UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988 9781685852573

Table of contents :
Contents
Foreword
1 Introduction
2 17-19 March 1978: Speedy and Effective Action
3 The Implementations of the Mandate
4 Strengthening the Size and Effectiveness of UNIFIL
5 The Humanitarian Situation: Interim Tasks for the Interim Force
6 1982-1985: New Situations, New Proposals
7 The Troop-Contributing Countries
8 Machinery and Models for Negotiations
9 The Role of the Security Council: The Political Constraints
10 The Role of the Security Council: The Constitutional Constraints
11 Summary: The Accomplishments and the Dilemmas of UNIFIL
Selected Bibliography
Index
About the Book and the Author

Citation preview

UNIFIL

UNIFIL

International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988

Bj0rn Skogmo With a Foreword by Sir Brian Urquhart

Lynne Rienner Publishers

/

Boulder & London

This book is No. 65 in the Norwegian Foreign Policy Studies of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo.

Published in the United States of America in 1989 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1989 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloglng-ln-Publlcatlon Data Skogmo, Bjctrn UNIFIL : international peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. United Nations—Armed Forces—Lebanon. 2. UNIFIL. 3- United Nations. Security Council. I. Tide. JX1981.P7S525 1989 341.5'8 88-18499 ISBN 1-55587-135-6 (alk. paper) British Cataloguing In Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984 ©

Contents Foreword

Sir Brian Urquhart

vii

1

Introduction

1

2

17-19 March 1978: Speedy and Effective Action

7

3

The Implementations of the Mandate

17

4

Strengthening the Size and Effectiveness of UNIFIL

79

5 The Humanitarian Situation: Interim Tasks for the Interim Force

91

6

1982-1985: New Situations, New Proposals

95

7

The Troop-Contributing Countries

131

8

Machinery and Models for Negotiations

163

9

The Role of the Security Council: The Political Constraints

191

10

The Role of the Security Council: The Constitutional Constraints

217

11

Summary: The Accomplishments and the Dilemmas of UNIFIL

241

Selected Bibliography

267

Index

271

About the Book and the Author

279 v

Foreword The method of conflict control now called peacekeeping has received much public attention and appreciation. Although the first major United Nations peacekeeping force was the Emergency Force rapidly improvised to defuse the 1956 Suez Crisis, the use of peacekeeping forces has now b e c o m e a more or less regular feature of the international scene. The actual nature and complexity of peacekeeping, however, is far less well or widely understood. Peacekeeping operations have done noble work in the past thirty years, and they certainly have an important future in the maintenance of world peace. They are not, however, always seen or judged with any real insight into their functioning or basic problems. Bj0rn Skogmo's book is of particular importance and value because it gives an extraordinarily comprehensive and perceptive account of the whole complex of political, logistical, military, psychological, and other factors within which a peacekeeping force operates. Some peacekeeping tasks are much more straightforward than others, having a precise and agreed mandate as well as the full cooperation of the parties in conflict. Others are extremely complicated and difficult, having been put together to deal with an emergency that overrode the need for clarity, unanimous support, and cooperation that are so important to soldiers in the field. UNDOF (the UN force in the Golan Heights of Syria) and UNEF II (the UN force that went into the battlefields along the Suez Canal in 1973) are examples of the first, more or less straightforward category. The UN operations in the Congo (ONUC) and Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) are excellent examples of the second. UNIFIL was set up and launched upon its stormy career during the weekend session of the Security Council in March 1978. An immediate face-saving response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was required, vii

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and all other considerations took second place. The task given to UNIFIL by the Security Council was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security, and to assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in Southern Lebanon. This mandate looked all right on paper, but it had little to do with the grim realities of the situation. The government of Lebanon was powerless in the area, the government of Israel was resentful of the new peacekeeping force and not disposed really to cooperate with it, while other armed groups in the area, including the PLO, had their own agendas and ideas. Having launched UNIFIL, the members of the Security Council, both individually and collectively, were extraordinarily restrained about providing strong and outspoken support for their new offspring. The crushing burden of performing an extraordinarily difficult and hazardous task therefore fell mainly on the commander and the officers and men of UNIFIL, with whatever help and direction the United Nations Secretary-General and his colleagues could provide. In the absence of political solutions or local cooperation, their task was to make the best of an impossible situation and to do what they could to keep the peace, to save lives, and to make the existence of the civilian inhabitants as tolerable as possible. All this had to be done against the shifting background of Middle Eastern politics, international relations, and the domestic concerns of various countries, including the troop-contributors, as well as the fullscale Israeli invasion of 1982. It is an extraordinary tribute to the successive commanders and to the officers and men of UNIFIL, as well as to the troop-contributing governments, that after ten years the Force is still in place and is regarded as a valuable, indeed an essential, element of peace and stability in this extremely sensitive area, even by those who were once its main detractors. Bjorn Skogmo gives a masterly account of the intertwining, and often tangled, skeins that make up the history of UNIFIL. He gives due balance to the political, military, diplomatic, humanitarian, legal, psychological, and practical factors that make up this story and relates them to each other in a way that clarifies and illuminates a very complex subject. His book is relevant not only to the United Nations Force in Lebanon, but to the much wider subject of the potential and limits of international control of conflict. I hope Bj0rn Skogmo's book will be widely read by government leaders, soldiers, and scholars, as well as by those members of the general public who are interested in the realities and the problems of keeping the peace.

—Sir Brian Urquhart

_

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, celebrated its tenth anniversary in March 1988. This was an occasion for looking back on a difficult decade and toward a future that seemed as uncertain as the past. During the 1978-1988 period, UNIFIL had to live through one large-scale invasion, several major incursions, and a never-ending series of infiltrations, encroachments, and other incidents. In spite of the problems, UNIFIL has done an important job in an environment that has been singularly hostile to other attempts at mediation, negotiations, peacekeeping, or peacemaking during the 1978-1988 period. But the price has been high. By January 1988, 151 UNIFIL soldiers had lost their lives, while more than 200 had been wounded in armed clashes, shellings, and mine explosions. UNIFIL is generally held to be the most complex and difficult UN peacekeeping operation ever, with the possible exception of the Congo operation in 1960-1964. What has gone wrong for UNIFIL? In analyzing UNIFIL's performance, achievements and failures, what are the main factors that can explain the outcome of events? The hypothesis underlying the present study is that the basic problems of the UNIFIL operation have been much more political than operational, that UNIFIL's failures have been caused more by breakdowns in the political premises and the diplomatic support system of the operation than by inadequate performance of the peacekeeping force in the field. This hypothesis would indicate the need for a closer This study is part of a larger project, "The Future of International Peacekeeping Operations," being carried out at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). The project is supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

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analysis of the UN Security Council and its role and functions in the management of the UNIFIL operation. All United Nations peacekeeping operations after the UNEF I operation (1956-1967), which was created by an emergency special session of the General Assembly, have been established by the Security Council. In many respects, the Security Council can be considered the governing board of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. The initial decision to launch a peacekeeping operation is made by the Security Council through its adoption of an enabling resolution, which also defines the mandate of the new peacekeeping force. Through the practice of giving the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations only a time-limited mandate, the Security Council will also have the opportunity and the responsibility to review the general situation surrounding the force at given intervals, usually every six months. In addition, the Security Council can be called upon to support the peacekeeping operation whenever it is subjected to attack, attempts at military or political pressure, or other major problems. In all these matters, there is a close collaboration between the Security Council on the one hand and the Secretary-General and the United Nations Secretariat on the other. The Secretary-General is responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council and is generally in charge of the executive functions involved in running a peacekeeping operation. This includes the appointment of a force commander and the recruitment of a military force covering contingents from several different troop-contributing countries. It further necessitates the setting up of structures responsible for all logistic and administrative arrangements involved in managing a military operation far away from headquarters. A vital element in any peacekeeping operation is also the machinery for crisis management, consultations, and negotiations provided to the parties by the United Nations. At one end of this diplomatic scale are the individual soldiers and battalion in the field. At the next level, the force headquarters and other UN-established liaison elements in the field provide a machinery for liaison functions and negotiations with the various authorities and groups in the countries concerned. At the highest diplomatic levels, UN peacekeeping operations draw upon the efforts of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General in New York. The Secretary-General will report on the implementation of most of these functions to the Security Council. To a large extent, the Secretary-General depends on the consent and the support of the Security Council to get the necessary legal and political backing for the peacekeeping operation in question. The Security Council is more than a decision-making body with the carefully defined area of responsibility found in the Charter of the

INTRODUCTION

3

United Nations, however. It is also a political forum that can be used by every member of the United Nations to express national policies and to vent individual grievances and frustrations. Sometimes, when situations occur that might constitute a threat to international peace and security, individual national interests may converge. In such cases the Security Council will be able to adopt decisions with general international support, articulated by the members of the Council through their decisions. Sometimes these decisions are supported by the parties to the conflict themselves. But sometimes—and perhaps more often— the individual national interests of the parties directly involved in a conflict will be so divergent that the parties are more interested in using the Security Council as another conflict arena—as a way to gain time in order to establish faits accomplis or as a forum to extol the virtues of their own side and to condemn the vices of the other. In such cases, the possibilities will be sharply diminished that the Security Council can adopt decisions all parties to a conflict will respect. The saga of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is in many ways the story of a conflict in which the Security Council has been used to both of the purposes mentioned above. In March 1978, when the Security Council adopted resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) establishing UNIFIL, there was apparently a convergence of national interests that made possible a positive decision by the Council. Among the members of the Council and between the parties to the conflict, there seemed to exist a general consent to the establishment of UNIFIL, although varying degrees of enthusiasm could be observed. When it became evident as early as June 1978 that UNIFIL would not be given the opportunity to fulfill its mandate in its entirety, this was a sign that the initial convergence of interests was no longer present. Indeed, the question may be asked whether the condition that everybody agreed was necessary to establish UNIFIL—that it would have the full support of the parties concerned—ever had been present. The following is an attempt to study the role of the Security Council in the establishment of UNIFIL and in later consultations and debates on its situation and future. The purpose of the study is to analyze the policies and behavior of the different actors and to identify the main constraints involved in the management of a UN peacekeeping operation, seen mostly from a New York perspective. It should not be seen as any attempt to write a chronological history of UNIFIL or of the turbulent history of Lebanon during the 1978-1988 period. Nevertheless, Chapters 2-6 sum up to a certain extent the main events in UNIFlL's life, and Chapters 7-11 treat those events from a more analytical point of view. The analysis is based primarily on the records of the Security

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Council—the official or provisional records of its meetings, its resolutions and decisions, its official documents Getters or communications received from member states, reports of the Secretary-General to the Council), its annual reports to the General Assembly, and so on. It must be stressed that these records often contain little information about consultations and negotiations among the members of the Security Council, the parties concerned, and the Secretariat. The official records reflect only the outcome of the consultations involved in the Council's discussion of the item on the agenda and not very much about the process leading to its decisions. Nevertheless, these records give a fairly accurate and authoritative reflection of the policies of the various actors involved on the issue before the Council. As such, they provide a valuable and necessary framework for any analysis dealing with the Security Council and its work. Nations do not always reveal ulterior motives or all their acts and policies in official communications to the Security Council, however. The official sources therefore have to be compared and corrected with what has been revealed from other sources. A number of books, articles, and press reports have been published on UNIFIL and on the Lebanon crisis in the 1978-1988 period. Wherever it has been deemed necessary, such secondary sources have been used to make the basic documentation of events as accurate as possible. The main sources of this type are indicated by notes wherever they are used, whereas general knowledge and information from the media have been used more freely. A list of the secondary sources used is annexed at the end of the study. Another source of information has been a series of interviews with members of the UN Secretariat, representatives from the permanent missions of the parties to the conflict, and members of the Security Council. These interviews were conducted in New York between 26 April and 4 May 1985. A second round of interviews was conducted in New York in November and December 1985. Since none of these interlocutors has been given the opportunity to review or correct the descriptions and interpretations attributed to the different parties in this study, these sources will not be named. The present study is part of a larger project, "The Future of International Peacekeeping Operations," carried out at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs during 1984-1988. As another part of this larger project, a special edition of the periodical Internasjonal Politikk was published (in Norwegian) in September/October 1985, containing articles on different political and military aspects of Norway's participation in the UNIFIL operation. Some of these articles have been used as sources for the present study. For this and other

INTRODUCTION

5

practical reasons, many of the examples used in the present study to illustrate the problems of UNIFIL are based on experiences in the sector covered by the Norwegian contingent (NORBATD and on other problems affecting Norway's participation in UNIFIL. Wherever sources concerning other troop-contributing nations have been available, these have also been used. To these sources is added a subjective element—personal observations made and impressions received during more than five years of diplomatic service at the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations (1979-1984). In this period, Norway served as a member of the Security Council during 1979 and 1980 and has participated in the consultations among the UNIFIL troop-contributing countries. It must be strongly underlined that the descriptions, interpretations, and judgments in this paper represent the views of the author alone and not those of the Norwegian government.

CHAPTER TWO

17-19 March 1978: Speedy and Effective Action On 11 March 1978, a group of Palestinian guerrillas staged a series of attacks on civilian targets in Israel, including a bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv highway. The group, which infiltrated Israeli territory by sea, came from Palestinian bases in Lebanon. Israel sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Doc. S/12598) on 13 March 1978, informing him of the incident and stating that thirty-seven Israeli civilians had been killed and seventy-six wounded during the raid. On 14-15 March, massive numbers of Israeli troops crossed into Lebanon on several axes. The intervention was brought to the attention of the Security Council through a letter from the representative of Lebanon on 15 March, in which the Lebanese government vehemently d e p l o r e d and strongly protested the intervention, which was characterized as a "naked aggression against Lebanese territory" (Doc. S / 1 2 6 0 0 of 15 March 1978). In the same letter, the Lebanese government disclaimed any connection with the commando operation on the Haifa-Tel Aviv road and stated that "Lebanon is not responsible for the presence of Palestinian bases in Southern Lebanon in the present circumstances." The Lebanese government also reserved its right to call an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation. The formal request for an urgent meeting of the Council came on 17 March. The Council held its first meeting the same day and continued its debates on 18 March. On 19 March, the Council adopted two resolutions that established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Even though the underlying strategy was inspired by the Lebanese government, the formal proposal to set up a United Nations peacekeeping force to assure an Israeli withdrawal from Southern

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Lebanon came from the United States. President Jimmy Carter gives the following description of the genesis of UNIFIL in his memoirs. After having described the Israeli intervention on 14-15 March 1978 as a terrible overreaction, he writes that "I instructed [Secretary of State] Cytrus Vance] to tell them [the Israelis] that we would introduce a resolution in the United Nations calling for their withdrawal from Lebanon and the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force there." 1 Cyrus Vance informed Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on the day of the invasion that the United States saw no other solution to the crisis in Southern Lebanon than a UN f o r c e . 2 T h e following day, consultations were initiated with the other members of the Security Council. The idea quickly received support from the other Western members of the Security Council and a somewhat more ambivalent consent from the nonaligned members of the Council and Arab countries. An understanding was also reached with the Soviet Union that the Soviets would not veto the proposal, and the formal draft resolution to establish a UN peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon was introduced by the United States Permanent Mission in the afternoon of 18 March. The Security Council voted on the draft U.S. resolution in the morning o f 19 March 1978, less than a day after the formal presentation of the U.S. proposal. Twelve countries voted in favor, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia abstained, and China did not participate in the vote. The resolution, which was adopted as resolution 425 (1978), defined the following mandate of UNIFIL in operative paragraph 3 of the draft: • Confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces • Restoring international peace and security • Assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. From the point of view of the Lebanese government, the idea of deploying UN observers or peacekeeping troops in Southern Lebanon was not new. A limited number of UN observers from the UN Truce and Supervision Organization (UNTSO) had been present in the border area since 1949 to supervise the armistice agreement between Israel and Lebanon. (See Chapter 8.) In 1972 the Lebanese obtained an increase in the number of UNTSO observers in Southern Lebanon from seven to twenty-one. The possibility of a United Nations force in Southern Lebanon was briefly discussed during a meeting with Secretary-General Waldheim and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin during Begin's visit to the United States in July 1977. 3 In September 1977, the Lebanese government had initiated consultations

17-19 MARCH 1978: ACTION

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with the UN Secretariat with a view to obtaining agreement on a new and significant increase in the number of UNTSO observers. These proposals were not supported by the Israeli government or by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), however, as long as tension in the area was kept at tolerable levels. For the Lebanese government, the atmosphere of international crisis caused by the 15 March Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon created an opportune moment to push for the establishment of a larger UN presence there. To obtain the necessary backing in the Security Council, the Lebanese government sought the backing of the U.S. government, with France as its second option. For the United States, the idea of sending a peacekeeping force to Southern Lebanon was seen as a way to get the crisis quickly under control to avoid further damage to the peace process in the Middle East. As soon as President Carter had made his decision, the U.S. Mission to the Security Council concentrated on pushing the establishment of UNIFIL through the Security Council quickly. The drafting of resolution 425 (1978) and the necessary consultations with the other members of the Security Council were undertaken by the U.S. delegation in close cooperation with the Lebanese. 4 Whereas the vote in the Council indicated broad support for the U.S. proposal, the debate in the Council reflected considerably more skepticism. Besides Lebanon, none of the parties directly involved—Israel, the PLO, or Syria—came out with any open, explicit support of the establishment of UNIFIL during their interventions in the Council debate. Some of the nonaligned members feared that the mission of the new UN Force might not be as temporary as the mandate indicated. The Arabs, including the PLO and Syria, declared that they would have preferred a stronger resolution with much stronger condemnations of the Israeli intervention. The Soviet Union, which abstained on the vote, voiced serious misgivings about the third part of the mandate and declared that it would not pay its share of the budget of UNIFIL. An important question in connection with the adoption of resolution 425 (1978) is whether the parties to the conflict were consulted on the proposal to establish a UN peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon. With respect to the Lebanese government this condition was clearly fulfilled.5 The PLO was not consulted, however, and the Permanent Observer of the PLO to the United Nations, Terzi, bitterly criticized the resolution as just another "derivative" and partial solution to the Middle East conflict that did not endeavor "to seek a solution dealing with the root and heart of the tragedy in the Middle East—namely, the question of Palestine" (SCOR 2074th meeting, 19

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March 1978). Indeed, as the PLO was not officially considered a party to the conflict by the terms of resolution 425 (1978), the SecretaryGeneral had to tread carefully to obtain the necessary pledges of cooperation from the PLO. That support could not be obtained until 27 March, more than one week after the decision to establish UNIFIL. Even the Israeli government was informed rather than consulted on the establishment of UNIFIL. Even though the Israeli Mission to the UN was consulted on the wording of resolution 425 (1978), it made it plain that Israel was unenthusiastic about the establishment of a new UN force in Southern Lebanon. 6 Prime Minister Begin was on his way to the United States at the time of the Security Council debate. The Israelis asked for a postponement of the voting on resolution 425 so that Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan could be in New York to present Israel's case, but this request was not accepted by the United States.7 The Israelis did not mobilize all their political resources in the United States to oppose the idea of setting up UNIFIL, but clearly felt that they had been more or less pressed into it. The statement of the Israeli Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Herzog, criticized resolution 425 (1978) as "inadequate and sorely lacking" (SCOR 2074th meeting). Neither Ambassador Herzog's statements in the Council nor any other public documents of the UN indicate any prior agreement of Israel to the establishment of UNIFIL. Meanwhile, as the members of the Security Council consulted and debated in New York, the Israeli Defence Forces continued their advance on the ground, as they had done during the Security Council's consultations during the Middle East wars in 1967 and 1973. During this process, the military aims of the operation, which initially had been declared to include only a 10kilometer zone immediately north of the border, were gradually enlarged. 8 The memoirs of Defence Minister Ezer Weizman even suggest that the decision of the Security Council might have had some contrary effects: Even so, we might not have pushed on were it not for the intervention of the United Nations. When we learned that the Security Council was deliberating whether to send a UN force to Southern Lebanon, it was suggested that we advance to the Litani, ensuring that the UN units would take control of the whole area between the river and our border, while the terrorists would have to pull back their forces north of the river. Both the prime minister and I approved of this proposal. 9

Even in the UN Secretariat, the feelings over the proposal to establish a new UN peacekeeping force were, at best, fairly mixed. On the one hand, there was some satisfaction over the U.S. initiative. It was seen as a sign that the United Nations was back in business

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again, after some years during which the focus of U.S. peacemaking efforts in the Middle East had taken place outside the framework of the United Nations. On the other hand, there were also strong doubts among key officials within the Secretariat w h e t h e r the b a s i c assumptions underlying the U.S. draft resolution were really tenable. For these reasons, some people feared that a new UN force in Southern Lebanon would be a peacekeeper's nightmare and that the UN would be saddled with a difficult task without enough political support to do the job. 1 0 In this respect, they shared some of the misgivings or questions that were voiced in the Security Council debate. Roughly summarized, the questions that emerged during the consultations in Security Council circles centered on the following problems: • What was the extent of Israeli commitment to withdraw forces from Lebanon, especially in light of the apparent Israeli objective to establish a more permanent link to the Christian militias in the border area? • What was the United Nations Force supposed to do with the different armed groups in the area? Some of them belonged to or collaborated with the PLO, which at that time had a strong political position at the United Nations. Others were armed by Israel, the dominant military force in the area. • What could the United Nations really do to reestablish the authority of the Lebanese government in an area where government authority had been weak if not nonexistent for years and in a situation where the effectiveness of the same government was seriously and gradually being undermined by the intermittent civil war in the country? The UN Secretariat is the servant of the Security Council, however, and these questions could not be openly expressed as opposition to the establishment of UNIFIL. Nevertheless, the speed with which the consultations on the new force developed during 17 to 19 March left open several important issues, the resolution of which was vital for the effective functioning of a UN peacekeeping force. One motive for the United States to expedite a vote was to get the Lebanon crisis quickly under control—if possible, before Prime Minister Begin's arrival on 21 March in Washington, where the continuation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks was to be the main item on the agenda. Another argument in favor of seeking a quick vote was the risk that prolonged discussions in the Council on the wording of the draft resolution might jeopardize the initial majority within the Council to establish UNIFIL. Protracted consultations might

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also shift the draft resolution in directions that might be harder for the United States and Israel to accept. The statements by Arab countries and by the East Europeans that they would have preferred a resolution sharply condemning Israel were an ominous warning in this respect. In their efforts to rush a rapid decision through the Council, the Lebanese government and the U.S. delegation received effective help from the British. The president of the Security Council during March 1978, Ambassador Ivor Richard of the United Kingdom, has written that "in a series of five meetings beginning on Friday afternoon and ending on Sunday night, I used the powers of the presidency to the utmost to schedule meetings in quick succession and even, when necessary, to cut short lengthy speeches. Members of the Council did not insist on having 24 hours in which to consult their governments because they also desired speedy action." 11 Resolution 425 (1978) did not ask the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l to carry out any feasibility study on the establishment of UNIFIL. Instead he was requested through operative paragraph 4 of resolution 425 (1978) to report back to the Council within twenty-four hours. The Secretariat, which had b e e n prepared for this outcome through the consultations in the Council, reacted with impressive speed. The Secretary-General's report was presented immediately after the adoption of resolution 425. This made it possible for the Council to meet again in the afternoon of 19 March to adopt the proposals in the Secretary-General's report containing basic guidelines for the new UN Force through resolution 426 (1978). Yet, questions remained about the feasibility of UNIFIL's basic purpose. These may be discerned in the Secretary-General's report, even though they are couched in terms of conditions that must be met for the Force to be effective. These include (Doc. S/12611 of 19 March 1978): • It must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. • It must operate with the full cooperation of all the parties concerned. • It must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit. The report of the Secretary-General also contained "terms of reference" for UNIFIL; some "general considerations," including its composition and the basic rules for the use of force; a proposed plan of action, which included the appointment of an interim Force commander; and a method for financing the new Force. In elaborating on this report, the Secretariat drew upon the experiences of previous

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UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and a series of understandings that had evolved during these operations on the division of responsibilities between the Security Council and the Secretary-General. The definition of UNIFIL's area of operation had to be left open in the Secretary-General's report, which envisaged the responsibility of UNIFIL as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, UNIFIL was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this was achieved, it would "establish and maintain an area of operation as defined." The Secretariat initially wanted to have this area more clearly defined when the terms of reference were worked out 1 2 An early draft of the report included the phrase "see map enclosed." Consultations with the members of the Security Council and with the representatives of Israel and Lebanon indicated profound disagreements on a definition of the area of operations, however, and in the final draft, a further definition of the area of operation had to be left open, pending the outcome of the negotiations on the implementation of resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). The UN Secretariat is on record as stating that this lack of an agreement on the area of operation gravely hampered UNIFIL's work from the very start.13 Another change had to be made in the final draft of the SecretaryGeneral's report. Initially the Secretariat had wanted to include a clear statement of principle that no armed group would be allowed to stay within UNIFIL's area of deployment This paragraph had to be omitted b e c a u s e o f opposition from Lebanon and Kuwait. Kuwait was important in order to obtain Arab support of the text, which in turn was necessary to get the requisite nine votes for resolution 426 (1978) from the nonaligned members and the East Europeans. From the time that the U.S. initiative to establish a UN peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon was formally proposed to the adoption by the Security Council of the mandate and guidelines of UNIFIL, little more than twenty-four hours had passed. Even if two days of preparatory consultations are counted, the establishment of UNIFIL was an unusually rapid decision by the Security Council on a matter of such importance for the United Nations. With the benefit of hindsight and in the light of the succession of problems that met the new UN Force during its deployment and later existence in Southern Lebanon, it is of course tempting to raise the question whether the Security Council should have taken more time to work out in further detail an agreement between the parties concerned on how UNIFIL was to function in the area. One important argument in favor of such a view is the fact that even if the Council needed less

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than twenty-four hours for its decision, it took more than a week to get the first full contingents into the area and almost a month and a half to make the Force fully operative. A bit more time for consultations in the beginning could therefore have been well spent and might have saved time and helped to avoid some of the problems in the deployment phase and in the later stages of the operation. In N e w York, the sense of urgency was strong during the weekend of 17-19 March 1978, h o w e v e r . W h e n the Security Council w a s discussing the situation in Lebanon, the Israeli Defence Forces were still advancing and losses w e r e mounting; to quote Ambassador Ghassan Tueni, "People die on the Sabbath and they die on the Sundays" (SCOR 2072th meeting, 18 March 1978). In such situations, the Security Council has a duty under the UN Charter to act, and the Council would indeed have been criticized had it not acted as quickly as possible. The debates and the consultations in the Council also showed that there was a relative convergence of interests—or rather an absence of strong divergence—among the members of the Council and the parties concerned to act quickly in order to contain the crisis in Southern Lebanon and to keep it from escalating further, even if the various parties had different motives for this attitude. The Security C o u n c i l can o n l y act e f f e c t i v e l y if such m o m e n t s o f r e l a t i v e international consensus—which do not come very often in the Council nowadays—are exploited and transformed into decisions. There was therefore considerable satisfaction in the Security Council over the quick decision to establish UNIFIL. The president of the Council characterized the events "as one of the most rewarding occasions during my tenure at the United Nations."14

NOTES 1. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Toronto, New York, London, Sydney: Bantam Books, 1982), 310-311. 2. Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 288. 3. Ibid., 280. 4. Ghassan Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres (Paris: Jean-Claude Lattes, 1985), 200-204. Ambassador Tueni writes that Lebanon consciously let the United States sponsor resolution 425 (1978) instead of asking for sponsorship from the Third World members of the Council (which would have been more normal for Lebanon as an Arab state). According to Ambassador Tueni, this decision meant choosing a major option and a certain risk, but it also was a "policy of assurance" vis-a-vis Israel. 5. According to the UN Secretariat, the formal request from the Lebanese government for a meeting of the Security Council and the official acceptance

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by Lebanon of resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) constitute a sufficient substitution for a direct request from the host country to establish a UN force on its territory. 6. The full extent of U.S.-Israeli consultations on the establishment of UNIFIL and its follow-up has not yet been made public, but in his book The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), President Jimmy Carter gives one example of U.S. pressure on Israel because of its policies in Southern Lebanon. He writes (pp. 96-97): In spite of my expressions of concern and the worldwide outcry, Begin seemed determined to keep his forces in Lebanon for an extended period and—in another direct violation of American law—to transfer American weapons, including artillery and armored vehicles, to the Lebanese militia commanded by Major Saad Haddad. These troops had been trained and supported by the Israelis, in order to seal off the Southern portion of the country against Palestinian terrorists. In carrying out this assignment, they also prevented Lebanese regular troops and U.N. peace-keeping forces from entering the area. After consulting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and with key supporters of Israel in the Congress, I decided that we could not permit the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon to continue. In the event that Begin would not accede to our wishes, we prepared to notify Congress, as required by law, that U.S. weapons were being used illegally in Lebanon, which would have automatically cut off all military aid to Israel. Also, I instructed the State Department to prepare a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel's action. The American Consul General in Jerusalem was instructed to deliver a message to Prime Minister Begin that explained these plans and urged that he withdraw his forces. The report came back from Jerusalem that Begin read the message, stood quietly for a few moments, and then said, "It's over." President Carter suggests that this incident took place after the establishment of UNIFIL, that is, during the spring of 1978. Another well-placed source who participated in U.S.-Israeli contacts during this period, William B. Quandt, writes in his book about the Camp David process that the letter from Carter to Begin on the armed personnel carriers in Southern Lebanon was sent on 24 September 1977. William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986). 7. Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from Sinai and Lebanon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, 1984), 18. 8. According to one account, which is based on an interview (in 1983) with General Gur, the chief of staff during the 1978 operation, the Israeli government was divided on the matter of how far north the Israeli Defence Forces should proceed and whether Israel should accept a UN force to the international border. According to this version, Prime Minister Begin and Foreign Minister Dayan, who both were heavily involved in the negotiations

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concerning Egypt, thought that Israel should accept the U.S. pressure to stop the advance of the IDF and to accept a UN force down to the border. Defence Minister Weizman and General Gur, on the other hand, thought that the IDF should advance all the way to the Litani and that Israel should not accept a UN Force to the border. The Weizman-Gur view prevailed because the key village of Tibnin surrendered without resistance. See Odd Karsten Tveit, Nederlag (Oslo: J. W. Cappelen, 1985), 66-759. Ezer Weizman, The Battle for Peace (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), 277. 10. According to Sir Brian Urquhart's memoirs, he expressed his concerns about the establishment of UNIFIL to a number of ambassadors who came to discuss the situation. Urquhart, A Life, 280. 11. Ivor Richard, "The Council President as a Politician", in Paths to Peace: The UN Security Council and Its Presidency, edited by Davidson Nicol (New York: Pergamon Policy Studies, Pergamon Press, 1981). 12. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping (New York: United Nations, 1985), 110. 13- Ibid., 115. 14. Richard, "The Council President."

CHAPTER THREE

The Implementations of the Mandate THE ORIGINAL MANDATE—PACKAGE DEAL OR RECIPE FOR DEADLOCK?

The three elements of the mandate of UNIFIL brought together by the Security Council can be seen as an attempt to forge a compromise or an implicit package deal. Under the first part of the mandate, which demanded the withdrawal of Israeli troops, the Israelis were supposed to give up the territories which had been taken in Southern Lebanon. In return Israel presumably would get international peace and security on the border with Lebanon. A restoration of the effective authority of the Lebanese government would also mean that the power and influence of the PLO in Southern Lebanon would be curbed. The Lebanese government got the best part of the package, which is not surprising since it had participated in its assembling. Not only did Lebanon obtain the support of the Security Council for the demands for an Israeli withdrawal, it also obtained a promise from the Security Council that the United Nations Force would help to restore international peace and security. Lebanon further gained a pledge of UN assistance in the task of restoring its authority in the south. At face value, the PLO probably got the worst deal. The only aspect of the mandate that it wholeheartedly supported was the demand for the Israeli withdrawal. This was, however, a fairly important bait, especially as the Israeli forces were still advancing when resolution 425 (1978) was adopted. PLO interests were also considered during the drafting of the Secretary-General's report, when the provision authorizing UNIFIL to prevent the incursion of any armed personnel into its zone of operations had to be omitted. The PLO consequently did not mobilize its friends in the Security Council in any 17

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active opposition to the establishment of UNIFIL. At the time, these friends included Kuwait, which was the Arab member of the Council at the time, the Soviet Union, and most of the nonaligned members of the Council. A package deal presupposes that all parties keep their sides of the bargain. It also is dependent on a minimum of common understanding on how the various elements of the deal should be interpreted and implemented. In the case of UNIFIL, the deal put together by the members of the Security Council soon started to unravel, not only on the overall package but on each of the three parts of the mandate. Indeed, it has been forcefully argued that there was a built-in deadlock in the original plan because the PLO effectively had been given the right to maintain its presence in Southern Lebanon, which again gave the Israelis an excuse to maintain the Christian militias as a counterbalance.1 In the following discussion, the implementation of each of the three parts of the mandate will be analyzed separately. It must be stressed, however, that the three elements of UNIFIL's mandate are usually seen as an integral whole; splitting the package, as is attempted in this chapter, is to a certain degree artificial.

T H E ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND T H E PROBLEM OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS

The First Withdrawal For most members of the Security Council, the confirming of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon was seen as the most important task of UNIFIL. This part of the mandate also had a direct operational impact on the situation of UNIFIL because of the close links between the area of withdrawal and UNIFIL's area of deployment. In the first consultations on the drafting of resolution 425 (1978), the Lebanese delegation proposed that the new UN Force should "ensure" the withdrawal of Israeli troops.2 The use of this verb was not accepted by the U.S. delegation, which argued that this would confer a too active role for UNIFIL vis-à-vis the Israeli troops that might create incidents and conflict. The verb "confirm" was chosen as a compromise. It was more active than "observe," yet sufficiently vague to allow for different interpretations. Diplomatically, this compromise was necessary to obtain a rapid adoption of the draft resolution. Operationally, the different interpretations on what UNIFIL was supposed to do vis-à-vis the Israeli troops opened the way for a conflict on UNIFIL's basic purpose, which created major problems

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during the deployment period of March-June 1978. In the Secretariat and the Security Council, there was a clear understanding from the beginning that the first part of the mandate implied that Israeli troops should withdraw completely from Lebanon to the international border. The Security Council confirmed the Secretary-General's understanding of this aspect through its adoption of resolution 426 (1978). Its demand for a full Israeli withdrawal was repeated in several later resolutions and decisions. 3 It was also the understanding, at least among the Western sponsors o f the resolution and in the Secretariat, that UNIFIL's area of deployment should cover most if not all of the area between the border and the Litani River to the north. This condition was not as clearly spelled out in Security Council resolutions or the SecretaryGeneral's reports, mainly because it concerned the sensitive question of how UNIFIL should deal with the PLO. As stated in Chapter 2, the Secretariat made some efforts to have this point clarified before the terms of reference of UNIFIL were defined, but was unsuccessful because of opposition from Lebanon and Kuwait. The Israelis, on their part, pressed for a UNIFIL deployment that would include control of the key bridges (including the Kashmiye Bridge north of Tyre) across the Litani into the UNIFIL area, areas that their own forces had not managed to conquer during the 1978 intervention. UNIFIL soon ran into trouble, however, both in the northern and southern parts of the planned area of deployment. Major problems soon became evident in the Tyre area, where the PLO had one of its main bases. During late March and April the French unit posted there tried to assume control of the city and its immediate vicinity. These attempts were firmly resisted by the PLO. On 2 May, members of the French and Senegalese contingents came under attack by armed elements. Two French and one Senegalese UNIFIL member were killed and ten wounded, including the commanding officer of the French battalion, Colonel Salvan. Other contingents deploying in their alotted sectors further inland encountered similar problems with Palestinian elements. Parallel to the incidents in the field, the PLO continued its diplomatic offensive against the idea of letting UNIFIL take control of Tyre and in certain other Palestinian strongholds south of the Litani. T h e main argument of the PLO was that these areas were not conquered by the Israelis during their intervention and could therefore not be included in the implementation of the first part of UNIFIL's mandate or, by implication, in UNIFIL's area of deployment. Another important argument of the Palestinians for being allowed to remain in the UNIFIL area was that they had legitimate rights to do so under the

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terms of the Cairo Agreement of 1969 (Doc. S/12845 of 13 September 1978). The PLO mobilized strong support for these views from other Arab countries, a number of which made their stand clear to the Secretary-General during April 1978. In these conditions, the SecretaryGeneral decided to delay the proposed deployment, p e n d i n g negotiations with the PLO.4 The Force commander thought that UNIFIL should not allow the Palestinians to keep their strongholds within UNIFIL's area of deployment and argued for a strong stand from the UN on this issue. The Lebanese government, which had earlier refused to challenge the PLO on this issue, informed the UN in early May that it would support an eviction of the PLO's positions from the UNIFIL area, 5 but by that time it was too late. In the UN Secretariat it was felt that the SecretaryGeneral's hands were tied by the lack of support for a firm stand on this issue in the Security Council, as had become evident during the drafting of the Secretary-General's report of 19 March. The Secretariat was also constrained by the principle that UNIFIL should operate with the agreement of the parties concerned and by the principle of nonuse of force except in self-defense (see Chapter 4). It was also strongly felt that the UN was unfairly asked to take on military operations that neither the Lebanese nor the Israelis had been willing to undertake prior to or during the March 1978 intervention and that such a course of action would fatally damage a peacekeeping operation from the outset.6 Secretary-General Waldheim met with PLO Chairman Arafat in Beirut on 17 April to discuss matters relating to UNIFIL's deployment. The PLO again made clear that it would only support the UNIFIL mission if the area of deployment were limited to those areas covered by the withdrawal of Israeli troops. In the end, UNIFIL deployment in these areas "was not pressed" (Doc. S/12845). In retrospect, this was probably one of the judgment calls for which valid arguments could be advanced for either course of action. The Tyre problem obviously could not have been solved by military means by UNIFIL contingents. Even the Israelis had shied away from entering the densely populated and well-armed Palestinian camps in Tyre during Operation Litani. To have forced the Palestinians out of the rest of the UNIFIL area or to have refused them reentry would probably have been easier in the deployment phase in March-April 1978 than later, however, and many of the problems that UNIFIL met later could possibly have been avoided. On the other hand, such forceful action by UNIFIL against PLO positions would most probably have undermined the fragile political base of the whole UNIFIL operation in the Security Council. It would almost certainly have affected the attitude of the PLO, many of the Arabs, and the Soviet

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Union against the UNIFIL concept. It is difficult to see how such a policy could have b e e n implemented, at least without a correspondingly tough policy toward the Christian militias, which would have brought its separate set of problems and conflict with the Israelis. This would also have strained the ground rules for the use of force and the conditions set by some (but not all) of the troopcontributing countries for their participation in UNIFIL. At the very least, such a course of action would have required strong support and leadership from the members of the Security Council. These were not forthcoming. In the south, UNIFIL deployment initially went more smoothly. During the first three stages of the Israeli withdrawal, which were negotiated by General Siilasvuo, who served as chief coordinator of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Middle East, and UNIFIL Force Commander Erskine, no major problems occurred, although members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General indicated their impatience about what was perceived as foot-dragging on the part of the Israelis.7 UN negotiators at the time were well aware of the possibility that Israel might want some kind of political or military power left behind in the hands of the Christian militia forces in the area under the command of Major Saad Haddad. But no such desires had been communicated to the UN, and the Secretary-General and his negotiators had to proceed on the assumption that Israel would comply fully with the terms of resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). At the least, the Secretariat trusted that some kind of arrangements of coexistence between UNIFIL and the militias in the border area could be worked out after the Israeli withdrawal. Indeed, precisely because UN officials feared that Israel might press for some kind of formal role for Major Haddad if the subject were brought up, the problem of the future status of the Christian militias in the border area was never formally raised by the UN negotiators in their discussions with the Israelis.8 The most serious problem for UNIFIL, which was to haunt the Force during the rest of the period discussed in the present study, was revealed on 13 June 1978. During the fourth and last phase of the Israeli withdrawal, which was scheduled for this date, the Israeli Defence Forces did not relinquish control over the area closest to the border to UNIFIL as planned, but turned it over to the militia forces under the command of Major Haddad. In UN terminology, these forces became known as the de facto forces (DFF). The area controlled by these forces between the international border to the south and the UNIFIL area to the north and east became known as the "enclave," which also included "the gap" between the Norwegian battalion area in

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the eastern sector and the other UNIFIL battalions. The existence of the gap, which encompassed Major Haddad's headquarters in Marjayoun, meant that UNIFIL's deployment did not form one uninterrupted zone across Southern Lebanon and that UNIFIL had no possibility of controlling infiltrations from the Palestinian positions north of the Litani through this area. The existence of the gap also meant that UNIFIL could not control Israeli incursions into Southern Lebanon, particularly across the Litani to Palestinian concentrations around the Beaufort Casde, Nabatiya, and Aichiyeh. In fact, UNIFIL officials believed that this gap was left precisely for that purpose. During the deployment period of UNIFIL, Major Haddad was still provisionally recognized by the Beirut government as de facto commander of the Lebanese forces in his present area "for the purpose of facilitating UNIFIL's mission" (Doc. S/12620/Add. 5 of 13 June 1978). There was no doubt within UNIFIL that the Christian militias were controlled by the Israelis from the start of the UNIFIL operations, however, and that the Israeli Defence Forces manipulated these groups at will to circumvent earlier agreements with UNIFIL whenever they desired. 9 The provisional recognition of Major Haddad by the Beirut government made it possible for the Israelis to state that they considered Major Haddad to be a legitimate representative of the Lebanese army and that by handing over the control of the border area to these forces, Israel had fulfilled its obligation to withdraw from Lebanon in conformity with resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). The Lebanese position on this point also tied the hands of UNIFIL during the crucial events of 13 June 1978. When the Lebanese changed their position on the legitimacy of the de facto forces, valuable time had been lost and the matter was a fait accompli. In his last progress report on the deployment of UNIFIL, dated 13 June 1978, the Secretary-General stated: "On 13 June, these Israeli forces withdrew from the remaining occupied area in Southern Lebanon" (Doc. S/12620/Add. 5). This observation, which proved to be factually misleading as actual Israeli control over the area was maintained through the Haddad forces, was based on communications from Force headquarters in Naqoura, which in turn were based on what were understood to be Israeli promises. During later Israeli incursions into Lebanon, UNIFIL always took great care to doublecheck before confirming Israeli withdrawals in reports from the Secretary-General. During the deployment phase of UNIFIL in March-June 1978, the U.S. government continued its support of the new UN operation through an active bilateral diplomacy, including in relation to Israel.

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U.S. pressure on the Israelis in connection with the establishment of the security zone controlled by Major Haddad and his troops appears to have been concentrated on the stationing and use of U.S.-made weapons in the area and not on the establishment of the security zone itself, however. 10 It nevertheless seems clear, both from President Carter's version of events and the Vance memoirs, that the president and his staff were basically critical of the policies of Israel in Southern Lebanon, both in March-June 1978 and afterward. One question that merited a closer analysis is why the United States let itself be surprised by the de facto establishment of the "security belt" in Southern Lebanon in June 1978 when the very aim of the Israeli intervention was to establish a 10-kilometer zone along the border. It seems evident that U.S. negotiators during this period operated on the assumption that the Israelis would withdraw completely and leave control over the entire area to UNIFIL.11 In this context, it is worth noting that one veteran participant in and observer of UN peacekeeping operations has suggested that the UN apparently was "lured" into the situation in which the UN Force found itself after the events of 13 June 1978.12 In early September 1978, the Lebanese government withdrew its provisional recognition of Major Haddad and his colleagues because orders had "not been obeyed." In a letter to the Secretary-General, dated 5 September, the Lebanese declared that "the Commanders of the so-called de facto Lebanese forces are now to be considered as having no further quality or authority whatsoever to act on behalf of the Lebanese Army, to negotiate with the United Nations or to exercise any legal command in the area" (Doc. S/12834). The formal withdrawal of recognition by Beirut was in itself a constant source of irritation and frustration for Major Haddad and his men. Many of the incidents and harassment tactics used by the de facto forces in the 1978-1981 period can be seen as attempts to enhance their status and position in the area. Nevertheless, the tasks of crisis management and conflict prevention were made somewhat easier for UNIFIL by the fact that the Lebanese government allowed the establishment of two liaison offices with the Haddad forces in Marjayoun and Bent Jbail. The Israelis answered the new Lebanese position on Major Haddad's forces by stating that resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) "do not require control of any area to be turned over to UNIFIL, as alleged in the Lebanese letter of 5 September" (Doc. S/12840 of 8 September 1978). In spite of the fact that Israel was completely alone in maintaining this interpretation of resolutions 425 and 426 (1978), the Israelis never changed their basic position on this issue. In a statement made by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the UN,

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Ambassador Yehuda Z. Blum, in the Security Council on 19 September 1978, at the end of the first six-month mandate of UNIFIL, it was declared that Israel had fulfilled its obligations under the first part of the UNIFIL mandate by having completely withdrawn its forces from Lebanese territory. It was further maintained that "Israel provided significant assistance and tangible aid to UNIFIL, facilitating its entry into Southern Lebanon, installing facilities and assisting with communications, supplies and logistics" (SCOR 2086th meeting, 19 September 1978). The only concession that the Israelis were prepared to give to UNIFIL in the "security zone" was the establishment of a number of observation posts. Following extensive negotiations among the parties concerned, the Secretary-General succeeded during the summer of 1978 in deploying twenty-four UNIFIL positions within the Haddad enclave in addition to the five former UNTSO observation posts. The enclave positions conceded by the Israelis sometimes became a liability because they were frequently isolated in a hostile environment. There were many attempts to take as hostages the UNIFIL troops manning these static posts, to harass them by gunfire, or to cut their supply routes to exert pressure on UNIFIL headquarters. The limits on UNIFIL's deployment that were established in June-September 1978 lasted, with only minor modifications, beyond the second Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May-June of 1985. The Harassment Period, 1978-1981 The problems caused by Major Haddad and his de facto forces were a dominant and frustrating factor in UNIFIL's life and existence from the summer of 1978 onward, particularly until the cease-fire of July 1981. These forces not only denied UNIFIL the right to deploy down to the border area, but they also created various obstacles to restrict the movement of UNIFIL troops and personnel in the area. In addition to regular harassment of UN positions both within the enclave and in UNIFIL's own area of deployment, Major Haddad repeatedly made attempts to widen his area of operation by trying to set up positions inside the UNIFIL area. The situation that confronted UNIFIL as a result of the 13 June limits established on its deployment was repeatedly discussed in the Security Council. In his report to the Council at the end of the first sixmonth mandate period, on 19 September 1978, the Secretary-General stated that "the present situation, through no fault of UNIFIL, is unacceptable" (Doc. S/12845). At the insistence of the French delegation, the Security Council voted in September for only a fourmonth renewal of the mandate. According to the French, "We must

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clearly state that time is running out." In this perspective, a shorter mandate period was thought necessary to put pressure on the parties to cooperate with UNIFIL (SCOR 2085th meeting). At the next renewal, in January 1979, the Council again voted for a shorter mandate period than the regular six months by extending the mandate by five months until June 1979. The Haddad forces pressed their advantages. In April 1979, the headquarters of UNIFIL at Naqoura, which was located within the enclave controlled by Haddad, was bombarded with heavy artillery over a period of several hours, causing eight UNIFIL casualties (wounded). This incident was directly linked to a joint effort by the Lebanese government and the UN to take concrete steps to strengthen the authority of the Beirut government, and will therefore be discussed further in Chapter 3. A particularly serious period in UNIFIL's existence occurred during the winter and spring of 1980. In January, the de facto forces closed all roads in the Haddad enclave to UNIFIL personnel on two occasions. During the same period, firings from Major Haddad's forces into the UNIFIL area increased, and the Secretary-General noted that a "general hardening of attitudes" took place (Doc. S/13994 of 12 June 1980). In the same period, the Palestinians and other armed elements continued infiltration attempts into the UNIFIL area of deployment from the north. Following a decision to restaff five UN observation posts along the Israel-Lebanon demarcation line with five UNTSO observers in March, the de facto forces started a campaign of intense harassment of these posts. The situation escalated dangerously during April, with UNIFIL subjected to intense harassment and violence by Major Haddad's forces. On 6 April, the de facto forces attempted to establish a permanent position in a village in the Irish sector of UNIFIL. The attempt was resisted by the Irish troops, and the Irish were—according to standard UNIFIL procedures—quickly reinforced by soldiers from other contingents. The tension escalated seriously on 6-7 April after a group of five Palestinian terrorists crossed the border, entered the Israeli kibbutz Misgav Am, and took a group of women and children hostage. In the ensuing shootout, three Israelis were killed and many more wounded. The terrorists were all killed. In the days that followed, the de facto forces waged an almost open war against UNIFIL, both in the Irish sector and by opening heavy fire on UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura, including the Force hospital. On the side of UNIFIL, one Irish soldier and one Fijian soldier were killed and several wounded, while one person was killed and three wounded among the de facto forces. On 18 April, three Irish soldiers on their way to a UN observation post in the enclave were

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stopped by the de facto forces. One of them was shot and badly wounded; the other two were kidnapped. Despite efforts by UNIFIL to have them released, they were murdered the same day. In New York, the Secretary-General informed the members of the Security Council of the escalation of tensions in and adjacent to the UNIFIL area of operations in a special report on 11 April (Doc. S/13888 of 11 April 1980). Three further reports were issued on 16 and 18 April (Addenda 1-3). The Security Council met on 13, 14, 15, 16, and 18 April to discuss the situation. The troop-contributors to UNIFIL had continuous consultations with the Secretariat in New York. A separate ministerial meeting of the troop-contributing countries was convened in Dublin on 2 May to discuss what the troop-contributors should do. In a presidential statement of 18 April, the members of the Council expressed "shock and outrage" at the report of the "cold-blooded murder of peacekeeping soldiers by the de facto forces," which was characterized as "a direct defiance of the authority of the Security Council and to the mission of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security" (Doc. S/13900 of 18 April 1980). The statement by the Security Council members did not mention Israel by name, but the address was nevertheless clear: "The Security Council strongly condemns all those who share in the responsibility for this outrageous act." During the same meeting, Tunisia, which served as the Arab member of the Security Council during the 1980-1981 period, submitted a draft resolution that went even further than the presidential statement by containing several paragraphs that would have "strongly condemned" Israel. For the U.S. delegation, this was a bit too much, and the United States threatened to use its veto if this draft were submitted to a vote. In a second revised draft adopted after five days of consultations by twelve votes in favor and three abstentions (resolution 467 [1980]), the word "strongly" had disappeared, and the draft centered instead on a paragraph that strongly deplored both "the military intervention of Israel in Lebanon" and "provision of military assistance to the so-called de facto forces." The U.S. delegation abstained in the voting, thereby finding itself in the somewhat uncomfortable position of being in league with the traditional abstentionists on UNIFIL, that is, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The reasons given by the delegation of the United States for its abstention on this resolution were representative of a policy that the United States has held consistently for many years. This policy concerned the quest for balance in the language of the decisions by the Security Council on UNIFIL and the situation in Southern Lebanon. Criticism of Israel and of Israeli policies should, in the opinion of the

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United States, be balanced by a similar criticism of the activities of the PLO and other armed elements. Formulations criticizing the "encroachments" of Major Haddad's forces on UNIFIL positions should be accompanied by similar references to the "infiltrations" by the armed elements. Incidents affecting UNIFIL, even if initiated by Major Haddad's forces, were seen as elements in "a cycle of violence" for which both parties had to accept responsibility. During the rest of 1980 and the winter of 1981, the level of violence from Major Haddad's forces was somewhat scaled down, possibly because of the pressure brought upon the Israelis both in New York and through bilateral channels. Nevertheless, local incidents, harassments, and attempts of encroachment into the UNIFIL area of operations continued. In March 1981, a new escalation of tensions took place, following an attempt by UNIFIL to expand the deployment of Lebanese army troops in the area. A Lebanese platoon was assigned to Kantarah village. Haddad was trying to pressure the village to defy UNIFIL and declare allegiance to him. Arrival of the Lebanese soldiers could have seriously endangered his designs inasmuch as the people of the south would then have proven their loyalty to the Lebanese army. The incident ended in intense shelling by the de facto forces on UNIFIL positions in the Nigerian and Dutch sectors. One Nigerian officer and two other ranks were killed and twenty others wounded. Among the survivors in the building that took the hardest hit was UNIFIL's deputy commander, Brigadier General 0degaard of Norway. As in April 1979 and 1980, the situation was brought before the Security Council by the Lebanese government and through special reports issued by the Secretary-General. Even this time, the Council members agreed on a strong presidential statement that "condemns these outrageous actions by the so-called de facto forces." Again, such acts were described as "a direct defiance of the authority of the Security Council and a challenge to the mission of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security." The Council members also addressed "a serious warning to all the forces responsible for these dangerous acts" (Doc. S/14414 of 19 March 1981). The Israeli Permanent Representative to the UN during most of UNIFIL's existence, Ambassador Blum, initially maintained that "While Israel had made it clear that it cannot be indifferent to the fate of the villagers of the south, it cannot assume responsibility for their actions" (SCOR 2106th meeting, 8 December 1978). After a while, however, it became increasingly difficult for the Israelis to maintain the pretense that they did not directly control Haddad. UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel regularly observed Israeli Defence Force (IDF) officers alongside the forces of Haddad. There was no doubt that weapons,

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ammunition, and other supplies were furnished by Israel. In response to these harassments, members of the Security Council and some of the troop-contributors made it clear to the Israelis that if they did not have full control over Haddad so far, they had better assume such control to prevent a recurrence of such provocations. The Israelis gradually seemed to understand that the excesses of Major Haddad were bad public relations for Israel even in countries that traditionally had been friendly to Israel. The official policy that Major Haddad's forces were a legitimate Lebanese group was maintained, however.

The Second Invasion The second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, on 6 June 1982, was intimately linked to the question of a breakdown of international peace and security in the area, the concern addressed in the second part of UNIFIL's mandate (discussed later in this chapter). The 1982 invasion brought new demands for a withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. In the first days of the invasion, the Security Council adopted two resolutions that again were to be the subject of political arguments and different interpretations. In the 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 5 period, most of these events concerned areas north of the Litani and outside UNIFIL's area of deployment. These will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6, and only a brief summary of the withdrawal aspect is contained in the present context. Following a request by the Lebanese government on 4 June 1982, the Council members met on the same day to consult on the situation. A presidential statement was issued, calling on the parties to adhere strictly to the cease-fire (of 23 July 1981) and to refrain from any hostile acts that could aggravate the situation (Doc. S/15163 of 4 June 1982). In an open meeting the following day, the Council adopted resolution 5 0 8 ( 1 9 8 2 ) in which the Security Council "calls upon all the parties to the conflict [Israel was not addressed directly] to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and not later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1 9 8 2 . " On 6 June the Council met again and this time adopted the much sharper resolution 5 0 9 ( 1 9 8 2 ) in which the Council "demand[ed] that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon." In a report from the Secretary-General issued on 7 June on the implementation of resolution 509 (1982), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had received replies from the Lebanese government, which declared that "despite the present Israeli aggression, Lebanon has not become a party to the hostilities that have

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ensued"; from the PLO, which stated that it agreed "to the content of your message relevant to Security Council resolution 509 (82)"; and from Israel (Doc. S/15178). The Israeli communication stated: 1. The "Peace for Galilee" operation w a s ordered because o f the intolerable situation created by the presence in Lebanon o f a large n u m b e r of terrorists operating from that country, e q u i p p e d with m o d e r n , long-range w e a p o n r y , threatening the lives of the civilian population o f Galilee. 2. A n y w i t h d r a w a l o f I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y f o r c e s p r i o r t o t h e conclusion of concrete arrangements which would permanently and reliably preclude h o s t i l e a c t i o n a g a i n s t I s r a e l ' s c i t i z e n s is inconceivable. 3. The inherent right of self-defence is o n e of the fundamental rights of sovereign States. Article 51 of the Charter o f the United Nations reaffirms the right of self-defence of all Member States.

The Israeli communication also repeated the Israeli offer to sign a peace treaty with "independent Lebanon, its territorial integrity preserved." Resolutions 508 and 509 (1982), which were adopted unanimously by the Council, were to be referred to again and again by the Lebanese government in the months and years that followed. For the Lebanese, the unanimous demand by the Council for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal by the Israeli forces from Lebanon was even stronger than resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). These resolutions therefore became important political symbols in the negotiations and consultations on the conditions and modalities of the Israeli withdrawal. On this point, the Lebanese government received strong support from Syria, other Arab countries, and the Soviet Union, which also repeatedly referred to the implementation of these resolutions as necessary conditions for any political settlement of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict. Israel, as is evident from the position quoted above, made it clear that it did not recognize or accept resolutions 508 or 509 (1982). When the Security Council met again on 8 June, the Council members were faced with one of the most difficult questions put before the Council: How the Security Council should act to contain escalating international conflicts if a member nation does not want to cooperate with the Council. This time, however, the Israelis received stronger support from the United States, which used its veto on a new Spanish draft resolution that "condemns the non-compliance with resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) by Israel" and that threatened Israel that the Security Council would have to meet again "to consider practical ways and means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" if

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Israel did not comply with the demands for a cease-fire and a forthwith and unconditional withdrawal (Doc. S/15185 of 8 June 1982).13 In the memoirs of Alexander Haig, secretary of state at the time, a vivid description is given of the last-minute deliberations of the U.S. administration on how the United States should vote on the Spanish draft. Whereas President Reagan was first advised that the United States should vote in favor of the draft, Haig argued that this "would bring about a major break with Israel" and convinced the president that the U.S. veto should be used. 14 In the period between 1982 and 1984, the question of the conditions and modalities of the Israeli withdrawal was subject to several rounds of contacts and negotiations between the Israeli and the Lebanese governments. An agreement between the two countries on the withdrawal and on security arrangements after the completion of the withdrawal was signed on 17 May 1983, after prolonged diplomatic efforts by U.S. Ambassadors Philip Habib and Morris Draper and the personal involvement of Secretary of State George Shultz. Primarily because of strong opposition from Syria, the agreement was never implemented, and it was formally c a n c e l e d by the L e b a n e s e government on 5 March 1984. One reason for Syria's negative attitude toward the 17 May agreement was the conditions established by the Israeli government for its implementation. These conditions, which were closely linked to the objectives of the Israelis for the 1982 invasion, included the prior withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, the return of prisoners held by Syria and the PLO, and the return of the remains of Israeli soldiers supposedly buried in Syria. According to President Amine Gemayel himself, the Lebanese knew that these conditions were virtually unimplementable, and the United States had no success in convincing Syria to accept the agreement. 15 In the first year after the 1982 invasion, the Lebanese government generally agreed with the Israeli and U.S. objective of obtaining a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. The support for this objective was first made clear in an official statement from the Lebanese government on 14 July. 16 In the informal consultations of the Security Council on draft resolutions in the summer and fall of 1982, the Lebanese attempted to use the Council's general support for a withdrawal of Israeli troops as a vehicle to demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. Security Council resolution 520 of 17 September 1982 included, for example, a preambular paragraph that took note "of the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon." The Lebanese government also notified the Arab League Summit Conference at Fez, Morocco, of

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its decision "to put an end to the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon." 17 In the Fez Declaration of 9 September 1982, which supported "the implementation of Security Council resolutions, and in particular resolution 508 and 509 (1982)," it was further noted that "the Lebanese and Syrian Governments will start negotiations on measures to be taken in the light of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon." Such formulations and paragraphs became increasingly unpalatable for Syria, which never accepted that the Syrian presence in Lebanon, formally as part of the Arab Deterrent Force, was placed on equal footing with the Israeli presence. Not surprisingly, the Syrians received support from the Soviet Union for this view. From September 1983 onward, the draft resolutions submitted to the Security Council by the Lebanese government had a qualification added to the original wording about the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces—namely, the phrase "whose presence in Lebanon does not have the approval of the Government of Lebanon." (Doc. S/15990 of 19 September 1983.) In the particular language of the Security Council, this is as clear an example as any of the ascendancy of Syrian influence on the Lebanese government from this period. The breakdown of the 17 May 1983 agreement, the outbreak of new heavy fighting in Lebanon in the wake of the first stage of the Israeli withdrawal in September 1983, and the withdrawal of the Multinational Force from Beirut in February 1984 created a need for a new course in the attempts to find a negotiated solution to the IsraeliLebanese conflict. One consequence of these events was a marked disengagement on the part of the U.S. government from the conflict, even from the diplomatic scene. This diplomatic vacuum also opened room for new initiatives by the Secretary-General. In his report to the Security Council before the renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL in April 1984, the Secretary-General pointed to three aspects of the problem of the Israeli withdrawal that needed attention. First, the government of Lebanon and the people of Southern Lebanon desired the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and authority up to the internationally recognized border at the earliest possible date. Second, Israel, while expressing its desire to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, was concerned over the security of its northern border after the withdrawal of those forces. Third, the security of the Palestinian refugees, especially in the camps in the Sidon area, was a matter of grave concern and responsibility. O n the basis of these observations, the Secretary-General suggested that the Security Council at an appropriate time should consider a future course of action that would include the following: • The temporary deployment of UNIFIL, with elements of the

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Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces, in areas vacated by Israeli forces • The immediate deployment of elements o f UNIFIL in the Sidon area on Israeli withdrawal from that area, with a view t o assuring the safety and security of the population, including Palestinian refugees in the c a m p s in that area • T h e working out o f the n e c e s s a r y arrangements t o e n s u r e that Southern Lebanon b e c o m e s a zone of p e a c e under the sovereignty and authority of the L e b a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t ( D o c . S / 1 6 4 7 2 of 9 April 1984)

The Security Council requested the Secretary-General "to continue his consultations" through resolution 549 (1984). As a result of the ensuing contacts with the governments of Israel and Lebanon during the summer and fall of 1984, the Secretary-General convened a conference of military representatives of the two countries under United Nations auspices in Naqoura in November 1984. The aim was "to discuss military aspects relating to the withdrawal of Israeli forces and security arrangements in Southern Lebanon" (Doc. S/17093 of 11 April 1985). The Naqoura talks produced no results, however, and on 14 January 1985, the Israeli government announced its unilateral decision to withdraw from Lebanon in three phases. The communiqué issued by the government of Israel on 15 J a n u a r y 1985 set forth the following three-stage plan for a redeployment of the Israeli Defence Forces along Israel's northern border: • P h a s e 1: In the w e s t e r n s e c t o r o f L e b a n o n , t h e I D F will w i t h d r a w from the Sidon area and d e p l o y in the Litani-Nabatiya region. • Phase 2: In the eastern sector of Lebanon, the IDF will deploy in the Hasbaya region. • P h a s e 3: T h e IDF will d e p l o y a l o n g the I s r a e l i - L e b a n e s e international border while maintaining a zone in Southern Lebanon w h e r e local forces (SLA) will operate with IDF backing. 1 8

According to this plan, the first stage of the withdrawal would take place within five weeks of the 14 January decision. The communiqué stated that a timetable would be submitted in advance to the Lebanese government and the UN Secretariat in order to permit them to organize and deploy forces in the areas the IDF would vacate. The timetable for the withdrawals defined in phases two and three was not determined in the 14 January decision, but would be decided by the Israeli cabinet throughout all the phases. The communiqué also stated that efforts to reach diplomatic agreements would continue. As described in further detail in Chapter 8, these efforts produced no result during the spring

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of 1985. By early June, the Israeli forces had completed their redeployment plan and had withdrawn most but not all of their troops from Lebanon. They also continued their military excursions into Southern Lebanon, and the problem of the "security zone" remained unsolved. During the Israeli occupation of the UNIFIL area in the 1982-1985 period, several problems arose concerning the question of how UNIFIL should deal with the occupying forces and their Christian allies. Some of these problems were new to UN peacekeeping operations and confronted UNIFIL with situations not clearly defined in international law as regulated by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (the Fourth Geneva Convention) or the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907. Neither of these conventions had foreseen a situation in which the occupied areas regulated by the conventions are also controlled by the United Nations through a peacekeeping force. In the first period after the 1982 invasion, the focus of interest on all sides, including the Lebanese government, was on the political and military situation and not on the legal aspects of the Israeli occupation. In August and September 1984 and again in March 1985, the Lebanese government introduced draft resolutions before the Security Council that would have formally affirmed that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention applied to the territories occupied by Israel in Southern Lebanon (Doc. S/16732 of 6 September 1984 and Doc. S/17000 of 11 March 1985). Both resolutions were vetoed by the United States, but not because it disagreed on the applicability of the Geneva Convention. In a statement during the March 1985 debate, for example, U.S. Permanent Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick stated that the United States would have been prepared to join in a statement that would have affirmed the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the occupied areas in Lebanon. The draft resolution presented by the Lebanese—which the Lebanese delegation had been unwilling to discuss or modify—was unbalanced in the U.S. view, however, and "does not accord Israel fair treatment" (Doc. S/PV. 2573 of 12 March 1985). Israel, on its part, maintained that the IDF was not an occupying force in Southern Lebanon under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention but a military force conducting operations of a temporary nature. Nevertheless, Ambassador Blum referred to the International Committee of the Red Cross as witness "that Israel has been applying the Fourth Geneva Convention in the area of Lebanon under its control, and Israel's conduct on south Lebanon meets the requirement of that Convention as well as of other relevant rules of international

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law aimed at protecting the civilian population" (Doc. S/PV. 2552 of 30 August 1984). UNIFIL, on its part, based its behavior toward the Israeli Defence Forces on the provisions of the Geneva Convention. This meant that the IDF had to be granted freedom of movement and other rights and responsibilities relative to the security situation in the area. On the other hand, the Fourth Geneva Convention also establishes clear limitations on what an occupying power is allowed to do in its relations with the civilian population. The reports of the SecretaryGeneral on developments in the UNIFIL area in the 1982-1985 period indicated that the Israelis stretched these limitations quite far and that clear transgressions occurred. Because of the provisions of the Geneva Convention, UNIFIL troops were instructed not to block the movements of the Israeli Defence Forces, but to observe and report on their activities. These procedures generally meant that UNIFIL troops followed Israeli troops at a close distance wherever they went within the UNIFIL area. When the Israelis went beyond what UNIFIL thought allowable under the Geneva Convention, UNIFIL troops often tried to intervene, at times by placing themselves between the Israelis and the civilian population (Doc. S/17093 of 11 April 1985). The purpose was to establish buffer zones with the goal of preventing violence and starting mediation. An even thornier problem concerned the question of how to deal with the Christian militias allied with the Israelis. These groups had no similar legal rights under the Geneva Convention. UNIFIL was therefore instructed not to allow these groups access to the UNIFIL area if they operated alone. Very often these groups operated with the Israeli troops, however. This meant that it was much more difficult for UNIFIL, both from a military and from a legalistic point of view, to block their access to the UNIFIL zone. In such situations, the militias generally were allowed to pass through if the IDF accepted command responsibilities. If not, the militias were in principle refused access. 19 The Secretary-General's reports from the 1982-1985 period contain several accounts of incidents in the UNIFIL area as a result of these problems. During the occupation period, Israel attempted in several ways to strengthen its hold on the civilian population in the UNIFIL area. One method was the creation of "village committees," which would, for example, be responsible for levying taxes and financing the irregulars armed by the Israelis. Local leaders opposed these efforts, and a number of them asked UNIFIL for help, seeking assistance against what they considered to be undue pressure by the occupying force (Doc. S/15863 of 12 July 1983). Israeli plans to set up such committees

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35

met with little success, however, and by April 1984, the SecretaryGeneral noted a noticeable increase of hostile reactions by the local population against the pressure of the Israelis (Doc. S/16472 of 9 April 1984). In the same month, Major General Antoine Lahad, a former officer in the Lebanese National Army, took over the command of the de facto forces after Major Haddad, who had died three months earlier. At the same time, these forces were renamed South Lebanon Army, or SLA. In the fall of 1984 and the winter of 1985, the situation in the south deteriorated further as the Israelis prepared their withdrawal. Numerous attacks from local groups, mostly from the Shi'ite Muslim segments of the population, were carried out against Israeli soldiers and positions. The Israelis, for their part, carried out increasingly frequent "cordon-and-search operations" in villages in the area. Apart from the regular observe-and-report procedures maintained by the individual battalions, special task forces, usually organized into units consisting of three UNIFIL officers, were set u p at the Force headquarters on a standby basis to monitor operations of this kind. As soon as movements of Israeli troops toward villages or other targets in the UNIFIL area were observed, UNIFIL units or task forces were alerted and usually managed to arrive at the scene at the same time as the Israelis. UNIFIL could not prevent the Israelis from carrying out their searches, but on most occasions managed to mitigate the behavior of the Israelis by "preventing, within the limits of its means, acts of violence against the population, and the destruction of property" (Doc. S/17093). In a number of cases, UNIFIL personnel interposed themselves physically to prevent the demolition of houses, which led to heated arguments and sometimes direct confrontations between UNIFIL and the Israelis. One such incident, which received considerable media attention and led to diplomatic repercussions, occurred in mid-February 1985 in the village of Burj Rahhal, where UNIFIL soldiers from the French contingent became engaged in fisticuffs with IDF soldiers in an effort to stop the Israelis in demolition of village houses. In his April 1985 report, the Secretary-General noted that fourteen bodies were found after Israeli search operations during this period, although UNIFIL did not witness the actual deaths of these persons (Doc. S/17093). The Secretary-General noted that UNIFIL made repeated protests to the Israeli authorities about these operations. The problem of UNlFIL's relationship with the Christian groups became particularly acute during and after the second Israeli withdrawal in 1985. After the emergence of the SLA in 1984, the Lebanese government had adopted an even stricter policy on the recognition problem than it had followed during the days of Major

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Haddad and his de facto forces in the 1978-1982 period. In a letter to the Secretary-General on 27 March 1985, it was expressly stated that Lebanon "is not prepared to assign any role to any military force which is not a legal force" (Doc. S/17062 of 27 March 1985). This letter referred to the problem of formal recognition of the SLA, not necessarily to informal liaison contacts. UNIFIL could and often did establish contact with lower echelons of any armed group to prevent escalation of incidents, and UNIFIL did not feel bound by any political directives from any of the parties involved in this respect. The problem of defining UNIFIL's relations with the SLA therefore was determined by UNIFIL's decision to hold the Israelis responsible for the behavior of the SLA, which was, after all, an auxiliary of the occupying power. To establish liaison with the SLA at a higher level would entail the risk of permitting the Israelis to disclaim any control over that militia. In the spring of 1985, some low-level, informal liaison contacts were nevertheless established. In the wake of the Israeli redeployments and the establishment of the "security zone," a series of incidents occurred during the first half of 1984 between UNIFIL and the SLA, which was sometimes supported by Israeli troops. A particularly serious episode occurred in the Finnish sector in June, when twenty-four UNIFIL soldiers from the Finnish contingent were kidnapped and held hostage by the SLA to obtain the return of a number of defectors. It later was learned that the Finnish soldiers had staged a mock attack on the group in question in order to allow them to defect safely. The Finns were held hostage for several days in spite of repeated appeals to Israel to use its influence to have the UNIFIL soldiers released. Some observers saw this episode as an attempt by the SLA to force UNIFIL into some kind of recognition of the SLA and felt that the episode might have been averted if liaison arrangements had been established.20 In fact, the SLA did obtain a small victory inasmuch as the deputy commander of UNIFIL met with high-ranking representatives of the SLA to obtain the release of the Finnish soldiers. Later, an informal liaison group consisting of two UNIFIL representatives at colonel/lieutenant colonel levels and two representatives of the SLA, including a civilian adviser, was established. The Lebanese government did not object to the setting up of such working contacts. The Problem of the "Security Zone" The discussions on the last phase of the Israeli withdrawal during the spring of 1985 bore more than a passing resemblance to the negotiations during May and June 1978 on the first Israeli withdrawal

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37

from Lebanon. A key element in the Israeli position, both in 1978 and in 1985, was the notion of a "security belt" or "zone" immediately north of the border area. The concept of some kind of security arrangements for Israel in alliance with the Christian groups in Southern Lebanon had been present in Israeli thinking about its northern borders long before the 1978 events. Both within the UN Secretariat and in some of the literature that has been written about the Israeli-Lebanese conflict, reference has been made to the diaries of David Ben-Gurion, who wrote on 24 May 1948 that "the weak link in the Arab coalition is Lebanon. Moslem rule is artificial and easy to undermine. A Christian state must be established whose southern border will be the Litani. We shall sign a treaty with it."21 Even more telling are the references to the same issue in the diaries of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett (who opposed such plans), which describe a meeting on 16 May 1954 where Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan were present. Sharett quotes Dayan as having said in this meeting that T h e only thing that's necessary is to find an officer, even just a major. We should either win his heart or buy him with money, to m a k e him agree to declare himself the saviour of the Maronite population. T h e n the Israeli a r m y will e n t e r L e b a n o n , will o c c u p y t h e n e c e s s a r y territory, a n d will create a Christian regime which will ally itself with Israel. T h e territory from the Litani southward will b e totally a n n e x e d to Israel a n d everything will b e all right. 2 2

According to one of the most prominent Israeli specialists on Lebanon, such ideas did not represent a continuous line in official Israeli thinking about Lebanon, however, at least not until the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976, when Israel renewed its contacts with Christian elements in Lebanon, including cooperation with Major Haddad in Marjayoun. 2 ' Some kinds of privileged rights for Israel in Southern Lebanon were also implicit in the tacit "red line agreement" of 1976 between Israel and Syria. According to this agreement (mediated by the U.S. government), Syria, in return for the deployment of its forces in Lebanon without Israeli interference, agreed not to interfere "in Israeli ground operations or air strikes against Palestinian guerrilla positions, particularly those south of the Zahrani river." Other conditions included "no movement of Syrian troops south of the Zahrani, no deployment of Syrian missiles in Lebanon, no Syrian attempt to close the Christian port of Junieh, and no imbalance in the Syrian moves against the Christians and Palestinians."24 In his book The Battle for Peace, Defence Minister Weizman observes that the Israelis considered advancing to the Litani River to

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ensure that the UN units would take control over the whole area between the river and the border. This might suggest that the Israelis believed a comprehensive UNIFIL deployment would have been possible if the PLO had let UNIFIL take full control over the Tyre area and the other strongholds in the UNIFIL area. Israeli statements in the Security Council in the 1978-1982 period also made a sort of linkage between these two aspects by making it clear that a further deployment of UNIFIL to the south would be absolutely out of the question as long as the Palestinians kept their positions in the Tyre area and their other positions within the UNIFIL area. There never was any promise by the Israelis to give up the security belt controlled by the Haddad forces, however. The refusal of the PLO to give up its positions in Tyre and its other strongholds also made it impossible for UN negotiators to suggest any kind of package deal, consisting of a full Palestinian withdrawal from all areas south of the Litani and a similar Israeli disengagement from the security belt. The opposition of the Security Council to the concept of a security belt for Israel in Southern Lebanon has been as constant as the concept itself. It has been repeatedly stated, both in the reports by the Secretary-General and in the decisions of the Security Council, that UNIFIL could only function effectively and take care of its tasks if the UN Force was allowed to take control over the area all the way down to the international border. There was little difference between the situation in September 1978, when the renewal of the first mandate of UNIFIL was discussed in the Council, and the situation in early 1988 after twenty-three mandate extensions. In the many resolutions adopted by the Security Council on extensions of the mandate of UNIFIL the recurring phraseology has been of the "strong support of the Security Council for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries" (resolution 536 [19831, for example). Behind this phraseology—proposed by the Lebanese—lies a unanimous support in the Council for the message that the international community could not accept any arrangements about Lebanese territory that the Lebanese government itself had not accepted. The areas included in the security belt, as it was defined by the Israeli government in connection with the 1985 withdrawal, did not correspond on all counts with the enclave occupied by the de facto forces in the 1978-1982 period. In some sectors, the new security belt was defined in such a way as to include regions within the UNIFIL area of deployment. This was the case particularly in the eastern sector, where the entire deployment area of the Norwegian battalion was

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39

included. The security zone also included UNIFIL areas that in January 1988 were the domain of the Nepalese, Irish, and Finnish battalion sectors (Doc. S/19445 of 27 January 1988). The boundaries of the security zone were not permanently defined, but were in effect determined by the forward position of the IDF and the SLA. In his January 1988 report, the Secretary-General reported that the IDF and SIA maintained a total of fifty-seven positions within the UNIFIL area, fifteen of which were located within the battalion sectors. During the July 1987-January 1988 period, four such positions within the battalion sectors were closed, partly as a result of repeated resistance operations against these positions. In the early phases after the 1984 withdrawal, the bulk of the SLA, whose total number in mid-1985 was estimated at between 1,250 and 1,500, lacked training and were poorly organized. SLA soldiers were described as "proxies in the hands of IDF. SLA is paid, equipped, trained and controlled by IDF."25 The security zone itself was described as little more than a zone of occupation and was considered as such by UNIFIL and the UN. In the security zone there has been little change in the situation in the 1985-1988 period. Compared with the UNIFIL area, where the situation has been relatively quiet, the security zone has remained tense (Doc. S /17965). During the winter of 1985-1986, two serious incidents occurred in and near the village of Kunin in the border area between the Irish battalion sector and the enclave. The first of these, at the end of December and during the first days of January, started by an ambush against an IDF/SLA search operation that caused all the inhabitants to leave the village. The incident was brought before the Security Council through a request for a meeting by the Lebanese on 6 January (Doc. S/17717). A draft resolution that would have strongly deplored "the Israeli act of violence as well as abusive practices and measures against the civilian population in Southern Lebanon" (Doc. S/17730/Rev. 2) was introduced by the Lebanese, but was vetoed by the United States. In the second incident, in February, two Israeli soldiers were abducted from the same area. Following this incident, an Israeli force of about three mechanized battalions, accompanied by members of the SIA and supported by tanks and helicopter carriers and gunships, carried out a series of cordon-and-search operations in the UNIFIL area from 17 to 22 February. As usual, such actions were followed by an increasing number of incidents in the border area involving ambushes, car bombs, shelling, and Israeli retaliations in the following weeks. As the conflict between the Lebanese resistance groups and the IDF/SLA intensified during 1986, UNIFIL personnel were exposed to

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increasing attacks from both sides. In August and September 1986, UNIFIL personnel, particularly in the French sector, suffered a serious confrontation with the Shi'ite group Amal, which was followed by attacks by other armed elements, causing several dead and wounded. The French twice asked for urgent consideration by the Security Council of the situation, and in a report to the Council issued on 18 September (Doc. S/18348), the Secretary-General painted a bleak picture of the "major crisis" facing UNIFIL. The prime concern at that stage was the security of UNIFIL personnel, and in his report, the Secretary-General presented to the Council a list o f immediate measures proposed to him by the Force commander, including regroupment of UNIFIL positions and contingents, a crash program for additional reinforced shelters, and increased reliance on armed personnel carriers. The Security Council expressed its deep concern over the situation in a presidential statement of 5 September (Doc. S/18320), and in a resolution adopted on 23 September (resolution 587 [19861), the Secretary-General was requested to take any further measures needed to enhance the security of the men of UNIFIL and their peace mission. The voting on this resolution, which was adopted by fourteen votes in favor and an abstention from the United States, also marked a small shift in the U.S. position on the security zone. In a statement after the vote, U.S. Permanent Representative Vernon Walters pointed to the paragraph in the resolution that called on the SecretaryGeneral "to make the necessary arrangements for a deployment of the Force to the southern border of Lebanon." Ambassador Walters stated that "by focusing exclusively on redeployment of the Force the resolution ignores the critical factor that has prevented the fulfilment of UNIFIL's mandate: the absence of agreement among the parties concerned on security arrangements that would protect their respective interests" (Doc. S/PV. 2708). Ambassador Walters added that it was "neither realistic nor responsible to demand" that the Secretary-General should impose such a deployment and that "doing so will only increase the level of friction and mistrust." The basic problems caused by the security zone remained basically unsolved at the tenth anniversary of UNIFIL. During the 1986-1988 period, negotiations on future security arrangements in Southern Lebanon that would permit a UNIFIL deployment to the international border—or a UNIFIL withdrawal—also seemed deadlocked. At the end of the period covered by the present study, there were no signs that the Israelis would be more willing to withdraw fully and completely from Lebanon than they had been in the past. The Israeli authorities continue to maintain that the security zone is

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a temporary arrangement, made necessary by their security concerns in the light of the situation existing in Southern Lebanon and the rest of the country. According to the Israelis, they cannot allow the deployment of UNIFIL to the border as there is no central government in Beirut able to exercise effective authority throughout the area (Doc. S/19445). The maintenance of the security zone controlled by Israel means that the first part of the mandate of resolution 425 (1978) was as unfulfillable in 1988 as it had been since 13 June 1978.

RESTORING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The PLO and the "Armed Elements" The task of restoring international peace and security was even more vaguely defined than the job of confirming UNIFIL's withdrawal.26 The operational meaning of this part of the mandate was defined in the Secretary-General's report on the implementation in resolution 425 (1978): "The Force will use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation will not be utilized for hostile activities of any kind." This part of the mandate therefore included the dual task of keeping peace in the area and of putting a stop to cross-border violations from that area. The last element was included in the mandate by the sponsors of resolution 425 (1978) for the purpose of stopping the guerrilla or terrorist attacks from PLO bases in Southern Lebanon against Israel. This part of the mandate consequently was the main legal and political justification for regulating the behavior of the PLO and other armed elements in the area of operations. Although the PLO was not particularly happy with this part of the mandate, it realized that it had little choice in the new situation and that it could draw greater political benefits by seeking to cooperate with UNIFIL than by openly obstructing the UN Force. The main instrument for any UN peacekeeping operation in the implementation of its mandate will be the route of mediation and negotiations, derived from the underlying assumption that such operations can only function with the overall cooperation of the parties concerned. The use of this instrument will have to be closely c o o r d i n a t e d with the u s e of the military capabilities o f the peacekeeping force. An important aspect here will be the ground rules for the necessary show of firmness and, if need be, the use of force. In the context of the reestablishment of international peace and security, the first priority of the UN and UNIFIL negotiating machinery was to put a stop to the fighting and the bloodshed. A vital instrument

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for the UN in this respect, both in 1978 and during later recurrences of fighting in the area, was the negotiation and monitoring of cease-fires. Immediately after the adoption of resolution 425 on 19 March, the Secretary-General made a statement in the Council in which he appealed to all concerned to put an immediate end to the hostilities in the area (SCOR 2075th meeting). The Israeli advances and the fighting in the area did not come to an immediate stop, however, but continued for another two to three days. On 23 March, the Secretary-General transmitted a report from the Force commander that the cease-fire seemed to be holding since 22 March (Doc. S/12620). Nevertheless, some fighting continued. On 27 March, the Secretary-General issued an appeal to all parties concerned to observe a general cease-fire in Southern Lebanon. The following day, on 28 March, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat informed the Secretary-General through UNIFIL Commander General Erskine that the PLO accepted the appeal for a general cease-fire (Doc. S/12620/Add. 1 of 2 April 1978). The cease-fire between the PLO and the Israelis in this period generally held during the first weeks and months of UNIFIL's existence, but numerous incidents nevertheless occurred between PLO armed elements and UNIFIL during the deployment phase. Part of the problem with the Palestinians was that they operated in small groups, and the PLO leadership in Beirut by no means had full control over them all. in the eastern sector alone, the Norwegian contingent encountered no fewer than six different Palestinian factions during the deployment process. Some of these groups did not even formally accept the cease-fires negotiated with the PLO leadership. 27 In UN terminology, these different groups were called the "armed elements," which included both the PLO and other Palestinian groups as well as some Lebanese groups organized into the Lebanese National Movement—a loose association of various Muslim and leftist parties. The next step in the Secretariat's efforts to restore international peace and security in Southern Lebanon was to obtain a more general commitment from the PLO to cooperate with UNIFIL, or at least to avoid an armed showdown. Negotiations with the PLO on how this matter should be settled continued during the period of April-June 1978. During the Waldheim-Arafat meeting in Beirut on 17 April, the PLO leader was not helpful on proposals to move units of the Lebanese army to the south along the coast road or on the presence of PLO groups already in the south. 2 8 The final outcome of these negotiations was summarized in the Secretary-General's report of 13 June 1978, in which he reported on the negotiations between Arafat and Undersecretary-General Roberto E. Guyer in Damascus on 21 May:

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Arafat confirmed that, in pursuance of the guarantees already given to the Secretary-General, PLO would cooperate with UNIFIL and that it would not initiate hostile acts against Israel from Southern Lebanon, although it would continue such acts from other areas. While the question of the PLO presence in Southern Lebanon was a matter to be settled between PLO and the Lebanese Government, PLO would facilitate UNIFIL's tasks in response to the Secretary-General's appeal. In particular, PLO would refrain from infiltrating armed elements into the UNIFIL area of operation. The assurances given by PLO are in line with a five-point agreement concluded between Prime Minister ElHoss and Chairman Arafat. Arrangements have been worked out to improve liaison between UNIFIL and PLO in order to avoid incidents. In the context of that agreement, for humanitarian as well as practical reasons and as an ad hoc interim arrangement, UNIFIL has agreed to allow the delivery, under UNIFIL control, of certain non-military supplies—food, water and medicine—to limited Palestinian groups still in its area of operation (Doc. S/12620/Add. 5 of 13 June 1978).

There were thus two important concessions from the PLO contained in this commitment—the pledge not to initiate hostile acts into Israel from Southern Lebanon and the pledge to refrain from infiltrations of armed elements into the UNIFIL area. This agreement and later PLO acceptance of cease-fires in the area also implied that the PLO in principle recognized the second part of UNIFIL's mandate on the restoration of international peace and security. There were at least two major catches in the official position of the PLO, however. One catch was that nonmilitary supplies to Palestinian elements inside the UNIFIL area should be allowed. This made it possible for the Palestinians to move back to at least some of their previous strongholds inside the UNIFIL area, where they could pick up arms from different caches without openly breaking the agreement with UNIFIL. UNIFIL had no legal or political authority to stop this kind of unarmed infiltration, since it was accepted by the government of Lebanon in its agreements with the PLO. UNIFIL's task then was constricted to stop all attempts to infiltrate arms or armed personnel into the area and to limit the supplies to Palestinians strictly to nonmilitary goods. If arms were caught at UNIFIL checkpoints, the arms were confiscated. In theory, all such arms could have been destroyed by UNIFIL. Instead, by force of the agreement reached between UN negotiators and the PLO during the deployment period, personal weapons that had been confiscated were later given back to PLO officers at agreed transfer points, whereas other types of arms and ammunition were blown up. This policy, which was often criticized by the Israelis, was strongly defended by UNIFIL officers as necessary because of the concern for the safety of UNIFIL troops.

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A second catch derived from the fact that Arafat insisted that the Palestinian armed elements who were said to have remained in the UNIFIL area of operation throughout the Israeli military action should be allowed to keep their positions. To avoid an armed showdown with the PLO and to secure its general cooperation, UNIFIL agreed that a limited number of 140 armed elements belonging to various groups of the PLO could remain in UNIFIL's area, assembled in six positions, and on the clear understanding that these elements would not be used for military purposes. 29 If UNIFIL's relationship with the PLO and the Palestinian groups is compared with UNIFIL's relationship with the Christian militias, the formal relations with the armed elements were easier in the sense that these groups, at least in the 1978-1982 period, were not officially recognized by the Lebanese government. Nevertheless, political sensitivities existed. As the question of the PLO presence in Southern Lebanon was formally a matter to be settled between the PLO and the Lebanese government, UNIFIL in principle had to await the outcome of such negotiations before settling questions relating to UNIFIL's relationship with the Palestinian armed elements. In practice, more direct contacts had to be established. During the deployment phase before the five-point framework agreement quoted above was negotiated, it was often necessary for UNIFIL battalions to establish direct contact with the various Palestinian groups and armed elements because of the need to get incidents under control as quickly as possible. Arrangements made on these levels with the Palestinians were seldom contested by the Lebanese authorities. The infiltration of armed elements nevertheless created major problems for UNIFIL in several of the battalion areas. The problems before 1982 were perhaps most acute in the "iron triangle" within the Fiji battalion, but nests of Palestinian armed positions were also scattered in other battalion areas. Even if such Palestinian positions inside the UNIFIL area were largely kept in check by UNIFIL, they nevertheless reduced the overall authority of the UN Force. Above all, they furnished a pretext to the Israelis and the local forces supported by Israel to criticize UNIFIL not only on the withdrawal question but also on the law and order issue. Israel made its views known in a sharp letter from Foreign Minister Dayan to Secretary-General Waldheim dated 13 June 1978 (the date of the fourth and last stage in the planned Israeli withdrawal). In this letter, the Israelis stated that it is "known that some units of UNIFIL treat these PLO elements with indulgence and even cooperate with them, and that there are official PLO liaison officers in touch with UNIFIL" (Doc. S/12736 of 13 June 1978). The Israelis suggested that such arrangements contradicted the

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position expressed by Secretary-General Waldheim during his visit in Jerusalem on 18 April 1978. The Secretary-General answered on 14 June with an equally sharply worded letter to Dayan, in which he stated that "it is true that there are PLO liaison officers with UNIFIL, as indeed there are liaison officers of all parties concerned" and that the PLO had undertaken to cooperate with UNIFIL, whereas the Israeli government, by not turning over the control of the remainder of the area of operation, had certainly not made the task easier for UNIFIL (Doc. S/12738 of 14 June 1978). For the individual battalions, such liaison arrangements with the Palestinian elements were an operational necessity. As long as UNIFIL had no authority to evict either Palestinian or Christian militia positions inside the UNIFIL area by forceful means, the individual battalions had to establish some kind of practical working arrangements with the groups in their area to avoid complete anarchy. Nevertheless, such arrangements met with sharp disapproval. A local agreement between a Palestinian group and the Norwegian battalion in the eastern sector was bitterly criticized by the Israelis on the grounds that the Palestinians had no business being in positions south of the Litani in the first place. For UNIFIL, it was difficult to understand that such criticism was justified by the facts. In the period between 1978 and 1982, the PLO and other armed elements regularly broke the agreement not to infiltrate the UNIFIL area. A long series of confrontations with UNIFIL personnel occurred, many of them serious and leading to casualties and loss of UNIFIL lives. The Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council contained long lists of infiltration attempts as well as separate chapters on "exchanges of fire across the UNIFIL area." Negotiations with the PLO to establish some kind of calm in the area were therefore more or less a continuous process. The PLO leadership remained generally positive in its attitude toward UNIFIL, but on the question of infiltrations, it seemed either unable or unwilling to help. UNIFIL officers sometimes strongly suspected that PLO officers were by no means as innocent in this traffic as they pretended to be. Because of the problem of unarmed infiltrations to arms caches in the area, and because some armed elements managed to sneak by UNIFIL checkpoints by using uncharted or unguarded trails, the number of armed elements inside the UNIFIL area steadily grew. By July 1981, UNIFIL estimated that the number had increased to about 450, established in some thirty different positions. 30 The Israelis regularly claimed that the real number of terrorists inside the UNIFIL area was substantially higher. The PLO also sometimes gave promises that were not fully

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delivered. In June 1979, for example, the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement issued a declaration in which they promised that the PLO would "withdraw all resistance forces from the city of Tyre" and "all armed forces from villages and towns in Southern Lebanon."31 These pledges were, at best, only partly or temporarily implemented. The reason given was that the Israelis had started shelling the Palestinian refugee camps and civilians in Lebanese villages only a few hours after the withdrawal of the Palestinian military from towns and villages of the south. According to the PLO representative in the Security Council, "Nobody in his right mind who wants to be objective can ask the Palestinians or the Lebanese not to resist a genocide that has been and is still being directed against them" (SCOR 2164th meeting). The Palestinian forces therefore remained in the area, and the incidents continued. A typical illustration of the situation prevailing in the UNIFIL area during this period, and of the lack of full cooperation from the parties concerned, is the following excerpt from the Secretary-General's report of December 1979: While the PLO has renewed its assurances of co-operation with UNIFIL, infiltrations have nevertheless continued, although their number has diminished since the establishment of the cease-fire [of 26 August 19791- Regrettably, as described above, some of these attempts at infiltration have led to casualties. These infiltration attempts are usually explained by the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement as being defensive measures necessitated by the encroachments or the aggressive intentions of the de facto forces acting with the encouragement and assistance of Israel. The de facto forces, in turn, seek to justify encroachments and other activities as defensive measures against the activities of the armed elements. This is a vicious circle which must be broken if the cease-fire is to be strengthened and progress is to be made, in the interest of all concerned, towards the implementation of Security Council resolutions (Doc. S/13691 of 14 December 1979).

The spring and summer of 1981 brought new threats to international peace and security in Southern Lebanon. In his June report, the Secretary-General noted that there had been "heavy and frequent exchanges of fire between the de facto forces in the enclave and armed elements stationed in the Tyre pocket and north of the Litani River" during the six-month period under review (Doc. S/14537 of 16 June 1981). Many of the Katyusha rockets fired by the Palestinians hit near civilian settlements in northern Israel, driving the civilian population into shelters. In Kiryat Shemona, a high proportion of the population left the town, and in Nahariya, the tourist industry came to a standstill. This was obviously not acceptable to the Israelis

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and contributed to the political climate that made "Operation Peace for Galilee" possible one year later. The report of the Secretary-General on the 1981 incidents made it clear that the armed elements and the Haddad forces took turns in instigating the shellings and that Israeli Defence Forces also took an active part. UNIFIL was powerless to do very much about this type of shelling since the exchanges of fire took place over and across the UNIFIL area of deployment, although on occasion shells fell near UNIFIL positions. The general deterioration in the situation also brought other kinds of pressure on UNIFIL. The Palestinians and other armed elements repeatedly sought to relocate some of their positions in the UNIFIL area, stating that their action was defensive because of the danger of attack. For its part, UNIFIL continued to make strenuous efforts to prevent infiltration and contain such activities (Doc. S/14537). The situation grew particularly serious during late April 1981. Apart from intense shellings over UNIFIL positions, Israeli aircraft conducted a series of heavy raids against the Tyre pocket and other targets north of the Litani. In the process, Israeli fighters shot down two Syrian helicopters in the Bekaa Valley and flew reconnaissance missions over Syrian positions. This prompted Syria to bring in surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to reinforce its positions in the Beka'a—causing what became known as the "missile crisis." In order to prevent a further escalation of the conflict, the U.S. government dispatched Special Envoy Philip Habib to the area. Together with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper, Habib initiated a shuttle diplomacy among Syria, Israel, and Lebanon to contain the conflict during the period May-July 1981. After a quieter period in May 1981, the fighting resumed in June and July. In the UNIFIL area, a serious incident occurred on 19 June, when two Fijian soldiers serving with UNIFIL were killed by armed elements, most probably from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).' 2 The news of the killings was brought to the members of the Security Council through an oral report by the Secretary-General in the meeting scheduled on 19 June to renew UNIFIL's mandate. After this renewal had been agreed upon through the adoption of resolution 488 (1981), the Council members continued their informal consultations for several days until they finally agreed upon the text of a presidential statement on 25 June. In one respect, the reaction of the Security Council to the killing of UNIFIL soldiers by armed elements could be seen as a litmus test of the impartiality of the Council. The Israelis had always maintained, and with considerable reason, that the Security Council consistently reacted more strongly against all acts committed by Israel and its allies than against acts committed by the PLO or other terrorist groups in the

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Middle East. In the end, primarily because of pressure from the United States and other Western members of the Council, the presidential statement issued on 25 June contained many of the same formulations used in the statements adopted in April 1980 regarding the killing of the two Irish soldiers and the March 1981 killings in the Nigerian sector, both by Major Haddad's forces. The tone of the presidential statement on the incident in the Fijian sector was nevertheless not as sharp as in the April 1980 or the March 1981 statements. This can be explained partly by the fact that the PLO, unlike the de facto forces or Israel, at least gave the semblance of cooperating with the UN to investigate the incident. Yasser Arafat personally gave his assurances to the UN, and the Council statement took note of the fact that an investigating group had been established and that "appropriate steps are being taken by all concerned in co-operation with the command of the Force to prevent a recurrence of such incidents" (Doc. S/14572). In spite of his reporting on the incidents between UNIFIL and armed elements, the Secretary-General in several of his reports stressed the "over-all cooperation" of the PLO with UNIFIL. As noted above, this distinction was made necessary by the fact that the PLO leadership did not fully control all the groups in Southern Lebanon that came under the "armed elements" heading. Some of the various splinter groups in the area continued to ignore the succession of ceasefires. Other incidents occurred because of lack of planning or discipline or both. It must also be stressed that the PLO liaison officers assigned to UNIFIL generally were very helpful in getting such incidents under control to prevent further escalation. Nevertheless, the positions established by the armed elements inside the UNIFIL area and the attempts to increase the number of such positions continued to be a sore point in the relations between UNIFIL and the PLO. In his December 1981 report, the Secretary-General stated that UNIFIL had "continued its intensive efforts to have such positions removed and has sought the co-operation of the PLO. These efforts have not yielded adequate results" (Doc. S/14789). Certain armed elements continued their attempts to establish positions, particularly in some parts of the Senegalese battalion area. These attempts, the Secretary-General noted, contributed to tensions and on occasion led to clashes between sympathizers of various factions. UNIFIL suffered several casualties during its attempts to curb these activities. After new escalations of violence and repeated attempts to establish new cease-fires in July, a new and more comprehensive cease-fire was negotiated through a joint effort by the Habib mission and the UN. It took effect on 24 July. On the UN side, all levels of the

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negotiating machinery were used. The actual negotiations with the PLO were carried out by Force Commander General Callaghan and his staff, the negotiations were coordinated by the Secretariat in New York, and the Security Council was convened through a request from the Lebanese government to put added pressure on the parties. In a quotation ascribed to Undersecretary-General Urquhart, a simple message to the PLO saying "stop please" would hardly work. "They just can't lay down their weapons, or people won't think you're a national liberation movement."33 The Security Council produced a presidential statement on 17 July, containing "an urgent appeal for an immediate end to all armed attacks and for the greatest restraint . . . so that peace and quiet may be established in Lebanon" (Doc. S/14599). A unanimous resolution adopted on 21 July called "for an immediate cessation of all armed attacks" (resolution 490 [1981D- These appeals gave added weight to the requests of the Secretary-General, and General Callaghan "could be instructed to impress on Mr. Arafat that a significant body of nations was now reaching out to him giving his movement a new political dignity." 34 The cease-fire of 24 July, according to which "all hostile military action between Lebanese and Israeli territories would cease" as of that date (Doc. S/146l3/Add. 1 of 24 July 1981), lasted with only very minor breaches until the first days of June 1982, when the entire situation in Southern Lebanon rapidly unraveled into a new and full-scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon on 6 June. The question of interpretation and the scope of the 24 July ceasefire agreement became a matter for discussion between Israeli representatives and the U.S. government during the winter and spring of 1982. According to the Alexander Haig memoirs, Israeli officials maintained in these discussions that the July 1981 cease-fire was universal. They would therefore regard any Israeli-targeted terrorist attack anywhere in the world as well as the violation of any Israeli frontier as a violation meriting retaliation. The objective for Israeli representatives in these contacts with the United States has been described as not so much to strengthen the cease-fire as to reach an understanding as to what would constitute an unquestionable breach of it.35 The United States for its part referred to the literal wording of the cease-fire agreement, which restricted it to activities "from Lebanon directed at targets in Israel (and vice versa)." The U.S. interpretation was in this respect identical to the views in the UN Secretariat on the implications of the cease-fire agreement. Initial U.S. response to the Israeli plans during the winter of 1981-1982 was that the United States would be strongly opposed to a new invasion "unless there is a major, internationally recognized

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provocation." Haig writes that in his last meeting with Defence Minister Sharon before the invasion, the United States added another condition—that Israeli retaliation must be "proportionate to any such provocation."36 No serious pressure seems to have been exerted on Israel by the United States to abstain from the implementation of the war plans, however.37 The motives and circumstances that led to the Israeli invasion of June 1982 have been amply documented; one comprehensive version of these events is given by two prominent Israeli journalists, Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, in their book Israel's Lebanon War.& This book mentions two developments on the Palestinian side that motivated the Israeli government's decision to intervene: the considerable build-up, largely in the PLO-controlled territories north of the Litani, of new artillery and long-range weapons capable of firing over the heads of UNIHL against targets in northern Israel (as demonstrated by rockets fired from the Tyre pocket against Nahariya during the 1981 crisis), and the accompanying tendency to regroup the traditionally small guerrilla groups into an incipient army. This book attaches even greater importance, however, to developments on the Israeli side: the formation of the second Likud government, the appointment of Ariel Sharon as the new minister of defense, the dream of forging an alliance between Israel and the Phalangists in Lebanon, the hope of reducing Syrian influence in Lebanon, and above all, the desire to completely eliminate the PLO as a threat to Israel's northern border. Israel's pretext arrived on 3 June 1982, when its ambassador to London was attacked by a terrorist. In the UN or U.S. interpretation of the agreement, the attack was not considered a break of the July 1981 cease-fire since the cease-fire was clearly limited to hostile military action within Israeli and Lebanese territory. Nevertheless, it was enough for Israel to initiate a series of air strikes against PLO strongholds in West Beirut. The PLO duly retaliated by firing at Israeli settlements in Galilee, and the cease-fire was broken. (A footnote to this version is that the London incident was carried out by the Palestinian splinter group led by Abu Nidal.39 This group was not part of the PLO and had, in fact, carried out a series of terrorist attacks on PLO representatives abroad.) In the period between the Israeli invasion of June 1982 and the summer of 1985, the PLO was not a military and political factor in Southern Lebanon. It consequently created no major problems for UNIFTL, apart from the question of a possible role for UNIFIL in the protection of Palestinian refugee camps (see Chapter 6). During the 1986-1988 period, there were increasing signs that PLO and other Palestinian groups were seeking to reestablish some of their positions

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in Southern Lebanon after the setbacks suffered during the Israeli invasion in 1982. The attempts were bitterly resisted by some Lebanese groups, in particular by Amal. In spite of the sieges and battles around Palestinian refugee camps in the 1985-1988 period, the PLO had by early 1988 reestablished some of its former influence in Lebanon. By the spring of 1988, Israeli defense experts predicted a new upsurge of Palestinian attacks across the Lebanese border to support the uprising in the VCfest Bank and Gaza. 40

The Resistance Movement Apart from the problems with the Christian militias and the PLO, UNIFIL's relationship to local Lebanese groups in the area was also an important factor, particularly in the post-1982 period. In principle, the relationship to the local Lebanese population was organized through arrangements with the governor of Southern Lebanon and with the local authorities, the village mukhtars, or other representatives of the Lebanese authorities. In the disintegration of Lebanese society that followed the second Israeli invasion, particularly after September 1983, even the local groups in Southern Lebanon strengthened their militias. In UNIFIL's area, a particularly important group was Amal, which had been formed in 1974 as the military organization of the Shi'ite Muslims, which constituted the majority of the local population in UNIFIL's area of deployment. The first liaison arrangements with Amal were established in the second half of 1980 (Doc. S/14295 of 12 December 1980). During the first half of 1982, mounting animosity between Amal and members of the pro-Palestinian Lebanese National Movement escalated into serious clashes in the Senegalese sector, and UNIFIL had to intervene to restore law and order.41 The influence of Amal in Southern Lebanon steadily grew through the following years, both in the UNIFIL area and in the rest of Lebanon. Unlike the Christian militias in the border area, which were supported by Israel, Amal was officially recognized by the Lebanese government. Its leader, Nabih Berri, became the minister of justice and formally responsible for Southern Lebanon. UNIFIL's relationship with Amal was generally good, and on the whole, the group has strongly supported UNIFIL's role in the area. Significant parts of the Shi'ite population in Southern Lebanon had reacted positively during the first stages of the 1982 invasion, which liberated the local population from the dominating influence of the PLO and other Palestinian elements. During the 1983-1984 period, and partly because of the heavy-handedness of the occupying forces, a gradual radicalization of the Shi'ite population occurred, and by the spring of 1985, both Amal and other groups were engaged in an active

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resistance movement against the Israeli forces. There was a major difference between the legal status of the PLO on the one hand and Lebanese organizations such as Amal on the other. The PLO was considered by the Lebanese government to be an external force on Lebanese territory, whose presence and activities were regulated through inter-Arab agreements. Amal and the other Lebanese groups, on the other hand, were national groups engaged in a legitimate resistance movement against an occupying force and its allies on Lebanese territory. The policy followed by UNIFIL in the face of this situation was made clear in a statement by the Secretary-General on 27 February 1985: UNIFIL is n o w stationed in an area where active resistance against IDF is in p r o g r e s s , and in w h i c h the latter is e n g a g e d in active countermeasures. UNIFIL, for obvious reasons, has n o right t o impede Lebanese acts of resistance against the occupying force, nor d o e s it have the mandate or the means to prevent countermeasures. In these circumstances, the men of UNIFIL have d o n e their utmost to mitigate violence, protect the civilian population, and to reduce acts o f reprisal to a minimum (Doc. S / 1 7 0 9 3 of 11 April 1985).

UNIFIL's situation in these circumstances became increasingly difficult. An important task for the Force became to keep its area of deployment demilitarized to avoid its use by any of the conflicting parties as a theater for military operations. To assure freedom and safety of movement for the local population was another important task, as was the need to ensure the safety of UN personnel. 4 2 To promote these objectives, an informal agreement was reached with Amal in June 1985, according to which Amal instructed its members not to carry weapons of any kind in the UNIFIL area of operation. Under this agreement, UNIFIL continued to confiscate arms found on persons crossing UNIFIL checkpoints on the same basis as it had previously done with the PLO, which meant that personal weapons were returned to Amal officers after a certain period of time. T h e increasing impatience of Amal over continued Israeli occupation (quite apart from frustrations about the SLA and the "security zone") also had more than a little to do with pressures from other and more fundamentalist Shi'ite groups in Southern Lebanon. These groups included the Islamic Resistance Movement, led by the Shi'ite group Hizbollah, but also included some other fundamentalist groups. The Islamic Resistance Movement was in large part supported and supplied by Iran and became an increasingly strong factor in the area from 1984 onward. UNIFIL repeatedly tried to establish liaisons with the Hizbollah as it had done with other groups in the area, but such attempts proved considerably more difficult in this case. On

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several occasions, in February 1985 and in April 1987, the Hizbollah accused UNIFIL of cooperating with the Israelis. UNIFIL's traditional way of defusing such threats by political contacts did not succeed in this case, and neither formal agreements nor informal understandings could be concluded with Hizbollah. Nevertheless, a tacit and uncertain modus vivendi was established. Events of July-September 1986 brought new and dramatic illustrations of the dangers in the situation. This series of incidents started on 11 August when two men, one of them a local Amal leader, were shot by a sentry of the French contingent in a confrontation at a UNIFIL checkpoint. In a general flare-up in the following days, UNIFTL positions came under a series of attacks, particularly in the French sector, but also in the Fijian, Finnish, Irish, and Nepalese contingent areas. In spite of a settlement of the dispute between UNIFIL and Amal, the incidents of early September led to a further deterioration of the situation. On 4 and 13 September, four French UNIFIL soldiers were killed by two separate remote-controlled bombs, several more were wounded, and the French contingent continued to be the subject of a campaign of harassment and intimidation. Many felt Hizbollah elements were involved in the later phases of this conflict and particularly in the killing of the UNIFIL soldiers. But the loose organizational patterns of the Shi'ites, the influx of external elements, and the dual membership in militia groups generally made it difficult to determine whether such attacks were carried out as isolated acts by independent groups or whether they were part of a larger organizational strategy on the part of the fundamentalist groups. An official denunciation of UNIFIL and resolution 425 (1978) by the leader of Hizbollah in July was, however, an ominous sign in this respect. Regardless of who was behind them, the events underscored the problems UNIFIL was facing in its effort to maintain peace and security in an area of active resistance. In his report to the Security Council in January 1987, the Secretary-General again noted the political danger: UNIFIL's attempts to prevent use of its area for hostile activities would cause it to be perceived by the local population as helping to protect the "security zone" and thereby condoning the continuing Israeli occupation (Doc. S/18581). Throughout 1987 and early 1988, armed resistance groups continued to launch frequent operations against the IDF and SLA, using small arms, grenades, rockets and mortars, and mines and roadside bombs. As usual, these also caused UNIFIL casualties. Most of the operations remained limited in scope, but in some cases attacks were carried out by armed elements numbering up to 200 men. While Amal insisted that all such operations be coordinated through its operational

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center in Tyre, this was not accepted by Hizbollah or other radical groups. The resistance therefore continued to be fragmented, but by early 1988 the influence of the more fundamentalist or radical groups seemed to be increasing rather than waning.

The Partiality and Ineffectiveness Accusations The Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council on UNIFIL during the 1978-1981 period leave little doubt that the problems caused by the forces of Major Haddad in the south and east, were a greater obstacle for the fulfilment of UNIFIL's mandate than the armed elements to the north and west. Although Israeli policy toward UNIFIL was never set forward in any systematic, written statement,43 it was clear that Israel was basically critical of the UN Force. Israeli officials repeatedly suggested that UNIFIL was partial to the PLO and the armed elements. Even the Secretary-General's reports were on occasion accused of being "slanted in favour of the PLO and against the local Lebanese forces in the south" (Doc. S/PV. 2180 of 19 December 1979). Most of this criticism derived from the fact that Israel interpreted the UNIFIL mandate very differently from the members of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, and the troop-contributors. If the Israelis ever understood or accepted that the UN and UNIFIL, by force of the provisions of the UN Charter and the decisions of the Security Council, were obliged to accept the primacy of the government of the host country (for instance, in matters concerning the recognition or nonrecognition of the different armed groups in the area), then this understanding or acceptance was not immediately evident from their statements. This basic difference of views was particularly evident concerning UNIFIL's relationship with the PLO. The Israelis never accepted that UNIFIL had no authority to stop the presence or the movements of unarmed Palestinians in the UNIFIL area. Necessary working contacts between the UNIFIL contingent and Palestinian groups were interpreted or misrepresented by the Israelis as "sweetheart deals" b e t w e e n UNIFIL commanders and the PLO. Accusations were made that certain UNIFIL units actually helped camouflage PLO operations by arrangements whereby the PLO agreed to leave the UNIFIL battalion alone if the latter turned a blind eye to PLO infiltrations and military operations. 44 In the Security Council, Israeli representatives seldom went so far as to directly accuse UNIFIL of such partiality, but the attitude was clear. One argument was that UNIFIL let itself be exploited by the In a statement in the Council on 19 January 1979, Ambassador stated that UNIFIL was now an element in the tactics of the "Previously they hid behind a shield of refugees and villagers.

PLO. Blum PLO. Now

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they are trying to hide also behind a shield of United Nations peacekeeping forces. This surely is totally inadmissible and can only be regarded for what it is: the total abuse of international peace-keeping" (SCOR 2113th meeting). This practice was more or less openly admitted by the PLO itself, although the group characterized its actions as necessary defensive measures. Thus, the factual base of the Israeli argument on this point was not unfounded. A second argument used by Israel to substantiate its accusations of UN partiality derived from the casualty figures of UNIFIL. Ambassador Blum pointed out that many more UNIFIL soldiers lost their lives as a result of PLO activities than in confrontation with the de facto forces (Doc. S/PV. 2180 and Doc. S/PV. 2289). Still, most blame was put on the latter. There was considerable truth even in this argument, but it had only limited usefulness as proof of UNIFIL partiality since the argument could be reversed and used as proof that UNIFIL made great sacrifices in its efforts to check infiltrations from the armed elements. A third Israeli argument against UNIFIL was that the Force was not effective in stopping infiltrations from the PLO through its area of operations and into Israel and that UNIFIL even cooperated with the PLO at times.45 Such accusations were made both in general terms and by informing the Security Council of each separate incident. In a bitter statement to the Council on 14 April 1980, immediately after the Misgav Am incident on 6-7 April 1980, Ambassador Blum listed examples of PLO infiltrations into Israeli territory in January, April, and May 1979, in February 1980, and the Misgav Am incident itself (Doc. S/PV. 2213). Only the latter led to a loss of Israeli lives, however. A regrettable incident during which a UNIFIL soldier from the Nigerian battalion was caught smuggling arms for the PLO also drew much attention in Israel. UN officials had several answers to these charges. One response was that UNIFIL contingents constantly had to be on guard against the attempts of the Haddad forces to undermine UNIFIL's positions and to set up new posts inside the UNIFIL area of deployment. UNIFIL therefore had to defend itself on two fronts at the same time—a situation that more than anything else jeopardized its overall efficiency. UNIFIL officials pointed to the fact that UNIFIL had to deploy in a most unorthodox manner, facing four directions as well as looking inward. Had UNIFIL been allowed to deploy to the border and then turn around facing north, Israel could not have found all the pretexts of criticism, UNIFIL officials maintained. On the infiltration question, UN officials freely admitted that the armed elements to the north constantly tried to infiltrate the UNIFIL area and that this led to a gradual increase in Palestinian positions within the UNIFIL area during the 1978-1982 period. Indeed,

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information about such infiltration was regularly contained in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council. Nevertheless, UN officials maintained that the overwhelming majority of such infiltrations were stopped in the UNIFIL area and that the UN Force in fact did a remarkably good job of stopping armed infiltration through UNIFIL lines against targets in Israel. The UN Secretariat firmly maintained that not one terrorist incident in the northern part of Israel leading to loss of Israeli lives occurred as a result of infiltration through UNIFIL lines during the 1978-1982 period. The most serious infiltration—the Misgav Am incident—in all probability came through Shi'ite areas in the gap west of Haddad's headquarters in Marjayoun. Responsibility for this act was claimed by an organization called the Arab Liberation Front (Doc. S/13888 of 11 April 1980). What UNIFIL was unable to control was artillery or rocket fire against targets in northern Israel from positions north of UNIFIL's area of deployment. As noted in the Nathan Pelcovits study, some Israeli leaders conceded in private that it was precisely because UNIFIL was largely effective in preventing PLO incursions that the PLO was forced to resort to long-range shellings.46 Even in this respect, UNIFIL's record was almost amazingly good. According to UNIFIL records of the 1978-1982 period, only one such rocket attack (on 17 July 1981) was launched from PLO positions within the UNIFIL area. Even the shelling into northern Israel from the bases to the north of the UNIFIL area came to a complete halt—except for one rocket in May 1982—during the 1981-1982 cease-fire. One last argument UN officials used to counter the charge of UNIFIL's ineffectiveness was that all alleged infiltrations into Israel by necessity also had to pass through the zone controlled by the de facto forces. In this context, it was pointed out that these forces—at least in the 1978-1982 period—had very little to show for themselves as proof of their own effectiveness in stopping infiltration. Even the Israeli Defence Forces had never managed to be 100 percent effective at preventing terrorism—a standard to which Israel held UNIFIL accountable. After three years of experience with the new "security zone" in the 1985-1988 period, the IDF conceded that despite steppedup security measures, it was virtually impossible to make the zone completely impenetrable. 47 Several analysts of international peacekeeping operations in Lebanon have observed a discrepancy between the official Israeli position on UNIFIL, which on the whole has been negative, and more unofficial assessments of the UN Force, which tended to be more positive. 48 In the Security Council, Ambassador Blum stretched the Israeli position so far as to admit that "UNIFIL fulfills a useful function"

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(SCOR 2147th Meeting, 12 June 1979), but later pronouncements retracted even this judgment. The official statements in the Security Council in this respect seemed to correspond to shifts in attitudes toward UNIFIL in the Israeli defense and foreign policy establishments. While representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the political establishments in the 1978-1982 period often expressed the view that they realized UNIFIL had a stabilizing influence, the attitudes in military circles were initially much more negative. From the minister of defense downward, the military generally made no bones about the fact that it basically considered UNIFIL to be a pest and nuisance. This was important, since UNIFIL officials strongly suspected that the shaping and the implementation of Israeli policy toward UNIFIL was left pretty much to the military command and the officers in the field.49 This impression was corroborated by foreign diplomats and media representatives, particularly from the troop-contributing countries, when they raised UNIFIL matters with Foreign Ministry officials and even with the prime minister's office. The impression gained was that the political establishment in Israel was not always well informed about the actual situation in Southern Lebanon and that the responsibility was left largely with the Ministry of Defence and with the Northern Command. In later phases of UNIFIL's existence, particularly after the 1984-1985 period, UNIFIL observers noted a shift in this pattern. From the Israeli defense establishment began to appear more positive evaluations of UNIFIL's existence and performance, possibly because the IDF's own e x p e r i e n c e s in Lebanon had created a better understanding of UNIFIL's problems. UNIFIL officials noted a particular honeymoon in official Israeli attitudes toward UNIFIL during the summer and autumn of 1984. Before the Israeli elections in 1984 and in the period leading to the Naqoura talks, Israeli officials, notably from the Labour party, praised UNIFIL highly. Israeli newspaper comments appeared eulogizing UNIFIL and apologizing for previous mistreatment of it. UN representatives in the area had never before noted such an outpouring of goodwill from Israel, and past accusations against UNIFIL suddenly seemed to be forgotten.50 This period ended rather abruptly when the Naqoura talks ended and Israel could not get UNIFIL to deploy in the role wanted by Israel. When Israel decided to establish the "security zone," UNIFIL again had to be put into a bad light. Even though the official Israeli position on UNIFIL as communicated to the Secretary-General during 1986 again shifted to a more positive view, the dualism in Israeli attitudes toward UNIFIL continued even in 1988. There are no indications in UN public records that might signal

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that the Israeli government ever was particularly interested in listening to the arguments of the Secretary-General about UNIFIL effectiveness or in helping UNIFIL to be more effective by lifting the obstacles erected by Israel against UNIFIL's deployment. For the Israelis, the accusations against UNIFIL of partiality and of ineffectiveness were a necessary and convenient alibi for maintaining their "security zone" in the area closest to the border. As noted by one analyst, the bad blood between the Israeli military and UNIFIL may be ascribed to Israeli distrust of any UN peacekeeping operation; but probably similar controversy w o u l d have arisen even in the case of a non-UN peacekeeping operation in Southern Lebanon.51 The Israelis further established a series of conditions that were impossible for UNIFIL to fulfill because they fell outside the mandate and the area of deployment of the UN Force. UNIFIL officials also noted with some resignation that any examples of UNIFIL's effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in its area were seldom credited to UNIFIL by the Israelis. Instead, any successes were seen as proof of the effectiveness of their own security arrangements. During the 1984—1985 period, for instance, Israel was keen to exploit the efforts of UNIFIL and Amal to maintain stability in the south. The relative calm that ensued was not credited to UNIFIL, but was seen by Israel as a sign of the success of the SLA and the "security zone" concept. Israeli officials thus seemed to have made a decision almost on principle—UNIFIL was not to be considered an effective peacekeeping force in the areas closest to its border. No arguments or facts from UN representatives seemed to influence this basic attitude. Whether this mistrust should be attributed to a lack of faith in UNIFIL's military or political capabilities to fully handle the security situation on the Lebanese borders, whether it is partly because of political expediency determined by the desire to have a free hand to conduct preemptive or retaliatory military operations in Southern Lebanon, whether it is a general unwillingness to accept any third-party interposition that can block the direct contact to its neighbors that Israel wants, or whether all these motives play a part can be discussed at length. In this context, it is enough to point to the Israeli attitude as a recurring problem for UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East.

REESTABLISHING THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT The Constitutional Aspects The third and last part of the original mandate called on UNIFIL to assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective

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authority in the area. As pointed out earlier, this was no small task, for two important reasons. First, the Lebanese government did not have effective authority over Southern Lebanon before the invasion because of the PLO presence formalized through the Cairo Agreement of 1969Second, the authority of the central government in Beirut was already seriously undermined by the civil war in the country, which had raged on and off for more than two years. Indeed, the Lebanese state had not enjoyed sovereign rights over all of Lebanon since the late 1960s. According to Wadi Haddad, who served as national security adviser to President Amine Gemayel in the 1982-1984 period, real government control has rarely passed beyond the confines of the presidential palace and part of Beirut in recent years.52 Difficulties related to the first of these problems had arisen before the adoption of resolution 425 (1978). The Soviet Union, in a statement made by Ambassador Troyanovski before the vote on 19 March 1978, made it clear that "we cannot agree to the United Nations troops being given functions that are not proper to them in regard to the transfer of effective authority in that region to the Government of Lebanon" (SCOR 2074th meeting, 19 March 1978). According to the Soviet view, the task of the UN Force should be to "observe the ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and to separate the sides." In a statement in the Security Council on 3 May 1978, the Soviet position on this point was further elaborated, and Ambassador Troyanovski stressed that "attempts to embroil the United Nation troops in the internal affairs of Lebanon could lead to the most undesirable and dangerous complications."53 Ambassador Troyanovski said nothing about the motives behind the Soviet position on this part of the mandate. One explanation is the combination of the ideological factor and historical experiences—particularly the experiences of the UN operations in Congo between I960 and 1964, which the Soviet Union at the end was sharply against. This experience made it somewhat difficult for the Soviet Union to confirm a precedent whereby UN troops could be used to bolster the effective authority of existing governments against forces of revolution or upheaval. In Southern Lebanon, these factors pointed to the same conclusion as the third and perhaps most important local factor—the desire of the Soviet Union to protect the interests of the PLO. There is nothing unusual in the fact that the United Nations is asked to take a stand on the legitimacy or nonlegitimacy of member governments. This is a type of problem regularly brought before the world organization by one or the other party to national or international conflicts. The credentials or legitimacy of governments or

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liberation movements are regularly subject to disputes, debates, and voting in the General Assembly. The direct involvement of UN peacekeeping troops in a country that is being ravaged by a bloody civil war is another story, however. The fate of the UN operations in Congo, which very nearly destroyed the United Nations, still constitutes the best example of what can be the political costs of a UN involvement on one of the sides of a civil war, even if it is the government side. T h e breakdown of the Multinational Force in Beirut in 1982-1984, which also had a mandate to assist in the strengthening of the authority o f the Lebanese government, furnished a more recent local example of the risks inherent in such mandates. In the UN Secretariat, the key officials concerned were more than anyone else aware of the potential dangers inherent in this part of the mandate. The limitations of United Nations and UNIFIL involvement in matters that constitutionally fell under the internal responsibilities of the Lebanese government were therefore defined in the SecretaryGeneral's initial report on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978), which contained the following paragraph: "UNIFIL, like any other United Nations peace-keeping operation, cannot and must not take on responsibilities which fall under the Government of the country in which it is operating. These responsibilities must be exercised by the competent Lebanese authorities. It is assumed that the Lebanese Government will take the necessary measures to co-operate with UNIFIL in this regard" (Doc. 12611).

The Relationship Between the Lebanese Government and the PLO For the PLO, the protection of its positions in Southern Lebanon became a first priority after the 15 March 1978 Israeli intervention. In the wake of the military setbacks suffered during the intervention, this was a task which put to a hard test the well-established skills of the PLO leadership in turning military setbacks into political advantages. The aim of conserving the Cairo Agreement brought the PLO into conflict hot only with the Israelis, but also into an argument with the Lebanese government. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Lebanese had made it clear in their first communication to the Security Council after the 15 March intervention that Lebanon was not responsible for the presence of Palestinian bases in Southern Lebanon or the activities of the PLO. Both in 1978 and during the rest of the period covered by the present study, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon was an extremely controversial element in Lebanese politics; indeed, it had played a major role in the outbreak of the civil war in the country in 1975-1976.

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The formal subject of the Lebanese-PLO argument concerned the respective validity of Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) and the 1969 Cairo Agreement.54 The initial PLO position was that the Cairo Agreement continued to be valid even in the new situation created after the Israeli invasion and that UNIFIL consequently should hand authority for and control of the area back to the PLO. More specifically, the PLO considered the reference in Security Council resolution 425 (1978) on a restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in the area to include also the implementation of the Cairo Agreement. According to the PLO, the Cairo Agreement was an international obligation assumed and accepted by the Lebanese government not only toward the PLO but toward all members of the Arab League. The Lebanese government, on the other hand, took the position that Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) must be given precedence because these were binding resolutions under the UN Charter; further, authority over the areas should be given back to the Lebanese government according to operative paragraph 3 in resolution 425. This was a finer way of expressing the view that the Cairo Agreement had lost its validity in the new circumstances, but the Lebanese government would not initially state publicly a position that would imply a direct break with the PLO. In this respect, the Lebanese government received effective support from the Israelis, who made it perfectly clear that they would never accept that control of the area in question should be returned to the PLO. After Lebanon shifted its position on the PLO presence in the south in late April 1978,55 the Lebanese government made several attempts to obtain support from other Arab countries for its stand on the relationship with the PLO. At the Arab summit in Tunisia in November 1979, Lebanon obtained some support through a resolution in which the summit took note of a promise from the PLO to refrain from undertaking any military action from the Lebanese border and not to announce from Lebanon acts undertaken by the PLO inside the occupied territories (Doc. S/13689 of 13 December 1979). This was not quite enough for the Lebanese, however, and the Lebanese president made a formal reservation in which it was repeated that "the resolutions of the Security Council concerning Southern Lebanon have executive priority over each and all previous decisions or documents." The Lebanese therefore reserved their position on the paragraph concerning Lebanon "inasmuch as it does not clearly state that there should be no armed presence inside UNIFIL's area of operation except that of the Lebanese State and of the United Nations." The formal side of the arguments between the PLO and the Lebanese government on the validity of the Cairo Agreement has

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remained unsettled. In addition to the arguments quoted above, Lebanon has maintained that the PLO has violated the terms of the agreement by involving itself in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The PLO, on the other hand, has stated that the Cairo Agreement was a legal agreement between two parties and that it can only be canceled or amended by a new agreement between the same two parties. During the period of Israeli occupation b e t w e e n the s e c o n d invasion in 1982 and the Israeli withdrawal in the spring and summer o f 1985, the question of the validity of the Cairo Agreement in Southern Lebanon was, of course, not on the agenda. The evacuation o f the PLO h e a d q u a r t e r s from L e b a n o n in 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 3 and the resurgence of the civil war in the country contributed to a serious weakening of the PLO's position in Lebanon, both militarily and politically. The local population in the south, and particularly Amal, made it abundantly clear that the PLO would not b e permitted to regain its positions in the south on the terms of the Cairo Agreement. In 1984-1985, the relationship between the PLO and the Lebanese government again became a controversial issue, particularly over the question of a UN responsibility for and protection of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. This time, the issue did not affect UNIFIL directly since the controversy referred mostly to the Palestinian camps in the Sidon and Beirut areas. This issue will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6. By 1988, the Palestinians had regained much of their former strength in the areas around Sidon, helped partly by a new generation of Palestinian youth in the refugee camps who had reached the age where they could carry guns. There were also some signs of a new a l l i a n c e in L e b a n e s e p o l i t i c s b e t w e e n the P a l e s t i n i a n s and fundamentalist groups such as the Hizbollah. It still seemed improbable that the PLO would regain the position of power and control in Southern L e b a n o n it had e n j o y e d under the terms o f the Cairo Agreement in the 1970-1978 period. Many observers felt that Syria, which had strengthened its position in the Beirut area, would not allow the PLO to regain its former positions. Nevertheless, this possibility seemed somewhat less remote in 1988 than it had in the 1982-1985 period.

Strengthening Lebanese Authority In the South T h e s e c o n d major problem in connection with the third part o f UNIFIL's mandate c o n c e r n e d the question of h o w the effective authority of the Beirut government should b e reestablished in the south when it was at the same time being undermined in the rest of the country as a result of the civil war. This was sometimes a rather

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delicate diplomatic problem to handle. In spite of its problems at home, the Lebanese government continued to exist as the constitutional government of the host country. Its foreign service, including its permanent mission in New York, continued to function remarkably well under the circumstances and was, during most of the period, fully able to articulate Lebanese policies and positions on the various problems related to UNIFIL. The problems therefore arose not so much in the policy-making stage as in the implementation of these policies. During the spring and summer of 1978, the Lebanese government was urged by the Secretary-General, the United States, and other members of the Security Council to initiate steps that might strengthen the authority of the central government in the south to make possible a rapid implementation of this part of the mandate. This appeal was welcomed by the Lebanese government itself, which wanted international support for steps that might lead the country back to normal conditions. A first step in this direction was the reestablishment of some symbols of civilian authority in the UNIFIL area. This was achieved during June and July 1978 through the stationing of a civilian administrator in Tyre and the stationing of approximately 100 gendarmes based at five different locations, who gradually assumed some of the regular police functions in the area. A second and more important step was to deploy elements of the Lebanese army in the south. This was no simple task—the Lebanese army had partly disintegrated during the civil war in 1976. Some of the army units had openly associated themselves with factions involved in the fighting or with Syria. Later attempts to reconstruct the army had broken down because of what had been described as a vicious circle: The army could not be restored without a consensus; this required political normalization, which could not proceed in the absence of an effective and credible state system; any such system again needed the backing of an apolitical, militarily effective army.56 A first attempt to establish a Lebanese army presence in the south was made at the end of July 1978. After a series of contacts with all parties concerned, supported by UN negotiators in the area, the Lebanese government decided to send an army task force to Tibnin in the UNIFIL area at the end of July 1978. The effort was very much encouraged by the United States. When the task force reached the Kaoukaba area on 31 July, elements of Major Haddad's forces opened fire on it with artillery. Under these circumstances the Lebanese army found itself unable to proceed, and when Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart came to Kaoukaba in mid-August to see what could be

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done, he found the unit in a terrified and demoralized state.57 When UN negotiators urged the Israelis to facilitate the Lebanese army deployment, they were told that Israel could not intervene because it was a Lebanese internal affair. 58 According to one report, the major factor behind the 31 July incident was Major Haddad himself, who feared for his own position if the Lebanese army was deployed in the area.59 Apparently, he received support from the chief of the Israeli Northern Command, General Eitan, who appealed directly to Prime Minister Begin and received authorization to unleash Haddad against the advancing Lebanese platoon. This was done in spite of Israel's promises to the United States that it would accept the army deployments. It should be noted that the Syrians after some initial hesitation supported the deployment, whereas the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) ironically were against it, although for different reasons than the Israelis. Formally, the PLO and the LNM argued that the Lebanese army was "confessional" and not "balanced" and that they wanted an army deployment in the enclave controlled by Major Haddad before they would agree to have it admitted to their own areas. An underlying motive behind these arguments probably also was a skepticism about any effective reestablishment of governmental authority in the south and a wariness of Syrian influence in the area.60 After the establishment of the zone controlled by de facto forces on 13 June and the failure of the 31 July operation, representatives of the Lebanese government in Beirut expressed p r o f o u n d disappointment and disillusionment about the situation. 61 They accused the United States of giving the Lebanese government false signals about the feasibility of the 31 July operation. They were also critical of the performance of UNIFIL; in the view of the Lebanese authorities, UNIFIL had a duty under Security Council resolution 425 (1978) to do whatever necessary to fulfill its mandate. These views were expressed to Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart during his visit to Beirut at the end of August and more formally in a letter to the Secretary-General on 5 September, two weeks before the renewal of UNIFlL's mandate. In Urquhart's words, the Lebanese "as usual were blaming someone else for their misfortunes." 62 He also noted that UNIFIL Commander Erskine was equally furious at the Lebanese unit, "having in mind the risks his own men were running to help these reluctant patriots." After the failure of the 31 July operation, the Lebanese government tried to secure the effective support of the Security Council before making any new efforts to reestablish its authority. This was achieved through a presidential statement adopted on 19 January 1979 (Doc.

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S/13043) and through two paragraphs included in resolution 444 (1979) adopted in connection with the second renewal of the UNIFTL mandate the same day. According to this resolution, the government of Lebanon was invited "to draw up, in consultation with the SecretaryGeneral, a phased programme of activities to be carried out over the next three months to promote the restoration of its authority." "Phased programme of activities" became almost a code word for the efforts of the Lebanese government to reestablish its authority in the south in the 1978-1982 period. According to the program—which became the subject of protracted negotiations with UN personnel—the Lebanese government would increase the presence of Lebanese civilian administrators in the south, including civil servants, medical personnel, teachers, and public works employees (Doc. S/13258). The program also envisaged the further deployment of Lebanese military personnel in Southern Lebanon by bringing Lebanese army strength up to one battalion by the middle of April. The United Nations and UNIFIL on their part would intensify their efforts to consolidate the cease-fire and put an end to harassment of UNIFIL and of the local population by the de facto forces led by Major Haddad. In addition, UNIFIL would intensify its efforts to secure further deployment and control of the border area. Implementation of the program was due to start in mid-April. In advance, UN officials sought the cooperation of Israel, aided by diplomatic approaches by troop-contributing countries and other interested governments, including the United States, in support of the UN effort (Doc. S/13258). UNIFIL officials also initiated consultations with Major Haddad, who on 14 April made it clear that he strongly opposed a deployment of the Lebanese army contingent to Southern Lebanon. On 15 April 1979, in connection with the move of the contingent to Southern Lebanon, the de facto forces started a massive campaign of shelling UNIFIL positions, including the barracks at Tyre. On 18 April, Major Haddad proclaimed his enclave a "Free and Independent Lebanese State," which was, of course, a direct challenge to Lebanese sovereignty in the area. Following a lull in the fighting, the shelling of UNIFIL positions resumed on the morning of 18 April. Several hundred artillery rounds appeared to have been fired. In the NORBATT headquarters at Ebl-es-Saqi, one Norwegian soldier was killed and another wounded, most probably by artillery fired from Israel.® The UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura also came under fire following an incident in which one DFF soldier was killed. The Secretary-General, in a special report to the Security Council on the events of 18 April, reported that "for hours and in darkness, they shelled indiscriminately the entire headquarters compound, including

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the hospital and the helipad, with mortar, rocket and heavy machinegun fire" (Doc. S/132454 of 19 April 1979). Miraculously, nobody was killed, but eight UNIFIL personnel were wounded. The material damage was great. As news of this massive and unprovoked assault on UNIFIL headquarters emerged, urgent efforts were made b o t h at UN headquarters and in the field to get the firing stopped. This was finally achieved through the efforts of the Israeli authorities and representatives of the Israeli Defence Forces at the scene. In New York, the president of the Security Council, who in April 1979 was Ambassador Aalgaard of Norway, initiated a series of intensive consultations with the representatives of Israel and Lebanon, the other members of the Security Council, and other troopcontributing nations. A parallel effort was undertaken in the capitals concerned, and several countries made diplomatic demarches in Jerusalem that made it clear that the Israeli government had to accept the responsibility for Major Haddad's activities. In these consultations, attention was focused on three problems that needed immediate solution: •The establishment of a security perimeter around the Naqoura headquarters »The securing of free movement for UNIFIL units and personnel between the Naqoura headquarters and the individual battalion areas •A general cessation of the harassment of UNIFIL by the de facto forces. Although no watertight guarantees were given, the Israelis gave some indications during these consultations that they would keep Major Haddad on a tighter leash in the future. The support of the Security Council for these measures was summed up in a presidential statement issued on behalf of the members of the Security Council on 25 April 1979. In the same period, the Israeli government firmed up its position on the more long-term problem of reestablishing the authority of the Lebanese government. In a letter to the president of the Security Council dated 1 May 1979, the Israelis effectively put a bar in front of future substantial steps by the Lebanese government to implement this part of the mandate in Southern Lebanon. In this letter the Israeli position was summed up as follows: "It is obvious that in the present situation of foreign domination and intervention in Lebanon, imposed by Syria and the so-called PLO against the true interests of the people of Lebanon, the concepts of Lebanese 'sovereignty' and 'effective authority of the Government of Lebanon' cannot be realized" (Doc.

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S/13289 of 1 May 1979). After the events of April 1979, some progress was nevertheless achieved by UNIFIL and by the Lebanese government to increase the authority of the Beirut government in the area. The Naqoura headquarters was made more secure by the stationing of a French military unit there. The Lebanese army battalion of 500, which was deployed in the area in April 1979, remained there under the control of the Force commander, and its members participated jointly with UNIFTL troops in patrolling and manning observation posts and checkpoints. During the rest of 1979 and 1980, efforts were made to increase the Lebanese presence, both civilian and military. By March 1981, the Lebanese army units in the south numbered about 1,300-1,400 troops. Further deployments were made difficult not only because of the internal situation in Lebanon as a whole but also because of continued opposition from the regional forces there. The de facto forces continued to create problems, and the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement were no more helpful in the areas they controlled. The serious incidents resulting in the death of two Nigerian soldiers in March 1981 were also direcdy related to attempts by Major Haddad's forces to remove a Lebanese army platoon from the village of alQantara, in which it had been deployed since the April 1979 events. During the extremely difficult period for UNIFIL between 1979 and the cease-fire of July 1981, the Lebanese Permanent Mission in New York continued a very active diplomacy during the consultations of the Security Council on UNIFIL matters. For the Lebanese, it was important to have Council decisions include references to the "phased programme of activities" or related efforts to strengthen the authority of the Beirut government. Generally, Lebanon succeeded in these efforts, although the Soviet Union on several occasions repeated its initial reservations on this part of the mandate. In the difficult period following the June 1982 invasion, the Lebanese army unit attached to UNIFIL was kept at the various battalion headquarters but at significantly lower strength. Members of this unit were repeatedly intimidated by the Israeli Defence Forces. During most of the post-1982 period, its strength varied between 100 and 200, all ranks. In January 1988 the figure was at 128 (Doc. S/19445), with the bulk of the unit stationed in Tyre. During the 1982-1985 period, when the whole UNIFIL area was located within the zone occupied by the Israeli Defence Forces, there were no possibilities for either UNIFIL or the Lebanese government to take any further steps to reestablish the authority of the central government in the south. Two developments in this period should nevertheless be noted, because they both shed some light on two

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inherent problems in this part of the mandate. One of these developments concerned the experiences of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut in the 1982-1984 period. Besides its task of monitoring cease-fires, some units of the MNF also assumed tasks that aimed at strengthening the authority of the Lebanese government in the Beirut area. The MNF was militarily far more powerful than UNIFIL or other UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, and some of its firepower was used, initially as a reprisal, both to protect itself and to give the government a hand against its opposing forces. As Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart has noted, the relatively narrow political base of the MNF led most people of the Middle East to perceive the MNF as a Western, NATO operation. 64 The MNF thereby became part of the problem rather than the referee of the problem, and in the end, it experienced increasing difficulties because it was considered one-sided and partisan. This image applied particularly to the U.S. and partly to the French contingents, whereas the Italian and the British contingents were more successful in maintaining their impartiality. Even if the MNF was atypical of any peacekeeping operations in the sense defined by the United Nations, this e x p e r i e n c e again s h o w e d that in any civil war situation, international peacekeeping forces must tread with extreme care to maintain their impartiality and not become too associated with one of the parties in the internal conflict, even if that party constitutes part of the central government A second development during this period that deserves to be noted concerned the 17 May 1983 agreement between the Israeli and Lebanese governments. Even this agreement was based on the idea of a linkage between the Israeli withdrawal and a reestablishment of the authority of the Lebanese government. The security arrangements in the addendum to the agreement contained several detailed provisions on the stationing of the Lebanese army, police, internal security forces, and auxiliary forces—organized under the full authority of the government of Lebanon—in the security region provided by the agreement. 65 The major difference between this agreement and the package deal embodied in resolution 425 (1978) was that the security arrangements in the 17 May agreement were perceived by most parties, including Syria, to be one-sidedly in the interest of the Israelis. This perception was a major factor for the eventual cancellation of the agreement in March 1984. The UN-sponsored Naqoura negotiations between Israel and Lebanon from 8 November 1984 to 24 January 1985 also touched upon the problem of the reestablishment of the authority of the Lebanese government in the area vacated by the Israeli withdrawal. The talks

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were broken off, however, before any details about the strengthening of the authority of the Lebanese government could be contemplated or negotiated. In the aftermath of the August-September 1986 events, the idea of deploying Lebanese army units in the south was again taken up. A UN mission to Lebanon in early September led by Undersecretary-General Goulding suggested that if the Lebanese leaders succeeded in their current efforts at national reconciliation, the Lebanese government might wish to deploy a small unit of the Lebanese army to the northwestern part of the UNIFIL area as a first step toward the return of its effective authority in the area (Doc. S/18348). By early 1988, no significant progress had been obtained on this issue. The Authority Problem in Lebanon as a Whole A dominant theme in Ambassador Tueni's statements to the Security Council from 1978 to his departure in 1983 was that Lebanon was primarily a victim of other people's wars. In a statement to the Security Council on 18 September 1978, for example, he stated that "if Lebanon is still today a problem country,' it is through no fault of its own" (SCOR 2086th meeting). He supported the Secretary-General's observations that "the situation in Southern Lebanon is very closely linked to the formidable problems of Lebanon as a whole" which in turn are "inextricably linked with the problem of the Middle East" These linkages meant that the question of reestablishing the authority of the Lebanese government was connected not only to the question of a withdrawal of Israeli troops and to the question of regulating the Palestinian presence in Southern Lebanon. It was also linked to the effects of the intermittent civil war on the overall authority of the Lebanese government and thereby also (at least according to Israeli statements) to the question of the Syrian presence and influence in Lebanon. For the Lebanese delegation, the last of these questions was extremely sensitive and delicate, both internally and externally. It was not possible for Lebanon, as an Arab country, to openly discuss the role of Syria in the Security Council. It was even less possible to indicate any kind of support for the Israeli view that these questions were connected. Israel initially indicated strong support for the third part of UNIFIL's mandate. In a statement to the Security Council on 19 January 1979, Ambassador Blum stated that "UNIFIL was entrusted with an appropriate mandate" and that by concentrating on the withdrawal issue, "attention may have been diverted from the centrality of the other inseparable components of UNIFIL's mandate, which are restoration of international peace and security and assistance to the

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Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its authority in the area" (SCOR 2113th meeting). This support was always seen in the perspective of strengthening the authority of the Lebanese against the PLO and the Syrians, however. The role of Israel itself in undermining Lebanese authority and sovereignty was never admitted. After the breakdown of the 17 May 1983 agreement, and particularly after the Naqoura talks in January 1985, Israeli representatives b e c a m e increasingly scornful of the possibility of the Lebanese government regaining any effective authority in the country. This observation has also been used to justify Israel's lack of interest in negotiations with the Lebanese government after this period. Ambassador Tueni has given a fascinating account of the underlying strategy envisaged by the Lebanese goverment in 1978 to use the UN and UNIFIL to help Lebanon eradicate the wars waged on its territory by outside forces and to regain its general authority. In this version, the strategy behind the initiative to establish UNIFIL had a much wider scope than just to obtain a rapid withdrawal of the Israelis from Lebanon. It was the beginning of an attempt to use the UN to internationalize the stakes in obtaining a solution to the Lebanese problem. According to Tueni, the establishment of UNIFIL thereby constituted a hope that Lebanon could begin to extricate itself from the vise of the Palestinian-Israeli-Syrian conflict on Lebanese soil. 66 Apart from the tole assigned to UNIFIL in this strategy, the Lebanese also saw the Security Council as an important instrument for increasing the interests of the international community in finding a solution to the problem in Lebanon. A second step in this strategy was taken in September-October 1978. In August, the Syrian forces deployed around Beirut had opened a violent and prolonged barrage of fire against Christian positions in East Beirut. In New York, the situation in Lebanon was discussed by the foreign ministers of the countries involved at the end of September. On 28 September, President Carter launched the idea of convening an international conference on Lebanon to which Syria and the parties concerned would be invited. The idea gained little support, however, and was soon abandoned. A direct contact to the Soviet Union was also established on the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow, and Carter delivered "something between a demand and an ultimatum"67 for Soviet assistance to make the Syrians agree to a ceasefire. Because of the involvement of Syria, it was difficult for the Lebanese government itself to bring the matter before the Security Council. 6 8 Instead, it made a secret arrangement with the French delegation to put the Beirut situation before the Council. As a result of

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consultations in which the Syrian delegation took part, a resolution was adopted on 6 October that called upon "all those involved in hostilities in Lebanon to put an end to acts of violence and observe scrupulously an immediate and effective cease-fire and cessation of hostilities so that internal peace and reconciliation may be restored based on the preservation of Lebanese unity, territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty" (resolution 436 [1978D- In the next paragraph, the resolution called upon all involved to allow International Red Cross units into the conflict area to evacuate the wounded and provide humanitarian assistance. In the view of Ambassador Tueni, this was an important resolution because it meant an international consecration of the unity, integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Lebanon and because it contained an international appeal for national reconciliation in Lebanon and an explicit admission that internal peace there was dependent upon a cessation of external hostilities. It also meant that the Lebanese question was lifted to the level of strategic dialogue between the two superpowers and that Syria and Israel had to agree to a cease-fire in Lebanon. Even though the fighting in the Beirut area ceased in October 1978—for the time being—the Lebanese were soon disappointed in their hopes that the concept of internationalization embodied in resolution 436 (1978) would lead to increased international interest in finding a solution to the Lebanese problem. Neither the United States nor France gave any active follow-up to the resolution, and the Lebanese were advised to come to terms with the Syrians on their own. It is worth noting that the question of establishing a UN presence in Beirut was also considered during the September 1978 events. At that point, however, it was impossible to obtain UN forces in these areas "because Lebanon was not in a position to ask for it." 69 The fate of resolution 436 (1978), which was soon forgotten, also indicates the limitations of the strategy of internationalization. The principles quoted in the resolution—to which the Lebanese attached great importance—were for most of the members of the Security Council self-evident but of such a general character that little operational significance was attached to them. For most members of the UN and the media, the most important message in the resolution lay in its call for a truce and its humanitarian appeal and not in its political content. The inclination o f the international community—including the Security Council—to get embroiled in the violence and quagmire of Beirut was at that time very limited. Events during the summer of 1982 accentuated for the Lebanese

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the need for an internationalization of the Lebanese crisis in order to find a solution. As described by Ambassador Tueni, "It was at the United Nations that Lebanon chose to defend itself—not being able to defend itself elsewhere." 70 The request for the Security Council to meet during the first days of the Israeli invasion and the drafting and adoption of resolutions 508 and 509 (1982) can both be seen as parts of the strategy. Even the non-UN options—the establishment of the MNF and the heavy reliance on the United States during 1982-1984—were based on the conviction that peace in Lebanon could be restored only through help from the outside. In retrospect, the strategy of internationalizing the Lebanese question has been at best only a partial success. From one point of view, it has managed to put part of Southern Lebanon, the UNIFIL area, under a kind of international mandate that has probably been the best substitute available for effective government control. The strategy of internationalization has not succeeded in fulfilling its broader objectives, however, in spite of the fact that the Lebanese have managed to keep the situation in Lebanon at center stage in the Security Council during most of the 1978-1988 period. During this process, Lebanon has been able to mobilize broad international support and sympathy for its cause. Its prime adversary, Israel, has been isolated in the Council's debates on Israeli policies and practices in Lebanon and was finally forced to withdraw its forces from most of the areas occupied in the 1982 war. Nevertheless, by early 1988, Lebanon was still besieged by political anarchy, local militia leaders in conflict or competition with each other, and an intermittent civil war. Syrian troops were as firmly entrenched as in 1978. Most of the resolutions passed by the Security Council have enjoyed only temporary respect, sometimes receiving none at all from the parties involved. The United States has put insufficient pressure on the Israelis to obtain the necessary peace and stability in the south, and the strategic dialogue between the two superpowers envisaged by the Lebanese ended before the Soviet Union brought any pressure on Syria to effectuate that part of the bargain. A new foreign actor, Iran, has established a strong influence in some parts of the population. On the matter of the reestablishment of the effective authority of the Lebanese government, the situation was also bleak. Neither UNIFIL nor the Security Council has managed to make much progress in implementing this part of UNIFIL's mandate in Southern Lebanon. There can be no doubt that these efforts have been negatively affected by the erosion of the Lebanese government's authority in the rest of the country. From 1984-1985 onward, there seems to have been an increasing convergence of views in the UN Secretariat, Security

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Council circles, and even within Lebanon itself that a change in the sequence of events in the original scenario of internationalization is overdue. According to this revised view, the Lebanese can no longer rely so heavily on the UN or other outside powers for finding a solution to their internal crisis. First, a national reconciliation must be obtained—it is only on this basis that a reestablishment of the authority of the central government can be restored. In this context, UNIFIL can hopefully assist the efforts to return the areas in Southern Lebanon to the authority of the Beirut government, as envisaged in resolution 425 (1978). Without such a national reconciliation and the establishment of a workable central government, UNIFIL will continue to face a hopeless task on this part of the mandate. The role of Syria is, of course, a continuing question in this picture. It remains to be seen whether the various Lebanese factions will be able to muster the political will necessary to break the vicious circle alone or whether they have just transferred their hopes for outside help from the UN or the United States back to the Syrians.

NOTES 1. Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 290. 2. Ghassan Tueni, interview with the author, 30 October 19853- An example is the presidential statement adopted by the Council on 8 December 1978, which states, in part: "The Council believes that the unimpeded deployment of the Force in all parts of Southern Lebanon will contribute significantly to the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government and the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty within Lebanon's internationally recognized boundaries" (Doc. S/12958 of 8 December 1978). 4. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping (New York: United Nations, 1985), 116. 5. Ghassan Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres (Paris: Jean-Claude Lattes, 1985), 203-204. The Lebanese government later on several occasions called on Arab organizations for a complete withdrawal of the Palestinians from the UNIFIL zone. 6. Urquhart, A Life, 290-291. 7. See the Interim Report of the Secretary-General on 8 April 1978 (Doc. S/12620/Add. 2) in which he refers to a message to Prime Minister Begin on 5 April and statements in the Security Council on 3 May 1978 (SCOR 2076th meeting). 8. Secretariat member, personal interview, December 1985. 9. Helge Faret, "Problemer og erfaringer med i starte en FN-aksjon i et konfliktomride," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 4B, 1978. 10. See note 6 to Chapter 2, quoting President Carter's version of these

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events. The incident about the armed personnel carriers and the indirect threat to cut off U.S. military aid to Israel are also referred to in former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's memoirs. Vance describes one letter from the administration to Congress being sent on 5 April 1978, and he dates the armed personnel incident after the events of 13 June 1978. Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 20911. One member of the U.S. delegation to the Security Council during the March 1978 events has been quoted as saying "it never crossed my mind" that Israel would turn over the border area to Major Haddad rather than UNIFIL. See Naomi Joy Weinberger, "Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon," The Middle East Journal, vol. 37, no. 3, Summer 1983. Ms. Weinberger adds: "While angered by the Israeli action, the U.S. felt there was little to do after the fact." 12. Indar J. Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984), 104. 13- The official explanation given in the Council by the U.S. Permanent Representative, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, for the U.S. veto was the following: "Unfortunately, the resolution now before us is not sufficiently balanced to accomplish the objectives of ending the cycle of violence and establishing the conditions for a just and lasting peace in Lebanon. For that reason, the United States voted against this resolution" (Doc. S/PV. 2377 of 8 June 1982). 14. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 339. 15. Amine Gemayel, "The Price and the Promise," Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 4, Spring 1985. 16. In his book Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors, Wadi Haddad, who served as President Amine Gemayel's national security adviser for eighteen months up to May 1984, writes that the different communal views in Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli invasion quickly converged on three basic principles, the first of which was "the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity through the withdrawal of all foreign forces—Palestinians, Syrians, and Israelis—the disarmament of the Palestinian camps, and the enforcement of the law equally for all residents." (New York: Praeger Special Studies, CSIS, The Washington Papers, 1985), 81. 17. Fez Declaration, as published in Appendix IX, in Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985). 18. Cabinet communiqué on withdrawal released in Jerusalem, 15 January 1985. 19. A separate paper on UNIFIL service in occupied areas has been written (in Norwegian) as another part of the project by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs on the future of peacekeeping operations. See Martin Hjelmervik Ness, "FN i okkupert omràde?—UNIFIL etter invasjonen i 1982," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. 20. Illustrative of this problem is a media report from Jerusalem during the incident that stated: "Israel has benefitted from the fact that UNIFIL has been

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forced to deal with the SLA more than ever before, granting it a form of recognition which conflicts with the UNIFIL mandate." The Guardian, 13 June 1985 (Ian Black from Jerusalem). 21. As quoted in George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon. An analysis of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the implications for U.S. Israeli relations. (Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984), 27. 22. Ibid., 28. 23. Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), 164. 24. Haddad, Lebanon, 74. 25. Kjell Skjelsbaek and Martin Hjelmervik Ness, "The Predicament of UNIFIL," NUPl-Notat, no. 343, 1985. 26. It should be noted that the expression "international peace and security" also has a special standing in the UN Charter, Chapters V—VII, which, inter alia, confer on the Security Council the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Art. 24). Resolution 425 (1978) does not, however, contain language from Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which contains the provisions for forceful measures against member states in case of "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" (Art. 39). The establishment of UNIFIL is therefore not usually counted as a Chapter VII decision of the Council. 27. Vigar Aabrek, "Militaer taktikk i fredens tjeneste," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985, 134. 28. Urquhart, A Life, 292. 29. Blue Helmets, 119. 30. Ibid., 123. 31. See statement by the PLO representative in the Security Council on 12 June 1979 (SCOR 2147th meeting). 32. Odd Karsten Tveit, Nederlag (Oslo: J. W. Cappelen, 1985), 114. 33. New York Times, 18 August 1981: "Effort is half the battle, says UN's peacekeeper," by Bernard D. Nossiter. 34. Ibid. 35. Ze'ev Schiff, "Green Light, Lebanon," Foreign Policy, no. 50, Spring 1983, 79. 36. Haig, Caveat, 335. 37. In his critical study of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the implications for U.S.-Israeli relations, George W. Ball writes that the "most plausible inference from Haig's activities and inactivities is that he was basically sympathetic to Sharon's larger plans." Ball, Error, 38. 38. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), Chapters 1-6. 39. Ibid., 98-99. 40. Jerusalem Post, 17 April 1988 ("Uneasy summer likely with increasing terror from Lebanon"). 41. Blue Helmets, 135. 42. Ness, "FN", 178-180. 43- Aharon Levran, "UN Forces and Israel's Security," Jerusalem Quarterly,

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no. 37, 1986, 68. 44. Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from Sinai and Lebanon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, 1984), 19. 45. Such accusations have been picked up and given further distribution by some analysts. See, for example, Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), which gives a brief, but very unbalanced account of UNIFIL's policies and efforts (p. 57). 46. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping, 2347. Jerusalem Post, 17 April 1988. 48. See Weinberger, "Peacekeeping," 346, which quotes Ze'ev Schiff as describing a gradual evolution in Israeli attitudes toward UNIFIL "from deep initial suspicion to a guarded acknowledgement that UNIFIL was making a positive contribution." 49. Brig. Gen. (Res.) Levran, who served as General Staff Liaison Officer to UN Forces in the region in 1980-1982, confirms in his article that Israeli policy-making toward UNIFIL was largely dominated by the Israeli Defence Forces and within the army by its senior representatives in the field. General Levran argues convincingly that the perspective of these officers was narrow and local instead of broad and national, that their proximity to the events and problems in the field (and perhaps even more to Haddad and his troops) blurred their perception of interests and political consideration. See Levran, "UN Forces," 68. 50. UNIFIL member, personal interview, November 1985. 51. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping, 28. 52. Haddad, Lebanon, 31. 53- In his book Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985) the Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko, who served as personal adviser to Foreign Minister Gromyko before taking up the post of Undersecretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs, attributes the following attitude on UN peacekeeping operations to Gromyko: '"What kind of so-called peace-keeping operations are we talking about' 1 he asked. 'No mention is made of such things in the UN Charter. They are dangerous and could lead to interference in the internal affairs of states.' He always harked back to the Congo as an example. 'Remember in the Congo we saw how UN troops could be used against the progressive forces'" (p. 257). 54. The Cairo Agreement between the Lebanese government and the Palestine Liberation Organization of 3 November 1969, which was signed under pressure from the other Arab countries, formally granted the PLO the right of work, residence, and movement in Lebanon and the "right to participate in the Palestinian revolution through the Palestinian armed struggle, as well as provisions to facilitate commando activity, specifically in the border areas." The original text was graded "Top Secret," for the eyes of the commands only. A French translation was published in Le Livre Blanc Libanais: Documents Diplomatiques, 1975-76. (Beyrouth: République

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Libanaise, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et des Libanais d'outre-mer, 1976), 196-198. 55. The position of the Lebanese government was made clear in a letter written and signed by President Sarkis addressed to Secretary-General Waldheim in April 1978. See Tueni, Une guerre, 203-204. 56. Rabinovich, The War, 57-58. 57. Urquhart, A Life, 297-298. 58. Blue Helmets, 131. 59- Weinberger, "Peacekeeping," 353. 60. Rabinovich, The War, 112. 61. See statement by a Lebanese army spokesman to the Beirut newspaper IKE on 19 August 1978, in which the following opinion was noted: "A Lebanese army spokesman Friday accused the United States, the United Nations and Israel of going back on pledges they made about the deployment of army troops in South Lebanon." According to L'Orient le Jour, Beirut, of 25 August 1978, Prime Minister Hoss also blamed the United States for having advised the Lebanese government to send the army unit to the UNIFIL area. 62. Urquhart, A Life, 297. 63. Tveit, Nederlag, 96. 64. Speech, "The Work of Peace," given by Brian Urquhart at the Bicentennial of the Treaty of Paris at the National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., on 28 September 198365. Article 8, paragraph 2 of the agreement has the following wording: During the six-month period after the withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with Article 1 of the present agreement and the simultaneous restoration of Lebanese governmental authority along the international boundary between Israel and Lebanon, and in the light of the termination of the state of war, the parties shall initiate, within the Joint Liaison Committee, bona fide negotiations in order to conclude agreements on the movement of goods, products and persons and their implementation on a non-discriminatory basis. 66. Tueni, Une guerre, 201-202. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid., 209. 69. Ibid., 210. 70. Ibid., 227.

CHAPTER FOUR

Strengthening the Size and Effectiveness of UNIFIL THE OPTIONS As shown in Chapter 3, it became evident during the first weeks and months of UNIFIL's existence that the new UN Force would have enormous problems in implementing the three parts of its initial mandate. In the face of this situation, there were three basic options available for the parties concerned and for the Security Council: • Conclude that UNIFIL in its initial form and with its initial instructions, as defined through resolutions 425 and 426 (1978), was n o t e q u i p p e d for the task a n d that a s t r e n g t h e n i n g a n d / o r redeployment of UNIFIL should be contemplated. • Accept that the situation was difficult and that the ideal situation for the full implementation of the mandate would be hard to reach, but nevertheless hope that through patient negotiations, the parties would realize the value of UNIFIL for their own interest so that UNIFIL could be given the opportunity to fulfill its mandate. • Conclude that the mandate was unimplementable because of lack of cooperation from the parties directly concerned. This option would then lead to an early withdrawal of the Force, which, in any case, was only meant to have an interim character. The following three chapters will take a closer look at the various suggestions and proposals that were set forth from the perspective of the first of these options. Roughly considered, these proposals can b e grouped into four different categories: • Proposals to increase the size of UNIFIL (Chapter 4) • Proposals to make the UN Force more effective within the terms

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of the original mandate or to change the mandate to make UNIFIL more effective. These proposals would therefore concern the ground rules for the show of firmness and, if need be, the use of force. (Chapter 4) • Proposals to give UNIFIL new tasks (Chapter 5) • Proposals to change the area of deployment (Chapter 6)

CHANGING THE SIZE OF UNIFIL

In the Secretary-General's initial report on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978), he considered "as a preliminary estimate, that [UNIFIL] must have at least five battalions each of about 600 all ranks, in addition to the necessary logistics units. This means a total strength of the order of 4,000" (Doc. S/12611). This estimate was subsequently confirmed by the Security Council through resolution 426 (1978). Only six weeks later, the initial estimate had to be revised upward. In a letter dated 1 May 1978 to the president of the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that he had received a strong recommendation from Force Commander General Erskine and from General Siilasvuo that "in view of the very difficult conditions on the ground and in the light of the experience so far acquired, they strongly feel that the total strength of the Force should be brought to about 6,000" (Doc. S/12675 of 1 May 1978). The Secretary-General supported this recommendation, and the Security Council approved the increase on 3 May 1978 through resolution 427 (1978). By the beginning of June 1978, the deployment of UNIFIL up to the 6,000 ceiling was more or less completed, and the size of UNIFIL was kept near this level up to the winter of 1982. As part of a series of proposals to make UNIFIL more effective, the Lebanese government several times suggested that the size of the Force should be increased. A concrete proposal to this effect was presented in a letter dated 14 December 1981, in which Lebanon proposed several measures to enable UNIFIL to attain the objectives of resolution 425 (1978), including "an increase in the number of the Force by no less than 1,000 troops, to make future deployment possible and, more immediately, to seal the present area of operation" (Doc. S/14792 of 14 December 1981). On 16 February 1982, the Secretary-General issued a special report in which he informed the members of the Council that the situation in the area remained "extremely volatile" and that he had requested Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart to pay a visit to the area to consult with the parties concerned (Doc. S/14869 of 16 February 1982).

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During this visit it was established that both the Force commander of UNIFIL and the Lebanese government were of the opinion that UNIFIL should be increased by no less than 1,000 men to reinforce present operations and to make further deployment possible in a manner that conformed with resolution 425 (1978). The Council met on 23 February to decide the matter. In resolution 501 (1982), the Council voted "to approve the immediate increase in the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon recommended by the Secretary-General (in paragraph 6 of document S/14869) from approximately six thousand to approximately seven thousand troops to reinforce present operations as well as to make further deployments possible on the lines of resolution 425 (1978)." An important motive for the increase of the ceiling for UNIFIL from the 6,000 to the 7,000 level was the hope that this would make possible a closure of the "gap" in the UNIFIL area between the Norwegian battalion area in the east and the Nepalese (later the Ghanese) sector. During the winter of 1982, there were some hopes in the UNIFIL command and in the UN Secretariat that it might be possible to reach an agreement with the Israelis on this question. In the consultations on the deployment of the extra 1,000 soldiers, however, no positive results were obtained. Even the PLO and the other factions constituting the "armed elements" preferred to keep the gap open. The new battalion was instead deployed in the Tyre area, following a slight realignment of the borders between the various battalion areas in the main area of deployment. The main part of the increase to the 7,000 level was provided by a new French battalion, which was deployed in the first days of June 1982, only a few days before the new Israeli invasion. In August 1982, the bulk of this battalion was withdrawn from UNIFIL and moved to the Beirut area, where it became part of the Multinational Force (MNF). No substitution for the French battalion was envisaged in the new circumstances, although some of the other reinforcements brought in following the February 1982 increase were retained for a time. In the immediate aftermath of the June 1982 invasion, some of the contingency plans made in the U.S. government envisaged a significant increase in UNIFIL's size, perhaps up to 12,000 to 14,000 troops with an expanded mandate. 1 Such plans were not acceptable to the Israelis, however, and were never presented at the UN headquarters in New York. During the 1982-1985 period, some of the troop-contributing countries, in particular the Norwegians, expressed the view that the new circumstances—in which UNIFIL was situated far behind the new front line between the Israeli Defence Forces and the Lebanese, with no possibilities of implementing its original mandate—no longer

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required a full-size peacekeeping force. They therefore suggested that a plan for a gradual reduction of UNIFIL should be developed, but in such a way that the Force could be brought back quickly to its original level if circumstances changed so that the Force could be able to better implement its mandate. In this context, suggestions were also put forward that the functions of the Force could be changed, at least partly, from the traditional peacekeeping tasks to more observer functions, since UNIFIL was constrained largely to observe-and-report procedures anyhow. UNIFIL Commander General Callaghan strongly advised against the elaboration of such plans, however, and the UN Secretariat found it difficult to overrule his advice on such a question. A main argument against the proposal to reduce the Force was the return of many former inhabitants of the area and even a new influx of refugees from the fighting around Beirut This led to a major increase in the civilian population and an upsurge of the economy in the area. In this situation, a reduction of the Force was thought by some to be interpreted as sending the wrong signal, both to the Israelis and to the civilian population. A slight decrease of UNIFIL personnel was nevertheless effected, and during most of the period between February 1983 and April 1985, the actual size of UNIFIL was kept between the 5,400 and 5,900 levels. In the preparation for the Naqoura talks in November 1984-January 1985, the Secretary-General instructed the Force headquarters to prepare contingency plans (Doc. 16776 of 9 October 1984) for a new enlargement of UNIFIL in the event Israel accepted a full deployment of the Force, including in the areas closest to the international border. In such a situation, the 6,000- or even the 7,000troop ceiling would be insufficient to cover the new tasks, especially as the Israelis in that case would quite rightly expect even higher standards of effectiveness and impartiality. Among the alternatives envisaged during this planning process was a recommendation that the ceiling be lifted to 10,000 troops. Since the Israelis never gave their blessing to such an increase in the UNIFIL deployment area, this recommendation was never put before the Security Council. The idea that UNIFIL could be converted into an observer group was briefly suggested in the Secretary-General's report of 18 September 1986, after the serious incidents between UNIFIL and Shi'ite groups. The idea—one among various possibilities considered—was rejected, however, on the grounds that it would greatly reduce the Force's ability to exercise some control over the level of hostilities in the area of deployment (Doc. S/18348).

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THE RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE The basic parameters for United Nations peacekeeping operations for the show of firmness and the use of force have been well established during previous operations in the Middle East, in Congo, and on Cyprus. The relevant paragraph in the Secretary-General's 19 March 1978 report to the Council had the following wording: "The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It will not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The Force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Council" (para. 4 d in Doc. S/12611). There was no discussion in the Security Council on this point in connection with the adoption of resolution 426 (1978), which formally ratified the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . T h e g e n e r a l considerations for the use of force quoted above were almost identical to the guidelines that had been proposed by the Secretary-General when the second United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai (UNEF II) was established in 1973. 2 Any other formulations would, in all probability, have required lengthy consultations with the members of the Security Council. These formulations also reduced the concerns of the governments of the troop-contributing countries, which would have b e e n much less willing to put troops at the disposal of the Secretary-General if the UN Force had been given more offensive tasks in Southern Lebanon. The ground rules for the use of force nevertheless were taken up several times during UNTFIL's existence, most often in communications from the Lebanese government. Such proposals were generally met with great skepticism in the Secretariat. The feeling of responsibility for the safety of the UN peacekeepers was strong. Brian Urquhart was "very conscious that our soldiers were taking risks the Lebanese themselves were not prepared to take," and his book leaves no doubt about his exasperation that "the Lebanese in their impotence continued to make impossible demands and criticism of UNIFIL which was, unlike the Lebanese army, actually being shot at. "3 In the United Nations peacekeeping system, more detailed rules for the use o f force are contained in the Standing Operational Procedures. These procedures define what is meant by force and the principles governing its use. The degree of force used must only be sufficient to achieve the mission at hand and to prevent, as far as possible, loss of human life or injury. Force should as a rule never b e

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initiated, except possibly after continuous harassment when it becomes necessary to restore a situation so that the United Nations can fulfill its responsibilities. 4 In the command structure of the UN peacekeeping system, considerable latitude is also granted to the force commander on the question of interpreting the guidelines concerning military questions, such as the rules for the use of force in self-defense. The personality of the c o m m a n d e r t h e r e f o r e b e c o m e s an important variable in determining the mode of operations of e a c h individual UN peacekeeping operation. This flexibility has, throughout the history of UN peacekeeping operations, given rise to an almost continuous discussion on the repartition of responsibilities between New York and the force headquarters, as exemplified in the peacekeeper's adage that "when New York is in doubt, the issue is left to the force headquarters, which is always wrong." The possibilities open to the UN headquarters to shift blame to the force headquarters or the individual battalions when things went wrong were rarely used, however. The criticism from officers in the field against what was perceived to be too narrow rules or lack of support from New York for more firmness was, in this respect, probably much more widespread. From the side of the Lebanese, it was repeatedly suggested that the provision that force or self-defense could be used in order to resist attempts to prevent UNIFIL from discharging its mandate should be given a more "dynamic" interpretation. In a letter to the SecretaryGeneral dated 5 September 1978, the Lebanese formally raised this possibility, albeit in indirect terms. When the Security Council met in January 1979 to discuss the second renewal of UNIFIL's mandate, the Lebanese ambassador again raised the question of strengthening UNIFIL. In his statement, Ambassador Tueni said that the time had probably come for the Council "to take a fresh look at the basic principles that prompted the inception of UNIFIL, its terms of reference and the guidelines by which its action is and was to be governed." He emphasized that it had "not been possible or necessary, so far, even to use a show of force or establish its military credibility by asserting its right to self-defence against those who would hinder its freedom of movement or deployment" (SCOR 2113th meeting, 19 January 1979). The publication of the "phased programme of activities" in April 1979 and the subsequent problems in implementing this program also reflected the desire of the Lebanese government for a strengthening of the effectiveness of UNIFIL in implementing its mandate. This program was elaborated in consultation with the UN Secretariat, however, and therefore also reflected the extreme caution with which the Secretariat viewed all proposals to change UNIFIL into a more effective military

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force. The Lebanese government, however, did not give u p easily its hopes of getting more help from UNIFIL in dealing with the very frustrating situation in the south. In a n e w letter, dated 7 May 1979, the Lebanese expressed the view that It is thus clear to us that a certain measure of "peaceenforcing" was not precluded at the very inception of UNIFIL. . . . The military option should not be foreclosed by the exclusive use of the (so far) limited diplomatic option. In the light o f the tragic experiences accumulated since, w e think that UNIFIL should have a greater military credibility. A serious deterrent capability can alone enable the Force to discourage any challenge to its authority and prevent attacks on its men and installations, let alone prevent it from pursuing its mission. . . . If, h o w e v e r , obstruction should c o m e f r o m irresponsible elements, armed illegitimately, then it becomes vital that UNIFIL should not be allowed to find itself in a position of inferiority or inadequacy. . . . The time has now come for the Security Council to give UNIFIL the means of carrying out its mission to the end, forcefully, with confidence and assured success (Doc. S/13301). The Lebanese at this time stressed that they did not seek a fundamental change in the mandate of UNIFIL. In a letter dated 28 August 1979, the Lebanese requests w e r e further elaborated. In this letter, the Lebanese representative stated that he was under instructions from his government to request explicitly . . . that measures be taken urgently to fulfill the following: • Provide UNIFIL with the necessary weapons and equipment "of a defensive character" that will enable the Force to exercise selfdefence, which includes "resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate," as stated in the Secretary-General's report of 19 March 1978 (S/12611, para. 4 d ) and instantly approved by resolution 426 (1978), then confirmed by resolution 450 (1979). A serious deterrent capability will at least enable the Force to discourage further challenges to its authority and prevent attacks on its men and installations that imperil both its safety and success. • Support UNIFIL with necessary logistical and infrastructural means, not excluding additional personnel, that will increase its deterrence capability and enable it "to function as an effective military unit," as stated in paragraph 5 of resolution 450 (1979). • Reconsider the definition of the "area of operation" of UNIFIL and its m e t h o d s o f d e p l o y m e n t and m o v e m e n t , in the light of developments on the terrain since resolution 426 (1978) confirmed the provisions of the Secretary-General's report of 19 March 1978 (Doc. S/13519 of 28 August 1979).

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Resolution 467 (1980), adopted after the serious incidents in March and April 1980 that culminated in the attack on the Misgav Am kibbutz and the murder of the two Irish UNIFIL soldiers, included a paragraph that called "attention to the provisions in the mandate that would allow the force to use its rights of self-defence." Although this was nothing m o r e than a r e s t a t e m e n t of p r e v i o u s policies, it w a s m e a n t as a reminder that the mandate and guidelines of UNIFIL did not exclude more forceful action. In his J u n e 1980 report to the Security Council, the SecretaryGeneral commented o n the proposals concerning the use of force. His observations on this occasion are as clear a definition as any of h o w the UN Secretariat looked u p o n the various proposals to give UNIFIL a stronger military capability: I have reviewed this question very carefully with the Force Commander and am examining new measures to reinforce the defence capability of UNIFIL, in particular with a view to improving the security of its personnel and to making the Force headquarters at Naqoura less vulnerable. Measures are also being considered to enable the contingents of UNIFIL to react firmly and consistently to threats or actions designed to interfere with the discharge of the duties of the Force. I shall, of course, keep the Council informed in this regard. In this connection, I should, however, like to state that the use of force in self-defence will not by itself achieve significant progress in the implementation of the UNIFIL mandate. A peacekeeping operation must achieve its major objectives through means other than the use of force, and this consideration certainly applies to UNIFIL. While consolidating UNIFIL and taking the necessary steps to render its position as strong as possible, I believe that the main road to full implementation of the UNIFIL mandate lies in political and diplomatic efforts. These efforts must secure genuine co-operation with the Force and implant the conviction that such co-operation represents, in the long term, the best guarantee of security and normality for all concerned. In this connection, I appreciate the diplomatic support that I have received from Member States, particularly the troop-contributing countries (Doc. S/13994 of 12 June 1980). T h e n e w m e a s u r e s referred to in the Secretary-General's report were the subject of informal discussions with s o m e of the members of the Security Council a n d the troop-contributors in the s p r i n g a n d summer of 1980. The steps envisaged included changes in the standing orders of UNIFIL to allow UNIFIL personnel to o p e n fire in certain s p e c i f i e d situations—for instance, when other forces shot at UNIFIL p e r s o n n e l to kill, w h e n other forces tried to infiltrate the present UNIFIL area to set u p n e w positions, or w h e n UNIFIL p o s t s w e r e

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denied necessary provisions. All these measures were possible within the existing mandate, and no changes in the basic parameters of peacekeeping operations as defined in the March 1978 documents were contemplated. The reactions among the troop-contributors to taking steps that could escalate the use of violence in the UNIFIL area were fairly negative, however. The United States, which feared that such steps would lead to increased confrontations between UNIFIL and the Israelis, was also less than enthusiastic. The ideas were therefore never put into effect. After the dramatic events of April-June 1980, it became clear that the Lebanese would not get enough support from the SecretaryGeneral or from the Security Council for a basic revision of the mandate or mode of operation of UNIFIL. In its 14 December letter of 1981 requesting an increase in the number of the Force by 1,000 men, the Lebanese government nevertheless again called for UNIFIL "to deploy, fully unimpeded, in the totality of its area of operation up to the internationally recognized boundaries, using if and when necessary, its right of self-defence" (Doc. S/14792). At first, the Security Council gave no more support to the requests of the Lebanese on this aspect than it had on previous occasions. On suggestions from the Lebanese, resolution 501 (1982), which increased UNIFIL's size to 7,000 troops, included an operative paragraph that reemphasized and quoted the full text of the relevant paragraphs of the Secretary-General's initial report on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) concerning the rules for the use of force. Even if no new elements were introduced, this procedure can be said to have elevated the proposed terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force concerning the rules for the use of force to a slightly higher status since they were quoted in a resolution and not simply in a report. Since the cease-fire of July 1981 was generally respected in the March-May period of 1982, this interpretation was never put to any serious test before the June 1982 invasion, however. It would be incorrect to suggest that the Lebanese government received no support in the Security Council for its various proposals to increase the effectiveness of UNIFIL. In several of the debates held in the Council in the 1978-1982 period, the general frustration over the lack of cooperation from the parties concerned ran so high that several countries indicated a willingness to consider stronger measures. Among the permanent members of the Council, the French expressed a readiness "to strengthen UNIFIL's capacity," although they also stressed that this objective must be seen in the context of the "security of its personnel" (Doc. S/PV. 2232 of 17 June 1980). Among the other troopcontributing countries, a statement in April 1980 from the

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representative of Fiji—the Fijians had one of the highest casualty rates of all the troop-contributors—probably represented the strongest endorsement for a revision of the rules for the show of force: It is equally important to review the mandate concerning the use of force by UNIFIL troops. In calling for such a review, we are mindful that UNIFIL's central character as a peace-keeping force should neither be compromised nor brought into question. At the same time, my Government is concerned at the seeming ease with which the de facto forces appear to have moved into UNIFIL's area of operation and taken up positions without any apparent reaction from UNIFIL until too late. We believe that we have long passed the point beyond which UNIFIL should not be expected to tolerate the harassment both verbal and physical to which it has been subjected, especially in recent weeks. What has happened in recent weeks has weighed heavily in my Government's mind and has prompted the above observation (Doc. S/PV. 2218 of 18 April 1980).

As a general rule, however, both the members of the Security Council and the troop-contributors expressed strong support for the general policy followed by the Secretary-General on the use of force, as formulated in the guidelines for UNIFIL from March 1978 and in his subsequent reports. The guidelines and the standing operational procedures were, in this respect, sufficiently flexible to allow each battalion commander a relatively high degree of latitude. In a situation as volatile as Southern Lebanon, this was an operational necessity, particularly as local challenges to the authority of the individual battalions tended to develop quickly. There were several reports of incidents in which UNIFIL contingents, in response to repeated provocations, employed rather more force than the UN and Naqoura headquarters perhaps appreciated. On the other hand, there were also cases in which UNIFIL units were not sufficiently firm to establish respect. Here again, sound political judgment and military professionalism among UNIFIL officers were two equally important requirements. It should also be stressed that after the problems encountered during the deployment period, the proposals of the Lebanese government to strengthen the military capabilities of UNIFIL were directed mainly against the activities of the Israelis and the de facto forces, and not toward the PLO or the other armed elements in the south. The Lebanese, as a matter of principle, maintained that the activities of groups like the PLO were internal matters that should be dealt with by the Lebanese authorities or on an inter-Arab basis and not by the United Nations. This was a position often criticized and ridiculed by the Israelis in the debates of the Security Council. It would

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probably be right to assume, however, that the Lebanese government had little choice in this matter if it wanted to retain support from other Arab countries in the predicaments of Lebanon. It is interesting to note that Israel, from a different point of view and with different objectives in mind, also at times advocated a stronger and more forceful role for UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. In the Israeli statement to the Security Council after the adoption of resolution 425 on 19 March 1978, Ambassador Herzog stated that "Israel understands the spirit of the resolution as indicating a clear link between the withdrawal of our troops and the establishment of an effective deterrent force against future terrorist attacks" (SCOR 2074th meeting). The view that UNIFIL in its existing form was not sufficiently strong was also an underlying factor in later Israeli criticism of UNIFIL's lack of effectiveness against the PLO. Israeli diplomats also on other occasions indicated that they thought that the concept of peacekeeping in the Middle East would not be viable without a certain amount of peace-enforcing. For obvious reasons, the Israelis never pressed for a stronger role for UNIFIL in this respect.5 In the observations made by the Secretary-General in his September 1986 report, issued after serious clashes between UNIFIL and local Shi'ite elements, the possibilities of reassessing some aspects of the rules for the use of force were again discussed. One suggestion was to acquire heavier armaments. In the opinion of Force Commander Hagglund, UNIFIL should not be provided with weapons heavier than it had at present, however, given the Force's need for the cooperation and consent of the local population. The Force commander instead believed that UNIFIL's tactical concept should be to avoid violence by being able to deploy superior force quickly when needed (Doc. S/18348). A number of measures were introduced in late 1986 and early 1987 in order to enhance the Force's effectiveness and improve the security of its personnel. One of these was a major redeployment of UNIFIL in late 1986 as a result of the withdrawal of the French contingent from its previous sector. Another was a revision of the Standing Operational Procedures to ensure that the tasks assigned to the individual units were realistic and practicable in the prevailing circumstances in Southern Lebanon. Steps were also taken to ensure that these procedures were carried out in as uniform a manner as possible by all units of the Force. The most important step, however, was the establishment of a composite mechanized c o m p a n y with representatives of all six infantry battalions. The Force Mobile Reserve, as it became known, was set up with armored personnel carriers and was deployed quickly to areas of tension and other special tasks when

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needed. Ambassador Tueni in his book describes UNIFIL's problems as being caused by the fact that it was given a "dynamic mission" but essentially "static means" to do the job. 6 It seems clear, however, that all the parties involved in the conflict in Southern Lebanon advocated a stronger role for UNIFIL only if the deterrence or enforcement capability was used against their adversary(ies). Had it followed that path, UNIFIL would have run the risk of being burdened with the same stalemate and balance of forces, but with a considerably higher level of violence than with the present interpretation of the mandate. This observation suggests once again that UNIFIL's problems were caused more by a lack of agreement among the parties on the basic objectives of UNIFIL's mission than in the problems of means and capabilities.

NOTES 1. Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from Sinai and Lebanon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, 1984), 11. 2. Indar J. Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984), 53. 3. Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 292, 301. 4. Peacekeepers' Handbook (New York: International Peace Academy, Pergamon Press, 1984), Chapter 4. 5. In a statement in the Security Council on 8 D e c e m b e r 1978, Ambassador Blum stated that "Israel also believes that UNIFIL is adequately equipped to fulfil its mandate" (SCOR 2106th meeting). 6. Ghassan Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres (Paris: Jean-Claude Lattes, 1985), 203.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Humanitarian Situation: Interim Tasks for the Interim Force Humanitarian assistance to the local population has been an important side task for UNIFIL since the initial deployment period. An emergency relief and reconstruction program for Southern Lebanon, coordinated by a special representative of the Secretary-General for humanitarian assistance, was in operation during the first mandate period. A humanitarian section was set up at the UNIFIL headquarters to provide liaison to all aspects of the United Nations assistance program and to assist the special representative. Similar liaison officers were assigned for such purposes at e a c h contingent ( D o c . S / 1 2 8 4 5 ) . UNIFIL contingents also initiated a variety of humanitarian programs for the local population within their respective sectors, including provision of medical supplies, housing, agricultural aid (such as the supply of fertilizers), and other activities. The humanitarian tasks became even more important in the period between the second Israeli invasion on 6 June 1982 and the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in February-June 1985, when UNIFIL could do very little to implement any of the three parts of the original mandate. In this situation, it became essential to give UNIFIL meaningful tasks, both to justify its continued presence and to keep up the morale of UNIFIL's troops. In a report to the Security Council on the situation of the UN Force following the first two weeks of the Israeli invasion, the SecretaryGeneral referred to the fundamentally altered situation for UNIFIL and the dangers inherent in it, but said that UNIFIL troops nevertheless continued to staff their positions. He went on to state: "They are also endeavouring, to the extent possible in the circumstances, to extend their protection and humanitarian assistance to the population of the area. These are obviously interim tasks, pending a decision by the 91

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Council on the status of UNIFIL" (Doc. S/15194/Add. 2 of 14 June 1982, para. 17). The Security Council met on 18 June 1982, and upon request of the Lebanese government and the recommendation of the SecretaryGeneral, passed an interim measure extending the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of two months. In the resolution renewing the mandate—resolution 511 ( 1 9 8 2 ) — t h e following paragraph was included: "[The Security Council] authorizes the Force during that period to carry out, in addition, the interim tasks referred to in paragraph 17 of the report of the Secretary-General on the Force" (operative paragraph 2). The next day, the Security Council adopted resolution 512 (1982) on the humanitarian situation in Southern Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli advances. This text focused on the role of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and nongovernmental organizations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross. It did not mention UNIFIL. A third resolution on the humanitarian situation—resolution 513 (1982)—adopted on 4 July focused on the situation for the civilian population in Southern Lebanon and in West Beirut without mentioning explicitly any UN organizations. The implementation of these resolutions was, as usual, left to the Secretary-General. The ensuing consultations and negotiations of the SecretaryGeneral and of UN representatives on how the UN system could help alleviate the suffering in Southern Lebanon during the summer of 1982 were extremely difficult and delicate. The Israelis deeply resented the coverage in the world media about the loss, destruction, and damage sustained by the civilian population in Southern Lebanon during the advances of the Israeli forces and claimed the reports were grossly exaggerated. They were no more enthusiastic about what they considered to be one-sided UN resolutions on these aspects and were generally not very cooperative with UN representatives and agencies. The Lebanese government, on its part, resented that more attention was given in the media and in the UN to the fate of Palestinian refugees than to the situation of Lebanese civilians. The Lebanese w e r e therefore less than k e e n on allowing UN a g e n c i e s or representatives to assume relief tasks to aid the Palestinians. The S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l sent a s p e c i a l representative, Swedish UN Ambassador Anders Thunborg, to Lebanon during the summer of 1982 to get an overall view of the humanitarian situation. Because of the sensitivities of the parties involved, this mission was surrounded by an unusual amount of secrecy, and the Thunborg report was never made public or even made available to other governments.

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In his report to the Council when the mandate of UNIFIL came up for renewal in August 1982, the Secretary-General reported that UNIFIL had not been allowed to provide any humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in the south outside its area of deployment. Until 16 June, UNIFIL humanitarian teams had been able to assist the population of Tyre through the distribution of food and water and the dispensing of medical aid, but these efforts had been halted by the Israeli authorities on 16 June. In the second half of June, UNIFIL had extended cooperation to the humanitarian efforts of various United Nations programs and to the International Committee of the Red Cross. UNIFIL had generally been deeply engaged in extending protection and humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in its area. In October 1982, when the mandate was up for renewal again, the situation had not improved. The Secretary-General reported to the Council that it had not been possible, owing to the attitude of the Israeli authorities, for UNIFIL to play a useful role in the humanitarian assistance field outside its area of deployment. In resolution 523, adopted on 28 October 1982, the Security Council in operative paragraph 3 addressed itself directly to this problem: "[The Security Council] authorizes the Force during that period to carry out, with the consent of the Government of Lebanon, interim tasks in the humanitarian and administrative fields, as indicated in resolution 511 (1982) and 519 (1982), and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the security of all the inhabitants of the area without any discrimination." The humanitarian tasks defined in this resolution thereby constituted a new part of the mandate of UNIFIL—as interim tasks for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon. In spite of the fact that this "humanitarian" paragraph disappeared from the mandate resolutions in January 1983, the tasks performed by UNIFIL in the humanitarian field became a main preoccupation of the Force in the 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 5 period, pending the advent o f new circumstances that would make a return to the tasks defined in the original mandate possible. A typical description of the work done by UNIFIL in this respect was given in the Secretary-General's report to the Council in April 1985: UNIFIL continued to co-operate with the Lebanese authorities as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in extending assistance to the local population. UNIFIL has reported that the e c o n o m y of the area has suffered severely, owing to the spreading violence as well as restrictions affecting the movement of people and goods. A significant number of Lebanese civilian patients were treated in UNIFIL medical centres. UNIFIL medical personnel at

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the hospital in Naqoura performed 197 surgical operations and treated 3,833 patients, including 287 in-patients (Doc. S/17093 of 11 April 1985).

The very presence of UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon contributed to the s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f the l o c a l e c o n o m y through the j o b s and p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r provided b y UNIFIL p e r s o n n e l . This was an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r t h r o u g h o u t UNIFIL's e x i s t e n c e , b u t p e r h a p s particularly so during the 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 5 o c c u p a t i o n period, w h e n Southern Lebanon was practically cut off from the rest of Lebanon by the Israelis. 1 UNIFIL's performance of these tasks had, of course, an intrinsic humanitarian value. But it also had important political effects in Southern Lebanon, transforming this area into a zone that—at least until the incidents and violence that preceded and followed the Israeli withdrawal in 1985—constituted a relatively peaceful corner of Lebanon. It should be stressed that such humanitarian assistance was extended not only to the local population but also to refugees from other parts of Lebanon. As a result of the fighting in the Beirut area during 1985, for example, a substantial number of Christian refugees sought safety in the UNIFIL area, where they received shelter, food, and other provisions before moving back north. The confidencebuilding value of these operations vis-à-vis the civilian population was an important asset for the eventual resumption of the tasks defined in the original mandate of UNIFIL. It must be stressed even in this context that there were important constitutional constraints on what UNIFIL could do even in the humanitarian field without assuming functions that were clearly internal affairs. UNIFIL officers were, for instance, sometimes asked to act as impartial judges in disputes among civilians or groups in the area. 2 Even if such requests showed a flattering trust in UNIFIL on the part of the civilian population, UNIFIL could not assume policing or judiciary functions necessary for the restoration of internal law and order in the area. Even here, UNIFIL could only assist the government of the host country in strengthening this authority. It could not replace it.

NOTES 1. Karin Storch, "Peacekeeping: The Role of UNIFIL 1978-84, 11 thesis (unpublished) at the American University of Beirut, February 19852. Martin Hjelmervik Ness, "FN i okkupert omride?—UNIFIL etter invasjonen i 1982", InternasjonalPolitikk, nr. 2/3, 1985, 183.

CHAPTER SIX

1982-1985: New Situations, New Proposals FACING AN INVASION T h e 1 9 8 2 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was not entirely u n e x p e c t e d by the UNIFIL c o m m a n d and the UN Secretariat. Already in 1981, the UNIFIL commander had consulted the Secretariat in New York on what UNIFIL was supposed to do in the case of a n e w major Israeli invasion. T h e instructions from N e w York w e r e b r i e f and left c o n s i d e r a b l e latitude to the judgment of the Force commander. 1 Any attempts to invade UNIFIL's area of deployment should b e opposed, but short of seriously jeopardizing the safety and security of the UN troops. In April 1982, which by many observers in the UN was thought to b e the most likely period for a new Israeli attack, the UNIFIL commander issued a n e w and more detailed set of instructions to the individual battalions. T h e s e would include the setting u p of physical barriers in front of the Israeli advances, but still no opening of fire with the intention to kill. During this period, Israeli intelligence officers w e r e m o r e than usually anxious to learn what UNIFIL would do in case of an invasion. There can b e little doubt that the Israelis s u c c e e d e d in their intelligence efforts and that they k n e w the standing orders of UNIFIL before the invasion. 2 This was unavoidable because of the express transparency o f UN p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s . O n e o f the c o n t r a s t s b e t w e e n traditional military tactics and p e a c e k e e p i n g t e c h n i q u e s is that UN p e a c e k e e p i n g is b a s e d o n t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f v i s i b i l i t y a n d predictability—of letting all parties k n o w what they could e x p e c t if a given course of action was chosen. The prelude to the 6 June invasion started in the Security Council on 4 June, when the representative of Lebanon asked for the Council's urgent consideration of the Israeli air attacks on Beirut and the shelling 95

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of targets in Lebanon north of the Nabatiya area the same day. Following the Lebanese request, the Security Council issued a presidential statement on 4 June in which "the President and the members of the Council make an urgent appeal to all the parties to adhere strictly to the cease-fire that had been in effect since 24 July 1981" (Doc. S/15163). In a meeting of the Council on 5 June, the Secretary-General reported that "in view of the continuing hostilities, the build-up of forces south of the border and the very real danger of further escalation, I and my colleagues have remained in close touch with the parties concerned, urging them to restore and maintain the cease-fire." The Secretary-General added that he had "asked all parties to adhere to my appeal by no later than 0600 hours local time tomorrow, Sunday 6 June 1982" (Doc. S/PV. 2374 of 5 June 1982). In the same meeting, the Security Council adopted by a unanimous vote resolution 508 (1982), which also called for an immediate and simultaneous cease-fire by that time. The Israeli government paid no heed to the appeals from New York. When the commander of UN1FIL, General Callaghan, was on his way to meet with the chief of the Israeli Northern Command in the Israeli town of Nazareth to discuss the implementation of resolution 508 (1982) and the Secretary-General's appeal, he was diverted to Zefad—the site of the Israeli War Command. In a meeting with Israeli Chief of Staff General Eitan, General Callaghan was informed that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon w o u l d b e g i n twenty-eight minutes afterward. From all available sources, it seems clear that the key persons in the Israeli government paid almost no attention to the call for a cease-fire by the Security Council or to other anticipated reactions from the United Nations before deciding to proceed. 3 W h e n the Security Council met again on 6 June, the Israeli invasion was an established fact. The Secretary-General gave the following oral report to the Council, basing it on information received from the commander of UNIFIL: As the Israeli forces moved into Southern Lebanon, the Commander of UNIFIL gave instructions for the standing operational procedures to be put into effect by all units. These include measures to block advancing forces, and also defence measures. The overwhelming strength and weight of the Israeli forces precluded the possibility of stopping them, and UNIFIL positions in the line of the invasion have thus been overrun or by-passed. UNIFIL is, of course, a peace-keeping force with a specific mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, which is based on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Security Council. The

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Force has neither the mandate nor the military capacity to counter an invasion such as is now taking place, which is estimated to comprise more than two mechanized divisions with full air and naval support

(Doc. S/PV. 2375). The Secretary-General also reported that one Norwegian UNIFIL soldier was killed by shrapnel fragments during the invasion. The next report of the Secretary-General to the Council was given during the next meeting of the Council, on 8 June. On this occasion, he stated that In the UNIFIL a r e a itself, d e s p i t e t h e difficult, d a n g e r o u s a n d provocative situation at present prevailing, UNIFIL troops and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observers have r e m a i n e d in all their positions. T h e y w e r e instructed to b l o c k advancing forces, take defence measures and stay in their positions until their safety was seriously imperilled. Contingents have acted accordingly despite the o v e r w h e l m i n g strength of the IDF movements. [Some examples o f such resistance were mentioned, including an incident in the Dutch sector, w h e r e Dutch soldiers planted obstacles before advancing Israeli tank columns, and a brave resistance at the Khardala bridge by a small Nepalese position which stood its ground for two days, despite harassment and threats.] T h r o u g h o u t t h e p r e s e n t hostilities, C e n e r a l Callaghan has repeatedly and most strenuously protested the violation of Lebanese territory by the IDF, and of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Since the start o f the operation, UNIFIL Headquarters at Naqoura has b e e n cut off from all UNIFIL battalions and supply routes have b e e n closed. Communications have b e c o m e difficult and the logistical situation is grave (Doc. S/PV. 2376).

During the first two weeks of the 1982 invasion, two meetings were also held in New York between the Secretariat and the troopcontributing nations. A common concern was for the safety of UNIFIL troops as Israeli forces rolled through their lines and as these advancing forces were subjected to artillery fire from retreating Syrian and Palestinian troops to the north. During these meetings, Brian Urquhart shared with the troop-contributors the information available in New York about the situation in the field, based on reports from UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel in the area. There was unanimous support among the representatives of troopcontributors in New York for the view that UNIFIL had neither a mandate nor a possibility of staging any kind of active resistance against the advancing Israeli troops. In fact, this opinion was so strong among the troop-contributors that it was held to be self-evident. The question of alternative methods to stop the Israelis was therefore not discussed at all.

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One fairly common first reaction among the troop-contributors in the first days following the Israeli invasion was that the position of UNTFIL, far behind the advancing Israeli troops, was now meaningless and that the Security Council should consider withdrawing the Force. At the same time, there was also a strong feeling of mutual solidarity among the troop-contributors. None of them liked the idea of withdrawing their contingents unilaterally in a crisis situation without a recommendation by the Secretary-General or a decision by the Security Council to that effect. The Secretariat was very much aware of these views, and the Secretary-General made a strong appeal to the troopcontributing nations not to take any unilateral steps in this situation. One argument raised in this respect was that a piecemeal disintegration of UNIFIL would seriously harm the United Nations and its possibility of playing a role in the new situation. Parallel to the consultations of the Security Council on a renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL before 19 June 1982, the troop-contributing nations continued to meet with the Secretariat to assess the situation. There was widespread frustration, anxiety, and uncertainty among the troop-contributors on how the situation following the Israeli invasion should be handled. Several were worried about the morale of their troops, who were reduced to spectators as the Israelis continued their operations. At the same time, there was broad support for the humanitarian mandate given to UNIFIL and subsequent exasperation at the Israelis when UNIFIL was not permitted to assume broader tasks in this field. Even though the troop-contributing nations accepted the idea of a short renewal of UNIFIL's mandate in June 1982, several of them listed conditions that should be met before further renewals were approved. Among these conditions was a declared willingness by Israel to withdraw its invasion forces, at least from the area they now occupied within UNIFIL's area of operations, but ultimately all the way to the Israeli-Lebanese border as envisaged in Security Council resolution 425 (1978). Another condition listed was that Israel should stop its efforts to block or hinder the humanitarian relief efforts that were under way, both in the UNIFIL area and in the other areas where UN relief organizations were active. Some of the troop-contributors also expressed the view that if UNIFIL should be maintained for a further period of time, then the Force must be given more meaningful tasks than was the case at present. The troop-contributors nevertheless let themselves be persuaded to accept a two-month extension of UNIFIL's mandate until 19 August 1982. The appeals from the Lebanese government and the strong recommendation from the Secretary-General were, in this case,

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i n s t r u m e n t a l in s w a y i n g t h e t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t o r s t o w a r d this compromise. Both in New York and through demarches in capitals, the U.S. government also strongly supported the view that UNIFIL should b e kept in the area. Even Israeli representatives signaled in private conversations that it would, at this point, be premature to withdraw UNIFIL. The situation of a UN force being faced with a major invasion from one country into a neighboring state could in itself be the subject of a separate study. In the circumstances, UNIFIL had little choice but to stand back. The UN Force had neither the size nor the heavy military equipment that would have been needed to stop the Israeli forces. Its deployment in the various battalion areas was geared to the purpose of observation and of being observed—and not on defense positions that could block full-scale military divisions. Not a single statement could be heard in the Security Council criticizing the order not to take active military measures against the Israelis as they pushed through UNIFIL lines. Even though not even the permanent members of the Council were consulted on the orders given to UNIFIL, there was a general agreement among the members of the Council that UNIFIL had no other choice. In subsequent debates and analyses of the events of June 1982, the question has nevertheless b e e n raised whether UNIFIL could have done more to stop the Israeli invasion. UNIFIL's role during the 6 June invasion is often used as a symbol by critics to illustrate the general lack of effectiveness of the UN Force. Arguments that UNIFIL should have taken more preventive steps are also often heard from officers and soldiers of UNIFIL who did not particularly appreciate being reduced to the role of spectators o f the advancing Israeli troops. 4 Among UNIFIL officers, several examples are mentioned of steps that could have been taken had the necessary orders been given from the Naqoura or New York headquarters. In the Norwegian sector, for example, the battalion command sought permission to blow up some strategic pieces of road, which would have delayed the Israelis at least for a few hours. O n e of the other small "might-have-beens" in this respect concerns the question of what would have happened if the French battalion, which had been deployed in the Tyre area only two days before the invasion, had been fully operational. Even though the French had a reputation of interpreting their mandate a bit more forcefully than the other battalions, it is not very probable that events would have developed much differently from the way they did. This discussion should therefore b e seen more as a debate on what a UN force could do to frustrate or delay invasions in or through its area of d e p l o y m e n t — f o r e x a m p l e , by mining roads and b l o w i n g u p

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bridges—than on the question of whether the UN Force could have actively resisted the invasion. On this basic question, there seems to be almost unanimous agreement that "the UNIFIL troops had no sane choice but to stand aside." 5

1 9 8 2 : THE BEIRUT OPTION

By 14 June 1982, the Israeli forces had pushed all the way up to the Beirut area and linked u p with Christian Lebanese forces in East Beirut. On 2 July, the Israelis established a military siege of Beinit in order to force out the PLO. This intensified the diplomatic efforts under way to avoid an all-out battle for Beirut and to find a solution to the crisis. During this process, the Security Council was to a large extent blocked by the veto cast by the United States on 8 June. Through this veto, the United States made it evident that it would not accept any decision by the Council that could be interpreted as sanctions against Israel for not having respected Security Council resolutions 508 and 509 (1982). U.S. diplomacy was instead focused on the mission of Philip Habib, w h o continued his shuttles between the parties in the area during the June-August period. The Lebanese government was also powerless—and therefore passive. Although the Lebanese Permanent Mission in New York continued to protest in vigorous terms the Israeli advances, it did not formally sponsor a proposal drafted by Brian Urquhart during the 12-13 J u n e w e e k e n d calling for the deployment of UN military observers in the Beirut area. 6 The possibility of a more direct U.S. involvement in the Beirut crisis was at that time being vented, and the Phalangists were not pressing particularly hard on their government for any new decisions in New York as long as the siege of PLO positions in West Beirut continued. Many of the initiatives, draft resolutions, and proposals on how the Security Council should react to the tragic events in Beirut during the summer of 1982 therefore were presented by delegations other than the Lebanese. During the days, weeks, and months that followed the Israeli invasion, the Security Council held a series of meetings to discuss various proposals to deal with the Lebanese crisis. UNIFIL's mandate was extended by two months as "an interim measure"—first on 18 June, then on 17 August. During these debates, several proposals were advanced that implied sending a United Nations or a multinational peacekeeping force to the area, including the possibility of redeploying some units from UNIFIL u p to Beirut and its vicinity. A second set of proposals and decisions concerned sending UN observers from UNTSO

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to the same area. In the Security Council, Brian Urquhart continued exploring the possibility of sending UN observers to the area. In his words, "Our observers could not have solved the problem, but they would have been there as an internationally accepted source of common sense, objective information, and decency which could have been built on in the future."7 A draft resolution prepared by the British delegation that would have demanded an immediate cease-fire and authorized the stationing of UN observers was not formally presented as a UN document because of a disagreement with the French delegation, which instead put forward its own draft resolution on 26 June. This came after a particularly heavy bombardment of West Beirut on 25 June by Israeli aircraft, naval vessels, and artillery from their positions just outside the city. The draft demanded that "all the parties observe an immediate cessation of hostilities throughout Lebanon" and demanded the "immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged around Beirut to a distance of 10 km from the periphery of that city as a first step towards a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon as well as the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut which shall retire to the existing camps" (Doc. S/15255/Rev. 2). In operative paragraph 6 of this proposal, the Secretary-General was requested "as an immediate measure, to station United Nations military observers, in agreement with the Government of Lebanon, with instructions to supervise the cease-fire and disengagement in and around Beirut." In operative paragraph 7 of the same resolution, the French went a step further and launched the idea of even sending peacekeeping troops to Beirut: "[The delegation] further requests the SecretaryGeneral to study any request by the Government of Lebanon for the installation of a United Nations force which could, within the framework of the implementation of the preceding paragraphs, take up positions beside the Lebanese interposition forces, or for the use of the forces available to the United Nations in the region." The French resolution obtained fourteen votes in favor during the vote in the Security Council, but it was nevertheless not adopted because of a veto cast by the U.S. delegation. By several indications, the members of the Council were close to an agreement on a text that would have won at least a U.S. abstention, but negotiations were broken off in favor of an early vote. In an explanation of the veto, the U.S. representative said that the United States supported the call for an immediate cease-fire, the call for a simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian forces from the area of Beirut, and the proposal that UN observers, upon the request of

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the government o f Lebanon, monitor the cease-fire. These principles where wholly consonant with the proposals of the Habib mission at that stage, which were to send the Lebanese army into West Beirut to a c c e p t the heavy arms of the Palestinians and to d e p l o y a UN p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e to g u a r a n t e e the s a f e e v a c u a t i o n o f the Palestinians. 8 Nevertheless, the failure of the resolution "to call for the e s s e n t i a l r e q u i s i t e for the r e s t o r a t i o n o f the a u t h o r i t y o f the Government of Lebanon, that is the elimination from Beirut and e l s e w h e r e o f the p r e s e n c e o f a r m e d Palestinian e l e m e n t s " was described as "a fatal flaw"—hence the negative vote (Doc. S/PV. 2381 of 26 June 1982). The U.S. veto must also be seen in the light of an expressed unwillingness on the part of the Israelis to have any kind of UN forces or observers deployed in the Beirut area at that time. Secretary of State Haig writes in his book that the United States "fended off attempts to relieve the PLO's dilemma, such as a French initiative in the UN Security Council," and he makes it clear that he agreed with the Israelis that only a strong military pressure on the PLO, without any UN-observer presence interposed between the PLO and the Israelis, would make the PLO withdraw its forces from Beirut. 9 T h e F r e n c h p r o p o s a l o n a larger u s e o f UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operations in Lebanon, including the possibility of redeployments of UNIFIL, was put forward a second time during the summer of 1982. On 2 July, the French and the Egyptian delegations circulated a joint working paper to the members of the Security Council containing some ambitious proposals both to tackle the immediate crisis in the Beirut area and to seek solutions to some of the political issues involved. 10 Following several revisions, the French-Egyptian proposals w e r e formally introduced through a draft resolution submitted by the two delegations on 2 July (Doc. S/15317). T h e draft is interesting also because it represents the most comprehensive proposal put before the Security Council for a solution to the Beirut crisis and the IsraeliLebanese conflict. Section A of the draft demanded a withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged around Beirut "to an agreed distance as a first step towards their complete withdrawal" and a simultaneous withdrawal from West Beirut of the Palestinian armed forces. Section B r e p e a t e d the proposal from the 26 J u n e draft—to station, as an immediate measure, UN military observers in order to supervise the cease-fire and disengagement in and around Beirut. T h e draft also requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the prospects for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (or the use of UN forces already deployed in the region) that could take up positions beside the Lebanese interposition forces. In section C of the FrenchEgyptian draft, some principles of a political solution to the crisis were

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stated. According to this proposal, Settlement of the Lebanese problem should contribute to the initiation of a durable restoration of peace and security in the region within the framework of negotiations based on the principles of security for all States and justice for all peoples, in order namely to: (a) Reaffirm the right of all States in the region to existence and security in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967); (b) Reaffirm the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination with all its implications, on the understanding that to this end the Palestinian people shall be represented in the negotiations and consequently, the Palestine Liberation Organization shall be associated therein; (c) Call for the mutual and simultaneous recognition of the parties concerned. . . .

The draft finally requested the Secretary-General to consult with all the parties concerned and to make proposals to the Security Council designed to achieve by political means the objectives mentioned. Although the basic thinking behind the French-Egyptian proposals was laudable enough, it was completely detached from military and political realities on the ground. It had no connection to the Habib mission, which at the time was the focus of interest for the Lebanese, the Israelis, and the PLO. To say the least, the political atmosphere surrounding the Beirut crisis was not very propitious for political compromises along the lines proposed. The Israelis, who were bent on driving the PLO leadership out of Beirut and Lebanon, were in no mood to grant the PLO a role in the negotiations—a concession that Israel has never been willing to make on other Middle East problems. Neither was it realistic to expect a PLO leadership under such circumstances to be able to take the final step toward recognizing resolution 242 (1967) and Israel's right to exist, which the PLO has been unable or unwilling to do since 1967. Nevertheless, some media attention at the time was given to signals from the PLO leadership to a delegation of U.S. congressmen that the PLO was prepared to accept previous Security Council resolutions on the Middle East. 11 The Lebanese ambassador, while supporting the French-Egyptian initiative, stressed that peace in Lebanon "should not, and indeed, cannot wait for the comprehensive settlement of the Middle East crisis" and that peace in Lebanon should be the beginning and not the end of peace in the Middle East (Doc. S/PV. 2385 of 29 July 1985). In his book, Ambassador Tueni has written that the Lebanese had to ask Washington and Paris to harmonize their actions so that Lebanon would not have to choose between the French initiative and the Habib

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mission. 12 The French-Egyptian initiative was never put to a vote in the Council. In a second meeting on 29 July, the Council members were instead invited to vote on a different text, one proposed by the representative of Spain, with a much more modest and immediate scope. This draft resolution demanded, that "the Government of Israel lift immediately the blockade of the city of Beirut in order to permit the dispatch of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid provided by United Nations agencies and by nongovernmental organizations." The draft was adopted by fourteen votes in favor as resolution 515 (1982). The U.S. delegation did not participate in the vote after having lost a procedural vote on the question of allowing delegations a two-hour pause to consult with their governments. Normally such requests are granted by the other members of the Council without any major discussion: The fact that the U.S. delegation lost a procedural vote on a perfectly normal and reasonable request must be seen more as a result of accumulated frustrations among Council members, including Western allies, over U.S. support of Israeli positions during the Beirut crisis than because of any faults with the proposal itself. It was not until the new escalation in fighting around Beirut in the beginning of August that the members of the Security Council managed to reach agreement on sending UN observers to Beirut. A new ceasefire broke down on 1 August. The Security Council met the same day to discuss the situation and to adopt resolution 516 by a unanimous vote. This resolution again demanded an immediate ceasefire and, in operative paragraph 2, authorized the Secretary-General "to deploy immediately, on the request of the Government of Lebanon, United Nations Observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut." The formal request from the Lebanese government to station UN observers in the Beirut area to ensure that the cease-fire was fully observed by all parties concerned was confirmed in a new report from the SecretaryGeneral the same day (Doc. S/15333). At that time, the proposal could be only partially implemented. The Israeli armed forces started their assault on West Beirut on 3 August, and the Israelis delayed for several days the necessary cabinet decision on the question of sending UN observers to Beirut. On 5 and 6 August, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that he had been informed by Israel that its government considered that "United Nations observers could in no feasible and practical way monitor the activities of the terrorist organizations in Beirut and its environs" (Doc. S/15345). The Israelis also blocked the movement of the designated UNTSO observers to Beirut. Two reasons have been offered to explain

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this negative attitude. First, the Israelis disliked the l a n g u a g e of resolution 516 (1982) as much as they resented other Security Council resolutions criticizing Israel during the summer of 1982. Second, they did not trust that the UN observers could effectively ensure the w i t h d r a w a l o f PLO f o r c e s f r o m B e i r u t . 1 3 Following intense consultations, a presidential statement, and a n e w resolution (resolution 517 [1982]), the Secretary-General finally obtained the permission of the Israelis to send ten UN observers from UNTSO to the Beirut area. These observers were constituted as the Observer Group Beirut ( O G B ) under UNTSO. In Beirut, Philip Habib finally succeeded in assembling a plan that would ensure the evacuation of the PLO leadership and forces from Beirut. On 20 August, the president of the United States informed the Secretary-General that the United Slates had agreed, in response to a request from the Lebanese government for the participation of U.S. military personnel in a multinational force in Beirut, to deploy a force of about 8 0 0 to Beirut for a period not e x c e e d i n g 30 days (Doc. S/15371). By 26 August, this Multinational Force, which also counted contingents from France and Italy, numbered 2,285 troops. The French contingent was largely identical to the unit put at the disposal of UNIFIL at the beginning of June 1982. When the evacuation of the PLO armed forces was completed in mid-September, the Multinational Force was withdrawn. On 14 September 1982, the new president-elect of Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated by a b o m b that destroyed the building where he was holding a meeting with his Phalangist followers. The day after, Israeli troops moved into West Beirut, officially to maintain law and order. According to Schiff and Ya'ari, the assassination occurred two days after a meeting between the president-elect and the Israeli Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon, which centered on two subjects—the " p u r g e o f W e s t B e i r u t " a n d o f f i c i a l n e g o t i a t i o n s with I s r a e l . Understanding was said to have been achieved on both subjects, but a g r e e m e n t on the first w a s in stark violation o f the e v a c u a t i o n arrangement negotiated by Habib, which guaranteed protection to the "law-abiding noncombatant" Palestinian population of Beirut. 14 T h e Security Council met again on 16 S e p t e m b e r following a request from the representative of Lebanon, who wanted an urgent meeting to consider the situation in the country after the latest Israeli incursion into Beirut. A new resolution ( 5 2 0 [1982]) was adopted, which condemned both the murder of Bashir Gemayel and "the recent Israeli incursions into Beirut in violation of the cease-fire agreements and of Security Council resolutions." This time, the United States joined the unanimous vote of the Council, and resolution 520 (1982) became

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the only example of the United States voting for a resolution that explicitly condemned the Israelis for their policies in Lebanon. The news reports of the ensuing massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps reached New York on Saturday, 18 September 1983. The request for a meeting of the Security Council this time came from Jordan, not from Lebanon, which was more than a little embarrassed by the O G B ' s identification of Lebanese Kataeb (Phalangist) elements as the most likely perpetrators of the massacre. After an all-night meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution 521 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , w h i c h c o n d e m n e d the criminal m a s s a c r e and a s k e d the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l "to initiate a p p r o p r i a t e c o n s u l t a t i o n s and, in particular, c o n s u l t a t i o n s with the G o v e r n m e n t o f L e b a n o n , o n additional steps which the Security Council might take, including the p o s s i b l e d e p l o y m e n t o f U n i t e d N a t i o n s F o r c e s , to assist that Government in ensuring full protection for the civilian population in and around Beirut." T h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l r e p o r t e d b a c k to the C o u n c i l o n 20 September that he had consulted the commander of UNIFIL on the possibility of sending UNIFIL units to the area of Beirut. According to this report, it would b e possible to send to Beirut about 2,000 troops "without seriously affecting the capacity of UNIFIL to perform its own interim tasks in Southern Lebanon" (Doc. S/15408 of 20 September). The Lebanese government, however, never sent in a formal request for a UN peacekeeping force in Beirut. In the same report, the SecretaryGeneral informed the m e m b e r s of the Council that the L e b a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t had formally requested the reconstitution of the Multinational Force. On the same day, the United States, France, and Italy decided to send the Multinational Force back to Beirut. A British contingent joined the MNF in December 1982, and the MNF was to stay in Beirut until February-March of 1984. Resolution 521 (1982) also addressed the question of increasing the size of the OGB. The resolution authorized the Secretary-General to increase the number of United Nations observers in Lebanon from ten to fifty. This time, the Israeli government—chastised by the domestic and international uproar over the Sabra and Chatila massacres—quickly concurred. The additional forty UN observers were deployed in Beirut within two days. In retrospect, an interesting question remains in connection with the events in the Beirut area during the period June-September 1982: how close were the parties to an agreement on a UN peacekeeping force in Beirut at the time? A decision to send UN observers seems certainly to have been within reach in mid-June, given a minimum of interest and leadership from the permanent members. The vote of 26

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J u n e on the F r e n c h p r o p o s a l indicates that all C o u n c i l m e m b e r s , including the United States, also could support a proposal to send UN peacekeepers to Beirut, at least in principle. A statement b y President Brezhnev o f the Soviet Union on 2 0 July confirmed that the Soviet Union would support the use of a UN p e a c e k e e p i n g force in Beirut but not the injection of U.S. forces into the area. 1 5 O n the other hand, it is equally clear that a UN p e a c e k e e p i n g force in Beirut during the summer o f 1982 would not have enjoyed the full support o f the parties concerned. T h e Israelis w e r e firmly against it, and the L e b a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t clearly preferred a U.S. p r e s e n c e in Beirut over a UN Force. Nevertheless, the Lebanese in all probability would have accepted a UN presence if the attempts to create the MNF had failed. Even the PLO s e e m s to have preferred that the task o f securing a safe evacuation from Beirut was guaranteed by the United States rather than by UN observers. 1 6 It is thus clear that a UN force in Beirut would have had an extremely difficult task, even though it is safe to a s s u m e — g i v e n the b a s i c rules for the use o f force for UN troops ( s e e Chapter 4 ) — t h a t a UN force w o u l d not h a v e b e c o m e directly involved in the actual fighting in the same manner as the MNF did.

1 9 8 3 : THE SHOUF AND BEKA'A OPTIONS T h e period b e t w e e n September 1982 and May 1983 was marked b y r e n e w e d e f f o r t s b y U.S. d i p l o m a t s to n e g o t i a t e or p r o m o t e an agreement b e t w e e n the Lebanese and Israeli governments on the terms of the Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since the 1982 invasion. After several shuttle trips to the area by U.S. Ambassadors Philip Habib and Morris Draper, as well as the personal involvement of Secretary of State George Shultz, such an agreement was signed on 17 May 1983. 1 7 This period also represented the high point o f U.S. influence on the Lebanese government and, correspondingly, the low-water mark of Syrian influence. President Amine Gemayel seems by o n e account to h a v e put almost e x c l u s i v e r e l i a n c e o n "the A m e r i c a n o p t i o n " — a s o p p o s e d to the Israeli and Syrian o n e — a n d of having "thrown" (the Lebanese government and the army) into the lap of the United States. 1 8 A basic objective o f the diplomatic efforts during this period was to use the planned Israeli withdrawal to effect a prior or parallel withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces from Lebanon. In this situation, the Lebanese government again asked for a n e w role for UNIFIL. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 12 January

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1983, the Lebanese requested a renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL for another interim period of six months. This was characterized as a practical consideration that "will have a stabilizing effect in the region" (Doc. S/15557 of 13 January 1983). The new plans contained in this letter concerned the area of deployment of UNIFIL and were the most ambitious that had been proposed for UNIFIL. Not only was it asked to cover the entire country, it was also suggested—albeit indirectly—that UNIFIL should survey the withdrawal of PLO and Syrian troops in addition to its original mandate in relation to the withdrawal of Israeli troops. After first asking for a six-month extension of the mandate, the Lebanese representative stated the following position: 2. My G o v e r n m e n t f e e l s that b e c a u s e o f t h e c h a n g i n g circumstances, the UNIFIL area of operations should be extended to c o v e r t h e w h o l e c o u n t r y for t h e p u r p o s e o f c o n f i r m i n g t h e withdrawal of all n o n - L e b a n e s e forces and armed e l e m e n t s from Lebanon, restoring international peace and security and assisting the G o v e r n m e n t of L e b a n o n in e n s u r i n g the return of its e f f e c t i v e authority. 3. T h e G o v e r n m e n t of Lebanon w i s h e s that s u c h e x p a n d e d deployment be carried out as s o o n as all non-Lebanese forces and armed elements withdraw from the country. 4. My Government d o e s not wish, neither d o e s it envisage, any involvement by UNIFIL in any clash of conflict b e t w e e n Lebanese factions or groups. It is the view of my Government that dealing with such incidents is the sole responsibility of Lebanon's security forces. 5. My Government s e e k s a UNIFIL role which w o u l d support the Lebanese army and provide it with the required assistance to restore the e f f e c t i v e authority of t h e L e b a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t t h r o u g h o u t Lebanon. 6. Lebanon is not a s k i n g at present for any increase in the number of UNIFIL troops.

In N e w York, s u c h p r o p o s a l s w e r e met w i t h g r e a t skepticism—almost disbelief. In his observations to the Security Council in January 1983, in which he supported the Lebanese request for a six-month renewal of the mandate, the Secretary-General stressed that "the details of any new tasks for UNIFIL would, of course, need to be carefully considered in advance. It is evident, however, that only when the current negotiations are completed will it be possible to d e f i n e in detail the f u t u r e role of UNIFIL as e n v i s a g e d by the Government of Lebanon" (Doc. S/15557). The autumn of 1982 also marked a change in the formal Israeli position on the future of UNIFIL. The Secretary-General reported in October 1982, when a new extension of the mandate was discussed by the Council, that the attitude of the Israeli government as expressed to

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him had not been in favor of the continued activity of UNIFIL. 19 In his January 1983 report, the Secretary-General stated that "the Government of Israel has expressed the view that UNIFIL should not at the present time b e extended for more than two or three months" (Doc. S/15557). In the Security Council debate, the Israeli position was made even clearer in the statement of Ambassador Blum, which confirmed that "over the past months the Government of Israel has repeatedly stated that, in the new circumstances surrounding the situation in Lebanon, UNIFIL, as established in 1978, has outlived its usefulness and its presence is no longer called for in Southern Lebanon" (Doc. S/PV. 2411 of 18 January 1983). The United States during this period stressed in Security Council consultations and debates that UNIFIL should be maintained in the area while negotiations were continuing on the terms of the Israeli withdrawal. In the Security Council debate in January 1983, the U.S. representative, Ambassador Lichenstein, stated that the United States "joined enthusiastically" in the vote renewing UNIFIL's mandate, and that this renewal "can b e a positive e l e m e n t in the negotiations between the Government of Lebanon and other parties in the Middle East. . . . It is not yet possible to define with precision the nature of the role UNIFIL may b e called upon to play in the arrangements under negotiation. However, by acting to extend UNIFIL's mandate for six months, the Security Council has wisely ensured that UNIFIL will be available to assist in the peace process" (Doc. S/PV. 2411 of 18 January 1983). The U.S. view was expressed in talks with some of the troopcontributing nations, who were indicating continuous frustration and impatience over UNIFIL's situation. T h e 17 May a g r e e m e n t a s s i g n e d only a very m i n o r role to UNIFIL—that of protecting Palestinian refugee camps in the Sidon area. Article 7 of the agreement stated that "nothing will preclude the deployment on Lebanese territory of international forces requested and accepted by the Government of Lebanon to assist in maintaining its authority. New contributors to such forces shall b e selected from among the states having diplomatic relations with both parties to the present agreement." T h e implications of this paragraph for UNIFIL were not further defined. When the mandate of UNIFIL came up for renewal in July 1983, the political foundations of the 17 May agreement had already started to unravel. The situation was therefore still very uncertain both as to UNIFIL's future and as to the Israeli withdrawal. T h e L e b a n e s e government this time asked for a three-month renewal. The SecretaryGeneral again supported the request from the Lebanese and stated that "a withdrawal of UNIFIL from its area of operation before the Lebanese

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Government is in a position to assume effective control o f the area w i t h its n a t i o n a l a r m y a n d i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y f o r c e s w o u l d u n q u e s t i o n a b l y b e a s e r i o u s b l o w to the p r o s p e c t s o f an e a r l y restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon as well as to the welfare of the inhabitants o f the UNIFIL area of deployment" (Doc. S / 1 5 8 6 3 of 12 July 1983). The Security Council agreed and e x t e n d e d the mandate of UNIFIL until 19 O c t o b e r 1983 through resolution 537 (1983). O n 4 S e p t e m b e r 1983, the Israelis unilaterally w i t h d r e w their troops from the Beirut area and regrouped in a new line at the Awali River, forty kilometers north of the Israeli-Lebanese border. H e a v y fighting erupted almost immediately in the vacated areas, most heavily in the S h o u f and Aley regions. It s o o n b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that the Lebanese government, which had counted on the direct negotiations with Israel, was in no position to control this n e w outbreak of the civil war. T h e Phalangists lost considerable ground in the fighting, while forces supported b y Syria strengthened their position. T h e events of S e p t e m b e r 1983 thus marked a major c h a n g e in the game b e t w e e n Israel and Syria over influence on events in Lebanon. T h e L e b a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t asked for an urgent m e e t i n g o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l o n 9 S e p t e m b e r . A m e e t i n g w a s h e l d o n 12 S e p t e m b e r , but only the L e b a n e s e s p o k e . O n 19 S e p t e m b e r , the Lebanese delegation submitted a draft resolution to the Council that contained n e w proposals for UN peacekeeping forces or observers in Lebanon. T h e proposals this time explicitly asked for UN assistance also on internal matters, such as the maintenance o f public order. T h e relevant paragraphs in the draft resolution, which also called for an i m m e d i a t e c e a s e - f i r e a n d a p r o m p t c e s s a t i o n o f all h o s t i l i t i e s throughout Lebanon, had the following wording: [The Security Council] 3. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy immediately and in consultation with the Government of Lebanon an adequate number of United Nations observers to monitor the situation in the areas of hostilities and requests all parties to co-operate fully with the United Nations observers in the implementation of their mandate; 6. Requests the Secretary-General, as a matter of urgency, to initiate appropriate consultations, and in particular with the Government of Lebanon, on additional steps, including the possible deployment of United Nations forces, to assist that Government in its efforts to ensure peace and public order and secure the full protection of the civilian population in all areas of hostilities (Doc. S/15990 of 19 September 1983). Although it was not specified in the text, it was the understanding

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of the Lebanese that the UN observers or forces would be deployed in the area vacated by the Israelis—that is, primarily in the Shouf region. Parallel to these efforts, the Secretary-General sought to expand the activities of the Observer Group Beirut so as to provide a restraining element in the evacuated areas. 20 The Lebanese draft was never put to a vote in the Council, however. During consultations with the permanent members of the Council, the Soviet Union made it clear that it would not accept the proposal to establish a UN presence in the area under the existing circumstances because the conflict at this stage was internal, not international. Syria opposed the proposal on the same grounds and also because it did not want a UN presence that would freeze the situation. 2 1 In face of this opposition, the Lebanese delegation dropped the matter without pressing it to a vote at this stage. The Israelis, on their side, had some other ideas for UNIFIL. In consultations with the UN Secretariat, members of the Security Council, and the troop-contributing countries in the period after it became clear that the 17 May agreement would not be implemented, the Israelis raised the idea of moving UNIFIL up to the Beka'a Valley. The idea was to redeploy the Force in such a way that it would constitute a buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Beka'a. They likewise repeated the idea for UNIFIL redeployment inherent in the 17 May agreement—a UNIFIL role in the area south of the Awali River—an idea that remained an Israeli policy objective also in the Naqoura talks in December 1984-January 1985 and after. In the Security Council, the Israeli position was expressed most clearly in a statement in April 1984: It is Israel's position that the security of south Lebanon should eventually be guaranteed by Lebanese forces. At the same time, Israel believes that UNIFIL could perform a useful role by serving as a buffer separating the Israeli Defence Forces and the Syrian forces currently in Lebanon. Likewise, in the view of the Government of Israel, UNIFIL could fulfil a useful function north of the area of deployment of the Israeli Defence Forces, where it could serve as a genuine peace-keeping force. With regard to the possibility of UNIFIL's deployment there, including the Sidon area, the Government of Israel would be prepared to consider and discuss this matter in due course (Doc. S/PV. 2530 of 19 April 1984).

The Lebanese government soon made it clear, however, that it would not accept the suggested UNIFIL deployment in the Beka'a. The reason given was that Lebanon could not accept the United Nations Force acting as a buffer between two foreign armies on Lebanese territory, as this would risk freezing a situation that was wholly

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unacceptable to the Lebanese government. Although Syria initially did not reject these ideas out of hand, the Lebanese position was adamant on this point. It was therefore evident that the Israeli suggestions would not receive enough support in the Council and that the Soviet Union would very likely veto them. The suggestion to redeploy UNIFIL to the Beka'a was therefore never formally presented to the Security Council. O n e more important development from this period should be mentioned, even though it took place in Northern Lebanon and not in the UNIFIL area. In November 1983, a faction of the PLO opposed to Chairman Arafat started an armed rebellion against the pro-Arafat forces in the Tripoli area. Heavy fighting, which also affected Lebanese civilians, ensued and continued for several weeks. The rebels were strongly supported by Syria, which was thought by many to have instigated the rebellion. The developments in Tripoli were discussed in a meeting of the Security Council on 11 November. A presidential statement was issued, appealing "to all parties concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and seek freely to attain, and to respect, an immediate cessation of hostilities." The role of the UNRWA and the International Committee of the Red Cross in providing emergency humanitarian assistance was also mentioned (Doc. S/16142 of 11 November 1983). Following a request from the French delegation, the Security Council met again on 23 November 1983. This time, the Council adopted by a unanimous vote resolution 542 (1983), which repeated the call for a cease-fire. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to follow the situation in Northern Lebanon, to consult with the Lebanese government, and to report back to the Council. To avoid bringing the Syrian-PLO dispute into the open on the floor of the Security Council, no debate was held in connection with the adoption of this resolution. The involvement of the Secretary-General and the Security Council in the events in Northern Lebanon in the last days of November and early December 1983 centered on the question of securing the safe evacuation of the pro-Arafat forces from the Tripoli area—not only because of humanitarian concerns but also to avoid further destruction in Tripoli. A UN umbrella was considered necessary, however, to minimize the risk of Israeli attacks on the ships during the evacuation process. During the preceding negotiations, Saudi Arabia put heavy pressure on Syria to allow such an evacuation and finally managed to get the consent of the Arab parties involved. On 3 December, the Secretary-General informed Council members in a carefully negotiated statement that he had decided "to authorize the flying of the United Nations flag alongside the national flag of the ship concerned, on the

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ships which would evacuate the armed elements of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Tripoli (Lebanon)." T h e idea of Chairman Arafat sailing away to safety under the UN flag was not e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y s u p p o r t e d b y e v e r y o n e , and t h e Israelis w e r e predictably strongly against it. The United States set three conditions for its acceptance of a Security Council authorization of the UN flag: the evacuations should b e for explicitly humanitarian purposes, the heavy arms of the PLO armed elements should b e left behind, and the authority of the Lebanese government should b e respected. As a result of bilateral and informal consultations conducted during the previous days, the president of the Security Council, Ambassador Max van der Stoel of the Netherlands, the s a m e day (3 D e c e m b e r ) issued a statement confirming that the Secretary-General's position "has the support of the members of the Security Council" (Doc. S/16194 and D o c . S / l 6 l 9 5 ) . It s h o u l d b e n o t e d that the a c h i e v e m e n t o f this c o n s e n s u s a m o n g C o u n c i l m e m b e r s r e q u i r e d s o m e very c l e v e r diplomatic footwork by the Dutch delegation during this period. T h i s e v a c u a t i o n t h e r e b y e n d e d the p r e s e n c e o f the PLO's leadership, its headquarters, and most of its military units in Lebanon, although the bulk of the Palestinian refugees and civilian population in the country remained behind. One of the participants in the Security Council consultations on Lebanon during the 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4 period has characterized the agreement reached on the Tripoli evacuation—which was very low-key compared with the Habib negotiations on the Beirut evacuation in 1982—as one of the few modest contributions of the Security Council to a solution o f the crisis in Lebanon during the 1982-1984 period. 22

1984: THE QUESTION OF REPLACING THE MNF The problems encountered by the Multinational Force in Beirut and the causes for its eventual withdrawal are not the subject of the present study. 23 In the present context, it is enough to mention the general breakdown of law, order, and cease-fires in the Beirut area following the September 1983 Israeli withdrawal from the area. Two car bombs against the U.S. and French contingents of the MNF in Beirut on 23 October 1983 took the lives of 241 U.S. and 58 French soldiers. T h e attack had a strong psychological and political impact. At the UN headquarters, the developments in the Beirut area were seen with increasing concern. The question of what the UN could or should do continued to be the subject of very informal discussions among UN officials, Lebanon, the United States, France, and others. 24

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In December, Brian Urquhart wrote a column in the New York Times in which he expressed his doubt about the workability and the future of the MNF and his hope "that eventually the UN peacekeeping capacity may again be of value in pacifying this uniquely difficult and violent problem." 25 In a press conference on 21 December, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar also stated that he thought a UN force would be more effective in preserving order in the Beirut area. Urquhart went to Washington in early January 1984 to discuss with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz the idea of using UN peacekeepers to facilitate a ceasefire, Lebanese national reconciliation, and the withdrawal of foreign troops, but he met with no success. 26 In a letter dated 14 February 1984, the representative of France asked for an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in the Beirut area. The French had consistently stated, both in connection with the constitution of the Multinational Force and on later occasions, that they would have much preferred a UN over a non-UN force in Beirut. Because of the serious situation in the area, the French stated: "A United Nations force is needed, and the most suitable way to provide it is undoubtedly to send certain detachments from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to Beirut" (Doc. S/PV. 2514 of 15 February 1984). They added: "If the United Nations asked us, we should not object to French elements of UNIFIL being among those detachments." During the second half of February 1984, the Security Council held several meetings to discuss the French proposal to send a UN force to Beirut to replace the MNF. The French delegation submitted a draft resolution in the Council on 23 February. Following intense consultations with other members of the Security Council, revised versions were submitted on 27 and 28 February. At the outset, there was great skepticism about the French idea both among m e m b e r s of the Council and among the troopcontributors to UNIFIL. A formal argument against it was that the situation in the Beirut area in 1984 (after the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the area) was an internal civil war rather than an international conflict and that the use of UN troops should primarily be considered only in international conflict situations. For the troopcontributors, the concern for the safety and security of their troops was extremely important, given the highly volatile situation in Beirut, the absence of any agreements of cooperation among the UN forces and the different groups involved in the civil war, and the general lack of discipline necessary to ensure that cease-fires and agreements would be respected. The hesitance evident in a Dutch statement to the Security Council on 16 February that "the e x p e r i e n c e of the

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multinational forces also serves as an e x a m p l e that w e should not embark too hastily on a United Nations peacekeeping mission in that area" ( D o c . S/PV. 2 5 1 5 ) was shared by m a n y other UNIFIL troopcontributors. O n the other hand, there was a general c o n c e r n in all quarters for the humanitarian situation of the civilian population in Beirut. T h e final version of the French resolution, which was put to a vote on 29 February 1984, included the following paragraphs on the use of UN observers and forces in Beirut: [The Security Council] 2. Requests the Secretary-General to make without delay all arrangements to enable the Observer Group Beirut to monitor compliance with the cease-fire in the Beirut area; 3. Decides, in agreement with the Government of Lebanon, to constitute immediately, under the authority of the Council, a United Nations Force composed of personnel furnished by Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council and selected, if appropriate, from contingents of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. The said Force will take up position in the Beirut area, in co-ordination with the Lebanese authorities concerned, as soon as all elements of the Multinational Force have withdrawn from Lebanese territory and territorial waters. The United Nations Force will have the mission of monitoring compliance with the ceasefire and helping to protect the civilian populations, including in the Palestinian refugee camps, and, without intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon for the benefit of any party whatever, will thereby assist in re-establishing the peace necessary for the restoration of the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon (Doc. S/16357/Rev. 2 of 28 February 1984). T h e French draft resolution obtained thirteen positive votes while two m e m b e r s — t h e Soviet Union and Ukraine—voted against it. Even if the draft w a s n o t a d o p t e d b e c a u s e o f t h e S o v i e t v e t o , this w a s a r e m a r k a b l y g o o d vote for the F r e n c h in v i e w o f the reservoir o f skepticism in New York at the prospect of involving UN troops in the q u a g m i r e o f Beirut. Up to the last day o f consultations, there w a s uncertainty about the final Soviet position on the text. In advance, the French thought the Soviets supported in principle the basic idea o f deploying UN troops in Beirut. 2 7 In New York, the consultations with the Soviet delegation proved difficult and time-consuming, however. T h e final consultations focused not only on the wording regarding the s e n d i n g o f UN troops to Beirut, but also on the formulations that w o u l d guarantee that the Multinational F o r c e — i n particular the U.S. contingent and the U.S. warships outside Lebanese waters—would not return to Beirut.

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The Soviet position on the French text was set forth in the Security Council on 29 February. In his statement, Soviet A m b a s s a d o r Troyanovsky reminded the Council that the Soviet Union, both in July 1982 and after the Sabra and Chatila massacres in September of the same year, had b e e n in favor of considering the use of UNIFIL contingents in the region of the Lebanese capital. According to the Soviet representative, the present French draft contained "unacceptable or ambiguous wording—for example, that relating to the mandate of the United Nations forces in Beirut" (Doc. S/PV. 2519). He also said that "during the course of the work of the draft resolution it became quite clear that some members of the Security Council did not wish to assume the responsibility not to resume interference in Lebanon." He stressed that the Soviet Union had favored continuing consultations on t h e s e p r o b l e m s and r e g r e t t e d that the French draft h a d b e e n introduced in the Council without any further considerations of the Soviet position in order to force a vote. The Soviet statement caused some speculation in the Security Council that an agreement to establish a UN force in Beirut would have been within reach had the French not pressed their resolution to the vote before the possibilities of consultations with the Soviet delegation were exhausted. The strong suspicion that the French initiative was motivated as much by the search for an alibi to withdraw the French contingent from the MNF—which in late February 1984 was the only contingent remaining—added fuel to such speculation. One of the problems in the text—the assurances of the withdrawal of the MNF from Lebanese territory and territorial waters—seemed eminently solvable; the United States had already decided to withdraw its contingent and the Sixth Fleet from Lebanese territory and waters. The French nevertheless maintained that they had to act when they did because of the need to maintain the thirteen votes that they had in their pocket. According to the French delegation, the Soviet Union was only playing for time in the hope of getting the nonaligned nations to block the French draft. General Rikhye, in his book, quotes a senior Soviet diplomat in New York as saying during the autumn of 1983 that "we are not going to agree to pull the American chestnuts out of the fire"—a version that would support the final French reading of Soviet intentions. 28 Another argument to support this point of view was that the Soviet Union in this situation also acted on behalf of Syrian interests and Syria did not want a UN presence in Beirut in February 1984 because things were going its way anyhow. An opposite school of thought pointed to Syrian signals that the Syrians were not against the basic idea of a UN force in Beirut at the time, provided that the mandate was limited in time and to the task of observing the cease-fire.

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The Syrians also signaled that they wanted a more detailed agreement on the deployment area of the proposed force and supported the Soviet demands for a better guarantee that the MNF would not return. 29 The position of Lebanon and the United States in relation to the F r e n c h p r o p o s a l s h o u l d also b e registered. T h e U.S. delegation obviously resented the idea of having to give guarantees to the Security Council, and by implication also to the Soviet Union, that U.S. soldiers or ships in a given situation would not b e allowed back to Lebanon. In statements to the Council before and after the vote, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick characterized the draft resolution as "very imperfect, in many ways an unsatisfactory draft resolution." She stated that if the UN were to b e permitted to undertake an enhanced peacekeeping role today in Lebanon, the United States would have had "further and more detailed commentary about the precise terms of the draft resolution." O n the i d e a o f s e n d i n g a UN p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e to B e i r u t , Ambassador Kirkpatrick spoke in positive, although general terms. She stated that "the establishment of a peace-keeping force of the sort foreseen in it would, if it were to be constituted, stand in a long and distinguished record of United Nations peace-keeping efforts"—and added that it was "particularly unfortunate that no new peace-keeping effort is to b e permitted this body today" (Doc. S/PV. 2 5 1 9 of 29 February 1984). The Lebanese position on the French proposal was initially rather reserved. Even if the proposal to send a UN force to Beirut was said to b e "positive," Lebanese Ambassador Fakhoury characterized it as "partial and limited" for the following reasons: First, the creation of favourable political conditions to ensure stability is the basis for the consolidation of security. Secondly, large parts of Lebanon continue to languish under the y o k e of occupation. Thirdly, any international force which may be dispatched to Lebanon must have the m e a n s and effectiveness fully t o undertake its task in all L e b a n e s e regions. Fourthly, this effectiveness alone is c a p a b l e o f enabling the United Nations forces successfully to undertake their tasks, particularly in h e l p i n g a c h i e v e s e c u r i t y a n d stability a n d participating in efforts to bring about Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese territory inside its internationally recognized borders (Doc. S/PV. 2 5 1 6 of 23 February 1984).

After the vote of the Security Council on 29 February and the Soviet veto, the Lebanese ambassador nevertheless expressed disappointment and regret. He stated that even if a positive decision would have been partial and limited, it could have played a part in putting an end to a situation that all the Council members had recognized as being very s e r i o u s , i n d e e d tragic. He a p p e a l e d to the Security C o u n c i l to

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"reconsider the positions taken today" and "to give consideration and respond positively to any n e w initiative which is in keeping with the s e r i o u s n e s s of the situation throughout L e b a n o n and by m e a n s o f w h i c h the Council w o u l d b e able to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it under the UN Charter" (Doc. S/PV. 2519). In a statement after the vote, the Secretary-General also a p p e a l e d to the Council "to continue to consider the situation in Lebanon with the closest attention and with a sense of urgency." After the w i t h d r a w a l o f the MNF and the S o v i e t v e t o in the Council, the sense o f relief in New York from having avoided another e x t r e m e l y difficult and d a n g e r o u s UN p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n in Lebanon was—at least for the troop-contributors—almost tangible. In the Secretariat, however, there was also a sense o f disappointment that the UN would not b e allowed to play a more direct role in the search for p e a c e in L e b a n o n in the w a k e of the Israeli withdrawal. Brian Urquhart went to the Middle East in March and tried to work out with the parties a plan b y which UNIFIL would deploy in areas vacated by the Israeli forces and b e temporarily responsible for the security of the civilian populations and the Palestinian refugees in those areas until the Lebanese army could take over. 3 0 The plan was well received, and on Urquhart's return, it was presented to the Security Council in the April report by the Secretary-General (see Chapter 3).

THE QUESTION OF PROTECTING THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS T h e I s r a e l i d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e P L O h e a d q u a r t e r s in B e i r u t in August-September 1982, and the subsequent evacuation of PLO armed units, first from Beirut in early September 1982 and then from Tripoli in N o v e m b e r 1983, left the Palestinian refugee c a m p s in Lebanon very exposed. Although a number of PLO fighters managed to stay behind, they were at that stage clearly unable to defend the camps against both the Israelis and the various armed groups in Lebanon that wanted to put an e n d to the PLO presence in Lebanon o n c e and for all and that had grudges to b e a r or vendettas to wage from previous rounds in the civil war. T h e question o f international protection of the refugee camps in B e i r u t first a r o s e in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e e v a c u a t i o n a g r e e m e n t negotiated by Ambassador Habib in August 1982. This b e c a m e o n e of the tasks for the first Multinational Force in Beirut. T h e Lebanese-U.S. e x c h a n g e of notes in connection with the establishment of MNF I said that the withdrawal was to take place in a manner that would assure the safety of such departing personnel and o f the persons in the area

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(presumably Palestinian civilians and associated elements left behind) and further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese government over the Beirut area. 31 After the Sabra and Chatila massacres in September, the PLO sent a letter to the Security Council dated 18 September calling on the Council to dispatch an international military force to provide protection to the Palestinians in Beirut and in other parts of Lebanon. On 20 September, this call was reiterated in a new letter, in which the PLO maintained that an increase in the number of United Nations observers in Beirut would not guarantee the security of the Palestinians in the camps. The PLO letter stated that "the PLO insists that military forces, or United Nations military forces, or agreed multinational forces, should be deployed immediately to undertake the effective safeguards" (Doc. S/15404). On the same day, the Lebanese government requested the reconstitution of the Multinational Force, and the idea of using UN troops for the purpose of protecting the camps was put in abeyance. The next proposal for a UN role for these purposes was put forward in the 17 May agreement between Lebanon and Israel. Paragraph 4 of the "Annex on Security Arrangements" to the agreement had the following text: It is understood that the Government of Lebanon may request appropriate action in the United Nations Security Council for one unit of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to be stationed in the Sidon area. The presence of this unit will lend support to the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces in asserting governmental authority and protection in the Palestinian refugee camp areas. For a period of 12 months, the unit in the Sidon area may send teams to the Palestinian refugee camp areas in the vicinity of Sidon and Tyre to surveil and observe, if requested by the Government of Lebanon, following notification to the Security Arrangements Committee. Police and security functions shall remain the sole responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, which shall ensure that the provisions of the present agreement shall be fully implemented in these areas.' 2

In New York, the reactions to these proposals were generally negative. Quite apart from the fact that the 17 May agreement assigned UNIFIL a very limited role, it was also pointed out that the UNIFIL unit would not be stationed near the camps themselves, but in (by implication, other parts of) Sidon. Even more important, it would only be allowed to send teams to the camps on specific request by the government of Lebanon. The faith in Security Council circles in the position of the Lebanese government on this very sensitive question had been somewhat reduced after the Sabra and Chatila events, and it was feared

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that UNIFIL could risk becoming a hostage for acts that it had no possibility of controlling. The 17 May agreement was never brought before the Council, however, and no formal proposal was submitted on this item during the rest of 1983. The April 1984 proposals by the Secretary-General included a role for UNIFIL in the protection of the Palestinian camps in the Sidon area. At that time, the Lebanese g o v e r n m e n t e x p r e s s e d s u p p o r t in a statement in the Security Council during the April 1984 renewal of UNIFIL's mandate (Doc. S/PV. 2530). The Lebanese also presented a draft resolution that would have authorized the Secretary-General to deploy UNIFIL units in accordance with his proposals. In spite of the fact that Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart had cleared the p r o p o s a l s with the g o v e r n m e n t s in the area and with Council members, the consultations on the Lebanese draft eventually broke down because of U.S. insistence that the draft should also demand a withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. 33 During the Secretary-General's visit to the Middle East in June 1984 and during the visits of Brian Urquhart in March and September, the question of future roles for UNIFIL was discusscd with both the Israeli and the Lebanese governments. These talks included the question of the protection of the Palestinian camps after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. In the Secretariat and in UNIFIL itself, there was a genuine concern over the humanitarian aspect of this situation and a general feeling that the UN had both a responsibility and a possibility of doing something. There is no doubt that Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar personally shared these concerns. As a concrete result of these concerns, contingency plans for the detachment of UNIFIL units to such tasks were developed during the fall of 1984 by the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura. These plans would have been ready for implementation very quickly if necessary agreement had been reached with the Israeli and Lebanese governments. During the autumn of 1984, the PLO also repeated its request for a UN protection of the refugee camps. In a letter dated 19 September 1984 to the Secretary-General, Chairman Yasser Arafat referred to the Secretary-General's proposals in his April report and "in the light of an impending holocaust," he appealed to the Secretary-General and to the international community "to take all measures to ensure the nonrecurrence of genocide and to provide all possible guarantee for the safety and security of the Palestinians in those areas" (Doc. S/16749 of 19 September 1984). Most if not all of the requests from the PLO for protection were based on complaints against the Israelis, who willingly furnished the PLO with cause for criticism through a n u m b e r of m o p p i n g - u p

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operations in the remaining Palestinian camps in the south before the Israeli withdrawal from these areas. O n e particularly heavy-handed operation occurred in the Ein el-Hilweh camp in the Sidon area in May 1984. T h e s e events were brought before the Security Council at a meeting on 21 May by Kuwait, acting on behalf of the Arab group at the United Nations. An acrimonious debate was held but no draft resolution was submitted on this occasion. During the successive stages of the withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces during the spring of 1985, similar search operations were conducted in other Palestinian camps. B y the fall o f 1984, h o w e v e r , the position o f the L e b a n e s e government had hardened on this issue. The Lebanese stressed that the protection of the civilian population was a task for which the Lebanese government alone was responsible and one that the Lebanese army was ready to a s s u m e . But the s p e c t e r of the Sabra and Chatila massacres in 1982 in which the (Phalangist) Lebanese forces had been directly i n v o l v e d was p r e s e n t in e v e r y b o d y ' s mind during the discussions on possible UN protection of the Palestinian refugee camps. The PLO initially had to step extremely carefully not to tread on the sensibilities of the Lebanese government in this respect. It was one thing for the PLO to ask for UN protection against the Israelis. Such a request would at least get support from the other Arabs. It was quite another story to indicate openly in the UN that the Palestinians might also have something to fear from some of the groups in the internal Lebanese conflict—or even worse, from groups associated with the Lebanese or Syrian governments. During the winter and spring of 1985, the PLO continued to ask for UN protection o f the refugee camps in a series of letters to the Secretary-General. The first of these letters was transmitted on 16 January, immediately following the suspension of the Naqoura talks and the announcement of the three-stage Israeli plan for a unilateral redeployment. This must b e seen as a clear indication that the PLO feared what would happen in the refugee camps in the Sidon area before, during, and after the Israeli withdrawal. The 16 January letter was followed b y new requests from the PLO in February and April (Docs. S/16949 and S/17111). In May 1985, heavy fighting broke out in and around the Sabra, Chatila, and Bourj el-Barajneh camps in East Beirut. This time, the antagonists were members of Amal—which earlier in May had issued a sharp warning to the PLO against any attempts to try regaining its former positions in Southern Lebanon—and the remaining Palestinians in the camps. In New York, the Secretary-General issued a statement on 22 May in which he appealed directly to the Lebanese government and to all concerned to put an end to violence involving the civilian

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population. This statement was followed on 24 May by a presidential statement issued on behalf o f the members of the Security Council that strongly appealed for restraint in order to alleviate the sufferings of civilians in Lebanon. On 30 May, Egypt requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council "on the continued escalation of violence involving the civilian population in and around Beirut affecting the safety and security of the Palestinians in the refugee camps" ( D o c . S / 1 7 2 2 8 ) . T h e Security Council met on 31 May and adopted by a unanimous vote resolution 564 (1985), which expressed the "deepest concern" of the Council at the heavy cost of human lives and called on all concerned to end acts o f v i o l e n c e against the civilian population in L e b a n o n and "in particular in and around Palestinian refugee camps." The resolution further called o n all parties to allow international relief efforts, especially by the UNRWA and the ICRC, to provide humanitarian assistance to all those affected by the fighting. Resolution 564 (1985) did not call for any UN role in the task of protecting the Palestinian refugee camps. Such a role for the UN was again made impossible by the opposition of the Lebanese government. In a very sharp statement in the Security Council on 31 May, the Lebanese ambassador stated that Lebanon opposed and rejected "this Council's meeting without our consent. We also oppose and reject any decision on a matter that we consider to be an internal matter—and that really is an internal matter" (Doc. S/PV. 2532). The PLO representative also took the floor during the meeting of the Security Council on 31 May. In his statement, the fighting in and around the Palestinian camps in May 1985 was placed in the same context as the events in 1982, when—according to the PLO—Israel and the United States had been involved. The PLO representative suggested that the "whole exercise that is taking place now" was part of a c a m p a i g n to " e l i m i n a t e n o t o n l y t h e a r m e d e l e m e n t s b u t all Palestinians." He appealed to UN bodies to take immediate action to provide shelter for the Palestinian refugees and again stated that "their safety is the responsibility of the United Nations." In the opinion of the PLO, "the Security Council should have authorized the SecretaryGeneral to deploy more concrete methods to prevent the recurrence of the crime of genocide. We still believe that the observer group in Beirut should have kept the Secretary-General apprised of the sad happenings in the area" (Doc. S/PV. 2582). The fighting in and around the Palestinian refugee camps in East Beirut continued sporadically during the 1985-1988 period, interrupted by repeated attempts to reach a lasting cease-fire. A new presidential statement was issued by the Security Council on 6 June 1986, in which

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another appeal was made "to all concerned to use their influence in bringing about the cessation of the fighting" (Doc. S/18138 of 6 June 1986). Again the appeal called on the parties to allow UNRWA and other humanitarian organizations to mount emergency operations in the camps, and again n o general role for the UN in protecting the camps was mentioned. A total blockade against the camps was imposed in October 1986, and bitter fighting continued intermittently until the autumn of 1987 in what became known as "the camps war." An accord to end the Amal siege of the camps was concluded in September 1987, but the siege was not totally lifted until January 1988. According to most observers, the lifting o f the siege—presented by Amal as an act of solidarity with the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza—did not signify a b r o a d e r r a p p r o c h e m e n t b e t w e e n Amal and the PLO and o t h e r Palestinian organizations, however. Amal still seemed to b e committed to k e e p i n g control of Southern Lebanon, and this aim remained incompatible with a return of PLO influence in the south. From one point of view, the Lebanese government's position on the question of a UN role in the protection of the Palestinian camps was consistent with the position it had maintained throughout the period of UNIFIL's existence—the relationship between the Lebanese and the PLO was an internal, Lebanese (at most an inter-Arab) affair and not the responsibility of the United Nations. Seen from another angle, there was a marked discrepancy between the repeated requests from the Lebanese to the UN for deployment of UN1FIL or UN troops all over Lebanese territory and the unwillingness—after 1 9 8 4 — t o consider such deployment in the areas where an agreement in the Security Council would have b e e n possible. Whether this attitude should be attributed to internal Lebanese politics or whether it was inspired by Syria, as claimed by many observers, can only b e the subject of conjecture. What is clear is that Syria—which during the 1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 5 period continued its campaign against the pro-Arafat PLO factions following the Tripoli events o f November 1983—strongly s u p p o r t e d the L e b a n e s e government in its stand c o n c e r n i n g the Palestinian camps. One widely shared assumption at the UN was that Syria o p p o s e d the idea o f UN protection o f the Palestinian camps because it feared that the pro-Arafat factions of the PLO would rebuild their strength in the refugee camps north o f the Litani River under the shelter o f the UN. T h e Syrians, like the Lebanese, have also b e e n consistent in their stand that the relationship between the Palestinians and the Arab countries is not a matter for the United Nations. In attempts to explain this view, Syrian diplomats have indicated a certain fear that a UN safeguard for Palestinians in Lebanon would establish a

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BJ0RN SKOGMO

precedent that could have consequences for Syria and for other Arab countries with Palestinian camps in their territories.

1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 5 : THE NAQOURA TALKS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

The talks at the UNIFIL headquarters in the period from 8 November 1984 to 24 January 1985 between military representatives from Israel and Lebanon have been referred to several times in this study. In the present context, the focus will be on the proposals presented for changes in the area of deployment of UNIFIL. The proposals presented by Israel at Naqoura in December 1984 would have led to an almost complete redeployment of UNIFIL. In the Secretary-General's report of April 1985, the following summary is given of Israeli positions on this issue: The Israeli representative took the position that UNIFIL should be deployed in the entire area to be evacuated by the Israeli forces with the positioning of the main forces of UNIFIL between the Zahrani and Awali rivers up to the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Whereas Israel would accept a limited UNIFIL presence further south, the Israeli representative maintained that local forces should be responsible for security arrangements in the southernmost part of Lebanon. There was little change in these basic positions as the conference progressed (Doc. S/17093 of 11 April 1985).

The Lebanese position during the Naqoura talks was, as described in Chapter 3, that Israel should withdraw fully from Lebanese territory according to Security Council resolution 509 (1982). The Lebanese government also insisted on the s u b s e q u e n t deployment of the Lebanese army together with UNIFIL down to the international border in accordance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978). The Naqoura talks were adjourned on 14 January 1985 without any agreement having been reached between the two parties, and thus the proposals made by the Israelis for the future deployment of UNIFIL were never formally put before the Security Council. Without strong support from the Lebanese and the Syrian governments, a proposal to deploy UNIFIL units north of the Litani would have been seen by most Council members as a step in the wrong direction. The probability of a Soviet veto would have been high. In any case, the announcement on 14 January of the unilateral plan for withdrawal of the Israeli forces made even this problem hypothetical. In the five-week period between the 14 January announcement and the implementation of the first phase of the Israeli redeployment plan, diplomatic c o n t a c t s c o n t i n u e d in order to s e e k mutually

1982-1985: NEW SITUATIONS & PROPOSALS

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acceptable arrangements that could ensure an orderly withdrawal by the IDF. Brian Urquhart continued his intensive consultations in a new trip to the area at the end of January. This time, further progress was blocked by Lebanese and Syrian refusals to discuss any new roles for UNIFIL as long as no detailed plans or assurances were forthcoming from Israel that the withdrawal from Lebanon would be complete. One reason given for this attitude was that the Lebanese government could not risk putting its approval on a plan that in its second and third phases posed the risk of cementing a more permanent Israeli control over the zone closest to the border. During the course of these consultations, the question of a role for the UN in observing the withdrawal process was also discussed. While Israel continued to advocate a redeployment of UNIFIL to cover the areas up to Sidon, an alternate suggestion was made to station UN observers independent of UNIFIL in these areas. On the Lebanese side, several arguments were set forth to explain why such a proposal would be inadvisable. One point was that the stationing of UN observers in the area "will serve to shift responsibility for eventual violence in regions evacuated by the Israelis on to the UN and Lebanon and away from Israel, where responsibility really belongs." 34 It was also argued that a UNIFIL deployment north of the Litani would consecrate Israeli control of the south. No request from the Lebanese government to the Secretary-General was therefore presented. In New York, informal consultations among the members of the Security Council on a presidential statement on the situation in the Sidon area were initiated by the president of the Council in February. Even here, no agreement between the parties concerned could be reached. After the first stage of the Israeli withdrawal, severe fighting occurred in the Sidon area. As usual, large groups of people were driven from or fled their homes to seek safety elsewhere in Lebanon. A substantial part of the Christian population in the Sidon area sought refuge in the mountain city of Jezzine, to the northeast of the UNIFIL area. By May 1985, 60,000 Christian refugees were amassed in the area under the protection of the SLA. From the Israeli side came suggestions to establish a UN presence in the Jezzine area to protect these groups. In early May, an informal proposal to use UNIFIL units for such a purpose was put forward by the French delegation to the Security Council. By that time, it had become clear that both Lebanon and Syria were adamantly against any UNIFIL deployment or UN presence north of the Litani River, and even this suggestion failed to get the necessary support. The position of the Lebanese government on the Israeli withdrawal and the future role of UNIFIL in Lebanon was defined in a letter to the

126

BJ0RN SKOGMO

Secretary-General on 27 March 1985. In this letter, the Lebanese "understanding" of UNIFIL's role was set forth in the following five points: 1. The UNIFIL area of deployment extends from the Litani River s o u t h w a r d as far as the internationally r e c o g n i z e d b o u n d a r i e s of Lebanon. 2. T h e w h o l e o f this r e g i o n s h o u l d be u n d e r t h e e x c l u s i v e authority o f the L e b a n e s e army, assisted in its task solely by the United Nations Force, since Lebanon is not prepared to assign any role t o any military force which is not a legal force. 3. L e b a n o n is in n o c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t the creation of what is known as "buffer zones" or of "security cordons" o f any kind. 4. The area of deployment of the United Nations F o r c e should not b e c o m e a d i s e n g a g e m e n t z o n e b e t w e e n illegal a r m e d forces within Lebanese territory. 5. The posts which the United Nations forces are to o c c u p y will be determined by agreement with the Lebanese Government alone (Doc. S/17062).

In this communication the Lebanese government talked no more about any role for UNIFIL in other areas of Lebanon. The Lebanese had apparently also given up the objective of transforming UNIFIL into a more effective deterrent or enforcing operation. These points must be seen as a clear indication that UNIFIL—after more than seven years of existence and after seventeen renewals of its mandate—was back to the area south of the Litani (which it had never left) and to the tasks defined for it in resolution 425 of 19 March 1978. Even after the completion of the Israeli redeployment on 10 June 1985, there was some optimism in the UN Secretariat that further progress c o n c e r n i n g UNIFIL's situation was still possible. UN negotiators continued their shuttle diplomacy in the area, and at the beginning of August the Israelis indicated that they could be willing to withdraw some of their positions within the "security zone" if adequate security arrangements could be obtained in return. The Security Council was informed about these developments at the end of August. Later during the autumn of 1985, the Israeli position again hardened. In his October 1985 report, the Secretary-General again struck a rather pessimistic note on the possibilities of reaching a negotiated solution to UNIFIL's problem within the near future. O n e question that surfaced during the consultations in the aftermath of the Naqoura talks was whether it would be possible to reach agreement on a package deal for a redeployment of UNIFIL. The suggestion was that Israel, in return for obtaining a UNIFIL deployment north of the Litani, particularly in the Jezzine area, would have

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permitted a similar redeployment o f UNIFIL southward down to the international border. At o n e stage, the Israeli representatives suggested that s u c h a quid pro quo p e r h a p s could b e obtained, but no firm commitments were given. B e c a u s e the L e b a n e s e remained adamant that n o UNIFIL redeployment to the north could b e discussed before Israel h a d w i t h d r a w n c o m p l e t e l y to the international border, and b e c a u s e they w o u l d not c o n s i d e r any deals on the basis of commitments, only after actual withdrawals, the question was never formally raised. 3 5 Later during the summer o f 1985, the South Lebanon Army established a stronghold o f its o w n in J e z z i n e , and even the Israelis lost any interest in a UNIFIL redeployment to this area. In spite of this general attitude, it should b e noted that the possibilities of a trade-off b y a simultaneous increase in UNIFIL's area of deployment northward and southward was vented b y Israeli officials as late as 1986.36

NOTES 1. Secretariat member, personal interview, New York, May 1985. 2. The Pelcovits study notes that Israeli strategic planners were quite concerned about the human and political costs of UNIFIL resistance when planning the "Peace for Galilee" operation. In the end, however, Israel decided to accept the political costs and to attack through UNIFIL lines. Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from Sinai and Lebanon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, 1984). 3. See Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 97-108. 4. See Ole Jacob Hald, "UNIFIL-operasjonens betydning for det norske forsvar," Internasjonal Politikk nr. 2/3, 1985, 251. Colonel Hald was chief of the army division responsible for preparations for Norwegian participation in UN peacekeeping forces from 1974 to 1982. 5. Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, 1196. Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 288. 7. Ibid., 345. 8. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984), 49. 9. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat• Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 34510. Referred to in a statement by the French ambassador in the Security Council on 29 July 1982 (Doc. S/PV. 2384). 11. The account of this meeting received considerable international attention at the time. U.S. Congressman Paul McCloskey, who met Chairman Arafat during the Beirut crisis, announced that he had received a written

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BJ0RN SKOGMO

statement from Arafat that the PLO recognized all UN resolutions on the Palestinian problem. By implication, this could also include resolution 242 (1967), which was the condition set by the United States for initiating negotiations with the PLO. However, Arafat did not expressly recognize resolution 242 (1967), and the offer was therefore not considered to satisfy U.S. requirements. See Ghassan Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres (Paris: Jean Claude Lattes, 1985), 239. 12. Tueni, Une guerre, 231. 13- Pelcovits, Peacekeeping, 13. 14. Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, 246-248. 15. Ball, Error, 49. 16. In his article "America's Failure in Lebanon" in the New York Times Magazine, 8 April 1984, Thomas L. Friedman writes: "One of the great ironies of the Marine mission in Beirut was that the man who first suggested sending American troops to Lebanon was Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat. During the negotiations in the summer of 1982 to evacuate the besieged P.L.O. from Beirut, Mr. Arafat, according to American officials, insisted that United States troops be involved in overseeing the guerrillas' departure as a guarantee that the Israelis would not try to interfere with the operation." 17. In an address on 11 April 1983, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam formulated the following four-point strategy for U.S. diplomacy in Lebanon at the time (.Dept. of State Bulletin June 1983, vol. 83, no. 2075, p. 58): • First, prompt and complete withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon; • Second, agreement on effective security arrangements to prevent future attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory; • Third, strengthening the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces; and • Fourth, reestablishment of a Lebanese national consensus and reconstruction of the Lebanese economy. 18. Friedman, "America's Failure." 19. Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1982-15 June 1983. 20. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping (New York: United Nations, 1985), 146. 21. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping, 59. This account also points to strong misgivings but not total opposition against the idea of a UN involvement from Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, whose forces were heavily involved in the fighting in Shouf. Jumblatt feared that an international force would permanently divide the country on the pattern of Cyprus, but nevertheless suggested that an international force composed of "totally neutral" countries would be more acceptable. 22. Robert Serry, "UNIFIL, Nederland, en de rol van der Verenigde Naties in Libanon," Internationale Spectator, 39-5, May 1985. 23. The Multinational Force was the subject of an international workshop arranged by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in October 1985 as another part of the NIIA project on "The Future of Peacekeeping Operations."

1982-1985: NEW SITUATIONS & PROPOSALS

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24. In the Pelcovits study, a description is given of the various options that were discussed both within the UN framework and in other contexts during the fall of 1983. Included in these options was a plan for a totally neutral group of observers, outside the UN framework, in which Greece was to play a major part. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping, 51-62. 25. Brian Urquhart, "How Nations Might Unite in Peacekeeping," reprinted in the International Herald Tribune, 21 December 1983. 26. Brian Urquhart, A Life, 362. 27. French diplomat, personal interview, New York, May 1985. 28. Indar J. Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984), 238. 29. Syrian diplomat, personal interview, New York, May 1985. 30. Brian Urquhart, A Life, 362. 31. Robert B. Houghton and Frank G. Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1984). 32. The full text of the agreement was printed by the Jerusalem Post on 17 May 1983. 33- Brian Urquhart, A Life, 363. 34. Editorial, Daily Star (Beirut), 22 January 1985. 35- Secretariat member, personal interview, December 1985. 36. Uri Lubrani, coordinator of Israeli government affairs regarding Lebanon, in interview with Aftenposten (Oslo), 30 January 1986.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Troop-Contributing Countries THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS O n 19 March 1978—after the adoption of resolutions 425 and 4 2 6 — t h e Secretary-General and his staff moved to get the UN Force established as q u i c k l y as possible. T h e first task, the a p p o i n t m e n t of a F o r c e commander, was partly done on 19 March through the appointment of Major General E. A. Erskine of Ghana, the chief of staff of UNTSO, as interim c o m m a n d e r o f UNIFIL ( D o c . S / 1 2 6 1 1 ) . In a letter to the p r e s i d e n t o f the Security Council on 12 April 1978, the SecretaryGeneral a n n o u n c e d that it was his intention, "subject to the consent of the Council," to a p p o i n t General Erskine c o m m a n d e r of the F o r c e (Doc. S / 1 2 6 4 1 ) . After informal consultations the same day, the Council members confirmed their agreement through a formal letter from the president o f the Security Council (Doc. S/12642). The same procedure was followed w h e n Lieutenant General William Callaghan o f Ireland s u c c e e d e d General Erskine as commander of UNIFIL as o f 15 February 1 9 8 1 , a n d w h e n M a j o r G e n e r a l Gustav H a g g l u n d o f F i n l a n d w a s appointed to replace General Callaghan as of 1 J u n e 1986. A s e c o n d task was to establish a UN presence in the area occupied by the Israelis as quickly as possible. United Nations p e a c e k e e p i n g resources already existed in the Middle East through the presence of UNEF II in the Sinai, the UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) o n t h e G o l a n H e i g h t s , a n d the U N T S O w i t h its h e a d q u a r t e r s in J e r u s a l e m . With the c o n s e n t o f the g o v e r n m e n t s o f the troopc o n t r i b u t i n g countries c o n c e r n e d , o n e S w e d i s h a n d o n e Canadian detachment from UNEF II and o n e Iranian detachment from U N D O F w e r e transferred to Southern Lebanon to serve temporarily as advance guard o f UNIFIL from 22 March. Austria w a s similarly a p p r o a c h e d 131

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( D o c . S / 1 2 6 l 6 o f 21 March 1978), with a v i e w to obtaining its acceptance for the use of its UNDOF contingent, but it set certain unfulfillable conditions for the transfer o f its troops, much to SecretaryGeneral Waldheim's personal disappointment. Parallel to t h e s e temporary m e a s u r e s , the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l reported to the Council that he had made "initial contacts with a number of governments with a view to ascertaining their willingness to provide contingents for the n e w Force" prior to the adoption o f resolution 426 on 19 March (SCOR 2075th meeting, 19 March 1978). T h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l already had an offer from France, which declared a willingness to contribute in its statement in the Security Council debate. On 21 March, the Secretary-General reported that he had received positive responses from Nepal and from Norway (Doc. S/12616). By the next progress report, on 2 April, Senegal had agreed to provide a battalion of about 600, all ranks (Doc. S/12620/Add. 1 of 2 April 1978). In his next report, on 8 April, no new troop-contributors were added to the list, but the Secretary-General reported that he was continuing consultations concerning additional contingents for UNIFIL, " b e a r i n g in m i n d t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u i t a b l e g e o g r a p h i c a l representation" (Doc. S/12620/Add. 2 of 8 April 1978). On 12 April, Nigeria a g r e e d to c o n t r i b u t e a battalion for UNIFIL, w h i c h was subsequently confirmed in a letter from the Secretary-General to the president of the Council on 26 April (Doc. S/12666). In his letter to the Security Council president o f 1 May, in which the Secretary-General recommended an increase in the strength of UNIFIL to the level of about 6,000, he also informed the Council that the governments of Fiji, Iran, and Ireland were prepared to make available a battalion each for service in UNIFIL (the existing Iranian contingent was provisionally detached from UNDOF) (Doc. S/12675 of 1 May 1978). The deployment of the individual contingents to UNIFIL during the first two months is indicated in Table 7.1. Although there was an understandable time lag b e t w e e n the actual consultations with the countries concerned and the Secretary-General's reports, it is evident that the recruitment and deployment of UNIFIL did not proceed as rapidly as desired. UNIFIL did not reach its provisional ceiling of 4,000 troops until late April, more than one month after the decision of the Security Council to establish the Force. T h e s e c o n d stage o f the deployment went more quickly, and the 6,000 ceiling was reached less than a month after the 3 May decision of the Council to increase the size of the Force. At least two factors can b e found to explain these delays in the recruiting process. First, many of the traditional troop-contributing

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

133

Table 7.1 UNIFIL Deployment April-June 1978

2 April

8 April

17 April

5 May

13 June

Infantry units Fiji

500

France

627

729

728

732

703

Iran

524

Ireland

665 642

642

30

669

734

723

640

634

Canada

91

91

France

540

541

Norway

205

207

636

Nepal Nigeria Norway

216

629

718

Senegal

Logistical units

From

UNDOF/UNEFII

Canada (from UNEFII)

18

19

19

—

11

195

198

185

190

190

224

225

216

212

—

68

68

68

23

42

Iran (from UNDOF) Sweden (from UNEF H) UNTSO observers

Source: UN Document S/12620/Add 1 (2 April), Add 2 (8 April), Add 3 (17 April), Add 4 (5 May), and Add 5 (13 June).

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nations to UN peacekeeping with standby forces earmarked for UN service w e r e already e n g a g e d in UNFICYP (the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cyprus), UNEF II, and UNDOF and could not be expected to make additional troops available to UNIFIL. An equally important factor was probably the concerns many potential troop-contributing countries had about important aspects of the UNIFIL operation, such as the somewhat uncertain degree of consent from the parties involved regarding UNIFIL's mission. As long as full consent and support from Israel, the PLO, and the local parties in Lebanon were not assured, some of the potential troop-contributors feared that their troops might become embroiled in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or in the Lebanese civil war. Another question was whether the new UN force would in reality h a v e the interim character that was i n t e n d e d or w h e t h e r the commitment to put troops at the disposal of the Secretary-General risked becoming more or less open-ended. For many of the potential troop-contributors, it was evident that UNIFIL would not be an easy operation, either on the ground or from a political point of view. Some of them also had domestic constituencies where the debate on that country's relationship to Israel and the PLO was conducted with great passion. In March-April 1978, and even later, the repercussions f r o m participation in UNIFIL s e e m e d at best uncertain. In the Netherlands, for example, the government's decision of January 1979 to join UNIFIL became subject to a public debate. The government's decision was based on a declaration of principle made in 1965 that the Netherlands would be willing to put its troops at the disposal of the United Nations for peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the Dutch government's initial decision to send troops was heavily criticized by the opposition in the Dutch parliament, both on procedural grounds, because conscripted military personnel might be used, and because of implications for the Netherlands' traditional policy toward the Middle East. Table 7.2 lists all the different troop-contributing countries to UNIFIL from the first renewal of the mandate in September 1978 up to a n d i n c l u d i n g the t w e n t i e t h r e n e w a l in J u n e 1986. With the reorganization of the Force in 1986, which included the creation of a French composite battalion (consisting of a maintenance company, a defense company an armored escort company, and a bomb disposal detachment), a different, more detailed breakdown of the individual contingents was introduced in the Secretary-General's reports. Table 7.3 lists the troop contributors from January 1987 until January 1988 according to this new method. From these tables, it appears that fourteen different m e m b e r

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

135

countries have put troops at the disposal o f UNIFIL (UNTSO observers not included during the first ten-year period of the Force). Of these, eight come from the group of Western and other states (Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), three come from the African group (Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal), while three troop-contributors belong to the Asian region (Fiji, Iran, and Nepal). Some of these have been troop-contributors during the entire period. This group includes Fiji, France, Ireland, and Norway. Others have participated only during a small part of the total period. Canada took part only in the first mandate period, for instance, while the Iranian contingent was withdrawn in late January 1979 following the revolution that toppled the Shah. During the first and s e c o n d mandate period, France was the largest troop-contributor. In later periods, first Norway, then the Netherlands, France, Ghana, and Norway have had this position. A first criterion in the selection of troop-contributor countries is a capability and a willingness to put troops at the disposal of the UN for peacekeeping operations. From previous such operations a pool of traditional troop-contributors has emerged. In this pool are Canada, the Nordic countries, and certain countries in the Third World, such as G h a n a . T h e Nordic countries, for e x a m p l e , have standby forces earmarked for UN service that can be mobilized and deployed at very short notice. Countries from this pool that were not already engaged in UNEF II, UNDOF, or UNFICYP were among the first to be approached during the establishment of UNIFIL. The nonrenewal of the mandate of UNEF II in 1979 meant that some of the troop-contributors to this force could make at least some of their peacekeeping forces available to UNIFIL (Ghana). Likewise, the nonimplementation of the UN plan for a peaceful transition to majority rule in Namibia meant that some of the troops earmarked for the UN force there could, at least temporarily, serve in UNIFIL (Finland). O f the fourteen troop-contributing countries to UNIFIL, eleven h a v e served in previous UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operations ( o b s e r v e r missions not included). 1 This group includes Canada, Finland, Ghana, Iran, Italy, Ireland, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, and Sweden. Fiji, France, and the Netherlands took part for the first time; these three have, however, been among the largest troop-contributors to UNIFIL. Thus, the pool of troop-contributing countries with experience from UN peacekeeping has increased slightly, although the traditional troopcontributors still dominate. A s e c o n d c r i t e r i o n for s e l e c t i n g t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t o r s for UN peacekeeping, which in the case of UNIFIL was stressed both by the Soviet Union and nonaligned countries, is that recruitment must b e

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Table 7 2

UNIFIL Troop-Contributors, September 1978-June 1986 13 Sept 1978 Doc. S/12845

12 Jan. 1979 Doc. /13026

8 June 1979 Doc. /13384

14 Dec. 1979 Doc. /13691

12 June 1980 Doc. /13994

12 Dec. 1980 Doc. /14295

500

501

656

658

633

619

—

—

—

—

—

—

644

681

—

Infantry units Fiji Finland France Ghana

—

—

—

788

782

—

—

—

300

Iran

599

598

—

—

—

—

Ireland

661

646

625

653

625

596

Nepal

642

599

643

644

—

Netherlands

10

—

—

800

865

815

848

Nigeria

673

599

776

700

700

6%

Norway

706

623

653

659

653

660

Senegal

634

594

592

591

577

576

Canada

117

—

—

—

—

—

France

537

609

494

524

574

735

33

34

34

Logistic units

Italy

—

—

—

Norway

218

288

289

301

291

175

Sweden

—

—

—

—

—

144

Ghana

—

—

—

—

—

—

Ghana

—

—

—

57

67

75

Ireland

—

114

129

47

47

49

—

—

115

94

94

—

HQ Camp Command

Engineer Company France

Totals

UNTSO observers

5,931

5,852

5,772

6,126

5,898

5,999

36

36

37

38

74

71

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

137

Table 1 1 Continued 16 June 1981 Doc. S/14537

11 Dec. 1981 Doc. /14789

10 June 1982 Doc. /15194

13 Aug. 1982 Doc. /15357

14 Oct. 1982 Doc. /15455

13 Jan. 1983 Doc. /15557

12 July 1983 Doc. /15863

12 Oct. 1983 Doc. /16036

628

628

628

628

629

626

625

625

—

—

—

—

491

485

495

—

—

595

595

¡26

129

147

147

377

377

557

557

558

556

550

550

601

601

671

671

671

672

667

655

430

430

432

462

462

—

—

—

810

810

810

810

810

807

805

731

696

696

696

696

696

444

—

—

688

660

660

660

648

648

645

605

561

561

561

561

561

557

561

559

738

738

775

775

775

782

782

793

34

34

34

34

40

40

42

41

143

171

191

191

189

191

202

199

144

144

144

144

144

142

144

143

99

99

140

140

140

146

153

154

51

51

51

51

51

55

80

83

6,000

6,000

6,945

6,975

6,500

6,286

5,888

5,780

67

85

87

87

74

72

69

73

(table continues overleaf)

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Table 12

Continued 9 Apr. 1984 Doc. S/16472

9 Oct. 1984 Doc. /16776

11 Apr. 1985 Doc. /17093

10 Oct 1985 Doc. /17557

9 Apr. 1986 Doc. /17965

17 June 1986 Doc. /18164

Fiji

623

629

626

627

626

627

Finland

496

503

500

509

511

514

France

610

606

610

608

609

605

Ghana

557

558

571

573

580

560

645

637

639

644

644

651

Infantry units

Iran Ireland

—

—

666

665

800

800

165

160

162

161

—

—

Norway

639

634

647

649

650

648

Senegal

559

565

776

767

770

785

783

786

40

44

48

48

48

51

Norway

199

205

204

203

207

216

Sweden

144

142

150

146

146

144

Nepal Netherlands Nigeria

Logistic units Canada France Italy

Ghana

60

HQ Camp Command Ghana

148

146

138

133

126

70

Ireland

87

87

91

91

95

95

5,688

5,683

5,822

5,842

5,825

5,827

75

63

70

75

75

77

Engineer Company France

Totals

UNTSO observers

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

Table 7.3

139

UNIFIL Troop-Contributors, January 1987-January 1988 Military Personnel 12 Jan. 1987 S/18581

24 July 1987 S/18990

22 Jan. 1988 S/19445

Fiji HQ Command Infantry battalion Military Policy COmpany Force Mobile Reserve

6

6

7

612

614

625

7

7

9

—

—

27

15

15

17

508

504

511

Finland HQ UNIFIL Infantry battalion Military Police Company Force Mobile Reserve

9

9

8

—

—

15

32

32

26

488

479

469

10

10

10

27

27

41

777

836

822

60

60

—

6

10

7

France HQ UNIFIL Composite battalion Military Policy Company

Ghana HQ UNIFIL Infantry battalion Engineer Company Military Police Company Force Mobile Reserve

—

—

21

Ireland HQ UNIFIL Infantry battalion

12

12

13

648

649

650

HQ Camp Command

71

71

55

Military Police Company

13

13

12

Force Mobile Reserve

—

—

17 (table continues overleaf)

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Table 73

Continued Military Personnel 12 Jan. 1987 S/18581

24 July 1987 S/18990

22 Jan. 1988 S/19445

Italy HQ UNIFIL Helicopter unit

4

4

4

44

44

47

Nepal HQ UNEFIL Infantry battalion Military Police Company Force Mobile Reserve

11

11

19

748

834

797

5

5

5

—

—

28

34

34

33

Infantry battalion

676

655

673

Maintenance company

Norway HQ UNIFIL

¡60

175

167

Military Police Company

17

17

15

Force Mobile Reserve

—

—

5

Sweden HQ UNIFIL Logistic battalion Military Police Company Force Mobile Reserve

Total UNIFIL

UNTSO Observers

8

8

16

616

629

605

8

8

8

—

—

5

5,668

5,778

5,811

77

74

79

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

141

based on the principle of equitable geographical representation. This means that efforts must b e made to get troop-contributors from all the regional groups within the UN. This condition was only partially fulfilled in t h e c a s e o f UNIFIL. T w o g e o g r a p h i c a l r e g i o n s are conspicuously absent from the list of troop-contributing countries. The S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l c o u l d not get any v o l u n t e e r s from the Latin American region, although first Bolivia and then Mexico were asked. There was little h o p e o f Eastern European participation after the abstention of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in the voting on resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). Nevertheless, the Secretariat first approached Romania as the Eastern European country most likely to take a position independent of the Soviet Union. When the Romanians answered negatively, Poland was asked to make available a small contingent on a provisional basis, but also quickly said no. In the April 1986 renewal of UNIFIL's mandate, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria shifted the traditional East European abstention during the voting to a positive vote. This was by some observers seen as a move that would open the way for Eastern European participation as troop-contributors to UNIFIL. While this would broaden the political base of the UNIFIL operation, it could also serve to stiffen Israeli opposition to UNIFIL's continued presence in Southern Lebanon. By mid-1988, no changes in UNIFIL's composition to include East European troop-contributors had been contemplated. One problem in previous UN peacekeeping operations has been whether the Secretary-General should have the determining influence in their organization and management—as maintained by Western countries—or whether the Security Council should control all aspects o f t h e o p e r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g d e c i s i o n s o n the s t r e n g t h and the specification of contingents—as maintained by the Soviet Union. 2 The UNIFIL operation has followed the compromise formula worked out during the establishment of UNEF II in 1973, whereby the Security Council discusses the formal proposals o f the Secretary-General in informal consultations but without any formal voting procedures. If the members of the Security Council agree with the Secretary-General's proposals, this agreement is confirmed through a formal letter from the president o f the Council to the Secretary-General. In the case of UNIFIL, the Security Council has accepted all of the Secretary-General's formal proposals on the composition of the Force. T h e Soviet Union made no protests over the fact that several NATO countries (France, the Netherlands, and Norway) took part. 3 In reality, this formal exchange of letters represents only the end result of the consultations b e t w e e n the Secretariat and the m e m b e r s o f the Council. If the Secretariat suspects that potential troop-contributors m a y not b e

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acceptable to some of the permanent members of the Council, this question will usually be sorted out through informal channels before any formal recommendation is submitted to the Council. Political considerations have played a more significant role in the selection of the Force commander, however. All three of UNIFIL's commanders until January 1988 had come from nonaligned or neutral countries (Ghana, Ireland, and Finland), although other countries contributed larger contingents to UN1FIL.4 A second interesting feature and potential problem in the composition of UNIFIL was the presence of France, a permanent member of the Security Council, among the troop-contributing countries. 5 In spite of the participation of the United Kingdom in UNFICYP, the participation of permanent members has been the exception rather than the rule in previous UN peacekeeping operations since 1956. For instance, resolution 340 (1973), which established UNEF II, specifically excluded permanent members of the Security Council from taking part. There are no formal barriers in the UN Charter to the inclusion of permanent members of the Council in UN peacekeeping operations. Brian Urquhart, while serving as Undersecretary-General, wrote a column in the New York Times about his dream that the major powers one day will take place in such operations. 6 Such participation does, however, require understandings and perceptions of collective responsibility among the major powers—and particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union—which have rarely been present during most of the first forty-three years of the United Nations. The United States has not looked upon the prospects of seeing Soviet troops deployed in conflict areas around the world—even under the blue UN helmet—with any enthusiasm. Indeed, the most critical point during the Middle East war in October 1973—the nuclear alert called by the United States on 24-25 October—came as a direct reaction to a Soviet threat to support an Egyptian proposal to send a UN force consisting of U.S. and Soviet troops to the Middle East to enforce the cease-fire adopted by the Security Council through resolution 338 (1973), or to act unilaterally if the United States were not prepared to go along. 7 Another problem inherent in the issue of major powers participating in international peacekeeping operations is that any such force that involves major powers from only side of the East-West equation would easily be considered insufficiently impartial, either in the conflict area or in the rest of the world. This was one of the problems with the MNF in Beirut in 1982-1984. In February 1984, when the French made their second proposal for a UN presence in

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

143

Beirut, they found it necessary to include in their draft resolution a provision specifically precluding permanent members of the Security Council from taking part in the proposed UN force. The Beirut episode did not have immediate repercussions for the participation of France in UNIFIL, but the problems encountered by the French in 1986 that led to their partial withdrawal from UNIFIL also show that the major powers may bring with them liabilities from their larger regional or global roles to more local peacekeeping missions. This danger was also highlighted by the kidnapping in February 1988 of Lt. Col. William Higgins, a U.S. officer serving as chief of Observer Group Lebanon with UNIFIL. At the time of writing, Col. Higgins was still being held hostage. In the late 1970s and throughout most of the 1 9 8 0 s , the g l o b a l s i t u a t i o n s e e m e d far f r o m t h e p o i n t w h e r e p e a c e k e e p i n g forces from the United States and the Soviet Union would take part side by side in any p e a c e k e e p i n g operation. T h e question of whether UNIFIL would have had a higher deterrent effect on the parties concerned—including the Israelis in June 1982—if the permanent members of the Security Council had taken part as troopcontributors in Southern Lebanon therefore remains one of the many intriguing but hypothetical questions raised by the UNIFIL experience. With the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1986 onward and with the new, positive attitude toward UN p e a c e k e e p i n g a n n o u n c e d by the Soviet Union in 1987, the possibility of direct superpower participation in UN peacekeeping has b e c o m e somewhat less remote. There can b e little doubt that this would substantially strengthen the power and prestige of UN peace efforts. Eventually, it could also lead to n e w a c c e p t a n c e o f the collective security system envisaged in the UN Charter. O n e last condition for the selection of troop-contributing nations is that t h e t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t o r s must b e a c c e p t a b l e to t h e p a r t i e s themselves. In UNIFIL's case, this primarily meant that they had to be accepted by the Lebanese government on behalf of the host country. Obviously, the Lebanese overnment a c c e p t e d the fourteen troopcontributing countries to UNIFIL. The Lebanese would, at least in the 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 3 period, possibly have had more difficulty in accepting East European countries but were spared the dilemma by the unwillingness of those countries to take part during this period. Israel, though a party to the conflict, was not a host country to UNIFIL. It was therefore not granted any veto rights over which countries should participate in the UN force, as long as these countries were not themselves parties to the conflict on the Arab side. As a rule, the Israelis were nevertheless consulted before new troop-contributors were confirmed. In this context it should b e noted that three of the

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t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t i n g c o u n t r i e s t o UNIFIL—Ghana, Nigeria, a n d Senegal—did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Even if the Israelis have sometimes made this criterion a condition for acceptance, the UNIFIL exception to this rule is not unique. Poland, for example, has taken part as a troop-contributor both to UNEF II and UNDOF.8 The reason Israel never challenged the participation of the three African countries may also stem from a rather curious dilemma the Israelis established for themselves: On the one hand, they did not want t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t o r s that w e r e directly hostile to Israel and, by implication, too friendly with the PLO.9 On the other hand, the Israelis were also distinctly unhappy with the inclusion in the ranks of the troop-contributors of some of Israel's closest remaining friends in the West—such as Norway and the Netherlands—because they foresaw that their presence in Southern Lebanon might cause problems for Israel's bilateral relations with its traditional friends. This was not an argument that could be made officially to the UN, however. In any case, the Secretariat did not have available such a wide choice of p o t e n t i a l t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t o r s that it could a f f o r d to t a k e into consideration such delicate concerns. This Israeli concern for problems in their bilateral relations with the troop-contributors subsequently proved to be justified. UNIFIL soldiers returned to their home countries disgruntled at having been harassed and threatened by Major Haddad's forces, the South Lebanon Army, or even by elements from the Israeli Defence Forces, which caused noticeable shifts in public sympathy in Norway and the Netherlands over Israeli policies and practices toward the Palestinians and neighboring countries. 10 On the official level, the governments of the troop-contributors repeatedly had to make demarches vis-à-vis Israeli authorities to protest local incidents. 1 1 One of the troopcontributors, Finland, almost broke diplomatic relations with Israel over the kidnapping of twenty-four Finnish soldiers by the SLA in June 1985. The problem of strains in bilateral relations with friendly troopcontributors was often cited by Israeli representatives as the main reason they wanted UNIFIL withdrawn from Southern Lebanon.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE ROUTINES When a member country of the United Nations agrees to put troops at the disposal of the Secretary-General, it automatically assumes certain interests, both in the conflict itself and in the way the peacekeeping operation in question is managed from New York. A first concern for the governments of the troop-contributing nations to UNIFIL was for

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

145

the safety of their troops. These governments knew that the UNIFIL mission in Southern Lebanon was difficult and dangerous and that a certain casualty rate probably had to be accepted. The troopcontributors nevertheless were not prepared to let their troops become directly involved in acts of war. They therefore had to be informed and consulted by the Secretariat in situations that could subject UNIFIL to direct attacks or otherwise affect the safety of their troops. It also meant that contingency plans for the evacuation of UNIFIL troops had to be elaborated—a concern that was pressed by some of the troopcontributors. In addition to such common interests and concerns, there was a host of practical, administrative problems that had to be sorted out individually with each troop-contributing nation. In New York, these problems were handled through direct contacts between the Secretariat and the permanent missions. Two problems can be mentioned in detail, if only to show the administrative variety in managing a UN peacekeeping operation. One of these was the question of press coverage and media access to the various battalion areas. In the first phases of UNIFIL's existence, press and information services to a large extent had to be handled by the individual battalions. Because of the lack of guidelines from Naqoura and a general and perfectly understandable inexperience in conducting military operations within an open and highly charged political environment such as Lebanon, the officers of the first contingents were generally very cautious in dealing with media representatives. On the other hand, media reports b a s e d on unauthorized interviews with individual officers or soldiers tended to give a somewhat simplified view of the overall situation. A set of guidelines and rules for visits by media representatives to the UNIFIL area thus had to be created. After the problems of the deployment period, the UNIFIL headquarters fully accepted that the media of the troop-contributing countries tended to focus their attention and interest on the battalion area controlled by their own country and that information services could not be wholly centralized to Naqoura or through the UN information center in Beirut. Indeed, UNIFIL encouraged press visits both from the troop-contributing countries and others, and generous assistance was provided to thousands of media representatives from all parts of the world, who often came to Southern Lebanon somewhat unaware of realities in that part of the world. From 1979 onward, the spokesman of the Force commander at Naqoura, Timur Goksel, and his staff were nearly the only objective, reliable sources of information in the region for media representatives covering the events in Southern Lebanon. In the 1982-1985 period, this

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was sometimes a source of irritation for the Israeli military, which preferred to let reporters into the area mostly on tours guided by Israeli officers, 12 who tended to skirt areas of active fighting or resistance. Mr. Goksel, who b e c a m e known in media circles as "Mister South Lebanon," nevertheless gained universal respect in the international press—including most of the Israeli media—because of his extensive local contacts and general accessibility. A second problem concerned the repartition of high-officer posts at the Naqoura headquarters. Each of the troop-contributing countries wanted to have a certain number of officers from its country attached to the Force headquarters, preferably in posts as high as possible. This was a fully legitimate objective, since each troop-contributing nation needed reliable channels for transmitting necessary information, insights, and inputs between its national contingent and the Force command. Of course, it also opened up new career opportunities for the officers of the troop-contributors. Since officers from several troopcontributors often were put forward as candidates for the same job, the Secretariat had to tread diplomatically to assure that no individual troop-contributor became, too dissatisfied.

THE MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARIAT

To facilitate consultations between the Secretariat and the troopcontributing nations, and among the troop-contributors themselves, a pattern of contact meetings in New York was instituted, both on a regular and on an ad hoc basis. Such meetings were arranged either by the Secretariat or at the initiative of individual troop-contributing nations. Meetings called by nations were most often held without representatives of the Secretariat present. A first meeting was held in New York on 31 March 1978 between the Secretariat and delegations from the troop-contributing countries of France and Norway to discuss questions relating to setting up the logistic infrastructure of UNIFIL (Doc. S/12620/Add. 1 of 2 April 1978). During the ensuing stages of the deployment period in the spring and summer of 1978, several meetings of this type were arranged with the growing flock of troop-contributors to discuss other practical problems. A regular feature of the consultations between the Secretariat and the troop-contributors was the meeting held before each renewal of UNIFIL's mandate. The pattern of these meetings was determined by the expiration of the first six-month period of UNIFIL in September 1978. According to this pattern, two such meetings were held in

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

147

connection with each renewal. First, a meeting with representatives of the troop-contributors was held some days before the open meeting of the Security Council. The first of these meetings in September 1978 was chaired by the SecretaryGeneral himself, later meetings were most often chaired by Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart or by his successor, Marrack Goulding. The Force commander was usually flown in from Naqoura to attend these meetings, and a representative of the department of the Secretariat responsible for the financial situation of UNIFIL also attended. In this meeting, the main observations in the SecretaryGeneral's report to the Security Council on the current situation in the area were presented to the troop-contributors. Afterward, the floor was opened for relatively free debate, during which each troop-contributing country could raise any point desired. Sometimes a second meeting with the troop-contributors was held just before the Security Council renewed the mandate. This meeting was chaired by the Secretary-General, and the purpose was to formally ask the troop-contributors whether they were willing to put their contingents at the disposal of the Secretary-General for the period of the new mandate. After the new mandate was approved by the Security Council, the Secretary-General sought confirmation of this willingness in a letter written to each of the troop-contributing countries. Other meetings were convened on an ad hoc basis, that is, when developments in the UNIFIL area made consultations with the troopcontributors necessary. Several of these were held during the 1978-1982 period as a result of serious incidents affecting UNIFIL—for example, the April 1979 bombardment of the UNIFIL headquarters, the August 1979 killing of three Fijian soldiers, and the April 1980 incidents when the two Irish soldiers were killed. In these meetings, the representatives of the troop-contributors received a briefing from the Secretariat, usually given by Brian Urquhart, on the latest developments in the area, and they were given the opportunity to present and to exchange views on how the situation should be handled. The objective of such meetings was not necessarily to agree on any course of action that the troop-contributors should take jointly. In some cases, as in the April 1979 crisis, the meeting ended with an informal understanding that those troop-contributors that had normal relations with Israel should take individual action in bilateral contact with Israel and/or with the United States. After the series of meetings held between the Secretariat and the troop-contributors before the 19 June 1982 renewal of the mandate, the contacts between the Secretariat and the troop-contributors reverted to

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their former pattern. One such meeting was held in February 1984 in connection with the French proposal in the Security Council for a UN presence in Beirut (see Chapter 6). Much to the irritation of some of the participants, the French had not been particularly willing to inform or to consult their fellow troop-contributors about the content or extent of their proposal, which implied possible redeployment of UNIFIL to the Beirut area. A widespread concern for the safety of UNIFIL troops in the volatile Beirut area was also evident. Nevertheless, while it is probable that some of the troop-contributors would not have accepted having their troops sent to Beirut, others indicated that they would be willing to cooperate with any decision that the Security Council might reach and that the Secretary-General could recommend. In this respect, the reaction to the Beirut proposal of 1984 was one of the rare examples of important differences of view among the troopcontributors on the future of the UN Force.

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTORS AS AN INDEPENDENT GROUP

In April 1980, following the killings of two Irish UNIFIL soldiers, the Irish government proposed that a meeting of the UNIFIL troopcontributing countries be held at the ministerial level to assess the situation. The Irish offered to host such a meeting in Dublin. The meeting took place on 2 May 1980. Representatives of eleven troop-contributing countries were present, many of them represented by their ministers of defense. In a communiqué issued after the meeting, the troop-contributors generally supported the decisions of the Security Council concerning the situation in Southern Lebanon (Doc. S/13921 of 2 May 1980). The participants regretted the loss of lives and endorsed the call on the parties involved to cooperate with the Secretary-General in enabling UNIFIL to fulfill its mandate. Other elements from Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and subsequent texts adopted on UNIFIL were also present in the text of the communiqué—including strong criticism of the Israelis and their support of Major Haddad and the de facto forces. The basic problem facing the troop-contributors both at the Dublin meeting and in other situations was identical to the one facing the Security Council and the Secretary-General: the lack of effective tools for influencing the Israelis to make them more cooperative with UNIFIL. In effect, there were only two means of sanctions available, neither of which was particularly effective. One method was to continue the political pressure on the Israelis. The Dublin communiqué stated that the text would be the basis for a

THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

149

number of diplomatic a p p r o a c h e s to b e made to certain governments—primarily Israel, Lebanon, and the United States—on behalf of the group of troop-contributing countries as a whole. In each country's capital a delegation of three representatives, consisting where possible of one Western European, one African, and one Asian troopcontributor, made diplomatic approaches on behalf of the entire group. The second and more drastic approach available to the troopcontributors was to threaten to withdraw their respective contingents from UNIFIL if the situation did not improve. This element was also present in the Dublin communiqué but in fairly veiled and indirect terms: "Ministers and Representatives stated that unless rapid progress is made in the creation of conditions in which the Force can operate more safely and effectively, including adequate international protection and immunity for its personnel, its continued viability may be brought into question" (Doc. S/13921). The final element in the Dublin communiqué contained the rudiments of a follow-up mechanism. The troop-contributors stated that they intended, "through continuing regular meetings," to monitor developments closely and to continue to act in concert to support the efforts of the Secretary-General. Furthermore, they intended to meet again at the ministerial level in due course to review the progress made toward the creation of conditions that would allow UNIFIL to exercise fully and effectively the mandate it had received from the Security Council. At the Dublin meeting, Norwegian Minister of Defence Thorvald Stoltenberg offered to host the next meeting of the troop-contributors in Oslo. The Norwegian Permanent Mission to the United Nations started consultations in New York in September—October 1980 on the question of holding another meeting at the end of the year or at the start of 1981. At that time, however, the situation in the UNIFIL area was relatively quiet, and there was a general feeling among the other troop-contributing nations that new ministerial meetings should be held only when the situation required it. One argument was that such high-level meetings would lose their impact if they were transformed into routine exercises. The next crisis situation in the UNIFIL area of operation occurred in March 1981, when an incident in the Nigerian sector left two UNIFIL soldiers dead and eleven wounded. On the initiative of Nigeria, the troop-contributing nations met at the Nigerian Mission in New York to evaluate what could be done about the situation. The possibility of convening another ministerial meeting in Oslo was discussed, as were other ways and means to make the views of the troop-contributors known more forcefully to the Security Council and to the parties

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themselves. The meeting ended in an agreement that a delegation consisting of three troop-contributing countries should immediately see the president of the Security Council to underline the demands of the t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t o r s that the Council take urgent action. Similar demarches were made to the Secretary-General, the United States, and the Soviet mission. The Security Council met the same afternoon, and a tough presidential statement about the situation was issued. There was a general feeling among the troop-contributors that their point had been made and their purpose thereby achieved, and no further steps were taken at that stage. The Norwegians made a new round of informal soundings with the other troop-contributors on the possibility of holding another ministerial meeting in Oslo during the escalation of events in the UNIFIL area in April-May 1981. They received positive answers from several member groups. Others, however, pointed to the new initiative that had been taken by the United States to find political solutions to the situation in Southern Lebanon (the Habib mission) and voiced the view that the troop-contributors should await the outcome of these efforts before they decided on any new initiative for themselves. In the aftermath of the June 1981 incidents in the Fijian sector, new meetings among the troop-contributors were held, but this time with the participation of the Secretariat. The question of holding more regular meetings between the Secretariat and the troop-contributors was discussed, but even in this context a number of the troopcontributors preferred that future meetings should be arranged on an ad hoc basis, as had been the case up to that point. After the difficult weeks and months following the Israeli invasion of June 1982, the Norwegians finally invited representatives from the other troop-contributors to a meeting at the Norwegian Permanent UN Mission in New York in September 1982, in connection with the general debate of the General Assembly. Several foreign ministers as well as the prime minister of the Netherlands took part in the meeting, which was chaired by Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs Svenn Stray. No formal communiqué or press statement was issued, nor were any new initiatives on the part of the troop-contributors contemplated. The meeting revealed, however, that there were important nuances in h o w the individual troop-contributors evaluated the situation. O n e group expressed strong dissatisfaction and impatience over UNIFIL's predicament far behind Israeli lines and stressed that UNIFIL must be given a more meaningful task or mandate to justify its continued presence in the area. While sharing the general dissatisfaction over UNIFIL's situation, other troop-contributors expressed the need for patience and supported the views of the Secretary-General that UNIFIL

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could still perform important tasks in Southern Lebanon, pending the outcome of negotiations on the Israeli withdrawal. During the 1982-1985 period, frustrations continued to mount in several of the troop-contributing countries over UNIFIL's situation. The Netherlands announced during the mandate renewal in January 1983 that the Dutch government would view its future participation in UNIFIL in the light of three general objectives: First, some progress should be made by the Lebanese government in the reestablishment of its authority in the country; second, there must be improvement in the prospect of withdrawing foreign troops from Lebanon; and third, any future role of UNIFIL would only be possible if the Force were able to operate effectively in an uninterrupted area u p to the Lebanese-Israeli border (Doc. S/PV. 2411 of 18 January 1983). In spite of some pressure from the United States and some of the other troop-contributors, the D u t c h g o v e r n m e n t r e d u c e d its p a r t i c i p a t i o n in UNIFIL in October-November 1983 from one battalion to a reinforced infantry company. In October 1985, the remaining Dutch contingent was withdrawn (Doc. S/17557). The withdrawal of the Nigerian battalion in January 1983 and the Senegalese battalion in December 1984 must also be seen as an expression of frustration over the complete lack of progress in fulfilling UNIFIL's original mandate. Even in some of the remaining troop-contributing countries—for example, Norway—both military and government representatives publicly stated that their countries' c o n t i n u e d participation in UNIFIL w o u l d have to be reviewed if the situation of the UN Force did not improve. In March 1985, the frustrations of the troop-contributors were summed u p in a letter to the Secretary-General (Doc. S/17067 of 29 March 1985). In this letter, the troop-contributors expressed d e e p concern over recent developments in Southern Lebanon. At that time, the number of incidents between UNIFIL and the Israeli Defence Forces had risen sharply as the Israelis tried to "clean up" the area before their unilateral withdrawal. The troop-contributors stressed that UNIFIL would only be able to carry out its original mandate if the Force were "allowed to be deployed and to operate effectively in an area that forms one uninterrupted whole u p to the internationally recognized boundary." They urgently called upon the governments of Israel and Lebanon to ensure the security of all concerned in the wake of a full Israeli withdrawal. In the expectation that these principles would apply to the future operation of UNIFIL, the troop-contributors indicated their willingness to continue to support the Force with a view to the implementation of the mandate given to it by the Security Council. A further meeting of the troop-contributors was held at the

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Permanent Mission of Finland in New York in June 1985 in connection with the kidnapping by the SLA of a group o f t w e n t y - o n e peacekeeping soldiers from the Finnish battalion. In a letter to the Secretary-General, the troop-contributors urged all governments having influence on the kidnappers to exert it so that the prisoners would be released unharmed and without delay (Doc. S/17251 of 10 June 1985). On later occasions, they met to discuss both the difficult operational situation facing UNIFIL and the financial problems caused by the withholding of U.S. contributions to UNIFIL's budget. A major problem in establishing a more organized cooperation among troop-contributors to a UN force is that there exists no sharp definition of their roles or responsibilities as a group in the UN Charter. In earlier attempts to elaborate guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations, the UN Special Committee on P e a c e k e e p i n g (the Committee of 33) has touched upon the role of the troop-contributors. No consensus solutions have been reached on the question of giving the troop-contributors a more formal responsibility in the management process of these operations, however. The lack of a constitutional base meant that the cooperation among UNIFIL's troop-contributing countries had to be conducted largely on an ad hoc basis. This was also made necessary by the fact that the prospects of seeing the group of troop-contributing nations emerge as an independent actor in the management of the UNIFIL operation was regarded with some skepticism within the Security Council, including by the Soviet Union. It was pointed out that the group of troop-contributors should not act in such a way that it interfered with the prerogatives of the Security Council or those of the Secretary-General. The French, who had the unique dual role of being both a permanent member of the Council and a troop-contributor, never hid the fact that they considered the cooperation between the troop-contributors as something of a sideshow to their participation in the Council. One attempt to establish a more formal consultation machinery for UNIFIL in which the troop-contributors would play an important part should nevertheless be noted. In April 1980, following the events that culminated in the murder of the two Irish soldiers, the Permanent Representative of the United States, Ambassador Donald McHenry, included a proposal in his statement to the Council that represented the most concrete proposal put forward in the Security Council on the establishment of new consultative mechanisms for UNIFIL: As another possibility, . . . members of the Council might wish to consider asking the Secretary-General to work closely with a commission composed of States contributing to UNIFIL to discuss and

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f o r m u l a t e n e w w a y s to help to e n s u r e the security of L e b a n e s e inhabitants o f that region and forestall acts of violence across the border, assisting UNIFIL in fulfilling its mandate. Members of such a commission might include, in addition to representatives of the troopc o n t r i b u t i n g States, third States w h i c h h a v e s o far not involved t h e m s e l v e s directly in the Southern L e b a n o n situation e x c e p t by supporting the peace-keeping responsibilities of the United Nations. Any such party would have to have a mandate broader than o n e of m e r e fact-finding. It should be c h a r g e d with the responsibility of actively s e e k i n g l o n g - r a n g e solutions to the serious threat to the p e a c e which the unresolved situation in the Southern Lebanon border a r e a presents. It should c o m e u p with c o n c r e t e p r o p o s a l s which ultimately might be presented to the Council and to other c o n c e r n e d parties (Doc. S/PV. 2 2 1 8 of 24 April 1980).

These proposals would have meant that important consultations and decisions affecting UNIFIL w o u l d have taken p l a c e outside the framework of the Security Council. The proposal was also drafted in such a way that the Soviet Union would not have been automatically included. It was therefore no major surprise that the U.S. proposals were immediately shot down by a statement in the same debate by Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky, who reaffirmed "our position on the Security Council's administration of UNIFIL." Since nobody felt that UNIFIL's interests could b e served by a controversy with the Soviet Union on this issue, the U.S. proposals were never given any active follow-up. The idea of involving at least some of the UNIFIL troopcontributors in the efforts to find political solutions to the Middle East conflict was considered by the United States one more time, in May 1982. This time the plans did not advance from the drawing board in Washington to the floor of the Security Council, and the proposal was never introduced in New York. The group o f troop-contributing countries to UNIFIL was not a homogeneous one. There were wide differences among the individual contingents in military and peacekeeping training, equipment, and leadership. In New York, there were considerable differences in the approaches and policies the countries had toward the Middle East conflict. Some of them, such as Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria, had no problem accepting the PLO as the sole and authentic representative of the Palestinian people; the Europeans had traditionally b e e n much more sympathetic to Israel. T h e r e w e r e also significant d i s c r e p a n c i e s in the d i p l o m a t i c resources available to each of the participating countries. Some o f the European troop-contributors had fairly large UN Missions in New York; e m b a s s i e s or diplomatic presences in Beirut, Tel Aviv, and other Middle East capitals; and good communications networks from their

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battalion areas to their capitals and to New York. These countries could follow events in Southern Lebanon almost on a day-to-day basis—sometimes even faster than the Secretariat—both as to political developments and administrative questions. Others, such as Fiji and Nepal, had very small missions in New York and, at best, rudimentary diplomatic presences in the Middle East. These factors make it possible to distinguish between a group of "activists"—countries such as Norway, Ireland, and the Netherlands—and a group of "traditionalists"—the Asian and African troop-contributors. The activists were more vocally impatient than the others about UNIFIL's situation and the lack of progress in the fulfillment of UNIFIL's mandate and a bit more inclined to suggest that the troop-contributors should do something about it. These countries also had domestic c o n s t i t u e n c i e s that e x p e c t e d some kind of action from their governments whenever incidents affected the security of their troops. The traditionalists, by comparison, were generally more cautious and more willing to leave the basic decisions affecting UNIFIL to the Secretary-General and his staff. Nevertheless, the perception of shared interests among the troop-contributors far outweighed the nuances that sometimes emerged on the tactical question of how the troopcontributors could best promote their cause. From the start of UNIFIL's existence, there was a remarkable identity of views on the underlying causes of UNIFIL problems. The drafting of letters and statements on behalf of the troop-contributors generally caused no major discussions among them. For the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, the group of troopcontributing countries in most cases represented a political and diplomatic resource that could be drawn upon in many of the crisis situations affecting UNIFIL, particularly during incidents affecting the safety of the troops. In these cases, a close cooperation served the interests of all parts o f the UN effort in Lebanon. T h e troopcontributors—through joint statements, letters or other communications, and bilateral channels—could give support and added weight to the steps taken by the Secretary-General to solve the crisis at hand. The governments of the troop-contributors, on their side, had a forum where they could vent their frustrations and discuss the situation with like-minded countries. The fact that the initiative for new meetings of the troop-contributors was expected to come from the country whose troops were directly involved in the crisis at hand also had a therapeutic function: The government of the country involved could show its public that initiatives were being taken and that something was being done. At other times, the impatience and the sometimes conflicting

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demands of the troop-contributors w e r e p r o b a b l y regarded as somewhat of a nuisance in the Secretariat. Their expectations that the Secretary-General should do something to get the Israelis, the PLO, or the various Lebanese factions involved to cooperate often seemed superfluous because the Secretariat was doing everything it deemed possible anyway. The veiled threats or signals that UNIFIL should b e wholly or partly withdrawn if the situation did not improve sometimes required considerable diplomatic footwork by the Secretariat to soothe nerves and to stress the need for patience. The regular contacts between the Secretariat and the UNIFIL troopcontributing countries have probably served to strengthen the concept that troop-contributors should have a voice in the management of UN p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s and that they must b e informed and consulted on all events or procedures affecting the safety of the individual contingents. On the other hand, the attempt of the group of troop-contributors to play a more political role in the conduct of UNIFIL affairs has also shown that this cooperation has its clear limitations and that its ad hoc character probably is the best model. After the 1980-1982 period, when meetings of the troop-contributors outside the UN building were first initiated, the ad hoc nature of this cooperation became generally recognized—even among the "activist" troop-contributors.

THE FINANCIAL PROBLEM In his initial report on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978), the Secretary-General stated the following on the financing of the UNIFIL operation: "The costs of the Force shall be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, p a r a g r a p h 2, of the Charter." In m a k i n g this recommendation, the Secretariat knew very well that this method of financing would not be acceptable to all member nations and that some member countries would refuse to pay their share. The only alternative financing system, however, would have been the UNFICYP model, which is based on voluntary contributions. For UNFICYP, this method of financing has led to a chronic deficit and heavy burdens both on its troop-contributors and on the relatively small number of countries that have extended voluntary contributions. By 1985, the backlog for reimbursements to the troop-contributors from the UN ran six to seven years behind schedule. The experience of this group of donor countries—which by definition is composed of the countries

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most positive to UN peacekeeping operations—has made clear that the UNFICYP financing model must be the exception rather than the rule. The principle of collective responsibilities enunciated in the UN Charter must also extend to the financing aspects of future UN peacekeeping operations. In the Security Council debate on 19 March 1978, the Soviet Union made it clear "that the costs to be incurred in connection with the consequences of Israeli aggression against Lebanon, including the cost of dispatching troops to Southern Lebanon, should be defrayed by the aggressor—Israel" (SCOR 2075th meeting). A similar statement was g i v e n by the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . China, as a nonparticipant in the vote, also announced that it would not undertake any expenses for the sending of the interim force. 13 The condition e x p r e s s e d by the Soviet Union and the East Europeans that the costs of UNIFIL should be borne by Israel was of course totally unrealistic. If this had b e e n a condition for sending UNIFIL to the area, the Israeli government would in all certainty have been even more negative about UNIFIL than it already was. Similarly, there was no way to force Israel to pay such costs, short of suspending Israel's right to vote in the General Assembly according to Article 19 of the Charter or through sanctions according to Chapter VII of the Charter, which the United States would not permit. When the Soviet Union shifted its position to a positive vote on UNIFIL's mandate in April 1986, it also indicated "its willingness henceforth to take part in the financing of that Force" (Doc S/PV. 2681 of 18 April 1986). In October 1987, the Soviet Union went one step further by announcing its readiness to consider participating in offsetting the deficits in UN peacekeeping operations. This signaled that the Soviet Union would also start repaying its accumulated debts to the budgets of UNIFIL and other UN peacekeeping operations. This step served to confirm a very constructive and positive change in Soviet policies toward such operations. The Security Council itself has no authority to allocate budget resources from the budget of the United Nations. To authorize the Secretary-General to enter into financial commitments for UNIFIL, a special session of the General Assembly was convened on 21 April 1978. Through resolution S-8/2, the General Assembly appropriated $54 million for operation of UNIFIL for the six-month period of its first mandate. 14 Resolution S-8/2 was adopted by the 8th Special Session by ninety-nine votes in favor, fourteen against, and zero abstentions. The Soviet Union and the other East Europeans (Romania and Yugoslavia excepted), Albania, Cuba, Laos, Syria, and Vietnam voted against, thereby indicating that they would not pay their share of the assessed

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contributions. A considerable number of UN members did not participate in the vote, among them several countries that have also refused to pay. 15 Resolution S-8/2 also invited "voluntary contributions to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon both in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General." Through resolution 34/9, Section D, adopted by the 34th General Assembly in 1979, the General Assembly later decided to establish a "suspense account" for UNIFIL, intended as a supplement for the regular budget of UNIFIL. According to the provisions governing the use of the suspense account, the resources of the account were to consist of voluntary contributions in cash made by governments, by international organizations, and by other private sources. In spite of repeated appeals by the Secretary-General, the flow of resources to the suspense account has been very small. By September 1987, only about $34,000 had been received from governments of member states as voluntary contribtions (Doc. A/42/692). The attitude of the Soviet Union and the other states that declared they would not pay their assessed share of UNIFIL's budget made it clear from the very start that UNIFIL would have to operate with a serious budget deficit. This situation was compounded by the fact that many of those m e m b e r states that a c c e p t e d their financial responsibilities tended to transmit their payments to the United Nations rather late. A significant time-lag problem in the reimbursement process to the troop-contributing countries was thereby accumulated. The growth of the budget deficit for UNIFIL has been chronicled through the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council before each renewal of the mandate. By the end of December 1987, the accumulated shortfall in the UNIFIL special account had reached an estimated $311.8 million (Doc. S/19445). From the beginning of UNIFIL in March 1978 until April 1986, the General Assembly had apportioned among member states a total amount of $1.4 billion. The shortfall had up to that point been increasing at an annual rate of roughly $25 million, which represents some 18 percent of the annual budget of UNIFIL. The Secretary-General repeatedly expressed his extreme concern about this state of affairs, which could "jeopardize the functioning of this important operation" (Doc. S/17965). As a result, he noted, "the Organization is falling far behind in the reimbursement of the troop-contributing countries, thus placing an unfair and increasingly heavy burden on them, particularly to the less wealthy ones." He therefore again appealed to all member states to pay their assessments without delay and appealed to the governments of the more-developed countries to give additional contributions to the

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UNIFIL suspense account. In UNIFIL's situation of chronic deficit, the UN had to give first priority to financing the running costs involved in keeping the operation afloat, such as food, spare parts, medicine, maintenance costs, fuel, and transportation. Reimbursement of the costs of the troop-contributors could only be made after such costs had b e e n covered. In UNIFIL's budget, such reimbursements a m o u n t e d to roughly 55 percent (plus/minus 2.5 percent) of the total costs. 16 The brunt of the deficits in UNIFIL's budget thus had to be borne by the troop-contributors themselves. To facilitate the recruiting of more Third World members to UN peacekeeping operations, one common rate of reimbursement was set for all contingents, regardless of actual troop costs. Generally, higher labor costs in the developed countries made these troops more expensive than troops from the less-developed troop-contributors. This situation can best be illustrated by some figures. In 1980, the standard rate of reimbursement for troop pay and allowances was fixed at $950 per person per month. An additional reimbursement of $70 was set for clothing and gear. Finally, each troop-contributing nation was granted reimbursements for depreciation of contingent-owned equipment. Because of the budget deficit, the UN could, until 1986, reimburse the troop-contributors only $750 pier person per month for pay and allowances and an even smaller share in the other categories. From 1986, as a result of the continuing nonpayment of assessments, reimbursement to the troop-contributors was reduced still further, first to $600, then to $415 per person per month. In theory, those contingents with actual troop costs of less than $600 per person per month could earn money on UNIFIL service. Even this calculus sometimes failed. Fiji, which joined UNIFIL for several political reasons, also hoped that its participation in the force w o u l d e a r n "badly n e e d e d f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e a n d r e d u c e unemployment." 17 These hopes were never fulfilled. By July 1983, the UN owed Fiji a sum of $10.03 million, which almost equaled Fiji's total e x p e n d i t u r e s o n its a n n u a l d e f e n s e b u d g e t . By 1988, t h e s e accumulated burdens had forced the Fijian government to consider whether it could afford continuing in UNIFIL. Even though the total costs of UNIFIL participation for these troop-contributors were less than those of their richer colleagues, they were much less able to afford such deficits. This problem is serious because it may jeopardize the efforts of the UN to assure a better geographical balance and to recruit more Third World members to UN peacekeeping operations. For the m o r e - d e v e l o p e d , t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t i n g c o u n t r i e s , the economic costs involved in UNIFIL participation in total figures could

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become quite high. Actual troop costs for monthly pay and allowances and for other expenses for most of these countries far exceeded the reimbursement rates of the UN. For the three Nordic troopcontributors, actual troop costs in 1985 were estimated to be the following (figures are in U.S. dollars): Pay and Allowance

Agreed Reimbursement

Actual Reimbursement

Finland

1,681

1,048

450

Norway

2,900

1,086

761

Sweden

2,083

1,090

790

For Norway and Finland, this meant that UN reimbursement covered less than one-third (26 percent) of actual troop costs.18 For Sweden, the percentage was slightly higher (35 percent), but nevertheless far from satisfactory. A significant part of the shortfall for these countries thus represented money that would not be reimbursed by the UN even had all member countries paid their assessed contributions. For relatively rich countries, such figures may not seem prohibitive. Nevertheless, the financial burdens involved in the UNIFIL operation contributed to a gradual feeling of exhaustion for many of the original troop-contributors, particularly when added to the frustration of not being allowed to fulfill the mandate. The fact that some of them unilaterally reduced or withdrew their contingents was at least partly caused by this financial factor. In many of the troop-contributing countries, a continuous discussion evolved among the different departments and ministries over the question of whether to continue or to withdraw from UNIFIL. Part of the opposition to continued UNIFIL service came from the ministries of finance. For those countries that had to go through periods of slow economic growth, recession, and balance-of-payment problems—which many of them have done during the ten-year period—it was sometimes difficult for the supporters of UNIFIL to advocate that it should be immune to the general cuts in public expenses. Doubts or opposition to continued UNIFIL service could also be heard from the defense establishments in some of the troopcontributing countries. Traditionally, military circles in troopcontributing countries have been very positive to UN peacekeeping service. In addition to adventure and travel, it gives added field experience and valuable training not otherwise available, for both officers and soldiers. If the costs of UN service have to be financed wholly or partly through the regular defense budgets, these costs have

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to be w e i g h e d against other d e f e n s e needs, however. In such evaluations, UNIFIL service did not always come out the winner. The situation described above represents more than a temporary problem that affects the UNIFIL operation. It also represents an erosion of the domestic base for UN peacekeeping service in countries that have hitherto been the staunchest supporters of such operations. So far, the political will to support UN efforts has been strong enough to overcome the burdens and the arguments described above. In situations where UN peacekeeping operations enjoy the full support of the parties concerned and are allowed to function according to their mandate, there is every reason to assume that the will to participate will be as strong as before. In situations where UN peacekeeping operations continue a prolonged existence without these conditions being present—as in the case of UNIFIL—the strains become serious. In December 1985, the U.S. Congress adopted a policy that meant a substantial reduction in U.S. assessed contributions to the UNIFIL budget. The Reagan administration made clear that it did not agree with this decision and that efforts would be made to reinstate the contribution to UNIFIL's budget. These efforts did not meet with any immediate success, which meant that the United States could not pay its assessed contribution for the period between April and October 1986. Later decisions by Congress also cut the U.S. contribution for fiscal years 1987 and 1988. In spite of administration efforts to convince Congress that the U.S. contribution to UNIFIL should be resumed, these efforts had not s u c c e e d e d by the spring of 1988. For the troopcontributors, these cuts added to the burden, and both individually and collectively, they urged the United States to resume its payments to UNIFIL in accordance with its obligatioas under the UN Charter. One such joint demarche, made in Washington in November 1987, gained media attention because of the somewhat unusual answer the troopcontributors received from Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead, w h o urged them to petition Congress themselves. 1 9 If the U.S. withholding of assessed contributions to UNIFIL's budget is allowed to stand, the consequences for UNIFIL's financial situation would be very serious.

NOTES 1. Based on list of troop-contributors in Henry Wiseman, Peacekeeping (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983). 2. Indar J. Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984), particularly Chapter 6. 3. Norway, together with other NATO countries such as Denmark and

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Canada, had also been a member of UNEF I in the Sinai from 1956-1967. In connection with the UNFICYP operation, the Soviet Union had signaled that it would have problems accepting more N A T O countries than those (Denmark, Canada, and the United Kingdom) that already took part. 4. According to a Norwegian newspaper, this position was restated by the Soviet Union in April 1986, when the question of a successor to General Callaghan was discussed in N e w York. According to this report, the possibility of a Norwegian officer as a replacement to Callaghan was raised by some quarters (not by the Norwegian government). In informal soundings, the Soviet Union again m a d e it clear that it was not p r e p a r e d to accept a Force commander for UNIFIL from a N A T O country. Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), 3 April 1986. 5. It should be noted that about t w e n t y observers from the U.S. contingent of UNTSO have served under UNIFIL command on a regular basis, without formally being members of UNIFIL. Until March 1985, the U.S. UNTSO observers w e r e based in the entire UNIFIL area of operation. Because of threats of kidnappings, they have since this period been largely restricted to UNTSO observation posts in the "security zone." 6. Brian Urquhart, " H o w Nations Might Unite in P e a c e k e e p i n g , " International Herald Tribune, 21 December 1983. 7. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger states the f o l l o w i n g v i e w on the participation of the Soviet Union in UN peacekeeping: "We were not prepared to send American troops to Egypt, nor would w e accept the dispatch of Soviet forces. We had not worked for years to reduce the Soviet military presence in Egypt only to cooperate in reintroducing it as the result of a UN resolution. Nor w o u l d w e participate in a joint force with the Soviets, which w o u l d legitimize their role in the area and strengthen radical elements." Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), 579. 8. Because Poland has no diplomatic relations with Israel, the Israeli authorities have severely restricted the movement of the Polish forces on the Israeli side of the deployment line. See The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping ( N e w York: United Nations, 1985), 107. 9. Senegal was clearly a borderline case in this respect. In 1978, Senegal's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Medoune Fall, served as chairman of the "Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People," on which the PLO had a major influence. 10. According to one explanation, the fact that UNIFIL soldiers tended to return to their home countries much more critical of Israel and Israeli policies than when they came was due to the fact that Israel, because of its traditionally high standing in countries like Norway and the Netherlands, was expected to live up to a much higher standard of behavior than the Arabs. When UNIFIL soldiers found that they had more problems with the Israelis and their allies than with the PLO—as was the case in the Norwegian sector—the reactions w e r e often strong. What particularly surprised and disappointed Norwegian UNIFIL officers was the Israeli misrepresentation of facts, the construction of

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episodes that had not taken place, deliberate provocations, and so on. See Odd Karsten Tveit, Nederlag (Oslo: J. W. Cappelen, 1985), 95-97. According to this analysis, the observation that such reactions led UNIFIL soldiers to switch their political sympathies to the PLO is probably exaggerated, however. See Harald Stanghelle, "UNIFIL og Norge—holdninger og myter," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 198511. One example of such demarches occurred during the April 1980 incidents, when Prime Minister Odvar Nordli of Norway wrote letters both to President Carter and Prime Minister Begin. In the letter to Begin, the Norwegian prime minister stated that "we can no longer tolerate the constant harassment and use of force against UNIFIL by Major Haddad and his troops." (See UD-informasjon (Oslo), nr. 16, 7 May 1980.) During 1985, the Norwegian government made several demarches to the Israeli government about IDF-SLA harassment of the Norwegian contingent as a result of incidents in the "security zone." (See Aftenposten, 25 March 1985). 12. Tveit, Nederlag, 60. 13. China, which announced on 19 March that it would not undertake any expenses for the UNIFIL operations, changed its position on UN peacekeeping operations in December 1980 and has since this period paid its assessed contributions. (See Chapter 10.) 14. According to a formula adopted by the General Assembly in 1973, the share assessed to the developing countries for the financing of UN peacekeeping operations was reduced to one-third of their share to the regular budget of the UN, the least-developed countries even less. The permanent members of the Security Council were, according to this formula, expected to cover the differential. 15. Until the Soviet Union's shift in position in April 1986, twenty-two countries refused to pay their assessed contributions to UNIFIL (Doc. S/179656). Apart from those fourteen who voted against resolution S-8/2, this group included Algeria, Benin, Democratic Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, and Yemen. 16. Ola Husa, "Forsyningstjenesten," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. 17. See Ramesh Thakur, "Ministate and macro-cooperation: Fiji's peacekeeping debut in Lebanon," Review of International Studies 10 (1984), 269-284. 18. On the other hand, it was argued by supporters of Norway's continued participation in UNIFIL that the annual costs of a UNIFIL soldier for the Defence Department amounted to 65 percent of the costs of keeping a conscript soldier in Norway for his regular military service. Total costs for the Norwegian government amounted to about 95 percent of these costs (since part of the cost of UNIFIL was covered by departments other than the Defence Department). See Ole Jacob Hald, "UNIFIL-operasjonens betydning for det norske forsvar," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. 19. Elaine Sciolino, "State Dept. Urges Foreign Envoys to Lobby Congress," International Herald Tribune, 18 November 1987.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Machinery and Models for Negotiations THE QUESTION OF A STATUS OF THE FORCE AGREEMENT

In earlier UN peacekeeping operations, it has proven highly desirable from an operational and legal point of view for the United Nations and the host government to reach a Status of the Force Agreement.1 Such an agreement defines the privileges and immunities of the UN force and its members, questions of jurisdiction with regard to the force, settlement of disputes and claims between the UN and nationals of the host country, and arrangements for the use of premises by the force. A particularly important element in such agreements has been provisions agreed between the contending parties for the freedom of movement of the force. From the point of view of the United Nations, complete freedom of movement not only in the area of operation but also in adjoining areas is desirable. Often this ideal condition has been restricted by the parties to the conflict, however. Access of UN force members to the territories controlled by the parties has, for instance, been restricted by advance clearance procedures, rules limiting the movement of UN forces to certain roads and hours, and regulations for search of UN vehicles. The last point has been of special importance in Lebanon, where road checkpoints established by local militias and groups have been an important symbol of power. In the case of UNIFIL, no such Status of the Force Agreement could be concluded. The Lebanese government, which would have been a main party to such an agreement, was never in a position to extend effective guarantees vis-à-vis the UN Force on the question of privileges and immunities for UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. Officially, the Lebanese government took the position that there was no need for a Status of the Force Agreement for UNIFIL, since Lebanon had 163

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formally recognized the validity of Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) and, consequently, also the provisions for the effective functioning of the Force that were defined in the Secretary-General's r e p o r t of 19 March 1978. This r e p o r t i n c l u d e d the f o l l o w i n g subparagraph on this point: "The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force and its personnel should be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations" (Doc. S/12611). As was the case with the three elements of the mandate, there was no consensus among the parties involved in the conflict in Southern Lebanon on the scope of these provisions. UNIFIL therefore had to sort out by improvisation—and by the gradual development of a network of local "understandings" with the different parties involved—many of the problems that are usually regulated by the Status of the Force Agreement. The efforts to solve these operational problems of the UN Force necessitated an almost continuous process of contacts and negotiations among all the parties involved. After a while, these negotiations became almost indistinguishable from the efforts of UN and UNIFIL to find a negotiated solution to the issues underlying the conflict. In the following, these different tasks will therefore be discussed together.

THE UN NEGOTIATING MACHINERY IN NEW YORK

An analysis of the UNIFIL operation would not be complete without an attempt to describe and to evaluate the negotiating m a c h i n e r y available, both for the purpose of crisis management and for the search for solutions to the underlying issues of the conflict. This analysis must include the UN structures involved in the UNIFIL operation, including the question of a status agreement and the alternative models for negotiations that have been put forward by the parties to the conflict in Southern Lebanon. The basic structure for the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations exists in specific branches of the UN Secretariat that have standing responsibilities for contingency planning and management. In New York, the staging of the UNIFIL operation was and is conducted from the Office of the Undersecretaries for Special Political Affairs, which is h e a d e d by two u n d e r s e c r e t a r i e s - g e n e r a l . O n e of t h e s e — B r i a n Urquhart—was responsible for all UN peacekeeping operations until his r e t i r e m e n t in J a n u a r y 1986, w h e n h e was s u c c e e d e d by

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Undersecretary-General Marrack Goulding. Given the fact that the office geographically is responsible for the handling of international conflicts all over the world, the staff has been amazingly small. The Military Staff within the office, which is responsible for the military aspects of all existing peacekeeping and observer missions of the UN, has four officials. On some aspects of peacekeeping operations, other departments within the Secretariat have responsibilities. In crisis situations, the Secretary-General's own cabinet may be mobilized. All administrative matters, including logistics and provisions, are handled by the Office for Field Operational and External Support Activities, which is a separate branch of the UN Secretariat. In this department, about fifty persons deal with UNIFIL matters. Roughly half of this staff is financed from the regular UN budget, the other half from the special account set up for UNIFIL. All necessary coordination with regard to UNIFIL operations, especially developments affecting the security situation of the UN Force, is conducted from the Office for Special Political Affairs. Reports and communications come to this office not only from the Force headquarters at Naqoura, but from the Jerusalem and Beirut offices of the United Nations. The office—as the representative of the SecretaryGeneral—is ultimately responsible for the handling of all incidents and events of the UN Force that might have political repercussions, both in relation to the Security Council and to the parties concerned. Because of the geographical distance from Southern Lebanon to New York, the problem of the different time zones involved, and because events in the field sometimes develop so fast that there is no time to get instructions from New York, a fairly large amount of responsibility has to be delegated to the Force commander. The New York headquarters of the United Nations is also a communications center for diplomatic communications, not only between the member countries of the United Nations and the UN Secretariat but among the individual members themselves. Through this communications network, the Secretariat is usually able to reach the governments of member states quickly, either through their permanent m i s s i o n s at the N e w York h e a d q u a r t e r s or t h r o u g h direct communications with the governments involved. This infrastructure is extremely important in crisis situations, when interventions from many countries have to be orchestrated in a short period of time to put the maximum pressure on the parties to get the problems under control as quickly as possible. The Secretary-General has b e e n closely involved in various political and diplomatic support actions for UNIFIL. Secretary-General Waldheim visited the area in April 1978 for an initial round of talks on

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the establishment and deployment of UNIFIL. Before and after this visit, the Secretary-General was personally involved in exchanges of messages with Prime Minister Begin on the speed and the modalities of the first Israeli withdrawal. Similar communications at the highest level took place during later crisis situations affecting UNIFIL—SecretaryGeneral Pérez de Cuellar paid a similar visit to Lebanon and Israel and to other Middle East countries in June 1984. The key person in the management of the UNIFIL operations in the 1978-1985 period was nevertheless Brian Urquhart. Urquhart has been working on UN peacekeeping activities almost since the UN was established and knows more about the subject than any other person alive. He has had extensive contacts with the parties to the Middle East conflict during previous UN peacekeeping operations and observer missions in the area. His integrity, impartiality, and neutrality toward this or other conflicts have never been seriously contested. As a general rule, Urquhart (and later Goulding) made a personal visit to the area before each renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL for talks with the Lebanese and Israeli governments, often also with Syria and the PLO. A prime objective of these talks was to find ways and means to remove obstacles that prevented fulfillment of UNIFIL's mandate. The Undersecretary-General had fairly free rein—within the framework of the parameters established by the Security Council—to consult with the parties concerned on all arrangements that could lead to mutually accepted solutions to the conflict in Southern Lebanon. Here again, reference can be made to the proposals presented in the Secretary-General's report of April 1984. This initiative led to the Naqoura talks in December 1984-January 1985, which had their origin in the visit made by Brian Urquhart to the area during March 1984. After the suspension of the Naqoura talks, Urquhart and his closest collaborators made repeated visits to the area to consult with the parties on security arrangements in Southern Lebanon through which UNIFIL could fulfill the role intended for it in the original mandate. Urquhart visited the area in January and April and again in June 1985 to discuss the implementation of Security Council resolution 561 (1985) renewing UNIFIL's mandate. Assistant Secretary-General F. T. Liu, whose record and experience of UN peacekeeping service is also very long, visited the region in May 1985. Other representatives of the UN Secretariat in New York were also involved in these negotiations, in particular Jean-Claude Aimée, director in Urquhart's office, who carried out a lengthy shuttle diplomacy in the region throughout 1985. From January 1986, Undersecretary-General Goulding continued the active involvement of the Office for Special Political Affairs in the political management of the UNIFIL operation.

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An important task of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat was to keep the Security Council informed about the evolvement of the situation in the area, both concerning its operational and its political aspects. The Secretary-General himself proposed the basic guidelines for the chain of command and responsibility in his report of 19 March 1978, which stipulated that The Force will be under the c o m m a n d of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The c o m m a n d in the field will be exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security C o u n c i l . T h e C o m m a n d e r will be r e s p o n s i b l e t o the S e c r e t a r y General. The Secretary-General will k e e p the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All m a t t e r s w h i c h m a y affect the nature o f the c o n t i n u e d effective f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e F o r c e will be referred to the Council for its decision (Doc. S / 1 2 6 1 1 ) .

The reporting requirements set up through this paragraph therefore were a continuous task not only during the initial phase but before each successive renewal of the mandate or whenever the situation in the area called for it. Some of the reports were requested by the Security Council through separate paragraphs in resolutions concerning UNIFIL. The Security Council on several occasions asked the Secretary-General to report on the situation in the area before the expiration of the existing mandate period. In this way, the Council and the Secretary-General could indicate to the parties concerned that developments in the area were followed closely in New York and that the general situation was under frequent review. Apart from such cases, the Secretary-General has significant latitude in his judgment about both when to report and how to report. During the first six-month mandate period, for example, the SecretaryGeneral produced no fewer than six progress reports on UNIFIL (released on 23 March, 2 April, 8 April, 17 April, 6 May, and 13 June). He also gave oral reports to the members of the Council, both in informal consultations and in open meetings. During many of the successive crisis situations affecting UNIFIL, the Secretary-General issued special reports, often combined with oral briefings for Council members in informal consultations or in open meetings, on situations that needed the attention of the Council. For the members of the Security Council, the troop-contributors, other interested member countries of the UN, and the media, the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council generally were an extremely valuable source of information about the situation in the

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area. First, they gave the basic facts about the series of incidents between the opposing parties, which often also involved clashes with UNIFIL personnel. This was in itself important in order to balance the flow of communications to the Security Council from the parties themselves, which gave only their version of events. Second, the reporting system b e t w e e n the Secretary-General and the Security Council was also a two-way street through which the Secretary-General could indicate, through his observations and recommendations, when and where he needed some support from the Security Council. World public opinion can also be an important tool for the Secretary-General in certain situations. The written reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council are public documents, available to other UN members outside the Security Council and to the media. In s o m e situations w h e r e access to news and events is otherwise restricted, factual information can be a powerful aid. UNIFIL observers sometimes suspected that an important reason behind the Israeli opposition to a UNIFIL deployment in the "security belt" in the 1978-1982 period, to a UN presence in Beirut in June 1982, and to UNIFIL's general presence in Southern Lebanon in the post-1982 period was the fact that UNIFIL and other UN observers could watch what was going on and make this information available to UN member states and the world media. A special feature of the periodic reports published before each renewal of the mandate was the concluding chapter that contained "observations" about the more political problems affecting UNIFIL at the time. Compared with reports of the Secretary-General about other conflict areas in the world, these observations were often remarkably outspoken. Brian Urquhart wrote most of these observations himself during his tenure, and they left little doubt about which party deserved blame, criticism, or praise. Often the severest criticism was directed at the Israelis and their local cohorts—something that in the political environment of the United Nations is a fairly easy and popular thing to do. But the PLO and the armed elements by no means escaped criticism whenever this was deserved, which sometimes was more unpopular. Such observations were as a rule based on factual events or c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and w e r e always p r e s e n t e d in a n o n p o l e m i c a l manner. Almost from the first month of UNIFIL's existence, the reports of the Secretary-General were testimony to the frustrations felt by the Secretariat because of the lack of sufficient cooperation from the parties concerned. This feeling of frustration was not lessened by the fact that the key officials k n e w from experience that they or the Secretary-General could do little about it.

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In this reporting about UNIFIL, the Secretary-General employed nearly every verbal approach imaginable. These included praise, encouragement, deploration, criticism, condemnation—anything that might have an effect—in a combined carrot-and-stick approach. The carrot offered to the Israelis was, of course, that UNIFIL could offer a reasonable guarantee for stopping armed infiltrations into Israel if the UN Force were allowed to take charge of the area all the way down to the Lebanese-Israeli border and if harassment of the Force by Christian militia forces (armed and controlled by Israel), could be stopped. The Israelis, as discussed in Chapter 3, never accepted the offer, preferring their own special solutions to their security problems. The stick part of the Secretary-General's approach also suffered from a lack of effective tools. The Secretary-General cannot threaten any member country with sanctions according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter even if he wanted to, which the Secretary-General generally does not. That is the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council. The ultimate threat at the disposal of the Secretary-General would have been to recommend to the Security Council that the Force be withdrawn from Southern Lebanon. Such a step could possibly have created more pressure on the Lebanese government and on the United States, which least wanted such a withdrawal. An important argument against any threat of withdrawal, however, was that it was completely ineffective against the most important party—the Israelis. During most of the UNIFIL period, they would have welcomed such a withdrawal rather than regretted it. A second concern for the Secretary-General was the general prestige of UN peacekeeping operations. If UNIFIL had been withdrawn without having been able to fulfill its mandate, it would inevitably have been seen by important elements in world public opinion as a new defeat for the United Nations—as another sign that UN peacekeeping was not effective in containing international conflicts. Such a criticism would have been unfair and unjust because the reason behind the withdrawal would not have been any intrinsic fault in the UN peacekeeping system but the lack of cooperation from the parties concerned. Nevertheless, it would in all probability have been made. The morale of the UNIFIL troop-contributing nations also had to be considered. The Secretary-General already had difficulty convincing some of the troop-contributors that their continued participation was indispensable because UNIFIL itself was essential for the maintenance of relative peace and security in Southern Lebanon. If the SecretaryGeneral himself started to suggest that the presence of UNIFIL was no longer that necessary, the risk was always there for its piecemeal disintegration through withdrawal of individual contingents.

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Therefore, the Secretary-General's use of threats in his reports on the future course of UNIFIL had to be couched in general, indirect terms. One example is the Secretary-General's repeated use of the expression that UNIFIL's situation was "unacceptable," when both UNIFIL and the Secretary-General had few other choices but to continue to accept it. These repetitions were therefore soon perceived by the Israelis to be empty threats, and probably rightly so.

THE REGIONAL STRUCTURES The Establishment Period

In the Middle East, a skeleton structure for negotiations also existed. Since 1949, the UNTSO has provided mediating services to the parties to the general armistice agreements between Israel and its four neighboring Arab states of 1949. It provided a pool of officers with extensive personal experience in Middle Eastern affairs for the establishment of UNF.F II in October 1973, which in turn provided the nucleus of UNDOF when this force was set up in May 1974. UNTSO played much the same role during the establishment of UNIFIL, by providing the new UN Force with its first commander, General Emmanuel A. Erskine of Ghana, and with diplomatic back-up functions from the UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem. This was also the base of the chief coordinator of the United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Middle East at the time, General Ensio Siilasvuo of Finland. Even though General Siilasvuo is known to have advised against the creation of UNIFIL in March 1978, he had personal experience from UNEF I and II, UNFICYP, and UNDOF in the problems of establishing a new UN peacekeeping operation, as well as from diplomatic negotiations with the parties to the conflict. 2 In his first report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978), the Secretary-General stated that he had instructed Siilasvuo to contact the Israeli and Lebanese governments for the purpose of reaching agreements on the modalities o f the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the establishment of a United Nations area of operation. During April, May, and June 1978, General Siilasvuo repeatedly met with Defence Minister Weizman, with the chief of staff of the Israeli D e f e n c e Forces, and with other Israeli military representatives to discuss Israeli plans for the successive phases in the withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. In spite of his title as chief coordinator of the United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, General Siilasvuo had no supreme military command functions over the missions' force

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commanders. The commanders of UNIFIL, UNEF II, and UNDOF all reported directly to the Secretary-General in N e w York. General Siilasvuo's functions were therefore much more political than military, and he continued to be an important liaison for the Secretary-General for high-level contacts with the parties until his retirement in December 1979. At that point, his chief coordinator's post was discontinued, and the chief of staff of UNTSO was ordered to perform general liaison functions regarding United Nations peacekeeping activities in addition to his normal tasks (Doc. S/13994 of 12 June 1980). In Beirut, a similar skeleton structure existed for contacts with the Lebanese government. In 1976, the Secretary-General had established, at the request of the Lebanese government, a special fund for humanitarian assistance to Lebanon for the victims of the civil war. To determine needs and to coordinate relief assistance, the SecretaryGeneral had appointed a special representative, John Saunders. During the first days of UNIFIL's existence, he was authorized to reallocate existing funds to meet the most pressing humanitarian needs in the wake of the Israeli invasion CDoc. S/12620 of 23 March 1978) Later, he provided a more general liaison channel with the Lebanese authorities in Beirut whenever required. When Saunders left Lebanon in March 1979, his successors assumed the same functions. At times, the director of the United Nations information center in Beirut also provided services beneficial to UNIFIL. In the second half of 1979, UNIFIL established its own office in Beirut, which, in addition to providing accommodation for UNIFIL personnel on duty, also served as a location where UNIFIL representatives could meet with Lebanese authorities and others (Doc. S/13691 of 14 December 1979). For the military aspects of the UNIFIL operations, the Beirut liaison officer was important in order to facilitate movements of UNIFIL personnel in Southern Lebanon. More administrative tasks, such as procurement, also were handled from the Beirut office. The Location of the Force Headquarters Although the skeleton structure for negotiations and mediation in the UNIFIL area was established on 19 March 1978, it took more time to make the Force headquarters fully operative. Part of the reason for the delays derived from the problem in deciding on the right location. The forward headquarters at Naqoura was not satisfactory because it was completely surrounded by the enclave controlled by the de facto forces. The initial plan of action (Doc. S/12620) stated that plans were being worked out to establish UNIFIL headquarters at Tyre as soon as possible. When these plans had to be abandoned because of the PLO presence there, a proposal was made to move the headquarters to

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Zahrani, north of the Litani River and the UNIFIL area. Even this had to be given up because of the presence of Syrian troops—members of the Arab Deterrent Force—in the proposed location. In spite of a direct appeal from Secretary-General Waldheim to President Sarkis of Lebanon, the Syrians refused to leave. In the end, it was decided to keep the headquarters at Naqoura. Some observers saw the decision to stay at Naqoura as a serious mistake for which UNIFIL had to pay a heavy cost.3 In view of later events, particularly the repeated attempts of Haddad's forces to block free movement of UNIFIL personnel in the area, there can be little doubt that this choice negatively affected the headquarters' capabilities with regard to the command and control functions vis-a-vis the individual contingents. On the other hand, it has also been argued that locating the UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura had certain advantages. It facilitated communications with the UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem and the observation posts in the enclave. It also made the conduct of contacts and negotiations with the Israeli Defence Forces easier than they would have been had the headquarters been situated north of the UNIFIL area.4 As a result of the constant harassments by the de facto forces in the 1979-1980 period, the question of moving the headquarters from Naqoura was again considered. At that time, the Lebanese government opposed a move because it wanted to keep at least a UN flag in an area of Lebanon otherwise controlled by the Israelis through their proxies.5 During later phases of UNIFIL's existence, particularly after the deterioration of the situation in and around Beirut from 1983 onward, UN officials maintained that it would have been next to impossible to provide UNIFIL with necessary logistic or administrative support if the headquarters had been situated north of the Litani.6 The Beirut airport was closed for extended periods of time, and UN cars and convoys were repeatedly blocked or delayed at the numerous checkpoints manned by different armed groups along the road. Hijackings of UN cars were also frequent and very costly for the UNIFIL budget. Rotation of troops and other logistic services therefore had to be arranged through Israel to a large extent. The Military and Political Infrastructure In the first phase of the UNIFIL operation, even General Erskine's tasks were at least as much political as military, as the Force commander had to be in constant contact with the parties on matters concerning the deployment and functioning of the Force.7 The establishment of an operative staff at Naqoura took considerable time, however. When the first contingents arrived in Southern Lebanon in late March 1978, there

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were practically no staff resources available at Naqoura. During the main deployment stage in April, a staff o f about twenty-five to thirty officers gradually became operative. It has been estimated that it took three to four w e e k s to get this nucleus of the headquarters staff operative to such a degree that it could assume the functions of the interim command. Even at that time, the headquarters was still a long way from being able to cope with all the problems at hand. 8 According to one officer serving with the UNIFIL headquarters during the first year, the initial implementation of the mandate given to UNIFIL had to a very large extent to b e improvised, "partly in an amateurish way." 9 The professional military element of UNIFIL that gradually was put in place was therefore not present during the most critical phase of UNIFIL's deployment. This observation again leads to the question of whether the United Nations could or should establish at least a skeleton military infrastructure to be better able to act quickly a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l l y in t h e c a s e o f n e w a s s i g n m e n t s for UN peacekeeping operations. It also highlights the more general question of how such operations can be better prepared even in their military a s p e c t s . T h e c a s e h a s b e e n m a d e f o r c e f u l l y that military a n d administrative advice and expertise should b e included along with political e x p e r t i s e from the outset and that s p e c i a l i z e d military e x p e r t i s e s h o u l d b e i n c o r p o r a t e d as s o o n as an o p e r a t i o n is c o n c e i v e d . 1 0 T h e problems e n c o u n t e r e d in the deployment and establishment period of UNIFIL were considered during the discussions of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping of the General Assembly during its meeting in 1979. As has been the case throughout the period of existence of this committee, n o consensus could be reached among its members on how these problems could be handled, and no further progress on these issues has been registered since then. 1 1 The delays in making the UNIFIL headquarters fully able to take care of necessary military support functions meant that the individual c o n t i n g e n t s had to tackle most o f the difficult p r o b l e m s o f the deployment stage largely on their own. In some cases, particularly during the early period, it was necessary for the battalion commanders to use other channels to get the crisis at hand under control as quickly as possible in order to ensure the safety of their troops. For those troop-contributors that had national embassies in Tel Aviv and/or Beirut, it sometimes was necessary to use national channels to reach the Israelis or the PLO quickly at sufficiently high levels of authority to get the situation under control. Such initiatives sometimes created coordination problems for the Naqoura headquarters because not all the troop-contributors could draw u p o n such national diplomatic channels in the area. In general, however, the need for both orthodox

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and unorthodox crisis-management methods was recognized by the Secretariat. After the difficulties of the deployment phase, such procedures cannot be said to have created any major problems for UNIFIL's functioning. If the establishment of a military infrastructure had to be started almost from scratch, the situation has b e e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d as significantly better concerning the infrastructure for logistical and administrative services. 12 In this area, the staff of the Office for Field Operational and External Support Activities provided a valuable nucleus. At the F o r c e headquarters, these matters w e r e the responsibility of the chief administrative officer, who was a civilian reporting directly to the Force commander. Potentially, this division between civilian and military responsibilities could have created problems had the chief administrative officer perceived his functions as a kind of "superchief' of staff. In practice, this potential problem does not seem to have occurred because the continuous operational p r o b l e m s facing UNIFIL made the military c h i e f of staff an indispensable link concerning both the military and the various logistical problems involved in the management of the UNIFIL operations. 13 On political questions, the Force commander could draw on the assistance of a senior political adviser, who was based at the Naqoura headquarters. This post has been held by a series of highly entrusted officers, usually recruited from the New York headquarters. The senior political adviser's ability to establish personal contact with the different actors in the field—thereby keeping UNIFIL informed about their prevailing moods and thinking—has been described as indispensable for UNIFIL.14 The liaison structures set up for contacts with the parties were also quite elaborate. With the Israelis, contacts at the political level in principle were channeled through the UN headquarters and the Israeli permanent mission to the UN in New York. At military levels, liaison channels were set up to the main liaison office of the Israeli Defence Forces in Jerusalem, to the Northern Command in Nazareth, and to lower-level liaison offices in Tiberias, Metullah, and Rosh Hanikra. Similar liaison channels were established to the Lebanese government and to the PLO. 15 These liaison procedures later became the subject of several revisions. In some international conflicts, the Secretary-General—often after initiatives from members of the Security Council—has appointed a special representative charged with the diplomatic and political contacts and negotiations with the parties to the conflict. In Cyprus, such a special representative exists alongside the force commander of UNFICYP. The idea of appointing a special representative of the

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Secretary-General for the conflict in Southern Lebanon has been suggested from time to time, including by the Lebanese in 1979. 16 The Secretary-General and the Secretariat have seen no need for such a position, however, and the proposal has never been formally made in the Security Council. The existing setup, with the UNIFIL commander and his staff handling the operational contacts with the parties, and representatives from the Secretariat in New York supplying additional diplomatic services, has been judged satisfactory. During the 1984-1985 period, for example, the mission of Jean-Claude Aimée of the Secretariat filled most of the functions that would have been assumed by a special representative. The lack of support for the idea of appointing a special representative must also be seen as a result of the observation that the main problem of UNIFIL has not been lack of proper channels for contacts and negotiations with the parties to the conflict.

THE LOCAL STRUCTURES

In the battalion areas, separate negotiating structures had to be set up as the individual contingents moved in during March-May 1978. In spite of the efforts made by General Siilasvuo and Force Commander Erskine, a host of problems awaited the individual battalions as they tried to assume control over their designated areas of deployment. A number of ethnic, religious, and political factions and groupings existed in the area, with many separate and conflicting attitudes about the UN Force. Each battalion therefore had to establish its own structures for negotiations, mediation, and communications with the individual groups or powers in their area. The foundations for the future work of a UN operation are very often laid during the deployment period. During this period, it is of major importance that the different contingents can operate on the basis of common centralized guidelines and procedures. In the case of UNIFIL, the process of translating the general guidelines in the Secretary-General's report into more detailed operational orders adapted to the situation in Southern Lebanon did not proceed quickly enough to provide sufficient guidance to the first battalions during the deployment period. To a considerable extent, these had to resort to their own individual interpretation of the terms of resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). This factor has been described as a major weakness of the UNIFIL operation in its first phases. 17 A characteristic of most negotiations with the various parties was that they had to be conducted indirectly. As a general rule, the

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different adversaries preferred to shoot at each other instead of solving problems by direct talks. UNIFIL constantly had to act as a go-between, conducting negotiations first with one side and then with the other. With the Israelis, negotiations concerning the modalities of the withdrawal were conducted largely at battalion level. With other groups, contacts had to be set up at troop level or at each observation post. Whereas negotiations with the Israeli Defence Forces in the deployment phase generally were conducted in a professional and orderly manner, the de facto forces usually conducted negotiations by way of first formulating demands and then threatening to start shelling if the demands were not met. 18 Often they shot first and formulated their demands afterward. The local PLO groups and affiliated armed elements initially were openly hostile to the attempts of UNIFIL to assume control of their former positions. Leadership of the different groups changed frequently, and contacts often had to be reestablished with new personalities. 19 During the deployment phase, the task of crisis management became the first and foremost priority in order to deescalate the succession of confrontations and conflicts that met the individual battalions as they moved in. A communications infrastructure had to be established to each of the groups—often through telephone lines—in order to reach the local leaders quickly when incidents erupted. 2 0 Sometimes, these communication channels were suddenly "out of order." When such occurrences coincided with local provocations, it could be interpreted by UNIFIL as a planned incident, one not instigated by uncontrolled elements. This also made it possible for UNIFIL to react more firmly to show who was in control, 21 as the telephone lines had a tendency to be suddenly repaired when needed. At the same time, attention also had to be given to the task of preventive diplomacy and to low-level confidence-building measures aimed at increasing trust and understanding. Liaison officers were appointed, both from UNIFIL contingents and from some of the groups, and a system of regular contact meetings—for example, on a weekly basis—was developed. In the negotiation of these agreements, several concerns had to be respected. One of these was the problem of formal or informal recognition of the different groups, discussed in Chapter 3. This problem derived from the pressure from many of the groups to conclude agreements with UNIFIL at the highest level possible. This was thought to enhance the prestige of the group in question because it implied a certain degree of recognition by the United Nations. For UNIFIL, it was not possible to extend any formal kind of recognition to groups that were not officially recognized by the Lebanese government, however. From UNIFIL's side, these problems

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therefore had to be handled through working arrangements negotiated at lower levels, either at battalion or even at troop levels. Generally, problem-solving and crisis management were easiest at lower levels. If higher levels became engaged, more prestige also became involved. The multilayered negotiating structure of UNIFIL and U N peacekeeping operations generally made it possible to deal even with this problem. In some contingents, six or seven levels w e r e set up to deal with problems before reaching the level of the battalion commander. 22

STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS In this description of the negotiating structure of UNIFIL at the N e w York, regional, and local levels, some structural problems must also be noted. O n e of these concerns the problem of continuity. At the N e w Y o r k l e v e l , the continuity has b e e n v e r y strong. T h e personal experience and expertise of the Secretary-General, the office of the undersecretaries for special political affairs, and other key officials in the U N Secretariat in mediating international conflicts have been the strongest assets o f any U N i n v o l v e m e n t in attempts to negotiate p e a c e f u l settlements of international conflicts and have b e e n of invaluable importance for the survival of UNIFIL. Brian Urquhart's experience alone in this field was probably unmatched in international politics during the 1978-1986 period. At the regional level, UN officials and officers are shifted or rotated more frequently, and continuity decreases. At the Force commander level, UNIFIL had only three officers during its first ten years, which should b e seen as a definite advantage. At the deputy commander level, however, the normal tour of service became shorter. The same was true for most other members of the UNIFIL staff at Naqoura. It was mainly at the battalion level that continuity became a real problem, however. Many of the individual contingents were rotated every six months. Even though some of the officers and soldiers served for two periods or even more, a lot of personal trust and confidence between UNIFIL and the different groups and leaders in the area was lost with each rotation. Rotation periods were often exploited by some of the armed groups and militias, which tried to capitalize on the i n e x p e r i e n c e a m o n g the n e w troops to push f o r w a r d their o w n positions. T h e redeployments of UNIFIL battalions that w e r e made necessary b y the goings and comings of new troop-contributors also became the targets of such attempts at exploitation. A second problem, related to the last point, concerns the fairly w i d e g a p b e t w e e n the b a c k g r o u n d o f the i n d i v i d u a l national

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contingents of UNIFIL. These differences were evident both concerning military training and equipment and how the individual battalions interpreted their mission and instructions. Comparisons and rankings of the qualities and weaknesses of the individual battalions were favorite sports of both UNIFIL officers and outside analysts. 23 In spite of all attempts by the Naqoura headquarters and the Secretariat in New York to impose a common operational procedure, there was no ignoring the fact that the individual battalions came from very different cultures and backgrounds. The decentralized command structure of UNIFIL added to this problem. During the period of Israeli occupation from June 1982 to the spring of 1985, there were, for example, somewhat varying interpretations within the different sectors on what right the occupying power should be accorded concerning access to UN areas and some aspects of its freedom of movement. In the Norwegian sector, a very strict interpretation was adopted, quite probably more strict than what the Naqoura headquarters thought was advisable. 2 4 As this strict interpretation was practiced with impartiality, and since it was grudgingly accepted by the Israelis, no major problems arose. The net result was probably beneficial for UNIFIL since it increased the respect for the UN Force both among the local population and among Israeli officers. Nevertheless, the fact that some battalions soon were rumored to be strict, whereas others were more lax in the interpretations of the standard operational procedure, made it possible for the Israelis, the PLO, and the local groups to exploit differences and to press UNIFIL at the weakest points of the Force. 25 During the first half of 1987, Force Commander Hagglund initiated a number of revisions in the standing operating procedures aimed at ensuring that the tasks assigned to individual units were carried out in as uniform a manner as possible by all units of the Force. With the present recruiting p r o c e d u r e s of UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operations, it is difficult to find easy solutions to any of these problems. Under more "normal" peacekeeping operations, in which the parties concerned cooperate with the UN force in the fulfillment of its mandate, these factors generally have less importance. In situations where the parties do not cooperate, the old adage that "a chain is not stronger than its w e a k e s t link" b e c o m e s more important. H o w planning, training, and rotation procedures could be ameliorated on these points is probably among the questions that should be studied in further detail in later analyses of the UNIFIL experience. A third p r o b l e m that should be noted concerns intelligence functions. For obvious reasons, it was impossible for UNIFIL (or other UN peacekeeping operations) to set up separate intelligence systems charged with the task of providing military or political intelligence

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about the plans of groups or persons in the host country. UNIFIL was therefore obliged to concentrate its efforts in this field on technical means to augment its surveillance and detection capability. Initially, this system was based on networks of checkpoints, observation posts, and mobile and foot patrols (Doc. S/13691 of 14 December 1979). Intelligence was subsequently reinforced by the introduction of nightvision binoculars, stronger searchlights, and sophisticated ground surveillance radar that provided UNIFIL with an early warning system at medium range, which enhanced the capability of the Force to block incursion attempts and apprehend infiltrators. Apart f r o m t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e , a m i n i m u m o f a d v a n c e information would have been desirable for the UN Force to prevent incidents or to make preparations to handle situations that arose from such incidents. Israeli officials often pointed to UNIFIL's lack of adequate intelligence services as one of the main weaknesses of the Force in its effort to maintain peace and security in the area. UNIFIL officials maintain, on the other hand, that substantial amounts of intelligence data and information could be obtained through voluntary information offered by persons or groups in the area. In the post-1982 period, for example, local Lebanese groups regularly kept UNIFIL informed about possible PLO movements to the south. During this period, the most serious problem in this respect probably came from UNIFIL's failure to reach a more c o m p l e t e understanding with fundamentalist groups, such as the Hizbollah. This relative failure must, however, be weighed against the fact that these groups proved to be e x t r e m e l y difficult to p e n e t r a t e e v e n for m a j o r i n t e l l i g e n c e organizations operating in the region, including the Israelis. UNIFIL o f f i c i a l s , as i n d i c a t e d a b o v e , s a w the p r o b l e m of intelligence as much more a question of rights for a UN peacekeeping force faced with a national resistance movement than as a problem of setting up intelligence structures. A more advanced intelligence organization can, in any case, be seen as contrary to the very basis of UN peacekeeping operations, founded as they are on the premise of cooperation from the parties concerned.

A MACHINERY FOR PEACEMAKING: THE OPTIONS OF THE CONFLICTING PARTIES

The Lebanese Model: Reactivating ILMAC In principle, the negotiating machinery of UNIFIL and the SecretaryGeneral can be used both for indirect contacts and mediation between the parties and as an initiator of and a third-party presence in direct

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negotiations b e t w e e n the parties. To transcend the level of crisis management to the level of creating lasting solutions to underlying p r o b l e m s , that is, from p e a c e k e e p i n g to p e a c e m a k i n g , direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict become a necessity. D i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s a i m e d at p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t o f a r m e d international conflicts very often require a more carefully defined political and institutional framework, however. In the Middle East conflict, the search for such a negotiating framework has proved to b e almost as elusive as a solution to the conflict itself. One of the goals of the UN's efforts in Southern L e b a n o n has b e e n to contain the immediate crisis with the h o p e that the two countries c o n c e r n e d meanwhile would seek solutions to current and underlying problems in their relationship through negotiations. Before the establishment of UNIFIL, the only existing framework for such direct contacts was the Israeli-Lebanon Mixed Armistice C o m m i s s i o n (ILMAC), w h i c h w a s c r e a t e d u n d e r the a r m i s t i c e agreement between Israel and Lebanon signed on 23 March 1949 as part o f the General Armistice Agreement b e t w e e n Israel and its neighboring states. According to the armistice agreement b e t w e e n Israel and Lebanon, the Mixed Armistice Commission was composed of five m e m b e r s . Israel and L e b a n o n e a c h w e r e to d e s i g n a t e two members. The chairman of the commission was to be the chief of staff of UNTSO or his representative. On the Israeli side, the commission had its headquarters in Metullah, while the Lebanese headquarters was situated in Naqoura. Later the Lebanese headquarters of ILMAC was moved to Beirut, where it also functioned as a liaison office for UNIFIL and for the chief coordinator of the United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Middle East (Doc. S/12845). A key point in the argument between the Lebanese and the Israeli governments on the validity of the armistice agreement concerned Article III, particularly paragraph 2: No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article V of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party. 2 6

A major problem with ILMAC was that the commission had b e e n largely paralyzed since the June 1967 war. T h e Israeli government maintained that Lebanon, because it had declared a state of war against Israel during the war, had unilaterally voided the armistice agreement

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between the two countries and that ILMAC therefore no longer had any functions. In spite of this position, a limited number of UNTSO observers continued their task of supervising the agreement on the Lebanese side of the border. In 1972, following a request by the Lebanese government, the number of UNTSO observers was increased from seven to twenty-one by force of a consensus document of the Security Council (Doc. S / 1 0 6 1 1 o f 19 April 1972). This document also contained two observations regarding the scope and acceptance of this decision. One was from General Siilasvuo, chief of staff of UNTSO at the time, who pointed out that the three new observation posts envisaged could not provide comprehensive coverage of the armistice demarcation line and that the "posts therefore must be considered rather as a limited United Nations presence on one side of the line which would provide only a measure of observation and a somewhat more rapid supply of information from UNTSO sources than exists at present." The second observation was an objection by the Israelis concerning the Lebanese requests. The continued role of ILMAC was stressed in the first report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978). The Secretary-General stated as one of the assumptions underlying the establishment of UNIFIL that it represented an interim measure until the government of Lebanon assumed its full responsibilities in Southern Lebanon. According to the Secretary-General's report: "The termination of the mandate of UNIFIL by the Security Council will not affect the continued functioning of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, as set out in the appropriate Security Council decision" (Doc. S/12611). The Lebanese government maintained during the entire period of UNIFIL's existence in Southern Lebanon that ILMAC was the only acceptable framework for direct talks with the Israeli government. The Lebanese policy on this issue was set forth in further detail in the Secretary-General's report of 13 June 1978, in which the Lebanese government defined five principles that were supposed to govern the state of affairs in the area, "pending full establishment of Lebanese authority, including military forces, in the UNIFIL area of operation." The Lebanese stated that all border problems shall henceforth be discussed with UNIFIL and in the f r a m e w o r k o f a r e - a c t i v a t e d I s r a e l - L e b a n o n M i x e d Armistice Commission, a meeting of which was held on 12 June, the Lebanese Government being represented by senior military officers from Beirut (Doc. S / 1 2 6 2 0 / A d d . 5).

In addition to the 12 June meeting, which was held before the fourth

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stage of the Israeli withdrawal the following day, a second meeting of ILMAC was held on 30 July, before the movement of the Lebanese army unit to the south (Doc. S/12834 of 5 September 1978). Israel's initial position on the proposal to reactivate ILMAC was not negative. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 3 August 1978, Foreign Minister Dayan wrote: "Please be advised that the Government of Israel is considering agreeing to reinstate the Lebanese/Israeli General Armistice Agreement of 1949 in order to enable Israel to consider the matter positively. We request a reaffirmation from the Government of Lebanon that it will abide by all the provisions of the Agreement, including article III. . . ," 27 According to Ambassador Tueni, the Lebanese government replied that it was prepared to abide by the terms of the armistice agreement. In a lengthy memorandum to the Security Council setting forth the Lebanese government's legal interpretation of the status of the armistice agreement (Doc. S/13361 of 30 May 1979), the Lebanese argued that the armistice agreement was, by virtue of the conditions stated in its preamble, "imperative and permanent since its termination is not merely contingent upon the parties' mutual agreement, but also and more specifically upon the establishment of a 'permanent peace in Palestine.' " The Lebanese also maintained that the Security Council alone was empowered to act on both the interpretation and revision of the agreement "on the grounds that this Agreement has b e e n concluded in pursuance of Security Council action towards the end of achieving peace in Palestine." In a private letter to the SecretaryGeneral, dated 15 June 1979, the Lebanese government asked for an increase in the number of UNTSO observers so that these could report "with unimpeachable impartiality" when and where violations took place with regard to the General Armistice Agreement (SCOR 2164th meeting). In a sharply worded statement to the Security Council on 12 June 1979, the Israeli Permanent Representative rejected the proposal to reactivate ILMAC and reverted to the earlier position of Israel on the status of the armistice agreement. In his statement, Ambassador Blum referred to the events of June 1967, when the Lebanese government rejected a request by Israel for a meeting of ILMAC "in view of the state of war." According to the Israeli view, "by these declarations and actions, the Government of Lebanon made it clear that it considered that the Armistice Agreement had come to an end" (SCOR 2147th meeting). Israel felt the armistice agreement was a bilateral instrument between the two countries, which were the only parties to it, and it was "totally inadmissible" for the Lebanese "to make others party to it." The Israelis interpreted paragraph 2 of Article III solely in the

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perspective of the presence and the activities of the PLO in Southern Lebanon—note the reference to "para-military forces" and "non-regular forces." According to Ambassador Blum, Lebanon had for years ignored its obligations flowing from both the armistice agreement and general international law by permitting the PLO to perpetrate acts of terrorism from their bases in Southern Lebanon against targets in Israel. The existence of the 1969 Cairo Agreement was seen as a direct proof of this policy. As long as those fundamental obligations were not respected—"and assurances are not forthcoming that they will be respected—reference to the Armistice Agreement and the frameworks established under it can scarcely be meaningful," Ambassador Blum stated (SCOR 2147th meeting). In accordance with its own legal interpretation of the armistice agreement, the Lebanese government sought a new confirmation from the Security Council of the continued validity of the agreement and ILMAC. In resolutions 450 and 459 (1979), which renewed UNIFIL's mandate in June and December 1979, the Lebanese delegation managed to have included separate paragraphs in which the Security Council reaffirmed the validity of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon and called upon the parties to take the necessary steps to reactivate the Mixed Armistice Commission. The effort to reactivate ILMAC was also an integral part of the various programs and plans of action presented to the SecretaryGeneral and to the Security Council by the Lebanese government for the purpose of strengthening its authority in the area in the 1978—1982 period. (See Chapter 3.) These efforts were continually being frustrated by the Israelis, however, not only in the Security Council chamber but also in the fields. The UNTSO observation posts in the border area were repeatedly subjected to harassment by Major Haddad's de facto forces. Necessary movements were being denied, supplies were being cut, and elements from the de facto forces forced their way into the UNTSO observation posts. The attacks on the UNTSO observation posts—quite apart from the fact that they were a source of irritation for the Israelis because they could observe troops and movements within the enclave occupied by the de facto forces—also must be seen as attempts to undermine the armistice agreement of which UNTSO was a part. The conflict about the UNTSO observation posts and ILMAC was particularly brought to the forefront in March-April 1980. Following the establishment of UNIFIL, these posts had been under the operational control of the UNIFIL commander. Four of them had also been staffed by UNIFIL personnel because of a temporary shortage of UNTSO observers for this purpose. In early 1980, the UNIFIL commander

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decided to replace the observers at these four posts with UNTSO personnel as these became available. The Israeli Defence Forces and the de facto forces initially raised no objections, but in early March, the de facto forces advised UNIFIL that they no longer agreed with the plan for the return of UNTSO observers. Nevertheless, UNIFIL went ahead, and in the following weeks, the observation posts were subject to intense harassment that in April escalated into the UNIFIL area, leading to the kidnapping and murder of the two Irish UNIFIL soldiers (see Chapter 3). Resolution 467 (1980), adopted on 24 April following the escalation of tension and incidents in the UNIFIL area, included a direct request to the Secretary-General to convene a meeting, at an appropriate level, of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission to agree on precise recommendations and to reactivate the General Armistice Agreement. The Secretary-General and the chief of staff of UNTSO followed up on the Security Council's request at the end of May 1980 (Doc. S/13994 of 12 June 1980). During the next mandate period, these efforts continued through a series of consultations. The Israeli representatives maintained their position that ILMAC was no longer valid, but indicated that they would welcome a meeting with representatives of the Lebanese government. UNTSO and UN representatives stated the position of the United Nations—the General Armistice Agreement and ILMAC remained vaiid, in the absence of a decision by mutual consent of the signatories or by the Security Council or the General Assembly. A meeting between representatives of the Lebanese and Israeli authorities finally took place in Naqoura on 1 December 1980. The meeting was chaired by the chief of staff of UNTSO, who also had the dual capacity of being the chair of ILMAC. The Israelis stated both before and during the discussions that they considered the meeting as a contact between representatives of the two governments and not as a preliminary meeting of ILMAC. The Lebanese repeated their view that the armistice agreement was still valid and stated that it was their aim, through that and future meetings, to reactivate ILMAC and to implement the armistice agreement fully. During the rest of the period until the second Israeli invasion in June 1982, the Secretary-General and the UNTSO staff continued to make efforts to reactivate ILMAC according to the resolutions of the Security Council. A meeting of ILMAC was proposed in April 1981 in connection with the escalation of tensions in the area. The efforts broke down, however, on the Israeli refusal to recognize ILMAC. By June 1982, the efforts to reactivate this channel for direct communication and negotiation between the two governments

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appeared to be completely stalemated. In the post-1982 period, the ILMAC issue receded as long as direct contacts and negotiations between Israel and Lebanon were still going on. When the breakdown of the 17 May 1983 agreement signaled that this attempt at direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon had failed, the search for a negotiating formula again became an issue. The Lebanese government continued to support a reactivation of ILMAC, but this aspect was no longer stressed as strongly as before in the Security Council. For example, references to reactivation disappeared from draft Security Council resolutions on UNIFIL presented by the Lebanese delegation. Unless the Israelis change their stand on this issue, this avenue seems closed for the time being. Israel has been completely alone in its rejection of the armistice agreement and the proposal to reactivate ILMAC. Even the U.S. delegation, in a statement in the Security Council on 14 June 1979, made it clear that in the view of the United States "the Armistice Agreement remains in force" and that they "support the machinery provided by the 1949 Armistice Agreement as offering one way for the Government of Israel and Lebanon to be in contact" (SCOR 2149th meeting). The arguments used by the Israelis in this respect, based on the 1967 war, are of course historical and formalistic in character. Had Israel seen a revival of the armistice regime as being in its interest, it seems safe to assume that a solution would have been found to circumvent the J u n e 1967 events. For the Israelis, a r e n e w e d commitment to the armistice arrangement on the Lebanese border could mean that other neighboring states would reinvoke their parts of the agreement. It would also imply that even Israel would have to abide by the terms of Article III and that it therefore would have to abandon its policies of retaliatory or preventive military strikes across the border. It would also mean a return to past arrangements that Israel had judged unsatisfactory when it was trying to establish new security arrangements on its northern border better suited to Israeli needs. Thus, the question of a reactivation of the armistice agreement and ILMAC returns to the problem of finding security arrangements in the border region that would satisfy both the Lebanese and the Israeli governments. This is, of course, also UNIFIL's mission, and the question of a future role for ILMAC therefore seems intimately linked with the future of UNIFIL and the UN in Southern Lebanon, as stated in the Secretary-General's initial r e p o r t on the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of resolution 425 (1978).

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The Israeli Model: Managing Without the UN The alternative o f the Israeli government for finding a solution to the problems on its northern border has b e e n through direct bilateral negotiations without any presence or participation by the United Nations. The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed in March 1979. It did not take many weeks before the Israeli government p r o p o s e d a similar negotiating model for the settlement o f the problems between Israel and Lebanon. In a speech to the Knesset on 7 May 1979, Prime Minister Begin e x t e n d e d a direct appeal to the president o f Lebanon, inviting him to a meeting with a view to reaching a negotiated peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon. Prime Minister Begin declared himself ready to travel to Beirut or to invite President Sarkis to Israel for that purpose (SCOR 2146th meeting, 31 May 1979). T h e Lebanese government was no more accommodating to the Israeli model for negotiations than the Israelis had b e e n to the proposal to reactivate ILMAC, however. No official bilateral contacts took place between the two countries in the period before the 1982 invasion. Nevertheless, as Schiff and Ya'ari have amply documented in their book, quite a lot of very unofficial and secret contacts took place between the Phalangists in Lebanon and Israeli representatives during this period. T h e 1 9 8 2 i n v a s i o n and the e l e c t i o n o f B a s h i r G e m a y e l ( a s s a s s i n a t e d b e f o r e taking o f f i c e ) and then Amine G e m a y e l as president of Lebanon changed the political environment in Lebanon, at least for a while. In the months following the invasion, the Israelis tried hard to use their military p r e s e n c e in L e b a n o n as a territorial bargaining asset to b e traded for a peace treaty that gave maximum c o n s i d e r a t i o n to Israeli security interests in the b o r d e r r e g i o n . Paradoxically, these negotiations and their ultimate results were very much complicated by the fact that Israel disturbed its own negotiating model by introducing conditions or elements not directly linked to the bilateral problems between Israel and Lebanon—namely, the prior or simultaneous withdrawal of PLO and Syrian troops from Northern and C e n t r a l L e b a n o n . 2 8 T h e Syrian i n f l u e n c e , c o m b i n e d with t h e undercurrent of anti-Israeli feelings in the majority Muslim population in Lebanon, may have been so strong that the ultimate fate of the 17 May agreement might not have been different, even if the negotiations had b e e n kept solely to bilateral problems. Its chances for survival would nevertheless probably have been better had the agreement had not been overloaded with such sensitive issues. T h e negotiations that led up to the 17 May agreement w e r e conducted completely outside the framework of the United Nations,

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and the agreement was not communicated to the Security Council, either by the Lebanese or by others. T h e 17 May agreement represented the high point of the direct bilateral contacts between Israel and Lebanon. The Syrian and internal opposition to the agreement, which led to its eventual cancellation in March 1984, meant that in the future it would be very difficult for any Lebanese government to enter into direct bilateral negotiations between the two countries outside the framework of ILMAC. President Amine Gemayel has attempted to draw some lessons from the 1982 war and its aftermath. On the question of direct negotiations with Israel, he writes: "A second and related lesson, this one of specific relevance to the immediate Arab-Israeli theater, is that no Arab government except Egypt will, or can, pursue any extended negotiations with Israel without strong and clearly manifested support in the Arab world." 29 In the same article, President Gemayel also makes two other observations in the elaboration of the point. He writes that "Syria cannot be excluded if a settlement in the region is to be seriously considered" and that "the PLO, with all its diverse membership, is involved in the Middle East problem"—as are Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt as countries bordering on Israel. In the light of the growing Syrian influence in Lebanon from 1983 onward and the further weakening of the authority of the Lebanese government, it is very difficult to imagine circumstances changing to a point that would again make it possible for any Lebanese government to repeat the attempt to negotiate a separate peace agreement with Israel independent of Syria or other Arab nations. After the suspension of the Naqoura talks in January 1985, the Israeli government also seems to have given up its hopes of finding a solution to its problems on its northern border through direct negotiations, at least as long as the Lebanese government continues to be without any real authority within Lebanon itself. For the time being, it therefore seems that even this road for settling the conflict in Southern Lebanon through negotiations is blocked for the foreseeable future.

The Arab Model: The International Peace Conference Since 1983, Arab efforts (including by the PLO) to reach a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict have been concentrated on the proposal to convene an international peace conference on the Middle East. In several respects, the proposal can be seen as a continuation of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East, which met in December 1973 under United Nations auspices as a follow-up to Security Council resolution 338 (1973). A main difference between the Geneva Conference model and the proposal for the international peace

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conference is that the latter proposal explicitly presumes that the PLO shall take part in the conference. According to a General Assembly resolution from 1983 that contains "guidelines" for the proposed conference, all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict are invited to participate in the c o n f e r e n c e "on e q u a l footing and with equal right"—including the PLO, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other concerned states (Doc. A/RES/38/58c). This condition has, of course, not made it more palatable to Israel. On this question, Israel has received full support from the United States. 30 The question of the PLO's participation (or finding another formula for the participation of representatives of the Palestinian people) has not been the only obstacle to the proposal to convene the conference. As the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated in the early 1980s, the question of Soviet participation in the proposed conference also became the subject of controversy (see C h a p t e r 9). This issue w a s also l i n k e d to the q u e s t i o n of reestablishment of Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations. During the s e c o n d half of 1985 and winter of 1986, a series of informal consultations initiated by the United States took place on the international peace conference, based on a preliminary agreement between King Hussein of Jordan and Chairman Arafat of the PLO to "move together toward the achievement of a p e a c e f u l and just settlement of the Middle East crisis and the termination of Israeli occupation of the occupied territories" (Doc. S/17581 of 22 October 1985). Following a new break between Jordan and the PLO in early 1986, this a v e n u e for negotiations w a s s u s p e n d e d for a while. Nevertheless, Jordan, supported by Egypt and other Arab countries, continued to insist that any direct talks on a lasting solution must take p l a c e w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of a U N - s p o n s o r e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference. The Israeli's have traditionally opposed the idea of an international peace conference on the Middle East. In an important statement to the UN General Assembly on 23 October 1985, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres indicated more flexibility on this issue, however. He stated that, if necessary, negotiations with a view to reaching peace treaties between Israeli and Arab states—as well as to resolving the P a l e s t i n i a n i s s u e — " m a y b e initiated w i t h the s u p p o r t of an international forum." 3 1 During 1986 and 1987, this position was developed further into open support on the part of Peres and the Labour party for the concept of an international conference as a first step toward direct peace talks. In a new peace effort conducted by U.S. Secretary of State Shultz d u r i n g the s p r i n g of 1988, the international c o n f e r e n c e was once again put at the top of the

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negotiating agenda. T h e Shultz plan was blocked, at least for the time being, b y firm opposition from Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. It must b e stressed that neither the proposal for an international peace c o n f e r e n c e nor other m o d e l s for an international f o r u m are primarily geared to the conflict in Southern Lebanon, but rather at a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s o l u t i o n to the M i d d l e East c o n f l i c t . It might

be

presumed, h o w e v e r , that any negotiations aimed at a comprehensive solution w o u l d also h a v e to deal with the p r o b l e m s in Southern Lebanon, including the future status o f the Palestinian refugees in the area. In the short run, the possibilities o f an early convening of the c o n f e r e n c e appear to b e b l o c k e d b y the PLO's refusal to formally recognize Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and b y Israeli refusal to a c k n o w l e d g e the "territory f o r p e a c e " formula inherent in this r e s o l u t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the shift t o w a r d an a c c e p t a n c e o f

the

conference idea on the part of the United States and the Israeli Labour party suggests that this formula might b e the only avenue possible toward negotiations o n a lasting peace in the Middle East.

NOTES 1. Ingrid Lehman, "United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations in the 1970's," in SIPRI Yearbook, 1980 (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1980). 2. Siilasvuo, Ensio, "United Nations Peace-keeping in the Middle East: Lessons and Prospects," RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 26 (December 1981). 3. Indar J. Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984), 105. 4. Jean-Pierre Colin, "Liban: Ombres et lumières sur la FINUL," Défense Nationale, 36/1980. 5. Naomi Joy Weinberger, "Peacekeeping options in Lebanon," Middle East Journal, vol. 37, no. 3, Summer 1983, 343. 6. Secretariat member, personal interview, November 19857. Examples: Doc. S/12620 Add. 5; Doc. S/12621; Doc. S/12845. 8. Helge Faret, "Problemer og erfaringer med à starte en FN-aksjon i et konfliktomrâde," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 4B, 1978. 9. Martin Vadset, "UNIFIL—kommando og koordinering," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. Colonel Vadset served as Deputy Chief of Staff and subsequently as Deputy Commander of UNIFIL in the 1978-1979 period. He later became Chief of Staff of UNTSO. 10. Rikhye, The Theory, 206-207. Rikhye argues further that "there is a need to establish suitable and co-ordinated procedures at the highest level within UN headquarters." 11. Ibid., 192-193. 12. Vadset, "UNIFIL."

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13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ghassan Tueni, personal interview, October 198517. Vigar Aabrek, "Militaer taktikk i f r e d e n s tjeneste," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985, 136. Colonel Aabrek served as the first battalion commander of the Norwegian contingent from March to September 1978. 18. Major Haddad regularly threatened UNIFIL officers that "I have to shell you" with heavy mortars if his demands were not met, say, within ten minutes. As a general rule, UNIFIL did not give in to such threats, but the efforts to avoid escalation often put high demands on the negotiating skills of the UNIFIL officers concerned. See Ole Ranning, "Forhandlinger og konflikter lokalt," InternasjonalPolitikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. 19. Vigar Aabrek, "Megling i felten og prosedyrer i forbindelse med trefninger," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 4B, 1978. 20. Ole Renning, "Forhandlinger," 149. 21. Ibid. 22. Martin Hjelmervik Ness, "FN i o k k u p e r t omride—UNIFIL etter invasjonen i 1982," Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. 23- For example, see Naomi Weinberger's article, which reports that "the Fiji battalion . . . earned a reputation for toughness in dealing with guerrillas" and that "the Senegalese were known to be lax in supervising the PLO, and the N e p a l e s e b e c a m e q u i t e c o z y with H a d d a d ' s militia." W e i n b e r g e r , "Peacekeeping," 344. 24. Ness, "FN." 25. See Marianne Heiberg, "Observations on UN Peace-Keeping in Lebanon," NUPI-Notat, nr. 305, September 1984. 26. See Rosalyn Higgins, UN Peace-Keeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1969). 27. This letter was not published as a Security Council document, but was made public in a statement by Ambassador Tueni in the Security Council on 29 August 1979 (SCOR 2164th meeting). 28. At least o n e prominent analyst has seen this linkage as "a wellconceived ploy" to satisfy the United States in a situation where the Begin government did not really wish to have to abide by the agreement. See George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Middle East Peace), 66-68. 29. Amine Gemayel, "The Price and the Promise," Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 4, Spring 1985. 30. Four countries voted against resolution 38/58c (Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United States). Fifteen countries abstained, including most of the EC countries, Costa Rica, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the Solomon Islands. 31. Jerusalem Post, 23 October 1985.

CHAPTER NINE

The Role of the Security Council: The Political Constraints In his report to the General Assembly on the agenda item called "the situation in the Middle East" in October 1984, the Secretary-General s u m m e d u p s o m e of the b a s i c p r o b l e m s that since

1948 h a v e

hampered all attempts to negotiate a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict: There has always been the question of whether talks should be direct, or indirect through some intermediary. There has been the question of whether negotiations should be between Israel and her Arab neighbours one on one, or conducted by all the parties concerned together. There has been the question of whether the negotiating process should be comprehensive or step by step. And there has been the controversy over the manner in which the Palestinian people should be represented (Doc. S/16792 of 26 October 1984). After reviewing the status of proposals that w o u l d use the machinery of the United Nations to negotiate a solution to the M i d d l e East question—including the Geneva Conference model and the proposal o f c o n v o k i n g an international p e a c e c o n f e r e n c e o n the

Middle

East—the Secretary-General referred to his proposal to involve the Security Council more actively in such negotiations: Earlier this year, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, I discussed with a number of Governments concerned the possibility of using the machinery of the Security Council in a new way to work with the parties concerned on various aspects of the Middle East problem and to distil from the various proposals and plans that have been put forward in recent years the common elements that could help to work out the basis of a negotiating structure. I believe that such a process, if it could be initiated, might still have served to clear the ground and to prepare for a full-fledged effort to negotiate the problem.

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These observations serve as a useful introduction to the issue posed at the beginning of this study—of the role of the Security Council in the management of the UNIFIL operation. Through resolution 425 (1978), the Security Council passed the responsibility for the implementation of the decision to establish UNIFIL into the hands of the Secretary-General. Chapters 7 and 8 have described in some detail the structures established and the efforts made to execute this mandate. The ultimate criterion for any peacekeeping operation and for any negotiating structure is, however, in its results. And in spite of the dedicated professionalism, experience, and efforts of the UN Secretariat and the officers and soldiers who have served with UNIFIL, this machinery has not in itself enough influence, power, or authority without enjoying "at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council," as stated by the Secretary-General in his initial report on UNIFIL (Doc. S/12611). The decisions of the Security Council have been referred to repeatedly in this study. From the description of events in Chapters 2-5, it is evident that not even the Council has managed to tackle the problems that have affected UNIFIL from the start. This study will now analyze the basic political and constitutional constraints in the Council's discussions and decisions on UNIFIL. In other words, what are the limitations—and the possibilities—of the Security Council in the management of a UN peacekeeping operation like UNIFIL? Starting from the elementary, but too-often forgotten observation that the Security Council is no more than the sum of its individual members, it is necessary first to investigate the most important political dimensions in the work of the Security Council on UNIFIL. Foremost among these, of course, is the regional conflict, which encompasses the conflict between Israel and its neighboring Arab states, the Palestinian problem, and—particularly in Lebanon—the role of Syria. T h e positions of the regional actors involved in the political environment of the UNIFIL operation have been described and analyzed in previous chapters, however, and need not be repeated here. Other important dimensions—for UNIFIL, the Lebanese conflict, and the ability of the Security Council to fulfill the obligations invested in it under the UN Charter—include the relationship among the permanent members of the Security Council. In this context, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is of particular importance. In addition, the U.S.-Israeli relationship is a major factor. To understand the constraints of the Security Council in the management of the UNIFIL operation, it is necessary to examine the impact of these relationships.

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THE SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Pre-1978 Contacts One of the misfortunes of UNIFIL was that it was established at a time when the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had just taken a sharp turn for the worse. In fact, the period between 1978 and 1985 was characterized by extremely poor relations between the two superpowers, including in the United Nations. Even t h o u g h major c a u s e s of this g e n e r a l deterioration o f superpower relations were to b e found in factors extraneous to the Middle East—such as the stalemate over the Soviet deployment of intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, the ensuing response by the NATO countries, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan—there was also a major split between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Middle East conflict. The most visible issue in this split was the preparations and the negotiations of the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which occurred in the same time period as the establishment and deployment of UNIFIL. Other and more long-standing issues, such as their respective positions on the Palestinian issue and the role of the PLO, also divided the two superpowers. For most U.S. administrations, the question of what role the Soviet Union should be accorded in the Middle East peace negotiations has been an important underlying factor in the formulation of U.S. policies. Originally, the Carter administration was positive about giving the Soviet Union such a role through the reconvening o f the Geneva Conference on the Middle East. 1 The Carter administration proceeded on this diplomatic track up to the issuing of a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the Middle East by Foreign Ministers Vance and Gromyko on 1 October 1977. In this statement, the two co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference put down on paper certain joint principles that were meant to be a step toward reconvening the Geneva Conference, not later than December 1977. The substance of the joint U.S.-Soviet statement—which did not mention the situation in Lebanon—was based largely on the text of earlier UN resolutions on the Middle East and contained nothing dramatically new. It omitted, however, some elements crucial to Israel and c o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e d as leaving the d o o r ajar for a PLO participation in the negotiations. In Israel, the U.S.-Soviet statement caused an uproar that rapidly spread to U.S. public opinion. To calm the storm, the U.S. government issued a new statement on 4 October 1977, this time as a joint U.S.-Israeli statement, which by many

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observers was seen as a repudiation of the 1 October statement. In the views of one analyst, these events represented "a momentous reverse for American diplomacy," and the quick retreat by the U.S. government had "considerable influence on expectations of America's ability and willingness to bring her Jewish client to heel in the future."2 If the road back to Geneva was not completely blocked by the events of 1 and 4 October 1977, the U.S. effort to use this framework as a vehicle for its peace efforts in the Middle East was halted by President Sadat's historic journey to Jerusalem on 19-20 November 1977. From then on and for the rest of the Carter administration, all energy available for the peace efforts in the Middle East was spent on the Camp David process. And because the Soviet Union joined the general Arab condemnation of the Camp David process, the events of October-November 1977 also meant a suspension of U.S.-Soviet cooperation to find negotiated solutions to the Middle East conflict.

Soviet Policy Toward UNIFIL and the UN For the Soviet Union, the UNIFIL operation has been a frustrating experience, at least during its first seven years. When the U.S. proposal to establish a UN force in Lebanon was presented, the Soviets were caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, it was difficult for the Soviet Union to openly support a U.S. initiative in the Middle East in a period when the Soviets and the radical Arab countries were very suspicious of the U.S. role in the rapprochement between Israel and Egypt. A positive vote on resolution 425 (1978) could also have meant that the Soviet Union accepted its part of the financial responsibility for the UN Force. On the other hand, it was necessary to do something to get the Israelis out of Southern Lebanon. In this connection, the Soviets were under pressure from some of the Arab countries that supported the idea of sending a UN peacekeeping force to the area. A U.S. diplomat has also pointed to heavy lobbying by the nonaligned members of the Council in securing "Soviet acquiescence in resolutions on [Rhodesia and] a UN Force in Lebanon that Moscow would probably have opposed otherwise." 3 The Soviet Union used three arguments to explain its abstention during the vote on resolution 425 (SCOR 2074th meeting). One argument was directed against the third part of UNIFIL's mandate—the reestablishment of the authority of the Lebanese government in the area. (See Chapter 3 ) The second was that the draft was not strong enough in its criticism of Israel. A third reason given by the Soviet Union for not voting for resolution 425 (1978) was that amendments to the U.S. draft put forward by the Soviet delegation during the consultations were not

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considered by the U.S. delegation. Some of these amendments reflected long-standing Soviet positions on UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operations, such as the principle of a time-limited mandate. These concerns were generally addressed in the Secretary-General's report and the subsequent adoption of resolution 426 (1978), but Soviet irritation over the fact that it was forced to stand on the sidelines during the establishment of UNIFIL was obvious. In the 1978-1982 period of UNIFIL's existence, the Soviet Union gave every impression of being at least as frustrated as everybody else with UNIFIL's general situation and the lack o f progress in implementing the original mandate. The sharpest language was from the start directed against the Israelis. Some examples: "this behaviour of Israel is a direct and inadmissible defiance of the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole" (SCOR 2076th meeting, 3 May 1978), "deliberate sabotage of the decisions of the Council," and "deliberate flouting of the legitimate authority of the Security Council" (SCOR 2106th meeting, 8 December 1978). The call for stronger language against Israel in the Council's resolutions and the threat that the Council should consider adopting sanctions against Israel in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter were r e p e a t e d in a great number of statements by Soviet representatives in the Council during the successive phases of the crisis in Lebanon. Characteristically, these two elements were brought together in the only draft resolution submitted to the Council by the Soviet Union on the situation in Lebanon during the 1978-1988 period. This occurred on 6 August 1982, after the Israeli move into West Beirut, when the Soviets introduced a text that "strongly condemns Israel for not implementing resolutions 516 (1982) and 517 (1982)" and that would have the Council decide that "all the states' members of the United Nations should refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons and from providing it with military aid until the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory" (Doc. S/15347/Rev. 1). The draft was, of course, promptly vetoed by the United States, and the whole exercise proved that the policy of condemnations or sanctions never was a particularly effective or realistic policy—neither in 1978, nor in 1982, nor in later stages. The fact that the Soviet delegation knew perfectly well that the United States (and probably also the United Kingdom and France) would veto any proposals to adopt sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the UN Charter did little to lessen Soviet frustrations. Some propaganda effect could possibly be derived from the fact that the United States was largely isolated in its noncondemnation policy toward Israel, but even in the UN, the value of such exercises is fairly limited.

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On the question of strengthening the role and effectiveness of UNIFIL, the attitude of the Soviet Union can best be characterized as being one of very reluctant acquiescence. This was evident in Soviet statements both with respect to the 3 May 1978 decision to lift the troop ceiling of UNIFIL to 6,000 men and to the 23 February 1981 debate on increasing UNIFIL's size to 7,000 (resolution 501). Here again, the reasons given by the Soviets for not vetoing a strengthening of UNIFIL were the same as during the 19 March decisions—namely, that the Soviet Union gave consideration to the position of the Arab parties directly concerned. When the Soviet Union shifted its position in the Security Council from an abstention to a positive vote on UNIFIL's mandate in April 1986, the Soviet representative, Ambassador Dubinin, gave two reasons for the change. First, he referred to Israel's "provocative actions . . . to complicate the activities of UNIFIL and in the long run to drive it out of Lebanon" (Doc. S/PV. 2681 of 18 April 1986). In the circumstances then, the Soviet Union shared the opinion of the Lebanese government to retain the presence of UNIFIL in Lebanon. "In so doing, our basic postulate is that such a presence acts as a decisive factor impeding the implementation of Israel's aggressive plans in respect of Southern Lebanon," the Soviet ambassador stated. Second, he added that the Soviet Union had acted the way it did because it had taken "into account the appropriate appeal from the Lebanese Government." The two reasons given by the Soviet Union for its shift on UNIFIL should probably be taken at face value, although Soviet self-interests were also very much present. In the months preceding the April 1986 renewal of the mandate, the Lebanese had worked through several channels to make the Soviets adopt a more positive attitude toward UNIFIL, including by sending a parliamentary delegation to Moscow. From the Lebanese side, this was a clear sign of disenchantment with the loss of U.S. interest in helping to solve the problems in Lebanon. By responding positively to the Lebanese signals at that point, the Soviets could hope that their move would be seen in flattering contrast to the disengagement of the U.S. interest in UNIFIL (as manifested through the congressional decision to cut the U.S. contribution to UNIFIL's budget, which became effective at the same April 1986 renewal). After having been largely on the diplomatic sidelines during most of the Lebanese crisis in the 1978-1986 period, the Soviet Union, by showing that it would finally live up to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council in the collective financing of UNIFIL, would also strengthen its influence in any future international discussions about security arrangements in Southern Lebanon acceptable to the Lebanese (and Syrian) governments.

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Soviet Relations with the Arab Parties to the Conflict The attitudes and postures of the Soviet Union during the key Security Council decisions on UNIFIL and the situation in Lebanon thus seern to indicate that its position to a large extent has been influenced by the Arab parties involved. In this respect, the Soviet delegation also played a significant role in defending the interests of the Syrians and the PLO in the drafting of Council resolutions and decisions. As both the Syrians and the PLO could use the Arab and nonaligned channels within the Council to promote their views, resorting to the assistance of the Soviet delegation was not necessarily their first option. Since most members of the Council knew that language unacceptable to the Syrians or the PLO would be subject to implicit or explicit threats of a Soviet veto, this relationship nevertheless defined one of the important parameters for the Council's decisions on UNIFIL and Lebanese matters. This became particularly clear in the 1985-1984 period when proposals to establish a UN or UNIFIL presence north of the Litani were discussed. In principle, the role played by the Soviet Union in relation to the PLO and Syria was not very different from the role played by the United States in defense of Israeli interests in the Council. The problems of the Soviet delegation were enhanced, however, by the fact that Syria and the PLO leadership at several stages were in open conflict with each other.4 During UNIFIL's lifetime, the Soviet Union on at least two occasions joined unanimous votes in the Security Council that indirectly—but clearly—criticized Syrian or Syriansupported behavior in Lebanon. O n e such case o c c u r r e d in September-October 1978 in connection with the adoption of resolution 436 (1978). A second occurred in May 1985, when the Council adopted resolution 564 (1985) as a result of the fighting between Amal and Palestinian groups in the refugee camps of West Beirut. Contrary to Syrian positions, the Soviet Union generally supported the idea of a UN role for the protection of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. On the other side, the Soviet Union's opposition to the French proposal to replace the MNF with a UN force in Beirut in February 1984 can be interpreted as support of Syrian positions. The picture of Soviet attitudes toward the PLO-Syrian conflict—to the extent this conflict reached the Security Council chamber—is therefore somewhat equivocal. In this respect, it seems to confirm the hypothesis that the Soviet Union prefers to play a balancing role between the PLO and Syria instead of choosing between them. It has been suggested by one analyst that "in UN forums the Soviet Union is the follower, not the fashioner of hard-line Arab positions on ArabIsraeli issues." 5 Even if this analysis was set forth primarily to illuminate Soviet reactions to the Camp David process, the theory

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seems to hold even in the case of UNIFIL and the situation in Lebanon.

The Necessity of U.S.-Soviet Working Relations In spite of their reservations about the process of consultations, the March 1978 statements by Ambassador Troyanovsky in the Security Council contained no substantive criticism of the United States. However, after the September 1978 renewal of UNIFIL's mandate—the same day as the announcement of the breakthrough in the Camp David agreements between Israel and Egypt—Soviet statements in the Security Council on UNIFIL became increasingly laced with criticism of U.S. policy in the Middle East and U.S. support of Israel. In 1978, this criticism was still fairly indirect, but as the atmosphere between the superpowers deteriorated on all fronts, the language became more and more vituperative, until the United States was almost placed on the same footing as the Israelis. In April 1985, for example, the U.S. position in Lebanon was "not only as a political cover for its junior partner in the strategic alliance but also a direct encouragement of that partner to pursue its inhuman policy towards Lebanon" (Doc. S/PV. 2575 of 17 April 1985). From 1986 onward, the language in Soviet criticism was again tempered. The verbal pyrotechnics apart, the ability of the Security Council to function according to the purposes and principles defined in the UN Charter is very dependent upon at least some working contacts between the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1978, such contacts were still possible, which made Soviet consent to the establishment of UNIFIL easier to obtain. The high-level contacts between Washington and Moscow during the Beirut crisis in September 1978 can also be mentioned in this context. From this period onward until 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 7 , such working contacts seem to have b e c o m e increasingly scarce. No report about the handling of the 1982 crisis mentions any attempts by the two superpowers to initiate any kind of cooperation in the Security Council to contain the crisis. Many observers of Soviet policy in the Middle East have characterized the response of the Soviet Union to the 1982 war as being very restrained compared with Soviet behavior during earlier Middle East wars. There were no massive airlifts of arms or materials to the Arab parties in the first stages of the war, as occurred during the 1973 war. There was no high-level exchange of visits from the Soviet Union to its Arab allies. The primary Soviet consideration seems to have been to avoid a general war between Israel and Syria that could lead to more direct superpower involvement. PLO spokespersons openly stated their disappointment with the lack of concrete support from the Soviet Union during the Beirut crisis.6 In this context, it has

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b e e n pointed out that the Soviet Union also had reason to be disappointed with the PLO, whose leadership sought U.S. recognition as one of its main political goals, and with Syria, which was reported to be keenly interested in resuming the dialogue with the United States that had been interrupted in 1977. 7 During the first days of the June 1982 invasion, the first diplomatic response of the Soviet Union was to emphasize the role of the United Nations and to support the call in the Security Council for an immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops. One analyst of Soviet behavior during this crisis stated that the Soviet Union, by going to the UN, "avoided the necessity of direct action, obtained the propaganda value from the vetoes cast by the United States to protect Israel, and tried to use the Security Council debates to split the U.S. from its NATO allies who were far more critical of Israel." 8 The statement by President Brezhnev on 20 July that the Soviet Union would support the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in the Beirut area—but not the injection of any U.S. troops in the area—also indicates that the Soviet Union, in spite of its reservations about UN peacekeeping operations, finds them preferable to non-UN options. The February 1984 discussion in the Security Council on the question of establishing a UN presence in Beirut again underlined the importance of a working relationship between the two superpowers in the Security Council. Brian Urquhart has observed that "the Soviets had made it clear that any agreement to a wider United Nations role in Lebanon would depend primarily on the United States consenting to talk to them as an equal superpower with legitimate interests in the Middle East rather than as a delinquent outlaw" and that his suggestion to Secretary of State Shultz of high-level talks with the Soviets on Lebanon was passed over in silence. 9 If the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union had been able to meet in serious consultations in an atmosphere free from mutual suspicions and recriminations, they might have found compromise language that would have made adoption of the French draft possible. In spite of its February 1984 veto, the Soviet Union has not been completely negative in its attitude toward UNIFIL or on the question of a UN role in Lebanon. The 1986 shift to a positive position on UNIFIL also signaled a further movement toward a more constructive position. A role for the UN has, of course, also been consistent with Soviet interests in having a say in the region. Any negotiations or solutions under UN auspices would have to consider Soviet interests, which is the very reason the UN framework has not been particularly attractive to the United States, particularly during the Reagan years. On the other hand, Soviet participation in UN solutions would, as noted by Cyrus

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Vance, also make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to play a spoiler role. 10 The involvement of the Security Council in the Lebanese conflict during the 1978-1988 period seems to suggest that the ability of the Soviet Union to use the UN machinery to promote its own interests in the Middle East has been fairly limited. The Soviet Union has not been able to have any major impact in the political negotiations on the establishment or the functioning of UNIFIL or on its future role in Southern Lebanon south of the Litani. In the Council, the Soviet delegation has played the role of a constitutional guardian—to see to it that the UNIFIL operation followed basically the same parameters as have previous UN peacekeeping operations. On the military side, the deliveries of heavy, long-range arms to the PLO during the 1981-1982 period did not improve UNlFIL's situation, even if this build-up took place largely to the north of the UNIFIL area. Whether this should be interpreted as a factor extraneous to the UNIFIL mission or as an attempt to circumvent or undermine the UN effort to restore international peace and security in the area could be the subject of discussion beyond what is possible in the present context. The Soviet dilemma of a positive attitude toward but a limited influence on the UN is particularly evident in the Soviet position on the question of finding a negotiated setdement of the Middle East conflict. The Soviet Union has consistently advocated that such a settlement will only be possible through a comprehensive settlement, not by partial solutions. This is also the majority view at the United Nations. From this basic attitude, the Soviet Union since 1973 has called for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference—with the Soviet Union and the United States as co-chairs. After it became clear that the United States would not favor such a reconvening, the Soviet Union has supported the proposal for an international peace conference, in which the Soviet Union would be guaranteed a role. With the new rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1986 onward, the two superpowers resumed their dialogue also on regional issues such as the Middle East conflict. This dialogue has taken place in high-level bilateral contacts, not only between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadse but also within the Security Council. In March 1988, a new round of consultations ensued within the Council on the question o f an international conference on the Middle East. The U.S. position on the modalities of a conference still differed from that of the Soviet Union and other Council members, but the resumption of working contacts on the Middle East must nevertheless be seen as a positive step for the effective functioning of the Security Council.

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THE IMPACT OF ISRAELI-U.S. RELATIONS The Carter Years The relationship between Israel and the United States has been of crucial importance for UNIFIL from the very start. Indeed, the U.S. initiative to establish UNIFIL can b e traced to this dimension. The U.S. role in the establishment of a new UN peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon was clearly dominated by the desire to get the crisis in Southern Lebanon rapidly under control. A prime objective of U.S. policy at the time was to nurture the still very fragile dialogue that had just been opened between Israel and Egypt into more substantial peace agreements. T h e fact that the L e b a n e s e government wanted and welcomed a U.S. lead in the establishment of UNIFIL in March 1978 was also motivated by the fact that the United States had more leverage over the Israelis than any other country and that U.S. support therefore was essential to get the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon. From the very start of UNIFIL, the United States had to maintain a very delicate balancing act in the Security Council b e t w e e n two opposing concerns in relation to Israel. The first was to make Israel cooperate with UNIFIL. The United States had, through its initiative in March 1978, assumed a special responsibility to see to it that UNIFIL was given a chance to do the job in Southern Lebanon. The United States was perceived to be the only country with sufficient influence over the Israelis to make them remove the obstacles to the fulfillment of UNIFIL's mandate. On the other hand, the United States also felt obliged to protect Israeli interests in the Security Council. From the drafting o f resolution 425 (1978) to almost every subsequent resolution and decision on the crisis in Southern Lebanon, the U.S. delegation to the Security Council repeatedly had to use its influence on the Lebanese and the other members of the Council to avoid sharper language or measures against Israel. Without the threat of a U.S. veto, there can be little doubt that the Security Council would have sharply condemned Israel on several occasions for its policies in Southern Lebanon. As stressed in the discussion of the establishment of UNIFIL in Chapter 2, the full extent of Israeli-U.S. contacts on the establishment o f UNIFIL has not yet b e e n made public. Nor has the record o f diplomatic contacts during later crises and developments concerning UNIFIL and the conflict in Southern Lebanon been published at any length. This fact introduces an amount of uncertainty in the analysis of the role of Israeli-U.S. relations in the history of UNIFIL. In addition, both the Israeli and the U.S. governments undoubtedly seek to k e e p conflicts and quarrels in their bilateral relations away from the public

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eye—for obvious domestic reasons—and away from the scrutiny of the Soviet Union, the Arab countries, and the other members of the United Nations—for equally obvious foreign policy reasons. With these possibilities for error kept in mind, it is nevertheless possible from open sources to get a broad picture of the impact of Israeli-U.S. relations on UNIFIL, both in 1978 and in later phases. The strongest U.S. pressure on Israel in connection with UNIFIL and the problems in Southern Lebanon seems to have come during the 1977-1978 period, particularly in connection with President Carter's letter to Prime Minister Begin on the use of U.S.-made arms by Major Haddad. The lessons drawn from this incident by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance are also interesting and deserve to be quoted: "The Lebanon crisis did provide an important demonstration that Begin would respond when he understood the president was determined that a particular Israeli course of action detrimental to American interests should not continue."11 The balancing act in relation to Israel that had to be performed by the U.S. delegation to the Security Council was particularly evident in relation to the activities of the de facto forces. The official U.S. position on this issue was clear enough. In the debates of the Security Council on UNIFIL matters, both during the regular mandate renewals and during the succession of crisis situations brought before the Council by the Lebanese government, the U.S. delegation repeatedly made clear it thought UNIFIL should be able to deploy to the border and that the United States was very unhappy with the problems the de facto forces created for UNIFIL. This attitude was first expressed in a statement made by the U.S. representative in the Security Council on 8 December 1978. In this statement, James Leonard said that "it is clear that Israel has influence on these [de facto] groups and the ability to exercise greater influence than it has done so far. We believe that Israel has a duty, in accordance with the Security Council resolutions, to assist UNIFIL in fulfilling its mandate" (SCOR, 2106th meeting). The same statement also made it clear, however, that there were limits to what the United States was prepared to accept by way of language in Security Council decisions criticizing Israel. The U.S. representative stated that the United States definitely could not associate itself with any condemnations of Israel in Council resolutions. U.S. influence on Israel was perhaps most useful during the many crisis situations that affected UNIFIL during the 1978-1981 period. During the Naqoura crisis in April 1979 and in connection with the killing of the Irish soldiers in April 1980, the United States was very helpful in making it plain to the Israeli government that this kind of behavior by Major Haddad and his troops was intolerable and that the

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Israelis had to prevent recurrences. In such situations, the United States readily accepted that it had a special duty toward UNIFIL, both during the informal consultations of the Security Council and in dialogues with representatives of the troop-contributors. For the crisismanagement efforts of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat in New York, the U.S. assistance was of major importance. In such situations, communications were often established directly between the Secretary-General or Brian Urquhart in New York and the U.S. government at the highest level. Dialogue between the U.S. and Israeli governments took place mostly through bilateral channels, not necessarily in New York. The need for discretion by U.S. diplomats in relations with Israel was compounded by the fact that the United States also had to heed the concerns of the Lebanese government during Security Council consultations. During the pre-1982 period and until the withdrawal of the Multinational Force in Beirut in February 1984, the United States had very close contacts with the Lebanese government, both in Beirut and New York. After the drafting of resolution 425 (1978), later draft resolutions and presidential declarations during this period were usually prepared by the Lebanese Mission in New York. More often than not, these drafts were shown first to the U.S. delegation and then to the other parties concerned and to the members of the Security Council. The need to maintain full U.S. support for UNIFIL in order to keep the pressure on Israel was generally realized—not only by the Lebanese but by the Secretariat, the troop-contributors, and even by most of the Arab countries. This meant that the U.S. delegation had quite a lot of leverage over the drafting of the decisions of the Security Council. Almost everybody realized that a U.S. veto on any resolution affecting UNIFIL, even apart from the regular mandate resolutions, would seriously undermine UNIFIL's position. Even a U.S. abstention was generally thought undesirable. Before the events following the 1982 invasion, the U.S. delegation supported all UNIFIL resolutions, except for one abstention, in 1980. Although the U.S. delegation to the Security Council seldom was able to reach a perfect balance between its conflicting concerns—most Council members thought that the harassments of Haddad were a bigger problem for UNIFIL than the activities of the Palestinians—the United States in the other pre-1982 resolutions managed to get language that it could live with, even though reservations sometimes had to be made in its statements before or after the vote. Nevertheless, all was not harmony in the general state of U.S.Israeli relations on the UNIFIL question during the pre-1982 period.

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There was a wide gap in the views of the two governments in their attitudes toward the main issue—UNIFIL's presence in Southern Lebanon. The United States, true to its godfathership, consistently s u p p o r t e d UNIFIL and its continued p r e s e n c e in the area. Representatives of the U.S. government made it clear, both in the Security Council and in other forums, that they fully shared and supported the Secretary-General's views that a withdrawal of UNIFIL from the area would have serious destabilizing consequences in the region and that the UN Force had important functions there. In the debates and consultations of the Security Council, U.S. representatives seldom hid the fact that they were about as frustrated and exasperated by the lack of cooperation from the parties concerned—the Israelis not excluded—as everybody else. This general support of UNIFIL was also present in U.S. bilateral diplomacy in the Middle East. U.S. diplomatic representatives regularly visited the area, negotiating cease-fires and using whatever influence they had to maintain stability. Although most of these diplomatic missions had a wider scope than the support of UNIFIL, cooperation between U.S. and UN representatives during this period was generally close and fruitful. Nevertheless, judging from the memoirs of President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and National Security Adviser Brzezinski, it s e e m s evident that the events in Southern Lebanon—including the ups and downs of UNIFIL—were generally not very high on the political agenda in Washington. In the 1978-1979 period, the implications of the Camp David process and the efforts to negotiate the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty clearly took precedence. In the 1979-1980 period, the situation in Iran, especially after the hostage drama at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became the dominating concerns. During the Carter administration, there were also other serious conflicts between the United States and Israel over UN matters, which reduced still further U.S. flexibility to put effective pressure on the Israelis over the UNIFIL issue. In August 1979, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, had to resign because he had not informed the State Department of a meeting he had with the PLO Permanent Observer to the UN at the end of July in preparation for the U.S. presidency of the Security Council in August of that year. In the words of President Carter, "a mountain was made of a molehill," but the Israelis were not pleased. 12 In March 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had to publicly excuse a positive U.S. vote in the Security Council on a resolution criticizing Israeli settlements on the West Bank. The resolution also included several references to the sensitive Jerusalem issue, and Vance had to explain the vote as an accident

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caused by a "breakdown in communications with the UN delegation." President Carter characterized the ensuing uproar in Israel and among U.S. Jews as "a serious political blow to me" and "highly damaging to me among American Jews throughout the country for the remainder of the election year."13 In fact, judging by the published accounts of the Carter years, these incidents were far more important for U.S.-Israeli relations than were UNIFIL and the situation in Southern Lebanon. In his authoritative analysis of U.S.-Israeli relations during this period, Jerusalem Post correspondent Wolf Blitzer gives extensive attention to the March 1980 vote in the Security Council, but does not mention UNIFIL or Southern Lebanon.14 Blitzer's observation that "Vance and other senior American policymakers promised Israel that the United States would 'work against' any effort to make the Security Council an important forum for consideration of the settlements issue or any other in the Arab-Israeli conflict" is also worth noting in the present context.15 In his memoirs, President Carter writes that in response to a question from President Sadat during the Camp David summit in September 1978 about whether Carter had devoted much time to the situation in Lebanon, he admits to having answered that "since direct American interest was aroused primarily in moments of crisis, we had not mounted a concerted effort to find a permanent solution to the continuing Lebanese tragedy."16 This description seems to be a good characterization of U.S. policy toward Lebanon even through the rest of the Carter years. In contrast to the administration's activist efforts to find solutions to the Middle East conflict on the Egyptian-Israeli front (including the Palestinian and West Bank problems), the policy on Lebanon can probably be better described as being of the "damagelimitation approach," to borrow Secretary of State Vance's terminology. 1 7 It should be stressed, however, that the U.S. government was by no means alone in its relative negligence of the situation in Lebanon during this period. The same was true for most of the Arab countries, 1 8 which were more c o n c e r n e d with the implications of the Camp David process, the Iran-Iraq war, and other issues than with Lebanon. To a considerable extent, the political leadership of Israel also gave higher priority to the Camp David process and to other Middle East issues during this period. Even in Lebanon, representatives of the troop-contributing nations sometimes found a surprising degree of ignorance of or disinterest with the Southern Lebanon situation in high circles of Beirut's political community.

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The 1981-1988 Period The primary lines of U.S. policy toward the Middle East conflict were continued after the presidential elections of 1980 and the advent of the Reagan administration in January 1981. The main commitments were upheld—the special relationship with Israel, the development of cooperation with Egypt following the Camp David agreements, and the support of the efforts of the Lebanese government to restore its authority and some measure of peace and security in the country. Even the succession of problems in U.S.-Israeli relations continued. T h e sale of AWAC airplanes to Saudi Arabia in 1981 c a u s e d considerable turbulence, both domestically and in the bilateral relations. In the United Nations, the United States joined unanimous votes in the Security Council on a resolution that strongly condemned the military attack by Israel against a nuclear reactor outside Baghdad in June 1 9 8 1 (resolution 4 8 7 [ 1 9 8 1 D and a resolution that "the Israeli decision to improve its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the o c c u p i e d Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect" in December 1 9 8 1 (resolution 4 9 7 [ 1 9 8 1 D Support for UNIFIL was another constant feature in U.S. policy toward the Lebanon issue. The United States consistently expressed the view that the presence of UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon should be maintained even in the difficult period following the 1982 invasion, pending the outcome of negotiations on a new Israeli withdrawal. As had been the case in the 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 2 period, these views were presented with particular strength before each mandate renewal of UNIFIL in the Security Council. U.S. interest in UNIFIL's life and problems in the periods between the mandate renewals appeared, in comparison, to be considerably less—at least seen through the eyes of some of the troop-contributors. The United States also continued its general cooperation with the UN in order to contain conflicts and crisis in the area. One example occurred during the mission made by U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib during the summer of 1981, following the serious escalation of incidents and retaliatory attacks in the Bekaa Valley and in Southern Lebanon, including massive air raids by the Israeli Air Force against Beirut on 17 July. Through Ambassador Habib, the United States exerted heavy pressure on the Israelis to accept a cease-fire, while General Callaghan on behalf of the UNIFIL and the UN was similarly engaged in negotiations with the PLO. This cooperation was necessary for both the United States and the United Nations, since U.S. representatives were forbidden through pledges given to Israel to negotiate directly with the PLO, while UN representatives were similarly without much influence on the Israelis without U.S. backing.

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According to one account, this operation was not too closely coordinated between the UN and the United States. The cease-fire negotiated with the Israelis was several hours out of phase with the cease-fire negotiated with the PLO.19 Nevertheless, the negotiations leading to the cease-fire agreement of 24 July 1981 are possibly the best example during UNIFIL's lifetime of what could be achieved through a joint UN-U.S. effort to stop the firing across the IsraeliLebanese border and to gain time for negotiations. It is worth noting that most U.S. presentations of this cease-fire agreement tend to give most if not all the credit for this agreement to the Habib effort, neglecting the role of the UN team. In spite of these lines of continuity, there were also major changes in policy and in emphasis on important aspects of the Middle East conflict after the advent of the Reagan administration. The new U.S. Permanent Representative, Jeane Kirkpatrick, made it clear in March 1981 that the United States would be even less willing than before to support or accept UN resolutions criticizing Israel. Furthermore, the new administration had an even more negative view of the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, as witnessed by the concept of the "strategic consensus" defined by Secretary of State Alexander Haig and by the U.S.-Israeli agreement on a memorandum of understanding establishing strategic cooperation between the two countries in December 1982. After the deployment of new Soviet-built SAM-6 missiles in the Bekaa Valley at the end of April 1981, it also adopted a much more negative position on the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon, which had been tacitly welcomed by the United States (and Israel) in 1976. Initially, some circles within the U.S. government seem to have assigned a significant role to the United Nations and to UNIFTL in the efforts to obtain a removal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. Alexander Haig's memoirs give a fairly extensive presentation of the concepts behind U.S. diplomacy in the area after the July 1981 ceasefire. Haig writes that by late August 1981, a "three-part plan" existed to obtain a withdrawal of Syrian troops before the upcoming presidential elections in Lebanon. This plan called for the development of an Arab consensus "leading to a withdrawal of Syrian forces [then face to face with Phalange militia], the solution of the problem of Syrian SAM-6 missiles in the Beka'a Valley, and a strengthening of the cease-fire in the south through a more efFective U.N. presence and the simultaneous phased removal of PLO heavy weapons and the Israeli military presence from the enclave commanded by Israel's Christian friend, Major Saad Haddad." 20 The foreign ministers of Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria formed a quadripartite commission to deal with

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consultations among the Arabs, including the PLO, in what was called the "Beiteddine process." 21 Haig reports that the talks broke down almost immediately, both because Syria wanted an "Arabization" of Lebanon and not a withdrawal of their own troops and because the PLO wanted to remain in Lebanon. 22 During the fall of 1981 and the winter and spring of 1982, a main objective for U.S. diplomatic missions and efforts in the area continued to be the maintenance of the July 1981 cease-fire. Ambassador Philip Habib continued his visits to the area, and Israeli representatives both at government and military levels visited Washington for talks on the situation in Lebanon and in the rest of the Middle East following the final stages of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. The first direct signals from Israel to the United States that a new invasion of Lebanon was considered seem to have been transmitted in October 1981. Secretary of State Alexander Haig writes that Prime Minister Begin, during a bilateral meeting in Cairo in connection with the funeral of President Sadat, told Haig that "Israel had begun planning a move into Lebanon that would not draw Syria into the conflict." According to Haig's version of Begin's statement, "the general idea was to push the PLO back from the border area and then go to the U.N. and ask for a guarantee that Israel's border would not be attacked. "23 The suggestion that Prime Minister Begin—of all people—might want some kind of UN guarantee for Israel's northern border is intriguing and somewhat puzzling. For one thing, it is not very much in line with Israel's general views on UN guarantees for its borders or with its previous attitudes toward UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. No further information about this idea is given in Haig's book, nor are any implications for UNIFIL mentioned. In any case, the idea was not pursued in the Security Council after the invasion, either by Israel or the United States. The Haig memoirs contain one more report of a plan to involve the UN or at least some elements of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon in the efforts to avoid the upcoming Israeli invasion. These plans were considered in the weeks immediately preceding the June 1982 invasion: I seized upon the idea of calling for a conference composed of the European countries participating in the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon (France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway); Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as the gulf states represented in the Bait a Din group; and the United States. Syria would have been invited to attend, but not the USSR. This group, which had excellent communications with

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Israel, the PLO, and all factions in Lebanon, might have been able to move on the fundamental issues and perhaps arrest the tumbling current toward war. 24

This proposal was never put forward by the United States, however, and the troop-contributors were not even informed about Haig's plans. Haig attributes the fate of these proposals to sharp divisions within the administration over its policy toward Israel. During the spring and summer of 1982, there were important shifts in policies and signals from the United States regarding the new Israeli intervention into Lebanon. Most important was that the United States identified itself strongly with the Israeli (and Lebanese) objective of linking a withdrawal of Israeli troops to a similar withdrawal of PLO and Syrian troops from Lebanon. This shift has been noted both by Israeli sources 2 * and by the Haig memoirs and soon became apparent in U.S. statements in Security Council debates during the summer of 1982. This shift of position meant that the United States no longer could support the demand in resolution 509 (1982) for an "unconditional" withdrawal of Israeli troops. A by-product of this shift of position was that it also implied that the United States no longer supported unequivocally the first part of UNIFIL's mandate, as defined in resolution 425 (1978). In the Security Council, this shift in U.S. policy can be dated to 8 June 1982, when the U.S. delegation cast its veto on the Spanish draft resolution that would have repeated the call in resolution 509 (1982) for a forthwith and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli military forces. It should be noted, however, that this veto was also motivated by the Council's implicit threat of adopting UN sanctions if Israel did not comply with the call for a cease-fire and for immediate withdrawal. The U.S. policy shift over a brief two days—from a vote for resolution 508 of 5 June and resolution 509 of 6 June to a veto on 8 June—caused some head-shaking in Security Council circles. Some veteran observers of the UN saw it as a sign that the authority of the Council had become so weak that even the permanent members did not take seriously positions that they had themselves supported. For the U.S. delegation to the Security Council, this position led to its active opposition to having any direct mention of resolutions 508 and 509 (1982) included in future resolutions of the Council on the Lebanon crisis. In true Security Council fashion, these references had to be made indirectly, by referring to earlier "relevant resolutions" of the Council. After the announcement of the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in January 1985, the United States again started mentioning its previous support of resolutions 508 and 509 (1982) and reconfirmed

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that it had "opposed Israel's entering Lebanon in the beginning" (Doc. S/PV. 2573 of 12 March 1985). In 1985, when the Israelis by their unilateral redeployment finally abandoned the condition that Syrian troops should be withdrawn from Lebanon parallel with their own, the general objective of a removal of all foreign troops from Lebanon seems to have been relegated to a more long-term perspective even by the United States. However, the objective continued to be present in U.S. statements in the Security Council. An interesting exchange of ideas between the U.S. government and the Israelis on the possibility of an i n c r e a s e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacekeeping force in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 invasion has been described in the Pelcovits study. In the first days after the invasion, planners in Washington thought that an augmented UNIFIL would provide the best chance of an international force of sufficient size with international acceptability, although Israel's distrust of the UN made the proposal problematic. 26 On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Begin in mid-June u r g e d the Reagan administration to field a multinational peacekeeping force in the south, similar to the Sinai presence, and indicated that he would welcome a U.S. contingent within such a multinational force as guarantor and as the logical replacement of Israeli forces when they withdrew. The United States made it clear, however, that it did not support this idea. Shortly afterwards, the Israeli government changed its position to an open opposition to the idea of any international peacekeeping presence in the south. 2 7 As indicated in Chapter 6, the idea of using a UN peacekeeping force in West Beirut to assure the safe evacuation of the Palestinians was also the first option of the Habib negotiations during June-July 1982.2« The Reagan plan of 1 September 1982, which has been seen as an attempt by the United States to exploit "the new realities" of the situation in Lebanon for a fresh start toward a solution of the Palestinian issue, 2 9 contained very little a b o u t the situation in L e b a n o n . N o r was the United Nations framework given much attention, except for the references to the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). During the diplomatic contacts in the s u m m e r and fall of 1983—after the Syrian opposition to the 17 May agreement became clear—both UN officials and the non-U.S. participants in the MNF (particularly the French) sounded out the idea of replacing the MNF with an increased UN presence, both in the Beirut area and in the sector between Beirut and the Litani. As indicated in Chapter 6, the U.S. government was cautious but not unfavorable toward the idea,

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provided it was acceptable for the Lebanese governmental In the view of the United States, the UN option was workable only if the fighting in the area came to an end and the political situation in Beirut was stabilized. After the withdrawal of the MNF from Beirut in February-March 1984, U.S. interest in and influence over developments in Lebanon appeared greatly diminished. The United States seemed once again to have moved toward support of the UN channel for the peace efforts in Lebanon. Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy made three trips to the region in September-December 1984 in connection with the situation in Lebanon. His efforts were described as "exploratory," and in a statement to the U.S. Congress on 30 January 1985, Murphy stated that the United States would "continue to support UN-sponsored efforts, such as the Naqoura talks, to achieve the arrangements necessary to enhance security in southern Lebanon." He also stated that the United States had "concluded that the next step would have to be taken by the parties themselves and that we should support the efforts of the United Nations to facilitate an orderly withdrawal."32 During the spring and summer of 1985, Murphy continued his visits to the Middle East. This time, the focus of his consultations was on reviving the talks on the West Bank issue, and very little coordination with the UN efforts by Brian Urquhart and his collaborators on the Lebanese question seems to have taken place. A U.S. statement in the Security Council on 17 April 1985 expressed continued support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and for his proposal to establish a consultative mechanism under UN auspices to effect the needed cooperation of the parties to the conflict. This statement also contained a warning, however, "that the present extension of the mandate, for which we voted because of the strong commitment to UNIFIL's potential role in Lebanese peace-keeping, could well be the last interim extension that the international community would be prepared to support" (Doc. S/PV. 2575 of 17 April 1985). By the end of the period covered in the present study, the U.S. position on UNIFIL continued to be positive, although increasingly low-key. In 1985-1988 the United States seemed to be even less willing or interested than previously in putting any kind of pressure on Israel to withdraw completely from Lebanon or to engage itself in any active diplomatic or political efforts to find a negotiated solution to the difficult situation facing UNIFIL after the establishment of the "security zone" in Southern Lebanon. The withholding of U.S. assessed contributions to UNIFIL's budget from 1986 onward also implied a lower political commitment on the part of the United States toward

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UN1FIL, despite official statements from administration officials to the contrary. The shift in the U.S. position on the demand for a full UNIFIL deployment to the Lebanese-Israeli border, as manifested by the U.S. abstention in the Security Council voting on a French draft resolution in September 1986, also increased the distance between the United States and other supporters of UNIFIL. Observers at the UN Secretariat in New York also noted an almost complete lack of reference to the Lebanon situation in statements by Secretary of State Shultz or other senior officials of the Reagan administration after the traumatic events of February 1984. The impression of a further U.S. disengagement from Lebanese affairs was also reinforced by the decision of the U.S. Congress in December 1985 to cut the U.S. contributions to UNIFIL's budget, although this decision was actively resisted by the administration. It is a telling sign of the importance of U.S.-Israeli relations for UNIFIL that the administration's best hope for getting Congress to reinstate contributions was to enlist the support of the Israeli government. This came during Prime Minister Shimon Peres' visit to Washington in early April 1986, when Peres, to the satisfaction of the U.S. government, publicly expressed that in the situation existing in Lebanon, there was no replacement for UNIFIL inside Lebanon, although he restated earlier Israeli opposition to a UNIFIL deployment to the frontier of Israel.

U.S. Policies Toward the UN Efforts In Lebanon Among the critics of the Reagan administration's policies in UN circles, it was sometimes suspected that U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East under this administration were not always complementary to the UN efforts, but that these efforts also contained an element of competition with the UN. Apart from the voting and statements from the 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 4 period cited above, reference was also made to the generally more critical U.S. attitude toward the United Nations during the Reagan administration than during previous U.S. governments. To discuss this hypothesis, it is necessary to make a distinction between the three organs of the United Nations involved in the UNIFIL operation and in the question of a role for the UN in the different stages of the Lebanese crisis. These three organs are the peacekeeping operation itself (UNIFIL or other UN operations in Lebanon), the Security Council, and the negotiating efforts of the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat On the question of U.S. attitudes toward UN peacekeeping operations in general, it has been observed even by the Heritage Foundation that "even the harshest critic of U.N. peacekeeping must admit that every American President since the foundation of the United

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Nations has actively supported and even relied upon its peacekeeping role." 33 The analysis made in this study seems to suggest that this line in U.S. policy toward UN peacekeeping is largely unbroken. The support of the U.S. government toward UNIFIL has been consistent. The two U.S. vetoes against a UN presence in the Beirut area in June and July 1982 seem to have been dictated at least as much by the express wishes of the three parties involved in the crisis as by any U.S. opposition in principle against a UN option. The examples quoted from the Haig memoirs and the Pelcovits study of contingency planning in the State Department during the 1981-1982 period seem to suggest that the possibility of using some parts of the UN peacekeeping effort was among the options considered at several stages both during the 1982 crisis and in the 1983-1984 period. The question whether the policy of U.S. support for UN peacekeeping will continue to be unbroken in the future will, however, depend very much on a reinstatement of U.S. financial contributions to the assessed budget of these operations. On the question of U.S. attitudes toward the Security Council, the picture during most of the 1980s has been more negative. If U.S. policy toward the Lebanon crisis in 1982 is compared with previous Middle East crises, it seems clear that in 1982 the United States was much less interested in using, or willing to accept, the Security Council as a crisismanagement body than it had been in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1978. The successive draft resolutions and proposals submitted to the Security Council from June to September were all submitted by other delegations. The main efforts of U.S. diplomacy to find a solution to the crisis were made outside the framework of the Security Council. As indicated earlier in the present study, a distinction can be made b e t w e e n the functions of the Security Council as the most representative international body for crisis management and conflict control and the possibilities of using the Security Council as a negotiating forum for the peaceful settlement of underlying issues. In the theory of international peacekeeping, this distinction corresponds roughly with the one often made between "peacekeeping" and "peacemaking." It is not a new phenomenon that the United States has been less than enthusiastic about the idea of using the Security Council as a negotiating forum for conducting more detailed and protracted peace negotiations. The negative reactions of the United States to the proposal of the Secretary-General to make better use of the Security Council to find a peaceful, comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict therefore do not represent any major departure from previous U.S. policies. What is worth noting, although it is by no means without precedent, is that this skeptical attitude toward the

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Security Council in 1982 seemed to apply even to an international crisis situation. Admittedly, the 1982 war was unlike previous Middle East wars in several respects because the United States, particularly during Haig's tenure as secretary of state, had considerable sympathy with the war objectives of the Israelis—to obtain a withdrawal from Lebanon of PLO and Syrian troops. It therefore remains to be seen whether this attitude was situational or whether it represents a more lasting distrust of the Security Council. It is worth noting, however, that the United States from 1986 onward again became more interested in using the framework of the Security Council for more concerted international action on international conflicts, as exemplified by the consultations that led to resolution 598 (1987) on the Iran-Iraq war. On the question of U.S. attitudes toward the negotiating efforts of the Secretary-General, the picture seems to be somewhat ambivalent. In the crisis situations affecting UNIFIL during the 1978-1981 period, the United States was, as noted in earlier chapters, generally very helpful. After the advent of the Reagan administration, the element of competition with UN mediation efforts on some occasions became more evident. 34 The United States has repeatedly supported resolutions in the Security Council that have expressed encouragement and support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to find solutions to the crisis at hand and even for his more long-term search for negotiated solutions. On the crucial questions affecting UNIFIL—such as the relationship to Israel and to the de facto forces and UNIHL's deployment in the security belt in the border area—U.S. support for the Secretary-General's efforts seems to have been more passive and largely verbal. U.S. representatives have repeatedly indicated in the Security Council that they found the situation affecting UNIFIL to be uncomfortable or even unacceptable. Nevertheless, it seems to have been a situation that the United States could tolerate. Several factors have been set forth to explain U.S. policies on the Lebanese question during the period examined in the present study. Some analysts have pointed to a general lack of a clear concept for U.S. Middle East policy, particularly in the 1982-1984 period.35 The evidence offered in the present study on U.S. policy toward UNIFIL, the efforts in the Security Council to find a solution to the Lebanese crisis, and other attempts at finding political solutions to the Lebanon issue during this period would tend to support this proposition. Closely connected with this hypothesis are the reports of internal divisions within the U.S. administration on what policy the United States should follow in the area. Such reports were particularly strong during Alexander Haig's tenure at the State Department and seem to be borne out by the Haig memoirs themselves. During the 1985-1987 period, some observers noted that the U.S. administration seemed to have

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assumed a general hands-off policy toward the Middle East conflict, adopting the view that the United States was better off with the status quo. In 1988, the peace efforts conducted by Secretary of State Shultz signaled a new active phase in UN diplomacy. On the substantial side, the most important factors to explain the more negative attitudes of the United States toward the Security Council seem to be the two dimensions discussed in the present chapter. For the United States, a more systematic use of the Security Council, either for crisis management or for peacemaking purposes, would imply giving the Soviet Union a more direct influence on Middle East diplomacy than it would have if other, non-UN forums were used. Similarly, the extremely negative attitude taken by Israel toward the Security Council would mean that the United States, by going to the Council, would face strong opposition at the outset from Israel and from domestic groups, which most U.S. administrations prefer to avoid. On the other hand, it is an open question whether any just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be obtained, even outside the UN, without tackling these two obstacles.

NOTES 1. Secretary of State Vance writes in his memoirs, "I advised President Carter in November 1976 that as a practical matter the Soviet Union, with political interests in the region and as a p>atron of several Arab states, should be accorded a role in negotiations that would help to dissuade it from undermining our efforts." Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 164. 2. Raymond Cohen, "Israel and the Soviet-American Statement of 1 October 1977: The Limits of Patron-Client Influence," ORBIS, 22, Fall 1978, 630. 3- Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers (New York: Praeger, Council on Foreign Relations, 1983), 1294. This policy dates from the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975-1976, when the Soviet Union moved from an initially cautious and ambivalent attitude, through attempts to mediate between the PLO and the Syrians, to intense frustration and anger over Syria's continued campaign against the PLO. See liana Kass, "Moscow and the Lebanese Triangle," Middle East Journal, 33/1979. 5. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union and the Peace Process Since Camp David," Washington Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 1, Winter 1985. 6. Galia Golan, "The Soviet Union and the Israeli Action in Lebanon." International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 1, 1983. 7. Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), 148-149. 8. Robert O. Freedman, "The Soviet Union and a Middle East Peace Settlement: A Case Study of Soviet Policy During the Israeli Invasion of

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Lebanon and Its Aftermath," in Peacemaking in the Middle East, edited by Paul Marantz and Janice Gross Stein (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985). 9- Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 362. 10. See note 1 to the present chapter. 11. Vance, Hard Choices, 208. 12. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (Toronto, New York," London, Sydney: Bantam Books, 1982), 491. 13. Ibid., 493-494. 14. Wolf Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 30. 15. Ibid., 30. 16. Carter, Keeping Faith, 368-369. 17. Vance, Hard Choices, 165. 18. Rabinovich, The War, 94. 19. New York Times, 18 August 1981. 20. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 331. 21. See Wadi Haddad, Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors (New York: Praeger Special Studies, CSIS, The Washington Papers, 1985), 60-6l. The Beiteddine Conference was established in October 1978 by the Arab countries participating in or financially supporting the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon. 22. Haig, Caveat, 331. 23. Ibid., 326. 24. Ibid., 334. 25. Ze'ev Schiff, "Green Light, Lebanon," Foreign Policy, no. 50, Spring 1983. 26. Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from Sinai and Lebanon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, 1984), 11. 27. Ibid., 28-29. 28. George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984), 49. 29. Ibid., 52. 30. President Reagan, "United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East," Address to the Nation, 1 September 1982, as published in Appendix VIII, in Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985), 170-176. 31. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping, 58. 32. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 85, no. 2097, April 1985. 33. Patrick J. Garrity, "The UN and Peacekeeping," in A World Without a UN, edited by Burton Yale Pines (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1984). 34. Urquhart, A Life, 366. 35. Thomas L. Friedman, "America's Failure in Lebanon," New York Times Magazine, 8 April 1984. The George Ball study also makes this point.

CHAPTER TEN

The Role of the Security Council: The Constitutional Constraints THE PROBLEM OF THE AGENDA

In the period between March 1978 and the end of May 1987, the Security Council discussed the situation in the UNIFIL area in fiftyseven meetings. 1 Another thirty-nine meetings were convened to discuss the situation in other parts of Lebanon, most of these in the 1982-1985 period. The great majority of the Council meetings on UNIFIL were convened on the basis of reports from the Secretary-General, either in connection with the mandate renewals, through other reports requested by the Council, or through special reports when the situation called for it. In addition to these meetings, the Lebanese on seven different occasions in the 1978-1982 period requested urgent meetings of the Council to discuss the situation in Southern Lebanon. In the 1982-1987 period five requests from the Lebanese were submitted, all on the situation in other parts of Lebanon. These include the 4 June 1982 request, in which the Council remained formally involved during the following weeks and months. The Lebanese also requested an urgent meeting of the Council in January 1986. Seven of the meetings or series of meetings during the 1978-1987 period were convened without any report by the Secretary-General or any request from the Lebanese. Three countries—France, Egypt, and Jordan—were behind these requests. Only one of the meetings requested from these countries—in September 1987—concerned the situation in the UNIFIL area, the others focused on developments in other parts of Lebanon. Two of these meetings were occasioned by fighting involving Syria or Syria-backed elements (October 1978 and November-December 1983). The PLO or other Palestinian elements 217

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were also involved in two of these incidents (November-December 1983 and May 1985). The examples mentioned above suggest that only four series of meetings of the Council on the situation in Lebanon were occasioned by events not directly related to acts initiated by the Israelis or their allies in Southern Lebanon. These four include the October 1978 meeting, which was primarily directed toward the Syrian bombardments of East Beirut, the French request for a meeting in November-December 1983 on the events in the Tripoli area, the Egyptian request of May 1985 concerning the fighting between Amal and the PLO in the Palestinian camps in West Beirut, and the French request for a meeting in September 1986, which was caused mainly by the attacks against its UNIFIL contingents by Shi'ite elements. Israeli representatives repeatedly argued in the Security Council that there was a strong bias against Israel in the Council's agenda. In a statement of February 1982, for example, Ambassador Blum bitterly criticized the Security Council for completely ignoring the subversion of Lebanese sovereignty by the PLO and Syria and accused the Council of taking "a cynical approach" that was "totally at variance with the facts and realities prevailing in Lebanon" (Doc. S/PV. 2332 of 25 February 1982). He pointed to the fact that the Council had not put on its agenda previous massacres in the Lebanese civil war or the brutal repression of the uprising in the Syrian town of Hamaa in February 1982. Ambassador Blum also regularly pointed to the fact that the Security Council was repeatedly convened on requests from Jordan or other Arabs (on behalf of the PLO) to discuss Israeli policies and practices on the West Bank and in Gaza, while no terrorist attacks against Israel were ever put on the agenda. In Chapter 3 it was suggested that Israeli accusations against UNIFIL to a large extent were self-serving and not borne out by the facts. There can be little doubt that the Israelis have a better case in their accusation that the Council's agenda has been largely one-sided and partial. Even though the formal reasons for this state of affairs—which are largely based on Article 2.7 of the UN Charter on the principle of noninterference of the UN in internal affairs and Article 52 on regional arrangements—may be eminently justifiable in legal terms, this strong bias against Israel in the agenda of the Security Council also has its distinct political costs. This is not to suggest that the meetings and the debates of the Security Council on the situation in Southern Lebanon or in connection with the 1982 invasion and the subsequent occupation have been unjustified. As pointed out even by countries that have been sympathetic to Israel, its policies and practices in Lebanon have raised disturbing questions from the point of view of

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international law, including the UN Charter. Israel's counduct has also quite justly b e e n characterized as out of proportion to the provocations.2 Israel's undermining of UNIFIL's mission and mandate has also given the Security Council ample justification for debates on how the UN should react to this kind of behavior toward a UN peacekeeping force. But there can be no doubt that the Israelis had a valid argument when they pointed to a general unwillingness among the majority of the members of the Security Council to put problems of international terrorism against civilians and innocent hostages on its agenda. There can also be no doubt that the destruction, brutalities, and breaches of international humanitarian law caused and suffered by the different parties involved in the Lebanese civil war, including the PLO and Syria, most probably have been considerably greater than the death and destruction caused by Israeli forces. This brings in perceptions of fairness and of evenhandedness, which are important both for the general prestige and authority of the Security Council and in relation to its role in the efforts to find negotiated solutions to the Middle East conflict. These observations may, with a certain reason, be considered unjust toward the members of the Security Council. The questions of how the international community should deal with the problems of international terrorism or how to stop the brutalities of civil wars belong to the gray zones of international law in which there are no easy answers, either inside or outside the United Nations. The problem is therefore not primarily institutional, but rather a result of political conflicts and ideological cleavages in the international community, particularly in relation to the Middle East conflict. It can also be seen as a result of political alliances and coalitions within the UN, mainly between the Arab and the other nonaligned countries. Against this coalition, Israel has become quite isolated—its policies and practices outside its 1967 borders, Lebanon included, have not made it easy to regain the support and sympathy it once enjoyed. It is not very probable that either Lebanon or Syria will change its negative position on Security Council discussions on what each considers to be internal affairs. Neither does it seem very probable that the PLO will cease exploiting its support in the Arab and Third World in order to use the Security Council as a forum and a platform to promote what it considers to be a just and legitimate cause. Further steps by the members of the Council to tackle the problem of international terrorism, both in its general aspects and in concrete cases, would nevertheless be important steps in the process of

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reestablishing the authority and the prestige of the Security Council. Since the impetus in restoring a measure of impartiality for the Council on Middle East issues cannot be expected from the parties to the conflict themselves—in this case Lebanon, the PLO, or Syria—the onus would be on the nonaligned members of the Council. It is entirely possible for this group of states to continue to support using the Security Council as a forum for debates, condemnations, manifestations of solidarity, and other verbal forms of reactions in international crisis situations. But if the nonaligned want to invest more real authority behind the decisions of the Council—that is, if they really want the Western permanent members to put their individual or collective influence behind the decisions of the Council—then a serious effort must be made to restore a larger measure of equal treatment in the matters put before the Council. Some interesting steps in this direction were taken by the Security Council in December 1985, first by the adoption of resolution 579 of 18 December condemning the taking of hostages and kidnappings in general terms. This was followed by a presidential statement adopted on 30 December on an initiative by the United States dealing with the attacks committed by Palestinian/Arab terrorists, most probably from the Abu Nidal group, against civilians in the airports of Rome and Vienna. The fact that the camps war in 1985-1988 was repeatedly put on the agenda must also be seen as a positive sign that even Arab retributions against the Palestinians were a matter of concern for Council members. The spillover effect from the biases in the Council agenda on Middle East issues to the general authority and prestige of the Council has probably hampered the ability of the Council to function as a governing board for UNIFIL, perhaps even for future UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. The extremely negative attitude of the Israelis toward the Security Council has influenced important layers of world public opinion, most particularly in the United States. This has made it easier for Israel to explain and justify noncompliance with the resolutions of the Security Council, even though these—because of the U.S. influence on the drafting process—have been much more balanced than the agenda. Whether the other parties to the conflict like it or not, UN or international peacekeeping operations cannot function effectively without the full support of the parties concerned. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, this includes Israel.

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INFORMAL AND BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS T h e Role o f the President o f t h e Council When a member country requests a meeting of the Security Council, this request is, as a rule, discussed by the fifteen member countries of the Council in a closed meeting b e f o r e they decide whether to schedule an open meeting or to vote on a draft resolution. In the case of UNIFIL, such "informal consultations" were also scheduled by the president to discuss formal proposals from the Secretary-General on questions regarding the composition of the Force (see Chapter 7), the appointment of the Force commander, and other matters. They could also be called by the president when the Secretary-General wanted to brief members of the Council on crisis situations affecting the Force. As the i n f o r m a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s are not o p e n to the m e d i a or to nonmembers of the Security Council, the Secretary-General could also give Council members a somewhat more detailed account of his negotiations with the parties concerned than what was printed in the written r e p o r t s o f the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l . S i n c e the i n f o r m a l consultations are not considered to be particularly leak-proof, the confidentiality of the actual negotiations are scrupulously protected by the Secretary-General even in such briefings to the Council. The informal consultations have come to play a very useful role for communications between the Security Council and the SecretaryGeneral. Some of the earlier problems on the respective responsibilities of these two organs of the United Nations in the management of UN peacekeeping operations have been solved through the development of this channel. On the other hand, the Secretary-General himself has warned that these consultations "may become a substitute for action by the Security Council or even an excuse for inaction" (Doc. A/37/1 Suppl. 1). In some of the crisis situations affecting UNIFIL, there is little doubt that the Secretary-General brought the situation to the attention of Council members not only to inform them but to receive some assistance. The Council members did not always fulfill such hopes. Bilateral consultations, conducted by the president of the Security Council or between members of the Council themselves, are the most informal and confidential way for the Council to handle international conflicts. The influence of the president depends to a considerable degree both on the personality of the president and the interests of his home country. Some of the most active presidents on UNIFIL matters have come from the troop-contributing countries, such as the French in September 1978 and in June 1982, the Norwegians in April 1979, the Irish in August 1982, and the Dutch in December 1983. It must b e stressed that the president in most cases will need a request from one

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of the paities to the conflict, or a crisis on an agenda item that has been put before the Council, to engage himself and others actively in bilateral consultations with the parties to a conflict or with Council members. One example of how the president of the Council can use the informal and bilateral consultations to good effect occurred in April 1979. During the crisis caused by Haddad's bombardment of the Naqoura headquarters, the Lebanese delegation asked for an urgent meeting of the Council to discuss the situation. The president of the Council during this month, Ambassador Ole Aalgaard of Norway, asked for thirty-six hours in order to search for other ways to defuse the situation. During consultations with the Israeli delegation in New York, the president held out the probability of an open meeting of the Council, in which sharp criticism and condemnations of Israel for its support of the Haddad forces would be certain. The president, who consulted closely with the Secretary-General and Brian Urquhart, also met with representatives of the UNIFIL troop-contributing countries, which agreed to make bilateral demarches to the Israeli prime minister through telegrams or telephone calls to impress on him that something had to be done to curb the activities of Major Haddad. As a result of this pressure, the president managed to extract some promises from the Israelis that they would see what could be done to ensure the safety of the Force and of the UNIFIL headquarters. Even though the situation in the area continued to deteriorate during the following two months and a full debate was eventually held at the end of May and beginning of June, the threat of holding a meeting in this case probably had a more direct effect on the situation in the area than a full-fledged debate. A more extended use of the presidency of the Security Council for direct negotiations with the parties to a conflict has to pass one major hurdle. This is the problem of continuity, as the presidency of the Council changes each month. Even though incoming presidents are briefed and assisted by a very competent staff from the Secretariat, much insight and experience are lost at each rotation. There are, in principle, no barriers to the Council giving an outgoing president a personal mandate to continue the contacts and consultations he has established with parties to a conflict. This is done from time to time, but the authority of the presidency will be lost.

The Permanent Members Even in the consultation processes of the Security Council, continuity and influence are concentrated primarily among its permanent members. Without their active participation and support, the Security

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Council's ability to function as an instrument for negotiation or mediation in international conflicts will be severely diminished. The United States and the Soviet Union are, of course, major members; their roles have been discussed in Chapter 9 and will not be repeated here. Among the other permanent members of the Council, France has played a particularly active role on UNIFIL matters. The French have important historical, political, and cultural ties to Lebanon. Probably for these reasons, France was the first country to put troops at the disposal of UNIFIL. Through several mandate periods, it was the largest troopcontributor, and it has advanced important proposals on strengthening the UN role in Lebanon. One of the motives behind the French policy on UNIFIL and on the Lebanese crisis has no doubt been that a UN blue beret would legitimize a continued French presence and interest in Lebanese affairs. In this case, there has b e e n almost full correspondence between French and UN interests, however, and the strong support given by France to the UNIFIL operation has been an important asset for the UN Force. Through its traditional ties to Lebanon, France was initially well suited to play a role in the diplomacy behind the scenes in the Security Council's discussions on the situation in Lebanon. Sometimes such initiatives were taken in close contact with the Lebanese government, which could not always take the steps that it wanted because of the sensitivities of other Arab parties, in particular those of Syria and the PLO.3 On other occasions, French initiatives were taken without full prior consent from the Lebanese. The French insistence on shorter mandate renewals for UNIFIL in September 1978 and January 1979 did not conform with the requests of the Lebanese. The July 1982 FrenchEgyptian initiative, as noted by Ambassador Tueni, left the Lebanese somewhat confused. 4 Even the February 1984 initiative to replace the MNF with a UN presence in Beirut was not initially in full conformity with the objectives of the Lebanese government. The success of French initiatives was often damaged by the French propensity for launching initiatives without advance consultations—which more than once reduced their possibilities of getting support for proposals that could otherwise have been accepted. Nevertheless, the French have more than any other permanent member made active use of the Security Council to find solutions to the Lebanese crisis, both for crisis management and for peacemaking purposes. In the 1983-1986 period, even French individuals and interests became targets of attacks, kidnappings, murders, and bombs in Lebanon by fundamentalist Shi'ite groups, possibly as a spillover from earlier French support of Iraq in its war with Iran. Even though the

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French held firm for a long time after the first such incident—directed against the French MNF contingent in October 1983—these attacks gradually took their toll. Toward the end of the period, a French disengagement from Lebanon had become visible as compared with previous levels. This also affected UNIFIL, as exemplified by the withdrawal of the logistical battalion announced in April 1986 and parts of the composite battalion in 1987. The deterioration of the relationship between the fundamentalist Shi'ite groups and the French in September 1986 led the French to bring the situation of UNIFIL before the Security Council o n c e more as a part of the crisismanagement effort. The United Kingdom held the presidency of the Council when UNIFIL was established in March 1978 and has since then been a consistent and constructive supporter of the role of the UN Force in Southern Lebanon, although its support has been low-key. The British have introduced no request for meetings or independent proposals as draft resolutions on UNIFIL matters. China did not participate in the votes of the Security Council on resolutions 425 and 426 (1978), although the Chinese representative expressed full support for the complaints and the condemnations expressed by Lebanon, the PLO, and the Arabs against the Israeli aggression. When the People's Republic of China took over the permanent seat assigned to China by the UN Charter, the Chinese consistently declared their distance from UN peacekeeping operations. In December 1981, the Chinese changed their position on this issue and for the first time took part in a vote on a resolution regarding UN peacekeeping operations by casting a positive vote on resolution 498 (1981), which renewed the mandate of UNIFIL for another period of six months. The Chinese did so quietly, without any explanation of vote or other fanfare. This change must be seen as a highly welcome and positive step to assure the collective responsibility of UN members for UN peacekeeping operations.

The Non-Allgned Group and the Arab Members In the informal consultations of the Security Council, the caucus formed by the members of the nonaligned countries has come to play an increasingly important role during the early 1980s. Indeed, the institutionalization of their cooperation took place in 1978-1979, the first year of UNIFIL's existence. 5 Depending on which members are elected to the Security Council from the various regional groups, the nonaligned members of the Council number between six and nine countries. 6 Their support is therefore needed to muster the nine votes necessary to obtain a positive decision by the Council.

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In the case of UNIFIL and the Lebanese crisis, the profile of the nonaligned group has been considerably lower than on most other questions before the Council. Lebanon is itself a member of the nonaligned movement, and the nonaligned members have in most cases followed the lead of the Lebanese delegation in Council consultations. This is in accordance with usual practice when member countries of the nonaligned movement are involved in international conflicts7—as is the Council practice of leaving the handling of Third World conflicts to nonaligned countries from the region involved. The Arab members of the Security Council have played a significant role in the consultations of the Security Council on UNIFIL matters and on the Lebanese situation. 8 During UNIFIL's lifetime, Kuwait (1978-1979), Tunisia (1980-1981), Jordan (1982-1983), Egypt (1984-1985), the United Arab Emirate (1986-1987), and Algeria (1988-1989) have served on the Council as members from the Arab group of countries. During the days of March 1978 when UNIFIL was established, the delegation of Kuwait played a crucial role behind the scenes in mobilizing Arab and nonaligned support for the initiative to establish UNIFIL, and the delegation of Kuwait was a key factor in the informal consultations of the Council during the entire 1978-1979 period. The April 1980 initiative to introduce a draft resolution strongly condemning Israel for its policies toward UNIFIL and Lebanon during Tunisia's period on the Council has been described in Chapter 3. Jordan, which served as the Arab member of the Council during the 1982 invasion, played an active role both in the consultations and the debates of the Council during this period and introduced the resolution adopted by the Council after the Sabra and Chatila massacres. Egypt has on several occasions played an active role in the Council on the Lebanese question, often in collaboration with France. The FrenchEgyptian initiative of July 1982 (when Egypt was not a member of the Council) has been discussed in Chapter 6. The Egyptian request for a meeting of the Council in May 1985, against the express wishes of the Lebanese government, is another example of this collaboration. This stands as one of the extremely rare cases of an inter-Arab conflict being brought before the Security Council by an Arab state. The Arab member of the Security Council is, in theory, seen as an unofficial guarantee that Arab interests are safeguarded in the work of the Council. In the case of UNIFIL and the Lebanese question, this has been no easy task because of the inter-Arab rivalries involved. The intermittent conflict between the Lebanese government and the PLO has been discussed in several chapters of the present study. The PLOSyrian conflict, which was brought particularly to the forefront in the 1985-1985 period, is another example. Syria's shifting alliances with

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different member groups of the Lebanese government and Syria's conflicts with other countries of the Arab world, in particular with Egypt, constitute a third set of conflict dimensions. The relationship between the PLO and Jordan constitutes a fourth dimension. This relationship was strained for a long period after the crushing of PLO bases in Jordan in 1970, which led to the influx of a large number of Palestinian refugees into Southern Lebanon. Relations improved significantly during the 1984-1985 period, only to deteriorate again in 1986. As a whole, both the nonaligned countries and the Arab countries have been very supportive of UNIFIL and the UN effort in Lebanon. Not a single negative vote or abstention has been registered by countries from this group on UNIFIL resolutions or on draft resolutions on the Lebanese situation in the 1978-1985 period. This does not mean that there have been no doubts or frustrations from the nonaligned members concerning the situation affecting UNIFIL. Some of these doubts were registered in the 17-19 March 1978 debate of the Council on the establishment of UNIFIL. There were also serious doubts among some of the nonaligned countries during the February 1984 debate on the French proposal for a UN presence in Beirut, although all nonaligned members of the Council ultimately voted for the French draft resolution. Judged from the background of previous skepticism in some of the Third World countries about UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operations, their support of the UNIFIL operation must nevertheless be seen as a positive development. Their support of the UN option has probably b e e n r e i n f o r c e d b y the establishment o f non-UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operations in the Middle East. The nonaligned countries have regarded this development with concern and have left no doubt that they far prefer the UN option. On the negative side, it must be a subject of regret that the financial problems involved in the UNIFIL and other UN peacekeeping operations have not made it possible for more Third World countries to take part as troop-contributors.

THE DEBATES When the members of the Security Council decide to call an open meeting of the Council, they can choose among several different ways to structure the debates. At one end of the scale are the full-fledged debates with the participation of countries that are not members of the Security Council. Such debates have become increasingly frequent in the work of the Council during the last few years.

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Full-fledged debates were held a number of times on UNIFIL matters. The debate on the establishment of UNIFIL from 17-19 March 1978 and the debates on the first mandate renewals had a fairly wide number of participants. Similarly, the Council debates on the April 1980 incidents and the June-July crises of 1981 had the character of fullfledged debates. Many of the series of meetings held during the Israeli invasion in the summer of 1982 drew a large number of speakers. Such mobilization of support was used by the Lebanese delegation when it wanted to demonstrate to the Lebanese people and to world opinion that Lebanon enjoyed broad international support for its cause in Southern Lebanon. One effect of these open debates was that they made the Israelis furious about being the target of criticism and condemnation from countries that the Israelis—sometimes with eminent reason—considered to be much worse transgressors than Israel in matters of military occupations or h u m a n rights violations. Ambassador Blum and other Israeli representatives therefore much preferred to direct their considerable rhetorical skills against the situation in these countries, and against what was described as the evil role of the PLO in terrorism all over the world, than to discuss Israel's policies in Southern Lebanon. Such debates (and the sometimes interminable right-of-reply sessions that followed) therefore had a tendency to exacerbate tensions rather than being a remedy—although the therapeutic value of such steam-venting exercises for the conflict parties and the members of the world community should be kept in mind. After the 1979-1980 period, more limited debates—often restricted to Council members, the parties to the conflict, and sometimes one or two troop-contributors—became the pattern most often used in connection with the renewals of the mandate. Such debates generally were less volatile and were more focused on the state of affairs in Southern Lebanon. This depoliticization of the mandate debates was a result of a conscious effort by the Lebanese delegation, the United States, and some of the troop-contributors to shelter the UNIFIL mandate from the fallout of other political wars in the Council. In this way, the renewal of UNIFIL's mandate became more similar to the mandate renewals of UNFICYP and UNDOF, which, through an understanding established between the parties concerned, are generally not subject to full-fledged debates.

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THE OPTIONS FOR DECISIONS The decisions of the Security Council necessarily reflect the political dimensions brought into the Council by its members. In the case of UNIFIL, the n e c e s s i t y o f maintaining U.S. support for UNIFIL, combined with the role of the United States as the protector of Israeli interests in the Council, assured that the decisions of the Council would not tip too far in the direction of strong criticism of Israel or its policies. On the other side, the general sympathy in the Council for the legitimacy of the case of the Lebanese government and for the cause of Palestinians assured that the pressure would always b e in that direction. This alignment of forces had the effect of severely limiting the options that might otherwise have been available to the Security Council in matters affecting UNIFIL. It nevertheless is of interest to discuss these options in somewhat further detail, even if the nuances involved might not seem very significant outside the Security Council chamber. The decisions of the Council can be articulated either through presidential statements, which are consensus documents issued after informal consultations with the support of all members of the Council, or through resolutions, which are formal and stronger. Presidential statements were issued in several o f the crisis situations affecting UNIFIL (December 1978, April and May 1979, April 1980, March and June 1981, for example). A resolution is always necessary to renew the mandate. The decisions of the Council represent by themselves mostly a purely verbal expression of the collective or majority opinion of the m e m b e r s o f the Council. T h e s e opinions can take the form of confirmation of the general principles applicable to the situation at hand ("declares", "reaffirms," "reiterates," "calls attention to," "calls on to respect"). These terms raise the question of the legal scope of the decisions of the Council on the Lebanese issue. The decisions of the Council can be given an operational meaning ("decides," which is the word used when the mandate is renewed). They can also be addressed directly to one or all the parties to a conflict ("appeals," "urges," "calls on," "demands"). Moreover, the decisions can b e formulated as expressions of censure ("regrets," "deplores," "condemns," "strongly condemns"). Finally—and this is the only way the Council members collectively can use direct pressure against a member state—the Council can recommend or adopt sanctions.

The General Principles for a Solution The affirmation of general principles is usually the least problematic part of the process of formulating the decisions of the Security Council.

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Practically all the decisions adopted by the Security Council on UNIFIL or on the Lebanese crisis contain a statement of the principles involved or a reference to earlier decisions in which these principles have been stated. The content of these resolutions have been referred to in the descriptive part of this study. To summarize, the Security Council has, through these decisions, formulated the following principles for a solution to the crisis in Southern Lebanon: • The territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon (within its internationally recognized boundaries) has been confirmed in several resolutions, starting with resolution 425 (1978). • The demand that Israel should withdraw its troops completely to the internationally recognized border has been a recurrent theme. Again, the principle was first stated in resolution 425 (1978) (withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory). It was restated in resolution 509 (1982) and repeated in later resolutions. • On the general relationship between Israel and Lebanon, the Security Council has reaffirmed the continued validity of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 between Israel and Lebanon, in resolutions 450 and 459 of 1979. The Council has given its support to a reactivation of the Israeli-Lebanese Mixed Armistice Commission as an instrument for contact and communications between the two countries on problems in the border area in several resolutions, starting with resolution 450 (1979). • The only concession to Israeli security concerns in Southern Lebanon that has been recognized by the Security Council is the establishment of UNIFIL, which was charged with restoring international peace and security in the area. Through its support for the negotiating efforts of the Secretary-General, the Council has also indicated its readiness to consider other security arrangements that might be mutually acceptable to the parties concerned. It must be stressed that with the exception of the Soviet and East European abstentions on the fourth principle (until April 1986), there has been unanimous support in the Security Council for these general principles. This unanimity includes the United States. These four principles have been largely formulated by the Lebanese government. Israel has accepted the first principle, although the Israelis have made a linkage to the presence of Syrian and PLO troops in Lebanon. This linkage is also made in relation to the implementation of the second principle. Israel does not recognize the third and has—as documented in Chapter 3—cooperated only partially with the UNIFIL mission in the implementation of the fourth principle.

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The Legal Scope One of the questions concerning the decisions of the Security Council, both from the view of international law and from the political point of view, is whether the decisions of the Security Council are binding on member states. From a strictly legal and traditionally Western point of view, it has been argued that since the language of Chapter VII of the UN Charter was not explicitly invoked, the Council decisions on Lebanon are only recommendations and not binding under Article 25 of the Charter, which states that all member states of the United Nations have an obligation to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."9 This argument was made specifically regarding resolutions 508 and 509 (1982). In the debates of the Security Council during the summer of 1982, even Western delegations referred to Article 25 as applicable to the situation in Lebanon, however. 10 From a more political point of view, these two resolutions continue to be regarded as valid by the Security Council even in 1988. In debates on the Middle East conflict, the question of whether the decisions of the Council are binding on the parties concerned has to a large extent been dependent on whether these decisions have been formally accepted by the parties themselves. That resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) continue to be regarded as cornerstones of a negotiated settlement in the Middle East, whereas scores of other Security Council resolutions have rapidly faded into oblivion, is determined primarily by the fact that these resolutions were accepted both by Israel and Arab states. The importance of the criterion of acceptance of Council decisions by the parties involved is also well illustrated by the continuous pressures on the PLO to formally accept resolution 242 (1967). The Security Council has adopted no resolutions on the Lebanese problem that have a status similar to resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)—although these two resolutions, by being general and comprehensive, can probably be stretched to cover even the Lebanese aspect of the Middle East conflict. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the most important failure of resolution 425 (1978) establishing UNIFIL was that the parties' full support and commitment to the resolution was not assured before its adoption. During the rest of UNIFIL's existence in the 1978-1986 period, none of the Council resolutions adopted on UNIFIL has been fully and unequivocally accepted by Israel—that is, in the sense defined by the Council itself. Admittedly, the Israelis were usually able, with a little help from the U.S. delegation, to prevent the adoption of resolutions it found completely unacceptable. It is an important step from tolerating a Security Council resolution to fully

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supporting it, however. The question might be asked whether it is too late to initiate an effort in the Security Council to negotiate a resolution on the IsraeliLebanese problem that would be acceptable to both countries, as well as to Syria and the PLO. Such a step would require strong leadership within the Council, especially by its permanent members. It would have to pass the twin hurdles of superpower conflict and Israeli mistrust. It would require a Lebanese government able to adopt and implement difficult decisions. It would probably also be less than easy for the Lebanese to accept since any alternative solution to resolutions 425 (1978) and 509 (1982) that would be acceptable to Israel would probably have to address the problem of mutual—and therefore also Israeli—security concerns in the border area between Israel and Lebanon. It could therefore be construed as a retreat from the demands for a forthwith and unconditional Israeli withdrawal contained in resolution 509 (1982). To use the negotiating machinery of the Security Council for such purposes would therefore be more difficult in 1988 than it would have been in 1978. Whether it is impossible is (among the other constraints discussed in this study) also a question of political will both inside the Council and among the parties to the conflict.

The Compliance Problem and Expressions of Censure For reasons described in Chapters 3 and 9, the Security Council has repeatedly, and often unanimously, adopted resolutions and presidential declarations addressed directly to Israel. The Council has appealed to Israel, it has urged, it has called upon, and it has demanded that Israel comply with the decisions of the Council. Nevertheless, Israel has not complied. The Council has furthermore on several occasions invoked its own prestige and authority to give added weight to its decisions, such as by characterizing acts by Major Haddad's forces—for which Israel was held responsible—as a "direct challenge to and defiance of the authority of the Security Council and to the mission of the United Nations" (Doc. S/13900 of 18 April 1980). Israel has not been deterred from continuing its support of the forces responsible for the continuation of such acts. This, of course, raises the question of how the Security Council should react to such open noncompliance by a member state. The most common reaction of the Security Council in such situations is to manifest its displeasure through an expression of censure. Many of the hardest tugs-of-war in Council consultations on UNIFIL and Lebanon have centered on which expression of censure should be used in each particular situation. In this context, it is enough

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to point to the U.S. opposition to using the strongest expression of censure ("condemns," "strongly condemns") against Israel. During UNIFIL's lifetime, the United States has voted for only one resolution condemning Israel for its policies and practices in Lebanon (resolution 520 of 17 September 1982, adopted after the second Israeli incursion into West Beirut) and has permitted the adoption of one more by not using its veto against the adoption of resolution 467 of 24 April 1980. This haggling about words—which for most persons outside the Security Council chamber do not carry significant differences of meaning—is probably not one of the aspects of the work of the Council that enhances its general prestige. For the members of the Council and for the parties directly involved in a conflict, the choice of words used in the decisions of the Security Council carry considerable symbolic value, however. For those who wanted to condemn—in this case mostly the Lebanese government (but not always), the PLO, many of the Arab countries, the Soviet Union, and others—a condemnation of Israel for its policies in Lebanon and for its non-compliance with earlier Council resolutions would be fully justified by the facts. It would also be a legitimate way by which the Security Council could express its opinion about a clear case of a threat and use of force against the territorial integrity of a member state, as well as a direct challenge to the authority of the Security Council. For Israel, the role of being condemned as a kind of international outlaw was unjust, wrong, and intolerable because the Council did not take into account what were seen as terrorist acts against Israel that motivated its reactions and because other transgressions against human rights and humanitarian concerns in Lebanon and in the Arab world were not subject to similar discussions or condemnations by the Security Council. The expressions of censure are perhaps the most important instrument of the "steam-venting" functions of the Security Council. Here again, the political value of these functions should not be underestimated, either in general or in relation to the Lebanese conflict. For the Lebanese government, the support expressed by the Security Council for its case against the Israeli interventions was important because the Lebanese had very few other ways to do anything about it. For the members of the Security Council, its permanent members included, and even for the troop-contributors, the expressions of censure represented an official translation of the frustrations they all felt because of the obstructions raised against the implementation of UNIFIL's mandate. Nevertheless, the instrumental value of the expressions of censure for UNIFIL's situation must be considered to be fairly limited. If the condemnations, deplorations, or expressions of regret had any positive

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influence on Israeli policies toward UNIFIL or the Lebanese issue, then this positive effect was not immediately visible. Here again, the question may be asked if a negative e f f e c t in the form of counterreactions was observable. Against this question can be argued, however, that the Security Council has not used any stronger expression than "strongly deplores" against Israel in the UNIFIL mandate resolutions. This could hardly serve as an excuse for counterreactions against the UN Force, not even for Israel.

The Question of Sanctions The adoption of sanctions is the strongest way by which the Security Council can react to cases of aggression and noncompliance of member states. Sanctions can be imposed either by invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter—in which case the sanctions would be collective and binding for member states of the United Nations—or as calls on member states to impose individual sanctions. During the 1978-1988 period, no draft resolutions that would have imposed sanctions against Israel according to Chapter VII of the Charter were submitted to the Council on UNIFIL or Lebanese matters. As discussed in Chapter 9, this was primarily because the United States had made it quite clear that it would veto any such proposal and because a veto by the United States would also undermine the vital U.S. support of UNIFIL. Nevertheless, the threat that the Security Council could be forced to adopt sanctions if the situation for UNIFIL did not improve was evoked in several of the resolutions adopted in the 1978-1982 period. Such a threat first entered the UNIFIL resolutions in connection with the second renewal of the mandate, in January 1979. In the resolution adopted on this occasion, resolution 444 (1979), the Security Council reaffirmed "its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978)." In the language of the Security Council, this is a clear, although indirect, reference to the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. The same or similar paragraphs were included in resolutions 450 and 459 (1979), resolutions 474 and 483 (1980), and resolution 488 (1981). In the last three of these, the threat was significantly weakened by the fact that the references to the "relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nation" were deleted. Two draft resolutions have been identified in earlier chapters as containing indirect or direct threat of UN sanctions against Israel in 1982. The first of these was presented on 8 June 1982 (see Chapter 3

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for text) after Israel's refusal to accept the demand in Security Council resolutions 508 and 509 (1982) to cease hostilities and to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Again, this was only a threat of sanctions similar to the 1979-1981 resolutions mentioned above. In spite of the fact that the United States had earlier voted for resolutions containing such formulations—although only resolution 488 (1981) was adopted under the Reagan administration—the draft was vetoed by the United States. The second draft resolution proposing sanctions against Israel was the Soviet draft of August 1982 after the first Israeli incursion into West Beirut. Not even this resolution was explicitly worded as a Chapter VII resolution, but was instead formulated as a decision that all UN members should refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons or military aid—that is, a call for voluntary sanctions (see Chapter 9 for full text). No UNIFIL mandate resolution adopted by the Security Council in the 1982-1985 period contains any provision for the imposition of sanctions or any threat that the Council would meet again to consider "practical ways and means according to the relevant provisions of the Charter." The only resolution adopted by the Council after the June 1982 invasion that even vaguely contains such formulations is resolution 523 of 18 October 1982, which requested the SecretaryGeneral "to report to the Council on ways and means of ensuring the full implementation of the mandate of the Force." Significantly, the buck was this time not accepted by the Council itself, but passed to the Secretary-General. The fact that the Security Council in the post-1982 period abandoned the use of threats to consider sanctions, the strongest means of pressure in its arsenal, must primarily be seen as a result of the negative attitude of the Reagan administration to such measures against Israel, even in the form of veiled threats as adopted in the 1979-1981 resolutions. It can also be seen as a result of the observation that threats lose their deterrent value and their credibility very quickly if no follow-up is given to them. It seems safe to assume that the Israelis saw the indirect threats of sanctions by the Security Council in the 1979-1981 period as empty bluffs, and probably rightly so. To these factors can be added the argument that the adoption of UN sanctions against a member state for not cooperating with a UN p e a c e k e e p i n g force would be a negation o f one of the very assumptions underlying such operations. They can only function with the support of the parties concerned, and such support cannot, by definition, be imposed. This observation leads to the conclusion that the threat of sanctions against Israel for not cooperating with UNIFIL is neither credible nor workable as a means of putting pressure on Israel.

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The imposition of sanctions against Israel for its policies and practices in Lebanon—as with all other cases affecting Israel—would also have very negative effects on the United Nations as a universal world organization. The present study is written under the firm conviction that the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations against Israel would harm the UN much more than it would hurt Israel. The consequences for UNIFIL would in all likelihood be very grave. The polarization of attitudes between a majority of the members of the United Nations on one side and Israel on the other has in the 1970s and 1980s been one of the most serious problems facing the world organization. There can be little doubt that the prime reason for this state of affairs has been Israel's own policies, both in regard to the territories occupied in the 1967 war and in Lebanon. Israel's invocation of the rights of self-defense according to Article 51 of the Charter has been accepted by no other state as an excuse for the continued occupation of or control over these territories. But neither can it be doubted that the massive and continuous onslaughts on Israel by the Arabs in practically all bodies of the United Nations—even though each individual agenda point and each condemnatory resolution may have a reason—collectively have produced counterreactions in Israel and the United States not only against the Arabs but also against the United Nations. Instead of being a forum for negotiations and peaceful settlement of disputes, the United Nations—the Security Council very much included—has become a second battlefield. Even if the two sides in the conflict may see short-term benefits in continuing this "dialogue of the deaf' in the Council, it is difficult to see how it is in the longterm interest of any of them.

THE NECESSITY OF A MULTILATERAL-BILATERAL APPROACH

The debate on the respective roles and responsibilities of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the management of UN peacekeeping operations has been referred to earlier in this study. As noted particularly in Chapters 7 and 8, the UNIFIL experience seems to suggest that the most important questions regarding this relationship have been settled, that a modus vivendi has been found, and that this no longer can be regarded as an institutional problem of the United Nations. The question of where the balance has settled between the two organs of the United Nations may nevertheless still be valid. Judged from one perspective, the Secretary-General and the Secretariat have clearly been the most important element in managing and maintaining UNIFIL. All aspects concerning the implementation of

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the decision to establish UNIFIL have been left to the SecretaryGeneral. There are extremely few, if any, examples of the Security Council not accepting the recommendations of the Secretary-General regarding the operational aspects of UNIFIL. In most of the cases for which the Secretary-General has sought help from the Security Council when the Lebanon situation became intolerable, the Council members simply passed a decision returning the problem to the SecretaryGeneral. The Council gave expressions of general support for his efforts and some bilateral assistance to unlock crisis situations, but very little else. From this perspective, a fairly solid case could be constructed for the allegation that the Security Council has relinquished or abdicated a large part of its responsibilities for UNIFIL, thereby contributing to a further diminishing of the prestige and the authority of the Security Council. The most obvious problem with the efforts of the Security Council in relation to the UNIFIL operation has not been in the formulations of its decisions but in the follow-up given to them. This observation includes not only the parties to the conflict but the members of the Security Council and other UN members. In Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar's first report on the work of the organization in 1982 Oargely written by Brian Urquhart), he pointed to "a tendency in the United Nations for Governments to act as though the passage of a resolution absolved them from further responsibility for the subject in question" (Doc. A/37/1 Suppl. 1). Among the troop-contributors to UNIFIL there was sometimes a noticeable irritation that the members of the Security Council seemed to concern themselves with UNIFIL only when the mandate came up for renewal and in crisis situations, and that very little thinking and effort seemed to be spent on this subject in the periods in between. This observation points to the importance of regarding a UN peacekeeping operation, including UNIFIL, as a total political system, involving the multilateral efforts within the Security Council and the UN Secretariat, the individual follow-ups to these efforts, and a strongly supportive bilateral diplomacy. If the parties to a conflict do not accept or comply with the decisions of the Council, bilateral support efforts become even more necessary to ensure that the respect and authority of Security Council decisions are upheld or to find other negotiated solutions to the conflict. Bilateral diplomacy takes place, by definition, primarily outside multilateral frameworks, even in the Middle East. As described in Chapter 9, a large part of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East has been conducted outside the UN framework, both before and after the establishment of UNIFIL. A main reason for this state of affairs, apart

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from U.S. and Israeli strategic concerns, has been that the UN route has been perceived to be too cumbersome and to involve too many actors, including some "undesirables." There are, however, at least two distinct advantages in coordinating such bilateral efforts more closely with the United Nations. One of these derives from the fact that the UN machinery is instantly available for coordinating crisis management and peace efforts at practically all levels of a conflict. This was realized by the United States in March 1978 and in several of the other crisis situations in Lebanon, not counting the 1982 invasion and its aftermath. In the case of UNIFIL, the informal consultations of the Security Council, the negotiating efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff, and the bilateral support actions from the troop-contributors and the members of the Security Council have all been integral parts of the total peacekeeping effort. From this perspective, even the implementation and the follow-up part of the record of the Security Council in the conduct of the UNIFIL operation have been valuable, even though the efforts have not been strong enough to produce the desired results. The second advantage of using the Security Council as an instrument for international crisis management and peaceful settlement of conflicts is that the Council, by virtue of the UN Charter, guarantees an international legitimacy to the solutions contained in its decisions that no other body can provide. Again, the prime examples of this effect can be found in resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which still constitute the only internationally recognized constitutional framework for the search for a just and lasting peace in the region. In Lebanon, the efforts made during the 1982-1983 period to negotiate a settlement to the conflict outside the UN framework foundered, at least partly because of the lack of regional or international legitimacy. As pointed out by the Secretary-General in his proposal to member states to involve the Security Council more actively in the Middle East peace efforts, the Security Council is "the only place in the world where all of the parties concerned can sit at the same table" (Doc. A/37/1 Suppl. 1). The machinery for consultations and negotiations of the Security Council is also a surprisingly flexible instrument, which can be used to different purposes at several levels of a negotiation process. It can be used as a means to consult on (or to obtain) Security Council legitimization of settlements that have been negotiated elsewhere, as in the case of the Kissinger negotiations on the Middle East in 1973-1975. It can provide a framework for efforts by individual Council members or a group to negotiate settlements to international conflicts under UN auspices. This was done, for example, when the four Western members of the Council in the 1977-1978 period

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negotiated the basic principles of a settlement of the Namibia conflict. The implementation of this settlement was left to the Secretary-General, whose plan for implementation was ratified by the Security Council through resolution 435 (1978). Finally, it can be used to give more active support to the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement decisions passed by the Council. To again quote from the 1982 report of the Secretary-General, "without the continuing diplomatic and other support of member states, the Secretary-General's efforts often have less chance of bearing fruit. Very often a Member State or group of Member States with a special relationship to those involved in such negotiations could play an extremely important reinforcing role in promoting understanding and a positive attitude" (Doc. A/37/1). The efforts of the Secretary-General to implement Council decisions regarding UNIFIL and the situation in Lebanon seem to a considerable degree to be in need of such supportive actions. In his 1982 report, the Secretary-General raised the question of whether it would be possible "to underpin the authority of peacekeeping operations by guarantees, including explicit guarantees for collective or individual supportive action" ( D o c . A / 3 7 / 1 ) . This idea—together with the other observations in this report on the role of the United Nations—was made the subject of a lengthy series of informal consultations among the members of the Security Council during the 1983-1984 period. Among the ideas put forward in this c o n t e x t was a n o n a l i g n e d p r o p o s a l that attacks against a UN peacekeeping operation should by definition be considered a threat against international peace and security and that Chapter VII of the UN Charter should automatically b e invoked. The idea was not judged acceptable, however, and nothing concrete came of the exercise. The general question formulated by the Secretary-General nevertheless is an idea well worth considering further. In the case of UNIFIL, the most consistent collective and individual supportive actions have come from the group of troop-contributors. As the fate of UNIFIL has proved, their influence has not been enough to ensure the necessary respect for the decisions of the Council. A more active and forceful effort by the members of the Security Council, especially its permanent members, would be highly desirable and necessary.

NOTES 1. The figures used in this chapter are compiled from the annual reports of the Security Council covering the period up to 15 June 1985. 2. See the statements made by the representative of Ireland and during the Security Council debate on 18 June 1982 (Doc. S/PV. 2379).

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3. Ghassan Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres (Paris: Jean-Claude Lattes, 1985). 4. Ibid. 5. Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers (New York: Praeger, Council on Foreign Relations, 1983), 113. 6. From the group of Western and other states, Malta, which served on the Council in the 1983-1984 period, is a member of the nonaligned movement. From the East European group, Yugoslavia is a founding country of the movement. Several Latin American countries are not members. 7. Jackson, The Non-Aligned 117. 8. According to standard practice, an Arab country is elected to the Security Council alternately from the Asian group (Kuwait, Jordan) and from the African group (Tunisia, Egypt). 9. Istvan S. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: Hants, Gower, 1984), 151. 10. See the statement by President of the Security Council, Ambassador Noel Dorr of Ireland, in the Council on 6 August 1982 (Doc. S/PV. 2391).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Summary: The Accomplishments and the Dilemmas of UNIFIL A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION WITHOUT PEACEKEEPING AGREEMENTS

A basic problem confronting UNIFIL since its establishment was the absence of a detailed agreement between the parties to the conflict on the implementation of the mandate of the UN Force. This raises the question of whether prior agreement from the parties to a conflict should be considered a prerequisite for the creation of any new UN peacekeeping operation. If the situation is such that no prior agreement is possible, what other lessons can be drawn from the UNIFIL experience on the relationship between peacekeeping operations and the peacemaking aspects of such operations? Some insights into these problems can be offered by comparing the UNIFIL operation with the two other UN peacekeeping operations established in the Middle East in the 1970s—the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the Sinai and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Syrian Golan Heights. It must be stressed, however, that both of these operations also differ from UNIFIL in that they were basically interposition forces deployed between opposing armies, while UNIFIL has been deployed in a densely populated area that has not been clearly defined. The establishment of UNEF II in the Sinai as a result of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 can be compared with the UNIFIL operation in the sense that even UNEF II was set up without any detailed agreement between the parties. Security Council resolution 340 (1973), which established UNEF II, was adopted after a series of high-level contacts among Washington, Moscow, Jerusalem, and Cairo, but without any prior detailed agreement on the deployment of the new force except in the general task of supervising the cease-fire called for in resolution 241

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338 (1978) adopted three days earlier. Both in 1973 and in 1978, the situation in the field and the sense of urgency in the Security Council were such that rapid and effective action was thought to be more essential than having all the details about the operation worked out in advance. The follow-up given to the establishment of UNEF II was very unlike the attention—or lack of attention—given to the situation in Southern Lebanon after the establishment of UNIFIL, however. Following the events of the October 1973 war, a committed and lengthy effort was undertaken by the U.S. government to use the respite in fighting provided by the UN force to seek negotiated solutions to the conflict. Through the step-by-step diplomacy initiated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a first communication to the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of the cease-fire called for in resolution 338 (1973) and the positioning of UNEF II was transmitted on 9 November 1973.1 Under the provisions of Security Council resolution 338 (1973), the Geneva Conference on the Middle East was convened in December of the same year under UN auspices. The next step of Kissinger's efforts led to the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces in Pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference of 18 January 1974. A new series of negotiations led to the second Sinai agreement in September 1975, as a result of which Israel withdrew from a further portion of the Sinai and returned it to Egypt. The last steps toward peace between Israel and Egypt—the Camp David agreements of September 1978 and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of March 1979—were undertaken outside the UN framework because of Arab and Soviet resistance to the idea of separate peace agreements with Israel. Nevertheless, all these agreements contained detailed provisions for the successive redeployments of UNEF II, the UN force and observers envisaged in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the "acceptable alternative multinational force" suggested in President Carter's letter to Sadat and Begin in March 1979 2 Because these agreements were negotiated freely by the governments of the parties concerned and subject to a guaranteed U.S. interest, UNEF II and the alternative Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (the MFO), the international peacekeeping operations in question, were guaranteed a high degree of cooperation from the parties involved, a luxury UNIFIL has never enjoyed. 3 The UNDOF on the Golan—unlike UNEF II and UNIFIL—was established only after the signing of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces in Geneva at the end of May 1974. The agreement contained detailed provisions on the positioning of the UN force and observers. In fact, the area of deployment for UNDOF

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was defined through a detailed map, leaving absolutely no room for conflicting interpretations by the parties to the agreement. 4 Even here the main parties to the conflict had committed themselves through their acceptance of the agreement negotiated by Kissinger to abide by its provisions and to respect the division of forces between their respective national armies monitored by the UN force. There are other lessons to be drawn from a comparison between the 1973-1975 disengagement accords in the Sinai and on the Golan and the 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 3 negotiations on Lebanon. There were major differences in the way these sets of negotiations were conducted. The disengagement accords with both Egypt and Syria had a UN base, first by resolution 338 (1973), sponsored jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union and, in pursuance of this resolution, the Geneva Conference on the Middle East under UN auspices in December 1973. The negotiations between the parties to the accords were conducted by Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy between the capitals concerned, but the other key Arab countries were kept continually informed. The Soviet Union, in its capacity as co-chair of the Geneva Conference, was kept advised through regular briefings by Kissinger—although by no means to the extent that it would have liked. Consequently, those parts of the disengagement accords that directly affected the United Nations through the roles assigned to UNEF II and to UNDOF met with no problems in the Security Council. As noted in several of the chapters of the present study, no such high-level political efforts were undertaken on behalf of UNIFIL or the situation in Southern Lebanon. The implementation of the resolution that established UNIFIL was left almost entirely to the SecretaryGeneral and his staff. As indicated in Chapters 3 and 9, the assistance provided to the Secretary-General from the United States, the other permanent members of the Security Council, and the parties to the conflict was sufficient neither to solve the underlying problems that made the fulfillment of UNIFIL's mandate impossible nor to make a withdrawal of the interim Force advisable. The key role of the U.S. diplomacy in the search for negotiated solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict, even in its Lebanese aspects, was discussed in detail in Chapter 9. From this analysis of U.S. diplomatic efforts to support UNIFIL and resolve the problems of Lebanon, it is evident that the most high-level U.S. effort was made during the negotiations leading up to the 17 May agreement of 1983, in which Secretary of State George Shultz was personally involved. Here again, if a comparison is made with the 1 9 7 3 - 1 9 7 5 negotiations that defined the roles of UNEF II and UNDOF, major differences are evident. The 17 May 1983 agreement between Israel

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and Lebanon also assigned a role to the UN peacekeeping force in the area, in this case UNIFIL. As noted in Chapter 6, this role was extremely limited, however, and implied that the mandate determined for UNIFIL by the Security Council in resolution 425 (1978) would have to be abandoned. The support of Syria, which after Lebanon was the Arab country that would be most affected by the May agreement, was not secured before it was signed. Nor was the Soviet Union informed or consulted. 5 This fact would have made Council adoption of a revised mandate for UNIFIL along the lines of the provisions of the 17 May agreement extremely dubious, and a Soviet veto would have been highly probable. Implementation of the May agreement could thereby possibly have led to the establishment of another non-UN peacekeeping force even in Southern Lebanon, as in the Sinai by the MFO and in Beirut by the MNF. The failure to involve Syria in negotiations on an agreement whose implementation was made dependent on a withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon caused this agreement soon to be annulled and forgotten. Even if the continuing disintegration of the Lebanese political system has made the task difficult, no political effort on a level similar to the 1973-1975 negotiations has been made since then to find negotiated solutions to the security problems in Southern Lebanon, either in support of the Secretary-General's negotiations or outside the UN framework. The considerations noted above would then tend to suggest the following: • A detailed prior agreement between the parties to the conflict on the establishment of the peacekeeping force, including a detailed agreement on its area of deployment, is the best guarantee for the effective functioning of a UN force. • If the circumstances are such that a prior agreement is not possible, then a committed, consistent effort should be made at high political levels to reach agreement with the parties to the conflict on the implementation of the decision to set up the force. • It would not be enough to leave the task of implementation entirely to the Secretary-General without sufficient support from the members of the Security Council, especially from those with influence in the area concerned. This would be especially true in cases where a mandating resolution is a compromise text, leaving major issues ambiguous or unsetded, as in the case of resolution 425 (1978). A committed effort by the United States to support the peacekeeping operations in question is particularly important, especially in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict

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The importance of a consistent diplomatic effort to seek negotiated solutions is reinforced by what has been called "the one ironclad rule of Middle Eastern politics that when things are not moving forward, they usually move backward." 6 This factor has also been pointed out by former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who has stated that "the worst of all possible options is a deadlock or inactivity. Experience has proved that long periods of diplomatic inactivity have led more to war than to peace." 7 This observation has been proven to be appropriate, even for the situation in Southern Lebanon.

THE PROBLEM OF LINKAGES

It has been pointed out in several of the chapters of the present study that a main problem in UNIFIL's birth and existence has been that its mandate, both in its initial conception and in its implementation, became linked to problems that far transcended the piece of land between the Lebanese-Israeli border and the Litani river. These linkages are important. They not only explain the fact that UNIFIL's mandate, after twenty-three renewals, in 1988 was still as far from implementation as in 1978, but they also have a determining influence on UNIFIL's future in the area. Four sets of such linkages have been defined in earlier chapters. These include the regional linkages, the linkages to the internal situation in the countries and parties involved, the strategic linkages, and finally, the linkages inherent in any UN solution.

The Regional Linkages The regional linkages were originally the most important. At this level, the first and most important linkage, at least in March 1978 and for the rest of the period up to 1982, was to the Palestinian problem. It was the presence of the Palestinians in Southern Lebanon and their strategy of promoting their cause by armed struggle that started the chain reaction leading to the events of March 1978 and the creation of UNIFIL. It was the perceived need of the Palestinians to maintain their general status in Southern Lebanon—including their bases in the Tyre pocket and their nests within the UNIFIL area—that created the initial problems for UNIFIL's deployment, even though these problems were soon overshadowed by the obstacles created by the Israelis and their local allies. In spite of the PLO's setbacks in Lebanon in the 1982 war and its aftermath, the large number of Palestinian refugees left behind in Southern Lebanon underline the need for a just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian problem, even for the sake of Lebanon. As

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long as no political solutions arc found to settle the Palestinian problem by peaceful means, the problem will continue to haunt any attempts to reach more partial settlements of the Middle East conflict, both within the UN framework and outside. A second regional linkage has been the role of Syria in Lebanon and the question of the controversies—or the tacit understandings—between Israel and Syria over the rules of the game in Lebanon. This linkage was established explicitly by the Israelis in the 1982-1984 period when they made Israel's complete withdrawal from Lebanon conditional on the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Israel has also maintained that the third part of UNIFIL's mandate, the reestablishment of the effective authority of the Lebanese government, cannot be fully implemented as long as Syrian troops are in Lebanon. The Syrians have not been as open about their motives as the Israelis, but there is every reason to believe that they also perceive linkages between the situation in Southern Lebanon and their own interests. The available literature is replete with speculations about Syrian policies and intentions in Southern Lebanon. From Israeli sources, one such linkage has been seen between Syrian acceptance of more clearly defined security arrangements in Southern Lebanon and the issue of the Golan Heights. According to this perspective, "the only hope for a permanent arrangement would seem to be a 'package deal' with the Syrians, including Lebanon, the Golan Heights and the Palestinians."8 Syria's consistent opposition to the establishment of the Israeli security belt in Southern Lebanon and its support to armed groups that have staged a series of attacks on the Israeli Defense Forces and the SLA in this belt would tend to support such a hypothesis. Even Israeli regional interests should be mentioned in this context. T w o aspects of this interest can be discerned. The first concerns possible Israeli ambitions on the water resources of Southern Lebanon, in particular those of the Litani River. This question has been an open or an underlying issue in the relationship between the inhabitants of Israel and Lebanon since well before Israel's creation as a state—it dates to the 1923 Anglo-French agreement on the boundary between Lebanon and Palestine. 9 In the UN, Arab representatives have repeatedly accused Israel of harboring ambitions of a de facto annexation of Southern Lebanon in order to divert the waters of the Litani River into Israel. In a statement in the Security Council on 29 August 1984, for instance, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon referred to reports that the Israelis were preparing to dig a tunnel that could "absorb all the waters of the Litani River" and that "Israel will not abandon its ambitions over Lebanese waters" (Doc. S/PV. 2552). Israeli

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representatives have consistently denied any such plans. In the same Council debate, the Israeli Permanent Representative characterized the Lebanese statement as "a calumny that has been repeated by various Lebanese officials over the years" and referred to the fact that a group of UN observers had been invited to the area in question by the Israeli Defence Forces, but found no traces that work had been done to divert the waters of the Wazzani or the Litani Rivers. Such Israeli denials were repeated at the highest political levels in meetings with the SecretaryGeneral and his staff. The second aspect of Israeli regional interests concerns its security interests, which are, of course, directly related to the establishment of the "security zone" discussed in Chapter 3. Israel's general military strategy in Southern Lebanon—the concept of a security perimeter outside its 1949 borders and an "iron fist" policy inside and outside these areas—seems closely linked to its strategy regarding the even more important security concerns on the West Bank and on the Golan Heights. The similarity between the situation in these occupied areas and in Southern Lebanon has led many observers to see Southern Lebanon as a "north bank," which would or could eventually be sought for annexation to Israel. Again, Israeli representatives have consistently denied having any such territorial ambitions in Lebanon. However, as long as the Israelis were still controlling the water resources of Southern Lebanon, as long as the "security zone" defined after the 1985 redeployment increasingly took on the hallmarks of a zone of occupation, 10 and as long as Israeli politicians continued to say openly that Israel should aim for control over the whole area up to the Litani River,11 it is difficult to completely disregard the possibility that such motives are present in Israeli thinking about Southern Lebanon. Other regional linkages could also be mentioned. One of these would be the rise of Shi'ite fundamentalism in Lebanon and the role of Iran. Another would be the role of Jordan and developments concerning the pursuit of the "Jordanian option" as an approach for a negotiated settlement. These factors and others are all part of the total political system affecting UNIFIL and the possibilities of the UN for promoting peace and security in Southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, they fall outside the framework of the present study and will not be discussed in further detail.

The Internal Linkages The attitudes and the policies of the various actors involved in the conflict in Southern Lebanon will not be determined solely by their interactions on the regional or international levels. The internal situation in each individual country or party to the conflict will clearly

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be a factor. The most important internal linkage in a solution to the Lebanese conflict is to the Lebanese civil war. The strategy of internationalization described by Ambassador Tueni (see Chapter 3) as a motive for the request for a UN force was itself built on a set of linkages—the idea that a zone of peace in the south would reestablish the authority of the government in the country as a whole, which would also help stop the civil war. Instead, the continued fighting has further undermined the authority of the central government. This has weakened its ability to implement policies and agreements that it has advocated and supported. In turn, this has had negative c o n s e q u e n c e s on its credibility as a negotiating partner. This general weakening of authority has also continuously postponed the time when UNIFIL could realistically hand over the authority of its area of operation to the Lebanese authorities in accordance with its original mandate. A somewhat higher degree of acceptance of national responsibilities by the warring factions in Lebanon—instead of their inclination to put their hopes in outside help—seems to be highly desirable, including from the point of view of a fulfillment of UNIFIL's mandate. Other internal factors in Lebanon would also affect UNIFIL and the situation in Southern Lebanon. The future role of Amal in the south will be important. The question of whether armed groups in Southern Lebanon will continue or increase their attacks on Israeli Defence Forces and the SLA in the "security zone," or even across the international border, will also have direct impact on the security situation in the area. Internal developments in Israel have also played an important part in its policies in Lebanon. As documented by Schiff and Ya'ari (see Chapter 3), the personalities and the ambitions of key persons within the Israeli government played a major role in the prelude to and implementation of the 1982 invasion. Internal opposition in Israel to a continued occupation of large parts of Lebanese territory was probably as important as external pressures for the redeployment plan of January 1985 and the subsequent withdrawal from Lebanon. The ability of the Israeli government to take decisions regarding a complete Israeli withdrawal to the international border—and a substitution of the "security zone" idea with UN or other security arrangements—would also to a considerable extent be determined by political developments within Israel itself. The observation that "Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics" 12 underlines the importance of the internal factor in Israel, even for UNIFIL. Internal developments within the PLO—and the alliances and confrontations of some of these internal elements with Syria—have

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also played an important role in the evolvement of events in Lebanon. The fighting in the Tripoli area in 1983 can be attributed to this factor, and the interactions of Palestinian elements with different factions involved in the Lebanese civil war have been a factor in the conflict ever since the civil war erupted in 1975. The ability of the PLO leadership to keep a reasonable degree of control over various Palestinian splinter groups in order to prevent acts of terrorism against innocent civilians will also be important in creating a political climate in which negotiations are possible. This factor will direcdy affect the ability of the PLO to "deliver" its part of negotiated solutions in the Middle East.

The Strategic Linkages The linkages of the Middle East conflict to the strategic relationship between the two superpowers have been discussed in Chapter 9. It appears from this analysis that the antagonistic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has seriously hampered the ability of the Security Council to support effectively the UNIFIL mission. An amelioration of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as through a d e v e l o p m e n t of understandings regarding the Middle East, would have highly beneficial effects, not only on the ability of the Security Council to function according to the UN Charter but also on developments in the region itself. One area of the Lebanese conflict that seems to be in dire need of some kind of superpower or international understanding concerns the question of arms deliveries to the parties involved in conflicts on Lebanese territory. Lebanon has, since the start of the civil war in 1975, become a victim of ever more destructive weapons. These have often b e e n used indiscriminately and without any regard for b a s i c humanitarian principles. For UNIFIL (or other p e a c e k e e p i n g operations), one of its fundamental functions—to provide an area of separation between the parties to a conflict—has been undermined by the deliveries to the conflict partners of more long-range weapons able to fire over the area o f separation. Developments in weapons technology and deliveries of such weapons to conflict zones raise the question of whether collateral measures should be considered as part of the establishment of peacekeeping operations—for instance, in the form of demilitarized zones or other arms control measures in the areas bordering the area of deployment of the peacekeeping force. In Southern Lebanon, such collateral measures seem highly desirable to support UNIFIL's task of restoring international peace and security in the area. As long as the Katyushas continue to be fired from

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Tyre or from bases north of the Litani into northern Israel, Israel will continue to be legitimately concerned about the security arrangements in the border area. Some kind of agreed or unilateral restraints on the part of the Soviet Union to halt deliveries of this type of weapon to parties involved in the conflict in Southern Lebanon would be a welcome step to support UNIFIL's mission in the area. Whether such restraints would be possible in the center of the arms bazaars of the Middle East or whether they would be realistically available without some corresponding restraints on the use of U.S.-made arms in Southern Lebanon by Israel is, of course, another question. The introduction into the Middle East of ballistic missies made by China and other producers further complicates such possibilités. Other strategic linkages would be to the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union both in negotiations on a peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflict and in security arrangements that may be agreed to in such negotiations. As stressed in Chapters 9 and 10, the support of the United States for UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East will continue to be an essential condition for the success of these missions. Even if UN arrangements for the security interests of Israel may seem sufficient from the point of view of Lebanon or other Arab countries, U.S. assistance will continue to be important in negotiating with the Israeli government and in guaranteeing security arrangements that are credible also for Israel. It would be a serious blow to UN effectiveness—not only in the Middle East—if the United States resumes or sees itself obliged to search for solutions outside the UN framework, as was the case in the 1982-1984 period with the 17 May agreement and the Multinational Force. The breakdown of these arrangements and the lack of success of later U.S. efforts to revive the peace process based on bilateral contacts might suggest that U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East need a minimum of UN legitimacy as much as the UN needs U.S. s u p p o r t . A combined multilateral-bilateral approach seems to carry significant advantages from the points of view of both sides. The consent of the Soviet Union to UN peacekeeping will also be important in finding solutions to some of the structural problems facing UN peacekeeping. Soviet support in the Security Council would be necessary if UNIFIL is maintained in Southern Lebanon as part of more permanent security arrangements in the area. The Soviet shift to a positive vote on UNIFIL's mandate in April 1986 and the important policy changes toward open support of UN peacekeeping announced in September 1987 are highly positive developments in this respect. 14 To obtain Soviet assurances that no unilateral vetoes would be cast against a UN peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon, even in crisis

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situations, some kind of superpower contacts will probably b e necessary. This fact again points to the importance of adequate working contacts between the permanent members of the Security Council (see Chapter 9).

The UN Linkages A role for the United Nations in the security arrangements in Southern Lebanon—or in the more general search for peace in Lebanon or in the Middle East—in itself includes certain linkages. The regional, internal, and strategic linkages discussed in the present chapter may indicate that the conflict in Southern Lebanon can best be settled if all the various interests involved are in some way brought into the negotiations. This observation therefore tends to suggest that a c o m p r e h e n s i v e solution to the Middle East conflict would b e necessary—or at least useful—to settle even the Israeli-Lebanese aspects. A comprehensive solution would bring in the principles defined by the UN in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It could also point to the question of a resumption of the Geneva Conference as a follow-up to resolution 338 (1973). If other frameworks for comprehensive solutions are sought, the proposal to convene some kind of international peace conference on the Middle East seems to be the most relevant. The negotiating and consultative machinery of the Security Council can also be used, as proposed by the SecretaryGeneral. A comprehensive solution within the framework of the UN would also imply some kind of recognition of the rights of the Palestinians, including dealing with the PLO. A second route for finding a solution to the conflict in Southern Lebanon would then be to disregard linkages to other aspects of the Middle East conflict wherever possible and to isolate the search for security arrangements in Southern Lebanon to factors that concern Lebanon and Israel. This would mean disregarding all linkages except the internal factors in these countries—factors that by definition determine the ability of these governments to negotiate and to implement negotiated solutions. An important argument in favor of this negotiating approach is the fact that the Israeli-Lebanese issue should by far be the easiest to solve in the Middle East, since all parties agree that there are no territorial issues involved. It would also be quite simple to achieve, since it would only require a decision by the Israeli government to fully implement resolution 425 (1978). The removal or weakening of the armed elements of the PLO in Southern Lebanon since 1982 might also have made it easier to "de-link" the Palestinian issue from the Israeli-Lebanese aspects of the situation. In 1988, this again seems more difficult because of renewed Palestinian influence in

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Southern Lebanon and the uprising in the West Bank and Ga2a. Whether it would be possible to disregard the Syrian linkage would to a large extent depend on the Israelis, since they are the ones who have established it. In the various UN options discussed in this study, Syrian interests have not been included, since Syria has not been considered a party to the conflict in Southern Lebanon. In 1988, it seems to be somewhat difficult to envisage Syrian support or acquiescence for security arrangements in Southern Lebanon that are not based on a complete Israeli withdrawal—at least without opening linkages to the other fronts (the Golan and the Palestinian issues). It would probably be easier to disregard the UN linkages through a partial Israeli-Lebanese settlement than it would be if a comprehensive framework is sought. The fate of the 17 May 1983 agreement suggests the importance of obtaining regional and UN legitimization even for partial solutions, however. As pointed out by President Gemayel, it would be extremely difficult for any Arab country except Egypt to enter into a partial settlement with Israel without broader Arab support.15 Even a partial settlement of the conflict in Southern Lebanon would involve linkages to previous decisions in the UN. The general principles for a solution—defined by the Security Council through resolutions 425 (1978), 508 and 509 (1982), and other decisions (see Chapter 10)—would be a factor in any negotiations, both inside and outside the UN framework. If a negotiated solution includes provisions for security arrangements in Southern Lebanon, the role of UNIFIL and the UNTSO would also have to be considered. From the point of view of most insiders within the UN and many outsiders, it seems somewhat hard to understand that the security situation in the border region would be better without UNIFIL, even for Israel, than it is with UNIFIL. The evidence offered in the present study suggests that the UN machinery is flexible enough to be useful at several levels, both for peacekeeping purposes and for negotiations on the underlying political issues. The fact remains, however, that only the Israelis themselves determine how they perceive their own security interests. For the time being, the Israelis seem to insist that the UN linkages are basically more negative than positive for Israel. It should be strongly stressed at this point that peace in Lebanon and in the Middle East is more important than to salvage a role for the UN in the efforts to obtain such a peace. There is little value in insisting on a role for the United Nations in the negotiating process if the parties to the conflict agree that other frameworks will lead to faster or better results. Even from the point of view of the interests of the UN system, peace in the Middle East should be given a much

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higher priority than any prestige gained for the UN if a solution is found through it. Indeed, a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, obtained even outside the framework of the UN, would be instantly beneficial to the entire UN system. It would remove one of the most important and serious conflicts from the agenda of UN bodies. It would liberate UN debates from antagonisms, controversies, and stalemates that have done more than perhaps any other factor to destroy the atmosphere of cooperation within the world organization. There are probably extremely few UN members that would not dearly cherish the thought of being spared the endless, acrimonious debates, consultations, and votes on the policies and practices of Israel in the occupied territories in the Middle East so that more attention could be given to other important problems in the world. This fact, however, also serves to explain why most UN members continue to urge within UN bodies for a negotiated solution and a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The discussion in the present chapter has been based on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will continue to search for negotiated solutions to the conflict in Southern Lebanon, either through some kind of comprehensive or partial framework or through combinations of the two. It is also entirely possible that the parties do not have the necessary ability or political will to search for negotiated solutions, that the chain of linkages is too heavy, and that the political or psychological obstacles to serious negotiations are so high that they prove to be insurmountable. This would then point in the direction of a status quo situation in Southern Lebanon for still some time. In 1988, this seems indeed to be the most probable scenario. This would mean that the area will continue to be a zone of tension, armed skirmishes, terrorist attacks on both sides of the border, and cross-border violations of Lebanese territory by Israel. This scenario would then raise the question of the future of UNIFIL. More precisely, the question must be asked if UNIFIL should be withdrawn from Southern Lebanon or whether it should continue its difficult mission in spite of the obstacles raised for the fulfillment of its original mandate.

THE CASE FOR WITHDRAWING UNIFIL

The Credibility of Interim Peacekeeping Operations In his initial report on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978), the Secretary-General listed three essential conditions that must be met for the UN Force to be effective: "First, it must have at all times the full

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confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit" (Doc. S/12611). As described in the various chapters in the present study, these conditions have been met only very partially during the first seven years of the existence of the Force. Even though the Security Council has indicated its confidence in UNIFIL by renewing its mandate twentythree times by January 1988, the willingness or the ability of the permanent members of the Security Council to use their collective or individual influence on the parties c o n c e r n e d to ensure a full implementation of UNIFIL's mandate has been somewhat less than one hundred percent The parties to the conflict have not fully cooperated with UNIFIL, and some of them have created major problems for UNIFIL's deployment and general functioning. And even though UNIFIL has managed to function surprisingly well as a military unit under the circumstances, the limitations established on its area of deployment and the restrictions placed on its movements in the area have hampered the integration between the Force headquarters and the individual contingents. The non-fulfillment of these three basic conditions comes, of course, on top of the problems of the original mandate, which by 1988 looked as unfulfillable as it had during major parts of UNIFIL's existence. At the expiration of the first mandate period for UNIFIL in September 1978, the Secretary-General characterized the situation facing UNIFIL after the deployment period as "unacceptable" (Doc. S/12845). This expression has been used in a great many of the reports, statements, and decisions formulated within UN bodies to describe UNIFIL's situation in the first seven years of the existence of the Force. The efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff to improve the situation through negotiations, persuasion, and other means have been described in Chapters 3 and 8. Similarly, the consultations, debates, and decisions of the Security Council on UNIFIL matters have been documented in Chapters 9 and 10. This discussion has revealed that both the Secretary-General and the Council members have pretty much exhausted the ways and means realistically available to them—given existing constraints—to improve working conditions for UNIFIL and to make possible the implementation of its original mandate. Nevertheless, the situation has not basically improved. In addition to the perennial problem of Israel's refusal to withdraw its presence from and control over its "security zone" in Southern Lebanon, UNIFIL's problems in dealing with an active and legitimate (according to the government of the host country) resistance

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movement against targets in that zone could also erode some of the support that UNIFIL has previously e n j o y e d among the local population. The most logical conclusion in the face of a situation judged to be unacceptable would, of course, be to cease accepting it. And since more than ten years have passed and no dramatic improvement for UNIFIL seems to be in sight, a very logical decision would be to conclude that the conditions for the effective functioning of the Force had not been met and that UNIFIL should be withdrawn. A withdrawal of UNIFIL would be justified also by the fact that UNIFIL from its very start was designed to be an interim operation. From this point of view, a withdrawal of UNIFIL would in fact be long overdue. These arguments, which are specific to UNIFIL, can be reinforced by pointing to some disturbing precedents that the UNIFIL experience may have created for future UN peacekeeping operations. One of these precedents derives from the suggestion that the deterrent value of counterreactions from the UN system in cases of noncooperation with UN p e a c e k e e p i n g has b e e n considerably diminished by the UNIFIL operation. By using threats of retribution—in the form of veiled threats of withdrawal or indirect threats of sanctions (which have never been used)—the Secretary-General and the Security Council have reduced the credibility of their most important means of exercising influence or pressure on parties that do not cooperate with the United Nations. As pointed out in Chapters 9 and 10, the Israelis have quite correctly assumed that none of the direct or indirect threats formulated by the UN system because of Israeli obstructionism of the UNIFIL effort would be carried out. As long as the political and constitutional constraints on the UN system are what they are, it would perhaps serve the credibility of the UN better if such noncredible threats are not use—or if logical conclusions are drawn and UNIFIL withdrawn. A second argument is that the UNIFIL operation, which comes on top of twenty-four years of UNFICYP, may have reduced the credibility of UN peacekeeping forces as interim measures that can be quickly mobilized in times of crisis and then rapidly withdrawn as soon as the immediate crisis is over. If the impression is created that UN peacekeeping operations are almost immovable objects once they are established, there may be less willingness both from the parties to a conflict and from the major powers to use such UN operations as a flexible instrument to contain future international crisis situations. These observations may point to a need for a more thorough discussion within the UN system on how peacekeeping operations can be disbanded or withdrawn within a reasonable time period if the

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conditions defined when the Force was established are not met. Possibly this can be done through defining other advance criteria, in addition to those formulated for UNIFIL. Another possibility would be to study whether more fixed time periods for interim operations could or should be used in such a way that quasi-automatic mandate renewals, regardless of changing circumstances, are avoided. A major problem with all kinds of advance criteria for UN peacekeeping operations is that such criteria could and should never be made too rigid. UN peacekeeping operations have always been established in international crisis situations that are almost by definition unpredictable and fluid. One of the major concerns of the Security Council in its task of maintaining international peace and security should be to keep open any option for the UN that may serve to prevent escalations, alleviate human suffering, or prepare the ground for serious political negotiations. It would therefore be as wrong to predetermine that interim operations should be automatically withdrawn within fixed time limits as it would be to continue along the present track of indeterminate renewals of a mandate. Possibly some kind of arrangements for transforming interim operations into more permanent fixtures in cases where this is appropriate should be studied further. If the members of the Security Council determine that a peacekeeping operation designed for interim purposes is still necessary after its initial mandate period, they could consider some kind of more transitional arrangements whereby the UN force would be given more permanent underpinnings from the Council. This would imply more active support from the permanent members of the Council to deal with the situation, including burden-sharing for the troop-contributors. The working methods of the Security Council (see Chapter 10) are currently geared almost exclusively toward responding to international crisis situations brought before the Council by member states of the UN. Discussions of more permanent problems of principle facing the members of the Council have been much more rare in recent years. The informal consultations among Council members on the SecretaryGeneral's 1982 report on the work of the organization—which included the proposal to underpin UN peacekeeping operations by some kind of guarantees—have produced no concrete results. The question of how to devise better support systems for UN peacekeeping operations is nevertheless a subject that belongs to the responsibilities of the Council itself. It should not be delegated to other UN bodies. To postpone every difficult decision regarding UNIFIL to the next mandate renewal means evading responsibility rather than living up to it. According to this perspective, a more honest choice would then be to conclude that enough is enough and that UNIFIL should be withdrawn.

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It should be strongly stressed that none of the dilemmas or observations presented above are original or new. Practically every member state that has given statements in the Security Council on UNIFIL matters—and the Secretary-General—has warned against the practice of quasi-automatic renewals of UNIFIL's mandate. The need for a "clarification of UNIFIL's role, agreed upon by the parties themselves" was pointed out by the U.S. Representative in the Security Council during the April 1985 renewal (Doc. S/PV. 2575 of 19 April 1985). In the same statement, a warning was issued that "neither the troop-contributors nor the Secretary-General, nor this Council, can be expected to continue supporting the mission of the Force unless such a clarification is agreed upon in the months ahead." Here again, however, such lucid analyses and perceptive observations can be of little help to UNIFIL as long as no active follow-up is given to them.

The Exhaustion Factor Another set of arguments that may be set forward to justify a withdrawal of UNIFIL from Southern Lebanon has to do with the situation facing the troop-contributing countries. As described in Chapter 7, these countries have had to suffer considerable burdens as a result of their participation in the UN Force. The casualty list of 151 UNIFIL soldiers killed and more than 200 wounded by January 1988 is in itself serious. Furthermore, the troop-contributors have had to carry major parts of the financial expenses involved in UNIFIL participation themselves, with only partial reimbursement from the United Nations. The never-ending repetition of incidents has been a constant strain in their bilateral relations with the parties to the conflict, particularly with Israel. And most important, these factors have come on top of the general frustrations over not being allowed to do the job in Southern Lebanon that they had sent their peacekeeping forces to accomplish. The exhaustion factor—or the attrition rate—among the UNIFIL t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t o r s is serious e n o u g h . In addition, possible c o n s e q u e n c e s for future UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operations can be discerned even here. Most of the troop-contributing countries are recruited from the traditional pool of troop-contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. If a new international crisis should call for the establishment of another large-scale peacekeeping operation under UN auspices, recruitment of troop-contributors to this force may be more difficult as a result of the painful lessons gleaned from the UNIFIL experience. This factor is reinforced by the constraints described in Chapter 10. If countries that are being asked to put peacekeeping troops at the disposal of the United Nations for interim periods find themselves in a situation where they in reality, if not

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formally, face more or less open-ended commitments, then this experience may dampen their willingness to take part in future missions. In periods where there are few UN peacekeeping forces or observer missions in operation, this problem may not be acute. These concerns must be weighed, however, against other and more positive trends. It may be argued that the 1978-1988 period, which has b e e n a most difficult o n e for UNIFIL and for UN peacekeeping, also has broadened and solidified international support for the concept. Previous skepticism among nonaligned nations has almost disappeared. China has shifted from a very negative view of UN peacekeeping to a positive policy. The Soviet Union, whose distrustful attitude and lack of financial support has blocked or caused major problems for earlier UN peacekeeping ventures, has made support for UN peacekeeping a main element in its new UN policy. As long as these positive trends are partly offset by a shortfall of financial and political support from the United States, and as long as the financial problems affecting UN peacekeeping operations remain unsolved, the exhaustion factor nevertheless should give rise to concern.

The Crisis Maximization Argument These observations seem to be reinforced by the difficult situation still facing UNIFIL after ten years. The cautious optimism present both in the UN Secretariat and among the troop-contributors during the first eight months of 1985 about the prospects of getting Israel to agree to a redeployment of UNIFIL to cover most if not all of the area down to the international border had disappeared in 1988 as a result of renewed intransigence on the Israeli side. Apart from the valiant efforts by the UN Secretariat, there were no serious negotiations or consultations in progress between the parties to the conflict on future peace arrangements in the area. In his excellent analysis of the politics of the Arab-Israeli peace process, Harold H. Saunders has developed an analytical framework for approaching the barriers to peace that also seems appropriate to the issues in Southern Lebanon. 16 As a first task in attempting to break down these barriers, Mr. Saunders writes that "the most critical period in the peace process comes when leaders are deciding whether to commit themselves to a negotiated settlement." 17 According to this framework, developing the commitment to negotiate is the most complex part of the peace process because it involves a series of interrelated judgments. Four such judgments are identified: • A judgment that the present situation no longer serves a party's interests . . .

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• A judgment that the substance of a fair settlement is available . . . • A judgment that leaders on the other side will be willing and politically able to negotiate such a settlement . . . • A judgment that the balance of forces will permit a fair settlement . . .

In the case of the conflict in Southern Lebanon, at least two of these judgments appear to be negative. In Israel, the prevailing judgment after the completion of the 1985 redeployment plan appeared to be that the ensuing situation very much served Israeli interests. In addition, Israel gives the third of these judgments—the ability of the Lebanese government to negotiate—a quite negative verdict. Unless these judgments are changed, this analysis would then lead to the conclusion that the Israeli commitment to negotiate will most probably remain weak in the foreseeable future. A more traditional argument against UN peacekeeping operations—that such operations tend to freeze international conflicts instead of solving them—would tend to point in the same direction. In Lebanon, this argument was used openly to explain Lebanese opposition to the idea of using UN forces in the Beirut area during the summer of 1982 (see Chapter 6). The question might thus be posed whether a withdrawal of UNIFIL could contribute to an "unfreezing" of the situation in Southern Lebanon. To use Harold Saunders' framework, it could be necessary to create a situation in which a preservation of the status quo would no longer be judged to be in Israel's interest. In other words, the creation of a new international crisis could be the only possibility to put the situation in Southern Lebanon back on the political agenda at sufficiently high levels in Israel, in the United States, and in the Security Council to create new incentives for real negotiations. This argument, of course, carries its own set of counterarguments. A withdrawal of UNIFIL on these grounds would clearly be a high-risk policy, almost an act of desperation. The costs in humanitarian terms might be sufficient alone to advise against it There also would be no guarantee that such a course of action would bring the parties back to the negotiating table. The experiences from the other fronts of the Middle East conflict are not particularly encouraging in this respect.

THE CASE FOR STAYING THE COURSE T h e Stability Factor

The main argument used by the Secretary-General and the members of the Security Council to justify keeping UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon in

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spite of all its problems has been that the maintenance of the UN Force in the area has been necessary to maintain local and regional stability. Again, this note was struck in the Secretary-General's report after the first mandate period in September 1978, in which he stated that "if for any reason UNIFIL were to be removed, the result, in the present circumstances, could only be a disastrous change for the worse in Southern Lebanon" (Doc. S/12845). In later reports, the SecretaryGeneral has repeatedly stated that the results of a UNIFIL withdrawal could also lead to a renewed and serious deterioration of the situation in the Middle East as a whole. The stability argument can be discussed for its repercussions on three levels—the local, the regional, and the global. On the local level, there can be no doubt that UNIFIL has been a very important stabilizing factor throughout its existence. From the point of view of the humanitarian situation in Southern Lebanon, UNIFIL has clearly been a success. Compared with the rest of Lebanon, the UNIFIL area has, in spite of all incidents, been an area of relative peace and stability. It has become a haven for refugees from other parts of the country. The area has prospered economically. There can be no doubt that the great majority of the local population has looked upon UNIFIL as its main protector and that it very much wants UNIFIL to stay. Judging from the fighting and disturbances that erupted in the wake o f the successive stages of the Israeli withdrawal in the 1983-1985 period, the probabilities are high that similar fighting would break out in the south if UNIFIL were to be suddenly withdrawn. Villagers of many of the different contingent areas, particularly among the Shi'ite Muslims, have repeatedly made it clear that they would see no alternative but to leave their homes and the area if UNIFIL were no longer there to protect them from the SLA and the Israeli Defence Forces. Israeli officials, on their parts, made it clear that they would not hesitate to expel the inhabitants from villages suspected of harboring terrorists or resistance forces. Several operations of this kind have taken place, one in November 1985. Israeli officials defended such acts with the argument that they were made necessary by the acts of the villagers themselves and that Israel could therefore not be held accountable for the consequences. Because of the legacy of mistrust, bloodshed, and massacres in Lebanon, a UNIFIL withdrawal could therefore very well lead to a mass exodus from the areas south of the Litani, thereby creating new flows of refugees in a country that has very few safe havens left for refugees. The value of UNIFIL both in humanitarian and in political terms at the local level could therefore be sufficient by itself to justify UNIFIL's continued presence. It should be stressed that the wishes of the local population should

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not necessarily be accorded a final say in the question of withdrawing or keeping UNIFIL. Part of the reason for the interest expressed by the local population in maintaining UNIFIL is not directly related to the fulfillment of UNIFIL's mandate. The presence of UNIFIL contingents in Southern Lebanon has created new commercial markets for businesses and others in the area. At least part of the love affair between UNIFIL and the locals can be credited to this factor. Even though a withdrawal of UNIFIL would create economic problems for part of the local population, this would be an inevitable consequence of any withdrawal, including one following a fulfilled mandate. Loss of local markets for the local populations when any UN force is withdrawn is regrettable. These factors nevertheless fall outside the issue of maintaining international peace and security. On the regional level, the stability argument is open to more serious questioning. It is one of the main disappointments of UNIFIL that the existence of the Force in Southern Lebanon did not manage to deter the June 1982 invasion, although the main causes for the invasion were not found in UNIFIL's area of deployment (see Chapter 6). After the 1985 withdrawals from major parts of the areas occupied in the 1982 war, a new major Israeli intervention into Lebanon does not seem as probable as before the 1982 events, at least not with a direct Labour party influence in the Israeli government. Nevertheless, the Israelis have publicly declared that they will continue to react strongly to any threats to northern Israel or the "security zone" from bases even to the north of this area. If acts of resistance from Lebanese groups against Israeli troops or the SLA in Southern Lebanon continue to escalate, as the leaders of Amal and other Lebanese groups have promised will happen, it seems safe to predict that Israeli retaliatory or preemptive operations would also increase. In the UN Secretariat, there has been an increasing fear that the resulting escalations of the cycle of violence "could well develop into a new and serious international crisis" (Doc. S/17557). It is difficult to completely disregard such scenarios—which could very well bring Israel and Syria to the brink of a new war—although a more continuous conflict in the style of a "war of attrition" might seem as likely. On the global level, the argument was sometimes made, especially in the 1978-1982 period, that a withdrawal of UNIFIL might also lead to escalations that might ultimately threaten world peace. Such a scenario will necessarily mean that escalation first proceeds through the regional level. For the reasons mentioned above, this does not seem highly probable in the present situation. Nevertheless, there are very disturbing precedents in the Middle East conflict for the escalation potential of decisions affecting UN peacekeeping operations. The

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withdrawal of UNEF I by request of the Egyptian government is commonly regarded as one of the most important reasons for the escalation of the 1967 crisis into a full-fledged regional war. In 1973, as has been noted in Chapter 9, the Soviet threat to support a UN resolution on the sending of a joint U.S.-Soviet force to the Middle East (or unilateral action if this was not possible) triggered a nuclear alert by the United States. The Secretary-General and the Secretariat can be forgiven for not advocating a course of action in Lebanon that might have similar consequences.

The Maintenance of the UN Option A second school of arguments to justify UNTFIL's continued presence in Southern Lebanon has to do with the need to preserve the option of having a UN peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon that would be readily available to play a role in any negotiated security arrangements for the area. Such arguments were used by the United States in the period following the June 1982 Israeli invasion. From the point of view of the U.S. government, this argument was initially set forward to keep UNIFIL in the area pending the outcome of the Lebanese-Israeli-U.S. negotiations that led to the 17 May agreement of 1983. The basic argument remained valid, however, even after the United States withdrew fiom the n e g o t i a t i o n s on the future arrangements in Southern Lebanon. It remains valid as long as any realistic hope can be nurtured that the Secretary-General or his staff—or any other party—will succeed in getting the parties to negotiate directly or indirectly on mutually acceptable security arrangements in Southern Lebanon. Since the 1984-1985 period, the consultations and the negotiations under UN auspices, first in Naqoura and later in the capitals concerned have been practically the only serious effort made to find a political solution to the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. The maintenance of UNIFIL appears in this context to be important, if not essential, to strengthen the hand of the SecretaryGeneral in his continued efforts. If UNIFIL is withdrawn, it could prove to be difficult both from a political and practical point of view (for example, to find troop-contributors) to reestablish UN peacekeeping services as part of more permanent security arrangements in Southern Lebanon. 18 Another argument related to the question of maintaining the UN peacekeeping option in Lebanon and in the Middle East concerns the problem of negative consequences for the UN in case of a unilateral withdrawal. If a UNIFIL withdrawal led to renewed fighting and new flows of refugees from the south, it would very probably result in a hunt for scapegoats. In such a situation, the UN system and the

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Secretary-General would be highly vulnerable to arguments and propaganda placing the blame on the UN. Here again, the memory of the 1967 withdrawal of UNEF I is still very much present in the UN Secretariat. The risks inherent in a withdrawal—that the responsibility for the ensuing violence and chaos would be put squarely on the shoulders of the UN—have probably been one of the strongest motives for the Secretary-General in not recommending this option to the Security Council. At the present time, the UN system of conflict resolution and peacekeeping can ill afford such additional burdens.

The Authority of the United Nations One of the arguments used in debates about UNIFIL's future in Southern Lebanon has been that to let the Force continue to be a sitting duck for tauntings, deliberate harassment, r e p e a t e d provocations, kidnapping, and murders—to say nothing of the general noncooperation by some of the main parties to the conflict—will undermine the prestige and the authority of the United Nations not only in that area but in general. Such arguments have b e e n an underlying theme in a great number of statements in Security Council debates on the UNIFIL situation, where frustrations over UNIFIL's situation at times have been almost tangible. Here again, it is necessary to sort out the different aspects of the argument before an evaluation can be made. First, the question of the authority of the United Nations in Lebanon cannot be measured in absolute terms. It must be related to other attempts to establish authority in the very difficult times that Lebanon experienced during the 1970s and 1980s. The erosion of authority of the Lebanese government has been noted several times in this study. The authority of the PLO leadership over the various armed groups under its umbrella was not particularly impressive during the 1978-1981 period, and the fighting between Arafat loyalists and Syrianbacked dissenters in the post-1982 period did not improve discipline. The experiences of the Israelis during the occupation period in 1982-1985 indicate that even an effective war machine is not enough to establish authority in occupied areas. The Multinational Force in Beirut met with little success in assisting the return of authority to the Lebanese government in the Beirut area, and the power that grew out of the guns of the U.S. Sixth Fleet was not particularly relevant to the Lebanese situation. Even the Syrian army has had its share of problems in establishing any substantial authority among the shifting alliances and conflicting patterns in Lebanese politics. Compared with these attempts to establish authority, UNIFIL and the United Nations probably do not come out too badly. There are no

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reliable data available that would indicate any significant deterioration of the authority of the blue berets in Lebanon if the situation in 1988 is compared with the situation in 1978. Even the flare-up between the French UNIFIL contingent and fundamentalist Shi'ites in August-September 1986 was overcome within a relatively short time. By and large, UNIFIL has managed to maintain its impartiality and—in spite of all the harassment and casualties—has not been the target of large-scale attacks. On the contrary, UNIFIL has played a significant role in maintaining authority in its area of deployment in Southern Lebanon. During significant parts of its existence, UNIFIL has been nearly the only effective representative of the authority of the Lebanese government. In the process, UNIFIL has probably also managed to do its share to bolster the authority of the Lebanese government during an extremely difficult period for it, even if this contribution has not been sufficient to counter other negative trends. The question of the authority of the Security Council in relation to the situation in Southern Lebanon has been discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. What is more important than the prestige of the Council is the need to preserve the respect for the UN Charter. This has been and remains one of the most important arguments for the maintenance of UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. A withdrawal of the UN Force without a fulfillment of its mandate would serve the interests of the most aggressive party—Israel—while it would be against the interests of the injured party—Lebanon. As long as Israel continues to violate Lebanese territory in a manner widely regarded as disproportionate to the provocations, and as long as Israel continues to maintain a zone of security that is little more than a zone of occupation on the territory of a member state of the United Nations against the express wishes of the legitimate government of that state, leaving the UNIFIL area open to the Israelis and their local allies will continue to be seen by the Security Council, the troop-contributors, and most other UN members as extremely disturbing from the point of view of the UN Charter. A withdrawal of UNIFIL under such circumstances would be widely regarded as an implicit recognition of Israeli rule in Southern Lebanon and as a Council admission that open violations of international law do pay after all. For the majority of UN members, including troopcontributing nations, the idea that one state should be allowed to invade and occupy a neighboring state and withdraw only after the installment o f a puppet regime in parts of that country is not acceptable: it undermines principles of international law that are vital for their own security interests. Israeli representatives will continue to point to similar or worse transgressions of the Charter in other parts of the world to defend their policies. This may be factually correct, but

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s o m e w h a t beside the points made in the UN Charter. Israeli representatives may also continue to point to the lack of authority of the Lebanese government as a main reason for not relinquishing factual control over parts of Southern Lebanon. The apparent truth in this argument must, however, be weighed against the fact that Israel has done more than most other external forces to undermine this authority. In some of the comparative studies made of peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, there has been a tendency to consider UNIFIL and the UN as an option equivalent to non-UN options for solutions to the conflicts in the Middle East. This argument may be eminently defensible in relation to the question of a role for the United Nations in the negotiating process—and even in relation to the problem of security arrangements in the border area between two sovereign states. It should not be possible to consider respect for the basic provisions of the UN Charter as simply another option, however. The fact remains that the Secretary-General and most of those members of the Security Council that have consistently voted for renewals of UNIFIL's mandate through more than ten years have considered UNIFIL to be somewhat more than a modest-size peace-keeping force responsible for local security arrangements. They have also entrusted UNIFIL with the task of being a custodian for a concept of international law—as determined through the UN Charter—and an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security—as defined through the decisions of the Security Council. After April 1986, there was unanimity in the Council for this view. The successes and failures of UNIFIL have reflected the problems inherent in the Charter, including the lack of respect in the international community for its most crucial provision, Article 2.4 on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. UNIFIL has also been a victim of the lack of authority that the members of the Security Council have been able or willing to invest in their own decisions. A unilateral withdrawal of UNIFIL would, in this perspective, be seen as a further erosion of the visions of the UN Charter. This is the true dilemma of UNIFIL.

NOTES 1. IndarJ. Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984), 53. 2. As published in Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 496. 3. In contrast to UNEF II and the MFO, UNIFIL had the additional

266

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problem of being deployed in a fairly densely populated area. 4. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), 1253-1254. 5. See Wadi Haddad, Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors (Washington, D.C.: Praeger Special Studies, CSIS, The Washington Papers, 1985), Chapter 11. 6. Thomas L. Friedman, "Armed and Dangerous," New York Times, 5 January 1986. 7. Abba Eban, interview, Newsweek, 19 August 1985. 8. Moshe Maoz, professor of the Hebrew University, as interviewed by Daniel Gavron in the Jerusalem Post, 11 May 1985 ("Assad's Scenario for Lebanon"). 9 Fredric C. Hof, Galilee Divided, The Israeli-Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, Special Studies on the Middle East, 1985). 10. Kjell Skjelsbaek and Martin Hjelmervik Ness, "The Predicament of UNIFIL," NUPI-Notat, no. 343, December 1985, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo. 11. See the Jerusalem Post of 5 January 1986 ("SLA kills two terrorists, clashes with radical militias") in which Deputy Prime Minister David Levy is quoted as stating that "the only solution to terror attacks in the north was to expand the zone and strengthen the SLA." In the same article, Knesset member Rafael Eitan is quoted as advocating that "Israel had to consolidate its hold on an area up to the Litani River." 12. Jerusalem Post, 22 September 1985: ("Pragmatism and the PLO" by Gabi Scheffer). 13. The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai is here a case apart since this force was established outside the UN framework only as a second choice—because the efforts to obtain Security Council legitimization for a UN operation broke down. 14. It should be noted in this respect that the Soviets have not been generally unsupportive of UN peacekeeping in the Middle East except on the financial side. Even though the Soviet Union blocked the UN option in the Sinai after the Camp David agreements, there were some indications at that time that the Soviet Union was not altogether negative to a continued role for the UN even in such circumstances. See Richard W. Nelson, "Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model," International Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, Winter 84/85. 15. Amine Gemayel, "The Price and the Promise," Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 4, Spring 1985. 16. Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985), p. 22-37. 17. Ibid., 24. 18. It could also prove to be easier. The Netherlands, which withdrew from UNIFIL in 1985, indicated to the Secretary-General "that it would consider resuming its contribution to UNIFIL should the Force be enabled to play the role envisaged for it by the Security Council" (Doc. S/17557 of 10 October 1985).

Selected Bibliography UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS Security Council documents. These documents, which contain reports by the Secretary-General, draft r e s o l u t i o n s , p r e s i d e n t i a l s t a t e m e n t s , a n d communications from member states, are numbered chronologically as Doc. S/xxxxx. In the present study, the date of publication for each document is generally given the first time the document is referred to. In subsequent notes, only the document number is listed. Security Council records. This series of documents contains the verbatim records of the meetings of the Council. At the time the material for the present study was compiled, the Official Records (SCOR) were available only for meetings up to August 1979. For all later meetings, the Provisional Verbatim records (Doc. S/PV xxxx) have been used. The reports of the Security Council The official reports of the Security Council are published annually, covering the period from 16 June of one year to 15 June the following year. The reports contain the text of all draft resolutions and decisions presented before the Council, the records of the voting in the Council, and a list of the Security Council Documents circulated in relation to the matters before the Council. General Assembly documents. The study also refers to some General Assembly documents. (A). Several series of such documents are issued, including collection of resolutions, records of General Assembly meetings, reports of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and others. The document reference is listed wherever direct quotations are used.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES Aabrek, Vigar. Internasjonal

"Megling i feiten og prosedyrer i forbindelse med trefninger." Politikk, nr. 4B, 1978. 267

268

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

. "Militaer taktikk i fredens tjeneste.", Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. Ball, George W. Error and Betrayal in Lebanon: An analysis of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the implications for U.S.-Israel relations. Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984. Blitzer, Wolf. Between Washington and Jerusalem: A reporter's notebook New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. Toronto, New York, London, Sydney: Bantam Books, 1982. . The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985. Cohen, Raymond. "Israel and the Soviet-American Statement of 1 October 1977: The Limits of Patron-Client Influence." ORBIS, 22, Fall 1978. Colin, Jean-Pierre. "Liban: O m b r e s et lumières sur la FINUL." Défense Nationale, 36/1980. Dam, Kenneth, W. "A Time for Reason and Realism in the Middle East." Address before the World Affairs Council in St. Louis on 11 April 1983Dept. of State Bulletin, Washington, D.C., June 1983, vol. 83, no. 2075. . "Policy Options in Lebanon." Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dept. of State Bulletin, Washington, D.C., January 1984, vol. 84, no. 2082. Faret, Helge. "Problemer o g erfaringer med i starte en FN-aksjon i et konfliktomràde." Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 4B, 1978. Freedman, Robert O. "The Soviet Union and a Middle East Peace Settlement: A Case Study of Soviet Policy During the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon and Its Aftermath." In Peacemaking in the Middle East, edited by Paul Marantz and Janice Gross Stein. London, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985. Friedman, Thomas L. "America's Failure in Lebanon." In New York Times Magazine, 8 April 1984. Gabriel, Richard A. Operation Peace for Galilee: The lsraeli-PLO war in Lebanon. New York: Hill and Wang, 1984. Garrity, Patrick. "The UN and Peacekeeping." In A World without a UN, edited by Burton Yale Pines. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1984. Gemayel, Amine. "The Price and the Promise." Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 4, Spring 1985. Golan, Galia. "The Soviet Union a n d t h e Israeli Action in L e b a n o n . " International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 1, 1983Haddad, Wadi D. Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors. New York: Praeger Special Studies, CSIS, The Washington Papers, 1985. Haid, Ole Jacob. "UNIFIL-operasjonens betydning for det norske forsvar." Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. Haig, Alexander M., Jr. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1984. Heiberg, Marianne. "Observations on UN Peace-Keeping in Lebanon." NUPINotat, no. 305, September 1984, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo. and Higgins, Rosalyn. United Nations Peace-keeping 1946-1967: Documents

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

269

Commentary. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1969. Hof, Fredric C. Galilee Divided: The Israeli-Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, Special Studies on the Middle East, 1985. Houghton, Robert B. (with Trinka, Frank G.). Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of State, 1984. Husa, Ola. "Forsyningstjenesten." Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. International Peace Academy. Peacekeepers' Handbook. New York: International Peace Academy, Pergamon Press, 1984. Jackson, Richard L. The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers. New York: Praeger, Council on Foreign Relations, 1983. J a m e s , Alan. "Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982." International Journal, 38, Autumn 1983, 613-634. Kass, liana. "Moscow and the Lebanese Triangle." Middle East Journal, 33, 1979. Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1982. Lehman, Ingrid. "United Nations Peace-Keeping operations in the 1970's." In S1PRI Yearbook, 1980. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1980. Levran, Aharon. "UN Forces and Israel's Security." Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 37, 1986. Nelson, Richard W. "Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model." International Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, Winter 84/85. Ness, Martin Hjelmervik. "FN i okkupert omride?—UNIFIL etter invasjonen i 1982." Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. . (with Skjelsbaek, Kjell). "The Predicament of UNIFIL." NUPI-Notat, no. 343, December 1985, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo. Pelcovits, Nathan A. Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from Sinai and Lebanon. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, 1984. Pogany, Istvan S. The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Hants, Gower, 1984. Quandt, William B. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986. Rabin, Yitzhak. Interviewed in Jerusalem Post, 23 August 1985. Rabinovich, Itamar. The War for Lebanon. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984. Richard, Ivor. "The Council President as a Politician." In Paths to Peace: The UN Security Council and Its Presidency, edited by Davidson Nicol. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. Rikhye, Indar J. The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping. London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. "The Soviet Union and the Peace Process Since Camp David." Washington Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 1, Winter 1985. Ronning, Ole. "Forhandlinger og konflikter lokalt." Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985.

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Saunders, Harold H. The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985. Schiff, Ze'ev. "Green Light, Lebanon." Foreign Policy, no. 50, Spring 1983Schiff, Ze'ev (with Ya'ari, Ehud). Israel's Lebanon War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984. Serry, Robert."UNIFIL, Nederland, en de roi van der Verenigde Naties in Libanon." Internationale Spectator, 39-5, May 1985Shevchenko, Arkady. Breaking with Moscow. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. Siilasvuo, Ensio. "United Nations Peace-keeping in the Middle East: Lessons and Prospects." RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 26, December 1981. Skjelsbask, Kjell (with Martin Hjelmervik Ness). "The Predicament of UNIFIL." NUPI-Notat, no. 343, December 1985, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo. Stanghelle, Harald. "UNIFIL og Norge—holdninger og myter." Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985. Storch, Karin. "Peacekeeping: The Role of UNIFIL 1978-84." Thesis at the American University of Beirut, February 1986. Trinka, Frank G. (with Houghton, Robert B.). Multinational Peace-keeping in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of State, 1984. Thakur, Ramesh. "Ministate and Macro-cooperation: Fiji's Peacekeeping Debut in Lebanon," Review of International Studies, 1984. Tueni, Ghassan. Une guerre pour les autres. Paris: Jean-Claude Lattes, 1985Tveit, Odd Karsten. Nederlag. Oslo, Norway: J. W. Cappelen, 1985. United Nations. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping. New York: United Nations, 1985. Urquhart, Brian. A Life in Peace and War. New York: Harper and Row, 1987. . "The Work of Peace." Speech given at the Bicentennial of the Treaty of Paris at the National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D C., 28 September 1983. . "How Nations Might Unite in Peacekeeping." In International Herald Tribune, 21 December 1983. Vadset, Martin."UNIFIL—kommando og koordinering." Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 2/3, 1985Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983Weinberger, Naomi Joy. "Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon." Middle East Journal, vol. 37, no. 3, Summer 1983. Weizman, Ezer. The Battle for Peace. New York: Bantam Books, 1981. Wiseman, Henry. Peacekeeping. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983. Ya'ari, Ehud (with Schiff, Ze'ev). Israel's Lebanon War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.

Index Aalgaard, Ole, 66, 222 Abu Nidal Group, 50, 220 Administration: UNIFIL troops, 144-145 Aichiyeh, 22 Aimée, Jean-Claude, 166, 175 Airstrikes: Israeli, 50, 95 Albania, 156 Aley, 110 Algeria, 225 Amal, 40, 51-52, 53, 58, 62, 121, 123, 218, 248, 261 Anglo-French agreement (1923), 246-247 Arab Deterrent Force, 31, 172 Arab Liberation Front, 56 Arab states, 225, 230, 252; peace efforts, 187-189, 207-208. See also individual countries Arab summit, 61 Arafat, Yassir, 20, 42, 48, 52, 120, 127128(nn 11, 16), 248, 263; evacuation from Tripoli, 112-113; protection of forces, 43-44 Armed elements, 42, 88, 248; attacks by, 53-54; infiltration in UNIFIL area, 45, 46, 55-56; killings by, 47-48; Palestinian, 43-44; resistance movements, 51-54. See also individual forces Arms: sales, 249-250 Army, 50; Lebanese, 63-64, 67, 77(n6l) Assassinations, 105 Austria: UNDOF forces, 131-132 AWACs planes, 206 Beaufort Castle, 22 Begin, Menachem, 8, 10, 11, 15-l6(nn 6, 8), 166, 202, 210 Beirut, 95, 100, 106, 110, 172, 213; cease-

fires, 71, 101; government authority, 62, 65-69; Multinational Force in, 31, 60, 81, 113-118; Palestine Liberation Organization, 105, 127-128(nll); peacekeeping proposals, 102-104; refugee camps, 121-122; Syrian attacks, 70-71; UNIFIL forces, 114-115, 148. See also East Beirut; West Beirut Beka'a Valley, 47, 111 Ben-Gurion, David, 37 Berri, Nabih, 51 Blum, Yehuda Z., 24, 55, 109, 182, 183 Bombings, 53, 113. See also Shellings; Terrorism Bourj el-Barajneh camp, 121 Brezhnev, Leonid, 199 Burj Rahhal, 35 Cairo Agreement (1969), 20, 59, 60, 61-62, 75(n54), 183 Callaghan, William, 82, 131; cease-fire negotiations, 48-49, 96, 206 Camp David agreements, 194, 198, 204, 242 Camps war, 123 Canada: forces, 131, 135 Carter, Jimmy, 8, 9, 15(n6), 70, 202. See also Carter administration Carter administration, 193-194, 204-205 Casualties, 47-48, 53, 55, 65, 257; Fijian, 88, 147; Irish, 147, 148, 152; Naqoura bombardment, 25, 65; Nigerian, 67, 149; Norwegian, 97; UNIFIL, 65-66 Cease-fires, 42, 66, 71, 114; Beirut, 71, 101; negotiations, 48-49, 206, 207; refugee camps, 122-123; Resolution 508, 96; UNEF II, 241-242 271

272

INDEX

Censure: by Security Council, 231-232 Chatila, 106, 121 China, 8, 224, 258; UNIFIL finances, 156, I62(nl3) Christian militias, 18, 21; Israeli control, 21-22, 169 Christians: in Lebanon, 37, 100; refugees, 94, 125; and UNIFIL, 35-36 Civilians, 46, 65, 106, 112, 113, 115; humanitarian aid, 92, 171; Israeli control of, 34-35; protection of, 33, 34, 121-122, 260-261. See also Refugees Civil war, 59, 60, 62-63, 68, 69, 72, 171, 249; Palestinians, 248-249 Conflict resolution: Security Council, 237238 Cordon-and-search operations, 35, 39 Cuba, 156 Czechoslovakia, 8, 141, 156 Dayan, Moshe, 10, 37, 44, 45, 182 Debates, 230: Security Council, 226-227 De facto defense forces (DFF), 35, 54, 55, 56, 64, 176; action, 24-27; aggression, 46, 67, 88; area control, 21-22, 23-24; harrassment by, 65, 172, 183; Israeli forces, 27-28; Lebanese recognition, 22, 23; Naqoura, 25, 26; shelling by, 47, 190(nl8), 222; UNTSO observers, 183184; U.S. views of, 202-203. See alio South Lebanon Army Deployment: UNIFIL forces, 13-14, 18-19, 20, 21, 148, 264 DFF. See De facto defense forces Diplomacy, 243; bilateral, 236-237 Draper, Morris, 30, 47, 107 East Beirut, 218 Eban, Abba, 245 Egypt, l6l(n7), 217, 225; peacekeeping proposals, 102-103; UNEF I, 261-262 Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces in Pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference, 242 Ein el-Hilweh camp, 121 Eitan, General, 64, 96 Emergency Force, vii Erskine, Emmanuel A., 21, 42, 64, 80, 131, 170, 172 Fakhoury, Ambassador, 117 Fez Declaration (1982), 31 Fiji, 53, 150, 154, 158; force casualties, 88, 147; UNIFIL forces, 44, 47, 48, 135, 190(n23) Financing, l62(nl3); troop contributors, 157-159; UNFICYP, 155-156; UNIFIL, 156-160, I62(nl5)

Finland, 159; force kidnapping, 144, 151152; UNIFIL forces, 36, 39, 53, 135 Force: use of, 83-90 Force Mobile Reserve: establishment, 8990 Fourth Geneva Convention. See Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War France, 71, 152; Beirut crisis, 102-103, 114, 115, 117; forces in Middle East, 9, 19, 35, 53, 99, 132, 134, 135; Multinational Force, 142-143, 223-224; Security Council, 217, 218, 221, 223 "Free and Independent Lebanese State," 65 Fundamentalist groups, 179. See also Shi'ites Galilee, 50 Gemayel, Amine, 30, 59, 107, 186 Gemayel, Bashir, 105, 186 General Armistice Agreement, 180, 183, 184, 229 Geneva Conference on the Middle East, 187, 200, 242 Geneva Convention, 33 Ghana, 153; force contribution, 81, 135, 143 Golan Heights: peacekeeping forces, vii, 242-243 Goskel, Timur, 145-146 Goulding, Marrack, 69, 147, 165 Gromyko, Andre, 193 Guerrillas, 7, 37, 41, 50, 217-218. See also Terrorism; individual groups Guyer, Roberto E., 42-43 Habib, Philip, 30, 48, 206, 208; shuttle diplomacy, 47, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107 Haddad, Saad, 15(n6), 37, 64, 65; de facto forces, 21, 22, 24-27, 28, 54, 202-203; government recognition, 22, 23 Haddad, Wadi, 59 Hägglund, Gustav, 89, 131, 178 Haig, Alexander, 49, 207 Headquarters: locating, 171-172 Herzog, Ambassador, 10 Hizbollah, 52-53 Hostages, 36, 219, 220. See also Kidnappings Humanitarian aid, 91-92, 120, 123, 171; PLO evacuation as, 112, 113; UNIFIL, 93-94, 260 Human rights, 227 ICRC. See International Committee of the Red Cross IDF. See Israeli Defence Forces ILMAC. See Israeli-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission

INDEX

Information: access to, 145-146 Intelligence systems, 178-179 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 33, 92, 93, 112; Beirut, 71 International law, 33 Iran, 52, 72, 247; UNIFIL forces, 131, 135 Ireland, 53, 154, 184, 221; force casualties, 147, 148, 152; UNIFIL forces, 25-26, 39, 135 Iron triangle, 44 Islamic Resistance Movement, 52-53 Israel, 7-8, 46, 47, 50, 54, 56, 95-96, 103, l6l(nl0), 173, 230; armistice, 180, 181, 182; attack on West Beirut, 104-105; censure of, 26-27, 168-169, 195, 202, 227, 231-233; invasion of Lebanon, 2829, 30, 49-50, 95, 96-100, 208-210, 227, 261; Lebanese army, 63-64; and Lebanon, 12, 14, 15-l6(n8), 52-53, 229, 246-247; Naqoura negotiations, 124-127; negotiations with Lebanon, 186-187; occupation of Lebanon, 37-38; Palestine Liberation Organization, 44-45, 50, 55, 118; political pressure on, 148-149; regional interests, 246-247; sanctions against, 233-235; Security Council, 21, 218-219, 222; security zone, 23, 24, 3839, 40-41, 249-250; troop withdrawals, 17, 18, 19, 2 1 , 22, 3 1 , 32-33, 77(n65), 110; UNIFIL, 10, 19, 55-58, 89, 108-109, 111-112,143-144, 243-244; U.S. relations, 29-30, 201-212. See also Israeli Defence Forces Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), 15-l6(n8), 34, 35, 53, 56, 66, 67, 75(n46), 88, 174, 176, 184, 248, 261; Christian militia, 2122; de facto forces, 27-28; redeployment, 32-33; and South Lebanon Army, 39-40; troop withdrawal, 18, 19, 21, 22, 31, 120-121, 125, 126, 151; in West Beirut, 105-106 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (1979), 242 Israeli-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC), 180; Palestine Liberation Organization, 182-183; reactivation, 181-185, 229; role, 180-181 Italy: force contributions, 106, 135 Jerusalem, 174 Jezzine, 125 Jordan, 106, 188, 217, 225, 226, 247 Kantarah village, 27 Kaoukaba, 63 Kashmiye Bridge, 19 Kataeb elements, 106 Kidnappings: Finnish troops, 144, 151-152; Irish troops, 184; Security Council and,

273

219, 220 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 33, 117, 207 Kiryat Shemona, 46 Kissinger, Henry, 242 Kunin, 39 Kuwait, 13, 18, 207, 225 Lahad, Antoine, 35 Laos, 156 Lebanese National Army, 35 Lebanese National Movement (LNM), 41, 45-46, 51, 61,64 Lebanon, 23, 37, 47, 71-72, 76(n54), 77(n65), 103, 228, 229, 246, 259; Arab deterrent forces, 30-31; armistice, 180181, 182-183; authority in the South, 5859, 65-69; crisis control, 11-12; force distribution, 21-22; government authority, 62-63, 66-67, 72-73, 109-110, 128(nl 7), 248; and Israel, 68-69, 71-72, 95-96, 100, 231-232, 246-247, 261; Israeli occupation, 7-8, 17, 18, 19, 28-29, 62, 74(nl6); negotiations, 186-187; Palestine Liberation Organization, 20, 42-43, 51-52, 60-62, 112; peacekeeping force, 8-9, 60-62, 112; regional stability, 259-260; resolutions, 13, 14-I5(nn4, 5), 29, 230-231; Status of Force Agreement, 163-164; UNIFIL, 15(n6), 88-89, 107-108, 143, 244; U.S. policy, 205, 211-212. See also Beirut; East Beirut; Southern Lebanon Liason structures, 174, 176-177 Litani, 22 Litani River, 246-247 LNM. See Lebanese National Movement Mandate Period, 24-25, 227 Marjayoun, 22 Massacre: Palestinian civilians, 106 Media: access by, 145-146 Metullah, 174, 180 MFO. See Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Military forces, 2, 11, 27, 50, 104-105; Arab, 30-31; area control, 21-22; liaisons, 176-177; UNIFIL contributors, 132-141. See also various armies; countries; forces Ministry of Defence (Israel), 57 Misgav Am, 25, 26 Missiles, 47. See also Shellings MNF. See Multinational Force Morale, 98, 144, 169 Multinational Force (MNF), 60, 68, 106; formation, 81, 105; French support, 142143, 223-224; operations, 113-118; redeployment, 210-211; refugee camp

274

INDEX

protection, 118-119; withdrawal from Beirut, 31, 117 Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO), 242, 266(nl3) Murphy, Richard W., 211 Nabatiya, 22 Nahariya, 46, 50 Naqoura, 67; bombardment, 25, 65, 222; de facto forces, 25-26; staff resources, 172-173; UN1FIL headquarters at, 145, 146, 171, 172. See also Negotiations, at Naqoura Nazareth, 96, 174 Negotiations, 243, 262; Arab, 187-189; cease-fire, 48-49, 206, 207; at Naqoura, 68-69, 82, 124-127, 184, 262; peacemaking, 179-180; regional structure, 170-171; Resolution 425, 4142, 192; UNTFIL role, 175-176, 177 Nepal, 53, 97, 154; UNIFIL forces, 39, 81, 132, 135, 190(n23) Netherlands, 154, l6l(nl0); UNIFIL forces, 27, 97, 134, 135, 144, 151, 266(nl8) Nigeria: force casualties, 67, 149; UNIFIL forces, 27, 132, 135, 143, 151, 153 Nonaligned countries, 9, 13, 194, 224-226, 239(n6) NORBATT headquarters, 65 Northern Command (Israel), 57, 65, 96, 174 Northern Lebanon, 112 Norway, 99, 154, l60-l6l(nn 3, 4, 10); force casualties, 65, 97; UNIFIL forces, 21-22, 27, 38-39, 81, 132, 135, 144, 149, 150, 159, l6l(nl0), l62(nn 11, 18), 178 Observation posts, 24, 25, 172, 181, 183; Israeli forces, 27-28. See also Observer Group Beirut; Observers; United Nations Truce and Supervision Organization Observer Group Beirut (OGB), 105, 106, 111 Observers: Beirut, 100-101, 104-105, 106, 110-111; UNIFIL, 34, 82. See also Observation posts; Observer Group Beirut; United Nations Truce and Supervision Organization Occupation: Israeli, 7-8, 17, 18, 19, 28-29, 33-35, 62, 74(nl6) Odegaard, Brigadier General, 27 Office for Field Operational and External Support Activities, 165, 174 Office for Special Political Affairs, 165, 166 Office of the Undersecretaries for Special Political Affairs, 164-165 OGB. See Observer Group Beirut ONUC, vii Operation Litani, 20

Palestine, 9, 246 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 910, 29, 50, 65, 76(n54), 88, 103, 118, 153, l6l(nl0), 173, 188, 208, 217, 218, 225, 226, 263; area control, 22, 38, 67; Beirut, 102, 127-128(nll); cease-fire negotiations, 48-49; changes, 248-249; evacuation of forces, 45-46, 105, 108, 112-113,118, 128(nl6); ILMAC, 182183; impact, 17-18; infiltration of UNIFIL, 45-46; Lebanese government and, 51-52, 54, 60-62, 70, 229, 245-246; negotiations, 41, 42, 206; Northern Lebanon, 112-113; offensive action, 1920; refugee protection, 118-119, 120121, 122; regional control, 51, 59; Soviet support, 197, 198-199, 200, 215(n4); terrorism, 41-42,227; and UNIFIL, 41, 42^5, 54-55 Palestinians, 42, 50, 92, 97, 102, 103, 106; and civil war, 248-249; guerrilla activities, 7, 217-218; in Lebanon, 50-51, 54, 60, 62; in South Lebanon, 226, 245246; Syrian views, 123-124. See also Civilians; Palestine Liberation Organization; Refugee camps; Refugees, Palestinian "Peace for Galilee operation," 29, 46, 127(n2) Peacekeeping agreements, 241 Peacekeeping operations, vii, 2, 10-11, 20, 26, 76(n53), 84, 128(n21), 129Cn24), 141-142, 192, 226, 262, 265; Beirut, 100, 101, 102-103; deployment, 13-14, 132141; enforcing cease-fires, 114-115; establishing presence, 131-132; financing, 159-160, l62(nn 13, 14); future of, 255-256; military infrastructure, 173-174; Soviet views, 195, 199, 266(nl4); UN organization of, 164-170; use of force, 83-90; U.S. views, 212-213, 250 Peres, Shimon, 212 P6rez de Cuellar, Secretary-General, 120, 166, 236 PFLP. See Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Phalangists, 50, 105, 106, 110, 121, 186 PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization Political advisors, 174 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 47 Press: access by, 145-146 Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), 33-34 Reagan administration, 160, 206, 210, 214 Refugee camps, 106; fighting, 121, 122-

INDEX

123, 218; Israeli Defence forces, 120121; Palestinian, 46, 50, 118-120; protection, 50, 109, 115, 118-121, 122. See also Refugees Refugees, 46, 92, 94, 125; Palestinian, 31, 32, 46, 113, 245; in Southern Lebanon, 82, 226. See also Civilians; Refugee camps Resolution 34/9, 157 Resolution 242, 103, 210, 230, 237, 251 Resolution 338, 230, 237, 241-242, 251 Resolution 340, 241 Resolution 425, 9, 10, 11-12, 13, I4(n4), 41, 42, 68, 98, 148, 175, 194, 203, 209, 224, 229, 230, 231, 233, 244, 252; area control, 23-24; conditions, 253-254; implementation, 131, 251; Israeli compliance, 18, 21; responsibilities, 60, 192; Soviet attitude, 194-195, 201; validity, 60, 164 Resolution 426, 13, 14-I5(n5), 21, 83, 131, 175, 224; area control, 23-24; validity, 60, 164 Resolution 436, 70-71 Resolution 444, 64-65, 233 Resolution 450, 183, 229, 233 Resolution 459, 183, 229, 233 Resolution 467, 232 Resolution 474, 233 Resolution 483, 233 Resolution 488, 47, 233, 234 Resolution 498, 224 Resolution 501, 81, 87 Resolution 508, 28, 29, 72, 74(nl3), 96, 100, 209, 230, 233, 252 Resolution 509, 28-29, 72, 74(nl3), 100, 209, 229, 230, 231, 233, 252 Resolution 511, 93; role, 92 Resolution 512, 92 Resolution 513, 92 Resolution 515, 104 Resolution 516, 104-105 Resolution 519, 93 Resolution 520, 30-31, 105, 232 Resolution 521, 106 Resolution 523, 93, 234 Resolution 542, 112 Resolution 549, 32 Resolution 564, 122 Resolution 579, 220 Resolution S-8/2, 156-157, l62(nl5) Richard, Ivor, 12 Romania, 156 Rome airport attack, 220 Rosh Hanikra, 174 Sabra, 106, 121 Sanctions: Security Council, 233-235

275

Saudi Arabia, 112, 206, 207 Saunders, John, 171 Secretariat, 154, 164, 174, 175; meetings, 146-148; responsibilities, 165, 167; troop withdrawals, 262-263 Secretary-General, 2, 154, 214, 251, 260, 265; criticism of Israel, 168-169; financing, 155, 156; information source, 167-168; mandate implementation, 244245; peacekeeping operations, 10-11, 141-142, 165, 167, 256-257; and Security Council, 237-238; special representative, 174-175; troop deployment, 254-255; UNIFIL, 12-13, 84, 221, 235-236, 243 Security Council, 1-2, 3-4, 12, 26, 49, 142, 185, 244, 251, 256, 265; Arab countries, 225-226; armed elements, 47^8; Beirut crisis, 102-104, 106-107, 115-116; binding decisions, 229-230; conflict resolution, 237-238; criticism of Israel, 202, 222, 227; debates, 226-227; impartiality, 219-220; information access, 167-168; meetings, 217-218; members, 222-224; negotiations, 66, 69-70; president, 221-222; resolutions, 14-I5(nn 4, 5), 29-31, 228-229, 230-231; role, 2-3, 75(n26), 191-192; sanctions against Israel, 195, 233-235; Soviet role, 200, 249; Tripoli evacuation, 112-113; UNIFIL, vii-viii, 7-8, 9, 24-25, 108-109, 235-236; U.S. role, 202-203, 213-214, 215, 249 Security zone, 53, 246, 248, 26l; control, 23, 24, 33; definition, 38-39; establishment, 21-22, 36-37, 64; Israeli views, 40-41, 247; maintenance, 58, 247; troop deployment, 37-39 Self-defence: defining, 86-87; peacekeeping force, 83, 84, 85 Senegal, 153, l6l(n9); UNIFIL forces, 19, 48, 132, 135, 143, 151, 190(n23) Shamir, Yitzhak, 188 Sharett, Moshe, 37 Sharon, Ariel, 49-50, 105 SheUings, 50, 190(nl8), 218; by armed elements, 46-47; Israeli, 95-96; of UNIFIL headquarters, 65-66 Shevardnadse, Eduard, 200 Shi'ites, 51, 53, 218, 247, 260; and French forces, 223, 224; hostility by, 35, 40; resistance movements, 51, 52-53; terrorism, 56, 223 Shouf, 110 Shultz, George, 30, 107, 188, 200, 243 Sidon, 62, 125; area security, 31-32; protection of camps, 109, 125; refugee camp protection, 119, 120, 121 Siilasvuo, General, 21, 80, 170-171, 181 Sinai, 241-242, 243

276

INDEX

SLA. See South Lebanon Army Southern Lebanon, vii-viii, 62, 77(n6l), 82, 251, 262; government authority in, 5859, 65-69, 72-73, 110 South Lebanon Army (SLA), 35, 36, 53, 58, 74(n20), 125, 248, 261, 266(nll); Israeli Defence Force, 39-40; kidnapping, 144, 151-152 Sovereignty: of Lebanon, 31-32, 38, 69-73, 218 Soviet Union, 8, 9, 31, 59, 67, 141, 152, 188, 200, 229, 234, 243, 249, 250; Beirut crisis, 107, 111, 115-116; Middle East policy, 193, 194, 198, 199-200, 215(n4), 250-251; Palestine Liberation Organization and, 197, 198-199; peacekeeping operations, l6l(n7), 199, 266(nl4); troop deployment, 142, 143; UNIFIL, 153, 156, 160-I6l(nn3, 4) Spain: condemnation of Israel, 29-30 Special Committee of Peace-Keeping of the General Assembly, 173 Standard Operating Procedures, 83-84, 8990, 178 Status of Force Agreement, 163 Stoel, Max van der, 113 Stoltenberg, Thorvald, 149 Stray, Svenn, 150 Sweden: forces, 131, 135, 159 Syria, vii, 29, 37, 47, 70, 110, 156, 186, 197, 207, 217, 218, 251-252; attack on Beirut, 70-71; forces in Lebanon, 30, 31, 72, 97; Palestine Liberation Organization, 62, 112, 215(n4), 225; Palestinians, 123-124; role, 73, 107, 192, 246; troops, 108, 120, 172; UNIFIL deployment, 116-117 Territory: integrity of, 218, 229 Terrorism, 25, 41, 45, 50, 56, 104, 219, 220, 227, 266(nll). See also Bombings; Guerrillas; Hostages; Kidnappings; various terrorist groups Terzi, 9 Thunborg, Anders, 92 Tiberias, 174 Tibnin, 63 Tripoli: PLO evacuation, 112-113 Troyanovski, Ambassador, 59, 116, 153, 198 Tueni, Ghassan, 69, 70, 71, 84, 103, 182 Tunisia, 26, 61, 225 Tyre, 46, 47, 53, 63, 93, 119, 171; control of, 19, 20; PLO control, 38, 245; shelling, 65-66 UNDOF. See United Nations Disengagement Observer Force UNEF I, 2, 160-I6l(n3); withdrawal, 261-

263 UNEF II. See United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai UNICEF. See United Nations Children's Fund UNIFICYP, 134, 135, 155-156 UNIFIL. See United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Arab Emirate, 225 United Kingdom, 224 United Nations: authority, 263-265; bilateral diplomacy, 236-237; Lebanese government legitimacy, 59-60, 70; organization, 164-170. See also Secretariat; Secretary-General; Security Council; various UN organizations United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 93 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), vii, 131-132, 135, 170, 242-243 United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai (UNEF n), vii, 83, 131, 135, 170, 241242 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), vii-viii, 34, 40, 85, 120; administration, 144-145, 153, 168-170; in Beirut, 114-115, 148, 264-, civilians and, 260-261; conflicts, 39-40; deployment, 13-14, 18-19, 20, 21, 73(n3), 81; duties, 18-19, 20; establishment, 3, 8, 243-244; financing, 156-160, l62(nl5); force deployment, 118, 125-126, 143-144; force size, 80-82; Israeli attitudes toward, 55-58, 76(n49); origins, 7-8; Palestine Liberation Organization, 2021, 41-43, 54-55; refugee protection, 119-120; regional stability, 259-260; role changes, 107-108, 111-112; troopcontributors to, 132-141, 149-155, 257258; withdrawal, 149, 170, 257-258, 266(nl8) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 92, 93, 112, 123 United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping, 152 United Nations Truce and Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 97, 131, 135, I6l(n5), 183, 184; Beirut, 100-101, 105; mediation services, 170-171; numbers, 181, 182; Southern Lebanon, 8-9, 25 United States, 73, l6l(n5), 188, 200, 229, 243, 249, 262; Beirut crisis, 117, 128(nl6); cease-fire agreements, 49-50; critcism of Israel, 26-27, 204, 231-232; Israeli invasion, 49-50, 101-102, 209-210; Israeli relations, 201-212; Lebanese

INDEX relations, 8, 9, 23, 64, 71, 211-212; Middle East policy, 193-194, 206-212, 214-215; Multinational Force, 68, 106; peacekeeping operations, 212-213, 250; sanctions on Israel, 73-74(nl0), 100; Security Council, I4(n4), 213-214, 215; Security Council vetos, 233-234; support of Israel, 29-30, 33; troop deployment, 142, 143; troop withdrawal, 116, 128(nl7); UNIFIL, 15(n6), 22-23, 160, 204, 211-212, 227-228 UNRWA. See United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East UNTSO. See United Nations Truce and Supervision Organization Urquhart, Brian, 63, 64, 68, 80, 83, 101, 125, 147, 199, 211, 222; Multinational Force, 113-114; peacekeeping

277

operations, 164, 166, 168; UNIFIL deployment, 118, 120 Vance, Cyrus, 8, 15(n6), 73-74(nl0), 193, 200, 204-205 Vienna airport attack, 220 Vietnam, 156 Village committees: Israeli control, 34-35 Waldheim, Kurt, 8, 20, 42, 44-45, 132, 165 Walters, Vernon, 40 Weapons. See Arms Weizman, Ezer, 10, 37, 170 West Beirut, 102, 104; Israeli invasion, 105106 Yugoslavia, 156 Zahrani, 172 Zahrani River, 37

About the Book and the Author The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established as a result of a major Israeli intervention in Lebanon in March 1978, is generally held to be the most complex, frustrating, and difficult of any UN peacekeeping operation (with the possible exception of the Congo operation in 1960-1964). In attempting to assess what has gone wrong for UNIFIL, to identify the factors that can explain the outcome of the events, Bj0rn Skogmo traces the operation's failures to breakdowns in the political premises and diplomatic support system underlying it, rather than to inadequate performance by the peacekeeping force in the field. Focusing on the role of the UN Security Council in the formation and functioning of UNIFIL, Skogmo analyzes the policies and behaviors of the actors involved. In the process, he not only describes the specific events of the Israeli-Palestinian-Lebanese conflict as these have affected UNIFIL, but also places the peacekeeping operation in the context of a larger political system. The study concludes with arguments for withdrawing vs. maintaining UNIFIL troops in the region. B]0rn Skogmo is presently deputy-director general of policy planning and research in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His book reflects his more than five years of diplomatic service at the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, during which time he participated in the consultations among the countries contributing troops to UNIFIL. The study was initiated during 1984-1985, when the author was a visiting research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA).

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