunate that the statute does not explicitly state whether the court is to admit all evidence which is actually, on an objective test, relevant or whether it may admit evidence if it seems to it at the time to be relevant … [T]he Evidence Act 1995 should be approached in a purposive manner to aid the court process and not to delay it. The only construction which fulfils this purpose is to hold that evidence is relevant if it appears to the court to be relevant at the time it is tendered. If it were necessary to have a voir dire examination to examine the objective facts underlying relevance each time an objection arose, trials would never finish”: Nodnara Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 140 FLR 336; 38 ATR 527 (NSW SC) per Young J.

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Evidence may be so “ambiguous” that there is no available rational basis on which to conclude that it affects the assessment of the probabilities of the existence of a fact in issue. Thus, for example, in Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 the fact in issue was whether a person had fallen over a vertical wall rather than adjoining side walls. Ambulance officers’ records relating to the injured person contained the words: “Fall from 1.5 metres onto concrete”. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in a joint judgment (Gummow J and Crennan J agreeing in separate judgments) observed at [25]–[26] that, because “a fall from one of the non-vertical sides meant a vertical fall of the same distance as a fall from the vertical face”, the representation “was so ambiguous that it could not rationally affect the assessment of the probability of a fall from the vertical head wall”.8 Examples may be given of other cases where evidence has failed to satisfy the test of relevance: • the opinion of a witness that a vehicle was moving at “roughly” 100 km per hour “or more”, when the circumstances of observation were that she was in a car moving in the opposite direction at 70 km per hour, at night, and she observed the approaching headlights of the other vehicle only for a few seconds;9 • evidence of an expert’s opinion relied upon because another expert regarded it as “significantly reinforcing” his opinion, without explaining the reasoning process involved;10

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• evidence from a witness that she interpreted the facial expression of the accused to indicate that he did not know someone; 11 • the mere fact that a person has been charged with a criminal offence is no evidence that he or she has committed the offence and is thus irrelevant;12 • the fact that a criminal defendant has no knowledge of any fact from which a motive to lie imputed to a complainant in cross-examination might be inferred;13 8. However, it should be noted that, in BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499; 215 A Crim R 395; [2012] HCA 9, while French CJ held that evidence was not relevant because it was “equivocal” (at [56]), none of the other members of the High Court shared this view. Indeed, the majority of the High Court held that the evidence in question was so probative that there was no rational view of it consistent with the innocence of the defendant (see Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [160]; Heydon J at [108], Bell J at [202]). 9. R v Panetta (1997) 26 MVR 332. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that no rational basis for the opinion had been demonstrated and the evidence should have been excluded as not relevant. See also Mahlo v Westpac Banking Corp (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 21 November 1996); R v Lynch [1999] NSWCCA 32 at [82]. 10. Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District (No 10) [2016] NSWSC 1587 at [631]–[635]. 11. R v Meakin (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1006 at [16]-[22]. 12. Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Newman [2015] VSCA 25 at [25]. 13. In Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; 151 ALR 16 at 7, the majority of the High Court concluded that, under the common law, “the fact that an accused has no knowledge of any fact from which a motive of the kind imputed to a complainant in cross-examination might be inferred is generally irrelevant. In general, an accused’s lack of knowledge simply means that his © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• evidence that a criminal defendant had taken drugs intravenously four months after the robbery with which he was charged;14 • evidence that the complainant had exhibited sexual interest in another man at or near the time defendant was alleged to have engaged in non-consensual intercourse with the complainant;15 • evidence that a defendant could not recall his brother’s date of birth some 15 years after the brother’s death (said to bear on the nature of the relationship between the applicant and his brother);16 • a defendant’s opinion as to whether “a ‘kid’ with problems needs their mother and father” (said to bear on the mental state of that “kid”);17 • evidence that a complainant in relation to alleged child sexual abuse had a history of bedwetting (where there was no expert evidence on a possible link between the bedwetting and child sexual abuse);18

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• evidence that the complainant, in relation to alleged child sexual abuse, wrote a letter in what was said to be a “tone” inconsistent with her allegations, where “it would invite the jury to speculate”, from that “tone”, as to her frame of mind when she wrote the letter, “and to speculate as to how” a child of the same age “might be expected to have expressed herself, in writing such a letter, if she had been subjected to the sexual abuse of the type alleged”.19

evidence cannot assist in determining whether the complainant has a motive to lie, but if the facts from which an inference of motive might be drawn are facts that the accused would know if they existed, his lack of knowledge could be elicited to disprove those facts”. A similar approach may be taken under s 55. 14. In R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held (at [31]) that such evidence “could not support an argument, let alone tend to establish, that four months earlier he was an illicit drug taker, nor that such drugs comprised heroin nor that they (whatever they were) were ingested shortly before the robbery so that any possible analgesic effect might have been operating at the time of the robbery. For the same reason, it could not establish a motive at the time of the robbery”. See also Swan v The Queen (2013) 234 A Crim R 372; [2013] VSCA 226 (evidence that appellant took heroin prior to a car accident was not relevant in the absence of any evidence supporting a conclusion that this ingestion detrimentally affected his driving: at [14]). Of course, prior drug use may well be relevant to a fact in issue: Cook v The Queen [2016] VSCA 174 at [66]–[71]. 15. R v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335, Simpson J (RA Hulme J and Barr AJ agreeing) at [68]. It has to be said that this conclusion of lack of relevance is somewhat surprising given that the trial judge who had admitted this defence evidence (wrongly, according to the Court of Criminal Appeal) had considered that the evidence went beyond showing a sexual interest in one man but “showed a tendency on the part of the complainant to engage in sexual activity, regardless of the identity of any person with whom she engaged” (at [64]). Surely such evidence would meet the test of relevance given that the conduct occurred close in time to the alleged non-consensual sexual activity between the complainant and the defendant? 16. Gilham v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131 at [429]. 17. Gilham v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131 at [430]–[431]. 18. Clay v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 405, 245 A Crim R 470; [2014] VSCA 269 at [30]–[32]. 19. Ferguson v The Queen [2015] VSCA 279 at [39]–[40].

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• evidence from a complainant that she had interpreted an apology given by the defendant as an admission of guilt;20 • evidence regarding the precise nature and outcome of the criminal proceedings against an alleged accomplice of a criminal defendant, called at the trial as a witness for the defence.21 Other possible examples are discussed at [EA.55.240] to [EA.55.510].

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The relevance of evidence does not depend on its capacity by itself to prove anything. The assessment of the probabilities must be made in the context of other evidence either admitted at the time or subsequently to be adduced.22 Sometimes the determination of the question whether evidence adduced by a party is relevant depends on the court making another finding (for example, a finding that it is reasonably open to conclude that evidence is what it is claimed to be, or that a process which produced a particular document is reliable), which may require other evidence to be admitted. If the other evidence is not admitted and the finding is not made, relevance will not be established (although s 57 permits a provisional finding of relevance pending the other evidence being admitted). No distinction is drawn in the Act between “logical” relevance and “legal” relevance. The common law has traditionally drawn such a distinction (by use of such concepts as “sufficient relevance”) in order to exclude evidence of minimal probative value (that is, tendency to prove some fact in issue23) which, if admitted, would add unduly to the time and cost of a trial or create disproportionate difficulties for the process. That function is performed under the Act by the discretion contained in s 135 (see [EA.56.60] below). McHugh J summarised the position in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274 at [81]: In the Interim Report of the Australian Law Reform Commission that led to the enactment of the Act, the Commission pointed out that distinguishing between “legal” and “logical” relevance disguised the myriad policy considerations that contributed to the former. The Commission thought that, as a threshold test, relevance should require only a logical connection between evidence and a fact in issue. To the extent that other policies of evidence law, such as procedural fairness and reliability, required the strict logic of the relevance rule to be modified, that could best be done by the exclusionary rules – such as the hearsay rule and the credibility rule – and by conferring discretions on the court as in ss 135 to 137. The terms of s 55 indicate that it was intended to give effect to the Commission’s view as to the proper approach for determining the relevance of evidence. 20. Patrick v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 651; 241 A Crim R 153; [2014] VSCA 89 at [33]–[35]: “The fact in issue was whether the appellant assaulted the complainant, a matter about which the complainant gave direct evidence. Her subsequent interpretation of his apology provides no greater support for her allegations than her direct evidence”. 21. Santo v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 269 at [46]. Of course, such information may be relevant where the alleged accomplice has been called by the prosecution and gives evidence against the defendant, since it may bear on the existence of any motive to lie (at [44]). 22. See Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59, Heydon J at [177]; Britt v Britt [2017] FamCAFC 27 at [34], [62]. 23. The Dictionary defines “probative value” as “the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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This analysis was accepted as correct by a majority of the High Court in Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 when Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ observed (at [6]) that “although questions of relevance may raise nice questions of judgment, no discretion falls to be exercised. Evidence is relevant or it is not.”

[EA.55.90] “a fact in issue” The reference to “fact” should be contrasted with “law”. Evidence will not be relevant if the only issue to which it relates is a question of law (for example, the construction of a statute).24 The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 641, n 3) that:

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The expression “fact in issue” should be interpreted as referring to the issues in the proceedings defined by substantive law and pleadings and thus would extend to facts to be proved in undefended or ex parte proceedings.

Thus, the first and critical question is a matter of substantive law. In a civil proceeding, the first things to be considered are the factual elements of any legal cause of action or legal defence relied upon by the parties.25 In a criminal proceeding, it will be the factual elements of the charged offence and any defence.26 Thus, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ observed in Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20 at [16] that “[t]he facts in issue in a criminal proceeding are those which establish the elements of the offence” Accordingly, “fact in issue” should be understood to mean “ultimate fact in issue”. Such a fact may be a matter of mixed fact and law (for example, a claim that the defendant was “negligent”). Of course, behind these ultimate issues there will often be many issues about facts that are themselves relevant to facts in issue.27 As the definition of “relevant evidence” makes clear, relevance may be indirect and only a minimal effect on the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue is required. As the ALRC observed, the “pleadings” of the parties to a proceeding may confine those (ultimate) facts which are “in issue”.28 If a party to the proceeding asserts the existence of a fact which the substantive law requires to exist for the purposes of some cause of action or defence, and the opposing party formally indicates that there is no dispute as to the existence of that fact, evidence which 24. See Victorian Workcover Authority v Elsdon (2013) 42 VR 434; [2013] VSCA 235, Bongiorno JA and Dixon AJA at [85] (although a court may receive evidence in determining whether there is any specialised meaning of words or phrases and, if so, what that meaning is: at [84]). 25. See, for example, Australian Broadcasting Corp v McBride (2001) 53 NSWLR 430; [2001] NSWCA 322; EI Dupont de Nemours & Co v Imperial Chemical Industries PLC [2002] AIPC 91–788; [2002] FCA 230 at [50] and [59] per Branson J. 26. See Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 at [7] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. In Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274, the High Court held (at [30]) that evidence of what the alleged victim of a sexual assault said to several people soon after the alleged assault was evidence which, “if accepted, could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of a fact in issue in the proceedings, the fact being that the complainant did not consent to have intercourse with the appellant”. 27. See Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 at [7] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 28. See, for example, Fuller-Lyons v New South Wales (No 1) [2013] NSWSC 411 at [12]; Robinson v Goodman [2013] FCA 893 at [24].

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would only be relevant on the basis that it bears on the existence of that fact would cease to be relevant in the proceeding (and would not be admissible: s 56(2)).29 Of course, if the evidence is relevant to some other fact in issue in the proceeding, it may still be admissible (see [EA.56.60]). Further, a fact may be relevant to an (ultimate) “fact in issue” even if that first fact is not the subject of dispute.30 Evidence of that fact may be admissible (subject to the other provisions of Ch 3 and procedural provisions in the Act, for example s 191: see [EA.191.20]; see also [EA.184.20]). In Griffıth v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2003] NSWSC 483, Levine J held that, where there was no issue that a video recording recorded a television program, a transcript of the recording could not “be relevant in these proceedings … because there is no room for its acceptance rationally affecting, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of what is, in reality, not a fact in issue” (at [11], [13]). The flaw in this reasoning is that the expression “fact in issue” should be interpreted as referring to the issues in the proceedings defined by substantive law and pleadings. On that approach, the transcript was relevant evidence of the contents of the program and indirectly relevant to the fact in issue in the proceeding (whether the program was defamatory).31 Of course, there might be discretionary reasons for not admitting the transcript.32 A similar point may be made in respect of the case of Reading v ABC [2003] NSWSC 716, where Shaw J held (at [29]–[31]) that a transcript of a television program was not relevant because the jury could not perform their function of assessing the response of the ordinary reasonable viewer to the broadcast by use of a written transcript. Shaw J accepted that a transcript “may go to an assessment of whether something was, or was not, said in the broadcast – if that was an issue of contention between the parties” (at [28]). However, it may be observed that what was said will always be relevant to the fact in issue of whether the program was defamatory, regardless of whether what was said is in dispute and regardless of whether things not recorded in the transcript (such as tone of voice and the visible actions of the actors) need to be taken into account as well. On the other hand, the danger that a jury will focus unduly on the written word may well justify discretionary exclusion of the transcript (as Shaw J held at [32]–[33]).33 Practical difficulties may arise where there is no formal narrowing of facts in issue but it appears nonetheless that the existence of some alleged fact is not in dispute. In R v Sievers (2004) 151 A Crim R 426; [2004] NSWCCA 463 the appellant had been convicted of murder. At his trial, he had formally admitted 29. Compare McNeil v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 54 ATR 1; 202 ALR 35; [2003] FCA 958 (Fed Ct). However, see also the discussion in relation to s 184 at [EA.184.20]. 30. Foreign Media Pty Ltd v Konstantinidis [2003] NSWCA 161 at [10]–[11]. 31. In Nuclear Utility Technology & Environmental Corp Inc v ABC [2010] NSWSC 711, McCallum J observed at [11] that “[t]he conclusion reached by Levine J that a transcript of a broadcast is not ‘relevant’ within the meaning of s 55 of the Act where a tape or disc recording of the broadcast is available to be put before the jury may be open to debate”. 32. See Nuclear Utility Technology & Environmental Corp Inc v ABC [2010] NSWSC 711 at [12]–[13]. 33. See also Nuclear Utility Technology & Environmental Corp Inc v ABC [2010] NSWSC 711 at [12]–[13]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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stabbing the victim and had also offered to enter a plea to manslaughter on the basis of provocation (which was not accepted by the prosecution). The prosecution adduced evidence of the appellant’s conduct after the death of the victim (including the appellant disposing of the knife and the body, cleaning up the crime scene and moving interstate), which was relied upon as admissions by conduct (demonstrating consciousness of guilt of murder: see [EA.81.60]). It was argued on appeal that this evidence was capable of showing that the appellant was conscious of his guilt of having committed a crime, but was not capable of rationally affecting the probabilities that he committed murder as distinct from manslaughter. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal divided on this question. Levine J considered the evidence was relevant to whether the appellant had intended to kill the victim or cause her grievous bodily harm. Barr J considered that the evidence was relevant to whether the defence of provocation was available, on the basis that it was relevant to whether the appellant had lost control when he killed the victim (as he claimed). Simpson J (dissenting) held that the evidence was not relevant, since there was no (practical) issue at the trial that the appellant had intended to cause at least grievous bodily harm to the victim and because (contrary to the view of Barr J) the evidence was “not capable of going to” the issue of loss of control (at [82]). The approach of Levine J does appear problematic given the fact that, as he himself stated in his judgment, “the only practical issue for the jury was whether the appellant was guilty of murder or manslaughter on the basis of provocation” (at [2]). There was no “practical issue” as to the prosecution allegation that he had stabbed the victim with at least an intention to cause grievous bodily harm.34 On the other hand, it is desirable that the courts insist on parties using formal procedures (such as formal admissions) to narrow issues in dispute, so that there can be no uncertainty as to whether a particular fact is, or is not, “in issue” for the purposes of a determination of relevance.35 Yet even that may not be enough. In R v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335, Simpson J (RA Hulme J and Barr AJ agreeing) held at [150] that evidence was relevant to whether or not sexual intercourse had occurred even though the defendant’s counsel had indicated that this was not in dispute. Simpson J explained: 34. Compare Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374; 207 A Crim R 202; [2011] HCA 7, Heydon J at [111]. In Gilham v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal observed at [419] that the appellant’s “dexterity” with a knife “was not a fact in issue at trial”, because “[a]t no time was it suggested that he was physically incapable of wielding the knife in a manner consistent with the wounds sustained by the victims”, with the consequence that evidence sought to be adduced of him holding the knife in court was not relevant and thus inadmissible. 35. Compare Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374; 207 A Crim R 202; [2011] HCA 7, Heydon J at [88]–[90]. See also Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 at [26]. As regards the disagreement in Sievers as to whether the appellant’s conduct was relevant to the issue of loss of control (an element of the provocation defence) Simpson J is arguably wrong in holding that the appellant could not be conscious of his guilt of murder unless he “appreciated the circumstances that make a killing murder as distinct from manslaughter” (at [82]). He may know he did not lose control, without knowing the legal implication of that fact. However, it is difficult to see how his conduct after the death of the victim was capable of showing he knew he had not lost control. On the other hand, it may be observed that, in theory at least, post-offence conduct can reduce the probability of loss of control at the time of commission of the offence without any reliance on reasoning via “consciousness of guilt” (cf R v Loader (2004) 89 SASR 204; 147 A Crim R 312; [2004] SASC 234) (although the prosecution does not appear to have sought to use the evidence in this way).

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First, as set out above, an accused is not bound by pre-trial pleadings. Second, also as mentioned above, whether the facts that support an element of an offence are or are not disputed, the obligation remains on the Crown to prove each element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.

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This analysis would suggest the unpalatable conclusion that even a formal admission (that sexual intercourse had occurred) would not be sufficient to prevent it being a “fact in issue”. However, it has been accepted by a NSW Supreme Court judge that “[formal] admissions may mean that a particular matter is no longer a ‘fact in issue’”.36 A different problem arose in Falzon v The Queen [2017] VSCA 74. When the police searched the applicant’s premises on 17 December 2013, they found a hydroponic facility with cannabis plants growing and plant stumps from which cannabis had already been harvested. The estimated value of the cannabis already harvested was more than $16,000. On the same day, the police raided the applicant’s home and found $120,800 in cash secreted at various locations throughout the house, as well as various items related to the cultivation of cannabis. Initially, the applicant was charged with cultivating and trafficking cannabis “between 24 July and 17 December 2013” but this was changed to cultivating and trafficking cannabis “on 17 December 2013”. The trafficking alleged was based on possession of cannabis for the purpose of sale. The applicant admitted possession of the cannabis but told police the cannabis was for personal use (and for friends) and not for sale. On appeal, the issue was whether the evidence of the finding of the cash at the applicant’s home was relevant to the fact in issue of whether the cannabis was possessed for sale. At trial, this evidence had been admitted to show that the applicant was in the business of selling cannabis and it was held that this was relevant to the issue of whether the cannabis found on 17 December 2013 was possessed for sale. Priest JA and Beach JA held that it was not, emphasizing the importance of the change made by the prosecution to the charge against the applicant. Instead of charging an offence alleging trafficking over an extended period, the charge was only in respect of the single day when the cannabis was found in the applicant’s possession. Priest JA and Beach JA stated at [146]: In our view, insofar as the evidence of the possession of the cash was admitted on the basis that it was evidence of past trafficking, it was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. At the risk of repetition, the cultivation and trafficking … related to … one day. … [W]ith respect to the trafficking, the prosecution eschewed reliance on a … case that involved an allegation of an ongoing drug trafficking business. Thus, as a matter of logic, it is impossible to say that the evidence of cash at the applicant’s home — from which it was not said that he conducted any ongoing illicit business — could have gone in proof of his having possession of cannabis for sale … on a single day in December 2013.

The difficulty with this analysis is that (as the other member of the Court pointed out) the prosecution did not “eschew … a case that involved an allegation of an ongoing drug trafficking business”. While the charge itself alleged possession for

36. R v Brooks [2017] NSWSC 188, Hamill J at [23], see also at [72]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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sale on a particular day, the prosecutor at the trial maintained a case that the appellant was in a continuing business of drug trafficking.37 Whelan JA, in dissent, stated at [68]: The fact that under an earlier indictment the prosecution had charged the applicant with trafficking over a period of time … and had then abandoned charges on that basis alleging possession for the purpose of sale on one particular day, is not significant, in my view. … The prosecution did eschew [charges based on conduct over a period of time]. But the prosecutor did not eschew reliance on the contention that … the secreted cash [was] indicia of a drug trafficking business then being conducted by the applicant.

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That analysis appears persuasive. The charge brought was a matter for prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutorial decision to narrow the scope of the charge by charging trafficking on a single day did not preclude a conclusion that the finding of the cash was relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding. Whether or not the applicant was engaged in such a business was not a “fact in issue” (in the sense of a factual element of the charged offence) but evidence tending to show that he was engaged in such a business was relevant to what was the fact in issue - whether the cannabis was possessed for sale on that day. The applicant’s possession of the cash on that day permitted an inference that he was, on that day, active in a business of drug trafficking and, accordingly, increased the probability that the cannabis was possessed for sale. The fact that the charge itself did not allege a continuing business of drug trafficking did not bar the prosecution from contending that he was engaged in such a business. On 19 April 2018, the High Court allowed an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, stating that reasons would be published at a later date: R v Falzon [2018] HCATrans 68.

[EA.55.120]

“evidence … not taken to be irrelevant” (s 55(2))

The function of s 55(2) is to make clear that evidence which relates only to one of the matters referred to in the provision is not necessarily irrelevant to a fact in issue. Thus, the mere fact that the “only” apparent relevance of an item of evidence is to the credibility of a witness does not mean that it is not relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding. Usually the reverse will be true (see [EA.55.150]). Nevertheless, the kinds of evidence referred to in s 55(2) are not made relevant by that provision – there must still be compliance with the test in s 55(1).38 Thus, evidence which relates only to the admissibility of other evidence may not satisfy the test of s 55(1). In that event it may be admissible in a separate proceeding39 to determine the admissibility of that other item of evidence but will 37. Whelan JA noted at [59]–[61] that the prosecutor at the trial relied on the cash to support a contention that the applicant was engaged in an “illegal business” of selling drugs – the cash, and other items found, were “indicia of trafficking”. 38. However, it should be noted that McHugh J did not appear to appreciate this point in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274 at [75]–[77]. 39. Section 4 provides that the Act applies in relation to all proceedings, “including proceedings that: … (b) are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind”. Section 189 provides for “voir dire” hearings – hearings to determine “preliminary questions” (as defined) – and s 189(7) specifically provides: “In the application of Chapter 3 to a hearing to determine a preliminary question, the facts in issue are taken to include the fact to which the hearing relates.”

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not be admissible in the trial proper (however, Austin J took a contrary view in ASIC v Rich (2004) 213 ALR 338; 51 ACSR 363; [2004] NSWSC 1062 at [49], discussed further at [EA.189.120]). Evidence which relates only to a failure to adduce evidence would usually be relevant under s 55(1), because it would bear on the nature of the inference to be drawn by the tribunal of fact from the failure of a party to adduce that other evidence, which in turn will affect the probability of the existence of a fact in issue (see [EA.55.180]).

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[EA.55.150]

“… relates only to … the credibility of a witness”

Evidence which relates (or is relevant) only to the credibility of a witness is dealt with in Pt 3.7. The term “credibility of a witness” is defined in the Dictionary to mean “the credibility of any part or all of the evidence of the witness, and includes the witness’s ability to observe or remember facts and events about which the witness has given, is giving or is to give evidence.” As explained in [EA.55.120] the function of s 55(2) is to make clear that evidence which relates only to one of the matters referred to in the provision is not necessarily irrelevant to a fact in issue and that the mere fact that the “only” apparent relevance of an item of evidence is to the credibility of a witness does not mean that it is not relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding. Where a witness has testified in relation to some fact in issue, evidence relating to the credibility of the witness will indirectly affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the fact in issue. However, for evidence to relate to the credibility of a witness, it must rationally bear on the question whether the testimony of the witness should, or should not, be relied upon, either generally or in respect of particular testimony.41 Matters which relate to the credibility of a witness include truthfulness or veracity, intelligence, bias or motive to be untruthful,42 opportunities of observation, reasons for recollection or belief, powers of perception and memory, any special circumstances affecting competency, prior statements consistent or inconsistent with testimony, internal inconsistencies and ambiguities in testimony and direct contradiction of testimony. Evidence may be relevant in this way even if serves only to negate inferences regarding credibility sought to be drawn from other evidence. For example, expert evidence regarding the behaviour of victims of child sexual assault was held to be relevant even though it: 40. The effect of s 189(8) is that, in a jury trial where the jury has not been present during a voir dire, evidence of the testimony of a witness in the voir dire is not admissible in the trial proper unless the witness gives inconsistent evidence in the trial, or has died before giving evidence in the trial. In trials without a jury, or cases where the jury has been present during a voir dire, the voir dire testimony may be admitted in the trial proper – if relevant to a fact in issue. Of course, even if admissible the court may exclude the evidence in the exercise of discretion under s 135 (taking into account any lack of opportunity to cross-examine the witness). 41. See also [EA.101A.90]–[EA.101A.120]. Compare R v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314; [2003] NSWCCA 93 at [31]–[34] per Sheller JA. 42. For example, evidence that an alleged accomplice had been given a discount on sentence as a result of an undertaking to give evidence against the defendant and that, if there was a failure to fulfil that undertaking, the sentence might be increased: Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204; [2000] FCA 461 at [207]; R v Stewart (2001) 52 NSWLR 301; 124 A Crim R 371; [2001] NSWCCA 260; R v Yammine (2002) 132 A Crim R 44; [2002] NSWCCA 289; R v Sullivan [2003] NSWCCA 100 at [43], at [63]–[96] per Buddin J, at [105]–[109] per Smart AJ; R v Campbell [2004] NSWCCA 314 at [13]–[20]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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could not establish that it was probable the complainant was telling the truth, but it could establish that her behaviour was not demonstrative of untruthfulness by reference to common or usual patterns of behaviour as asserted by the defence. In this sense, it could establish that the counterintuitive behaviour complained of was of neutral significance.43 Evidence which is to the “discredit” of a witness in some moral sense would not relate to the credibility of the witness unless it tended to suggest that the witness ought not to be relied upon.44 It should be noted that, where evidence has been admitted in a proceeding of a statement made by a person, evidence relating only to the credibility of that person may well be relevant under s 55(1), notwithstanding the fact that such evidence does not fall within the terms of s 55(2)(a) because the person is not a “witness” in the sense of a person testifying in the proceeding. Such evidence will be subject to the provisions of Div 3 of Pt 3.7 (s 108A and, where the person is a defendant in criminal proceedings, s 108B).

[EA.55.180]

“a failure to adduce evidence”

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In some cases, the absence of evidence (for example, the absence of evidence of a motive to commit a crime)45 will be directly relevant. However, evidence which relates only to a failure to adduce evidence would usually be relevant on the basis that it bears on the nature of the inference capable of being drawn by the tribunal of fact from the failure of a party to adduce that other evidence, which in turn will affect the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. This Act does not contain any provisions dealing with the drawing of such an inference (although s 20 deals with “comment” on such failure). Common law principles would apply. In civil proceedings, under the common law (the “rule in Jones v Dunkel”), adverse inferences may46 be drawn from the failure of a party to adduce particular evidence, where such evidence would reasonably have been expected.47 This is a particular application of Lord Mansfield CJ’s maxim “that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to 43. MA v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 564; 226 A Crim R 575; [2013] VSCA 20, Osborne JA at [22]. Indeed, evidence regarding the behaviour of persons other than victims (for example, parents of victims) was held to be relevant in this way because it bore on the likely behaviour of victims (Osborne JA at [45]). 44. Compare R v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314; [2003] NSWCCA 93 at [34]–[37] per Sheller JA. 45. See R v O’Donohue [2001] NSWCCA 458. 46. But are not compelled: Howell v Macquarie University [2008] NSWCA 26 at [93]–[99]; Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (2011) 16 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-885; [2011] FCAFC 53 at [79]; Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd v Sporte Leisure Pty Ltd (2012) 202 FCR 286; [2012] FCAFC 51 at [88]; Bailey v Director-General, Department of Natural Resources NSW [2015] NSWCA 318 at [91]–[95]; Addenbrooke Pty Limited v Duncan (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 76 at [148], [165]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Geary [2018] VSCA 103 at [257]. 47. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; 32 ALJR 395; 76 WN (NSW) 278; [1959] ALR 367; Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551; ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 86 ALJR 522; [2012] HCA 17 at [164]–[170]; Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191; Archer v Richard Crookes Constructions Pty Ltd (1997) 15 NSWCCR 297; Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328 at [95]–[100]; Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29465; [2011] NSWCA 303, Campbell JA at [93]–[94].

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have produced and in the power of the other to have contradicted”. As a general proposition,49 one would reasonably expect a party to call a person as a witness if such a person is likely to be able to provide admissible evidence regarding some fact in issue,50 one would have expected that party (rather than another party) to call the person,51 and the failure to call the person is not satisfactorily

48. Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969 at 970 (ER).

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49. An example of where the general proposition would not apply is where the evidence of the person is unnecessary or would be needlessly cumulative on other evidence: Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123 at [60]–[67]; Hammond v Hammond [2010] NSWSC 331 at [73]–[74]; Masoud v Masoud [2016] FamCAFC 24 at [52]–[53]; SAMM Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Shaye Properties Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 132, per McColl JA at [162]–[163]. It would also not apply where there is not an available inference against the party on the evidence, so that there is no obligation on the party to call the witness to rebut the inference: Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123 at [54]; Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd v Sporte Leisure Pty Ltd (2012) 202 FCR 286; [2012] FCAFC 51 at [95]. Conversely, it would apply where “the witness not called was himself a party and was arguably in a better position to give evidence about the matter in question than” the witness actually called: Chand v Azurra Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 227 at [40]; see also Powercor Australia Ltd v Perry (2011) 33 VR 548; [2011] VSCA 239 at [25]–[26]. The general proposition is more likely to be applied where the allegation made by the party not calling the witness concerns fraudulent or improper conduct: White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) v White [2005] NSWCA 173 per Ipp JA at [282]. Particular care needs to be taken where the party not adducing the evidence is unrepresented: Downes v Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (2014) 313 ALR 383; [2014] VSCA 193. 50. ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 86 ALJR 522; [2012] HCA 17 at [168]–[169], [263], [266]. The rule only applies where a party is required to explain or contradict something, a question which turns on the issues in the case: Jones v Dunkel at 321; Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121 at [51]; O’Meara v Dominican Fathers (2003) 153 ACTR 1; [2003] ACTCA 24 at [69]; Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29465; [2011] NSWCA 303, Campbell JA at [93]–[94]; Mamo v Surace (2014) 86 NSWLR 275; [2014] NSWCA 58 at [65]–[66]. In Doolan v Renkon Pty Ltd (2011) 21 Tas R 156; [2011] TASFC 4 the Tasmanian Full Court observed at [47] that there was no reason to call a person as a witness because the only relevant evidence the witness could give would have been inadmissible hearsay. Similarly, there is authority that an adverse inference should not be drawn from failure to adduce evidence that is privileged (at least, where the privilege has not been waived): Cooper v Hobbs [2013] NSWCA 70 at [58]–[63]; but cf Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [213]–[229]. In Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 158 it was held at [81] that it is “not necessary to call cumulative evidence”, so that “the rule [did] not operate” where the “primary operator” was called as a witness. 51. See Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 (CA); Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123 at [68]–[75]; AMP Services Ltd v Manning [2006] FCA 256 per Finkelstein J at [49]; Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd v Sporte Leisure Pty Ltd (2012) 202 FCR 286; [2012] FCAFC 51 at [97]–[99]; Director, Offıce of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2013) 231 IR 278; [2013] FCAFC 8, Besanko and Perram JJ at [12]–[103]; Re Bellpac Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] FCAFC 48 at [56]–[57]; MSPR Pty Ltd v Advanced Braking Technology Ltd [2013] NSWCA 416 at [55]; Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 158 at [89]. In ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 86 ALJR 522; [2012] HCA 17, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ were not persuaded that a particular witness (Mr Robb) should have been called by ASIC rather than the respondents, stating at [163]: “A conclusion that it was ‘unfair’ for ASIC not to have called Mr Robb as its witness necessarily proceeded from an assumption that ASIC’s conduct denied the defendants in the proceedings some advantage or subjected them to some disadvantage. That advantage or disadvantage was never identified. General reference was made to the defendants being denied the opportunity to cross-examine Mr Robb. But to what effect? No reason is advanced to suppose that Mr Robb would have [given evidence that would hurt the respondent’s © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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explained. Such a (potential) witness may be, indeed, a party to the proceedings53 and considerable importance may well attach to the inference that nothing which the party (who does not testify) could say would assist his or her case.54 Similarly, as a general proposition, one would reasonably expect a party to question a witness regarding a particular fact in issue, if the witness is likely to be able to speak on the fact in issue, one would have expected that party (rather than another party) to question the witness regarding the fact in issue, and the failure to ask the question is unexplained.55 Similar principles apply in respect of the tendering of documentary evidence. Assuming particular evidence would reasonably have been expected then, as a general rule, the adverse inference that may be drawn from the failure to adduce it is that the evidence, if adduced, would not have assisted the party’s case.56 On the other hand, it cannot be inferred that the evidence would have been unfavourable to the party’s case.57 Put differently, while it may (depending on all

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case]. General reference was made to the difficulty of the defendants calling him ‘blind’ – without knowing what he would say. … why would that difficulty cause unfairness if he could not be expected to give evidence that would [hurt the respondent’s case]?” 52. See Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328 at [97]–[98] per Heydon JA; Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131 at [649]–[668] per Giles JA; Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v Tormey [2009] NSWCA 135 at [62] per Ipp JA (citing the comments of Sheller JA, in R v Vaitaiki (unreported, NSW CCA, 6 October 1993), that it “is for the party who might have been expected to have called the witness to provide the explanation. If the party does not provide an explanation, the other party wishing to rely upon the failure to produce the witness, is not required to cross-examine about the absent witnesses’ whereabouts”); see also RHG Mortgage Ltd v Ianni [2015] NSWCA 56 at [90]. Possible explanations for not calling the person may be not knowing what the person will say or the person having a reason for not telling the truth: Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437. However, these may not be a satisfactory explanation, particularly given the availability of s 38: see RHG Mortgage Ltd v Ianni [2015] NSWCA 56 at [90]. 53. Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131 at [649]; Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [212]; Trkulja v Markovic [2015] VSCA 298 at [94]. 54. Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [212]. 55. Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australasia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 (CA) at 418–419 per Handley JA; Freeman v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 78 FCR 91 at 98–99; White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169; [1998] FCA 806 at 226–229 per Goldberg J; Stambolziovski v Nestorovic [2015] NSWCA 332 at [51]–[58]. See also Prentice v Cummins (No 6) (2003) 203 ALR 449; [2003] FCA 1002 at [77]–[80] per Sackville J (where a witness “elected to give no evidence” in respect of a particular issue). For criminal proceedings, see R v Navarolli [2010] Qd R 27; (2009) 194 A Crim R 96; [2009] QCA 49 at [4]. 56. See Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; 32 ALJR 395; 76 WN (NSW) 278; [1959] ALR 367 per Kitto J (at 308) and Menzies J (at 312); Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 559–560; Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (2011) 16 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-885; [2011] FCAFC 53 at [79]; Mamo v Surace (2014) 86 NSWLR 275; [2014] NSWCA 58 at [67]. 57. Brandi at 559–560 (ALR); ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 86 ALJR 522; [2012] HCA 17, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [168]; Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123 per Campbell J at [50]. A qualification to this proposition is that the conduct of a party/witness in failing “to comply with the duty of a witness to tell the whole truth” might, in certain circumstances, constitute an admission: Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ at [64]. Heydon, Crennan

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the circumstances) be appropriate to conclude that evidence already adduced by an opponent which might have been contradicted by the uncalled evidence may be more readily accepted, and inferences open on the opponent’s evidence more readily drawn58, the failure cannot fill an evidentiary gap in the opponent’s case.59 Equally, the failure cannot be used to discount the probative value of evidence that has been called by the party and is direct, not inferential, evidence in support of the party’s case.60 and Bell JJ explained this distinction in the following way: “There is a reason why failure to call a witness or failure to ask a particular question of a witness supports the possible inference that the witness’s evidence would not have assisted the party, while failure of a party-witness to tell the whole truth may support an inference that the party suppressed evidence which would have been damaging to the party-witness. A litigant has no duty to call particular witnesses or to procure that any witnesses called by that litigant are asked particular questions. A litigant who enters the witness box, on the other hand, is under a positive duty to tell the whole truth in answer to the questions asked.” This analysis appears questionable. Even if a party had a duty to call a witness notwithstanding that witness did not assist the party or was unfavourable to the party, the failure would not necessarily support the latter inference (rather than the former). Equally, a duty on a party/witness to tell the whole truth does not necessarily support an inference that a failure to tell the whole truth means that the whole truth would be unfavourable (that is, the party/witness may choose not to leave facts out because he or she considers that they are not relevant). A better explanation may be that, in some (arguably rare) circumstances, it is logically possible to exclude an explanation that the relevant failure arose from a belief the evidence would not have assisted the party and to infer a belief that it would have been unfavourable. In Rhodes v O’Neill [2017] TASFC 1, Estcourt J held at [32]–[33] that an inference should be drawn that the evidence of the witness would have been “damaging” to the case of the respondent (because “the only way in which the evidence … could ‘not have assisted’ the respondent’s case would be by [the witness] confirming” the appellant’s case in a particular respect). However, Estcourt J was in dissent and the other members of the Court held that the trial judge “was not entitled to use the failure to call [the witness] as a basis for inferring facts which were unfavourable to the respondent’s case” (Brett J at [57], Wood J agreeing at [1]). 58. Rich J said in Insurance Commissioner v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39 at 49 that where an inference is open and the defendant elects not to give evidence “the Court is entitled to be bold”. Similarly, Gleeson CJ and Handley JA said in SS Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyds Rep 288 at 293 that “[w]here the inference of greater fault is open on the evidence we see no difficulty in drawing that more adverse inference where the defendant fails to call evidence”. See also United Group Resources Pty Ltd v Calabro (No 5) (2011) 198 FCR 514; [2011] FCA 1408 at [74]–[75]; Charltons CJC Pty Ltd v Fitzgerald [2013] NSWSC 350. In Trkulja v Markovic [2015] VSCA 298, the Victorian Court of Appeal observed at [95] that “where the absent witness or party is the only person capable of giving evidence on a particular issue in dispute, his or her failure to enter the witness box may attain a particular significance. … [A]lthough the silence of one party cannot fill the place of actual evidence on an issue, it may serve to resolve a doubt or an ambiguity, especially where the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the silent party. In these circumstances, a failure to call or give evidence may have more than ordinary significance”. (citing Tozer Kemsley & Millbourn (A/asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384; [1956] HCA 6 at 403 (CLR)). 59. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; 32 ALJR 395; 76 WN (NSW) 278; [1959] ALR 367 per Kitto J (at 308) and Menzies J (at 312); Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 74 ALJR 743; [2000] HCA 18 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J at 143; King v Collins [2007] NSWCA 122 at [42]; Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v Tormey [2009] NSWCA 135 at [72]; Morley v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2010) 247 FLR 140; 5 BFRA 364; [2010] NSWCA 331 at [634]; JP Morgan Australia Ltd v Consolidated Minerals Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 3 at [65]; Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (2011) 16 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-885; [2011] FCAFC 53 at [79]; Moore v Moore [2014] FLC 93-595; [2014] FamCAFC 113 at [163]; Trkulja v Markovic [2015] VSCA 298 at [98]; Toll Pty Ltd v Harradine [2016] NSWCA 374 at [79]. In Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Courtenay Investments Ltd [2016] WASCA 194, it was observed at [128] that the principle only © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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These principles were summarized by Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ in Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11 at [63]: The rule in Jones v Dunkel is that the unexplained failure by a party to call a witness may in appropriate circumstances support an inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted the party’s case. That is particularly so where it is the party which is the uncalled witness. The failure to call a witness may also permit the court to draw, with greater confidence, any inference unfavourable to the party that failed to call the witness, if that uncalled witness appears to be in a position to cast light on whether the inference should be drawn. These principles have been extended from instances where a witness has not been called at all to instances where a witness has been called but not questioned on particular topics. Where counsel for a party has refrained from asking a witness whom that party has called particular questions on an issue, the court will be less likely to draw inferences favourable to that party from other evidence in relation to that issue.

The way in which these principles interact with the standard of proof in civil proceedings is discussed at [EA.140.120]. The application of the principles to multi-party proceedings (where the question arises whether the inference may be drawn against a party that would not, strictly speaking, be expected to adduce the evidence) raises particular difficulties.61

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In criminal proceedings, the common law position is different. Furthermore, the Victorian Jury Directions Act 2015 contains provisions relating to the failure to give evidence or call a witness that apply in criminal trials (see [EA.20.420]). As regards the common law, in Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285; 76 ALJR 1552; [2002] HCA 45 Gaudron and Hayne JJ observed at [9]–[10] (Kirby J at [52] and Callinan J at [121] agreeing, McHugh J dissenting): [I]t will seldom, if ever, be reasonable to conclude that an accused in a criminal trial would be expected to give evidence. Not only is the accused not bound to give comes “into play when an inference is open from facts proved by direct evidence and the question is whether” the inference should be drawn – it will not apply where “an inference to that effect is simply not open on the evidence” (at [139]). 60. ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 86 ALJR 522; [2012] HCA 17, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [169]–[170]; Heydon J at [253]. See also Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98 at [199]–[200]; Toll Pty Ltd v Harradine [2016] NSWCA 374 at [80]. 61. In Galea v Bagtrans Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 350 the NSW Court of Appeal concluded that, in general, a distinction should not be drawn between one party that would be expected to adduce the evidence and another party, in substantially the same interest, who would not (see Hodgson JA at [62], Allsop P and Macfarlan JA agreeing). Hodgson JA observed at [61]: “The consideration that, if a party has available evidence that would assist it in obtaining a finding favourable to it, then that party can be expected to lead that evidence, is in my opinion one of general application, not one that operates (as does an admission) only against the party in question. It is not as such a rule of law, but rather an application of common sense to fact-finding that is permitted by the law. I do not think this approach involves unfairness to a party which does not itself have the evidence immediately available: parties in the same interest concerning an issue in the case can and often do co-operate and confer, and there is no property in a witness. If one party actually calls evidence that harms the case of another party in the same interest, that is not considered unfair to the latter party; and I do not think inferences drawn because of a failure to call evidence by one party can be considered unfair. It is highly undesirable that there be conflicting findings of fact as regards different parties in the same proceedings, and in my opinion that possibility should be limited to cases where it is unavoidable, as it may be in the case of admissions”.

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evidence, it is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The mode of reasoning which is spoken of in R v Burdett and Jones v Dunkel ordinarily, therefore, cannot be applied to a defendant in a criminal trial. That mode of reasoning depends upon a premise that the person concerned not only could shed light on the subject but also would ordinarily be expected to do so. The conclusion that an accused could shed light on the subject-matter of the charge is a conclusion that would ordinarily be reached very easily. But given the accusatorial nature of a criminal trial, it cannot be said that, in such a proceeding, the accused would ordinarily be expected to give evidence. So to hold would be to deny that it is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. … [This] reasoning … cannot be confined to the accused giving evidence personally. It applies with equal force to the accused calling other persons to give evidence. It cannot be said that it would be expected that the accused would call others to give evidence. To form that expectation denies that it is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Only in “the most unusual circumstances” (at [15]) will the reasoning described in Jones v Dunkel be available. It appears that such circumstances would arise “only if there is a basis for concluding that, if there are additional facts which would explain or contradict the inference which the prosecution seeks to have the jury draw, and they are facts which (if they exist) would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the [person not called by the defence], that a comment”62 on the failure of the defence to call the witness may be available (after applying the principles in Jones v Dunkel). Such facts which it is suggested could have been, but were not, revealed must be additional to those already given in evidence by the witnesses who were called. The fact that the person could have supported or contradicted evidence already given would not suffice. For this reason, Gaudron and Hayne JJ observed (at [19]) that an adverse inference would not be available where the defence failed to call a person who might have supported alibi evidence adduced in the trial.63 If an adverse inference is not available, it would usually be appropriate to direct the jury that they must not speculate about what evidence a person may or may not have given if called as a witness, that the accused is not obliged to give or call any evidence at all, and that it is for the prosecution to prove the case and that the onus of doing so never shifts, whether evidence is called on behalf of the accused or not.64 The same principles apply to 62. Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 at [64]. 63. In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373, Barr and Hall JJ considered a situation where the prosecution commented on the failure of the defence to adduce evidence of the defendant’s good character from witnesses other than the particular witness who gave such evidence. They stated at [239]: The same criticism of the prosecution [as made by members of the High Court in Dyers] cannot be made in circumstances where the evidence in question is not of a kind which would ordinarily be called by the prosecution at all, as in the case of evidence of good character. Nevertheless, the discussion of the principles at stake in Dyers demonstrates the general undesirability of the prosecution commenting on the failure of the defence to call evidence, just as it is inappropriate for the trial judge to make such comment, generally speaking. One practical difficulty is that the circumstances in which the defence could be expected to call such evidence may well need explanation, the giving of which will tend to divert the attention of the jury from the primary matters before them and will inevitably be to encourage speculation, not based upon evidence, but upon that which was not said. 64. See Rocco v The Queen [2003] HCA Trans 497 (2 December 2003), where special leave to appeal was refused. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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constrain permissible cross-examination of the defendant about the failure to adduce evidence.65 Equally, it would not generally be permissible to draw an adverse inference from the failure of the defence to cross-examine a prosecution witness, at all or in relation to a particular topic.66 Plainly enough, an adverse inference cannot be drawn against one defendant from the failure of another defendant (who is not a compellable witness: s 17(3)) to testify. In R v Corish (2006) 96 SASR 207; 170 A Crim R 162; [2006] SASC 369 a majority of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal (Gray J, Anderson J agreeing) held at [38] that these principles applied even if the defendant carried an onus of proof on an issue in respect of which the witness might have testified (Bleby J reserved decision on this question). Similarly, in Jones v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2010) 189 FCR 390; [2010] FCAFC 136 the Full Court of the Federal Court applied these principles in a trial by judge alone for contempt, rejecting (at [26]) an argument that a distinction should be drawn between “what the jury may be told” and “how a jury, trial judge or appellate court may reason”:

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Reference to those reasons shows that they are concerned to prevent an impermissible process of reasoning by the tribunal of fact. It is difficult to see why that process of reasoning is not equally impermissible whether the tribunal of fact be a jury or a judge. In a case where a person is charged with a criminal offence, whether the tribunal of fact is a judge or a jury, there is no expectation, as there is of a party to civil litigation, that the person will call all relevant evidence which is available and not inherently or obviously credible. It is this expectation which is the foundation for the drawing of the Jones v Dunkel inference.

Equally, the Full Court was unpersuaded that the fact that a party to contempt proceedings “does not ordinarily have the same obligations to the administration of justice as a prosecutor in a criminal case” was a sufficient basis for a different approach, given that the alleged contemnor was “not obliged, or expected, to make any proof of his or her innocence” (at [34]). In regard to the drawing of an adverse inference from the failure of the prosecution in a criminal trial to call a particular person as a witness, the position under the common law may be similar, albeit for different reasons. In the joint reasons in RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3 it was stated at [28] that “[t]he observations by the Court in Jones v Dunkel must not be applied in criminal cases without taking account” the “considerations” that, “[i]n a criminal trial, not only is an accused person not bound to give evidence, it is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt”. It was also stated at [29] that “if the question concerns the failure of the prosecution to call a witness whom it might have been expected to call, the issue is not whether the jury may properly reach conclusions about issues of fact but whether, in the circumstances, the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt 65. Frengos v The Queen [2012] VSCA 18 at [27]; Ahmed v The Queen [2012] VSCA 200 at [16]. However, directions by the trial judge to the jury may cure any prejudice caused by such cross-examination. 66. See Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Kiefel JJ in Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; 180 A Crim R 142; [2008] HCA 1 at [26]–[28]; see also FH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 231, Harrison J at [45], [88]–[91].

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of the accused”. Subsequently, Gaudron and Hayne JJ observed in Dyers at [17] (see also Kirby J at [52] and Callinan J at [118]): As was held in R v Apostilides, it is for the prosecution to decide what evidence it will adduce at trial. The trial judge may, but is not obliged to, question the prosecution in order to discover its reasons for declining to call a particular person, but the trial judge is not called upon to adjudicate the sufficiency of the reasons that the prosecution offers. Only if the trial judge has made such an inquiry and has been given answers considered by the judge to be unsatisfactory, would it seem that there would be any sufficient basis for a judge to tell the jury that it would have been reasonable to expect that the prosecution would call an identified person. There would then be real questions about whether, and how, the jury should be given the information put before the judge and then a further question about what directions the jury should be given in deciding for itself whether the prosecution could reasonably have been expected to call the person. Only when those questions had been answered would further directions of the kind contemplated by Jones v Dunkel have been open and they are not questions which arise in the present matter.

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Accordingly, in the view of Gaudron and Hayne JJ, as “a general rule”, a trial judge should not direct the jury in a criminal trial that the prosecution would be expected to have called persons to give evidence other than those it did call as witnesses (at [6]). Thus, as a general rule, the judge should not direct the jury that they are entitled to infer that the evidence of those who were not called would not have assisted the prosecution. A direction not to speculate about what the person might have said should be given. That general rule will not apply “only in cases where it is shown that the prosecution’s failure to call the person in question was in breach of the prosecution’s duty to call all material witnesses” (at [6]; see also [11]).67 In R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has regarded the observations of Gaudron and Hayne JJ as obiter dicta only (Heydon JA at [103], Hulme J and Carruthers JA agreeing). Heydon JA observed (at [102]) that “[i]t has been a longstanding practice in this State … that in appropriate circumstances an accused may seek and obtain a Jones v Dunkel direction about the failure of the Crown to call a particular witness”. He added (at [103]) that “[i]f the reasoning in that dictum” became the legal position it “could radically affect the rights of accused persons to seek comments adverse to the Crown case”. However, it may be doubted whether the observations of Gaudron and Hayne JJ are as “radical” as Heydon JA appears to believe. As noted above, an adverse inference may only be open where evidence would reasonably have been expected to be called. If a trial judge is satisfied that the prosecution had good reasons for not calling particular evidence (or, putting the matter more precisely, was satisfied that it would not be reasonably open to a jury to conclude that the reasons were not good), it would be inappropriate to direct the jury that they were entitled to infer that the evidence would not have assisted the prosecution. 67. As regards the content of that duty, see Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 119; R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 575–576; Tran v Magistrates’ Court (Vic) [1998] 4 VR 294; Hakim v Waterways Authority (NSW) (2006) 149 LGERA 415; [2006] NSWCCA 376; R v Jensen (2009) 23 VR 591; [2009] VSCA 266 at [60]–[76]; Geitonia Pty Ltd v Inner West Council [2016] NSWCCA 186 at [66]–[82], [156]–[158], see also at [130]–[140]; R v Manning [2017] QCA 23 at [19]–[25], [27]. The prosecution could call the person in a Basha inquiry (in the absence of the jury) in order to determine what the person will say if called as a witness: R v Ibrahim [2007] NSWSC 1140; Director of Public Prosecutions v McRae [2010] VSC 114. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Conversely, if the prosecution fails to provide any good reason for the failure to adduce evidence that would have been expected to be adduced by the prosecution, the direction may be given.68 The observations of Gaudron and Hayne JJ in Dyers have been applied in Victoria and South Australia.69 Some confusion appears to have been created by the observations of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Kiefel JJ in Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; 180 A Crim R 142; [2008] HCA 1 at [27], where it was stated that “[i]t was neither necessary nor appropriate for the trial judge to direct the jury that an inference adverse to the case for the prosecution could be drawn” from the failure of the Crown to adduce particular evidence, citing the passage from RPS70, noted above, that “if the question concerns the failure of the prosecution to call a witness whom it might have been expected to call, the issue is not whether the jury may properly reach conclusions about issues of fact but whether, in the circumstances, the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused”. These observations in Mahmood were cited by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in Louizos v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 223; [2009] NSWCCA 71 to support what appears to have been the conclusion that “a Jones v Dunkel direction should not be given against the Crown” (Howie J at [56], McClellan CJ at CL and Grove J agreeing). Howie J appears to have understood this as being the view of Gaudron and Hayne JJ in Dyers, endorsed by the majority judgment in Mahmood. However, it is suggested that this is not correct. The High Court has not held that a Jones v Dunkel direction should never be given against the Crown, only that this will be the general rule, which will not apply “in cases where it is shown that the prosecution’s failure to call the person in question was in breach of the prosecution’s duty to call all material witnesses” (Gaudron and Hayne JJ in Dyers at [6]). However, the precise content of the direction would have to be adapted to the context in which the ultimate question for the jury is not whether it may properly reach conclusions about issues of fact but whether it should entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.71 The Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal has accepted that circumstances can arise in which it is appropriate to draw a Jones v Dunkel inference against the Crown, regardless of whether it bears the onus of proof on the issue in question.72 68. Compare R v Tang [2003] NSWCCA 357 per Dunford J at [34]. In Huy Vinh Quach v The Queen (2011) 35 VR 71; [2011] VSCA 390 the Victorian Court of Appeal divided on the question whether, in a case where the jury asked the trial judge whether there was “anything preventing” the accused from calling a character witness, it was necessary for the judge to do more than remind the jury of the onus of proof and direct them not to speculate about matters that were not in evidence (Warren CJ, in dissent, considered that the jury should have been further directed that they must not reason that the absence of good character evidence led on behalf of the accused suggested that he was not of good character). 69. R v Heinze (2005) 153 A Crim R 380; [2005] VSCA 124 at [77]; Police v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243; 193 A Crim R 490; [2009] SASC 66 (Full Court); R v Nguyen [2009] SASC 91 (CCA); R v Bolte [2010] SASC 112 at [21], [128]. For further discussion, see A Papametheos, “Can an inference still be drawn against the Crown for failure to call a material witness?” (2006) 30 Crim LJ 24. 70. RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 74 ALJR 449; [2000] HCA 3. 71. See R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; 15 A Crim R 88 at 575; Police v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243; 193 A Crim R 490; [2009] SASC 66 (Full Court) at [63], [69]. 72. R v LB (2011) 246 FLR 466; [2011] NTCCA 4 at [41]–[46].

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Of course, if a Jones v Dunkel direction should never be given against the Crown, the question arises whether evidence adduced by the Crown to explain the failure to call a witness would be admissible.73 If no adverse inference could be drawn, the evidence would not be relevant. On the other hand, if the correct position is that an adverse inference may sometimes be drawn against the Crown, such evidence may well be relevant to a fact in issue. It would then be appropriate to determine whether the defence intended to invite the drawing of an adverse inference (see [EA.55.570]), whether the evidence was relevant in respect of that inference74 and obtain a ruling on the question whether such an inference would be open if the explanatory evidence was not admitted.

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Sometimes an argument will arise as to whether civil proceedings should be seen as quasi-criminal for the purposes of the application of these principles. It was argued in Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131 that proceedings for civil penalties should be treated in the same way as criminal proceedings in this context. However, Giles JA held (at [658]–[659]): Proceedings for civil penalties do not share the same fundamental features of a criminal trial. Civil penalties can fairly be regarded as punitive, with a resemblance to fines imposed on criminal offenders, but the resemblance is not identity. It is necessary to focus on these proceedings brought under the [Corporations] Act, rather than some general class of civil penalty proceedings, since the statutory foundation for and incidents of the proceedings may affect the view taken. As used in the Act the civil penalty provisions do not necessarily lead to imposition of pecuniary penalties, and may lead to a compensation order with the same effect as if the company had brought civil proceedings for breach of the directors’ duties or to a disqualification order made not punitively but protectively. They are not to be equated with provisions for criminal offences. More important, the civil penalty proceedings are expressly to be maintained by civil law processes, not by a criminal trial with its fundamental features.

It was also held that the existence of a privilege against exposure to penalties did not preclude the drawing of an “inference adverse to the person from whom a civil penalty is claimed to be drawn because of the failure of the person to give evidence” (at [661]; see also [EA.128.690]).75 In Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466; 242 ALR 643; [2007] FCAFC 132, the Full Federal Court discussed the Adler case and concluded at [76] that there is no reason in civil proceedings for pecuniary penalties to deny the applicability of the principles in Jones v Dunkel. However, in Jones v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2010) 189 FCR 390; [2010] FCAFC 136 the Full Federal Court significantly qualified this analysis (at [24]–[26]), at least in respect of contempt proceedings where the 73. See Darwiche v The Queen (2011) 209 A Crim R 424; [2011] NSWCCA 62, Johnson J at [297], [300]; El-Zeyat v The Queen; Aouad v The Queen (2011) 207 A Crim R 411; [2011] NSWCCA 61; Osman v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 157. 74. See DJF v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 412; [2011] NSWCCA 6, Adams J at [31]–[34]. 75. See also Morley v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2010) 247 FLR 140; 5 BFRA 364; [2010] NSWCA 331 at [685]–[687]. As regards disciplinary proceedings against professionals, see Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135; Lucire v Health Care Complaints Commission [2011] NSWCA 99 at [126]–[134]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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criminal standard of proof applies (even though the proceedings were characterised as “civil proceedings”: at [33]). More recently, the High Court considered the position with respect to the role of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) in ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 86 ALJR 522; [2012] HCA 17. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ assume, without deciding, that ASIC was subject to some form of duty to “conduct litigation fairly” and that there was a “duty” to call a particular witness (at [152]–[155]), but rejected the use of that failure to weaken ASIC’s case. The plurality stated at [155]:

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[I]t would be expected that the remedy for breach of the duty would lie either in concluding that the primary judge could prevent the unfairness by directing ASIC to call the witness or staying proceedings until ASIC agreed to do so or, if the trial went to verdict, in concluding that the appellate court should consider whether there was a miscarriage of justice that necessitated a retrial. But no solution to the hypothesised unfairness could be found by requiring that the primary judge or an appellate court apply some indeterminate discount to the cogency of whatever evidence was called in proof of ASIC’s case. This would seem to be no more than an attempt to “punish” a regulatory authority by denying it the relief it seeks. But that approach would fail to recognise that the regulatory authority seeks the remedy it does for public and not its own private purposes. It is an approach that would seek to supplement, needlessly, the long-established and generally applicable principles that are engaged when a party to litigation does not call evidence that it could be expected to call. The asserted principle would evidently have no satisfactory roots. And because the notion of “discounting” the evidence is necessarily indeterminate, the asserted principle would have no certain content.

It may be concluded that the High Court has rejected any use of a failure to call a witness there was some “duty” to call as a supplementary basis for the drawing of an adverse inference. On the other hand, the generally applicable principles will apply to permit an adverse inference if the witness would reasonably have been expected to have been called.76 As with criminal proceedings, the existence of a duty of fairness on ASIC may simply mean that the court will need to be persuaded that there was a breach of the duty in that ASIC should reasonably have called the witness.

[EA.55.210]

Evidence from a witness

Part 2.1 deals with the adducing of evidence from witnesses. Where the evidence is adduced by means of question and answer (rather than in narrative form: s 29(2)), the requirement of relevance will apply both to the question asked of the witness and to the answer given by the witness. In Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59, Heydon J stated at [157]: The relevance of a question depends on whether one among a range of possible answers “could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding”. It is not the case that a question is irrelevant because one possible answer is not relevant. If a witness answers a question “I did not see”, that may not “rationally affect ... the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue”, but the question remains relevant so 76. See, for example, ASIC v Flugge [2016] VSC 779.

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long as one possible answer satisfies the quoted words.

As regards the answer actually given, Heydon J was somewhat ambiguous (at [156]): Once a question not objected to has been answered responsively, it is normally too late to object to either the question or the answer.

It is true that the answer has been, in a sense, admitted. However, if the answer is not relevant evidence, it would be curious if an objection could not succeed on the basis that the evidence should be excluded. Of course, there may be no practical need to have the evidence excluded (given that it could have no rational bearing on any fact in issue in the proceeding), but if the submission is made it should succeed. Either s 56(2) is understood to apply or, alternatively, the evidence should be excluded under s 135 on the basis that it has no probative value. In BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499; 215 A Crim R 395; [2012] HCA 9 at [94], Heydon J modified his analysis as follows: If the actual answer is or becomes irrelevant, it is usually ignored, though if necessary various formal techniques for dealing with irrelevant evidence which may be prejudicial can be employed. One of those techniques is striking out the evidence. Another is telling the jury to ignore it. A third is telling the jury to treat the case as if the evidence had not been given. A fourth is discharging the jury (footnotes omitted).

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[EA.55.240]

Out-of-court statements

The relevance of evidence of an out-of-court statement was considered by the High Court in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274.77 The High Court held that evidence of what the alleged victim of a sexual assault said to several people soon after the alleged assault was relevant to the issue of whether she consented to intercourse. However, in a joint judgment, Gaudron and Kirby JJ observed (at [58]) that “as a matter of logic”, a statement made outside of court is: not, as such, proof of the facts asserted [in it]. People do make false statements of fact and false accusations. … There has to be more than the fact that the statement is made to produce the conclusion required by s 55 as the price of admissibility. Rationality connotes logical reasoning.

It will depend on the circumstances in which the statement is made whether it is “probative” of the facts asserted in it.78 Gleeson CJ and Hayne J stated (at [31]): It is possible to imagine circumstances in which evidence of the fact that a complaint of an alleged crime has been made might be evidence that could not rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. For example, the nature of the complaint, the circumstances in which it was made, or some matter personal to the complainant, might provide a reason why that could be so. However, the present case does not raise an issue of that kind. As the trial judge warned the jury, the fact that an assertion is repeated does not make it any less untrue if it were untrue to begin with. Furthermore, some complaints may be made in circumstances which require particular attention to be given to the danger of fabrication. However, in the circumstances of the present case, it is impossible to deny 77. For a general discussion of this case, see McGinley, “Relevance of Recent Complaint in Rape Cases” (2001) 75 ALJ 772. 78. See Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274 at [52]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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that the evidence of the complaints made to the three witnesses in question could be regarded by the jury as affecting their assessment of the probability that there was no consent to the intercourse.

A word of caution is perhaps necessary in respect of the second last sentence in this passage. It is difficult to see how a danger of fabrication, however great, could justify a conclusion that evidence does not meet the test of relevance.79 McHugh J pointed out (Papakosmas at [81]): The words “if it were accepted” in that section make it clear that a court assesses “the probability of the existence of a fact in issue” on the assumption that the evidence is reliable.80

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This proposition was subsequently endorsed by the majority of the High Court in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 at [22] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the judgments of the High Court in that case with some of the views expressed in Papakosmas. In Adam the majority of the court held that evidence of an out-of-court statement by a witness to a murder, which described the events that led up to the murder and the murder itself, was relevant not only to the credibility of the witness as a prior inconsistent statement but also because it was directly relevant to the facts in issue, on the basis that it was assumed to be “accepted”.81 This conclusion was drawn notwithstanding a strong argument, accepted by Gaudron J, that the statement was not of a kind that is inherently reliable, indeed it was of a kind that the Act treats as potentially unreliable,82 and was one which could not properly be tested by the defence.83 Yet none of the members of the High Court considered that these considerations had any bearing on the relevance of the evidence. The application of the requirement of relevance in the context of evidence of “complaint” has arisen on a number of occasions apart from Papakosmas. In R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 138, Hunt CJ at CL observed “that there may be cases where the mere assertion of a self-serving statement could not rationally affect” the assessment of the probability of the existence of the fundamental fact in issue (the occurrence of the offence alleged), but he concluded that: 79. Indeed, it is doubtful whether evidence may be excluded on this basis under the discretions in ss 135 and 137: see [EA.135.150] and [EA.137.90]. 80. McHugh J expressed the opinion (at [77]) that “[i]n almost every conceivable instance of sexual assault, evidence that the victim had complained about the assault at the first reasonable opportunity, would ‘rationally affect … the assessment of the probability of the existence’ of intercourse having taken place and of a lack of consent to that intercourse having been given”. He did not discuss complaints made at a later time. Subsequently he said (at [87]): “Notions of reliability and procedural fairness play no part in testing the relevance of evidence for the purpose of s 55 of the Act.” 81. Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 at [23]. 82. At the time he made the statement implicating the appellant, the witness was himself the subject of a charge that he had murdered the victim: see s 165(1)(d). 83. Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 at [78]–[79] per Gaudron J. However, it should be noted that the majority judgment rejected this argument in the context of deciding whether the trial judge had erred in granting leave to cross-examine a witness under s 38: see Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 at [29]–[30].

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it all depends upon the circumstances in which the statement was made. In most cases, the circumstances in which the assertion is made will be capable of giving a self-serving statement probative value. Whether or not it does in fact do so, will then be a question for the jury. A “complaint” made in a situation where it might be expected that such a complaint would be made by a truthful person who has been sexually assaulted is clearly capable of affecting such an assessment and it is thus relevant.

Post-Papakosmas, some judges have excluded evidence of complaint because it was not “spontaneous” and lacked “specificity”.84

[EA.55.270]

Opinion evidence

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The relevance of an opinion held by a witness was considered by the High Court in Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50. Two police officers testified that, in their opinion, a person shown in photographs taken by bank security cameras was the accused. Kirby J considered (at [43]) that the police opinion evidence met the test of relevance because it could reasonably be concluded that “the witnesses were better placed to recognise the person in the photographs than” the jury.85 On the other hand, the majority of the court held that the evidence did not meet the test of relevance because the “police witnesses were in no better position to make a comparison between the appellant and the person in the photographs than the jurors”.86 They concluded: Because the witness’s assertion of identity was founded on material no different from the material available to the jury from its own observation, the witness’s assertion that he recognised the appellant is not evidence that could rationally affect the assessment by the jury of the question we have identified. The fact that someone else has reached a conclusion about the identity of the accused and the person in the picture does not provide any logical basis for affecting the jury’s assessment of the probability of the existence of that fact when the conclusion is based only on material that is not different in any substantial way from what is available to the jury. The process of reasoning from one fact (the depiction of a man in the security photographs) taken with another fact (the observed appearance of the accused) to the conclusion (that one is the depiction of the other) is neither assisted, nor hindered, by knowing that some other person has, or has not, arrived at that conclusion. Indeed, if the assessment of probability is affected

84. See, for example, R v Maher [2005] ACTSC 41 per Higgins CJ at [29]–[32]. 85. Kirby J stated (at [42]): “Members of a jury watch a person such as the appellant (especially where, as here, that person gives no evidence) sitting immobile in the courtroom. The police witnesses had repeatedly viewed the appellant in daylight. They had seen him in motion. They had observed him from different angles. They had had the opportunity to view him engaged in varying and more natural movements.” 86. Smith at [9] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ noted that the jurors had probably spent more time in the presence of the appellant than had the police witnesses before they gave their evidence, that there was no suggestion that the physical appearance of the appellant had changed materially between the time when the photographs were taken and the time of the trial, and that “there was no suggestion … that the police, by reason of their previous observations of the appellant, were at some advantage in recognising the person in the photographs”. However, it may be observed that it should not be necessary that the witness suggest such an advantage. Kirby J certainly considered that the police were in a better position than the jury. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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by that knowledge, it is not by any process of reasoning, but by the decision-maker permitting substitution of the view of another, for the decision-maker’s own conclusion.87

Conversely, if the witness is in a better position than the jury to engage in a process of identification then the opinion will be relevant.88 In R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356, Simpson J (McClellan CJ at CL and Rothman J agreeing) observed (at [35]) that facts that influenced the outcome in Smith were the relatively limited opportunity the two police officers had had of observing the appellant and gaining familiarity with his physical appearance; the relatively greater opportunity the members of the jury had had to observe the appellant during the course of the trial; the quality of the photographic evidence; and the absence of any evidence that the appellant had changed his appearance between the taking of the photographs and the trial. Simpson J noted at [46] that the High Court left open the possibility that, in other circumstances, evidence identifying a defendant as a person in photographic material could be relevant.89 Similarly, in ALRC 102 it was stated at para 9.23:

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[T]he reasoning of the majority in Smith v The Queen was that the opinions of the police officers were not based on anything in substance additional to that upon which the jury would base their view. It will often be the case … that a police officer will base his or her identification of a person in a photograph on material that is different in a substantial way from the material available to the tribunal of fact. In contexts outside police investigations, this may be even more likely. Family and social contexts are examples.

If the basis of an opinion is not disclosed, or no evidence is admitted in order to establish the basis, it is arguable that it may be concluded that the opinion evidence does not satisfy the requirement of relevance because it will not be possible to assess whether it is capable of affecting the probabilities of the existence of a fact in issue (see [EA.79.240]). In Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; [1998] FCA 1200 at 374, Branson J observed that: 87. Smith at [11]; see also R v Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439; [2001] NSWCCA 381; R v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444; 139 A Crim R 30; [2003] NSWCCA 191]; Anandan v The Queen [2011] VSCA 413. 88. Miller v The Queen (2015) 252 A Crim R 486; [2015] NSWCCA 206, at [112]; R v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 at [18] (although it should be noted that the evidence of “recognition” was classified as evidence of “fact”, not “opinion”: see [EA.76.90]). 89. Simpson J stated that one example was where there was evidence that the defendant’s appearance had changed since the making of the photographic image; and “another illustration was where there was some distinctive feature about the accused’s appearance or manner of movement, revealed in the photographs, which would not otherwise be apparent to the jury”. Neither of these circumstances applied in Drollett, but Simpson J nonetheless concluded that the evidence in question was relevant because the witness “had a reasonably high degree of familiarity with the appearance of the appellant” and the jury was not in as good a position as the witness to make the comparison. In Miller v The Queen (2015) 252 A Crim R 486; [2015] NSWCCA 206, it was held at [112] that “each of the witnesses was in a better position than the jury to recognise the appellant because his appearance at the time of trial differed in a significant way from his appearance at the time of the offence”. In Nguyen v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 4, RA Hulme JA held at [91] that the relevance test was satisfied where a police officer, identifying a recorded voice as the defendant, relied upon the overall sound of the voice as well as attributes he was able to articulate and that “[t]he amount of time he invested in repeatedly listening to the calls and the [defendant’s] police interview is something that would have been impractical for the jury to replicate” (see also Schmidt J at [105]).

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the position may be that, in the circumstances of a particular case, a bare expression of opinion could, if accepted, rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. In the circumstances of most cases, however, a bare expression of opinion is likely to be incapable of affecting the assessment of the probability of the existence of any fact in issue in the proceeding.

As the ALRC explained in ALRC 102 at para 9.72:

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The process of establishing the relevance of opinion evidence requires the tendering party to identify and to prove, or foreshadow the proof of, the facts relied on by the expert to an extent sufficient to persuade the court that the evidence of opinion, if accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding.

The reference to “foreshadow[ing] the proof of the facts relied on by the expert” is important. As the ALRC noted at para 9.76, expert evidence led early in a party’s case will often be led before the tendering party has led evidence of the matters on which the expert bases his or her opinion, so that compliance with the requirements of s 55 may not be possible at that stage. However, the opinion may be admitted conditionally and subject to an undertaking from the tendering party under s 57. More important, the words “to an extent sufficient to persuade the court that …” in the passage should also be emphasised. It was not being stated that the facts relied on, or assumed, by the expert must be established for the expert’s opinion to meet the test of relevance. Rather, the point being made was that a failure to establish those facts may have the consequence that the court concludes that the test of relevance is not satisfied. It has to be said that it is difficult to envisage when that conclusion might be reached on this basis if the assessment of relevance is to proceed (as it must) on the assumption that the opinion will be “accepted”, but that point may be put to one side. What is clear is that there is no requirement in all cases to prove the facts relied on, or assumed, by the expert for the expert’s opinion to meet the test of relevance. It is true that, in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21, Heydon J stated at [108]: Failure by the tendering party to comply with the proof of assumption rule makes the opinion evidence irrelevant.

Heydon J had earlier (at [61]) defined the “proof of assumption rule” as the “requirement that the ‘facts’ and ‘assumptions’ [on which the opinion is based] … be proved before the [opinion] evidence was admissible”.90 However, Heydon J was in dissent and this view should be considered as having been rejected by the other members of the High Court. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ referred to “the basis rule” at [41] as “a rule by which opinion evidence is to be excluded unless the factual bases upon which the opinion is proffered are established by other evidence”, then stated: Whether that rule formed part of the common law of evidence need not be examined. It may be accepted that the Law Reform Commission’s interim report on evidence denied the existence of such a common law rule and expressed the intention to refrain from including a basis rule in the legislation the Commission proposed and which was later enacted as the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 90. See also Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2011) 274 ALR 705; [2011] FCAFC 11 at [171] per Jacobson, Foster and Barker JJ. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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It appears clear that the plurality accepted that s 79 does not incorporate “the basis rule” and that issues of this type are left, as intended by the ALRC, to the discretions in Pt 3.11. While no reference was made in the plurality judgment to the question of relevance, it cannot be doubted that the plurality considered that a failure to establish the factual bases upon which the opinion is proffered would not necessarily render the opinion evidence irrelevant. That this is correct is easily demonstrated – even where the facts assumed do not correspond exactly with the facts established, they may be sufficiently like the facts established so as to render the opinion of significant probative value.91 Of course, the position may be different (and the opinion evidence rendered not relevant) if the evidence adduced is not capable of establishing facts that are at least similar to the facts assumed to exist. In Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1, Brett J (Blow CJ and Wood J agreeing) stated:

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[40] Of course, it is possible to envisage a case in which the failure to prove the underlying assumptions impacts on the admissibility of an opinion. It must, of course, be possible that an opinion completely unrelated to proved facts may be so hypothetical that it simply does not satisfy the test of relevance contained in s 55 of the Act , in that it could not rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding.

If an opinion is purportedly based on specialised scientific knowledge, failure to demonstrate the validity of the “scientific knowledge” involved may mean that the opinion does not meet the test of relevance. In Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; [1998] FCA 1200 at 374, Branson J observed that: “[t]he position may be that, in the circumstances of a particular case, a bare expression of opinion could, if accepted, rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. In the circumstances of most cases, however, a bare expression of opinion is likely to be incapable of affecting the assessment of the probability of the existence of any fact in issue in the proceeding.” Similarly, in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305, Heydon JA stated at [85]: [T]he opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of “specialised knowledge” in which the witness is expert by reason of “training, study or experience”, and on which the opinion is “wholly or substantially based”, applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded.

Although this was said in relation to s 79, the proposition that an opinion must not be a bare “ipse dixit” (Heydon JA at [87]) has application in this context.92 For example, where an “expert” purports to “match” two items, there must be evidence capable of rationally supporting the existence of the knowledge upon which the examiner relies to make the “match” and to assist the tribunal of fact to 91. See Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85; [1985] HCA 58 at [9]; HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281 at [39]; Dixon v Whisprun Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 344 at [53]; Nominal Defendant v Saleh (2011) 57 MVR 412; [2011] NSWCA 16 at [263]. 92. See also Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 354; [2002] FCAFC 157 at [14] per Branson J; Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [25] per Lindgren J.

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assess the applicable risk of error – otherwise the tribunal of fact cannot make rational use of the evidence of a “match”.93 In some circumstances, the content of the opinion itself may not be relevant. For example, it has been held that the opinion of a doctor that observations on examination of an alleged sexual assault victim were “consistent” with the alleged victim’s account may be “entirely neutral” and thus not relevant.94 In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Pace [2015] VSCA 18, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that an opinion from an expert regarding the amount of whiskey that needed to be consumed to produce a particular blood alcohol level was not relevant because there was “not one jot of evidence to suggest that” the person in question had consumed any whiskey. The court observed at [29] that, “[i]n order for an hypothesis to be available for the jury’s use, there must be some evidentiary support for it, beyond mere speculation or guesswork. In this case there is none”. In other cases, no opinion is in fact expressed. In R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 an expert was called by the defence to give evidence about an approach to voice identification (acoustic analysis) that differed from the method of identification used by a number of prosecution witnesses. However, the expert did not challenge the opinions given by the prosecution witnesses since she had not undertaken any acoustic analysis herself and was not in a position to offer an opinion as to identification. Wood CJ at CL concluded at [110] that “[w]ithout the next step of applying it [acoustic analysis] to the facts of this case, it did not qualify as relevant evidence”.

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[EA.55.300]

“Real evidence”

Section 52 refers to “evidence to be adduced in a way other than by witnesses giving evidence or documents being tendered in evidence”. Such “other” evidence is that information perceived directly by the court and may be referred to compendiously as “real evidence” (see [EA.52.30]). Examples include physical objects admitted as exhibits and the physical characteristics and demeanour of witnesses and other persons in court. In Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59 the members of the High Court applied the definition of “relevant evidence” (see [EA.52.30]) in s 55 to evidence adduced by the prosecution in the criminal trial of the appellant. Security cameras had photographed an armed man wearing overalls, sunglasses and a balaclava robbing persons of money. Similar overalls and a similar balaclava were found at the home of the appellant. He was required to wear those overalls and balaclava (as well as a pair of sunglasses similar to those worn by the robber) in front of the jury, for the suggested purpose of comparing his appearance with the appearance of the robber in the security photographs (and descriptions of the robber given by witnesses). The members of the High Court came to differing conclusions as to whether this evidence was relevant. Justices Gummow and Hayne stated at [26]: Looking at the appellant wearing the balaclava and overalls (with or without sunglasses) enabled a comparison between no more than the items he put on and what was depicted in the security photographs. But that comparison could be drawn without the appellant being asked to put them on. Dressing the appellant in the items provided 93. See Ligertwood A, “What lawyers should and can do now that they know about the forensic sciences” (2015) 36 Adel LR 153 at 157–160. 94. R v RTB [2002] NSWCCA 104; R v Skaf [2004] NSWCCA 74 at [295]–[297]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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no information to the jury that could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the determination of any fact in issue because it revealed nothing about the wearer and nothing about the appellant that was not already apparent to the jury observing him in the dock.

Accordingly, evidence of the appearance of the appellant wearing the balaclava, overalls and sunglasses was not relevant evidence. He should not have been required to wear them. However, Heydon J rejected a submission that “the appearance of the accused in a balaclava which was not asserted to be the balaclava worn by the offender was irrelevant” (at [177]):

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If, attired in the balaclava, the accused had looked very different from the descriptions given by the eyewitnesses, that would have been material capable of raising a reasonable doubt. If, so attired, he had looked similar to the descriptions, it would, taken with other evidence, have been material capable of supporting a conclusion of identity.

Heydon J came to the same conclusion in respect of the overalls (at [183]–[184]). Crennan J agreed with Heydon J (at [266]). Kirby J also declined to follow the analysis of Gummow and Hayne JJ but the reasons he gave for this were primarily procedural (see at [83]–[100]). He did not clearly determine that the evidence was relevant, although he came very close to so holding (see at [100]–[104]).95 It has to be said that it is difficult to disagree with the view of Heydon J that the jury could rationally have regarded the combination of the defendant’s body and the clothing he was asked to wear as providing information bearing on their assessment of the probabilities of a fact in issue over and above the information provided by those objects considered separately. It may be noted that all members of the Court agreed that evidence of the appellant walking in front of the jury and speaking certain words used by the robber was relevant. As Gummow and Hayne JJ stated at [27]: Observing how the appellant walked and how he spoke certain words might bear upon the jury’s decision whether he was the man the witnesses had described. The jury could observe for itself these matters concerning the appellant; the jury could compare its observations with what the witnesses had said about the robber.

[EA.55.330]

Circumstantial evidence

Circumstantial evidence is evidence tending to prove the existence of a fact (a “circumstance”) that is not a fact in issue, but from which an inference regarding the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding is sought to be drawn. Given that evidence may be relevant even if it only “indirectly” affects the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue, there is no doubt that circumstantial evidence can be relevant evidence. Further, since relevance only requires that the evidence “could rationally affect” that probability, there is equally no doubt that circumstantial evidence need not have any particular degree of probative force to be relevant. If the inference sought to be drawn to a fact in issue from the circumstance sought to be proved is rationally open, the mere existence of other possible inferences will not mean that the evidence ceases to be relevant, since a rational fact-finder “could” find that the evidence affects the probability of the existence of that fact in issue. For example: 95. Kirby J held at [108]–[109] that the evidence should have been excluded under s 135.

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• DNA evidence linking a defendant to a piece of tape created a “possible” connection between the defendant and the crime sufficient to make the evidence relevant, notwithstanding the existence of other possibilities consistent with innocence;96 • evidence that the defendant had “an unhappy or sexless marriage” was relevant, albeit minimally so, to the issue whether the he in sexual misconduct with a seven-year-old child, on the basis that it could provide “a reason why the person concerned might have sought sexual relief outside the marriage”, bearing in mind that the sexual acts alleged “appeared on the face of them designed to obtain sexual gratification for the [defendant]”;97 • evidence that a person had talked about doing “maximum damage” was relevant in a terrorism conspiracy trial where there was other evidence that the person, while not alleged to be a party to the conspiracy, was a person from whom members of the alleged conspiracy took “spiritual guidance”;98 • evidence that the defendant’s fingerprints were found on several pages of a manual containing instructions for building a machine gun could be used to infer an interest in the content of the manual and a specific interest in firearms, and then to deciding whether to reject his denials of knowledge of the presence of certain guns (not machine guns) in his garage;99 • evidence of research findings that a person who is in the untreated prodromal stage of a psychotic illness is at a significantly increased risk of irrational violence is relevant to support a defence of diminished responsibility;100 • evidence of motive may “point to murder rather than manslaughter”;101 • the conduct of the defendant, both before and after the alleged offence, was relevant and admissible to support an inference as to his state of mind at the time of the alleged offence (and, in particular, as to whether what happened was an accident).102 However, the question arises whether circumstantial evidence will be relevant if a jury could not rationally regard the inference sought to be drawn to a fact in issue as more probable than other available inferences. This question has arisen most acutely in criminal proceedings in relation to evidence of “consciousness of guilt”. In Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 ALJR 40; 68 A Crim R 349, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ stated at 212 (CLR): Whilst in many cases it must be a question for the jury whether a lie was told because the truth was perceived to be inconsistent with innocence or for some other reason ... 96. R v Chanthovixay [2004] NSWCCA 285, Hulme J at [34]. 97. Neal v The Queen [2005] TASSC 70, Crawford J at [10], Tennent J at [19]. 98. Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [240]–[246]. 99. Strachan v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 322 at [19]. 100. R v Villalon [2014] NSWSC 725 at [21]–[23]. 101. R v Baden-Clay (2016) 90 ALJR 1013; [2016] HCA 35 at [70]. 102. Farquharson v The Queen (2012) 36 VR 538; [2012] VSCA 296 at [111]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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the innocent explanation for that lie was so plausible that the lie could not have been probative of guilt.

The difficulty with this passage is that it leaves uncertain the degree of plausibility required for the “innocent explanation” before it may be concluded that post-offence conduct relied on to infer consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant “could not have been probative of guilt” (that is, would not be relevant). In R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263 a five-judge Victorian Court of Appeal considered evidence that permitted an inference of consciousness of guilt of the charged offence but also an inference of consciousness of guilt of a different offence. The Court observed at [41] that an inference of consciousness of guilt may be open from evidence of post-offence conduct even if the conduct is “reasonably susceptible of another possible explanation”. However, the Court held at [40] that it may not be open where, considered in the context of all of the evidence in the proceeding, conduct is “equally consistent” with two or more possible offences (see also [72]). The Western Australian Court of Appeal has endorsed this view. In Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389; [2007] WASCA 143 the Court, after an extensive discussion of the authorities, accepted at [300] that a:

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lie is incapable of amounting to an implied admission of guilt because there is an innocent explanation for it that is just as likely as the inference of guilt which might be drawn from the lie.

See also [302]. This approach to relevance appears consistent with probability theory. If a rational fact finder could only conclude that the probability of an admission of guilt inferred from conduct is 0.5 (or less) compared with the probability of an “innocent” explanation (which is 0.5 or more), the evidence does not affect the probability of guilt and is not relevant (assuming that the innocent explanation does not point towards the defendant being not guilty). Of course, in many cases, the test of relevance will be satisfied, since a court will be satisfied that it could rationally be concluded that the probability of an admission of guilt inferred from post-offence conduct such as flight or lies is greater than 0.5. In R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263 the Victorian Court of Appeal also held at [40] that an inference of consciousness of guilt may not be open from evidence of post-offence conduct where, considered in the context of all of the evidence in the proceeding, the conduct is “intractably neutral” (see also at [72]).103 While the Western Australian Court in Martinez considered that this test was the same in substance as the “equally consistent” test, this may be doubted. Circumstances may arise where a court considers that a fact finder could not determine, other than on a speculative (ie non-rational) basis, that the probability of an admission of guilt inferred from conduct was greater that 0.5 (compared with the probability of an “innocent” explanation or explanations).104 In those circumstances, the evidence “could [not] rationally affect” the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue because 103. See also R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 (SACCA) at 409; Zhu v The Queen (2013) 38 VR 77; [2013] VSCA 102 at [36]–[45]. 104. It may be noted that the evidence will be “intractably neutral” if it would involve “speculation” or “conjecture” to choose between different possible explanations: compare SGH v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 161 at [62], [132]–[135].

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it is “intractably neutral”. The Queensland Court of Appeal in R v Ortega-Farfan (2011) 215 A Crim R 251; [2011] QCA 364 adopted this analysis when it held (Fraser JA at [54]) that evidence of a question asked by the defendant was “intractably neutral”. The position is analogous to the situation where evidence is “so ambiguous” that there is no available rational basis on which to conclude that it affects the assessment of the probabilities of the existence of a fact in issue (see [EA.55.60] above). Thus, in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Massey [2017] VSCA 38 the Victorian Court of Appeal held that evidence of the finding of a murder victim’s DNA on the defendant’s shoes and inside his vehicle was not relevant because he was the (estranged) husband of the victim and, notwithstanding that they had been separated for three years, it would be “wholly speculative” to infer that the DNA was placed in those locations in consequence of the defendant murdering her – there was “no rational basis for finding that the method of transfer was connected with the killing”.105

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The Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal has cited the analysis in Ciantar.106 It has been followed by the Quensland Court of Appeal.107 Similarly, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, in Penza v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 21, accepted the correctness of the principles articulated in Ciantar and Martinez (Hoeben JA at [137]–[139], [185], [190]), although it was concluded that the test of relevance was satisfied in a case where it was open to the jury to consider that the lies and flight of a defendant were “more consistent” with commission of the offence charged than some other, minor, offence (Hoeben JA at [192]).108 Of course, even if the evidence meets the test of relevance, the probative value of the evidence may be low, and outweighed by dangers with the evidence.109 However, as the Victorian Court of Appeal emphasised in R v Cavkic (No 2) [2009] VSCA 43, the assessment of relevance (and probative value) in relation to circumstantial evidence must not be conducted in isolation. Other evidence admitted, or to be admitted, in the proceeding may bear on that assessment. Thus, with respect to evidence from which the prosecution sought to infer “consciousness of guilt” from particular conduct of the accused, “the question is whether in the context of the whole of the evidence adduced in proof of the accused’s guilt, it was open to a jury to conclude that the conduct … was

105. Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Massey [2017] VSCA 38 at [3], [14], [78]–[87]. The members of the Court were divided on the question whether other DNA evidence should have been excluded as not relevant or pursuant to s 137. 106. Smart v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 15 at [91]. 107. R v Baden-Clay [2015] QCA 265 at [47]–[48]. See also R v Duckworth [2016] QCA 30 at [96]–[98] (but cf Philippides JA at [5]–[17]). 108. Even if the evidence is “intractably neutral” as between an offence charged and an alternative offence in respect of which the defendant might be convicted, but not intractably neutral as regards an “innocent explanation”, then the evidence is clearly still relevant to a fact in issue: R v Brooks [2017] NSWSC 188 at [42]. 109. See, for example, Smith v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 182 at [42]–[53]. See, generally, the commentary on ss 135 and 137 (particularly at [EA.137.90]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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indicative of consciousness of guilt” (at [70]), notwithstanding that other possible explanations for the conduct were also open (at [70], [96]).110 In R v Baden-Clay (2016) 90 ALJR 1013; [2016] HCA 35, the High Court considered whether it was open to a jury to use post-offence concealment and lies to find the defendant guilty of murder, as distinct from manslaughter. No issues of relevance (or admissibility) arose. However, it was observed that, while such evidence may be “intractably neutral” (at [74]), it may be open in the circumstances of the particular case to the tribunal of fact to reason that it was more consistent with murder than manslaughter (at [76]).111

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Indeed, it is important to appreciate that, in some circumstances, evidence that will not be admitted in the proceeding may bear on the relevance (and probative value) of circumstantial evidence. For example, in R v Ortega-Farfan (2011) 215 A Crim R 251; [2011] QCA 364 the Queensland Court of Appeal held that the potential significance of various statements made by a defendant relied on by the prosecution to support an inference of consciousness of guilt was affected by the context of those statements, which had been excluded by the trial judge in the exercise of discretion – exclusion of that context meant that “the jury were in no position to make any meaningful assessment of the significance of the appellant’s allegedly incriminatory statements” (Fraser JA at [59]). The last point to be made is that it may not be open to draw an inference of consciousness of guilt from circumstantial evidence of the conduct of the defendant quite apart from any innocent explanations for that conduct. For example, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held in Kuehne v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 270 that “delay” in defendants approaching the police to give their account of relevant events (which accounts were later relied upon by the defence at trial) could bear on the credibility of those accounts but could not be used to infer consciousness of guilt, quite apart from any consideration that to do so might infringe the “right to silence”. It was held that the delay was not capable of constituting an implied admission (Latham J at 7) and would involve impermissible circular reasoning (Fullerton J at 69). These principles have been applied in respect of other circumstantial evidence. (for example, evidence of “distress” of a complainant112 and evidence said to demonstrate “a sexual interest in the complainant”).113 However, it is important 110. See also Butler v The Queen (2011) 216 A Crim R 215; [2011] VSCA 417 at [134]; Brooks v The Queen (2012) 36 VR 84; [2012] VSCA 197 at [67]–[69]; Zhu v The Queen (2013) 38 VR 77; [2013] VSCA 102 at [40], [45]; R v Hill [2014] QCA 107 at [187]; Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [240]. 111. See also Mulvihill v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 259 at [221]–[227]; R v Reid [2018] QCA 63 at [78]–[113]. 112. Flora v The Queen (2013) 233 A Crim R 320; [2013] VSCA 192 at [44]–[94] 113. In R v Manning (2014) 239 A Crim R 348; [2014] QCA 49 Holmes JA of the Queensland Court of Appeal held at [3] (Margaret McMurdo P agreeing) that a telephone call made by the appellant to the complainant’s father, some time after the families had ceased contact, in which the appellant was crying and sobbing, repeatedly saying that he was sorry, and that he wanted to keep the relationship going, was inadmissible not only because of “the existence of rational inferences other than guilt” which could not be excluded, but because it was “incapable of bearing the inference of guilt contended for by the Crown so as to be probative of anything in the Crown case”.

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to note that, in Victoria, the Jury Directions Act 2015 now regulates in Div 1 of Pt 4 directions with respect to “incriminating conduct” by an accused (such as lies) which the prosecution may contend “amounts to an implied admission by the accused” (s 18). Significantly, such evidence cannot be relied on by the prosecution as evidence of an implied admission “unless the trial judge determines that, on the basis of the evidence as a whole, the evidence of conduct is reasonably capable of being viewed by the jury as” such an admission (s 20(1)(b)).

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[EA.55.340]

Corroboration

Evidence may be relevant because it tends to corroborate, or confirm, evidence given by a witness. While, under the common law, the term “corroboration” has a technical meaning, in this context it simply means evidence that supports or confirms some aspect of the testimony of a witness. In Gentry v The Queen [2016] VSCA 54, for example, the Victorian Court of Appeal observed at [50]–[52] that the finding of an item of clothing with the DNA of the accused on it amounted to corroboration of the complainant because it tended “to confirm the evidence of that witness that the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime”. It was not circumstantial evidence because no inference was sought to be drawn from it (at [55]). Rather, it tended to directly confirm the allegations of the complainant (at [54]). In Choi v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 150, the evidence of an alleged accomplice was “corroborated by documents, telephone calls and his pleas of guilty” – the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that it provided “a great deal of support for such parts of his significant evidence as were not common ground”, notwithstanding the lack of “independence” (Hulme J at [61]). Of course, while evidence may be relevant as corroboration of other evidence, it may also be relevant in other ways (for example, as circumstantial evidence).

[EA.55.360]

Events that are part of a “transaction”

At common law, evidence of conduct that forms part of a relevant transaction will itself be relevant. This is because “without [evidence of such conduct] the transaction of which the [fact in issue] formed an integral part could not be truly understood and, isolated from it, could only be presented as an unreal and not very intelligible event”.114 There is no doubt that evidence of such conduct would satisfy the test of relevance under s 55.115 For example, evidence as to how a vehicle was being driven some distance from the location of a subsequent collision may tend to show how it was being driven at the time of the collision.116 Conduct of a person close in time to other alleged conduct by the person may 114. O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566 at 577 per Dixon J. 115. R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 at [26]; Parkinson v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 133 at [21]–[24]. Of course, the evidence may not be admissible if it is excluded by one of the exclusionary rules. It should be noted that the court avoided use of the language of “res gestae”. That term tends to generate more confusion than assistance. 116. See R v Sullivan [2002] NSWCCA 505 at [13]. It may also be relevant in other ways, for example, it may explain why other road users were paying attention to, and able to give evidence of, the driving of the vehicle at the time of the collision (at [14]) and it may be relevant to any issue as to the knowledge of the driver at that time (at [15]). In Semaan v The © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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have substantial probative value both as to whether the alleged conduct occurred and the person’s state of mind at the time.117

[EA.55.390]

Tendency evidence

There are authorities suggesting that “tendency evidence” (evidence showing the propensity of a person to act or think in a particular way, relied on to prove the person did in fact behave in the particular way on a particular occasion: see [EA.97.60]) will often not be relevant. A Federal Court judge has observed that “[g]enerally speaking, proof that a person has on other occasions engaged in conduct similar to that alleged against him in the litigation does not tend to prove that he engaged in the conduct alleged”.118 However, it is dangerous to generalise and such evidence may sometimes have significant probative value: see [EA.97.120]. As noted at [EA.55.60] the definition of “relevance” is very wide. For example, in R v MM [2004] NSWCCA 364, James J (with whom the other members of the Court of Criminal Appeal were in agreement) observed at [61] that evidence that a person charged with offences of child sexual assault had collected child pornography and had fantasised about sexual acts with children satisfied the criterion of relevance. He stated:

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It is in accordance with common human experience that a person who has had thoughts, particularly persistent thoughts, about some type of act is, at least to some extent, more likely to perform an act of that type than a person who has never had such thoughts. It is not to the point that many persons who fantasise about some act never actually do it.

In R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306 the accused had been charged with sexually assaulting a sleeping female houseguest and the prosecution adduced evidence that he had sexually interfered with two other sleeping female houseguests on other occasions. The trial judge, after referring to similarities and dissimilarities between the offence charged and the other two events, effectively concluded that the latter evidence was not relevant via tendency reasoning. However, the members of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal were unanimous that the trial judge was wrong to hold that the evidence was not relevant as tendency evidence (Campbell JA at [44], Howie J at [145], Rothman J at [158]). In contrast, in Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374; 207 A Crim R 202; [2011] HCA 7, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ held that, while evidence of sexual activity between the appellant and three persons who were not complainants would have had “significant probative value” as to whether “sexual activity” had taken place between the appellant and the two complainants (but for the fact that the complainant’s “evidence that the appellant had sexual relations with them during consultations was not challenged”), the evidence “could not rationally affect the likelihood that” the complainants did not consent to sexual contact on any occasion charged in the indictment (at [74]) and “did not rationally bear” on the issue whether the appellant had an honest and reasonable Queen (2013) 230 A Crim R 568; [2013] VSCA 134 Priest JA (Buchanan JA and Ashley JA agreeing) accepted at [32] that other driving will be relevant where it is “closely related in time, distance and circumstance” to the driving in issue. 117. See R v Salami [2013] NSWCCA 96. 118. Sundberg J in Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto-Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417 at [10].

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but mistaken belief that either complainant had consented (at [83]). Further, it was held that the evidence was “not capable of bearing rationally on the assessment of” the plausibility of the reasons given by the complainants for not making an early complaint (at [80]).119

[EA.55.420]

Coincidence evidence

In Phillips v The Queen (2005) 225 CLR 303; 80 ALJR 537; [2006] HCA 4 the High Court considered a case involving allegations of sexual assault by five complainants against the same defendant. The trial judge held that, under common law principles, the evidence of each complainant was admissible in respect of the trials involving the others because “the improbability of similar lies by each of the complainants” made it likely that the allegations were true and that consent was absent. However, the members of the High Court, in a joint judgment, rejected this analysis. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated at [47]:

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Whether or not similar fact evidence could ever be used in relation to consent in sexual cases, it could not be done validly in this case. It is impossible to see how, on the question of whether one complainant consented, the other complainants’ evidence that they did not consent has any probative value. It does not itself prove any disposition on the part of the accused: it proves only what mental state each of the other complainants had on a particular occasion affecting them, and that can say nothing about the mental state of the first complainant on a particular occasion affecting her.

The High Court considered that the evidence did not have “any probative value”, that is, it was not relevant. Similarly, in CGL v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) [2010] VSCA 26 the Victorian Court of Appeal considered that similarities in alleged sexual assaults were “unremarkable circumstances that are common to sexual offences against children” and concluded at [30] that “there was no sufficient connection, in either time or circumstance, between the acts alleged to raise any issue of the improbability of coincidence”, so that “the absence of relevant similarity”, other than “commonplace” similarity, meant that the evidence could not be viewed as being probative of guilt (at [26]).

[EA.55.450]

Evidence of an acquittal

In Washer v Western Australia (2007) 234 CLR 492; 177 A Crim R 386; 82 ALJR 33; [2007] HCA 48, the question arose of the relevance in a criminal trial of an earlier acquittal of the accused in relation to a criminal charge arising out of connected circumstances. Gleeson CJ, Heydon and Crennan JJ observed at [29]: Relevance will be decided in the light of the legal principles applicable to the prosecution and defence of the charge against the accused, as related to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. If, in this case, the appellant has a legal right, by reason of his acquittal, to be given the benefit of an assumption relevant to the assessment of the other evidence in the case, then evidence of the acquittal would be relevant. If the fact of the acquittal had some logical connection with the assessment of the probabilities concerning some fact or facts in issue, the evidence would be relevant. In either case, however, a decision about relevance requires consideration of the effect of the acquittal.

It was a question of law as to the effect of the acquittal. Gleeson CJ, Heydon and 119. See also Semaan v The Queen (2013) 230 A Crim R 568; [2013] VSCA 134 Priest JA (Buchanan JA and Ashley JA agreeing) at [27]–[33] (evidence of “driving” on other occasions). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Crennan JJ concluded at [41] that the acquittal was not relevant because there “was no process of reasoning whereby that information would have made less plausible any step in the prosecution case as it was finally left to the jury”.

[EA.55.480]

Remedial measures and evidence of insurance

The Act does not refer to evidence of remedial measures (adduced as evidence of negligence) or to evidence that a defendant was insured. Under the common law, such evidence has sometimes been excluded as “irrelevant”, for policy reasons. The ALRC declined to recommend a specific provision to deal with such evidence, considering that the exclusionary discretions in Pt 3.11 were adequate to deal with the issue: see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 645.120

[EA.55.510]

The parole evidence rule

This rule is part of the substantive law and, as intended by the ALRC (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 46), is not affected by the operation of the Act.121 The same is true for other rules relating to the construction of contracts.122 If the rule of substantive law operates to render evidence not relevant, that may be seen as the consequence of the operation of that rule on what facts are in issue.123

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[EA.55.540]

Evidence of a conversation

There is a rule of practice under the common law that evidence of conversations should, if possible, be given in direct speech.124 However, if what was said in the conversation is relevant, so will be evidence of the conversation that is not given in direct speech form. Thus, pursuant to s 56, evidence from a witness of a conversation in indirect speech or as to the substance or effect of what was said will be admissible “except as otherwise provided by this Act”. Possibly applicable exclusionary provisions would be the hearsay rule in s 59 (if what was said is sought to be used to prove the existence of a fact that was intended to be 120. See also Fowkes v Parker [1999] NSWCA 442. 121. 260 Oxford Street Pty Ltd v Premetis [2006] NSWCA 96; Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304; Owens v Lofthouse (2007) 5 ABC(NS) 465; [2007] FCA 1968 at [62]; Taleb v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) [2014] VSC 285 at fn[2]; Cherry v Steele-Park [2017] NSWCA 295 at [70]. 122. Peabody Resources Ltd v Macquarie Generation (unreported, NSW SC, Einstein J, 23 November 1998); Payce Properties v BBC Hardware [1999] NSWSC 968; Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Andreasen [2005] NSWSC 579 at [8]. See also Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29465; [2011] NSWCA 303, Campbell JA at [136]–[145]. 123. As discussed at [EA.55.90], the substantive law plays a key role in determining what is a “fact in issue”. In Cherry v Steele-Park [2017] NSWCA 295, White JA expressed the view at [163] that s 9(1) of the NSW Act would have the effect that the parole evidence rule would apply to render inadmissible evidence is as to the construction of the contract. However, Leelming JA (Gleeson JA agreeing) at [56] did not express a view on that point, noting that such an approach may be contrary to the authorities discussed at [EA.Intro.120]. As Leeming JA observed at [90], “in order to determine whether a document was relevant, it is necessary to know, and with some precision, what the disputed questions of construction are”. 124. Commonwealth v Riley (1984) 5 FCR 8 at 34; LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 31; [2001] NSWSC 688 at [8]–[9]; Hamilton-Smith v George [2006] FCA 1551 per Besanko J at [82]; see also [EA.26.270].

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asserted), the opinion rule in s 76 (if the witness is expressing an opinion as to what was said – but note the exception to that rule in s 78) and the discretions in Pt 3.11.

[EA.55.570]

Provisional relevance

Sometimes the relevance of evidence will depend on the existence of a particular fact (for example, that the evidence is what it is claimed to be, or that other evidence will be admitted in the proceeding). If relevance “depends on the court making another finding”, s 57 permits the court to make a finding of (provisional) relevance if it is reasonably open to make that finding or the party adducing the evidence undertakes to adduce further evidence that will make it reasonably open to make that finding (see [EA.57.90]–[EA.57.210]).

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A different problem arises where the relevance of evidence depends on the course taken by opposing parties in the proceeding. For example, evidence that a criminal suspect was offered an opportunity to answer police questions and declined may not be admissible as evidence of guilt (see s 89) but may be relevant if the defence seeks to contend that the police investigation was inadequate because the suspect/defendant was not interviewed (see [EA.89.150]; see also [EA.114.150]). Similarly, evidence of expert opinion that a physical examination of a rape complainant was “consistent with” her account may not be relevant to prove guilt (where the examination was “neutral”, that is, equally consistent with rape not having occurred) but may become relevant if the defence argues that the investigation was inadequate because no medical examination took place.125 In R v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185, Heydon JA (with whom the other members of the Court of Criminal Appeal agreed) observed at [16]–[17]: A solution in particular cases might be for Crown and defence to agree that the evidence not be called and to agree to join in a request that the trial judge direct the jury that the jury should attribute no significance to the absence of the evidence because it is immaterial. Another technique which might be employed where the Crown proposes to call inconclusive medical evidence is for the trial judge to secure from the defence an undertaking not to comment on the absence of the evidence if the Crown decides not to call the evidence or it is rejected. That admittedly would still leave open whatever risk of jury speculation there is.

It is plainly desirable that the position of the opposing party or parties be clarified before evidence is admitted on this provisional basis. If it is clear that the anticipated course will not be taken by the opposing party or parties, the evidence remains irrelevant and inadmissible (s 56(2)).126 There would be no need to consider the possible application of the discretions in Pt 3.11. As for the argument that evidence should be admitted to prevent “speculation” by a jury tribunal of fact,127 this should be resisted. Juries are directed to decide cases on the evidence and not to speculate about matters that are not the subject of evidence. If necessary, the first “solution” suggested by Heydon JA in Dann might be 125. See R v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185 at [14]. 126. Of course, if counsel subsequently invites the jury to draw an inference from the absence of the evidence in question, various consequences may flow, including discharge of the jury (cf WC v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 231). 127. Compare R v RTB [2002] NSWCCA 104 at [24]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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adopted. It is not appropriate to treat otherwise irrelevant evidence as relevant because it would prevent jury speculation.

[EA.55.600]

Appellate review

In R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, Campbell JA held at [94]:

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Whether a particular item of evidence is relevant to a particular fact in issue is a question of law, concerning which an appellate court is in as good a position to make a decision as is the trial judge.

Thus, on this analysis, the appeal court could simply substitute its own view on the question. However, the other two members of the Court of Criminal Appeal did not find it necessary to address this issue. Further, it should be noted that the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal appears to have divided on this issue under the common law. In R v Vaughan (No 2) (2009) 105 SASR 532; [2009] SASC 395 Kourakis J held at [87] that a ruling on relevance “involves a question of law alone… [It] allows no discretion and does not require the making of any finding of fact”. The other two members of the Court (Gray and Sulan JJ) disagreed, holding at [31] that the question “involved the exercise of judicial discretion undertaken having regard to the factual circumstances arising in the trial … necessarily involv[ing] a question of mixed law and fact”. However, it is important to appreciate that, under the common law, “legal” relevance requires “sufficient relevance” (see Gray and Sulan JJ at [11]), justifying this reference to an element of judicial discretion. Further, it should be noted that the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal was not addressing the question of the nature of the applicable appellate review but the distinct, albeit related, issue of classification of grounds of appeal in terms of questions of “law”, “fact” and “mixed law and fact”. In Jones Lang LaSalle (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taouk [2012] NSWCA 342, Meagher JA (McColl JA and Sackville AJA agreeing) observed at [37] that, ordinarily, a party cannot advance on appeal a basis for relevance that was not advanced at first instance: Ordinarily, such an explanation cannot be given for the first time in argument on appeal because there will not have been any ″improper″ admission or rejection of evidence and because of the prejudice to the other parties in a party being permitted to justify the tender on grounds not argued or sufficiently argued before the primary judge. That prejudice will arise in relation to rejected material if those parties could possibly have addressed it by further evidence, including through cross-examination. … This reflects the fundamental principle that a party is bound by the conduct of his or her case and that it is only in exceptional circumstances that after a case has been decided against him or her, a party is allowed to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, was not put during the hearing when the opportunity was available. Meagher JA rejected contrary authority which suggested that where evidence is tendered on an untenable basis and rejected, an appeal may be brought if the evidence was admissible on an alternative basis (although not argued).

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Cth Act: 56 Relevant evidence to be admissible (1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. (2) Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible. NSW Act: 56

Relevant evidence to be admissible

(1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. (2) Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible. Vic Act: 56

Relevant evidence to be admissible

(1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. (2) Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible. ACT Act: Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

56

Relevant evidence to be admissible

(1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. (2) Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible. NT Act: 56

Relevant evidence to be admissible

(1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. (2) Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible.

[EA.56.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 51, para 122; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 638.

[EA.56.60] General comments This is the key provision regarding the admissibility of evidence in Ch 3. It displaces common law rules on admissibility of evidence (unless that law is preserved elsewhere in the Act).128 According to s 56, if evidence is not relevant (as defined in s 55) it is not admissible in a proceeding. If it is relevant, it is admissible, “except as otherwise provided by this Act”. It may be excluded by 128. See discussion at [EA.Intro.120]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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one of the exclusionary rules, in the exercise of judicial discretion, or under one of the procedural provisions in the Act. In this context, the discretion under s 135 should be emphasised. Applying in both civil and criminal proceedings, it permits a court to refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might: (a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or (b) be misleading or confusing; or (c) cause or result in undue waste of time. In the Introductory Note to Ch 3, a diagram designed to show how Ch 3 applies to particular evidence was included.129 More generally, in deciding whether an item of evidence may be admitted (and how it may be used), it may be necessary to determine: • whether the evidence in question is relevant (as defined in s 55) or, at least, provisionally relevant (s 57); • whether any of the procedural rules in Ch 2 prevent the adducing of the evidence; • how the evidence is relevant (it may be relevant in different ways and in respect of more than one fact in issue); • what use or uses are sought to be made of the evidence; • whether any of the exclusionary rules in Ch 3 apply to the evidence (some of the rules only apply to a particular use of evidence);

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• whether one permissible use of the evidence will allow it to be used for an otherwise impermissible use (see, for example, s 60); • whether discretionary exclusion of the evidence is appropriate (ss 135, 137, 138); • whether an order should be made under s 169(1)(c) or 169(3) that the evidence not be admitted in evidence (due to non-compliance with the request procedure in ss 166–169); • whether discretionary prohibition of a particular use of the evidence is appropriate (s 136); • whether, in civil proceedings, an order can and should be made that a provision of the Act is not to apply to the evidence (s 190(3)); and • whether there has been an effective waiver of a provision of the Act (s 190(1)). It may not be necessary to proceed through the checklist in respect of all evidence. In some circumstances, for example, a court may conclude that discretionary exclusion is appropriate without detailed consideration of the other questions. The distinction between admission and use of evidence is an important one.130 Indeed, as French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ stated in IMM v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 at [38]: 129. It should be noted that this diagram does not refer to those procedural provisions in the Act that may prevent evidence being adduced at all. 130. Silvia v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2001] NSWSC 562 at [6] per Hamilton J.

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The first question, posed by Pt 3.1, is a threshold one for all evidence – whether it is relevant. Before that question may be answered, it is necessary to identify the purpose or purposes for which the evidence is tendered. The identification of its purpose may have important consequences, especially in areas such as opinion evidence and tendency evidence.

If evidence is only sought to be used for a use that does not satisfy the test for relevant evidence, the evidence would not be admitted at all. If admitted evidence is relevant for one use but is not relevant for another use, it is not “admissible” for that latter use.131 Further, the mere fact that evidence has been admitted does not mean that it may be used in all the ways it is relevant. If it is not admissible for a particular use, it cannot be used in that way (subject to the operation of the waiver provisions in s 190). If the court has exercised its general discretion in s 136 to prevent a particular use of the evidence, it cannot be used in that way. Where no ruling is sought, or given, under s 136, the evidence may be used for all relevant (and admissible132) purposes, including uses contrary to the interests of the party adducing the evidence.133

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The different Parts in Ch 3 are not mutually exclusive. For example, even if hearsay evidence, to which Pt 3.2 applies, is not rendered inadmissible by that Part, it may be rendered inadmissible by another Part of Ch 3. As the High Court held in Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [19], the opinion rule in s 76 applies to hearsay evidence (evidence to which Pt 3.2 applies) of opinion. Evidence may be admitted at one point in a proceeding and then later excluded by reason of the application of a provision of the Act. In a Federal Court case,134 evidence was admitted “provisionally” on the basis that it might be excluded under s 169(1)(c) if the requirements of that provision were satisfied. Similarly, a court may have to reconsider the admission of evidence if the factual basis for admissibility changes, or new facts emerge supporting discretionary exclusion.135 Conversely, a change of circumstances may result in a court admitting evidence that had been excluded at an earlier stage of the proceedings.136

131. See Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29465; [2011] NSWCA 303, Campbell JA at [103]. Compare, under the common law, BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 289–290, 301, 305, 326. 132. As noted above, it may even be used for an “inadmissible use” if the court has made an order under s 190 dispensing with the application of the applicable provision in the Act. 133. R v Horton (1998) 104 A Crim R 306 at 312 per Wood CJ at CL; see also Choi v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 150 at [56]; Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422; [2010] NSWCA 70 at [100]–[104]. See also, for the comparable common law position, B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599. 134. Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Parnell Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 537; 159 ALR 477; [1998] FCA 1580 at 542 per Mansfield J. 135. R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190; [2000] NSWCCA 210; R v Howard (2005) 152 A Crim R 7; [2005] NSWCCA 25 at [36]; Qoro v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 220 at [62]; R v Ashley (2014) 286 FLR 226; [2014] NTSC 26 at [18]; Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 at [229]–[235]. 136. For example, defence evidence may have the effect of raising a factual issue to which the evidence is relevant: see R v Jacobson (Ruling No 5) [2014] VSC 554. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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“Evidence … is not admissible”

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As noted above, under this provision, if evidence is not relevant, it is not admissible in a proceeding. This proposition was reflected in the statement of the majority of the High Court in Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 at [6] that if “evidence is not relevant, no further question arises about its admissibility. Irrelevant evidence may not be received”. Such evidence may not be received by the court, in the sense of taken into account in the determination of the facts in issue in the proceeding.137 Even if evidence is relevant, there are a number of other provisions in the Act (for example, ss 84, 85, 114, 115 and 134) which enact that certain defined categories of evidence are “not admissible”. Further, there are a number of provisions in the Act (for example, ss 59, 76, 89, 91, 97 and 98) which enact that certain defined categories of evidence are “not admissible” for a particular use. Whether or not an item of evidence is admissible for a particular use will not normally affect whether or not it is admissible for another use. Thus, for example, in Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36, the High Court considered whether evidence that fell within the business record exception (s 69) to the hearsay rule (s 59) was nonetheless caught by the opinion rule (s 76). French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in a joint judgment (Gummow J and Crennan J agreeing in separate judgments) held at [19] that it was: Section 56(1) contemplates that relevant, ie otherwise admissible, evidence may be excluded by more than one exclusionary rule in Pts 3.2–3.11. One exclusionary rule is the hearsay rule. If evidence satisfies s 69, then by s 69(2) the hearsay rule does not apply. But s 69(2) does not provide that the evidence is admissible. It is only admissible if no other exclusionary rule applies. Section 76 excludes “[e]vidence of an opinion” – not “evidence by a witness of an opinion”. There is no indication in any other provision in Pt 3.3 that it operates only in relation to the opinions of witnesses.

However, in some circumstances, the fact that evidence is relevant and admissible for one particular use may have the effect that it will be admissible for another relevant use (for which use it would otherwise have been be inadmissible): see ss 60 and 77. If evidence is generally inadmissible (that is, inadmissible for any use), it must not be admitted even if adduced in some other way. For example, where evidence of an out-of-court experiment is inadmissible, evidence of the opinion of an expert that is based on, or derived from, that experiment (and thus, in substance, constitutes evidence of that experiment) is also inadmissible.138

137. Of course, it may be “received” in the informal sense of being considered at least to such an extent as is necessary to determine whether it is admissible. 138. Gilham v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131 at [184]–[192].

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Objection to admissibility

Where there is an objection to admissibility on the basis that the requirement of relevance is not satisfied, it is for the party tendering the evidence or asking a question to make clear to the court the purpose for which the evidence is tendered and how it becomes relevant and admissible.139 In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ stated at [19]–[20]: As a general rule, trial judges confronted with an objection to admissibility of evidence should rule upon that objection as soon as possible. Often the ruling can and should be given immediately after the objection has been made and argued. If, for some pressing reason, that cannot be done, the ruling should ordinarily be given before the party who tenders the disputed evidence closes its case. That party will then know whether it must try to mend its hand, and opposite parties will know the evidence they must answer. It is only for very good reason that a trial judge should defer ruling on the admissibility of evidence until judgment.

Certainly, a ruling on an objection should not be deferred indefinitely.140 On the other hand, where objection to admissibility is taken only on the basis of relevance, it is a common practice for the evidence to be admitted “subject to [a determination of] relevance”, which will take place prior to judgment. That would certainly be appropriate where a litigant is unrepresented.141

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[EA.56.150]

Absence of objection to admissibility

An important issue, particularly in respect of the application of the admissibility rules in Chapter 3, is whether the provisions apply in the absence of objection being taken by a party to the proceeding. It is discussed in the Introduction at [EA.Intro.350].

[EA.56.210]

Reasons

In Jones Lang LaSalle (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taouk [2012] NSWCA 342, Meagher JA (McColl JA and Sackville AJA agreeing) stated at [33]: It is not necessary nor practicable that every ruling about the admissibility of evidence be accompanied by reasons. Nor is it possible to formulate a single criterion by reference to which it can be judged whether reasons should be given. Cases which involve the exercise of a discretion or where admissibility depends on the resolution of some intermediate question of fact or law, may warrant the giving of short reasons. Whether that is so will also depend on the perceived importance of the evidence involved and the likely effect of its rejection or admission on the outcome of the case: see Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 260, 279; Kwan v Kang [2003] NSWCA 336 at [113]–[114]; Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59 at [34]. However, if a party wants to 139. Jones Lang LaSalle (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taouk [2012] NSWCA 342, Meagher JA (McColl JA and Sackville AJA agreeing) at [30], citing Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282; [1940] HCA 43 at 292 per Starke J. The objecting party should also make clear the ground(s) of objection if required to do so by the court: Adamson v Ede [2009] NSWCA 379 at [97]. 140. Kwan v Kang [2003] NSWCA 336 at [113]–[114]; ACN 062 895 774 Pty Ltd v Tyndall [2007] NSWCA 64 at [23]. 141. See Spencer v Commonwealth [2014] FCA 1288 at [20]–[29]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 57

preserve fully its rights to challenge a particular ruling on appeal and the basis for rejection or admission is not clear from the argument, it should press for that basis to be stated, however shortly.

Cth Act: 57

Provisional relevance

(1) If the determination of the question whether evidence adduced by a party is relevant depends on the court making another finding (including a finding that the evidence is what the party claims it to be), the court may find that the evidence is relevant: (a) if it is reasonably open to make that finding; or (b) subject to further evidence being admitted at a later stage of the proceeding that will make it reasonably open to make that finding. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), if the relevance of evidence of an act done by a person depends on the court making a finding that the person and one or more other persons had, or were acting in furtherance of, a common purpose (whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy or otherwise), the court may use the evidence itself in determining whether the common purpose existed. NSW Act:

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57

Provisional relevance

(1) If the determination of the question whether evidence adduced by a party is relevant depends on the court making another finding (including a finding that the evidence is what the party claims it to be), the court may find that the evidence is relevant: (a) if it is reasonably open to make that finding, or (b) subject to further evidence being admitted at a later stage of the proceeding that will make it reasonably open to make that finding. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), if the relevance of evidence of an act done by a person depends on the court making a finding that the person and one or more other persons had, or were acting in furtherance of, a common purpose (whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy or otherwise), the court may use the evidence itself in determining whether the common purpose existed. Vic Act: 57

Provisional relevance

(1) If the determination of the question whether evidence adduced by a party is relevant depends on the court making another finding (including a finding that the evidence is what the party claims it to be), the court may find that the evidence is relevant— (a) if it is reasonably open to make that finding; or (b) subject to further evidence being admitted at a later stage of the proceeding that will make it reasonably open to make that finding. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), if the relevance of evidence of an act done by a person depends on the court making a finding that the person and one 360

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or more other persons had, or were acting in furtherance of, a common purpose (whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy or as part of involvement in the commission of an offence or otherwise), the court may use the evidence itself in determining whether the common purpose existed. Notes: 1 Subsection (2) differs from section 57(2) of the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act. 2 Subdivision (1) of Division 1 of Part II of the Crimes Act 1958 deals with complicity in commission of offences. [Subs (2) am Act 63 of 2014, s 7(12)] [S 57 am Act 63 of 2014]

ACT Act: 57

Provisional relevance

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(1) If the decision about the question whether evidence presented by a party is relevant depends on the court making another finding (including a finding that the evidence is what the party claims it to be), the court may find that the evidence is relevant— (a) if it is reasonably open to make the finding; or (b) subject to further evidence being admitted at a later stage of the proceeding that will make it reasonably open to make the finding. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), if the relevance of evidence of an act done by a person depends on the court making a finding that the person and 1 or more other people had, or were acting in furtherance of, a common purpose (whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy or otherwise), the court may use the evidence itself in deciding whether the common purpose existed. NT Act: 57

Provisional relevance

(1) If the determination of the question whether evidence adduced by a party is relevant depends on the court making another finding (including a finding that the evidence is what the party claims it to be), the court may find that the evidence is relevant: (a) if it is reasonably open to make that finding; or (b) subject to further evidence being admitted at a later stage of the proceeding that will make it reasonably open to make that finding. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), if the relevance of evidence of an act done by a person depends on the court making a finding that the person and one or more other persons had, or were acting in furtherance of, a common purpose (whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy or otherwise), the court may use the evidence itself in determining whether the common purpose existed.

[EA.57.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 52, para 123; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 646. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.57.60]

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Differences between the provisions

The Victorian provision includes the additional words “or as part of involvement in the commission of an offence” after the word “conspiracy” in s 57(2). These words were added as part of a wider reform of the law relating to the doctrines at common law of acting in concert, joint criminal enterprise and common purpose. However, it may be doubted whether they serve any purpose in this provision. The better view is that the Victorian provision operates in precisely the same way as the Commonwealth and NSW provisions.

[EA.57.90] General comments

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The ALRC explained the purpose and logic behind the proposal on which this provision is based: It is argued that the relevance of evidence – its ability to affect the probabilities – in the form of a document, object or reading of a technical instrument depends on establishing other facts – authorship, identity, accuracy. The standard of proof that should be applied is – as suggested by Morgan – whether it would be open to the jury to find the fact proved. It is not appropriate generally to hold a voir dire and permit the opposing party to adduce contradictory evidence. The issue is the relevance of the proffered evidence. If it is capable of affecting the probabilities, its effect on the probabilities is for the tribunal of fact … Similar issues arise where a party wishes to have a copy document or the transcript of a tape recording admitted. Assuming that the original document or tape is relevant, the relevance of the copy or transcripts will depend on a preliminary finding that the copy or transcript is what the party claims it to be. Similarly, the relevance of machine produced evidence depends upon it being that which the party tendering it claims it to be. This will depend in turn on the accuracy and reliability of the devices involved. The relevance of the machine produced evidence is conditional on accepting the reliability/accuracy of the devices. In each case the issues to be decided in determining the relevance of the evidence must be considered again and finally by the tribunal of fact. The appropriate test, is whether it would be reasonably open to a jury to find the fact established.

Further, if the relevance of item of evidence A depends on the admission of item of evidence B, A may be provisionally admitted if the party adducing A undertakes to adduce B. If B is not adduced, or not admitted, A will cease to be relevant and will not be admitted. It has been observed that this provision permits a court “to say evidence is provisionally relevant where the relevance of any particular piece in the jigsaw cannot be determined conclusively until the court has completed the jigsaw”: Nodnara Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 140 FLR 336; 38 ATR 527 (NSW SC).

[EA.57.120]

Authentication

This provision constitutes a liberal approach to the authentication and identification of documents and things: see ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 982–983. It should also be read in conjunction with the provisions in Pt 4.3, which facilitate proof of various matters (generally by means of presumptions). However the ALRC noted (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 986): It is to be expected that parties will continue to authenticate key documents with extrinsic evidence. Tactical pressures will cause this. Nevertheless, relaxation of the authentication rules requires the provision of safeguards for the party against whom the document is led. The proposal gives a party the right to request on reasonable grounds the calling of persons involved in the making of the document and the production of 362

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[EA.57.120]

related documents. If the request is not complied with and there is no reasonable cause, the court may give directions to secure compliance, make costs orders or refuse to admit the evidence.

These provisions are contained in Pt 4.6, Div 1 (ss 166 to 169). An additional safeguard is provided by the court’s discretionary power under s 135. On the other hand, there is authority to the effect that a party’s assurance as to the relevance of particular documents, and an undertaking to establish relevance at a later stage of the proceeding, do not apply to the question of authentication.142 In National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309; [1999] NSWSC 539, Bryson J in the NSW Supreme Court observed (at [19]):

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In the language used in s 57(1), a finding that the evidence is what the party claims it to be is distinguished from the question whether the evidence is relevant; authenticity is something on which relevance depends.

Bryson J held that it was necessary to satisfy him on the balance of probabilities that the documents in question were “what they are alleged to be”. It is not entirely clear whether the ruling in this case was because the undertaking did not extend to authentication, or because the view was taken that this provision could not apply to the question of authentication. It is suggested that the latter view, if taken, is wrong. It was the clear intention behind this provision that a finding as to authentication (on which relevance depends) need not be obtained before the evidence is found to be relevant and admissible, so long as it is “reasonably open” to find that the document is authentic (s 57(1)(a)) or an undertaking is given that further evidence will be adduced “at a later stage of the proceeding that will make it reasonably open to make” the finding that the document is authentic: s 57(1)(b). That approach appears to have been followed by Carr J in Cordelia Holdings Pty Ltd v Newkey Investment Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1018 at [52]–[54].143 However, the analysis of Bryson J was doubted in O’Meara v Dominican Fathers (2003) 153 ACTR 1; [2003] ACTCA 24 at [85] per Gyles and Weinberg JJ. The position remains unresolved. Austin J in ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 at [117] understood Rusu to stand for the propositions that authenticity must be “established” and that “authentication cannot be achieved solely by drawing inferences from the face of the document where there is no other evidence to indicate provenance” (see also [EA.58.30]).144 It is not possible to see the source of these propositions of law in the Act, notwithstanding the “tactical pressures” recognised by the ALRC (see above) which will lead parties to “continue to authenticate key documents with extrinsic evidence”. However, as Gyles and Weinberg JJ pointed out (in O’Meara at [90]), an absence of evidence as to the provenance of a document may provide a basis 142. National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309; [1999] NSWSC 539. 143. See also Campbell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIRComm 148. 144. See also ACCC v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 280 ALR 97; [2011] FCA 338 at [79]–[81]; Barescape Pty Ltd v Bacchus Holdings Pty Ltd (No 5) [2011] NSWSC 1307 at [25]. In Crime Commission (NSW) v Cassar (2012) 224 A Crim R 448; [2012] NSWSC 1170, Rothman J stated at [41]: “As Austin J held in ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417, while evidence of the authenticity or authentication of a document cannot be achieved solely by drawing inferences on the face of the document and something more is necessary, the nature of the document may mean that only a small amount of evidence is necessary in order to draw the inference as to the document’s authenticity. Nevertheless, authenticity cannot be achieved solely from the document itself.” © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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for its discretionary exclusion, given that an opponent may be hampered in making inquiries about, and leading evidence concerning, the matters in the document. In ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448; 301 ALR 326; [2012] FCA 1355, Perram J reviewed the authorities and concluded that National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309; [1999] NSWSC 539 was “plainly wrong”, holding at [98] that “the question for the [court] is not, as Rusu suggests, whether the document proves itself. The question is whether it is relevant. If it is alleged not to be authentic it will still be relevant as long as there is material from which its authenticity may reasonably be inferred. By s 58(1), that material expressly includes what may reasonably be inferred from the document itself”. Perram J provided a useful statement of “basic propositions” at [92]: 1. There is no provision of the Evidence Act which requires that only authentic documents be admitted into evidence. The requirement for admissibility under the Act is that evidence be relevant, not that it be authentic. On some occasions, the fact that a document is not authentic will be what makes it relevant, i.e., in a forgery prosecution. In other cases, there may be a debate as to whether a particular document is or is not authentic, for example, a contested grant of probate where it said that the testator’s signature is not genuine. 2. In cases of that kind, the issue of authenticity will be for the tribunal of fact to determine. In cases heard by a judge alone, this will be the judge at the time that judgment is delivered and the facts found. In cases with a jury, it will be the jury. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

3. The question of what evidence will be admitted is a question of law for the tribunal of law, which will be the Court. 4. Since authenticity is not a ground of admissibility under the Evidence Act, the issue of authenticity does not directly arise for the tribunal of law’s consideration at the level of objections to evidence. 5. What does arise for its consideration is the question of relevance under s 55. If the evidence is relevant it is admissible: s 56. It will be relevant under s 55 if the evidence is such that ‘if it were accepted, [it] could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’. 6. The question of a document’s authenticity is relevant only to the tribunal of law’s consideration of relevance under s 56. It has no other role. 7. In that inquiry, the question for the tribunal of law is not whether the document is authentic but whether receipt of the document could, to paraphrase s 55, rationally affect the assessment of the probability of a fact. 8. If there is raised a question about the authenticity of a document (and assuming that, if authentic, it would otherwise be relevant to an issue) then there will be an issue in the proceedings about its authenticity. This will be a question for the tribunal of fact to resolve, if the document is admitted. 9. The question for the tribunal of law, by contrast, will be whether the document is relevant to a fact in issue under s 55. That is, the question will be whether the document can rationally affect the assessment of the probabilities of the fact, including its authenticity. 10. What materials may be examined in answering this question? The answer is provided by s 58. 364

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This analysis has been followed. by some other judges.146

[EA.57.210]

Nevertheless, Rusu continues to be followed

Where a document is tendered as a sample of a person’s handwriting (to permit comparison with other handwriting contended to be by that person), it is not necessary for there to be direct evidence that the sample was written by the person – circumstantial evidence will be sufficient.147

[EA.57.150]

Computer-produced evidence

Where evidence is tendered which was allegedly computer-produced then, apart from documentary and hearsay issues, it will be necessary to establish that the computer system does what is claimed for it (before the evidence can be relevant). In these circumstances, this provision will allow the court to find that the evidence is relevant if it is reasonably open to find that the computer system does what is claimed for it (or subject to further evidence being admitted at a later stage of the proceeding that will make it reasonably open to make that finding). In addition, it may be possible to utilise s 146 and, where appropriate, s 147. For other aspects of computer-produced evidence, see [EA.48.150], [EA.59.150], [EA.69.330], [EA.146.60] and [EA.147.60]. In addition, the procedural protections (ss 166–169 and 193), exclusionary discretion provisions (ss 135 and 137) and the possibility of waiver of the rules of evidence (s 190) should be noted.

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[EA.57.180]

Survey evidence

Where survey evidence is tendered, it is not relevant without evidence that it was a reliable survey. This provision will allow the court to find the survey evidence is relevant if it is reasonably open to find that the survey was reliable (or under s 57(1)(b)). For other aspects of survey evidence, see [EA.72.90] and [EA.78.60].

[EA.57.210]

Section 57(2): Common purpose

The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 646) the principles behind this provision (as found in the Commonwealth and NSW Acts) as follows: Evidence of statements made by an alleged conspirator A and tendered as evidence of acts done pursuant to the alleged conspiracy will continue to be admissible against A and against alleged conspirator B. The evidence is not tendered for a hearsay purpose and is not caught by the hearsay proposal. Such evidence raises an issue of conditional or provisional relevance – the relevance of the act of A to the case against B will depend upon a finding that there was a common purpose. This issue is covered by the proposal on conditional relevance. In addition, however, the proposal provides that, as at present, the evidence of A’s acts may be considered with evidence of B’s acts and collateral circumstances to prove the common design.

Thus, applying s 57(1), evidence of an act by A will be relevant as against B “if it is reasonably open to make [the] finding” that the act by A was done in 145. See Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 35) [2014] VSC 59 at [27]; ASIC v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (in liq) (2015) 105 ACSR 116; [2015] FCA 342 at [94]. However, it should be noted that, in Matthews Forrest J, while doubting the proposition of Austin J in ASIC v Rich that the document itself cannot be the “sole” basis to infer “authenticity” (at [31]), did not need to resolve that question because there was other evidence pointing to authenticity. 146. See Re Maiden Civil Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1618 at [23]. 147. Miller v The Queen (2015) 252 A Crim R 486; [2015] NSWCCA 206, at [146]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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furtherance of a common purpose between A and B. In the absence of such a conclusion, what A did may not be relevant in a proceeding against B (although it may be relevant on some other basis). For example, in a trial of A and B for the murder of C, evidence that A’s fingerprint was on the murder weapon will usually only be relevant as against B if there is evidence on which it is reasonably open to find that such act (holding the murder weapon) was done in furtherance of some common purpose between A and B. The (provisional) existence of that common purpose between A and B will mean that evidence of A’s act (holding the murder weapon) will not only be relevant under s 55 as against A, it will also be relevant as against B (because it will tend to increase the probability that B was criminally responsible for the murder of C). The function of s 57(2) is to permit evidence of A’s act to be used (with all the other evidence admissible against B) for the purpose of showing that it is reasonably open to make the finding that the act by A was done in furtherance of a common purpose between A and B, so that A’s act will be relevant and admissible against B. This provision reflects the existing common law.148 The word “act” should be understood to include “verbal act” (that is, a statement adduced for a non-hearsay purpose). It should also be understood that the provision does not affect the application of the hearsay rule to acts or statements of a third person allegedly acting in furtherance of a common purpose with the accused: see s 87. Thus, where evidence of a statement by A that “B is in this too” is tendered to prove the participation in the common purpose of B, it is being adduced for a hearsay purpose and the operation of that rule is unaffected by this provision. In effect, this provision simply allows the act of A to be considered with the acts of B for the purpose of proving the existence of the common purpose, its participants and its scope (which may be a pre-condition to the relevance of A’s act as against B).149 As noted, the Victorian provision includes the additional words “or as part of involvement in the commission of an offence” after the word “conspiracy” in s 57(2). These words were added as part of a wider reform of the law relating to the doctrines at common law of acting in concert, joint criminal enterprise and common purpose. However, it may be doubted whether they serve any purpose in this provision. The better view is that the Victorian provision operates in precisely the same way as the Commonwealth and NSW provisions.

Cth Act: 58

Inferences as to relevance

(1) If a question arises as to the relevance of a document or thing, the court may examine it and may draw any reasonable inference from it, including an inference as to its authenticity or identity.

148. See R v Associated Northern Collieries (1912) 14 CLR 387; [1911] HCA 73 at 399–402; Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 93–94. 149. See R v Baladjam (No 19) [2008] NSWSC 1441 at [71]–[91]; Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (2012) 264 FLR 1; [2012] VSC 94 at [770]–[771].

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[EA.58.60]

(2) Subsection (1) does not limit the matters from which inferences may properly be drawn. NSW Act: 58

Inferences as to relevance

(1) If a question arises as to the relevance of a document or thing, the court may examine it and may draw any reasonable inference from it, including an inference as to its authenticity or identity. (2) Subsection (1) does not limit the matters from which inferences may properly be drawn. Vic Act: 58

Inferences as to relevance

(1) If a question arises as to the relevance of a document or thing, the court may examine it and may draw any reasonable inference from it, including an inference as to its authenticity or identity. (2) Subsection (1) does not limit the matters from which inferences may properly be drawn. ACT Act:

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58

Inferences as to relevance

(1) If a question arises as to the relevance of a document or thing, the court may examine it and may draw any reasonable inference from it, including an inference as to its authenticity or identity. (2) Subsection (1) does not limit the matters from which inferences may properly be drawn. NT Act: 58

Inferences as to relevance

(1) If a question arises as to the relevance of a document or thing, the court may examine it and may draw any reasonable inference from it, including an inference as to its authenticity or identity. (2) Subsection (1) does not limit the matters from which inferences may properly be drawn.

[EA.58.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 53, para 124; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 985–986.

[EA.58.60] General comments In determining the relevance of an object (“a document or thing”), reasonable inferences may be drawn from it. This appears to extend to the authentication of the document. However, Bryson J in the NSW Supreme Court has observed in National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309; [1999] NSWSC 539 at [19]: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.58.60]

s 58

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a question of authenticity is not a question as to the relevance of documents within subs 58(1), which treats authenticity as part of the material on which relevance may be determined.

Bryson J considered that authenticity should be distinguished from relevance. On this approach, apparently, a court may not draw reasonable inferences from a document as to its authenticity.150 It is suggested that such a view is inconsistent with the intention behind this provision and its legislative history. It was plainly intended that, for the purposes of determining the admissibility (s 56) of a document, a question of prima facie authenticity151 (on which relevance will depend) may be decided with the assistance of reasonable inferences from the document itself. After all, the ultimate question of authenticity is for the tribunal of fact, not the court determining the question of admissibility. The approach taken by Bryson J was doubted by Madgwick J (the other members of the Federal Court preferring not to express a view) in Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 305 at [25].152 In Jones Lang LaSalle (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taouk [2012] NSWCA 342, Meagher JA (McColl JA and Sackville AJA agreeing) noted at [34] the conflicting views but considered that it was not necessary to consider the correctness of the approach taken by Bryson J. However, in ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448; 301 ALR 326; [2012] FCA 1355, Perram J reviewed the authorities and concluded that National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309; [1999] NSWSC 539 was “plainly wrong”, holding at [94]–[101] that a court may draw reasonable inferences from a document for the purposes of determining that the authenticity of the document may reasonably be inferred (and the document was, accordingly, relevant). That view has been accepted as correct in both the Victorian Supreme Court153 and the NSW Supreme Court.154 The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has noted that aspects of Rusu are controversial, without deciding its correctness.155

150. However, in ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 Austin J stated at [117] that “[i]n National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309; [1999] NSWSC 539, Bryson J did not deny that inferences may be drawn from the document itself, relevant to the question of authenticity”. Austin J concluded that Bryson J held that “authentication cannot be achieved solely by drawing inferences from the face of the document where there is no other evidence to indicate provenance” (see discussion at [EA.57.120]). See also Traxys Europe SA v Balaji Coke Industry Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1132 at [13]. 151. Under s 57(1), it is only necessary that it be “reasonably open” to find that the document is what the party adducing it claims it to be. 152. See also Cordelia Holdings Pty Ltd v Newkey Investment Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1018 at [52]–[53] per Carr J; Campbell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIRComm 148. 153. Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 35) [2014] VSC 59 at [27]–[36]; Traffıc Calming Australia Pty Ltd v CTS Creative Traffıc Solutions Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 741 at [105]. 154. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Pinn [2015] NSWSC 1684 at [42]–[46]. 155. Bobolas v Waverley Council (No 4) [2015] NSWCA 337 at [42]; Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26 at [101].

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.30]

It should be noted that this provision does not deal with the drawing of inferences from the object in order to establish some other precondition to admissibility: see s 183.156

[EA.58.90] Safeguards The party against whom the document or thing is led may utilise the request system in Pt 4.6: ss 166–169. Enhanced discovery powers are given by s 193.

Part 3.2 – Hearsay [EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.30]

Summary of this Part

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This Part establishes the “hearsay rule”, which excludes evidence of a “previous representation” in specified circumstances, subject to exceptions created in the rest of the Part. Division 2 creates exceptions for first-hand hearsay, with different rules in civil and criminal proceedings and depending on whether the maker of the representation is available to testify. Other exceptions are created in other Parts of the Act (for example, Pt 3.4 Admissions). Division 3 creates exceptions for more remote hearsay. An overview of the operation of the hearsay rule and exceptions is provided in the following diagrams.157

156. In Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 35) [2014] VSC 59, Forrest J erred at [40] by relying on this provision, rather than s 183, for the purposes of applying s 69. Of course, since there are no substantive differences between this provision and s 183, the error has no practical significance. 157. Produced by the Judicial College of Victoria. Available at: http:// www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/publications/uniform-evidence-resources. Reproduced with permission. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.30]

: Hearsay overview

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FIGURE 1

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: Hearsay in civil proceedings

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FIGURE 2

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.30]

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.30]

: Hearsay in criminal proceedings

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FIGURE 3

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Part 3.2 - Hearsay

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.1.30]

DIVISION 1 – THE HEARSAY RULE DIVISION 3.2.1 – THE HEARSAY RULE (ACT ONLY)

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.1.30] Summary of this Division This Division establishes the “hearsay rule”, which excludes evidence of a “previous representation” when it is adduced to prove the existence of a fact that (it can reasonably be supposed that) the person intended to assert by the representation (a “hearsay purpose”). However, pursuant to s 60, whenever evidence of a “previous representation” is relevant for a non-hearsay purpose and is admitted on that basis, the hearsay rule ceases to apply and the evidence may be used for a hearsay purpose (unless it is evidence of an admission in criminal proceedings).

Cth Act: 59

The hearsay rule—exclusion of hearsay evidence

(1) Evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation.

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[Subs (1) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 17]

(2) Such a fact is in this Part referred to as an asserted fact. (2A) For the purposes of determining under subsection (1) whether it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert a particular fact by the representation, the court may have regard to the circumstances in which the representation was made. Note: Subsection (2A) was inserted as a response to the decision of the Supreme Court of NSW in R. v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 18]

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of a representation contained in a certificate or other document given or made under regulations made under an Act other than this Act to the extent to which the regulations provide that the certificate or other document has evidentiary effect. Note: Specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are as follows: • evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose (section 60); • first-hand hearsay: – civil proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (section 63) or available (section 64); – criminal proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (section 65) or available (section 66); • contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc. (section 66A); • business records (section 69); • tags and labels (section 70); • electronic communications (section 71); • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (section 72); © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 59

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence • marriage, family history or family relationships (section 73); • public or general rights (section 74); • use of evidence in interlocutory proceedings (section 75); • admissions (section 81); • representations about employment or authority (subsection 87(2)); • exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments (subsection 92(3));

and

convictions

• character of and expert opinion about accused persons (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. [Subs (3) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 19; insrt Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 10] Examples: (1)

D is the defendant in a sexual assault trial. W has made a statement to the police that X told W that X had seen D leave a night club with the victim shortly before the sexual assault is alleged to have occurred. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of what X told W cannot be given at the trial. (2) P had told W that the handbrake on W’s car did not work. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of that statement cannot be given by P, W or anyone else to prove that the handbrake was defective. (3) W had bought a video cassette recorder and written down its serial number on a document. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, the document is inadmissible to prove that a video cassette recorder later found in D’s possession was the video cassette recorder bought by W.

[S 59 am Act 135 of 2008; Act 125 of 1999]

NSW Act:

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59

The hearsay rule—exclusion of hearsay evidence

(1) Evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation. [Subs (1) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[16]]

(2) Such a fact is in this Part referred to as an asserted fact. (2A) For the purposes of determining under subsection (1) whether it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert a particular fact by the representation, the court may have regard to the circumstances in which the representation was made. Note: Subsection (2A) was inserted as a response to the decision of the Supreme Court of NSW in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[17]]

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of a representation contained in a certificate or other document given or made under regulations made under an Act other than this Act to the extent to which the regulations provide that the certificate or other document has evidentiary effect. [Subs (3) insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[6]] Notes: Specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are as follows: • evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose (section 60), • first-hand hearsay: – civil proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (section 63) or available (section 64)

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• • • • • • • • • • • •

– criminal proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (section 65) or available (section 66) contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc (section 66A) business records (section 69) tags and labels (section 70) electronic communications (section 71) Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (section 72) marriage, family history or family relationships (section 73) public or general rights (section 74) use of evidence in interlocutory proceedings (section 75) admissions (section 81) representations about employment or authority (section 87(2)) exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and convictions (section 92(3)) character of and expert opinion about accused persons (sections 110 and 111).

Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Examples:

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1 D is the defendant in a sexual assault trial. W has made a statement to the police that X told W that X had seen D leave a night club with the victim shortly before the sexual assault is alleged to have occurred. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of what X told W cannot be given at the trial. 2 P had told W that the handbrake on W’s car did not work. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of that statement cannot be given by P, W or anyone else to prove that the handbrake was defective. 3 W had bought a video cassette recorder and written down its serial number on a document. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, the document is inadmissible to prove that a video cassette recorder later found in D’s possession was the video cassette recorder bought by W. [S 59 am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[18]; Act 53 of 2000]

Vic Act: 59

The hearsay rule—exclusion of hearsay evidence

(1) Evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation. (2) Such a fact is in this Part referred to as an asserted fact. (2A) For the purposes of determining under subsection (1) whether it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert a particular fact by the representation, the court may have regard to the circumstances in which the representation was made. Note: Subsection (2A) was inserted as a response to the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359. Notes: 1 The Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act include another subsection. 2 Specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are as follows— • evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose (section 60) • first-hand hearsay— • civil proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (section 63) or available (section 64) • criminal proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (section 65) or available (section 66) © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc. (section 66A) • business records (section 69) • tags and labels (section 70) • electronic communications (section 71) • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (section 72) • marriage, family history or family relationships (section 73) • public or general rights (section 74) • use of evidence in interlocutory proceedings (section 75) • admissions (section 81) • representations about employment or authority (section 87(2)) • exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and convictions (section 92(3)) • character of and expert opinion about an accused (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions.

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Examples: 1 D is the accused in a sexual assault trial. W has made a statement to the police that X told W that X had seen D leave a night club with the victim shortly before the sexual assault is alleged to have occurred. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of what X told W cannot be given at the trial. 2 P had told W that the handbrake on W’s car did not work. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of that statement cannot be given by P, W or anyone else to prove that the handbrake was defective. 3 W had bought a video cassette recorder and written down its serial number on a document. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, the document is inadmissible to prove that a video cassette recorder later found in D’s possession was the video cassette recorder bought by W. [S 59 am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.10]

ACT Act: 59

The hearsay rule—exclusion of hearsay evidence

(1) Evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation. (2) For this part, a fact mentioned in subsection (1) is an asserted fact. (3) For the purposes of deciding under subsection (1) whether it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert a particular fact by the representation, the court may have regard to the circumstances in which the representation was made. Note: Subsection (3) was inserted as a response to the decision of the NSW Supreme Court in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359.

(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of a representation contained in a certificate or other document given or made under a regulation made under an Act other than this Act to the extent to which the regulation provides that the certificate or other document has evidentiary effect. Note: Specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are as follows: • evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose (s 60) • first-hand hearsay:

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Part 3.2 - Hearsay – civil proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (s 63) or available (s 64) – criminal proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (s 65) or available (s 66) • contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc (s 66A) • business records (s 69) • tags and labels (s 70) • electronic communications (s 71) • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (s 72) • marriage, family history or family relationships (s 73) • public or general rights (s 74) • use of evidence in interlocutory proceedings (s 75) • admissions (s 81) • representations about employment or authority (s 87(2)) • exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and convictions (s 92(3)) • character of and expert opinion about accused people (s 110 and s 111).

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Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Examples: 1 D is the defendant in a sexual assault trial. W has made a statement to the police that X told W that X had seen D leave a night club with the victim shortly before the sexual assault is alleged to have happened. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of what X told W cannot be given at the trial. 2 P had told W that the handbrake on W’s car did not work. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of that statement cannot be given by P, W or anyone else to prove that the handbrake was defective. 3 W had bought a video cassette recorder and written down its serial number on a document. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, the document is inadmissible to prove that a video cassette recorder later found in D’s possession was the video cassette recorder bought by W. Note: An example is part of the Act, is not exhaustive and may extend, but does not limit, the meaning of the provision in which it appears (see Legislation Act, s 126 and s 132).

NT Act: 59

The hearsay rule — exclusion of hearsay evidence

(1) Evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation. (2) Such a fact is in this Part referred to as an asserted fact. (2A) For the purposes of determining under subsection (1) whether it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert a particular fact by the representation, the court may have regard to the circumstances in which the representation was made. Note for subsection (2A): Subsection (2A) is inserted as a response to the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359.

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of a representation contained in a certificate or other document given or made under regulations made under an Act other than this Act to the extent to which the regulations provide that the certificate or other document has evidentiary effect. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Notes for subsection (3): Specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are as follows: • evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose (section 60) • first-hand hearsay: • civil proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (section 63) or available (section 64) • criminal proceedings, if the maker of the representation is unavailable (section 65) or available (section 66) • contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc. (section 66A) • business records (section 69) • tags, labels and writing (section 70) • electronic communications (section 71) • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (section 72) • marriage, family history or family relationships (section 73) • public or general rights (section 74) • use of evidence in interlocutory proceedings (section 75) • admissions (section 81) • representations about employment or authority (section 87(2)) • exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and convictions (section 92(3)) • character of and expert opinion about accused persons (sections 110 and 111).

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Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Examples for section 59: 1 D is the defendant in a sexual assault trial. W has made a statement to the police that X told W that X had seen D leave a night club with the victim shortly before the sexual assault is alleged to have occurred. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of what X told W cannot be given at the trial. 2 P had told W that the handbrake on W’s car did not work. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, evidence of that statement cannot be given by P, W or anyone else to prove that the handbrake was defective. 3 W had bought a video cassette recorder and written down its serial number on a document. Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies, the document is inadmissible to prove that a video cassette recorder later found in D’s possession was the video cassette recorder bought by W.

[EA.59.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 7.4–7.62; ALRC 38, s 54, para 126; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 684.

[EA.59.60] Differences between the provisions The Victorian provision does not include subsection (3).

[EA.59.90] General comments This provision establishes the “hearsay rule” which excludes evidence of a “previous representation” in certain circumstances, subject to exceptions created in Pt 3.2. The ALRC explained that “the proposal applies to statements and conduct – so the term ‘representation’ is used”.158 The rule applies to testimony from a witness as to the making of the previous representation and to a document insofar as it contains the previous representation. It makes no difference whether the witness testifies to a previous representation made by some other person or to 158. See ALRC 26, vol 1, para 684. See also Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60 at 599.

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[EA.59.120]

159

the witness’s own previous representation. In addition not only an assertion that a fact existed (or exists) but also a representation in the form of an “opinion” as to the existence of a fact, fall within the scope of s 59.160 There are four requirements for evidence to be caught by the hearsay rule: (a) the evidence is a “previous representation” (see [EA.59.120]); (b) the previous representation was “made by a person” (see [EA.59.150]); (c) the evidence of a previous representation is adduced to prove the existence of a fact asserted by the representation (see [EA.59.180]); and (d) it can reasonably be supposed that the person who made the representation intended to assert the existence of that fact (see [EA.59.210]).

[EA.59.120]

“previous representation”

This term is defined in the Dictionary: “previous representation” means a representation made otherwise than in the course of giving evidence in the proceeding in which evidence of the representation is sought to be adduced.

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The term “proceeding” is not defined. In Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314; [2008] FCA 369 the issue arose whether an interlocutory hearing determining an issue of privilege was the same proceeding as the subsequent trial (so that an affidavit read in the interlocutory hearing would not be a “previous representation” for the purposes of the Act). Rares J held at [27]: I am of opinion that the proper construction of the definition of “previous representation” in the Act requires that the expression “in the course of giving evidence in the proceeding in which evidence of the representation is sought to be adduced” be treated as a reference to the hearing before the judge, as defined, in which the evidence is sought to be adduced. It does not extend to other hearings or phases, including any interlocutory proceeding, in which the parties have been engaged prior to that hearing. Of course, if a matter is part heard, on the resumption of hearing it is the same proceeding for the purposes of the definition of “previous representation”. But where one can readily segregate the interlocutory or other phases of a matter from the trial, proceeding or phase in which the evidence is sought to be adduced, I am of opinion that a representation made before the current hearing is capable of being a previous representation within the meaning of that term in the Act. 159. Although, of course, the witness may be able to give direct (non-hearsay) evidence of his or her state of mind at the time of making the representation. Further, if the witness were to endorse the representation as true, the representation would be incorporated into the testimony of the witness and cease to be (if it was) hearsay: see R v Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim R 180; [1999] NSWCCA 370 (NSWCCA) at [25]. 160. See SPAR Licensing Pty Ltd v MIS QLD Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 298 ALR 69; [2012] FCA 1116 at [238]. Thus, evidence of a previous representation in the form of an opinion as to the existence of a fact may be caught by both the hearsay and opinion rules. If the hearsay rule did not apply to an assertion of “opinion”, much evidence regarded as hearsay by the common law would not be caught by the hearsay rule in the Act. There is nothing in the ALRC reports to support such an interpretation and it would be difficult to support in principle – the concerns which support the existence of a hearsay rule apply equally to second-hand (or more remote) accounts of an assertion of opinion. Nevertheless, the argument that the hearsay rule does not apply to such evidence has been advanced elsewhere: see Cross on Evidence (Butterworths, Aust ed, looseleaf service), para [46,855]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The word “representation” is also defined in the Dictionary to include: (a) an express or implied representation (whether oral or in writing); or (b) a representation to be inferred from conduct; or (c) a representation not intended by its maker to be communicated to or seen by another person; or (d) a representation that for any reason is not communicated. A “representation” would include not only an assertion that a fact existed (or exists) but also a representation in the form of an “opinion” as to the existence of a fact.161 It is clear from (b) that the term “representation” applies to conduct as well as statements. The High Court observed in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60 at [21] that the term “was used to apply to statements and to conduct and was used to encompass all that those statements or that conduct would convey to the observer”. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has held in R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701; [2002] NSWCCA 455 that the concept may extend to a communication made by silence, for example, a failure to respond to a question. In that case, a police officer asked 300 university students whether any had seen the deceased with a person driving a 1973 white Ford Fairlane. None responded to this request. The court held that evidence from the police officer of this absence of response was evidence of a “representation” by each of the students. Wood CJ at CL and Howie J stated (at [262]):

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Whether a representation does arise from the silence or non-action of a person on any particular occasion will depend upon the circumstances and, in particular, whether an inference can be drawn that the person by silence or non-action made a representation of fact, regardless of whether or not the person intended to convey the representation.

In this case, the representation inferred from the conduct of each student was that the student had not seen the deceased with such a person.

[EA.59.150]

“made by a person”

This provision only applies to a previous representation (see [EA.59.120]) “made by a person”. The word “person” is not defined in the Act. However, s 21(1) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) provides that “In any Act or instrument: … ‘person’ includes an individual, a corporation and a body corporate or politic.” It is clear that this provision does not apply to machine generated information in respect of which there is no relevant human input.162 It does not apply to evidence of animal conduct.

[EA.59.180]

A purposive rule

If evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not adduced to prove the existence of a fact asserted by the representation, it is not classified as hearsay. This reflects the common law.163 Another way of expressing this proposition is to say that evidence of a representation is not caught by the hearsay rule if it is not adduced to prove the truth of any fact asserted in the 161. See [EA.59.90]. 162. Compare Campbell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIRComm 148 at [141]–[146]. 163. Such evidence is sometimes referred to as “original evidence” to distinguish it from hearsay evidence: Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283; [1989] HCA 9 at 289 per Mason CJ;

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representation, but adduced for some other purpose. In shorthand, the evidence is adduced for a non-hearsay purpose. If the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible for that other purpose, it will be admitted (although, in a jury trial, if the evidence is not also admissible for a hearsay use, careful directions will be needed as to how the evidence can, and cannot, be used).164 Examples of previous representations not caught by the hearsay rule on this basis would be: • evidence of oral discussions and representations adduced to prove the terms of an alleged agreement;165 • in an action for defamation, evidence of a previous representation adduced to prove the contents of the alleged defamation; • evidence of threats made to a person adduced to prove that he or she was acting under duress;166 • evidence of oral representations to explain why certain conduct occurred thereafter;167 • evidence of a representation alleged to be a lie and relevant for the purpose of drawing an inference of “consciousness of guilt”;168 • evidence of a representation as to a person’s conduct adduced to prove the state of mind of a person who heard the representation;169 • evidence of the contents of a representation adduced for the purpose of drawing rational inferences, such as to the speaker’s intention, emotion, or knowledge of or belief in the facts asserted;170

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• evidence of a conversation to infer the matters being discussed;171 • evidence of a previous representation by a witness adduced to prove consistency or inconsistency with the witness’s in-court testimony (and thereby bear on the credibility of the witness); • evidence of the medical history given by a patient to a doctor adduced to prove the basis of an opinion given by the doctor;172 Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 571 per Brennan J. Where the evidence is of a previous statement, it is sometimes referred to as a “verbal act” to emphasise that the evidence is adduced to prove an event: Ratten v The Queen [1972] AC 378 at 387 per Lord Wilberforce; Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 94. 164. See, for example, R v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465; [2000] NSWCCA 83 (NSWCCA). 165. See, for example, R v Macraild (unreported, NSW CCA, Sully, Dunford, Simpson JJ, 18 December 1997). 166. Compare Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 at 970. 167. R v Georgiou (2005) 153 A Crim R 288; [2005] NSWCCA 189 at [32]–[42]; Schanker v The Queen [2018] VSCA 94 at [56]–[60]. 168. Kamleh v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 541; [2005] HCA 2 at [17]–[18]. 169. See R v Preston (unreported, NSW CCA, Handley JA, Smart, Preston JJ, 9 April 1997). 170. See Gaudron and Kirby JJ in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274 at [48]; Bull v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 443; [2000] HCA 24 at [117]–[126] (common law) per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 per McHugh J at [77]–[83]; Kamleh v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 541; [2005] HCA 2; R v Ung (2000) 112 A Crim R 344; 173 ALR 287; [2000] NSWCCA 195 (NSWCCA) at [41]–[43] per Smart AJ. See also the discussion of s 72 at [EA.72.30]. 171. Wing Cheong Li v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 419; [2010] NSWCCA 40 at [55]–[58]. 172. See R v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 at 367 (see also [EA.79.240]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• evidence of a previous representation adduced to prove that the person who made the representation had a facility to speak English;173 • evidence of a representation by a person used to infer the identity of the person;174 • evidence that A identified B as an offender, adduced not to prove that B was the offender but to determine who it was that A identified (which would be relevant if A subsequently testified that he or she had identified someone as the offender);175 • evidence that a police officer said to a suspect “I have been told that you killed X” adduced to provide the context for suspect/defendant’s answer;176 • evidence of the contents of a previous representation, adduced where a witness has testified that what is asserted in the previous representation is true (and thus adduced to establish precisely what it is that the witness asserts to be true).177 • evidence of a translation of a conversation.178 173. Bochkov v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 166 at [112].

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174. R v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 526; [2006] NSWSC 648 at [52]–[55]. 175. See R v Barbaro (2000) 112 A Crim R 551; [2000] NSWCCA 192 (NSWCCA). In Director of Public Prosecutions v Nicholls (2001) 123 A Crim R 66; [2001] NSWSC 523 at [25]–[27], Adams J suggested such evidence would also be non-hearsay on the basis that the evidence “would amount to original evidence of his own state of mind and the evidence would merely be an expression of it”. There is support for that analysis in Barbaro at [43]. See also R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 at [42]–[46]; Aouad v The Queen (2011) 207 A Crim R 411; [2011] NSWCCA 61 at [253] in relation to evidence of a computer generated (“com-fit”) image of the offender. Whether or not that view is correct, Adams J appears to be correct in Nicholls in rejecting the view of Hidden J in R v Taousanis [2001] NSWSC 74 that evidence of the act of identification of B by A would be hearsay. Conversely, if A denied identifying someone as the offender, evidence from C that A did identify someone (B) as the offender would be hearsay if adduced to prove that B was the offender. It would not be hearsay if adduced to prove inconsistency with A’s in-court testimony (with s 60 having consequential operation): see R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 (NSW CCA) at [41] per Hidden J, Spigelman CJ agreeing at [1]. Alternatively, one of the hearsay exceptions (eg, s 66) may apply: see R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 (NSW CCA) at [8]–[10] per Grove J, Spigelman CJ agreeing at [1]. 176. See R v Fairbairn [2011] ACTSC 78; 212 A Crim R 32 where words said to a person (who became the defendant in criminal proceedings) were admitted so that what was said by the defendant could be understood and given meaning (at [41]). 177. See, for example, R v Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim R 180; [1999] NSWCCA 370 (NSWCCA) at [25]. 178. Director of Public Prosecutions v BB (2010) 29 VR 110; [2010] VSCA 211 at [34]–[37]. See also Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (t/as North West Immigration Services) (1996) 140 ALR 273, Hill J at 280: “The translator does not act as a narrator but merely as a person who makes the language of one party intelligible to another as uttered. The evidence is not put forward as evidence of a representation made by the translator as to what was said by a party to the conversation, but as direct evidence of the conversation itself through the medium of the translation”. Accuracy of the translation is a necessary precondition to relevance. As Hill J pointed out: “proof of a translation will be shown by calling the translator. But that is not the exclusive means of proof. An alternative means of proving accuracy of the translation is to show that the interpreter was put forward by the person against whom the evidence is tendered as the person whom that person accepts as a translator and is admitted to be a qualified

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• evidence on a preliminary discovery application of a representation adduced to prove the reasonableness of the belief of the person who heard the representation.179

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A party claiming that the evidence of a previous representation is not being led to prove the existence of a fact asserted by the representation, but for some other purpose, will have to show that the evidence is relevant and admissible for that other purpose. In the case of R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701; [2002] NSWCCA 455, discussed at [EA.59.120], the prosecution adduced evidence that a police officer asked 300 university students whether any had seen the deceased with a person driving a 1973 white Ford Fairlane and that none had responded to this request. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that the evidence was caught by the hearsay rule if it was adduced to prove that none of the students had seen the deceased with such a person. The prosecution argued that the evidence of the response, or lack of response, to the inquiry was led “for no other purpose than to prove that no student came forward in answer to the inquiry”. In response to this argument, Wood CJ at CL and Howie J observed (at [265]–[267]): But what was the relevance of that fact, unless the jury was asked to draw from it an inference that, because the students had not seen the deceased with such a person, she had never been with such a person and, therefore, no such person existed? This appears to be the way the evidence was used by the Crown. The evidence of the inquiry made by the Superintendent was admitted as part of the general police inquiries that followed the disappearance of the deceased. This was admitted to ensure that the jury did not speculate about the extent of the police investigation into the disappearance of the deceased shortly thereafter. … But admitting evidence of the extent of police inquiries in order to avoid speculation on that subject is one thing, and admitting the response to those inquiries is quite another. … [I]n the present case, the fact that none of the students responded to the Superintendent’s inquiry was irrelevant. That fact could not “rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceedings”, see s 55 of the Act. The jury could draw no inference from the failure of the response to the inquiry by the Superintendent to support a conclusion that the deceased was not picked up from home in a white Ford Fairlane vehicle. The failure of response by any one of the students could have been a result of the fact that the student did not recall seeing the deceased at all let alone in the company of any particular person, or that the student did see the deceased in company of such a person but was not prepared to say so, for example because he or she did not wish to get involved or wanted to protect the person. The significance of the failure of response in the circumstances of this case was a matter of speculation.

[EA.59.210]

Implied assertions

In respect of the problem of “implied assertions”, this provision is a significant departure from the common law. The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 684): translator”. In accordance with s 57, it will only be necessary for the court to conclude that “it is reasonably open” to find that the translation was accurate. If there is no such evidence, the translation will be inadmissible: cf Azizi v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 325; [2012] VSCA 205 at [84]–[96]. 179. Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals v Samsung Bioepis AU Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 193, Perram J at [154]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 59

The proposal resolves the issue of whether the proposed rules should apply to implied assertions as well as express assertions, by recommending that a distinction be drawn between intended and unintended implied assertions, with the latter outside any hearsay rule.180

Prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, evidence of a previous representation made by a person was not classified as hearsay if the fact asserted by it (the existence of which the evidence is adduced to prove) was not intentionally asserted by the person making the representation. The ALRC considered that, in general, “implied” assertions, (that is, statements or conduct tendered to prove the existence of any fact impliedly, rather than expressly, asserted by that statement) would be excluded from the operation of the hearsay rule.181 Of course, even though the fact or opinion had not been expressly asserted, the person may still have intended to make the representation. In that situation, the representation would still be caught by the provision. However, in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503, concern was expressed by Spigelman CJ of the NSW Supreme Court that if the word “intended” in s 59(1)“requires some form of specific conscious advertence on the part of the assertor”, very few implied assertions would be caught by the rule (at [359]). Without expressing “a final view” he stated (at [361]):

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It is arguable that the scope of the word ‘intended’ in s 59(1) goes beyond the specific fact subjectively adverted to by the author as being asserted by the words used. It may encompass any fact which is a necessary assumption underlying the fact that the assertor does subjectively advert to.182

These observations prompted comment in ALRC 102 that, in general, implied assertions made out of court should not be caught by the hearsay rule (at paras 7.56–7.58). It was said that adoption of the view suggested by Spigelman CJ “could cause considerable practical difficulties”(at para 7.44) and “could cause disruption if adopted” (at para 7.60). It was concluded at para 7.60 that “[t]hose outcomes should be avoided by giving further definition to ‘intention’ in s 59” and at para 7.62 that “the prospect of courts adopting … the approaches explored in Hannes should be foreclosed”. As a result,183 this provision was amended by insertion of the words “it can reasonably be supposed that” after “a fact that” in s 59(1). In addition, s 59(2A) 180. The ALRC proposal was based on the approach of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence. See also Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594 at 599–600. 181. An example of an implied assertion contained in a statement would be the words “Hello X”, tendered to prove that the person spoken to was X. An example of an implied assertion by conduct would be the failure of hotel patrons to order a particular beer, tendered to prove the beer was adulterated. The present common law position in respect of implied assertions, whether by statements or conduct, is uncertain: Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283; [1989] HCA 9; Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558; Ligertwood, Australian Evidence (4th ed, Butterworths, 2004), Ch 8. 182. Dowd J agreed with this view (at [485]). Studdert J did not expressly address the issue, although he did conclude (at [478]) that the representation in question “did not pass the hearsay test imposed by s 59”. 183. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act states: “This amendment (along with a new subclause (2A)) is intended to provide further guidance on the definition of hearsay evidence under this Division and foreclose the prospect of courts adopting a different approach to

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[EA.59.210]

was inserted. ALRC 102 explained the intended purpose of these amendments (that were initially proposed in ALRC DP 69): The test proposed by the Commissions in DP 69 is external to the maker of the representation. It proceeds on the basis that ‘intention may properly be inferred from the external and objective manifestations normally taken to signify intention’. Intent or state of mind is inferred from the conduct engaged in by a person. Investigation into the subjective mindset of the representor is not required. A subjective approach requires the party opposing a finding that a fact was subjectively intended to be asserted to do battle with the intangible shadows of subjective intentions, to use Deane J’s metaphor. Proof of a subjective state of mind is very difficult, particularly if the maker of the representation is not called to give evidence. [footnotes deleted]

Similarly, the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act states at para 57: The test proceeds on the basis that intention may be properly inferred from the external and objective manifestations normally taken to signify intention. Although direct evidence of subjective intention can be considered, investigation or proof of the subjective mindset of the person who made the representation is not required.

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It is apparent that “an objective test of intention” should be applied rather than a “subjective test” (ALRC DP 69 at para 7.50). Prior to the amendment to s 59(1) following on ALRC 102, the party arguing for admission of the evidence would have to satisfy the court that the person who made the previous representation did not intend to assert the particular fact.184 Applying s 142(1), the standard of proof in respect of that fact was the balance of probabilities. Under the current formulation, the party arguing for admission of the evidence will have to satisfy the court that it could not reasonably be supposed that the person who made the previous representation intended to assert the particular fact. If a consideration of all the circumstances in which the representation was made could lead a hypothetical reasonable person to infer that the fact was intended to be asserted, then the hearsay rule applies to it. Clearly enough, the amended test imposes a heavier burden on the party contending that the evidence is not caught by the hearsay rule. The current test will result in more evidence being classified as hearsay and subject to this exclusionary rule. Although the hearsay rule established by this provision does not apply to all “implied assertions”, if the person who made the representation “can reasonably be supposed” to have intended to assert a fact implied in the representation, it will be caught by the rule.

determining the meaning of ‘intention’, such as the approaches explored in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503”. See also similar observations in the Explanatory Memoranda to the Commonwealth and New South Wales amending Acts in respect of this provision. 184. This was the basis of the reasoning of Studdert J in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503 when he concluded that the implied representation in question did not pass the hearsay test imposed by s 59 because “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, it could not be inferred that the appellant did not intend to assert by what he wrote the very matters which the appellant contends emerged from a reading of the document”: see [477]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.59.240]

s 60

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

Affidavits

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It has been held that affidavits “read” in a proceeding are not hearsay evidence.185 Rather, they are testimonial evidence in written rather than oral form. Of course, if the Evidence Act applies to the proceeding in which the affidavit is adduced, the provisions of the Act will apply to the contents of the affidavit. If an affidavit is prepared for a proceeding, but not “read”, the better view is that it should be treated like any other document containing previous representations.186 In Singh v Singh [2007] NSWSC 1357 Barrett J considered a number of affidavits where the deponents stated that he or she had read the affidavit of X and then went on to say “I agree with the contents of this affidavit”. Barrett J noted at [10] that “unqualified adoption in one witness’s affidavit of an account given on affidavit by another witness” was the subject of comment in an article published in 1992 that concluded that the evidence infringed the common law hearsay rule. Barrett J regarded this view as holding good under s 59, observing at [12] that “the problem – and it is a fundamental problem – that the witness is not unambiguously giving evidence of what he or she saw or heard ... gives rise to the hearsay difficulty”. The problem with this analysis is that the deponents who expressed agreement with what X deposed were not giving evidence of the previous representations by X. That evidence would come from X’s affidavit. They were simply asserting “agreement” with the previous representations made by X in his affidavit. Barrett J acknowledged, correctly, at [9] that “[i]n concept, I suppose, there is no difference between adopting one’s own prior statement and adopting someone else’s prior statement”, while adding that “in the latter case a more conservative approach is indicated”. Given that an affidavit is testimonial evidence in written rather than oral form, and given that it would not be regarded as hearsay evidence for a witness to testify as the deponents in this case did, the correct approach would be to hold that the evidence in this case was not caught by s 59 but to consider application of s 135, on the basis that the ambiguity in their evidence justified discretionary exclusion.

Cth Act: 60

Exception: evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose

(1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact. [Subs (1) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 items 20 and 21]

(2) This section applies whether or not the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact (within the meaning of subsection 62(2)). 185. Protective Commissioner v B (unreported, NSW SC, Hodgson J, 23 June 1997). 186. In State Bank of New South Wales v Lo [2000] NSWSC 1191 at [148]–[150], Austin J did not attempt to resolve this issue. Applying r 9(1) of Pt 38 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 he held that the affidavit could not be “used” in the proceeding (at [150]–[154]). However, it is arguable that this would not prevent it being treated like any other document for the purposes of the application of the hearsay rule (although exclusion under s 135 may be appropriate).

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Note: Subsection (2) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594. [Subs (2) insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 22]

(3) However, this section does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission. Note: The admission might still be admissible under section 81 as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is “first-hand” hearsay: see section 82. [Subs (3) insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 22] [S 60 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 60

Exception: evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose

(1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact. [Subs (1) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[19]]

(2) This section applies whether or not the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact (within the meaning of section 62(2)). Note: Subsection (2) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594.

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[Subs (2) insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[20]]

(3) However, this section does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission. Note: The admission might still be admissible under section 81 as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is “first-hand” hearsay: see section 82. [Subs (3) insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[20]] [S 60 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 60

Exception—evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose

(1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact. (2) This section applies whether or not the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact (within the meaning of section 62(2)). Note: Subsection (2) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594.

(3) However, this section does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission. Note: The admission might still be admissible under section 81 as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is “first-hand” hearsay—see section 82.

© 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.60.30]

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Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

ACT Act: 60 Exception—evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose (1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact. (2) This section applies whether or not the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact (within the meaning of section 62(2) (Restriction to first-hand hearsay)). Note: Subsection (2) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594.

(3) However, this section does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission. Note: The admission might still be admissible under s 81 as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is first-hand hearsay—see s 82.

NT Act: 60

Exception — evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose

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(1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact. (2) This section applies whether or not the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact (within the meaning of section 62(2)). Note for subsection (2): Subsection (2) is inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594.

(3) However, this section does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission. Note for subsection (3): The admission might still be admissible under section 81 as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is “first-hand” hearsay — see section 82.

[EA.60.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 7.63–7.144, 10.144–10.159; ALRC 38, s 54, paras 126, 144–145; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 334, 685.

[EA.60.60] General comments This provision does not reflect the common law. Under the common law, where evidence of a previous representation is admitted for a non-hearsay purpose, it may only be used for that purpose. It may not be used to prove the existence of an asserted fact, unless it falls within an exception to the exclusionary rule. Section 60 takes the opposite approach.187 The ALRC explained the reasoning behind the provision (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 685): Under existing law hearsay evidence that is admissible for a non-hearsay purpose is not excluded, but may not be used by the court as evidence of the facts stated. This 187. Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60 at 595.

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[EA.60.60]

involves the drawing of unrealistic distinctions. The issue is resolved by defining the hearsay rule as preventing the admissibility of hearsay evidence where it is relevant by reason only that it would affect the court’s assessment of the facts intended to be asserted. This would have the effect that evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose – eg to prove a prior consistent or inconsistent statement, or to prove the basis of the expert’s opinion – will be admissible also as evidence of the facts stated.

The ALRC then proceeded to discuss both examples of prior consistent and inconsistent statements and the basis of expert opinion (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 685): A major change made to the law, however, is to allow consistent and inconsistent statements to be used not only to assess the credibility of the witness but also as evidence of the matters stated. This is the law in Queensland and Tasmania, where prior inconsistent statements are tendered by the cross-examiner, or where prior consistent statements are tendered to meet an allegation of “fabrication” … Under the proposal, evidence by an expert of the facts on which his opinion is based will be admissible as evidence of those facts. [Footnotes deleted.]188

However, the provision is not limited to these categories. As the ALRC stated, whenever “evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose [is admitted on that basis] … [it] will be admissible also as evidence of the facts stated”. Examples of the application of this provision are: • representations which are admissible because they formed part of conversations which were relevant to prove the making of an agreement for sale and were admitted on that basis;189

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• evidence of a prior consistent statement;190 • evidence of a prior inconsistent statement;191 • evidence of the basis of an expert’s opinion.192 It is important to stress the word “admitted”. This provision will only have operative effect once evidence has been admitted in a proceeding – it has no bearing on whether the evidence is “admissible” or should be admitted in the first place (see ALRC 102 at para 7.83).193 188. This matter is discussed in greater detail in the commentary on s 79. 189. See R v Macraild (unreported, NSW CCA, Sully, Dunford, Simpson JJ, 18 December 1997). 190. See R v Singh-Bal (1997) 92 A Crim R 397. For evidence of “complaint” in a sexual assault prosecution see R v H (1997) 92 A Crim R 168 at 170–171 per Hunt CJ at CL; R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131; R v RPS (unreported, NSW CCA, No 60583 of 1996, 13 August 1997). 191. See Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60 at 601, 603–604. 192. R v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364; Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60 at 603–604; Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; [1998] FCA 1200; R v Lawson [2000] NSWCCA 214 (but note the powerful dissent of Sperling J at [101]–[108]); Moran v Amoret Installations Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 106; Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd (2001) 21 NSWCCR 389; [2001] NSWCA 25 at [70]; Guthrie v Spence (2009) 78 NSWLR 225; [2009] NSWCA 369 at [75]; Ceva Logistics (Aust) Pty Ltd v Redbro Investments Pty Ltd (2010) 24 VR 486; [2010] VSCA 26 at [142]–[143]. 193. Thus, in TB v New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1145, Campbell J excluded evidence of a patient’s history recorded in a medical report because the evidence was “not relevant for a purpose other than proof of the asserted fact” (at [8]). Campbell J considered at [9] that the evidence was rendered inadmissible by reason of the judgment in Ramsay v Watson (dealing with the common law) but the better analysis is that the evidence was rendered inadmissible by © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 60

It has been held that the word “purpose” does not mean a subjective purpose of the party seeking to adduce the evidence.194 Rather, it refers to the use to which the evidence, if admitted, would be put, as objectively ascertained. Thus, for example, evidence of a previous representation may be admitted as a prior inconsistent statement and then used (pursuant to this provision) for a hearsay use, even though the party adducing the evidence indicates that it would not adduce the evidence at all if it could not be used to prove the existence of a fact asserted in the representation.195 It follows that the approach of a NSW Supreme Court judge,196 in holding that s 60 did not apply where “the principal relevance” of the adduced evidence was as hearsay evidence rather than for a non-hearsay purpose, must be regarded as wrong.

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On the other hand, there is authority that, if a party wishes to rely on this exception to the hearsay rule, this should be made clear and a ruling should be obtained from the court that the evidence may be used for a hearsay purpose.197 Such a procedure will suggest consideration of the possible application of s 136 to limit the permissible use that may be made of the evidence (see [EA.60.120] below). In 1998, prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, the High Court held that the provision did not convert evidence of what was said, out of court, into evidence of some fact that the person speaking out of court did not intend to assert.198 Putting the proposition another way, the provision did not apply to second-hand or more remote hearsay. However, the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102 inserted s 60(2) and s 60(3). The effect of s 60(2) is to ensure that, in general, this provision does apply to second-hand or more remote hearsay (see ALRC 102 at para 7.105), while s 60(3) creates an exception for this proposition in criminal proceedings in relation to evidence of an admission (see [EA.60.90]). In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 7.65, 7.81: The intention of s 60 was to enable evidence admitted for a non-hearsay purpose to be used as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted in the representation, and to do so whether or not the evidence is first-hand or more remote hearsay, subject to the controls provided by ss 135–137. … The focus will be on the weight to be accorded to the evidence, not on admissibility.

s 59 and not saved by this provision. This point appears also to have been missed in In the matter of Re Idoport Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 524 at [60]. The evidence in that case was relevant and admissible because it was not caught by the hearsay rule in s 59, not because it was admissible pursuant to this provision. 194. R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; [1999] NSWCCA 197 at [116]. It should be noted that the High Court dismissed an appeal in this case without expressly discussing this issue: Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57. It may be assumed that the High Court found no error in the approach of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. 195. R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; [1999] NSWCCA 197 at [116]. 196. Austin J in ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 at [168]–[169]. 197. Ghebrat v The Queen (2011) 214 A Crim R 140; [2011] VSCA 299 at [47]. See also Russell v The Queen [2013] VSCA 155 at [29]–[32]. 198. Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60 at 601.

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Part 3.2 - Hearsay

[EA.60.60]

Thus, to give one example, ALRC 102 states (para 7.99) that this provision will render the hearsay rule inapplicable to the following evidence admitted as forming part of the basis of an expert opinion, notwithstanding that it involves second hand or more remote hearsay: • knowledge acquired by experts from reading the work of other experts and from discussion with them; • the reported data of fellow experts relied upon by such persons as scientists and technical experts in giving expert opinion evidence; • factual material commonly relied upon in a particular industry or trade or calling. Similarly, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Commonwealth amending Act states at para 68–9:

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[S]ection 60 was not intended to be limited to first-hand hearsay, either in relation to prior statements or in relation to the factual basis of expert evidence. New subsection 60(2) clarifies that section 60 operates to permit evidence admitted for a non-hearsay purpose to be used to prove the facts asserted in the representation, whether the evidence is first-hand or more remote hearsay. That is, whether or not the person had first hand knowledge based on something they saw, heard or otherwise perceived.199

It may be noted that the NSWLRC recommended that s 60 should be amended to provide that it did not apply to evidence “relevant to establish what facts have been assumed by the expert as a basis for the expert’s opinion” but this recommendation was not accepted (ALRC 102, paras 7.107–7.143). The conclusion reached in ALRC 102 was that this provision “does not apply to assumptions” because evidence “expressed in terms of an assumption of fact on which the expert has expressed an opinion … and not as an assertion of fact, it does not purport to assert the existence of a fact, or to repeat another person’s assertion that a fact exists” (para 7.119). Equally, it is not a “representation”. Accordingly, such an amendment was regarded as unnecessary. While this analysis might not be regarded as entirely persuasive (legal representatives of a party seeking an opinion from an expert may simply make a number of “representations” of fact and direct the expert to form the opinion on the basis of those representations200), this only highlights the importance of the discretions and mandatory exclusions in Pt 3.11, particularly s 136 (see ALRC 102 at paras 7.135–7.136): see [EA.60.120]. Of course, even if s 136 is not utilized, as Cooper J observed in Lardil Peoples v State of Queensland [2000] FCA 1548 at [26], s 60 “does not give to the hearsay evidence a weight or cogency which the circumstances do not warrant. The absence of an order under s 136 of the Act does not prevent the respondents from contending that in the circumstances of this case, the hearsay statements should be given little or no weight and should not be relied upon”. In a jury trial, careful directions to the jury may be necessary (see [EA.60.150]). 199. Explanatory Memorandum to the Evidence Amendment Bill 2008 (Cth), at paras 68–69. Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum of the NSW amending Act and the Explanatory Memorandum of the Victorian Act. 200. However, evidence of such representations may not be admitted into evidence, so that s 60 has no application. See [EA.79.270]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.60.90]

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[EA.60.90]

s 60

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

“evidence of an admission” in criminal proceedings (s 60(3))

The effect of s 60(3), inserted in an amendment to the Act following on ALRC 102, is to create, in criminal proceedings, a specific exception to the operation of s 60(1) that “would make clear that evidence of an admission, constituted by a statement which is more remote than first-hand hearsay, should be excluded from the ambit of s 60” (ALRC 102, para 10.155). As the Note to s 60(3) states, the “admission might still be admissible under section 81 as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is ‘first-hand’”. Thus, the actual outcome of the decision of the High Court in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60 is maintained. In that case, evidence was adduced from the police that a witness, C, called by the prosecution, had told them that the accused, L, had confessed to him. Evidence of the alleged confession was not admissible under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule (s 81) because the evidence of the confession was not first hand (s 82). However, the evidence of C’s representation to the police was said to be relevant to C’s credibility as a statement inconsistent with his in-court testimony (he denied that L confessed to him). Admitted on this basis it was then left to the jury as evidence that L had committed the crime with which he was charged. The High Court held that s 60 operated only upon the “representation” by C, not any representations allegedly made by L. Thus, the trial judge should have given clear directions to the jury about the limited use which could be made of the evidence of C’s representation that L had confessed or excluded the evidence entirely under s 137 (in the circumstances of the case the High Court preferred the latter course: at 604). Section 60(3) maintains this position. However, it also goes further. Even first-hand hearsay evidence of an admission, admitted for some non-hearsay use, may not be used to prove the truth of the admission pursuant to s 60(1). Such hearsay use of the admission will only be permissible if the requirements of Pt 3.4 are satisfied.201 In Power v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 261; 242 A Crim R 553; [2014] VSCA 146, Redlich JA and Robson AJA in the Victorian Court of Appeal held at [66] that s 60(3) had no application where, in the criminal trial of a single defendant, evidence of an alleged co-offender’s plea of guilty was admitted in circumstances where the co-offender was a prosecution witness. That is plainly correct – the plea of guilty by the alleged co-offender would not be an admission by the defendant (subject to the operation of s 87). As Redlich JA and Robson AJA stated, “the special character of a representation as an ‘admission’ applies only to out of court conduct of a party to the current litigation”. Of course, the fact that the plea of guilty would not be an admission (as defined) would mean that s 81(1) had no operation as an applicable hearsay rule exception. The hearsay rule would apply unless some other hearsay rule exception was operative, such as s 60(1) (where the evidence “is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact”, such as a credibility use under Pt 3.7).

[EA.60.120]

Discretion to limit use

It will not always be a desirable outcome that evidence of a previous representation admitted for a non-hearsay purpose may be relied on to prove the 201. See Tasmania v B (No 2) [2012] TASSC 39 at [15]–[16].

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Part 3.2 - Hearsay

[EA.60.150]

existence of some fact that the person who made the representation intended to assert by the representation. For example, an opposing party may be unfairly prejudiced by an inability to cross-examine the maker of the representation. In such circumstances, it may be appropriate to utilise the discretion conferred on the court by s 136.202

[EA.60.150]

Jury directions

When s 60 is applied to evidence of a previous representation in a jury trial (and s 136 is not), it is “preferable”, although not usually obligatory, that a direction be given that the evidence may be used to prove the truth of the fact or facts asserted in the representation as well as for the relevant non-hearsay purpose.203 Presumably, the jury will assume this in any event. A judge, if requested, is required to warn the jury that hearsay evidence may be unreliable: see s 165(1)(a).204 In addition, where a prior consistent statement is involved, it may well be appropriate to observe that repeating an account does not necessarily make it more reliable (although the view may be taken that this is such a self-evident proposition that no jury need be told that).205 If a ruling is made that evidence of a previous representation in a jury trial may not be used to prove the truth of the fact or facts asserted in the representation, or the party adducing the evidence concedes that the evidence is not relied upon for such a use, a direction may be necessary to the jury regarding the use that may, and may not, be made of the evidence.206

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Cth Act: 61

Exceptions to the hearsay rule dependent on competency

(1) This Part does not enable use of a previous representation to prove the existence of an asserted fact if, when the representation was made, the person who made it was not competent to give evidence about the fact because of subsection 13(1). [Subs (1) subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 23]

202. See, for example, Jango v Northern Territory (No 4) [2004] FCA 1539 at [10]. For a discussion of the possible application of s 136, see [EA.79.270], [EA.136.150], [EA.136.180]. 203. See R v Hilder (1997) 97 A Crim R 70; R v Abdallah [1999] NSWCCA 380 at [29] per Hidden J; Raimondi v The Queen [2013] VSCA 194 at [25]. 204. See, eg, R v Lozano (unreported, NSW CCA, Hunt CJ at CL, Sperling, Barr JJ, 10 June 1997), p 15. On the other hand, it was stated in R v RJC (unreported, NSW CCA, 1 October 1998) that the trial judge was “bound” to “make it clear to the jury” that evidence of a prior inconsistent statement (a “complaint”) was evidence “relevant to determining the truth of the matter(s) of which the complaint was made” (p 13). But since presumably the jury will assume this, it is arguable that such a direction would be unnecessary and potentially confusing: see R v Abdallah [1999] NSWCCA 380 at [29] per Hidden J. 205. Meagher JA in R v Kesisyan [2003] NSWCCA 259 at [11]. 206. See, for example, Christian v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 370; [2012] NSWCCA 34 at [86]–[91]; Power v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 261; 242 A Crim R 553; [2014] VSCA 146 at [78]–[80] (see also [EA.165.480]). On the other hand, there may be good reasons not to give the direction: see Raimondi v The Queen [2013] VSCA 194 at [26]–[31]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

(2) This section does not apply to a contemporaneous representation made by a person about his or her health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. Note: For the admissibility of such contemporaneous representations, see section 66A. [Subs (2) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 24]

(3) For the purposes of this section, it is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that when the representation was made the person who made it was competent to give evidence about the asserted fact. [S 61 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 61

Exceptions to the hearsay rule dependent on competency

(1) This Part does not enable use of a previous representation to prove the existence of an asserted fact if, when the representation was made, the person who made it was not competent to give evidence about the fact because of section 13(1). [Subs (1) subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[21]]

(2) This section does not apply to a contemporaneous representation made by a person about his or her health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. Note: For the admissibility of such contemporaneous representations, see section 66A.

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[Subs (2) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[22]]

(3) For the purposes of this section, it is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that when the representation was made the person who made it was competent to give evidence about the asserted fact. [S 61 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 61

Exceptions to the hearsay rule dependant on competency

(1) This Part does not enable use of a previous representation to prove the existence of an asserted fact if, when the representation was made, the person who made it was not competent to give evidence about the fact because of section 13(1). (2) This section does not apply to a contemporaneous representation made by a person about his or her health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. Note: For the admissibility of such contemporaneous representations, see section 66A.

(3) For the purposes of this section, it is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that when the representation was made the person who made it was competent to give evidence about the asserted fact.

394

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[EA.61.60]

ACT Act: 61 Exceptions to the hearsay rule dependent on competency (1) This part does not enable use of a previous representation to prove the existence of an asserted fact if, when the representation was made, the person who made it was not competent to give evidence about the fact because of section 13(1) (Competence—lack of capacity). (2) This section does not apply to a contemporaneous representation made by a person about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. Note: For the admissibility of contemporaneous representations, see s 66A.

(3) For this section, it is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that when the representation was made the person who made it was competent to give evidence about the asserted fact. NT Act: 61

Exceptions to the hearsay rule dependant on competency

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(1) This Part does not enable use of a previous representation to prove the existence of an asserted fact if, when the representation was made, the person who made it was not competent to give evidence about the fact because of section 13(1). (2) This section does not apply to a contemporaneous representation made by a person about his or her health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. Note for subsection (2): For the admissibility of such contemporaneous representations, see section 66A.

(3) For the purposes of this section, it is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that when the representation was made the person who made it was competent to give evidence about the asserted fact.

[EA.61.30] General comments This provision was included in the Act in order to ensure that the competence requirements (specifically in respect of lack of capacity: s 13) operate in respect of out-of-court representations.207 Where the person is incompetent to testify but was competent when he or she made the previous representation, this provision has no application.208

[EA.61.60] Burden and standard of proof Under s 61(3) the burden of proof is on the party arguing that the person who made the representation was not competent. In accordance with s 142(1), that 207. This provision was not expressly recommended by the ALRC. However, substantially the same effect was sought by a definitional provision: see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 686. 208. In such a situation the person is unavailable to testify under the definition of that term (see Dictionary, Pt 2, cl 4(1)(b)) and, in consequence, the requirements for admissibility of the evidence will be less than if the person was competent to testify. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.61.90]

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party will have to satisfy the court that “it has been proved on the balance of probabilities” that the person was incompetent.

[EA.61.90] Exceptions Section 61(2) provides that the competence requirements do not apply where the representation falls within the “state of mind etc” exception: s 66A. Similarly, where the representation is not adduced to prove an asserted fact or the person could not reasonably be supposed to have intended to assert the fact,209 this provision will have no application.

DIVISION 2 – FIRST-HAND HEARSAY (CTH ONLY) DIVISION 3.2.2 – FIRST-HAND HEARSAY (ACT ONLY) DIVISION 2 – “FIRST-HAND” HEARSAY (NSW, VIC AND NT)

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.30]

Summary of this Division

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The Act distinguishes first-hand from more remote hearsay. Thus, Div 2 of the Hearsay Part of the Act deals with “first-hand hearsay” and Div 3 deals with “other exceptions to the hearsay rule”. Section 62 defines “first hand hearsay” for the purposes of the Division (for an example of the distinction between first-hand and more remote hearsay, see [EA.62.60]). Division 2 is divided into five categories:210 • s 63: civil proceedings if the maker of the previous representation is not available to testify; • s 64 (and s 68): civil proceedings if the maker of the previous representation is available to testify; • s 65: criminal proceedings if the maker of the previous representation is not available to testify; • s 66: criminal proceedings if the maker of the previous representation is available to testify. • s 66A: a previous representation made by a person about his or her contemporaneous health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. Section 67 deals with requirements of notice in respect of the first three categories.

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.60]

Policy framework

The ALRC explained its approach (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 678): It is suggested that the starting point for formulating exceptions to a rule excluding hearsay evidence should be the proposition that the “best evidence available” to a party 209. That is, it is relevant for a non-hearsay purpose. See commentary on s 59. 210. The ALRC explained that its proposal for civil proceedings was developed from the approach taken in the English Civil Evidence Act 1968 and the rules made under it: ALRC 26, vol 1, para 686.

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should be received. This will assist the parties to present all relevant evidence and give the court the competing versions of the facts. In so doing, the appearance and reality of the fact-finding exercise will, on balance, be enhanced and so will the fairness of the trial process. The concept involves two elements – the quality of the evidence and its availability. The quality of hearsay evidence will vary considerably. Some categories of hearsay evidence, however, can be isolated and have been for the purposes of the proposal.

The approach that the ALRC took to remote hearsay is discussed in the commentary to Div 3 of Pt 3.2. In respect of first-hand hearsay, the ALRC stated (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 678):

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A distinction can and should be drawn between statements made during or shortly after the events to which they refer and later statements. The least unreliable account of events is likely to be that given at or shortly after the event. Experience suggests that the account of an event given shortly after the event will be more accurate than one given months or years after the event. We have all experienced the loss of memory of the detail of events. Psychological research, however, suggests that loss of memory is more dramatic than we realise and that we under-estimate the extent to which the memory is affected by a variety of distorting factors over time. It may be argued that evidence of a statement made shortly after the event will generally be the best available evidence and that any exceptions drawn should recognise this … The element of availability, however, raises at least two issues. First, where the eyewitness has died, become too ill to testify or cannot be found, his out-of-court statement will be the best evidence available of what he saw. Secondly, the availability of evidence in a practical sense depends upon the difficulty of producing it to the court. So, what is the best available evidence may depend upon a balancing of the importance and quality of evidence against the difficulty of producing it.

In addition, the ALRC explained why it distinguished civil and criminal proceedings, and between hearsay evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defence (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 679): The concern to minimise wrongful convictions requires a more cautious approach to the admission of hearsay evidence against the accused. The best available evidence for the prosecution should not necessarily be received. Where the maker is unavailable some guarantees of trustworthiness should be required (as at present in some common law and statutory exceptions). That same concern, however, reinforces, the desirability of an approach without such limitations for evidence led by the accused. In addition, the cost of producing available direct evidence for the prosecution should be regarded as an issue of minimal or little significance. The accused is entitled to confront those who accuse him and expect that he will not be convicted on hearsay evidence where a relevant witness is available.

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.90] Combining first-hand hearsay exceptions There is no provision in the Act prohibiting the combination of first-hand hearsay exceptions created by this Division and elsewhere in the Act. In theory, then, it might be possible to render more remote hearsay admissible (subject to discretionary exclusion) by combining two first-hand hearsay exceptions in respect of one item of evidence. For example, if W is asked in a civil proceeding to testify regarding what A (who is unavailable) said B had admitted, the evidence of B’s admission might be admissible notwithstanding the hearsay rule even though it is not first-hand hearsay, using a combination of s 81 and s 63. However, careful analysis reveals this is not the case. Evidence of A’s © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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representation could not be admitted as first-hand hearsay to prove that B said the words alleged and then the (first-hand) hearsay exception for admissions (s 81) relied upon to permit use of the evidence to prove the truth of what B the appellant had said. The reason is that the admissions hearsay exception only applies if evidence of the admission is “given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the admission being made; or it is a document in which the admission is made” (s 82). In this case, the evidence is to be given by W (who did not hear the admission being made).

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.120]

Discretionary exclusion

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The discretionary and mandatory exclusion provisions in Pt 3.11 (ss 135–138) may be utilised to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay evidence. The ALRC explained how this might operate in practice (ALRC 38, para 146): The Commission remains of the view that the court can and should consider the reliability of the evidence concerned in applying those discretions. The Bill does not refer to the “unreliability of the evidence” but it refers to the probative value of the evidence. Thus, for example, assume that the plaintiff has given evidence that Y said to the plaintiff that slanderous statements were made to Y about the plaintiff by the defendant. Assume the evidence is relevant to prove that the defendant did in fact make the alleged slanderous statements to Y – a hearsay purpose. The defendant wishes to have the evidence excluded and relies on the exclusionary discretion. In exercising that discretion, the trial judge can proceed on the assumption that Y made the statements. Proceeding on that basis, the judge can take account of the fact that the plaintiff’s evidence is hearsay as that will go to the probative value of the plaintiff’s evidence. The judge can also look to the surrounding circumstances in which the statement was made to the plaintiff and other matters going to the reliability of the evidence, such as how recently after the event the statement was made, whether the person who made the statement had an interest or not in the matters referred to and whether the circumstances placed some obligation on the person who made the statement to tell the truth. The reliability of the evidence is an important consideration in assessing its probative value. In addition, the reliability of the evidence, if accepted, is relevant to other matters raised by the discretion – the risk of misleading the court, confusion and undue consumption of time.

However, this view of the ALRC has not necessarily been adopted by the courts. For a general discussion of the possible application of ss 135 or 137 in this context, see [EA.135.120], [EA.137.90].

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.2.150]

Warnings

In a jury trial, s 165 requires the trial judge, if requested, to warn the jury (s 165(2)) regarding hearsay evidence (s 165(1)(a)), unless “there are good reasons for not doing so” (s 165(3)).

Cth Act: 62

Restriction to “first-hand” hearsay

(1) A reference in this Division (other than in subsection (2)) to a previous representation is a reference to a previous representation that was made by a person who had personal knowledge of an asserted fact. 398

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Part 3.2 - Hearsay

(2) A person has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if his or her knowledge of the fact was, or might reasonably be supposed to have been, based on something that the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived, other than a previous representation made by another person about the fact. (3) For the purposes of section 66A, a person has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if it is a fact about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind at the time the representation referred to in that section was made. [Subs (3) insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 25] [S 62 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 62

Restriction to “first-hand” hearsay

(1) A reference in this Division (other than in subsection (2)) to a previous representation is a reference to a previous representation that was made by a person who had personal knowledge of an asserted fact.

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(2) A person has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if his or her knowledge of the fact was, or might reasonably be supposed to have been, based on something that the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived, other than a previous representation made by another person about the fact. (3) For the purposes of section 66A, a person has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if it is a fact about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind at the time the representation referred to in that section was made. [Subs (3) insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[23]] [S 62 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 62

Restriction to “first-hand” hearsay

(1) A reference in this Division (other than in subsection (2)) to a previous representation is a reference to a previous representation that was made by a person who had personal knowledge of an asserted fact. (2) A person has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if his or her knowledge of the fact was, or might reasonably be supposed to have been, based on something that the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived, other than a previous representation made by another person about the fact. (3) For the purposes of section 66A, a person has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if it is a fact about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind at the time the representation referred to in that section was made.

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ACT Act: 62 Restriction to first-hand hearsay (1) For this division (other than in subsection (2)), a previous representation is a previous representation that was made by a person who had personal knowledge of an asserted fact. (2) A person has personal knowledge of an asserted fact if the person’s knowledge of the fact was, or might reasonably be supposed to have been, based on something that the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived, other than a previous representation made by someone else about the fact. (3) For section 66A (Exception—contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc), a person has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if it is a fact about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind at the time the representation mentioned in the section was made. NT Act: 62

Restriction to “first-hand” hearsay

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(1) A reference in this Division (other than in subsection (2)) to a previous representation is a reference to a previous representation that was made by a person who had personal knowledge of an asserted fact. (2) A person has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if his or her knowledge of the fact was, or might reasonably be supposed to have been, based on something that the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived, other than a previous representation made by another person about the fact. (3) For the purposes of section 66A, a person has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if it is a fact about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind at the time the representation referred to in that section was made.

[EA.62.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 55, paras 127, 139(a), 143(b); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 678.

[EA.62.60] General comments Division 2 of the Hearsay Part of the Act (Pt 3.2) deals with “first-hand hearsay”.211 This provision defines “first-hand hearsay” for the purposes of the Division. It requires that the person who made the previous representation had knowledge of the asserted fact which “was, or might reasonably be supposed to have been, based on something that the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived” (other than a previous representation). Consequently, the party adducing the hearsay does not have to satisfy the court that it was so based. It will be enough that it “might reasonably be supposed” to have been so based. However, it has been held that this requirement will not be satisfied “where it is at least equally possible (and there is no other indication on face of the material) 211. The one exception is s 65(3).

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[EA.62.60]

that the person may have been given the information by somebody else”.212 The gravity of the allegations against a defendant in a criminal proceeding are not relevant to the question of whether or not a person’s knowledge of an asserted fact was, or might reasonably be supported to have been, based on what the person had seen.213

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In Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in a joint judgment (Gummow J and Crennan J agreeing in separate judgments) considered the words “saw, heard or otherwise perceived” in s 78(a) and observed at [43] that one of the ordinary meanings of “perceive” is “to observe by one of the five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste or touch” (citing the first of the two meanings which the Macquarie Dictionary gives, and the third of the meanings given by the Oxford English Dictionary, for “perceive”). They considered that this meaning is supported by the use of the words “saw, heard or otherwise” before “perceived”. They also stated that it plainly has this meaning as part of a definition of “personal knowledge of a fact” in s 69(5). The same would apply in this context. Evidence of a previous representation by A that fact X occurred, where A had personal knowledge (as defined) of the fact, is first-hand hearsay that X occurred. Evidence of a previous representation by A that B said X occurred (where B had personal knowledge of the fact), is second-hand hearsay that X occurred. Evidence of a representation by A that B said that C said X occurred (where C had personal knowledge of the fact), is third-hand hearsay that X occurred. And so on. An interesting, albeit somewhat contentious, example of the distinction between first-hand hearsay and second-hand or more remote hearsay is provided by Vickers v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered a case where the appellant had been convicted of assault offences against N. The defence case was self-defence. At the trial, evidence had been admitted of a signed written statement made to investigating police by G, tendered through a police officer, T. The statement contained a number of representations made by G, initially orally to a police officer, and then in writing when, by signing the statement, he adopted them.214 One of the representations in the statement was “I heard him [the accused/ appellant] say that he was provoked in the male toilets”. Simpson J discussed this evidence at [52]: 212. Citibank Ltd v Liu [2003] NSWSC 69 at [4] per Hamilton J. See also Tasmania v Dolega [2016] TASSC 65 at [32]. 213. R v Vincent (2002) 133 A Crim R 206; [2002] NSWCCA 369 at [19]. However, cf Tasmania v Dolega [2016] TASSC 65 at [32] (see also [EA.142.60]). 214. There was no direct evidence of this, but it was assumed. As Simpson J explained in the Court of Criminal Appeal at [49]: “[T]he statement was tendered through [T], although [T] had not been present at the time the statement was taken. Sensibly, no point was taken that [T] had not seen, heard or otherwise perceived [G] making the representations; there was no issue that the statement (that is, each individual representation) had, in fact, been made to the other police officer who had accordingly seen, heard or otherwise perceived [G] making the representations, and could, accordingly, (provided that the individual representations were relevant) have given evidence to that effect. Notionally, therefore, the hearsay evidence that was given and that was admitted under s 65(2) was the evidence of [T] (standing in for the officer to whom the statement had been made) that he had heard (and/or seen) [G] make a series of representations made admissible by s 65(2).” © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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There are, in fact, two previous representations and it is important to distinguish between them. One is the representation made by [G] that he heard the appellant say that he had been provoked. That was an express oral representation made by [G] to, and heard by, the police officer who took his statement; alternatively (or additionally), it was an express written representation made by [G] and seen or perceived by the police officer who took, and witnessed, the statement. The other representation is the representation contained in the words attributed by [G] to the appellant, that he had (in fact) been provoked. On the face of [G]’s statement, this was an express oral representation made by the appellant and heard by [G]. This latter representation was relied upon by the Crown as an admission by the appellant – that is, a representation made by the appellant adverse to his interest in the outcome of the proceedings.

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Simpson J held at [54], James and Hall JJ agreeing, that the fact that the appellant said that he had been provoked (first-hand hearsay from G) was not relevant to any issue in the trial and thus inadmissible under s 56 for that use. Simpson J continued: “it was relevant only if it could also be used in proof of the truth of what the appellant had said” (that is, second-hand hearsay from G of what A said, sought to be used by the prosecution to prove the truth of what A said). It was relied upon by the prosecution for this purpose because the statement was evidence “that the appellant had struck [N] and had done so in the absence of any attack by [N] upon him” (Simpson J at [56]). However, as second-hand hearsay the evidence was inadmissible.215 Sometimes, even the most experienced judges can appear confused about the operation of Ch 3.2. An example is the judgment of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Karam v The Queen [2015] VSCA 50. In that case, the appellant (“A”) was convicted, along with a number of other person (including “H”) with a conspiracy to possess imported drugs. In the joint trial, evidence of a conversation involving H was admitted for a hearsay use against H but not against A. An appeal was brought on the ground that it should have been permitted to be used to exculpate 215. It should be noted that hearsay exceptions cannot be combined (at least in this context). Evidence of G’s representation could not be admitted as first-hand hearsay to prove that the appellant said the words alleged and then the (first-hand) hearsay exception for admissions (s 81) relied upon to permit use of the evidence to prove the truth of what the appellant had said (see James J at [10]). The reason is that the admissions hearsay exception only applies if evidence of the admission is “given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the admission being made; or it is a document in which the admission is made” (s 82). In this case, the evidence was given by T (who did not hear the admission being made) and the admission was not “made” in G’s statement. Nor could s 72 be relied upon (the appellant’s contemporaneous belief when he spoke to G that he had been provoked was not relevant; what was relevant was what happened in the toilets and his state of mind at that time). However, it should also be noted that it could be argued that use of G’s representation to prove that “the appellant had struck [N] and had done so in the absence of any attack by [N] upon him” meant that it was not caught by the hearsay rule, on the basis that both facts were implied from what the appellant said, rather than intended to be asserted by him (see [EA.59.210]). On that analysis, the evidence would be relevant (and admissible) first-hand hearsay: G’s out-of-court representation of what the appellant said would be used not to prove what the appellant intended to assert but what he impliedly asserted. The counter argument is that the implication (that “the appellant had struck [N] and had done so in the absence of any attack by [N] upon him”) depended on the assumed truth of the intended assertion (that the appellant had been provoked). If admissible for the prosecution, it is an interesting question whether the evidence would also have been available for the defence to be used to prove that the appellant was “provoked” (even though provocation is not a defence to an assault charge: cf Simpson J at [82]).

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A, on the basis that one interpretation of the conversation was that H said that A had told the organizers of the conspiracy that it could not succeed (or said to the organizers something that implied that A believed it could not succeed). The Court of Appeal observed at [52] that “[i]nadmissible hearsay remains inadmissible even if, on one view, it might be regarded as exculpatory”, citing Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1; 83 A Crim R 370; [1995] HCA 27. However, Bannon was a case dealing with the common law and s 65(8) creates a special hearsay exception for exculpatory evidence in criminal trials. The reason that provision had no application in this case was that the evidence was not first-hand hearsay. As first-hand hearsay, where H had personal knowledge of the asserted fact that A had said certain words (but no personal knowledge of the facts asserted by those words), the evidence was not relevant. The evidence of what H said was only relevant as second-hand hearsay – to prove the existence of facts asserted by A (in respect of which he had personal knowledge). Thus, there was no need for the court to consider (as it did: see footnote 11 in Karam v The Queen) the possible application of s 66A since there is no doubt this provision is intended to limit the application of s 66A to first-hand hearsay (although see [EA.62.90]). On the other hand, the Court of Appeal was correct to endorse (at [81]) the ruling of the trial judge (see [72]) that s 60 had no application. While that provision does operate in respect of second-hand hearsay (see s 60(2)), the evidence of the previous representation by A had not been admitted in A’s trial – it had only been admitted in the trial of H (that is, the evidence of the previous representation by H. which in turn evidenced the previous representation by A, had been admitted only in the trial of H).

[EA.62.90] “personal knowledge of the asserted fact” for the purposes of s 66A (s 62(3)) Section 66A, inserted in the Act as part of the amendments following on ALRC 102, was originally s 72, an exception to the hearsay rule that applied (on its face) to both first-hand and more remote hearsay. Under that provision, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made by a person if the representation was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. The intention behind s 62(3), in combination with s 62(1), is to ensure that s 66A applies only to first-hand hearsay. In fact, read literally, they do not achieve that goal. Section 62(1) requires that the “previous representation” have been made by a person who had personal knowledge of an asserted fact, with s 62(3) limiting the precise knowledge to the terms of s 66A. However, s 66A already implicitly requires this, since the representation is about the representor’s own health, etc. It is the term “evidence of a previous representation” in s 66A that creates the remote hearsay problem. Read literally, W could give “evidence of” a previous representation made by A, by recounting what he had been told by X that A had said. In Mid-City Skin Cancer & Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak [2006] NSWSC 615, Campbell J came close to limiting the former s 72 to first-hand hearsay by a narrow interpretation of the word “evidence” (see at [11]–[13]). It is now abundantly clear that the legislative intention is that s 66A should be limited to first-hand hearsay (see ALRC 102, paras 8.171–8.174). The courts should give effect to that intention, pending amendment to put the matter beyond doubt.

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Cth Act: 63 Exception: civil proceedings if maker not available (1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to: (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Note 1: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. Note 2: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [Subs (2) am Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 11] [S 63 am Act 125 of 1999]

NSW Act: 63

Exception: civil proceedings if maker not available

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(1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to: (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, or (b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Notes: 1 Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. 2 Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [Subs (2) am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[7]] [S 63 am Act 53 of 2000]

Vic Act: 63

Exception—civil proceedings if maker not available

(1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to— (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Notes:

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1 Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. 2 Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons.

ACT Act: 63

Exception—civil proceedings if maker not available

(1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to— (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Note 1: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. Note 2: The dictionary, pt 2, s 4 is about the availability of people.

NT Act: 63

Exception — civil proceedings if maker not available

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(1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to: (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Notes for subsection (2): 1 Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. 2 Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons.

[EA.63.30] ALRC references ALRC 38 s 56, paras 127(a), 143(c); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 682, 686–687.

[EA.63.60] General comments The effect of this provision is that first-hand hearsay in oral216 or documentary217 form is not excluded by the hearsay rule in civil proceedings where the person who made the representation is not available to give evidence (about a fact he or she intended to assert by the representation).218 216. See Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 at [168]–[173]. Of course, “oral” testimony may extend to affidavit evidence. 217. Only first-hand hearsay in the document falls within the first part of s 63(2)(b), since it only applies to that part of the document which contains a previous representation defined in s 62(1) so as to limit it to first-hand hearsay: confirmed by Barrett J in Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598; [2009] NSWSC 769 at [42]. See also Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Definitions

“Civil proceeding” is defined in the Dictionary to mean “a proceeding other than a criminal proceeding”. A “criminal proceeding” is also defined in the Dictionary (see commentary at [EA.Dict.Pt.1.60]). The term “previous representation” is defined in s 62(1) to limit the application of s 63 first-hand hearsay. Clause 4 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary deals with the unavailability of persons. Under cl 4(2), if a person does not fall within one of the listed categories of unavailability, “the person is taken to be available to give evidence about the fact”. Commentary on that clause is found in the Dictionary. Finally, the term “asserted fact” is defined in s 59. It means that s 63 only applies in respect of evidence defined as hearsay under s 59.

[EA.63.100]

“evidence of the representation that is given by a person” (s 63(2)(a))

A witness reading aloud a document pursuant to s 32(3) is still “giving evidence” of a representation recorded in that document for the purposes of this hearsay exception even if the witness has no existing memory of the representation recorded in the document.219

[EA.63.120]

Documentary extension (s 63(2)(b))

The effect of s 63(2)(b) is that not only the representation in the document is not excluded by the hearsay rule but also any other “representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation”.220

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[EA.63.150]

Notice requirements

Section 67, discussed below, imposes notice requirements in respect of evidence sought to be adduced under this provision.

[EA.63.180]

Request to produce documents or call witnesses

Section 167 permits a party to “make a reasonable request to another party for the purpose of determining a question that relates to: (a) a previous representation”. The procedure is prescribed in Pt 4.6 Div 1. It should be noted that, under s 166(f) a “request” may include a request to another party to call as a witness the Ltd [2015] VSC 582 at [166]; Nichia Corporation v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2016) 240 FCR 13; [2016] FCA 466 at [18]–[19]. Under s 62(1) the previous representation must be “made” by a person and cl 6 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary deals with how a representation contained in a document is taken to have been made by a person. For an example of the application of these provisions, see Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (No 2) (2000) 181 ALR 108 at [21]–[22] per Heerey J. 218. Of course, that does not necessarily make it admissible – it may be excluded under another rule or in the exercise of judicial discretion. 219. CSR Ltd v Amaca Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 320 at [86]. If the document recounts the making of a representation, the evidence of that representation would be second-hand hearsay evidence (of that representation). Conversely, the evidence from the witness reading the document aloud pursuant to s 32(3) would be first-hand evidence of the making of the representation. 220. It is suggested that it would be “reasonably necessary” to refer to a representation in order to understand another representation where the first representation may reasonably be regarded as qualifying or explaining the latter representation.

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[EA.63.240]

person who made the previous representation. However, the unavailability of the person would provide “reasonable cause” for non-compliance with such a request: s 169(4).

[EA.63.210]

Credibility evidence

Section 108A permits a party against whom hearsay evidence has been admitted, without the maker of the previous representation being called, to tender evidence relevant to the credibility of the person who made the previous representation. Section 108B imposes further restrictions on admission of such evidence where the person who made the representation is a defendant in criminal proceedings.

[EA.63.240]

Proof by affidavit or written statement (Division 2 of Part 4.6)

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Evidence of a fact that is “to be proved in relation to a document or thing” under s 63, may (in accordance with Div 2 of Pt 4.6) be given by a person permitted under s 171 to give such evidence – by affidavit or, if the evidence relates to a public document (see Dictionary), by a written statement. The evidence may include evidence based on the knowledge and belief of the person who gives it, or on information that that person has: s 172. A copy of the affidavit or statement must be served on each party a reasonable time before the hearing of the proceeding: s 173(1). The party who tenders the affidavit or statement must, if another party so requests, call the deponent or person who made the statement to give evidence but need not otherwise do so: s 173(2).

Cth Act: 64

Exception: civil proceedings if maker available

(1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to: (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation; if it would cause undue expense or undue delay, or would not be reasonably practicable, to call the person who made the representation to give evidence. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. Section 68 is about objections to notices that relate to this subsection. [Subs (2) am Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 12]

(3) If the person who made the representation has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by: (a) that person; or

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(b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made. [Subs (3) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 items 26 and 27]

(4) A document containing a representation to which subsection (3) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination in chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [S 64 am Act 135 of 2008; Act 125 of 1999]

NSW Act: 64

Exception: civil proceedings if maker available

(1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to: (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, or (b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation, if it would cause undue expense or undue delay, or would not be reasonably practicable, to call the person who made the representation to give evidence.

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Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. Section 68 is about objections to notices that relate to this subsection. [Subs (2) am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[8]]

(3) If the person who made the representation has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by: (a) that person, or (b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made. [Subs (3) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[24]]

(4) A document containing a representation to which subsection (3) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination in chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [S 64 am Act 46 of 2007; Act 53 of 2000]

Vic Act: 64

Exception—civil proceedings if maker available

(1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to— (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or 408

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(b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation— if it would cause undue expense or undue delay, or would not be reasonably practicable, to call the person who made the representation to give evidence. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. Section 68 is about objections to notices that relate to this subsection.

(3) If the person who made the representation has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by— (a) that person; or (b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made. (4) A document containing a representation to which subsection (3) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination in chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons.

ACT Act: 64

Exception—civil proceedings if maker available

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(1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to— (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation; if it would cause undue expense or undue delay, or would not be reasonably practicable, to call the person who made the representation to give evidence. Note 1: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. Note 2: Section 68 is about objections to notices that relate to this subsection.

(3) If the person who made the representation has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by— (a) the person; or (b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made. (4) A document containing a representation to which subsection (3) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination-in-chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note: The dictionary, pt 2, s 4 is about the availability of people.

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[EA.64.30]

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NT Act: 64 Exception — civil proceedings if maker available (1) This section applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to: (a) evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation; if it would cause undue expense or undue delay, or would not be reasonably practicable, to call the person who made the representation to give evidence. Note for subsection (2): Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. Section 68 is about objections to notices that relate to this subsection.

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(3) If the person who made the representation has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by: (a) that person; or (b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made. (4) A document containing a representation to which subsection (3) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination in chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note for section 64: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons.

[EA.64.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 57, paras 127(b), 139(a); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 686, 688.

[EA.64.60] General comments The effect of this provision is that, in a number of specified situations, first-hand hearsay in oral or documentary form is not excluded by the hearsay rule in civil proceedings where the person who made the representation is available to give evidence (about a fact he or she intended to assert by the representation).

[EA.64.90] Definitions The definitions of “civil proceeding” and “criminal proceeding” were noted in the commentary on s 63. The term “previous representation” is defined in s 62(1) to limit the application of s 64 to first-hand hearsay. Clause 4 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary deals with the unavailability of persons. Under cl 4(2), if a person does not fall within one of the listed categories of unavailability, “the person is taken to be available to give evidence about the fact”. The term “asserted fact” is defined in s 59. It means that s 64 only applies in respect of evidence defined as hearsay under s 59. Where the person who made the representation is not identified (but is nonetheless “available to give evidence” because it has not been 410

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[EA.64.150]

established that the person is “not available” pursuant to Cl 4 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary), it may be difficult to establish any of the requirements under this provision.221

[EA.64.120]

Section 64(2): general comments

The effect of this provision is that first-hand hearsay in oral or documentary222 form is not excluded by the hearsay rule223 if “it would cause undue expense or undue delay, or would not be reasonably practicable, to call the person who made the representation to give evidence”. The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 688): It is intended that in civil trials the problem of whether a party should or should not have to call the maker of the previous representation who is available should be resolved so far as possible by the parties. The proposal has the effect that evidence of the previous representation, whenever made, may be given in evidence if notice is given to the other party and no objection is taken, or if the court grants leave. The judge may refuse to grant leave but reserve the question of costs. Rules of court enable leave of the court to be obtained prior to trial. The proposal also enables application to be made at the trial, where notice of objection is given for leave to tender the evidence without calling the maker of the previous representation.

It has been held that the provision may operate even if the person who made the representation is called to give evidence.224

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[EA.64.150]

Section 64(2): “undue expense or undue delay”

The word “undue” imports a broad discretion. Relevant considerations would include the nature of the proceedings and the various considerations listed in the general discretionary provisions: ss 135 and 192.225 In respect of the term “undue expense” it has been observed226 that relevant matters would include: … the actual cost of securing the attendance of the witness; a comparison of that cost with the value of what is at stake in the litigation; and an assessment of the importance of the evidence the witness might give.

Similarly, the length of any delay must be compared against the overall length of the proceeding, taking into account the importance of the evidence in question 221. See, for example, Daniels v State of Western Australia (2000) 173 ALR 51; [2000] FCA 413 at [21]. 222. Only first-hand hearsay in the document falls within the first part of s 64(2)(b), since it only applies to that part of the document which contains a previous representation defined in s 62(1) so as to limit it to first-hand hearsay. Under s 62(1) the previous representation must be “made” by a person and cl 6 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary deals with how a representation contained in a document is taken to have been made by a person. For an example of the application of these provisions, see Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (No 2) (2000) 181 ALR 108 at [21]–[22] per Heerey J. 223. Of course, that does not necessarily make it admissible – it may be excluded under another rule or in the exercise of judicial discretion. 224. Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41–650. However, Lindgren J held that it would not cause undue expense or delay for the persons to testify as to matters in their representations. 225. For a discussion of this requirement, see ACCC v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41-650. 226. Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (No 2) (2000) 181 ALR 108 at [25] per Heerey J; see also De Rose v South Australia (No 4) [2001] FCA 1616 at [11] per O’Loughlin J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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and the extent to which it is disputed. In Council of the New South Wales Bar Assn v Franklin [2014] NSWCA 329 the NSW Court of Appeal held at [21] that it would cause “unwarranted expense and delay” to call six witnesses to give evidence orally when transcript of their earlier evidence (including crossexamination by the same opposing party) was available and the veracity or the reliability of the proposed evidence was not significantly challenged. It would be relevant to consider the availability of alternatives to calling the person to give evidence, such as the use of video technology.228

[EA.64.180]

Section 64(2): “not be reasonably practicable”

Considerations that would bear on this issue would include the location of the person, their age and medical condition, the cost of calling them to give evidence, any delay in the proceeding which would be caused, the importance of the evidence and the extent to which it is disputed.229Also relevant would be the willingness of the person to give evidence, either in person or by some other alternative.230 In Council of the New South Wales Bar Assn v Franklin [2014] NSWCA 329 the NSW Court of Appeal held at [20] that the opinion of a person’s treating psychiatrist that if she had to give evidence about the relevant events again it would “seriously affect her psychiatric stability” and “lead to an exacerbation of her condition with worsening of anxiety and PTSD” justified the conclusion “that it is not reasonably practicable to call her: both because of her infirmity and because, it might be inferred, she would be unwilling to give evidence”.

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[EA.64.210]

Section 64(2)(b): documentary extension

The effect of s 64(2)(b) is that not only the representation in the document is not excluded by the hearsay rule but also any other “representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation”.231

[EA.64.240]

Section 64(2): notice requirements

Section 67, discussed below, imposes notice requirements in respect of evidence sought to be adduced under this provision. For an example of the application of those requirements in respect of this provision, see Council of the New South Wales Bar Assn v Franklin [2014] NSWCA 329 at [17].

[EA.64.270]

Section 64(2): objection by another party

Under s 68, another party may object to the tender of hearsay evidence. It provides a procedure to determine, at or before the hearing, whether a party in 227. De Rose v South Australia (No 4) [2001] FCA 1616 at [13] per O’Loughlin J. See also Campaign Master (UK) Ltd v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 181 FCR 152; [2009] FCA 1306. 228. Citibank Ltd v Liu [2003] NSWSC 69 at [6] per Hamilton J; Wilson v Mitchell (No 2) [2014] VSC 332 at [20]. 229. De Rose v South Australia (No 4) [2001] FCA 1616 at [15]–[16] per O’Loughlin J. 230. Citibank Ltd v Liu [2003] NSWSC 69 at [8] per Hamilton J. 231. It is suggested that it would be “reasonably necessary” to refer to a representation in order to understand another representation where the first representation may reasonably be regarded as qualifying or explaining the latter representation.

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[EA.64.300]

civil proceedings is to be permitted to adduce evidence of a first-hand hearsay representation under s 64(2). Objection must be made not later than 21 days after notice has been given of the intention to adduce the evidence. The court may order that the evidence be admitted under s 190, notwithstanding non-compliance with the Act’s requirements.

[EA.64.300]

Section 64(3): general comments

The effect of this provision is that first-hand hearsay in oral or documentary form is not excluded by the hearsay rule in civil proceedings where the person who made the representation “has been or is to be called to give evidence”. Prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, this provision required that the representation had to be made at a time when the occurrence of the asserted fact “was fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation”. However, in ALRC 102 it was recommended that this requirement be deleted (at para 8.15). It stated: [I]n practice the requirement of freshness in memory is not considered an important touchstone of evidentiary reliability. While the original policy distinction was designed to put the “best evidence” before the court, practical experience suggests that any difference in the quality of hearsay evidence that satisfies the fresh in memory requirement and evidence that does not is slight. Further, the difference can be dealt with as a matter of the weight given to the evidence, or in exercise of the provisions in Part 3.11.232

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Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act: The effect of this item is to remove the requirement that the exception only applies if the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation at the time when the representation was made. The Report considered that, in practice, the requirement of freshness in memory is not considered an important indicator of evidentiary reliability. However, the court may still take this factor into account in determining the weight to be given to the evidence, and whether to exclude or limit the use of the evidence under sections 135 through 137.233

In Osborne Metal Industries v Bullock (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 636 the question arose whether this provision applied where the person who made the representation had testified, had not given any evidence of the representation, the evidence of the representation was proposed to be adduced by tendering a document after the person had left the witness box, and no offer was made to recall the person to the witness box to allow him to be cross-examined about the representation. McDougall J held that the provision did not apply in that situation (notwithstanding that the person, in one sense, “has been … called to give evidence”), bearing in mind that s 64(1) indicates that the area of its operation is that “a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact”.234 232. See s 64(4) and [EA.64.330]. 233. Explanatory Memorandum to the Evidence Amendment Bill 2008 (Cth), at para 81. Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum of the NSW amending Act. 234. At [26]. McDougall J added at [27] that, if he was “wrong in that construction”, the fact that the person was unavailable, and could not be tested on the representations in the document, was a powerful reason for refusing, in the exercise of the general discretion given by s 135, to admit © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.64.330]

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Section 64(4): documents

Although s 64(3) does not refer expressly to “a document so far as it contains the representation”, in contrast with s 63(2) and 64(2), 64(4) makes it clear that the hearsay exception in s 64(3) may apply to a document containing such a representation. Presumably, the person who made the representation in the document would give evidence that he or she made the representation contained in the document. Alternatively, another person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made in the document would give evidence of this. The document would then be admitted into evidence to prove the representation. However, s 64(4) provides that the document may not be tendered until the conclusion of the examination-in-chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court otherwise orders (see s 192 in respect of a court giving leave). The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 688): This proposal is derived from the English Civil Evidence Act 1968. Without it a witness could simply tender his previous statement in evidence in chief and give no oral evidence. It is restricted to written statements.

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The term “document” is defined broadly in the Dictionary to the Act. Further, cl 8 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides that a reference in the Act “to a document includes a reference to: (a) any part of the document”. Accordingly, careful analysis may be required of each part of a document to determine whether it contains a “previous representation … about an asserted fact” by the person who “has been … called to give evidence” (where s 62 restricts “previous representation” to first-hand hearsay and s 59(2) defines an “asserted fact” to mean a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person who made the previous representation intended to assert by the representation).235 There is no express reference to “another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation” (again in contrast with ss 63(2) and 64(2)). However, that would appear unnecessary. The hearsay rule in s 59 would not apply to other representations sought to be used for the purpose of understanding the previous representation admitted under this provision – such representations are not being admitted “to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation” (see [EA.59.180]). Any representation admitted for such a purpose could then be used for a hearsay purpose (s 60), subject to the operation of s 136. This analysis would indicate that ss 63(2)(b) and 64(2)(b) are unnecessary.

[EA.64.360]

Proof by affidavit or written statement (Division 2 of Part 4.6)

Evidence of a fact that is “to be proved in relation to a document or thing” under s 64, may (in accordance with Div 2 of Pt 4.6) be given by a person permitted the document. In Ying Mui Pty Ltd v Frank Kiang Ngan Hoh (Ruling No 2) [2016] VSC 531, the person who allegedly made the representation had testified without giving evidence of the representation but could be recalled to be cross-examined about it. In those circumstances, Vickery J ruled at [14]–[18] that the person was “available” to give evidence about the representation and the provision applied. 235. See, for example, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Geary (Ruling No 3) [2015] VSC 656.

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[EA.64.420]

under s 171 to give such evidence – by affidavit or, if the evidence relates to a public document (see Dictionary), by a written statement. The evidence may include evidence based on the knowledge and belief of the person who gives it, or on information that that person has: s 172. A copy of the affidavit or statement must be served on each party a reasonable time before the hearing of the proceeding: s 173(1). The party who tenders the affidavit or statement must, if another party so requests, call the deponent or person who made the statement to give evidence but need not otherwise do so: s 173(2).

[EA.64.390]

Request to produce documents or call witnesses

Section 167 permits a party to “make a reasonable request to another party for the purpose of determining a question that relates to: (a) a previous representation”. The procedure is prescribed in Div 1 of Pt 4.6. It should be noted that, under s 166(f), a “request” may include a request to another party to call as a witness the person who made the previous representation.

[EA.64.420]

Credibility evidence

Section 108A permits a party against whom hearsay evidence has been admitted, without the maker of the previous representation being called, to tender evidence relevant to the credibility of the person who made the previous representation.

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65

Exception: criminal proceedings if maker not available

(1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, if the representation: (a) was made under a duty to make that representation or to make representations of that kind; or (b) was made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication; or (c) was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable; or (d) was: (i) against the interests of the person who made it at the time it was made; and (ii) made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. [Subs (2) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 items 28–30]

(3) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made in the course of giving evidence in an Australian or overseas proceeding © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 65

if, in that proceeding, the defendant in the proceeding to which this section is being applied: (a) cross-examined the person who made the representation about it; or (b) had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the representation about it. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection.

(4) If there is more than one defendant in the criminal proceeding, evidence of a previous representation that: (a) is given in an Australian or overseas proceeding; and (b) is admitted into evidence in the criminal proceeding because of subsection (3); cannot be used against a defendant who did not cross-examine, and did not have a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine, the person about the representation.

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(5) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), a defendant is taken to have had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine a person if the defendant was not present at a time when the cross-examination of a person might have been conducted but: (a) could reasonably have been present at that time; and (b) if present could have cross-examined the person. (6) Evidence of the making of a representation to which subsection (3) applies may be adduced by producing a transcript, or a recording, of the representation that is authenticated by: (a) the person to whom, or the court or other body to which, the representation was made; or (b) if applicable, the registrar or other proper officer of the court or other body to which the representation was made; or (c) the person or body responsible for producing the transcript or recording. (7) Without limiting paragraph (2)(d), a representation is taken for the purposes of that paragraph to be against the interests of the person who made it if it tends: (a) to damage the person’s reputation; or (b) to show that the person has committed an offence for which the person has not been convicted; or (c) to show that the person is liable in an action for damages. (8) The hearsay rule does not apply to: (a) evidence of a previous representation adduced by a defendant if the evidence is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document tendered as evidence by a defendant so far as it contains a previous representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. [Subs (8) am Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 13]

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(9) If evidence of a previous representation about a matter has been adduced by a defendant and has been admitted, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of another representation about the matter that: (a) is adduced by another party; and (b) is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the other representation being made. Note: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [S 65 am Act 135 of 2008; Act 125 of 1999]

NSW Act: 65

Exception: criminal proceedings if maker not available

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(1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, if the representation: (a) was made under a duty to make that representation or to make representations of that kind, or (b) was made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication, or (c) was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable, or (d) was: (i) against the interests of the person who made it at the time it was made, and (ii) made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. [Subs (2) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[25]–[27]]

(3) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made in the course of giving evidence in an Australian or overseas proceeding if, in that proceeding, the defendant in the proceeding to which this section is being applied: (a) cross-examined the person who made the representation about it, or (b) had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the representation about it. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection.

(4) If there is more than one defendant in the criminal proceeding, evidence of a previous representation that: (a) is given in an Australian or overseas proceeding, and (b) is admitted into evidence in the criminal proceeding because of subsection (3), cannot be used against a defendant who did not cross-examine, and did not have a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine, the person about the representation. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(5) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), a defendant is taken to have had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine a person if the defendant was not present at a time when the cross-examination of a person might have been conducted but: (a) could reasonably have been present at that time, and (b) if present could have cross-examined the person. (6) Evidence of the making of a representation to which subsection (3) applies may be adduced by producing a transcript, or a recording, of the representation that is authenticated by: (a) the person to whom, or the court or other body to which, the representation was made, or (b) if applicable, the registrar or other proper officer of the court or other body to which the representation was made, or (c) the person or body responsible for producing the transcript or recording.

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(7) Without limiting subsection (2)(d), a representation is taken for the purposes of that subsection to be against the interests of the person who made it if it tends: (a) to damage the person’s reputation, or (b) to show that the person has committed an offence for which the person has not been convicted, or (c) to show that the person is liable in an action for damages. (8) The hearsay rule does not apply to: (a) evidence of a previous representation adduced by a defendant if the evidence is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, or (b) a document tendered as evidence by a defendant so far as it contains a previous representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. [Subs (8) am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[9]]

(9) If evidence of a previous representation about a matter has been adduced by a defendant and has been admitted, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of another representation about the matter that: (a) is adduced by another party, and (b) is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the other representation being made. Note: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [S 65 am Act 46 of 2007; Act 53 of 2000]

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Vic Act: 65 Exception—criminal proceedings if maker not available (1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, if the representation— (a) was made under a duty to make that representation or to make representations of that kind; or (b) was made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication; or (c) was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable; or (d) was— (i) against the interests of the person who made it at the time it was made; and (ii) made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable.

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Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection.

(3) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made in the course of giving evidence in an Australian or overseas proceeding if, in that proceeding, the accused in the proceeding to which this section is being applied— (a) cross-examined the person who made the representation about it; or (b) had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the representation about it. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. [Subs (3) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.11]

(4) If there is more than one accused in the criminal proceeding, evidence of a previous representation that— (a) is given in an Australian or overseas proceeding; and (b) is admitted into evidence in the criminal proceeding because of subsection (3)— cannot be used against an accused who did not cross-examine, and did not have a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine, the person about the representation. [Subs (4) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.12]

(5) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), an accused is taken to have had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine a person if the accused was not present at a time when the cross-examination of a person might have been conducted but— (a) could reasonably have been present at that time; and (b) if present could have cross-examined the person. [Subs (5) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.13] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(6) Evidence of the making of a representation to which subsection (3) applies may be adduced by producing a transcript, or a recording, of the representation that is authenticated by— (a) the person to whom, or the court or other body to which, the representation was made; or (b) if applicable, the registrar or other proper officer of the court or other body to which the representation was made; or (c) the person or body responsible for producing the transcript or recording.

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(7) Without limiting subsection (2)(d), a representation is taken for the purposes of that subsection to be against the interests of the person who made it if it tends— (a) to damage the person’s reputation; or (b) to show that the person has committed an offence for which the person has not been convicted; or (c) to show that the person is liable in an action for damages. (8) The hearsay rule does not apply to— (a) evidence of a previous representation adduced by an accused if the evidence is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document tendered as evidence by an accused so far as it contains a previous representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection. [Subs (8) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.14]

(9) If evidence of a previous representation about a matter has been adduced by an accused and has been admitted, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of another representation about the matter that— (a) is adduced by another party; and (b) is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the other representation being made. Note: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [Subs (9) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.15] [S 65 am Act 68 of 2009]

ACT Act: 65

Exception—criminal proceedings if maker not available

(1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, if the representation— (a) was made under a duty to make that representation or to make representations of that kind; or 420

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(b) was made when or shortly after the asserted fact happened and in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication; or (c) was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable; or (d) was— (i) against the interests of the person who made it at the time it was made; and (ii) made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection.

(3) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made in the course of giving evidence in an Australian or overseas proceeding if, in the proceeding, the defendant in the proceeding to which this section is being applied— (a) cross-examined the person who made the representation about it; or (b) had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the representation about it.

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Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection.

(4) If there is more than 1 defendant in the criminal proceeding, evidence of a previous representation that— (a) is given in an Australian or overseas proceeding; and (b) is admitted into evidence in the criminal proceeding because of subsection (3); cannot be used against a defendant who did not cross-examine, and did not have a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine, the person about the representation. (5) For subsection (3) and subsection (4), a defendant is taken to have had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine a person if the defendant was not present at a time when the cross-examination of a person might have been conducted but— (a) could reasonably have been present at the time; and (b) if present could have cross-examined the person. (6) Evidence of the making of a representation to which subsection (3) applies may be presented by producing a transcript, or a recording, of the representation that is authenticated by— (a) the person to whom, or the court or other body to which, the representation was made; or (b) if applicable, the registrar or other proper officer of the court or other body to which the representation was made; or (c) the entity responsible for producing the transcript or recording. (7) Without limiting subsection (2)(d), a representation is taken for subsection (2)(d) to be against the interests of the person who made it if it tends— (a) to damage the person’s reputation; or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) to show that the person has committed an offence for which the person has not been convicted; or (c) to show that the person is liable in an action for damages. (8) The hearsay rule does not apply to— (a) evidence of a previous representation presented by a defendant if the evidence is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document tendered as evidence by a defendant so far as it contains a previous representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Note: Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection.

(9) If evidence of a previous representation about a matter has been presented by a defendant and has been admitted, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of another representation about the matter that— (a) is presented by another party; and (b) is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the other representation being made. Note: The dictionary, pt 2, s 4 is about the availability of people.

NT Act:

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65

Exception — criminal proceedings if maker not available

(1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, if the representation: (a) was made under a duty to make that representation or to make representations of that kind; or (b) was made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication; or (c) was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable; or (d) was: (i) against the interests of the person who made it at the time it was made; and (ii) made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable. Note for subsection (2): Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection.

(3) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made in the course of giving evidence in an Australian or overseas proceeding if, in that proceeding, the defendant in the proceeding to which this section is being applied: (a) cross-examined the person who made the representation about it; or 422

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(b) had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the representation about it. Note for subsection (3): Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection.

(4) If there is more than one defendant in the criminal proceeding, evidence of a previous representation that: (a) is given in an Australian or overseas proceeding; and (b) is admitted into evidence in the criminal proceeding because of subsection (3); cannot be used against a defendant who did not cross-examine, and did not have a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine, the person about the representation.

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(5) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), a defendant is taken to have had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine a person if the defendant was not present at a time when the cross-examination of a person might have been conducted but: (a) could reasonably have been present at that time; and (b) if present could have cross-examined the person. (6) Evidence of the making of a representation to which subsection (3) applies may be adduced by producing a transcript, or a recording, of the representation that is authenticated by: (a) the person to whom, or the court or other body to which, the representation was made; or (b) if applicable, the registrar or other proper officer of the court or other body to which the representation was made; or (c) the person or body responsible for producing the transcript or recording. (7) Without limiting subsection (2)(d), a representation is taken for the purposes of that subsection to be against the interests of the person who made it if it tends: (a) to damage the person’s reputation; or (b) to show that the person has committed an offence for which the person has not been convicted; or (c) to show that the person is liable in an action for damages. (8) The hearsay rule does not apply to: (a) evidence of a previous representation adduced by a defendant if the evidence is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or (b) a document tendered as evidence by a defendant so far as it contains a previous representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation. Note for subsection (8): Section 67 imposes notice requirements relating to this subsection.

(9) If evidence of a previous representation about a matter has been adduced by a defendant and has been admitted, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of another representation about the matter that: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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is adduced by another party; and is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the other representation being made.

Note for section 65: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons.

[EA.65.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 8.38–8.65; ALRC 38, s 58, paras 128(a), 139(b), 143(d); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 691–692.

[EA.65.60] General comments The effect of this provision is that, in a number of specified situations, first-hand hearsay in oral or documentary form is not excluded by the hearsay rule in criminal proceedings where the person who made the representation is not available to give evidence (about a fact he or she intended to assert by the representation).236 In Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32, the High Court explained at [57] that the focus must be on the particular representation:

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It can be seen that the application of s 65(2) proceeds upon the assumption that a party is seeking to prove a particular fact relevant to an issue in the case. It then requires the identification of the particular representation to be adduced in evidence as proof of that fact. The circumstances in which that representation was made may then be considered in order to determine whether the conditions of admissibility are met. This process must be observed in relation to each relevant fact sought to be proved by tendering evidence under s 65.

The High Court explained at [61] that such an approach, focused upon the particular representation tendered to prove a particular fact in issue, has the “benefit of being conducive to the preservation of clarity, good order and fairness in the conduct of criminal trials”. Furthermore, it was emphasised at [60]–[61] that the serious consequences of the successful invocation of this provision by the prosecution (the defendant will have no opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement with a view to undermining any inculpatory representation) “emphasise the need for compliance with the conditions of admissibility prescribed by the section”. While this provision does not refer to a document which contains a previous representation (except in s 65(8)), the explanation is that it is assumed that, where “person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made”, it may have been made in a document (by, for example, the person making it by signing the document).237 This analysis is supported by s 64(3), which implicitly assumes that a representation may be contained in a document in circumstances where “a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made”. The express reference in s 65(8) to “a document tendered as evidence by an accused so far as it contains a previous representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand 236. See Cvetkovic v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 329 Campbell JA (Simpson J and Whealy J agreeing) at [340]–[341]. 237. Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204; 172 ALR 185; [2000] FCA 461 at [154].

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the representation” is to make it clear that the latter parts of the document are equally admissible. However, it would be preferable to amend the provision to make the position clearer.

[EA.65.90] Definitions A “criminal proceeding” is defined in the Dictionary (see commentary at [EA.Dict.Pt.1.60]). The term “previous representation” is defined in s 62(1) to limit the application of s 64 to first-hand hearsay. Clause 4 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary deals with the unavailability of persons. Under cl 4(2), if a person does not fall within one of the listed categories of unavailability, “the person is taken to be available to give evidence about the fact”. Commentary on cl 4 of Pt 2 is found in the Dictionary. The term “asserted fact” is defined in s 59. It means that s 65 only applies in respect of evidence defined as hearsay under s 59.

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[EA.65.120]

“(2)(a) made under a duty to make that representation or to make representations of that kind”

As with all the hearsay exceptions contained in s 65(2), the hearsay rule “does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made”. Thus, the hearsay exception does not apply to evidence of an entry in a document, at least where no evidence is given by a person who perceived the entry being made.238 On the other hand, it has been held that where such a person does give evidence, this provision does not specify the form in which the evidence may be given (thus the document may be adduced through the witness).239 This provision derives from the common law exception to the hearsay rule for statements by a person now deceased made in the course of a legal duty to observe and record.240 At common law it is required that there be no motive for the deceased to state other than the truth. However, under this provision the duty need not be a legal duty, the person need not be deceased (only “unavailable”) and there is no requirement of an absence of motive to misrepresent. Section 67, discussed below, imposes notice requirements in respect of evidence sought to be adduced under this provision.

[EA.65.150]

“(2)(b) made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication”

As with all the hearsay exceptions contained in s 65(2), the hearsay rule “does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made”. See general discussion at [EA.65.120]. 238. Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204; [2000] FCA 461 (Fed Ct FC) at [154]. 239. R v Suteski (2002) 128 A Crim R 275; [2002] NSWSC 218 at [34] per Kirby J. 240. R v O’Meally [1952] VLR 499. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The term “asserted fact” is defined in s 59, which provides (s 59(2)) that it is a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that a person intended to assert in a “representation”: see [EA.59.210].241 Thus, the questions requiring determination under this provision are whether: (a) the fact, that the person making the representation that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert, had allegedly occurred at the same time or shortly before the representation was made; and (b) the representation was made in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication. The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision was based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 692):

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The proposal includes an exception for representations made “[when] or shortly after” the events referred to in it. A formula is used which takes up the suggestions of the Privy Council in Ratten’s case. It directs attention to the question of the likelihood of fabrication. An alternative suggestion has been made of requiring that the person be still under the stress of the situation. This has not been used because psychological research suggests it would not protect against fabrication and stress adversely affects the perception and performance of the person under stress. In addition, it would exclude evidence of statements made “shortly after” the event which would have probative value.

In Ratten v The Queen [1972] AC 378 at 391, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council stated that “hearsay evidence may be admitted if the statement providing it is made in such conditions (always being those of approximate but not exact contemporaneity) of involvement or pressure as to exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion”.242 However, there are important differences between this approach and the language adopted in s 65(2)(b). There is no reference to “conditions of involvement or pressure” and a formulation of “circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication” is adopted rather than a requirement that “the possibility of concoction” be excluded. As for the rejection by the ALRC of a requirement of “stress”, it may be noted that psychological research has not verified the proposition that stress protects against fabrication.243 Further, circumstances of stress or excitement may well substantially aggravate weaknesses of perception.244 They may also affect the transfer of information between the person making the representation and the person who perceives it.245 However, even if such concerns do not relate to the danger of “fabrication” and, consequently, would not prevent admission of the evidence under s 65(2)(b), they may justify discretionary exclusion. The view has been expressed that this provision is limited to representations about a fact in issue (such as an alleged crime) itself and not about some 241. See also R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704 at [34] per Levine J. 242. This proposition was restated and affirmed by the House of Lords in R v Andrews [1987] 1 AC 281. The common law position in Australia is uncertain (see Ligertwood, Australian Evidence (4th ed, Butterworths, 2004) at 8.66–8.70). 243. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 692. 244. ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 420, 666, 692. 245. See Odgers S, “Res Gestae Regurgitated” (1989) 12 UNSWLJ 262 at 271.

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antecedent event. However, given the definition of “asserted fact” in s 59, the “asserted fact” in this provision could include an antecedent event. Other decisions have not placed the suggested limitation on this provision247 and in R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386, Mason P (with whom Hulme and Simpson JJ were in agreement) held (at [25]) that the concept is not so confined.

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There is no requirement under this provision to establish that the “asserted fact” (that is, the fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert in his or her representation) in fact occurred.248 For the purposes of this provision, it is assumed that the fact occurred. Given the terms of this provision, there must be evidence to enable a judgment to be made as to the temporal connection between the occurrence of the asserted fact and the making of the representation.249 The phrase “shortly after” imports a degree of flexibility.250 However, there is an apparent conflict of authority as to the primary objective of this condition. Some courts have considered that, while the “predominant factor” must be the actual time that has elapsed, other considerations would include the subject matter of the event and how long the memory of such an event is likely to remain clear in the mind.251 This would permit the admission of representations made hours and even days after the asserted fact (allegedly) occurred. However, the preferable view is that the ALRC intended a much narrower approach, bearing in mind the words of the Judicial Committee in Ratten (“approximate … contemporaneity”) and the apparent linkage between the time when the representation was made and the unlikelihood of fabrication (rather than considerations of memory loss). This view has been adopted by the Full Federal Court in Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490; [2000] FCA 1868 at [48]: [I]t would be a mistake, in determining whether a statement has been made “shortly after”, to over-emphasise such matters as whether the events in question were “fresh” in the memory of the person making the statement. The rationale for the exception to the hearsay rule contained in s 65(2)(b) is not based only upon the necessity to ensure that the events in question may be easily recalled. Rather that provision is, as a whole, intended to allow evidence that is unlikely to be a fabrication. One condition of this is 246. R v Dean (No 2) (unreported, NSW SC, Dunford J, 12 March 1997), p 5. 247. R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 359–360; R v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295; R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 at [86] per Howie J. In a subsequent decision, Dunford J observed that what he said in R v Dean (No 2) (unreported, NSW SC, Dunford J, 12 March 1997) may need to be reconsidered in an appropriate case: R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; [1999] NSWCCA 377 at [27] per Dunford J (see also Smart AJ at [228]). 248. R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704 at [34]–[38] per Levine J. 249. Azizi v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 325; [2012] VSCA 205 at [47]. 250. R v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295. See also R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704 at [39]–[40] per Levine J; R v Jang [1999] NSWSC 1040 at [16] per Bell J. 251. R v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295; R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704; R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 at [88] per Howie J. This approach was endorsed by the Full Federal Court in Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204; [2000] FCA 461 at [123]–[135]. An (unsuccessful) appeal to the High Court did not raise this issue. See also R v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8; [2000] NSWCCA 303 (NSWCCA) at [33] per Dunford J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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that the statements be made spontaneously during (“when”) or under the proximate pressure of (“shortly after”) the occurrence of the asserted fact.252

It is true that the provision does not explicitly impose such a condition. However, the concept “shortly after” cannot be given any meaning without some frame of reference. Assistance in determining the applicable frame of reference of the concept may be found in the statutory context, which shows that the concept is connected to an inquiry into the probability that the representation is a “fabrication”, rather than (more generally) whether it is “reliable”. As the Full Federal Court said in Williams at [47] “it is principally a concern to exclude concocted evidence that informs the meaning of the phrase ‘shortly after’.” It is certainly arguable that shortness in time after an incident will only support an inference of truthfulness where it supports an inference that the person making the representation is still under the influence of the incident, involved in it rather than detached from it, and where there has been little time to contemplate fabrication of a false account. While the ALRC rejected a requirement of “stress”, the condition of “proximate pressure” adopted by the Federal Court understood in this way appears a correct interpretation of the provision. The Full Court concluded that “it would seem to be an unusual case” in which a representation made days after the occurrence of the asserted fact might be regarded as having been made “soon after” it, notwithstanding the fact that the representor “may be considered to have retained a good recollection of events”: Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490; [2000] FCA 1868 at [49] (see also R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386 at [13]–[14]).253 Despite the apparent cogency of this analysis, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held in Harris v The Queen (2005) 158 A Crim R 454; [2005] NSWCCA 432 that it was “open” to a trial judge to find that a written statement made by a victim to police 24 hours after the incident in which he was injured was made “shortly after” that incident (even though he had been asked by the police the previous day to come and make the statement, thus having abundant time to prepare a false account). It is very difficult to see how it could be said that the statement was made “under the proximate pressure” of the incident. The High Court refused special leave to appeal on the basis that the appeal had “insufficient prospect of success” (Harris v The Queen [2006] HCATrans 247) but it should be noted that Gleeson CJ observed during the argument that the Court of Criminal Appeal “quoted” the relevant passages from Williams and did not indicate any disagreement with them. Notwithstanding the difficulty in reconciling the actual result in Harris with the reasoning in Williams, it is suggested that Williams should still be regarded as good law. A condition of admissibility under this provision is that the statement “be made spontaneously during (‘when’) or under the proximate pressure of (‘shortly after’) the occurrence of the asserted fact”.254 252. See Director of Public Prosecutions v Curran (No 1) [2011] VSC 279 at [26]. 253. A possible example of such an “unusual case” where a number of days (or even longer) might properly be considered “shortly after”, even on the approach of the Federal Court in Williams, would be where the victim of an assault is in a coma and, soon after emerging from the coma (days or weeks after the assault), makes a representation about what happened during the assault. 254. See Director of Public Prosecutions v Curran (No 1) [2011] VSC 279 at [26]; Lewis v The Queen [2018] VSCA 40 at [48]. However, see also R v Ryan (2013) 33 NTLR 123; 234 A Crim R 299; [2013] NTSC 54; R v Ashley (2014) 253 A Crim R 285; [2014] NTSC 15 at [27].

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It should be noted that, in Youkhana v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 85 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that it was open to a sentencing judge to hold that the requirements of this provision were met in a case where a statement was made to the police some months after the asserted fact – primarily because the person who made the statement knew that his representations could, and would, be checked by the authorities and because (citing Harris) of his acknowledgement that he would be liable to prosecution if he wilfully stated anything which he knew to be false, or did not believe to be true (Bellew J at [54]–[58]). The court made no reference to Williams or to the issues raised in this commentary. However, it appears that it was never argued that the “shortly after” requirement was not satisfied, so that the judgment is of limited significance. Section 65(2)(b) requires that the court be satisfied that the representation has been made “in circumstances that make it unlikely” that the representation was a fabrication. Again there is conflicting authority, in this case in relation to the meaning of the word “fabrication”. In R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704 Levine J held at [41]–[45] that the word in this context means “made up”, rejecting an argument, based on s 108(3)(b), that “fabrication” might extend to innocent reconstruction or distortion as a result of suggestion. On the other hand, in R v Kuzmanovic [2005] NSWSC 771 Miles AJ at [13] emphasised the avoidance of the term used in Ratten, “concoction”, and concluded that “despite views to the contrary (eg Levine J in Polkinghorne) I think that fabrication may be taken to include reconstruction falling short of a false invention yet not entirely free of a process of piecing together discrete items of memory”. This conflict relates to the question of whether the phrase “shortly after” permits a court to take into account considerations such as how long the memory of the event is likely to remain clear or “fresh” in the mind. In Kuzmanovic, Miles AJ at [16] rejected the view of the Full Federal Court in Williams that the words “shortly after” mean “under the proximate pressure of the occurrence of the asserted fact” and preferred the approach which focuses on whether the matters conveyed were “still fresh in the mind of the person recounting that narrative”. That issue is discussed above. However, it is suggested that a possible flaw in the reasoning of Miles AJ is that, even if “fabrication” extends to innocent “reconstruction”, it certainly includes deliberate concoction. The requirement that the court be satisfied that the representation have been made “in circumstances that make it unlikely” that the representation was “a fabrication” means that, on the broader approach to “fabrication”, the court must be satisfied that it is unlikely that there has been innocent reconstruction (it is a “fresh” memory) and also satisfied that the circumstances make it unlikely that there has been deliberate concoction. In R v Kazzi (2003) 140 A Crim R 545; [2003] NSWCCA 241, Ipp JA (with whom Grove and Dowd JJ agreed) observed (at [14]) that an ability to speak and understand the English language may be a consideration relevant to the operation of this provision, although on either a narrow or broad view of the word “fabrication” it would appear more relevant to the application of the discretions in Pt 3.11. The decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in Harris v The Queen (2005) 158 A Crim R 454; [2005] NSWCCA 432 was discussed above in relation to the meaning of the term “shortly after”. It is also a surprisingly liberal judgment in respect of the requirement that the circumstances “make it unlikely © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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that the representation is a fabrication”. The court held that it was open to a trial judge to rule that a written statement made by a victim at a police station the day after an incident in which he was injured was made “in circumstances that make it unlikely that” it was “a fabrication”, essentially because the statement began with the standard formula asserting the truth of the statement and acknowledging the possibility of prosecution for an untruthful statement. The High Court refused special leave to appeal on the basis that the appeal had “insufficient prospect of success” (Harris v The Queen [2006] HCATrans 247) and it remains to be seen how influential this judgment proves to be. In R v AB [2011] ACTSC 204, Penfold J of the ACT Supreme Court was unpersuaded that a statement containing such a formula was made in circumstances making a fabricated representation unlikely (at [35]).255 On the other hand, Harris v The Queen [2006] HCATrans 247 was followed in Youkhana v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 85, where emphasis was placed not only on the fact that the person who made the representation acknowledged that he would be liable to prosecution if he wilfully stated anything which he knew to be false, or did not believe to be true, but also on the fact that the person knew that his representations could, and would, be checked by the authorities (Bellew J at [54]–[58]).

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It is important to emphasise that the party seeking to have the evidence admitted will need to point to “circumstances” which “make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication”. It should not be sufficient to point to the absence of circumstances that indicate a real risk of fabrication (for example, the existence of a motive or motives to fabricate).256 However, their absence will make it easier to satisfy the court that other circumstances make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication.257 In Tasmania v Dolega [2016] TASSC 65, Brett J applied this provision subsequent to the judgment of the High Court in Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32, in relation to s 65(2)(d) (see [EA.65.240]). Brett J observed at [19] that, while the focus of that provision is on the reliability of the representation, whereas under this provision it is on whether the representation is a fabrication, “both subsections operate in a similar way”. Brett J applied the proposition emphasised by the High Court that the focus must be on the particular representation rather than approaching the various representations made by the relevant person on a “compendious” basis. After considering a possible motive on the part of the person making the representations to fabricate evidence against the defendant, events subsequent to the making of the representations, and the absence in the representations of matters that might have 255. See also Munro v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 11, a case dealing not with s 65(2)(b) but with s 65(2)(c), where Refshauge ACJ and Penfold J in the ACT Court of Appeal stated at [6]: “[I]t is clear that imposing a legal obligation on a person to tell the truth does not always work. Trial courts, criminal and civil, regularly hear starkly conflicting testimony from different witnesses all of whom are giving sworn evidence and thereby exposing themselves to perjury charges if they do not tell the truth. This suggests either or both that a legal obligation to tell the truth does not always work to produce truthful evidence or does not always work to produce evidence that is otherwise reliable; that is, if two witnesses give irreconcilable sworn evidence, then at least one of them must be giving evidence that is either untrue or otherwise unreliable”. 256. Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490; [2000] FCA 1868 (Fed Ct FC) at [56]–[58] (but cf R v Kuzmanovic [2005] NSWSC 771 per Miles AJ at [19]). 257. R v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8; [2000] NSWCCA 303 (NSWCCA) at [33] per Dunford J.

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been expected to be recounted, it was concluded that a positive finding could not be made that the circumstances in which any of the representations were made “make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication” (at [22]–[23]) – notwithstanding that all the representations were made in a statutory declaration.

[EA.65.180]

“… made in circumstances that …” (s 65(2)(b),(c),(d))

The circumstances in which a representation was made may include other representations which form part of the context in which the relevant representation was made.258

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While the “circumstances” mean “the circumstances in which the representation was made, its factual setting at the time it was made”,259 it is established that “evidence of events other than those of the making of the previous representation [can] throw light upon the circumstances of the making of that representation”. This proposition, advanced in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, has been endorsed by the High Court in Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32 at [70]. Thus, a court may take into account events prior260 or subsequent to the representation being made and other representations made by the same person on other occasions.261 Evidence tending merely to the reliability of the asserted fact (usually the ultimate issue at the trial) should not be taken into account.262 This approach was endorsed in ALRC 102 at para 8.58. For example, other events may, for the purposes of the application of s 65(2)(b), be relevant to the issue of whether the circumstances in which the representation was made make it unlikely that the representation was a fabrication.263 It may be appropriate for the court to have regard to the consistency of what was said with other material in the proceeding,264 evidence of what the maker of the previous

258. Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32 at [71]. Thus, it was observed that a “representation may be demonstrably unreliable because it is followed by a specific retraction of the assertion of the relevant fact. Statements made by the representor that are demonstrably or inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous may be circumstances forming part of the context in which a relevant representation is made which tend against a positive evaluation of the likely reliability of that representation”. 259. R v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295, p 10. See also R v Jang [1999] NSWSC 1040 at [11] per Bell J; R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704 at [33] per Levine J; R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 at [89] per Howie J. 260. In R v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8; [2000] NSWCCA 303 (NSWCCA) at [33], Dunford J took into account the misspelling of an allegedly forged signature in a document when concluding that a later statement by the purported signer to the effect that he had not signed the document was unlikely to be a fabrication. 261. R v Dean (No 2) (unreported, NSW SC, Dunford J, 12 March 1997); R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 360. 262. R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386 at [29], [36]; Clarke v The Queen [2017] VSCA 115, at [80]. 263. Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490; [2000] FCA 1868 at [53]–[54] (see also Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204; [2000] FCA 461 at [145]. 264. Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490; [2000] FCA 1868 at [54]; Chidiac v The Queen (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 120 at [160]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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representation has said on other occasions, any motive to make a false statement266 and “evidence indicating that the person who made the previous representation was incapable of having heard or seen the matter which was the subject of the previous representation”. However, these matters will be only part of the inquiry as to whether the circumstances in which the representation was made make it unlikely that the representation was a fabrication. For that reason, they may only be taken into account if they throw light upon the circumstances of the making of the representation and its reliability as affected thereby.267

[EA.65.210]

“(2)(c) made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable”

As with all the hearsay exceptions contained in s 65(2), the hearsay rule “does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made”. See general discussion at [EA.65.120]. The ALRC did not propose this provision.268 It appears to derive from the judgment of Mason CJ in Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283; [1989] HCA 9 at 293:

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The hearsay rule should not be applied inflexibly. When the dangers which the rule seeks to prevent are not present or are negligible in the circumstances of a given case there is no basis for a strict application of the rule. Equally, where in the view of the trial judge those dangers are outweighed by other aspects of the case lending reliability and probative value to the impugned evidence, the judge should not then exclude the evidence by a rigid and technical application of the rule against hearsay.

While this approach was not endorsed by a majority of the High Court either in Walton or the subsequent decision of Pollitt v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 558, this provision comes close to adopting it. However, the person who made the representation must be “unavailable” and the court must be satisfied that the circumstances make it “highly probable” that the representation is reliable.269 The United States Federal Rules of Evidence include an exception to the hearsay rule based on “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”: see FRE 807. In Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204; [2000] FCA 461 at [146], the Full Federal Court concluded that this provision should be interpreted strictly: The requirement in s 65(2)(c) of the Act that it be “highly probable” that a representation be “reliable” in order to be admissible is an onerous one. It is easy to see why that should be so. Section 65(2)(c) has the potential to operate unfairly against an accused person. This particular exception to the hearsay rule was not recommended by either the Australian Law Reform Commission or the New South Wales Law Reform 265. Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204; [2000] FCA 461 at [145]; see also R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 at [96] per Howie J; Youkhana v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 85 at [52]–[53]; Chidiac v The Queen (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 120 at [177]. 266. Chidiac v The Queen (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 120 at [150]–[153]. 267. R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386 at [29] per Mason P. 268. Indeed, it was rejected by the majority of the ALRC: see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 727. 269. For an application of this provision, see R v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295, pp 26–28. See also R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704; R v Jang [1999] NSWSC 1040.

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Commission. Treating “reliability” alone as the basis for admissibility, represents a radical departure from the principle that hearsay evidence, no matter how reliable it may appear to be, is inadmissible unless it falls within a recognised exception to the hearsay rule.270

However, some NSW courts have taken a broad view of the provision, perhaps failing to give sufficient weight to the burden on the party seeking to have the evidence admitted to point to “circumstances” that significantly increase the probability of reliability, rather than the absence of circumstances which indicate unreliability.271 In Munro v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 11, Refshauge ACJ and Penfold J in the ACT Court of Appeal looked carefully at the circumstances said to have satisfied this test. They were “unconvinced” that the test “would be satisfied simply because it was made to a police officer or because it was made in the context of an understanding that a false statement would expose the maker to prosecution” – bearing in mind that a legal obligation on a person to tell the truth does not always work and that, in any event, “reliability” is not limited to considerations of truthfulness (at [5]–[14]). However, the test was satisfied in a case where the evidence was in relation to a system of work that was likely to be well-remembered, the person had no personal interest in the proceedings and any inclination to exaggerate would have been outweighed by an inclination to avoid a criminal prosecution for giving false information about a matter that to some extent at least could have been checked (at [16]–[19], see also Burns J at [79]–[80]).

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Regarding the “circumstances” that may be taken into account in applying the test, see [EA.65.180].

[EA.65.240]

“(2)(d) against the interests of the person who made it at the time it was made”

As with all the hearsay exceptions contained in s 65(2), the hearsay rule “does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made”. See general discussion at [EA.65.120]. This provision derives from the common law exception to the hearsay rule for statements by a person now deceased made against pecuniary interest.272 However, under this provision no such limitation is placed on the “interest”, nor must the person be deceased (only “unavailable”). Section 65(7) provides that, for the purposes of para (2)(d), a representation is taken to be against the interests of the person who made it in certain specified circumstances (without limiting the operation of para (2)(d)). The ALRC explained this provision (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 692): While there is the category of representation against “financial interests”, the history of the common law does not offer encouragement that the phrase would be interpreted to 270. This analysis was endorsed in Williams v The Queen (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 at [55]. See also R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386 at [38]–[40]. 271. See, for example, R v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8; [2000] NSWCCA 303 (NSWCCA) at [34] per Dunford J. 272. See Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee & Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 at 78. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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include a liability for damages or statements tending to damage reputation – hence those specific categories are listed in a definition that is not exhaustive.

As was emphasised by the High Court in Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32, since the application of s 65(2) proceeds upon the assumption that a party is seeking to prove a particular fact relevant to an issue in the case, and requires the identification of the particular representation to be adduced in evidence as proof of that fact, the focus is on the circumstances in which that representation was made to determine whether the conditions of admissibility are met (at [57]). While each representation relied upon should be considered in context so as to determine whether, when seen in context, those conditions are met, there should not be a “compendious approach” to a number of representations made about the same time in order to come to a view as to whether all the statements are admissible (at [59]). Thus, s 65(2)(d)(i) requires that the representation tendered against the other party is able to be seen to be against the interests of the maker of the statement (at [56]).

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It has been held that the test of “against interest” is objective and does not turn on the motive(s) of the representor.273 Whether a representation is against interest should be determined in context, rather than considering the representation in isolation.274 Admitting the telling of lies to the police on an earlier occasion would necessarily “tend” to damage that person’s “reputation”, regardless of the person’s prior reputation, on the basis that the word “tend” refers “to a possibility not an actuality”.275 Statements (admissions) by a person may tend to show “that the person has committed an offence for which the person has not been convicted” even if evidence of the admissions could not be used to prove it.276 Prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, there was no additional requirement that the previous representation had to be “made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable”. In ALRC 102, it was stated at paras 8.45–8.46: The assumption behind s 65(2)(d) is that where a statement is against the interests of the person who made it, this provides an assurance of reliability. However, where the person who made the statement is an accomplice or co-accused, this may not be the case. An accomplice or co-accused may be motivated to downplay the extent of his or her involvement in relevant events and to emphasise the culpability of the other. There is reason to suspect that an accomplice or co-accused would be more inclined to take such a course where (for example) they have immunity from prosecution. Where the accomplice gains immunity from prosecution the reliability safeguard of the representation being against self-interest no longer applies: the accomplice can fabricate evidence to implicate the accused and will only suffer the legal consequences of perjury if discovered.

273. R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182; 137 A Crim R 371; [2002] NSWCCA 509 at [94] (special leave to appeal refused 2 December 2003). See also R v Sio (2013) 234 A Crim R 508; [2013] NSWSC 1412 at [53]. 274. R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182; 137 A Crim R 371; [2002] NSWCCA 509 at [93]; see also R v El Masri [2010] NSWSC 1277, Hoeben J at [29]. 275. R v El Masri [2010] NSWSC 1277, Hoeben J at [19]. 276. R v El Masri [2010] NSWSC 1277, Hoeben J at [20].

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Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memoranda of the Commonwealth amending Act and the Victorian Act. It was concluded in ALRC 102 that imposing “some criteria of trustworthiness is warranted” (para 8.48). The High Court observed in Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32 at [64] that the provision “requires a trial judge to be positively satisfied that the representation which is tendered was made in circumstances that make it likely to be reliable notwithstanding its hearsay character”. Another way of expressing the test is that the court must be satisfied that circumstances make it likely that the asserted fact is “likely to be true” (at [63]). An example of such circumstances derived from Wigmore on Evidence 3rd ed (1940), vol 5, §1422 was given (at [64]):

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[C]ircumstances that “are such that a sincere and accurate statement would naturally be uttered, and no plan of falsification be formed”; in other words, circumstances that of themselves tend to negative motive and opportunity of the declarant to lie.

In contrast, if the declarant has a motive to lie, the test is unlikely to be satisfied. In Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32, the particular representation was by an accomplice in the commission of the crimes in question and, as the High Court observed at [65], statements by an accomplice “afford a classic example of a case where a ‘plan of falsification’ may be expected to be formed, given the obvious interest of one co-offender to shift blame onto his or her accomplice, especially where the circumstances also include the opportunity to seek to curry favour with the authorities”. The fact that the representation was made soon after the crime may have negated a danger of honestly mistaken recollection but did nothing to remove the danger arising from a motive to shift blame to the co-offender (at [66]). Of course, the question of reliability only arises if the representation was “against the interests of the person who made it at the time it was made” and that circumstance may point to reliability (at [67]). However, the representation by the accomplice admitted against the appellant, while “against interest”, was nonetheless “plainly apt to minimise his culpability by maximising that of Mr Sio” (at [68]). Nothing else in the objective circumstances in which the statement was made “was apt to shift the balance in favour of a positive finding of likely reliability in respect of” the asserted fact (at [73]). In Asling v The Queen [2018] VSCA 132, the Victorian Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion in a case where an accomplice was not speaking to the police but rather to a friend (at [80]). The suggestion that this hearsay exception could never be satisfied in a case where the relevant representation was made by a co-offender was rejected. The fact that such evidence “may” be unreliable (see s 165) does not preclude a conclusion that the circumstances in which it is made make it likely that it is reliable (at [81]). Since the “true concern of the provision is with the identification of circumstances which of themselves warrant the conclusion that the representation is reliable notwithstanding its hearsay character”, it is to risk being distracted from that task to be “overly concerned with what circumstances may properly be taken into account to determine the unreliability of a representation”.277 Further, attention must be directed to an assessment of the circumstances in which the 277. Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32 at [71] (emphasis in original). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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statement was made to establish its likely reliability, rather than to a general assessment of whether or not it is likely that the representor is a reliable witness.278 Regarding the “circumstances” that may be taken into account in applying the test, see generally [EA.65.180].279 No guidance is provided in the provision regarding representations that are partially “against interest” and partially in the interest of the representor. One option would be to admit only those representations that are against interest.280 However, the better approach would be to also admit other representations that qualify, or put in proper context, the representations against interest.281 The hearsay rule in s 59 would not apply to other representations sought to be used for the purpose of understanding the previous representation admitted under this provision – such representations are not being admitted “to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation” (see [EA.59.180]). Any representation admitted for such a purpose could then be used for a hearsay purpose (s 60), subject to the operation of s 136.

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Section 67, discussed below, imposes notice requirements in respect of evidence sought to be adduced under this provision. As regards appellate review, in Sio v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 42, Leeming JA held at [30] that “a trial judge’s conclusion when giving a ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence that the circumstances make it ‘likely’ that the representation is reliable … is to be approached not in accordance with the principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, but Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; 53 ALJR 293; [1979] HCA 9”. However, in Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32, where the High Court held that the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in that case “in failing to conclude that the trial judge had erred” (at [73]), the High Court concluded that the trial judge had erred on the basis that “[i]t was not open to the trial judge to be satisfied positively of the likely reliability” of the assertion in question “by reference to the circumstances in which that assertion was made” (at [73], emphasis added).

278. Sio v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 963; [2016] HCA 32 at [72]. 279. In R v El Masri [2010] NSWSC 1277, Hoeben J held that where a witness made an “induced statement” (whereby what was said could not be used against her unless she breached the specific conditions under which the statement was made), the circumstances in which the statement was made made it “likely” that the representations were reliable because “the protection provided by that statement would be lost if anything said in the statement were false” (at [23]), she was at worst an “accessory after the fact” to a crime rather than a co-offender (at [26]) and she was aware when making the statement that her account could be checked against CCTV footage (at [27]). 280. See Williamson v United States 114 S Ct 2431 (1994). 281. As the common law presently does in respect of admissions which are only partially inculpatory: Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536; R v Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7; [188] 1 All ER 65 (HL).

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“evidence in an Australian or overseas proceeding” (s 65(3)–(6))

The ALRC explained the proposal on which these provisions are based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 692):

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Despite the risk of distortion of memory over time, prior … evidence … should be received because of the pressures against fabrication … There are dangers in admitting this and other hearsay – as highlighted by an example given to the Commission. In R v Lynch and Watson [1978] Tas SR 190 the Crown wished to tender depositions of evidence given at committal proceedings by the victim of an alleged police assault in proceedings which had been brought against the relevant police officers. It was sought to tender this evidence under s 134 of the Evidence Act 1910 (Tas) which enables depositions to be produced subject to satisfaction of the conditions specified. The evidence was excluded on the basis of the general discretion to exclude evidence otherwise admissible. The grounds were that the jury would not hear the evidence of the alleged victim in person and the accused would not be able to cross-examine that witness. This is an appropriate result. On the other hand, the possibility of admitting such evidence should exist – for example hearsay evidence of a more routine nature and therefore likely to be accurate should be admissible for the prosecution. In the proposal, a similar exclusionary discretion is available.

Given the broad and inclusive definition of “representation” in the Dictionary, it is clear that a previous representation may be “made in the course of giving evidence” in a number of different ways for the purposes of s 65(3). One way would be for a witness to adopt, explicitly or implicitly, a representation made on another occasion.282 Another would be for a written statement (containing a representation) to be admitted as evidence of the person who made the statement: Ambrosoli at [56]–[57]. Section 65(3) is the only provision in Div 2 of Pt 3.2 which does not require evidence of first-hand hearsay to be given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived its being made. Section 67, discussed below, imposes notice requirements in respect of evidence sought to be adduced under s 65(3). As with all evidence to which a hearsay exception applies, discretionary exclusion remains a possibility. However, an argument for exclusion based on the inability of the defendant to cross-examine the person at trial would face the difficulty that a requirement of this hearsay exception is that the defendant cross-examined the person in the earlier proceeding, or at least had a reasonable opportunity to do so (s 65(3)). In Puchalski v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 220, Smart AJ (McClellan CJ at CL and Hislop J agreeing) stated at [95]: Section 65(3) is not based upon the nature and extent of the cross-examination. … It would be an odd result to refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor under s 137, when that evidence was rendered admissible by s 65(3).

The Victorian Court of Appeal has also tended to take a conservative view in respect of the possibility of discretionary exclusion, emphasising the availability of judicial directions to cure possible unfair prejudice.283 282. R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386 at [55] per Mason P. 283. Director of Public Prosecutions v BB (2010) 29 VR 110; [2010] VSCA 211. See also Luna v The Queen [2016] VSCA 10 at [46]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged that, in some circumstances, an accused person may have suffered “unacceptable prejudice from a lost opportunity to cross-examine”. It has also been acknowledged, at least implicitly, that “the kind of cross-examination conducted in committal proceedings is no substitute for the kind conducted at trial”.284 The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has rejected an argument that this provision is available only in respect of prosecution witnesses, holding that it can apply to the evidence of a co-accused.285

[EA.65.300]

“a previous representation adduced by a defendant” (s 65(8))

The effect of this provision is that first-hand hearsay in oral or documentary286 form is not excluded by the hearsay rule when adduced by the defendant in criminal proceedings (as long as the person who made the previous representation is not available to give evidence).287 The ALRC explained this proposal (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 692):

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As to evidence called by the accused, he is not required to satisfy the conditions which the prosecution must satisfy. This reflects the propositions contained above in the discussion of the principles that should guide the formulation of the proposal. The distinction is warranted primarily by the concern to minimise the conviction of the innocent. The proposal would enable the exonerating statements of the alleged victim to be received, the confessions of third parties and statements of deceased persons who could have given evidence.

The effect of s 65(8)(b) is that not only the representation in the document is not excluded by the hearsay rule but also any other “representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation”.288 Section 67, discussed below, imposes notice requirements in respect of evidence sought to be adduced under this provision.

[EA.65.330]

“If evidence of a previous representation about a matter has been adduced by a defendant” (s 65(9))

This provision will allow another party to adduce hearsay evidence which qualifies or explains a representation admitted under s 65(8). Thus, for example, if the defence adduces evidence of a third party confession under s 65(8)(a), the 284. See Luna v The Queen [2016] VSCA 10 at [31], [37], [45]. 285. Taber v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 427; [2007] NSWCCA 116. 286. See Cvetkovic v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 329 at [302]–[303]. Only first-hand hearsay in the document falls within the first part of s 65(8)(b), since it only applies to that part of the document which contains a previous representation defined in s 62(1) so as to limit it to first-hand hearsay. Under s 62(1) the previous representation must be “made” by a person and cl 6 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary deals with how a representation contained in a document is taken to have been made by a person. 287. Of course, that does not necessarily make it admissible – it may be excluded under another rule or in the exercise of judicial discretion: R v O’Connor [2003] NSWCCA 335 at [12]–[13]. 288. It is suggested that it would be “reasonably necessary” to refer to a representation in order to understand another representation where the first representation may reasonably be regarded as qualifying or explaining the latter representation.

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prosecution may adduce evidence from a person who heard the making of the alleged confession that the third party also made other statements which qualified or explained in some way the confession. However, s 65(9) has a wider effect. In order to admit evidence of a previous representation (R1) where the defence has had admitted another previous representation (R2) all that is required is: (1) R1 is “about” the same “matter” as R2; (2) the person who made R1 is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact in R1; and (3) evidence of R1 is “given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived” the making of R1.289 The Full Court of the Federal Court has observed:

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Pursuant to that subsection, if evidence of a previous representation by someone who is not available to give evidence about a matter has been adduced by the defendant in a criminal proceeding and has been admitted, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of another representation about the matter that is adduced by another party and is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the other representation being made. The reference to “another party” plainly includes the Crown, and the right of the Crown to respond under s 65(9) is not limited by the preconditions that would govern the leading of first-hand hearsay evidence as part of the Crown case in chief under s 65(2) …290

The Full Court pointed out that “the retaliatory provisions of s 65(9)” appear to be wide enough to apply “where evidence of a previous representation was admitted under” some provision other than s 65(8), such as s 60. If the requirements of s 65(9) are met, admissibility will then be determined by the discretions in Pt 3.11. An important question raised by this provision is the scope of the term “the matter”. This may be applied narrowly or broadly. For example, in a criminal proceeding where the defendant proposed to adduce evidence of representations by the deceased as to aspects of their “relationship”, it was pointed out that a liberal interpretation of the phrase would have permitted prosecution evidence of any other relevant representation by the deceased about the relationship, while a narrower construction would have confined “the matter” to the factual aspect of the relationship which was the subject of the representation to be adduced by the defence, or perhaps to the issue in the proceedings to which such a representation related.291 In ALRC 102, the following comments were made in respect of this issue at para 8.65: [T]he [correct] approach should be to identify the content of the representation to be adduced by the defendant and to consider whether the other representations can be said to be relevant to it. As a result, it should not be necessary to construe the term “about 289. Thus, a document containing R1 would not be admissible under this provision unless evidence is given by a person who saw the document being made: cf R v Mrish (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 4 October 1996). 290. Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 at 80. 291. R v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295, p 13. In the event, it was not necessary for Sperling J to resolve this question because the prosecution sought only to adduce evidence of a representation by the deceased regarding a specific element in the anticipated evidence to be led from the defendant. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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a matter” and it may, in fact, be preferable to avoid defining it. If it is necessary to construe the term, a broad construction should be adopted and, where that may cause unfair prejudice, the mandatory and discretionary exclusions in Part 3.11 should be used. Narrowing the interpretation of any of the hearsay exceptions carries the danger of introducing technicalities, something the uniform Evidence Acts are intended to remove and avoid.

While this provision only permits retaliatory evidence where “evidence of a previous representation about a matter … has been admitted”, the prosecution and defence may agree to waive that requirement pursuant to s 190 in order to permit the prosecution to adduce the retaliatory evidence at an earlier stage of the trial and avoid the need for the prosecution re-opening its case after the defence case (in circumstances where the defence had given notice of the intention to adduce evidence of the previous representation).292

[EA.65.360]

Proof by affidavit or written statement (Division 2 of Part 4.6)

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Evidence of a fact that is “to be proved in relation to a document or thing” under s 65, may (in accordance with Div 2 of Pt 4.6) be given by a person permitted under s 171 to give such evidence – by affidavit or, if the evidence relates to a public document (see Dictionary), by a written statement. The evidence may include evidence based on the knowledge and belief of the person who gives it, or on information that that person has: s 172. A copy of the affidavit or statement must be served on each party a reasonable time before the hearing of the proceeding: s 173(1). The party who tenders the affidavit or statement must, if another party so requests, call the deponent or person who made the statement to give evidence but need not otherwise do so: s 173(2).

[EA.65.390]

Request to produce documents or call witnesses

Section 167 permits a party to “make a reasonable request to another party for the purpose of determining a question that relates to: (a) a previous representation”. The procedure is prescribed in Pt 4.6 Div 1.

[EA.65.420]

Credibility evidence

Section 108A permits a party against whom hearsay evidence has been admitted, without the maker of the previous representation being called, to tender evidence relevant to the credibility of the person who made the representation.

[EA.65.450]

Other provisions

Part 4 of Ch 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) allows evidence to be admitted of a deposition taken from a person who was “dangerously ill” if a number of procedural safeguards were complied with. It also allows evidence of a written statement admitted in committal proceedings to be admitted at trial if the person who made the statement is practically unavailable.

292. See R v Mrish (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 4 October 1996).

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Cth Act: 66 Exception: criminal proceedings if maker available (1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) If that person has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by: (a) that person; or (b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; if, when the representation was made, the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation. (2A) In determining whether the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of a person, the court may take into account all matters that it considers are relevant to the question, including: (a) the nature of the event concerned; and (b) the age and health of the person; and (c) the period of time between the occurrence of the asserted fact and the making of the representation. Note: Subsection (2A) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606.

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[Subs (2A) insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 31]

(3) If a representation was made for the purpose of indicating the evidence that the person who made it would be able to give in an Australian or overseas proceeding, subsection (2) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor of the representation unless the representation concerns the identity of a person, place or thing. (4) A document containing a representation to which subsection (2) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination in chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [S 66 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 66

Exception: criminal proceedings if maker available

(1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) If that person has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by: (a) that person, or (b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, if, when the representation was made, the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(2A) In determining whether the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of a person, the court may take into account all matters that it considers are relevant to the question, including: (a) the nature of the event concerned, and (b) the age and health of the person, and (c) the period of time between the occurrence of the asserted fact and the making of the representation. Note: Subsection (2A) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[28]]

(3) If a representation was made for the purpose of indicating the evidence that the person who made it would be able to give in an Australian or overseas proceeding, subsection (2) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor of the representation unless the representation concerns the identity of a person, place or thing. (4) A document containing a representation to which subsection (2) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination in chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [S 66 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act:

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66

Exception—criminal proceedings if maker available

(1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by the person who made the representation or a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made if— (a) the person who made the representation has been or is to be called to give evidence; and (b) either— (i) when the representation was made, the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation; or (ii) the person who made the representation is a victim of an offence to which the proceeding relates and was under the age of 18 years when the representation was made. Note: Subsection (2) differs from the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act. [Subs (2) subst Act 37 of 2017, s 17]

(2A) In determining whether the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of a person, the court may take into account all matters that it considers are relevant to the question, including— (a) the nature of the event concerned; and (b) the age and health of the person; and 442

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(c)

the period of time between the occurrence of the asserted fact and the making of the representation.

Note: Subsection (2A) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606.

(3) If a representation was made for the purpose of indicating the evidence that the person who made it would be able to give in an Australian or overseas proceeding, subsection (2) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor of the representation unless the representation concerns the identity of a person, place or thing. (4) A document containing a representation to which subsection (2) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination in chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons. [S 66 am Act 37 of 2017]

ACT Act: 66

Exception—criminal proceedings if maker available

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(1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) If the person has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by— (a) the person; or (b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; if, when the representation was made, the happening of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation. (3) In deciding whether the happening of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of a person, the court may take into account all matters that it considers are relevant to the question, including— (a) the nature of the event concerned; and (b) the age and health of the person; and (c) the time between the happening of the asserted fact and the making of the representation. Note: Subsection (3) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court in Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606.

(4) If a representation was made for the purpose of indicating the evidence that the person who made it would be able to give in an Australian or overseas proceeding, subsection (2) does not apply to evidence presented by the prosecutor of the representation unless the representation is about the identity of a person, place or thing. (5) A document containing a representation to which subsection (2) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination-in-chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note: The dictionary, pt 2, s 4 is about the availability of people. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.66.30]

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NT Act: 66 Exception — criminal proceedings if maker available (1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. (2) If that person has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by: (a) that person; or (b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; if, when the representation was made, the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation. (2A) In determining whether the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of a person, the court may take into account all matters that it considers are relevant to the question, including: (a) the nature of the event concerned; and (b) the age and health of the person; and (c) the period of time between the occurrence of the asserted fact and the making of the representation.

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Note for subsection (2A): Subsection (2A) is inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606.

(3) If a representation was made for the purpose of indicating the evidence that the person who made it would be able to give in an Australian or overseas proceeding, subsection (2) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor of the representation unless the representation concerns the identity of a person, place or thing. (4) A document containing a representation to which subsection (2) applies must not be tendered before the conclusion of the examination in chief of the person who made the representation, unless the court gives leave. Note for section 66: Clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary is about the availability of persons.

[EA.66.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 8.66–8.124; ALRC 38, s 59, para 128(b); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 688, 693–694.

[EA.66.60] General comments The effect of this provision is that first-hand hearsay in oral or documentary form is not excluded by the hearsay rule in criminal proceedings where the person who made the representation is available to give evidence (about a fact he or she intended to assert by the representation) and, when the representation was made, the occurrence of that fact “was fresh in the memory” of that person. While s 66(2) does not refer to a document which contains a previous representation, s 66(4) makes it clear that it is assumed that, where “person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made”, it may have 444

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[EA.66.60]

been made in a document (where, for example, the person makes the representation by signing the document). One example of the application of this provision in criminal proceedings will be the potential admissibility, subject to the general requirement of relevance (see particularly [EA.55.240]) and the “fresh in the memory” requirement in this provision, of evidence of “complaint” made soon after the alleged offence (so long as it is not caught by s 66(3)). Unlike the common law, there is no limitation to complaints of sexual assault, and the evidence will be admissible to prove the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, assuming that it meets the test of relevance (see, particularly, [EA.55.240]) and subject to application of the judicial discretions in Pt 3.11.293 On the basis of consistency with the complainant’s in-court testimony294, the evidence will also be admissible to support the credibility of the complainant (s 102 only applies to “credibility evidence”, defined in s 101A to ensure that it does not apply where the evidence is relevant not only because it affects the credibility of a witness or person but also relevant and admissible for another purpose) unless s 136 is applied.295 Evidence of accompanying physical manifestations of distress would also be admissible,296 on the basis that such evidence would be relevant as tending to support the witness’s evidence and would either not be hearsay at all (the “distress” would not involve any intentional assertion of fact) or fall within the terms of this provision.

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The defence may take advantage of the provision adducing, for example, evidence of exculpatory statements by the defendant (so long as the defendant is to testify).297 Whether adduced by the prosecution or the defence, care is needed in delineating “the asserted fact” (see [EA.66.90]). For example, subject to the “fresh in the memory” requirement and possible discretionary limitations, a witness (A) who has made a statement identifying a person (B), may testify as to the terms of that statement, as may a person (C) who was present when the statement was 293. See R v H (1997) 92 A Crim R 168; R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131; R v Papakosmas (unreported, NSW CCA, 10 December 1997). 294. See IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 at [71]–[72]; DV v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 276 at [145]. Of course, the out-of-court representation may not be consistent with the complainant’s testimony. While that would bear on the use of the evidence for a credibility use, the point should be made that the question of admissibility under this provision is not affected by the consistency, or inconsistency, of the out of court representation with the in-court testimony of the representor: Miller v The Queen [2011] VSCA 143 at [46]–[51]. 295. In relation to the possible application of s 136 in this area, see [EA.136.150]. 296. Compare R v Grattan [2005] NSWCCA 306 at [119]–[134]. 297. See R v Crisologo (1998) 99 A Crim R 178; R v Dyers (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, Newman, Hidden JJ, 24 October 1997); R v Parkes (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12 at [13]–[17], [49]–[55]; R v Ashley (2014) 286 FLR 226; [2014] NTSC 26 at [11]–[13]; Constantinou v The Queen [2015] VSCA 177 at [177]–[188]; R v Meakin (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1006 at [7]–[14]. In Parkes, Ipp JA appears to have missed the requirement in s 66(2) that “that person [who made the previous representation] has been or is to be called” but Hulme J made the position clear at [135]. See also R v Fairbairn [2011] ACTSC 78; 212 A Crim R 32 at [30]–[32]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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298

made. However, “the asserted fact” in a case of identification will usually be that the person identified (B) was present at some relevant event (for example, the commission of the crime charged against B). Thus, the “occurrence of the asserted fact” which must be fresh in the memory of A is the event itself where A saw the person later identified as B.299 Conversely, in the case of recognition by A of a person B shown in a photograph as someone previously known, “the asserted fact” is that the person recognised is someone familiar. In this situation, the “occurrence of the asserted fact” which must be fresh in the memory has been held to be the continuing familiarity with the features of the person depicted.300 Another example of the care that must be taken in delineating “the asserted fact” is where the assertion is a negative one. Thus, A may say that he has never sexually assaulted B. In this context, the critical issue will be the nature of the allegation against A. If A’s statement was made in 2002 and the allegation is that he sexually assaulted B in 1996, the relevant asserted fact is that he did not sexually assault B in 1996.301 While A has also asserted that he has not sexually assaulted B in 2002 (as well as all other years), that assertion is simply not relevant.

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[EA.66.90]

Definitions

The definition of “criminal proceeding” in the Dictionary was noted in the commentary on s 63. The term “previous representation” is defined in s 62(1) to limit the application of s 64 to first-hand hearsay. Clause 4 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary (noted in the commentary on s 63) deals with the unavailability of persons. Under cl 4(2), if a person does not fall within one of the listed categories of unavailability, “the person is taken to be available to give evidence about the fact”. The term “asserted fact” is defined in s 59. It means that s 66 only applies in respect of evidence defined as hearsay under s 59. Last, it should be noted that “person” in this provision would include a defendant: see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 693. 298. However, it may well be that evidence that A identified a photograph of B as an offender, adduced not to prove that B was the offender but to determine who it was that A identified (which would be relevant if A subsequently testified that he or she had identified someone as the offender) would not be caught by the hearsay rule at all (and thus there need not be compliance with the requirements of s 66). See R v Barbaro (2000) 112 A Crim R 551; [2000] NSWCCA 192 (NSWCCA); Director of Public Prosecutions v Nicholls (2001) 123 A Crim R 66; [2001] NSWSC 523 at [25]–[27] per Adams J; cf the common law position: Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 55 ALJR 355; [1981] HCA 17. As Adams J pointed out in Director of Public Prosecutions v Nicholls, this analysis is not affected by evidence from A that he or she could no longer recognise the offender or no longer recognise the photograph which had been selected, so long as A testified that he or she had identified someone as the offender. Indeed, it may be added that Adams J’s reliance on s 66 in relation to any mark placed by A on a photograph of B soon after the act of identification (see [27]) appears unnecessary, since the mark is relied upon not for a hearsay purpose but simply to determine who it was that A identified. This provision will tend to have primary application in those cases where A does not testify that he or she had identified someone as the offender, and in “recognition” cases: see R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 (NSW CCA) at [8]–[10] per Grove J, Spigelman CJ agreeing (at [1]). 299. R v Barbaro (2000) 112 A Crim R 551; [2000] NSWCCA 192 (NSWCCA) at [34] per Grove J. 300. R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 (NSWCCA) at [10] per Grove J, Spigelman CJ agreeing. 301. R v Rymer (2005) 156 A Crim R 84; [2005] NSWCCA 310 at [22].

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[EA.66.120]

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[EA.66.150]

“available to give evidence about an asserted fact”

Clause 4 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary defines when a person “is taken not to be available to give evidence about a fact” and cl 4(2) provides that if a person does not fall within one of the listed categories of unavailability, “the person is taken to be available to give evidence about the fact”.302 It is clear that, as a result, there is no requirement that the person remember the “asserted fact”. Equally, there is no requirement that the person remember the making of the previous representation (evidence of the representation may be given by another person pursuant to s 66(2)(b)).303 Of course, the discretions in Pt 3.11 may have application in such circumstances.304

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[EA.66.150]

“that person … is to be called to give evidence”

This hearsay exception only applies where the person who made the representation “has been or is to be called to give evidence”. If that person is called to give evidence, there is no requirement that the person give evidence about the representation.305 For the purposes of determining whether a person “is to be called to give evidence”, a court may accept an undertaking from a party to the proceedings that the person will be called. Thus, for example, a court in criminal proceeding may admit, in the prosecution case, evidence of a previous representation made by the defendant, if the defence informs the court that the defendant will be giving evidence (in the defence case).306 The court may conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that it has been established that the defendant “is to be called”.307 The question arises as to the proper course if the evidence is admitted on that basis but the person is not in fact called to give evidence. The court may make rulings designed to remedy that situation. One possible remedial ruling would be to exclude the evidence admitted pursuant to this provision (and, in a jury trial, to direct the jury to disregard that evidence).308 302. See Singh v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 263 at [10]–[15]. 303. See Singh v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 263 at [10]–[15]; R v Brooks (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 261 at [6]–[16]. 304. See Singh v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 263 at [20]–[33]; R v Brooks (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 261 at [6], [17]–[20]. 305. See R v Brooks (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 261 at [10]. 306. See, for example, R v Ashley (2014) 286 FLR 226; [2014] NTSC 26 at [11]–[17]; Ashley v The Queen (2016) 258 A Crim R 101; [2016] NTCCA 2 at [52]–[53]. 307. Ashley v The Queen (2016) 258 A Crim R 101; [2016] NTCCA 2 at [53]. However, it was pointed out at [55] that the jury may be directed that the evidence “will become inadmissible, and you will be instructed to disregard that evidence if the accused does not give evidence”. If the court is not satisfied that the defendant “is to be called” but the defendant is in fact called in the defence case, “it will be open to the defence to call the evidence in the defence case” (at [56]). 308. See, for example, R v Ashley (2014) 286 FLR 226; [2014] NTSC 26 at [18]; Ashley v The Queen (2016) 258 A Crim R 101; [2016] NTCCA 2 at [54]. The evidence may be excluded on the basis that, when it became apparent that the defendant would not be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule did apply to the evidence and, pursuant to s 59, it was not admissible. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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“fresh in the memory”

The requirement that the occurrence of the asserted fact have been fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation requires consideration of the time when the representation was made, in the light of when the asserted fact was asserted to have occurred. There is no requirement that the person who made the representation have, at the time of the proceeding, any memory, let alone a “fresh” memory, of either the asserted fact or the making of the representation.309 Prior to the insertion of s 66(2A), following on ALRC 102, the term “fresh in the memory” was considered in the High Court judgment of Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438; [1998] HCA 1. In the majority judgment, it was stated (by Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 405): The word “fresh”, in its context in s 66, means “recent” or “immediate”. It may also carry with it a connotation that describes the quality of the memory (as being “not deteriorated or changed by lapse of time”) but the core of the meaning intended is to describe the temporal relationship between “the occurrence of the asserted fact” and the time of making the representation. Although questions of fact and degree may arise, the temporal relationship required will very likely be measured in hours or days, not, as was the case here, in years.

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The majority of the court explained that limiting this hearsay exception to statements made “very soon after” events in question reflects experience that “the memory of events does change as time passes” and will ensure that attention will not be distracted from the quality of the evidence that the witness gives in court by material of “little usefulness”.310 This approach reflected the psychological research on memory available to the ALRC at the time of ALRC 26 and ALRC 38. Nevertheless, some decisions subsequent to Graham indicated that the courts were prepared to take a “flexible” approach.311 309. See Singh v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 263 at [16]–[18]. 310. Thus, it was held that evidence of a complaint made six years after the last of the acts alleged against the accused was not admissible under s 66. In a separate judgment (with which Gleeson CJ agreed), Callinan J considered (at 410) that: “While it cannot be doubted that the quality or vividness of a recollection will generally be relevant in an assessment of its freshness, its contemporaneity or near contemporaneity, or otherwise, will almost always be the most important consideration in any assessment of its freshness … There may be cases in which evidence of an event relatively remote in time will be admissible pursuant to s 66, but such cases will necessarily be rare and requiring of some special circumstance or feature.” Callinan J emphasised that voir dire hearings “to explore questions of vividness and the like” should be avoided as much as possible. See also R v Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479; [1999] NSWCCA 21; R v RNS [1999] NSWCCA 122; R v Whitmore (1999) 109 A Crim R 51; [1999] NSWCCA 247. 311. See eg R v Le [2000] NSWCCA 49, where representations about a course of conduct which had taken place over the preceding six months was admissible under this provision, bearing in mind the regular repetition of the behaviour up until the day the representations were made (per Sully J at [51]–[52], Hidden J at [126]–[127], but see Hulme J at [84]). In R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; [1999] NSWCCA 197 at 281–282 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered (at [132]–[133]) that there was “much to commend” in the view expressed by the trial judge that “a statement made seven weeks after an event is not one which should be regarded as being outside the period of fresh memory … [particularly bearing in mind the] events of the kind here involved” (ie the murder of a policeman). It should be noted that the High Court dismissed an appeal in this case without considering this issue: see Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96;

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Furthermore, ALRC 102 (para 8.122) proposed amendment of s 66 to include a provision similar to s 66(2A) to: make sufficiently clear the ALRC’s intention in the previous Evidence inquiry that the quality of ‘freshness’ will not be confined to the time which elapses between the occurrence of the relevant event and the making of a representation about the event.

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ALRC 102 referred to more recent psychological research bearing on the proper approach to determining whether a memory was “fresh”: • Contrary to the view that “negative emotion, stress and anxiety generally hinder memory function”, the research tends to show that “the significant central actions of an emotionally arousing event are likely to be better remembered than ordinary non-emotional events, even if peripheral details cannot be recalled” (paras 8.88–8.98). • “Traumatic memory” has its own features distinct from memory for emotional events (paras 8.109–8.111). • The proposition that memory is likely to be lost rapidly after an event is less true for a “remarkable event” than for an unremarkable memory – “how quickly something is forgotten depends upon its subjective significance, both at the time the event was witnessed, and in the days, weeks and months following the event” (paras 8.99–8.104). • The “concern that memory may be contaminated by post-event information or suggestion is mitigated where the nature of the events witnessed contributes to a greater encoding of memory, thereby reducing the potential misinformation effect” (paras 8.105–8.108). Memory is an area of ongoing research and debate (ALRC 102, para 8.103; see also McClellan P, Who is telling the truth? Psychology, common sense and the law (2006) 80 ALJ 655). Courts will be required to take into account that research when determining whether a particular event was “fresh in the memory” of the person who made the representation. In accordance with s 142, the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities of this fact. Section 66(2A) makes it clear that a court will not be confined to “focusing primarily on the lapse of time between an event and the making of a representation about it” (ALRC 102, para 8,120) but will require consideration of a wide range of factors. Nevertheless, it has to be said that a clear understanding of the concept of “freshness” of memory remains somewhat elusive.312 The application of this provision was considered by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629; [2010] NSWCCA 181. XY had been 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57. In Skipworth v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 37, Mason P (Barr and Hall JJ agreeing) considered at [18] that “the time gap (66 days) was not great and there is every reason why the memory of the events was sufficiently fresh to make the evidence admissible on this wider basis”. On the other hand, in Langbein v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 378; [2008] NSWCCA 38, where the delay was 66 days, McClellan CJ at CL (Hall J and Price J agreeing) concluded at [83]–[85] that the trial judge had erred in finding that the events recounted were “fresh in the memory”. 312. Some limited assistance might be gained by analogies to such objects as fruit. A fruit will be “fresh” when it is in substantially the same condition as when picked. Usually this will depend on the passage of time, but certain techniques might be utilised (for example, freezing) in an attempt to maintain “freshness”. Different types of fruit will remain fresh for different periods of time and in different conditions. However, fruit that appears “fresh” may not be, in fact, “fresh”. Fruit that looks in good condition, or even tastes good, may still not be “fresh”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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charged with four counts of sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10 between 1 June 2003 and 14 September 2005. Whealy J (Campbell JA and Simpson J agreeing) held that evidence of complaints of sexual abuse made by the complainant to a friend CD in the latter part of 2007 and to the complainant’s parents in June 2009 all satisfied the test in s 66(2), even in the absence of evidence from the complainant asserting that the occurrence of the asserted abuse was fresh in his memory in both 2007 and 2009. Whealy J stated at [99]:

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[T]he expression, “fresh in the memory”, is now to be interpreted having regard to the considerations specified in s 66(2A) and such other matters as the court considers relevant to the question to be dealt with in the section. In particular, “the nature of the event” looms large in the matters now to be considered. That represents a very significant change to the interpretation given to the phrase “fresh in the memory” determined by the High Court in Graham’s case.

As regards the 2007 complaint, Whealy J emphasised (at [84]–[85]) the unusual nature of the sexual abuse described in the complaints, the “vivid picture painted” and the manner in which the events were recounted (“the representation was made in circumstances where the complainant was clearly embarrassed, troubled and not at all like his normal self”) which “suggested those events were well and truly implanted in the complainant’s memory”. Whealy J emphasised at [98] the fact that the ALRC “had stressed recent research showed that emotionally arousing or stressful incidents were remembered very well, even though peripheral details surrounding them might not be”. In addition, there was considerable consistency between the account given to CD in 2007 and what the complainant told the police in 2009 (at [86]). As regards the complaints made to the parents in 2009, Whealy J stated at [105] that “essentially … it is the striking nature of the incidents themselves that have persuaded me that it is likely the occurrence of the matters described to the parents would have been fresh in the memory of the complainant when the complaints were made”. Whealy J also referred at [91] to a statement made by the complainant that he could not get the memories of abuse “out of my head” and observed that, “[g]iven the repeated nature of the sexual incidents, their unusual features, and the youth and naivety in sexual terms of the complainant at the time they were said to have occurred, it is likely, indeed highly likely, that the memory of those events would remain with him for many years to come” and, indeed, “would have [been] reinforced” by the 2007 conversation with CD. Whealy J stated at [105] that “the marked similarity between the sexual incidents … would have been a reinforcing factor on the complainant’s retention of the incidents in his memory”. Uncertainty or confusion as to precisely when the alleged abuse occurred would only be “peripheral” to the application of the test in s 66(2) (at [97]). Plainly enough, the Court concluded that, while the same test nominally operates as prior to the amendments, the way in which “freshness” of memory is to be assessed has changed. It is apparent that, on the approach of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, the “vividness” of the asserted memory of the event (in terms of the amount of detail and any “striking” or “unusual” aspects) will be a very significant factor. While the High Court in Graham downplayed that consideration in comparison with the question of contemporaneity when assessing “freshness” of memory, the Court of Criminal Appeal has given particular emphasis to “the nature of the event concerned” referred to in s 66(2A)(a) (see at [99]). That seems 450

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to go further than required by the amendments. It will be interesting to see if the High Court accepts the correctness of that analysis. A particular issue in respect of the meaning of the concept arises from the following observations in ALRC 26 in relation to this provision applying in criminal proceedings (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 693):

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The risk of fabrication is reduced by requiring that the representation be made when the facts described were fresh in the memory.

These observations may permit an argument that a court should not find that the occurrence of the asserted fact was “fresh in the memory” of the person who made the representation where there is, in the particular circumstances, a substantial risk of fabrication. However, it is unclear whether such an approach is consistent with the rationale behind the provision as it originally appeared in the Act or its current formulation. The conventional view would be that a court should determine admissibility on the assumption that the person who made the representation was truthful, although such an approach is not explicitly required by this provision. Certainly, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629; [2010] NSWCCA 181 made it clear at [89]–[90] that it regarded such considerations as ambiguity and apparent inconsistency in previous representations suggesting possible unreliability as matters “extraneous” to the question of whether the test in s 66(2) is satisfied. Indeed, Whealy J (Campbell JA and Simpson J agreeing) plainly approached the assessment required by that provision on the assumption that the complainant was truthful (see, for example, at [92]). However, it may be observed that there is a significant distinction between assuming that the evidence of the making of the representation will be accepted (and is, accordingly truthful and reliable) and assuming that the (hearsay) representation itself is truthful and reliable. In LMD v The Queen [2012] VSCA 164 the Victorian Court of Appeal has followed a similar approach to the “fresh in the memory” requirement taken in XY. Harper JA (Bongiorno JA and Davies JA agreeing) held, rather surprisingly, that the requirement that a complaint made 10 years after alleged sexual abuse was fresh in the complainant’s memory was “clearly satisfied” because of “her reaction to the approaches made by her boyfriend when sexual intercourse between them was contemplated” (at [25]) – she told him of the decade old (alleged) abuse because “she was having difficulty in having sexual intercourse with him because, as she told the jury, her mind then turned to what had happened years before with her uncle, and she tended to ‘freeze’” (at [19]). That evidence certainly indicated that she remembered the abuse but it is difficult to understand how it asserted more. The Court considered that it did not matter that she did not provide any detail to her boyfriend – “[t]he events to which the complainant referred when she said that she had been ‘molested’ were inherently likely to remain firmly in her mind, if not as to detail, then as to the general nature of the behaviour to which she says she was subjected” (at [24]). It appears that it was the nature of the events allegedly remembered that was the critical factor in supporting the conclusion that the memory was “firm/fresh”. Similarly, in a restricted judgment in 2016, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal adopted the approach taken in XY and emphasised the “unusual, emotionally © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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disturbing” circumstances of the alleged offending before concluding that it was likely that “the memory of these events would endure in [the complainant’s memory] for years to come”.313 However, the position is not settled. It should be noted that, in ISJ v The Queen (2012) 38 VR 23; 226 A Crim R 484; [2012] VSCA 321, the Victorian Court of Appeal at [49] reserved for consideration “on an appropriate occasion whether XY gives sufficient emphasis to the temporal factor that remains within the concept of ‘fresh in the mind’.” Further, in Clay v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 405, 245 A Crim R 470; [2014] VSCA 269, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that a 20 year delay was simply too long. The court stated at [50]: While it is true that the “nature of the event” concerned is a relevant factor in determining whether to permit evidence of previous complaint to be led, so too, in terms, is “the period of time between the occurrence of the asserted fact and the making of the representation”. Wherever the line is to be drawn, a period that, in the case of at least two of the complainants, exceeded 20 years seems to us to have been so far beyond what the legislature could ever have contemplated when it enacted s 66(2A) as to make it impossible to say that the requirements of the section were met. In this case, absent any evidence to suggest that these matters were relevantly “fresh in the memory” of the individual complainant concerned, the hearsay rule was applicable. Evidence of each of the complaints should, accordingly, have been excluded.

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In Pate v The Queen [2015] VSCA 110, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that a trial judge had erred in holding that the test was satisfied where the “complaint” was made 12 years after the alleged offences (although the appeal did not succeed on this basis because trial counsel did not object to the admission of the evidence). Weinberg JA observed at [65]: … There is no single bright line figure beyond which a representation made long after an event cannot be “fresh in the memory”. Plainly, however, the greater the period that has passed, the greater the need for there to be some reason why the event would be “fresh” in the memory. LMD v The Queen [2012] VSCA 164 provides a useful example of the kind of evidence that might be sufficient to overcome the time barrier in the notion of something being fresh. There was no evidence of that kind in Clay v The Queen [2014] VSCA 269(2014) 43 VR 405, 245 A Crim R 470; [2014] VSCA 269, and in my view, there was equally no evidence of that kind in the present case.

Priest JA agreed (at [136]), but went somewhat further. He doubted the correctness of both R v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629; [2010] NSWCCA 181 and LMD v The Queen [2012] VSCA 164 (at [141]).314 He added at [146]: … [G]iven that determination of “freshness” of memory is not confined simply to temporal proximity, when assessing whether an asserted fact is “fresh in the memory”, consideration might also be given to whether the particular memory can be said to be free of factors which potentially might taint or influence it (such as – to use a non-exhaustive example – psychological counselling or therapy).

The third member of the Court, Dixon AJA, agreed at [150] with the “reasons” of both Weinberg and Priest JJA. In Boyer v The Queen [2015] VSCA 242, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that a number of statements made more than 12 313. Decision restricted [2016] NSWCCA 92, Schmidt J (McCallum and RA Hulme JJ agreeing) at [46], [50], [57]. Also given emphasis was the fact that, 28 years later, the complainant “gave police a detailed account of the events”: at [51], [57]. 314. See also Boyer v The Queen [2015] VSCA 242 at [73].

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years after the “asserted facts” were not admissible because “[t]here was no evidence before the trial judge upon which she could have concluded that the occurrence of the asserted facts were fresh in [the representor’s] memory at the time that any of the representations were made” (Priest JA at [74]).315 Finally, it should be noted that, in IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14, two members of the High Court, Nettle J and Gordon J, made the following observations with respect to complaint evidence considered in that case: [T]he charged offences were alleged to have occurred between 2002 and 2009, and yet the first complaint was said not to have been made until October or November 2010. While it might be that some of the alleged course of sexual offending was still fresh in the mind of the complainant in October or November 2010, it is at least questionable that the specific offences which were alleged to have been committed between 2002 and 2005 were still fresh in the mind of the complainant by that time. The same applies, but possibly with added strength, in relation to the complaints to SW, SC and KW, which were said not to have been made until August 2011.

While these observations were made in a dissenting judgment, they give support to the recent Victorian authorities suggesting that insufficient emphasis has been given to the temporal factor that remains within the concept of “fresh in the memory”.

[EA.66.210]

Statements and proofs of evidence (s 66(3))

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The effect of s 66(3) is that the hearsay exception created by s 66(2) does not apply to evidence of a previous representation if: (1) the previous representation “was made for the purpose of indicating the evidence that the person who made it would be able to give”; (2) the previous representation does not“concern the identity of a person, place or thing”; and (3) evidence of the previous representation is adduced by the prosecution. The onus of proof will rest on the party seeking to adduce the evidence to negate one of these matters in order to establish admissibility.316 Wood CJ at CL has discussed the first requirement in R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 at 34 (see also Adams J at 67–70 and James J at 63): I do not mean to suggest that s 66(3) will absolutely exclude as inadmissible hearsay, evidence from a witness of all representations made to him by another person who is available to give evidence, and which relates to matters other than identity. In each case, the question will turn upon the purpose for which the representations were made by that other person. Clearly on one side of the dividing line will be a statement, prepared in the form of a proof of evidence, crystallising the product of one or more interviews with him. On the other side of the line will be the product of routine 315. See also Bauer v The Queen (No 2) [2017] VSCA 176, where it was held at [112] that “there was no evidence in this case that the occurrence of any relevant asserted fact was ‘fresh in the memory’ of [the complainant] at the time that she made the previous representations upon which the prosecution sought to rely”. 316. R v Sharma [2009] ACTSC 154 at [40]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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investigations, where it is not known whether the person spoken to and making the representations is a suspect, or potential witness.

In this case, it was held (by Wood CJ at CL at 34) that s 66(3) applied “only because the witness [who made the previous representations] made it expressly clear, from the outset, that he was making the previous representations for the purpose of disclosing the evidence that he would be able to give, in a prosecution of the principal offender, and referred to himself more than once, in the discussion or interview, as a ‘witness’”. In contrast, it was held in Semaan v The Queen; DPP v Semaan [2017] VSCA 261 at [39] that s 66(3) did not apply where a representation was “‘made for the purpose of assisting the police to deal with a continuing and dangerous situation’”. In Saunders v The Queen (2004) 149 A Crim R 174; [2004] TASSC 95 (Tas CCA), Crawford J observed at [60]:

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If a person makes a detailed statement to a police officer or legal practitioner that is recorded in the form of a proof of evidence, the statement will almost invariably be one made by the person for the purpose of indicating the evidence that the person will be able to give in any subsequent court proceedings. However, the case may not be so clear if immediately or shortly after an incident, a person at the scene makes a representation to a police officer who has just arrived at the scene and is trying to find out what has happened. In such a case, the purpose of the representation may only be to make a complaint or allegation or to provide information to the officer to assist the investigation of what took place. Giving evidence at prospective court proceedings might not form part of the representor’s purpose.

A statement made to indicate what evidence the person would give as a witness in proceedings will still be caught by s 66(3) even if it is “preliminary” or a first draft.317 Of course, a previous representation to which s 66(3) applies may, if the necessary conditions are met, be used to refresh the memory of a witness while testifying or be admissible under the credibility provisions in Pt 3.7.318

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Documents

Where the representation is contained in a document, s 66(4) provides that the document may not be tendered until the conclusion of the examination-in-chief, unless the court otherwise orders. The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 688): This proposal is derived from the English Civil Evidence Act 1968. Without it a witness could simply tender his previous statement in evidence in chief and give no oral evidence. It is restricted to written statements.

317. Stevens v McCallum [2006] ACTCA 13 at [169]; R v Sharma [2009] ACTSC 154 at [39]. 318. See R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 at 34 per Wood CJ at CL; and ALRC 26, vol 1, para 694.

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Request to produce documents or call witnesses

Section 167 permits a party to “make a reasonable request to another party for the purpose of determining a question that relates to: (a) a previous representation”. The procedure is prescribed in Div 1 of Pt 4.6.

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Other provisions

A number of provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) create exceptions to the hearsay rule in criminal proceedings, notwithstanding that the person who made the representation was available to give evidence. For example, s 306B(4) provides that the hearsay rule does not prevent a record of evidence given by a complainant in relation to a prescribed sexual offence at a trial in relation to that offence being admitted at a retrial of that offence. Section 306V(1) provides that the hearsay rule (and the opinion rule) “do not prevent the admission or use of evidence of a previous representation” given by a “vulnerable person”, as defined, in an interview conducted by an investigating official. Similarly, s 289I provides that the hearsay rule (and the opinion rule) “do not prevent the admission or use of evidence of a representation” made in a recorded statement by a complainant in relation to a “domestic violence offence” when questioned by a police officer about that offence, so long as the recording was “made with the informed consent of the complainant” and the questioning occurred “as soon as practicable after the commission of the offence”. These provisions require directions to be given to a jury in respect of such evidence.319

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Section 377 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) provides: 377 Exception to hearsay rule—previous representations made by complainant under 18 years (1) In this section— asserted fact has the same meaning as in the Evidence Act 2008; hearsay rule has the same meaning as in the Evidence Act 2008; previous representation has the same meaning as in the Evidence Act 2008. (2) This section applies in a criminal proceeding that relates (wholly or partly) to a charge for a sexual offence if a complainant under the age of 18 years who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact or the complainant’s credibility is relevant. (3) Subject to subsection (4), if a complainant has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence to support an asserted fact or the complainant’s credibility that is given by— (a) the complainant; or (b) a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made. 319. For example, s 306X provides that “the judge must warn the jury not to draw any inference adverse to the accused person or give the evidence [of a representation admitted pursuant to s 306V] any greater or lesser weight because of the evidence being given in that way”. There is considerable Queensland authority bearing on comparable statutory warnings: see, for example, R v DM [2006] QCA 79; R v HAB [2006] QCA 80; R v Hellwig [2007] 1 Qd R 17; 161 A Crim R 489; [2006] QCA 179; R v Bisht (2013) 234 A Crim R 309; [2013] QCA 238; R v Coss [2015] QCA 33; R v Ali [2015] QCA 191. See also R v Cheng [2015] SASCFC 189. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(4) Subsection (3) does not apply unless the court is satisfied that the evidence is relevant to a fact in issue and is sufficiently probative, having regard to the nature and content of the representation and the circumstances in which it was made. (5) A witness has personal knowledge of the asserted fact if his or her knowledge of that fact was, or might reasonably be supposed to have been, based on something that the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived, other than a previous representation made by another person about the fact. (6) Evidence of the kind referred to in subsection (3) is admissible to support the credibility of the complainant as a witness.

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(7) Nothing in this section takes away from or limits any discretion a court has to exclude evidence.

It has to be said that this provision is not well drafted. Sections 377(2) and (3) are somewhat ambiguous but it appears to be the case that this provision creates a first-hand hearsay exception in criminal proceedings that relate (wholly or partly) to a charge for a sexual offence where the person who made the representation is a complainant under the age of 18 years, that person has been or is to be called to give evidence, and the court is satisfied, pursuant to s 377(4) that the evidence is relevant (an otiose requirement bearing in mind s 56(2) in this Act) and “is sufficiently probative, having regard to the nature and content of the representation and the circumstances in which it was made”. The first-hand hearsay limitation derives from the terms of s 377(3). Section 377(5) serves no function since there is no specified requirement of “personal knowledge” in the provision. While the complainant must be called as a witness, evidence about the representation may come from another witness “who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made”. If the evidence is relevant to the credibility of the complainant, the credibility rule in s 102 will not apply (s 377(6)). As regards the requirement that the evidence is “sufficiently” probative, presumably this must be measured in the context of the rationale behind the hearsay rule, general considerations of fairness to the accused and the “guiding principles” in s 338. Any danger of “unfair prejudice” may be explicitly taken into account under s 137 of this Act, which still has application (s 377(7)). This provision, and its relationship with s 66, was considered by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Stark v The Queen (2013) 230 A Crim R 455; [2013] VSCA 34. Maxwell P (Redlich JA and T Forrest AJA agreeing) observed at [40] that the provisions should be understood to operate in conjunction but that, in practice, evidence that would not be admissible under s 377 would not be likely to satisfy the requirements of s 66, while evidence that satisfied s 66 would almost certainly satisfy s 377.320 As regards the interpretation of this provision, Maxwell P referred to earlier authority in respect of the earlier Evidence Act 1958 provision from which this provision was derived. Relevant considerations that would bear on whether the evidence was “sufficiently probative” included the delay between the event in question and when the representation was made (as well as the “nature and content” of the representation and the circumstances in which it was made) but Maxwell P considered that (adopting earlier authority) the particular “complaint” in question satisfied the test where it disclosed “an identifiable, 320. See also Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [247].

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specific representation”, which added weight to the complainant’s evidence “by constituting a representation that was likely to be made if the fact contained in the representation had occurred” (at [55]).

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Maxwell P also referred to the somewhat curious aspect of s 377(3) which provides that “the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence to support an asserted fact or the complainant’s credibility …” (emphasis added), observing at [54] “that if the hearsay evidence of the complaint is to be relied on to prove the fact stated, it may be necessary to show a closer connection in content, between the representation (and the asserted fact(s)) and the relevant allegation of sexual assault, than if the evidence went only to credit”. This view that the provision may be utilised to admit evidence purely for the purpose of supporting the complainant’s credibility (and that this will support a differential application of the “sufficiently probative” test) is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the fact that the provision is solely directed to determining circumstances in which “the hearsay rule does not apply” (notwithstanding the fact that s 377(6) provides that, if the hearsay rule does not apply to the evidence, it may also be used to support the credibility of the complainant). It is difficult to understand how considerations increasing the value of the evidence for a purpose going “only to credit” would bear on the quite distinct question of whether the hearsay rule should, or should not, apply to the evidence. The analysis of Maxwell P was “somewhat tentative” (at [47]) and it is suggested that, in this regard at least, it may be doubted. However, his Honour’s concluding remarks (at [63]) suggesting that the provision seem to impose “an almost impossible task” on both judge and jury may be endorsed – given the current scope of s 66 this provision, flawed as it is in a number of ways, serves no useful purpose and should be abrogated.

Cth Act: 66A Exception: contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc. The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made by a person if the representation was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. [S 66A insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 32]

NSW Act: 66A Exception: contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made by a person if the representation was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. [S 66A insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[29]]

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Vic Act: 66A Exception—contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc. The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made by a person if the representation was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. ACT Act: 66A Exception—contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made by a person if the representation was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind. NT Act:

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66A Exception — contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc. The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made by a person if the representation was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind.

[EA.66A.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 8.158–8.174.

[EA.66A.60] General comments This provision did not appear in the original ALRC proposals. The issue was thought to be covered by confining the definition of “hearsay” to intended assertions and by other first-hand hearsay exceptions. However, it was incorporated in s 72 of the Act, as it stood prior to the amendments following on the recommendations of ALRC 102. ALRC 102 proposed (ALRC 102, paras 8.172–8.174) that the provision should be retained but renumbered and placed in Div 2 – “First-hand hearsay”, thereby making clear that the provision created an exception to the hearsay rule only in respect of first-hand hearsay (see further discussion at [EA.62.90]). An example of the operation of this provision was provided by Bell J of the Victorian Supreme Court at [7]: … The operation of the exception is well illustrated by the classic case of evidence of fears expressed by a murdered wife about her husband’s violence and her intention to

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leave him. First-hand hearsay evidence of the words and actions of the deceased expressing these feelings and intentions are usually admissible in the trial of criminal charges against the husband. …321

The requirement of contemporaneity requires that the representation by the person must be with respect to that person’s (see s 62) “health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind” at the time of the making of the representation.322

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In ALRC 102, reference was made at para 8.162 to the potentially wide interpretation that could be given to the terms “knowledge” and “state of mind”. Both could be interpreted very broadly to include “belief” or “memory”. However, such an interpretation would effectively abrogate the hearsay rule as contained in s 59. For example, evidence may be adduced of a representation made by a person that he believed that some event had occurred or remembered that some event had occurred. Even if the belief or memory of the person was not a fact in issue in the proceedings, it may be argued by the party adducing the evidence that it satisfied the test of relevance on the basis that an inference could be drawn from the belief or memory to prove that the event had in fact occurred (premised on an argument that the person’s belief or memory was likely to be reliable). If the evidence were admitted on this basis, it would evade the operation of the hearsay rule. Such an interpretation has not been adopted.323 In ALRC 102, it was accepted that the “potential absurdity of construing s 72” in such a way “gives reason for not adopting a construction of that breadth” (para 8.163). A connected problem arises where the representation refers to some event that created the state of mind, for example, the making of a threat leading to a state of fear. In ALRC 102, this example was considered at paras 8.165–8.166 (in discussing the former s 72): For instance, where evidence is admitted to prove that a victim was afraid of the accused (being a representation about a state of mind) does s 72 also allow the representation to be used to prove the occurrence of an event that created that state of mind, such as the making of a threat? Section 72 contemplates that the health, feelings, 321. Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2015] VSC 459 at [7]. In that case, evidence was admitted under this provision of statements by a company’s representative that the company did not intend to award contracts to another company by reason of union bans, which evidence was relevant to issues of causation and quantum (at [9]). 322. See Connect TV Pty Ltd v All Rounder Pty Ltd (No 5) [2016] FCA 338 at [62] 323. An example of this interpretation being avoided is in the judgment of Studdert J in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503 at [480]. Compare also R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704 at [25]; Roach v Page (No 27) [2003] NSWSC 1046, Sperling J at [16]. Some judges emphasise the requirement of contemporaneity: Connect TV Pty Ltd v All Rounder Pty Ltd (No 5) [2016] FCA 338 at [63]. Alternatively, reliance could be placed on the requirement of “rationality” in s 55. In Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274 at [58], Gaudron and Kirby JJ observed that “as a matter of logic”, a statement made outside of court is “… not, as such, proof of the facts asserted [in it]. People do make false statements of fact and false accusations. ... There has to be more than the fact that the statement is made to produce the conclusion required by s 55 as the price of admissibility. Rationality connotes logical reasoning.” On this approach, the mere fact that a person believed that some event had occurred or remembered that some event had occurred would not rationally tend to prove that it had occurred. It would not be relevant to that fact in issue. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind of a person who made a previous representation will be facts in issue. The section allows representations identified in the section to be used as evidence of the person’s health, feelings and so on. Where the evidence is sought to be used for another purpose, it must be relevant for that purpose. That is, to be admissible for that other purpose, it must be that the evidence admitted under s 72 could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. Provided the relevance requirement is made out, the evidence admitted under s 72 will be admissible as evidence of any fact in issue.

However, it is important to note that the hearsay exception created by this provision is limited to a “contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind”. This will include a reference in such a representation to some event that created the state of mind existing at the time of the making of the representation (“I am afraid he will carry out his threat to kill me”) but not to a discrete representation about such an event that does not satisfy the requirements of this provision.

[EA.66A.90] Survey evidence This provision will ensure that the hearsay rule does not prevent evidence being received from the persons conducting any survey of the responses given to them by persons interviewed324 (s 78 will provide an applicable exception for the operation of the opinion rule).325

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67

Notice to be given

(1) Subsections 63(2), 64(2) and 65(2), (3) and (8) do not apply to evidence adduced by a party unless that party has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence. (2) Notices given under subsection (1) are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of this section. (3) The notice must state: (a) the particular provisions of this Division on which the party intends to rely in arguing that the hearsay rule does not apply to the evidence; and (b) if subsection 64(2) is such a provision—the grounds, specified in that provision, on which the party intends to rely. (4) Despite subsection (1), if notice has not been given, the court may, on the application of a party, direct that one or more of those subsections is to apply despite the party’s failure to give notice. (5) The direction: (a) is subject to such conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit; and

324. Austereo Pty Ltd v DMG Radio (Aust) Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 93; 61 IPR 257; [2004] FCA 968, Finn J at [17]. 325. See also [EA.57.180] and [EA.78.60].

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(b) in particular, may provide that, in relation to specified evidence, the subsection or subsections concerned apply with such modifications as the court specifies. NSW Act: 67

Notice to be given

(1) Sections 63(2), 64(2) and 65(2), (3) and (8) do not apply to evidence adduced by a party unless that party has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence. (2) Notices given under subsection (1) are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of this section. (3) The notice must state: (a) the particular provisions of this Division on which the party intends to rely in arguing that the hearsay rule does not apply to the evidence, and (b) if section 64(2) is such a provision—the grounds, specified in that provision, on which the party intends to rely.

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(4) Despite subsection (1), if notice has not been given, the court may, on the application of a party, direct that one or more of those subsections is to apply despite the party’s failure to give notice. (5) The direction: (a) is subject to such conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit, and (b) in particular, may provide that, in relation to specified evidence, the subsection or subsections concerned apply with such modifications as the court specifies. Vic Act: 67

Notice to be given

(1) Sections 63(2), 64(2) and 65(2), (3) and (8) do not apply to evidence adduced by a party unless that party has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence. (2) Notices given under subsection (1) are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of this section. (3) The notice must state— (a) the particular provisions of this Division on which the party intends to rely in arguing that the hearsay rule does not apply to the evidence; and (b) if section 64(2) is such a provision—the grounds, specified in that provision, on which the party intends to rely. (4) Despite subsection (1), if notice has not been given, the court may, on the application of a party, direct that one or more of those subsections is to apply despite the party’s failure to give notice. (5) The direction— © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a) (b)

s 67

is subject to such conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit; and in particular, may provide that, in relation to specified evidence, the subsection or subsections concerned apply with such modifications as the court specifies.

ACT Act: 67

Notice to be given

(1) A relevant exception does not apply to evidence presented by a party unless the party has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to present the evidence. (2) A notice given under subsection (1) must be given in accordance with any regulation or rules of court made for this section. (3) The notice must state— (a) each relevant exception on which the party intends to rely in arguing that the hearsay rule does not apply to the evidence; and (b) if section 64(2) (Exception—civil proceedings if maker available) is to be relied on—the grounds, stated in the section, on which the party intends to rely.

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(4) Despite subsection (1), if notice has not been given, the court may, on the application of a party, direct that 1 or more relevant exceptions apply despite the party’s failure to give notice. (5) The direction— (a) is subject to the conditions (if any) the court thinks fit; and (b) in particular, may provide that, in relation to stated evidence, 1 or more relevant exceptions apply with the modifications the court states. (6) In this section: relevant exception means— (a) section 63(2) (Exception—civil proceedings if maker not available); or (b) section 64(2) (Exception—civil proceedings if maker available); or (c) section 65(2), (3) and (8) (Exception—criminal proceedings if maker not available). NT Act: 67

Notice to be given

(1) Sections 63(2), 64(2) and 65(2), (3) and (8) do not apply to evidence adduced by a party unless that party has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence. (2) Notices given under subsection (1) are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of this section. (3) The notice must state: 462

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[EA.67.60]

(a)

the particular provisions of this Division on which the party intends to rely in arguing that the hearsay rule does not apply to the evidence; and (b) if section 64(2) is such a provision — the grounds, specified in that provision, on which the party intends to rely. (4) Despite subsection (1), if notice has not been given, the court may, on the application of a party, direct that one or more of those subsections is to apply despite the party’s failure to give notice. (5) The direction: (a) is subject to such conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit; and (b) in particular, may provide that, in relation to specified evidence, the subsection or subsections concerned apply with such modifications as the court specifies.

[EA.67.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 60, paras 127(a), 128(a), 143(e); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 695–698.

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[EA.67.60] “reasonable notice” This provision requires “reasonable”326 notice to be given of an intention to adduce evidence of a first-hand hearsay representation where the maker of the representation will not be called as a witness (except where the evidence is admitted pursuant to s 66A). A similar notice procedure operates in England in civil trials.327 The ALRC stated (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 697): Disclosing the substance of all representations would, on occasion, involve a waiver of privilege … The party can decide what is more important – preserving the confidentiality or tendering the statement.

Regulation 5 in the Commonwealth Evidence Regulations 1995, NSW and Victorian Evidence Regulations deals with notice under this provision. One requirement is to identify the substance of the evidence of the previous representation that the notifying party intends to adduce. It has been held that this requirement is not satisfied by identifying “a lengthy document within which the representation may be found, without identifying the representation and the relevant part of the document”.328 Section 67 imposes additional requirements to those set out in reg 5. The notice must state the particular provisions of Div 2 of Pt 3.2 on which the party intends to rely in arguing that the hearsay rule does not apply to the evidence which the party intends to adduce. If s 64(2) is such a provision, the notice must state the grounds on which the party intends to rely. Reference to other provisions on 326. Presumably, relevant considerations would be the date when the notice is given (compared with the date of the hearing) and the detail provided in the notice. Regulation 5 in the Evidence Regulations 1995 prescribes what the notice must contain. 327. See Civil Evidence Act 1968 (UK) and Rules of the Supreme Court O 38, rr 21 to 33. 328. Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41–650 (Fed Ct per Lindgren J). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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which no reliance is ultimately put will not invalidate the notice. Section 181 permits proof of service of “a written notification, notice, order or direction” by affidavit “of the person who served, gave or sent it”.

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It is arguable that service of an affidavit or statement containing all the information required in a formal “notice” amounts to sufficient notice.330 As regards the timing of the notice (bearing on the requirement that the notice be “reasonable”), the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal accepted in Puchalski v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 220 that “notice given five minutes before the hearing of the application” to seek admission of the evidence “would not normally be reasonable” (Smart AJ at [103], McClellan CJ at CL and Hislop J agreeing). However, in the particular circumstances of that case it was held that the notice given by the prosecution to the defence was reasonable (Smart AJ at [105]). It may be noted that reference was made at [106] to the fact that the defendant did not “point to any changes in the conduct of his case that he could not accommodate other than that he would not have the opportunity to crossexamine” the person who made the representation – a circumstance that might be thought to bear more on the question of whether a direction should be given under s 67(4) (see below) than to the reasonableness of the notice. In Singh v Newridge Property Group Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 411 Biscoe AJ held at [20] that notice given by the defendants on the last working day before the hearing commenced was not reasonable in circumstances where more than two years earlier the plaintiffs had written to the defendants indicating that objection was taken to the evidence and the shortness of notice made it not reasonably practicable in the time available for the plaintiffs to investigate and marshal evidence as to the availability of the declarant or as to his credibility pursuant to s 108A. Similarly, in Darlaston v Parker (2010) 189 FCR 1; 196 IR 307; [2010] FCA 771 Flick J held (at [253], [255]) that notice given on the third day of a hearing, the day prior to the party giving notice closing its case, was not reasonable notice in circumstances where the party was aware “from the outset of [the] hearing that difficulties were being experienced in securing the attendance of a witness” (at [255]). Rules of the particular court in which the evidence is being adduced may prescribe times for the giving of notice under s 67. For example, the NSW Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 prescribe time periods in civil proceedings to which the Rules apply.

[EA.67.90]

Direction despite failure to give notice

Section 192 deals with the giving of directions generally and, without limiting the matters which the court may take into account, s 192(2) requires the court to consider five matters in deciding whether to make a direction. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as 329. Easwaralingam v Director of Public Prosecutions (2010) 208 A Crim R 122; [2010] VSCA 353 at [41]. 330. See Turnbull v Gorgievski [1999] NSWSC 871 at [3] per Hamilton J.

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“matters which may be relevant in a particular case”. In a case in the Federal Court, where notice had not been given of an intention to rely on both ss 63(2) and 64(2), Hill J observed: The scheme of the Evidence Act is to require notice to be given if the maker of the representation is not to give direct evidence. That notice, under s 67, has to be “reasonable”. The theory presumably is to ensure that if one party does not propose to call the maker of the representation the other party at least may have the chance to do so. However, the Court is given power to direct that either or both of subss 63(2) and 64(2) apply, despite the failure to give notice. No criteria are laid down by the Evidence Act upon which the Court is to proceed. However, and without attempting to in any way define appropriate criteria exclusively, matters relevant to the Court in exercising the discretion, which would need to be exercised judicially, would include the prejudice to the parties by dispensing with the requirement to give notice; as well as, for example, in a case involving s 64, matters of expense and delay which might point in favour of permitting the evidence to be adduced.332

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Hill J held that there was no real prejudice, because there was in fact no challenge to the reliability of the hearsay evidence. In a Family Court decision, Maddock v Maddock [2005] FamCA 868, the approach taken by Hill J was referred to with approval (at [74]–[75]). In another decision of the Family Court, concerning the admissibility of notes written by the deceased father of the applicant wife, the majority of the Full Court stated: In our view, the trial judge was clearly in error in refusing to admit the evidence. There was no reason to doubt the authenticity of the documents. There was no apparent prejudice by reason of the failure to give the requisite statutory notice and none was sought to be relied upon. The evidence was clearly important. It would be unfair to the wife to exclude it. The inability of the husband to cross examine the maker of the document could be properly taken into account when determining what weight should be given to the documents.333

Where there is a challenge to the reliability of the hearsay evidence and an opportunity to cross-examine has been lost, whether that loss caused actual prejudice will require careful consideration.334 In a NSW case,335 a direction was given after the court noted that, in the circumstances, giving of notice would not have made any substantial difference to the plaintiff’s ability to counter the evidence since it had already been put to the 331. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. 332. Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (t/as North West Immigration Services) (1996) 140 ALR 273 at 282. 333. Kayes v Kayes [1999] FLC 92–84; FamCA 357 per Kay and Dawe JJ at [74]. Finn J dissented on the basis that no error in the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion had been established. Similarly, the NSW Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against a trial judge’s direction under this provision on the basis that it could not “be categorised as unreasonable or plainly unjust”, Sheller JA emphasising that it was not for the appeal court “to set aside the order because this Court in the circumstances would not have made it”: Villanueva v New South Wales [1999] NSWCA 105 per Sheller JA at [13]. 334. Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 4) (2003) 197 ALR 131; [2003] FCA 17 at [24] per Lindgren J. See also Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 8) [2004] FCA 338 at [101]–[104]. 335. Kaperonis v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (unreported, NSW SC, Badgery-Parker J, 2 February 1996). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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plaintiff and denied. In another NSW case, emphasis was placed on the fact that the party that failed to give notice could not reasonably have foreseen that the hearsay evidence would be available, at least with sufficient particularity to enable a notice to be given.336 In another, emphasis was placed on the fact that, despite the absence of a formal notice within the meaning of the section, actual notice was given of most of the matters required.337 Prejudice arising from the loss of an opportunity to take steps to find the declarant may not be significant if it is likely that such efforts would be unsuccessful.338

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In contrast, a Victorian Supreme Court judge declined to make a direction under s 67(4) in a case where the evidence in question was relevant and “important” because the prosecution had failed to provide an explanation as to why proper notice had not been given and admission of the evidence would result in incurable unfairness and injustice to the defendant as well as disrupt and compromise the proper conduct of the trial. Kaye J observed in Director of Public Prosecutions v Azizi (No 2) [2012] VSC 600 at [21] that, if there had been proper notice, “the defence may well have taken a quite different approach both in preliminary openings to the jury and in cross-examination of the two witnesses whose evidence has been completed”. Further, he noted at [22] that admission of the evidence at the stage the trial had reached would give it “undue prominence and excessive weight in the atmosphere of a criminal trial”, which prejudice to the defence “could not be offset by any appropriate direction by me”. He also observed at [27]–[28] that if the evidence were admitted “there would be disproportionate delay in a trial which otherwise is to be of quite short and concise duration”, as well as “insurmountable procedural difficulties” created. The court may, under s 192(1), give a direction “on such terms as the court thinks fit”.339 In addition, s 67(5) permits the court to impose conditions and to modify the application of one or other of ss 63(2), 64(2) and 65(2), (3) and (8).

Cth Act: 68 Objections to tender of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings if maker available (1) In a civil proceeding, if the notice discloses that it is not intended to call the person who made the previous representation concerned because it: (a) would cause undue expense or undue delay; or (b) would not be reasonably practicable; a party may, not later than 21 days after notice has been given, object to the tender of the evidence, or of a specified part of the evidence. (2) The objection is to be made by giving to each other party a written notice setting out the grounds on which the objection is made.

336. Markoff v Lautogo (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 5 March 1997). 337. Turnbull v Gorgievski [1999] NSWSC 871 at [3] per Hamilton J. 338. Quintano v BW Rose Pty Ltd (2008) 186 A Crim R 448; [2008] NSWSC 1012 at [8]. 339. For an example of the terms of such a direction, see Markoff v Lautogo (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 5 March 1997).

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(3) The court may, on the application of a party, determine the objection at or before the hearing. (4) If the objection is unreasonable, the court may order that, in any event, the party objecting is to bear the costs (ascertained on a solicitor and client basis) incurred by another party: (a) in relation to the objection; and (b) in calling the person who made the representation to give evidence. [Subs (4) am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 33; Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 4] [S 68 am Act 113 of 2015; Act 34 of 1997]

NSW Act: 68 Objections to tender of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings if maker available (1) In a civil proceeding, if the notice discloses that it is not intended to call the person who made the previous representation concerned because it: (a) would cause undue expense or undue delay, or (b) would not be reasonably practicable, a party may, not later than 21 days after notice has been given, object to the tender of the evidence, or of a specified part of the evidence.

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(2) The objection is to be made by giving to each other party a written notice setting out the grounds on which the objection is made. (3) The court may, on the application of a party, determine the objection at or before the hearing. (4) If the objection is unreasonable, the court may order that, in any event, the party objecting is to bear the costs incurred by another party: (a) in relation to the objection, and (b) in calling the person who made the representation to give evidence. Note: This subsection differs from section 68(4) of the Commonwealth Act because of the different way costs are ascertained by NSW courts.

Vic Act: 68 Objections to tender of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings if maker available (1) In a civil proceeding, if the notice discloses that it is not intended to call the person who made the previous representation concerned because it— (a) would cause undue expense or undue delay; or (b) would not be reasonably practicable— a party may, not later than 21 days after notice has been given, object to the tender of the evidence, or of a specified part of the evidence. (2) The objection is to be made by giving to each other party a written notice setting out the grounds on which the objection is made. (3) The court may, on the application of a party, determine the objection at or before the hearing. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(4) If the objection is unreasonable, the court may order that, in any event, the party objecting is to bear the costs incurred by another party— (a) in relation to the objection; and (b) in calling the person who made the representation to give evidence. Note: This subsection differs from section 68(4) of the Commonwealth Act because of the different way costs are ascertained by Victorian courts.

ACT Act: 68 Objections to tender of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings if maker available (1) In a civil proceeding, if the notice discloses that it is not intended to call the person who made the previous representation because it— (a) would cause undue expense or undue delay; or (b) would not be reasonably practicable; a party may, not later than 21 days after the day notice has been given, object to the tender of the evidence, or of a stated part of the evidence. (2) The objection must be made by giving to each other party a written notice setting out the grounds on which the objection is made.

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(3) The court may, on the application of a party, decide the objection at or before the hearing. (4) If the objection is unreasonable, the court may order that, in any event, the party objecting must bear the costs incurred by another party— (a) in relation to the objection; and (b) in calling the person who made the representation to give evidence. Note: Subsection (4) differs from the Commonwealth Act, s 68(4) because of the different way costs are worked out by ACT courts.

NT Act: 68 Objections to tender of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings if maker available (1) In a civil proceeding, if the notice discloses that it is not intended to call the person who made the previous representation concerned because it: (a) would cause undue expense or undue delay; or (b) would not be reasonably practicable; a party may, not later than 21 days after notice has been given, object to the tender of the evidence, or of a specified part of the evidence. (2) The objection is to be made by giving to each other party a written notice setting out the grounds on which the objection is made. (3) The court may, on the application of a party, determine the objection at or before the hearing. (4) If the objection is unreasonable, the court may order that, in any event, the party objecting is to bear the costs incurred by another party: (a) in relation to the objection; and (b) in calling the person who made the representation to give evidence. 468

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[EA.68.90]

Note for subsection (4): This subsection differs from section 68(4) of the Commonwealth Act because of the different way costs are ascertained by Territory courts.

[EA.68.30] ALRC references ALRC 26, vol 1, para 695.

[EA.68.60] Differences between the Commonwealth and NSW/Victorian provisions The NSW/Victorian provision is identical with the Commonwealth provision except that the words in the brackets in s 68(4) are deleted. In NSW and Victoria, specific provisions determine the basis on which costs are ascertained.

[EA.68.90] General comments

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This provision provides a procedure to determine, at or before the hearing, whether a party in civil proceedings is to be permitted to adduce evidence of a first-hand hearsay representation under s 64(2). The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 695): Costs can be saved in civil trials in not having to call witnesses. The proposal extends existing law by enabling a party to avoid having to call witnesses who are available by serving notice on the other parties containing the above details and, should objection be received, obtaining the court’s leave – before or at trial – to not call the witness. If there is no objection the representation may be received in evidence without proof. In this context the notice provision not only protects the parties but also gives the court the means to regulate the admission of firsthand hearsay in civil trials. The judge will be able to resolve the issue of whether the witness should be called by directing that he be called and placing the burden of costs on the party objecting or, if in doubt, reserving the question of costs for further consideration after the witness’s evidence is concluded. In this way unnecessary objections can be discouraged. The procedure introduces a discretionary element and therefore uncertainty in preparation for trial. It addresses that problem, however, by enabling the issues to be resolved before the trial commences should a party wish to do so.

Objection must be made not later than 21 days after notice has been given of the intention to adduce the evidence.340 The court may order that the evidence be admitted under s 190, notwithstanding the objection.

340. See Council of the New South Wales Bar Assn v Franklin [2014] NSWCA 329 at [18] (“the immediate context and other provisions of s 68 make clear that ‘may’ is used in the sense ‘may only’ so that s 68(1) defines the period of time in which the party receiving the notice is permitted to object to the tender of the relevant hearsay evidence”). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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DIVISION 3 – OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE DIVISION 3.2.3 – OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE (ACT ONLY)

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.30] Summary of this Division The ALRC considered that “the view should be taken that second-hand hearsay is generally so unreliable that it should be inadmissible except where some guarantees of reliability can be shown together with a need for its admissibility”: ALRC 26, vol 1, para 678. This Division creates exceptions to the hearsay rule in respect of a number of categories of second-hand and more remote hearsay.

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.60] Discretionary exclusion The discretionary and mandatory exclusion provisions (ss 135–138) may be utilised to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay evidence. Application of these provisions to hearsay evidence was discussed in the general introduction to Div 2 and for a general discussion of the possible application of ss 135 or 137 in this context, see [EA.135.150].

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.90] Discovery Section 193 provides that the powers of a court in relation to:

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(a) the discovery or inspection of documents; and (b) ordering disclosure and exchange of evidence, intended evidence, documents and reports; extend to enabling the court to make such orders as the court thinks fit … to ensure that the parties to a proceeding can adequately … inspect documents of the kind referred to in paragraph (b) or (c) of the definition of “document” in the Dictionary: … (b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of the document or of any part of the document; or (c) any part of such a copy, reproduction or duplicate. The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 716) that this proposal was designed to extend rules relating to discovery “to include tapes, disks, microfilms and other media” and: … to enable the party against whom the evidence is to be led to examine the record keeping system and to have provided to it all information, materials and equipment needed to understand the way in which the records are kept and compiled and how any visible reproduction of the contents of the record is produced.

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.120]

Request to produce documents or call witnesses

Section 167 permits a party to “make a reasonable request to another party for the purpose of determining a question that relates to: (a) a previous representation”. The procedure is prescribed in Div 1 of Pt 4.6. 470

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.150]

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.2.Div.3.150]

Warnings

In a jury trial, s 165 requires the trial judge to warn the jury (s 165(2)) regarding hearsay evidence (s 165(1)(a)), unless “there are good reasons for not doing so”: s 165(3).

Cth Act: 69

Exception: business records (1) This section applies to a document that: (a) either: (i) is or forms part of the records belonging to or kept by a person, body or organisation in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business; or (ii) at any time was or formed part of such a record; and (b) contains a previous representation made or recorded in the document in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business.

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(2) The hearsay rule does not apply to the document (so far as it contains the representation) if the representation was made: (a) by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact; or (b) on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the representation: (a) was prepared or obtained for the purpose of conducting, or for or in contemplation of or in connection with, an Australian or overseas proceeding; or (b) was made in connection with an investigation relating or leading to a criminal proceeding. (4) If: (a) the occurrence of an event of a particular kind is in question; and (b) in the course of a business, a system has been followed of making and keeping a record of the occurrence of all events of that kind; the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence that tends to prove that there is no record kept, in accordance with that system, of the occurrence of the event. (5) For the purposes of this section, a person is taken to have had personal knowledge of a fact if the person’s knowledge of the fact was or might reasonably be supposed to have been based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived (other than a previous representation made by a person about the fact). Note 1: Sections 48, 49, 50, 146, 147 and subsection 150(1) are relevant to the mode of proof, and authentication, of business records. Note 2: Section 182 gives this section a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records.

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NSW Act: 69 Exception: business records (1) This section applies to a document that: (a) either: (i) is or forms part of the records belonging to or kept by a person, body or organisation in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business, or (ii) at any time was or formed part of such a record, and (b) contains a previous representation made or recorded in the document in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business.

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(2) The hearsay rule does not apply to the document (so far as it contains the representation) if the representation was made: (a) by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact, or (b) on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the representation: (a) was prepared or obtained for the purpose of conducting, or for or in contemplation of or in connection with, an Australian or overseas proceeding, or (b) was made in connection with an investigation relating or leading to a criminal proceeding. (4) If: (a) the occurrence of an event of a particular kind is in question, and (b) in the course of a business, a system has been followed of making and keeping a record of the occurrence of all events of that kind, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence that tends to prove that there is no record kept, in accordance with that system, of the occurrence of the event. (5) For the purposes of this section, a person is taken to have had personal knowledge of a fact if the person’s knowledge of the fact was or might reasonably be supposed to have been based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived (other than a previous representation made by a person about the fact). Notes: 1 Sections 48, 49, 50, 146, 147 and 150(1) are relevant to the mode of proof, and authentication, of business records. 2 Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 69 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records.

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Vic Act: 69 Exception—business records (1) This section applies to a document that— (a) either— (i) is or forms part of the records belonging to or kept by a person, body or organisation in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business; or (ii) at any time was or formed part of such a record; and (b) contains a previous representation made or recorded in the document in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business.

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(2) The hearsay rule does not apply to the document (so far as it contains the representation) if the representation was made— (a) by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact; or (b) on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the representation— (a) was prepared or obtained for the purpose of conducting, or for or in contemplation of or in connection with, an Australian or overseas proceeding; or (b) was made in connection with an investigation relating or leading to a criminal proceeding. (4) If— (a) the occurrence of an event of a particular kind is in question; and (b) in the course of a business, a system has been followed of making and keeping a record of the occurrence of all events of that kind— the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence that tends to prove that there is no record kept, in accordance with that system, of the occurrence of the event. (5) For the purposes of this section, a person is taken to have had personal knowledge of a fact if the person’s knowledge of the fact was or might reasonably be supposed to have been based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived (other than a previous representation made by a person about the fact). Note: 1 Sections 48, 49, 50, 146, 147 and 150(1) are relevant to the mode of proof, and authentication, of business records. 2 Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 69 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records.

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ACT Act: 69 Exception—business records (1) This section applies to a document that— (a) either— (i) is or forms part of a record belonging to or kept by an entity in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business; or (ii) at any time was or formed part of the record; and (b) contains a previous representation made or recorded in the document in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to the document (so far as it contains the representation) if the representation was made— (a) by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact; or (b) on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact.

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(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the representation— (a) was prepared or obtained for the purpose of conducting, or for or in contemplation of or in connection with, an Australian or overseas proceeding; or (b) was made in connection with an investigation relating or leading to a criminal proceeding. (4) If— (a) the happening of an event of a particular kind is in question; and (b) in the course of a business, a system has been followed of making and keeping a record of the happening of all events of that kind; the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence that tends to prove that there is no record kept, in accordance with the system, of the happening of the event. (5) For this section, a person is taken to have had personal knowledge of a fact if the person’s knowledge of the fact was or might reasonably be supposed to have been based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived (other than a previous representation made by a person about the fact). Note 1: Sections 48, 49, 50, 146, 147 and 150(1) are relevant to the mode of proof, and authentication, of business records. Note 2: The Commonwealth Act, s 182 gives the Commonwealth Act, s 69 a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records.

NT Act: 69

Exception — business records (1) This section applies to a document that: (a) either: (i) is or forms part of the records belonging to or kept by a person, body or organisation in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business; or

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(ii) at any time was or formed part of such a record; and (b) contains a previous representation made or recorded in the document in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business. (2) The hearsay rule does not apply to the document (so far as it contains the representation) if the representation was made: (a) by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact; or (b) on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the representation: (a) was prepared or obtained for the purpose of conducting, or for or in contemplation of or in connection with, an Australian or overseas proceeding; or (b) was made in connection with an investigation relating or leading to a criminal proceeding.

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(4) If: (a) the occurrence of an event of a particular kind is in question; and (b) in the course of a business, a system has been followed of making and keeping a record of the occurrence of all events of that kind; the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence that tends to prove that there is no record kept, in accordance with that system, of the occurrence of the event. (5) For the purposes of this section, a person is taken to have had personal knowledge of a fact if the person’s knowledge of the fact was or might reasonably be supposed to have been based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived (other than a previous representation made by a person about the fact). Notes for section 69: 1 Sections 48, 49, 50, 146, 147 and 150(1) are relevant to the mode of proof, and authentication, of business records. 2 Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 69 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records.

[EA.69.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 61, para 129; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 702–709.

[EA.69.60] General comments The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 702–705): The Commonwealth business records provisions are used as the basis for the proposal for public and private records kept by computer and other means. They are derived from and very similar to the New South Wales business records provisions which have also been adopted in Tasmania. They relate to representations contained in records of or kept by a business and recorded in the course of or for the purposes of the business. Although computers can be used for a variety of purposes, it is principally as record © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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keeping devices that they must be considered in relation to the hearsay rule. Computer records are kept by electronic means and with less human involvement than is the case with written records. It is suggested that the safeguards of the document being part of a record of a business and of the statement being recorded in the course of or for the purposes of the business are sufficient threshold requirements to apply at the stage of admissibility of records kept by whatever means they are. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission in its Report [NSWLRC 17, para 48] commented that the fact that the statements were to be used by the business provided a strong incentive for accuracy. The same sort of threshold requirement has been used in Victoria and in Queensland in the provisions dealing with books of account of a business (general financial records and records of goods produced and stock records) and in the legislation of Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia enabling statements in documents to be admitted in criminal proceedings … It is true that errors, accidental and deliberate, occur and can occur at every stage of the process of record keeping by computers. The fact is, however, that they are the exception rather than the rule, they tend to occur at the stage when the information is fed into the system, and there are techniques available which can be, and are, employed at each stage of the record keeping process to eliminate error …. In many cases there will he no bona fide issue as to the accuracy of the record. It is more efficient to leave the party against whom the evidence is led to raise any queries and make any challenges it may have.

In Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1083 at [4](3) Hamilton J observed that “[t]he cases in general terms indicate that the inclusive provisions of subss (1) and (2) of s 69 should be regarded as being of wide import and construed accordingly … Equally, the exclusory provisions of s 69 ought to be construed as sections of wide import.” However, as Sperling J made clear in Roach v Page (No 15) [2003] NSWSC 939 and Roach v Page (No 27) [2003] NSWSC 1046 (see [EA.69.120]), the provisions should also be considered in the light of the reliability rationale behind s 69.

[EA.69.90] Definitions of “document” and “business” The word “document” is defined in the Dictionary: “document” means any record of information, and includes: (a) anything on which there is writing; or (b) anything on which there are marks, figures, symbols or perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them; or (c) anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else; or (d) a map, plan, drawing or photograph. See also cl 8 of Pt 2 of this Dictionary on the meaning of document.

Clause 8 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides: 8 References to documents (a) any part of the document; or (b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of the document or of any part of the document; or (c) any part of such a copy, reproduction or duplicate.

The term “business” is defined in cl 1 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary: 1 References to businesses (1) A reference in this Act to a business includes a reference to the following: 476

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(a) a profession, calling, occupation, trade or undertaking; (b) an activity engaged in or carried on by the Crown in any of its capacities; (c) an activity engaged in or carried on by the government of a foreign country; (d) an activity engaged in or carried on by a person holding office or exercising power under or because of the Constitution, an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, being an activity engaged in or carried on in the performance of the functions of the office or in the exercise of the power (otherwise than in a private capacity); (e) the proceedings of an Australian Parliament, a House of an Australian Parliament, a committee of such a House or a committee of an Australian Parliament; (f) the proceedings of a legislature of a foreign country, including a House or committee (however described) of such a legislature. (2) A reference in this Act to a business also includes a reference to: (a) a business that is not engaged in or carried on for profit; or

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(b) a business engaged in or carried on outside Australia.

Because the definition includes “a profession, calling, occupation, trade or undertaking” and “an activity engaged in or carried on by the Crown in any of its capacities”, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that it includes the activities engaged in or carried on by the Department of Health Services, other analogous social welfare agencies, hospitals, medical practices and kindred health care providers.341 On the other hand, in Mundine v Brown (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 515, Harrison J held at [8] that a “Domestic Violence Forum” was not a “business”: It was not a profession, calling, occupation or trade. The first defendant contends that it can satisfy the description of an undertaking. That expression must be understood in the context of the exception for which the section provides. There must in my view be a commercial or mercantile flavour to the circumstances in the course of which the document was generated. The Forum was not in this category. It was a meeting of concerned groups or members of the community with an interest in addressing certain nominated and possibly related social and public health issues. It did not have a constitution or any formal structure. It was not incorporated in a formal way and was not associated with any informal but identifiable structure either. An undertaking to my mind suggests the existence of a particular task or enterprise of some type going well beyond an ad hoc assembly of like-minded people commendably in search of ideas and solutions to disparate social problems.

[EA.69.120]

“part of the records belonging to or kept by a person, body or organisation in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business” (s 69(1)(a))

No definition is provided of the term “record” although judicial consideration of the same term used in other legislation may be helpful.342 A broad approach 341. Lancaster v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 820; 247 A Crim R 165; [2014] VSCA 333 at [14]. 342. See R v Jones [1978] 2 All ER 718; R v Tirado (1974) 59 Cr App R 80; Bates v Nelson (1973) 6 SASR 149; O’Donnel v Dakin [1966] Tas SR 87; Manton v Commonwealth (1981) 34 ALR © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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would be that adopted in R v Jones [1978] 2 All ER 718 at 721 where it was stated that “although it is not an exclusive definition of the word, ‘record’ in this context means a history of events in some form which is not evanescent”.343 The phrase “in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business” is also not defined in the Act. An almost identical phrase appeared in pre-existing legislation,344 and was considered in a number of cases.345 In Roach v Page (No 15) [2003] NSWSC 939 Sperling J made the following observations (at [5]–[6]) regarding the composite term “the records of a business”:

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The records of a business are the documents (or other means of holding information) by which activities of the business are recorded. Business activities so recorded will typically include business operations so recorded, internal communications, and communications between the business and third parties. On the other hand, where it is a function of a business to publish books, newspapers, magazines, journals (including specialised professional, trade or industry journals), such publications are not records of the business. They are the product of the business, not a record of its business activities. Similarly, publications kept by a business such as journals or manuals (say, for reference purposes) are not records of the business.346

This analysis was adopted by Middleton J in Hansen Beverage Co v Bickfords (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 406 at [133], where his Honour concluded that “the concept of a business record is an internal record, kept in an organised form accessible in the usual course of business, actually recording the business activities themselves and does not include the product of the business itself”.347 However, in Southern Cross Airports v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2011) 83 ATR 612; [2011] NSWSC 349 Gzell J stated at [41] that “[i]n addition to the documents by which activities of a business are recorded I would include as business records documents relevant to the conduct of the business”. He added at [42]–[44]: The introductory words of s 69(1)(a)(i) of the Evidence Act that the provision applies to a document that is, or forms part of, the records belonging to or kept in the course of, or for the purposes of a business, encompasses more than documents recording the activities of a business. For example, a valuation of the assets of a business for insurance purposes or for the purpose of determining appropriate depreciation rates does not record the activities of a business but it is kept in the course of, or for the 342 at 344; H v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 849; Atra v Farmers & Graziers Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281 at 288; Burnside Sub-Branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 324. 343. On the other hand, in H v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 849 it was concluded that the intention of the English legislation was “to admit in evidence records which a historian would regard as original or primary sources, that is, documents which either give effect to a transaction itself or which contain a contemporaneous register of information supplied by those with direct knowledge of the facts”. 344. See Evidence Act 1898 (NSW), s 14CE(5); Evidence Act 1905 (Cth), s 7B(1)(b); Evidence (Business Records) Interim Arrangements Act 1984 (NT), s 5(1)(b); Evidence Act 1910 (Tas), s 40C(1)(b). 345. See Re Marra Developments Ltd (No 2) [1979] 2 NSWLR 193; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 13, 18, 19) (1988) 14 NSWLR 116. 346. See also Murray v RentWorks Ltd [2003] NSWIRComm 54 at [41], [45] per Glynn J; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320 at [180]–[187] per Austin J. 347. See also ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 5) (2012) 301 ALR 352; [2012] FCA 1479 at [15].

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purposes of, the business. It is preferable, in my view, not to seek to define a business record but to be guided to a decision whether or not a document is a business record by the terms of the statutory provision itself.

The Victorian Court of Appeal has held that entries in the files of a Victorian Government Department, apparently made by departmental officers in the course of and as part of their duties, even if themselves based on hearsay, were parts of the records belonging to or kept by the Department as records and for the purposes of the Department’s activities.348 It was observed that “[p]rima facie, individual patient records maintained by a hospital, doctor or other health care provider are business records of the activities carried on by the health care provider and, therefore, are business records, even though … they concern the individual patients as opposed to the running of the hospital or health care provider’s practice”.349 On the other hand, in Roach v Page (No 27) [2003] NSWSC 1046, Sperling J observed at [9] that a book published by a business to provide a history of the business, and “a flyer or a media advertisement or a website publication, extolling the virtues of the business” are not “a record of the business merely because [they] purportedly record activities of the business”. The same may be true for “many items of correspondence received by a firm which do not get filed and hence do not ever form part of a record”.350

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A document may be a record of a business even if it is a draft, or otherwise appears to be a document produced “along the way” to completion of a final document.351 An email may be a “business record” for the purposes of this provision and s 48(1)(e) of the Act.352 In ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448; 301 ALR 326; [2012] FCA 1355, Perram J stated at [59]: Of course, not every email sent or received by an employee to or from his or her work email address will be for work purposes but this does not mean that it ceases, as a result, to be a business record. One justification for email retention is to ensure and/or encourage responsible email use and this, by itself, is probably a purpose of the business. In practice, the communications contained in a personal email from a work address are unlikely to satisfy the requirements of s 69(1)(b); that is, the representations contained in them will not have been made in the course of or for the purposes of the business, but this does not mean that they are not business records.

A document may be kept “in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business” even if it is for the “personal use” of a particular employee,353 although such an intended personal use may mean that the document was never intended to be a record kept in the course of or for the purposes of the business.354 It is important to appreciate that “in the course of” a business and “for the purposes of” a 348. Lancaster v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 820; 247 A Crim R 165; [2014] VSCA 333 at [15]. 349. Lancaster v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 820; 247 A Crim R 165; [2014] VSCA 333 at [19]. 350. ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448; 301 ALR 326; [2012] FCA 1355, Perram J stated at [56]. 351. Timms v Commonwealth Bank [2003] NSWSC 576 at [17]; NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power & Water Authority [1999] FCA 1549 at [9]; ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 at [188]; ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 562 at [14]. 352. Aqua-Marine Marketing Pty Ltd v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 194 FCR 479; [2011] FCA 578 at [10]. 353. Gordon v Ross [2006] NSWCA 157 at [38]. 354. Mundine v Brown (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 515 at [5]–[7]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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business are alternatives. As Reeves J observed in Asden Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Dinoris (No 2) [2015] FCA 1025 at [11], “the representation can be made or recorded in the document in the course of the business – that is, how it comes into existence – or it can be recorded in the document for the purposes of the business – that is, why it comes into existence”. While in many, if not most, circumstances, the means by which, and the purposes for which, the representation comes into existence will exclusively serve the same business, in some cases the representation will be prepared in the course of one business and be partly prepared for the purposes of that business and partly for the purposes of another business. An invoice found in the records of A purporting to be for goods or services supplied by B to A (and prepared by B) may be a business record of A.355 Reeves J explained at [13] that this was so “because invoices are almost invariably prepared in the course of the business of A, for example, an invoice which describes the work A claims to have performed and the amount it claims to be owed for that work. And they are almost always prepared for the dual purposes of the business of A and the business of B, that is, the business for whom A did the work and to whom it usually sends the invoice”. It has been held that the word “kept” in s 69(1)(a)(i) simply means “retained or held” as opposed to “maintained systematically”.356 On the other hand, mere possession of a document by a business would not be enough to make it a record kept by the business.

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[EA.69.150]

“contains a previous representation made or recorded in the document in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business” (s 69(1)(b))

The term “previous representation” is defined in the Dictionary: “previous representation” means a representation made otherwise than in the course of giving evidence in the proceeding in which evidence of the representation is sought to be adduced.

The phrase “in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business” is discussed at [EA.69.120]. The fact that a previous representation was made by a person who is not an employee of the business does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it was not made for the purposes of the business.357 It is clear that a representation made by a third party can still be said to be “for the purposes of the business”.358 On the other hand, if it is not possible to identify who made the representation, the requirements of this provision may not be satisfied.359 There is no requirement that the representation be made, or the record created, at any time 355. See Tasmania v Tu Ai Lin (2011) 225 A Crim R 1; [2011] TASSC 54 at [26]–[28]; ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448; [2012] FCA 1355 at [47]–[50]; Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 3) [2017] FCA 1045 at [25]. 356. Feltafield Pty Ltd v Heidelberg Graphic Equipment (1995) 56 FCR 481 at 483; ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 at [190]. 357. Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 569; [2003] FCA 933 at [12] per Hely J. 358. ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448; 301 ALR 326; [2012] FCA 1355 at [45]–[49]. 359. See HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Clements [2014] NSWSC 290 at [12].

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contemporaneous to the events to which it relates. Section 183 permits a court to draw reasonable inferences from a document (see [EA.69.540]).

[EA.69.170]

“The hearsay rule does not apply to the document (so far as it contains the representation) …” (s 69(2))

It is important to distinguish in this context a “document” from a “representation” made in that document. To the extent that s 69(2) is satisfied in respect of that representation, then to that extent the hearsay rule does not apply to the document.361 Equally, the fact that s 69(2) is not satisfied in respect of one part of a document does not mean it will not be satisfied in respect of another part (although a concern about one aspect of a document may inform the question whether a representation elsewhere found in the same document satisfied this provision).362

[EA.69.180]

“personal knowledge”

The ALRC explained this requirement in s 69(2)(a) and (b), as defined in s 69(5) (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 707):

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It must be possible to trace the information back to a person who may be supposed to have had personal knowledge of it. This requirement appears in other legislation relating to documentary hearsay. It is recommended in lieu of the “qualified person” requirement, of the Commonwealth Act. It effectively prevents the tendering of reliable records where information recorded is provided by persons who are not closely associated with the business whose records are involved.

The “tracing” exercise may involve a number of steps, and thus extend beyond second-hand hearsay to more remote hearsay. In Lancaster v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 820; 247 A Crim R 165; [2014] VSCA 333, the Victorian Court of Appeal rejected an argument that in order for a representation in a document to come within the description in s 69(2), of having been made “on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied by a person who had or it might reasonably be supposed had personal knowledge of the asserted fact, it was necessary that the maker of the document have received the information directly from a person who had or it might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact (first-hand hearsay) or directly from a person who received the information directly from a person who had or it might reasonably be supposed had personal knowledge of the asserted fact (second-hand hearsay)”. The court held (at [24]–[27]) that “directly or indirectly” embraces degrees of remoteness beyond second-hand hearsay. Section 69(5) provides that “a person is taken to have had personal knowledge of a fact if the person’s knowledge of the fact was or might reasonably be supposed to have been based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived (other than a previous representation made by a person about the fact”). In Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 French CJ, Heydon and 360. Gordon v Ross [2006] NSWCA 157 at [37]. 361. Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [17]; Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26 at [88], [97]. 362. Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26 at [103]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Bell JJ in a joint judgment (Gummow J and Crennan J agreeing in separate judgments) considered the words “saw, heard or otherwise perceived” in s 78(a) and observed at [43] that one of the ordinary meanings of “perceive” is “to observe by one of the five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste or touch” (citing the first of the two meanings which the Macquarie Dictionary gives, and the third of the meanings given by the Oxford English Dictionary, for “perceive”). They considered that this meaning is supported by the use of the words “saw, heard or otherwise” before “perceived”. They also stated that it plainly has this meaning as part of a definition of “personal knowledge of a fact” in s 69(5).363 Even with respect to s 69(2)(a) (“by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact”), the party adducing the evidence does not have to satisfy the court that the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact. It will be enough that he or she “might reasonably be supposed” to have had such knowledge (see [EA.62.60]). In Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 984, McDougall J stated at [19]:

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In this context, I think, the words “or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge” indicate that the court is allowed to draw inferences not just from the form of the document, but from the nature of the information contained in it.

It is suggested that a better approach would be to justify the drawing of such inferences under s 183.364 In Lin v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 9 the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal observed that reasonable inferences could be drawn from the circumstances in which documents were obtained as well as “the nature of the representations and how they appear on the relevant documents” (Tennant and Porter JJ at [91]). It is important to focus attention on the particular asserted fact in question. Where a person asserted several facts, the resolution of the question whether the person had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact may differ from fact to fact.365 There is no need to identify the person who made the representation in the business record or the person with the requisite personal knowledge.366 However, an inability to identify the person who made the representation may have the

363. See also Duncan v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 84 at [131]. 364. See also Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26 at [89]–[91]; HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Clements [2014] NSWSC 290 at [14]. 365. See, for example, Byrne v Javelin Asset Management Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 214 at [49]. 366. Lin v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 9 at [87]; Lancaster v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 820; 247 A Crim R 165; [2014] VSCA 333 at [27]; Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26 at [108]. In Lancaster v The Queen, the Victorian Court of Appeal inferred that a representation of fact made in a Departmental business record about the behaviour of a child was made on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied by the child’s teacher, a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact (at [35]). Another representation was inferred to have been made on the basis of observations of the child’s mother or “someone” who observed the child playing (at [46]).

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consequence that, even drawing reasonable inferences under s 183, the court is not satisfied that whoever it was “might reasonably be supposed” to have had the necessary knowledge.367 There is nothing in s 69(2) to suggest that the person having the relevant personal knowledge must bear any particular relationship to the enterprise whose business is involved.368 Thus, in Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36, French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in a joint judgment (Gummow J and Crennan J agreeing in separate judgments) accepted that it would be open to trace a statement in an ambulance officer’s records (about what happened to a person who had fallen and injured himself) to “bystanders”, but the requirement of personal knowledge was not satisfied because “the bystanders did not have personal knowledge of the fall, and could not reasonably be supposed to have had it: … the fall took place before the bystanders arrived”. The requirement of “personal knowledge” creates difficulties in respect of statements of opinion contained in a business record (see [EA.69.210]).

[EA.69.210]

“the asserted fact”

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The hearsay rule (s 59) does not apply to a “representation” in a document (falling within the terms of s 69(1)) if the representation is based (under s 69(2)(a) or (b)) on “personal knowledge of the asserted fact”. The term “asserted fact” is defined in s 59(2) to mean a fact the existence of which can reasonably be supposed was intended to be asserted in the representation. It was noted at [EA.59.90] that a representation in the form of an “opinion” as to the existence of a fact would appear to fall within the scope of that term. In Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 569; [2003] FCA 933 at [18] Hely J held that “[g]iven that s 69 is to be construed broadly, and that at least in some contexts ‘fact’ may include an opinion (without statutory extension), in my view s 69 of the Act is capable of operation even if the asserted fact is an opinion in relation to a matter of fact”.369 Thus, an expert auditor’s report on the financial position of the company can fall within the description of forming “part of the records belonging to or kept by ... (an) organisation in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business”.370 Nevertheless, a potential difficulty may arise in admitting assertions of opinion under s 69, given the requirement (directly or indirectly) of “personal knowledge” (as defined in s 69(5)). When an opinion is expressed regarding the existence of some fact, the person expressing the opinion often did not “see, hear or otherwise perceive” that the fact exists (or existed). This will usually be the case when the representation is made by an expert. Both the Evidence Act 1905 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1898 (NSW) provided that personal knowledge was not required where the representation was “made by an expert on the subject matter” of the representation. There is no comparable provision in this Act. It has been suggested that this is a lacuna in the 367. See HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Clements [2014] NSWSC 290 at [14]. 368. See Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303 at [8] per Barrett J. 369. See also New South Wales v Mannall [2005] NSWCA 367 at [145]; Young v Coupe [2004] NSWSC 546 at [14]. 370. Forbes Engineering (Asia) Pte Ltd v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675, Collier J at [102]–[103]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 69

371

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legislation. However, in Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 569; [2003] FCA 933 at [19] Hely J held that the requirement of personal knowledge of the asserted fact is satisfied in relation to opinions expressed out of court by experts “because the asserted fact consists of opinions which they themselves had formed and expressed”. This analysis may reveal some confusion – the “asserted fact” in that case is not the opinion itself but the fact in respect of which the opinion is given. An expert has personal knowledge of his or her opinion, but may not have personal knowledge of the fact in respect of which the opinion is given. Of course, if the existence of the opinion is itself a relevant fact, there would be no problem372 – the problem arises where the opinion is only relevant for the purpose of proving the fact about which the opinion is expressed. A better answer than that provided by Hely J in Ringrow may be that the expert will still have personal knowledge for the purposes of s 69(5) if his or her opinion (“knowledge”) of the fact “was or might reasonably be supposed to have been based on what the [expert] saw, heard or otherwise perceived” (that is, it is not necessary that the person expressing the opinion “saw, heard or otherwise perceived” that the fact in respect of which the opinion is given exists or existed). An alternative solution may be that the evidence would be admissible under Pt 3.3 (with the previous representation involved not being caught by the hearsay rule at all or, alternatively, one of the hearsay exceptions applying to it). As to whether evidence of an opinion which does satisfy the requirements of s 69 must also comply with the requirements of Pt 3.3, see [EA.76.120]. This problem with applying the requirement of personal knowledge to an expression of opinion in a business record was discussed by French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in a joint judgment (Gummow J and Crennan J agreeing in separate judgments) in Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36. In that case, an ambulance officer’s records relating to a person who had fallen and injured himself contained the words: “? Fall from 1.5 metres onto concrete”. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ noted authority that “asserted fact” in this provision includes an opinion in relation to a matter of fact and then stated: But the construction of “asserted fact” to include an opinion in relation to a matter of fact, though convenient, is a little strained. In one sense every person who holds an opinion has personal knowledge of it, and indeed is the only person to have personal knowledge of that person’s opinion. But to hold an opinion that the respondent fell in a certain way (or that there is a question about it) is different from having personal knowledge that he fell in that way (or that there is a question about it): that personal knowledge could normally only be derived from seeing or perhaps hearing the event, not by drawing inferences from other circumstances observed some time later. However, it was not argued in this Court that the authorities which state that “asserted fact” includes an opinion in relation to a matter of fact are wrong. It is not necessary further to deal with this point, which the parties did not debate at any stage. 371. See discussion in Cross on Evidence (Butterworths, Aust ed, looseleaf service), para [46,855]. 372. For example, in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] FCA 1131, Greenwood J held that a number of opinions expressed by corporate officers in business records were relevant to establish that those opinions were held (because this bore on the question of the corporation’s purpose in engaging in certain ventures). Obviously enough, the corporate officers had personal knowledge of their own opinions. Similarly, in Lancaster v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 820; 247 A Crim R 165; [2014] VSCA 333, hearsay evidence that a psychiatrist had made a particular diagnosis was held admissible because the making of the diagnosis was regarded as a relevant fact (at [57]–[64]).

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It is regrettable that the issue was not further discussed, because these observations raise more questions than they answer. While it is, on the face of it, accepted that the requirement of “personal knowledge” is not satisfied on the basis that a person who expresses an opinion has personal knowledge of the opinion, the implication that the person must have actually perceived the event about which the opinion is expressed plainly leaves things in an unsatisfactory state (in relation to, for example, expressions of expert opinion). Subsequent to this judgment, in ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) (2012) 207 FCR 448; 301 ALR 326; [2012] FCA 1355, Perram J regarded the observations in the High Court as dicta and, in any event, did not “accept that the mere fact that an interpretation is ‘strained’ means inevitably it is wrong” (at [65]). Perram J followed authority that “an opinion as to the existence of a fact falls within the scope of the term ‘asserted fact’ in s 69” (at [62]–[65]). On the other hand, in Sydney Attractions Group Pty Ltd v Schulman [2013] NSWSC 858 Sackar J, whilst implicitly approving the two preceding sentences at [88], held at [89] that an opinion not regarding fact but as to the law clearly does not fall within the scope of this provision.

[EA.69.240]

Pending proceedings and criminal investigations (s 69(3))

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In respect of this proposal, the ALRC stated (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 707): A representation made in the course of the investigation of an offence or for criminal proceedings cannot be adduced. The provision is derived from s 7D(3) of the Commonwealth Act … Without this provision, any note of information and rumour in police or private records gathered during the investigation of a crime would be admissible … It is necessary to limit the application of the proposal to avoid it being used to admit notes of information and rumour recorded in the solicitor’s file or to circumvent the firsthand hearsay proposals–for example, tendering a proof of evidence in the solicitor’s file or statements in the business’ files.

The ALRC also stated (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 707, n 175): The proposal would not prevent statements being used for a non-hearsay purpose – eg solicitor’s file notes of conversations to prove that something was said and what was said should this be relevant in interlocutory applications, professional negligence cases etc. In other cases the firsthand hearsay proposal should suffice.

It should be noted that s 69(3) refers to preparation or obtaining etc of “the representation”, not the document containing the (previous) representation.373 Thus: Retrieval to meet a subpoena with no change save from electronic to printed form could not cause s 69(3) to apply. Likewise, mere omission of items which do not alter the effect of what is sought to be admitted should not cause s 69(3) to apply. But when adjustments go further than that, in order to meet the requirements of litigation, the position may well be different and requires to be tested.374 373. See R v Dudko (2002) 132 A Crim R 371; [2002] NSWCCA 336 at [59]. 374. Edmunds-Jones Pty Ltd v Australian Women’s Hockey Assn Inc [1999] NSWSC 285 at [13] per Santow J. Santow J stated (at [15]) that where “data [has been] formatted for use in an excel spread sheet” further evidence is required as to whether the “formatting” in question rendered the evidence “inadmissible by virtue of s 69(3)(a) of the Act as having been reproduced with greater adaptation than mere retrieval and collation”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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In Averkin v Insurance Australia Ltd [2016] NSWCA 122, Leeming JA (McColl JA agreeing) discussed this provision at [112]–[113]: When paragraphs (a) and (b) are read together, it may be seen that both provisions look forward to future litigation, but they do so in quite different ways. Paragraph (a) will at least ordinarily require an answer to the question why the representation was prepared or obtained. If that was for the purpose of conducting litigation, or for or in contemplation of or in connection with litigation, then it applies. The words “for” (twice), “purpose” and “in contemplation” are all words which are directed to identifying a purpose. When there is such a purpose connecting the preparation or obtaining of the representation to litigation, then the subsection applies. In contrast, paragraph (b) turns on the circumstances in which the representation was made. No question of purpose arises; there must instead simply be a sufficient connection between the making of a representation and an investigation. True it is that the investigation must be one which relates to or leads to a criminal proceeding, and in that way paragraph (b) also looks to the future. It is in this way that there is a link between the representation and litigation.

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It has been held that the intention of s 69(3)(a) is to prevent the preparation of documents (once proceedings have commenced or are considered reasonably likely to commence) for use as evidence in situations where there would otherwise be no confirmatory material.375 However, it is not necessary for the party resisting admission of the evidence to show that the creator of the document had the purpose of making self serving statements. “It is, rather, that the possibility, bearing in mind human nature, to make self serving statements in such circumstances” which justifies application of the hearsay rule.376 Barrett J of the NSW Supreme Court has concluded:377 The purpose of the exclusion is … to prevent the introduction through this exception to the hearsay rule of hearsay material which is prepared in an atmosphere or context which may cause it to be self-serving in the sense of possibly being prepared to assist the proof of something known or at least apprehended to be relevant to the outcome of identifiable legal proceedings.

Thus, it would not apply to routine documents recording explanations/warnings given as precautions which might be of utility if legal proceedings later ensued.378 It would not apply where the document is “brought into existence for the purpose of [a government Department] conducting its affairs in proper order, and ensuring that complaints or matters that the Department thought should be investigated and dealt with were in fact investigated and dealt with”.379 In order for s 69(3)(a) to apply, a person must have “prepared” or “obtained” the representation (not the document) in contemplation etc of a proceeding. It is an unusual use of language to refer to the “preparing” of a representation, but the 375. Creighton v Barnes (No 2) (unreported, NSW SC, Cohen J, 18 September 1995). 376. Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1083 at [4](5)–(7) per Hamilton J; Averkin v Insurance Australia Ltd [2016] NSWCA 122, Leeming JA (McColl JA agreeing) at [114]. 377. Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303 at [12]. See also Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1083 at [4](5)–(7) per Hamilton J at 4(5)–(7); Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 984 per McDougall J at [23]–[24]. 378. See Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303; Atra v Farmers & Graziers Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281 followed. 379. New South Wales v Mannall [2005] NSWCA 367 at [141].

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reference is to the person who prepared, formulated, shaped or framed the terms in which the representation is made.380 This will typically be or include the maker of the representation. Lindgren J in the Federal Court has observed that “the person who ‘obtains’ a representation is a person who seeks the representation or procures it to be made. This person is not the maker of the representation, but may be a person who ‘prepared’ it”: at [26]. He concluded (at [27]): By referring to persons who prepared or obtained the representation, the legislature was attempting to encompass all those who might cause a representation to be made in the form which it takes.381

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It has been held that the expression contained in s 69(3)(a), “in contemplation of” and the expression contained in both s 69(3)(a) and (b)“in connection with” should be regarded as words of wide meaning.382 As regards the test of “contemplation”, it is the contemplation of the person who “prepared” or “obtained” the representation that matters.383 Lindgren J in the Federal Court concluded that “the expression ‘in contemplation’ means … ‘in view as a purpose’, ‘prospective’ or ‘expected’”: at [31]. The possibility of legal proceedings is not sufficient – proceedings must be likely or reasonably probable.384 Taking a purposive approach to the provisions, the issue is whether there is a “real risk of the mischief, to which s 69(3) is directed, arising”.385 Even if that test is satisfied, the existence of other reasons for the preparation of the document may well mean that the business records exception would still apply.386 Where litigation has begun and preparation of the document is recognised at the time as bearing a relevance to and as potentially playing a part in that litigation, then it is prepared “in contemplation of” or “in connection with” the litigation, even if the document is prepared with several purposes in view.387 In Nye v New South Wales (2002) 134 A Crim R 245; [2002] NSWSC 1268 at [20] O’Keefe J held that representations by a witness at a Royal Commission regarding a police investigation that had taken place years before (which had led to a criminal 380. Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Advanced Medical Institute Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 1357 per Lindgren J at [25]; BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq) v Binetter (No 4) [2016] FCA 1351 at [351]. 381. See also Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v MDS Diagnostics Pty Ltd (2010) 85 IPR 525; [2010] FCA 108, Bennett J at [111]–[112]. 382. R v Rondo (2001) 126 A Crim R 562; [2001] NSWCCA 540 at [96] per Smart AJ; Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1083 at [4](3) per Hamilton J. 383. Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Advanced Medical Institute Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 1357 per Lindgren J at [23]. 384. Nikolaidis v Legal Services Commissioner [2007] NSWCA 130 per Beazley JA at [61] (see also Hodgson JA at [91]); Waterwell Shipping Inc v HIH Casualty & GIO Ltd (unreported, NSW SC, Giles CJ Comm D, 8 September 1997); Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1083 per Hamilton J at [9]; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Advanced Medical Institute Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 1357 per Lindgren J at [43]; Lewincamp v ACP Magazines Ltd [2008] ACTSC 69 at [24]. 385. Keane v Caravan City Cowra Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 942 per Rothman J at [15]. 386. Compare Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 984 per McDougall J at [36]–[38]. 387. Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303 at [18] per Barrett J; Timms v Commonwealth Bank [2003] NSWSC 576 at [15] per Barrett J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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proceeding) were not made “in connection with an investigation relating or leading to a criminal proceeding”. The Royal Commission was not investigating any crime and could only recommend that consideration be given to criminal proceedings. The evidence given by the witness at the Royal Commission was not made “in connection with” the earlier police investigation – it was simply about what had occurred during the investigation. The policy behind this exclusion did not justify such a broad interpretation of the words “in connection with” to justify the application of the hearsay rule to the evidence of the witness. Conversely, in Thomas v New South Wales (2008) 74 NSWLR 34; [2008] NSWCA 316, a majority of the NSW Court of Appeal held that a representation made in testimony given before a Royal Commission was made “in connection with” the proceeding constituted by the Royal Commission.388

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It has been held that the term “Australian or overseas proceeding” “must mean a proceeding to which the party, otherwise entitled to the document, is a party”.389 Similarly, in Kang v Kwan (2002) 11 BPR 20623; [2002] NSWSC 1187 at [177] Santow J drew a distinction between the proceedings before him (which were a “mere possibility”) and other proceedings actually in contemplation when the document in question was prepared, holding that he was satisfied that s 69(3) did not prevent the adducing of the evidence. This approach is highly questionable. Section 69(3)(a) refers to “an Australian … proceeding” and it is the contemplation of legal proceedings, regardless of whether they prove to be the proceedings in which the issue of admissibility arises, which justifies the non-application of this hearsay exception. It is suggested that Hamilton J was correct when he stated in Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1083 at [4](3) “that what is referred to in subs (3)(a) and (b) respectively is not the proceeding in which the tender of material is sought to be made, or a proceeding to which the investigation referred to in (b) has led, but simply a proceeding or an investigation”.390 Subsequently, in Australian Medic-Care Co Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (No 4) (2008) 170 FCR 9; 249 ALR 381; [2008] FCA 1038, Finn J stated at [13]–[14]: In Kang v Kwan [2002] NSWSC 1187 Santow J, in a very brief passage in his judgment, held that the relevant misrepresentation must have been prepared or obtained in contemplation of the very proceedings in which the document is sought to be used. No reference was made by his Honour to authorities dealing with this question under either the Evidence Act or earlier similar provisions. For my own part, I am satisfied that the decision of Santow J places an undue limitation upon the clear wording of s 69(3) and is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the provision itself. Section 69(3) refers only to a proceeding without any limitation as to parties: see the observations of Hamilton J in Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 1083 at [4](4). The unreliability of evidence of representations made or prepared in a context which might cause the representation to be self serving is, in my view, as likely to exist whether or not the proceedings in contemplation was the one in which the 388. See discussion in Addenbrooke Pty Ltd v Duncan (No 5) [2014] FCA 625 at [89]–[94]. 389. Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd v Hapag-Lloyd AG [1998] NSWSC 644. This is a somewhat surprising holding (a “characterisation” which was “noted” without further comment by Barrett J in Vitali v Stachnik [2001] NSWSC 303 at [14]). The concerns as to reliability would appear to arise regardless of whether “the party, otherwise entitled to the document” was a party to the proceedings. 390. See also Timms v Commonwealth Bank [2003] NSWSC 576 at [14] per Barrett J.

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representation was sought to be tendered. It is, in my view, unsurprising that the decision of Santow J has in this respect attracted criticism: see Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (7th ed) at [1.3.2880]. For my own part I am not prepared to follow the Kang v Kwan decision. I am satisfied that the legal proceedings in contemplation referred to in s 69(3) relate to any legal proceedings in which the representation might become admissible and is not confined to the proceedings in which the statement is sought to be tendered.

A “proceeding” in “court” (defined in the Dictionary to the Act) is “not one confined to proceedings which involve the determination of a suit or action, civil or criminal, between opposing parties ie proceedings which can be regarded as a lis inter partes”.391 Accordingly, it extends to, for example, a coronial inquiry. The winding up of an insolvent company by a liquidator appointed by the court is a process which is ultimately subject to the control of the court and is a proceeding in the court.392

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It is an interesting question whether, pursuant to s s 69(3)(b), it is necessary that a “criminal proceeding” actually commenced. As Besanko J explained in Lewincamp v ACP Magazines Ltd [2008] ACTSC 69 at [29], where “no criminal proceeding ever eventuates, it makes little sense to describe an investigation as relating or leading to a criminal proceeding”. On the other hand, as Besanko J went on to say at [29]: [H]aving regard to the purpose of the section, it may be unduly restrictive to require there to have been an actual criminal proceeding. The purpose of this exception to the business records exception is to exclude representations made in business records which might have a self-serving motivation such as to undermine their reliability. One can imagine circumstances where such a self-serving motivation exists in connection with an investigation, though the investigation never in fact leads to a criminal proceeding. But if an investigation does not in fact relate or lead to a criminal proceeding, it must be of a type such as to relate or lead, in the ordinary course of events, to a criminal proceeding.

In Averkin v Insurance Australia Ltd [2016] NSWCA 122, Leeming JA (McColl JA agreeing) held at [115] that “the criminal proceedings in paragraph (b) likewise need not be in existence at the time the representation is made, and indeed need never in fact commence”. However, the investigation393 in connection with which the representation was made must be extant at the time it is made in order to fall within s 69(3)(b).394 It is not sufficient if a representation is made in connection with a possible investigation in the future, which in turn might lead to criminal proceedings. 391. Nicholas J in BestCare Foods Ltd v Origin Energy LPG Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1304 at [12]. 392. Rosseau Pty Ltd (in liq) v Jay-O-Bees Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 50 ACSR 565; [2004] NSWSC 818; De Bortoli Wines Pty Ltd v HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) (2011) 200 FCR 253; 281 ALR 454; [2011] FCA 645 at [29]. 393. In Averkin v Insurance Australia Ltd [2016] NSWCA 122, Leeming JA (McColl JA agreeing) stated at [119] that whether there was an “investigation” will “turn on the facts of a particular case. Some investigations may be formal, some less so”. It was held (Basten JA dissenting) that an “investigation” had not commenced at the time of the relevant representation (at [121]–[122]). 394. Averkin v Insurance Australia Ltd [2016] NSWCA 122, Leeming JA (McColl JA agreeing) at [118]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.69.270]

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“no record kept” (s 69(4))

Similar provisions were contained in earlier legislation relating to business records395 and considered in a number of cases.396

[EA.69.300]

Proof of documents

Sections 48, 49 and 50 deal with the ways in which evidence of the contents of documents may be adduced.

[EA.69.330]

Computer-produced evidence

Evidence of a previous representation caught by s 59 may be a document which has been produced by a computer (of course, not all computer records are hearsay – the computer itself may generate information rather than reproduce information stored in it: [EA.59.150]). To be admissible the contents of the document must be relevant (see ss 55, 56 and 57(1)). Since the contents of the document are only likely to be relevant where they in fact constitute evidence of the records contained within the computer, it will be necessary to rely on Pt 2.2 (whereby evidence of the contents of the computer record may be adduced by tendering the document). In addition, since the document is caught by s 59, this provision (s 69) allows it to be admitted notwithstanding the hearsay rule where its requirements are satisfied (that is, the document is a business record within the terms of s 69). Assistance in establishing those requirements may be provided by s 183.

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[EA.69.360]

“processes, machines and other devices”

Sections 146 and 147 relate to evidence and documents produced by “processes, machines and other devices”.

[EA.69.390]

Request to produce documents or call witnesses

The general provisions relating to the “request system” were noted in the introduction of this Division of the Act. The ALRC explained the application of these provisions to business records (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 707): The present Commonwealth Evidence Act 1905 does not provide a general mechanism by which the party against whom the business record is led may question the persons who supplied the information kept in the record or made the entries in the record … The party relying on the record will at times need to call those responsible for the entries and runs the risk of little weight being given to the record if they are not called. Some protection for the other party, however, is needed in both civil and criminal trials. It is proposed that the court have the power to direct the calling of persons involved in making the record. This together with adequate discovery, and the right to cross examine the officer who verifies the conditions of admissibility should be sufficient protection. The need to give such a direction will arise where there is a genuine dispute on a matter arising out of or related to the representation … The proposal provides 395. Evidence Act 1905 (Cth), s 7E; Evidence Act 1898 (NSW), s 14CH; Evidence (Business Records) Interim Arrangements Act 1984 (NT), s 8; Evidence Act 1910 (Tas), s 40F; Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 79F. 396. See Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 567; Prasad v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 23 ALD 183; 101 ALR 109.

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[EA.69.480]

more guidance by identifying matters to be considered – the importance of the evidence; whether there is a genuine dispute; whether there is reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the representation, document etc; the cost and delay involved in complying with the order; the nature of the proceedings.

Under the request system a party may request, among other things, that “a specified person believed to be concerned in production or maintenance of a specified document or thing” (s 166(c)) or “the person who made the previous representation” (s 166(f)) be called as a witness. The Act encourages the party intending to adduce hearsay evidence to give proper notice, whether or not the notice preconditions to admissibility apply. If proper notice is given, institution of the “request” system is subject to a time limit (subject to being overridden by the court). In Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Parnell Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 537; 159 ALR 477; [1998] FCA 1580 the issue arose as to whether the procedural requirements of the “request system” might “preclude” the admission of business records evidence. No notice had been given of the proposed tender of the documents and the opposing parties argued that s 168(5) entitled them to make a “request” within 21 days and that the documents could not be admitted until the procedure contemplated by Div 1 of Pt 4.6 had taken place. This submission was rejected on the basis that “there is nothing in ss 166–169 which demands that admissibility under s 69 can only be effected after the procedure which those sections impose has been undertaken”.397 For further discussion of this issue, see [EA.169.60].

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[EA.69.420]

Credibility evidence

Section 108A permits a party against whom hearsay evidence has been admitted, without the maker of the previous representation being called, to tender evidence relevant to the credibility of the person who made the representation.

[EA.69.450]

Criminal proceedings

The ALRC stated that “the proposal on business records does not distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings”. However, it stated (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 709) that: … it is appropriate, however, for the court to have regard to the special nature of the criminal trial. In particular, a judge should be more willing to make orders requested by an accused.

[EA.69.480]

Commonwealth records

Under the Commonwealth Act only, s 182(1) operates to apply s 69 to: … documents that: (a) are, or form part of, Commonwealth records; or (b) at the time they were produced were, or formed part of, Commonwealth records …

in respect of “all proceedings in an Australian court” under s 5. “Commonwealth record” is defined in the Dictionary. Section 182(2) ensures that s 69 applies to 397. Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Parnell Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 537; 159 ALR 477; [1998] FCA 1580 at 541. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

491

[EA.69.510]

s 69

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence 398

any version of the hearsay rule. Section 182(5) ensures that s 69 “does not derogate from the operation of a law of a State or Territory that enables evidence of” business records “to be given”.

[EA.69.510]

Proof by affidavit or written statement (Division 2 of Part 4.6)

Evidence of a fact that is “to be proved in relation to a document or thing” under s 69, may (in accordance with Div 2 of Pt 4.6) be given by a person permitted under s 171 to give such evidence – by affidavit or, if the evidence relates to a public document (see Dictionary), by a written statement. The evidence may include evidence based on the knowledge and belief of the person who gives it, or on information that that person has: s 172. A copy of the affidavit or statement must be served on each party a reasonable time before the hearing of the proceeding: s 173(1). The party who tenders the affidavit or statement must, if another party so requests, call the deponent or person who made the statement to give evidence but need not otherwise do so: s 173(2). Of course, Div 2 of Pt 4.6 does not provide an exclusive means of proving the matters under this provision.399

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[EA.69.540]

Burden and standard of proof

The burden of proof is on the party arguing that a document (or part of document) is admissible.400 In accordance with s 142(1), that party will have to satisfy the court of the factual pre-conditions for admissibility “on the balance of probabilities”. However, in Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 984, McDougall J held at [30] that s 69(3) should be construed as an exception to the operation of s 69(2) (rather than a further condition of admissibility) so that the party opposing admissibility bore the onus of showing that the exception was made out. In Averkin v Insurance Australia Ltd [2016] NSWCA 122, Basten JA at [7]–[8] (McColl and Leeming JJA agreeing) observed that there are reasons to question that assumption and the issue was not resolved. Wherever the onus lies, pursuant to s 142(1), the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.401 Section 183 permits a court to draw reasonable inferences from a document.402 In Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26, Leeming JA (Basten and Gleeson JJA agreeing) stated at [91]: 398. That is, where a hearsay rule applying in a court is different from the hearsay rule in the Act, s 69 operates as an exception to the hearsay rule applicable in that court. 399. 1165 Stud Road Pty Ltd v Power [2015] VSC 476 at [10]. 400. Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [17]; Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26 at [85]. 401. There is no need to establish any of the requirements of s 69 with “unequivocal clarity”: Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26 at [96]. 402. In Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 35) [2014] VSC 59, Forrest J erred at [40] by relying on s 58 (which refers to determinations of relevance), rather than s 183, for the purposes of drawing inferences from a document. However, since there are no substantive differences between s 58 and s 183, the error has no practical significance. In Traffıc Calming Australia Pty Ltd v CTS Creative Traffıc Solutions Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 741, Almond J at [112] drew inferences from the documents in question to conclude that they were not business records.

492

Uniform Evidence Law

s 69

Part 3.2 - Hearsay

[EA.69.600]

[Section] 183 of the Evidence Act authorises a court to draw reasonable inferences from the document itself as well as from other matters from which inferences may properly be drawn. That provision provides that where a question arises about the application of the Act to, inter alia, the operation of s 69 to a document, then the court may “draw any reasonable inferences” from the document as well as from other matters from which inferences may properly be drawn.

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In that case, inferences were drawn from both the documents sought to be admitted pursuant to this provision and from other matters. Thus, for example, an inference was drawn that the documents were copies of business records of a particular company from the fact that the documents were produced to the court pursuant to court order addressed to the company (at [98]). An inference was drawn from the documents themselves that they were copies of contemporaneous file notes maintained by the company for the purposes of its business (at [98]). Similarly, inferences were drawn from the documents that they were automatically generated (at [107]). Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that other evidence relied upon to prove the requirements of this provision may include a previous representation in the document itself which is not caught by the operation of the hearsay rule in s 59 (because evidence of the previous representation is relevant for a purpose other than to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person who made the representation intended to assert by the representation). Thus, in Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd v Calleja [2018] NSWCA 26, Leeming JA (Basten and Gleeson JJA agreeing) stated at [109] that “in order to apply s 69(2), it is necessary to look to the particular representations which are said to be outside the operation of the hearsay rule” and took into account such representations to infer that “the the file notes disclose a series of representations reflecting conversations made at the same time as, or immediately before, the file notes were made, by the person who participated in those conversations”.

[EA.69.570]

Discretionary exclusion

The discretionary and mandatory exclusion provisions (ss 135–138) may be utilised to exclude evidence to which s 69 applies (see [EA.135.150]).403

[EA.69.600]

Other provisions

The effect of s 8 is that provisions in other legislation relating to evidence of a business record are preserved. Thus, for example, s 1305 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) makes admissible, in any legal proceedings, a “book” kept by a body corporate under a requirement of that Act.404 In ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 Austin J held at [229]–[231] that the discretionary provisions in Pt 3.11 (including s 135) may be utilised to exclude evidence rendered “admissible” by this provision.

403. For a good example of the application of s 135 in this context, see Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 35) [2014] VSC 59 at [46]–[65]. 404. See Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Arthur Yates & Co Ltd (2003) 21 ACLC 592; [2003] NSWSC 281; Timms v Commonwealth Bank [2003] NSWSC 576 at [24]–[25] per Barrett J); ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 at [223]–[321]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

493

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 70

Cth Act: 70 Exception: contents of tags, labels and writing (1) The hearsay rule does not apply to a tag or label attached to, or writing placed on, an object (including a document) if the tag or label or writing may reasonably be supposed to have been so attached or placed: (a) in the course of a business; and (b) for the purpose of describing or stating the identity, nature, ownership, destination, origin or weight of the object, or of the contents (if any) of the object. Note: Section 182 gives this subsection a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records.

(2) This section, and any provision of a law of a State or Territory that permits the use in evidence of such a tag, label or writing as an exception to a rule of law restricting the admissibility or use of hearsay evidence, does not apply to: (a) a Customs prosecution within the meaning of Part XIV of the Customs Act 1901; or (b) an Excise prosecution within the meaning of Part XI of the Excise Act 1901. Note: Section 5 extends the application of this subsection to proceedings in all Australian courts.

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[Subs (2) am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 34 and 35; Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 5] [S 70 am Act 113 of 2015; Act 34 of 1997]

NSW Act: 70

Exception: contents of tags, labels and writing The hearsay rule does not apply to a tag or label attached to, or writing placed on, an object (including a document) if the tag or label or writing may reasonably be supposed to have been so attached or placed: (a) in the course of a business, and (b) for the purpose of describing or stating the identity, nature, ownership, destination, origin or weight of the object, or of the contents (if any) of the object. Note: The Commonwealth Act has an additional subsection. It provides that the exception does not apply to Customs and Excise prosecutions. Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act extends the application of that subsection to proceedings in all Australian courts.

Vic Act: 70

Exception—contents of tags, labels and writing The hearsay rule does not apply to a tag or label attached to, or writing placed on, an object (including a document) if the tag or label or writing may reasonably be supposed to have been so attached or placed— (a) in the course of a business; and (b) for the purpose of describing or stating the identity, nature, ownership, destination, origin or weight of the object, or of the contents (if any) of the object. 494

Uniform Evidence Law

s 70

Part 3.2 - Hearsay

[EA.70.120]

Note: The Commonwealth Act has an additional subsection. It provides that the exception does not apply to Customs and Excise prosecutions. Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act extends the application of that subsection to proceedings in all Australian courts.

ACT Act: 70

Exception—contents of tags, labels and writing

The hearsay rule does not apply to a tag or label attached to, or writing placed on, an object (including a document) if the tag or label or writing may reasonably be supposed to have been attached or placed— (a) in the course of a business; and (b) for the purpose of describing or stating the identity, nature, ownership, destination, origin or weight of the object, or of the contents (if any) of the object. Note: The Commonwealth Act, s 70 includes an additional subsection providing that the exception does not apply to customs and excise prosecutions. The Commonwealth Act, s 5 extends the application of the subsection to proceedings in all Australian courts.

NT Act:

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70

Exception — contents of tags, labels and writing

The hearsay rule does not apply to a tag or label attached to, or writing placed on, an object (including a document) if the tag or label or writing may reasonably be supposed to have been so attached or placed: (a) in the course of a business; and (b) for the purpose of describing or stating the identity, nature, ownership, destination, origin or weight of the object, or of the contents (if any) of the object. Note for section 70: The Commonwealth Act has an additional subsection. It provides that the exception does not apply to Customs and Excise prosecutions. Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act extends the application of that subsection to proceedings in all Australian courts.

[EA.70.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 62, para 129; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 712.

[EA.70.60] Differences between provisions The Commonwealth provision has an additional subsection which provides that the exception does not apply to Customs and Excise prosecutions. Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act extends the application of s 70(2) to proceedings in all Australian courts.

[EA.70.90] “business” This term is defined in cl 1 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary.

[EA.70.120]

“may reasonably be supposed”

The party adducing the evidence does not have to satisfy the court that the tag or label or writing was attached or placed as specified. It will be enough that it “may reasonably be supposed” to have been so attached or placed (see [EA.62.60]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

495

[EA.70.150]

[EA.70.150]

s 70

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

Commonwealth records

Under the Commonwealth Act only, s 182(1), subject to s 182(3), operates to apply s 70(1) to documents405 that: (a) are, or form part of, Commonwealth records; or (b) at the time they were produced were, or formed part of, Commonwealth records …

in respect of “all proceedings in an Australian court” under s 5. Section 182(3) provides: (3) Subsection (1) applies to subsection 70(1) only in relation to tags or labels that may reasonably be supposed to have been attached to objects in the course of carrying on an activity engaged in by a body, person or organisation referred to in the definition of “Commonwealth record” in the Dictionary.

The phrase “tags or labels attached to objects” is defined by s 182(4)(b) to include “a reference to writing placed on objects”. Section 182(2) ensures that s 70(1) applies to any version of the hearsay rule.406 Section 182(5) ensures that s 70(1)“does not derogate from the operation of a law of a State or Territory that enables evidence of” business records “to be given”.

[EA.70.180]

Customs and excise prosecutions [Cth Act only]

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Under s 70(2) these prosecutions are excluded from the operation of s 70(1) (and any other analogous hearsay exceptions).

[EA.70.210]

Proof by affidavit or written statement (Division 2 of Part 4.6)

Evidence of a fact that is “to be proved in relation to a document or thing” under s 70, may (in accordance with Div 2 of Pt 4.6) be given by a person permitted under s 171 to give such evidence – by affidavit or, if the evidence relates to a public document (see Dictionary), by a written statement. The evidence may include evidence based on the knowledge and belief of the person who gives it, or on information that that person has: s 172. A copy of the affidavit or statement must be served on each party a reasonable time before the hearing of the proceeding: s 173(1). The party who tenders the affidavit or statement must, if another party so requests, call the deponent or person who made the statement to give evidence but need not otherwise do so: s 173(2).

405. Section 182(4)(a) defines this word to include “a reference to writing placed on objects”. 406. That is, where a hearsay rule applying in a court is different from the hearsay rule in the Act, s 70(1) operates as an exception to the hearsay rule applicable in that court.

496

Uniform Evidence Law

s 71

Part 3.2 - Hearsay

Cth Act: 71 Exception: electronic communications The hearsay rule does not apply to a representation contained in a document recording an electronic communication so far as the representation is a representation as to: (a) the identity of the person from whom or on whose behalf the communication was sent; or (b) the date on which or the time at which the communication was sent; or (c) the destination of the communication or the identity of the person to whom the communication was addressed. Note 1: Division 3 of Part 4.3 contains presumptions about electronic communications. Note 2: Section 182 gives this section a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records. Note 3: Electronic communication is defined in the Dictionary. [S 71 subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 33]

NSW Act:

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71

Exception: electronic communications

The hearsay rule does not apply to a representation contained in a document recording an electronic communication so far as the representation is a representation as to: (a) the identity of the person from whom or on whose behalf the communication was sent, or (b) the date on which or the time at which the communication was sent, or (c) the destination of the communication or the identity of the person to whom the communication was addressed. Notes: 1 Division 3 of Part 4.3 contains presumptions about electronic communications. 2 Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 71 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records. 3 Electronic communication is defined in the Dictionary. [S 71 subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[30]]

Vic Act: 71

Exception—electronic communications The hearsay rule does not apply to a representation contained in a document recording an electronic communication so far as the representation is a representation as to— (a) the identity of the person from whom or on whose behalf the communication was sent; or (b) the date on which or the time at which the communication was sent; or (c) the destination of the communication or the identity of the person to whom the communication was addressed. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

497

[EA.71.30]

s 71

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

Notes: 1 Division 3 of Part 4.3 contains presumptions about electronic communications. 2 Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 71 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records. 3 Electronic communication is defined in the Dictionary.

ACT Act: 71

Exception—electronic communications The hearsay rule does not apply to a representation contained in a document recording an electronic communication so far as the representation is a representation as to— (a) the identity of the person from whom or on whose behalf the communication was sent; or (b) the date or time when the communication was sent; or (c) the communication’s destination or the identity of the person to whom the communication was addressed. Note 1: Div 4.3.3 contains presumptions about electronic communications. Note 2: The Commonwealth Act, s 182 gives the Commonwealth Act, s 71 a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records. Note 3: Electronic communication —see the dictionary.

NT Act:

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71

Exception — electronic communications The hearsay rule does not apply to a representation contained in a document recording an electronic communication so far as the representation is a representation as to: (a) the identity of the person from whom or on whose behalf the communication was sent; or (b) the date on which or the time at which the communication was sent; or (c) the destination of the communication or the identity of the person to whom the communication was addressed. Notes for section 71: 1 Part 4.3, Division 3 contains presumptions about electronic communications. 2 Section 182 of the Commonwealth Act gives section 71 of the Commonwealth Act a wider application in relation to Commonwealth records. 3 Electronic communication is defined in the Dictionary.

[EA.71.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 6.43–6.62; ALRC 38, s 63, para 129; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 711.

[EA.71.60] General comments This provision, prior to amendment following on ALRC 102, was based on existing legislation in several States and Territories.407 In ALRC 102 it was 407. Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 53; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 75; Evidence Act 1910 (Tas), s 41; Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 82. See ALRC 26, para 711.

498

Uniform Evidence Law

s 71

Part 3.2 - Hearsay

[EA.71.90]

observed at para 6.58 that “ways of communicating electronically are expanding and changing rapidly” so that “a broad and flexible approach to this technology is needed”. It was proposed (paras 6.57–6.61) that the provision: should be amended to replace the words “a document recording a message that has been transmitted by electronic mail or by a fax, telegram, lettergram or telex’ with the words ‘an electronic communication”, as defined in s 5 of the Electronic Transactions Act.

It was concluded (para 6.59) that the term “electronic communication” would embrace all modern electronic technologies, including telecommunications, as well as the more outmoded fax, telegram, lettergram and telex methods of communication. As the Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act states in respect of this provision: This clause provides a broad and flexible definition of the technologies which fall within the exception to the hearsay rule for telecommunications. This definition is not device-specific or method-specific and embraces all modern electronic technologies. It is also intended to be sufficiently broad to capture future technologies.

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See also similar observations in the Explanatory Memoranda to the Commonwealth and New South Wales amending Acts in respect of this provision. This provision operates to create an exception to the hearsay rule for the specified representations. However, that does not necessarily mean that the evidence of the representation will be admissible in the proceeding.408 For example, a representation as to “the identity of the person from whom or on whose behalf the communication was sent” may not satisfy the requirement of relevance if there is no evidence on the basis of which it could reasonably be found that the represented identity was the true identity (see ss 55-58).

[EA.71.90]

Definitions

The term “document” is defined in the Dictionary: “document” means any record of information, and includes: (a) anything on which there is writing; or (b) anything on which there are marks, figures, symbols or perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them; or (c) anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else; or (d) a map, plan, drawing or photograph.

In addition, cl 8 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides: 8. References to documents A reference in this Act to a document includes a reference to: (a) any part of the document; or (b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of the document or of any part of the document; or (c) any part of such a copy, reproduction or duplicate. 408. Prior v Wood [2017] FCA 193 at [78]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.71.120]

s 71

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

The term “electronic communication” is defined in the Dictionary and, as a result of that definition, means: (a) a communication of information in the form of data, text or images by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy, or both, or (b) a communication of information in the form of sound by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy, or both, where the sound is processed at its destination by an automated voice recognition system.

For commentary on that definition, see [EA.Dict.Pt.1.90].

[EA.71.120]

Presumptions

For the message to be used for the specified purposes, evidence of transmission will be necessary. However, Div 3 of Pt 4.3 contains presumptions about electronic communications (s 161), lettergrams and telegrams (s 162). Further, reasonable inferences may be drawn from the document itself under s 183.

[EA.71.150]

Commonwealth records

Under the Commonwealth Act only, s 182(1) operates to apply s 71 to documents that: (a) are, or form part of, Commonwealth records; or

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(b) at the time they were produced were, or formed part of, Commonwealth records …

in respect of “all proceedings in an Australian court” under s 5. “Commonwealth record” is defined in the Dictionary. Section 182(2) ensures that s 71 applies to any version of the hearsay rule.409 Section 182(5) ensures that s 71“does not derogate from the operation of a law of a State or Territory that enables evidence of” business records “to be given”.

[EA.71.180]

Proof by affidavit or written statement (Division 2 of Part 4.6)

Evidence of a fact that is “to be proved in relation to a document or thing” under s 71, may (in accordance with Div 2 of Pt 4.6) be given by a person permitted under s 171 to give such evidence – by affidavit or, if the evidence relates to a public document (see Dictionary), by a written statement. The evidence may include evidence based on the knowledge and belief of the person who gives it, or on information that that person has: s 172. A copy of the affidavit or statement must be served on each party a reasonable time before the hearing of the proceeding: s 173(1). The party who tenders the affidavit or statement must, if another party so requests, call the deponent or person who made the statement to give evidence but need not otherwise do so: s 173(2).

409. That is, where a hearsay rule applying in a court is different from the hearsay rule in the Act, s 70(1) operates as an exception to the hearsay rule applicable in that court.

500

Uniform Evidence Law

s 72

Part 3.2 - Hearsay

[EA.72.30]

Cth Act: 72 Exception: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a representation about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group. [S 72 subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 34]

NSW Act: 72 Exception: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a representation about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group. [S 72 subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[31]]

Vic Act: 72 Exception—Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs

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The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a representation about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group. Note: Section 72 formerly provided an exception for contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc. Such provision can now be found in section 66A.

ACT Act: 72 Exception—Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a representation about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group. NT Act: 72 Exception — Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a representation about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group. Note for section 72: Section 72 formerly provided an exception for contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc. Such provision can now be found in section 66A.

[EA.72.30] ALRC References ALRC 102, paras 19.2–19.75.

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[EA.72.60]

[EA.72.60]

s 72

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

General comments

Prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102, this provision created a hearsay rule exception for “contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc”. That exception may now be found in s 66A. The current s 72 was proposed in ALRC 102. At paras 19.16 to 19.17 it was stated: There are several contexts in which it is necessary to adduce evidence of ATSI traditional laws and customs. The most common currently is in proceedings under the Native Title Act; however, this is not the only area in which this issue arises. Indeed, it is likely that it will become increasingly important in other areas of law, particularly as native title claims will ultimately expire. Evidence of ATSI traditional laws and customs is also relevant to areas of law such as criminal law defences, sentencing, coronial matters, succession, family law, and placement of children. Other legal contexts in which the admissibility of evidence of ATSI traditional laws and customs may be important include proceedings arising under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), and similar state and territory legislation, such as the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (SA).

At para 19.74 it was concluded:

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Amending the uniform Evidence Acts to provide an exception to the hearsay rule for evidence relevant to ATSI traditional laws and customs would make the rules of evidence more responsive to the ATSI oral tradition. Currently, a large proportion of evidence of ATSI traditional laws and customs could be objected to on hearsay grounds. The amendment proposed by the Commissions would shift the focus from whether there is a technical breach of the hearsay rule, to whether the particular evidence is reliable.

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act’s provision states: The laws of evidence have treated information passed on orally as a second class form of knowledge. In Australian Indigenous societies, the value given to information about traditional law and custom passed on via oral tradition is determined by considering factors such as the actual transmission, the source of the information, and the person to whom it has been passed. This clause does not treat orally transmitted evidence of traditional law and custom as prima facie inadmissible, as this is the form by which law and custom are maintained under Indigenous traditions. The intention of this clause is to make it easier for evidence of traditional law and customs to be adduced where relevant and appropriate. The exception shifts the focus away from whether there is a technical breach of the hearsay rule, to whether the particular evidence is reliable. Factors relevant to reliability or weight will include the source of the representation, the persons to whom it has been transmitted, and the circumstances in which it was transmitted. The requirements of relevance in clauses 55 and 56 may operate to exclude representations which do not have sufficient indications of reliability. Reliability can be enhanced through use of judicial powers to control proceedings, to create a culturally appropriate context for the giving of evidence regarding the existence or content of particular traditional laws and customs.

See also similar observations in the Explanatory Memoranda to the Commonwealth and New South Wales amending Acts in respect of this provision.

[EA.72.90] Definitions The term “traditional laws and customs” is defined in the Dictionary: 502

Uniform Evidence Law

s 73

Part 3.2 - Hearsay

[EA.72.90]

“traditional laws and customs” of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group (including a kinship group) includes any of the traditions, customary laws, customs, observances, practices, knowledge and beliefs of the group.

For commentary on this definition, see [EA.Dict.Pt.1.180].

Cth Act: 73

Exception: reputation as to relationships and age (1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation concerning: (a) whether a person was, at a particular time or at any time, a married person; or (b) whether 2 people cohabiting at a particular time were married to each other at that time; or (c) a person’s age; or (d) family history or a family relationship.

[Subs (1) am Act 129 of 2017, s 3 and Sch 3 item 7]

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(2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by a defendant unless: (a) it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted; or (b) the defendant has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the defendant’s intention to adduce the evidence. (3) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted. [S 73 am Act 129 of 2017]

NSW Act: 73

Exception: reputation as to relationships and age (1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation concerning: (a) whether a person was, at a particular time or at any time, a married person, or (b) whether a man and a woman cohabiting at a particular time were married to each other at that time, or (c) a person’s age, or (d) family history or a family relationship.

(2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by a defendant unless: (a) it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted, or (b) the defendant has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the defendant’s intention to adduce the evidence. (3) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Vic Act: 73 Exception—reputation as to relationships and age (1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation concerning— (a) whether a person was, at a particular time or at any time, a married person; or (b) whether a man and a woman cohabiting at a particular time were married to each other at that time; or (c) a person’s age; or (d) family history or a family relationship. (2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by an accused unless— (a) it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted; or (b) the accused has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the intention of the accused to adduce the evidence. [Subs (2) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.16]

(3) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted. [S 73 am Act 68 of 2009]

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ACT Act: 73

Exception—reputation as to relationships and age (1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation about— (a) whether a person was, at a particular time or at any time, a married person; or (b) whether a man and a woman cohabiting at a particular time were married to each other at the time; or (c) a person’s age; or (d) family history or a family relationship.

(2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence presented by a defendant unless— (a) it tends to contradict evidence mentioned in subsection (1) that has been admitted; or (b) the defendant has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the defendant’s intention to present the evidence. (3) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence presented by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence mentioned in subsection (1) that has been admitted.

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[EA.73.60]

NT Act: 73 Exception — reputation as to relationships and age (1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation concerning: (a) whether a person was, at a particular time or at any time, a married person; or (b) whether a man and a woman cohabiting at a particular time were married to each other at that time; or (c) a person’s age; or (d) family history or a family relationship. (2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by a defendant unless: (a) it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted; or (b) the defendant has given reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the defendant’s intention to adduce the evidence. (3) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted.

[EA.73.30] ALRC references

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ALRC 38, para 129; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 710.

[EA.73.60] General comments The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 710) that its proposal was similar to that enacted in the United States Federal Rules of Evidence: see FRE 803(19) and (20), FRE 804(b)(4). Section 73(1) allows, in civil proceedings, hearsay evidence of reputation as to age410 and certain relationships. There is no definition of the term “reputation”, which is defined in The Macquarie Dictionary to mean “the estimation in which a person or thing is held, especially by the community or the public generally”. In Ceedive Pty Ltd v May [2004] NSWSC 33, Levine J took a very broad view of the concept, holding at [11] that it “does not require anything more, in the context of this case, than a statement that the witness’s knowledge is acquired based upon a conversation with one person”. However, in Cvetkovic v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 329 Campbell JA (Simpson J and Whealy J agreeing) stated at [353]: Before any evidence falls within section 73, it must be evidence of “reputation concerning” one of the subject matters listed in section 73(1)(a)–(d). While “reputation” is concerned with beliefs held about matters relating to a person, rather than the truth of those matters relating to a person, a belief would need to be held by more than one person before it rose to the status of “reputation”. It may be that a belief would need to be held by a considerably more than one person before it amounted to a “reputation”, but it is unnecessary to explore that matter.

The rest of the provision deals with criminal proceedings. A “criminal proceeding” is defined in the Dictionary (see commentary at [EA.Dict.Pt.1.60]). 410. See Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 55. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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“family history or family relationship” (s 73(1)(d))

This provision has been utilised in native title claims.411 It has been held412 that the reference to evidence of reputation concerning “a family relationship” is directed to evidence of the fact of a relationship, not its quality. Thus, reputation evidence of a possible sexual relationship between a defendant’s wife and another was not within the purview of the provision. In Day v Couch [2000] NSWSC 230 Bryson J held that “family history” did not include “detailed real estate transactions”. In Ceedive Pty Ltd v May [2004] NSWSC 33, Levine J held at [9] that “family history … does not mean family gossip”. He added: Family history in its ordinarily understood meaning in my view encompasses date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, date and place of cohabitation in the 21st century or the 20th century and place of work of ancestors of the witness.

However, in certain contexts this may be an unduly narrow approach to the provision.

[EA.73.120]

Criminal proceedings: defence (s 73(2))

This limitation was not proposed by the ALRC. However, it prevents the defence surprising the prosecution with hearsay evidence of reputation and, in combination with s 73(3), gives the prosecution a proper opportunity to rebut such evidence. The term “reasonable notice in writing” is undefined. Presumably the situation referred to in s 73(2)(a) is where hearsay evidence of reputation has been adduced by a co-defendant (having given proper notice under s 73(2)(b)). Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[EA.73.150]

Criminal proceedings: prosecution (s 73(3))

The ALRC explained that the limitation as to prosecution evidence in criminal proceedings was “necessary to avoid second-hand hearsay of family relationships being tendered against an accused person in incest prosecutions or bigamy charges”.413 However, if hearsay evidence of reputation has been adduced by the defence in accordance with s 73(2), the limitation is removed in respect of evidence which “tends to contradict” it.

[EA.73.180]

Service

Section 181 permits proof of service of “a written notification, notice, order or direction” by affidavit “of the person who served, gave or sent it”.

Cth Act: 74

Exception: reputation of public or general rights

(1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation concerning the existence, nature or extent of a public or general right.

411. See, for example, Yamirr v Northern Territory (No 2) (1998) 82 FCR 533. 412. R v Mrish (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 15 August 1996). 413. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 710.

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[EA.74.30]

(2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted. NSW Act: 74

Exception: reputation of public or general rights

(1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation concerning the existence, nature or extent of a public or general right. (2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted. Vic Act: 74

Exception—reputation of public or general rights

(1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation concerning the existence, nature or extent of a public or general right. (2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted. ACT Act:

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74

Exception—reputation of public or general rights

(1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation about the existence, nature or extent of a public or general right. (2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence presented by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence mentioned in subsection (1) that has been admitted. NT Act: 74

Exception — reputation of public or general rights

(1) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation concerning the existence, nature or extent of a public or general right. (2) In a criminal proceeding, subsection (1) does not apply to evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless it tends to contradict evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (1) that has been admitted.

[EA.74.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 64, para 129; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 710.

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s 75

General comments

This provision is based on an existing common law exception, but omits a number of restrictions that operate in respect of that exception.414 Under the common law, the term “public right” is one affecting the community in general.415 A “general right” is one affecting a particular class, such as the rights of a group of Aboriginals in respect of a particular piece of land.416 Thus, this provision has been utilised in native title claims.417 However, the provision has no application where the disputed right is characterised as private.418

[EA.74.90] Criminal proceedings: prosecution (s 74(2)) The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 710) that the limitation as to prosecution evidence in criminal proceedings was necessary because “the existence of a public or general right may be a key issue – is a road a public road (compare proceedings for offences relating to the Franklin dam)?” However, if hearsay evidence of reputation has been adduced by the defence in accordance with s 74(1), the limitation is removed in respect of evidence which “tends to contradict” it. The definition of “criminal proceeding” in the Dictionary is extracted in the discussion of s 73.

Cth Act: 75

Exception: interlocutory proceedings

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In an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source. NSW Act: 75

Exception: interlocutory proceedings In an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source.

414. See ALRC 26, vol 1, para 710. The restrictions that have been removed are the requirement that the previous representation must have been made by a person deceased at the time of the trial, the requirement that any statement upon which the reputation evidence is based was made prior to the dispute arising, and the requirement that the declarant have special “competence”. 415. Brett v Beales (1830) 10 B & C 508; 109 ER 539. 416. Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141; Mabo v Queensland [1992] 1 Qd R 78; Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; 218 ALR 292; [2005] FCA 50. 417. See, for example, Yamirr v Northern Territory (No 2) (1998) 82 FCR 533; Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; 218 ALR 292; [2005] FCA 50. 418. See Earl of Dunraven v Llewellyn (1850) 15 QB 791; 117 ER 657; White v Taylor (No 2) [1969] 1 Ch 150.

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[EA.75.90]

Vic Act: 75 Exception—interlocutory proceedings In an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source. ACT Act: 75

Exception—interlocutory proceedings In an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who presents it also presents evidence of its source. NT Act: 75

Exception — interlocutory proceedings

In an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source.

[EA.75.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 65, para 143(f).

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[EA.75.60] General comments The Rules of most federal, Territory and State Supreme Courts include a similar provision. The purpose of the provision is to facilitate the conduct of interlocutory proceedings in circumstances where it is often difficult, at short notice, to adduce evidence in direct and admissible form.419 As Spigelman CJ (Allsop P and Hodgson JA agreeing) observed in NSW Crime Commission v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349 at [43], this provision “is based on a recognition that interlocutory applications frequently need to be made on an urgent basis, when direct evidence may not be able to be gathered in sufficient time or where it is undesirable to alert the other party”. This hearsay exception applies not only to first-hand, but also to more remote, hearsay (with the safeguard being possible discretionary exclusion under s 135).420 This view was substantially endorsed by Carr J in the Full Federal Court421 (the other members of the court not needing to address the question). It has subsequently been followed.422

[EA.75.90] “an interlocutory proceeding” The ALRC explained that the term “interlocutory proceedings” refers to “proceedings that are not final, usually dealing with procedural problems that arise in preparing a case for trial, but including proceedings for injunctions 419. Wily v Terra Cresta Business Solutions Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 949 per Palmer J at [11]. 420. Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 1; 190 ALR 1 at [117] per Merkel J; ACCC v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia SRL (No 4) (2012) 298 ALR 251; [2012] ATPR 42-423; [2012] FCA 1323 at [116]. 421. Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 317; [2003] FCAFC 153 at [64]–[66]. 422. Liu v The Age Co [2010] NSWSC 1176 at [38]–[39]; United Dairy Power Pty Ltd v Murray Goulburn Co-operative Co Ltd [2011] FCA 762 at [53]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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423

pending the trial of an action”. It has been held that an application to dismiss a proceeding for want of prosecution is interlocutory because “it would not be based on or involve any decision on the rights of the parties, and would not act as res judicata”.424 Conversely, a judgment obtained by a plaintiff as a result of a summary judgment application is a final order, so that the proceedings pursuant to which it is made cannot be considered interlocutory.425 As Lindgren J in the Federal Court has pointed out in Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 3) (1996) 64 FCR 55 at 58: The nature of the proceedings is to be determined not by the form of them, for example, by the fact that they are brought by notice of motion in existing proceedings, but by reference to the kind of relief sought.

Lindgren J cited the statement of Windeyer J in Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 444:

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[A] final order is one which finally disposes (subject to appeal) of an action or an existing dispute between the parties.

However, Lindgren J noted that there can be considerable difficulty in applying such a formula. Even a decision, which all would acknowledge to be interlocutory, finally disposes of the particular issue the subject of that decision, subject to any right of appeal. He noted that some orders are regarded as interlocutory on the basis that “they contemplate that the parties will be before the same court again when a decision will be made which will determine the parties’ jural relations after which they will not be before that court again on the same matter”. In deciding that a proceeding for an injunction permanently restraining the exercise of a right was not, in the particular circumstances, an interlocutory proceeding, he was influenced by the fact that the right was not an incidental part or adjunct of other proceedings, but was independent and self-standing.426 Similarly, in Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424; [2004] FCA 332, Gyles J held that a decision in a proceeding to seek to enforce a common law right or immunity derived from legal professional privilege (and thus not simply ancillary to a proceeding in a court) will be a final resolution of the dispute or controversy between the parties. On the other hand, a Full Court decision of the Federal Court has declined to draw a distinction between orders intended to have “only interim effects” and proceedings “more conventionally and obviously regarded as interlocutory”.427 The court considered that a “restraining order” under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 (ACT) was an interlocutory order for the purposes of s 75, bearing in mind the need to avoid application of rigid procedural rules in “urgent cases”. The court stated (at 49): It may be conceded that the ordinary test to determine whether an application is interlocutory is whether the order finally determines the rights of the parties, see eg 423. See ALRC 38, para 143, n 33. 424. Chapmans Ltd v Davey [1998] NSWSC 148 (followed in Aylett v Attorney-General (Tas) (2003) 11 Tas R 315; [2003] TASSC 19 at [6] per Cox CJ). 425. Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd v Baylily Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 82, Hodgson JA (Beazley JA agreeing) at [135]. 426. See Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 3) (1996) 64 FCR 55 at 59. See also Wentworth v Wentworth (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 8 April 1997). 427. Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Hiep (1998) 86 FCR 33.

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[EA.75.90]

Sanofi v Parke Davis Pty Ltd (No 1) (1982) 149 CLR 147 at 152 and that such test concerns the legal rather than the practical or real effect of the order in question: ibid at 153. However, in our view, the application of those tests confirms the approach we have taken. Nor, in our view, is there any requirement, in order to constitute interlocutory proceedings, that there must be engrafted a requirement that there is also to be “a principal cause pending between them”, cf Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 443 per Windeyer J. It is simply that in most cases where the issue arises, and of course it commonly arises in the context of whether an appeal from an order or decision lies as of right or only by leave, there will be some such principal cause pending.

It is apparent that care must be taken in relying on decisions regarding the meaning of the terms “final” and “interlocutory” in different contexts.428 As the Full Court of the Federal Court has observed:

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It is not difficult to find good reason for allowing relaxation of the hearsay rule in a narrower category of cases than that in which the right of appeal is truncated by a requirement for leave. The latter requirement merely places the parties in the hands of the court. Relaxation of the hearsay rule may substantially affect the outcome of the proceedings or the way in which they are conducted.429

Rares J of the NSW Supreme Court has also emphasised a distinction between the operation of this provision and the question of whether evidence on information and belief would be sufficient to satisfy the applicable standard of proof.430 Rares J held that the expression “interlocutory proceeding” in this provision “ordinarily will take the character of the proceeding in the Court in which it is conducted as determinative” and that an application for judgment on the basis that proceedings were an abuse of process “would necessarily be interlocutory since the order that would be made determining it will either permit the proceedings to continue to a final hearing or will terminate the proceedings with an order that is interlocutory”.431 There is conflicting authority on the question whether a hearing in relation to preliminary discovery is an “interlocutory proceeding” even though the relief provided for finally determines the rights of the parties in relation to question of discovery.432 It has been held that a voir dire pursuant to s 189 is not an “interlocutory proceedings” for the purposes of this provision.433 However, the contrary view has been taken in Crime Commission (NSW) v Cassar (2012) 224 A Crim R 448; [2012] NSWSC 1170, where Rothman J (without referring to this earlier authority) held at [44]–[46] that a voir dire to determine the admissibility of business records was an “interlocutory proceeding” for the purposes of this provision. Similarly, in R v Nona (2015) 254 A Crim R 301; [2015] ACTSC 175, Refshauge J of the ACT Supreme Court held at [37]–[48] that such a proceeding 428. See Salter Rex & Co v Ghosh [1971] 2 QB 597 at 600–601; Tampion v Anderson (1973) 48 ALJR 11 at 12–13. 429. Malouf v Malouf (1999) 86 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 284 at [33] per Beaumont, Lee and Dowsett JJ; see also Bruce F McLaren Holdings Pty Ltd v McLaren & McLaren (2000) 155 FLR 403. 430. Ashby v Commonwealth (No 3) (2012) 206 FCR 444; [2012] FCA 788 at [10]–[11]. 431. Ashby v Commonwealth (No 3) (2012) 206 FCR 444; [2012] FCA 788 at [8]. 432. See Liu v The Age Co [2010] NSWSC 1176 at [25]–[36]. 433. Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 637. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 75

is interlocutory, since it would “not determine the rights of the parties finally; … it will only ‘decide how the cause is to be conducted’”.

[EA.75.120]

“evidence of its source”

Where the proceedings are interlocutory, “evidence of [the] source” of hearsay evidence will, in practice, be sufficient evidence (usually, but not necessarily, in affidavit form434) to identify the source, and thus allow proper investigation by another party (or the court).435 Palmer J stated in Wily v Terra Cresta Business Solutions Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 949 at [11]–[12]: [T]he requirement of the section that the source of the information be revealed goes some way to assisting the court in assessing the reliability of that evidence. Without any indication of the source of the evidence proffered on information and belief, the court is unable to assess its weight nor can the opponent test the evidence or make any sensible submission as to its weight. In the present case … the endeavours on the part of the liquidator to keep secret the identity of the litigation funder – if there is a funder – has caused me great concern. I do not think that the requirement of s 75 is fulfilled by identifying “the source” of evidence on information and belief by the sole description “our client”.436

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There must be identification of a particular source who is reasonably likely to have knowledge of the relevant fact.437 This does not necessarily require identification of the “ultimate source” of the information.438 It has been observed: As a general rule, where affidavit evidence is given on information and belief, the “source” (or at least the primary source) of that information includes the identification of the person or persons who supplied the information. [However], in circumstances of urgency the court may accept a general statement of sources as sufficient compliance. The question as to what is a sufficient disclosure of sources must be decided according to the exigencies of each particular case.439

[EA.75.150]

Opinion evidence

The exception to the hearsay rule created by this provision in respect of interlocutory proceedings is not an exception to the opinion rule in s 76.440 434. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 222 at [45] per Einstein J. 435. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Ahern (No 2) [1988] 2 Qd R 158 at 163, cited by Spigelman CJ in Crime Commission (NSW) v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349 at [44]. See also Registrar of Aboriginal Corps v Murnkurni Women’s Aboriginal Corporation (1995) 58 FCR 125; 137 ALR 404 at [413]; De Bortoli Wines Pty Ltd v HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) (2011) 200 FCR 253; 281 ALR 454; [2011] FCA 645 at [40]–[43]. 436. This passage was cited by Spigelman CJ in Crime Commission (NSW) v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349 at [45]. 437. Spigelman CJ (Allsop P and Hodgson JA agreeing) in Crime Commission (NSW) v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349 at [46]. See also Prior v Wood [2017] FCA 193 at [77]. 438. Spigelman CJ (Allsop P and Hodgson JA agreeing) in Crime Commission (NSW) v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349 at [42]. 439. Australian Gift and Homewares Assn Ltd v Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Trust (Ruling No 1) [2014] VSC 481, Derham AsJ at [79]. 440. Terranora Group Management Pty Ltd v Terranora Lakes Country Club Ltd (in liq) (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 1 December 1997). See also [EA.76.120].

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[EA.75.180]

Part 3.3 - Opinion

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.3.30]

Other provisions

Section 70(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) provides that the court may dispense with the rules of evidence for proving any matter that is not bona fide in dispute in civil proceedings. Pursuant to s 9(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), that provision (which originally appeared in the Supreme Court Act 1970) has been applied to dispense with the requirement in s 75 that evidence must be adduced of the source of the hearsay evidence in question.441 Similar provisions to s 70(1)(a) exist in other jurisdictions.

Part 3.3 – Opinion [EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.3.30]

Summary of this Part

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This Part establishes, in s 76, the “opinion rule”, which excludes evidence of an opinion (which is sought to be used “to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed”). The two major exceptions to this rule are opinions substantially based on specialised knowledge (s 79) and non-expert opinions which are based on what a witness saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event (s 78). Section 80 makes it clear that evidence of an opinion may not be excluded simply on the basis that it is about “a matter of common knowledge” or an ultimate issue in the proceeding. An overview of opinion evidence is provided in the diagram below. 442

441. Broke Hills Estate Pty Ltd v Oakvale Wines Pty Ltd (2005) 23 ACLC 1266; [2005] NSWSC 638 per Gzell J at [15]. 442. Produced by the Judicial College of Victoria. Available at: http:// www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/publications/uniform-evidence-resources. Reproduced with permission. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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: Opinion evidence

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FIGURE 4

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514

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s 76

Part 3.3 - Opinion

Cth Act: 76 The opinion rule (1) Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of an opinion contained in a certificate or other document given or made under regulations made under an Act other than this Act to the extent to which the regulations provide that the certificate or other document has evidentiary effect. [Subs (2) insrt Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 14] Note: Specific exceptions to the opinion rule are as follows: • summaries of voluminous or complex documents (subsection 50(3)); • evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence (section 77); • lay opinion (section 78); • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (section 78A); • expert opinion (section 79); • admissions (section 81); • exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and convictions (subsection 92(3)); • character of and expert opinion about accused persons (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions.

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Examples: (1)

P sues D, her doctor, for the negligent performance of a surgical operation. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P’s neighbour, W, who had the same operation, cannot give evidence of his opinion that D had not performed the operation as well as his own. (2) P considers that electrical work that D, an electrician, has done for her is unsatisfactory. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P cannot give evidence of her opinion that D does not have the necessary skills to do electrical work.

[S 76 am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 35; Act 125 of 1999]

NSW Act: 76

The opinion rule

(1) Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of an opinion contained in a certificate or other document given or made under regulations made under an Act other than this Act to the extent to which the regulations provide that the certificate or other document has evidentiary effect. [Subs (2) insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[10]] Note: Specific exceptions to the opinion rule are as follows: • summaries of voluminous or complex documents (section 50(3)) • evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence (section 77) • lay opinion (section 78) • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (section 78A) • expert opinion (section 79) © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 76

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• admissions (section 81) • exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and convictions (section 92(3)) • character of and expert opinion about accused persons (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Examples: 1 P sues D, her doctor, for the negligent performance of a surgical operation. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P’s neighbour, W, who had the same operation, cannot give evidence of his opinion that D had not performed the operation as well as his own. 2 P considers that electrical work that D, an electrician, has done for her is unsatisfactory. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P cannot give evidence of her opinion that D does not have the necessary skills to do electrical work. [S 76 am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[32]; Act 53 of 2000]

Vic Act: 76

The opinion rule

Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed.

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Notes: 1 The Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act include an additional subsection. 2 Specific exceptions to the opinion rule are as follows— • summaries of voluminous or complex documents (section 50(3)) • evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence (section 77) • lay opinion (section 78) • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (section 78A) • expert opinion (section 79) • admissions (section 81) • exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and convictions (section 92(3)) • character of and expert opinion about an accused (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Examples: 1 P sues D, her doctor, for the negligent performance of a surgical operation. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P’s neighbour, W, who had the same operation, cannot give evidence of his opinion that D had not performed the operation as well as his own. 2 P considers that electrical work that D, an electrician, has done for her is unsatisfactory. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P cannot give evidence of her opinion that D does not have the necessary skills to do electrical work.

ACT Act: 76

The opinion rule

(1) Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of an opinion contained in a certificate or other document given or made under a regulation made under an 516

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Act other than this Act to the extent to which the regulation provides that the certificate or other document has evidentiary effect. Note: Specific exceptions to the opinion rule are as follows: • summaries of voluminous or complex documents (s 50(3)) • evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence (s 77) • lay opinion (s 78) • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (s 78A) • expert opinion (s 79) • admissions (s 81) • exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and convictions (s 92(3)) • character of and expert opinion about accused people (s 110 and s 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Examples: 1 P sues D, her doctor, for the negligent performance of a surgical operation. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P’s neighbour, W, who had the same operation, cannot give evidence of his opinion that D had not performed the operation as well as his own. 2 P considers that electrical work that D, an electrician, has done for her is unsatisfactory. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P cannot give evidence of her opinion that D does not have the necessary skills to do electrical work. Note: An example is part of the Act, is not exhaustive and may extend, but does not limit, the meaning of the provision in which it appears (see Legislation Act, s 126 and s 132).

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76

The opinion rule

(1) Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of an opinion contained in a certificate or other document given or made under regulations made under an Act other than this Act to the extent to which the regulations provide that the certificate or other document has evidentiary effect. Notes for section 76: Specific exceptions to the opinion rule are as follows: • summaries of voluminous or complex documents (section 50(3)) • evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence (section 77) • lay opinion (section 78) • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (section 78A) • expert opinion (section 79) • admissions (section 81) • exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and convictions (section 92(3)) • character of and expert opinion about accused persons (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Examples for section 76: 1 P sues D, her doctor, for the negligent performance of a surgical operation. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P’s neighbour, W, who had the same operation, cannot give evidence of his opinion that D had not performed the operation as well as his own. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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2 P considers that electrical work that D, an electrician, has done for her is unsatisfactory. Unless an exception to the opinion rule applies, P cannot give evidence of her opinion that D does not have the necessary skills to do electrical work.

[EA.76.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 66, para 143(f).

[EA.76.60] Differences between the provisions The Victorian provision does not include subsection (2).

[EA.76.90] General comments

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The ALRC explained its “opinion evidence” proposals (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 738): It being proposed to maintain an exclusionary rule, the proposals must draw a distinction between evidence of fact and evidence of opinion. As has been pointed out, a major criticism of the law at present is the artificiality of this distinction. Attention has been drawn to the presence of a continuum between evidence in the form of fact and evidence in the form of opinion, the one at times passing imperceptibly into the other. The distinction, however, can serve a useful purpose and is, in the end, unavoidable. Evidence at the extreme of the continuum, which most would be prepared to classify as evidence of opinion, will generally be open to more dispute than material at the opposite end, which most would classify as evidence of fact. For accuracy of fact finding and to minimise confusion and time-wasting, therefore, it is necessary to exercise some control upon material at the opinion end of the continuum. In addition, the distinction must be drawn if rules are to be advanced to control the admission of expert opinion evidence. The approach which has been adopted is to continue to use the fact/opinion distinction for the purposes of drafting an exclusionary rule but to minimise the difficulties flowing from its usage. This is achieved in part by making the primary question for the court the question of whether the evidence, be it “fact” or “opinion”, is based on the witness’ personal perception. If it is, lay opinion evidence (subject to other requirements) may be admissible. If it is not, the evidence of opinion will not be admissible unless it is expert testimony.

Section 76 creates a general exclusionary rule for opinion evidence (the opinion rule). However, it is important to note that the rule does not apply to any evidence of an opinion. Rather, it creates a rule that evidence of an opinion “is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed”. In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; [2011] HCA 21, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ stated at [31]: Section 76(1) expresses the opinion rule in a way which assumes that evidence of an opinion is tendered “to prove the existence of a fact”. That manner of casting the rule does not, as might be supposed, elide whatever distinction can be drawn between “opinion” and “fact” or invoke the very difficult distinction which sometimes is drawn between questions of law and questions of fact. It does not confine an expert witness to expressing opinions about matters of “fact”. Rather, the opinion rule is expressed as it is in order to direct attention to why the party tendering the evidence says it is relevant. More particularly, it directs attention to the finding which the tendering party will ask the tribunal of fact to make. In considering the operation of s 79(1) it is thus necessary to identify why the evidence is relevant: why it is “evidence that, if it were accepted, 518

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could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding”. That requires identification of the fact in issue that the party tendering the evidence asserts the opinion proves or assists in proving.

The position is similar to the hearsay rule, as it applies to representations. If evidence of an opinion is not adduced to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed, but adduced for some other purpose443, the opinion exclusionary rule does not apply. If the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible for that other purpose, it will be admitted (although, in a jury trial, if the evidence is not also admissible for the purpose of proving the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed, careful directions will be needed as to how the evidence can, and cannot, be used). Perram J in the Federal Court has given the following example: For example, a statutory power of a Minister may be made contingent on the existence of a particular opinion held by the Minister or a question may arise in employment litigation as to whether an employee was dismissed because the employer held a particular opinion about the employee. In both cases, the fact to be proved is the mental state of a person consisting of an opinion, but it is the fact of the opinion, and not the opinion as fact, which is being proved in such circumstances. Consequently, and in an orthodox fashion, s 76(1) is not engaged.444

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As regards the situation where evidence of opinion is relevant as evidence of the fact in respect of which the opinion is expressed and is also relevant and admissible for another purpose, see s 77. As the ALRC explained above, the Act does not attempt to define the term “opinion”.445 However, it has been observed in a subsequent decision, consistently with the views expressed by the ALRC, that an opinion is, in substance, an inference drawn or to be drawn from observed and communicable data.446 In Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in a joint judgment (Gummow J and Crennan J agreeing in separate judgments) proceeded on the assumption that this was the meaning of an “opinion”. In that case, ambulance officers’ records relating to a person who had fallen and injured himself contained the words: “? Fall from 1.5 metres onto concrete”. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ emphasised the question-mark and held that this was not “evidence of an opinion” that the injured man had in fact fallen from 1.5 metres onto concrete, or even evidence of 443. For example, evidence that A believed (on the basis of psychic experiences) that B had committed a murder may not be adduced to prove that B had committed the murder but, where A has testified for the prosecution regarding alleged admissions by B to A, as relevant to the credibility of A’s evidence (A’s belief may have affected his perception of what B actually said). 444. Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals v Samsung Bioepis AU Pty Ltd (2017) 351 ALR 103; [2017] FCAFC 193 at [152]. The Full Court of the Federal Court held that the opinion rule did not apply where the question on a preliminary discovery application was the reasonableness of a belief based on an opinion (Allsop CJ at [79]–[80], Perram J at [154]–[162]). 445. For a discussion by the ALRC of the meaning of the term “opinion” at common law, see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 156. See, in particular, R v Perry (No 4) (1982) 28 SASR 119. 446. Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 5) (1996) 64 FCR 73 at 75. See also Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [10], [27]–[38]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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an opinion that “that there was a question whether [the respondent] had fallen the 1.5 metres onto concrete” (at [37]–[38]). What was written had several possible meanings (at [28]). French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ concluded at [38]:

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The ambulance officers’ records are so shrouded in obscurity about what data they observed and suggest so great an unlikelihood that that data could support, or were seen as pointing to, any definitive inference that it is not possible to find on the balance of probabilities what the impugned representation was stating. It is therefore not possible positively to find that it stated an opinion.

This passage suggests that, to be evidence of an opinion to which this provision applies, the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a particular inference is being, or has been, drawn. It is true that, read literally, the provision only applies to evidence that is evidence “of an opinion” and this would support the proposition that it would not apply unless the court were satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that an opinion had been expressed. However, that is not the preferable interpretation of this provision. If the evidence is irredeemably ambiguous, it may not meet the requirement of relevance, on the basis that it would not be open to conclude that it rationally affected the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue (see [EA.55.60]). However, if the test of relevance is satisfied, and it is rationally open to conclude that a particular inference has been drawn, the application of this exclusionary rule should not turn on the court being satisfied “on the balance of probabilities” that the particular inference has been drawn. After all, the effect of s 76 is to create a rule of inadmissibility, subject to exceptions created by ss 77, 78 and 79. If it would be open to the tribunal of fact to find that a particular inference has been drawn (that is, a particular opinion expressed), the evidence should be subject to the operation of this Part. The provision should be construed in that light. Of course, in the vast majority of cases, there will not be any ambiguity regarding what was intended to be conveyed. The question will remain whether what was intended to be conveyed should properly be classified as involving the drawing of an inference. Thus, evidence about what professionals generally do in particular circumstances may be no more than evidence of fact about professional practices or professional standards.447 Evidence from a senior departmental officer of his knowledge of a practice by which Members of Parliament dealt with government departments is not opinion evidence.448 Nor is evidence from a computer expert describing the workings of a computer and describing what he personally did and observed in relation to the information derived from the hard drives of the computers because “he does not arrive at or form any conclusions, nor does he make any judgments by a process of reasoning from the facts that he observed”.449 Evidence given by an expert witness regarding observations of an attempted reconstruction of an accident is not opinion evidence.450 Nor is evidence from a forensic accountant summarising the financial records of a 447. ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 at [20] per Austin J. 448. Obeid v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 221 at [250]. 449. Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2011] VSC 272, Vickery J at [50]. 450. Collaroy Services Beach Club Ltd v Haywood [2007] NSWCA 21 per McColl and Bryson JJA at [57].

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company. Evidence from an anthropologist will “often be direct evidence of the anthropologist’s observations”.452 Even evidence expressed in the form of a “conclusion” may not be caught by this provision if it constitutes a summary or general statement about observed facts and does not involve the drawing of inferences from those facts.453 In some circumstances, evidence from a person of what that person would have done in a hypothetical situation is not an “opinion” under this provision, since the evidence does not involve the drawing of an inference.454 The NSW Court of Appeal has endorsed this view, Bryson JA stating: I do not find it possible to see evidence given by a person about his state of mind, in an actual or hypothetical situation, as an opinion. The state of a person’s mind is a fact and remains a fact whether what is under the discussion is an actual state of mind, or the state in which a person’s mind would be in some contingency which has not happened.455

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Similarly, the Full Court of the Federal Court has accepted this line of authority.456 Indeed, the Full Court of the Federal Court has concluded that a senior manager in a corporation giving evidence as how the corporation would have acted in a hypothetical situation is not giving opinion evidence.457 In contrast, the Victorian Court of Appeal has held that a Government Planning Minister giving evidence regarding the recommendations he would have expected to receive from a planning panel in certain hypothetical circumstances “could only have been an expression of his own opinion”.458 In a Federal Court decision, it was held that the statement by a member of the National Crime Authority that “the information then available did not identify …

451. Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v Toshiba Singapore Pte Ltd [2011] FCAFC 55 at [203]. 452. Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; 249 ALR 300; [2008] FCAFC 63 at [94]. 453. Compare Britt v Britt [2017] FamCAFC 27 at [40]–[41], [48]–[50], [55]. 454. Allstate Life Insurance Co at 75. See also Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (No 3) (1997) 80 FCR 276 per Finn J. It was held in both of these judgments that, even if the evidence did fall within the terms of s 76 (on the assumption that it applies both to evidence which is substantively an opinion and evidence in the form of an opinion), it would be rendered admissible by s 77. 455. Seltsam Pty Ltd v McNeill [2006] NSWCA 158 at [123] (Handley JA and Tobias JA agreeing). See also Vella v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 148 at [114]–[121]. 456. Fitness Australia Ltd v Copyright Tribunal (2010) 89 IPR 442; [2010] FCAFC 148 the Court observed at [65] that “[w]e do not think that it would be appropriate to depart from that approach”. 457. La Trobe Capital & Mortgage Corp Ltd v Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 299; 273 ALR 774; [2011] FCAFC 4, Finkelstein J (Jacobson and Besanko JJ agreeing) at [53]–[58]. Finkelstein J observed at [57] that the corporation’s state of mind was “discernible through its board and employees”, that the witness was “a senior manager responsible for, and with an intimate knowledge of, [the corporation’s] investment practices” and the evidence was “likely to be … the ‘most reliable evidence’ of what [the corporation] would have done”. 458. Love v Roads Corp (2014) 200 LGERA 76; [2014] VSCA 30 at [114]. It was held that evidence of that opinion was inadmissible because there was no evidence to show that he was qualified to give opinion evidence pursuant to s 79 about what the contents of the panel report or recommendations would have been in those circumstances: at [116]–[120]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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any particular suspect person in relation to any offence” was not an “opinion”.459 The Full Court (Wilcox, Whitlam and Lehane JJ) stated (at [22]): The substance of his evidence is that the Authority has no information that enables it to identify a particular offence or suspect. That is a statement of fact. It is true it is made by a person who has knowledge of the material currently before the Authority and is made after that person has read the material. But it is a statement about a negative fact. The circumstance that the statement concerns that material does not make it an inference from observed and communicable data, any more than it would be such an inference if a witness were to depose that a file did not contain any document printed on yellow paper.

In this context, a distinction may usefully be drawn between evidence of “experience” and evidence of “opinion”. Thus, a witness with experience of how a particular type of vehicle behaves in certain conditions may give relevant evidence of that experience, which is properly regarded as evidence of fact rather than opinion.460 Even if such experience is based in part on information provided by others, so that the hearsay rule (s 59) is applicable, the evidence of the witness will not constitute evidence of opinion unless the witness proceeds to draw some inference from that experience.461 Where the witness does seek to draw an inference and thus express an opinion, issues will arise as to expertise based on experience (see [EA.79.150]) and any hearsay basis of the opinion (see [EA.79.240]).

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The courts have acknowledged (as did the ALRC) that the distinction between evidence of “fact” and evidence of “opinion” assumes a dichotomy that is not always easy to draw462 and that it is “always a question of degree”.463 As a NSW Supreme Court judge has observed: 459. Bank of Valletta PLC v National Crime Authority (1999) 90 FCR 565; 165 ALR 60; (1999) 90 FCR 565, 165 ALR 60. 460. Compare, at common law, Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 490; Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436 at 442. See also R v Barker (1988) 34 A Crim R 141. In Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1) [2003] NSWSC 160, Shaw J held (at [16]) that evidence from a retired police officer who conducted numerous inquiries relating to the activities of prison escapees and testified regarding that “experience” was “properly described as opinion evidence since it relates to circumstances that he has not seen, heard or otherwise perceived”. It is suggested that a preferable analysis would be that it became opinion evidence when the witness drew inferences from that experience to the circumstances of the particular proceeding. The hearsay aspect of the experience raised different issues. 461. In Yara Pilbara Fertilisers Pty Ltd v Oswal [2016] VSC 440, it was concluded that certain evidence of a witness was opinion evidence because it “necessarily involves judgment, assessment and interpretation” (Dodds-Streeton JA at [138]). 462. See Kirby J in Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 at [52]; Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; [1998] FCA 1200 at 375 per Branson J; Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Assn Inc v Guide Dog Assn (NSW & ACT) (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 532 per Sackville J; Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; [2000] FCA 858 at [8]–[9] per Nicholson J; Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 at [472] per Mansfield J. For a recent example, see Partington v The Queen (2009) 197 A Crim R 380; [2009] NSWCCA 232 (discussed in the commentary on s 78), where Grove J considered at [66] that testimony from a witness that sounds she heard coming from the other side of a door were a person being repeatedly pushed against the door was “no more than descriptive of an auditory perception by a witness and whatever deductive or inferential process may have passed through the mind they were essentially inherent”, so that it was not evidence of an “opinion”. However, McClellan CJ at CL (RA Hulme J agreeing) accepted that the evidence was an opinion and this appears the preferable view given the risk of error in interpreting sounds.

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The line between opinion evidence and evidence of fact is not always clearly defined. Evidence of physical identification illustrates the point. On the one hand such evidence may be characterised as evidence of fact; but, depending on the circumstances, it may more properly be characterised as evidence of opinion. The ordinary observer would regard evidence given by a man identifying his wife of 30 years as evidence of fact; but a witness who identifies a suspect in a police lineup would be perceived as giving evidence more closely allied to opinion evidence.464

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In a subsequent decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal it was held that evidence from police officers that they identified the defendant as the person photographed by a bank security camera was “not evidence of an opinion but was direct evidence that a person shown in the photograph was the accused”.465 However, when this case went to the High Court, Kirby J held that the evidence should be regarded as opinion evidence “[g]iven all that is now known about the dangers of mistakes inherent in the process of identification (and recognition)”.466 While the other members of the High Court did not need to address this issue, the approach taken by Kirby J is persuasive. Kirby J accepted that a statement identifying a person, clearly depicted in a studio photograph, as one’s spouse (or partner), would normally be regarded as a statement of fact, but he noted that the experience of the law is that very great risks of wrongful conviction and miscarriages of justice can attend identification (and recognition) evidence generally, and particularly where such evidence is based on photographs. Where a real risk of misidentification is present (see [EA.114.240] and [EA.115.300]), it is appropriate to classify the evidence as opinion evidence. In R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356, Simpson J (McClellan CJ at CL and Rothman J agreeing) restated the position she had taken in Leung, observing at [43]–[44]: There may be many instances where identification from photographs, even if a person is well known to the witness as a spouse, has to be classified as opinion evidence. It cannot always be assumed that the photographic material will clearly depict the person who is its subject. The person may be partly obscured, or may be photographed from an unusual angle concealing facial or other defining features. In such a case, the evidence would properly, in my view, be classified as opinion evidence. The result of this analysis is that, in every case, it will be necessary to examine the nature of the evidence proposed to be adduced, and all relevant circumstances, before a determination can be made whether the evidence tendered falls into the category of opinion evidence and subject to the admissibility provisions of Pt 3.3 of the Evidence Act.

The High Court in Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 237 A Crim R 589; [2014] HCA 29 has reaffirmed the proposition that an opinion is “an 463. La Trobe Capital & Mortgage Corp Ltd v Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 299; 273 ALR 774; [2011] FCAFC 4, Finkelstein J (Jacobson and Besanko JJ agreeing) at [44]. 464. R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 at [43] per Simpson J. 465. R v Smith [1999] NSWCCA 317; (1999) 47 NSWLR 419 at [24] per Sheller JA. Sheller JA considered (at [22]) that, “to a witness who knows a person well enough to recognise that person on sight, there is no more inference involved in recognising that person as the person whose face is shown in a photograph than there is in recognising the same person when meeting that person in the street”. This may be true, but it is arguable that both involve evidence of opinion. Of course, whether the evidence is opinion or not may not matter much in practice, since it is arguable that it would fall within the terms of s 78 (but cf Simpson J in R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 at [30]–[35]; see generally [EA.78.60]). 466. Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 at [57]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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inference drawn from observed and communicable data” in the context of a case where an anatomist did not identify a defendant as the offender (and was not permitted to testify that there was a “high degree of anatomical similarity” between them) but pointed to anatomical “characteristics” which were said to be “similar” – the High Court accepted that the evidence of “identification of … physical characteristics” consisted of “inferences from … observations” and was, accordingly, opinion evidence.467

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On the other hand, the evidence will not be opinion evidence if the witness is, in reality, giving a description of events observed by the witness.468 Where the evidence is of “recognition” of someone very “familiar” (for example, a brother) and, it should be added, there is in the circumstances no real risk of misidentification, it may be appropriate to classify the evidence as evidence of “fact” (or “direct evidence”), not “opinion” evidence.469 The identification by a witness of an object as falling within a class of objects commonly encountered by members of the general public in ordinary life (for example, a remote control for a garage door) is not evidence of opinion.470 It may be that evidence as to what a person meant in making a particular statement (from the person to whom the statement was made) is not properly characterised as an “opinion”.471 In AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; 182 A Crim R 262; 82 ALJR 534; [2008] HCA 8, a judgment of the High Court determining an appeal from a jurisdiction where the common law rules of evidence applied, Heydon J observed at [114] that “identification by some form of intuition or feeling” is “inadmissible”, presumably on the basis that it would be opinion evidence to which no exception to the common law exclusionary rule applied. However, Heydon J also considered at [114] that “identification by circumstantial inference”472 was admissible. It is difficult to see how that can be correct. Assuming that it is properly categorised as evidence of opinion, the relevance of the opinion may be doubted (bearing in mind the principles applied in Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398: see [EA.55.270]). In any event, if this Act were applicable, it is difficult to see how the requirements of s 78 could be satisfied. Where an assertion is made without “full particulars”, the dividing line between fact and opinion may be more difficult to draw. In La Trobe Capital & Mortgage Corp Ltd v Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 299; 273 ALR 774; [2011] FCAFC 4 it was argued that an assertion that “loan applications totalling $2.4 million” were “rejected” during a particular period was evidence of an opinion in the absence of particulars of specific loan applications rejected. Finkelstein J (Jacobson and Besanko JJ agreeing) stated at [45]: In some cases it may be that an unparticularised statement will be inferential in nature. Thus, a summary as to the effect of a conversation may well be an opinion, albeit 467. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ at [21]. 468. R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 at [54]–[55], [60]. 469. R v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 at [31]; R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 at [68]–[71]. 470. Thi Dung Ta v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 32, James J at [72]. 471. Patrick v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 651; 241 A Crim R 153; [2014] VSCA 89 at [30]–[32]. 472. The particular inference was that the person who indecently assaulted X must have been Y rather than Z because Y was next to X on the bed at the time they went to sleep in the same bed.

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admissible lay opinion: Connex Group Australia Pty Ltd v Butt [2004] NSWSC 379. In other cases, a recollection of an observation may be imperfect, but not be inferential. A traffic officer might testify that s/he has observed thousands of vehicles without recalling the precise number. This evidence is not inferential.

Finkelstein J accepted at [46] that “[w]here evidence is not fully particularised, the dividing line between what is opinion and what is fact is not always easy to draw and clearly depends on the extent to which the evidence goes beyond the witness’ direct observations or perceptions” but concluded that the assertion regarding rejected loan applications “does not, when read in context, involve an inference” – the witness was “effectively saying that, although he could not recall rejections of specific loans, his general recollection was that one or more loans totalling $2.4 million were rejected”. This was “no less of a direct observation than if [the witness] had been able to point to a particular loan being rejected” (at [47]).473

[EA.76.120]

Hearsay evidence of an opinion

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In Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36, French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in a joint judgment (Gummow J and Crennan J agreeing in separate judgments) held at [19] that the opinion rule in s 76 is not confined to evidence of an opinion given by a witness in court – it applies to any evidence of an opinion, including out-of-court hearsay representations of opinion: Section 56(1) contemplates that relevant, ie otherwise admissible, evidence may be excluded by more than one exclusionary rule in Pts 3.2–3.11. One exclusionary rule is the hearsay rule. If evidence satisfies s 69, then by s 69(2) the hearsay rule does not apply. But s 69(2) does not provide that the evidence is admissible. It is only admissible if no other exclusionary rule applies. Section 76 excludes “[e]vidence of an opinion” – not “evidence by a witness of an opinion”. There is no indication in any other provision in Pt 3.3 that it operates only in relation to the opinions of witnesses.

Thus, the High Court rejected the view of Austin J of the NSW Supreme Court in ASIC v Rich (2005) 191 FLR 385; 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 at [205]–[222] that the opinion rule in s 76 is confined to evidence of an opinion given by a witness in court, so that it does not apply to out-of-court hearsay representations of opinion. Similarly, in Lancaster v The Queen [2014] VSCA 333, the Victorian Court of Appeal held at [68] that a representation in a business record that the mother of a child had formed the opinion that the child had “multiple personality disorder” was not admissible, notwithstanding s 69, because the opinion was not admissible pursuant to s 76 and none of the exceptions to that rule were shown to have applied.474 473. See also Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Assn Inc v Guide Dog Assn (NSW & ACT) (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 532; Bank of Valletta PLC v National Crime Authority (1999) 90 FCR 565; 165 ALR 60; (1999) 90 FCR 565, 165 ALR 60 at [22]. 474. However, it should be noted that the court also observed at [70] that, if the “opinion” was relevant as “a short hand descriptor of particular observed symptoms”, s 77 (combined with s 69) would operate to permit admission of the opinion notwithstanding the fact that neither s 78 or s 79 applied. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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In ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2010) 275 ALR 235; [2010] FCA 1131 Greenwood J in the Federal Court had followed the view of Austin J at [30]. It is suggested that Greenwood J was correct to conclude in that case that the requirements of s 79 did not need to be satisfied, but not for that reason. In ACCC v Cement Australia, a fact in issue was the purpose with which the defendant company entered a particular contract. Greenwood J held that a number of opinions expressed by corporate officers in business records were relevant to establish that those opinions were in fact held because this bore on the question of the company’s purpose in engaging in certain ventures. Thus, the opinions were relevant facts themselves, rather than relied on “to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed”. Accordingly, s 76 did not apply and there was no need to seek an exception to that provision under s 79.475 In contrast, the opinions admitted into evidence in ASIC v Rich were valuation opinions, where the evidence was only relevant to prove the fact asserted by the opinion.

[EA.76.150]

Evidence in the form of an opinion

The phrase “evidence of an opinion” would appear to cover both evidence which is substantively an opinion (an inference from “factual” data) and evidence in the form of an opinion.476

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[EA.76.180]

Exceptions to the Opinion Rule

As the Note to this provision states, a number of exceptions to the opinion rule are created by other provisions in this Act, including the exceptions in ss 77, 78 and 79. In addition, a number of provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) create exceptions to the opinion rule in criminal proceedings. For example, s 306V(1) provides that the opinion rule (and the hearsay rule) “do not prevent the admission or use of evidence of a previous representation” given by a “vulnerable person”, as defined, in an interview conducted by an investigating official. Similarly, s 289I provides that the opinion rule (and the hearsay rule) “do not prevent the admission or use of evidence of a representation” made in a recorded statement by a complainant in relation to a “domestic violence offence” when questioned by a police officer about that offence, so long as the recording was “made with the informed consent of the complainant” and the questioning occurred “as soon as practicable after the commission of the offence”. It is not at all clear why these exceptions to the opinion rule were created. If the evidence would have been inadmissible opinion evidence if given in court, it is not apparent why the situation should be different because of the circumstances in which the previous representation was made. Careful consideration would need to be given to discretionary exclusion in the particular circumstances of the case if the evidence would have been inadmissible if given in court.

475. Of course, s 77 might then apply to permit the use of the opinion to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. Greenwood J applied s 136 to prevent such a use (at [110]). 476. For example, a witness testifying that, in his or her opinion, another person was “intoxicated”. In fact, such evidence may be more a compendious description of observed phenomena than an opinion in the strong sense. However, it will be caught by the opinion rule, only being admitted if it satisfies the requirements of s 78.

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Cth Act: 77 Exception: evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. NSW Act: 77 Exception: evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. Vic Act: 77 Exception—evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed.

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ACT Act: 77 Exception—evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. NT Act: 77 Exception — evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed.

[EA.77.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 66, para 148.

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General comments

In some circumstances, an opinion may have multiple relevance. It may be relevant as evidence of the fact in respect of which the opinion is expressed and relevant in another way.477 In those circumstances, if the evidence has been admitted for the other purpose, it may also be used to prove the fact in respect of which the opinion is expressed, regardless of those provisions in the Act imposing controls on such use.478 The ALRC did not discuss this provision. It is presumably based on the same rationale as the comparable provision in respect of the hearsay rule (s 60) – the common law, which appears to take the opposite approach, “involves the drawing of unrealistic distinctions”.479 However, as was observed in respect of s 60, it may be queried whether this is a desirable outcome in respect of some examples of “evidence of an opinion” not caught by the opinion rule.480 In such circumstances, the discretion conferred on the court by s 136 can be used.481

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In Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 3) [2017] FCA 1045, it was held at [41] that representations in three letters were relevant for a distinct purpose other than the proof of the existence of a fact about which the opinion was expressed. They were relevant to prove that the plaintiff was, at the various times those letters had been written, actively pursuing the possibility of constructing a purpose-built nursing home on a greenfield site, which was “a separate and distinct matter upon which [the plaintiff] was put to proof” (at [42]). In those circumstances, Kerr J observed at [45], “[o]nce evidence is so admitted it becomes evidence for all purposes”. Jis Honour at [83]–[84] declined to apply s 136 in respect of the evidence. Another example of a situation in which s 77 had application is the case of R v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75, although none of the members of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal referred to this provision. The appellant had been charged with 477. For example, evidence that A believed (on the basis of psychic experiences) that B had committed a murder may be relevant both to the issue of whether B had committed the murder but also, if A testifies for the prosecution regarding alleged admissions by B to A, relevant to the credibility of A’s evidence (A’s belief may have affected his perception of what B actually said). 478. See, eg, Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 5) (1996) 64 FCR 73 at 77 and Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (No 3) (1997) 80 FCR 276 per Finn J. 479. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 685. 480. In one of the final drafts of the Evidence Bill 1994 an example was included of the operation of s 77. It was deleted in the Act. However, it is useful to provide an example of the problems with s 77. The example given was: “W, who has been fraudulently holding himself out to be a doctor, diagnoses D to be HIV negative. D is charged with knowingly transmitting the virus to V. At the trial, the court admits W’s evidence about the diagnosis to show that it was made. Despite the opinion rule, that evidence becomes admissible to prove that the diagnosis was made”. This analysis appears to be misleading in that s 77 would operate to allow the evidence of the diagnosis of W to be used not only “to prove that the diagnosis was made” but also to prove that D was HIV negative. 481. For examples of the application of s 136 in this context, see Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corp (1995) 62 FCR 424 and Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v George; Estate of Conacher (No 2) (unreported, NSW SC, Einstein J, 28 November 1997); Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907; James v Launceston City Council (2004) 13 Tas R 89; [2004] TASSC 69 at [11]–[14].

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detaining a victim with intent to have sexual intercourse with her. There was very little evidence in the case as to the appellant’s reasons for detaining the victim. The issue on appeal was whether evidence that the victim had told her mother “a man tried to rape me” could be used to prove that the appellant had in fact intended to have sexual intercourse with her. Spigelman CJ held that the evidence was admissible hearsay and that, while the opinion rule was applicable, the exception in s 78 applied. Simpson J also accepted that the evidence was caught by the opinion rule but she held that s 78 did not apply and the evidence was inadmissible as opinion evidence. Barr J did not refer to the opinion rule at all. It is suggested that the better analysis is that s 76 had prima facie application when the victim’s statement was sought to be used “to prove the existence of a fact [the appellant intended to have sexual intercourse with her] about the existence of which the opinion was expressed”. However, since the statement was relevant and admissible “for a purpose other than proof of the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed” (that is, to establish consistency of conduct on the part of the victim, and to thereby enhance her credibility as a witness: Spigelman CJ at [28], Simpson J at [54], Barr J at [62]), this provision had the effect that the “opinion rule does not apply to evidence of [the] opinion”. The evidence could be used to prove an intention on the part of the appellant to have sexual intercourse, only subject to the possible use of the discretion in s 136 to limit the use to be made of the evidence (see [EA.136.20]).

Cth Act:

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78

Exception: lay opinions The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if: (a) the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event; and (b) evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception of the matter or event. NSW Act: 78

Exception: lay opinions The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if: (a) the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event, and (b) evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception of the matter or event.

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Vic Act: 78 Exception—lay opinions The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if— (a) the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event; and (b) evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception of the matter or event. ACT Act: 78

Exception—lay opinions The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if— (a) the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event; and (b) evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception of the matter or event. NT Act:

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78

Exception — lay opinions

The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if: (a) the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event; and (b) evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception of the matter or event.

[EA.78.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 67, para 148; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 739–740.

[EA.78.60] General comments The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, paras 739–740): At present lay opinion evidence is conventionally said to be inadmissible unless it fits within an apparently anomalous miscellany of “exceptions”. The main factors that these share are that they can be said to be shorthand expressions of fact based on the witness’s perceptions and that it has been seen by the courts as convenient to allow the expression of opinion in their case rather than to insist upon a lengthy, and possibly not particularly helpful, recitation of facts. The ultimate criterion for admission of opinion evidence should be whether it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the testimony, or determining a fact in issue. To be of the requisite assistance, the lay opinion evidence must be based on the witness’s personal perception of a matter or event. Against the admission of such evidence must be balanced time and cost factors, the danger of the evidence misleading or confusing the tribunal of fact and the possibility of it being more prejudicial than probative. Thus, it is proposed to admit lay opinion testimony where it is based upon the personal perception of the witness and it is necessary to obtain an adequate account of his perceptions. The proposal, therefore, 530

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revives the original rationale based on the distinction between opinion based on the witness’s perception and mere uninformed speculation. Consideration was given to including the express requirement that the opinion be rationally based. Arguably, however, this is the way the clause would be interpreted. If it is not, the second requirement – that it be necessary to obtain an adequate account of the witness’s perception of the relevant event – should provide sufficient protection.

Examples of evidence which may be admitted under this section, as under the common law,482 are “opinions” as to the identity of individuals,483 the apparent age of a person,484 the speed at which something was moving,485 the state of the weather, a road or the floor of a factory, and whether some person was “under the influence of intoxicating liquor”. Similarly, evidence of opinions which form the basis of a survey may be admitted under this provision.

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In Connex Group Australia Pty Ltd v Butt [2004] NSWSC 379, White J held that the opinion of a witness as to the “gist” or “effect” of a conversation he had heard was based on what he heard and otherwise perceived about the conversation. Since the witness could not recall every word spoken, it was necessary to receive the opinion to obtain an adequate account or understanding of what he perceived of the conversation (at [27]). As White J noted at [24], s 78 would apply to an opinion which was itself an articulation of the witness’s perception of a matter or event, recognising that “people customarily express themselves in terms of opinion and belief when testifying as to their perceptions”. The opinion of the witness as to the effect of the conversation was needed for the tribunal of fact to get a full account of what he perceived.486

482. Although this may be a matter of dispute: see R v Panetta (1997) 26 MVR 332 (NSW CCA). 483. However, it may be noted that in R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287, Simpson J relied upon s 79. She stated (at [43]) that such opinion evidence “is frequently opinion evidence permitted to be given by a person without specialist qualifications, but whose specialised experience of the person of whom the identification is made qualifies him or her to give the evidence. It may be that this is a familiar example of an ad hoc expert”. The same approach was taken in R v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 at [32]. 484. In R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered (at [154]) that “a lay person, that is a person who does not have any special training in the assessing of intelligence and who has not administered any psychological tests to the subject person, may nevertheless, if he has had a large number of dealings with that person and if he states the basis for his opinion (as happened in the present case), express opinions in general, qualitative terms about the level of intelligence of that other person”. It may be that this is an example of expertise based on experience: see s 79. 485. South Sydney Junior Rugby Leagues Club Ltd v Gioia [2000] NSWCA 249 (the speed of an escalator). But see the discussion of R v Panetta (1997) 26 MVR 332 below (the speed of a car). See also Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Assn Inc v Guide Dog Assn (NSW & ACT) (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 531. 486. See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki Corporation (No 2) (2015) 332 ALR 396; [2015] FCA 1304 at [55]–[59]. In Connex Group Australia Pty Ltd v Butt [2004] NSWSC 379, White J also considered at [21] that “a person’s perception includes what the person understands about the matter perceived of which he or she has gained knowledge through the senses”, citing the Macquarie Dictionary. Thus the witness’s “understanding” of the conversation was not just “based” on his perception of it, it was part of that perception. This analysis is inconsistent with the analysis of French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [43], discussed below. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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As noted above, the ALRC gave consideration to including an express requirement that the opinion be rationally based, but considered that the requirement in para (b) provided sufficient protection. However, it was pointed out by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal that such a condition is imposed by the fundamental requirement (s 56) of relevance – as defined in s 55.487 To be relevant, evidence must be capable of rationally affecting (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. If an opinion is not rationally based, that test is not satisfied and the evidence is not admissible.488

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The first consideration of this provision in the High Court was in the case of Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 where only Kirby J found it necessary to discuss it.489 Two police officers testified that, in their opinion, a person shown in photographs taken by bank security cameras was the accused. Kirby J considered that the police opinion evidence met the test of relevance because it could reasonably be concluded that the witnesses were better placed to recognise the person in the photographs than the jury. However, he held (at [60]): Neither police officer was present at the “matter or event” in question in the appellant’s trial, namely the robbery. Although the security photographs record the robbery taking place, the opinion of the police officers is “based on” the photographs and not, as such, “based on” the robbery itself which they did not see, hear or otherwise perceive. The Australian Law Reform Commission’s report makes it clear that this provision of the Act was addressed, essentially, to the opinion of eyewitnesses. It exists to allow such witnesses to recount, as closely as possible, “their original perception [so as] to minimise inaccuracy and encourage honesty”. It is important to note that the requirements for the applicability of s 78 of the Act are cumulative (“and”). Neither the language of the Act governing the reception of lay opinion evidence, nor the purposes of those provisions as explained by the Commission, justifies treating the opinions expressed by the two police officers as falling within a permissible exception.490

This analysis appears questionable. In s 78, the term “matter or event” is not related to what is in question in the trial but rather to what the person expressing the opinion “saw, heard or otherwise perceived”. Indeed, not only is there no suggestion in the provision that the “matter or event” must be a fact in issue in the proceeding (compare s 55), there is no express requirement that the “matter or event” must itself be relevant. It is true that it has been held by Simpson J in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal that the section assumes that the matter or event

487. R v Panetta (1997) 26 MVR 332. 488. In this case, the witness expressed the opinion that a vehicle was moving at “roughly” 100 km per hour “or more”, when the circumstances of observation were that she was in a car moving in the opposite direction at 70 km per hour, at night, and she observed the approaching headlights of the other vehicle only for a few seconds. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that no rational basis for the opinion had been demonstrated and the evidence should have been excluded. 489. The majority of the court determined the case on the basis of the test of relevance in s 55 (see [EA.55.270]). 490. See also R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 at [63].

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as perceived by the witness is relevant to the proceeding but this is misleading since it is not s 78 but s 56(2) which imposes the requirement of relevance. If the person’s perception of a “matter or event”, whether or not that perception incorporates an element of opinion, is not relevant, it is excluded by s 56(2). However, a person’s perception of a “matter or event” may be relevant even if the “matter or event” itself is not.492 In Smith, the applicable “matter or event” was the security camera photographic image, the appearance of the accused, and a comparison of the two. If the police officers’ perception of that comparison met the test of relevance (because they were in a better position to make a comparison between the accused and the person in the photograph than the jurors493) then an opinion as to identity based on that perception, and needed to obtain an adequate

491. R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 at [33] per Simpson J. The other two members of the Court of Criminal Appeal (Spigelman CJ and Sperling J) reserved their position as to the scope and effect of this provision. This case is discussed further in the footnotes. 492. For example, where a person expresses an opinion as to the speed of a vehicle, that opinion may be based not only on a perception of the vehicle in question but on a mental comparison with the speed of vehicles perceived on other occasions. The speed of those latter vehicles is not a relevant matter or event, but the person’s perception of those vehicles will be relevant to an assessment of the quality of the opinion as to the speed of the vehicle in question. In R v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444; 139 A Crim R 30; [2003] NSWCCA 191 at [7] Spigelman CJ stated that it was “not necessary to determine whether or not a lay opinion under s 78 of the Evidence Act 1995 extends to a ‘matter or event’ which is not itself relevant”. 493. See the discussion of this issue by the majority of the High Court (at [9]; see also [EA.55.270]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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account or understanding of that perception, should satisfy the requirements of s 78.494 If that were not the case, it is difficult to see how such an opinion could ever be admissible.495 This critique was accepted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Kheir v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 308; 244 A Crim R 231; [2014] VSCA 200. In that case, a police officer listened repeatedly to intercepted recorded telephone calls and a recorded interview between the appellant and police officers (after his arrest) and then, after comparing the voices, identified the appellant’s voice on some of the calls. It was accepted that the police officer was in a better position to perform the comparison than the jury, since the interview was not admitted into evidence. It was held at [65] that: [w]hether the voice heard in the intercepts was also that in the record of interview was a fact in issue, and the comparison could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of that fact. [The police officer’s] opinion was based upon that comparison, and his opinion — that the voices on the two tapes were the same — was necessary to shed light upon the observations he made about the voices’ similarities.

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Equally, in Nguyen v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 4, Basten JA in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal engaged at [39] in a similar critique of the approach of Simpson J in R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287, although the other members of the Court did not directly address the issue.

494. If Kirby J’s analysis were correct, even if the police witness was in a much better position than the jurors to make a comparison between the accused and the person in the photograph (because, eg, the police witness had spent considerably more time with the accused than the jury, the accused’s appearance had changed materially before the trial and the police had other advantages in recognising the person in the photographs) the police witness’s opinion would not be admissible (because it would be excluded by s 76 and neither s 78 nor 79 would apply). It is unlikely that the other members of the court in Smith would have adopted that approach. In R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287, Simpson J held (at [34]) that an interpreter’s attribution, following his comparison of voices on two sets of tape recordings, of two of the voices to the two accused, did not come within the terms of this provision: “[T]he relevant matter was the identity of the speakers on the DAT tapes. [The interpreter’s] perception of that matter did not become relevant until he had formed his opinion as to that identity. Evidence of his opinion was therefore not necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of his perception. It was his opinion evidence that was said to render his perception of the matter or event relevant and admissible. Without his opinion, there was no ‘matter or event’ perceived by him, understanding of which would be facilitated by evidence of his opinion”. This analysis is problematic. It was a fact in issue whether the two accused were the persons recorded speaking on the DAT tapes. Evidence of their voices recorded on another occasion was relevant to that fact in issue since a comparison between the voices on the two sets of tape recordings could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the fact in issue. That comparison was a relevant “matter or event” in the proceeding although it is not necessary that the “matter or event” must itself be relevant. The interpreter’s opinion was based on what he heard when he listened to the two sets of tape recordings and engaged in such a comparison. In addition, evidence of that opinion was arguably necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of his perception of the similarities between the two sets of voices. This critique was adopted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Kheir v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 308; 244 A Crim R 231; [2014] VSCA 200 at fn [29]. 495. It might be argued that it should never be admissible. However, that result does not appear to be consistent with the ALRC’s goal to admit opinion evidence which “will assist the tribunal of fact in understanding the testimony or determining a fact in issue” as distinct from “mere uninformed speculation”: see ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 739–740, extracted above.

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Unfortunately, in the second High Court case to look at this provision, Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36, a similar mistake to that made by Justice Kirby seems to have been made by all members of the Court. In that case, ambulance officers’ records relating to a person who had fallen and injured himself contained the words: “? Fall from 1.5 metres onto concrete”. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in a joint judgment (Gummow J and Crennan J agreeing in separate judgments) stated at [39]:

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Section 78(a) goes to questions of form. It must be possible to extract from the form of what the person stating the opinion said, construed in context, that the opinion is about a “matter or event”, and that it is “based” on what the person stating the opinion “saw, heard or otherwise perceived” about that matter or event.

This analysis, it is suggested, is wrong. Section 78(a) does not require that “the opinion is about” the “matter or event” referred to in the provision. It requires only that the opinion “is based on” what the person perceived about the matter or event. Accordingly, it must not be based on what the person has been told about the matter or event (that is, on hearsay) or what the person otherwise thinks happened without having witnessed it (“mere uninformed speculation”, to use the language of the ALRC). The person must have been a witness to the matter or event. It is likely that an opinion based on what a person perceived about a matter or event will be about that matter or event, but that is not required by s 78(a). An opinion based on what a person perceived about a matter or event may be relevant and admissible even if the opinion is not about the matter or event (and, indeed, even if the matter or event is not in itself relevant to a fact in issue). It should be concluded that section s 78(a) does not go to “questions of form” but to a single question of substance – was the opinion based on what was actually perceived about a matter or event with the person’s senses? There were two possibilities regarding the applicable “matter or event” in the case of the report of the ambulance officers: it was the circumstances of the fall or it was the circumstances when the ambulance officers arrived at the scene. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ concluded correctly that, if the applicable matter or event was the actual circumstances of the fall, the opinion of the ambulance officers was not admissible because, although the opinion was about that matter or event, that opinion was not based on what they perceived about the fall (since they did not see, hear or otherwise perceive anything about the fall). As French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ observed at [46], the term “otherwise perceived” should not be read so broadly as to extend to inferences regarding the matter or event without having actually witnessed it. As regards the alternative “matter or event”, French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ concluded that, if the “matter or event” was the circumstances when the ambulance officers arrived at the scene (including the extent of the injured man’s injuries), the ambulance officers were “not stating an opinion on that subject, only about their cause”, with the consequence that s 78(a) would not be satisfied – the “opinion” was not about the “matter or event” of the circumstances when the ambulance officers arrived. As explained above, this analysis is misconceived because s 78 does not require that the opinion has to be about the matter or event perceived. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ referred with approval to the case of R v Howard (2005) 152 A Crim R 7; [2005] NSWCCA 25 where the NSW Court of © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Criminal Appeal held that evidence of a witness who had viewed some cannabis and estimated the period since it had been harvested was inadmissible. Hunt AJA, Grove and James JJ said at [29]: The only matter or event was the viewing and identification of the cannabis. The opinion evidence was an assertion of something said to have happened beforehand (harvest) and specifying the time which must have elapsed between the harvest and the viewing, a progression which [the witness] did not purport to see, hear, or otherwise perceive.

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It may be accepted that the applicable “matter or event” was, in one sense, “the viewing and identification of the cannabis”, although it would be preferable to say that it was “the presence of (harvested) cannabis”. The witness perceived that matter or event. The opinion regarding when it had been harvested was presumably “based” on what the person perceived about the cannabis, notwithstanding that the witness had not perceived the harvesting. Again, the provision does not require the opinion to be about the matter or event perceived. However, it may well be that the holding of the High Court in Lithgow City Council (based on s 78(a)) that s 78 only permits admission of an opinion “about” some matter or event that was actually witnessed by the person expressing the opinion is largely supportable by reason of the requirements of s 78(b). That provision does suggest that, as a practical matter, only an opinion “about” some “matter or event” will fall within the scope of s 78 because only such an opinion will be “necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception of” that matter or event. Of course, that will depend on the proper construction of the words of s 78(b). Before discussing that provision, the High Court’s position on s 78(a) should be re-stated: it does not permit admission of an opinion about some matter or event unless the matter was actually witnessed by the person expressing the opinion. Thus, in practice it will only permit admission of the kind of evidence that was admitted under the common law rule. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ referred to this type of evidence at [45]: The common law permitted the reception of non-expert opinion evidence where it was very difficult for witnesses to convey what they had perceived about an event or condition without using rolled-up summaries of lay opinion – impressions or inferences – either in lieu of or in addition to whatever evidence of specific matters of primary fact they could give about that event or condition. The usual examples are age, sobriety, speed, time, distance, weather, handwriting, identity, bodily health and emotional state, but a thorough search would uncover very many more. The problems which arise in examples falling into this category would have been reduced, though not completely solved, if, at the time of the observation, the observer had foreseen that one day he or she would be questioned by a police detective or a barrister, for then the observer might have made some conscious contemporaneous attempt to sort out the primacy [sic: primary] facts so as to facilitate their future recollection and expression. But in many cases, to endeavour to describe the primary facts underlying the inference may be ineffective or misleading without stating the inference. The reason why it is very difficult for the observer is that it is almost impossible to separate the inferences from the primary facts on which they are based, and often very difficult to identify and recollect the primary facts themselves.

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This point was made most clearly in the approach taken to the interpretation of s 78(b). French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ, plainly basing their analysis on the common law position, stated at [48]: The function of the law in relation to that category is to permit reception of an opinion where the primary facts on which it is based are too evanescent to remember or too complicated to be separately narrated. Where the evidence is that a person appeared to be drunk or middle-aged or angry, for example, it is impossible in practice for the observer separately to identify, remember and narrate all the particular indications which led to the conclusion of drunkenness, middle age or anger. For that reason, s 78 permits the conclusion to be stated: without it the evidence does not convey an adequate account or generate an adequate understanding of the witness’s perception of the sobriety, age or emotional state being observed.

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Applying that approach to the requirement of “necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception”, their Honours concluded that it was not necessary to admit evidence of the ambulance officers’ opinion in order to obtain an adequate account or understanding of what they perceived. “Necessary”, in this context, and consistently with the common law, means “the only way” to overcome some “incapacity” in the witness “to perceive, to remember what they had perceived, or to say what they had perceived about it” (at [51]). It would not be established simply because the ambulance officers’ were not called as witnesses and thus no other evidence of their perceptions was adduced. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ concluded that it was not necessary, in order to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the perceptions of ambulance officers, that the opinion be received because (at [48]): in cases of the present type the primary facts are not too evanescent to remember or too complicated to be separately narrated. It would be possible for an observer to list his or her perceptions of specifically identifiable medical circumstances of someone found in a drain, perceptions of specifically measurable distances between limbs and other objects and perceptions of specifically describable angles of limbs. Professional investigators like police officers, for example, commonly make precise measurements of that kind and compose diagrams to illustrate what they have measured. Those persons can often remember what they have measured even without recourse to their notes. The process is not one where component observations are made which are incapable of meaningful expression without stating the composite opinion to which they led. It is not necessary, in order to obtain an adequate account or understanding of perceptions of that kind, that the opinion be received.

Thus, there was no established necessity to admit the opinion to overcome “some incapacity in perception, memory or expression”. Since it was not “not possible to say what perception it was” that the ambulance officers made of the injured man’s position, it was “not possible to say … whether the statement was necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding” of their perception (at [56]). Accepting the correctness of this analysis it follows that, as a practical matter, s 78 does not permit admission of an opinion about some matter or event unless the matter was actually witnessed by the person expressing the opinion. While the High Court derived such a requirement from s 78(a), it also flows from the requirements of s 78(b) – if the opinion is admitted to overcome some incapacity in perception, memory or expression of the witness to the matter or event perceived by the witness, it follows that the opinion must be about that matter or event. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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However, some important questions remain. The first is whether it is required that the primary perceptions be identified by the holder of the opinion. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ did not need to resolve that issue for the purposes of the appeal, but they made their views clear:

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The appellant submitted that s 78 could not apply in the present circumstances where the ambulance officers had not identified the perceptions and observations on which their conclusion was based, because that left such a “disconnection” between their ultimate conclusion and any underlying observations that it cannot be said that the evidence of opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account of their perception of the matter or event. It is not necessary to decide the point, but that submission, which, according to the Court of Appeal, contradicts a concession before it, is probably not correct. There is authority against it. The common law rule does not require a full statement by witnesses of perceptions and observations – though gaps of this kind may well go to weight. Indeed the whole point of the common law rule is that it cures the difficulty that an observer may be confident about a conclusion reached from observations without being able to perceive, remember or state the primary materials which led to it. There is nothing in s 78(b) to suggest any different position. It is possible to conclude – not in this case, but in other cases – that a person’s opinion is based on what that person perceived without the person providing an exhaustive list of what the person perceived. It is true, though, that the less the witness or other observer states his or her primary perceptions, the harder will it be for the tendering party to establish the condition of admissibility in s 78(a) (because of the difficulty of establishing that the opinion is “based” on the perceptions) and the condition of admissibility in s 78(b) (because of the difficulty of establishing that the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perceptions).

Thus, it follows that there is no strict requirement to identify the primary perceptions of the holder of the opinion, although a failure to do so may have the consequence that the requirements of s 78(a) and s 78(b) will not be established. Further, the absence of such evidence may affect the weight to be given to the opinion (and may justify discretionary exclusion). 496 Another important question that remains is whether the opinion may be expressed in terms of an inference from what the person perceived rather than a compendious description of what the person perceived. Putting the matter differently, may the person who has perceived the matter or event, and who needs to express the opinion in order to overcome some incapacity in perception, memory or expression, draw inferences from what was perceived? It has to be said that the judgment of the High Court in Lithgow City Council appears to permit the drawing of inferences. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ made repeated reference to the “observer” being permitted to give evidence of “inferences” or “conclusions”. However, there is some ambiguity. At [48], it is stated that “where the evidence is that a person appeared to be drunk or middle-aged or angry, for example, it is impossible in practice for the observer separately to identify, remember and narrate all the particular indications which led to the conclusion of drunkenness, middle age or anger” (emphasis not in original). Evidence that a person “appeared to be drunk” is a compendious description of what was perceived (and involves an opinion in the limited sense that the witness regards that description as an accurate summary of what was 496. See Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Assn Inc v Guide Dog Assn (NSW & ACT) (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 531.

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perceived). Evidence that a person “was drunk” is significantly different evidence involving the drawing of an inference from what was perceived. Equally, at [45], French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ noted that the common law permitted the reception of non-expert opinion evidence “where it was very difficult for witnesses to convey what they had perceived about an event or condition without using rolled-up summaries of lay opinion – impressions or inferences – either in lieu of or in addition to whatever evidence of specific matters of primary fact they could give about that event or condition”. There is ambiguity as to whether the “summaries” are of the primary facts perceived (expressed in the form of an impression or inference) or of the impressions or inferences themselves.

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It is suggested that, consistently with the common law, the better view would be that it would rarely, if ever, be necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of a person’s perception of a matter or event to permit the person to move beyond a compendious description of what was observed (“he/she appeared drunk”) to an inference from what was perceived (“he/she was drunk”).497 Indeed, even if the evidence is expressed as a compendious description, it might involve the drawing of an inference which is unnecessary to obtaining an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perceptions. However, the current state of the law in that regard remains uncertain. French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ referred at [57] to “authority” against the proposition that the primary perceptions must be identified by the holder of the opinion. One was the judgment of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Harvey (unreported, NSW CCA, Beazley JA, Smart, James JJ, 11 December 1996). It was held that the two requirements of s 78 were satisfied where a prosecution witness in a child sexual assault trial testified that, on entering the accused’s office, she saw him sitting at his desk, the complainant child was standing a couple of feet away from him, and the accused had an expression on his face which she described as “a look of like sexual gratification – that’s the best way that I can express it”. Beazley JA, with whom the other members of the court agreed, held (p 7) that s 78 “permits the opinion to be admitted without there being evidence of the primary facts upon which the opinion is based”, and concluded that this “evidence satisfied the express terms of s 78”. However, her Honour also considered that the evidence should have been excluded in discretion under s 137.498 Clearly enough, the proposition that an opinion may be admitted without there being evidence of the primary facts upon which the opinion is based is correct. However, it may nonetheless be queried whether the ruling, that the requirements of s 78 were satisfied, was correct. While it was open to the trial judge to find that the witness’s opinion was “based” (at least in part) on what she saw, there must be real doubt as to whether it was “necessary” for the witness to so testify in order to provide an “adequate account or understanding” of her perception of the “matter or event”. It was not a compendious description of what she had seen, expressed in the form of an opinion, but actually drew an inference from what 497. See, for example, R v Klobucar [2013] ACTSC 118 at [83]–[90] (evidence of person’s opinion that he had committed the offence of drug trafficking not needed to obtain an adequate understanding of the evidence he gave of his perceptions using his various senses). 498. Alternatively, it might be thought the evidence did not even meet the test of relevance: cf R v Meakin (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1006 at [16]–[22]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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she saw. Whether it was necessary would depend on whether she was able to give an adequate account of what she saw on the face of the accused without giving this evidence. If she had been required to give evidence of the “primary facts upon which” her opinion was based, the necessity to give the opinion might have been explored. Since the onus was on the prosecution to show such necessity, the absence of inquiry in this regard raises real questions as to whether s 78 applied. More important, it may be queried whether it could be satisfied. It is difficult to see why the witness could not give an adequate account of what she saw on the face of the accused without giving this evidence. The witness went beyond an “account or understanding” of what she saw (the mechanism of perception in this case), to express an opinion as to the cause of what she saw (that is, the look of “gratification” was “sexual” in origin). It seems likely that she could have adequately conveyed what she saw without expressing this opinion.

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Another “authority” against the proposition that the primary perceptions must be identified by the holder of the opinion, referred to by French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ at [57], is R v Van Dyk [2000] NSWCCA 67. Smart AJ held (at [133]) that evidence that the defendant had “a look of wanting” was admissible because “most lay people and many lawyers would have difficulty in giving more detail. Indeed, ‘a look of wanting’ is a matter of impression and opinion”.499 Again, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the evidence should have been excluded in discretion but, again, it may be doubted whether it was “necessary” for the witness to so testify in order to provide an “adequate account or understanding” of her perception of the “matter or event”. In R v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered a case where the appellant had been charged with detaining a victim with intent to have sexual intercourse with her. The issue on appeal was whether evidence that the victim had told her mother “a man tried to rape me” could be used to prove that the appellant had in fact intended to have sexual intercourse with her. Spigelman CJ held that the evidence was admissible hearsay and that, while the opinion rule was applicable (see discussion at [EA.76.120]), the exception in s 78 applied (at [36]), notwithstanding the fact that no attempt had been made by the prosecution to establish that it was “necessary” for the victim to express this opinion in order to provide an “adequate account or understanding” of her perception of the “matter or event”. Simpson J also accepted that the evidence was caught by the opinion rule but she held that s 78 did not apply. The third member of the court failed to address the opinion evidence issue at all. It is suggested that Simpson J was correct when she held at [57] that the second requirement of s 78 was not met: “Evidence of the complainant’s opinion is not necessary to obtain (or to give the jury) an adequate account or understanding of her perception of the matters and events in question”. As Simpson J explained (in a different context) at [53], what “she said was, properly characterised, her conclusion, drawn from the conduct she observed, of what was in the appellant’s mind”.500 499. However, the court held that the evidence should have been excluded in discretion. 500. It should be noted that this case also involves the interrelationship between the hearsay rule and the opinion rule (see [EA.76.120]) and the application of s 77 (see [EA.77.30]).

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In Partington v The Queen (2009) 197 A Crim R 380; [2009] NSWCCA 232, the appeal related to evidence from a witness LB that sounds she heard coming from the other side of a door were a person (and, particularly, a person’s head) being repeatedly pushed against the door. McClellan CJ at CL (RA Hulme J agreeing) held that this was evidence of an opinion that was not made admissible under this provision. McClellan CJ at CL stated at [47]:

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In the present case LB both saw the door and heard noises outside of it. That is the event, or in fact the sequence of continuous events, which she both saw and heard. There was no difficulty in understanding her account of that event. However, she did not see, although obviously she heard, the sounds of the event which was happening on the other side of the door. Although she may have had an opinion, either speculative or an informed guess, as to what was happening outside the door she did not relevantly perceive that event. Her perception was confined to what she could see and hear on the inside. The door deprived her of any capacity to perceive what was happening on the outside. Evidence as to her opinion as to what may have been happening outside the door was not necessary to understand what she perceived from her position inside the room. She was able to give an account of her perception of the event – what she saw and heard - without proffering her opinion as to what she believed was taking place on the other side of the door.

The conclusion reached by McClellan CJ at CL that the requirements of s 78(b) were not satisfied in this case appears to be correct, but some care should be taken with this passage. It should be understood in the context of the particular issue before the court. McClellan CJ at CL should not be understood to be saying that the door deprived LB generally of any capacity to perceive what was happening on the outside. As McClellan CJ at CL noted at [8], “she heard male voices yelling and swearing … she heard the sound of a man moaning”. Thus, she could perceive by her sense of hearing human voices, their gender and the content of what was said. There is no reason to draw a distinction under the Act between events perceived visually and events perceived by hearing (see French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ in Lithgow City Council at [43]). Thus, LB could perceive that some object came into contact with the door, the general location of that contact and the volume of noise generated. The critical issue was whether, given that her testimony regarding the nature of that object and the cause of its movement was evidence of opinion,501 such opinion was “necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of” LB’s perception of the event occurring on the other side of the door. As McClellan CJ at CL concluded, it was not. Her evidence was not a compendious description of her perceptions but a (contentious) inference from what she perceived to the causal factors behind

501. Grove J accepted at [61] that the testimony from LB that the sounds she heard involved a person’s “head” being pushed against the door was evidence of an opinion, although he disagreed with the view of McClellan CJ at CL and RA Hulme J that LB’s evidence that the sounds were a person being repeatedly pushed against the door, without referring to the person’s “head”, was opinion evidence. As observed in the commentary on s 76 at [EA.76.90], the view of McClellan CJ at CL (and RA Hulme J) is preferable given the risk of error in interpreting sounds. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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502

those perceptions. McClellan CJ at CL also provided at [46] examples of cases where the requirements of s 78 would be satisfied: If, for example, a witness observed an altercation between two persons and one of them threw a punch a witness could say that he was of the opinion that the punch was thrown with the intention of hitting another. An observer of a person raising their voice could say whether the voice was raised in anger. A witness could give evidence of their opinion of the speed of a motor vehicle or the age of a person. In each case assuming an accurate account of the event is relevant, the witness is able by expressing an opinion about what they observed, to provide an adequate account or understanding of the witness’ perception of the event.

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Again, it is suggested that some caution is required. While opinions as to speed and age would usually fall within the scope of s 78, that would not always be the case (for example, where an opinion as to speed is based solely on sound; where an opinion as to age is based solely on smell!). The case of R v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75 illustrates the contentious nature of the proposition that a witness might be permitted under this provision to express an opinion as to the state of mind of a person who made observed physical movements. And while a witness might be permitted to describe the sound of a raised voice as “like an angry voice”, it may in some cases be going too far to say that it was “raised in anger”. It is suggested that, in contentious cases, the courts should give close attention to the requirement that the opinion be “necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception of the matter or event”. The person should first be required to give an account of his or her perceptions without introducing any opinion. Then, if the person asserts the need under s 78(b), the question should be whether the opinion is relied upon as evidence of what was perceived rather than sought to be used as an inference drawn from those perceptions. Finally, questions of “adequacy” and “necessity” must be addressed. For example, in Patrick v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 651; 241 A Crim R 153; [2014] VSCA 89, the Victorian Court of Appeal considered a case where the complainant testified that the defendant (charged with indecently assaulting her) had said to her, years later, “I want to apologise for the things I have done” and the complainant was permitted to testify that she “took” this statement to be a reference to the charged offences. The Victorian Court of Appeal considered that, while evidence could be given of what the defendant said, the complainant’s “interpretation of his apology” was not relevant (at [33]) but also held that, if it was a relevant opinion, her “evidence about what was in the [defendant’s] mind” was “not ‘necessary’ to obtain an adequate account of her perception of the matter or event” (the statement made by the defendant) – it was “an interpretation” of that statement (at [49]–[50]).503 In contrast, in Kheir v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 308; 244 A Crim R 231; [2014] VSCA 200 the Victorian Court of Appeal held that a police officer who had listened repeatedly to 502. Of course, the line between what is permissible and what is not permissible can be very fine. LB testified that the sounds of banging she heard could not have been “somebody banging on [the] door furiously”. This appears to go beyond the scope of s 78, but if she had said that the sounds were not like those of somebody banging on a door (with their hand), this might well have been permissible. 503. See also Welsh v Carnival PLC (t/as Carnival Australia) (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 1282 (witness not permitted to “express an opinion as to the cause of the plaintiff’s anger”).

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intercepted recorded telephone calls and a recorded interview between the appellant and police officers (after his arrest) and then, after comparing the voices, identified the appellant’s voice on some of the calls, was permitted to express that opinion of identity pursuant to this provision because “his opinion … was necessary to shed light upon the observations he made about the voices’ similarities” (at [65]) and “the facts upon which” the identification rested were “too numerous or nebulous for the witness to enumerate” (at [67]).504

[EA.78.90] Jury directions The Victorian Criminal Charge Book suggests a suitable direction to a jury in respect of lay opinion evidence.505

Cth Act: 78A Exception: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a member of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of the group. [S 78A insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 36]

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NSW Act: 78A Exception: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a member of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of the group. [S 78A insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[33]]

Vic Act: 78A Exception—Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a member of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of the group.

504. The requirement of relevance was satisfied because the police officer was in a better position to perform the comparison than the jury, since the interview was not admitted into evidence (at [65]). Complaints by the defence about unfair prejudice were rejected given that the defence had objected to admission of the interview (at [72]–[75]). If the interview had been admitted into evidence, the opinion may well have been inadmissible. See also Tran v The Queen [2016] VSCA 79 at [104]–[110] (appropriate directions given to the jury regarding admission of the evidence pursuant to s 78, not s 79, and no realistic possibility that jury would have conflated roles). 505. Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au, Part 4.13.1.4. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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ACT Act: 78A Exception—Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a member of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of the group. NT Act: 78A Exception — Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a member of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of the group.

[EA.78A.30] ALRC References ALRC 102, paras 19.2–19.83.

[EA.78A.60] General comments

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This provision was introduced in the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102. At paras 19.16–19.17 it was stated: There are several contexts in which it is necessary to adduce evidence of ATSI traditional laws and customs. The most common currently is in proceedings under the Native Title Act; however, this is not the only area in which this issue arises. Indeed, it is likely that it will become increasingly important in other areas of law, particularly as native title claims will ultimately expire. Evidence of ATSI traditional laws and customs is also relevant to areas of law such as criminal law defences, sentencing, coronial matters, succession, family law, and placement of children. Other legal contexts in which the admissibility of evidence of ATSI traditional laws and customs may be important include proceedings arising under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), and similar state and territory legislation, such as the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (SA).

At paras 19.77–19.78 it was stated: [T]he Commissions believe that some relaxation of the opinion rule is necessary to permit a member of an ATSI group to give opinion evidence about the laws and customs of that group, without the ATSI member first having to establish that he or she has “specialised knowledge based on [his or her] training, study or experience” within the meaning of s 79. … [T]he recommended amendment would differentiate between, on the one hand, members of an ATSI group who are competent to give evidence on the traditional laws and customs of that ATSI group by virtue of their membership of, and involvement with, that ATSI group; and, on the other hand, people who are not members of the ATSI group in question and therefore whose competence to give such evidence must be dependent on their having the requisite ‘specialised knowledge based on [their] training, study or experience’ (within the meaning of s 79). ATSI witnesses who fall within the new provision would still give evidence subject to the safeguards provided by s 55 (relevance) and the discretionary and mandatory exclusions in ss 135–137. 544

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Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memoranda to the Victorian Act and the Commonwealth and New South Wales amending Acts in respect of this provision. This provision only applies to “evidence of an opinion expressed by a member of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group”. The opinion rule in s 76 would not apply to evidence from that person “about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of the [person’s] group”. Of course, as was pointed out in ALRC 102 at para 19.80, the requirements of relevance in s 55 would still have to be satisfied. Thus, a person who is not a member of such a group but who nevertheless has specialised knowledge of the traditional laws and customs of the group (for example, an anthropologist) could only give opinion evidence about the relevant traditional laws and customs if the requirements of s 79 were satisfied.

[EA.78A.90] Definitions The term “traditional laws and customs” is defined in the Dictionary: “traditional laws and customs” of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group (including a kinship group) includes any of the traditions, customary laws, customs, observances, practices, knowledge and beliefs of the group.

For commentary on this definition, see [EA.Dict.Pt.1.180].

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79

Exception: opinions based on specialised knowledge

(1) If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. [Subs (1) insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 37]

(2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1): (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and following the abuse); and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following: (i) the development and behaviour of children generally; (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences. [Subs (2) insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 38] [S 79 am Act 135 of 2008]

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NSW Act: 79 Exception: opinions based on specialised knowledge (1) If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. (2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1): (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and following the abuse), and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following: (i) the development and behaviour of children generally, (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences. [Subs (2) insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[34]] [S 79 am Act 46 of 2007]

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Vic Act: 79

Exception—opinions based on specialised knowledge

(1) If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. (2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1)— (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and following the abuse); and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following— (i) the development and behaviour of children generally; (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences.

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ACT Act: 79 Exception—opinions based on specialised knowledge (1) If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of the person’s opinion that is completely or substantially based on that knowledge. (2) To remove any doubt, and without limiting subsection (1)— (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and following the abuse); and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge mentioned in paragraph (a), a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following: (i) the development and behaviour of children generally; (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences. NT Act:

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79

Exception — opinions based on specialised knowledge

(1) If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. (2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1): (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and following the abuse); and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following: (i) the development and behaviour of children generally; (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences.

[EA.79.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 9.25–9.102, 9.138–9.158; ALRC 38, s 68, paras 148–149; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 352, 355–358, 362–363, 743–748, 750–751.

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General comments (s 79(1))

Before evidence of a person’s opinion may be admitted under this provision, it must be established that the opinion is wholly or substantially based on “specialised knowledge” (which, in turn, is based on the person’s training, study or experience). Accordingly, it will be necessary to establish (on the balance of probabilities: s 142) that, quite apart from the requirement of relevance (s 55) (see [EA.55.60], [EA.55.270]): (1) the person has “specialised knowledge”; (2) that specialised knowledge is based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (3) the opinion is “wholly or substantially” based on that specialised knowledge.

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These requirements are mandatory – it will not be sufficient that a supposed expert’s opinion is given in accordance with the conventions of the expert’s particular field of scholarship.506 The courts have imposed additional requirements relating to expert reports and evidence (see [EA.79.330]). These rules interact with the requirements of this provision. It should be noted that the provision uses the term “specialised knowledge” rather than the more conventional “expertise”. The terms really have the same meaning in this context. However, the use of the term “specialised knowledge” as a requirement for the admission of opinion evidence does have the advantage of limiting the confusion that can sometimes arise between evidence from an expert which is evidence of fact rather than opinion (and thus not subject to the opinion rule at all: [EA.76.90]) and evidence of opinion derived from expertise. The use of the term “knowledge” also has significance: [EA.79.120]. There is no requirement that the expert’s opinion meet some standard of probative value to be admissible. However, in Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373, Barr and Hall JJ observed at [292] that “[a] reading of the cases suggests that the strictness with which the courts approach questions of admissibility of opinion evidence is directly related to the doubtfulness of the claim to special knowledge”. Barr and Hall JJ also pointed out: [R]equirements in relation to what must be disclosed for the benefit of the trier of fact, as opposed to the judge ruling on admissibility, find no ready source in s 79 of the Evidence Act. It seems likely that they must be evaluated by reference to the power to exclude evidence, the probative value of which may be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, pursuant to s 137 of the Evidence Act.

Section 137 applies to prosecution evidence in criminal proceedings. The discretion in s 135 would be available in other cases (see [EA.79.300]). It has been pointed out that some courts are occasionally willing to receive “expert assistance” without requiring compliance with this provision or, indeed, 506. Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [19] per Lindgren J. Lindgren J observed that “[l]awyers should be involved in the writing of reports by experts: not, of course, in relation to the substance of the reports (in particular, in arriving at the opinions to be expressed); but in relation to their form, in order to ensure that the legal tests of admissibility are addressed”.

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any of the rules relating to “evidence” (for example, in order to assist in understanding some technical subject matter).507 Such a procedure might perhaps be seen as an example of taking judicial notice (cf s 144) or by way of a submission rather than admissible evidence.508 The Federal Court Rules (O 10, r 1(2)(j)Federal Court Rules) authorise the Federal Court to receive expert opinion “by way of submission in such manner and form as the Court may think fit, whether or not the opinion would be admissible as evidence”. However, it is suggested that such a use of opinion “evidence” that need not satisfy the requirements of this provision should be approached with great circumspection, given the risk that the court might give undue significance to what may the disputable views of an “expert”.509

[EA.79.90] General comments (s 79(2))

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This provision was introduced in the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102. In the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act it is stated: This item implements recommendation 9–1 of [ALRC 102]. Section 79 provides an exception to the opinion rule where the opinion is based on specialised knowledge. Expert opinion evidence on the development and behaviour of children can be relevant to a range of matters in legal proceedings, including testimonial capacity, the credibility of a child witness, the beliefs and perceptions held by a child, and the reasonableness of those beliefs and perceptions. Such evidence can, in certain cases such as child sexual assault matters, be important in assisting the court to assess other evidence or to address misconceived notions about children and their behaviour. However, the Report found that courts show a continuing reluctance in many cases to admit this type of evidence. This amendment highlights that the exception covers this particular type of expert opinion evidence.510

These observations reflect the analysis in ALRC 102, where it was stated at paras 9.155–9.156: In the Commissions’ view expert opinion evidence on child development and behaviour (including the effects of sexual abuse on the development and behaviour of children) can in certain cases be important evidence in assisting the tribunal of fact to assess other evidence or to prevent inappropriate reasoning processes based on misconceived notions about children and their behaviour. There is scope within s 79 as it currently stands for the admission of expert opinion evidence on child development and behaviour. However, submissions received and consultations held by the Commissions demonstrate that Australian courts continue to demonstrate a reluctance to admit such evidence under s 79. Therefore, the Commissions conclude that s 79 should be amended to clarify the position. The Commissions do not see the recommended reform as constituting any major departure from the existing law, but as highlighting the admissibility of a particular type of expert opinion evidence.

The effect of s 79(2) appears to be to “clarify”: 507. Justice Branson, “Expert evidence: a judge’s perspective” (2006) Bar News (Sydney) at 33. 508. See BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council (2007) 162 FCR 234; 247 ALR 104; [2007] FCAFC 157 at [185]. 509. Cf McGregor v McGregor (2012) 47 Fam LR 498; [2012] FamCAFC 69 at [119]–[125]. 510. At para 105–6. Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Victorian Act. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a) that “child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and following the abuse)” is an area of “specialised knowledge” for the purposes of s 79(1)); (b) that if a person has such specialised knowledge, the opinion rule in s 76 does not exclude evidence of an opinion given by that person “relating to … the development and behaviour of children generally”; and

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(c) that if a person has such specialised knowledge, the opinion rule in s 76 does not exclude evidence of an opinion given by that person “relating to … the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences”. There is an element of ambiguity with the term “relating to”. It could mean “involving” or, alternatively, “connected with”. The discussion in ALRC 102 does not resolve that ambiguity. If the term has the former meaning, this provision has very little practical significance. Obviously enough, a person with specialised knowledge about “child development and child behaviour” can express a relevant opinion about “the development and behaviour of children generally”. Equally, a person with specialised knowledge about “the impact of sexual abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and following the abuse” can express a relevant opinion about “the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences”. Indeed, such “opinions” might even be regarded as evidence of fact, not opinion, and thus not even caught by s 76. The real issue is whether such a person may proceed to express an opinion regarding the particular circumstances of the case in which the evidence is given. The better view would be that this provision has no application to such evidence and it is s 79(1) that determines the matter. Some support for that approach comes from the Explanatory Memoranda to the Victorian Act and the Commonwealth amending Act in respect of this provision, where reference is made to “specialist knowledge on the development and behaviour of children”. It should also be noted that, in De Silva v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 236 A Crim R 214; [2013] VSCA 339 the Victorian Court of Appeal held at [27] that an expert witness permitted to perform an “educative role” pursuant to the comparable provision in s 108C regarding “child development and child behaviour” had impermissibly “strayed … into areas in which it had not been shown that she was qualified to express an opinion” (for example, speculation about what may have been behind the complainant’s initial non-disclosure). Of course, whatever the practical operation of this provision (or s 79(1)), the evidence must still satisfy the requirement of relevance and the discretionary and mandatory exclusionary provisions in Pt 3.11 may have application (quite apart from any judicial directions to a jury about the evidence). ALRC 102 recognised this at para 9.157: There is some danger in admitting this category of evidence. In particular, the evidence might invite a jury to reason using the doubtful syllogism: abuse of children elicits certain behavioural responses; the complainant exhibited some or all those behaviours; therefore, the complainant is likely to be telling the truth about being sexually abused, or is likely to have been sexually abused, or was sexually abused. The reasoning is 550

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doubtful for several reasons. However, the dangers of such expert opinion evidence being misused can be addressed adequately by judicial comments or directions and the application of Part 3.11.

[EA.79.120]

“specialised knowledge” (s 79(1))

This phrase is not defined in the Act. Giles JA of the NSW Court of Appeal has observed that the phrase “is not restrictive; its scope is informed by the available bases of training, study and experience”511 (see [EA.79.150]). The courts have been willing to give it ample scope.512 Nevertheless, it is apparent that the term contains two elements. There must be “knowledge”, as distinct from, for example, “belief”. The knowledge must be “specialised” rather than generally held in the community. Under the common law, a regularly cited test of expertise was one referred to by Dixon CJ in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491, where he quoted the following passage:

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On the one hand it appears to be admitted that the opinion of witnesses possessing peculiar skill is admissible where the subject-matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it without such assistance, in other words, when it so far partakes of the nature of a science as to require a course of previous habit, or study, in order to the attainment of a knowledge of it.

This passage continues to be cited by courts applying the Act.513 However, it should be approached with care. Section 80 makes it clear that opinion evidence is not inadmissible only because it is about a matter of “common knowledge”: see [EA.80.150]. Further, there is no doubt that specialised knowledge may exist which is not scientific in nature, and s 79 itself makes it clear that such knowledge may be based on experience rather than training or study: see [EA.79.150]. As the High Court observed in Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 237 A Crim R 589; [2014] HCA 29 at [23]: Specialised knowledge is knowledge which is outside that of persons who have not by training, study or experience acquired an understanding of the subject matter. It may be of matters that are not of a scientific or technical kind and a person without any formal qualifications may acquire specialised knowledge by experience.514

Thus, in Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 (a case involving anthropological evidence relating to an Aboriginal land claim), Mansfield J observed at [467]–[468]: I share with Lindgren J the view, as he expressed in Harrington-Smith [HarringtonSmith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893] at [26] that there are “great practical differences” between experts’ reports from different 511. Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131 at [629]. 512. For example, investor behaviour (Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79; 137 ALR 138 at 85); proper professional conduct (Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131 at [629]); coded language used by drug dealers (R v Lam (2002) 135 A Crim R 302; [2002] NSWCCA 377 at [69]–[82]); the propensity of prison escapees to engage in criminal activity (Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1) [2003] NSWSC 160). 513. For example, ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 at [14] per Austin J. 514. Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 237 A Crim R 589; [2014] HCA 29, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ at [21]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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disciplines. … Underlying his Honour’s statement is the notion that science and mathematics are exact disciplines, whereas the disciplines of anthropology, humanity, much of economics, and history are not. There is a longer list which could be created. In most if not all disciplines, opinion is formed by reasoning drawn from a group of “facts”. The facts may be drawn from a scientific experiment, historical documents or a series of conversations held with members of a native title claimant group. However, “facts” themselves have varying degrees of primacy or subjectiveness. Some facts are now, in reality (and despite the deconstructionists) incontrovertible. Our communication systems make them so: the use of numbers in measurement is a clear example. Some are obviously more subjectively perceived: estimates, descriptions of persons or events, and the like (the explanations of Dr Wells for the significance she attributed to many contemporary records provides examples). Some are complex and themselves involve judgment. In the realm of expert evidence, the primary data upon which an opinion is based may comprise a mixture of primary and more complex facts. The opinion may then be further based upon an interpretation (sometimes requiring expertise) of those facts and that stage may require an exercise of judgment, sometimes fine judgment, by the person concerned.

At common law, it is accepted that, to be admissible, the opinion of a supposed expert must derive from a “field of expertise”. However, Australian law has never clearly resolved the test for a “field of expertise”. There are authorities which appear to adopt a test of “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific discipline,515 authorities which require a court to make an assessment of “reliability”516 and authorities which adopt both tests.517 The ALRC considered that such matters should be left to discretion (ALRC 26, para 743):

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[It has been suggested] the expert must be able to point to a relevant accepted “field of expertise” and the use of accepted theories and techniques. Quite what constitutes such 515. This formulation derives from the United States decision of Hatchet v U S 293 F 1012 (1923). See Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 at 320; R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410; R v Lewis (1987) 29 A Crim R 267; 88 FLR 104 at 287–288 (A Crim R) per Muirhead J; R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 at 119 per King CJ; R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; (1991) 55 A Crim R 361 at 115 (VR); R v Jamieson (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 at 77; R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467 at 473 per King CJ. 516. Casley-Smith v Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 (FC) at 320 and 328 per Olsson J; R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 at 124 per Bollen J; R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467 at 479 per Duggan J. A number of decisions dealing with survey evidence have formulated guidelines designed to ensure the reliability of the survey results as a precondition to admissibility: Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 18 FCR 285; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158; Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379. In R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 the English Court of Appeal applied a test of “sufficient reliability”, combined with a careful analysis of the available evidence, to conclude that an expert should not be permitted to express an evaluative opinion in mathematical terms regarding footwear mark comparison. Similarly, in R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2; [2013] 1 Cr App R 32, the same court stated at [11] that “in determining the issue of admissibility, the court must be satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for the evidence to be admitted”. 517. R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 at 939 and 941; R v Lewis (1987) 29 A Crim R 267; 88 FLR 104 at 269–271 per Maurice J. In R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, King CJ applied (at 47) a test “of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience”. This test was endorsed by Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; 159 ALR 170 at 336. While it does refer to recognition as one basis for a conclusion of reliability, it appears clear that the ultimate test is reliability. See also the judgment of Kirby J at 373–376. The English Court of Appeal has adopted a test of “sufficient reliability” and then cited the observations of King CJ in Bonython: R v Reed (David) [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 at [111].

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a field remains a matter for speculation. There are major difficulties in implementing such a test … It is proposed, therefore, not to introduce the “field of expertise” test. There will be available the general discretion to exclude evidence when it might be more prejudicial than probative, or tend to mislead or confuse the tribunal of fact. This could be used to exclude evidence that has not sufficiently emerged from the experimental to the demonstrable.518

However, the High Court has emphasized the significance of the word “knowledge” in this provision. In Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 237 A Crim R 589; [2014] HCA 29, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ stated at [23]:

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The Macquarie Dictionary defines “knowledge” as “acquaintance with facts, truths, or principles, as from study or investigation” (emphasis added) and it is in this sense that it is used in s 79(1). The concept is captured in Blackmun J’s formulation in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc: “the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. ... [It] applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds”. [footnotes excluded]

The reference to the judgment of Blackmun J in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993) (hereafter Daubert) is to the leading United States Supreme Court decision on Rule 702519 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It should be noted that Blackmun J went on to say that “[p]roposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation – ie ‘good grounds’, based on what is known”. It was argued in that “in order to constitute an area of ‘specialised knowledge’ there must be an independent means of gauging the reliability and validity of an opinion based on that knowledge”.520 This reflected the actual holding by the Supreme Court in Daubert. It was held that a court considering the admission of an opinion based on “scientific knowledge” must make an assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid. They offered guidelines for use in deciding what proffered scientific evidence should be admitted. While they did not set out a definitive checklist, they referred to a number of factors, including “falsifiability”, the “known or potential error rate” associated with applications of a theory, whether the findings have been subjected to peer review and publication, as well as the “general acceptance” of the science being offered.521 Further, the court 518. Compare Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 at 306. See also B v R and Separate Representative (1995) 19 Fam LR 594 and Tanti v Rothe (unreported, NSW SC, McLelland CJ in Eq, 28 November 1996). The Canadian Supreme Court appeared to favour such an approach in R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600 but has moved to a demonstrated reliability requirement for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence: R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239. 519. Section 79 is similar, but not identical, to the United States , r 702, prior to the latter’s amendment in 2000. There are two obvious differences. First, s 79 refers to “specialised knowledge” and not “scientific, technical, or other specialised knowledge” as in r 702. Second, s 79 does not require that such “specialised knowledge” will assist the trier of fact as stated in r 702. In 2000, r 702 was amended to incorporate an explicit requirement of reliability. 520. Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 237 A Crim R 589; [2014] HCA 29, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ at [38]. 521. The majority opinion lists those criteria, but also points out that sound criteria have been suggested in other sources, some of which they list, and says (n 12): “To the extent that they focus on the reliability of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its underlying © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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considered that a precondition to admissibility of expert evidence is a “valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry”. It must be demonstrated that the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony properly can be applied to the facts in issue.522 This was perceived as an aspect of relevance – expert testimony which is not “sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute” is not (sufficiently) relevant.

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Unfortunately, it was not necessary for the High Court in Honeysett to decide issues relating to relevance or the practical application of the requirement of “knowledge”. The specialized knowledge in that case was “anatomy”, a conceded field of “knowledge”, and the case was resolved by deciding whether the expert’s opinion was based on his undoubted knowledge of anatomy: see [EA.79.150]. Accordingly, the High Court left for another day questions as to whether the “knowledge” requirement, and the reference to “good grounds”, imports consideration of “reliability” or “validity”. The approach of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has generally been to resist a consideration of “reliability” or “validity”. In R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; 161 A Crim R 377; [2006] NSWCCA 167, Spigelman CJ (Simpson and Adams JJ agreeing) quoted at [138] the extract from Daubert but stated at [137] that “the focus of attention must be on the words ‘specialised knowledge’, not on the introduction of an extraneous idea such as ‘reliability’”. (see also discussion at [EA.79.150]). In Amaba Pty Ltd v Booth (2010) 9 DDCR 488; [2010] NSWCA 344 Basten JA (Beazley JA and Giles JA agreeing) emphasised the differences between this provision and US FRE (Federal Rules of Evidence) 702523 and then observed at [57] that “[t]he great variety in expert evidence which may be proffered at a trial, taken together with the circumstances in which it is proffered, should give rise to caution in imposing statements from case law, particularly case law with a different basis, on the application of a relatively straightforward statutory rule”.524 Yet a requirement of “knowledge”, understood in terms of “good grounds” and “appropriate validation”, would seem to necessarily invite an assessment of reliability. While the guidelines adopted in Daubert may have limited application, particularly outside areas of “hard” science, it is certainly arguable, particularly in principles, all these versions may well have merit”. The United States Supreme Court has extended the principle in Daubert beyond the scope of traditional science to engineering testimony: see Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 US 137 (1999). The Canadian Supreme Court has adopted similar criteria in assessing reliability: see R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239. 522. Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993). 523. Basten JA observed at [56] that the US Supreme Court “derived its principles from that part of FREr 702 which required that the evidence ‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue’”, words that do not appear in s 79. However, as noted earlier in this commentary, the majority also relied upon the requirement of “relevance” (equally applicable under this Act) and the word “knowledge” in FRE 702 (also found in s 79). 524. Basten JA concluded that the challenge to the admissibility of an opinion expressed by a Professor of Pathology on the cause of the respondent’s mesothelioma should be rejected in circumstances where “there was no challenge to his [general] expertise” (at [60]), there was no attempt “to identify an opinion expressed by [the expert] which was outside his area of expertise” (at [61]), no evidence was adduced to challenge his assertion that his views were “almost universally accepted” (at [61]) and the expert clearly explained the basis on which he came to his opinions (at [66]–[69]).

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relation to novel scientific evidence, that the burden should be on the party seeking to have the evidence admitted to demonstrate its reliability. Concerns about past miscarriages of justice support the view that, particularly in criminal proceedings, the courts should exercise more of a gate-keeping function with respect to prosecution forensic evidence.525 Certainly, some members of the High Court have interpreted s 79 in such a way as to require expert testimony to meet a standard of evidentiary reliability to be admissible. Gaudron J held in HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; [1999] HCA 2 at [58]:

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So far as this case is concerned, the first question that arises with respect to the exception in s 79 of the Evidence Act is whether psychology or some relevant field of psychological study amounts to “specialised knowledge”. The position at common law is that, if relevant, expert or opinion evidence is admissible with respect to matters about which ordinary persons are unable “to form a sound judgment … without the assistance of [those] possessing special knowledge or experience … which is sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience”. There is no reason to think that the expression “specialised knowledge” gives rise to a test which is in any respect narrower or more restrictive than the position at common law.526

Subsequently, in Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4 at [82], Gaudron J restated her position. While the test applied by Gaudron J does refer to recognition as one basis for a conclusion of reliability, it appears clear that the ultimate test is reliability. In both HG and Velevski, Gaudron J was in dissent. However, in Velevski, two other members of the court, Gummow and Callinan JJ, appeared to accept (at [154]) that it must be “established that there is a reliable body of knowledge and experience”.527 The judgment in Honeysett does not resolve the issue but the reference to Daubert certainly suggests that the High Court will ultimately require “appropriate validation” of supposed “knowledge”. However, subsequent to Honeysett, the Victorian Court of Appeal held in Tuite v The Queen [2015] VSCA 148 at [70] that this provision “leaves no room for reading in a test of evidentiary reliability as a condition of admissibility”. While the “good grounds” requirement was adopted (at [72]), without explaining what it entailed, the court concluded that the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in requiring “appropriate validation” was derived from the term “scientific knowledge” in r 702, which does not appear in this provision. Yet, requiring “appropriate validation” does not seem to be dependent on characterising an area of “knowledge” as “scientific”. Indeed, as the Court of Appeal acknowledged in a footnote (footnote 78), the United States Supreme Court subsequently “took a 525. See, for example, Law Commission, “Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales” (London, 2011); Edmond G, “The Admissibility of Forensic Science and Medicine Evidence under the Uniform Evidence Law” (2014) 38 Crim LJ 136; Edmond G and San Roque M, “Honeysett v The Queen: Forensic Science, Specialised Knowledge’ and the Uniform Evidence Law” (2014) 36 SydLR 323; Edmond G, “What lawyers should know about the forensic sciences” (2015) 36 Adel LR 33; Ligertwood A, “What lawyers should and can do now that they know about the forensic sciences” (2015) 36 Adel LR 153; President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, “Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods” (Washington, 2016). 526. The other members of the court did not address this question. 527. The other members of the court, Gleeson CJ and Hayne J, said nothing to the contrary. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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different view” to that taken by the Court of Appeal, holding in Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 US 137 (1999) that what had been said in Daubert applied to all “scientific”, “technical” and “other specialized” matters within the scope of r 702. In truth, it seems that the primary basis for the Court of Appeal’s conclusion appears to have been the observations of the ALRC (see at [78]–[81]). Quite apart from the question of whether the requirement of “specialised knowledge” imports a requirement that expert testimony must meet a standard of evidentiary reliability, it will be necessary to establish that the person purporting to have such knowledge (on which a particular opinion of that person is said to be wholly or substantially based: see [EA.79.180]) does in fact528 possess such knowledge.529 It is important to understand that this proposition applies to each opinion sought to be given.530 For example, a professional qualification has its limits so far as specialised knowledge is concerned.531 Thus, it has been held:

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• A chartered accountant may express opinions about accounting standards and principles and their application but not about the conduct of experienced and competent company directors.532 The latter opinion is substantially based on knowledge which is not “specialised” (and the specialised knowledge which is possessed is not the whole or substantial basis of the opinion).

528. It is a question of fact: Hamod v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] NSWCA 243 at [39]. 529. See, eg, Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd [1999] AIPC 91–530; [1999] FCA 1561 at [69], where Finn J held that while the expert witnesses were “able to venture opinions on facets of the wine’s reputation especially as to quality” he did not accept that their “knowledge would enable or qualify them relevantly to express opinions on the reputation of the wine amongst the segment of the wine consuming public with which this case is concerned”, nor (at [75]) did they have expertise on the question “of the likelihood of an association being made by the relevant section of the wine purchasing public in consequence of the shared words in the brand names of … two wines”. In Aurousseau v Commonwealth [1998] FCA 1724, Lehane J considered evidence of a report should have been excluded because “it is not by any means obvious that the training, study or experience described by [the writer of the report] equipped him with specialised knowledge to conduct the experiment to which he referred or to derive from it the conclusion which he stated”. However, the other members of the Federal Court considered that “part” of the report was admissible. In Campbell v The Queen (2014) 312 ALR 129; [2014] NSWCCA 175, the evidence of an Associate Professor was held to be entirely inadmissible because neither his formal qualifications nor his course of study established that he had acquired specialised knowledge regarding the mechanics of the human body in terms of movement and reactions (see Bathurst CJ at [229]–[234]). 530. See Pollard v Wilson [2010] NSWCA 68 at [87]–[89]. 531. See Australian Cement Holdings Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Ltd [2001] NSWSC 645 at [7] per Barrett J; Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79; 137 ALR 138. 532. Australian Cement Holdings Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Ltd [2001] NSWSC 645 at [6] per Barrett J: “I do not think that the experience of watching practitioners do what they do, or even discussing with them why they do what they do, arms the observer with specialised knowledge of the particular field of practice. The emphasis must be on ‘specialised’ in the phrase ‘specialised knowledge’. This connotes something beyond the product of the observations of a non-participating onlooker.”

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• A board member of a trustee company holding and managing investments did not have the necessary specialized knowledge to express an opinion about the duties and responsibilities of a trustee under the Corporations Act.533 • The ordinary training and experience of a professional may be sufficient to justify admission of that person’s opinion as to what a competent and careful professional in that field would normally do (assuming that this is categorised as evidence of “opinion” in the first place: [EA.76.90]), but not in hypothetical circumstances that are out of the ordinary.534 • An expert on plants may be able to identify a plant as cannabis but not estimate its age.535 • A person with specialised knowledge in relation to horticultural matters is not a valuer.536

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• A police officer familiar with the argot of the drug world may be able to say that language employed in intercepted conversations was “consistent with” being language referable to a drug transaction but not go further and express the opinion that the speakers were in fact talking about drugs.537 • A traffic engineer had specialised knowledge as to the way people drive, what signs and other information may be absorbed by them and what kind of safety designs are effective to reduce accidents on roads, but that kind of knowledge did not extend to identifying what was actually perceived by the driver involved in an accident or whether accounts given by the driver and an observer were reliable.538

533. Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland (No 13) [2016] FCA 1153 at [37]–[44]. 534. ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 at [13] per Austin J; see also [19]–[22] and [53]–[54]. In Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 404; [2001] NSWSC 448 at [380], Bryson J stated that “it is well established” that an expert cannot say what he or she would do in particular circumstances, but could say what a reasonably careful and competent professional in that field would or should do. Bryson J cited only pre-Evidence Act 1995 authority. However, this proposition was accepted by Austin J in ASIC v Vines at [31]–[32]. Austin J suggested that this “may be because it is not evidence based upon the expert’s specialised knowledge” but this seems implausible. Discretionary analysis may be apposite. 535. R v Howard (2005) 152 A Crim R 7; [2005] NSWCCA 25 at [26]. 536. Pollard v Wilson [2010] NSWCA 68 at [89]. 537. Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204. Cf Nguyen v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 557; [2007] NSWCCA 249; Dodds v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 408; [2009] NSWCCA 78 at [23]–[26]; Czako v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 202 at [97]–[116]. In Meade v The Queen [2015] VSCA 171, it was held that a person with training and experience in the area of boot manufacture and marketing could express an opinion that certain footprints were “consistent” with a particular make of boot. 538. Nominal Defendant v Ismail (2014) 69 MVR 343; [2014] NSWCA 432 at [21]–[28], [83]. See also Fairall v Hobbs [2017] NSWCA 82 at [52]–[55]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• A medical practitioner may be able to express opinions regarding the causes of particular injuries, but not about how much force would have been required to cause the injuries539 or whether the injuries were inflicted deliberately.540 • A psychologist may be able to express opinions about human behaviour but not as to why a person told lies in a particular context.541 A psychologist may be able to say that there is a “real possibility” that a child had “been exposed to sexual conduct” while not able to express the opinion that such exposure had occurred.542 A psychologist who has expertise in the area of eyewitness identification evidence may give “general” evidence in relation to the ways that memory can be affected by exposure to “post-event information”, but not express an opinion as to the reliability of the evidence of a particular witness.543 On the other hand, while the specialised knowledge connoted by the title of a consultant psychologist may be an insufficient basis for an opinion that a person suffered from a particular psychiatric illness, the particular psychologist may have specialised knowledge sufficient for that purpose based on his or her training, study or experience beyond the specialised knowledge connoted by the title.544 Further, even if the test of “specialised knowledge” is satisfied, evidence of an expert’s opinion may be excluded in the exercise of discretion (see [EA.79.300]).

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[EA.79.150]

“based on the person’s training, study or experience” (s 79(1))

Under the common law, there has been some uncertainty as to whether expertise can be derived from experience, rather than a course of study.545 The ALRC explained its proposal (ALRC 26, para 742): An expert should be defined as a person who “has special knowledge, skill, experience or training about a matter”, and that he generally be able to give opinion evidence that 539. See R v Lee [2001] ACTSC 133 at [54]–[55] per Crispin J. 540. R v Lee [2001] ACTSC 133 at [42]. Crispin J observed that: “[D]ivining the state of mind of an unknown person would not fall within his or her field of specialised knowledge”. He added (at [44]): “Of course there may be circumstances in which a psychiatrist who has interviewed a particular person might be able to express an expert opinion as to that person’s level of understanding, whether he or she would have been likely to have had sufficient cognitive ability to understand certain matters or even perhaps, to deduce certain matters from circumstances proven in evidence.” 541. R v Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218; [2001] NSWCCA 216 at [49] per Smart AJ. 542. Lancaster v The Queen [2014] VSCA 333 at [49]–[52]. 543. R v Dupas (2010) 211 A Crim R 81; [2011] VSC 180 at [18], [26]; Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 at [281]–[282]. .See also MA v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 564; 226 A Crim R 575; [2013] VSCA 20, Osborne JA at [88] (whether psychiatrist could go beyond evidence as to the general behaviour of victims of child sexual abuse to give opinion evidence regarding the specific reactions of alleged victim of sexual abuse). 544. Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 at [1428]–[1432] per the court (Beazley JA, Giles JA and Santow JA). 545. See Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486; Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436. However, as the quotation from Gaudron J noted above indicates, the trend of authority recognises that expertise may be derived from experience.

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utilises his specialised knowledge, skill, experience or training. Experience can be a sounder basis for opinion than study. Not to include special experience as a qualification would keep valuable evidence from the courts.

It is important to note that the requisite specialised knowledge may have been acquired from different types of training, study and experience: Hence for example, the question of whether or not a person has satisfied s 79 criteria in showing an entitlement to express opinions as to functionality or as to functionality comparisons, may be answered in the affirmative in respect of A who has demonstrated specialised knowledge of a very technical nature (as for example in relation to the writing of technical specifications and functional specifications and calculation of effort estimates and use of source lines of code and the like) with far less experience of a conceptual nature. The question may also be answered in the affirmative in respect of B who has demonstrated specialised knowledge of functionality at far more of a conceptual level but with less technical experience. There are some cases where too narrow an approach to the route to or categorisation of specialised knowledge or to classification of the opinions capable of being expressed as based whether wholly or substantially, on that specialised knowledge, may lead to injustice because the court will have pre-empted the entitlement of the parties through appropriately qualified experts to have the issue litigated and only determined in the final judgment following the receipt of the respective opinions of experts.546

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The necessary expertise may derive from a combination of training, study and experience. Thus, an expert who was not qualified in 1961 may be able to give evidence of the state of knowledge within his or her area of specialised knowledge in 1961, based upon a review of the literature as it stood then.547 Where “experience” is asserted to be the basis of “specialised knowledge”, this will need to be clearly demonstrated. Much will depend on the field of knowledge in question.548 Thus, a police officer may have sufficient experience to express an opinion that a recorded conversation includes coded language of a sort commonly used by drug dealers.549 A person trained to identify genuine products sold under a particular trademark has “a narrow specialist ability to detect counterfeit 546. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 at [153] per Einstein J. 547. BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v University of Adelaide (2008) 6 DDCR 382; [2008] NSWCA 210 at [26]. 548. It should be noted that, if specialised knowledge is derived from experience, the test of “reliability” discussed above would need to be applied with care. Application of scientific principles of review may be inappropriate. 549. R v Lam (2002) 135 A Crim R 302; [2002] NSWCCA 377 at [69]–[82]. Similarly, a police officer may have sufficient experience to express an opinion as to whether it was typical behaviour of a supplier to have drugs in the quantity and of the purity of the drugs discovered in the defendant’s car (but lack expertise to give evidence as to the purpose for which the defendant possessed the drug): R v Colley [2003] NSWCCA 323. See also Sim v Powell (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 10 September 1997) (valuation of horses); O’Brien v Gillespie (1997) 41 NSWLR 549 (proper conduct of a solicitor); Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1) [2003] NSWSC 160 (the propensity of prison escapees to engage in criminal activity). For pre-Evidence Act 1995 cases, see Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 (experience of “unstable adolescent girls”); Price v The Queen [1981] Tas R 306 (experience of heroin); R v Yilditz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115 (the attitudes of a particular community); R v Shephard [1993] AC 380 (experience of store detective with computerised cash register system). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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products”. A person who has training and experience in the area of boot manufacture and marketing may be able to express an opinion regarding the boots that caused certain footprints even if he had not undergone formal training in shoe, or work boot, identification.551 There is little doubt that a person may have what is sometimes referred to as “ad hoc expertise” based on particular experience (such as repeated listening to tape recordings which are substantially unintelligible to anybody who had not played them repeatedly).552 Evidence from a witness “recognising” a person in a photograph on the basis of prior familiarity has been regarded in New South Wales as “a familiar example of an ad hoc expert”.553 However, if the opinion is founded on the “experience” of repeatedly examining material no different from the material available to the tribunal of fact, the opinion may not be relevant.554 Furthermore, the Victorian courts have taken a conservative approach to treating “identity evidence … as a matter of expertise”.555 Clearly enough “experience”, without proper training or study, would be quite insufficient in a technical field of science.556 A United Kingdom accountant who has in the course of his practice been incidentally exposed to, and acquired some derivative familiarity with, some aspects of United States accounting practice, may not have the specialized knowledge that would equip him or permit him to give expert evidence applying “United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles”.557 A layman who had read extensively particular materials published

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550. Nokia Corp v Truong (2005) 66 IPR 511; [2005] FCA 1141 per Crennan J at [35]. See also Facton Ltd v Seo (2011) 91 IPR 135; [2011] FCA 344 at [29]. 551. Meade v The Queen [2015] VSCA 171 at [188]. 552. R v Cassar [1999] NSWSC 436; R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 at [37]–[40] per Simpson J (noting the following authorities: R v Menzies [1982] 1 NZLR 40; Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180; 30 A Crim R 417; Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107); Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 at [39]–[44]; R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 at [107]; Irani v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 125; [2008] NSWCCA 217 at [14]. In Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 237 A Crim R 589; [2014] HCA 29, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ stated at [48] that “[w]hether the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal is right to consider that the repeated listening to an indistinct tape recording or viewing of videotape or film may qualify as an area of specialised knowledge based on the listener’s, or viewer’s, experience does not arise for determination in this appeal”. See also Morgan v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 25 at [37]–[42]. It should also be noted that asking a person to compare recordings in order to express an opinion as to identity may be improperly suggestive (raising possible application of s 138): R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 at [45]. 553. R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287, Simpson J at [43]; see also R v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 at [32]; R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 at [63]; Daniels v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 372 at [60]; Nguyen v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 4, RA Hulme JA at [83]; Schmidt J at [103]–[105]. 554. Nasrallah v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 188 at [42]–[47] (but cf Nguyen v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 4, Basten JA at [42]–[49]; RA Hulme JA at [91]; Schmidt J at [105]). See generally [EA.55.270]. 555. Kheir v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 308; 244 A Crim R 231; [2014] VSCA 200 at [62] (see also at [63]–[65]). 556. See Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486; Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436. 557. Daya v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1622.

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in a relevant specialised field would be unlikely to have the requisite specialised knowledge. In Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 at [25], Einstein J referred to:

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… the importance of the court being satisfied that the claimed expert, through training, study or experience, is shown to have become capable of appreciating the validity (and sometimes the invalidity) and the substance (and sometimes the lack of substance) in statements made and points of view expressed in such extrinsic reading materials. Putting the matter in the terms adopted by Wigmore, the witness must be accepted by the court as fitted in the matter about which he or she is allowed to give his or her supposed knowledge. An important parameter of an exercise in a particular case may be whether the witness is shown to have by training study or experience, sufficient specialised knowledge to be in a position to be aware of the trustworthy authorities and proper sources of information.

The reference to “sufficient specialised knowledge” indicates that a question of degree is involved (it may be that this flows from the requirement that the opinion be “substantially based” on specialised knowledge: see [EA.79.180]). An accountant may not have sufficient experience based on his observations to have specialised knowledge as to how an experienced and competent company director would act.558 In ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 at [12], Austin J drew from this case the proposition “that ‘specialised experience’ connotes something beyond the product of the observation of a non-participating onlooker, at any rate where the knowledge is about a standard of competence in doing a job that requires the exercise of judgment”. Where it is suggested that a new area of expertise has developed, or is developing, the courts have to be careful to recognise that the specialised knowledge need not involve the application of narrow expertise gained from narrow experience in established fields of knowledge.559

[EA.79.180]

“wholly or substantially based on that knowledge” (s 79(1))

While, in a sense, no opinion will be based solely on specialised knowledge (it will also be based on certain factual premises), it must be based “wholly or substantially” on that knowledge. In consequence, it will be necessary to show that the person “has specialised knowledge of an identifiable kind”560 (see [EA.79.120]). Further, an expert witness should not be permitted to stray outside the witness’s area of expertise.561 The words “wholly or substantially” in the section were introduced in lieu of the words “wholly or partly” to avoid an expert witness giving non-expert opinion evidence: see ALRC 38, para 151(a). It is not enough that a particular opinion falls within the field in which the witness is an 558. Australian Cement Holdings Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Ltd [2001] NSWSC 645, referred to by Giles JA in Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131 at [630]. 559. See Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 at [89] per Einstein J. 560. NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 7) (1999) 161 ALR 576 at [7] per Lindgren J. 561. See, eg, Randwick City Council v Minister for the Environment (1998) 54 ALD 682; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 at [252]–[274] per Einstein J; Cadwallader v Bajco (2001) 189 ALR 370; [2001] NSWSC 1193 at [150] per Austin J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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expert, if no “special knowledge” is used in reaching that opinion. If the issue in respect of which the opinion is given involves no question of specialised knowledge (because, for example, it turns on a factual analysis), then the opinion cannot be regarded as based on the witness’s specialised knowledge.563

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The High Court has drawn a distinction between an opinion based on “specialised knowledge” and an opinion that is “subjective”. For example, in HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; [1999] HCA 2 Gleeson CJ stated at [39]–[44]: [39] ...An expert whose opinion is sought to be tendered should differentiate between the assumed facts upon which the opinion is based, and the opinion in question … [T]he provisions of s 79 will often have the practical effect of emphasising the need for attention to requirements of form. By directing attention to whether an opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience, the section requires that the opinion is presented in a form which makes it possible to answer that question. [40] ...[T]he witness had to identify the expertise he could bring to bear, and as Clark v Ryan [(1960) 103 CLR 486] illustrates, his opinions had to be related to his expertise. [41] ...[In this case, the opinion sought to be adduced] was not shown to have been based, either wholly or substantially, on [the expert’s] specialised knowledge as a psychologist. On the contrary, a reading of his report, and his evidence at the committal, reveals that it was based on a combination of speculation, inference, personal and second-hand views as to the credibility of the complainant, and a process of reasoning which went well beyond the field of expertise of a psychologist... ... [44] This was not a trial by jury, but in trials before judges alone, as well as in trials by jury, it is important that the opinions of expert witnesses be confined, in accordance with s 79, to opinions which are wholly or substantially based on their specialised knowledge. Experts who venture “opinions” (sometimes merely their own inference of fact), outside their field of specialised knowledge may invest those opinions with a spurious appearance of authority, and legitimate processes of fact-finding may be subverted.564

Similarly, in Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 237 A Crim R 589; [2014] HCA 29, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ held at [43] that 562. See Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; [1998] FCA 1200 per Emmett J (at 380–381) and Finkelstein J (at 383). 563. Cadwallader v Bajco (2001) 189 ALR 370; [2001] NSWSC 1193 at [148] per Austin J. 564. The other members of the court did not deal with this issue. The reference to Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 should be read with care. It is a leading common law authority on the admissibility of “expert opinion evidence”. While it is used by Gleeson CJ as illustrative of the proposition (imposed by s 79) that an opinion must be related to the “expertise” (ie “specialised knowledge”), Gleeson CJ does not hold that the decision is otherwise determinative of the effect of the Act in this context. For a similar application of the requirement that the opinion must be based “wholly or substantially” on the specialised knowledge, see Tomark Pty Ltd v Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 347 at [42] per Stein JA, Beazley JA agreeing, Priestley JA disagreeing on this point. See also Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd [1999] AIPC 91–530; [1999] FCA 1561 at [75] per Finn J. In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373, Barr and Hall JJ observed at [290] that even though “the spurious nature of the authority may be apprehended,

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the opinion of an expert in anatomy that an offender and the defendant both had certain anatomical characteristics (such as “oval shaped heads”) was not based on his knowledge of anatomy but “his subjective impression of what he saw when he looked at the images” of the offender and the defendant – the evidence “gave the unwarranted appearance of science to the prosecution case that the [defendant and the offender] share a number of physical characteristics” (at [45]).565 In Allen v Robbie [2015] NSWCA 247, the NSW Court of Appeal upheld exclusion of an expert report by an accountant which “was based upon an unfounded assumption, amounting to speculation” (Harrison J at [68]). A psychologist who has studied known sex offenders may be able to make generalizations about such behaviour (a retrospective characterization) but not make predictions based on certain reported behaviour.566 The requirement that an opinion be “wholly or substantially based on” specialised knowledge means that the reasoning process leading to the formation of the opinion must be exposed (made “transparent”) so as to demonstrate that the opinion is so based (see further discussion at [EA.79.240]). As Gleeson CJ stated in HG, the opinion must be “shown to have been” wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge. Thus, in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; [2011] HCA 21, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ concluded at [42] that where an expert’s opinion on a particular question “lacked reasoning, the absence of reasoning pointed (in this case, inexorably) to the lack of any sufficient connection between [the opinion] and relevant specialised knowledge”. Similarly, in Morgan v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 33; [2011] NSWCCA 257 it was held (Hidden J at [140]) that it was “never satisfactorily explained” how an expert in anatomy “could perform an anatomical comparison between relatively poor quality CCTV images of a person covered by clothing from head to foot with images of the appellant”. In those circumstances, it had not been established that his evidence of similarity in body shape “could be said to be based upon his specialised knowledge of anatomy” (at [144]). In Gilham v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal concluded at [345] that an opinion from forensic pathologists that stab wounds in three different victims were “similar” (and thus showed a pattern) was not shown to be substantially based on the experts’ experience in stab wounds. In Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2012] NSWCA 383, it was held that expert evidence was inadmissible because it was not demonstrated that such specialised knowledge as an expert had “enabled him to express an informed opinion on the matters addressed” (Sackville AJA at

and allowance made, there is a potentially more insidious risk that the exercise required of the court or jury will be subverted through adoption of a shortcut, by acceptance of the opinion of another, without careful evaluation of the steps that opinion was reached”. 565. It is important to note that it was not the mere fact that the expert expressed an opinion as to similarity of characteristics which rendered his opinion inadmissible – it was that the opinion was based on his subjective impression. In contrast, in Meade v The Queen [2015] VSCA 171, the Victorian Court of Appeal held at [217] that a person with training and experience in the area of boot manufacture and marketing could express an opinion that certain footprints were “consistent” with a particular make of boot. 566. SLS v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 64; 243 A Crim R 318; [2014] VSCA 31 at [212]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[231]) nor how he “used such specialised knowledge as he had in order to form the opinions” (Sackville AJA at [234]). Other examples may be given.567

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Of course, the level of “demonstration” required that the opinion is “wholly or substantially based on” specialised knowledge will vary from case to case, just as the degree of emphasis on “form” referred to by Gleeson CJ in HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; [1999] HCA 2. Requirements of form may be more easily satisfied or of lesser importance in a given case.568 In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; [2011] HCA 21, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ emphasized at [37] that the requirement that the reasoning process be made transparent can “be met in many, perhaps most, cases very quickly and easily” (see further discussion at [EA.79.240]).569 In Hart v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2016] FCA 897, a Federal Court judge held at [23] that “strict adherence to the formal requirements of s 79 is of lesser importance” where the field of expertise is relatively objective and less susceptible to inference and speculation than other fields. However, a recurring issue in the application of s 79 is whether the courts should investigate the reliability of opinions sought to be admitted into evidence under this provision. That issue was considered in the context of the requirement of “specialised knowledge”, on which the opinion is supposedly based (see [EA.79.120]). It also arises in the present context, in that a court may insist (particularly in contentious fields of specialised knowledge) that it be demonstrated by the adducing party that the purported linkage between the expert’s specialised knowledge and a particular opinion is valid or reliable. If it is not shown that the expert can reliably form the opinion on the basis of that specialised knowledge then, on this reasoning, it has not been shown that the opinion is “wholly or substantially based” on that specialised knowledge. In such circumstances, the court may hold that the opinion is, in fact, not based on the specialised knowledge possessed by the expert but rather on “speculation”, “subjective impression”, “common sense” inferences, and so on. In R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; 161 A Crim R 377; [2006] NSWCCA 167, Spigelman CJ (Simpson and Adams JJ agreeing) drew a clear distinction between an expert on anatomy and “facial mapping” expressing an opinion regarding “similarity” between facial characteristics and expressing an opinion of “identity” of facial characteristics (ie “it is the same person”). Spigelman CJ noted at [145] American 567. For example, in ACCC v Homeopathy Plus! Australia Pty LTd (2014) 146 ALD 278; [2014] FCA 1412, Perry J observed at [33] that “[a]t its heart, the difficulty with [the expert’s] report was that it cast no light upon the reasoning by which the opinions given were reached” (see also at [32]). In Rolleston v Insurance Australia Ltd [2017] NSWCA 168, the NSW Court of Appeal held that a valuer had failed to demonstrate how his opinion was based on his specialised knowledge – as Meagher JA stated at [6], “[t]he valuer must explain, in a way which demonstrates the application of the adopted methodology and specialised knowledge, how the comparable sales justify the conclusion as to value”. 568. Hart v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2016] FCA 897 at [23]. 569. They observed that “a specialist medical practitioner expressing a diagnostic opinion in his or her relevant field of specialisation is applying ‘specialised knowledge’ based on his or her ‘training, study or experience’, being an opinion ‘wholly or substantially based’ on that ‘specialised knowledge’, will require little explicit articulation or amplification once the witness has described his or her qualifications and experience, and has identified the subject matter about which the opinion is proffered”.

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authorities which have concluded that “fingerprint evidence [has] the requisite scientific basis to justify the expression of opinion that the accused and the offender are the same”. Australian authority is to the same effect.570 However, in respect of facial mapping, Spigelman CJ stated at [154]:

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[T]he US debate [about fingerprint evidence] emphasises the significance of the step from evidence of similarity, to a conclusion about the identity of the suspect and the offender. Facial mapping, let alone body mapping, was not shown, on the evidence in the trial, to constitute “specialised knowledge” of a character which can support an opinion of identity. … The three opinions of Dr Sutisno in the present case do not, in my view, go beyond a “bare ipse dixit”. Dr Sutisno did not identify the terms of the “strict protocol” that she purported to have applied, nor did she set out the basis on which the “protocol” was developed.

The reference to the failure to identify the protocol adopted by the expert focuses on the need to expose the reasoning process leading to the formation of the opinion so as to demonstrate that the opinion is based on specialised knowledge. However, Spigelman CJ’s judgment also imported reliability considerations. The specialised knowledge was not shown to be “of a character which can support” the opinion expressed. The reference to “bare ipse dixit” (“I say so”) is from the judgment of Heydon JA in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [87], where he asked whether an expert’s opinion was “intelligible, convincing and tested” (see discussion at [EA.79.240]). Spigelman CJ also endorsed at [155] the conclusion of the English Court of Appeal that in the absence of “any national database of facial characteristics or any accepted mathematical formula, as in the case of fingerprint comparison, from which conclusions as to the probability or occurrence of particular facial characteristics or combinations of facial characteristics could safely be drawn” [emphasis added], it followed that “any estimate of probabilities and any expression of the degree of support provided by particular facial characteristics or combinations of facial characteristics must be only the subjective opinion of the facial imaging or mapping witness”. This analysis is similar to that adopted by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993) (see [EA.79.120]) with the qualification that the ultimate conclusion is not that the opinion lacks “reliability” or “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry” but rather that it is simply “subjective”. So characterised, the opinion would not be “wholly or substantially based” on the expert’s specialised knowledge. Not surprisingly, there is no definition of the word “substantially”. It appears in other parts of the Act (for example, ss 101, 103 and 135). It gives considerable flexibility to courts as to whether to admit evidence of “expert” opinion.571 In this regard, a court will have to be careful to avoid, on the one hand, too narrow and confined a set of tests in categorising the suggested necessary specialised knowledge and in categorising the opinions said to have been expressed572 and, 570. R v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; 116 A Crim R 38; [2000] NSWCCA 357. 571. For an example of a disagreement between members of a court in this regard, see Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; [1998] FCA 1200 per Branson J (at 374–375), Emmett J (380–381). 572. For example, in Hatziandoniou v Ruddy [2015] NSWCA 234, the NSW Court of Appeal held that a trial judge had adopted “an unduly narrow approach to the question of the qualifications © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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on the other hand, applying too wide a set of tests in categorising at an inappropriate level of generality, either or both of the necessary specialised knowledge required to be shown and the opinions required to be wholly or substantially based upon that specialised knowledge (which may make it difficult, if not impossible, to comprehend the scope and nature of the alleged specialised knowledge).573 The court must be satisfied that the particular opinion in question “is wholly or substantially based on” the person’s specialised knowledge. Thus, for example, a general statement that “[t]he opinions contained in this report are those of my own and are based wholly or substantially on the knowledge set out under section 1.3.1 of this report”, which section merely lists the person’s expertise and qualifications at a very general and abstract level, would not be sufficient.574

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Of course, the discretion inherent in the determination of the question whether an opinion is substantially based on specialised knowledge must be exercised within the scope of the requirement that the particular opinion be “based” on specialised knowledge. It would not be permissible to exclude the evidence on some unrelated criterion, such as the evidence being “argumentative”. Priestley JA in the NSW Court of Appeal observed: Very often, experts’ opinions are the conclusions they reach after a process of reasoning which, when stated, takes the form of an argument, in the sense of the statement of a reasoning process. The submissions to the trial judge never seem to have taken account of this not very subtle point. They seemed to assume that an “argument” by an expert could not be the foundation of an opinion but somehow invalidated it and turned the expert into an advocate … [I]f the argument (reasoning process) is sound and supports the opinion and the opinion is one in an area within which the person expressing it is acknowledged as an expert, then the argumentative (or reasoning) aspect of the formation of the opinion cannot of itself be a reason for excluding the argument or belittling the opinion.575

Furthermore, there is no doubt that a particular opinion may be “substantially based” on specialised knowledge notwithstanding the fact that the expert witness of [an engineer] to express his opinion as to the mechanism by which [fluid discharged from a motorcycle] came to be where it was on the road” (Simpson JA at [44]). It was not necessary for the expert engineer to have “tested the flow of liquid from a motorcycle engine”. His training in fluid dynamics and expertise in cooling systems in motor vehicles was sufficient to support an opinion about the operations of a breached cooling system in a motorcycle. Simpson JA observed at [44] that “[o]ne of the benefits of expertise is that it enables the person who has the relevant ‘training, study or experience’ to extrapolate from the general to the particular”. 573. See Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 at [120]–[121] per Einstein J. 574. Fonterra Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd v Viropoulos (No 2) [2015] FCA 974 at [20]. 575. Barbosa v Di Meglio [1999] NSWCA 307 at [33]. Priestley JA dissented but Mason P, in the majority, expressed agreement with this passage (at [15]). However, cf Hardy v Your Tabs Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 150 at [134], where Heydon JA held that evidence was inadmissible because it “was not really expert opinion evidence, but advocacy”. See also Jango v Northern Territory (No 4) [2004] FCA 1539, where Sackville J held that certain opinions expressed by an expert were more advocacy than admissible opinion under s 79 because they related to the establishment of primary facts, which were for the court to determine and had not been “shown to be the product of specialist knowledge based on training or experience” (at [29]).

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takes into account matters of “common knowledge” in formulating the opinion. In Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4 at [82] Gaudron J stated: The concept of “specialised knowledge” imports knowledge of matters which are outside the knowledge or experience of ordinary persons …. So to say, however, is not to say that an expert witness cannot have regard to matters that are within the knowledge of ordinary persons in formulating his or her opinion. So much is expressly acknowledged by s 80(b) of the Evidence Act.

While Gaudron J was in dissent, the same proposition was advanced by Gummow and Callinan JJ in their joint judgment576 and their analysis was subsequently endorsed by the High Court in Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 237 A Crim R 589; [2014] HCA 29 at [24]. On the other hand, Gummow and Callinan JJ concluded that the experts in that case went beyond their expertise when “instead of just stating what they had observed and using only those parts of ordinary knowledge and experience which it was necessary for them to use in reaching their expert opinions, they gave weight, and attached significance to other matters”: for example, the “security” of a hair clip (at [164]).577 In essence, the experts relied upon matters that did not involve specialised knowledge.578

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Similarly, a particular opinion may be “substantially based” on specialised knowledge notwithstanding the fact that the expert witness utilises materials provided by others in formulating the opinion. In R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658, Hall J stated at [57]: It is not uncommon for professional persons or experts in various fields to utilise materials produced by third party specialists for the purpose of assisting them apply their specialised knowledge. That does not mean that the opinion of the former is not based wholly or substantially upon his or her specialised knowledge (the making or production of such materials being proved independently or admitted in legal proceedings). An example is the radiologist who produces an MRI scan which, in due course, is utilised by a medical specialist for the purposes of forming an opinion concerning causation, diagnosis and/or treatment. The specialist utilises such materials (and equipment) for the purposes of exercising his specialised knowledge in order to arrive at an opinion for the purposes of treatment or otherwise. 576. Velevski at [158]. Gummow and Callinan JJ stated that: “‘Training, study or experience’, the words used in the section, necessarily include, as they must in all areas of expertise, observations and knowledge of everyday affairs and events, and departures from them. It will frequently be impossible to divorce entirely these observations and that knowledge from the body of purely specialised knowledge upon which an expert’s opinion depends. It is the added ingredient of specialised knowledge to the expert’s body of general knowledge that equips the expert to give his or her opinion.” The other members of the court, Gleeson CJ and Hayne J, said nothing to the contrary. 577. Gleeson CJ and Hayne J seemed to take the same view (at [45]). However, these members of the court rejected the appeal on the basis that there had been no miscarriage of justice. 578. In Verryt v Schoupp (2015) 70 MVR 484; [2015] NSWCA 128, the NSW Court of Appeal held that a psychiatrist’s opinion “as to how she thought an ordinary boy of 12 was likely to have acted and thought in the circumstances in which the respondent found himself” was an opinion “with respect to matters of ordinary human experience” which was “not shown to be based on any specialised knowledge of a 12 year old child’s ordinary behaviour in circumstances such as those confronting the respondent” and thus did not satisfy the requirements of this provision (Meagher JA at [51]–[59]). See also Roads and Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Barrie Toepfer Earthmoving and Land Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 916 at [15]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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As regards issues arising from the factual basis of the expert’s opinion, see [EA.79.240]. Finally, a particular opinion may be “substantially based” on “specialised knowledge” notwithstanding that the court “might have been able to reach the same conclusion if given enough time”.579 In Hart v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2016] FCA 897, a Federal Court judge observed at [35] that “[t]he measure of whether evidence falls within s 79(1) is not whether the task can in theory be performed by a sufficiently capable judge in the particular area given enough time and effort, without the application of accepted specialised knowledge, but whether the task is in fact carried out by the genuine application of such accepted specialised knowledge that adds the required level of value to the evidentiary and judicial process”.

[EA.79.210]

Joint opinions

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The requirement that the opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge can have significant implications where the opinion is expressed jointly by more than one person, as with joint expert reports adduced in evidence. In Cooke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 51 ATR 223; [2002] FCA 1315 Stone J considered a report prepared by two persons, where only one gave evidence. It was not possible to tell from the report which parts of it, if any, were prepared solely by the person who gave evidence. The other joint author was not called and there was no plan to call him. Stone J held: To be admissible, an expert opinion must be wholly or substantially based on the expert witness’s specialised knowledge. … This requirement clearly cannot be met if it is partly based on the knowledge or opinion of someone else. I was not prepared, however, to exclude this report, comprising as it did, the whole of the respondent’s evidence without giving the respondent the opportunity to elicit (in non-leading questions) evidence from [the expert who did give evidence] as to the parts (if any) for which he had been solely responsible.

This approach was followed by Barrett J in Paino v Paino [2005] NSWSC 1313. He found that the expert witness who was called could not establish that he was solely responsible for any particular part of the report and concluded at [15] that he was not satisfied that any part of it “is based ‘wholly’ or even ‘substantially’ on” the knowledge of the expert witness who testified. However, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against this judgment on the basis that the witness did make it clear which opinions were his (even though they were based on factual information collected by the co-author of the report).580 A similar approach has been adopted in a case where one person was responsible for the opinions expressed in a report prepared by another person.581 Where the witness asserts that he or she holds to (or “adopts”) all the opinions in the joint report (or, indeed, to any particular opinion in the joint report), there is a danger of “compromised opinion”. In BrisConnections Finance Pty Ltd v Arup Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1268, Lee J stated: 579. Hart v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2016] FCA 897 at [34]. 580. Paino v Paino (2008) 40 Fam LR 96; [2008] NSWCA 276, Hodgson JA and McColl JA at [68]–[69], Young CJ in Eq agreeing at [113]. 581. NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2010] NSWSC 921 at [29]–[31].

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[48] It is evident that there is a need to work out where licit delegation, consultation and testing ends, and where inappropriate compromise of opinions begins. There is a danger in generalising and using labels, but I will use the term “compromised opinions” to mean opinions reached as a result of decision to “adopt” an opinion, which opinion is not the result of an application of the specialised knowledge of a proposed witness, but as a result of a compromise between the proposed witness and another. This is to be contrasted with an opinion which is the result of an application of the specialised knowledge of a proposed witness, but is reached following discussion and debate between the expert and another (even if the tentative or preliminary view of the expert is refined or changed by that discussion and debate, and involves, as a matter of fact, a consensus emerging, by reason of that process, between the initial view of the expert and the view of another). The former is an abdication of the expert’s responsibility to form an opinion by reason of the application of the expert’s specialised knowledge; the latter is a faithful discharge of the expert’s responsibility to test and refine the expert’s views and come to a considered opinion based on the expert’s specialised knowledge, even though it may involve embracing a final view which may not have been initially evident. Subject to how the opinion is expressed, the latter is admissible while the former is not.582

Of course, deficiencies in expression may be cured by additional evidence. As Lee J observed at [50], “if the opinion is properly formed, there is no reason why deficient expression cannot be cured by additional evidence on the voir dire or in chief (subject to considerations of case management)”.

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[EA.79.240]

“the basis rule”

Under the common law, the view has generally been taken that the admissibility of expert opinion evidence depends on proper disclosure and evidence of the factual basis of the opinion. Thus, the expert must disclose the facts (usually assumed) upon which the opinion is based,583 the facts upon which the opinion is based must be capable of proof by admissible evidence584 and evidence must be admitted to prove the assumed facts upon which the opinion is based.585 However, the ALRC considered that no such preconditions to admissibility 582. Lee J added at [53]: “[T]here needs to be some recognition of the reality of complex litigation here: any expert report in an arcane area of specialised knowledge, which requires analysis of a very large volume of primary data in order to form an opinion, is likely to be, in a literal and practical sense, a collaborative effort. Provided the expert’s mind is applied to the analysis and reasoning processes which those working with the expert have developed, so that when the report is finalised it is apparent that the whole of the reasoning and conclusions it contains has been ‘adopted’ as the expert’s own reasoning and conclusions (as the process was explained by Austin J in Rich), even if this causes the expert’s initial or tentative views to change, there is no difficulty.” 583. Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 462 per Dixon J; R v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440; R v Lewis (1987) 29 A Crim R 267; 88 FLR 104 at 271 (A Crim R); Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 348. 584. Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at 649; Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85; [1985] HCA 58 at 846. 585. Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at 649; Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85; [1985] HCA 58 at 846 (ALR);Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; [2011] HCA 21, Heydon J at [66]–[90]. See also R v Perry (1990) 49 A Crim R 243 (NSW CCA); Steffen v Ruban [1966] 2 NSWLR 622 at 626 and 630–631; Sych v Hunter (1974) 8 SASR 118 at 119. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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should be imposed. It proposed (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 750) that such matters should be left to the “relevance discretion” (s 135) and it has been utilised on this basis (see [EA.79.300]).586 On the other hand, as was noted at [EA.79.180], “an expert whose opinion is sought to be tendered should differentiate between the assumed facts upon which the opinion is based, and the opinion in question” so that it is possible for the court to determine whether the opinion is “wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience”.587 Not only should the facts on which the opinion is based be identified, the reasoning process leading to the formation of the opinion must be exposed so as to demonstrate that the opinion is based on particular specialised knowledge.588 This point was emphasised by Heydon JA, as he then was, in his often cited summary of the applicable principles in this area in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles:589 In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, • it must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of “specialised knowledge”; • there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert; • the opinion proffered must be “wholly or substantially based on the witness’s expert knowledge”;

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• so far as the opinion is based on facts “observed” by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved590 by the expert; • and so far as the opinion is based on “assumed” or “accepted” facts, they must be identified and proved591 in some other way; • it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; 586. Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Offıce of Environment and Heritage (2013) 298 ALR 532; [2013] NSWCCA 114 (Price J at [65]–[68], Schmidt J at [179]); Wentworth v Wentworth (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 8 April 1997); NRMA Ltd v Morgan (unreported, NSW SC, Giles CJ Comm D, 1 September 1998). See also R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 at [55]–[56] per Hodgson JA. 587. Gleeson CJ in HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; [1999] HCA 2 at [39]. See also NRMA Ltd v Morgan (unreported, NSW SC, Giles CJ Comm D, 1 September 1998); Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 38) [2014] VSC 102, Forrest J at [30]–[31], [46]–[47]. 588. See Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Assn (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd (2000) 120 FCR 146; [2000] FCA 1463 at [23] per Black CJ, Cooper and Emmett JJ; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 at [19] per Einstein J; Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 38) [2014] VSC 102, Forrest J at [30]–[31]. 589. Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [85]. 590. In Rhoden v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165, Heydon JA made it clear (at [86]) that the issue for the court is not whether the facts are proved to any particular standard of proof but rather whether “there is evidence which, if accepted, is capable of establishing the” existence of the facts. 591. In Rhoden v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165, Heydon JA made it clear (at [86]) that the issue for the court is not whether the facts are proved to any particular standard of proof but rather whether “there is evidence which, if accepted, is capable of establishing the” existence of the facts.

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[EA.79.240]

• and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of “specialised knowledge” in which the witness is expert by reason of “training, study or experience”, and on which the opinion is “wholly or substantially based”, applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert’s specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished weight. And an attempt to make the basis of the opinion explicit may reveal that it is not based on specialised expert knowledge, but, to use Gleeson CJ’s characterisation of the evidence in HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; [1999] HCA 2 (at [41]), on “a combination of speculation, inference, personal and second-hand views as to the credibility of the complainant, and a process of reasoning which went well beyond the field of expertise”.592

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Although this summary was essentially only obiter dicta593 and has been very significantly qualified in some respects in subsequent judgments (see discussion below), the proposition that the reasoning process must usually be demonstrated so that the court can be satisfied that the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert’s specialised knowledge (and is not a bare “ipse dixit”) has been repeatedly affirmed.594 In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; [2011] HCA 21, after accepting that the admissibility of opinion evidence “is to be determined by application of the requirements of the Evidence Act rather than by any attempt to parse and analyse particular statements in decided cases divorced from the context in which those statements were made”, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ stated at [37]: Accepting that to be so, it remains useful to record that it is ordinarily the case, as Heydon JA said in Makita, that “the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of ‘specialised knowledge’ in which the witness is expert by reason of ‘training, study or experience’, and on which the opinion is ‘wholly or substantially based’, applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded”. 592. Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [85]. The other members of the Court of Appeal, Priestley and Powell JA, did not address this issue. See also Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 at [10] per Einstein J; R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; 125 A Crim R 315; [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [20] and [40] per Mason P; Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; [2000] FCA 858 at [30] per Nicholson J; TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82 at [145]. In Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 354; [2002] FCAFC 157, Branson J pointed out that it is not strictly necessary for the court to be “sure” that the opinion is based wholly or substantially on specialised knowledge – the test is satisfaction on the balance of probabilities (at [14]). The NSW Court of Appeal agreed with this in Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131 at [631]. 593. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Tong (2004) 151 A Crim R 296; [2004] NSWSC 689 at [37]. 594. See Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington (2005) 2 DDCR 271; [2005] NSWCA 42 at [80]–[81]; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 at [83]; Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204 at [29], [42]; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 14) [2006] FCA 500 at [28]; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 15) [2006] FCA 515 at [31]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The plurality judgment emphasised, however, that this requirement that the reasoning process be made transparent can “be met in many, perhaps most, cases very quickly and easily”. Thus, they observed that “a specialist medical practitioner expressing a diagnostic opinion in his or her relevant field of specialisation is applying ‘specialised knowledge’ based on his or her ‘training, study or experience’, being an opinion ‘wholly or substantially based’ on that ‘specialised knowledge’, will require little explicit articulation or amplification once the witness has described his or her qualifications and experience, and has identified the subject matter about which the opinion is proffered”.595 Of course, in other cases, close attention may be required as to whether the requirement is satisfied.596

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It is also possible that a failure to disclose the basis of an opinion would bear on the question of relevance under s 56. If the basis of an opinion is not disclosed, or no evidence is admitted in order to establish the basis, it might be concluded that the opinion evidence does not satisfy the requirement of relevance because it will not be possible to assess whether it is capable of affecting the probabilities of the existence of a fact in issue: see [EA.55.270].597 If the expert does not state and distinguish between all the factual assumptions underlying the opinion and the opinion itself, which would enable a tribunal of fact to properly assess the reliability of the opinion, then the opinion may not be relevant.598 Alternatively, discretionary exclusion may be appropriate.599 In Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 (a case involving anthropological evidence relating to an Aboriginal land claim) Mansfield J observed at [469] that, while there are “great practical differences” between experts’ reports from different disciplines [t]he important thing in any expert’s report, in my view, is that the intellectual processes of the expert can be readily exposed. That involves identifying in a transparent way what are the primary facts assumed or understood. It also involves making the process of reasoning transparent, and where there are premises upon which the reasoning depends, identifying them. 595. In Allianz Australia Ltd v Sim (2012) 10 DDCR 325; [2012] NSWCA 68, Allsop P (Meagher JA agreeing) observed at [9] that “the two requirements of the section and the explanation that is ordinarily required as to how the opinion applies to the facts should not be elevated into something more than they are: procedural rules to limit evidence to that which is rational and coherent and properly arising from expertise and directed to areas in respect of which the court needs assistance”. 596. See, for example, Cambridge v Anastasopoulos [2012] NSWCA 405 at [23]–[44]. 597. In Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; [1998] FCA 1200 at 374 Branson J observed that: “[T]he position may be that, in the circumstances of a particular case, a bare expression of opinion could, if accepted, rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. In the circumstances of most cases, however, a bare expression of opinion is likely to be incapable of affecting the assessment of the probability of the existence of any fact in issue in the proceeding”. See also Heydon JA in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [86]; Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 354; [2002] FCAFC 157 at [14] per Branson J; Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [25] per Lindgren J. 598. Compare R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; 129 A Crim R 408; [2002] VSCA 77 at [19]–[21]; Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [25] per Lindgren J. 599. Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159 FCR 397; [2007] FCAFC 70 at [108]–[109], see [EA.79.300].

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[EA.79.240]

Of course, as noted at [EA.76.90], the distinction between evidence of “fact” and evidence of “opinion” (“reasoning”) assumes a dichotomy that is not always easy to draw. Mansfield J qualified the need to separate “fact and premise from opinion” by adding at [472]–[473]: At least in the context of expert anthropological reports, the line between an opinion and the fact upon which that opinion is based is not always clear. This is especially the case because expert anthropology reports often rely on hearsay evidence from members of the tribe itself. Judgments are made by the anthropologist about the significance of such evidence. … In my view, while the clear separation of fact and premise from opinion is clearly desirable, it is necessary to accept that there is sometimes difficulty in discerning between the facts upon which an opinion is based and the opinion itself in an expert anthropology report. Such a difficulty should not be regarded as a fatal flaw that may render the report or the opinion inadmissible [although it] … should not excuse the expert from appreciating the need for transparency in the report and in oral evidence on the matter explained so far as that is possible, so that time and effort is not inappropriately wasted on trying to identify from a poorly constructed report the facts or premises underlying the opinions expressed in it, and the points at which an interpretive or judgmental opinion has been formed and the reasons for it.

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There remain other possible qualifications on the proposition that the reasoning process must be made transparent. First, the NSW Court of Appeal has held in ASIC v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; [2005] NSWCA 152 (Spigelman CJ at [92]–[107], Giles and Ipp JJA agreeing) that the proposition that the expert should disclose the underlying facts and the process of reasoning by which the opinion was formed is a reference to the “asserted” factual basis and process of reasoning. The opinion evidence will not become inadmissible if the court finds that the opinion was in truth based on some different factual basis (that is, the expert was influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by other facts than those disclosed), even if reliance on that different factual basis was impermissible for some reason. How an expert in fact came to hold an opinion may bear on the weight to be given the opinion and may bear on the operation of the discretions in Pt 3.11, but is not material to the application of s 79. Second, requiring that the reasoning process be (reasonably) transparent does not involve an investigation of the merits of the particular opinion. The fact that an expert could have used other, more accurate, tests will not make the evidence inadmissible.600 Equally, it must be remembered that “specialised knowledge” is just that, knowledge that is not generally held. As Barr and Hall JJ pointed out in Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [292], “the greater the ability of the witness to explain the process of inference, the greater the likelihood that the existence of ‘specialised knowledge’ will be doubted”. Third, in some cases, the connection between the expertise and the opinion may be self-evident (for example, where a translator expresses an opinion that particular words in one language have a certain meaning in another).601 Barr and Hall JJ observed in Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 600. Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373 per Barr and Hall JJ at [296]. 601. Nguyen v Nguyen & Vu Publishing Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1166 per Sperling J at [3]–[4]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 79

165 A Crim R 151; 205 FLR 217; [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [292] that “the need to demonstrate the process by which an inference was drawn is less likely to be insisted upon with strictness in the case of a well-accepted area of expertise, than in other cases”. In some areas of expertise which involve a degree of subjectivity, a court should be cautious about excluding an opinion on the basis that the reasoning process lacks transparency. Einstein J has observed: There is a narrow line … between on the one hand, a holding that opinion is inadmissible as being seen to lack the necessary scientific rigour and/or by reason of being riddled with lack of transparency and/or by reason of lack of identification of the premises considered by the expert, and on the other hand, a view that the very subject matter/comparison under consideration and in respect of which opinions are sought to be expressed maybe so subjective or so lacking of precision or definition as to make a court especially cautious not to peremptorily dismiss a bona fide attempt by a person with specialised knowledge … from being held to be qualified under s 79 to be able to express opinions …602

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Fourth, in the case of an expert opinion based upon what the expert has actually perceived, relevance and admissibility do not necessarily depend upon the setting out of all the non-opinion matters which were perceived and on which the opinion is partly based.603 Accordingly, the opinion may be admissible even if such matters are not disclosed (because, for example, privilege applies). Fifth, it is not necessary to identify the general and specialist knowledge customarily relied on by experts in the field .604 This is the position under the common law.605 Rule 703 of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.” While no equivalent provision is contained in the Evidence Act, the same result appears to flow from the structure of the Act, although it might be thought preferable to make this clear by introducing an equivalent provision into the Act. In Notaras v Hugh [2003] NSWSC 167, Sperling J observed at [17] that the basis for an expert’s opinion “may be unrecalled learning, experience without recollection of particular instances, conversation with colleagues”. In Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; 249 ALR 300; [2008] FCAFC 63, the Full Court of the Federal Court accepted at [92]–[93] that “there is nothing in the Evidence Act that displaces” the common law principle that “experts are entitled to rely upon reputable articles, 602. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123 at [197]. See also Muldoon v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 105; [2008] NSWCCA 315, where Hodgson JA observed at [39] that a dog handler interpreting the behaviour of a tracker-dog cannot be expected to make “wholly transparent the process of reasoning giving rise to these interpretations [because] inferences of that kind are not such as could reasonably be expected to be supported wholly by explicit inferential steps”. 603. R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 at [55] per Hodgson JA; however, see Ipp AJA at [77]–[85]. 604. Notaras v Hugh [2003] NSWSC 167 per Sperling J at [17]–[18]; Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 per Sackville J at [73]–[74]. 605. Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141; PQ v Australian Red Cross [1992] 1 VR 19; R v Jeffrey (1991) 60 A Crim R 384.

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publications and material produced by others in the area in which they have expertise, as a basis for their opinions”.606 Sixth, where the opinion is not in-court evidence but contained in a previous representation (so that it is provisionally caught by the hearsay rule under s 59 although, for whatever reason, the hearsay rule does not apply to the evidence), it is not necessarily the case that the principles apply at all, given the fact that litigation may not even have been contemplated at the time the opinion was expressed. Thus, in Rich v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2005) 54 ACSR 365; [2005] NSWCA 233 Handley JA in the NSW Court of Appeal observed at [13], without needing to decide the question, that “[i]t is far from clear that these principles apply with their full force, or at all, to out-of-court statements by experts in business records even if such statements do have to meet the standard in s 79”.

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Seventh, there is a real limit rejecting expert evidence on the basis that there is an inadequate explanation as to how the specialised knowledge applies to the facts where this would involve evaluation and judgment requiring the very expertise under consideration – “it may be difficult to see any other course consonant with practical common sense and running an efficient trial than to admit the evidence, perhaps conditionally as being initially satisfied of its relevance”.607 Forrest J of the Victorian Supreme Court has observed that, rather than engage in “an excruciatingly detailed analysis” of an expert’s report, “the exercise that I suggest would apply in most cases is this: examine the report as a whole and determine whether the reader can sensibly distinguish between assumed facts and the expression of opinion based on the witness’ expertise”.608 Finally, as regards other aspects of what was said by Heydon JA in Makita, it should be concluded that they do not represent the law under the Evidence Act. In particular, the proposition that assumed facts upon which an opinion is based must be proved for the opinion to be admissible should not be regarded as good law. In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; [2011] HCA 21, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ referred to “the basis rule” at [41] as “a rule by which opinion evidence is to be excluded unless the factual bases upon which the opinion is proffered are established by other evidence”, then stated: Whether that rule formed part of the common law of evidence need not be examined. It may be accepted that the Law Reform Commission’s interim report on evidence denied the existence of such a common law rule and expressed the intention to refrain from including a basis rule in the legislation the Commission proposed and which was later enacted as the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).

It appears clear that the High Court accepts that s 79 does not incorporate “the basis rule” and that issues of this type are left, as intended by the ALRC, to the discretions in Pt 3.11. However, the precise position remains somewhat uncertain. Subsequent to Dasreef, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in Cooper v The 606. See also Gudjala People # 2 v Native Title Registrar [2008] FCAFC 157 at [94]–[95]; Cambridge v Anastasopoulos [2012] NSWCA 405 at [40]. 607. Allianz Australia Ltd v Sim (2012) 10 DDCR 325; [2012] NSWCA 68, Allsop P (Meagher JA agreeing) at [9]. 608. Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 38) [2014] VSC 102, Forrest J at [33]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Queen [2011] NSWCCA 258 held that the proposition of Heydon JA in Makita that “assumed” or “accepted” facts “must be … proved” was “approved” in Dasreef (Beazley JA at [193], Hidden J and RA Hulme J agreeing). Yet the passage from the plurality judgment in Dasreef said by Beazley JA to show that “approval” in fact focused on transparency of reasoning rather than proof of assumed facts. The distinction does not appear to have been addressed by Beazley JA. In an earlier judgment in the NSW Court of Appeal, Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Ltd (2011) 80 NSWLR 43; [2011] NSWCA 11, Beazley JA (Giles JA and Tobias JA agreeing) cited (at [77]) authority focusing on the requirement that the reasoning process be made transparent and accepted at [88] that “the principle in Makita do [sic] not require that there be an exact correspondence between the assumed facts upon which an expert opinion is based and the facts proved in the case”. In Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2012] NSWCA 383, the NSW Court of Appeal noted that “[d]ifferent views have been expressed as to the consequences of the failure of a party tendering an expert’s report to prove the assumptions on which the report rests” (Sackville AJA at [242]) but found it unnecessary to resolve the apparent conflict. In Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Offıce of Environment and Heritage (2013) 298 ALR 532; [2013] NSWCCA 114 Price J in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal took the same position at [61] but the other members of the Court (Schmidt J at [176]–[177], McCallum J at [138]) appear to have accepted the view expressed above that the approach of Heydon J was rejected by the rest of the High Court in Dasreef. The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that view in Taub v R [2017] NSWCCA 198, Simpson JA (Walton J and Button J agreeing) at [31]-[33].609 In Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1, Brett J (Blow CJ and Wood J agreeing) stated in the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal: [38] The effect of the plurality’s reasoning [in Dasreef] is that evidence of an opinion is admissible if the requirements of the section are satisfied and the connection between the witness’s opinion and his specialised knowledge, as it applies to the assumed facts is demonstrated on the evidence. The factual assumptions must therefore be stated and their relationship to the opinion explained, but they need not necessarily be independently proved. The failure to prove facts upon which the expert has relied to form the opinion will therefore not affect the application of s 79 to the evidence, and hence unless the evidence is excluded for another reason, it will be admissible.

Another reason may be that the evidence fails to meet the test of relevance610 or that discretionary exclusion is justified pursuant to a provision in Pt 3.10.611 The Full Court of the Federal Court has observed that many of the matters referred to by Heydon JA in Makita “involve questions of degree, requiring the exercise of judgment” that should commonly be regarded as going to weight rather than admissibility.612 Thus, if the opinion evidence is admitted, assessment of the weight to be given to the opinion will necessarily require consideration whether any facts assumed to have existed for the purposes of the opinion have been proved to exist. Of course, 609. See also Nisan v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 265 at [36]–[37]. 610. Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1, Brett J at [40]. See also [EA.55.270]. 611. Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1, Brett J at [42]. See [EA.79.300]. 612. Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 354; [2002] FCAFC 157 at [16] and [87].

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as has been noted many times, even where the facts assumed do not correspond exactly with the facts established, they may be sufficiently like the facts established so as to render the opinion of value.613

[EA.79.270]

The hearsay rule and the basis of an opinion

Where some basis of the opinion is hearsay in form, that is, evidence of out-of-court representations of fact, careful analysis is required. Such evidence is not caught by the hearsay rule (s 59) because it is not adduced to prove the existence of the facts asserted by the representations – it is relevant and admissible to explain the assumptions on which the opinion is based.

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Further, the effect of s 60 (discussed at [EA.60.60]) is that evidence of out-of-court representations of fact admitted to explain the assumptions on which an opinion is based may then, subject to s 136 (see [EA.136.60] and [EA.136.180]), also be used to prove the existence of the asserted facts. This means that not only such material as the reported data of other experts and information commonly relied on in the area of expertise may be relied on for a “hearsay purpose”, so also may statements made to the expert about the facts of the particular case.614 However, Sperling J has suggested that evidence of such statements should never be admitted to explain the assumptions on which an opinion is based: I would like to see a practice in jury trials – civil and criminal – whereby history is established in relation to expert opinion evidence by asking, as a leading question, whether the witness has made certain specified assumptions for the purpose of forming an opinion (or asking the witness to make the assumptions on the spot, if the opinion evidence is being led cold). The witness would then be asked what opinion the witness has formed (or forms on the spot), based on those assumptions, in relation to the issue in question (specifying the issue). The witness would only be asked when, how and by whom the history was communicated to the witness if the communication was relevant and admissible as such. Then the evidence of the communication would be led with the same care as evidence of any other relevant communication is led, rather than the witness simply reading from a report in whatever form the communication may be recorded there, as is mostly done now. In either case, the trial judge would then tell the jury what status the evidence had as proof of facts in issue. In the first case, the status would be nil and the jury would be told why the evidence was led and that there was, therefore, no need, in that case, to be concerned about where the assumptions put to the witness had come from. In the second case, the jury would be told precisely what issue the evidence goes to and how it might bear on that issue. All that could be achieved 613. See Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; 62 ALR 85; [1985] HCA 58 at 846; HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; 73 ALJR 281; [1999] HCA 2 at [39]; Dixon v Whisprun Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 344 at [53]; Nominal Defendant v Saleh (2011) 57 MVR 412; [2011] NSWCA 16 at [263]. This point was acknowledged by Beazley JA in Cooper v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 258 at [194] and in Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Ltd (2011) 80 NSWLR 43; [2011] NSWCA 11 at [88]. As noted above, if the evidence adduced is not capable of establishing facts that are at least similar to the facts assumed to exist, the opinion evidence may not satisfy the test of relevance. 614. Of course, the weight given to such statements by the tribunal of fact is likely to be reduced by their hearsay nature. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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without ever saying to a jury that the history on which the opinion is based is or is not “evidence of the fact”, a formulation understood by lawyers but which must send juries reeling.615

Even if such a practice is not adopted, Sperling J has expressed the view that s 136 should be utilised to ensure application of the hearsay rule, at least where failure to do so would be unfair to an opposing party. He stated in Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 at [75](j):

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The operation of s 60 on assumption evidence which is given as the basis for an expert opinion is also a special case. Where such evidence is in the form of a bare statement of facts or where facts are stated as having been provided by some other person or persons, s 60 operates to make the account evidence of the truth of the facts so stated. That is not so if the expert says that certain facts are assumed for the purpose of providing the opinion. A disadvantage should not be incurred in legal proceedings by happenstance. If the facts stated are contentious, it will ordinarily be unfair that the opposite party is fixed with assumption evidence as evidence of the truth of the facts stated by reason of those facts having been stated in one form rather than the other.

In the Federal Court, Lindgren J has indicated that he would utilise s 136 if satisfied “that the hearsay form was chosen for the … purpose” of “proving the asserted facts by hearsay evidence”.616 However, absent such a finding, he took into account the hearsay nature of the evidence as a matter going to its weight. Similarly, in Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S (2008) 76 IPR 618; [2008] FCA 559, Lindgren J saw no reason to apply s 136 in respect of “the reportings of clinical studies published in peer-reviewed articles in scientific journals of high repute” (at [779]).617 For further discussion of the possible application of s 136, see [EA.136.60] and [EA.136.180].

615. R v Lawson [2000] NSWCCA 214 at [108]. This proposal was not discussed by the other members of the court. The High Court refused special leave to appeal on 23 November 2001 but noted that the matters advanced by Sperling J were “arguable”. 616. Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [38] 617. See also Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; 249 ALR 300; [2008] FCAFC 63 at [90]–[93]. In Commissioner of Patents v Sherman (2008) 172 FCR 394; [2008] FCAFC 182 the Full Court of the Federal Court endorsed at [40] the analysis of Lindgren J in Alphapharm regarding the interaction of s 60 with the basis of an expert opinion, but made no reference to the potential application of s 136. In TJ v Western Australia (No 3) [2015] FCA 1359, Rares J at [10] noted the observation of Cooper J in Lardil Peoples v State of Queensland [2000] FCA 1548 at [26] that s 60 “does not give to the hearsay evidence a weight or cogency which the circumstances do not warrant” when concluding (at [9]) that he saw no basis for the application of s 136.

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Discretionary exclusion

Even if not excluded by s 76, evidence of an expert’s opinion may be excluded in the exercise of discretion under s 135 (or, where applicable, s 137). In exercising the discretion, it is suggested618 that relevant (overlapping) considerations would include:619 • the degree of reliability of the particular field of expertise; • insofar as the opinion is based on facts “observed” by the expert, whether they have been identified and proved; • insofar as the opinion is based on “assumed” facts, whether have been identified and proved;620 • insofar as the opinion is based on hearsay (other than the general and specialist knowledge customarily relied on by experts in the field), whether non-hearsay evidence has been admitted to prove the facts asserted in the hearsay evidence;621

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• insofar as the opinion is based, consciously or unconsciously, on impermissible material, the impact of this on the probative value of the opinion;622 618. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see Odgers and Richardson, “Keeping Bad Science out of the Courtroom – Changes in American and Australian Expert Evidence Law” (1995) 18 UNSWLJ 108; Edmond and Mercer, “Keeping “Junk” History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science out of the Courtroom: Problems with the Reception of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc” (1997) 20 UNSWLJ 48; G Edmond, “After Objectivity: Expert Evidence and Procedural Reform” [2003] Syd L Rev 8; G Edmond, “Specialised Knowledge, the Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability: Reassessing Incriminating Expert Opinion Evidence” (2008) 31 UNSWLJ 46; G Edmond and A Roberts, “Procedural Fairness, the Criminal Trial and Forensic Science and Medicine” (2011) 33 Syd L Rev 359 at 379–380; Edmond G, “The Admissibility of Forensic Science and Medicine Evidence under the Uniform Evidence Law” (2014) 38 Crim LJ 136. 619. The ALRC discussed other factors bearing on the value of expert evidence in ALRC 26, paras 733–736. See also Tanti v Rothe (unreported, NSW SC, McLelland CJ in Eq, 28 November 1996). 620. Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159 FCR 397; [2007] FCAFC 70 at [108]; ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 at [82] per Austin J; Rees v Lumen Christi Primary School [2010] VSC 514 at [55]. 621. Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Offıce of Environment and Heritage (2013) 298 ALR 532; [2013] NSWCCA 114 (Price J at [65]–[68], Schmidt J at [178]–[179]). Compare R v Sing (2002) 54 NSWLR 31; [2002] NSWCCA 20; Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 1364, Collier J at [346]–[348]. 622. In ASIC v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; [2005] NSWCA 152, the NSW Court of Appeal considered a situation where an expert witness had (as found by the trial judge) taken into account in forming his opinion information that he had been asked to ignore. Spigelman CJ, with whom Giles and Ipp JJA agreed, observed at [168] that it “is necessary to assess the degree to which any particular opinion was likely to have been formed by the unconscious use of excluded material” for the purpose of assessing the probative value of the opinion, but also pointed out (at [169]) that “a critical factor in assessing the weight is the logical force of the process of reasoning based on the disclosed facts. That some other facts had some role to play in the process of drawing the relevant conclusions does not necessarily mean that the evidence is of lower, let alone low, probative value.” He added at [170] that “the fact that a broader range of information may originally have been availed of would not necessarily detract to any significant degree from the probative value of the evidence given”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• whether the expert has failed to take into account relevant facts and, if so, any difficulties that may be involved in remedying that failure;623 • insofar as the opinion is based on assumptions as to the law, whether those assumptions are correct;624 • whether the reasoning process leading to the formation of the opinion has been clearly exposed;625 • whether the reasoning process is valid; • the degree of reliability of the application of the field of expertise to the particular issue; • whether the opponent is in a position to test alleged or assumed facts on which the opinion is based, by cross-examination or otherwise;626 • the degree of reliability of the expert’s opinion (taking into account the expert’s qualifications, experience, facilities, resources, etc – see discussion below); • the likely capacity of the tribunal of fact to understand and assimilate the evidence, without being misled or simply deferring to the expert opinion; 627 • the likely capacity of the tribunal of fact to properly determine the issue without the benefit of the expert opinion;628 • the importance of the issue to which the evidence relates; • the likely court time utilised if the opinion is admitted;629 • the danger that the focus of the trial will shift from the evidence of the facts in dispute to the conflict between the competing theories of the various expert witnesses; 623. Dean-Willcocks v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2003) 45 ACSR 564; [2003] NSWSC 466 at [41] per Austin J. 624. Dean-Willcocks v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2003) 45 ACSR 564; [2003] NSWSC 466 at [33]–[38] per Austin J. 625. Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159 FCR 397; [2007] FCAFC 70 at [108]–[109]; Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [85]; Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204 at [43]; Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 1364, Collier J at [352]; Rees v Lumen Christi Primary School [2010] VSC 514 at [55]. 626. Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 1364, Collier J at [341]; Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd v Robalino [2009] NSWSC 969, McDougall J at [143]–[144]; Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Offıce of Environment and Heritage (2013) 298 ALR 532; [2013] NSWCCA 114 (Price J at [66], Schmidt J at [179]). See also [EA.135.150]. 627. Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204 at [43]; Rees v Lumen Christi Primary School [2010] VSC 514 at [47], [50], [55]; Farrugia v Jindi Woraback Children’s Centre Inc [2011] VSC 250 at [20]–[22]; Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1 at [59]–[60]. See the discussion at [EA.137.150]. In many cases, it would be necessary in a jury trial for the trial judge to direct the jury that they have the ultimate obligation to determine the facts and that they should not simply defer to the expert(s): cf Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; 155 ALR 652; [1998] HCA 50, particularly Kirby J (at 300–301). The giving of such a warning would reduce the potential prejudicial impact of the evidence. Nevertheless, it may not negate it: see Morgan v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 33; [2011] NSWCCA 257 at [145] (referring to “the white coat effect”). 628. See R v Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWCCA 388. 629. See R v Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWCCA 388 at [69]–[70].

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• whether the evidence is being led against a defendant in a criminal trial (which, in turn, may invoke such principles as the obligations on the prosecution in respect of calling witnesses in criminal proceedings;630 • whether it is trial by jury (and, if it is, the likely effectiveness of appropriate judicial directions631).

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Difficult issues can arise in respect of one of the factors referred to above – the degree of reliability of the expert’s opinion. The courts do not always agree on what factors, bearing on the reliability of a witness’s evidence, can be taken into account for the purposes of possible discretionary exclusion – as distinct from an assessment of weight by the tribunal of fact. This issue is discussed generally at [EA.137.90]. The NSW courts have taken a more restrictive approach to the Victorian courts. In Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290, Ipp JA (Whealy and Howie JJ agreeing) expressed the view (at [45]–[56]) that a number of factors said to affect the reliability of an opinion expressed by an “ad hoc” expert on voice identification (such as the time that had elapsed between listening to the voices; how often the expert listed to them; whether there were any special features of the voices) were matters that either “had little bearing on [the] discretionary exercise” or would not “have any relevant weight” for the purposes of that exercise. A similar analysis was adopted in respect of factors said to reduce the reliability of a similar opinion expressed by an expert in linguistics (at [77]–[78]). Ipp JA also held (at [71]) that a risk that an expert is “biased (unconsciously or otherwise)” is “no reason not to admit evidence of [the] expert”.632 In Haoui v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 331; [2008] NSWCCA 209 it was accepted at [127] that bias was not a basis for evidentiary exclusion.633 The NSW Court of Appeal has taken the same view.634 In IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14, discussed in detail at [EA.137.90], the High Court determined (by a 4:3 majority) that a trial judge, in assessing the “probative value” of evidence for the purposes of a number of provisions in the UEL (including s 137), must proceed on the assumption that the evidence “is accepted” (and thus is to be regarded as both 630. R v Sing (2002) 54 NSWLR 31; [2002] NSWCCA 20 at [35]. 631. Farrugia v Jindi Woraback Children’s Centre Inc [2011] VSC 250 at [22]. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Wise [2016] VSCA 173, the Victorian Court of Appeal cautioned against too ready an assumption that a danger that a jury will give too much weight to certain evidence will be cured by “appropriate directions”. Reference was made to one of the dangers associated with DNA evidence being “what has come to be known as the ‘CSI effect’” (at [70]). See generally at [EA.137.60]. 632. Citing FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33 (Ormiston JA, Chernov and Eames JJA concurring); Collins Thomson v Clayton [2002] NSWSC 366 per Austin J, and Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gee Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485 per Campbell J); see also Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; 218 ALR 292; [2005] FCA 50 per Selway J at [163]. 633. On the other hand, cf Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Selim [2008] FCA 416 at [157]. A distinction might be drawn between determining whether bias is present and determining whether the expert utilized a process that exposed him or her to extraneous information that was likely to cause bias and increase the chance of error: see G Edmond and A Roberts, “Procedural Fairness, the Criminal Trial and Forensic Science and Medicine” (2011) 33 Syd L Rev 359 at 379–380. 634. Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 at [17], [223]–[225]. See also Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha Ltd v Tomar (No 4) [2012] FCA 385 at [35]–[54]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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credible and reliable). However, as is explained at [EA.137.90], the discussion in the majority judgment of identification evidence at [50] suggests that while the evidence of the identifying witness is to be accepted as credible and reliable, this does not mean that the opinion of identity itself must be assumed to be reliable. The circumstances in which the observation was made may show that the subsequent identification (the opinion itself) is “weak” and “unconvincing” and, accordingly, of low probative value. The logic of this analysis would carry through to consideration of expert evidence in the context of s 137 (and, indeed, s 135). When an expert asserts an opinion, the assessment of the probative value of that evidence requires an assumption that the expert is being truthful regarding the content of the opinion and is reliably recounting the content of the opinion. However, it does not require an assumption that the opinion itself is “reliable”, in the sense that the opinion may be relied upon as correct. The court should be permitted to consider factors bearing on the cogency of that opinion in determining the extent to which a rational fact-finder could regard the evidence as affecting the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. It would appear appropriate to take into account such matters as the expert’s qualifications, training, experience, facilities and resources when assessing the probative value of the evidence for the purposes of possible discretionary exclusion.635 The probative value of an expert opinion may be reduced by demonstrated flaws in its factual basis or the process of reasoning.636 Non-compliance with court rules relating to expert reports and evidence will have a bearing on the question whether the court might be misled or an opposing party unfairly prejudiced (see [EA.79.330]). Equally, in areas of novel expertise, where questions of general validity arise, these may be taken into account in the discretionary exercise (referring, where appropriate, to the considerations referred to by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993) and the Canadian Supreme Court in R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600 and R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239: see [EA.79.120]). The Victorian Court of Appeal has adopted this approach in Tuite v The Queen [2015] VSCA 148, emphasizing at [101] that “the touchstone of reliability for scientific evidence must be trustworthiness, and trustworthiness depends on validation”. Where the evidence is based on “new science”, the party proposing to rely on the evidence “will need … to establish that the underlying science is ‘sufficiently reliable to be admitted in a court of law’”. (at [106]). Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether this approach will to continue to be regarded as appropriate in the light of the High Court’s judgment in IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14. Thus, in Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1, Brett J in the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal observed at [55] that “[a] strict application” of the observations in IMM “would suggest that the failure to establish the facts upon which the opinion is based will not affect the assessment of probative value for the purposes of ss 135 or 137” but then noted at [56] that the discussion of “weak identification evidence” was “somewhat difficult to reconcile” with that approach, suggesting that “unproved or discredited 635. Compare Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 323 per Einstein J at [20]. 636. See ASIC v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; [2005] NSWCA 152 at 168 per Spigelman CJ.

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assumptions which form the basis of an opinion would be relevant to the assessment of the probative value of that opinion”. The Court did not need to resolve the issue.

[EA.79.330]

Court Rules

The Federal Court,637 the Family Court,638 the ACT Supreme Court639, the NSW Supreme Court640 and the Victorian Supreme Court641 have imposed requirements relating to expert reports and evidence. These rules interact with the requirements of this provision. More generally, the courts impose duties and responsibilities on all expert witnesses.642 Compliance with these obligations will make it easier for the opinion evidence to be admitted.643 Non-compliance will make it more likely (but certainly not inevitable644) that a court will not be satisfied that the requirements of s 79 are met. In ACCC v Emerald Ocean Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 740 at [4] RD Nicholson J observed in relation to the Federal Court guidelines: [Section 79] is to be understood in the context of the guidelines for expert witnesses in proceedings before this Court. Those guidelines cannot influence the interpretation of the section but they do evidence the understanding of the way in which the section applies.

Non-compliance with the rules will also have an effect on the application of the discretion to exclude evidence in s 135 (or s 137). For example, exclusion may be 637. Federal Court Rules 2011, Pt 23. See also Federal Court Expert Evidence Practice Note. 638. Family Court Rules 2004, Pt 15.5.

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639. Court Procedures Rules 2006, Pt 2.12. 640. NSW Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, Pt 31, Div 2; Supreme Court Rules 1970, Pt 75 r 3J (applying UCPR Sch 7) r 3K. See Barak v WTH Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 649; Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2002] NSWSC 980; ASIC v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; [2005] NSWSC 149 at [256]; NM Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Rimanui Farms Ltd [2010] NSWSC 921. As regards r 3K in Pt 75 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970, see Abdallah v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 34 at [51]–[56]. 641. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic), r 44. See also the Magistrates’ Court Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Vic), O 19. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 should also be noted (see [EA.79.450]). 642. See National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer) (No 1) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 at 81–82; Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [719]–[720]; Restricted Judgment [2018] WASCA 14 at [255]–[261], [302]. 643. In X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Specialty Network (No 5) [2011] NSWSC 1351, Adamson J ruled at [35] that there was no breach of s 79 where experts preparing a joint report pursuant to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) were not required to provide reasons for matters upon which they agreed. Adamson J also held at [50] that the UCPR “authorises the admission into evidence of a joint report prepared in accordance with the rules, subject to rules of exclusion such as s 135 of the Evidence Act”. That cannot be correct – the evidence must still satisfy the requirements of Chapter 3, including s 79, and Adamson J appears to have acknowledged this in other parts of the judgment. There is also some discussion of this issue in Campton v Centennial Newstan Pty Ltd (No 1) [2014] NSWSC 304. 644. Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [728]–[729]. In Tyneside Property Management Pty Ltd v Hammersmith Management Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 395, Brereton J held at [7] that the fact that a consultant engineer “has not, and could not, comply with the expert witness code of conduct – being associated as he is with the defendants – ...does not impact on the admissibility of an out-of-court opinion expressed by the witness before litigation was contemplated”. See also Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha Ltd v Tomar (No 4) [2012] FCA 385 at [35]–[54]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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appropriate where there is a real danger that the court might be misled, or the opposing party unfairly prejudiced, because the expert is expressing an opinion “which is infected by failure to understand [the expert’s] responsibilities as an expert”.645 Breach of the obligation to include any examinations, tests or other investigations on which the expert has relied, including details of the qualifications of the person who carried them out may require exclusion on the basis that the opponent will be unfairly disadvantaged by an inability to evaluate and test the cogency of the evidence.646 Of course, if there is non-compliance with the court rules, the evidence may not be admitted in any event because the court is not prepared to waive the requirement for compliance.647

[EA.79.360]

Certificates of expert evidence

Section 177 provides a procedure whereby expert opinion evidence may be adduced in written form (in a “certificate”) without necessarily requiring the expert to attend proceedings as a witness. The procedure is available in both civil and criminal proceedings. However, the party on whom a copy of the “certificate” is served under s 177(2) may require the expert to testify: s 177(5). In those circumstances the certificate is not admissible (s 177(6)), although there may be costs consequences: s 177(7).

[EA.79.390]

Inferences

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Section 183 permits a court to draw reasonable inferences from a document. It has been held that this provision does not dispense with proof of matters that needs to be provided before opinion evidence becomes admissible: see [EA.183.80].648

[EA.79.420]

Procedure

Court Rules provide for special procedures regarding expert evidence (see [EA.79.330]). These procedures will affect the way in which expert evidence is adduced (see [EA.26.300]). As regards procedures impacting on s 79, in Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 323 reference was made by Einstein J at [2]–[4] to use of a “schedule template” in dealing with s 79 objections: The course of the written scheduling which has come forward is, it seems to me, particularly efficient, this having comprised the defendants setting out in three columns: • the paragraphs of the relevant statements which are objected to; • in relation to each of those paragraphs or portions of paragraphs, the nature of the opinion which the defendants submit the witness seeks to give [in terms of a characterisation of the opinion] and, 645. United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 870 at [15]–[19] per Campbell J. See also New South Wales v Bitsikas [2010] NSWSC 773 at [54]; Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [729]; Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (Ruling No 8) [2014] VSC 567 at [151].. 646. Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Offıce of Environment and Heritage (2013) 298 ALR 532; [2013] NSWCCA 114, Price J at [65]–[68]; see also Schmidt J at [178]–[179]. 647. See, for example, Guy v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2017] FCA 1104 at [58]. 648. See also Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Assn (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd (2000) 120 FCR 146; [2000] FCA 1463 at [20] per Black CJ, Cooper and Emmett JJ.

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• the required training and expertise which the defendants submit would be necessary [and in relation to which the defendants submit that [the witness’s] expertise has shortcomings which are said to remove his opinions from the legitimate ambit of the s 79 elements]. The plaintiffs in response have added a further column setting out their submission as to the area of specialised knowledge which it is submitted has been shown and acting as a contradictor for relevant purposes. This mode of the court dealing with s 79 objections by schedule is an efficient, it seems to me, manner of treating with what can otherwise become a very difficult exercise for the court. It enables the court, quite often without having to spend very much time at all in concentrating on the precise paragraphs the subject of objection, to determine: • what are the areas of the witness’s training, study and experience; • what is the specialised knowledge shown to have been demonstrated by that training, study and experience; and • what are the areas, if any, in relation to which the witness is shown to be in a position to express s 79 opinions wholly or partly based upon that specialised knowledge.

In ALRC 102, support was expressed for “practices to help ensure that expert opinion evidence is presented in a way that assists … in assessing whether it complies with the requirements of s 79, including by requiring parties to prepare schedules describing explicitly how each component of expert opinion is connected to the specialised knowledge of the expert” (para 9.91).

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[EA.79.450]

Other provisions

Part 4.6 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) deals with expert witnesses and expert evidence. In particular, s 65H(1) provides that a “court may give any directions it considers appropriate in relation to expert evidence in a proceeding”. Section 65K(1) provides that a “court may give any direction it considers appropriate in relation to the giving of evidence by any expert witness at trial”. Section 388 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) provides: 388 Evidence of specialised knowledge in certain cases Despite any rule of law to the contrary, in a criminal proceeding that relates (wholly or partly) to a charge for a sexual offence, the court may receive evidence of a person’s opinion that is based on that person’s specialised knowledge (acquired through training, study or experience) of— (a) the nature of sexual offences; and (b) the social, psychological and cultural factors that may affect the behaviour of a person who has been the victim, or who alleges that he or she has been the victim, of a sexual offence, including the reasons that may contribute to a delay on the part of the victim to report the offence.

There are some curious aspects to this provision, compared with s 79 (as it operates in the context of the rest of the Evidence Act 2008) and s 108C (which deals with comparable evidence relevant only to credibility). It does not specifically require that the evidence be relevant nor does it refer to considerations of unfair prejudice to an accused. Presumably, such considerations would bear on the court’s unfettered discretion (“the court may …”) as to whether or not it would “receive” the evidence. Similarly, there is no requirement that the opinion be “wholly or substantially based” on the expert’s specialised © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 79

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knowledge but, again, it is unlikely that an opinion only marginally based on specialised knowledge would be received. It has to be said that it would have been preferable for the provision to have been drafted in a way that made these matters explicit. In other respects, the provision adds little to s 79(1) and s 108C and the issues that arise under those provision (in particular, the requirement of “specialised knowledge” and the requirement that the knowledge be “acquired through”/“based on” training, study or experience) would arise in this context. It should be noted that Redlich JA and Whelan JA in the Victorian Court of Appeal observed in MA v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 564; 226 A Crim R 575; [2013] VSCA 20 at [95] that “it appears that ordinarily the decision as to admissibility is likely to be the same”. However, the limited nature of the opinion permitted to be received under this provision should be emphasised – it would appear that the opinion must be expressed at a level of generality and should not involve an opinion regarding the particular circumstances of the case in which the evidence is given. Section 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 provides that “for the purposes of murder, defensive homicide or manslaughter, in circumstances where family violence is alleged” (s 9AH(1)) certain categories of evidence (specified in s 9AH(3)), which would include opinion evidence, “may be relevant” for certain specified uses (s 9AH(2)). It is difficult to assess the significance of this provision, which pre-dated the introduction of the Evidence Act 2008. On a strict view, it has no substantive significance, since to say that evidence “may be” relevant does not mean that it is necessarily relevant and certainly does not mean that it is necessarily admissible. The requirements of s 79 would still apply. However, the Victorian Criminal Charge Book suggests that this provision does have real significance, stating at Part 4.13.1.1 para 18 that the evidence specified in s 9AH(3) “may be led” for the specified uses.649

[EA.79.480]

Jury directions

Expert opinion evidence will generally require careful directions so that the jury can assess the evidence and apply it properly.650 The NSW Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book and the Victorian Criminal Charge Book both provide extensive guidance regarding possible directions to the jury in respect of expert opinion evidence.651 It is conventional to inform the jury that, generally, only an expert is permitted to give evidence of his or her opinion. The jury should be directed that it is for them to decide whether an opinion is credible and what weight it should be given.652 They are not bound by the opinion of an expert and must not be overawed by the scientific appearance of an expert opinion.653 Thus, where an expert witness has given evidence about the “ultimate issue” (see s 80), the judge 649. Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au. 650. Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4; R v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242; [2004] VSCA 72. 651. Judicial Commission of NSW, Criminal Courts Bench Book www.judcom.nsw.gov.au, “Expert Evidence”; Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au, Part 4.13. 652. R v Anderson [2000] 1 VR 1; (2001) 111 A Crim R 19; [2000] VSCA 16; Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4. 653. R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; [2002] SASC 294; R v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123; (1999) 105 A Crim R 243; [1999] VSCA 27.

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should make it clear that it is the jury’s role to determine the issue.654 In R v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123; (1999) 105 A Crim R 243; [1999] VSCA 27, Callaway JA considered (at [34]) that, “in view of the importance of expert evidence in this case, it would be desirable for the jury to be directed in conventional terms that expert opinion is no better than the facts on which it is based, that it is for the jury to be satisfied of the facts in issue at the trial and that ultimately it is their opinion that counts”.655 Thus, the jury should be directed “as to the necessity for it to analyse the basis upon which the [expert] reached his opinion”.656 In Nguyen v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 557; [2007] NSWCCA 249, James J observed at [75] that “[t]he summing-up was … defective in that the jury were not directed to examine the basis on which [the expert witness] had formed each opinion and to determine whether the facts constituting the basis had been proved”.657 It may be appropriate to direct the jury that, even where the facts assumed by the expert witness do not correspond exactly with the facts they find established,658 they may be sufficiently like the facts established so as to render the opinion of value.

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Careful directions will be necessary where the expert evidence is unanimous.659 In Kosian v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 40 VR 335; 237 A Crim R 156; [2013] VSCA 357, Redlich JA observed at [49]–[50]: [T]he province of the jury to reject expert evidence is subject to important qualification. The jury are not entitled to capriciously disregard the expert evidence. They should accept those opinions unless there are facts which entitle them to reject or differ from the opinions of the experts. If the expert opinion is on an esoteric subject quite outside common experience, then depending upon what facts are in controversy and the degree of unanimity between the experts, it may be perverse for the tribunal of fact to ignore it. … Where expert evidence of mental defect or disability is all the one way, “it may 654. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 743. See also Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640; [2000] NSWSC 1077. 655. See also Batt JA at [107]. See also Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 258; [2000] WASCA 213 at [49]. 656. Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204, Studdert J (Hall and Latham JJ agreeing) at [51]. 657. See also R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269, where the English Court of Appeal observed that the jury will usually need directions as to how they should approach conflicting expert evidence: “If the issue arises, a jury should be asked to judge whether the expert has, in the course of his evidence, assumed the role of an advocate, influenced by the side whose cause he seeks to advance. If it arises, the jury should be asked to judge whether the witness has gone outside his area of expertise. The jury should examine the basis of the opinion. Can the witness point to a recognised, peer-reviewed, source for the opinion? Is the clinical experience of the witness up-to-date and equal to the experience of others whose evidence he seeks to contradict? … the judge should guide them by identifying those reasons which would justify either accepting or rejecting any conflicting expert opinion on which either side relies” (at [219]–[220]). 658. However, care would have to be exercised in this context where the expert gives evidence assisting the defendant – since guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the defence does not have to point to facts that are “proved” or “established” before they can be taken into account by the jury in favour of the defendant. 659. Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343; 22 ALR 599; R v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 at 370; R v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242; [2004] VSCA 72; R v Klamo (2008) 18 VR 644; 184 A Crim R 262; [2008] VSCA 75; R v NCT (2009) 26 VR 247; [2009] VSCA 240. See also Goodridge v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 37 at [116], [122]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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be inappropriate and sometimes erroneous to direct a jury to the effect that the expert evidence is there to assist you, you are not bound to adopt it”. [footnotes omitted]

On the issue of whether a jury should be directed that a fact sought to be proved by expert opinion evidence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, see the general discussion at [EA.141.120]. Particular types of expert evidence (for example, DNA evidence, fingerprint evidence, handwriting evidence) will require specific directions to the jury: see [EA.165.450]. In respect of expert evidence about child sexual abuse (see s 79(2)), the ALRC suggested (ALRC 102, para 9.156–7) that it may be appropriate in cases where such evidence is admitted to direct the jury not to reason using the following “doubtful syllogism”: [A]buse of children elicits certain behavioural responses; the complainant exhibited some or all those behaviours; therefore, the complainant is likely to be telling the truth about being sexually abused, or is likely to have been sexually abused, or was sexually abused.

Cth Act: 80

Ultimate issue and common knowledge rules abolished Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about: (a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue; or (b) a matter of common knowledge.

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NSW Act: 80

Ultimate issue and common knowledge rules abolished Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about: (a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue, or (b) a matter of common knowledge.

Vic Act: 80

Ultimate issue and common knowledge rules abolished Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about— (a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue; or (b) a matter of common knowledge.

ACT Act: 80

Ultimate issue and common knowledge rules abolished Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about— (a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue; or (b) a matter of common knowledge.

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NT Act: 80 Ultimate issue and common knowledge rules abolished Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about: (a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue; or (b) a matter of common knowledge.

[EA.80.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 9.103–9.137; ALRC 38, s 69, para 148; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 354, 359, 743.

[EA.80.60] General comments One of the central issues raised by the Evidence Act 1995 is whether, and if so, to what extent, it codifies the law of evidence (to the exclusion of the common law). That issue is discussed in other parts of this work: see the Introduction, [EA.Intro.120]. In this context, it has been held that:

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… s 80 does not and cannot represent a complete codification of the law of evidence to the exclusion of the development of a body of principles referred to in the cases decided prior to its enactment.660

It is suggested that such a view is wrong. The ALRC intended to abolish both the common law “ultimate issue” and “common knowledge” rules (see below). Further, it is strongly arguable that relevant opinion evidence which is not excluded by the opinion rule (by reason of ss 77, 78 or 79) or any other provision of the Act (including the discretionary provisions) “is admissible in the proceeding” (s 56(1)), regardless of the position under the common law. Einstein J has adopted this analysis and concluded: The effect of s 80 is not to permit evidence which goes to an ultimate issue at all events; neither is it a section which works to exclude evidence. Its effect is to remove the fact that the evidence goes to an ultimate issue from the reasons for which a court must or could exclude the evidence.661

[EA.80.90] “fact in issue or an ultimate issue” The term “fact in issue” should be understood in the sense in which it is used in s 55 – a matter in issue in the trial as determined by substantive law and pleadings: see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 641.662 It should not be interpreted as any fact that is disputed in the trial. The original proposal of the ALRC, designed to

660. O’Brien v Gillespie (1997) 41 NSWLR 549 at 557 per Levine J. See also Symonds v Egan National Valuers (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 15) (unreported, NSW SC, Dowd J, 22 February 1996); Dyson v Pharmacy Board [2000] NSWSC 981 at [35]–[36] per Austin J (although this case may involve the operation of the substantive law, cf [EA.55.510]). 661. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 at [39]. 662. For example, was the defendant “negligent”, did the testator have “testamentary capacity”, was the accused “insane”? © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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663

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abolish “the ultimate issue rule”, referred only to an opinion “about a fact in issue”: see ALRC 26, s 69; ALRC 38, s 69. It follows that the words “fact in issue or an ultimate issue” should be seen as a composite term designed to abolish “the ultimate issue rule”. The ALRC explained its approach (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 743): It is conventionally said that testimony may not be given upon the ultimate issue or possibly upon ultimate issues generally. Quite what constitute ultimate issues, however, has not as yet been authoritatively ruled upon. Despite this the courts have continued to try to apply the ultimate issue rule. It has been suggested that the true analysis of the rule is that it prohibits a witness applying any kind of a “legal standard” to the facts, something which it is suggested is the function of the jury after instruction from the judge … It can be argued that little is to be gained by permitting witnesses, whether expert or not, to give opinion evidence about the legal consequences flowing from relevant events … The expert psychiatric witness, however, should be able to testify in terms of the accused not knowing what he was doing or not knowing that it was wrong, even though this is a question requiring the application of legal standards to the facts of the case. As to the layman, he can, under the proposal, express an opinion where it is based on his perception and so could speak of “negligence” and “fraudulence” and use other terms capable of having a legal meaning. It may be, however, that there is little harm in such evidence. If the terminology concerned slips out in the course of evidence, the witness can be questioned on what he meant. In a jury trial, the judge can direct the jury that the ultimate issue is for the jury to decide. Such evidence, in any event, comes under the control of the provision on lay opinion evidence – is the evidence necessary to obtain an adequate account of the witness’ perception of the matter or event – and of the exclusionary discretions which can be used to exclude evidence of little probative value and with the potential to mislead or confuse. Evidence of an expert on a question involving legal standards and questions is similarly controlled – he must have special qualifications such as are likely to assist the court – and is also subject to the exclusionary discretions.

While the ALRC considered that a specific provision abolishing the “rule” was necessary “so as to make clear the stance of the draft legislation on the area and to preclude so far as possible re-emergence of the rule via the relevance discretions” (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 743), certain observations are apposite. First, a witness may not express an opinion as to the identification of the relevant law or as to its proper application, at least where it will determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.664 That is a matter for the court. However, this does not mean that a witness is barred from expressing an opinion on “the ultimate legal issue”.665 Such an issue (for example, was D “negligent”?) may involve matters of mixed fact and law including the application of a legal standard. It was the explicit intention of the ALRC that this provision would abolish the common law 663. Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 127; Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 490–491 and 492 per Dixon CJ and Windeyer J; R v Ashcroft [1965] 1 Qd R 81 at 85; R v Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1; R v Darrington (1979) 1 A Crim R 124 at 133. 664. See Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79; 137 ALR 138, Lindgren J at 83; Faucett v St George Bank Ltd [2003] NSWCA 43 per Sheller JA (Mason P and Meagher JA agreeing) at [48]; Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard [2009] ATPR 82-020; [2009] NSWCA 167, .Beazley JA (Ipp and Basten JJA agreeing) at [68]. 665. Forge v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 213 ALR 574; 52 ACSR 1; [2004] NSWCA 448.

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prohibition on expert opinion evidence regarding matters of mixed fact and law involving the application of a legal standard. The provision should not be interpreted so as to maintain the common law prohibition.666 Accordingly, the NSW Court of Appeal has accepted that “a company director should … be able to speak of directors’ duties of due care and proper conduct and their application” even though the ultimate issue in the proceeding is whether a particular director breached his duty of care.667 Similarly, expert evidence may be given on factual questions of causation, even where the opinion is expressed in language that is employed in legal analysis in causation.668

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It appears to follow that abolition of the rule would not alter the operation of the principle that, while evidence as to the content of foreign law is admissible where that content is a question of fact, evidence as to its application is not, at least where application of the foreign law to facts will determine the rights and liabilities of the parties (so as to avoid intrusion upon the functions of the judiciary).669 Conversely, where the application of foreign law will not determine the rights and obligations of the parties, but the court is concerned with foreign law as a subsidiary fact necessary to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties under domestic law, expert opinion on the application of the foreign law may be admitted.670 Similarly, a decision of the Federal Court has held that opinion evidence was admissible even though the “language used by [the expert] sometimes ‘stumbles’ … into the area of legal standards”, because it was not “an opinion as to the law”.671 In the context of evidence regarding what a careful professional would do in specified hypothetical circumstances, Austin J has observed that “separating out the legal standard, which is a matter for the Court, from the question what a competent and careful professional could be expected to do (which may be regarded as one of fact) may be a problem, but not an insuperable one”.672 Second, Mason P in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has made the following valid point: In New South Wales opinion evidence is not inadmissible only because it is about a fact in issue or an ultimate issue (Evidence Act, s 80(a)). However, judges should

666. Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1263, Barrett J at [21]. 667. Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131; Forge v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 213 ALR 574; 52 ACSR 1; [2004] NSWCA 448 at [271]. 668. Allianz Australia Ltd v Sim (2012) 10 DDCR 325; [2012] NSWCA 68, Allsop P (Meagher JA agreeing) at [34]–[35], Basten JA at [118]–[121] (Meagher JA agreeing). 669. Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79; 137 ALR 138 at 83–84. 670. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640; [2000] NSWSC 1077. 671. See Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 253; [1999] FCA 1061 at [8] per Sackville J. See also Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 50 NSWLR 640; [2000] NSWSC 1077; ACCC v Lux Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 89 at [15]–[16] per RD Nicholson J. 672. ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 at [29]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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exercise particular scrutiny when experts move close to the ultimate issue, lest they arrogate expertise outside their field or express views unsupported by disclosed and contestable assumptions.673

In such circumstances, the requirements of s 79 may not be satisfied.674. Indeed, the requirement of relevance under s 56 may not be satisfied.675

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Third, the more central the issue upon which the expert is testifying, the greater the concern over the possibility that a lay tribunal will defer to the expert. Further, many “ultimate issues” are of the sort where expert evidence is unlikely to be particularly helpful. The courts have always had to balance a desire to admit relevant expert evidence against the dangers that it may be given excessive importance by the tribunal of fact or mislead the court in some other way. The primary concern has been with juries, as distinct from judges sitting without a jury. In this context, Dawson J of the High Court listed some of the dangers with expert opinion evidence: Although the modern attitude towards expert evidence is, perhaps, less exclusionary than in the past, it is nevertheless still important to recognise the dangers of wrongly admitting it. The admission of such evidence carries with it the implication that the jury are not equipped to decide the relevant issue without the aid of expert opinion and thus, if it is wrongly admitted, it is likely to divert them from their proper task which is to decide the matter for themselves using their own common sense. And even though most juries are not prone to pay undue deference to expert opinion, there is at least a danger that the manner of its preparation may, if it is wrongly admitted, give to it an authority which is not warranted. In addition the calling of unnecessary expert evidence tends to prolong a trial, particularly when it provokes the calling of further expert evidence in reply. Moreover there is then a risk that the focus of the trial will shift from the evidence of the facts in dispute to the conflict between the competing theories of the various expert witnesses.676

These considerations should be taken into account in application of the discretion under s 135 (or, where applicable, s 137).677 On occasion, the application of such discretions would justify the exclusion of expert opinion evidence even in a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.678 It is suggested that such discretionary 673. R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; 125 A Crim R 315; [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [40]. 674. See, for example, Faucett v St George Bank Ltd [2003] NSWCA 43 at [49] per Sheller JA (Mason P and Meagher JA agreeing); Dean-Willcocks v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2003) 45 ACSR 564; [2003] NSWSC 466 at [15], [27], [32] per Austin J); ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 at [27] per Austin J; Jango v Northern Territory (No 4) [2004] FCA 1539 at [36]–[41]; Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204 at [29]; Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1263, Barrett J at [28]; National Telecoms Group Ltd v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 1) [2011] NSWSC 455 at [34]–[40]; Roads and Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Barrie Toepfer Earthmoving and Land Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 916 at [19]. 675. See also Roads and Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Barrie Toepfer Earthmoving and Land Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 916 at [17]–[20]. 676. Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 130–131. 677. See [EA.79.300]. 678. In Yates Property Corp v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84, the Full Court of the Federal Court expressed a “wish to discourage” expert evidence on the question of negligence of counsel (at 110–111). The Full Court noted a suggestion that such evidence was “now admissible under s 80”, did not express any opinion on the correctness of the suggestion but indicated that such evidence was “of little assistance”. It may be observed that s 80 does not make any evidence

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analysis should be adopted rather than the use of traditional (common law) language referring to the “usurping” of the function of the trier of fact (although some judges persist in the use of such language).679

[EA.80.120]

Other provisions

Other provisions may operate to render inadmissible evidence of an opinion about a fact in issue or an ultimate issue. For example, s 23A(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides that, for the purposes of deciding whether a mental “impairment” was “so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter”, evidence “of an opinion that an impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter is not admissible”. Thus, while expert opinion evidence might be given regarding the nature and causes of the impairment, it may not be given in respect of the ultimate issue whether the impairment is “so substantial” as to justify reducing murder to manslaughter.

[EA.80.150]

“a matter of common knowledge”

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The traditional common law position is that opinion evidence is not admissible if it is in respect of a matter of “common knowledge”.680 The ALRC rejected this limitation (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 743): Excluding evidence because the “ordinary man” has some knowledge about the area is entirely fallacious and ought not to be part of evidence law. Clearly, if the matter about which the expert is seeking to testify is patent and known to all, the court’s time would be wasted by its presentation. A relevance discretion is quite capable of excluding such material. An expert, however, may still be of assistance to the court even in an area about which most people know something. An expert purports to have “special” skill and knowledge about something over and above that of the ordinary man. It is proposed, therefore, to omit the common knowledge requirement and to rely upon the relevance provisions, the discretions to ensure that unnecessary evidence is not admitted. The effect of this will be, for example, that testimony by psychiatrists and psychologists on the behaviour of the “normal” man will, so long as it is relevant, be prima facie admissible … In addition, relevant testimony upon the dangers of admissible. Rather, it provides that evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible on a particular basis. It may be inadmissible on another basis (eg, failure to comply with the requirements of s 79). Further, a court might exclude in discretion evidence which, as the Full Court considered here, is “of little assistance” and “has a tendency to distract the court from a proper adjudication of the issues” (at 111). See also Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co v Tyco Electronics Pty Ltd (2002) 56 IPR 248; [2002] FCAFC 315 at [50]. 679. Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [87]; ASIC v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291; [2003] NSWSC 1095 at [30]; Rees v Lumen Christi Primary School [2010] VSC 514 at [52]; Farrugia v Jindi Woraback Children’s Centre Inc [2011] VSC 250 at [21]. 680. See, eg, R v Ashcroft [1965] 1 Qd R 81 at 85; R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 at 54; Smith v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588. However, other formulations of this test ask whether the lay perspective is likely to be “correct”: see Dixon CJ in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491; Casley-Smith v Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 (FC) per Olsson J at 320; R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 at 369 per King CJ. Put differently, they ask whether the expert testimony would “assist” or “help” the lay tribunal: see Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94, particularly Deane J (at 127) and Dawson J (at 130); E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 31 FCR 299; Hoogwerf v The Queen (1992) 63 A Crim R 302 at 314 per Walsh J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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identification evidence under some circumstances and even on child development will be prima facie admissible subject to the application of the exclusionary discretions.

The Full Court of the Federal Court, in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159 FCR 397; [2007] FCAFC 70 has emphasised (at [55]) these observations of the ALRC, holding at [57] that the trial judge erred in concluding “that it is a condition of the admissibility of opinion evidence that the opinion relates to an issue that is outside the knowledge or experience of ordinary persons”. In the High Court, Gaudron J observed that, while the specialised knowledge on which an opinion must be substantially based (for the purposes of s 79) cannot be “common knowledge”, that does not prevent an expert witness taking into account matters of “common knowledge” in formulating the opinion: The concept of “specialised knowledge” imports knowledge of matters which are outside the knowledge or experience of ordinary persons … So to say, however, is not to say that an expert witness cannot have regard to matters that are within the knowledge of ordinary persons in formulating his or her opinion. So much is expressly acknowledged by s 80(b) of the Evidence Act.681

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While it might be thought that s 80(b) was directed more at the question whether an opinion may be “about” a matter of common knowledge, rather than whether it can be (partially) based on common knowledge, there can be no doubt that the general proposition advanced by Gaudron J is correct. Indeed, it needs to be emphasised that s 80(b) operates in respect of any opinion evidence, whether expert (s 79) or lay (s 78). Authorities which have simply applied the common law “rule” that an opinion is not admissible if it involves an “area … not outside the experience of ordinary persons”682 should not be followed. Of course, while s 80(b) has the effect that an opinion will not necessarily be inadmissible because it is “about” a matter of common knowledge, that fact may result in a conclusion that the requirements of s 79 are not satisfied. In particular, the court may not be satisfied that such an opinion is, “wholly or substantially based” on specialised knowledge.683 Further, as the ALRC made clear, the possibility of discretionary exclusion remains. If a lay tribunal is in a good position to make the relevant determination without expert assistance, the risk that it will unnecessarily defer to an “expert” may support the view that such evidence should be excluded under s 135 (or, where applicable, s 137).684 Indeed, 681. Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402 at [82]. The other members of the court did not address this question, although Gummow and Callinan JJ observed at [158] that, in arriving at an opinion based on specialised knowledge, training or experience there can be no objection to an expert relying on “knowledge of everyday affairs events and departures from them” (see [EA.79.180]). See also Campbell v The Queen (2014) 312 ALR 129; [2014] NSWCCA 175 at [225]. 682. See, for example, Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719; [2006] FCA 363 per Heerey J at [11]; overturned on appeal in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159 FCR 397; [2007] FCAFC 70 at [54]. 683. See Roads and Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Barrie Toepfer Earthmoving and Land Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 916 at [15]. 684. This would permit the courts to continue to prevent expert evidence on such issues as the credibility of a witness (cf Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; 155 ALR 652; [1998]

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the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has held that while expert evidence regarding the reliability of identification evidence, both generally and in the circumstances of a particular case, may not be inadmissible on the basis that it is about a matter of common knowledge, the circumstances of the particular case may lead to the conclusion that its probative value would be outweighed by the danger that the evidence might cause or result in undue waste of time.685

Part 3.4 – Admissions

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.4.30]

Summary of this Part

This Part creates (in s 81) an exception to both the hearsay and opinion rules for first-hand evidence (s 82) of an admission (a previous representation made by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding, civil or criminal, which is adverse to that person’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding) and the context in which it was made. Section 83 deals with use of an admission against a co-party, s 87 with admissions made by agents (formal and informal) of a party, and s 89 (along with s 89A in the NSW Act) with admissions by “silence”. Section 84 imposes threshold requirements for admissions in both civil and criminal proceedings (so that admissions obtained by violence or similar conduct will be inadmissible) while, exclusively in criminal proceedings, s 85 attempts to ensure that an admission is reliable and s 90 focuses on considerations of “fairness” to a defendant. There is no general provision dealing with the reliability of evidence of admissions (s 88 provides that, for the purposes of determining admissibility, a court must assume the admission was made if such a conclusion is “reasonably open”) although s 86 excludes an unsigned record of police interview in certain circumstances.

HCA 50), the dangers with identification (cf Smith v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588), the ordinary meaning of words, “ordinary human nature” (see Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719; [2006] FCA 363 per Heerey J at [14]–[29]) and whether a person has acted “dishonestly”. 685. R v Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWCCA 388 at [69]–[70]. It should be noted that Smart AJ observed at [61] that the expert would be permitted “to state the results of his research and the general state of learning and answer questions based on assumptions” but not to express an opinion as to the reliability of the specific identification. Similarly, in R v Dupas (2010) 211 A Crim R 81; [2011] VSC 180 the trial judge admitted general defence expert evidence about the weaknesses of identification evidence, the displacement effect and the media misinformation effect (as well as explanation by means of general examples how each of these factors could affect reliability), rejecting a prosecution argument that the probative value of the evidence would be substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to the prosecution or misleading or confusing. It was not argued that admitting such expert evidence would cause undue waste of time, notwithstanding the fact that strong judicial directions would be given as to the dangers and problems with the identification evidence. The trial judge considered that the evidence “would support, rather than undermine, the force of the judicial directions as to the dangers and problems with the identification evidence”. On appeal, the Victorian Court of Appeal endorsed that analysis: Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 at [243]–[283]. See also A Gold, Expert Evidence in Criminal Law: The Scientific Approach (Toronto, 2003), pp 62–63. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 81

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Cth Act: 81 Hearsay and opinion rules: exception for admissions and related representations (1) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of an admission. (2) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a previous representation: (a) that was made in relation to an admission at the time the admission was made, or shortly before or after that time; and (b) to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the admission. Note: Specific exclusionary rules relating to admissions are as follows: • evidence of admissions that is not first-hand (section 82); • use of admissions against third parties (section 83); • admissions influenced by violence etc. (section 84); • unreliable admissions of accused persons (section 85); • records of oral questioning of accused persons (section 86). Example: D admits to W, his best friend, that he sexually assaulted V. In D’s trial for the sexual assault, the prosecution may lead evidence from W: (a) that D made the admission to W as proof of the truth of that admission; and (b) that W formed the opinion that D was sane when he made the admission. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

NSW Act: 81 Hearsay and opinion rules: exception for admissions and related representations (1) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of an admission. (2) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a previous representation: (a) that was made in relation to an admission at the time the admission was made, or shortly before or after that time, and (b) to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the admission. Note: Specific exclusionary rules relating to admissions are as follows: • evidence of admissions that is not first-hand (section 82) • use of admissions against third parties (section 83) • admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct (section 84) • unreliable admissions of accused persons (section 85) • records of oral questioning of accused persons (section 86). Example: D admits to W, his best friend, that he sexually assaulted V. In D’s trial for the sexual assault, the prosecution may lead evidence from W: (a) that D made the admission to W as proof of the truth of that admission, and (b) that W formed the opinion that D was sane when he made the admission.

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Vic Act: 81 Hearsay and opinion rules—exception for admissions and related representations (1) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of an admission. (2) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a previous representation— (a) that was made in relation to an admission at the time the admission was made, or shortly before or after that time; and (b) to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the admission. Note: Specific exclusionary rules relating to admissions are as follows— • evidence of admissions that is not first-hand (section 82) • use of admissions against third parties (section 83) • admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct (section 84) • unreliable admissions of an accused (section 85) • records of oral questioning of an accused (section 86) Example: D admits to W, his best friend, that he sexually assaulted V. In D’s trial for the sexual assault, the prosecution may lead evidence from W— (a) that D made the admission to W as proof of the truth of that admission; and (b) that W formed the opinion that D was sane when he made the admission.

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ACT Act: 81 Hearsay and opinion rules—exception for admissions and related representations (1) The hearsay rule and opinion rule do not apply to evidence of an admission. (2) The hearsay rule and opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a previous representation— (a) that was made in relation to an admission at the time the admission was made, or shortly before or after that time; and (b) to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the admission. Note: Specific exclusionary rules relating to admissions are as follows: • evidence of admissions that is not first-hand (s 82) • use of admissions against third parties (s 83) • admissions influenced by violence etc (s 84) • unreliable admissions of accused people (s 85) • records of oral questioning of accused people (s 86). Example: D admits to W, his best friend, that he sexually assaulted V. In D’s trial for the sexual assault, the prosecution may lead evidence from W— (a) that D made the admission to W as proof of the truth of the admission; and (b) that W formed the opinion that D was sane when he made the admission. Note: An example is part of the Act, is not exhaustive and may extend, but does not limit, the meaning of the provision in which it appears (see Legislation Act, s 126 and s 132). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

NT Act: 81 Hearsay and opinion rules — exception for admissions and related representations (1) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of an admission. (2) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a previous representation: (a) that was made in relation to an admission at the time the admission was made, or shortly before or after that time; and (b) to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the admission. Note for section 81: Specific exclusionary rules relating to admissions are as follows: • evidence of admissions that is not first-hand (section 82) • use of admissions against third parties (section 83) • admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct (section 84) • unreliable admissions of accused persons (section 85) • records of oral questioning of accused persons (section 860 Example for section 81:

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D admits to W, his best friend, that he sexually assaulted V. In D’s trial for the sexual assault, the prosecution may lead evidence from W: (a) that D made the admission to W as proof of the truth of that admission; and (b) that W formed the opinion that D was sane when he made the admission. [Editor’s Note: There appears to be a drafting error in Note for section 81. The reference to “accused persons (section 860” should probably read “accused persons (section 860)”.]

[EA.81.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 71, para 152; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755.

[EA.81.60] General comments In effect, an “admission” is not rendered inadmissible by the operation of either the hearsay or opinion rules (unless s 82 or s 83 apply). The word “admission” is defined in the Dictionary: “admission” means a previous representation that is: (a) made by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding (including a defendant in a criminal proceeding); and (b) adverse to the person’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding.

The term “previous representation” is defined: “previous representation” means a representation made otherwise than in the course of giving evidence in the proceeding in which evidence of the representation is sought to be adduced.

The term “proceeding” is not defined. In Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314; [2008] FCA 369 the issue arose whether an interlocutory hearing determining an issue of privilege was the same proceeding 598

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as the subsequent trial (so that an affidavit read in the interlocutory hearing would not be a “previous representation” for the purposes of the Act). Rares J held at [27]:

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I am of opinion that the proper construction of the definition of “previous representation” in the Act requires that the expression “in the course of giving evidence in the proceeding in which evidence of the representation is sought to be adduced” be treated as a reference to the hearing before the judge, as defined, in which the evidence is sought to be adduced. It does not extend to other hearings or phases, including any interlocutory proceeding, in which the parties have been engaged prior to that hearing. Of course, if a matter is part heard, on the resumption of hearing it is the same proceeding for the purposes of the definition of “previous representation”. But where one can readily segregate the interlocutory or other phases of a matter from the trial, proceeding or phase in which the evidence is sought to be adduced, I am of opinion that a representation made before the current hearing is capable of being a previous representation within the meaning of that term in the Act.

Accordingly, the interlocutory proceeding “was not this trial of the issues between the parties” and thus a representation made in that proceeding “did not occur in the course of giving evidence in the proceeding in which it is now sought to tender” evidence of the representation, with the consequence that the “affidavit is capable of being a previous representation and thus capable of falling within the meaning of ‘admission’ as a matter of law” (at [33]). It may be observed that, while this analysis appears correct, the argument advanced before Rares J was misconceived. If the affidavit was not a “previous representation” (and thus not an “admission”), equally it would not be hearsay evidence caught by the exclusionary rule in s 59 – if relevant and not excluded by any other rule, it would be admissible (s 56). The word “representation” is defined: “representation” includes: (a) an express or implied representation (whether oral or in writing); or (b) a representation to be inferred from conduct; or (c) a representation not intended by its maker to be communicated to or seen by another person; or (d) a representation that for any reason is not communicated.

Clause 6 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary deals with representations in documents: 6 Representations in documents For the purposes of this Act, a representation contained in a document is taken to have been made by a person if: (a) the document was written, made or otherwise produced by the person; or (b) the representation was recognised by the person as his or her representation by signing, initialling or otherwise marking the document.

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It follows that, where a document is supposedly relevant on the basis that it contains an “admission” (as defined), the document will not be admissible unless evidence is adduced to satisfy (a) or (b).686 An obvious example of a representation which would constitute an admission would be an outright confession made to police (an “express” representation). However, any acknowledgment of some relevant fact that tended to establish guilt, or liability, would be an admission. Indeed, any representation, adduced by the prosecution and capable of rationally affecting the assessment of the probability of the existence of facts asserted by a prosecution witness in relation to an alleged offence would constitute an admission.687 An admission may be made by adoption of a representation made by another. As the definition of “representation” indicates, an admission may be made by conduct from which an admission might reasonably be inferred (an “implied” representation). In Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ observed at [64]: Depending on the circumstances, when a party lies, or destroys or conceals evidence, or attempts to destroy or conceal evidence, or suborns witnesses, or calls testimony known to be false, or fails to comply with court orders for the production of evidence (like subpoenas or orders to answer interrogatories), or misleads persons in authority about who the party is, or flees, the conduct can be variously described as an implied admission or circumstantial evidence permitting an adverse inference. The position must be the same where there is a failure of a party-witness to comply with the duty of a witness to tell the whole truth.

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An admission may be made in pleadings (and thus would include a subsequently withdrawn plea of guilty).688 The ALRC discussed the definition of “admission”: [A]ny definition of “admission” should include the requirement that the assertion by a party be against the interests of that party in the trial. In addition, the definition should not exclude admissions contained in pleadings. This is contrary to the orthodox view, which seems to be based on doubts about the reliability of such pleadings. They may be made for tactical reasons rather than as an assertion of truth. Contradictory pleadings may be filed. But more recent decisions support the proposition that pleadings should not be placed in a special category – it should be a question of fact in the circumstances whether the particular statement constitutes an admission.689

This analysis was adopted by Ryan J in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Pratt (No 3) [2009] FCA 407 at [72]. As Ryan J explained, the question of fact will be whether the statement in the pleading amounts “to a positive assertion or acknowledgement of a material fact”. He added: A statement in a defence or subsequent pleading that a party “admits” an allegation in a particular paragraph of a statement of claim or subsequent pleading may not always 686. In this regard, s 88 should be noted: “For the purpose of determining whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the court is to find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that he or she made the admission.” 687. R v W [1999] NSWCCA 116 at [39]–[41] per Wood CJ at CL. 688. Compare R v D’Orta-Ekenaike [1998] 2 VR 140; (1998) 99 A Crim R 454; R v Zampogna (2003) 85 SASR 56; 138 A Crim R 368; [2003] SASC 75; R v Rustum [2005] VSCA 142. There may be discretionary reasons for excluding evidence of a withdrawn plea of guilty: Grosvenor v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 5 at [13]–[20]. 689. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755; see also ALRC 26, Appendix C, para 113; ALRC 38, Appendix C, para 19.

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constitute such a positive assertion or acknowledgement. It may, in its context and other relevant circumstances, signify no more than that the party admitting the allegation is content for the litigation in which it is made to be resolved on the basis that the allegation is true or has been proved. That election may be made for a variety of forensic reasons, including a desire to avoid the costs of contesting the allegation in question or a belief that the party making the admission can succeed on some other issue without disputing the particular allegation. A fortiori, a statement in a defence or subsequent pleading that a party “does not admit” an allegation in an earlier pleading will rarely, if ever, constitute an admission in the relevant sense. It indicates no more than that the party on whose behalf the “non-admission” is made intends to put the opposing party to proof at trial of the alleged fact.

An admission may be made in an “agreement”. As Ryan J observed in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Pratt (No 3) [2009] FCA 407 at [77], a “recital to a deed or other written contract may, in its context, be so expressed as to warrant the conclusion that both contracting parties intended it to operate as an assertion of actual fact”. However, Ryan J also stated that “[a]n agreement does not ordinarily constitute a representation by a contracting party”:

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One reason for that is the difficulty in attributing a particular statement in the agreement to one party or the other. It is also notorious that parties to an agreement may elect to conduct their contractual relations and, if necessary, enforce the rights arising from them on a basis which is contrary to fact.

Ryan J also held that an “Agreed Statement of Facts” made pursuant to s 191 did not “contain a representation … of a fact material to the present criminal proceedings” (for further discussion, see [EA.191.40]). Nevertheless, the Full Court of the Federal Court has accepted that a statement in an agreement is capable of constituting an admission.690 Similarly, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has accepted that statements in a deed constituted representations of the actual facts, as understood by the parties to the deed.691 In general, the courts have taken a broad view of the term “admission”, extending it to facts inferred from words or conduct.692 Even if evidence of a representation is not “hearsay” (because it is not sought to be used to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person who made it intended to assert by the representation: s 59), it may still be an “admission”. The definition of “admission” does not require that the representation relate to the facts in issue in the proceeding (although, of course, the requirement of relevance means that it must be capable of affecting, directly or indirectly, a fact in issue). Rather, it must be “adverse to the [party’s] interest in the outcome of the proceeding”. It has been 690. Wu v Li [2015] FCAFC 109 at [21]–[32]. 691. Taylor v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 2 at [50]. 692. R v Horton (1998) 104 A Crim R 306 at 317 per Wood CJ at CL; R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 at 42 per Wood CJ at CL; R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 at [34]–[66] per the court. Examples may be flight from the jurisdiction, attempts to suborn witnesses and lies on a material issue. One difficult area is silence. In some circumstances, it may be reasonably open to infer an admission from silence in response to questioning, or in a failure to reply to correspondence: see, eg, Davies v Nyland (1974) 10 SASR 76 at 88; Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 at 373; Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57. In other circumstances, silence may not constitute an admission: The Age Co Ltd v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; 272 FLR 426; [2013] NSWCA 26 at [17]. Further, the Act specifically deals with the silence of an accused in criminal proceedings in s 89 (along with s 89A in the NSW Act). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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held that use of a representation made by a party out of court to discredit the party’s testimony meant that it was being used in a manner adverse to the party’s interest in the outcome of his trial.693 Because the definition refers to the admission being “adverse to the [party’s] interest in the outcome of the proceeding” rather than adverse at the time it was made, it has been accepted that a representation which is, on the face of it, exculpatory, may be an “admission” if it is relied upon as constituting an implied admission. This may be contrasted with the position under the English Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK), where a “confession” is defined in s 82 to include “any statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it”.694 Under this Act, a lie may be capable of revealing a “consciousness of guilt”695 of a charged offence and regarded as an admission on that basis.696 The same reasoning is applicable in civil proceedings.697 Plainly enough, a “denial”, if it is not capable of being regarded as an admission, will not be admissible under this provision.698 If it is otherwise irrelevant, it should be excluded.699 693. R v Rahme [2001] NSWCCA 414 at [42] per Mason P.

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694. R v Hasan [2005] 2 Cr App R 22. 695. To be capable of showing consciousness of guilt, the lie must be related to a material issue and be capable of explanation on the basis that the defendant knew that the truth would implicate him or her in the offence charged: Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 ALJR 40; 68 A Crim R 349 at 210 (CLR), 362 (A Crim R); Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234; 112 A Crim R 114; [2000] HCA 28; R v T (1997) 92 A Crim R 390; Green v The Queen (1999) 73 ALJR 575; [1999] HCA 13; see also R v Ugochukwu (2003) 138 A Crim R 544; [2003] NSWCCA 104; R v Hodge [2002] NSWCCA 10 at [18]; R v Sievers (2004) 151 A Crim R 426; [2004] NSWCCA 463; Quinlan v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 106; [2006] NSWCCA 284. It would not be so capable if it was only possible to conclude that a defendant had lied by finding that he or she committed the offence with which they have been charged: R v Zhen (1995) 83 A Crim R 572; R v Lane (2011) 221 A Crim R 309; [2011] NSWCCA 157 at [12]–[20]; [71]; [85]. If it is not so capable, it may still be admissible as relevant to the credibility of the defendant. It may be capable of showing consciousness of guilt in relation to one charge, but not another: cf R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52; R v Sievers (2004) 151 A Crim R 426; [2004] NSWCCA 463; Meko v The Queen (2004) 146 A Crim R 131; [2004] WASCA 159 at [43]–[53]; R v Heyes (2006) 12 VR 401; 160 A Crim R 435; [2006] VSCA 86; R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263; Brooks v The Queen (2012) 36 VR 84; [2012] VSCA 197 at [69]; Zhu v The Queen (2013) 38 VR 77; [2013] VSCA 102 at [36]–[45]; R v Reid [2018] QCA 63 at [78]–[113]. Careful directions to the jury may be required: Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 41; 77 ALJR 1433; [2003] HCA 40 (see [EA.165.480]). 696. R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 at 42 per Wood CJ at CL; R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 at [34]–[66]; R v Esho [2001] NSWCCA 415 at [129]–[130]. 697. See Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [180]–[184]. 698. For the common law position, see Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82 at 107; Straker v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 649; 51 ALJR 690 at 694. Of course, some specific denials (for example, of presence at the scene of a crime) may be shown to be a lie and permit an inference of consciousness of guilt: see Rana v The Queen [2014] VSCA 198. 699. In Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438; [1998] HCA 1 at 616, Callinan J rejected a proposition that evidence of a denial by the suspect/defendant during police questioning was relevant and admissible to establish that the defendant was allowed to put his version of events at the earliest opportunity. Gleeson CJ agreed with him but the rest of the High Court did not consider it necessary to consider this issue: see also R v W [1999] NSWCCA 116 at [37]–[39] per Wood CJ at CL.

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An example of the broad approach is the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal judgment in R v Horton (1998) 104 A Crim R 306. It was held that evidence of a statement made to a police officer by the accused that “he (the victim on the murder charge) fell on the knife”, which on the face of it was exculpatory, was adverse to the defendant’s interest in the outcome of her trial, in that the making of the statement tended to show that the accused was not particularly affected by the amount of alcohol she had consumed, thus weakening her “defence” of intoxication. This decision concerned the meaning of the word “admission” in (now) s 281 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 but it was held that it should be regarded as having the same meaning as under this Act.700 The difficulty with this decision is that it is not clear that the defendant had made a “representation” that she was not intoxicated. Rather, the fact of non-intoxication was inferred from her conduct, rather than a representation to that effect inferred from her conduct. Subsequent decisions have held that words relied upon to establish lack of consent for an identification parade701 or consent for a search702 are not “admissions”. In the former case, Bryson J observed:

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[T]he statement was not an admission; it was a direct statement on the subject of the plaintiff’s wishes about taking part in an identification parade, and was not in any sense an admission or (to search for illustrative analogies) a narration, a relation or a representation about whether some state of facts existed … [T]he proof offered was direct proof of the event of the defendant saying something which in context was a refusal, and there was no proof of an admission.703

While the plaintiff intended to communicate lack of consent, the evidence of what he said was relied upon as a relevant event. In the latter case, Director of Public Prosecutions v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227; [2001] NSWSC 797, James J agreed with this analysis. He added (at [93]–[94]): In ordinary usage the word “representation”, even if it is not limited to an assertion of fact, nevertheless has an indirect quality; a representation is an assertion, stating, alleging, picturing or portraying of some matter other than itself. The uttering of words by a person giving or refusing consent is not a representation about something else, it is a fact or event in itself; it is not a representation that the person is consenting or refusing to consent, it itself constitutes the giving or refusing of consent.

Similarly, in R v Gao [2003] NSWCCA 390 it was held that what was said during a police interview was not a “representation” (and thus not an admission) when used for voice comparison purposes. The same approach was adopted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Haddara v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 53; 241 A Crim R 93; [2014] VSCA 100, where Priest JA (Redlich and Weinberg JJA agreeing) stated at [128]: Contenting myself with the view that representation evokes notions of an assertion, a statement, an allegation, a depiction or a portrayal of some fact, matter or state of 700. This assumption may be questioned. The meaning of a word in legislation may be affected by the statutory context. The central focus of s 281 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 is to prevent fabrication of evidence by the police. Conversely, the provisions of Pt 3.4 deliberately avoid investigation of that issue (cf s 88). These differing contexts may impact on the meaning given to the word “admission”. 701. Ah-See v Heilpern (2000) 115 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWSC 627. 702. Director of Public Prosecutions v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227; [2001] NSWSC 797. 703. Re A (a Child) (2000) 115 A Crim R 1 at [28] and [44]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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affairs (or the like), it cannot reasonably be argued, in my opinion, that the record of interview contained any representation within the meaning of the [Evidence Act]. Hence there was no admission, the admissibility of which might have fallen for determination under s 90. The record of interview was not introduced in order to rely on the content of any of the applicant’s statements, but simply so as to compare his voice …

This analysis also applies where the alleged “admission” involves not words but “a representation to be inferred from conduct” (see definition of “representation”). It was held in R v Knight (2001) 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 114 (NSWCCA) at [80] per Greg James J that the provision of a handwriting sample, which is to be used for comparision purposes, is not an admission. In R v G [2005] NSWCCA 291 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that posing for a photograph (at the request of police) is not an “admission” because it was “not a representation in the relevant sense”. While posing for the photograph was adverse to the accused’s interest in the outcome of his subsequent trial (because the photograph was used to assist in establishing the prosecution case), no representation or assertion was sought to be inferred from such conduct.

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It is somewhat difficult to reconcile these decisions with R v Horton (1998) 104 A Crim R 306.704 The line between drawing an inference from conduct (which will be an “admission”) and relying on the conduct itself (which will not) will not always be easy to draw. The better view may be that Horton is wrongly decided in that it involved reliance on neither an intentionally asserted fact nor an implied belief as to the existence of a fact.705 A narrow view of the term “admission” was articulated by one member of the Federal Court in R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419; [2000] FCA 1618. GH, a member of a motorcycle gang, had been charged with conspiring with other members of the gang to give the police a false account of how he had been shot. There was considerable evidence that he had been threatened by the other members to tell the police this false story (which, no doubt, would have supported a defence of duress). The trial judge applied s 84 to exclude the evidence of what GH had told the police. However, on appeal, the Full Federal Court held that his false account was not an admission, and thus s 84 had no application. Spender J held (at [16]): The essential requirement of the definition of “admission” in the Dictionary to the Act is that it is the representation itself which has to be adverse to the interests of the accused on his trial, not the surrounding circumstances or the state of mind of the maker at the time of the making of the representation. A statement which is exculpatory on its face is not a representation which is adverse to the interests of the accused: it is the addition of other circumstances which may import that quality. It is not the representation, but the proof of its untruth, which is or may be adverse.

Spender J acknowledged that this view was contrary to NSW authority. It means that an exculpatory statement, even if shown to be false, is not a previous representation that is adverse to the interests of a defendant at his trial, and thus 704. Bryson J explains the distinction in Ah-See v Heilpern (2000) 115 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWSC 627 at [38]. 705. In R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 at [414]–[416], Carruthers AJ observed that it is arguable that R v Horton was wrongly decided. However, it was not necessary to decide the question.

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not an “admission”. The other two members of the Federal Court, Miles J and Madgwick J, in separate judgments, did not take this narrow approach. In essence, they considered that the false account by GH was not an admission because his representation was not of itself adverse to his interests and it was not a case of an implied admission (this was an alternative view expressed by Spender J at [23]). The prosecution was not relying upon the false account as revealing a “consciousness of guilt” but an act forming part of the offence charged.707 Miles J stated (at [54]) that it was not necessary to express an opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of the New South Wales authorities and Madgwick J stated (at [82]) that nothing he said “necessarily calls into question the approach of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Horton”. One difficulty with the narrow approach taken by Spender J is that it does not address the proposition that a person may make more than one representation at the same time. An exculpatory statement may be a representation of innocence. However, when it is shown to be a lie, it may also imply a belief in guilt (and thus constitute an implied “representation” of that fact). Another difficulty is that, in Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594; [1998] HCA 60 at [21], the High Court, when considering the definition of “hearsay” in s 59, observed:

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[I]t is clear from the Interim Report of the Law Reform Commission on Evidence that, in the proposals that were later formulated in the Act, the term “representation” was used to apply to statements and to conduct and was used to encompass all that those statements or that conduct would convey to the observer.

There is no reason to adopt a more restrictive approach in the context of Pt 3.4, particularly given the general policy concerns regarding evidence of admissions that are reflected in ss 84 and 85.708 A subsequent judgment of the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal has favoured the approach of the majority in GH, rejecting the view of Spender J that simply because a statement is exculpatory on its face it is not an admission.709 Similarly in Beckett v The Queen (2014) 315 ALR 295; [2014] NSWCCA 305, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that an allegedly false statement made under oath during an interview with investigators from the Office of State Revenue was not an “admission” where it was being relied upon as “primary evidence” of the commission of an offence of make false statement under oath (Beazley P at [179]–[185]). It appears to have been accepted (see at [176]) that the allegedly false statement was not a “representation” in the sense used in this 706. R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419; [2000] FCA 1618 at [15]. 707. R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419; [2000] FCA 1618 per Miles J (at [54]–[55]), Madgwick J (at [79]). The analysis may be summarised in the following way. One representation made by GH was that he had been shot in a particular way. Plainly, the prosecution was not relying on that representation. In addition, a representation might be inferred from GH’s conduct in giving the false story to the police that he had conspired to give such a false account. However, the mere act of giving the false account permitted such an inference, without relying on any inferred representation. 708. See discussion of Madgwick J in R v GH at [78]. It is also arguable that the inclusion of s 89, dealing with the drawing of inferences from silence, in Pt 3.4 indicates an assumption that adverse inferences drawn from other conduct (such as a lie) would fall under the umbrella of an “admission”. 709. Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234; [2006] TASSC 75 per Crawford J at [31] and Tennent J at [120]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Act – it was not being relied on to prove the existence of any fact represented to exist (in contrast with a case where a lie is relied on as a representation by conduct that the person telling the lie is conscious of his or her guilt, relied upon to prove that fact so represented). The judgments of Miles J and Madgwick J in R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419; [2000] FCA 1618 and the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal in Cook are consistent with the NSW decisions of Re A (a Child), Director of Public Prosecutions v Leonard, R v Knight, R v G and Beckett and the Victorian decision in Haddara. Interestingly, Madgwick J indicated, in dicta, that he would regard a statement that is of itself adverse to a defendant’s interests as an admission even though it is relied upon by the prosecution as an act forming part of the offence charged.710 It appears NSW and Victorian courts would not go so far, unless the statement is relied upon to infer a particular state of mind.711

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[EA.81.90] Standard of proof In accordance with this provision, the hearsay and opinion rules do not apply to an “admission”. Since the word “admission” is defined to mean a previous representation that is “made” by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding, it is necessary to determine the applicable standard of proof. Under s 88, for the purpose of deciding whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the standard of proof for finding “that a particular person made the admission” is the prima-facie standard (that is, the court “is to find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that he or she made the admission”). In R v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 526; [2006] NSWSC 648 Whealy J held at [28]–[33] that the representation itself “cannot be used for the purposes of making a finding that it was the accused who may have made the admissions constituted by the representation”. He gave two reasons for this holding (at [28]–[30]): First, it would be entirely circular to make use of the statements … for this purpose. If there be no evidence beyond the representations themselves from which it might reasonably be open to find the statements were made by the accused, the conclusion they were or might have been made by him can only be reached by accepting the truth of the statements and by proceeding on the assumption that they were made by him. … Secondly, assuming, as I do, that the statements … were consistent with the background and occupation of the accused, they do not prove of themselves that it is he 710. R v GH at [80] per Madgwick J. 711. Madgwick J advanced the following scenario (at [80]): “Assume that, in a bank robbery by A and B, A says to the customers and staff, ‘Get back, these guns are loaded’. B then shoots and kills a bank teller. Charged with being an accomplice to the murder by B, A claims to have acted under the duress of B in participating in the robbery and making the statement, but to have been nevertheless told by B that the guns were in fact not loaded. The representation as to knowledge that the guns were loaded is itself adverse to the defendant’s interest in the outcome of the trial, as well as being evidence of a legal incident of the various crimes allegedly committed.” Madgwick J concluded that the statement would not cease to be an admission because it was also evidence of an ingredient of an offence charged and A would be entitled to the protection of s 84. Spender J considered a similar scenario (at [25]) and came to the opposite conclusion. It is suggested that a third approach is preferable, which turns upon the use sought to be made of the statement by the prosecution. If it is sought to be used simply as an act constituting an offence by A or as a relevant event, it should not be regarded as an admission. Conversely, if it is sought to be used to infer a belief in A that the guns were loaded, it should be regarded as an admission.

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who made the statements. It would still be necessary for the tribunal of fact to draw inferences in relation to either the statements or the truth of the statements and to place those inferences along side other known evidence before making a deduction or drawing an inference that it was or was not the accused …

It is suggested that this analysis should be qualified, so as to draw a distinction between hearsay, and non-hearsay, use of the representation. Any representation which falls within the scope of s 59 should not be used to prove that it was the defendant who made it, unless some other hearsay exception applies. However, if a representation is relevant in a non-hearsay way to the identity of the representor, it should be available to be used for that purpose (cf, s 55(2)(b)). In respect of those provisions in Pt 3.4 (ss 84, 85 and 86) which render an “admission” inadmissible unless certain factual circumstances are satisfied, the general standard of proof imposed by s 142 applies to the determination of those facts (satisfaction that the facts have been proved “on the balance of probabilities”). It would appear also that the question whether or not a “previous representation” (if made) is an “admission” is a question for the court applying the same test (although it might be argued that the test in s 88 should be applied).

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[EA.81.120]

Lack of personal knowledge

The ALRC proposed that “admissions which are not based on personal knowledge are admissible if there is evidence of belief in the fact admitted”.712 However, no specific provision enacting this proposal appears in the Act. It follows that personal knowledge or belief in the fact admitted is not required.713 However, presence or absence of personal knowledge may affect whether words or conduct (including silence) could reasonably be regarded as an “admission”, within the scope of the definition. In Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1935) 54 CLR 134; [1935] HCA 71, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ stated at 143: In determining whether he intends to affirm or acknowledge a state of facts the party’s knowledge or source of information may be material. For if he states that another person has told him of it, and it appears that he has additional sources of information to the like effect, it may be right to understand him as implying a belief in what he repeats. Or, again, a person who fails to contradict a statement concerning matters within his own knowledge may be understood as acquiescing in the statement if the circumstances are such as to make it unlikely that he would allow an erroneous statement to pass unchallenged.714

The evidence may not be “probative” of a fact in issue715, which would support a conclusion that the evidence does not satisfy the relevance test. Further, absence of personal knowledge may be relevant to the exercise of the exclusionary discretions.

712. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755, p 424. 713. See Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314; [2008] FCA 369 at [37]–[40]. 714. See Vitek v Estate Homes Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1805 at [11]. 715. See Brendas v Genter [2018] NSWCA 8 at [38] (although, of course, an assessment of relevance under s 55 requires an assumption that the evidence will be “accepted”). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Changes in capacity

The ALRC observed that “the present rule is that an admission made by a person in a personal capacity is not admissible against that person when a party to litigation in a representative capacity and vice versa”.716 However, the ALRC proposed that changes of capacity should not be taken into account in considering whether a representation should be regarded as an admission.717

[EA.81.180]

Admissions by third parties

Section 83 deals with the use of an admission by a party for or against other parties in legal proceedings. A discrete issue is when a representation made by another person is to be treated as an admission by a party and thus regarded as admissible against the party. Section 87 deals with admissions made by a person with the authority, actual or imputed, of a party (see [EA.87.30]–[EA.87.210]).

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There is no provision in the Act dealing with admissions by predecessors in title, a recognised common law exception to the hearsay rule.718 In Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty; Harkins v Butcher (2002) 55 NSWLR 558; [2002] NSWCA 237 at [15], Handley JA (Beazley JA and Hodgson JA agreeing) considered that s 9 of the NSW Act preserved the common law rule. This conclusion is certainly debatable. The fact that there is no provision for admissions by a predecessor in title suggests that it was intended to abolish that hearsay exception (see [EA.Intro.120], [EA.9.90]). This was certainly the intention of the ALRC. In ALRC 26 at 423, it wrote: It may be concluded that assertions against the interest of a party, made by a third party having some privity of interest with or associated in some way with that party, are likely to be more reliable than hearsay in general, but also less reliable than admissions made personally by a party. Taking into account the various hearsay considerations noted earlier, it would seem that the best approach is to impose a requirement of authority to speak or a requirement that the statement relate to an area of personal responsibility. The party against whom the evidence is led is likely to be in a position to contest the reliability of the statement. The present category of “authorised admissions” will, therefore, be modified and expanded, while the area of “admissions” by persons in “privity” will, because of the latter consideration, be abolished.

A footnote to this text added: “Because of problems a party may have in attacking the reliability of a statement by a person in privity with him, no special exception to the hearsay rule is proposed for this category. However, it is envisaged that much of this presently admissible evidence would continue to be admissible under the hearsay proposals – chiefly where the person in privity is not available to give evidence – subject to the safeguards in those proposals.”

716. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755. 717. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755. 718. Falcon v Famous Players Film Co Ltd [1926] 2 KB 474 (CA) at 488, 498; Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 211.

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Admissions of mixed law and fact

Since the Act abolishes the ultimate issue rule relating to opinion evidence, the ALRC rejected a proposal “to exclude admissions by a party on a subject which is a mixture of law and fact (for example, ‘I was negligent’)”.719 However, such an admission cannot determine any legal issue in the proceeding (unlike admissions in pleadings) and may have little or no weight as an admission of failure to comply with a legal standard of conduct.720 In Insurance Australia Ltd (t/as NRMA Insurance) v Asaner [2016] NSWSC 614, Campbell J held inadmissible an “admission” that involved “the application of a legal standard” and was not “an admission of any fact relevant in these proceedings”.

[EA.81.240]

“evidence of a previous representation that …” (s 81(2))

The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755): A party may make a series of assertions of fact, some against interest at trial, some in his interest, some neutral. Only the former assertions would fall into the proposed definition of “admission”. Existing law, nevertheless, permits the self-serving portions of a statement to be admitted as evidence. It is not proposed to recommend any changes to the law. An assertion against interest should be considered in context – to assess its probative value it is necessary to consider assertions which qualify or modify it. Fairness to the party requires that his statements not be taken out of context.

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The meaning of the phrase “shortly … after” was considered by Barrett J in Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 598; [2009] NSWSC 769. He stated at [48]: The meaning of “shortly ... after” is to be understood in the light of the purpose s 81(2) is intended to serve. It is an adjunct to s 81(1) which puts evidence of an admission beyond the operation of the hearsay rule. Section 81(2) recognises that some other hearsay statement may serve to give essential added content to an admission, in that the other statement is necessary to a proper understanding of the admission. But s 81(2) also recognises that the other statement will be of explanatory or clarifying value only if intimately associated with the admission. The need to exclude the intervention of self-serving after-thought, re-construction or alteration is recognised by the words “made ... at the time the admission was made, or shortly before or after that time”.

Observing that s 81(2) is not intended to modify the common law position, with the arguable consequence that the words “made ... at the time the admission was made, or shortly before or shortly after it was made” are concerned to delineate what is, in common law terms, a single “occasion” (at [50]), he concluded that representations made 10 months and 13 months after an admission could not conceivably be regarded as made “soon after” the admission, since “[a] very long period intervened in which there was ample opportunity for self-serving after-thought, re-construction or alteration” (at [54]). It was not necessary to decide how cases that are less clear, where the time gap is of the order of hours or possibly days and the representations are made at different locations, should be resolved (at [53]–[54]). It may be observed that it is difficult to justify a strict 719. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755, p 424. 720. Compare Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317; [2003] HCA 51. See also Johnston v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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approach being taken to the “shortly before or after” requirement given the other requirements that the previous representation must have been made “in relation to an admission” and that “it is reasonably necessary to refer [to the representation] in order to understand the admission”. If these are satisfied, there would appear to be very strong reasons for taking a liberal approach to the requirement of “shortly before or after” bearing in mind the rationale of fairness to the defendant upon which this provision is based.721 It should be noted that s 65(2)(b) uses the phrase “shortly after” and authority in respect of that provision may assist here, although the differing statutory context and the different rationales of the two provisions should be kept firmly in mind.

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As regards the requirements that the previous representation must have been made “in relation to an admission” and that “it is reasonably necessary to refer [to the representation] in order to understand the admission”, the applicable principle is that an assertion against interest should be considered in context, “as a whole”: see Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; 180 A Crim R 142; [2008] HCA 1, Hayne J at [39]; Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 499; [2014] FCA 404. As a practical matter, if there is admissible evidence available to the prosecution of previous representations of the defendant that contain both inculpating and exculpating material, fair presentation of the prosecution case will ordinarily require that the prosecution lead all that evidence.722 On the other hand, while the context of an admission may be admitted into evidence under this provision, as long as its preconditions are satisfied,723 discretionary exclusion (under s 137) is possible if the contextual evidence creates a danger of unfair prejudice.724 The common law permits self-serving representations which form part of the context of an admissional statement to be admitted as evidence of the truth of the representations.725 While s 81(2) does not specify that the previous representation must be made by the person who made the admission, this was clearly intended by the ALRC. On the other hand, the example provided in the Act suggests that s 81(2) should be given a wider operation. It is difficult to see how the evidence referred to in para (b) of the example falls within the provision for previous representations under s 81(2). Nevertheless, at least in respect of representations made by third parties, the uncertain application of s 81(2) has little practical 721. For common law authority on this issue, see Middleton v The Queen (1998) 19 WAR 179 at 189–190; Flowers v The Queen (2005) 153 A Crim R 110; [2005] NTCCA 5; R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444; [2009] VSCA 213 at [46]–[62]. 722. This may be the explanation for the ruling of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Theodoropoulos v The Queen [2015] VSCA 364 at [110] that a part of a police interview where the accused speculated about possible motives for the complainant making allegations against him should not have been excluded. 723. See R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503 at [483] per Studdert J. 724. See R v W [1999] NSWCCA 116 at [37] per Wood CJ at CL citing R v Plevac (1995) 84 A Crim R 570. The court held that discretionary exclusion was not required since there was “no risk of prejudice or unfairness associated with the tender of the ERISP in video form” (at [39]). 725. Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 (HC); Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536; R v Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7; [188] 1 All ER 65; R v Beck [1990] 1 Qd R 30; Willis v The Queen (2001) 25 WAR 217; [2001] WASCA 296. The self-serving statement may be excised if this can be done without distorting or giving a false impression of the evidence which is admitted: Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695 at 704 per McGregor J.

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[EA.81.270]

importance. A previous representation made to the person who made the admission, which assists in understanding the admission, is likely to be relevant and admissible notwithstanding the hearsay rule.726 Since, pursuant to this provision, the hearsay rule does not apply to a self-serving representation, that representation may be used not simply to “understand” an admission but as evidence of the fact asserted by the representation. However, an exculpatory representation may (not must) have less weight (that is, may be less credible or reliable) than the inculpatory parts of a statement.727

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[EA.81.270]

Previous representations that are not adverse to the person’s interest

Wholly self-serving representations made by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding will not be admissible under this provision, since there is no “admission” (a previous representation “adverse to the person’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding”) and thus neither s 81(1) nor s 81(2) (see [EA.81.240] in relation to self-serving representations which form part of the context of an admission statement) can have application. However, such representations may be admissible under s 64(3) or s 66(2) if the person/party has been or is to be called to give evidence. Alternatively, they may be admissible as a “prior consistent statement” under s 108. Further, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held in R v Rymer (2005) 156 A Crim R 84; [2005] NSWCCA 310 that, applying the controversial judgment of the High Court in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 (see [EA.101A.60]), such representations will be admissible (subject to the discretions in Pt 3.11) whether or not the party is to testify, if the party has made a formal plea (such as a plea of not guilty in a criminal trial) and the credibility of that assertion is in issue. Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeal went so far as to hold that, in a criminal trial, the prosecution has an obligation to adduce the evidence of such exculpatory representations “absent some particular reason for refraining from doing so” (Grove J at [59], Barr and Latham JJ agreeing). However, it may be doubted whether the analysis of the Court of Criminal Appeal can now be regarded as soundly based, given the amendments to Pt 3.7 following on ALRC 102 (see [EA.101A.60]).

Cth Act: 82

Exclusion of evidence of admissions that is not first-hand

Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule to evidence of an admission unless:

726. For example, evidence that a police officer said to a suspect “I have been told that you killed X” may be adduced to provide the context for the suspect/accused’s answer, if the answer is in some way adverse to the suspect/defendant’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings. In those circumstances the question containing the assertion would not be caught by the hearsay rule (ss 59 and 60). It would be admissible, subject to discretionary exclusion (ss 135 and 136). 727. See Mule v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 1573; [2005] HCA 49. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a)

it is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the admission being made; or

[Para (a) am Act 125 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 6 item 15]

(b) it is a document in which the admission is made. Note: Section 60 does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission. [S 82 am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 39; Act 125 of 1999]

NSW Act: 82

Exclusion of evidence of admissions that is not first-hand Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule to evidence of an admission unless: (a) it is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the admission being made, or [Para (a) am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1.5[11]]

(b) it is a document in which the admission is made. Note: Section 60 does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission. [S 82 am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[35]; Act 53 of 2000]

Vic Act:

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82

Exclusion of evidence of admissions that is not first-hand

Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule to evidence of an admission unless— (a) it is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the admission being made; or (b) it is a document in which the admission is made. Note: Section 60 does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission.

ACT Act: 82

Exclusion of evidence of admissions that is not first-hand Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule to evidence of an admission unless— (a) it is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the admission being made; or (b) it is a document in which the admission is made. Note: Section 60 (Exception—evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose) does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission.

NT Act: 82

Exclusion of evidence of admissions that is not first-hand Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule to evidence of an admission unless: (a) it is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the admission being made; or (b) it is a document in which the admission is made. Note for section 82: Section 60 does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission.

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[EA.82.30]

[EA.82.30]

General comments

This provision limits the admission exception to the hearsay rule to first-hand evidence of the admission. Thus evidence from W that he had been told by X that D had made an admission would not be protected by s 81 from the application of the hearsay rule. Similarly, a document containing a “previous representation” by X (the author of the document) that D had made an admission would not be protected by s 81 from the application of the hearsay rule.728 However, the exceptions to the hearsay rule in Div 3 of Pt 3.2 may apply to render such second-hand or more remote hearsay evidence admissible. On the other hand, as the Note to this provision makes clear, the hearsay exception created by s 60 does not apply to evidence of an admission (so that s 60 will not apply to overcome the operation of the hearsay rule where second-hand or more remote evidence of an admission is admitted for a non-hearsay purpose: see [EA.60.60]).

Cth Act: 83

Exclusion of evidence of admissions as against third parties

(1) Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule or the opinion rule to evidence of an admission in respect of the case of a third party. (2) The evidence may be used in respect of the case of a third party if that party consents.

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(3) Consent cannot be given in respect of part only of the evidence. (4) In this section: third party means a party to the proceeding concerned, other than the party who: (a) made the admission; or (b) adduced the evidence. NSW Act: 83

Exclusion of evidence of admissions as against third parties

(1) Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule or the opinion rule to evidence of an admission in respect of the case of a third party. (2) The evidence may be used in respect of the case of a third party if that party consents. (3) Consent cannot be given in respect of part only of the evidence. (4) In this section: third party means a party to the proceeding concerned, other than the party who: (a) made the admission, or (b) adduced the evidence.

728. Compare Daniel v Western Australia (2001) 186 ALR 369; [2001] FCA 223 at [8]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Vic Act: 83 Exclusion of evidence of admissions as against third parties (1) Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule or the opinion rule to evidence of an admission in respect of the case of a third party. (2) The evidence may be used in respect of the case of a third party if that party consents. (3) Consent cannot be given in respect of part only of the evidence. (4) In this section, third party means a party to the proceeding concerned, other than the party who— (a) made the admission; or (b) adduced the evidence. ACT Act: 83

Exclusion of evidence of admissions as against third parties

(1) Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule or opinion rule to evidence of an admission in relation to the case of a third party. (2) The evidence may be used in relation to the case of a third party if the third party consents.

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(3) Consent cannot be given in relation to part only of the evidence. (4) In this section: third party means a party to the proceeding, other than the party who— (a) made the admission; or (b) presented the evidence. NT Act: 83

Exclusion of evidence of admissions as against third parties

(1) Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule or the opinion rule to evidence of an admission in respect of the case of a third party. (2) The evidence may be used in respect of the case of a third party if that party consents. (3) Consent cannot be given in respect of part only of the evidence. (4) In this section: third party means a party to the proceeding concerned, other than the party who: (a) made the admission; or (b) adduced the evidence.

[EA.83.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 71, para 152(d); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755.

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[EA.83.60]

Part 3.4 - Admissions

[EA.83.60]

General comments

This provision is intended to ensure that evidence of an admission by one defendant (D1) cannot be used against another defendant (D2) in the proceedings, unless D2 consents. Where D2 does wish to rely on parts of the admission, the entire admission will be admissible both for and against him or her. The ALRC explained the proposal (ALRC 26, para 755, p 425):

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An admission, and the statement of which it forms part, should not be admissible against a co-party. If an admission is admitted into evidence against a party then the trial judge should inform the tribunal of fact that the evidence may be used only against that party. If he is of the opinion that the tribunal of fact may nonetheless give the evidence weight against another party, he may consider exercise of the judicial discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence. A more difficult question is whether evidence of a party’s admission may be used by, not against, a co-party – for example, an accused wishes to take advantage of a co-accused’s admissions which help his case. It is proposed to permit a co-party to use a party’s admission which is in evidence. This right, however, should be subject to the limitation that statements connected to the admissions will be admissible in relation to the co-party’s case – even though unfavourable to the co-party.

On one view, s 83(1) is unnecessary, for the following reason. When a joint trial is held, involving multiple parties, in legal theory there is not one trial but several. In a joint trial involving two defendants (D1 and D2), for example, evidence admitted in the trial against D1 may not be admissible for or against D2, and must be disregarded in the trial of D2 (and if that is impossible, the trials should be separated).729 Where evidence is admitted of an admission by D1 it wiIl not necessarily be an “admission” in the trial of D2, since an “admission” is defined to be a previous representation “made by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding”. Since D1 is not a party in the trial of D2, the evidence of a previous representation by D1 is not an admission in the trial of D2 unless s 87 operates to permit it being treated as an admission by D2. However, this provision serves the useful function of making the technical legal position clear.730 It should also be noted that the effect of s 83(1) is that s 81“does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule or the opinion rule”. It may well be that an exception to the hearsay rule in Pt 3.2 may apply to render evidence of an “admission” by D1 admissible against D2. Thus, to give one example, evidence that D1 said when spoken to by police: “I committed the crime, along with [D2]” may fall within the terms of s 66(2) even though it is not properly classified as an admission in the trial of D2.731 In Power v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 261; [2014] VSCA 146, Redlich JA and Robson AJA in the Victorian Court of Appeal held at [65] that s 83(1) has “no application to the plea of a co-offender in some other proceeding and who is not a party in the proceedings” (that is, no application where, in the criminal trial of a single defendant, evidence of an alleged co-offender’s plea of guilty was admitted in circumstances where the co-offender was a prosecution witness). That 729. R v Rahme [2001] NSWCCA 414. 730. Compare R v Cornelissen [2004] NSWCCA 449 at [92]–[110]. 731. It is assumed that D1 is “available” to give evidence, given that D1 is not defined to be “unavailable” under the terms of cl 4 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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is plainly correct – the alleged co-offender is not a party in the proceedings against the defendant and, accordingly, the plea is not an admission (as defined) in the proceedings against the defendant. Of course, the hearsay rule would apply in any event (subject to the operation of any other hearsay exception in the Act) because the admission hearsay exception in s 81(1) has no application (subject, at least in theory, to the operation of s 87). Unlike ss 83(1), 83(2) does perform a substantive function. It creates a discrete exception to the hearsay and opinion rules where D2 wishes to use D1’s previous representation in his or her own trial. The provision allows such use although s 83(3) mandates that consent cannot be given in respect of part only of the evidence. Significantly, it would appear that an “admission” by D1 may be used by D2 even if there are serious questions about the circumstances in which the admission was obtained or the reliability of the admission. The reason is that, since the previous representation by D1 is not technically an admission in the trial of D2, the exclusionary rules relating to admissions contained in ss 84, 85 and 90 do not apply (although the discretion in s 138 would apply). Thus, it has been held in one case that D1’s admission was admissible in the (joint) trial of D2 (to support D2’s defence case) but was not admissible against D1 in his trial because of factors requiring its exclusion under s 84.732

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The “consent” required by s 83(2) is consent to the use of the admission by D1 in respect of the case of D2. Such consent cannot be inferred from some authority to act as agent given by D2 to D1 when the use of the admission in litigation was not contemplated.733 Indeed, the better view would be that the consent must be given when, or after, the admission is admitted into evidence in the case of D1. There is no doubt that s 83(3) has no possible application (that is, requiring consent) where the evidence is admissible against a third party on some basis other than through the application of the admission exception in s 81.734 That is, it may not be caught by the hearsay rule at all, or some other hearsay rule exception may apply.

Cth Act: 84 Exclusion of admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct (1) Evidence of an admission is not admissible unless the court is satisfied that the admission, and the making of the admission, were not influenced by: (a) violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether towards the person who made the admission or towards another person; or (b) a threat of conduct of that kind.

732. R v Rahme [2001] NSWCCA 414. 733. Custom Coaches (Sales) Pty Ltd v Frankish [2002] NSWSC 781 at [4] per Hamilton J. 734. See, for example, Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29465; [2011] NSWCA 303 at [125].

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(2) Subsection (1) only applies if the party against whom evidence of the admission is adduced has raised in the proceeding an issue about whether the admission or its making were so influenced. NSW Act: 84 Exclusion of admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct (1) Evidence of an admission is not admissible unless the court is satisfied that the admission, and the making of the admission, were not influenced by: (a) violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether towards the person who made the admission or towards another person, or (b) a threat of conduct of that kind. (2) Subsection (1) only applies if the party against whom evidence of the admission is adduced has raised in the proceeding an issue about whether the admission or its making were so influenced. Vic Act:

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84 Exclusion of admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct (1) Evidence of an admission is not admissible unless the court is satisfied that the admission, and the making of the admission, were not influenced by— (a) violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether towards the person who made the admission or towards another person; or (b) a threat of conduct of that kind. (2) Subsection (1) only applies if the party against whom evidence of the admission is adduced has raised in the proceeding an issue about whether the admission or its making were so influenced. ACT Act: 84 Exclusion of admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct (1) Evidence of an admission is not admissible unless the court is satisfied that the admission, and the making of the admission, were not influenced by— (a) violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether towards the person who made the admission or towards someone else; or (b) a threat of conduct mentioned in paragraph (a). (2) Subsection (1) only applies if the party against whom evidence of the admission is presented has raised in the proceeding an issue about whether the admission or its making were influenced in a way mentioned in subsection (1).

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NT Act: 84 Exclusion of admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct (1) Evidence of an admission is not admissible unless the court is satisfied that the admission, and the making of the admission, were not influenced by: (a) violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether towards the person who made the admission or towards another person; or (b) a threat of conduct of that kind. (2) Subsection (1) only applies if the party against whom evidence of the admission is adduced has raised in the proceeding an issue about whether the admission or its making were so influenced.

[EA.84.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 72, paras 154(a), 158(a); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 766.

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[EA.84.60] General comments Section 84 applies in both civil735 and criminal proceedings. The meaning of the word “admission” is discussed in detail at [EA.81.60]. In combination with other provisions in the Act (particularly ss 85, 90 and 138) this section replaces the common law “voluntariness rule”,736 although it is appropriate to make some reference to the common law position concerning the admissibility of admissions to set the enactment of this provision in context.737 The ALRC explained the philosophy behind the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 765, p 436): Techniques which are perceived as particularly likely to substantially impair the mental freedom of a suspect may be prohibited, and any evidence produced as a result of them excluded. If interrogators engage in acts of violence, threats of violence, torture or inhuman, degrading or oppressive conduct, then an admission made subsequent to such conduct may be untrue, regardless of the characteristics of the suspect being interrogated.

735. Compare Jung v Son [1998] NSWSC 698. 736. Since that rule is not reproduced in the Act, the effect of s 56(1) is that the rule has no application in proceedings to which the Act applies. See R v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188. This does not mean that the common law authorities relating to “voluntariness” have no relevance to the application of s 84 (or any other provision in the Act), but it is clear that considerable caution should be exercised in using such authorities: see R v Fulling [1987] QB 426 (CA). 737. Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 at [180].

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The Act does not provide any definitions of the conduct referred to in s 84(1). Assistance may be derived from international conventions on human rights.738 A similar provision is contained in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK).739 The Macquarie Dictionary indicates that the ordinary meaning of the word “oppression” involves the exercise of authority or power “in a burdensome, cruel or unjust manner”.740 In Higgins v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 56, Hoeben J (Sully and Bell JJ agreeing) accepted that “the concept [oppressive conduct] should not be limited to physical or threatened physical conduct but can encompass mental and psychological pressure”.741 On the other hand, in R v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142; [2009] ACTSC 104, Refshauge J considered (at [37]) that “the conduct involved should be of a relatively significant level of impropriety”. However, the NSW Court of Appeal in Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 considered at [241] that this

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imposes a gloss on the section which, in our view, is not warranted by its language. The only question s 84(1) poses is whether the “admission and [its] making” were “not influenced by” conduct of the nature identified. At best, … the wide scope of the section in its application in both civil and criminal proceedings is a reason for not giving “an expansive meaning to ‘oppression’ in s 84”.

The United Kingdom authorities, and the comments of the ALRC referred to above, suggest that the term “oppressive conduct” should not be understood as meaning the same thing as “oppression” under the common law rules relating to voluntariness, but rather eujsdem generis with the other terms in s 84(1)(a).742 However, it should be noted that Smart J in the NSW Supreme Court imported common law considerations into the concept of “oppressive conduct” in this provision, holding that the police questioning “transgressed permissible limits”.743 738. See, in particular, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights considered in such cases in the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights as The Greek Case (1969) 12 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 186 and Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] 2 EHRR 25. 739. Section 76 of PACE provides that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that a confession was not obtained “by oppression”. “Oppression” is defined to “include torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture)”. Further, as the NSW Court of Appeal pointed out in Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 at [249], another “significant difference” with s 84 is that the UK provision only applies in criminal proceedings. In R v Fulling [1987] QB 426 (CA) it was held that the word “oppression” should not be interpreted to mean the same thing as the concept of “oppression” under the common law rules relating to voluntariness. Rather it should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning of “exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh, or wrongful manner, unjust or cruel treatment” (OED). In practical terms, it refers to unacceptable extreme forms of police misconduct: see also R v Paris (1992) 97 Cr App R 99; R v Heaton [1993] Crim LR 593. In some circumstances, a deliberate deception may be oppression: R v Heron (The Times, 22 November 1993). 740. Cited in Wily v Fitz-Gibbon [1998] FCA 121. 741. Hoeben J at [26]. However, Hoeben J held at [27] that being required to attend an interview as part of an employment contract with a bank was not oppressive, since it was “a regular incident of employment”. 742. See R v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 at [123]. 743. R v LL (unreported, NSW SC, Smart J, 1 April 1996). Smart J referred to the following considerations: (a) there was an attempt to break down the answers of the suspect by way of © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Further, some judges continued to use the language of “voluntariness” when applying the provisions of the Act.744 In Higgins v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 56, noted above, Hoeben J covered his bases by holding at [28] that there was “no basis for the submission that the responses given by the appellant were not voluntary, that is, made in the exercise of a free choice to speak or be silent”. Nevertheless, as Adams J pointed out in R v Ul-Haque (2007) 177 A Crim R 348; [2007] NSWSC 1251, while the precise boundaries of the term “oppressive … conduct” are uncertain (at [94]), the relevant test under this provision is not whether “the will” has been “overborne” (at [119]).745 This proposition was endorsed by the NSW Court of Appeal in Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 at [237]. In R v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432, Hamill J held that “the accused was subjected to conduct that can properly be described as ‘oppressive’. It involved the exercise of authority and power in a burdensome, harsh and wrongful manner and imposed on the accused unreasonable and unjust burdens”.746

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“[I]nhuman conduct” means conduct incompatible with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.747 The Macquarie Dictionary defines “degrade” to include “to lower in dignity or estimation; bring into contempt”. In the context of this provision, it conveys significantly humiliating conduct.748 denial or unfavourable replies; (b) there was searching questioning in which scepticism was expressed and in which it was suggested that he was not telling the truth; (c) his account of his movements, his presence at the scene and his alibi were checked and challenged; (d) when he indicated that he did not wish to comment upon the allegations in the audio/visual demonstrations further questioning continued; (e) he was pressed to give reasons why other persons would say he was the offender when they were “friends” of his. See also R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [38], where Simpson J observed that “the provisions of s 84 set out the circumstances in which the absence of true voluntariness in admissions will result in the exclusion of evidence of the admissions”. Factors leading her to conclude that there was oppressive conduct were an offer of witness protection in return for co-operation in the context of being confronted with two alternatives only (to co-operate with police or be charged with murder); being told that he could expect a reduced (or no) sentence in return for his co-operation; a threat of some kind of physical violence; and being told that he would have no further opportunity to co-operate with police (at [40]). 744. See, for example, R v Wu (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, Levine, Barr JJ, 12 November 1998). 745. See also R v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142; [2009] ACTSC 104, Refshauge J at [33]. 746. R v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 at [134]. Relevant matters included (at [135]) that “[t]he accused was unlawfully detained for a period of many hours”; “[a]spects of the questioning of the accused at the time of his arrest (‘I want to know why you did it’) and towards the end of the ERISP was unfair and improper in that it assumed his guilt and ridiculed and belittled his answers”; “[t]he implicit suggestion that his termination of the interview was capable of giving rise to an inference that he was guilty was never withdrawn”; “[h]e was denied access to a lawyer after asking for one”; he was sleep deprived; “[h]e was told that the offence with which he was charged ‘effectively carried life’, that his account didn’t add up and that the detectives were giving him an ‘opportunity’ to talk”; “[h]e was approached to provide further information after he had clearly, and repeatedly, indicated that he sought to exercise his right to silence after more than 2,000 question in the ERISP”; “[h]e was subject to psychological and emotional pressure to change his version of events”; “[h]e was subject to questioning in a small confined space in circumstances where the designated custody manager was not involved in any meaningful way before, during or after the interview”. 747. R v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 at 192; R v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142; [2009] ACTSC 104 at [32]. 748. Compare Jung v Son [1998] NSWSC 698.

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For the purposes of the provision, it is irrelevant who engaged in the conduct (thus, the provision is not limited to misconduct by an “investigating official”: compare s 85).749 Further, the term “influenced by” imposes a minimal level of causation.750 Thus, it will be necessary for the prosecution to demonstrate that the conduct referred to in s 84(1) did not have any causal effect on the making of the admission. It has been held that: … s 84 does not require the isolation of a single reason, or a single event or incident or instance of conduct provoking the confession; there may be a number of factors working together that, combined, cause the admission to be made. If oppressive conduct on the part of police is one of those factors (or, more accurately, if the Crown has failed to negative such conduct as one of those factors) then the evidence is inadmissible.751

This analysis was adopted in Higgins v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 56, Hoeben J at [26] (Sully and Bell JJ agreeing). It is clear that that conduct may have occurred prior to any relevant interview and need not have been the conduct of those interviewing the relevant party.752 If an admission is rendered not admissible by this provision, another admission made subsequently may also not be admissible because the prosecution is unable to negative a causal link.753

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The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) contains a provision (s 76(2)) which provides that an admission may be rendered inadmissible under s 76 “notwithstanding that it may be true”. Section 84 does not contain such a provision in express terms but it may be assumed that it is implied.754 In R v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142; [2009] ACTSC 104, Refshauge J concluded at [33] that the reliability of the admission is “not relevant” to the application of this provision. He observed: What is proscribed are unacceptable forms of conduct in the context of questioning and not questions of reliability or voluntariness, though these are likely to be put at risk by such conduct, which is part of the reason for rejecting such evidence.

[EA.84.90]

Procedure

The effect of s 84(2) is that the accused must “raise an issue” about whether the admission or its making were influenced in the prescribed way. As under the common law,755 this formulation does not clearly resolve whether the court must determine the question simply when the defence requests it (asserting inadmissibility) or, to prevent a “fishing expedition”, there must be some material to show that there is a “real question” of admissibility. The Federal Court has held that: 749. R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419; [2000] FCA 1618 at [40]. 750. In R v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142; [2009] ACTSC 104, Refshauge J observed at [32], citing R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [44], that “the test to determine the causal relationship between the conduct and the admission is not a stringent test”. 751. R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [44] per Simpson J. As Hamill J pointed out in R v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 at [138], “it may be more accurate to speak in terms of the oppressive conduct ‘influencing’ – rather than provoking or causing – the confession”. 752. Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 at [280]. 753. R v JF (2009) 237 FLR 142; [2009] ACTSC 104, Refshauge J at [46], [72]. 754. See ALRC 26, vol 1, para 965. 755. See MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 84

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[A]n accused person may rely on evidence in the prosecution case to raise the issue under s 84(1) without the need to give or call evidence on a voir dire. In some circumstances a voir dire may be convenient as a matter of procedure. In other cases, where there is nothing in the prosecution evidence in the trial to raise the issue, a voir dire hearing in which the accused gives or calls evidence would appear to be necessary if the issue is to be properly raised. There is no need in all cases for the accused to give or adduce evidence on a voir dire. If the evidence in the prosecution case is capable of leading to a finding that the making of an admission was influenced by the sort of conduct provided for by s 84(1), then the accused is entitled to raise the issue of non-admissibility of an admission under s 84(1). Once the issue is raised, the court is bound to give effect to the provisions of the section and not to admit the evidence of the admission unless the prosecution has discharged the onus.756

Caution should be taken with the second last sentence. It is not necessary that the evidence prove that an admission or its making were so influenced. After an extensive discussion of authority, the NSW Court of Appeal held in Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 at [234] that the applicable test was that “there must be some evidence that indicates through legitimate reasoning that there is a reasonable possibility an admission or its making were influenced by proscribed conduct”. In determining any “preliminary question” of fact regarding evidence of an admission, s 189(2) provides that, in a jury trial, the jury must not be present during the voir dire. The effect of s 189(3) is that, in a voir dire in relation to an admission in a criminal proceeding, the defendant may not be cross-examined as to the truth of the admission (unless the issue of its truth has been raised by the defendant). The effect of s 189(6) is that a defendant testifying in a voir dire proceeding relating to an admission may rely on the privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, the effect of s 189(8) is that, in a jury trial where the jury has not been present during a voir dire, evidence of the testimony of a defendant in the voir dire is not admissible in the trial proper unless the defendant gives inconsistent evidence in the trial. In trials without a jury, the voir dire testimony is generally admissible in the trial proper.

[EA.84.120]

Burden and standard of proof

In accordance with s 142(1), the evidence of an admission will not be admissible unless the court is satisfied that “it has been proved on the balance of probabilities” that “the admission, and the making of the admission, were not influenced by” the conduct of the type referred to in s 83(4)(a) and (b). Accordingly, the NSW Court of Appeal held in Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 at [273] that the trial judge “had to be satisfied that both the admission and its making were not influenced by the relevant conduct” and the trial judge erred when he “posed a test which placed the onus on the appellant to establish that there was s 84(1) conduct which did influence the making of the admissions relied upon”. However, the Court added: [Section] 84(1) placed the relevant onus squarely upon the respondent once the primary judge concluded, as in our view he did, that there was s 84(1) conduct in relation to the appellant’s situation.

This, it is suggested, also misstates the onus. Once the party seeking exclusion of the evidence satisfies s 84(2) by pointing to some evidence that indicates that 756. R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419 at [59] per Miles J.

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there is a reasonable possibility an admission or its making were influenced by proscribed conduct, the onus is on the party adducing the evidence to establish either that the alleged conduct did not occur or that, if it did, it did not influence the admission or the making of the admission. There is no obligation on the party seeking exclusion of the evidence to satisfy the court that “there was s 84(1) conduct”. The observation by the Court of Appeal was not a necessary part of the reasoning for determining the appeal since no party to the appeal had taken issue with the approach of the trial judge in this regard.

[EA.84.150]

Other provisions

Even if evidence of an admission is not rendered inadmissible by this provision, other provisions in this Act (for example, s 85, s 90, s 138) may result in exclusion of the evidence.757

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The effect of s 8 is that provisions in other legislation relating to evidence of an admission (see, for example, the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)) are preserved. Thus, Pt IC of the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 imposes requirements in relation to the period of detention (ss 23C–23E), treatment of arrested persons (s 23Q), cautioning (s 23F), communications with a “friend”, relative or legal practitioner (ss 23O and 23M), allowing a legal practitioner to be present during questioning (s 23G(3)), interpreters (s 23N), and special provisions for Aboriginal persons, Torres Strait Islanders and persons under 18 (ss 23H–23K). In addition, there are provisions relating to tape-recording of interviews (s 23V). Similar legislation operates in New South Wales. Part 9 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), imposes requirements in relation to the period of detention (ss 114–115), cautioning (s 122), communications with a “friend”, relative, guardian, independent person, legal practitioner and consular official (ss 123–124), interpreters (s 128), medical assistance (s 129), refreshments and facilities (s 130) and custody records (s 131). It should be noted that s 113(2) expressly provides that “nothing in this Part affects … the operation of” any provisions in the Evidence Act 1995. The Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2005 imposes additional obligations (for example, cl 33 in relation to obtaining legal representation for Aboriginal persons or Torres Strait Islanders). Also significant is s 281 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) which provides that evidence of an “admission” is not admissible unless tape-recorded, in the absence of a “reasonable excuse”.758 Section 13 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) continues to apply to admissions by children.759 There is also similar legislation in Victoria. Subdivision 30A of Div 1 of Pt 1 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) regulates “Custody and Investigation”. It imposes requirements in relation to the period of detention (s 464A), questioning of children (s 464E), communications with a “friend, relative and legal practitioner” (s 464C), consular assistance (s 464F) and interpreters (s 464D). 757. It should be noted that it has been held that evidence of illegality or impropriety can be taken into account when applying s 84 as well as s 138: R v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 at [105]–[119]. 758. But see, in respect of that provision, Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; 78 ALJR 538; [2004] HCA 12 discussed at [EA.85.150]. 759. R v H (1996) 85 A Crim R 481; R v Duncan [2004] NSWCCA 431 at [255]–[265]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Cth Act: 85 Criminal proceedings: reliability of admissions by defendants (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only to evidence of an admission made by a defendant: (a) to, or in the presence of, an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence; or (b) as a result of an act of another person who was, and who the defendant knew or reasonably believed to be, capable of influencing the decision whether a prosecution of the defendant should be brought or should be continued. Note: Subsection (1) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216. [Subs (1) subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 40]

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(2) Evidence of the admission is not admissible unless the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected. (3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the purposes of subsection (2), it is to take into account: (a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the person who made the admission, including age, personality and education and any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the person is or appears to be subject; and (b) if the admission was made in response to questioning: (i) the nature of the questions and the manner in which they were put; and (ii) the nature of any threat, promise or other inducement made to the person questioned. [S 85 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 85

Criminal proceedings: reliability of admissions by defendants

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only to evidence of an admission made by a defendant: (a) to, or in the presence of, an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence, or (b) as a result of an act of another person who was, and who the defendant knew or reasonably believed to be, capable of influencing the decision whether a prosecution of the defendant should be brought or should be continued. Note: Subsection (1) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216. [Subs (1) subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[36]]

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(2) Evidence of the admission is not admissible unless the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected. (3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the purposes of subsection (2), it is to take into account: (a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the person who made the admission, including age, personality and education and any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the person is or appears to be subject, and (b) if the admission was made in response to questioning: (i) the nature of the questions and the manner in which they were put, and (ii) the nature of any threat, promise or other inducement made to the person questioned. [S 85 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act:

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85

Criminal proceedings—reliability of admissions by accused

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only to evidence of an admission made by an accused— (a) to, or in the presence of, an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence; or (b) as a result of an act of another person who was, and who the accused knew or reasonably believed to be, capable of influencing the decision whether a prosecution of the accused should be brought or should be continued. Note: Subsection (1) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216. [Subs (1) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.18]

(2) Evidence of the admission is not admissible unless the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected. (3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the purposes of subsection (2), it is to take into account— (a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the person who made the admission, including age, personality and education and any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the person is or appears to be subject; and (b) if the admission was made in response to questioning— (i) the nature of the questions and the manner in which they were put; and (ii) the nature of any threat, promise or other inducement made to the person questioned. [S 85 am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.17] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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ACT Act: 85 Criminal proceedings—reliability of admissions by defendants (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only to evidence of an admission made by a defendant— (a) to, or in the presence of, an investigating official who at the time was exercising functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence; or (b) as a result of an act of someone else who was, and who the defendant knew or reasonably believed to be, capable of influencing the decision whether a prosecution of the defendant should be brought or should be continued. Note: Subsection (1) was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216.

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(2) Evidence of the admission is not admissible unless the circumstances in which the admission was made make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected. (3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for subsection (2), it must take into account— (a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the person who made the admission, including age, personality and education and any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the person is or appears to be subject; and (b) if the admission was made in response to questioning— (i) the nature of the questions and the way in which they were put; and (ii) the nature of any threat, promise or other inducement made to the person questioned. [Editor’s Note: There appears to be a drafting error in the Note of subs (1). The reference to “the High Court of” should probably read “the High Court”.]

NT Act: 85 Criminal proceedings — reliability of admissions by defendants (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only to evidence of an admission made by a defendant: (a) to, or in the presence of, an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence; or (b) as a result of an act of another person who was, and who the defendant knew or reasonably believed to be, capable of influencing the decision whether a prosecution of the defendant should be brought or should be continued. Note for subsection (1): Subsection (1) is inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216.

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[EA.85.90]

(2) Evidence of the admission is not admissible unless the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected. (3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the purposes of subsection (2), it is to take into account: (a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the person who made the admission, including age, personality and education and any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the person is or appears to be subject; and (b) if the admission was made in response to questioning: (i) the nature of the questions and the manner in which they were put; and (ii) the nature of any threat, promise or other inducement made to the person questioned.

[EA.85.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 10.11–10.97; ALRC 38, s 73, paras 154(d), 158(c); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 765.

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[EA.85.60] General comments In criminal proceedings, evidence of an admission made by a defendant in certain circumstances (s 85(1)) “is not admissible unless the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected” (s 85(2)). Some matters to be taken into account in determining that issue are specified in s 85(3). It should be noted that the Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act states in respect of this provision: The requirements in clause 85 are designed to place minimal administrative or resource demands on the police (for instance there is no general duty to ensure that admissions are made in circumstances that are unlikely to adversely affect the truth of the admission). However, it is simultaneously intended to ensure that the prosecution can demonstrate reliability in cases where the truth of an admission may be in doubt due to the circumstances in which it was made.

Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Commonwealth amending Act. However, the point may be made that the intention behind the provision reflected in the second sentence of the passage may have the indirect effect of placing “administrative or resource demands on the police” in an attempt to ensure that evidentiary exclusion under this provision does not occur.

[EA.85.90] Definitions The meaning of the word “admission” is discussed in detail at [EA.81.60]. This provision is limited to “a criminal proceeding”. This term is defined in the Dictionary: see [EA.141.60] and [EA.Dict.Pt.1.60]. The term “investigating official” is defined as follows: (a) a police officer (other than a police officer who is engaged in covert investigations under the orders of a superior); or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) a person appointed by or under an Australian law (other than a person who is engaged in covert investigations under the orders of a superior) whose functions include functions in respect of the prevention or investigation of offences. The term “police officer” is also defined in the Dictionary.

[EA.85.120]

Limited application (s 85(1))

The provision is limited to evidence of an admission made in the particular circumstances referred to in s 85(1)(a) and (b). The ALRC did not limit the application of its proposal in ALRC 38 to admissions made in those circumstances. It may be that s 85(1)(a) and (b) were introduced to replicate the common law requirements relating to a “person in authority”.760 However, only limited assistance can be provided by those common law principles.

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[EA.85.150]

“to, or in the presence of, an investigating official …” (s 85(1)(a))

Prior to amendments following on ALRC 102, s 85(1)(a) referred to admissions made “in the course of official questioning”. In Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; 78 ALJR 538; [2004] HCA 12 the High Court gave a narrow scope to the identical term in s 8 of the Tasmanian Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995.Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ held that the use of the word “questioning” means that “an event cannot be said to have taken place ‘in the course of official questioning’ if the official nominates a future time when that course of questioning will commence, and the event happens before that time” (at [49]) or, if an official says after some questioning “no further questions will be asked”, the event happens after that time in circumstances where “no further question was asked which triggered the impugned statement” (at [49], [53]).761 In ALRC 102 it was observed at para 10.28 that such an “approach arguably grants a wide discretion to police to nominate when ‘official questioning’ begins and ends” and it was concluded at para 10.58 that this provision should be amended “so as to overcome the majority interpretation of ‘in the course of official questioning’ in Kelly”. ALRC 102 acknowledged that a test expressed in terms of “made … to, or in the presence of, an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence” is a broad test (para 10.65). It added: For instance, it does not provide that an investigating official to whom an admission is made must be performing functions in connection with the offence for which the defendant is subsequently charged; rather, he or she could be investigating any offence.

Further: 760. See R v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215 at 229. In Deokinanan v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 20 at 33 it was stated that this concept included police officers and probably extended to “anyone who has authority or control over the accused or over the proceedings or the prosecution against him”. 761. Applying these propositions, Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ held that “the course of official questioning” ended when a police officer ceased to ask questions of the appellant in a formal police interview and said “[W]e’ll conclude the interview”, so that an alleged admission made some time later when the appellant was getting into a police car to be taken to a hospital for the purpose of obtaining samples of blood and hair was not made during “official questioning”.

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• There is no limitation turning on whether the maker of the admission is in custody or under arrest, or was or ought reasonably to have been suspected of having committed an offence. • The admission may have been made anywhere. • There is no requirement of any causal connection between the conduct of the investigating official and the making of the admission.

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However, there must be a linkage to the “investigation” of an offence. If the “investigating official”, as defined, is only performing a function that is unrelated to, and unconnected with, an investigation, this provision will not apply. In R v Naa (2009) 76 NSWLR 271; [2009] NSWSC 851, Howie J considered similar words in s 281 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (“questioning by an investigating official in connection with the investigation of the commission or possible commission of an offence”) and held (at [76]–[80]) that an admission made to two police officers by a man armed with a knife who was subsequently charged with murder, where the police “had no intention or purpose other than to try to get the accused to disarm and in the meantime to protect themselves and others from him”, was not made “in connection with the investigation ... of the commission of an offence”. While the statutory context is different, a similar approach may be taken in respect of this provision. Further, the definition of “investigating official” in the Dictionary should be noted. It does not include “a police officer who is engaged in covert investigations under the orders of a superior”, so that this provision will not apply where an admission is made to, or in the presence of, such an undercover police officer. It may be noted that the Explanatory Memorandum to the Commonwealth amending Act in respect of this provision states: This amendment goes further than recommendation 10–1 in two respects. These departures were recommended by the working group, approved by the expert reference group and are part of the model evidence provisions endorsed by SCAG. First, in addition to inserting new subsection 85(1), item 40 also amends paragraph 85(1)(b) to add the words “as a result of an act of another person who was, and who the defendant knew or reasonably believed to be capable of influencing the decision to prosecute”. This is to remove covert operatives from the ambit of the provision, following Callaway JA’s suggestion in R v Tofilau [2006] VSCA 40 that covert operatives may be included in the scope of section 85.762

Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum to the NSW amending Act and the Victorian Act. Although it is not a matter of any practical importance, it is difficult to understand these observations. It is not s 85(1)(b) that produces the outcome that covert operatives are not within the ambit of the provision. Rather, it is the definition of “investigating official” in the Dictionary that produces this outcome. On the other hand, it was held in R v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 that there may be “official questioning” by a person who is an “agent” for an investigating official, although this would not extend to a person who is “acting in order to assist the police in their inquiries”. It has also been held that a relative of the 762. Explanatory Memorandum at 113–114. The second respect in which the amendment goes further than recommendation 10–1 is that the term “official questioning” has been removed from other parts of the Act so as to avoid any uncertainty. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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defendant who was a police officer, although not assigned to investigate the crime, was acting in an official capacity after administering a caution to the defendant.763 It is unclear how these authorities would be applied to the current formulation of this provision. It should be noted that legislation in other jurisdictions adopts a similar definition of “investigating official”.764

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[EA.85.180]

“person who was … capable of influencing the decision” to prosecute (s 85(1)(b))

In relation to this provision, it would appear that proof of a causal link between the admission and the “act”, and proof that the person who did the act was in fact capable of influencing the decision to prosecute (at the time of the “act”), are required. Further, by reason of an amendment following on ALRC 102 (although it should be noted that this amendment was not proposed in ALRC 102), it must be proved that “the defendant knew or reasonably believed” that the person was capable of influencing the decision to prosecute. It has been held765 that a person would not be capable of influencing the decision to prosecute merely because “it was his choice whether or not he co-operated with the police to the extent of conversing with the accused in the way proposed by the police and … the very conversation between himself and the accused was likely to be a factor in influencing the police as to whether or not to prosecute”. In contrast, in R v Lieske (2006) 166 A Crim R 213; [2006] ACTSC 97 Gray J held at [19] that a complainant was “capable of influencing the decision whether a prosecution of the defendant should be brought or should be continued” where, at the time of the conversation in question, no charges had been laid and “the matter of the decision to prosecute would be very much influenced by the complainant’s attitude to giving evidence”.

[EA.85.210]

“unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected” (s 85(2))

Once the requirements in s 85(1) are satisfied, the question under s 85(2) is whether “the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected”. The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, para 765, p 437) that it proposed to: … require the trial judge to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the admission was made in circumstances that were not likely to affect its truth adversely. The trial judge should determine, as a preliminary issue, whether the reliability of the admission may have been impaired by the way it was obtained. The judge should consider all the circumstances, including the characteristics of the person making the admission. In making this decision he should take into account a number of factors – whether there was misconduct by those interrogating, whether procedural safeguards were adopted, whether the ability of the person making the admission to make rational decisions was substantially impaired. It would also be relevant to this question whether other incriminating evidence was discovered or obtained as a consequence of the admission being made. 763. R v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432. 764. For example s 464 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). See R v Frugtniet (1999) 107 A Crim R 161; [1999] VSCA 58. 765. R v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188.

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This provision is not concerned with the question of whether the admission was in fact made (that is, the truth of the evidence as to the making of the admission, as distinct from the truth of the admission, if made). While, in accordance with s 81, the hearsay and opinion rules do not apply to an “admission”, and an “admission” is defined to mean a previous representation that is “made” by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding, the effect of s 88 is that, for the purpose of deciding whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the standard of proof for finding “that a particular person made the admission” is the prima-facie standard (that is, the court “is to find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that he or she made the admission”). Turning to the question of the truth of the admission, if made, the discussion by the ALRC might be seen to suggest that a subjective analysis is involved, requiring the court to focus on the actual reliability of the admission. It should be noted that the comparable provision in the English Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), s 76(2)(b), provides: (2) If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained: (a) …

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(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof, the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except insofar as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid.

Under this provision, a court is required to consider a hypothetical question – not whether the particular admission is reliable but whether any admission which the accused might make in consequence of what was said or done is likely to be rendered unreliable.766 It is immaterial whether the actual admission subsequently turns out to be true.767 The policy behind such an approach is a concern with the methods used to obtain the admission rather than whether it is in fact reliable. The latter question is essentially a matter of weight for the jury. The language of s 85(2) is different to that of s 76(2) of PACE, particularly in the use of the term “the truth of the admission”.768 Nevertheless, it is arguable that an objective test should still be applied. It may be that, expressed in different terms, s 85(2) provides that evidence of an admission is not admissible unless the circumstances in which the admission was made would not have been likely to adversely affect the reliability of the admission. Such an interpretation would focus on the objective likelihood that the interrogators’ conduct would affect reliability, not whether it did in fact. For example, where a “threat, promise or other inducement” was made to the defendant, the prosecution would have to demonstrate that that inducement would not have been likely to adversely affect 766. R v Crampton (1991) 92 Cr App R 372. 767. R v McGovern (1991) 92 Cr App R 228; R v Blackburn [2005] 2 Cr App R 30 at [62]. 768. In addition, the court is required to take into account “any relevant condition or characteristic of the person who made the admission”: s 85(3)(a). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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the truthfulness of any admission made by the defendant. In ALRC 102, support was expressed for this analysis at para 10.87. In the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal decision of R v Rooke (unreported, NSW CCA, Newman, Levine, Barr JJ, 2 September 1997), Barr J stated (pp 14–15):

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I think that the expression “the circumstances in which the admission was made” as used as in subs (2) is intended to mean the circumstances of and surrounding the making of the admissions, not the general circumstances of the events said to form part of the offence to which the admissions are relevant. That is because, first, it is the plain meaning of the words. Secondly, it follows because subs (1) intends the section to have effect only where there is official questioning (or an act of the kind relevant under para (1)(b)). So far as the present appeal is concerned, the section may be said to be intended to require courts to inquire, where appropriate, into the process by which official questioning produces evidence tendered at trial. If the circumstances of the official questioning are such as to produce untruthful or unreliable evidence of admissions – adversely to affect their truth – the evidence is inadmissible. But the section is only concerned with the truth or reliability of evidence of admissions in this limited way. It has generally no part to play in the admissibility of evidence of admissions which may be untrue or unreliable for other reasons. Untruthfulness or unreliability in those circumstances is not a question for the trial judge at all, but for the jury. The authors of ALRC 26 said, at para 765, speaking of the draft forerunner to s 85, “the trial judge should determine as a preliminary issue whether the reliability of the admission may have been impaired by the way it was obtained”. This construction is consistent with subs 189(3).

It was held that the circumstances contemplated by s 85(2) did not include the circumstance that the defendant had (allegedly) admitted doing two things (receiving a car from unidentified persons and changing the numbers on it) which it could be proved he did not do.769 On either a subjective or an objective test, this is a surprising holding. Just because the question under s 85(2) is whether the circumstances in which an admission was made produced a particular result, does not mean that other “circumstances” are not relevant to that inquiry (s 85(3) does not limit the matters that the court may take into account). On a subjective approach, evidence tending to show that an admission cannot be true would tend to support an argument that the circumstances of the making of that admission (and others made at the same time) were such as to render them unreliable. On an objective approach, such evidence would tend to support an argument that the circumstances of the making of the admissions were such that any admissions would be unlikely to be reliable. Care must be taken in referring to s 189(3). It provides: In the hearing of a preliminary question about whether a defendant’s admission should be admitted into evidence (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) in a criminal proceeding, the issue of the admission’s truth or untruth is to be disregarded unless the issue is introduced by the defendant.

If there is a voir dire in relation to an admission, one of the issues may be whether “the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to 769. On the other hand, it was accepted that it was relevant that a record of the alleged admissions was made by the use of a word processor instead of by video or audio tape (because this tended to support an argument that the police had acted improperly) and relevant that the defendant was detained unlawfully (because this also tended to support a conclusion of improper questioning).

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[EA.85.210]

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make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected”. The defendant may testify regarding those circumstances (even if he or she also denies actually making an admission).770 Can the defendant also deny the truth of the alleged admission (that is, deny his or her guilt) and adduce evidence tending to show that the admission is untrue? The truth of the admission, if made, would appear to be relevant to the issue under s 85(2). If the admission (or part of the alleged admission) is shown to be untrue, this would tend to support an argument that the admission was made in circumstances which were likely to adversely affect the truth of any admission made. If the defendant does not choose to raise the issue of the truth of the alleged admission, the effect of s 189(3) is that the issue is to be disregarded and no evidence adduced in respect of it. However, if the defence does raise the issue of the truth of the alleged admission, the prosecution would be entitled to adduce evidence on that question.771 This supports an argument that evidence relevant to the truth of the admission would be relevant to the application of s 85. This view appears to have been adopted in R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [52] per Simpson J: It seems to me that subs (3) is designed to obviate a “bootstraps” argument in the determination of the admission of the evidence. That is, evidence of an admission will not be admitted because the admission can be shown, by other evidence, to be truthful. The attention of the court is to be directed to the circumstances in which the admission was made, excluding evidence that would substantiate or contradict the admission. The legislation delineates the circumstances in which the admission was made from its independently verifiable (or otherwise) content. An exception to that position, provided in s 189(3), is made where the accused introduces the question of truth or falsity of the admission. Where the accused takes that course, neither the Crown or the court is precluded from embarking on an examination of the proof [sic: truth?] of the admission, although it may be that the extent to which that will be considered is limited …

This analysis does not resolve the question of whether the test under s 85(2) is subjective or objective. There is authority which supports an objective approach.772 However, the trend of authority involves a subjective analysis, in the sense of a focus on the impact of the circumstances in which the admission was made on the actual reliability of the admission.773 As a result, the actual contents of the particular admission have been used to support a conclusion that the admission is reliable.774 The Explanatory Memorandum to the 2008 Victorian Act 770. See R v Rooke (unreported, NSW CCA, Newman, Levine, Barr JJ, 2 September 1997); R v Salindera (unreported, NSW CCA, 25 October 1996). 771. See R v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432. 772. R v Nikau (unreported, NSW SC, 14 October 1997); R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 at 44 per Wood CJ at CL; Wade v Mid North Coast Area Health Service [2004] NSWIRComm 254 per Staff J at [100]. 773. See R v Helmhout [2000] NSWSC 185 at [38] per Bell J; R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [62]–[64] per Simpson J; R v Waters (2002) 129 A Crim R 115; [2002] ACTSC 13 at [38]–[44] per Gray J; R v McNiven [2011] VSC 397 at [70]; Soteriou v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] VSCA 328 at [29]–[30], [46]; Severino v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 80 at [76]. 774. In R v Helmhout [2000] NSWSC 185 at [38], Bell J emphasised the fact that the admissions in question contained “a good deal of volunteered detail” and included “a physical demonstration of the events”. In R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099, Simpson J regarded the video tape of a “walkaround” containing admissions as “a compelling piece of evidence” because the defendant identified where events occurred and demonstrated what had taken place, thereby pointing to © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(at [EA.85.60]), and similar observations made in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Commonwealth amending Act, also appear to support a subjective analysis. The observation that the provision is “intended to ensure that the prosecution can demonstrate reliability in cases where the truth of an admission may be in doubt due to the circumstances in which it was made” seems more consistent with a subjective than an objective analysis. Any police impropriety may be taken into account in applying s 85 but it seems clear that an admission may be inadmissible under this provision even without police impropriety.775 Equally, a suspect’s vulnerabilities should be taken into account under s 85.776 An important question is whether those vulnerabilities by themselves might result in exclusion under s 85 (for example, in a situation where the police were unaware of the vulnerabilities). As noted above there need not be a causal link between the conduct of the police conducting questioning and the making of the admission. It would tend to follow that the admission may be inadmissible by reason only of something attributable to the accused. Such a position would contrast with English law.777 It has been held that the limitation in s 85(1)(a), prior to the amendments following ALRC 102, to an admission made “in the course of official questioning”, meant that it must be the circumstances of official questioning which give rise to the possibility of untruthful or unreliable evidence.778 Similarly, McClellan J in the NSW Supreme Court focused on the “objective circumstances” in which an admission was made and put to one side the defendant’s “undoubted psychiatric problems”.779 However, the precise words of s 85(2) are “the circumstances in which the admission was made”, and it is not self-evident why those circumstances do not include vulnerabilities of the suspect of which the police were unaware.780 Higgins J in the ACT Supreme Court observed:781 [I]t is obvious from the terms of s 85(2) that the “circumstances” are not confined to those known to the interrogator. Nor are they confined to any objective tendency in the questions or the manner in which they had been put to produce an unreliable or untruthful answer. the reliability of the admissions. Even in a case where it was held that the focus should be “on the objective likelihood of whether [the investigating official’s] conduct would have affected the reliability of the admissions” (Wade v Mid North Coast Area Health Service [2004] NSWIRComm 254 per Staff J at [100]), close attention was paid by the court to the actual contents of the interview. 775. R v McNiven [2011] VSC 397 at [69], [74]. Compare R v Fulling [1987] QB 426; R v Goldenburg (1988) 88 Cr App R 285; R v Walker [1998] Crim LR 211. 776. See R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174; Doklu v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 333; [2010] NSWCCA 309 at [35]–[36]; R v BL [2015] NTSC 85 (aboriginal suspect). Compare R v Harvey [1988] Crim LR 241; R v Delaney (1989) 88 Cr App R 338; R v McGovern (1991) 92 Cr App R 228; R v Moss (1990) 91 Cr App R 371. 777. See R v Crampton (1991) 92 Cr App R 372; R v Goldenburg (1988) 88 Cr App R 285 (s 76 says “in consequence of anything said or done which was …”). 778. R v Nikau (unreported, NSW SC, 14 October 1997). See also R v Rooke (unreported, NSW CCA, Newman, Levine, Barr JJ, 2 September 1997). 779. R v Munce [2001] NSWSC 1072 at [28]. 780. Compare R v Braun (unreported, NSW SC, Hidden J, 24 October 1997); R v GA (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson CJ, James J, Sperling J, 17 July 1997). 781. R v Taylor [1999] ACTSC 47 at [29]. See also R v McNiven [2011] VSC 397 at [65].

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In addition, it should be noted that the requirement in s 85(3) that the court must take into account “any relevant condition or characteristic of the person” is not subject to any qualification that the condition or characteristic be one that was known to the official questioner or “objectively” apparent.782 In R v McLaughlan (2008) 185 A Crim R 97; 218 FLR 158; [2008] ACTSC 49, Refshauge J concluded at [67] that “[t]he weight of authority, accordingly, seems to be that the personal and psychological vulnerabilities of the accused”, even when not apparent, “are relevant to the issue of whether it is unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected”.783 The replacement of the words in s 85(1)(a) “the course of official questioning” with “to, or in the presence of, an investigating official …” should be regarded as providing further support for that conclusion. In R v Munday (No 1) [2016] VSC 26, it was held that admissions were inadmissible pursuant to this provision where the accused was “superficially intact” but “likely to be quite thought disordered and psychotic as a consequence of a likely diagnosis of schizophrenia” (T Forrest J at [22]). Of course, the fact that the suspect has a vulnerability to making false admissions does not mean that he or she did – evidence of the actual making of the admission may lead to a conclusion that it is unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected by the circumstances in which it was made.784 It is apparent that there are a number of issues about the application of this provision which have not been authoritatively settled by the courts. In earlier editions of this work, the view was expressed that the legislation is ambiguous “and may require clarificatory amendment”.785 However, in ALRC 102 it was concluded that the provision did not require amendment. It appears that most of the conclusions in the preceding analysis as to the preferable interpretation of the provision have been endorsed as correct, with the consequence that there is no need for amendment (see at paras 10.87–10.97). In particular, the following propositions were advanced: • As a general rule, the question is not whether the circumstances did in fact adversely affect the truth of the admission (resulting in an admission that is in fact untrue), but whether they were likely to do so. • The court should not consider evidence as to the actual truth of the admission when determining its admissibility under s 85(2), unless that issue is raised by the defendant pursuant to s 189(3) – if the actual admission is shown to be untrue, this would tend to support an argument 782. It is true that the provision refers to a condition or characteristic “to which the person is or appears to be subject”. However, the latter words should be understood to negate any burden of proof on the defendant to prove that he or she was in fact subject to the condition or characteristic. 783. See also R v McNiven [2011] VSC 397. 784. See Tasmania v Sudani [2011] TASSC 50 at [66]–[71]. 785. Part of the reason for the ambiguity is the legislative history – the ALRC Interim Report favoured a “truth” test, requiring the trial judge to consider the reliability of the actual admission: ALRC 26, vol 1, para 766. The Final Report accepted criticism of this approach and appeared to favour a more objective approach, but this change of policy was not clearly reflected in redrafting of the provision. See, generally, Dennis, “The Admissibility of Confessions under Sections 84 and 85 of the Evidence Act 1995: An English Perspective” (1996) 18 Syd LR 34. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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that the admission was made in circumstances which were likely to affect adversely the truth of any admission made. • Section 85(3) requires the court to consider the personal characteristics of the defendant in analysing the “circumstances” in which the admission is made. The “circumstances of the admission” include, among other things, the characteristics and conditions of the defendant independently of any actions taken by the police. In addition, s 85(3) does not confine those characteristics and conditions to those that are known to the investigating officials. An admission may be unreliable (or likely to be unreliable) even in the absence of police misconduct or irregularity.

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It will be interesting to see how the courts deal with such expressions of opinion. Separate issues arise where this provision applies by reason of the operation of s 85(1)(b). It was noted at [EA.85.180] that it would appear that proof of a causal link between the admission and the “act” is required. On the other hand, in deciding whether the test in s 85(2) is met, there is no requirement that the other person know of “any relevant condition or characteristic of the person who made the admission” that is operative. Equally, as where s 85(1)(a) applies, the list of matters to be taken into account in s 85(3) is not exclusive. For example, in R v Gazzignato (2004) 143 A Crim R 584; [2004] TASSC 6, Cox CJ referred to the fact that “false boasts of criminal behaviour are common and perhaps sometimes even necessary” within a criminal, and particularly a prison, culture, although he concluded that he did not find this “note of caution” compelling “where both men were well known to each other, involved in the same episode which had resulted in their being charged with murder and had no need to impress the other with boasts which the other, because of his presence at the scene, was likely to know were untrue”.786

[EA.85.240]

Alleged lies (and other implied admissions)

The meaning of the word “admission” is discussed in detail at [EA.81.60]. The weight of authority is that it extends to a lie by the defendant which is relied on by the prosecution as an implied admission. It has been held that this provision applies in respect of such evidence, so that it will not be admissible unless “the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected”.787 The availability of inferences consistent with innocence may make it difficult for the prosecution to satisfy the requirements of the provision.788

[EA.85.270]

Procedure

The defence must first satisfy the court that the admission was made by the defendant “to, or in the presence of, an investigating official …” etc under s 85(1)(a) or “as a result of an act of” the person referred to in s 85(1)(b). At that point, if “a question legitimately arises as to whether the circumstances were such that the truth (or untruth) of the admission might have been adversely 786. See also R v Walker [2000] NSWCCA 130 at [33]. 787. R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 at 43–44 per Wood CJ at CL. 788. Compare R v Lieske (2006) 166 A Crim R 213; [2006] ACTSC 97 per Gray J at [24]–[25].

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789

affected”, the prosecution will bear the burden of proof under s 85(2). As regards when such a question has legitimately arisen, see [EA.84.90]. In determining any “preliminary question” of fact regarding evidence of an admission, s 189(2) provides that, in a jury trial, the jury must not be present during the voir dire. The effect of s 189(3) is that, in a voir dire in relation to an admission in a criminal proceeding, the defendant may not be cross-examined as to the truth of the admission (unless the issue of its truth has been raised by the defendant). The effect of s 189(6) is that a defendant testifying in a voir dire proceeding relating to an admission may rely on the privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, the effect of s 189(8) is that, in a jury trial where the jury has not been present during a voir dire, evidence of the testimony of a defendant in the voir dire is not admissible in the trial proper unless the defendant gives inconsistent evidence in the trial. In trials without a jury, the voir dire testimony is generally admissible in the trial proper.

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[EA.85.300]

Burden and standard of proof

In accordance with s 142(1), the defence will have to satisfy the court that “it has been proved on the balance of probabilities” that the admission was made by the defendant “to, or in the presence of, an investigating official …” etc under s 85(1)(a) or “as a result of an act of” the person referred to in s 85(1)(b).790 Once that burden of proof has been met, and “a question legitimately arises as to whether the circumstances were such that the truth (or untruth) of the admission might have been adversely affected”791, the prosecution will bear the burden of proof under s 85(2). In accordance with s 142(1), the evidence of an admission will not be admissible unless the court is satisfied that “it has been proved on the balance of probabilities” that “the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected”.792 Sometimes the allocation of the burden of proof on the prosecution will be decisive, particularly in cases where there is uncertainty regarding the precise circumstances in which the admission was made.793 Thus, failure to electronically record an interview will be relevant, indirectly, to the operation of this provision.

[EA.85.330]

Other provisions

The effect of s 8 is that provisions in other legislation relating to evidence of an admission are preserved (see [EA.84.150]).

789. R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 at 44. 790. Compare Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234; [2006] TASSC 75 per Crawford J at [40], Blow J at [73] and Tennent J at [133]. 791. R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 at 44; FMJ v The Queen [2011] VSCA 308 at [48]–[50]; see also [EA.85.270] and [EA.84.90]. 792. See Soteriou v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] VSCA 328 at [22]. 793. R v Waters (2002) 129 A Crim R 115; [2002] ACTSC 13. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 86

Cth Act: 86 Exclusion of records of oral questioning (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only if an oral admission was made by a defendant to an investigating official in response to a question put or a representation made by the official. (2) A document prepared by or on behalf of the official is not admissible to prove the contents of the question, representation or response unless the defendant has acknowledged that the document is a true record of the question, representation or response. (3) The acknowledgment must be made by signing, initialling or otherwise marking the document. (4) In this section: document does not include: (a) a sound recording, or a transcript of a sound recording; or (b) a recording of visual images and sounds, or a transcript of the sounds so recorded. NSW Act:

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86

Exclusion of records of oral questioning

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only if an oral admission was made by a defendant to an investigating official in response to a question put or a representation made by the official. (2) A document prepared by or on behalf of the official is not admissible to prove the contents of the question, representation or response unless the defendant has acknowledged that the document is a true record of the question, representation or response. (3) The acknowledgement must be made by signing, initialling or otherwise marking the document. (4) In this section: document does not include: (a) a sound recording, or a transcript of a sound recording, or (b) a recording of visual images and sounds, or a transcript of the sounds so recorded. Vic Act: 86

Exclusion of records of oral questioning

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only if an oral admission was made by an accused to an investigating official in response to a question put or a representation made by the official. [Subs (1) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.19]

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(2) A document prepared by or on behalf of the official is not admissible to prove the contents of the question, representation or response unless the accused has acknowledged that the document is a true record of the question, representation or response. [Subs (2) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.19]

(3) The acknowledgement must be made by signing, initialling or otherwise marking the document. (4) In this section, document does not include— (a) a sound recording, or a transcript of a sound recording; or (b) a recording of visual images and sounds, or a transcript of the sounds so recorded. Note: See also sections 83 and 84 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 which relate to the admissibility of evidence in the absence of an accused in a summary hearing. [S 86 am Act 68 of 2009]

ACT Act: 86

Exclusion of records of oral questioning

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(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only if an oral admission was made by a defendant to an investigating official in response to a question put or representation made by the official. (2) A document prepared by or on behalf of the official is not admissible to prove the contents of the question, representation or response unless the defendant has acknowledged that the document is a true record of the question, representation or response. (3) The acknowledgment must be made by signing, initialling or otherwise marking the document. (4) In this section: document does not include the following: (a) a sound recording, or a transcript of a sound recording; (b) a recording of visual images and sounds, or a transcript of the recorded sounds. NT Act: 86

Exclusion of records of oral questioning

(1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only if an oral admission was made by a defendant to an investigating official in response to a question put or a representation made by the official. (2) A document prepared by or on behalf of the official is not admissible to prove the contents of the question, representation or response unless the defendant has acknowledged that the document is a true record of the question, representation or response. (3) The acknowledgement must be made by signing, initialling or otherwise marking the document. (4) In this section: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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document does not include: (a) a sound recording, or a transcript of a sound recording; or (b) a recording of visual images and sounds, or a transcript of the sounds so recorded.

[EA.86.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 75, para 154(e); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 769.

[EA.86.60] General comments The effect of this provision is that an alleged documentary record of official questioning of a defendant (when a suspect) will not be admissible in criminal proceedings unless the defendant had acknowledged the record as a true record by signing, initialling, or otherwise marking it. “Document” is broadly defined in the Dictionary, although s 86(4) excludes tape or video recordings from the definition of “document” in this context. The acknowledgment must be by signing, initialling, or otherwise marking the document so as to indicate that it is a true record of the question, representation or response. Evidence from an official of oral acknowledgment will be insufficient. In that latter situation (or where there is no acknowledgment) an official will only be permitted to testify as to the admission(s), using the documentary record for the purposes of refreshing memory.

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The Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act explains the purpose of this provision: The purpose of this clause is to limit the circumstances in which documentary evidence, such as a statement of evidence containing an admission, is used to prove the contents of the statement.

However, as the Explanatory Memorandum proceeds to state, this provision does not limit the admissibility of oral evidence regarding any such admission, where this evidence comes within an exception to the hearsay rule. Equally, it does not affect requirements in relation to the electronic recording of “records of interview” (see [EA.86.120]). Further, where such documentary evidence is made admissible pursuant to other legislation, the effect of s 8 is that this provision will not apply. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act gives an example: For example, in relation to summary offences, documentary evidence containing admissions, without a defendant’s acknowledgement, may form part of the brief of evidence against a defendant. Clause 5 of Schedule 2 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 provides that in certain circumstances such evidence is to be treated as if its contents are a record of evidence given orally. This clause is not intended to affect the operation of that provision.

[EA.86.90] Definitions This provision is limited to “a criminal proceeding”. This term is defined in the Dictionary. The term “investigating official” is also defined in the Dictionary as is the term “police officer”. Section 25 of the Australian Federal Police Legislation Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) ensures that this provision applies as if a reference to a police officer includes a reference to “a person who was a member or special member of the Australian Federal Police at any time”. 640

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[EA.86.120]

[EA.86.120]

Other provisions

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The effect of s 8 is that provisions in other legislation designed to ensure the reliability of evidence of an admission are preserved. These other provisions have much more practical importance than s 86. For example, s 23V of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides that evidence of an admission made to an investigating official is generally inadmissible unless tape-recorded (although a court may admit the evidence “if, having regard to the nature of and the reasons for the non-compliance or insufficiency of evidence [of compliance] and any other relevant matters, the court is satisfied that, in the special circumstances of the case, admission of the evidence would not be contrary to the interests of justice”: s 23V(5). Similarly, s 281 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) provides that evidence of an “admission” is not admissible unless tape-recorded, in the absence of a “reasonable excuse”. It is clear that these provisions impose requirements for admissibility which are additional to those contained in s 86.794 In Victoria, s 464H(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 provides that “evidence of a confession or admission made to an investigating official by a person who” was suspected “or ought reasonably to have been suspected”, of having committed an offence “is inadmissible as evidence against the person in proceedings for an indictable offence” unless “recorded by audio recording or audiovisual recording” or subsequently confirmed (which confirmation was recorded by audio recording or audiovisual recording). However, s 464H(2) provides that a court “may admit evidence of a confession or admission otherwise inadmissible by reason of subsection (1) if the person seeking to adduce the evidence satisfies the court on the balance of probabilities that the circumstances – (a) are exceptional; and (b) justify the reception of the evidence”.

Cth Act: 87

Admissions made with authority

(1) For the purpose of determining whether a previous representation made by a person is also taken to be an admission by a party, the court is to admit the representation if it is reasonably open to find that: (a) when the representation was made, the person had authority to make statements on behalf of the party in relation to the matter with respect to which the representation was made; or (b) when the representation was made, the person was an employee of the party, or had authority otherwise to act for the party, and the representation related to a matter within the scope of the person’s employment or authority; or (c) the representation was made by the person in furtherance of a common purpose (whether lawful or not) that the person had with the party or one or more persons including the party. (2) For the purposes of this section, the hearsay rule does not apply to a previous representation made by a person that tends to prove:

794. R v Schiavini (1999) 108 A Crim R 161; [1999] NSWCCA 165 at [16] per Studdert J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a)

that the person had authority to make statements on behalf of another person in relation to a matter; or (b) that the person was an employee of another person or had authority otherwise to act for another person; or (c) the scope of the person’s employment or authority. NSW Act: 87

Admissions made with authority

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(1) For the purpose of determining whether a previous representation made by a person is also taken to be an admission by a party, the court is to admit the representation if it is reasonably open to find that: (a) when the representation was made, the person had authority to make statements on behalf of the party in relation to the matter with respect to which the representation was made, or (b) when the representation was made, the person was an employee of the party, or had authority otherwise to act for the party, and the representation related to a matter within the scope of the person’s employment or authority, or (c) the representation was made by the person in furtherance of a common purpose (whether lawful or not) that the person had with the party or one or more persons including the party. (2) For the purposes of this section, the hearsay rule does not apply to a previous representation made by a person that tends to prove: (a) that the person had authority to make statements on behalf of another person in relation to a matter, or (b) that the person was an employee of another person or had authority otherwise to act for another person, or (c) the scope of the person’s employment or authority. Vic Act: 87

Admissions made with authority

(1) For the purpose of determining whether a previous representation made by a person is also taken to be an admission by a party, the court is to admit the representation if it is reasonably open to find that— (a) when the representation was made, the person had authority to make statements on behalf of the party in relation to the matter with respect to which the representation was made; or (b) when the representation was made, the person was an employee of the party, or had authority otherwise to act for the party, and the representation related to a matter within the scope of the person’s employment or authority; or (c) the representation was made by the person in furtherance of a common purpose (whether lawful or not) that the person had with the party or one or more persons including the party. (2) For the purposes of this section, the hearsay rule does not apply to a previous representation made by a person that tends to prove— 642

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(a)

that the person had authority to make statements on behalf of another person in relation to a matter; or (b) that the person was an employee of another person or had authority otherwise to act for another person; or (c) the scope of the person’s employment or authority. ACT Act: 87

Admissions made with authority

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(1) For the purpose of deciding whether a previous representation made by a person is also taken to be an admission by a party, the court must admit the representation if it is reasonably open to find that— (a) when the representation was made, the person had authority to make statements on behalf of the party in relation to the matter in relation to which the representation was made; or (b) when the representation was made, the person was an employee of the party, or had authority otherwise to act for the party, and the representation related to a matter within the scope of the person’s employment or authority; or (c) the representation was made by the person in furtherance of a common purpose (whether lawful or not) that the person had with the party or 1 or more people including the party. (2) For this section, the hearsay rule does not apply to a previous representation made by a person that tends to prove— (a) that the person had authority to make statements on behalf of someone else in relation to a matter; or (b) that the person was an employee of someone else or had authority otherwise to act for someone else; or (c) the scope of the person’s employment or authority. NT Act: 87

Admissions made with authority

(1) For the purpose of determining whether a previous representation made by a person is also taken to be an admission by a party, the court is to admit the representation if it is reasonably open to find that: (a) when the representation was made, the person had authority to make statements on behalf of the party in relation to the matter with respect to which the representation was made; or (b) when the representation was made, the person was an employee of the party, or had authority otherwise to act for the party, and the representation related to a matter within the scope of the person’s employment or authority; or (c) the representation was made by the person in furtherance of a common purpose (whether lawful or not) that the person had with the party or one or more persons including the party. (2) For the purposes of this section, the hearsay rule does not apply to a previous representation made by a person that tends to prove: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a)

that the person had authority to make statements on behalf of another person in relation to a matter; or (b) that the person was an employee of another person or had authority otherwise to act for another person; or (c) the scope of the person’s employment or authority.

[EA.87.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 76, para 152(c); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755.

[EA.87.60] “the court is to admit the representation if …”

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On a literal reading, a court must admit evidence rendered admissible under this provision and the discretions to exclude evidence in Pt 3.11 would not be available. There is no policy justification for such an approach and nothing in the ALRC Reports supports it. The opening words of the provision refer to “the purpose of determining whether a previous representation made by a person is also taken to be an admission by a party” and it would be preferable to interpret the provision as if it said that “the representation is to be taken to be an admission by a party if …”. Consistently with this approach, it was held by McDougall J in Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [No 4] [2006] NSWSC 90 at [28] that “[a]lthough s 87 says that the court ‘is to admit the representation’ if it makes the necessary finding, I do not see that as overriding, or excluding the application of, s 135”.

[EA.87.90] “authority to make statements” or “within the scope of the person’s employment or authority” (s 87(1)(a), (b)) The ALRC explained the proposal which is the basis of the provision enacted in s 87(1)(a) and (b) (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755, pp 422–423): The primary argument for permitting an “admission” by a third party to be proved against a party is based on the adversary nature of the trial system. It is fair to allow a party to be held responsible for an assertion made by a third party if that third party is an agent of the party acting under his authority. Thus, an admission made by a managing director should be admissible against the company, even if arguably unreliable, because he either had actual authority to make the admission or was put in a position where a reasonable observer would assume he had such authority … [I]t would seem that the best approach is to impose a requirement of authority to speak or a requirement that the statement relate to an area of personal responsibility.

It is important to note that s 87(1)(a) refers to an authority to make “statements”, not “admissions”. Authority to make the latter is not necessary – if there is authority to make statements, any such statement may be treated as an admission made by the party giving authority795. Such authority may be express or implied 795. See The Age Co Ltd v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; 272 FLR 426; [2013] NSWCA 26 at [11]–[14], [19].

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796

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from the circumstances. An example of a finding of authority to make statements is Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314; [2008] FCA 369, where it was noted that “a solicitor has implied authority to make admissions receivable by the Court against his or her client during the actual progress of litigation” (Rares J at [18]). In contrast, it was held in Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 657 that the mere fact that a person was the secretary of a company supported only an inference that he had the authority to be inferred from the statutory functions of a company secretary and did not permit an inference that he had authority within the terms of (1)(a) or that he was an “employee” under (1)(b). Membership of a particular group will not normally permit the inference of authority to make statements on behalf of the group.797 On the other hand, statements made by a solicitor within the ordinary course of the solicitor’s business acting for a client would be made with implied authority from the client to make the statements.798 The significance of para (b) is that it is not necessary for the court to be satisfied that it is reasonably open to find that the person who made the previous representation had actual or ostensible authority to make the representation.799 This is an alternative pathway to admissibility.800 All that is required is that it is reasonably open to find that, when the representation was made,801 it related to a matter within the scope of the person’s employment or authority.802 A flexible approach has been taken to “the scope of the person’s employment”, rejecting the application of authority regarding the alleged negligence of employees.803 In addition, s 87(2) permits use of the representation to assist in this task although, on its own, it may not be sufficient.804 Nevertheless, care must be taken in determining the limits of a person’s scope of employment. It may be within the scope of a solicitor’s employment to swear an affidavit attesting to the fact that a 796. See The Age Co Ltd v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; 272 FLR 426; [2013] NSWCA 26 at [15]–[16]. 797. Daniel v Western Australia (2001) 186 ALR 369; [2001] FCA 223 at [9] per Nicholson J. 798. See The Age Co Ltd v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; 272 FLR 426; [2013] NSWCA 26 at [19]. 799. Unlike the common law position: Burr v Ware Rural District Council [1939] 2 All ER 688; Executor Trustee & Agency Co of SA v Insurance Offıce of Australia [1949] SASR 337 at 340; Pomeroy v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd (1973) 5 SASR 191. However, it should be noted that in ACCC v Mayo International Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 327, Kiefel J appears to have applied the common law authorities. A similar conclusion may be drawn in respect of BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2000] FCA 1613 and Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard [2009] ATPR 82-020; [2009] NSWCA 167, Beazley JA at [63]–[65]. In Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [No 4] [2006] NSWSC 90 McDougall J emphasised that the Act “sought in many cases to amend those [common law] principles”. He rejected an argument that the provision should be read narrowly. 800. Wright v Optus Administration Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] NSWSC 1717 at [13]–[14]. 801. See Kirk Pty Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1998] NSWSC 1; Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [No 4] [2006] NSWSC 90. 802. Presumably, in this context, the word “authority” means “actual authority”. Of course, if it would reasonably appear to a third party that authority existed (and thus ostensible authority existed) it may also be “reasonably open to find” that actual (implied) authority existed. 803. Wade v Mid North Coast Area Health Service [2004] NSWIRComm 254 per Staff J at [77]–[82]; Wright v Optus Administration Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] NSWSC 1717 at [18]. 804. ACCC v World Netsafe Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 119 FCR 307; [2002] FCA 517 at [15] per Spender J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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valuation of property had been obtained, which valued the property at a particular price, but not within the scope of his or her employment to make a representation as to what the value of the property was.805

[EA.87.120]

“in furtherance of a common purpose” (s 87(1)(c))

The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755, pp 423–424) that a previous representation by A, allegedly acting in furtherance of a common purpose with B, will not be hearsay where it is relevant as a verbal act to establish the existence of the common purpose:

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Evidence of statements made by an alleged conspirator A and tendered as evidence of acts done pursuant to the alleged conspiracy will continue to be admissible against alleged conspirator B. The evidence is not tendered for a hearsay purpose and is not caught by the hearsay proposal. Such evidence raises a problem of conditional or provisional relevance – the relevance of the act of A to the case against B will depend upon a prima facie finding that there was a common purpose between A and B. This issue is covered by the proposal on provisional relevance and can be handled in practice as at present.

This issue is dealt with in s 57(2). If the previous representation by A is not caught by the hearsay rule (because it is not relied upon for the purpose of proving the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that A intended to assert by the representation), there is no need to rely upon this provision to characterise the representation as an admission by B in order to prevent the application of the hearsay rule to the evidence of the representation by A.806 However, where evidence of a previous representation by A is adduced against B for a hearsay purpose, s 87(1)(c) will allow it to be admitted if it is reasonably open to find that the representation was made by A in furtherance of a807 common purpose with B. This reflects the existing common law.808 In Landini v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 259, Hall J observed at [19](c): 805. DJZ Constructions Pty Ltd v Paul Pritchard t/as Pritchard Law Group [2010] NSWSC 1024 at [24]. 806. See Tsang v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2011) 219 A Crim R 304; [2011] VSCA 336 at [35]–[37]; Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [256]. 807. This word was emphasised by Greg James J in R v Watt [2000] NSWCCA 37 at [32], when he held that a previous representation made at a time outside specified dates for an alleged common purpose of drug supply was nevertheless admissible under this provision (Grove J agreeing, Hidden J dissenting). In R v May (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 595, Rothman J accepted that this provision does not require that the representation be made in furtherance of a common purpose that is the subject of charges before the court. However, he pointed out that, “in most cases … the existence of another uncharged common purpose (and representations made in furtherance thereof)” are “not relevant to, and would be excluded from, proceedings in relation to the charge before the Court” (at [26]). Rothman J referred at [28] to R v Watt [2000] NSWCCA 37 as “authority for the principle that the common purpose and representation must be relevant to the charges before the Court”. However, strictly speaking, it is only the representation that must be relevant to a fact in issue and it is theoretically possible that a representation in furtherance of a common purpose that is not relevant to a fact in issue will itself be relevant to a fact in issue. 808. R v Macraild (unreported, NSW CCA, Sully, Dunford, Simpson JJ, 18 December 1997); Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [268]. Under the common law, an admission by A (that, eg, B was involved in a criminal enterprise) is admissible against B if the court decides that there is “reasonable evidence” of common purpose and that the admission was made in furtherance of that common purpose: see Ahern v The Queen (1988)

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The expression “common purpose” is a familiar one particularly in the field of criminal conspiracy. … It, generally speaking, involves the concept of a combination or some form of preconcert formed between two or more persons to do an act or acts of a particular kind. When used in s 87(1)(c), it applies to a common purpose whether that common purpose be a lawful one or not.

As regards the concept “in furtherance of”, Hall J stated at [19](d): The phrase “in furtherance of” carries with it the ordinary English dictionary meaning encapsulated in the word “furtherance”, namely, the fact of being helped forward; the action of helping forward; advancement, aid, assistance: Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed, Vol 1, p 1053). In the context of s 87(1)(c), it denotes an act done to advance, aid or help a common purpose whether that purpose is a lawful one or not.

He added at [25]: A representation will usually need to be more than a narrative statement of account of some past event in order for it to be a representation described in s 87(1)(c). … Representations within that provision will often be in the nature of directions, instructions, arrangements or statements accompanying acts, as has been observed, is usually the position concerning the admissibility at common law of statements against parties to an unlawful conspiracy or combination. … It is, of course, possible to envisage a statement concerning a past activity that may carry with it an implication that the activity is to form the basis for a future arrangement and thereby relate to a combination or common purpose that existed at the time the statement was made.

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It has been argued that: [T]he question posed by s 87 of the Act should be determined on two levels: whether or not there was a common purpose for the purpose of admissibility should be determined from the judge’s point of view in favour of admission if it were reasonably open so to find; on the other hand, whether the representation was made in furtherance of that common purpose was a matter to be determined to his satisfaction, presumably on the balance of probabilities.809

However, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that the provisions of s 87 do not justify such a distinction.810 While this provision is likely to be utilised most commonly in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt that it applies equally in civil proceedings.811

[EA.87.150]

Standard of proof

For purposes of admissibility, a previous representation made by A must be treated as an admission by B “if it is reasonably open to find” one of the 165 CLR 87; Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236. Some courts continued to apply the common law (eg ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Ltd (2004) 141 FCR 183; [2004] FCA 1678) on the doubtful assumption that the rules of admissibility in the Act do not “cover the field” (see [EA.Intro.120]). Some courts simply applied the common law without any reference at all to this provision (eg Tsang v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2011) 219 A Crim R 304; [2011] VSCA 336 at [34]–[95]). 809. R v Brownlee (1999) 105 A Crim R 214 at [20]. Such an approach would appear to reflect the common law position (see, for example, R v Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54 at [39], where Wood CJ at CL applied common law authorities notwithstanding the apparent applicability of this provision). 810. In Landini v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 259, Hall J at [23] appears to have failed to appreciate that this contended distinction was rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeal. 811. Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser (2007) 243 ALR 356; [2007] FCA 1535, Gray ACJ at [35]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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preconditions in s 87(1). Thus the civil standard of proof is excluded: see s 142. In Jackson v TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1229 at [40] Adams J observed: It seems to me that the phrase “reasonably open” has been deliberately chosen to distinguish the standard of proof from that which applies to the ultimate issue and it is an adaptation of the phrase “reasonable evidence” adopted in Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 as required where it is sought to tender evidence of prior representations made by an alleged co-conspirator against an accused charged with conspiracy and is virtually equivalent to “a prima facie case”. The tribunal of fact would be entitled to consider these factual matters for itself in determining what weight to give to the representation and may well not place any weight on it if it is not satisfied that any of these factual preconditions exist. In that regard it would, of course, be quite wrong to inform a jury that the trial judge had determined that it was “reasonably open to find” that the factual preconditions existed.

[EA.87.180]

Use of a previous representation under s 87(2)

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Section 87(2) permits use of any previous representation by the person (who made the representation sought to be relied on as an admission by a party) to meet the standard of proof (except in relation to establishing s 87(1)(c)). The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 755, p 423) the proposal on which this provision is based: There remains, as under present law, the problem of establishing the conditions of admissibility – the admission in question cannot be used and the relevant information is in the possession of the party against whom it is sought to lead the admission. It is proposed that it will be sufficient for admissibility if the person who made the statement purported or appeared to be an agent or employee of the party and purported or appeared to have authority within the area to which the statement related.

This provision permits evidence of a representation made by the alleged agent to be admitted in order to prove the agency (actual or ostensible) to the requisite standard.812 As under the common law,813 such a representation cannot be used to prove any of the elements of s 87(1)(c).814 However, the representation may be used to prove the existence of some relevant common purpose pursuant to s 57(2), where the representation is not being used for a hearsay purpose.815

[EA.87.210]

Jury directions

While admissibility turns on the question of whether “it is reasonably open to find” one of the preconditions in s 87(1) (see [EA.87.150]), the tribunal of fact would be entitled to consider these factual matters for itself in determining what weight to give to the representation and may well not place any weight on it if not satisfied that any of these factual preconditions exist. In that regard it would, 812. In contrast with the common law: see MacLennan v Hastings Transport Pty Ltd [1969] VR 376; Pomeroy v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd (1973) 5 SASR 191. 813. See Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 814. ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2007) 160 FCR 321; [2007] ATPR 42-162; [2007] FCA 794 per Gray J at [53]–[54]. 815. See [EA.57.210]; [EA.87.120]; see also R v Baladjam (No 19) [2008] NSWSC 1441 at [71]–[91]; Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (2012) 264 FLR 1; [2012] VSC 94 at [770]–[771].

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of course, be quite wrong to inform a jury that the trial judge had concluded that it was reasonably open to find that one of the necessary factual preconditions did exist.816

Cth Act: 88

Proof of admissions For the purpose of determining whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the court is to find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that he or she made the admission. NSW Act: 88

Proof of admissions For the purpose of determining whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the court is to find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that he or she made the admission. Vic Act: 88

Proof of admissions

For the purpose of determining whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the court is to find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that he or she made the admission.

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ACT Act: 88

Proof of admissions

For the purpose of deciding whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the court must find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that the person made the admission. NT Act: 88

Proof of admissions For the purpose of determining whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the court is to find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that he or she made the admission.

[EA.88.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 77.

[EA.88.60]

General comments

This provision permits a court to admit evidence of an alleged admission if it is reasonably open to find that the admission was made.817 It has been said that the provision “deals both with the identity of the person said to be making the 816. Compare R v Bacash [2001] 3 VR 428; (2001) 124 A Crim R 535; [2001] VSCA 193; R v Atallah [2001] 3 VR 437; (2001) 125 A Crim R 463; [2001] VSCA 194. 817. It has been observed that it would not be appropriate to hold a voir dire to determine this question: see R v Singh-Bal (1997) 92 A Crim R 397. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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admission and whether what is done is an admission”. However, the latter formulation may be misleading. In applying that test to alleged admissions recorded by a listening device, where it was argued that the “senses” of a jury in listening to the recording “may well exceed the capabilities of those of a trial judge”, it was observed: The section speaks of the court making a finding. That finding could only be made on the basis of what appears to the court to “be reasonably open” rather than some conjecture as to what others might perceive. A trial judge can only determine whether evidence has the capability of rationally affecting a matter in issue by application of his or her own senses.819

It is apparent that the provision relates to the question of whether the conduct contended to constitute an admission (by a person who became a party in the proceeding) did in fact occur. It does not relate to the question of whether such conduct, if it occurred, is an “admission”. In Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Pratt (No 3) [2009] FCA 407 Ryan J had to determine whether statements sought to be imputed to Mr Pratt constituted admissions. Ryan J stated at [69]: [T]here is an anterior question. That is whether statements contained in the prima facie admissible documents, which were clearly brought into existence by or with the concurrence of Pratt’s legal representatives acting with his authority, were admissions at all in the sense of being previous representations of fact. In my view, that question is one of mixed fact and law to be resolved independently of, and before, any final determination of whether the statements imputed to Pratt were actually made …

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Cth Act: 89

Evidence of silence

(1) In a criminal proceeding, an inference unfavourable to a party must not be drawn from evidence that the party or another person failed or refused: (a) to answer one or more questions; or (b) to respond to a representation; put or made to the party or other person by an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence. [Subs (1) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 41]

(2) Evidence of that kind is not admissible if it can only be used to draw such an inference. (3) Subsection (1) does not prevent use of the evidence to prove that the party or other person failed or refused to answer the question or to respond to the representation if the failure or refusal is a fact in issue in the proceeding. (4) In this section: inference includes: (a) an inference of consciousness of guilt; or 818. See R v Hall [2001] NSWSC 827 at [28] per Greg James J. 819. R v Hall [2001] NSWSC 827 at [29].

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(b) an inference relevant to a party’s credibility. [S 89 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 89

Evidence of silence generally

(1) Subject to section 89A, in a criminal proceeding, an inference unfavourable to a party must not be drawn from evidence that the party or another person failed or refused: (a) to answer one or more questions, or (b) to respond to a representation, put or made to the party or other person by an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence. [Subs (1) am Act 9 of 2013, Sch 1[1]; Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[37]]

(2) Evidence of that kind is not admissible if it can only be used to draw such an inference. (3) Subsection (1) does not prevent use of the evidence to prove that the party or other person failed or refused to answer the question or to respond to the representation if the failure or refusal is a fact in issue in the proceeding.

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(4) In this section: inference includes: (a) an inference of consciousness of guilt, or (b) an inference relevant to a party’s credibility. [S 89 am Act 9 of 2013; Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 89

Evidence of silence

(1) In a criminal proceeding, an inference unfavourable to a party must not be drawn from evidence that the party or another person failed or refused— (a) to answer one or more questions; or (b) to respond to a representation— put or made to the party or other person by an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence. (2) Evidence of that kind is not admissible if it can only be used to draw such an inference. (3) Subsection (1) does not prevent use of the evidence to prove that the party or other person failed or refused to answer the question or to respond to the representation if the failure or refusal is a fact in issue in the proceeding. (4) In this section, inference includes— (a) an inference of consciousness of guilt; or (b) an inference relevant to a party’s credibility.

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ACT Act: 89 Evidence of silence (1) In a criminal proceeding, an inference unfavourable to a party must not be drawn from evidence that the party or someone else failed— (a) to answer 1 or more questions; or (b) to respond to a representation; put or made to the party or other person by an investigating official who at the time was exercising functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence. Note: Fail includes refuse (see Legislation Act, dict, pt 1).

(2) Evidence of that kind is not admissible if it can only be used to draw an inference mentioned in subsection (1). (3) Subsection (1) does not prevent use of the evidence to prove that the party or other person failed to answer the question or to respond to the representation if the failure is a fact in issue in the proceeding. (4) In this section: inference includes the following: (a) an inference of consciousness of guilt; (b) an inference relevant to a party’s credibility. NT Act: Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

89

Evidence of silence

(1) In a criminal proceeding, an inference unfavourable to a party must not be drawn from evidence that the party or another person failed or refused: (a) to answer one or more questions; or (b) to respond to a representation; put or made to the party or other person by an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence. (2) Evidence of that kind is not admissible if it can only be used to draw such an inference. (3) Subsection (1) does not prevent use of the evidence to prove that the party or other person failed or refused to answer the question or to respond to the representation if the failure or refusal is a fact in issue in the proceeding. (4) In this section: inference includes: (a) an inference of consciousness of guilt; or (b) an inference relevant to a party’s credibility.

[EA.89.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 10.11–10.66; ALRC 38, s 78, paras 165–169; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 756–758. 652

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[EA.89.60]

Part 3.4 - Admissions

[EA.89.90]

Differences between provisions

This provision in the NSW Act is expressly made subject to the operation of s 89A in that Act.

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[EA.89.90] General comments This provision is limited to the silence of a person in response to questions put or representations made by an investigating official (who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence). This means that the provision is rather narrower in its operation than the common law position.820 Prior to amendments following on ALRC 102, s 85(1) used the phrase “in the course of official questioning”. It is not apparent that the amendment has made any substantive change to this provision (in contrast with the position in respect of a similar amendment made in respect of s 85(1)(a): see [EA.85.150]). The narrow application of the provision means that silence in other circumstances might be treated as an admission under s 81. For example, the definition of the term “investigating official” in the Dictionary excludes a “police officer who is engaged in covert investigations under the orders of a superior”. It may also be that committal proceedings do not fall within the scope of this provision, in which case the present common law protections in this area821 have arguably been circumscribed, almost certainly unintentionally, by the Act. However, this is generally not a problem in practice because the present common law protections continue to operate since the drawing of inferences is not a question of admissibility.822 Indeed, if the common law would prohibit the drawing of the adverse inference and the evidence is not otherwise relevant, it would follow that s 56(1) would render the evidence inadmissible.823 This provision substantially reflects the common law. Thus, silence in such circumstances, whether total or selective,824 and whether or not a caution has been given,825 cannot be treated as an admission or “consciousness of guilt”.826 Further, as the High Court held in Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; 55 A 820. See Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; 55 A Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34; R v Anderson [2002] NSWCCA 141. 821. In Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; 55 A Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34 it was held that the right to remain silent applies to the conduct of a committal proceeding and silence maintained in such proceedings provides no basis for any inference against an accused. For silence in response to questioning by persons other than the police, see generally R v Salahattin [1983] 1 VR 521; R v Gallagher [1998] 2 VR 671; (1997) 96 A Crim R 300; R v MMJ (2006) 166 A Crim R 501; [2006] VSCA 226; R v Lester [2010] QCA 152 at [33]–[34] (special leave to appeal refused: Lester v The Queen [2011] HCATrans 126); Sibanda v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 67; 213 A Crim R 303; [2011] VSCA 285 at [67]–[77]. 822. R v Anderson [2002] NSWCCA 141; R v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385. 823. R v Lyberopolous [2002] NSWCCA 280 at [31]. However, it is not entirely clear how this proposition may be reconciled with the terms of s 56(1). 824. Given the reference in s 89(1)(a) to “one or more questions”: see King v The Queen (1986) 15 FCR 427 at 436. Regarding the common law position, see R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; 171 A Crim R 315; [2007] VSCA 95. 825. However, there is common law authority that the right to silence, and the prohibition against drawing adverse inferences from its exercise, does not extend beyond the investigative context where a caution is administered: Xypolitos v The Queen [2014] VSCA 339 at [78]. That © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34, “previous silence about a defence [or explanation] raised at the trial” does not provide “a basis for inferring that the defence or explanation is a new invention or is rendered suspect or unacceptable” or otherwise less credible.827 As under the common law, the prohibition is on the drawing of any adverse inference from silence (in failing to answer a question or respond to a representation) – it will not prevent the drawing of adverse inferences from the giving of inconsistent accounts.828 Further, as under the common law, the provision will apply where the person who is silent does not become the defendant but the prosecution nonetheless seeks to draw an inference adverse to the defendant from the person’s silence.829 For example, where the person declined to answer police questions but testified in support of the defence case, an inference adverse to the person’s credibility may not be drawn from that silence because to do so would lead to an inference unfavourable to the defendant.830 Where evidence is given of dealings between the police and the defendant, in the course of which the defendant exercises the right to silence, it is generally incumbent upon the trial judge to direct the jury that the exercise of the right to silence cannot be used to ground any inference adverse to the accused.831 It is preferable that such a direction be given at the time when the evidence is first adduced.832

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[EA.89.120]

Definitions

This provision is limited to “a criminal proceeding”. This term is defined in the Dictionary. The term “investigating official” is defined in the Dictionary as is the term “police officer”.

authority should be regarded as doubtful – the High Court in Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; 55 A Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34 did not (at 99 (CLR)) limit the principle in that way. The right exists whether or not the caution is given. 826. R v Matthews (unreported, NSW CCA, 28 May 1996) (directions to jury); Yisrael v District Court (NSW) (1996) 87 A Crim R 63 (judge alone). Regarding the common law, see Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; 55 A Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34 at 99 (CLR). 827. See also R v Stavrinos (2003) 140 A Crim R 594; [2003] NSWCCA 339; Sanchez v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 472; [2009] NSWCCA 171 at [53], [70]. 828. R v Merlino [2004] NSWCCA 104 at [71]; see also Petty at 101–103; R v Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118; [2007] VSCA 41 at [20]; Xypolitos v The Queen [2014] VSCA 339 at [76]–[78]. In Van der Vegt v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 279, it was observed at [40]–[44] that the appellant did not exercise his right to silence at all and the prosecution was relying not on “silence” but on the fact that the version given in the witness box “was inconsistent” with the earlier version given to the police. 829. Jones v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 443. 830. Jones v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 443 per McClellan CJ at CL at [89]–[90]. 831. R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109; R v Matthews (unreported, NSW CCA, 28 May 1996); R v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37 at [143]–[147]; see also R v Roberts (2011) 111 SASR 100; [2011] SASCFC 117 at [56]–[70]. No particular form of words is required in directing the jury as to the nature of the right to silence and that no inference adverse to the defendant may be drawn: see R v Hodge [2002] NSWCCA 10 at [30]. 832. R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109; R v Matthews (unreported, NSW CCA, 28 May 1996); Sanchez v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 472; [2009] NSWCCA 171 at [58].

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[EA.89.150]

Part 3.4 - Admissions

[EA.89.150]

“not admissible if it can only be used to draw such an inference” (s 89(2), (3))

If the evidence can be legitimately used in another way, it will be admissible for that use under s 89(2) (subject to the exclusionary discretions) but cannot be used for the purpose proscribed by s 89(1). Section 89(3) provides an example of the operation of that principle – the failure or refusal to answer questions or respond to a representation is being used not to draw any adverse inference but because the fact of that failure etc is itself a fact in issue in the proceedings (for example, in a prosecution of a person for failing to furnish information as required by a police officer). A refusal to answer police questions may be relevant to the defendant’s state of mind when making admissions to persons other than the police.833 Another example may be adducing the evidence to establish that the defendant was given an opportunity to respond to allegations against him or her,834 or to show how the police conducted the investigation,835 although there is persuasive obiter dicta that such an approach should be rejected where the defence has not raised an issue about the fairness of the investigation.836

NSW Act:

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89A Evidence of silence in criminal proceedings for serious indictable offences (1) In a criminal proceeding for a serious indictable offence, such unfavourable inferences may be drawn as appear proper from evidence that, during official questioning in relation to the offence, the defendant failed or refused to mention a fact: (a) that the defendant could reasonably have been expected to mention in the circumstances existing at the time, and (b) that is relied on in his or her defence in that proceeding. 833. Severino v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 80 at [70], [74], [76]. 834. R v Graham (unreported, NSW CCA, Newman, Levine, Barr JJ, 2 September 1997); R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 234; R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109; R v Matthews (unreported, NSW CCA, 28 May 1996); R v Naudi [1999] NSWCCA 259 at [16] (Windeyer J, Newman J agreeing, Sperling J expressing doubts (at [46])). However, it is difficult to see how such a use of the evidence satisfies the test of relevance in s 55 (see (1995) 19 Crim LJ 237–239). While evidence may be relevant to explain the absence of other evidence in a proceeding (in order to prevent an adverse inference that such other evidence would not have assisted the party failing to adduce it) it is not entirely clear that such a situation exists here. Another possibly contentious example is evidence of a refusal to provide a blood or similar sample: see R v Naudi [1999] NSWCCA 259 (Windeyer and Newman JJ agreeing (at [21]), Sperling J expressing doubts (at [49])). 835. R v Macris (2004) 147 A Crim R 99; [2004] NSWCCA 261 at [36]; see also [EA.114.150]. 836. In Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438; [1998] HCA 1 at 616, Callinan J rejected a proposition that evidence of denials by the suspect/defendant during police questioning, not admissible as “admissions”, were relevant and admissible to establish that the defendant was allowed to put his version of events at the earliest opportunity. Similarly, he pointed out that the propriety of particular police questions, as part of the investigative process, provided no basis for the admission into evidence of the questions (or the answers). Gleeson CJ agreed with Callinan J, but the rest of the High Court did not consider it necessary to consider this issue. See also [EA.55.570]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(2) Subsection (1) does not apply unless: (a) a special caution was given to the defendant by an investigating official who, at the time the caution was given, had reasonable cause to suspect that the defendant had committed the serious indictable offence, and (b) the special caution was given before the failure or refusal to mention the fact, and (c) the special caution was given in the presence of an Australian legal practitioner who was acting for the defendant at that time, and (d) the defendant had, before the failure or refusal to mention the fact, been allowed a reasonable opportunity to consult with that Australian legal practitioner, in the absence of the investigating official, about the general nature and effect of special cautions. (3) It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in giving a special caution.

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(4) An investigating official must not give a special caution to a person being questioned in relation to an offence unless satisfied that the offence is a serious indictable offence. (5) This section does not apply: (a) to a defendant who, at the time of the official questioning, is under 18 years of age or is incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of a special caution, or (b) if evidence of the failure or refusal to mention the fact is the only evidence that the defendant is guilty of the serious indictable offence. (6) The provisions of this section are in addition to any other provisions relating to a person being cautioned before being investigated for an offence that the person does not have to say or do anything. The special caution may be given after or in conjunction with that caution. Note: See section 139 of this Act and section 122 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002.

(7) Nothing in this section precludes the drawing of any inference from evidence of silence that could properly be drawn apart from this section. (8) The giving of a special caution in accordance with this section in relation to a serious indictable offence does not of itself make evidence obtained after the giving of the special caution inadmissible in proceedings for any other offence (whether or not a serious indictable offence). (9) In this section: official questioning of a defendant in relation to a serious indictable offence means questions put to the defendant by an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of the serious indictable offence. special caution means a caution given to a person that is to the effect that: 656

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Part 3.4 - Admissions

[EA.89A.30]

(a)

the person does not have to say or do anything, but it may harm the person’s defence if the person does not mention when questioned something the person later relies on in court, and (b) anything the person does say or do may be used in evidence. Note: The Commonwealth Act does not include this section. [S 89A insrt Act 9 of 2013, Sch 1[2]]

[EA.89A.30] General comments This provision was introduced into the NSW Act by the Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Bill 2013 (NSW). It was not recommended by the ALRC or the NSWLRC. As the Explanatory Memorandum to the amending Act states:

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The object of this Bill is to amend the Evidence Act 1995 so that in proceedings for a serious indictable offence an unfavourable inference may be drawn from the defendant’s failure or refusal to mention a fact during official questioning that the defendant could reasonably have been expected to mention and that is later relied on by the defence in the proceedings.

As is apparent, the possibility of the drawing of an adverse inference from silence would only be available in “criminal proceedings for a serious indictable offence”. The latter term is defined in the (NSW) Interpretation Act 1987 in a way that means this provision may operate in the Local Court with respect to such indictable offences dealt with summarily. There are other limitations on circumstances in which an “unfavourable inference” will be open. An unfavourable inference cannot be drawn unless: (a) the proceedings are criminal proceedings for a “serious indictable offence” (s 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987 defines “serious indictable offence” to mean an “indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more” and “indictable offence” to mean “an offence for which proceedings may be taken on indictment, whether or not proceedings for the offence may also be taken otherwise than on indictment”); and (b) the defendant was undergoing “official questioning” (defined to mean “questions put to the defendant by an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of the serious indictable offence”) in relation to the serious indictable offence (the term “investigating official” is defined in the Dictionary to this Act); and (c) the defendant had been given a “special caution” by an investigating official (“to the effect that the person does not have to say or do anything, but it may harm the person’s defence if the person does not mention when questioned something the person later relies on in court, and (b) anything the person does say or do may be used in evidence”); and (d) the investigating official who gave the special caution, at the time it was given, “had reasonable cause to suspect that the defendant had committed the serious indictable offence” (in respect of which the defendant is being prosecuted) and was “satisfied” that that offence was “a serious indictable offence”; and © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(e) the special caution “was given in the presence of an Australian legal practitioner who was acting for the defendant at that time”; and (f) prior to the relevant silence (that is, “failure or refusal to mention” a fact) the defendant was “allowed a reasonable opportunity to consult with that Australian legal practitioner, in the absence of the investigating official, about the general nature and effect of special cautions”; and (g) the defendant “failed or refused to mention a fact … that is relied on in his or her defence” in the criminal proceedings for the serious indictable offence; and (h) the defendant “could reasonably have been expected to mention” that fact “in the circumstances existing at the time”; and (i) the defendant was not, at the time of the official questioning, under 18 years of age; and (j) the defendant was not, at the time of the official questioning, “incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of a special caution”; and (k) the evidence of silence is not the only evidence that the defendant is guilty of the serious indictable offence.

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All these requirements must be satisfied before it would be open for the tribunal of fact in criminal proceedings to draw an “unfavourable inference” from the silence of the defendant during official questioning. A number of considerations will bear on the question whether the defendant “could reasonably have been expected to mention” the fact later relied on. “[T]he circumstances existing at the time” of the official questioning would include not only the defendant’s mental and physical condition and the way in which the defendant is questioned but also the nature of the information provided to the defendant by the officials regarding the reasons for arrest and, possibly, regarding the evidence against the defendant in the possession of the officials conducting the questioning. It must also include any legal advice the defendant had received prior to the questioning. This provision does not attempt to circumscribe the unfavourable inference that may be drawn if the requirements of this provision are satisfied. It will simply be a matter of logic and experience, similar to any assessment of the relevance of circumstantial evidence (see [EA.55.60], [EA.55.330]). In trials with judge and jury, it will be for the trial judge to determine what inference, unfavourable to the defendant in some way in the context of the criminal proceedings, would be rationally open to be drawn. The availability of alternative inferences, not unfavourable to the defendant, would need to be considered in that context. If an unfavourable inference is open, the evidence adduced on the voir dire would be adduced again before the jury. The jury would require directions on the availability of that inference. Those directions would be required to make clear what inference(s) was/were open and what inference(s) was/were not open. If an inference of “consciousness of guilt” was open, appropriate warnings would be required under the common law about the drawing of that inference (see [EA.165.480]). Even if such an inference was not open, and the unfavourable inference related to the credibility of evidence given by the defendant in the criminal proceedings (or the credibility of other evidence adduced in the criminal proceedings), careful directions would still be required (see [EA.165.480]). 658

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s 89A

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[EA.89A.60]

Part 3.4 - Admissions

[EA.89A.60]

Procedure

Evidence will have to be admitted on the voir dire (see s 189) in relation to the requirements that must be satisfied before it would be open to draw an unfavourable inference from silence during official questioning. In a trial with a judge and jury, it appears that some of the requirements would be determined exclusively by the trial judge (those requirements that must be satisfied if subs (1) is to “apply”), while the requirements in s 89A(1) would be decided by the jury – although the question for the trial judge would be whether it would be open to the jury to find that those requirements had been satisfied. As regards questions of onus and standard of proof, s 142 does not directly apply because this provision is not (at least directly) concerned with whether evidence “should be admitted or not admitted” but, rather, whether a particular inference may be drawn from evidence. However, if it would not be open to draw any unfavourable inference from silence, it may be that evidence of that silence is not relevant, and thus may not be admitted. Whatever the resolution of that issue, it is likely that the courts will apply a balance of probabilities test. The preferable view is that the onus would rest on the prosecution to establish that: (a) the defendant had been given a “special caution” by an investigating official (s 89A(2)(a)) before the relevant silence (s 89A(2)(b)); (b) the investigating official who gave the special caution, at the time it was given, “had reasonable cause to suspect that the defendant had committed the serious indictable offence” (in respect of which the defendant is being prosecuted) and was “satisfied” that that offence was “a serious indictable offence” (s 89A(2)(a); (4)); (c) the special caution “was given in the presence of an Australian legal practitioner who was acting for the defendant at that time” (s 89A(2)(c)); (d) prior to the relevant silence the defendant was “allowed a reasonable opportunity to consult with that Australian legal practitioner, in the absence of the investigating official, about the general nature and effect of special cautions” (s 89A(2)(d)); (e) the defendant was not, at the time of the official questioning, under 18 years of age (s 89A(5)(a)); (f) the defendant was not, at the time of the official questioning, “incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of a special caution” (s 89A(5)(a)). As regards the requirements in s 89A(1), they would be matters for the jury to be satisfied in relation to but the trial judge would not permit the jury to draw an unfavourable inference unless it would be open to the jury to find that those requirements had been satisfied. Thus, the trial judge would need to be satisfied that it would be open to the jury to be satisfied that: (a) the defendant was undergoing “official questioning” in relation to the serious indictable offence; (b) the defendant “failed or refused to mention a fact … that is relied on in his or her defence” in the criminal proceedings for the serious indictable offence; and (c) the defendant “could reasonably have been expected to mention” that fact “in the circumstances existing at the time”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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If the trial judge concludes that it would be open to make such findings, the trial judge would then have to determine what unfavourable inference(s) it would be open to the jury to draw in the circumstances. At the appropriate time, the jury would then be directed about the matters it must determine and given appropriate warnings. As regards the requirement in s 89A(5)(b) that he evidence of silence is not the only evidence that the defendant is guilty of the serious indictable offence, this would appear to be a matter for the trial judge given that the requirement must be satisfied before s 89A can “apply”. However, it may be appropriate for the trial judge to direct the jury that they could not return a verdict of guilty on the basis alone of an unfavourable inference from silence.

Cth Act: 90

Discretion to exclude admissions In a criminal proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence of an admission, or refuse to admit the evidence to prove a particular fact, if: (a) the evidence is adduced by the prosecution; and (b) having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence. Note: Part 3.11 contains other exclusionary discretions that are applicable to admissions.

NSW Act:

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90

Discretion to exclude admissions In a criminal proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence of an admission, or refuse to admit the evidence to prove a particular fact, if: (a) the evidence is adduced by the prosecution, and (b) having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence. Note: Part 3.11 contains other exclusionary discretions that are applicable to admissions.

Vic Act: 90

Discretion to exclude admissions In a criminal proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence of an admission, or refuse to admit the evidence to prove a particular fact, if— (a) the evidence is adduced by the prosecution; and (b) having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would be unfair to an accused to use the evidence. [Para (b) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.20] Note: Part 3.11 contains other exclusionary discretions that are applicable to admissions. [S 90 am Act 68 of 2009]

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ACT Act: 90 Discretion to exclude admissions In a criminal proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence of an admission, or refuse to admit the evidence to prove a particular fact, if— (a) the evidence is presented by the prosecution; and (b) having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence. Note: Pt 3.11 contains other exclusionary discretions that apply to admissions.

NT Act: 90

Discretion to exclude admissions

In a criminal proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence of an admission, or refuse to admit the evidence to prove a particular fact, if: (a) the evidence is adduced by the prosecution; and (b) having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence. Note for section 90: Part 3.11 contains other exclusionary discretions that are applicable to admissions.

[EA.90.30] ALRC references

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ALRC 102, paras 10.98–10.143; ALRC 38, s 79, para 160(b).

[EA.90.60] General comments The meaning of the word “admission” is discussed in detail at [EA.81.60] (for non-admission evidence, see [EA.90.300]. This provision, when enacted, reflected a common law rule relating to evidence of admissions in criminal proceedings.837 Under that common law rule, evidence of an admission could be excluded by a trial judge if, having regard to the conduct of the police in obtaining it and all the circumstances of the case, it would be unfair to admit the evidence against the defendant.838 As the circumstances vary so will the standards of behaviour required of law enforcement authorities.839 In some extreme circumstances, even questioning a person may be regarded as improper and justify exclusion of any consequent admission.840 The High Court has held that it would be good reason for exercise of the common law rule if a trial judge considers that police conduct may have brought about an 837. Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46, Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [52]; Gummow and Hayne JJ at [108]. 838. R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 at 154; McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 506–507 and 513; Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177; 64 A Crim R 393; [1992] HCA 69 at 234–235; Foster v The Queen (1993) 67 ALJR 550 at 554. See also R v Dungay (2001) 126 A Crim R 216; [2001] NSWCCA 443 at [48]. 839. See Seymour v Attorney-General (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 416 at 428–429; R v Li [1993] 2 VR 80 at 87–88. 840. See R v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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841

unreliable admission. Of course, that consideration is dealt with by s 85 of the Act, at least where the requirements of s 85(1) are satisfied. However, the High Court made it clear in respect of the common law rule that the reliability of the admission, assuming it was made, is not the sole criterion of fairness.842 Under the Mason High Court, it seemed to be clear that any significant infringement of a defendant’s rights must ordinarily result in exclusion under the common law rule.843 Indeed, some members of that High Court suggested that an admission made in circumstances of impropriety must be excluded on fairness grounds if it may not have been made, or may not have been made in the form in which it was made, in the absence of the impropriety.844 Such an approach, if applied to this provision, would tend to make reliance on s 138 in this context unnecessary. However, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal took a more restrictive view of this provision, expressly holding that it would not necessarily be unfair to admit evidence of an admission even though it was accepted that, if there had been no impropriety, the admission would not have been made.845 Further, as Kirby J concluded in Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46 at [238], it became apparent that the Gleeson High Court was “not now resolved to preserve the previously stated values”.

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In 1998, the High Court reconsidered, and reformulated, the common law relating to evidence of admissions in criminal proceedings.846 The majority judgment in R v Swaffıeld held (at 194 per Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ) that admissibility of such evidence should be seen as, in general terms: … turning first on the question of voluntariness, next on exclusion based on considerations of reliability and finally on an overall discretion which might take account of all the circumstances of the case to determine whether the admission of the evidence or the obtaining of a conviction on the basis of the evidence is bought at a price which is unacceptable, having regard to contemporary community standards.847 841. Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 34; Duke v The Queen (1989) 63 ALJR 139 at 140, 141, 144 and 147; Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177; 64 A Crim R 393; [1992] HCA 69; Foster v The Queen (1993) 67 ALJR 550 at 554–557. 842. Foster v The Queen (1993) 67 ALJR 550 at 554–557. 843. Foster at 555. In the view of the majority of the High Court, factors supporting exclusion on fairness grounds included the circumstances of the arrest, the serious and reckless infringement of the defendant’s rights, the compulsive nature of the interrogation, the absence of a non-police witness or electronic recording and the questionable voluntariness of the confession. It will be a question of degree. For example, the existence of the right to silence does not mean that exclusion will be required simply because a suspect states that he or she does not want to answer any further questions: see R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414, rejecting South Australian common law authority to the contrary. Thus, “the officer is not bound to accept the first answer given; questioning is not to be regarded as unfair merely because it is persistent … It is a question of degree as to whether persistence has crossed the line so as to render it unfair to use the answers in evidence”: at 419 per Hunt CJ at CL. 844. See Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 656; 35 A Crim R 232 at 662 per Mason CJ; Duke v The Queen (1989) 63 ALJR 139 at 141 per Brennan J. This approach was referred to, and implicitly approved of, by the majority of the court in R v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1 at 189 845. R v Helmhout (2001) 125 A Crim R 257; [2001] NSWCCA 372 at [48]–[51] per Hulme J. 846. R v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1. 847. The majority rejected the view (adopted by Brennan CJ) that the law in this area should turn on consideration of voluntariness, reliability and public policy.

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A qualification, relating to protection against forensic disadvantages, was also adopted.848 The “overall discretion” is intended to invest “a broad discretion in the court” which may take into account considerations of fairness, public policy and “protection of the rights and privileges of the accused”.849 Acknowledging that “the notion of compulsion is not an integral part of the fairness discretion and it plays no part in the policy discretion”, the majority of the court recognised (at 127):

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… as the Canadian Supreme Court has done, an approach which looks to the accused’s freedom to choose to speak to the police and the extent to which that freedom has been impugned. Where the freedom has been impugned the court has a discretion to reject the evidence. In deciding whether to exercise that discretion, which is a discretion to exclude not to admit, the court will look at all the circumstances. Those circumstances may point to unfairness to the accused if the confession is admitted. There may be no unfairness involved but the court may consider that, having regard to the means by which the confession was elicited, the evidence has been obtained at a price which is unacceptable having regard to prevailing community standards. This invests a broad discretion in the court but it does not prevent the development of rules to meet particular situations.

The approach adopted by the High Court in this case has been influential in respect of the application of both s 138 and this provision (in combination with s 138).850 Indeed, the majority indicated that the new formulation of the common law in this area would, “putting to one side the question of voluntariness”, reflect the approach taken in the Evidence Act when the relevant sections are “taken in combination”.851 It may be observed that, while the common law concept of “voluntariness” is not reproduced in this Act (compare s 84), it is likely to be regarded as unfair to admit into evidence an admission which would be regarded as not voluntarily made at common law.852 Subsequent decisions of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal have emphasised the need for the courts to “be vigilant to ensure that evidence is not permitted to be introduced at an unacceptable price”,853 while recognising that “[i]t is always a matter of degree as to whether police questioning has gone too far, recognising the duty of the investigating police officer on the one hand and the right of the suspect on the other hand”.854 In one judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated: We are of the view that to admit the recorded conversations upon the ground that they derogated from the appellant’s right to silence or privilege from self-incrimination would, in all the circumstances of this case, be very far from seriously offending prevailing community standards. In saying this, however, we wish to point out that the reference by the High Court, as by this Court, to community standards in this respect is not to any notion of populist public opinion. Rather, this refers to community standards 848. R v Swaffıeld at 122 and 124 per Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ. 849. R v Swaffıeld at 124. 850. See eg R v Suckling [1999] NSWCCA 36; R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66; R v Simmons (No 2) (2015) 249 A Crim R 82; [2015] NSWSC 143 at [124]–[130]. 851. See R v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1 at 194. 852. See R v Pitts (No 1) (2012) 229 A Crim R 387; [2012] NSWSC 1652 at [40]. 853. R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66 at [30] per the court. 854. Fernando at [32]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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concerning the maintenance of the rule of law in a liberal democracy, the elements of the proper administration of justice and the due requirements of law enforcement. We do not see that admitting the evidence is unfair to the appellant. There was no unlawful or improper conduct on the part of law enforcement officers … Nor do we see that any real question of unreliability arises, to the extent that it is a significant factor tending to exclusion, although the conclusion that what was said on the tape-recorded conversations is true, is very much a matter of judgment … We do not consider that here there were principles “governing the interrogation of suspects” which mitigated against the propriety of the approach taken in this case so that it is necessary to consider whether the statements “would not have been made or not have been made in the form in which they were made”.855

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In Pavitt v The Queen (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88, McColl JA and Latham J relied heavily on R v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1 (and on the Canadian authority referred to in the High Court judgments) in formulating principles to be applied where admissions are not made to a police officer. However, more recent NSW authority has limited the circumstances in which it might be said that that there is unfairness by reason of the police using an agent to circumvent an assertion of the right to silence (see [EA.90.270]). Given that reliability is not the sole criterion of “fairness”, the scope of the concept remains elusive. In the ALRC Interim Report on Evidence (ALRC 26) it was proposed that this discretion not be retained, partly on the basis that “‘fairness’ is a vague concept and the courts have failed to define precisely the principles behind it or considerations relevant to it” (at para 967). Although the ALRC Final Report concluded that the discretion was “needed” (ALRC 38, para 160(b)), the uncertainty remains.856 As Gleeson CJ and Heydon J stated in Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46 at [56]: The language in s 90 is so general that it would not be possible in any particular case to mark out the full extent of its meaning.

Gummow and Hayne JJ observed at [109] that “[w]hen it is ‘unfair’ to use evidence of an out-of-court admission at the trial of an accused person cannot be described exhaustively”. As noted above, it is apparent that the Gleeson High Court took a restrictive view of the circumstances in which evidence of an admission that had survived the tests in ss 84, 85 and 138 should be excluded under this provision. This was made most explicit in the judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ, who stated at [109]: Thus although the discretion given by s 90 is generally similar to the common law discretion considered in Lee, it is a discretion that will fall to be considered only after applying the other, more specific, provisions of the Act referred to at the start of these reasons. The questions with which those other sections deal (most notably questions of the reliability of what was said to police or other persons in authority, and what consequences follow from illegal or improper conduct by investigating authorities) are not to be dealt with under s 90. The consequence is that the discretion given by s 90 will be engaged only as a final or “safety net” provision. 855. R v Suckling [1999] NSWCCA 36 at [40]–[41] per the court. 856. For a discussion of Swaffıeld and its implication, see A Palmer, “Applying Swaffield: covertly obtained statements and the public policy discretion” (2004) 28 Crim LJ 217.

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Gummow and Hayne JJ appear to have concluded that the appellant could not succeed in an argument contending that what the police did should be “condemned” and that the appellant “had been misled into saying something that could be used in evidence against him” (at [116]), because of a concession made by counsel for the appellant that exclusion was not required under s 138 (at [118]–[122]). It may be accepted that a court must be careful to distinguish the issue of “fairness” from, for example, public policy considerations arising from police impropriety. However, it is a different thing to say that s 90 is simply not available in cases where issues of police illegality or impropriety arise. It would be a drastically restrictive reading of the term “the circumstances in which the admission was made” to completely exclude from consideration circumstances which are characterized as involving “impropriety” or “illegality” (see s 138), or which impaired the reliability of an admission made to the police (see s 85). Yet in R v Cooney [2013] NSWCCA 312, an interlocutory appeal determined by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Leeming JA (Johnson J and Latham J agreeing) held at [8] that a judge had erred in having regard to police conduct involving unlawfulness “through the prism of s 90” rather than s 138. In Restricted Judgment [2017] NSWCCA 283, Adamson J (Hoeben CJ at CL and Davies J agreeing) held at [30] that whether the police “ought” to have put to a suspect being interviewed what he had said in an earlier “pretext call”, so as to provide an opportunity to explain apparent inconsistencies in his account, “would appear” to be a matter that is “not relevant to s 90 of the Evidence Act, but would have been relevant had an objection been made pursuant to s 138”. It has to be said that this is a very odd approach particularly given that s 138 could not have been engaged because none of what was said in the interview was unlawfully or improperly obtained. It remains to be seen whether these narrow approaches to s 90 in the context of other provisions such as s 138 will prevail.857 In Em, the other members of the majority did not address this issue. Nevertheless, Gleeson CJ and Heydon J also took a narrow view of the operation of this provision, seeing no unfairness in the police knowingly taking advantage of the defendant’s mistaken belief that anything he said could not be used in evidence against him: The difficulty is that every day police officers take advantage of the ignorance or stupidity of persons whom they eventually prosecute, and a mistake of the kind the appellant was operating under was simply a species of ignorance or stupidity.858

Only Kirby J, in dissent, concluded that there was clear unfairness (at [132], [228]–[231]). He observed that the police engaged in “a deliberate deception designed to emphasise in the appellant’s mind the distinction between a formal 857. It should be noted that a similarly restrictive operation to the sequential application of s 84 and s 138 has been rejected: R v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 at [106]–[119]. 858. Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46 at [77]. Gleeson CJ and Heydon J had earlier noted at [73] that no basis for regarding the admission as unreliable was advanced before the trial judge (and the basis later advanced was “highly implausible”). Gleeson CJ and Heydon J also rejected an argument that the appellant’s freedom to speak or not to speak was impugned (where it was contended that the police had contributed to the continued existence of the appellant’s belief that anything he said could not be used in evidence against him), on the basis that there was “no evidence that he turned his mind to the question again, or that he had any doubt about it which might cause him to question it, or that he had any desire to search for confirmation” (at [65]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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interview at the police station and an off-the-record chat in the park” (at [220]), with the consequence that the appellant was tricked out of exercising his right to silence. The police not only deliberately chose not to correct the appellant’s mistaken belief that anything he said was “off the record”, they consciously acted in a way designed to reinforce his mistaken belief. However, the majority of the court saw no unfairness in the use of such trickery.859 It remains to be seen how subsequent High Court benches will approach these issues. However, to give a counterpoint to the approach taken by the majority of the High Court in Em, note may be taken of the decision of the Full Bench of the South Australian Supreme Court in R v Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444; [2013] SASCFC 97 (a case decided under the common law), where it was held that “[i]f it becomes plain that a suspect has misapprehended something which has been said to him by an officer then the suspect should be disabused of his misunderstanding” (Vanstone J at [15]) and the following proposition was adopted (at [13]): “Devices and stratagems have a part to play in police investigation, but they must not be allowed to degenerate into dishonesty in any of its forms”.860 This may be contrasted with the observation of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in a recent judgment that a suspect “has no right to procedural fairness” during a police investigation.861

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[EA.90.90] Relevant considerations As the discussion in [EA.90.60] makes clear, it is difficult to provide comprehensive guidance as to matters relevant to the exercise of this discretion given the elusiveness of the concept in this context. It is important in this context to emphasise the operation of s 137, which deals with different fairness considerations. In some cases, these provisions may have overlapping application.862 There is no doubt that if the circumstances in which the admission was made rendered it unreliable, but s 85 is not engaged for some reason, exclusion of the evidence under this provision may be appropriate.863 This would be particularly the case if the unreliability arose from some action or omission on the part of law enforcement authorities. On the other hand, there are indications in R v Nelson (2004) 41 MVR 10; [2004] NSWCCA 231 that characteristics of the person who made the admission which might be regarded as rendering it unreliable (for example, intoxication) would not justify exclusion under this provision if “the jury [would be] well able to assess and evaluate [such matters] in weighing the 859. See further discussion at [EA.90.150]. 860. See also R v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 at [76]; R v LDV (No 2) [2013] NSWDC 215 at [87]–[98]. 861. Restricted Judgment [2017] NSWCCA 283, Adamson J at [34]–[35] (Hoeben CJ at CL and Davies J agreeing). 862. For example, in cases where the police use the “scenario” or “Mr Big” investigative technique, there will be issues of trickery and the reliability of any resulting admission, as well as the need to assess the potential unfair prejudice from the evidence of bad character that must be admitted in order to put the operation and the admission in context (see discussion in the Canadian Supreme Court judgment of R v Hart [2014] 2 SCR 544). 863. Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [112].

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evidence” (Sperling J at [55]). As to whether a conclusion that an admission was likely to be reliable would be a factor supporting a conclusion that it would not be unfair to use the evidence, Gleeson CJ and Heydon J held in Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46 at [72]–[73] that “the reliability of evidence was a factor affecting the fairness of its use”. It is certainly arguable that a distinction should be drawn between alleged unreliability of an admission and alleged unreliability of evidence of an admission. Just as with s 85 (see [EA.85.210]), this provision is not concerned with the question of whether the admission was in fact made. The effect of s 88 is that, for the purpose of deciding whether evidence of an admission is admissible, the standard of proof for finding “that a particular person made the admission” is the prima facie standard (that is, the court “is to find that a particular person made the admission if it is reasonably open to find that he or she made the admission”). This provision refers to “the circumstances in which the admission was made” and appears to proceed on the assumption that the admission was indeed made. The comparable discretion at common law was not available to exclude evidence of an admission because of concerns regarding the reliability of evidence of the admission and the same is true under this provision.864 However, a decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has left open the possibility of an argument that this provision may be used to exclude an admission in circumstances where a suspect’s language difficulties raise concerns as to whether he really did make the alleged admission.865 Alternatively, reliance may be placed on s 138. Conversely, in R v DRF [2015] NSWCCA 181, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered that it was a relevant consideration supporting the fairness of admitting evidence of an admission that it was tape-recorded and this “significantly enhanced its reliability” (Simpson JA at [98]). In R v Em [2003] NSWCCA 374 at [110] Howie J (with whom Ipp JA and Hulme J agreed) considered that, apart from the question of reliability, the “probative value” of the admission was not relevant to the exercise of this discretion (in contrast with the position under s 138: see [EA.138.450]): At common law a significant factor in the exercise of the unfairness discretion was the reliability of the admission, although it was not necessarily decisive: Swaffıeld [(1998) 192 CLR 159] at [78]. This was because the purpose of the discretion was the protection of the rights and privileges of the accused, including procedural rights occurring in the trial process. Similarly under s 90 the reliability of the evidence may be significant, because, if it is unreliable, there is more risk that its admission will result in an unfair trial. But if its reliability is accepted, and there was no finding by his Honour that the evidence was unreliable in the present case, then it seems to me that an assessment of probative value has little significance in the exercise of discretion. Certainly its lack of probative value does not seem to me to be a matter that indicates that the evidence should be rejected. Arguably, the less probative weight the evidence has, the less likely is its admission going to result in an unfair trial. In any event, to the extent that his Honour appears to have taken the lack of probative value of the evidence into account in exercising the discretion in favour of the respondent, his Honour was in error. 864. R v Walker [2000] NSWCCA 130 at [32]. 865. R v Taouk (2005) 154 A Crim R 69; [2005] NSWCCA 155 per James J at [86]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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A different view appears to have been taken in R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; 123 A Crim R 30; [2001] NSWCCA 29 at [56]–[58]. In R v Em [2003] NSWCCA 374 Howie J also considered (at [113]) that the seriousness of the offence was not relevant to the exercise of this discretion: I do not see how the seriousness of the offence, for which the accused is to stand trial, can have any relevance to an assessment of whether the trial would be unfair as a result of the admission of the evidence obtained by police misconduct. In my view, it simply cannot make any difference to the outcome of that assessment whether the accused is standing trial for murder or whether the trial relates to a charge of stealing from a shop. If the reception of the evidence leads to an unfair trial and it results in a conviction, there must be a miscarriage of justice regardless of the nature of the offence to which the conviction relates.

These issues were touched on by the High Court in Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46 but no decision was made (see Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [54]).

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In R v DRF [2015] NSWCCA 181, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered that it was a relevant consideration that a conversation between a “state agent” and a suspect, after the suspect had refused to answer police questions, had been tape-recorded pursuant to a warrant issued by a Supreme Court justice. Simpson JA stated at [93] that “it is material that the Parliament of NSW has permitted the issue, under specific circumstances, of warrants authorising the use of surveillance devices to intercept and record private conversations”. Simpson JA also emphasised that the warrant had been validly issued and stated at [95]: To categorise the admission of evidence so obtained as “unfair” would be to subvert “the statutory scheme involving judicially sanctioned covert surveillance as an aid to the detection of crime” that has been expressly adopted by the legislature: see Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46, at [69] and [78].

On the other hand, Simpson JA observed (at [96]) that “[e]ach case, of course, will be decided on its own facts” and implicitly accepted (at [102]) that the mere fact that the conversation had been lawfully recorded under warrant did not determine the issue.

[EA.90.120]

Lawfully compelled admissions

It would not necessarily be regarded as unfair to a defendant to use against him or her an admission which has been lawfully compelled (at, for example, a Royal Commission).866 Indeed, the NSW Court of Appeal has held: In exercising that discretion, it [is] not open to the court to hold that the use of the evidence in criminal proceedings against the accused would be unfair solely because of the manner in which and the purpose for which the evidence was obtained if … that manner and purpose were sanctioned by Parliament.867 866. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Alderman (1998) 45 NSWLR 526; 104 A Crim R 116. 867. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Attallah [2001] NSWCA 171 at [27]. However, the word “solely” should be emphasised. There may be circumstances in which the admission was compelled which might justify exclusion. Thus, it may be noted that, in X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; 232 A Crim R 410; [2013] HCA 29, French CJ and Crennan

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Failure to caution

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Section 139 provides that, in certain circumstances, evidence of a statement made or an act done by a person during questioning by an investigating official is taken to have been obtained improperly (for the purposes of s 138) if, before starting the questioning, the investigating official did not caution the person that the person does not have to say or do anything but that anything the person does say or do may be used in evidence. Any admission made in such circumstances may be excluded under this discretion.868 In Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46 it was accepted that the conditions specified in s 139 as the conditions in which a caution must be administered were not satisfied (the police did not believe that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the appellant had committed an offence before they asked him questions in a park). The High Court (Gleeson CJ and Heydon J, Gummow and Hayne JJ, Kirby J dissenting) rejected an argument that admissions made by the appellant should have been excluded under this provision in circumstances where the suspect believed that anything he said could not be used in evidence and the police, knowing this, had given the first part of the caution (“you have a right not to say or do anything”) but deliberately left out the second part of the caution (“anything you say or do may be used in evidence”) because, as one officer later explained, if it was given he might refuse to talk to the police. Gleeson CJ and Heydon J rejected an argument that the police had contributed to the continued existence of the defendant’s belief that anything he said could not be used in evidence against him, on the basis that there was “no evidence that he turned his mind to the question again, or that he had any doubt about it which might cause him to question it, or that he had any desire to search for confirmation” (at [65]).869 They also emphasised that the appellant’s belief that anything he said could not be used in evidence derived from his (mistaken) belief that the conversation was not being recorded (at [71]; see [EA.90.180]). Gummow and Hayne JJ emphasised a concession made by counsel for the appellant that exclusion was not required under s 138 (at [118]–[122]). Only Kirby J, in dissent, concluded that there was clear unfairness (at [132], [228]–[231]). A contrasting decision is R v Simmons (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189. Hamill J found that the police led an arrested person (who was initially properly cautioned) to believe that “what he said would not be recorded and that it would not be used against him” (at [124]). Given that the defendant exercised his right J referred at [58] to the discretion to exclude evidence which was derivatively obtained from a compulsory examination (where the legislation permitting the compulsory examination provided for use immunity in relation to the answers given but not for a derivative use immunity). 868. R v Sharp (2003) 143 A Crim R 344; [2003] NSWSC 1117 per Howie J at [12]. 869. However, what Gleeson CJ and Heydon J failed to acknowledge was that, if the police had not chosen to leave out the second part of the caution, and had told the appellant that anything he said may be used in evidence, there was every reason to believe that the appellant would have chosen to remain silent. It is regrettable that a distinction appears to be drawn between a case where the police trick a suspect by saying that what is said will not be used against the suspect and a case where a suspect believes that what he says will not be used against him and the police deliberately choose to leave out that part of the caution that would have corrected that misapprehension. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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to silence when interviewed by police electronically, it was held to be unfair to admit evidence of what he said after he was told that what he said would be “off the record” (at [151]).870 Another case that may be contrasted with Em is R v FE [2013] NSWSC 1692. Adamson J observed that police questioning of a child without the benefit of a caution in circumstances where the police officer had formed a belief that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the child has committed an offence meant that it would be unfair to admit admissions made by the child. Adamson J stated at [125]: Although the admissions the accused made may well be reliable I consider the price of their admission to be too high to be worth paying since they were obtained only by failing to comply with the laws and procedures referred to above and disregarding the rights of a 15-year-old girl who was unable to look after her own interests. In the present case the ends, in my view, fall far short of justifying the means.

[EA.90.180]

Failure to inform of electronic recording

The covert recording of a conversation does not of itself make it unfair to use the evidence, even if the defendant would not have spoken if he or she knew the conversation was being recorded.871

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[EA.90.210]

Declining to answer questions

There is no absolute rule that an interview conducted in the face of an objection by a suspect, or continued in the face of an indication that he or she does not wish to participate any further in it, should be rejected if tendered in evidence.872 It is a question of degree as to whether persistence has crossed the line so as to render it unfair to use the answers in evidence.873 Each case must be determined upon its own facts, and in particular by reference to the extent to which there is any unfair pressure placed upon the person being interviewed, or unfair advantage taken of his position, for example because of his age, vulnerability, lack of familiarity with the English language and so on.874 Moreover, in any weighing exercise the probative value of the evidence needs to be taken into account.875 Persisting in questioning a suspect after he or she has indicated an unwillingness to answer any more questions may be “improper” and thereby raise the application of s 138.876 A refusal to answer questions unless the interview is not recorded raises different issues, but exclusion may be justified particularly if the police 870. However, it should be noted that the evidence was also held to be inadmissible under s 85. 871. R v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1; Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46 at [69]. 872. R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414; R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; 123 A Crim R 30; [2001] NSWCCA 29 at [54]–[55] per Wood CJ at CL. 873. R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at [21] per Hunt CJ at CL; R v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519 at [100]–[104]. See also R v Plevac (1995) 84 A Crim R 570 at 579–581. 874. R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; 123 A Crim R 30; [2001] NSWCCA 29 at [56] per Wood CJ at CL; R v Pitts (No 1) (2012) 229 A Crim R 387; [2012] NSWSC 1652 at [38]–[41]. 875. See R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; 123 A Crim R 30; [2001] NSWCCA 29 at [56]–[58] per Wood CJ at CL (but compare R v Em [2003] NSWCCA 374 at [110] per Howie J, discussed in [EA.90.90]). 876. R v FE [2013] NSWSC 1692 at [132]–[135].

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intentionally or recklessly led the defendant to believe that, because the interview was not being recorded, they did not intend to use his statements in evidence against him.877 Other forms of trickery adopted by the police to circumvent an assertion of the right to silence will not necessarily result in exclusion under this provision, whether the trickery involves use of undercover police or an agent to elicit an admission: see [EA.90.270].

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[EA.90.240]

Suspects suffering a mental disorder or disability

It has been held878 that common law principles879 relating to the admissibility of admissions by persons suffering a mental disorder or disability are “applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the relevant provision of the Evidence Act”. It is recognised that persons who are intellectually impaired or who suffer from disease or disorder of the mind are by no means necessarily incapable of telling, or admitting the truth (compare s 85). In a case where the defendant was affected, to some degree, by the effects of the substantial quantity of alcohol and drugs consumed by him some hours before the interview, it was held that the “fact that the accused may have made admissions … in part because his tongue was loosened by the effects of alcohol and drugs does not, in my view, make it unfair to admit the interview”.880 Of course, each case will turn on its own facts and questions of degree. If there was a real danger of confabulation, a lack of awareness, a lack of capacity to make a rational decision between speaking and remaining silent or to give rational answers, for example, exclusion under this provision would be appropriate.881 On the other hand, in Riley v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 238, McClellan CJ at CL (Hoeben J and Grove AJ agreeing) at [155]–[158] considered that there would not be unfairness arising from potential unreliability if the tribunal of fact was in a position to assess and evaluate the reliability of the admission (in the case of a jury, with the benefit of appropriate directions from the trial judge).882 Of course, where an investigating official took advantage of a suspect’s mental disorder or disability to obtain a potentially unreliable admission, the evidence may well be inadmissible pursuant to s 85.

[EA.90.260]

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander suspects

The common law developed rules to protect Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander suspects during interrogation: R v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412; Dumoo v Gardner (1998) 143 FLR 245. Legislation with respect to police interrogation also 877. R v Em [2003] NSWCCA 374 at [108] and [133]. 878. R v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432 at 441 per Hidden J. 879. See R v Parker (1989) 19 NSWLR 177 at 183–184; R v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188; R v Smith (1992) 58 SASR 491; R v Garth (1994) 73 A Crim R 215. 880. R v Helmhout (2000) 112 A Crim R 10; [2000] NSWSC 208 at [39] per Bell J; see also R v Nelson (2004) 41 MVR 10; [2004] NSWCCA 231 at [22]–[23]. 881. See eg R v Medcalfe [2002] ACTSC 83 at [24]; R v Gallagher [2013] NSWSC 1102 at [235]–[241]. 882. See also R v Jarrett [2012] NSWCCA 81, where a medical diagnosis that the person was “mentally disordered” at the time an admission was made did not support exclusion under this provision because the diagnosis was only based on the person’s concern he might go to gaol as a result of committing offences and was threatening to commit suicide. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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provides for specific assistance and protections for such suspects. Breach of those rules may be a basis for excluding evidence of an admission under s 138884 but this provision may also have application.885 Even if there is no breach of the rules, there may be reasons to conclude that it would be unfair to admit the evidence (for example, where there is good reason to conclude that the suspect has answered questions in order to satisfy the perceived desires of the questioner (gratuitous concurrence).

[EA.90.270]

Admissions not made to an “investigating official”

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There is no doubt that application of this provision will vary between the situation where an admission is made to an “investigating official” and where it is not. An assessment of fairness will vary depending on whether the questioning is being conducted by the police or a comparable law enforcement official, by such a person engaged in a covert investigation, by an investigator who is not an investigating official, or by a friend, acquaintance or some other non-official person. As to the latter situation, it is clear that, for example, a failure to caution with regard to the right to silence will not require exclusion of any admission under this provision.886 Where the questioning is being conducted by an investigator who is not an investigating official, such as an insurance investigator or an investigator working for an employer, the courts will not equate such a situation to official questioning.887 Equally, an admission made to a “support person” (ie a person given the responsibility of assisting and supporting a suspect in police custody) will not necessarily be made in circumstances that will render use of it against the defendant as unfair.888 However, where what is said is a “protected confidence” as defined in s 126A of the NSW Act, this will be a significant consideration supporting a conclusion that use of the confidence against the defendant will be unfair (quite apart from the operation of s 126B) – in R v Leung [2012] NSWSC 1451, Price J observed at [22]: [T]he relationship between a clinical nurse specialist who is called to a police station to make a mental health assessment and an accused person is a protected relationship under s 126A Evidence Act. Ensuring that a person in custody is not a risk of self-harm is a matter of importance not only to the police force but to our society as a whole. It is fundamental to the reliability of the assessment that accused persons be able to speak freely to the health professional without fear that their conversation might be used in evidence against them. To be balanced against that consideration is the public interest in solving serious crimes such as manslaughter. However, it is unlikely that accused 883. See, for example, Pt 9 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) and associated regulations. 884. See, for example, R v Taylor [1999] ACTSC 47 at [20]. 885. See R v Tyson [2018] NTSC 27 at [29]–[33]. 886. Higgins v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 56 at [37]. 887. R v Frangulis [2006] NSWCCA 363 at [33]; Higgins v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 56 per Hoeben J at [34]–[37] (Sully and Bell JJ agreeing). 888. JB v The Queen (2012) 83 NSWLR 153; [2012] NSWCCA 12 at [23]–[45]. The fact that the support person does not caution the suspect that anything said may be used in evidence against him does not alter this conclusion: at [39].

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persons in custody would co-operate in a mental health assessment if they understood that the interview was not to be confidential.

The position with a police officer or comparable official engaged in a covert investigation is more complex.889 This situation would arise where the official was acting “undercover” or using a non-official as an agent. It is true that in R v Frangulis [2006] NSWCCA 363 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal saw no basis for exclusion under this provision where the police used an insurance investigator to question a suspect, on the surprising basis (see Hidden J at [33]–[34]) that the evidence would not have been excluded if the insurance investigator had not been acting on behalf of the police. On the other hand, it has been held890 that common law principles891 relating to admissions made to police informers apply under the Act. Relevant considerations will include whether the police used the person talking to the suspect as their agent, whether there is any evidence that the person held out any form of inducement, or made any threat, or engaged in any form of trickery with respect to engaging in the conversations, and whether there is any basis for concluding that the admissions were unreliable.892

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In Pavitt v The Queen (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88, McColl JA and Latham J, relying heavily on the judgment of the High Court in R v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1 (which in turn referred extensively to Canadian authority) summarised applicable principles as follows (at [70]):893 (a) The underlying consideration in the admissibility of covertly recorded conversations is to look at the accuseds freedom to choose to speak to the police and the extent to which that freedom has been impugned: Swaffıeld (at [91]) per Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ; (at [155]) per Kirby J; (b) If that freedom is impugned, the court has a discretion to reject the evidence, the exercise of which will turn on all the circumstances which may point to unfairness to the accused if the confession is admitted: Swaffıeld (at [91]); a conclusion that some or all of the Broyles factors were present did not lead to the admissions being excluded in either Pavic or Carters cases; (c) Even if there is no unfairness the court may consider that, having regard to the means by which the confession was elicited, the evidence has been obtained at a price which is unacceptable having regard to prevailing community standards: Swaffıeld (at [91]);

889. Compare R v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1, discussed above. 890. R v Walker [2000] NSWCCA 130. 891. See R v Swaffıeld (1998) 192 CLR 159; 72 ALJR 339; [1998] HCA 1; R v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507; R v Bailey (1993) 97 Cr App R 365; R v Lowe [1997] 2 VR 465; R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; 129 A Crim R 408; [2002] VSCA 77 at [24]–[64]. 892. See R v Walker [2000] NSWCCA 130 at [37]–[51] per Spigelman CJ; R v Lieske (2006) 166 A Crim R 213; [2006] ACTSC 97 per Gray J at [40]–[41]; R v LDV (No 2) [2013] NSWDC 215 at [87]–[98]. 893. See also W K v The Queen [2011] VSCA 345, Maxwell P at [49]–[52]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(d) The question whether the conversation was recorded in circumstances such that it might be characterised as either unfair and/or improper include whether the accused had previously indicated that he/she refused to speak to the police894; (e) The right to silence will only be infringed where it was the informer who caused the accused to make the statement, and where the informer was acting as an agent of the State at the time the accused made the statement. Accordingly, two distinct inquiries are required: (i) as a threshold question, was the evidence obtained by an agent of the State? (ii) was the evidence elicited? (f) A person is a State agent if the exchange between the accused and the informer would not have taken place, in the form and manner in which it did take place, but for the intervention of the State or its agents: Broyles (at [30]); (g) Absent eliciting behaviour on the part of the police, there is no violation of the accuseds right to choose whether or not to speak to the police. If the suspect speaks, it is by his or her own choice, and he or she must be taken to have accepted the risk that the recipient may inform the police: Hebert; (h) Admissions will have been elicited if the relevant parts of the conversation were the functional equivalent of an interrogation and if the State agent exploited any special characteristics of the relationship to extract the statement; evidence of the instructions given to the State agent for the conduct of the conversation may also be important: Broyles;

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(i) The fact that the conversation was covertly recorded is not, of itself, unfair or improper, at least where the recording was lawful.

This summary was adopted and applied by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335, Simpson J (RA Hulme J and Barr AJ agreeing) at [123]–[132].895 However, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has, on several occasions, taken a narrow view of the term “agent of the State”: R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363; 231 A Crim R 474; [2013] NSWCCA 121, Basten JA at [15]; R v Ryan [2013] NSWCCA 316 at [65]–[66]; see also R v DRF [2015] NSWCCA 181 at [57]. Furthermore, in a more recent decision, R v DRF [2015] NSWCCA 181, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that there was no relevant unfairness in circumstances where the police encouraged a complainant to act as a state agent and seek to elicit admissions (in a conversation recorded under warrant) from a suspect who had refused to answer police questions. Simpson JA emphasised at [89]–[99] that, notwithstanding that the police plainly intended to circumvent the suspect’s assertion of his right to silence, what was said by the suspect was reliable, the recording provided a reliable record of what was said, the warrant had been granted by a Supreme Court justice, there was no element of coercion and the conversation might easily have occurred without police intervention. Leeming JA emphasised at [4] that there was no suggestion of “deceptive conduct by the complainant” (other than 894. Note that, in R v Belford (2011) 208 A Crim R 256; [2011] QCA 43 a majority of the Queensland Court of Appeal held that a trial judge was entitled not to exclude admissions under the common law discretion in a case where a suspect had not exercised his right to silence but the police anticipated that he would assert it if asked questions by them and used an undercover officer to elicit the admissions. 895. See also R v Simmons (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189 at [90]–[95].

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failing to inform the suspect that the conversation was being recorded by the police) and that the suspect knew there was an ongoing police investigation (at [6]). It is apparent that the fact that the police use an agent to circumvent an assertion of the right to silence will not, by itself, result in exclusion under this provision. There is similar authority in other jurisdictions where undercover police are utilised for the same purpose.896 Where the informer was in prison at the time, knowledge on the part of the police and the informer that some form of assistance may be forthcoming with respect to the informer’s sentencing does not, by itself, constitute an element of impropriety.897 Where an objective of the police was “to obtain information concerning any plan, or plans, which the accused had for ongoing or future offences, and to nip them in the bud”, prior to arrest, this would be a consideration pointing to admission of the evidence.898

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[EA.90.300]

Non-admission evidence

The discretion conferred by this provision applies only to evidence of an admission. Accordingly, there is no discretion to exclude other prosecution evidence on the basis that, having regard to the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence. This contrasts with the position at common law,899 and it has been suggested that this may require amendment of the Act.900 Nevertheless, in ALRC 102 it was concluded that no amendment should be made (para 10.124). That might suggest that the issue is required to be dealt with under other provisions of the Act, particularly s 138. However, in Haddara v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 53; 241 A Crim R 93; [2014] VSCA 100, Redlich and Weinberg JJA (Priest JA dissenting) held that the common law discretion to exclude any evidence, whether confessional or real, on the ground that to receive it would be unfair to a criminal defendant (in the sense that the trial would be unfair) continues to apply in UEL jurisdictions. While the proposition that such a common law exclusionary discretion is not caught by the operation of s 56(1) may be doubted (see general discussion at [EA.Intro.120]), it is important to note s 11(2), which provides that “the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process in a proceeding are not affected” by this Act (see [EA.11.90]). There can be no doubt that those powers, existing in part to avoid an unfair trial, would extend to exclusion of evidence on the basis that “it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence”.

896. See, eg, R v Belford (2011) 208 A Crim R 256; [2011] QCA 43, per Fraser JA at [98]; R v Krezic [2017] QCA 122, per Boddice J at [31]–[39]. 897. See R v Walker [2000] NSWCCA 130 at [58] per Spigelman CJ. 898. R v Mallah (2005) 154 A Crim R 150; [2005] NSWSC 358 per Wood CJ at [113]–[114]. 899. R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542; 51 A Crim R 397; R v Pearsall (1990) 49 A Crim R 439; Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533; 126 ALR 481 at [548]; Police v Jervis (1998) 101 A Crim R 1 (SAFC); R v Schuurs [1999] QSC 176. 900. See R v Grant (2001) 127 A Crim R 312; [2001] NSWCCA 486 at [85] per Smart AJ. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Burden and standard of proof

The burden of demonstrating that it would be unfair to the defendant to use the evidence rests on the defence.901 To the extent that the defence relies on particular facts to meet this burden, proof on the balance of probabilities will be required: s 142(1).

[EA.90.360]

Appellate review

In MIH v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 199, Campbell JA (Hidden J and Smart AJ agreeing) held at [54] that “the exercise by a trial judge of the discretion that arises under s 90” would be reviewable on appeal only on the principles stated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499.902 The Victorian Court of Appeal has taken the same approach in the context of an interlocutory appeal.903 In Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46 the appellant submitted that this provision did not create a discretion, and hence that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in applying the standard of review described in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 that is normally applied to discretionary decisions, but it was unnecessary for the High Court to resolve this argument (see Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [55]).

Part 3.5 – Evidence of judgments and convictions

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.5.30]

Summary of this Part

This Part creates (in s 91) a prima facie rule that evidence of a decision or judgment, or a finding of fact, in a proceeding is not admissible to prove some fact that was in issue in those proceedings. That general rule is subject to a number of exceptions, provided for in ss 92 and 93. Section 92(1) creates an exception to the general rule in both civil and criminal proceedings in respect of grants of probate and letters of administration. Section 92(2) creates an exception in civil proceedings in respect of the conviction of an offence (but not an acquittal). Section 93 provides that s 91 will not operate in relation to convictions admitted in defamation proceedings and makes it clear that s 91 does not affect the rules relating to judgments in rem, res judicata and issue estoppel.

Cth Act: 91

Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions

(1) Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding. 901. Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; 81 ALJR 1896; [2007] HCA 46, Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [63]. 902. See also, Bin Sulaeman v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 283 at [96]. In respect of the common law, see R v Belford (2011) 208 A Crim R 256; [2011] QCA 43 at [57], [138]. 903. FMJ v The Queen [2011] VSCA 308 at [53].

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(2) Evidence that, under this Part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to prove that fact even if it is relevant for another purpose. Note: Section 178 (Convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings) provides for certificate evidence of decisions.

NSW Act: 91

Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions

(1) Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding. (2) Evidence that, under this Part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to prove that fact even if it is relevant for another purpose. Note: Section 178 (Convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings) provides for certificate evidence of decisions.

Vic Act: 91

Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions

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(1) Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding. (2) Evidence that, under this Part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to prove that fact even if it is relevant for another purpose. Note: Section 178 (Convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings) provides for certificate evidence of decisions.

ACT Act: 91

Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions

(1) Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in the proceeding. (2) Evidence that, under this part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to prove the fact even if it is relevant for another purpose. Note: Section 178 (Convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings) provides for certificate evidence of decisions.

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s 91

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

NT Act: 91 Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions (1) Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding. (2) Evidence that, under this Part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to prove that fact even if it is relevant for another purpose. Note for section 91: Section 178 (Convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings) provides for certificate evidence of decisions.

[EA.91.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 80, paras 170–171; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 781.

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[EA.91.60] General comments Section 91 establishes a prima facie rule that evidence of a decision or judgment, or a finding of fact, in a proceeding is not admissible to prove some fact that was in issue in those proceedings.904 In addition, even if the evidence is relevant and admissible for some other purpose, it may not be used for the purpose of proving such a fact. As Simpson J explained in Attorney General (NSW) v Martin [2015] NSWSC 1372 at [13], whether this provision operates to exclude the use of decisions or judgments “will depend upon an analysis of three things – (i) what facts were in issue in those proceedings; (ii) what facts were found in the decisions; and (iii) the use to which the [party adducing the evidence] seeks to put those judgments – that is, what facts [the party] seeks to prove by their use”. In Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174, Hunt AJA (Handley and McColl JJA agreeing) stated at [109]: It is clear that s 91 does not prevent the tender of judgments which contain findings as to the existence of facts relevant to the issues in the trial in which they are tendered. It merely prevents the judgments from being tendered for the purpose of proving the existence of those facts. If they are admissible for some other purpose – as they are in the present case, in order to demonstrate that they would have persuaded any honest-minded person that the defendant’s allegations were false – they may not then be used to prove the existence of those facts, a consequence which would otherwise have flowed from s 60 of the Evidence Act.

Thus, this provision does not prevent evidence being given of judgments for the purpose not of establishing the truth of the facts found, but to establish the terms of a judgment and its effect905 – as expressly recognised by the “Savings” provision in s 93. Equally, it will not prevent evidence being given of a 904. See, for example, Pacer v Westpac Banking Corp (unreported, NSW SC, Santow J, 15 April 1996); National Mutual Life Assn of Australasia v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (2001) 183 ALR 700; [2001] FCA 237 at [46]–[48]; Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Gillett (2004) 145 A Crim R 220; [2004] NSWSC 278; Daunt v Daunt [2015] VSCA 58 at [57]–[59]; Attorney General (NSW) v Martin [2015] NSWSC 1372 at [98]. 905. See, for example, Crawley v Vero Insurance Ltd (No 7) [2014] NSWSC 80 at [20].

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“decision” if there was no finding of any fact in issue in the proceedings.906 it will not prevent evidence being given of a “decision” if the facts thereby evidenced are not “a fact that was in issue in that proceeding”.907 Furthermore, the general rule is subject to a number of exceptions, provided for in s 92. However, there is a view that other exceptions should be recognised.908 Brereton J of the NSW Supreme Court has taken a very restrictive view of this provision, observing that “what s 91 is addressing is the formal record of conviction, the formal record of acquittal or the formal judgment or order disposing of a case in a civil case … not … the reasons for judgment, the findings of fact made by a judge in the course of coming to the final conclusion, nor the remarks on sentence, all of which remain no more than the opinion of the judge”.909 However, it has to be said that the NSW Court of Appeal in Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 did not approach s 91 in such a narrow way. Hunt AJA considered at [109] that s 91 had application to “Licensing Court judgments” which “contain findings as to the existence of facts relevant to the issues in the trial in which they are tendered” (so long as the finding was relied upon to prove the existence of a fact in issue in that proceeding). There was no suggestion that s 91 should be approached in the restrictive way adopted by Brereton J. In The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341, the NSW Court of Appeal held (at [9]) that this provision applied to “the detailed facts found by the sentencing judge [and] by the Court of Criminal Appeal”.910 Similarly, in Daunt v Daunt [2015] VSCA 58, the Victorian Court of Appeal (at [57]–[59]) applied this provision to a Tribunal “determination” which contained a number of findings of fact. It should be noted that Brereton J considered that his narrow approach to this provision did not render evidence of “reasons for judgment” admissible since his Honour considered that the common law still applied to exclude the evidence. The question whether the common law in respect of rules of admissibility has continuing application is discussed at [EA.Intro.120] but it is suggested that the better view is that s 91 applies more broadly to encompass any “finding of fact” made in another proceeding. An interesting question arose in Talacko v Talacko [2014] VSC 328 as to whether s 91 applies in a case where a court is deciding, pursuant to s 125(2), whether 906. See Attorney General (NSW) v Martin [2015] NSWSC 1372 at [54], [61], [79], [95]. 907. See Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 per Hunt AJA (Handley and McColl JJA agreeing) at [109]; Attorney General v Yau Hang Chan [2011] NSWSC 1315 at [46]–[47]. In Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 56, it was held that the relevance of the earlier judgment was to show what was in issue in the proceedings, and “[i]n those proceedings, it was not a fact in issue as to what the issues were before that Court” (Beech-Jones J at [6]). 908. For example, the question was raised by Lee J in Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 456, whether a finding of a judge hearing a substantive application can be used to determine the liability for costs of a third party, at least if the connection of the third party with the original proceedings was so close that no injustice would be caused by allowing this exception to the general rule: see at [13]–[22]. 909. Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) [2015] NSWSC 790 at [58]. 910. See also Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Livanes [2012] NSWCA 325, per McColl JA at [9]–[10]; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Gregory [2017] NSWCA 101, at [16]–[20]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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there are “reasonable grounds for finding” that relevant conduct had occurred so as to deprive a communication or document of client legal privilege. Although it was not necessary to decide the question, Elliott J expressed the view at [75] that use of earlier judgments to establish that there were “reasonable grounds” for finding alleged frauds “does not equate to seeking to prove the existence of the frauds on the balance of probabilities”, with the consequence that s 91(1) was not breached. While this view may be justifiable on a narrow reading of the provision, is consistent with Pt 4.1 and, perhaps, the policy behind s 125(2), it is certainly questionable whether it is consistent with the policy behind this provision. It is undesirable that this provision have no application to the establishment of a prima facie case.

[EA.91.90] Certificate evidence Section 178 (Convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings) provides for certificate evidence of decisions. It provides a procedure whereby evidence may be adduced in certificate form of the fact of a conviction (see also ss 178 and 179), acquittal, sentence, court order or “the pendency or existence … of a civil or criminal proceeding”.

Cth Act:

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92

Exceptions

(1) Subsection 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence of the grant of probate, letters of administration or a similar order of a court to prove: (a) the death, or date of death, of a person; or (b) the due execution of a testamentary document. (2) In a civil proceeding, subsection 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence that a party, or a person through or under whom a party claims, has been convicted of an offence, not being a conviction: (a) in respect of which a review or appeal (however described) has been instituted but not finally determined; or (b) that has been quashed or set aside; or (c) in respect of which a pardon has been given. (3) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a kind referred to in this section. NSW Act: 92

Exceptions

(1) Section 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence of the grant of probate, letters of administration or a similar order of a court to prove: (a) the death, or date of death, of a person, or (b) the due execution of a testamentary document. (2) In a civil proceeding, section 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence that a party, or a person through or under whom a party claims, has been convicted of an offence, not being a conviction: 680

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(a)

in respect of which a review or appeal (however described) has been instituted but not finally determined, or (b) that has been quashed or set aside, or (c) in respect of which a pardon has been given. (3) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a kind referred to in this section. Vic Act: 92

Exceptions

(1) Section 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence of the grant of probate, letters of administration or a similar order of a court to prove— (a) the death, or date of death, of a person; or (b) the due execution of a testamentary document.

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(2) In a civil proceeding, section 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence that a party, or a person through or under whom a party claims, has been convicted of an offence, not being a conviction— (a) in respect of which a review or appeal (however described) has been instituted but not finally determined; or (b) that has been quashed or set aside; or (c) in respect of which a pardon has been given. (3) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a kind referred to in this section. ACT Act: 92

Exceptions

(1) Section 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence of the grant of probate, letters of administration or a similar order of a court to prove— (a) the death, or date of death, of a person; or (b) the proper execution of a testamentary document. (2) In a civil proceeding, section 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence that a party, or a person through or under whom a party claims, has been convicted of an offence, other than a conviction— (a) in relation to which a review or appeal (however described) has been started but not finally decided; or (b) that has been quashed or set aside; or (c) in relation to which a pardon has been given. (3) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence mentioned in this section.

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NT Act: 92 Exceptions (1) Section 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence of the grant of probate, letters of administration or a similar order of a court to prove: (a) the death, or date of death, of a person; or (b) the due execution of a testamentary document. (2) In a civil proceeding, section 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence that a party, or a person through or under whom a party claims, has been convicted of an offence, not being a conviction: (a) in respect of which a review or appeal (however described) has been instituted but not finally determined; or (b) that has been quashed or set aside; or (c) in respect of which a pardon has been given. (3) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a kind referred to in this section.

[EA.92.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 81, para 170; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 772–776, 782.

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[EA.92.60] General comments Section 92(1) creates an exception to the general rule in both civil and criminal proceedings in respect of grants of probate and letters of administration. Section 92(2) creates an exception in civil proceedings in respect of the conviction of an offence (but not an acquittal).911 The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 773–778): The proposal is to make evidence of a conviction admissible against the person convicted (and those claiming through him) in any civil proceedings where it is relevant to the issue to be decided … The proposal has been limited to proceedings in which the person convicted is a party or persons are claiming through him. The narrower reform has been favoured because of the difficulties faced by a stranger seeking to counter the effect of a conviction tendered against him … The proposal renders admissible all convictions, whether by jury or before a magistrate … It may be advisable, although perhaps not strictly necessary, to define a conviction for the purposes of the proposal as not including a conviction that has been set aside, quashed, subject to appeal or in respect of which the person convicted has been pardoned. Where a conviction has been appealed against but the outcome is as yet unknown, the civil court should adjourn the proceedings or not take the conviction into account … The proposal makes no attempt to specify the weight to be accorded to the conviction, nor does it set up a presumption that the conviction is assumed to be correct, so as to place a legal onus of disproof upon the person convicted … A conviction has substantial evidentiary weight itself in any event and needs no presumption that it was justified. It is enough that the convicted person will have an evidentiary onus in the civil proceedings, if he disputes the facts sought to be proved by the conviction. 911. Batey v Potts (2004) 61 NSWLR 274; [2004] NSWSC 606.

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[EA.92.90]

It is important to note that the exception created by s 92(2) is for “evidence that a party … has been convicted of an offence”. It does not extend to evidence of any factual findings made by a court (for example, the court sentencing the person convicted of the offence). 912 There is an argument that other exceptions should be recognised. In Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 456, Lee J noted uncertainty as to whether a finding of a judge hearing a substantive application can be used to determine the liability for costs of a third party, at least if the connection of the third party with the original proceedings was so close that no injustice would be caused by allowing this exception to the general rule: see at [13]–[22].

[EA.92.70]

“a person through or under whom a party claims” (s 92(2)(a))

Brereton J of the NSW Supreme Court has discussed the extension in s 92(2)(a) (of the exception to s 91(1) in relation to evidence that “a party” has been convicted of an offence) to “a person through or under whom a party claims”: [61] … The words used in the section “through or under whom a party claims” directly import the strict concept of privity that applies in the law of res judicata and issue estoppel. In the leading High Court authority on that question, Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; 42 ALJR 89; [1968] HCA 34, Barwick CJ identified the necessary relationship of privity in the context of issue estoppel in these terms:

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The basic requirement of a privy interest is that the privy must claim under or through the person of whom he is said to be a privy. [62] The correspondence of the words in that dictum with the terms of the section make very clear that what was intended to be captured was exactly the same concept. … [63] It is frankly difficult to conceive of circumstances in which a party to a criminal proceeding will have privies for the purpose of s 92(2). …913

[EA.92.90] “The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply …” (s 92(3)) The effect of this provision is that, where an exception to the general exclusionary rule in s 91 applies and permits evidence of a decision, or of a finding of fact, in a proceeding to be admitted to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding, the hearsay and opinion rules have no operation – thus hearsay and opinion evidence of the decision or the finding of fact may be admitted. However, the tendency rule (s 97) continues to operate. Where evidence of a conviction is adduced to prove a fact from which a tendency to act or think in a particular way is sought to be inferred, there must be compliance with Pt 3.6. Equally, the coincidence rule (s 98) continues to operate. If those provisions do not apply, and the discretions in Pt 3.11 are not utilised to exclude the evidence of the conviction, it will be admissible. As the ALRC noted above, while evidence 912. The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court (NSW) v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341 at [9]; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court (NSW) v Livanes [2012] NSWCA 325 at [9]–[10]. 913. Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) [2015] NSWSC 790 at [60]–[66]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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of the conviction will not affect the applicable legal burden of proof, a tactical burden will be on the convicted person if he or she disputes the facts sought to be proved by the conviction.914

[EA.92.120]

Certificate evidence

Section 178 (Convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings) provides for certificate evidence of decisions. It provides a procedure whereby evidence may be adduced in certificate form of the fact of a conviction (see also ss 178 and 179), acquittal, sentence, court order or “the pendency or existence … of a civil or criminal proceeding”.

[EA.92.150]

Request to produce documents or call witnesses

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Section 167 permits a party to “make a reasonable request to another party for the purpose of determining a question that relates to: … (b) evidence of a conviction of a person for an offence”. The procedure is prescribed in Pt 4.6 Div 1. The ALRC explained this proposal (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 779): It is proposed to include a provision that, where a conviction is tendered by A against B, B may apply to the court to require that any witness (“X”) in the earlier criminal proceedings be called for the purpose of cross-examination by B. The onus to obtain such a witness’ name and address would be upon B and if X was unavailable, the conviction would still be admissible. This provision is primarily a safeguard against the situation envisaged by the New Zealand Committee, that A could tender a conviction obtained mainly on X’s evidence but deliberately refrain from calling X because A fears that X’s evidence is vulnerable to cross-examination. Such tactics would unfairly deprive B of a chance to contest properly the issue presented by X’s evidence. In considering an application that X be called for cross-examination, the court should have an overriding discretion to refuse or grant the application, having regard to matters such as – whether there is a genuine dispute about the conviction or a question relating to it; the importance of the fact which X’s evidence would tend to prove; the availability of any other witness to prove the same fact and whether undue delay or expense would be caused by calling X.

It should be noted that s 166 defines a “request” under s 167 to include a request to another party: (g) in relation to evidence that a person has been convicted of an offence, being evidence to which subsection 92(2) applies – to call as a witness a person who gave evidence in the proceeding in which the person was so convicted.

Cth Act: 93

Savings This Part does not affect the operation of: (a) a law that relates to the admissibility or effect of evidence of a conviction tendered in a proceeding (including a criminal proceeding) for defamation; or (b) a judgment in rem; or

914. See Gonzales v Claridades (2003) 58 NSWLR 188; [2003] NSWSC 508 at [66].

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s 93

Part 3.5 - Evidence of judgments and convictions

(c)

[EA.93.30]

the law relating to res judicata or issue estoppel.

NSW Act: 93

Savings This Part does not affect the operation of: (a) a law that relates to the admissibility or effect of evidence of a conviction tendered in a proceeding (including a criminal proceeding) for defamation, or (b) a judgment in rem, or (c) the law relating to res judicata or issue estoppel.

Vic Act: 93

Savings This Part does not affect the operation of— (a) a law that relates to the admissibility or effect of evidence of a conviction tendered in a proceeding (including a criminal proceeding) for defamation; or (b) a judgment in rem; or (c) the law relating to res judicata or issue estoppel.

ACT Act:

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93

Savings This part does not affect the operation of— (a) a law that relates to the admissibility or effect of evidence of a conviction tendered in a proceeding (including a criminal proceeding) for defamation; or (b) a judgment in rem; or (c) the law relating to res judicata or issue estoppel.

NT Act: 93

Savings This Part does not affect the operation of: (a) a law that relates to the admissibility or effect of evidence of a conviction tendered in a proceeding (including a criminal proceeding) for defamation; or (b) a judgment in rem; or (c) the law relating to res judicata or issue estoppel.

[EA.93.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 82, paras 170–171; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 782–783.

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685

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30]

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 93

Part 3.6 – Tendency and coincidence

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30]

Summary of this Part

This Part establishes the “tendency rule” (s 97), which excludes “tendency evidence”, that is, evidence of conduct, character or reputation adduced to prove a “tendency” to act or think in a particular way, unless the evidence has “significant probative value” and reasonable notice has been given of the intention to adduce the evidence (although s 100 allows a court to dispense with the notice requirement). The Part also establishes the “coincidence rule” (s 98), which excludes evidence “that 2 or more events occurred” adduced to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that “it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally” (relying on similarities in the events and/or the circumstances in which they occurred) unless the same requirements imposed in respect of tendency evidence are satisfied. Both provisions apply in civil and criminal proceedings, although s 94 makes it clear that they do not apply to evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness, to bail or sentencing proceedings, or to evidence of character, reputation, conduct or tendency if it is (as distinct from relevant to) a fact in issue. Section 101 imposes further restrictions in criminal proceedings on tendency evidence and coincidence evidence about the defendant adduced by the prosecution. Section 95 makes it clear that, where this Part renders evidence not admissible (or prevents it being used) to prove a particular matter, but the evidence has been admitted for another purpose, the evidence cannot be used in the prescribed way.An overview of tendency evidence and coincidence evidence is provided in the following diagrams.915

915. Produced by the Judicial College of Victoria. Available at: http:// www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/publications/uniform-evidence-resources. Reproduced with permission.

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s 93

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30]

: Tendency evidence

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FIGURE 5

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

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687

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.6.30]

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FIGURE 6

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 94

: Coincidence evidence

Cth Act: 94

Application

(1) This Part does not apply to evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness.

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s 94

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

(2) This Part does not apply so far as a proceeding relates to bail or sentencing. (3) This Part does not apply to evidence of: (a) the character, reputation or conduct of a person; or (b) a tendency that a person has or had; if that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue. NSW Act: 94

Application

(1) This Part does not apply to evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness. (2) This Part does not apply so far as a proceeding relates to bail or sentencing. (3) This Part does not apply to evidence of: (a) the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or (b) a tendency that a person has or had, if that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue. Vic Act: 94

Application

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(1) This Part does not apply to evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness. (2) This Part does not apply so far as a proceeding relates to bail or sentencing. (3) This Part does not apply to evidence of— (a) the character, reputation or conduct of a person; or (b) a tendency that a person has or had— if that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue. ACT Act: 94

Application—pt 3.6

(1) This part does not apply to evidence that relates only to the witness’s credibility. (2) This part does not apply so far as a proceeding relates to bail or sentencing. (3) This part does not apply to evidence of— (a) the character, reputation or conduct of a person; or (b) a tendency that a person has or had; if that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue.

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689

[EA.94.30]

s 94

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

NT Act: 94 Application (1) This Part does not apply to evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness. (2) This Part does not apply so far as a proceeding relates to bail or sentencing. (3) This Part does not apply to evidence of: (a) the character, reputation or conduct of a person; or (b) a tendency that a person has or had; if that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue.

[EA.94.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 84.

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[EA.94.60] “credibility of a witness” (s 94(1)) Part 3.7 of the Act deals with “credibility evidence” (defined in s 101A). An example of evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness would be evidence in a motor vehicle accident civil proceeding that an observer of the accident, giving evidence for one or other party, had prior convictions for offences of dishonesty. While the evidence of these convictions shows a “tendency” to be untruthful (cf s 97), if the evidence is relevant only to the credibility of the witness this Part has no application and the admissibility of the evidence will turn on Pt 3.7. However, where evidence is relevant not only to the credibility of a witness but also (more directly) to a fact in issue, this Part applies to the evidence (subject to the other provisions of s 94). If admissible as “tendency evidence” or “coincidence evidence” under this Part, Pt 3.7 will have no application (see s 101A). If by reason of this Part the evidence is not admissible, it will still be subject to the provisions of Pt 3.7 as “credibility evidence”. Even if it is admissible as credibility evidence, it cannot be used as “tendency evidence” or “coincidence evidence” (s 95).

[EA.94.90] “a fact in issue” The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 786): The character of a person may in some cases be a matter directly in issue as an element of a charge, claim or defence, and so admissible. Equally, his reputation, the opinion another holds of him, or some specific conduct of his, may be admissible for the same reason. Where a person’s character is directly in issue in a case, in the sense that it is “substantively required as the end product of proof”, it would be inappropriate to prevent evidence of that character from being adduced. The character of the person is not being used as the basis for inferring to behaviour in conformity with that character. Rather, it is the end point of proof and the evidence should be admitted notwithstanding that the tribunal of fact may be prejudiced by it. Similar considerations apply when a person’s reputation, another’s opinion of his character, or his specific conduct is directly in issue. Its admissibility will be governed by the relevance proposals. There can be no question that such evidence should be admitted in most cases. 690

Uniform Evidence Law

s 95

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

[EA.94.90]

The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 641, n 3) that the expression “fact in issue” should be interpreted as referring to the issues in the proceedings defined by substantive law and pleadings. Accordingly, “fact in issue” should be understood to mean “ultimate fact in issue” (see [EA.55.90]).916 Of course, behind the ultimate issues there will often be many issues about facts that are themselves relevant to facts in issue, but these are not facts “in issue”. An example of a case where character is directly in issue is a defamation action when justification is pleaded. In such a case, evidence of that character (in the form of evidence of reputation, opinion or specific conduct) may be admissible to establish the character of the person allegedly defamed. Similar examples can be given of cases where reputation,917 specific conduct918 or “tendency”919 are themselves a fact in issue in a proceeding, and evidence of them not subject to the provisions of Pt 3.6.

Cth Act: 95

Use of evidence for other purposes

(1) Evidence that under this Part is not admissible to prove a particular matter must not be used to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose. (2) Evidence that under this Part cannot be used against a party to prove a particular matter must not be used against the party to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

NSW Act: 95

Use of evidence for other purposes

(1) Evidence that under this Part is not admissible to prove a particular matter must not be used to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose. (2) Evidence that under this Part cannot be used against a party to prove a particular matter must not be used against the party to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose.

916. See Allam v Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 75 at [33]. 917. Re T [1980] 1 NSWLR 392 at 395 – an issue in the case was whether the appellant was “of good repute” within s 21 of the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW). 918. Legislation may impose heavier penalties where a person has committed earlier offences of a certain type. In such a case, the commission of those other offences is a fact in issue. 919. An example of a “tendency” which is a fact in issue may arise in a proceeding to determine whether a person seeking parole is “dangerous”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

691

[EA.95.30]

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s 95

Vic Act: 95 Use of evidence for other purposes (1) Evidence that under this Part is not admissible to prove a particular matter must not be used to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose. (2) Evidence that under this Part cannot be used against a party to prove a particular matter must not be used against the party to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose. ACT Act: 95

Use of evidence for other purposes

(1) Evidence that under this part is not admissible to prove a particular matter must not be used to prove the matter even if it is relevant for another purpose. (2) Evidence that under this part cannot be used against a party to prove a particular matter must not be used against the party to prove the matter even if it is relevant for another purpose. NT Act:

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95

Use of evidence for other purposes

(1) Evidence that under this Part is not admissible to prove a particular matter must not be used to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose. (2) Evidence that under this Part cannot be used against a party to prove a particular matter must not be used against the party to prove that matter even if it is relevant for another purpose.

[EA.95.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 85.

[EA.95.60] General comments This provision makes it clear that, where Pt 3.6 renders evidence not admissible (or prevents it being used) to prove a particular matter, but the evidence has been admitted for another purpose, the evidence cannot be used in the prescribed way.920 It thus takes the opposite approach to hearsay evidence which, under s 60, can be used as hearsay notwithstanding s 59, so long as the evidence has been admitted for another purpose. Evidence may initially be admitted for another 920. See Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 668; 297 ALR 406; [2013] HCA 21 at [30]–[31]; Allam v Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2012) 95 IPR 242; [2012] FCAFC 34 at [244]; El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [38]–[39]; White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18 at [142]–[143]. In a jury trial, it would be necessary to so direct the jury: see [EA.101.360].

692

Uniform Evidence Law

s 96

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

[EA.96.60]

purpose and then a ruling made at a later stage as to whether the evidence can be used in the prescribed way.921 As regards appropriate directions to a jury, see [EA.101.360].

Cth Act: 96

Failure to act A reference in this Part to doing an act includes a reference to failing to do that act. NSW Act: 96

Failure to act A reference in this Part to doing an act includes a reference to failing to do that act. Vic Act: 96

Failure to act

A reference in this Part to doing an act includes a reference to failing to do that act. ACT Act: Failure to act A reference in this part to doing an act includes a reference to failing to do that act. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

96

Note: Fail includes refuse (see Legislation Act, dict, pt 1).

NT Act: 96

Failure to act A reference in this Part to doing an act includes a reference to failing to do that act.

[EA.96.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 83.

[EA.96.60]

General comments

This provision ensures that evidence of an omission to act will be subject to the same rules as evidence of positive conduct. Despite the language of this provision, it is also intended that evidence of the absence of a particular state of mind (for example, evidence that a party had failed to foresee the consequences of certain conduct on another occasion) will be subject to this Part.

921. See R v Cornell [2015] NSWCCA 258 at [106]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

693

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 97

Cth Act: 97 The tendency rule (1) Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind unless: (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. [Subs (1) subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 42]

(2) Paragraph (1)(a) does not apply if: (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100; or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party. Note: The tendency rule is subject to specific exceptions concerning character of and expert opinion about accused persons (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[S 97 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 97 The tendency rule (1) Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind unless: (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence, and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. [Subs (1) subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[38]]

(2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if: (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100, or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party. Note: The tendency rule is subject to specific exceptions concerning character of and expert opinion about accused persons (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. [S 97 am Act 46 of 2007]

694

Uniform Evidence Law

s 97

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

Vic Act: 97 The tendency rule (1) Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind unless— (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. (2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if— (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100; or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party. Note: The tendency rule is subject to specific exceptions concerning character of and expert opinion about an accused (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions.

ACT Act:

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97

The tendency rule

(1) Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind unless— (a) the party seeking to present the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to present the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence presented or to be presented by the party seeking to present the evidence, have significant probative value. (2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if— (a) the evidence is presented in accordance with a direction made by the court under section 100 (Court may dispense with notice requirements); or (b) the evidence is presented to explain or contradict tendency evidence presented by another party. Note: The tendency rule is subject to specific exceptions about the character of and expert opinion about accused people (s 110 and s 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions.

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[EA.97.30]

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 97

NT Act: 97 The tendency rule (1) Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind unless: (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. (2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if: (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100; or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party. Note for section 97: The tendency rule is subject to specific exceptions concerning character of and expert opinion about accused persons (sections 110 and 111). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions.

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[EA.97.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 3.4–3.25, 11.8–11.17, 11.31–11.51; ALRC 38, ss 86, 87, paras 175–176; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 806–810.

[EA.97.60] General comments This provision, which applies in both civil and criminal proceedings, prohibits admission of evidence of “character, reputation, or conduct” of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had to prove that “a” person has a tendency to act or think in a particular way, unless the requirements of the provision are satisfied. The evidence is evidence specific922 to a person, adduced to prove that that person had a particular “tendency”. Like the hearsay rule (s 59), and the opinion rule (s 76), this provision is a “purpose” (or “use”) rule. If such evidence is not adduced to prove the existence of some tendency to act or think in a particular way, it is not caught by s 97. Indeed, it is not properly classified as “tendency evidence”, which is defined in the Dictionary as follows: “tendency evidence”means evidence of a kind referred to in subsection 97(1) that a party seeks to have adduced for the purpose referred to in that subsection.

Another way of expressing this proposition is to say that evidence of “character, reputation, or conduct” (or “tendency”) is not caught by this provision (the 922. Thus, in R v Villalon [2014] NSWSC 725, it was held at [22] that evidence of research findings (that a person who is in the untreated prodromal stage of a psychotic illness is at a significantly increased risk of irrational violence is tendency evidence) relied on to support a defence of diminished responsibility, was not tendency evidence because it was “not specific to the accused but it is generic evidence based on research applicable to a particular class of person”.

696

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Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

[EA.97.60]

“tendency rule”: see Dictionary) if it is not adduced to prove the existence of some tendency to act or think in a particular way, but adduced for some other purpose. In shorthand, the evidence is adduced for a non-tendency purpose (see [EA.97.240]). If the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible for that other purpose, it will be admitted (see [EA.97.270]). In the Full Federal Court, Sackville J observed: The critical question in a case in which the tendency rule stated in s 97(1) is said to apply to evidence of conduct is whether the evidence is relevant to a fact in issue because it shows that a person has or had a tendency to act in a particular way. To adopt the language of Cowen and Carter, the question is whether the evidence of conduct is relevant to a fact in issue via propensity: insofar as the evidence establishes the propensity of the relevant person to act in a particular way, is it a link in the process of proving that the person did in fact behave in the particular way on the occasion in question?923

As Sackville J noted (at [62]), this approach is consistent with the manner in which the ALRC used the term “propensity” in its reports on Evidence. It defined the word this way (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 785):

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Propensity. This word is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary to mean “inclination or tendency”. It seems that this is the way it is used in the law, a tendency to act, think or feel in a particular way. Usually the propensity will be evidenced by specific conduct, leading (like character) to the inference that the person will behave in conformity with that propensity.

Thus, in order to decide whether this provision applies to evidence of “character, reputation, or conduct” (or “tendency”) it is necessary to determine whether the evidence is to be used to show a tendency to act in a particular way, or have a particular state of mind,924 and to infer925 behaviour in conformity with that tendency on a particular occasion.926 This is a form of syllogistic reasoning.927 To avoid application of the provision, it will not be sufficient to assert that the evidence is relevant to prove something other than “tendency” (for example, “system” or “habit”) but to demonstrate that the evidence is relevant to a fact in issue by a process of reasoning which does not involve the drawing of an inference from evidence of “tendency” to conforming behaviour.928 In that 923. Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [61] per Sackville J (Whitlam and Mansfield JJ agreeing). 924. In Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal at [370]–[371] criticised a passage in the Victorian Court of Appeal judgment in Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [173](f) on the basis that it held that evidence of a state of mind is not admissible as tendency evidence. However, that appears to be a misreading of what was said by the Victorian Court of Appeal. That court was simply making the point that evidence of conduct may show a tendency to act in a particular way and that to contend that it also shows a particular state of mind may add nothing and thus have no probative value (other than “rank propensity”). 925. See Hughes v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 330 at [160]. 926. See, for example, Allam v Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2012) 95 IPR 242; [2012] FCAFC 34 at [244]; Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [358]–[364]. 927. Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [359]–[360]. 928. Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 at [65] per Sackville J (Whitlam and Mansfield JJ agreeing). Sackville J held that, in this case, the evidence © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.97.60]

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 97

context, it will be necessary to identify with some precision what the tendering party proposes to establish by the evidence.929

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The provision should be interpreted as dealing both with whether particular evidence may be admitted in a proceeding and how admitted evidence may be used in a proceeding. The applicable words are “is not admissible to prove that …”. If the particular evidence is not adduced to prove the existence of some tendency to act or think in a particular way, it is not caught by s 97. However, admission of the evidence for some other relevant use does not mean that s 97 no longer has any application. The fact that the evidence in question is admissible for another use and has been admitted into evidence, does not mean that s 97 has no work to do (because it only deals with admissibility). The point is put beyond doubt by s 95(1). If the evidence “is relevant for another purpose” (that is, relevant other than to prove a tendency to act or think in a particular way), the evidence “must not be used to prove that matter” (that is, must not be used to prove such a tendency) if the evidence is “not admissible to prove” such a tendency (that is, if the conditions of s 97 are not satisfied). As regards the scope of the term “tendency”, in Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Andreasen [2005] NSWSC 579, Hamilton J considered at [12]–[13] that dictionary definitions of the word “tendency” import “a degree of generality” so that it would be “a contorted and unnatural use of language” to “talk of a tendency to make particular statements about one particular subject matter in a negotiation for one particular contract” (he contrasted the factual situation in Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 where “an agent who was dealing with leases in a large shopping centre had a tendency to make particular types of representations to a larger or wider number of persons who were considering taking leases in the shopping centre”). It is suggested that the approach of Hamilton J should not be followed. If the reasoning involves an inference of conforming conduct from behaviour in a similar situation or situations, the requirements of the tendency rule should apply. It is not consistent with the policies behind the Act to treat evidence of conduct which is lacking “a degree of generality” as not subject to the tendency rule at all, with the consequence that it does not have to meet the pre-conditions to admissibility designed for such evidence. The very lack of generality may mean the evidence lacks sufficient probative value to make it admissible as tendency evidence. of five tenants regarding representations made to them by the respondent’s agent (Ms Kelly) “was relevant only to the fact in issue because it tended to show that Ms Kelly had a tendency to make representations to prospective tenants of the kind alleged by [a director of the appellant] Mr Williams. In the absence of an assumption that Ms Kelly had such a propensity, the evidence of the five tenants could not establish a system or business practice whereby such representations were made by or on behalf of Perpetual. The tendency of their evidence to establish propensity on the part of Ms Kelly was a necessary link in the reasoning leading to the conclusion that Ms Kelly made the alleged representations during her meeting with Mr Williams”: at [66]. For an example of a similar case reaching a different result, see ACCC v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 491; 59 IPR 435; [2003] FCA 850 at [49]–[52] per Selway J. In Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303, it was held at [344]–[372] that the evidence in question was not “tendency evidence” because, while it was capable of being used in such a way, it was relevant and used in another way. 929. Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [348]; White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA (Barrett JA agreeing) at [139].

698

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s 97

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

[EA.97.60]

The requirements of the provision are somewhat different from those recommended by the ALRC (see ALRC 38, Appendix A, cll 86 and 87). The ALRC considered, on the basis of psychological research (summarised in ALRC 26, vol 1 at paras 795–800), that “the concept of character in the narrow sense of general disposition has little value as a predictive tool of human behaviour”: see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 797. The Commission concluded (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 797):

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[S]tudies indicate that, in the absence of detailed Psychological information on an individual’s history and personality, the chances of accurate prediction are very low unless the individual is in similar situations – it is the behaviour in a similar situation rather than an inferred character trait which justifies prediction.

Therefore, “if an individual has behaved in a particular way in a particular situation, that individual is likely to behave in a similar way in a similar situation”: ALRC 26, vol 1, para 797. Thus, it may be inferred that a person behaved in a particular way on a particular relevant occasion if he or she behaved in a similar way in a similar situation. The Commission therefore proposed that evidence of a person’s past conduct on some occasion should only be admitted to establish a tendency to act or think in a particular way (and thereby infer similar conduct on some relevant occasion) if it could930 be shown that the circumstances of the two occasions were “substantially and relevantly similar”: ALRC 38, Appendix A, cl 87(b). However, s 97 does not expressly impose such a precondition to “tendency reasoning”. Rather, evidence of conduct (or character, reputation or tendency) is not admissible to establish a tendency to act or think in a particular way unless it has “significant probative value” and proper notice is given. Neither the Second Reading Speech for the Evidence Bill 1993 (Cth)931 nor the Explanatory Memorandum sheds light on the reason for the changes.932 In Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ observed at [21]–[23]: At the time the ALRC published its reports in its landmark reference on the law of evidence, the preponderance of English and Australian authority was against the admission of evidence of propensity altogether. The ALRC considered that the rules precluding the prosecution from adducing evidence of the bad character of the accused were supported by the results of psychological research. The research was concerned with the value of evidence of general behavioural traits such as honesty. A person’s general disposition was found to be of little value as a predictive tool, whereas a person’s behaviour in similar situations might justify prediction. The ALRC questioned the inflexible rejection of reasoning from propensity … The focus of the analysis remained on the singularity of the propensity. Reflecting this thinking, in the draft Evidence Bill appended to its final report the ALRC conditioned the admission of tendency evidence on proof of substantial and relevant similarity. 930. In the sense that “it is reasonably open to find” that the requirements are satisfied: see ALRC 38, Appendix A, cl 87. 931. Australia, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (15 December 1993), pp 4087ff. 932. For further discussion, see Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 at [50]–[53] per Sackville J. It should be noted that the assertion (at [53]) that the ALRC recommended a test of “substantial probative value” for tendency evidence in civil proceedings is incorrect. This test was only recommended for tendency evidence adduced against a defendant in criminal proceedings. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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… It suffices to observe that among the differences between the ALRC’s draft and s 97, as enacted, is the omission of any requirement of similarity. The legislature’s choice to reject the ALRC’s recommendation in this respect is unexplained, but … it is a choice which makes the ALRC’s reports less useful on this subject than on other subjects.

In ALRC 102, no proposal was advanced that the original proposed formulation should be adopted, notwithstanding the view being expressed at para 3.20 that recent research “does not challenge the basic proposition that the behaviour of an individual on one occasion has a very low correlation to his or her behaviour on another occasion in a different situation”. Nevertheless, such research should inform the assessment of “probative value” (see [EA.97.120]). The provision was amended as a result of recommendations in ALRC 102. Prior to the amendments, tendency evidence was “not admissible … if: (a) the party adducing the evidence has not given reasonable notice … or (b) the court thinks that the evidence would not … have significant probative value”. It has been amended to provide that tendency evidence is “not admissible … unless: (a) the party adducing the evidence gave reasonable notice … and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will … have significant probative value”. No specific reference was made to this amendment, or its purpose, in the Second Reading Speech but the Explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the Bill stated at [119] that “[t]he amendment does not change the substantive law, but makes the provision easier to understand”. Whatever the position prior to the amendment, it is clear that the onus is on the party adducing tendency evidence to establish that the requirements of both (a) and (b) are satisfied.933

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[EA.97.90] “a person” (s 97(1)) In Combined Insurance Co of America (t/as Combined Insurance Co of Australia) v Trifunovski (No 4) [2011] FCA 271, Perram J held that a “person”, for the purposes of this provision, includes a corporation. On the other hand, in Okwume v Commonwealth [2016] FCA 1252, Charlesworth J held at [235] that it does not include a Government Department.

[EA.97.120]

“significant probative value” (s 97(1)(b))

“Probative value” is defined in the Dictionary: “probative value” of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.

The first point that needs to be made is that the effect of this definition is that tendency evidence need only have significant probative value with respect to “a fact in issue”. It certainly is not required to have significant value with respect to all the facts in issue in the proceeding.934 In IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14, the High Court determined (by a 4:3 majority) that a trial judge, in assessing the “probative value” of evidence for the purposes of this provision (and a number of other provisions in the UEL) must proceed on the assumption that the evidence “is accepted” (and thus is to be regarded as both credible and reliable) – just as is 933. See discussion of Buchanan J in Astram Financial Services Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2010] FCA 1010 at [235]–[239]. 934. See, for example, Armstrong v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 323 at [19]–[20].

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required when assessing relevance under s 55. The evidence is to be “accepted as credible and reliable” (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [48]). Thus, for example, where a witness is called to testify that the witness observed a person engage in certain conduct (which evidence is adduced for the purpose of proving that the “person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind”), the probative value of that tendency evidence must be assessed on the assumption that the evidence of the witness is accepted – on the assumption that the person did engage in that conduct.935 However, there is NSW authority that, in determining whether tendency evidence has “significant probative value”, a court may take into account a possibility that the evidence is the product of “contamination” or, indeed, “concoction” that arises on the evidence in the proceeding. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile that authority, which includes judgments handed down after IMM936, with the proposition that the evidence is to be “accepted as credible and reliable”. The issue is discussed more generally at [EA.98.120] and [EA.101.240]. No guidance is given in the Act as to the adjective “significant”. The requirement was explained by French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ in IMM v The Queen at [46]:

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The significance of the probative value of the tendency evidence under s 97(1)(b) must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which the evidence is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing those facts. So understood, the evidence must be influential in the context of fact-finding.

Accordingly, it is important to focus carefully on the nature of the fact(s) in issue to which the evidence is relevant and whether the evidence may have significance or “importance” in establishing that fact or those facts.937 In IMM v The Queen, the appellant was charged with a number of sexual offences against his step-grandaughter between 2002 and 2010. The complainant’s evidence was the only direct evidence of the commission of the offences. The tendency evidence was evidence from the complainant that, some months after the conduct which constituted the last charged offence in 2010, he ran his hand up the complainant’s leg while the complainant and another girl were giving the appellant a back massage (it was “tendency evidence” because it was used by the prosecution to show that the appellant had a sexual interest in the complainant). Only the complainant gave evidence of this incident (the other girl was not called as a witness). French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ stated at [62]–[63]: In a case of this kind, the probative value of this evidence lies in its capacity to support the credibility of a complainant’s account. In cases where there is evidence from a source independent of the complainant, the requisite degree of probative value is more likely to be met. That is not to say that a complainant’s unsupported evidence can never meet that test. It is possible that there may be some special features of a complainant’s account of an uncharged incident which give it significant probative value. But without 935. For further discussion in the context of s 137, see [EA.137.90]. 936. R v GM [2016] NSWCCA 78 at [100]. 937. See Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ at [40]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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more, it is difficult to see how a complainant’s evidence of conduct of a sexual kind from an occasion other than the charged acts can be regarded as having the requisite degree of probative value. Evidence from a complainant adduced to show an accused’s sexual interest can generally have limited, if any, capacity to rationally affect the probability that the complainant’s account of the charged offences is true. It is difficult to see that one might reason rationally to conclude that X’s account of charged acts of sexual misconduct is truthful because X gives an account that on another occasion the accused exhibited sexual interest in him or her.

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Thus, in focusing carefully on the nature of the fact(s) in issue to which the tendency evidence was relevant, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ considered that the applicable “fact in issue” was whether the complainant’s account of the commission of the offences was both truthful and reliable. When assessing the capacity of the tendency evidence to increase the probability that this account was credible, the fact that it came from the complainant was of critical importance in determining whether the evidence had significant probative value. Notwithstanding the assumptions required when assessing probative value, the evidence lacked significance or importance in establishing that her account of the charged acts was true because it came from the complainant, was unsupported by a source independent of her and there was no feature of her account which gave it “significant probative value”. Similarly, in Bauer v The Queen (No 2) [2017] VSCA 176, the Victorian Court of Appeal held at [81] that a complainant’s evidence of the defendant’s alleged tendency “lacked any special feature” making it admissible.938 Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that the language of the definition of “probative value” requires an assessment of the capability of the evidence to rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. As Spigelman CJ stated in R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228 at [61], a case considering “probative value” in the context of s 137, “the word could in the definition of probative value” is significant and the “focus on capability draws attention to what it is open for the tribunal of fact to conclude”. The High Court has provided more guidance in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ stated at [16]: Tendency evidence will have significant probative value if it could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue to a significant extent.

The question under this provision is whether the evidence, by itself or together with other evidence (see [EA.97.150]), has the capacity to rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the fact in issue and to a significant extent.939 It is necessary to identify with some precision what the tendering party proposes to establish by the evidence.940 938. However, it should be noted that the High Court has granted special leave to appeal in this case: R v Dennis Bauer (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2017] HCATrans 269. 939. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ in Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 40 at [40] cited the following passage from R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, at [125] as posing the test required by s 97(1)(b): “the disputed evidence should make more likely, to a significant extent, the facts that make up the elements of the offence charged”. 940. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ in Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 40 at [56] emphasised the importance of focusing upon the tendency that the evidence is “sought to

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[EA.97.120]

In assessing the probative value of the evidence, the focus must be on: (a) the strength of the inference that can be drawn from the conduct to the tendency of the person to have a particular state of mind or to act in a particular way;941 and (b) the extent to which that tendency increases the likelihood that a fact in issue did, or did not, occur.942 As Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ explained, “[t]he starting point … requires identifying the tendency and the fact or facts in issue which it is adduced to prove”.943 As they also explained, “tendency evidence depends for its probative value on how persuasively it can be reasoned that the person will behave in a way that is consistent with the tendency”.944 Further, the assessment of the extent to which the tendency increases the likelihood that a fact in issue did, or did not, occur

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will necessarily involve a comparison between the tendency and the facts in issue. A tendency expressed at a high level of generality might mean that all the tendency evidence provides significant support for that tendency. But it will also mean that the tendency cannot establish anything more than relevance. In contrast, a tendency expressed at a level of particularity will be more likely to be significant.945

It follows that a tendency to commit crimes of the type with which a defendant is charged will not, by itself, satisfy the test of significant probative value. Thus, for example, with respect to trials of child sexual offences, it is apparent that the mere fact that the evidence shows a person who is sexually interested in children and who has a tendency to act on that interest, will not satisfy the requirement of significant probative value, notwithstanding that it is “unusual as a matter of ordinary human experience”.946 Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ accepted that such evidence “is likely to be influential to the determination of whether the reasonable possibility that the complainant has misconstrued innocent conduct or prove”. See White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA (Barrett JA agreeing) at [139], where it was held that the primary judge erred in admitting tendency evidence as significantly probative of one “particular matter” (to charge for work never performed) and then relying upon the evidence for a different purpose (to perform wholly unnecessary work with no therapeutic purpose). Evidence that a person had a tendency to lodge false claims could not be “significantly probative” that the person would perform work with no therapeutic purpose (at [142]). See also Decision restricted [2016] NSWCCA 98 at [47]; BD v The Queen [2017] NTCCA 2 at [85]–[100]. In Parkinson v Alexander [2017] ACTSC 201, Refshauge J held that a trial had miscarried in circumstances where the magistrate had “reformulated” the tendency that the evidence was to be used to prove and, even if the prosecution had “adopted” the reformulation, the defendant had not been given any notice of the reformulation. 941. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ referred in Hughes at [41] to “the extent to which the evidence supports the tendency”. 942. Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 at [76] per Sackville J (Whitlam and Mansfield JJ agreeing). See also Townsend v Townsend [2001] NSWCA 136 at [78]. 943. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 at [16]. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ referred at [41], in the context of a trial of child sexual offences, to “the extent to which the tendency makes more likely the facts making up the charged offence”. 944. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 at [20]. 945. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 at [64]. 946. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 at [57]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 97

fabricated his or her account has been excluded”, but proceeded to observe that “[t]he particularity of the tendency and the capacity of its demonstration to be important to the rational assessment of whether the prosecution has discharged its onus of proof will depend upon a consideration of the circumstances of the case”.947 It “does no more than prove a disposition to commit crimes of the kind in question”.948 They concluded at [41]: In summary, there is likely to be a high degree of probative value where (i) the evidence, by itself or together with other evidence, strongly supports proof of a tendency, and (ii) the tendency strongly supports the proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged.

This “open-textured, evaluative task” is “one for the court to undertake by application of the same well-known principles of logic and human experience as are used in an assessment of whether evidence is relevant”.949

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It is apparent that assessment of the strength of the tendency inference will often turn on such considerations as: • the nature of the proceedings (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ explained in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 that “[t]he capacity of tendency evidence to be influential to proof of an issue on the balance of probability in civil proceedings may differ from the capacity of the same evidence to prove an issue beyond reasonable doubt in criminal proceedings”950); • the issue to which the evidence is relevant (for example, tendency evidence may have greater probative value in proving conduct than in identifying an offender951); • the number of occasions of particular conduct relied upon;952 • the time gap(s) between them;953 947. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 at [40]. 948. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 at [57], [58]. The Victorian Court of Appeal refers to evidence of “mere propensity or disposition”: Bauer v The Queen (No 2) [2017] VSCA 176 at [82] (however, it should be noted that the High Court has granted special leave to appeal in this case: R v Dennis Bauer (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2017] HCATrans 269). 949. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [42]. 950. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [16]. 951. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [42]. 952. RHB v The Queen [2011] VSCA 295 at [20]; Bauer v The Queen (No 2) [2017] VSCA 176 at [82] (“single event … too isolated to establish the relevant tendency” but note that the High Court has granted special leave to appeal in this case: R v Dennis Bauer (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2017] HCATrans 269). On the other hand, if there are several occasions of similar conduct but there are thousands of occasions overall, “it is likely to represent such a miniscule fraction of all those occasions that I do not consider it can be regarded as being of any significance”: Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1403 at [59]. See also Galea v Farrugia [2013] NSWCA 164 at [85]–[89]: where a “company delivered many hundreds of truck loads of fill from a wide variety of sources … proof of deliveries of contaminated material to two sites without proof of the source of the material in my view says nothing about whether contaminated deliveries were made to two other sites”. 953. See R v Watkins (2005) 153 A Crim R 434; [2005] NSWCCA 164 at [36]; Twynam Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2008] FCA 1922 per Jagot J at [13]; Semaan v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 503; 230 A Crim R 568; [2013] VSCA 134 at [40]–[41]; McPhillamy v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 130 at [129] (but see also Meagher JA, in dissent, at [102]–[110]); Bauer v The

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• the degree of specificity/generality of the conduct/alleged tendency;954 • the degree of similarity between the conduct on the various occasions (including the conduct sought to be proved);955 • the degree of similarity of the circumstances in which the conduct took place956 (particularly if it is possible to establish a pattern of behaviour, or even a modus operandi957, in those circumstances);

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Queen (No 2) [2017] VSCA 176 at [82] (special leave to appeal granted: R v Dennis Bauer (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2017] HCATrans 269). See also Ninyette v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 184 at [34]; Daniels v Western Australia (2012) 226 A Crim R 61; [2012] WASCA 213 at [68]; DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 at [48]. But see RHB v The Queen [2011] VSCA 295 at [23]–[24]. In some circumstances, the time gap between the alleged acts may actually enhance the probative value of the tendency evidence (for example, see R v SK [2011] NSWCCA 292 at [26], where Latham J observed that the alleged tendency was to sexually abuse children between certain ages, so that time gaps between the alleged offences reflected the different ages of the complainants). The fact that the tendency evidence relates to events after the alleged conduct in issue does not necessarily mean that the probative value of the evidence is reduced: RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71 at [88]–[130]. However, in Parkinson v Alexander [2017] ACTSC 201, Refshauge J observed at [54]–[60] that it can be “problematic” to use “more recent conduct” to “explain past behaviour” and that there can be considerable difficulty in “arguing tendency retrospectively”. Close attention will need to be paid to the particular circumstances of the case. 954. Townsend v Townsend [2001] NSWCA 136 at [78]; Ibrahim v Pham [2007] NSWCA 215 at [264]–[266]; O’Keefe v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 121 at [65]–[68]; CGL v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 24 VR 486; [2010] VSCA 26 at [40]; Reeves v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 41 VR 275; 236 A Crim R 448; [2013] VSCA 311 at [60]; Sokolowskyj v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 at [40]; Bauer v The Queen (No 2) [2017] VSCA 176 at [82] (special leave to appeal granted: R v Dennis Bauer (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2017] HCATrans 269). See also DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 at [42]–[47]. In El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10, Leeming JA stated at [72]: “the specificity of the tendency directly informs the strength of the inferential mode of reasoning. It is easy to see why. It is, for example, one thing to say that a man has a tendency to steal cars; that says something, but not very much, as to whether he stole a particular car the subject of a charge. It is quite another to say that a man has a tendency to steal black European sports cars and then set them on fire, if the fact in issue is whether that man stole and burnt a black Porsche”. 955. See Townsend v Townsend [2001] NSWCA 136 at [78]; R v Eyles [2002] NSWCCA 510 at [36]; Century Yuasa Batteries Pty Ltd v Martin [2002] FCA 722 at [32]; R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 per Simpson J at [58]; Bective Station Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2006] FCA 1596 per Branson J at [83]; Twynam Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2008] FCA 1922 per Jagot J at [13]; BP v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 303 at [108]; DAO v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; 278 ALR 765; [2011] NSWCCA 63, Simpson J at [198]–[201]; FB v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 217 at [28]–[30]; Sokolowskyj v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 at [41]; Decision restricted [2016] NSWCCA 98 at [47]. See also DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 at [45]–[47], [53]. In Jacara, the Full Federal Court held that it was open to the primary judge to conclude that the evidence in question could not be said to have significant probative value on the facts and issues, bearing in mind the differences between the accounts of the various incidents and the time gap between them (particularly bearing in mind changed circumstances): see Sackville J at [78]–[82]. In Sokolowskyj v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 it was emphasised at [41] that “there was marked dissimilarity between the conduct relied upon to establish the tendency and the offence under consideration by the jury” (see also Decision restricted [2016] NSWCCA 98). On the other hand, differences between the conduct may have less significance if the circumstances in which it occurred are very similar (see below): RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71 at [141]–[143]. 956. See R v Milton [2004] NSWCCA 195 per Hidden J at [31]; R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 per Simpson J at [57], [68]; Twynam Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v AWB © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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958

• whether the tendency evidence is disputed;

• whether the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party.959 Although whether the proceedings are civil or criminal is relevant in this context, it is important to emphasise that this provision does not import the stringency of the common law rules in respect of “similar fact” evidence adduced by the prosecution against a defendant. As Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ observed in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 at [31], those principles “have been abrogated and entirely replaced by Pt 3.6” of this Act. The statutory words “do not permit a restrictive approach to whether probative value is significant”.960 Further, considerations of “fairness” to a defendant in criminal proceedings, which was an important aspect of those common law principles, is not a material consideration in the application of this provision. Rather, as Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ stated at [32]: In criminal proceedings, the risk that the admission of tendency evidence may work unfairness to the accused is addressed by s 101(2).961

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(Aust) Ltd [2008] FCA 1922 per Jagot J at [13]; FB v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 217 at [28]–[30]; Semaan v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 503; 230 A Crim R 568; [2013] VSCA 134at [40]–[41]; RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71 at [141]. See also Ninyette v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 184 at [34]; Daniels v Western Australia (2012) 226 A Crim R 61; [2012] WASCA 213 at [70]–[72]. The evidence may lack significant probative value if evidence of the relevant circumstances is not adduced: CDD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 65 at [77]. 957. R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 per Simpson J at [67]; R v PWD (2010) 205 A Crim R 75; [2010] NSWCCA 209 at [35]; DAO v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; 278 ALR 765; [2011] NSWCCA 63 at [158]; Reeves v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 41 VR 275; 236 A Crim R 448; [2013] VSCA 311 at [59]; Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 at [51]–[52]. 958. AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52 at [44]; Ibrahim v Pham [2004] NSWSC 650 per Levine J at [31]. If the jury cannot use tendency evidence unless satisfied of the existence of the tendency beyond reasonable doubt (see [EA.101.360], [EA.141.120]), it would follow that the evidence would not have “significance” as tendency evidence unless it was open to make that finding: see RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71, Ward JA (Harrison J and RA Hulme J agreeing) at [160]–[167]. 959. Where the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party, it is only the notice requirement in s 97(1)(a) that does not apply: see s 97(2). Sometimes the probative value of the evidence will be greater where it is used to explain or contradict other evidence rather than considered in isolation (this point does not appear to have been fully appreciated in Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886). Conversely, the evidence may not have significant probative value if it is being used to prove a negative: cf Bective Station Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2006] FCA 1596 per Branson J at [86]. 960. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [42]. 961. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [32]. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ observed that the Victorian Court of Appeal in Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 45 VR 680 had erroneously held that “the object of s 97(1)(b) is to protect against the risk of an unfair trial”. It follows that the view of Gageler J, in dissent in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, that whether tendency evidence will make the existence of a fact in issue “significantly more probable or improbable” depends on whether the increase “is enough to justify the ever-present risk that the objective probability will be subjectively overestimated” (at [87]) is not strictly correct in the view of the plurality. Such an analysis is more apposite to s 101(2).

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As noted above, similarities in the conduct, or the circumstances in which conduct occurred, will be relevant to whether tendency evidence has significant probative value. However, while the common law required “similarity”, that will not be a pre-condition to the test under this provision. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ stated at [37]–[39]:

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Depending upon the issues in the trial, however, a tendency to act in a particular way may be identified with sufficient particularity to have significant probative value notwithstanding the absence of similarity in the acts which evidence it. … Commonly, evidence of a person’s conduct adduced to prove a tendency to act in a particular way will bear similarity to the conduct in issue. Section 97(1) does not, however, condition the admission of tendency evidence on the court’s assessment of operative features of similarity with the conduct in issue. The probative value of tendency evidence will vary depending upon the issue that it is adduced to prove. In criminal proceedings where it is adduced to prove the identity of the offender for a known offence, the probative value of tendency evidence will almost certainly depend upon close similarity between the conduct evidencing the tendency and the offence. Different considerations may inform the probative value of tendency evidence where the fact in issue is the occurrence of the offence.

It follows that common law phrases such as “underlying unity”, “pattern of conduct” or “modus operandi” are potentially misleading.962 Nevertheless, they may assist in the application of the test under this provision. Thus, for example, in a trial of child sexual offences, evidence of “a tendency on the part of a mature adult to engage in sexual conduct with underage girls and a willingness to act upon that inclination”, which is “unusual as a matter of ordinary human experience”, will “often … include evidence of grooming of potential victims so as to reveal a ‘pattern of conduct’ or a ‘modus operandi’ which would qualify the evidence as admissible”.963 That “similarity” of conduct is not decisive was demonstrated in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, where the critical factor was the apparent willingness to take great risks. In a trial of child sexual offences, the alleged conduct showed that the defendant “was a man of mature years [with] a sexual interest in female children aged under 16 years”. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ concluded that “the evidence as a whole was capable of proving that the [defendant] was a person with a tendency to engage in sexually predatory conduct with underage girls as and when an opportunity presented itself in order to obtain fleeting gratification, notwithstanding the high risk of detection”.964 This “level of disinhibited disregard of the risk of discovery by other adults” was “even more unusual as a matter of ordinary human experience” than a tendency to act on a sexual interest in children.965 Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ stated at [58]–[60]: That the tendency evidence did more than prove a disposition to commit crimes of the kind in question, and was actually of significant value as proof of his guilt of the offences charged, can be illustrated by hypothesising separate trials in respect of each complainant with the only evidence against the appellant being the evidence of the 962. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [2], [56]. 963. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [57]. 964. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [56]. 965. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [57]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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complainant. In each such case, the jury would be presented with a prosecution case inviting it to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had engaged in behaviour towards the complainant which involved predatory sexual activity pursued by taking opportunistic advantage of a social or family or work occasion in circumstances in which the appellant courted a real risk of discovery by other adults. Considered in isolation, [a complainant’s] evidence might have seemed inherently unlikely: the appellant, a family friend, at dinner in [the complainant’s] home, absented himself from the party and came into her bedroom, and without making any attempt to ensure her silence, commenced to invasively sexually assault her while his daughter lay sleeping in the same bed. The jury might well be disinclined to accept [the complainant’s] evidence as satisfying it, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant had, in fact, engaged in conduct which was so much at odds with the jury’s experience of the probabilities of ordinary human behaviour. Proof of the appellant’s tendency to engage in sexual activity with underage girls opportunistically, notwithstanding the evident risk, was capable of removing a doubt which the brazenness of the appellant’s conduct might otherwise have raised.

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The force of the tendency evidence as significantly probative of the appellant’s guilt was not that it gave rise to a likelihood that the appellant, having offended once, was likely to offend again. Rather, its force was that, in the case of this individual accused, the complaint of misconduct on his part should not be rejected as unworthy of belief because it appeared improbable having regard to ordinary human experience.

When considered together, “all the tendency evidence provided strong support to show the [defendant’s] tendency to engage opportunistically in sexual activity with underage girls despite a high risk of detection”.966 The fact that the defendant’s sexual interest in underage girls was expressed “in a variety of ways did not deprive proof of the tendency of its significant probative value”.967 The tendency was “expressed at a level of particularity” sufficient to give the tendency “significance” in “mak[ing] more likely the elements of the offence charged”.968 Similarly, it was held that there was no error in holding that evidence “capable of establishing the [defendant’s] tendency to expose his genitalia to females” had significant probative value to the determination of whether the defendant had exposed his genitals to a complainant in circumstances in which that complainant’s evidence was said to have been fabricated.969 Much will depend on the nature of the tendency said to be shown. Thus, evidence that an accused had a sexual interest in a particular person might be significantly probative of an allegation that he committed a sexual offence against that person,970 but not at all probative that he committed a sexual offence against someone other than that person. Contrastingly, “evidence that an accused had a tendency to commit a particular kind of act or to commit a particular kind of act in particular circumstances, might be significantly probative of an allegation that 966. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [62]. 967. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [63]. 968. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [64]. 969. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [65]. 970. GBF v The Queen [2010] VSCA 135 at [26]; JLS v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 328; 204 A Crim R 179; [2010] VSCA 209 at [30]; MR v The Queen [2011] VSCA 39 at [14]; PCR v The Queen (2013) 235 A Crim R 302; [2013] VSCA 224 at [37]; Thu v The Queen [2017] VSCA 28 at [33]–[39]; Packard v The Queen [2018] VSCA 45, Beach JA and Beale AJA at [156]–[157] (Priest JA dissenting).

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the accused committed another act of the kind or committed another act of the kind in particular circumstances”.971 Evidence that a person had committed a sexual offence against one child in a family “may” have significant probative value as evidence of a tendency to offend against other children in the family.972 This is particularly likely to be the case where there are unusual features to the tendency.973 Evidence that a defendant had engaged in “grooming behaviours” may show a tendency to engage in that behaviour but not (depending on the nature of the behaviour) have significant probative value in proving that the defendant’s behaviour on a particular occasion was sexually motivated.974 Evidence that a person had a tendency to possess stolen property, simpliciter, without alleging a tendency to knowingly possess stolen property, will have negligible probative value in respect of a charge of stealing other property.975 Given that whether or not tendency evidence has significant probative value turns on the extent to which that tendency increases the likelihood that a fact in issue did, or did not, occur, it follows that if a party makes clear, even informally, that some matters are not in dispute, this will bear on the application of this provision since the question will be the bearing of the evidence on a fact in issue in the proceeding. In Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374; 207 A Crim R 202; [2011] HCA 7, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ held that, while evidence of sexual activity between the appellant and three persons who were not complainants would have had “significant probative value” as to whether “sexual activity” had taken place between the appellant and the two complainants but for the fact that the complainant’s “evidence that the appellant had sexual relations with them during consultations was not challenged”, the evidence did not have any probative value regarding live issues in the case (whether the complainants did not consent to sexual contact on any occasion charged in the indictment, whether the appellant did not have an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief

971. GBF v The Queen [2010] VSCA 135 at [26]. See also R v PWD (2010) 205 A Crim R 75; [2010] NSWCCA 209 where Beazley JA (Buddin J and Barr AJ agreeing) held that evidence that the respondent was a person who was sexually attracted to young male students who were “vulnerable” and acted upon that predilection in various ways and at different times had significant probative value in proving that the respondent acted in the way alleged in respect of each particular complainant (at [87]–[88]). In BP v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 303, Hodgson JA (Price J and Fullerton J agreeing) held at [112] that the appellant’s conduct in allegedly sexually abusing his daughter and grand-daughters was “sufficiently similar and sufficiently unusual for the evidence of each of them to have significant probative value” and be cross-admissible (see also at [114]). 972. RHB v The Queen [2011] VSCA 295; DR v The Queen [2011] VSCA 440 at [88] (although the court also observed that there were similar unusual aspects to the alleged offending – a point emphasised in the subsequent judgment of CEG v The Queen [2012] VSCA 55 at [10]–[13]; R v JRW [2014] NTSC 52 at [30]–[32]); Bauer v The Queen [2015] VSCA 55 at [171]–[174]. See also R v SK [2011] NSWCCA 292 at [39]–[43]; DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 at [42]–[47], [53]. 973. Reeves v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 41 VR 275; 236 A Crim R 448; [2013] VSCA 311 at [53]–[58] (but see Priest JA at [94]). 974. See BD v The Queen [2017] NTCCA 2, at [88]–[100]. 975. Pattison v Tasmania [2017] TASCCA 13 at [84]–[85]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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that either complainant had consented, the plausibility of the reasons given by the complainants for not making an early complaint).976 The distinction between tendency and coincidence reasoning needs to be emphasised, notwithstanding the fact that essentially the same test of admissibility applies (see ss 98 and 101). As noted, the existence of “similarity” is not essential to tendency reasoning, while it will always be a necessary requirement for coincidence evidence (see s 98). Even where “similarities” are relied upon to support admissibility, the existence of those similarities will be material to both processes of reasoning, but in different ways. For example, similarities in the circumstances in which alleged offences (with different victims) occurred may have limited significance for the purposes of tendency reasoning if no clear pattern of conduct is disclosed (if, for example, it is established that no offences occurred in the majority of cases where such circumstances existed) but may have considerable probative value as coincidence evidence (if, for example, if it would be a remarkable “coincidence” for the complainants to independently advance a similar, false, account of events).977 Conversely, evidence of a tendency may be clear “whereas reasonable minds might differ about the improbability of coincidence in respect of the similarities relied on”.978

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Of course, this provision is not limited to evidence of conduct – it extends to evidence of the character or reputation of a person and evidence of “a tendency” that a person has or had. However, it is likely that, in most circumstances, such evidence will not satisfy the test of “significant probative value”. As the ALRC intended, it “should not generally be admissible”.979 Thus, in ASIC v Vines [2003] NSWSC 1237 at [36], Austin J observed that: where the evidence is character evidence, the prospect that it will have a significant probative value in proving that the person had a tendency to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind, is if anything less than in a case where the evidence is evidence of conduct.

Austin J held (at [45]) that “[g]eneral evidence of the character of [the defendant in civil proceedings], given by witnesses on the basis of their observation of him in contexts other than the context in which he is said to have failed to discharge his statutory duty of care and diligence, frequently at a later time than the events of the present case” did not have significant probative value with respect to the 976. However, care should be taken with these distinctions. Heydon J, in a reasonably persuasive dissent, pointed out that the suggested divide between the appellant’s conduct and the complainant’s consent was not so clear cut and, while the appellant had not challenged the allegation that he had “sexual relations” with the complainants, he did dispute the detail of the conduct he was alleged to have engaged in. It might reasonably be said that a tendency to use psychological manipulation to persuade patients to engage in sexual activity may have a significant bearing on the question whether, in relation to a complainant patient, particular sexual activity was “consensual”. See also Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 at [26], [43] (an informal indication that certain alleged conduct was conceded was not sufficient to withdraw the issue from the jury as a matter no longer needing to be proved by the prosecution and did not necessarily mean the evidence lacked significant probative value). NSW appeal courts have taken a conservative approach to informal limiting of facts in issue (see [EA.55.90]). 977. See R v Matonwal & Amood [2016] NSWCCA 174, at [86]–[87], [92]. 978. Page v The Queen [2015] VSCA 357 at [72]. 979. See ALRC 38, para 177. See also ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 794 and 801.

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facts in issue because it was “unlikely to establish any firm or concrete tendency to act carefully and diligently in the different and particular circumstances pleaded against him”. In Cooper v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 258 the evidence in question was an opinion from an expert that was characterised by the Court of Criminal Appeal as evidence of a tendency on the part of a person to be violent – the court ruled that it was “unlikely” that the evidence would be considered to have significant probative value because of the very limited evidentiary support for the assumed facts upon which the opinion was based (Beazley JA at [201], Hidden J and RA Hulme J agreeing).

[EA.97.150]

“either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence” (s 97(1)(b))

In determining whether “the court thinks that the evidence will … have significant probative value”, the court may look at the evidence “by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence”. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ stated in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 at [40]:

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[I]t is not necessary that the disputed evidence has this effect by itself. It is sufficient if the disputed evidence together with other evidence makes significantly more likely any facts making up the elements of the offence charged.

Thus, tendency evidence which by itself lacks significant probative value may be “reinforced” by other tendency evidence.980 However, as the plurality also stated at [40], “where there are multiple counts on an indictment, it is necessary to consider each count separately to assess whether the tendency evidence which is sought to be adduced in relation to that count is admissible”. In DSJ v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 758; 215 A Crim R 349; [2012] NSWCCA 9, Bathurst CJ (Allsop P and McCallum J agreeing) considered the identical words in s 98(1)(b) and stated at [9]: [T]he matters to which the court is to have regard in performing this task is the evidence sought to be adduced either on its own or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to tender it. In particular, regard is not to be had to evidence either adduced or to be adduced by the other party to the proceedings.

[EA.97.180]

Notice (s 97(1)(a))

Subject to s 97(2), “reasonable”981 notice in writing must be given under s 97(1)(a). Section 99 provides that notice under s 97 is to be given in accordance 980. Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, at [62]. 981. Relevant considerations would include the date when the notice is given (compared with the date of the hearing), the complexity of the evidence and the detail provided in the notice. In Moroccanoil Israel Ltd v Aldi Foods Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 823, Katzmann J considered at [116] that there had not been reasonable notice because the date when the notice was sent (12 days before the trial was to start) did not provide “a reasonable opportunity to investigate the allegation, interview relevant witnesses, and file evidence”. Further, the description of the tendency in the notice “lacked the necessary degree of specificity” and did not “enable the party whose conduct [was] in question to meet the evidence” (at [117]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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with any regulations or rules of court made for that purpose. Regulation 6(2) of the Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth) deals with notice under this provision: (2) A notice given under subsection 97(1) of the Act (relating to the “tendency” rule) must state: (a) the substance of the evidence of the kind referred to in that subsection that the party giving the notice intends to adduce; and (b) if that evidence consists of, or includes, evidence of the conduct of a person, particulars of: (i) the date, time, place and circumstances at or in which the conduct occurred; and (ii) the names and addresses of each person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the conduct; (iii) in a civil proceeding – the address of each person so named; so far as they are known to the notifying party.

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Identical requirements are found in reg 5(2) of the Evidence Regulation 2010 (NSW) and reg 7(1) of the Evidence Regulation 2009 (Vic). Giles JA in the NSW Court of Appeal has observed: The purpose of a reg 6(2) notice is first, to ensure that attention is given to specific conduct and the circumstances of the conduct, and secondly, to enable the person whose conduct is in question to meet the tendency evidence. The purpose is linked with the decision upon probative value to be made by the court, since only with knowledge of specific conduct and the circumstances of the conduct can a proper assessment be made of the probative value of the evidence in relation to the conduct alleged in the trial.982

In Gardiner v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190, Simpson J went somewhat further. Her Honour stated at [128]: A properly drafted tendency evidence notice should, in my opinion, explicitly identify the fact or facts in issue upon which the tendering party asserts the evidence bears. It should also explicitly identify the tendency sought to be proved.983

The Victorian Court of Appeal has also emphasised the need for particularity.984 Further, the notice must not conflate the tendency evidence and the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence (such as, in a criminal proceeding, commission of the offence charged).985 The notice must be confined to the former. The notice may comply with these requirements by reference to another document or documents: “it is sufficiently compliant with the regulation if the notice states, either in its own body or by reference to documents readily identifiable, the nature and substance of the evidence sought to be tendered”.986 Failure to comply with the notice requirements renders the evidence inadmissible 982. Martin v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 337 at [91]. See also Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, Gageler J at [105]. 983. See also Moroccanoil Israel Ltd v Aldi Foods Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 823 at [117 984. Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [21]. 985. Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [22]. 986. R v AB [2001] NSWCCA 496 at [15] per Adams J.

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987

for a tendency use. Section 97(2) provides that notice need not be given if the court dispenses with notice requirements under s 100 or “the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party”.

[EA.97.210]

Service

Section 181 permits proof of service of “a written notification, notice, order or direction” by affidavit “of the person who served, gave or sent it”. Section 186 provides for the swearing of affidavits.

[EA.97.240]

“Non-tendency” evidence

It is important to appreciate that even if evidence may not be admissible for a tendency use, that does not mean that the evidence is irrelevant or inadmissible – the evidence may be relevant and admissible in another way. Examples may be given of evidence adduced against a defendant in criminal proceedings which, while it may not be admissible for a tendency use, is relevant and admissible for another purpose (see [EA.101.150] for an extended discussion): • evidence showing opportunity (and thereby rebutting a defence of alibi, if such a defence is advanced); • evidence of prior conduct revealing a motive for the crime charged; • evidence of a system;

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• • • •

putting other evidence in context; evidence identifying the defendant with the crime charged; evidence relevant to a person’s state of mind; evidence of “relationship” (where the evidence is not relied on for a tendency inference); • evidence of conduct which forms a part of a relevant transaction. As regards evidence adduced by the defence in a criminal proceeding, the difficulties in deciding whether evidence is “tendency evidence” or not were illustrated in R v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 21; [2004] NSWCCA 280. The defendant was charged with murder of V, claimed self-defence, and sought to adduce evidence that, 23 years earlier, V had murdered three persons. The trial judge treated the evidence as tendency evidence and concluded that it lacked significant probative value for the purposes of this provision. The appeal to the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal succeeded. Hodgson JA held that the evidence was not tendency evidence because it was not being used to show V had a tendency to kill but “to suggest that the deceased was a person who was not subject to very strong inhibitions against killing and contemplation of killing in the same way as are the great majority of people” (at [37]). Hulme J held that it was not tendency evidence on the basis that “it rendered less improbable the appellant’s account that the deceased had threatened to kill him” (at [56]). The third member of the court, Hidden J, had “some reservation” about the view that the evidence was not tendency evidence, observing (at [70]) that it was “necessarily tendency evidence” when used to “demonstrate … a propensity on the part of the deceased to retaliate in an extremely violent way against anyone 987. R v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176; [2000] NSWCCA 372 (NSWCCA) at [62] per Kirby J (in the absence of waiver under s 190). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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who crossed him”. It is suggested that the approach of Hidden J is to be preferred.988 The correct analysis is as follows: the fact in issue was whether V made a (“serious”) threat to kill D; evidence that V murdered three men 23 years before was relevant to that fact in issue only because it permitted an inference that V behaved in conformity with the propensity thereby disclosed (that is, making a serious threat to kill was behaviour in conformity with the established propensity to kill); accordingly the evidence was tendency evidence. The evidence does not cease to be tendency evidence because the inference sought to be drawn from prior killing is the making of a threat to kill rather than exactly conforming behaviour.989

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In the civil context, the business practices of company A may be relevant via tendency/propensity reasoning to the likely practices of an associated company B, but may also be directly relevant to the question of whether A performed certain business with B.990 Evidence of “system” may be non-tendency evidence. In Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 at [67], Sackville J gave an example: If, for example, the evidence in a shopping centre misrepresentation case shows that the lessor’s agent gave instructions that particular representations should be communicated to prospective tenants, that evidence would [not be tendency evidence]. The evidence, if accepted, would go beyond proving that the agent had a propensity to make representations of the kind alleged. Rather, it would establish that the agent had set in place a system which, if implemented in the particular case, would have resulted in the representation being made to the applicant. The existence of the system, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, readily supports an inference that it was implemented in the particular case. The evidence of the system makes it more likely that the fact in issue (the making of the representation to the applicant) occurred, independently of the agent’s propensity to act in a particular way.

In Ahern v Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd [2015] NSWSC 19, it was held at [11] that where the plaintiff asserted that he would have acted in a certain way in particular circumstances, evidence regarding what the plaintiff had done in comparable circumstances was not tendency evidence (although the better analysis may be that it fell within the scope of s 97(2)(b)). Some cases will present considerable difficulty in distinguishing between tendency and non988. See Elias v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 365 per Simpson J at [31]. 989. It may be noted that R v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 21; [2004] NSWCCA 280 was discussed in ALRC 102 at paras 11.9–11.11, without any view being expressed as to what approach was correct. The facts of Cakovski may be contrasted with those of Elias v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 365. The issue there was the appellant’s state of mind. In the absence of any evidence that the appellant was aware of previous incidents involving the victim, those incidents were not relevant at all, whether for tendency or non-tendency reasoning (Simpson J at [26]). In Davis v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 257, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that evidence that X had prior convictions for supplying drugs (where it was the defence case that X could have possessed drugs found at the home of the defendant) was not tendency evidence but “evidence directly relevant to the critical issue in the trial which was whether the Crown had established beyond reasonable doubt that the [defendant] was in possession of the drugs” (Price J at [97]). It was not explained how it was “directly relevant” and the better view is that it was tendency evidence. For another example of the difficulty in distinguishing tendency and non-tendency reasoning, see the different judgments of the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal in Martin v Tasmania (2008) 190 A Crim R 77; [2008] TASSC 66. 990. See Trylow v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 55 ATR 408; [2004] FCA 446 per Hill J at [109]–[118].

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tendency uses of evidence. For example, in Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 668; 297 ALR 406; [2013] HCA 21 the High Court held that it was open to the Full Court of the Federal Court to consider that evidence of emails was used by a trial judge as tendency evidence although it was argued that the evidence was only relied upon to show the existence of knowledge on the part of the respondents (ie to show their state of mind). The High Court concluded at [35] that it was open to characterise the trial judge’s reasoning as “based upon discernment of a tendency on the part of the respondents to act in a particular way which involved dealing with articles, the making of which infringed copyright of the applicants” (emphasis added). That is, it was used not just to show knowledge but to infer subsequent acts on the basis of tendency reasoning. In the Full Court of the Family Court it has been accepted that evidence of “family violence” may be relevant for the purpose of showing that the contributions towards the property of the parties and the welfare of the family by the victim of that family violence were made “more onerous” by the behaviour of the perpetrator.991 Such a use does not involve tendency reasoning because the evidence is not being used to show a tendency to act in a particular way, or have a particular state of mind, and to infer behaviour in conformity with that tendency on a particular occasion.

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[EA.97.270]

Use rule

As noted in [EA.97.60], this provision prohibits use of evidence of “character, reputation, or conduct” (or “tendency”) to prove that a person has a tendency to act or think in a particular way – unless the requirements of the provision are satisfied. It follows that if such evidence is relevant and admissible for another purpose992 it may be admitted for that latter purpose, subject to the discretions in ss 135 and 137. In accordance with s 95, if the evidence is admitted on that basis, it may not be used for the purpose of proving tendency. It follows that, where evidence is sought to be used for two different tendency uses, it must satisfy the requirement of this provision in respect of both, and the fact that it satisfies the requirements in respect of one use will not mean that it can be used for the other993. In a jury trial, careful directions to the jury will usually be required.994

[EA.97.300]

“evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party” (s 97(2)(b))

Section 97(2) provides that the notice requirements in s 97(1)(a) do not apply if “(b) evidence is adduced to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced 991. Britt v Britt [2017] FamCAFC 27 at [31], [33]. 992. For example, evidence of A’s conduct, which is similar to his or her alleged conduct which is a fact in issue, may be relevant to support B’s claim that he or she believed A would act in a particular way. Thus, where B is charged with the murder of A and relies on self-defence, evidence that A had engaged in violent conduct on other occasions may be relevant to support B’s assertion that, knowing of such conduct, he believed that it was necessary to act as he did. Such use of the evidence would not involve an inference that A actually acted in conformity with that tendency to violence on the occasion when he was killed. 993. See, for example, White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18 at [142]–[143]. 994. See discussion at [EA.101.360]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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by another party”. However, no reference is made to the requirement of “significant probative value” in s 97(1)(b). It follows that this requirement applies even though the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party.995 As regards creating an exception to the notice requirement, it would not be sufficient that another party has made a submission, rather than adduced evidence, which the tendency evidence is adduced to explain or contradict.996 Further, the evidence adduced by the other party must be “tendency evidence” to which the requirements of s 97 applied.997 The evidence must have been adduced to prove that a person has or had a tendency to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind. Despite the language of “adduced”, the other tendency evidence must have been admitted.998

[EA.97.330]

Exceptions

Section 94 expressly provides that this provision does not apply to “evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness”, evidence in bail or sentencing proceedings, and evidence of “character, reputation, conduct or tendency” where “that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue”. In addition, the rule established by this provision (referred to as “the tendency rule”) is subject to specific exceptions concerning the character of a criminal defendant (ss 110 and 111). As the note to the provision also indicates, other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. For example, special provisions in respect of the prior sexual history of the complainant in a prosecution for a sexual offence may create another exception.

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[EA.97.360]

Judgments and convictions

Part 3.5 deals with evidence of judgments and convictions. Even if evidence of specific conduct (which resulted in a court judgment or conviction) is admissible under the tendency rule, it may be that Pt 3.5 will render inadmissible evidence of the judgment or conviction. This will not affect other evidence of the conduct.

[EA.97.390]

Acquittals

The fact that the conduct sought to be admitted under this provision has been the subject of a previous criminal trial resulting in an acquittal does not necessarily mean that the evidence will be inadmissible.999 However, careful application of both this provision and s 101 will be required1000 and, if the evidence is admitted, careful directions to the jury will be required.1001

[EA.97.420]

Onus of proof

It may be noted that the provision states that evidence “is not admissible … unless (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice … or 995. Bective Station Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2006] FCA 1596 per Branson J at [85]. 996. Martin v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 38 at [43]. 997. Martin v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 38 at [43], [46]. 998. Compare Martin v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 38 at [46]. 999. R v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; 136 A Crim R 167; [2002] HCA 55 at [50]; R v RN [2005] NSWCCA 413 at [21]. 1000. Compare R v RN [2005] NSWCCA 413 at [31]–[38]. 1001. Compare R v RN [2005] NSWCCA 413 at [40].

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(b) the court thinks that the evidence will … have significant probative value”. Prior to amendments following on ALRC 102, the provision was expressed negatively and the view was open that the onus of proof was on the party submitting that the evidence was not admissible. However, the current formulation means that the onus will be on the party seeking to have the evidence ruled admissible to persuade the court that “reasonable notice” has been given and that the evidence “will” have “significant probative value”.

[EA.97.450]

Examples

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An example of the application of this provision in civil proceedings would be where a plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident negligence action adduced evidence that the defendant had been involved in previous accidents, to infer a tendency to bad driving and thus infer negligence in the accident in question. The evidence would only be admissible if the court concluded that, “either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence”, it had “significant probative value” (and there is compliance with notice requirements).1002 Discretionary exclusion under s 135 would still be possible.1003 An interesting question is whether evidence of an established course of business, or a usual practice of acting, or a “habit”, is caught by this provision (or, indeed, s 98). In Ritchie’s Supreme Court Practice, the view was expressed at [3865.6] that it will “rarely” be the purpose of evidence of usual practice to establish that a person had a “tendency … to act in a particular way”. However, this analysis appears questionable – evidence that a person (or business) had a usual practice is relevant via propensity in that it establishes the propensity to behave in a particular way and this is a link in the process of proving that the person (or business) did in fact behave in the particular way on the occasion in question (although the position may be different if a system has been set in place).1004 Of course, it is likely that such evidence will be regarded as having significant probative value, given the improbability of a departure from an established pattern of conduct.1005 An example of the application of this provision in criminal proceedings where the evidence is adduced by the prosecution would be a sexual assault case where the evidence discloses a “sexual relationship” between the complainant and the defendant on occasions other than that the subject of the prosecution. If such evidence is adduced “to prove that [the defendant] … had a tendency” to engage in sexual activities with the complainant on the occasion the subject of the prosecution (that is, the evidence is relied on for the purpose of drawing a 1002. For examples of the application of these principles in civil cases, see Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 8) (1999) 92 FCR 375; 165 ALR 468; Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto-Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417; Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171; B & M Activities Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [1998] NSWSC 324; Robinson v Goodman [2013] FCA 893 (alleged sexual harassment). 1003. For an example of the possible application of this discretion in this context, see Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto-Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417 at [19] per Sundberg J. 1004. See Sackville J in Jacara at [61], cited at [EA.97.60], [EA.97.240]. 1005. See Galea v Farrugia [2013] NSWCA 164 at [88]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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“tendency inference” from it to conforming behaviour) the evidence must have “significant probative value” in this regard to be admissible. In addition, s 101 would apply (and there would be the possibility of discretionary exclusion under s 137).1007 Of course, the evidence may be relevant for a non-tendency inference, and adduced only for that purpose, and neither ss 97 or 101 would apply (see [EA.101.150]). For example, evidence of “relationship” may be relevant to the state of mind of the complainant or the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the alleged offence.1008 If the evidence is not excluded under s 137 (or another provision such as s 293 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) or in Div 2 of Pt 8.2 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) (ss 339–352)), careful directions on how the evidence may, and may not, be used may be required (see [EA.97.270] and [EA.101.360]).

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Another example of the application of this provision in criminal proceedings where the evidence is adduced by the prosecution would be where the tendency sought to be established is not of the defendant but of person injured by a car driven by the defendant – to prove that the injured person would be very cautious (a particular state of mind) when crossing the road and would have crossed in a safe manner (a particular act).1009 An example of the application of this provision in criminal proceedings where the evidence is adduced by the defence would be where the defence adduced evidence (to support a defence of self-defence) that the victim of an assault had several convictions for violent assault himself, relied on to support an inference that the victim first attacked the defendant.1010 Again, the evidence must have “significant probative value” in this regard to be admissible. In addition, there would be the possibility of discretionary exclusion under s 135. On the other hand, if the only issue was the defendant’s state of mind, previous incidents involving the victim would not be relevant at all, whether for tendency or non-tendency reasoning, if there was no evidence that the defendant was aware of those incidents.1011 Another example of the application of this provision in 1006. Such evidence is sometimes referred to as evidence of “guilty passion”: see R v H (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; 98 A Crim R 71 at 708–709 per Ireland J (although Ireland J suggested a less inflammatory phrase would be “sexual desire or feeling of the accused for the complainant”); R v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8 at [23] per Hidden J. 1007. In Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95, Howie J observed at [118] that “the complainant’s account of the relationship would rarely have sufficient probative value to overcome the precondition of admissibility for tendency evidence in s 97 and s 101”. 1008. Thus, a history of sexual and physical violence may explain why the complainant appeared to consent to the offence charged. It may also explain why the defendant could not have believed that any apparent consent was real. Even in a case where consent or belief in non-consent is not in issue, such a history may explain why no immediate complaint was made after the alleged offence was committed. Another example of evidence relevant for a non-tendering inference would be evidence of the defendant’s reputation for violence relevant to prove a complainant’s state of mind. For further discussion, see [EA.101.150]. 1009. See R v Wolter [2015] ACTSC 269. 1010. Compare R v Osman [1998] NSWSC 13; R v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 21; [2004] NSWCCA 280; Bartlett v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 60 at [26]–[31]. Another example would be evidence that a police officer had planted drugs on a suspect, relied on to support an inference that he had done so to the defendant: R v McGoldrick [1998] NSWSC 121. 1011. Elias v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 365.

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criminal proceedings where the evidence is adduced by the defence relates to the contentious area of previous sexual history of a complainant in a sexual offence prosecution. His or her “reputation” is highly unlikely to meet the test of “significant probative value” while evidence of previous sexual conduct should only be admissible (to show “tendency”) in relation to the incident of the alleged sexual offence in question if the circumstances of the occasions were substantially and relevantly similar. In addition, specific statutory provisions in other legislation dealing with this area continue to apply (see, for example, in New South Wales, s 293 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and, in Victoria, Div 2 of Pt 8.2 Criminal Procedure Act 2009) and the court may exclude the evidence in accordance with the discretion under s 135.

[EA.97.480]

Appellate review

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Where a number of items of evidence are the subject of objection in a “global” way, without submissions addressing each item of evidence individually, an appeal court will not regard it as an error by the trial judge to deal with the objections in the same global way.1012 An interesting and difficult issue arises as to the nature of appellate review in this context. Simpson J held (McClellan CJ at CL agreeing, Rothman J dissenting) in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 at [36] that a decision as to “significant probative value” involves “a degree and value judgment” which “is reviewable on appeal only on the principles stated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40”.1013 There is support for this approach in Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 at [74]–[75] per Sackville J (Whitlam and Mansfield JJ agreeing). It has been followed: AW v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 1 at [45]; Bangaru v The Queen (2012) 269 FLR 367; [2012] NSWCCA 204 at [262], [275]; Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 at [6]. See also the discussion in respect of the same issue under s 98 at [EA.98.450]. Certainly a determination as to whether the “probative value” of the evidence is, or is not, “significant” involves questions of degree and, arguably, “room for reasonable differences of opinion”.1014 On the other hand, an assessment of significance is not simply a matter of impression or a value judgment.1015 Given that an appeal court would be in as good a position as the trial court to make the assessment, on the material available to the trial court (see Simpson J in Fletcher at [40]1016) there is much to be said for the view that the appeal court should consider for itself what is the correct answer to the question (applying the approach adopted by the High Court in Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; 1012. Bingul v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 239, Allsop P (Price J and Harrison J agreeing) at [37]. 1013. Special leave to appeal was refused by the High Court on 10 March 2006, on the basis that “the evidence in question was correctly admitted in the particular circumstances of this case and we are not persuaded that there has been any miscarriage of justice” (Gleeson CJ in Fletcher v The Queen [2006] HCATrans 127). 1014. Compare Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; [1986] HCA 17 at 518. 1015. Compare Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; 74 ALJR 1348; [2000] HCA 47 at [28]. 1016. That assumption may not always be correct in interlocutory appeals: R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, Campbell JA at [98]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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53 ALJR 293; [1979] HCA 9). The Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal has favoured the view that the determination of the admissibility of tendency evidence (under this provision and s 101) is not a matter of judicial discretion but rather a matter of “judgment which, if wrong, will be reviewed”.1017 The Victorian Court of Appeal has reached the same conclusion.1018 So has the Western Australian Court of Appeal in respect of similar legislation.1019 The Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal has engaged in comparable analysis.1020 A potential difficulty with both lines of authority is that the test in s 97(1)(b) is “the court thinks that the evidence will … have significant probative value”. The test turns on what the court “thinks”. In Ibrahim v Pham [2007] NSWCA 215, Campbell JA (Hodgson JA and Santow JA agreeing) stated at [262]–[263]:

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[I]t is to be observed that the test the section imposes relates to what “the court thinks”. The opinion that the court is required to form is one on the basis of the materials available to the judge at the time of forming his or her view. That opinion must be formed at a time when the evidence in the case is incomplete. An appellate court would be able to set aside a judge’s admission or rejection of evidence under section 97 [of the] Evidence Act if the opinion that the judge formed about whether the evidence would have significant probative value is one that, on the materials, a reasonable judge properly instructed could not have formed.

This test appears to be even more restrictive than an appeal under the principles stated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40.1021 However, subsequently, in R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, Campbell JA recanted these observations, concluding at [107] that the “inclusion of the words ‘the court thinks’ does not alter the analysis” since “any conclusion that a court comes to concerning any topic involving the application of an evaluative standard is an expression of what the court thinks”. His Honour held (the other members of the Court not considering it necessary to address the issue) that the House v The King test did not apply, with the consequence that the appeal court could substitute its own view in respect of this “evaluative standard” (see at [98]–[107]). An alternative view is that the question on appeal will be what the judge should have thought in all the circumstances.1022 Additional complexity derives from the statutory context. In DAO v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; 278 ALR 765; [2011] NSWCCA 63 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal sat a five judge court to determine the nature of review in an interlocutory appeal from a judge’s ruling that a number of trials of the applicant should not be separated because certain tendency evidence was cross-admissible in those trials. While Simpson J (Schmidt J agreeing) held at [206] that House v The King principles applied to the appellate review of the application of this 1017. L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381; [2006] TASSC 59 per Underwood CJ at [55] and Tennent J at [86]; see also Crawford J at [79]–[85]. See also [EA.98.450]. 1018. Dibbs v The Queen (2012) 225 A Crim R 195; [2012] VSCA 224 at [80]; PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88 at [16]. 1019. RMD v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 70 at [52](a). 1020. BD v The Queen [2017] NTCCA 2 at [100]. 1021. However, cf Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at 651–654 (CLR), [130]–[136] (HCA). 1022. Compare R v Parry [2017] SASCFC 66 at [121].

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provision in both such an interlocutory appeal and an appeal against conviction, the majority of the court determined the issue only for interlocutory appeals. Spigelman CJ held at [70] that House v The King applied to such an interlocutory appeal but observed that the position may be different in an appeal against conviction, where “the degree of appellate restraint applicable to a reversible, interlocutory ruling does not apply” (at [61]). Allsop P and Kirby J agreed, in substance, with Spigelman CJ.1023 This approach was subsequently followed by a five judge court of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal: KJM v The Queen (No 2) [2011] VSCA 268, 211 A Crim R 546 at [12].

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As regards appeals against conviction, it is impossible to predict the ultimate resolution of this issue for uniform evidence law jurisdictions. It may well be that the presence of the words “the court thinks that …” in the provision will be critical in leading to a conclusion that House criteria do apply. It is worth noting that, in DAO v The Queen, Spigelman CJ considered at [28] it is “strongly arguable that this test is analogous to the various statutory formulations which require a decision-maker, including a court, to be ‘satisfied’ of a certain matter” and usually import House v The King criteria for appellate review. Allsop P also made specific reference to these words and disagreed with Campbell JA’s recantation in R v Ford, observing at [101] that “[t]here is, in my view, a real difference between the review of a statutory precondition of what the court thinks will be the probative value of evidence and the appellate review of the fact of the probative value”.1024 However, it may be observed that it is doubtful whether the legislative draftsperson appreciated the potential significance of those words.1025 In IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 the High Court touched on this issue without clearly resolving it. The majority of the Court held that a trial judge had erred in failing to exclude tendency evidence pursuant to this provision. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ held at [64] that the evidence “did not qualify as having significant probative value and was not admissible under s 97(1)(b)”. The majority appear to have determined the question for themselves. In terms of appellate review, the majority did not apply House v The King limitations. Neither the language of the provisions itself (“the court thinks that the evidence will … have significant probative value”), nor intermediate appellate authority that appellate review of this provision is limited by House v The King criteria, prevented the majority from deciding the matter for itself. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the question of the nature of the appellate review was directly addressed and, accordingly, caution should be exercised before reading too much into this holding. Subsequently, in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ held at [12] that the conclusion of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal (in respect of an appeal against conviction 1023. The High Court refused special leave to appeal in this matter: DAO v The Queen [2011] HCATrans 298. Heydon J observed that the case was not a suitable vehicle for examining the correctness of the Court of Criminal Appeal’s conclusions because on either the House test or the Warren v Coombes test the same result would have been arrived at. 1024. See also Spigelman CJ at [27]–[30]. 1025. As noted at [EA.97.60], the requirements of the provision are somewhat different from those initially recommended by the ALRC and, in ALRC 102, while some minor amendments were recommended (which were subsequently adopted), there was no discussion of this issue at all. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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contending that a trial judge had erred in holding that tendency evidence had significant probative value) “that the tendency evidence adduced at the appellant’s trial had significant probative value in relation to proof of each count in the indictment was not attended by error” (see also at [64]). This analysis suggests approval of the appellate court determining the issue for itself but, again, it cannot be said that the question of the nature of the appellate review was directly addressed. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ referred to the language of “the court thinks” at [42]: [T]he open-textured nature of an enquiry into whether “the court thinks” that the probative value of the evidence is “significant” means that it is inevitable that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions. This means that in marginal cases it might be difficult to know whether an appellate court might take a different view of the significance of the tendency evidence from a trial judge. This might result in the setting aside of any conviction and an order for a retrial.

This discussion does not constrain an appellate court in taking “a different view of the significance of the tendency evidence from a trial judge”. Rather, it warns prosecutors that a cautious approach is wise before adducing tendency evidence.1026 The other three members of the Court, Gageler J, Nettle J and Gordon J, dissented on the basis that some of the tendency evidence “was not admissible” (Gordon J at [225]), again at least suggesting that House v The King principles were not applicable.

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Finally, in this context, it should also be noted that, under standard form statutory bases for appellate review of criminal convictions, in some circumstances it may be the case that admission of the evidence caused a miscarriage of justice, even though it could not be said that the decision to admit the evidence was wrong.1027

Cth Act: 98

The coincidence rule

(1) Evidence that 2 or more events occurred is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in

1026. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ referred in Hughes at [42] to “other risks for the prosecution”: “The admissibility of the tendency evidence is assessed based upon the evidence that witnesses are expected to give. In this case, the evidence given by the witnesses did not differ materially from their anticipated evidence. But in cases where the admissibility of tendency evidence is borderline, there may be risks if the actual evidence does not accord with the evidence as anticipated. Again, this could have consequences for any conviction. One intermediate appellate court has recently observed that the potential consequence of a new trial in cases where a conviction is overturned due to the wrongful admission of tendency evidence which was borderline should be a matter taken into account by the prosecution in assessing, perhaps conservatively, what tendency evidence it will rely upon”. 1027. See Simpson J in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 (at [41]–[42]). Curiously, Simpson J did not advert to this point in DAO v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; 278 ALR 765; [2011] NSWCCA 63 when her Honour held that House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 principles applied to the appellate review of the application of this provision in both an interlocutory appeal and an appeal against conviction.

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which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally unless: (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. Note: One of the events referred to in subsection (1) may be an event the occurrence of which is a fact in issue in the proceeding.

(2) Paragraph (1)(a) does not apply if: (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100; or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by another party. Note: Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as exceptions to the coincidence rule. [S 98 subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 43]

NSW Act:

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98

The coincidence rule

(1) Evidence that 2 or more events occurred is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally unless: (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence, and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. Note: One of the events referred to in subsection (1) may be an event the occurrence of which is a fact in issue in the proceeding.

(2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if: (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100, or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by another party. Note: Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as exceptions to the coincidence rule. [S 98 subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[39]]

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Vic Act: 98 The coincidence rule (1) Evidence that 2 or more events occurred is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally unless— (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. Note: One of the events referred to in subsection (1) may be an event the occurrence of which is a fact in issue in the proceeding.

(2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if— (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100; or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by another party.

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Note: Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as exceptions to the coincidence rule.

ACT Act: 98

The coincidence rule

(1) Evidence that 2 or more events happened is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they happened, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they happened, it is improbable that the events happened coincidentally unless— (a) the party seeking to present the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to present the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence presented or to be presented by the party seeking to present the evidence, have significant probative value. Note: One of the events referred to in s (1) may be an event the happening of which is a fact in issue in the proceeding.

(2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if— (a) the evidence is presented in accordance with a direction made by the court under section 100 (Court may dispense with notice requirements); or (b) the evidence is presented to explain or contradict coincidence evidence presented by another party. 724

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Note: Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as exceptions to the coincidence rule.

NT Act: 98

The coincidence rule

(1) Evidence that 2 or more events occurred is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally unless: (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence; and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. Note for subsection (1): One of the events referred to in subsection (1) may be an event the occurrence of which is a fact in issue in the proceeding.

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(2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if: (a) the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100; or (b) the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by another party. Note for section 98: Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as exceptions to the coincidence rule.

[EA.98.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 11.18–11.51; ALRC 38, s 88, paras 175–176; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 806–810.

[EA.98.60] General comments This provision, which applies in both civil and criminal proceedings, was significantly amended in response to the recommendations of ALRC 102. Before those amendments, the provision had not, on a literal reading, applied to evidence of events that the court concluded were not similar or the circumstances in which they occurred were not similar, so that such evidence would not have to comply with the requirements of this provision in order to be admissible. ALRC 102 recommended that the provision be redrafted to overcome this deficiency. The current provision applies to evidence of the occurrence of “2 or more events” and provides that such evidence may not be admitted to prove: that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally

unless the requirements of the provision are satisfied. Like the hearsay rule (s 59), © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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and the opinion rule (s 76) it is a “purpose” (or “use”) rule. If such evidence is not adduced for the specified purpose, it is not caught by s 98. Indeed, it is not properly classified as “coincidence evidence” which is defined in the Dictionary as follows: “coincidence evidence” means evidence of a kind referred to in subsection 98(1) that a party seeks to have adduced for the purpose referred to in that subsection.

Another way of expressing this proposition is to say that “evidence that 2 or more events occurred” is not caught by this provision (the “coincidence rule”: see Dictionary) if it is not adduced for the specified purpose but adduced for some other purpose. In shorthand, the evidence is adduced for a non-coincidence reasoning purpose (see [EA.98.240]). If the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible for that other purpose, it will be admitted for that use (see [EA.98.270]). The specified purpose caught by this provision in relation to “evidence that 2 or more events occurred” is: (a) to rely on any contended similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any contended similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred; (b) to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind;

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(c) by reasoning that “it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally. If that is, in substance, the process of reasoning relied upon, the requirements of this provision apply to the evidence. Thus, mere reliance on improbability of “coincidence” (which is, after all, one basis making circumstantial evidence relevant) will not make such evidence “coincidence evidence” to which the “coincidence rule” applies unless the process of reasoning relies on contended similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred.1028 In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 11.25: The intention of the proposal is that s 98 will apply where the tendering party argues that the evidence is relevant to the issues in the case on the basis of improbability reasoning and that reasoning turns on similarities between the events, or in the circumstances surrounding those events, or both. The Commissions’ view is that the terms of the recommendation and the suggested draft provision make either or both bases relevant to the test so that if the tendering party sought to limit the reasoning process to similarities of the events the section would still apply. However, the Commissions want to put this issue beyond argument. The recommendation has been amended to make the intention clearer by inserting the word “any” before “similarities”.

Examples of such improbability, or coincidence, reasoning which turns on similarities in events or the circumstances in which they happen may be given: • If evidence is adduced that three young girls had been killed in strikingly similar circumstances and it was improbable that the killings would have been the acts of different persons, proof that the defendant 1028. See R v MR [2013] NSWCCA 236 at [64]; Marsh v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 154 at [68].

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had killed two of the young girls makes it highly probable that he had killed the third (see ALRC 102 at para 11.4). • Striking similarities between two incidents in which the defendant was involved (the first involving some uncertainty as to what transpired; the second being uncertain only in respect of the defendant’s mental state) may permit inferences as to what precisely happened during the first incident and the state of mind of the defendant in the second.1029 • Similarities in the conduct of a defendant on different occasions may reveal a pattern from which it may be inferred via coincidence reasoning that the defendant did a particular act or had a particular state of mind.1030 • Where a number of persons have been poisoned, and the victims have all been associated with a particular person, the evidence of the other poisonings may support the inference that that person was responsible for the death in issue, because it would be contrary to ordinary experience that a series of poisonings, caused by accident or suicide, would occur by coincidence in the circle of persons with whom the person was associated.1031

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• Similarities in what was said, and when it was said, by a number of shop stewards relied on to support an inference that the union of which they were members gave a particular instruction.1032 • Similarities in the accounts of two or more witnesses regarding the conduct of the defendant may make it improbable that the witnesses are telling lies, in the absence of joint concoction or contamination (while the evidence is relevant to the credibility of the witnesses, it is not “relevant only because it relates to the credibility of a witness”: s 94(1)).1033 • Similarities in stab wounds inflicted on three victims said to show a pattern (from which it might be inferred that one person was responsible for all of the wounds).1034 The reference to “striking” similarities should not be misunderstood. It will often be the case that striking or unusual similarity in events, or the circumstances in which the events occurred, will be necessary for the evidence to satisfy the requirement of “significant probative value” (see [EA.98.120]). However, that will not always be the case.1035 1029. See R v Tamotsu (1999) 109 A Crim R 193; [1999] NSWCCA 400. 1030. See R v Bell [2002] NSWCCA 2. 1031. Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580; 57 ALJR 110; 44 ALR 449; [1982] HCA 75, Gibbs CJ at 587. See also CW v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288 (a number of fires where the victims were all associated with the accused). 1032. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2017] FCA 1191 at [121]. 1033. For further discussion, see [EA.98.120], [EA.101.120], [EA.101.240]. 1034. Gilham v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 131 at [319]–[329]; [350]. 1035. CW v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288 at [22] (discussed at [EA.98.120]); Harris v The Queen (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112 at [13]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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As noted above, if the contended similarities are not accepted by the court this will not mean that the evidence escapes the application of this provision. The evidence is still adduced to prove something “on the basis” of contended similarities. Rather, it will be likely that the requirement of “significant probative value” will not be satisfied and the evidence will not be admissible for coincidence reasoning. If not relevant and admissible for another purpose, the evidence will be inadmissible.

[EA.98.90] “Evidence that 2 or more events occurred …” (s 98(1)) The term “event” is very broad in scope and can include any type of occurrence, including human conduct and the results of human conduct. It can include the giving of an account regarding some other event (for example, a witness making allegations about the conduct of a defendant).

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The Note to s 98(1) makes it clear that one of the events referred to in subsection (1) may be an event the occurrence of which is a fact in issue in the proceeding. In ALRC 102 it was stated at para 11.27 that it was the intention of the original ALRC proposals that the events which are the subject of the charge would be included in appropriate cases and that this is typical of cases where coincidence reasoning is employed: For example, if the Crown has evidence that the accused committed another substantially similar crime, the evidence could go to the jury on the basis that, if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that: (i) the accused committed the other substantially similar crime; and (ii) that the same person committed that crime and the crime charged, the jury should be satisfied that it was the accused who committed the crime with which he or she is charged.

Thus, for example, where it is contended that two robberies must have been committed by the same person or persons because of striking similarities in the way they were committed, evidence that the defendant(s) committed one may thereby prove they committed the other, with which they are charged.1036 Once it had been determined that evidence of two or more “events” can be admitted for coincidence reasoning, then there is no justification for restricting the tribunal of fact from considering all the “similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred” as part of the process of determining whether or not the events occurred coincidentally.1037

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The identical requirement applies to “tendency evidence” in s 97 and the commentary on s 97(1)(b) has some application in this context: see [EA.97.120]. However, it is important to focus carefully on the nature of the fact(s) in issue to which the evidence is relevant and whether the evidence may have significance or importance in establishing that fact or those facts. Further, it is necessary to identify with some precision what the tendering party proposes to establish by the evidence. 1036. R v Gale (2012) 217 A Crim R 487; [2012] NSWCCA 174, Simpson J (McClellan CJ at CL and Fullerton J agreeing) at [34](ii). 1037. R v MR [2013] NSWCCA 236 at [79]; R v Cornell [2015] NSWCCA 258 at [71].

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“Probative value” is defined in the Dictionary: “probative value” of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.

In IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 the High Court determined (by a 4:3 majority) that a trial judge, in assessing the “probative value” of evidence for the purposes of s 97 (and a number of other provisions in the UEL) must proceed on the assumption that the evidence “is accepted” (and thus is to be regarded as both credible and reliable) – just as is required when assessing relevance under s 55. The evidence is to be “accepted as credible and reliable” (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [48]). There is no reason to doubt that this analysis applies to the assessment of the probative value of coincidence evidence for the purposes of this provision.1038 Thus, for example, where one witness is called to testify that a particular “event” occurred and another witness is called to testify that another particular “event” occurred (which evidence is adduced for the purpose of proving that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally), the probative value of that coincidence evidence must be assessed on the assumption that the evidence of both witnesses is accepted – on the assumption that both events occurred.1039

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No guidance is given in the Act as to the adjective “significant”. However, the same requirement in s 97(1)(b) was explained by French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ in IMM v The Queen at [46]: The significance of the probative value of the tendency evidence under s 97(1)(b) must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which the evidence is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing those facts. So understood, the evidence must be influential in the context of fact-finding.

Accordingly, as in the context of s 97(1)(b), it is important to focus carefully on the nature of the fact(s) in issue to which the evidence is relevant and whether the evidence may have significance or importance in establishing that fact or those facts. Coincidence evidence is sought to be used “to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally”. Whether it has significance or importance in establishing a fact in issue will depend on: (a) the strength of the inference from the “events” to establish the “particular act” or “particular state of mind” (where the inference involves reasoning on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally), and 1038. Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72 at [75]. 1039. For further discussion in the context of s 137, see [EA.137.90]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) where the “particular act” or “particular state of mind” is not itself a fact in issue, the capacity of proof of that “particular act” or “particular state of mind” to establish a fact in issue. In CGL v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 24 VR 486; [2010] VSCA 26 the Victorian Court of Appeal held at [22] that the questions to be addressed in relation to coincidence evidence under this provision (putting to one side the requirements of s 101) are as follows: 1) Are the similarities in the specified events and/or in the circumstances in which they occurred such that it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally? 2) If so, would the evidence of those events and circumstances tend to prove that the accused: a) did the specified act; or b) had the specified state of mind where doing that act or having that state of mind is a fact in issue or is relevant to a fact in issue? 3) If so, does the evidence have significant probative value, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or ought to be adduced by the prosecution?

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4) If so, does the probative value of the evidence substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused? It is suggested that this formulation somewhat misstates the requirements of this provision.1040 It is not a requirement of this provision that the similarities in the specified events and/or in the circumstances in which they occurred be such that “it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally”. Rather, the provision only applies where that is the reasoning upon which the party adducing the evidence (in this case, the prosecution) relies in order to prove its case. That is, the prosecution adduces the evidence for the purpose of attempting to persuade the tribunal of fact to draw the inference that, by reason of the contended similarities in the specified events and/or in the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally. If it would not be reasonably open to the tribunal of fact to draw that inference, the evidence may well fail the test of relevance (see [EA.55.330]) and, accordingly, would have no probative value. However, it is not a requirement of admissibility that the court be satisfied that it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally. A fortiori, it is not a requirement of admissibility that the court be satisfied that “the similarities” in the specified events and/or in the circumstances in which they occurred are such that it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally. It should be noted that the Court of Appeal observed at [26] that the “only issue debated in argument on the hearing of the leave application” was whether the evidence in question “could be viewed as being probative of the guilt of the accused”, so that “comments on other aspects of the coincidence and tendency evidence are intended to be of assistance but, in the circumstances, should be 1040. This suggestion was noted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in CW v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288 at [7] fn 3 but it was observed that “[w]hether that is so is a question we can leave for another day”.

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treated as expressing tentative views only”. Accordingly, the formulation of the questions to be addressed under this provision should be regarded as “tentative”. Equally, care should be taken with the Court’s reference (at [29]–[30]) to the reasoning in R v Papamitrou (2004) 7 VR 375; [2004] VSCA 12, a case arising under s 398A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (now repealed), which imposed a requirement that it be “in all the circumstances just to admit” the evidence. That is not the applicable test under this provision, or s 101. While the Crown on appeal “accepted that the correct approach to assessing the probative significance of these asserted similarities was to be found in the judgment of Winneke P in Papamitrou” (the Court at [28]), there are dangers in importing such considerations as “underlying unity”, “modus operandi” and “pattern of conduct” except to assist the assessment of relevance and degree of probative value. It is apparent that obtaining such assistance was how the Court of Appeal proceeded, when it concluded at [30] that “there was no sufficient connection, in either time or circumstance, between the acts alleged to raise any issue of the improbability of coincidence” (that is, the suggested similarities were either non-existent or so unremarkable that the evidence lacked any probative value, let alone significant probative value).

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Nevertheless, Victorian courts have continued to proceed on the basis that a court must be satisfied that “having regard to the similarities in the events and in the circumstances in which they occurred, that it was improbable that the events occurred coincidentally”.1041 Perhaps it should simply be accepted that a court cannot “think” that coincidence evidence “will … have significant probative value” unless the court is satisfied that it is “improbable” that the events in question occurred coincidentally.1042 The proper approach to be taken to the assessment of whether the evidence has “significant probative value” in the context of s 98(1)(b) was considered by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in DSJ v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 758; 215 A Crim R 349; [2012] NSWCCA 9. The members of the court relied on the judgment in R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 226; [2006] NSWCCA 112 for the proposition that court is required to assess the capacity of the evidence to affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue – it is not required to assess whether the evidence would have this effect, that is, engage in a fact-finding exercise involving an assessment of the reliability and credibility of the evidence (Bathurst CJ, Allsop P and McCallum J agreeing, at [7]–[10]; Whealy JA, Bathurst CJ, Allsop P, McClellan CJ at CL and McCallum J agreeing, at [55]–[56], [72], [75]). As noted above, that proposition was endorsed by a majority of the High Court in IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14. However, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that, in assessing whether coincidence evidence had “significant probative value”, consideration could be given to alternative explanations for the evidence other 1041. See Quarrell v The Queen [2011] VSCA 125 at [14]; Harris v The Queen (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112 at [11]; Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72 at [78]. 1042. That analysis appears to have been adopted in Harris v The Queen (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112 at [11]. Significantly, the court proceeded to hold at [25] that the evidence in question lacked “significant probative value” even though “it was improbable that the two complainants, as a matter of coincidence, would separately give accounts of the offending against them in the manner in which they” had. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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than the inference sought to be drawn by the party adducing the evidence, so long as the alternative explanation arises on the evidence (Bathurst CJ at [10]; Whealy JA at [78]). It must be a real possibility, not a fanciful one (Whealy JA at [79]). The Court must ask whether that possibility substantially alters the “view as to the otherwise significant capacity of the coincidence evidence to establish the fact or facts in issue” (Whealy JA at [80]), although the court does not ask whether one explanation is more probable than the other (Whealy JA at [81]). Such an alternate explanation that is open on the evidence and is a real possibility and not fanciful may have the effect of depriving the evidence of an otherwise significant capacity to establish a fact in issue (and thus of “significant probative value”). The Victorian Court of Appeal adopted that analysis in CV v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] VSCA 58 at [6], [21]. Plainly enough, very relevant to the assessment of the probability that two or more events occurred coincidentally (and thus the probative value of the evidence) will be the degree of similarity in the events and/or the circumstances in which the events occurred. However, it is important to take into account that, as the Victorian Court of Appeal has pointed out:

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[t]he cogency and significance of the events or the surrounding circumstances will depend on the issue to be proved, as well as on the nature of the evidence. The issue may be whether a particular person committed the acts, whether the acts were committed at all, or the state of mind of the person performing the acts.1043

The determination of whether the test is satisfied may require careful analysis, as demonstrated by the case of R v Zhang (2005) 227 ALR 311; 196 FLR 152; 158 A Crim R 504; [2005] NSWCCA 437, a case concerning this provision before it was amended following on ALRC 102. The appellant was charged with two drug importation offences. The “admissibility” issue (or “cross-admissibility” issue) was whether evidence tending to prove her guilt in relation to one count could also be used to prove her guilt in relation to the other count (and vice versa), bearing in mind that, in legal theory, there were two “trials” in relation to the two counts on the indictment (even though they were occurring at the same time). By the time the trial judge ruled on use/admissibility it was clear that the only real issue in respect of both trials was whether the appellant had knowledge of the existence of the drugs. Accordingly, the question for the trial judge was whether the similar circumstances made it unlikely that the appellant lacked the requisite knowledge so as to give the evidence “significant probative value”. Simpson J (Buddin J agreeing) concluded at [145] that it was open to the trial judge to hold “that the evidence supporting each count was admissible in respect of the other count in order to prove that, because of the improbability of the events (that is, the presence of the drugs in two premises controlled by the appellant without her knowledge) occurring coincidentally, the appellant attempted to, in the one case, and did in fact in the other, possess the substance in question”. However, curiously, Simpson J also conceded at [148] that “the evidence may have done little to enhance the prosecution case in respect of the single disputed issue, the appellant’s knowledge”. Basten JA dissented, concluding after a detailed analysis 1043. CV v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] VSCA 58 at [11].

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(at [48]–[64]) that while the evidence in respect of one count was admissible in respect of the other, the reverse was not true. Another example of the care which must be taken in assessment of probative value is the High Court judgment of Phillips v The Queen (2005) 225 CLR 303; 80 ALJR 537; [2006] HCA 4. Although the appeal related to the common law, the discussion of probative value is applicable in this context. The case involved allegations of sexual assault by five complainants against the same defendant. The trial judge held that the evidence of each complainant was admissible in respect of the trials involving the others because of “the improbability of similar lies by each of the complainants” (and not for tendency reasoning). There was nothing particularly “striking” or “remarkable” about the alleged sexual assaults. Rather, it was simply the fact that a number of complainants made similar allegations against the defendant which was regarded as significant in making it likely that the allegations were true and that consent was absent. However, the members of the High Court, in a joint judgment, rejected this analysis. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated at [47]:

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Whether or not similar fact evidence could ever be used in relation to consent in sexual cases, it could not be done validly in this case. It is impossible to see how, on the question of whether one complainant consented, the other complainants’ evidence that they did not consent has any probative value. It does not itself prove any disposition on the part of the accused: it proves only what mental state each of the other complainants had on a particular occasion affecting them, and that can say nothing about the mental state of the first complainant on a particular occasion affecting her.

Although undoubtedly controversial,1044 the conclusion of the High Court may be supported in the following way. While the number of similar complaints may have increased the probability that the defendant sexually assaulted one or more complainants, it did not increase the possibility that he had sexually assaulted any particular complainant. In the absence of striking similarities in the allegations, it could not be concluded that all the complainants were telling the truth and, accordingly, one or more might still be making a false allegation. The only way in which evidence was relevant (or, at least, had significant probative value) was because it showed a tendency to sexual assault (a process of reasoning for which it was otherwise inadmissible). Much depended on the issues raised in the trial. As the Victorian Court of Appeal observed in Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [178], “[h]ad the defence been one of accidental contact, for example, the case for cross-admissibility may have been considerably more powerful”. It is important to note that the court is required to determine the admissibility of “[e]vidence that 2 or more events occurred … to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally”. Thus, focussing on proof of a particular act, similarities in the events and/or their circumstances are being used to prove that particular act. It would not be logical to assume or reason that that person did the particular act, that is the fact in issue sought to be proved, in 1044. See Gans J, “Similar facts after Phillips” (2006) 30 Crim LJ 224. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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order to establish the requisite similarity. In R v Gale (2012) 217 A Crim R 487; [2012] NSWCCA 174, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered a case where it was contended that two robberies must have been committed by the same persons because of similarities in the way they were committed and that proof that the defendants committed one might thereby prove they committed the other. Some of the suggested similarities in the two robberies assumed that the defendants had committed both robberies (or relied upon evidence from an informer to that effect). Simpson J (McClellan CJ at CL and Fullerton J agreeing) stated at [37]: Some of the asserted similarities expose a serious logical fallacy in the argument. The [asserted similarities] are all, far from being established similarities (or similarities capable of being established), the very facts that the DPP seeks to prove by the coincidence evidence. This involves, in my opinion, a misunderstanding of the note to s 98. The note permits an “event” to be the subject of coincidence evidence, even where its occurrence is a fact in issue in the proceeding. The Crown cannot use the (asserted) presence of [one defendant] at both events to prove that [that defendant] was present at the [robbery for which the defendant was on trial]. The argument is a classic instance of “begging the question” (properly so called). It assumes the very facts that the DPP seeks to prove. In my opinion, similarities for the purposes of s 98 must be capable of proof by means other than the “facts” sought to be established.

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It did not matter that there was evidence from an informer of the particular similarities – it was not permissible to reason that they had committed both robberies in a similar way in order to prove that they had committed the robbery for which they were on trial. Clearly enough, close attention will be required in respect of the suggested similarities in respect of the events and/or the circumstances in which they occurred. The assessment of whether the evidence of the relevant events has significant probative value requires a consideration of the combined effect of all the relevant similarities.1045 It is important to consider all similarities in combination, rather than sequentially or in isolation.1046 In AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52, another case concerning this provision before it was amended following on ALRC 102, a trial judge ruled that evidence of alleged sexual assaults by the appellant on his step-daughter, PNE, was cross-admissible in respect of the trial of similar allegations by his daughter, CNE. However, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal stated at [42]–[43]: The similarities that the Judge identified were, in reality, unremarkable circumstances that are common to sexual offences against children. The Crown Prosecutor on the appeal did not maintain that PNE’s evidence was admissible under s 98 to prove the appellant’s guilt on the counts relating to CNE on the basis of the improbability of the events occurring coincidentally. This was a realistic concession that the allegations made by PNE were not of events that were substantially and relevantly similar to the allegations made by CNE nor were the circumstances in which they occurred substantially similar. It was an error to admit the evidence of PNE at the trial of the counts involving CNE under the coincidence rule. 1045. See R v MR [2013] NSWCCA 236 at [9]–[10], [79], [89]; R v Matonwal [2016] NSWCCA 174 at [73]. 1046. See R v Matonwal [2016] NSWCCA 174 at [73]; Pearson v The Queen [2016] VSCA 341 at [25]; Hunt v The Queen [2017] VSCA 196 at [29], [75], [95]. See also [EA.98.150].

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While this analysis focussed upon the terms of s 98(2), prior to its amendment following ALRC 102, there is little doubt that similar considerations inform the assessment of probative value under the current provision. “Striking” similarities are not essential, but absence of striking or unusual similarities will make it less likely that the requirement of significant probative value will be satisfied. The Victorian Court of Appeal engaged in just such an approach in the similar case of CGL v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 24 VR 486; [2010] VSCA 26, adopting at [31] the language of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal that the alleged similarities were “unremarkable circumstances that are common to sexual offences against children” and concluding at [30] that “there was no sufficient connection, in either time or circumstance, between the acts alleged to raise any issue of the improbability of coincidence”. In essence, “the absence of relevant similarity”, other than “commonplace” similarity, meant that the evidence lacked any probative value, let alone significant probative value.

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Similarly, in PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88 the Victorian Court of Appeal came to essentially the same view regarding alleged similarities (see at [22]–[23]). In that analysis, the Court considered at [19] that it was “a mistake to treat as relevant similarities for this purpose features of the alleged offending which reflect circumstances outside the accused’s control”. As regards those circumstances within the accused’s control, the similarities in respect of the alleged offending were “unremarkable”, there was no “distinctive progression” of the offences and there was no common “distinctive feature” in respect of surrounding circumstances (at [22]–[23]).1047 In contrast, in NAM v The Queen [2010] VSCA 95, there were “strikingly distinctive” similarities (Maxwell P at [12]) in respect of some of the conduct alleged (involving use of a banana) and “distinctive” and “strikingly similar” behaviour (at [17]) on the part of the accused in the surrounding circumstances of some of the offences (allegedly providing the complainants with beer, and then with liquorice, in connection with the sexual offending), so that it was “highly improbable, to the point of impossibility, that the similarity in the complainants’ accounts could be explained by coincidence” (at [12]). As noted above, the presence of striking similarities between two or more events (for example, particular thefts) may support an inference that the same person was responsible for all. In those circumstances, the requirement of significant probative value will be satisfied. An example is R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319, discussed in the commentary to s 101 at [EA.101.180], where all the thefts alleged to have been committed by the defendant were committed using a particular unusual technique to remove a shop window without breaking it.1048 However, the striking similarity, or the required probative value, may arise in different ways.1049 In Wallis v Tasmania [2007] TASSC 4 a majority of the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that the requirements of this provision as it existed prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102 (and s 101) were satisfied where the appellant had possession of a 1047. See also Bauer v The Queen [2015] VSCA 55 at [171]–[174]. 1048. For other examples, see Wilcox v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 42; R v Matonwal [2016] NSWCCA 174 at [81]–[88] (“identical weapons”, “distinctive” clothing, other similarities). 1049. R v Matonwal [2016] NSWCCA 174 at [86]–[87]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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large number of items stolen in six separate burglaries. Evans J observed at [89] that an inference adverse to innocent possession is more likely to be drawn against an accused found in possession of a substantial quantity of items that had been stolen in the course of separate and distinct incidents than an accused found in possession of one stolen item. He concluded at [92]: The characteristic of each event that is strikingly similar is the appellants possession of property alleged to have been stolen in a burglary. … This similarity provides a sound basis for inferring that because of the improbability that each event would have occurred by coincidence, the appellant was the perpetrator of each burglary or received the goods identified as having been stolen in each burglary knowing the goods to be stolen.

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Crawford J came to the same conclusion at [66], notwithstanding his earlier expressed view (at [65]) that the evidence did not establish on its own such a clear underlying unity through similar facts that it could be said that the same offender must have committed all of them. Underwood CJ (dissenting), who focused exclusively on the lack of striking similarities between the actual burglaries, considered at [41] that the evidence was not sufficiently probative to be cross-admissible. That “striking” similarity is not always required was emphasised by the Victorian Court of Appeal in CW v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288. In that case, the applicant had been charged with three separate arsons and the probative value of the coincidence evidence rested on the fact that the victims of the fires were all persons with whom the applicant had had business dealings, and were in a current dispute with him. The Court of Appeal observed at [22] that the basis of the coincidence reasoning in such a case, relying “on the existence of a relationship which uniquely links the accused person with two or more victims of similar crimes”, was “quite different” from those cases where striking similarity was needed to establish significant probative value.1050 Similarly, in Page v The Queen [2015] VSCA 357, a case where it was argued that the improbability of coincidence made it more probable that the accounts given by several complainants of the respective events/circumstances were true, it was stated at [57]: There is no requirement of “unity”, “connection” or “pattern” over and above the requirement of cogency in the common features or similarities. Thus, there might be a single unusual feature of the alleged offending, or of the circumstances, which recurs in the descriptions given by the respective witnesses. The very distinctiveness of that feature might be sufficient to support “improbability of coincidence” reasoning, despite there being no other similarities or, at least, none which would attract the description “underlying unity” or “pattern of conduct”. As this court said in Velkoski, the greater the number of complainants, the less distinctive or similar the evidence need be to satisfy coincidence reasoning

Equally, in CV v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] VSCA 58, where it was the defendant’s state of mind that was in issue, the prosecution relied on three separate loan applications where the defendant made a gross overstatement of net 1050. See also Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 (in a case where two complainants alleged sexual assaults by the defendant, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal emphasised at [52] that each complainant alleged that she was lured by the defendant to his place of business, in circumstances where he would be alone); Harris v The Queen (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112.

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income in order to prove fraud – there was no need to prove “striking” similarity in the applications or the circumstances of the applications. As regards the existence of “dissimilarities”, Leeming JA observed in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal judgment of El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [74]–[75] that “relevant dissimilarities” may dilute the probative value of the evidence but will not necessarily mean that coincidence evidence lacks significant probative value: Evidence which supports … coincidence reasoning turns on whether there are relevant similarities or dissimilarities. … The question is whether the similarity is explicable by coincidence, not whether there are other points of difference.

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Equally, in Cox v The Queen [2015] VSCA 28, the Victorian Court of Appeal found that there was “sufficient underlying unity” in the allegations made by three complainants to satisfy the requirements of this provision (and s 101), notwithstanding the existence of some differences in those accounts. As was observed in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Alexander [2016] VSCA 92 at [30], “there is always a danger in cases involving multiple complainants, of embarking upon a too detailed search for dissimilarities, (of which there will always be a number) and then treating the existence of such differences as the basis for watering down the probative value that should properly attach to the broader similarities”.1051 However, it depends on the precise reasoning involved. In Harris v The Queen (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that, in a case where the significant probative value was said to derive from the unlikelihood of two complainants independently making similar allegations against the defendant, the court concluded as follows at [25]: Taken together, [the] dissimilarities necessarily diminish the strength of the proposition that it is improbable that the two complainants would allege that the events occurred as a matter of coincidence. While we accept that, nevertheless, it is improbable that the two complainants, as a matter of coincidence, would separately give accounts of the offending against them in the manner in which they have, containing the similarities that we have described, the degree of that improbability is necessarily undermined by the differences between the two sets of offending alleged by each complainant. In those circumstances, while we consider that the coincidence evidence, sought to be admitted, would be of probative value, we do not consider that it has such cogency that it would have significant probative value, either by itself, or having regard to the other evidence to be adduced by the prosecution.

On the other hand, the Victorian Court of Appeal in Page v The Queen [2015] VSCA 357 observed at [59] that “[l]ogically, however, once the identified similarities can be said to raise the improbability of coincidence – and hence give the evidence its probative value – the existence of dissimilarities will not diminish that probative value”. A particular issue arises where similarities in the accounts of two witnesses regarding the conduct of the defendant are contended to make it improbable that the witnesses are telling lies, in the absence of joint concoction or contamination. In IMM v The Queen, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ made the following observation at [59] with respect to such coincidence evidence: 1051. It was held at [44] that, while there were “obvious dissimilarities between the allegations” made by three complainants, “these dissimilarities do not, in my view, significantly diminish the underlying unity of what underpins coincidence reasoning in this case”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.98.120]

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 98

[T]here should be reference to the appellant’s submission concerning the risk of joint concoction to the determination of admissibility of coincidence evidence. The premise for the appellant’s submission – that it is “well-established” that under the identical test in s 98(1)(b) the possibility of joint concoction may deprive evidence of probative value consistently with the approach to similar fact evidence stated in Hoch v The Queen – should not be accepted.1052

In Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50, the High Court held in respect of the common law that similar fact evidence whose probative value “lies in the improbability of the witnesses giving accounts of happenings having the requisite degree of similarity unless the happenings occurred” will not be admissible if there is “a possibility of joint concoction” because there will in consequence be “a rational view of the evidence that is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused” (Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ at 296). Subsequent authority has extended that analysis beyond the possibility of joint concoction to the possibility of contamination. As Basten JA stated in McIntosh at [36], such an analysis “is not consistent with the language of the Evidence Act”. The key passage of Basten JA is at [47]: Whilst, in determining probative value as a question of capability to affect the assessment of a fact in issue, the court is not required to disregard inherent implausibility, on the other hand, contestable questions of credibility and reliability are not for the trial judge, but for the jury. Accordingly, the suggestion that the possibility of concoction is a factor which must be taken into account in determining whether particular evidence has significant probative value should not be accepted.

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However, this passage needs to be understood in context. In McIntosh at [49]–[50], Basten JA stated: [49] … If a possibility of concoction at a level sufficient to affect the capacity of the evidence to bear significant probative value were to be identified, it would probably have been necessary to carry out a reasonably searching cross-examination on the voir dire. That did not happen. Thus, the reason why the trial judge did not consider the possibility of concoction in making his rulings, was that it was neither relied upon by counsel for the accused at trial, nor was it inherently necessary for the judge to consider such matters in assessing significant probative value. [50] Given the manner in which the evidence unfolded, the absence of reference to the possibility of concoction in the assessment of admissibility was unsurprising. On any view, it revealed no error on the part of the trial judge.

It is apparent that Basten JA did not hold that a possibility of concoction is immaterial to the question of whether the evidence has significant probative value. Rather, a mere possibility of this could not support a conclusion that the evidence lacks significant probative value. However, if the probability of concoction reached a particular “level sufficient to affect the capacity of the evidence to bear significant probative value”, then it would be appropriate to take it into account. The majority judgment in IMM did not take a different view. It only rejected the proposition that “the possibility of joint concoction may deprive evidence of probative value”. 1052. Footnote 45 of IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 read: “See the discussion in McIntosh v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 184 at [42]–[48] per Basten JA, [172] per Hidden J agreeing, [176] per Wilson J agreeing”.

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s 98

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

[EA.98.150]

Coincidence evidence is sought to be used “to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally”. It may be that some degree of risk of joint concoction or contamination will have the consequence that the evidence will have a limited capacity to rationally affect the probability that the complainant’s account of a charged offence is true. In those circumstances, the evidence would lack significance or importance in establishing those facts. Subsequent to IMM, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has held that, in determining whether tendency evidence has “significant probative value”, a court may take into account a possibility that the evidence is the product of “contamination” or, indeed, “concoction” that arises on the evidence in the proceeding.1053 While it is somewhat difficult to reconcile that authority in relation to tendency evidence with the proposition that the tendency evidence is to be “accepted as credible and reliable”, it plainly supports the view that, in determining whether coincidence evidence has “significant probative value”, a court may take into account a possibility that the evidence is the product of “contamination” or “concoction” that arises on the evidence in the proceeding.

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[EA.98.150]

“either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence” (s 98(1)(b))

In determining whether “the court thinks that the evidence will … have significant probative value”, the court may look at the evidence “by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence”. In DSJ v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 758; 215 A Crim R 349; [2012] NSWCCA 9, Bathurst CJ (Allsop P and McCallum J agreeing) stated at [9]: [T]he matters to which the Court is to have regard in performing this task is the evidence sought to be adduced either on its own or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to tender it. In particular, regard is not to be had to evidence either adduced or to be adduced by the other party to the proceedings.

The Victorian Court of Appeal has adopted that analysis.1054 It follows that the court should disregard evidence either adduced or to be adduced by the other party to the proceedings but should assess probative value both of the coincidence evidence alone and in the context of other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence. Accordingly, it was held erroneous for a trial judge to fail to take account other evidence relied upon by the prosecution in seeking to have coincidence evidence admitted.1055 Equally, where there are a number of items of “coincidence evidence”, it is necessary to 1053. R v GM [2016] NSWCCA 78 at [100]. See also BM v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 253 at [58]–[60], [64]–[66]. 1054. CV v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] VSCA 58 at [22]. 1055. R v Matonwal [2016] NSWCCA 174 at [75]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.98.180]

s 98

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

give consideration to the evidence sought to be tendered as a whole, rather than separate consideration of each particular circumstance relied upon.1056 In R v MR [2013] NSWCCA 236, Beech-Jones J (with whom Hoeben CJ at CL agreed, see also Schmidt J at [18]) emphasised the words of s 98(1)(b) in a case where coincidence evidence tended to prove that a number of robberies “were committed by the same group or subgroup” (at [86]) but the fact that there were a different number of offenders in the armed robberies was “a matter that weighs against the evidence of the events being significantly probative of [the defendant’s] involvement in each offence” (at [95]). However, there was other evidence which directly connected him to each of those offences (“albeit that evidence is of varying strength”) and, in those circumstances, the coincidence evidence had “significant probative value” in establishing the fact in issue, “namely the involvement of [the defendant] in each offence” (at [95]).

[EA.98.180]

Notice (s 98(1)(a))

“Reasonable”1057 notice in writing must be given under s 98(1)(a). Section 99 provides that notice under s 97 is to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for that purpose. Regulation 6(3) of the Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth) deals with notice under this provision: (3) A notice given under subsection 98(1) of the Act (relating to the “coincidence” rule) must state: (a) the substance of the evidence of the occurrence of 2 or more related events that the party giving the notice intends to adduce; and

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(b) particulars of: (i) the date, time, place and circumstances at or in which each of those events conduct occurred; and (ii) the names and addresses of each person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived each of those events; (iii) in a civil proceeding – the address of each person so named; so far as they are known to the notifying party.

Identical requirements are found in reg 6(2) of the Evidence Regulation 2010 (NSW) and reg 7(2) of the Evidence Regulations 2009 (Vic). As Leeming JA observed in El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [56], it is “essential” that the notice identify “what was the particular state of mind or particular act which was sought to be proven, and the circumstances in which those events occurred, which were improbably coincidental”. In R v Zhang (2005) 227 ALR 311; 196 FLR 152; 158 A Crim R 504; [2005] NSWCCA 437 Simpson J (Buddin J agreeing) stated at [131]: A properly drafted s 98 Notice involves the identification of four matters. These are: 1056. R v MR [2013] NSWCCA 236 at [9]–[10], [78]–[79]; R v Matonwal & Amood [2016] NSWCCA 174 at [73]. 1057. Presumably, relevant considerations would include the date when the notice is given (compared with the date of the hearing), the complexity of the evidence and the detail provided in the notice.

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Uniform Evidence Law

s 98

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

[EA.98.240]

• the two or more related “events” the subject of the proposed evidence; • the person whose conduct or state of mind is the subject of the proposed evidence; • whether the evidence is to be tendered to prove that a person did a particular act, and, if so, what that “act” is;

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• whether the evidence is to be tendered to establish that that person had a particular state of mind, and, if so, what that “state of mind” is.

The notice may comply with these requirements by reference to another document or documents: “it is sufficiently compliant with the regulation if the notice states, either in its own body or by reference to documents readily identifiable, the nature and substance of the evidence sought to be tendered”.1058 However, there would not be compliance “by a seemingly mechanical notice in general terms identifying the whole of the Crown case”.1059 Failure to comply with the notice requirements renders the evidence inadmissible for a coincidence reasoning use.1060 Section 98(3) provides that notice need not be given if the court dispenses with notice requirements under s 100 or “the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party”. It has been held that no unfairness has been created (and, presumably, dispensation under s 100 is appropriate) where a tendency evidence notice, rather than a coincidence evidence notice, has been given.1061 However, in contrast, the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal has held that a tendency notice did not fulfil the requirements of a coincidence notice, particularly because it did not identify the “events” and the substance of the evidence relating to them, with the consequence that the requirement of notice and the requirement in s 98(1)(a) had not been satisfied.1062 The Federal Court Rules (O 33 r 19) require notice to be in accordance with Form 147, but compliance with that requirement may be dispensed with if the court is satisfied that the purpose behind the notice has been satisfied.

[EA.98.210]

Service

Section 181 permits proof of service of “a written notification, notice, order or direction” by affidavit “of the person who served, gave or sent it”. Section 186 provides for the swearing of affidavits.

[EA.98.240]

“Non-coincidence” evidence

Examples may be given of evidence adduced against a defendant in criminal procedings which, while it may not be admissible as coincidence evidence, is relevant and admissible for another purpose (see [EA.101.150] for a more extended discussion): • evidence showing opportunity (and thereby rebutting a defence of alibi, if such a defence is advanced); • evidence of prior conduct revealing a motive for the crime charged; 1058. R v AB [2001] NSWCCA 496 at [15] per Adams J. 1059. El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [56]. 1060. R v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176; [2000] NSWCCA 372 at [62] per Kirby J (in the absence of waiver under s 190). 1061. See R v Teys (2001) 161 FLR 44; 119 A Crim R 398; [2001] ACTSC 29 at [66] per Miles CJ. 1062. Pattison v Tasmania [2017] TASCCA 13 at [120]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.98.270]

• • • •

s 98

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

evidence of a system; putting other evidence in context; evidence identifying the defendant with the crime charged; evidence relevant to a person’s state of mind;

• evidence of “relationship” (where the evidence is not relied on for a tendency inference); • evidence of conduct which forms a part of a relevant transaction.

[EA.98.270]

Use rule

This provision prohibits use of evidence “that 2 or more related events occurred” to prove that, “a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that … it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally” – unless the requirements of the provision are satisfied. It follows that if such evidence is relevant and admissible for another purpose it may be admitted for that latter purpose, subject to the discretions in ss 135 and 137. In accordance with s 95, if the evidence is admitted on that basis, it may not be used for the purpose of proving an act or state of mind by “improbability reasoning”. In a jury trial, careful directions to the jury usually will be required: see [EA.101.360].

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[EA.98.300]

“evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party” (s 98(2)(b))

Section 98(2) (which was, prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102, s 98(3)) provides that the notice requirements in s 98(1)(a) do not apply if “(b) evidence is adduced to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by another party”. However, no reference is made to the requirement of “significant probative value” in s 98(1)(b). It follows that this requirement applies even though the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by another party.1063 As regards creating an exception to the notice requirement, a corresponding provision is found in s 97(2)(b). It would not be sufficient that another party has made a submission, rather than adduced evidence, which the coincidence evidence is adduced to explain or contradict.1064 Further, the evidence adduced by the other party must be “coincidence evidence”, as defined in the Dictionary to the Act.1065 Despite the language of “adduced”, the other coincidence evidence must have been admitted.1066

[EA.98.330]

Exceptions

Section 94 expressly provides that this provision does not apply to “evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness”, evidence in bail or sentencing proceedings, and evidence of “character, reputation, conduct or tendency” where “that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue”. Further, as the note to the provision indicates, other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. 1063. Compare Bective Station Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2006] FCA 1596 per Branson J at [85]. 1064. Compare Martin v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 38 at [43]. 1065. Compare Martin v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 38 at [43], [46]. 1066. Compare Martin v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 38 at [46].

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s 98

[EA.98.360]

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

[EA.98.450]

Evidence of practice or habit

An interesting question is whether evidence of an established course of business, or a usual practice of acting, or a “habit”, is caught by this provision (or, alternatively, s 97). In Ritchie’s Supreme Court Practice, the view was expressed at [3870.5] that: [E]vidence of course of business, or usual practice, is rarely adduced for the purpose of establishing the improbability of coincidence between past events and the matters in issue … [T]he usual purpose of the evidence is to establish the opposite – namely the improbability that, in relation to the matters in issue, there would have been a departure from an established pattern of conduct.

This analysis was implicitly endorsed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Tambree v Travel Compensation Fund [2004] NSWCA 24 at [100], and appears to be correct. However, the view expressed at [3865.6] that it is not tendency evidence (for the purposes of s 97) is more doubtful: see [EA.97.450].

[EA.98.390]

Judgments and convictions

Part 3.5 deals with evidence of judgments and convictions. Even if evidence of specific conduct (which resulted in a court judgment or conviction) is admissible under the coincidence rule, it may be that Pt 3.5 will render inadmissible evidence of the judgment or conviction. This will not affect other evidence of the conduct.

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[EA.98.420]

Onus of proof

It may be noted that the provision states that evidence “is not admissible … unless (a) the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice … and (b) the court thinks that the evidence will … have significant probative value”. Prior to amendments following on ALRC 102, the provision was expressed negatively and the view was open that the onus of proof was on the party submitting that the evidence was not admissible. However, the current formulation means that the onus will be on the party seeking to have the evidence ruled admissible to persuade the court that “reasonable notice” has been given and that the evidence “will” have “significant probative value”.1067

[EA.98.450]

Appellate review

An interesting and difficult issue arises as to the nature of appellate review in this context. Simpson J held1068 in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 at [36] that a decision as to “significant probative value” under s 97 involves “a degree and value judgment” which “is reviewable on appeal only on the principles stated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40” (see discussion at [EA.97.480]). In R v Zhang (2005) 227 ALR 311; 196 FLR 152; 158 A Crim R 504; [2005] NSWCCA 437 Simpson J at [141]1069 adopted the same analysis in respect of the requirements in this provision. The dissenting view of Basten JA appears preferable. He stated at [45]: 1067. Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72 at [97]. 1068. McClellan CJ at CL agreeing, Rothman J dissenting. 1069. Buddin J agreeing, Basten JA dissenting at [46]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.98.450]

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 98

[H]er Honour suggested in the same paragraph that appellate challenge to such a decision, which involves “an evaluative process”, may only be made in limited circumstances which she identified at [48] in Fletcher by reference to the principles established in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, at 505. House was concerned with the basis upon which an appellate court might interfere with a particular exercise of the discretionary power of a sentencing judge. However, there is a distinction in principle, even if the dividing line may be blurred in particular circumstances, between the exercise of a discretionary power and the making of a finding of fact which involves a level of “evaluation and judgment”: see, in a different context, Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [10]ff (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ), [115]–[116] (Callinan J). As presently advised, I would take the view that an accused should have no less protection under s 6(1) from an erroneous ruling by a trial judge than that enjoyed by a civil litigant albeit on an appeal by way of rehearing. The correct approach to the exercise of evaluating the evidence should follow that identified in Warren v Combes (1979) 142 CLR 531.

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As observed at [EA.97.480], given that an appeal court would be in as good a position as the trial court to make the assessment of “significant probative value”, on the material available to the trial court, there is much to be said for the view that the appeal court should consider for itself what is the correct answer to the question. The Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal has favoured the view that the determination of the admissibility of evidence under this provision and s 101 is not a matter of judicial discretion but rather a matter of “judgment which, if wrong, will be reviewed”.1070 The Victorian Court of Appeal has reached the same conclusion.1071 Additional complexity derives from the statutory context. In DAO v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; 278 ALR 765; [2011] NSWCCA 63 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal sat a five judge court to determine the nature of review in an interlocutory appeal from a judge’s ruling that a number of trials of the applicant should not be separated because certain tendency evidence was cross-admissible in those trials. The ruling in that case, discussed at [EA.97.480], would be applicable in respect of interlocutory appeals in respect of this provision. The position in relation to appeals against conviction remains unsettled. Whatever the correct analysis, it may be noted that, under standard form statutory bases for appellate review of criminal convictions, in some circumstances it may be the case that admission of the evidence caused a miscarriage of justice, even though it could not be said that the decision to admit the evidence was wrong.1072

1070. L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381; [2006] TASSC 59 per Underwood CJ at [55] and Tennent J at [86]; see also Crawford J at [79]–[85]. 1071. Dibbs v The Queen (2012) 225 A Crim R 195; [2012] VSCA 224 at [80]; PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) [2010] VSCA 88 at [16]. 1072. See Simpson J in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 (at [41]–[42]).

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Uniform Evidence Law

s 99

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

[EA.99.90]

Cth Act: 99 Requirements for notices Notices given under section 97 or 98 are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of this section. NSW Act: 99

Requirements for notices Notices given under section 97 or 98 are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of this section. Vic Act: 99

Requirements for notices

Notices given under section 97 or 98 are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of this section. ACT Act: 99

Requirements for notices

A notice given under section 97 (The tendency rule) or section 98 (The coincidence rule) must be given in accordance with any regulation or rules of court made for this section.

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NT Act: 99

Requirements for notices Notices given under section 97 or 98 are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of this section.

[EA.99.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 90, para 176(b).

[EA.99.60] Regulations Regulation 6 in the Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth), regs 5–6 in the Evidence Regulation 2010 (NSW) and reg 7 in the Evidence Regulations 2009 (Vic) deal with notice under this provision.

[EA.99.90] Service Section 181 permits proof of service of “a written notification, notice, order or direction” by affidavit “of the person who served, gave or sent it”. Section 186 provides for the swearing of affidavits.

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s 100

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

Cth Act: 100 Court may dispense with notice requirements (1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the tendency rule is not to apply to particular tendency evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 97. (2) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the coincidence rule is not to apply to particular coincidence evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 98. (3) The application may be made either before or after the time by which the party would, apart from this section, be required to give, or to have given, the notice. (4) In a civil proceeding, the party’s application may be made without notice of it having been given to one or more of the other parties.

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(5) The direction: (a) is subject to such conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit; and (b) may be given either at or before the hearing. (6) Without limiting the court’s power to impose conditions under this section, those conditions may include one or more of the following: (a) a condition that the party give notice of its intention to adduce the evidence to a specified party, or to each other party other than a specified party; (b) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified tendency evidence, or all tendency evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified tendency evidence; (c) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified coincidence evidence, or all coincidence evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified coincidence evidence. NSW Act: 100

Court may dispense with notice requirements

(1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the tendency rule is not to apply to particular tendency evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 97. (2) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the coincidence rule is not to apply to particular coincidence evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 98. (3) The application may be made either before or after the time by which the party would, apart from this section, be required to give, or to have given, the notice. (4) In a civil proceeding, the party’s application may be made without notice of it having been given to one or more of the other parties. 746

Uniform Evidence Law

s 100

Part 3.6 - Tendency and coincidence

(5) The direction: (a) is subject to such conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit, and (b) may be given either at or before the hearing. (6) Without limiting the court’s power to impose conditions under this section, those conditions may include one or more of the following: (a) a condition that the party give notice of its intention to adduce the evidence to a specified party, or to each other party other than a specified party, (b) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified tendency evidence, or all tendency evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified tendency evidence, (c) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified coincidence evidence, or all coincidence evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified coincidence evidence. Vic Act: 100

Court may dispense with notice requirements

(1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the tendency rule is not to apply to particular tendency evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 97.

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(2) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the coincidence rule is not to apply to particular coincidence evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 98. (3) The application may be made either before or after the time by which the party would, apart from this section, be required to give, or to have given, the notice. (4) In a civil proceeding, the party’s application may be made without notice of it having been given to one or more of the other parties. (5) The direction— (a) is subject to such conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit; and (b) may be given either at or before the hearing. (6) Without limiting the court’s power to impose conditions under this section, those conditions may include one or more of the following— (a) a condition that the party give notice of its intention to adduce the evidence to a specified party, or to each other party other than a specified party; (b) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified tendency evidence, or all tendency evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified tendency evidence; (c) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified coincidence evidence, or all coincidence evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified coincidence evidence.

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s 100

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

ACT Act: 100 Court may dispense with notice requirements (1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the tendency rule is not to apply to particular tendency evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 97 (The tendency rule). (2) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the coincidence rule is not to apply to particular coincidence evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 98 (The coincidence rule). (3) The application may be made either before or after the time by which the party would, apart from this section, be required to give, or to have given, the notice. (4) In a civil proceeding, the party’s application may be made without notice of it having been given to 1 or more of the other parties.

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(5) The direction— (a) is subject to the conditions (if any) the court thinks fit; and (b) may be given at or before the hearing. (6) Without limiting the court’s power to impose conditions under this section, the conditions may include 1 or more of the following: (a) a condition that the party give notice of its intention to present the evidence to a stated party, or to each party other than a stated party; (b) a condition that the party give the notice only in relation to stated tendency evidence, or all tendency evidence that the party intends to present other than stated tendency evidence; (c) a condition that the party give the notice only in relation to stated coincidence evidence, or all coincidence evidence that the party intends to present other than stated coincidence evidence. NT Act: 100

Court may dispense with notice requirements

(1) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the tendency rule is not to apply to particular tendency evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 97. (2) The court may, on the application of a party, direct that the coincidence rule is not to apply to particular coincidence evidence despite the party’s failure to give notice under section 98. (3) The application may be made either before or after the time by which the party would, apart from this section, be required to give, or to have given, the notice. (4) In a civil proceeding, the party’s application may be made without notice of it having been given to one or more of the other parties. (5) The direction: (a) is subject to such conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit; and 748

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[EA.100.60]

(b) may be given either at or before the hearing. (6) Without limiting the court’s power to impose conditions under this section, those conditions may include one or more of the following: (a) a condition that the party give notice of its intention to adduce the evidence to a specified party, or to each other party other than a specified party; (b) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified tendency evidence, or all tendency evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified tendency evidence; (c) a condition that the party give such notice only in respect of specified coincidence evidence, or all coincidence evidence that the party intends to adduce other than specified coincidence evidence.

[EA.100.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 90, para 176(b).

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[EA.100.60]

General comments

A similar notice procedure, and power to dispense with notice, operates in respect of hearsay evidence: see s 67.1073 Assistance will be provided by authorities in respect of the application of that provision. Section 192 deals with the giving of directions generally and is applicable in this context.1074 Two important considerations will be the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice caused to a party by the failure to give reasonable notice.1075 There may be no prejudice if notice was given of the intention to adduce the evidence, even though formal notice under s 99 was not given.1076 Prejudice to a party from the nature of the evidence itself, which is not caused by the failure to give reasonable notice, is not relevant.1077 An appropriate case for a prospective application to waive the requirement for notice may be where there is reason to believe that evidence will be fabricated if notice is given. An alternative procedure to dispensing with the notice requirements would be to adjourn the proceeding for an appropriate time in order to permit proper notice.1078 In Bryant v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 531; [2011] NSWCCA 26 Howie AJ (McClellan CJ at CL and Simpson J agreeing) considered a case where defence counsel made no complaint about the failure to give either a tendency or a coincidence notice and stated at [50]–[51]: [N]o tendency or coincidence notice was filed. This was in breach of both ss 97 and 98 of the Evidence Act. This is an unacceptable practice even though no point was taken by defence counsel. The importance of explicitly identifying the related events for the purpose of s 98 and the asserted tendency for the purpose of s 97 should be obvious: how else is the court going to be able to make a rational decision about the probative 1073. That procedure was based on the Civil Evidence Act 1968 (UK) and Rules of the Supreme Court, O 38, rr 21 – 33. 1074. R v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427 at [34]. 1075. R v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427 at [35] 1076. Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Andreasen [2005] NSWSC 579 at [19]. 1077. R v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427 at [44]. 1078. See R v Willoughby [2000] NSWSC 751. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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value of the evidence. The Judge should have refused to proceed until proper notices were given notwithstanding the attitude take by defence counsel.

These observations have been endorsed by the Victorian Court of Appeal.1079 In Parkinson v Alexander [2017] ACTSC 201, Refshauge J held at [45]–[68] that a trial had miscarried in circumstances where: the magistrate had “reformulated” the tendency that the evidence was to be used to prove (for the purposes of determining that the evidence was admissible), the defendant had not been given any notice of the reformulation, and there was no basis for excusing the lack of notice, since it had deprived the defendant of the opportunity to properly challenge the tendency finding.

Cth Act: 101 Further restrictions on tendency evidence and coincidence evidence adduced by prosecution (1) This section only applies in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to sections 97 and 98. (2) Tendency evidence about a defendant, or coincidence evidence about a defendant, that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the defendant unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant.

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(3) This section does not apply to tendency evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by the defendant. (4) This section does not apply to coincidence evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by the defendant. NSW Act: 101 Further restrictions on tendency evidence and coincidence evidence adduced by prosecution (1) This section only applies in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to sections 97 and 98. (2) Tendency evidence about a defendant, or coincidence evidence about a defendant, that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the defendant unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant. (3) This section does not apply to tendency evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by the defendant. (4) This section does not apply to coincidence evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by the defendant.

1079. Andelman v The Queen (2013) 277 A Crim R 81; [2013] VSCA 25 at [73]–[75].

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Vic Act: 101 Further restrictions on tendency evidence and coincidence evidence adduced by prosecution (1) This section only applies in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to sections 97 and 98. (2) Tendency evidence about an accused, or coincidence evidence about an accused, that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the accused unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused. [Subs (2) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.21]

(3) This section does not apply to tendency evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by the accused. [Subs (3) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.21]

(4) This section does not apply to coincidence evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by the accused. [Subs (4) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.21] [S 101 am Act 68 of 2009]

ACT Act:

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101 Further restrictions on tendency evidence and coincidence evidence presented by prosecution (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and applies in addition to section 97 (The tendency rule) and section 98 (The coincidence rule). (2) Tendency evidence about a defendant, or coincidence evidence about a defendant, that is presented by the prosecution cannot be used against the defendant unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant. (3) This section does not apply to tendency evidence that the prosecution presents to explain or contradict tendency evidence presented by the defendant. (4) This section does not apply to coincidence evidence that the prosecution presents to explain or contradict coincidence evidence presented by the defendant. NT Act: 101 Further restrictions on tendency evidence and coincidence evidence adduced by prosecution (1) This section only applies in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to sections 97 and 98. (2) Tendency evidence about a defendant, or coincidence evidence about a defendant, that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the defendant unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 101

(3) This section does not apply to tendency evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by the defendant. (4) This section does not apply to coincidence evidence that the prosecution adduces to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by the defendant.

[EA.101.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 102, paras 3.4–3.25, 11.52–11.92; ALRC 38, s 89, paras 175–176; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 810–811.

[EA.101.60]

General comments

This provision applies only in respect of evidence adduced by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding. “Criminal proceeding” is defined in the Dictionary.

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The provision is different from the original ALRC proposal: see ALRC 38, Appendix A, cl 89. The ALRC proposed that a special rule should apply to any evidence of a defendant’s conduct which was similar to alleged conduct of the defendant said to be part of the crime charged. The ALRC considered that such evidence of similar conduct necessarily disclosed a tendency to commit the crime charged, no matter how the prosecution sought to use it, and thus could have an unfairly prejudicial effect. Under the existing common law, a similar approach was arguably taken,1080 although later judgments of the High Court indicated that any special rule only applies where evidence disclosing a criminal tendency is relied upon to prove such a tendency.1081 Under the current provision, the requirements of s 101(2) are only applied to “tendency evidence about a defendant, or coincidence evidence about a 1080. In Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; 69 ALJR 147; [1995] HCA 7, McHugh J stated that: “[T]he principles concerning the admissibility of evidence revealing other misconduct are not confined to the so-called similar fact cases. They apply in any criminal trial where the Crown wishes to lead evidence tending to show that the accused has been guilty of wrongful acts other than those with which the accused is charged”. The majority of the High Court in Pfennig appeared to express similar views when they stated that “propensity evidence (including evidence of bad disposition and prior criminality) has always been treated as evidence which has or is likely to have a prejudicial effect … Hence, the necessity to find something in the evidence or in its connection with the events giving rise to the offences charged which endows it with a high level or degree or cogency”. However, the majority only extended the principle to “criminality” rather than “wrongful” acts. 1081. HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; 82 ALJR 723; 245 ALR 204; [2008] HCA 16 left the matter in considerable doubt, in that it would appear that three of the seven members of the court (Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) held that the Pfennig test applied to evidence that disclosed a criminal tendency (regardless of whether that was the use sought to be made of it), three other members of the court (Gleeson CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) held that the test applied only where the prosecution sought to use the evidence for tendency reasoning, while the remaining member of the court (Heydon J) did not determine the question. However, in Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; 210 A Crim R 300; 85 ALJR 558; [2011] HCA 12, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ appear to have held at [28] that “the rule in Pfennig would apply … [only] if the evidence was to be used in proof of the appellant’s propensity”. The judgment of the High Court in BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499; 215 A Crim R 395; [2012] HCA 9 has not resolved the issue because it was accepted that the evidence in question in that case was only relevant for propensity reasoning.

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defendant”. Where the evidence does not fall into either of these two categories, the balancing test is not applied.1082 The meaning of “tendency evidence” and “coincidence evidence” is discussed below, but it may be that a number of examples can be given of evidence which should be subject to the balancing test but is not because it does not fall within the definitions (see [EA.101.150]). Of course, it is arguable that evidence which does not fall into these categories should usually be admitted and that, on those occasions where it should be excluded, the discretion under s 137 is available for this purpose (see [EA.101.150]).1083 The counter view is that the fact that a defendant has engaged in other criminal or reprehensible conduct is so inevitably prejudicial that it should be presumptively inadmissible – requiring the prosecution to persuade the court that its probative value in the circumstances is so high as to outweigh the inevitable prejudicial effect. Certainly, courts should be alert to attempts to justify admission of evidence on the basis that it is not tendency or coincidence evidence when, in fact, it is really intended to be used for such a purpose.1084 In ALRC 102, it was concluded that arguments for and against changing the scope of this provision were evenly balanced and that the appropriate course was to retain the provision in its current form but to monitor its application (para 11.93). The language of this provision (evidence “cannot be used against the defendant”) may be contrasted with the terms of ss 97 and 98 (evidence “is not admissible to prove that …”). Since this provision is different from that proposed by the ALRC, it is not possible to be sure why the different formulation was adopted. However, the courts have proceeded on the assumption that there is no real difference between the two formulations, on the basis that, if the evidence “cannot be used against the defendant” it should not be admitted in the trial at all. In R v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433, Simpson J stated at [46]–[47]: Examination of the language of s 101(2), particularly when contrasted with the language of ss 97 and 98, yields yet another of those mysteries of the Evidence Act that have diverted litigation lawyers, judges and commentators for nigh on a decade. Sections 97 and 98 are, in their terms, concerned with admissibility. Unless the evidence under consideration has significant probative value, it is not admissible to prove either tendency or coincidence. Section 101(2), by contrast, if literally construed, appears to envisage that the evidence is admissible and is admitted (“evidence … that is adduced by the prosecution …”), but then to place restrictions – restrictions to the point of annihilation – on the use that can be made of that evidence. Why s 101(2) was so framed, is, as I have suggested above, a mystery. The only sensible way to approach s 101(2) is to treat it, like ss 97 and 98, and almost in defiance of its language, as a rule 1082. This point appears to have been missed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 per Smart AJ at [553] Mason P and Barr J agreeing at [283]. Smart AJ relied on the High Court case of Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590, but this dealt with the common law, not the Evidence Act 1995. However, in fairness to Smart AJ, it may be that he was saying no more than that, since the evidence in question was highly prejudicial, it required a substantial or strong degree of probative value to outweigh (s 137) the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, notwithstanding the availability of directions on use to the jury. 1083. See, eg, R v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185 at [36]–[37] per Heydon JA; R v Kovacs (2000) 111 A Crim R 374; [2000] NSWCCA 74 at [19] per Simpson J. 1084. See R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 at [31] per the court. See also [EA.101.150]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 101

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of admissibility, and put unproductive debate about its terminology to one side. It seems to me that s 101(2) has generally been construed as a rule with respect to admissibility.

Subsequently, in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338, Simpson J returned to this issue and restated her view that the provision “presents real problems of construction” and that on a literal construction it is not a provision about admissibility (at [46]). She observed that the provision “proceeds upon the basis that the evidence has been adduced. In its terms the subsection is a provision about what use may be made of the evidence once it has been ruled admissible under s 97 (or s 98) and has been adduced”. However, this analysis reveals a misconception. Although the term “adduced” is not defined in the Act, there is no doubt that it means the same as “tendered” by a party, which is a step prior to the determination of admissibility, not one which follows such a ruling.1085 Thus, the reference in the provision to evidence “that is adduced by the prosecution” does not carry with it the implication that the evidence has already been ruled admissible. The provision should be interpreted as dealing both with whether particular evidence may be admitted in a trial and how admitted evidence may be used in a trial. If the prosecution seeks to have admitted “tendency evidence” against a defendant and it cannot be used against the defendant because the test in s 101 is not satisfied, the evidence is inadmissible. If the evidence in question is sought to be used for some other permissible use or in fact has already been admitted (whether adduced by the defence or the prosecution) for some other permissible use, it cannot be used as tendency evidence against the defendant unless the test in s 101 is satisfied. Section 95(2) has the effect of applying s 101 to a tendency use against the defendant. Under that provision, if the evidence “is relevant for another purpose” (that is, relevant other than to prove that the defendant had a tendency to act or think in a particular way), the evidence “must not be used against the party to prove that matter” (that is, must not be used against the defendant to prove that the defendant had such a tendency) if the evidence cannot be used against the defendant (that is, if the conditions of s 101 are not satisfied). Not long after the judgment in Fletcher, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal handed down another judgment, R v Zhang (2005) 227 ALR 311; 196 FLR 152; 158 A Crim R 504; [2005] NSWCCA 437, in which Simpson J at [125] (Buddin J agreeing) accepted the view of Basten JA that “the word ‘adduced’ as it appears in the subsection should … be read as meaning ‘tendered’”. While Basten JA observed at [39] that “whether s 101(2) should indeed be treated as ‘a rule of admissibility’ … may properly be left for another time”, there is little difficulty in concluding that, if evidence is relevant only for one particular use, which use is prohibited by this provision, the evidence is inadmissible.1086

[EA.101.90]

“tendency evidence”

“Tendency evidence” is defined in the Dictionary: “tendency evidence” means evidence of a kind referred to in subsection 97(1) that a party seeks to have adduced for the purpose referred to in that subsection. 1085. See ALRC 38 at para 59. 1086. Compare R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319 at [54].

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[EA.101.120]

“Tendency evidence”, as defined in s 97, is evidence of conduct etc adduced to prove a “tendency” to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind. As explained at [EA.97.60], if such evidence is not adduced to prove the existence of some tendency to act or think in a particular way, but for some other purpose, it is not caught by s 97 and is not classified as “tendency evidence”. It should be noted that there is nothing in the definition of “tendency evidence” which indicates that it only relates to evidence that a defendant had committed crimes or other “wrongful” acts. Under the common law, there is some uncertainty whether the rules relating to “propensity evidence” are confined to “criminal or reprehensible conduct”1087 or “criminal or reprehensible propensity”.1088 It has been assumed that these limitations do not apply under the Act.1089 Of course, tendency evidence that does not suggest that the defendant had committed crimes or other “wrongful” acts is unlikely to have a significant prejudicial effect on the defendant.

[EA.101.120] “coincidence evidence” “Coincidence evidence” is defined in the Dictionary:

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“coincidence evidence” means evidence of a kind referred to in subsection 98(1) that a party seeks to have adduced for the purpose referred to in that subsection.

This evidence, as defined in s 98, is evidence which relies on the improbability of two or more events occurring coincidentally. An example was given in the discussion of s 98 of evidence that X committed crime A adduced to prove that he or she committed crime B on the basis that it is improbable that the crimes were committed by different persons. To use common law terminology, this may be established where there was something “strikingly similar” about the two crimes, permitting the inference that they were likely to have been committed by the same person. Alternatively, the striking similarities between two incidents in which the defendant was involved (the first involving some uncertainty as to what transpired; the second being uncertain only in respect of the defendant’s mental state) may permit inferences as to what precisely happened during the first incident and the state of mind of the defendant in the second.1090 Another example would be evidence relevant to the credibility of two or more witnesses in that it is, on the basis of common sense and experience, objectively improbable that similar allegations would be independently made by such witnesses unless they were true.1091 In R v Y (2007) 178 A Crim R 481; [2007] TASSC 112 Crawford J doubted the correctness of this analysis at [37]. After noting that, by reason of s 102, “if the evidence is only relevant to credibility, it is not admissible at all”, he stated: Director of Public Prosecutions v Boardman [1975] AC 421 and Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50 are cited as authorities for the 1087. BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 299 per Gaudron J. 1088. BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 305 per McHugh J. Kirby J simply referred to “evidence of criminal or discreditable conduct” (at 323). 1089. See R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [106] per Mason P. 1090. See R v Tamotsu (1999) 109 A Crim R 193; [1999] NSWCCA 400. 1091. See Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Boardman [1975] AC 421; Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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proposition, but they were common law cases and not cases under the uniform evidence legislation. My view is that to refer to evidence of the present kind as coincidence evidence under s 98 is to strain the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in s 98(1).

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While Crawford J was discussing the formulation of s 98 prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102, his comments would appear applicable to the current provision. However, given the policy framework on which the Act is built (particularly the concern in criminal proceedings to minimise the risk of wrongful conviction: see [EA.Intro.240]) it is far preferable that evidence of the sort dealt with in Boardman and Hoch be regarded as falling within the definition of “coincidence evidence”. If the evidence were only relevant to credibility, the exclusionary rule in s 102 would provide no real safeguard at all, given the exceptions to that provision in Pt 3.7. In any event, such evidence would never be relevant only to the credibility of a witness – it would always disclose a relevant tendency to commit the crime charged, notwithstanding the possibility that the evidence will be inadmissible for that use pursuant to s 97 or this provision. Since s 94(1) provides that Pt 3.6 “does not apply to evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness”, it is apparent that it will apply even where the evidence is relevant for both a credibility and a more direct use. The definition of “coincidence evidence” in s 98 should be understood to apply to the kind of credibility reasoning dealt with under the common law in Boardman and Hoch. Intermediate courts of appeal have generally proceeded on that assumption.1092 Indeed, the High Court itself, in IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14, has also proceeded on that assumption (see French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [59]). As with “tendency evidence”, it should be noted that there is nothing in the definition which limits it to evidence that a defendant in criminal proceedings had committed crimes or other “wrongful” acts.

[EA.101.150] Evidence which is neither “tendency evidence” nor “coincidence evidence” If evidence is relevant for a use which does not fall within the definitions of “tendency evidence” or “coincidence evidence” (and is not caught by any other exclusionary rule) it may be admitted for that use, subject to the discretions in ss 135 and 137: see [EA.101.60]. In accordance with s 95, if the evidence is admitted on that basis, it may not thereby be used for the purpose of proving tendency or coincidence.1093 A number of (sometimes overlapping) examples1094 1092. See R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [107]; R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 at [77]; W v The Queen (2001) 115 FCR 41; 124 A Crim R 545; 189 ALR 633; [2001] FCA 1648 at [99]; R v F (2002) 129 A Crim R 126; [2002] NSWCCA 125 at [23]–[28] and [48]–[49]; R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; [2002] NSWCCA 210 at [32]; AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52. For further discussion, see [EA.101.240]. 1093. See El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [38]–[45]; [60]. 1094. See also R v Rich (1998) 102 A Crim R 165 at 170–171 per Hidden J. Another example is found in El-Hilli v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 289 at [34] (evidence that an accused had in 2000 made a similar false representation to be wealthy to one allegedly made in 2008 was relevant in a non-tendency way to show lack of wealth because it was proved that he was shortly thereafter declared bankrupt and then went to prison between 2003 and July 2008).

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can be given of evidence which may not fall within the definitions of “tendency evidence” or “coincidence evidence”. However, considerable care is required. Simply asserting that evidence falls within one of the following general categories (for example, evidence of “relationship”, “background”, “context”) should not be sufficient – there should be a clear articulation of the way in which the evidence is relevant so as to demonstrate that it does not involve tendency or coincidence reasoning.1095 The “reality of what is sought to be achieved by the admission of the evidence” must be examined in light of the circumstances of the individual case.1096 An assurance by the adducing party that the evidence is not relied upon for tendency or coincidence reasoning will not be sufficient if the court concludes that the only relevance that the evidence could have is for such reasoning.1097 Further, the greater the difficulty in demonstrating that the evidence is relevant in a way that does not involve tendency or coincidence reasoning, the greater the risk that the jury will use it for tendency or coincidence reasoning (and thus the stronger the case for exclusion under ss 135 or 137).1098 On the other hand, the fact that other evidence is available to prove some fact that the evidence in question is said to be relied upon to prove without tendency or coincidence reasoning does not necessarily mean that it is “really” being used as “tendency evidence” or “coincidence evidence” – “it has never been the case that [a party] is shut out from adducing evidence because it has other evidence available to prove the same point”.1099 (a) Evidence showing opportunity and thereby rebutting a defence of alibi, if such a defence is advanced.1100 (b) Evidence of other conduct revealing a motive for the crime charged.1101 Some controversy developed as to whether evidence that A, charged with sexual dealings with a complainant, had engaged in other 1095. Compare RG v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 173 at [34]; Christian v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 98 at [46]. See also, in the common law context, Callinan J in Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; 167 A Crim R 192; 81 ALJR 391; [2006] HCA 56 at [141]–[146] (Heydon and Crennan JJ agreeing); HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; 82 ALJR 723; 245 ALR 204; [2008] HCA 16. 1096. RG v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 173 at [34]; MM v The Queen (2012) 232 A Crim R 303; [2012] ACTCA 44 at [97]; Christian v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 98 at [46]–[54]. 1097. RWC v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 332 at [130]; MM v The Queen (2012) 232 A Crim R 303; [2012] ACTCA 44 at [97]; Christian v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 98 at [46]–[54]. 1098. L’Estrange v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 89; (2011) 214 A Crim R 9, McCallum J (McClellan CJ at CL and RA Hulme J agreeing) at [60]–[64]. McCallum J stated at [61]: any characterisation of evidence of prior criminal conduct as “background” or “context” should sound a warning of the need to give careful attention to the risk that the purpose for which the jury might find the evidence most useful is that of placing the charges in the context of their having been brought against a person who has done this kind of thing before. 1099. Masri v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 243 at [56]. 1100. See R v Mansfield [1978] 1 All ER 134 (CA). 1101. See R v Patsalis and Spathis [No 4] [1999] NSWSC 715 at [14], [23]–[25] per Kirby J; Chand v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 53 at [85]–[86]. See also Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 631 per McHugh J; R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363; [2001] VSCA 18 (VSCA) at 365 per Brooking and Phillips JJA; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [138] per Heydon JA. A variant of this process of reasoning was shown in R © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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sexual activity with the complainant – thereby showing a sexual interest or “passion” for the complainant – was evidence revealing a motive for the crime charged, or properly analysed as tendency evidence. In Leonard v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 Hodgson JA at [49]–[52] expressed the view that evidence “supporting an inference that the accused was sexually attracted to the complainant, so that he had a motive to act in a sexual manner towards the complainant”: is not use as tendency evidence: it is rather evidence supporting an inference that the accused had motivation to act as charged. Evidence of a similar kind could be provided by a letter from the accused declaring sexual attraction to the complainant, in the absence of evidence that the accused had actually done anything to or with the complainant. Evidence used in this way might be called relationship evidence or it might be called motivation evidence.

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Hodgson JA considered that evidence that an accused has “an ordinary human motive to do something, such as sexual feelings towards someone else, is not as such” tendency evidence. He also referred to authorities discussed below under the heading “(e) evidence relevant to a person’s state of mind” to support the view that there is no relevant difference between “evidence of hatred and enmity” and “evidence of sexual attraction: both are ordinary motivational factors”. The other members of the court, Grove and Adams JJ, did not feel it necessary to express a view on the correctness, or otherwise, of this analysis. Other authority views evidence of “guilty passion” for the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution as tendency evidence.1102 Indeed, Hodgson JA in Leonard v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 accepted at [68] that the theoretical difference between “motive” and “tendency” are likely to have “little practical significance” in a child sexual assault trial: [S]exual feelings of adult males towards young children are considered abnormal, and the ordinary motivational force of sexual feelings … cannot easily be kept distinct from a perception that a person having such feelings towards a young child is a particular kind of person who is likely to act on these feelings. … Thus, evidence in such cases is not like evidence that a person charged with stealing (say) a rare stamp has a keen interest in such stamps, which would not be considered tendency evidence: it is unrealistic to liken evidence linking the ordinary human motivation of sexual feelings to a particular child, to evidence linking the ordinary human motivation of avarice to a particular kind of object such as a rare stamp, because as soon as one suggests that an adult male has sexual feelings towards a young child, one almost inevitably suggests that the person in question is the kind of person who is likely to assault the child.

In fact, the better view is the evidence relating to the stamp would be tendency evidence if it was simply evidence of prior conduct demonstrating a keen interest in stamps. Conversely, it would be v Kovacs (2000) 111 A Crim R 374; [2000] NSWCCA 74 where evidence that the defendant was a prisoner on work release tended to show he would not put at risk his status simply to help a person he did not know but might in order to take possession of heroin. 1102. R v H (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; 98 A Crim R 71 at 708–709 (NSWLR); R v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8 at [23] per Hidden J.

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evidence of motive (and not tendency evidence) if the evidence revealed that the stamp collector had a collection which required only one (the one stolen) to be complete. Subsequently, in ES v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197 Hodgson JA (Whealy J and Buddin J agreeing) accepted at [39] that “it is not practical to maintain” this distinction between evidence of motive and evidence of a tendency to have a particular state of mind “in the case of the sexual interest of an adult in a child”. Such evidence should be treated as tendency evidence. Hodgson JA left open the operation of distinction in other contexts but it is suggested that the same approach should be adopted where reliance is placed on a person’s “interest” in someone or something.1103

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However, in Colquhoun v The Queen (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190, Macfarlan JA expressed the dicta at [22] that evidence of an accused’s sexual interest in a child, which does not suggest that the accused had previously committed an unlawful sexual act in relation to the child, “is in effect no more than evidence of motive (because it is simply evidence of a sexual interest of the accused in the complainant which has not been acted upon)” and not tendency evidence. As explained above, this analysis adopts an odd interpretation of “motive” and also appears to ignore that a tendency may exist with respect to “a particular state of mind” as well as to “act in a particular way” (see s 97). Macfarlan JA accepted that his analysis was inconsistent with “the existing approach” that such evidence is tendency evidence and that such an approach had to be followed “at least where, as here, there has been no specific challenge to it”. It should also be noted that, in Donohue v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 17, one member of the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal (Brett J) considered that evidence that the appellant had made other approaches to persons to murder his wife “was directly relevant to establish the existence and nature of his motive to commit the alleged crime” (that is, incite another person to murder her). The other members of the court did not adopt the same reasoning and it may be doubted whether such reasoning can be properly distinguished from tendency reasoning. (c) Evidence of a system. For example, evidence that a system had been put in place to produce a particular outcome – it may be inferred that the outcome had occurred on a particular occasion, independently of any established tendency for that outcome to be produced on other occasions: see [EA.97.240]. Alternatively, evidence of a failure to put in place a system may be a fact in issue from which no tendency inference is sought to be drawn (cf s 94(3)). For example, in R v Cittadini (2008) 189 A Crim R 492; [2008] NSWCCA 256 the prosecution case was that the accused was criminally negligent in failing to implement any adequate process of supervision or quality control that would have detected a serious defect in the keel of a yacht. The evidence in question tended to show defects in the construction of the hull, rudder housing and other parts of the yacht. Simpson J (McClellan CJ at CL agreeing) 1103. However, a possible example of a case where the distinction holds is KSC v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 179 (at [69]–[84]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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held at [29] that such evidence was not tendency evidence if used to reason that an adequate system of supervision and quality control had not been implemented in respect of construction of the yacht and that failure resulted in the delivery of a yacht with a defective keel (rather than to prove that the accused was personally negligent in respect of the construction of the keel). Properly analysed, the omission alleged to have caused the defect in the keel (which caused the yacht to overturn and four persons to drown) was the failure to implement the relevant system. Establishing the failure to implement the system by the evidence of particular defects did not itself involve tendency reasoning but was a classic example of drawing an inference from a number of pieces of evidence (Simpson J at [30]) (d) Evidence identifying the defendant with the crime charged. For example, in a trial for murder, evidence which showed that part of the proceeds of a number of robberies were found at the scene of the murder and that other parts of the proceeds were found in the possession of the accused.1104 Possession of a weapon used in a particular offence would plainly fit within this category, but so would evidence of access to a weapon of the same kind that was used in the offence (even though it could not be proved that it was the same weapon).1105 In Radi v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 265 it was held that possession of bullets could be an indicium of drug supply even without evidence of possession of a firearm, although the members of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal gave differing (and inconsistent) reasons for this conclusion.1106 Evidence of previous attempts on the life of a murder victim by a group of persons is relevant via non-tendency reasoning to show their involvement in a joint criminal enterprise to bring about such a murder and their involvement in the actual murder.1107 Evidence that the defendant was in possession of a bottle of a particular drug may be relevant to show that he was also in possession of a quantity of the same (that is, precisely the same) drug found in another location.1108 (e) Evidence of a “general” admission. Evidence that the defendant has made an admission in general terms to conduct that might include the very conduct which is the subject of the criminal proceedings would not be “tendency evidence” or “coincidence evidence” if sought to be used 1104. See R v O’Meally (No 2) [1953] VLR 30 (FC); Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 631–632 per McHugh J. 1105. Compare Thompson v The Queen (1968) 117 CLR 313; 42 ALJR 16; R v Debs (2008) 191 A Crim R 231; [2008] VSCA 240. 1106. Hoeben J stated (at [34]) that the bullets “might” have been used in the drug supply, without explaining how this could have occurred in the absence of a firearm. RA Hulme J appears to have accepted (at [56]) that the bullets could not have been used in receiving the drugs but held that could have been possessed for the purpose of on-supply (presumably if the appellant obtained a firearm). Simpson J pointed out at [2] that the charge was possession for supply and that, given the quantity of drugs involved, there was simply no issue in the trial that the appellant was guilty if he knowingly received the drugs. However, Simpson J held at [7] that the bullets were relevant to the question of the appellant’s “knowledge” that he was in possession of drugs – without explaining how it was relevant in a non-tendency way. 1107. R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 at [325]. 1108. Christian v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 98 at [47], [54].

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as an admission of the charged conduct. In Rolfe v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 168; [2007] NSWCCA 155, Giles JA stated at [67]: Where the evidence is by way of admission by the accused of sexual activities with the complainant, and is not attributed to particular occasions being occasions other than those of the charged sexual conduct, in my view an additional relevance can arise. Such an admission that the accused engaged in sexual conduct with the complainant, while non-specific as to the charged sexual conduct and not of itself sufficient to prove that conduct, is relevant not on the bases of context and background and of “guilty passion” earlier mentioned, but because when taken with other evidence the jury could regard it as relating to or at least encompassing the charged sexual conduct and supporting that the charged sexual conduct occurred. If accepted, it could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the conduct charged against the accused (see Evidence Act, s 55). It will, of course, require an assessment of the admission, understood in its own context; for example, marked generality may mean that the admission can not properly be taken to encompass the charged conduct.1109

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By reason of its generality, the admission may not be capable of proving, on its own, the offence(s) charged, notwithstanding that it is sought to be used as an admission of such conduct.1110 Of course, evidence of general admissions would be tendency evidence if used as an admission to conduct similar to that charged and then to infer commission of the offence(s) charged by reliance on tendency reasoning. (f) Evidence relevant to a person’s state of mind. For example, evidence of A’s conduct, which is similar to his or her alleged conduct which is a fact in issue, may be relevant to support B’s claim that he or she believed A would act in a particular way. Thus, where B is charged with the murder of A and relies on self-defence, evidence that A had engaged in violent conduct on other occasions may be relevant to support B’s assertion that, knowing of such conduct, he believed that it was necessary to act as he did. Such use of the evidence would not involve an inference that A actually acted in conformity with that tendency to violence on the occasion when he was killed. Similarly, evidence that A had been violent to B in the presence of C would be relevant to whether C was in fear of A when she appeared to consent to sexual intercourse.1111 Evidence that B, a convicted criminal, was in possession of weapons and A knew this may permit the inference that A knew B was likely to be engaging in armed robberies.1112 Evidence that the defendant had threatened the complainant on other occasions tended to prove that his subsequent conduct was likely to cause fear in the 1109. Giles JA at [69]–[70] gave examples of other cases where such analysis had been adopted or was available: R v Centraco [2005] NSWCCA 11; R v Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138; [2004] NSWCCA 89. See also ARS v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 266 at [80]–[87]; GE v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 91 at [46], [54]–[56]. 1110. R v Centraco [2005] NSWCCA 11 at [15]; Rolfe v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 168; [2007] NSWCCA 155 at [71]. 1111. R v El-Hayek (2004) 144 A Crim R 90; [2004] NSWCCA 25. 1112. See Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [93]–[97] per McHugh J. See also R v Flavel [2001] NSWCCA 227 (knowledge of prior events tended to © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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complainant and that he knew this. Evidence that A was involved in organising a particular financial transaction showed that she had knowledge as to the nature of the transaction.1114 Evidence that a person had talked about doing “maximum damage”, adduced in a terrorism conspiracy trial where there was evidence that the person was someone from whom members of the alleged conspiracy took “spiritual guidance”, was not tendency evidence because it was “tendered to establish his attitudes, and accordingly the behaviour he encouraged in the [defendants]”.1115 Evidence that the defendant’s fingerprints were found on several pages of a manual containing instructions for building a machine gun is not tendency evidence where the evidence is used to infer an interest in the content of the manual and a specific interest in firearms, and then to deciding whether to reject his denials of knowledge of the presence of certain guns (not machine guns) in his garage.1116 The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has held that evidence which is relevant:

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as being part of the same connected series of events or evidence of conduct by an accused person evincing a particular state of mind at a time so proximate to the time of the commission of the alleged offence as to permit an inference that the same state of mind continued up to the time of the offence is not evidence of conduct by an accused person “in the past” or evidence tending to show that he has a particular “disposition” or “propensity” or “inclination”.1117

A state of mind shown to exist at one point in time may well be in existence a short time later.1118 No tendency reasoning is involved. However, a subsequent judgment of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal applied the temporal requirement extremely broadly, holding that evidence of an expressed desire to kill a victim five months before her prove that the defendant must have been at least suspicious that a ship voyage involved transportation of cocaine). However, evidence of other conduct revealing motive may be of low probative value and appropriately excluded under s 137: cf R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15; 147 A Crim R 585; [2004] VSCA 164. 1113. See R v Atroushi [2001] NSWCCA 406 at [33] and [45] per Carruthers AJ. 1114. See R v Boskovitz [1999] NSWCCA 437 at [66]–[75] per Smart AJ; see also R v Walters [2002] NSWCCA 291 at [48]. 1115. Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [256]. 1116. Strachan v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 322 at [21]–[22]. 1117. R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 at [30] per the court. See also R v Player (2000) 217 ALR 578; [2000] NSWCCA 123 at [16]; LJW v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 114 at [47]–[51]; TWL v The Queen (2012) 222 A Crim R 445; [2012] NSWCCA 57 at [43]–[45]. 1118. For example, in LJW v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 114, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that evidence that, on a particular day, the appellant “exhibited a state of mind displaying interest in and a lack of inhibition from” sexual activity in the presence of boys, was not tendency evidence when “it could be inferred that it was probable that [this state of mind] continued until the night-time of that day” (Hodgson JA at [51], Johnson J and Rothman J agreeing).See also Jiang v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 277 at [45]; Hothnyang v The Queen [2014] VSCA 64 at [15]–[21].

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murder was sufficiently proximate. It is difficult to see how the defendant’s prior conduct was not being used to show that he had a tendency to have a particular state of mind in respect of the deceased some time before her death, in order to infer that he had the same state of mind at the time of her death. The same problem exists in relation to the High Court case of Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334, applying the common law, where it was held that evidence of previous assaults by the defendant on the deceased could be used to show his state of mind towards her (that is, his “hostility” or “emnity” towards her) to rebut accident.1120 However, in Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95, Howie J observed at [114]–[116], after referring to Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334:

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The evidence of the relationship between the two persons was admissible to explain the acts giving rise to the discharge of the weapon. The evidence of the acrimonious relationship between the accused and his wife was admissible to put the shooting of the wife into context. … So in child sexual assault cases evidence of the relationship between the accused and the complainant is admissible to give context to the particular allegations made by the complainant that form the basis of the charges in the indictment.

In FDP v The Queen (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; [2008] NSWCCA 317 evidence that the appellant said to his wife, three weeks before allegedly stabbing her, “I now understand all these people that you hear about that kill their wives and kids because that’s how you make me feel” was held not to be tendency evidence since it was “evidence as to the appellant’s state of mind arising from his marital problems at a time relatively proximate to the incident the subject of the trial” (at [40]). In Elomar v The Queen (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303, evidence that X attended a terrorist training camp in 2001 was held at [367]–[368] not to be tendency evidence when used to prove his state of mind in 2004 and 2005, on the basis that an inference that he “continued” to have a state of mind supporting terrorism did not involve tendency reasoning. In Masri v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 243, evidence that the appellant was participating “in the importation of containers at a time very close in time to” another container importation was held admissible to “support an inference of continued substantial participation”. The Victorian Court of Appeal has observed that “proof of a connected series of events, not necessarily closely contemporaneous in a temporal sense to the act charged, but which evince a particular continuing state of mind may be admissible for purposes other than for tendency reasoning”.1121 Other factual scenarios may present similar difficulty in deciding whether the evidence does or does not constitute tendency evidence or coincidence evidence. For example, in R v Andrews [2003] NSWCCA 7, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal avoided deciding whether evidence 1119. R v Serratore [2001] NSWCCA 123 at [38]–[40] per Beazley JA. See also R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [136]–[138] per Heydon JA. 1120. See Wilson per Barwick CJ and Menzies J: Barwick CJ at 337.8, 338.7; Menzies J at 344.6. 1121. Higgins v The Queen [2016] VSCA 47 at [19]. See also Donohue v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 17 at [29]–[31]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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of violent acts and statements made by the appellant disclosing jealousy in respect of the victim was “tendency evidence”. Hulme J observed (at [13]) that:

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[T]here is much to be said for the view that the evidence was evidence tendered to prove that the Appellant had a tendency to have a particular state of mind. To say, as the Crown did, that the motive was jealousy carries with it the implications that the Appellant was jealous and, by reason of the nature of the emotion, the implication that he had a tendency to be jealous.

The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal preferred to avoid deciding whether evidence that the appellant had made 114 bank deposits of less than $10,000, permitting an inference that the appellant had knowledge of laws requiring reporting of transactions involving more than $10,000 (and was trying to evade them), was tendency or coincidence evidence.1122 However, the Victorian Court of Appeal was satisfied that no tendency or coincidence reasoning was involved and applied a similar analysis in a case where the defendant, charged with commercial cultivation of cannabis, had a prior conviction “which bore directly upon his state of mind, as regards the size of the crop he was growing”.1123 In R v Ngatikaura (2006) 161 A Crim R 329; [2006] NSWCCA 161, one member of the Court of Criminal Appeal (Beazley JA) held that evidence that an alleged drug dealer (who denied knowledge of drugs found at her home) had committed two prior drug supply offences was not tendency evidence because it tended to prove guilty knowledge by showing that “her association with the drugs in her home was not innocent” (at [25]). However, the majority of the court (Simpson and Rothman JJ) concluded that the evidence was tendency evidence because the only way in which the evidence tended to show guilty knowledge and association was via tendency reasoning. For further discussion, see “(b) evidence of other conduct revealing a motive” above. (g) Evidence of “relationship”.1124 A history of sexual and physical violence may explain why the complainant appeared to consent to the offence charged. It may explain why the defendant could not have believed that any apparent consent was real. In a case where consent or belief in non-consent is not in issue, such a history may explain why the 1122. R v Leask [1999] NSWCCA 33. While one of the members of the court considered that the evidence was not tendency evidence (at [47]) but was coincidence evidence (at [48]), the other members of the court held that it was not necessary to resolve the question because the test in s 101 was satisfied (at [94] and [105]). 1123. Ivanoff v The Queen [2015] VSCA 116 at [19]–[21]. See also Lin v The Queen [2018] VSCA 100. 1124. See, eg, R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457; R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 367; R v H (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; 98 A Crim R 71 at 708–709; R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 at 367 per Howie AJ; Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204; [2000] FCA 461; R v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176; [2000] NSWCCA 372; KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; 118 A Crim R 262; [2001] HCA 11. See also Smith and Holdenson, “Comparative Evidence; Admission of Evidence of Relationship in Sexual Offence Prosecutions” 73 ALJ 432 (Pt 1) and 494 (Pt 2). In R v McSmith [2002] NSWCCA 68, Dunford J at [11] observed that he preferred to describe this evidence as “background” evidence or “context” evidence.

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alleged victim and the defendant acted as they did, which may otherwise have appeared surprising and therefore implausible.1126 It will avoid the circumstances of the alleged offence being considered in isolation, where they may appear “inexplicable” and be “misunderstood”.1127 It may tend to show their respective states of mind at the time.1128 It may explain why no immediate complaint was made after the alleged offence was committed1129 or why the relationship continued.1130 Such a history may also tend to show that a person was not acting alone but at the instigation of the other person in the relationship.1131 If relevant on any of these bases1132 the evidence will not be subject to the requirements of s 97 or s 101. Properly analysed, such evidence is evidence bearing on the credibility of a witness (usually the complainant). Thus, in WFS v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 406; 223 A Crim R 327; [2011] VSCA 347, Robson AJA (Buchanan JA and Whelan AJA agreeing) held that “relationship evidence” adduced in that case “is relevant to the assessment of the credibility of the complainant in that her version of the particular incident, which is the basis of the charge in the indictment, may be more capable of belief when seen in the context of what the complainant says was her sexual relationship with the accused. It may explain, on the complainant’s version, why the accused and the complainant acted as they did in circumstances where, without the context of the relationship, those acts might be inexplicable” (at [87]). However, care must be taken. It should not be good enough to assert that the evidence is relied on to show the “surrounding circumstances” or “background” to the alleged offence, without a clear articulation of the precise way in which the evidence is relevant.1133 Thus, conduct occurring after, rather than before, the alleged offence may only be 1125. R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 (NSWSC) at [71]–[73] per Howie J; Leonard v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 at [49]; RG v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 173 at [38]; KTR v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 271 at [99]. 1126. RG v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 173 at [38]; KTR v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 271 at [101], [146]. 1127. See Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; 210 A Crim R 300; 85 ALJR 558; [2011] HCA 12 at [45]. 1128. R v Atroushi [2001] NSWCCA 406 at [33], [45] and [47] per Carruthers AJ; Boney v The Queen (2008) 187 A Crim R 167; [2008] NSWCCA 165 at [29]. 1129. KTR v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 271 at [99], [101]. But compare Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 per McClellan CJ at CL at [82]. 1130. Kaifoto v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 186 at [38]. 1131. R v Chan (2002) 131 A Crim R 66; [2002] NSWCCA 217 at [46]–[48]. 1132. See discussion in R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 at [30]–[33]; R v Grattan [2005] NSWCCA 306 at [125]–[134]. 1133. Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [80]; RG v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 173 at [34]. Compare R v H (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; 98 A Crim R 71 at 708–709; R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 at 369 per Howie AJ; R v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185 at [36]–[37] per Heydon JA; R v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370 at [18]–[25] per Adams J; R v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519 at [7]–[9] per Spigelman CJ; MM v The Queen (2012) 232 A Crim R 303; [2012] ACTCA 44 at [106]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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relevant to the “relationship” via propensity/tendency reasoning (even though such a relationship, once established, is itself relevant in a non-propensity way).1134 Evidence that a defendant was inclined to violence when intoxicated may be relevant to his relationship with his wife, and why it broke up, but may become “tendency evidence” if relied on for tendency reasoning (that the defendant killed his wife when under the influence of alcohol, acting in conformity with this tendency).1135 The same is true of evidence of “guilty passion” for the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.1136 Evidence may cease to be simply “background” or “context” when it is sought to be used as direct evidence going to proof of the elements of the charge.1137

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Sometimes, very fine distinctions are drawn. In R v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519, Spigelman CJ relied on a pre-Evidence Act 1995 judgment of the High Court1138 to hold that a “prior relationship of other drug dealings” between the appellant and a man named Le could be admitted to rebut any innocent explanation (other than drug dealing) for a trip by Le from Melbourne to the vicinity of the appellant’s residence in Sydney, Spigelman CJ considering that such use of the evidence did not involve “tendency reasoning” (at [15], [22]–[45], James J agreeing at [110]). The evidence of the nature of the relationship between the appellant and Le was adduced not to prove that the appellant had a tendency to engage in drug dealing but rather as bearing on “both the probability of and/or the nature of a meeting” when Le made the trip to Sydney (at [35]). The evidence “raise[d] the improbability that there was no meeting and/or no meeting relating to drugs” (at [39]).1139 Perhaps a clearer example of non-tendency and 1134. R v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176; [2000] NSWCCA 372 (NSW CCA) at [45] per Kirby J. See also R v Cornelissen [2004] NSWCCA 449 at [72]. Even if relevant in some other way, discretionary exclusion may be appropriate: see R v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185 at [36]–[37] per Heydon JA. 1135. R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701; [2002] NSWCCA 455 at [270]–[282]. 1136. See R v H (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; 98 A Crim R 71 at 708–709 (NSWLR); R v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8 at [23] per Hidden J; DJV v The Queen (2008) 200 A Crim R 206; [2008] NSWCCA 272 at [39]; RWC v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 332 at [124]–[130]. See also HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; 82 ALJR 723; 245 ALR 204; [2008] HCA 16. 1137. R v Giovannone (2002) 140 A Crim R 1; [2002] NSWCCA 323 at [131]–[133] per Carruthers AJ. 1138. Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590. 1139. One difficulty with this analysis is that use of relationship evidence to prove a meeting (regardless of the purpose of the meeting) between Le and the appellant appears to rely on an assumption that the appellant and Le acted in conformity with a tendency to meet (pursuant to their relationship), while use of the relationship evidence to prove a meeting between Le and the appellant for the purposes of drug dealing appears to rely on an assumption that the appellant and Le acted in conformity with a tendency to engage in drug dealing together. Another difficulty is that reasoning via the “improbability that there was no meeting and/or no meeting relating to drugs” may, in any event, make the evidence “coincidence evidence”. In R v Ngatikaura (2006) 161 A Crim R 329; [2006] NSWCCA 161, Rothman J suggested at [85] another basis on which the evidence in this case was not “tendency evidence”: “the evidence sought to be admitted was intercepted telephone conversations which went to the totality of the conduct giving rise to the supply of drugs on the particular occasion with which the accused was charged. In other words the evidence was admissible because it formed the totality of the

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non-coincidence reasoning is R v Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54. In circumstances where the defendant claimed that his involvement with his brothers in a particular drug importation was very limited (and a one-off), evidence of statements by him referring to other drug importations involving both him and his brothers “was clearly relevant to a consideration of his relationship with his brothers, and of the reason for, and nature of, his conduct” in respect of the particular importation (at [66]). The fine distinctions required in this area have led Priest JA in the Victorian Court of Appeal to express the view that “relationship evidence – including context evidence – should be seen for what it is... tendency evidence”.1140 However, the other members of the court (Redlich JA and Coghlan JA) expressly stated at [11] that “[t]his is not the occasion, in our respectful opinion, to explore context or relationship evidence” and it is difficult to support the approach taken by Priest JA (notwithstanding its attractive simplicity) given the definition of “tendency evidence” in this Act. As the examples given above show, in many cases such evidence is plainly not being relied upon to “prove that a person has or had a tendency... to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind”. This has been acknowledged by the ACT Court of Appeal, although the majority of the court emphasised that only careful analysis of the evidence in the context of the other evidence and the issues in the trial will determine whether the evidence is relevant via non-tendency (and non-coincidence) reasoning.1141 Of course, even if the “relationship” evidence is not classified as “tendency” or “coincidence” evidence, it may still be inadmissible on relevance or discretionary grounds.1142 More remote relationship evidence may have less probative value.1143 General relationship evidence may have limited probative value.1144 Relationship evidence may have low probative value in respect of the offence charged, particularly if the existence of the relationship is not in dispute.1145 Indeed, it may have no probative value (and thus be irrelevant) in conduct leading up to the charge in question and its probative value did not depend on tendency reasoning” (see “(g) Evidence putting other admissible evidence in context” below). See also Mac v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 24 at [28]–[34]; Masri v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 243 at [49]–[57]. 1140. Murdoch v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 451; [2013] VSCA 272 at [93]. 1141. MM v The Queen (2012) 232 A Crim R 303; [2012] ACTCA 44. 1142. Compare Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232; [1996] HCA 22 at 438–439; Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 per McClellan CJ at CL at [82]; RG v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 173 at [36]–[38] (and see below). 1143. R v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176; [2000] NSWCCA 372 (NSW CCA) at [45] per Kirby J; R v Atroushi [2001] NSWCCA 406 at [44] per Carruthers AJ; Benson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 51 at [36], [85]. 1144. R v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176; [2000] NSWCCA 372 (NSW CCA) at [49]–[51] per Kirby J; R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; [2002] NSWCCA 210 at [94] per Greg James J; Benson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 51 at [37]. 1145. R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 at [553] per Smart AJ, Mason P and Barr J agreeing at [283]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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establishing particular conduct. The more specific the relationship evidence, the greater the amount, and the greater the similarity to the offence charged, the greater the potential prejudicial impact.1147 On the other hand, exclusion of some relationship evidence in discretion does not mean that other relationship evidence may not be admitted.

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(h) Evidence putting other admissible evidence in context. Sometimes this terminology is used to mean the same thing as evidence of “state of mind” or “relationship”, discussed above. Thus, in R v MM [2014] NSWCCA 144 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal accepted (at [28]–[32], [55]) that evidence from the complainant (and contained in various admissions by the defendant) about a lengthy history of incestuous sexual behaviour was “context evidence” when used to explain lack of surprise or resistance by the complainant and delay in complaint, as well as to understand the complainant’s evidence about her lack of consent (and the defendant’s knowledge of her lack of consent) with respect to particular charged acts.1148 In ES v The Queen (No 2) [2010] NSWCCA 198 Hodgson JA held at [59]–[60] that evidence was “admissible as context evidence” where it “did no more than fill out what was, on the complainant’s account, a rounded and realistic picture of the relevant relationship between herself and the appellant”.1149 The reference to “the complainant’s account” is important. As Adams J (Hislop J agreeing) stated in SKA v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 205 at [275]–[277]: the evidence is definitely not adduced to “set what occurred in context”. It is adduced merely to set the evidence of the complainant as to the charged acts in context so that her evidence as to those matters (not the facts) can be fairly understood. … the evidence, as contextual, was admissible for the purpose alone of enabling the complainant to give a coherent account and, in that sense, to avoid the apparent lack of credibility which a partial account might have.

In that context, it would not be a material consideration that the alleged uncharged acts might not have involved a criminal offence (because of, for example, the application of the doli incapax principle). The alleged 1146. R v Fung (2002) 136 A Crim R 95; [2002] NSWCCA 479, Sully J at [51], Beazley JA agreeing. Evidence that A was a drug dealer, and that A and B were “good friends”, was held not “relevant to proof” that B knew a bag in his possession contained drugs. It was held that the minimum that the prosecution needed to prove was first, that the drugs in the bag came from A; and, secondly, that the nature and the circumstances of B’s friendship were such that the only rational inference was that he must have known that A was an active drug trafficker. Hulme J dissented, holding that the evidence met the test of relevance (at [89]) and was not inadmissible under the Act. 1147. R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 at [553], [603] per Smart AJ, Mason P and Barr J agreeing at [283]; Tanner v The Queen [2001] WASCA 60; R v McNamara (2002) 131 A Crim R 140; [2002] NSWCCA 248 at [33]–[34]; R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999; R v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180. 1148. See also ES v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197 at [41]. 1149. See also CA v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 324, where it was held at [79]–[81] that a trial judge did not err in holding that that evidence of a single act, separated in time from two other alleged events, might be relevant to prevent a jury being left with an “unrealistic and/or misleading picture as to the two series of” other events.

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conduct is “to be viewed from the perspective of the [alleged] victim, and not through the prism of the [defendant’s] criminal responsibility”.1150 Other examples may be given. Evidence that X said she had been assaulted by A might explain why the person to whom it was said then complained that she also had been assaulted by A – the evidence of what X said is not admitted to prove an assault on X but “as part of the circumstances leading up to the complaint” by C and to “explain why [C] made her complaint to [X]”.1151 Evidence of admissions to other crimes may be admitted into evidence for the purpose of allowing a jury “properly to evaluate the truthfulness or otherwise of the [defendant’s] statements about” the crime for which he was on trial.1152 In R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 it was held that evidence of a prosecution witness (JS) that the defendant had sexually abused him (in a similar way to that alleged by the complainant) was held not to be tendency evidence but rather evidence of an “admission” because, at the time the alleged abuse was occurring, the defendant “told him that it was all right to do ‘these things’, that he used to do them with the complainant and that the complainant said that it felt good”.1153 While it might be said that the admission was what the defendant said to JS, not what the defendant was allegedly doing to JS at the time, the latter evidence needed to be adduced to put the evidence of the admission in context (by explaining what “these things” were). Another example would be evidence of conversations between two persons which tend to show the true nature and content of a particular ambiguous conversation between the same persons.1154 The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has indicated the care which should be taken with evidence said to be relevant in this way: Where it is proposed to lead evidence of other offences as “context” it is essential that those offences be as precisely defined as possible as to time, place and character. The complainant should not be simply invited to make general allegations. The Crown prosecutor and, for that matter, the trial judge have a responsibility to ensure that all such evidence is elicited in such a way as will permit its true significance to be appropriately weighed in relation to the offences actually charged.1155

Nevertheless, the same Court sometimes treats this category as another way of describing evidence discussed in other categories of evidence that is neither tendency evidence nor coincidence evidence (for example, 1150. Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Martin [2016] VSCA 219 at [110]. 1151. Galvin v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 449; [2006] NSWCCA 66 per Howie J at [46]–[47]. 1152. R v Suckling [1999] NSWCCA 36 at [27]; R v SY [2004] NSWCCA 297. 1153. R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 at [21], [58] and [65]. 1154. R v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519 at [15], [18]–[21] per Spigelman CJ (James J agreeing); Masri v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 243. 1155. R v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370 at [18] per Adams J. It was held that most of the “context” evidence was simply irrelevant (at [20]). See also R v Cornelissen [2004] NSWCCA 449 at [72]; R v Rajakaruna (2004) 8 VR 340; 146 A Crim R 238; [2004] VSCA 114 at [179]–[180]; Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [80]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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categories (f) and (g)). Even if relevant as “context” (or “background”), there may be a strong case for exclusion under ss 135 or 137.1157 (i) Evidence of conduct which forms a part of a relevant transaction. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has held that if evidence of some event “was an integral part of a connected series of events … which included [an event in issue] and which could not truly be understood without reference to the evidence” then such evidence would be relevant (under s 55) and would not be tendency evidence.1158 The Victorian Court of Appeal has applied a very similar analysis.1159 The issue of relevance is discussed above at [EA.55.360]. It should be noted that use of the language of “res gestae” should be avoided. That term tends to generate more confusion than assistance. In the NSW case, the evidence was relevant in a non-tendency way because it showed that the defendant was present just before the event in issue and also because of an assumption that a state of mind shown to exist at one point in time may well be in existence a short time later. In the Victorian case, aggressive behaviour by the appellant in the hours before and after an alleged murder was relevant to her state of mind at the time of the alleged murder. Similarly, in FDP v The Queen (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; [2008] NSWCCA 317, it was held that evidence of the making of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) on the appellant in respect of his wife (who, a week later, he allegedly stabbed) was relevant to that alleged stabbing in a non-tendency way in that the evidence explained a number of matters that were relevant events.1160 Evidence as to how a vehicle was being driven some distance from the location of a subsequent collision may tend to show how it was being

1156. See, for example, KTR v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 271 at [90]–[92], [99]–[101]. 1157. In L’Estrange v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 89; (2011) 214 A Crim R 9, McCallum J (McClellan CJ at CL and RA Hulme J agreeing) stated at [61]: any characterisation of evidence of prior criminal conduct as “background” or “context” should sound a warning of the need to give careful attention to the risk that the purpose for which the jury might find the evidence most useful is that of placing the charges in the context of their having been brought against a person who has done this kind of thing before. 1158. R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 at [26]–[27] per the court. The court applied the common law principle articulated by Dixon J in O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566 at 577–578, that “without [the evidence in question] the transaction of which the alleged murder formed an integral part could not be truly understood and, isolated from it, could only be presented as an unreal and not very intelligible event”. See also R v Lamb [2002] NSWSC 323; Samadi v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 251; [2008] NSWCCA 330 at [63]; LJW v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 114 at [45]–[46]. 1159. Hothnyang v The Queen [2014] VSCA 64 at [15]–[21]. 1160. FDP v The Queen (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; [2008] NSWCCA 317, McClellan CJ at CL, Grove J and Howie J agreeing, stated at [36]: “[T]he evidence explained why the appellant could not have direct contact with the complainant or the children and the arrangements that had to be made for his access to the children through the complainant’s parents”.

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driven at the time of the collision. However, it should not be assumed that evidence of surrounding circumstances will not be subject to the test in s 101. It will often be necessary to examine the process of reasoning involved. Simply asserting that the evidence is being relied upon to put other evidence “in context”, so that it can be “truly understood”, or as “background” evidence, should not be sufficient,1162 although courts still adopt such language.1163 Equally, any reliance on any such principle as “the presumption of continuance” should be carefully analysed. An example of a case where a questionable ruling that evidence did not involve tendency reasoning because it fell in this category is R v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83. In the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Hulme J held that evidence that drugs were found in the appellant’s premises in July 2001, suggesting that she “was at that time engaged in a business of the supply of methylamphetamine”, was not tendency evidence when admitted to prove that the appellant had been supplying amphetamines in May 2001 (at [46], Mason P agreeing at [8]). It is difficult to see how anything other than tendency reasoning is being utilised when conduct in July is used to infer similar conduct in May, notwithstanding the reference by Hulme J at [37] to “the presumption of continuance”.1164 Similarly, in R v Cerullo [2003] NSWCCA 201, while Hulme J considered at [17] that evidence that three weeks before an importation of cocaine the defendant said he was expecting to be in possession of some “white cappucino” in the foreseeable future was plainly relevant to the question of whether he was involved in the subsequent importation and “clearly went further than indicating” a propensity to deal in drugs, Buddin J (Spigelman CJ agreeing) considered that the nexus between the conversation and the subsequent importation was weak and the evidence “lacked the 1161. See R v Sullivan [2002] NSWCCA 505 at [13]; R v Duryea (2008) 103 SASR 70; 192 A Crim R 286; [2008] SASC 363 at [56]–[74]. 1162. Compare, at common law, Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 633–634 per McHugh J; Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106; 72 ALJR 1012; 155 ALR 15 at [175] per Callinan J; Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; 167 A Crim R 192; 81 ALJR 391; [2006] HCA 56 at [145]–[146] per Callinan J. In R v Kassoua [1999] NSWCCA 13 at [23] per Grove J it was held that evidence of a “failed attempt” to commit an offence actually committed a week later was admissible “as part of the continuity of circumstances which led to a later completed crime”: citing King v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 423 and R v Kalazjich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415. It is difficult to see how this does not involve tendency reasoning. 1163. See, for example, R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [135] per Heydon JA. 1164. Hulme J also held (at [46]) that the evidence that drugs were found in the appellant’s premises in July 2001 was not “tendency evidence” because it was “evidence of physical inanimate facts, not evidence of conduct of the Appellant”. This approach was not agreed with by the other member of the majority of the court (Mason P at [9]) and it should be regarded as highly doubtful. As Mason P explained, the “finding of the drugs in the house only assumed relevance because it was the appellant’s house and because this gave rise to the inference that they were in her possession. These facts in combination could be capable of giving rise to a tendency issue in particular circumstances”. The prosecution sought to use the evidence of the presence of the drugs to infer that they were in the possession of the appellant in July 2001, to further infer that she was a drug supplier in July 2001, and finally to infer that she is a drug supplier in May 2001. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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necessary probative value to justify its admissibility” (at [88]). In R v Fleming [2017] SASCFC 135, a judgment of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal applying the common law, Peek J made an important point at [34] about the danger of bootstraps reasoning in the context of an argument that evidence is not “tendency evidence”, in that it may be assumed that the defendant is guilty of the offence charged in order to conclude that two or more events formed part of a “transaction”. As Peek J stated at [40], if that assumption is necessary to be made to find “a connected series of events” or “one transaction”, then tendency reasoning will be the true basis for the inference of guilt. (j) Evidence which corroborates the testimony of a complainant. In Kapanadze v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 69, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held (at [65]) that certain evidence could be used as tendency evidence to show a sexual interest in the complainant but accepted (at [66]) that it could also be used “to corroborate the complainant’s evidence” about the incident. However, in R v NKS [2004] NSWCCA 144, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that evidence that a defendant charged with sexually assaulting his daughter had admitted to some (uncharged) sexual activity with her was not tendency (or coincidence) evidence but was “corroborative evidence, that is, evidence to support, confirm or strengthen other evidence that the [defendant] committed the offences charged” (Grove J at [11]–[13], see also Howie J at [21]). It is suggested that introduction of the concept of “corroboration” in this context is unhelpful and potentially misleading. It developed under the common law to give content to warnings to juries about the dangers of convicting on certain categories of uncorroborated evidence. In the present context, determination of admissibility, it adds little to the requirement of relevance and obscures the critical issue of the process of reasoning involved. It is true that some members of the High Court have used the concept in the context of determining admissibility under the common law1166 but the common law did not require careful analysis of processes of reasoning. A clearer explanation for the conclusion that the evidence in NKS was not tendency evidence may be found in the reference to it being evidence of the “relationship” between the defendant and his daughter (Grove J at [8], Howie J at [21]), although even here tendency reasoning may be involved (the evidence showed the defendant had a sexual interest (or “passion”) for his daughter, demonstrating “a tendency to … act in a particular way” and “have a particular state of mind”: s 97(1)). Significantly, in ES v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197 Hodgson JA (Whealy J and Buddin J agreeing) held at [43] held that evidence of uncharged inappropriate sexual contact between the accused and the child complainant would 1165. However, the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal applied the proviso to s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) to dismiss the appeal. Special leave to appeal was refused by the High Court on 6 August 2004. In refusing special leave, Kirby and Hayne JJ observed that “the better approach expressed in the court below was that of Buddin J, with whom Spigelman CJ agreed”. 1166. For example B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 610.

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have probative force “only as motive/tendency evidence” (that is, as tendency evidence) if used for the purpose of “corroborating the complainant”. (k) Evidence rebutting a defence account. In Bryant v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 531; [2011] NSWCCA 26 Howie AJ (McClellan CJ at CL and Simpson J agreeing) held at [92] that evidence relating to various offences allegedly committed by the appellant was relevant to rebut his explanation for other offences with which he was charged (that he was returning various incriminating items to a person who was the actual offender). In McDonald v The Queen [2014] VSCA 80 at [29], the Victorian Court of Appeal held at [28] that it was open to admit evidence that the defendant (charged with child sex offences) posessed child pornography, not as tendency evidence, but rebut his statement to the police (admitted to in evidence) “that he was not interested in children”. However, just as evidence of bad character led to rebut good character may not be used as evidence of guilt (see [EA.110.90]), so evidence adduced for rebuttal purposes in this context should not be used as evidence of guilt. Sometimes, with respect to this mode of non-tendency and non-coincidence reasoning, very fine distinctions are drawn (as with the other modes of reasoning discussed). In Dunn v The Queen [2017] VSCA 371, the Victorian Court of Appeal relied on a pre-Evidence Act 1995 judgment of the High Court1167 to support a ruling that evidence that a defendant charged with trafficking drugs in 2014 (where the defence account was that he knew nothing of the drugs found on his property) had been present on a property with a clandestine drug laboratory drugs in 2001 was not tendency evidence or coincidence evidence but rather “to rebut a defence of innocent association” (at [33]). It has to be said that it is difficult to see how the evidence tended to rebut that defence other than by reliance on either tendency or coincidence reasoning. There is no doubt that the discretions under ss 135 and 137 are available for the purpose of, where appropriate, excluding evidence which discloses criminal or reprehensible conduct on the part of a defendant, even if the evidence does not fall within the definitions of “tendency evidence” or “coincidence evidence”.1168 Because the evidence will sometimes be highly prejudicial, it will require in such circumstances a substantial or strong degree of probative value to outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, notwithstanding the availability of directions on use to the jury.1169 There will need to be careful assessment of both 1167. Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590; 43 A Crim R 221; [1989] HCA 50. It may be noted that, in R v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519, Spigelman CJ relied on the same High Court judgment to hold that certain evidence was evidence of “relationship” and not tendency or coincidence evidence. 1168. See, eg, R v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185 at [36]–[37] per Heydon JA; R v Kovacs (2000) 111 A Crim R 374; [2000] NSWCCA 74 at [19] per Simpson J; R v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176; [2000] NSWCCA 372 (NSW CCA) at [47] per Kirby J. 1169. R v McNamara (2002) 131 A Crim R 140; [2002] NSWCCA 248. In this case, Blanch AJ relied (at [32]–[33]) on common law authority to conclude that “relationship evidence” must have “strong probative force” to be admissible. It is suggested that such an approach is wrong. Neither s 97, 98 nor 101 impose any such limitation on the admissibility of evidence which is © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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the level of probative value and the extent of the danger of unfair prejudice, taking into account procedural considerations and anticipated judicial directions to the jury. For general discussion of these discretions see, in particular, [EA.137.60]–[EA.137.150]. The greater the difficulty in demonstrating that the evidence is relevant in a way that does not involve tendency or coincidence reasoning, the greater the risk that the jury will use it for tendency or coincidence reasoning, and thus the stronger the case for exclusion under ss 135 or 137.1170 To give one example, in ES v The Queen (No 1) [2010] NSWCCA 197 it was held that, while evidence of uncharged inappropriate sexual contact between the accused and the child complainant would not be tendency evidence when used as “context evidence”, it had “at best extremely modest” probative value for that use. Further, the risk of its being used as tendency evidence (for which it was not admissible) required its exclusion. Hodgson JA (Whealy J and Buddin J agreeing) explained at [43]:

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If it were considered as doing no more than enabling the charged acts to be seen in context, and as not supporting the complainant at all by way of motive/tendency reasoning, its probative value was at best extremely modest. However, since the evidence was not admissible in this case as motive/tendency evidence because of failure to comply with s 97, its considerable probative force in that character must be considered as being unfairly prejudicial. In my opinion, it is clear that accordingly the modest probative value as context evidence was plainly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice from its probative force as motive/tendency evidence (which, for the reasons I have given, must be considered as unfairly prejudicial).

Of course, the view may be taken that directions to the jury will reduce, if not eliminate, the risk of impermissible tendency reasoning, particularly in a case where the evidence derives from the complainant rather than an independent source.1171 Where it comes from an independent sourse, the danger of impermissible tendency reasoning is increased. Thus, in Leonard v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 Hodgson JA at [55]–[56] drew a distinction between general relationship evidence and independently corroborated evidence of relationship: If the evidence is of a generalised nature by the complainant alone, it would not in my opinion have [a prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value]. It can easily be made clear to the jury that the evidence is only to show that the complainant’s account of the assaults charged is not implausible because they would not have happened in that way if they were isolated incidents, and that there is no greater reason to accept the complainant’s evidence that there were other incidents than to accept her evidence that neither “tendency evidence” nor “coincidence evidence”. The common law rules relating to admissibility have been displaced by the provisions of the Act (see [EA.Intro.120]). The proper approach is to apply the “discretion” in s 137, recognising that a substantial or strong degree of probative value will often be required to outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. See also R v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180 at [19]; R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 at [553], [622] per Smart AJ, Mason P and Barr J agreeing at [283] (see also Smart AJ at [491]). For a good example of the often complex analysis required in applying the discretions to this kind of evidence, see Galvin v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 449; [2006] NSWCCA 66 at [17]–[40]; [43]–[48]. 1170. See L’Estrange v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 89; (2011) 214 A Crim R 9, McCallum J (McClellan CJ at CL and RA Hulme J agreeing) at [60]–[64]. 1171. See KJS v The Queen (2014) 86 NSWLR 603; [2014] NSWCCA 27 at [41]–[44]. See also [EA.137.60] regarding jury directions as a mechanism to reduce the danger of unfair prejudice.

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the charged assaults occurred: the two generally stand or fall together. However, if there is clear independent corroboration of another incident, then the prejudicial effect could well outweigh the probative value, if the only permissible probative value were to remove the implausibility that the complainant’s account would have if were taken as an account of isolated incidents. The jury could well accept that the corroborated incident occurred because of the corroboration, and they could consider that this in turn gave corroboration that the charged assaults occurred, otherwise than through the only permissible use of the evidence. That is, they could use the evidence in an impermissible and thus prejudicial way.1172

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A contrasting example is R v MM [2014] NSWCCA 144. In that case, evidence from the complainant and from an independent source (various admissions by the defendant) about a lengthy history of incestuous sexual behaviour was “context evidence” to, for example, explain lack of surprise or resistance by the complainant and delay in complaint with respect to particular charged acts, but was also admissible as tendency evidence. In those circumstances, there was no need for a direction prohibiting tendency reasoning and no danger of the jury impermissibly engaging in tendency reasoning, with the consequence that there was no basis for exclusion under s 137 (see at [31]). In considering the application of s 137 (and s 135), it has been held by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 that “evidence that is capable of disclosing a tendency on the part of an accused person” must be excluded in discretion if the prosecution “fails to exclude the reasonable possibility of concoction on the part of the proposed witness or witnesses”.1173 This principle derives, indirectly, from the approach taken by the High Court in Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50 at 296 (CLR) per Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ to the common law relating to similar fact evidence (see below [EA.101.180]) and the view that the prejudicial effect of such evidence will inevitably outweigh its probative value. Whether it is consistent with the approach taken to the discretionary provisions in the Act by the High Court in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274 remains to be seen. Indeed, in TKWJ v The Queen (2002) 212 CLR 124; 133 A Crim R 574; [2002] HCA 46 at [88], McHugh J expressed the view that when evidence of alleged misconduct by the defendant is tendered to rebut evidence of good character and not as “similar fact or tendency evidence”, “the question of collusion [is] irrelevant to an issue under s 135” and, presumably, s 137 (see [EA.110.90]). The other members of the High Court did not address this issue. However, given the view expressed in IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 by French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [59] with respect to coincidence evidence that it “should not be accepted” that, under s 98(1)(b), “the possibility of joint concoction may deprive evidence of probative value consistently with the approach to similar fact evidence stated in Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50” (see [EA.101.240]), it would seem implausible that such a possibility might support exclusion of evidence that is neither coincidence evidence nor tendency evidence. 1172. The other members of the court, Grove and Adams JJ, did not feel it necessary to express a view on the correctness, or otherwise, of this analysis. 1173. R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 at [77] per Simpson J; see also R v J [2000] NSWCCA 246 at [63]–[69] per Adams J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.101.180] “probative value … substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect”

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The test in s 101(2) is similar to the traditional common law rule of admissibility for “similar fact” evidence or “propensity” evidence (that is, evidence that a defendant had committed crimes, or other “wrongful” acts, similar to that with which he or she is charged, thereby disclosing a propensity to commit the crime charged).1174 In Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 593–594, for example, Brennan J stated that such evidence is inadmissible at common law “unless the probative force of the evidence clearly transcends the merely prejudicial effect of showing that the accused has committed other offences”. However, a majority of the High Court determined in Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; 69 ALJR 147; [1995] HCA 7 that a more restrictive rule of admissibility should be applied at common law, holding that “the basis for the admission of similar fact evidence lies in its possessing a particular probative value or cogency such that, if accepted, it bears no reasonable explanation other than the inculpation of the accused in the offence charged”.1175 The earlier decision of the High Court in Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50 was cited for this test of admissibility.1176 In contrast, McHugh J in his judgment in Pfennig preferred the traditional “balancing” test (emphasising that it was “a matter of law and not discretion”). He considered that, while in some circumstances it would be appropriate to require the evidence to meet the “no [other] reasonable explanation” test, it was not the case that the evidence “must always meet this high standard” to be admissible. New South Wales courts applying this provision initially imported the stricter approach of the majority of the High Court in Pfennig, justified on the argument that the high level of probative value required by that approach will always be necessary to “substantially outweigh” the inevitable prejudicial effect of such evidence.1177 However, in the Full Federal Court decision of W v The Queen (2001) 115 FCR 41; 124 A Crim R 545; 189 ALR 633; [2001] FCA 1648, Miles J rejected this New South Wales authority and preferred the approach articulated by McHugh J in Pfennig in respect of the common law. Madgwick J also indicated support for the approach taken by McHugh J (at [102]). Subsequently, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal agreed with this view. In R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319, Spigelman CJ (Sully, O’Keefe, Hidden and Buddin JJ agreeing) held (at [95]) that “[s]ection 101(2) calls for a balancing exercise which can only be conducted on the facts of 1174. See Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580; 57 ALJR 110; 44 ALR 449; [1982] HCA 75 at 585, 604 and 609; Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 534, 547–549, 560 and 564; Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 593–594, 598, 607, 610 and 632; B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 608 and 618. 1175. Pfennig at 481 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ (see further discussion of this test at [EA.101.210]). 1176. The High Court held that similar fact evidence whose probative value “lies in the improbability of the witnesses giving accounts of happenings having the requisite degree of similarity unless the happenings occurred” will not be admissible if there is “a possibility of joint concoction” because there will in consequence be “a rational view of the evidence that is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused” (Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ at 296 (CLR)). 1177. See eg R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 363; R v H (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; 98 A Crim R 71 at 709; R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359.

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each case”. The court must give “consideration to the actual prejudice in the specific case which the probative value of the evidence must substantially outweigh” (at [94]). The way in which the majority of the High Court in Pfennig held that the common law balancing exercise should be conducted did not apply to the balancing exercise under s 101(2), primarily because the statutory provision expressly requires a balancing process and tilts that process by the use of different terminology (that is, by the addition of the word “substantially”, which was not used in prior case law). Spigelman CJ (along with Sully and O’Keefe JJ) rejected (at [99]) the view of Hidden and Buddin JJ that evidence in respect of which s 101(2) applies “is likely to be highly prejudicial” and the test of admissibility must be “one of very considerable stringency”. The application of the balancing exercise will turn on the facts of each case. The High Court initially granted special leave to appeal from this judgment but the grant was rescinded on 1 December 2004, the court indicating the view that Spigelman CJ was correct.

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The decision in Ellis raises the following questions. How precisely are probative value and prejudicial effect to be “weighed” against each other? What is the significance of the requirement that the probative value of the evidence must “substantially” outweigh “any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant”? Will there be cases where the “prejudicial effect” the evidence “may have on the defendant” is so great that the probative value required to substantially outweigh it must in fact be such that it “bears no reasonable explanation other than the inculpation of the accused in the offence charged”? The last question is the most easily answered. In Ellis, Spigelman CJ observed (at [96]): My conclusion in relation to the construction of s 101(2) should not be understood to suggest that the stringency of the approach, culminating in the Pfennig test, is never appropriate when the judgment for which the section calls has to be made. There may well be cases where, on the facts, it would not be open to conclude that the probative value of particular evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect, unless the “no rational explanation” test were satisfied.

Of course, as the Victorian Court of Appeal observed in Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [173], the Pfennig test “has no application to the admissibility of tendency or coincidence evidence” under this Act, but the observations of Spigelman CJ recognize that there will be circumstances where the high level of probative value required under the Pfennig test will be needed to substantially outweigh the unfairly prejudicial dangers arising from the evidence (for discussion of what the test requires: see [EA.101.210]). The obvious next question is, in what circumstances will the high level of probative value required under the Pfennig test be needed? Spigelman CJ provided no guidance on this question. Indeed, he did not even (explicitly at least) determine that the test had no relevance in the circumstances of Ellis (a coincidence case). Some guidance may be provided by the judgment of McHugh J in Pfennig, a judgment which was, as noted above, approved by both the Federal Court in W and the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Ellis. McHugh J stated at 529–530 (CLR): If the risk of an unfair trial is very high, the probative value of the evidence disclosing criminal propensity may need to be so cogent that it makes the guilt of the accused a © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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virtual certainty … Thus, where the prosecution case depends entirely on propensity reasoning, the evidence will need to be very cogent to be admitted … [I]n such a case, the evidence will need to be so cogent that, when related to the other evidence, there is no rational explanation of the prosecution case that is consistent with the innocence of the accused.

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This passage suggests that the “no rational explanation” test would apply where “the prosecution case depends entirely on propensity reasoning”, that is, the evidence falls within the definition of “tendency evidence” in s 97 (see [EA.97.60]) and, in addition, is the only substantial prosecution evidence in the trial. On the other hand, at 532 he referred to the situation where “the Crown is relying on the accused’s criminal propensity because the risk of prejudice from propensity reasoning is so high”. This suggests (notwithstanding the ambiguity inherent in the word “relying”) that the test would apply whenever the prosecution adduces tendency evidence against a defendant in criminal proceedings, regardless of the availability of other evidence of guilt. However, if that is what McHugh J meant it would have to be qualified in relation to the Evidence Act. As noted at [EA.101.90], there is nothing in the definition of “tendency evidence” which indicates that it only relates to evidence that a defendant had committed crimes or other “wrongful” acts (in contrast with the common law). It would be inappropriate to apply the no reasonable explanation test where the tendency evidence in question does not reveal wrongful, let alone criminal, conduct on the part of the defendant. If the tendency evidence is likely in a particular case to cause little unfair prejudice, adoption of such a test is plainly inappropriate.1178 What about “coincidence evidence”? Examples of such evidence were noted at [EA.101.120]. In Pfennig, McHugh J made it clear that he considered it inappropriate to apply the no rational explanation test where “objective improbability reasoning” is relied upon. He acknowledged that “the risk of prejudice in true similar fact cases is … as Murphy J pointed out in Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580; 57 ALJR 110; 44 ALR 449; [1982] HCA 75 at 594] that ‘[c]ommon assumptions about improbability of sequences are often wrong’” but considered the risk of prejudice as less than in propensity reasoning cases (at 530–531). However, in cases where the defendant had “admitted the facts of the similar incident” (at 531), or there was clear evidence that the defendant was responsible, with the consequent risk of propensity reasoning by the jury, he left it open whether it was appropriate to apply the no rational explanation test. In CW v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288 the Victorian Court of Appeal were satisfied (at [28]) that the coincidence evidence in that case did not disclose “prior offending or bad character” and thus did not create such a risk of unfair prejudice that it would not be open to conclude that the probative value of particular evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect unless the “no rational explanation” test was satisfied. Nevertheless, presumably there will be cases 1178. See Odgers, “Proof and Probability” (1989) Australian Bar Review 137. In GBF v The Queen [2010] VSCA 135, the Victorian Court of Appeal did not purport to apply the “no rational explanation” in a case where tendency evidence was admitted, simply observing at [30] that “the section calls for the application of a balancing process which is to be conducted on the facts of each case”.

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where, even in respect of what the Act describes as “coincidence evidence”, application of the no rational explanation test will be appropriate.1179 If the case is not one in which application of the no reasonable explanation test is appropriate, the court will be left to engage in the weighing or balancing exercise provided for in s 101(2). The meaning of the term “probative value” in a similar context in criminal proceedings (the application of the general discretion to exclude evidence in s 137) is discussed in detail at [EA.137.90]. Similarly, the term “danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant” appears in s 137 and the discussion of it at [EA.137.120] will be of some assistance. Nevertheless, the particular formulation, context and history of the test of admissibility imposed in s 101(2) means that generalisations from s 137 are likely to be of limited use. Obviously enough, the test in s 101(2) is intended to be more restrictive in terms of admissibility than the s 137 test.

[EA.101.185] “probative value” “Probative value” is defined in the Dictionary:

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“probative value” of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.

In IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 the High Court determined (by a 4:3 majority) that a trial judge, in assessing the “probative value” of evidence for the purposes of s 97 (and a number of other provisions in the UEL) must proceed on the assumption that the evidence “is accepted” (and thus is to be regarded as both credible and reliable) – just as is required when assessing relevance under s 55. The evidence is to be “accepted as credible and reliable” (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [48]). There is no reason to doubt that this analysis applies to the assessment of the probative value for the purposes of s 98 or this provision.1180 Since this provision only has application where the tendency evidence or coincidence evidence has satisfied the requirements of s 97 and/or s 98, it follows that the court has already ruled that the evidence has “significant probative value”. That concept was discussed at [EA.97.120] and [EA.98.120] As that discussion demonstrated, probative value depends upon the circumstances of each case, the nature of the evidence involved, the issue to which the evidence is relevant,1181 the way in which it is relevant and the other evidence in the case. If there is more than one act alleged, each should be considered in combination with the others.1182 Evidence of a general criminal tendency is unlikely to have sufficient probative value to outweigh the obvious prejudicial dangers of such evidence.1183 The nature of the defence case may affect the purpose for which the evidence is adduced against the defendant, and have a bearing on the probative value of the 1179. See eg R v Gibbs (2004) 154 ACTR 1; 146 A Crim R 503; [2004] ACTSC 63 at [18]–[23]. 1180. Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72 at [75]. 1181. See Phillips v The Queen (2005) 225 CLR 303; 80 ALJR 537; [2006] HCA 4 at [26], [47]. 1182. R v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427 at [55]. 1183. See O’Keefe v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 121, Howie J at [60], [65], [69]; Donohoe v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 176 at [56]–[61]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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evidence and consequently its admissibility. For example, an item of evidence may have far greater probative value in proving identity than proving guilty mind; if the defence admits identity, exclusion may be appropriate. Similarly, evidence may be more probative in rebutting a defence claim of accident than proving particular conduct occurred.1185 Of course, in the absence of any indication by the defendant that a particular issue is not in dispute or a particular defence is not relied upon, the prosecution may proceed on the basis that all elements and possible defences open on the evidence are in dispute.1186

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[EA.101.190] “prejudicial effect” Turning to the concept of “prejudicial effect” the evidence “may have on the defendant”, it is curious that there is no reference to “unfair prejudice”, as in s 137. Despite this, it would be absurd if the concept of “prejudicial effect” applied simply on the basis that the evidence tended to prove the guilt of the defendant, thereby “prejudicing” the defendant’s prospects of acquittal. The concept should be understood in substantially the same way as “unfair prejudice” in s 137, albeit with an emphasis on the way that the evidence may, rather than necessarily will, impact adversely on the defendant.1187 While prejudicial effect is often inevitable (so that the tendency/coincidence evidence would almost invariably require “a strong degree of probative force” to be admissible even under the less onerous common law balancing test1188) the degree, and the level of unfairness to the defendant, will vary from case to case. The ALRC discussed the potential prejudicial effect in detail.1189 The primary dangers are that the jury may be influenced to convict as punishment for conduct other than that charged;1190 may overestimate the probative value of the evidence; may too readily accept other prosecution evidence adduced to prove guilt; and may be distracted from the central issues in the trial. In Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ stated at [17]: 1184. See Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 560; Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 601–602 and 608. 1185. R v Barton [2004] NSWCCA 229 at [14]. 1186. See Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374; 207 A Crim R 202; [2011] HCA 7, Heydon J at [44]–[150]. However, it should be noted that Heydon J was in dissent and the plurality judgment (Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) accepted at [65] that the defence may informally indicate that a particular element is not “challenged”, with the consequence that evidence relevant to that element will not have “significant” probative value. 1187. See R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, Campbell JA at [55]; R v Jennings [2010] NSWCCA 193 at [21]; Sokolowskyj v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 at [47]; Clegg v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 49 at [74]. 1188. Markby v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 108; 52 ALJR 626 at 117; Pfennig at 487 (CLR). 1189. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 795ff; ALRC 102, para 3.18 (see also Pfennig at 487–488, 528 (CLR)). 1190. In R v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427, Howie J (Santow JA and Bell J agreeing) held that the fact that the tendency evidence adduced by the prosecution alleged criminal conduct by the defendant for which the defendant had never been charged or stood trial was “irrelevant” to the balancing test under s 101(2). While it may be true that this consideration did not bear on an assessment of the probative value of the evidence, this is nevertheless a surprising view at least if the jury were to find out that the defendant had never been charged or stood trial in relation to the allegations, since this would have been likely to increase “the prejudicial effect” the evidence “may have” on the defendant (on the basis that the jury may conclude that he would escape punishment for the other alleged offences and this would prejudice their assessment of the charged offences).

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The reception of tendency evidence in a criminal trial may occasion prejudice in a number of ways. The jury may fail to allow that a person who has a tendency to have a particular state of mind, or to act in a particular way, may not have had that state of mind, or may not have acted in that way, on the occasion in issue. Or the jury may underestimate the number of persons who share the tendency to have that state of mind or to act in that way. In either case the tendency evidence may be given disproportionate weight. In addition to the risks arising from tendency reasoning, there is the risk that the assessment of whether the prosecution has discharged its onus may be clouded by the jury’s emotional response to the tendency evidence. And prejudice may be occasioned by requiring an accused to answer a raft of uncharged conduct stretching back, perhaps, over many years.

Examples may be given. In Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72 the Victorian Court of Appeal stated at [77]):

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One can readily understand how the prejudicial effect of coincidence evidence which is extrinsic to the circumstances of the offence charged can outweigh its probative value. For example, where the victim of a sexual assault gives evidence that the accused used a knife with a distinctive handle, evidence by a bank teller that the accused threatened him or her with a knife with the same distinctive handle may satisfy the test of significant probative value in s 98, but that probative value is likely to be outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the disclosure to the jury that the accused may have committed an armed robbery. Another example may be where the coincidence evidence discloses the bad character of the accused in a context which is separate from the offending conduct for which he or she is charged.

In R v Watkins (2005) 153 A Crim R 434; [2005] NSWCCA 164, Barr J referred at [49] to “a real danger that the jury’s recognition of the appellant’s prior guilt was likely to divert them from a proper consideration of the evidence as bearing on the question of his intent in the charges before them”. In R v GAC (2007) 178 A Crim R 408; [2007] NSWCCA 315 the primary danger was that “the jury might reason no more rationally than that, if the respondent molested [two other persons], he did the same to the complainant, and that emotion not rationality would govern” (Giles JA at [83]). In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 3.18 that “the prejudicial effect of evidence of previous misconduct has been confirmed in research conducted by the Law Commission of England and Wales involving magistrates and mock juries”. For example, information of a previous conviction for indecent assault on a child was found to be particularly prejudicial whatever the offence charged and to have a significant impact on jurors’ perception of the defendant’s credibility as a witness.1191 On the other hand, in JLS v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 328; 204 A Crim R 179; [2010] VSCA 209 the Victorian Court of Appeal saw no risk of unfair prejudice in the sense of the jury over-estimating the likelihood of the appellant giving effect to his tendency to engage in sexual activity with the complainant (Redlich JA at [31], Mandie JA and Bongiorno JA agreeing).1192 Prejudice may arise even in those cases where the tendency/ coincidence evidence does not tend to show that the defendant has committed other crimes or “wrongful” acts. For example, as Murphy J pointed out in Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580; 57 ALJR 110; 44 ALR 449; [1982] HCA 75 at 594, “[c]ommon assumptions about improbability of sequences are often wrong”. 1191. However, see RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71, Ward JA (Harrison J and RA Hulme J agreeing) at [170]–[177]. 1192. See also DJW v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 164 at [61]–[62]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The sheer number of other incidents relied upon to show tendency or coincidence may generate unfairness to the defendant1193. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has emphasised that the focus must be on the particular circumstances of the case rather than on “general statements about the arousal of prejudice”.1194 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the formulation in s 101(2) is “any prejudicial effect [the evidence] may have on the defendant”. This focuses on how the jury may use the evidence. The extent of such a prejudicial danger will not be affected by the other prosecution evidence. The court cannot know how the jury may regard that other evidence, nor the weight the jury will give to the tendency/coincidence evidence.

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Furthermore, the reference to “any prejudicial effect [the evidence] may have on the defendant” is not limited to the potential effect of the evidence on a jury. In R v Chase [2018] NSWCCA 71, it was accepted that this formulation would permit consideration of the interest of the defendant “in a fair trial” (Basten JA at [33]). Where prejudicial effect was contended to arise from admission of evidence that the defendant had committed a similar offence (in circumstances where the defendant had been convicted of that other offence and a notice of intention to appeal had been filed), it was accepted that prejudice to the defendant might arise if the appeal were successful and a retrial ordered (at [31]). On the other hand, merely revisiting the verdict would not constitute prejudice to the defendant (at [27]) nor would the likelihood that the defendant would have to testify to explain the evidence (at [28]). However, the issue of unfair prejudice may have limited significance in a case where the tendency evidence or coincidence evidence will be admitted in any event – because it is relevant for a use that does not involve tendency reasoning or coincidence reasoning. As was observed by Leeming JA in El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [82], “[s]ection 101 will apply with much greater force when the only way in which evidence is said to be relevant is because of tendency or coincidence reasoning”.1195 Further, it would be appropriate for a court to consider the extent to which the danger of prejudice associated with admitting the evidence may be reduced by some other action, such as editing the evidence. Certain parts of the evidence may be particularly prejudicial and may be excluded without significantly

1193. See R v Teys (2001) 161 FLR 44; 119 A Crim R 398; [2001] ACTSC 29 (ACT SC) at [69]–[70] per Miles CJ. Miles CJ considered that “to have allowed evidence of some 200 other instances of similar acts on the part of the accused was to load the prosecution case with unnecessary ammunition. The jury were unlikely to give particular attention to each and every one of those instances. There was a consequent danger that the jury might be swayed by the number of instances of further and similar alleged criminal conduct”. 1194. R v SK [2011] NSWCCA 292, Latham J (Giles JA and Rothman J agreeing) at [34]; RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71, Ward JA (Harrison J and RA Hulme J agreeing) at [170]–[177]; Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 at [55]–[59]. 1195. See also AC v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 21 at [61]–[70].

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impairing the probative value of what remains. In a jury trial, the danger of prejudice may be reduced by directions to the jury. In Pfennig, McHugh J observed (at 530 (CLR)) that:

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[T]he risk of prejudice may be so small that justice both to the accused and to the prosecution can be done by admitting evidence that is probative of guilt and warning the jury that they must not use the evidence in the way that is likely to create prejudice.1197

As with s 137, the availability of options designed to reduce the risk of unfair prejudice, such as judicial directions to the jury, should be taken into account, although there is no requirement that it be assumed that such options will be successful.1198 Indeed, it may be observed that such an assumption would effectively neuter this provision as a safeguard against the potential risk of miscarriages of justice arising from admission of this kind of evidence. In R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, Campbell JA in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal observed at [138]–[139] that the trial judge had come to the view that he could be “confident that directions will cure” the sorts of prejudice arising from evidence that the accused, charged with sexual assault, had been convicted of offences of sexual assault. Campbell JA (the other two members of the Court did not find it necessary to address this issue) concluded that “any prejudicial effect … can be dissipated” (at [140]) with the consequence that no balancing exercise was engaged upon (since there was no risk of prejudice to be balanced by probative value). However, the trial judge had not said that he was confident that directions would cure the risk of unfair prejudice, only that he was confident that the jury would “do their best to apply” the directions given to them (see Campbell JA at [139]). That may be accepted but, human nature being what it is, it would be quite wrong to assume that such directions will completely negate the risk of unfair prejudice. This analysis has been accepted by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in Sokolowskyj v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 at [56]–[57]. However, some decisions of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal appear to minimise that risk. In R v PWD (2010) 205 A Crim R 75; [2010] NSWCCA 209 Beazley JA (Buddin J and Barr J agreeing) observed at [90] that a trial judge’s view that there was a real risk that the jury would focus on the allegations of serious criminal conduct and be unable to properly consider the basis upon which the evidence would be admitted: fails to recognise the intelligence and focus with which juries go about their deliberations. In this regard, the Court is also entitled to take into account that juries are to be properly directed as to the use to which such evidence is to be put.

Similarly, in R v MM [2014] NSWCCA 144 the court concluded in respect of the tendency evidence in question (which was highly probative both for tendency reasoning and as supporting the credibility of the complainant) that there was “nothing about the evidence that renders its potential for unfair prejudice 1196. For example, see R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 (NSW SC) at [80]–[81] per Howie J. 1197. See also CW v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288 at [30]. 1198. R v GAC (2007) 178 A Crim R 408; [2007] NSWCCA 315, Giles JA at [87], [89] (Hulme and Hislop JJ agreeing); Sokolowskyj v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 at [53]–[56]. However, compare with Donohue v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 17 at [25]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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incapable of amelioration by judicial direction” (at [53], see also at [48]).1199 Nevertheless, the fundamental point is that the court is required to engage in the required balancing exercise, assessing the risks of unfair prejudice in the light of actions that may be taken in an attempt to reduce those risks, without any general assumption that such actions will necessarily be successful.1200 Thus, for example, as the Victorian Court of Appeal observed in Harris v The Queen (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112 at [28]–[30], where the required directions would be “quite complicated and potentially confusing”, the prejudicial effect of the evidence might not be outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. Conversely, in Mol v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 76 it was concluded (at [61]) that the prejudice identified (the risk the jury might use the tendency evidence in the determination of issues not confined to the state of mind of the defendant, particularly whether he was “reckless as to consent”) despite directions to the contrary, was relatively slight. Much will depend on the particular danger of prejudice involved. Thus, for example, directions about the sequential process of reasoning a jury must apply in relation to tendency evidence may be readily capable of being understood and applied, in contrast with directions designed to meet a concern about evidence being of such a nature that it might divert the jury from a proper consideration of the evidence.1201

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[EA.101.195] “substantially outweighs” Another difficulty presented by the statutory test is giving effective operation to the requirement that the probative value of the evidence must “substantially” outweigh “any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant”. As noted above, it is the addition of that requirement which differentiates the test in this provision from the general test in s 137. One possibility is that “substantially” means much the same thing as “clearly”, the term used by Brennan J in Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 593–594 when he formulated the common law test. However, in Ellis, Spigelman CJ was at pains to distinguish the statutory formulation from the common law test (at [84], but compare [67]) and this would suggest that the word has a different meaning. Perhaps assistance may be derived from the Macquarie Dictionary definition of “substantial”, which includes the meanings “real or actual”, “of ample or considerable amount”, “of real worth or value”. The word appears in other parts of the Act (for example, ss 79, 103 and 135) but it is difficult to draw any real assistance from those provisions. In R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338, Rothman J at [104] noted the following statement of Deane J in Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v AMIEU (1979) 42 FLR 331 at 348: The word “substantial” is not only susceptible of ambiguity; it is a word calculated to conceal a lack of precision … [I]t can, in an appropriate context, mean real or of substance as distinct from ephemeral or nominal. It can also mean large, weighty or big. It can be used in the relative sense or can indicate an absolute significance, quantity or size. 1199. See also R v Ali [2015] NSWCCA 72 at [51]; Clegg v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 49 at [81]; BC v The Queen (2015) 257 A Crim R 340; [2015] NSWCCA 327, Beech-Jones J at [81], [110] (Simpson JA agreeing at [1]; Adams J dissenting at [28]–[30]). 1200. Sokolowskyj v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 at [52]–[57]. 1201. See Clegg v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 49 at [83].

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Rothman J concluded at [119] that “substantial” in the context of s 101(2) “is used to mean ‘large, weighty or big’ and indicates an absolute significance”. However, Rothman J was in dissent and the other members of the Court of Criminal Appeal did not address the topic. In BC v The Queen (2015) 257 A Crim R 340; [2015] NSWCCA 327, Adams J observed at [20] that “the test is certainly one of considerable stringency”, but his Honour was also in dissent.

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Plainly enough, the court must give adequate reasons for the ultimate conclusion reached as to the result of the balancing process mandated by this provision.1202 This will require reference to “probative value”, any danger of (unfair) prejudicial effect on the defendant, and whether the former “substantially” outweighs the latter. However, it should be observed that, in Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; 69 ALJR 147; [1995] HCA 7, McHugh J pointed out (at 528–529 (CLR)) that the traditional common law balancing test, properly understood, involves an assessment of what the “interests of justice” require: [T]he proposition that the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect is one that can be easily misunderstood. The use of the term “outweigh” suggests an almost arithmetical computation. But prejudicial effect and probative value are incommensurables. They have no standard of comparison. The probative value of the evidence goes to proof of an issue, the prejudicial effect to the fairness of the trial. … If there is a real risk that the admission of such evidence may prejudice the fair trial of the criminal charge before the court, the interests of justice require the trial judge to make a value judgment, not a mathematical calculation. The judge must compare the probative strength of the evidence with the degree of risk of an unfair trial if the evidence is admitted. Admitting the evidence will serve the interests of justice only if the judge concludes that the probative force of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial is such that fair minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.

In R v RN [2005] NSWCCA 413, Sully J (with whom Grove and Howie J were in agreement) expressed the view that this passage described “the essence of [the] task” required by this provision. It was also applied by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in Sokolowskyj v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 at [57]. In Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20, Gageler J, observed at [87] that whether tendency evidence would make the existence of a fact in issue “significantly more probable or improbable” depends on whether the increase “is enough to justify the ever-present risk that the objective probability will be subjectively overestimated”.1203 Such an analysis may be more apposite to the application of this provision. The test does not require the court to apply any particular standard of satisfaction. The balancing of the two “incommensurables” set out in the section does not require the reaching of any particular standard of satisfaction in the same way that disputed facts lend themselves to findings in accordance with particular 1202. R v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427, Howie J (Santow JA and Bell J agreeing) at [58]. In O’Keefe v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 121 it was observed that if the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons so that the Court of Criminal Appeal could not rely upon the judge’s determination, the court would have to reach its own conclusion as to whether the evidence ought to have been admitted (Howie J at [50]). 1203. See also at [71]–[73]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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standards. As the Victorian Court of Appeal stated in Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72 at [96], “[a]ll that the section requires is that the court assess the probative value of the evidence and the prejudicial effect it may have on the accused and determine whether the probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect”. A final observation should be made. It is clear that, if tendency/coincidence evidence is admitted under this provision, there would be no basis to exclude it under s 137.1205 However, for evidence which is neither tendency nor coincidence evidence (see [EA.101.150]), that provision will provide the crucial test of admissibility. Given that such evidence may be highly prejudicial (disclosing other criminal or wrongful conduct by the defendant), careful analysis will be required.

[EA.101.210] The “Pfennig” test

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As noted in [EA.101.180], a majority of the High Court determined in Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; 69 ALJR 147; [1995] HCA 7 that the test of admissibility for “similar fact evidence” under the common law should be “that, if accepted, it bears no reasonable explanation other than the inculpation of the accused in the offence charged”.1206 Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ cited Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50 at 294 (CLR), then stated: “In other words, for propensity or similar fact evidence to be admissible, the objective improbability of its having an innocent explanation is such that there is no reasonable view of it other than as supporting an inference that the accused is guilty of the offence charged.” McHugh J observed in Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465; [1999] HCA 32 at [40]: The “no other reasonable explanation” test requires the judge to come to a view as to the guilt of the accused before the evidence in question is admitted. If, at the stage of determining whether the evidence is admissible, the judge decides that there is no “reasonable explanation” for the evidence other than inculpation of the accused, the evidence will be admitted. The judge has then, in effect, determined that the accused is guilty of the charges although, of course, it is for the jury to determine the ultimate question of the guilt or innocence of the accused on the whole of the evidence. Where the trial is by a judge without a jury, he or she must also examine the whole of the evidence before finding the accused guilty, notwithstanding that he or she has already decided that there is no reasonable explanation for the disputed evidence other than the accused’s guilt.

In Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [97], McHugh J observed that “the admissibility of the evidence ... has to depend on the inferences that could be drawn from that evidence standing alone”. 1204. Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72 at [96]. 1205. R v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433 at [60]–[61]; AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52 at [41], see also McHugh J in Pfennig at (1995) 182 CLR 461, 515. In R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306 Campbell JA appears to have considered at [59] that there is no “difference of substance between section 101(2) and section 137”. That proposition cannot be accepted. Evidence that is not rendered inadmissible pursuant to s 101(2) would not be rendered inadmissible pursuant to s 137, but evidence that is not rendered inadmissible pursuant to s 137 may well be rendered inadmissible pursuant to s 101(2). 1206. Pfennig at 481 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ.

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However, there is a view that the true test is not whether the judge is satisfied that the evidence proves the guilt of the defendant but rather whether the evidence, together with the other evidence in the case, is capable of proving guilt.1207 In R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; [2002] NSWCCA 210, Hodgson JA stated (at [29]) that the test was whether the evidence “when it is added to the other evidence … would eliminate any reasonable doubt which might be left by the other evidence”.1208 In R v Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 17 Hodgson JA observed at [28] that “the test certainly does not require the judge to reach the view that the jury acting reasonably must convict” but rather whether the judge considers that the additional evidence leaves no rational view consistent with innocence. It may be observed that it is difficult to reconcile the approach of Hodgson JA with the observation of McHugh J in Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 that “the admissibility of the evidence ... has to depend on the inferences that could be drawn from that evidence standing alone”. Further, the Pfennig test requires that the evidence possess “a particular probative value or cogency such that, if accepted, it bears no reasonable explanation other than the inculpation of the accused in the offence charged”. Thus, the question is not whether it eliminates any reasonable doubt as to guilt arising from the other evidence but rather whether the existence of the tendency or coincidence evidence can be reasonably explained on any basis other than the guilt of the accused. In addition, the approach of Hodgson JA requires a judge to engage in an impossible exercise if the judge considers that the other evidence in the case proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt – the judge is nonetheless required to “assume” that the jury would be left with a reasonable doubt and then to ask whether the tendency/coincidence evidence “would eliminate any reasonable doubt that might be left by the other evidence”.1209 The artificiality of such a process is manifest. Further, it must mean that the more probative the other prosecution evidence in the case, the less probative need be the tendency/ coincidence evidence to get it “over the line”. It is suggested that, while there is no doubt that the Pfennig test requires the probative value of the tendency/ coincidence evidence should be assessed in the context of the other prosecution evidence, the gloss put on the test by these decisions is dangerous and inappropriately waters down the need for a high level of probative value generally required under the test. The High Court revisited the Pfennig test in Phillips v The Queen (2005) 225 CLR 303; 80 ALJR 537; [2006] HCA 4, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ restating it at [9] as: “the evidence is inadmissible unless, viewed in the context of the prosecution case, there is no reasonable view of the similar fact evidence consistent with the innocence of the accused”. The Court made it clear that lower courts must apply that rule (at [60]). However, they also stated at [63]: What is said in Pfennig v The Queen about the task of a judge deciding the admissibility of similar fact evidence, and for that purpose comparing the probative 1207. See R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 238–239 per Badgery-Parker J. See also R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564. 1208. See also R v Joiner (2002) 133 A Crim R 90; [2002] NSWCCA 354. 1209. R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; [2002] NSWCCA 210 at [26], see also R v Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 17 at [28] and [31]–[32]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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effect of the evidence with its prejudicial effect, must be understood in the light of two further considerations. First, due weight must be given to the necessity to view the similar fact evidence in the context of the prosecution case. Secondly, it must be recognised that, as a test of admissibility of evidence, the test is to be applied by the judge on certain assumptions. Thus it must be assumed that the similar fact evidence would be accepted as true and that the prosecution case (as revealed in evidence already given at trial or in the depositions of witnesses later to be called) may be accepted by the jury. Pfennig v The Queen does not require the judge to conclude that the similar fact evidence, standing alone, would demonstrate the guilt of the accused of the offence or offences with which he or she is charged. But it does require the judge to exclude the evidence if, viewed in the context and way just described, there is a reasonable view of the similar fact evidence which is consistent with innocence.

This passage appears to reject the view that admissibility turns on whether the evidence, together with the other evidence in the case, is capable of proving guilt. Rather, it must be excluded if there is a reasonable view of the evidence consistent with innocence. On the other hand, the passage suggests a rejection of the statement of McHugh J in Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 that “the admissibility of the evidence ... has to depend on the inferences that could be drawn from that evidence standing alone”. However, McHugh J accepted that the Pfennig test requires the probative value of the evidence to be assessed in the context of the other prosecution evidence. The point he was making was that the “similar fact evidence” is not admissible if there is a rational/reasonable inference from the evidence consistent with innocence. This point highlights the difficulty in reconciling the last two sentences of the passage extracted above from Phillips v The Queen (2005) 225 CLR 303; 80 ALJR 537; [2006] HCA 4 – if there is no reasonable view of the evidence which is consistent with innocence (the pre-condition to admissibility), does not the evidence demonstrate the guilt of the accused of the offence or offences with which he or she is charged? Subsequently, in HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; 82 ALJR 723; 245 ALR 204; [2008] HCA 16, three of the seven members of the High Court (Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) held that the Pfennig test applied to evidence that disclosed a criminal tendency (regardless of whether that was the use sought to made of it), three other members of the court (Gleeson CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) held that the test applied only where the prosecution sought to use the evidence for tendency reasoning, while the remaining member of the court (Heydon J) did not determine the question. However, as regards the actual content of the Pfennig test, Heydon J indicated that he agreed with the approach taken by Hodgson JA in a series of NSW cases, discussed above.1210 Such an approach plainly significantly reduces the “stringency” of that test. While here was no clear majority supporting this approach, the views of Hayne J (with whom Gummow J and Kirby J agreed) were also a significant qualification of the orthodox view of Pfennig. Hayne J stated at [118]: In deciding the question of admissibility presented by Pfennig, the trial judge is not called on to decide whether the evidence which the prosecution intends to adduce does or does not establish the accused’s guilt. In most cases, perhaps all, that inquiry could not be undertaken. To ask whether evidence proves guilt would not be possible because the trial judge will usually be required to decide disputed questions of admissibility 1210. At [284]–[286]. See also Gleeson CJ at [27] and Kiefel J at [510].

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before any, or at least all, of the evidence to be called by the prosecution has been adduced. …[T]he trial judge is not called upon to make some separate or sequential assessment of evidence to be led at the trial in which it is necessary or relevant to ask whether the evidence, with or without the material whose admissibility is being considered, would support a verdict of guilt. Rather, the determinative question is whether there is a reasonable view of the similar fact evidence which is consistent with innocence. And as explained earlier, in cases of the kind now under consideration (in which absence of consent is not an issue) there usually will be no reasonable view of other sexual conduct which would constitute an offence by the accused against the complainant which would do other than support an inference that the accused is guilty of the offence being tried.

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Thus Hayne J provides a reconciliation for the uncertainty created by Phillips v The Queen (2005) 225 CLR 303; 80 ALJR 537; [2006] HCA 4. He considers that the test of admissibility under the common law is whether the evidence only supports an inference of guilt. It need not have any particular level of probative force in proving guilt, but it must not be reasonably open to regard it as not pointing towards guilt. This makes the Pfennig test much less demanding than traditionally understood. However, no clear majority of the High Court accepted this analysis and it remains to be seen if it becomes the orthodox position under the common law.1211 The judgment of the High Court in Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; 210 A Crim R 300; 85 ALJR 558; [2011] HCA 12 (in relation to unique Queensland legislation) has not clarified the position. The most recent judgment of the High Court in this area, BBH v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 499; 215 A Crim R 395; [2012] HCA 9, also reveals considerable division regarding this test. There is support from Crennan and Kiefel JJ, in the majority, for the approach taken by Hodgson JA (see at [155]–[159]). Their Honours concluded that the evidence in question resolved any doubt left by the rest of the prosecution evidence (at [158]) because there “no credible innocent explanation for the conduct … comes to mind” (at [160]). Heydon J may also be understood to adopt the same approach (at [108]). The other member of the majority, Bell J, applied the formulation in Phillips extracted above, and concluded that, in the context of the rest of the prosecution case the suggested innocent explanation “was not a rational view of what” had been witnessed (at [202]). In contrast, Hayne J (Gummow J agreeing) considered that the evidence “was reasonably open to other – innocent – explanations” (at [79]) as did French CJ (at [59]). Indeed, French CJ held that the evidence was not even relevant, because it was “equivocal”.

[EA.101.240] Example: similar allegations A particular issue with both tendency and coincidence evidence arises where two or more persons make similar allegations of criminal conduct against D. The evidence of allegations by witness A is sought to be admitted in the trial of the allegations made by B, and, sometimes, vice versa. The evidence may be characterised as tendency evidence. Alternatively, it may regarded as coincidence 1211. For further discussion, see Hamer D, Admissibility and use of relationship evidence in HML v The Queen: One step forward, two steps back (2008) 32 Crim LJ 351. It may be noted that the analysis of Hayne J in HML was regarded as the “correct approach” to the determination of admissibility by Muir JA (McMurdo P and Chesterman JA agreeing) in R v Brown [2011] QCA 16 at [19]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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evidence, whereby striking similarities in the accounts of two or more witnesses regarding the conduct of the defendant are relied upon to make it likely that both A and B are telling the truth (and thus prove the guilt of the defendant).1212 Even if there is no dispute about the allegations by A, coincidence reasoning may be relied on in the same way to conclude that the similar allegations made by B must be true, given the contended improbability of B making similar allegations unless they were true. Under the common law, the application of the Pfennig test that the evidence must bear “no reasonable explanation other than the inculpation of the accused in the offence charged” had the consequence that the evidence of allegations by A was not admissible in the trial of the allegations made by B if there was the “possibility of concoction” or contamination.1213 In applying the Hoch test, it was observed1214 that:

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it is necessary for the trial judge to determine whether there is a real chance of concoction or contamination rather than a merely speculative chance. Similar facts could not be reasonably explained on the basis of concoction unless there was a real chance of it. To determine whether there is a real chance the trial judge must look at the facts of the case before him and determine what were the circumstances of the witnesses sought to be called to give similar fact evidence. Undoubtedly where such witnesses are in close relationship and there is both an opportunity and motivation to concoct and they give evidence of the same sorts of sexual behaviour on the part of an accused person, the determination of admissibility on the facts of Hoch ... will perhaps be a compelling indication of the determination required.1215

In New South Wales, the Court of Criminal Appeal adopted this approach prior to R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319,

1212. Although the evidence is relevant to credibility, the better view is that it is still appropriately characterised as coincidence evidence: see [EA.101.120]. 1213. Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50 at 296 per Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ. At 297 Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ stated that admissibility depends on the evidence “having the quality that it is not reasonably explicable on the basis of concoction”: see also BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 301 per Gaudron J. 1214. R v Robertson (1997) 91 A Crim R 388 (QCA) at 409 per Ambrose J. 1215. See also Hickey v The Queen (2002) 136 A Crim R 150; [2002] WASCA 321 (WACCA); R v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265; [2009] SASC 89, Vanstone J at [94]–[96], Anderson J agreeing at [138]. It should be noted that the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal has held in R v Dawson-Ryan (2009) 104 SASR 571; [2009] SASC 259 at [28] that the trial judge may make findings as to the reliability and credibility of the witnesses who testify on the voir dire in relation to this issue, not for the purpose of determining the truthfulness of the complainant’s account of the alleged act constituting the offence but to determine whether there was such a reasonable possibility of concoction that the evidence would not be admissible. In R v Ellis (2010) 107 SASR 94; 199 A Crim R 249; [2010] SASC 118 Sulan J held (at [60]–[67], Duggan J agreeing, Kourakis J dissenting at [109]–[114]) that such a credibility finding could justify a ruling that there was no possibility of concoction (or contamination). However, the better view appears to be, even in common law jurisdictions, that it is not permissible for a trial judge to rule that there was no possibility of concoction (or contamination) on the basis of a finding that a denial of concoction (and contamination) was credible. That would appear to be the correct interpretation of the statement of Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ in Hoch at 297 that a voir dire “will not be for the purpose of the trial judge making a preliminary finding whether there was or was not concoction”.

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although the reasoning was not always identical. In R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [107], Mason P held that a reasonable possibility of collusion or contamination required exclusion under s 97 or 98“because that risk deprives the evidence of its significant probative value”. In R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 it was held (at [77] per Simpson J) that such evidence would be inadmissible under s 101(2) because the prejudicial effect of the evidence inevitably outweighed its probative value.1217 In W v The Queen (2001) 115 FCR 41; 124 A Crim R 545; 189 ALR 633; [2001] FCA 1648, Madgwick J of the Federal Court, having indicated support for the approach taken by McHugh J in Pfennig, nonetheless considered that it was appropriate to continue to apply the Hoch test “because the prospect of concoction could not stand with the notions that the evidence must have ‘significant’ probative value under s 97 and/or s 98 and must ‘substantially’ outweigh ‘any’ prejudicial effect it ‘may’ have, because of the terms of s 101” (at [99]).

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Post-Ellis, in AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal dealt with a case where a trial judge ruled that evidence of alleged sexual assaults by the appellant on his step-daughter, PNE, was cross-admissible in respect of the trial of similar allegations by his daughter, CNE. The court stated at [44]: If the possibility of joint concoction cannot be excluded the evidence does not possess the same probative value since there exists another explanation for the circumstance that each complainant has made like allegations. Hoch was concerned with the admission of similar fact evidence under the common law and propounded the “no other rational view” test that was adopted in Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 482–483 per Mason CJ, Deane J and Dawson J. This is not the test for the admission of tendency or coincidence evidence under the Act; R v Ellis [2003] NSWCCA 319. However, it was not an error to consider the possibility of joint concoction in assessing the probative value of the evidence. To the extent that his Honour did so, it was an error to find that there was no possibility of joint concoction: The complainants were sisters and were in contact with one another at the time each made her complaint. Insofar as the Judge assessed the probative value of PNE’s allegations as being substantial in proof of the allegation that the appellant assaulted CNE his Honour erred.

It followed that a “real possibility” or “real chance” of joint concoction or contamination was likely to result in a conclusion that the evidence did not satisfy the test in s 101(2).1218 A real risk of contamination may arise not from 1216. See R v F (2002) 129 A Crim R 126; [2002] NSWCCA 125 at [23]–[28] and [48]–[49] per Wood CJ at CL; R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; [2002] NSWCCA 210 at [32]. 1217. Of course, such a conclusion also has implications for the application of the s 137 discretion in respect of evidence which is not subject to s 101. 1218. In BP v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 303, Hodgson JA (Price J and Fullerton J agreeing) stated at [110] that there must be a “real chance rather than a merely speculative chance of concoction” and observed at [11] that while “relationship, opportunity and motive” would be relevant to this question, “[o]ne of these on its own is not sufficient to base a finding of a real possibility of concoction” (see also at [116]–[120]). As regards the possibility of contamination, Hodgson JA stated at [123]: “In my view, it is not a risk of any contamination whatsoever that would necessarily require the exclusion of evidence: it must be a risk of contamination that goes to the substance of the evidence, and not merely to incidental details of no materiality. I accept that, unless the Crown negates a real chance of contamination going to the substance of the evidence, then the evidence of other witnesses should not be admitted as tendency evidence. However, the risk of unconscious influence as to incidental details © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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contact with another complainant but from prejudicial publicity. Of course, a risk of “contamination” would not bear on admissibility where it relates not to A (whose evidence is sought to be admitted in the trial of the allegations made by B) but only to B.1220 In that situation, it would only bear on the credibility and reliability of B’s testimony. A similar approach was adopted in Tasmania.1221 The Victorian Court of Appeal also accepted in Murdoch v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 451; [2013] VSCA 272 that the requirements of s 101(2) “could not be satisfied” if “there was a rational view that those features of the two complainants’ account” that “had the requisite degree of similarity” could be explained “on the basis of collusion and concoction”.1222 However, concerns were raised about the difficulty of reconciling authority that a real possibility of joint concoction or contamination will so reduce the “probative value” of the evidence so as to require exclusion under s 97, s 98 or s 101 with the view that “questions of credibility and reliability … play no part in the assessment of the probative value”.1223 The view was expressed that application of a “Hoch” analysis is “problematic” under this.1224 Nevertheless, in BSJ v The Queen (2012) 35 VR 475; [2012] VSCA 93, the Victorian Court of Appeal observed at [21]:

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...[W]e consider that the issue of concoction is properly viewed as an exception to that rule. Deciding whether there is a “real chance” that concoction has occurred will ordinarily not involve any assessment of the reliability or credibility of individual witnesses. Rather, it entails a fact-finding exercise, in which the judge will consider would not in my view necessarily require the evidence to be excluded.” See also FB v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 217 at [35], [44]; RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71 at [144]–[159]. The mere “opportunity” for concoction or contamination would not be sufficient: RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71 at [158]. In Reeves v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 41 VR 275; 236 A Crim R 448; [2013] VSCA 311, Maxwell ACJ emphasised at [63]–[64] that there must be some “evidentiary basis” for a conclusion that there was a “real possibility” of collusion, concoction or contamination. However, it should be noted that in BJS v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 239, views were expressed doubting the application of Hoch analysis post-Ellis. It should also be noted that, in RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71, Ward JA (Harrison J and RA Hulme J agreeing) formulated the test in terms of whether there was “such a risk of contamination or concoction of [the] evidence as to lessen its probative value to the degree that it could not be said to be significant” (at [159]). Recent NSW authority has accepted that possible concoction or contamination can give rise to a competing inference in the assessment of whether there is significant probative value, but BP is regarded as erroneous in adopting “the Hoch approach”: R v GM [2016] NSWCCA 78, Hoeben CJ at CL at [104]. 1219. BJS v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 239. 1220. RHB v The Queen [2011] VSCA 295 at [27]. 1221. Tasmania v S [2004] TASSC 84; Tasmania v Farmer (2004) 148 A Crim R 99; [2004] TASSC 104. 1222. Redlich JA and Coghlan JA at [4]. Priest JA at [72] and [99]–[100] used the language of “a real possibility of concoction, collusion or contamination” and Redlich JA and Coghlan JA should not be understood to have a different view (see at [8]). Priest JA also observed at [95] that “[t]here can be no doubt that in determining whether evidence of tendency or coincidence has significant probative value” (the tests under s 97 and s 98) “a trial judge is required to take into account the possibility of concoction, collaboration or contamination” (Redlich JA and Coghlan JA agreed at [8]). 1223. See [EA.137.90]. 1224. See Jones v The Queen (2014) 246 A Crim R 425; [2014] NSWCCA 280 at [75].

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what the objective record shows about matters such as relationship, opportunity and motive. These are matters which can properly be assessed by a judge, without usurping the function of the jury.1225

Notwithstanding that view, it is now apparent that a mere possibility of concoction or contamination will not require exclusion under either s 97, s 98 or s 101. In IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ made the following observation at [59] with respect to coincidence evidence: ...[T]here should be reference to the appellant’s submission concerning the risk of joint concoction to the determination of admissibility of coincidence evidence. The premise for the appellant’s submission – that it is “well-established” that under the identical test in s 98(1)(b) the possibility of joint concoction may deprive evidence of probative value consistently with the approach to similar fact evidence stated in Hoch v The Queen – should not be accepted.1226 The significance of the risk of joint concoction to the application of the s 101(2) test should be left to an occasion when it is raised in a concrete factual setting.

The footnoted reference to the judgment of Basten JA in McIntosh v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 184 at [42]–[48] is significant. Basten JA stated in McIntosh at [36] that a Hoch analysis “is not consistent with the language of the Evidence Act”. However, the key passage is at [47]:

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Whilst, in determining probative value as a question of capability to affect the assessment of a fact in issue, the court is not required to disregard inherent implausibility, on the other hand, contestable questions of credibility and reliability are not for the trial judge, but for the jury. Accordingly, the suggestion that the possibility of concoction is a factor which must be taken into account in determining whether particular evidence has significant probative value should not be accepted.

A mere possibility of concoction could not support a conclusion that the evidence lacks significant probative value. However, as explained at [EA.98.120] above, Basten JA did not hold that a possibility of concoction is immaterial to the question of whether the evidence has significant probative value. It is apparent from what was stated at [49]–[50] that if the probability of concoction reached a particular “level sufficient to affect the capacity of the evidence to bear significant probative value”, then it would be appropriate to take it into account. There is recent NSW authority that possible concoction or contamination can give rise to a competing inference in the assessment of whether there was significant probative value, although it is erroneous to adopt “the Hoch approach”.1227 The majority judgment in IMM did not take a different view. It only rejected the proposition that “the possibility of joint concoction may deprive evidence of probative value”1228. It may be that some degree of risk of joint concoction or contamination will have the consequence that the evidence will have a limited 1225. The Court of Appeal also adopted at [22] the somewhat problematic reasoning of the High Court in Hoch v The Queen that “probative value is destroyed if it appears that the evidence may in fact have been concocted” (emphasis not in original). 1226. Footnote 45 of IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 read: “See the discussion in McIntosh v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 184 at [42]–[48] per Basten JA, [172] per Hidden J agreeing, [176] per Wilson J agreeing”. 1227. See Jones v The Queen (2014) 246 A Crim R 425; [2014] NSWCCA 280 at [87]; DJW v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 164 at [41]–[44]. 1228. See Donohue v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 17 at [27]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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capacity to rationally affect the probability that the complainant’s account of a charged offence is true. In those circumstances, the evidence would lack significance or importance in establishing those facts. Characterised as tendency evidence, the probative value of allegations by witness A in the trial of the allegations made by B is also unlikely to be “significant” for the purposes of s 97(1)(b) if the allegations made by A are disputed by the defence and there is a substantial risk of joint concoction or contamination. In AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal emphasised at [44] that the fact that the “happening of the assaults against PNE and CNE was in issue at trial … was a matter that was significant to the assessment of the probative value of the evidence demonstrating the relevant tendency evidence [sic] as well as by way of coincidence reasoning”. Since there was a risk of joint concoction, the trial judge erred in assessing the PNE’s allegations as being significant in proof of the allegation that the appellant assaulted CNE.1229 Indeed, it was difficult to see how PNE’s allegations, which were themselves in issue, could rationally affect the likelihood of CNE’s allegations being true save by coincidence/improbability reasoning.1230

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Subsequent to IMM, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has held that, in determining whether tendency evidence has “significant probative value”, a court may take into account a possibility that the evidence is the product of “contamination” or “concoction” that arises on the evidence in the proceeding.1231 The following questions were considered apposite: Does the evidence in this matter amount to a real risk of contamination or concoction so as to give rise to a competing inference sufficient to deprive the tendency evidence of significant probative value. Put another way, is there a competing inference to be drawn such as to render the tendency evidence inherently implausible.1232

Similarly, while s 101(2) does not require the exclusion of coincidence evidence on the (common law) basis that there is a rational view of the evidence inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, it would be arguable that the probative value of coincidence evidence is reduced where the circumstances reveal such a risk of joint concoction or contamination as to negate a contention that “it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally”. Nevertheless, the precise position remains uncertain. As noted, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ stated in IMM v The Queen that “[t]he significance of the risk 1229. AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52 at [44]. 1230. AE v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 52 at [49]. 1231. R v GM [2016] NSWCCA 78, Hoeben CJ at CL at [100]. 1232. R v GM [2016] NSWCCA 78, Hoeben CJ at CL at [111]. A possible example of a situation where tendency evidence would be deprived of significant probative value was stated to be where a “victims group” met on a regular basis to discuss what had happened to each of them (at [119]–[120]). Hoeben CJ at CL went on to state at [111]: “In carrying out that evaluative exercise, questions of credibility, reliability and weight should be disregarded”. However, it may be observed that it is very difficult to see how they are being “disregarded” in relation to the assessment of the probative value of the tendency evidence itself, where the possibility that the tendency evidence is the product of contamination or concoction is being taken into account. They may be disregarded when assessing the evidence of contamination and/or concoction but they are hardly being disregarded when assessing the probative value of the tendency evidence itself.

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of joint concoction to the application of the s 101(2) test should be left to an occasion when it is raised in a concrete factual setting”. In NSW, notwithstanding the observation of Basten JA in McIntosh v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 184 at [49] that “[i]f a possibility of concoction at a level sufficient to affect the capacity of the evidence to bear significant probative value were to be identified, it would probably have been necessary to carry out a reasonably searching crossexamination on the voir dire”, the view has been expressed that a voir dire should not be held in respect of the issue because “contestable questions of credibility and reliability resting on the possibility of contamination or concoction” are “a matter for the jury” not the trial judge.1233 It remains to be seen whether dangers of concoction or contamination will continue to be a basis for exclusion of tendency and coincidence evidence.

[EA.101.270] Exceptions

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In accordance with s 101(3) and 101(4), this provision does not apply where tendency or coincidence evidence is adduced by the prosecution “to explain or contradict” similar evidence adduced by the defence.1234 A corresponding provision is found in s 97(2)(b) (see [EA.97.270]) and s 98(2)(b) (see [EA.98.300]). It would not be sufficient that another party has made a submission, rather than adduced evidence, which the tendency evidence or coincidence evidence is adduced to explain or contradict.1235 Further, the evidence adduced by the other party must be either “tendency evidence” or “coincidence evidence”, as defined in the Dictionary to the Act.1236 Despite the language of “adduced”, the other tendency evidence or coincidence evidence must have been admitted.1237 Equally, it does not apply where the prosecution or another defendant adduce evidence of character under Pt 3.8 (ss 110 and 111).

[EA.101.300] Procedure Where evidence is sought to be admitted under this provision in a jury trial, it may be appropriate for the trial judge to explore the matter in the absence of the jury (in a voir dire under s 189).1238

[EA.101.330] Onus of proof Where tendency evidence about a defendant, or coincidence evidence about a defendant, is adduced by the prosecution, the onus will be on the prosecution to show that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any 1233. See Hughes v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 330 at [98]. 1234. There is a brief discussion of s 101(3) in R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 361. An example of the (unacknowledged) application of this provision is R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [139]–[140] per Heydon JA. 1235. Compare Martin v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 38 at [43]. 1236. Compare Martin v The Queen[2015] ACTCA 38 at [43], [46]. 1237. Compare Martin v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 38 at [46]. 1238. R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [107] per Mason P. Compare at common law: Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50 at 297 (CLR); BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 300–301 per Gaudron J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant, or that the provision does not apply by reason of the application of s 101(3) or (4).1239

[EA.101.360] Jury directions It may be necessary to direct a jury how evidence that has been admitted in the proceedings but may not be used against a defendant pursuant to this provision may, and may not, be used. Further, it may be necessary for a trial judge to direct a jury how evidence that may be used against a defendant pursuant to this provision may, and may not, be used. However, any such obligation on the trial judge is subject to statutory limitation. In Victoria, the Jury Directions Act 2015, ss 25–30 (see also ss 12–17), now regulates the giving of jury directions in respect of “other misconduct evidence” (see [EA.101.480]).

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If evidence is relevant for a use that does not fall within the definitions of “tendency evidence” or “coincidence evidence” and is admitted for that use, it may not thereby be used for the purpose of proving tendency or coincidence (s 95). Section 95 makes it clear that, where Pt 3.6 renders evidence “not admissible” (or prevents it being used) to prove a particular matter, but the evidence has been admitted for another purpose, the evidence cannot be used in the prescribed way.1240 Thus, in a jury trial, absent statutory modification, if not admissible as “coincidence evidence”, directions to the jury may be required that they must not engage in coincidence reasoning.1241 If not admissible as “tendency evidence”, careful directions would usually1242 be required from the trial judge. For example, describing evidence as showing “relationship” may 1239. Derwish v The Queen [2016] VSCA 72 at [97]. 1240. See El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [38]–[45]; [60]. 1241. Compare R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 at [110]. 1242. See eg R v H (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; 98 A Crim R 71; R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359; R v Fraser [1998] NSWSC 286; R v Gilbert (unreported, NSW CCA, Grove, Levine, Dowd JJ, 10 December 1998); R v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8 at [28]–[29] per Hidden J; R v Veitch [1999] NSWCCA 185; R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [132] per Mason P; R v Dixon [2001] NSWCCA 39 at [85]; R v ATM [2000] NSWCCA 475 at [75]–[77] per Howie J; R v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370 at [21]–[22] per Adams J; R v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180 at [19]; R v Baldwin [2004] NSWCCA 21; Glass v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 8 at [41]–[43]. Common law authorities will be directly applicable in this context: see BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 305 and 331; Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106; 72 ALJR 1012; 155 ALR 15 at 132, 157, 164–166; R v G [1997] 2 VR 609 (“relationship evidence”); R v Kostaras (2002) 133 A Crim R 399; [2002] SASC 326 per Doyle CJ at [51]–[57]; R v WO [2006] QCA 21. However, such directions will not always be required: see KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; 118 A Crim R 262; [2001] HCA 11; R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 at [324]–[335]; R v Van Dyk [2000] NSWCCA 67 at [104]–[105] per Smart AJ; Tanner v The Queen [2001] WASCA 60; R v Walters [2002] NSWCCA 291 at [49]–[52]; Tedesco v The Queen [2003] SASC 79; (2003) 85 SASR 66; R v El-Hayek (2004) 144 A Crim R 90; [2004] NSWCCA 25 at [44]–[52]; R v Merlino [2004] NSWCCA 104; R v Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 396 at [65]; Erohin v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 102 at [68]; Toalepai v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 270; DLJ v The Queen [2011] VSCA 389 at [63]–[78]; Lyndon v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 112 at [63]–[65]; Hanna v The Queen [2014] VSCA 187 at [60]–[64]. Where a direction is required in a case involving multiple counts, a “separate consideration” direction given in relation to the evidence on the counts makes it plain to the jury that the verdict for each count must be based only upon the evidence

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wrongly embrace tendency reasoning. Similar limitations would apply in respect of party submissions to the jury as to use of the evidence.1244 Absent statutory modification, a direction prohibiting tendency reasoning will be required where there is a real risk that the jury may engage in impermissible tendency reasoning.1245 The risk is likely to be very high, thereby making the direction essential, where the evidence comes from a source other than the complainant in the trial.1246 If there is anything said in the trial that might suggest a tendency on the part of the defendant or the evidence is used in a way that might indicate a tendency, then a warning should be given.1247 If other evidence is placed before the jury for the purposes of proving a criminal propensity on the part of the defendant, a warning would be required in respect of other similar evidence not admitted for a tendency purpose.1248 On the other hand, a direction that the jury should not engage in tendency (or coincidence) reasoning will not be required if it would be potentially confusing or prejudicial to the defendant (for example, in a case involving multiple counts, it may sometimes be preferable to simply identify the individual strands of evidence that are admissible in relation to each count).1249 Equally, a direction will not be necessary if there is no risk of the jury engaging in tendency reasoning.1250

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In some cases, where the evidence discloses similar conduct to that charged, it may also be necessary to direct the jury they may not substitute the uncharged

referable to that count alone, but it is insufficient in itself to amount to a warning against reasoning on a “tendency” or “substitution” basis as to evidence that was not referable to any count: Paton v The Queen [2011] VSCA 72 at [30]–[32]; Glass v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 8 at [45]. 1243. JDK v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 333; [2009] NSWCCA 76 at [36]. See also R v IK (2004) 89 SASR 406; 147 A Crim R 237; [2004] SASC 280 at [55]; R v DRG (2004) 150 A Crim R 496; [2004] SASC 394 at [56]–[57]; R v ML [2009] VSCA 106 at [10]–[11]; Rees v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 66; SKA v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 205 at [279]–[288]. On the other hand, it was held in Hanna v The Queen [2014] VSCA 187 (at [59], [64]) that use of the word “tendency”, while undesirable, could not in the context of the directions taken as a whole “have provoked illegitimate propensity reasoning”. 1244. El-Haddad v The Queen (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; 293 FLR 284; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [44]. 1245. R v Giovannone (2002) 140 A Crim R 1; [2002] NSWCCA 323 per Mason P at [99]; R v El-Hayek (2004) 144 A Crim R 90; [2004] NSWCCA 25 at [44]–[52]; R v Baldwin [2004] NSWCCA 21 at [64]; R v SY [2004] NSWCCA 297 at [26]; R v Cornelissen [2004] NSWCCA 449 at [73]; Toalepai v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 270; Restricted Judgment [2017] NSWCCA 252 at [51]; see also R v CHS (2006) 159 A Crim R 560; [2006] VSCA 19 at [108]; Mortada v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 36 at 50; Ulutui v The Queen (2014) 41 VR 676; 241 A Crim R 574; [2014] VSCA 110 at [65]; Lyndon v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 112 at [63]–[65]. 1246. Galvin v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 449; [2006] NSWCCA 66 per Howie J at [51]; R v VAS (2006) 170 A Crim R 452; [2006] VSCA 159 at [19]–[23]. 1247. Toalepai v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 270 at [48]. 1248. Toalepai v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 270 at [44]. 1249. R v Matthews [2004] NSWCCA 259 at [35]–[51]; R v Merlino [2004] NSWCCA 104 at [30]–[38]; KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; 118 A Crim R 262; [2001] HCA 11 per McHugh J at 234; DLJ v The Queen [2011] VSCA 389 at [63]–[78]. 1250. See Hanna v The Queen [2014] VSCA 187 at [60]–[64]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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criminal behaviour for the charged offences. Again, however, no such direction will be necessary if there is no real risk of the evidence being used in this way.1252 In Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95, McClellan CJ at CL stated at [80] that it is essential in any trial where the prosecution seeks to tender evidence which may suggest prior illegal acts by the accused, “especially where the charges relate to alleged sexual acts”, that if admitted as “background” or “context”: the trial judge must carefully direct the jury both at the time at which the evidence is given and in the summing-up of the confined use they may make of the evidence. They should be told in clear terms that the evidence has been admitted to provide background to the alleged relationship between the complainant and the accused so that the evidence of the complainant and his/her response to the alleged acts of the accused, can be understood and his/her evidence evaluated with a complete understanding of that alleged relationship. The jury must be told that they cannot use the evidence as tendency evidence.

McClellan CJ at CL also noted at [81] that the NSW Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book “contains a model direction with respect to relationship evidence which is to my mind the appropriate manner in which to instruct the jury”.1253

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The further observations of Howie J at [119] should also be noted: Context evidence is relevant to the credibility of the complainant only in that his or her version of the particular incident which is the basis of the charge in the indictment may be more capable of belief when seen in the context of what the complainant says was his or her sexual relationship with the accused. It may explain, on the complainant’s version, why the accused and the complainant acted as they did in circumstances where without the context of the relationship those acts might be inexplicable. But other than generally assisting the complainant’s credibility in this way, context evidence does not make the complainant’s account more reliable than it would be in the absence of that evidence. Context evidence does not make it more likely that the accused committed any of the offences charged in the indictment.

The reference to “likely” in this passage highlights a possible criticism of the NSW Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book direction prohibiting “reasoning that, because the accused may have done something wrong to [the complainant] on another occasion, [he/she] must have done so on the occasions charged”. It would be preferable to adopt the language favoured by the Victorian Court of Appeal, which prohibits reasoning that, because the defendant may have engaged in other similar conduct, the defendant was “the kind of person who was likely to have done so on the occasions charged”.1254 The Victorian Criminal Charge Book 1251. R v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83 per Hulme J at [54]; R v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180 at [19], [45]; SKA v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 205 at [281]; Glass v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 8 at [41], [45], [47]. 1252. Jiang v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 277 at [44], [51]; Ulutui v The Queen (2014) 41 VR 676; 241 A Crim R 574; [2014] VSCA 110 at [65]. 1253. See also JDK v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 333; [2009] NSWCCA 76 at [31]–[32]; Rees v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 66; FH v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 231 at [92]–[94]. 1254. R v G [1997] 2 VR 609 at 614; R v GVV (2008) 20 VR 395; 184 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170 at [38]; WFS v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 406; 223 A Crim R 327; [2011] VSCA 347 at [101]; SKA v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 205 at [275]–[288].

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suggested direction reflects this language. Further guidance is given regarding proper directions on “relationship evidence” in other authorities.1256 In Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; 210 A Crim R 300; 85 ALJR 558; [2011] HCA 12, a case that did not involve the uniform evidence law, the High Court (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) observed at [47] that “it should be explained to the jury that the evidence is to allow the complainant to tell her, or his, story but that they will need to consider whether it is true”. Thus, it is very important to make clear to the jury that the evidence is not adduced to “set what occurred in context” but to set the evidence of the complainant as to the charged acts in context so that the complainant’s evidence as to those matters (not the facts) can be fairly understood – to avoid the apparent lack of credibility which a partial account might have.1257 If admitted as tendency and/or coincidence evidence, careful directions to the jury (absent statutory modification) will usually be necessary about the care that should be taken with such reasoning.1258 The jury should be directed with particularity about the way in which the evidence might be used.1259 The differences between tendency and coincidence reasoning should be explained, although if the evidence is admissible as tendency evidence, a direction in terms of coincidence (emphasising, for example, striking similarities in the evidence) is unlikely to constitute a misdirection.1260 Where tendency evidence in the form of “sexual interest” is admitted, particularly careful directions will be required.1261 If the evidence is admitted to show a particular specific tendency (rather than a more general criminal tendency), it may be necessary to make this clear to the jury and to direct them not to engage in the latter reasoning.1262 Reference to whether the evidence demonstrated a pattern of conduct, or possessed an underlying unity, for the defendant to act in a particular way or have a particular state of mind may be required.1263 The Victorian Criminal Charge Book provided guidance regarding possible directions to the jury in respect of tendency and coincidence evidence.1264 More limited guidance is provided in the NSW Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book: Judicial Commission of NSW, Criminal 1255. Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au, Part 4.16.7 (as at 1 December 2009). See also Glass v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 8 at [43]. 1256. Rodden v The Queen (2008) 182 A Crim R 227; [2008] NSWCCA 53 at [125]; Boney v The Queen (2008) 187 A Crim R 167; [2008] NSWCCA 165 at [49]–[53]; WFS v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 406; 223 A Crim R 327; [2011] VSCA 347 at [101]. 1257. SKA v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 205, Adams J (Hislop J agreeing) at [275]–[277]. 1258. R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519; [2000] NSWCCA 78. 1259. R v Li [2003] NSWCCA 407 at [14], [60]; Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [227]–[236]. 1260. KJR v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 226; [2007] NSWCCA 165. See also Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4 at [144]–[148]. 1261. See Rodden v The Queen (2008) 182 A Crim R 227; [2008] NSWCCA 53 at [47]; Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [233]–[234]. 1262. See Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 242 A Crim R 222; [2014] VSCA 121 at [234]. 1263. Murdoch v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 451; [2013] VSCA 272, Priest JA at [136], Redlich JA and Coghlan JA agreeing at [9]. 1264. Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au, Part 4.16. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Courts Bench Book. Where there are multiple counts, and multiple tendency evidence, the complexity of a required direction is likely to be very great indeed.1266

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There is common law authority that where evidence is relied upon to prove a tendency on the part of the defendant, the acts relied upon to prove the tendency must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.1267 In contrast, non-tendency evidence (such as evidence of “relationship”) need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.1268 The preferable view may be that, in most cases, it is not even appropriate to consider whether the acts showing the “relationship” have been proved to any standard, since they are not being used as evidence of guilt but admitted as bearing on the credibility of the complainant. In WFS v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 406; 223 A Crim R 327; [2011] VSCA 347, the trial judge directed the jury that they “are not in any way making the decision about whether the previous matters, the uncharged act, as we called it, is established. It is not a factor for your consideration, in the sense of any conclusion being required to be reached”. Robson AJA (Buchanan JA and Whelan AJA agreeing) did not regard this direction as wrong in the context of the use that the prosecution sought to make of the evidence, but held that it was misleading in circumstances where the evidence was relied upon by the defence for the purposes of discrediting the complainant – if the jury was satisfied that an uncharged act did not occur as claimed by the complainant, this would tend to undermine her credibility (at [149]–[154]).1269 In HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; 82 ALJR 723; 245 ALR 204; [2008] HCA 16 the High Court considered these issues in the context of the common law, leaving the matter in considerable doubt. Hayne J stated at [247]: [A]t least a majority of the Court is of the opinion that “[i]n the ordinary course a jury would be instructed by the trial judge that they must only find that the accused has a sexual interest in the complainant if it is proved beyond reasonable doubt”.

However, in Roach v The Queen (2011) 242 CLR 610; 210 A Crim R 300; 85 ALJR 558; [2011] HCA 12 the position under the common law was clarified. French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ held at [49], in respect of evidence that tended to disclose a propensity for violence on the part of the appellant, that “it was neither necessary nor appropriate for the trial judge to give the jury any 1265. Judicial Commission of NSW, Criminal Courts Bench Book www.judcom.nsw.gov.au, Trial Instructions – Tendency and Coincidence Evidence. 1266. See, for example, the discussion of Nettle J in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 92 ALJR 52; [2017] HCA 20 at [172] (it should be noted that the other members of the Court did not address the directions in that case because no ground of appeal related to them). 1267. R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 (NSWSC) at [33] per Howie J; see also R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519; [2000] NSWCCA 78 at [49] per Powell JA (although this proposition was doubted by the other members of the court), R v Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138; [2004] NSWCCA 89 at [24]–[25], [30]–[34]. 1268. R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 at [44]; see also R v Fetherston [2006] VSCA 278 at [33]. 1269. Compare ES v The Queen (No 2) [2010] NSWCCA 198 at [72], [74] where Hodgson JA observed that a direction in terms of being “satisfied beyond reasonable doubt” of a particular incident could “be understood as an invitation to tendency reasoning” to prove guilt (rather than involving credibility reasoning). It is difficult to see why it would make any difference if the jury were instructed they only had to be “satisfied” that the incident occurred. However, this argument was rejected in R v Hagarty (2004) 145 A Crim R 138; [2004] NSWCCA 89.

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direction about the standard of proof to be applied to that evidence” where the evidence was not admitted for tendency reasoning but to show the “relationship” between the appellant and the complainant and to prevent the jury misunderstanding the complainant’s account of the alleged offence. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has understood the requirement to be limited to cases where tendency reasoning is adopted in relation to sexual activity.1270 However, the latter limitation (based on a narrow reading of HML) may be doubted. The Victorian Court of Appeal has held that the direction should be given if there is a real risk of the jury engaging in tendency reasoning.1271 For discussion of this issue in a more general context, see [EA.141.120].

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Where coincidence evidence is admitted, it has been held that (absent statutory modification) the considerations governing admissibility of the evidence are a guide to appropriate directions to the jury.1272 On the other hand, Hodgson J in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has pointed out that the jury need not be concerned with the requirements for admissibility, although an assessment of the weight to be given in the evidence will turn on an assessment of the improbability of the relevant coincidence and the extent to which any common cause (such as concoction or contamination) is excluded.1273 Similarly, the Victorian Court of Appeal held in Murdoch v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 451; [2013] VSCA 272 that the trial judge had erred because the jury had not had their attention “focused sufficiently upon not only the similarities, but also the dissimilarities, in the coincidence evidence”.1274 If admitted as coincidence evidence but not as tendency evidence, the jury should almost invariably be directed not to engage in tendency reasoning.1275 Where there is prosecution reliance on the similarities in the accounts of two or more witnesses (submitted to make it improbable that the 1270. DJV v The Queen (2008) 200 A Crim R 206; [2008] NSWCCA 272; FDP v The Queen (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; [2008] NSWCCA 317 at [38]; DJS v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 200 at [54]–[55]. In Versi v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 206, the view was expressed that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply to “coincidence evidence”: [17], [134]. In Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4 it was acknowledged that the same principles apply whether the tendency reasoning is based on uncharged acts or acts which are the foundation of other charged offences (see at [130]–[135]). If the jury cannot use the tendency evidence unless satisfied of the existence of the tendency beyond reasonable doubt, it would follow that the evidence would not be admissible as tendency evidence unless it was open to make that finding: see RH v The Queen (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71, Ward JA (Harrison J and RA Hulme J agreeing) at [160]–[167]. In Campbell v The Queen (2014) 312 ALR 129; [2014] NSWCCA 175 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered that the question whether tendency evidence (which in the particular case did not involve sexual activity) needed to be proved beyond reasonable doubt should be reserved for an appropriate case (see Simpson J at [322]–[333], Bathurst CJ at [259], Hidden J at [338]). 1271. See Neubecker v The Queen (2012) 220 A Crim R 585; [2012] VSCA 58 at [22]–[42]; Ferguson v The Queen [2015] VSCA 279 at [45]–[53]. 1272. R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 at [20]–[21] per Hidden J. 1273. R v WRC (2002) 130 A Crim R 89; [2002] NSWCCA 210 at [62]; see also R v Folbigg (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; [2005] NSWCCA 23 at [103]; R v Glennon (No 2) (2001) 7 VR 631 at [160]; R v Glennon (No 3) [2005] VSCA 262 at [29]–[32]. 1274. Priest JA at [136] , Redlich JA and Coghlan JA agreeing at [9]. Priest JA was referring specifically to the question whether “the evidence was capable of demonstrating improbability of coincidence”. 1275. Compare R v DCC (2004) 11 VR 129; 151 A Crim R 4; [2004] VSCA 230 at [6]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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witnesses are telling lies in the absence of joint concoction or contamination), directions will be necessary regarding that process of reasoning.1276

[EA.101.390] Judgments and convictions Part 3.5 deals with evidence of judgments and convictions. Even if evidence of specific conduct (which resulted in a court judgment or conviction) is admissible under Pt 3.6, it may be that Pt 3.5 will render inadmissible evidence of the judgment or conviction. This will not affect other evidence of the conduct.

[EA.101.420] Acquittals The fact that the conduct sought to be admitted under this provision has been the subject of a previous criminal trial resulting in an acquittal does not necessarily mean that the evidence will be inadmissible.1277 However, careful application of this provision will be required and, if the evidence is admitted, careful directions to the jury will be required.

[EA.101.450] Appellate review

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Where a number of items of evidence are the subject of objection in a “global” way, without submissions addressing each item of evidence individually, an appeal court will not regard it as an error by the trial judge to deal with the objections in the same global way.1278 The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has held on a number of occasions that the test under s 101(2) is a matter of “judgment” which, in terms of appellate review, is analogous to the exercise of a judicial discretion (notwithstanding the fact that, unless the court is persuaded that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant, there is no residual discretion).1279 Consequently, the balancing process judgment would be reviewable on appeal only on the principles stated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40.1280 However, there is a contrary view,1281 which appears to have increasing support. In Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; 69 ALJR 147; [1995] HCA 7, McHugh J pointed out (at 528–529 (CLR)) that the traditional common law 1276. Compare R v C, CA [2015] SASCFC 143 at [23]–[35]. 1277. R v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; 136 A Crim R 167; [2002] HCA 55 at [50]. 1278. Bingul v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 239, Allsop P (Price J and Harrison J agreeing) at [37]. 1279. R v Milton [2004] NSWCCA 195 at [33]; R v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427 at [37], [48], [60], [62]; R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 per Simpson J at [65], [70], McClellan CJ at CL agreeing at [1], Rothman J dissenting at [168]; AW v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 1 at [45]; R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, Campbell JA at [108]–[117] (the other members of the Court did not find it necessary to address this issue); DAO v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; 278 ALR 765; [2011] NSWCCA 63 at [82], [83], [84], [88], [100], [101], [104]; Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 at [6]; Hughes v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 330 at [189]. 1280. See also Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; [1986] HCA 17 at 518. However, if the trial judge fails to give adequate reasons for the discretionary determination, the appeal court will have to reach its own conclusion as to whether the evidence ought to have been admitted: O’Keefe v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 121, Howie J at [50]. 1281. See Rothman J in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 at [168].

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[EA.101.450]

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balancing test (expressed in very similar terms to the balancing test in s 101), properly understood, involves an assessment of what the “interests of justice” require. He concluded that the common law test is “a matter of law and not discretion”, with the onus on the prosecution to justify admission of the evidence and more extensive appellate review than where a discretion is involved (at 515 (CLR)). In this regard, he was in agreement with the majority of the High Court (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ) who observed (at 477.7, 483.3) that the balancing test under the common law is “a guiding principle” rather than “a discretion”. Similarly, in R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319, Spigelman CJ (Sully, O’Keefe, Hidden and Buddin JJ agreeing) expressly stated at [95] that this provision “calls for a balancing exercise … It requires the court to make a judgment, rather than to exercise a discretion”. This analysis would support the view that appellate review of this provision is not limited by House v The King principles or, at least, that they should be applied liberally in this context.1282 The Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal has favoured the view that the determination of the admissibility of tendency evidence (and, presumably, coincidence evidence) is not a matter of judicial discretion but rather a matter of “judgment which, if wrong, will be reviewed”.1283 In R v GAC (2007) 178 A Crim R 408; [2007] NSWCCA 315, where the parties were prepared to proceed on the assumption that House v The King principles applied, Giles JA observed at [77] that “[t]he last word may not have been written” on the issue. More recently, the Victorian Court of Appeal has concluded that House v The King principles do not apply in respect of the admissibility of tendency and coincidence evidence.1284 Additional complexity derives from the statutory context. In DAO v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; 278 ALR 765; [2011] NSWCCA 63 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal sat a five judge court to determine the nature of review in an interlocutory appeal from a judge’s ruling that a number of trials of the applicant should not be separated because certain tendency evidence was cross-admissible in those trials. While Simpson J (Schmidt J agreeing) held at [206] that House v The King principles applied to the appellate review of the application of this provision in both such an interlocutory appeal and an appeal against conviction, the majority of the Court determined the issue only for interlocutory appeals. Spigelman CJ held at [70] that House v The King applied to such an interlocutory appeal but observed that the position may be different in an appeal against conviction, where “the degree of appellate restraint applicable to a reversible, interlocutory ruling does not apply” (at [61]). Allsop P and Kirby J agreed, in substance, with Spigelman CJ, although it is worth noting that Allsop P stated at [104] that application of House criteria “is supported by the recognition that the assessment to be made under s 101 will, or may, involve, amongst other things, a consideration, in advance, of the utility of, and protection afforded by, directions that may be necessary or available as the evidence is given or in any summing 1282. Compare Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; 74 ALJR 1348; [2000] HCA 47 at [28]. 1283. L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381; [2006] TASSC 59 per Underwood CJ at [55] and Tennent J at [86]; see also Crawford J at [79]–[85]. 1284. PNJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88 at [16]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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up”. The holding that House v The King applied to an interlocutory appeal was subsequently followed by a five judge court of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal: KJM v The Queen (No 2) [2011] VSCA 268, 211 A Crim R 546 at [12].

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As regards appeals against conviction, it is suggested that the better view is that, in the context of an appeal where the fundamental issue is whether there has been a “miscarriage of justice”, appellate review of this provision should not be limited by the House v The King criteria and the appeal court should consider for itself what is the correct answer to the question (applying the approach adopted by the High Court in Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; 53 ALJR 293; [1979] HCA 9). The High Court has rejected any suggestion that, if a decision being appealed from can be described as a discretionary decision, it follows that the appeal can only be allowed if the criteria identified in House are satisfied.1286 The fact that the decision of a court involves weighing and balancing various factors does not of itself mean that an appeal court is not in as good a position as the trial judge to make that particular decision, and thus to conclude that the trial judge was wrong.1287 The weight of authority is to the effect that considerations of witness credibility, where a trial judge may well be in a better position to make assessment than the appeal court, are excluded from the balancing exercise required under the provision. An appeal court, in deciding whether there has been a miscarriage of justice, can determine for itself whether some action, for example, judicial directions to the jury, shifted the balance in favour of admissibility. Unlike a determination of an appropriate sentence for a convicted offender, where it is accepted that there is no single right answer, the question posed by this provision is answered by a “yes” or “no” answer. Section 137 involves a similar balancing of probative value and danger of (unfair) prejudice. As discussed at [EA.137.210], there is NSW authority that House v The King applies to review of the application of that provision in appeals against conviction. However, the recent trend of authority in that jurisdiction and in Victoria is to accept that House v The King does not apply in that context. It is not apparent why a different approach should be taken in respect of this provision. However, if the correct view is that appellate review of this provision is limited by House v The King criteria, and an appellate court finds error on that basis in the exercise of the discretion by the trial judge, the question arises as to whether the appellate court may exercise the discretion for itself. The answer to that question will, in part, depend on the statutory context (for example, whether the appeal is by way of rehearing). Even if it may be exercised by the appeal court, 1285. The High Court refused special leave to appeal in this matter: DAO v The Queen [2011] HCATrans 298. Heydon J observed that the case was not a suitable vehicle for examining the correctness of the Court of Criminal Appeal’s conclusions because on either the House test or the Warren v Coombes test the same result would have been arrived at. 1286. Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124; [2008] HCA 13; R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, Campbell JA at [78]. 1287. R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, Campbell JA at [84]. However, it should be noted that, notwithstanding this proposition, Campbell JA held that House v The King principles applied to appellate review of this balancing test.

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1288

there may be practical reasons for not doing so. In respect of appeals against conviction under the common form statutory provisions, it is suggested that an appeal should normally be allowed unless the only proper result of the balancing exercise would be same (on the basis that, otherwise, the appellant has lost a real chance of a different result and a possible consequent acquittal). If the balancing exercise is “akin” to the exercise of a discretion in respect of which minds may properly differ, it is difficult to see why an appeal court should simply apply its own view of “the correct” result.1289 A final point needs to be made. In some circumstances it may be the case that admission of the evidence caused a miscarriage of justice, even though it could not be said that the decision made by the trial court under this provision was wrong.1290

[EA.101.480] Other provisions The Victorian Jury Directions Act 2015, ss 25–30 (see also ss 12–17) regulates the giving of jury directions in respect of “other misconduct evidence”, defined in s 26 to mean “(a) coincidence evidence; or (b) tendency evidence; or (c) evidence of other discreditable acts and omissions of an accused that are not directly relevant to a fact in issue; or (d) evidence that is adduced to assist the jury to understand the context in which the offence charged or any alternative offence is alleged to have been committed”. Common law rules are abolished (s 30). If the evidence is adduced by the prosecution and defence counsel asks for a direction (s 27(2)):

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the trial judge must— (a) identify how the other misconduct evidence is relevant (whether directly or indirectly) to the existence of a fact in issue in the trial and direct the jury not to use the evidence for any other purpose; and (b) if the evidence forms only part of the prosecution case against the accused, inform the jury of that fact; and (c) direct the jury that it must not decide the case based on prejudice arising from what the jury has heard about the accused.

However, the judge need not give the direction if there are good reasons for not doing so (s 14). Further, the judge “need not … (a) explain further what the jury should consider in deciding whether to use the other misconduct evidence; or (b) identify impermissible uses of the other misconduct evidence; or (c) refer to any other matter” (s 27(3)), although this provision is itself subject to s 29 (which provides that where “other misconduct evidence (other than tendency evidence) is adduced”, defence counsel may request “that the trial judge warn the jury not to use the evidence as tendency evidence”) and s 14 (which requires the judge to 1288. See R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306, Campbell JA at [119]–[123], [129]–[135]. 1289. Compare Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438; [1998] HCA 1 at [10]. 1290. Compare R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 at [41]–[42]. Curiously, Simpson J did not advert to this point in DAO v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; 278 ALR 765; [2011] NSWCCA 63 when her Honour held that House v The King principles applied to the appellate review of the application of this provision in both an interlocutory appeal and an appeal against conviction. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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comply with such a request “unless there are good reasons for not doing so”). Section 16 mandates a direction “if the trial judge considers that there are substantial and compelling reasons” for giving the direction (and certain procedural requirements are satisfied): see discussion at [EA.165.570]. Similar provisions apply where “other misconduct evidence” is adduced by a “coaccused” (s 28). As regards directions during the course of the trial, s 10(2) provides that a trial judge may give “a direction, that is consistent with this Act, that the trial judge considers necessary at any time before the close of all evidence”.

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Part IC of the Crimes Act 1958(Vic) purports to make “relevant” evidence of “family violence” adduced in a criminal proceeding in which self-defence or duress “in the context of family violence is in issue”. Part 6 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 regulates the giving of jury directions in respect of such evidence if it has been admitted.

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Part 3.7 – Credibility

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30]

Summary of this Part

This Part deals with “credibility evidence”, defined in s 101A. “Credibility” imports notions of reliability and is not limited to truthfulness. Section 102 creates the “credibility rule” that “credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible”. However, s 108C creates an exception for expert evidence concerning the credibility of a witness. Further, under s 103, credibility evidence may be adduced in cross-examination of a witness if the evidence “could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness”. Section 104 imposes further restrictions on cross-examination of a defendant in criminal proceedings about a matter that is relevant to the assessment of the defendant’s credibility. If the witness denies what is put in cross-examination, or does not admit it, the credibility rule will not prevent evidence being adduced to prove it, if the court gives leave under s 106(1). Leave is not required if the evidence falls into one of the listed categories in s 106(2). Section 108 regulates credibility evidence adduced by the party calling the witness for the purpose of re-establishing the credibility of the witness (although credibility evidence intended to support the credibility of a witness may also be admissible under ss 106, ss 108C and s 110). In Div 3, s 108A deals with the less common situation of the credibility of persons who are not witnesses but who made an out-of-court representation that has been admitted into evidence and provides that “credibility evidence” about such a person is inadmissible “unless the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the person’s credibility”. Section 108B imposes further restrictions on admission of such evidence where the person who made the representation is a defendant in criminal proceedings. An overview of credibility evidence is provided in the diagram below.1

1. Produced by the Judicial College of Victoria. Available at: http://www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/ publications/uniform-evidence-resources. Reproduced with permission.

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.7.30]

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FIGURE 7

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

: Credibility evidence

DIVISION 1 – CREDIBILITY EVIDENCE DIVISION 3.7.1 – CREDIBILITY EVIDENCE (ACT ONLY)

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s 101A

Part 3.7 - Credibility

Cth Act: 101A Credibility evidence Credibility evidence, in relation to a witness or other person, is evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness or person that: (a) is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; or (b) is relevant: (i) because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; and (ii) for some other purpose for which it is not admissible, or cannot be used, because of a provision of Parts 3.2 to 3.6. Note 1: Sections 60 and 77 will not affect the application of paragraph (b), because they cannot apply to evidence that is yet to be admitted. Note 2: Section 101A was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96. [S 101A insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 45]

NSW Act:

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101A

Credibility evidence

Credibility evidence, in relation to a witness or other person, is evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness or person that: (a) is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person, or (b) is relevant: (i) because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person, and (ii) for some other purpose for which it is not admissible, or cannot be used, because of a provision of Parts 3.2 to 3.6. Notes: 1 Sections 60 and 77 will not affect the application of paragraph (b), because they cannot apply to evidence that is yet to be admitted. 2 Section 101A was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96. [S 101A insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[40]]

Vic Act: 101A Credibility evidence Credibility evidence, in relation to a witness or other person, is evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness or person that— (a) is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; or (b) is relevant— (i) because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; and (ii) for some other purpose for which it is not admissible, or cannot be used, because of a provision of Parts 3.2 to 3.6. Notes: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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1 Sections 60 and 77 will not affect the application of paragraph (b), because they cannot apply to evidence that is yet to be admitted. 2 Section 101A was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96.

ACT Act: 101A

Credibility evidence

Credibility evidence, in relation to a witness or someone else, is evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness or person that— (a) is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; or (b) is relevant— (i) because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; and (ii) for some other purpose for which it is not admissible, or cannot be used, because of a provision of parts 3.2 to 3.6. Note 1: Section 60 and s 77 will not affect the application of par (b), because they cannot apply to evidence that is yet to be admitted. Note 2: Section 101A was inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96.

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NT Act: 101A Credibility evidence Credibility evidence, in relation to a witness or other person, is evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness or person that: (a) is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; or (b) is relevant: (i) because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; and (ii) for some other purpose for which it is not admissible, or cannot be used, because of a provision of Parts 3.2 to 3.6. Notes for section 101A: 1 Sections 60 and 77 will not affect the application of paragraph (b), because they cannot apply to evidence that is yet to be admitted. 2 Section 101A is inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96.

[EA.101A.30]

ALRC References

ALRC 102, paras 12.5–12.19.

[EA.101A.60]

General comments

In simple terms, this provision ensures that the requirements of Pt 3.7 in respect of “credibility evidence” do not apply where the evidence is relevant not only because it affects the credibility of a witness or person but also relevant and admissible for another purpose. In such a situation, the evidence may (subject to the possible application of the discretion to limit use in s 136) also be used to 810

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[EA.101A.60]

affect the credibility of that witness or person even if it would not satisfy the requirements of Pt 3.7 if those requirements applied to it. As Note 2 states, this provision was inserted in the Act in response to the decision of the High Court in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57. Prior to amendment, s 102 provided that “[e]vidence that is relevant only to a witness’s credibility is not admissible”. In Adam, the High Court held at [34]–[35] that s 102 should be interpreted literally, so that if evidence was relevant in a proceeding in some way other than to a witness’s credibility, it was not caught by s 102, even if the evidence was inadmissible for that other use.2 If s 102 did not apply, the evidence would be admissible as bearing on the witness’s credibility (pursuant to s 56), subject to the court’s general discretion to exclude or limit the use of evidence. Section 101A reverses that position. In ALRC 102, the ALRC explained at para 12.14: Evidence relevant both to credibility and a fact in issue, but not admissible for the latter purpose, should be subject to the same rules as other credibility evidence.

The drafting of the provision was explained at para 12.17: The amendment now put forward by the Commissions has two main components. It introduces the notion of purpose, and directs attention to the preceding provisions of the Acts rather than those that follow:

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• By referring to evidence which is not admissible for another purpose, the section picks up those provisions which exclude the admission of evidence for a particular purpose (eg ss 59, 76, 91, 97 and 98) rather than those which exclude evidence entirely (eg ss 84, 85 and 86). • By referring to Pts 3.2 to 3.6, the section removes from consideration the provisions which follow — ie, privileges and the mandatory and discretionary exclusions, leaving the latter provisions to operate if the evidence is not excluded by the credibility provisions.

Section 101A(a) refers to evidence that is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of a witness or person. Thus, if the evidence is relevant evidence under s 55 for some other reason, it will not be caught by this definition of credibility evidence (see [EA.101A.120] below). However, s 101A(b) extends the definition to cover evidence that is relevant because it affects the assessment of the credibility of a witness or person and is also relevant “for some other purpose for which it is not admissible, or cannot be used, because of a provision of Pts 3.2 to 3.6”. Parts 3.2 to 3.6 are: Part 3.2 Hearsay Part 3.3 Opinion Part 3.4 Admissions Part 3.5 Evidence of Judgments and Convictions Part 3.6 Tendency and Coincidence. Each of those parts contains a provision or provisions that provide that evidence “is not admissible to prove” a particular matter (see ss 59, 76, 91, 97 and 98). If 2. The reasoning of the High Court was partially based on a misreading of the significance of s 60 (see Editorial, “A case study in statutory interpretation” (2001) 25 Crim LJ 309 at 311), a proposition implicitly accepted by the contents of Note 1 to this provision. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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evidence is relevant, but not admissible, for one of those prohibited purposes, and also relevant because it affects the assessment of the credibility of a witness or person, the requirements of Pt 3.7 apply to the evidence. However, where evidence is not only relevant because it affects the credibility of a witness or person but also relevant and admissible for another purpose, it is not “credibility evidence”, as defined, and the requirements of Pt 3.7 do not apply to the evidence. That is, it may be used to affect the assessment of the credibility of that witness or person even if it would not satisfy the requirements of Pt 3.7 if those requirements applied to it.

[EA.101A.90]

“affects the assessment of the credibility of a witness or person”

The term “credibility of a witness” is defined in the Dictionary: “credibility of a witness” means the credibility of any part or all of the evidence of the witness, and includes the witness’s ability to observe or remember facts and events about which the witness has given, is giving or is to give evidence.

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Evidence will affect the assessment of the credibility of a witness whether the evidence tends to support the credibility of the witness or tends to discredit the witness. It is clear that the concept applies to evidence which bears on the reliability of a witness generally as well as evidence which bears on the reliability of particular testimony of the witness.3 In Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328, a five judge Victorian Court of Appeal unanimously held at [265]: [T]he express reference to a person’s ‘ability to observe or remember facts and events’ can only be a reference to reliability. In short, ‘credibility’ imports notions of both truthfulness and reliability. Matters bearing on the credibility of a witness thus include truthfulness or veracity, intelligence, bias or motive to be untruthful, opportunities of observation, reasons for recollection or belief, powers of perception and memory, any special circumstances affecting competency, prior statements consistent or inconsistent with testimony, internal inconsistencies and ambiguities in testimony and direct contradiction of testimony.4 As the Victorian Court of Appeal concluded in Dupas at [266], “for the purpose of the credibility rule, the Act has removed any distinction between credibility and reliability, in relation both to the witness and to the witness’s evidence”. In general, these propositions apply even if the person is not a witness (for example, where evidence of a previous representation has been admitted in a proceeding and a party seeks to adduce credibility evidence about the person who made the representation: see s 108A). 3. This appears from the definition, and from the approach taken in s 104, where the effect of s 104(2) and (3) is that evidence showing “bias”, “motive to be untruthful”, memory problems and a “prior inconsistent statement” are treated as being relevant to “credibility”. This conclusion was endorsed in R v Milat (unreported, NSW SC, Hunt CJ at CL, 9 April 1996); see also R v Rivkin (2004) 59 NSWLR 284; 184 FLR 365; [2004] NSWCCA 7 at [332]. However, cf Peacock v The Queen (2008) 190 A Crim R 454; [2008] NSWCCA 264, discussed at [EA.101A.120]. 4. See, for example, Wren v Emmett Contractors Pty Ltd (1969) 43 ALJR 213 (HC) at 221 per Windeyer J.

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[EA.101A.120]

[EA.101A.120] “relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person”

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Prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, s 102 provided that “[e]vidence that is relevant only to a witness’s credibility is not admissible”. The concept “relevant only to a witness’s credibility” is now found in this provision: s 101A(a). In this context, s 55(2)(a) should be noted. It provides that “evidence is not taken to be irrelevant only because it relates only to … (a) the credibility of a witness”. As explained at [EA.55.120] and [EA.55.150], the function of s 55(2) is to make clear that evidence which relates only to one of the matters referred to in the provision is not necessarily irrelevant to a fact in issue. Thus, the mere fact that the “only” apparent relevance of an item of evidence is to the credibility of a witness does not mean that it is not relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding. Usually, the reverse will be true. Where a witness has testified in relation to some fact in issue, evidence relating to the credibility of the witness will indirectly affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the fact in issue. The important point in this context is that recognition that the evidence is indirectly relevant to a fact in issue does not mean that it will not be “relevant only to a witness’s credibility”. It is clear that the words “relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person” must be understood to mean “relevant to a fact in issue only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person”. Subject to s 101A(b), where the evidence is relevant in another way, Pt 3.7 has no application. Thus, for example, where evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for embezzlement has been admitted in a criminal trial on the basis that it satisfies the requirements of Pt 3.6 of the Act, the evidence may, despite the provisions of Pt 3.7, be used in respect of the credibility of the defendant as a witness (subject to the operation of the discretion in s 136). However, there may be considerable difficulty in deciding whether an item of evidence is relevant only to credibility. McHugh J observed in relation to the comparable issue under the common law: The line between evidence relevant to credit and evidence relevant to a fact-in-issue is often indistinct and unhelpful. The probability of testimonial evidence being true cannot be isolated from the credibility of the witness who gives that evidence except in those cases where other evidence confirms its truth either wholly or partly. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from that evidence are necessarily dependent on the credibility of the deponent. Zuckerman has correctly described the distinction between evidence as to the credibility of witnesses and evidence as to facts-in-issue as productive of absurdity. Indeed, in some cases, the credibility of a witness may be of such crucial importance that it is decisive of the facts-in-issue, particularly where, as in the present case, the witness is a participant in the very facts-in-issue or the only eyewitness to them. The rationale behind the credit and facts-in-issue distinction does not depend on logic. It ‘is based primarily upon the need to confine the trial process and secondarily upon notions of fairness to the witness’. It is rooted in the need for “case management” rules. The distinction is regarded as necessary to prevent the trial of a case being burdened with the side issues that would arise if parties could investigate matters whose only real probative value was that “they tended to show the veracity or falsity of the witness who was giving evidence which was relevant to the issue”. It is for that reason, as Lord © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Pearce pointed out in Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595 at 607] that “[m]any controversies which might ... obliquely throw some light on the issues must in practice be discarded because there is not an infinity of time, money and mental comprehension available to make use of them”. That being so, the evidentiary rules based on the distinction between issues of credit and facts-in-issue should not be regarded as hard and fast rules of law but should instead be seen “as a well-established guide to the exercise of judicial regulation of the litigation process”. …

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The rigid distinction between credit and facts-in-issue and the rules predicated on that distinction should therefore be minimised by the adoption of a more flexible view as to when matters going to the credibility of a witness should be admitted as evidence probative of the facts-in-issue. Evidence concerning the credibility of a witness is as relevant to proof of an issue as are the facts deposed to by that witness. There is no distinction, so far as relevance is concerned, between the credibility of the witness and the facts to which he or she deposes. The credibility of evidence is locked to the credibility of its deponent. The truth of that proposition is in reality recognised by the rule that a witness can be cross-examined as to matters of credit. Because that is so, it is irrational to draw a rigid distinction between matters of credit and matters going to the facts-in-issue.5

McHugh J repeated this approach in Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 76 ALJR 1024; 190 ALR 370; [2002] HCA 31 at [37]–[41] and in Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 at [43]. In both decisions, there was considerable support for some of his analysis (particularly the proposition that the line between evidence relevant to credit and evidence relevant to a fact-in-issue is often indistinct) from other members of the High Court.6 The analysis of McHugh J has had some influence on the proper interpretation of this Act.7 However, care must be taken in distinguishing between two issues: the credibility/issue distinction and the merits of the “finality rule”: see s 106. The view expressed by McHugh J in Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 at [53] that the common law collateral fact rule should be regarded as “a rule of convenience – a rule for the management of cases – rather than a fixed rule or principle” has been rejected by the majority of the High Court: Gleeson CJ at [2]. Further, the observations of Hayne and Heydon JJ in Nicholls at [286] should be noted: But whatever the difficulties of definition and approach, the law as it stands does not permit any relaxation of the traditional rules merely on the ground that the particular witness’s credibility is inextricably linked with the principal issue in the case. 5. Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; 151 ALR 16 at 22–24. McHugh J dissented in the result but this extract from his judgment does not appear to conflict with the views of the majority. 6. Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 76 ALJR 1024; 190 ALR 370; [2002] HCA 31, Gleeson CJ at [3], Hayne J at [83], Callinan J at [96]–[104]; Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1, Gummow and Callinan JJ at [168], Kirby J at fn 199, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [285]. 7. In the context of the interpretation of the former s 102, they have been described as “very helpful and persuasive” by Smart J in R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488. See also R v Rivkin (2004) 59 NSWLR 284; 184 FLR 365; [2004] NSWCCA 7 at [334].

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Part 3.7 - Credibility

[EA.101A.120]

The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, in R v Chen (2002) 130 A Crim R 300; [2002] NSWCCA 174, has referred to evidence which “might, on one approach, be said to relate to credibility” while not being regarded as relevant only to a witness’s credibility.8 The Court held that evidence adduced by the prosecution that a prosecution witness had provided a written undertaking to co-operate with law enforcement authorities was “not tendered as evidence relevant only to a witness’s credibility” because it was tendered “pursuant to the Crown’s duty of fairness to the accused to lay out before the jury the status of the witness without that status being dragged out in cross-examination in a manner which might not be favourable to the interests of the accused” (at [28.4]). It is not apparent why considerations of “fairness” affected the question of whether the evidence is relevant only to the credibility of the witness.9 The court added:

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It is customary to obtain the address and occupation of witnesses at the start of the examination in chief. Strictly speaking the address and occupation of a particular witness at the time of the trial is irrelevant to any issue, though either an address or an occupation at the time of the events in issue can be. The evidence is received simply in order to locate the witness in society. Similarly, the qualifications of an expert do not go to an issue, and, if there is no objection to the witness’s expertise, can only be relevant to the reliability of the opinions or other evidence to which the witness testifies. Yet s 102 cannot be construed to render that kind of evidence inadmissible when for centuries it has been admissible.

In R v Gonzalez-Betes [2001] NSWCCA 226 it was held at [43]–[48] that the prosecution was permitted, in relation to “an indemnified accomplice, or a person to whom some benefit has or might be extended by dint of that witness’ testimony” to adduce “that fact in evidence and the true status of the witness not for the purpose of increasing the witness’ credibility but to enable the jury properly to consider those matters on the question of whether the witness’ credibility is thereby diminished”. A similar approach has been taken to evidence that an alleged accomplice giving evidence for the prosecution (and thus testifying regarding his involvement in the offence) had entered a plea of guilty to the offence.10 It has to be said that the contention that this evidence is not relevant only to the witness’s credibility is difficult to accept. The Victorian Court of Appeal has accepted that it is only relevant in that way and that it is probably correct that such evidence is not admissible unless, and until, an attack is made on the credibility of the witness.11 8. R v Chen (2002) 130 A Crim R 300; [2002] NSWCCA 174 at [28]. 9. In Azzi v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 249, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal declined to apply this “fairness” reasoning to support the admission of an alleged lie relied upon by the Crown to discredit the defendant (where it was argued that “to put the prosecution case fully and fairly, the Crown must adduce any admissible evidence of what an accused person tells police when interviewed”): Fullerton J at [36]–[39], Beazley P and Hidden J agreeing. 10. Ith v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 70, McClellan CJ at CL at [39]. 11. Andelman v The Queen (2013) 277 A Crim R 81; [2013] VSCA 25 at [36]–[46]. However, in Power v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 261; 242 A Crim R 553; [2014] VSCA 146, Redlich JA and Robson AJA held that, while evidence of an alleged co-offender’s plea of guilty was relevant only to that co-offender’s credibility (in a case where the alleged co-offender was a prosecution witness), the prosecution could elicit the evidence prior to any attack being made on the credibility of the witness by the defence because the witness had been declared unfavourable and leave had been granted to the prosecution to question the witness “about matters relevant only to the witness’s credibility” pursuant to s 38(3). That proposition is questionable (see further © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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In a Tasmanian case, Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 170 A Crim R 1; 207 FLR 20; [2006] TASSC 111, a trial judge admitted evidence (adduced by the prosecution) of the circumstances in which first “complaints” were made by a number of alleged victims in a sexual assault trial, on the basis that the evidence was relevant to the delay by the complainants in making their complaints which she would highlight for the jury when she gave a warning about the significance of that delay in complaint. Such an approach is similar to the “fairness” analysis adopted in Chen. In the Court of Criminal Appeal, Crawford J observed at [45] that evidence that “merely establishes the fact that there was a delay in the making of a complaint and the accused person becoming aware of what was alleged against him” will be relevant in that way, but he then added: However, evidence explaining why a complainant delayed making a complaint or what motivated a complainant to make a complaint many years after the material events, particularly in a case where no earlier complaint was ever made, will generally be relevant only to the credit of the complainant.

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Slicer J seems to have taken the same view (at [115]). On the other hand, Blow J at [179] considered that most of the evidence was not relevant only to a witness’s credibility, since it tended “to negative the possibility of concoction or contamination” between the complainants and was thus relevant “as circumstantial evidence of the happening of the event or events in issue”. A difficulty with this analysis is that negating the possibility of concoction or contamination in this context appears to relate to the credibility of the complainants. Similar issues arose in the case of KTR v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 271 in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. It was contended on appeal that evidence of violence by the appellant to various children in his family was relevant only to the credibility of allegations made by two step-daughters that they had been sexually abused by him over a long period. It was argued that, since the prosecution was not required to prove absence of consent, the evidence was relevant only to rebut any challenge to their credibility arising from apparent acquiescence and delay in complaint. This argument was rejected. McClellan CJ at CL (Fullerton J and Simpson J agreeing) held at [99] that: evidence of violence perpetrated by the appellant against the complainants was relevant because it provided a realistic context in which to understand the complainants’ evidence. Evidence that a complainant did not resist the appellant or report the assaults to her mother because she believed it to be pointless to resist or was scared or terrified of the appellant’s possible response demands an understanding of the context of the prior relationship between the complainant and the appellant. discussion at [EA.38.210]). Further, Redlich JA and Robson AJA held (at [55]–[75]) that, to the extent that the plea of guilty (and the statement of facts agreed to by the co-offender) constituted a representation as to the guilt of the defendant, that evidence would be admissible as evidence of the truth of the representation. This analysis appears to have been premised, at least in part, on the judgment of the High Court in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 (see at [59]) and to that extent must be regarded as per incuriam, given that the Act was amended for the express purpose of reversing that decision: see Note 2 to s 101A and the discussion at [EA.101A.60]. On the other hand, if the evidence was admitted for a credibility use under Pt 3.7, s 60(1) would apply to permit use as evidence of the truth of the representation (subject to s 136). Thus, as Redlich JA and Robson AJA themselves noted, if the representation was admitted as a prior inconsistent statement (a credibility use), s 60(1) would apply to permit a hearsay use.

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s 101A

Part 3.7 - Credibility

[EA.101A.120]

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It has to be said that such language as providing “a realistic context in which to understand” a complainant’s evidence sounds suspiciously like a credibility use of the evidence. Perhaps a better way to explain the non-credibility relevance of the evidence of prior violence is that the state of mind of the complainants at the time of the alleged abuse was relevant to whether or not the abuse occurred, and the prior violence would tend to have affected their state of mind to the extent that they were aware of it.12 Sometimes courts have avoided the operation of Pt 3.7 by adopting an unduly narrow approach to the concept “relevant only … [to] the credibility of the witness”. For example, in Peacock v The Queen (2008) 190 A Crim R 454; [2008] NSWCCA 264, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered the terms of s 102 as it stood prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102: “Evidence that is relevant only to a witness’s credibility is not admissible”. Simpson J, with whom McClellan CJ at CL agreed, considered at [57] that “a distinction to be drawn between evidence going to the credibility of a witness, and evidence going to the credibility of the evidence given by that witness (in this context it might be better to use the word ‘reliability’)”. Her Honour held that s 102 (as it was then formulated) prohibited “evidence going only to the former: it does not prohibit evidence going only to the latter of which an obvious example is evidence contradicting facts asserted by a witness”. In consequence, the “reliability of evidence given by a witness might be challenged by evidence contradicting all, or part, of that witness’s evidence”. This analysis is flawed. The term “credibility of a witness” is defined in the Dictionary to the Act to mean “the credibility of any part or all of the evidence of the witness …”. It follows that “evidence that is relevant only to a witness’s credibility” means “evidence that is relevant only to the credibility of any part or all of the evidence of the witness”. Equally, in respect of this provision, evidence “relevant to the credibility of the witness … that … is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness” means evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness that is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of any part or all of the evidence of the witness. It follows that evidence contradicting facts asserted by a witness can be subject to this Part.13 Unfortunately, Peacock (and particularly the judgment of Simpson J at [57]) has been followed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in RGM v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 89. In that case, the appellant had been charged with child sexual abuse offences in relation to his step-daughter and the prosecution was permitted to adduce a great deal of prejudicial evidence of his general (non-sexual) behaviour in the household, not to show a “tendency” to engage in sexual abuse but to provide an explanation why there was delay in complaint (at [58]). Some of the complainant’s evidence regarding those incidents was corroborated by her mother. It was argued on appeal that that evidence was 12. McClellan CJ at CL (Fullerton J agreeing) held at [101] that only prior violence in the presence of the complainants was admissible, while Simpson J rejected this limitation (at [149]). 13. The other member of the Court, Nettle AJA, accepted that the evidence was caught by s 102 and inadmissible. It may be noted that Simpson J observed at [60] that such an outcome would be unjust – the defence should be able to directly contradict a significant aspect of the evidence of an important prosecution witness. However, the answer to that concern is that the amendments to s 106 now give a court the power to admit such evidence. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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caught by this provision. However, that submission was rejected. Fullerton J (McClellan CJ at CL and Johnson J agreeing) at [73] quoted the passage of Simpson J in Peacock at [57] with approval and then stated at [74]: In the present case, of course, the evidence from the complainant’s mother when she detailed the [various incidents] was not evidence contradicting the facts asserted by the complainant, evidence which would, on any view, have been properly admitted to undermine the reliability of her evidence concerning these incidents, it was evidence having the contrary effect, namely evidence generally consistent with the complainant’s evidence about those incidents thereby supporting the reliability of her evidence. It was precisely in that way that the trial judge suggested that the evidence given by the complainant of those incidents was supported where, by way of contrast, there was no support for her evidence of being sexually assaulted. I am not persuaded that this direction breached the credibility rule.14

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This analysis repeats the error made by Simpson J, failing to appreciate that credibility evidence can be not only evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness but can extend to evidence relevant to the credibility of evidence given by that witness.15 It also appears to draw a distinction between evidence undermining reliability/credibility and evidence supporting reliability/credibility which has no bearing on the operation of this provision. The Victorian Court of Appeal has concluded that the analysis adopted in Peacock and RGM should not be accepted. In Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328, a five judge court unanimously held at [263] that it was “unable to accept” the distinction between “evidence going only to the credibility (truthfulness) of the witness and … evidence going only to the credibility (reliability) of the evidence given by that witness”, since “it is not possible to reconcile the view of the majority in Peacock with the definitions in the Dictionary of the Act”. Accordingly, “credibility” imports notions of reliability as well as truthfulness (see [EA.101A.90]). As the Court of Appeal concluded at [266], “for the purpose of the credibility rule, the Act has removed any distinction between credibility and reliability, in relation both to the witness and to the witness’s evidence”.

14. It should be noted that the analysis of Fullerton J was obiter since the appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge failed properly to direct the jury regarding the evidence. 15. In this case, it is arguable that the only relevance of the evidence relating to non-sexual incidents in the household given by the complainant was to meet an anticipated attack on the credibility of the complainant when she alleged sexual abuse – that she had failed to make immediate complaint (where, for example, the complainant testified that she was afraid to complain because of her fear of the appellant arising from his behaviour in the household). Her evidence in that regard was credibility evidence. The only apparent relevance of the evidence relating to non-sexual incidents in the household given by the complainant’s mother was to meet the same attack on the complainant’s credibility (the fact that the incidents occurred made it more likely that the delay in complaint did not undermine the credibility of the complainant’s allegations of sexual abuse) and to meet any attack made on her in cross-examination that she was telling lies about the non-sexual incidents. Contrary to the view of the Court of Criminal Appeal, it would seem that the evidence, from both the complainant and her mother, was credibility evidence in relation to the complainant under this provision, with the consequence that it was subject to the credibility rule in s 102 and the issue would then arise whether any other provision in Part 3.7 had the effect that the credibility rule did not apply.

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s 101A

Part 3.7 - Credibility

[EA.101A.150]

[EA.101A.150] Example: evidence of prior consistent statement of a witness Evidence that a witness has made a previous representation that is consistent with evidence given by the witness (see definition of “prior consistent statement” in the Dictionary to the Act) may be relevant because it affects the assessment of the credibility of that witness. Evidence of the previous representation may be relevant for another use. It may be relevant to prove the existence of a fact that the person intended to assert by the representation. However, s 59, in Pt 3.2, provides that “evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation” (the “hearsay rule”). If that hearsay rule applies to the evidence, then the evidence is “credibility evidence”, as defined, since the evidence is relevant because it affects the credibility of a witness and also relevant for some other purpose (to prove the existence of a fact that the person intended to assert by the representation) for which it is not admissible, or cannot be used, “because of” s 59. Conversely, the evidence is not “credibility evidence”, as defined, if: (a) the evidence is relevant to prove the existence of a fact that it cannot reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation (that is, it is not caught by the hearsay rule); or

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(b) the hearsay rule established by s 59 does not apply to the evidence by reason of the operation of one of the other provisions of Pt 3.2 (except s 60). The reason that the evidence is not “credibility evidence”, as defined, if the hearsay rule does not apply to the evidence by reason of the operation of one of the exceptions in Pt 3.2 is that, in such a situation, s 59 no longer operates to cause the evidence to be not admissible for that purpose/use. Since the evidence is not “credibility evidence”, the requirements of Pt 3.7 do not apply to the evidence. Subject to the possible application of s 136, it may be used to affect the credibility of the witness even if it would not satisfy the requirements of Pt 3.7 (for example, s 108) if those requirements applied to it. The reason that the operation of s 60 does not have this consequence is that s 60 only operates to cause the hearsay rule not to apply to evidence of a previous representation where the evidence “is admitted” for a non-hearsay use. As Note 1 states, “[s]ections 60 and 77 will not affect the application of paragraph (b), because they cannot apply to evidence that is yet to be admitted”. Section 60 has no operation if the evidence is not admitted. When determining whether the evidence of a previous representation is to be admitted, it accordingly has no bearing. When a court is determining whether Pt 3.7 applies to evidence (for the purpose of determining whether the evidence may be admitted), the possible future application of s 60 is irrelevant. Thus, if s 59 prima facie applies to the evidence, and none of the other provisions of Pt 3.2 render it non-applicable, the evidence is “credibility evidence” for the purposes of Pt 3.7 since it is also relevant because it affects the credibility of the witness. If the evidence is not admissible by reason of Pt 3.7, it may not be admitted. Since it may not be admitted, s 60 can have no application. Of course, if the evidence satisfies the requirements of Pt 3.7 and is admitted, s 60 may then apply to render the hearsay © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

rule inapplicable in respect of the evidence. The evidence may then be used for both a credibility use and a hearsay use, subject to the possible application of s 136.

[EA.101A.180] Example: exculpatory previous representation The defence in a criminal proceeding may tender evidence of a wholly exculpatory previous representation where the evidence is not a prior consistent statement because the defendant does not testify. Given that such a representation is not admissible under the “admission” exception to the hearsay rule (s 81), and no other exception to s 59 is applicable, it would follow that the evidence is “credibility evidence” in relation to the defendant (that is, even though the defendant is not a witness, the evidence is relevant because it affects the assessment of the credibility of that person,16 who has made a previous representation implicit in the denial of guilt conveyed by the plea, and it is also relevant for a hearsay purpose for which it is not admissible because of s 59). The admissibility of that evidence will be determined by the application of s 108A and s 108B.

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Prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Rymer (2005) 156 A Crim R 84; [2005] NSWCCA 310 applied the reasoning in Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; 123 A Crim R 280; 75 ALJR 1537; [2001] HCA 57 (see [EA.101A.60]) to hold that such evidence was admissible. However, since the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102 have effectively reversed Adam, the correctness of Rymer must now be regarded as doubtful.17

[EA.101A.210] Example: character evidence While s 101A(b)(ii) makes no reference to Pt 3.8 (Character), this does not mean that evidence relevant to both the defendant’s credibility and the defendant’s character, albeit inadmissible for that latter use, falls outside the definition of “credibility evidence”. The reason is that such evidence is, in substance, “tendency evidence”, caught by the “tendency rule” in s 97 (which is a provision in Pt 3.6). If the provisions of Pt 3.8 do not operate to render the tendency rule inapplicable, and it does apply to evidence relevant “to prove that” the defendant “has or had a tendency … to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind”, the evidence will fall within the definition of credibility evidence. DIVISION 2 – CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES DIVISION 3.7.2 – CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES (ACT ONLY)

16. However, an argument might be advanced that an exculpatory representation is not even relevant to the credibility of the defendant’s denial of guilt: cf Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; 73 ALJR 1274, discussed at [EA.55.240]. If that argument were accepted, the evidence would be clearly inadmissible. 17. See also [EA.81.270]. The Court of Criminal Appeal also held that the Crown has an obligation to adduce the evidence “absent some particular reason for refraining from doing so” (Grove J at [59]). Again, the correctness of that holding must now be regarded as doubtful.

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Part 3.7 - Credibility

Cth Act: 102 The credibility rule Credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible. Note 1: Specific exceptions to the credibility rule are as follows: • evidence adduced in cross-examination (sections 103 and 104); • evidence in rebuttal of denials (section 106); • evidence to re-establish credibility (section 108); • evidence of persons with specialised knowledge (section 108C); • character of accused persons (section 110). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Note 2: Sections 108A and 108B deal with the admission of credibility evidence about a person who has made a previous representation but who is not a witness. [S 102 subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 items 44 and 45; am Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 items 7 and 8]

NSW Act: 102 The credibility rule Credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible.

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Notes: 1 Specific exceptions to the credibility rule are as follows: • evidence adduced in cross-examination (sections 103 and 104) • evidence in rebuttal of denials (section 106) • evidence to re-establish credibility (section 108) • evidence of persons with specialised knowledge (section 108C) • character of accused persons (section 110) Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. 2 Sections 108A and 108B deal with the admission of credibility evidence about a person who has made a previous representation but is not a witness. [S 102 subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[40]; am Act 55 of 1997]

Vic Act: 102 The credibility rule Credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible. Notes: 1 Specific exceptions to the credibility rule are as follows— • evidence adduced in cross-examination (sections 103 and 104) • evidence in rebuttal of denials (section 106) • evidence to re-establish credibility (section 108) • evidence of persons with specialised knowledge (section 108C) • character of accused persons (section 110) Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. 2 Sections 108A and 108B deal with the admission of credibility evidence about a person who has made a previous representation but is not a witness.

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[EA.102.30]

s 102

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

ACT Act: 102 The credibility rule Credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible. Note 1: Specific exceptions to the credibility rule are as follows: • evidence given in cross-examination (s 103 and s 104) • evidence in rebuttal of denials (s 106) • evidence to re-establish credibility (s 108) • evidence of people with specialised knowledge (s 108C) • character of accused people (s 110). Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. Note 2: Section 108A and s 108B deal with the admission of credibility evidence about a person who has made a previous representation but is not a witness.

NT Act:

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102 The credibility rule Credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible. Notes for section 102: 1 Specific exceptions to the credibility rule are as follows: • evidence adduced in cross-examination (sections 103 and 104) • evidence in rebuttal of denials (section 106) • evidence to re-establish credibility (section 108) • evidence of persons with specialised knowledge (section 108C) • character of accused persons (section 110) 2 Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions. 3 Sections 108A and 108B deal with the admission of credibility evidence about a person who has made a previous representation but is not a witness.

[EA.102.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 102, paras 12.5–12.19. Compare ALRC 38, s 94, para 179; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 817–822.

[EA.102.60]

General comments

“Credibility evidence” is defined in s 101A. This provision renders such evidence “about a witness” inadmissible but other provisions in Divs 2 and 4 create exceptions to that general rule (and, as Note 1 states, other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further exceptions). The language of “credibility evidence about a witness” has been described as “awkward” because the provision is intended to apply not only to evidence which is led, or sought to be led, from another witness but also to cross-examination of the witness whose credibility is in issue. As Basten JA explained in Tieu v The Queen (2016) 92 NSWLR 94; 258 A Crim R 546; [2016] NSWCCA 111 at [30]: The rule is awkwardly formulated with respect to cross-examination, because it is the answer which is the “evidence” and until the answer is known, one can only speculate as to whether it will affect the assessment by the jury of the credibility of the witness. Further, in some cases the question will cause more prejudice than the answer.

Nevertheless, this provision applies to such cross-examination – if the answer to the question would be inadmissible, the question is objectionable. 822

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s 102

Part 3.7 - Credibility

[EA.102.100]

If evidence is relevant because it affects the credibility of a witness but also relevant and admissible for another purpose, it is not “credibility evidence” (see [EA.101A.60]). Where such evidence is admitted, the provisions in this Division do not limit the use that can be made of the evidence. The “credibility rule” in this provision does not apply where the “credibility evidence” is evidence relevant to the credibility of a person other than a witness. As Note 2 states, ss 108A and 108B deal with the admission of credibility evidence about a person who has made a previous representation but is not a witness.

[EA.102.90]

Exceptions

As Note 1 to the section indicates, there are several exceptions to this rule. Some involve evidence adduced to discredit a witness (see, for example, s 103). The only explicit exceptions applying to evidence supporting the credit of a witness are s 108 (to rebut an attack on credibility), s 108C (expert evidence) and Pt 3.8 (character of criminal defendant).18 The common law rule permitting evidence of “complaint” in sexual assault cases is not expressly enacted but the evidence may be admissible under s 108(3).19

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However, other exceptions may exist for evidence supporting the credit of a witness. Thus, where evidence relating to witness A is adduced under s 106 from witness B to rebut a “denial” by witness A, it is possible that the party that called witness A may utilise s 106 in order to re-establish the credibility of that witness (see [EA.106.300]). Further, there is (somewhat questionable) authority that s 38(3) creates another exception (see [EA.38.210]).

[EA.102.100] Possible application of ss 135 and 137 It has generally been assumed that, even if one of the exceptions to the credibility rule applies, a court may exclude credibility evidence pursuant to s 135 or, in criminal proceedings where the evidence is adduced by the prosecution, pursuant to s 137. Discussion of other provisions in Pt 3.7 proceeds on that assumption. However, in Tieu v The Queen (2016) 92 NSWLR 94; 258 A Crim R 546; [2016] NSWCCA 111, Basten JA observed that neither provision may apply to credibility evidence. His Honour stated at [44]: … Section 137 requires a balancing between the “probative value” of the proffered evidence and the danger of unfair prejudice. The phrase “probative value” is defined to mean “the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.” This definition uses the language of s 55, relating to the concept of “relevant evidence”, without expressly adverting to the effect being either direct or indirect. While, in a literal sense, these provisions can apply to credibility evidence, s 101A draws a clear distinction between credibility evidence which is relevant “only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness” and evidence which is otherwise relevant to a fact in issue, such as a recounting of the perceptions of the witness of a particular event. The reason for 18. R v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467; [2001] NSWSC 595; R v Rivkin (2004) 59 NSWLR 284; 184 FLR 365; [2004] NSWCCA 7 at [329]–[345]. See also s 106: [EA.106.300]. 19. In any event, such evidence is likely to be admissible under s 66 (and may be used for both hearsay and credibility purposes, subject to s 136): see [EA.66.60]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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thinking that s 137 may not operate with respect to credibility evidence is that it raises a different issue, namely the “probative value” of the evidence, rather than an assessment of the credibility of the witness. The credibility of the witness is not a fact in issue; the witness may have low credibility, but there may be reasons for thinking that the evidence adduced from the witness as to facts in issue is entirely credible. This distinction is implicit in the exception to the credibility rule (namely that credibility evidence is not admissible) in s 103(1) which asks, not whether the evidence has probative value, but whether the evidence “could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness.”

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Basten JA also noted at [45] that, prior to 1 January 2009, s 103(1) of the NSW Act stated that the credibility rule did not apply to evidence adduced in cross-examination “if the evidence has substantial probative value”. After comments made about that test by Hunt CJ at CL in R v RPS (unreported, CCA, NSW, No 60583 of 1996, 13 August 1997), an amendment operating from 1 January 2009 changed the language to “could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness”. Basten JA observed that this amendment “gives support for the proposition that there are two different exercises (weighing the probative value of the evidence and weighing the credibility of the witness), thus casting doubt upon the application of ss 135 and 137 in the exercise of the discretionary power granted by s 104(2)”. However, Basten JA stated that the point was not addressed in argument and it was not necessary to reach a final view as to the operation of these provisions. The other two members of the Court of Criminal Appeal in fact appear to have considered that s 137 did apply to the credibility evidence adduced by the prosecution (see McCallum–J at [130]–[131] and Davies J at [143], [149]). It is suggested that the proposition raised by Basten JA – that neither s 135 nor s 137 apply to “credibility evidence” – should not be accepted. As explained at [EA.55.150], where a witness has testified in relation to some fact in issue, evidence relating to the credibility of the witness will indirectly affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the fact in issue. The function of s 55(2) is to make clear that evidence which relates only to one of the matters referred to in the provision is not necessarily irrelevant to a fact in issue and that the mere fact that the “only” apparent relevance of an item of evidence is to the credibility of a witness does not mean that it is not relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding. Equally, in applying the definition of “probative value”, evidence relating to the credibility of a witness who testified in relation to some fact in issue will affect – to some extent – the assessment of the probability of the existence of the fact in issue. While the decision of the High Court in IMM v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 that a trial judge, in assessing the “probative value” of evidence for the purposes of a number of provisions in the UEL (including s 137), must proceed on the assumption that the evidence “is accepted” (and thus is to be regarded as both credible and reliable) would seem to support the view that an assessment of “probative value” would not extend to an assessment of the credibility of a witness, that is not necessarily the case. Take an example where a defendant (D), charged with armed robbery, testifies denying his guilt and the prosecution adduces evidence from witness W that D has engaged in an extra-marital affair with W (said to be relevant because it “discredits” D in a moral sense and tends to suggest that D is less likely to be truthful in the witness 824

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box). The High Court judgment requires that the “probative value” of W’s evidence be assessed on the assumption that D did engage in an extra-marital affair with W, but it is suggested that the probative value of the evidence is still very low because the inference that, as a result, D’s evidence regarding the facts in issue in the trial is less likely to be truthful, is very weak. As regards the significance of the amendment to s 103, it is explained at [EA.103.60] that where evidence has the potential to have a real, persuasive, bearing on the reliability of a witness, or the reliability of particular testimony of the witness, the current test should be regarded as being satisfied. The amendment was made to make clear that the test of s 103 would be satisfied by evidence that could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness. That would be sufficient even if the evidence of the witness was of little importance (which might support an argument that it lacked “substantial probative value”). Equally, the test would not be satisfied by evidence that could not substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of a witness even if the witness happened to give important evidence critical to the trial (where it might conceivably be argued that the evidence did have “substantial probative value” because of the importance of the witness). The change of language from “substantial probative value” to “could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness” does not support the view that an assessment of “probative value” would not extend to an assessment of the credibility of a witness.

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[EA.102.120] Credibility evidence and joint trials When a joint trial is held, involving multiple defendants, in legal theory there is not one trial but several. In a joint criminal trial involving two defendants (D1 and D2), for example, evidence admitted in the trial against D1 may not be admissible for or against D2, and in that situation must be disregarded in the trial of D2 (and if that is impossible, the trials should be separated): see general discussion at [EA.56.180]. Where the credibility of a prosecution witness, W, is in issue, and W is corroborated in some respect by a previous representation by D1, that credibility enhancement of W (which logically might support the general credibility of W, including with respect to evidence given by W against D2) may not be taken into account when assessing the prosecution case against D2.20

Cth Act: 103 Exception: cross-examination as to credibility (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in crossexamination of a witness if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness. [Subs (1) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 46]

(2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to:

20. R v Vu Ngoc Pham [2004] NSWCCA 190, Hulme J (Spigelman CJ agreeing) at [6]–[8]; Destanovic v The Queen [2015] VSCA 113, Weinberg and Beach JJA at [102]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the witness was under an obligation to tell the truth; and (b) the period that has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or occurred. [Subs (2) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 47] [S 103 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 103

Exception: cross-examination as to credibility

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in crossexamination of a witness if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness. [Subs (1) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[41]]

(2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to: (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the witness was under an obligation to tell the truth, and (b) the period that has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or occurred. [Subs (2) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[42]] Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[S 103 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 103

Exception—cross-examination as to credibility

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in crossexamination of a witness if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness. (2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to— (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the witness was under an obligation to tell the truth; and (b) the period that has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or occurred. ACT Act: 103

Exception—cross-examination as to credibility

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence given by a witness in cross-examination if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the witness’s credibility. (2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for subsection (1), it must have regard to— 826

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(a)

whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the witness was under an obligation to tell the truth; and (b) the period that has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or happened. NT Act: 103

Exception — cross-examination as to credibility

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in crossexamination of a witness if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness. (2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to: (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the witness was under an obligation to tell the truth; and (b) the period that has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or occurred.

[EA.103.30]

ALRC references

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ALRC 102, paras 12.20–12.25. Compare ALRC 38, s 96, para 179; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 819.

[EA.103.60]

General comments

Prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, s 103(1) provided that the “credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness if the evidence has substantial probative value”. The ALRC explained the reasoning behind the proposal on which that provision was based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 819): A witness should no longer be open to cross-examination on any negative aspect of character or misconduct on the basis that it is relevant to credibility. The research of psychologists suggests that emphasis should be placed on evidence of conduct which is similar to testifying untruthfully (ie involves false statements) and which took place in circumstances similar to those of testifying (ie the witness was under a substantial obligation to tell the truth at the time). Consideration was given to including a proposal to that effect but it was thought to be too limiting for the exercise of cross-examination. At the same time, the present law, despite judicial powers of control does not adequately limit such cross-examination. It is proposed, therefore, to include a general rule having the effect of prohibiting cross-examination as to credibility unless it has substantial probative value on the question of credibility. To assist in the use of the clause, a further clause is included which refers to matters relevant to the probative value of such evidence. It will be permissible to cross-examine a witness with respect to bias, or motive to be untruthful, with respect to mental and physical capacity, about his ability to perceive the relevant events and about prior inconsistent statements.

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Accordingly, it was proposed that tests requiring a “material” affect on the credit of the witness be replaced by a requirement of “substantial probative value”.21 Following the amendments arising from ALRC 102, the credibility rule in s 102 states the general prima facie rule that credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible. However, under this provision, such evidence may be adduced in cross-examination of a witness if the evidence “could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness”. That formulation, introduced by the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, reflects the interpretation given to the previous formulation of “substantial probative value”. In ALRC 102, the ALRC stated at para 12.28: Many matters can be said to go to a witness’ credit or discredit, but will not have an impact on the assessment of the veracity and accuracy of that witness’ evidence. Where the evidence is not of substantial probative value in the assessment of a witness’ credibility, at best it adds unnecessarily to the length of trials. At worst it prejudices the proper assessment of the witness’ credibility by the tribunal of fact and distracts from the facts in issue to be determined. Section 103 provides a formal means which does not exist at common law appropriately to limit cross-examination.

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Hunt CJ at CL stated in R v RPS (unreported, NSW CCA, 13 August 1997), p 29–30)22 in respect of the previous formulation: The addition of the word ‘substantial’ nevertheless imposes a limitation upon the common law, when almost anything was allowed upon the issue of credit unless it clearly had no material weight whatsoever upon that issue. That limitation is an important one. Counsel must, however, be given some freedom in cross-examination — whether it relates to a fact in issue or to credit. They are not obliged to come directly to the point; they are entitled to start a little distance from the point and to work up to it.

These comments are apposite to the current test. Further, as the ALRC observed in ALRC 102 at para 12.29, the application of the test must be considered in the context of the case as a whole.23 It is suggested that where evidence has the potential to have a real, persuasive, bearing on the reliability of a witness, or the reliability of particular testimony of the witness, the test should be regarded as being satisfied.24 An example of cross-examination that would not satisfy the test would be in relation to matters to the general “discredit” of a witness in some moral sense which had little impact on the question of whether the witness ought not to be relied upon.25 21. See discussion of McCallum J in Tieu v The Queen (2016) 92 NSWLR 94; 258 A Crim R 546; [2016] NSWCCA 111 at [124]. 22. See also Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 at [86] per Sackville J (Whitlam and Mansfield JJ agreeing) and R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 at [179]–[183]. See eg El-Azzi v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1056. 23. See eg El-Azzi v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1056. 24. In respect of the earlier formulation of the test, this approach was referred to approvingly by Dowd J in R v Fowler (unreported, NSW SC, 15 May 1997). See also R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 at [183]. 25. Of course, if the evidence sought to be adduced in cross-examination would not even tend to suggest that the witness ought not to be relied upon it would not be relevant to the credibility of the witness at all (cf R v Slack (2003) 139 A Crim R 314; [2003] NSWCCA 93, Sheller JA at [34]–[37]; R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 at [253]).

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One factor which may be significant in this context is the potential incremental effect of the evidence on the assessment of the credibility of the witness. While an item of evidence may have considerable significance when considered in isolation, it may be that other evidence has already been admitted on this question. In those circumstances it may be that the proffered evidence adds little to what has already been admitted and that its potential incremental bearing on credibility is minimal.26 It is important to appreciate that evidence may be capable of having a substantial effect on the assessment of the credibility of a witness even if it serves only to negate inferences regarding credibility sought to be drawn from other evidence. For example, expert evidence regarding the behaviour of victims of child sexual assault was held to be satisfy the comparable requirement under s 108C(1)(b)(ii) even though it:

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could not establish that it was probable the complainant was telling the truth, but it could establish that her behaviour was not demonstrative of untruthfulness by reference to common or usual patterns of behaviour as asserted by the defence. In this sense, it could establish that the counter-intuitive behaviour complained of was of neutral significance.27

Another important difference between the original s 103 and the current provision should be noted. The original provision was drafted in such a way that it could apply to cross-examination of a witness on the credibility of another witness as well as cross-examination of a witness regarding their own credibility. However, the current provision applies “to evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness” (emphasis added). The last mentioned witness is clearly a reference to the witness who is being cross-examined.

[EA.103.90]

“evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness”

The question arose in McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] NSWSC 218 whether this provision might permit admission of credibility evidence in the form of a document. McCallum J rejected a submission that the only purpose of this provision is to permit “cross-examination” (at [26]) and that a document tendered during cross-examination cannot properly be characterised as “evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness” (at [31]). McCallum J observed that the document in question was a document written by the witness which it was reasonably open to conclude was a false account of the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the car and could substantially affect the jury’s assessment of the witness’s credibility (at [24]). McCallum J also stated that she could “see no reason why the document itself cannot not be adduced in cross examination (at least where the witness accepts that it is his document, as occurred here)” (at [37) and observed that the judgment of the NSW Court of 26. R v Galea (2004) 148 A Crim R 220; [2004] NSWCCA 227 at [115]–[117]. However, note the analysis of the High Court judgment of Aytugrul v The Queen (2012) 247 CLR 170; 215 A Crim R 501; [2012] HCA 15, where a submission which relied on the idea of “incremental” probative value in relation to s 137 was rejected. 27. MA v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 564; 226 A Crim R 575; [2013] VSCA 20, Osborne JA at [22]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Criminal Appeal in Aslett v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 49 was at least “implicit” authority for the proposition that this provision might permit admission of a document. It is suggested that this decision should not be followed.28 “Cross-examination” involves questioning of a witness and evidence adduced in cross-examination is usually understood to mean the answers given by the witness to the questions. While a broader scope might be given to the words in this provision to extend to the adducing of a document, that would not be consistent with the scheme of this Part and, in particular, s 106. That provision provides that the credibility rule does not apply, in certain circumstances, to “evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility and that is adduced otherwise from the witness”. There is no doubt such evidence may be a document, and no doubt that a document is evidence “adduced otherwise than from the witness”. However, s 106 requires that the “substance of the evidence” have been put to the witness in cross-examination and the witness “denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence”. There is also a leave requirement if the evidence does not fall into certain categories specified in s 106(2).29 Section 106 indicates that the particular witness in this case should have been asked questions about the document pursuant to this provision and then, if the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the making of that document, the document could be admitted pursuant to s 106 (and particularly s 106(2)(e), which refers to false representations made while under an obligation to tell the truth). The requirements of s 106 are designed not only to ensure fairness to the witness but also to avoid the admission of any (further) credibility evidence where the witness has conceded in cross-examination the substance of the matter that bears on his or her credibility. Rather than holding that the document in this case might be admitted pursuant to this provision, it would be a preferable approach to hold that this provision does not extend to the admission of documents and that it is s 106 which provides the applicable exception to the credibility rule for documentary credibility evidence.

[EA.103.120] Examples Given the broad scope of credibility evidence (see discussion of s 101A), it is clear that many more examples can be given of evidence satisfying the requirements of s 103(1) than the matters referred to in s 103(2). Thus, cross-examination may well be permitted regarding such matters as bias or motive to be untruthful,30 opportunities of observation, reasons for recollection or belief, powers of perception and memory, any special circumstances affecting 28. It was expressly not followed in R v Ryan (No 7) (2012) 218 A Crim R 384; [2012] NSWSC 1160, S.G.Campbell J at [28]. It is not clear whether the same view was taken in Col v The Queen (2013) 237 A Crim R 67; [2013] NSWCCA 302 at [30] (the better view is that it was not – the discussion appears to relate not to the document but to the testimonial evidence regarding the prior inconsistent statement). 29. In fact, the document in this case fell within the category in s 106(2)(e) (see McCallum J at [25]), with the consequence that leave would not have been required. 30. Compare Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; 151 ALR 16 at 6. In Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4, Bathurst CJ accepted at [358] that evidence of an out-of-court statement made by a witness “indicated a particular attitude which could lead to an inference being drawn that he was a person who might seek to tailor his evidence in favour of the accused”.

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competency, prior statements inconsistent with testimony, internal inconsistencies and ambiguities in testimony, prior discussion about the facts of the case with other potential witnesses,32 and direct contradiction of testimony. Previous lies by the witness may substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness, whatever the nature of the “obligation to tell the truth”.33 However, where the questioning relates to the general honesty of the witness, careful analysis will be required. When discussing the “substantial probative value” formulation, the ALRC explained this emphasis (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 817–818):

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The existing law permitting the admission of evidence of a witness’ reputation for veracity or another’s opinion as to his veracity assumes that people have character traits with respect to truth-telling which produce consistent behaviour in different situations. But psychological research has, as noted above, demonstrated that such an assumption should not usually be made. Evidence relevant to credibility will have minimal probative value unless it relates to specific conduct in substantially similar situations. In addition, it suffers from the same disadvantages as other character evidence – the dangers of misestimation and prejudice. Another policy concern is that the threat of having character evidence used against a witness may discourage him from giving testimony and thus deprive the tribunal of fact of relevant, perhaps crucial, evidence … Evidence of reputation or opinion should not be admitted to show a tendency to untruthfulness except to rebut evidence of good character adduced by an accused.34

These comments are apposite to the current test. The matters referred to in s 103(2) are designed to ensure that evidence relating to the general honesty of a witness is only adduced in cross-examination where there is a proper basis for concluding that it has a real bearing on the likely truthfulness of the witness. This is unlikely to be the case where the evidence is in the form of reputation or opinion.35 It is also unlikely to be the case where it is specific conduct showing “bad character”, even prior convictions, unless the conduct involves false representations and took place in circumstances where there was some (moral or legal) obligation to tell the truth.36 However, judicial views differ. Thus the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal divided on the question of whether evidence that a 31. Sections 43 and 45 impose procedural requirements in respect of this mode of cross-examination. 32. Compare Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 731; [2005] NSWCA 110 at [30], [34]. 33. Compare State Rail Authority (NSW) v Brown (2006) 66 NSWLR 540; [2006] NSWCA 220 per Giles JA (Santow JA agreeing) at [20]–[21]. 34. See also the discussion of the psychological research at [795]ff. 35. This approach may be contrasted with the existing common law: R v Richardson [1969] 1 QB 299; [1968] 2 All ER 761 (CA); R v Hanrahan [1967] 2 NSWR 717 (CCA); Bell v The Queen (1985) 7 FCR 555 (FC); R v BDX (2008) 24 VR 288; 194 A Crim R 57; [2009] VSCA 28 at [29]–[47]; R v JSM (2013) 117 SASR 535; 235 A Crim R 73; [2013] SASCFC 96 at [29]–[74] 36. In R v Fowler (unreported, NSW SC, 15 May 1997), Dowd J rejected cross-examination on a witness’s prior convictions involving assault. He referred to convictions for larceny, assault and murder as typically irrelevant to credibility: “Even a murderer can be truthful.” This approach may be contrasted with the common law position where there appears to be a presumption that the mere fact of criminality, no matter how minor the offence and whether or not it involves mens rea, is relevant to credibility: see R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 741 per Hunt J. In Fletcher v The Queen (2015) 45 VR 634; 252 A Crim R 11; [2015] VSCA 146, Dixon AJA (with whom Weinberg and Priest JJA agreed) held at [94]–[95] that evidence that a person (whose credibility was in issue) “[was] scared” of the applicant was “no more than an assertion of the applicant’s bad character” and could not rationally affect the assessment of the probability that what the person said she saw and heard was true. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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witness had prior convictions, for supplying a prohibited drug and having goods in custody reasonably suspected of being stolen, had “substantial probative value”.37 Presumably, the court would also have divided in the same way on the application of the current test. In another case, the Court of Criminal Appeal accepted a concession that prior convictions for “offences of dishonesty” satisfied the test.38 Another example relates to the contentious area of previous sexual history of a complainant in a sexual offence prosecution. Evidence of “sexual reputation” or specific instances of sexual conduct (for example, prostitution) is unlikely to meet the test of “could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness” – unless relevance to credibility can be demonstrated in some way other than showing “bad (moral) character”. In any event, specific statutory provisions in other legislation dealing with this area continue to apply: see, for example, in Victoria, s 37A of the Crimes Act 1958 and, in New South Wales, s 293 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Finally, the court may exclude the evidence in accordance with the discretion under s 135.

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A possible example of the application of this provision is in relation to cross-examination of sexual assault complainants about surrounding tangential detail of the alleged assault. In Reed v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 314 Spigelman CJ observed at [64]: Cross-examination of sexual assault complainants often proceeds as if the reliability of their evidence about the assault can in some way be shaken by a failure to be precise about surrounding tangential detail. This approach is, in my opinion, rarely appropriate. Memory of surrounding detail has few if any implications, in my opinion, for a person’s reliability about the central details of a traumatic event. The psychological assumptions that appear to underlie much cross-examination have no scientific basis and, indeed, are contrary to what we do know about human memory. (See eg Richard J McNally, Remembering Trauma (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 2003) esp at pp 48–62.)

However, a number of points need to be made about this passage. First, it was not said in the context of possible application of this provision but rather in the context of whether non-disclosure of evidence to the defence had resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Second, the Chief Justice added at [65] that “[w]ith regard 37. R v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83. The witness in question gave alibi evidence for the defendant. Smart J (dissenting) observed (at [128]) that it “does not follow that because a man has supplied drugs on an occasion he will give false alibi evidence” and that cross-examination in respect of neither conviction satisfied the s 103(1) test. However, Hulme J held (at [56], Mason P agreeing at [3]) that both convictions had “substantial probative value”. He observed that the first conviction was “indicative of a disregard of a law designed and calculated to reduce harmful conduct within the community and akin to the conduct with which the Appellant was charged” and the second “is clearly one which in almost all cases, bespeaks dishonesty”. A similar issue arose in respect of another witness who was cross-examined about his possession of two marijuana plants. All members of the court agreed that, by itself, such evidence would not have substantial probative value, but the majority concluded that, in the particular circumstances of the case and in conjunction with other evidence, it satisfied the s 103(1) test. See also R v Burns (2003) 137 A Crim R 557; [2003] NSWCCA 30. In Montgomery v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 73 it was held that the period that had elapsed since the offences (a minimum of 50 years) the evidence could not have been held to have had substantial probative value. 38. Tieu v The Queen (2016) 92 NSWLR 94; 258 A Crim R 546; [2016] NSWCCA 111. However, it should be noted that McCallum J at [115] pointed out that disobedience to a good behaviour bond is “quite different” to “dishonesty” and the connection of that offence to the appellant’s credibility was “tenuous”.

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[EA.103.150]

to issues of veracity, surrounding detail can be of greater significance”. Third, this provision may have no operation with respect to this kind of evidence since the evidence will usually be relevant not only to the credibility of the complainant but also to the issues in the trial, so that the evidence would not fall within the scope of the definition of “credibility evidence” in s 101A. Finally, the comments of Sully J, who agreed with the Chief Justice, but added the following observation at [85] should be noted: It seems to me, however, that it would be appropriate to allow for the undoubted fact that every criminal trial is individual, with facts and circumstances and with forensic exigencies particular to it. … There is, I believe, nothing novel about the proposition that there are, in the very nature of things, some sexual assault trials in which the only practical means by which the accused person can exercise his right to test the evidence of his accuser is, precisely, by testing in some proper fashion matters of detail that could be fitted easily enough within the description “surrounding tangential detail”.

[EA.103.150] Procedure

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As the ALRC observed in ALRC 102 at para 12.29, if objection is taken to cross-examination under this provision, counsel can outline the probative value of the line of questioning, if need be in the absence of the witness and jury, thereby allowing the court to rule on the line of questioning without prejudicing the forensic technique of the cross-examiner. If necessary, a voir dire may be held pursuant to s 189, if a question of admissibility depends on the court finding that a particular fact exists. The particular ethical obligations on prosecutors in criminal trial may require the seeking of a ruling under this provision in advance of cross-examination. In Montgomery v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 73, Simpson J (McClellan CJ at CL agreeing) stated at [6]: It is inherent in s 103 that a court may be called upon, in advance of cross-examination, to make a ruling as to the existence or otherwise of substantial probative value in the evidence. No ruling under s 103 was sought, and no notice was given to counsel for the appellant of the intention to cross-examine on the subject matter of [the witness’s] prior convictions. That, in itself, was, in my opinion, a serious departure from proper standards of conduct required of a Crown prosecutor. Had the Crown prosecutor advised defence counsel of his intention to cross-examine on that subject, defence counsel would have had the opportunity, which he undoubtedly would have taken, of raising the matter with the trial judge and obtaining a ruling on whether he would permit that cross-examination. It has been pointed out that a court, in considering whether to allow a question seeking to elicit an answer bearing on the credibility of a witness, should assume that the answer given will be that sought by the cross-examiner for the purposes of deciding whether the test is satisfied and the question is to be permitted. Thus, “the fact that the witness might have been unlikely to make … an admission [does] not affect the admissibility of the questions”.

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Cth Act: 104 Further protections: cross-examination of accused (1) This section applies only to credibility evidence in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to section 103. [Subs (1) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 48]

(2) A defendant must not be cross-examined about a matter that is relevant to the assessment of the defendant’s credibility, unless the court gives leave. [Subs (2) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 49]

(3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required for cross-examination by the prosecutor about whether the defendant: (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which his or her evidence relates; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement. (4) Leave must not be given for cross-examination by the prosecutor under subsection (2) unless evidence adduced by the defendant has been admitted that: (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecutor has a tendency to be untruthful; and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility.

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[Subs (4) subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 50]

(5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to: (a) the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted; or (b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted. [Subs (5) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 51]

(6) Leave is not to be given for cross-examination by another defendant unless: (a) the evidence that the defendant to be cross-examined has given includes evidence adverse to the defendant seeking leave to cross-examine; and (b) that evidence has been admitted. [S 104 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 104 Further protections: cross-examination as to credibility (1) This section applies only to credibility evidence in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to section 103. [Subs (1) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[43]]

(2) A defendant must not be cross-examined about a matter that is relevant to the assessment of the defendant’s credibility, unless the court gives leave. [Subs (2) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[44]]

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(3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required for cross-examination by the prosecutor about whether the defendant: (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful, or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which his or her evidence relates, or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement. (4) Leave must not be given for cross-examination by the prosecutor under subsection (2) unless evidence adduced by the defendant has been admitted that: (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecutor has a tendency to be untruthful, and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. [Subs (4) subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[45]]

(5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to: (a) the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted, or (b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted.

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[Subs (5) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[46]]

(6) Leave is not to be given for cross-examination by another defendant unless: (a) the evidence that the defendant to be cross-examined has given includes evidence adverse to the defendant seeking leave to cross-examine, and (b) that evidence has been admitted. [S 104 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 104

Further protections—cross-examination as to credibility

(1) This section applies only to credibility evidence in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to section 103. (2) An accused must not be cross-examined about a matter that is relevant to the assessment of the credibility of the accused, unless the court gives leave. [Subs (2) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.22]

(3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required for cross-examination by the prosecutor about whether the accused— (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which his or her evidence relates; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement. [Subs (3) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.23]

(4) Leave must not be given for cross-examination by the prosecutor under subsection (2) unless evidence adduced by the accused has been admitted that— (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecutor has a tendency to be untruthful; and © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. [Subs (4) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.23]

(5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to— (a) the events in relation to which the accused is being prosecuted; or (b) the investigation of the offence for which the accused is being prosecuted. [Subs (5) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.24]

(6) Leave is not to be given for cross-examination by another accused unless— (a) the evidence that the accused to be cross-examined has given includes evidence adverse to the accused seeking leave to cross-examine; and (b) that evidence has been admitted. [Subs (6) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.25] [S 104 am Act 68 of 2009]

ACT Act: 104

Further protections—cross-examination as to credibility

(1) This section applies only to credibility evidence in a criminal proceeding and applies in addition to section 103.

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(2) A defendant must not be cross-examined about a matter that is relevant to the assessment of the defendant’s credibility, unless the court gives leave. (3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required for cross-examination by the prosecutor about whether the defendant— (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which the defendant’s evidence relates; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement. (4) The prosecutor must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless evidence presented by the defendant has been admitted that— (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecutor has a tendency to be untruthful; and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. (5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to— (a) the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted; or (b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted. (6) Leave must not be given for cross-examination by another defendant unless— (a) the evidence that the defendant to be cross-examined has given includes evidence adverse to the defendant seeking leave to cross-examine; and 836

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Part 3.7 - Credibility

[EA.104.60]

(b) that evidence has been admitted. NT Act: 104 Further protections — cross-examination as to credibility (1) This section applies only to credibility evidence in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to section 103. (2) A defendant must not be cross-examined about a matter that is relevant to the assessment of the defendant’s credibility, unless the court gives leave. (3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required for cross-examination by the prosecutor about whether the defendant: (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which his or her evidence relates; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement.

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(4) Leave must not be given for cross-examination by the prosecutor under subsection (2) unless evidence adduced by the defendant has been admitted that: (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecutor has a tendency to be untruthful; and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. (5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to: (a) the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted; or (b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted. (6) Leave is not to be given for cross-examination by another defendant unless: (a) the evidence that the defendant to be cross-examined has given includes evidence adverse to the defendant seeking leave to cross-examine; and (b) that evidence has been admitted.

[EA.104.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 102, paras 12.35–12.43; ALRC 38, s 97, paras 179(b), 180(b); ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 411–413, 820–822.

[EA.104.60]

General comments

The effect of this provision is that additional limitations (over and above those imposed by ss 102 and 103) on the admissibility of credibility evidence are imposed in the context of cross-examination of a defendant in criminal proceedings: • Leave to cross-examine the defendant must be sought and obtained, unless the matters sought to be the subject of cross-examination fall within s 104(3). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.104.90]

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 104

• Where leave is required, it cannot be given for cross-examination by the prosecutor unless the matters sought to be the subject of crossexamination fall within s 104(4). • Where leave is required, it cannot be given for cross-examination by another defendant unless the matters sought to be the subject of cross-examination fall within s 104(6).

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It is important to appreciate that this provision only applies to “credibility evidence” as defined in s 101A. Even if evidence is relevant because it affects the credibility of a witness or person it will not be credibility evidence if it is also relevant and admissible for another purpose. It follows that this provision has no application in respect of evidence that is relevant and admissible as bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Cross-examination about internal inconsistencies, omissions and other such weaknesses in a defendant’s testimony would not usually fall within the definition of “credibility evidence”, since it is not relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the defendant (and s 101A(b)(ii) does not apply): see [EA.101A.60]. Similarly, this provision does not apply to tendency evidence that is admissible in relation to the defendant. The admissibility of such evidence, and the scope of permissible cross-examination of the defendant intended to elicit such evidence, is determined by Pt 3.6 and Pt 3.8. Thus, for example, where evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for embezzlement is admissible on the basis that it satisfies the requirements of Pt 3.6 of the Act, the defendant may be cross-examined about the matter, and the evidence so adduced may be used in respect of the credibility of the defendant as a witness (subject to the operation of the discretions in s 135 and, particularly, s 137). For the same reason, it does not apply to character evidence that, pursuant to a provision of Pt 3.8, is not excluded by the tendency rule (see [EA.101A.210]). If evidence of matters tending to show the defendant’s bad character (including prior convictions) is adduced under this provision in a jury trial, careful directions would usually be required from the trial judge to the effect that the jury may only use the evidence in relation to the credibility of the defendant and, accordingly, must not engage in tendency reasoning (see [EA.101.360]).

[EA.104.90]

“unless the court gives leave” (s 104(2))

While s 104(4) and (6) indicate when leave must not be given, s 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.39 In this context, if leave is sought to cross-examine the defendant about matters tending to show his bad character (including prior convictions), the obvious dangers of unfair prejudice will be an important consideration notwithstanding appropriate judicial directions being given to the jury.40 39. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. 40. See R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 at [200], [259]–[262].

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s 104

Part 3.7 - Credibility

[EA.104.150]

[EA.104.120] “leave is not required for cross-examination by the prosecutor” (s 104(3)) Leave need not be obtained for cross-examination of the defendant by the prosecutor (leave is still required for cross-examination by another defendant) regarding the matters which are listed in s 104(3). However, s 103 continues to apply – the evidence must be capable of substantially affecting the credibility of the defendant to be admissible. The various listed matters may be discussed separately: (1) Bias or motive to be untruthful. Bias is usually (at least, at common law) understood in the sense of having an interest in a particular outcome of the proceedings.41 However, the High Court has held that it would deflect the jury from its fundamental task of deciding whether the prosecution proved the elements of the charged offence beyond reasonable doubt to suggest that the defendant’s evidence be evaluated on the basis of the defendant’s interest in the outcome of the trial.42 Cross-examination permitted by s 104(3)(a) should be understood consistently with that principle.43 It follows that cross-examination under s 104(3)(a) should only be permitted when there is some particular reason why the defendant has a bias or motive to lie regarding some aspect of the case, rather than the general interest in the outcome of the proceeding which any defendant would have.

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(2) Perception or memory problems. Thus, a physical or psychological condition may affect the defendant’s credibility in this way. (3) Prior inconsistent statement. While s 104 imposes no limitation on this mode of cross-examination of a defendant, ss 43 and 45 impose procedural requirements.

[EA.104.150] Cross-examination by the prosecutor generally In summary, the prosecutor may (subject to judicial discretion) cross-examine the defendant on a matter relevant to the credibility of the defendant only where the matter is: (1) relevant to a fact in issue in another way (and the evidence sought to be elicited is admissible for that purpose): see s 101A definition of “credibility evidence” for example, where the evidence is admissible under Pt 3.6 or Pt 3.8; 41. R v Umanski [1961] VR 242 (FC). 42. Robinson v The Queen (No 2) (1991) 180 CLR 531; 55 A Crim R 318; Hargraves v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 257; 218 A Crim R 123; [2011] HCA 44 at [46]; R v Parsons [2015] SASCFC 183. 43. It has been held that the common law principle applies to the prosecution: R v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 (NSW CCA); R v Booty (unreported, NSW CCA, 19 December 1994); R v Ellem [1994] 2 Qd R 549; (1994) 75 A Crim R 370 (Qld CA) (Fitzgerald P and Davies JA, McPherson JA dissenting); MAJW v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 255 at [45]–[50]. Thus, cross-examination of the defendant by the Crown Prosecutor to make the suggestion has been prohibited. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.104.180]

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 104

(2) one of the matters listed in s 104(3), so long as there is compliance with the requirements of s 103; (3) adduced in response to an attack on the truthfulness of a prosecution witness (ss 104(4) and 104(5)) (discussed below).

[EA.104.180] Cross-examination by the prosecutor in response to an attack on the truthfulness of a prosecution witness (s 104(4), (5))

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The ALRC explained the rationale behind the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 821): The accused should receive special protection from the dangers associated with the admission of character evidence used to attack credibility. The need for such evidence is likely to be small. Put differently, its incremental probative value is low. This is because the fact-finder hardly needs such evidence when it is obvious that any accused, indeed any party, is vitally interested in the outcome of his own case … The exception permitting the prosecution to cross-examine the accused as to bad character and prior misconduct where the accused has attacked the character of a prosecution witness has been justified on the basis that the jury “is entitled to know the credit of the man on whose word the witness’ character is being impugned”, and as a disincentive to unjustifiable attacks on prosecution witnesses. But it is suggested that the first argument, founded on a “tit for tat” basis, has little merit. The attack on the credibility of prosecution witnesses may not be based on the accused’s instructions. Furthermore, the purpose of the cross-examination is to suggest that such witnesses are unworthy of credit. The question of their credibility is altogether unrelated to the existence of a record of misconduct on the part of the accused. The fact that the accused has been guilty of past misconduct does not in any way reduce the danger of convicting him on the testimony of witnesses whose vulnerability as to credibility is demonstrable. The second argument has some merit, in that the approach provides some disincentive to unjustifiable attacks on prosecution witnesses. But objectionable methods of defence ought not to be punished by the admission of prejudicial evidence. More important, the rule is a disincentive to justifiable attacks on credibility. The mechanism for solving the problem is too broad in effect.

Cross-examination will only be permitted where: (1) evidence has been adduced44 by the defendant that tends to prove that a prosecution witness has a tendency to be untruthful (and the evidence has been admitted); (2) the evidence adduced by the defendant does not involve evidence of conduct in relation to: (a) the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted; or 44. Notwithstanding the proposals of the ALRC (ALRC 38, App A, cl 97(4)(b)(i)), the provision does not require that the evidence must have actually been given by the defendant. Thus, evidence will have been adduced by the defendant where defence counsel cross-examines a prosecution witness to obtain evidence of the sort referred to in s 104(4)(b) and (5). Of course, the evidence must have been adduced and admitted – defence counsel simply suggesting to a prosecution witness that he or she has a tendency to be untruthful, for example, will not result in the grant of leave if the prosecution witness rejects the suggestion.

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[EA.104.180]

(b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted;45 (3) the evidence adduced by the defendant is relevant solely or mainly to the prosecution witness’s credibility;46 (4) the evidence complies with the requirements of s 103;47 (5) leave is given by the court (s 104(2));48 and (6) the court’s discretionary powers (ss 135–137) are not exercised. In R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that it was open to the trial judge to grant leave to the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant charged with drug offences about a prior conviction for corruption (when he was a police officer). Sperling J stated at [259]–[262] (Santow JA agreeing at [12]):

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The leading case is the decision of the High Court in Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45. The appellant was charged with rape. He was tried in Queensland. … So far as is relevant, the provisions of the Queensland statute were, in relevant respects, substantially the same as s 104. On the hearing of the appeal in the High Court, counsel for the appellant advanced the proposition that the discretion under the statute to allow cross-examination of an accused as to credit should be exercised adversely to the accused only in exceptional circumstances. The High Court rejected that proposition, holding that the discretion was unfettered. In so holding, however, the court emphasised the importance of the consideration that allowing such cross-examination was an exception to the general rule that evidence of an accused person’s criminal history should not be adduced in a criminal trial. 45. It was argued in Tieu v The Queen (2016) 92 NSWLR 94; 258 A Crim R 546; [2016] NSWCCA 111 that cross-examination in relation to armed robbery offences in which D was not involved fell within the exclusion in s 104(5) because those offences were dealt with as part of one investigation which included, but was not limited to, the offences for which D was prosecuted. Basten JA at [59] rejected that submission, pointing out that no part of the investigation of the offences committed by D related to those other offences. While there was one investigation so far as the prosecution witness (who was involved in all the offences) was concerned, there was a separate investigation in relation to D. The other members of the Court of Criminal Appeal, McCallum J and Davies J, do not appear to have addressed this issue. 46. For an example of the application of this requirement, see R v Diamond (unreported, NSW CCA, 19 June 1998). Notwithstanding the proposals of the ALRC (ALRC 38, Appendix A, clause 97(4)(b)(iii)), the provision does not require that the purpose of the defence in attacking the prosecution witness “was solely or mainly to impugn the credibility of the witness”. 47. Thus the evidence must satisfy the test that it “could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness”. In R v Houssein [2003] NSWCCA 74 it was held that the evidence in question (that the appellant was the subject of an apprehended violence order in respect of his mother, was not even relevant to his credibility (Hulme J at [53]). In Tieu v The Queen (2016) 92 NSWLR 94; 258 A Crim R 546; [2016] NSWCCA 111, it was conceded that prior convictions for offences of dishonesty were capable of substantially affecting the assessment of the appellant’s credibility so as to fall within the exception to the credibility rule provided for in s 103 (McCallum J at [129]). 48.

In Tieu v The Queen (2016) 92 NSWLR 94; 258 A Crim R 546; [2016] NSWCCA 111, it was accepted that the prosecution had wrongly cross-examined without first obtaining leave and held by McCallum and Davies JJ (Basten JA dissenting) that this had resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In respect of comparable State provisions, it has been held that leave should be given “sparingly and cautiously”, but a substantial attack by the defence on important prosecution witnesses will justify it: see Domican v The Queen (No 3) (1990) 46 A Crim R 428 (NSW CCA) at 442 per Kirby ACJ, quoting Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 47.

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[EA.104.180]

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s 104

Sperling J held that, in the particular circumstances, the trial judge had not erred in granting leave to cross-examine under s 104. Similarly, Simpson J stated at [200] (Santow JA agreeing at [12]):

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After considerable hesitation I have come to the view that it was open to his Honour to exercise his discretion (in which I include performing the relevant balancing exercises) in the manner in which he did. In my opinion, the exercise involved a fine balancing of competing considerations. The evidence of the prior conviction was, in my opinion, likely to have been highly prejudicial to the appellant. (That prejudice was somewhat diminished by reason of the very different nature of the corruption offence from the offences with which the appellant was charged. It could not, therefore, have led the jury mistakenly to treat it as tendency evidence.) The evidence was also highly probative in relation to his credibility. In the ordinary course, it would seem to me that the danger of unfair prejudice created by evidence of a serious criminal conviction would substantially outweigh its probative value. However, that assessment has to be made in the light of the fairness considerations. I emphasise that it would not be every case where an attack is made upon the credibility of the Crown witnesses that would warrant the exercise of the s 104(2) discretion to grant leave to cross-examine in relation to such a serious matter. Caution would have to be exercised in assessing overall fairness, and in the balancing exercises. Legal representatives of persons charged with serious criminal offences must have substantial flexibility in their approach to cross-examining prosecution witnesses, without fear that attacks on those witnesses, if made within proper limits, will expose their clients to the potential disclosure of their criminal histories, or alternatively, operate as a disincentive to their exercising the option to give evidence.

A relevant consideration in assessing the question of fairness was the nature and extent of the attack on the truthfulness of the prosecution witness(s): at [192], [201]. While there was no finding of impropriety in the way the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined (which would have been a significant factor supporting a grant of leave: Sperling J at [267]–[268], but cf the observations made by the ALRC above that “objectionable methods of defence ought not to be punished by the admission of prejudicial evidence”), the cross-examination on matters going to dishonesty was extensive. In the same case, Simpson J considered at [199] whether the leave requirement in s 112 might apply in this context (see discussion at [EA.112.60]). Her Honour suggested that, even if it does not: … s 112 is relevant, in my view, to show that the common law resistance to allowing evidence of prior criminal history is still relevant in guiding the exercise of the s 104(2) discretion: see R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319; Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45; [1985] HCA 79.

It is suggested at [EA.112.60] that the better view is that s 112 would have no practical application in respect of the cross-examination of a defendant in criminal proceedings about credibility evidence. However, the considerations which found the common law “resistance to allowing evidence of prior criminal history” (which primarily turn on the obvious dangers of unfair prejudice arising from evidence tending to show the defendant’s bad character being adduced) may be taken into account when applying the s 104(2) leave requirement.

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[EA.104.240]

[EA.104.210] Cross-examination by another defendant generally In summary, D1 may (subject to judicial discretion) cross-examine D2 on a matter relevant to the credibility of D2 only where the matter is: (1) relevant to a fact in issue in D1’s trial in another way (and the evidence sought to be elicited is admissible for that purpose): see s 101A definition of “credibility evidence” (for example, where the evidence is admissible under Pt 3.6 or Pt 3.8); or (2) D2 has given evidence adverse to D1 (s 104(6)) (discussed below).

[EA.104.240]

Cross-examination of D1 by D2 where D1 has given evidence adverse to D2 (s 104(6))

Similar provisions in other jurisdictions have been interpreted to require that the evidence of D1 is objectively assessed to determine whether it supports the prosecution case against D2 or undermines D2’s defence.49 In addition, there must be compliance with the requirements of s 103 and leave must be given by the court see [EA.104.90].50 Leave is still required pursuant to s 104(2) because s 104(4) only provides that “leave must not be given … unless: (a) and (b)” – satisfaction of (a) and (b) does not mean that leave must be given.

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Cth Act: 105 Further protections: defendants making unsworn statements [Repealed] [S 105 rep Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 2 item 7]

NSW Act: 105 Further protections: defendants making unsworn statements Note: The Commonwealth Act includes a provision that will only apply in proceedings in a federal court sitting in Norfolk Island. It sets out the situations in which where a defendant in a criminal proceeding has made an unsworn statement evidence may be adduced from a person relating solely to the credibility of the defendant.

49. Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574; R v Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257 at 261. A mere denial of guilt by D2 may constitute evidence against D1 if the crime must have been committed by one of them: see R v Mir [1989] Crim LR 894 (CCA). A judgment must be made on the overall effect of D2’s evidence. The motive of D2 is irrelevant: see Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574 at 589; R v Corak (1982) 30 SASR 404 at 424. 50. The ALRC suggested that leave might be appropriately refused where D1 has a long criminal record and does not propose to give evidence, and D2 has only a single conviction: see ALRC 26, vol 1, para 413. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.105.30]

s 105

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

Vic Act: 105 Further protections—accused making unsworn statements Note: The Commonwealth Act previously included a provision which set out the situations in which where a defendant in a criminal proceeding had made an unsworn statement evidence might have been adduced from a person relating solely to the credibility of the defendant. [S 105 am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.26]

NT Act: 105 Further protections — defendants making unsworn statements Note for section 105: The Commonwealth Act formerly included a provision that only applied in proceedings in a federal court sitting in Norfolk Island. This provision has been repealed.

[EA.105.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 98, para 87(h); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 592.

[EA.105.60]

General comments

Notwithstanding the Note to the NSW/Victorian provision, s 105 in the Commonwealth Act has been repealed. This reflects the fact that no Australian jurisdiction permits a defendant to make an unsworn statement.

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Cth Act: 106

Exception: rebutting denials by other evidence

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility and that is adduced otherwise than from the witness if: (a) in cross-examination of the witness: (i) the substance of the evidence was put to the witness; and (ii) the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence; and (b) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. (2) Leave under paragraph (1)(b) is not required if the evidence tends to prove that the witness: (a) is biased or has a motive for being untruthful; or (b) has been convicted of an offence, including an offence against the law of a foreign country; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement; or (d) is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates; or (e) has knowingly or recklessly made a false representation while under an obligation, imposed by or under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, to tell the truth. [S 106 subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 52]

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NSW Act: 106 Exception: rebutting denials by other evidence (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility and that is adduced otherwise than from the witness if: (a) in cross-examination of the witness: (i) the substance of the evidence was put to the witness, and (ii) the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence, and (b) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. (2) Leave under subsection (1)(b) is not required if the evidence tends to prove that the witness: (a) is biased or has a motive for being untruthful, or (b) has been convicted of an offence, including an offence against the law of a foreign country, or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement, or (d) is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates, or (e) has knowingly or recklessly made a false representation while under an obligation, imposed by or under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, to tell the truth. [S 106 subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[47]]

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Vic Act: 106

Exception—rebutting denials by other evidence

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility and that is adduced otherwise than from the witness if— (a) in cross-examination of the witness— (i) the substance of the evidence was put to the witness; and (ii) the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence; and (b) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. (2) Leave under subsection (1)(b) is not required if the evidence tends to prove that the witness— (a) is biased or has a motive for being untruthful; or (b) has been convicted of an offence, including an offence against the law of a foreign country; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement; or (d) is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates; or (e) has knowingly or recklessly made a false representation while under an obligation, imposed by or under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, to tell the truth.

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ACT Act: 106 Exception—rebutting denials by other evidence (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility and that is presented otherwise than from the witness if— (a) in cross-examination of the witness— (i) the substance of the evidence was put to the witness; and (ii) the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence; and (b) the court gives leave to present the evidence. (2) Leave under subsection (1)(b) is not required if the evidence tends to prove that the witness— (a) is biased or has a motive for being untruthful; or (b) has been convicted of an offence, including an offence against the law of a foreign country; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement; or (d) is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which the witness’s evidence relates; or (e) has knowingly or recklessly made a false representation while under an obligation, imposed by or under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, to tell the truth. NT Act: Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

106

Exception — rebutting denials by other evidence

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility and that is adduced otherwise than from the witness if: (a) in cross-examination of the witness: (i) the substance of the evidence was put to the witness; and (ii) the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence; and (b) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. (2) Leave under subsection (1)(b) is not required if the evidence tends to prove that the witness: (a) is biased or has a motive for being untruthful; or (b) has been convicted of an offence, including an offence against the law of a foreign country; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement; or (d) is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates; or (e) has knowingly or recklessly made a false representation while under an obligation, imposed by or under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, to tell the truth.

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ALRC References

ALRC 102, paras 12.62–12.93. Compare ALRC 38, s 99, paras 179(c), 180(c); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 819.

[EA.106.60]

General comments

This provision significantly modifies the common law “collateral fact” or “finality” rule: see discussion at [EA.101A.120].51 Prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, s 106 provided for a fixed list of situations (now listed in s 106(2) as circumstances where leave is not required) in which credibility evidence might be admitted to rebut a “denial” by a witness. In ALRC 102 it was concluded that “a more flexible approach” should be adopted. At para 12.74 it was stated: The Commissions acknowledge concerns that broadening exceptions to the finality rule has the potential to lengthen some trials. However, the Commissions share the view that more flexibility is needed and that avoiding miscarriages of justice is more important than protecting the efficiency of trials. The Commissions believe that concerns about lengthening trials are addressed by the imposition of a leave requirement where the evidence does not fall into one of the existing categories, and by the requirement that the evidence be capable of substantially affecting the credibility of the witness.

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This view is endorsed in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act which states at para 151: Evidence not falling within the current exceptions may now be adduced with the court’s leave. While this has the potential to lengthen some trials, it is considered that increased flexibility is needed to avoid a miscarriage of justice which is more important than ensuring the efficiency of trials.

In summary, the credibility rule in s 102 will not apply to rebuttal evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness if: (1) the evidence is relevant to a fact in issue in another way (and the evidence sought to be elicited is admissible for that purpose): see s 101A definition of “credibility evidence”; or (2) the procedural requirements of s 106(1)(a) are satisfied and the evidence falls within one of the categories of s 106(2); or (3) the procedural requirements of s 106(1)(a) are satisfied and the court gives leave to adduce the evidence (see s 106(1)(b) and s 192). Of course, discretionary or mandatory exclusion is still possible under one of the provisions in Pt 3.11. It may be noted that the flexibility inherent in the third scenario means that it will not be essential for a court to determine whether either of the first two circumstances arise. It will not be essential to determine whether the rebuttal evidence is relevant to a fact in issue in another way and admissible for that purpose. It will not be essential to determine whether the evidence falls into one of the categories specified in s 106(2). 51. This appears not to have been appreciated by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Papazoglou v The Queen [2014] VSCA 194 (see at [11], [129], [133], [136], [141], [264], [290]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Further, where evidence relating to witness A is adduced under this provision from witness B to rebut a “denial” by witness A, the party that called A may utilize this provision in order to re-establish the credibility of A (see [EA.106.300]).

[EA.106.90]

Procedural requirements (s 106(1)(a))

Before any evidence may be admitted under this provision, the substance of the evidence must have been put (usually in cross-examination) to the witness in respect of whose credibility it is adduced and the witness must have “denied”, or not admitted or agreed to, the substance of the evidence. This, in turn, means that the requirements of ss 103 and 104 must have been complied with. Thus, if cross-examination has not been permitted on some matter relevant to the witness’s credibility then evidence of that matter cannot be adduced under this provision (although, of course, it may be admissible if it does not fall within the definition of “credibility evidence” in s 101A). However, a mechanistic approach, in which each and every proposition contained in the evidence in question is put to the witness, is not required.52 This provision requires only that “the substance of the evidence” be put.

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Prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, s 106 required that the witness must have “denied” the substance of the evidence. There was no alternative in terms of the witness not admitting or not agreeing to the substance of the evidence. Under the current provision, it would be sufficient that the witness answered that he or she had no memory of the matter (see ALRC 102 at [12.79]). Applying the former provision, it has been held that a court may take into account the way in which the witness testifies in deciding whether the witness has in fact denied the substance of the evidence.53 A similar approach may be taken in deciding whether the witness has not admitted or not agreed to the substance of the evidence. However, a surprisingly strict approach to the former provision was taken by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Australian Automotive Repairers Assn (Political Action Committee) Inc (in liq) v Insurance (Aust) Ltd [2006] ATPR 42–111; [2006] FCAFC 33. In a trial the appellant had cross-examined two witnesses called by the respondent and put to them that they, in giving earlier evidence in the trial, had been coached by solicitors for the respondent. However, the precise suggestion put to each witness was that the solicitor indicated an answer and the witness had then given that answer. The Full Federal Court regarded it as critical that it was not put to either witness that they “were responsive to the coaching” (at [51]), that is, it was never put to them that they had testified “because” of the alleged prompting from the solicitor (at [53]). Since this was not suggested to either witness, they had not “denied the substance of the evidence” which the appellant had sought to adduce, which was affidavits from persons who had observed the alleged “coaching”. It has to be said that this is a surprising decision. In a case such as this it should be sufficient that it is put to the witness that he was coached in some way and he then testified in the same way as he was coached, and this be denied, without having to put to the witness 52. Perish v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 89 at [480]. 53. Copmanhurst Shire Council v Watt (2005) 140 LGERA 333; [2005] NSWCA 245 at [39].

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that he testified as he did because of the coaching. The implication of the cross-examination is that, when the witness testified in the same way as indicated by the coaching, he did so because of the coaching. Further, it may be observed that when the witnesses in this case both denied being coached, they also necessarily denied testifying as they did because of coaching. Nevertheless, this judgment suggests that, even under the current provision, the allegation must be made explicit when it is put to the witness.54

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In Col v The Queen (2013) 237 A Crim R 67; [2013] NSWCCA 302, it was argued that, because a prosecution witness had acknowledged in crossexamination (as an unfavourable witness) that her police statement was inconsistent with her evidence at trial, the consequence was that the requirements of s 106(1) were not satisfied and the police statement was inadmissible. Latham J (Rothman J and Davies J agreeing) appears to have misunderstood the argument to rely on s 43(2) rather than this provision and held at [36] that s 43(2) would not render the statement inadmissible. While that proposition may be accepted (see [EA.43.180]), it is certainly arguable that the requirements of s 106(1)(a)(ii) were not satisfied, with the consequence that the credibility rule did apply to evidence of the police statement (rendering it inadmissible).55 There are a number of reasons for this: (a) The words “the substance of the evidence” in s 106(1)(a)(i) and (ii) must be understood as relating back to the words “evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility”. Thus, the question is whether the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence that is relevant to the witness’s credibility. An example of “evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility” is evidence that tends to prove that the witness “has made a prior inconsistent statement” (s 106(2)(c)). The focus is on the making of the prior inconsistent statement, not the truth or otherwise of the statement. What is relevant to the witness’s credibility is the act of making a prior inconsistent statement. (b) The statutory context supports the construction that admission of the making of a prior inconsistent statement constitutes an admission of “the substance of the evidence”. Part 3.7 is concerned with “credibility evidence” – evidence that is relevant to the credibility of a witness. It is not concerned with use of an out-of-court statement to prove the truth of any representation in the statement (which is dealt with in Pt 3.2). Section 106 creates an exception to the credibility rule for certain 54. This decision also raises interesting questions as to whether the evidence of “coaching” is more appropriately seen as falling within s 106(2)(a) than s 106(2)(e) (see [EA.106.150], [EA.106.270]) and whether it is in fact “credibility evidence”. 55. However, that conclusion was not inescapable. The question was whether the witness admitted “the substance of the evidence”. In this case, the witness admitted that she had made the police statement (that was inconsistent with her in-court testimony) but claimed that what she said in the statement was based on what she had been told had happened rather than her own memory. If the statement implicitly asserted that her account was based on her memory of what had happened (as seems likely), it could be concluded that she had not admitted “the substance of” what she said in the statement. The High Court refused special leave to appeal: Col v The Queen [2014] HCATrans 236. It was simply stated, rather unhelpfully: “An appeal would not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of special leave. We are not persuaded the interests of justice are engaged by this application”. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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evidence that is relevant to a witness’s credibility if certain conditions are satisfied. The making of a prior inconsistent statement is relevant to the witness’s credibility but the exception only applies if the witness does not admit that fact – the making of the prior inconsistent statement. The question of a possible hearsay use of the prior inconsistent statement has no bearing on the application of s 106. (c) This construction is also consistent with the purpose of s 106(1)(a)(ii), which is concerned with the efficient conduct of litigation (see ALRC 26, para 819; ALRC 38, para 180(c), ALRC 102, para 12.74–12.78). If the witness has admitted making the prior inconsistent statement, the efficient conduct of litigation is served by preventing the party who obtained that admission in cross-examination from adducing other evidence to prove again that the witness made the prior inconsistent statement. (d) This construction is also consistent with the legislative history of the provision (see ALRC 26, para 819; ALRC 38, para 179(c); see also ALRC 102 at para 12.62–12.83). (e) The Evidence Act 1995was drafted to reflect the terms of such standard statutory provisions as s 54 Evidence Act 1898 (NSW), which provided: “If a witness upon cross-examination as to a former statement made by him relative to the subject matter of the cause or proceeding, and inconsistent with his present testimony, does not distinctly admit that he has made such statement, proof may be given that he did in fact make it”. [emphasis added]. Substantially, uniform statutory provisions to the same effect existed in all Australian jurisdictions prior to the introduction of the uniform evidence law. The italicised words show that the focus was on the making of the statement. (f) Substantially, identical statutory provisions continue to be found in non-Uniform Evidence Law jurisdictions. They all support the proposition that the denial, or failure to admit, relates to the making of the prior inconsistent statement. It is an interesting question whether the procedural requirements of the common law relating to putting matters to a witness before evidence may be admitted might be thought to apply under the Act. In Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 the High Court held that the common law imposed such requirements on a party seeking to adduce evidence that a witness is biased, quite separate from the similar statutory obligations relating to alleged prior inconsistent statements. Section 43 imposes such procedural obligations under the Act, but only in relation to prior inconsistent statements. However, Chapter 2 of the Act is not a code and it seems likely that the wider common law obligation would apply. It would follow that, where a party wishes to adduce evidence under this provision of what the witness allegedly said out of court, the circumstances of the alleged statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion on which it was made, as well as the substance of what was allegedly said, must be put to the witness in cross-examination. This reflects the general proposition that this provision should be applied in the context of common law principles (see ss 8 and 9). For example, as the High Court observed in respect of a comparable Queensland provision, the legislation 850

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does not modify “the underlying principle of the accusatorial and adversarial system that it is for the prosecution to put its case both fully and fairly before the jury, before the accused is called on to announce the course that will be followed at trial”.56 Thus, as a matter of practice and procedure, the general principle is that the prosecution must offer all its proof before a defendant is called upon to make his or her defence.57 This provision should be understood to operate subject to that general principle (see also [EA.43.210]).58

[EA.106.120] “the court gives leave to adduce the evidence” (s 106(1)(b))

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If the procedural requirements of s 106(1)(a) are satisfied and the court gives leave to adduce the rebuttal evidence, there is no need to fit the evidence into one of the specific categories in s 106(2) (or to determine whether the evidence is relevant to a fact in issue in another way and admissible for that purpose). Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and requires the court to consider a number of matters in deciding whether to grant leave. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.59 Plainly enough, a relevant matter would be the public interest in the efficient conduct of litigation and the undesirability of unduly lengthy trials.60 It would also be appropriate to consider the discretions in Pt 3.11.61 Thus, consideration must be given to whether admission of the evidence may, for example, cause unfair prejudice to the defendant.62 Under s 192(2) the court may give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. In concluding that a flexible approach based on leave was appropriate, ALRC 102 referred at para 12.67 to the observations of McHugh J in Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 at [55] where he discussed the common law: In many cases, the finality rule also protects witnesses from having to defend themselves against discreditable allegations that are peripheral to the issues. But the common law should not have any a priori categories concerning the cases where the collateral evidence rule should or should not be relaxed. It should be regarded as a flexible rule of convenience that can and should be relaxed when the interests of justice require its relaxation. Avoiding miscarriages of justice is more important than protecting the efficiency of trials. 56. R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299; 196 ALR 421; [2003] HCA 13 at [27]. 57. Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 380; Niven v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 513; R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465; [1999] HCA 32 at [9]. 58. This appears to have been assumed in R v O’Driscoll (2003) 57 NSWLR 416; 141 A Crim R 368; [2003] NSWCCA 166. 59. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. 60. See Ballard v Brookfield Multiplex Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1461 at [20]. 61. See R v Attallah [2005] NSWCCA 277 at [61]–[62]. 62. Friend v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 41 at [132], [136]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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These comments are apposite to the question of whether leave should be granted under this provision, as are his additional comments at [56] (cited in ALRC 102 at para 12.68): [E]vidence disproving a witness’s denials concerning matters of credibility should be regarded as generally admissible if the witness’s credit is inextricably involved with a fact in issue. Consistently with the case management rationale of the finality rule, however, a judge may still reject rebutting evidence where, although inextricably connected with the fact in issue, the time, convenience or expense of admitting the evidence would be unduly disproportionate to its probative force. In such cases, the interests of justice do not require relaxation of the general rule that answers given to collateral matters such as credit are final.

The fact that the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act states at para 151 that “increased flexibility is needed to avoid a miscarriage of justice which is more important than ensuring the efficiency of trials” confirms the applicability of these sentiments to the determination of an application for leave under this provision. An example of a case where leave may properly be granted might be a criminal case where the defence seeks to adduce evidence to directly contradict a significant aspect of the evidence of an important prosecution witness, notwithstanding that the evidence does not relate directly to the facts in issue in the case.63

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[EA.106.150] “biased or has a motive for being untruthful” (s 106(2)(a)) The comparable common law exception64 to the “collateral fact rule” will provide considerable assistance in applying this provision, although arguments will to arise as to whether their scope is precisely the same. For example, the common law exception extends to evidence of “corruption”, such as use of bribes or coaching of witnesses.65 In Australian Automotive Repairers’ Assn (Political Action Committee) Inc (in liq) v Insurance (Aust) Ltd [2006] ATPR 42–111; [2006] FCAFC 33 the Full Court of the Federal Court left it unclear whether evidence of alleged “coaching” of a witness falls within the scope of (a), preferring to hold that the evidence fell within (e) (see [EA.106.270]). Under the comparable common law position, where bias of only a certain type or degree has been admitted, evidence may be admitted to prove bias of a different type or a greater degree.66 It appears arguable that evidence may be adduced of events from which a bias or motive may be inferred.67 Indeed, the Victorian Court of 63. Compare Peacock v The Queen (2008) 190 A Crim R 454; [2008] NSWCCA 264, a decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal under the Act as it stood prior to the amendments following ALRC 102. 64. See, in particular, Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1, particularly at [261]–[270]. 65. See Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 at [2], [62]–[73], [173]–[175], [205], [262]–[271]. 66. Bakopoulos v General Motors Holden Pty Ltd [1973] VR 190 (FC); R v Abebe & Mulugeta (unreported, WA CCA, 26 April 1994). 67. Compare Nicholls v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196; 79 ALJR 468; [2005] HCA 1 per Hayne and Heydon JJ at [269]; Palmer v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 1; 151 ALR 16 at 7, fn 23.

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Appeal took the view under the common law that evidence tending to show that a complainant had told lies in respect of the defendant was evidence of bias against the defendant.68 However, it has been held that this provision does not extend to evidence of a statement of an intention to blackmail even though it would be evidence tending to prove a motive for being untruthful.69 Of course, the precise scope of this exception has much less practical importance now that the court may simply grant leave under s 106(1).

[EA.106.180] “has been convicted of an offence” (s 106(2)(b)) As noted above, this evidence will only be admissible where the witness alleged to have been convicted of the offence has been cross-examined about it and denied, or not admitted or agreed to, the allegation. Proof of the conviction may be facilitated by ss 178–180.

[EA.106.210] “has made a prior inconsistent statement” (s 106(2)(c))

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As noted above, the witness alleged to have made a prior statement inconsistent with his or her testimony must have had the substance of this allegation put to him or her in cross-examination. Only if the substance of the allegation is denied or not admitted or agreed to can the prior statement be proved. Sections 43 and 45 impose various procedural requirements in this respect. If evidence of the prior inconsistent statement is admitted in accordance with these provisions, it may be used for a hearsay purpose as well as to discredit the witness (s 60), subject to s 136.

[EA.106.240] “is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates” (s 106(2)(d)) If the witness has denied or not admitted or agreed to the substance of the claimed inability, evidence may be admitted to prove it (subject to the court’s discretion). This formulation is significantly different from that in s 104(3)(b) in that there is no express reference to an inability to “recall” matters to which the witness’s evidence relates. This omission may have been inadvertent.70 However, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has rejected a submission that the provision should be broadly interpreted to permit evidence relating to an inability “to recall”.71 Nevertheless, despite this important limitation, this provision (as it existed in s 106 prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102) has 68. R v BDX (2008) 24 VR 288; 194 A Crim R 57; [2009] VSCA 28, Vincent and Weinberg JJA at [89], Ashley JA at [206]. However, see also Nettle and Redlich JJA at [192]. 69. Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 670 at [13]–[14] per Levine J. 70. However, it is possible to explain the apparent discrepancy on the basis that s 104(3)(b) is not a provision of general application and merely describes a circumstance in which a defendant in criminal proceedings can be cross-examined without leave. Section 106, however, provides a limited expansion of the rules allowing evidence in chief to be received attacking the credit of a witness. It may have been thought to be going too far to permit evidence to be admitted attacking a witness’s ability to recall. 71. R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736; [2001] NSWCCA 282 at [75]–[91]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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been interpreted broadly, extending to many aspects of “reliability”, including “psychological, psychiatric or neurological considerations” creating a “proneness to lying”.72 Thus, the cross-examining party may be permitted to call expert testimony to establish the condition which allegedly may affect awareness, so long as the requirements of s 79 are satisfied. For example, an ophthalmologist who has examined the witness may be permitted to testify to the extent of the witness’s shortsightedness, where this is relevant to whether the witness’s testimony should be accepted.73 On the face of it, this provision would permit (subject to the opinion provisions in Pt 3.3 and the discretions in Pt 3.11) evidence to be given on problems with perception and identification processes generally: for the common law position, compare Smith v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588. However, the scope of this provision as applicable to expert evidence is of largely academic interest, since s 108C now creates a general exception to the credibility rule for such evidence. Indeed, the scope of the provision is not nearly as important since the post-ALRC 102 amendments, given the fact that the court may simply grant leave under s 106(1).

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[EA.106.270] “has knowingly or recklessly made a false representation while under an obligation, imposed by or under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, to tell the truth” (s 106(2)(e)) In contrast to s 103(2)(a), the obligation to tell the truth must be a legal one. Where relevant, proof of a conviction may be facilitated by ss 178–180. Evidence of foreign law may be facilitated by Div 3 of Pt 4.6. On one reading of this provision, it would allow evidence to be admitted to show that the witness has lied in the same proceeding (as well as other proceedings) as long as the substance of the evidence has been put to the witness in cross-examination (and the witness has denied it).74 Such an interpretation would appear to permit rebuttal in all circumstances. However, it does not appear that this was intended by the ALRC. Further, an argument against such an interpretation is that it would render paras (a) to (d) unnecessary.75 This argument was accepted in ALRC 102 (at para 12.80): 72. R v Souleyman (unreported, NSW SC, Levine J, 5 September 1996); R v Rivkin (2004) 59 NSWLR 284; 184 FLR 365; [2004] NSWCCA 7 at [336]. 73. See R v Souleyman (unreported, NSW SC, Levine J, 5 September 1996); R v Rivkin (2004) 59 NSWLR 284; 184 FLR 365; [2004] NSWCCA 7 at [337]. For the comparable common law position, see Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; 155 ALR 652; [1998] HCA 50 (a psychiatrist testified that the alleged victim suffered from three distinct psychiatric disorders which might affect memory and truthfulness); Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595 (a doctor who had examined a victim soon after an alleged assault could establish the victim’s hysteria to throw doubt upon the testimony given by the victim at the trial); R v Eades [1972] Crim LR 99; Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94. 74. The judgment of Lindgren J in Australian Automotive Repairers’ Association (Political Action Committee) Inc v NRMA Insurance Ltd (No 4) [2004] FCA 369 at [15] appears to assume such a reading, but the issue was not clearly raised. 75. In R v Spiteri (2004) 61 NSWLR 369; [2004] NSWCCA 321, Simpson J noted the issue but did not find it necessary to decide it (at [50]–[51]).

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The Commissions concluded that, even if that construction is open, it should, applying the rules of statutory construction, be rejected because it would render the rest of the section redundant. It was clearly not the intention of the legislature.76

This issue arose indirectly in Australian Automotive Repairers’ Assn (Political Action Committee) Inc (in liq) v Insurance (Aust) Ltd [2006] ATPR 42–111; [2006] FCAFC 33. The Full Court of the Federal Court considered whether evidence of coaching of a witness was admissible under this provision and held that it was not because the witness had not “denied the substance of the evidence” (see [EA.106.90]). It was not necessary to decide whether the evidence fell within (e) or was more appropriately regarded as falling within (a) or some other basis of admissibility. Of course, as noted generally above, the precise meaning of the provisions in s 106(2) has much less practical importance now that the court may simply grant leave under s 106(1).

[EA.106.300] Rebuttal of evidence led on a collateral issue (re-establishing credibility)

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Where evidence relating to witness A is adduced under this provision from witness B to rebut a “denial” by witness A, the party that called A may re-examine A in an attempt to explain or contradict the evidence (ss 39 and 108(1)) and may cross-examine B to the same effect. Further, the party that called A may utilize this provision in order to re-establish the credibility of A. As ALRC 102 explains at paras 12.88–12.90: 12.88 Whenever evidence is led by one party from a witness pursuant to s 106, the opposing party will have an opportunity to cross-examine that witness. Where the cross-examiner has evidence capable of rebutting the evidence of that witness, the substance of that evidence can be put to that witness in cross-examination. Evidence which could contradict that witness’ evidence will be relevant to his or her credibility and, subject to satisfying the requirements of an amended s 106, will be admissible. 12.89 The following example illustrates how this might occur. The defendant in a criminal trial calls Dave as an alibi witness. Dave is cross-examined by the prosecutor to the effect that he has a motive to lie because he was paid by the defendant’s wife Gloria to provide an alibi for the defendant. Dave denies this. The prosecutor puts to Dave that he received a large sum of money from Gloria on a particular day. Dave denies this and says Pamela gave him money on that day in payment for a car he sold to her. Pursuant to s 106, the prosecution then calls evidence from Brian who claims to have seen Gloria give Dave money on that day. Brian is cross-examined by the defence and it is put to him that he is mistaken about the identity of the person giving Dave money. Brian denies that he is mistaken. Under the proposed amendment to s 106 the defendant could, with leave, call Pamela to give evidence that she gave Dave money in payment for a car on the day in question to rebut the denial by Brian that he is mistaken as to whom he saw handing over money. 12.90 Provided s 106 is amended as recommended, and so long as the evidence is denied (or not admitted) by the first witness called pursuant under s 106 and the court grants leave, evidence can be led from another witness to rebut evidence led under s 106. 76. ALRC 102 referred to Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 303, 311, 321; Norton v Long [1968] VR 221 at 223 applying the maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Cth Act: 107 Exception: application of certain provisions to makers of representations [Repealed] [S 107 rep Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 9]

NSW Act: 107 Exception: application of certain provisions to makers of representations [Repealed] [S 107 rep Act 55 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1.7[4]]

Vic Act: 107 Exception—application of certain provisions to makers of representations Note: This section has been repealed from the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act.

NT Act: 107 Exception — application of certain provisions to makers of representations Note for section 107: This section has been repealed from the Commonwealth Act and NSW Act.

Cth Act:

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108

Exception: re-establishing credibility

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in reexamination of a witness. (2) [Repealed] [Subs (2) rep Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 2 item 8; am Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 10]

(3) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if: (a) evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness has been admitted; or (b) it is or will be suggested (either expressly or by implication) that evidence given by the witness has been fabricated or re-constructed (whether deliberately or otherwise) or is the result of a suggestion; and the court gives leave to adduce the evidence of the prior consistent statement. [S 108 am Act 135 of 2008; Act 34 of 1997]

NSW Act: 108

Exception: re-establishing credibility

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in reexamination of a witness. (2) [Repealed] Note: The Commonwealth Act includes a subsection referring to section 105 of that Act. [Subs (2) am Act 55 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1.7[5] and [6]]

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(3) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if: (a) evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness has been admitted, or (b) it is or will be suggested (either expressly or by implication) that evidence given by the witness has been fabricated or re-constructed (whether deliberately or otherwise) or is the result of a suggestion, and the court gives leave to adduce the evidence of the prior consistent statement. [S 108 am Act 55 of 1997]

Vic Act: 108 Exception—re-establishing credibility (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in reexamination of a witness. (2)

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Note: The Commonwealth Act previously included a subsection referring to section 105 of that Act.

(3) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if— (a) evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness has been admitted; or (b) it is or will be suggested (either expressly or by implication) that evidence given by the witness has been fabricated or re-constructed (whether deliberately or otherwise) or is the result of a suggestion— and the court gives leave to adduce the evidence of the prior consistent statement. ACT Act: 108 Exception—re-establishing credibility (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence given by a witness in re-examination. (2) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if— (a) evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness has been admitted; or (b) it is or will be suggested (either expressly or by implication) that evidence given by the witness has been fabricated or reconstructed (whether deliberately or otherwise) or is the result of a suggestion; and the court gives leave to present the evidence of the prior consistent statement.

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s 108

NT Act: 108 Exception — re-establishing credibility (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in reexamination of a witness. Note for subsection (2): The Commonwealth Act formerly included a subsection (2) referring to section 105 of that Act. That subsection has been repealed.

(3) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if: (a) evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness has been admitted; or (b) it is or will be suggested (either expressly or by implication) that evidence given by the witness has been fabricated or re-constructed (whether deliberately or otherwise) or is the result of a suggestion; and the court gives leave to adduce the evidence of the prior consistent statement.

[EA.108.30]

ALRC References

ALRC 102, paras 12.84–12.93; ALRC 38, s 101, para 144(a); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 685.

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[EA.108.60]

General comments

As a general rule, a party calling a witness may not have admitted credibility evidence (defined in s 101A) in relation to that witness, unless the credibility of the witness is attacked by another party. Thus, in general, a party may not adduce evidence relating to such matters as good character (unless it is the good character of a criminal defendant under Pt 3.8) or memory, or out-of-court statements consistent with the witness’s testimony.77 Thus, the common law rule permitting evidence of “fresh complaint” in all sexual assault cases is not retained in this Act.78 Nor is the common law “oath-belief rule”.79 However, if the credibility of the witness is attacked by another party, the party calling the witness may have admitted credibility evidence which rebuts the attack so long as the requirements of this provision (or s 106) are satisfied. In addition, expert evidence going to credibility may be admitted pursuant to s 108C.

77. However, cf R v Gonzalez-Betes [2001] NSWCCA 226 at [43]–[48] where it was held that the prosecution was permitted, in relation to “an indemnified accomplice, or a person to whom some benefit has or might be extended by dint of that witness’ testimony” to adduce “that fact in evidence and the true status of the witness not for the purpose of increasing the witness’ credibility but to enable the jury properly to consider those matters on the question of whether the witness’ credibility is thereby diminished”. However, it may be that these matters should be left to defence cross-examination and possible Crown re-examination. 78. Although such evidence may be admitted if the requirements of s 108(3)(b) are satisfied: see [EA.108.150]. In addition, such evidence is likely to be admissible under s 66 (and may be used for both hearsay and credibility purposes): see [EA.108.210]. 79. See R v JSM (2013) 117 SASR 535; 235 A Crim R 73; [2013] SASCFC 96 at [29]–[74].

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[EA.108.90]

Part 3.7 - Credibility

[EA.108.120]

Re-examination of a witness (s 108(1))

The effect of this provision is that credibility evidence may be admitted in re-examination of that witness, subject to the requirements of re-examination imposed by s 39 (the matter “arises” from cross-examination or the court gives leave) and the court’s discretionary powers (ss 135–137). There is no requirement that leave be obtained from the court to adduce the evidence, in contrast with the terms of s 108(3). In R v Attallah [2005] NSWCCA 277 it appears to have been wrongly assumed that evidence of a prior statement of a witness relevant only to the credibility of the witness had to be admitted through the s 108(3) exception to the credibility rule. Since the evidence was being adduced in re-examination of the witness, there was in fact no need to rely upon s 108(3) nor to seek leave from the court to adduce the evidence (even making the questionable assumption that the prior statements were “prior consistent statements” as defined in the Dictionary to the Act). It has been held80 that a liberal construction of the phrase “in re-examination” should be preferred, so that it is not confined to oral evidence from a witness but also encompasses evidence that certain documents came to the witness’s attention at a certain time, thereby permitting the tender of those documents.

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[EA.108.120] “prior consistent statement of a witness” (s 108(3)(a)) Under s 108(3)(a), if evidence of a “prior inconsistent statement” (see the Dictionary to the Act for the definition of this term) of a witness has been admitted, leave (see below [EA.108.180]) may be granted to adduce evidence of a contrary prior consistent statement (see Dictionary). Since the prior consistent statement is admitted to support the credibility of the person who made the statement, such person must be a witness in the proceeding, whose credibility is in issue (but see also s 108A). However, evidence of the prior consistent statement need not be adduced from that person (although the fact that the person who allegedly made the prior consistent statement does not give evidence of it may be material to the question of leave).81 This provision applies even if the prior inconsistent statement was tendered by the same party that seeks leave to adduce the prior consistent statement, although this circumstance would be relevant to the question of whether leave should be granted.82 There is no requirement that the prior consistent statement should have been made at any particular time. Thus, it may be admitted even if it was made after the alleged prior inconsistent statement.83 However, the timing of the prior consistent statement, and its ability to answer the challenge to credibility arising from the evidence of the prior inconsistent statement would be material to 80. McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 27 June 1996). 81. Leung v The Queen (2003) 144 A Crim R 441; [2003] NSWCCA 51 at [86]. 82. R v Selsby [2004] NSWCCA 381 at [55]; KNP v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 227; [2006] NSWCCA 213 at [29]–[31]. 83. Compare KNP v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 227; [2006] NSWCCA 213; Friend v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 41 at [131]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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whether leave is granted. Further, the discussion below at [EA.108.150] of the leave requirement in respect of s 108(3)(b) may be relevant in this context.84 A Supreme Court judge has observed that the “ordinary … police statement in criminal proceedings or a proof of evidence in civil proceedings … would ordinarily be so devoid of value in answering an earlier inconsistent statement … as not to be arguably probative at all”.85 If evidence of a prior consistent statement is admitted in accordance with this provision, it may be used for a hearsay purpose as well as to support the credibility of the witness (s 60), subject to s 136.86

[EA.108.150] “prior consistent statement of a witness” (s 108(3)(b)) Evidence of a prior consistent statement (see the Dictionary to the Act for the definition of this term) of a witness will not be excluded by the credibility rule in s 102 if: (1) it is or will be suggested either expressly or by implication that evidence given by the witness: (a) has been fabricated; or (b) has been reconstructed, whether deliberately or otherwise; or (c) is the result of suggestion; and Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

(2) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. It has been suggested that “the denial of the events alleged without more does not necessarily suggest, expressly or implicitly, positively, reconstruction, fabrication

84. See KNP v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 227; [2006] NSWCCA 213 at [25]–[31]. If the prior consistent statement throws light on or qualifies the prior inconsistent statement there will be a strong case for a grant of leave. Thus it was pointed out in R v Ali [2000] NSWCCA 177 at [47] per Sperling J that “it is a very different situation where evidence has been adduced of a prior inconsistent statement. In such a case, a consistent statement made at about the same time, coupled with an explanation for the inconsistent statement which is connected with the truth of the consistent one has the potentiality to answer the attack on the witness’ credibility in a rational way”. However, it is not essential to a grant of leave that the prior consistent statement be connected with the inconsistent one in this way. What is necessary is that the prior consistent statement tends to reinstate the witness’s credibility (which has been undermined by the prior inconsistent statement): KNP v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 227; [2006] NSWCCA 213 at [25]–[27]. Also relevant will be whether admitting evidence of the prior consistent statement “ensured … that particular alleged inconsistencies … could be assessed fairly by reference to the entirety of the context of which they formed a part”: Friend v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 41 at [132]. 85. R v Cassar, Sleiman and Kalache (Judgment No 12) [1999] NSWSC 352 at [18] per Sperling J. However, the difficulty is in determining what circumstances pertaining to the making of the statement are relevant to the grant of leave. Nevertheless, the approach of the trial judge was endorsed on appeal (without detailed discussion): R v Sleiman [2003] NSWCCA 231 at [74]. 86. For discussion of the possible application of s 136 in this context, see [EA.136.150].

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87

or suggestion”. On the other hand, there “is no warrant for reading into the provision a requirement that fabrication be explicitly raised or strongly inferred before the credibility rule is waived”.88 It is enough that one of the suggestions “will be made”. This would allow evidence of the prior consistent statement unless an undertaking is given to not make such a suggestion. On one interpretation, it might allow such evidence before the witness has testified, or while the witness is giving evidence-in-chief.89 On the other hand, there is much to be said for the view that: [T]he phrase “if it is or will be suggested” encompasses the suggestion having been made to a witness or an intention to make the suggestion at a later time (most usually in final address). It does not mean that the subsection operates before the witness has been called. Indeed, the section refers explicitly to “evidence given by the witness”.90

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Since the prior consistent statement is admitted to support the credibility of the person who made the statement, such person must be a witness in the proceeding, whose credibility is in issue (but see also s 108A). However, evidence of the prior consistent statement need not be adduced from that person (although the fact that the person who allegedly made the prior consistent statement does not give evidence of it may be material to the question of leave).91 It is not explicitly necessary, as it is under the common law doctrine of “recent invention”, that the prior consistent statement was made either contemporaneously with the event in question, or at a time sufficiently early to be inconsistent with the suggestion that the evidence given at the trial is a recent invention or reconstruction, and thus rationally tends to answer that suggestion.92 It need not be a “complaint”.93 It need only be “consistent” with evidence of the witness (thus, it does not have to be identical with (all) the evidence of the witness).94 However, it has been pointed out that “the ability of the prior consistent statement to answer the suggestion must remain a matter to be considered in determining whether leave is granted”.95 The leave requirement was considered by the High Court in Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438; [1998] 87. R v Whitmore (1999) 109 A Crim R 51; [1999] NSWCCA 247 at [39] per Greg James J. 88. Pavitt v The Queen (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88 at [105]. See also Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4 at [177]. 89. The view has been expressed that, if any question arises as to the admissibility of a prior consistent statement during the evidence-in-chief of a prosecution witness, it is desirable that the court inquires whether it will be suggested that relevant portions of the witness’s evidence have been fabricated, reconstructed or are the result of suggestion: see R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 (NSWCCA) at 147 per Smart J. See also R v RPS (unreported, NSW CCA, No 60583 of 1996, 13 August 1997), p 10 per Hunt CJ at CL. 90. See Hadid v Australis Media Ltd [No 2] (unreported, NSW SC, Sperling J, 28 October 1996), p 11). But cf R v NJF (unreported, NSW CCA, 5 June 1997), a case where the Court of Criminal Appeal accepted that it was sufficient that the suggestion had been made in cross-examination of the complainant at committal proceedings. 91. Leung v The Queen (2003) 144 A Crim R 441; [2003] NSWCCA 51 at [86]. 92. R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 141 per Hunt CJ at CL; referring to Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 479–480. 93. Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4 at [180]. 94. See Dunks v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 134 at [31]–[40]. 95. R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 141 per Hunt CJ at CL. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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HCA 1. The issue was whether leave should have been given to the prosecution to adduce evidence of the alleged victim’s first “complaint”, which was consistent with her in-court testimony. The majority of the court (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) observed (at 609): In exercising the discretion under s 108(3) to permit the adducing of a prior consistent statement, it is important to bear two matters in mind. First, s 108 creates an exception to the “credibility rule” – the rule that evidence that is relevant only to a witness’ credibility is not admissible. Second, it is important to identify how the evidence relates to the statutory premise for its admission. Whether, if admissible, the complaint becomes evidence of the truth of what is asserted is not relevant to the exercise of the discretion to give leave under s 108. The exercise of the discretion under s 108 depends upon the effect of the evidence on the witness’ credibility: here, the suggestion of fabrication.

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Thus, it is necessary to isolate the nature of the attack on the credibility of the witness, so that it can be determined whether the evidence of a prior consistent statement bears upon that issue.96 In this case, the defence suggestion was that the evidence of the complainant had been “fabricated” but the time of the alleged fabrication was not identified. Given that the complaint (made six years after the events in question) led at once to the start of police investigations, it was doubtful that the defence was suggesting that the fabrication occurred at a time after the making of the complaint. Accordingly, as the majority of the High Court observed, “it may be doubted that a jury could gain assistance from its making in deciding whether the complainant had fabricated her story”. In simple terms, it appeared that the fact of the making of the complaint did not tend to rebut the attack on credibility.97 A Supreme Court judge has suggested that: [T]he ordinary … police statement in criminal proceedings or a proof of evidence in civil proceedings … would ordinarily be so devoid of value in answering … a suggestion of fabrication as not to be arguably probative at all.98

The difficulty is in determining what circumstances pertaining to the making of the statement are relevant to the grant of leave.99 In R v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227; [2002] NSWCCA 328, Howie J observed at [56] that “[b]ecause the 96. As the majority explained (at 609), unless the evidence “can be said to assist the resolution of that question, the evidence of the [prior consistent statement] is not important [s 192(2)(c)] and would do nothing except add to the length of the hearing [s 192(2)(a)]”. If the statement could not assist in meeting the attack on credibility, the statement would not be admitted under this provision: JD v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 274 at [21]–[22]. 97. See also R v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227; [2002] NSWCCA 328 at [51] per Howie J; R v Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 396 at [31]; Abdul-Kader v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 281; [2007] NSWCCA 329 at [42]–[50]); Langbein v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 378; [2008] NSWCCA 38 at [93]. In Nikolaidis v The Queen (2008) 191 A Crim R 556; [2008] NSWCCA 323, it was alleged that a prosecution witness had fabricated her allegations after the middle of 2001. Simpson J observed at [218] that “any statement [the prosecution witness] had made prior to that date, consistent with her evidence …, was therefore capable of rebutting the suggestion of fabrication”. It should be noted that, in Doyle v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 4, Bathurst CJ acknowledged at [182] that a complaint was made some five years after the alleged incident but did not consider that this was fatal to a grant of leave bearing in mind that it was “made well prior to the trial”. 98. R v Cassar (Judgment No 12) [1999] NSWSC 352 at [18] per Sperling J. 99. In Cassar, the trial judge considered that “it would be open to a jury to accept” that the prior consistent statement was made by a man “fearful of telling what he knew but looking for a way to do so” (Sperling J at [19]). Sperling J considered that a “statement made in that context would

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statement is being admitted to meet [an attack of fabrication, reconstruction or the result of suggestion] the timing of the making of the statement, generally speaking, will be more important than the circumstances in which the statement was made”. This proposition was endorsed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 (Simpson J at [21], Adams and Johnson JJ agreeing) but it was observed that this proposition “was not expressed to be universal or absolute”. The complainant in MDB, who alleged he was assaulted by the appellant on a camping trip, did not complain until six months later when he was about to accompany the appellant on another camping trip. Simpson J held at [24] that this circumstance (the prospect that he was about to go on another trip with the appellant) was: capable of being very powerful in enabling the jury to understand why it was that he had delayed in his disclosure for a period of six months, but had made his disclosures when he did. It was capable of being compelling evidence in rebutting the suggestion of fabrication, by explaining the context and the circumstances in which he took the course he did.100

It has been observed in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal that any application for leave:

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would need to be evaluated in the context of the policy of the Act setting its face against evidence relevant on credibility alone unless made relevant by some course, consciously chosen by the accused … [T]he restraint from attacking credibility by going no further [than denying events alleged by the complainant] would be a most material matter mitigating against the grant of leave.101

Of course, even if evidence of a prior consistent statement is not rendered admissible under this provision, the evidence may be admissible on an entirely separate basis (see the other provisions of s 108 and see also s 66). If evidence of a prior consistent statement is admitted in accordance with this provision, it may be used for a hearsay purpose as well as to support the credibility of the witness (s 60),102 subject to s 136. have a probative value beyond mere assertion, in advance, of what was later said in evidence. It could rebut the suggestion of fabrication”. However, the critical issue is whether such analysis, taking into account matters bearing on the reliability of the out-of-court statement, is permissible, bearing in mind the statement of the majority of the High Court in Graham that “[w]hether, if admissible, the complaint becomes evidence of the truth of what is asserted is not relevant to the exercise of the discretion to give leave under s 108”. Nevertheless, the approach of the trial judge was endorsed on appeal (without detailed discussion): R v Sleiman [2003] NSWCCA 231 at [74]. 100. Simpson J rejected (at [26] a submission that this circumstance was “relatively neutral”. However, it is arguable that it was neutral for the purposes of this provision. In respect of the credibility of the complainant, the circumstance did not really explain why he delayed for six months in making a complaint (other than some sort of generalisation that there was “no need”). It did provide an explanation for why he chose to complain when he did, but that was not an issue before the jury until the evidence of complaint was adduced. It is difficult to see how the circumstance relied upon by the Court of Criminal Appeal supported the credibility of the complainant, as distinct from providing a reason why he made the complaint when he did (as distinct from, say, a week or a month later than when he did complain). 101. R v Whitmore (1999) 109 A Crim R 51; [1999] NSWCCA 247 at [38]–[39] per Greg James J; see also R v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370 at [52]. 102. However, as the majority of the High Court noted in Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438; [1998] HCA 1 at 609: “whether, if admissible, the [prior consistent © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.108.180] “if the court gives leave” (s 108(2), (3)) The application of the leave requirement in respect of s 108(3)(a) and (b) is discussed above. Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and requires the court to consider a number of matters in deciding whether to grant leave. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.103 It would also be appropriate to consider the discretions in Pt 3.11.104 Thus, consideration must be given to whether admission of the evidence may, for example, cause unfair prejudice to the defendant.105 Under s 192(2) the court may give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit”. It has been suggested that “the better course to adopt” in cases where evidence of a prior consistent statement is sought to be admitted under s 108(3) is for the relevant evidence to be taken on the voir dire (see s 189), and then to rule on the basis of the actual evidence so given, rather than on the basis of statements made from the bar table as to what it is anticipated the evidence may be.106

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[EA.108.210] Example: evidence of “complaint” in criminal proceedings There is no specific provision in the Act retaining the common law rule permitting evidence of “fresh complaint” in all sexual assault cases. Accordingly, the question of admissibility is to be resolved under the general provisions of the Act (and, of course, any other applicable legislation: see, for example, Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 377, discussed at [EA.66.300]). Such evidence will usually be relevant for a hearsay use (to prove the facts asserted to exist in the complaint) and may be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule (particularly, s 66). If so, the evidence does not fall within the definition of “credibility evidence” (and thus the credibility rule in s 102 has no application) and it may be used both to prove the existence of any asserted fact and to support the credibility of the complainant, subject to discretionary limits on use: see s 136.107 The evidence may be relevant and admitted for a non-hearsay use108 (other than a credibility use) and, in consequence, admissible for a hearsay use (s 60) and (because of the definition of “credibility evidence”) a credibility use, again subject to discretionary limits on use. If neither of these situations applies, and the evidence falls within the definition of “credibility evidence”, to which the statement] becomes evidence of the truth of what is asserted is not relevant to the exercise of the discretion to give leave under s 108”. Thus, the potential use of the evidence to independently establish the facts asserted by the witness in testimony is not a basis for a grant of leave. 103. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. 104. See R v Attallah [2005] NSWCCA 277 at [61]–[62]. 105. Friend v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 41 at [132], [136]. 106. Leung v The Queen (2003) 144 A Crim R 441; [2003] NSWCCA 51 at [90] per O’Keefe J. 107. For discussion of the possible application of s 136 in this context, see [EA.136.150]. 108. For example, in R v HJS [2000] NSWCCA 205 at [158]–[160] evidence of complaint was held relevant to make comprehensible the defendant’s response (admissible as an “admission”) when informed of the complaint.

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[EA.108.240]

credibility rule in s 102 applies, the evidence may be admissible under this provision. Thus, it may be admitted in re-examination of the complainant, subject to the requirements of re-examination imposed by s 39 and possible discretionary exclusion. It may be admitted if evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the complainant has been admitted, subject to leave. Even if no prior inconsistent statement has been admitted, evidence of the “complaint” may be admitted as a prior consistent statement109 if the suggestion referred to in s 108(3)(b) has been or will be made, again subject to leave. Leave would not be granted if the fact of the making of the complaint did not tend to rebut the attack on credibility.110 If admissible under this provision to support the credibility of the complainant, then, by reason of s 60, it may also be used for a hearsay purpose, again subject to s 136. In a jury trial, careful directions and warnings may be required under s 165 and the common law: see [EA.165.450] and [EA.165.480].

[EA.108.240] Jury directions

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The assessment of the impact of a prior consistent statement on credibility will be a matter for the jury. Thus, for example, it should not be assumed that where a prior consistent statement has been admitted into evidence because a prior inconsistent statement has been introduced, that the two statements will necessarily have the same probative value.111 An evaluation of the significance of any prior consistent or inconsistent statement to the credibility of a witness should ordinarily be undertaken by a discrete consideration of each statement.112 The separate evaluation should take account of the timing and circumstances in which the statement was made and the nature of the matter in issue.113

DIVISION 3 – CREDIBILITY OF PERSONS WHO ARE NOT WITNESSES DIVISION 3.7.3 – CREDIBILITY OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT WITNESSES (ACT ONLY)

109. Given the Dictionary definition of this term, the statement must be consistent with evidence given by the witness/complainant. If the witness/complainant has not testified as to the subject matter of the alleged “complaint”, the evidence will not be admissible under this provision: see R v Dixon [2001] NSWCCA 39. 110. See Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438; [1998] HCA 1 and the discussion above in [EA.108.150]. 111. Niaros v The Queen [2013] VSCA 249, Redlich JA at [98]. 112. Niaros v The Queen [2013] VSCA 249, Redlich JA at [99]. 113. Redlich JA added at [99]: “So, for example, the fact that a statement was made on oath in court proceedings may lead to it being given greater weight. Because a prior consistent statement is being admitted to meet a particular attack, the timing of the making of the statement, generally speaking, may assume more importance than the circumstances in which the statement was made” © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 108A

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Cth Act: 108A Admissibility of evidence of credibility of person who has made a previous representation (1) If: (a) evidence of a previous representation has been admitted in a proceeding; and (b) the person who made the representation has not been called, and will not be called, to give evidence in the proceeding; credibility evidence about the person who made the representation is not admissible unless the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the person’s credibility. [Subs (1) subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 54]

(2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to: (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the person who made the representation knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the person was under an obligation to tell the truth; and (b) the period that elapsed between the doing of the acts or the occurrence of the events to which the representation related and the making of the representation. [Subs (2) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 55]

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[S 108A am Act 135 of 2008; insrt Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 11]

NSW Act: 108A Admissibility of evidence of credibility of person who has made a previous representation (1) If: (a) evidence of a previous representation has been admitted in a proceeding, and (b) the person who made the representation has not been called, and will not be called, to give evidence in the proceeding, credibility evidence about the person who made the representation is not admissible unless the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the person’s credibility. [Subs (1) subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[49]]

(2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to: (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the person who made the representation knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the person was under an obligation to tell the truth, and (b) the period that elapsed between the doing of the acts or the occurrence of the events to which the representation related and the making of the representation. [Subs (2) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[50]] [S 108A am Act 46 of 2007; insrt Act 55 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1.7[7]]

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Vic Act: 108A Admissibility of evidence of credibility of person who has made a previous representation (1) If— (a) evidence of a previous representation has been admitted in a proceeding; and (b) the person who made the representation has not been called, and will not be called, to give evidence in the proceeding— credibility evidence about the person who made the representation is not admissible unless the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the person’s credibility. (2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to— (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the person who made the representation knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the person was under an obligation to tell the truth; and (b) the period that elapsed between the doing of the acts or the occurrence of the events to which the representation related and the making of the representation. ACT Act:

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108A Admissibility of evidence of credibility of person who has made a previous representation (1) If— (a) evidence of a previous representation has been admitted in a proceeding; and (b) the person who made the representation has not been called, and will not be called, to give evidence in the proceeding; credibility evidence about the person who made the representation is not admissible unless the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the person’s credibility. (2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for subsection (1), it must have regard to— (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the person who made the representation knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the person was under an obligation to tell the truth; and (b) the period that elapsed between the doing of the acts or the happening of the events to which the representation related and the making of the representation.

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NT Act: 108A Admissibility of evidence of credibility of person who has made a previous representation (1) If: (a) evidence of a previous representation has been admitted in a proceeding; and (b) the person who made the representation has not been called, and will not be called, to give evidence in the proceeding; credibility evidence about the person who made the representation is not admissible unless the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the person’s credibility. (2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to: (a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the person who made the representation knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the person was under an obligation to tell the truth; and (b) the period that elapsed between the doing of the acts or the occurrence of the events to which the representation related and the making of the representation.

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[EA.108A.30]

ALRC References

ALRC 102, paras 12.94–12.107. Compare ALRC 38, s 100, para 131(c); ALRC 26, vol 1, para 721.

[EA.108A.60]

General comments

“Credibility evidence” is defined in s 101A. This provision renders such evidence “about” a “person who made” a “previous representation” that “has been admitted in a proceeding” inadmissible, “unless the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the person’s credibility”. If evidence is relevant because it affects the credibility of a person but also relevant and admissible for another purpose, it is not “credibility evidence” (see [EA.101A.60]). Where such evidence is admitted, the provisions in this Division do not limit the use that can be made of the evidence. This provision does not apply where the “credibility evidence” is evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness. In that situation, ss 102 and 103 create largely the same rule regarding admissibility of the credibility evidence. This provision permits a party against whom hearsay evidence has been admitted, without the maker of the previous representation being called, to have admitted evidence relevant to the credibility of the person who made the representation.114 Indeed, this provision might be utilised by the party that adduced the evidence of

114. For an example of the application of the provision, see R v Siulai [2004] NSWCCA 152 at [79]–[81].

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the previous representation, either to adduce evidence to discredit,115 or to support the credit of, the person who made the previous representation. The same test (“could substantially affect the assessment of … credibility”) operates as is applied under s 103, in deciding whether the credibility rule (s 102) does not apply to cross-examination of a witness as to credibility: see [EA.103.60].116 However, it should be noted that while the matters referred to in s 108A(2), which a court is required to have regard to in deciding whether the evidence satisfies the test in s 108A(1), are matters that tend to discredit the person, s 108A is not limited in its application to evidence tending to discredit (see ALRC 102 at para 12.94).

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It has been held that a “person” (who “made a representation”) may be a corporation.117 In Azzi v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 249, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered this provision in a case where the appellant had been convicted of supplying 16 grams of heroin (found in his wardrobe in his bedroom). Evidence was led that, when asked about the heroin by the police, the appellant denied any knowledge of its presence. The prosecution was also permitted to adduce evidence that other drugs, including a small amount of methylamphetamine, were found in other parts of the bedroom as well as evidence that, when asked about that methylamphetamine, the appellant told a lie about it (claiming he thought it was “probably sugar”). In the Court of Criminal Appeal, Fullerton J (Beazley P and Hidden J agreeing) held that evidence of that lie was not admissible coincidence evidence pursuant to Part 3.6 in the trial of the heroin offence and that the evidence was caught by s 101A (it was “credibility evidence” with regard to the appellant’s denial of guilt with respect to the heroin offence). However, it was held that the evidence satisfied the requirements of this provision (as well as s 108B). It was held that “the previous representation [was] the appellant’s denial [to the police] that he was in possession of the heroin” and the evidence that he told a lie about the methylamphetamine “was capable of substantially effecting the jury’s assessment of his credibility” (Fullerton J at [47]).

115. In R v Arthurell (unreported, NSW SC, Hunt CJ at CL, 18 September 1997), this provision was applied, by “analogy”, in a criminal proceeding to allow the prosecution to adduce evidence-in-chief designed to discredit an out-of-court exculpatory account given by the defendant. In R v Sood (No 3) [2006] NSWSC 762, Simpson J at [82]–[84] permitted the prosecution to adduce evidence to undermine the accuracy of an account of relevant facts asserted by the defendant on a previous occasion and admitted in the prosecution case (however, there was no reference made to this provision and no finding that the defendant would not be called to give evidence). It should be noted that these authorities preceded the amendment of the Act to introduce s 108B and, for that reason, should not be regarded as good law now. 116. See ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 13) [2013] FCA 577 at [14]–[16]. In Fletcher v The Queen (2015) 45 VR 634; 252 A Crim R 11; [2015] VSCA 146, Dixon AJA (with whom Weinberg and Priest JJA agreed) held at [94]–[95] that evidence that a person (whose previous representation had been admitted in the proceeding and would not be called to give evidence in the proceeding) “[was] scared” of the applicant was “no more than an assertion of the applicant’s bad character” and could not rationally affect the assessment of the probability that what the person said she saw and heard was true. 117. ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 13) [2013] FCA 577 at [11]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 108B

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

Criminal proceedings

Where the person who made the previous representation is a defendant in a criminal proceeding, s 108B imposes further restrictions on the admissibility of credibility evidence. In criminal trials, the prosecution may not know until the close of the prosecution case whether the defence will adduce evidence of a previous representation by someone who will not be called as a witness. The procedural question will arise whether the prosecution can then take advantage of this provision. The issue is addressed in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act at para 157: Subsection 108A only applies where the person who made the representation will not be called to give evidence in the proceeding. Where that person is the defendant or a witness for the defence, it will be up to the defence whether or not to call that person to give evidence. There is generally no obligation on the defence to disclose this information to the prosecution or the court. This may lead to uncertainty for the prosecution before the close of its case where it is not aware whether the relevant person who made the representation will be called. Without this information, the prosecution cannot rely on the provisions of section 108A to admit credibility evidence. However, this problem can be overcome by the prosecution later being able to reopen its case, or being allowed to call a case in reply: see R v Siulai [2004] NSWCCA 152.118

Cth Act:

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108B Further protections: previous representations of an accused who is not a witness (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to section 108A. (2) If the person referred to in that section is a defendant, the credibility evidence is not admissible unless the court gives leave. (3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required if the evidence is about whether the defendant: (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which his or her previous representation relates; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement. (4) The prosecution must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless evidence adduced by the defendant has been admitted that: (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecution has a tendency to be untruthful; and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. (5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to: (a) the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted; or 118. Explanatory Memorandum, para 157. Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Victorian Act.

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(b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted. (6) Another defendant must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless the previous representation of the defendant that has been admitted includes evidence adverse to the defendant seeking leave. [S 108B insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 56]

NSW Act: 108B Further protections: previous representations of an accused who is not a witness (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to section 108A. (2) If the person referred to in that section is a defendant, the credibility evidence is not admissible unless the court gives leave.

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(3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required if the evidence is about whether the defendant: (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful, or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which his or her previous representation relates, or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement. (4) The prosecution must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless evidence adduced by the defendant has been admitted that: (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecution has a tendency to be untruthful, and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. (5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to: (a) the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted, or (b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted. (6) Another defendant must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless the previous representation of the defendant that has been admitted includes evidence adverse to the defendant seeking leave. [S 108B insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[51]]

Vic Act: 108B Further protections—previous representations of an accused who is not a witness (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to section 108A. (2) If the person referred to in that section is an accused, the credibility evidence is not admissible unless the court gives leave. [Subs (2) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.27] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required if the evidence is about whether the accused— (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which his or her previous representation relates; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement. [Subs (3) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.27]

(4) The prosecution must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless evidence adduced by the accused has been admitted that— (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecution has a tendency to be untruthful; and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. [Subs (4) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.27]

(5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to— (a) the events in relation to which the accused is being prosecuted; or (b) the investigation of the offence for which the accused is being prosecuted. [Subs (5) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.27]

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(6) Another accused must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless the previous representation of the accused that has been admitted includes evidence adverse to the accused seeking leave. [Subs (6) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.27] [S 108B am Act 68 of 2009]

ACT Act: 108B Further protections—previous representations of an accused who is not a witness (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and applies in addition to section 108A. (2) If the person mentioned in section 108A is a defendant, the credibility evidence is not admissible unless the court gives leave. (3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required if the evidence is about whether the defendant— (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which the defendant’s previous representation relates; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement. (4) The prosecution must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless evidence presented by the defendant has been admitted that— (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecution has a tendency to be untruthful; and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. 872

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[EA.108B.60]

(5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to— (a) the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted; or (b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted. (6) Another defendant must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless the previous representation of the defendant that has been admitted includes evidence adverse to the defendant seeking leave. NT Act: 108B Further protections — previous representations of an accused who is not a witness (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and so applies in addition to section 108A. (2) If the person referred to in that section is a defendant, the credibility evidence is not admissible unless the court gives leave.

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(3) Despite subsection (2), leave is not required if the evidence is about whether the defendant: (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which his or her previous representation relates; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement. (4) The prosecution must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless evidence adduced by the defendant has been admitted that: (a) tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecution has a tendency to be untruthful; and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility. (5) A reference in subsection (4) to evidence does not include a reference to evidence of conduct in relation to: (a) the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted; or (b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted. (6) Another defendant must not be given leave under subsection (2) unless the previous representation of the defendant that has been admitted includes evidence adverse to the defendant seeking leave.

[EA.108B.30]

ALRC References

ALRC 102, paras 12.94–12.107.

[EA.108B.60]

General comments

In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 12.97: In criminal proceedings there are several situations in which a previous representation of the defendant may be admitted, namely: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 108B

• where the evidence of the previous representation is admitted under the admission provisions; • where a previous representation of the defendant is admitted for a non-hearsay purpose; • where a previous representation of the defendant is admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule in Part 3.2.

The effect of this provision is that additional limitations (over and above that imposed by s 108A) are imposed on “credibility evidence” about a defendant in criminal proceedings who made “a previous representation” that has been admitted in the proceeding: • Leave to admit the evidence must be sought and obtained, unless the matters sought to be the subject of cross-examination fall within s 108B(3). • Where leave is required, it cannot be given for evidence adduced by the prosecutor unless the matters sought to be the subject of crossexamination fall within s 108B(4). • Where leave is required, it cannot be given for evidence adduced by another defendant unless the requirements of s 108B(6) are satisfied.

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These additional limitations correspond to the imitations imposed by s 104 on the admissibility of credibility evidence adduced in cross-examination of a defendant, over and above the limitations imposed by s 103 (for detailed discussion of the corresponding limitations in s 104, see [EA.104.90] to [EA.104.240]). In the present context, the defendant has not testified (and is thus not a witness), so that Div 2 has no application. ALRC 102 explained at para 12.105–12.106: The Commissions are of the view that a defendant should not be placed at any greater disadvantage than would follow if that defendant had given evidence as a witness, particularly where the opportunity to lead evidence relevant only to credibility arises because the prosecution has led evidence of a previous representation of that defendant. … [T]he section needs to apply restrictions on evidence relevant to the credibility of the maker of previous representation equivalent to those which apply to evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness, including the protections afforded by s 104.

It may be noted that, if the prosecution has adduced evidence of a previous representation as an admission, it is arguable that the credibility of the maker of the representation (subsequently the defendant in the criminal proceedings) is not in issue, so that the requirement of relevance in s 56 is not satisfied in respect of credibility evidence adduced by the prosecution (see ALRC 102 at para 12.107). It is important to appreciate that this provision only applies to “credibility evidence” as defined in s 101A. Even if evidence is relevant because it affects the credibility of a witness or person it will not be credibility evidence if it is also relevant and admissible for another purpose. It follows that this provision has no application in respect of evidence that is relevant and admissible as bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Thus, this provision does not apply to tendency evidence that is admissible in relation to the defendant. The admissibility of such evidence is determined by Pt 3.6 and Pt 3.8. Thus, for example, where evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for embezzlement is admissible on the basis that it satisfies the requirements of Pt 3.6 of the Act, the evidence so adduced may be used in respect of the credibility of the defendant 874

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[EA.108B.60]

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regardless of this provision (subject to the operation of the discretions in s 135 and, particularly, s 137). For the same reason, it does not apply to character evidence that, pursuant to a provision of Pt 3.8, is not excluded by the tendency rule (see [EA.101A.210]). In Azzi v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 249, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal considered this provision in a case where the appellant had been convicted of supplying 16 grams of heroin (found in his wardrobe in his bedroom). Evidence was led that, when asked about the heroin by the police, the appellant denied any knowledge of its presence. The prosecution was also permitted to adduce evidence that other drugs, including a small amount of methylamphetamine, were found in other parts of the bedroom as well as evidence that, when asked about that methylamphetamine, the appellant told a lie about it (claiming he thought it was “probably sugar”). In the Court of Criminal Appeal, Fullerton J (Beazley P and Hidden J agreeing) held that the evidence satisfied the requirements of s 108A and this provision. With respect to this provision, it was held that the evidence was “about whether the accused … has made a prior inconsistent statement”. Fullerton J stated at [50]: “the sugar lie is the evidence ‘about whether the accused made a prior inconsistent statement’ (namely his denial that he was in possession of the heroin) as provided for in s 108B(3)(c)”. It is difficult to follow this reasoning. The term “prior inconsistent statement” of a witness is defined in the Dictionary to the Act to mean “a previous representation that is inconsistent with evidence given by the witness”. However, s 108B is concerned with a situation where a person is not a witness, so this definition does not apply. The question, then, is what the term means in this context. Bearing in mind that this provision complements s 108A, it presumably means a previous representation that is inconsistent with the previous representation that has already been admitted in the proceeding (referred to in s 108A(1)(a)). In this case, the previous representation that had already been admitted in the proceeding was the denial to the police of any knowledge of the heroin. Fullerton J plainly so held. Nevertheless, it is not at all clear how telling a lie about the methylamphetamine can be described as a representation that was “inconsistent” with that representation, unless (perhaps) telling a lie about one drug could be seen to be “inconsistent” with a telling the truth about another drug. If the previous representation about the heroin was characterised as “I am truthfully asserting that I did not know it was there”, is it reasonable to say that evidence tending to show that another representation made at the same time about another drug was a lie is evidence that can be regarded as “inconsistent” with the first representation? If evidence of matters tending to show the defendant’s bad character (including prior convictions) is adduced under this provision in a jury trial, careful directions would usually be required from the trial judge to the effect that the jury may only use the evidence in relation to the credibility of the defendant and, accordingly, must not engage in tendency reasoning.

DIVISION 4 – PERSONS WITH SPECIALISED KNOWLEDGE DIVISION 3.7.4 – PEOPLE WITH SPECIALISED KNOWLEDGE (ACT ONLY)

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Cth Act: 108C Exception: evidence of persons with specialised knowledge

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(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence given by a person concerning the credibility of another witness if: (a) the person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (b) the evidence is evidence of an opinion of the person that: (i) is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge; and (ii) could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of a witness; and (c) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. (2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1): (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse); and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge of that kind, a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following: (i) the development and behaviour of children generally; (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences. [S 108C insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 56]

NSW Act: 108C

Exception: evidence of persons with specialised knowledge

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence given by a person concerning the credibility of another witness if: (a) the person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, and (b) the evidence is evidence of an opinion of the person that: (i) is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge, and (ii) could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness, and (c) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. (2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1): (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse), and 876

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(b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge of that kind, a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following: (i) the development and behaviour of children generally, (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences. [S 108C insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[51]]

Vic Act: 108C Exception—evidence of persons with specialised knowledge

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(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence given by a person concerning the credibility of another witness if— (a) the person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (b) the evidence is evidence of an opinion of the person that— (i) is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge; and (ii) could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness; and (c) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. (2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1)— (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse); and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge of that kind, a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following— (i) the development and behaviour of children generally; (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences. ACT Act: 108C

Exception—evidence of people with specialised knowledge

(1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence given by a person about the credibility of another witness if— (a) the person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (b) the evidence is evidence of an opinion of the person that— (i) is completely or substantially based on that knowledge; and (ii) could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness; and © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(c)

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the court gives leave to present the evidence.

(2) To remove any doubt, and without limiting subsection (1)— (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse); and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge mentioned in paragraph (a), a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following: (i) the development and behaviour of children generally; (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences. NT Act:

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108C Exception — evidence of persons with specialised knowledge (1) The credibility rule does not apply to evidence given by a person concerning the credibility of another witness if: (a) the person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (b) the evidence is evidence of an opinion of the person that: (i) is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge; and (ii) could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness; and (c) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. (2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1): (a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse); and (b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has specialised knowledge of that kind, a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the following: (i) the development and behaviour of children generally; (ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences.

[EA.108C.30]

ALRC References

ALRC 102, paras 12.108–12.133.

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[EA.108C.60]

Part 3.7 - Credibility

[EA.108C.60]

General comments

Although not a matter of practical importance, it is odd that this provision appears in its own Division in Pt 3.7, since it is in substance an exception to the credibility rule in s 102. In ALRC 102, it was stated at para 12.128: [I]t is clear that the uniform Evidence Acts should provide an exception for expert testimony to prevent injustice to the parties and ensure a proper factual basis for the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses.

Examples of such evidence were given at para 12.11–12.121: • expert opinion evidence in relation to any relevant cognitive impairment of the witness; • expert opinion evidence in relation to any lack of capacity to observe events. • expert opinion evidence on the effects and experience of family violence where that is relevant to the credibility of a witness. • expert opinion evidence “as to the hysterical and unstable nature of the alleged victim of an assault”;119 • expert opinion evidence on the behaviour and development of children and the long term effects of family violence. It was concluded at para 12.133:

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In the Commissions’ view, the uniform Evidence Acts should be amended to include a new exception to the credibility rule relating to expert testimony of substantial probative value, subject to the leave of the court. The new provision should be drafted to attract the admissibility requirements of s 79 of the uniform Evidence Acts.

Section 108C(1) serves that function. “Credibility evidence” given by a person is not rendered inadmissible by the credibility rule in s 102 if: (1) the person has “specialised knowledge”; (2) that specialised knowledge is based on the person’s training, study or experience; (3) the opinion is “wholly or substantially” based on that specialised knowledge; (4) the opinion concerns the credibility of another witness; (5) the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of that other witness; and (6) the court gives leave to adduce the evidence. Such evidence may be adduced to discredit or support the credit of the witness (see ALRC 102 at para 12.117). Of course, even if the evidence is not rendered inadmissible by the credibility rule in s 102, the discretionary and mandatory exclusionary provisions in ss 135–137 may apply. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the NSW amending Act, the following examples are given of evidence that may be rendered admissible by this provision: 119. Compare, under the common law, Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The new section is intended to enable the admission of expert opinion evidence that is relevant to the fact-finding process (for example, to prevent misinterpretation of the behaviour of a witness with an intellectual disability or cognitive impairment, or inappropriate inferences from such behaviour).

Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memoranda to the Victorian Act and the Commonwealth amending Act. In Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328, the Victorian Court of Appeal referred at [272] to such examples as an expert testifying “as to aspects of children’s behaviour – such as that of child victims of sexual assault – which are not a matter of ordinary knowledge”, to “the effect of a personality disorder, where there was a rational basis for that disorder to undermine a witness’s credibility”, and “as to the power of suggestion in the case of a child being interviewed by a person in authority”. The court considered that expert evidence relating to the ways that memory (of identification witnesses) can be affected by exposure to “post-event information” was admissible under this provision (see at [243]–[283]).

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It is important to appreciate that this provision only applies to “credibility evidence” as defined in s 101A (since it creates an exception for the credibility rule in s 102, which provides that “[c]redibility evidence about a witness is not admissible”). Even if evidence is relevant because it affects the credibility of a witness or person it will not be “credibility evidence” if it is also relevant and admissible for another purpose. Such evidence will not be caught by the credibility rule in s 102 and, accordingly, this provision will have no work to do. Of course, if the evidence is opinion evidence, the requirements of s 79 will still have to be met (unless reliance is placed on s 78). Of course, even if this provision has the effect that the credibility rule does not apply, the possibility of discretionary exclusion remains.120

[EA.108C.90]

“specialised knowledge” (s 108C(1), (2))

Requirements 1–3 noted in [EA.108C.60] correspond to identical requirements under s 79. The detailed discussion of those requirements at [EA.79.30]–[EA.79.390] will be applicable in this context. It is somewhat odd that it was felt necessary to include these requirements in this provision, since the opinion rule in s 76 has general application and s 79 creates an exception only for that rule. This provision could simply have stated that the credibility rule did not apply to evidence of an opinion that could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of a witness (along with the leave requirement), leaving it to s 79 to impose the necessary requirements to avoid application of the opinion rule in s 76. In fact, the correct analysis is that s 76 does apply to the evidence of opinion referred to in this provision and the requirements of s 79 must still be satisfied. Obviously enough, however, if the requirements of this provision are satisfied, that will not be a practical issue. 120. See, for example, Wotton v Queensland (No 4) [2015] FCA 1075 (sociolinguist, who had given evidence regarding a number of features of the way Aboriginal people respond to questioning about past events, not permitted to express opinion as to examples of problems of intercultural communication such as gratuitous concurrence seen in the transcript of evidence given by four Aboriginal witnesses).

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The inclusion of requirements 1–3 noted in [EA.108C.60] in this provision does serve to emphasise the necessary linkage between the “specialised knowledge” and the particular opinion concerning the credibility of another witness – that particular opinion must be wholly or substantially based on the specialised knowledge of the expert. Thus, in Harris v Bellemore [2009] NSWSC 1497, McCallum J observed at [41] that “[t]he specialised knowledge of the expert liability witnesses in the present case is not in any field that touches on the assessment of the credibility of their colleagues”, with the consequence that this provision would not permit “parties in a medical negligence case to call evidence from their expert witnesses on liability as to the credibility of the defendant doctor”. McCallum J concluded at [43] that “any opinion of the experts on liability in these proceedings as to the credibility of [the witness’s] evidence could not be substantially based on their specialised knowledge”.121

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Similarly, in Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328, a case where the defence sought to adduce expert evidence bearing on the reliability of identification evidence admitted against the appellant, the Victorian Court of Appeal at [243]–[283] endorsed the approach of the trial judge who, while allowing general expert evidence about the weaknesses of identification evidence, the displacement effect and the media misinformation effect (as well as explanation by means of general examples how each of these factors could affect reliability), excluded evidence from the expert upon the precise circumstances pertaining to each identification, or as to whether those circumstances gave rise to a risk of unreliability. Section 108C(2)(a) provides that a reference in s 108(1) “to specialised knowledge includes a reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour” etc. Section 108C(2)(b) refers to particular kinds that a person with such specialized knowledge might express. In ALRC 102 it was stated at para 12.122 that the provision was intended: to clarify that evidence can be led under the section in relation to the development and behaviour of children generally and the development and behaviour of victims of child sexual assault. This clarification is designed to overcome a demonstrated reluctance of courts to accept that the development and behaviour of children is a matter of specialised knowledge outside the general knowledge of the community.

Of course, evidence that falls within the scope of s 108C(2) must still satisfy the requirements of s 108C(1) in the particular circumstances of the case. Section 108C(2) does not create any presumption that those requirements will be met. It only seeks to make clear that there should be no unstated presumption that such evidence will not meet the requirements of s 108C(1). ALRC 102 stated at para 12.132: The Commissions also maintain that clarification of the admissibility of expert evidence relating to the behaviour and development of children is justified on the basis of the demonstrated reluctance of some judicial officers to accept that this is a relevant field of expertise and a matter beyond the “common knowledge” of the tribunal of fact. The inclusion of the provision does not connote that undue prominence should be given to this evidence, and should not be seen as taking away from the generality of the provision. 121. See also National Australia Bank v Caporale [2012] NSWSC 509 at [12]–[13]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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In addition, ALRC 102 made reference at para 12.130 to the possible application of the discretionary and mandatory exclusionary provisions in ss 135 to 137: [Section] 137 requires the court to exclude evidence which is unfairly prejudicial to a defendant in criminal proceedings, and s 136 allows the court to limit the use the tribunal of fact may make of the evidence. For example, if evidence of the behaviour and development of victims of child sexual assault is admitted, the court may direct that the evidence only be used for the credibility purpose and not to reason that, because the behaviour of the complainant is consistent with that of a victim of child sexual abuse, the complainant was abused.

In De Silva v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 236 A Crim R 214; [2013] VSCA 339, the Victorian Court of Appeal held at [27] that an expert witness permitted to perform an “educative role” pursuant to this provision regarding “child development and child behaviour” had impermissibly “strayed … into areas in which it had not been shown that she was qualified to express an opinion” (for example, speculation about what may have been behind the complainant’s initial non-disclosure).

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[EA.108C.120] “could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness” This requirement corresponds to the identical requirement in s 103 in relation to cross-examination as to credibility. The discussion of that provision at [EA.103.30]–[EA.103.120] will be applicable in this context. It is important to bear in mind however that, in practice, s 103 will be applied in respect of evidence adduced to discredit the witness, while this provision applies not only to such evidence but also to evidence that tends to support the credit of the witness. It is also important to appreciate that determination of whether this requirement is satisfied must be done in the context of the other evidence admitted, or to be admitted, in the proceeding.122 Thus, evidence may be capable of having a substantial effect on the assessment of the credibility of a witness even if it serves only to negate inferences regarding credibility sought to be drawn from other evidence. For example, expert evidence regarding the behaviour of victims of child sexual assault was held to be satisfy the requirement under s 108C(1)(b)(ii) even though it: could not establish that it was probable the complainant was telling the truth, but it could establish that her behaviour was not demonstrative of untruthfulness by reference to common or usual patterns of behaviour as asserted by the defence. In this sense, it could establish that the counter-intuitive behaviour complained of was of neutral significance.

On the other hand, this provision must be applied in respect of each opinion sought to be given by the witness. Thus, a sociolinguist may be able to give 122. For example, in Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 the Victorian Court of Appeal observed at [277] that, where “general evidence” from an expert “about the weaknesses of identification evidence, the displacement effect and the media misinformation effect” had been admitted, “the jury were as well placed as [the expert] to assess whether and to what extent the general propositions bore on the credibility of the individual witnesses”, with the consequence that evidence from the expert “as to the reliability of the identification by each witness, or the degree to which that witness’s evidence might be unreliable” could not have substantially affected the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. See also Wotton v Queensland (No 4) [2015] FCA 1075 at [16].

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evidence regarding a number of features of the way Aboriginal people respond to questioning about past events but not permitted to express an opinion as to examples of problems of intercultural communication (such as gratuitous concurrence) seen in the transcript of evidence given by four Aboriginal witnesses.123

[EA.108C.150] “the court gives leave to adduce the evidence” Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and requires the court to consider a number of matters in deciding whether to grant leave. Whenever a court is considering giving leave, permission or a direction under the Act, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”.124 Important considerations would include whether admission of the evidence will unduly add to the length of the trial, the importance of the evidence in ensuring a proper factual basis for the evaluation of the credibility of a witness and fairness to the parties or a witness (see ALRC 102 at paras 12.128–12.129). Where the evidence is adduced by the defence in criminal proceedings, occasions where leave should be refused “would be rare”, because a conclusion that expert evidence could “substantially affect” the assessment of the credibility of a particular witness, whose evidence may be of critical importance in the trial, “is a conclusion that the evidence is likely to be of real utility”.125

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[EA.108C.180] Credibility of persons who are not witnesses This provision applies only “to evidence given by a person concerning the credibility of another witness”. It has no application to credibility evidence about a person who made a “previous representation” that has been admitted in a proceeding (cf Div 3, ss 108A to 108B). However, subject to the requirements of s 79, opinion evidence that is credibility evidence may be admitted in such circumstances pursuant to s 108A.

[EA.108C.210] Other provisions Section 388 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) permits opinion evidence based on particular specified specialised knowledge to be received in a criminal proceeding that relates (wholly or partly) to a charge for a sexual offence (see [EA.80.60]).

123. Wotton v Queensland (No 4) [2015] FCA 1075. 124. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [41] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. 125. Audsley v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 506; 247 A Crim R 14; [2014] VSCA 321 at [46]–[47]. The situation might be different where “the expert evidence proposed to be led concerns the credibility of a peripheral witness and where, for some particular reasons, the leading of the evidence would result in substantial disruption of the trial, or substantial prejudice to the other party, or both” (at [54]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

Part 3.8 – Character [EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.8.30]

Summary of this Part

Section 110 permits the defence in criminal proceedings to adduce evidence to prove the defendant’s good character, either generally or in a particular respect. If such evidence is admitted, the prosecution may adduce rebuttal evidence. Section 111 permits a defendant in criminal proceedings to adduce expert opinion evidence relevant to the character of another defendant in the proceedings. If such evidence is admitted, the other defendant may adduce rebuttal evidence. Leave of the court must be obtained for any cross-examination of a defendant under this Part (s 112).

Cth Act: 109 Application This Part applies only in a criminal proceeding. NSW Act: 109

Application

This Part applies only in a criminal proceeding.

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Vic Act: 109 Application This Part applies only in a criminal proceeding. ACT Act: 109 Application—pt 3.8 This part applies only in a criminal proceeding. NT Act: 109 Application This Part applies only in a criminal proceeding.

[EA.109.30]

“criminal proceeding”

This term is defined in the Dictionary: “criminal proceeding” means a prosecution for an offence and includes: (a) a proceeding for the committal of a person for trial or sentence for an offence; and (b) a proceeding relating to bail; but does not include a prosecution for an offence that is a prescribed taxation offence within the meaning of Part III of the Taxation Administration Act 1953.

For discussion of this definition, see [EA.Dict.Pt.1.60].

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Cth Act: 110

Evidence about character of accused persons

(1) The hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced by a defendant to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character. (2) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is generally a person of good character has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not generally a person of good character. (3) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is a person of good character in a particular respect has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not a person of good character in that respect. (4) [Repealed] [Subs (4) rep Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 2 item 9] [S 110 am Act 135 of 2008]

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NSW Act: 110

Evidence about character of accused persons

(1) The hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced by a defendant to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character. (2) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is generally a person of good character has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not generally a person of good character. (3) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is a person of good character in a particular respect has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not a person of good character in that respect. Note: The Commonwealth Act includes an additional subsection relating to unsworn statements.

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Vic Act: 110

Evidence about character of an accused

(1) The hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced by an accused to prove (directly or by implication) that the accused is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character. [Subs (1) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.29]

(2) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that an accused is generally a person of good character has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the accused is not generally a person of good character. [Subs (2) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.29]

(3) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that an accused is a person of good character in a particular respect has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the accused is not a person of good character in that respect. [Subs (3) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.29] Note: The Commonwealth Act previously included an additional subsection relating to unsworn statements.

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[S 110 am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.28]

ACT Act: 110

Evidence about character of accused people

(1) The hearsay rule, opinion rule, tendency rule and credibility rule do not apply to evidence presented by a defendant to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character. (2) If evidence presented to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is generally a person of good character has been admitted, the hearsay rule, opinion rule, tendency rule and credibility rule do not apply to evidence presented to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not generally a person of good character. (3) If evidence presented to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is a person of good character in a particular respect has been admitted, the hearsay rule, opinion rule, tendency rule and credibility rule do not apply to evidence presented to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not a person of good character in that respect.

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NT Act: 110

Evidence about character of accused persons

(1) The hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced by a defendant to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character. (2) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is generally a person of good character has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not generally a person of good character. (3) If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant is a person of good character in a particular respect has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not a person of good character in that respect.

[EA.110.30] ALRC References ALRC 38, s 91, s 95, paras 177–178; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 802–803.

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[EA.110.60] Evidence of good character of criminal defendant (s 110(1)) The ALRC explained the rationale behind the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 802): There is a danger that the fact-finder will wrongly estimate the probative value of evidence of the accused’s good character. More importantly, it may decide the case simply on the basis that any crime he may have committed has been balanced by his previous good behaviour. But there are grounds of policy which may justify admission of evidence of good character if adduced by a criminal defendant. A fundamental principle of our accusatorial criminal trial system has been encapsulated in the maxim: “Better that ten guilty men go free than one innocent man be wrongly convicted”. If the legal system is to minimise the risk of wrongful conviction, it may be necessary to give the accused an absolute right to introduce evidence of his good character, subject to the relevance discretion. On some occasions this option may be vital to an accused. In a mistaken identity situation, where the accused has no alibi but his own, good reputation may be the only thing that can save him from mistaken identifying witnesses. On balance it is wise to retain this kind of protection notwithstanding the low probative value of such evidence. There are a number of options that could be adopted to achieve such protection … It is proposed that the accused may adduce evidence from witnesses about his reputation and that those witnesses may be asked to give evidence about the basis upon which they express their view as to his reputation.

The fact that “the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply” to evidence adduced to prove the defendant’s good character means that such evidence may include: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• hearsay evidence (generally excluded under s 59), including evidence of the reputation of the defendant126; • opinion evidence (generally excluded under s 76), including “lay” or “expert”127 opinion evidence regarding the defendant;128 • evidence of past conduct of the defendant adduced to prove that the defendant has or had a tendency (whether because of his or her character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind (generally excluded under s 97); • credibility evidence (generally excluded under s 102). However, the evidence must be relevant to the “character” of the defendant, and adduced for that purpose, to be admissible under s 110. In Attwood v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359, the High Court stated in relation to the common law position:

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The expression “good character” has of course a known significance in relation to evidence upon criminal trials; it denotes a description of evidence in disproof of guilt which an accused person may adduce. He may adduce evidence of the favourable character he bears as a fact or matter making it unlikely that he committed the crime charged. … As Cockburn CJ said: “The fact that a man has an unblemished reputation leads to the presumption that he is incapable of committing the crime for which he is being tried.”

It has been held that the expression “good character” in s 110 has the meaning accorded to the expression in Attwood129. However, there is no doubt that evidence of good character may also relate to a character trait of “truthfulness” rather than to a suggested unlikelihood of committing the offence charged (which would be relevant if evidence of a representation by the defendant is admitted or the defendant testifies)130. It is important to note that this provision does not make evidence admissible – it simply negates the operation of the specified exclusionary rules. The evidence may still be excluded by the court under the discretion conferred in s 135. If admitted the evidence may be used as directly relevant to the issue of guilt and also, if evidence of a representation by the defendant is admitted or the defendant

126. See Bishop v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 at [39]; R v Ceniccola [2010] NSWSC 1554. 127. Curiously, it appears that the normal rule requiring “specialised knowledge” under s 79 does not apply, since the opinion rule itself does not apply. However, the court’s discretionary powers may be utilised to achieve the same result (cf R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600). 128. See eg R v Chapman [2002] NSWCCA 105; Bishop v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 at [3]–[6]. 129. Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 at 53 (FCR). 130. Even if the defendant does not testify, his or her credibility may be in issue where evidence is admitted of out-of-court statements by the defendant: cf Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465; [1999] HCA 32; R v Azzopardi (unreported, NSW CCA, Spigelman CJ, Sully, Hidden JJ, 1 October 1998), p 12.

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testifies, as bearing on his or her credibility – unless the court exercises its discretion under s 136 to limit the use of the evidence.132 The High Court has held that, under the common law, there is no rule requiring a trial judge to direct the jury concerning the defendant’s good character.133 Rather, the trial judge retains “a discretion as to whether to direct the jury on evidence of good character after evaluating its probative significance in relation to both: (a) the accused’s propensity to commit the crime charged; and (b) the accused’s credibility”.134 Subsequently, members of the High Court observed that “whether to give a direction at all, or the form of it if given in relation to character evidence will require close attention to the relevance of the evidence to the offence, and to the issue or issues to which the evidence relates”.135 The proposition that there is no obligation on a trial judge to give any direction to a jury as to the use to be made of evidence of character was endorsed by Howie J (McClellan CJ at CL and Adams J agreeing) in Gallant v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 339 at [39]. Nevertheless, even if there is no obligation on a trial judge, it would be generally desirable to assist the jury regarding evidence of a defendant’s character. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has held136 that the following principles apply in jury trials:

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1 It is desirable in all cases in which there is evidence as to the accused’s good character that a direction be given as to the use to which that evidence should be put. 2 No particular form of words is necessary, but the direction should convey to the jury that they should bear in mind the accused’s good character when considering whether they are prepared to draw from the evidence the conclusion of the accused’s guilt. They should bear it in mind as a factor affecting the likelihood of the accused committing the crime charged. The judge may add, if he thinks it appropriate in the particular case, that the jury should consider the accused’s previous good character in assessing the credibility of any explanations given by him and, when he has given evidence, his credibility as a witness. 3 The judge is, of course, at liberty to remind the jury that people do commit crimes for the first time and that evidence of previous good character cannot prevail against evidence of guilt, which they find to be convincing notwithstanding the accused’s previous good character. This 131. See Eastman at 53. 132. This is unlikely to happen. Compare the position at common law: R v Lawrence [1984] 3 NSWLR 674; R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 at 299. 133. Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; 164 ALR 465; [1999] HCA 32 at [30] per McHugh J, [77] per Gummow J, [155] per Hayne J. 134. Melbourne at [30] per McHugh J. 135. Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [21] per Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ. See also R v Szabo [2000] NSWCCA 226 at [65]. 136. R v RJC (unreported, NSW CCA, 18 August 1998), p 27 per the Court, citing R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577; see also R v Robinson [1999] NSWCCA 172 at [24] per Grove J; R v Soto-Sanchez (2002) 129 A Crim R 279; [2002] NSWCCA 160 at [27] per Heydon JA; R v Hart (2002) 131 A Crim R 609; [2002] NSWCCA 313 at [11]–[12] per Adams J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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last consideration may apply with particular force to certain types of crime and the judge is, of course, free to point that out to the jury if he sees fit.137

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The Victorian Court of Appeal has emphasized that such directions should generally be given.138 Nevertheless, the proposition that no particular form of words is necessary has been stressed.139 It has been held that simply directing a jury that the law required them to take into account evidence of good character in considering whether they were satisfied that the defendant’s guilt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt would be sufficient to convey that the evidence may make it less likely that he or she was guilty.140 Directing the jury that “a person of good character is less likely to have committed the offence than a person not of good character” is permissible.141 The NSW Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book142 and the Victorian Criminal Charge Book143 both provide guidance regarding a possible direction regarding evidence of good character. Of course, if the defendant has given no evidence in court, and made no out-of-court statements admitted into evidence, no direction in respect of good character bearing on credibility would be appropriate. Further, given that evidence of good character (and rebuttal evidence) may be limited under the Act to a “particular respect” of the defendant’s character, it is clear that the necessary direction to the jury will be limited to that particular respect. Thus, for example, the particular respect may have no bearing on truthfulness and thus no relevance to credibility. In those circumstances, the defendant would not be entitled to a direction that good character should be taken into account in assessing the credibility of the defendant’s testimony or out-of-court statements.144 The Victorian Criminal Charge Book suggests an appropriate direction where the evidence of good character is limited to a “particular respect” of character.145 137. Similar things may be said by a prosecutor in submission: RJ v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 174; [2010] NSWCCA 263 at [50]–[61]. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in Imnetu v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 203 saw “no difficulty” in a prosecutor’s submission to the jury that “less weight should be given to the good character of a 20-year-old accused than say a 60-year-old accused” (at [39]–[43]). However, other qualifying comments must be approached with caution, particularly if they might be understood by the jury as directions of law: Bishop v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273; Mathis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 118 at [14]; Wahi v The Queen [2015] VSCA 132 at [23] (“… even Jack the Ripper had no prior convictions at some stage”). 138. Bishop v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 at [36]; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Newman [2015] VSCA 25. 139. R v Telfer (2004) 142 A Crim R 132; [2004] NSWCCA 27 at [33]; Ka Chung Fung v The Queen (2007) 174 A Crim R 169; [2007] NSWCCA 250 at [59]; Ith v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 70 at [47]; Zhu v The Queen (2013) 232 A Crim R 51; [2013] NSWCCA 163 at [92]. 140. R v Telfer (2004) 142 A Crim R 132; [2004] NSWCCA 27 at [36]. 141. Ka Chung Fung v The Queen (2007) 174 A Crim R 169; [2007] NSWCCA 250 at [57]–[60]. 142. Judicial Commission of NSW, Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book, www.judcom.nsw.gov.au, Trial Instructions – Character [2-350]ff. 143. Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au, Pt 4.3.2. 144. R v Zurita [2002] NSWCCA 22 at [23]. 145. Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au, Pt 4.3.3.

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Where the only evidence of good character is that the defendant does not have any criminal convictions, that may be treated as evidence limited to a “particular respect” of character.146 Pursuant to s 110(2) or 110(3) evidence may be adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the accused is not generally, or in a particular respect, a person of good character (see [EA.110.90]). Further, there may be evidence admitted in the proceeding of conduct of the defendant which bears on the weight to be given the evidence of good character. In those circumstances, the evidence of that conduct could be used to reduce the weight to be given to the evidence of good character although it must not be used as evidence of bad character (unless that tendency use is permitted pursuant to ss 97 and 101).147

[EA.110.90] Evidence of bad character (adduced by the prosecution or another defendant) to rebut evidence of good character of criminal defendant (s 110(2) and (3))

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The ALRC explained the rationale behind the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 803): If the accused has led evidence tending to prove that he is not the kind of person who could commit the crime he is charged with, the prosecution must be permitted to rebut this evidence or the tribunal of fact might be left with a totally misleading impression of the accused. In fairness, the prosecution should be permitted to adduce the same type of evidence as was the accused. But the rule, under existing law, that the rebuttal evidence only negates good character without pointing to the likelihood of guilt seems incapable of enforcement. Further, the law’s assumption of indivisibility of character which permits the prosecution to adduce rebuttal evidence relating to a “character trait” other than that raised by the accused seems incorrect. Where the evidence of the accused’s good character has been confined to his character in a particular respect, the evidence of bad character or prior conviction in rebuttal should be confined to such evidence as tends to disprove his good character in that respect. The evidence may be relevant to credibility, but if the accused does not take the witness stand his credibility is not in issue. The evidence is immaterial and therefore irrelevant. Of course, if the evidence tendered by the accused crosses the spectrum of character, the prosecution should be able to rebut both in terms of issue and credibility.

The precondition for rebuttal evidence being admitted under s 110(2) or (3) is that evidence has been “adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that a defendant” is a person of good character, either generally or in a particular respect. It has been held that evidence from the defendant that is “no more than [an] emphatic denial” of guilt (for example, “I would not do that sort of thing”) would not satisfy the test.148 Thus, in Huges v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 the Victorian Court of Appeal held that the defendant’s testimony (“I’ve never hit my daughter”, “I’m just not into pornographic movies”) was “nothing more … than a denial of the allegations of 146. See Parsons v The Queen [2016] VSCA 17 at [64]–[67]. 147. See Habib v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 261. 148. Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279; R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 at [132]–[144]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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the particular conduct alleged against him in the count about which he was being questioned” (Priest JA at [23], see also Lasry AJA at [49]). More generally, it has been held that the precondition requires a subjective intention on the part of the defendant, that evidence tending to show good character is adduced for the purpose of showing this and thereby supporting an inference that he or she is not guilty of the crime charged and/or supportive of the defendant’s credibility.149

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However, the Full Court of the Federal Court has pointed out that evidence tending to show that the defendant is of good character, adduced to rebut a specific aspect of the prosecution case, will still “raise good character” under s 110 (permitting prosecution rebuttal evidence) where another purpose of adducing the evidence is to prove the defendant was a person of good character: “if the evidence were led with the intention of raising the likelihood that by reason of his general disposition” he was not guilty of the crime charged.150 Evidence may be adduced to prove that the defendant is a person of good character in a particular respect even if the particular respect is truthfulness. In R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 the defendant (charged with a serious drug offence), giving evidence-in-chief, admitted that he had given false information to Centrelink. This evidence was elicited without any conscious or deliberate decision to elicit evidence of the defendant’s bad character. However, defence counsel then adduced (and intended to adduce) evidence from the defendant that having been asked a question, he had sworn to tell the truth and that was exactly what he was doing notwithstanding that the answer might be harmful to his case. Tobias JA (Hoeben J and Smart AJ agreeing) held at [51] that this was evidence of good character in a particular respect. A difficult issue can arise if the suggested basis for operation of either s 110(2) or (3) is evidence given by the defendant in cross-examination. There is no doubt that the defendant might in some circumstances “adduce” evidence to prove his or her good character by answers given to cross-examination.151 However, as noted above, if the defendant gives evidence tending to show his or her good character but there is no intention to rely on this for a character inference (for example, the evidence is “inadvertent” or “accidental” or simply an “emphatic denial” of prosecution allegations152) the precondition will not be satisfied. In some circumstances, it may not be possible for the defendant to give a responsive 149. Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279 per Higgins J at 297; R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329 at [145]; PGM v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 426; [2006] NSWCCA 310 at [35]; Huges v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 at [23]–[24]. Because of the possibility of rebuttal evidence of bad character, a decision to adduce evidence of good character should be taken with great care and consideration should be given to seeking an advance ruling as to whether such rebuttal evidence will be admitted under this provision: see general discussion in R v Qaumi (No 61) [2016] NSWSC 1192 at [23]–[24]. In certain circumstances, the discretionary exclusionary provisions in Pt 3.11 may have application if the decision was a “genuine forensic mistake in the heat of the moment”: R v Qaumi (No 61) [2016] NSWSC 1192 at [22], [25]. 150. See Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 at 54 (FCR). 151. R v Skaf [2004] NSWCCA 74 at [225]–[226]. 152. Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279 per Higgins J at 297–298.

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and truthful answer which does not appear to raise good character, so that it could not reasonably be inferred that the defendant did intend to raise good character.153 More controversially, in Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279, Higgins J appeared to hold that, even if such an intention existed, the precondition would not be satisfied if the defendant’s answer was “responsive” to the question asked. There is logic in this position – in such circumstances, the evidence tending to show the defendant’s good character could be said to have been “adduced” by the cross-examiner, not by the defendant, regardless of the intentions of the defendant.154 There is some support for this view in PGM v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 426; [2006] NSWCCA 310, where Barr J observed at [38] that, if the defendant’s answers “were true” (and, presumably, responsive), “he could not properly be said to have given them deliberately, intending thereby to raise his good character”. However, Barr J also accepted that, in some circumstances, a defendant may give a truthful and responsive answer that is intended to assert good character. The converse view to the approach taken by Higgins J in Gabriel is that the defendant has taken advantage of the question to “adduce” the evidence. It is difficult to predict which view will become accepted. The fact that “the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply” to evidence adduced to prove that the defendant is not (generally or in a particular respect) a person of good character means that such evidence may include:

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• hearsay evidence (generally excluded under s 59), including evidence of the reputation of the defendant; • opinion evidence (generally excluded under s 76), including “lay” or “expert”155 opinion evidence regarding the defendant; • evidence of past conduct of the defendant adduced to prove that the defendant has or had a tendency (whether because of his or her character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind (generally excluded under s 97); • credibility evidence relating to the defendant (generally excluded under s 102). However, the evidence would have to be relevant. The Victorian Court of Appeal has emphasised that even if the defence had led evidence as to “prior good conduct in relation to sexual matters”, it is impossible to see how “mere scuttlebutt” or “rumours” as to sexual offending, wholly unrelated to the issues in 153. PGM v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 426; [2006] NSWCCA 310 at [38]–[40]; Huges v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338. 154. There are passages in non-Evidence Act cases which support this view: R v Everitt [1921] VLR 245 at 249; R v White [1969] VR 203 at 205. In R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCCA 329, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal did not clearly address this issue (see generally at [115]–[145] and particularly at [146]). In R v Skaf [2004] NSWCCA 74, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal emphasised that the evidence in question was “a non-responsive answer that amounts to more than an emphatic denial of guilt”: at [226]. 155. Curiously, it appears that the normal rule requiring “specialised knowledge” under s 79 does not apply, since the opinion rule itself does not apply. However, the court’s discretionary powers may be utilised to achieve the same result. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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the trial, could possibly be led under this provision. Similarly, evidence of traffic offences would be irrelevant in a case involving alleged sexual assault.157 Further, where the defence has only had admitted evidence to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is a person of good character in a particular respect, the evidence adduced by the prosecution or another defendant must, if it is to be admitted, be adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is not a person of good character in that particular respect.158 In Bishop v The Queen (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273, Redlich JA stated: The phrase ‘in a particular respect’ in s 110 is described by Gans and Palmer as meaning “pertaining to a particular characteristic” such as for example, gentleness, generosity or good citizenship. But it may also relate to a particular context in which relevant conduct has taken place. Thus evidence may for example be adduced by work colleagues as to the defendant’s honesty in his employ or by his relatives as to his good parenting skills. The accused may call evidence which is specifically focussed upon good character relating to the charge or an absence of prior bad character with respect to the specific conduct the subject of the charge.159

Evidence of good character “in a particular respect” may be evidence of good character generally, except for a particular respect. Thus, for example, evidence may be adduced that the defendant in a sexual assault trial had no prior criminal convictions, except for traffic offences.160 Even if “the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply”, the discretions in Pt 3.11 may be applied to the evidence161. It

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156. Wah v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 41; [2014] VSCA 7, Weinberg JA (Priest and Coghlan JJA agreeing) at [29], [65]. 157. Wah v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 41; [2014] VSCA 7, Weinberg JA (Priest JA and Coghlan JA agreeing) at [81]. 158. Thus, in Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279, it was held that where the defendant intended to “deny that he was the kind of person who had a tendency to stab people”, rebuttal evidence “had to be confined to the accused’s tendency or otherwise to ‘stab’ people” (Higgins J at 297–298). Even if the aspect of character raised was broader, such as “any tendency to physical violence”, it was pointed out that this would not permit cross-examination that included reference to a crime of dishonesty (at 298C). This approach was endorsed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v PKS (unreported, NSW CCA, 1 October 1998), pp 9–10. See also R v Zurita [2002] NSWCCA 22, where it was held that evidence of “a lack of antecedents for sexual offences generally” would not let in evidence of prior convictions for larceny, assault or traffic-related matters: at [19] per Howie J. In contrast, in Omot v The Queen [2016] VSCA 24, it was held at [24]–[27] that evidence that the defendant “had never been charged with a sexual offence” could be rebutted by evidence that he had prior convictions for offences involving violence, particularly bearing in mind that the allegations of the complainant “unmistakably included the assertion that she had been forcibly subdued as an incident of the rape”. 159. Redlich JA (Coghlan JA agreeing) at [8]. 160. Wah v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 41; [2014] VSCA 7, Weinberg JA (Priest JA and Coghlan JA agreeing) at [89]–[90]. In theory, this might have permitted the prosecution to elicit details of the traffic offences, but the better view was that the details were irrelevant (Weinberg JA at [81]). However, as noted at [EA.110.60], evidence of lack of criminal convictions may itself be treated as evidence limited to a “particular respect” of character: Parsons v The Queen [2016] VSCA 17 at [64]–[67]. 161. For discussion of the possible application of the “probative value prejudice discretion” under common law (comparable to s 137), see R v Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 at 705; R v Hettiarachchi [2009] VSCA 270 at [45]–[50].

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might be appropriate to exclude the evidence if, for example, it is not “the same type of evidence” admitted for the purpose of establishing good character. It is difficult to see how it could ever be appropriate to admit remote hearsay162. Further, where the evidence is to be adduced in cross-examination of the defendant, s 112 requires that leave of the court must first be obtained (see [EA.112.60]).

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In Clegg v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 125, the issue arose whether tendency evidence that has been held inadmissible pursuant to s 101 might nonetheless be admitted pursuant to this provision. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that it could. Payne JA (with whom Schmidt and Fagan JJ agreed) expressed the view at [83], without deciding the issue, that s 110(2) and (3) render both s 97 and s 101 inapplicable to prosecution evidence adduced in rebuttal of good character. It was not necessary to decide this, because, even if s 101 applied, s 101(3) operated to allow the prosecution to “contradict evidence led by the appellant that raised his good character via tendency reasoning”. Evidence adduced by the prosecution in rebuttal of evidence of good character would fall within the terms of s 101(3). Of course, the discretions in Pt 3.11 may be applied to the evidence (at [88]), but the fact that the s 101(2) test had not been satisfied would have no bearing on the application of those provisions (see at [88]–[90]). On first analysis, evidence adduced under s 110(2) or (3) may be used as directly relevant to the issue of guilt and also, if the defendant gives evidence, as bearing on his or her credibility.163 However, the court may exercise its discretion under s 136 to limit the use of the evidence. Further, although it was the view of the ALRC that the rule, under the common law,164 that rebuttal evidence only negates good character without pointing to the likelihood of guilt was “incapable of enforcement”, and (by implication) it should not be adopted in the Act, it is arguable that such a rule will still apply. While the “tendency rule” (defined in the Dictionary to mean s 97(1)) does not apply to evidence adduced under s 110(2) or (3), there is no mention of s 101(2). Consequently, if that rule applied to exclude tendency evidence about the defendant adduced by the prosecution, the effect of s 95 would appear to be that evidence adduced under s 110(2) or (3) (which would be evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of the defendant adduced to prove that he or she had a tendency to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind) could not be used “against the defendant”. Consistent with the common law position, it could only be used to negate the evidence of good character. A difficulty with this analysis is that s 101(3) provides that s 101(2) does not apply to prosecution tendency evidence adduced to “explain or contradict tendency evidence adduced by the defendant”. On one argument it could be said that this provision supports a conclusion that the prosecution evidence may only be used to negate (“contradict”) the evidence of good character. The counter argument is that s 101(3) causes s 101(2) not to apply at 162. See Wah v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 41; [2014] VSCA 7, Weinberg JA (Priest JA and Coghlan JA agreeing) at [81]. 163. This was noted by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 at 57–58 (FCR), but the court expressed no view on the proper interpretation of the provision. 164. The most recent authoritative statement of the common law position is BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275. See also R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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all, so that no limitations remain on the use of the prosecution evidence. The prevailing view in New South Wales is that the Act has not changed the common law position.165 Similarly, Weinberg JA of the Victorian Court of Appeal has observed in a footnote that evidence of bad character adduced in rebuttal of evidence of good character may not be used “to infer that the accused was more likely to have committed the offences because he was a person of bad character”.166 As noted above, in Clegg v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 125, Payne JA (with whom Schmidt and Fagan JJ agreed) held that, even if s 101 applied, s 101(3) operated to allow the prosecution to “contradict evidence led by the appellant that raised his good character via tendency reasoning”. This would suggest that the “rebuttal” evidence may only be used to negate the evidence of good character. However, Payne JA had earlier expressed the view at [83] that s 110(2) and (3) render both s 97 and s 101 inapplicable to prosecution evidence adduced in rebuttal of good character. That might be seen to support a tendency use of the rebuttal evidence, but Payne JA observed that it was not necessary to decide the applicability of s 101. In respect of “coincidence evidence”, it would appear that it could not be admitted at all under this provision. There is no reference to the coincidence rule (s 98) or to its extension in s 101. Accordingly, it would seem that coincidence evidence which is adduced by the prosecution to prove that the defendant is not generally, or in a particular respect, a person of good character, must comply with the requirements of s 98 and s 101 to be admissible.167 However, there is an argument that compliance with neither provision would be necessary if the evidence is only to be used to negate evidence of good character. As regards s 98, “coincidence evidence” is evidence “that 2 or more related events occurred” adduced to “prove that, because of the improbability of the events occurring coincidentally, a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind”. Arguably, evidence adduced to prove that the defendant is not a person of good character would not fall within that definition at all. As regards s 101, even if the prosecution evidence is characterized as “coincidence evidence”, that provision only states that the evidence “cannot be used against” the defendant. As noted above, it is arguable that evidence which is adduced by the prosecution to negate evidence of good character, to prove that the defendant is not generally, or in a particular respect, a person of good character, does not fall within the scope of s 101. Of course, the evidence would be subject to the operation of the discretionary provisions in Pt 3.11. In that regard, it has been held by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 that “evidence that is capable of disclosing a tendency on the part of an accused person” must be excluded in discretion if the prosecution “fails to 165. R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 at [63] per Simpson J (relying on the operation of s 95); R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 per Tobias JA at [68]–[93] (relying on common law authority); Wing Cheong Li v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 419; [2010] NSWCCA 40 at [118]–[119] (reference to the Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book at [2-390]). 166. Wah v The Queen (2014) 239 A Crim R 41; [2014] VSCA 7, Weinberg JA (Priest JA and Coghlan JA agreeing) at fn [20]. However, the issue was not fully argued and authorities relied upon were all under the common law. 167. There is authority that a similar position exists under the common law: R v Wheeler (unreported, NSW CCA, 16 November 1989).

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exclude the reasonable possibility of concoction on the part of the proposed witness or witnesses”: at [77] per Simpson J.168 However, in TKWJ v The Queen (2002) 212 CLR 124; 133 A Crim R 574; [2002] HCA 46, McHugh J took a contrary view. In a trial of alleged sexual assaults against C, the prosecution proposed to adduce evidence of similar alleged offences against K to rebut an anticipated assertion of good character by the accused. McHugh J stated (at [88]):

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In the Court of Criminal Appeal, Adams J said that, if the character evidence had been led and K’s evidence tendered in rebuttal, R v Wheeler would have required the trial judge to exercise his discretion under s 135 of the Evidence Act and reject the rebuttal evidence. His Honour said that the reasonable possibility of collusion between the complainant and K would have been a relevant and, perhaps, decisive consideration in exercising the discretion. But with great respect, the question of collusion was irrelevant to an issue under s 135 of the Evidence Act. K’s evidence did not go to the tendency of the appellant to act in the way alleged by the complainant. K’s evidence was relevant because, if believed, it would have rebutted the evidence led to show the appellant’s good character. When evidence is tendered as similar fact or tendency evidence, the possibility of collusion between the complainant and the deponent to the similar fact or tendency evidence is a matter that is relevant to the admissibility of the evidence. When the evidence is tendered to rebut evidence of good character, any question of collusion is a matter for the jury. It does not go to the admissibility of or the discretion to reject the evidence. Wheeler was wrongly decided on this point.

The other members of the High Court did not address this issue. One difficulty with the analysis of McHugh J is that it is not clear that a court determining “probative value” for the purposes of s 135 or 137 should assume that the evidence is credible and reliable (see [EA.137.90]). Another difficulty is that the High Court has justified the inadmissibility at common law of “similar fact” or coincidence evidence where there is a possibility of collusion on the basis that such a possibility “destroys the probative value of the evidence which is a condition precedent to its admissibility”.169 Less controversially, McHugh J went on to discuss the possible application of s 137 more generally (at [89]–[90]): The trial judge of course would have had a discretion to exclude K’s evidence concerning the character of the appellant on the ground that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. That would have required the judge to consider a number of matters. Would her evidence be likely to divert the jury from the critical issue at the trial – whether the Crown had proved the charges against the appellant? Would it be likely to induce the jury to believe that, if he had sexually assaulted K, he was the sort of person who was likely to have sexually assaulted the complainant? Would it be likely to create undue suspicion against the appellant and undermine the presumption of innocence? Given the age of K, would it be likely to cause contempt for, bias or some other form of prejudice against, the appellant? If the judge had made an affirmative answer to any of these questions, he or she would have to have made a value judgment as to whether the prejudicial effect outweighed the importance of the rebuttal evidence to the Crown case and put at risk the fairness of trial. … The most likely risk of prejudice in this case was that the jury might think that, if the appellant had sexually assaulted K, he was the sort of person who was likely to assault the complainant. In my opinion, K’s evidence would give rise to the risk of prejudice, a risk that almost always arises when evidence is admitted to rebut evidence of good character. But if the evidence of bad character is cogent, it is a risk that must usually be 168. See also R v J [2000] NSWCCA 246 at [63]–[69] per Adams J. 169. Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296 per Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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taken unless the accused is to have an advantage that he or she is not entitled to have. In the vast majority of cases, the risk will be eliminated by a strong direction to the jury that the rebuttal evidence can only be used on the issue of good character. Even if the judge thinks that such a direction may not eliminate the risk of prejudice, the probative value of the evidence on the character issue may still require its admission. It will do so if its probative value outweighs any prejudice that it creates. In this case, the judge would have been bound to direct the jury that K’s evidence was relevant only in determining whether the appellant was a person of good character or not. Such a direction should have been sufficient to eliminate the risk.

If evidence is admitted adduced under s 110(2) or (3) for the limited use of negating good character, a jury must be so directed. The NSW Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book170 and the Victorian Criminal Charge Book171 both suggest directions to juries formulated on that basis. Further, given that evidence of good character (and rebuttal evidence) may be limited under the Act to a “particular respect ”of the accused’s character, it is clear that the necessary direction to the jury will be limited to that particular respect. The Victorian Criminal Charge Book suggests an appropriate direction where the evidence of character is limited to a “particular respect” of character.172

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[EA.110.120] Procedure Under s 192A a court may, if it considers it to be appropriate to do so, give a ruling or make a finding in relation to a question about the admissibility or use of evidence proposed to be adduced before the evidence is adduced in the proceedings. The court may also give an advance ruling in respect of the giving of leave, permission or direction under s 192. It follows that a defendant may apply to the court for rulings on the potential consequences of adducing evidence of good character. In particular, a ruling may be sought as to whether the adducing of particular defence evidence will render admissible evidence that the defendant is not a person of good character, generally or in a particular respect. There is authority that, where the defence has given notice that it will adduce evidence that the defendant is a person of good character, but has not yet adduced such evidence, the prosecution may nonetheless adduce evidence that the defendant is not a person of good character (without having to call the evidence in a case in reply).173 Gray J noted that there were indications in Copley v The Queen [2000] FCA 994 that this was not permissible but he held that in a trial by judge alone, s 57 could be utilised to “admit the evidence provisionally and permit its use, in effect, in rebuttal, upon the accused”. Technically, this ruling is questionable. Section 57 deals with provisional determinations of relevance, not admissibility. There is no provision in the Act permitting a court to admit (otherwise not admissible) evidence subject to a later conclusion that it is admissible (unless the view expressed by Spigelman CJ of the NSW Supreme Court that “not admissible” means “not admissible over objection” were applied: 170. Judicial Commission of NSW, Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book, www.judcom.nsw.gov.au, Trial Instructions – Character [2-390]. 171. Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au, Pt 4.3.2 172. Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au, Pt 4.3.3 173. R v KH [2002] ACTSC 108 at [13] per Gray J.

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see [EA.56.150]). In general, evidence that the defendant is not a person of good character is not admissible unless s 110 operates to make the hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility rules inapplicable. The precondition for the operation of s 110(2) or (3) is that evidence that the defendant is a person of good character “has been admitted”. Of course, such evidence may be admitted in the prosecution case (by cross-examination of prosecution witnesses) but, absent such evidence being admitted, evidence of bad character is technically not admissible – regardless of advance notice given by the defence. However, the same result may be achieved by reliance on s 190 of the Act. The defendant may consent to waive the operation of the hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility rules and the court may order accordingly.

Cth Act: 111

Evidence about character of co-accused

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(1) The hearsay rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence of a defendant’s character if: (a) the evidence is evidence of an opinion about the defendant adduced by another defendant; and (b) the person whose opinion it is has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (c) the opinion is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. (2) If such evidence has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove that that evidence should not be accepted. NSW Act: 111

Evidence about character of co-accused

(1) The hearsay rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence of a defendant’s character if: (a) the evidence is evidence of an opinion about the defendant adduced by another defendant, and (b) the person whose opinion it is has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, and (c) the opinion is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. (2) If such evidence has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove that that evidence should not be accepted. Vic Act: 111

Evidence about character of co-accused

(1) The hearsay rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence of the character of an accused if— (a) the evidence is evidence of an opinion about the accused adduced by another accused; and © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) the person whose opinion it is has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (c) the opinion is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. [Subs (1) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.30]

(2) If such evidence has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove that that evidence should not be accepted. [S 111 am Act 68 of 2009]

ACT Act: 111

Evidence about character of co-accused

(1) The hearsay rule and tendency rule do not apply to evidence of a defendant’s character if— (a) the evidence is evidence of an opinion about the defendant presented by another defendant; and (b) the person whose opinion it is has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (c) the opinion is completely or substantially based on that knowledge. (2) If evidence mentioned in subsection (1) has been admitted, the hearsay rule, opinion rule and tendency rule do not apply to evidence presented to prove that the evidence should not be accepted.

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NT Act: 111

Evidence about character of co-accused

(1) The hearsay rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence of a defendant’s character if: (a) the evidence is evidence of an opinion about the defendant adduced by another defendant; and (b) the person whose opinion it is has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience; and (c) the opinion is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. (2) If such evidence has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule and the tendency rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove that that evidence should not be accepted.

[EA.111.30]

ALRC References

ALRC 38, s 92, paras 177–178; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 805.

[EA.111.60]

General comments

This provision permits a defendant in criminal proceedings (D1) to have admitted expert opinion evidence relevant to the character of another defendant in the proceedings (D2), subject to the court’s discretion to exclude the evidence under s 135 (s 137 is only available in respect of evidence adduced by the prosecution). 900

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[EA.112.60]

Part 3.8 - Character

174

Where such evidence has been admitted, D2 may adduce evidence that that evidence should not be accepted”.

“to prove

Cth Act: 112 Leave required to cross-examine about character of accused or co-accused A defendant must not be cross-examined about matters arising out of evidence of a kind referred to in this Part unless the court gives leave. [S 112 am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 57]

NSW Act: 112 Leave required to cross-examine about character of accused or co-accused A defendant must not be cross-examined about matters arising out of evidence of a kind referred to in this Part unless the court gives leave. [S 112 am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[52]]

Vic Act: 112 Leave required to cross-examine about character of accused or co-accused An accused must not be cross-examined about matters arising out of evidence of a kind referred to in this Part unless the court gives leave. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[S 112 am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.31]

ACT Act: 112 Leave required to cross-examine about character of accused or co-accused A defendant must not be cross-examined about matters arising out of evidence mentioned in this part unless the court gives leave. NT Act: 112 Leave required to cross-examine about character of accused or co-accused A defendant must not be cross-examined about matters arising out of evidence of a kind referred to in this Part unless the court gives leave.

[EA.112.30] ALRC References ALRC 38, s 93, para 178(a).

[EA.112.60] General comments The effect of this provision is that the leave of the court must first be obtained before a defendant in criminal proceedings can be cross-examined by the prosecution or another defendant about matters relating to his or her character 174. The nature of the evidence is not defined. Since the hearsay rule, the tendency rule and the opinion rule do not apply, it appears that the evidence may fall into any of those categories. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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under this Part. Some difficulties are presented by the term “matters arising out of” and in harmonising this provision with Pt 3.7. This was referred to by the High Court in Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 at [38], where Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ observed: This case does not call for the Court to attempt to harmonize Pts 3.7 and 3.8 of the Act: nor is it necessary to give a meaning to the phrase in s 112 “matters arising out of evidence”; whether that phrase is intended to refer to something other than credibility evidence strictly so called, or to other matters or topics touched upon, or resulting from the reception of the character evidence itself.

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In R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455, Simpson J at [199] (Santow JA agreeing at [12]) referred to this issue in the context of a discussion of s 104 (which is in Pt 3.7 and deals with cross-examination of a defendant in criminal proceedings about evidence relevant only to the defendant’s credibility): The “Part” [referred to in s 112] is Pt 3.8 of the Evidence Act, concerned with character. A question arises as to the meaning of “matters arising out of evidence of a kind referred to in this Part”; in Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247; [2001] HCA 4 the High Court declined to attempt to “harmonise” Pt 3.8 with Pt 3.7 (concerned with credibility, in which s 104 appears). Section 110, also in Pt 3.8, is concerned with evidence adduced on behalf of a defendant intended to establish good character, either generally or in a particular respect. One construction, probably the most obvious construction, of s 112 is that it only prohibits cross-examination of a defendant about matters arising out of evidence called on his or her behalf to establish good character. Thus the discretion to grant leave to cross-examine a defendant about character does not exist and is not triggered, unless and until a defendant gives or adduces evidence of good character, either generally or in a particular respect. The alternative construction is that “evidence of a kind referred to in this Part” is character evidence, in which case leave could be given (subject to s 192 considerations and ss 135 and 137) whether or not the defendant has raised good character. If the latter is the correct construction, then s 112 prohibits cross-examination on character whether or not the defendant has raised character, subject to leave being granted. If the former is the correct construction, then there is nothing (other than s 102) that expressly prohibits cross-examination of an accused person in relation to previous criminal history. However, even on this construction, s 112 is relevant, in my view, to show that the common law resistance to allowing evidence of prior criminal history is still relevant in guiding the exercise of the s 104(2) discretion: see R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 319; Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45; [1985] HCA 79.

It is important to note that these observations, and the comments in Stanoevski, were made prior to the amendments following ALRC 102, particularly in relation to Pt 3.7. The difficulties in harmonising this provision with Pt 3.7 have been largely removed. It is suggested that it is useful to distinguish a number of different situations where the prosecution seeks to cross-examine a defendant about his or her criminal history: (a) The defendant has adduced evidence to prove that he or she is a person of good character and the evidence of criminal history falls within the terms of s 110(2) or s 110(3). Assuming that such evidence is not relevant only to the credibility of the defendant, it would not be “credibility evidence” as defined in s 101A (s 101A(b) would not be applicable because the “tendency rule” in Pt 3.6 does not apply by reason of the operation of s s 110). Accordingly, Part 3.7 does not apply. 902

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s 112

Part 3.8 - Character

[EA.112.60]

Leave would be required under this provision on either of the two constructions referred to by Simpson J. If such evidence were relevant only to the credibility of the defendant, it would be “credibility evidence” and not only would leave be required under this provision, the requirements of s 103 and s 104 would have to be satisfied. (b) The defendant has not adduced evidence to prove that he or she is a person of good character and thus the evidence of criminal history does not fall within the terms of s 110(2) or s 110(3). Assuming that the evidence of criminal history is not relevant only to the credibility of the defendant but also relevant to show a tendency on the part of the defendant to commit the crime(s) charged, the question would be whether it was “not admissible, or cannot be used, because of a provision of Pts 3.2 to 3.6” (s 101(b)(ii)), in particular because of ss 97 or 101. (i) If the evidence satisfied the requirements of both ss 97 and 101, it would not be “credibility evidence” as defined in s 101A and Pt 3.7 would not apply. Leave would only be required for cross-examination of the defendant pursuant to this provision if the second of the constructions referred to by Simpson J was correct. (ii) If the evidence of criminal history did not satisfy the requirements of s 97 or s 101 applied, it would fall within the definition of “credibility evidence” and the requirements of s 103 and s 104 would have to be satisfied. Whatever the scope of this provision, leave would be required pursuant to s 104(2) for cross-examination about the defendant’s criminal history. If the evidence of criminal history is relevant only to the credibility of the defendant it would fall within the definition of “credibility evidence” and leave would be required pursuant to s 104(2). Given this analysis, it would be preferable to adopt the “most obvious” construction of “matters arising out of evidence of a kind referred to in this Part” – that, as Simpson J explained, this provision “only prohibits cross-examination of a defendant about matters arising out of evidence called on his or her behalf to establish good character”. If the defendant has not adduced evidence to prove that he or she is a person of good character, leave would be required under s 104(2) for cross-examination about criminal history where that history is not admissible “tendency evidence” under Pt 3.7, so that there would be no need for a leave requirement pursuant to this provision. Common law “resistance to allowing evidence of prior criminal history” may be taken into account when applying the s 104(2) leave requirement. Conversely, if the evidence of criminal history is admissible “tendency evidence” (and as a result Pt 3.7 does not apply), there is no good reason why a leave requirement should be imposed at all. Putting to one side the possible application of s 112 to cases where the defendant has not adduced evidence of good character, it would appear that the non-specific language of the provision is designed to allow a court broad discretion in regulating cross-examination of a defendant where the defence has adduced evidence of good character and the prosecution proposes to challenge that claim in cross-examination: see ALRC 38, para 178(a). For example, in R v El-Kheir © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[2004] NSWCCA 461 the defendant gave evidence-in-chief which appeared to disclose bad character, but the evidence was adduced for the purpose of proving that he was the sort of person who would tell the truth when giving evidence on oath (evidence of good character in a particular respect). It was held at [54] that the prosecution required leave under this provision for cross-examination about this evidence. Section 192 deals with the grant of leave generally and permits the court to give leave “on such terms as the court thinks fit” (see [EA.192.40]). The discretion to grant leave will overlap with the court’s discretion to exclude prosecution evidence in ss 135 and 137. Considerations of “fairness” will no doubt play an important role (see s 192(2)(b)). However, as the Full Court of the Federal Court has pointed out: The function of the discretion vested in the judge in a criminal trial is to ensure fairness in the trial process having regard, on the one hand to the need to protect the accused against undue prejudice and, on the other hand, to the probative significance of the evidence sought to be led by the Crown.175

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The Full Court endorsed the proposition that “[a] fair trial is one which is fair to both parties, the accused and the Crown – which prosecutes on behalf of the whole community”. On the other hand, in Huges v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338, the Victorian Court of Appeal emphasised several reasons why leave should not have been granted in that case, including the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence of bad character, the low probative value of that evidence, and the fact that, if the defendant denied the allegation in cross-examination, prosecution rebuttal evidence would be the last evidence the jury heard (see at [31]–[37], [42], [50]–[55]). It has been held176 that the prosecution must reveal the nature and extent of the evidence it proposes to adduce in the course of requesting leave. Relevant considerations to the question of leave would include: • the relevance of the proposed rebuttal evidence to the character claimed by the defendant; • the role, if any, of the prosecution in opening up the question of character; • the stage of the trial at which the question of character has been raised;177 • whether or not counsel for the defendant had determined, for tactical reasons, not to raise character; • whether any warning had been given by the prosecution or the court that adducing evidence of good character might entitle the prosecution to adduce rebuttal evidence; 175. Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 at 55 (FCR). 176. Gabriel v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 298 per Higgins J; Huges v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338. 177. Huges v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 at [32], [46], [51].

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[EA.Ch3.Pt.3.9.30]

178

• a comparison of the probative value of the proposed rebuttal evidence compared with its unfairly prejudicial tendency; • the use that might be made of the evidence;179 • other alternatives to granting leave (for example, modifying the direction to the jury about the evidence of good character180). Further assistance in the application of this provision may be provided by authorities dealing with similar provisions in other jurisdictions.181

Part 3.9 – Identification evidence

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[EA.Ch3.Pt.3.9.30] Summary of this Part This Part applies only in criminal proceedings (s 113). Section 114 provides that “visual identification evidence” of a defendant is not admissible when adduced by the prosecution unless an identification parade was utilised by the police (or “it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade”) and the identification of the defendant was made without any intentional influence on the witness to identify the defendant. Section 115 provides that “picture identification evidence” (including photographic identification) adduced by the prosecution is not admissible in a number of situations. If identification evidence is admitted, s 116 requires a judge to inform the jury that there is a special need for caution before accepting such evidence and of the reasons for that need for caution. An overview of visual identification evidence is provided in the diagram below.182

178. In Huges v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338, Coghlan JA observed at [41]–[42] that evidence from the complainant in a child sexual abuse trial that that the defendant had committed a similar uncharged act on another occasion would not have “any probative value”, since “[r]ebuttal cannot flow from an assertion from the person whose credit is fundamentality in issue in the trial” (see also Lasry AJA at [55]). However, in this context the different views of the Victorian Court of Appeal and the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal with respect to the definition of “probative value” should be noted see [EA.137.90]). 179. In particular, whether the evidence might be used as directly relevant to the issue of guilt: see [EA.110.90]; see also Vo v The Queen (2013) 33 NTLR 65; 229 A Crim R 95; [2013] NTCCA 4 at [49]–[51]. 180. Huges v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338, Priest JA at [35]. 181. See, in particular, Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45; R v Brownlow (2003) 86 SASR 114; 142 A Crim R 201; [2003] SASC 262; Vo v The Queen (2013) 33 NTLR 65; 229 A Crim R 95; [2013] NTCCA 4. 182. Produced by the Judicial College of Victoria. Available at: http:// www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/publications/uniform-evidence-resources. Reproduced with permission. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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FIGURE 8

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 113

: Visual identification evidence

Cth Act: 113 Application of Part This Part applies only in a criminal proceeding.

906

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s 114

[EA.113.60]

Part 3.9 - Identification evidence

NSW Act: 113 Application of Part This Part applies only in a criminal proceeding. Vic Act: 113 Application of Part This Part applies only in a criminal proceeding. ACT Act: 113 Application—pt 3.9 This part applies only in a criminal proceeding. NT Act: 113

Application of Part

This Part applies only in a criminal proceeding.

[EA.113.30] ALRC References ALRC 38, s 102.

[EA.113.60] “criminal proceeding”

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The term “criminal [EA.Dict.Pt.1.60]).

proceeding”

is

defined

in

the

Dictionary

(see

Cth Act: 114

Exclusion of visual identification evidence

(1) In this section: visual identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification based wholly or partly on what a person saw but does not include picture identification evidence. (2) Visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless: (a) an identification parade that included the defendant was held before the identification was made; or (b) it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade; or (c) the defendant refused to take part in such a parade; and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the defendant. (3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court in determining whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade, it is to take into account: (a) the kind of offence, and the gravity of the offence, concerned; and (b) the importance of the evidence; and © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(c)

the practicality of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things: (i) if the defendant failed to cooperate in the conduct of the parade—to the manner and extent of, and the reason (if any) for, the failure; and (ii) in any case—to whether the identification was made at or about the time of the commission of the offence; and (d) the appropriateness of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things, to the relationship (if any) between the defendant and the person who made the identification.

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(4) It is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade if it would have been unfair to the defendant for such a parade to have been held. (5) If: (a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade unless an Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel acting for the defendant, or another person chosen by the defendant, was present while it was being held; and (b) there were, at the time when the parade was to have been conducted, reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for such an Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel or person to be present; it is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade at that time. [Subs (5) am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 58]

(6) In determining whether it was reasonable to have held an identification parade, the court is not to take into account the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making identifications. [S 114 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 114

Exclusion of visual identification evidence

(1) In this section: visual identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification based wholly or partly on what a person saw but does not include picture identification evidence. (2) Visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless: (a) an identification parade that included the defendant was held before the identification was made, or (b) it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade, or (c) the defendant refused to take part in such a parade, and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the defendant. 908

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Part 3.9 - Identification evidence

(3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court in determining whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade, it is to take into account: (a) the kind of offence, and the gravity of the offence, concerned, and (b) the importance of the evidence, and (c) the practicality of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things: (i) if the defendant failed to cooperate in the conduct of the parade—to the manner and extent of, and the reason (if any) for, the failure, and (ii) in any case—to whether the identification was made at or about the time of the commission of the offence, and (d) the appropriateness of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things, to the relationship (if any) between the defendant and the person who made the identification.

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(4) It is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade if it would have been unfair to the defendant for such a parade to have been held. (5) If: (a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade unless an Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel acting for the defendant, or another person chosen by the defendant, was present while it was being held, and (b) there were, at the time when the parade was to have been conducted, reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for such an Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel or person to be present, it is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade at that time. [Subs (5) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[53]]

(6) In determining whether it was reasonable to have held an identification parade, the court is not to take into account the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making identifications. [S 114 am Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: 114

Exclusion of visual identification evidence

(1) In this section, visual identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification based wholly or partly on what a person saw but does not include picture identification evidence. (2) Visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless— (a) an identification parade that included the accused was held before the identification was made; or (b) it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade; or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(c) the accused refused to take part in such a parade— and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the accused. [Subs (2) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.32]

(3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court in determining whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade, it is to take into account— (a) the kind of offence, and the gravity of the offence, concerned; and (b) the importance of the evidence; and (c) the practicality of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things— (i) if the accused failed to cooperate in the conduct of the parade—to the manner and extent of, and the reason (if any) for, the failure; and (ii) in any case—to whether the identification was made at or about the time of the commission of the offence; and (d) the appropriateness of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things, to the relationship (if any) between the accused and the person who made the identification. [Subs (3) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.32]

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(4) It is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade if it would have been unfair to the accused for such a parade to have been held. [Subs (4) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.32]

(5) If— (a) the accused refused to take part in an identification parade unless an Australian legal practitioner acting for the accused, or another person chosen by the accused, was present while it was being held; and (b) there were, at the time when the parade was to have been conducted, reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for such an Australian legal practitioner or person to be present— it is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade at that time. [Subs (5) am Act 17 of 2014, s 160 and Sch 2 item 39.3; Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.32]

(6) In determining whether it was reasonable to have held an identification parade, the court is not to take into account the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making identifications. [S 114 am Act 17 of 2014; Act 68 of 2009]

910

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s 114

Part 3.9 - Identification evidence

ACT Act: 114

Exclusion of visual identification evidence

(1) In this section: picture identification evidence —see section 115. visual identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification based completely or partly on what a person saw but does not include picture identification evidence.

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(2) Visual identification evidence presented by the prosecutor is not admissible unless— (a) an identification parade that included the defendant was held before the identification was made; or (b) it would not have been reasonable to have held the parade; or (c) the defendant refused to take part in the parade; and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the defendant. (3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court in deciding whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade, it must take into account— (a) the kind of offence, and the gravity of the offence; and (b) the importance of the evidence; and (c) the practicality of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things— (i) if the defendant failed to cooperate in the conduct of the parade—to the manner and extent of, and the reason (if any) for, the failure; and Note: Fail includes refuse (see Legislation Act, dict, pt 1).

(ii)

in any case—to whether the identification was made at or about the time of the commission of the offence; and (d) the appropriateness of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things, to the relationship (if any) between the defendant and the person who made the identification. (4) It is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade if it would have been unfair to the defendant for the parade to have been held. (5) If— (a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade unless an Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel acting for the defendant, or someone else chosen by the defendant, was present while it was being held; and (b) there were, at the time when the parade was to have been conducted, reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for a person mentioned in paragraph (a) to be present; it is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade at that time. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(6) In deciding whether it was reasonable to have held an identification parade, the court must not take into account the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making identifications. NT Act: 114

Exclusion of visual identification evidence

(1) In this section: visual identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification based wholly or partly on what a person saw but does not include picture identification evidence.

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(2) Visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless: (a) an identification parade that included the defendant was held before the identification was made; or (b) it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade; or (c) the defendant refused to take part in such a parade; and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the defendant. (3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court in determining whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade, it is to take into account: (a) the kind of offence, and the gravity of the offence, concerned; and (b) the importance of the evidence; and (c) the practicality of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things: (i) if the defendant failed to cooperate in the conduct of the parade — to the manner and extent of, and the reason (if any) for, the failure; and (ii) in any case — to whether the identification was made at or about the time of the commission of the offence; and (d) the appropriateness of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things, to the relationship (if any) between the defendant and the person who made the identification. (4) It is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade if it would have been unfair to the defendant for such a parade to have been held. (5) If: (a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade unless an Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel acting for the defendant, or another person chosen by the defendant, was present while it was being held; and

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[EA.114.60]

(b) there were, at the time when the parade was to have been conducted, reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for such an Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel or person to be present; it is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade at that time. (6) In determining whether it was reasonable to have held an identification parade, the court is not to take into account the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making identifications.

[EA.114.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 13.1–13.59; ALRC 38, s 103, paras 185–187; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 830–833.

[EA.114.60] General comments

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The general effect of this provision is that “visual identification evidence” as defined (see [EA.114.90]) of a defendant in criminal proceedings is not admissible when adduced by the prosecution unless: • an identification parade was utilised by the police or “it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade”; and • the identification of the defendant was made without any intentional influence on the witness to identify the defendant. Because “identification evidence” is defined to mean an assertion of resemblance regarding “a defendant”, this provision has no application to identification of some other person or a thing. Further, this provision has no application to evidence of description of a person alleged by the prosecution to be the defendant, unless the person testifying as to the description takes the next step of asserting some resemblance between the person described and the defendant.183 The provision would apply to evidence which satisfies the definition even if the person making the assertion of identification of the defendant also asserts that it was a case of “recognition” of someone familiar.184 On the other hand, the provision does not apply to evidence of recognition of a person shown in a photograph as someone previously known (even if the person previously known is the defendant).185 In respect of such evidence, possible bases for exclusion would be lack of relevance (s 55) (see, in particular, [EA.55.270]), application of the opinion rule (s 76) and discretionary exclusion under Pt 3.11. In summary, an identification parade need not have been held if: (1) the defendant refused to take part in such a parade (s 114(2)(c)); or 183. See [EA.114.90]. 184. Trudgett v The Queen (2008) 70 NSWLR 696; 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62 at [19]–[32]. 185. R v Smith (1999) 47 NSWLR 419; [1999] NSWCCA 317; R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 (NSW CCA) at [37]–[38] per Hidden J; R v Hennessy [2001] NSWCCA 36. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(2) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade unless a lawyer acting for the defendant, or another person chosen by the defendant, was present while it was being held; and there were reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for such a lawyer or person to be present (s 114(5));186 or (3) it would have been unfair to the defendant for such a parade to have been held (s 114(4));187 or (4) it would otherwise not have been reasonable to have held such a parade, taking into account such matters as those listed in s 114(3) but not taking into account the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making identifications (s 114(6)).

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In respect of evidence to which this provision applies, the ALRC explained its proposal (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 833): The proposal advanced is similar to that contained in the original research paper – the holding of an identification parade should remain as a pre-condition to admissibility. It is modified to include the last mentioned qualification excusing the failure to hold an identification parade where to hold it would not be reasonable. It is the most satisfactory one. Identification evidence is defined to include evidence of a person who witnessed the identification. The hearsay aspect of such evidence is dealt with by the hearsay proposals. It is contemplated that it would not be reasonable to hold an identification parade where an arrested suspect refuses to co-operate. The view is taken that the suspect should have the right to refuse but that the prosecution cannot be prevented from attempting to obtain the best identification evidence. The only exception to this proposition is where the suspect refuses to attend an identification parade on the ground that he wants a lawyer present. If, however, it was not reasonably practicable for a lawyer to be present – eg, if his lawyer is not available and he refuses to get another one – the prosecution should be permitted to use other identification evidence. It would also be not reasonable to require the holding of an identification parade before arresting a suspect where the suspect is invited to attend an identification parade and refuses. Nothing in the proposal would prevent the use of an informal “showing” in a group of people and the admissibility of evidence of it if an identification parade was refused.

The ALRC considered that these proposals were necessary because it had concluded, on the basis of the extensive literature, that identification evidence was generally more unreliable and difficult to assess than other types of evidence,188 that the standard method of testing evidence by cross-examination does not provide adequate protection against unreliable identification evidence,189 and that identification parades are likely to be less unreliable than other modes of first identification.190 However, as explained at [EA.114.90], the definition of “visual identification evidence” in s 114 limits the effect of the provision. 186. This provision is curiously drafted in that the language of “presumption” is adopted. This seems unnecessary since the effect is an irrebuttable presumption. 187. This provision is curiously drafted in that the language of “presumption” is adopted. This seems unnecessary since the effect is an irrebuttable presumption. 188. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 826; see also paras 415–421. 189. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 827; see also paras 425–426. 190. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 830. See also paras 433–435; but compare para 835.

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If this provision does not render visual identification evidence inadmissible (because, for example, it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade), there is no limitation imposed on the type of visual identification evidence that may be admitted. Subject to the provisions of Pt 3.11 (see [EA.114.240]), it may be permissible for such evidence to be, for example, an in-court identification, notwithstanding the potential unreliability of such evidence (see ALRC 102 at paras 13.93–13.109). However, s 116 imposes a requirement for an appropriate warning to the jury in respect of such evidence.

[EA.114.90] “visual identification evidence” The term “identification evidence” is defined in the Dictionary: “identification evidence” means evidence that is: (a) an assertion by a person to the effect that a defendant was, or resembles (visually, aurally or otherwise) a person who was, present at or near a place where: (i) the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted was committed; or (ii) an act connected to that offence was done; at or about the time at which the offence was committed or the act was done, being an assertion that is based wholly or partly on what the person making the assertion saw, heard or otherwise perceived at that place and time; or

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(b) a report (whether oral or in writing) of such an assertion.

Thus, “identification evidence” is broadly defined to mean an assertion (based wholly or partly on what the person making the assertion saw, heard or otherwise perceived) that the defendant is, or resembles, a person present “at or about the time” the crime (or connected act) in question was committed, or hearsay191 evidence of such an assertion. It does not include evidence of identification of a person other than the defendant192 or evidence of identification of an object. It does not include security surveillance footage, or evidence of an identification made by a tracker dog, since that does not involve an assertion by a person. It does not include DNA evidence or fingerprint evidence used for the purposes of identification (see ALRC 102 at paras 13.17–13.34). It does not include identification based on “facial mapping” using data from facial recognition information technology. It would not include an assertion that a computer generated image resembled the offender, since there is no reference to the defendant in such an assertion.193 It would not include an assertion that the defendant is not a person present at or 191. Hearsay evidence is dealt with in Pt 3.2. Where “visual identification evidence” is in the form of hearsay, compliance with both s 114 and Pt 3.2 is required for admissibility. 192. See R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701; [2002] NSWCCA 455 at [325.] 193. The view of Bell J in R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 at [44] to the contrary should be regarded as wrong. In Aouad v The Queen (2011) 207 A Crim R 411; [2011] NSWCCA 61 James J (McClelland CJ at CL and Johnson J agreeing) observed at [263]: In my opinion and notwithstanding an assertion made by the trial judge in para 44 of her judgment, the evidence was not identification evidence and therefore not “visual identification evidence”. Mr Rahman was not asserting that Aouad was or resembled one of © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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about the time the crime (or connected act) in question was committed. It has no application to evidence of description of a person alleged by the prosecution to be the defendant, unless the person testifying as to the description takes the next step of asserting some resemblance between the person described and the defendant.195 In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Bass [2016] VSCA 110, the Victorian Court of Appeal stated at [35]–[38]: [35] The requirement arising from the words “an accused was, or resembles” a person may be satisfied if the witness asserts, first, that the accused “was … a person who was, present” at or near the place where the relevant offence was committed; or, secondly, that the accused “resembles … a person who was, present” at or near the place where the relevant offence was committed. [36] Generally, an assertion of resemblance might relate to obvious physical features which are visually observable, including height, weight, age, gender, complexion, facial features and the length, texture and colour of a person’s hair. Visually observable physical features can also include race, distinctive marks and gait.

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[37] The Macquarie Dictionary defines “resemble” to mean “to be like or similar to”, “to liken or compare”. The Oxford English Dictionary contains six meanings for “resemble”, including, “To be like, to have likeness or similarity to, to have some feature or property in common with (another person or thing)”, “To compare or liken (a person or thing) to another”, and “To be like in some respect to another person or thing”. The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary defines “resemble” to mean “be like; have a similarity to, or features in common with, or the same appearance as.” [38] So far as visual identification evidence is concerned, as a matter of ordinary language, in order for a witness to assert that the accused “resembles … a person who was, present” at or near the place where the relevant offence was committed, the witness must, in effect, assert that he or she has seen both the accused and a person at or near the place where the relevant offence was committed, and that, based on his or her observations of their physical features, the accused resembles that person.

Similarly, in Trudgett v The Queen (2008) 70 NSWLR 696; 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62 it was held that the definition did not include a complainant’s evidence that was to the effect that the person who attacked her was introduced to her as “Adam” and that that was all she knew about him. Spigelman CJ explained at [35]: [35] The complainant made no “assertion … to the effect that the” appellant “was, or resembles … a person”, namely the perpetrator. She gave no “identification evidence” within the meaning of the Dictionary definition …

Perhaps more controversially, it was held at [37]–[38] that evidence of the introduction was not caught by the definition: the shooters. He was merely asserting that some of the shooter’s features were like certain features shown in the comfit booklet and that the comfit image resembled the shooter. 194. For further discussion regarding non-identification evidence, see [EA.114.360]. 195. Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Bass [2016] VSCA 110 at [39] (see also at [55]–[61]; Walford v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; 217 A Crim R 555; [2012] NSWCA 290 at [17]–[18]. See also R v Taufua (unreported, NSWCCA, No 60079 of 1996, 11 November 1996).

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[37] One witness said that he introduced the appellant to the complainant and did so under the name of “Adam”. This is evidence of what the witness said. It is not evidence of what the witness “saw, heard or otherwise perceived” and, accordingly, is also not “identification evidence” within the Dictionary definition … [38] Obviously, it is implicit in evidence to the effect, “I introduced X to Y” that X and Y were there at the time. That is not, in my opinion, evidence of “presence” within s 116. The long history of identification evidence indicates that the Dictionary definition is concerned with direct evidence of “presence”, not indirect evidence of the character involved in reciting the occurrence of an introduction.

The Victorian Court of Appeal endorsed this analysis in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Bass [2016] VSCA 110, stating at [40]: A person’s name does not constitute identification evidence. This is because the witness makes no “assertion … to the effect that the [accused] was or resembles … a person”, namely the perpetrator. It is not a reference to a physical feature of that person.

So much may be accepted. However, where the witness in Trudgett was asserting, in substance, that the person he introduced to the complainant was the defendant, it is not apparent why concerns about the reliability of identification evidence have no application or why the definition should not be held to apply.

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The definition includes evidence of both an “in court”196 and an “out of court” identification.197 The resemblance may be visual, aural, “or otherwise”. However, “visual identification evidence” limits this definition in two significant ways: (1) the “identification evidence” must be “based wholly or partly on what a person saw”. Thus, s 114 does not apply in a case where the identification evidence is not partly visually based – where, for example, it is wholly aurally based; (2) the term does not include “picture identification evidence” – which is defined in s 115 to mean: identification evidence relating to an identification made wholly or partly by the person who made the identification examining pictures kept for the use of police officers.

Under s 115(10)(a), a reference to a picture includes a reference to a photograph. Consequently, where the identification evidence is wholly aurally based or, more importantly, made wholly or partly by examination of pictures or “mug shots”, there is no requirement under s 114 to have utilised an identification parade and no requirement under s 114 that the identification of the defendant was made 196. For example, an identification of the defendant sitting in the “dock” by a witness who observed the offender at the scene of the crime. However, the definition would not include the situation where the jury is asked to compare the appearance of the defendant with a photograph of the offender: R v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330 at [46]–[47]. 197. R v Taufua (unreported, NSW CCA, 11 November 1996); R v Tahere [1999] NSWCCA 170; R v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21; [1999] ACTSC 112. The definition would not extend to evidence by a witness identifying a person in a photograph to be a person the witness knows (R v Smith [1999] NSWCCA 317; (1999) 47 NSWLR 419 at [13] per Sheller JA; R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 (NSW CCA) at [37]–[38] per Hidden J; R v Hennessy [2001] NSWCCA 36) or the tribunal of fact comparing the defendant with a photograph of the offender (R v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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without any intentional influence on the identifying witness to identify the defendant.198 It would appear to follow that aural identification is left to judicial discretion (see [EA.114.360]) and picture identification to s 115.

[EA.114.120]

“identification parade”

This term is not defined in the Act. Broadly interpreted, it would mean any group of people (including the person who subsequently became the defendant), utilised for the purpose of a witness attempting to identify someone involved in a crime. However, ss 3ZM, 3ZN and 3ZP of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) set out requirements and procedures for holding identification parades in relation to Commonwealth offences.199 In the absence of such legislative prescription, the courts themselves should interpret the term in such a way as to ensure a minimum level of fairness and evidentiary reliability.200

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[EA.114.150] “an identification parade” held “unless the defendant refused to take part in such a parade” The effect of s 114(2) is that it is not necessary to even consider the reasonableness of not holding an identification parade if the defendant refuses to take part in one. It is not a “refusal” to take part in an identification parade to decline to speak to an investigating official, in circumstances where the investigating official has not communicated a request to participate in an identification parade.201 It is not a “refusal” to take part in an identification parade to say that legal advice is desired before a decision is made whether or not to take part.202 However, a failure to give an unequivocal answer after legal 198. It is true that the ALRC did not make any express proposals in regard to identification evidence which is wholly aurally based (see [EA.114.30]). However, it is not clear why an identification parade should not be adopted (unless “unreasonable”) in such cases. Nor is there any good explanation for not requiring that the identification of the defendant be made without any intentional influence on the identifying witness to identify the defendant. Equally, there appears no good reason why the requirements of s 114 should not apply to “picture identification evidence”, as defined. Of course, there may be good reasons in a particular case for the first identification to be made by such a method rather than by an identification parade (where, for example, the police have no suspect and a witness is asked to examine folders of “mug shots”) but it would “not have been reasonable to have held such a parade” and the application of s 114 would not result in exclusion of the evidence. Nor is there any good explanation for not requiring that the identification of the defendant be made without any intentional influence on the identifying witness to identify the defendant. However, these criticisms are ameliorated to some extent by the provisions of s 115, discussed below. 199. It is desirable that similar legislation be introduced in other jurisdictions to mandate such procedures, ensuring such things as a minimum number of foils (who match the description given by the witness) and fair conduct of the parade. See Shepherd, Ellis and Davies, Identification Evidence: A Psychological Evaluation (Aberdeen University Press, 1982). 200. However, NSW courts appear to focus more on possible discretionary exclusion (see [EA.114.240]) and jury warnings (ss 116 and 165) rather than extended application of this provision: R v Fisher [2001] NSWCCA 380. 201. R v Massey [2009] ACTCA 12, Higgins CJ at [13]. 202. R v Sarlija (2009) 3 ACTLR 259; [2009] ACTSC 127, Penfold J at [28]. In contrast, it is a refusal to say “no, but I may change my mind if my lawyer advises that I should”: R v Carpenter [2011] ACTSC 71; 212 A Crim R 1 at [70]–[72].

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advice is obtained may be treated as a refusal. No general rule can be laid down regarding how long the decision may be deferred. It will be relevant to consider what steps were taken by investigating officials to seek an unequivocal answer.204 Presumably a refusal must be absolute – if the defendant refuses to take part unless certain conditions are met (and thus agrees if the conditions are met), an assessment of reasonableness, including the reasonableness of the conditions, should be made (see s 114(3)(c)(i)). That is certainly the case where the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade unless a lawyer acting for the defendant, or another person chosen by the defendant, was present while it was being held – s 114(5) provides that an identification parade need not have been held if there were reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for such a lawyer or person to be present. However, for a different view in respect of the identical words in s 115(5)(a), see [EA.115.180].

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It should be noted that the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) effectively ensures that a refusal to take part in an identification parade will be video or audio recorded (s 3ZM(3), (4)). No such safeguard exists under NSW or Victorian law. It is an interesting question whether the prosecution may adduce evidence in the trial proper of a refusal to take part in an identification parade. There is no doubt that such a refusal cannot be treated as an admission (cf s 89) or evidence of guilt in some other way. However, there is authority that the prosecution may adduce evidence of the refusal to explain why no identification parade was held, even if the defence has not suggested some unfairness about the identification process.205 A similar issue has arisen in respect of refusals to answer police questions (see [EA.89.150]) and there is some support for the view that such evidence should not be admissible unless the defence has raised an issue as to fairness or at least declined to give an undertaking not to raise such an issue. It is suggested that an argument that the evidence should be allowed to prevent the jury speculating about the failure to hold a parade is not persuasive, since juries are directed to decide cases on the evidence and not to speculate about matters that are not the subject of evidence (see discussion at [EA.55.570]).

[EA.114.180]

“an identification parade” held unless “it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade”

Pursuant to s 114(2), “visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor” may be admissible if “it would not have been reasonable to have held” an identification parade that included the defendant before “the identification” was made. The meaning of the term “the identification” is not entirely clear. It could mean an “assertion by a person to the effect that a defendant was, or resembles … a person” present “at or about the time” the crime (or connected act) in question was committed (see definition of “identification evidence”: [EA.114.90]). Alternatively, it could mean the time when the person believed, rather than 203. R v Sarlija (2009) 3 ACTLR 259; [2009] ACTSC 127, Penfold J at [16]. 204. R v Sarlija (2009) 3 ACTLR 259; [2009] ACTSC 127, Penfold J at [28]. 205. R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 (NSWCCA); R v Davies (2005) 11 VR 314; 153 A Crim R 217; [2005] VSCA 90 (VCA). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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asserted, that “a defendant was, or resembles … a person” present “at or about the time” the crime (or connected act) in question was committed. While the courts have not been required to resolve this issue, the former is the preferable interpretation because the “making” of an “identification” seems more consistent with the act of asserting something than the existence of a particular state of mind. However, in practice, it is unlikely that these two possible interpretations will produce different outcomes, because if it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade before one, it will almost always not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade before the other, and vice versa. What is important to emphasise is that “the identification” is not the giving of evidence of the assertion in the proceeding – it is the making of the assertion or the formation of the state of mind prior to the making of the assertion. Such an assertion may be made in court (a “dock identification”) or out of court.206 Whether or not it would have been reasonable to have held an identification parade prior to the particular identification in question will depend in part on when that identification occurred (or, in the case of a “dock identification”, is proposed to occur).207 The reference to “such a parade” in s 114(2)(b) is ambiguous. It could mean “an identification parade that included the [defendant/accused]” or it could mean “an identification parade that included the [defendant/accused] held before the identification was made”. If it meant the former, visual identification evidence would not be admissible if it would have been “reasonable” to have held an identification parade at any time prior to the adducing of the evidence, regardless of when the “identification” was made. There may be good policy reasons to support such an approach. However, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has favoured the latter interpretation208. In assessing the question of reasonableness, the court is required to take into account such matters as those listed in s 114(3) but not taking into account the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making identifications (s 114(6)). Section 114(4) provides that “[i]t is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade if it would have been unfair to the defendant for such a parade to have been held”. No guidance is provided as to circumstances in which it would be “unfair” to the defendant to hold an identification parade. Plainly, there will be considerable overlap between circumstances rendering it “unreasonable” to hold a parade and circumstances rendering it “unfair to the defendant” to hold such a parade. 206. See R v D [2008] 2 ACTLR 225; [2008] ACTSC 82. In R v Taylor (2008) 2 ACTLR 216; [2008] ACTSC 52 Rares J appears to have held that “before the identification was made” in s 114(2)(a) means in all cases “at any time before the evidence of the identification is given at the trial”. As Penfold J observed in R v D, that interpretation is unsupported by authority and should not be followed. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has expressly rejected the approach of Rares J: Walford v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; 217 A Crim R 555; [2012] NSWCA 290, Hoeben J at [68]. 207. See Walford v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; 217 A Crim R 555; [2012] NSWCA 290. 208. Walford v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; 217 A Crim R 555; [2012] NSWCA 290, Hoeben JA at [69]–[75] (see also Basten JA at [27]).

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The matters listed in s 114(3) may well allow the police to avoid holding an identification parade in such cases as where the identifying witness “recognised” the defendant when the crime was committed, where identification is not seriously in issue, where the crime involved is relatively minor, or where it is practically difficult to conduct a proper parade. Thus, for example, it would not have been reasonable to hold a parade in a case where the identification occurred a few minutes after the commission of the offence and before the police had begun an investigation.209 Similarly, in R v D [2008] 2 ACTLR 225; [2008] ACTSC 82 Penfold J held in a case where evidence was adduced that a victim had told workmates and then the police that a named person (the defendant, “D”), who he knew, had assaulted him, that “it would not have been possible for an identification parade that included D to have been held before the identification was made” (at [14]). In Ilioski v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 164, Hunt AJA (Adams and Latham JJ agreeing) observed at [123]: [I]t could not rationally be expected that, before arresting the appellant for the very serious offence committed, the police could have arranged an identification parade in the circumstances of the present case. It has not been suggested that the appellant would have declined to participate or to cooperate; what is said is that the necessary logistics of arranging an appropriately held identification parade were extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to perform in the situation which existed at that time. The test proposed by s 114 is whether it would have been unreasonable, not that it would have been impossible, to arrange an identification parade. First, the appellant himself … had by then developed a black eye and was “pretty well bruised up”. It would not have been practicable to find sufficient men of general similar appearance to the appellant, and any identification parade at that time was very unlikely to have provided a fair array. Because the formal identification was necessary in order to effect the arrest, the identification … could not have been put off to a later date. Secondly, the police were in any event very involved at the time in attempting to bring the general situation … under control.

The issue of “recognition” has been considered by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. In R v Taufua (unreported, NSW CCA, 11 November 1996) the identification was an in-court “dock” identification. It was argued that it would not have been reasonable to hold an identification parade in circumstances where the identifying witness claimed to have seen the person identified a number of times before the commission of the offence. However, Barr J observed: Despite a degree of familiarity Mr Little [the identifying witness] may be taken to have had with the man he had seen in the past and whom he thought was the man he saw in July 1994 [when the offence occurred], I do not think that if his Honour had considered subs (2)(b) he could reasonably have come to the view that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade. In my view Mr Little’s evidence did not describe a relationship of great familiarity. It was twelve months since he had seen the man he thought he recognised. The man’s appearance had changed noticeably.210

In other cases, the fact that the identifying witness “recognised” the defendant has led to a conclusion that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade.211 209. R v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21; [1999] ACTSC 112 at [17] per Miles CJ. 210. Taufua, p 11. 211. In R v Ford [1998] NSWSC 96, it was held that the familiarity of the identifying witness with the defendant, and the distinctive appearance of the latter, meant that it was reasonable not to © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held in R v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83 that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade where the identification was made by a police officer who observed the person alleged to be the accused and, some months later, took part in a search of the accused’s premises and arrested her for various offences – any use of an identification parade at that point would have been “pointless” (Smart AJ at [89]–[94]). The court rejected a suggested general rule (founding discretionary exclusion under s 137) that a police officer who may be called upon to give identification evidence should not take part in execution of a search warrant at a suspect’s premises and that if he does so, he cannot give identification evidence (Smart AJ at [96]). Thus, it may be unreasonable to hold an identification parade where the witness has already identified the defendant. In R v D [2008] 2 ACTLR 225; [2008] ACTSC 82 Penfold J stated in dicta at [53]–[56]: The following scenario based on the facts of this case and a hypothetical identification parade illustrates the risks of identification parades after identification. • C is assaulted by a person he believes he recognises, during a 90-second encounter, as A, a fellow student from the primary school he left four years ago. He passes on this identification of his assailant to the police when he reports the assault.

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• An identification parade is organised including A. C expects that A will be included, and has a sufficient memory of A to identify him in the identification parade. On the basis of this memory and his previously expressed belief that A was the assailant, C, acting entirely in good faith, picks out A in the parade. The problem is that all this identification really shows is that C does know A well enough to pick him out of a parade. His ability to do that does not confirm that the assailant was A; at most it confirms that the assailant was sufficiently similar in appearance to A to explain C’s initial identification. The reliability of that initial identification is not established or increased by C’s ability to identify A in a different context, and one in which he is already expecting to see A. Furthermore, if C’s memory of A was reasonably accurate, but C had doubts about his identification of his assailant, the effect of including A in an identification parade might simply be to confirm C’s initial identification. Among other things, seeing A in an identification parade might overlay C’s actual memory of the assault with his now reinforced memory of A’s appearance so as to minimise those doubts. Although, as demonstrated above, C’s ability to pick out A in the parade does not prove that C’s initial identification was reliable, it might nevertheless make C more certain about his identification and less susceptible to cross-examination on behalf of A. That is, rather than demonstrating the accuracy of C’s initial identification, such an identification parade might contaminate C’s identification dangerously, but without that contamination being apparent. hold a parade. Similarly, in Director of Public Prosecutions v Donald [1999] NSWSC 949, Bell J accepted a submission that, in a case where the identifying witness had seen the defendant walking in the street, recognised her as the offender and then reported the matter to the police, any identification made at an identification parade following the arrest of the defendant “might be said to have been contaminated by her earlier identification”. See also R v Leroy [2000] NSWCCA 302. In R v Buchanan (2004) 152 A Crim R 302; [2004] NSWSC 816 Buddin J pointed out that “recognition” may arise where there is a prior relationship between the defendant and the witness (a factor required to be taken into account under s 114(3)(d)).

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It might be argued that in cases such as the current one, an identification parade could reveal a dramatically mistaken identification (for instance if the complainant had recognised the assailant as a former classmate but had wrongly albeit honestly attributed the name of another former classmate to him). However, if such a mistake is likely to be disclosed at an identification parade when the complainant recognises the person he has named but realises that person was not the assailant, it is also likely to be disclosed at the trial when the complainant realises that the person in court is the person he has named but not the assailant. The possibility that a mistaken identification might emerge earlier if an identification parade is held would not seem to outweigh the very real prejudice already described that might be caused by holding a parade after an identification has been made.

Similarly, in Peterson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 111, the Victorian Court of Appeal accepted (at [48]) that it would not have been reasonable to have held a parade where the victim had already viewed and identified a photograph of the accused on Facebook (given the danger of the “displacement effect”).

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In determining whether or not it would have been reasonable to hold an identification parade, the court may take into account considerations other than those listed in s 114(3) and s 114(4). For example, it will be relevant that the defendant had refused to take part in an identification parade in relation to an offence closely related to the one charged, and had declined to answer police questions or provide a buccal swab, so that the “police would have been reasonably entitled to assume that any further request would also be declined”.212 It will be relevant to consider the anticipated probative value of an identification parade identification in the particular circumstances of the case.213 Similarly, as regards the “practicality” of holding a parade, the court may take into account considerations other than those listed in s 114(3)(c). Relevant factors would include logistical difficulties and the time it would take to organise a parade.214 It has been held that a defendant’s incarceration in a high security prison in another jurisdiction meant that it would not have been reasonable for the Australian Federal Police to have held an identification parade that included him on that date.215 However, s 114(6) makes it clear that the prosecution cannot justify a failure to hold an identification parade on the basis that the police had “pictures or photographs that could be used” for identification purposes (see s 115 for the rules relating to the admissibility of picture identification evidence). It should be noted that circumstances may change. Just because it was reasonable not to hold an identification parade at a particular time and place (because, for example, of difficulties in obtaining enough people of similar appearance to permit a fair identification parade) does not mean that it was reasonable not to do so at a later time.216 Further, in NSW, the NSW Police Force has released a 212. R v Duncan [2004] NSWCCA 431 at [196]. 213. Ilioski v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 164 at [124]. 214. R v Leroy [2000] NSWCCA 302 at [19]–[23]; Ilioski v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 164 at [123]; Dickman v The Queen [2015] VSCA 311 at [92]. 215. R v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45; [2000] FCA 1195 (Fed Ct FC). 216. R v Tahere [1999] NSWCCA 170. In this case, the issue of visual identification evidence arose during the course of the trial. There was no evidence before the court that the particular circumstances of unfairness present on the night of the offence (which justified not holding an © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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document entitled “Procedures for the Evidence Act” which specifies procedures to be adopted in using photographs for identification purposes (at pp 33–35).

[EA.114.210] “without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the defendant” (s 114(2)) This condition of admissibility applies to all “visual identification evidence”, as defined (see above). The prosecution will be required to satisfy the court either that the witness was not “influenced” to identify the defendant or that any such influence was not intended.217 It is clear that simply telling the witness that there would be a suspect in the identification parade would not constitute intentionally influencing the witness to identify the defendant.218

[EA.114.240] Discretion to exclude If visual identification evidence is admissible under s 114, it may still be excluded under the court’s discretionary powers: see Pt 3.11. In exercising those powers under ss 135 and 137219 the court would need to determine the “probative value” of the identification evidence. “Probative value” is defined in the Dictionary:

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“probative value” of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.

In IMM v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 529; [2016] HCA 14 the High Court determined that a trial judge, in assessing the “probative value” of evidence for the purposes of a number of provisions in the UEL (including s 137), must proceed on the assumption that the evidence “is accepted” (and thus is to be regarded as both credible and reliable). This issue is discussed in detail at [EA.137.90]. As explained there, it is of critical importance to appreciate the (limited) consequences of an assumption that the evidence of a witness is to be accepted as credible and reliable. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ stated at [50]: ...It must also be understood that the basis upon which a trial judge proceeds, that the jury will accept the evidence taken at its highest, does not distort a finding as to the real probative value of the evidence. The circumstances surrounding the evidence may identification parade on that occasion), or any other basis for a finding of unreasonableness, were also present at a time reasonably proximate to the trial. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the evidence of in-court identification was inadmissible under s 114. 217. Compare R v Gibson [2002] NSWCCA 401 at [63]–[66] per Sully J. 218. R v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264; [2002] NSWCCA 247 at [29]–[32]. 219. There is abundant common law on how probative value and unfair prejudice may be assessed in this context: see, eg, Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 181; Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 55 ALJR 355; [1981] HCA 17; Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; [1992] HCA 13. It has been suggested that an appropriate test for application of the common law discretion enacted under s 137 would be whether the quality of the evidence falls short of the point where its frailty or frailties cannot be cured by an appropriate caution to the jury: R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 (NSW CCA) at 196 per Hunt CJ at CL, who added that the identification evidence must be considered in the context of all the evidence in the case. Courts operating under the Evidence Act have adopted a similar analysis: R v Nelson (2004) 41 MVR 10; [2004] NSWCCA 231 at [20] per Sperling J. For an example of a case where the probative value of identification evidence was found to be “extremely low” and the danger of unfair prejudice “substantial”, requiring exclusion under s 137, see R v Nguyen [2003] NSWSC 1068.

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indicate that its highest level is not very high at all. The example given by JD Heydon QC was of an identification made very briefly in foggy conditions and in bad light by a witness who did not know the person identified. As he points out, on one approach it is possible to say that taken at its highest it is as high as any other identification, and then look for particular weaknesses in the evidence (which would include reliability). On another approach, it is an identification, but a weak one because it is simply unconvincing. The former is the approach undertaken by the Victorian Court of Appeal; the latter by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. The point presently to be made is that it is the latter approach which the statute requires. This is the assessment undertaken by the trial judge of the probative value of the evidence.

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It appears to follow from this discussion that the evidence of an identifying witness may be seen as evidence of a belief, with the consequence that it is to be assumed that the witness is being truthful when he or she testifies that this belief is held and is reliably recounting the content of the belief220 but this does not mean that the belief itself must be assumed to be reliable. Other evidence, including “the circumstances surrounding the evidence” of the witness, may indicate that it has low probative value. The circumstances in which the observation of the offender was made show that the subsequent identification (the belief itself) is “weak” and “unconvincing” and, accordingly, of low probative value. It would necessarily follow that another example would be where the circumstances in which the (first) identification of the accused as the offender also render that identification “weak” and “unconvincing” and, accordingly, of low probative value (for example, where there was a high level of “suggestion” that the accused was the offender). In R v Dickman (2017) 91 ALJR 686; [2017] HCA 24, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ unanimously accepted the trial judge’s assessment that the probative value of identification evidence adduced by the prosecution was “low”. They stated at [43]: This was an estimate that did not depend upon his Honour’s assessment of [the witness’s] truthfulness or reliability as a witness. Assuming that the jury would accept the … identification at its highest, it was identification with limited capacity to rationally affect the assessment of the probability that the respondent was the [offender].

Matters said to reduce the probative value of the evidence were “the limitations of photographic identification” and the fact that the witness conceded that “the respondent’s photograph bore the closest resemblance to his recollection of the appearance of the [offender]”. The “limitations” of photographic identification were not elucidated in the judgment, but may have included a prior police suggestion that the suspected offender’s photograph was present in the photo-board and possible “displacement” from an earlier photographic identification process engaged in by the witness. It was not explained by the Court how these matters, while plainly undermining the reliability of the witness’s belief that the respondent was the offender, did not involve any assessment by the trial judge of his “reliability as a witness”. Nevertheless, the 220. See, for example, Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Wearn [2018] VSCA 39, where the Victorian Court of Appeal accepted at [26]–[27] that inconsistencies in successive accounts given by an identification witness should have been disregarded in assessing the probative value of the evidence of identification. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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important point is that the High Court accepted that the evidence was of low probative value, and this may be explained on the basis that, while it might be assumed that the witness was reliably recounting the content of his belief that the respondent was the offender, this did not mean that the belief itself was assumed to be reliable. There has been considerable research into the problems with visual identification.221 Factors relevant to an assessment of the probative value of identification evidence might include: • any prior familiarity with the subject;222 • characteristics of the subject;223 • the circumstances of the perception of the subject;224 • relevant characteristics of the witness, including sincerity, bias or interest,225 eyesight, hearing, concentration, ability to process perceptions and memory, ability to compare memory of past perceptions with present perceptions and ability to communicate;

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• the nature of any description given by the witness of the subject (and the length of time between the initial perception and the giving of the description);226

221. See, eg, Brewer, Weber and Semmler, “Eyewitness Identification” in Brewer and Williams (eds), Psychology and the Law – An Empirical Perspective (The Guildford Press, New York, 2005), Ch 6; Kapardis, Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction (1997), pp 20–92; Loftus and Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal (3rd ed, 1997); Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); and I Coyle, D Field and G Miller, “The blindness of the eye-witness” (2008) 82 ALJ 471. See also ALRC 102 at paras 8.86–8.112. 222. The courts have generally taken the view that “recognition” of a familiar person is likely to have greater probative value, and less danger of unfair prejudice, than identification of a stranger. However, even relatives can make mistakes of identification from photographs: see Kirby J in Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 at [55]; R v Carpenter (2000) 117 A Crim R 272; [2011] ACTSC 71 (Tas CCA). 223. Some characteristics (eg, different racial group to the witness) may reduce the probative value of identification evidence: R v Nguyen [2000] NSWCCA 285 at [25]; R v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 at [35]; R v Afu, R v Caleo (No 11) [2018] NSWSC 190 at [21]. Other characteristics may be so unusual that they enhance probative value. See, generally, ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 419–421 and R v Feiloakitau (unreported, Qld CA, 14 December 1993). 224. In relation to visual identification, relevant circumstances will include period of perception, type or amount of attention, distance from subject, lighting conditions, stress of the witness and degree of concentration of the witness. As regards distance and lighting conditions, see for example WA Wagenaar and JH Van Der Schrier, “Face recognition as a function of distance and illumination: A practical tool for use in the courtroom” (1996) 2 Psychol Crime & Law 321. It should be noted that ALRC 102 discusses recent research on memory and concludes that,, contrary to the view that “negative emotion, stress and anxiety generally hinder memory function”, the research tends to show that “the significant central actions of an emotionally arousing event are likely to be better remembered than ordinary non-emotional events, even if peripheral details cannot be recalled” (paras 8.88–8.98). 225. R v Nguyen [2003] NSWSC 1068. 226. R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 429–430 per Hunt CJ at CL; R v Leroy [2000] NSWCCA 302 at [25]–[26]; R v Afu, R v Caleo (No 11) [2018] NSWSC 190 at [20].

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• the length of time between the initial perception and the identification;227 • the mode of, and procedures adopted in respect of, the first identification and any subsequent identifications (such modes including identification parades,228 photographic identification,229 “showings”,230 courthouse231 and in-court identification232 and, in particular, the existence of any suggestion, implicit or explicit, that the person subsequently identified is the subject or is the person suspected;233 • what record, if any, was made of the process of identification;234

227. R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 430 per Hunt CJ at CL; R v HMB [2000] NSWCCA 554. See also the discussion of memory in Mackenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348 at 373 and the reference to Sternberg, In Search of the Human Mind (1989), pp 277–278. 228. Relevant considerations would include the number of foils, the similarity (or otherwise) of their appearance to any description given by the witness and to the defendant, and the procedures adopted during the parade (see R v Fisher [2001] NSWCCA 380 and [EA.114.120]). 229. See [EA.115.300] for a discussion of the problems with photographic identification. 230. See Kelly v The Queen (2002) 129 A Crim R 363; [2002] WASCA 134 (common law).

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231. See Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [157]–[158] per Kirby J. 232. Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 182; Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 55 ALJR 355; [1981] HCA 17 at 426–427; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [18] per Gleeson CJ; R v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45; [2000] FCA 1195 (Fed Ct FC); R v Le (2002) 130 A Crim R 256; [2002] NSWCCA 193 (NSWCCA); Al-Hashimi v The Queen (2004) 181 FLR 383; 145 A Crim R 186; [2004] WASCA 61; R v Stanley [2004] NSWCCA 278 at [21]; Evans v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 521; 179 A Crim R 232; 82 ALJR 250; [2007] HCA 59, Heydon J at [164]; Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [415]; R v Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522; [2013] SASCFC 69 at [34]; Fadel v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 134, per Simpson JA at [85] (Button and N Adams JJ agreeing). There may be no justification for discretionary exclusion (or, rather, prohibition) of a “dock” identification if it is simply a formality to confirm that the person previously identified is, in fact, the defendant before the court: Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 at [110] (presumably in such circumstances the appropriate question for the witness would be: “Can you see in court the person you identified?”, not “Can you see in court the person who committed the offence?”). However, cf I Coyle, D Field and G Miller, “The blindness of the eye-witness” (2008) 82 ALJ 471 at 490–491. 233. Whatever the precise mode of identification, the greater the degree of suggestion, explicit or implicit, to the effect that the person subsequently identified is the subject or is the person suspected by the police, the less the probative value of the evidence. See, eg, R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326; [2000] NSWCCA 61 at [23]–[25] and [28] per Sheller JA; R v Leroy [2000] NSWCCA 302 at [30]; R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190; [2000] NSWCCA 210 (NSWCCA) at [26] per Spigelman CJ; R v Kostic (2004) 151 A Crim R 10; [2004] SASC 406 (SACCA) at [33]–[34]. However, the impact on probative value of such suggestion may be reduced if the witness did not expect to see the person subsequently identified and the identification was unsolicited and spontaneous: Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 Informing the witness that the police were holding a suspect would not necessarily require the exclusion of the evidence: McCartney v The Queen (2012) 38 VR 1; 226 A Crim R 274 [2012] VSCA 268 at [58]. Informing the witness that the police were holding a suspect would not necessarily require the exclusion of the evidence: McCartney v The Queen (2012) 38 VR 1; 226 A Crim R 274 [2012] VSCA 268 at [58]. 234. Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 per McHugh J (at [50]) and Kirby J (at [155]); R v Buchanan (2004) 152 A Crim R 302; [2004] NSWSC 816 per Buddin J at [45]; Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Lynch (2006) 166 A Crim R 327; [2006] TASSC 89 at [36]; Qoro v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 220 at [65]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• the state of mind of the witness at the first identification and any subsequent identifications;235 • any risk of displacement;236 • the confidence of the witness (that is, the degree of probability that the witness is prepared to ascribe to the identity of the subject);237 • the existence of other evidence supporting the identification238 (although it is clear that even several people may be equally mistaken in an identification); and

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235. In particular, any expectation by the witness that the subject (or some representation of the subject) will be present will affect the probative value of any identification: R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326; [2000] NSWCCA 61 at [25] per Sheller JA. It would be relevant whether the witness was told that the offender was not necessarily a participant in the parade, although it has been observed that such a practice need not be followed: R v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264; [2002] NSWCCA 247 at [31]. 236. Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 55 ALJR 355; [1981] HCA 17; R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52; R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190; [2000] NSWCCA 210 (NSWCCA) at [27]–[31] per Spigelman CJ; R v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45; [2000] FCA 1195 (Fed Ct FC) at [54]; R v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37 at [80]; Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [413]–[414]; R v Afu, R v Caleo (No 11) [2018] NSWSC 190 at [22]. Thus, subsequent identifications after a first identification (of, eg, a photograph) carry the risk that the memory image of the offender has been displaced by the image first identified (the face in the photograph). Such a danger exists even if there was no identification of the photograph: see Alexander at 400; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [158] per Kirby J. On the other hand, the particular circumstances of the case may justify admission of the evidence notwithstanding the risk of displacement: R v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385 (witness who picked D’s photograph after “recognising” him as the offender later resiled from the identification); Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 at [87]–[104]. In R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 it was held at [38] that there was no significant risk of displacement where a witness identifies a picture of the defendant after having already engaged in a process of preparing a computer image of the offender (a “com-fit image”). 237. A qualified identification or assertion only of resemblance (eg, “he looks like” the offender) reduces the probative value of the identification, although this factor by itself will not require discretionary exclusion: R v McDonald [2001] NSWCCA 363 at [24]; R v Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim R 180; [1999] NSWCCA 370 (NSWCCA); R v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45; [2000] FCA 1195 (Fed Ct FC); R v Eldridge [2002] NSWCCA 205 at [22] per Greg James J; R v Razzak [2004] NSWCCA 62 at [22]; R v Adams [2004] NSWCCA 279 at [18]–[19]. However, it should not be assumed that a confident and unqualified identification is necessarily reliable. In fact, a high level of confidence is unlikely to enhance the probative value of the identification evidence, although the demeanour of the witness may make the evidence more attractive to the tribunal of fact. See the discussion in Mackenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348 at 373; R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190; [2000] NSWCCA 210 at [15]–[16] per Spigelman CJ. 238. R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190; [2000] NSWCCA 210 (NSWCCA) at [38] per Spigelman CJ. However, in Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [165], Kirby J agreed with the proposition that “unsatisfactory evidence of an act of identification cannot be turned into evidence of a positive identification by reference to circumstantial or other evidence unrelated to the act of identification”. Similarly, in R v Razzak [2004] NSWCCA 62, Levine J stated (at [28]): “It is as much a matter of common sense, if not logic, as it is a matter of principle, to assert that other evidence, other circumstantial evidence, touching upon the issue of identification, cannot bolster flawed evidence of identification to the point where the flaws are eliminated and a finding can be made that that flawed identification is correct” (see also [26] and [36]). See also R v Winters [2010] SASC 100 at [33]; Selby v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 40 at [30]–[42].

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• the reliability of other parts of the witness’s evidence.

It is suggested that factors relevant to an assessment of the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant (see ss 135 and 137) deriving from identification evidence and the dangers that the evidence might be “misleading or confusing” (see s 135) include: • prejudice (particularly that involved in an inference that the defendant has a criminal record or is adversely known to the police) arising from the mode of identification adopted240 (s 115(3) and (5) are designed to minimise the prejudicial effect of picture identification) or arising from some other source; • the danger of over-estimation by the tribunal of fact of the value of the identification evidence;241 • any disadvantage faced by the defence in being able to test the reliability of the identification evidence;242 • any danger of unfair emphasis on the evidence (for example, from being adduced late in a trial);243

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239. R v Nguyen [2003] NSWSC 1068. 240. In Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [22], Gleeson CJ observed that a danger of this kind “is clearly a risk of unfair prejudice. It is a risk that will be suggested which is of a kind that is ordinarily excluded in the interests of fairness to an accused”. See also R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 429–430 per Hunt CJ at CL; R v Nelson (2004) 41 MVR 10; [2004] NSWCCA 231 at [13] per Sperling J; R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326; [2000] NSWCCA 61 at [23] per Sheller JA; Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 55 ALJR 355; [1981] HCA 17 at 409. 241. The tribunal of fact may not be fully aware of, or understand, the considerations relevant to probative value in the particular circumstances of the case. The tribunal of fact may be unduly impressed by the confidence with which the witness makes the identification: see R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190; [2000] NSWCCA 210 at [15]–[16] per Spigelman CJ. Cross-examination of the witness may not be an effective test of the quality of the evidence. See, generally, ALRC 26, vol 1, para 426. In Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [65], McHugh J stated: “In exercising the discretion to exclude positive-identification evidence, the judge must take account of the risk that that evidence will be given greater weight than it deserves and will operate to the prejudice of the accused. In considering that risk, the judge must determine whether the Domican directions that will be given will be likely to overcome the prejudice that might ensue without those directions. If, despite those directions, the risk of prejudice remains and the evidence is weak, the proper exercise of the judicial discretion may require the exclusion of the evidence.” See also R v McDonald [2001] NSWCCA 363 at [25]; R v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45; [2000] FCA 1195 (Fed Ct FC); R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 at [151]–[152]; Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Lynch (2006) 166 A Crim R 327; [2006] TASSC 89 at [43]. 242. This consideration overlaps with the question of what record, if any, was made of the process of identification (a factor noted above as bearing on the probative value of the identification). In R v Taousanis [2001] NSWSC 74, Hidden J held that he would have excluded picture identification evidence where only three photographs remained from the array used to identify the defendant ten years earlier. See also R v Afu, R v Caleo (No 11) [2018] NSWSC 190 at [25]. 243. R v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21; [1999] ACTSC 112. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• the existence of other evidence tending to reduce the importance of the identification evidence;244 • the likely effect of any judicial warnings and directions to the tribunal of fact in relation to the identification evidence.245 Thus, in R v Dickman [2017] HCA 24, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ stated at [48]:

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Unfair prejudice may be occasioned because evidence has some quality which is thought to give it more weight in the jury’s assessment than it warrants or because it is apt to invite the jury to draw an inference about some matter which would ordinarily be excluded from evidence.

As regards the former, the Court concluded at [57] that “the limitations” of the identification evidence admitted in the trial of the respondent “were apparent” and “[t]he trial judge’s conclusion that the danger of unfair prejudice was minimal and could be adequately addressed by direction was justified”. While the Victorian Court of Appeal had referred to the “seductive quality” of identification evidence, and observed that this is difficult to ameliorate by judicial directions to the jury, the High Court observed at [47] that the identification in that case “was unlikely to have the seductive effect of an identifying witness who is adamant that the accused is the offender”, since the witness conceded that he chose a photograph of the respondent which “bore the closest resemblance to his recollection of the appearance of the [offender]”. The Court did not suggest that it should generally be assumed that jury directions will be effective, but it is apparent that it was considered that in this case the trial judge was justified in believing that they would be adequate in ameliorating the danger of the jury giving the evidence more weight than it deserved. This conclusion was no doubt based in part on the proposition that “the limitations” of the identification 244. However, in Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [165], Kirby J agreed with the proposition that “unsatisfactory evidence of an act of identification cannot be turned into evidence of a positive identification by reference to circumstantial or other evidence unrelated to the act of identification”. 245. R v Nguyen [2002] NSWCCA 342 at [27]–[34]; R v Leroy [2000] NSWCCA 302 at [33]; R v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45; [2000] FCA 1195 (Fed Ct FC) at [59]; R v Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim R 180; [1999] NSWCCA 370 (NSWCCA); R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 at [150]–[152]; R v Filitis [2004] NSWCCA 68; Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Lynch (2006) 166 A Crim R 327; [2006] TASSC 89 at [40]–[43; Qoro v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 220 at [65]; McCartney v The Queen (2012) 38 VR 1; 226 A Crim R 274 [2012] VSCA 268 at [61]; Peterson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 111 at [55]–[56]. In MA v The Queen (2011) 31 VR 203; [2011] VSCA 13 Redlich JA (Weinberg JA and Bongiorno JA agreeing) stated at [25]: “Deficiencies in identification evidence other than those that are the subject of specific provision in the Evidence Act 2008 will ordinarily be addressed by appropriate cautionary directions being given by the trial judge. The need to exclude such evidence would generally only arise when the trial judge concludes that no directions can adequately remove a danger that the evidence will be given undue weight or will be impermissibly used”. See also Reid v The Queen [2014] VSCA 295 at [30]–[31]. However, in Dickman v The Queen [2015] VSCA 311, a majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that “the probative value of the impugned evidence was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice” because the probative value was “slight” and “there is a seductive quality to identification evidence that is difficult to ameliorate by judicial direction” (Priest JA and Croucher AJA at [111], Whelan JA dissenting on the basis that the trial judge was “correct” in considering that “notwithstanding the factors which made the evidence less probative, the risk or danger of misuse was minimal”).

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evidence “were apparent” and, thus, it was not a case where the jury was required to grapple with “abstract notions as to the dangers of identification evidence” (at [57]).

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As regards the latter basis for a finding of unfair prejudice, the High Court gave the example of the “rogues’ gallery” effect of photographic identification evidence, which creates such a risk because “the appearance of some photographs kept by the police may invite the jury to infer that the accused has a criminal record”. In this case, it had been argued that the jury may have inferred that the police had information adverse to the defendant that had not been put before the jury, although the Court concluded at [49]–[56] that there was no basis to consider that such a danger arose. Quite apart from s 137, s 138 may provide a basis for discretionary exclusion of identification evidence on the basis that it was illegally or “improperly” obtained. While no NSW or Victorian legislation mandates appropriate procedures for the conduct of identification parades, breach of the requirements and procedures for holding identification parades in relation to Commonwealth offences under ss 3ZM, 3ZN and 3ZP of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) would render the identification evidence illegally obtained. No definition is provided in s 138 of “impropriety” and it will be a matter for the courts to determine whether particular modes of identification adopted by the police were, in the particular circumstances of the case, proper or improper. A relevant consideration will be fairness to the defendant. It is true that s 138(1) does not expressly refer to “unfairness” to the defendant in criminal proceedings as an aspect of the “undesirability” of admitting improperly or illegally obtained evidence, nor does s 138(3) include it as a consideration which the court must take into account in applying the test in s 138(1). Further, s 90, which does create a discretion to refuse to admit evidence if “having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence” is limited in its application to evidence of admissions. Nevertheless, it appears clear that considerations of fairness to a defendant in criminal proceedings may be taken into account in exercise of the discretion under s 138. While they will not be determinative, it is likely that a court will exclude evidence where it concludes that, having regard to the way in which the evidence was obtained, it would be unfair to use the evidence against the defendant. One example might be identification evidence which, while admissible under Pt 3.9, was obtained by questionable methods.246 246. For example, where the police deliberately choose not to take a definite suspect into custody in order to utilise picture identification rather than an identification parade. Under the existing common law, identification evidence tendered by the prosecution against a defendant must be excluded if it would be unfair to admit it given the conduct of the police in obtaining it and all the circumstances of the case. While application of the discretion depends on the particular circumstances of the case, the courts have provided some guidance, at least in relation to modes of identification. Thus, failure to use an identification parade after the “detection process” has ended is, in the absence of some explanation, usually improper and may result in exclusion: Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 55 ALJR 355; [1981] HCA 17; R v Pearsall (1990) 49 A Crim R 439 (NSW CCA); Dawson v The Queen [1990] 2 WAR 458 at 471–472; R v Browne (1987) 30 A Crim R 278 (NSW CCA); R v Goodall [1982] VR 33 (FC); R v Haidley [1984] VR 229 (FC); R v De-Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381 (CCA). See also R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52; R v Smith [2000] NSWCCA 468 at [69]–[73]; Strauss v Police (SA) (2013) 224 A Crim R 389; [2013] SASC 3 at [203]–[206]. In Pace v The Queen (2014) 247 A Crim R 1; [2014] VSCA 317, the Victorian Court of Appeal found no impropriety (or unfairness) in use © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Even in New South Wales and Victoria, the procedures mandated in the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 would provide some guidance as to proper methods. Further, in NSW, the NSW Police Force has released a document entitled “Procedures for the Evidence Act” which specifies procedures to be adopted in identification parades (at pp 31-33).247 Failure to photograph or video-record a particular mode of identification might justify discretionary exclusion.248

[EA.114.270] Jury warnings Jury warnings regarding identification evidence are required under ss 116 and 165.

[EA.114.300]

Unsafe conviction

A conviction based on identification evidence may be unreasonable.249

[EA.114.330] Aural (including voice) identification

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The definition of “visual identification evidence” has the effect that “identification evidence” must be “based wholly or partly on what a person saw”. Thus, s 114 does not apply in a case where the identification evidence is not partly visually based – where, for example, it is wholly aurally based. Equally, s 115, which deals with “picture identification evidence”, would not apply. There is no admissibility provision in the Act which deals with aural identification. It follows that the admission of such evidence turns on relevance and judicial discretion,250 notwithstanding some common law authorities to the contrary.251 When considering discretionary exclusion of aural identification evidence, most of the of a “photobook” where the victim had provided nicknames for his attackers because the police had no firm suspects at that stage (see at [33]–[45]). Where the identification relates to a voice, what is regarded as proper or fair procedure is likely to be different: Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 at [58]–[60]. 247. Procedures for the Evidence Act, NSW Commissioner of Police, 12 April 2013. In R v Afu, R v Caleo (No 11) [2018] NSWSC 190, RA Hulme J noted the document at [4] but did “not understand them to be instructions or mandatory procedures required of police officers” (at [5]). 248. R v Penny (1997) 91 A Crim R 288 (WA SC); Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [155] per Kirby J; R v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264; [2002] NSWCCA 247 at [24]–[28]; Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Lynch (2006) 166 A Crim R 327; [2006] TASSC 89 at [36]. See also Strauss v Police (SA) (2013) 224 A Crim R 389; [2013] SASC 3 at [203]–[206]. However, see Pace v The Queen (2014) 247 A Crim R 1; [2014] VSCA 317 at [42]. 249. The High Court stated in Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 182: “[I]f a witness whose previous knowledge of the accused man has not made him familiar with his appearance has been shown the accused alone as a suspect and has on that occasion first identified him, the liability to mistake is so increased as to make it unsafe to convict the accused unless his identity is further proved by other evidence direct or circumstantial.” See also Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95; 65 A Crim R 12; R v Garlin (1991) 56 A Crim R 195; Strauss v Police (SA) (2013) 224 A Crim R 389; [2013] SASC 3. 250. See R v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; 116 A Crim R 38; [2000] NSWCCA 357 (NSWCCA); R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6 at [34]; R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 at [92]. 251. There are common law decisions in NSW which are authority for the view that aural identification evidence may be inadmissible under the common law in certain circumstances: R v Smith (1987) 7 NSWLR 444; 23 A Crim R 266; R v Brownlowe (1987) 7 NSWLR 461. However, there is also considerable common law authority to the effect that the issue is ultimately resolved by judicial discretion: Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 382

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[EA.114.360]

factors bearing on possible discretionary exclusion of visual identification evidence (see [EA.114.240]) are applicable.252 This will include identification procedures similar to photographic identification.253 There are recognised dangers with such evidence.254 On the other hand, what is regarded as proper or fair procedure in respect of aural identification is likely to be different to visual identification.255

[EA.114.360] Non-identification evidence This provision applies to “identification evidence”, which is defined to mean an assertion that the defendant is, or resembles, a person present at or about the time the crime (or connected act) in question was committed. Thus, it does not apply to an assertion that the defendant is not such a person. Accordingly, this provision imposes no limitations on such evidence (for example, an in-court exclusion rather than an in-court identification).256 Similarly, it does not apply to an assertion of resemblance or identification in relation to a thing or a person other than the defendant (see [EA.114.60]). However, discretionary exclusion is still possible (Pt 3.11) and jury warnings may be required (s 165 and the common law). Regarding the procedure to be adopted when inviting a witness to view a thing in court for the purposes of identification (or expressing an opinion as to resemblance), see [EA.37.120].

Cth Act:

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115

Exclusion of evidence of identification by pictures

(1) In this section: picture identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification made wholly or partly by the person who made the identification examining pictures kept for the use of police officers. (2) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if the pictures examined suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody.

and 406; R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 (FC); Jones v The Queen (1989) 41 A Crim R 1 (VicCCA); R v Corke (1989) 41 A Crim R 292 (Qld CCA); R v Omar (1991) 58 A Crim R 139 (ACT SC); Miladinovic v The Queen (1993) 47 FCR 190; 71 A Crim R 478; R v Bueti (1997) 70 SASR 370; R v Callaghan [2001] 4 VR 79; (2001) 124 A Crim R 126; [2001] VSCA 209. It has been held that any common law requirements for admissibility did not survive the enactment of this Act: R v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; 116 A Crim R 38; [2000] NSWCCA 357 at [13]–[14]; Miller v The Queen (2015) 252 A Crim R 486; [2015] NSWCCA 206 at [55]. 252. Compare R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6; Miller v The Queen (2015) 252 A Crim R 486; [2015] NSWCCA 206 at [57]–[107]. 253. Miller v The Queen (2015) 252 A Crim R 486; [2015] NSWCCA 206 at [61]–[107] (see also [EA.115.300]). 254. Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 381–382 per Brennan CJ; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 per McHugh J (at [84]), Kirby J (at [160]). 255. Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 at [58]–[60]. 256. See R v Moran [1999] NSWCCA 92 at [15] per Smart AJ. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(3) Subject to subsection (4), picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if: (a) when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged; and (b) the picture of the defendant that was examined was made before the defendant was taken into that police custody. (4) Subsection (3) does not apply if: (a) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that custody; or (b) it was not reasonably practicable to make a picture of the defendant after the defendant was taken into that custody.

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(5) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if, when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged, unless: (a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade; or (b) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that custody; or (c) it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade that included the defendant. (6) Subsections 114(3), (4), (5) and (6) apply in determining, for the purposes of paragraph (5)(c) of this section, whether it would have been reasonable to have held an identification parade. (7) If picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is admitted into evidence, the judge must, on the request of the defendant: (a) if the picture of the defendant was made after the defendant was taken into that custody—inform the jury that the picture was made after the defendant was taken into that custody; or (b) otherwise—warn the jury that they must not assume that the defendant has a criminal record or has previously been charged with an offence. Note: Sections 116 and 165 also deal with warnings about identification evidence.

(8) This section does not render inadmissible picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor that contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence adduced by the defendant. (9) This section applies in addition to section 114. (10) In this section: (a) a reference to a picture includes a reference to a photograph; and (b) a reference to making a picture includes a reference to taking a photograph.

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NSW Act: 115

Exclusion of evidence of identification by pictures

(1) In this section: picture identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification made wholly or partly by the person who made the identification examining pictures kept for the use of police officers. (2) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if the pictures examined suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody. (3) Subject to subsection (4), picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if: (a) when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged, and (b) the picture of the defendant that was examined was made before the defendant was taken into that police custody.

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(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if: (a) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that custody, or (b) it was not reasonably practicable to make a picture of the defendant after the defendant was taken into that custody. (5) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if, when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged, unless: (a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade, or (b) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that custody, or (c) it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade that included the defendant. (6) Sections 114(3), (4), (5) and (6) apply in determining, for the purposes of subsection (5)(c) of this section, whether it would have been reasonable to have held an identification parade. (7) If picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is admitted into evidence, the judge must, on the request of the defendant: (a) if the picture of the defendant was made after the defendant was taken into that custody—inform the jury that the picture was made after the defendant was taken into that custody, or (b) otherwise—warn the jury that they must not assume that the defendant has a criminal record or has previously been charged with an offence. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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Note: Sections 116 (Directions to jury) and 165 (Unreliable evidence) also deal with warnings about identification evidence.

(8) This section does not render inadmissible picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor that contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence adduced by the defendant. (9) This section applies in addition to section 114. (10) In this section: (a) a reference to a picture includes a reference to a photograph, and (b) a reference to making a picture includes a reference to taking a photograph. Vic Act: 115

Exclusion of evidence of identification by pictures

(1) In this section, picture identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification made wholly or partly by the person who made the identification examining pictures kept for the use of police officers.

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(2) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if the pictures examined suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody. (3) Subject to subsection (4), picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if— (a) when the pictures were examined, the accused was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the accused has been charged; and (b) the picture of the accused that was examined was made before the accused was taken into that police custody. [Subs (3) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.33]

(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if— (a) the appearance of the accused had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the accused was taken into that custody; or (b) it was not reasonably practicable to make a picture of the accused after the accused was taken into that custody. [Subs (4) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.33]

(5) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if, when the pictures were examined, the accused was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the accused has been charged, unless— (a) the accused refused to take part in an identification parade; or (b) the appearance of the accused had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the accused was taken into that custody; or (c) it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade that included the accused. [Subs (5) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.33]

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(6) Sections 114(3), (4), (5) and (6) apply in determining, for the purposes of subsection (5)(c) of this section, whether it would have been reasonable to have held an identification parade. (7) If picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is admitted into evidence, the judge must, on the request of the accused— (a) if the picture of the accused was made after the accused was taken into that custody—inform the jury that the picture was made after the accused was taken into that custody; or (b) otherwise—warn the jury that they must not assume that the accused has a criminal record or has previously been charged with an offence. Note: Division 4 of Part 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 also deals with warnings about identification evidence. [Subs (7) am Act 14 of 2015, s 72; Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.33]

(8) This section does not render inadmissible picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor that contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence adduced by the accused. [Subs (8) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.33]

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(9) This section applies in addition to section 114. (10) In this section— (a) a reference to a picture includes a reference to a photograph; and (b) a reference to making a picture includes a reference to taking a photograph. [S 115 am Act 14 of 2015; Act 68 of 2009]

ACT Act: 115

Exclusion of evidence of identification by pictures

(1) In this section: picture identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification made completely or partly by the person who made the identification examining pictures kept for the use of police officers. (2) Picture identification evidence presented by the prosecutor is not admissible if the pictures examined suggest that they are pictures of people in police custody. (3) Subject to subsection (4), picture identification evidence presented by the prosecutor is not admissible if— (a) when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged; and (b) the picture of the defendant that was examined was made before the defendant was taken into police custody. (4) Subsection (3) does not apply if— © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a)

the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time the offence was committed and the time the defendant was taken into the custody; or (b) it was not reasonably practicable to make a picture of the defendant after the defendant was taken into the custody. (5) Picture identification evidence presented by the prosecutor is not admissible if, when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged, unless— (a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade; or (b) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time the offence was committed and the time the defendant was taken into the custody; or (c) it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade that included the defendant.

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(6) Sections 114(3) to (6) (Exclusion of visual identification evidence) apply in deciding, for subsection (5)(c), whether it would have been reasonable to have held an identification parade. (7) If picture identification evidence presented by the prosecutor is admitted into evidence, the judge must, on the defendant’s request— (a) if the picture of the defendant was made after the defendant was taken into the custody—tell the jury that the picture was made after the defendant was taken into the custody; or (b) otherwise—warn the jury that they must not assume that the defendant has a criminal record or has previously been charged with an offence. Note: Section 116 (Directions to jury) and s 165 (Unreliable evidence) also deal with warnings about identification evidence.

(8) This section does not render inadmissible picture identification evidence presented by the prosecutor that contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence presented by the defendant. (9) This section applies in addition to section 114 (Exclusion of visual identification evidence). (10) In this section: (a) a reference to a picture includes a reference to a photograph; and (b) a reference to making a picture includes a reference to taking a photograph.

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NT Act: 115

Exclusion of evidence of identification by pictures

(1) In this section: picture identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification made wholly or partly by the person who made the identification examining pictures kept for the use of police officers. (2) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if the pictures examined suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody. (3) Subject to subsection (4), picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if: (a) when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged; and (b) the picture of the defendant that was examined was made before the defendant was taken into that police custody.

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(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if: (a) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that custody; or (b) it was not reasonably practicable to make a picture of the defendant after the defendant was taken into that custody. (5) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if, when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged, unless: (a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade; or (b) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that custody; or (c) it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade that included the defendant. (6) Section 114(3), (4), (5) and (6) apply in determining, for the purposes of subsection (5)(c) of this section, whether it would have been reasonable to have held an identification parade. (7) If picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is admitted into evidence, the judge must, on the request of the defendant: (a) if the picture of the defendant was made after the defendant was taken into that custody — inform the jury that the picture was made after the defendant was taken into that custody; or (b) otherwise — warn the jury that they must not assume that the defendant has a criminal record or has previously been charged with an offence. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 115

Note for subsection (7): Sections 116 (Directions to jury) and 165 (Unreliable evidence) also deal with warnings about identification evidence.

(8) This section does not render inadmissible picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor that contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence adduced by the defendant. (9) This section applies in addition to section 114. (10) In this section: (a) a reference to a picture includes a reference to a photograph; and (b) a reference to making a picture includes a reference to taking a photograph.

[EA.115.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 13.60–13.82; ALRC 38, s 104, paras 188–190; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 435–436, 835–839.

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[EA.115.60] General comments In general terms, the effect of s 115 is that “picture identification evidence” (see [EA.115.90]) adduced by the prosecution is not admissible in the following three situations: (1) the defendant was in police custody when the pictures were examined (s 115(5)), unless: (a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade; or (b) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly from when the offence was committed; or (c) it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade that included the defendant; or (d) the evidence contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence adduced by the defence (s 115(8)). (2) the defendant was in police custody when the pictures were examined, and the picture of the defendant was made before he or she was taken into police custody (s 115(3), (4)) unless: (a) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly from when the offence was committed;257 or (b) it was not reasonably practicable to make258 a picture of the defendant after he or she was taken into custody; or (c) the evidence contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence adduced by the defence (s 115(8)). (3) the pictures suggest259 that they are pictures of persons in police custody (s 115(2)), unless the evidence contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence adduced by the defence (s 115(8)). 257. For example, where a defendant has shaved off a beard since the time when the offence was allegedly committed. 258. Under s 115(10)(b)“a reference to making a picture includes a reference to taking a photograph”. 259. See [EA.115.120].

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[EA.115.90]

Because “identification evidence” is defined to mean an assertion of resemblance regarding “a defendant”, this provision (like s 114) has no application to identification of some other person or a thing. In respect of such evidence, the only basis for exclusion (assuming relevance) would be discretionary under Pt 3.11. Further, this provision has no application to evidence of description of a person alleged by the prosecution to be the defendant, unless the person testifying as to the description takes the next step of asserting some resemblance between the person described and the defendant.260 The provision does not apply to evidence of recognition of a person shown in a photograph as someone previously known (even if the person previously known is the defendant).261 Equally, it does not apply to the tribunal of fact comparing the defendant with a photograph of the offender.262 An overview of picture identification evidence is provided on the next page.263

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[EA.115.90] “picture identification evidence” “Identification evidence” is defined in the Dictionary (the definition is extracted in the discussion of s 114). It is broadly defined to mean an assertion (based wholly or partly on what the person making the assertion saw, heard or otherwise perceived) that the defendant is, or resembles, a person present “at or about the time” the crime (or connected act) in question was committed, or hearsay264 evidence of such an assertion. The resemblance may be visual, aural, “or otherwise”. However, “picture identification evidence” limits this definition to identification made wholly or partly by the person who made the identification examining pictures kept for the use of police officers. Under s 115(10)(a), a reference to a picture includes a reference to a photograph. In the Dictionary, “police officer” is defined in slightly different ways in the Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Acts. However, in substance it means: (a) a member of the Australian Federal Police; or (b) a member of the police force of a State or Territory. Section 25 of the Australian Federal Police Legislation Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) provides that this provision applies as if a reference to a police officer includes a reference to “a person who was a member or special member of the Australian Federal Police at any time”.

260. R v Taufua (unreported, NSW CCA, 11 November 1996). 261. R v Smith (1999) 47 NSWLR 419; [1999] NSWCCA 317; R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 (NSW CCA) at [37]–[38] per Hidden J; R v Hennessy [2001] NSWCCA 36. 262. See R v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330. 263. Produced by the Judicial College of Victoria. Available at: http:// www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/publications/uniform-evidence-resources. Reproduced with permission. 264. Hearsay evidence is defined and generally excluded by s 59 in Pt 3.2. Where “picture identification evidence” is in the form of hearsay, compliance with both s 115 and Pt 3.2 is required for admissibility. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.115.90]

s 115

: Picture identification evidence

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FIGURE 9

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

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[EA.115.120]

Part 3.9 - Identification evidence

[EA.115.150]

“the pictures examined suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody” (s 115(2))

The Victorian Court of Appeal noted in Pace v The Queen (2014) 247 A Crim R 1; [2014] VSCA 317 at [23] that “[i]n ordinary parlance, to ‘suggest’ is to insinuate, create or evoke an impression, or to call up or bring something to mind”. It was held that “there must be something in the nature of the photographs themselves which might create the impression in the mind that they are of persons in police custody”. Thus, photographs which were “consistent with the photographs taken for driving, boating and shooter’s licences” did not breach the prohibition given that there was “nothing in the background of those photographs – the suggested height scale, presence of security mesh, the appearance of a secure door with substantial hinges, or the like – which suggests objectively that the males depicted in the photos are in police custody” (at [24]–[25]).

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[EA.115.150] “police custody” (s 115(3); s 115(5)) Apart from the operation of s 115(2), this provision is limited to circumstances where, when the pictures were examined by the person who made the identification, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has been charged. It follows that it does not apply where another police force investigating some other offence conducts the picture identification, or the defendant is held in prison at the time of the picture identification.265 It does not apply where preparation of the materials to be used for picture identification took place while the defendant was in custody but the examination of the pictures occurred at a time that the defendant was not in custody.266 The Dictionary defines “police officer” to mean a member of the Australian Federal Police or a member of the police force of a State or Territory.The term “custody” is not defined. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has given the term “the normal meaning” of “under physical restraint”.267 In consequence, the police may be able to evade operation of this provision by defining a person as voluntarily co-operating (“assisting the police with their inquiries”)268 or by releasing an arrested person on bail before attempting picture identification (as was the situation in R v McKellar [2000] NSWCCA 523). Whether the person is in the custody of the police may involve a legal question: Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Byrne (No 2) [2016] VSC 345. In R v Darwiche (2006) 166 265. See R v El Mostafa (2007) 6 DCLR(NSW) 305; [2007] NSWDC 326. 266. R v Sarlija (2009) 3 ACTLR 259; [2009] ACTSC 127, Penfold J at [34]–[35]. 267. R v McKellar [2000] NSWCCA 523 at [43]. 268. Under the common law, the police have been able to evade the operation of the law relating to arrest and related procedural requirements by defining a person as voluntarily co-operating, ie, simply “assisting the police with their inquiries”. If the police merely ask persons to “come to the police station to assist with inquiries” and do not “plainly convey” the impression that they are not free to refuse, then there may be no arrest even if the police would have “arrested” them if they had refused to come and the persons believe that they are under compulsion: see R v Miller (1980) 25 SASR 170 at 184; R v Conley (1982) 30 SASR 226 at 239; R v O’Donoghue (1988) 34 A Crim R 397 (NSW CCA). But cf Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 656; 35 A Crim R 232 at 239–240 per Mason CJ. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 115

A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924, a NSW Supreme Court judge held that a suspect was not in police “custody” for the purposes of either s 115(3) or s 115(5) where he had not been arrested in relation to the offence with which he was subsequently charged but had been brought to the police station from a correctional centre (to where he was later returned). It is difficult to reconcile this decision with McKellar. The suspect was plainly under the physical restraint of the police when they took him from the correctional centre. It is implicit in the judgment that Bell J required a linkage between the custody and “the offence with which the defendant has been charged” (and is, implicitly, the subject of the criminal trial where s 115 is being applied) but that is not required in either s 115(3) or s 115(5) and it is difficult to see any policy justification for it. What matters is that the suspect is under the control of the investigating police and they can take proper steps to ensure fair identification procedures (use of contemporaneous pictures, offering the opportunity of an identification parade), regardless of the technical basis upon which the suspect is in police custody.

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Whatever interpretation is given to the term “police custody”, it is clear that it does not extend to a situation where the police suspect that the defendant committed a crime but choose to engage in picture identification before asking or compelling the defendant to come to a police station. It follows that, in such circumstances, the picture identification evidence will not be excluded by s 115, no matter how unreasonable this decision was (unless the pictures used suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody).269 Of course, discretionary exclusion under s 138 may be possible if it were concluded that the police had acted improperly. In ALRC 102, it was observed at para 13.82 that “this may be a sufficient safeguard and reduces the need to consider possible reforms to s 115”.

[EA.115.180]

“the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade” (s 115(5)(a))

The identical words appear in s 114(2)(c) and the commentary on that provision (at [EA.114.150]) would be applicable. In R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924, Bell J considered s 115(5)(a) and stated at [34]: The verb “refuse” is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed, as “to decline to take or accept (something offered or presented); to reject the offer (a thing)”. I consider that the accused declined to accept the offer to participate in an identification parade and that this constituted a refusal for the purposes of subs (5)(a). The fact that he indicated that if certain conditions were met he might take a different stance does not mean that the stance taken at the time the offer was made did not constitute a refusal. My conclusion that the accuseds conduct constituted a refusal for the purposes of subs (5)(a) is reinforced by the terms of s 114(5): The conduct of a defendant in declining to take part in an identification unless that defendants lawyer or another person is present is treated for the purposes of subpara (a) as a refusal. 269. The ALRC considered (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 838, n 32) it more practical to adopt a test of “custody” rather than to attempt to focus on the state of knowledge of the police as suggested by Stephen J in Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 55 ALJR 355; [1981] HCA 17 at 417. The minority (Stephen and Murphy JJ) suggested that the test should be whether the defendant was a “definite suspect”: Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395; 55 ALJR 355; [1981] HCA 17 per Stephen J (at 417), Murphy J (at 436–437). But see R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52.

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[EA.115.240]

Subsequently, in the appeal in relation to this case, Aouad v The Queen (2011) 207 A Crim R 411; [2011] NSWCCA 61 James J (McClelland CJ at CL and Johnson J agreeing) simply stated at [264]:

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I do not consider that there was any error by her Honour in holding, for the reasons she gave, that Aouad had refused to take part in an identification parade within s 114(2)(c)of the Evidence Act 1995.

It is unfortunate that the analysis of the Court of Criminal Appeal was so circumscribed270, since the approach taken by Bell J is problematic. The terms of s 114 (discussed at [EA.114.150]) suggest a contrary approach. The fact that s 114(5) provides that “it is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade” if the defendant wanted his or lawyer or another person to be present and “there were … reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for such an Australian legal practitioner or legal counsel or person to be present” tends to show that such a scenario would not involve a refusal to take part in a parade (for the purposes of s 114(2)(c)). Similarly, the fact that, under s 114(3), a court considering whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade “is to take into account … (c) the practicality of holding an identification parade having regard [to] … (i) if the defendant failed to cooperate in the conduct of the parade – to the manner and extent of, and the reason (if any) for, the failure” indicates that a failure on the part of the defendant to “cooperate” with what the police propose is not to be regarded as a “refusal” to take part in the parade. This, in turn, suggests that if the defendant declines to take part in a parade unless certain conditions are met, an assessment of reasonableness (including the reasonableness of the conditions) should be made, rather than the conclusion drawn that the defendant had “refused to take part” in the parade. There is no apparent reason why a different approach should be taken to the meaning of the words “the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade” in s 115(5)(a).

[EA.115.210]

“it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade that included the defendant” (s 115(5)(c))

In determining whether it would have been reasonable to have held an identification parade, s 114(3)–(6) apply: s 115(6). Those provisions are discussed above.

[EA.115.240]

Procedure for examination of pictures

No procedure is prescribed in this Act, apart from the requirements that the pictures should not suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody and (if the defendant was in police custody when the pictures were examined) his or her picture must have been made after he or she was taken into police custody (s 115(3)(b)). There is no requirement that the identification of the defendant should be made without any intentional influence on the witness to identify the defendant: contrast s 114(2). However, ss 3ZO and 3ZP of the Crimes Act 1914 270. On one view, this part of the judgment was obiter dicta, since James J had already rejected the applicable ground of appeal on another basis. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.115.270]

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(Cth) set out requirements and procedures for photographic identification in relation to Commonwealth offences. No such statutory requirements exist in New South Wales and Victoria.

[EA.115.270] “picture identification evidence adduced by the defence” (s 115(8)) The defence may wish to adduce evidence about picture identification evidence. For example, if the picture identification occurred before an identification parade took place, it may have affected the identification at the parade: see ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 421ff. If the defence does this, the prosecution is permitted to adduce evidence which contradicts or qualifies picture identification evidence adduced by the defence, notwithstanding the general rules of admissibility relating to such evidence. On the other hand, the admissibility of such evidence would be subject to the other exclusionary rules and discretions and the procedural law on reopening the prosecution case.

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[EA.115.300] Discretion to exclude If picture identification evidence satisfies the requirements of s 115, it may still be excluded under the court’s discretionary powers: see, particularly, ss 137 and 138. For detailed discussion of the possible application of these discretionary powers in respect of identification evidence, see the discussion in relation to s 114 at [EA.114.240]. Where photographs are used, the court will give particular attention to the actual photographs and the procedure adopted, as bearing on both the probative value of the identification evidence and the danger of unfair prejudice.271 For example, consideration will be given to the number of photographs of the defendant, the environment in which the defendant appears in any photograph of him or her, and the similarities (or otherwise) of persons in the other photographs used.272 If the defendant was the only one of those included in the relevant photo board whose appearance had a highly distinctive feature, that feature having itself been an identifying factor in the witness’s mind, the case for exclusion would be strong.273 The original description of the offender given by the witness is also important. In R v Nguyen [2003] NSWSC 1068 at [14](xxi) Buddin J observed: It is axiomatic that the photographs selected for inclusion in the array should be totally consistent with the original description provided by the witness of the suspect’s physical features and any other identifiable features, including the clothing worn by him or her.

On the other hand, in R v Skaf [2004] NSWCCA 74, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal Agreed (at [124]) with the following proposition from R v Lee (unreported, NSW CCA, Cole JA, Dowd, Sperling JJ, 5 May 1997): It is not a satisfactory basis of challenge to identification evidence to seek to render it tenuous by seeking to exclude from the array of photographs produced all those with a feature or features different to the precise description previously given to police. Whilst the photographs must bear a relationship to the description given, it is always a matter of judgement whether they constitute an appropriate and sufficient panel from which any selection may be made. 271. R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 429–430 per Hunt CJ at CL. 272. Compare R v Maklouf [1999] NSWCCA 94 at [40] per Hidden J. 273. THD v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 106; [2010] VSCA 115, Maxwell P at [8].

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[EA.115.300]

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One reason why identification through a photograph is likely to be less reliable than direct personal identification is that “differences in appearance between the offender and a suspect may be less noticeable when a photograph of the suspect is used”.274 Particular disadvantages are the two-dimensional and static nature of a photograph, and the fact that it is a head, or sometimes head and shoulders, representation only.275 The problems with photographic identification (in the particular context of bank security photographs) were noted by Kirby J in Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50:276 [E]ven relatives can make mistakes of identification from photographs. The accuracy of such identification testimony may depend upon the quality of the photograph; the clarity of the lighting at the scene; whether there is a frontal, or sideways, or rear depiction of the features of the subject; the eyesight of the examiner; the length of time that the photograph is examined; external indicia of familiarity in the print; the degree of physiological or psychological arousal at the time of perception and so on. Most people have, at some stage in their lives, mistaken the identity of a person as a family member or someone they know well. How much greater is the chance of error in identification where it is done from a photograph and the photograph relied upon is not of a well-lit studio portrait of a close family member or friend … but the somewhat imperfect representation in a bank security photograph of a scene where the subject of the photography is taking pains to disguise, or hide, his or her appearance. … The experience of the law, expressed with increasing conviction during the last two decades, is that very great risks of wrongful conviction and miscarriages of justice can attend identification (and recognition) evidence generally, and particularly where such evidence is based on photographs. In this sense, I see no difference in the dangers caused by evidence of identification from photographs of the offender in action, such as produced by bank surveillance, and identification from photographs of the accused and other suspects held by police. The risks, already large, may be enhanced by the natural desire of a person performing the act of identification to produce an affirmative outcome rather than to admit to incapacity and failure. The risks are still further increased where the person concerned has a relevant professional motivation (even if only subconsciously) to identify a person. One such motivation is that which a police officer quite naturally has to solve a serious crime.277

Subsequent judgments have also emphasised particular concerns with photographic identification.278 On the other hand, the Western Australian Court of Appeal has pointed out that there may be a number of advantages with photographic identification as compared to an identification parade.279 274. Pitkin v The Queen (1995) 80 A Crim R 302; 130 ALR 35 at 38 (ALR) per Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ. 275. Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 at [49]. 276. The other members of the High Court did not discuss this topic. 277. Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 at [55]–[56]. Kirby J referred to Kapardis, Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction (1997), pp 27 and 36–39; Loftus and Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal (3rd ed, 1997); and Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony (1979), p 154. See also Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 per Gleeson CJ (at [22]), Kirby J (at [155]). 278. R v Southon (2003) 85 SASR 436; 139 A Crim R 250; [2003] SASC 205; R v Campbell (2007) 175 A Crim R 79; [2007] VSCA 189 at [22]; Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 at [39]–[49]. 279. Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 at [49]–[54]. It may be easier to ensure that “fillers” resemble the suspect. In an identification © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 116

It should be noted that breach of the requirements and procedures for photographic identification in relation to Commonwealth offences under ss 3ZO and 3ZP of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) would render the identification evidence illegally obtained and subject to exclusion under s 138. Further, in NSW, the NSW Police Force has released a document entitled “Procedures for the Evidence Act” which specifies procedures to be adopted in using photographs for identification purposes (at pp 33–35).280

[EA.115.330] Jury warnings If the picture of the defendant was made after the defendant was taken into custody, s 115(7)(a) requires a trial judge, if requested by the defence, to inform the jury that the picture was made after the defendant was taken into that custody. If the picture of the defendant was not made after the defendant was taken into custody, s 115(7)(b) requires a trial judge, if requested by the defence, to warn a jury they must not assume that the defendant has a criminal record or has previously been charged with an offence. In addition, further jury directions are required under ss 116 and 165. It has been noted that: The section is not at large. It is directed to the problems associated with the use of “mug shots” ie pictures which themselves give the impression that the persons depicted were persons known to police.281

This explains why the provision depends upon a request being made by the defendant. In a case where there is nothing in the photographs “to suggest that the persons depicted were known to police or involved in any form of criminality”, it would not be necessary to give the warning. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[EA.115.360]

Unsafe conviction

A conviction based on picture identification evidence may be unreasonable.282

Cth Act: 116

Directions to jury

(1) If identification evidence has been admitted, the judge is to inform the jury:

parade, differences between the suspect’s demeanour may be different from the demeanour of the fillers, suggesting to the witness that the suspect is more likely to be the offender. Photographic identification may be held closer in time to relevant events than it is possible with an identification parade, reducing memory concerns. 280. Procedures for the Evidence Act, NSW Commissioner of Police, February 1998. Available at: http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/policies__and__procedures/legislation_list/procedures_ for_the_evidence_act. 281. R v Maklouf [1999] NSWCCA 94 at [27] per Wood CJ at CL. 282. The High Court stated in Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 182: “[I]f a witness whose previous knowledge of the accused man has not made him familiar with his appearance has been shown the accused alone as a suspect and has on that occasion first identified him, the liability to mistake is so increased as to make it unsafe to convict the accused unless his identity is further proved by other evidence direct or circumstantial.” See also Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95; 65 A Crim R 12; R v Garlin (1991) 56 A Crim R 195.

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that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence; and (b) of the reasons for that need for caution, both generally and in the circumstances of the case. (2) It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in so informing the jury. NSW Act: 116

Directions to jury

(1) If identification evidence has been admitted, the judge is to inform the jury: (a) that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence, and (b) of the reasons for that need for caution, both generally and in the circumstances of the case. (2) It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in so informing the jury. Vic Act:

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116

Directions to jury

Note: Section 116 of the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act requires the judge to give certain directions to the jury relating to identification evidence. Division 4 of Part 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 contains provisions relating to identification evidence that apply in criminal trials. [S 116 am Act 14 of 2015, s 73]

ACT Act: 116

Directions to jury

(1) If identification evidence has been admitted, the judge must tell the jury— (a) that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence; and (b) of the reasons for the need for caution, both generally and in the circumstances of the case. (2) It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in telling the jury. NT Act: 116

Directions to jury

(1) If identification evidence has been admitted, the judge is to inform the jury: (a) that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence; and (b) of the reasons for that need for caution, both generally and in the circumstances of the case. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.116.30]

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(2) It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in so informing the jury.

[EA.116.30] ALRC References ALRC 38, s 105, para 191; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 841.

[EA.116.60] Differences between provisions The Victorian provision was repealed in 2015. The Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) deals comprehensively with warnings to juries in criminal proceedings (see [EA.116.180]).

[EA.116.90] General comments

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This provision only applies in criminal proceedings: s 113. Because “identification evidence” is defined to mean an assertion of identity or resemblance regarding “a defendant”, this provision (like ss 114 and 115) has no application to identification of some other person or a thing (see also [EA.114.90], [EA.114.360]). Further, this provision has no application to evidence of description of a person alleged by the prosecution to be the defendant, unless the person testifying as to the description takes the next step of asserting some resemblance between the person described and the defendant.283 In respect of such evidence, any need for a warning will arise only from s 165 or the common law. In relation to identification of a defendant, this provision substantially reflects the common law. Although it is not explicit in the provision, the High Court has held that, as with the common law, the judicial obligation to give a warning only arises where the reliability of the identification evidence is disputed.284 In Mouroufas v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 58 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal extended this proposition further, holding that there was no obligation to give a warning where the identification witness was challenged as to truthfulness and credibility generally, but not regarding the “ability to identify” or being mistaken as to identity (at [32]–[34]).285 However, unlike the common law, the directions will be required even in cases where identification evidence is not a “significant part of the proof of guilt of an

283. Eastman v The Queen (1997) 76 FCR 9; 158 ALR 107 at 104–105 (FCR). 284. Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 41; 77 ALJR 1433; [2003] HCA 40 at [19], [22], [53], [94]; see also Trudgett v The Queen (2008) 70 NSWLR 696; 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62 at [43]–[51]; Clifford v The Queen (2004) 12 Tas R 415; [2004] TASSC 16 at [31]. 285. On the other hand, a warning would be required if it is contended that the witness was either untruthful or mistaken.

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286

offence”. Further, the provision is expressed in mandatory terms, so that the direction will be required even if not requested by a party.287 As regards the content of a jury direction, assistance may be derived from the common law. In Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; [1992] HCA 13 at 561–562 the High Court held (per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) that the warning required under the common law must meet a number of requirements: The terms of the warning need not follow any particular formula. But it must be cogent and effective. It must be appropriate to the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the jury must be instructed “as to the factors which may affect the consideration of [the identification] evidence in the circumstances of the particular case”. A warning in general terms is insufficient. The attention of the jury “should be drawn to any weaknesses in the identification evidence”. Reference to counsel’s arguments is insufficient. The jury must have the benefit of a direction which has the authority of the judge’s office behind it. It follows that the trial judge should isolate and identify for the benefit of the jury any matter of significance which may reasonably be regarded as undermining the reliability of the identification evidence.288

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These principles will assist in formulation of a warning under s 116.289 Directions must be given with the authority of the judge and not put merely as the arguments of counsel.290 However, no particular form of words is required and it will be sufficient if the trial judge in effect “endorses” the submissions made by counsel.291 Telling the jury that they are “bound to consider” the matters referred to is regarded as sufficient.292 On the other hand, telling them it is “entirely a matter for you” whether they take them into account would not be sufficient.293 Of course, the contents of an appropriate direction will depend on the circumstances of each case and “the issues in the case as a whole”.294 However, the ALRC stated in its Interim Report (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 842): The judge should, for example, refer to the fact that there have been occasions when innocent persons have been convicted on the basis of mistaken identification, that honest witnesses who are certain may be mistaken, that mistakes may be made even 286. R v Demiroz [2003] NSWCCA 146 at [62] per Carruthers AJ (Sheller JA and Hidden J agreeing). The quotation comes from Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; [1992] HCA 13 at 561. Although none of the members of the High Court in Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 41; 77 ALJR 1433; [2003] HCA 40 expressly held that this common law qualification did not apply under this provision, the correct view must be that directions under s 116 are required whenever identification is in dispute, whatever view is taken of the significance of the identification evidence in respect of proof of guilt (see Callinan J at [89]). 287. Kanaan v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [183]. 288. See also, in relation to aural identification, Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 382, 383–384, 397–398. 289. R v Cook (unreported, NSW CCA, 24 August 1998). 290. See R v Dupas (No 3) [2009] VSCA 202 for an example of a case under the common law where the appeal court divided on the question whether there had been compliance with this requirement. 291. Cumberland v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 377 at [34]. 292. R v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385 at [73]. 293. Compare R v Mendoza (2007) 173 A Crim R 157; [2007] VSCA 120 at [46]. 294. Gardiner v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190, McClellan CJ at CL (James and Simpson JJ agreeing) at [79]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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where there are multiple eyewitnesses, that mistakes may be made even by witnesses who knew the suspect prior to the occasion in question, and that factors such as the stress of the situation, the lighting and the distance from which the eyewitness stood are all matters to which the jury should give close attention. He should warn them of the problem of estimating the weight to be given to the evidence and the tendency to overestimate the weight of identification evidence. The judge should also warn the jury of the factors in the particular case that are capable of having caused errors in the identification.295

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Thus, a general warning will be necessary, conveying the “special” nature of the need for caution.296 It would be prudent to refer to past miscarriages of justice deriving from identification evidence.297 The reasons for the need for care must be disclosed.298 In this regard, there is a wealth of psychological research which has identified the weaknesses of identification evidence: see ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 420–430. In every case a warning should be given in respect of the danger that an honest witness may be mistaken, and that an honest but mistaken witness may be convincing.299 There would need to be reference to considerations relevant to an assessment of probative value in the circumstances of the particular case.300 As the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal stated in Kanaan v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [183], the judge must “refer to every matter of significance which may reasonably be regarded as undermining the reliability of identification evidence”, regardless of how the case has been conducted or what is requested by the parties (although a somewhat less rigorous approach was adopted by the same court in Gardiner v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190 at [75]–[79]). Even if a matter of significance would be “obvious” to the jury, it should be the subject of a warning (although failure to do so may not result in a miscarriage of justice).301 On the other hand, this provision is concerned with “the reliability of the identification evidence given in favour of the Crown, not with its honesty” so that it would not be necessary to direct the jury about, for example, bias or a possible motive to lie.302 As Hunt AJA observed, the “whole point of the need for such warnings in relation to identification evidence is to ensure that the jury is 295. This passage has been described as “helpful” by Hunt CJ at CL in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal: R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414, fn 49. 296. R v Bruno (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson CJ, Powell JA, Studdert J, 7 July 1997), p 11 per Studdert J; R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414. However, the provision imposes no mandatory method of expression: R v Kingswell [1998] NSWSC 412, p 20 per Studdert J. 297. R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 428. Hunt CJ at CL stated: “[I]t would be prudent for trial judges to refer to innocent people having been convicted upon honestly mistaken evidence”. See also Smart J (at 431–432) and Howie AJ (at 433). A failure to draw this to the attention of the jury was held to require a new trial in Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 at [35]. 298. R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 431–432 per Hunt CJ at CL; see also 431–432 per Smart J. 299. Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 at [12]. 300. See R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414; R v MMK [2005] NSWCCA 273 at [21]. 301. Ilioski v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 164 at [84]. 302. Ilioski v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 164 per Hunt AJA at [98]–[99].

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made aware of the seductive effect of honest evidence, and of the fact that such evidence has led to proven miscarriages of justice when it has subsequently been shown to have been mistaken”. Some relevant factors are referred to at [EA.114.240] and [EA.115.300]. Factors that might, in a particular case, require mention would include: • Whether the witness had any prior familiarity with the subject. Identification of a stranger is more prone to error than “recognition” of someone known.303 However, an assertion of “recognition” would still require a warning (because it falls within the definition of identification evidence) although the contents of the warning might be somewhat modified.304 In Gardiner v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190, McClellan CJ at CL (James and Simpson JJ agreeing) stated at [75] that when “evidence is given that a person previously known to the witness was recognised the warning required will be significantly confined”. Nevertheless, even relatives can make mistakes of identification from photographs.305 • The characteristics of the subject. For example, some characteristics (eg, different racial group to the witness) may reduce the value of identification evidence.306 • The circumstances of the perception of the subject. In relation to visual identification, relevant circumstances will include period of perception, type or amount of attention, distance from subject, lighting conditions, and characteristics of the witness (for example, poor eyesight, intoxication, stress and degree of concentration). As regards stress in particular, it should be noted that ALRC 102 discusses recent research on memory and concludes that, contrary to the view that “negative emotion, stress and anxiety generally hinder memory function”, the research tends to show that “the significant central actions of an emotionally arousing event are likely to be better remembered than ordinary non-emotional events, even if peripheral details cannot be recalled” (paras 8.88–8.98). The Western Australian Court of Appeal has concluded that the effect of stress upon a person’s ability to identify another is not so clear that a judge should be required to direct upon it.307 • Relevant characteristics of the witness, including sincerity, bias or interest, eyesight, hearing, concentration, ability to process perceptions 303. Ilioski v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 164 at [68]. 304. Trudgett v The Queen (2008) 70 NSWLR 696; 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62 at [19]–[32]; see also R v Tran [1997] QCA 170; Al-Hashimi v The Queen (2004) 181 FLR 383; 145 A Crim R 186; [2004] WASCA 61; Peck v WA [2005] WASCA 20; R v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225; 161 A Crim R 13; [2006] VSCA 58 at [26]–[31]; Sindoni v The Queen (2011) 211 A Crim R 187; [2011] VSCA 195 at [63]–[64]. 305. See Kirby J in Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; 75 ALJR 1398; [2001] HCA 50 at [55]; R v Carpenter (2000) 117 A Crim R 272; [2011] ACTSC 71 (Tas CCA). 306. R v Nguyen [2000] NSWCCA 285 at [25]; R v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 at [35]; Carr v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 439 at [30]; R v Namie [2011] QCA 304 at [38]. 307. Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 at [87]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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and memory, ability to compare memory of past perceptions with present perceptions and ability to communicate. • The nature of any description given by the witness of the subject (and the length of time between the initial perception and the giving of the description.308 • The length of time between the initial perception and the identification.309 • The mode of, and procedures adopted in respect of, the first identification and any subsequent identifications (such modes including identification parades,310 photographic identification,311 “showings”,312 courthouse313 and in-court identification).314 The greater the degree of suggestion, explicit or implicit, to the effect that the person subsequently identified is the offender (or is a person suspected to be the offender), the greater the risk of error.315 It may be that in some cases something said or done by the witness gives rise to a concern about whether the witness has performed a relative identification (picking the person who “looks most like” the offender), rather than actually identifying the offender.316 It should not be suggested that deficiencies in the process may be overlooked because of practical difficulties attending the obtaining of satisfactory evidence of identification.317 • Whether a record was made of the process of identification.318

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308. Ilioski v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 164 at [86]–[90]; R v Franicevic [2010] QCA 36 at [19]; but cf Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 at [63]–[71]. 309. Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 at [53], [109]; R v Franicevic [2010] QCA 36 at [19]. 310. Relevant considerations would include the number of foils, the similarity (or otherwise) of their appearance to any description given by the witness and to the defendant, and the procedures adopted during the parade (see R v Fisher [2001] NSWCCA 380 and [EA.114.120]). 311. See [EA.115.300] for a discussion of the problems with photographic identification. 312. See Kelly v The Queen (2002) 129 A Crim R 363; [2002] WASCA 134 (common law). 313. See Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [157]–[158] per Kirby J. 314. R v Stanley [2004] NSWCCA 278 at [21]; Aslett v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 188 at [74]–[75]. See also Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 182; Al-Hashimi v The Queen (2004) 181 FLR 383; 145 A Crim R 186; [2004] WASCA 61; R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 at [61]. In Aslett v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 188 Kirby J (Allsop P and Johnson J agreeing) held at [74] that the jury should have been warned that the in-court identification “was of no value on the issue of identification”. Kirby J relied upon a direction suggested by the NSW Supreme Court Bench Book. However, that suggested direction related to a situation where the witness had made an earlier identification and is simply indicating the person that was earlier identified. In Aslett, the in-court identification was strictly inadmissible evidence (see at [57]), so it would have been appropriate to give such a direction in that case. However, it should not be regarded as an appropriate direction in all circumstances. 315. See, for example, R v Pretorius [2007] QCA 432 at [30], [35]–[36]. 316. Where that is so, it would be appropriate for there to be a judicial warning that the jury should take into account the risk that such an identification may have occurred: Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 at [62]. 317. R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 at [60]. 318. See Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 per McHugh J at [50] and Kirby J at [155].

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• The state of mind of the witness at the first identification and any subsequent identifications and, in particular, any expectation by the witness that the subject (or some representation of the subject) will be present will affect the probative value of any identification.319 • Any risk of displacement. For example, subsequent identifications after a first identification (of, eg, a photograph) carry the risk that the memory image of the offender has been displaced by the image first identified (the face in the photograph). There may be a risk of displacement by a photograph even if the person in the photograph was not identified.320 A risk may arise from being informed that others believe the person later identified to be the offender.321 However, there may no substantial risk of displacement where a witness identifies a picture of the defendant after having engaged in a process of preparing a computer image of the offender (a “com-fit image”).322 • The confidence of the witness (that is, the degree of probability that the witness is prepared to ascribe to the identity of the subject) although it should not be assumed that a confident and unqualified identification is necessarily reliable. In fact, a high level of confidence is unlikely to enhance the probative value of the identification evidence.323

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• The existence of other evidence supporting the identification, although other circumstantial evidence cannot bolster flawed evidence of identification324 and even several people may be equally mistaken in an identification. If there is more than one identification witness, it would be appropriate to warn the jury that several witnesses may be equally mistaken.325 • Any non-identification or negative identification on the part of the witness.326 319. R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326; [2000] NSWCCA 61 at [25] per Sheller JA. 320. Aslett v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 188 at [73]. 321. Penfold v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 101 at [60]. 322. Compare R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 at [38]; Wimbridge v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196 at [34]. Seeing the defendant outside the circumstances of the offence may create a risk of displacement: R v Mendoza (2007) 173 A Crim R 157; [2007] VSCA 120. 323. See Mackenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348 at 373; R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190; [2000] NSWCCA 210 at [15]–[16] per Spigelman CJ; Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; 177 A Crim R 418; [2007] WASCA 244 at [12], [117]–[118]; but see also R v MMK [2005] NSWCCA 273 at [20]–[21]. 324. Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [165]; R v Razzak [2004] NSWCCA 62 at [28]; R v Ong (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; [2007] VSCA 206 at [21], [42]. See also R v Bennett (2004) 88 SASR 6; 144 A Crim R 215; [2004] SASC 52; R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 at [58]. Sindoni v The Queen (2011) 211 A Crim R 187; [2011] VSCA 195 at [68]. However, cf R v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225; 161 A Crim R 13; [2006] VSCA 58 at [37]–[41]; R v White (2008) 102 SASR 35; [2008] SASC 265. 325. Compare R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 at [156]–[162]; R v Ali (2001) 122 A Crim R 498; [2001] NSWCCA 218; Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95; 65 A Crim R 12 at 112; R v Coates (unreported, WA CCA, 1 March 1994); R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 at [65]. 326. R v Franicevic [2010] QCA 36 at [19]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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• The reliability of other parts of the witness’s evidence. • If another witness has made a “negative identification”, that should be brought to the jury’s attention, along with a direction regarding the proper approach to such exculpatory evidence (see [EA.165.480]). On the other hand there is no requirement to refer to the “danger” or “dangers” of convicting, although such a direction may be given.327 It would not be necessary for the trial judge to tell the jury that the identification has in fact been weakened in the particular case since it is for the jury to determine the weight to be given to evidence.328 Nor would it be necessary that the judge refer to every conceivable weakness in the evidence, however slight.329 It would not be necessary to refer to a consideration affecting the value of the evidence if this might indirectly prejudice the defendant.330 It is not necessary that a trial judge should refer to every matter that is advanced on behalf of the defendant as affecting the identification evidence.331 Where there is more than one identification witness, reference may be made to those specific matters said to be capable of undermining the reliability of the identification evidence which are common to all the witnesses rather than dealing with each such matter seriatim in respect of each witness.332

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The NSW Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book333 and the Victorian Criminal Charge Book334 both provide extensive guidance regarding possible directions to the jury in respect of different categories of identification evidence.

327. R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 per Hunt CJ at CL (at 427–428), Smart J (at 432); compare R v Bruno (unreported, NSW CCA, Gleeson CJ, Powell JA, Studdert J, 7 July 1997), pp 11–12 per Studdert J. 328. R v Heuston (1995) 81 A Crim R 387 at 394, qualifying what was said in R v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 at 218; see also R v Eldridge [2002] NSWCCA 205 at [44] per Greg James J. 329. Radford at 218; Eldridge at [56]; R v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385 at [87]; R v Balogun [2004] NSWCCA 72 at [16]. 330. R v Razzak [2004] NSWCCA 62 at [33] per Levine J. However, the application of this principle was somewhat problematic. Levine J accepted a prosecution argument that directions regarding photographic identification would have had the potential to act contrary to the interests of the defendant (who had declined participation in an identification parade), “leading inevitably to a jury question of ‘well, why was not the accused subjected to an identification parade?’ and, of course, the inevitable path of speculation to which that leads”: at [33]. The difficulty with this analysis is that at least some directions could be given about photographic identification without referring to identification in a parade. 331. R v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 at [23]; R v Adams [2004] NSWCCA 279 at [29]; R v MMK [2005] NSWCCA 273 at [19]. 332. R v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 at [22]. See also R v Winters [2010] SASC 100 at [59]. 333. Judicial Commission of NSW, Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book, http:// www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks, Trial Instructions – Identification Evidence – Visual Forms [3-000]ff. 334. Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/publications, Pt 4.12.

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[EA.116.120]

Part 3.9 - Identification evidence

[EA.116.120]

Evidence of “resemblance” or “similarity”

Such evidence (eg “he looks like” the offender) would have less probative value than a positive identification.335 It should not be characterised as an “identification”.336 In Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [54]–[56], McHugh J drew a distinction (under the common law) between evidence of positive identification (where a witness claims to recognise the defendant as the person seen on a relevant occasion) and “circumstantial identification evidence” (where a witness “asserts that the general appearance or some characteristic or propensity of the accused is similar to that of the person who committed the crime”). He considered that “a judge is not automatically required to warn the jury concerning the dangers of circumstantial identification evidence” (at [57]). This approach was purportedly followed under this Act by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Dodd (2002) 135 A Crim R 32; [2002] NSWCCA 418 at [16]ff per Sully J (Meagher JA and Sperling J agreeing) in respect of identification evidence tendered in the trial of the appellant for armed robbery. However, two criticisms may be made of this decision. First, Sully J failed to refer to the terms of this provision or the definition of “identification evidence” in the Dictionary, which includes “an assertion by a person that a defendant … resembles (visually, aurally or otherwise) a person who was … present at or near a place where” the offence was comitted or a connected act done. This definition would extend to much, although not all, of the evidence referred to by McHugh J as “circumstantial identification evidence”. Accordingly, the obligations imposed under s 116 (and s 165) would apply. Second, Sully J appears to have misapplied the propositions stated by McHugh J when he characterised evidence from a witness (Ms Newman) that she identified the appellant as the man who had borrowed her car on the day of the robbery (other witnesses having given evidence that the car was seen in the vicinity of the robbery) as “circumstantial identification evidence” which did not require “a precise application of the Domican principles” (at [19]). McHugh J had included within the category of “positive identification” evidence from a witness claiming “to recognise the accused as the person seen on an occasion … [that] provides the ground for an inference, alone or with other evidence, that the accused committed the crime in question” (McHugh J at [54]). Ms Newman’s identification of the appellant satisfied this test. Further, it satisfied the definition of “identification evidence” for the purposes of s 116 (and s 165) because she asserted that the appellant “was, or resembles … a person who was … present at … [the] place where … an act connected to [the] offence was done” (that is, the car allegedly used to transport the robbers was borrowed). If there is a dispute as to whether the evidence of a witness is positive identification or only an assertion of resemblance, that issue must be determined by the tribunal of fact, with appropriate directions on the issue.337 335. Compare R v Hackett [2006] VSCA 138 at [36]. 336. R v Cook (unreported, NSW CCA, Smart, Ireland, Dunford JJ, 24 August 1998) referring to Pitkin v The Queen (1995) 80 A Crim R 302; 130 ALR 35; R v Adams [2004] NSWCCA 279 at [22]–[23]; but cf R v Razzak [2004] NSWCCA 62 at [32]. 337. Compare R v Fahad (2004) 146 A Crim R 169; [2004] VSCA 28 at [21]; R v Hackett [2006] VSCA 138 at [36]; R v Morgan [2009] VSCA 225 at [27]–[28]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.116.150]

Aural (including voice) identification

Since “identification evidence” is defined to mean an assertion that the defendant is, “or resembles (visually, aurally or otherwise)”, a person present at or about the time the crime (or connected act) in question was committed, it is clear that this warning provision applies to aural identification of the defendant. For the same reason, s 165(1)(b) applies. The principles apply in the same way as for visual identification, although the factors bearing on the reliability of the evidence may differ.338

[EA.116.180] Other warning provisions

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Section 115(7) requires a trial judge, if requested by the defence, to warn a jury in respect of matters relating to “picture identification evidence”. In addition, further jury directions may be required under s 165 in the Commonwealth and NSW Acts.339 In those jurisdictions, directions may also be required under the common law (see [EA.164.90] and [EA.165.300]). In Victoria, the Jury Directions Act 2015 deals comprehensively with warnings to juries in criminal proceedings (although s 115(7) still applies). Division 4 deals with “identification evidence”, defined in s 35 in a way that is significantly broader than the definition of “identification evidence” in the Dictionary to this Act. It would include evidence of identification of a person other than the defendant (“accused”) and evidence of identification of an object. On the other hand, as with the definition in this Act, it would not apply to evidence of description of a person or object unless the person who gave the description took the next step of comparing the person or object described with another person (such as the defendant) or object. The prosecution or defence may request a direction pursuant to s 12: s 36(1). The party making a request for a direction “must specify … the significant matters that may make the evidence unreliable”: s 36(2). The significance of the reference to s 12 is that this is the provision which imposes a requirement on the parties to request jury directions after the close of evidence and before addresses and which triggers the operation of s 14. Section 36(3) provides: In giving a direction referred to in subsection (1), the trial judge must— (a) warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be given to it; and (b) inform the jury of the significant matters that the trial judge considers may make the evidence unreliable; and (c) inform the jury that— (i) a witness may honestly believe that his or her evidence is accurate when the witness is, in fact, mistaken; and (ii) the mistaken evidence of a witness may be convincing; and (d) if relevant, inform the jury that a number of witnesses may all be mistaken; and 338. R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6; Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 at [26]–[36]; see also R v Ong (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; [2007] VSCA 206 at [20]. 339. As to the relationship between ss 116 and 165, see R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701; [2002] NSWCCA 455 at [291] per Wood CJ at CL and Howie J.

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(e) if relevant, inform the jury that mistaken identification evidence has resulted in innocent people being convicted.

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It may be observed that this provision is different from s 116(1) in a number of ways. Section 116 imposes an obligation on the trial judge even in the absence of a request for a direction – although the courts have placed limitations on that proposition (see [EA.116.90]). While s 36(3) uses the term “must”, this only relates to the contents of a direction if the trial judge accedes to the request by a party for a direction. Section 14(1) requires the trial judge to give the “requested direction unless there are good reasons for not doing so” (the same formulation as found in s 165(3): see [EA.165.240]). Section 14(2) specifies matters the trial judge must have regard to in determining whether there are such “good reasons”. Significantly, s 15 provides that, “[s]ubject to section 16, the trial judge must not give the jury a direction that has not been requested under section 12”. Section 16 mandates a direction “if the trial judge considers that there are substantial and compelling reasons for doing” (and certain procedural requirements are satisfied). However, it is possible that an appeal court may be satisfied that, even if no request was made, there has been a “substantial miscarriage of justice” on the basis that the trial judge should have considered that there were “substantial and compelling reasons” for giving the direction. Another difference from s 116(1) is that the trial judge need only inform the jury of “significant” matters that the trial judge considers may cause the evidence to be unreliable. “Significant” should be understood in the sense of having a real bearing on the assessment of reliability in the circumstances of the case (the factors discussed at [EA.116.90] may be significant in this sense). Further, there are specific requirements in (c), (d) and (e) which must be complied with, at least “if relevant”. Like s 116(2), s 6 provides that “[i]n giving a direction to the jury, the trial judge need not use any particular form of words” (in addition, s 5(4) should be noted). Section 37 effectively abolishes all common law obligations to direct a jury “regarding the unreliability of identification evidence”. This is unlikely to make a significant difference (except, possibly, in the case where no request is made by a party for a direction: see discussion above).

Part 3.10 – Privileges [EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.30] Summary of this Part This Part deals with a number of privileges which allow a party to proceedings or a witness to refuse to disclose certain confidential (and privileged) communications and documents. The privileges relate to client legal communications (Div 1), professional confidential relationships (Div 1A), sexual assault communications (Div 1B), religious confessions (s 127), self-incrimination (s 128), reasons for judicial and jury decisions (s 129), matters of state (s 130) and settlement negotiations (s 131). Those provisions prohibit the adducing of evidence in a proceeding. However, s 128A extends the application of the privilege against self-incrimination to some ancillary processes relating to civil © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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proceedings and s 131A extends the application of other privileges in Pt 3.10 to some ancillary processes and pre-trial stages of civil and criminal proceedings.

DIVISION 1 – CLIENT LEGAL PRIVILEGE DIVISION 3.10.1 – CLIENT LEGAL PRIVILEGE (ACT ONLY)

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1.30] Summary of this Division

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This Division creates a privilege for, in general terms, confidential communications made, and confidential documents prepared, for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal advice (s 118) or providing legal services relating to litigation (s 119). Section 120 extends the privilege to unrepresented parties to legal proceedings. Sections 121–126 provide for various ways in which the privilege may be lost. An overview of client legal privilege is provided below.340

340. Produced by the Judicial College of Victoria. Available at: http:// www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/publications/uniform-evidence-resources. Reproduced with permission.

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FIGURE 10

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s 117

Cth Act: 117

Definitions

(1) In this Division: client includes the following: (a) a person or body who engages a lawyer to provide legal services or who employs a lawyer (including under a contract of service); (b) an employee or agent of a client; (c) an employer of a lawyer if the employer is: (i) the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or (ii) a body established by a law of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; (d) if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to persons of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is for the time being acting in respect of the person, estate or property of a client—a manager, committee or person so acting; (e) if a client has died—a personal representative of the client; (f) a successor to the rights and obligations of a client, being rights and obligations in respect of which a confidential communication was made. [Def am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 59] Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

confidential communication means a communication made in such circumstances that, when it was made: (a) the person who made it; or (b) the person to whom it was made; was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law. confidential document means a document prepared in such circumstances that, when it was prepared: (a) the person who prepared it; or (b) the person for whom it was prepared; was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law. means: an Australian lawyer; and an Australian-registered foreign lawyer; and an overseas-registered foreign lawyer or a natural person who, under the law of a foreign country, is permitted to engage in legal practice in that country; and (d) an employee or agent of a lawyer referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).

lawyer (a) (b) (c)

[Def subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 60]

party includes the following: 962

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(a) (b)

an employee or agent of a party; if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to persons of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is for the time being acting in respect of the person, estate or property of a party—a manager, committee or person so acting; (c) if a party has died—a personal representative of the party; (d) a successor to the rights and obligations of a party, being rights and obligations in respect of which a confidential communication was made. (2) A reference in this Division to the commission of an act includes a reference to a failure to act. [S 117 am Act 135 of 2008]

NSW Act: 117

Definitions

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(1) In this Division: client includes the following: (a) a person or body who engages a lawyer to provide legal services or who employs a lawyer (including under a contract of service), (b) an employee or agent of a client, (c) an employer of a lawyer if the employer is: (i) the Commonwealth or a State or Territory, or (ii) a body established by a law of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory, (d) if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to persons of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is for the time being acting in respect of the person, estate or property of a client—a manager, committee or person so acting, (e) if a client has died—a personal representative of the client, (f) a successor to the rights and obligations of a client, being rights and obligations in respect of which a confidential communication was made. [Def am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[54]]

confidential communication means a communication made in such circumstances that, when it was made: (a) the person who made it, or (b) the person to whom it was made, was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law. confidential document means a document prepared in such circumstances that, when it was prepared: (a) the person who prepared it, or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) the person for whom it was prepared, was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law. lawyer means an Australian lawyer, a foreign lawyer, or an employee or agent of either of them. [Def subst Act 7 of 2015, Sch 2.17[1]; Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[55]]

party includes the following: (a) an employee or agent of a party, (b) if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to persons of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is for the time being acting in respect of the person, estate or property of a party—a manager, committee or person so acting, (c) if a party has died—a personal representative of the party, (d) a successor to the rights and obligations of a party, being rights and obligations in respect of which a confidential communication was made. (2) A reference in this Division to the commission of an act includes a reference to a failure to act. [S 117 am Act 7 of 2015; Act 46 of 2007]

Vic Act: Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

117

Definitions

(1) In this Division— client includes the following— (a) a person or body who engages a lawyer to provide legal services or who employs a lawyer (including under a contract of service); (b) an employee or agent of a client; (c) an employer of a lawyer if the employer is— (i) the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or (ii) a body established by a law of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; (d) if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to persons of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is for the time being acting in respect of the person, estate or property of a client—a manager, committee or person so acting; (e) if a client has died—a personal representative of the client; (f) a successor to the rights and obligations of a client, being rights and obligations in respect of which a confidential communication was made; confidential communication means a communication made in such circumstances that, when it was made— (a) the person who made it; or 964

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(b) the person to whom it was made— was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law; confidential document means a document prepared in such circumstances that, when it was prepared— (a) the person who prepared it; or (b) the person for whom it was prepared— was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law; lawyer means— (a) an Australian lawyer; and (b) a non-participant registered foreign lawyer; and (c) a foreign lawyer or a natural person who, under the law of a foreign country, is permitted to engage in legal practice in that country; and (d) an employee or agent of a lawyer referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c);

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[Def am Act 38 of 2017, s 85; Act 17 of 2014, s 160 and Sch 2 item 39.4]

party includes the following— (a) an employee or agent of a party; (b) if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to persons of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is for the time being acting in respect of the person, estate or property of a party—a manager, committee or person so acting; (c) if a party has died—a personal representative of the party; (d) a successor to the rights and obligations of a party, being rights and obligations in respect of which a confidential communication was made. (2) A reference in this Division to the commission of an act includes a reference to a failure to act. [S 117 am Act 38 of 2017; Act 17 of 2014]

ACT Act: 117

Definitions—div 3.10.1

(1) In this division: client includes the following: (a) an entity that engages a lawyer to provide legal services or that employs a lawyer (including under a contract of service); (b) an employee or agent of a client; (c) an employer of a lawyer if the employer is— (i) the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or (ii) a body established by a law of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(d) if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to people of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is acting in relation to the person, estate or property of a client—the manager, committee or person; (e) if a client has died—the client’s personal representative; (f) a successor to the rights and obligations of a client, that are rights and obligations in relation to which a confidential communication was made. confidential communication means a communication made in circumstances that, when it was made— (a) the person who made it; or (b) the person to whom it was made; was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law.

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confidential document means a document prepared in circumstances that, when it was prepared— (a) the person who prepared it; or (b) the person for whom it was prepared; was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law. means— an Australian lawyer; and an Australian—registered foreign lawyer; and an overseas—registered foreign lawyer or an individual who, under the law of a foreign country, is permitted to engage in legal practice in that country; and (d) an employee or agent of a lawyer mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c). party includes the following: (a) an employee or agent of a party; (b) if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to people of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is acting in relation to the person, estate or property of a party—the manager, committee or person; (c) if a party has died—the party’s personal representative; (d) a successor to the rights and obligations of a party, that are rights and obligations in relation to which a confidential communication was made. lawyer (a) (b) (c)

(2) A reference in this division to the commission of an act includes a reference to a failure to act.

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NT Act: 117

Definitions

(1) In this Division:

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client includes the following: (a) a person or body who engages a lawyer to provide legal services or who employs a lawyer (including under a contract of service); (b) an employee or agent of a client; (c) an employer of a lawyer if the employer is: (i) the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or (ii) a body established by a law of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; (d) if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to persons of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is for the time being acting in respect of the person, estate or property of a client — a manager, committee or person so acting; (e) if a client has died — a personal representative of the client; (f) a successor to the rights and obligations of a client, being rights and obligations in respect of which a confidential communication was made. confidential communication means a communication made in such circumstances that, when it was made: (a) the person who made it; or (b) the person to whom it was made; was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law. confidential document means a document prepared in such circumstances that, when it was prepared: (a) the person who prepared it; or (b) the person for whom it was prepared; was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law. means: an Australian lawyer; and an Australian-registered foreign lawyer; and an overseas-registered foreign lawyer or a natural person who, under the law of a foreign country, is permitted to engage in legal practice in that country; and (d) an employee or agent of a lawyer referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).

lawyer (a) (b) (c)

party includes the following: (a) an employee or agent of a party; © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) if, under a law of a State or Territory relating to persons of unsound mind, a manager, committee or person (however described) is for the time being acting in respect of the person, estate or property of a party — a manager, committee or person so acting; (c) if a party has died — a personal representative of the party; (d) a successor to the rights and obligations of a party, being rights and obligations in respect of which a confidential communication was made. (2) A reference in this Division to the commission of an act includes a reference to a failure to act.

[EA.117.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 14.71–14.100; ALRC 38, s 108, paras 195–196; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 883.

[EA.117.60] Definition of “lawyer” Notwithstanding the technical differences between the jurisdictions regarding “foreign lawyers”, all jurisdictions include “an Australian lawyer” within the definition of “lawyer”. In the Commonwealth Act, the Dictionary defines “Australian lawyer” to mean:

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

a person who is admitted to the legal profession by a Supreme Court of a State or Territory under a law of a State or Territory specified in the regulations.

However, the NSW Act provides that “Australian lawyer” has the meaning it has in the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW). That legislation provides that “Australian lawyer” means: a person admitted to the Australian legal profession in this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction

In Victoria, the Dictionary to the Act does not define “Australian lawyer” but s 158 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), which has general application, defines it to have the same meaning as it does under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (Vic), which is identical to the comparable definition in the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW). One effect of these definitions is to make clear that a practicing certificate is not required (see ALRC 102 at paras 14.82–14.97). However, lack of a current practising certificate may mean that the lawyer “cannot necessarily be seen as independent or as necessarily acting in a legal professional capacity as a person who holds one, so as to give the quality of that person’s advice the description ‘legal advice’”.341 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Commonwealth amending Act states: This amendment adopts the ACT Court of Appeal decision in Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; [2005] ACTCA 35. In considering the definition of “lawyer” under section 117, the ACT Court of Appeal found that a practising certificate was an 341. Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; [2005] ACTCA 35 at [21]; see [EA.118.330].

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important indicator, but not conclusive on the issue of whether the legal advice wassufficiently independent to constitute legal advice for the purposes of claimingprivilege under the Act. The policy of the privilege does not justify its restriction to those with a practising certificate, particularly since a range of lawyers may provide legal advice or professional legal services in various jurisdictions. It is the substance of the relationship that is important, rather than a strict requirement that the lawyer hold a practising certificate. The amendment is directed at clarifying that client legal privilege may pertain to Australian lawyers and their employees and agents. However, the amendment is not intended to affect the common law concept of independent legal advice.342

Another effect of these definitions is to ensure that client legal privilege in Pt 3.10 applies, in general, to both Australian and foreign lawyers (see ALRC 102 at paras 14.98–14.100). It will not be necessary to show that the foreign lawyer has the same ethical and legal responsibilities as an Australian Lawyer (see ALRC 102 at para 14.90). However, as was stated in ALRC 102 at para 14.99:

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The Commissions’ view is that, should unusual facts about the status of a lawyer arise in a particular case, it will be open to the court to find that the prerequisite of the communication being made for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice will not have been made out. It will also be open to the party seeking the information to make a case that if client legal privilege was not available in the jurisdiction in which the communication was made, then it was not a confidential communication for the purpose of the uniform Evidence Acts. These are all matters which can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

As regards the inclusion within the definition of “lawyer” an employee or agent of an Australian lawyer or foreign lawyer, it may be noted that the fact that the “lawyer” is an employee or agent of a lawyer may well have a bearing on whether advice provided is “legal advice” (see [EA.118.330]) and whether a communication or document is “confidential” (see [EA.118.240]).

[EA.117.90] Definition of “client” In Apple v Wily [2002] NSWSC 855 at [7], [11], Barrett J observed: There is a definition of “client” in s 117(1). It is, however, the kind of explanatory or enlarging definition that specifies items which are included in the defined term, leaving the core meaning to be discovered by other means. In ordinary parlance, a “client” vis-à-vis a lawyer is a person for whom the lawyer performs legal services. Whether a relationship of that kind exists is to be determined by reference to the intentions of the parties objectively ascertained. … “Client”, in its ordinary signification, must therefore be regarded as referring to a person who, in respect of some legal matter within the scope of professional services normally provided by lawyers, has, with the consent of a lawyer, come to stand in a relationship of trust and confidence to the lawyer entailing duties of the lawyer to promote the person’s interests, to protect the person’s rights and to respect the person’s confidences. The privilege exists so that a person may consult his legal adviser in the knowledge that confidentiality will prevail.

These observations were cited with apparent approval by the NSW Court of Appeal in Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 at [73]. Barrett J concluded that a “client” is not simply any person to whom is owed by a lawyer the express or implied 342. Explanatory Memorandum, at paras 172–173. Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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obligation referred to in the definitions of “confidential communications” and “confidential document” in s 117. Otherwise, a lawyer who, on behalf of his or her acknowledged client, offered to impart information to another person upon the giving by that other person of an undertaking to maintain confidentiality (which undertaking was given) would thereby cause that other person also to be the lawyer’s client. Barrett J observed that the concept of “client” cannot be that wide. It is not essential that there be a valid contract of retainer between the lawyer and the “client”.343 As White J explained at [19]–[20], under the common law “privilege can exist in respect of communications where there is no valid retainer of the lawyer” and there is “no express requirement in s 118 of the Evidence Act 1995 or in the definition of ‘client’ or ‘lawyer’ which requires that a person only becomes a client if there is a contract of retainer or if the lawyer has accepted instructions to act”. The definition in (a) was, prior to the amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102, “an employer (not being a lawyer) of a lawyer”. In ALRC 102 it was noted at para 14.72 that this meant that a non-government lawyer could not be a client of an employed lawyer, while the definition in (c) meant that a government employer of a lawyer could be both a lawyer and a client for the purposes of Div 1. It was observed that there was no sound policy reason for this distinction and that, “[w]ith increasing fields of specialisation, it is not unreasonable to think that law firms will want to seek advice on particular matters, perhaps from their own specialists”. Accordingly, the ALRC recommended at para 14.81 that “for the purposes of the client legal privilege provisions of the uniform Evidence Acts (Pt 3.10), a client of a lawyer be defined as a person who engages a lawyer to provide professional legal services, or who employs a lawyer for that purpose, including under a contract of service (for example, as in-house counsel)”. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Commonwealth amending Act states: “The purpose of the amendment is to remove the distinction between government and private lawyers in allowing a client to be an employer of the lawyer.”344 In R v Petroulias (No 22) (2007) 213 FLR 293; 176 A Crim R 309; [2007] NSWSC 692, Johnson J dealt with a claim of client legal privilege made by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) in respect of notes taken during conferences between counsel and solicitors for the Crown and prosecution witnesses. Johnson J accepted at [56] that that the CDPP was a “client” and lawyers working within the office of the CDPP were persons providing legal services to the CDPP as the client.345 The definition (in (b)) includes an “agent” of a client. That term is not defined. The critical issue will be whether the client has expressly or impliedly authorised 343. Hawksford v Hawksford [2008] NSWSC 31; Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (No 2) (2009) 180 FCR 1; [2009] FCA 449 at [19]. See also Perazzoli v BankSA [2017] FCAFC 204 at [172], [181]–[182]. 344. Explanatory Memorandum, at para 170. Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act. 345. Johnson J also held at [66]–[75] that the calling of the prosecution witnesses at committal proceedings and earlier trials of the defendant did not give rise to waiver of privilege: see s 122. However, it should be noted that prosecution disclosure obligations may over-ride privilege: R v Seller [2015] NSWCCA 76, Fullerton J (Bellew J agreeing) at [245].

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the “agent” to act on behalf of the client in the context of obtaining legal advice (s 118) or professional legal services relating to ongoing or anticipated litigation (s 119).346 Assistance may be provided by authorities under the common law.347 In one case348 it was held that a receiver was not entitled to claim privilege in respect of a document in which the company had received legal advice. In Westpac Banking Corp v 789TEN Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 519; [2005] NSWCA 321 the NSW Court of Appeal upheld a trial judge’s ruling that a bank’s independent auditor was not acting as the bank’s agent when receiving a letter from the bank’s lawyers (see Tobias JA at [14]–[18]). On the other hand, in Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; 224 ALR 588; 56 ACSR 487; [2005] NSWCA 444 the NSW Court of Appeal adopted a broad reading of the word “agent” to include experts retained by client (an insurer) for the purpose of carrying out such investigation as was required for it (the insurer) to obtain legal advice from a lawyer. In Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 the NSW Court of Appeal readily inferred at [52] that legal officers within the NSW Department of Natural Resources were providing or receiving legal advice as the agents of the Director-General for the purpose of providing him with such information as was appropriate to enable him to ultimately determine whether or not to proceed to bring a prosecution.

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In Retravision (NSW) Ltd v Copeland (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 8 October 1996), a broad interpretation was given to the term “successor” in (f).349

[EA.117.120] Definitions of “confidential” communication/document A communication or document will be “confidential” if either the person who made/prepared it or the person to/for whom it was made/prepared “was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law”. As Giles JA observed in New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 at [55]: Differential confidentiality does not matter for the definitions in the Act, since it is enough that one of the parties to the communication or the preparation of the document is under an obligation not to disclose its contents.

346. In TransGrid v Members of Lloyds Syndicate 3210 [2011] NSWSC 301, Ball J observed at [11] that if the purpose of a communication between a client and a third party, such as an independent consultant, is to enable the third party to assist the client in some way and the third party has no interest in the communication other than to provide that assistance, then the third party is acting as the agent of the client for the purpose of that communication. 347. DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499; [2003] FCA 384 (but cf Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; 224 ALR 588; 56 ACSR 487; [2005] NSWCA 444, Basten JA at [109]–[123]). 348. Times Properties Pty Ltd v Challenge Bank Ltd [1996] ATPR 41–455. 349. See also Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Victoria [2013] VSC 302 at [143]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The obligation had to exist at the time when the communication/document was made/prepared. If it does, the communication or document will be “confidential” whatever later occurs – although subsequent circumstances may result in loss of privilege (see [EA.118.240]; s 122). The Full Federal Court has observed in relation to the phrase “under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law” that it should not be read narrowly and should not be confined to “the type of obligation which arises in the course of a solicitor/client relationship”.350 This view was endorsed by the NSW Court of Appeal in New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 at [41]. Giles JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing) stated at [41]: It can extend to an unspoken obligation, and to an ethical, moral or social obligation.

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Each case will turn on “the nature of the relationship in question and the circumstances, including conduct and/or conversations, surrounding the communications or documents in question” as well as “the nature of the documents in question and the purpose and context of their communication”.351 In Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 864, Graham J held at [55] that there was no implied obligation not to disclose where the party receiving the information had stated that it considered itself “free to use information in its possession ‘for its other functions or in other contexts’”. On appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, it was not necessary to determine the correctness of this conclusion but Allsop J expressed the view that it was correct.352 Allsop J emphasised that, as “a matter of objective analysis of the uncontroversial facts”, it must have been plain that it was at the very least possible that the advice would be disclosed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in the course of performing its functions. Similarly, in New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 Giles JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing) held at [50] that “uncommunicated internal resolve” on the part of a Department not to disclose witness statements prepared for it was “not an obligation”. It was understood that the department could use the statements “as it saw fit including by disclosure to the respondent or to the world in open court in legal proceedings. This is the antithesis of an obligation not to disclose their contents” (at [51]). As for an obligation on the witnesses who provided the statements, there was no evidence that at the time [the witnesses] “were asked, and agreed, not to disclose the contents of their statements” (at [52]). The fact that the department could subsequently prevent disclosure by the witnesses, “in maintenance of its freedom to prepare for litigation without fear of disclosure to the other party”, did not mean that the witnesses were under an obligation not to disclose the contents of their statements (at [60]). 350. Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247 at 259 per Higgins, Lehane and Weinberg JJ. 351. Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 per Bergin J at [33]; see also New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279, Giles JA at [46]; Sexton v Homer (2013) 65 MVR 460; [2013] NSWCA 414 at [106]–[107]; Hamilton v New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1213 at [35]–[40]. 352. Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2005) 144 FCR 379; [2005] FCAFC 125 at [35], Edmonds J agreeing at [40].

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It may be noted that “the person for whom [the document] was prepared” in Jackson was held not to be the individual person who obtained the document but the Government Department on whose behalf he obtained it. That was because the document was prepared for the Department as the intended recipient and potential user of the document (at [39]). In Hamilton v New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1213, it was argued that, where a police officer communicated with a solicitor employed in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), the relevant person “to whom [the communication] was made” was not the solicitor but the actual Director of Public Prosecutions. However, as BeechJones J held at [32], whatever the situation in Jackson with respect to the document in question, the relevant communication under s 119(a) was “between a lawyer acting for the client and another person”. Accordingly, the relevant person “to whom [the communication] was made” was the ODPP solicitor.

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Under the common law, the presence of a third party at the time a communication is made may indicate that the communication was not intended to be confidential.353 The same approach has been taken under this Act.354 However, the issue will remain whether, in the case of a communication, the person who made the communication, or the person to whom the communication was made, was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, and in the case of a document, whether the person who prepared the document, or the person for whom it was prepared, was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents.355 A finalised proof of evidence created for the purpose of serving it on an opposing party may not be “confidential”: Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 74 NSWLR 469; [2009] NSWSC 225. While privilege may not be lost under s 122 where a witness statement or affidavit is served in advance of trial pursuant to court order or procedural requirement (“under compulsion of law”: see [EA.122.330]), such a document may never have been privileged at all if it was created for the purpose of serving it on an opposing party. In such circumstances, the document was not prepared by a person who “was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law”, nor was the person for whom it was prepared under such an obligation.356

353. R v Braham [1976] VR 547 at 549. See also Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 76–78 per Gibbs CJ; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 22) (1988) 14 NSWLR 132 at 133–134 per McLelland J; ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393 at 562–564. 354. R v Sharp (2003) 143 A Crim R 344; [2003] NSWSC 1117 per Howie J at [34]–[37]. See also Edwards v Vic Land Rehabilitation [2012] VSC 188 at [26]–[28]; Slea Pty Ltd v Connective Services Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 361 at [19]–[20]. However, in R v Rogerson (No 31) [2016] NSWSC 195, it was held that the fact that a conversation intended to be confidential was monitored by prison authorities did not affect the nature of the conversation, because the monitoring was outside the control of the parties to the conversation (Bellew J at [22]–[29]). 355. Slea Pty Ltd v Connective Services Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 361 at [23]. 356. Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 74 NSWLR 469; [2009] NSWSC 225, White J at [10]–[13], citing the common law authority ACCC v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; 254 ALR 198; [2009] FCAFC 32. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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A document that records a communication that was not a confidential communication may still be a confidential document.357 It was held by the NSW Court of Appeal that the circumstances in which the file notes were created and the purpose for which they were created lead inescapably to the conclusion that [the person who prepared the document] owed an implied obligation to [his client] to keep them confidential ... regardless of the characterisation of the communications which ... those documents record.358

Cth Act: 118 Legal advice Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or (b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the client; or (c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client, lawyer or another person; for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client. [S 118 am Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 61]

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NSW Act: 118

Legal advice

Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer, or (b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the client, or (c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client, lawyer or another person, [Para (c) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[56]]

for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client. [S 118 am Act 46 of 2007]

357. Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 at [64]–[67], [69]. 358. Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 per McDougall J at [74].

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Vic Act: 118 Legal advice Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of— (a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or (b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the client; or (c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client, lawyer or another person— for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client. ACT Act:

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118

Legal advice

Evidence must not be presented if, on objection by a client, the court finds that presenting the evidence would result in disclosure of— (a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or (b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the client; or (c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client, lawyer or someone else; for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or 1 or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client. NT Act: 118 Legal advice Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or (b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the client; or (c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client, lawyer or another person; for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client.

[EA.118.30] ALRC references ALRC 102, paras 14.101–14.122; ALRC 38, s 106, para 195; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 877–879.

[EA.118.60] General comments This provision creates a privilege for, in general terms, confidential communications made, and confidential documents prepared, for the dominant © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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purpose of a lawyer providing legal advice. It is best discussed in conjunction with s 119, below. These provisions to a large extent reflect the common law doctrine of legal professional privilege. The privilege is based on the following rationale:

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[I]ts justification is to be found in the fact that the proper functioning of our legal system depends upon a freedom of communication between legal advisers and their clients which would not exist if either could be compelled to disclose what passed between them for the purpose of giving or receiving advice … The restriction of the privilege to the legal profession serves to emphasize that the relationship between a client and his legal adviser had a special significance because it is part of the functioning of the law itself. Communications which establish and arise out of that relationship are of their very nature of legal significance, something which would be coincidental in the case of other confidential relationships.359

In other words, the primary rationale for the privilege is to enhance the functioning of the adversarial system of litigation. The ALRC considered that communications with third parties should also be protected under this rationale where they form part of adversarial litigation, so that confidentiality would further “the proper functioning of [the] legal system”. However, the ALRC considered that this rationale would not justify extension of the privilege to third party communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice where litigation was not pending or anticipated.360 For that reason, s 118(c) did not include a reference to “another person” prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102. In ALRC 102, this view was modified in order to reflect changes in the common law that extended privilege to documents prepared by a third party for a client (with the intention that the documents would be provided to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice).361 In ALRC 102, it was concluded at para 14.122: Section 118(c) should be amended to provide that the legal advice privilege extends to information provided by a third party to the client or lawyer for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice. It is not recommended to extend the privilege to all communications with a third party … as this may extend unduly the scope of the privilege and result in a greater blurring of the advice and litigation privileges.

[EA.118.90] “Evidence is not to be adduced if …” This provision is concerned with the admissibility of evidence. That would cover adducing evidence in interlocutory proceedings as well as at a final hearing, or on 359. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 128 per Dawson J. The ALRC cited this at ALRC 26, vol 1, para 878. Another rationale sometimes advanced is that the frankness allowed by the rule better positions lawyers to dissuade their clients from breaking the law: Carter v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 121; [1995] HCA 33. 360. Compare Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 75 per Mason J (dissenting). 361. See Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217; [2004] FCAFC 122, discussed in ALRC 102 at paras 14.102–14.121. Interestingly, this view of the common law was not followed in Melrose Cranes and Rigging Pty Ltd v Manitowoc Crane Group Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 904, SG Campbell J considering at [32]–[40] that it appears to conflict with considered dicta in the New South Wales Court of Appeal and holding that “the traditional view of the rule in Wheeler v Le Marchant” should be applied (that is, “advice privilege” is not available where one of the parties to the communication is a third party who is not the agent of the client for the purpose of the communication).

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an appeal, and it has been held that evidence may be “adduced” in proceedings (see s 4) other than a conventional trial with examination-in-chief, crossexamination and re-examination.362 Thus, evidence may be “adduced” in a liquidator’s examination (although if such an examination is not a “proceeding” for the purposes of s 4 of the Act, none of the provisions of the Act apply: see [EA.4.150]). But this provision does not cover all the circumstances in which a claim for privilege might arise.363 Some courts took the view that it would be anomalous to have different rules applying to ancillary processes from those applying at trial. To avoid this, they followed a line of reasoning to the effect that, even if the provisions of the Act did not directly apply to claims for privilege made in relation to discovery and inspection of documents (and in other circumstances not involving the adducing of evidence), the common law, by analogy or derivation, should be treated as modified to accord with the statutory test, at least in the jurisdictions where the Act applies.364 However, the High Court held that this approach should not be adopted.365 Similarly, it held that utilising discretionary provisions in court Rules to achieve the same result should also be rejected.366

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Nevertheless, s 131A now extends the application of the provisions of Pt 3.10 (other than the provisions of ss 123 and 128) to some ancillary processes and pre-trial stages of civil and criminal proceedings. A witness must not be asked a question seeking to obtain evidence which falls within the terms of s 118. In accordance with s 134, evidence that must not be adduced in a proceeding is not admissible in the proceeding. Equally, a document to which the provision applies may not be tendered in evidence. Clause 8 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides: A reference in this Act to a document includes a reference to: (a) any part of the document; or (b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of the document or of any part of the document; or (c) any part of such a copy, reproduction or duplicate. 362. Re Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (2002) 168 FLR 116; 194 ALR 101; [2002] NSWSC 215 at [103]–[112] per Campbell J. 363. See Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553; 161 ALR 318; [1999] HCA 8; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67. 364. Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360; 152 ALR 418; Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539. 365. Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 at [18]–[28] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ. 366. Esso Australia Resources Ltd at [33]. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ did accept that “in a particular case, the circumstance that a document is one which could not be tendered in evidence because, eg, it was covered by client legal privilege under the Evidence Act 1898, might possibly be a consideration relevant to a decision as to whether it was necessary that it be produced for inspection even though at the stage of discovery it was not covered by privilege”. However, they concluded that “the question is one of necessity, and that this is to be determined in the light of the facts and circumstances of the individual case”. Similarly, Callinan J stated (at [145]): “The purpose of the rule is to control oppressive and unnecessary obligations of discovery, and more particularly perhaps, to prevent obfuscation by excessive discovery. Its purpose is not to permit modification of the law of privilege.” © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 118

This means that where the contents of a document are privileged under s 118, evidence cannot be adduced of any copy of that document. On the other hand, where only part of a document is privileged, it may be possible to sever non-privileged parts if this is practicable without disclosing privileged material. 367

[EA.118.120] “on objection by a client” Objection must be taken by the “client” (or the lawyer acting on behalf of the client). “Client” is defined in s 117 (see [EA.117.90]; [EA.118.270]). As the ALRC noted (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 883): The lawyer, as part of his normal obligations to his client, will remain obliged to claim the privilege on behalf of the client in the absence of instructions to waive it.368

In accordance with s 132, if it appears to the court that a witness or a party369 may have grounds for making an objection under this provision, the court must satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the absence of the jury) that the witness or party is aware of the effect of the provision.

[EA.118.150]

“disclosure”

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The court is required to engage in an exercise of prediction – whether the adducing of the evidence “‘would result in disclosure of’ certain communications or documents”. In Green v AMP Life Ltd [2005] NSWSC 95, Campbell J observed at [18]: The notion of “disclosure” involves something becoming revealed which was previously hidden, or known which was not previously known. There can, it seems to me, be disclosure of a matter, even if not everything concerning that matter is disclosed.

Campbell J concluded that allowing inspection of material contained in a law firm’s file, insofar as it consisted of drafts of the relevant insurance policy and customer information brochure, would result in some information becoming available to the person who carries out the inspection, about the topics concerning which the assistance of the law firm had been requested in the drafting of the documents. To that extent, it would result in disclosure of a confidential communication made between client and lawyer. Similarly, in Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1070, Barrett J accepted at [19] that “it is not possible to ‘disclose’ to a particular person something already known to or possessed by that person”. This analysis related to loss of privilege under s 122 and Barrett J accepted that the provisions dealing with loss of privilege from voluntary or consensual disclosure “cannot operate in a case where the content of a privileged document is communicated to a person who is already in possession of that content”. 367. Compare Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 per Mason and Wilson JJ (at 66), Deane J (at 87–88), Dawson J (at 102–103). However, it is not clear that such an option is possible under the Act. 368. A problem may arise if the lawyer has ceased to act for the client – the obligation to claim the privilege should still operate in practice. 369. A party includes a defendant in criminal proceedings: R v James (unreported, NSW CCA, 30 July 1998).

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On the other hand, in Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd (receivers & managers appointed) (in liq) (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899, Austin J stated at [14](e): The question is whether what is disclosed by adducing the evidence explicitly reveals the confidential communication or the contents of the confidential document, or supports an inference of fact as to the content of the confidential communication or document, which has a definite and reasonable foundation.

Austin J concluded that “[d]isclosure does not occur if what is adduced in evidence merely causes the reader to ‘wonder or speculate whether legal advice has been obtained and what was the substance of that advice’”.370 It is apparent that the effect of extending privilege to evidence that would “result in disclosure” of certain communications or documents is that it may not be only that communication or document that is privileged. As White J observed in Fenwick v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 353 at [30], “[s]econdary material is also privileged if that material discloses the privileged confidential communication”.

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[EA.118.180]

“communication”

The word “communication” is not defined. In the Macquarie Dictionary it is defined to mean, among other definitions, “the imparting or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information by speech, writing, or signs”. A communication may refer to earlier communications. Each communication must be considered separately for the purpose of determining whether privilege attaches. Nonprivileged material does not become privileged by later being included in a privileged communication. For example, the actual opinion of an expert consulted by a party to litigation will not be privileged even if a report containing that opinion is the subject of privilege.371

[EA.118.210] “document” (s 118(c)) The word “document” is very broadly defined in the Dictionary to this Act. In addition, cl 8 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides: A reference in this Act to a document includes a reference to: (a) any part of the document; or (b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of the document or of any part of the document; or (c) any part of such a copy, reproduction or duplicate.

However, it has been held that para (c) should not be given its widest possible meaning because that “would in a practical sense subsume most, if not all, documentary communications falling within para (a) and para (b)”.372 McLelland CJ in Eq placed considerable importance on the following passage in the ALRC Final Report (ALRC 38, para 195), which indicated the classes of confidential communications and documents on which it was intended to confer protection: 370. Citing AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; 232 ALR 743; [2006] FCA 571 at [133] per Young J (a judgment on the common law position). 371. Sendy v Commonwealth [2002] NSWSC 1109 at [14]–[17] per Dunford J. 372. Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 at 149B per McLelland CJ in Eq. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(a) Communications for advice. Communications between lawyer and client (and between lawyers engaged by the same client) made for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the client. The lawyer’s normal obligation to claim the privilege on behalf of the client in the absence of instructions to waive it would not be disturbed. (b) Communications for litigation. Communications between lawyer or client and a third party (including the client’s employees and agents) made for the dominant purpose of providing or receiving legal services in connection with pending or anticipated litigation. Similar provisions should apply in relation to the unrepresented litigant. (c) Documents etc. The protection should extend to documents (such as notes, memoranda, opinions and advices of the lawyer and records of communications) prepared for the same purposes and whether delivered or not.

McLelland CJ in Eq regarded the illustrative examples in category (c) as “illuminating” and proceeded to conclude:

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In my opinion para (c), on its true construction, does not apply to a document, the essential character of which is that of a communication made by the lawyer to another person (or at least another person not within the extended definition of “lawyer” in s 117), or made by the client to another person (or at least another person not within the extended definition of “client” in s 117). Such a document must find its claim for protection if at all under para (a) or para (b).373

This approach appears to accord with the views of the ALRC, expressed in the Interim Report, that there should be no privilege for “third-party communications” in a “purely advice situation”: ALRC 26, vol 1, para 882. If the “essential character” of a document is such a communication, privilege should not attach. Of course, as McLelland CJ in Eq pointed out, if the essential character of the document is not such a communication, and it is protected under para (c) of s 118, it will not lose the protection conferred under para (c) merely because it is communicated.374 For example, a communication between the lawyer and a third party, which enclosed such a document, or a copy of such a document, would not thereby result in loss of protection for the document.375 Subsequent to this decision, the NSW Court of Appeal gave some consideration to the scope of s 118(c).376 In certain obiter statements, Powell JA, with whom Meagher JA agreed, observed (at 389): [T]he documents comprehended by s 118 of the Act are, in my opinion, documents – even if not delivered to the client – containing advice to or a note of, or record of, the advice given, or to be given to a client.

Consequently, records of interview prepared by a solicitor following interviews he conducted with employees of his client were not protected by s 118(c).377 This view largely endorses the approach of McLelland CJ in Eq and places 373. Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 at 149F. 374. The words “(whether delivered or not)” would preclude such a view. 375. Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 at 149–150 per McLelland CJ in Eq. Of course, privilege may be lost by the operation of s 122. 376. Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulation (1997) 42 NSWLR 351. 377. However, he considered that they were protected under s 119.

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considerable reliance on the illustrative examples provided by the ALRC. However, whether it proves to be a comprehensive statement of the types of documents protected under s 118 remains to be seen. In this regard, it should be noted that Smart AJA considered (at 393) that the records of interview taken by the solicitor might well fall within the scope of s 118(c), on the basis that a lawyer retained to give legal advice to a client may need to ascertain relevant facts by “speaking with the client’s employees or other witnesses and obtaining the opinion of an expert”.378 In 2005, the NSW Court of Appeal in Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; 224 ALR 588; 56 ACSR 487; [2005] NSWCA 444 expressly accepted the correctness of the approach of McLelland CJ in Eq (Basten JA at [110], Beazley JA and Santow JA agreeing). The Court of Appeal held (Basten JA at [84], [102], [108]) that the judge at first instance was wrong to hold “where the solicitor, acting within general instructions, of his or her own initiative seeks a report from an expert, that report falls outside legal advice privilege”. The issue is to be determined by the terms of this provision, not the common law, and “the terms of s 118 in relation to legal advice, when read with the definitions in s 117, expressly prohibit evidence being adduced which would result in disclosure of the contents of a confidential document prepared by an agent of the client or a lawyer for the dominant purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice to the client” (Basten J at [108]). For the purposes of a confidential document (to which s 118(c) applies) “it does not matter whether the agent is identified as the agent of the solicitor or the agent of the client” (Basten JA at [105]). It makes no difference that the solicitor “acts on his or her own initiative”. In contrast, if it is necessary to rely on para (a) (because it involves a confidential oral communication and not a confidential document), that provision does not in terms cover communications between a lawyer and his or her employee or agent, or between a client and his or her agent.

[EA.118.220]

Copies of a document

It is clear that a copy of a privileged document is also privileged.379 Under the common law, a party may be able to prove a particular document, which by reason of privilege cannot be furnished by the production of the original, by tendering a copy as secondary evidence, even though the copy has been obtained by improper or illegal means.380 However, the position under this provision (and 378. In Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd v Catchklin Pty Ltd (unreported, FCA, Finn J, 6 May 1998) it was held that a lawyer’s file note of a non-privileged communication could itself be privileged under s 118(c). However, there was no reference to the NSW authority noted above. 379. See Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247. The Full Court of the Federal Court observed (at 254) that both ss 118 and 119 “prohibit evidence from being adduced by reference to the result that would follow from its being adduced, including, inter alia, that the evidence would result in disclosure of ‘a confidential communication made … for the dominant purpose …’ or ‘the contents of a confidential document … prepared … for the dominant purpose …’. Tendering a copy would have that effect just as would tendering the original”. The court held that originals and copies are equally protected unless the privilege is lost for one of the reasons set out in the succeeding sections of the Act. See also Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2009) 175 FCR 508; [2009] FCA 240 at [14]–[18]; Re Optimisation Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1581, Brereton J at [37]–[39]. 380. See Re Optimisation Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1581 at [26]–[36]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 119) is that, if the original is protected by privilege, so is a copy or other secondary evidence of the original privileged communication or document.381 Equally, privilege would apply to that part of an otherwise non-privileged document that contained a copy of a privileged document, since adducing the former document “would result in disclosure” of the contents of the privileged document – although it may be possible to edit the former document to avoid such disclosure.382

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With regard to the vexed question under the common law whether privilege can attach to copies of non-privileged documents383, the answer in respect of this provision is that a copy of a non-privileged document may be privileged where the “contents” of the copy were “prepared” for the prescribed dominant purpose or disclosure will reveal other privileged material.384 In Kamasaee v Commonwealth (No 2) [2016] VSC 404, Macaulay J observed at [44] that this can raise interesting questions about email chains. Macauley J stated at [46]: In my view, that on-forwarding of the email chain was tantamount to making “copies” of the original email communications for the purpose of seeking the advice. Emails, of course, do not exist in their original form as the printed documents that have been shown to the court. In their original form, emails are digital data transmissions which are collected and displayed on a computer screen in the form of letters and words due to computer software which causes that to occur. Each email is a standalone communication. But at the click of a particular button on the computer a received email can be reproduced and on-sent to a new recipient with or without a new message, or copied back to the original recipient in the course of a reply. In my view, the use of these processes in email communication effects a copying (or reproducing) function which generates a new form of the original email. The purpose for generating that new form is whichever purpose lies behind the decision to choose to “reply to” or “forward” the original email.

In Desane Properties Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2018] NSWSC 173, Robb J stated at [178]–[181] (after noting the analysis of Macauley J): [178] In my view truly difficult questions may arise where the Court is required to determine whether a chain of emails is protected by client legal privilege. The position may be much more difficult than the case where a photocopy of a document is made. A shopping list may not be privileged, but if a party wishes to obtain legal advice about the shopping list, or to provide it to a lawyer for the dominant purpose of the party being provided with professional legal services related to an anticipated, pending or subsisting proceeding, the fact will be that the photocopy of the shopping list will be produced by the conscious act of the client in photocopying it for the particular purpose. That will not necessarily be the case for chains of emails, which may often include emails that have little to do with the purpose of sending the whole chain to the final recipient, but may in part be created because of lazy decisions along the chain to click on “Reply” or “Reply All”, rather than to take the trouble to create a new email 381. Re Optimisation Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1581, Brereton J at [37]–[39]. 382. Harden Shire Council v Curtis [2009] NSWCA 179 at [18]–[24]. 383. Considered at length by the High Court in Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501; 91 A Crim R 451; [1997] HCA 3. 384. Compare R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473. See also Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Byrne (No 2) [2016] VSC 345 at [44]–[47]; Kamasaee v Commonwealth (No 2) [2016] VSC 404 at [43].

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for the relevant protected purpose, containing only the earlier emails or other information necessary to achieve the protected purpose. [179] Another problematic issue is that email chains tend to proliferate by reason of the “Reply All” function, sometimes in order to spread information among interested persons, and sometimes out of laziness. Many versions containing substantially the same chains may be created with, in a particular case, say, the last email in the chain asking a worker in a neighbouring office to bring back a sandwich for the sender after lunch. All of the prior emails in the chain may be privileged, but the final one obviously is not. [180] With respect to the views expressed by Macaulay J, the problem created by email chains may not always be solved by treating the on-forwarding of the email chain as being tantamount to making copies of the original email communications for the purpose of seeking legal advice. It will often not be sufficient to consider the circumstances in which the last email in the chain has been produced, as the purpose for its production may not be protected, but emails earlier in the chain may warrant protection. [181] However, I respectfully agree with Macaulay J that in a particular case, an examination of the final email in the chain in the context of the chain, as a whole, may justify treating the whole chain as if the individual emails had intentionally been copied for a protected purpose.

Of course, a non-privileged document does not become privileged because a copy of it is included in a privileged communication.385 Lastly, the ALRC noted (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 884) that:

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Privilege would not apply, as at present, to acts or things actually observed by the lawyer unless to give that evidence would involve disclosure of privileged material.

This reflects the common law in respect of legal professional privilege.386 Thus, a lawyer may be compelled to prove a client’s handwriting or testify regarding whether a particular document is in the client’s possession (unless the lawyer’s knowledge is derived from privileged material). Equally, the privilege does not extend to physical objects (other than documents).

[EA.118.240]

“a confidential communication … or … confidential document”

The terms “confidential communication” and “confidential document” are both defined in s 117 (see [EA.117.120]. The ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 879): As at present, and consistently with the rationale, the requirement is maintained that the communication be confidential. An issue arises as to whether there should be a statutory presumption of confidentiality where it is shown that there is a client/lawyer relationship. It has not been included because there does not appear to be such a presumption recognised by the law and it is to be expected that the courts will continue to find a confidential relationship where they would at present.

It has been held387 that a document may cease to be confidential where it has subsequently been disclosed, even inadvertently, but this ruling appears to be 385. Sendy v Commonwealth [2002] NSWSC 1109 at [15] per Dunford J. 386. National Crime Authority v S (1991) 29 FCR 203; 54 A Crim R 307. 387. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [17] per Santow J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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wrong given the definition of “confidential document” which requires focus on the situation at the time the document was prepared. The ruling was not followed by Simpson J in Cannar v Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 at [80]. An argument that adducing evidence could not “result in disclosure” of a communication or document which had entered the public domain was rejected by Simpson J (at [81]–[82]). Her analysis appears to have been endorsed on appeal by the NSW Court of Appeal in British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158 at [146]–[147], [187]. Similarly, in Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312, McDougall J observed at [87] that if a document was confidential when it was created, “its subsequent use and annotation in conference can hardly have served to displace that confidentiality”. The potential consequences of inadvertent disclosure are dealt with by s 122. In Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; [2005] ACTCA 35 the ACT Court of Appeal observed at [24] that “where client legal privilege is claimed over documents produced by an in-house lawyer, particularly when that in-house lawyer is employed in government service, the question is whether the document would meet the statutory test of being a confidential document”. It may not be confidential if, for example, a defence force lawyer had previously been ordered by a superior officer to hand over files relating to the client thereby breaching client privilege in relation to that earlier advice (at [27]).

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[EA.118.270] “client” This term is defined (inclusively) in s 117, so that it includes, for example, “(b) an employee or agent of a client” and “(f) a successor to the rights and obligations of a client”: see [EA.117.90]. It has been observed that, subject to the adoption of those extended meanings, the client referred to in para (a) of s 118 must be identical with the client referred to in the concluding part of the section. Similarly, the client referred to in para (b) must be identical with the client referred to in the concluding part of the section.388 Equally, a confidential document prepared for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal advice to a client (s 118(c)) can only be the subject of an objection under this provision by that client.389 The qualification relating to the extended meanings in s 117 means that the client making the objection need not be the same person or entity as the client referred to in (a), (b) or (c) (that is, the word “client” is read to mean “client for the time being”).390 On that analysis, where a trustee, acting as trustee, has obtained legal advice and, subsequently, is replaced by a new trustee, the latter, as “successor to the rights and obligations of a client”, would be able to rely on this provision to make an objection as a “client” even though the confidential communication was 388. Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 at 148 per McLelland CJ in Eq 389. See Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Whitebox Trading Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 324 at [90], [124]. 390. Retravision (NSW) Ltd v Copeland (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 8 October 1996).

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made between the original trustee and a lawyer. It has been held that the use of the word “employer” in the definition does not intend to exclude the professional engagement by a client of a lawyer.391

[EA.118.300] “lawyer” This term is defined in s 117 and is discussed at [EA.117.60]. It includes an “employee or agent of a lawyer”. It is important to note that “advice” provided by a “lawyer” is not necessarily “legal advice” (see [EA.118.330] below). It has been observed that, subject to the adoption of the extended meanings of the term, the lawyer referred to in para (a) must be identical with the lawyer referred to in the concluding part of the section. Similarly, the lawyer referred to in para (b) must be identical with the lawyer referred to in the concluding part of the section.392

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[EA.118.330] “legal advice” “Legal advice” is construed broadly to include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the relevant legal context.393 In a practical day-to-day context, a lawyer’s views on the legal framework may so inform what appears to be commercial advice that it is properly characterised as legal advice.394 However, there will be no privilege if a communication is with a lawyer acting in a non-legal capacity, providing something other than “legal advice”. The advice must relate to matters of law, although legal advice goes beyond formal advice as to the law. A lawyer providing advice on accounting or administration may not be providing “legal advice”. Further, the courts have developed a requirement of professional independence. In ASIC v Rich [2004] NSWSC 1017, Hamilton J considered that the appropriate test was whether the communication could be characterised as the giving of independent legal advice by a person acting in the role of a legal adviser giving advice to a client.

In Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; [2005] ACTCA 35 the ACT Court of Appeal referred to “independent advice given professionally” (at [20], [30]). Thus, while it is not essential that a lawyer hold a current practising certificate, lack of such a certificate may mean that the lawyer “cannot necessarily be seen as independent or as necessarily acting in a legal professional capacity as a person who holds one, so as to give the quality of that person’s advice the description ‘legal advice’”.395 As regards in-house lawyers, in Telstra Corp Ltd v Minister for Communications, Information Technology & the Arts (No 2) [2007] FCA 1445, Graham J stated at [35]: 391. See discussion in Times Properties Pty Ltd v Challenge Bank Ltd [1996] ATPR 41–455. 392. Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 at 148 per McLelland CJ in Eq. 393. WorkCover Authority of NSW, General Manager v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84 at [77]; IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [47](9). Preparation of draft legislation necessarily involves the giving of legal advice: New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd (2009) 180 FCR 543; [2009] FCAFC 160. 394. See DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499; [2003] FCA 384 at [45]. 395. Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; [2005] ACTCA 35 at [21]. See also Rich v Harrington (2007) 245 ALR 106; [2007] FCA 1987 at [40], [59]–[60]; Hannaford v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NSW) [2013] NSWSC 1708 at [52]–[74]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 118

In my opinion an in-house lawyer will lack the requisite measure of independence if his or her advice is at risk of being compromised by virtue of the nature of his employment relationship with his employer. On the other hand, if the personal loyalties, duties and interests of the in-house lawyer do not influence the professional legal advice which he gives, the requirement for independence will be satisfied.396

Similarly, while an in-house employed lawyer is entitled to claim privilege on behalf of his or her employer as a client (see [EA.117.60], [EA.118.300]), Spigelman CJ observed in Sydney Airports Corp Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 at [24]: An in-house solicitor is, by reason of his or her position, more likely to act for purposes unrelated to legal proceedings than an external solicitor who, in the normal course, has no relevant function other than that involving legal proceedings and/or legal advice. An in-house solicitor may very well have other functions. Accordingly, in determining whether or not a document was brought into existence for a purpose which was both privileged and dominant, the status of the legal practitioner is not irrelevant.

Thus, in Priest v New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1281 a number of conclusions and recommendations made in a “legal advice” prepared by an in-house lawyer led Johnson J (at [43]–[48]) to find that “the dominant purpose of the report is not the provision of legal advice” but rather “an administrative or process review being the focus of the report”.

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[EA.118.360]

“for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client”

The “purpose” referred to in this provision is the purpose which led to the making of the communication or the preparation of the document.397 It is not a question of the motive of the individual who made it.398 On the other hand, while “purpose” must be objectively determined, “the subjective purpose will always be relevant and often decisive”.399 What is required is an objective view of all the evidence, taking into account the intention not only of its author, but also the person or authority under whose direction it was procured.400 Where the making 396. This analysis was adopted by Schmidt J in Banksia Mortgages Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 535 at [23]–[26]. 397. Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247 at 253F; IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [47]. 398. As Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 at [39] observed in respect of the common law: “In many cases the reports would result from established corporate or bureaucratic procedures, and the individual who made the report would simply be following instructions. It may be necessary to understand the internal procedures, or the objectives of some person of higher authority, in order to identify the purpose or purposes for which reports were prepared.” 399. Callinan J in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 at [172], cited by Spigelman CJ in Sydney Airports Corp Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 at [6] (the other members of the Court of Appeal agreeing). See also Carter Holt Harvey Wood Products Australia Pty Ltd v Auspine [2008] VSCA 59 at [2]; Sexton v Homer (2013) 65 MVR 460; [2013] NSWCA 414 at [108]; IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [47](5). 400. See Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322; 138 ALR 735 at 740, citing Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027. Spigelman CJ in Sydney

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of the communication or the preparation of the document is for a corporation it may be necessary to examine the purpose of persons in the corporation’s hierarchy, other than the author or the person directly commissioning the document, to determine the purpose for which the communication was made or the document prepared.401 As McHugh J observed, frequently it will be necessary to consider “the surrounding facts and circumstances, particularly previous dealings between the parties”.402 The lawyer may be able to give evidence about the circumstances surrounding the communication.403 The lawyer’s retainer may be relevant.404 It would be erroneous to believe that the privilege is “necessarily or conclusively established by resort to any verbal formula or ritual”: Where a communication is not made for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice, the privilege does not apply. Equally, where a document is not prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice, the privilege does not apply.405

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It is important to remember in this context that particular communications made at the same time may have different purposes. Equally, different parts of a document may have different purposes (a reference to a document is defined in Pt 2 of the Dictionary to include a reference to “any part of the document”). In Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; [2004] FCAFC 337, Allsop J stated at [157]–[159]: A person can see a legal adviser and receive legal advice and commercial or other non-legal advice. The former will be privileged, the latter not. Difficulties of course can arise in demarcation. Difficulties can arise if the advice is intermingled. The resolution of the issue will generally be a question of fact. If there is one conversation or one body of writing incapable of being broken up into which there is intermingled privileged material and non-privileged material the communication as one or as a whole will only be protected if the dominant purpose of the communication or the creation of the writing was to give or receive or record legal advice. If a conversation or a note can be divided up such that privileged and non-privileged material can be segregated, the communications or writing made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice will be privileged, even if the balance of the communications, perhaps even if most of the communications go to other matters. One does not lose privilege on a note made as an aide-memoire for the asking of legal advice by putting ten other notes on the same page to remind one to ask about ten other topics. It depends on the nature of the communication or writing and the circumstances of the creation of the document. Airports Corp Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 at [9]; ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393 at 545–546; Gorman v Cook [2002] NSWSC 1149 at [13]. In respect of the comparable common law position, see Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ (at [39]), McHugh J (at [77]) and Callinan J (at [172]). 401. See Powercor Australia Ltd v Perry (2011) 33 VR 548; [2011] VSCA 239 at [20]; IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [47](6). 402. See Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 at [77] per McHugh J (dissenting). 403. Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd (receivers & managers appointed) (in liq) (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899 per Austin J at [28]. 404. WorkCover Authority of NSW, General Manager v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84 at [85] and [88] per McColl JA. 405. Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 51 ALJR 198; [1976] HCA 63 at 689 (CLR), cited by Black CJ and Emmett J in Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; [2004] FCAFC 337 at [13]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.118.390]

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It is the purpose in existence at the time of the making of the communication or the preparation of the document which is determinative.406 Thus, a document will not be privileged merely because it was handed to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.407 Equally, if privilege attaches to a document prepared for the prescribed purpose, it does not matter whether it was actually used for that purpose.408 There will be no privilege if the intended use of a document is to advise and inform the client in making the client’s communication to the lawyer (whether or not that communication embodied wholly or substantially the content of the document) and not to record the communication to be made to the lawyer.409 The dominant purpose must be the provision of legal advice to the client and it is irrelevant what use the client intends to make of the advice. Thus, even if the client intends to use the legal advice obtained in furtherance of a fraud or some other improper purpose, this provision will apply, although privilege may be lost under s 125.410 On the other hand, it has been held that where the advice is not obtained for the utility of that advice in furtherance of the improper purpose but instead for the sake of appearance, as by cloaking an illegal step with the appearance that things are being done properly, the privilege does not apply.411

[EA.118.390] “dominant purpose”

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This provision adopts a “dominant purpose” test. The test is intended to reflect that proposed by Barwick CJ in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 51 ALJR 198; [1976] HCA 63 at 678 (CLR): It seems to me to be preferable to test the status of each document according to the purpose of its production … For my part, I prefer the word “dominant” to describe the relevant purpose. Neither “primary” nor “substantial”, in my opinion, satisfies the true basis of the privilege.

Although this test was rejected by the majority of the High Court in Grant v Downs, preferring a “sole purpose” test, the ALRC considered that it struck “the correct balance”: ALRC 26, vol 1, para 881. English412 and New Zealand413 courts apply a “dominant purpose” test in relation to common law legal professional privilege. It follows that these authorities may provide some assistance with respect to this term, although the view has been expressed that 406. IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [47](3). 407. Building Insurers’ Guarantee Corp v A & MI Hanson Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 381 at [2]; compare Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 112–113 per Deane J; Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217; [2004] FCAFC 122 at [47]. 408. Compare Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; [2004] FCAFC 337 at [62], [228]–[234]. 409. Compare Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217; [2004] FCAFC 122 at [48]. 410. See Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 222 at [60] per Einstein J. See also Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37] per Santow J. 411. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](2) per Santow J. 412. See, in particular, Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 716; Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027. 413. See Konia v Morley [1976] 1 NZLR 455; Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596.

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414

they provide “little help”. Some authorities have used English formulations.415 The High Court has now adopted the same test of dominant purpose for the common law privilege.416 The majority of the court did not attempt to define the test, although they noted observations to the effect that the “test is a familiar concept in other branches of the law, notably insolvency and taxation”.417 They did observe that the following approach (derived from the test expounded by Jacobs J in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 51 ALJR 198; [1976] HCA 63 at 692 (CLR)418) was “close to a dominant purpose test”: [I]f a document is created for the purpose of seeking legal advice, but the maker has in mind to use it also for a subsidiary purpose which would not, by itself, have been sufficient to give rise to the creation of the document, the existence of that subsidiary purpose will not result in the loss of privilege.

Such a test provides a clear criterion: would the communication have been made or the document prepared even if the suggested dominant purpose had not existed? If the answer is “yes”, the test is not satisfied. If the answer is “no”, the test will be satisfied notwithstanding that some ancillary use or purpose was contemplated at that time.419 Thus, it has been observed that “[i]f the decision to bring the document into existence would have been made irrespective of any intention to obtain legal professional services” it is doubtful whether “the purpose of obtaining professional legal services could be regarded as the dominant purpose for the making of the document”.420 Other members of the Federal Court

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414. See Branson J in Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322; 138 ALR 735 at 327. 415. In Mitsubishi Electric Australia Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (Vic) (2002) 4 VR 332; [2002] VSCA 59 (dealing with the common law) the Victorian Court of Appeal adopted the view of Lord Edmund-Davies in Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 716 that the concept of “clear paramountcy” should be the touchstone. This formulation was followed by McDougall J in Singapore Airlines v Sydney Airports Corp Ltd [2004] NSWSC 380 and by Kenny J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 60 ATR 266; 225 ALR 266; [2005] FCA 1247 at [30](7). It was simply noted on appeal by Spigelman CJ in Sydney Airports Corp Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 at [7]. 416. See Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67. 417. Esso Australia Resources at [51] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, citing Richardson J in Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596 at 605. Thus, assistance may be derived from other contexts in which the concept is used: cf Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Spotless Services Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 404 at 416, where the High Court observed that “[I]n its ordinary meaning, dominant purpose indicates that purpose which was the ruling, prevailing or most influential purpose”. This formulation was simply noted by Spigelman CJ in Sydney Airports Corp Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 at [7]. It was applied by Elliott J in IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [47](3). 418. Jacobs J adopted a test that looked to the reason for the existence of the material and posed the question in the following terms: “does the purpose of supplying the material to the legal adviser account for the existence of the material”? 419. See Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322; 138 ALR 735 at 328 per Branson J; Sellers Pty Ltd v Hapag-Lloyd AG (unreported, NSW SC, Admiralty Div, Giles CJ Comm D, 11 September 1997) and ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393. 420. Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322; 138 ALR 735 at 328 per Branson J (Fed Ct). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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have adopted similar analyses. In Roach v Page (No 17) [2003] NSWSC 973, Sperling J rejected an argument that privilege did not apply to communications with a prospective expert witness because such an expert was required by Court Rules “to assist the court”, on the basis (at [8]) that “the predominant purpose of such communications is to bring forward expert evidence in aid of the party. But for that purpose, the communications would not be entered into at all.”422 The NSW Court of Appeal applied this analysis in Westpac Banking Corp v 789TEN Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 519; [2005] NSWCA 321, Tobias JA (with whom Beazley JA and Campbell AJA agreed) adopting the language of Branson J in Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd and holding that documents were not prepared for the dominant purpose of providing the client bank with a professional legal service because they would have been prepared irrespective of that intention, since the bank’s auditor (not an agent of the bank) required those services for the purpose of carrying out its audit obligations (at [57]–[60]). In Carter Holt Harvey Wood Products Australia Pty Ltd v Auspine [2008] VSCA 59, the Victorian Court of Appeal appears to have endorsed this approach at [7].423 However, while the “but for” test offers desirable clarity of analysis, it cannot be said with any certainty that it is the proper approach to resolving the issue of dominant purpose. As noted above, the High Court has not unambiguously endorsed it. Thus, as a result, some courts have emphasised what is not a “dominant” purpose. If two purposes are of equal weight, one would not dominate the other.424 Even if a particular purpose was “greater than” another purpose, or was “the most important” purpose, this does not necessarily mean it was the “dominant” purpose.425 In the latter judgment, Spigelman CJ concluded at [55] that it was open to find the dominant purpose test was not satisfied where the document was “always to be deployed for non-privileged purposes, which purposes were of significance”, even though the privileged purpose “may have been the most important single factor”. Another approach is to adopt similar but equally vague language. Thus, it has been held under the common law that “a ‘dominant purpose’ is one that predominates over other purposes; it is the prevailing or paramount purpose”.426

421. Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217; [2004] FCAFC 122 at 366 [35] per Finn J; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) [2006] FCA 1234 at [44](6) per Young J. 422. See also Dyball v The Harden Shire Council [2004] NSWSC 486 at [23]–[27]. 423. However, the view has been expressed in Victoria that there must be a “clear paramountcy” of purpose: Perry v Powercor [2011] VSC 308 at [55]; Liesfield v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 348 at [27]. 424. See Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322; 138 ALR 735 at 328 (FCR); IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [47](4). See also McHugh J in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 at [76]. 425. Sydney Airports Corp Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 per Spigelman CJ at [49] (the other members of the Court of Appeal agreeing). It is somewhat difficult to reconcile this observation with the proposition earlier adopted (at [7]) that “dominant indicates the purpose which was the … most influential purpose”. 426. Perazzoli v BankSA [2017] FCAFC 204 at [72].

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[EA.118.480]

Documents which are, or evidence, transactions

The ALRC considered (ALRC 26, para 879) that its proposals would “ensure that evidence about concluded conveyancing and other property transactions would not be excluded”. It considered that limitation of the privilege to “the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client or a lawyer … for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client” (or “professional legal services” under s 119) meant that documents which merely constitute or evidence transactions (such as contracts, conveyances, trust deeds, receipts, invoices, minutes or declarations) would not be caught by the privilege. This is certainly the common law position,427 although it is possible that the change from a sole purpose to a dominant purpose test may have some impact on this reasoning. In that (unlikely) event, s 121(3) may apply.

[EA.118.450]

Inferred confidential communications or confidential documents

In Mead v Mead (2007) 81 ALJR 1185; 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25 Gleeson CJ (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) discussed the common law principles relating to legal professional privilege and stated at [10]:

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The rule relating to legal professional privilege does not prevent the drawing, from events and circumstances, of inferences about the knowledge of a party, even if the probable source of such knowledge is a privileged communication.

The same conclusion should be reached in respect of this provision. It only prohibits the adducing of evidence and thus does not prevent the drawing of inferences.

[EA.118.480]

Third party communications/documents

Communications between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, even if made for the dominant purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice to the client, are not privileged under s 118.428 Contrast s 119. On the other hand, s 118(c) was amended following on ALRC 102 to reflect changes in the common law that extended privilege to documents prepared by a third party for a client (with the intention that the documents would be provided to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice): see [EA.118.60]. Thus, legal advice privilege extends to documents provided by a third party to the client or lawyer for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice, but not to communications with a third party.429 It would also extend to a document prepared by the lawyer or client with the intention of delivering the 427. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 per Murphy J (at 86), Deane J (at 112–113); O’Reilly v Commissioners of State Bank of Victoria (1982) 153 CLR 1; 44 ALR 27 at 24–25 per Mason J. 428. See Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd (2005) 189 FLR 297; [2005] NSWSC 259. Young CJ in Eq at [72]–[77] suggested the position may be different where a report is obtained from a third party expert who is retained by the lawyer on the explicit instructions of the client, but it is difficult to find a basis for that approach in this provision. 429. See IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [78]–[79]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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document to a third party (on a confidential basis), so long as the dominant purpose for the preparation of the document was that the client be provided with legal advice.430

[EA.118.510] Loss of client legal privilege Client legal privilege may be lost under ss 121 to 126, discussed below.

[EA.118.540]

Burden and standard of proof

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It is clear that the “burden of proof” is on the “client”, objecting to the evidence under this provision.431 In accordance with s 142(1), the court “is to find that the facts necessary for deciding” the factual questions under s 118 have been proved “if it is satisfied that they have been proved on the balance of probabilities”. The authorities emphasise the need for focused and specific evidence in order to ground a claim for client legal privilege.432 In Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; [2004] FCAFC 337, Black CJ and Emmett J observed at [13] that “it is not sufficient for a party merely to assert a claim for privilege nor will an affidavit asserting the purpose for which a document was brought into existence followed by a statement about the category of legal professional privilege to which the document is said to belong necessarily be sufficient”. However, these propositions should not be carried too far, bearing in mind that the court may find that privilege applies in relation to a document purely on the basis of inspection of the document.433 In Hastie Group Ltd (in liq) v Moore [2016] NSWCA 305, Beazley P and Macfarlan JA cited the following statement of the plurality in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; 51 ALJR 198; [1976] HCA 63 at 689 (CLR) (in relation to the common law) at [32]: It is for the party claiming privilege to show that the documents for which the claim is made are privileged. He may succeed in achieving this objective by pointing to the nature of the documents or by evidence describing the circumstances in which they were brought into existence. But it should not be thought that the privilege is necessarily or conclusively established by resort to any verbal formula or ritual.

It was observed at [33] that “every case depends on its own facts and, as is stated by the plurality in Grant v Downs, there may be circumstances from which privilege may be established without the need for” detailed evidence. There need not be “express statements made in support of the claim for privilege. The Court is entitled to draw inferences from other proved facts” (at [34]). It was inferred that a report prepared in response to an “engagement letter”, which was itself privileged, was privileged (at [35]–[39]). 430. Cf under the common law, New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd (2009) 180 FCR 543; [2009] FCAFC 160 at [40]. 431. Compare Powercor Australia Ltd v Perry (2011) 33 VR 548; [2011] VSCA 239 at [42]. 432. Barnes v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 67 ATR 284; 242 ALR 601; [2007] FCAFC 88 at [18]; Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 at [40]; Blackrock Asset Management Australia Services Ltd v Waked (No 2) [2011] FCA 479 at [18]; IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [47](8). 433. See Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 16) [2013] NSWSC 418, Ball J at [11]–[15]; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v De Martin & Gasparini Pty Limited [2017] FCA 856 at [6]-[23].

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Procedure

Rules of Court may impose procedural requirements.434 General procedure relating to the determination of a question whether evidence should be admitted is dealt with in s 189. In accordance with s 132, if it appears to the court that a witness or a party may have grounds for making an objection under this provision, the court must satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the absence of the jury) that the witness or party is aware of the effect of the provision. If an application or objection is made, it should be determined in accordance with s 189. In accordance with s 133, if a question arises in relation to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question. The High Court has suggested that a court “should not be hesitant to exercise such a power”.435 This is particularly the case where the judge hearing the application relating to privilege is not the trial judge.436 On the other hand, many claims for privilege may be determined by the court without the need to inspect the document and, ordinarily, the court will not examine the document if the party claiming privilege has not established a basis for the claim in an affidavit in support.437 In Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; [2004] FCAFC 337, Black CJ and Emmett J observed at [17] that a court may make orders allowing evidence to be given in confidence under such conditions as to preserve the claimed privilege (which the evidence is adduced to support).

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[EA.118.600]

Inferences from claim of privilege

This provision contains no prohibition on the drawing of an adverse inference from the making of an objection. The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 862): No adverse inference should be drawn from the fact that privilege is claimed. Under existing law, no adverse inferences should be drawn where a person claims a privilege. It is not thought to be necessary, therefore, expressly to forbid the drawing of adverse inferences.

The ALRC did not make any proposals with respect to the drawing of inferences from evidence given or conduct occurring in a trial, considering it neither necessary nor possible.438 It is clear that no inference may be drawn from exercise of the privilege and, in a jury trial, a jury should be so directed.439 However, it has been observed: 434. See, for example, Rule 21.3(2)(d) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (discussed in Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 at [39], [41]). 435. Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 at [52] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ. 436. Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd (receivers & managers appointed) (in liq) (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899 per Austin J at [14](k). 437. IOOF Holdings Ltd v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 311 at [47](12). See also Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 at [2]. 438. ALRC 26, vol 1, para 862, n 52. 439. Christian v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 370; [2012] NSWCCA 34 at [29]; R v James (unreported, NSW CCA, 30 July 1998); Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044 at [15] per Hodgson CJ in Eq; R v Seller [2015] NSWCCA 76 at [172]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 119

[I]n my opinion, where a party is claiming to make out a case, and that party bears the onus of proof, and where that case could be given positive support by calling evidence of legal advice or lack of legal advice, the failure of that party to call that evidence can be taken into account in deciding whether that party has discharged the onus of proof which it bears.440

That proposition must be subject to the principle that an adverse inference should not be drawn from failure to adduce evidence that is privileged (and where the privilege has not been waived).441

Cth Act: 119 Litigation Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made; or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared; for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party.

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NSW Act: 119

Litigation

Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made, or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared, for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party.

440. Wayne Lawrence at [15]. 441. See Cooper v Hobbs [2013] NSWCA 70 at [58]–[63]; Ashby v Slipper (2014) 219 FCR 322; 312 ALR 551; [2014] FCAFC 15, Mansfield and Gilmour JJ at [144].

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Vic Act: 119 Litigation Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of— (a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made; or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared— for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party. ACT Act:

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119

Litigation

Evidence must not be presented if, on objection by a client, the court finds that presenting the evidence would result in disclosure of— (a) a confidential communication between the client and someone else, or between a lawyer acting for the client and someone else, that was made; or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared; for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party. NT Act: 119 Litigation Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made; or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared; for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party.

[EA.119.30] ALRC references ALRC 38, s 106, para 195; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 877–879.

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[EA.119.60] General comments This provision creates a privilege for, in general terms, confidential communications made, and confidential documents prepared, for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal services relating to litigation. This provision was discussed above in conjunction with s 118. To a significant extent, it parallels s 118. However, there are three important differences, relating to the (dominant) purpose for which the communication is made (or the document is prepared), the application of the privilege to third party communications, and the approach to documents generally. Other aspects of the provision, common to s 118, are discussed in the commentary on s 118.

[EA.119.90] Definitions The expression “Australian or overseas proceeding” is defined in the Dictionary to the Act as meaning “a proceeding (however described) in an Australian court or a foreign court”. The term “Australian court” is defined in the Dictionary: “Australian court” means: (a) the High Court; or (b) a court exercising federal jurisdiction; or (c) a court of a State or Territory; or (d) a judge, justice or arbitrator under an Australian law; or

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(e) a person or body authorised by an Australian law, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence; or (f) a person or body that, in exercising a function under an Australian law, is required to apply the laws of evidence.

It should be noted that the definition of an “Australian court” is broad in that it extends to tribunals that are not required to apply the rules of evidence but are authorised to receive evidence or may receive evidence with the consent of the parties (see para (e) of the definition and see also [EA.5.30]). The term “foreign court” is defined in the Dictionary to the Act in a similar way: “foreign court” means any court (including any person or body authorised to take or receive evidence, whether on behalf of a court or otherwise and whether or not the person or body is empowered to require the answering of questions or the production of documents) of a foreign country or a part of such a country.

[EA.119.120] “for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to [a] … proceeding … or an anticipated or pending proceeding … in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party” Where a communication is not made for the dominant purpose of providing “professional legal services” relating to legal proceedings, the privilege does not apply. Equally, where a document is not prepared for the dominant purpose of providing “professional legal services” relating to legal proceedings, the privilege 996

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442

does not apply. For example, there will be no privilege if a communication is with a lawyer acting in a non-legal capacity.443 “Professional legal services” would include legal advice and representation, but not accounting, executive or administrative activities.444 In 789TEN Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 131; [2005] NSWSC 123 Bergin J noted that that the term “professional legal services” was not defined in the Act but, after referring to the definition of “legal services” in the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), concluded at [44] that the provision of a legal opinion as to whether a bank’s directors’ estimate of a possible settlement figure for litigation was reasonable in all the circumstances, was the provision of “professional legal services”. Since providing a client with professional legal services includes representing the client in legal proceedings, it is likely that a document prepared for use in such legal proceedings by the client’s lawyer will be privileged.445 Thus, in New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258, White J held at [28]:

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A lawyer will provide professional legal services in relation to a witnesss statement of evidence where the lawyer is asked to advise on what the statement should contain and settle the form of the statement. The deployment of the final report by the plaintiffs lawyers through its service on the opposite party and its tender into evidence will also constitute the provision of professional legal services relating to the proceeding.

However, it has been held that a document prepared as an originating process of legal proceedings or pleadings in such proceedings (as distinct from a supporting affidavit) is not privileged because it was not made for the dominant purpose of providing legal services.446 A document prepared by an expert witness for use by him or her in giving his or her evidence in legal proceedings may not be privileged, “unless it was prepared for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services”.447 A witness statement or affidavit created for the purpose of serving it on an opposing party pursuant to court order or procedural requirement may not be prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal services but rather for the dominant purpose of informing the court and the opposing party of the facts which the party that served the statement or affidavit in those proceedings sought to establish.448 In some circumstances, it is important to recognise that the provision refers to a purpose of the client “being provided with professional legal services” rather than “providing” such services. It is not necessary for the privilege to apply that the 442. Dimkovski v Ken’s Painting & Decorating Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 50 at [14] per Dunford J. 443. Such as, eg, an accountant, a company director or a friend, where “legal advice” is not being provided (cf [EA.118.330]. 444. Compare Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 per Mason and Wilson JJ (at 61), Dawson J (at 96); Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500; [1985] HCA 60; Leahy v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1980) 11 ATR 145. 445. See ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393 at 554. 446. Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 40. 447. New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 per White J at [31] (emphasis in original). 448. Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 74 NSWLR 469; [2009] NSWSC 225, White J at [22]–[28]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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document be prepared for use in legal proceedings. It has been held that a funding agreement for anticipated litigation satisfies the requirements of the provision.449 Similarly, it has been held that communications to provide information to the funder of litigation so that it would continue to provide funding satisfy the requirement.450 Bergin J observed: In this case it is the confidential communications rather than the funding agreement that are under consideration. They are not anterior to the dominant purpose, they are inextricably linked to the nature of the professional legal services being provided to the client. Their dominant purpose was to ensure the overall capacity of the plaintiff to have funding and to ensure that such funding would be forthcoming for the continued funding of the litigation. That seems to me to fall within the description of a dominant purpose of the client “being provided” with professional legal services. This description is to be contrasted with the expression “providing professional legal services”. The concept of the client “being provided with” something is of broader import and seems to me to encompass the purpose under consideration here.

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The relevant document must have been prepared for the dominant purpose “of the client” being provided with professional legal services relating to relevant proceedings. The words “of the client” had not been included in the proposal advanced by the ALRC.451 In Westpac Banking Corp v 789TEN Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 519; [2005] NSWCA 321 the NSW Court of Appeal accepted that lawyers for a bank prepared documents and sent them to the bank’s auditors for the dominant purpose of providing a “professional legal service relating to the proceedings” but the critical issue was whether the documents were prepared for the dominant purpose of the client bank, as distinct from its auditors, being provided with the relevant confidential information (Tobias JA at [32]). The court held that they were not (at [52]–[60]). The authorities indicate that proceedings are “anticipated or pending” where they are actually contemplated – a mere apprehension of possible litigation is not sufficient.452 In Mitsubishi Electric Australia Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (Vic) (2002) 4 VR 332; [2002] VSCA 59 at [19], Batt JA (with whom Callaway and Charles JJA agreed) distilled the test (under the comparable common law) as being: “there must be a real prospect of litigation, as distinct from a mere possibility, but it does not have to be more likely than not”. This formulation was adopted in respect of this provision by the NSW Court of Appeal in New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279, Giles JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing) at [67]. Giles JA rejected an argument that “there did not have to be anticipation at the time the statements were obtained”, stating at [69]: The purpose for which a document was prepared must be as determined at the time of its preparation, and the words “or might have been” are for anticipated proceedings which did not in fact come about. 449. Re Global Medical Imaging Management Ltd (In Liq) [2001] NSWSC 476 at [7] per Santow J (followed in Apple v Wily [2002] NSWSC 855). 450. Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 per Bergin J at [59]. 451. See discussion in Westpac Banking Corp v 789TEN Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 519; [2005] NSWCA 321 per Tobias JA at [47]–[51]. 452. See Warner v Women’s Hospital [1954] VLR 410; Lazenby v Zammit [1987] Tas R 54. For a recent discussion of the principles, see ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393 at 558–562; Gorman v Cook [2002] NSWSC 1149 at [11].

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s 119

Part 3.10 - Privileges

[EA.119.180]

As regards the determination of the purpose for which the communication was made or the document prepared, see [EA.118.360]. The term “dominant purpose” is discussed above at [EA.118.390]. The terms “client” and “party” are defined, inclusively, in s 117.

[EA.119.150] Confidential communication (s 119(a)) The term “confidential communication” is defined in s 117 (see [EA.117.120]). Confidential communications between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, if made for the dominant purpose referred to in s 119, are privileged. This would include confidential communications between the client and a lawyer or confidential communications made between two or more lawyers acting for the client (as under s 118).453 In addition, it would include confidential communications between the client and a third person and confidential communications between a lawyer acting for the client and a third person. The ALRC considered that communications with third parties should be protected under the primary rationale for the privilege (see [EA.118.60]) where they form part of adversarial litigation, so that confidentiality would further “the proper functioning of our legal system” by assisting the functioning of the adversary system. As Williams has written: [T]he privilege was but a logical consequence of the principal characteristics of the system – party responsibility for the collection of evidence and party autonomy in presenting the evidence that would best advance the party’s case or destroy that of the adversary.454

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Extension of the privilege to third party communications made for this purpose will encourage the production of information for litigation.

[EA.119.180]

The contents of a confidential document (s 119(b))

The term “confidential document” is defined in s 117 (see [EA.117.120]). The contents of a confidential document that was prepared for the dominant purpose referred to in s 119 is privileged. As is stated expressly in s 119(b), it does not matter whether the document was delivered or not. It need not be communicated to any other person. Further, as is implicit, it does not matter who prepared the document, whether the client, a lawyer acting for the client or another person. Thus, the document need not be prepared by the client or a lawyer. What matters is that the document was “confidential” and prepared for the specified dominant purpose. Thus, in contrast with the common law, privilege may attach to an experts documents, prepared for the purpose of expressing an expert opinion in litigation, even if they were not communicated to the client or the lawyer of the client.455 453. However, a contrary view of this provision is that the term “another person” does not include lawyers or clients: see McNicol, “Client Legal Privilege and Legal Professional Privilege: Considered, Compared and Contrasted” (1999) 18 Australian Bar Review 189 at 197. 454. Williams, “Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada” (1980) 58 Canadian Bar Review 1 at 47. The ALRC cited this at ALRC 26, vol 1, para 877. 455. Compare New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 per White J at [18]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.119.180]

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

s 120

Taking the example of draft reports, and notes used in preparing a report, by an expert, if they were prepared for the dominant purpose of a draft report being submitted for advice or comment by the clients lawyers, they would be privileged.456 On the other hand, as has been observed, if “they were brought into existence for the dominant purpose of the expert forming his or her opinions to be expressed in the final report, then it could be arguable that they were not made for the dominant purpose of the plaintiffs being provided with professional legal services relating to the proceedings”457 (see [EA.119.120]). Privilege would apply to that part of an otherwise non-privileged document that contained a copy of a privileged document, since adducing the former document “would result in disclosure” of the contents of the privileged document – although it may be possible to edit the former document to avoid such disclosure.458 It has been held459 in respect of s 118 that a document may cease to be confidential where it has subsequently been disclosed, even inadvertently, and such ruling would have implications for this provision. However, the ruling appears to be wrong given the definition of “confidential document” which requires focus on the situation at the time the document was prepared: see [EA.118.240]. The potential consequences of inadvertent disclosure are considered at [EA.122.210].

Cth Act:

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120 Unrepresented parties (1) Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication between the party and another person; or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared, either by or at the direction or request of, the party; for the dominant purpose of preparing for or conducting the proceeding. (2) [Repealed] [Subs (2) rep Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 12] [S 120 am Act 34 of 1997]

456. New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 per White J at [30], [34]; Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 7) [2013] VSC 553 at [15]. 457. White J at [30]. 458. Harden Shire Council v Curtis [2009] NSWCA 179 at [18]–[24]. 459. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 697 at [17] per Santow J.

1000

Uniform Evidence Law

s 120

Part 3.10 - Privileges

NSW Act: 120 Unrepresented parties (1) Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication between the party and another person, or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared, either by or at the direction or request of, the party, for the dominant purpose of preparing for or conducting the proceeding. (2) [Repealed] [Subs (2) rep Act 55 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1.7[8]] [S 120 am Act 55 of 1997]

Vic Act:

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120

Unrepresented parties

(1) Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of— (a) a confidential communication between the party and another person; or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared, either by or at the direction or request of, the party— for the dominant purpose of preparing for or conducting the proceeding. ACT Act: 120

Unrepresented parties

Evidence must not be presented if, on objection by a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, the court finds that presenting the evidence would result in disclosure of— (a) a confidential communication between the party and someone else; or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared by or at the direction or request of the party; for the dominant purpose of preparing for or conducting the proceeding. NT Act: 120 Unrepresented parties Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication between the party and another person; or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.120.30]

s 120

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

(b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared, either by or at the direction or request of, the party; for the dominant purpose of preparing for or conducting the proceeding. Note for section 120: The Commonwealth Act, NSW Act and Victorian Act formerly contained a subsection (2) of this section. The subsection has been repealed.

[EA.120.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 106, para 195; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 877, 883.

[EA.120.60]

General comments

The ALRC explained the rationale of the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 883): The privileges proposed for communications with third parties in anticipation of litigation and for notes and memoranda should apply in fairness to the litigant in person in an adversary system. The need for such a proposal is increased if the rule in Walker v Walker is abolished.

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The ALRC also noted (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 887): Documents relating solely to Party’s Own Case. The privilege protecting such documents is rarely, if ever, relied upon. It has been largely superseded by legal professional privilege. It is, however, the only protection available to the litigant in person and helps to reduce the disadvantage under which he operates in the trial system. It has been recommended that the third party communication privilege be available to the unrepresented litigant. If this is done, it is believed that the above privilege can be abolished.

This provision is very similar in content to s 119 (which, in turn, is similar to s 118). Both these provisions are discussed above and the commentary in respect of both is relevant to s 120. The primary difference between ss 120 and 119 is that the “dominant purpose” required under s 120 is “preparing for or conducting the proceeding” in which the evidence is sought to be adduced.

[EA.120.90]

Definitions

See the definitions of “party”, “lawyer”, “confidential communication” and “confidential document” in s 117.

Cth Act: 121

Loss of client legal privilege: generally

(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence relevant to a question concerning the intentions, or competence in law, of a client or party who has died. (2) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence if, were the evidence not adduced, the court would be prevented, or it could reasonably be expected that the court would be prevented, from enforcing an order of an Australian court. 1002

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s 121

Part 3.10 - Privileges

(3) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or document that affects a right of a person. NSW Act: 121

Loss of client legal privilege: generally

(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence relevant to a question concerning the intentions, or competence in law, of a client or party who has died. (2) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence if, were the evidence not adduced, the court would be prevented, or it could reasonably be expected that the court would be prevented, from enforcing an order of an Australian court. (3) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or document that affects a right of a person. Vic Act: 121 Loss of client legal privilege—generally

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(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence relevant to a question concerning the intentions, or competence in law, of a client or party who has died. (2) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence if, were the evidence not adduced, the court would be prevented, or it could reasonably be expected that the court would be prevented, from enforcing an order of an Australian court. (3) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or document that affects a right of a person. ACT Act: 121 Loss of client legal privilege—generally (1) This division does not prevent the presenting of evidence relevant to a question about the intentions, or competence in law, of a client or party who has died. (2) This division does not prevent the presenting of evidence if, were the evidence not presented, the court would be prevented, or it could reasonably be expected that the court would be prevented, from enforcing an order of an Australian court. (3) This division does not prevent the presenting of evidence of a communication or document that affects a right of a person.

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[EA.121.30]

s 121

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

NT Act: 121 Loss of client legal privilege — generally (1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence relevant to a question concerning the intentions, or competence in law, of a client or party who has died. (2) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence if, were the evidence not adduced, the court would be prevented, or it could reasonably be expected that the court would be prevented, from enforcing an order of an Australian court. (3) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or document that affects a right of a person.

[EA.121.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 107, paras 195, 196; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 885.

[EA.121.60]

General comments

The result of this provision is that the various privileges created under ss 118–120 are lost in three different situations.

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[EA.121.90]

Loss of privilege: s 121(1)

In its Interim Report, the ALRC explained the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 884): [T]he privilege will not apply to communications relevant to an issue between parties claiming through the same deceased client – for example, setting aside or resisting a grant of probate on grounds of testamentary incapacity or undue influence.

In its Final Report, the ALRC observed (ALRC 38, para 196): The interim proposal lifted the protection of privilege in respect of evidence of the intentions or competence of a client or party who has died. This loss of protection would only operate where an issue arises of, for example, testamentary capacity or the intentions of the deceased in a testator’s family maintenance case. It does not overrule rules of substantive law, such as those relating to the construction of wills and other instruments.

In d’Apice v Gutkovich – Estate of Abraham (No 1) [2010] NSWSC 1336 White J held at [17] that this provision does not abrogate a claim for privilege “that an executor or putative executor has in his or her own right” simply because the privileged document or communication is relevant to the intentions or competence of the deceased. White J stated at [20]: It seems to me that the rational construction of the provision and one which fits its context is that it abrogates a claim for privilege which the deceased person as a client or party could have maintained but for his or her death if the privileged documents or communications are relevant to the deceased’s intentions or competence.

Thus, White J held that this provision only abrogates a privilege that the deceased client or party could have maintained. White J explained (at [19]–[20]) this interpretation of the provision on the basis that it would not be “rational” to 1004

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s 121

Part 3.10 - Privileges

[EA.121.150]

interpret the provision as abrogating privilege simply on the basis that “the deceased had at some point retained a lawyer so as to fall within the definition of ‘client’ in s 117”, whereas, “if the suit concerned the testamentary capacity of a testator who had not retained a lawyer, the usual rules as to the availability of privilege would apply”. Of course, while such an analysis is understandable, the difficulty with this interpretation is that it effectively adds words to the provision in order to limit the effect of the broad definition of “client” in s 117. However, it has been followed.460

[EA.121.120] Loss of privilege: s 121(2) This provision results in the loss of client legal privilege where, if the evidence in question were not adduced, it could reasonably be expected that the court would be prevented from enforcing an order of an Australian court.461 An example is where the evidence related to the location of a child taken in breach of a court order – allowing the privilege in these circumstances would impede the enforcement of the order.462

[EA.121.150] Loss of privilege: s 121(3)

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This provision is in identical terms to the exception from the “without prejudice” privilege contained in s 131(2)(i) (see [EA.131.540]). In its Final Report, the ALRC defended the proposal on which this provision is based (ALRC 38, para 196): Commentators questioned the interim proposal removing the protection of privilege for a communication that “affects a right of a person …”. [It] must be retained to cover situations where a communication between the client and the lawyer has had the result of creating, limiting or terminating a person’s rights [eg secret trusts: Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387].

Hodgson CJ in Eq in the NSW Supreme Court has observed: In my opinion, [the words “affects a right of a person”] cannot mean a communication or document that is relevant to a right of a person because that would virtually eliminate the legal professional privilege as a ground for non-admission of evidence. In my opinion, that must mean a communication or document that affects in some fairly direct way what are the actual rights and perhaps also duties of a person.463

This analysis was applied in respect of the comparable exception to settlement negotiations privilege in s 131(2)(i) by Goldberg J in Asciak v Australian Secured 460. Gillett v Nelson [2014] NSWSC 115 at [19]–[20]. 461. In the matter of Strikers Management Pty Ltd; Australian Securities Commission v Peter Dimitri (unreported, FCA, Burchett J, 18 November 1997) the following comments were made about this provision: “The section is very curiously drafted … The difficulty is that the subsection is couched in terms of the effect upon proceedings of the rejection of the evidence, rather than in terms of the nature of that evidence. Does this mean that the same evidence would be admissible or not admissible, depending on whether without it the enforcement proceeding would actually fail or succeed? If so, when is the ruling on admissibility to be given?” Burchett J did not attempt to resolve these questions. 462. State Central Authority v Blyth [2010] FamCA 90, Murphy J at [35]. Under the common law, see R v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141; [1980] HCA 26. In that judgment, some members of the High Court suggested a broader “public interest” exception than that recognised by this provision. 463. Talbot v NRMA Ltd [2000] NSWSC 602 at [3]. This analysis was agreed with by Besanko J of the Federal Court in Dunstan v Orr (2008) 217 FCR 559; 171 IR 135; [2008] FCA 31 at [141]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.121.180]

s 121

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

& Managed Mortgages Pty Ltd (2008) 66 ACSR 298; [2008] FCA 753 at [34]. The provision applies to communications that affect rights directly, and not merely by way of being evidentiary as to rights created or affected otherwise.464 Arguably465 other examples of a communication or document affecting a right of a person are: defamatory utterances; acts of bankruptcy; threats (constituting a tort or crime); misleading or deceptive conduct; the exercise of an option; a contractual offer or; conduct amounting to an election. However, this provision should be interpreted narrowly. In the ALRC’s Interim Report, the provision applied to a communication that “affects a right of a person or a communication that gives rise to right of action by a person”. The ALRC deleted the latter words in its Final Report, observing that “the second aspect – a communication giving rise to a right of action by a person – is better dealt with under the proposed fraud, crime exception”.466Of course, where the communication is between the client and lawyer (rather than any third party) it will rarely be the case that the communication itself (or an associated document) will actually affect the rights of any person. One example where it might is a communication between the client and lawyer in which the client authorises the lawyer to do something, such as enter into a settlement.467

[EA.121.180] Related communications and documents In accordance with s 126, if the application of s 121 means that evidence of a communication or the contents of a document lose privilege, evidence of another communication or document will also cease to be privileged if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document.

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[EA.121.210] Burden and standard of proof The “burden of proof” is on the party seeking to persuade the court that the privilege has been lost. In accordance with s 142(1), the court “is to find that the facts necessary for deciding” the factual questions under s 121 have been proved “if it is satisfied that they have been proved on the balance of probabilities”.

[EA.121.240] Procedure General procedure relating to the determination of a question whether evidence should be admitted is dealt with in s 189. In accordance with s 133, if a question arises in relation to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question.

464. See Hodgson JA in R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 at [41]. 465. See Green v AMP Life Ltd [2005] NSWSC 95 per Campbell J at [26]; KC v Shiley Inc (unreported, FCA, Tamberlin J, 11 July 1997). 466. ALRC 38, para 196 (second last dot point). That exception is dealt with in s 125. 467. See Hodgson JA in R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 at [42].

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Uniform Evidence Law

s 122

Part 3.10 - Privileges

Cth Act: 122 Loss of client legal privilege: consent and related matters (1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence given with the consent of the client or party concerned. (2) Subject to subsection (5), this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence if the client or party concerned has acted in a way that is inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence because it would result in a disclosure of a kind referred to in section 118, 119 or 120. (3) Without limiting subsection (2), a client or party is taken to have so acted if: (a) the client or party knowingly and voluntarily disclosed the substance of the evidence to another person; or (b) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party.

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(4) The reference in paragraph (3)(a) to a knowing and voluntary disclosure does not include a reference to a disclosure by a person who was, at the time of the disclosure, an employee or agent of the client or party or of a lawyer of the client or party unless the employee or agent was authorised by the client, party or lawyer to make the disclosure. (5) A client or party is not taken to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence merely because: (a) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed: (i) in the course of making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document; or (ii) as a result of duress or deception; or (iii) under compulsion of law; or (iv) if the client or party is a body established by, or a person holding an office under, an Australian law—to the Minister, or the Minister of the Commonwealth, the State or Territory, administering the law, or part of the law, under which the body is established or the office is held; or (b) of a disclosure by a client to another person if the disclosure concerns a matter in relation to which the same lawyer is providing, or is to provide, professional legal services to both the client and the other person; or (c) of a disclosure to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the disclosure, a common interest relating to the proceeding or an anticipated or pending proceeding in an Australian court or a foreign court. (6) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a document that a witness has used to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 122

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

opinion or has used as mentioned in section 32 (Attempts to revive memory in court) or 33 (Evidence given by police officers). [S 122 subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 62]

NSW Act: 122

Loss of client legal privilege: consent and related matters

(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence given with the consent of the client or party concerned. (2) Subject to subsection (5), this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence if the client or party concerned has acted in a way that is inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence because it would result in a disclosure of a kind referred to in section 118, 119 or 120. (3) Without limiting subsection (2), a client or party is taken to have so acted if: (a) the client or party knowingly and voluntarily disclosed the substance of the evidence to another person, or (b) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party.

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(4) The reference in subsection (3)(a) to a knowing and voluntary disclosure does not include a reference to a disclosure by a person who was, at the time of the disclosure, an employee or agent of the client or party, or of a lawyer of the client or party, unless the employee or agent was authorised by the client, party or lawyer to make the disclosure. (5) A client or party is not taken to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence merely because: (a) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed: (i) in the course of making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document, or (ii) as a result of duress or deception, or (iii) under compulsion of law, or (iv) if the client or party is a body established by, or a person holding an office under, an Australian law—to the Minister, or the Minister of the Commonwealth, the State or Territory, administering the law, or part of the law, under which the body is established or the office is held, or (b) of a disclosure by a client to another person if the disclosure concerns a matter in relation to which the same lawyer is providing, or is to provide, professional legal services to both the client and the other person, or (c) of a disclosure to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the disclosure, a common interest relating to the proceeding or an anticipated or pending proceeding in an Australian court or a foreign court. (6) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a document that a witness has used to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or 1008

Uniform Evidence Law

s 122

Part 3.10 - Privileges

opinion or has used as mentioned in section 32 (Attempts to revive memory in court) or 33 (Evidence given by police officers). [S 122 subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[57]]

Vic Act: 122

Loss of client legal privilege—consent and related matters

(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence given with the consent of the client or party concerned. (2) Subject to subsection (5), this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence if the client or party concerned has acted in a way that is inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence because it would result in a disclosure of a kind referred to in section 118, 119 or 120. (3) Without limiting subsection (2), a client or party is taken to have so acted if— (a) the client or party knowingly and voluntarily disclosed the substance of the evidence to another person; or (b) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party.

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(4) The reference in subsection (3)(a) to a knowing and voluntary disclosure does not include a reference to a disclosure by a person who was, at the time of the disclosure, an employee or agent of the client or party or of a lawyer of the client or party unless the employee or agent was authorised by the client, party or lawyer to make the disclosure. (5) A client or party is not taken to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence merely because— (a) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed— (i) in the course of making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document; or (ii) as a result of duress or deception; or (iii) under compulsion of law; or (iv) if the client or party is a body established by, or a person holding an office under, an Australian law—to the Minister, or the Minister of the Commonwealth, the State or Territory, administering the law, or part of the law, under which the body is established or the office is held; or (b) of a disclosure by a client to another person if the disclosure concerns a matter in relation to which the same lawyer is providing, or is to provide, professional legal services to both the client and the other person; or (c) of a disclosure to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the disclosure, a common interest relating to the proceeding or an anticipated or pending proceeding in an Australian court or a foreign court. (6) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a document that a witness has used to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 122

opinion or has used as mentioned in section 32 (Attempts to revive memory in court) or 33 (Evidence given by police officers). ACT Act: 122

Loss of client legal privilege—consent and related matters

(1) This division does not prevent the presenting of evidence given with the consent of the client or party. (2) Subject to subsection (5), this division does not prevent the presenting of evidence if the client or party has acted in a way that is inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the presenting of the evidence because it would result in a disclosure mentioned in section 118 (Legal advice), section 119 (Litigation) or section 120 (Unrepresented parties). (3) Without limiting subsection (2), the client or party is taken to have acted in the way mentioned in subsection (2) if— (a) the client or party knowingly and voluntarily disclosed the substance of the evidence to someone else; or (b) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party.

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(4) The reference in subsection (3)(a) to a knowing and voluntary disclosure does not include a reference to a disclosure by a person who was, at the time of the disclosure, an employee or agent of the client or party, or of a lawyer of the client or party, unless the employee or agent was authorised by the client, party or lawyer to make the disclosure. (5) A client or party is not taken to have acted in a way inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the presenting of the evidence only because— (a) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed— (i) in the course of making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document; or (ii) as a result of duress or deception; or (iii) under compulsion of law; or (iv) if the client or party is a body established by, or a person holding an office under, an Australian law—to the Minister, or the Minister of the Commonwealth, the State or Territory, administering the law, or part of the law, under which the body is established or the office is held; or (b) of a disclosure by a client to someone else if the disclosure is about a matter in relation to which the same lawyer is providing, or is to provide, professional legal services to both the client and the other person; or (c) of a disclosure to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the disclosure, a common interest relating to the proceeding or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding. (6) This division does not prevent the presenting of evidence of a document that a witness has used— (a) to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or opinion; or 1010

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(b) in a way mentioned in section 32 (Attempts to revive memory in court) or section 33 (Evidence given by police officers). NT Act: 122

Loss of client legal privilege — consent and related matters

(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence given with the consent of the client or party concerned. (2) Subject to subsection (5), this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence if the client or party concerned has acted in a way that is inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence because it would result in a disclosure of a kind referred to in section 118, 119 or 120. (3) Without limiting subsection (2), a client or party is taken to have so acted if: (a) the client or party knowingly and voluntarily disclosed the substance of the evidence to another person; or (b) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party.

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(4) The reference in subsection (3)(a) to a knowing and voluntary disclosure does not include a reference to a disclosure by a person who was, at the time of the disclosure, an employee or agent of the client or party or of a lawyer of the client or party unless the employee or agent was authorised by the client, party or lawyer to make the disclosure. (5) A client or party is not taken to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence merely because: (a) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed: (i) in the course of making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document; or (ii) as a result of duress or deception; or (iii) under compulsion of law; or (iv) if the client or party is a body established by, or a person holding an office under, an Australian law — to the Minister, or the Minister of the Commonwealth, the State or Territory, administering the law, or part of the law, under which the body is established or the office is held; or (b) of a disclosure by a client to another person if the disclosure concerns a matter in relation to which the same lawyer is providing, or is to provide, professional legal services to both the client and the other person; or (c) of a disclosure to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the disclosure, a common interest relating to the proceeding or an anticipated or pending proceeding in an Australian court or a foreign court. (6) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a document that a witness has used to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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opinion or has used as mentioned in section 32 (Attempts to revive memory in court) or 33 (Evidence given by police officers).

[EA.122.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 102, paras 14.123–14.147; ALRC 38, s 107, para 195; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 885.

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[EA.122.60]

General comments

In general terms, this provision results in loss of one or other of the privileges created by ss 118–120 where the client (under ss 118–119)468 or party (under s 120) waives the privilege, either expressly or impliedly. Prior to amendments following on ALRC 102, the focus of the provision was on the intention of the holder of the privilege and waiver consequent on disclosure of privileged material. Further, the provision was drafted in a way that attempted to avoid the uncertainty of the common law approach, which focused on considerations of “fairness”. However, in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 168 ALR 86; [1999] HCA 66 the High Court changed the focus of the common law. The test became whether the conduct of the client was, bearing in mind “considerations of fairness”, “inconsistent” with maintenance of the confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client which the privilege is designed to protect.469 In ALRC 102, it was accepted that s 122 was “inflexible because it does not take into account factual situations where there may be other conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege beyond a knowing and voluntary disclosure”. It was proposed (Recommendation 14–5) that “s 122(2) of the uniform Evidence Acts should be amended to provide that evidence may be adduced where a client or party has acted in a manner inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege”. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Commonwealth amending Act states: This amendment ensures that new s 122 is concerned with the behaviour of the holder of the privilege, as opposed to the intention of the holder of the privilege, as has been the case under the current s 122.470 468. See Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1070 at [26]; Edwards v Vic Land Rehabilitation [2012] VSC 188 at [32]. 469. Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 168 ALR 86; [1999] HCA 66 at [28] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ. Gleeson CJ and Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ stated at [29]: “What brings about the waiver is the inconsistency, which the courts, where necessary informed by considerations of fairness, perceive, between the conduct of the client and maintenance of the confidentiality; not some overriding principle of fairness operating at large”. At another point in the judgment ([35]), the test was expressed in terms of inconsistency between the conduct of the client and “the purpose of the privilege” in protecting the confidentiality of legal advice. See Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83; [1995] HCA 39. For further analysis, see DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499; [2003] FCA 384; Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer of Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; 57 ATR 52; [2004] FCAFC 237; SQMB v MIMIA (2004) 205 ALR 392; [2004] FCA 241 at [17]; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341; 229 ALR 304; [2006] FCAFC 86. 470. Explanatory Memorandum, at para 172–3. Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Victorian Act.

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The original provisions in respect of disclosure are substantially retained as circumstances in which the client or party “is taken to have” acted in a way that is inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege. In addition, s 122(1) is retained, although it now appears otiose and a source of potential confusion.

[EA.122.90]

Loss of privilege: consent (s 122(1))

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This provision results in loss of one or other of the privileges created by ss 118 to 120 where the client (under ss 118–119) or party (under s 120) consents to the evidence in question being adduced. The term “client” is defined in s 117(1). That includes an “agent” of the client (s 117(1)(b)), but agency requires authority from the client. It must be remembered that the privilege is that of the client. Neither a solicitor nor an intermediary (who is the agent of either the client or the solicitor) can without the client’s authority either consent to the material being adduced or abandon that obligation that goes with a solicitor’s retainer, to maintain the privilege.471 Prior to the amendments of s 122 following on ALRC 102, the weight of authority favoured a broad approach to this provision, extending it to implied or imputed consent.472 As a result, common law principles of imputed waiver, turning on considerations of “fairness” and “inconsistency”, were imported into the provision. With the changes to s 122 after ALRC 102, and particularly the adoption of the current common law test in s 122(2), it will be interesting to see how the courts approach s 122(1). One view would be that it is now essentially otiose – since the common law principles informing the meaning of consent in s 122(1) have now been explicitly adopted in s 122(2), the courts will have no reason to consider or apply s 122(1). However, the fact remains that the concept of consent is amorphous. Although the current approach of the courts to consent in s 122(1) has now been expressly adopted as a basis for waiver in s 122(2), this does not alter the fact that the courts may move, in time, to a different approach to consent. The current emphasis on “inconsistency” may change. Retention of s 122(1) means that common law developments in respect of waiver of privilege will continue to impact on the application of s 122. Only for the moment can it be said that s 122(1) is unlikely to have any practical significance.

[EA.122.120] Loss of privilege: “acted in a way that is inconsistent with” maintenance of the privilege (s 122(2)) As noted in [EA.122.60], this provision was introduced following on ALRC 102 in order to adopt the common law principles relating to waiver established by the High Court in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 168 ALR 86; [1999] HCA 66. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ stated at [29]: 471. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [29] per Santow J. However, in a different context (s 122(2)), Austin J in Sovereign v Bevillesta [2000] NSWSC 521 at [24] observed that authority includes “ostensible authority”. 472. Telstra Corp Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152 at 168; Perpetual Trustees (WA) Ltd v Equuscorp Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 925; Chen v City Convenience Leasing Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 297; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341; 229 ALR 304; [2006] FCAFC 86 at [68]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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What brings about the waiver is the inconsistency, which the courts, where necessary informed by the consideration of fairness, perceive, between the conduct of the client and the maintenance of confidentiality; not some overriding principle of fairness operating at large.

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The concept of “inconsistency” does appear to offer greater certainty and predictability than a test formulated in terms of “some overriding principle of fairness operating at large”.473 However, the critical question is: inconsistency with what? The provision is formulated in terms of “inconsistent with the client or party objecting”. Thus, the inconsistency is between some prior conduct of the client or party and the conduct of the client or party in objecting to disclosure of material prima facie protected by client legal privilege. Such an objection to disclosure involves a reliance on the protections conferred by s 118, s 119 or s 120 – a claim that the client or party is legally entitled to protect the confidentiality of a communication or document that was made or prepared for a legal purpose. How would prior conduct of the client or party be inconsistent with such a claim? Presumably, it would involve conduct in which the client or party, presented with an opportunity to assert such a claim, failed to do so or, at least, chose not to do so. It may be noted that the formulation in this provision is not identical with the way that the common law principle was formulated by the High Court in Mann v Carnell. There the inconsistency was “between the conduct of the client and the maintenance of confidentiality”. This suggests inconsistency not with a claim of legal entitlement to protect confidentiality but with a claim of confidentiality in general. In turn, this suggests that prior conduct of the client inconsistent with such a claim would involve conduct in which the client, presented with an opportunity to keep the material confidential, failed to do so or, at least, chose not to do so. On this analysis, the opportunity is not to claim a legal entitlement to protect confidentiality but, more broadly, to keep the material confidential.474 The broad way in which the High Court formulated the principle in Mann v Carnell might suggest, for example, that if the client chooses to disclose a privileged document to a person completely unconnected with the legal issue that was the dominant purpose for the creation of the document, it might reasonably be said that the holder of the privilege has acted in a way that is inconsistent with maintenance of the confidentiality of the privileged document. That would be the case even if the document is disclosed to that third party on a confidential basis (that is, it is not to be further disclosed). However, the actual decision in Mann v Carnell casts doubt on that analysis. The documents in question were confidential communications between legal advisers and the ACT Government in relation to certain litigation between the ACT and Dr Mann, which ultimately settled. The privilege attaching to those documents arose from the purpose of providing legal advice in relation to that litigation. The act relied upon by the appellant as conduct inconsistent with maintenance of that privilege was that of the Chief Minister of the ACT providing, on a confidential basis, a member of the ACT 473. See comments of Allsop P (with whom Hodgson JA agreed) in Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 at [4]. 474. In New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd (2009) 180 FCR 543; [2009] FCAFC 160 the Full Court of the Federal Court emphasised the imposition of a requirement of confidentiality, rejecting any additional requirement of the imposition of some kind of use restraint (at [42]–[59]).

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Legislative Assembly (Mr Moore) with an explanation for the settlement and enclosing copies of the privileged documents. It was contended that this was inconsistent with maintenance of the privilege because the disclosure did nothing to facilitate the litigation, which had concluded. It served only a (political) purpose of the Chief Minister. Even if the publication was “in confidence”, that could not justify maintaining the privilege in such circumstances. However, the High Court rejected this argument. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ stated at [34]–[35]:

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If Mr Moore had been given copies of the legal report and advice given to the Territory in relation to the proceedings brought by the appellant upon the basis that he was at liberty to show them to the appellant, (even if to nobody else), that would have waived the privilege, because it would have been inconsistent with the confidentiality protected by the privilege. It is not difficult to imagine other circumstances in which the basis on which the communications were made available to Mr Moore, even though limited, would have been inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege and thus would have resulted in waiver. Disclosure by a client of confidential legal advice received by the client, which may be for the purpose of explaining or justifying the client’s actions, or for some other purpose, will waive privilege if such disclosure is inconsistent with the confidentiality which the privilege serves to protect. Depending upon the circumstances of the case, considerations of fairness may be relevant to a determination of whether there is such inconsistency. … The purpose of the privilege being to protect the Territory from subsequent disclosure of the legal advice it received concerning the litigation instituted by the appellant, there was nothing inconsistent with that purpose in the Chief Minister conveying the terms of that advice, on a confidential basis, to a member of the Legislative Assembly who wished to consider the reasonableness of the conduct of the Territory in relation to the litigation.

It has to be said that this analysis is difficult to follow. It is accepted that the mere fact that the legal advice was disclosed on a confidential basis to Mr Moore did not mean there was no inconsistency. It is accepted that disclosure by a client “for the purpose of explaining or justifying the client’s actions” will waive privilege, but only if “such disclosure is inconsistent with the confidentiality which the privilege serves to protect”. Considerations of fairness are said to be relevant, but it is not clear how.475 At the end of the day, there is simply the assertion that the action of the Chief Minister was not inconsistent with “the purpose of the privilege”. In any event, the issue is now somewhat academic. Notwithstanding the differences in wording between the formulation in Mann v Carnell and the language of s 122(2), the High Court stated emphatically in Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46 that the principles recognised in Mann v Carnell, “articulated in relation to waiver at common law, 475. In Cargill Australia Ltd v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 99, Macaulay J stated at [50]: “From Mann v Carnell and subsequent authorities, it seems to me that the interaction between inconsistency and fairness in determining whether privilege has been waived may be viewed this way: Although it is inconsistency that effects the waiver, considerations of fairness may alert the Court to the fact of inconsistency or assist it to recognise or detect an inconsistency. Inconsistency and unfairness are not co-extensive: there may be unfairness without inconsistency, or inconsistency without unfairness. Care should be taken that any consideration of forensic unfairness as a factor that may ‘inform’ a perception of inconsistency does not obscure (or replace) the test of inconsistency.” © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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apply with equal force in relation to the statutory question posed by” this provision (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ at [32]). However, it should be noted that the Victorian Court of Appeal observed in Viterra Malt Pty Ltd v Cargill Australia Ltd [2018] VSCA 118 at [43] that, “notwithstanding that the High Court has made it clear that the common law and s 122(2) are closely related, the question to be asked is the statutory test posed by s 122(2), namely whether the respondents … have ‘acted in a way that is inconsistent with … objecting’ to the production of the privileged documents sought”. The judgment of the High Court in Mann v Carnell has been considered, and applied, in a large number of cases.476 For example, in Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2008) 82 ALJR 1288; 249 ALR 1; [2008] HCA 37, the High Court applied the principles in Mann v Carnell in a case where the Victorian Government had obtained confidential legal advice regarding a petition for mercy and the Attorney-General then issued a press release which stated, in part, that the “advice recommends on every ground that the petition should be denied”. Notwithstanding the fact that this might be regarded as voluntary disclosure of “the substance of the evidence” (cf s 122(2); [EA.122.270]), all members of the High Court concluded that there was no inconsistency between disclosing the fact of, and the conclusions of, the advice for the purpose of informing the public that the Government’s recommendation was based on independent legal advice, and wishing to maintain the confidentiality of the advice itself. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Kiefel JJ observed at [49] that “[w]hether, in a given context, a limited disclosure of the existence, and the effect, of legal advice is inconsistent with maintaining confidentiality in the terms of advice will depend upon the circumstances of the case. … questions of waiver are matters of fact and degree”. They concluded (at [48]) that there was no inconsistency or unfairness in “seeking to give the fullest information as to the process that had been followed, no doubt in order to deflect any criticism, while at the same time following the long-standing practice of not giving the reasons for the decision”. Kirby J also accepted (at [93]) that it was “a question of fact and degree” and also concluded (at [97]) there was no waiver given that “the press release revealed very little about the actual content of the joint advice” and “the purpose of issuing the press release was not, as such, to secure some advantage for the State in legal proceedings affecting the appellant”.477 476. See Cross on Evidence at [25010]. 477. It has been suggested that the reasons of the members of the High Court in Osland “reveal a reluctance to impute waiver where a disclosure has been made for the purpose of demonstrating that public officers have acted responsibly in accordance with legal advice”: D Moujali, “The return of fairness in determining implied waiver of legal professional privilege: Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice” Bar News, Summer 2008/09 13 at 15. It is also suggested that a different result is likely “where a disclosure is made in the expectation of gaining some commercial benefit; or where, in the context of parties who are in dispute, the disclosure is made to secure some strategic or forensic advantage in legal proceedings”. An example of a case where partial disclosure was regarded as waiving the privilege is Zentai v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2010] FCA 252 where McKerracher J considered that Osland could be distinguished on the basis that “almost all” the legal advice had been disclosed with only “small but important parts of the reasoning” withheld (at [137]) and the disclosure was “essentially at a private level” rather than the subject of a press release intended to demonstrate that there had been responsible advice before the decision-maker (at [140]).

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[EA.122.150]

In Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46, the High Court at [30] observed that waiver may be express or implied and where it is imputed by law, privilege is lost even though that consequence was not intended by the party losing the privilege.478 The question is whether “the conduct and position of the person who is said to have waived” was such that “he has ‘approbated’ so as to prevent him from ‘reprobating’” (at [31]). Application of this test of “inconsistency” may arise in different contexts. One is what is traditionally called “issue waiver” (see [EA.122.150]) and another is “disclosure waiver” (see [EA.122.180]).

[EA.122.150] Loss of privilege: “issue waiver” (s 122(2)) One context in which the test of “inconsistency” may arise is what is traditionally called “issue waiver”. An example is where the substance of legal advice received is relied upon in order to raise an issue in a legal proceeding. In Mann v Carnell, the High Court gave at [28] one example of a situation where there is “inconsistency between the conduct of the client and maintenance of the confidentiality which effects a waiver of the privilege”:

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… the institution of proceedings for professional negligence against the lawyer, in which the lawyer’s evidence as to advice given to the client will be received.

Cited at this point in the judgment was Lillicrap v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 All ER 724; [1993] 1 WLR 94 where the Court of Appeal held that when a client brings proceedings against its former solicitors for professional negligence, implied waiver of privilege will normally extend to facts and documents material to the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues and to the defendant’s proper defence to that cause of action. The courts may be expected to adopt a liberal approach to principle of inconsistency in such circumstances.479 There is no doubt that a party may waive legal professional privilege by the mere institution of proceedings.480 In Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd (2015) 321 ALR 191; [2015] VSCA 101, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that there had been waiver where the privilege holder, by its conduct in its pleading of the state of mind of a defendant, acted in a way that was inconsistent with its objection to that defendant adducing evidence that would result in disclosure of its knowledge of the privileged legal advice (which was relevant to that state of mind). While merely putting a state of mind in issue will not, of itself, give rise to waiver of privilege in respect of legal advice that is relevant to the existence of that state of mind481, in this case the state of mind that was put in issue concerned an understanding of legal rights. In contrast, in Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Limited [2016] FCAFC 117, while the privilege holder put its 478. Of course, waiver may occur intentionally (“expressly”) but that is clearly not essential. It follows that the observation of Beazley P and Emmett JA in El-Zayet v The Queen (2014) 88 NSWLR 556; [2014] NSWCCA 298 at [116] that “waiver involves an intentional abandonment of a right” must be approached with some care – the focus is on the intentional conduct of the party possessing the privilege, not whether the party intended to abandon the privilege. 479. See, for example, Artistic Builders Pty Ltd v Nash [2009] NSWSC 102. 480. Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd (2015) 321 ALR 191; [2015] VSCA 101 at [30]. 481. See Cargill Australia Ltd v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 99 at [49], [66]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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state of mind in issue and the legal advice received was relevant to that state of mind, there was no basis to conclude that the state of mind must have been informed by or addressed in the legal advice, so that it could not be said that the privilege holder acted inconsistently in seeking to maintain the privilege.482 The Full Court of the Federal Court emphasised in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341; 229 ALR 304; [2006] FCAFC 86 at [47] that each case turns on its own particular facts, but formulated the question in the context of claimed issue waiver as whether a party has

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made an assertion as part of his case that puts the contents of the privileged scheduled documents in issue, or necessarily lays them open to scrutiny, with the consequence that an inconsistency arises between the making of the assertion and the maintenance of the privilege.483

Reference was made with approval to the statement of Allsop J in DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499; [2003] FCA 384 at [58] which referred to waiver coming about when a party entitled to the privilege makes an assertion which is either about the contents of the confidential communication or which necessarily lays it open to scrutiny. Applying this analysis, the Full Court concluded that where the Commissioner of Taxation in giving particulars merely refers to privileged documents (not their contents) or asserts that privileged advice was relevant to or contributed to some decision, that would not be inconsistent with the maintenance of privilege (at [67]).484 However, his assertion in particulars that he took into account the matters “evidenced” by privileged documents put the contents of those documents in issue or laid them open to scrutiny, since it “is only by disclosing the contents of the documents to scrutiny, that the bases for the Commissioner’s satisfaction and exercises of discretions can be examined”. As a consequence, an inconsistency arose between the assertion made by the Commissioner in his particulars and the maintenance of privilege in the documents, and privilege was waived, even though the Commissioner disavowed any intention of so doing (at [73]–[74]). Similarly, in Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer of Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; 57 ATR 52; [2004] FCAFC 237, Gyles J (Tamberlin J agreeing) held at [68] that it was “... well established that for a client to deploy the substance or effect of legal advice for forensic or commercial purposes is inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality that attracts legal professional privilege”.485 In Hastie Group Ltd (in liq) v Moore [2016] NSWCA 305, Beazley P and Macfarlan JA stated at [57]: 482. Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Limited [2016] FCAFC 117 at [34]–[37]. The Court distinguished Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd (2015) 321 ALR 191; [2015] VSCA 101 at [38]–[40]. 483. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341; 229 ALR 304; [2006] FCAFC 86 at [68]. See also Parkview Qld Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] NSWSC 1599 at [11]. Black J acknowledged at [18] that the “assertion” of the content of legal advice which the party may or may not have received in respect of a relevant matter may be “express or implied”. 484. This analysis was followed in Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 422, Edmonds J at [65]–[70]. See also Lamers v Lamers [2017] VSC 760 at [16]. 485. See also Cooper v Hobbs [2013] NSWCA 70 at [73]; Macquarie Bank Ltd v Arup Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 117 at [18].

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[T]he authorities … make it plain that neither relevance to the other party’s claim nor reference by that party to a privileged document, without more, gives rise to waiver. Ordinarily there will need to be reliance on the contents of such a document.

Other examples may be given.486 The principles and authorities were reviewed by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Viterra Malt Pty Ltd v Cargill Australia Ltd [2018] VSCA 118. The court emphasised at [43]–[44] the statutory test in s 122(2) and that “there is no settled list of kinds of action which, by their very nature, give rise to implied waiver: each case must depend upon its own facts and circumstances and drawing generalisations from other cases may be dangerous” (see also at [72]). However, the court stated at [73]: Notwithstanding the need for caution on that account, it can be said that a pleading of reliance, without more, will not usually manifest inconsistency with the maintenance of client legal privilege in communications relevant to that state of mind. It can also be seen that the observation of Allsop J in DSE as to the circumstances in which privilege will be waived, while still a gloss on the statutory language, has commanded wide acceptance as a statement of the general operation of the principle.

On the other hand, formulations such as “centrality to the issue”, “necessity” to have recourse to the material and “materially affecting or contributing to the party’s state of mind” should not be understood as propounding an alternative test (at [75]).487

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If the party said to have waived privilege by raising an issue makes it clear that there is no relevant issue, so that the privileged material is not relevant to a fact in issue in the proceedings, it may be that privilege will not be lost.488 486. See Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Limited [2016] FCAFC 117. In Schulman v Abbott Tout Lawyers [2010] FCA 308, Flick J held that the applicants pleading reliance on legal advice provided by the respondents did not have the effect of waiving privilege in respect of separate legal advice provided by other lawyers, notwithstanding the respondent’s forensic interest in investigating the extent to which such “separate advice had been received on the same issue and the extent to which that separate advice may have influenced the Applicants’ decision-making”. In Re Idoport Pty Ltd (In Liq) (Recs Apptd) [2012] NSWSC 58 Ward J held that there had been no implied waiver of privilege in a case where the parties had not “directly put in issue their state of mind” (at [78]) and it could not be said that maintenance of the privilege was inconsistent with the way in which the parties have pleaded their case (at [112]; see also [146]). On the other hand, in Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 9) [2013] NSWSC 212 it was held that claims of mental incapacity by a plaintiff (and evidence from him that he was incapable of conducting business transactions and litigation) was inconsistent with maintenance of privilege with respect to his correspondence with his solicitors. In Hancock v Rinehart [2013] NSWSC 1978, Brereton J held at [10]–[23] that a party had “impliedly waived privilege through an affirmative pleading of its state of mind in the proceedings” (relying on Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044 at [12]). In ASIC v Park Trent Properties Group Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 342, Sackar J held that privilege had been waived where the defendant advanced a case that it had taken certain steps on the basis of legal advice and thereby sought to “take advantage of the effect of the advice” (at [64]). See also Parkview Qld Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] NSWSC 1599 at [11]–[21]; Presbyterian Church of Victoria Trusts Corp v Anstee [2014] VSC 426 at [18]; Lamers v Lamers [2017] VSC 760 at [17]–[22]; Cargill Australia Ltd v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 99. 487. It was held that, in the particular circumstances of the case, despite legal advice being relevant to a pleaded state of mind, nothing in the pleading had put that legal advice in issue or laid it open to scrutiny (see at [77]–[82]). 488. See National Australia Bank Ltd v C & O Voukidis Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 258. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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It is the conduct of the client, who possesses the privilege, which is capable of waiving it. It is not open to another party to litigation to force waiver of a client’s legal professional privilege by making assertions about, or seeking to put in issue, that client’s state of mind.489 Answering questions posed by a party as to the client’s state of mind, even if the answers reveal that legal advice was received, will not usually constitute deployment of the substance of the legal advice for a forensic or commercial purpose.490 Similarly in R v Seller [2015] NSWCCA 76, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal rejected an argument that maintenance of the privilege by prosecuting authorities in respect of a number of “in-house” documents was inconsistent with the prosecution contention in criminal proceedings that the distribution of certain compulsorily acquired material did not give any forensic advantage to the prosecution which deprived the respondents of a trial according to law. It was held at [168] that there was no waiver where the prosecution asserted that the compulsorily acquired material was not received, directly or indirectly, by the prosecution team and the respondents sought access to the documents to investigate that possibility. In substance, the party asserting waiver had raised the issue about receipt of compulsorily acquired material and could not rely on the denial of such receipt as constituting waiver.

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[EA.122.180] Loss of privilege: “disclosure waiver” (s 122(2)) Another context in which the test of “inconsistency” may arise is what is traditionally called “disclosure waiver”. However s 122(3) provides for circumstances where, by reason of disclosure of privileged material, the client or party “is taken to have” acted in a way that is inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege. It is important to emphasise that, pursuant to s 122(3), disclosure of “the substance of the evidence” has the consequence that privilege is necessarily lost – the court does not proceed to ask whether the client or party has “acted in a way that is inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence”. Nevertheless, circumstances may arise where the disclosure does not satisfy the requirements of those provisions (that is, there has been disclosure of something less than “the substance of the evidence”) but nonetheless is regarded as satisfying the general test in this provision. The introductory words of s 122(3) make it clear that disclosure may justify a conclusion that privilege is lost under s 122(2), notwithstanding the operation of s 122(3). Just as a number of courts, prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102, applied s 122(1) to ask whether disclosure of the contents of a document was inconsistent with the continued maintenance of confidentiality in that which was disclosed,491 so will courts consider the application of this provision in circumstances of disclosure, regardless of the application of s 122(3). 489. Nash v Glennies Creek Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2014] NSWIRComm 36 at [84], citing Commonwealth v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 107 at [10]. The Presbyterian Church of Victoria Trusts Corp v Anstee [2014] VSC 426 at [18]. 490. Nash v Glennies Creek Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2014] NSWIRComm 36 at [92]–[106]. 491. See eg Singapore Airlines v Sydney Airports Corp Ltd [2004] NSWSC 380. Followed in Ashfield Municipal Council v RTA [2004] NSWSC 917, Barrett J at [14]; ASIC v Rich [2004] NSWSC 923, Austin J at [12]–[14]. See also Cannar v Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 at [84]–[94]. McDougall J declined to reconsider his approach in Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1084.

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To give one example, in Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333; [2009] NSWCA 100 Tobias JA in the NSW Court of Appeal proceeded on the assumption that the common law principle developed by the English Court of Appeal in Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co [1981] 1 WLR 529; [1981] 2 All ER 485 was good law under this Act. As Tobias JA articulated that principle at [132]: Great Atlantic stands … for the proposition that where the whole of a document is a privileged communication between legal adviser and client, the party entitled to claim that privilege cannot waive the privilege as to part of the communication but claim it with respect to the remainder if to do so would result in unfairness. Either privilege is claimed with respect to the whole or waived as to the whole. The only exception to this would be where the communication dealt with two entirely different subject matters in respect of which privilege was claimed for the one that was relevant to the issues at hand and waived for the other which was not.

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As Allsop JA (with whom Hodgson JA agreed) pointed out at [3]–[4], a principle based on conceptions of “a freestanding or overriding principle of fairness ‘operating at large’” is not supportable under the common law as developed by the High Court or this provision. However, it is very likely that the courts will develop the “acted inconsistently” principle to cover circumstances of selective or partial disclosure by a party for forensic advantage, even if the terms of s 122(3) do not catch such conduct.492 In Gillies v Downer EDI Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1323 Garling J considered the application of this test in circumstances where a privileged document had been provided to an expert for the purposes of preparing a report to be used in litigation and that report, subsequently disclosed, made reference to that document. Garling J accepted that the mere fact the privileged document was used by the expert would not result in loss of the privilege,493 but ruled at [64] that the actual use of the privileged document by the expert “is such that it would be unfair for [the defendant] to rely on the report without disclosure of [the privileged document] to [the plaintiff]”. Relevant considerations were that the expert referred to opinions expressed in the privileged document and embraced them (at [61]) and the expert, to some (uncertain) extent, used, and relied upon, the privileged document (at [64]). Similarly, in Weston v Publishing & Broadcasting Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1288 Barrett J ruled at [46] that privilege had been lost where a party had put the document in question before the court on a confidential basis for the purpose of an application for extension of the time for service where it could reasonably be anticipated that there would subsequently be adversarial proceedings seeking to discharge the application (notwithstanding that the disclosure occurred “in the course of making a confidential communication”: s 122(5)(a)(i)). On the other hand, even where it has been admitted that the foundation of a solicitor’s assertion of market value is an expert report, supplied confidentially to the 492. In Banksia Mortgages Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 535 Schmidt J held that, pursuant to both s 122(2) and 122(3), privilege had been lost in respect of a client’s email communications which had been partially disclosed by the client’s solicitor in order to resist an order for summary judgment. 493. See at [49], where reference is made to New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258, at [53]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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solicitor to provide a proper basis for alleging market value in a pleading, it “is not inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality to plead that value”.494

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Similarly, in El-Zayet v The Queen (2014) 88 NSWLR 556; [2014] NSWCCA 298, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that privilege (under the common law) had not been lost where a Crown Prosecutor handed to a court the last page of a legal advising report upon which the Director of Public Prosecutions had endorsed a direction that no further criminal proceedings be brought. Beazley P and Emmett JA observed at [116] that, while there was no compulsion on the Crown Prosecutor to provide the signed direction, the document was provided to the court for the specific purpose of informing it in written form of the Director’s direction (that part of the document was not privileged) and, significantly, there was no “use of, or reliance upon, the privileged portion of the document by the Crown Prosecutor”. Another commonly recurring issue is the question whether disclosure by a party of an expert report obtained by that party has the effect of waiving privilege in respect of other documents and communications. There is extensive authority regarding this issue under the common law and, given the enactment of this provision in order to adopt the common law principles relating to waiver established by the High Court in Mann v Carnell, it is inevitable that this authority will be very influential in the application of this provision in such circumstances. Thus, in Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 33, Derham AsJ of the Victorian Supreme Court applied common law authority to hold that the critical issue in such circumstances was whether the other documents or communications “influenced or underpinned” the expert’s report (see also Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 10) [2014] VSC 44). Similarly, in Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2013] NSWSC 211, Ball J of the NSW Supreme Court applied (at [17], [23]) common law authority to hold that an expert’s report was not “based” on privileged material where that material only influenced the way that the report was expressed rather than the content of the opinions expressed in it. As Dodds-Streeton J stated in Shea v EnergyAustralia Services Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 303 ALR 230; [2013] FCA 937 at [60], if “the relevant documents or communications have not influenced the content of the final report, or may have influenced it but in relation only to form or peripheral matters, the inconsistency would be unlikely to be established”. The issue of disclosure “by mistake” was considered by the High Court in Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; 88 ALJR 76; [2013] HCA 46. In the NSW Court of Appeal, Campbell JA (Macfarlan JA agreeing) had held that client legal privilege was waived in circumstances where the documents had been disclosed in a formal discovery process by mistake (they were listed mistakenly as non-privileged) but there was a delay between discovery and the making of the claim of mistake and “it would not be obvious to a reasonable solicitor that a mistake had been made”. However, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ rejected this analysis, emphasising that the documents had not in fact been read by the party to whom they were discovered (at [28], [34]) and that, once the mistake had been discovered, a letter advising that privileged documents had 494. Towercom Pty Ltd v Fahour [2011] VSC 455 at [11].

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been incorrectly listed as non-privileged was “sent promptly” (at [34]). It was concluded at [35] that these circumstances were “not indicative of an inconsistent position being taken by the … parties’ lawyers such that waiver should be imputed to those parties”. Finally, it is important to emphasise that the disclosure must relate to the confidential communication rather than some underlying fact. Thus, disclosure of the substance of what it is anticipated a prospective witness will say in testimony does not thereby disclose the substance of what that prospective witness had said to a lawyer in a privileged communication – even though it might be inferred that something similar was said.495

[EA.122.210] Loss of privilege: knowing and voluntary disclosure (s 122(3)(a), (4), (5)) These provisions result in loss of one or other of the privileges created by ss 118 to 120 where the client (under ss 118 to 119) or party (under s 120) has knowingly and voluntarily disclosed to another person the substance of the evidence (see [EA.122.270]) and the disclosure was not made: • by an employee or agent of the client, party or lawyer who was not authorised to make the disclosure (s 122(4)); or • when making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document (s 122(5)(a)(i)) (see [EA.122.300]); or

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• as a result of duress or deception (s 122(5)(a)(ii)); or • under compulsion of law (s 122(5)(a)(iii)) (see [EA.122.330]); or • by an official or statutory body to a Minister with relevant ministerial responsibility (s 122(5)(a)(iv)); or • by a client to a person for whom a lawyer is providing professional legal services to both regarding the same matter (s 122(5)(b)); or • to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the disclosure, a common interest in an existing, anticipated or pending proceeding (s 122(5)(c)). It is important to emphasise that, disclosure of “the substance of the evidence” within the terms of s 122(3) and s 122(5) has the consequence that privilege is necessarily lost – the court does not proceed to ask whether the client or party has “acted in a way that is inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence” because the client or party “is taken to have” acted in a way that is inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege. The term “disclosure” is discussed at [EA.118.150]. The term “client” is defined in s 117(1) (see [EA.117.90]. That includes an “agent” of the client (s 117(1)(b)) and, thus, a lawyer acting with the authority of the client.496 However, the effect of s 122(4) is that s 122(3)(a) does not apply to a disclosure by a person who was, at the time, an employee or agent of a client unless the employee or agent was authorised to make the disclosure. It has been held that the general terms of s 495. See R v Gittany (No 3) (2013) 238 A Crim R 149; [2013] NSWSC 1670. 496. See Sovereign v Bevillesta [2000] NSWSC 521 at [24] per Austin J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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122(1) cannot be utilised to avoid this requirement. disclosure may be express or implied.498

Authority to make the

Privilege is lost where there has been disclosure by a client or party “to another person”. The NSW Court of Appeal has held that a court is not “another person” within the meaning of the provision.499 As regards companies, in Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 864, Graham J stated at [56]: Where a corporate client has received legal advice, any disclosure of the terms of that advice or the substance thereof from one officer to another within the corporation will not constitute a “disclosure to another person” and thereby result in a loss by the client of the relevant privilege.

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Graham J cited Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Merck & Co Inc (2004) 210 ALR 593; [2004] FCA 1131 at 597 [11] and [12] for this proposition. Although that case turned on the application of the common law, the position under this provision would appear to be the same. Similarly, it is likely to be held that disclosures of legal advice or the substance thereof by officers of one corporation within a group to officers of other corporations within that group or between different officers of another corporation within the group would not result in loss of the relevant client legal privilege (see Graham J at [56]). The view has been expressed that there has not been a “knowing and voluntary disclosure” where a lawyer sends a copy of a record of interview (prepared by the lawyer following an interview conducted with a person) to that person, or their legal representative, solely for the purpose of being checked and, if need be, corrected and then returned to the lawyer (the person interviewed and their legal representative not being entitled to retain a copy of the record of interview).500 For privilege to be lost, the disclosure must be both “knowing” and “voluntary”. It has been held that the word “voluntary” in s 122(2) is intended to mean something other than not “under compulsion of law” (in s 122(5)(a)(iii) as it currently is).501 Voluntary disclosure under a mistaken belief as to what is being disclosed would not necessarily result in loss of the privilege. Indeed, it has been observed that a voluntary disclosure is a disclosure that was not made by way of mistake.502 On the other hand, it has been held that “the notion of a voluntary disclosure [does not exclude] a disclosure made by mistake … in circumstances 497. Eden Productions Pty Ltd v Southern Star Group Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1166 at [255] per Gzell J (accordingly, it was held that a failure to object to evidence given by a third party did not constitute waiver). 498. Global Medical Imaging Management Ltd (in liq) v Australian Mezzanine Investments Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 430 at [18]–[19] per Einstein J. 499. Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar (2006) 66 NSWLR 112; [2006] NSWCA 160 at [45]. 500. Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulation (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 at 389 per Powell JA, Meagher JA agreeing, Smart AJA appearing to dissent. However, Powell JA noted that the situation would be different where the copy is provided without any condition as to non-disclosure, and it is in fact used to refresh the person’s memory before giving evidence. 501. See Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 12. 502. See Ampolex at 22. This approach was followed in Director of Public Prosecutions v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468; BT Australasia Pty Ltd v NSW (No 8) (1998) 154 ALR 202 at 208–209 per Sackville J; and Re Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (2002) 168 FLR 116; 194 ALR 101; [2002] NSWSC 215 at [116]–[117] per Campbell J.

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where formal discovery is made”. The line will sometimes be difficult to draw. It is possible that a disclosure may be made “knowingly” yet by way of mistake, and accordingly, perhaps not voluntarily. Equally, accidental disclosure would not result in loss of the privilege (unless one of the other provisions of s 122 applied). Thus, it has been held that, whatever may be the precise limits of the words “knowing and voluntary”: … they do not apply in a case where everything indicates an intention to claim privilege in respect of the document and what has gone wrong is attributable to sheer inadvertence or carelessness.504

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In Unsworth v Tristar Steering & Suspension Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1081, Gyles J referred to the confusing authority in this area and applied “the more restricted approach of Goldberg J” in Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 511; 145 ALR 391, holding at [9] that privilege was not lost where the “disclosure was inadvertent in every sense of the word and [the persons to whom disclosure was made] must have appreciated the probability of the documents having been included in the draft bundle by mistake”. At least in the context of formal discovery, the weight of authority is that mistaken disclosure will result in loss of privilege unless the mistake was “obvious” and should have been appreciated by the party to whom the document is disclosed.505 Similarly, a decision of the NSW Court of Appeal tends to indicate a strict approach in the context of a legal representative’s failure to object to a question seeking to elicit privileged material. In Divall v Mifsud [2005] NSWCA 447 a witness called by a party was asked in cross-examination to reveal the substance of a privileged statement and counsel for the party who called the witness failed to object. The substance of the statement was subsequently disclosed in the witness’s answers. Ipp JA (McColl JA agreeing) held at [10] that failure to object to those questions meant that the substance of the statement had been “knowingly and voluntarily disclosed to another person”. A difficulty with this analysis, as the dissenting member of the Court of Appeal, MW Campbell AJA, pointed out at [111], is that counsel had made it clear that he claimed privilege (on behalf of the 503. Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 511; 145 ALR 391 at 450. Goldberg J added: “In the absence of obvious mistake apparent to an inspecting party and fraud I consider that the appropriate principle to apply is that once inspection has been allowed of a document listed in that part of an affidavit or list in which privilege from inspection is not claimed, any privilege attaching to that document is to be regarded as waived by being included in that part of the affidavit or list and by being made available for inspection.” This approach was followed by Austin J in ASIC v Rich [2004] NSWSC 934, who observed at [4] that the approach of Goldberg J is “applicable, mutatis mutandis, where documents are produced under subpoena or pursuant to a notice to produce”. 504. Sovereign v Bevillesta [2000] NSWSC 521 at [23] per Austin J. See also Boensch v Pascoe [2007] FCA 532 at [38]; Dunstan v Orr (2008) 217 FCR 559; 171 IR 135; [2008] FCA 31 at [145]. 505. Biseja Pty Ltd v NSI Group Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1497 at [14]; Grace v Grace [2010] NSWSC 1514 at [14]–[15]. It should be noted that, in the latter case, decided after the amendments to this provision following ALRC 102, Brereton J made no reference to this provision – there was simply application of the principles of “waiver”. In Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd v Abdelkodous [2011] NSWSC 32 Hoeben J ruled that there was no waiver in a case where documents were mistakenly disclosed in response to a subpoena without a claim of privilege, observing at [58] that “there was not an orderly discovery process” and “it must have been obvious” that there was a potential claim for privilege. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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party) in respect of the statement. MW Campbell AJA adopted at [113] the reasoning of Austin J in Sovereign v Bevillesta to conclude that the failure to object was “attributable to sheer inadvertence or carelessness”. After observing at [114] that counsel could not have sought a forensic advantage from the failure to object and that no one at the trial “would imagine that [counsel] had suddenly decided to abandon the claim for privilege which he had successfully pursued”, he concluded that privilege had not been waived under this provision. It has to be said that this analysis is persuasive. The approach of the majority of the Court of Appeal may in fact turn on the apparent failure on appeal to explicitly contend (or adduce evidence) that the absence of objection was the result of counsel’s mistake. However, Ipp JA stated at [5]: Had cross-examining counsel, instead of asking the two questions which I have set out, again called for the statement – and had the statement been produced and tendered as an exhibit – that statement would have been admitted into evidence unless counsel … had objected. I can see no difference in principle between the admission of a privileged statement into evidence in circumstances where counsel for the party holding the privilege does not object, and oral evidence given by a party of the contents of that statement in circumstances where counsel for the party holding the privilege does not object.

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This reasoning treats failure to object to the question as equivalent to absence of objection to admission into evidence of the privileged statement. While not entirely persuasive,506 this indicates that failure to object to a question seeking to elicit privileged material will usually be treated as waiver. It is not clear whether disclosure on the mistaken basis that privilege is not available would result in loss of the privilege.507 However, in Fenwick v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 353, White J held at [35] that [t]he fact that the defendant took what I consider to be a mistaken view that it could not claim privilege on the draft letter does not affect the fact that the disclosure of the letter and therefore the substance of its legal advice, was both knowing and voluntary.

[EA.122.240] Loss of privilege: express or implied consent to disclosure (s 122(3)(b), (5)) These provisions result in loss of one or other of the privileges created by ss 118 to 120 where the client (under ss 118 to 119) or party (under s 120) has expressly or impliedly consented to the disclosure to another person of the substance of the evidence (see [EA.122.270]) and the disclosure was not made: • when making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document (s 122(5)(a)(i)) (see [EA.122.300]); or • as a result of duress or deception (s 122(5)(a)(ii); or • under compulsion of law (s 122(5)(a)(iii)) (see [EA.122.330]); or 506. First, privilege under s 119 does not even operate where there is no “objection by a client”. Second, in any event, waiver under s 190 requires the “consent” of a party, not simply a failure to object. Third, the requirement under s 122(3)(a) that “a client or party has knowingly and voluntarily” disclosed the substance of the evidence is a different question, one of fact rather than application of procedural rules. 507. See Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 511; 145 ALR 391; Sovereign v Bevillesta [2000] NSWSC 521 at [21].

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• by an official or statutory body to a Minister with relevant ministerial responsibility (s 122(5)(a)(iv)); or • by a client to a person for whom a lawyer is providing professional legal services to both regarding the same matter (s 122(5)(b)); or • to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the disclosure, a common interest in an existing, anticipated or pending proceeding (s 122(5)(c)). The term “disclosure” is discussed at [EA.118.150]. In Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1070, Barrett J held at [24] that only prior or contemporaneous events are relevant to the question of whether there “the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party”. He stated:

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The preposition “with” indicates that the consent must in some way accompany or attach to the disclosure. If, at the time of disclosure, the person concerned clearly and actively denies consent but that person later does things inconsistent with the continuation of privilege, the case is not, in my view, one of disclosure “with” some form of subsequently created consent.

This provision refers to “express or implied consent” and it has been held that this does not extend to “imputed” consent and, therefore, the common law approach based on the principle of fairness is not imported.508 In Gordian Runoff Ltd v Price [2004] NSWSC 600 McDougall J considered that common law principles should be applied under this provision (citing, inter alia, his earlier judgment in Singapore Airlines v Sydney Airports Corp Ltd [2004] NSWSC 380, although it appears that that case focused upon s 122(1)). It has been held that a court should not deliberately fashion a procedure with the aim of making a person a witness so that this provision would apply (thus circumventing his or her common law privilege against self-incrimination).509 An example of a case where it was held that implied consent had been given is Cannar v Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 at [100]–[103] per Simpson J. Her analysis was endorsed on appeal by the NSW Court of Appeal in British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158 at [184]–[186]. Another example is Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1070, where Barrett J held at [107]–[110] that there had been at least “implied consent” where the client’s lawyers “knew (or must be taken to have known) that, in order to remove the possibility that the Registrar [of the Supreme Court] would allow inspection by the plaintiffs … it was necessary that [the client] object”, and no objection was made. In contrast, in Mills v Wojcech [2011] NSWSC 86, a case decided after the amendments following on ALRC 102 (which imported the common law test in relation to waiver), Barr J held that privilege was not lost where the plaintiff’s former solicitor disclosed privileged documents in response to a subpoena, without the knowledge of the plaintiff or his then current solicitors (see at [69]–[75]). It had been held in respect of the comparable provision to s 122(3)(b) prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102 that privilege can only be lost under this 508. Sovereign v Bevillesta [2000] NSWSC 521 at [28] per Austin J. See also [EA.122.60]. 509. Pathways Employment Services v West (2004) 186 FLR 330; [2004] NSWSC 903 (see [EA.128.780]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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provision where the disclosure is made by some person other than the client or party (as defined in s 117).510 The provision (s 122(4) as it then stood) was “read as being subject to an implied qualification (derived from the terms of subs (2)) to the effect that it is limited to a disclosure other than by a client or party”.511 Where the disclosure has been made by the client or party (as defined), the provision had no application and the position was governed by s 122(2). Conversely, where the disclosure is made by some person other than the client or party, s 122(2) had no application and the position is governed by s 122(4). This approach was questionable under the earlier form of s 122.512 However, it certainly should not be applied in respect of the current provision. Sections 122(3)(a) and (b) plainly operate in tandem. On this approach, privilege is lost by knowing and voluntary disclosure by the client or party, except in certain situations. It will also be lost by disclosure with the consent of the client or party, except in certain situations. A client or party can consent to disclosure both where the client or party discloses and where some other person discloses. There does not appear to be any reason to distinguish disclosure by the client/party from disclosure by another person in this context.

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[EA.122.270] “the substance of the evidence” (s 122(3)) The Federal Court has observed that the test is “a quantitative one, which asks whether there has been sufficient disclosure to warrant loss of the privilege”.513 It has been held that a mere reference to the existence of legal advice will not amount to disclosure, but that the words “[the company] maintains that the correct ratio is 1:1 and has legal advice supporting this position” disclosed the “substance” of the legal advice (which was that the correct ratio was 1:1).514 It was observed that the “effect” of legal advice may also be its “substance”.515 Conversely, the words “I instructed counsel to advise on this liability”, did not result in a loss of privilege because they “said no more than what it would have been necessary to say in order to claim client legal privilege”:

510. Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings [No 2] (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 at 351 per McLelland CJ in Eq. 511. See Telstra Corp at 351. 512. The issue had been left open in Sovereign v Bevillesta [2000] NSWSC 521 at [16]–[17] per Austin J and Cannar v Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802, Simpson J at [95]–[103]. 513. Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360; 152 ALR 418 at 371. The Full Court observed that the application of this quantitative test “may result in privilege being lost in respect of a discrete part or aspect of a confidential communication or confidential document where the matter disclosed only relates to, or else relates sufficiently to, that part or aspect”. 514. Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 12. See also Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 70 ALJR 603 at 607 per Kirby J; NRMA Ltd v John Kerin Morgan t/as Allen Allen & Hemsley (unreported, NSW SC, Hunter J, 23 August 1996); BT Australasia Pty Ltd v NSW (No 7) (1998) 153 ALR 722; BT Australasia Pty Ltd v NSW (No 8) (1998) 154 ALR 202; ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526; 153 ALR 393 at 569–571. 515. See also Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360; 152 ALR 418 at 375, where it was held that the substance of a legal advice had been disclosed where its effect could be inferred. But cf Southern Cross Airlines Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Andersen & Co (1998) 84 FCR 472.

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[I]n any event, his words did no more than indicate that there existed a confidential communication between himself and counsel on the subject of advising on the liability and did not, in my opinion, disclose the substance of the communication.516

However, when the person who instructed counsel “went on to say, albeit in summary form, what counsel had advised, there was a disclosure of the substance of that otherwise privileged communication”.517 A critical issue is whether privilege is lost where a party states not only that it has received legal advice, but that it has acted on the advice, thereby disclosing the “bottom line” of the advice. A narrow, but understandable, view of the concept was adopted by Einfeld J in the Federal Court when he concluded that:

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[W]hen the subsection is referring to the substance of advice, it is not talking about the, as it were, “bottom line” of the advice, but to what its content is and possibly even the reasoning which led to it.518

It has been held that there has not been disclosure of the substance of the (letter of) instruction or instructions given to an expert by calling the expert as a witness nor, indeed, when the witness refers in evidence to what he had been instructed to do (unless the expert identified any material in the instruction document which he had taken into account in forming his views as expressed in evidence).519 Similarly, disclosure of an investigator’s advice, limited to operational matters, would not disclose the substance of his report if he was retained to conduct a full factual investigation into an incident so as to attempt to determine what had happened, and why.520 Indeed, McDougall J went further and expressed at [72] the view that the “conclusions” of an advice would not be the substance of the advice if they did not include the relevant factual bases (either as determined or assumed) and the reasoning process proceeding from those factual bases to the conclusions reached. Similarly, it has been held that the disclosure of the conclusion of a legal advice (that seeking preliminary discovery was “recommended”) did not amount to disclosure of the substance of the advice where there had been no disclosure of an opinion as to prospects of success and no disclosure of any of the reasoning which underpinned the recommendation.521 A solicitor’s assertion of market value, where it has been admitted that the 516. NRMA Ltd v Morgan (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 694 at [9] per Giles J. 517. NRMA Ltd v Morgan (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 694 at [16]. See also Lactalis Jindi Pty Ltd v Jindi Cheese Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 475. 518. SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best & Less Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1507 at [6]. Einfeld J supported this conclusion on the basis that the alternative would produce “absurd consequences”, stating at [5]–[6] that if privilege were lost: “merely because its recipient told his opponent that he was acting on legal advice in taking a particular stance on a particular disputed matter between them … [a] lawyer could give advice to a client that the client should not disclose to another party that the client is taking a particular position on legal advice. If the … argument is correct, the client may then be required to produce the lawyer’s advice to that effect with, as it seems to me, absurd consequences”. 519. Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (No 2) (1998) 83 FCR 397 at 401–402 per Mansfield J. It is clear that the common law position was influential in this approach, although Mansfield J recognised that the test of waiver under s 122 was not based on fairness. 520. Singapore Airlines v Sydney Airports Corp Ltd [2004] NSWSC 380 per McDougall J at [63]–[71]. 521. RinRim Pty Ltd v Deutsche Bank Australia Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1654, Darke J at [42]–[44]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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foundation of that assertion is an expert report, “is not disclosure of the substance of [the report], and does not purport to be”.522 After referring to some of these authorities, White J in the NSW Supreme Court stated in Fenwick v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 353 at [12]: It is difficult to reconcile the various cases, most of them on the previous s 122(2), as to what will constitute disclosure of the substance of a privileged communication. The balance of authority is that at least an express or implied summary of legal advice received amounts to disclosure of the substance of the advice.

However, care should be taken with the reference to “implied summary”. In Nash v Glennies Creek Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2014] NSWIRComm 36 the Full Bench of the NSW Industrial Court emphasised that an expression of views and a mere reference to the existence of legal advice that was considered in forming those views cannot amount to disclosure of the substance of that advice.523 Even if the views were “based on”, “founded on”, “relied on” or “had regard to” legal advice, that would not involve disclosure of the substance of the advice.524 A causal connection between the advice and the views formed does not mean that disclosure of the views formed constitutes disclosure of the substance of the advice.525 Indeed, the Full Bench appears to have accepted that there is an important distinction between “disclosure” of the substance of advice and “inferring” the substance of advice. 526

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[EA.122.300] “in the course of making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document” (s 122(5)(a)(i)) The terms “confidential communication” and “confidential document” are defined in s 117 (see [EA.117.120]). Both incorporate a requirement of “an express or implied obligation not to disclose [the communication’s or document’s] contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law”.527 This phrase should not be read narrowly and should not be confined to “the type of obligation which arises in the course of a solicitor/client relationship”.528 On the other hand, the existence of an obligation not to disclose will not be inferred simply from a failure to give

522. Towercom Pty Ltd v Fahour [2011] VSC 455 at [19]. 523. Nash v Glennies Creek Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2014] NSWIRComm 36 at [43], [55]–[56]. In essence, the disclosure was: “As a result of discussions with others in the Department and of information she was given, [the client] understood and believed that …”. It was not disputed that “others in the Department” included lawyers giving legal advice. 524. Nash v Glennies Creek Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2014] NSWIRComm 36 at [55]–[58], [64]–[65], [97]–[98]. 525. Nash v Glennies Creek Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2014] NSWIRComm 36 at [65]. 526. Nash v Glennies Creek Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2014] NSWIRComm 36 at [59]–[62]. 527. See [EA.117.120]. See also Hastie Group Ltd (in liq) v Moore [2016] NSWCA 305, Beazley P and Macfarlan JA at [60]. 528. Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247 at 259 per Higgins, Lehane and Weinberg JJ.

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express permission to disclose. The NSW Court of Appeal has emphasised the need to examine carefully the terms on which the communication is made.530

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On the face of it, this provision will operate where any confidential communication is made. In fact, from a careful analysis of the Law Reform Commission Reports, it appears that the ALRC intended this provision should operate much more narrowly, so that the term “a confidential communication” should be read to mean “a confidential communication in respect of which privilege is claimed”.531 The subsequent change of the word “the” to “a” in the Act could be seen as a matter of drafting and not a substantive policy decision. However, this is not how the provision has been applied by the courts and McLelland CJ in Eq in Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings [No 2] (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 at 350 has expressly taken the contrary view.532 Similarly, the NSW Court of Appeal has interpreted the provision as applying to any confidential communication.533 ALRC 102 made no reference at all to this issue. It is important to note that the current provision is expressed in terms that a client or party is not taken to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence “merely because” the substance of the evidence has been disclosed on a confidential basis. This does not mean that the confidential basis of the disclosure ensures that privilege is not lost. The High Court accepted in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; 168 ALR 86; [1999] HCA 66 that confidential disclosure will not necessarily mean that privilege is retained. Equally, it may be appropriate to determine that privilege is lost under s 122(3) even though the substance of the evidence has been disclosed on a confidential basis. Alternatively, circumstances may arise where it is appropriate to determine that privilege is lost under s 122(2) even though the substance of the evidence has been disclosed on a confidential basis.

[EA.122.330] “under compulsion of law” (s 122(5)(a)(iii)) The NSW Court of Appeal has taken a broad view of this concept.534 It is not limited to orders that require the disclosure of documents or information, breach of which is a contempt of court. It extends to “procedural directions” where the 529. Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] NSWSC 975 at [6]–[8] per Hamilton J. 530. Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 97. The court held that privilege had been lost when documents were handed to the police because “while the Police could not disclose the contents of the documents to all the world, it could disclose them for the purposes of the investigation … and, if it came to that, for a prosecution of the respondent. So the contents of the document could be put to persons referred to in it, as in fact happened, and those persons would not be under any restriction in further disclosing whatever was disclosed to them; and if the contents of the document were disclosed in the course of a prosecution of the respondent, subject to any special order which might be made, the contents would pass into the public domain”: Giles J at [28]. 531. See ALRC 26, vol 1, para 885 (“Disclosure” dot point); ALRC 26, vol 2, App A, cl 106(6)(a); ALRC 38, p 116, fn 24; App A, cl 107(6)(a). 532. See also Lakatoi v Walker [1999] NSWSC 156 at [31] per Rolfe J. 533. Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [1999] NSWCA 97. However, it may be noted that no examination of the legislative history in this regard was made. 534. See Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 at 551–552 and 553; Sevic v Roarty (1998) 44 NSWLR 287 at 296–297 per Sheller JA. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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primary sanction is to strike out a claim of action or a defence, or to deprive the party of the use of particular evidence.535 This approach has been followed by the Full Court of the Federal Court.536 In Dubbo City Council v Barrett [2003] NSWCA 267 the New South Wales Court of Appeal followed this approach even in a case where there was a failure to comply fully with the obligation to disclose – the partial disclosure was still made under compulsion of law (at [17]). Young CJ in Eq (at [20]) “very much regret[ted]” that this provision (as it stood prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102) had the effect that service of expert reports pursuant to a court rule meant that privilege was not lost. However, in Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 283; [2005] FCAFC 3 the Full Court of the Federal Court doubted (at [24]–[27]) the correctness of this line of authority and suggested that privilege would be lost where witness statements or affidavits were served in advance of trial pursuant to procedural requirements.537 In Gillies v Downer EDI Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1323 Garling J of the NSW Supreme Court suggested at [46] that the earlier authority need not be followed because the terms of the provision changed with the amendments following ALRC 102. He added further reasons for taking a narrower view of this provision: Section 131A, which was introduced by the Evidence Amendment Act 2007 and came into force on 1 January 2009, and thus did not exist at the time of the decisions of Akins and Sevic, effectively requires the Court to determine a pre-trial claim for privilege as though the claim was made in the course of adducing evidence at trial. It seems at least arguable that, for the purposes of determining whether privilege is lost, there should no longer be a distinction between an expert report served pursuant to case management orders prior to the commencement of a trial and the calling of witnesses, and an expert report relied upon during the trial once a witness has been called. … The consequences of the decision in Sevic were most impractical from the perspective of the efficient running of the litigation, including the proper and efficient preparation for trial and the taking of evidence at the trial. Those consequences do not fit comfortably with modern case-management practices, and in particular the “… just, quick and cheap …” principle to which litigation is subject in this Court.

However, other NSW judges regard the earlier decisions of the Court of Appeal as binding.538 Of course, if a document was not in fact privileged, the fact that there was a compulsion of law to file and serve it is not relevant.539 For example, finalised proofs of evidence created for the purpose of serving them on an opposing party may not be “confidential”: see [EA.117.120]. Alternatively, such a witness statement or affidavit may not be prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal services under s 119 but rather for the dominant purpose of informing the 535. Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 at 552 per Mason P pointing out that a “procedural direction” is still an order of the court and that there is no reason why a flagrant breach could not be punished as a contempt. 536. See Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp (1998) 86 FCR 215. See also Grundy v Lewis (unreported, FCA, Cooper J, 14 September 1998); Macquarie Bank Ltd v McCann & Associates Pty Ltd (unreported, FCA, Moore J, 2 December 1998). 537. See also ACCC v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; 254 ALR 198; [2009] FCAFC 32. 538. Actone Holdings Pty Ltd v Gridtek Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 991, Harrison J at [24]. 539. Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2004] NSWSC 40.

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court and the opposing party of the facts which the party that served the statement or affidavit in those proceedings sought to establish: see [EA.119.120]. Further, an alternative basis for holding that privilege had been lost might still be found under s 122(1) or s 122(2). In ACCC v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; 254 ALR 198; [2009] FCAFC 32 the Full Court of the Federal Court applied the common law principle of waiver based on “inconsistency”, now reflected in s 122(2), to hold at [127] that, “save where a disclosure is made for a particular and limited purpose, the filing and service [of a witness statement] operates as a complete, and not simply limited, waiver of privilege”.

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A disclosure is made “under compulsion of law” even if the basis for compulsion is later shown to be invalid.540 On the other hand, it was held by Schmidt J in Hannaford v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NSW) [2013] NSWSC 1708 that disclosure “which results from a failed claim for privilege is not the result of a compulsion of law, even when the disclosure follows a court’s resolution of a dispute as to whether or not there has been implied waiver of privilege in the document” (at [156]). Accordingly, the disclosure resulted in loss of privilege. In that case, a magistrate had ruled that a party had effectively waived privilege in respect of documents and ordered that they be provided to an opposing party. Schmidt J held that the subsequent providing of copies of the documents to the opposing party was not disclosure “under compulsion of law”. Schmidt J stated at [153] that s 122(5)(a)(iii) is “concerned with situations such as when disclosure has resulted, for example, from a court’s order requiring experts’ reports to be served on another party prior to hearing” rather than a ruling that privilege has been lost. It may be observed that, while the result (that privilege was lost pursuant to s 122) is undoubtedly correct, the reasoning adopts an implausible construction of the words “compulsion of law”. A preferable analysis would have been to say that privilege was lost not by reason of the court-ordered (and compelled) disclosure but by reason of the earlier conduct of the party resulting in the initial ruling that privilege in the documents had been waived.

[EA.122.360] Joint clients and “common interest” (s 122(5)(b), (c)) Under s 122(5), a client is not taken to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the client objecting to the adducing of the evidence “merely because” of a disclosure by the client to “another person” if it concerns a matter in respect of which they are joint clients of the same lawyer (s 122(5)(b)) or the client and the other person share a “common interest” in current or anticipated legal proceedings: s 122(5)(c). In respect of s 122(5)(b), the provision largely reflects the common law principle that where two persons join in a legal enterprise, the privilege is their joint privilege so that a privileged communication may be disclosed to each without loss of privilege.541 On the other hand, joint clients may not maintain privilege 540. ACCC v George Weston Foods Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 298; 198 ALR 592; [2003] FCA 601 at [45] per Conti J. 541. Compare Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151 at [41]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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against each other (see s 124). An interesting question not answered by this provision is whether disclosure by one client which results in loss of privilege for that client has a corresponding effect on a joint client’s privilege. At common law, waiver by one joint client is insufficient to affect the other’s privilege.542 The same result may flow under the Act by a distributive reading of s 122 (that is, disclosure by “a client” could not result in loss of privilege for another client). The concept of common interest for the purposes of s 122(5)(c) is not defined and assistance may be obtained from common law authorities.543 Examples of situations where the “common interest” provision would apply may include disclosure by insured to insurer, partner to partner, co-tenant to co-tenant.544 There is no requirement for a common lawyer. Bergin J observed in Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 at [56] that “each case must be considered on its own facts”. Where it was contended that a party to litigation and the “funder” of that party’s litigation shared a “common interest”, Bergin J stated at [56]:

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The type of funding, the arrangements for funding, the relationship between the funder and the funded party and the nature of the interests of the funder and the funded party will require analysis to determine whether there is an identity of interests such that they may be categories as “common”.

Since the funder had “an interest in the most advantageous conduct of these proceedings by the plaintiff” and that interest “is identical with that of the plaintiff”, the “funder in this case has ‘a common interest in relation to’ the proceedings” (Bergin J at [57]).545 In Hamilton v New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1213, Beech-Jones J accepted that “a mere common interest in the outcome of litigation will be sufficient” (at [72]) but observed that “the relevant interest must be more than a mere preference as to how the litigation should unfold” (at [73]).546 His Honour accepted that “a financial interest in the outcome of litigation may suffice” (at [73]) and held that a common interest in avoiding liability “for misfeasance in public office (or perhaps malicious prosecution)” satisfied the requirement (at [75]) (as well as, possibly, an interest in countering an adverse reflection on a statutory office holder’s performance). In contrast with the position of joint clients of the same lawyer, persons with a common interest 542. See generally Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 at 608A–D, cited by Mason P in Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151 at [41]. 543. Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 per Bergin J at [49]–[57]; Hamilton v New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1213 at [68]–[70]. 544. Compare Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689. But see also Re Konigsberg [1989] 3 All ER 289. Another example is a disclosure by a liquidator to the company’s creditors, who have a common interest with the liquidator in relation to anticipated action by the liquidator against third parties: Southern Cross Airlines Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Andersen & Co (1998) 84 FCR 472 at 480–481 per Drummond J. There is no “common interest” if the interests of the parties conflict: Patrick v Capital Finance Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1249; (2004) 211 ALR 272. 545. See also Re Bauhaus Pyrmont Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWSC 543 at [57]–[63]; Warburton v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2017] NSWSC 69 (accused in committal proceedings and person subpoenaed to give evidence did not have “common interest” in those proceedings). 546. That proposition was applied by Schmidt J in Warburton v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2017] NSWSC 69 at [72].

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may maintain privilege against each other (that is, s 124 does not apply), although they may be joint clients as well as share a “common interest”.547 As regards the discrete question whether disclosure by one party which results in loss of privilege for that party has a corresponding effect on a privilege possessed by a party sharing “common interest”, the common law position is that it may.548 The position under the Act is unclear. It is important to point out that s 122 deals with circumstances where client legal privilege is lost or, if s 122(5)(b) or s 122(5)(c) apply, it is not lost. This provision does not itself confer privilege by providing that evidence is not to be adduced (compare s 118 and s 119) – it only operates to create exceptions to other provisions that confer privilege. For that reason, neither s 122(5)(b) nor s 122(5)(c) confer privilege. Where they apply, they only prevent privilege being lost by a particular disclosure.549 It follows that the ruling of a NSW Supreme Court judge that certain communications were “the subject of common interest privilege”550 was misconceived. A discrete basis for conferring privilege must be found before these provisions can have any application.551

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Equally, it should be pointed out that neither s 122(5)(b) nor s 122(5)(c) have any work to do where the disclosure by a client is to a lawyer acting for the client – in those circumstances, by operation of s 118 (and s 122(5)(a)(i)), the disclosure would not involve the client acting in a manner inconsistently with the maintenance of the privilege because the disclosure is itself a privileged communication.552 Finally, it should be remembered that even if privilege is not lost because the disclosure was in circumstances where s 122(5)(b) or s 122(5)(c) apply, it may still be possible that privilege will be lost under s 122(2). However, the mere fact that there is disclosure in such circumstances is very unlikely to have such an outcome.553

547. Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151 at [42]–[44]. 548. Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 at 619–620; Patrick v Capital Finance Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1249; (2004) 211 ALR 272 at 277. 549. See, for example, Edwards v Vic Land Rehabilitation [2012] VSC 188 at [26]–[28]. [36]. 550. Re Creditors Trust Deed Established in the Administration of Bevillesta Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1419 at [10]. 551. See, for example, Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Whitebox Trading Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 324. 552. Hamilton v New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1213 at [47]–[48]. 553. See, for example, Hamilton v New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1213 at [83]–[86]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.122.390] Loss of privilege: a document used to try to revive a witness’s memory (or by a police officer under s 33) (s 122(6)) Privilege does not apply to a document that a witness has used to try to revive his or her memory under s 32554 or that a police officer has read or been led through under s 33. It has been held that privilege is lost: where for the purposes of giving evidence of the fact, the witness has referred to the document prior to giving the evidence to try to revive the witness’s memory of the fact. The sub-section does not apply generally to all documents to which recourse is had for the purpose of the litigation or for the framing of the case advanced.555

It is irrelevant whether or not the attempt to revive memory was successful.556 However, the attempt must relate to the evidence of fact or opinion which the witness gives or, perhaps, “is able to give”.557

[EA.122.420] Loss of privilege in other circumstances If a suggested basis for loss of privilege cannot be brought within the terms of this provision, or the other loss of privilege provisions in Pt 3.10, privilege will apply and the evidence is not to be adduced. Thus, in Cannar v Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 at [104]–[107], Simpson J rejected a submission based on common law authority that privilege would be lost in respect of material published in a court judgment. Her analysis appears to have been endorsed on appeal by the NSW Court of Appeal in British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Eubanks (2004) 60 NSWLR 483; [2004] NSWCA 158 at [150]–[153].

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[EA.122.450] Related communications and documents In accordance with s 126, if the application of s 122 means that evidence of a communication or the contents of a document loses privilege, evidence of another communication or document will also cease to be privileged if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document.

[EA.122.480] Burden and standard of proof The “burden of proof” is on the party seeking to persuade the court that the privilege has been lost. This conclusion flows from the wording of the provision: 554. It has been held that this provision is to the same effect as the common law in this area: see MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 61 FCR 236 at 238. Lindgren J in the Federal Court held that the words “try to revive the witness’s memory” do not impose a stricter test than the general law of “refreshment”: Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475; 61 ALJR 92; [1986] HCA 80; Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 were applied. See also Commonwealth Bank of Australia v McConnell (unreported, NSW SC, Rolfe J, 10 July 1997). 555. Grundy v Lewis (unreported, FCA, Cooper J, 14 September 1998). Cooper J held that the document in question was “before [the witness] as an aide-memoir or for the purposes of ensuring accuracy generally in the preparation of the statement as a whole and was not used specifically to attempt to revive his memory of any particular fact”. 556. Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1155 at [14] per Levine J. 557. Moran v Moran [No 9] (2000) Aust Torts Reports 81–558; [2000] NSWSC 219 at [15]–[19] per Kirby J. It is suggested that a better test would be that adopted by Cooper J in Grundy v Lewis (unreported, FCA, Cooper J, 14 September 1998), that is, whether the document, or part of a document, was referred to “for the purposes of giving evidence of the fact” or opinion.

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“this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence” if particular circumstances exist, with the burden necessarily falling on the party asserting the existence of those circumstances.558 In accordance with s 142(1), the court “is to find that the facts necessary for deciding” the factual questions under s 123 have been proved “if it is satisfied that they have been proved on the balance of probabilities”.

[EA.122.510] Procedure

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General procedure relating to the determination of a question whether evidence should be admitted is dealt with in s 189. In accordance with s 133, if a question arises in relation to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question: see [EA.133.60]. However, in Singapore Airlines v Sydney Airports Corp Ltd [2004] NSWSC 380, McDougall J did not consider it appropriate to inspect a document where the issue was whether the “substance” of certain evidence had been disclosed in the document and a party opposed inspection by the court. He stated at [66]: There is, I think, a significant distinction between inspecting a document to see whether it contains a privileged communication, and inspecting a document for the purpose of making a quantitative assessment of the contents of that document with the contents of some other document or documents. The former is a question on which, it might be thought, minds could not reasonably differ (for example, it would ordinarily be quite obvious if the document contained a record of communications between client and lawyer for a protected purpose). However, the latter involves not just an assessment of the communication, but a comparison of that communication with another document or documents for the purpose of seeing whether one can be said to embody the “substance” of the other.

Cth Act: 123 Loss of client legal privilege: defendants In a criminal proceeding, this Division does not prevent a defendant from adducing evidence unless it is evidence of: (a) a confidential communication made between an associated defendant and a lawyer acting for that person in connection with the prosecution of that person; or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by an associated defendant or by a lawyer acting for that person in connection with the prosecution of that person. Note: Associated defendant is defined in the Dictionary.

558. In Sharjade Pty Ltd v RAAF Landings [2008] NSWSC 151 Rein AJ accepted at [3](h) the correctness of the proposition that “[w]here it is alleged that privilege has been waived, the party alleging waiver carries the onus of establishing waiver”, citing Nine Films & Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd (2005) 65 IPR 442; [2005] FCA 356 at [21], Rich v Harrington (2007) 245 ALR 106; [2007] FCA 1987 at [8]; Re Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (2002) 168 FLR 116; 194 ALR 101; [2002] NSWSC 215 at [117]. However, note the contrary view of Sundberg J in Rio Tinto Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 64 ATR 63; 235 ALR 127; [2006] FCA 1200 at [27]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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NSW Act: 123 Loss of client legal privilege: defendants In a criminal proceeding, this Division does not prevent a defendant from adducing evidence unless it is evidence of: (a) a confidential communication made between an associated defendant and a lawyer acting for that person in connection with the prosecution of that person, or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by an associated defendant or by a lawyer acting for that person in connection with the prosecution of that person. Note: Associated defendant is defined in the Dictionary.

Vic Act: 123 Loss of client legal privilege—accused In a criminal proceeding, this Division does not prevent an accused from adducing evidence unless it is evidence of— (a) a confidential communication made between an associated accused and a lawyer acting for that person in connection with the prosecution of that person; or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by an associated accused or by a lawyer acting for that person in connection with the prosecution of that person. Note: Associated accused is defined in the Dictionary. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[S 123 am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch items 55.34 and 55.35]

ACT Act: 123 Loss of client legal privilege—defendants In a criminal proceeding, this division does not prevent a defendant from presenting evidence unless it is evidence of— (a) a confidential communication made between an associated defendant and a lawyer acting for the associated defendant in connection with the prosecution of the associated defendant; or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by an associated defendant or by a lawyer acting for an associated defendant in connection with the prosecution of the associated defendant. Note: Associated defendant —see the dictionary.

NT Act: 123

Loss of client legal privilege — defendants

In a criminal proceeding, this Division does not prevent a defendant from adducing evidence unless it is evidence of: (a) a confidential communication made between an associated defendant and a lawyer acting for that person in connection with the prosecution of that person; or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by an associated defendant or by a lawyer acting for that person in connection with the prosecution of that person. 1038

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[EA.123.90]

Note for section 123: Associated defendant is defined in the Dictionary.

[EA.123.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 102, paras 14.148–14.169; ALRC 38, s 107, para 195, 196; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 885.

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[EA.123.60]

General comments

The effect of this provision is that one or other of the privileges created by ss 118–120 is lost if the evidence (of a communication or document) is adduced by a defendant in criminal proceedings, unless the evidence derives from an associated defendant. On the face of it, the words “adducing evidence” would extend to a situation where the defendant’s counsel in criminal proceedings asks a question of a witness – the witness would not be able to rely on privilege to decline to answer the question. The loss of privilege in those circumstances would be contrasted with the position under the common law.559 However, the Victorian Court of Appeal concluded in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Galloway (2014) 245 A Crim R 427; [2014] VSCA 272 that the provision should not be read so widely and would only result in loss of privilege where the evidence is adduced by the accused in circumstances where the “evidence [is] already in the accused’s possession or knowledge” (at [85]). Thus, it would mean that privilege would be lost in a document in the possession of the accused and tendered in the criminal proceedings. It would not be lost where the accused made a call for the production of such a document, as if on subpoena.560 Equally, it would not be lost where defence counsel asked a question of a witness in order to elicit privileged information.561 Arguments might be advanced against this approach. It is arguable that it, in effect, adds words of limitation to the provision which are not there. Equally, it cannot be supported by the “principle of legality” because it has the effect of reducing the rights accorded to a defendant in criminal proceedings. While it brings the provision in line with the common law approach, and for that reason may well be followed in other uniform evidence law jurisdictions, it could be said that it is inconsistent with the proper approach to the relationship between this Act and the common law (see [EA.Intro.270]). Nevertheless, it is likely to be followed in other UEL jurisdictions.

[EA.123.90]

Evidence adduced by a defendant in a criminal proceeding

This provision is only applicable to the adducing of evidence at trial by a defendant in a criminal proceeding. The term “criminal proceeding” is defined in the Dictionary. For discussion of this definition, see [EA.Dict.Pt.1.60]. It has been observed in this context that an application in the Common Law Division of the NSW Supreme Court for a stay of criminal proceedings in the 559. See Carter v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 121; [1995] HCA 33. 560. See also R v Wilkie [2008] NSWSC 885, Grove J at [4]. 561. Unless, possibly, the contents of that information is within the “knowledge” of the accused. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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NSW District Court would not itself be a criminal proceeding . However, the Victorian Court of Appeal held in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Galloway (2014) 245 A Crim R 427; [2014] VSCA 272 at [25] that a hearing to determine whether there should be a permanent stay of criminal charges was “a criminal proceeding”. Section 131A in the NSW Act extends the application of the privileges in Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act, including the privileges created by ss 118–120, to some ancillary processes and pre-trial stages of civil and criminal proceedings. However, an express exception is created for this provision. In ALRC 102 it was stated at paras 14.168–14.169: The Commissions agree that it would be undesirable if the extension of the privilege sections of the uniform Evidence Acts to pre-trial proceedings had the effect of abrogating client legal privilege in relation to any legal advice given to the DPP. The policy foundation of client legal privilege—frank and complete communication between lawyer and client—applies equally to the DPP. Given the obligation on the prosecution to reveal all material evidence, significant court time could be spent in applications by the defence to gain access to advice that will have little bearing on the substantive issues in the case. Counsel or solicitors may also feel constrained in the provision of their advice for the DPP if such information could be made available later. The extension of s 123 to pre-trial contexts may also have an impact beyond the difficulties for prosecutors described above. It would effectively overturn the decision in Carter and remove the basis on which any person could claim the privilege in response to a subpoena to produce documents from an accused.

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It is apparent that the Commissions understood that the effect of s 123 was different from the common law position. However, as noted, the Victorian Court of Appeal has emphatically rejected that construction of s 123.

[EA.123.120] Associated defendant The privilege is not lost where the evidence is: (1) a confidential communication made between an associated defendant and his or her lawyer; or (2) the contents of a confidential document prepared by an associated defendant or by his or her lawyer. The terms “confidential communication” and “confidential document” are both defined in s 117: see also discussion of these terms in s 118. The word “lawyer” is defined in the Dictionary to mean “a barrister or solicitor”. Further, it is defined in s 117 to include “an employee or agent of a lawyer”. The term “associated defendant” is also defined in the Dictionary: “associated defendant”, in relation to a defendant in a criminal proceeding, means a person against whom a prosecution has been instituted, but not yet completed or terminated, for: (a) an offence that arose in relation to the same events as those in relation to which the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted arose; or (b) an offence that relates to or is connected with the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted. 562. Director of Public Prosecutions v Kane (1997) 140 FLR 468

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[EA.123.210]

[EA.123.150] Related communications and documents In accordance with s 126, if the application of s 123 means that evidence of a communication or the contents of a document loses privilege, evidence of another communication or document will also cease to be privileged if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document.

[EA.123.180] Burden and standard of proof The “burden of proof” is on the party seeking to persuade the court that the privilege has been lost. In accordance with s 142(1), the court “is to find that the facts necessary for deciding” the factual questions under s 123 have been proved “if it is satisfied that they have been proved on the balance of probabilities”.

[EA.123.210] Procedure General procedure relating to the determination of a question whether evidence should be admitted is dealt with in s 189. In accordance with s 133, if a question arises in relation to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question: see [1.3.14280].

Cth Act:

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124

Loss of client legal privilege: joint clients

(1) This section only applies to a civil proceeding in connection with which 2 or more parties have, before the commencement of the proceeding, jointly retained a lawyer in relation to the same matter. (2) This Division does not prevent one of those parties from adducing evidence of: (a) a communication made by any one of them to the lawyer; or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by or at the direction or request of any one of them; in connection with that matter. NSW Act: 124

Loss of client legal privilege: joint clients

(1) This section only applies to a civil proceeding in connection with which 2 or more parties have, before the commencement of the proceeding, jointly retained a lawyer in relation to the same matter. (2) This Division does not prevent one of those parties from adducing evidence of: (a) a communication made by any one of them to the lawyer, or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by or at the direction or request of any one of them, in connection with that matter.

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s 124

Vic Act: 124 Loss of client legal privilege—joint clients (1) This section only applies to a civil proceeding in connection with which 2 or more parties have, before the commencement of the proceeding, jointly retained a lawyer in relation to the same matter. (2) This Division does not prevent one of those parties from adducing evidence of— (a) a communication made by any one of them to the lawyer; or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by or at the direction or request of any one of them— in connection with that matter. ACT Act: 124

Loss of client legal privilege—joint clients

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(1) This section only applies to a civil proceeding in connection with which 2 or more parties have, before the start of the proceeding, jointly retained a lawyer in relation to the same matter. (2) This division does not prevent 1 of those parties from presenting evidence of— (a) a communication made by any 1 of them to the lawyer; or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by or at the direction or request of any 1 of them; in connection with that matter. NT Act: 124

Loss of client legal privilege — joint clients

(1) This section only applies to a civil proceeding in connection with which 2 or more parties have, before the commencement of the proceeding, jointly retained a lawyer in relation to the same matter. (2) This Division does not prevent one of those parties from adducing evidence of: (a) a communication made by any one of them to the lawyer; or (b) the contents of a confidential document prepared by or at the direction or request of any one of them; in connection with that matter.

[EA.124.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 107, para 195; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 884.

[EA.124.60]

Loss of privilege: evidence adduced by a joint client

The effect of this provision is that privilege under s 118 or 119 is lost if, in civil proceedings where “2 or more parties have, before the commencement of the proceeding, jointly retained a lawyer in relation to the same matter”, evidence of 1042

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[EA.124.60]

a communication made by any of the parties to the lawyer, or a confidential document prepared by or for any of the parties, in relation to the same matter, is adduced by one of the parties. “Civil proceeding” is defined in the Dictionary to mean “a proceeding other than a criminal proceeding”. The term “criminal proceeding” is also defined in the Dictionary: see [EA.Dict.Pt.1.60]. The terms “confidential document”, “lawyer” and “party” are defined in s 117. After noting this, Sifris J stated in Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 260 at [53]: However the section assumes that the matter in respect of which the lawyer has been retained is relevant to “the civil proceeding”. The section is not dealing with privilege in a vacuum. Accordingly there needs to be some correlation between the privileged information or documents and the proceeding between the holders of the joint privilege. To determine whether there is the necessary correlation it is necessary to look at what matters the advice is in relation to and what the subject matter of these proceedings is.

On the other hand, there is no need for a “dispute” to have arisen relating to the matter before the making of the communication or the preparation of the document. In Akcan v Cross [2013] NSWSC 403, Rein J stated at [13]:

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Whilst not felicitously expressed, I think it is tolerably clear that the intent of the section is to refer to the retention of a lawyer in connection with the same subject matter as is involved in the proceedings. To require that there has been retention of a lawyer prior to proceedings but after a dispute has arisen for the section to apply does not make sense. In context it is obvious that “matter” does not mean matter in the sense of “proceedings” because the joint retention of the lawyer must have been before the commencement of the proceedings.

It should be noted that this provision uses the term “communication”, while the privileges to which it is an exception only apply to “confidential” communications. The reason for this is unclear, but it is important to emphasise that a communication made by one (subsequent) party in the presence of another (subsequent) party may not be confidential and thus not attract privilege in the first place.563 It has been held, relying on common law authorities, that whether there is a communication made to, or from, a lawyer in his or her joint capacity is decided by objective evidence about whether the occasion for the communication was one where the lawyer was being asked to advance the purpose for which he or she was jointly retained.564 However, care should be taken with common law authorities, since while under the common law privilege attaching to evidence of communications between one or more parties to civil litigation and a lawyer whom they have jointly retained can be waived only with the concurrence of all privilege holders, this provision has the effect that “joint client legal privilege over evidence is lost where it is adduced by one of the joint privilege holders in connection with the same matter”.565 It is not a requirement of a joint retainer that a specific contractual document be entered into between each of the parties and the lawyer, nor is it required that each party communicate directly with or 563. See Akcan v Cross [2013] NSWSC 403 at [11]. 564. Re Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (2002) 168 FLR 116; 194 ALR 101; [2002] NSWSC 215 at [72] per Campbell J. 565. Jess & Jess [2015] FamCA 822 at [57]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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instructed the lawyer or that the lawyer direct any advice to each of the parties.566 While this provision does not apply to clients with a “common interest”, they may also be joint clients for the purposes of this provision.567 This provision has application to proceedings in connection with which two or more parties have the requisite joint interest. It is not restricted to litigation between such parties. That parties other than the joint privilege holders might gain access to material the subject of the joint privilege is a concomitant feature of litigation being conducted in open court.568

[EA.124.90]

Related communications and documents

In accordance with s 126, if the application of s 124 means that evidence of a communication or the contents of a document loses privilege, evidence of another communication or document will also cease to be privileged if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document.

[EA.124.120] Burden and standard of proof The “burden of proof” is on the party seeking to persuade the court that the privilege has been lost. In accordance with s 142(1), the court “is to find that the facts necessary for deciding” the factual questions under s 124 have been proved “if it is satisfied that they have been proved on the balance of probabilities”.

Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[EA.124.150] Procedure General procedure relating to the determination of a question whether evidence should be admitted is dealt with in s 189. In accordance with s 133, if a question arises in relation to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question: see [EA.133.60].

Cth Act: 125 Loss of client legal privilege: misconduct (1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of: (a) a communication made or the contents of a document prepared by a client or lawyer (or both), or a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, in furtherance of the commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty; or

566. Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 260 at [43], [52]. This analysis was confirmed by the Court of Appeal: Great Southern Managers Australia Ltd (in liq) v Clarke (2012) 36 VR 308; [2012] VSCA 207 at [21]–[22]. The court stated at [23]: “The better view is, as we have said, the view taken at first instance – namely that the joint retention requirement of s 124(1) is met when one of the joint privilege holders retains the lawyer for its own benefit and for the benefit of the other joint privilege holders”. See also Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Victoria [2013] VSC 302 at [142]. 567. Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151. 568. Great Southern Managers Australia Ltd (in liq) v Clarke (2012) 36 VR 308; [2012] VSCA 207 at [31]; Jess & Jess [2015] FamCA 822 at [60].

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(b) a communication or the contents of a document that the client or lawyer (or both), or the party, knew or ought reasonably to have known was made or prepared in furtherance of a deliberate abuse of a power. (2) For the purposes of this section, if the commission of the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, is a fact in issue and there are reasonable grounds for finding that: (a) the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, was committed; and (b) a communication was made or document prepared in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, offence or act or the abuse of power; the court may find that the communication was so made or the document so prepared. (3) In this section: power means a power conferred by or under an Australian law. NSW Act:

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125

Loss of client legal privilege: misconduct

(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of: (a) a communication made or the contents of a document prepared by a client or lawyer (or both), or a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, in furtherance of the commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty, or (b) a communication or the contents of a document that the client or lawyer (or both), or the party, knew or ought reasonably to have known was made or prepared in furtherance of a deliberate abuse of a power. (2) For the purposes of this section, if the commission of the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, is a fact in issue and there are reasonable grounds for finding that: (a) the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, was committed, and (b) a communication was made or document prepared in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, offence or act or the abuse of power, the court may find that the communication was so made or the document so prepared. (3) In this section: power means a power conferred by or under an Australian law. Vic Act: 125

Loss of client legal privilege—misconduct

(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of—

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(a)

a communication made or the contents of a document prepared by a client or lawyer (or both), or a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, in furtherance of the commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty; or (b) a communication or the contents of a document that the client or lawyer (or both), or the party, knew or ought reasonably to have known was made or prepared in furtherance of a deliberate abuse of a power. (2) For the purposes of this section, if the commission of the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, is a fact in issue and there are reasonable grounds for finding that— (a) the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, was committed; and (b) a communication was made or document prepared in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, offence or act or the abuse of power— the court may find that the communication was so made or the document so prepared. (3) In this section, power means a power conferred by or under an Australian law. ACT Act:

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125

Loss of client legal privilege—misconduct

(1) This division does not prevent the presenting of evidence of— (a) a communication made or the contents of a document prepared by a client or lawyer (or both), or a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, in furtherance of the commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty; or (b) a communication or the contents of a document that the client or lawyer (or both), or the party, knew or ought reasonably to have known was made or prepared in furtherance of a deliberate abuse of a power. (2) For this section, if the commission of the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, is a fact in issue and there are reasonable grounds for finding that— (a) the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, was committed; and (b) a communication was made or document prepared in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, offence or act or the abuse of power; the court may find that the communication was made or the document was prepared as mentioned in paragraph (b). (3) In this section: power means a power given by or under an Australian law.

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[EA.125.90]

NT Act: 125 Loss of client legal privilege — misconduct (1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of: (a) a communication made or the contents of a document prepared by a client or lawyer (or both), or a party who is not represented in the proceeding by a lawyer, in furtherance of the commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty; or (b) a communication or the contents of a document that the client or lawyer (or both), or the party, knew or ought reasonably to have known was made or prepared in furtherance of a deliberate abuse of a power. (2) For the purposes of this section, if the commission of the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, is a fact in issue and there are reasonable grounds for finding that: (a) the fraud, offence or act, or the abuse of power, was committed; and (b) a communication was made or document prepared in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, offence or act or the abuse of power; the court may find that the communication was so made or the document so prepared.

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(3) In this section: power means a power conferred by or under an Australian law.

[EA.125.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 38, s 107, paras 195, 197–198; ALRC 26, vol 1, para 885.

[EA.125.60]

General comments

In general terms, this provision results in loss of one or other of the privileges created by ss 118–120 if a communication or document either: (1) was made or prepared by a client, lawyer or party in furtherance of a fraud, an offence or an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty; or (2) was known, or should reasonably have been known, by the client, lawyer or party, to have been made or prepared in furtherance of a deliberate abuse of a statutory power.

[EA.125.90]

Loss of privilege: fraud, offence, liability to civil penalty (s 125(1)(a))

Privilege under ss 118–120 is lost if a communication or document was made or prepared by a client and/or lawyer (under ss 118–119) or the party (under s 120) in furtherance of the commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty. The terms “client”, “lawyer” and “party” are defined for the purposes of this provision in s 117. The term “offence” is defined in the Dictionary to mean “an offence against or arising under an Australian law”. Clause 3 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 125

For the purposes of this Act, a person is taken to be liable to a civil penalty if, in an Australian or overseas proceeding (other than a criminal proceeding), the person would be liable to a penalty arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country.

Under the common law a civil penalty is involved where a pecuniary payment is required as punishment rather than compensation to an injured party or enforcement of an agreement to pay money.569 Fines imposed under legislation are penalties.570 In addition, dismissal from employment or reduction in rank can constitute a penalty.571 To a significant extent, s 125(1)(a) reflects the common law and assistance has been derived from decided cases under the common law.572 Thus, it has been held, in accordance with the common law, that the range of instances of fraud are not limited to legal fraud in the narrow sense and extends to “all forms of fraud and dishonesty such as fraudulent breach of trust, fraudulent conspiracy, trickery and sham contrivances”.573 Santow J in Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 used that term: … to include the kind of sharp practice often associated with equitable fraud encompassed by the Shorter Oxford Dictionary sense of dishonesty, namely “lack of probity; disposition to deceive, defraud or steal”.574

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In ATH Transport v JAS (International) Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 956, Barrett J accepted that the “fraud” exception “is a statutory emanation of the principle that there is no privilege in iniquity” (at [12]). There is considerable NSW authority that a finding of fraud in this provision must involve an element of dishonesty. Einstein J expressed the “tentative opinion” that “fraud” as used in this provision requires an element of dishonesty, so that while (for example) abuse of process is conduct which would exclude privilege at common law, it will not do so under this provision unless it can be characterised

569. R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 at 742 per Isaacs J; Colne Valley Water Co v Watford & St Albans Gas Co [1948] 1 KB 500 at 504–505. 570. Compare Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328; Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 1 FCR 526. In Kaye v Woods (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 87, Mossop AsJ at [26] noted that “unsatisfactory professional conduct” or “professional misconduct” by a legal practitioner would expose the latter to disciplinary consequences including the possible imposition of a fine. 571. Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397; Martin v Police Service Board [1983] 2 VR 357. 572. See Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](11) per Santow J. For the leading common law authorities, see R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153; Varawa v Howard Smith & Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 382; Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500; [1985] HCA 60 at 511–513 per Gibbs CJ; Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 447; Barclays Bank v Eustice [1994] 4 All ER 511 at 521–522. 573. Kang v Kwan at [37](11), citing Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offıces Ltd [1972] Ch 553 at 565. 574. Kang v Kwan at [37](9). However, he also observed (at [41]) (relying on common law authority) that “neither client not legal adviser need appreciate the fraudulent character of the transaction”.

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[EA.125.90]

as dishonest. This view was subsequently followed by Santow J.576 In the NSW Court of Appeal decision of Van Der Lee v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 286 at [61] Hodgson J stated in obiter dicta that he “inclined to adhere to views expressed in Idoport to the effect that ‘fraud’ in para (j) of s 131(2) requires actual dishonesty”. The members of the Court of Appeal agreed that s 131(2)(j) had the same meaning as this provision, and the other members of the Court agreed with Hodgson J as to the meaning of “fraud” in this context. However, in Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341, Kyrou J of the Victorian Supreme Court held at [47] that “[t]he fact that s 125(1) does not require that the commission of an offence or an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty involve any dishonesty indicates that the section is intended to apply to all categories of fraud known to the law irrespective of whether dishonesty is a necessary element of such a fraud”. On that analysis, Kyrou J could see no reason why the expression “fraud” in s 125 of the Act should be given a narrower meaning than that given to it by the common law principles of privilege (under which fraud was not confined to actual dishonesty – equitable fraud involving breaches of fiduciary duty that fell short of actual dishonesty sufficed).577

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575

The communication must be made or the document prepared with the intention of facilitating the fraud, etc.578 It is not enough that the document is evidence of fraud, etc. As Mossop AsJ stated in Kaye v Woods (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 87 at [38], “the requirement that the document or communication be ‘in furtherance of’ the fraud etc requires more than the document or communication be relevant to it. Rather it must be connected to the fraud etc in the sense of helping it, advancing it or assisting it”. Advice on the legal consequences of a past fraud, the legal remedies that may be invoked by the victim of the fraud and any legal defences that may be available in respect of any claim by the victim would not be in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, although if the client is obtaining legal advice in the context of an ongoing dishonest or fraudulent undertaking (so that the advice will or may impact upon or inform the client in the course of that undertaking) it will be regarded as being in furtherance of the improper purpose.579 However, as Kyrou J of the Victorian Supreme Court pointed out in Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341 at [58] this does not mean that conduct occurring after the fraud, etc, cannot be held to be “in furtherance of the commission” of the fraud, etc.580 Thus, for example, “any positive steps taken by the fraudster to conceal information about the fraud or to place the property 575. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 222 at [63]. Einstein J observed that the “fact that deliberate abuse of power, which would have been a purpose excluding privilege at general law, is dealt with separately in paragraph (b) of s 125(1), supports the view that ‘fraud’ in paragraph (1) is not intended to cover all purposes which excluded privilege at general law”. 576. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](9). 577. In Talacko v Talacko [2014] VSC 328, Elliott J did not need to determine this question but observed at [79] that he had not formed the view that the analysis of Kyrou J was clearly wrong. 578. Zemanek v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (unreported, FCA, Hill J, 2 October 1997). 579. Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151 at [26]. 580. This proposition was adopted by Elliott J in Talacko v Talacko [2014] VSC 328 at [15](6). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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beyond the legal reach of the victim once the fraud is discovered can be in furtherance of the fraud in so far as they continue its efficacy”.581 The privilege will be lost if the client caused the making of a communication or the preparation of a document for a prescribed purpose, even if the lawyer was unaware of this purpose.582 Conversely, the privilege is not lost if some third party caused the making of a communication or the preparation of a document for a prescribed purpose, as long as the client, lawyer or party were unaware of this purpose.583

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On the face of it, the provision does not require that the fraud, etc, must be committed by the client who has the benefit of the privilege. The reference in s 125(1)(a) to “a person”, rather than to “the client”, provides some support for the proposition that, consistently with the common law, the section does not require that the client be knowingly involved in the fraud, offence or act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty. So does the presence of the words, “the client ... knew or ought reasonably to have known” in s 125(1)(b) and their absence from s 125(1)(a).584 However, in Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341, Kyrou J of the Victorian Supreme Court considered at [49] that a “construction of s 125(1)(a) that does not require that the client be knowingly involved in the fraud, offence or act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty would be contrary both to the public interest principles that underpin privilege and to the statutory context of the provision”.585 If a document is prepared for the purpose of planning or otherwise furthering a fraud, etc, privilege will be lost it does not attract privilege and this status cannot be affected by subsequent events – it does not matter whether the fraud, offence or act is consummated or not.586

[EA.125.120] Loss of privilege: deliberate abuse of a power (s 125(1)(b)) Privilege under ss 118–120 is lost if: (1) the communication or document was made or prepared in furtherance of a deliberate abuse of a power; and (2) this was known, or should reasonably have been known, by the client and/or lawyer (under ss 118–119) or the party (under s 120), to have been so made or prepared. 581. See Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341, Kyrou J at [60]; Talacko v Talacko [2014] VSC 328 at [15](7)–(8). 582. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [45] per Santow J. 583. But the position at common law may be different: R v Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis & Francis [1989] AC 346. 584. See Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341, Kyrou J at [49], [128]. 585. This proposition was adopted by Elliott J in Talacko v Talacko [2014] VSC 328 at [15](2). In Kaye v Woods (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 87, Mossop AsJ did not need to resolve the question because the actions of the lawyer were treated as those of the “client” given the definition of “client” in s 117 (at [31]). In SG v New South Wales Crime Commission [2016] NSWSC 1615, Rothman J held at [63] that both the client and his solicitor were “knowingly involved in” the communication of information in breach of s 80 of the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW). 586. Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 3411, Kyrou J at [65]; Talacko v Talacko [2014] VSC 328 at [15](11).

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Before discussing the scope of this provision, it is important to note the operation of s 11(2). In the NSW Court of Appeal case of Van Der Lee v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 286, it was held that the powers of a court with respect to abuse of process include its powers to receive evidence and may override privilege (see [EA.11.60]). The first part of this provision is based on the common law.587 It has been held that the word “deliberate” requires knowledge that the acts in question are an abuse of power, not merely that acts are deliberately done which are in fact an abuse of power.588 This view has been endorsed by the NSW Court of Appeal in Van Der Lee v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 286 at [24], [61], [68]. Further, it has been observed:

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Such a motive requires consideration, as seems to me obvious, of intent or purpose. It follows that it will never or almost never be capable of determination by the mere objective circumstance of illegality. Of course, the nature and circumstances of the illegality may enable the improper purpose or intention to be deduced and perhaps to the level of prima facie proof, but in this case there is no evidence which would permit such a conclusion.589

The word “power” is defined in s 125(3) to mean “a power conferred by or under an Australian law”. It has been held that the reference to “a power” is to a power to affect more directly the rights of other people than by the mere commencement of legal proceedings.590 However, in Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](12) and [42], Santow J held that the bringing of (or defending) legal proceedings is the exercise of a power which is “conferred by or under an Australian law”, so that a dishonest communication to a court, in furtherance of a purpose standing outside the (legitimate) scope of the relevant legal process so as to amount to an abuse of process, would invoke s 125(1)(b), as constituting a deliberate abuse of a power. He maintained that view in the Court of Appeal judgment of Van Der Lee v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 286 at [68]. While that case involved the application of s 131(2)(k), the Court of Appeal agreed that the provisions had the same meaning. Mason P agreed (at [24]) with Santow JA’s view as to the meaning of “a power”, although Hodgson JA (at [61]) preferred the approach of Einstein J in Idoport. In Georgeski v Owners Corp SP49833 [2004] NSWSC 945, Barrett J at [11] extended the principle beyond the commencement of legal proceedings to “the power to compromise proceedings” (although he held that there was no evidence that the power to compromise proceedings was in any way abused). In Trendlen Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 741, McDougall J recognised at [82] that the communication need not necessarily be made to the court (as it was in Kang v Kwan) – it would be sufficient that it was in furtherance of the abuse of process constituted by the bringing or continuance of the proceedings. 587. See John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Abernethy [1999] NSWSC 826 at [8] per Adams J; compare Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500; [1985] HCA 60. 588. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 222 at [64] per Einstein J. See also Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](10) per Santow J. The same approach has been taken in the Victorian Supreme Court: Bare v Small [2011] VSC 639. 589. John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Abernethy [1999] NSWSC 826 at [10] per Adams J. See also Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 222. 590. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 222 at [64] per Einstein J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The privilege will be lost if the client caused the making of a communication or the preparation of a document for the prescribed purpose, even if the lawyer was unaware of this purpose.591

[EA.125.150] Related communications and documents In accordance with s 126, if the application of s 121 means that evidence of a communication or the contents of a document loses privilege, evidence of another communication or document will also cease to be privileged if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document.

[EA.125.180] Burden and standard of proof Pursuant to s 125(2) where, as is often the case, the fraud, etc is in issue in the case and ultimately an issue for the tribunal of fact, the test which the court is required to apply is whether there are reasonable grounds to find that the fraud, etc occurred and the communication etc was made in furtherance of its commission.592 There must be “something to give colour to the charge”, some evidence at a prima facie level that has foundation in fact grounding such a claim.593 Santow J observed in the NSW Supreme Court:

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[T]he standards for establishing reasonable grounds will depend on the circumstances, though [there] must still be sufficient to “give colour to the charge”, that is at a prima facie level. Thus if a person challenging privilege is clearly not in a position to lead very much evidence concerning purpose, as where the other party has exclusive access to that evidence, the court may be satisfied with relatively less evidence. In contrast, much more evidence may be required where the party challenging improperly obtained access to that evidence.594

An interesting question arose in Talacko v Talacko [2014] VSC 328 as to whether s 91 applies in such circumstances. Section 91(1) provides that “[e]vidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding”. Although it was not necessary to decide the question, Elliott J expressed the view at [75] that use of prior judgments to establish that there were “reasonable grounds” for finding alleged frauds “does not equate to seeking to prove the existence of the frauds on the balance of probabilities”, with the consequence that s 91(1) was not breached. In Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341, Kyrou J of the Victorian Supreme Court considered at [68] that, in a case where the commission of a fraud, etc is not a 591. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [45] per Santow J. 592. Compare the position under the common law: Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501; 91 A Crim R 451; [1997] HCA 3. 593. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](6) per Santow J 594. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](7). It should be noted that an appeal in this case was allowed (Kwan v Kang [2003] NSWCA 336), not on the basis that Santow J had erred in respect of his evidentiary ruling but because his ruling had created a reasonable apprehension of bias on his part. See also Watson v McLearnon [2000] NSWSC 19. In British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283; 85 ALJR 348; [2011] HCA 2 the High Court held that, notwithstanding a trial judge observing that the evidential position may change, the “finding of fraud was otherwise expressed without qualification or doubt, that it was based on actual persuasion of the correctness of that conclusion”, with the consequence that an apprehension of bias arose (Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [145]).

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fact in issue in a proceeding, a document will not be privileged under s 125(1) if the party that alleges that the document is not privileged satisfies the court “that there is a prima facie case that” a fraud, etc has been committed and that the document was prepared in furtherance of that fraud, etc. That is, in substance, the same test as applied under s 125(2) in cases where fraud, etc is in issue in the case. Kyrou J appears (see at [70]) to have confused the question of whether s 125 requires that the commission of the fraud, etc be a fact in issue in a proceeding in order for a document that is prepared in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, etc to be held not to be privileged by virtue of the section (it does not) with the question of the applicable standard of proof. The better view is that the burden on the party seeking to persuade the court that the privilege has been lost is, pursuant to section 142(1), to prove the necessary facts “on the balance of probabilities”. The analysis of Kyrou J was adopted in by Elliott J in Talacko v Talacko [2014] VSC 328 at [15](10) and [16]. However, in Kaye v Woods (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 87, Mossop AsJ held at [42] that where s 125(2) does not apply “because the fraud etc is not a fact in issue in the proceedings”, then the party seeking to persuade the court that the privilege has been lost must prove the necessary facts “on the balance of probabilities”.

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[EA.125.210] Procedure General procedure relating to the determination of a question whether evidence should be admitted is dealt with in s 189. It is apparent that the rules of admissibility in Ch 3 of the Act apply.595 In accordance with s 133, if a question arises in relation to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question.596 It has been held that, if it is suggested that privilege has been lost under this provision (by, for example, a deliberate abuse of statutory power), some particulars of the alleged conduct should be given to the party claiming the privilege.597

Cth Act: 126 Loss of client legal privilege: related communications and documents If, because of the application of section 121, 122, 123, 124 or 125, this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or the contents of a document, those sections do not prevent the adducing of evidence of another communication or document if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document. Note: Example: A lawyer advises his client to understate her income for the previous year to evade taxation because of her potential tax liability “as set out in my previous letter to you dated 11 August 1994”. In proceedings against the taxpayer for tax evasion, evidence of the contents of the

595. Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](5) per Santow J; compare Lawcover Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police for NSW (unreported, NSW SC, Hodgson J, 28 November 1997). 596. John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Abernethy [1999] NSWSC 826 at [5] per Adams J. 597. Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 259 at [19] per Levine J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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letter dated 11 August 1994 may be admissible (even if that letter would otherwise be privileged) to enable a proper understanding of the second letter.

NSW Act: 126 Loss of client legal privilege: related communications and documents If, because of the application of section 121, 122, 123, 124 or 125, this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or the contents of a document, those sections do not prevent the adducing of evidence of another communication or document if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document. Note: Example: A lawyer advises his client to understate her income for the previous year to evade taxation because of her potential tax liability “as set out in my previous letter to you dated 11 August 1994”. In proceedings against the taxpayer for tax evasion, evidence of the contents of the letter dated 11 August 1994 may be admissible (even if that letter would otherwise be privileged) to enable a proper understanding of the second letter.

Vic Act:

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126 Loss of client legal privilege—related communications and documents If, because of the application of section 121, 122, 123, 124 or 125, this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or the contents of a document, those sections do not prevent the adducing of evidence of another communication or document if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document. Example: A lawyer advises his client to understate her income for the previous year to evade taxation because of her potential tax liability “as set out in my previous letter to you dated 11 August 1994”. In proceedings against the taxpayer for tax evasion, evidence of the contents of the letter dated 11 August 1994 may be admissible (even if that letter would otherwise be privileged) to enable a proper understanding of the second letter.

ACT Act: 126 Loss of client legal privilege—related communications and documents (1) If, because of the application of a relevant section, this division does not prevent the presenting of evidence of a communication or the contents of a document, the relevant section does not prevent the presenting of evidence of another communication or document if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document. Example: A lawyer advises his client to understate her income for the previous year to evade taxation because of her potential tax liability “as set out in my previous letter to you dated 11 August 1994”. In a proceeding against the taxpayer for tax evasion, evidence of the contents of the letter dated 11 August 1994 may be admissible (even if that letter would otherwise be privileged) to enable a proper understanding of the second letter. Note: An example is part of the Act, is not exhaustive and may extend, but does not limit, the meaning of the provision in which it appears (see Legislation Act, s 126 and s 132).

(2) In this section: relevant section means: 1054

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(a) (b)

section 121 (Loss of client legal privilege—generally); or section 122 (Loss of client legal privilege—consent and related matters); or (c) section 123 (Loss of client legal privilege—defendants); or (d) section 124 (Loss of client legal privilege—joint clients); or (e) section 125 (Loss of client legal privilege—misconduct). NT Act: 126 Loss of client legal privilege — related communications and documents If, because of the application of section 121, 122, 123, 124 or 125, this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or the contents of a document, those sections do not prevent the adducing of evidence of another communication or document if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document. Example for section 126: A lawyer advises his client to understate her income for the previous year to evade taxation because of her potential tax liability “as set out in my previous letter to you dated 11 August 1994”. In proceedings against the taxpayer for tax evasion, evidence of the contents of the letter dated 11 August 1994 may be admissible (even if that letter would otherwise be privileged) to enable a proper understanding of the second letter.

[EA.126.30]

ALRC references

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ALRC 38, s 107, Appendix A, para 283.

[EA.126.60]

General comments

It is suggested that it would be “reasonably necessary” to adduce “evidence of another communication or document” to “enable a proper understanding” of a communication or document where the former communication or document may reasonably be regarded as qualifying or explaining the latter communication or document. It must be remembered in this context that a reference to a document includes a reference to any part of the document.598 Sackville J in the Federal Court made the following observations about this provision: I do not think it either necessary or desirable to attempt to specify exhaustively the meaning that should be attributed to the language in s 126. However, I think that certain general comments can be made. Section 126 does not specify whose understanding is to be considered, when determining whether or not a source document is reasonably necessary “to enable a proper understanding” of a document in respect of which client legal privilege has been lost by reason of a voluntary disclosure. In my view, the legislation contemplates the application of an objective standard, rather than an assessment of the likely understanding of a particular individual, such as an expert witness who is to be called in the proceedings, or a party to the litigation. That an objective standard is contemplated is indicated by the phrase “reasonably necessary”, 598. Dictionary, Pt 2 cl 8(a). Thus, privilege may be lost under this provision for that part of a document that is needed to understand another (non-privileged) part. This point appears to have been missed by some commentators on the Act: Roberts, “Client Legal Privilege: Some Practical Considerations” (1996) 70 Law Inst J 54 at 56; McNicol, “Client Legal Privilege and Legal Professional Privilege: Considered, Compared and Contrasted” (1999) 18 Australian Bar Review 189 at 211. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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and by the fact that the latter part of s 126 is drafted in the passive tense. A court considering whether client legal privilege has been lost under s 126 must determine for itself whether the statutory standard has been satisfied in the particular circumstances of the case. In doing so, the court will take into account the forensic purpose for which it is proposed to use the document voluntarily disclosed.599

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It was argued that this provision simply restates the common law test of implied waiver formulated by the High Court in Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475; 61 ALJR 92; [1986] HCA 80 (see discussion at [EA.122.60] above) but Sackville J (in Towney) rejected this argument, noting that s 122, “which deals with loss of the privilege in the case of disclosure, departs from the common law test for determining whether a party has impliedly waived privilege”. However, he went on (at 413–414): This is not to deny that there is likely to be considerable overlap between the considerations relevant to the common law test governing waiver of legal professional privilege and those relevant to the test for loss of client legal privilege, specified in s 126. For example, as AG (NT) v Maurice makes clear, an important factor in determining whether the privilege has been impliedly waived under the common law is whether it would be misleading for a party to refer to or use certain privileged material, yet insist that the remainder of the privileged material should remain protected. Similarly, if one party discloses a privileged document or communication, in circumstances that make the disclosure misleading unless associated privileged material is also disclosed, it would be difficult to dispute that disclosure of the associated material is “reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of” the document already disclosed. In applying the standard specified by s 126 of the Evidence Act, it is to be borne in mind that the expression “proper understanding” is by no means narrow. The dictionary definition of “proper” includes “complete or thorough”; the definition of “understand” includes “to apprehend clearly the character or nature of” and “to grasp the significance, implications or importance of” (Macquarie Dictionary). It may or may not be correct to say that the test stated in s 126 of the Evidence Act is, or appears to be, narrower than the principles governing implied waiver under the general law: cf Cross on Evidence (Aust ed), para 25300. Any precise assessment of the scope of s 126 must await further decisions. However, I think it fair to say that, if a privileged document is voluntarily disclosed for forensic purposes, and a thorough apprehension or appreciation of the character, significance or implications of that document requires disclosure of source documents, otherwise protected by client legal privilege, ordinarily the test laid down by s 126 of the Evidence Act will be satisfied.

He concluded that a mere reference to a privileged source document, of itself, does not necessarily result in loss of the privilege attaching to the whole or even part of that source document. The circumstances of the particular case must be examined (see Towney at 413–414): It may be perfectly clear, for example, that the source document has been referred to for a very limited purpose, and that no further reference to the source document could assist in a proper understanding of the report. Again, a source document may be very clearly divided into discrete parts, and only one part might conceivably be relevant to gaining a proper understanding of the report. It could not be said in these circumstances that inspection of the other portions of the source document is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the report. 599. Towney v Minister for Land & Water Conservation (NSW) (1997) 76 FCR 401 at 412. See also NRMA Ltd v John Kerin Morgan t/as Allen Allen & Hemsley (unreported, NSW SC, Hunter J, 23 August 1996); Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (No 2) (1998) 83 FCR 397 at 400–401 per Mansfield J.

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In Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 the NSW Court of Appeal essentially accepted as correct the analysis of Sackville J in Towney. McDougall J (Mason P and Ipp JA agreeing) stated that “the operation of s 126 is to be assessed according to its terms, and not on the basis that in some way it incorporates the pre-existing common law” (at [93]) and that “the test set out in s 126 is an objective one” at [94]). He agreed with the reference made by Sackville J to dictionary definitions of the various terms used in this provision (at [96]). He considered that the provision “requires a consideration of the document or communication of which the ‘proper understanding’ is sought, and of the circumstances in which, and purposes for which, it is required” (at [95]). He added at [107]–[110]: The assessment of reasonable necessity is not something to be undertaken in a vacuum. It is to be undertaken having regard to, among other things, other information available ... Whether [a document] is in such a form as, either by itself or in conjunction with other available material, to be capable of complete or thorough understanding does not depend on suggested discrepancies between the [document] and underlying or antecedent documents. It is a question to be answered by reference to the [document] itself, considered in the context of other information available to the person who makes the objective analysis comprehended by the phrase “reasonably necessary”.

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Similarly, in ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577; [2007] NSWSC 859, Brereton J stated at [45]: “Proper understanding” of a document or communication will sometimes, but not always require that documents to which it responds or refers be available. It may very likely be so when the primary document contains a summary or excerpt from an earlier communication, or responds to questions which are not themselves restated in it. But I do not accept that “a proper understanding of the communication or document” involves an appreciation of the manner in which the opinions contained in the document have been formed over time, or the iterations and evolutions through which they have passed. The test is concerned with the comprehensibility of the primary communication or document: if it can be completely or thoroughly understood without more, then access to the related communications or documents is not reasonably necessary.600

DIVISION 1A – PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP PRIVILEGE (NSW ONLY) DIVISION 3.10.1A – PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP PRIVILEGE (ACT ONLY)

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1A.30] General comments This Division was incorporated in the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) by the Evidence Amendment (Confidential Communications) Act 1997 (NSW). No comparable Division was included in the Commonwealth Act until a decade later, when the Commonwealth enacted the Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 600. This passage has been approved: Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 323; Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 7) [2013] VSC 553 at [16]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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2007. However, as the title to that Commonwealth Act indicates, it applied only to confidential communications made to journalists. In 2011, the Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Bill 2011 (Cth) was enacted, significantly modifying the Division, while retaining its limited application to confidential communications made to journalists. The Victorian Evidence Act 2008, the ACT Evidence Act 2011 and the NT Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) do not contain a Div 1A. The ALRC proposed a general discretion to protect communications and records made in circumstances where one of the parties is under an obligation not to disclose them (see ALRC 38, s 109, paras 201–203; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 910–954), but this Division in the NSW Act has a number of important differences from that proposed by the ALRC. In fact, the origin of this Division is more accurately located in a Discussion Paper prepared by the NSW Attorney General’s Department in 1996, entitled Protecting Confidential Communications from Disclosure in Court Proceedings (DP 1996).

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The Division in the Commonwealth Act as it presently exists in based on a Bill (Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Bill 2011 (Cth)) introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament by the independent member of the House of Representatives, Andrew Wilkie, on 18 October 2010. The Bill was referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, which reported in favour of the Bill in November 2010. With some minor amendments, it was enacted on 12 April 2011 and commenced on 13 April 2011.

NSW Act: 126A

Definitions

(1) In this Division: harm includes actual physical bodily harm, financial loss, stress or shock, damage to reputation or emotional or psychological harm (such as shame, humiliation and fear). protected confidence means a communication made by a person in confidence to another person (in this Division called the confidant): (a) in the course of a relationship in which the confidant was acting in a professional capacity, and (b) when the confidant was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law or can be inferred from the nature of the relationship between the person and the confidant. [Def am Act 18 of 2011, Sch 1[1]; Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[59]]

protected confider means a person who made a protected confidence. protected identity information means information about, or enabling a person to ascertain, the identity of the person who made a protected confidence.

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(2) For the purposes of this Division, a communication may be made in confidence even if it is made in the presence of a third party if the third party’s presence is necessary to facilitate communication. [S 126A am Act 18 of 2011; Act 46 of 2007; insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

ACT Act: 126A

Definitions—div 3.10.1A

(1) In this division: confidant —see the definition of protected confidence. harm includes actual physical bodily harm, financial loss, stress or shock, damage to reputation or emotional or psychological harm (for example, shame, humiliation and fear).

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Note: An example is part of the Act, is not exhaustive and may extend, but does not limit, the meaning of the provision in which it appears (see Legislation Act, s 126 and s 132).

protected confidence means a communication made by a person in confidence to someone else (the confidant)— (a) in the course of a relationship in which the confidant was acting in a professional capacity; and (b) when the confidant was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law or can be inferred from the nature of the relationship between the person and the confidant. protected confider means a person who made a protected confidence. protected identity information means information about, or enabling a person to ascertain, the identity of the person who made a protected confidence. (2) For this division, a communication may be made in confidence even if it is made in the presence of a third party if the third party’s presence is necessary to facilitate communication. [S 126A insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 4]

[EA.126A.30]

“protected confidence”

In his Second Reading Speech in relation to this provision, the NSW Attorney-General stated: This protection will extend to a wide range of confidential communications and may include confidences imparted to doctors and other health professionals, journalists, social workers and in other relationships where confidentiality is an integral element.601

The types of relationship referred to in the definition of this term might include doctor/patient; nurse/patient; psychologist/client; therapist/client; counsellor/ client; social worker/client; accountant/client; private investigator/client; and

601. NSW, Legislative Council, Debates (22 October 1997), p 1121. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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journalist/source. It has been accepted that the provision can apply to journalists.602 However, the precise scope of the term “acting in a professional capacity” is uncertain.

NSW Act: 126B

Exclusion of evidence of protected confidences

(1) The court may direct that evidence not be adduced in a proceeding if the court finds that adducing it would disclose: (a) a protected confidence, or (b) the contents of a document recording a protected confidence, or (c) protected identity information. (2) The court may give such a direction: (a) on its own initiative, or (b) on the application of the protected confider or confidant concerned (whether or not either is a party).

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(3) The court must give such a direction if it is satisfied that: (a) it is likely that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to a protected confider if the evidence is adduced, and (b) the nature and extent of the harm outweighs the desirability of the evidence being given. (4) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the purposes of this section, it is to take into account the following matters: (a) the probative value of the evidence in the proceeding, (b) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding, (c) the nature and gravity of the relevant offence, cause of action or defence and the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding, (d) the availability of any other evidence concerning the matters to which the protected confidence or protected identity information relates, (e) the likely effect of adducing evidence of the protected confidence or protected identity information, including the likelihood of harm, and the nature and extent of harm that would be caused to the protected confider, (f) the means (including any ancillary orders that may be made under section 126E) available to the court to limit the harm or extent of the harm that is likely to be caused if evidence of the protected confidence or the protected identity information is disclosed, (g) if the proceeding is a criminal proceeding—whether the party seeking to adduce evidence of the protected confidence or protected identity information is a defendant or the prosecutor, (h) whether the substance of the protected confidence or the protected identity information has already been disclosed by the protected confider or any other person, 602. NRMA v John Fairfax [2002] NSWSC 563.

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(i)

the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of protected confidences, (j) the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of protected identity information. [Subs (4) am Act 18 of 2011, Sch 1[2]]

(5) The court must state its reasons for giving or refusing to give a direction under this section. [S 126B am Act 18 of 2011; insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

ACT Act: 126B

Exclusion of evidence of protected confidences

(1) The court may direct that evidence not be presented in a proceeding if the court finds that presenting it would disclose— (a) a protected confidence; or (b) the contents of a document recording a protected confidence; or (c) protected identity information.

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(2) The court may give a direction under this section— (a) on its own initiative; or (b) on the application of the protected confider or confidant (whether or not either is a party). (3) The court must give a direction under this section if it is satisfied that— (a) it is likely that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to a protected confider if the evidence is presented; and (b) the nature and extent of the harm outweighs the desirability of the evidence being presented. (4) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for this section, it must take into account the following matters: (a) the probative value of the evidence in the proceeding; (b) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding; (c) the nature and gravity of the offence, cause of action or defence and the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding; (d) the availability of any other evidence relating to the matters to which the protected confidence or protected identity information relates; (e) the likely effect of presenting evidence of the protected confidence or protected identity information, including the likelihood of harm, and the nature and extent of harm that would be caused to the protected confider; (f) the means (including any ancillary orders that may be made under section 126E) available to the court to limit the harm or extent of the harm that is likely to be caused if evidence of the protected confidence or the protected identity information is disclosed; (g) if the proceeding is a criminal proceeding—whether the party seeking to present evidence of the protected confidence or protected identity information is a defendant or the prosecutor; © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(h) whether the substance of the protected confidence or the identity information has already been disclosed by the confider or someone else; (i) the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of confidences; (j) the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of identity information.

protected protected protected protected

(5) The court must state its reasons for giving or refusing to give a direction under this section. [S 126B insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 4]

[EA.126B.30]

ALRC References

ALRC 102, paras 15.7–15.37.

[EA.126B.60]

General comments

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In the NSW Attorney General’s Department 1996 Discussion Paper (DP 1996), which preceded the introduction of Div 1A into Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)by the Evidence Amendment (Confidential Communications) Act 1997 (NSW), consideration was given to the proposals of various law reform reports in this area, including that of the ALRC. It was then stated: The test proposed by the reports balanced a public interest in preserving the confidential nature of certain relationships (which might be undermined by forced disclosure of confidential communications) against the public interest in having all relevant evidence placed before the court to ensure a fair trial. It is proposed that the court be required to balance the potential for harm in the particular case against the public interest in having all relevant evidence available to the court. This protects the interests of the person making the confidential communication who may suffer harm and not the members of the profession or occupation. It is proposed that both the objection and the court order may relate to part only of a confidential communication. It may be, for example, that some part of a document would expose the person to harm and need to be excluded, while some other parts of that document may contain evidence of great importance to the resolution of the issues in the case.603

However, the provision is curiously drafted. In a submission from the NSW Bar Association regarding this provision in the Evidence Amendment (Confidential Communications) Bill 1997, the comment was made: The provision as presently drafted gives no guidance at all to a court in exercising its discretion (under 126B(1)) to direct that evidence not be adduced, other than to list a number of matters the court is to take into account (126B(4)). In contrast, the provision specifies satisfaction of a balancing test as the precondition for the court being required (under 126B(3)) to direct that the evidence not be adduced. This is plainly unsatisfactory. … [I]t should be made clear that the court may only give a direction under this provision where the test in 126B(3) is satisfied.

In July 1997, in reply to the President of the Bar Association, the NSW Attorney-General, Mr JW Shaw QC, stated: 603. NSW Attorney General’s Department, Discussion Paper, Protecting Confidential Communications from Disclosure in Court Proceedings (June 1996), paras 4.9–4.11.

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It is not proposed to amend clause 126B of the Bill in the manner proposed by the Bar Association. I consider that the list of matters which the court is required to take into account gives the court very clear guidance as to the manner in which it is intended it should exercise the discretion to not adduce evidence of a confidential communication. If there is any doubt as to the way in which those factors are intended to affect the exercise of the discretion, reference should be made to either the Discussion Paper or my Second Reading Speech.

In his Second Reading Speech, the NSW Attorney-General stated: The first protection vests a discretion in the court to exclude evidence of a confidential communication. The evidence must be excluded if there is a likelihood that harm would be or might be caused, whether directly or indirectly, to the person who imparted the confidence and the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of having the evidence given or the documents produced.604

It appears likely that it was the intention of the drafters of this legislation that there would be only one “discretion”, to be exercised if (bearing in mind the various factors required to be taken into account) the nature and extent of the harm, which would or might be caused to a protected confider if the evidence were adduced, outweighs the desirability of the evidence being given.

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However, that is not how the provision is in fact drafted. Rather, as the NSW Bar Association pointed out, even if no direction is required under the balancing test in s 126B(3) (that is, the court is not satisfied that the harm which may be caused if the evidence is adduced outweighs the desirability of the evidence being given), the court still appears to retain an unguided discretion to direct that the evidence not be adduced: compare ss 137 and 135. Quite how that discretion is to be exercised, if at all, remains to be seen. One possibility is that the court might take into account public interests in non-disclosure other than the public interest isolated in s 126B(3) (the nature and extent of the harm which would or might be caused to a protected confider if the evidence were adduced). Possible public interests of this sort are discussed below. One such public interest is the general effective operation of the professional relationship in which the protected confidence was communicated. Interestingly, this was a matter referred to in DP 1996, in a way which suggested an intention that the court could take it into account in the application of this provision: There is a concern that certain of the relationships concerned fail to operate effectively without a privilege, particularly in relation to communications specifically made in contemplation of litigation. An example where litigation is in contemplation is sexual assault counsellors and their clients. Anecdotal evidence supports the view that clients have left counselling and/or withdrawn their complaint when informed that the notes of counselling sessions may be subpoenaed. In other cases, clients have censored themselves, to the detriment of the counselling relationship. Evidence in the USA supports the view that clients who know their files may be used in evidence will seek anonymity and/or refuse counselling. Other marginalised groups in the community, such as intravenous drug users, mental health patients, street kids and people with HIV may be reluctant to seek professional assistance where it is perceived that

604. NSW, Legislative Council, Debates (22 October 1997), p 1120. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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confidentiality will not be maintained. There is clearly potential for harm to flow to these people where confidentiality is not preserved.605

The fact that the reference to “sexual assault counsellors and their clients” predated the decision to formulate a special Division in the Act to deal with that category of confidential communication (see Div 1B and s 126F(3)), would not appear to negate the potential significance of these observations. It should be noted, however, that s 126H(3)(c) requires a court to consider (in the context of a sexual assault “protected confidence”) the “public interest in preserving the confidentiality of protected confidences” as well as the public interest in “protecting the protected confider from harm”.

[EA.126B.90]

“direct that evidence not be adduced” (s 126B(1))

This provision permits a court to prohibit the adducing of evidence in a proceeding (see the discussion in relation to client legal privilege at [EA.118.90]). However, s 131A extends the application of the privileges in Pt 3.10 (other than the provisions of ss 123 and 128) to some ancillary processes and pre-trial stages of civil and criminal proceedings.

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A witness must not be asked a question seeking to obtain evidence where a direction under s 126B(1) has been given. Equally, a document to which the provision applies may not be tendered in evidence. The court may give such a direction on its own initiative or on the application of the protected confider or confidant concerned (s 126B(3)). In accordance with s 134, evidence that must not be adduced in a proceeding is not admissible in the proceeding.

[EA.126B.120] The “harm” which “would or might be caused to a protected confider if the evidence is adduced” (s 126B(3)) The word “harm” is defined inclusively in s 126A(1) to include “actual physical bodily harm, financial loss, stress or shock, damage to reputation or emotional or psychological harm (such as shame, humiliation and fear)”. Further, the court is required to take into account the harm which “might” be caused “whether directly or indirectly”, as well as harm that will be caused, if the evidence is adduced (subject to the requirement to take into account the means available to the court to limit the harm or extent of the harm: s 126B(4)(f)). However, in at least one respect this concept is narrow – it relates only to harm to “a protected confider”. Thus, it does not extend to harm to the confidant, other potential confidants, or to the community in general. Equally, it would appear that the harm must be caused, or may possibly be caused, directly or indirectly, by the adducing of the evidence, rather than some other cause (such as the harm arising from the uncertainty before the court ruling as to whether or not the direction will be made).606 One 605. NSW Attorney General’s Department, Discussion Paper, Protecting Communications from Disclosure in Court Proceedings (June 1996), para 4.12.

Confidential

606. On the other hand, if the protected confider had relied on a promise of confidentiality, account presumably could be taken of the harm which might be caused to that person if the promise were not fulfilled.

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question remains, relating to the use of the term “a protected confider” rather than “the protected confider”. This may simply have been a drafting slip, which would mean that the harm which might be caused to other protected confiders, if the evidence were adduced, would not be a relevant consideration. On the other hand, it may have been deliberate (compare s 126(4)(e)). A difficulty with that approach is that the term “protected confider” is defined in s 126A(1) to mean “a person who made a protected confidence”. This would mean that the court could take into account harm which might be caused to a person who has already confided, but not the harm which might be caused because potential protected confiders do not confide by reason of concern over possible lack of confidentiality.

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[EA.126B.150] “the desirability of the evidence being given” (s 126B(3)) It is generally desirable, in both civil and criminal proceedings, that relevant evidence be given. Several of the factors listed in s 126B(4), which the court must take into account, bear on this desirability. Thus the more probative the evidence is, and the more important it is (particularly bearing in mind the availability or unavailability of any other evidence bearing on the same matters), the more desirable it is that the evidence be given.607 In criminal proceedings, where the evidence is adduced by the prosecution, the more serious the offence being prosecuted, the more desirable it is that the evidence be given. Where the evidence is adduced by the defence, the desire to minimise the risk of wrongful conviction will be a consideration strongly enhancing the desirability of the evidence being given. In Dept of Community Services v D (2006) 66 NSWLR 582; [2006] NSWSC 827 Brereton J considered at [22] that a significant factor making it desirable that the evidence be given was that “[a]t stake in these proceedings is the welfare of a child, and the importance of the court having relevant evidence bearing on that matter outweighs the interest of a party in a protected confidence”.

[EA.126B.180] “the probative value of the evidence” (s 126B(4)(a)) The term “probative value” is defined in the Dictionary: “probative value” of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.

For discussion of that term in a different context, see [EA.137.90].

[EA.126B.210] Available means to limit the harm (s 126B(4)(f)) In DP 1996, it was stated: The court should be required to consider the means available to it to limit the adverse consequences of a forced breach of confidence. These may include limiting publication of the evidence, ordering non-publication of part only of the evidence, suppressing the publication of names and other identifying information and conducting hearings in 607. See, for example, Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1155 at [15] per Levine J. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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camera (closed court). Many concerns about giving evidence can be addressed by using techniques such as these to keep confidential information secret. Breach of such orders can be punished as a serious contempt.608

In Dept of Community Services v D (2006) 66 NSWLR 582; [2006] NSWSC 827 Brereton J took into account that the hearing in which the confidences were sought to be adduced was required to be in camera, access to court records was limited and publication of certain matters was prohibited, concluding at [24] that “the confidential nature of the proceedings will in any event minimise … dissemination” of the confidences.

[EA.126B.240] Criminal proceedings (s 126B(4)(g)) In his Second Reading Speech, the NSW Attorney-General stated: In line with policy evidence in the Evidence Act 1995, there are very few circumstances in which evidence which may be adduced for the benefit of a defendant in a criminal proceeding should be granted privilege.609

Similarly, in DP 1996 it was stated:

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In line with the policy evident in the Evidence Act 1995, there are very few circumstances in which evidence which may be adduced for the benefit of a defendant in a criminal proceeding should be granted privilege (see section 123–client legal privilege). In R v Pearson (unreported, 5 March 1996 per Gleeson CJ) the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that section 123“produced the practical result that legal professional privilege does not stand in the way of obtaining access to subpoenaed documents, at least in circumstances where a legitimate forensic purpose of the accused at a criminal trial is served by being given access to such documents for the purpose of potential use at the trial”.610

Of course, s 126B is not in the same terms as s 123 because it requires the court only to take into account the fact that the party seeking to adduce evidence of the protected confidence or protected identity information is a defendant in criminal proceedings, rather than simply providing that the privilege is lost in such circumstances. Nevertheless, it is clear that this matter will be an important factor tending to persuade a court not to direct that such evidence not be adduced.

[EA.126B.270] “whether the substance of the protected confidence or the protected identity information has already been disclosed” (s 126B(4)(h)) Plainly enough, if confidentiality has already been lost, because the substance of the confidence has already been disclosed, it is less likely that harm will or might be caused if the evidence is adduced. Consequently, it is more likely that the court will find that the harm is outweighed by the desirability of the evidence being given. On the other hand, publication of an unauthenticated leak may not be a factor supporting disclosure: compare the area of public interest 608. NSW Attorney General’s Department, Discussion Paper, Protecting Confidential Communications from Disclosure in Court Proceedings (June 1996), para 4.13.5. 609. NSW, Legislative Council, Debates (22 October 1997), p 1121. 610. NSW Attorney General’s Department, Discussion Paper, Protecting Confidential Communications from Disclosure in Court Proceedings (June 1996), para 4.13.6.

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611

immunity. Where only partial disclosure has occurred, the court will need to consider whether that supports disclosure of the remainder. It should be noted that it is not necessary that the disclosure came from the protected confider – it may have been from “any other person”. It should also be noted that the matter referred to in this provision is only required to be taken into account by the court in applying s 126B, while the effect of s 126C is automatic loss of the privilege created by s 126B, where the protected confider consents to the evidence in question being adduced.

[EA.126B.300] Particular relationship: health professional and patient As noted above, the nature of the harm (and on whom it is inflicted) which a court may take into account under this provision is not entirely clear. In this regard, some assistance may be provided by the observations of the ALRC in its Interim Report on Evidence. The ALRC suggested (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 912) that one relevant public interest in preserving the confidentiality of doctor/patient communications is public health:

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The community has a clear interest in maintaining high levels of good health. This is arguably as significant a community priority as the bringing of the guilty to justice through the court system. It is said by many that the doctor/patient relationship is substantially dependent upon the creation and fostering of trust between the parties involved and that this cannot be achieved without a confidential relationship between doctor and patient. … It is argued that an absence of privilege poses a threat to public health, because it can deter people seeking medical assistance and can affect the quality of treatment.

Another public interest acknowledged by the ALRC (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 913) was “avoiding unnecessary hardship”: It is important for the acceptability of the trial system, that it not make unduly harsh demands of those affected by it. Forcing doctors to reveal what their patients have told them may on occasions seem so. To date this has been addressed by the courts indirectly – limiting the questions, controlling access to subpoenaed documents, and persuasion. … The absence of a privilege creates a situation in which the doctor’s code of ethics and his legal obligations as a witness may come into conflict.

The ALRC concluded (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 917–918): There is a need for a limited form of privilege relating to confidential communications between doctor and patient. While confidentiality and trust are not generally crucial to the formation or continuance of doctor/patient relationships, there will be occasions when they are. Every good doctor forms a relationship of trust and confidence with his patient and, to lesser and greater degrees, this relationship assists in the treatment of both somatic and psychic ills. There are occasions when the role of the doctor is not easily to be distinguished from that of the psychotherapist. Under these conditions, while confidentiality may not always be crucial to the treatment, disclosure in court may sometimes terminate the relationship. In this circumstance the public interest in the maintenance of health dictates that special consideration should be given to the maintenance of the doctor-patient relationship. In some cases, the public interest in the protection of the confidentiality of such a relationship may be more important than the interest of the litigation system in extracting all relevant evidence from the witness. Flexibility to cover such circumstances is necessary. Further, there will be occasions 611. See Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; [1978] HCA 43 at 45 per Gibbs ACJ. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 126B

when the doctor is placed in a position where he must either disobey his code of ethics or disobey the law. At present there is no procedure to deal with this situation. The judge must improvise, or exercise his powers under the law of contempt – an unsatisfactory position. The provision of a discretionary privilege would allow the competing public interests to be taken into account when the court is assessing whether evidence ought in the circumstances to be compelled from witnesses, thus allowing the courts to be sensitive to the individual needs of witnesses and of relationships.

In R v Leung [2012] NSWSC 1451, a case where the defendant had been arrested and was being examined by a clinical nurse specialist who was called to the police station to make a mental health assessment, Price J observed at [22]:

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[T]he relationship between a clinical nurse specialist who is called to a police station to make a mental health assessment and an accused person is a protected relationship under s 126A Evidence Act. Ensuring that a person in custody is not a risk of self-harm is a matter of importance not only to the police force but to our society as a whole. It is fundamental to the reliability of the assessment that accused persons be able to speak freely to the health professional without fear that their conversation might be used in evidence against them. To be balanced against that consideration is the public interest in solving serious crimes such as manslaughter. However, it is unlikely that accused persons in custody would co-operate in a mental health assessment if they understood that the interview was not to be confidential.

The evidence was excluded in that case. In contrast, in R v Kelsall (No 3) (2015) 249 A Crim R 148; [2015] NSWSC 253, the prosecution only sought to adduce disclosures to two doctors that conveyed a risk of harm to other people. In the light of evidence from both doctors that they adopted a policy of excluding from doctor/patient confidentiality anything that may bear upon a risk of self-harm or harm to others, RA Hulme J concluded that “the evidence in question was of a type that the doctors (and it would seem doctors generally) would consider being outside the scope of what is required to be kept confidential” and ruled that the evidence was admissible. The ALRC attempted to identify the public interests that would support the creation of a privilege in the context of a psychotherapist-patient relationship (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 921–931): It is conventionally asserted that the psychotherapist-patient relationship is one in which confidentiality is crucial and in which the utmost trust and confidence must be held by the patient. It is said that without complete confidentiality therapy is unlikely to produce the results that society would want. To this extent, it is argued that the relationship may be distinguished from the physician-patient one, since confidentiality is of the very essence of the relationship with the psychotherapist, whereas with the physician it is merely one of its aspects. Under these circumstances, the need of psychotherapists and their patients for confidentiality is more urgent than that of doctors and their patients. A variety of public policy reasons, it is argued support a privilege – the community’s interest in the treatment of mental illness, the minimisation of crime, and the avoiding of undue hardship in the application of the law. … It seems likely that the absence of a privilege will deter some patients from seeking treatment. It is a fair assumption that where the nature of the treatment contemplated concerns acts which are popularly realised to be unlawful, the patient will give some thought to the confidentiality of the information that he communicates to the psychotherapist. … An important aspect of psychotherapy has been the use of psychoanalysis which involves full disclosure by the patient of ideas, impulses, conflicts and emotions. For this to be possible, repression of memories must be overcome. In classical theory, the success of psychotherapy is inversely proportional to the degree of “resistance” encountered and 1068

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repression remaining present in the patient. It is asserted, therefore, that given the nature of psychotherapy, absolute confidence must be part of the psychotherapist-client relationship for the client successfully to reveal his inner thoughts and feelings, thereby “lifting his repressions”. As the process is in good part one of breaking down obstructions to the free-flowing of ideas both conscious and unconscious, the awareness in the patient of the possibility that his words might be repeated in court could well affect the success of the relationship. … It is important, however, not to over emphasise the importance of confidentiality. Confidentiality both never completely exists and exists only to a very limited extent in many kinds of therapy. … As in the area of doctor-patient relations, so here there is the potential for a clash between the professional ethical obligations of the therapist and his obligations as a witness. As noted above, the law does not provide any direct machinery to resolve this conflict when it arises. To require a psychotherapist to give evidence unnecessarily can adversely affect the acceptability of the trial system.

[EA.126B.330] Particular relationship: social worker and client

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The ALRC stated (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 936): The social work profession is responsible for work highly valued by the community. This includes direct counselling of individual, groups and families, community development; welfare administration; policy planning; teaching and training. Social workers have expertise in many different areas – family and other relationships, personality assessment, cultural and ethnic differences, social deviancy, social systems and resources available to assist client problems. The function which trained social workers fulfil is one which is wide in its application and crucial for significant segments of the population, particularly the disabled and the disadvantaged. Inherent in the relationship between social worker and client is the concept of trust. But the varying nature of relationships between social workers and their clients means that the degree of trust required and the likely detrimental effect of betrayal of that trust will vary considerably. In many situations, however, a social worker cannot continue his or her assistance unless the client can rely implicitly upon the social worker preserving confidences and the disclosure of confidential communications may also discourage persons from seeking help in the future.

Another public interest is “avoiding unnecessary hardship” (ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 937–938): [T]here will be occasions when the legal and ethical obligations of a social worker will conflict. Many social workers feel that their Code of Ethics dictates that they maintain the secrecy of communications entrusted to them at all costs. They feel that the ability of the courts as it is occasionally exercised to compel disclosure of confidences places them in a difficult ethical position. Failure to comply with a court order constitutes contempt of court. Lying to the court or distortion of the actual communications between social worker and client constitutes perjury. Betraying of the confidence of the client constitutes what many have identified as an unfair and unethical breach of professional ethics. It has been argued by social workers that a professional group of high standing in the community should not be subjected to such an ethical trilemma unless there is no alternative.

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[EA.126B.360] Particular relationship: journalists and their sources It has been accepted that this provision can apply to journalists.612 The primary area in which this provision might be regarded as having application is in relation to attempts to protect the anonymity of a journalists source of information, that is, to keep confidential “protected identity information” (defined in s 126B(1) as “information about, or enabling a person to ascertain, the identity of the person who made a protected confidence”).However, there is now a discrete provision in the NSW Act conferring a privilege in respect of the identity of a journalist’s informant: s 126K.

[EA.126B.390] Burden and standard of proof It appears clear from the formulation of s 126B that, to the extent that it is relevant to talk of the “burden of proof” in this context, it is on the party arguing that a direction be given. Again to the extent that it is relevant to talk of “standard of proof” in this context, s 142(1) imposes a standard of proof “on the balance of probabilities”.

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[EA.126B.420] Procedure The court may give a direction on its own initiative or on the application of the protected confider or confidant concerned: s 126B(3). In accordance with s 132, if it appears to the court that a witness or a party may have grounds for making an application or objection under this provision, the court must satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the absence of the jury) that the witness or party is aware of the effect of that provision. If an application or objection is made, or the court considers the matter on its own initiative, the issue should be determined in accordance with s 189. In accordance with s 133, if a question arises in relation to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question. In GB by his tutor FB v Western Sydney Area Health Service [2010] NSWSC 181 Hall J ordered that the legal representatives for the plaintiff’s sister, who intervened in the proceedings to claim privilege under this provision in respect of medical records relating to her, “should have to have a full and proper opportunity of inspecting all documents that have been produced” in answer to subpoena with a view to identifying any confidential information and making a claim under this provision. In accordance with s 126B(5), the court must state its reasons for giving or refusing to give a direction under this section.

NSW Act: 126C Loss of professional confidential relationship privilege: consent This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence given with the consent of the protected confider concerned. [S 126C insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

612. NRMA v John Fairfax [2002] NSWSC 563.

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ACT Act: 126C Loss of professional confidential relationship privilege—consent This division does not prevent the presenting of evidence with the protected confider’s consent. [S 126C insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 4]

[EA.126C.30]

Loss of privilege: consent

This provision results in loss of the privilege created by s 126B where the protected confider consents to the evidence in question being adduced. A similar provision operates in the context of client legal privilege: s 122(1): see [EA.122.90].

NSW Act: 126D Loss of professional confidential relationship privilege: misconduct

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(1) This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication made or the contents of a document prepared in the furtherance of the commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty. (2) For the purposes of this section, if the commission of the fraud, offence or act is a fact in issue and there are reasonable grounds for finding that: (a) the fraud, offence or act was committed, and (b) a communication was made or document prepared in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, offence or act, the court may find that the communication was so made or document so prepared. [S 126D insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

ACT Act: 126D Loss of professional confidential relationship privilege—misconduct (1) This division does not prevent the presenting of evidence of a communication made or the contents of a document prepared in the furtherance of the commission of a fraud or an offence or the commission of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty. (2) For this section, if the commission of the fraud, offence or act is a fact in issue and there are reasonable grounds for finding that— (a) the fraud, offence or act was committed; and (b) a communication was made or document prepared in furtherance of the commission of the fraud, offence or act; the court may find that the communication was made or the document was prepared as mentioned in paragraph (b). [S 126D insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 4] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.126D.30]

[EA.126D.30]

s 126D

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

General comments

In general terms, this provision results in loss of the privilege created by s 126B if the otherwise privileged protected confidence communication or document was made or prepared in furtherance of a fraud, an offence or an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty. The communication must be made or the document prepared with the intention of facilitating the fraud, etc. It is not enough that the document is evidence of fraud, etc. The term “offence” is defined in the Dictionary to mean “an offence against or arising under an Australian law”. Clause 3 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary provides: For the purposes of this Act, a person is taken to be liable to a civil penalty if, in an Australian or overseas proceeding (other than a criminal proceeding), the person would be liable to a penalty arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country.

Under the common law, a civil penalty is involved where a pecuniary payment is required as punishment rather than compensation to an injured party or enforcement of an agreement to pay money.613 Fines imposed under legislation are penalties.614 In addition, dismissal from employment or reduction in rank can constitute a penalty.615 This provision is substantially the same as s 125(1)(a) which, in turn, substantially reflects the common law in relation to client legal privilege.

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[EA.126D.60]

Related communications and documents

Since this Division has no provision similar to s 126 (relating to client legal privilege), if the application of s 126D means that evidence of a communication or the contents of a document loses privilege, it is presumably the case that evidence of another communication or document reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document will also cease to be privileged.

[EA.126D.90]

Burden and standard of proof

The “burden of proof” is on the party seeking to persuade the court that the privilege has been lost. Section 142(1) requires the court “to find that the facts necessary for deciding” factual questions have been proved “if it is satisfied that they have been proved on the balance of probabilities”. However, an exception to this arises under s 126D(2) where, as is often the case, the fraud, etc is in issue in the case and ultimately an issue for the tribunal of fact. In that situation the test which the court is required to apply is whether there are reasonable grounds to find that the fraud, etc occurred and the communication etc was made in furtherance of its commission. 613. R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 at 742 per Isaacs J; Colne Valley Water Co v Watford & St Albans Gas Co [1948] 1 KB 500 at 504–505. 614. Compare Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328; Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 1 FCR 526. 615. Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397; Martin v Police Service Board [1983] 2 VR 357.

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s 126F

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[EA.126E.30]

[EA.126D.120] Procedure General procedure relating to the determination of a question of whether evidence should be admitted is dealt with in s 189. It is apparent that the rules of admissibility in Ch 3 of the Act apply. In accordance with s 133, if a question arises in relation to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question.

NSW Act: 126E Ancillary orders Without limiting any action the court may take to limit the possible harm, or extent of the harm, likely to be caused by the disclosure of evidence of a protected confidence or protected identity information, the court may: (a) order that all or part of the evidence be heard in camera, and (b) make such orders relating to the suppression of publication of all or part of the evidence given before the court as, in its opinion, are necessary to protect the safety and welfare of the protected confider. [S 126E insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

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ACT Act: 126E Ancillary orders Without limiting any action the court may take to limit the possible harm, or extent of the harm, likely to be caused by the disclosure of evidence of a protected confidence or protected identity information, the court may— (a) order that all or part of the evidence be heard in closed court; and (b) make an order relating to the suppression of publication of all or part of the evidence given before the court as, in its opinion, is necessary to protect the safety and welfare of the protected confider. [S 126E insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 4]

[EA.126E.30]

General comments

This provision gives power to the court to hold proceedings in camera and to make suppression orders. Exercise of such powers (and any other similar powers possessed by the court) may reduce the harm likely to be caused by a forced breach of confidence, and thus support a conclusion that a direction should not be given that the evidence not be adduced.

NSW Act: 126F Application of Division (1) This Division does not apply in relation to a proceeding the hearing of which began before the commencement of this Division.

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s 126F

Chapter 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

(2) This Division applies in relation to a protected confidence within the meaning of this Division whether made before or after the commencement of this Division. (3) This Division does not apply in relation to a protected confidence within the meaning of Division 1B or Division 2 of Part 5 of Chapter 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Note: The Commonwealth Act does not include this subsection. [Subs (3) am Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[60]; Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.103[2]; Act 48 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.1[1]]

(4) The court may give a direction under this Division in respect of a protected confidence or protected identity information whether or not the protected confidence or protected identity information is privileged under another section of this Part or would be so privileged except for a limitation or restriction imposed by that section. [S 126F am Act 46 of 2007; Act 121 of 2001; Act 48 of 1999; insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

ACT Act: 126F Application—div 3.10.1A (1) This division extends to a protected confidence made before the commencement of this division.

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(2) This division does not apply in relation to a proceeding the hearing of which began before the commencement of this division. (3) This division does not apply in relation to a protected confidence within the meaning of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991, division 4.2.5 (Protection of counselling communications). Note: The Commonwealth Act does not include this subsection. [Subs (3) am Act 40 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 1[1.14]]

(4) The court may give a direction under this division in relation to a protected confidence or protected identity information whether or not the protected confidence or protected identity information is privileged under another section of this part or would be privileged except for a limitation or restriction imposed by that section. (5) For subsection (2), the hearing of a proceeding has begun if the court has begun to take oral or written evidence in the proceeding (other than in relation to bail or any other interlocutory matter). Note: The Commonwealth Act and NSW Act do not include this subsection. [S 126F am Act 40 of 2015; insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 4]

DIVISION 1B – SEXUAL ASSAULT COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE (NSW ONLY)

[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30]

General comments

This Division was first incorporated in the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) by the Evidence Amendment (Confidential Communications) Act 1997 (NSW). No 1074

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s 126H

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[EA.Ch.3.Pt.3.10.Div.1B.30]

comparable Division is included in the Commonwealth Act. No comparable provision was proposed by the ALRC. The Discussion Paper prepared by the NSW Attorney General’s Department in 1996, entitled Protecting Confidential Communications from Disclosure in Court Proceedings (DP 1996), did not propose a comparable provision. It appears to have emerged from a perception within the NSW Attorney General’s Department that the general privilege contained in Div 1A would not provide sufficient protection for confidential sexual assault counselling communications. In 1999, the Division was substantially amended by removing the substantive provisions and incorporating them in Pt 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). That Part is contained in Related Legislation, along with commentary. While the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) does not contain any comparable Division, similar substantive provisions to those in the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) are found in Div 2 of Pt 2 of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic).

NSW Act: 126G

Definitions

In this Division: criminal proceeding has the same meaning as criminal proceedings has in Division 2 of Part 5 of Chapter 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [Def am Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.103[3]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 6 and Sch 4.70[1]]

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principal protected confider has the same meaning as it has in Division 2 of Part 5 of Chapter 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [Def am Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.103[3]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 6 and Sch 4.70[1]]

protected confidence has the same meaning as it has in Division 2 of Part 5 of Chapter 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [Def am Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.103[3]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 6 and Sch 4.70[1]]

sexual assault offence has the same meaning as it has in Division 2 of Part 5 of Chapter 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [Def am Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.103[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 6 and Sch 4.70[1]] [S 126G am Act 121 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 48 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.1[2]; insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

NSW Act: 126H Exclusion of evidence of protected sexual assault communications (1) This section applies only in a civil proceeding in which substantially the same acts are in issue as the acts that were in issue in relation to a criminal proceeding. (2) If evidence was found to be privileged in a criminal proceeding under Division 2 of Part 5 of Chapter 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, the evidence may not be adduced in a civil proceeding to which this section applies. [Subs (2) am Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.103[4]; Act 94 of 1999, s 6 and Sch 4.70[2]] [S 126H am Act 121 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 48 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.1[2]; insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 126I

NSW Act: 126I Application of Division (1) This Division does not apply in relation to a civil proceeding the hearing of which began before the commencement of this section. (2) This Division applies, subject to subsection (1), in respect of a protected confidence whether made before or after the commencement of this section. [S 126I subst Act 48 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.1[2]; insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

DIVISION 1C – JOURNALIST PRIVILEGE (CTH, NSW, VIC) DIVISION 3.10.1C – JOURNALIST PRIVILEGE (ACT ONLY)

Cth Act: 126A

Definitions [Repealed]

[S 126A rep Act 21 of 2011, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1; insrt Act 116 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1]

Cth Act: 126B

Exclusion of evidence of protected confidences [Repealed]

[S 126B rep Act 21 of 2011, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1; insrt Act 116 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1]

Cth Act: 126C Loss of professional confidential relationship privilege: consent [Repealed] Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[S 126C rep Act 21 of 2011, s 2 and Sch 1 item 1; insrt Act 116 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1]

Cth Act: 126D Loss of professional confidential relationship privilege: misconduct [Repealed] [S 126D rep Act 21 of 2011, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1; insrt Act 116 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1]

Cth Act: 126E

Ancillary orders [Repealed]

[S 126E rep Act 21 of 2011, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1; insrt Act 116 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1]

Cth Act: 126F Application of Division [Repealed] [S 126F rep Act 21 of 2011, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1; insrt Act 116 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1]

Cth Act: 126J Definitions (1) In this Division: informant means a person who gives information to a journalist in the normal course of the journalist’s work in the expectation that the information may be published in a news medium. journalist means a person who is engaged and active in the publication of news and who may be given information by an informant in the expectation that the information may be published in a news medium. 1076

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s 126J

Part 3.10 - Privileges

news medium means any medium for the dissemination to the public or a section of the public of news and observations on news. [Former s 126G renum Act 132 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 1 item 27; insrt Act 21 of 2011, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1]

NSW Act: 126J Definitions In this Division: informant means a person who gives information to a journalist in the normal course of the journalist’s work in the expectation that the information may be published in a news medium. journalist means a person engaged in the profession or occupation of journalism in connection with the publication of information in a news medium. news medium means a medium for the dissemination to the public or a section of the public of news and observations on news. [S 126J reinsrt Act 18 of 2011, Sch 1[3]; rep Act 48 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.1[2]; insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

Vic Act:

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126J Definitions (1) In this Division— informant means a person who gives information to a journalist in the normal course of the journalist’s work in the expectation that the information may be published in a news medium; journalist means a person engaged in the profession or occupation of journalism in connection with the publication of information, comment, opinion or analysis in a news medium; news medium means a medium for the dissemination to the public or a section of the public of news and observations on news. (2) For the purpose of the definition of journalist, in determining if a person is engaged in the profession or occupation of journalism regard must be had to the following factors— (a) whether a significant proportion of the person’s professional activity involves— (i) the practice of collecting and preparing information having the character of news or current affairs; or (ii) commenting or providing opinion on or analysis of news or current affairs— for dissemination in a news medium; (b) whether information, having the character of news or current affairs, collected and prepared by the person is regularly published in a news medium; (c) whether the person’s comments or opinion on or analysis of news or current affairs is regularly published in a news medium; © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 126J

(d) whether, in respect of the publication of— (i) any information collected or prepared by the person; or (ii) any comment or opinion on or analysis of news or current affairs by the person— the person or the publisher of the information, comment, opinion or analysis is accountable to comply (through a complaints process) with recognised journalistic or media professional standards or codes of practice. [S 126J insrt Act 52 of 2012, s 3]

ACT Act: 126J Definitions—div 3.10.1C In this division: informant means a person who gives information to a journalist in the normal course of the journalist’s work in the expectation that the information may be published in a news medium. journalist means a person who is engaged and active in the publication of news and who may be given information by an informant in the expectation that the information may be published in a news medium. news medium means a medium for the dissemination to the public or a section of the public of news and observations on news.

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[S 126J insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 4]

[EA.126J.20] General comments This definitional provision is based on a provision proposed in a Bill introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament by the independent member of the House of Representatives, Andrew Wilkie, on 18 October 2010. In his First Reading speech on that date, he stated: These amendments are based on similar provisions of the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 and have been modified to ensure appropriate application in the context of Australian evidence law.

The definitions in the Wilkie Bill substantially replicated those in s 68(5) of the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006. The definition of the term “informant” remains the same. However, the definition of the term “journalist” in the Wilkie Bill (and, substantially, the New Zealand Act) was “a person who works in such a way that in the normal course of that person’s work they may be given material by an informant in the expectation that the information may be published in a news medium”. An amendment moved by the Greens in the Senate replaced the words “in the normal course of that person’s work” with the words “is engaged and active in the publication of news and who”. This may have been based, at least in part, on a submission made to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee that “the definition of ‘journalist’ could be broadened to encompass ‘journalism academics, retired journalists, freelance journalists and journalism students’” (Report at para 3.15). The Australian Greens stated in “Additional Comments” in the Report of the Committee at para 1.7: “We argue that it should not rest on whether or not your work is paid as to whether these 1078

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s 126K

Part 3.10 - Privileges

[EA.126J.30]

protections are afforded, but rather whether or not it is in the public interest for the source to be protected” (see also para 1.8). It is likely that the definition would also extend to a person working for an organization like Wikileaks (see Report at para 3.14). It may well extend to a “blogger”, particularly given the deletion of the words “in the normal course of that person’s work”. On any view, the definition is a very broad one. The definition of the term “news medium” in the Wilkie Bill (and the New Zealand Act) was “a medium for the dissemination to the public or a section of the public of news and observations on news”. An amendment moved by the Greens in the Senate replaced the words “a medium” with the words “any medium”. The Greens stated in “Additional Comments” in the Report of the Committee at para 1.9: “The Greens also seek to ensure that protection is proffered to those operating in independent and alternative media, not just the traditional or major media outlets”. The definition, which is clearly very broad, would encompass the efforts of both investigative journalists and gossip columnists. It would cover a range of media, including digital, by reference to the dissemination of “news and observations on news” to the public or a section of the public.

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[EA.126J.30] General comments [NSW, Vic, ACT Acts] The definitions of “informant” and “news medium” are substantially the same as the definitions in the Commonwealth Act. The definitions are based on those in s 68(5) of the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006. However, the definition of “journalist” is different in the three Acts. The NSW and Victorian definitions are different from the definition in the Commonwealth Act because the latter is not limited to a person “engaged in the profession or occupation of journalism”. However, the phrase “occupation of journalism” is likely to be given a broad interpretation. The NSW definition is different from the definition in the Victorian Act because the latter extends beyond the publication of “information” in a news medium to the publication of “comment, opinion or analysis” in such a medium, but then lists a number of factors in s 126J(2) which may have the effect of limiting the operation of the broad definition in s 126J(1). It is unlikely that leaving out the words “comment, opinion or analysis” will significantly narrow the scope of the definition in NSW because the journalist need only be acting “in connection with” the publication of information – so that a person providing “comment, opinion or analysis” in relation to such information would not be excluded from the scope of the definition.

Cth Act: 126K

Journalist privilege relating to identity of informant

(1) If a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the informant’s identity, neither the journalist nor his or her employer is compellable to answer any question or produce any document that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained. (2) The court may, on the application of a party, order that subsection (1) is not to apply if it is satisfied that, having regard to the issues to be determined in © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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that proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of evidence of the identity of the informant outweighs: (a) any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or any other person; and (b) the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also, in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts. (3) An order under subsection (2) may be made subject to such terms and conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit. [Former s 126H am Act 132 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 1 item 28; insrt Act 21 of 2011, s 3 and Sch 1 item 1]

NSW Act: 126K

Journalist privilege relating to identity of informant

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(1) If a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the informant’s identity, neither the journalist nor his or her employer is compellable to give evidence that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained. (2) The court may, on the application of a party, order that subsection (1) is not to apply if it is satisfied that, having regard to the issues to be determined in the proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of the identity of the informant outweighs: (a) any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or any other person, and (b) the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also, in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts. (3) An order under subsection (2) may be made subject to such terms and conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit. [S 126K reinsrt Act 18 of 2011, Sch 1[3]; rep Act 48 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.1[2]; am Act 54 of 1998; insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

Vic Act: 126K

Journalist privilege relating to identity of informant

(1) If a journalist, in the course of the journalist’s work, has promised an informant not to disclose the informant’s identity, neither the journalist nor his or her employer is compellable to give evidence that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained. (2) The court may, on the application of a party, order that subsection (1) is not to apply if it is satisfied that, having regard to the issues to be determined in the proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of the identity of the informant outweighs— (a) any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or any other person; and 1080

Uniform Evidence Law

s 126K

Part 3.10 - Privileges

[EA.126K.20]

(b) the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also, in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts. (3) An order under subsection (2) may be made subject to such terms and conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit. [S 126K insrt Act 52 of 2012, s 3]

ACT Act: 126K

Journalist privilege relating to informant’s identity

(1) If a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the informant’s identity, neither the journalist nor the journalist’s employer is compellable to answer any question or produce any document that would disclose the informant’s identity or enable that identity to be ascertained.

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(2) The court may, on the application of a party, order that subsection (1) is not to apply if it is satisfied that, having regard to the issues to be decided in the proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of the informant’s identity outweighs— (a) any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or anyone else; and (b) the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also, in the news media’s ability to access sources of facts. (3) An order under subsection (2) may be made subject to the conditions (if any) the court thinks fit. Note: The Commonwealth Act, s 126H is equivalent to this section. [S 126K insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 4]

[EA.126K.20]

General Comments [Cth Act only]

This provision creates a prima facie rule that a journalist and the journalist’s employer cannot be compelled by a court to disclose an informant’s identity but permits a court to over-ride this rule in the “public interest”. It is based on a provision proposed in a Bill introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament by the independent member of the House of Representatives, Andrew Wilkie, on 18 October 2010. In his First Reading speech on that date, he stated: This bill amends the Evidence Act 1995 ((Cth)) by strengthening the protection provided to journalists and their sources. It is intended to foster freedom of the press and better access to information for the Australian public. … The Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Bill 2010 is based on the premise that every member of the community has the fundamental right to free speech and that sometimes the exercise of that right needs to be undertaken anonymously, especially when it comes to people speaking out about official misconduct. Moreover, the bill is based on the premise that journalists must be able to publicise such outspokenness if they are to accurately inform the Australian public about matters of interest.

He later added: © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 126K

These amendments are based on similar provisions of the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 and have been modified to ensure appropriate application in the context of Australian evidence law.

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The Bill was referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee. In November 2010, the Committee released a report supporting the Bill, observing at para 3.2 that there was “broad support” for “the New Zealand model of creating a rebuttable presumption that the confidential relationship between a journalist and their source should be protected”. It is, at first sight, curious that the provision is expressed in terms of compellability (although that was the approach adopted in the New Zealand provision). In effect, it creates an exception to s 12, which provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act … (b) a person who is competent to give evidence about a fact in issue is compellable to give that evidence”. While some exceptions to that provision are found in Div 1of Pt 2.1 of Ch 2 (“Adducing Evidence”) of the Act, the exception created by this provision is found in Ch 12 (“Admissibility of Evidence”). This is not a matter of great practical importance, particularly bearing in mind that most of the other “privileges” found in Pt 3.10 are expressed in term that evidence “not be adduced”, rather than being “not admissible”. Further, the adoption of the language of “[not] compellable” rather than “not be adduced” makes little practical difference, other than to avoid the need to create an exception to the prohibition where the person entitled to the “privilege” gives “consent” to the evidence being adduced. The adoption of the language of “[not] compellable” imports the principle that the person who is entitled to the “privilege” (the journalist or the journalist’s employer) may choose (consent) to give the evidence. In those circumstances, whether it may be adduced and, if so, whether it is admissible, will be determined by the other provisions of Chs 2 and 3. However, the evidence may not be compelled by the court. Thus, in the absence of consent it cannot be “adduced” at all, even for the purposes of determining admissibility. Indeed, in contrast with the other privilege provisions in Ch 3, it is apparent that the significance of the reference to compellability is that the provision may apply in pre-trial contexts. Thus, for example, it may apply to “interrogatories” or, where the objection is in respect of a document, to orders for production in general (see also s 131A).

[EA.126K.30]

General Comments [NSW, Vic, ACT Acts]

The NSW and Victorian provisions are almost identical, the only difference being that, in s 126K(1) of the Victorian provision, the promise made by the journalist must have been made “in the course of the journalist’s work”. In practice, this is unlikely to make a significant difference because it is unlikely that a NSW court will ever be required to consider the effect of a journalist’s promise to an informant not to disclose the informant’s identity that was not made in the course of the journalist’s work. The NSW and Victorian provisions are almost identical with the comparable Commonwealth provision in s 126K (see the detailed commentary at [EA.126K.20]-[EA.126K.420]) but with one difference – s 126H(1) in the Commonwealth Act is expressed in terms of compellability “to answer any question or produce any document” rather than compellability “to give evidence”. It is doubtful that this will make any significant difference. If a journalist or the journalist’s employer is not compellable “to give evidence that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be 1082

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s 126K

Part 3.10 - Privileges

[EA.126K.120]

ascertained”, that would presumably extend to protection against being compelled, while giving evidence, to produce a document that would have the same effect. As regards “preliminary proceedings”, as distinct from the giving of evidence in court, see s 131A. It is important to appreciate that s 131A is not limited to pre-trial proceedings – it applies to any “disclosure requirement”, defined to mean “a process of order of a court that requires the disclosure of information or a document”. That would include an order made under s 36 by a court to a person present at a hearing of the court “to give evidence and to produce documents or things …”. Accordingly, s 131A would have the effect that the requirements of s 126K would have to be satisfied before the court would compel the journalist or the journalist’s employer to produce a document that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained.

[EA.126K.60]

Definitions

The terms “journalist”, “informant” and “news medium” are defined in s 126J.

[EA.126K.90]

“[i]f a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the informant’s identity …” (s 126K(1))

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A pre-condition for the prima facie rule that a journalist and the journalist’s employer cannot be compelled by a court to disclose an informant’s identity is that the journalist (as defined in s 126G) must have “promised” the informant (as defined in s 126G) “not to disclose the informant’s identity”. In Ashby v Commonwealth (No 2) (2012) 203 FCR 440; 290 ALR 148; [2012] FCA 766, Rares J rejected an argument that the prima facie rule that journalists would be able to resist producing, or disclosing to a court, any document or information provided by a person to whom they had once promised confidentiality that discloses the identity of the source or enables it to be ascertained, regardless of the connection between the promise and the particular information. Rares J observed at [21] that the purpose of this provision is “to ensure that a person who provides particular information can do so knowing that his or her identity as its source can be protected by the journalist” (emphasis in original). The provision should not be interpreted to give journalists “in effect, carte blanche to refuse to produce any documents or give evidence that disclosed the identity of a source, or enabled it to be ascertained, merely because the journalist once had had a connection with a person whose identity the journalist had promised not to disclose when imparting particular information” (at [23]). Thus, s 126K(1) would not apply where the relevant information was given to a journalist “on the record”, even if the journalist had also given the same person an undertaking of confidentiality that would, and should, protect revelation of the person being the source of other material provided “off the record” on the same occasion (at [27]).

[EA.126K.120] “the journalist nor his or her employer …” (s 126K(1)) The “privilege”, in the sense of the prima-facie right to resist being compelled to disclose an informant’s identity, is possessed by both the journalist who promised not to disclose the informant’s identity and by the “employer” of that journalist. The term “employer” is not defined and will be given its usual meaning. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.126K.150] “neither … is compellable to …” (s 126K(1)) The prima facie rule is that a journalist and the journalist’s employer cannot be compelled by a court to “to answer any question or produce any document that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained”. Thus, the rule applies to the adducing of testimony (from the journalist or the journalist’s employer), to the answering of questions pre-trial (for example, in response to interrogatories) and to the production of a document either pre-trial or during a trial. That it has this general application is confirmed in s 131A (see commentary at [EA.131A.60]). As regards applicable procedure, see [EA.126K.390].

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[EA.126K.180] “that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained” (s 126K(1)) It is not necessary that the answer to a question or a document would reveal the identity of the informant – it is sufficient that it would “enable that identity to be ascertained”. The onus would be on the journalist or the journalist’s employer to satisfy the court of this (see [EA.126K.390]). In Ashby v Commonwealth (No 2) (2012) 203 FCR 440; 290 ALR 148; [2012] FCA 766, Rares J observed at [30] that “the ordinary and natural meaning of the word ‘disclose’ includes: to open up (that which is closed or shut); to unclose ... to open up to the knowledge of others; to make openly known, reveal, declare (secrets, purposes, beliefs, etc). (Oxford English Dictionary online) to cause, to appear; allow to be seen; make known; reveal ... to uncover; lay open to view; (The Macquarie Dictionary online)”. Rares J concluded at [31]–[32] that the privilege is not available if the identity of the informant, as the source of the particular information, is already known or able to be ascertained.

[EA.126K.210] “having regard to the issues to be determined in that proceeding …” (s 126K(2)) If the prima facie rule of non-compellability created by s 126K(1) applies, the question is whether a court over-rides this rule in the “public interest” pursuant to s 126K(2). A number of requirements must be satisfied for the court to make such an order: (a) an application is made by a party for such order; (b) there is a public interest in the disclosure of evidence of the identity of the informant; and (c) “having regard to the issues to be determined in that proceeding”, that public interest “outweighs” the matters referred to in s 126K(2)(a) and s 126K(2)(b). If these requirements are satisfied, the court “may” order that s 126K(1)“is not to apply”, with the consequence that the journalist or the journalist’s employer can be compelled to answer any question or produce any document that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained. Thus, even if satisfied of these requirements the court still appears to retain an 1084

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unguided discretion to decline to make the order. In applying the balancing test and in exercising the discretion the court would, no doubt, consider the possibility of making any order subject to particular terms and conditions pursuant to s 126K(3). It is an interesting question whether s 192 applies to the making of an “order” pursuant to this provision. If it does, “in all cases the court must take into account the matters prescribed by s 192(2)”, as well as “matters which may be relevant in a particular case”. It has been held that the phrase “leave, permission or direction” in s 192 extends to the making of an “order” under s 26 and, accordingly, required application of the terms of s 192. However, an argument that s 192 does not apply to this provision is that s 126K(3) would have been otiose if s 192 applied, since the purpose of s 126K(3) would have been achieved by s 192(1).616 In Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687, Dixon J, when discussing the comparable Victorian provision, observed at [44]: the proper approach to considering whether to require disclosure of the identity of sources is: (a) First, to identify the issues in the proceeding that determine the context of the application; (b) Second, to identify the public interest in disclosure in the context of those issues that is advanced by the plaintiff;

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(c) Third, to assess the degree of significance, or weight, to be attributed to that public interest; (d) Fourth, to identify the likely adverse effect of an order for disclosure on the informant and others; (e) Fifth, to identify the public interest in a free and informed press and in investigative journalism; (f) Sixth, to assess the degree of significance, or weight, to be attributed to that public interest; (g) Seventh, to weigh up the competing considerations according to the significance, or weight, attributed to them to answer whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the other interests.

As regards the balancing test, Dixon J pointed out at [46]–[47] that the matters to be weighed may be described as “incommensurable”. He stated at [47]: … The public interest in the disclosure of the informant goes to the fairness of the trial of the issues raised in the proceeding, the interests of justice. The issues of likely adverse effect and public interest in facts and opinions communicated by an informed media have nothing to do with the fairness of the trial process, but a great deal to do with the proper functioning of a free democratic society under the rule of law. The only sense in which one set of considerations can outweigh the other is by a value judgement, which requires the attribution of weight, or degree of significance, to the factors being considered, but not for a calculation.

He added at [54] that the provision contemplates: 616. ASIC v Rich [2006] 201 FLR 207; [2006] NSWSC 643 per Austin J at [9]; ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 per Jacobsen J at [7]–[8]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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… that there can be circumstances in which the disadvantages to the [party seeking disclosure] in assessing the strength of the defendants’ defence may be a price that has to be paid, given the strength of the countervailing public interest. The public interest in free flow of information may outweigh other public interests which apply in relation to the production of documents for the purposes of litigation. Each decision will turn on the particular circumstances.

[EA.126K.220] having regard to the issues to be determined in that proceeding … (s 126K(2)) In Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687, Dixon J, when discussing the comparable Victorian provision, observed at [45]: The first task is to determine the issues in the proceeding that determine the context of the application, since the balancing exercise is undertaken “having regard to the issues to be determined in the proceeding” which includes the defences put forward, or to be taken, by the defendants. The public interest in disclosure must be identified by the [party seeking disclosure]. That inquiry will usually involve prognostication about the impact of the privilege on the just determination of [that party’s] claim. That said, the public interest considerations that are put into the value judgement required of the court are not in their entirety referable to the issues in the proceeding. Plainly, some of those considerations are broad, extending well beyond the issues between the parties.

Dixon J also identified two particular issues that may arise when a qualified privilege (or other) defence makes the identity of the source relevant:

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(a) The first issue is how the reliance on the undisclosed sources made their identity relevant (at 57]): It is evident that journalists need to exercise particular care in their use of information from confidential sources in order to avoid waiver of journalist’s privilege. The question of whether a plaintiff is unfairly denied an effective remedy by non-disclosure may be raised because of the conduct of the defendant. The extent to which the identity of sources is relevant to the proper administration of justice could depend upon the way information from the confidential source, and the nature and integrity of the source, is used by the defendant in its communication.

The issues raised in the proceeding by the defences taken may make the identity of sources relevant in a way that is inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege for similar reasons (at [59]): The defence may put in issue the way information from the confidential source, and the nature and integrity of the source, contributed to the reasonableness of publication. Fairness may dictate that the privilege is waived by the issue raised on the pleadings.

Dixon J observed that principles of “waiver” may have application in this context (at [60]–[67]): (b) The second issue that may affect a court’s assessment of the degree of interference with the public interest in the administration of justice that is occasioned by nondisclosure (Dixon J at [68], [71]): is whether a successful claim of privilege provides a sufficient basis to exclude Jones v Dunkel reasoning because a party or witness has failed to give evidence or an explanation that, on the question of reasonableness of publication, it could be expected to give. … The plaintiff’s ability to use Jones v Dunkel reasoning would be a factor that lessened the degree to 1086

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which the public interest in the disclosure of the identity of the sources was adversely affected by the privilege. It might not be the case that the plaintiff would be left without an effective remedy if disclosure is refused ….

[EA.126K.240] “having regard to the issues to be determined in that proceeding …” (s 126K(2)) It is suggested that the term “that proceeding” should be approached in a broad manner. For example, if the application is made in the context of a return of a subpoena for production of documents, the issues to be determined should be understood to extend to those issues that will arise in the anticipated trial (not simply the “proceeding” of the return of the subpoena).

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[EA.126K.270] “public interest in the disclosure of evidence of the identity of the informant” (s 126K(2)) It is generally in the public interest, in both civil and criminal proceedings, that relevant evidence be given. The more probative the evidence, the greater the public interest in the admission of the evidence. The assessment of this consideration must be made “having regard to the issues to be determined in [the] proceeding”. However, it is likely that the significance of the identity of the informer will be less a matter of obtaining relevant evidence and more a matter of permitting action to be taken in respect of the informant (for example, civil or criminal proceedings for wrongful disclosure of confidential information). The public interest in disclosure may extend to the potential general deterrent effect of such action. In Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687, Dixon J, when discussing the comparable Victorian provision, observed at [49] that an appropriate question would be: “To what degree will the conduct of a fair trial for the benefit of the [party seeking disclosure] be impaired by maintaining confidentiality of sources?” He added at [51]: … First, it is not necessary for a fair trial to be had that there be complete, or perfect, disclosure of all relevant and admissible evidence. Secondly, whether a fair trial is being conducted in the court is, quintessentially, an assessment to be made by the trial judge, who is best placed to make that assessment on the basis of the issues that remain to be determined at trial; on the pleadings, in the light of counsel’s opening statements, and on examination and cross-examination of witnesses and other relevant circumstances that occur in the course of the trial.

In that case, it was concluded at [160] that “the impact of non-disclosure of the sources on the plaintiff’s capacity to defeat the qualified privilege defence to be negative but not critical. … I am far from persuaded that the capacity for a fair trial on the issue of reasonableness is compromised to the extent of concluding that the plaintiff may not have an effective remedy”.

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[EA.126K.300] “any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or any other person” (s 126K(2)(a)) It may be noted that, in proposing a general “protected confidences” privilege, the ALRC placed considerable importance on the “avoidance of unnecessary hardship” for a journalist required to disclose the identity of an informant (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 952):

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Many journalist associations have ethical mandates which compel confidentiality. …[T]he absence of a privilege or other mechanism places the newsperson in an invidious position when confronted with the choice of obeying the mandates of the courts or the ethical dictates of his or her profession. The law is seen to require a breach of the code of ethics whatever the need for the evidence may be. There is also evidence that a considerable number of journalists would be prepared to go to jail in order to protect important source relationships which they believed ought to have been privileged but under existing law are not. Thus the contempt sanction possessed by the court will on occasions be seen as ineffective as well as harsh. …Under such circumstances, an unhealthy situation exists. Where a profession is prepared to disobey the mandates of the legal system and to suffer the consequences, rather than breach its own ethical rulings, at the least it must be said that law has not satisfactorily addressed the problem.

Plainly enough, if confidentiality has already been lost, because the identity of the informant has already been disclosed, it is unlikely that harm will be caused if the order is made. Consequently, it is more likely that the court will find that the likely adverse effect is outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. On the other hand, publication of an unauthenticated leak or gossip in respect of the identity of the informant may not be a factor supporting an order.

[EA.126K.330] “the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public …” (s 126K(2)(b)) In Ashby v Commonwealth (No 2) (2012) 203 FCR 440; [2012] FCA 766, Rares J referred at [18] to the general purpose underlying the provisions as the importance of the free flow of information in a democratic society. This proposition was cited by Dixon J in Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687 at [39]. It may be noted that, in proposing a general “protected confidences” privilege, the ALRC discussed what public interests support a privilege in relation to a journalist’s source (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 949). One is the public interest in confidentiality (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 949): It is frequently the “people’s right to be informed” that advocates of newsperson’s privilege legislation have championed. … It is undeniable that the role of the press is a crucial one within our community. It acts as a watchdog on the executive, the judiciary and the bureaucracy as well as on private enterprise. Without its free functioning, Watergate scandals might well not come to light and new ideas and criticisms would be more readily suppressed. … Free speech invites dispute. A free press plays a central role in providing a vehicle for free expression of personal opinion and as a vocal defender of free speech. It is argued that the refusal of a privilege arrogates to the government and to powerful organisations greater scope for malfeasance. It is argued that so long as a privilege protecting disclosure of a source exists, those in important 1088

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positions can with a reasonable degree of immunity give information to the media about the iniquities and corruption of the organisation responsible for them. Supporters of a newsperson-informant privilege frequently draw attention to the role of reporters and their informants in uncovering political scandals, abuses of governmental and multi-national corporate power and even the revelation of the attitudes and practices of subversive organisations. The question must be asked, however, whether the absence of a privilege would be likely to have a significant effect upon the performance of the role of the press. For example, is it likely that public debate is at present significantly inhibited and that abuses of government are notably left exposed in the absence of the privilege? How important is it to preserve the confidentiality of the information?

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The Significance of Confidentiality. The newsperson and most particularly the investigative journalist, uses information obtained in confidence in the process of assembling data for media stories. … The impact of the absence of a privilege, however, whether as to the information obtained or the identity of the informant, is difficult to assess. The absence of a privilege, and even for that matter enforcement of contempt proceedings against newspeople, need not discourage or prevent the provision of secret information for use by newspeople. The relationship between a newsperson and informant would necessarily, however, have to be less intimate and conducted through less personal channels. If an informant has information which he believes it is vital for him to pass on, he can do so in such a way that his identity is not revealed. Arguments which declare that the flow of confidential information would cease, were it to be absolutely clear that no privilege exists and that no promise by a journalist of confidentiality could be relied upon, are of very dubious worth. The problem with the informant concealing his identity is that a newsperson would have difficulty in substantiating the information given to him by an unidentifiable source. Thus, it may be said that the absence of a privilege might affect the quality of the information that a journalist is able to assemble.

The ALRC placed most importance on the “avoidance of unnecessary hardship” (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 952): Many journalist associations have ethical mandates which compel confidentiality. … [T]he absence of a privilege or other mechanism places the newsperson in an invidious position when confronted with the choice of obeying the mandates of the courts or the ethical dictates of his or her profession. The law is seen to require a breach of the code of ethics whatever the need for the evidence may be. There is also evidence that a considerable number of journalists would be prepared to go to jail in order to protect important source relationships which they believed ought to have been privileged but under existing law are not. Thus the contempt sanction possessed by the court will on occasions be seen as ineffective as well as harsh. … Under such circumstances, an unhealthy situation exists. Where a profession is prepared to disobey the mandates of the legal system and to suffer the consequences, rather than breach its own ethical rulings, at the least it must be said that law has not satisfactorily addressed the problem.

As formulated in s 126K(2)(b), the court is required to assess “the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also, in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts”. Although it is arguable that these two public interests will, in practice, put a heavy onus on anyone seeking to have the identity of an informant revealed, this is not necessarily the case. As the ALRC pointed out, it may be doubted that public debate was significantly inhibited and that abuses of government were left unexposed when the privilege did not exist. Further, the absence of the privilege, and even for that matter enforcement of contempt proceedings against journalists, need not discourage or prevent the provision of secret information for use by the © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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news media. Arguments that declare that the flow of confidential information would cease, were it to be clear that no privilege exists and that no promise by a journalist of confidentiality could be relied upon, are of dubious worth, although it should be accepted that a journalist would have difficulty in substantiating information provided by an unidentifiable source.

[EA.126K.360] “subject to such terms and conditions …” (s 126K(3)) Possible terms and conditions might be drafted in order to protect the confidentiality of the identity of the informant outside the scope of the proceeding. The court would consider the means available to it to limit the adverse consequences of a compelled breach of confidence. These may include limiting publication of the evidence, ordering non-publication of part only of the evidence, suppressing the publication of names and other identifying information and conducting hearings in camera (closed court). In Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687, Dixon J, when discussing the comparable Victorian provision, observed at [55]:

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To assist in this balancing exercise, the court has the power, pursuant to s 126K(3), to make an order subject to such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit. Appropriate terms and conditions may depend on the point in the proceeding when the issue arises, and may include pseudonym orders, closed court orders, and orders that restrict disclosure to certain persons and/or on the basis of particular undertakings given by those persons. In criminal cases, physical facilities in court rooms, including screens and remote audio-visual transmission are also employed where a witness persuades the court that adverse effects from identification by, or confrontation with, an accused are likely.

[EA.126K.390] Burden and standard of proof The “burden of proof” in respect of the matters in s 126K(1) is on the journalist or the journalist’s employer seeking to persuade the court that the requirements of that provision are satisfied. Section 142(1) requires the court “to find that the facts necessary for deciding” factual questions have been proved “if it is satisfied that they have been proved on the balance of probabilities”. On the other hand, if the court is considering an application made by a party under s 126K(2), the burden would appear to be on that party, to the standard of the balance of probabilities, in respect of the factual questions that arise under that provision. However, in Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687, Dixon J, when discussing the comparable Victorian provision, observed at [92] that the onus would rest on the party seeking disclosure in relation to “the public interest in the due administration of justice by disclosure of relevant evidence”, while the onus would rest on the party opposing disclosure in relation to the matters in s 126K(2)(a) and 126K(2)(b). As regards the actual weighing process, in Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687, Dixon J, when discussing the comparable Victorian provision, observed at [50]: The onus and standard of proof on the parties when advocating for that value judgment to be exercised in their favour are identified by an analogy with the scales of justice. The plaintiff bears the onus to tip the balance of the scales to favour disclosure, which is the required standard. The plaintiff bears the evidentiary onus of placing proof of 1090

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relevant considerations in one pan, while the defendants seeking to tip the balance in favour of confidentiality by reference to other considerations bear an evidentiary onus to place proof of those other considerations in the opposing pan. The court’s value judgement turns on assessing the weight, or degree of significance, of the opposing sets of considerations or values. That exercise may be affected by the extent to which the party that does not bear the evidentiary onus has sought to negate or minimise considerations put against its position. In respect of adverse effects from disclosure, which is a factual question, such consequences must be likely, in the sense of probably or apparently going to happen.

[EA.126K.420] Procedure

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As regards testimony, the application of the provision is relatively straightforward. The journalist or the journalist’s employer will be a witness. A question will be asked, the answer to which would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained. The journalist or the journalist’s employer will decline to answer the question and then claim that he or she is not compellable to answer the question. The court will first decide whether the requirements of s 126K(1) are satisfied and if they are, and an application is made by a party, decide whether to order that s 126K(1) is not to apply pursuant to s 126K(2). If no such order is made, the witness cannot be compelled to answer the question. As regards a document, the application of this provision may arise in pre-trial proceedings or in a call for production in a trial. As regards pre-trial proceedings, see s 131A. In the usual case, the journalist or the journalist’s employer will decline to produce the document and then claim that he or she is not compellable to produce it. The court will first decide whether the requirements of s 126K(1) are satisfied (assuming there is some dispute about the matter) and if they are, and an application is made by a party, decide whether to order that s 126K(1) is not to apply pursuant to s 126K(2). If no such order is made, production of the document cannot be compelled. However, it is possible that, even in that situation, the court may decide that some redaction of the document will ensure that the document will not then disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained. This may create some practical difficulties, since the court may have to see the document (and thus become aware of its contents) to decide whether some redaction of it would ensure that the document will not then disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained.

NSW Act: 126L Application of Division (1) This Division extends to information given by an informant before the commencement of this Division. (2) This Division does not apply in relation to a proceeding the hearing of which began before the commencement of this Division.

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(3) This Division (as applied by section 131A) does not apply to a disclosure requirement referred to in that section made before the commencement of this Division. [S 126L reinsrt Act 18 of 2011, Sch 1[3]; rep Act 48 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.1[2]; insrt Act 122 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1]

ACT Act: 126L Application—div 3.10.1C (1) This division extends to information given by an informant before the commencement of this division. (2) This division does not apply in relation to a proceeding the hearing of which began before the commencement of this division. (3) This division (as applied by section 131A) does not apply to a disclosure requirement mentioned in that section made before the commencement of this division. (4) For subsection (2), the hearing of a proceeding has begun if the court has begun to take oral or written evidence in the proceeding (other than in relation to bail or any other interlocutory matter). Note: The NSW Act does not include this subsection and the Commonwealth Act does not include this section. [S 126L insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 4]

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DIVISION 2 – OTHER PRIVILEGES DIVISION 3.10.2 – OTHER PRIVILEGES (ACT ONLY)

Cth Act: 127 Religious confessions (1) A person who is or was a member of the clergy of any church or religious denomination is entitled to refuse to divulge that a religious confession was made, or the contents of a religious confession made, to the person when a member of the clergy. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the communication involved in the religious confession was made for a criminal purpose. (3) This section applies even if an Act provides: (a) that the rules of evidence do not apply or that a person or body is not bound by the rules of evidence; or (b) that a person is not excused from answering any question or producing any document or other thing on the ground of privilege or any other ground. (4) In this section: religious confession means a confession made by a person to a member of the clergy in the member’s professional capacity according to the ritual of the church or religious denomination concerned. 1092

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NSW Act: 127 Religious confessions (1) A person who is or was a member of the clergy of any church or religious denomination is entitled to refuse to divulge that a religious confession was made, or the contents of a religious confession made, to the person when a member of the clergy. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the communication involved in the religious confession was made for a criminal purpose. (3) This section applies even if an Act provides: (a) that the rules of evidence do not apply or that a person or body is not bound by the rules of evidence, or (b) that a person is not excused from answering any question or producing any document or other thing on the ground of privilege or any other ground. (4) In this section: religious confession means a confession made by a person to a member of the clergy in the member’s professional capacity according to the ritual of the church or religious denomination concerned. Vic Act:

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127

Religious confessions

(1) A person who is or was a member of the clergy of any church or religious denomination is entitled to refuse to divulge that a religious confession was made, or the contents of a religious confession made, to the person when a member of the clergy. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the communication involved in the religious confession was made for a criminal purpose. (3) This section applies even if an Act provides— (a) that the rules of evidence do not apply or that a person or body is not bound by the rules of evidence; or (b) that a person is not excused from answering any question or producing any document or other thing on the ground of privilege or any other ground. (4) In this section, religious confession means a confession made by a person to a member of the clergy in the member’s professional capacity according to the ritual of the church or religious denomination concerned.

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ACT Act: 127 Religious confessions (1) A person who is or was a member of the clergy of a church or religious denomination is entitled to refuse to divulge that a religious confession was made, or the contents of a religious confession made, to the person when a member of the clergy. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the communication involved in the religious confession was made for a criminal purpose. (3) This section applies even if an Act provides— (a) that the rules of evidence do not apply or that an entity is not bound by the rules of evidence; or (b) that a person is not excused from answering a question or producing a document or other thing on the ground of privilege or any other ground. (4) In this section: religious confession means a confession made by a person to a member of the clergy in the member’s professional capacity according to the ritual of the member’s church or religious denomination. NT Act:

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127

Religious confessions

(1) A person who is or was a member of the clergy of any church or religious denomination is entitled to refuse to divulge that a religious confession was made, or the contents of a religious confession made, to the person when a member of the clergy. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the communication involved in the religious confession was made for a criminal purpose. (3) This section applies even if an Act provides: (a) that the rules of evidence do not apply or that a person or body is not bound by the rules of evidence; or (b) that a person is not excused from answering any question or producing any document or other thing on the ground of privilege or any other ground. (4) In this section: religious confession means a confession made by a person to a member of the clergy in the member’s professional capacity according to the ritual of the church or religious denomination concerned.

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[EA.127.30]

[EA.127.60]

General comments

This provision is derived from s 10 of the Evidence Act 1898 (NSW). It was not proposed by the ALRC.617 The privilege belongs to the member (or former member) of the clergy to whom the religious confession, as defined, was made. The wishes of the person who made the confession regarding whether it be divulged are not relevant. The privilege applies to both the fact that the confession was made and its contents.

[EA.127.60]

Loss of privilege

Unlike the provisions in respect of client legal privilege, there is no express provision for loss of this privilege.

NT Act: 127A

Journalist privilege

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(1) If a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the informant’s identity, neither the journalist nor the journalist’s employer is compellable to answer any question or produce any document that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained. (2) The court or a judicial entity may, on the application of a party, order that subsection (1) is not to apply if it is satisfied that, having regard to the issues to be determined in that proceeding, the public interest in the identity of the informant outweighs: (a) any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or any other person; and (b) the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public and, accordingly also, in the ability of journalists to access sources of information. (3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court or judicial entity for the purposes of subsection (2)(b), it is to take into account: (a) whether the information provided by the informant is a matter of public interest; and (b) how the journalist used the information provided by the informant, including whether the journalist: (i) verified the information before using the information (if reasonably practicable); and (ii) used the information in a manner that minimised any undue harm to any person; and (iii) used the information in a fair and accurate manner. (4) An order under subsection (2) may be made subject to any conditions the court or judicial entity thinks fit. 617. The ALRC proposed instead a general exclusionary discretion applicable to all “confidential communications”: ALRC 38, s 109. Such a provision has been included in the NSW Act (Div 1A). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(5) This section applies even if an Act provides: (a) that the rules or laws of evidence do not apply or that a judicial entity is not bound by the rules or laws of evidence; or (b) that a person is not excused from answering any question or producing any document or other thing on the ground of privilege or any other ground. (6) In this section: informant means a person who provides new or noteworthy information to a journalist for use in a news medium. journalist means a person who: (a) obtains new or noteworthy information about matters of public interest; and (b) deals with the information by: (i) preparing the information for a news medium; or (ii) providing comment, opinion or analysis of the information for a news medium. news medium means any medium for the dissemination of information to the public or a section of the public. [S 127A insrt Act 7 of 2018, s 5]

Cth Act:

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128 Privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings (1) This section applies if a witness objects to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness: (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty. (2) The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. (3) Subject to subsection (4), if the court determines that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court is not to require the witness to give the evidence, and is to inform the witness: (a) that the witness need not give the evidence unless required by the court to do so under subsection (4); and (b) that the court will give a certificate under this section if: (i) the witness willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4); or (ii) the witness gives the evidence after being required to do so under subsection (4); and (c) of the effect of such a certificate. [Subs (3) am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 1 and 2]

(4) The court may require the witness to give the evidence if the court is satisfied that: 1096

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(a)

the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and (b) the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence. (5) If the witness either willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4), or gives it after being required to do so under that subsection, the court must cause the witness to be given a certificate under this section in respect of the evidence. (6) The court is also to cause a witness to be given a certificate under this section if: (a) the objection has been overruled; and (b) after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection. (7) In any proceeding in an Australian court: (a) evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate under this section has been given; and (b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence; cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence.

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[Subs (7) am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 36]

(8) Subsection (7) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned. (9) If a defendant in a criminal proceeding for an offence is given a certificate under this section, subsection (7) does not apply in a proceeding that is a retrial of the defendant for the same offence or a trial of the defendant for an offence arising out of the same facts that gave rise to that offence. (10) In a criminal proceeding, this section does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by a defendant, being evidence that the defendant: (a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue; or (b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue. (11) A reference in this section to doing an act includes a reference to failing to act. (12) If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in respect of evidence given by the person in a proceeding in a State or Territory court, the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. [Subs (12) insrt Act 34 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 6 item 14]

(13) The following are prescribed State or Territory provisions for the purposes of subsection (12): (a) section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 of New South Wales; © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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(b) a provision of a law of a State or Territory declared by the regulations to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for the purposes of subsection (12). (14) Subsection (12) applies to: (a) a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4; and (b) a proceeding for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a law of the Commonwealth, other than a proceeding referred to in paragraph (a). (15) [Repealed] Note 1: Bodies corporate cannot claim this privilege: see section 187. Note 2: Clause 3 of Part 2 of the Dictionary sets out what is a civil penalty. Note 4: Subsections (8) and (9) were inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Cornwell v The Queen [2007] HCA 12 (22 March 2007). [Subs (15) rep Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 items 14 and 37] [S 128 am Act 113 of 2015; subst Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 63; Act 34 of 1997]

NSW Act:

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128

Privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings

(1) This section applies if a witness objects to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness: (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, or (b) is liable to a civil penalty. (2) The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. (3) Subject to subsection (4), if the court determines that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court is not to require the witness to give the evidence, and is to inform the witness: (a) that the witness need not give the evidence unless required by the court to do so under subsection (4), and (b) that the court will give a certificate under this section if: (i) the witness willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4), or (ii) the witness gives the evidence after being required to do so under subsection (4), and (c) of the effect of such a certificate. [Subs (3) am Act 69 of 2010, Sch 1[1] and [2]]

(4) The court may require the witness to give the evidence if the court is satisfied that: (a) the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country, and 1098

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(b) the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence. (5) If the witness either willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4), or gives it after being required to do so under that subsection, the court must cause the witness to be given a certificate under this section in respect of the evidence. (6) The court is also to cause a witness to be given a certificate under this section if: (a) the objection has been overruled, and (b) after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection. (7) In any proceeding in a NSW court or before any person or body authorised by a law of this State, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence: (a) evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate under this section has been given, and (b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence, cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence.

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Note: This subsection differs from section 128(7) of the Commonwealth Act. The Commonwealth provision refers to an “Australian Court” instead of a “NSW court”.

(8) Subsection (7) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned. (9) If a defendant in a criminal proceeding for an offence is given a certificate under this section, subsection (7) does not apply in a proceeding that is a retrial of the defendant for the same offence or a trial of the defendant for an offence arising out of the same facts that gave rise to that offence. (10) In a criminal proceeding, this section does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by a defendant, being evidence that the defendant: (a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue, or (b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue. (11) A reference in this section to doing an act includes a reference to failing to act. (12) If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in respect of evidence given by a person in a proceeding in a State or Territory court, the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. [Subs (12) insrt Act 69 of 2010, Sch 1[3]]

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(13) For the purposes of subsection (12), a prescribed State or Territory provision is a provision of a law of a State or Territory declared by the regulations to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for the purposes of that subsection. [Subs (13) insrt Act 69 of 2010, Sch 1[3]]

(14) Subsection (12) applies to a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4, other than a proceeding for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a law of the Commonwealth. [Subs (14) insrt Act 69 of 2010, Sch 1[3]] Notes: 1 Bodies corporate cannot claim this privilege. See section 187. 2 Clause 3 of Part 2 of the Dictionary sets out what is a civil penalty. 3 Section 128(12)–(14) of the Commonwealth Act give effect to certificates in relation to self-incriminating evidence under the NSW Act in proceedings in federal and ACT courts and in prosecutions for Commonwealth and ACT offences. 4 Subsections (8) and (9) were inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Cornwell v The Queen [2007] HCA 12 (22 March 2007). [S 128 am Act 69 of 2010, Sch 1[4]; subst Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[61] (am Act 107 of 2008); am Act 55 of 1997; Act 99 of 1995]

Vic Act:

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128 Privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings (1) This section applies if a witness objects to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness— (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty. (2) The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. (3) Subject to subsection (4), if the court determines that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court is not to require the witness to give the evidence, and is to inform the witness— (a) that the witness need not give the evidence unless required by the court to do so under subsection (4); and (b) that the court will give a certificate under this section if— (i) the witness willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4); or (ii) the witness gives the evidence after being required to do so under subsection (4); and (c) of the effect of such a certificate. [Subs (3) am Act 52 of 2012, s 4(1)]

(4) The court may require the witness to give the evidence if the court is satisfied that— 1100

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(a)

the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and (b) the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence. (5) If the witness either willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4), or gives it after being required to do so under that subsection, the court must cause the witness to be given a certificate under this section in respect of the evidence. (6) The court is also to cause a witness to be given a certificate under this section if— (a) the objection has been overruled; and (b) after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection.

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(7) In any proceeding in a Victorian court or before any person or body authorised by a law of this State, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence— (a) evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate under this section has been given; and (b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence— cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence. Note: This subsection differs from section 128(7) of the Commonwealth Act. The Commonwealth provision refers to an “Australian Court” instead of a “Victorian court”. [Subs (7) am Act 52 of 2012, s 4(2)]

(8) Subsection (7) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned. (9) If an accused in a criminal proceeding for an offence is given a certificate under this section, subsection (7) does not apply in a proceeding that is a retrial of the accused for the same offence or a trial of the accused for an offence arising out of the same facts that gave rise to that offence. [Subs (9) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.36]

(10) In a criminal proceeding, this section does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by an accused, being evidence that the accused— (a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue; or (b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue. [Subs (10) am Act 68 of 2009, s 97 and Sch item 55.37]

(11) A reference in this section to doing an act includes a reference to failing to act. (12) If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in respect of evidence given by a person in a proceeding in © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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a State or Territory court, the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. [Subs (12) insrt Act 52 of 2012, s 4(3)]

(13) For the purposes of subsection (12), a prescribed State or Territory provision is a provision of a law of a State or Territory declared by the regulations to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for the purposes of that subsection. [Subs (13) insrt Act 52 of 2012, s 4(3)]

(14) Subsection (12) applies to a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4, other than a proceeding for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a law of the Commonwealth. [Subs (14) insrt Act 52 of 2012, s 4(3)] Notes: 1 Bodies corporate cannot claim this privilege. See section 187. 2 Clause 3 of Part 2 of the Dictionary sets out what is a civil penalty. 3 Section 128(12) to (14) of the Commonwealth Act gives effect to certificates in relation to self-incriminating evidence under this Act in proceedings in federal and ACT courts and in prosecutions for Commonwealth and ACT offences. 4 Subsections (8) and (9) were inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Cornwell v. The Queen [2007] HCA 12 (22 March 2007). [S 128 am Act 52 of 2012, s 4(4); am Act 68 of 2009]

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ACT Act: 128

Privilege in relation to self-incrimination in other proceedings

(1) This section applies if a witness objects to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness— (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty. (2) The court must decide whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. (3) Subject to subsection (4), if the court decides that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court must not require the witness to give the evidence and must tell the witness— (a) that the witness need not give the evidence unless required by the court to do so under subsection (4); and (b) that the court will give a certificate under this section if— (i) the witness willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4); or (ii) the witness gives the evidence after being required to do so under subsection (4); and (c) of the effect of the certificate. [Subs (3) am Act 47 of 2011, s 5]

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(4) The court may require the witness to give the evidence if the court is satisfied that— (a) the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and (b) the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence. (5) If the witness either willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4), or gives it after being required to do so under that subsection, the court must give the witness a certificate under this section in relation to the evidence. (6) The court must also give a witness a certificate under this section if— (a) the objection has been overruled; and (b) after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection.

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(7) In any proceeding in an ACT court or before any entity authorised by a territory law, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence— (a) evidence given by a person in relation to which a certificate under this section has been given; and (b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence; cannot be used against the person. Note: This subsection differs from the Commonwealth Act, s 128(7). The Commonwealth provision refers to an “Australian court” instead of an “ACT court”. [Subs (7) am Act 14 of 2017, s 18; Act 47 of 2011, s 6]

(8) However, subsection (7) does not apply to a criminal proceeding in relation to the falsity of the evidence. (9) Subsection (7) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate. (10) If a defendant in a criminal proceeding for an offence is given a certificate under this section, subsection (7) does not apply in a proceeding that is a retrial of the defendant for the same offence or a trial of the defendant for an offence arising out of the same facts that gave rise to that offence. (11) In a criminal proceeding, this section does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by a defendant, if the evidence is the defendant— (a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue; or (b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue. (12) A reference in this section to doing an act includes a reference to failing to act. (13) If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in relation to evidence given by a person in a proceeding in © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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a State or Territory court, the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. [Subs (13) insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 7]

(14) For subsection (13), a prescribed State or Territory provision is a provision of a State or Territory law declared by regulation to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for that subsection. [Subs (14) insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 7]

(15) Subsection (13) applies to a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4, other than a proceeding for an offence against a Commonwealth law or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a Commonwealth law. [Subs (15) insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 7] Note1: The Commonwealth Act, s 128(12) to (14) gives effect to certificates in relation to self-incriminating evidence under this Act in proceedings in federal courts and in prosecutions for Commonwealth offences. Note 2: Bodies corporate cannot claim this privilege—see s 187. Note 3: The dictionary, pt 2, s 3 sets out what is a civil penalty. Note 4: The Commonwealth Act, s 128(12) to (14) gives effect to certificates in relation to self-incriminating evidence under this Act in proceedings in federal courts and in prosecutions for Commonwealth offences. Note 5: Subsections (9) and (10) were inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court in Cornwell v The Queen [2007] HCA 12 (22 March 2007). [S 128 am Act 14 of 2017; Act 47 of 2011]

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NT Act: 128

Privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings

(1) This section applies if a witness objects to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness: (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty. (2) The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. (3) If the court determines that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court is to inform the witness: (a) that the witness need not give the evidence unless required by the court to do so under subsection (4); and (b) that the court will give a certificate under this section if: (i) the witness willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4); or (ii) the witness gives the evidence after being required to do so under subsection (4); and (c) of the effect of such a certificate. (4) The court may require the witness to give the evidence if the court is satisfied that: 1104

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(a)

the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and (b) the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence. (5) If the witness either willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4), or gives it after being required to do so under that subsection, the court must cause the witness to be given a certificate under this section in respect of the evidence. (6) The court is also to cause a witness to be given a certificate under this section if: (a) the objection has been overruled; and (b) after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection.

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(7) In any proceeding in a Territory court or before any person or body authorised by a law of the Territory, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence: (a) evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate under this section has been given; and (b) any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence; cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence. Note for subsection (7): This subsection differs from section 128(7) of the Commonwealth Act, NSW Act and Victorian Act in relation to the reference to a “Territory court”.

(8) Subsection (7) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned. (9) If a defendant in a criminal proceeding for an offence is given a certificate under this section, subsection (7) does not apply in a proceeding that is a retrial of the defendant for the same offence or a trial of the defendant for an offence arising out of the same facts that gave rise to that offence. (10) In a criminal proceeding, this section does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by a defendant, being evidence that the defendant: (a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue; or (b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue. (11) A reference in this section to doing an act includes a reference to failing to act. Notes for section 128: 1 Bodies corporate cannot claim this privilege. See section 187. 2 Clause 3 of Part 2 of the Dictionary sets out what is a civil penalty. 3 The Commonwealth Act includes additional subsections (12) to (15). The subsections give effect to certificates in relation to self-incriminating evidence under this Act in proceedings in federal and Australian Capital Territory courts and in Territory prosecutions for Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory offences. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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4 Subsections (8) and (9) were inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 271 CLR 260.

[EA.128.30]

ALRC references

ALRC 102, paras 15.89–15.151; ALRC 38, s 110, paras 214–217; ALRC 26, vol 1, paras 852–862.

[EA.128.60]

Differences between provisions

In s 128(7), the Commonwealth provision refers to an Australian court while the NSW/Victorian provision refers to a NSW/Victorian court and “any person or body authorised by a law of this State, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence”. However, the definition of “Australian court” in the Commonwealth Act extends to such a person or body, so that there is no substantive difference between the provisions.

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[EA.128.90]

General comments

This provision is only partially based on the original proposals of the ALRC. In ALRC 26 and ALRC 38, the ALRC proposed an optional certification procedure – the witness, not the court, would decide whether to accept a certificate and give evidence. However, this provision adopts, in somewhat modified form, the approach taken under s 57 of the Evidence Act 1971 (ACT). Where a witness objects to being required to give evidence on the basis of self-incrimination (s 128(1)), the court must determine whether there are reasonable grounds for this objection (s 128(2)). If there are reasonable grounds then, subject to s 128(4), the court is not to require the witness to give that particular evidence – although the witness may choose to utilise the certification procedure and willingly give the evidence with the protection of a certificate (s 128(3)). Where evidence is given under the protection of a certificate, not only the evidence itself but also evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence, cannot be used against the person (s 128(7)). Where the witness is unwilling to give the evidence even with the protection of a certificate, the court may require the witness to give the evidence (with the protection of a certificate) if that is in “the interests of justice” and the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country (s 128(4)). The details of the provision are discussed at [EA.128.120]ff. In amendments following ALRC 102, changes were made to the structure of the provision to clarify the procedure and address some specific issues that had arisen. In addition, changes were made to the provision to take into account the judgment of the High Court in Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; 81 ALJR 840; [2007] HCA 12, handed down after ALRC 102. In interpreting the provision, it should be noted that the general principle that the ingrained nature of the protection against self-incrimination requires a strict 1106

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[EA.128.90]

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construction of provisions said expressly to remove that protection,618 also requires that a liberal interpretation be given to the protective provisions in a statute purporting to protect a person from the consequences of the abrogation of the protections against self-incrimination.619 An overview of the privilege against self-incrimination is provided in the diagram below.620

618. See Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 309; Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486 at 495, 500 and 508. 619. See Hartmann v Commissioner of Police (1997) 91 A Crim R 141 (NSW CA) at 147 per Cole JA. 620. Produced by the Judicial College of Victoria. Available at: http:// www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/publications/uniform-evidence-resources. Reproduced with permission. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.128.120]

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FIGURE 11

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s 128

: Privilege against self-incrimination

[EA.128.120]

“This section applies if a witness objects” (s 128(1))

In accordance with s 132, if it appears to the court that a witness or a party621 may have grounds for making an application or objection under this provision, 621. See HMP Industries Pty Ltd v Graham (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 17 July 1996). A plaintiff, just like a defendant, may take advantage of this provision: Clayton Utz v Dale [2015] VSCA 186 at [159]–[180].

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[EA.128.120]

the court must satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the absence of the jury) that the witness or party is aware of the effect of the provision. Objection may be made to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter: see [EA.128.150]. There is no express requirement that the objection must be bona fide, as appears to be required under the common law.622 It is unsettled whether a witness “objects” to giving particular evidence where the witness seeks to give evidence revealing the commission of a criminal offence, but to do so under the protection of a certificate given under this provision. In Ferrall v Blyton (2000) 27 Fam LR 178; [2000] FLC 93-054; [2000] FamCA 1442 the Full Court of the Family Court held that the provision applied in a case where a witness wanted to give affidavit evidence but had “objected” to doing so without the issue of a certificate (at [90]). The Full Court observed at [89] that “it would be unrealistic to limit the availability of a certificate to a situation where a witness is asked a particular question in cross-examination … otherwise an inappropriate forensic advantage would rest with the other party who would be in a position to prevent the question of an objection arising by simply not seeking to cross-examine”. The Full Court of the Family Court applied Ferrall v Blyton in Jarvis v Pike (2013) 50 Fam LR 593; [2013] FamCAFC 196.

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A similar approach was adopted by Campbell J in the NSW Supreme Court in Ollis v Melissari [2005] NSWSC 1016 at [5]–[7]: In my view, the expression “if a witness objects to giving particular evidence” is not to be construed in a narrow way, by reference only to someone saying “I object” in response to a particular question, in the course of taking evidence in court, in the way barristers traditionally do. Rather, the expression is to be construed more broadly, so that it also relates to the witness expressing an unwillingness to give the evidence. … I am strongly influenced in reaching this conclusion by the evident policy behind s 128. Part of that policy is that a way should be provided in which the claiming of a privilege against self-incrimination does not prevent a court hearing a civil case from obtaining relevant evidence, while at the same time to the extent the New South Wales Parliament has power to do so, not prejudicing in a subsequent criminal trial, the person who gives such evidence. That policy would be carried through only imperfectly if a s 128 certificate were not available concerning evidence given in re-examination.623

However, other courts have taken a narrower view of the term “objects”. In Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; 81 ALJR 840; [2007] HCA 12 a majority of the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ) doubted, without deciding, whether it could be said that a witness “objects” to giving particular evidence where the “witness sets out to adduce in chief evidence revealing the commission of criminal offences other 622. See BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724 at 728–729; Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177 at 182–183. Of course, in practice, if the application is not bona fide it is likely to fail (see [EA.128.360]). 623. Campbell J held that the provision applied where a witness was asked questions in re-examination to which the witness objected on the grounds that the answers may tend to incriminate him. An additional consideration on which Campbell J relied was that “it would be a fundamental unfairness if a witness were encouraged by the giving of a s 128 certificate, to give evidence in relation to which he had a right to remain silent, and for the topic so opened up not to be able to be clarified by legitimate re-examination, if the cross-examination on that topic left a misleading or incomplete impression” (at [7]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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than the one charged” (at [111]). The plurality observed that there was a question “whether witnesses who are eager to reveal some criminal conduct in chief, because it is thought the sting will be removed under sympathetic handling from their own counsel or for some other reason, are to be treated in the same way as witnesses who, after objection based on genuine reluctance, give evidence in cross-examination about some crime connected with the facts about which evidence is given in chief”. It is apparent from the analysis at [112] that a majority of the court was likely to hold, if and when the question fell for decision, that “s 128(1), and hence s 128 as a whole” does not apply in such a situation. Subsequently, the NSW Court of Appeal adopted an intermediate position. In Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442; [2010] NSWCA 237 Hodgson JA (Giles JA and Basten JA agreeing) held that any witness who is compellable to give evidence may, at any stage, including examination-in-chief and re-examination, “object” to giving evidence without the protection of a certificate. Hodgson JA observed at [20]:

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Plainly, in my opinion, if a witness gives evidence in chief because actually compelled to do so (by subpoena and threat of imprisonment), or because of the availability of such compulsion if he or she does not do so, there is no reason why that witness may not object to giving evidence in chief on the ground that that evidence may tend to incriminate. The question in my opinion is not whether the evidence is given in chief or in cross-examination, but rather whether an objection under s 128 is limited to an objection to giving evidence which the witness would otherwise be compellable to give.

However, Hodgson JA held that the position was different with a party giving evidence in chief, or in re-examination, in response to questions from that party’s own legal representative. Hodgson JA stated at [26] that is not evidence “which that party is, in any real sense, compellable to give: unless called by another party and asked questions in chief by that other party, a party’s evidence in chief is given entirely at the choice of that party and is not evidence that the party is compellable to give at the instance of anyone else”. A party who wishes to give evidence, but only with the protection of a certificate, does not “object” to giving that evidence within the meaning of s 128(1) “because there is no element of compulsion or potential compulsion which makes the expression ‘objects’ apposite” (at [28]).624 This analysis has been followed by the Full Court of the Federal Court. In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (2018) 351 ALR 168; [2018] FCAFC 4, Bromwich J (Kenny and Tracey JJ agreeing) held that Song “was plainly correct” (at [64]). Reliance was placed at [62] on “the ordinary meaning of ‘objects’ as used in s 128(1)” (noting that the High Court observed in Cornwell at [111]–[112] that applying the provision to a party who wishes to give the evidence would “strain” the word “objects”) and the discussion in the ALRC Interim Report, which was focused on “balancing the individual’s right or interest in not being compelled to 624. Hodgson JA noted at [31] that “[t]his approach could raise difficulties where the party is a company, and the witness is a director of the company” but left “that question to be determined in a case when it arises”.

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give evidence that may tend to incriminate or expose him or her to penalty, and the public interest in having such evidence available to a court” (at [34], [63]). Bromwich J stated at [36]:

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By contrast, to extend that statutory bargain to a party witness in the absence of compulsion would be to bestow a gain on an individual to advance his or her private interest in litigation, protected from the adverse consequences that might otherwise arise from use of that evidence. Such an outcome would be divorced from the clear historical roots of the privilege as an immunity from compulsion that is closely related to the right to silence, as opposed to a positive right to advance a forensic desire. Even if there is any public interest to be had from such an outcome, it would be incidental and secondary to the private interest. That was not any part of the reasoning of the ALRC in recommending a limited modification of the privilege as an alternative to its complete abolition.

On the other hand, it may be observed that, while it is true that the focus of the discussion in the ALRC Interim Report was on advancing a statutory modification of the common law right to not be compelled to self-incriminate, the discussion of the proposed certification procedure did not indicate that it should only be available in circumstances where the person could be compelled to give the evidence. There are good policy reasons why a broad construction should be given to the term “objects” – it would advance a policy that a court should be able to obtain as much relevant evidence as possible from any witness without causing prejudice to that person in subsequent criminal proceedings. That would advance the broad policy framework underpinning the UEL, as proposed by the ALRC, and give less significance to the pre-existing common law. Further, it may be questioned whether the focus on compulsion reflects the “ordinary meaning” of the term “object”. The Macquarie Dictionary defines “object” to mean, inter alia, “to offer a reason or argument in opposition … to express or feel disapproval”. There is no support in that definition for a test in terms of a response “to an element of compulsion or potential compulsion”. There is no obvious textual reason why “object” could not extend to (conditional) opposition to giving certain evidence without the protection of a certificate. However, it is likely that the narrower approach will prevail when the issue is ultimately determined in the High Court, given the scope of the pre-existing common law privilege and the absence in the ALRC discussions of a clearly stated intention to expand the circumstances in which such a claim might be advanced. A distinct issue arises, where evidence is given and, subsequently, an issue of self-incrimination is raised. On the face of it, this provision is expressed in the present tense (“objects to giving particular evidence”) and it would be too late to make an objection after the evidence in question has been given. Section 128(6) deals with the situation where an objection is made and wrongly overruled (with protection given “after the evidence has been given” when the court finds the objection was proper) but not the situation where no objection is made before the evidence is given. It might perhaps be argued that a (very) broad interpretation of “objects” could extend to evidence already given, but that is unlikely to be successful (for further discussion of this issue, see [EA.128.420]).

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[EA.128.150] “to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter” (s 128(1))

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This provision applies only in court. Section 131A extends the application of the provisions of Pt 3.10 of the Act to some ancillary processes and pre-trial stages of civil and criminal proceedings, but it expressly makes an exception for this provision. However, s 128A in the NSW Act creates a mechanism whereby privilege against self-incrimination claims may be determined in respect of information ordered by a NSW court in a civil proceeding to be disclosed in connection with a freezing, search or other order under Pt 25 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. A similar provision is found in the Victorian Act. Further, it should be noted that the Dictionary definition of “privileged information” in the NSW Uniform Civil Procedure Rules imports the application of almost all the provisions of Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 into civil pre-trial proceedings to which those Rules apply.625 Section 87 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) duplicates this provision in respect of orders for production (defined to mean “an interlocutory order requiring a person (other than a body corporate) to provide evidence to the court or to a party to a proceeding before the court)”.626 As regards the Federal Court, O 33 r 11 of the Federal Court Rules has the same effect, but only “in circumstances in which the order to produce the document or thing is made to facilitate its being immediately adduced in evidence”.627 It has been held that, if this provision does not apply, a court should not deliberately fashion a procedure with the aim of making a person a witness so that this provision would apply (thus circumventing his or her common law privilege against self-incrimination).628 A witness may give evidence in different ways, in examination-in-chief, cross-examination, or re-examination; orally or by affidavit. Subject to the requirement that a witness must “object” to giving evidence (see [EA.128.120]), this provision applies to all of these circumstances. Thus, the Family Court has applied the provision where a witness sought a certificate in respect of evidence to be given by way of affidavit.629 The words “or evidence on a particular matter” were added to the provision in amendments to the Act following on ALRC 102. In ALRC 102 it was stated at para 15.106:

625. Criminal pre-trial proceedings are dealt with in Pt 75 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 and Pt 53 of the District Court Rules 1973. It appears that the Evidence Act 1995 provisions are not imported in that context. 626. See s 87(1). “Provide evidence” is defined to mean “(a) to provide an answer to a question or to produce a document or thing, or (b) to swear an affidavit, or (c) to file and serve an affidavit or a witness statement, or (d) to pernit possession to be taken of a document or thing”. 627. Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2005) 144 FCR 379; [2005] FCAFC 125 per Branson J at [17] and Allsop J at [33]. 628. Pathways Employment Services v West (2004) 186 FLR 330; [2004] NSWSC 903 (see [EA.128.780]). 629. Ferrall v Blyton (2000) 27 Fam LR 178; [2000] FLC 93-054; [2000] FamCA 1442; J v D (2006) 36 Fam LR 206; [2006] FamCA 729.

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[R]ather than the current practice, where a certificate is required to be issued for each question, the Commissions support the view that “‘particular evidence” under the section should be defined to include “evidence both in response to questions and evidence on particular topics”.630

It is clear that the additional words in the provision are intended to ensure that a certificate is not required for each question but may be given in respect of all the evidence on a particular matter or topic. The “giving” of “evidence” would not extend beyond testimonial evidence to the production of “real” evidence, such as examination of fingerprints, viewing the appearance of the face, listening to the sound of a voice.631 On the other hand, production of a document might constitute the “giving” of evidence if it involves some admission with respect to the document.

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[EA.128.180] “the evidence may tend to prove that the witness: (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country” (s 128(1)(a)) Under s 128(2), and subject to s 128(4), if the court finds that there are reasonable grounds for this objection, the court is not to require the witness to give that particular evidence – although the witness may choose to utilise the certification procedure and willingly give the evidence with the protection of a certificate. Presumably, evidence may tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence632 against or arising under an Australian law633 or a law of a foreign country if it tends to implicate the person in the commission of the offence. A question which might appear an innocent one might, by affording a link in the chain of evidence, become a means of proving the commission of an offence by the witness.634 In addition, as under the common law, evidence may tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence if the evidence may: … set in train a process which may lead to incrimination or may lead to the discovery of real evidence of an incriminating character.635

630. See proposed amendment to s 128(1) in ALRC 102 at page 730. 631. Compare, under the common law, Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; 57 ALJR 248; [1983] HCA 10 at 292 (CLR). 632. This word is defined in the Dictionary to mean “an offence against or arising under Australian law”. However, the context of s 128 plainly indicates otherwise – it extends to an offence under foreign law: see s 3(3). 633. This term is defined in the Dictionary to mean “a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory”. Clause 9(2) of Pt 2 of the Dictionary also provides that “a reference in this Act to an Australian law is a reference to an Australian law (whether written or unwritten) of or in force in Australia”. 634. Application concerning Section 80 of the Supreme Court Act and Sections 119 and 128 of the Evidence Act [2004] NSWSC 614 per Brownie JA at [35]–[36]. 635. Rank Film Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 at 443 per Lord Wilberforce. Quoted with approval by Gibbs CJ in Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 294. See also Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ (at 310). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.128.210] “the evidence may tend to prove that the witness: … (b) is liable to a civil penalty” (s 128(1)(b)) Clause 3 of Pt 2 of the Dictionary defines “civil penalty”: For the purposes of this Act, a person is taken to be liable to a civil penalty if, in an Australian or overseas proceeding (other than a criminal proceeding), the person would be liable to a penalty arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country.

Under the common law a civil penalty is involved where a pecuniary payment is required as punishment rather than compensation to an injured party or enforcement of an agreement to pay money.636 Fines imposed under legislation are penalties.637 In addition, dismissal from employment or reduction in rank can constitute a penalty.638

[EA.128.240] Other modes of “self-incrimination” This provision does not apply to other modes of “self-incrimination”639 recognised under the common law. The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 862): A witness under the proposal is limited in his right to object to refusing to give evidence on the ground that it may tend to show that he has committed an offence or is liable to a civil penalty. A witness cannot refuse to give evidence on the ground that it might tend to “disgrace” him, show him guilty of forfeiture or adultery or meriting of ecclesiastical censure. Anachronisms present in the existing law are, therefore, removed. Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

[EA.128.270] Other persons This provision only applies where the evidence sought from a witness may tend to prove that that witness has committed an offence or is liable to a civil penalty. It has no application where the evidence may tend to prove that some other person (or body corporate) has committed an offence or is liable to a civil penalty.

[EA.128.300] Bodies corporate Section 187 provides that a corporation may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination (or the “penalty” privilege). This reflects the common law position.640 However, it is clear that, in cases in which an officer of a body corporate is called as a witness, that officer speaks in his or her own right rather than as a mouthpiece of the corporation, and is therefore entitled to claim a 636. See R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 at 742 per Isaacs J; Colne Valley Water Co v Watford & St Albans Gas Co [1948] 1 KB 500 at 504–505. 637. Compare Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328; Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 1 FCR 526. 638. See Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397; Martin v Police Service Board [1983] 2 VR 357. 639. Of course, it is not technically correct to describe these other modes of self-exposure to certain sanctions as aspects of “self-incrimination” – but it is a useful catch-all term. 640. See Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477; Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Ice Works (1994) 52 FCR 96.

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personal privilege – but not to claim the privilege on behalf of the corporation or on the basis that an answer would tend to incriminate the corporation.641

[EA.128.330] Oral/documentary evidence No distinction is drawn in the provision between the giving of oral testimony and the production of documentary evidence. This reflects the common law position.642 The ALRC noted (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 862): A difference may be said to be that the document in issue in most cases will be one that has been brought into existence for purposes unrelated to the court proceedings. Oral and documentary testimony are, however, often intimately related.

As Gibbs CJ, Mason and Dawson JJ explained in their joint judgment in Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385; 59 ALJR 254 at 393 in respect of the common law privilege against self-incrimination: [T]he privilege, apart from any statutory exclusion, would protect a person against a requirement that he produce or identify incriminating documents or reveal their whereabouts or explain their contents in an incriminating fashion.

However, doubt has been expressed as to whether the provision can apply to affidavit evidence. Young J in the NSW Supreme Court stated:

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Section 128 seems to envisage the situation where a person is in the position of objecting to giving particular evidence. The section also is set in the background of the witness giving evidence with the court having certain discretions as to whether in all the circumstances it should require the witness to answer a possibly incriminating question. This scenario suggests that it is applicable only where the witness is in court.643

This seems an unduly narrow approach to the provision. While the witness presumably needs to be in court to “object to giving particular evidence”, the provision does not prescribe any particular mode for the giving of the evidence and it would appear capable of applying to affidavit evidence. Subsequent decisions have endorsed this view.644 However, it does not apply to the anterior preparation of an affidavit as distinct from the adducing of evidence by way of affidavit in court.645

[EA.128.360] “reasonable grounds for the objection” (s 128(2)) The claimant does not have to prove on reasonable grounds that he or she has committed an offence or is liable to a civil penalty. The claimant’s onus is 641. See Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 at 495. 642. See Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385; 59 ALJR 254. 643. HMP Industries Pty Ltd v Graham (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 17 July 1996). 644. In the Marriage of Atkinson (1997) 136 FLR 347 at 376–377; National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (unreported, NSW SC, 6 April 1998); Amp General Insurance Ltd v Prasad [1999] NSWSC 349 at [4] per Hamilton J; Bax Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538 at [36] per Austin J; Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26; [2013] FCA 1124 at [11] (when affidavit evidence given by being “read”). 645. Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 15) (2013) 217 FCR 26; [2013] FCA 1124. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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discharged when it has been shown that there are reasonable grounds to find that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence or is liable to a civil penalty.646 No guidance is provided in respect of the term “reasonable grounds”. The common law principles in respect of the privilege against self-incrimination may provide assistance. In the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Giles JA has observed:

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The words in s 128(2) are “reasonable grounds for the objection”. The subsection does not refer to reasonable grounds for the conclusion that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence. The words used are similar to those found in the common law cases by which it was necessary that the court see that there are reasonable grounds to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer. I have taken that phrase from R v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311; 121 ER 730 at 330 (B & S), 738 (ER), cited by Gibbs CJ as a frequently approved statement of the law in Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 289. Because that was the common law approach, a witness could not refuse to answer a question which tended to show that he had committed a crime for which he could not be convicted and punished, for example because he had received a pardon or a protective certificate or because he had already been convicted or acquitted of the crime, see the statement to that effect and supporting cases cited by Gibbs CJ in Sorby v Commonwealth at 290. In my view the same concept underlies the words in s 128(2). Those words must, of course, be construed for their proper meaning and effect without being confined by preconceptions from the common law. But it seems to me to be a matter of commonsense that reasonable grounds for an objection must pay regard to whether or not the witness can be placed in jeopardy by giving the particular evidence.647

While the latter conclusion must be correct, it is suggested that care should be exercised in applying common law authorities in this area, given the fact that under this provision (unlike the common law) a certificate can be given to the witness and, in appropriate cases, the witness compelled to give evidence notwithstanding the existence of reasonable grounds for the objection. Thus, the public interest in the court not being deprived of relevant evidence may be served without the need for a strict application of the words “reasonable grounds for the objection”. Nevertheless, presumably, reasonable grounds would not exist where the witness has already effectively waived the right accorded under s 128.648 Further, as under the common law, an objection under s 128(1)(a) should not be allowed if there is no “reasonable ground to apprehend danger of incrimination to the witness if he is compelled to answer”.649 Certainly, there would not be reasonable grounds for the objection under s 128(1)(b) if there is no real risk of the person being liable to a civil penalty. There would not be reasonable grounds for the 646. Baker J in In the Marriage of Atkinson (1997) 136 FLR 347; Jarvis v Pike (2013) 50 Fam LR 593; [2013] FamCAFC 196 at [64]. 647. R v Bikic [2001] NSWCCA 537 at [13]–[15]. 648. For the principles relating to waiver, see discussion in relation to client legal privilege at [EA.122.60] and [EA.122.120]. 649. See Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 290 per Gibbs CJ. See also Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (1989) 88 ALR 69 (Fed Ct). In Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 at 581, Shaw LJ pointed out: “The precise measure or degree of the risk to the witness is something which the court is not called upon to assess so long as there is a degree of risk which cannot be dismissed as tenuous or illusory or so improbable as to be virtually without substance. The question is whether there is a recognisable risk.”.

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objection under s 128(1)(a) if there is no real risk of the person being prosecuted, even though it might still be said that “the evidence may tend to prove that the witness” committed the offence. Thus, as Giles JA observed above, there would not be reasonable grounds if the person could not650 be convicted and punished for the offence.651 There may not be reasonable grounds if there is no increased risk of prosecution because the evidence has already been disclosed.652 On the other hand, there may be reasonable grounds even though the risk of prosecution is small.653 It is a moot question whether reasonable grounds would exist if the offence in question is extremely minor.654 As noted above, there is no suggestion that the objection must be bona fide, as required under the common law. Equally, it is difficult to see how the requirement of “reasonable grounds” for the objection imports such a precondition. Of course, an objection made in circumstances where there are no “reasonable grounds” for the objection may not be bona fide, but that is not an additional precondition for the application of the provision. It is important to emphasise that there is certainly no requirement for the person making the objection to make some admission in order to establish “reasonable grounds” – the purpose of the provision is to protect a witness from having an admission that he or she makes in one proceeding being used against him or her in another proceeding.655 However, on the other hand, a mere objection to giving evidence on the asserted basis that there are reasonable grounds for the objection would not be enough.

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650. An undertaking not to prosecute may not be sufficient: BPA Industries Ltd v Black (1987) 11 NSWLR 609. 651. R v Bikic [2001] NSWCCA 537 at [13]–[15] per Giles JA. For example, where the person has received a pardon for the offence: Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 290 per Gibbs CJ; or where the person has been immunised or indemnified against prosecution: Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 290 per Gibbs CJ; Saffron v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 109 ALR 695. Gibbs CJ also referred (Sorby at 290) to the situation where the person has already been convicted or acquitted of the offence and this proposition was referred to by Giles JA in R v Bikic [2001] NSWCCA 537 when he stated that: “where [the witness] has not appealed so that there are unimpugned convictions, the position as stated by Gibbs CJ in Sorby v Commonwealth holds good for the purpose of s 128(2). The possibility of a late appeal does not alter the position because there will be no prejudice in any such appeal”. This passage implies that there may be reasonable grounds for an objection if an appeal against conviction has been filed, notwithstanding the fact that any incriminating evidence cannot be used in the appeal itself, on the assumption that the appeal may succeed and a new trial be ordered. 652. Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 290 per Gibbs CJ; Saffron v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 109 ALR 695; BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724; Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177. However, in Versace v Monte [2001] FCA 1572 at [12]–[13], Tamberlin J held that prior publication does not preclude the existence of reasonable grounds for objection. 653. Saffron v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 109 ALR 695; Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177; Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 at 581 per Shaw LJ. 654. While there is common law authority that the privilege may not be available in these circumstances (Rank Film Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380; but cf Warman International Ltd v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 478 at 489), it is suggested that such circumstances should not negate the existence of reasonable grounds under s 128(2). On the other hand, they will be very relevant to the application of s 128(4)(b). 655. Jarvis v Pike (2013) 50 Fam LR 593; [2013] FamCAFC 196 at [63]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The court must be satisfied that reasonable grounds exist. In the event that the court is not so satisfied and the objection is overruled, it may be that when the evidence is given that it will become apparent that reasonable grounds do exist. Pursuant to s 128(6), the court must cause the witness to be given a protective certificate under this section in relation to that evidence (see [EA.128.420]).

[EA.128.390] “if the court determines that there are reasonable grounds for the objection …” (s 128(3)) If the court finds that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court is to inform the witness in accordance with s 128(3). By inference in the Commonwealth provision,656 and explicitly in the NSW and Victorian provisions, the witness is not to be required to give the particular evidence, or evidence on the particular matter, unless required to give the evidence pursuant to s 128(4). If the court (initially) does not find that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, and the objection is overruled, the witness will be required to give that particular evidence. However if, after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection, the witness must be given a certificate: s 128(6).

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[EA.128.420] “… after the evidence has been given” (s 128(6)) This provision deals with the situation where an objection is made and overruled but, after the evidence is given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection. In those circumstances, the protection of a certificate must be given in respect of that evidence. This provision does not deal with the situation where no objection is made before the evidence is given. It is unlikely that an “objection” first made after the evidence is given could fall within the scope of s 128(1), although the provision has been applied retrospectively.657 Section 132 does impose an obligation on the court to ensure that a person who appears to have grounds to make an objection is aware of the effect of this provision and failure to comply with that obligation may mean that evidence given in ignorance of this provision has been obtained improperly (see LGM v CAM (2011) 46 Fam LR 118; [2011] FamCAFC 195 at [162]). However, it may be that there was no breach of s 132. For example, it may be the giving of the evidence that first alerts the court to possible grounds to 656. Prior to amendments to s 128 following on ALRC 102, s 128(2) expressly provided that if the court found that there were reasonable grounds for the objection, the court was not to require the witness to give that particular evidence, as well as provide this information. That reference to not requiring the witness to give the evidence has been deleted in the Commonwealth provision (but not the NSW and Victorian provision) but it is nonetheless clear that, if the witness chooses not to give the evidence, the witness must not be required to give it unless an order is made under s 128(4). The fact that s 128A(5), dealing with privilege claims in ancillary proceedings, does expressly provide that “the court must not require the information contained in the privilege affidavit to be disclosed” does not alter this conclusion. Nevertheless, it would be desirable for s 128(3) in the Commonwealth Act to be amended to state expressly that the court must not require the witness to give the particular evidence, subject to s 128(4). 657. See, for example, Lewis Securities Ltd (in liq) v Carter [2017] NSWSC 412, Rein J at [148]–[150].

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make an objection. This is a not uncommon problem in the courts and it would be desirable for s 128 to be amended to address it. Of course, one view may be that, in the absence of prior objection, there is no justification for protection to be conferred. That would certainly be the case if there was an informed decision not to make objection prior to giving the evidence. However, that is likely to be rare. In many cases, the witness is either unaware of the right to object or mistakenly believes that protection will be conferred whether or not objection is made. Section 128 should be amended to confer a discretion on the court to give, in appropriate cases, the protection of a certificate ex post facto, even where no prior objection was made.

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[EA.128.450] Loss of privilege Unlike the provisions in respect of client legal privilege, there is no express provision for loss of this privilege. Thus, for example, there is no express provision comparable to s 122, which deals with waiver of client legal privilege. Given this, in the NSW Industrial Relations Commission it was held by Haylen J, in WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Tsougranis (2002) 117 IR 203; [2002] NSWIRComm 282 at [40], that s 128 should not be regarded as a “code” in relation to the privilege against self-incrimination, with the result that common law principles relating to waiver of privilege would continue to have application. The general issue of whether the provisions of Ch 3 of the Act constitute a “code” are discussed in the Introduction at [EA.Intro.120]. It is argued there that Ch 3 is a “code”. In the present context, it is suggested that any question of waiver may be considered when determining whether there are “reasonable grounds” for the objection to giving evidence: see [EA.128.360]. In that context it would be relevant to consider common law principles relating to waiver of privilege.658

[EA.128.480] “the court may require the witness to give evidence” (s 128(4)) Even if the witness does not choose to give the evidence with the benefit of a certificate, the court “may”, if s 128(4)(a) and (b) are satisfied, “require the witness to give the evidence”. It is difficult to imagine any circumstances where a court, having concluded that “the interests of justice require” a witness to give evidence (s 128(4)(b)), nonetheless does not require the witness to give evidence. Nevertheless, this provision confers a discretion on the court. In Kang-Kem v Paine [2003] NSWSC 916, Barrett J observed (in respect of the provision as it stood prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102) at [11]: Given the positive conclusion already reached … as to the requirements of justice, any decision to exercise the ... discretion against requiring the witness to give the answer would, it seems to me, have to proceed from some clearly seen concern that a greater evil of some kind would result from the giving of the evidence. Since exercise of the discretion in favour of the adducing of the evidence must … be accompanied by a protective certificate, the possibility of exposure of the witness to incrimination or penalty must be disregarded in the search for any such greater evil and, since no other evil has been suggested or is apparent, I conclude that there is none. 658. See Ewin v Vergara (No 2) (2012) 209 FCR 288; [2012] FCA 1518 at [18]–[31]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[EA.128.510] “… the law of a foreign country” (s 128(4)(a)) In ALRC 102, it is stated at para 15.104–15.105: [A]n exception for an offence or civil penalty against or arising under a law of a foreign country was not part of the ALRC’s original proposal. However, because the legislated section was drafted in such a way that a person could be compelled to give evidence (which was not part of the ALRC proposal) it was considered that, as an Australian court cannot guarantee that any certificate of immunity issued by it will be respected in a foreign jurisdiction, the court should not use its discretion to overrule a legitimate claim of privilege in this regard. … It is not the existence of equivalent offences in foreign jurisdictions which removes the court’s ability to compel answers in the interests of justice—it is the risk of incrimination in relation to such offences. That risk will usually only exist where the evidence relates to actions within a foreign country. … The underlying policy of s 128 is that the privilege against selfincrimination should only be overridden when an immunity is available to the witness in relation to other proceedings.

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Lindenmayer J in In the Marriage of Atkinson (1997) 136 FLR 347 at 376–377 held that the witness claiming potential incrimination under the law of a foreign country must specify the particular law or at least the class of laws under which such an offence arises. However, Baker J at 349 disagreed with Lindenmayer J on the effect of s 128 and Smithers J did not find it necessary to address this question. In Gedeon v The Queen (2013) 237 A Crim R 326; [2013] NSWCCA 257, Bathurst CJ observed at [310] that it was unnecessary to decide if Lindenmayer J was correct because, in that case, the class of foreign law was adequately identified as “participation in the importation and export of drugs”.

[EA.128.540] “the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence” (s 128(4)(b)) In Cureton v Blackshaw Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 187 at [37], Sheller JA observed in the NSW Court of Appeal that the interests of justice should be “construed broadly”.659 He concluded that they “would permit questions to be put going to credit, particularly where credit was important and where the credit of the chief witness on the other side was to be impugned for conduct similar to that to be tested in cross-examination”.660 The same form of words is found in s 61(4) of the Coroners Act 2009 (NSW) and Leeming JA (Bathurst CJ and Beazley P agreeing) observed in Rich v Attorney General (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 419 at [19]–[20]: [The provision is] an instance of that class of broadly worded and undefined discretionary powers described by Dixon CJ in Klein v Domus Pty Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 467 at 473. … We have invariably said that wherever the legislature has given a discretion of that kind you must look at the scope and purpose of the provision and at what is its real object. If it appears that the dominating, actuating reason for the decision is outside the scope of the purpose of the enactment, that vitiates the supposed exercise of the 659. Additional assistance may be derived from judicial consideration of comparable State and Territory legislation. See Woods v Smith [1976] WAR 13; Attorney-General (WA) v Cockram (1990) 2 WAR 477. 660. See also Kang-Kem v Paine [2003] NSWSC 916 at [9] per Barrett J.

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discretion. But within that very general statement of the purpose of the enactment, the real object of the legislature in such cases is to leave scope for the judicial or other officer who is investigating the facts and considering the general purpose of the enactment to give effect to his view of the justice of the case. … [Further] the precondition of the exercise of power is not that the interests of justice require the evidence to be given under compulsion. The precondition is merely that the Coroner be satisfied that the interests of justice so require.

It is suggested (partly based on s 130(5)) that factors which may properly be considered would include: • the importance of the evidence in the proceeding;661 • the likelihood that the evidence will be unreliable even if a certificate is given;662 • if the proceeding is a criminal proceeding – whether the party seeking to adduce the evidence is a defendant or the prosecutor; • the nature of the offence, cause of action or defence alleged in the proceeding; • the nature of the offence or liability to penalty to which the evidence relates; • the likelihood of any proceeding being brought to prosecute the offence or impose the penalty;663

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• any resulting unfairness to a party (for example, unfairness arising from the party being forced by tactical considerations to disclose potentially incriminatory conduct which would not be protected by a certificate);664 • the likely effects of requiring the giving of the evidence, and the means available to limit its publication; • whether the substance of the evidence has already been published; • where a charge or charges has/have already been brought arising out of the events to which the evidence relates, whether the charge or charges have been finally dealt with;665 • if the witness is not to be required to give evidence, the way in which the refusal to give evidence is to be approached by the tribunal of fact (accordingly, in a jury trial, the content of anticipated directions to the jury as to how any refusal to give evidence is to be approached).666 661. R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 328; [2006] NSWSC 638 at [41]–[46]; Gedeon v The Queen (2013) 237 A Crim R 326; [2013] NSWCCA 257 at [289]–[290]. In Turco v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 209, two members of the NSW Court of Appeal held that one reason that it was not in the interests of justice to require a witness to give evidence on the appeal was because, even if accepted, the evidence would not justify allowing the appeal: Hodgson JA at [24]–[25], Campbell JA at [30]. 662. Compare R v Collisson (2003) 139 A Crim R 389; [2003] NSWCCA 212; Turco v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 209 at [19]–[23], [27]–[28], [30]. 663. See R v Simmons (No 6) [2015] NSWSC 418 at [18], [40]. 664. R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 328; [2006] NSWSC 638 at [36]; Gedeon v The Queen (2013) 237 A Crim R 326; [2013] NSWCCA 257 at [292]. 665. Compare R v Collisson (2003) 139 A Crim R 389; [2003] NSWCCA 212. 666. Compare R v Hore [2005] NSWCCA 3 at [218]–[219]); see also [EA.128.690]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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The provision places the onus on the party seeking to have the witness compelled to give the evidence to satisfy the court that the interests of justice “require” (as distinct from a less demanding term like “favour”) this.667 However, there is no presumption as to what the interests of justice do require. Thus, it would be wrong to approach the test on the assumption that the privilege against self-incrimination is “fundamental” and it would be “rare” to require a person who satisfies the test under s 128(2) to give evidence. Conversely, it would be wrong to assume that the protections conferred under s 128(7) create a presumption that the interests of justice will require the person to give the evidence. Each case must be assessed on its merits.668

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If the witness is a defendant in pending criminal proceedings, it would be most unlikely that the interests of justice could require the witness to give evidence. The reason is that the protections offered by s 128(7) do not offer a complete safeguard – the witness/defendant could still be prejudiced in his or her defence of the charge. Indeed, to compel evidence in such circumstances would involve a “fundamental alteration” of the “accusatory or judicial process” (X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; 232 A Crim R 410; [2013] HCA 29 at [124]). Hayne and Bell JJ stated: Even if the answers given at a compulsory examination are kept secret, and therefore cannot be used directly or indirectly by those responsible for investigating and prosecuting the matters charged, the requirement to give answers, after being charged, would fundamentally alter the accusatorial judicial process that begins with the laying of a charge and culminates in the accusatorial (and adversarial) trial in the courtroom. No longer could the accused person decide the course which he or she should adopt at trial, in answer to the charge, according only to the strength of the prosecution’s case as revealed by the material provided by the prosecution before trial, or to the strength of the evidence led by the prosecution at the trial. The accused person would have to decide the course to be followed in light of that material and in light of any self-incriminatory answers which he or she had been compelled to give at an examination conducted after the charge was laid. That is, the accused person would have to decide what plea to enter, what evidence to challenge and what evidence to give or lead at trial according to what answers he or she had given at the examination. The accused person is thus prejudiced in his or her defence of the charge that has been laid by being required to answer questions about the subject matter of the pending charge.669 667. This proposition was endorsed in Gedeon v The Queen (2013) 237 A Crim R 326; [2013] NSWCCA 257, Bathurst CJ at [285]. Bathurst CJ added at [286]: “[T]he requisite standard provided for in s 128(4)(b) of the Evidence Act is that the interests of justice require admission of the evidence. It is not enough that the evidence be relevant and in this case satisfy the exception to the credibility rule in s 103 of the Evidence Act. This relatively high standard of satisfaction is consistent with the fact that the legislation to a significant extent abrogates a basic common law right”. 668. Compare WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Tsougranis (2002) 117 IR 203; [2002] NSWIRComm 282 at [26]–[27] per Haylen J; WorkCover v Lindores Contractors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWIRComm 422 at [29] per Peterson J. 669. X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; 232 A Crim R 410; [2013] HCA 29, Hayne and Bell JJ at [124]. See also at [71], [85] and [136]. Kiefel J came to a similar conclusion and for essentially the same reasons. A similar analysis was adopted by French CJ in Lee v NSW Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; 87 ALJR 1082; [2013] HCA 39 at [54]. See also Lee v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 455; 237 A Crim R 436; 88 ALJR 656; [2014] HCA 20 at [31].

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Even if the witness is not a defendant in pending criminal proceedings, and not likely to become one,670 careful consideration of the possible consequences of requiring the giving of the evidence will be required. In Attorney General (NSW) v Borland [2007] NSWCA 201 the NSW Court of Appeal considered a similar provision in the Coroners Act 1980 (NSW). Handley JA (Ipp JA and McColl JA agreeing) noted that a witness at a coronial inquiry was not protected against a risk of civil penalty. He concluded at [19]: The fact that a certificate would not protect the witness against the risk of a civil penalty to which he would be exposed is a most material consideration in the exercise of the discretion.

However, it may still be in the interests of justice that the witness be required to give evidence notwithstanding “the inevitably imperfect protection of the certificate”.671 Questions may arise as to the potential forensic disadvantage suffered by a person who becomes a defendant in criminal proceedings (or proceedings for a civil penalty) and has been required to give evidence in earlier proceedings regarding the matters satisfying the test under s 128(2).672

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Other possible consequences, such as public embarrassment and humiliation and impacts on personal and professional relationships, would also be relevant.673 If the evidence is likely to have little probative value, and thus it is not important in the proceeding, the interests of justice may not require the witness to give the evidence.674 A court may conclude that any evidence that a person might relevantly give would be inherently unreliable, even without knowing what the content of the evidence is.675 On the other hand, while the danger that perjured or unreliable testimony will be given may be considerable, the public interest in requiring the evidence to be given will often be substantial.676 It has been held that a defendant in civil proceedings should be required to disclose their assets, and be given a certificate in relation to anticipated fraud and

670. See R v Simmons (No 6) [2015] NSWSC 418 at [18], [40]. 671. Rich v Attorney General (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 419, Leeming JA (Bathurst CJ and Beazley P agreeing) at [38]; see also at [39]–[42]. 672. See WorkCover v Lindores Contractors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWIRComm 422 at [26] per Peterson J. 673. R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 328; [2006] NSWSC 638 at [55]; R v Mayhew [2010] ACTSC 41 at [7]. 674. See Versace v Monte [2001] FCA 1572 at [11] per Tamberlin J. 675. R v Collisson (2003) 139 A Crim R 389; [2003] NSWCCA 212 at [28]–[33] per Tobias JA; Turco v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 209 at [19]–[23], [27]–[28], [30]. 676. See In the Marriage of Atkinson (1997) 136 FLR 347. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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criminal proceedings, in order to prevent the assets being “spirited away”.677 Thus, this provision overcomes the effect of the decision of the High Court in Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1.678

[EA.128.570] Giving a certificate (s 128(5), (6)) Regulation 7 in the Commonwealth and NSW Regulations, and reg 9 in the Victorian Regulations, provide that a certificate under s 128 may, but need not, be in accordance with Form 1 of the Regulations (see Evidence Regulations for the respective forms).

[EA.128.600] Effect of a certificate (s 128(7), (9)) The effect of a certificate given under this provision is to give the witness both use and derivative use immunity in respect of the evidence (except in a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence).679 Thus, in accordance with s 128(7) of the Commonwealth Act, for example, evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate under s 128 has been given (and evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence) cannot be used against the person “in any proceeding in an Australian court”, except in a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence.680 The term “Australian court” is defined in the Dictionary: “Australian court” means: (a) the High Court; or Copyright © 2018. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.

(b) a court exercising federal jurisdiction; or (c) a court of a State or Territory; or (d) a judge, justice or arbitrator under an Australian law; or (e) a person or body authorised by an Australian law, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence; or (f) a person or body that, in exercising a function under an Australian law, is required to apply the laws of evidence.

The term “NSW court” (s 128(7) in the NSW Act) is defined in the Dictionary to mean: (a) the Supreme Court; or (b) any other court created by Parliament, and includes any person or body (other than a court) that, in exercising a function under the law of the State, is required to apply the laws of evidence. 677. HMP Industries Pty Ltd v Graham (unreported, NSW SC, Young J, 17 July 1996). 678. The High Court held that there is no scope for an exception to the privilege against self-incrimination, in criminal or civil proceedings, other than by statute or waiver. This provision creates such a statutory exception: see Vasil v National Australia Bank Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 207 at 212–221 per Fitzgerald JA; Bax Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538 at [30] per Austin J. 679. Regarding the consequences of such immunity, see Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486. 680. For an example of the impact of this qualification, see R v Barbaro (unreported, NSW CCA, 20 July 1998).

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A comparable definition of “Victorian court” appears in the Dictionary of the Victorian Act. These terms should be given a liberal interpretation, given the principle that a liberal interpretation should be given to the protective provisions in a statute purporting to protect a person from the consequences of the abrogation of the protections against self-incrimination (see [EA.128.90]).681 It may be noted that the definition of an “Australian court” is broader in some respects than the definition of “NSW court” in the NSW Act and “Victorian court” in the Victorian Act. In particular, it extends to some tribunals which are not required to apply the rules of evidence but are authorised to receive evidence or may receive evidence with the consent of the parties (see para (e) of the definition and see also [EA.5.30]). However, in an amendment to the NSW Act following on ALRC 102, the words “or before any person or body authorised by a law of this State, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence” were added after “NSW court” in s 128(7). The same appears in the Victorian Act. This ensures that the giving of a certificate provides adequate protection, applying not only to traditional courts but also to bodies such as disciplinary tribunals and other administrative bodies (see ALRC 102 at paras 15.119–15.121).

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A question arises as to whether s 128(7) would prevent the use of the evidence in cross-examination, rather than being admitted into evidence in the proceeding.682 However, the better view would be that this would involve “use against the person” within the terms of s 128(7).683 Nevertheless, for various practical reasons, the protection offered under the Act is less than absolute.684 A certificate does not render the person immune from prosecution with respect to the offence or offences about which the person gives evidence.685 The term “proceeding” is not defined. It appears to cover any kind of activity by a court or tribunal, or at least any step in a suit or action where there is an issue between parties in dispute and the suit or action involves evidence adduced under the rules of evidence (see [EA.4.150]). However, in Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; 81 ALJR 840; [2007] HCA 12 a majority of the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ) held at [88], rather surprisingly,686 that a “proceeding” would not include a retrial. It was observed that the traditional position is that parties are at liberty to tender in a retrial evidence of admissions made at the first trial and that to “construe a statutory provision as negating that traditional possibility would require the identification of clear words to that effect”. It was held that “there are no clear words to that effect in s 128(7)”. In a subsequent amendment, s 128(9) was introduced to expressly provide that the prosecution would be able to tender in a retrial (or trial for an offence arising 681. Compare Hartmann v Commissioner of Police (1997) 91 A Crim R 141. 682. See Bax Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538 at [53] per Austin J. 683. Compare Calleija v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 391; [2012] NSWCCA 37 at [93]. 684. Pathways Employment Services v West (2004) 186 FLR 330; [2004] NSWSC 903, Campbell J at [33]. 685. Spence v The Queen [2016] VSCA 113 at [68]. 686. See the powerful dissent of Kirby J at [192]–[193]. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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out of the same facts) evidence of admissions made at the first trial by the defendant under the protection of a certificate. It may be observed that, while this provision reflects the result in Cornwell, the surprising construction given by the High Court to the term “proceeding” remains available. The question arises whether this will operate in respect of civil retrial (where a certificate was granted in the first trial), notwithstanding the argument that s 128(9) appears to show a legislative intention to limit the exception to criminal proceedings. Equally, no doubt, other circumstances may arise where the approach of the majority of the High Court to the term “proceeding” is sought to be utilised.

[EA.128.630] Certificates from different jurisdictions (s 128(12)–(14)) These subsections give effect to certificates in relation to self-incriminating evidence from different jurisdictions if prescribed.

[EA.128.660] Challenge to the giving of a certificate (s 128(8))

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This provision appears to have been prompted by the views expressed by the High Court in Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; 81 ALJR 840; [2007] HCA 12 regarding the significance of a failure to provide a proper certificate. A majority of the Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ) held at [91], in respect of the provision as it existed prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102: The role of a properly drafted certificate granted under s 128(6) (or s 128(3)) is simply to record a factual matter – what particular evidence was required to be given under s 128(5) (or was given after the accused chose to give it under s 128(2)). A s 128 certificate is only a convenient mechanism for use by a witness who later claims the protection given by s 128 and for aiding a court having the duty of determining that claim.

For these reasons, the majority judgment went on: It would be absurd if a witness were to fail to obtain the protection conferred by s 128(7) merely because a court which had decided that the conditions stipulated in s 128(1) and (5) (or s 128(1) and (2)) had been satisfied had failed to cause the witness to be given a certificate, whether because it had overlooked s 128(6) (or s 128(4)), or because, as here, a legal representative of the witness had failed to carry out a direction in relation to the certificate, or because of some lapse within the registry of the court. It would be equally absurd if a witness were to fail to obtain the protection conferred by s 128(7) merely because the witness and the court registry lost all copies of the certificate.

However, s 128(8) goes significantly further. If a “certificate under this section has been given” (s 128(7)), then the protections provided for in s 128(7) apply, regardless of any deficiency in the certificate and regardless of any error in the decision to give the certificate. Even if a certificate should not have been given, the protections it confers will remain. The Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act provides the rationale for this new provision:

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This amendment has been made on the basis that the granting of a certificate under section 128 is not the same as any other evidential ruling. To ensure that the policy of section 128 is carried into effect, the witness must be certain of being able to rely on that certificate in future proceedings.687

[EA.128.690] Inferences from claim of privilege This provision contains no prohibition on the drawing of an adverse inference from the making of an objection under s 128(1). The ALRC explained (ALRC 26, vol 1, para 862):

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No adverse inference should be drawn from the fact that privilege is claimed. Under existing law, no adverse inferences should be drawn where a person claims a privilege. It is not thought to be necessary, therefore, expressly to forbid the drawing of adverse inferences.

The ALRC did not make any proposals with respect to the drawing of inferences from evidence given or conduct occurring in a trial, considering it neither necessary nor possible: ALRC 26, vol 1, para 862, n 52. It has been suggested that it may be “open … to draw an inference adverse to the [witness] from his claim of privilege, notwithstanding the general line of authority precluding the court from drawing such an inference”.688 However, it has been held that the principle that it is not open to a court to draw adverse inferences from the fact that privilege is claimed continues to be applicable to a claim made under this statutory provision, given the fundamental nature of the privilege.689 Further, the Court of Criminal Appeal has held that a trial judge was correct in declining to inform the jury in a criminal trial that a particular witness had given evidence “under the protection of a s 128 certificate”.690 Of course, not permitting an adverse inference to be drawn from a refusal to give particular evidence (or, more generally, a claim of privilege) does not mean that a court may not draw the same inference from other evidence.691 In Spence v The Queen [2016] VSCA 113, the Victorian Court of Appeal stated the following “non-exhaustive propositions” at [82]–[88]: [82] First, a witness’s reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination is not relevant to his or her credit. [83] Secondly, since an objection based on the privilege against self-incrimination cannot affect the credit of the witness; and since, under s 128(2) of the Act, it is for the trial judge to “determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection”; the taking of the objection before the jury provides no evidential material bearing upon the witness’s credibility. 687. At para 187. Similar observations are made in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Victorian Act. 688. Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Dean [1999] NSWSC 1042 at [13] per Hunter J. 689. Versace v Monte [2001] FCA 1572 at [6]–[10] per Tamberlin J. 690. R v Macarthur [2005] NSWCCA 65 at [38]. 691. For example, in R v Hore [2005] NSWCCA 3 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal endorsed a jury direction that they could infer from other evidence before them that a witness had told previous lies on oath about an important issue even though the witness had declined to answer questions about the matter on the basis that his evidence might have incriminated him: at [211]–[218]. It is an interesting question whether a Jones v Dunkel inference can be drawn: see [EA.55.180] (and Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [214]–[229]). © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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[84] Thirdly, s 132 of the Act does not prevent the jury from being informed of the grant of a certificate under s 128. Section 132 merely requires that, if it appears to the trial judge that either a witness or a party may have grounds for invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, the judge must satisfy himself or herself that the witness or party is aware of the effect of s 128, and so satisfy himself or herself in the absence of the jury. Once a certificate is granted, however, s 132 of itself presents no obstacle to the existence of the certificate being revealed to the jury. [85] Fourthly, although the taking of the privilege against self-incrimination cannot affect credit, depending on the circumstances of a given case, the grant of a certificate under s 128 may affect credibility. Whether it has that capacity will depend on whether knowledge by the jury of the protection afforded to the witness by the grant of the certificate is capable of bearing upon the credibility of the evidence of the witness. Hence, where there is an attack on credit, whether of a general nature or directed to a fact in issue, it may be relevant to a jury’s assessment of credibility to know that a witness has been granted a certificate and its effect. That said, revealing the existence of the certificate might be a “two-edged sword”. We do not subscribe to the view, exemplified by Trudgian, that the mere grant of a certificate under s 128 will necessarily put a prosecution witness into a “very special category”, which “enables the defendant to say that the witness is unreliable”. Whether a witness might be regarded as “unreliable”, will depend on the particular facts of the case. [86] Fifthly, if it is plain that there is to be an attack on a witness’s credit and the protection afforded to the witness by the grant of the certificate is relevant, in the same way that it is customary to reveal the fact of an indemnity or undertaking from the outset, it will be proper to reveal the existence of a certificate under s 128 to the jury. [87] Sixthly, if there has been an attack on a witness’s credit, and the existence of a s 128 certificate has been revealed to the jury, counsel will ordinarily be justified in making relevant submissions to the jury as to the manner in which they should approach their assessment of the witness’s credibility in light of the certificate. [88] Seventhly, in circumstances in which the fact of the certificate is revealed to the jury, it will ordinarily be desirable for the judge to provide directions to the jury as to its effect. The extent of the protection which the certificate provides must be explained. Consistently with Macarthur, the judge should also ordinarily inform the jury that the certificate does not provide the witness with an immunity from prosecution, and does no more than prevent the witness’s evidence from being used against him or her in any subsequent proceeding. As part of any direction, the judge ordinarily should inform the jury that the witness cannot lie with impunity, since the certificate offers no protection against perjury.

A connected issue is whether adverse inferences might be drawn from the fact that a defendant in a proceeding for a civil penalty chooses not to testify. It might be argued that such a failure to testify constitutes an implicit objection to giving evidence on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the defendant is liable to a civil penalty, so that no adverse inference should be drawn. On the other hand, a failure to testify at all is not the same as objecting to the giving of particular evidence. Further, the certification procedure established in s 128 is not available. In Adler v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; 46 ACSR 504; [2003] NSWCA 131 the NSW Court of Appeal held that the existence of a privilege against exposure to penalties did not preclude the drawing of an “inference adverse to the person from whom a civil penalty is claimed to be drawn because of the failure of the person to give evidence” (Giles JA at [661]). Giles JA stated: In the end the argument must be that it would not be consistent with this stance against self-incrimination for an inference adverse to the person from whom a civil penalty is 1128

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s 128

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[EA.128.720]

claimed to be drawn because of the failure of the person to give evidence. That reasoning did not find favour in RPS v The Queen, in which the “right to silence” was not thought to be a useful basis for reasoning (at [22]). To say that a person can not be forced to give evidence against himself, by providing discovery or answering interrogatories or, in a criminal context, making a statement to the police, says little when it comes to the giving of evidence in the person’s own case. In ordinary civil proceedings the defendant can not be forced to give evidence in his own case. Civil penalty proceedings are no different in that respect. In my opinion, it was open for Jones v Dunkel inferences to be drawn against [the defendants who failed to testify].

This issue does not arise in criminal proceedings because this provision does not, for the most part, apply to the giving of evidence by a defendant in criminal proceedings: s 128(10) (but see also [EA.20.180]). Another issue is whether an adverse inference might be drawn in another trial if evidence is adduced of the making of the objection. Section 89 deals with the drawing of adverse inferences from silence – but it only applies to questioning by an “investigating official”, as defined: see the commentary on s 89.

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[EA.128.720] Exception – evidence of criminal defendant (s 128(10)) In a criminal proceeding, s 128 does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by a defendant, where the evidence is “evidence that the defendant: (a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue; or (b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue”. In Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; 81 ALJR 840; [2007] HCA 12 a majority of the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ) held at [84] that such words (ie “evidence that …”), originally found in s 128(8), are not limited to direct evidence that the defendant did the act or had the state of mind; they extend also to the giving of evidence by the defendant of facts from which the doing of the act or the having of the state of mind can be inferred.692

It follows that s 128 does not apply to evidence from a defendant that tends to show, directly or circumstantially, that the defendant committed the offence(s) charged. Thus, where an accused was charged with importation of drugs, evidence that he was involved in supplying drugs may be “evidence that …” the defendant imported drugs, with the consequence the defendant could not claim the privilege when asked questions about that issue. On the other hand, it would appear that s 128 may apply where evidence is sought to be adduced from the defendant that is relevant only because it relates to the credibility of the defendant. Furthermore, s 189(6) provides that this provision “does not apply to a hearing to decide a preliminary question” (defined in s 189(1) to mean a question whether a fact exists for the purposes of a court deciding whether “evidence should be 692. The majority judgment rejected a view that s 128(8) only applied to evidence that was (in effect) direct evidence that the defendant committed the crime charged, considering that such a “construction leads to results which would be both revolutionary and extremely unlikely, [and] … it is not supported by the ALRC Reports (and indeed is, to a degree, contradicted by them)” (at [85]). Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ also stated at [80] that it was not necessary to determine whether the term “fact in issue” would include a fact relevant to a fact in issue. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 128

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admitted (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not); or evidence can be used against a person; or a witness is competent or compellable”). In simple terms, a defendant in criminal proceedings may rely on the privilege against selfincrimination when giving evidence in a voir dire.

[EA.128.750] Burden and standard of proof It appeared clear from the formulation of s 128(2) prior to the amendments following on ALRC 102 that the “burden of proof” was on the party or person arguing that there are “reasonable grounds” for the objection taken under s 128(1). In accordance with s 142(1), the court would have to be satisfied that “it has been proved on the balance of probabilities” that reasonable grounds exist. However, the current formulation of s 128(2) is less clear, although it seems that in practice the effective burden will be on the party contending that there are reasonable grounds for the objection (see s 128(3)). Under s 128(4) the “burden of proof” is on the party or person arguing that “the interests of justice” require the witness to give evidence. To the extent that it is relevant to talk of “standard of proof” in this context, s 142(1) imposes a standard of proof “on the balance of probabilities”.

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[EA.128.780] Procedure In accordance with s 132, if it appears to the court that a witness or a party may have grounds for making an application or objection under this provision, the court must satisfy itself (if there is a jury, in the absence of the jury) that the witness or party is aware of the effect of this provision. However, it has been held that it is sufficient to warn the witness that he or she is entitled to decline to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.693 Where the witness does not object to giving evidence, the court is not obliged to explain the effect of this provision (including its certification procedure).694 In LGM v CAM [2011] FamCAFC 195 the Full Court of the Family Court observed at [162] that failure to ensure that the witness understands the effect of the provision and the rights conferred on the witness may have the consequence that evidence given by the witness should be excluded pursuant to s 138: “It was open to [the trial judge] to exclude the evidence given by the [witness] under compulsion of cross-examination because she had not been informed or properly informed of her privilege against self incrimination”. Prior to the amendments following ALRC 102, objection had to be made to each question or document sought. However, the addition of the words “or evidence on a particular matter” to s 128(1) is, as noted at [EA.128.150], intended to ensure that a certificate is not required for each question but may be given in respect of all the evidence on a particular matter or topic. Similarly, it may be appropriate to consider the question of whether “the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence” (s 128(4)(b)) on a topic by topic basis.695 693. Bates t/as Riot Wetsuits v Omareef Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1472. 694. See Bates t/as Riot Wetsuits v Omareef Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1472. 695. Rich v Attorney General (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 419, Leeming JA (Bathurst CJ and Beazley P agreeing) at [45]–[49] (discussing similar provisions in the NSW Coroners Act).

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s 128

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[EA.128.780]

If an application or objection is made, it should be determined in accordance with s 189, although it has been held that the test in s 128(2) of whether there are reasonable grounds for the objection does not have to be satisfied by evidence.696 In accordance with s 133, if a question arises in relation to a document, the court may order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for the purpose of determining the question. Prior to the amendments following ALRC 102, where the witness did object to giving evidence and the court found that there were reasonable grounds for the objection, this provision required the court to inform the witness that “he or she need not give the evidence”, “that, if he or she gives the evidence, the court will give a certificate under this section” and “the effect of such a certificate”. These obligations are no longer imposed by this provision. The Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth amending Act states: [S]ection 128 has been restructured to simplify the order in which the process of certification is outlined in the section. Rather than including the requirement for the court to inform the witness of his or her rights and the effect of the section, the new section provides: • that the witness may object to giving the evidence on the grounds that it may incriminate him or her (or make him or her liable to a civil penalty) (subsection 128(1))

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• that the court shall determine whether or not that claim is based on reasonable grounds (subsection 128(2)) • if the claim is reasonable, that the court can then tell the witness that he or she may choose to give the evidence or the court will consider whether the interests of justice require that the evidence be given, (subsections 128(3) and (4)) and • if the evidence is given, either voluntarily or under compulsion, that a certificate shall be granted preventing the use of that evidence against the person in another proceeding (subsection 128(5)).697

Where the application relates to affidavit evidence in an ancillary proceeding, special procedures were developed in some courts.698 However, the NSW Court of Appeal held in Ross v Internet Wines Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 436; [2004] NSWCA 195 that, since s 128 had no application to ancillary proceedings, the common law privilege against self-incrimination may operate to prevent compelled disclosure in accordance with such procedures. Subsequently, it was held that a court should not deliberately fashion a procedure (such as require a person to attend court to give evidence) with the aim of making that person a witness so that his or her common law privilege against self-incrimination can be circumvented.699 The NSW legislature intervened, with the enactment of s 87 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), which duplicates s 128 in respect of orders for production (defined to mean “an interlocutory order requiring a person (other 696. Application concerning Section 80 of the Supreme Court Act and Sections 119 and 128 of the Evidence Act [2004] NSWSC 614 per Brownie AJ at [22]–[24]. 697. At para 183. 698. See Amp General Insurance Ltd v Prasad [1999] NSWSC 349; Bax Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538 at [37]–[46] per Austin J; Vasil v National Australia Bank Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 207 at 221–222 per Fitzgerald JA. 699. Pathways Employment Services v West (2004) 186 FLR 330; [2004] NSWSC 903. © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 128A

than a body corporate) to provide evidence to the court or to a party to a proceeding before the court)”.700 As a result, in NSW the common law privilege is not available in respect of orders for production and the statutory approach embodies in this provision applies. Section 128A has extended the application of the provision even further. The Family Court has applied the provision where a witness sought a certificate in respect of evidence to be given by way of affidavit.701

Cth Act: 128A Privilege in respect of self-incrimination—exception for certain orders etc (1) In this section: disclosure order means an order made by a federal court in a civil proceeding requiring a person to disclose information, as part of, or in connection with a freezing or search order, but does not include an order made by a court under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. [Def am Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 15]

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relevant person means a person to whom a disclosure order is directed. (2) If a relevant person objects to complying with a disclosure order on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that the person: (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty; the person must: (c) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken; and (d) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken (the privilege affidavit) and deliver it to the court in a sealed envelope; and (e) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection. (3) The sealed envelope containing the privilege affidavit must not be opened except as directed by the court. (4) The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection.

700. See s 87(1). “Provide evidence” is defined to mean “(a) to provide an answer to a question or to produce a document or thing, or (b) to swear an affidavit, or (c) to file and serve an affidavit or a witness statement, or (d) to permit possession to be taken of a document or thing”. 701. Ferrall v Blyton (2000) 27 Fam LR 178; [2000] FLC 93-054; [2000] FamCA 1442; J v D (2006) 36 Fam LR 206; [2006] FamCA 729.

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s 128A

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(5) Subject to subsection (6), if the court finds that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court must not require the information contained in the privilege affidavit to be disclosed and must return it to the relevant person. (6) If the court is satisfied that: (a) any information disclosed in the privilege affidavit may tend to prove that the relevant person has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, an Australian law; and (b) the information does not tend to prove that the relevant person has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and (c) the interests of justice require the information to be disclosed; the court may make an order requiring the whole or any part of the privilege affidavit containing information of the kind referred to in paragraph (a) to be filed and served on the parties.

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(7) If the whole or any part of the privilege affidavit is disclosed (including by order under subsection (6)), the court must cause the relevant person to be given a certificate in respect of the information as referred to in paragraph (6)(a). (8) In any proceeding in an Australian court: (a) evidence of information disclosed by a relevant person in respect of which a certificate has been given under this section; and (b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct result or indirect consequence of the relevant person having disclosed that information; cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence concerned. (9) Subsection (8) does not prevent the use against the relevant person of any information disclosed by a document: (a) that is an annexure or exhibit to a privilege affidavit prepared by the person in response to a disclosure order; and (b) that was in existence before the order was made. (10) Subsection (8) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned. (11) If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in respect of information of a kind referred to in paragraph (6)(a), the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. [Subs (11) insrt Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 3]

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(12) For the purposes of subsection (11), a prescribed State or Territory provision is a provision of a law of a State or Territory declared by the regulations to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for the purposes of that subsection. [Subs (12) insrt Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 3]

(13) Subsection (11) applies to: (a) a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4; and (b) a proceeding for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a law of the Commonwealth, other than a proceeding referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection. Note 1: Bodies corporate cannot claim this privilege: see section 187. Note 2: Clause 3 of Part 2 of the Dictionary sets out what is a civil penalty. [Subs (13) insrt Act 113 of 2015, s 3 and Sch 5 item 3] [S 128A am Act 113 of 2015; insrt Act 135 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1 item 63]

NSW Act:

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128A Privilege in respect of self-incrimination—exception for certain orders etc (1) In this section: disclosure order means an order made by a NSW court in a civil proceeding requiring a person to disclose information as part of, or in connection with, a freezing, search or other order under Part 25 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 but does not include an order made by a court under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 of the Commonwealth or the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 or Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 of New South Wales. relevant person means a person to whom a disclosure order is directed. (2) If a relevant person objects to complying with a disclosure order on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that the person: (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, or (b) is liable to a civil penalty, the person must: (c) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken, and (d) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken (the privilege affidavit) and deliver it to the court in a sealed envelope, and (e) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection. (3) The sealed envelope containing the privilege affidavit must not be opened except as directed by the court. 1134

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s 128A

Part 3.10 - Privileges

(4) The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. (5) Subject to subsection (6), if the court finds that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court must not require the information contained in the privilege affidavit to be disclosed and must return it to the relevant person. (6) If the court is satisfied that: (a) any information disclosed in the privilege affidavit may tend to prove that the relevant person has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, an Australian law, and (b) the information does not tend to prove that the relevant person has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country, and (c) the interests of justice require the information to be disclosed, the court may make an order requiring the whole or any part of the privilege affidavit containing information of the kind referred to in paragraph (a) to be filed and served on the parties.

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(7) If the whole or any part of the privilege affidavit is disclosed (including by order under subsection (6)), the court must cause the relevant person to be given a certificate in respect of the information referred to in subsection (6)(a). (8) In any proceeding in a NSW court or before any person or body authorised by a law of this State, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence: (a) evidence of information disclosed by a relevant person in respect of which a certificate has been given under this section, and (b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct result or indirect consequence of the relevant person having disclosed that information, cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence concerned. (9) Subsection (8) does not prevent the use against the relevant person of any information disclosed by a document: (a) that is an annexure or exhibit to a privilege affidavit prepared by the person in response to a disclosure order, and (b) that was in existence before the order was made. (10) Subsection (8) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned. (11) If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in respect of information of a kind referred to in subsection (6)(a), the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. [Subs (11) insrt Act 69 of 2010, Sch 1[5]] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 128A

(12) For the purposes of subsection (11), a prescribed State or Territory provision is a provision of a law of a State or Territory declared by the regulations to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for the purposes of that subsection. [Subs (12) insrt Act 69 of 2010, Sch 1[5]]

(13) Subsection (11) applies to a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4, other than a proceeding for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a law of the Commonwealth. [Subs (13) insrt Act 69 of 2010, Sch 1[5]] Note: Section 87 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 makes provision with respect to protection against self-incrimination in relation to certain matters to which this section does not apply. [S 128A am Act 69 of 2010; insrt Act 46 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[62] (am Act 107 of 2008)]

Vic Act: 128A Privilege in respect of self-incrimination—exception for certain orders etc.

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(1) In this section— disclosure order means an order made by a Victorian court in a civil proceeding requiring a person to disclose information, as part of, or in connection with a freezing or search order under the Rules of the Supreme Court but does not include an order made by a court under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 of the Commonwealth or the Confiscation Act 1997; Note: This definition differs from the New South Wales Act.

relevant person means a person to whom a disclosure order is directed. (2) If a relevant person objects to complying with a disclosure order on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that the person— (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty— the person must— (c) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken; and (d) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken (the privilege affidavit) and deliver it to the court in a sealed envelope; and (e) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection. (3) The sealed envelope containing the privilege affidavit must not be opened except as directed by the court. (4) The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. 1136

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s 128A

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(5) Subject to subsection (6), if the court finds that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court must not require the information contained in the privilege affidavit to be disclosed and must return it to the relevant person. (6) If the court is satisfied that— (a) any information disclosed in the privilege affidavit may tend to prove that the relevant person has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, an Australian law; and (b) the information does not tend to prove that the relevant person has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and (c) the interests of justice require the information to be disclosed— the court may make an order requiring the whole or any part of the privilege affidavit containing information of the kind referred to in paragraph (a) to be filed and served on the parties.

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(7) If the whole or any part of the privilege affidavit is disclosed (including by order under subsection (6)), the court must cause the relevant person to be given a certificate in respect of the information referred to in subsection (6)(a). (8) In any proceeding in a Victorian court— (a) evidence of information disclosed by a relevant person in respect of which a certificate has been given under this section; and (b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct result or indirect consequence of the relevant person having disclosed that information— cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence concerned. (9) Subsection (8) does not prevent the use against the relevant person of any information disclosed by a document— (a) that is an annexure or exhibit to a privilege affidavit prepared by the person in response to a disclosure order; and (b) that was in existence before the order was made. (10) Subsection (8) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned. (11) If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in respect of information of a kind referred to in subsection (6)(a), the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. [Subs (11) insrt Act 52 of 2012, s 5]

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s 128A

(12) For the purposes of subsection (11), a prescribed State or Territory provision is a provision of a law of a State or Territory declared by the regulations to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for the purposes of that subsection. [Subs (12) insrt Act 52 of 2012, s 5]

(13) Subsection (11) applies to a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4, other than a proceeding for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a law of the Commonwealth. [Subs (13) insrt Act 52 of 2012, s 5] [S 128A am Act 52 of 2012]

ACT Act: 128A Privilege in relation to self-incrimination—exception for certain orders etc (1) In this section:

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disclosure order means an order made by an ACT court in a civil proceeding requiring a person to disclose information as part of, or in connection with, a freezing, search or other order under the Court Procedures Rules 2006, division 2.9.4 but does not include an order made by a court under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) or the Confiscation of Criminal Assets Act 2003. relevant person means a person to whom a disclosure order is directed. (2) If a relevant person objects to complying with a disclosure order on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that the person— (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty; the person must— (c) disclose the information in relation to which no objection is taken; and (d) prepare an affidavit containing the information in relation to which objection is taken (the privilege affidavit) and deliver it to the court in a sealed envelope; and (e) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection. (3) The sealed envelope containing the privilege affidavit must not be opened except as directed by the court. (4) The court must decide whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. (5) Subject to subsection (6), if the court finds that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court must not require the information contained in the privilege affidavit to be disclosed and must return it to the relevant person. 1138

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s 128A

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(6) If the court is satisfied that— (a) any information disclosed in the privilege affidavit may tend to prove that the relevant person has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, an Australian law; and (b) the information does not tend to prove that the relevant person has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and (c) the interests of justice require the information to be disclosed; the court may make an order requiring all or any part of the privilege affidavit containing information mentioned in paragraph (a) to be filed and served on the parties. (7) If all or any part of the privilege affidavit is disclosed (including by order under subsection (6)), the court must give the relevant person a certificate in relation to the information mentioned in subsection (6)(a).

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(8) In any proceeding in an ACT court or before any entity authorised by a territory law, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine evidence— (a) evidence of information disclosed by a relevant person in relation to which a certificate has been given under this section; and (b) any information, document or thing obtained as a direct result or indirect consequence of the relevant person having disclosed that information; cannot be used against the person. Note: This subsection differs from the Commonwealth Act, s 128A(8). The Commonwealth provision refers to an “Australian court” instead of an “ACT court”.

(9) However, subsection (8) does not apply to a criminal proceeding in relation to the falsity of the evidence. (10) Subsection (8) does not prevent the use against the relevant person of any information disclosed by a document— (a) that is an annexure or exhibit to a privilege affidavit prepared by the person in response to a disclosure order; and (b) that was in existence before the order was made. (11) Subsection (8) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate. (12) If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in relation to information mentioned in subsection (6)(a), the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. [Subs (12) insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 8]

(13) For subsection (12), a prescribed State or Territory provision is a provision of a State or Territory law declared by regulation to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for that subsection. [Subs (13) insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 8] © 2018 THOMSON REUTERS

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s 128A

(14) Subsection (12) applies to a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4, other than a proceeding for an offence against a Commonwealth law or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a Commonwealth law. Note: The Commonwealth Act does not contain provisions corresponding to s 128A(12) to (14). [Subs (14) insrt Act 47 of 2011, s 8] [S 128A am Act 47 of 2011]

NT Act: 128A Privilege in respect of self-incrimination — exception for certain orders etc. (1) In this section: disclosure order means an order made by a Territory court in a civil proceeding requiring a person to disclose information, as part of, or in connection with, a freezing or search order under the Rules of the Supreme Court but does not include an order made by a court under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) or the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act. Note for definition disclosure order: This definition differs from the NSW Act and Victorian Act.

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relevant person means a person to whom a disclosure order is directed. (2) If a relevant person objects to complying with a disclosure order on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that the person: (a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty; the person must: (c) disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken; and (d) prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken (the privilege affidavit) and deliver it to the court in a sealed envelope; and (e) file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection. (3) The sealed envelop