UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq 3031196740, 9783031196744

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1: Where Conflict and Culture Connect
1.1 The Importance of Cultural Heritage Protection
1.2 The Relationship Between Conflict and Cultural Heritage
1.2.1 Intentional Targeting of Cultural Heritage
1.2.2 Cultural Heritage as Collateral Damage
References
Chapter 2: UNESCO´s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural Heritage During Armed Conflict
2.1 The UNESCO 1945 Constitution
2.2 The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and Its Two Protocols (19...
2.3 The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
2.4 UNESCO´s 2015 Strategy: Reinforcement of UNESCO´s Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Plura...
2.5 UNESCO´s Capability: Culture in Armed Conflict
2.5.1 UNESCO´s Financial Resources: Culture in Armed Conflict
2.5.2 UNESCO´s Human Resources: Culture in Armed Conflict
References
Chapter 3: The State Heritage Institutions of Yemen, Syria and Iraq
3.1 State Heritage Institution Capabilities
3.1.1 Yemen: State Heritage Institution Capability
3.1.2 Syria: State Heritage Institution Capability
3.1.3 Iraq: State Heritage Institution Capability
3.2 The Yemeni Conflict
3.2.1 Yemeni Cultural Heritage: Intentional Targeting and Collateral Damage
3.3 The Syrian Conflict
3.3.1 Syrian Cultural Heritage: Intentional Targeting and Collateral Damage
3.4 The Iraqi Conflict
3.4.1 Iraqi Cultural Heritage: Intentional Targeting and Collateral Damage
References
Chapter 4: The Impact of Conflict on UNESCO´s Engagement with Yemen, Syria and Iraq
4.1 World Heritage Centre Profile Analysis
4.1.1 UNESCO´s Engagement with Yemen: World Heritage Centre Profile
4.1.2 UNESCO´s Engagement with Syria: World Heritage Centre Profile
4.1.3 UNESCO´s Engagement with Iraq: World Heritage Centre Profile
4.1.4 Data Comparison: Yemen, Syria and Iraq
4.2 The Effect of Conflict on UNESCO´s Ability to Engage with Key National Counterparts
4.2.1 UNESCO´s Relationship with GOAM and GOPCHY
4.2.2 UNESCO Field Office for Yemen
4.2.3 UNESCO´s Relationship with DGAM
4.2.4 UNESCO Field Office for Syria
4.2.5 Collective Discussion on UNESCO Offices for Yemen and Syria
4.2.6 UNESCO´s Relationship with SBAH
4.2.7 UNESCO Field Office for Iraq
4.3 Conclusions
References
Chapter 5: UNESCO´s Emergency Response ``First-Aid´´ to Cultural Heritage Sites
5.1 Preparedness vs. Emergency Response
5.2 Yemen: Emergency Response ``First-Aid´´
5.3 Syria: Emergency Response ``First-Aid´´
5.4 Iraq: Emergency Response ``First-Aid´´
5.5 Emergency Response ``First Aid´´ Conclusions
References
Chapter 6: UNESCO´s Reconstruction of Cultural Heritage Sites
6.1 Defining Reconstruction and Recovery
6.2 Yemen: Reconstruction
6.2.1 Cash for Work Project
6.2.2 Prioritisation Methodology
6.2.3 Implementation
6.3 Syria: Reconstruction
6.3.1 Ancient City of Aleppo
6.3.2 Site of Palmyra
6.3.3 Crac Des Chevaliers and Qal´at Salah El-Din
6.3.4 Ancient City of Damascus
6.3.5 Ancient City of Bosra
6.3.6 Ancient Villages of Northern Syria
6.4 Iraq: Reconstruction
6.4.1 Revive the Spirit of Mosul
6.4.2 Ashur (Qal´at Sherqat)
6.4.3 Babylon
6.4.4 Erbil Citadel
6.4.5 Hatra
6.4.6 Samarra Archaeological City
6.5 Reconstruction Conclusions
References
Chapter 7: Conclusions
References

Citation preview

Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 8

Joanne Dingwall McCafferty

UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq

Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market Volume 8

Series Editors Rachel Pownall, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Ana Quintela Ribeiro Neves Ramalho, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Christoph Rausch, Faculty of Science and Engineering, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Hildegard Schneider, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Vivian van Saaze, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Renée van de Vall, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Lars van Vliet, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Donna Yates , Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Advisory Editors Bert Demarsin, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Hester C. Dibbits, Department of History, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands Patty Gerstenblith, DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA Susan Legêne, VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Peggy Levitt, Department of Sociology, Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA, USA Simon Mackenzie, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand Olav J. M. Velthuis, Faculty of Social & Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Andrea Wallace, Law School, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK Matthias Weller, Department of Law, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

The book series Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market provides an international and interdisciplinary forum for volumes that • investigate legal, economic, and policy developments related to arts, heritage, and intellectual property; • critically assess how and for whom art and heritage values come about; • promote novel forms of user engagement, participatory presentations, and digitalization of arts and heritage; • examine the processes that transform cultural objects and practices into arts and heritage; and • highlight new approaches in preservation and conservation science. The series addresses a need for research and practice in the fields of art, culture, conservation, and heritage including a focus on legal and economic aspects. It deals with complex issues such as questions of authenticity and provenance; forgery and falsification; the illicit trade, restitution, and return of cultural objects; the changing roles of museums; the roles of experts and expertise; and the ethics of the art market.

Joanne Dingwall McCafferty

UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq

Joanne Dingwall McCafferty Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies University of Copenhagen Copenhagen, Denmark

ISSN 2524-7425 ISSN 2524-7433 (electronic) Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market ISBN 978-3-031-19674-4 ISBN 978-3-031-19675-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19675-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

There are many people whom I wish to acknowledge for providing me with unwavering support in the course of completing this research, and who have contributed to this project either via an interview or in giving me advice on the challenging field of cultural heritage protection during armed conflict. I will begin by expressing my overriding thanks to the Hermod Lannungs Fond for generously financing this research. Special thanks to former Secretary General of the Danish Parliament and Chairman of the Foundation, Carsten U. Larsen, whose great interest in my research, and the importance of heritage protection during armed conflict, brought me immense motivation. Secondly, I wish to thank Dr Emma Cunliffe, who has been continually available for both academic and personal advice, supported me through my first peer-reviewed article and provided invaluable encouragement and criticism in the course of this research. Massive thanks must go to my PhD Supervisor (2019–2022), Dr Tobias Richter, who has been a pillar of support throughout this entire process, always available to give advice and guidance, whether on academic or personal matters. Thank you for creating such a strong research environment, which has allowed me to develop many close, and sure to be, life-long friendships. Your passion for research and constant enthusiasm and interest in my work has made me love what I do and allowed me to thrive in the field. My heartfelt thanks, utmost love and appreciation goes to my partner, Calum William Hart. First, thank you for putting up with my absence while I was working in Copenhagen, and for surviving my constant presence in our flat in Glasgow during the Covid-19 Pandemic. Secondly, thank you for listening to and encouraging my thoughts, both rational and wild. Lastly, you have my sincere gratitude for supporting me through the worst of times and celebrating with me during the best of times over the past four years. Onto the next! Thanks must also go to my mum and dad, Ann and Robert McCafferty, and sister, Laura Emma Burns McCafferty, for their absolute support throughout the writing of this book, and indeed throughout my entire life, which has afforded me the ability to v

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Acknowledgements

get to this point. Without them, I could not have realised my many successes. Special thanks to Laura for never permitting me to take myself too seriously. Deepest thanks must also go to my grandparents, Anne and John Dingwall, and June and George McCafferty for being such a marvellous extra support system to my sister and me, while we were growing up in Shettleston, Blantyre and The Gorbals, and encouraging us to do whatever we dreamt of doing. Finally, thanks also to my aunt and uncle, Linda and George McCafferty for being so supportive in all my ventures. I must also acknowledge and express my deepest gratitude to my support system of closest friends, Sophie Evans, Viktor Ahlberg, Chris T. Smith, Christian Illingworth, Lily Higham, David Ross Linklater, Mhairi O’Neil, Eilidh McLaughlin and Dr Sarah Gambell. You all gave me the will to laugh while writing this book, and the ability not to let the stress get to me. Thanks also goes to my new colleagues and friends, Anne Jörgensen-Lindahl, Patrick Nørskov Pedersen, Joe Roe, Ann Frijda Schmidt, Terne Thorsen, Mette Bangsborg Thuesen, Anna Razeto and Asta Salicath Halvorsen. Each of you have made my time in Copenhagen unforgettable. Special thanks must go to Marie Elisabeth Berg Christensen (soon-to-be Dr Christensen), who has been a marvelous colleague and friend. I am thankful that our shared research interest in heritage protection allowed us to meet and become close colleagues and friends. I am sure we will be working together much more in the future. I wish you all the very best in your PhD. I would like to express my gratitude to the former Head of the Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies Department at the University of Copenhagen, Dr Ingolf Thuesen, whose passion and enthusiasm for the subject of heritage protection allowed the university to shine a light on this subject, through the approval of various workshops and a summer school. I would also like to thank the University of Glasgow, where I received both my MA and MSc, for hosting my research stay from September to December 2020. Special thanks to Prof Christa Roodt for her extensive supervision during this time and for her invaluable feedback on the initial chapters of this book. It is always a great experience working with you. I also wish to extend my deepest gratitude to another of my previous supervisors, Dr Donna Yates, who first inspired me to delve into this terrifyingly complex field of study. Thank you for your supervision during my Master’s, your guidance throughout my PhD and your continual support as I progress in my academic career. The value you see in early career researchers, and the time you are always willing to give them is admirable. I hope to be able to provide others with that same support, encouragement and inspiration in the future. Lastly, my great love and appreciation to Dr John Richards and Dr Minna Törmä for everything. Most importantly, I wish to extend my deepest gratitude to all those who gave of their time as interviewees, contributing hugely to this research, and allowing me to further understand the complex arena of heritage destruction, protection and reconstruction in relation to recent armed conflicts. Your knowledge and expertise proved invaluable. Unfortunately, the Covid-19 Pandemic prevented me from meeting many of you in-person, and, up until now, we have only had various Skype, Zoom or WhatsApp calls. My appreciation goes to Dr Isber Sabrine, who acted as an

Acknowledgements

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Arabic-English translator to some of those interviewed in Syria. I hope to be able to meet with you all soon. I also look forward to seeing again those of you whom I was fortunate enough to meet at UNESCO HQs, Paris and the Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C., and hope to work with you in the future. I would like to express particular thanks and appreciation to the late Mohanad Al-Sayani, Chairman of the General Organization of Antiquities and Museums (GOAM) of Yemen. Sadly, not long after my interview with him in 2020, Mohanad passed away from Covid-19. I would like to join the rest of my colleagues in passing on my condolences to his family and expressing my sincere thanks to Mohanad for all he did to protect and promote Yemeni culture. My deepest thanks also goes to Mohanad’s niece, who kindly and expertly acted as a translator, thereby allowing my interview with him to take place. I am grateful to have been able to speak with you both. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the people of Yemen, Syria and Iraq, who have endured immense hardship over recent years. Your respective cultural heritage and your love and passion for those cultures is inspiring. I hope, one day soon, to be able to experience even a small part of that culture and the hospitality of your nations. I wish each of you the very best, and hope that calmness and stability will return to, and remain with, your respective countries.

Contents

1

Where Conflict and Culture Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Importance of Cultural Heritage Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The Relationship Between Conflict and Cultural Heritage . . . . . . 1.2.1 Intentional Targeting of Cultural Heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Cultural Heritage as Collateral Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural Heritage During Armed Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The UNESCO 1945 Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and Its Two Protocols (1954, 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 UNESCO’s 2015 Strategy: Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 UNESCO’s Capability: Culture in Armed Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1 UNESCO’s Financial Resources: Culture in Armed Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 UNESCO’s Human Resources: Culture in Armed Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

. . . . . .

The State Heritage Institutions of Yemen, Syria and Iraq . . . . . . . . . 3.1 State Heritage Institution Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Yemen: State Heritage Institution Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Syria: State Heritage Institution Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Iraq: State Heritage Institution Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 2 6 6 8 9 11 11

15 23

25 28 28 33 40 43 43 44 47 51

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Contents

3.2

The Yemeni Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Yemeni Cultural Heritage: Intentional Targeting and Collateral Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Syrian Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Syrian Cultural Heritage: Intentional Targeting and Collateral Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The Iraqi Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Iraqi Cultural Heritage: Intentional Targeting and Collateral Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

5

53 54 64 66 74 76 83

The Impact of Conflict on UNESCO’s Engagement with Yemen, Syria and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 World Heritage Centre Profile Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 UNESCO’s Engagement with Yemen: World Heritage Centre Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 UNESCO’s Engagement with Syria: World Heritage Centre Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3 UNESCO’s Engagement with Iraq: World Heritage Centre Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.4 Data Comparison: Yemen, Syria and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Effect of Conflict on UNESCO’s Ability to Engage with Key National Counterparts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 UNESCO’s Relationship with GOAM and GOPCHY . . . . 4.2.2 UNESCO Field Office for Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 UNESCO’s Relationship with DGAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4 UNESCO Field Office for Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5 Collective Discussion on UNESCO Offices for Yemen and Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.6 UNESCO’s Relationship with SBAH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.7 UNESCO Field Office for Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

123 125 129 131 131

UNESCO’s Emergency Response “First-Aid” to Cultural Heritage Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Preparedness vs. Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Yemen: Emergency Response “First-Aid” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Syria: Emergency Response “First-Aid” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Iraq: Emergency Response “First-Aid” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Emergency Response “First Aid” Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

135 135 137 142 159 165 168

91 91 93 96 100 103 107 108 112 115 122

Contents

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6

UNESCO’s Reconstruction of Cultural Heritage Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Defining Reconstruction and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Yemen: Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Cash for Work Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Prioritisation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Syria: Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Ancient City of Aleppo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Site of Palmyra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Crac Des Chevaliers and Qal’at Salah El-Din . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4 Ancient City of Damascus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.5 Ancient City of Bosra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.6 Ancient Villages of Northern Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Iraq: Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 Revive the Spirit of Mosul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.3 Babylon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.4 Erbil Citadel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.5 Hatra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.6 Samarra Archaeological City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Reconstruction Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

175 175 181 182 184 185 199 200 204 207 210 211 212 214 214 237 237 238 239 240 242 247

7

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

List of Abbreviations

1954 Hague Convention 1970 Convention

1972 Convention AKTC ALIPH ASOR ASOR CHI BBC BSI Caesar Act CAORC Carabinieri TPC CFR CfW CHwB CJTF-OIR CP CPP CURE Framework DG DGAM DW

1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Aga Khan Trust for Culture International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in Conflict Areas American Schools of Oriental Research American Schools of Oriental Research Cultural Heritage Initiative British Broadcasting Corporation Blue Shield International US Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act Council of American Overseas Research Centers Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale Council on Foreign Relations Cash for Work: Promoting Livelihood Opportunities for Urban Youth in Yemen Cultural Heritage without Borders Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve Cultural property Cultural property protection Framework for Culture in City Reconstruction and Recovery Director-General Directorate-General of Antiquities and Museums Deutsche Welle News xiii

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EAR EPR Unit EU FSA FTO GIS GOAM GOPHCY GOPHCY-CATS

HCECR HCP HEF HfP HQ ICC ICCROM ICISS ICOM ICOMOS ICTS IDPs IED IESCO IGO INTERPOL Iraqi RRP IRGC ISIL ISIS JAN LOAC MENA MoC Mosul initiative MoU NATO NGO

List of Abbreviations

European Agency of Reconstruction Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit European Union Free Syrian Army Foreign Terrorist Organisation Geographic Information System General Organization of Antiquities and Museums General Organisation for the Preservation of Historic Cities in Yemen General Organisation for the Preservation of Historic Cities in Yemen – Centre for Architectural Training and Studies The High Commission for the Erbil Citadel Revitilisation High Contracting Party Heritage Emergency Fund Heritage for Peace Headquarters International Criminal Court International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty International Council of Museums International Council on Monuments and Sites Iraq Counter Terrorism Service Internally displaced persons Improvised explosive device Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation Intergovernment organisation The International Criminal Police Organization Iraqi Recovery and Resilience Programme Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Jabhat al-Nusra Law of Armed Conflict Middle East and North African Region Ministry of Culture Revive the Spirit of Mosul initiative Memorandum of Understanding North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nongovernmental organisation

List of Abbreviations

OUV PCNA PDNA PKK PWP RPBA SARG SBAH SCRI SDF SFD SHI SIDA SLS SOC SPS STC TDA The Observatory TNT UKBS UN DSS UN UNDP UNESCO UNESCO GCC UNGA UNITAR UNOPS UNOSAT UNSC UNSCR UNSG UNSR USCBS UXO WHC WHCo WHS WMF YPG

xv

Outstanding Universal Value Post-Conflict Needs Assessment Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Kurdish Workers’ Party Public Works Projects Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Syrian Arab Republic Government State Board of Antiquities and Heritage Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative Syrian Democratic Forces Social Fund for Development State heritage institution Swedish International Development Agency Security Level System State of Conservation Science for Peace and Security Southern Transitional Council The Day After The Observatory of Syrian Cultural Heritage Trinitrotoluene UK Blue Shield UN Department for Safety and Security United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNESCO Gulf Cooperation Council United Nations General Assembly United Nations Institute for Training and Research United Nations Office for Project Services UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Applications Programme United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resolution United Nations Secretary-General United Nations Special Rapporteur United States National Committee of the Blue Shield Unexploded ordnance World Heritage Centre World Heritage Committee World Heritage Site World Monuments Fund Kurdish People’s Protection Units

Chapter 1

Where Conflict and Culture Connect

Over the past decade, the landscape of culture and conflict has shifted—in an era of increasing fractionalisation, cultural heritage, whether tangible or intangible, is now very much at the centre of many global conflicts. The subject of cultural heritage protection during times of armed conflict has therefore received a greater amount of attention in recent years, both in the media, and in the drafting of legislation to improve implementation of safeguarding efforts. Conflict has truly become the defining heritage issue of our age. It is evident that, during conflict, at times, the front line of such safeguarding falls to the various military forces who often do not possess the relevant skill set to enforce such protective measures. Although it is crucial that at-risk cultural heritage is afforded the appropriate level of in situ protection or refuge in secure locations, it remains that this is not currently the direct responsibility of the military, or indeed non-state actors (NSAs), but of the relevant civilian authorities and cultural heritage experts available. On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Within 2 weeks of the start of the invasion, the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner had recorded 1424 civilian casualties in Ukraine (516 killed and 908 injured).1 Each day the civilian death toll rises rapidly. On 24 February, the intergovernmental organisation (IGO) of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) released a statement expressing its concern about the ongoing military operations and escalating violence in Ukraine. As is customary practice for UNESCO, the organisation called on parties to the conflict to respect “international humanitarian law, notably the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (hereafter ‘the 1954 Hague Convention’) and its two (1954 and 1999) Protocols, to ensure the prevention of damage to cultural heritage in all its forms”.2 On 3 March 2022, UNESCO voiced its concern for

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United Nations (2014). UNESCO (2022a).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. D. McCafferty, UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19675-1_1

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Where Conflict and Culture Connect

Ukrainian cultural heritage in the face of Russian aggression.3 Since the start of the invasion, cultural heritage sites and objects in affected areas in Ukraine have already taken damage, such as Kharkiv’s Dormition Cathedral, as a result of shelling on 2 March. Despite Russia continuing to build up its forces along the Ukrainian border since late December 2021, preventative measures to safeguard Ukrainian cultural heritage were only enacted following the outbreak of conflict in contradiction of the 1954 Hague Convention. This narrative is not new. In recent years, Yemen, Syria and Iraq have endured severe crises as a result of ongoing conflicts and political instability, with much of their cultural heritage being destroyed or greatly damaged due to intentional targeting, collateral damage and enforced neglect. UNESCO has consequently been involved to varying degrees in initiating cultural programmes focused on either protecting or reconstructing the cultural heritage of these countries. Naturally, however, in conditions of civil or international war and political instability, there comes many challenges in facilitating cultural safeguarding methods and rehabilitation programmes. There is a definite gap in current literature when it comes to determining how conflict and global governance influences UNESCO’s relationship, and ability to directly engage, with a given country, and how and why this impact varies across different forms of conflict and geopolitical situations. The purpose of this book is to establish UNESCO’s direct role in facilitating cultural heritage protection or reconstruction initiatives in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, alongside their respective state heritage institutions (SHIs) during recent and ongoing-armed conflicts and political unrest. In doing so, this research identifies reasons, both internal and external to the organisation, which influenced how it was able to engage with each country from the pre-conflict to conflict and, in the case of Iraq, post-conflict stage. Analysis will centre on UNESCO’s facilitation of preparatory measures pre-conflict, emergency response measures during conflict and heritage recovery and reconstruction initiatives post-conflict. In doing so, this book will attempt to understand the organisation’s capacity; the factors which affect its ability to carry out such cultural programmes in Yemen, Syria and Iraq amidst recent circumstances; and consequently, its limitations.

1.1

The Importance of Cultural Heritage Protection

Viewing cultural heritage as a human right could act as the much-needed catalyst for renewed international commitment in ensuring effective cultural heritage protection during armed conflict. Heritage can assume many forms. Examples of the more obvious form include Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris, Petra in Jordan, The Great Pyramid of Giza in Egypt, the Taj Mahal in India and the Statue of Liberty in the United States of America. However, cultural heritage encompasses more than such

3

UNESCO (2022b).

1.1

The Importance of Cultural Heritage Protection

3

iconic monuments. The UNESCO World Heritage List encompasses more than human-made cultural heritage, it also includes natural heritage sites such as Tongariro National Park, New Zealand and Yosemite National Park, USA. Even entire cities and towns may be inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. In order to be inscribed on the World Heritage List, sites must be of “outstanding universal value” (OUV).4 This may mean that such heritage represents “a masterpiece of human creative genius”, “an important interchange of human values”, “major stages of earth’s history, including the record of life, significant on-going geological processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiological features”.5 It is evident that culture does not have many boundaries, but this also determines that UNESCO has an enormous duty to acknowledge, foster the respect of, and advocate for the protection of, an enormous number of sites all over the world. This criterion demonstrates that heritage currently recognised by the World Heritage Centre (WHC) as significant may span from acknowledging human excellence and engineering, past civilisations, as well as natural significance both on land and at sea. The current UNESCO World Heritage List reflects this. Marie Cornu states that the “concept of heritage turns out to be a highly malleable framework which is constantly changing and developing.”6 In recent years, intangible heritage has entered into the framework of cultural heritage and is openly recognised by organisations as a valid form of heritage which should be afforded protection and which plays a crucial role in our societies. UNESCO validated this notion with the creation of the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage List in 2008.7 When trying to understand such forms of heritage, we may consider traditions, religious practices and rituals which define different cultures and which have been passed down through generations. UNESCO interpret cultural heritage to encompass tangible movable (paintings, sculptures, coins and manuscripts), immovable (monuments, archaeological sites, etc.) and underwater heritage (shipwrecks and underwater ruins and cities), as well as intangible heritage (oral traditions, performing arts and rituals).8 However, UNESCO’s definition of cultural heritage also encompasses natural heritage i.e. “natural sites with cultural aspects such as cultural landscapes, physical, biological or geological formations”.9 Moreover, UNESCO also qualifies “Heritage in the event of armed conflict” as its own individual category of heritage, distinct from tangible, intangible, and natural. It is not clear why this is the case, and UNESCO does not necessarily provide a clear definition from which to work. However, in order to provide greater focus on the scope of cultural heritage this book will

4

UNESCO (n.d.-a). UNESCO (n.d.-a). 6 Cornu (2014), p. 199. 7 UNESCO (n.d.-b). 8 UNESCO (n.d.-c). 9 UNESCO (n.d.-c). 5

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1 Where Conflict and Culture Connect

consider, we must look at the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (‘the 1972 Convention’) and the 1954 Hague Convention. Article 1 of the 1972 Convention categorises the following as “cultural heritage”: monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of [OUV] from the point of view of history, art or science; groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of [OUV] from the point of view of history, art or science; sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of [OUV] from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.

Article 1 of the 1954 Hague Convention defines “cultural property” thus: (a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above; (b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a); (c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as ‘centers containing monuments’.

The above definitions of cultural heritage and cultural property have many similarities, and so are used interchangeably in this book. For the purpose of this study, the 1954 Hague Convention will serve to inform UNESCO’s legal obligation to protect cultural heritage, and as such, heritage categories not mentioned in the above definition, i.e. underwater heritage, intangible heritage and natural heritage, have been excluded, leaving the focus only on that which is tangible. Moreover, when it comes to heritage safeguarding and reconstruction in Yemen, Syria and Iraq in recent years, UNESCO’s focus has chiefly centred on static heritage, followed by movable tangible heritage. As this book considers the role that UNESCO plays in relation to the protection of such heritage, focus will naturally be on larger heritage sites, with the majority being listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site (WHS) or inscribed on the Tentative List of World Heritage. Before addressing the destruction of such heritage and UNESCO’s role in its safeguarding, it is important to understand why it is necessary to protect cultural heritage in the first place, as well as the recent developments in the field of cultural rights. Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in his 1944 book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, and Proposals for Redress, following which he campaigned for its recognition as an international crime,

1.1

The Importance of Cultural Heritage Protection

5

something that became a reality at the 1946 UN General Assembly.10 The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide subsequently entered into force on 12 January 1951. Article 2 of the 1948 Convention defines genocide as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. . .: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.11

Edward C. Luck understood that Lemkin’s idea of genocide did not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, but could instead take on various forms.12 He consequently questioned “whether genocide must have a significant cultural component [and]. . . whether cultural genocide can be considered a standalone crime”.13 Although ‘cultural genocide’ is yet to be defined, accepted or codified in international legislation,14 Luck agrees with Lemkin’s placing of cultural destruction as one of the eight fields of the ‘techniques of genocide’ on a par with the other seven (political, social, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral).15 Another similarly framed phrase is “cultural cleansing”, which was used by Bokova in her article, Culture on the Front Line of New Wars, in reference to the then ongoing situation in Iraq and Syria.16 Former UN Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Karima Bennoune, pronounces that acts of “cultural cleansing,” take “the terrorization of a population to a new level by attacking even its history”.17 Heritage destruction is not limited to collateral damage resulting from military operations. Intentional targeting in the interest of ethnic cleansing and the eradication of identity and dignity has instead assumed a central role in many recent conflicts. Frederik Rosén states, The reappearance of the discussion about whether intended systematic destruction of [cultural heritage] to eradicate the cultural references and customs of a group should be viewed as “cultural cleansing” or even “cultural genocide” epitomizes the link between [cultural heritage] protection and the human rights agenda.18

10

United Nations (n.d.). Art. 2 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 12 Luck (2018), p. 19. 13 Luck (2018), p. 19. 14 Luck (2018), p. 27. 15 Luck (2018), p. 18. 16 Bokova (2015), p. 289. 17 Bennoune (2016), Protecting Cultural Property: International Conference on the 20th anniversary of the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, Geneva. 18 Rosén (2017), p. 16. 11

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1.2

Where Conflict and Culture Connect

The Relationship Between Conflict and Cultural Heritage

The relationship between war and culture is historic, with culture often used as a tool to undermine the opposition. The eradication of culture has been at the core of many global conflicts and major historical actions such as colonialisation and various other occupations. Such historical events involving culture remains a modern-day issue, as much of that which was looted during such occupations has not yet been repatriated.

1.2.1

Intentional Targeting of Cultural Heritage

UNESCO recognises that “threats to cultural heritage in the event of armed conflict result from intentional destruction, collateral damage, forced neglect, as well as from the organized looting and illicit trafficking of cultural objects, which today occurs at an unprecedented scale and finances, in some cases, terrorism”.19 There are two forms of cultural heritage destruction at the centre of this research inquiry, namely intentional targeting and collateral damage, although forced neglect will likely also constitute an important factor in the discussion. Attention is first given to intentional targeting,20 which, as per the 2003 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, means an act intended to destroy in whole or in part cultural heritage, thus compromising its integrity, in a manner which constitutes a violation of international law or an unjustifiable offence to the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience, in the latter case in so far as such acts are not already governed by fundamental principles of international law.21

Looking at recent historical cases such as the Nazi-Era, spanning 1933–1945, it is apparent that there was a systematic destruction of a culture, with a definite victim. This occurred in the bluntest of ways, from the damage and destruction of 267 synagogues during Reichskristallnacht, the desecration of more than 1400 Jewish cemeteries, the burning of books, to propaganda imagery and recordings, which would change the mindset of a nation, permitting and glorifying the mass undermining and eradication of a culture.22 This pattern of cultural heritage destruction persists in modern-day conflict.23 It has become evident that cultural heritage takes on new, negative value when it is enters into the realm of armed conflict. In an

19

UNESCO (2015), pp. 1–2. I acknowledge military targeting can be both intentional and legal, and should not always be categorised as collateral damage. 21 Section II 2003 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage. 22 Bevan (2016), pp. 39–48. 23 Newson and Young (2015), p. 450. 20

1.2

The Relationship Between Conflict and Cultural Heritage

7

era of rising identity politics, cultural heritage is often used as a tactical tool to usurp another’s cultural identity and history.24 Considering recent intentional destruction claimed and attributed to Da’esh, Cunliffe and Curini identify five reasons why the group intentionally target heritage, which results in an increase in positive sentiment toward them: 1. Humiliate targeted communities (this category includes both aspects of humiliation, as well as a positive judgement about the desire to attack pre-Islamic culture, as the two are closely interlinked). 2. Defy values of global cultural heritage. 3. Recruit through the broadcasting of their ideology. 4. Developing a narrative of origins, returning to the purity of the Early Islamic past. 5. Other reasons, including: a. Destruction of idols of other religions and cultures, as ordered by the Prophet (peace be upon him). b. Financing through the illegal trade of art/antiquities.25 It is evident that the sheer significance of cultural heritage in the conflict environment and the new forms of identity politics makes it extremely valuable as a tool, which may be used tactically by either side of combatants.26 This was evidenced by the Azerbaijani military’s shelling of Armenian religious sites, such as the Ghazanchetsots Holy Saviour Cathedral in Shushi in the 2020 conflict over disputed territory.27 Former UNESCO Director-General (DG), Irina Bokova stated, Violent extremists target culture because they know that cultural heritage is a force for resilience. They attack heritage and persecute communities in an overall strategy of ‘cultural cleansing’, because they know the power of culture to delegitimize their claims and false promises.28

It is significant that Bokova has used the term ‘cultural cleansing’, as it frames the loss of cultural heritage as a humanitarian issue. She confirms that there is a definite purpose to the destruction of said cultural heritage, which is to persecute whole communities, thereby confirming that it is not a victimless crime. The rise in identity politics is at the centre of intentional targeting of cultural heritage during armed conflict. The adoption of historical, religious and ethnic narratives by political leaders, militias and terrorist organisations envelops cultural heritage in conflicts today, making it a security-related issue.29 There are, of course, concomitant effects

24

Bevan (2016), pp. 17–18; Newson and Young (2017), p. 3. Cunliffe and Curini (2018), pp. 1104–1105. 26 Bevan (2016), p. 18. 27 Batycka (2020). 28 UNESCO (2017). 29 Rosén (2017), p. 15. 25

8

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Where Conflict and Culture Connect

from conflict, which undoubtedly have a negative impact on the safeguarding and conservation of cultural heritage. When exposed to situations of civil unrest and armed conflict, governments and state authorities are significantly weakened, chiefly due to a redirection of resources, meaning a lack of funding for heritage institutions. This lack of funding has led or contributed to a lack of enforcement of heritage safeguarding or implementation of conservation management plans.

1.2.2

Cultural Heritage as Collateral Damage

Collateral damage constitutes injury or destruction inflicted upon civilians or civilian objects, which were not the intended target. To grasp this term, it is first important to understand the principle of proportionality. The Customary International Humanitarian Law database states that the principle of proportionality “implies that collateral civilian damage must never be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.30 Proportionality determines that damage to civilians and civilian objects must be kept to a minimum; when considering this principle, each military operation must ensure any collateral damage is justifiable. Cultural heritage can become collateral damage where it is not the direct target of a military operation, but its potential damage was taken into consideration in line with the principle of proportionality. A key piece of international legislation in this research inquiry, the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols (1954, 1999), includes a military necessity clause. The key aim of the 1954 Hague Convention can majorly be summarised by Article 4(1): The High Contracting Parties [(HCPs)] undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other [HCPs] by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility, directed against such property.31

This is immediately followed by the military necessity clause, which states, “The obligations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present Article may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver”.32 Craig Forrest considers the “evolving use of military necessity as a justification rather than a limitation”,33 suggesting that in the context of the Hague Conventions, it served as a means to allow Parties to circumvent the newly introduced rules. In response to concerns raised in the 1993 Boylan Report, the justification of military necessity was more narrowly defined in Article 6 of the Second Protocol, which states a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity may be invoked when: 30

ICRC (n.d.). Art. 4 (1) 1954 Hague Convention. 32 Art. 4 (2) 1954 Hague Convention. 33 Forrest (2007), p. 10. 31

References

9

(i) that cultural property has, by its function, been made into a military objective; and (ii) there is no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military advantage to that offered by directing an act of hostility against that objective”.34 This more narrow definition has not however always proved effective, an example being the subsequent construction of the military base at the site of Babylon, a decision highlighted by Gerstenblith as “[p]robaby the most flagrant violation of [1954] Hague Convention principles”.35 Military necessity can justify a civilian object, in this case cultural heritage, as a legitimate intentional target if it meets the criteria of a military objective. In such instances, the site is no longer collateral damage, but the intended target. Nonetheless, with most conflicts today involving one or more NSAs, hostilities often shift into civilian populations. What is more, in such asymmetric conflicts, NSAs as well as nation states may intentionally occupy cultural heritage sites, thereby potentially making the site a legitimate military target. The very nature of non-international conflicts can therefore make distinguishing between military personnel/military objects and civilians/civilian objects very difficult. This blurring of the lines can often lead to a great amount of collateral damage, thereby eliminating the basic protection that the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) can afford civilian populations residing in countries experiencing armed conflict.

References Batycka D (2020) Armenian monuments in line of fire in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Art Newspaper. Available: https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/monuments-in-line-of-fire-innagorno-karabakh-conflict Bevan R (2016) The destruction of memory: architecture at war. Second expanded edition. Reaktion Books Ltd., London Bokova I (2015) Culture on the front line of new wars. Brown J World Aff 22(1):289–296 Cornu M (2014) Safeguarding heritage: from legal rights over objects to legal rights for individuals and communities? In: Sandis C (ed) Cultural heritage ethics: between theory and practice. Open Book Publishers, Cambridge, pp 197–203 Cunliffe E, Curini L (2018) ISIS and heritage destruction: a sentiment analysis. Antiquity 92(364): 1094–1111 Forrest CJS (2007) The doctrine of military necessity and the protection of cultural property during armed conflicts. Calif West Int Law J 37(2):177–219 Gerstenblith P (2006) From Bamiyan to Baghdad: warfare and the preservation of cultural heritage at the beginning of the 21st century. J Int Law 37:245–351 International Committee of the Red Cross (n.d.) IHL Database: Customary IHL. Available: https:// ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docindex/home Luck EC (2018) Cultural genocide and the protection of cultural heritage. J. Paul Getty Trust Occasional Papers in Cultural Heritage Policy, vol 2. J. Paul Getty Trust, Los Angeles

34 35

Art. 6 (a) (i) (ii) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. Gerstenblith (2006), p. 27.

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Newson P, Young R (2015) The archaeology of conflict damaged sites: Hosn Niha in the Biq’a Valley, Lebanon. Antiquity 89(344):449–463 Newson P, Young R (2017) Conflict: people, heritage, and archaeology. In: Newson P, Young R (eds) Post-conflict archaeology and cultural heritage. Rebuilding knowledge, memory and community from war-damaged material culture. Routledge, London, pp 3–19 Rosén F (2017) NATO and cultural property: embracing new challenges in the era of identity wars. CHAC, Copenhagen UNESCO (2015) General Conference 38th Session: Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict, November 2015, Paris. UNESCO, Paris, pp 1–12. Available: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/4 8223/pf0000235186 UNESCO (2017) UNESCO and Partners stand against Cultural Cleansing and Violent Extremism. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-and-partners-stand-against-cultural-cleansingand-violent-extremism UNESCO (2022a) UNESCO’s statement on the recent developments in Ukraine. Available: https:// www.unesco.org/en/articles/unescos-statement-recent-developments-ukraine UNESCO (2022b) Ukraine: UNESCO statement following the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/2411/ UNESCO (n.d.-a) The Criteria for Selection. UNESCO. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/ criteria/ UNESCO (n.d.-b) Browse the Lists of Intangible Cultural Heritage and the Register of good safeguarding practices. Available: https://ich.unesco.org/en/lists UNESCO (n.d.-c) What is meant by “cultural heritage”? UNESCO. Available: https://webarchive. unesco.org/20200318015446/http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-traffickingof-cultural-property/unesco-database-of-national-cultural-heritage-laws/frequently-asked-ques tions/definition-of-the-cultural-heritage/ UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage (2003) Entered into force 26 September 2003. Available: https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/ irrc_854_unesco_eng.pdf. United Nations (2014) Ukraine: civilian casualty update 8 March 2022. Available: https://www. ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=28233&LangID=E United Nations (n.d.) Genocide: Background. United Nations. Available: https://www.un.org/en/ genocideprevention/genocide.shtml

Chapter 2

UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural Heritage During Armed Conflict

2.1

The UNESCO 1945 Constitution

One of 18 specialised agencies within the UN system, the autonomous IGO of UNESCO is very much at the core of this research, which aims to delve into the mechanisms, programmes and initiatives it has in place to facilitate heritage protection specifically during armed conflict, with focus given to the recent conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. When trying to determine how UNESCO should be engaging in the protection of cultural heritage in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, it is important to establish the remit of this IGO. In order to do so, this chapter presents a close analysis of UNESCO’s 1945 Constitution, the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols (1954, 1999) as well as the policy document, UNESCO: Purpose and Philosophy (1946), written by Julian Huxley, the first UNESCO DG. Consideration of the Constitution and policy document identifies UNESCO’s original aims in this regard, while the 1954 Hague Convention details its legal obligations when it comes to heritage protection during armed conflict. Consideration is also given to responses from interviewees for this research to ascertain what is expected from UNESCO when it comes to heritage protection during armed conflict, irrespective of what these key documents define as the organisation’s mandate. Born out of war in November 1945, with a mission to help materially and morally rebuild the world,1 a year later, UNESCO’s “constitution was signed by thirty-seven countries and twenty countries completed ratification”.2 Huxley asserts, [i]n the first place, [UNESCO] is international, and must serve the ends and objects of the [UN], which in the long perspective are world ends, ends for humanity as a whole. And

1 2

Meskell (2018), p. 168. Huxley (1946), p. v.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. D. McCafferty, UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19675-1_2

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2

UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

secondly it must foster and promote all aspects of education, science, and culture, in the widest sense of those words.3

From such words, it is evident that UNESCO is faced with an enormous task and may find it difficult to develop any form of specialist capability. Nonetheless, given the broad nature and ambiguity of these key aims, one can argue that cultural heritage protection most certainly serves humanity and promotes culture, and should therefore be within UNESCO’s remit. The UNESCO Constitution further points out that the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace, are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern.4

These words demonstrate that under the UNESCO Constitution, culture is viewed as indispensable, and therefore something that must be preserved. Nonetheless, the Constitution does not state that UNESCO takes the responsibility to protect said culture. Instead, it proffers that the preservation of culture and education, allowing for justice and liberty and peace, is reliant on the cooperation of all nation states. Under its Constitution, UNESCO’s key purpose is understood as “advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind, for which the UN Organisation was established and which its charter proclaims”.5 UNESCO has established itself as the facilitator of such aims, with a heavy reliance on individual state compliance for its aims to become a reality. Of the three methods put forth by the Constitution, the third has the most relevance to the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflict. It states that it will maintain and diffuse knowledge “[b]y assuring the conservation and protection of the world’s inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions”.6 Here, by using the verb “to assure”, this article is stating that UNESCO must guarantee conservation and protection, which, as we have seen from recent conflicts, is impossible. Nonetheless, this method alone expresses a tangible aim for UNESCO; as the Constitution is a regular international treaty, binding on Member States and UNESCO, it set up the organisation to be a key player in the cultural heritage protection discourse. This subsequently means that UNESCO can shift its priorities overtime. The other methods for achieving the key aims centre on fostering and encouraging cooperation and collaboration. It should also be noted that, at this stage, there is no direct reference to armed conflict or any form of civil unrest. However, it does indirectly refer to armed conflict by stating “and recommending to

3

Huxley (1946), p. 5. Preamble 1945 UNESCO Constitution. 5 Preamble 1945 UNESCO Constitution. 6 Art. 1 (2) (c) 1945 UNESCO Constitution. 4

2.1

The UNESCO 1945 Constitution

13

the nations concerned the necessary international conventions”.7 One relevant convention, which is key to this research inquiry, is the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols (1954, 1999), which will later be discussed at length. Throughout the UNESCO Constitution and Julian Huxley’s policy paper, cultural heritage is not referred to as such. Instead, the term ‘art’ is used. Huxley determines that The field of arts includes music; painting; sculpture and the other visual arts; ballet and dance; creative writing, from poetry and drama to the novel and the critical essay; architecture and the film, in so far as arts; and all the applications of art, from interior decoration to industrial design.8

He distinctly keeps libraries, museums and galleries out of this, as he views his definition of art to be descriptive of ‘living art’. Nonetheless, he does support that such institutions as libraries, museums and galleries have importance.9 The later drafted 1954 Hague Convention, which uses the term ‘cultural property’, would go on to encompass all movable or immovable heritage, including libraries, museums and galleries under this single umbrella term.10 Throughout Huxley’s writing, he continually emphasises the significance of art’s social function; he states, “Art is capable of expressing the life of a city, a nation, or an epoch. The architecture and the drama of ancient Athens were not only an expression of its life, but an essential part of it”.11 He views art as “one of the essential agencies for mobilising society for action”, and believed that it would be “for Unesco to help see that in the world of tomorrow art takes its place on terms of equality with science, and plays an equally important role in human affairs”.12 From this, we can see from the outset that UNESCO greatly valued that which it defined as “art” and recognised that its protection and promotion was key. In terms of how UNESCO would promote cultural heritage, Lynn Meskell proffers that the organisation has gradually shifted from the support of original research or excavation to prioritising preservation and technical assistance.13 This change can be understood as a move from “archaeological discovery to monumental recovery”.14 It is most definitely easier to promote the protection or recovery of a tangible monument, with which people are all familiar, such as Palmyra,15 than something abstract, yet undiscovered, in the soil of another country. This greater prioritisation of preservation of monuments is indicative of cultural heritage protection during armed conflict becoming central to UNESCO’s cultural programming. 7

Art. 1 (2) (c) 1945 UNESCO Constitution. Huxley (1946), p. 48. 9 Huxley (1946), p. 48. 10 Art. 1 (a–c) 1954 Hague Convention. 11 Huxley (1946), p. 52. 12 Huxley (1946), p. 55. 13 Meskell (2018), p. 21. 14 Meskell (2018), p. 25. 15 Meskell (2018), p. 4. 8

14

2

UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

UNESCO established itself as an organisation centred on monumental salvage with the Rescue of the Nubian Monuments and Sites project across Egypt and Sudan,16 which brought about the relocation of key monuments to another more secure location after their preservation was threatened by the construction of a dam. This UNESCO mission elevated monuments within states beyond national interest, instead showing them to be of global concern.17 In recent years, the Revive the Spirit of Mosul initiative is the only project reminiscent of the scale of the salvage of the Nubian Monuments. UNESCO was founded in response to the cultural destruction witnessed during World War II, and so the organisation is directly tied to this issue. Although the UNESCO Constitution and the Huxley policy document do not detail any definite intentions for UNESCO to be directly involved in cultural heritage protection specifically during armed conflict, there is nonetheless a definite emphasis on the importance of conservation of art in both documents. For UNESCO, the 1954 Hague Convention triggered its direct involvement in the protection of cultural heritage in the context of armed conflict, with the organisation being mentioned on 37 occasions in the 1954 treaty, and again on 15 occasions in the 1999 Second Protocol. UNESCO is evidently key to the cultural heritage protection during armed conflict discourse. UNESCO has long since condemned the intentional destruction of cultural heritage,18 while Paragraph 15 of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2199 (2015) and Paragraph 1 of UNSCR 2347 (2017) formally recognised that such destruction should be deplored and condemned. The latter specifically states, the UN Security Council (UNSC) [d]eplores and condemns the unlawful destruction of cultural heritage, inter alia destruction of religious sites and artefacts, as well as the looting and smuggling of cultural property from archaeological sites, museums, libraries, archives, and other sites, in the context of armed conflicts, notably by terrorist groups.19

It is important to note that each UNSCR 2199 and 2347 placed particular emphasis on the condemnation of intentional destruction of cultural heritage by NSAs, specifically terrorist groups. This is a line also taken by UNESCO, which, as will be evidenced, only directly condemns the actions of NSAs, while taking a less direct tact when condemning destruction caused by nation states. Huxley posits, the analysis of evolutionary progress gives us certain criteria for judging the rightness or wrongness of our aims and activities, and the desirability or otherwise of the tendencies to be notes in contemporary history – tendencies of which UNESCO must take account.20

16

Meskell (2018), p. 45. Meskell (2018), p. 43. 18 Clément (2016), p. 122. 19 Para. 1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2017. 20 Huxley (1946), p. 12. 17

2.2

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in. . .

15

Despite the lack of a direct defining aim for UNESCO to protect cultural heritage at risk during armed conflict, it has, and is continuing to become, a more central part of the organisation’s remit.

2.2

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and Its Two Protocols (1954, 1999)

There are several key conventions, which serve to enable the protection of cultural heritage, be that from illegal trafficking, intentional destruction or neglect. They are: • The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two Protocols (1954, 1999); • The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (‘the 1970 Convention’); • The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; • The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects; • The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage; • The 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage; and • The 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. As this book is concerned with UNESCO’s role in protecting heritage during armed conflict, it will chiefly centre on the 1954 Hague Convention, the legal obligations it places upon UNESCO and the guidelines created for the States Parties on the implementation of the Convention, clarifying how Articles, referring to UNESCO, should be put into practice. Moreover, the 1972 Convention will provide context to the management processes surrounding WHSs, and the WHC’s obligations thus. It remains beyond the scope of this book to consider illegal trafficking or restitution of cultural heritage, neither is it able to cover protection of underwater heritage and intangible heritage or the promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions—although such subjects may be referred to where relevant to other discussions. The 1954 Hague Convention is rooted in the Lieber Code, a set of rules established by President Lincoln in 1863 regarding conduct for Union soldiers during the US Civil War; such regulations remain the basis for conflict legislation in the US today.21 The Lieber Code also stimulated other countries to adopt military 21

Gesley (2018).

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UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

regulations in the nineteenth century, leading to the codification of laws and customs of war,22 and over time, international treaties for the protection of cultural heritage against destruction and looting during wartime were developed, drafted and ratified by a high percentage of territories. Resolution 6.42 of the 1949 General Conference, Fourth Session states, [p]articular attention will be given to arrangements for the protection of such monuments, as well as to the protection of all objects of cultural value, particularly those kept in museums, libraries and archives, against the probable consequences of armed conflict.

Three expert meetings were subsequently held bring forth a draft convention on the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict.23 The 1954 Hague Convention promotes the safeguarding of and respect for cultural property,24 while the First Protocol addresses regulations around the exportation of cultural property from occupied territories25 and the deposit of cultural property abroad for secure storage.26 The addition of the First Protocol made the 1954 Hague Convention the first port of call in the prevention of illicit trafficking of cultural objects during conflict. Article 2 of the Second Protocol states that it “supplements the Convention in relations between the Parties.” Article 10 of the Second Protocol defined the concept of Enhanced Protection, which could be applied to certain cultural property following request of the State Party, while Article 22(1) determines the Protocol “shall apply in the event of an armed conflict not of an international character, occurring within the territory of one of the Parties.” The latter recognised the shift in warfare toward the greater occurrence of non-international conflicts, involving NSAs and a recognised State Party. Since its inception, the Convention has contributed toward internationally accepted standards for the safeguarding of cultural heritage by military personnel and relevant civilian authorities. The proliferation of looting and destruction of cultural heritage during times of armed conflict overtime has led to 133 out of 193 UN Member States ratifying the Convention and its First Protocol. Nonetheless, lack of action taken under the legal obligation of the Convention by States Parties and its lack of absorption into national legislation has prevented it from reaching customary international law standards.27 This claim by Meyer, regarding national implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention, has remained true over the course of recent years. An international norm, which was introduced by the 1907 Hague Convention, and which is carried forth into the 1954 Convention is referred to in Article 4(1): The [HCPs] undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other [HCPs] by refraining from any use of the property and its

22

Gesley (2018). O’Keefe (2006), p. 92. 24 O’Keefe (2006), p. 94. 25 Section 1 (1–4) 1954 Hague Convention, First Protocol. 26 Art. 2 (5) 1954 Hague Convention, First Protocol. 27 Meyer (1993), p. 360. 23

2.2

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in. . .

17

immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility, directed against such property.

The 1954 Hague Convention however represents the first instance whereby UNESCO becomes part of the legal discourse on cultural heritage protection in the event of armed conflict. Associate Programme Specialist in the UNESCO Cultural Heritage Protection Treaties Unit, Tural Mustafayev states, “under the 1954 Hague Convention . . .the UNESCO [DG] is the depositary of the Convention, meaning that if States want to become party to the Convention, and accept its obligations, UNESCO is the official organisation with which to consult.”28,29 Being a depositary does not only involve accepting the documents recording the State has become a Party, but it is also responsible for recording and sharing reservations and declarations made by States when joining the Convention.30 It is also the legal duty of UNESCO to collect reports on national implementation of the Convention31 and to host and support the meeting of HCPs.32 Former Director of UNESCO’s Revive the Spirit of Mosul initiative in Iraq, Louise Haxthausen states, UNESCO is the custodian of the international standards pertaining to cultural heritage protection, both in terms of conflict and peacetime. As we have witnessed from such conflicts as those in Mali, Syria and Iraq, culture can become an unfortunate, but essential element in the conflict itself, and part of the conflict rationale, hence the importance for it to be prioritised by UNESCO.33

UNESCO is first mentioned in Article 19(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention, which states it “may offer its services to the parties to the conflict.” Expanding on this, Article 23, concerns “Assistance of UNESCO” stipulating, HCPs may request technical assistance from UNESCO, which the organisation shall accord “within the limits fixed by its programme and by its resources”, while it may also propose its own solutions to the problems faced by the HCP.34 UNESCO has a mandate to offer its services upon request, be that declaring a certain area as a no-strike zone or to agree on the storage of cultural property in a neutral zone

28

Mustafayev (2020), personal communication. Art. 31 (2) of the Convention states, “The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the [DG] of [UNESCO].” 30 Art. 35 of the Convention concerns declarations of territorial extension of the Convention, while Art. 37 of the Convention concerns State Party’s denunciation of the legislation. 31 Art. 26 (2) of the Convention states, “Furthermore, at least once every four years, they shall forward to the [DG] a report giving whatever information they think suitable concerning any measures being taken, prepared or contemplated by their respective administrations in fulfillment of the present Convention and of the Regulations for its execution.” 32 Art. 27 of the Convention states, “The [DG] of [UNESCO] may, with the approval of the Executive Board, convene meetings of representatives of the [HCPs]. He must convene such a meeting if at least one-fifth of the [HCPs]. . .so request.” 33 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 34 Art. 23 1954 Hague Convention. 29

18

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UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

(Mustafayev, 2020, pers comm), or indeed any mode of assistance referred to under Article 33 of the Second Protocol. However, it remains the absolute responsibility of the individual State Party to prepare appropriate cultural heritage protection measures during peacetime. Researcher in cultural heritage protection and destruction at Newcastle University and Secretariat of the Blue Shield International (BSI), Emma Cunliffe states, UNESCO has no mandate whatsoever to tell countries what to do to protect their cultural heritage. In fact, it explicitly does not have that capability, which makes things very difficult; it cannot confront a State Party on not carrying out any of its pre-conflict safeguarding measures.35

Instead, UNESCO can only offer technical assistance as per Article 22(7) of the Second Protocol. This implies both that UNESCO, similar to Article 23(2) of the 1954 Hague Convention, can be pro-active in offering support to a State Party, which it may have identified as “in need”, and that it is able to work with NSAs, who are party to the conflict. Mustafayev points out that, ‘parties’ has a small ‘p’ here as it is referring to both States and [NSAs], and so UNESCO can become involved both when it is an international conflict between States, or a conflict within States, with one Party being a State, and the other party a [NSA].36

This distinction between the capitalisation and non-capitalisation of ‘party’ is confirmed by Article 1(a) of the Second Protocol, which details, “Party” means a State Party to this Protocol. However, this may not necessarily work in practice, as UNESCO is an IGO and can therefore only work with UN recognised governments. Cunliffe asserts, “while you could legally argue that UNESCO could provide support to [NSAs], politically I do not see how that would be possible.”37 As UNESCO is composed of States Parties, it must serve those above all. Nonetheless, UNESCO has a mandate to offer its services upon request. Mustafayev states, [t]hese services may be, for example, to declare a certain area as a no-strike zone or to agree on the storage of cultural property in a neutral zone. There can be a broad range of services offered. There is a purpose to protect and preserve cultural property and to detach it from conflict.38

As is also the case in Article 27 of the 1954 Hague Convention and Article 23 of the Second Protocol, concerning “Meeting of the Parties”, we can see that this refers only to HCPs, who convene at the same time as the General Conference of UNESCO. Such a meeting revolves around issues pertaining to the Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, such as election of Members of the Committee, endorsement of guidelines developed by the Committee, supervision of the use of the Fund by the Committee, and consideration of the report submitted by the Committee.39 UNESCO and the Committee have a formal 35

Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. Mustafayev (2020), personal communication. 37 Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. 38 Mustafayev (2020), personal communication. 39 Art. 23 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 36

2.2

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in. . .

19

relationship, as per Article 28, concerning the Secretariat. UNESCO is given the responsibility to ‘prepare the Committee’s documentation and the agenda for its meetings and shall have the responsibility for the implementation of its decisions’.40 This latter stipulation is key as it places UNESCO at the centre of monitoring the implementation of the Second Protocol. The Committee’s functions, outlined in Article 27, include, proposing guidelines for how the Second Protocol should be implemented, granting Enhanced Protection for select cultural property, and determining the use of the Fund. Given UNESCO’s formal relationship with the Committee, and its responsibility to ensure the implementation of such functions, it too has a central active role in the protection of cultural heritage under the Second Protocol. However, it must be said that in order for the Committee to carry out many of these functions, individual State Parties must be compliant and active in their implementation of the Second Protocol. For example, if the Committee and, in turn, UNESCO, are to grant Enhanced Protection for any cultural property, the State Party, where said cultural property lies, must first have ratified the Second Protocol and have made a formal application for Enhanced Protection. Nonetheless, Article 11(3) of the Second Protocol states: Other Parties, the International Committee of the Blue Shield [(ISBS)] and other NGOs with relevant expertise may recommend specific cultural property to the Committee. In such cases, the Committee may decide to invite a Party to request inclusion of that cultural property in the List.41

This means that another HCP to the Second Protocol, as well as ICBS and other NGO’s with relevant expertise, may recommend Enhanced Protection should be sought for cultural property in another Party’s territory, following which UNESCO would approach the State Party within whose territory the cultural property resides. However as international humanitarian law (IHL) rests on the principle of state sovereignty, the decision to formally apply for such protection ultimately lies with the State Party, to which the cultural property belongs. Moreover, States Parties must submit their reports for the Committee and UNESCO to monitor their compliance and States Parties must also apply for access to the Fund. When it comes to the 1954 Hague Convention and its two protocols (1954, 1999), actions must always begin with the individual State Party. Considering Yemen, Syria and Iraq, with which this book is concerned, each of the countries have ratified the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol, but not one of them has ratified the Second Protocol, and therefore they do not strictly qualify to receive such assistance from UNESCO. The Fund for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict exists firstly to provide “financial or other assistance in support of preparatory or other measures to be taken in peacetime”.42 And secondly, “to provide financial or other assistance in relation to emergency, provisional or other measures to be taken 40

Art. 28 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. Art. 11 (3) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 42 Art. 29 (1) (a) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 41

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UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

in order to protect cultural property during periods of armed conflict or of immediate recovery after the end of hostilities”.43 This fund therefore functions during peacetime, during conflict and post-conflict. Article 29(2) states it constitutes a “trust fund” and works “in conformity with the provisions of the financial regulations of UNESCO”,44 while UNESCO also implements the use of the fund. As per Article 29 (4)(b)(ii) of the Second Protocol, UNESCO, along with other organisations of the UN system, may contribute to the fund. In terms of the efficacy of The Fund, Matthews et al. state, “[u]nlike the World Heritage Fund, there is little competition among Parties for the monies. . .as it is little known outside expert circles.”45 To date, only five applications made to The Fund have received disbursements,46 demonstrating that it is not sufficiently utilised by States Parties to the Second Protocol. There remains no cap on requests, nor is there a formal limit set for that which a State Party can apply;47 however previous successful requests for funding range between US$23,500 and US$50,000.48 UNESCO also records that previous requests range from US$15,000 to US$50,000,49 suggesting that at least one application has been rejected. UNESCO is also mentioned under Article 30 of the Second Protocol, which concerns dissemination. Sub-section 3, sub-paragraph b denotes that States Parties shall, as appropriate “develop and implement with UNESCO and relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations, peacetime training and educational programs”.50 This obligation is entirely on the States Parties, who should be the proactive actors here. Although “UNESCO may offer its services to the parties to the conflict”,51 the onus is on the individual States Parties to access these services. Destruction of cultural heritage sites should not be classed as collateral damage for the sole reason that it is carried out by a State-run military, as being a State-run military does not guarantee ethical compliance with the 1954 Hague Convention. Article 31 of the Second Protocol, regarding International Cooperation is key to this research. It states, “[i]n situations of serious violation of this Protocol, the Parties undertake to act, jointly through the Committee, or individually, in cooperation with UNESCO and the [UN] and in conformity with the Charter of the [UN]”.52 In such cases, when cultural heritage was intentionally targeted during armed conflict, particularly in Iraq and Syria, both States Parties should have been able to work directly with the Committee or in cooperation with UNESCO. Yet, as previously

43

Art. 21 (9) (b) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. Art. 29 (2) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 45 Matthews et al. (2020), p. 12. 46 UNESCO (n.d.-a). 47 UNESCO (2017a). 48 UNESCO (n.d.-a). 49 UNESCO (2017a). 50 Art. 30 (3) (b) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 51 Art. 22 (7) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 52 Art. 31 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 44

2.2

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in. . .

21

mentioned, Yemen, Syria and Iraq have not yet ratified the Second Protocol, and so are not necessarily privy to this particular benefit. Matthews et al.,53 encourage the government of Iraq to ratify the Second Protocol for reasons such as being able to benefit from The Fund for the Protection of Cultural Property, as per Article 29 of the Second Protocol, or Enhanced Protection, as per Articles 10 and 11 of the Second Protocol. Moreover, Mustafayev explains, Enhanced Protection, as an international listing, helps to elevate the visibility of any damage. Without such visibility, destroyed sites in Yemen, Syria and Iraq are not getting press attention, making it very hard to garner international support. Had Yemen, Syria and Iraq ratified the Second Protocol and attained Enhanced Protection for certain sites, I think they would have been in a better position to protect such sites, because their military personnel would have been provided with the necessary training.54

Regardless of this, UNESCO has, at some point or another, developed initiatives in cooperation with Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Article 33 of the Second Protocol gives some further detail to this collaboration between UNESCO and States Parties. It states, A Party may call upon UNESCO for technical assistance in organizing the protection of its cultural property, such as preparatory action to safeguard cultural property, preventive and organizational measures for emergency situations and compilation of national inventories of cultural property, or in connection with any other problem arising out of the application of this Protocol. UNESCO shall accord such assistance within the limits fixed by its programme and by its resources.55

It further states that, ‘UNESCO is authorized to make, on its own initiative, proposals on these matters to the Parties’.56 The latter statement again signifies that UNESCO can assume a proactive role and approach the State Party on its own accord. This Article as a whole focuses on preventive measures to safeguard cultural heritage, which is in line with the spirit and letter of the 1954 Hague Convention, that is preventive safeguarding measures during peacetime, with the obligation on the State Party. It is important to note that the assistance UNESCO can provide is very much dependent on its resources. These obligations set out for UNESCO support Christina Luke and Lynn Meskell’s argument that UNESCO is primarily a standard-setting agency, which provides technical solutions and in doing so has “retreated further into its bureaucratic, managerial, and expert-driven functions”.57 This advisory role of UNESCO comes through in Huxley’s 1946 policy paper. He states, What Unesco can do in this vast sphere of the practical application of creative knowledge and art, is accordingly to study the problems in correlation, to endeavor to promote the best methods of translating theory into practice, and to give guidance as to right application.58

53

Matthews et al. (2020), pp. 12–13. Mustafayev (2020), personal communication. 55 Art. 33 (1) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 56 Art. 33 (3) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 57 Luke and Meskell (2019), p. 9. 58 Huxley (1946), pp. 27–28. 54

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UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

This again supports the idea of UNESCO as a standard-setting advisory agency, and not one for practically implementing or enforcing said standards. Meskell proffers that the agency has moved away from their initial centrifugal approach, and has now adopted a “centripetal approach”, with the onus being on Member States to “conserve sites in their own territories”, according to a UNESCO devised system.59 The will of States Parties to the 1954 Hague Convention to enact preventative measures during peacetime is fundamental to the efficacy of the convention; without supporting national legislation and active implementation, the convention has limited effect. Nonetheless, UNESCO can play a central role in providing the support that would allow all States Parties, who are interested, to achieve effective national implementation. Moreover, although limited, UNESCO has the power to exert pressure on its Member States to honor ratified treaties.60 Yet, there is a persistent lack of interest from States Parties to the Convention, with little to no planning during peacetime or implementation during conflict. When detailing her experience in witnessing the 2016 Committee sessions of the 1954 Hague Convention, Meskell recounts, there was scant representation from the Member States, the small auditorium was always half empty, discussions were compressed into a mere two days, and the convention’s budget was miniscule. The wealthiest and most powerful nations were not in attendance, nor were those responsible for the devastating airstrikes on Yemen and Syria.61

Not only does this demonstrate that there is little accountability for States who are in breach of the Convention, but also that those States Parties with the greatest impetus to make significant change or financial contribution show a complete lack of engagement. Of those interviewed for this research, some expressed concerns about UNESCO’s ability to engage meaningfully in the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflict. It is the view of Lawyer, Archaeologist and Executive Director of the Antiquities Coalition, Tess Davis that, “UNESCO is not an organisation . . .set up to deal with conflict, with their mandate often rooted in peacetime activities.”62 This view is reflected by Laurie Rush,63 who states, I am not convinced there is really anything UNESCO can do that is substantive and pragmatic in terms of protecting cultural property in the conflict setting other than educating military personnel. The trouble is that most militaries do not look to UNESCO for training support.

Former Chief of the UNESCO Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit, Giovanni Boccardi, certainly disagrees with Davis64 and Rush65 regarding

59

Meskell (2018), p. 26. Meskell (2018), p. xvii. 61 Meskell (2018), p. 193. 62 Davis (2020), personal communication. 63 Rush (2020), personal communication. 64 Davis (2020), personal communication. 65 Rush (2020), personal communication. 60

The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural. . .

2.3

23

UNESCO’s role when it comes to conflict engagement. He asserts the importance of UNESCO occupying this role, stating, if you need to set up a programme in Yemen, negotiating with the rebels and the government and to gather the international community in a credible, neutral environment then, beyond the UN, and UNESCO in particular, I do not see many others whom could play that role. Crises and emergencies really are our core business.66

He further proffers “it is precisely when peace is under threat that UNESCO has to step in to work through science, education and culture; during peacetime,. . . our role is much less relevant or necessary”. Such polarising points of view are what brings great validity to this book; when those who are most involved in the field of cultural heritage protection are not clear where UNESCO stands, or should stand, on this issue, it is clear there is a problem.67

2.3

The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage

Although the 1954 Hague Convention is the central piece of legislation when it comes to understanding the obligations of UNESCO in terms of heritage protection during armed conflict, it is also important to discuss the 1972 Convention to understand the obligations of UNESCO, specifically the World Heritage Committee (WHCo) and States Parties to ensure effective management and conservation of such properties. This will, in turn allow for an assessment of how the conditions of armed conflict have affected these processes in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, as well as how such processes may be ill-equipped to deal with conflict situations. The WHCo is a body within UNESCO, meaning the organisation is ultimately responsible for the implementation of decisions made by the Committee.68 Articles 4 and 5 of the 1972 Convention set out that it is the responsibility of the individual State Party to ensure appropriate measures are taken to identify, preserve and conserve cultural heritage properties within their territory. In the context of armed conflict, the responsible authorities may not have access or territorial control of all areas with cultural heritage properties in their care, or indeed, there may be a lack of financial and material resources available to ensure their effective management, in addition to obvious security concerns. In such an event, the State Party would raise such impediments at the next annual WHCo session, examples of which are evidenced throughout this book via State of Conservation (SoC) reports from Yemen, who ratified the Convention in 1980, and Syria and Iraq, both of whom accepted the Convention in 1975 and 1974 respectively. Although under Article 6(3) of the 1972 Convention, HCPs undertake “not to take any deliberate measures which might

66

Boccardi (2019), personal communication. Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 68 Art. 14 (2) 1972 Convention. 67

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UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 situated on the territory of other States Parties to this Convention”,69 damage to WHSs is not always possible to mitigate. As per Article 6(2), if States Parties request help in the protection and conservation of properties on the World Heritage List or List of World Heritage in Danger within their territory, recognising that “it is the duty of the international community as a whole to cooperate”,70 States Parties should provide such assistance. Nonetheless, this does not guarantee that all requests for aid will be granted or financially supported, as the context of armed conflict introduces other factors, such as political tension and sanctions, which may prevent many nation states from contributing financial or technical support to a certain country in need. Even when a State Party’s direct requests for International Assistance are approved and disseminated via the World Heritage Fund, chiefly consisting of compulsory and voluntary contributions made by States Parties to the convention,71 there remain further challenges. Such challenges include gaining on the ground access to the property in question amidst an armed conflict, while ensuring appropriate security measures are in place. Although Article 15(4) states, “No political conditions may be attached to contributions made to the Fund”, political banding and favour transactions are becoming common place within the WHCo,72 which ultimately has the power to approve or reject requests for International Assistance via the World Heritage Fund. The 1972 Convention ultimately gave greater power to its Member States, particularly the 21 with representatives residing on the WHCo. Meskell emphasises that those on the Committee are state representatives, who are primarily concerned with the national interests of their own country.73 The chief catalyst for awarding World Heritage status soon became economic self-interest, rather than ethical norms governing the protection of cultural heritage as set out in the 1972 Convention,74 resulting in political banding and World Heritage status being awarded on the basis of political influence. There exists criticism regarding the aim of the 1972 Convention itself, with Meskell contributing that the World Heritage List serves to create an ultimate inventory of selected “unique and irreplaceable wonders of the world”, furthering UNESCO’s goals of listing, standardising, and monitoring the management of such properties “according to uniform technical and managerial standards”.75 Although this book does not serve to address such criticisms, this discourse is utilised in order to understand the WHCo, and consequently UNESCO’s approach to dealing with the management of World Heritage properties at risk, damaged or destroyed during the course of armed conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq in recent years.

69

Art. 6 (3) 1972 Convention. Art. 6 (1) 1972 Convention. 71 Art. 15 (3) (a) 1972 Convention. 72 Bertacchini et al. (2015), p. 4. 73 Meskell (2018), p. 100. 74 Meskell (2018), p. 100. 75 Meskell (2018), pp. 66–67. 70

2.4

2.4

UNESCO’s 2015 Strategy: Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for. . .

25

UNESCO’s 2015 Strategy: Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict

The year 2015 marked a definite turning point for cultural heritage protection in relation to armed conflict. With backing from UNESCO, around 50 countries adopted UNSCR 2199, which prohibited trade in cultural property originating in Iraq or Syria.76 Meanwhile, Former DG for UNESCO, Irina Bokova, launched the Unite4Heritage social media campaign, promoting the global safeguarding of cultural heritage. In September 2015, “the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) published satellite photos showing [Da’esh] jihadists to have destroyed the Temple of Bel in Palmyra”.77 Following this, Italy proposed to the UN General Assembly, the creation of the Blue Helmets for Culture.78 Later in February 2016, Italy signed an agreement with UNESCO, creating the world’s first emergency task force for culture, comprising civilian experts and members of the Italian carabinieri.79 It was during 2015 in Paris, where the General Conference, 38th session took place, that UNESCO set out the Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict. This 2015 strategy (commencing January 2016 and concluding January 2022) was developed in response to “growing requests for assistance by Member States affected by conflict”.80 When this conference took place, there was ongoing destruction of cultural heritage in many countries including Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Given UNESCO’s obligations under the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, it is evident that they would need to develop a strategy on how to respond to a potentially high rate of requests for assistance from countries experiencing conflict, particularly given the central focus on cultural heritage within each conflict. UNESCO states, “The overall goal of the. . .strategy is to reduce the vulnerability before, during and in the aftermath of conflict where destruction and threats are unprecedented”.81 From the 2015 UNESCO strategy paper, this research is able to determine how the organisation views its role in modern conflicts in relation to the protection of cultural heritage, and the extent to which it believes it should engage in such State affairs. Thus, the two objectives of UNESCO concerning cultural heritage protection during armed conflict are as follows:

76

UNESCO (2017b). UNESCO (2017b). 78 UNESCO (2017b). 79 UNESCO (2017b). 80 UNESCO (2015), p. 3. 81 UNESCO (2015), p. 3. 77

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UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

1. “Strengthen the ability of Member States to prevent, mitigate and recover the loss of cultural heritage and diversity as a result of conflict” and 2. “Incorporate the protection of culture into humanitarian action, security strategies and peace-building processes by engaging with relevant stakeholders outside the culture domain”.82 Based on the first objective outlined by UNESCO, the organisation expresses a reliance on the predication that Member States are never the perpetrators of cultural heritage destruction and all aim to comply with the 1954 Hague Convention. Regardless, UNESCO is not in a position to hold Member States accountable for any violation of the convention. However, these two objectives centre on the provision of support to and strengthening of national counterparts and are, as a result, proactive in nature. Moreover, when outlining their “Priority areas of action”, the organisation acknowledges, “that acting in times of peace for the prevention of loss of cultural heritage and diversity has often proven to be the most effective way to protect”.83 Similar to the ethos behind this statement by UNESCO, this book considers cultural heritage safeguarding measures within the framework of the 1954 Hague Convention, meaning only those measures taken during peacetime or in the pre-conflict phase, whether carried out by UNESCO or the relevant State Party, are considered proactive and preventative. Alternatively, all safeguarding actions carried out by UNESCO or a State Party during conflict are considered mitigation or emergency response “first aid”. In terms of the proactive “Priority areas of action”, UNESCO outline their focus on: • Building synergies in the implementation of relevant UNESCO conventions, especially the 1954 Hague Convention; • Developing “its technical activities aimed at assisting Member States in identifying, mitigating and reducing potential risks”; • Strengthening capacities of national and local authorities; • Strengthening “advocacy at all levels to promote consideration of and investment in culture as an integral part of conflict prevention strategies and operational action”; and • Raising awareness around the importance of cultural heritage protection.84 It should be noted that UNESCO does not define the forms of “culture” in which it aims to invest, and therefore it is unclear what culture it sets out to prioritise for safeguarding under this 2015 strategy. Due to the direct reference to the 1954 Hague Convention, it is likely that UNESCO’s priority in terms of heritage preservation must lie with the forms of cultural property defined in Article 1 of the Convention. In

82

UNESCO (2015), p. 4. UNESCO (2015), p. 4. 84 UNESCO (2015), pp. 4–5. 83

2.4

UNESCO’s 2015 Strategy: Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for. . .

27

terms of the immediate response actions highlighted under UNESCOs “Priority areas of action”, focus is given to: • Enhancing capacity to allow for the collection of “systematic, reliable and verified data” on damage to and destruction of cultural heritage, “essential to define priority mitigating measures”, and determine whether such damage or destruction was intentional; • Enhance collaboration with other UN agencies and other concerned international organisations, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), to allow for data to be collected as well as coordinated rapid response mechanisms; and • The creation of “comprehensive Technical Support Programmes for the protection of cultural heritage during conflict for countries affected”. UNESCO also notes here that the Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage programme is considered good practice and may be used as a basic template for other countries.85 Relevant to Iraq’s current situation, in this 2015 strategy, UNESCO also set out their ‘priority areas of action’ when it comes to the recovery stage. In preparation for this stage, UNESCO places emphasis on continual documentation of built, movable and intangible heritage and preparation of recovery strategies.86 During the recovery phase, the strategy boasts the broad goal of “supporting national authorities in assessing, planning and implementing mid- to long-term programmes for cultural heritage rehabilitation and preservation, as well as for the promotion of cultural diversity”.87 Additionally, UNESCO will “continue engaging in joint in-depth assessment exercises, such as [UN]/World Bank and European Union-supported Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs), promoting a comprehensive and systematic approach to the recovery of the culture sector”.88 This strategy indicates that UNESCO believed that, from 2015, its obligations in terms of cultural heritage protection during armed conflict would increase. This expectation came with the outbreak of conflict in Yemen, in addition to multiple ongoing conflicts, consequently an expectation for an increase in requests for assistance from the organisation, as well as an increase in statutory obligations, such as the role of UNESCO in assisting in the implementation of UNSCR 2199.89 This assistance in implementation of UNSCR 2199 specifically concerns Paragraph 17, regarding the prevention of illicit trafficking of cultural property from Syria and Iraq, as well as the restitution of such items to the Syrian and Iraqi people.90

85

UNESCO (2015), pp. 5–6. UNESCO (2015), p. 6. 87 UNESCO (2015), p. 6. 88 UNESCO (2015), p. 6. 89 UNESCO (2015), p. 10. 90 Para. 17 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199, 2015. 86

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UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

UNESCO’s Capability: Culture in Armed Conflict

It has often been said that UNESCO has far too broad a remit, encompassing three very different subject areas, each of which requires an extraordinary amount of attention. Since its inception, UNESCO has been chiefly concerned with the education aspect of its remit, with particular focus on the elimination of illiteracy.91 This is not a negative comment on UNESCO, however when a not-so-large budget requires to be split between three massive development areas such as education, science and culture, whichever is deemed the least important will most definitely suffer. Understanding UNESCO’s resource allocation to the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflict will be key to determining what is within UNESCO’s capability. Further consideration will also be given to UNESCO’s overall budget, particularly since, in recent years, it has lost significant income from the US and Israel, following UNESCO’s recognition of Palestine as a Member State.

2.5.1

UNESCO’s Financial Resources: Culture in Armed Conflict

Over the past decade, Palestine has been bidding for membership across the board of IGOs, being a valid route for it to gain recognition as a nation state. In 2011, Palestine made a bid for full UN membership, as well as with the UNSC; however, this bid never made it to a vote, due to a US veto. Nonetheless, Al Jazeera explain, since 2011, Palestine has been able to join more than 50 international organisations and agreements, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), INTERPOL, and of course, UNESCO.92 Even following Palestine’s unsuccessful attempt to gain full membership at the UN in 2011, it did achieve promoted status from that of Non-Member Observer Entity, to Non-Member Observer State. Lynch states, a 1990 US law bans the appropriation of funds “for the [UN] or any specialized agency thereof which accords the Palestine Liberation Organization the same standing as a member State”.93 Moreover, in 1994, Congress prohibited funding of “any affiliated organization of the [UN] which grants full membership as a state to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood”.94 Along with Israel, the US ceased funding UNESCO in 2011, and formally left the organisation on 1 January 2019, in response to Palestine being admitted as a Member State of UNESCO on 31 October 2011. A statement from Victoria Nuland of the State Department on 1 November 2011,

91

Bennett and Oliver (2001), p. 372. Al Jazeera (2019). 93 Lynch (2011). 94 Lynch (2011). 92

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proclaimed, “[t]oday’s vote by the member states of UNESCO to admit Palestine as a member is regrettable, premature and undermines our shared goal of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East”.95 Nuland further stated the US Government would only support the statehood of Palestine if it were “‘realised through direct negotiations’ with Israel”.96 Soon after, Israel followed suit, stating it would stand by the US’ decision to leave UNESCO, and accused the organisation of unfairly targeting Israel.97 As of 2018, UNESCO’s core annual budget only amounted to around US$250 million.98 It is evident that UNESCO has suffered a steep decline in its budget in recent years due to the loss of the US as a Member State, whose previous contributions constituted around 22% of its total budget.99 Meskell states, “At first glance, the US withdrawal signaled a shortfall of around US $60 million”, yet Meskell was later informed at UNESCO Paris HQ that “the shortfall was closer to US$240 million and that the effect was crippling on vital programs, making it impossible to keep global operations going.”100 Meskell has since noted that accounting for inflation and statutory increases, the total loss for UNESCO is equivalent to 30%. As of 2017, the US’ unpaid bill amounted to almost US$550 million.101 The UNESCO Status of Contributions to the Regular Budget recorded, as at 25 April 2019, the US, as a non-Member State, still owed UNESCO US$611,773,808; Israel owed US$9,879,713; and Yugoslavia, SFRY owed US $2,766,483, a total of US$624,420,004. It is evident that the major party damaging UNESCO the most by withholding funds is the US. Such a loss in budget has ultimately affected the organisation’s programmes and initiatives, leading it to seek funds from other parties. Although UNESCO continues to operate on a daily basis, the US’ withdrawal has put a major dent in its finances, affecting its ability to realise its central policy focuses.102 As of January 2020, 65% of UNESCO’s staff is financed via the organisation’s regular budget, with 35% financed via extrabudgetary funds.103 Nonetheless, UNESCO report that the “ratio of staff on Regular Programme funded posts vs. Extrabudgetary funded posts has slightly increased between January 2016 (63/37) and January 2020 (65/35)”.104 The politicisation of UNESCO has been an historic reasoning used by Member States to withdraw in the past, with the US accusing UNESCO thus, in addition to financial mismanagement and an unworkable bureaucracy, since the Ronald Reagan

95

Lobe (2011). Lobe (2011). 97 Landau (2017). 98 Meskell (2018), p. 88. 99 Meskell (2013), p. 491. 100 Meskell (2013), p. 491. 101 Meskell (2018), p. 75. 102 Coningham (2017). 103 UNESCO (2020), p. 5. 104 UNESCO (2020), p. 5. 96

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administration,105 and the UK suspending its membership between 1985 and 1997. Gareth Harris notes, the Conservative overseas aid minister Timothy Raison told the House of Commons in 1985 that UNESCO was badly managed and had been “harmfully politicised”.106 Simon McGee of The Times states, Margaret Thatcher withdrew Britain from the organisation as she stated it has “anti-western bias and financial mismanagement”.107 The UK rejoined UNESCO during the Blair government in 1997. UK Government members have periodically expressed their wish to withdraw from the organisation, most recently in 2011. Often, such rhetoric revolves around the UK’s contributions to UNESCO being a waste of taxpayer’s money. With claims of financial mismanagement and harmful politicisation emanating from the UK, US and Israeli Governments, it may seem that UNESCO is the one at fault. However, with Member States being the catalysing agencies in all such problematic issues at UNESCO, it is likely the UK, US and Israeli governments are imposing their own politicised view on UNESCO and projecting a false view of the organisation. The latter narrative has validity when taking into consideration the US’ historical relationship with the UN and UNESCO. In 1984, Ronald Reagan withdrew the US from UNESCO, and one year later, Margaret Thatcher followed suit by withdrawing the UK. In 1985, Jeremy Corbyn stood up in Westminster to oppose the decision to take the UK out of UNESCO. He stated, “[t]he basis of this debate is not the finances or the administrative arrangements of Unesco, but the power of the far right in the United States”.108 Corbyn suggested that the UK’s move was influenced directly by US politics, claiming that this was a colluded move between both countries against the organisation. Regardless of each Member State or former Member State’s opinion, it remains that the removal of key contributors to the agency’s budget will negatively affect its ability to carry out programmes globally. Giovanni Boccardi, former head of the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) unit, affirmed, “since 2011, UNESCO has had to cut hundreds of positions and reduce innumerable programmes”.109 When it comes to how this has affected the culture sector, Boccardi stressed that “our budget used to enable the decentralisation of some resources to our 53 field offices, however nowadays this has become purely symbolic.”110 He further stated “97% of what we [EPR] do has to come from extrabudgetary sources, which are the result of negotiations with an individual donor”.111 A potential solution to accruing greater funds for heritage at risk is the Heritage Emergency Fund (HEF), a multi-donor and non-ear-marked funding mechanism, established in 2015 to enable

105

Meskell (2018), p. 197. Harris (2018). 107 McGee (2011). 108 Thornberry (2018). 109 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 110 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 111 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 106

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the organisation to respond appropriately to a broad range of global crises resulting from both natural and human-made hazards.112 Boccardi states, the fund can be distributed within 48 hours, allowing us to respond efficiently to an emergency situation that arises. The distribution of this fund need only be approved by our Assistant DG for Culture, delegated by the DG, making the bureaucracy very minimal.113

Key donors to the HEF include the Qatar Fund for Development, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science of the Netherlands.114 What is more, members of the public can donate any amount they wish directly to the fund. Yemen, Syria and Iraq have all been beneficiaries of the HEF. On the topic of the fund, Boccardi finally stated, “we are trying to promote this to mobilise resources and we are also trying to partner with other organisations to put together our respective capacities and increase the scale of our activities.”115 An example of such a partner is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has significantly more freedom to engage with countries experiencing conflict than UNESCO, and so could increase the organisation’s access. With a lack of sufficient funds from the primary UNESCO budget, it appears that the EPR Unit must spend a large portion of its time and resources on realising funds to have the ability to engage with any meaningful cultural heritage protection projects. UNESCO remains extremely reliant on the cooperation of its Member States to be able to achieve its aims. Since the US pulled out of UNESCO in 2011, the organisation has had less influence and less impetus to be able to carry out many reforms, or drive forward more initiatives in support of scientific, educational, or cultural development, due to the reduction in annual funding. This brings to the fore the political influence Member States can have on an IGO, and without the cooperation of all Member States, very little can be achieved on UNESCO’s part. The impact the loss of US funding had on UNESCO reaffirms that the organisation needs the US as a member far more than the US needs UNESCO. Meskell stated in 2013 that this loss of income along with the number of WHSs reaching 1000, leading to more requests for international assistance and field missions, while UNESCO’s sustainable development and capacity building commitments increase, indicates that the organisation is being pushed toward fiscal crisis.116 Moreover, the ceasing of all US extrabudgetary contributions to the World Heritage Fund, has led to it operating with a mere US$4 million for all requests of international assistance, causing a negative impact on UNESCO’s ability to carry out conservation and management of World Heritage properties.117 112

UNESCO (n.d.-b). Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 114 UNESCO (n.d.-b). 115 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 116 Meskell (2014), p. 220. 117 Meskell (2018), p. 75. 113

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UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

In the previously discussed 2015 strategy, at the time of publication, UNESCO acknowledged having very limited staff and regular budget to engage significantly in heritage protection activities.118 It further states, “Regular programme financial resources for operational activities are. . .limited, and used mostly to support postdisaster assessment missions, the elaboration of project proposals or coordination meetings”.119 Following this, the strategy states that it will aim at building capabilities of the 1970 Convention Secretariat,120 but does not mention that of the 1954 Hague Convention Secretariat. Nonetheless, it remains that in 2015, UNESCO fully acknowledged, “the human and financial resources dedicated to the protection of cultural heritage affected by conflict remain insufficient for the Organization to respond effectively”.121 Both UNESCO and its Member States evidently recognise the need for additional resources when it comes to heritage protection in the event of armed conflict. When it comes to the funding of key mechanisms, under UNESCO’s control, for the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict, this distinct lack of funding is apparent. Mustafayev states, “The 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols programme received a regular budget from UNESCO, which comes from mandatory State contributions. This programme received US$150,000 per year, which is a really small amount of funding.”122 He further stated, “30–40% of these funds are allocated to organising meetings for the committee, therefore in reality, the programme has around US$90,000 per year, which will be used to raise extrabudgetary funds from countries eager to contribute long-term in certain projects.” In 2015, UNESCO proposed that US$25 million was required over the subsequent 6 years to support the implementation of all priority emergency actions in times of conflict. It stipulates that an additional US$20 million should come from extrabudgetary contributions and put to the HEF, while US$5 million should stem from the regular programme and budget (US$2.5 million each for staff and activities).123 UNESCO’s response to conflict, inclusive of staff and activities for 2015 was US$3.349 million, with a ratio of 1/11.5 (regular programme/extrabudgetary funding), while this strategy proposes an increase of 124% on 2015 expenditure over each of the subsequent 6 years.124 Consideration of the Executive Board’s Draft Action Plan for the implementation of the 2015 strategy shows it to be significantly underfunded, with the majority of proposed projects and initiatives going entirely without financial support.125 Out of 32 proposed initiatives, the total estimate cost

118

UNESCO (2015), p. 8. UNESCO (2015), p. 8. 120 UNESCO (2015), p. 8. 121 UNESCO (2015), p. 9. 122 Mustafayev (2020), personal communication. 123 UNESCO (2015), p. 10. 124 UNESCO (2015), p. 10. 125 UNESCO (n.d.-c). 119

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for which stood at US$15,765,000, total funding amounting to only US$475,000 had been secured for three, namely: • Campaign for the global ratification of UNESCO Conventions (US$75,000); • Strengthening synergies among Conventions (US$100,000); and • Management and promotion of the HEF (US$300,000).126 This indicates that, at the time of writing, the Executive Board’s Draft Action plan for the implementation of the 2015 strategy initiatives had a deficit of US $15,290,000. This pessimism with regard to the funding of the 2015 strategy extends to the plans for the expansion of human resources to support its implementation. Although nine new positions were proposed, each providing 6 years’ employment, the total estimate cost for which stood at US$9,623,952, funding amounting to only US$936,000 (US$156,000 per year) had been secured for but one of them— (P2) Associate Project Officer—1972 (CLT/HER/WHC/ARB).127 This indicates that, at the time of writing, the Executive Board’s Draft Action plan for the implementation of the 2015 strategy human resources showed a deficit of US $8,687,952. These figures show that not even the target of US$5 million of regular funding to support the 2015 strategy action plan was met; only US$1,411,000 was secured at the time of writing the Executive Board Draft Action Plan, of the US $25 million target.

2.5.2

UNESCO’s Human Resources: Culture in Armed Conflict

When considering UNESCO’s human resource allocation to cultural heritage protection during armed conflict, it is important to start with a broader outlook on UNESCO’s human resource capacity. The January 2020 Key Data on UNESCO’s Staff report records the organisation to comprise 2201 staff, from 171 nationalities.128 This figure is then divided into 1071 staff at HQ (49%); 759 staff in 53 field offices (34%); and 371 staff in nine Category 1 Institutes (17%).129 UNESCO has 193 Member States of which 79% are represented within its task force.130 Of the 2201 UNESCO staff, 49% reside at HQ; 9% in Asia and the Pacific; 14% in Africa; 7% in Latin America and the Caribbean; 5% in the Arab States and 17% in Europe and North America.131 This includes staff on fixed-term appointments encompassing

126

UNESCO (n.d.-c). UNESCO (n.d.-c). 128 UNESCO (2020), p. 1. 129 UNESCO (2020), p. 1. 130 UNESCO (2020), p. 1. 131 UNESCO (2020), p. 3. 127

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fixed-term project appointments.132 Overall, since 2010, the number of UNESCO staff has decreased by 5%; UNESCO demonstrates that while the number of staff at HQ has decreased by 19%, the number of field office staff has increased by 8% and the number of staff in Category 1 Institutes has increased by 30%. Furthermore, between 2018 and 2020, each of these groups demonstrate an increase in staffing levels.133 When considering the division of human resources across the field offices alone, UNESCO records 23% (172) members of staff in Asia and the Pacific; 35% (263) in Africa; 17% (133) in Latin America and the Caribbean; 15% (115) in the Arab States and 10% (76) in Europe and North America.134 As it stands, the Arab States is the only region without staff in Category 1 Institutes.135 In relation to programme sectors, we can see from UNESCO’s 2020 report that the culture sector has 16% (192) of staff, while the Education sector constitutes 40% (496) and the Natural Sciences sector possess 24% (306).136 With the culture sector comprising 192 members of staff, this constitutes 8.7% of the collective UNESCO task force on fixedterm appointments, including fixed-term project appointments. It is worth noting that UNESCO is the only UN agency with a mandate on culture, and yet under its programmes sectors, culture is allocated just 16% of human resources, correlating to 8.7% of UNESCO’s total staff count. Problems were encountered when trying to ascertain the staff members working within different departments of the culture sector. Presumably, due to a reshuffle in recent years, there is a lack of clarity around the staff members working in relation to heritage protection in armed conflict. At the 205th session of the UNESCO Executive Board, published in October 2018, UNESCO detailed the organisational structure of the culture sector. It highlighted five distinct themes, namely World heritage; Culture and Emergencies; Living Heritage; Diversity of Cultural Expressions; and Cultural Policies and Development.137 The theme with most relevance being Culture and Emergencies, comprises five separate units, namely EPR; Movable Heritage; Museums; Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; and Underwater Heritage.138 The UNESCO 2015 strategy states, At [HQ], the Unit for [EPR] consists of one Professional and one General Service staff. In the [then] current biennium, staff of the 1970 and 1954 Hague Conventions, as well as those of the Arab States Unit of the [WHC] have devoted a very significant proportion of their time to such activities. Field offices covering countries facing emergencies related to conflicts, such as Beirut (for Syria), Baghdad, the Project Antenna for Libya, and Bamako, do not have any international CLT [culture] staff on regular posts.139

132

UNESCO (2020), p. 3. UNESCO (2020), p. 4. 134 UNESCO (2020), p. 6. 135 UNESCO (2020), p. 6. 136 UNESCO (2020), p. 8. 137 UNESCO (2018), Annex. 138 UNESCO (2018), Annex. 139 UNESCO (2015), p. 8. 133

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The 2015 strategy proposed that an additional US$2.5 million from the regular budget should be allocated to such units, through a phased approach, over the subsequent 6 years, to allow for additional posts to be established, which would in turn institutionalise a sustainable response by UNESCO to conflicts in the field of culture.140 Since its publication in 2015, such human resources appear to have grown, albeit marginally. A UNESCO report stipulates that 11 professional staff and 5 General Service staff are dedicated to the entirety of the Culture and Emergencies theme.141 This means that a total of 16 staff are spread over the five discrete units listed above at UNESCO HQ. When trying to decipher how the 16 staff are currently allocated across the five units, it was necessary to scour the UNESCO website. Of all the units listed, staff/contacts listings could only be located for two, namely the Cultural Heritage Protection Treaties unit and the EPR Unit, both of which work in close coordination with one another. UNESCO states, the EPR Unit, established in 2014, would ensure the overall coordination of the 2015 strategy, discussed above, for the protection of culture and the promotion of cultural pluralism during conflict.142 Furthermore, UNESCO states, “An underlying objective in establishing the EPR Unit is to improve the coherence of the Sector’s response in addressing emergencies and to ensure that adequate attention is given to long-term preparedness and prevention strategies.”143 This unit also deals with heritage protection in the event of natural disasters. Boccardi states, there is more or less a 50/50 split between resource allocation to armed conflict and natural disaster situations, but it greatly depends on where their efforts are most needed each year. Moreover, within the realm of heritage protection, the majority of their efforts tend to focus on cultural heritage over natural heritage, as cultural sites, particularly in the context of armed conflict, face greater threats.144 Boccardi further states, at the EPR Unit, we work very closely with our field officers, who identify priorities in their region; if cultural heritage is identified as a priority because the country is exposed to earthquakes or because there is a risk of political instability, then we engage in a discussion to try to develop a response.145

The Cultural Heritage Protection Treaties unit has six members of staff listed on the UNESCO website (Table 2.1), while the EPR Unit lists five members of staff (Table 2.1). During an interview with Giovanni Boccardi, it was made known that he was due to retire late 2019; as Boccardi remains on the staff list accessible via UNESCO’s website, the current list cannot necessarily be viewed as accurate. Nonetheless, a tally of the six members of staff from the Cultural Heritage Protection Treaties unit and the five members of staff from the EPR Unit equals 11 professional staff members, mirroring that detailed under the 205th session of the Executive 140

UNESCO (2015), p. 10. UNESCO (2018), Annex. 142 UNESCO (2015), p. 7. 143 UNESCO (2015), p. 8. 144 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 145 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 141

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Table 2.1 UNESCO staff for culture units. Source: UNESCO Official Website Relevant cultural units Personnel listed on UNESCO website

Cultural Heritage Protection Treaties Unit Mr Lazare Eloundou Assomo Ms Anna Sidorenko

Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit Mr Giovanni Boccardi Ms Alessandra Borchi

Ms Nadia Carde

Ms Sophie Abraham

Mr Erik Kleijn

Ms Léonie Evers

Ms Ala’a Otain

Ms Lynda Zerguine

Mr Tural Mustafayev

Arab States Unit May Shaer (Head of Unit) Alcira Sandoval Ruiz (Programme Specialist) Youmna Tabet (Associate Project Officer) Inel Massali (Programme Assistant) Marie Chuvin (Programme Assistant) Ghaliya Al-lamki (Associate Programme Specialist) Adonis El Khusseyn (Consultant)

Board, published in October 2018. It therefore must follow that the staff representing these two units must straddle the other three units listed under Culture and Emergencies. Returning to the previous point regarding the time spent on realising necessary extrabudgetary funds for the EPR Unit: when considering the minute human resources at its disposal, each individual’s time must be viewed as extremely valuable if the unit is to bring to fruition meaningful cultural heritage protection initiatives. However, a large portion of the unit’s time is instead spent garnering financial support, often with not much success, given the lack of funds realised under the 2015 strategy, for which the EPR unit was given responsibility. A second relevant department could be the Arab States Unit, comprising seven members of staff (Table 2.1). To ascertain UNESCO’s physical presence in, and human resource capacity for, Yemen, Syria and Iraq, consideration is given to the field offices. For Yemen, there exists a cluster office in Doha, Qatar. Despite efforts by the Doha offices to establish a national office in Yemen, this has not yet been possible, with efforts greatly complicated by the ongoing conflict. Nonetheless, UNESCO have successfully established a Project Office, based in Sana’a, dedicated to its ongoing Cash for Work: Promoting Livelihood Opportunities for Urban Youth in Yemen (CfW) initiative in Yemen, which will be discussed later. As of May 2020, only one person, Nabil Monassar, worked at this designated project office. Currently, only Yemeni nationals are officially able to work at this office, due to financial and security constraints, but visiting international experts, such as Architect and Restorer, Tom Leiermann, may use it as a short-term base.146 However, it has been indicated that

146

Interviewee C (2020), personal communication.

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the Doha Office are recruiting additional people to carry out monitoring and evaluation, finance work, administrative work, HR management, etc.147 The number of people working in the Sana’a project office increased from one to three,148 albeit still restricted to Yemeni nationals, with this move likely occurring late 2020, early 2021. Interviewee C states, there are “six staff members working in relation to cultural heritage in Yemen within our regional office in Doha, with these staff covering several levels (communication, programme management, administration, expertise in the field of rehabilitation, monitoring and evaluation).”149 The regional office in Beirut, Lebanon, has been allocated to cover Syria, positioned close to the Syrian border. Unfortunately, in the course of data collection, despite many efforts, no comment was received from the Beirut office, to ascertain their physical presence, if any, in Syria. Furthermore, unfortunately, despite many efforts, no data was realised from the UNESCO regional office in Beirut on how many personnel are allocated to work for culture-oriented projects in Syria. For Iraq, there is a national office in Baghdad, and an office in Erbil, Kurdistan. In relation to the national field office in Baghdad, Iraq, Interviewee A confirms, the total projected staff for 31 December 2020 was 68, of which 17 were to work for culture-oriented projects.150 It is likely that these 17 culture-oriented staff in the Iraq office occupy roles similar to those held in the Doha office, described above. This is still viewed as too little for Abdulrahman Emad of the Nineveh Department of Antiquities, who stated, “[t]he problem is the number of people working in the office, which I think is a result of funding issues”.151 A tally of the 11 professional members of staff under the Culture and Emergencies department at HQ, the seven members of staff within the Arab States Unit of the WHC and the six members of staff in the Doha office engaging in culture-oriented projects in Yemen, equals 24 members of staff. This constitutes 24 UNESCO staff beneath the office of DG, who are in a position to engage with issues pertaining to cultural heritage protection or reconstruction in Yemen in relation to the ongoing conflict. However, cultural heritage conservation and management expert and previous UNESCO Consultant, Cristina Iamandi explains, “the Arab State Unit does not deal with Yemen at all”.152 If this is accepted as fact, there then remains 17 members of staff, beneath the office of DG, engaging with such issues. A similar tally for Iraq indicates that 35 UNESCO staff beneath the office of DG are able to engage with issues pertaining to cultural heritage protection or reconstruction in Iraq, in relation to the recent conflict. Although obvious, it must be stated that UNESCO will have employed an array of contractors and other temporary extra-budgetary staff in the course of its past and ongoing projects and initiatives in Yemen, Syria and

147

Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. Interviewee C (2021), personal communication. 149 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 150 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 151 Emad (2020), personal communication. 152 Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 148

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Iraq. Nonetheless, the low numbers of core staff presented here somewhat confirms the financial issues faced by UNESCO. Senior Heritage Advisor for Heritage for Peace (HfP), Rene Teijgeler acknowledges this, stating, “[t]here are few people within UNESCO who are engaged fulltime with heritage protection during armed conflict, despite the seriousness of the problem at hand”.153 Among other challenges, such as lack of security and inherent political instability, that UNESCO faces when trying to engage in heritage protection initiatives during conflicts, Boccardi asserts a key challenge is the lack of finances. He states, When it comes to heritage protection, the UNESCO operation is so microscopic, compared to what other organisations and UN agencies are capable of achieving with their far vaster human resources. The budget programme that UNESCO’s Member States approve every two years is the equivalent of the budget for cultural activities of a mid-size city in Italy.154

Interviews carried out for this research, reveal that 100% (2) of the UNESCO HQ officials interviewed felt that there are insufficient resources allocated to cultural heritage protection in armed conflict. From those working in the relevant field offices, 20% (1 of 5) felt there is insufficient resource allocation, while one respondent did not provide a conclusive answer, and the remaining 60% (3 of 5) did not comment on the matter. Of the relevant government officials interviewed, 50% (2 of 4) believed there to be insufficient resource allocation, one respondent did not provide a conclusive answer and the other did not comment on the issue. Finally, of the 25 independent experts interviewed, 64% (16) felt that there is insufficient resource allocation within UNESCO to cultural heritage protection in armed conflict, while 16% (4) believed that UNESCO should not be involved in heritage protection in armed conflict, and 28% (7), did not comment on the issue. When asked about this topic, Mustafayev stated, At an operational level, UNESCO makes it a priority to pull resources to protect cultural heritage in armed conflict. However, I would always say the funds we receive are not enough. There is no way that we can rely solely on UNESCO’s budget, so there is a need to appeal to countries or private partners, who will buy into the idea or project and provide the necessary funds to support it. Therefore, we use our UNESCO budget to raise funds. UNESCO’s budget is really concerning in this regard, but I think that if UNESCO gives enough attention to convincing its States Parties to contribute funds to this kind of work, then we can achieve more.155

Former head of the EPR Unit, Giovanni Boccardi adds, “we have such limited resources, and such few people, that we cannot have a comprehensive view of the entire world and constantly react to every possible issue that may arise.”156 UNESCO’s staff, focusing on cultural heritage protection, must chose their battles and focus on only a few projects, while prioritising the least developed countries, before addressing lower and middle-income countries.

153

Teijgeler (2020), personal communication. Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 155 Mustafayev (2020), personal communication. 156 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 154

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It is important to acknowledge the existence of Blue Shield (BS), its various national counterparts and its formal relationship with UNESCO, as a potential additional branch through which UNESCO is able to advocate for improved cultural heritage protection during armed conflict. Formed in 1996 by the International Council on Archives (ICA), the International Council of Museums (ICOM), the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA) and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), the International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS) was an NGO centred on the protection of heritage from conflicts and disasters.157 The relationship with UNESCO stems from the naming of the organisation after the emblem brought about in the 1954 Hague Convention to identify protected cultural heritage.158 The relationship between UNESCO and ICBS developed with Article 27(3) of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, which identified ICBS as an advisory body to the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.159 In 2008, the Association of National Committees to the Blue Shield (ANCBS) was established, and later merged with ICBS in 2016 to become Blue Shield (BS). The organisation’s mission under Article 2(1) of its 2016 Statutes, states that it is “committed to the protection of the world’s cultural property, and is concerned with the protection of cultural and natural heritage, tangible and intangible, in the event of armed conflict, natural- or human-made disaster”.160 This shows significant crossover with UNESCO’s goals, especially those highlighted in the organisation’s 2015 strategy. BS does not work in isolation; the organisation’s Secretariat, Emma Cunliffe states, BS is in the process of becoming a formal partner with UNESCO.161 However, an issue with BS is that it is chiefly run by volunteers, albeit professionals in the fields of heritage and heritage protection, with only 2.5 paid positions funded by Newcastle University. Peter Stone illustrates the current unfortunately small-scale nature of BS, stating “A minor issue is that we [BS] still do not have a bank account. . . because it has been too difficult to arrange one in a suitable country”, making the organisation difficult to deal with for foundations.162 Beyond having an advisory position at select meetings, BS does not have any further practical relationship with UNESCO,163 neither does it impact UNESCO’s financial scope, or significantly contribute to an increase in UNESCO’s human resource capability. It is therefore deemed pointless for this book to address the policies and activities of BS to further ascertain the extent of UNESCO’s direct engagement in heritage protection during armed conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Nonetheless, it is

157

Blue Shield (n.d.). Blue Shield (n.d.). 159 Art. 27 (3) 1954 Hague Convention, Second Protocol. 160 Art. 2 (1) Blue Shield International (2016). 161 Cunliffe (2021), personal communication. 162 Stone (2020), personal communication. 163 UNESCO (n.d.-d). 158

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UNESCO’s Legal Obligation and Capability to Protect Cultural. . .

worth noting that four interviewees for this research are either currently, or have been, members of BS, UK Blue Shield (UKBS) and Blue Shield Netherlands, and so this research benefits from the BS perspective. Although possessing infinitely more staff than BS, UNESCO is also suffering from a lack of permanent staff. Meskell summarises this staffing deficit in relation to the tasks UNESCO is faced with, stating, “[i]t has become an institution of volunteers, as well as temporary staff on short-term contracts, consultants, retired employees staying on, and a reduced regular staff trying to manage two or three posts each.”164 Despite this research being solely focused on the role of UNESCO in the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict situations, it is acknowledged that any financial issues the organisation is facing extends beyond this niche area. Cunliffe states, I do not get the impression that armed conflict is sufficiently prioritised by UNESCO when it comes to resource allocation, nor do I think that UNESCO has enough money, human resources, or any other form of resources, to tackle heritage protection during armed conflict. However, I do not think it has enough resources to tackle any of the other areas within its remit either.165

Regardless of the organisation’s recent fiscal struggles, it is evident that UNESCO’s WHC became the standard-setting agency in terms of cultural and natural heritage protection values.166 Nonetheless, it is also clear that without the cooperation of its Member States, very little in this regard may be achieved.

References Al Jazeera (2019) Palestine launches bid for full UN membership despite US veto. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/15/palestine-launches-bid-for-full-un-membershipdespite-us-veto Bennett AL, Oliver JK (2001) International organizations: principles and issues, 7th edn. Pearson Bertacchini E et al (2015) Shifting the balance of power in the UNESCO World Heritage Committee: an empirical assessment. Int J Cult Policy 23(3):331–351 Blue Shield (n.d.) What is the Blue Shield? https://theblueshield.org/about-us/what-is-the-blueshield/ Blue Shield International (2016) Amendment to the Articles of Association of National Committees of the Blue Shield. Baker & McKenzie, Amsterdam. https://theblueshield.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/06/statute-Amendments_BSI_2016.pdf Clément E (2016) A historical perspective on the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict: from the Hague 1907 Convention and the Roerich Pact, to the 2003 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage. ICOMOS. https:// openarchive.icomos.org/id/eprint/2495/1/Etienne%20Clement%20Estonia-ICLAFI%20 ICOMOS%202016%20rev.pdf

164

Meskell (2018), p. 88. Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. 166 Thuesen (2018), p. 3. 165

References

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Coningham R (2017) Why the US withdrawal from UNESCO is a step backwards for global cultural cooperation. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-withdrawalfrom-unesco-is-a-step-backwards-for-global-cultural-cooperation-85692 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (1945) 16 November 1945. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_ TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html Gesley J (2018) The “Lieber Code” – the first modern codification of the laws of war. https://blogs. loc.gov/law/2018/04/the-lieber-code-the-first-modern-codification-of-the-laws-of-war/ Harris G (2018) UK threat to leave Unesco reignites debate about purpose of UN culture body. The Art Newspaper. https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/uk-threat-to-leave-unesco-reignitesdebate-about-purpose-of-un-culture-body Huxley J (1946) UNESCO: its purpose and philosophy. Euston Grove Press, London Landau N (2017) Following in U.S.’ footsteps, Israel announces exit from UNESCO. Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/following-u-s-footsteps-israel-announces-exit-fromunesco-1.5629428 Lobe J (2011) US halts UNESCO funding. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/ features/2011/11/1/us-halts-unesco-funding Luke C, Meskell L (2019) Archaeology, assistance, and aggression along the Euphrates: reflections from Raqqa. Int J Cult Policy 25(7):831–842 Lynch C (2011) UNESCO votes to admit Palestine; U.S. cuts off funding. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/unesco-votes-to-admit-palestineover-us-objections/2011/10/31/gIQAMleYZM_story.html Matthews R et al (2020) Heritage and cultural healing: Iraq in a post-Daesh era. Int J Herit Stud 26(2):120–141 McGee S (2011) UK threatens to withdraw from ‘wasteful’ Unesco. The Times. https://www. thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-threatens-to-withdraw-from-wasteful-unesco-nthgzsw76lx Meskell L (2013) UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention at 40: challenging the economic and political order of International Heritage Conservation. Curr Anthropol 54(4):483–494 Meskell L (2014) States of conservation: protection, politics, and pacting within UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee. Anthropol Q 87(1):217–244 Meskell L (2018) A future in ruins: UNESCO, world heritage, and the dream of peace. Oxford University Press, New York Meyer DA (1993) The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and its emergence into customary international law. Boston Univ Int Law J 11:349–389 O’Keefe R (2006) The protection of cultural property in armed conflict. Cambridge University Press, New York Thornberry E (2018) UK withdrawal from Unesco would be historical and cultural vandalism. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/13/uk-withdrawal-unescohistorical-cultural-vandalism-emily-thornberry Thuesen I (2018) Who owns the past? In: Kinzel M, Bangsborg Thuesen M, Thuesen I (eds) Conflict & culture: understanding threats to heritage. Orbis Publishing House, Copenhagen, pp 3–9 UNESCO (2015) General conference 38th Session: reinforcement of UNESCO’s action for the protection of culture and the promotion of cultural pluralism in the event of armed conflict, November 2015, Paris. UNESCO, Paris, pp 1–12. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/ pf0000235186 UNESCO (2017a) Armed conflict and heritage: apply for funding. UNESCO. http://www.unesco. org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-conflict-and-heritage/international-fund/apply-for-funding/ UNESCO (2017b) A historic resolution to protect cultural heritage. https://en.unesco.org/ courier/2017nian-di-3qi/historic-resolution-protect-cultural-heritage UNESCO (2018) Decisions adopted by the Executive Board at its 205th Session. UNESCO, Paris. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000265956

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UNESCO (2020) Key data on UNESCO Staff. UNESCO, Paris. https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/ files/staff_key_data_june_2020en.pdf UNESCO (n.d.-a) Armed conflict and heritage. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/ armed-conflict-and-heritage/international-fund/funded-projects/ UNESCO (n.d.-b) Heritage Emergency Fund. https://en.unesco.org/themes/protecting-our-heri tage-and-fostering-creativity/emergencyfund2 UNESCO (n.d.-c) Executive Board’s Draft Action Plan for the implementation of the 2015 strategy. UNESCO internal report. Unpublished UNESCO (n.d.-d) Partners. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-conflict-andheritage/r-nav/partnerships/ United Nations Security Council (2015) United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199. United Nations, New York United Nations Security Council (2017) United Nations Security Council Resolution 2347. United Nations, New York

Chapter 3

The State Heritage Institutions of Yemen, Syria and Iraq

3.1

State Heritage Institution Capabilities

The competent civilian authorities referred to throughout the 1954 Hague Convention can be understood as the state heritage institutions (SHIs). The Syrian National report on the 1954 Hague Convention Four Year Cycle 2005–2010,1 identifies the Ministry of Culture (MoC), represented by DGAM as the principle national administrative entity of Syria’s legislation and national laws for the protection of cultural property, in application of the 1954 Hague Convention.2 For Yemen, the relevant competent authorities are GOPHCY and GOAM, and for Iraq, it is SBAH. It is crucial to understand the capabilities of the competent authorities across Yemen, Syria and Iraq to determine to what extent they were, and are able, to meet the demands of the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol, to which they are all party. As stated earlier, Yemen, Syria and Iraq have not yet ratified the Second Protocol, which stipulates further roles for UNESCO in relation to safeguarding cultural heritage at risk during conflict. It is therefore important to ascertain the obligations on the governments of these three countries and their respective civilian authorities in terms of the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol. Yemen ratified the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol on 6 February 1970, while the Syrian Arab Republic ratified it on 6 March 1958 and Iraq on 21 December 1967. The 1954 Hague Convention immediately establishes the view of a shared cultural heritage though its use of the phrase ‘the cultural heritage of all [hu]mankind’.3 Promoting commonality, this phrase emphasises the need for all Member States to respect the

1

I acknowledge this is more than four years, but it is not addressed in the official document. UNESCO (2011). 3 Preamble, 1954 Hague Convention. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. D. McCafferty, UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19675-1_3

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cultural heritage of all nation states, and yet the responsibility to enact in situ cultural heritage protection lies with each individual HCP.4 Articles 3 and 8 of the 1954 Hague Convention are concerned with the in situ protection of cultural property of great importance, as determined by the State in good faith and its removal to secure refuges in situations of armed conflict.5 As is evidenced in Article 3 of the Convention, each HCP is obligated to enact its own safeguarding measures during peacetime. Article 8 of the Convention states that special protection may be afforded to a “limited number of refuges intended to shelter movable cultural property of very great importance” and such heritage is granted special protection “by its entry in the ‘International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection’”.6 Moreover, Article 25 of the Convention is concerned with its dissemination during peacetime via training of military personnel and, if possible, civilians. It encourages that the principles of the convention “are made known to the whole population, especially the armed forces and personnel engaged in the protection of cultural property”.7 Similarly, Article 7(2) states that the, “[HCPs] undertake to plan or establish in peace-time, within their armed forces, services or specialist personnel whose purpose will be to secure respect for cultural property and to co-operate with the civilian authorities responsible for safeguarding it”.8

3.1.1

Yemen: State Heritage Institution Capability

To ascertain the current capability of GOPHCY and GOAM, both Nabil Monassar, the former Vice Chairman of GOPHCY and current Project Consultant for UNESCO’s CfW scheme in Yemen, and the late Mohanad Al-Sayani, Chairman of GOAM were interviewed for this research. Monassar explains, in 2018, that he was “put on leave without payment from GOPHCY by the Government” and since 2018 has “been working with UNESCO as a Consultant for the [CfW] project, implemented by the Social Fund for Development [(SFD)], funded by the EU.”9 This indication of lack of funds for this Yemeni SHI to support its workers is confirmed in Yemen’s State Party Reports on the SoC of its three WHSs. For example, the report concerning Sana’a, states that, “[c]urrently, GOPHCY has [a] lack of basic [means] and [a] continuing lack of organizational support, [and is therefore impeded in fulfilling] its obligations, unless [it is] reinforced by urgent international support”.10 Cultural heritage conservation and management expert,

4

McCafferty (2022), p. 170. McCafferty (2022), p. 170. 6 Art. 8 (1) and (6) 1954 Hague Convention. 7 Art. 25 1954 Hague Convention. 8 Art. 7 (2) 1954 Hague Convention. 9 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 10 GOPHCY (2019a). 5

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Cristina Iamandi also confirms this lack of funding for GOPHCY, stating “[it] has always lacked funding, with the institution receiving little budget from the Yemeni Government.”11 This is also mirrored by Al-Sayani’s case with GOAM. Al-Sayani asserts, What the Government currently provides is not enough; staff at GOAM have not been receiving a salary since January 2018, and for the two months prior to that, staff were receiving only half salary due to the lack of budget caused by the conflict.12

In lieu of government funding, Monassar stated, “GOPHCY and GOAM are receiving some funds via this EU project, while UNESCO has also provided some training and equipment for both institutions.”13 Such financial support is not a long-term solution and therefore cannot act as a substitute for the provision of steady government support and funding. Currently, the most crucial funding needed is the provision of stable and appropriate salaries for all core staff in Yemeni SHIs. Prior to the outbreak of conflict, GOPHCY was drafting a four-year strategy for the preservation and management of historic cities, with aims of improving conservation, creating new job opportunities and enhancing living conditions of the local population, but such a strategy unfortunately never came to fruition.14 As stated, GOPHCY and GOAM’s budget was significantly reduced, with various employees not receiving any salary. It follows that capacity to ensure any form of emergency response capability for heritage-safeguarding interventions during the conflict would be extremely limited. Even before the outbreak of conflict in 2015, Iamandi states, “there were already around 300 buildings in ruin [in Sana’a], beyond repair.” She further asserts that in Yemen it “was already a difficult situation before the [2015] conflict”, with many other conflicts already existing with separatist movements.15 However, knowledge of the Old City of Sana’a is, at least, comprehensive, as in 2008 UNESCO and GOPHCY- Centre for Architectural Training and Studies (CATS), the latter for which Nabil Monassar works, published a mass inventory of the site, which also addressed conservation and rehabilitation concerns.16 However, Cunliffe states, “Yemen does not have a complete digitised database of sites; instead it is currently incomplete and paper-based.”17 Cunliffe further recounted that EAMENA were working with said SHIs on completing this database, however the basic components were simply not there with which to work.18 The possibility of GOPHCY or GOAM moving this inventory forward has likely decreased given the newly complex government structure brought about by the

11

Iamandi (2020), personal communication. Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 13 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 14 Ravagnan et al. (2017), p. 145. 15 Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 16 UNESCO (2008). 17 Cunliffe (2021), personal communication. 18 Cunliffe (2021), personal communication. 12

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conflict. Interviewee F raises the issue of Yemen being a fractured State, which has resulted in two GOAMs. Interviewee F states, The recognised government and [MoC] in Aden shifted the head administrative office to Aden, changing the designated chairman of GOAM from Mohanad Al-Sayani to another government official. As Al-Sayani was based in Sana’a, and the internationally recognised [MoC] resides in Aden, Al-Sayani began to assume a partner or affiliate role.19

Until his passing on 10 August 2020, it appeared that Al-Sayani was the official representative for GOAM, as he carried on working tirelessly in this capacity. The shifting territorial control, and consequent changes in heritage authority leadership, has led to greater fractionalisation among GOAM. This has inevitably added to the complexity for an IGO, such as UNESCO, in facilitating meaningful engagement with the SHI. The current situation within Yemen relating to government is at the core of the problem. Monassar asserts, the problem is that we have two governments now; we have a government here in Sana’a, and we have another in Riyadh in the North. A key challenge is the political system that has divided Yemen into three parts; one in the North, one in the South and another in the East.20

The political division across Yemen has pushed the funding of SHIs down the priority list. What complicates this situation further is the position of the Central Bank; Monassar states, “the Central Bank is majorly ineffective because it was transferred to Aden, where the situation is worse and more complicated. It will be difficult for people and institutions who are situated in the North and East to deal with the Central Bank in Aden. In Sana’a, for example, the Central Bank is blocked.”21 This breakdown and lack of functional infrastructure has evidently been a major contributing factor in the loss of funding for GOPHCY and GOAM. On top of this, during the conflict, transferring money to Yemeni institutions from outside the country is a lengthy process.22 All this means that both GOAM and GOPHCY are unable to function at full capacity and act with immediacy to ensure the safeguarding of cultural heritage throughout Yemen. In each report Yemen submitted to the WHCo on the SoC of its WHSs, the State Party “[r]eiterates its previous calls for the international community to provide technical and financial support, including through the UNESCO [HEF]”.23 GOPHCY states that it requires this support “for the implementation of the Emergency Action Plan for the Safeguarding of Yemen’s Cultural Heritage, adopted at the UNESCO Expert meeting in July 2015, including funding for capacity building and first-aid restoration and protection measures”.24 Finally, Yemen “calls on the [WHC]

19

Interviewee F (2020), personal communication. Monassar (2020), personal communication. 21 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 22 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 23 GOPHCY (2019a, b, c). 24 GOPHCY (2019a, b, c). 20

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and the Advisory Bodies to continue providing the State Party with technical assistance and support”.25 Al-Sayani states, “most of GOAM’s efforts go into appealing to the government to give greater prioritisation to heritage safeguarding and reconstruction.”26 He adds, “international support focuses chiefly on humanitarian aid, not on museums and heritage.”27 Al-Sayani was not suggesting that monuments be prioritised over vital, life-saving humanitarian aid, but was rather expressing that with their current absolute lack of funds, GOAM and GOPHCY are powerless to do the job with which they are tasked. There is, however, some support coming from the UNESCO Doha office. Nabil Monassar, although on unpaid leave from GOPHCY, remains well connected with his friends and colleagues, currently involved with the institution. This strong level of trust is undoubtedly invaluable for UNESCO Doha in carrying out the CfW scheme across Yemen. As previously mentioned, UNESCO is currently trying to strengthen GOPHCY and GOAM through the provision of training. Monassar expresses the hope that these institutions and their staff can sustain the work to preserve the Yemeni cultural heritage independently, following the end of the CfW project.28 Despite this hope, as previous iterated, such international heritage interventions are no substitute for consistent governmental support, both politically and financially. The amount of funds and support GOPHCY and GOAM are currently receiving from the EU will not necessarily be replaced by any of the governments in power in Yemen, once the current funding for this project ends. “The instability, fragmentation of government and lack of security brought about by the ongoing armed conflict, has resulted in the loss of local authorities and local institutions in Yemen”.29

3.1.2

Syria: State Heritage Institution Capability

With regard to Syria, the major inhibitor is political. In order to understand the DGAM situation and capabilities, its former DG, Dr Maamoun Abdulkarim, who was in the post from 2012 to 2017 was interviewed for this research. Abdulkarim recollects that, “during this period, the situation in Syria was very difficult, and in such conditions it became impossible to safeguard the Syrian cultural heritage. These conditions were the same across all areas of Syria.”30 Abdulkarim’s first reaction to the conflict, once in the post of DG, was to close all the museums, starting with the National Museum of Damascus.31 Abdulkarim states, “DGAM received from the 25

GOPHCY (2019a, b, c). Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 27 Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 28 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 29 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 30 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 31 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 26

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Government what resources were available during this difficult time, and all the resources they received went into the documentation and transfer of Syrian heritage from all museums to secure locations in Damascus.”32 A key issue contributing to the DGAM’s lack of funds during the early stages of the conflict was the perceived close connection between DGAM and the regime. Abdulkarim recounted, “during this time, I found myself isolated by international partners; many of our partners left us because they viewed us as part of the regime.”33 This evidently changed as a result of the work of the UNESCO Amman office and former UNESCO DG, Irina Bokova, particularly when Anna Paolini, then in the UNESCO Amman office, organised a four-day regional training workshop on illicit trafficking of Syrian artefacts,34 which took place from 10 to 13 February 2013 at the Marriott Hotel in Amman. For Abdulkarim, this was one of his first contacts with the international community since the start of the conflict. Prior to this, ICOMOS, in cooperation with the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), UNESCO and DGAM, ran an e-learning heritage first-aid course for Syrian cultural heritage professionals from 7 to 8 January 2013 at the Damascus National Museum.35 Abdulkarim recounted that such events presented him with a great opportunity to establish contact with all the relevant organisations, such as INTERPOL, ICOMOS, ICOM, ICCROM, etc.36 Although throughout his time as DG of DGAM, Abdulkarim worked well with UNESCO, this collaboration has unfortunately ceased. Abdulkarim states, when Bokova and I left our positions..., there came a new strategy and a new mentality. Something changed in the relationship between UNESCO and DGAM. In my time as [DG], we were supported by the international media, and when you are in the media, many countries try to find some solution to support you in your mission. When you are in isolation, no sponsor, organisation, foundation or person knows the reality of what is going on, and so international financial support falls away.37

What is more, Amr Al-Azm claims the current DG of DGAM, Mahmoud Hammoud, does not have staff with the necessary expertise: The expertise has evaporated as the vast majority of anyone who knows how to do anything in Syria is dead, in prison, in exile or has voluntarily left the country. There are barely any bones left to the institution of DGAM itself.38

Isber Sabrine seconds this point, stating that those “who worked well at DGAM have all left Syria, which has left the institution in a poor situation.”39 Al-Azm further

32

Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 34 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 35 ICOMOS (2013). 36 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 37 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 38 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 39 Sabrine (2020), personal communication. 33

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states, “those left in the Department of Antiquities do the best they can with what they have, but there is a complete lack of any form of real leadership, guidance or resources.”40 Unfortunately, despite efforts, it has not been possible to interview the current DG of DGAM therefore no comment is made as regards the current make-up of the institution or the expertise, if any, at its disposal. Nonetheless, the reliance on international funds demonstrates the lack of internal funds being received by DGAM to effectively carry out its work to safeguard Syrian cultural heritage. This claim of DGAM lacking the necessary financial support was confirmed in recent years; with the restriction of international support, DGAM experienced extreme financial difficulties, as evidenced in Syria’s State Party Report on the SoC of the Syrian World Heritage Sites, dated 1 February 2019. Throughout this report, DGAM consistently relayed its concern for the lack of financial support. For example, when describing the threats to the Ancient City of Aleppo, DGAM expressed the “large cost of repair and rehabilitation of destroyed houses, as the repair work requires the use of traditional materials (stone, wooden roofs and mortar), which have become rare in the market and expensive if ever found”.41 They further stated that this “led to some building infringements during restoration work under the pressure of the high prices and the lack of materials and the urgent need of the residents to go back to their city and houses”. Furthermore, it recounted the “[s]low implement[ation] of the recovery plan, due to poor coordination among stakeholders, lack of awareness in the community, large financial expenses associated with the large volume of destruction and sabotage”.42 Emphasis is continually placed on the “lack of financial and human resources in Aleppo” which is identified as the “main problem in implementing the plan” for the recovery of the Ancient City.43 Also identified is a “lack of trained personnel”.44 With limited and sporadic funds available, DGAM states that when it comes to the Ancient City of Aleppo “work is done successively whenever the financial support is provided”.45 This is indicative that DGAM is not able to commit to whole projects but have to stop and start depending on when it is able to get access to international funds. The resultant stop-start approach does not allow for long-term conservation and site management planning, but instead likely assumes the form of emergency response “first-aid” projects. DGAM submitted a request to the UNESCO office in Beirut on 29 August 2018, to finance the recovery plan of the Ancient City of Aleppo.46 DGAM also requested international assistance on 22 November 2018 “to finance the first phase of the

40

Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. DGAM (2019), pp. 4–5. 42 DGAM (2019), p. 5. 43 DGAM (2019), p. 14. 44 DGAM (2019), p. 14. 45 DGAM (2019), F. 46 DGAM (2019), p. 14. 41

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master plan of the Crac Des Chevaliers”.47 Prior to these funding applications, during his time as DG, Abdulkarim stated that DGAM received funds to support some urgent restoration building works, but unfortunately due to the economic situation and the high value of the dollar, the salaries of DGAM staff, numbering around 2500 architects, archaeologists, etc., became very limited.48 This therefore created many difficulties for the workers. Abdulkarim confirms that while he worked in the position of DG, he elected to receive his salary from the university where he also worked, in order to keep the regime from having any control over him.49 Cumulatively, this information shows that there is insufficient support for DGAM, both internally and internationally, to ensure the effective safeguarding or reconstruction of Syrian cultural heritage. This therefore signifies that the institution is unlikely to possess the capacities necessary to fulfil its obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention to safeguard and preserve its cultural property per Article 5(1), be that via application for Special Protection for movable CP or refuges housing CP as per Article 8, or appropriate use of the Blue Shield Emblem as per Article 17. Despite not having to support the DG with a salary from 2012 to 2017, a lack of trained personnel, combined with a lack of appropriate budget provided consistently at government level, and reliance on sporadic and often absent international support, determines that the DGAM has been unable to function effectively throughout the conflict. In addition, Danti states, the DGAM and other in-country networks engaged in heritage monitoring and reporting have markedly reduced accessibility to heritage placed within Da’esh or Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) controlled areas.50 Aside from the lack of financial support to fulfil their obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention, Al-Azm states that, following the invasion of Iraq and the looting of the Baghdad Museum, both he, who at the time was Director of Science and Conservation Labs, and Abdulkarim, who was Director of Museums, realised Syria had no emergency disaster contingency planning. Al-Azm and Abdulkarim therefore began to draw up such a plan.51 However, Al-Azm claims that within a couple of months of developing the plan, he was invited to the local Mukhabarat and ordered to desist immediately. He further recounts, it was the regime’s view that “by planning for disaster contingency, you are essentially encouraging an invasion, and undermining both confidence in the ability of the regime to prevent such a thing from happening, and public morale, which is an offence”.52 For this reason, Al-Azm and Abdulkarim were forced to cease in the planning of preparatory measures for the protection of Syrian cultural heritage,53 contrary to State Party obligations to do so under the 1954 Hague Convention. Financial issues aside, if the Syrian Government

47

DGAM (2019), p. 17. Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 49 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 50 Danti (2015), p. 141. 51 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 52 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 53 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 48

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is prohibiting the implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention, then the DGAM will have been rendered powerless prior to the outbreak of the conflict. It was only once the conflict had begun that Abdulkarim was appointed DGAM, after which he implemented the plans he and Al-Azm developed in 2003.54 Nonetheless, had such “preparatory” measures been in place prior to the conflict, or right at the outset, they would undoubtedly have had greater impact.

3.1.3

Iraq: State Heritage Institution Capability

The SBAH – the main heritage institution under the MoC – is very much under resourced55 and Iraqi cultural heritage authorities, in general, have faced a persistent lack of funding.56 In his article entitled ‘Why Iraq’s archaeology and heritage will continue to crumble’, Kathem proffers that there is a system of undermining SBAH in Iraq’s post-2003 sectarian politics; not serving the ethno-nationalist and religious purposes of the time, it has been allocated very little resources, preventing Iraq from being able to rebuild.57 Kathem’s research brings to the foreground that post-2003, SBAH has been receiving little government support either financially or politically, leading to its redundancy and the consequent neglect of major historic archaeological sites, such as Babylon and in Nineveh, since 2003.58 Kathem states that, since 2003, the MoC, the SBAH and its provincial offices have had “some of the lowest allocated budgets in the country, leaving Iraq’s archaeology community in disrepair and [that]. . . employees are desperately searching outside the sector to augment their comparatively low incomes.”59 Zaina highlights the lack of human resource capability in relation to the protection of Iraq’s archaeological sites, asserting that SBAH’s protection and management focuses on a few large sites, while less attention is paid to others.60 Kathem asserts that the relevant civilian authorities, such as the MoC, Tourism and Antiquities and by association, the SBAH, “are afflicted by sectarian quotas [which] has created widespread intra-institutional political party competition and a lack of cohesive organisation and absence of strategy”.61 This instability, still permeating the SBAH institution today, took hold in the lead up to the 2003 conflict. It is evident that with SBAH’s current financial situation, the SHI is not in the best position to fulfil its obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention and will inevitably continue

54

Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. Kathem (2019), personal communication. 56 Zaina (2019), p. 200. 57 Kathem (2020). 58 Kathem (2020). 59 Kathem (2019), p. 171. 60 Zaina (2019), p. 198. 61 Kathem (2019), p. 173. 55

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to rely upon international heritage interventions from organisations such as UNESCO. Hanson echoes this sentiment, noting the difficulty in documenting the severity and extent of looting at archaeological sites in Iraq due to the unstable security situation as well as the limited resources of SBAH.62 Abdulrahman Emad of the Nineveh Department of Antiquities confirms Kathem’s assertions of the MoC and SBAH’s lack of funding. Emad states, “The problem is that the Iraqi [MoC] does not have money, and so there is not enough funds to go down to the SBAH and then to our department.”63 For this reason, Emad expresses that in order to carry out the necessary restoration projects in Nineveh Province, they turned to UNESCO, with whom they are currently working on the Mosul initiative, and that they are also open to working with any other organisations who want to offer funds.64 Nonetheless, Emad also iterated that around 75% of the old city of Mosul’s buildings have been destroyed, most of them historic buildings, and with each international intervention focusing on restoring three or four buildings, Nineveh Department of Antiquities will still be left with more than 10,000 buildings that require restoration.65

This corroborates the notion that such international heritage interventions are not sustainable. Instead, there needs to be investment in greater financial and expert capabilities within the relevant SHIs, in this case, SBAH, and its disparate localised departments. A starting point would be to ensure appropriate salaries for positions within the SHIs, which would attract capable and competent personnel, and give those, currently in these positions, who have the relevant expertise, greater incentive to create innovative, long-term preventative safeguarding initiatives, instead of having to fragment their time, augmenting their salaries from various part-time jobs. There are definite parallels to be drawn from the effects conflict has had on the basic infrastructure of these three countries, with each of their SHIs suffering in terms of financial and human resources. In the context of conflict, each of these institutions have almost become superfluous, reliant on sporadic international donations and heritage interventions to carry out any form of work. As is evidenced from research, as well as the semi-structured interviews carried out for this research, such international support does not allow for the long-term independent function of the SHIs, leaving them unable to fulfil their obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention. Beyond any international support, GOPHCY, GOAM, DGAM and SBAH seem unlikely to be able to commit to any development or recovery projects because there are no guarantees of future financial support, either governmental or external/ international. Paul Fox suggests that lack of State Party planning is currently the biggest gap in the implementation of heritage protection during armed conflict.66 62

Hanson (2011), p. 114. Emad (2020), personal communication. 64 Emad (2020), personal communication. 65 Emad (2020), personal communication. 66 Fox (2020), personal communication. 63

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Considering UNESCO’s discretionary role when it comes to the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols (1954, 1999), with the obligation being on the State Party to enact preparatory safeguarding measures during peacetime and to request technical support if necessary in preparation for conflict, and the financial incapacity of such SHIs, Fox’s statement encapsulates the current situation well.

3.2

The Yemeni Conflict

The Yemeni conflict began in 2015, following a decade of localised armed conflicts.67 Since then, AlJazeera Centre for Studies has termed Yemen a “Failed State”.68 On 25 March 2015, at the request of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the Saudi and UAE-led coalition intervened, commencing airstrikes, consequently signalling the start of the armed conflict,69 formally recognised as a civil war,70 meaning IHL would now be applied. The UN-recognised government of Yemen i.e. that with which UNESCO is able to communicate and engage, is led by President Hadi, and backed by the Saudi-led coalition. Until April 2020, the UN-recognised government was based in the southern city of Aden. This was until the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which constitutes Yemen’s southern separatists, who are backed by the UAE, “claimed sole control of the regional capital”.71 This was a move that “threatened to resume fighting between the two ostensible allies”,72 following which both the UN-recognised government and separatists signed a “Saudi-brokered power sharing agreement. . .after months of fighting” in the south of the country.73 Such a deal aimed “to create [a] cohesive government capable of challenging Houthi forces”.74 The remaining key party to this conflict is the Iranian-aligned Houthi forces, also known as Ansar Allah. A UN panel of experts on Yemen assert, “Iran has supplied the Houthis with donations of fuel to raise revenue for their campaign, but no direct financial or military link has been found”.75 Varoutsikos states that, the Houthis constitute “a congregation of northern tribes that initiated a regional uprising against Saleh in 2004. The Houthis demand equal treatment as well as autonomy within Yemen, which they believe is too influenced by Saudi Arabia and the US.”76 This

67

ICRC (n.d.). Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (2018). 69 Amnesty International (2020). 70 Council on Foreign Relations (2021a). 71 Al Jazeera (2020). 72 Al Jazeera (2020). 73 Wintour (2019). 74 Wintour (2019). 75 Allinson (2019). 76 Varoutsikos (2015). 68

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NSA gained vast territory in 2014, during which time it took the capital city, Sana’a, forcing President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi into exile. Triggered by this, the Saudis intervened “supported by a coalition of seven Arab countries and backed by the US, the UK and France”.77 The launch of the Saudi-led air campaign in 2015 to roll back on Houthi territorial gains led to the significant escalation of the Yemeni crisis.78 Nonetheless, the Houthi forces control Sana’a to this day. This somewhat illustrates the country’s division, with territory split between control of the UN-recognised government (backed by the Saudi-led Coalition), the STC (backed by the UAE) and the Iranian-aligned Houthi forces. It is evident that deals made and signed are frequently broken and territorial control can easily shift. Such territorial shifts inform later discussion on how UNESCO is able to engage with Yemen on heritage safeguarding and reconstruction as well as how the IGO is able to function in the country amidst such instability and turmoil.

3.2.1

Yemeni Cultural Heritage: Intentional Targeting and Collateral Damage

Yemen’s SHIs, GOPHCY and GOAM must create an inventory of Yemeni cultural property, identify sites for Special Protection and register such applications with the 1954 Hague Convention Committee and devise a peacetime heritage management register that could constitute sites “of great importance” under Article 1(a) of the 1954 Hague Convention.79 Yemen currently has no sites registered under Special Protection and possesses no peacetime heritage management register, while inventories created centre on the country’s WHSs. Yemen ratified the 1972 Convention in 1980 (UNESCO n.d.-a), and has since successfully had three cultural sites listed on the World Heritage List. These are the Historic Town of Zabid (1993), the Old City of Sana’a (1986) and the Old Walled City of Shibam (1982).80 There is also one natural site listed, namely Socotra Archipelago (2008).81 It also has a further ten sites inventoried on the Tentative List—including the Archaeological site of Marib (2002) and the Historic city of Saada (2002)—which indicates “those properties which each State Party intends to consider for nomination”.82 Following the launch of the Arab coalition’s first airstrikes in the region, Sana’a and Shibam joined Zabid on the UNESCO List of World Heritage in Danger, meaning all of Yemen’s cultural WHSs were acknowledged as being at risk, and may consequently lose their status.83 Such 77

Varoutsikos (2015). Anadolu Agency (2020). 79 Art. 1 (a) 1954 Hague Convention. 80 UNESCO (n.d.-a). 81 UNESCO (n.d.-a). 82 UNESCO (n.d.-a). 83 UNESCO (n.d.-b). 78

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properties are placed on this list in accordance with Article 11(4) of the 1972 Convention. One of the key dangers listed in this Article is “the outbreak or the threat of armed conflict”,84 which was the case with Sana’a and Shibam. Zabid was previously listed in 2000 due to poor urban planning leading to the destruction of more than 40% of traditional houses.85 The cultural WHSs in Yemen present unique challenges when it comes to their protection during armed conflict, as all three sites constitute entire towns or large sections of cities. This means that the scope of what requires safeguarding is great, while the likelihood of damage to or destruction of the sites occurring is high. The WHSs of Sana’a, Zabid and Shibam comprise many historic houses and the communities that live in them. It is the opinion of Emma Cunliffe that it “is the community in all its aspects, embodied in all of the buildings that give these sites their World Heritage status.”86 To illustrate the extent of damage to cultural sites across Yemen due to the conflict, this section acknowledges damage to all forms of cultural property, whether old or new, religious or secular, and whether or not said cultural property is under the care of GOPHCY, GOAM or UNESCO. However, beyond that, focus will centre on safeguarding and reconstruction initiatives for Yemeni World Heritage, as it is firmly within the management of GOPHCY and GOAM, and the concern of UNESCO. The following demonstrates the type of destruction that has befallen the cultural heritage in Yemen, and subsequently indicates the role cultural heritage has played throughout this conflict. Throughout the conflict in Yemen, there has been both intentional targeting and collateral damage, as well as damage caused as a result of neglect. Researcher in archaeology at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, Lamya Khalidi states that “the coalition, its Yemeni opponents, and jihadi terrorist groups including [Da’esh]” are all responsible for “the systematic degradation of the country’s millennia-old cultural heritage”. She further states that “much of this damage, notably that from Saudi air strikes and from demolitions carried out by the IS, appears to be intentional”.87 Under all three reports submitted by Yemen on the SoC of each of its WHSs, the State Party reported “continuing concern” at the damage caused to the sites as a result of the ongoing armed conflict. The reports further stated that each of the sites continue to be either threatened by or vulnerable to “the current security situation, ongoing social change and continuing lack of organisational support and resources for both heritage management and physical conservation”.88 Focus will first centre on intentional targeting of cultural heritage in Yemen. Former World Heritage Consultant to the UNESCO WHC (Paris), Cristina Iamandi states that, “heritage was not specifically targeted [by warring parties] in Yemen, like it has been during the Syrian conflict.”89 Although Syria may have experienced a

84

Art. 11 (4) 1972 Convention. Varoutsikos (2015). 86 Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. 87 Lamya Khalidi (2017), p. 735. 88 GOPHCY (2019a). 89 Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 85

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higher rate of intentional targeting of cultural heritage, such forms of destruction are evidenced in the Yemeni conflict. An unpublished research inquiry, carried out by Emma Cunliffe, into the extremist destruction of cultural heritage occurring in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen details such intentional attacks. Cunliffe’s study reveals that, in Yemen, over the years of 2015 and 2016, at least fourteen extremist attacks on cultural heritage took place. Four of these fourteen intentionally targeted attacks were carried out by Ansar al Sharia (Al Qaeda), five were carried out by Da’esh, one was carried out by Salafists, and the group(s) responsible for the additional four attacks remain unknown. Table 3.1 details the fourteen target sites, when each site was targeted, the group responsible and the method of destruction employed. It should be noted that Cunliffe’s research inquiry details that the ‘Explosives’ method includes improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombs, mortars, suicide bombs and other incendiary attacks, and the ‘Vandalism’ method may involve desecration, destruction of frescoes, graffiti, burning of bibles, minor attacks, attacks with jackhammers and sledgehammers to the building or its contents that are not covered by other damage. It is important to caveat the difficulty of verifying heritage damage reports.90 For example, on 3 September 2016, the UNESCO DG condemned the destruction of the ninth century mosque of Bani Matar in Yemen, which they state is confirmed by several reports from GOPHCY and GOAM describing the mosque’s destruction by an airstrike on Thursday 25 August 2016.91 However, through analysis of satellite imagery, EAMENA shed light on the greater complexity to this narrative, highlighting inconsistencies in the timeline of proposed destruction; the building which is said to have suffered the destruction; and the fact that the building in question was, in fact, not used for religious purposes.92 Therefore, no account of damage to heritage structures in situations of armed conflict is confirmed until on-the-ground verification has taken place. As is evidenced by Table 3.1, the methods of destruction employed by the various militias and terrorist organisations demonstrate that each incident was a highly deliberate and calculated attack. It must be noted that this only represents data collected over 2015 and 2016 via Twitter accounts acknowledging the occurrence of extremist attacks, and is therefore only a sample of attacks, which may have occurred throughout the ongoing conflict. The late Mohanad Al-Sayani, Chairman of GOAM corroborates the occurrence of intentional targeting of cultural sites. In an article by Mohammed Yahya Gahlan, Al-Sayani is quoted to have said, “35 religious sites and shrines were destroyed and vandalized by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and others, who believe such shrines and monuments are forbidden [by God].”93

90

EAMENA (n.d.). UNESCO (2016a). 92 EAMENA (n.d.). 93 Yahya Gahlan (2019). 91

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Table 3.1 Intentional destruction of cultural sites in Yemen. Source: Dr Emma Cunliffe Site name Tomb of Sufi Saint Sufayan Bin Abdullah Tomb of Saint Sufyan Bin Abdullah Al-Hashoosh Mosque

Location Al Houta

Al-Badr Mosque

Sanaa

Sufi Shrine

Hadramout

The Catholic Church of St Joseph (first attack) The Catholic Church of St Joseph (second attack) Balili Mosque

Aden

Tomb of Sheikh Ahmed bin al-Faqih Muzahim Bagabr Shrine (Unidentified)

Mukalla Hadramout

Shrine (Unidentified)

Hadramout

Shrines/Tombs (Unidentified)

Hadramout

Mosque of bin Ismail

Shihr

Mosque of Sheikh Abdulhadi al-Sudi

Ta’izz

Al Hota Town Sana’a

Aden Saada

Date of event 01-022015 11-022015 20-032015 20-032015 30-062015 15-092015 16-092015 24-092015 29-092015 30-102015 29-112015 04-012016 15-022016 29-072016

How it was damaged Bulldozing

Explosives

Group responsible Ansar Al Sharia (Al Qaeda) Ansar Al Sharia (Al Qaeda) D’aesh

Explosives

Da’esh

Unknown

Unknown

Vandalism

Unknown

Looting; vandalism; fire Explosives

Unknown

Vandalism

Da’esh

Vandalism Unknown

Ansar Al Sharia (Al Qaeda) Da’esh

Bulldozing; vandalism Vandalism

Ansar Al Sharia (Al Qaeda) Unknown

Explosives

Salafist

Explosives

Da’esh

Moreover, roughly 16 months later, in June 2020, when interviewed for the purposes of this study, Al-Sayani, stated that 40 cultural sites had been damaged through terrorism.94 If we are to take Al-Sayani’s statement as true, then a further 26 targeted attacks on religious sites took place by terrorist groups over the period of 2017 to 2020. Although such acts may not be central to the Yemeni conflict, they have certainly become a key contributor to the ongoing unrest. Interviewee C counters this by stating that in Yemen, “most of the damages are related to a lack of maintenance, neglect, depleting capacities and to collateral damage. There were no focused bombardments on cultural heritage.”95 There is evidently dissonance between this statement that there has been a complete absence of targeted attacks on cultural heritage, and the data collated by Cunliffe, alongside observations of Al-Sayani, who

94 95

Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. Interviewee C (2019), personal communication.

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was continually present in Yemen throughout the conflict. However, it is acknowledged that both statements can be true; given that Sana’a alone has around 12,000 sites, it is true that a small proportion of such sites suffered damage or destruction. Moreover, neither UNESCO nor GOAM are responsible for the protection of all churches and mosques, many of which may be modern, thus not inventoried on any list of cultural property. A recent, well-publicised example of an extremist group targeting a cultural and religious site during the conflict is the case of the historical Mosque and Mausoleum of Ahmed Al-Faz in the Al Fazah area, Al Hudaydah governorate. On 24 June 2018, the mosque and mausoleum were partially destroyed by an armed extremist group, after which on 22 October 2018, the same group destroyed the mosque in its entirety using explosives.96 The panel of experts who addressed the President of the UNSC on this matter “received confirmation that the historic Ahmed Al-Faz Mosque was used for religious purposes” and that “its destruction constitutes a violation of the applicable rules of IHL”.97 This incident was again reported on in Yemen’s 2019 State Party Report on the SoC of The Historic Town of Zabid. The report states, “The forces loyal to the coalition controlled. . . Al-Faza area west of Zabid and an extremist group was involved in the bombing of . . .Al-Faz Mosque and Mausoleum, which is one of the most prominent historical landmarks in the area”.98 On 30 October 2018, UNESCO condemned the intentional destruction of the Ahmed Al-Faz Mosque and Mausoleum.99 In addition to intentional targeting of cultural and religious sites, there have also been reports of looting. Mina Aldroubi states that the “[Houthi] rebels were. . .condemned for pillaging a library in Zabid. The Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (IESCO) slammed the Houthis for ransacking the library and taking historic artefacts, scientific books and manuscripts.”100 The same article also quoted Yemen’s Deputy Cultural Minister, Abdullah Bukkada, who stated, From the start of the war until now Houthi rebels have attempted to destroy all of Yemen’s history. The truth is Yemen is full of historical sites and the damages that are caused have been through looting or direct destruction.101

Although intentional targeting has evidently been prevalent in this conflict, it should be noted that the Deputy Cultural Minister has not blamed Da’esh or Al Qaeda for their role in the intentional destruction of cultural and religious sites, referenced above. Nor has he acknowledged the impact that collateral damage from Coalition military operations has had on the cultural heritage of Yemen. Consideration is now given to determining the effect of such collateral damage.

96

UNSC (2019). UNSC (2019). 98 GOPHCY (2019a). 99 UNESCO (2018). 100 Aldroubi (2019). 101 Aldroubi (2019). 97

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Khalidi states that, “Saudi Arabia has conducted a largescale campaign of air attacks on its neighbor with the stated purpose of driving back the Houthi rebels who have taken control of the capital Sana[‘a] and large parts of the country.”102 Iamandi confirms the resulting occurrence of collateral damage to WHSs. She states, The northern part of Sana’a was targeted, where the Ministry of Defence was located, next to a very important Ottoman Mosque. That whole area was militarised at the beginning of the conflict. A government official building relating to defence and the military in the area in front of Bab AL-Yemen, in the east of Sana’a, was also affected.103

Iamandi implies that cultural heritage is chiefly not the motivation for such destruction, but that it may be caught up in the bombing that takes place, thereby becoming collateral damage. This account indicates that, as neither cultural heritage nor civilians were directly targeted, the principle of distinction under IHL was accounted for, while necessity (as a defence) was employed in the targeting of northern Sana’a given it was militarised from the outset of the conflict. Moreover, based on Iamandi’s account, the principle of proportionality was applied, as the damage caused to civilian objects was not excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. When asked about the damage incurred to cultural heritage during the armed conflict in Yemen, a leading Yemeni architect recounted that the majority of the damage occurred in Sana’a and Aden. He states that such damage caused to the buildings are a direct result of missiles, shots fired, etc., while for Zabid, the primary issue has been illegal building and illegal modifications to existing buildings.104 From this account, it appears that around 50% of the damage can be categorised as collateral damage, proffering that cultural heritage, although not the only target, is a central element of this conflict. Interviewee C states, “from the damage assessment report produced by UNESCO Doha, we can see that there are damages to the famous historic centre in The Old City of Sana’a. This collateral damage extends to the houses in the neighbouring areas.”105 Nabil Monassar, former Vice Chairman of GOPHCY and current Project Consultant for UNESCO’s CfW scheme in Yemen, further elaborates: the severe damage was concentrated in The Old City of Sana’a, because it was directly targeted by airstrikes, with more than 2000 historical buildings being damaged to varying degrees. There have also been huge explosions surrounding The Old City of Sana’a, which have affected the vulnerable buildings inside the city. Furthermore, due to its proximity to the Red Sea, the buffer zone of Zabid has been exposed to airstrikes, causing some damages, while other historical sites such as Ta’izz Citadel and the Marib Museum have been directly targeted by airstrikes, leading to the loss of many objects. Moreover, the small historic village of Kaukaban, north-west of Sana’a has been partially destroyed by airstrikes.106

102

Khalidi (2015), p. 2. Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 104 Interviewee D (2020), personal communication. 105 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 106 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 103

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Once again, as many areas had been taken into military use, airstrikes targeting such areas would be in line with the principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction. Moreover, as per Article 4(2) of the 1954 Hague Convention, imperative military necessity allows for the waiving of Article 4(1) regarding respect for and protection of cultural property within territories of HCPs. As Yemen presents a unique case where large areas, encompassing entire towns and parts of cities, are listed as WHSs, and which are also the settings for the ongoing conflict, military necessity will often apply, allowing for the, albeit proportional, targeting of civilian objects, specifically cultural sites. At the sixth session of the Subsidiary Committee of the Meeting of the States Parties to the 1970 Convention held on 28–29 May 2018, Mohanad Al-Sayani of GOAM acknowledged that the “archaeological wealth of the ancient Yemeni civilization has been subjected to destruction and vandalism by the aggression of the Arab coalition forces”.107 Benjamin Passey records that the official list of attacks provided to him by Al-Sayani, shows Saudi airstrikes had damaged or destroyed 59 cultural sites since joining the Yemen conflict in 2015.108 Al-Sayani is later quoted in a February 2019 article for Al-Monitor, stating that GOAM had so far identified 66 sites that were hit by airstrikes.109 He also later confirmed in an interview for the purposes of this study that “airstrikes have had a huge impact on the heritage, with an estimated 66 sites fully destroyed by direct or indirect airstrikes”.110 As previously discussed, the 1954 Hague Convention includes a military necessity clause, which may have justified such airstrikes that resulted in the damage or destruction of sites. There is currently however no evidence to corroborate the intended targets of such airstrikes. Based on conflicting narratives as described above, there appears to be a distinct lack of clarity regarding the heritage sites destroyed in the Yemeni conflict. An article by Mina Aldroubi for The National, an online publication based in the UAE, noted, “UNESCO has expressed grave concern over the destruction of cultural sites in Yemen”.111 Yet the UN “agency told The National that it does not currently have enough independently verified information to take stock of the loss of Yemen’s heritage since the start of the conflict”.112 There is only a small number of official acknowledgments and condemnations of any destruction of cultural heritage during the Yemeni conflict by UNESCO. They include airstrikes on the ancient city of Marib,113 the destruction of historic buildings in the Old City of Sana’a, as a result of

107

Al-Sayani (2018). Passey (2018), p. 8. 109 Yahya Gahlan (2019). 110 Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 111 Aldroubi (2019). 112 Aldroubi (2019). 113 UNESCO (2015a). 108

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a bombing raid,114 the aforementioned Bani Matar,115 and Ahmed Al-Faz Mosque and Mausoleum in Al Hudaydah.116 However, Lamya Khalidi suggests that there is a lack of acknowledgement by the UN system of the role the Saudi coalition is playing in the intentional destruction of Yemeni cultural heritage,117 as well as a lack of acknowledgement by UNESCO of sites that have been destroyed in the course of the conflict.118 Nonetheless, neither the 1954 Hague Convention nor the 1972 Convention stipulates that it is UNESCO’s responsibility to provide public reports on damage to cultural heritage sites and the actors involved. The obligation of documenting damage to cultural heritage, specifically WHSs, lies with the competent authority, which is required to submit an annual report on each site to the General Conference of UNESCO, as per Article 29(1) of the 1972 Convention. Khalidi,119 Varoutsikos120 and Passey121 support Monassar and Al-Sayani’s accounts of direct targeting of Yemeni cultural heritage by the Saudi-led coalition. Khalidi states, “Less reported is that these bombardments show a pattern of targeting cultural heritage sites in a country that has made extraordinary contributions to world civilization.”122 Khalidi states that the targeting of a civilian district of the historic city of Sana’a, a WHS, on 12 June 2015 by Saudi Arabia was inexcusable. Moreover, their bombardment of the Marib Dam on 31 May 2015, which left it gravely damaged, was completely illegitimate as it was not a military target and presented no strategic value, being in an uninhabited area at the edge of the Ramlat al-Sabatayn desert.123 Khalidi is of the opinion that such destruction should be categorised as “targeted and systematic destruction” and draws comparisons between the Saudi attacks on Yemeni cultural heritage and that of [Da’esh’s] “obscurantist ideology” by which they justified the destruction of cultural heritage sites.124 Published on 27 January 2017, a UN report stated that eight out of ten investigations, carried out by a panel of experts on Yemen, found “no evidence that the air strikes had targeted legitimate military objectives”.125 Moreover, all ten investigations revealed it to be almost certain that “the coalition did not meet international humanitarian law requirements of proportionality and precautions in attack”, with some attacks amounting to war crimes.126 The panel also found that “violations associated with 114

UNESCO (2015b). UNESCO (2016a). 116 UNESCO (2018). 117 Khalidi (2017), p. 737. 118 Khalidi (2017), p. 736. 119 Khalidi (2015, 2017). 120 Varoutsikos (2015). 121 Passey (2018). 122 Khalidi (2015), p. 2. 123 Khalidi (2015), p. 3. 124 Khalidi (2015), pp. 3–4. 125 UNSC (2017), p. 49. 126 UNSC (2017), p. 49. 115

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the conduct of the air campaign are sufficiently widespread to reflect either an ineffective targeting process or a broader policy of attrition against civilian infrastructure”.127 Varoutsikos seconds Khalidi’s words, expressing that Saudi airstrikes damaged “irreplaceable parts of the region’s cultural heritage”, while some airstrikes “do not seem to have [had] any direct strategic imperatives, such as those on Dhamar museum, the Marib [D]am and the civilian areas of the old Sana’a.”128 Khalidi recounted the tally of destroyed or partially destroyed cultural heritage sites from the start of the conflict through to 2017: Since March 2015, counts of damaged or destroyed archaeological sites (ten), museums (eight), mosques (ten) and churches (two), tombs (over seventeen), monuments and old cities, and UNESCO [WHSs] (six) exceed seventy-eight according to the official Yemeni list. Fifty-nine of these have been damaged or destroyed by Saudi coalition bombs (seventeen in the range of 70 to 100 percent destroyed) despite the coalition having been handed by UNESCO no fly lists129 of cultural heritage to avoid. Two sites have been damaged by opposition forces and the remaining seventeen were damaged by explosives detonated by al-Qa’ida and the IS (thirteen of these are in the range of 70 to 100 percent destroyed and one of them includes six tombs). Three of these damaged sites are UNESCO [WHSs] and include the historic cities of Sanaa, Zabid, and Shibam, while three others—Thula, Marib, and Saada—are on the tentative list of UNESCO [WHSs].130

The organisation, Mwatana for Human Rights, has made great efforts to document the collateral damage caused by airstrikes in Yemen. Their 2019 report titled, “Day of Judgement: The Role of the US and Europe in Civilian Death, Destruction, and Trauma in Yemen”, records a series of airstrikes and their impact. Mwatana recorded 16 airstrikes on civilian gatherings and structures, three airstrikes on educational/ health facilities and one attack on civilian businesses by the Saudi/UAE Coalition with weapons showing US identification. They also recorded one airstrike on educational/health facilities and four airstrikes on civilian businesses by the Saudi/ UAE Coalition with weapons showing UK identification. They further recorded one airstrike on educational/health facilities and one airstrike on the government cultural centre by the Saudi/UAE Coalition with unknown weapons identified. Mwatana asserts that in,

127

UNSC (2017), p. 50. Varoutsikos (2015). 129 N.B. This is not an official term. I interpret this to mean either “restricted target list” or “no-strike lists”. A restricted target list constitutes a list of valid targets that have specific restrictions placed on the actions authorised against it due to operational considerations (DOD 2021, 186). A no-strike list constitutes a “list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement” (DOD 2021, 155). 130 Khalidi (2017), p. 736. 128

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most of the twenty-seven incidents, the objects attacked neither appeared to have been used for military purposes nor were [they] in the vicinity of legitimate military targets. The attacks on these objects likely violated the principle of distinction. In the few instances in which Ansar Allah (Houthi) fighters were near or at the site of the attack, the resulting foreseeable harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure appears to have been out of proportion to any apparent military advantage.131

Mwatana for Human Rights also provides a detailed report, recording 28 ancient historic monuments, cities listed on the World Heritage List, monuments, religious monuments and museums, which have been destroyed by the various parties to the conflict.132 This 2018 report, titled “The Degradation of History: Violations Committed by the Warring Parties against Yemen’s Cultural Property”, also recommends that all parties to the conflict, including NSA groups such as Ansar al-Sharia and al-Qaeda, cease targeting cultural property.133 Middle East Correspondent for The Independent, Bel Trew reported that these “27 strikes were the only incident which the researchers were able to collate sufficient evidence for” as “access to Yemen is heavily restricted”; however “Mwatana found that in 2018 alone there were 128 apparently unlawful airstrikes”.134 Furthermore, the UN recorded 987 incidents of air strikes, which had targeted residential buildings; 31 on civilian factories, 27 on educational institutions and 16 on medical units in 2016.135 It is evident that such attacks on cultural heritage should constitute war crimes. Presenting such an argument is not within the scope of this research, however for an analysis of how Saudi Arabia’s acts against Yemeni cultural heritage should be categorised thus, please refer to Benjamin Passey’s 2018 article entitled “The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in the Yemen Conflict: Legal Implications and State Responsibility”. Cultural heritage has evidently played a key role in the Yemeni conflict, yet this is not necessarily reflected in UNESCO’s reporting on the destruction inflicted by the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthi rebels, and Da’esh, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Nonetheless, it remains that there is a limited amount of information available on the intentional targeting of cultural heritage sites in Yemen, as there has not been sufficient on-the-ground corroboration of reported damage. No conclusive statements can therefore be made with regard to how much damage, for example, Saudi airstrikes have caused, and whether or not such damage was proportionate to any military advantage gained.

131

Mwatana for Human Rights (2019), p. 105. Mwatana for Human Rights (2018), pp. 32–104. 133 Mwatana for Human Rights (2018), pp. 22–23. 134 Trew (2019). 135 UNSC (2017), p. 50. 132

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The Syrian Conflict

In March of 2011, “peaceful protests erupted in Syria. . .after 15 boys were detained and tortured for writing graffiti in support of the Arab Spring. One of the boys, a 13-year-old, was killed after having been brutally tortured”.136 In response to the protests, President Bashar al-Assad had hundreds of demonstrators killed and imprisoned many more.137 In May 2012, Human Rights Watch declared the fighting in areas of Syria, particularly Idlib, had “reached the level of an armed conflict under international law”, signifying that IHL would now apply.138 On 12 June 2012, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Herve Ladsous, officially declared Syria to be in a state of civil war.139 From peaceful protests against the Assad regime, the conflict “escalated into a full-scale civil war between the Syrian government – backed by Russia and Iran [and] anti-government rebel groups – backed by the US, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and others in the region”.140 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) highlights three campaigns that drive the conflict. They are, “coalition efforts to defeat [Da’esh], violence between the Syrian government and opposition forces, and military operations against Syrian Kurds by Turkish Forces”.141 To this, it is possible to add the triggering of violence from Shia NSAs across large parts of Syria (as well as Iraq) by Da’esh’s targeting of holy sites, such as the Seyyida Zaynab shrine in Damascus.142 Such shrines are not managed by DGAM, but by Awqaf, i.e. not UNESCO’s designated counterpart. They are neither protected under the 1954 Hague Convention, as they are not considered ‘antiquities’ under Syria’s 1966 Law, nor are they classed as World Heritage. For this reason, many of these holy sites are open to direct targeting. The Global Coalition against Da’esh is addressed later in this chapter when considering the Iraq conflict (2014–2017), particularly with respect to the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). Those key parties in opposition to the Syrian Armed Forces, controlled by President Assad, are the Free Syrian Army (FSA), “a loose conglomeration of armed brigades formed in 2011 by defectors from the Syrian Army and civilians”,143 and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is “dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)”.144 As part of the YPG’s strategic tactics, they work alongside the FSA,145 as SDF represents an alliance of both Kurdish and Arab Forces fighting against IS militants in northern 136

Al Jazeera (2018). Al Jazeera (2018). 138 Human Rights Watch (2012). 139 Charbonneau (2012). 140 Council on Foreign Relations (2021b). 141 Council on Foreign Relations (2021b). 142 Isakhan (2020), p. 739. 143 Al Jazeera (2018). 144 Al Jazeera (2018). 145 Stephens and Stein (2015). 137

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Syria,146 and both rebel groups have a common enemy in the Assad regime. However, there is often tensions between the opposition groups partially due to the YPG’s “openly Kurdish identity [which] undermines its appeal in Arab areas”.147 A defining characteristic of the Syrian conflict has been high levels of shifting alliances, with groups often disbanding. AlJazeera state, the US has supported YPG due to their successful offensive being “narrowly focused on [Da’esh], rather than focusing first on regime forces”, and “public sympathy in the West has tended to view the Kurds as the most forwardthinking rebel group in the battle against extremism.”148 The Trump administration has provided air support and weapons to the SDF and deployed several hundred US special forces alongside them to fight against IS militants in northern Syria. Although the US is clearly in opposition to the Assad regime, with the Trump administration issuing “weapons and military training to moderate rebel factions fighting against government forces loyal to President Bashar [al-]Assad”,149 in 2018, President Donald Trump tweeted, “We have defeated [Da’esh] in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency”.150 Turkey, from the outset, has been a key backer of the Syrian opposition, fighting alongside non-Kurdish factions, including the FSA.151 On 13 October 2019, US “Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper said. . .that President Trump ordered a withdrawal of American forces from northern Syria”. Esper elaborated, “American troops, mostly Special Operations forces, would leave the northeastern part of the country in the face of Turkey’s incursion into the section of Syria controlled by Kurdish forces”.152 In a statement released the following day on Monday 14 October 2019, Esper called Turkey’s incursion “unacceptable”, stating it “undermined the successful multinational ‘Defeat ISIS’ mission in Syria, and resulted in the release of many dangerous [Da’esh] detainees”. Esper further purported that this move caused the risk to US forces in northeast Syria to reach an unacceptable level.153 Russia, on the other hand, having long since backed the Assad regime, “first intervened in Syria in September 2015” with airstrikes they claim to have been against Da’esh, but which the US counter-claims were “primarily directed against non-[Da’esh] rebel forces fighting the Assad government”.154 With Assad being Russia’s closest ally in the Middle East, Putin’s primary aim is to maintain the power of the Syrian regime, thereby securing Russia’s military influence across the region. Tehran has supported the Assad regime since 2012, contributing via military aid, via

146

Pearson and Sanders (2019). Stephens and Stein (2015). 148 Al Jazeera (2015). 149 Pearson and Sanders (2019). 150 Trump (2018). 151 Pearson and Sanders (2019). 152 Barnes and Schmitt (2019). 153 U.S. Department of Defense (2019). 154 Pearson and Sanders (2019). 147

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the provision of weapons, training and the deployment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Shiite militias in the region, and intelligence sharing.155 Moreover, Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim political party and military group based in Lebanon, functioning as a proxy of Iran—its largest benefactor—is another key supporter of the Assad regime. In 2013, Hezbollah publically confirmed its involvement in the Syrian Civil War, supporting the Syrian Government against largely Sunni rebel groups, contributing more than seven thousand Hezbollah militants to the pro-Assad alliance. In 2019, “Hezbollah withdrew many of its fighters from Syria, attributing the decision to the Assad regime’s military success”.156 Although late 2020 and early 2021 saw the re-emergence of conflict in southern Syria, Syrian Government and pro-government forces (Assad, Russia and Iran) have control of the majority of the area from Latakia Governorate to Maarrat al-Nu’man to Aleppo Governorate, down to Homs, Damascus and Bosra. Meanwhile, the Kurds (YPG, the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Peshmerga, etc.) have control of northeast Syria (north of the Euphrates), and Ahrar Al Sham, Jaish al Islam, etc. have control of northwest Syria.157

3.3.1

Syrian Cultural Heritage: Intentional Targeting and Collateral Damage

Ratifying the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol on 6 March 1958 and the 1972 Convention in 1975,158 the Syria Arab Republic has since had six cultural sites listed on the World Heritage List. These are: Ancient City of Aleppo (1986), Ancient City of Bosra (1980), Ancient City of Damascus (1979), Ancient Villages of Northern Syria (2011), Crac des Chevaliers and Qal’at Salah El-Din (2006) and Site of Palmyra (1980). Syria has an additional 11 sites (12 nominations) inventoried on the Tentative List, including Ebla (Tell Mardikh) (1999), Raqqa-Ràfiqa: la cité abbasside (1999) and Mari & Europos-Dura sites of Euphrates Valley (2011).159 Of the 12 Tentative nominations, 11 were listed in 1999, with the other listed in 2011.160 In 2013, the WHCo resolved to place all of Syria’s WHSs on the List of World Heritage in Danger, indicating the centrality of Syrian cultural heritage to the ongoing conflict.161 The WHC records the factors affecting the property of the Ancient City of Aleppo in 2019 as lack of land conservation, lack of management

155

Pearson and Sanders (2019). Council on Foreign Relations (2020). 157 Live Map (2021). 158 UNESCO (n.d.-c). 159 UNESCO (n.d.-d). 160 UNESCO (n.d.-d). 161 UNESCO (2013a). 156

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activities, lack of management systems/plan and war.162 Since 2013, the primary impact has been “[d]estruction and damage due to the armed conflict.163 For the Ancient City of Bosra, the key factors affecting the property in 2019 are housing, illegal activities and war.164 Since March 2011, factors affecting the property have majorly been “[d]amage of historic buildings due to the conflict” and “[i]llegal constructions following the start of the conflict”.165 Such issues affecting WHSs, as illegal construction, were ongoing during peacetime, but conflict can exacerbate the problem. Moreover, war is evidenced as the common factor affecting the other Syrian WHSs in 2019, with other factors similar to those listed above.166 It is important to note that it is not only UNESCO WHSs that are affected by direct or indirect targeting, although due to their acquired status, UNESCO’s response to heritage destruction will inevitably place greater focus on such sites across Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Once Syria entered into conflict, cultural heritage became one of the casualties as heritage sites became part of the battlefield and movable heritage was looted.167 Once Da’esh intentionally attacked the ancient Temple of Baalshamin, Temple of Bel and the Arch of Triumph in Palmyra in 2015, it became clear to the broader international community, that culture was a key element of the Syrian conflict. The following provides an account of the different forms of destruction caused to Syrian cultural heritage throughout the course of the conflict. The destruction of cultural heritage took hold in Syria around March 2012. During the following eight months, Syrian museums and cultural sites suffered greatly as 12 museums throughout the country were damaged and/or looted. Cultural sites, such as Old Homs. . ., Old Aleppo. . ., Palmyra, Bosra, a port of Old Damascus, and the Dead Cities of northern Syria. . ., were turned into battlefields and military bases.168

Meskell proffers that the destruction of cultural heritage in Syria assumes various forms, namely “bombing in urban centres, attacks on religious structures, the use of archaeological sites as strategic vantage points and the looting of sites and museums for objects to be sold on the international market”.169 In order to break down the different forms of destruction taking place during the initial years of the Syrian conflict, attention is paid to Michael Danti’s 2015 article, “Ground-Based Observations of Cultural Heritage Incidents in Syria and Iraq”. The American Schools of Oriental Research Cultural Heritage Initiatives (ASOR CHI) is an international collaboration of scholars working to implement CPP via documenting damage, promoting global awareness and planning emergency and 162

UNESCO (2019a). UNESCO (2019a). 164 UNESCO (2019b). 165 UNESCO (2019b). 166 UNESCO (2019c, d, e, f). 167 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 168 Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 346. 169 Meskell (2015), p. 7. 163

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post-war responses170 with a focus on Syria, northern Iraq, and, during 2017 and 2018, Libya. Over ASOR CHI’s initial nine months of reporting between July 2014 and May 2015, a total of 646 damage incidents for Syria were documented.171 This period of reporting demonstrated the leading cause of heritage damage across Syria by frequency to be as follows: looting (25%), illegal digging (17%), combat damage (13%), illegal construction (11%), deliberate destruction (9%) and tunnel bombs (3%).172 Danti, notes that illegal digging includes military, agricultural, and other modifications of archaeological sites, barrel bombs are placed under the umbrella of combat damage, although could also be a form of deliberate destruction, and that tunnel bombs, although classed as their own form of damage, could also come under the umbrella of deliberate destruction.173 This indicates that the impact of the military on cultural heritage could be greater than records currently show and the percentage of damage attributed to deliberate destruction could be higher. Danti states, “[c]ombat damage and looting are widespread in Syria, and all major combatants (state, quasi-state, and non-state) are responsible for acts of theft and destruction to varying degrees.”174 However, during this reporting period, combat damage was said to be heaviest in Aleppo, Homs and Daraa, all of which then experienced heavy conflict, with archaeological sites being used as military bases, while “in the north of Aleppo Governorate several military forces. . .allegedly planted mines on archaeological sites”.175 Moreover, the opposition’s military use of heritage sites, consequent precision airstrikes by the Syrian Government, “barrel bombings, and artillery bombardments on densely settled historic neighborhoods, such as those of Aleppo and Homs” and the “repeated use of tunnel bombs by extremist groups, particularly Islamic Front fighters and their affiliates in Aleppo’s old city” have caused the destruction of built heritage on a large scale.176 In Daraa, combat within the Ancient City of Bosra, saw the destruction of parts of the WHS.177 Moreover, while Danti’s assessment of the methods of damage and destruction inflicted upon Syria’s cultural heritage shows that air raids and bombing are not the only or necessarily the main agent employed, it remains true that a single aerial bombardment can have a greater destructive impact than, for example, looting, as it can lead to the instantaneous obliteration of sites. However, this does not mean to say that airstrikes were not calculated in terms of proportionality. In order to provide a sense of the damage inflicted on Syria in the course of the conflict, there follows a brief discussion on the damage inflicted upon the Ancient City of Aleppo. Da’esh officially took over Raqqa in January 2014, declaring it the

170

ASOR (2021). Danti (2015), p. 139. 172 These figures drew from both ASOR CHI and DGAM collected data. 173 Danti (2015), p. 140. 174 Danti (2015), p. 137. 175 Danti (2015), p. 140. 176 Danti (2015), p. 138. 177 UNESCO (2015c). 171

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capital of the Da’esh emirate and, after seizing the Taqba airbase on 24 August 2014, the group had control of the entire Raqqa province. In response to the group’s territory expansion, on 23 September 2014, the US launched its first airstrikes against Da’esh in Syria,178 triggering the commencement of destruction of the region. With regard to the US-led Coalition’s fight against Da’esh, Boer et al. state that in “Phase III (defeat), [CJTF-OIR]. . . conducted air and artillery strikes and limited ground troop assistance in support of offensive battles against [Da’esh], including in the two ‘capitals’ of [Da’esh]-occupied territory: Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq”. After Raqqa was captured, “the Coalition continued to assist partnered ground troops with airstrikes and ground operations until the terrorist group was defeated as a territorial entity”.179 Airwars and Amnesty International found that at least 1600 civilians were likely killed in Coalition strikes amidst the battle of Raqqa, and an estimated 80% of all buildings were levelled during the Coalition’s assault.180 Oakford suggests that 95% of strikes in Raqqa as well as all artillery strikes were American, with at least, 21,000 munitions hitting the city.181 In addition to the concern around the modern city of Raqqa being reduced to rubble, there is also concern from Syrian archaeologists regarding immense destruction by Da’esh in the Euphrates Valley of ancient settlements, archaeological facilities, dig houses and storerooms, where artefacts were housed.182 UNESCO and UNITAR’s 2018 report titled “Five Years of Conflict: The State of Cultural Heritage in the Ancient City of Aleppo” provides an account of the destruction incurred within the WHS via analysis of satellite imagery taken from 2013 to 2017. It should be noted that the damage documented via this report does not set out to differentiate between how the damage was inflicted; such information regarding the whole of Syria (July 2014 and May 2015) can be gleaned from Danti as discussed above. The report concludes that within the Ancient City of Aleppo, 723 land plots were destroyed, 2168 were severely damaged, 2287 moderately damaged and 624 possibly damaged. This translated into 56 historic buildings destroyed, 82 severely damaged, 270 moderately damaged, 20 possibly damaged and 8 showing no visible damage.183 Early August 2012, saw the Aleppo Citadel become implicated in combat between the FSA and the Syrian Government forces. An Independent article stated “They [Syrian Government forces] are now in a position to bring in additional forces through Hamdaniyah, which they hold, and aim to link up with other troops at Aleppo Castle and the city’s airport”.184 This suggests that forces had placed themselves within the boundary of the WHS, which would open it up to military damage. Within the Citadel parameter, UNESCO and

178

Wilson Center (2019). Boer et al. (2020), p. 12. 180 Boer et al. (2020), p. 25. 181 Oakford (2018). 182 Ebdo and Ahmed (2017); Luke and Meskell (2019), p. 8. 183 UNESCO and UNITAR (2018), p. 29. 184 Sengupta (2012). 179

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UNITAR’s report,185 shows one site to be destroyed, three severely damaged, 21 moderately damaged and six with possible damage. For Aleppo, a great amount of damage took place late September 2012, when the Syrian Government Forces and insurgents engaged in combat in the market area (souk), destroying around 1500 shops.186 UNESCO and UNITAR’s report187 show 31 marketplaces within the Ancient City of Aleppo as destroyed, 43 severely damaged, 82 moderately damaged, one with possible damage and zero with no visible damage. Further clashes in April 2013 resulted in the complete destruction of the minaret.188 Neither Syrian Government forces nor insurgents have taken responsibility for its destruction.189 UNESCO and UNITAR’s report documents 17 religious sites in the Ancient City of Aleppo as destroyed, 21 severely damaged, 121 moderately damaged, 11 with possible damage and only five showing no visible damage.190 Finally, of the two museum sites within the Ancient City, one is severely damaged, while the other is moderately damaged.191 Under the category of “other historic buildings and places”, eight are listed as destroyed, 17 severely damaged, 65 moderately damaged, eight possibly damaged and three with no visible damage.192 There is currently a scarce amount of data available on the exact damage caused to each individual site within Aleppo, and thorough damage assessments are yet to be carried out. In relation to this deliberate destruction between July 2014 and April 2015, Danti suggests there was a minimum number of 58 deliberate destructions of heritage sites in Syria carried out by belligerents, especially Da’esh, and estimates this figure to be higher.193 However, Luke and Meskell suggest that such intentional destruction of cultural heritage is not limited to Da’esh, stating that it is well documented that insurgent groups in Syria have engaged in the destruction of religious and cultural heritage, with targeted sites including archaeological monuments, Shia mosques and shrines.194 As an example of such targeting by insurgents, Dittmann and Almohamad refer to the grave of leading Shiite imam an-Nawawi, and Christian sites and arbitrary acts in two Christian monasteries in Maloula.195 In 2015, Palmyra, a UNESCO WHS, suffered extensive intentional damage. Dittmann and Almohamad state that the city of Palmyra presented a “key strategic location for [Da’esh] as it is linked with a highway to a number of important cities in both Syria

185

UNESCO and UNITAR (2018), p. 33. Guidetti and Perini (2015). 187 UNESCO and UNITAR (2018), p. 83. 188 UNESCO and UNITAR (2018), p. 59. 189 Guidetti and Perini (2015). 190 UNESCO and UNITAR (2018), p. 57. 191 UNESCO and UNITAR (2018), p. 95. 192 UNESCO and UNITAR (2018), p. 105. 193 Danti (2015), p. 140. 194 Luke and Meskell (2019), p. 2. 195 Dittmann and Almohamad (2015), p. 30. 186

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and Iraq” and has proximity to oil and gas fields.196 Da’esh certainly employed its provocation strategy when it came to Palmyra,197 with images of its destruction posted on social media by Da’esh supporters.198 This strategy has been referred to as ‘socially mediated terrorism’ by Smith et al.199 and Cunliffe and Curini.200 The group destroyed shrines, statues and temples, with the excuse that they were the manifestations of heresy and idolatry. These included Islamic Shrines near the settlement of Tadmar, the Shiite Shrine of Sheikh Mohammad ibn, the Sufi Tomb of Shagaf/Nizar Abu Behaeddine, as well as the Temple of Baalshamin and the Temple of Bel.201 Also destroyed were the Triumphal Arch, multiple Tower Tombs, the remaining museum collections,202 and reportedly a row of columns in its immediate vicinity.203 Meanwhile, Da’esh looted smaller and easily portable items, such as small statues, manuscripts, seals and coins from the site.204 Furthermore, the site had been previously looted by others between 2012 and 2014, pre-Da’esh. Intentional targeting by Da’esh is not the only damage inflicted on Palmyra. With Da’esh’s presence in the city, there would likely be military operations inflicted upon the region as well. Deutsche Welle News (DW) states, “Russia’s defense ministry confirmed that Su-25 jets hit a fortified [Da’esh] position in the historic city” on Monday 2 November 2015. DW further reported that an activist in the city stated that “the bombing hit an area close to a historic castle overlooking the Roman ruins”, while “the UK based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights also confirmed that Russian warplanes had targeted Palmyra. . .adding that several strikes hit the city’s historic citadel.”205 Such claims would place the actions of the Russian military and the consequent damage to cultural heritage under the category of intentional targeting under the justified use of military necessity in the pursuit of Da’esh.206 Although Moscow denies its participation in the targeting of ancient sites,207 Weekly ASOR CHI Report 93-94 confirms via use of DigitalGlobe satellite imagery that Russian military forces occupied the archaeological site of Palmyra, specifically the area known as the Northern Necropolis within the UNESCO WHS boundaries.208 Moreover, Danti issues claims that the Assad regime, along with Russia and Iran,

196

Dittmann and Almohamad (2015), p. 34. Dittmann and Almohamad (2015), p. 31. 198 Shaheen (2015). 199 Smith et al. (2015). 200 Cunliffe and Curini (2018), p. 1094. 201 Dittmann and Almohamad (2015), p. 34. 202 Cunliffe and Curini (2018), p. 1101. 203 Cunliffe and Curini (2018), p. 1107. 204 Dittmann and Almohamad (2015), p. 34. 205 Deutsche Welle News (2015). 206 Dittmann and Almohamad (2015), p. 34. 207 Deutsche Welle News (2015). 208 ASOR CHI (2016), p. 1. 197

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have been engaged in the looting and trafficking of movable cultural property for many years.209 Danti states there is “concrete, indisputable evidence” for this;210 however, access to this data has not been realised. Daniels touches on this issue, stating UNESCO can only work by the way it positions itself with governments, which becomes a real problem in a conflict, especially when the government is the majority perpetrator of the damage, or the Russians are the principle perpetrator of the damage.211

Daniels alludes to the Assad regime and its supporters participating in the strategic intentional destruction across Syria, placing the Parties on a par with that of Da’esh. In a report for ASOR CHI, O’Connell states, after Syrian opposition forces. . .captured Ma’arat al-Numan from regime forces in October 2012, a commander from the FSA-affiliate group Jabhat Ansar al-Islam claimed that when the museum was under regime control, Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) officers used the [Ma’ara Museum] as a [HQ] and ‘robbed most of the contents, especially those easy to carry.’212

O’Connell further recounts however that, “The Ma’ara Museum has been damaged in multiple incidents beginning in March 2014”, while the DGAM “reported that the museum had been looted and damaged by opposition forces.”213 In 2015, the Syrian Army are then reported to have dropped two barrel bombs on the museum “causing severe structural damage to the eastern wing of the complex (along with several ancient columns and mosaics), as well as the mosque and tekkiye (pilgrim’s residence) located in the central courtyard”.214 Moreover, Amr Al-Azm recalls the third and final airstrike on the Ma’ara Museum caused significant damage to the northwest corner of the building placing it in a state of partial collapse, while still housing important mosaics.215 Although in a rebel-held town, the Ma’ara Museum presented no strategic value for Syrian Government forces. This differs from the July 2013 airstrikes against Crac des Chevaliers, as the WHS was being utilised by rebel forces as a military base,216 while damage to the Umayad mosque of Aleppo was caused due to fighting between factions taking place in the courtyard of the site. Such instances can be justified under the military necessity clause of the 1954 Hague Convention, as the heritage sites were occupied by a party to the conflict, the targeting of which would provide a proportionate military advantage.

209

Danti (2020), personal communication. Danti (2020), personal communication. 211 Daniels (2020), personal communication. 212 O’Connell (n.d.). 213 O’Connell (n.d.). 214 O’Connell (n.d.). 215 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 216 Westcott (2019). 210

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The case of Raqqa has proven that the effects of military airstrikes can cause significant damage, rivalling that of intentional targeting by belligerents. Previous head of the UNESCO office in Baghdad, Louise Haxthausen confirms that in the cases of Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, UNESCO has provided all Coalitions with the coordinates of select cultural heritage sites.217 Haxthausen also confirms UNESCO ensures Coalitions are aware that any intentional damage caused to these sites would be in violation of IHL, in accordance with the 1954 Hague Convention.218 Although UNESCO likely did not share such coordinates with the Russians or Iranians, via their support of the Assad Regime, both parties likely already had access to such information. Nevertheless, intentional targeting of historical sites was likely carried out under the clause of military necessity; whether or not the damage inflicted was proportionate is another question. Examination of the WHC’s media statements regarding the destruction of cultural heritage in Syria shows that the organisation never directly condemned the actions of the Assad regime or its supporters, Russia and Iran. On three occasions, when condemning the destruction of the ancient Aleppo markets,219 as well as the continuing destruction of ancient Aleppo,220 and the general escalation of violence and damage to World Heritage in Syria, such as Crac des Chevalier,221 the WHC “reminded all parties of the[ir] conflict’s obligations under the 1954 . . .Convention. . .to which Syria is a signatory”.222 This reminder that Syria is a signatory to the Convention is the most direct accusation from the WHC to the Syrian Government. It is acknowledged that the Syrian Government forces are known to have been involved in the partial destruction of the markets, ancient Aleppo and Crac des Chevalier during combat.223 In another statement regarding the condemnation of military presence and destruction at WHSs in Syria,224 and a statement regarding destruction at the Church of Saint Simeon in northern Syria as a result of an airstrike,225 the WHC again merely reminds all parties to the conflict of their obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention. The WHC evidently do not assume the role of directly condemning the actions of a State Party; after all, it is not within the power of UNESCO to determine how a State Party interprets military necessity. When it comes to the actions of NSAs however, the WHC is far more direct. In some statements regarding the destruction of sites at Palmyra, the WHC stretches only to blame “extremists”,226 however when it came to the destruction of 217

Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 219 UNESCO (2012). 220 UNESCO (2013b). 221 UNESCO (2013c). 222 UNESCO (2012). 223 Westcott (2019). 224 UNESCO (2014). 225 UNESCO (2016b). 226 UNESCO (2015f, g, 2017). 218

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the Mar Elian monastery,227 and the destruction of Palmyra’s ancient Temple of Baalshamin,228 Da’esh were directly named as the perpetrators. The Syrian conflict has generated much blurring of lines around intentional targeting of cultural heritage and cultural heritage as collateral damage, with many parties misusing heritage sites for military purposes, thereby forcing the sites into the battlefield.

3.4

The Iraqi Conflict

Iraq has experienced two major conflicts this millennium, the Iraq War (2003–2011) and the Iraq non-international armed conflict (2014–2017), with political instability still plaguing the country in its current post-conflict phase. Stabilisation in Iraq is yet to be achieved. This research chiefly centres on UNESCO’s engagement with Iraq in relation to the most recent conflict and post-conflict period, therefore only background to the 2014–2017 non-international armed conflict, rooted in combatting Da’esh is provided. RULAC stipulates that under the condition of a non-international armed conflict, [a]ll parties to the conflicts are bound by Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions that provides for the minimum standard to be respected and requires humane treatment without adverse distinction of all persons not or no longer taking active parts in hostilities. . . [and] customary international humanitarian law. . .[while] international human rights law continues to apply.229

Human Rights Watch states that the renewal of the state of armed conflict, specifically located in Anbar Province, was triggered by government forces’ attacks on largely peaceful demonstrations on 20 December 2013.230 On 30 December, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported the death of ten people as Iraqi security forces dismantled an anti-government Sunni protest camp in the western city of Ramadi.231 The CFR states that in 2014, Da’esh “advanced into Iraq from Syria and took over parts of Anbar Province, eventually expanding control in the northern part of the country and capturing Mosul in June 2014.”232 The Iraqi Army is said to have “crumbled in the face of the militant assault”, with the militants freeing countless prisoners and taking control of military bases, as well as many public buildings.233 With this consolidation of control of Mosul and the surrounding Nineveh Province, Da’esh then looked to other targets. In response, the US formed 227

UNESCO (2015d). UNESCO (2015e). 229 RULAC (2021). 230 Human Rights Watch (2015). 231 British Broadcasting Corporation (2013). 232 Council on Foreign Relations (2021c). 233 Al-Salhy and Arango (2014). 228

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an international coalition to counter Da’esh,234 which would be operational across both Iraq and Syria. This Global Coalition to Defeat Da’esh is comprised of 78 countries and five organisations, namely the Arab League, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, INTERPOL, NATO and the EU.235 The US Department of Defense record, as of 9 August 2017, “the Coalition has conducted 13,331 strikes in Iraq, and 11, 235 strikes in Syria, for a total of 24,566. . .in support of Operation Inherent Resolve”.236 Moreover, as of 14 September 2020, “Airwars had tracked 34,676 declared US-led Coalition air and artillery strikes in both Syria and Iraq since 2014”.237 The total cost of kinetic operations in relation to Da’esh between 8 August 2014 and 30 June 2017 amounted to US$14.3 billion.238 In terms of civilian harm, it should be noted that for “the major battles of Mosul and Raqqa, credible public estimates of civilian deaths from US-led Coalition actions remain more than ten times higher than the alliance itself admits”.239 The US Department of Defense formally established the CJTF-OIR on 17 October 2014.240 OIR, in conjunction with partner forces, set out to defeat Da’esh in designated areas of Iraq and Syria and set conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability.241 The Global Coalition would also work with local partners in Iraq in the fight against Da’esh. The CFR records, Regional forces – including as many as thirty thousand Iranian troops – joined the Iraqi army, local tribes, and the Kurdish Peshmerga in operations to begin retaking territory from the group, eventually recapturing Tikrit in April 2015, Ramadi in December 2015, Fallujah in June 2016, and Mosul in July 2017.242

The Iraqi Government declared victory over Da’esh in December 2017. On 30 April 2018, the US Central Command marked the deactivation of the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command, which “oversaw troops from the U.S.-led coalition as they helped Iraqi forces roll back [Da’esh’s] self-declared caliphate”.243 Nonetheless, the CFR states, “[m]ore than five thousand U.S. service members remain in Iraq as part of a train, advise, and assist mission bolstered by NATO troops to help the Iraqi military and stabilize the country.”244 The kinetic element of the Da’esh-focused international Coalition in Iraq and Syria, previously comprised 14 states,245 however as of late 2020 now only comprises the US, the UK, France 234

Council on Foreign Relations (2021c). The Global Coalition (n.d.). 236 U.S. Department of Defense (n.d.-a). 237 Boer et al. (2020), p. 13. 238 U.S. Department of Defense (n.d.-a). 239 Boer et al. (2020), p. 14. 240 U.S. Department of Defense (n.d.-b). 241 U.S. Department of Defense (n.d.-c). 242 Council on Foreign Relations (2021c). 243 El-Ghobashy and Sonne (2018). 244 Council on Foreign Relations (2021c). 245 Boer et al. (2020), p. 12. 235

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and Belgium.246 As of early 2021, Iraq territorial control was chiefly divided between the Iraqi Government in the south and the Kurdistan Peshmerga in the north. However, Interviewee A explains, Hatra “is a place, which is still very much controlled by Da’esh and other militias, making it very difficult for UNESCO to go there.”247 Although Iraqi forces are said to have “seized the UNESCO-listed ancient site of Hatra from the Daesh extremist group” late April 2017,248 the US Central Command stated on 19 June 2020 that the “Iraq Counter Terrorism service (ICTS) continues to pursue Daesh remnants in Hatra desert”, in the Nineveh Governorate.249

3.4.1

Iraqi Cultural Heritage: Intentional Targeting and Collateral Damage

Ratifying the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol on 21 December 1967 and the 1972 Convention in 1974,250 Iraq has since successfully had five cultural sites listed on the World Heritage List. These are: Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) (2003), Babylon (2019), Erbil Citadel (2014), Hatra (1985) and Samarra Archaeological City (2007).251 It also has one mixed site listed, namely, The Ahwar of Southern Iraq: Refuge of Biodiversity and the Relict Landscape of the Mesopotamian Cities (2016).252 Moreover, Iraq has 12 sites inventoried on the Tentative List, including Nimrud (2000) and the Old City of Mosul (2018),253 which fell victim to cultural heritage destruction at the hands of Da’esh, but is now currently at the centre of UNESCO’s largest cultural reconstruction programme: Revive the Spirit of Mosul. Of Iraq’s cultural sites on the World Heritage List, three are listed under World Heritage in Danger, namely Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat), Hatra and Samarra Archaeological City.254 This again signifies that such sites are at risk of damage or destruction and may consequently lead to the loss of their World Heritage status. UNESCO records the site of Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) to be inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger due to threats of “[n]earby construction of a dam entailing partial flooding and seepage” and “[a]rmed conflict”.255 For Hatra, the established threat is “[d]estruction and damage due to the armed conflict”,256 while similarly for 246

Airwars (n.d.). Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 248 AFP (2017). 249 US Central Command (2020). 250 UNESCO (n.d.-c). 251 UNESCO (n.d.-e). 252 UNESCO (n.d.-e). 253 UNESCO (n.d.-e). 254 UNESCO (n.d.-f). 255 UNESCO (2019g). 256 UNESCO (2019h). 247

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Samarra Archaeological City, the threat is established as “[s]tate of conflict in the country that does not allow the responsible authorities to assure the protection and management of the property”.257 Across all three of these sites, the consistent threat is conflict. This remains the case as per the above referenced 2019 SoC reports, despite there no longer being an ongoing-armed conflict in Iraq. The outbreak of conflict in Iraq with the US-invasion in 2003 brought with it both intentional targeting of cultural heritage and collateral damage as a result of military campaigns. Katharyn Hanson sheds light on the sharp increase of archaeological site looting in Iraq at the outset of the 2003 US invasion, with particular focus given to the site of Umma.258 Hanson demonstrates via close examination of satellite imagery that there were approximately 8318 new looters’ pits on the surface of Umma between February 2003 and June 2005, which is 3564 new looters’ pits per year, an increase on the previous annual rate by a multiple of 223.259 Although Hanson notes that the rate of looting at Umma did decrease between 2005 and 2008, the then “annual rate of 162 new pits per year [was] still ten times the level of looting before the [then] current war.”260 Moreover, the collections housed at the Iraqi National Museum were looted between 8 and 12 April 2003, when staff had vacated the premises.261 This prompted international heritage interventions and campaigns in Iraq by organisations such as INTERPOL and UNESCO, as well as key intervention by the Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale (Carabinieri TPC), with the latter aiding in the identification of remaining artefacts, the preparation of inventories and the subsequent secure storage of artefacts, alongside the museum professionals.262 The Iraqi National Museum was finally able to reopen 12 years later in February 2015, following the recovery and restoration of ca. 4300 out of the ca. 15,000 looted artefacts.263 However, Iraq was in the midst of a war against Da’esh, who were first reported to have inflicted damage to cultural heritage in June 2014.264 In the same year as the reopening ceremony, Da’esh “filmed and then distributed videos of themselves destroying statues at the Mosul Museum as well as blowing up remains at nearby archaeological sites such as Nineveh and Nimrud”.265 In the case of the museum, most of the items destroyed were from the Assyrian exhibit, while in “early 2015, [Da’esh] announced the[ir] intention to destroy the walls of Nineveh [an ancient Assyrian symbol] if the Iraqis attempted to liberate Mosul”.266 Although there have been suggestions that many of the destroyed statues previously housed in

257

UNESCO (2019i). Hanson (2011). 259 Hanson (2011), p. 117. 260 Hanson (2011), p. 118. 261 Poole (2008). 262 McCafferty (2022), pp. 173–174. 263 United Nations (2015). 264 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 7. 265 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 1. 266 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 7. 258

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the Mosul Museum were, in fact, replicas, it does not diminish the sentiment behind such direct attacks. Cunliffe and Curini discuss the reasons behind such attacks on heritage, and the resulting rise in positive or negative sentiment toward Da’esh, a group demonstrated to be extremely strategic in its social media campaign, in terms of how videos are staged and for what it claims responsibility.267 Given the attacks against artefacts in the Mosul Museum were part of a Da’esh-claimed video, publicised on social media, it is clear the group determined the content would gain it valuable positive sentiment, resulting in the recruitment of others. With the prevalence of Da’esh across Iraq and Syria during 2015, the reopening of the Iraqi National Museum was consequently overshadowed by the group’s destructive campaigns across the region. Dittmann and Almohamad identify the plunder and subsequent trade from cultural heritage as one of six important sources of income for Da’esh,268 while the Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, state only 1% (around US$30 million) of Da’esh’s income was generated through the trafficking of antiquities in 2015, with the biggest generators being extortion (33%), oil (25%), natural gas (14%) and phosphate (10%).269 These figures will, of course, also include looting orchestrated and carried out across Syria, with Da’esh’ operations being cross-border. Dittmann and Almohamad also posit other key reasons for the group’s destruction of cultural heritage, namely cleansing (religious or ideological reasoning) and the promotion of Da’esh’s provocation strategy, in which circumstance the dramatically staged destruction of cultural heritage is filmed.270 Moreover, in July 2014, as “part of the iconoclastic programme. . .[Da’esh] destroyed the Nebi Yunus mosque, a contemporary mosque built atop an archaeological mound housing the remains of an ancient Assyrian palace dating back to the seventh century BCE”.271 It was not until January 2017, when Iraqi forces captured the area around the mosque, that the full extent of the damage was revealed, discovering that Da’esh “had dug several tunnels through the mound underneath the mosque that housed the ruins of the Assyrian palace”. Moreover, in March 2017, archaeologists discovered Da’esh had looted many artefacts from the site”.272 What is more, Brian Rose confirms that Da’esh “placed explosive devices in the rubble of the palace”, making the documentation of remains extremely hazardous.273 At the time of writing, Danti stated Da’esh was “responsible for an estimated 250 intentional destructions of cultural heritage across the region”, although the actual number may be higher and “is steadily rising”. He further elaborates that the,

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Cunliffe and Curini (2018), pp. 1104–1106. Dittmann and Almohamad (2015), p. 29. 269 Bindner and Poirot (2016), p. 7. 270 Dittmann and Almohamad (2015), pp. 30–32. 271 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 1. 272 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 10. 273 Rose (2020), personal communication. 268

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“deliberate destruction of heritage places by [Da’esh] remains the most reported destructive force in northern Iraq with some confirmed cases of combat damage, looting and vandalism of cultural repositories, and illegal excavations at archaeological sites.”274 A reliable resource for monitoring the destruction of key cultural heritage sites in Mosul is the Monuments of Mosul in Danger project, “supported by the Oriental Institute, The Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague, and the research program Strategy AV21 of The Czech Academy of Sciences”.275 The project was in response to Da’esh’ threat of destruction to Mosul’s architectural sites, such as mosques, shrines, mausolea and churches, after they seized control of the town in 2014.276 The list compiled by the project team, evidences that 45 monuments in Mosul alone were registered as partially ruined, levelled, ruined, or razed, i.e. completely destroyed.277 Almost all of the 47 buildings destroyed are religious in nature, with the majority pertaining to Muslim heritage.278 Danti asserts that in “the vast majority of cases, [Da’esh] in Iraq (and Syria) has targeted the religious heritage of Muslims, Christians, and Yazidis”, with Muslim heritage, in particular, suffering under the terrorist organisation.279 He further affirms, “[Da’esh] continues to focus on religious heritage for a complex mix of tactical, strategic, political, and ideological reasons”.280 R. Matthews et al. state that the “annihilation of Mosul’s old city was completed during the liberation from 19th February to 21 July 2017. The cityscape was bombarded from aircraft and helicopters, targeted by countless missiles and devastated by suicide attacks.”281 It is documented that this ‘liberation’ of the city culminated in a final act of destruction from Da’esh, which was symbolically targeted at Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret.282 As well as the religious monuments, R. Matthews et al. provide a detailed account of the significant number of secular monuments damaged or destroyed during the conflict.283 R. Matthews et al. state that at “least five large riverside houses were sacrificed during the total razing in the last phase of the battle, excellent examples of late Ottoman urban domestic architecture which created a distinctive Mosul river bank panorama.”284 Cunliffe and Curini confirm that of the 82 events relating to attacks on cultural heritage attributed to Da’esh in the media, the group claimed only 31; “the rest were

274

Danti (2015), p. 138. Monuments of Mosul in Danger (n.d.-a). 276 Monuments of Mosul in Danger (n.d.-a). 277 Monuments of Mosul in Danger (n.d.-b). 278 Matthews et al. (2020), p. 8. 279 Danti (2015), pp. 138–139. 280 Danti (2015), p. 139. 281 Matthews et al. (2020), p. 8. 282 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 2; Matthews et al. (2020), p. 8. 283 Matthews et al. (2020), p. 9. 284 Matthews et al. (2020), pp. 8–9. 275

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picked up in other media sources.”285 Data collected for this study show that Da’esh has claimed responsibility for more than 50% of attacks on shrines, and for less than 50% of those attacks on archaeological sites, cemeteries, churches/monasteries and mosques, with the group claiming responsibility for only 10% of attacks on churches and monasteries.286 This study ascertained that only “a small portion of heritage related incidents are promoted in the media and even fewer are claimed”.287 Cunliffe and Curini further state that Da’esh “downplay events, at least online, that could be costly in terms of their support, such as attacks on cemeteries”.288 Moreover, Cunliffe and Curini claim that the “high numbers of unpublicised events suggest that the main intended audience is local or internal, and the primary positive reason for support relates to [Da’esh’s] humiliation of targeted communities.”289 It is understood that the peak of destructive escalation took place between May and June 2016, with Da’esh’s destruction of Sennacherib’s Palace in Nineveh and the three ancient gates.290 For a “detailed analysis of the evolution of the damage over time within five different areas in the Nineveh Archaeological Site perimeter”, refer to Angiuli et al.291 Although significant damage to Mosuli cultural heritage was caused through intentional targeting by armed terrorist groups, it is important to note that the damage incurred by Mosul was not all inspired by ideologically based violence. With airstrikes and on-the-ground ammunition targeting the area, particularly during the period of Mosul’s ‘liberation’ in 2017, cultural heritage most certainly fell victim to military operations. For example, R. Matthews et al. state, serious damage was inflicted on Shaykh al-Shatt Mosque which is the oldest still preserved architectural monument in the city, originating in the late 12th century. The mosque was ruined either by an air strike or by an internal explosion between 12th and 18 July 2017.292

Although heavily damaged, the mosque luckily remains “the only standing structure among the rubble”.293 Angiuli et al., via satellite imagery-based damage assessments demonstrate that in “late 2016 and during 2017, during heavy clashes between Iraqi and [Da’esh] forces, more military-related damages were observed” within the Nineveh and Nebi Yunus sites and their immediate vicinity.294 Through satellite imagery-based damage assessments, Angiuli et al. identified and classified a total of 268 points of damage and change in areas of interest corresponding to the Nineveh

285

Cunliffe and Curini (2018), p. 1098. Cunliffe and Curini (2018), pp. 1098–1099. 287 Cunliffe and Curini (2018), p. 1106. 288 Cunliffe and Curini (2018), p. 1107. 289 Cunliffe and Curini (2018), p. 1106. 290 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 17. 291 Angiuli et al. (2020), pp. 17–29. 292 Matthews et al. (2020), p. 8. 293 Matthews et al. (2020), p. 8. 294 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 17. 286

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and Nebi Yunus sites (around five square kilometres), between November 2013 and March 2018.295 Angiuli et al. state the damage observed has been assessed as mostly falling under the fundamentalist category,296 with fundamentalist damage “defined as all types of damage (especially “destruction” and “partial destruction”) that correspond with . . .[Da’esh’s] presence in the area”.297 Meanwhile, military-related damage is said to constitute 30% of the damage observed,298 with such damage “defined as all types of action related to military activity, e.g., defence positions, construction of perimeters, revetments, or trenches located on an archaeological site, as well as damages due to weapon impact or explosion”.299 The other 15% is attributed to possible looting,300 which is “defined as the illegal excavation and plundering of an archaeological site, done to gain profit (e.g. by selling what has been plundered)”.301 Angiuli et al. note that the phrase “possible looting” was used as some looting is carried out using machinery such as bulldozers and excavators, which can make it difficult to discern between looting and construction.302 This study provides definitive proof of the role military operations have played in contributing to the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq. Cori Wegener recounts that, at a UNESCO meeting three to five months ahead of the offensive on Mosul, Iraqi colleagues were questioned on what measures they were taking to educate their military on the sites that they needed to pay special attention to, which Da’esh subsequently targeted.303 Wegener further states that the Iraqis assured those at the meeting that they would ensure the relevant training was provided, but this did not happen. Moreover,304 the previous head of the UNESCO office in Baghdad, Louise Haxthausen indicates that, “because of the magnitude of the destruction, [she thought] everyone, including the Coalition, whose bombing caused a lot of the physical destruction that occurred in Mosul, particularly the Old City, felt a responsibility to contribute to the reconstruction”.305 This is relevant to the UNESCO-led Mosul initiative, which is discussed at length in Chap. 6. Wegener also indicated that as Iraq was part of the Coalition, any thought to cultural heritage protection was believed to be the responsibility of the Iraqi’s alone.306 As previously stated CJTF-OIR’s phase III (defeat) saw the Coalition conducting air and artillery strikes against Da’esh, with particular focus on Raqqa, Syria and

295

Angiuli et al. (2020), pp. 14–15. Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 15. 297 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 12. 298 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 15. 299 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 12. 300 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 15. 301 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 12. 302 Angiuli et al. (2020), p. 12. 303 Wegener (2020), personal communication. 304 Wegener (2020), personal communication. 305 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 306 Wegener (2020), personal communication. 296

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Mosul, Iraq. Boer et al. state that, “[a]fter both Raqqa and Mosul were captured, the Coalition continued to assist partnered ground troops with airstrikes and ground operations until the terror group was defeated as a territorial entity.”307 The Boer et al. (2017, with 2020 revisions) report titled “Seeing Through the Rubble: The civilian impact of the use of explosive weapons in the fight against ISIS”, provides a full analysis of the inherent risks from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, with particular emphasis on civilian harm. Given the focus of this research, consideration is given only to indirect civilian harm through the destruction of cultural heritage. Amnesty International brings attention to the employment of “500 lb general purpose bombs used by the coalition in Mosul [that] contain 90 kg of high explosive and are lethal within a radius of 230 m.”308 Amnesty International recounts that such an explosive “containing the equivalent of 190 pounds of [Trinitrotoluene (TNT)]” was used in Mosul “to strike two snipers on a building full of civilians”, rendering it a disproportionate attack.309 The organisation also provides a witness account of a direct attack on Khaled Ibn al Waleed mosque in Wadi Hajjar, a residential neighbourhood in Mosul on or around 20 February 2017. The witness statement presented by Amnesty International recounts that “60–70 people were praying inside the mosque”, when it “was hit by up to five rockets, causing the roof to collapse and destroying two nearby houses”, while a second round of strikes was carried out a few minutes later. The witness “attributed the damage to an airstrike, having heard aircraft in the sky.”310 Amnesty International states that the “strike appears to have been an attempt to target the [Da’esh] vehicle [outside] and the fights inside the mosque”, however given the resulting “high civilian death toll and the nature of the objects that were struck”, there is an increased likelihood that it was a disproportionate attack.311 Given the forms of military weapons used, which lack the ability to execute precise attacks on legitimate military objectives, and the miscalculation of proportionality by the US-led coalition, it is evident that cultural heritage often fell victim to coalition military operations. Danti asserts that “[c]ombat damage, large-scale looting, and politically and ideologically motivated destructions of heritage places and cultural property have emerged as pervasive, daily crimes and atrocities”, while the “severe and rapid degradation of cultural infrastructure further raises risks and exacerbates adverse impacts.”312 Cultural heritage has undoubtedly played, and is still playing, highly significant roles in the Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi conflicts. Terrorist groups such as Da’esh and Al Qaeda have engaged in looting to fund their agenda, as well as the complete destruction of sites for iconoclastic reasons, which was often broadcast to aid their provocation strategy. Although the destruction of cultural heritage at the

307

Boer et al. (2020), p. 12. Amnesty International (2017), p. 12. 309 Amnesty International (2017), p. 36. 310 Amnesty International (2017), p. 35. 311 Amnesty International (2017), pp. 35–36. 312 Danti (2015), p. 132. 308

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hands of military forces is often categorised as collateral damage, it has been established that States have also engaged in the intentional targeting of heritage sites, as was evidenced through the actions of the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen. With regard to collateral damage however, Tural Mustafayev states that the “majority of the destruction caused by the military is due to a lack of awareness of what can and cannot be targeted. They often do not know the difference between destroying cultural sites and damaging a civilian object.”313 It is evidenced that the majority of the damage outlined has been concentrated in the urban areas, where major combat ensues and where there are key territorial gains to be made. Interviewee E states, “Archaeological sites will always be in danger, but museums are primary targets because they are in cities where these conflicts often take place.”314 Museums have most definitely been the target of looting and staged iconoclastic destruction of historic objects, such as that representative of ancient Assyria, across Yemen, Syria and Iraq. More significantly, of course, this concentration of combat and destruction in urban areas has unfortunately led to, not only the destruction of heritage sites and museums housing various collections, but the displacement of multitudes of civilians and the deaths of many others, thousands of which remain unacknowledged by parties to the conflicts.

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Allinson T (2019) Yemen’s Houthi rebels: who are they and what do they want? Deutsche Welle. Available: https://www.dw.com/en/yemens-houthi-rebels-who-are-they-and-what-do-theywant/a-50667558 Al-Salhy S, Arango T (2014) Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul. The New York Times. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/militants-in-mosul. html American Society of Overseas Research (2021) About ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives. Available: https://www.asor.org/chi/about American Society of Overseas Research Cultural Heritage Initiatives (2016) ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq: Weekly Report 93–94 — May 11 - 24, 2016. ASOR CHI. Available: https://www.asor.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/09/ASOR_CHI_Weekly_Report_93%E2%80%9394r.pdf Amnesty International (2017) At Any Cost: The Civilian Catastrophe in West Mosul, Iraq. Available: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/07/at-any-cost-civilian-catastro phe-in-west-mosul-iraq/ Amnesty International (2020) Yemen War: No End in Sight. Available: https://www.amnesty.org/ en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/ Anadolu Agency (2020) Yemen: Saudi-led planes strike rebel positions in Sanaa. Anadolu Agency. Available: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemen-saudi-led-planes-strike-rebel-posi tions-in-sanaa/1971953# Angiuli E et al (2020) Satellite imagery-based damage assessment on Nineveh and Nebi Yunus Archaeological Site in Iraq. Remote Sens 12(10) Barnes JE, Schmitt E (2019) Trump orders withdrawal of U.S. troops from northern Syria. The New York Times. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/politics/mark-espersyria-kurds-turkey.html Bindner L, Poirot G (2016) ISIS Financing 2015. Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, France. Available: https://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf Boer R, Treffers L, Woods C (2020) Seeing Through the Rubble: the civilian impact of the use of explosive weapons in the fight against ISIS. Paxforpeace. Available: https://paxforpeace.nl/ media/download/pax-airwars-seeing-through-the-rubble-full-report.pdf British Broadcasting Corporation (2013) Ten die as Iraq security forces dismantle Sunni camp. Available: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25548776 Brodie N, Sabrine I (2018) The illegal excavation and trade of Syrian cultural objects: a view from the ground. J Field Archaeol 43(1):74–84 Charbonneau L (2012) Syria conflict now a civil war, U.N. peacekeeping chief says. Available: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE85B1BI20120612 Council on Foreign Relations (2020) What Is Hezbollah? Available: https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/what-hezbollah Council on Foreign Relations (2021a) Global Conflict Tracker: War in Yemen. Available: https:// www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen Council on Foreign Relations (2021b) Global Conflict Tracker: Civil War in Syria. Available: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-syria Council on Foreign Relations (2021c) Global Conflict Tracker: Iraq. Available: https://www.cfr. org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/political-instability-iraq Cunliffe E, Curini L (2018) ISIS and heritage destruction: a sentiment analysis. Antiquity 92(364): 1094–1111 Danti M (2015) Ground-based observations of cultural heritage incidents in Syria and Iraq. Near East Archaeol 78(3):132–141 Deutsche Welle News (2015) Russia bombs ancient Syrian city of Palmyra. Deutsche Welle. Available: https://www.dw.com/en/russia-bombs-ancient-syrian-city-of-palmyra/a-18822445 Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums (2019) State Party Report on The State of Conservation of the Syrian Cultural Heritage Sites (Syrian Arab Republic). DGAM, Damascus. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3866

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Dittmann A, Almohamad H (2015) Devastation of cultural heritage and memory in Syria and Iraq: component of a multi-level provocation strategy? Int J Humanit Soc Sci 5(11):28–40 Ebdo R, Ahmed A (2017) The archaeological sites in the middle Euphrates valley and Balikh basin. The Authority of Tourism and Protection of Antiquities, Al Jazira Canton, Syria. Available: https://en.unesco.org/syrian-observatory/news/archaeological-sites-middle-euphrates-valleyand-balikh-basin El-Ghobashy T, Sonne P (2018) U.S. disbands command overseeing American ground forces in Iraq, as major combat against ISIS ends. The Washington Post. Available: https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-shuts-down-ground-forces-office-in-iraq-as-com bat-against-islamic-state-ends/2018/04/30/2c7b3fcc-4c61-11e8-af46-b1d6dc0d9bfe_story.html Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East & North Africa (n.d.) The difficulty of verifying heritage damage reports. EAMENA. Available: https://eamena.org/article/difficulty-verifyingheritage-damage-reports Fanusie YJ, Joffe A (2015) Monumental fight: countering the Islamic State’s antiquities trafficking. FDD Press, Washington D.C. General Organisation for the Preservation of Historic Cities in Yemen (2019a) State Party’s Report on the State of Conservation of the Old City of Sana’a, Yemen - Inscribed on the World Heritage List in Danger. UNESCO, Paris. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3873 General Organisation for the Preservation of Historic Cities in Yemen (2019b) State Party’s Report on the State of Conservation of Old Walled City of Shibam, Yemen - Inscribed on the World Heritage List in Danger. UNESCO, Paris. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3874 General Organisation for the Preservation of Historic Cities in Yemen (2019c) State Party’s Report on the State of Conservation of the Historic Town of Zabid, Yemen - Inscribed on the World Heritage List in Danger. UNESCO, Paris. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3872 Guidetti M, Perini S (2015) Civil war and cultural heritage in Syria, 2011-2015. Syrian Stud Assoc Bull 20(1):1–42 Hanson K (2011) Ancient artefacts and modern conflict: a case study of looting and instability in Iraq. In: Stone P (ed) Cultural heritage, ethics, and the military. Boydell and Brewer, Woodbridge, pp 113–128 Human Rights Watch (2012) Syria: War Crimes in Idlib During Peace Negotiations. Executions, Destruction of Property, and Arbitrary Detentions. Human Rights Watch. Available: https:// www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/02/syria-war-crimes-idlib-during-peace-negotiations Human Rights Watch (2015) World Report 2015: Iraq. Events of 2014. Human Rights Watch. Available: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/iraq# International Committee of the Red Cross (n.d.) War in Yemen. Available: https://www.icrc.org/en/ war-yemen International Council on Monuments and Sites (2013) Protection of Syria’s Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: ICOMOS - ICCROM e-learning course for Syrian cultural heritage professionals. Available: https://www.icomos.org/en/home-doc/569-protection-of-syria-s-cul tural-heritage-in-times-of-armed-conflict-icomos-iccrom-e-learning-course-for-syrian-culturalheritage-professionals Isakhan B (2020) The Islamic State Attacks on Shia Holy Sites and the “Shrine Protection Narrative”: threats to sacred space as a mobilization frame. Terror Polit Violence 32(4): 724–748. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1398741 Isakhan B, Meskell L (2019) UNESCO’s project to ‘Revive the Spirit of Mosul’: Iraqi and Syrian opinion on heritage reconstruction after the Islamic State. Int J Herit Stud 25(11):1189–1204. https://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2019.1578988 Kathem M (2019) Cultural (dis)continuity, political trajectories and the state in post – 2003 Iraq. Int J Herit Stud 26(2):163–177 Kathem M (2020) Why Iraq’s archaeology and heritage will continue to crumble, 20 April. Available: https://mehiyar.wordpress.com/2020/04/20/why-iraqs-archaeology-and-heritagewill-continue-to-crumble/?fbclid=IwAR31FJuEGugG_CnyzMCpQkR2mfrunJqoIc_pBck0 x5jUXTat7LC8Z-viMwU

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Khalidi L (2015) Yemeni Heritage, Saudi Vandalism. The New York Times. Available: https:// www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/opinion/yemeni-heritage-saudi-vandalism.html Khalidi L (2017) The destruction of Yemen and its cultural heritage. Int J Middle East Stud 49(4): 735–738 Lababidi R, Qassar H (2016) Did they really forget how to do it? Iraq, Syria, and the international response to protect a shared heritage. J East Mediterr Archaeol Herit Stud 4(4):341–362 Live Map (2021) Syria Live Map. Available: https://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2020/10-decemberdamascus-an-internal-transport-bus-was-burned Luke C, Meskell L (2019) Archaeology, assistance, and aggression along the Euphrates: reflections from Raqqa. Int J Cult Policy 25(7):831–842 Matthews R, Rasheed QH, Fernández MP, Fobbe S, Nováček K, Mohammed-Amin R, Mühl S, Richardson A (2020) Heritage and cultural healing: Iraq in a post-Daesh era. Int J Herit Stud 26(2):120–141 McCafferty JD (2022) International heritage interventions as no substitute for capable state party heritage institutions: the case of the Carabinieri TPC Intervention in the 2003 Iraq War. In: Cunliffe E, Fox P (eds) Safeguarding cultural property and the 1954 Hague Convention: all possible steps. Boydell & Brewer, Suffolk, pp 169–180 Meskell L (2015) Gridlock: UNESCO, global conflict and failed ambitions. World Archaeol 47(2): 225–238 Monuments of Mosul in Danger (n.d.-a) About the Project. Available: http://www. monumentsofmosul.com/#xl_xr_page_index Monuments of Mosul in Danger (n.d.-b) Deiberately Destroyed by Islamic State in 2014-2017. Available: http://www.monumentsofmosul.com/#xl_xr_page_destriyedmonuments Mwatana for Human Rights (2018) The Degradation of History Violations Committed by the Warring Parties against Yemen’s Cultural Property. Available: https://mwatana.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/12/The-Degradation-of-History-English.pdf Mwatana for Human Rights (2019) “Day of Judgment”: The Role of the US and Europe in Civilian Death, Destruction, and Trauma in Yemen. Mwatana for Human Rights. Available: https:// mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Final-Design_Day-of-Judgment_Mwatana.pdf O’Connell J (n.d.) Incident Report Feature: Ma’ara Museum. Available: https://www.asor.org/chi/ reports/incident-report-feature/Ma%E2%80%99ara-Museum/ Oakford S (2018) Raqqa: a city destroyed then forgotten. Airwars. Available: https://airwars.org/ news-and-investigations/raqqa-a-city-destroyed-then-forgotten/ Passey B (2018) The destruction of cultural heritage in the Yemen Conflict: legal implications and state responsibility. Brigham Young Univ Prelaw Rev 32(4):1–52 Pearson A, Sanders L IV (2019) Syria conflict: what do the US, Russia, Turkey and Iran want? Deutsche Welle. Available: https://www.dw.com/en/syria-conflict-what-do-the-us-russia-tur key-and-iran-want/a-41211604 Poole (2008) Looting Iraq. Smithsonian Magazine. Available: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/ arts-culture/looting-iraq-16813540/ Ravagnan R, Maigret SA, Muradore C (2017) Preserving and transmitting traditional building techniques in Yemen. In: Marchand THJ (ed) Architectural heritage of Yemen: buildings that fill my eye. Ginko Library, London Sengupta K (2012) Special report: hundreds of rebel fighters leave Aleppo after relentless shelling by regime forces. Available: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/specialreport-hundreds-of-rebel-fighters-leave-aleppo-after-relentless-shelling-by-regime-forces-802 6802.html Shahab S, Isakhan B (2018) The ritualization of heritage destruction under the Islamic State. J Soc Archaeol 18(2):212–233. https://doi.org/10.1177/1469605318763623 Shaheen K (2015) Islamic State releases images said to show destruction of Palmyra temple. The Guardian. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/25/islamic-state-imagesdestruction-palmyra-temple-baal-shamin-isis

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Smith et al (2015) The Islamic State’s symbolic war: Da’esh’s socially mediated terrorism as a threat to cultural heritage. J Soc Archaeol 16(2):164–188 Stephens M, Stein A (2015) The YPG: America’s new best friend? Al Jazeera. Available: https:// www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/6/28/the-ypg-americas-new-best-friend The Global Coalition (n.d.) 83 Partners United in Ensuring Daesh’s Enduring Defeat. Available: https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partners/ The Rule of Law in Armed Confllict Project (2021) Non-international armed conflicts in Iraq. RULAC. Available: https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflictsin-iraq#collapse3accord Trew B (2019) UK and US bombs caused nearly 1,000 civilian casualties in Yemen, damning report finds. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-war-uk-usbombs-british-american-civilian-casualties-mwatana-university-human-rights-network-a880 9401.html Trump DJ (2018) Donald Trump Tweet. Available: https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump?ref_src= twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor UNESCO (2008) The inventory of the historic city of Sana’a: a tool for urban conservation. UNESCO. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/569/ UNESCO (2011) Syrian Arab Republic National report on the implementation of the Hague Convention of 1954 and its two Protocols (1954 and 1999): four-year cycle 2005-2010. UNESCO, Paris. Available: http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/ pdf/Syria-2005-2010-en-final.pdf UNESCO (2012) UNESCO Director-General deplores destruction of ancient Aleppo markets, a World Heritage site. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/940 UNESCO (2013a) Update of the List of World Heritage in Danger (inscribed properties). Decision: 37 COM 8C.1. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/5176 UNESCO (2013b) UNESCO Director-General deplores continuing destruction of ancient Aleppo, a World Heritage site. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1002 UNESCO (2013c) UNESCO Director-General deplores the escalation of violence and the damage to World Heritage in Syria. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-director-generaldeplores-escalation-violence-and-damage-world-heritage-syria UNESCO (2014) UNESCO Director-General condemns military presence and destruction at World Heritage Sites in Syria. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-director-general-con demns-military-presence-and-destruction-world-heritage-sites-syria UNESCO (2015a) UNESCO Director-General condemns airstrikes on Yemen’s cultural heritage. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-director-general-condemns-airstrikes-yemen-scultural-heritage UNESCO (2015b) The Director General of UNESCO condemns the destruction of historic buildings in the Old City of Sana’a, Yemen. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1295 UNESCO (2015c) Director-General condemns destruction of vestiges in the Ancient City of Bosra, a Syrian World Heritage site. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1416 UNESCO (2015d) Director-General Irina Bokova condemns the destruction of the Mar Elian monastery in Syria. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1338 UNESCO (2015e) Director-General of UNESCO Irina Bokova firmly condemns the destruction of Palmyra’s ancient temple of Baalshamin, Syria. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/directorgeneral-irina-bokova-firmly-condemns-destruction-palmyra-s-ancient-temple-baalshamin UNESCO (2015f) Irina Bokova condemns latest destruction of cultural property from the site of Palmyra in Syria. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1313 UNESCO (2015g) UNESCO Director-General condemns the destruction of the Arch of Triumph in Palmyra - “Extremists are terrified of history”. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/directorgeneral-condemns-destruction-arch-triumph-palmyra-extremists-are-terrified-history UNESCO (2016a) UNESCO Director-General condemns the destruction of the 9th century mosque of Bani Matar in Yemen. Available: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/member-states/single-view/ news/unesco_director_general_condemns_the_destruction_of_the_9th/

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UNESCO (2016b) Director-General of UNESCO deplores severe damage at Church of Saint Simeon, in northern Syria. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1499 UNESCO (2017) UNESCO Director-General condemns destruction of the Tetrapylon and severe damage to the Theatre in Palmyra, a UNESCO World Heritage site. Available: https://whc. unesco.org/en/news/1620 UNESCO (2018) UNESCO condemns the intentional destruction of a historical mosque and mausoleum in the Hodeida Governorate of Yemen. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/ news/1895 UNESCO (2019a) State of Conservation: Ancient City of Aleppo (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3866 UNESCO (2019b) State of Conservation: Ancient City of Bosra (Syrian Arab Republic) [Online]. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3867 UNESCO (2019c) State of Conservation: Ancient City of Damascus (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3868 UNESCO (2019d) State of Conservation: Ancient Villages of Northern Syria (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3869 UNESCO (2019e) State of Conservation: Crac des Chevaliers and Qal’at Salah El-Din (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3870 UNESCO (2019f) State of Conservation: Site of Palmyra (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3871 UNESCO (2019g) State of Conservation: Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) (Iraq). Available: https://whc. unesco.org/en/soc/3854/ UNESCO (2019h) State of Conservation: Hatra (Iraq). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3 855/ UNESCO (2019i) State of Conservation: Samarra Archaeological City (Iraq). Available: https:// whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3856/ UNESCO (n.d.-a) Yemen - UNESCO World Heritage Centre. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/ en/statesparties/ye UNESCO (n.d.-b) List of World Heritage in Danger. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/danger/ UNESCO (n.d.-c) 1972 World Heritage Convention: States Parties Ratification Status. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ UNESCO (n.d.-d) World Heritage Centre: Syrian Arab Republic. Available: https://whc.unesco. org/en/statesparties/sy UNESCO (n.d.-e) Iraq: International assistance. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ iq/assistance/ UNESCO (n.d.-f) Update of the List of World Heritage in Danger (Retained Properties). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/7373 UNESCO & UNITAR (2018) Five Years of Conflict: The State of Cultural Heritage in the Ancient City of Aleppo. Available: https://unitar.org/sites/default/files/media/publication/doc/ UNESCO_UNITAR-5-years-conflict.pdf United Nations (2015) UNESCO welcomes re-opening of Iraq’s National Museum in Baghdad. Available: https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/03/492402-unesco-welcomes-re-opening-iraqsnational-museum-baghdad United Nations Security Council (2017) Letter dated 27 January 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council. Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen. UNSC, New York. Available: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/859551?ln=en United Nations Security Council (2019) Letter dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council. Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen. UNSC, New York. Available: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1664359?ln=en United States Central Command (2020) Defeating Daesh Highlights of the Week June 24, 2020. CentCom. Available: https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-ArticleView/Article/2230468/defeating-daesh-highlights-of-the-week-june-24-2020/

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United States Department of Defense (2019) Statement by Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper Regarding Turkey, Syria Border Actions. U.S. Department of Defense. Available: https://www. defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/1988372/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-drmark-t-esper-regarding-turkey-syria-border/ United States Department of Defense (n.d.-a) Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations to Defeat ISIS. Available: https://dod.defense.gov/OIR/ United States Department of Defense (n.d.-b) About CJTF-OIR. Available: https://www. inherentresolve.mil/About-CJTF-OIR/ United States Department of Defense (n.d.-c) Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve: Fact Sheet. U.S. Department of Defense. Available: https://www.inherentresolve.mil/ Portals/14/Documents/Mission/20210915%20Updated%20Mission%20Statement%20Fact% 20Sheet.pdf.pdf?ver=5OLdNQ7TrF7R4YjokCHosQ%3D%3D Varoutsikos B (2015) Bricks and mortar fire: Yemen’s cultural heritage is in the crosshairs. The Conversation. Available: https://theconversation.com/bricks-and-mortar-fire-yemens-culturalheritage-is-in-the-crosshairs-48484 Westcott T (2019) Inside the medieval castle that survived a 21st century war. Middle East Eye. Available: https://www.middleeasteye.net/discover/inside-krak-de-chevaliers-castle-syria-built %20by-medieval-crusaders-survived-21st-century-war Wilson Center (2019) Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State. Wilson Center. Available: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamicstate Wintour P (2019) Yemen government signs power-sharing deal with separatists. The Guardian. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/05/yemen-government-signs-powersharing-deal-with-separatists Yahya Gahlan M (2019) Many calls but little action to stop cultural destruction in Yemen. Al-Monitor. Available: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2019/02/yemen-war-devastat ing-for-countrys-heritage.html Zaina F (2019) A risk assessment for cultural heritage in Southern Iraq: framing drivers, threats and actions affecting archaeological sites. Conserv Manag Archaeol Sites 21(3):184–206

Chapter 4

The Impact of Conflict on UNESCO’s Engagement with Yemen, Syria and Iraq

4.1

World Heritage Centre Profile Analysis

Lynn Meskell’s work in creating an institutional ethnography of UNESCO World Heritage, tracing the politics of governance and sovereignty and the subsequent implications for multilateral diplomacy, international conservation, and heritage rights, is central to the development of this book’s understanding of how UNESCO functions as an organisation. The gridlock theory,1 which Meskell employs to describe UNESCO’s inability to act in Yemen, and more broadly in relation to conflict in her article titled, ‘UNESCO, world heritage and the gridlock over Yemen’ is applied throughout this research. Hale and Held state, [t]oday it seems that gridlock itself . . .has a self-reinforcing element, one that emerges from the corrosive effect of unmanaged globalization on domestic politics. The rise of nationalism and populism across the world, in many different kinds of countries, has multiple and complex origins. But this trend can be seen as part of a downward spiral in which gridlock leads to unmanaged globalization or unmet global challenges, which in turn help to provoke anti-global backlashes that further undermine the operative capacity of global governance institutions.2

This theory of gridlock is applied to UNESCO’s projects in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, and more broadly the organisation’s relationship with the three countries, to ascertain whether Meskell’s observations of UNESCO’s failure to act due to high levels of interdependence on its Member States and between Member States, is equally or varyingly prevalent in different cases. Meskell “documents how UNESCO has been increasingly unable to deal with its own intransigent member states, leading to institutional gridlock and, an inability to fulfil its founding mission”.3 Wolff Michael

1

Hale and Held (2018). Hale and Held (2018), p. 130. 3 Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 12. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. D. McCafferty, UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19675-1_4

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Roth’s 2007 idea that passivity and agency are closely linked could be applied to Hale and Held’s 2018 framework on gridlock. Roth suggests that passivity is a theoretical concept and, from a “theoretical perspective, still is a form of agency (just as pauses in music are central aspects of the music that have to be theorized in and for themselves rather than as absence of sound).”4 In any instance where UNESCO fails to act or assumes a passive standpoint, this should be construed as an action in itself, and as responsive to other factors. In other words, UNESCO’s passivity should be construed to be indicative of the actions of another actor, the nature of the organisation or the limits of its capabilities. When using the term “passive” to describe UNESCO’s response to a particular issue, the Cambridge Dictionary adjective definition is used: “not acting to influence or change a situation, allowing other people to be in control”.5 In applying this definition to UNESCO’s various responses to risks posed to heritage sites in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, this study therefore categorises the organisation as passive when it is merely responding to the actions of other actors, an example being the condemnation of destruction. UNESCO is also categorised thus when it is reliant on other actors to fulfil an action, such as calling on parties to a conflict to cease the destruction of cultural heritage. When classifying a UNESCO response as “active”, the Cambridge Dictionary adjective definition is again employed, “doing something practical rather than allowing a situation to develop itself”.6 UNESCO is therefore categorised as active when it is the catalyst amid an action, for example, launching an initiative to safeguard cultural heritage or hosting a technical meeting to produce recommendations on the reconstruction of a heritage site. Nonetheless, it should be noted that while a UNESCO response is categorised as active, it does not necessarily signify that the organisation sufficiently or meaningfully followed through on each action. When initially trying to gauge UNESCO’s levels of engagement in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, it was prudent to carry out various observations on each country’s WHC profile. Each profile has four headings, namely Description, Documents, Assistance, and Law. Under Description there is a list of the country’s WHSs, which are categorised as cultural, natural or mixed, as well as a list of the sites inventoried on the Tentative List. Each profile also lists all activities carried out for the country by the WHC, all media statements published by the WHC regarding the country’s cultural heritage, and any events the WHC has held for the country in this regard. Under Documents, the WHC has chronologically collated all documents pertaining to any decision regarding the country’s WHSs. Under Assistance, it documents each of the country’s requests for international assistance, as well as the total amount of funds approved via this avenue. Lastly, under Laws it details each of the National Cultural Heritage Laws established in the country in question. For example, in relation to national legislation, in its 2011 periodic report as a State Party to the 1954 Hague Convention, Syria refers to the Law of Antiquities issued under

4

Roth (2007), p. 2. Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.-a). 6 Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.-b). 5

4.1

World Heritage Centre Profile Analysis

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Table 4.1 UNESCO engagement with Yemen (2007–2020). Source: UNESCO Official Website UNESCO/Yemen engagement Activities News Events

During peacetime 1 1 0

During conflict 1 10 1

Total 2 11 1

Decree—Law No. 222, dated 26 October 1963.7 This book has already covered the various World Heritage and Tentative Sites in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, and so the key information of interest under the Description tab, is firstly the data which can be gleaned from the activities, media statements and events logged on each profile, both prior to and during the Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi conflicts. In the case of Iraq, postconflict updates are also considered. This research has found that the WHC publishes media statements regarding “actions” with no results, such as inconsequential meetings, or the production of recommendations with no follow-up, as will be discussed throughout this chapter and beyond. This shows the organisation to advertise its activities, even when its efforts have little to no consequence or influence. It therefore follows that if the WHC did something, which had real impact, with respect to heritage protection in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, such an action would likely be reported via a media statement. From this, the following correlation is drawn: fewer media statements equates to less action. Notwithstanding this, a high number of media statements does not necessarily translate to more action that is meaningful. One variable, which cannot be accounted for in this analysis, is action taken by UNESCO that is not disclosed to the public for reasons pertaining to security concerns or data protection.

4.1.1

UNESCO’s Engagement with Yemen: World Heritage Centre Profile

The data on activities, news statements and events collated on Yemen’s WHC profile, depicts UNESCO to have increased its engagement with Yemen since the outbreak of conflict in 2015. From peacetime to during conflict, as evidenced by Table 4.1, there has been a tenfold increase in media statements, consistency as regards registered activities and an increase from zero to one in registered events hosted by UNESCO regarding Yemeni heritage. Of the 10 news statements published during the conflict in Yemen, six (60%) could be categorised as passive, with those chiefly expressing concern, condemning the destruction of cultural heritage, or calling for all parties to the conflict to protect Yemeni heritage.8 Meskell and Isakhan provide detailed discussion on UNESCO’s forms of responses to the

7 8

DGAM (2011), p. 2. UNESCO (n.d.-a).

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heritage crisis in Yemen, deeming its overall response as a failure to act. Meskell and Isakhan particularly focus on the WHC’s media statements condemning ongoing destruction of cultural heritage in Yemen; citing “impasse management”, and noting the passivity of such statements in that they always fall short of naming the perpetrators when the available evidence suggests that the damage was caused by the Saudi-coalition airstrikes.9 The remaining four (40%) media statements may be categorised as active. These statements signal the launch of initiatives and action plans, the moving of WHSs to the In Danger list, and mobilisation of funds.10 There was an absence of statements during the period from 2017 to 2019 inclusive, despite Yemeni cultural heritage incurring damage and destruction during those years. Furthermore, despite the launch of the Emergency Response Plan to Safeguard Yemen Cultural Heritage on 13 May 2015, there was no subsequent follow-up statement regarding its progress. Likewise, despite the announcement of the Emergency Action Plan (emphasis on “Action”) for the Safeguarding of Yemen’s Cultural Heritage on 16 July 2015, again there has been no follow-up statement on its progress, implementation, or results. The WHC has published an average of 1.7 news statements per year on Yemeni cultural heritage since the start of the Yemeni conflict in 2015. For Yemen, the WHC’s media statements suggest that the organisation has exhibited a largely distant and passive relationship with the country. The single activity registered under Yemen’s profile during the conflict, namely the Satellite-Based Damage Assessment of Cultural Heritage Sites 2015 Report of Iraq, Nepal, Syria and Yemen is a product of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNESCO and UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). This report, which allows for the monitoring of damage to cultural heritage via satellite imagery, was made possible by UNOSAT’s “technical expertise in remote monitoring” and UNESCO’s “vast network of cultural heritage experts, who help identify damage and put it into context”.11 Hanson states, “[w]ithout ground documentation, satellite and aerial images provide the next best source for analysis.”12 Such remote monitoring and engagement by UNESCO appears to be all the organisation is willing or capable of implementing; due to the obvious and major security issues, the organisation is unable to operate on-the-ground, without the aid of an implementing partner beyond the UN system, such as SFD. Detailed consideration is given to UNESCO’s ongoing CfW scheme based in Yemen and implemented by SFD, which is based in Sana’a, in Chap. 6. The single event registered under Yemen’s WHC profile pertains to the Third World Heritage Marine Managers Conference, the subject of which is not entirely relevant to the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflict.

9

Meskell and Isakhan (2020), pp. 2–4. UNESCO (n.d.-a). 11 UNESCO (2015). 12 Hanson (2011), p. 114. 10

4.1

World Heritage Centre Profile Analysis

95

Table 4.2 Significant donations to UNESCO. Source: UNESCO Official Website Country Qatar

Year 2014

Purpose HEF

UAE

2018

Mosul initiative

Saudi Arabia

2019

UNESCO’s strategic conservation plans, including ongoing protection of WHSs in conflict

Donation US $10 million US $50.4 million US $25 million

Meskell suggests that UNESCO’s exhibition of passive responses is indicative of gridlock. She states that UNESCO “has found itself mired in contentious decisionmaking processes that has either stalled or struggled to deliver”.13 When it comes to Yemen, it is evident that the Saudi-led coalition has played a significant role in the destruction of cultural heritage.14 What is more evident is that UNESCO is failing to recognise the role that such large global powers have played in the destruction of Yemeni cultural heritage, constituting an unmet global challenge, thereby contributing a gridlock within the agency itself. Meskell and Isakhan state that, factors such as a high level of interdependence within UNESCO, a high number of Member States and the veto power each Member State holds, contributes greatly toward UNESCO’s gridlock, particularly in situations of conflict.15 Meskell suggests that donations (Table 4.2) received by UNESCO from Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are at the centre of this interdependence, with UNESCO reliant on such funds to function since the US ceased its annual contributions in 2011. It follows that the greater a country’s financial contribution to UNESCO, the greater influence said country has on UNESCO’s budget and programmes.16 It is outwith the scope of this research to discuss the political agendas behind such donations and the inherent political nature of UNESCO, particularly the WHCo. Meskell provides detailed insight on such issues.17 However, for the purpose of this book, it is important to acknowledge how the ongoing conflict and other potential factors at play may have influenced UNESCO’s fragmented engagement with Yemen.

13

Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 5. Khalidi (2015, 2017) and Meskell and Isakhan (2020). 15 Meskell and Isakhan (2020), pp. 5–6. 16 Meskell (2018), p. 79. 17 Meskell (2013, 2014, 2015a, b, 2018). 14

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Table 4.3 UNESCO engagement with Syria (2007–2020). Source: UNESCO Official Website UNESCO/Syria engagement Activities News Events a

During peacetime 2 1 2

During conflict a 4 51 1

Total 6 52 3

Post-March 2011

4.1.2

UNESCO’s Engagement with Syria: World Heritage Centre Profile

From the data on activities, news statements and events collated on Syria’s WHC profile, it is evidenced that UNESCO has increased its engagement with the country since the outbreak of significant unrest in 2011.18 As shown in Table 4.3, there has been a huge increase in news statements, rising from one in peacetime to 51 during conflict, while registered activities have doubled and registered events have halved. Of the 51 news statements published during the conflict in Syria, 29 (57%) can be classified as passive in nature, with the vast majority of these deploring or condemning the destruction of Syrian cultural heritage or calling on parties to the conflict to cease the destruction of cultural heritage and make efforts to aid in its safeguarding. Others celebrate the liberation of Palmyra and condemn the loss of two leading scholars of Syrian Archaeology and the murder, by Da’esh, of the former head of antiquities at the ancient city of Palmyra, Khaled al Assad to whom there is also a dedicated In Memoriam. There are then 22 media statements (43%), which this study classifies as active, including the listing of Syria’s six WHSs on the List of World Heritage in Danger, the launch of the Emergency Red List of Syrian Antiquities at Risk, training activities, damage assessments and expert meetings on emergency measures. As evidenced by Fig. 4.1, UNESCO’s news statements and therefore overall engagement in Syrian cultural heritage during the conflict peaked with 15 statements in 2015, which, as previously discussed, was a significant year for cultural heritage destruction in Syria. During said year, many motions were made within UNESCO and the UN to better facilitate heritage safeguarding in conflict zones, following which the WHC’s engagement diminishes year on year, until 2019 when zero news statements were registered, and 2020 when one was registered. This single 2020 statement regarding ‘Recommendations of the Technical Meeting on the Recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra’ was not published until 17 July 2020, despite the meeting having taken place some seven months earlier on 18 December 2019. The statement consists of a brief summary of the meeting, while the supporting document consists of three pages detailing the recommendations. It can also be seen 18

For the purpose of this study, I will consider UNESCO’s response to the Syrian conflict from March 2011, as the organisation consistently refers to this date as the beginning of said conflict. This is despite it being declared an armed conflict in May 2012.

4.1

World Heritage Centre Profile Analysis

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Fig. 4.1 Number of WHC news statements regarding Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi cultural heritage (2007-2020). Source: UNESCO Official Website

that the WHC was not reporting on or engaging with Syrian cultural heritage to any great extent prior to the outbreak of significant unrest on 15 March 2011. The first news statement published on Syria’s WHC profile was on 8 August 2008, detailing a newsletter in French on the progress of the ‘France Unesco Convention projects’. It includes the bullet point, “‘Ancient Villages’ of northern Syria: workshop and awareness. idlib, April 11–12, 2008”.19 There are no further statements until 30 March 2012, just over one year following the outbreak of significant unrest (but shortly prior to the situation being declared an armed conflict). Lababidi and Qassar commented, One year following the onset of the uprising...the international community, represented by UNESCO, expressed for the first time, their concerns about the safety of Syrian heritage through an appeal, directed by Irina Bokova, [DG] of UNESCO, to Assad’s forces and his opponents to protect Syrian heritage.20

The WHC has published an average of 5.1 news statements per year on Syrian cultural heritage since the outset of unrest in 2011. Six activities are logged on Syria’s WHC profile, four of which have taken place post-March 2011. The first, titled ‘Support research into ancient mosaics of the Ma’arat an-Noman Museum, Syrian Arab Republic’, centres on documentation. UNESCO states that, the project consisted of following up on work carried out as part of a doctoral dissertation on a corpus of 80 mosaics from the Byzantine era. . .by updating the bibliography, to allow more in-depth study of the context of archaeological discovery, enriching the epigraphical features, and providing an up-to-date transcription.21

19

UNESCO (2008). Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 346. 21 UNESCO (n.d.-b). 20

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Such a project builds upon the documentation and research previously executed and therefore does not require the facilitation of on-the-ground work in Syria during the conflict. The second activity logged during the Syrian conflict is the previously mentioned Satellite-Based Damage Assessment of Cultural Heritage Sites 2015, followed by a project proposal for the ‘Emergency Safeguarding of the Portico of the Temple of Bel in Palmyra (Syrian Arab Republic)’. This activity proposes a US $150,000 funded project centred on a thorough analysis of the available documentation, sound assessment of the damages and the consolidation of the Portico of the Temple of Bel.22 Around the time of publication of this proposal, it can be seen from WHC news statements, that from 24 to 26 April 2016 the organisation “sent a Rapid Assessment mission to the [W]orld Heritage site of Palmyra. . .led by the Director of the [WHC]”.23 Moreover, on their return, the UNESCO experts presented their preliminary findings regarding the WHS. The experts are said to have identified emergency measures “to consolidate and secure the building and the considerable work that will be required to document, evacuate, safeguard and restore whatever is possible”, while “[w]ork to match and document the fragments of destroyed statues ha[d] already begun”. Nevertheless, it does also state that participants had to examine damages to the Temple of Bel from a distance, as the edifice [was] still inaccessible and demining operations [had] not yet been completed. Likewise, the Mamluk Citadel, overlooking the ancient city, which also sustained serious damage, remain [ed] inaccessible.24

Although some initial damage assessment work took place, the Portico of the Temple of Bel could not have been afforded a detailed assessment or emergency consolidation, nor any form of reconstruction at that time. The site of Palmyra incurred further damage with the destruction of the Tetrapylon and severe damage to the Theatre in January 2017.25 While Palmyra has been under the control of an NSA, such as Da’esh, UNESCO has been unable to engage safeguarding initiatives at the site. In such instances when the SHI, and consequently UNESCO, are unable to obtain sufficient access to heritage sites due to said location being beyond State control, Danti recommends grassroots efforts among local citizens as the “best and most reliable method for protecting heritage” and such efforts should be “bolstered through international cooperation and assistance”.26 In the case of Palmyra, the location was recaptured in early March 2017, after which UNESCO announced the completion of the conservation of the Lion of Al-lāt statue, previously damaged by Da’esh, from the ancient city on 17 December 2017,27 and published recommendations of the technical meeting on the recovery of

22

UNESCO (n.d.-c). UNESCO (2016a). 24 UNESCO (2016b). 25 UNESCO (2017a). 26 Danti (2015), p. 141. 27 UNESCO (2017b). 23

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World Heritage Centre Profile Analysis

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Table 4.4 UNESCO engagement with Iraq (2007–2020). Source: UNESCO Official Website UNESCO/Iraq engagement Activities News Events

During peacetime 0 0 1

During conflict a 3 30 2

Post-conflict 0 4 0

Total 3 34 3

a This encompasses the conflicts from 2003–2011 and 2014–2017. In December 2017, a government victory was declared. Council on Foreign Relations (2021) states, “In late April 2018, the US military officially disbanded the command overseeing the fight against [Da’esh] in Iraq, declaring an end to major combat operations against the group.” Currently Iraq is deemed to be experiencing political instability, with many ongoing protests in the country (Global Conflict Tracker 2021)

Palmyra.28 It would seem no further action was taken on the emergency conservation of the Portico of the Temple of Bel, meaning the follow-through on this proposed project fell short of its intentions. The fourth and final activity registered during the Syrian conflict, as of 26 November 2021, concerns the publication of a 143-page book titled ‘Five Years of Conflict: The State of Cultural Heritage in the Ancient City of Aleppo’. This publication provides a remote assessment of 518 properties, including the Citadel and the Great Mosque (Omayyad Mosque). In coordination and cooperation with UNITAR-UNOSAT imagery analysis, as well as historians, architects and archaeologists, UNESCO was able to carry out a remote assessment via satellite imagery, allowing it to monitor otherwise inaccessible areas for the first time.29 As we can see from such activities carried out for Syrian cultural heritage, the vast majority of the work is facilitated remotely due to the security risks of UNESCO officials entering the country to work on-the-ground; it was made evident from UNESCO’s rapid assessment mission to Palmyra that such on-the-ground work requires a UN security force escort. In lieu of being able to carry out work in Syria, a First Aid Technical Assistance Workshop for three WHSs in Syria, namely Crac des Chevaliers, Palmyra and the Ancient city of Damascus, was held at the UNESCO Beirut field office 13–15 December 2016. Cultural heritage experts and the technical staff of the DGAM attended this workshop. From this meeting, urgent interventions and restoration work was recommended for the site of Crac des Chevaliers “to avoid further degradation of the masonry” as well as further detailed assessment of the site to ascertain any less urgent work necessary, while further documentation and diagnosis was recommended for the site of Palmyra.30 Additionally, revision of DGAM’s restoration plans for the Old Ottoman Bank, seriously damaged by the fire that spread in al-Asrooniya neighbourhood in the Ancient City of Damascus, was advised, along with a recommendation to urgently “protect the building from further degradation due to weathering”.31 As an outcome of damage assessments carried out

28

UNESCO (2020). UNESCO (2018). 30 UNESCO (2016c). 31 UNESCO (2016c). 29

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on each of these WHSs, UNESCO published detail reports on their condition, as of mid-December 2016. Such documents are considered when detailing UNESCO’s preparedness, emergency response and reconstruction and recovery actions for Syrian cultural heritage in Chaps. 5 and 6.

4.1.3

UNESCO’s Engagement with Iraq: World Heritage Centre Profile

From the data on activities, news statements and events collated on Iraq’s WHC profile, unsurprisingly UNESCO increased its engagement with Iraq during the conflict. As evidenced by Table 4.4, the WHC news statements on Iraqi cultural heritage rose from zero during peacetime, to 30 during conflict, while registered activities rose from zero to three, and the number of events doubled from one to two. Of the 30 news statements published during conflict in Iraq, 15 (50%) could be categorised as passive, i.e. responding to the actions of others, without proffering any form of active engagement. They chiefly serve to condemn the acts of terrorist organisations against cultural heritage, and to call on parties to the conflict to protect Iraqi cultural heritage, therefore relying on the compliance of other actors.32 The remaining 15 (50%) news statements could be categorised as active. They include the inscription of sites on the World Heritage List, the adoption of relevant UNSCRs, the addition of the site of Hatra to the List of World Heritage in Danger, as well as the launch of an Emergency Response Action Plan to safeguard Iraqi heritage, a conservation project and a rapid assessment mission. Unlike Yemen and Syria, Iraq is now in a post-conflict situation. Since the official end of the conflict in December 2017, the WHC has registered four news statements, all of which can be constituted as active in nature. Three of these relate to the ongoing UNESCO flagship Mosul initiative, which is considered in detail in Chap. 6, while the remaining statement covers the listing of Babylon as a WHS. The WHC has published an average of 2.1 news statements per year on Iraqi cultural heritage during both recent Iraq conflicts, occurring from 2003 to 2011 and from 2014 to 2017. Moreover, the WHC has published an average of 1.3 media statements per year on Iraqi cultural heritage in the recent post-conflict period of December 2017–2020. There are three activities registered on Iraq’s WHC profile, which occurred as the country experienced conflict, the first being the International Coordination Committee for the Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage of Iraq.33 This activity, which took place late 2003, could be construed as a response to the outbreak of conflict in March of the same year, when commenced the US Invasion. The Committee referred to operates under the auspices of the Iraqi authorities and “is composed of international 32 33

UNESCO (n.d.-d). UNESCO (2003).

4.1

World Heritage Centre Profile Analysis

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experts and of representatives of foundations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations funding or implementing activities for the safeguarding of the Iraqi cultural heritage”.34 UNESCO states, The role of this Committee is to review various ongoing activities in support of national cultural heritage rehabilitation efforts according to priorities set out by the Iraqi authorities and to ensure that international assistance is carried out at the highest international standards.35

It is clear that this committee, which is largely composed of actors outwith UNESCO, and is merely facilitated by the organisation, does not constitute any form of on-the-ground engagement from UNESCO to facilitate or take a central role in the safeguarding or reconstruction of Iraqi cultural heritage during the conflict. Instead, it is reliant on any such progress being implemented by the Iraqi counterparts, namely SBAH. The second activity registered concerns the Report on Damage Assessments in Babylon,36 which was published by the International Coordination Committee for the Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage of Iraq—Subcommittee on Babylon, again led by the Iraqi authorities and various experts brought together by UNESCO. Initial efforts to document and assess the condition of the site of Babylon began on 24 June 2005 during the Special Session at UNESCO HQ, which also aimed at “devising measures to mitigate the damage, coordinating activities and efforts, and assisting the Iraqi authorities to prepare an overall conservation and management plan for the site of Babylon”.37 On the webpage, which details this information, a hyperlink has been created over “conservation and management plan for the site of Babylon”,38 linking to the ‘Final Report on Damage Assessments in Babylon’ PDF page on the UNESDOC Digital Library. However, upon review of this document, published just over 4 years later on 26 June 2009, and 6 years after a military base was originally installed, covering 150 ha of the site, the report does not detail any such conservation or management plan. Instead, it provides a detailed damage assessment both pre- and post-2003.39 Additionally, the third recommendation gleaned from this report states that based “on the results of the assessment and aforementioned archaeological investigations, the SBAH should develop and implement a site management conservation plan for Babylon in close cooperation and consultation with the UNESCO International Coordination Committee – Babylon Sub-Committee”.40 In 2018, the Government of Iraq nominated Babylon for inscription on the World Heritage List, and with this nomination, SBAH developed and proposed a management plan for the site. Of course, Babylon was then inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2019. 34

UNESCO (2003). UNESCO (2003). 36 UNESCO (2009a). 37 UNESCO (2009a). 38 UNESCO (2009a). 39 UNESCO (2009b). 40 UNESCO (2009b), p. 20. 35

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Returning to the activity itself, it is clear that, as with many issues relating to conservation of sites, the onus was on the national counterpart, SBAH, while the Committee, established by UNESCO, assumed a monitoring and technical advisory role. It is evident that SBAH moved slowly in developing such a management plan, however, as has been previously established, the SHI has been poorly financed since the outbreak of conflict in 2003 and is therefore majorly lacking in capacity. The question then arises as to whether such a weak and ill-supported institution has the capacity to implement such a management plan effectively to ensure the continual conservation of the new WHS of Babylon. The third and final activity registered on Iraq’s WHC profile is the aforementioned Satellite-Based Damage Assessment of Cultural Heritage Sites 2015 Summary Report of Iraq, Nepal, Syria & Yemen.41 The two events scheduled during conflict in Iraq pertain to the third ad hoc meeting of experts on Babylon on 12 November 2007,42 and a meeting of the International Coordination Committee for the Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage of Iraq on 13–14 November 2007.43 The former meeting of the experts on Babylon discussed progress achieved since the previous meeting, just under 2 years earlier,44 presumably producing a damage assessment and conservation and management plan. The latter meeting had four themes on the agenda, namely historical monuments and archaeological sites; museums and cultural institutions; intangible cultural heritage; and libraries and archives,45 all of which were to be covered within the 9 h scheduled over the 2-day meeting. The International Coordination Committee officially met on five occasions on the following dates: 24–25 May 2004; 22–23 June 2005; 13–14 November 2007; 12–13 January 2010; and 3–4 April 2011.46 The Committee is not recorded to have convened at any point during the second outbreak of conflict commencing 2014. Lababidi and Qassar record that the last registered meeting in 2011, “discussed the work at and the condition of the archaeological site of Babylon” and that “the committee planned the next meeting in Baghdad in 2012, which apparently never occurred”.47 On the UNESCO website, only the opening speeches by the then DG of UNESCO, Koichiro Matsuura for the 2004 and 2005 sessions, and the final report and final recommendations from the third session in 2007 are accessible. Unfortunately, there are no official documents publically available for the fourth and fifth sessions in 2010 and 2011 respectively. In terms of tangible outcomes, it was announced at the second International Coordination Committee session in 2005, that on 20 May 2004, US$5.5 million was approved over a 3-year period for the rehabilitation of Iraqi cultural heritage. Matsuura states, “Phase I activities carried out in 2004 were financed to a large extent through a [US] 41

UNESCO (n.d.-e). UNESCO (2007a). 43 UNESCO (2007b). 44 UNESCO (2007a). 45 UNESCO (2007b). 46 UNESCO (n.d.-f). 47 Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 344. 42

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$1.5 million contribution from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”48 At the second International Coordination Committee session on 22–23 June 2005, he further states that “Phase II costed at [US]$2 million, for which the tendering process has been initiated with potential donors, could be implemented in the second half of 2005”.49 As with Phase one, the second phase was to cover “capacity building and training and concerns, national cultural and educational policies”.50 Prior to these five sessions, which took place over a period of 8 years, UNESCO convened three expert meetings as an immediate response to the looting of the Iraqi National Museum in 2003. The first meeting was held at UNESCO HQ on 17 April 2003 and focused on making “a comprehensive preliminary assessment”, while the second meeting “held jointly with the British Museum in London on 29 April [2003], focused on the urgent needs for the rehabilitation of the National Museum”.51 At the third meeting, which was held on 1 August 2003 in Tokyo “needs for the rehabilitation of the Museum, particularly the laboratories and storage areas, were clearly identified”.52 It was from such meetings that the International Coordination Committee for the Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage of Iraq came to fruition under the auspices of the Iraqi Government and UNESCO, as well as its “statutes in order to ensure the implementation of the recommendations of the meetings and the missions”.53 “According to what was suggested in the first two out of three meetings, two UNESCO missions were sent to Iraq in 2003”.54 As stated by Matsuura, the “two missions dispatched by UNESCO to Iraq in May and June 2003 made an initial assessment of the extent of the damage and losses sustained.” Moreover, a “list of priority tasks was drawn up in coordination with the Director of the Museum, the Director of Research and the [DG] of the Department of Iraqi Antiquities”.55

4.1.4

Data Comparison: Yemen, Syria and Iraq

From the data presented above, it can be seen that Yemen, Syria and Iraq have each unsurprisingly registered greater engagement from UNESCO since the start of their respective conflicts. Laurie Rush asserts that, “due to the conflicts, there is a greater need for UNESCO to be present in these countries”.56 Although this does not mean

48

UNESCO Director-General (2005), p. 3. UNESCO Director-General (2005), p. 3. 50 UNESCO Director-General (2005), p. 3. 51 UNESCO Director-General (2004), pp. 2–3. 52 UNESCO Director-General (2004), p. 3. 53 Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 344. 54 Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 343. 55 UNESCO Director-General (2004), p. 3. 56 Rush (2020), personal communication. 49

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14 12 10 8 6

4 2 0

Yemen

Syria Passive

Iraq

Acve

Fig. 4.2 WHC’s passive and active news statements regarding cultural heritage in Yemen, Syria and Iraq (2015). Source: UNESCO Official Website

the organisation would continually exhibit a higher rate of engagement with the countries regarding their cultural heritage, as there are other factors at play, which have influenced UNESCO’s ability to engage throughout the conflicts, it does signify that when cultural heritage, particularly World Heritage, is at risk, UNESCO does exhibit greater involvement. As documented in each country’s WHC profile, UNESCO exhibited its highest degree of engagement during 2015. This data showing an increase in engagement from UNESCO during conflict is in line with Meskell’s assertion that preservation, conservation and recovery has increasingly supplanted discovery and cultural reform when it comes to UNESCO’s activities.57 The majority of UNESCO’s activities across Yemen, Syria and Iraq have stemmed from destruction of heritage, and a consequent interest in either documenting said damage or reconstructing damaged and destroyed heritage. According to statements and recorded activities, the WHC has engaged the least with Yemen, documenting only 11 news statements over 12 years, two activities and one event. Following that logic, Yemen has received the lowest average media engagement from the WHC during its conflict, closely followed by Iraq. Syria has received the most media engagement, with most of that engagement falling between the years of 2012 and 2017, mirroring the years when Dr Maamoun Abdulkarim held the position of DG of DGAM in Syria. Meskell recounts a similar imbalance of engagement between Yemen and Syria at the 39th session of the WHCo in Bonn, 2015, stating, “Yemen’s plight was grave, yet the members of the [WHCo] remained largely silent, a stark comparison with their robust responses and many hours of debate about Syria.”58 Later, consideration is given to the implications and potential effects of such factors as shifting SHIs on UNESCO’s engagement with all three countries during their respective conflicts, as well as post-conflict in Iraq. 57 58

Meskell (2018), p. 72. Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 9.

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It is clear from Fig. 4.1 that UNESCO’s high level of engagement dropped off significantly after 2015. This could signify that the commitments and goals outlined by UNESCO’s 2015 strategy, as discussed in Chap. 2 were not sustained beyond 2015 in Yemen and Iraq, nor beyond 2016 in Syria. However, in order to determine whether this high volume of news statements is not merely from passive responses condemning a high volume of attacks on cultural heritage, this study looks more closely at the type of media statements issued for all three countries during 2015. As evidenced by Fig. 4.2, of the six news statements published in 2015 regarding Yemeni cultural heritage, three are passive, while three are active. On two occasions during 2015, UNESCO condemned the destruction of cultural heritage in Yemen. Of the 15 news statements published in 2015 regarding Syrian cultural heritage, 13 are passive, while two are active. On six occasions, UNESCO condemned the destruction of cultural heritage in Syria and, on a further two occasions, deplored the loss of two leading scholars of Syrian Antiquity and the killing of Khaled Al-Assad. Of the 16 news statements published that same year relating to Iraqi cultural heritage, 10 are passive and six are active. On four occasions, UNESCO condemned the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq. The year 2015 realises a greater number of media statements condemning attacks on cultural heritage across Yemen, Syria and Iraq compared with other years. For Yemen, 50% of all statements during 2015 were passive in nature while 33% of all statements constituted responses to attacks; for Syria, 87% of all statements during 2015 were passive in nature while 53% of all statements constituted responses to attacks; and for Iraq, 63% of all statements during 2015 were passive in nature while 25% of all statements constituted responses to attacks. These figures determine that, even during its most prolific year in terms of engagement with Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi cultural heritage, the WHC’s engagement was passive and highly reactive in nature, which subsequently filtered down to how units as Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) were able to act. It is plausible that the WHC were merely powerless to engage in an emergency response capacity in areas controlled by NSAs, as UNESCO would have no SHI with which to cooperate. However, 10 years on from the start of the Syrian conflict, this situation of gridlock, which the WHC find themselves bound by, has not changed. Meskell has proffered that UNESCO have retreated into two key responses, namely awareness raising and technocratic functionality.59 With much of UNESCO’s responses to heritage crises rooted in responses such as condemnation of attacks, workshops, conferences, exhibitions and social media campaigns, the likes of Unite4Heritage, which Meskell states is, although admirable, “largely digital and severely under-funded.”60 In the case of both Yemen and Syria, we can see that UNESCO, in their unwillingness to get involved in conflict, have resorted to what Meskell and Isakhan have called “impasse management”,61 meaning UNESCO 59

Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 3. Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 4. 61 Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 4. 60

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largely ignore or fail to engage in major issues so as to avoid fuelling further conflict. Meskell criticises this impasse management approach, calling it a short-term strategy, and proffers that issues pertaining to conflicts require to be addressed appropriately in the international arena, with multilateral organisations such as UNESCO acting as a platform and mediator, as it has done so for issues such as apartheid, racism and gender equity.62 Instead of having any debate around the issue of intentional targeting of cultural heritage in an attempt to understand better the motivations behind such attacks, UNESCO has only offered condemnation,63 epitomising the concept of impasse management; there exists no real dialogue from UNESCO on how to prevent such destruction in the first instance. Despite this exhibition of impasse management, in this technocratic capacity, UNESCO is acting within its legal mandate and obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention. Nonetheless, it remains discordant with its 2015 strategy, which indicated UNESCO’s expected increase in engagement with heritage protection initiatives in conflict-ridden countries, specifically citing the need to strengthen the ability of Member States to prevent, mitigate and recover the loss of cultural heritage, which would involve improved collaboration with SHIs. Resulting from their research into the international response to the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria, Lababidi and Qassar, establish the key outcome recommendations from the international community, led by UNESCO. They are: “security measures for archaeological sites; security measures for museums; monitoring and assessing the damages; security measures to fight illicit trafficking; capacity building/training; raising awareness; and call to ratify and implement the conventions”.64 Lababidi and Qassar (2016) declare there to be a repetitive pattern of recommendations and actions adopted by the international community, led by UNESCO, despite the differences between cases, in addition to the lack of proven effectiveness of such recommendations. The news statements, activities and events registered under the Yemeni WHC profile show that the WHC’s response to the destruction of, or risk to, Yemeni cultural heritage, has not deviated from this pattern as established by its response to Syria and Iraq. Greater analysis of this pattern is undertaken when considering UNESCO’s programmes and initiatives in Yemen during the conflict in Chap. 5, to ascertain to what extent it applies. Furthermore, Lababidi and Qassar also acknowledge that UNESCO and its partners’ response to such crises is generally framed by a risk-avoidance attitude and delayed action.65 This has been evidenced across all three countries. For example, Lababidi and Qassar record that it was not until February 2013 that UNESCO made a practical step to protect Syrian heritage.66 This practical step was a 3-day regional training workshop in the UNESCO office in Amman, Jordan, to address the illicit trafficking

62

Meskell (2018), p. 167. Meskell (2018), p. 186. 64 Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 356. 65 Lababidi and Qassar (2016), pp. 355–358. 66 Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 346. 63

4.2

The Effect of Conflict on UNESCO’s Ability to Engage with Key. . .

107

of Syrian artefacts.67 Lababidi and Qassar acknowledge, “relevant regional and international heritage experts, police and customs officials, auction houses, and the [DGAM]” attended this workshop,68 however the resultant use and impact of such training remains to be evidenced.69

4.2

The Effect of Conflict on UNESCO’s Ability to Engage with Key National Counterparts

As UNESCO’s work is not strictly considered humanitarian relief, the organisation is subject to the restrictions of the UN Department for Safety and Security (UN DSS). For this reason, UNESCO cannot gain entry into a country until the UN DSS grants clearance. The UN DSS has a Security Level System (SLS), which evaluates five categories, including armed conflict. These levels range from one (minimal) to six (extreme). Giovanni Boccardi states, if a location is in level four (substantial) to six, only lifesaving missions are permitted, “and, of course, it is difficult to argue that restoring a museum is a lifesaving mission.”70 In such cases, UNESCO try to assist their national counterparts from outside the relevant country as much as possible.71 As UNESCO is an intergovernmental agency, its primary national counterparts are, of course, governments, and key authorities, both at national and local levels. As previously mentioned, the key counterparts for UNESCO in Yemen, Syria and Iraq are GOAM and GOPHCY, DGAM, and SBAH respectively. In determining UNESCO’s role in, and capability to engage in, heritage protection during armed conflict, it is important to ascertain how the organisation’s relationship with such national counterparts has changed as a result of the recent and ongoing conflicts in each of these countries. By combining the above data gleaned from the WHC, and key interview data, primarily from UNESCO field office officials and key government officials, this study demonstrates a more nuanced illustration of the effect of conflict on UNESCO’s engagement with Yemen, Syria and Iraq. One of the key influencing factors in determining the level of involvement UNESCO can have in the protection of a country’s cultural heritage is the shifting political motivations of the IGO’s Member States; any form of political instability can affect UNESCO’s ability to engage with a government. With the conflict and post-conflict phase being synonymous with political instability, it is inevitable that UNESCO faces challenges when it comes to engaging with Yemen, Syria and Iraq. There was a consensus on this point among those

67

UNESCO (2013). Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 346. 69 Interview data from previous DG of DGAM, Dr Maamoun Abdulkarim, showed him to find this event useful to establish greater contacts with the international community. 70 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 71 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 68

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interviewed for this research. Rene Teijgeler states, “[d]ifferent Member States’ political positions can greatly impact UNESCO’s ability to engage with a country”.72 This opinion is seconded by Peter Stone73 and Giovanni Boccardi, who states, “UNESCO is not an organisation that exists in a scientific and technical world of its own; it has always been a political organisation, and culture is an inherently political topic.”74

4.2.1

UNESCO’s Relationship with GOAM and GOPCHY

When it comes to Yemen, it is clear there has been severe fractionalisation in the country, with territories shifting between the UN recognised government and the Houthi Rebels, the key shift being the control of Sana’a to the latter. Interviewee B states that, “as mainly the UN is based in Sana’a, we also have to deal with the other party to the conflict[, the Houthi Rebels]. We keep in touch, not at a formal level, but more at a technical level.”75 With regard to formal engagement with GOAM and GOPHCY, UNESCO prefers “to bypass the issue of political involvement” by using the semi-governmental organisation, SFD, as a facilitator. This is an organisation which, Iamandi states, “has always been an important partner in all projects UNESCO have carried out in Yemen.”76 GOAM and GOPHCY are normally based in Sana’a, but as has been established, there has been significant shifts to Aden, where the recognised government resides, and consequent changes in staffing. Another key factor previously established is the weak state of GOAM and GOPHCY. Prior to, and even more so during the conflict, both institutions were poorly financed, with key officials having to source an income elsewhere. Taking such factors into consideration, and with SFD acting as mediator, UNESCO Doha does not appear to have a strong rapport with Yemeni SHIs. Interviewee B confirmed that, in fact, UNESCO “do not have any direct contact with GOAM or GOPHCY”.77 It should be noted that this interview was carried out prior to the designated project office for the CfW scheme in Sana’a being established. Following the establishment of this office in Sana’a, solely occupied by Nabil Monassar, who remains recognised as a Vice Chairman of GOPHCY, albeit unfunded by the Yemeni government, UNESCO may have developed greater communications with the relevant institutions. Monassar did confirm, “engagement between UNESCO and GOPHCY and GOAM is made easier by the project

72

Teijgeler (2020), personal communication. Stone (2020), personal communication. 74 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 75 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 76 Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 77 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 73

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office”.78 Mohanad Al-Sayani corroborates this communication takes place by confirming that there are “some meetings and negotiations that are held between specialists at UNESCO and GOAM.”79 The establishment of a project office in Sana’a and the hiring of the head of GOPHCY have proved two great moves for UNESCO towards strengthening communication and ties with the relevant Yemeni authorities. Through this single personnel appointment, UNESCO can tap into all of Monassar’s Yemeni connections, established both from his decades of experience working with Yemeni heritage, and his time at a government institution. Moreover, UNESCO Doha also has direct contact with the MoC, based in Aden, under which GOPCHY sits. Interviewee B stated, “We keep them abreast by informing them of the damage/needs assessment results, the choices of buildings we have identified for restoration or reconstruction, etc.”80 In dealing with the MoC, UNESCO is, by default, engaging with the UN recognised Yemeni Government. It was further expressed that “it is important that UNESCO keep everybody involved and informed, with the same level of information”.81 Interviewee C acknowledged that the “main issue. . .is the lack of stable counterparts [in Yemen].”82 Moreover, the strong political fragmentation is negatively affecting the preservation strategy and the ability to make a comprehensive and inclusive effort. The lack of one robust counterpart means we cannot effectively coordinate the development of programmes. In all other countries, we have UN development assistant framework and the transition strategy, documenting the capacity gaps from the national perspective, which then allows to better articulate the projects within the one cooperation framework. In Yemen, this is not possible as there is a lot of dilution and dispersion of efforts.83

Monassar seconds this opinion, acknowledging that the “relevant institutions in Yemen must be strengthened, and capacities must be built”.84 The solution remains with the Yemeni Government’s provision of appropriate-level salaries for state heritage authorities, which will attract and maintain capable and competent personnel. Currently, with the international restrictions facing Yemen, UNESCO has to find other avenues to ensure financial support is made available. Interviewee C explains, “UNESCO is working through third parties, and intermediary partners, who have greater flexibility in channelling their resources to Yemen; an example of such a partner is OXFAM.”85 This appears to be the situation with SFD, a neutral and well-respected organisation within Yemen. Despite this, as can be seen from the above data gleaned from WHC media statements regarding Yemen, UNESCO had scant engagement with the country prior

78

Monassar (2020), personal communication. Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 80 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 81 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 82 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 83 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 84 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 85 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 79

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to the outbreak of conflict in 2015, meaning, despite the obvious difficulties, the organisation is building a stronger and more meaningful relationship with the relevant national counterparts than was previously the case. Monassar states, “UNESCO was late to be engaged with Yemen, [and] the current initiatives in the country would not have happened had it not been for the conflict.”86 When it comes to Yemen, there is a tension between UNESCO only exhibiting meaningful engagement as a response to crimes against cultural heritage during the conflict, and the organisation attempting to build this engagement with the national counterparts when conditions are at their worst. As a result, while doing so, the organisations must navigate political instability, lack of on-the-ground access, blockades, lack of security, etc. From the late Mohanad Al-Sayani’s perspective, “the conflict has made communication between UNESCO and GOAM really difficult”, with the majority of such interactions taking place via WhatsApp and email.87 With such necessities as face-to-face, and on-the-ground communication not often being feasible, any major initiatives, such as the CfW scheme will be difficult to coordinate, alongside SFD. When asked how UNESCO’s relationship is with GOAM and GOPHCY, Interviewee C replied, The relationship is going well. We are working at the technical level and have been working on cooperation with them for over 20 years. They have played a part in the training workshops, which took place in 2019 (they comprised four training workshops for Yemenis, with one taking place in Djibouti, one in Cairo, and two in Jordan. The relationship has been very successful.88

Despite this, it is possible that there are still fractious issues between the two parties. For example, UNESCO has had to utilise the third-party cultural heritage unit of SFD for the implementation of programmes as they are “far more credible to supervise technical studies” than the government agencies, “given their lack of capabilities”.89 This also means that funds for Yemeni initiatives are channelled through SFD. Interviewee C recounts, The only concern and somehow criticism [GOAM and GOPCHY] have of [UNESCO], is they would like to receive direct financial contribution..., which [UNESCO] cannot do, because [it does] not have all the assurances that the funds would not be mismanaged. Instead, [UNESCO] channel[s] the funds through SFD to ensure strong monitoring and evaluation, to avoid corruption and mismanagement.90

The UNESCO and national counterpart relationship has not been able to function, as it normally should, given the variety of issues raised. In addition, with SFD assuming the role of national implementer, much of the responsibility to involve GOAM and GOPHCY in the UNESCO-led initiatives, lies with them. Interviewee C has expressed to SFD “the importance of having GOPHCY fully engaged” with them 86

Monassar (2020), personal communication. Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 88 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 89 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 90 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 87

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and UNESCO.91 It is clear that if this inclusivity is not maintained, high levels of distrust may arise between UNESCO and its national counterparts. Regarding UNESCO’s response to the NSA, Houthi Rebels, “initially UNESCO were cautious, and as a result, were not involved in Yemen for around one or two years. They were concerned initially, but they waited to see how the conflict would develop”.92 This is corroborated when we consider the media statements discussed above: at the outset of the Yemeni conflict, UNESCO’s response is majorly passive, with any active responses such as enlistment of sites on the World Heritage in Danger List (2015) or the establishment of an Emergency Action Plan (2015), not requiring the organisation to enter the country. Moreover, the key active initiative in Yemen, namely the CfW scheme, which required on-the-ground engagement, did not commence until 1 September 2018. Citing potential political reasoning behind UNESCO’s decision, Cristina Iamandi states, In GOPHCY, most of those who are Sunni were replaced with people who are Shia. Some of those who worked for GOPHCY, such as Nabil Monassar, went with the Houthis, because, with them on his side, it was the only way to survive and to continue in his professional life. Otherwise, he would have been marginalised. . .Slowly, slowly, when the sides started to be consolidated and the regime began to be recognised by foreign countries, UNESCO decided to get involved.93

However, a key limitation of this particular study into UNESCO’s media statements is that not every move by UNESCO is publicly declared. For example, through qualitative data gathered, it was ascertained that UNESCO provided the Saudis with a no-strike list, which naturally was not publicised, and therefore was not listed as an action on Yemen’s WHC profile. Where feasible, documentary data is crossexamined with interview data to create an accurate as possible representation of UNESCO’s engagement. It is clear that, as an intergovernmental agency, and ultimately being accountable to its Member States, UNESCO is often inhibited by the political stances of those States of which it is comprised. Brian Daniels of University of Pennsylvania, believes “it is fair that UNESCO hesitated to actually get involved in Yemen”,94 suggesting the key issue was the lack of availability of funding to UNESCO to aid in issues pertaining to Yemen. Nonetheless, Daniels does acknowledge the political undertones to this contributory inhibiting factor. In the end, the EU fronted the funds for UNESCO’s key initiative in Yemen.

91

Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 93 Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 94 Daniels (2020), personal communication. 92

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The Impact of Conflict on UNESCO’s Engagement with Yemen, Syria and Iraq

UNESCO Field Office for Yemen

A key issue, which has elicited varying points of views from interviewees conducted for this study, and which is a key influencing factor in developing UNESCO’s relationship with its national counterparts, is the absence of a UNESCO national office in Yemen. As previously mentioned, the UNESCO activities for Yemen are operated out of the regional office in Doha, Qatar. There has never existed a national UNESCO office in Yemen.95 Political implications of this regional office also being responsible for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which are closely implicated in the war, aside, the basic logistics of access during conflict are highly complex. Interviewee B asserts, it is impossible to enter Yemen via Oman because we cannot enter by land, and it is not possible to take a normal flight, so instead we must take a UN flight, yet UN flights only go to certain places.96

In lieu of a national office, UNESCO has taken to establish the aforementioned project office, which expanded to three employees, late 2020-early 2021. Interviewee B explains the endeavour to establish this office was very complicated and took those in the Doha office over a year to achieve.97 Interviewee B further stated, permission for such an office needs to originate from UNESCO HQ, and for that you need to justify the need for it—“sometimes there is more difficulty inside the house than outside the house to make it happen”.98 With the project office, hosted by United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), being established on 15th October 2019,99 this statement suggests that initial efforts for the office setup began late 2018, which aligns with the commencement of the CfW project on 1 September 2018. Such an office, designated to the CfW initiative, is the only guarantee to have very robust close monitoring and evaluation capability on the ground, and to ensure a high standard of basic operations such as the transfer of cash to beneficiaries to allow the project to progress.100 More importantly, “this office will allow UNESCO Doha to reinforce national capacity, and better understand the needs of those living in Yemen, which are forever changing in the conflict context”. The office is designated to the operation of this project alone. Although beyond every party’s control, it is worth noting that, 18 months into this 3-year CfW project, due to Covid19, “it is being managed via Zoom and Skype calls with the Co-ordinator in Yemen, and those who work in the Doha office are, of course, working from home”.101 Moreover, Interviewee B posits, the decision to not have a Yemen national office is

95

Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 97 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 98 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 99 UNESCO (2019). 100 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 101 Interviewee D (2020), personal communication. 96

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“a political decision from UNESCO HQ. For the time being,...there is not a willingness to open a fully-fledged national office in Yemen”.102 A key political issue is, of course, that “Sana’a is ruled by the de facto authorities, while UN entities are only dealing with the internationally recognised government, based in the south, in Aden”.103 There is likely “a reluctance on UNESCO’s part because of the risks entailed in the environment, in addition to their diminished capacities globally”.104 Speaking as a Yemeni national with contacts across various regions and territories in the country, Nabil Monassar believes all parties in Yemen (Sana’a, Aden, Hadhramaut, etc.), are willing to have a UNESCO office in their territory. This was made clear on a UNESCO mission to Sana’a, during which there took place various meetings with the representatives of relevant institutions.105

He suggests that having a national office in Yemen would be much appreciated and helpful to all the parties in Yemen, albeit he does not know how neighbouring countries would react to such a move.106 This proposed sentiment by Monassar propels the notion that the bureaucratic difficulty of establishing a national office and even a project office, as discussed above, originates chiefly with UNESCO’s need to satisfy its various Member States. Nonetheless, the NSA does not have significant weight; “UNESCO would not be able to involve NSAs without the consent of the State and, most of the time, States do not give consent as they consider it an internal issue”.107 However, when asked whether the primary office for Yemen being based in Doha, Qatar was problematic for UNESCO’s initiatives in the country, the late Mohanad Al-Sayani of GOAM, stated, “[w]e do not have any problem with the location of the UNESCO office being in Doha. The office was there both before and after the conflict broke out. The Doha team are cooperative and support us.”108 Monassar is of the opinion that this office [in Sana’a] should have been established a long time ago because it facilitates a centre for cooperation inside the country between different institutions, as well as civil society organisations. Generally speaking, it will allow UNESCO to be more engaged in the situation regarding cultural heritage preservation in Yemen.109

Interviewee D agrees, stating, “When the CfW project was proposed for Yemen, UNESCO should have become stationed in Yemen”.110 Of course, efforts to create the project office only commenced shortly after the CfW project was approved in

102

Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 104 Danti (2020), personal communication. 105 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 106 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 107 Mustafayev (2020), personal communication. 108 Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 109 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 110 Interviewee D (2020), personal communication. 103

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September 2018. It is clear that until very recently, UNESCO saw no real need to establish an office in Yemen. UNESCO states, Despite not having a physical office in the country, UNESCO [Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)] and Yemen have been active in implementing different projects in culture, education, natural science, and communication and information in Yemen. This has been possible with the close partnership with a number of local and international organizations in the country and local experts.111

Moreover, despite access for international staff becoming more difficult following the outbreak of conflict in 2015, and the need for an office in Sana’a consequently increasing, UNESCO delayed any initial action in Yemen until late 2018, when the current UN-recognised government was more widely acknowledged by Member States. This office has the potential to have long-term benefit for UNESCO in Yemen, as it is UNESCO Doha’s goal to see it develop to a fully-fledged or national office.112 Currently, as only national staff are permitted to work in the project office, Interviewee B states, the solution is to send international staff on long-term missions.113 Nonetheless, the rules around sending international staff to Yemen are continuously changing, particularly when it comes to security. For UNESCO in Yemen, the movement of international staff is greatly limited.114 Interviewee B explains, “we need to plan such visits six months in advance, including the allowance of two months to attain a visa. In my entire career, I have never seen such a complicated and difficult environment as Yemen.”115 In addition to having to work according to the will of its various Member States, UNESCO has to face the bureaucracy imposed by a country in conflict when engaging with Yemen. Leiermann states, “with our engagement with Yemen being so complex and sensitive, it is important that it is not entirely carried out via email and phone calls”.116 Interviewee B offers this bottom line on the issue: Like all other agencies, if we have a large project, we should be based there, not in Doha or anywhere else in the region, or even in HQ. It does not make sense to work that way. . .From my perspective, the operation should have moved to Yemen when the conflict began, as did UNOPS.117

It is clear that given the current situation and logistical challenges the Doha team face in facilitating a major initiative in Yemen, an operational office, permitting inclusivity of both national and international staff, would be the natural solution.

111

UNESCO (2019). Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 113 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 114 Leiermann (2019), personal communication. 115 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 116 Leiermann (2019), personal communication. 117 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 112

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It is curious that UNESCO HQ approved the CfW initiative, centred on reconstruction and requiring a lot of on-the-ground presence and collaboration, to operate during the Yemeni conflict, yet HQ will not allow for a functional office, among other UN agencies on the ground in Sana’a. Despite UNESCO not being classed as a humanitarian agent, and so not prioritised to facilitate on-the-ground initiatives during conflict, the Doha team’s project, nonetheless has been greenlit by HQ to operate thus. It would appear that it is up to the field office to figure out how to implement. Interviewee C states, “the established field presence of the project office in Sana’a allowed us to attract additional funding” this time from the UN Peacebuilding Support Office based in New York, and consequently launch a new parallel project in Yemen “on freedom of expression and youth access to the peacebuilding process”.118 If an officially established presence in a country, constituted by one man residing in a project office, can lead to greater funding opportunities for said country, then there is a great argument to solidify this presence in the form of a national office.

4.2.3

UNESCO’s Relationship with DGAM

It can be seen from the data reflected in the media statement study that UNESCO did not engage much with Syria prior to the conflict. Recounting a personal experience, Emma Cunliffe got the impression that UNESCO did not have any detailed knowledge of Syria’s World Heritage before the conflict. She states that when she, was carrying out the damage assessment for Aleppo with UNESCO and UNOSAT, the first major problem we had was trying to ascertain which, within the thousands of buildings within the [WHS], actually contributed to the World Heritage status. UNESCO shared a cadastral plan, with details of individual building plots for the whole city, but it dated to the 1980s. It aligned to a list in a Word Document of plot numbers and historic buildings. It transpired there was no up-to-date information on the status of those actual properties, and there was no real monitoring of any individual property. In the end, not all the buildings on the list could be matched to cadastral plots, and a small portion of the buildings on the list were gone years before any conflict began, but no one in Syria had updated this information with UNESCO, as there was no monitoring taking place in Aleppo in that level of detail.119

Isber Sabrine is of the opinion that “[s]omehow the conflict affected UNESCO’s engagement in Syria in a positive way.”120 Data collated on UNESCO’s media statements regarding Syria, evidenced that, at least, UNESCO’s concern for cultural heritage in the country grew following the outbreak of conflict. The majority of UNESCO’s engagement with Syria occurred during the conflict, more specifically during Abdulkarim’s time as DG of DGAM, i.e. between 2012 and 2017. It has also been established that any major UNESCO engagement in Syria ceased at the end of 118

Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. 120 Sabrine (2020), personal communication. 119

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2017, with only two items of “news” listed on the country’s WHC profile since, with the latter concerning a pathway for the removal of sites from the List of World Heritage in Danger, occurring on 19 November 2020. Abdulkarim reiterates, the “regime is a political system, while the state institutions are the country’s administration.”121 Abdulkarim brings to the foreground the fact that the international community’s position on a government is highly influential in whether a country in need will receive external aid or cooperation. In Syria, the primary challenge for UNESCO stems from changing territory lines amidst the conflict. Regardless of whether UNESCO is willing to engage with the Syrian regime, the rules of the organisation dictate that it must act in accordance with its Member States, who have the power to veto NSA support. This means that UNESCO is typically unable to engage with territories outwith regime control, greatly affecting its access to heritage sites in territories occupied by NSAs. Danti states, “for a while, 60–70% of the country was outside DGAM control,. . .which had a huge impact on UNESCO’s ability to operate.”122 Later in the conflict, “[a]lthough the regime . . .reconquered more territories and now controls over 50%, most of the land east of the Euphrates is still out of their control, making, at least, 40% of the country still unreachable”.123 With Iran and Russia being the only major supporters of the Assad Regime, the majority of the international community remain in opposition. Due to the resultant embargoes and sanctions, Abdulkarim struggled to develop good foreign relations. He further asserts, “[w]e cannot divide the Syrian heritage between the regime and the opposition”.124 It mattered not that at the outset of the conflict in 2012, Abdulkarim kept the work of DGAM as distinct from the regime as was possible and did all in his power to safeguard Syria’s cultural heritage, beginning with the closure of the National Museum of Damascus, followed by others and the evacuation of collections to secure locations.125 DGAM continued to be isolated from the international community. Abdulkarim recounts, this situation “changed in mid-February 2013, when a representative of the UNESCO Office in Amman, Jordan, organized a conference on illicit trafficking of Syrian artefacts”, stating that for him “this was the first contact from the international community as DGAM during the Syrian conflict”.126 From his initial formal contact with UNESCO on 15 March 2012, Abdulkarim claims there developed a good relationship between DGAM and UNESCO. He states, The entire time, my aim was to be transparent and to share information among all the relevant parties. That way, we could benefit from all parties’ expertise and improve upon our

121

Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. Danti (2020), personal communication. 123 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 124 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 125 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 126 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 122

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strategy when necessary. We therefore exchanged all our information with UNESCO when they sent an expert to Palmyra, to Aleppo, and to Damascus. We discussed what we were able to do and what we were not capable of doing. It was a great period of cooperation between UNESCO and Syria.127

As previously mentioned in discussions regarding Yemen, such communication and information sharing is crucial for building trust. At the outset of this time of cooperation between UNESCO and Syria, Irina Bokova invited Abdulkarim to a high-level meeting at UNESCO HQ, also attended by the Special Envoy for the UN to Syria and Directors of ICOMOS, ICCROM, etc., at which he would deliver a lecture on the situation regarding Syria’s cultural heritage.128 At this meeting, a strategy was agreed upon, after which “UNESCO declared new funds from the EU, to support Syrian cultural heritage through DGAM”; this funding was in the form of the Observatory for the Safeguarding of Syria’s Cultural Heritage (‘the Observatory’), which commenced in 2014.129 During the subsequent 3 years, Abdulkarim states, “Syria had the support of UNESCO”; the two parties, along with the EU, met regularly, and UNESCO aided DGAM in “carrying out emergency work, and exchanged information with us to facilitate the safeguarding of the Syrian cultural heritage.”130 Clearly mutual respect and high-level trust was established between Abdulkarim and Irina Bokova, resulting in the receipt of financial support from the EU. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government was aware that Abdulkarim was not a supporter of the regime, and therefore “when they believed they had won the war, they let Abdulkarim go, appointing someone . . .loyal to the regime, namely Mahmoud Hammoud”.131 The view that the current DG of DGAM is pro-regime is also supported by Isber Sabrine132 and Michael Danti.133 Al-Azm further claims, this was a political appointment. . .Mahmoud Hammoud, like others in similar positions in Syria, is there, not to do a job, but to do the bidding of the regime and make it look good. Mahmoud Hammoud promotes the regime narrative, while Maamoun Abdulkarim would never have done that. It is for this reason the international community is now unable to have any serious interaction with DGAM.134

Shortly after Abdulkarim departed his position, Irina Bokova released a statement praising his commitment as DG of DGAM for Syria between 2012 and 2017.135 She stated,

127

Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 129 UNESCO (n.d.-g). 130 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 131 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 132 Sabrine (2020), personal communication. 133 Danti (2020), personal communication. 134 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 135 UNESCO (2017c). 128

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I wish to thank Dr Maamoun Abdulkarim for all these years of collaboration between UNESCO and the DGAM working for the sake of humanity’s common good. I welcome Dr Mahmoud Hammoud as new [DG] of the DGAM, and I wish to reaffirm UNESCO’s commitment to work side by side with all the professionals and associations active on the ground to safeguard Syrian heritage, which represents the soul of the people in Syria and a force to build peace.136

Unfortunately, this great period of cooperation between DGAM and UNESCO did not last. Interviewee G states, the replacement of Abdulkarim in 2017 signalled the regime was siding with its true loyalists. “With the Russians and the Iranians now coming in, as well as a much greater commitment from Hezbollah, the regime therefore did not need to placate, so to speak the YPG and the Kurdish factions as much”.137 Abdulkarim states, “After I left [in 2017] more than 90 percent of the relations have ceased. Now, there exists a cold relationship between UNESCO and DGAM, and there is limited contact between the two parties.”138 He indicates that this shift occurred because of both the change of DG of DGAM as well as the change of DG of UNESCO to Audrey Azoulay.139 In addition, Isber Sabrine states, at the time a key UNESCO staff member was removed from their position in the regional office in Beirut, overseeing Syrian projects, and allocated a new position in the Amman, Jordan office.140 Abdulkarim further proffers, that the drop off in media support has had an impact on sponsor interest.141 With the DGAM triggering an end to communication with UNESCO, the organisation’s consequent withdrawal from engagement, and a lack of media attention on Syrian cultural heritage destruction, it does not seem likely that a high profile Syrian cultural heritage reconstruction initiative is on the horizon beyond that facilitated by Russia. In addition, due to UNESCO’s budgetary issues, such an initiative would require extrabudgetary funding, donated by a Member State, the EU, etc., which would be contingent on there being a strong political will. Abdulkarim elaborated on this lack of financial and technical support from UNESCO. He confirms that since he left his position in 2017, there has been little support for Palmyra, despite its destruction being so widely publicised in 2015 when it was intentionally targeted by Da’esh.142 Abdulkarim further stated, the same can be said for Aleppo, with the exception of a small project underwent by the Aga Khan Foundation under the government in the Russian Federation, to restore the Great Mosque of Aleppo, and [Aid to the Church in Need’s] restoration of the Maronite Cathedral of St. Elijah.143

136

UNESCO (2017c). Interviewee G (2020), personal communication. 138 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 139 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 140 Sabrine (2020), personal communication. 141 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 142 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 143 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 137

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Following Abdulkarim’s departure from the position of DG of DGAM however, Russia signed a MoU with DGAM to provide support in the field of restoration and rehabilitation of Syrian archaeological sites, especially the city of Palmyra.144 UNESCO, of course, is not attached to any of these restoration projects. To clarify these comments, Abdulkarim’s term as DG of DGAM ended on 26 September 2017. UNESCO publicised the successful conservation of the Lion of Al-lāt statue from ancient city of Palmyra on 5 October 2017,145 this project having been initiated during Albdulkarim’s time in office. Subsequently, two further activities for Syria have taken place since Abdulkarim’s departure. Firstly, the UNESCO and UNITARUNOSAT publication detailing damage to cultural heritage in the Ancient City of Aleppo on 17 December 2018146 and secondly, the publication of recommendations of the ‘Technical Meeting on the recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra’ on 17 July 2020 (the meeting itself took place on 18 December 2019).147 It is important to note that UNESCO’s publications regarding these activities do not mention the input of the current DG of DGAM or any other relevant Syrian state institution, only various experts.148 Since being appointed DG of DGAM, Mahmoud Hammoud is only known to have met with UNESCO on one occasion, namely at the same ‘Technical Meeting on the Recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra’ held on 18 December 2019 at UNESCO’s HQ. This technical meeting had “the aim of reflecting on, and discussing the recovery of Palmyra, as a World Heritage property”.149 The previous month, it was announced that Russia and Syria signed an agreement to restore the ancient city of Palmyra, with the only UNESCO involvement as follows: “the formation of an international expert group under the auspices of Unesco and DGAM, together with the Hermitage and Aga Khan Foundation”.150 This indicates the organisation again assuming a technocratic role in this programme, as opposed to an implementer role. Plets suggests, “by strategically mobilizing its diplomatic networks through UNESCO”, Russia is attempting to raise the Assad regime out of international isolation, creating UNESCO-Syria Arab Republic projects to gift the regime with political capital it could use to project itself onto the international stage.151 Russian state-owned news agency, RIA Novosti asserted that Bokova had previously expressed that UNESCO was starting to consider options for preserving and restoring the remnants of Palmyra, and that she wished to do so in close cooperation with the State Hermitage Museum.152 UNESCO’s move away from Syria in late 2017 could be construed as a complete rejection of this tact, preventing Russia

144

Heritage for Peace (2018). UNESCO (2017b). 146 UNESCO (n.d.-i). 147 UNESCO (2020). 148 UNESCO (n.d.-i, 2020). 149 UNESCO (2020). 150 Kishkovsky (2019). 151 Plets (2017), p. 22. 152 RIA Novosti (2016). 145

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from bolstering the image of the Assad regime, cutting its ties with the international community. UNESCO’s potential return to cooperating with Russia in reconstruction projects in Syria could see the Assad regime given a greater platform through exposure to the international community. Abdulkarim acknowledged Mahmoud Hammoud’s meeting with UNESCO and considered it a positive step; however he then proffered that he foresees UNESCO’s immediate future involvement with Syria to centre on publications, training or workshops, yet “for more significant and meaningful support from UNESCO in Palmyra and Aleppo, something big needs to change in terms of the situation in Syria.”153 The central issue evidently lies with the sanctions against Syria. Amr Al-Azm asserts, UNESCO simply “cannot send money to the State of Syria” as the organisation will be in violation of the sanctions”.154 He further states, “the Department of Antiquities, of course, does not have a separate bank account through which it can receive funds from a donor – any funds received go straight to the Treasury and then to the Ministry of Finance”.155 Clearly, there is no viable avenue for UNESCO to get money directly to the Department of Antiquities. When facing such a complex situation as navigating political avenues to find a way to engage with Yemen, UNESCO Doha sought to employ an implementing partner (SFD) to assume the role of mediator between UNESCO and Yemeni state institutions, entrusting SFD with financial management of the project, thus essentially bypassing the Yemeni Government. In Yemen, UNESCO has stronger connections to GOAM and GOPHCY, via their employment of Nabil Monassar. Currently, no such connection exists between UNESCO and DGAM. It is possible that this investment of time and resources by the Doha office is due to Qatari interests in Yemen, whereas Russia is the most likely candidate to step in for the majority of Syrian restoration projects, without the assistance of UNESCO. Despite this however, it must be acknowledged that Syria has made three requests for international assistance since Abdulkarim’s departure, each for US$30,000, all of which were approved.156 The requests were as follows: • Recovery plan for Ancient City of Bosra, approved on 21 December 2018; • Documentation & Emergency Structural Intervention in Qal’at Salah El-Din, approved on 3 March 2020; and • Safeguarding the Damascus Wall and the adjacent Urban Fabric (the area between Bab al-Salam and Bab Touma), approved on 29 October 2020.157 The World Bank, via UNESCO’s international assistance application service, funded this total of US$90,000,158 which pales into insignificance compared to the

153

Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 155 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 156 UNESCO (n.d.-j). 157 UNESCO (n.d.-j). 158 UNESCO (n.d.-j). 154

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US$50.4 million issued by the UAE for the reconstruction of sites in Mosul. Although it is not clear how much of a role, if any, UNESCO played in the implementation of each of these projects, funds were issued to the Syrian Arab Republic through UNESCO channels, for the purpose of cultural conservation during the current iteration of DGAM. As it has not been possible to secure an interview with the current DG of DGAM, Dr Mahmoud Hammoud, no comment is proffered on whether these projects came to fruition and/or the completion stage of same. It is clear however, that it is the State Party, i.e. Syria, which must submit the application for international assistance; this therefore proves Syria is showing a wish to preserve their WHSs and a willingness to seek some level of technical cooperation with UNESCO. This could signify that the decision to engage meaningfully on issues relating to heritage protection and reconstruction on a collaborative project, via DGAM, now lies with UNESCO and the political will of its Member States. It is significant to note that the applications for international assistance were filed via this channel by Syria, during Abdulkarim’s time as DGAM. This may have been due to the fact that both parties were already cooperating with one another. With no active UNESCO programmes underway to provide reconstruction and conservation efforts, Syria must request funds to act independently of the organisation. Regardless of the current situation in Syria however, Abdulkarim believes politics should be put aside to allow for greater support to be afforded DGAM, granting it greater capacity to function during the conflict.159 He finished the interview stating, “The protection of the Syrian cultural heritage is bigger than the ongoing political fight”.160 Although no longer a Member State, US influence can still affect UNESCO’s ability to engage with Syria. With the US Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (Caesar Act) entering into force on 17 June 2020, having being signed by President Trump on 20 December 2019, it is extremely unlikely that there will be any significant move within UNESCO to have a more hands on approach to Syria’s cultural rehabilitation. Section 103 subsection (c) of the Caesar Act states, The strategy described in this subsection is a strategy to deter foreign persons from entering into contracts related to reconstruction in the areas described in subsection (b) for or on behalf of [the Government of Syria; the Government of the Russian Federation; the Government of Iran; or a foreign person that is a military contractor, mercenary, or a paramilitary force knowingly operating in a military capacity inside Syria for or on behalf of the Government of Syria, the Government of the Russian Federation, or the Government of Iran].161

The areas referred to in subsection (b) are those in Syria that the President determines and those under the control of the Government of Syria; the Government of the Russian Federation; the Government of Iran; or a foreign person as described above.162 The Fact Sheet published by the Office of the Spokesperson on 17 June

159

Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 161 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019. 162 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019. 160

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2020 regarding the Caesar Act, summarises this strategy thus: “The Caesar Act also mandates sanctions on those profiting off the Syrian conflict by engaging in reconstruction activities”.163 Although it could hardly be said that UNESCO would profit from any engagement in reconstruction activities in Syria, it is highly unlikely that the organisation’s Member States or the EU would be willing to provide any extrabudgetary funds to engage in such a programme because of the introduction of the Caesar Act. Given this further muddying of the waters around engaging in activities on land within the territory of the Syrian regime or its supporters, namely Russia and Iran, or engaging with the State Party on any project, which may benefit the State, UNESCO Member States will be reluctant to encourage any form of communication. Currently, UNESCO would have to “openly flout international monetary sanctions and face the ire of the [US] if they want to put money into a project in Syria”.164 Like Abdulkarim, Al-Azm suggests that, unless there is a significant change within the regime, UNESCO will continue to take a hard line on not working with Syria.165 With sanctions mounting against it, Syria is experiencing a paucity of international relations despite its government remaining legal with a seat at both the UN and UNESCO.

4.2.4

UNESCO Field Office for Syria

As briefly discussed in Chap. 2, UNESCO’s activities for Syria are chiefly managed out of the Beirut, Lebanon regional field office, while as Giovanni Boccardi states, a small, single-handed run antenna office exists in Aleppo.166 As no further information is available on this antenna office, it is disregarded in future discussion. Maamoun Abdulkarim recognises that positioning the UNESCO staff for Syria in the Beirut office was the only option due to political issues (discussed above). Nonetheless, he concedes it is “not the best option for Syria”, stating, If UNESCO had a small office in Damascus, it would make the operation of cultural initiatives much easier, because the UNESCO colleague would be able to work on the ground, near affected sites, such as Palmyra. Moreover, communication would no longer be an issue, as UNESCO could have more direct contact and cooperation with DGAM.167

This reflection from Abdulkarim on the ideal move for UNESCO and Syria mirrors those arguments for the establishment of the small project office in Sana’a, which was successful, and the current argument for the establishment of a fully-fledged national office in Yemen. Similar to the situation in Yemen, other UN agencies are currently operating in Syria, such as United Nations Development Programme 163

U.S. Department of State (2020). Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 165 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 166 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 167 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 164

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(UNDP), to improve infrastructure. Abdulkarim recognises that for UNESCO to be positioned in Syria during 2013–2015, would have been a great risk, however, “now the situation has stabilised in Damascus, UNESCO should move toward establishing a small office, similar to what UNDP have done”.168 Al-Azm confirms, “as it has been [and remains] problematic to give international support to Syria, it made sense, both politically and economically, to run [operations] through Lebanon” while Bokova was DG.169 However, a key issue brought to the fore by Michael Danti is the tensions between Lebanon and Syria. Danti asserts, “adding the politics of Lebanon into the mix does not make things easier. The better part of the Syrian population was not going to trust any UNESCO project being held in Beirut from the get-go.”170 While this book does not elaborate on any prior tensions between Lebanon and Syria, it is important to acknowledge that any move by UNESCO to position its Syrian office in Beirut will have political ramifications that will affect the organisation’s relationship with other Member States. Despite the various issues connected with positioning the office in Beirut, Danti nonetheless believes that if UNESCO was to establish an office in Damascus, the security threat would be too great to allow personnel to leave their compound, resulting in on-the-ground capacity being largely unchanged.171 With the Beirut office being only a two-and-a-half-hour drive from Damascus, Sabrine argues that UNESCO having a base in Damascus would not influence its engagement with Syria.172 Of course, for UNESCO’s current level of involvement with Syria, the Beirut office fits perfectly; however if the organisation elected to implement a largescale reconstruction initiative in Syria, it would prefer to have a consistent physical on-the-ground presence to work alongside the local authorities.

4.2.5

Collective Discussion on UNESCO Offices for Yemen and Syria

Given the respective locations of their offices in relation to the countries under their responsibility, it is evident that Yemen presents a much more complex situation than Syria.173 With conditions of armed conflict indisputably posing many challenges for UNESCO, often rendering it unoperable, Laurie Rush demonstrates that it is unrealistic for the organisation to engage in such issues.174 Regarding the lack of a

168

Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 170 Danti (2020), personal communication. 171 Danti (2020), personal communication. 172 Sabrine (2020), personal communication. 173 Sabrine (2020), personal communication. 174 Rush (2020), personal communication. 169

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national office in both Syria and Yemen, Emma Cunliffe appropriately raises the issue of security: I do not think it would be remotely responsible to expect UNESCO to put themselves in the high-danger areas, where the damage is occurring. The only place that we can responsibly ask them to go are the secure areas, which would achieve nothing, and the issue of access to affected areas remains.175

Cunliffe offers the solution that UNESCO should operate through partnerships, sending one UNESCO staff member as part of a larger humanitarian mission, embedding cultural heritage as part of their overall work.176 With the UNESCO project office in Sana’a—which has gone from one staff member to three—housed within the office of UNOPS, this much should easily be achieved. Iamandi builds on this issue of security stating that if “UNESCO had an office in Yemen, military protection would be imposed on them, which would not actually allow them to carry out more work, or to be more efficient than they are now in Doha.”177 Rene Teijgeler supports the views of both Cunliffe and Iamandi, explaining that it is not possible to travel from Aden to Sana’a to Doha—“it does not work in times of crisis”.178 Nonetheless, it is for this reason, that Teijgeler supports having a fixed physical on-the-ground presence, to enable a consistent and more accurate overview of the situation. The fact remains, that “without a presence on the ground, you cannot carry out meaningful, sustained cultural heritage preservation efforts”.179 Paul Fox brings the issue of access and offices back to UNESCO’s obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention: The Convention does not state that UNESCO officials should have access to anything during conflict. It states that UNESCO should recommend to a State Party a short list of people who might act as the Commissioner General, and the Commissioner General has the authority to appoint specialists who can be sent on missions to investigate issues. This is entirely a State Party affair.180

Fox touches on the issue of whether UNESCO should propose projects—particularly those of a hands-on nature such as the CfW project in Yemen—in countries, when said country is in the midst of an armed conflict. It is true that UNESCO’s role under the 1954 Hague Convention does not involve fieldwork, and therefore arguably should not be present during conflict at all. However, it is also apparent that how UNESCO perceived its own role to protect cultural heritage during armed conflict has developed since the writing of the Second Protocol, particularly given the publication of its 2015 strategy on the Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for the Protection of Culture and Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed

175

Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. 177 Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 178 Teijgeler (2020), personal communication. 179 Interviewee F (2020), personal communication. 180 Fox (2020), personal communication. 176

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Conflict. UNESCO recognised that its obligation to engage in heritage protection during armed conflict would increase following 2015, which is further evidenced by the organisation’s active decision to engage in a reconstruction project during conflict in Yemen. Peter Stone—who believes not having an office on the ground is an inhibiting factor—offers a bottom line on this contentious issue. He states, You cannot deliver a project from a distance and expect it to be of the same quality as if you are sitting in the same country, where you can meet with the relevant actors and build trust. This is a very understandable concern. UNESCO is safe working in Doha or Beirut, whereas those implementing their projects are at risk, working in the middle of conflict zones.181

The UNESCO Doha team pushing for a more meaningful office in Sana’a, which can also house international staff, will no doubt share Stone’s sentiments. Stone’s comments speak to the conflicting actions of the UNESCO Secretariat greenlighting a large-scale reconstruction programme, without the proper on-the-ground support for SFD, its implementing partner. Stone highlights that, if such projects are going to take place during conflict, someone is going to endure the majority of the associated risks. Stone’s argument suggests that UNESCO should shoulder this risk alongside their implementing partners, by positioning themselves on the ground.

4.2.6

UNESCO’s Relationship with SBAH

The case of UNESCO in Iraq presents a very different picture. Contrary to the situation in Yemen and Syria, UNESCO has a national office in Baghdad as well as an office in Erbil, which is the closest region to Mosul—where UNESCO has a large reconstruction programme—and the northern regions of Iraq that have been liberated. As is evidenced in the media statements study, UNESCO demonstrated greater engagement with Iraq during conflict than during peacetime between 2007 and 2020. Iraq’s WHC profile shows no media statements to be listed prior to 2007. It also shows that UNESCO’s engagement with Iraq did not take off until 2014, the year signalling the start of the Iraq Civil War. Giovanni Boccardi states, in the context of the Iraq Civil War (2014–2017), Iraq presented a very different scenario [to Syria]. There was an international coalition working hand in hand with the Iraqi Government and Army, which defeated Da’esh. This then made it possible for UNESCO, other UN agencies, and the rest of the international community to immediately step in and support the government.182

Louise Haxthausen, former Director of the UNESCO Baghdad Office, reiterates this cooperation between UNESCO and the Iraqi Government, stating, “[w]ith the government, we had no problem, we only had support. [Although] the Iraqi

181 182

Stone (2020), personal communication. Boccardi (2019), personal communication.

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Government, particularly the [MoC], is quite limited and not very strong, politically, we had all the support we needed.”183 It is important to caution that the Kurdish Regional authorities are distinct from the authorities with which UNESCO engage in Baghdad, and so these accounts do not necessarily reflect UNESCO’s relationship with those in the north. Haxthausen acknowledges that, UNESCO’s interest in Iraq definitely grew after the liberation of the areas occupied by Da’esh; “Culture was put higher on the agenda for Iraq.”184 This is indicative of a few things. One, it signals that UNESCO were more willing to engage with Iraq when the country was in the control of the recognised government. Secondly, the organisation was more willing to implement a project on the ground when the conflict had shifted into a stabilisation or postconflict phase. Thirdly, the liberation of Mosul is known for Da’esh intentionally targeting key heritage sites, such as Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret. With UNESCO’s new flagship project centring on the reconstruction of these two monuments in Mosul, it suggests that this symbolic destruction triggered UNESCO’s subsequent symbolic move to reconstruct. The destruction of historic sites during the liberation of Mosul certainly motivated UNESCO to launch the Mosul initiative. Haxthausen recounts, with the heavy destruction of the Old City of Mosul in the last period of the conflict between Da’esh and the Coalition, “we suddenly saw among the authorities in Baghdad an interest in working on the preservation of other key historical centres of Iraq, in particular Basra and Baghdad itself.”185 The battle of Mosul certainly spurred the relevant authorities into action to cooperate on heritage reconstruction programmes. When it came to negotiations for the Mosul initiative, with respect to what should be reconstructed, UNESCO encountered an issue with the internal governance of Iraq. When Louise Haxthausen was negotiating this issue, “the local governor was not speaking with the central government”,186 which undoubtedly made communication more difficult to facilitate. However, when implementing phases of the Mosul initiative, headed up by Paolo Fontani, during 2020, the UNESCO team worked on a daily basis with around 15–20 members of Department of Antiquities staff, while the Deputy Head of the Department of Antiquities remained at hand. This close cooperation demonstrates the polarity between the situation in Iraq, compared to that of Syria and Yemen. Abdulrahman Emad, who manages the Department of Heritage in the Old City of Mosul, seconds this statement regarding close cooperation. Emad, who states he initially did not know anyone from UNESCO but has now established a good relationship with them, confirms that UNESCO has full access to the Old City of Mosul at all times, and he and his colleagues work together with UNESCO on the Mosul initiative. He states that he and his colleagues “worked particularly closely with Stefano, an Italian Engineer on the project, who worked on the stabilisation of

183

Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 185 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 186 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 184

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the base of . . .[Al-Hadba] Minaret and . . .[Al-Nouri] Mosque”,. . .[and they] also work closely with Maria, the Director of the UNESCO Mosul Office.”187 Following unsuccessful attempts to seek out a representative for the Department of Antiquities in the region for the purposes of this study, it was recommended by the UNESCO Baghdad Office that contact be made with Abdulrahman Emad. Emad further stated, Our [MoC] think that UNESCO do a lot of things without asking us. They clearly do not know the truth, because we are always in contact with the UNESCO team. Every week, we sent a report to the Ministry, informing them of any updates on the projects and of our work with UNESCO.188

This is a curious statement as it presents the idea that there is either, or both, a fractious relationship between the Nineveh Department of Antiquities staff and the Iraqi MoC, or between UNESCO and the MoC. It may also be indicative of a poor communication system between UNESCO and the Ministry. It is evident that a large IGO such as UNESCO, with a regimented way of functioning, will face many difficulties when working in a country like Iraq, where there are complex ethnosectarian tensions; “who UNESCO is talking to makes a big difference”.189 In order to understand Iraq’s current political situation and the country’s ability to work alongside UNESCO, it must be appreciated that once sanctions were imposed against the Saddam Hussein regime, the situation deteriorated dramatically for SBAH.190 Kathem confirms that under such sanctions, all budgets were limited.191 The instability still permeating the SBAH institution today with a lack of financial or political support from the government, took hold in the lead up to the 2003 conflict.192 This laid the path for a highly politically dominated state infrastructure. Rene Teijgeler states, “[t]oday in Iraq, State power is down, SBAH is very weak and the power is in the hands of religious endowments or ethnic groups.”193 When initially approaching Iraq with the Mosul initiative, UNESCO would have made contact with their national counterpart, SBAH under the MoC in Baghdad. Despite the initiative concerning a location under the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional authorities, UNESCO was obligated to first collaborate with SBAH in Baghdad. Interviewee G claims, There is a lot of tension between the [MoC] in Baghdad and in Mosul. I would say there is a major rift between the two organisations, and at the institutional level there is almost a complete lack of interoperability. Some would argue that those in Baghdad are at loggerheads with Nineveh Province.194

187

Emad (2020), personal communication. Emad (2020), personal communication. 189 Interviewee G (2020), personal communication. 190 Rush (2020), personal communication. 191 Kathem (2020), personal communication. 192 McCafferty (2022), p. 169. 193 Teijgeler (2020), personal communication. 194 Interviewee G (2020), personal communication. 188

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Despite UNESCO adhering to its standard protocol, given the obvious tensions, in first communicating with those in Baghdad, “they immediately created distrust [with those] in Mosul”.195 This lack of trust is also reflected among local Iraqis, many of whom have expressed concern about the money funding the project coming from the Gulf States; “many of the Iraqis on the ground do not trust them because they see them as the same people who funded Da’esh”.196 Adding to the political instability through which UNESCO is required to navigate, the Iraqi MoC, now controlled by the Shia, is led by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH),197 now recognised by the US and US State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO).198 Mehiyar Kathem informs that the Iraqi Government is questioning how UNESCO can improve relations with the Government with no operational office in the country. He also indicates that the Iraqi Government raised the question “How can we work together when the [UNESCO] team in Iraq is [only] one or two or three people”?199 It is clearly documented that UNESCO established an office in Baghdad in 2003,200 followed by an additional office in Erbil, which is discussed later. Although it is unclear how many staff were stationed in the UNESCO Baghdad office at different stages of its existence, this research demonstrates the total projected staff as at 31 December 2020 was 68, of which 17 were identified for working on cultureoriented projects. This constitutes an exceedingly large number of culture staff for a UNESCO field office, showing the strength of the UNESCO Iraq mission in comparison to the Doha and Beirut offices for Yemen and Syria respectively. Perhaps during conflict in Iraq, only a limited number of UNESCO staff were stationed within the UN Compound in Baghdad, due to legitimate security concerns. The statement from Kathem however suggests a fractious relationship between UNESCO and the Iraqi Government, in addition to potential concerns from the Iraqi Government regarding UNESCO’s engagement with the country, and possible lack of (or mis) communication between the two parties. Kathem also describes UNESCO consultations with the Iraqi Government as limited: “[UNESCO] go for one or two meetings every few months to see a Minister. There is no ongoing dialogue. . .They [only] have meetings when they need to. . .sign papers and contracts”.201 With Abdulrahman Emad of Nineveh Department of Antiquities presenting a contradictory account of his relationship with UNESCO, it appears that now UNESCO is operational in Mosul, the majority of cooperation and communication is made with Government representatives in the Nineveh region. In turn, this has given rise to complaints from the MoC in Baghdad regarding decisions being made without its express approval (as alluded to by Emad) and a

195

Interviewee G (2020), personal communication. Interviewee G (2020), personal communication. 197 Interviewee G (2020), personal communication. 198 The Soufan Center (2020). 199 Kathem (2019), personal communication. 200 UNESCO (2021). 201 Kathem (2019), personal communication. 196

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lack of continued communication from UNESCO, despite Emad stating he provides a weekly report to the MoC regarding the ongoing UNESCO project in the region. It should be noted that this research does not benefit from direct information from a representative of the MoC in Baghdad. Such standpoints, of course, may also be exacerbated by the tensions between the MoC in Baghdad and its counterparts under the Kurdistan Regional authorities, referred to by Interviewee G. Interviewee F states, it “is important to go beyond the key players. . .and talk to the local authorities and stakeholders in order to ensure that you are responding to the actual needs on the ground.”202 Despite conflict in the country being highly complex and challenging to understand, it is key that UNESCO inserts itself into that context, communicating effectively with all parties to understand how international support can be of assistance to the people on the ground. With both national and international political tension currently permeating Iraq, UNESCO will be challenged to maintain strong communication with all relevant authorities in both Baghdad and Nineveh Province, and to ensure all parties approve of decisions made regarding the reconstruction of heritage sites in Mosul, all the while paying heed to the needs of the local population.

4.2.7

UNESCO Field Office for Iraq

Giovanni Fontana Antonelli states, Iraq has an advantage by having people physically deployed in the country; in my opinion, this is a big asset. Some people believe that you can do this kind of action remotely, but I strongly believe the contrary. In order to work with the local partners, the local authorities, and local communities, it is very important for you to have an on-the-ground presence.203

The history of the UNESCO Baghdad office presents us with insight into how conflict in Iraq has influenced UNESCO’s engagement with the country. On 19 August 2003, A terrorist attack on the [UN HQ] in Baghdad. . .claimed the lives of 22 people. . . The attack devastated the Canal Hotel, which served as a base for some 300 international UN personnel in Baghdad out of the 646 in Iraq altogether.204

Rene Teijgeler states that, as a result, UNESCO were unable to be present in Iraq.205 Nevertheless, the “About the UNESCO Office in Iraq” section on the UNESCO website states that the “UNESCO National Office to Iraq was founded in 2003 to improve Education, Culture, the Sciences and Media situation in the country”,206

202

Interviewee F (2020), personal communication. Antonelli (2019), personal communication. 204 United Nations (2003a). 205 Teijgeler (2020), personal communication. 206 UNESCO (n.d.-k). 203

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while under the “Our Expertise” section, it states that the office “was established in February 2004”207 for the same reasons. Although the exact date the office was established is not clear, it is evident that it was set up following the US invasion of Iraq, during the insurgency phase. Inherently, this would have been a highly volatile and unstable time in Iraq, as evidenced by the bombing of the UN HQ, yet UNESCO still saw fit to build its presence on the ground, although it is unclear how many UNESCO personnel were deployed to the field office at that time. Antonelli states, the major event which mobilised UNESCO to establish this national office was the looting of the Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad, elaborating that consequently the “quantity of projects that started in Iraq after 2003 was incremental”.208 Housed in the UN Compound, UNESCO utilised the already established UN offices in Baghdad as a base to implement its programmes. Moreover, the smaller UNESCO office in Erbil was likely established following the Baghdad office—again an exact date of establishment is unavailable. The positioning of both these offices provides UNESCO with a base both inside and beyond the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Despite security risks following the outbreak of conflict in the country, UNESCO evidently saw a greater need for an on-the-ground presence in Iraq. On 22 May 2003, following the end of the US-invasion on 1 May 2003, the UNSC decided to “lift trade and financial sanctions on Iraq”, which had been enforced since 1990. Part of this decision, was that there would be an appointment of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), at the time, Kofi Annan. The Special Representative’s responsibilities, according to the resolution, would involve coordination of [UN] activities in post-conflict processes in Iraq, coordinating among [UN] and international agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities and, in coordination with the Authority, assisting the people of Iraq.209

The lifting of financial sanctions under UNSCR 1483 (2003), as well as the call for the UN and international agencies to roll out activities centred on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction during this stabilisation period, provided UNESCO with an appropriate window to set up a base in Baghdad. Despite further sanctions against Iraq in later years, UNESCO would always maintain a position in the UN Compound in Baghdad, making easier the roll out of post-conflict or stabilisation phase programmes and initiatives, such as the Mosul initiative, which commenced in 2018, following the end of the Iraq Civil War in 2017.

207

UNESCO (n.d.-l). Antonelli (2019), personal communication. 209 United Nations (2003b). 208

References

4.3

131

Conclusions

It is apparent that UNESCO’s ability to be physically stationed in a country, with a fully-fledged office and sufficient staff at its disposal, is highly interconnected with and dependent on the stability of that country, and the political support of the agency’s Member States to the country in question. UNESCO’s varying degrees of communication and collaboration with, and presence in a given country is greatly dependent on a variety of factors, external to UNESCO, and many other internal influencing factors. Firstly, the country’s political stability is demonstrative of influencing UNESCO’s ability to communicate effectively with all relevant authorities and build trust across different regions. Political instability may lead to the insufficient funding of key heritage institutions, leading to a lack of capable authority to cooperate with UNESCO on heritage issues. Secondly, the political stances of UNESCO’s Member States on a given country have the potential to cease all UNESCO’s communications thus; the issuing of sanctions impede the provision of financial and technical aid as demonstrated in Syria. Thirdly, the territorial control of the given UN-recognised government inevitably affects the level of engagement UNESCO can have with different regions of the country, as it is unable to work in areas controlled by NSAs. Michael Danti asserts that given “the ubiquity of [NSAs] and the nature of warfare in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, there are many gaps in UNESCO’s coverage.”210 However, should this inability to provide financial support due to imposed sanctions also be paired with, for example, a lack of access under restrictions imposed by the UNDSS, UNESCO, as an IGO, would be ill-placed to provide any form of meaningful support.

References Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act 2019. (S.52 — 116th Congress). United States Government, United States of America Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.-a) Meaning of passive in English. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictionary/english/passive Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.-b) Meaning of active in English. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictionary/english/active Council on Foreign Relations (2021) Global conflict tracker: Iraq. https://www.cfr.org/globalconflict-tracker/conflict/political-instability-iraq Danti M (2015) Ground-based observations of cultural heritage incidents in Syria and Iraq. Near East Archaeol 78(3):132–141 DGAM (2011) Syria State Party Report, 1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural heritage in the event of armed conflict. https://en.unesco.org/protecting-heritage Hale T, Held D (2018) Breaking the cycle of Gridlock. Glob Policy 9(1):129–137

210

Danti (2020), personal communication.

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Hanson K (2011) Ancient artefacts and modern conflict: a case study of looting and instability in Iraq. In: Stone P (ed) Cultural heritage, ethics, and the military. Woodbridge, Boydell and Brewer, pp 113–128 Heritage for Peace (2018) Damage to Syria’s heritage. http://www.heritageforpeace.org/syriaculture-and-heritage/damage-to-cultural-heritage/previous-damage-newsletters/5195-2/ #mctoc9 Khalidi L (2015) Yemeni heritage, Saudi vandalism. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2015/06/27/opinion/yemeni-heritage-saudi-vandalism.html Khalidi L (2017) The destruction of Yemen and its cultural heritage. Int J Middle East Stud 49(4): 735–738 Kishkovsky S (2019) Russia and Syria sign agreement to restore ancient city of Palmyra. The Art Newspaper. https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/russia-and-syria-sign-agreement-torestore-ancient-city-of-palmyra Lababidi R, Qassar H (2016) Did they really forget how to do it? Iraq, Syria, and the international response to protect a shared heritage. J East Medit Archaeol Herit Stud 4(4):341–362 McCafferty JD (2022) International heritage interventions as no substitute for capable state party heritage institutions: the case of the Carabinieri TPC Intervention in the 2003 Iraq War. In: Cunliffe E, Fox P (eds) Safeguarding cultural property and the 1954 Hague Convention: all possible steps. Suffolk, Boydell & Brewer, pp 169–180 Meskell L (2013) UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention at 40: challenging the economic and political order of International Heritage Conservation. Curr Anthropol 54(4):483–494 Meskell L (2014) States of Conservation: protection, politics, and pacting within UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee. Anthropol Q 87(1):217–244 Meskell L (2015a) Gridlock: UNESCO, global conflict and failed ambitions. World Archaeol 47(2): 225–238 Meskell L (2015b) Transacting UNESCO World Heritage: gifts and exchanges on a global stage. Soc Anthropol 23(1):3–21 Meskell L (2018) A future in ruins: UNESCO, world heritage, and the dream of peace. Oxford University Press, New York Meskell L, Isakhan B (2020) UNESCO, world heritage and the gridlock over Yemen. Third World Q 41(10):1776–1791 Plets G (2017) Violins and trowels for Palmyra: post-conflict heritage politics. Anthropol Today 33(4):18–22 RIA Novosti (2016) Piotrovsky: it is important to restore Palmyra as a symbol of the fight against evil. RIA Novosti. https://ria.ru/20160331/1400357284.html Roth W-M (2007) Theorizing passivity. Cult Stud Sci Educ 2:1–8 The Soufan Center (2020) IntelBrief: The United States and Iran continue tit-for-tat escalation in Iraq. The Soufan Center. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-united-states-designates-asaibahl-al-haq-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/ UNESCO (2003) International Coordination Committee for the safeguarding of the cultural heritage of Iraq. https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/181/ UNESCO (2007a) 3rd ad hoc meeting of experts on Babylon. https://whc.unesco.org/en/events/44 5/ UNESCO (2007b) 3rd plenary session of the International Co-ordination Committee for the Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage of Iraq (ICC). https://whc.unesco.org/en/events/444/ UNESCO (2008) Newsletter n° 10 de la Convention France-UNESCO. https://whc.unesco.org/en/ news/457/ UNESCO (2009a) Report on damage assessments in Babylon. https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/ 586/ UNESCO (2009b) Final report on damage assessment in Babylon: International Coordination Committee for the safeguarding of the cultural heritage of Iraq. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ ark:/48223/pf0000183134

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UNESCO (2013) UNESCO Director-General deplores continuing destruction of ancient Aleppo, a World Heritage site. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1002 UNESCO (2015) Satellite-based damage assessment of cultural heritage sites 2015 summary report of Iraq, Nepal, Syria & Yemen. http://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/890/ UNESCO (2016a) UNESCO rapid assessment mission to Palmyra. https://whc.unesco.org/en/ news/1485 UNESCO (2016b) UNESCO experts take preliminary stock of destruction in World Heritage site of Palmyra. https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-experts-take-preliminary-stock-destruction-worldheritage-site-palmyra UNESCO (2016c) Technical assistance workshop to world heritage sites in Syria. https://whc. unesco.org/en/events/1386/ UNESCO (2017a) UNESCO Director-General condemns destruction of the Tetrapylon and severe damage to the Theatre in Palmyra, a UNESCO World Heritage site. https://whc.unesco.org/en/ news/1620 UNESCO (2017b) Conservation completed on Lion of Al-lāt statue from ancient city of Palmyra, damaged by ISIL. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1727 UNESCO (2017c) Director-General praises Dr Maamoun Adbulkarim’s commitment as Director General for Antiquities and Museums of Syria between 2012 and 2017. https://en.unesco.org/ syrian-observatory/reports/heritage UNESCO (2018) Five years of conflict: the state of cultural heritage in the Ancient City of Aleppo; a comprehensive multi-temporal satellite imagery-based damage analysis for the Ancient City of Aleppo. UNESCO, Paris UNESCO (2019) UNESCO opens project office in Yemen to improve youth livelihoods and cultural heritage protection. https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-opens-project-office-yemenimprove-youth-livelihoods-and-cultural-heritage-protection UNESCO (2020) Recommendations of the Technical Meeting on the Recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/2133 UNESCO (2021) Baghdad: National Office to Iraq. https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/baghdad UNESCO (n.d.-a) World Heritage Centre: Yemen. http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/YE UNESCO (n.d.-b) Support research into ancient mosaics of the Ma’arat an-Noman Museum, Syrian Arab Republic. https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/865/ UNESCO (n.d.-c) Emergency safeguarding of the Portico of the Temple of Bel in Palmyra (Syrian Arab Republic). https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/903/ UNESCO (n.d.-d) Iraq: international assistance. https://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/iq/ assistance/ UNESCO (n.d.-e) Satellite-based damage assessment of cultural heritage sites 2015 summary report of Iraq, Nepal, Syria & Yemen. https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/890/ UNESCO (n.d.-f) International Coordination Committee (ICC) for the safeguarding of the cultural heritage of Iraq. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-culturalproperty/emergency-actions/iraq/international-coordination-committee-icc-for-thesafeguarding-of-the-cultural-heritage-of-iraq/ UNESCO (n.d.-g) The emergency safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage project. https://en. unesco.org/syrian-observatory/emergency-safeguarding-syrian-cultural-heritage-project UNESCO (n.d.-i) World Heritage Centre: Syrian Arab Republic. https://whc.unesco.org/en/ statesparties/sy UNESCO (n.d.-j) International assistance. https://whc.unesco.org/en/intassistance/?action= request&search_pattern=Syria UNESCO (n.d.-k) About the UNESCO Office in Iraq. https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/baghdad/ about UNESCO (n.d.-l) Our expertise. https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/baghdad/expertise UNESCO Director-General, 1999-2009 (Matsuura, K.) (2004) Address by Mr Koïchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, on the occasion of the opening of the first meeting of the International Coordination Committee for the Safeguarding of Iraqi Cultural Heritage

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UNESCO, 24 May 2004, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris. UNESCO, Paris. https://unesdoc. unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000135110_eng UNESCO Director-General, 1999-2009 (Matsuura, K.) (2005) Address by Mr Koïchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, on the occasion of the opening of the International Coordination Committee for the Safeguarding of Iraqi Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, 22 June 2005, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris. UNESCO, Paris United Nations (2003a) In Memoriam: Baghdad, 19 August 2003. https://www.un.org/en/ memorial/baghdad2003.shtml United Nations (2003b) Security Council lifts sanctions on Iraq, approves UN role, calls for appointment of Secretary-General’s Special Representative. https://www.un.org/press/ en/2003/sc7765.doc.htm United States Department of State (2020) Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. Fact Sheet. U.S. Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/index. html

Chapter 5

UNESCO’s Emergency Response “First-Aid” to Cultural Heritage Sites

5.1

Preparedness vs. Emergency Response

As per the 1954 Hague Convention, it is the individual State Party’s responsibility to ensure effective heritage safeguarding preparedness measures, while UNESCO assumes the role of standard setting agency, available to provide expertise when requested. UNESCO often has to operate within strict confines, with the power of its Member States restricting its capacity to engage in the provision of aid to protect cultural heritage during armed conflict. Despite such frequent restrictions, in recent years, UNESCO has portrayed itself to be more of a central actor in facilitating hands-on heritage safeguarding and reconstruction efforts, with its 2015 strategy promoting a more central focus on this issue. The remainder of this book is concerned with how UNESCO has directly implemented cultural heritage protection in Yemen, Syria and Iraq in terms of preparedness, emergency response, and recovery. As with the earlier comparative analysis of the WHC’s media statements regarding cultural heritage in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, the subsequent two chapters incorporate a comparative element, whereby the difference in UNESCO’s approach to each country and the factors that have influenced its approach to heritage preservation are considered. Document and archival analysis is employed to construct a solid representation of UNESCO’s initiatives and projects in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, and the extent to which they have been effective. Consideration is also given to budget sources and its dispersal, how initiatives and projects are implemented, parties, and actors involved in the implementation process and challenges met. Further insight is gained via qualitative semi-structured interviews with UNESCO staff members, Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi government officials and independent experts in the field of heritage protection during armed conflict. The evidence gleaned from the qualitative data provides additional information into the practical functioning of UNESCO, as well as the various challenges encountered in the planning and implementation stages of UNESCO-led initiatives in each country. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. D. McCafferty, UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19675-1_5

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I decided to merge discussion of both UNESCO’s so-called preparedness and emergency response measures as, in reality they are both acted upon in a reactive manner, with the line between both categories blurred. Many “emergency response” strategies developed during conflict, encompassing the creation of conservation and management plans, by definition, verge into the preparedness category, but are enacted reactively. As discussed in UNESCO’s 2015 strategy, cultural heritage management and conservation constitutes pre-conflict risk preparedness and reduction. Such planning is the responsibility of the individual State Party under the 1954 Hague Convention, but UNESCO also recognises that such action “remains so far limited and under-funded”.1 UNESCO therefore committed to “strengthen advocacy at all levels to promote consideration of and investment in culture as an integral part of conflict prevention strategies and operational action.”2 It remains however that management and conservation planning should occur in time of peace as per the 1954 Hague Convention and its two protocols. As established, the Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi SHIs possessed severely depleted resources pre-conflict, and so were unable to fulfil their obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol. For such reasons, any actions occurring during conflict, previously determined as preparedness, are hereby labelled emergency response “first-aid”. More specifically, UNESCO actions, which could be construed as preventative, if acted upon in the pre-conflict phase, such as calling on all parties to a conflict to protect the country in question’s cultural heritage, or the provision of no-strike lists, are often only acted upon reactively, following the commencement of destruction to heritage, thereby qualifying such actions as emergency response. This chapter, as well as Chap. 6, chiefly build on the media statement analysis discussed in Chap. 4, with particular analysis of those categorised as ‘active’ in nature. In delving into these particular statements, this book ascertains the degree to which UNESCO was actively engaging with heritage protection and reconstruction in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, as well as the degree of effectiveness and success of its programmes and strategies. Salam Al Quntar and Brian Daniels identified three categories of projects enacted by the international heritage community in response to the destruction of Syrian cultural heritage. They are: site documentation projects, mainly utilising satellite imagery, journalistic accounts and social media reports, such as ‘Le patrimoine archéologique syrien en danger’ (The Syrian Archaeological [Heritage] in Danger), public awareness raising projects, and emergency training and mitigation projects.3 At this point, reconstruction initiatives had yet to be rolled out. Al Quntar and Daniels assert that less attention has been given to emergency interventions to safeguard at-risk heritage.4 This assertion, made in 2016, is applied to UNESCO’s emergency response strategies across Yemen, Syria and Iraq in relation to their

1

UNESCO (2015a), p. 5. UNESCO (2015a), p. 5. 3 Al Quntar and Daniels (2016), pp. 382–383. 4 Al Quntar and Daniels (2016), p. 382. 2

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respective armed conflicts. Al Quntar and Daniels,5 raise ethical concerns around the documentation of sites, which include such efforts being demonstrative of the international community’s voyeuristic analytical gaze, and drawing unwanted attention to the cause of terrorist groups, with increased visibility of sites such as Palmyra potentially putting them at greater risk. However, Al Quntar and Daniels also cite three reasons justifying site documentation during conflict, namely, raising public awareness, assisting future stabilisation or reconstruction efforts, and criminal accountability for perpetrators.6 Regardless of this discourse, site documentation remains a major facet of emergency response strategies proposed by UNESCO.

5.2

Yemen: Emergency Response “First-Aid”

Analysis of the WHC’s media statements regarding Yemeni cultural heritage shows the organisation only commenced public reporting in 2015, with such reporting trailing off in 2016, thereby demonstrating UNESCO to be acting in a reactionary manner to heritage destruction in Yemen. It is however fair to note internal reporting continued in the form of the WHCo’s annual monitoring procedure. Of UNESCO’s media output, the majority of statements were evidenced to be passive in nature, while four were construed as active; pertaining to a direct action the organisation took to effect change. UNESCO has evidently encountered various challenges when engaging with Yemen, with the complex and shifting political landscape and consequent lack of on-the-ground access being a major inhibitor. Meanwhile, lack of meaningful commitment from Member States has presented a further challenge for the organisation to navigate in attempting to facilitate any form of emergency response measures. Meskell and Isakhan proffer that UNESCO has exhibited a lack of meaningful response or concerted action when it comes to Yemen, despite there being extensive damage to the UNESCO WHSs.7 The following determines the extent to which this statement is true in terms of UNESCO’s approach to cultural heritage destruction in Yemen. A significant preparedness role that UNESCO can undertake is the creation of no strike lists for Parties to the conflict. Interviewee B states that at “the outset of conflict, the UNESCO [DG] sends letters to the Parties reminding them of their responsibilities under the 1954 Hague Convention. But this usually stays with the politicians and never really goes down to the relevant military personnel.”8 Recognising this as insufficient, and as a supplement to this measure, Interviewee B stated talks took place with the Saudis responsible for cultural heritage, to encourage the safeguarding of Yemeni sites. Despite these talks however, 1 week

5

Al Quntar and Daniels (2016), p. 385. Al Quntar and Daniels (2016), p. 383. 7 Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 2. 8 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 6

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later, Sana’a was bombed.9 In response to this, and in coordination with a group of experts in archaeology and heritage, UNESCO devised a list of 50 sites, inclusive of archaeological sites and villages beyond the three WHSs, which was then distributed to the Coalition parties.10 This is corroborated by Mohanad Al-Sayani,11 as well as Tural Mustafayev, who stated that when “the conflict started in Yemen, UNESCO dispatched the coordinates of cultural properties to Coalition Forces . . .[and while we] do not have a full list of cultural property, . . .any coordinates we do have, especially the [WHSs], we . . .share.”12 Cunliffe further states that she and her colleagues at EAMENA, Oxford University “did a little bit of work with the Doha Office in sharing data for the no strike list for Yemen.”13 Although not a comprehensive or exhaustive list, the dissemination of this information to Coalition Forces to the Yemeni conflict allows for better practice in the planning and execution of military operations, which may lead to the destruction of known cultural heritage, if military necessity is not satisfied. It remains however, that NSAs are excluded from this process, a major flaw considering their central role in each of the discussed conflicts. Mustafayev claims such a coordinate list was disseminated among warring States Parties prior to the commencement of bombing,14 however Interviewee B states otherwise: “UNESCO continue to monitor these sites and have since recorded a decrease in damages.”15 The list was issued as an emergency response mechanism to attempt to slow the damages to cultural heritage sites in Yemen, and not as a preventative measure in the pre-conflict phase. An article run by NewScientist on 23 January 2017, confirms this, stating the list produced by EAMENA, to be put forward from the US Committee of the Blue Shield (USCBS) to the Saudi-led coalition, would be ready in a few weeks.16 Al-Sayani stated, “[d]espite issuing the warring Parties with the coordinates of the protected locations, these sites were still damaged. Also, we could not visit locations, due to potential airstrikes.”17 Al-Sayani posits a more pessimistic view, demonstrating that the risks to the highlighted Yemeni cultural heritage sites had not sufficiently diminished, and remained under imminent threat of destruction. UNESCO’s initial response to the destruction of cultural heritage in Yemen was relatively quick, with the launch of an emergency response plan on 13 May 2015, around 2 months after the official outbreak of conflict. This signalled the commencement of UNESCO’s engagement with Yemen, with the Doha office’s primary concerns being assessments, technical assistance and monitoring. UNESCO began

9

Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 11 Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 12 Mustafayev (2020), personal communication. 13 Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. 14 Mustafayev (2020), personal communication. 15 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 16 Irwin (2017). 17 Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 10

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by preparing rapid assessment forms for historic buildings, archaeological sites and museum collections in cooperation with the Arab Regional Centre, GOAM and GOPHCY, and then worked alongside GOAM to ascertain levels of damage to archaeological sites and collections. To this end, UNESCO also set out to organise recorded training sessions, in cooperation with ICCROM-ATHAR, on risk management, rapid documentation techniques and disaster and risk preparedness.18 In line with Article 30(3)(b) of the Second Protocol, such training efforts should be made available during peacetime in cooperation with UNESCO and relevant GOs and NGOs, yet, as Yemen has yet to ratify the Second Protocol, these inherent preparedness measures unfortunately took the form of emergency response “first aid” efforts. This emergency response “first aid” approach to training is again evidenced by Interviewee C who stated, “UNESCO has conducted training workshops in Djibouti and Amman, Jordan for Yemenis on combatting illicit trafficking of cultural objects, and on preventative conservation of museum collections.” Moreover, “the [MoC] in Aden has requested that UNESCO establish a Unit within the Ministry to allow for better monitoring of illicit trafficking and to facilitate the submission of restitution files”.19 This emerging pattern of UNESCO enacting capacity building or awareness raising “preparedness” measures in an emergency response manner is testament to the fact that SHIs are unable to meet their basic obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention during peacetime. Lastly, UNESCO stated it was engaged in revising the Geographic Information System (GIS) database of the old city of Sana’a.20 This mass inventory of the old city of Sana’a, created in 2008,21 constituted a significant preparatory step taken during peacetime, and would provide a measure by which Yemeni authorities could assess where damage and destruction had occurred. To facilitate remote monitoring of damage to cultural heritage sites across Iraq, Nepal, Syria and Yemen, Boccardi states, UNESCO established a partnership with UNITAR-UNOSAT, which provides satellite imagery to UN agencies. This agreement means UNITAR-UNOSAT provides us with requested ‘before and after’ satellite imagery; we inform UNITAR-UNOSAT of the desired coordinates, along with the dates from when the images should be. Through this system we have been able to monitor a number of archaeological sites in remote areas, which have been looted, damaged or destroyed from the Baraqish to the Queen of Sheba to Ma’rib, and to other places around the country.22

The publication of the Satellite-Based Damage Assessment of Cultural Heritage Sites, inclusive of a three-page assessment of Yemeni sites, in 2016,23 the provision of damage assessment forms, training centred on risk and damage assessment techniques, and the revision of the GIS database of the Old City of Sana’a, shows

18

UNESCO (2015b). Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 20 UNESCO (2015b). 21 UNESCO (2008). 22 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 23 UNITAR-UNOSAT (2016). 19

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the majority of UNESCO’s initial approach to centre on documentation. As per Article 33(1) of the Second Protocol, to which Yemen are not party, UNESCO may be called upon in a preparatory capacity to provide technical assistance on the compilation of national inventories. Such documentation was not carried out during peacetime by Yemen, which has resulted in UNESCO taking such emergency response action to document the loss of Yemeni cultural heritage in the conflict phase. The WHCo inscribed both the Old City of Sana’a and the Old Walled City of Shibam on the List of World Heritage in Danger. The aim of placing sites on this list is said to “help reinforce international mobilization for the safeguarding of the site”.24 It would initially appear that such international support would materialise as on 16 July 2015, UNESCO’s then DG, Irina Bokova, announced an Emergency Action Plan for the Safeguarding of Yemen’s Cultural Heritage, following a two-day expert meeting held at UNESCO HQ.25 Daniels states, UNESCO’s typical response to any of these crises is to convene a meeting in Paris and launch a big action plan that essentially has already been preordained by every other conflict that has ever happened, regardless of whether the plan is achievable.26

This plan, developed in coordination with institutional partners and GOAM and GOPHCY focused on the following areas: awareness raising and advocacy; information gathering and coordination; technical assistance through risk-mitigation measures on the ground; and capacity building initiatives.27 Unfortunately, the resulting action plan has not been made available by UNESCO; the only documentary evidence of the two-day expert meeting is the published programme of the event, opening with an address by Mr Alfredo Pérez de Armiñán, UNESCO’s then Assistant DG for Culture.28 It can therefore not be determined which objectives; specific actions; potential partners; and cost estimations were identified in the course of this meeting. Nonetheless, it is known that Bokova, when announcing the formulation of the plan, called on the international community for support. Bokova stated, To succeed, this plan must be funded, and it is clear that the local government does not have the resources to undertake these efforts alone. . .I ask you to mobilize your institutions and your contacts to support UNESCO and the Yemeni authorities to implement this action plan.29

However, from 2016 through 2019, the WHCo has, through adopted decisions regarding the WHSs of Sana’a, Zabid and Shibam, continually reiterated calls for the international community to provide technical and financial support, including

24

UNESCO (2015c). UNESCO (2015d). 26 Daniels (2020), personal communication. 27 UNESCO (2015d). 28 UNESCO (2015e). 29 UNESCO (2015d). 25

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through the UNESCO HEF, for the implementation of the Emergency Action Plan.30 This demonstrates UNESCO’s lack of ability to enact emergency measures; with damage assessments and restorative actions deemed necessary emergency interventions in mid-2015, action has not yet been taken due to lack of funds and an international community yet unwilling to provide financial support to Yemen. It would therefore seem that Daniel’s assertion that UNESCO’s go-to response to such a crisis is to formulate an unrealistic action plan has proved true in this instance, with there being no indication of how the plan will be implemented. As previously discussed, Yemen’s SHIs have extremely limited funding, with employees not receiving a basic salary. For this reason, as cited by GOPHCY in their 2019 SoC reports on Sana’a, Zabid and Shibam, Yemen is completely reliant on external funding to facilitate priority conservation, management measures and capacity building programmes.31 GOPHCY further states that the “local staff and experts could implement any necessary actions, if there is. . .serious generous support from the international communit[y] and organizations.”32 Ravagnan, De Maigret and Muradore assert that conservation and preservation work in Yemen would greatly rely on financial aid made available in the post-conflict phase.33 In the current context, the international community remain reserved on committing to any form of support to the country. Stone agrees with this sentiment, stating, “[g]iven the immense politicisation, I do not envision a great deal of money being allocated to Yemen from any side, until the view on what the outcome of the conflict will be becomes clearer.”34 The lack of materialisation of the Emergency Action Plan determines that Meskell, Isakhan and Khalidi’s assertions that UNESCO has exhibited a lack of meaningful response when it comes to Yemen have validity. However, UNESCO have, in recent years, accelerated action on an alternative plan, serving to facilitate reconstruction projects across Yemen’s three cultural World Heritage cities, Sana’a, Zabid and Shibam, as well as Aden. The majority of UNESCO’s engagement with Yemen in relation to the protection of cultural heritage during the ongoing-armed conflict lies in recovery initiatives, namely the CfW scheme. Some aspects of this scheme, discussed in the following chapter, such as extensive damage assessments and stabilisation projects have the hallmarks of emergency response mechanisms when carried out in isolation, but, in this case, were part of a larger recovery mission, committed to by UNESCO, with EU funding. For this reason, these measures will be addressed collectively under the category of reconstruction.35

30

UNESCO (2016a, 2017a, 2018a, 2019a). GOPHCY (2019a), p. 6. 32 GOPHCY (2019b), p. 5. 33 Ravagnan et al. (2017), p. 144. 34 Stone (2020), personal communication. 35 Not mentioned in this chapter is the Yemeni Emergency Red List of Cultural Objects at Risk, produced by ICOM. Although ICOM maintains formal relations with UNESCO, it is unclear whether UNESCO played a role in the production of this list. 31

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Syria: Emergency Response “First-Aid”

The UNESCO Beirut field office website details its areas of expertise, one of which is ‘culture’ in both Lebanon and Syria. In response to the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011, UNESCO Beirut states the organisation has “actively mobilized its partners and the international community to raise awareness on the situation, and assist Syria in protecting all forms of its heritage, be it built, movable or intangible”.36 Analysis of the WHC’s media statements regarding Syrian cultural heritage, showed the organisation’s response to its destruction to be majorly passive. However, 22 of the WHC’s statements are ‘active’ in nature. Consideration is given to each of these ‘active’ responses to gauge the impact and effectiveness of UNESCO’s engagement, and to analyse the organisation’s claims of mobilising the international community to raise awareness and assisting in the safeguarding of all forms of Syrian heritage over the past 10 years. As established, UNESCO’s relationship with Syria throughout the course of the conflict has been turbulent, with the majority of engagement dropping off with the change in DG of DGAM and DG of UNESCO in 2017. Moreover, persistent and growing sanctions against the Assad regime have only tightened the already restrictive environment in which UNESCO had to operate. Deeper analysis of UNESCO’s attempted emergency response strategies and initiatives in the country throughout the conflict also informs on how the organisation’s engagement has been impacted by external, as well as internal, factors. UNESCO’s first emergency response course of action commenced over 2 years following the outbreak of conflict in Syria. In June 2013, the WHCo resolved to place Syria’s six cultural WHSs on the List of World Heritage in Danger. The reason proffered by the Committee for doing so was “to draw attention to the risks [the sites faced] because of the situation in the country”, while the danger listing was intended to “mobilize all possible support for the safeguarding of the properties”.37 Regardless of such reasoning, Russia attempted to veto this move by the WHCo to place Syria’s WHSs on the In Danger list, with Ambassador Mitrofanova referring to the need for sovereignty over such issues. Russia made this veto move despite the Syrian Ambassador being in support of the move to the In Danger list, and willingly cooperating with the WHCo and UNESCO on such issues.38 Although the attempt by Russia to block this decision failed, it is indicative of the political tensions and power plays that can make UNESCO enter a state of gridlock. At the 37th session of the WHCo in 2013, it was noted that Syria’s WHSs were “threatened by both ascertained and potential dangers”.39 At the 38th session of the WHCo in 2014, the specific reason for the listing of the six sites as ‘In Danger’ was down to “Destruction and ascertained as well as potential threats consequent to the armed

36

UNESCO (n.d.-a). UNESCO (2013a). 38 Meskell (2014), p. 222. 39 UNESCO (2013b), p. 107. 37

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conflict in Syria”.40 Evidently, the sites had already incurred some destruction, which negatively affected their OUV, with the chief catalyst, of course, being the armed conflict. In 2013, the WHCo urged parties to the conflict to refrain from any destruction of Syrian heritage, launched an appeal for cooperation in combatting illicit trafficking of cultural objects out of Syria, and requested Bokova to “consider the creation of a Special Fund aimed at the conservation of the World Heritage properties in Syria”.41 These decisions by the WHCo intended to garner international support for improved safeguarding of Syrian cultural WHSs. At the 38th session of the WHCo in 2014, it was stated that over the preceding year, UNESCO had “intensified its activities to monitor the situation of Syrian heritage, raise awareness on its protection, and undertake emergency actions to safeguard it”.42 The raising of designated “Special Funds” for Syria via the following shows this intensification of activities by UNESCO: • The launch of the EU-funded Emergency Safeguarding of Syrian Cultural Heritage Project on 1 March 2014, in partnership with ICOMOS and ICCROM (2.46 million Euros), which is discussed later; • The Flemish Government-funded project for the organisation of an International Experts Meeting on Syria and for Emergency Assistance Measures (US $170,000); and • The Arab Regional Centre for World Heritage’s financial support to the WHC for the safeguarding of Syrian cultural heritage (US$200,000).43 Moreover, UNESCO also maintained cooperation with DGAM and provided damage assessment forms, while the organisation organised, at the request of the State Party, a meeting with ICOMOS, ICCROM and INTERPOL, for the provision of technical recommendation for the safeguarding of the Old City of Damascus.44 UNESCO was also set to host additional meetings regarding Crac des Chevaliers and the preservation of Syrian cultural heritage as a whole, while fundraising for further actions on Syrian World Heritage and Tentative WHSs.45 The 2013 request by the WHCo for cooperation in the combat of illicit trafficking of cultural objects out of Syria also appears to have been heeded by Bokova. On 25 September 2013, Bokova, alongside the President of ICOM and United States Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, launched the Emergency Red List of Syrian Cultural Objects at Risk.46 The Red List endeavour was launched as a collaborative effort from UNESCO and ICOM, and financed by

40

UNESCO (2014a), pp. 10–18. UNESCO (2013b), pp. 107–108. 42 UNESCO (2014a). 43 UNESCO (2014a), p. 20. 44 UNESCO (2014a), pp. 20–21. 45 UNESCO (2014a), p. 21. 46 UNESCO (2013c). 41

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the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs.47 The production of the ICOM Red List aids police, customs officials and practitioners involved in heritage protection worldwide “by helping them identify the categories of objects that are particularly vulnerable to illegal purchase, transaction and export”.48 The eight-page document covers items from Prehistory, Ancient History, Islamic era, Middle Ages, and Ottoman period, with objects including manuscripts, tablets, figural sculpture, vessels, architectural elements, accessories and instruments, stamps and cylinder seals, tesserae and coins.49 In terms of the production of the Emergency Red List, it would seem that UNESCO’s actual involvement was minimal, with its role mainly being with regard to the launch. ICOM’s press release for the launch of the Red List for Syria did not mention UNESCO when discussing its production. Instead, the press release stated, the list would “be drafted in cooperation with a team of specialists, and has received support of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State”.50 ICOM and UNESCO have a formal relationship. This relationship is likely indicative of the role UNESCO played in the Red List, with both organisations supporting and promoting the other’s programmes and initiatives; UNESCO’s role in the launch contributed to a larger platform for the promotion of the Red List to the international community. Moreover, as ICOM announced that the Red List would be created in October 2012, it was therefore in development prior to the 37th session of the WHCo in 2013. UNESCO’s later involvement in the launch showed the organisation to be involved in cooperation to combat illicit trafficking of cultural objects out of Syria as per the WHCo’s request. A key UNESCO programme, comprising various projects, which the organisation considers “good practice”,51 is the “Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage” programme, which was officially launched on 1 March 2014 for an initial 3-year period with EU funding and support from the Flemish and Austrian governments.52 This project emerged from an Action Plan developed at a high-level technical meeting held by Bokova, with the participation of the UN and Arab League Joint Special Representative, the DG of DGAM, ICOMOS, ICCROM, ICOM, INTERPOL, the World Customs Organisation and the EU.53 The Flemish Government supported this project by funding the international expert meeting, titled Rallying the International Community to Safeguard Syria’s Cultural Heritage, attended by 120 experts from 22 countries from 26–28 May 2014,54 which alone cost US$170,000. Put into perspective, the cost of this meeting is 5.7% of the

47

ICOM (2013), p. 8. UNESCO (2013c). 49 ICOM (2013), pp. 4–7. 50 ICOM (2012). 51 UNESCO (2015a), pp. 5–6. 52 UNESCO (n.d.-b). 53 UNESCO (2014a), p. 20. 54 UNESCO (2014b). 48

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2.46 million EUR then donated by the EU to support the resultant project, tasked with providing an “operational response to halt the on-going loss of cultural heritage and prepare post-conflict priority actions in Syria”.55 Boccardi asserts this was “a large programme, which involved lots of training, inventories, cultural mapping, support to the authorities against illicit trafficking of cultural property, awareness raising, educational activities, campaigns, etc.”56 Moreover, Boccardi also states, We, of course, also played the more typical UNESCO role. We convened several international expert meetings, involving Syrians and experts from various countries, who had been working in Syria for many decades and who had a knowledge crucial for Syrian authorities to be able to preserve their cultural heritage.57

In describing UNESCO’s role in hosting international meetings as “typical”, Boccardi indicates that the organisation’s more practical engagement in the form of the Emergency Safeguarding programme, is atypical. At this international expert meeting, Amr Al-Azm questioned whether UNESCO would ignore the five WHSs, which at the time, were outside regime-controlled areas.58 UNESCO has demonstrated a pattern of not engaging with sites beyond regime control in Syria; when Aleppo was under rebel control, UNESCO’s response to heritage destruction was limited to condemnation, while the organisation began hosting meetings regarding the WHS and organising damage assessment missions once the regime had regained control in November 2016.59 The same response is evidenced in the case of Palmyra. Danti suggests, “[s]maller and more adaptive types of heritage units are needed to make up for this gap in UNESCO’s coverage.”60 UNESCO published an infographic detailing the first years’ events, which took place in 2014, under this Emergency Safeguarding project. The infographic breaks down UNESCO’s activities into three categories, namely, knowledge and documentation; communication and awareness raising efforts; and technical assistance and capacity building.61 During the first year, five events was designated as knowledge and documentation, while one was designated as communication and awareness raising, and seven as technical assistance and capacity building. This UNESCO programme evidences that the organisation encompasses site documentation, public awareness raising projects, and emergency training and mitigation projects in its emergency response strategy. Such “emergency response” tactics from UNESCO are actions typically categorised as preventative, if carried out pre-conflict or during peacetime. The “Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage” initiative chiefly centres on awareness raising mechanisms. By 2016, a large number of documentation projects had commenced showing an exponential increase in such 55

UNESCO (n.d.-c). Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 57 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 58 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 59 UNESCO (n.d.-d). 60 Daniti (2020), personal communication. 61 Patchil (2020). 56

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activity from 2014.62 Al Quntar and Daniels suggest that we have perhaps reached a saturation point for information regarding cultural heritage destruction, rendering public awareness campaigns to be of little value.63 In terms of technical assistance and capacity building, three events constituted meetings, while four took the form of training events. One hundred individuals, with a mix of police and customs officers and heritage professionals, participated in the training events held in Beirut, with Damascus being the city with the highest number of beneficiaries. The training sessions covered: • combating illicit trafficking of Syrian cultural artefacts (10–14 November 2014); • first aid to built cultural heritage in Syria (24 November–6 December 2014); • the protection of movable heritage during and post-conflict and the protection of museums from looting (26–30 January 2015); and • the 2003 Convention for the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage (9–13 February 2015). Reporting on the second training session on first aid to built heritage, UNESCO included two positive feedback statements from trainees in their press release, while further stating that participants had requested complementary training activities from UNESCO to ensure more DGAM staff benefited from the course material.64 Some discrepancies are evidenced in UNESCO’s 2014 statement related to the training, which records 22 individuals to have attended the course, whereas UNESCO’s infographic records 23. Moreover, despite stating that the course took place from 24 November–6 December 2014, as does the infographic, on two occasions, UNESCO’s statement contradicts this by referring to the training as a 3-week course, as opposed to a 2-week course. Regardless, despite, the positive feedback recorded, training programmes in themselves have limitations, if those receiving the training continue to go without financial support and access to necessary resources to implement what they have learned.65 Stacy Bowe of the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative (SCRI) advocates, “a comprehensive follow-up assessment on how trainees have used the training received” to understand its relevance and level of success.66 Rene Teijgeler, who believes that “[s]uch programmes are very much overrated and centre on buzzwords”, adds “it is important to question how this [project], and many other projects, are evaluated and monitored to ensure no corruption takes place, and to measure the tangible success of the project.”67

Isber Sabrine suggests those who received this UNESCO training in Beirut “are not making use of it” and further states, “There does not seem to be any tangible results 62

Cunliffe et al. (2017), pp. 19–32. Al Quntar and Daniels (2016), p. 387. 64 UNESCO (2014c). 65 Al Quntar and Daniels (2016), p. 389. 66 Bowe (2020), personal communication. 67 Teijgeler (2020), personal communication. 63

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from the [Emergency Safeguarding] project.”68 It would appear that UNESCO has shown no transparency with regard to the monitoring of how the training was implemented by recipients in Syria, and it remains that it has not publicly disclosed any evaluation or report on the Emergency Safeguarding project results. In August 2014, UNESCO stated “continuous monitoring and early assessment of damage is a priority to prepare a sound and coordinated response for future rehabilitation”, for which reason the organisation launched the Observatory as part of the Emergency Safeguarding project. Funded by the EU, the Observatory was first announced on 28 May 2014, following an international expert meeting at UNESCO HQ. The initial aim of the Observatory was to “monitor the state of buildings, artefacts and intangible cultural heritage to combat illicit trafficking and collect information to restore heritage once fighting is over”.69 However, Cunliffe recounts that this knowledge and documentation element of the project was not used for the prioritisation of sites for emergency response but was instead used for awareness raising.70 By this logic, the only aspects of the initiative not strictly concerned with awareness raising were the technical assistance and training initiatives (capacity building). The Observatory acted as a platform on which UNESCO and its partners, such as ICOM and INTERPOL, could collate reports and initiatives, with the UNESCO Beirut office managing the overall project.71 With the latest damage documentation entry on the website being 7 April 2018,72 this project publically appears to have been chiefly dormant since then. Al-Azm states that when key personnel was relocated and Syrian operations closed down in the Beirut office, “clearly, a new political decision had been made; UNESCO does not want to deal with the DGAM politically, so. . .as far as Syria is concerned, UNESCO was disengaging.”73 The demise of this Observatory platform coincided with a shift in personnel, as well as the overall decline of UNESCO’s involvement in Syria. This could suggest that the continuation of UNESCO projects is majorly dependent on individual staff members or the persistent challenge of securing funds for a project’s continuation. However, in this case, the demise of the platform is more likely indicative of Syria’s divergence from UNESCO, to which the latter responded by shifting human resources and responsibilities to alternative UNESCO programmes. Further distinct evidence of UNESCO’s termination of its initial efforts to assist in safeguarding Syrian cultural heritage is the ceasing of the Observatory’s collation of all damage assessments carried out by DGAM74 and various organisations such as

68

Sabrine (2020), personal communication. UNESCO (2014b). 70 Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. 71 UNESCO (n.d.-e). 72 UNESCO (n.d.-f). 73 Al-Azm (2020), personal communication. 74 N.B. DGAM removed all documented damage from their website in 2020. 69

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ASOR,75 HfP and The Day After (TDA).76 The Observatory consistently collated damage assessments dating from 23 February 2014 through 18 October 2018.77 The sheer volume of damage assessments collated on this single platform, together with a lack of evidence of any resultant increased support for cultural heritage safeguarding initiatives, qualifies Al Quntar and Daniel’s assertion that there exists a saturation point of information regarding cultural heritage destruction, which renders public awareness campaigns of little value. Regardless, following 18 October 2018, no further damage assessments are made available via this website. Despite destruction still ongoing, such damage assessments are now denied this platform. Cunliffe states that the Observatory projects were due to terminate in December 2018, with potential for a 6 month extension. This however never came to fruition, with website updates ending between 2 and 3 months prior to December 2018.78 Cunliffe records, “the Emergency Safeguarding project finished Christmas 2019. They [UNESCO] never announced the termination of the project, nor did they publish any results.”79 Although it is commendable that the programme, through the Observatory, extended beyond the initially estimated 3 years, it is true that UNESCO practically ceased all operations in relation to this project prior to its official termination in 2019, and the organisation perhaps did not want to draw any attention to said termination. At the 40th and 41st session of the WHCo in 2016 and 2017 respectively, attention was drawn to the lack of funds available for the effective implementation of Emergency Safeguarding Action Plans in Mali, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, and Member States were urged to contribute additional funding.80 It is clear from continual appeals from DGAM for funding for emergency conservation works and reporting of lack of equipment and trained personnel,81 that UNESCO’s Emergency Safeguarding initiative did not solve the major resource deficit issues in DGAM. There evidently remains a need for such initiatives. Nonetheless, direct appeals from the WHCo for funding for the Emergency Safeguarding project also ceased following 2017, with Member States thereafter only encouraged to donate to the HEF.82 Abdulkarim states, “[w]e wanted to work with UNESCO, to facilitate more emergency preventative safeguarding in Syria, but now we know that such UNESCO programmes have ceased.”83 The lack of results published from the Emergency Safeguarding project following its termination determines that its impact remains unknown. What is more, the inactive project website has a tab for ‘Publications’,

75 ASOR’s funding to carry out damage assessments of Syrian cultural heritage ceased in December 2018. 76 TDA’s final report, collated on the Observatory website, was published on 27 January 2018. 77 UNESCO (n.d.-g). 78 Cunliffe (2021), personal communication. 79 Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. 80 UNESCO (2016b), p. 9; UNESCO (2017b), p. 9. 81 DGAM (2019), p. 14. 82 UNESCO (2018b, 2019b). 83 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication.

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which includes hyperlinks to the project outputs for years one and two, as well as outputs until November 2017,84 however the links do not work.85 When trying to access the publications from another UNESCO webpage, the links also fail to function, which suggests either website incompetency or the relevant files are no longer publically accessible. March 2016 saw a tangible contribution from UNESCO in terms of facilitating resources to effect on-the-ground heritage safeguarding. Through cooperation with French and Swiss heritage professionals, in 2016 UNESCO responded to the lack of funds and material resources available to Syrian heritage professionals to securely evacuate and store museum collections, by providing nearly seven tonnes of necessary materials. The material resources were transported to the UNESCO office in Beirut and donated to DGAM staff in Syria.86 This was undoubtedly a welcome initiative, supported by UNESCO, and led by Swiss and French heritage professionals, to mitigate risks to prioritised museum collections accessible to DGAM. It does however constitute further preventative measures enacted in an emergency response fashion, 5 years following the outbreak of conflict. Following the initial liberation of Palmyra from Da’esh, the 199th session of the Executive Board of UNESCO met on 8 April 2016. It was unanimously adopted that UNESCO should include safeguarding and preservation of Palmyra and other Syrian WHSs in the then forthcoming Action Plan for the implementation of the 2015 Strategy.87 It was also unanimously adopted that UNESCO should promote broad participation and coordination among States, UN agencies and partner organisations toward the restoration of such sites, while UNESCO was invited to send a damage assessment mission to Palmyra and other sites, such as Aleppo, to identify urgent needs in terms of conservation, restoration and safeguarding.88 UNESCO’s subsequent actions would provide hope that the organisation would work alongside DGAM in facilitating emergency response and recovery efforts. UNESCO dispatched a rapid assessment mission (funded by the HEF) to Palmyra from 23–27 April 2016, which acknowledged the need for documentation and consolidation work. For example, the report acknowledged the museum required emergency consolidation and securing of the building structure, emergency inventorying and documentation of remaining items and fragments.89 The emergency intervention recommendations detailed short, medium and long-term activities, which were expanded upon via a detailed report on the site of Palmyra, following a ‘Technical Assistance Workshop for the World Heritage Sites of the Crac des Chevaliers, Palmyra and the Ancient City of Damascus’ from 13–15 December 2016. This

84

UNESCO (n.d.-h). This was last tested on 21 November 2022. 86 UNESCO (2016c). 87 UNESCO (2016d), p. 2. 88 UNESCO (2016d), p. 2. 89 UNESCO (2016e), pp. 2–3. 85

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report provided an extensive damage assessment, which also identified the need for immediate actions. For example, the report identified Palmyra citadel as “currently particularly at risk due to the alarming instability of the largely cracked remains of Tower No. 17, of the north-eastern corner [and] Tower No. 7, of the eastern bed of the bridge”.90 It also set out clear guidelines on which emergency response mechanisms to enact in order to prevent further destruction to the citadel, museum, Temple of Bel, Temple of Baalshamin, Arch of Triumph and the rest of the archaeological site. Following the initial damage assessment, UNESCO held consultations with various Member State representatives and relevant experts,91 as well as a meeting in Berlin, attended by over 230 Syrian and international experts, titled ‘Follow-up to the implementation of the UNESCO Action Plan for the Emergency Safeguarding of Syria’s Cultural Heritage’. At this meeting, Bokova stated that the priority was “to conduct a comprehensive inventory of the damages, identify emergency safeguard [ing] measures to save what is possible, wherever possible”.92 This meeting in Berlin had three main objectives, namely, to exchange information on the condition of all Syrian heritage sites, reach a consensus on all initial priorities and emergency measures, and to coordinate all actions under one common vision.93 The result of this meeting was an updated version of UNESCO’s ‘Recommendations and Road Map for the Safeguarding of Syria’s Cultural Heritage’, with focus given to the following subsections: • • • • •

Local communities; Documentation, archives, damage assessment, technologies and innovation; Advocacy, coordination, communication and awareness-raising; Technical assistance, capacity building and future needs; and Preparing future safeguarding plans.94

The majority of future plans identified under each of the above categories centre on either hosting meetings or training workshops, with the primary aim of building capacities of heritage professionals and relevant authorities in Syria.95 At the core of the meeting, Mechtild Rössler, Director of UNESCO’s WHC, emphasised the need for cooperation among stakeholders with regard to both emergency works and recovery projects in Syria.96 Abdulkarim states “Sometimes, UNESCO acted to mediate between myself and the rest of the world”, something he greatly appreciated. UNESCO acted as DGAM’s “neutral” spokesperson when addressing States in the

90

UNESCO (2017c), p. 17. UNESCO (2016f). 92 UNESCO (2016g). 93 UNESCO (2016h). 94 UNESCO (2016i). 95 UNESCO (2016i). 96 UNESCO (2016h). 91

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appeal for funding and coordinating international support.97 Without this facilitation, institutions such as DGAM, with direct connection with the Assad regime, have only a limited number of options, the best being cooperation with the regime’s official military allies, Russia and Iran, to finance emergency and recovery heritage projects. Abdulkarim acknowledges the efforts made by UNESCO under Bokova to convince some oppositions outside Syria to support DGAM, further stating that UNESCO “tried to combat the idea that DGAM is part of the regime, however the problem for UNESCO is that the international community incorrectly considers all Syrian state institutions to be part of the regime.”98 In response to recommendations from the First-Aid Technical Assistance Workshop, which took place on 13–15 December 2016, a project proposal for the Emergency Safeguarding of the Portico of the Temple of Bel in Palmyra was produced. This proposal was originally based on recommendation number five, which stated, Guarantee temporarily the protection and stability of the monuments remains, implementing appropriate measure for the partial shoring or dismantling . . .of the structures, and in particular, the west portico of the Temple of Bel and the remains of the side pillars of the Arch of Triumph.99

This project proposed a budget of US$150,000, to be used over a period of 6 months to document the Portico, complete a damage assessment, and the emergency consolidation of the Portico. The proposal further states that the project contributes to the operational response proposed in the UNESCO Emergency Safeguarding Action Plan for Syria’s Cultural Heritage adopted at the High Level meeting that UNESCO organized on 29 August 2013 in order to halt the on-going loss of cultural heritage and prepare post-conflict priority actions.100

Nonetheless, this project has not yet been implemented due to a lack of funding received.101 This is despite a continual reiteration by DGAM to the WHCo that “the portico of the Temple of Bel and the Triumphal Arch require urgent consolidation works”.102 The DGAM is recorded as being unable to progress with such emergency work without funding support, which it has previously requested, and appealed for via the WHCo to other States Parties, without success. In response, the WHCo resolved to express “its concern that the portico of the Temple of Bel and the Triumphal Arch are at risk of collapse due to the lack of funding for their emergency consolidation”.103

97

Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 99 UNESCO (2017c), p. 47. 100 UNESCO (n.d.-i). 101 Interviewee H (2021), personal communication. 102 UNESCO (2019c). 103 UNESCO (2019c). 98

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Two of the ‘Immediate Actions’ put forth as a recommendation following the ‘Technical Meeting on the Recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra’ on 18 December 2019, were to: • Conduct a detailed documentation study of the current situation of the site and of all its individual monumental structures; and • Implement emergency interventions at specific monuments, such as at the Citadel, the Temple of Bel (which would encompass the Portico) and the Triumphal Arch, in line with the recommendations of the ‘Technical Assistance Workshop for the World Heritage Site of Palmyra’.104 In terms of emergency response mechanisms, this December 2019 technical meeting also recommended the: • enhancement of international cooperation for the update of inventories related to looted objects, with the support of UNESCO and ICOM; • development of a site map of Palmyra, including all information and documents available on specific monuments and areas; and • establishment of an integrated conservation management plan.105 Given the readymade (2017) proposal for the documentation and consolidation of the Portico of the Temple of Bel, following the initial technical assistance workshop in December 2016, referred to in the latter immediate action, has not yet been funded or implemented, such “immediate” actions have either not been taken by UNESCO, or have instead been taken on by Russia. This is demonstrative of UNESCO’s technocratic nature discussed by Meskell (2018); in the case of Syria, there is a plethora of technical meetings concluding the same recommendations, with little to no follow-up or practical implementation. This further confirms Cunliffe’s notion that UNESCO’s collation of damage assessments assumed the primary role of awareness raising, with little application for recovery planning. Nonetheless, Article 33(1) merely requires that UNESCO provide technical assistance with respect to documentation at the request of the State Party on a preparatory basis, i.e. during peacetime. Aside from awareness raising activities by UNESCO, the organisation has played no further role in the prevention of antiquities trafficking from Syria. The latter two emergency response recommendations highlighted above, again, require the funding of onsite activity, something DGAM has been requesting during conflict without any success. The portico stabilisation project, which would allow for some site documentation has been consistently snubbed, while any management plan would need to come from the State Party itself, possibly with the support of UNESCO, but since the Syrian Government is currently not engaging with UNESCO, this recommendation is unlikely to come to fruition. This technical meeting again demonstrates lack of engagement; although experts, from various countries attended this meeting,

104 105

UNESCO (2019d). UNESCO (2019d), pp. 2–3.

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including the Syrian Arab Republic, there was no mention of any attendance by the DGAM or any representative of the Syrian Government. Given the implementation of the recommendations is contingent on the action and agreement of said competent authority, i.e. DGAM, it is unlikely there was any intent for these recommendations to be implemented resultant of this meeting. In the case of Syria, UNESCO is not acting upon emergency response recommendations in a manner consistent with an emergency, nor is it able to. Even following the WHCo outright identifying lack of funding as the direct cause of the potential collapse of the Portico and the Triumphal Arch in Palmyra, other States Parties neglected to commit any funds to the project. This could be construed as indicative of the power ongoing sanctions against Syria have over international organisations. However, it must be questioned why UNESCO continues to pretend that it is capable of intervening by hosting such international technical meetings on emergency safeguarding of Syrian cultural heritage when it is aware of its inability to act on its own recommendations. Meskell discusses the dominance of States and their politics over UNESCO, stating, “conservation priorities have devolved into political webs of reciprocities and relationships that increasingly relegate conservation to the wings, rather than placing it at centre stage.”106 The continual hosting of international meetings, with little to no implementation of resultant recommendations, show such efforts by UNESCO to be more indicative of political appeasement, than any form of meaningful action. With regard to the experts who participated in this technical meeting on the recovery of Palmyra in 2019, their recommendations do not bring to light anything more than what was already established by the initial rapid assessment mission by UNESCO and the subsequent, more detailed report comprising a comprehensive damage assessment and various recommendations produced in 2016. This 2019 meeting was therefore of no value, particularly given that it has failed to realise any funding for the implementation of the recommendations raised. The original 2016 rapid assessment report called upon the international community to support the Palmyra recovery actions “with significant human and financial resources” in close cooperation with UNESCO,107 yet the 2019 recommendations do not make such a call, despite the absence of funds remaining the primary inhibitor in ensuring the preservation of existing structures in Palmyra. Al Quntar and Daniels raise the crucial point that site documentation endeavours may not have any utility in assisting with future stabilisation or reconstruction efforts when carried out during conflict, due to the likelihood of further damage incurred to the site in the intervening time between the assessment and the restorative intervention.108 Site documentation only serves a purpose when emergency interventions are implemented soon after. Although still able to function in terms of awareness raising or holding certain groups or countries accountable when documentary evidence is gathered in the correct manner, UNESCO’s effort to support others to document

106

Meskell (2018), p. 115. UNESCO (2016e), p. 5. 108 Al Quntar and Daniels (2016), p. 385. 107

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Palmyra came to nothing, with there being no significant follow-up action or intervention. Apart from the evacuation of Palmyra Museum’s collections, and Iconem’s full scan and mapping of the site for DGAM,109 little more has been achieved. Site documentation during conflict, is crucial, as it raises awareness among the international heritage community of any structures at imminent risk of collapse and can allow for the development of stabilisation plans. The major gap is the failure to financially support or facilitate the roll out of such plans in a timely and appropriate manner, with political factors often being the key inhibitor. At a UNESCO conference held in late 2014, Bokova called for the creation of “protected cultural zones” around heritage sites in Syria and Iraq,110 something which evidently was not heeded, given the wealth of destruction in 2015. “Protected cultural zones” was item 11 on the provisional agenda of the Committee Meeting for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict on 10–11 December 2015.111 It was subsequently concluded that UNESCO Member States and the UNESCO Secretariat “give due consideration to the idea of ‘cultural protected zones’”.112 It is recorded that UNESCO would explore the establishment and operationalisation of “protected cultural zones” in the context of the legal framework established by the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols (1954, 1999). The Committee also acknowledges that neither the 1954 Hague Convention nor its two Protocols define “protected cultural zones”.113 This idea set out by Bokova in 2014 did not come to fruition. Even if such measures were taken, it is unlikely that they would have been effective against extremist groups or military groups set on intentionally targeting heritage sites. The Executive Board Draft Action Plan for the previously discussed 2015 strategy details that the Protected Cultural Zones initiative would cost US$40,000, the funding for which was not secured.114 Moreover, in November 2015, UNESCO met with Abdulkarim, the then DG of DGAM, as well as Assistant DG for Culture Francesco Bandarin, and Director of the WHC Mechtild Rössler, and experts in heritage conservation, one being Giovanni Boccardi.115 This meeting primarily centred on action DGAM had taken to mitigate risks to Syrian heritage and conservation issues to Syrian WHSs included on the List of World Heritage in Danger. Consideration was also given to the WHCo’s recommendation at the 39th session in 2015 for a Reactive Monitoring Mission, security conditions permitting, and the creation of a prioritised action plan for the recovery of Syrian WHSs.116 No resolution was reached regarding a recovery plan, and, as has been evidenced by the analysis of UNESCO’s response to required

109

UNESCO (2017d). UNESCO (2014d). 111 UNESCO (2015f), p. 1. 112 UNESCO (2015f), p. 3. 113 UNESCO (2015f), p. 2. 114 UNESCO (n.d.-j). 115 UNESCO (2015g). 116 UNESCO (2015g). 110

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emergency interventions at the WHS of Palmyra, the DGAM continued to go underfunded in its emergency conservation efforts. Moreover, from 16–19 January 2017, UNESCO led an emergency mission to Aleppo to complete a preliminary damage assessment of the WHS. This initial assessment, followed up by an International Coordination Meeting for the recovery of Aleppo’s heritage on 2–3 March 2017,117 and the publication of the joint UNESCO-UNITAR report on damage to Aleppo,118 revealed 60% of the old city to be severely damaged, while 30% was totally destroyed.119 This extensive damage was noted to span the Great Umayyad Mosque, the Citadel, mosques, churches, suqs, khans, madrassas, hammams, museums and other significant historic buildings in Aleppo.120 This pattern of damage assessment and monitoring without follow up implementation of emergency works make any such initial assessments futile. At this stage, UNESCO indicated it was working on an “emergency initiative to coordinate international efforts”, the results of which are discussed in the following chapter. On 19 November 2020, the Secretariat of the WHC announced that it would host a series of online technical meetings for Syrian properties on the List of World Heritage in Danger, with the aim of “clarifying the process for the elaboration of the Desired [SoC]” for their removal from the list.121 UNESCO’s established pattern when it comes to heritage interventions in Syria, as exemplified via the organisation’s actions regarding Palmyra, demonstrates a perpetuation of a cyclical approach centred on hosting expert or high-level meetings and producing recommendations, with no follow-up. Upcoming meetings are likely to repeat established recommendations of the organisation. UNESCO’s reactive response to the destruction of cultural heritage in Syria is exemplified by the WHC’s media statement titled “UNESCO meeting considers protection of Ancient City of Damascus following fire”.122 This media statement makes the following remarks: “A recent fire that devastated a neighbourhood of the Ancient City of Damascus raised the alarm about the need to protect the old city” and “sparked discussions about post-conflict action in Syria”.123 Moreover, Nada Al Hassan, Chief of the Arab Region at the UNESCO WHC, is quoted to have said that this “unfortunate incident gives an impetus to develop a comprehensive plan for the protection of the old city of Damascus and other heritage sites in the country to prevent another disaster from occurring in the future”.124 Such remarks suggest that the WHC needed another form of disaster, such as the fire in Damascus, to spur the organisation into action in assisting DGAM in formulating and implementing an

117

UNESCO (2017e). UNESCO (2018c). 119 UNESCO (2017f). 120 UNESCO (2017f). 121 UNESCO (2020a). 122 UNESCO (2016j). 123 UNESCO (2016j). 124 UNESCO (2016j). 118

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emergency response or recovery plan for Syrian WHSs. From this meeting, UNESCO’s recommendations for DGAM included the following: • Submit an application for International Assistance funds of US$30,000 for the creation of a site management plan; • Create a Data Bank of documentation for the Ancient City of Damascus; • Implement emergency recovery of the Ottoman Bank, greatly damaged in the fire, using traditional materials; • Awareness-raising among local communities and the private sector in the World Heritage property; and • Develop a “handy and operational manual to mitigate the risks of disasters, with a focus on fire”.125 Regarding UNESCO’s final recommendation, it should be questioned why, given the technocratic nature of the organisation, such a manual—beyond that by André Noblecourt, published by UNESCO in 1958—has not already been developed by UNESCO, ready to distribute to SHIs. Follow-up responsibilities UNESCO took from this meeting, in response to the destruction of aspects of this WHS, was to provide training to a team in Damascus on disaster risk management,126 in addition to the training provided on first aid to built heritage in Syria to DGAM staff and other heritage professionals in late 2014. The organisation also stated it would organise a meeting on which documentation on the ancient city and other monuments should be prioritised for digitisation.127 With there being no further mention of the provision of training on disaster risk management, nor the proposed meeting on the prioritisation of digitisation of documentation of the Ancient City of Damascus and other monuments and considering UNESCO’s significant drop off in engagement with Syria the following year, it is likely these events never came to fruition. In 2017, the WHCo stated, it “[r]egrets that the restoration works undertaken in al-Asrooniya neighbourhood are not based on historical archives and documentation, and do not use traditional materials, thus impacting the [OUV] of the property”.128 The Committee is expressing consternation over damaged shops in the region affected by fire, being restored or reconstructed using some materials and techniques in conflict with those traditionally used.129 Considering these shops serve the livelihoods of many Syrians and given the lack of support from UNESCO in the implementation of emergency recovery efforts, the priority should be the secure but efficient restoration of the shops. UNESCO’s drop off in meaningful engagement with Syria is evident in the organisation’s 2018 joint report with UNITAR-UNOSAT detailing a damage assessment of various sites in Aleppo carried out via satellite imagery analysis, including

125

UNESCO (2016k). UNESCO (2016k). 127 UNESCO (2016k). 128 UNESCO (2017g). 129 DGAM (2017), p. 6. 126

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the citadel, religious places, marketplaces, museums and other historic buildings and places.130 The aim of this UNITAR-UNOSAT and UNESCO report is to create awareness and mobilize decision- and policy-makers as well as the general public on the urgent need, when conditions allow, to scale-up actions on the ground in order to safeguard and protect the remaining monuments, shrines, mosques, archaeological sites and other cultural property in Aleppo.131

The information detailed in the report was therefore not utilised by UNESCO to inform discussions with DGAM on the development of a recovery plan for the WHS. With the already saturated level of damage assessment data reported via the Observatory, prior to its termination, it remains to be seen whether such awareness raising efforts have gleaned any results from UNESCO’s Member States in terms of direct support to Syrian cultural heritage. Moreover, such awareness raising efforts by UNESCO seem superficial at best, given the organisation’s diminished engagement with DGAM post-2017; remote monitoring without utilising the data for practical measures, is evidential of either the level of passivity UNESCO has reached with regard to Syria, or the lack of will on Syria’s part to engage with the organisation. In terms of emergency response, the only further aid UNESCO has extended is the granting of Syria’s International Assistance application of US$30,000 in October 2020 for the safeguarding of the Damascus Wall and the adjacent urban fabric (the area between Bab al-Salam and Bab Touma).132 Teijgeler believes that in “the beginning, UNESCO did try [in Syria], but barely achieved anything.”133 When it comes to emergency response action in Syria, UNESCO’s approach can be described as technocratic, with minimal implementation. This is exemplified by the various meetings and conferences held by UNESCO with experts and stakeholders to discuss potential roadmaps for better heritage safeguarding and recovery approaches. This demonstrates UNESCO’s habit of retreating into its “‘field of competence’ position in order to rescue itself from political bombshells”.134 Meskell suggests that the only way UNESCO can intervene when it comes to heritage destruction in Syria is “by listing the Syrian [WHS]s as endangered, [and] signaling to the international community the State Party’s failure to protect”.135 Meskell proffers the organisation’s only alternative avenues are via discussions and planning as evidenced by UNESCO’s output under the Emergency Safeguarding project. This summation of UNESCO’s engagement in Syria in the context of heritage protection during the ongoing-armed conflict should also extend to training and advocacy/awareness-raising, which, again, have not necessarily translated into on-the-ground implementation of emergency or recovery works. Nonetheless, again, as per Article 30(3)(b) of the Second Protocol the 130

UNESCO (2018c), p. 9. UNESCO (2018c), p. 135. 132 UNESCO (2020b). 133 Teijgeler (2020), personal communication. 134 Meskell (2018), p. 169. 135 Meskell (2015), p. 8. 131

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individual State Party is obligated to work in cooperation with UNESCO during peacetime to develop and implement relevant training and educational programmes. Al Quntar and Daniels argue that much of the responses to the Syrian crisis among the international heritage community did not centre on humanitarian interventions, missing the opportunity for meaningful social action and engagement.136 This has evidently been true of UNESCO’s response in Syria and was initially evidenced in the organisation’s emergency response to the destruction of Yemeni cultural heritage. UNESCO has since shifted its approach in Yemen to centre on humanitarian action via the CfW reconstruction initiative, thereby significantly improving its social action and engagement in the country. Across UNESCO’s response to the destruction of cultural heritage in Syria, there was a definite prioritisation of, and emphasis on, the WHS of Palmyra, over all other sites, with Aleppo being the second priority focus. Luke and Meskell determine that the emphasis and focus on sites such as Palmyra demonstrate colonial and imperialist pasts, suggesting that this “pattern perpetuates the very cultural differences that organisations such as UNESCO, the UNDP, and progressive academic institutions claim to challenge.”137 This is further evidenced in the 2016 UNOSAT ‘SatelliteBased Damage Assessment of Cultural Heritage Sites 2015 Summary Report of Iraq, Nepal, Syria & Yemen’, promoted by UNESCO. When addressing Syria, UNESCO only referred to damage incurred to Palmyra, including the Arch of Triumph, Temple of Baalshamin, Temple of Bel and the Ancient City of Palmyra.138 Although worthy of international attention, UNESCO’s excessive focus on Palmyra, which, in the end, achieved very little, could have been better centred on carrying out damage assessments and the development of recovery strategies in areas of Syrian heritage, which have more of a daily impact on the standard of living of Syrians, such as souqs, historic buildings and religious sites. As laid out in the previous chapter, UNESCO exhibited a greater level of engagement in heritage protection during armed conflict across Yemen, Syria and Iraq in 2015, seemingly making efforts to refocus its attention on this particular issue. A significant move by the UN system in 2015, which was welcomed by UNESCO’s DG, was the adoption of UNSCR 2199.139 This Resolution, which condemns the destruction of cultural heritage—placing emphasis on Da’esh and Al-Nusra Front as the perpetrators—acknowledged the role of illicit trafficking of cultural objects in financing such terrorist groups and determined that Member States should take appropriate steps to counter illicit trafficking of cultural objects from Syria and Iraq.140

136

Al Quntar and Daniels (2016), p. 382. Luke and Meskell (2019), p. 838. 138 UNITAR-UNOSAT (2016), pp. 9–11. 139 UNESCO (2015h). 140 Para. 16 United Nations Security Council, 2015a. 137

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Iraq: Emergency Response “First-Aid”

UNESCO Iraq is now implementing the biggest portfolio in UNESCO, with over US $130 million of funding. This portfolio, of which a large portion pertains to culture and heritage reconstruction, is “expected to grow into the future”.141 However, persistent tensions in the country, particularly between the Nineveh Governorate and the MoC in Baghdad, as well as significant international political tensions, suggest UNESCO’s facilitation of projects and initiatives across Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan has not been, and will not be made, simple. UNESCO assert its “interventions in the field of culture concentrate on safeguarding cultural heritage and rehabilitating cultural institutions”. When it comes to UNESCO’s interventions in Iraq, its efforts initially focussed on “emergency assistance to the protection of archaeological sites and the rehabilitation of cultural institutions such as the National Museum and the National Library and Archives”. Moreover, UNESCO states, the organisation also “works with the Iraqi government to provide technical expertise and support capacity development within the relevant cultural institutions for heritage conservation and management”.142 UNESCO proffers it has a longstanding cooperation with Iraq and has successfully accomplished a number of major cultural heritage projects, such as the restoration of Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra, which commenced in 2007, and the revitalisation of Erbil Citadel in relation to its inscription on the World Heritage List in 2014.143 The following allows for in-depth consideration of UNESCO’s emergency response “first-aid” approaches to Iraq in the context of the most recent conflict, which spanned 2014 to 2017, with particular reference to relevant media statements identified as active in nature. The first move UNESCO made regarding Iraq at the outset of the 2014 conflict, was to place Erbil Citadel on the World Heritage List at the June 2014 Doha Qatar session of the WHCo.144 Since then, the Citadel has remained off the List of World Heritage in Danger, unlike other cultural sites in Iraq. Less than 1 month later, on 17 July 2014, UNESCO held a consultation with Iraqi and international cultural heritage experts to agree upon an Emergency Response Action Plan (Action Plan hereafter). At this stage, said Action Plan did not set out any concrete commitment for UNESCO to engage on-the-ground emergency safeguarding measures or remote monitoring for that matter. The chief intention of the Action Plan, upon its announcement, was to “secure the cooperation of all stakeholders, including national and international organizations, humanitarian relief workers in the field, art dealers, international museums and law enforcement authorities, in safeguarding Iraq’s heritage”, which could be construed as an empty voicing of support to the Iraqi people. Furthermore, the Action Plan aimed to ensure the implementation of the

141

UNESCO (2019e). UNESCO (n.d.-k). 143 UNESCO (n.d.-l). 144 UNESCO (2014e). 142

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1954 Hague Convention, the 1970 Convention and the 1972 Convention.145 However, the previous 10 years in Iraq demonstrate a lack of implementation of peacetime measures, crucially of the 1954 Hague Convention, and with Iraq not having ratified the Second Protocol, there is not much hope for its improved implementation, or for NSAs to show adherence to the spirit of the convention. In addition to seeking to enforce a ban on trafficking of Iraqi cultural objects, which was put into force back in 2003 under UNSCR 1483, UNESCO also pressed for “close monitoring of the [SoC] of heritage and training of conservation professionals while helping those in place prepare emergency measures for the possible relocation of movable heritage”.146 With the UNSCR 1483 not having a significant impact on the rate of illicit trafficking of cultural objects out of Iraq in the preceding 10 years,147 there is no indication as to how this will now change. Moreover, the responsibility to carry out comprehensive SoC reports on WHSs in Iraq, and the development of emergency measures for the relocation of objects to secure refuges, during an armed conflict, remains with SBAH, which possessed, and still possess, very limited human and financial resources. As it did for Syria, UNESCO stated on 12 August 2014, that it was strengthening action to safeguard cultural heritage under attack, while reiterating the importance of the key cultural conventions as well as prevention and long-term engagement.148 Applying Weiss and Connelly’s assertion that early intervention can constitute preventative action,149 with the relatively early establishment of an Action Plan, within 6 months of the outbreak of conflict, UNESCO would be justified as enacting a preventative and precautionary approach to cultural heritage safeguarding in Iraq. However, the 1954 Hague Convention is clear in its stipulation that preparedness measures are to be carried out in the pre-conflict phase. Any such action during conflict is therefore emergency response “first aid” at best. Moreover, the Action Plan, to be carried out by the UNESCO Office for Baghdad, in close collaboration with Iraqi heritage professionals, the UNESCO Culture Sector at HQ and institutional partners and experts, placed particular focus on awareness raising on the threats of armed conflict to cultural heritage and damage assessments, neither of which come under the preventative category. In terms of any preventative measures alluded to in the Action Plan, UNESCO stated that “existing inventories” were to be updated and digitised where necessary.150 Lastly, UNESCO proffered “[e]mergency measures could be put into place for the temporary relocation of cultural objects, including library collections and manuscripts.”151 There has been no subsequent assurance that such an effort has taken place with the assistance of UNESCO. Given

145

UNESCO (2014f). UNESCO (2014f). 147 Russell (2008), p. 43. 148 UNESCO (2014g). 149 Weiss and Connelly (2019), p. 7. 150 UNESCO (2014h). 151 UNESCO (2014h). 146

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the presence of Da’esh across both Iraq and Syria at the time, UNESCO often discussed both countries simultaneously when considering potential safeguarding strategies against the effects of the terrorist group. As previously mentioned, at a conference held in late 2014, Bokova called for the creation of “protected cultural zones” around heritage sites in both Syria and Iraq.152 Evidently this did not occur or had no evidentiary effect against terrorist groups’ intent on destroying heritage sites, as demonstrated by the subsequent destruction at, for example, Nimrud and Mosul. Shortly following the destruction of cultural heritage at Hatra and Nimrud, on 28 March 2015, Bokova launched the online #Unite4Heritage campaign at Baghdad University, under the Emergency Safeguarding project. This campaign, which was entirely focused on awareness raising, established a tall order: “to create a global movement to protect and safeguard heritage under threat”.153 Although the destruction, which took place in Iraq, was used as an initial platform on which to launch the campaign, it would not be the sole focus, with Bokova intending for the campaign to be for the world’s cultural heritage as a whole. This campaign was maintained for a couple of years via various video campaigns, with one example titled “The Value of Heritage”, in which seven individuals from different countries spoke about their own heritage and were asked to contemplate seeing it damaged, destroyed or lost.154 However, the official website and Twitter page has laid dormant since late November 2018.155 Although the hashtag (#unite4heritage) is still occasionally employed by individuals and organisations such as Karima Benoune, the UNSR in the Field of Cultural Rights,156 and Blue Shield,157 UNESCO no longer promotes the campaign, suggesting it is no longer a part of its core heritage programme. Responding to Da’esh’s destructive campaign, the UNESCO DG denounced the destruction at Nimrud on 13 April 2015.158 The DG then addressed the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 28 May 2015, which resulted in the condemnations of such deliberate destruction, calls to trace the perpetrators and urgent action from the international community, and encouragement for all States Parties to ratify the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC.159 The 2016 SoC report of Hatra shows just under US$2 million to have been donated by the Italian Funds-In-Trust, the Government of Japan, the Government of Norway, the Government of Italy and the Government of the Netherlands, then made available via UNESCO’s extrabudgetary funds over the 2015–2016 period.160 This could constitute a direct response from the international community to the UNGA appeal. However, it was

152

UNESCO (2014d). UNESCO (2015i). 154 UNESCO (2016l). 155 UNESCO (n.d.-m, n.d.-n). 156 UNSR Culture (2019). 157 Blue Shield International (2020). 158 UNESCO (2015j). 159 UNESCO (2015k), a-b. 160 UNESCO (2016m). 153

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noted via the 2017 State Party SoC report that, for the third consecutive year, SBAH had been unable to carry out any conservation measures at WHSs in Iraq, due to persisting security concerns.161 It is therefore unclear what the extra-budgetary funds, allocated from the previous 2-year UNESCO funding cycle, would have been intended for in Iraq. In July of 2015, the WHCo resolved to inscribe the site of Hatra on the List of World Heritage In Danger, citing deliberate destruction of heritage and war as the factors affecting the property that year,162 with UNESCO going slightly further, stating it was “due to damage inflicted to the property by armed groups”.163 Despite the organisation’s evident limited capacity or political ability to stage large-scale interventions in most cases during conflict, it maintains a central position in this field. Given the territory of Mosul came under the control of an NSA, Da’esh, at the outset of the conflict, UNESCO would be greatly limited in terms of how it could engage in a meaningful manner. UNESCO responded on 26 February 2015 with the DG, Bokova, requesting a UNSC meeting on the destruction of cultural heritage in Mosul.164 The result of this action was a press statement from the UNSC, which essentially repeated its sentiments from the recent Resolution 2199, by condemning the role of terrorist organisations, such as Da’esh, in the destruction of cultural heritage across Syria and Iraq,165 a statement subsequently welcomed by UNESCO’s DG.166 At this point, in relation to the 2014 conflict in Iraq, UNESCO’s tangible involvement was limited to the aforementioned 2015 UNITAR-UNOSAT and UNESCO joint summary report on remote satellite-based damage assessments, inclusive of Iraq, Nepal, Syria and Yemen.167 Wegener asserts, We do not need more satellite imagery of Iraq. . . .The Iraqis know what is broken. They need organisations that are going to come in and help fix it. I also think we need more organisations that are focused on the detailed damage assessments, not just what you can see from space.168

The restrictive confines in which UNESCO must work dictates that it cannot provide or assist in the provision of thorough damage assessments of an area controlled by an NSA until that area is liberated. Therefore, particularly affected areas within Iraq, such as Nimrud, Hatra and Mosul were unreachable for long periods of time, both for UNESCO and SBAH. It remains however, that significant investment in satellite imagery to document heritage damage and destruction does not have much of a role beyond raising international awareness around the issue, given the lack of detailed

161

SBAH (2017), p. 3. UNESCO (2015l). 163 UNESCO (2015m). 164 UNESCO (2015n). 165 United Nations (2015). 166 UNESCO (2015o). 167 UNITAR-UNOSAT (2016). 168 Wegener (2020), personal communication. 162

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information it can glean. Nonetheless, awareness raising remains necessary in order to attract investment. This pattern of UNESCO’s shifts in engagement is evidenced in the organisation’s various condemnations of destruction of heritage at Nimrud, while it was under Da’esh control,169 to its response once the archaeological site was liberated late November 2016, i.e. the UNESCO office in Baghdad leading a rapid assessment mission on 14 December 2016.170 Crucially, the aim of this mission was to first assess the damage inflicted over the previous 2 years by Da’esh and to “identify emergency safeguarding measures that could be taken in order to prevent any further loss”.171 Possible actions to be taken would be discussed 2 months later 23–24 February 2017 at an International Coordination Meeting on the Cultural Heritage of Liberated Areas of Iraq at UNESCO HQ,172 showing swift action from UNESCO. From consideration of the WHC’s statement regarding this particular meeting, the organisation’s additional immediate emergency actions included the construction of a fence around Nimrud, ensuring sites were guarded, as well as a damage assessment mission to Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat).173 This is corroborated and expanded on slightly by Boccardi, who stated, “UNESCO supported SBAH in places such as Nimrud. . ., where we installed a protective fence around the site and mapped the area following the destruction perpetrated there by Da’esh.”174 Wegener further stated, “UNESCO built a fantastic fence around part of the Nimrud site, and brought caravans to the site, so site guards would have a place to get out of the sun,” asserting, when it came to Nimrud, UNESCO were “really proactive.”175 Moreover, at this meeting, it was agreed that a joint UNESCO-Iraqi Steering Committee would be appointed “to coordinate and advocate the many national and international initiatives to rehabilitate the cultural heritage of Iraq”.176 This Steering Committee would play a future role in the decision-making of the Mosul initiative, discussed in the following chapter. In further reference to the above highlighted pattern of UNESCO’s engagement with an occupied territory, on 28 April 2017, when welcoming the liberation of Hatra, UNESCO stated it would send a rapid emergency assessment mission, in cooperation with the Iraqi Government, to facilitate a damage assessment and take emergency safeguarding measures, as soon as security measures permitted.177 It was noted in Iraq’s 2019 State Party SoC report however, that despite the UNESCO DG making this promise, “[n]o International Committee [or]... Damage Assessment was

169

UNESCO (2015j, p). UNESCO (2016n). 171 UNESCO (2016n). 172 UNESCO (2016n). 173 UNESCO (2017h). 174 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 175 Wegener (2020), personal communication. 176 UNESCO (2017h). 177 UNESCO (2017i). 170

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sent”.178 In both 2018 and 2019, the WHCo acknowledged the partial damage assessment of Hatra SBAH submitted, however noted, “with concern the continuing lack of complete and detailed information on the [SoC] of the property”.179 Despite UNESCO’s subsequent extensive engagement with Iraq via reconstruction efforts in Mosul and Basra, there has been no explanation as to why the organisation has been unable to support SBAH in this “emergency response” measure in Hatra, years following its liberation. At this point in the timeline of UNESCO’s engagement with Iraq, moving into the post-conflict period, the vast majority of attention shifted to the reconstruction of Mosul, chiefly the stabilisation and reconstruction of Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret. It would seem that now there has been a significant decline in the destruction inflicted upon Iraqi cultural heritage, there has also been a decline in any urgency on UNESCO’s part, to facilitate or carry out emergency safeguarding measures across affected sites, with all energy instead centring on a single initiative. This shift in focus with regard to Iraq is also linked with a change in UNESCO policy with the appointment of a new DG, Audrey Azoulay, in 2017. In the following chapter, in-depth consideration is given to the Mosul initiative, which can be placed under the category of reconstruction. However, there also existed a pre-emptive project for the rehabilitation of Mosul, which can be categorised as emergency response, namely the project titled, ‘Documentation of the Urban [H]eritage of Mosul’, which was launched on 1 June 2018, with a budget of US$330,000 donated by the HEF.180 This project would have acted as a direct precursor to reconstruction activities in the city, with the funds designated to provide “detailed documentation of the urban heritage of the city, through an overall survey of the historic urban fabric and urban heritage, including of religious interest”.181 The documentation was carried out by the French 3D-modelling company, Iconem, between 14 June and 7 July 2018, and concluded a previous assessment carried out in February 2018. Most of the project’s allocated budget of US$330,000 however, was supposedly set aside for the establishment of an Antenna office in Mosul, which we now know to be in operation, and for the purchase of an armed vehicle for transportation to the region.182 Acknowledging Da’esh’s destructive campaign, which led to the burning of books, manuscripts, severe damage to museums and bulldozing of archaeological sites, such as Hatra and Nimrud, Lababidi and Qassar summarise UNESCO’s response to such destruction as a “travesty”.183 Discussing UNESCO’s allocation of already limited finances to the hosting of expert meetings and workshops, Lababidi and Qassar suggest such funds be allocated instead to, for example, the provision of museum guards or basic equipment for the safeguarding of cultural

178

SBAH (2019), p. 6. UNESCO (2019f). 180 UNESCO (2018d). 181 UNESCO (2018d). 182 UNESCO (2018d). 183 Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 345. 179

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heritage in situ, calling the allocation of human and financial resources “counterproductive to the discipline of protecting cultural heritage.”184 Danti claims, in Iraq, [n]obody but us [ASOR-CHI] are addressing the immediate needs right now. Using State Department dollars, we ask SBAH what they want done right now and how they want it done, and we work with them to develop the plan and we give them the money. I do not see UNESCO doing that.185

Across each SoC report SBAH provided to the WHCo on an annual basis, the SHI brought forth issues of lack of financial support and human and material resources necessary to carry out essential preparedness and emergency response measures. Similar to UNESCO’s emergency response “first aid” to the destruction of cultural heritage in Yemen and Syria, the organisation’s response in Iraq revolved around awareness raising and the promise of damage assessments, some of which did not take place, and some of which were carried out via remote satellite monitoring. It became clear that the latter could not be used to inform a needs assessment of a site, but could only further contribute to awareness raising. Moreover, the Action Plan did not seem to have any real impact, with the majority of UNESCO updates stemming from international meetings held on the matter, demonstrating the technocratic nature of the organisation. In terms of preventative action taken by UNESCO, there was a lack of support given to SBAH during peacetime, or in the pre-conflict phase to enact appropriate measures, as per the 1954 Hague Convention. The only significant “preventative” measure taken by UNESCO was during conflict, following the liberation of Nimrud, where a fence was installed and archaeological site guards stationed to mitigate further looting and destruction. This serves to reiterate the point that those of UNESCO’s actions, which are preventative in nature, often take place during conflict or in the stabilisation phases, making them inherently reactive, and thus categorised as emergency response “first aid”.

5.5

Emergency Response “First Aid” Conclusions

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) states, “[p]revention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.”186 From this perspective, greater resources should be placed into prevention, with it being preferable to reconstruction.187 UNESCO acknowledges that prevention and long-term engagement is key when it comes to cultural heritage protection and views its role in this regard to build national capacities via advocacy, awareness raising, advice and 184

Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 355. Danti (2020), personal communication. 186 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), p. xi. 187 Weiss and Connelly (2019), p. 6. 185

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training. It further states that preventative capacity building is preferable to last minute endeavours, specifically in times of conflict.188 This is contradictory to UNESCO’s evidenced reactive engagement with Yemen, Syria and Iraq when it comes to such efforts. Very few UNESCO interventions in Yemen, Syria or Iraq qualify as ‘early’ or ‘preventative’. This does not mean to say those working for UNESCO are reluctant to extend preventative or emergency aid to Yemen, Syria or Iraq, but that the organisation has multiple limitations in terms of lack of funding and the restrictive power Member States possess over its ability to act. The most typical initial response from UNESCO and the international community to the destruction of cultural heritage in areas experiencing conflict, where the area concerned is in NSA territory, more specifically when that NSA has a terrorist designation, is condemnation. This chiefly remains the standard response until the area is liberated or shifts back to the UN-recognised-government’s control, at which time, UNESCO may send a delegation to carry out or facilitate a rapid assessment mission. Laurie Rush believes that [i]f UNESCO were not so anxious to be viewed as the brilliant superheroes of heritage protection and to bring great fame and accolades to the organisation, but were instead willing to work behind the scenes, they could be really effective in protecting heritage.189

This sentiment speaks to UNESCO’s preference to focus greater attention on larger symbolic reconstruction projects, as opposed to projects of a more preventative nature, in line with the letter and spirit of the 1954 Hague Convention. In terms of UNESCO’s support for major activities, Interviewee F “would recommend less investment in restoration, and more investment in the provision of basic facilities and infrastructure.”190 Given the severe lack of resources of the SHIs of Yemen, Syria and Iraq, it is evident there is a lack of capacity for them to carry out their obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention, rendering them unable to facilitate this basic requirement. Close consultation with GOAM, GOPHCY, DGAM and SBAH, by UNESCO to ascertain exactly what these institutions are lacking, would better serve for stronger preventative cultural heritage protection capabilities. Certain countries should be prioritised, for example, States Parties at-risk of political instability and conflict, whose heritage institutions regularly cite lack of capacity and resources as a debilitating issue at the WHCo annual sessions. Interviewee E believes “UNESCO could be more active in ensuring protective measures by working with, for example, museum directors, to help build museum structures, which have improved storage facilities, and which are ready for any crisis.”191 Interviewee E further states, “[w]hen it comes to protecting sites, I think more engagement with government authorities, local entities and citizens is needed in

188

UNESCO (2014g). Rush (2020), personal communication. 190 Interviewee F (2020), personal communication. 191 Interviewee E (2020), personal communication. 189

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order to develop a strategy to protect archaeological areas.”192 These recommendations highlighted by Interviewee E would serve to ensure improved implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention, particularly with respect to the preparation of in situ protective measures and facilities as per Articles 3 and 8, as well as Articles 5 and 8 of the Second Protocol. The issue with the lack of emphasis on preventative measures does not only lie with UNESCO, but extends to its donors, which have great influence over the form projects and initiatives take. Haxthausen asserts, [f]ew donors will actually focus on building the capacities of the national institutions, or civil societies for that matter, but rather focus on having a prestigious project. Of course, given the cultural heritage of Iraq, there are many prestigious sites. Therefore, there is a lot of interest in being rather site focused.193

Furthermore, when asked about UNESCO’s role in preventative initiatives, referring to the UN system as a whole, Haxthausen stated, [t]he reality is that it is not happening. I think it is happening to some extent, but you cannot compare the investment of the international community in terms of reconstruction with investment in prevention. Unfortunately, it is somehow very difficult to mobilise donors and partners, in a significant manner, around prevention.194

This narrative presented by Haxthausen speaks to the power the substantial donor has over UNESCO’s cultural heritage protection programme, and the level to which the organisation engages in preventative vs. recovery measures. With most donors striving for the prestigious reconstruction projects to bolster their own image in the international community, preventative, large-scale and long-term capacity building initiatives in currently under-funded SHIs will continue to go unsupported. Interviewee A believes that UNESCO has always been engaged in prevention, with advocacy being the main branch of the organisation’s job. They further state that the “only difference now is that . . .[UNESCO] have decided to do some work on the ground in the form of reconstruction.”195 It must then be determined whether the advocacy work such as awareness raising initiatives have proved successful or impactful. Of course, it is not possible to measure how many people have absorbed UNESCO’s messaging through such recent campaigns as #Unite4Heritage—and this research does not intend to undermine the importance of UNESCO’s awareness raising campaigns. However, consideration of this campaign shows UNESCO not to sustain such awareness raising efforts, with the organisation instead appearing to approach them on an ad hoc basis, shifting to its next centre stage project, in this case the Mosul initiative, almost overnight. Antonelli states, the #Unite4Heritage campaign “caused a lot of visibility, but with no results.”196

192

Interviewee E (2020), personal communication. Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 194 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 195 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 196 Antonelli (2019), personal communication. 193

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Meskell and Isakhan suggest that there is a disproportionate response to Yemen’s loss of cultural heritage, compared to similar occurrences in Syria, Iraq, Mali and France.197 This is evidenced in the analysis of the WHC’s media statements, which shows UNESCO to have minimal engagement with Yemen throughout the conflict in comparison to Syria and Iraq. However, it must be acknowledged that UNESCO’s engagement with Syria has greatly diminished since 2017 and the departure of Dr Maamoun Abdulkarim from his position as DG of DGAM, and therefore UNESCO have arguably had a greater presence in Yemen than in Syria throughout 2018, 2019 and 2020, particularly given the organisation’s EU-funded, SFD-implemented CfW project. In terms of actual emergency response mechanisms, there is limited implementation across the board of Action Plans, with such plans going unfunded in the case of Yemen or having little impact beyond awareness raising and documentation of damage in Syria and Iraq. UNESCO’s presence in Syria has not amounted to much, and has only diminished as time went on, while the organisation’s major involvement in Yemen and Iraq stems from reconstruction activities.

References Al Quntar S, Daniels BI (2016) Responses to the destruction of Syrian cultural heritage: a critical review of current efforts. Int J Islamic Archit 5(2):381–397 Blue Shield International (2020) BlueShield_Int Tweet, 7 January 2020. https://twitter.com/ BlueShield_Int/status/1214512202151026688 Cunliffe E, Leckie L, Varoutsikos B (2017) Towards a protection of the Syrian cultural heritage: a summary of the national and international responses. Newcastle University ePrints. https:// eprints.ncl.ac.uk/file_store/production/244800/E5222C4B-A0FE-44E8-91CB-6D16434C12 D3.pdf Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums (2017) State Party Report on the State of Conservation of the Syrian cultural heritage sites (Syrian Arab Republic). DGAM, Damascus. https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3542 Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums (2019) State Party Report on The State of Conservation of the Syrian cultural heritage sites (Syrian Arab Republic). DGAM, Damascus. https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3866 General Organisation for the Preservation of Historic Cities in Yemen (2019a) State Party’s Report on the State of Conservation of Old Walled City of Shibam, Yemen - inscribed on the world heritage list in danger. UNESCO, Paris. https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3874 General Organisation for the Preservation of Historic Cities in Yemen (2019b) State Party’s Report on the State of Conservation of the Historic Town of Zabid, Yemen - inscribed on the world heritage list in danger. UNESCO, Paris. https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3872 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. ICISS, Ottawa. https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/18432/IDL-1 8432.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y International Council of Museums (2012) ICOM to launch a Red List for Syria. https://icom. museum/en/ressource/icom-to-launch-a-red-list-for-syria/

197

Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 2.

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International Council of Museums (2013) Emergency Red List of Syrian cultural objects at risk. https://icom.museum/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ERL_SYRIE_EN.pdf Irwin A (2017) A no-strike list may shield Yemen’s ancient treasures from war. NewScientist. https://www.newscientist.com/article/2118745-a-no-strike-list-may-shield-yemens-ancient-trea sures-from-war/ Lababidi R, Qassar H (2016) Did they really forget how to do it? Iraq, Syria, and the international response to protect a shared heritage. J East Medit Archaeol Herit Stud 4(4):341–362 Luke C, Meskell L (2019) Archaeology, assistance, and aggression along the Euphrates: reflections from Raqqa. Int J Cult Policy 25(7):831–842 Meskell L (2014) States of Conservation: protection, politics, and pacting within UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee. Anthropol Q 87(1):217–244 Meskell L (2015) Gridlock: UNESCO, global conflict and failed ambitions. World Archaeol 47(2): 225–238 Meskell L (2018) A future in ruins: UNESCO, world heritage, and the dream of peace. Oxford University Press, New York Meskell L, Isakhan B (2020) UNESCO, world heritage and the gridlock over Yemen. Third World Q 41(10):1776–1791 Patchil (2020) UNESCO’s emergency safeguarding of the Syrian cultural heritage. Communication strategy, data visualization, editorial design, visual communication. http://www.patchil.com/ portfolio/safeguarding-of-the-syrian-cultural-heritage/ Ravagnan R, Maigret SA, Muradore C (2017) Preserving and transmitting traditional building techniques in Yemen. In: Marchand THJ (ed) Architectural heritage of Yemen: buildings that fill my eye. Gingko Library, London Russell JM (2008) Efforts to protect archaeological sites and monuments in Iraq, 2003-2004. In: Emberling G, Hanson K (eds) Catastrophe! The looting and destruction of Iraq’s past. The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, Chicago, pp 29–44 State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (2017) World Heritage Sites in Iraq, Hatra-Ashur – Samarra, State of Conservation Reports. UNESCO, Baghdad. https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3 783 State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (2019) World Heritage Sites in Iraq, Hatra-Ashur – Samarra, State of Conservation Reports. UNESCO, Baghdad. https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3 856 UNESCO (2008) The inventory of the historic city of Sana’a: a tool for urban conservation. UNESCO. https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/569/ UNESCO (2013a) Syria’s six world heritage sites placed on List of World Heritage in Danger. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1038 UNESCO (2013b) In: UNESCO (ed) Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirty-seventh session, 16 - 27 June 2013, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. UNESCO, Paris. https://whc.unesco.org/en/sessions/37COM UNESCO (2013c) Emergency Red List of Syrian antiquities at risk is launched in New York. https://en.unesco.org/news/emergency-red-list-syrian-antiquities-risk-launched-new-york UNESCO (2014a) UNESCO Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirty-eighth session, 15-25 June 2014, Doha, Qatar. UNESCO, Paris. https://whc.unesco.org/en/sessions/38COM UNESCO (2014b) UNESCO to create an observatory for the safeguarding of Syria’s cultural heritage. https://en.unesco.org/syrian-observatory/news/unesco-create-observatorysafeguarding-syria%E2%80%99s-cultural-heritage UNESCO (2014c) UNESCO concludes training course on “First Aid to Cultural Built Heritage in Syria”. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1208 UNESCO (2014d) UNESCO conference calls for protected cultural zones to be established Syria and Iraq. https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-conference-calls-protected-cultural-zones-beestablished-syria-and-iraq-1

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UNESCO (2014e) Sites in Iraq, Japan, the Netherlands and Saudi Arabia inscribed on World Heritage List. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1155 UNESCO (2014f) Emergency response action plan to safeguard Iraqi heritage. https://whc.unesco. org/en/news/1170 UNESCO (2014g) UNESCO strengthens action to safeguard cultural heritage under attack. https:// whc.unesco.org/en/news/1176 UNESCO (2014h) Emergency plan to safeguard Iraq’s cultural heritage. https://whc.unesco.org/en/ news/1187 UNESCO (2015a) General conference 38th Session: reinforcement of UNESCO’s action for the protection of culture and the promotion of cultural pluralism in the event of armed conflict, November 2015, Paris. UNESCO, Paris, pp 1–12. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/ pf0000235186 UNESCO (2015b) UNESCO launches emergency response plan to safeguard Yemen cultural heritage. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1279 UNESCO (2015c) Yemen’s Old City of Sana’a and Old Walled City of Shibam added to List of World Heritage in Danger. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1310 UNESCO (2015d) Emergency action plan for the safeguarding of Yemen’s cultural heritage announced. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1325 UNESCO (2015e) Expert meeting on the safeguarding of Yemen’s cultural heritage, 15-16 July 2005, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris. UNESCO, Paris. https://www.academia.edu/14144668/ The_British_Museum_and_Yemen UNESCO (2015f) Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Tenth meeting, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris, 10 to 11 December 2015. UNESCO, Paris. http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/ Protected_Cultural_Zones_ENG.pdf UNESCO (2015g) Syrian Antiquities Director attends General Conference and meets with UNESCO Director-General to discuss heritage protection. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/13 80 UNESCO (2015h) UNESCO Director-General welcomes UN Security Council Resolution to step up protection of cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq. https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-directorgeneral-welcomes-security-council-resolution-step-protection-cultural-heritage UNESCO (2015i) #Unite4Heritage campaign launched by UNESCO Director-General in Baghdad. https://en.unesco.org/news/unite4heritage-campaign-launched-unesco-director-generalbaghdad UNESCO (2015j) UNESCO Director-General condemns destruction at Nimrud in Iraq. https://whc. unesco.org/en/news/1244 UNESCO (2015k) “Saving the cultural heritage of Iraq” – Director-General welcomes Adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1287/ UNESCO (2015l) State of Conservation: Hatra (Iraq). https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3328 UNESCO (2015m) The Iraqi site of Hatra added to the List of World Heritage in Danger. https:// whc.unesco.org/en/news/1309 UNESCO (2015n) Director-General requests UN Security Council meeting on destruction of heritage in Mosul. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1239 UNESCO (2015o) Director-General welcomes UN Security Council statement on destruction of artifacts at Mosul Museum. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1241 UNESCO (2015p) Minister of State Böhmer condemns destruction of Iraqi cultural sites in Nimrud by the ISIS terrorist group and calls for peace in Iraq. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1246 UNESCO (2016a) State of Conservation: Old City of Sana’a (Yemen). https://whc.unesco.org/en/ soc/3352 UNESCO (2016b) UNESCO Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Fortieth session, 10 - 17 July 2016, Istanbul, Turkey. UNESCO, Paris. https://whc.unesco.org/en/sessions/40COM

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UNESCO (2016c) UNESCO and French and Swiss heritage professionals stand up for the safeguarding of Syrian heritage. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1465 UNESCO (2016d) Executive Board Hundred and ninety-ninth session: UNESCO’s role in safeguarding and preserving Palmyra and Other Syrian world heritage sites. UNESCO, Paris. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000244379 UNESCO (2016e) Report of the UNESCO Rapid Assessment Mission to the World Heritage “Site of Palmyra”, Syrian Arab Republic, 23–27 April 2016. UNESCO, Paris. https://whc.unesco.org/ en/documents/142423 UNESCO (2016f) UNESCO holds consultations ahead of the International Expert Meeting in Berlin on cultural heritage in Syria. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1495 UNESCO (2016g) Director General opens Berlin expert meeting on the safeguarding of Syria’s heritage. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1503 UNESCO (2016h) Syrian and international experts agree on emergency measures to safeguard Syria’s heritage. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1505 UNESCO (2016i) Updated recommendations and road map for the safeguarding [of] Syria’s cultural heritage: outcome of the international expert meeting: ‘Follow-up to the implementation of the UNESCO Action Plan for the Emergency Safeguarding of Syria’s Cultural Heritage’ (2 – 4 June 2016, Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany). UNESCO, Berlin UNESCO (2016j) UNESCO meeting considers protection of Ancient City of Damascus following fire. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1593 UNESCO (2016k) First aid support meeting: follow-up to the World Heritage Committee Decisions on the Ancient City of Damascus, 14-15 November 2016, UNESCO Office, Beirut, Lebanon, Recommendations of the Meeting. UNESCO, Beirut UNESCO (2016l) The value of heritage. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1592 UNESCO (2016m) State of Conservation: Hatra (Iraq). https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3341 UNESCO (2016n) UNESCO Director General sends rapid assessment mission to the Nimrud archaeological site in Iraq. https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-director-general-sends-rapidassessment-mission-nimrud-archaeological-site-iraq UNESCO (2017a) State of Conservation: Old City of Sana’a (Yemen). https://whc.unesco.org/en/ soc/3549 UNESCO (2017b) UNESCO Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Forty-first session, 2 – 12 July 2017, Krakow, Poland. UNESCO, Paris. https://whc.unesco.org/en/sessions/41COM UNESCO (2017c) Technical assistance workshop for the world heritage sites of the Crac des Chevaliers, Palmyra and the Ancient City of Damascus, Beirut 13, 14, 15 December 2016: Site of Palmyra. UNESCO, Beirut. https://whc.unesco.org/en/events/1386/ UNESCO (2017d) Technical assistance workshop for the world heritage sites of the Crac des Chevaliers, Palmyra and the Ancient City of Damascus, Beirut 13, 14, 15 December 2016: Crac Des Chevaliers. UNESCO, Beirut. https://whc.unesco.org/en/events/1386/ UNESCO (2017e) UNESCO hosts first international coordination meeting for the recovery of Aleppo’s heritage. https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1639 UNESCO (2017f) UNESCO reports on extensive damage in first emergency assessment mission to Aleppo. https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-reports-extensive-damage-first-emergency-assess ment-mission-aleppo UNESCO (2017g) State of Conservation: Ancient City of Damascus (Syrian Arab Republic). https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3544 UNESCO (2017h) UNESCO calls on international community to help revive Iraq’s cultural heritage in the wake of massive destruction. https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-callsinternational-community-help-revive-iraq-s-cultural-heritage-wake-massive UNESCO (2017i) UNESCO Director-General welcomes the liberation of Hatra and will send emergency assessment mission “as soon as possible”. https://en.unesco.org/news/unescodirector-general-welcomes-liberation-hatra-and-will-send-emergency-assessment-mission

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UNESCO (2018a) State of Conservation: Old City of Sana’a (Yemen). https://whc.unesco.org/en/ soc/3802 UNESCO (2018b) UNESCO Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Forty-second session, 24 June – 4 July 2018, Manama, Bahrain. UNESCO, Paris. https://whc.unesco.org/en/sessions/42COM UNESCO (2018c) Five years of conflict: the state of cultural heritage in the Ancient City of Aleppo; a comprehensive multi-temporal satellite imagery-based damage analysis for the Ancient City of Aleppo. UNESCO, Paris UNESCO (2018d) Documentation of the Urban heritage of Mosul. https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/ baghdad/mosuldocumentationurbanheritage UNESCO (2019a) State of Conservation: Old City of Sana’a (Yemen). https://whc.unesco.org/en/ soc/3873 UNESCO (2019b) UNESCO Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Forty-third session, 30 June – 10 July 2019, Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan. UNESCO, Paris. https://whc.unesco.org/en/sessions/43COM. Accessed 14 Jan 2022 UNESCO (2019c) State of Conservation: Site of Palmyra (Syrian Arab Republic) [Online]. https:// whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3871 UNESCO (2019d) Technical meeting on the recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra, 18 December 2019. UNESCO, Paris UNESCO (2019e) UNESCO Iraq is implementing the biggest portfolio in UNESCO. https://en. unesco.org/news/unesco-iraq-implementing-biggest-portfolio-unesco UNESCO (2019f) State of Conservation: Hatra (Iraq). https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3855 UNESCO (2020a) Online technical meeting for Syrian properties on the List of World Heritage in Danger. https://whc.unesco.org/en/events/1563/ UNESCO (2020b) International assistance: safeguarding the Damascus Wall and the adjacent Urban Fabric (the area between Bab al-Salam and Bab Touma). https://whc.unesco.org/en/ intassistance/3202 UNESCO (n.d.-a) Culture. https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/beirut/CLT UNESCO (n.d.-b) The emergency safeguarding of the Syrian cultural heritage project. https://en. unesco.org/syrian-observatory/emergency-safeguarding-syrian-cultural-heritage-project UNESCO (n.d.-c) Emergency safeguarding of the Syrian cultural heritage. https://en.unesco.org/ emergencysafeguardingofthesyrianculturalheritage UNESCO (n.d.-d) World Heritage Centre: Syrian Arab Republic. https://whc.unesco.org/en/ statesparties/sy UNESCO (n.d.-e) Observatory of Syrian cultural heritage: about us. https://en.unesco.org/syrianobservatory/about-us UNESCO (n.d.-f) Observatory of Syrian cultural heritage. https://en.unesco.org/syrian-observatory/ UNESCO (n.d.-g) Observatory of Syrian cultural heritage: reports. https://en.unesco.org/syrianobservatory/damage-assesment-reports UNESCO (n.d.-h) Observatory of Syrian cultural heritage: publications. https://en.unesco.org/ syrian-observatory/publications UNESCO (n.d.-i) Emergency safeguarding of the Portico of the Temple of Bel in Palmyra (Syrian Arab Republic). https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/903/ UNESCO (n.d.-j) Executive Board’s Draft Action Plan for the implementation of the 2015 strategy. UNESCO internal report. Unpublished UNESCO (n.d.-k) Our expertise. https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/baghdad/expertise UNESCO (n.d.-l) About the UNESCO Office in Iraq. https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/baghdad/ about UNESCO (n.d.-m) Unite4Heritage. https://www.unite4heritage.org/ UNESCO (n.d.-n) Unite4Heritage Twitter. https://twitter.com/unite4heritage?lang=en

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Chapter 6

UNESCO’s Reconstruction of Cultural Heritage Sites

6.1

Defining Reconstruction and Recovery

With the loss of some cultural heritage, comes the loss of cultural identity and social cohesion,1 with reconstruction following as a logical step to repair such damage. This section uses the following definitions of ‘reconstruction’ and ‘recovery’, as set out by the UN 2016 General Assembly, interchangeably to discuss the activities carried out by UNESCO to rebuild cultural heritage sites in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Reconstruction: The medium- and long-term rebuilding and sustainable restoration of resilient critical infrastructures, services, housing, facilities and livelihoods required for the full functioning of a community or a society affected by a disaster, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better”, to avoid or reduce future disaster risk. Recovery: The restoring or improving of livelihoods and health, as well as economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities, of a disasteraffected community or society, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better”, to avoid or reduce future disaster risk.2

Roha W. Khalaf sheds light on the complexity surrounding the reconstruction of destroyed UNESCO WHSs,3 something that only becomes more complex when UNESCO is the organisation designated to lead the process. Paragraph 86 of the UNESCO 2019 Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the 1972 Convention states that in “relation to authenticity, the reconstruction of. . .historic buildings or districts is justifiable only in exceptional circumstances. Reconstruction is acceptable only on the basis of complete and detailed documentation and to no

1

Weiss and Connelly (2019), p. 4. UN General Assembly (2016), p. 21. 3 Khalaf (2016). 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. D. McCafferty, UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19675-1_6

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extent on conjecture”.4 UNESCO therefore does not often carry out reconstruction projects, particularly reconstruction without a concerted attempt to be authentic to the original conception of a site. With this in mind, and in the context of UNESCO’s reconstruction projects, specifically those relating to World Heritage, which is considered in this chapter, it follows that UNESCO considers intentional targeting and collateral damage as exceptional circumstances, permitting the reconstruction of selected historic buildings and districts. Muñoz-Viñas provides a philosophical view of authenticity, stating, “the only authentic state of an object is tautologically the one that it has now”,5 with any present form of the object, in this case heritage site, also being an authentic condition. When it comes to integrity, Khalaf proffers that in the context of international heritage discourse, this signifies “visual integrity”.6 The Operational Guidelines for the 1972 Convention provides a useful insight into UNESCO’s discourse on ‘authenticity’ and ‘integrity’. On the subject of ‘authenticity’, Article 82 lists a series of attributes, the truthful and credible expression of which denote cultural value.7 They are form and design; materials and substance; use and function; traditions, techniques and management systems; location and setting; language, and other forms of intangible heritage; spirit and feeling; and other internal and external factors.8 Regarding ‘integrity’, Article 88 states, “[i]ntegrity is a measure of the wholeness and intactness of the natural and/or cultural heritage and its attributes”.9 This suggests that reconstruction would aid in restoring the integrity of a site, making it ‘whole’ and ‘intact’, while the manner in which said reconstruction is carried out will reinstate or secure the inherent characteristics of a site. UNESCO has promoted The Venice Charter of 1964, which covers the limits of restoration.10 The organisation collaborated on the editing of the Charter, and recognised its principles as the basic policy guidelines for the assessment of cultural heritage sites on its World Heritage List.11 The Charter states, restoration “must stop at the point where conjecture begins, and in this case moreover any extra work which is indispensable must be distinct from the architectural composition and must bear a contemporary stamp”.12 However, with a lack of guidelines existing for practitioners on the implementation of this Charter, the regulations on the practice of reconstruction remain vague.13 Khalaf argues, “a reconstruction in the present is a layer in the continuous process of evolution of a destroyed WHS”, which can be characterised as

4

Art. 86 Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the 1972 Convention, 2019a. Muñoz Viñas (2012), p. 26. 6 Khalaf (2016), p. 269. 7 UNESCO (2019a). 8 UNESCO (2019a). 9 UNESCO (2019a). 10 Khalaf (2016), p. 264. 11 Jokilehto (1998), p. 230. 12 Art. 9 1964 Venice Charter. 13 Khalaf (2016), p. 264. 5

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Defining Reconstruction and Recovery

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a “contemporary stamp”, as per the Venice Charter.14 In the case of ICOMOS’ reconstruction project of the Bamiyan Buddhas, work came to a halt in 2013 due to the combination of old and new material being perceived as a violation of Article 9 of The Venice Charter.15 The reconstruction of some sites discussed in this chapter, such as Mosul’s Al-Nouri Complex, Al-Saa’a Church and Al-Tahira Church constitute something very different, as they are sites with which people actively engage for religious practices, and do not constitute WHSs. Their reconstruction for the practical use of the local community is more prudent than ensuring the upholding of a 1964 legal perspective on reconstruction. The reconstruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas may not guarantee the improved quality of life for the local community, while the reconstruction projects in Mosul certainly will. A strong example of reconstruction as reconciliation, which was permitted, is the rebuilding of the Frauenkirche, Dresden, Germany, which was destroyed in an extensive air raid attack on the city by British and American air forces in February 1945. Salvaged fragments of the original structure are embedded in the reconstruction, distinguishable by their darker colour, and therefore clearly showing the combination of both old and new materials.16 The approach ensures the employment of traditional skills, and anything salvaged and useable from the rubble is utilised, the aim being to create as close a likeness to the past structures as possible, using drawings, photos and historic paintings as reference points.17 Khalaf presents the argument that giving precedence to “the quest to maintain WH status”18 impedes the rights of the local population to quality and continuity of urban life.19 With such reconstruction projects, particularly when led by UNESCO, taking upwards of five years to complete, with potential further bureaucratic delays, there is a clear argument against such projects. Relinquishing the site and its WH status would permit another company to expedite the process, albeit possibly without consideration of cultural and historical integrity, but would allow for a quicker return to the normalcy of everyday life for the local population. Nonetheless, not all sites have residents, for example, Nimrud, Hatra, Palmyra, Crac Des Chevaliers are not (now) populated, and so there is no particular need to expedite the reconstruction process of these isolated sites. UNESCO further counters this argument for expedition in the Preamble to its 26 November 1976 Recommendation concerning the Safeguarding and Contemporary Role of Historic Areas,20 which states, “irrational and inappropriate reconstruction work is causing serious damage to. . .historic

14

Khalaf (2016), p. 269. Kalman (2017), p. 544. 16 Kalman (2017), pp. 548–549. 17 Kalman (2017), pp. 540–541. 18 In the context of this chapter, this statement is also applicable to sites elected by UNESCO for reconstruction, which do not have World Heritage status, namely Al-Nouri Mosque, Al-Saa’a Church and Al-Tahira Church. 19 Khalaf (2016), p. 263. 20 UNESCO (1976). 15

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heritage.” UNESCO however, has not set forth what they would classify as “irrational” or “inappropriate”.21 Regardless of the disparate sides of the argument, the deciding vote must always lie with the State Party, and more specifically, the local community with a strong engagement with the heritage site in question, with the heritage site being brought back into use for the benefit of concerned communities.22 Two previous cases, which the WHC viewed as exceptional circumstances, and therefore appropriate to be reconstructed, are the Historic Centre of Warsaw, Poland, following its destruction during the Second World War, and the Old Bridge Area of the Old City of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina.23 Both sites were inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List following their reconstruction. The official inscription of the Mostar Bridge on the UNESCO World Heritage List following its reconstruction, led by UNESCO, describes, it as “a symbol of reconciliation, international co-operation and of the coexistence of diverse cultural, ethnic and religious communities”.24 Kalman views the resolve to rebuild the Mostar Bridge to be “as ideologically driven as the resolve to destroy it”, further stating its reconstruction constituted an erasure of evidence of the bombardment and memories of the Croatian aggression.25 The commemoration of such acts of destruction by inscribing reconstructed sites, as well as those not reconstructed, such as the Bamiyan Buddhas, on the UNESCO World Heritage List, Kalman argues is a yet another means of reconciliation.26 The now inscribed site entitled Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley, has become a “testimony to the tragic destruction by the Taliban of the two standing Buddha statues, which shook the world in March 2001”.27 Kalman also discusses reconciliation as a key incentive behind reconstruction itself, with the reinstated physical site becoming the symbolic embodiment of said reconciliation,28 a view seconded by UNESCO and the World Bank, who state, “in postconflict situations culture can contribute to long-term recovery by enhancing social cohesion and resilience and building bridges for reconciliation.”29 UNESCO’s Medium-Term Strategy (2014–2021) proffers the replacement of “post-conflict intervention models”, with one that “supports conflict prevention. . .which would improve the coordination of prevention, early warning and risk reduction programmes on the one hand, and emergency response, reconstruction and reconciliation programmes on the other”.30

21

Khalaf (2016), p. 264. Khalaf (2016), p. 268. 23 Khalaf (2016), p. 266. 24 UNESCO (n.d.-a). 25 Kalman (2017), p. 540. 26 Kalman (2017), p. 543. 27 UNESCO (2003). 28 Kalman (2017), p. 548. 29 UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 18. 30 UNESCO (2014a), p. 24. 22

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Defining Reconstruction and Recovery

179

In 2008, the European Commission, the UN and the World Bank signed a Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning, with the aim to “collaborate on a common approach to post-disaster and post-conflict management, resulting in two tools, namely the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA)”.31 In 2015, the three agencies published a Guide to Developing Disaster Recovery Frameworks, the methodology of which was “applied to cultural heritage as part of the Nepal Earthquake PostDisaster Recovery Framework 2015, in which the restoration and retrofitting of historical buildings and structures were prioritized”.32 A culture specific PDNA was developed in the decade following the initial Joint Declaration, however, there remains disconnect in the strategies used to approach this field of recovery.33 A position paper published by UNESCO and the World Bank in 2018 outlines the Framework for Culture in City Reconstruction and Recovery (CURE Framework), specific to post-conflict or post-disaster situation.34 Via the CURE Framework, UNESCO and the World Bank require the mainstreaming of culture across the reconstruction and recovery processes of urban areas.35 UNESCO and the World Bank’s 2018 position paper builds on such previous strategies and UNESCO’s 2016 Global Report Culture: Urban Future, which presents a culturebased approach to urban development, determining there is a need to use an integrative approach to reconstruction and recovery, employing both a peoplecentred and place-based approach.36 A people-centred approach speaks to the engagement of community members across the four phases of recovery as per the CURE Framework, namely Damage and Needs Assessment and Scoping; Policy and Strategy; Financing; and Implementation.37 A place-based approach “reflects the need to build on local context and leverage local characteristics”, ensuring the incorporation of local history and culture.38 UNESCO and the World Bank suggest that the adoption of the CURE Framework, which integrates culture as a core element for city reconstruction and recovery, will promote a more integrated approach to people-centred and place-based policies, as culture is itself synonymous with both.39 The UNESCO projects and initiatives discussed in this chapter have a place-based starting point, with the goal being to reconstruct a damaged or destroyed cultural heritage site. This study determines whether UNESCO has sought to employ a people-centred methodology to “ensure that outcomes (infrastructure, assets,

31

UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 8. UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 16. 33 UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 8. 34 UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 8. 35 UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 9. 36 UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 19. 37 UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 19. 38 UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 19. 39 UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 24. 32

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services, etc.) are embedded in strong community ownership, reflect societal priorities, and are used, operated, and managed in a sustainable manner”.40 Giblin claims all post-conflict international and national policies are inevitably problematic because they unavoidably script some groups as victims, some as perpetrators, some as pre-eminent and others as subsidiary, a situation that is only amplified by the highly selective process of postconflict heritage casting.41

This selective prioritisation of some communities versus others can be combatted, to an extent, via community consultation. ASOR’s Danti evidences the benefit of collaboration with local citizens. He noted, “NGOs operating in and near the conflict zone involved in humanitarian efforts were privy to large amounts of cultural heritage information that was voluntarily provided by local stakeholders, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugees”.42 He further demonstrated that through strategic partnerships with such NGOs, ASOR CHI “have greatly expanded [their] capacity to monitor and assess the ongoing heritage situation, and in doing so. . .have been able to increase. . .support for Syrian and Iraqi heritage professionals and better integrate cultural heritage work within the larger humanitarian effort”.43 In his 2018 article, ‘Post-conflict reconstruction and the heritage process’, Mattias Legnér demonstrates how a shift from a solely place-based approach to a more nuanced integrated people-centred and place-based approach led to a successful heritage reconstruction of historic houses from the Ottoman period (kullas) in Kosovo 2001–2002. Legnér acknowledges that international donors to reconstruction projects have power to impart their own values on historic sites, via the choice of sites to reconstruct and the manner in which said reconstruction is carried out.44 The three key parties in this reconstruction project were the EU’s European Agency of Reconstruction (EAR) (donor), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) (donor), and Cultural Heritage without Borders (CHwB) (facilitating NGO). Legnér illustrates that “EAR wanted to show that it took responsibility for the heritage of Kosovo by acting efficiently, providing the necessary funding and avoiding conflict”, while “CHwB was eager to demonstrate its intimate alliance with SIDA in order to secure future funding for new projects in Kosovo”.45 In this project, EAR’s approach could be characterised as place-based, while SIDA, promoted a more integrated approach, with the people (the local population) taking precedence in order to promote skills development and to open a dialogue on Kosovo heritage. EAR’s election for the place-based approach was informed by a will to complete the reconstruction on a restricted budget and schedule, to the exclusion of the local community. This led to a lack of respect for the methodology behind a place-based 40

UNESCO & World Bank (2018), p. 21. Giblin (2014), p. 504. 42 Danti (2015), p. 135. 43 Danti (2015), p. 135. 44 Legnér (2018), p. 80. 45 Legnér (2018), p. 87. 41

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Yemen: Reconstruction

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approach, which requires respect for local context and leverage of local characteristics; in truly place-based cultural reconstruction projects, economic and scheduling factors tend to take precedence over social and historical components. Amidst conflict with EAR, and given the aim of the project was “to promote reconciliation between groups that were defined along ethnic lines”,46 SIDA and CHwB steered the project toward a more integrated people-centred approach, thereby allowing for inclusion of the local community, which ultimately made the reconstruction a success. Giblin’s calls for greater attention to be paid to situated semiotics for a more nuanced and appropriate response to post-conflict heritage-healing practice,47 also refers to this community-centred model, whereby there is community involvement in the decision-making process, ensuring post-conflict heritage projects reflect local needs. This integrated people-centred and place-based approach, promulgated by UNESCO, is referred to throughout this chapter as a means to test how well UNESCO is implementing its own recommendation in the course of the organisation’s reconstruction projects across Yemen, Syria and Iraq.48

6.2

Yemen: Reconstruction

In 2017, via their SoC Report to the WHCo, Yemen’s MoC and GOPHCY while acknowledging “ICCROM Sharjah and UNESCO Doha for their modest assistance and support” urged them and other concerned international organisations to provide greater levels of support to Yemeni WHSs in danger.49 The phrase “modest assistance and support” surely references the organisations’ creation of rapid assessment forms and training sessions in rapid assessment and risk management,50 which constituted some of the limited work carried out under the 2015 Emergency Action Plan. Council of American Overseas Research Centers (CAORC) regularly use and recommend the use of these rapid assessment forms to on-the-ground Yemeni experts completing documentation of objects and sites.51 Interviewee F states, [w]hen CAORC began to get involved with Yemen in 2018, we consulted a number of Yemeni heritage specialists and academic specialists. We were advised that in the then current situation, with the amount of damage that could still be done, there should be less focus on restorative projects or onsite conservation programmes, and more focus on

46

Legnér (2018), p. 81. Giblin (2014), p. 515. 48 The COVID-19 Pandemic evidently affected UNESCO’s reconstruction programmes, particularly across Yemen and Iraq, during 2020. Given the global impact of the Pandemic chiefly took hold in March 2020 I will only discuss the Pandemic in relation to UNESCO’s programmes from that point in time. However, this book does not set out to understand the full extent to which the Pandemic has affected UNESCO’s progress in the discussed reconstruction programmes. 49 UNESCO (2017a), p. 3. 50 UNESCO (2015a). 51 Interviewee F (2020), personal communication. 47

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documentation, collections management and the removal of artefacts to secure locations until such time when the situation begins to normalise. It [Yemen] was still in emergency response mode.52

As evidenced in the previous chapter, UNESCO’s 2015 Emergency Response strategy is yet to be implemented in Yemen, with UNESCO Doha instead opting to increase its engagement with the country via an alternative reconstruction programme. When it comes to Yemen, the decision was made to commence physical reconstruction during conflict, with the commencement of an EU funded initiative, titled ‘Cash for Work: Promoting Livelihood Opportunities for Urban Youth in Yemen’ (CfW). This decision sets Yemen apart from UNESCO’s presence in Syria, where there are no reconstruction activities due to the ongoing conflict and fraught political relations, and Iraq, where UNESCO elected to commence reconstruction initiatives only when the country had entered the post-conflict phase. This move to initiate reconstruction amidst an armed conflict seems to be in contradiction with UNESCO’s 2015 strategy, which states that such action should occur in “the aftermath of conflict, when recovery and reconstruction of the culture sector become possible”.53 Throughout UNESCO’s 2015 strategy, recovery and reconstruction is only referred to in the post-conflict context, never during conflict,54 as UNESCO evidently views this as not feasible. It is also possible that UNESCO view reconstruction during conflict as unwise given the increased likelihood of it being destroyed again before reaching the stabilisation period.

6.2.1

Cash for Work Project

Regardless, the UNESCO Office for Doha, which oversees activities in Yemen, has formulated this project, alongside its implementing partner, SFD, a non-profit organisation founded in 1997, based in Sana’a, with a total of US$12 million of EU funds.55 The official UNESCO Doha CfW webpage states this includes a EUR 250,000 UNESCO contribution,56 (roughly US$300,000). As discussed in Chap. 3, all three of Yemen’s cultural WHSs are on the In Danger List, due to the ongoing conflict. UNESCO’s CfW initiative aims to reconstruct these sites, namely the Historic Town of Zabid, the Old City of Sana’a and the Old Walled City of Shibam, as well as the coastal Historic City of Aden, which, although not a WHS, has great cultural significance. This initiative has three strategic areas of action: urban rehabilitation, youth engagement and creative industries. The central focus is essentially the protection

52

Interviewee F (2020) personal communication. UNESCO (2015b), p. 6. 54 UNESCO (2015b), pp. 3, 4 and 6. 55 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 56 UNESCO (n.d.-b). 53

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Table 6.1 Reconstruction plans for sites in Yemen. Source: UNESCO Official Website Infrastructure, sites and key aspects identified for immediate restorative or reconstructive intervention

Sana’a Roofs, walls, windows and façades of private houses Public spaces around Sailah and the main Mosque City Wall

Shibam Main Souq

Sana’a National Museum Bustan gardens and Al-Qasimi Sanitation and infrastructures

Souq area at Bab al-Sabah

Zabid Structure and architectural details of historic houses Central Souq

Aden Central Crater District

Water Tank reservoirs

Private mud houses

Bab Siham and Bab Shabariq Museum in Citadel

Infrastructure

Mydan square

Public squares and urban landscape Sesabana trees

City Wall

City Wall

Oasis

Gardening works Architectural details of remarkable buildings

Public squares

National Museum and Sultan Palace The Market

Façades carpentry and wooden balconies of historic houses Souq area at Bab al-Sabah

and promotion of tangible and intangible heritage, while simultaneously promoting livelihoods and opportunities for youths, defined as 18–35-year-olds, in Yemen.57 Overall, this project seeks to provide 500,000 ‘cash-for-work’ days, employ 4000 urban youths (of which 500 should be women), aged 15 to 35, after the first 2.5 years of the project,58 and assess 8000 heritage buildings and sites.59 The US$12 million in funds secured from the EU was allocated to the first phase of the project, which would primarily encompass damage assessment and the development of a rehabilitation plan.60 In terms of physical reconstructions and restorations, Table 6.1 demonstrates sites identified for immediate intervention across the four cities.61 Consideration is firstly given to the methodology behind the prioritisation of such sites. 57

UNESCO (n.d.-b). Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 59 UNESCO (n.d.-b). 60 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 61 UNESCO (n.d.-b). 58

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Prioritisation Methodology

The ongoing reconstruction of cultural heritage in Yemen presents a unique context. In the case of Yemen, multiple private houses and public spaces, used daily for livelihoods or leisure, largely make up the WHSs of Sana’a, Zabid and Shibam. These historic houses are majorly what comprise the country’s WHSs, with the Old City of Sana’a composed of 103 mosques, 14 hammams, and over 6000 houses, all built before the eleventh century.62 When it came to the identification of sites for priority intervention, the first step was to carry out a damage assessment of the four cities of Sana’a, Zabid, Shibam and Aden, employing photogrammetry-based data and using several categories to determine the extent of the damage, ranging from minor to extreme destruction.63 Under the supervision of UNESCO, these assessments were entirely implemented by SFD, alongside local individuals, many of whom owned the private properties affected by the conflict,64 thereby satisfying phase one of the CURE Framework. The range of the damage assessments encompassed houses, public spaces, water and sewer networks, telecommunications, etc.65 Interviewee B states, the completion of extensive damage assessments “gave us a panorama of the three [WHS]s and Aden, allowing us to ascertain the major needs of each city, in terms of building conservation, restoration of public spaces, such as gardens, bus stops, and so on.”66 The findings of the damage assessments were then used in consultation with GOAM and GOPHCY and SFD to develop a rehabilitation plan.67 It should be noted that UNESCO is engaging with representatives of the key government agencies in each of the concerned cities, where priorities and concerns vary.68 At a workshop in late July-early August 2019, key stakeholders and UNESCO took stock of the damage assessments and produced a rehabilitation plan, which set out the priorities of the project and ways in which unskilled, skilled and highly skilled youths could be employed.69 Interviewee C states, factors that determined whether something was of high priority included architectural importance, benefit to the livelihoods of the local people, etc. They also asserted that after considering such influencing factors, key stakeholders elected for the immediate interventions to focus on historic housing, more so than on monumental buildings.70 Phase two of the CURE Framework, which advocates the inclusion of local community members in the development of policy and strategy, appears to have been at

62

UNESCO (n.d.-c). Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 64 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 65 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 66 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 67 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 68 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 69 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 70 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 63

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the centre of UNESCO Doha’s concerns in the development of this reconstruction prioritisation plan. A separate City Profile survey carried out by UN-Habitat records that in the historic city of Aden alone, “over 95% of heritage sites. . . sustained significant damages from conflict related causes”.71 This survey, published in 2020 covers “45 sites, among which 43 (96%) are affected. . . Of these, 42% have major damage and 2% have completely collapsed. Of the remaining sites, 21% have moderate damage and 35% have minor damage”.72 UN-Habitat records, “Aden’s portion [of rehabilitation efforts] represents one of the largest shares of the cash-for-work rehabilitation budget”.73 An estimated 80% of the intervention focuses on private housing, public spaces and commercial areas.74 Given the focus on private housing, the owners were involved at each stage of the project development and contributed ideas on restoration and the identification of priorities.75 With only two museums featured and no physical reconstruction of religious buildings, the key aim is to provide good living conditions to those returning to the cities.76 With the entirety of the Old City of Sana’a, the Old Walled City of Shibam and the Historic City of Zabid inscribed on the World Heritage List, there is no real need for UNESCO to focus solely on monuments, museums or religious sites. Instead, there is greater freedom to focus on reconstructing and restoring buildings that would provide immediate benefit to the local communities, while still restoring the fabric of a WHS. Interviewee C recounts, “in developing a rehabilitation plan, a balance was struck among architectural needs, preservation needs and ensuring the dispersing of aid in order to alleviate the suffering and challenges Yemeni people are facing,” a strategy supported by the funder.77 Initially, in Sana’a alone, 129 buildings were identified for intervention, and a rigorous selection criterion was employed to prioritise the buildings requiring the most urgent interventions, which then narrowed the focus to 40 buildings for the first phase of interventions.78

6.2.3

Implementation

In practical terms, UNESCO has been running its operations from the regional office, based in Doha, Qatar, and, as has been established, has succeeded in setting up a designated project office in Sana’a. This office is currently utilised by three

71

UN-Habitat (2020), p. 32. UN-Habitat (2020), p. 35. 73 UN-Habitat (2020), p. 35. 74 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 75 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 76 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 77 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 78 UNESCO (2020a). 72

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Yemeni nationals, including Nabil Monassar, previous Vice Chairman of GOPHCY, and now UNESCO’s on-the-ground Project Coordinator.79 Having this office as a base in the country will likely have sped up some bureaucratic processes and allowed for greater observation and monitoring of the project. Nonetheless, for UNESCO, Yemen remains difficult to access, with key parts of the country, such as Sana’a, under the control of NSAs; therefore, the organisation would still require on-theground assistance from another party with a long-standing presence, and ability to work in the country. UNESCO seem to be able, to an extent, to circumvent its lack of access to NSA controlled areas, via both the employment of Monassar in Sana’a, and via its partnership with SFD. With cultural heritage constituting one of SFD’s key sectors and focuses for projects,80 alongside its previous experience implementing cash for work initiatives via a Labour-Intensive Works Programme in Yemen,81 this organisation seems best placed to roll out UNESCO’s initiative. SFD is able to contribute expertise via knowledge of the local communities and implementation of similarly structured projects, and possesses an ability to operate freely in the country, with greater access than UNESCO. Interviewee C states, “SFD has been noted for its neutrality. . .and are able to work with several governmental entities, bridging the gap between these actors [in Yemen].”82 In this regard, SFD is an invaluable partner for UNESCO, affording it the ability to have a level of communication with all governmental parties. As evidenced in Yemen’s 2017 SoC Report, GOPHCY had already been working alongside SFD to mitigate the loss of cultural heritage, with SFD acting as both financer and implementer. Such work includes paving the southern gate area of the old city of Zabid and carrying out some restoration works in Alashaair mosque.83 In practice, this project is implemented by SFD, in close cooperation with UNESCO’s government counterparts, GOAM and GOPHCY, and is monitored by a dedicated team in UNESCO’s office in Doha, comprised of both Yemeni and international professionals.84 Facilitating all coordination and communication between SFD and UNESCO Doha is Nabil Monassar.85 Monassar recognises that the armed conflict presents “a very challenging situation that affects the transportation and movement of UNESCO staff and international experts. . . [which has made] carrying out any kind of activity in Yemen just now very difficult.”86 However, Monassar is “hoping that more donors will be engaged in the project in Yemen, and that the Project Office is able to become a UNESCO national office”, which he believies to be “essential for this area.”87 Despite the 79

Monassar (2020), personal communication. Social Fund for Development (n.d.-a). 81 Social Fund for Development (n.d.-b). 82 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 83 UNESCO (2017a), pp. 3–4. 84 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 85 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 86 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 87 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 80

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current lack of access, there is optimism that this partnership with the EU and SFD will allow UNESCO “to have a stronger and more credible presence across the country”.88 SFD assuming the role of implementing partner determines that this project is facilitated according to its procedures, and as SFD is not an IGO like UNESCO, it has greater scope to engage with different actors across Yemen. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that, throughout the Covid-19 Pandemic, all UNESCO Doha staff have been working from home, which has made remote management of the project very challenging.89 When discussing the EU funding of the CfW initiative, Interviewee B stated, I am happy because this is neutral money, and it does not come with any strings attached. At the outset of the Yemeni conflict, I was asked by HQ to approach the Saudis [for funding]. We made a proposal, but it never materialised. Personally, I would not be comfortable to approach them, but,. . .I know that my colleagues in HQ are discussing some funding possibilities with the Saudis. We are of the opinion that it would be very imprudent to raise funds from the Saudis to work in an area that is controlled by the Houthis. It would also be very difficult for us to implement. Such a project would have to be mainly managed by HQ, because I know that the Saudis do not want us, who are based in Doha, Qatar, to manage the project.90

This speaks to a disconnect and fragmentation between those in HQ and those working in the Doha field office when it comes to ethical and practical decisions regarding parties with which they are willing to engage. It also suggests that funders can have significant influence over the operation of a project, in order to align said project with their own agenda. Interviewee B advocates the importance of neutrality in a funder, especially when it comes to cultural rehabilitation projects, where politics can come into play.91 For this reason, Interviewee B warns against seeking funds from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.92 UNESCO’s most significant project however, namely the Mosul initiative, is funded chiefly by the UAE. Although one end goal of this project is to rebuild key heritage structures, the main focal point is the rehabilitation of the community through the provision of skills and livelihoods. Interviewee B states, the CfW project posits “quite an alternative way for UNESCO to look at cultural heritage, because it is operated through the empowerment of youth, providing livelihoods, skills and confidence via the restoration of cultural heritage.”93 The reconstruction of cultural heritage sites is the means to which UNESCO Doha aims to deliver greater sustainability of employment for the youth of Sana’a, Zabid, Shibam and Aden. This project was initially developed, in talks with the EU regarding funding, shortly following the outbreak

88

Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 90 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 91 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 92 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 93 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 89

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of conflict in 2015.94 Since its inception, the project set out to focus on the rebuilding of private housing, public spaces, such as gardens, and only monuments where it constitutes a building of collective use, such as a museum or a souq, which may be affected by the conflict.95 The main target of the reconstruction element of this project is “to help people who lost their homes, as a result of the conflict, get back to their original home”. The decision specifically to adopt a largely people-centred approach was the elective of the Doha office.96 The fact that this project is centred on the provision of livelihoods signifies that the UN DSS will give UNESCO priority to initiate it during conflict. As per the UN’s Programme Criticality Framework, the provision of humanitarian aid has the highest priority in countries experiencing armed conflict, while projects aiming to provide livelihoods are of second priority.97 Therefore, in Yemen, the only projects that have international on-the-ground presence are those with lifesaving missions, and those centred on the provision of livelihoods. Had this project been framed to centre on the reconstruction of a significant monument, with no real involvement of the local community, it most likely would not have been permitted until the post-conflict phase. It is likely that this project came under Programme Criticality (PC) 2 criteria, which permits personnel to operate in locations with a Maximum Acceptable Security Risk level of “High”.98 It is unlikely that maximum-security criterion, PC1, was granted, as it remains that only Yemeni Nationals can operate on-theground to implement the project via SFD; the project cannot yet operate in a manner where UNESCO international staff are able to work directly alongside their national counterparts. Whether or not UNESCO Doha can increase its on-the-ground capacity with international staff is regularly assessed via further examination of the Programme Criticality criteria, in the context of the constantly changing security conditions in Yemen.99 Mohanad Al-Sayani recounted that GOAM had requested a team, comprised of UNESCO and GOAM officials to visit certain archaeological sites, which had served as military bases, in order to produce needs assessments.100 Despite the Yemeni SHI making such a request, suggesting that archaeological sites are, to them, a priority, it would seem that, given the likelihood of military presence in such areas, this could not be granted. SFD could, of course, facilitate such a needs assessment, if the sites are declared secure, but it remains that UNESCO has prioritised areas and sites, which will have the greatest immediate impact on the local communities, a factor which has afforded the organisation clearance to operate during the conflict.

94

Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 96 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 97 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 98 United Nations Programme Criticality (n.d.). 99 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 100 Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 95

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The centrality of both livelihoods and culture to this project is majorly in line with the CURE Framework, ensuring the integration of both people-centred and placebased approaches. Tom Leiermann states, UNESCO has determined to focus on the rehabilitation of sites that are most linked with local interests, because “if the locals do not identify with the preservation of the cities they live in, it is not likely to be successful.”101 Interviewee C proffers that local community involvement spans from damage assessment through to the election of sites to be prioritised in the reconstruction process (which is constantly ongoing to allow local residents the opportunity to object to the choice or method of reconstruction), and in the physical reconstruction of sites and infrastructure.102 This, however, is contested by Interviewee D, a Yemeni Conservationist Architect, who states that, [d]uring the damage assessments of the [WHS]s in Yemen, UNESCO did not involve the people in the decision-making and did not consult experts on site restoration works. They did not decide on a methodological approach to the reconstruction and they did not establish much criteria for selecting projects for reconstruction. They also did not get the advice of local professionals or people who have experience in restoration projects. As far as I know, in Zabid, they only consulted the owners of the houses, when they went to assess the damages. They only get a short time to complete the damage assessments, so I think they have to carry out this work very fast, and only deal with the people they encounter.103

Interviewee D does acknowledge that they are not aware of whether UNESCO consulted with various community members via a forum, however, it remains that, if such a forum exists, its considerations are undocumented. From consideration of Interviewee C’s statements, it appears that greater efforts were indeed made, and are still being made to ensure the local community’s involvement in decision-making processes. It may be true that such interaction with local community members, and local experts, using Interviewee D as an example, were limited due to time restraints, while only GOPHCY, GOAM and SFD were involved in the agreement of a rehabilitation plan. In practice, it appears that the majority of community involvement comes from the implementation phase. While Interviewee D believes there should have been greater community and local expert involvement in the early stages, he has been able to voice his concerns via communication with the UNESCO Doha office, where he has sent reports and proposals on further stabilisation, restoration and reconstruction work.104 The UNESCO team has acknowledged the receipt of these reports and proposals, one of which related to a partially collapsed building housing old documents and manuscripts concerning Endowments of the Old City of Zabid and has notified Interviewee D that they will be considered for future implementation phases.105

101

Leiermann (2019), personal communication. Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 103 Interviewee D (2020), personal communication. 104 Interviewee D (2020), personal communication. 105 Interviewee D (2020), personal communication. 102

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UNESCO signed an agreement with SFD in September 2019, with civil works due to commence end of November 2019.106 The early process of damage assessment and development of a rehabilitation plan however took one year longer than initially expected, causing a significant delay in the overall project.107 The cause of such delay being in the main due to “long back and forth exchanges among national authorities, UNESCO, the donor (the EU) and SFD”.108 Additionally, it is estimated that a delay of four months was caused by the international payment from Paris to SFD, to finance the project, being rejected twice due to the banking system used, resulting in UNESCO Doha having to make payments through UNDP.109 Due to blockades and inspections on transfers of funds from Europe or the U.S. to Yemen, ensuring the flow of funds from the EU to the relevant parties will inevitably be challenging. Moreover, “the setup of the Sana’a office took a long time, and the recruitment of the management team took six months”,110 further pushing back the implementation phase of the project. Despite eventually reaching the implementation phase in November 2019, no such implementation occurred, and in March 2020 many non-essential operations had to cease due to the threat of the Covid-19 outbreak.111 In Al-Qasimi, Sana’a, due to the conflict, five houses were destroyed, with a further 10 in the immediate vicinity affected.112 UNESCO experts, alongside SFD and local authorities, are documented to have carried out field inspections in the course of the damage assessments, while photogrammetry-based data was collected in cooperation with GOPCHY.113 UNESCO’s intervention involved the removal of debris and cleaning around the sites, which was implemented by local authorities.114 Procedures were put in place to ensure the correct construction equipment and materials would be available for stabilisation efforts.115 Stabilisation efforts were not carried out in 2019 but were planned for 2020. Further emergency technical studies were carried out in residential areas located mainly on the west bank of Al-Sailah, following the flash floods in April 2020, to assess water drainage, rain discharge and sewage infrastructure. During these assessments, a further 18 traditional burned brick and mud houses, which were at risk of collapse, were identified for urgent stabilisation intervention. Public Works Projects (PWP) and GOPHCY would implement such intervention work.116 PWP, established in 1996, is an

106

Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 108 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 109 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 110 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 111 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 112 UNESCO (2020b), p. 41. 113 UNESCO (2020c). 114 UNESCO (2020b), p. 41. 115 UNESCO (2020c). 116 UNESCO (2020c). 107

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organisation with similar aims to SFD, focusing on actions such as creating job opportunities for skilled and unskilled labourers and providing infrastructure service projects to poor and deprived communities.117 As for interventions in Zabid, due to torrential rain and flooding, conditions significantly worsened for the two historic houses, namely, Hawaiji House and House Raba’i. With this additional support from the HEF, “UNESCO and its local counterparts in Yemen [also] launched urgent technical documentation and feasibility studies in order to raise awareness among local stakeholders about the importance of protecting the buildings”.118 In June 2020, UNESCO Doha announced that significant progress had been made with respect the stabilisation and urgent restoration works to both Hawaiji House and House Raba’i, involving repairs to the brick structures of the walls, the roofs (beams and covers), wooden reinforcement for openings, and protections of plasterworks affected by the flood.119 Iamandi expressed concern that qualified people may not be employed to implement the restoration of these two houses, with UNESCO eager to employ Yemeni youths, who lack the necessary expertise.120 However, those employed under the project would fulfil a variety of roles; unskilled workers carrying out minor tasks, and those with the relevant skills carrying out significant physical restoration work, as well as providing training to others. Such unskilled workers are unlikely to be given free rein over restoration projects. In August 2020, UNESCO stated that the organisation’s intervention in Al-Qasimi, Sana’a and Zabid is set to save 30 buildings from collapse.121 The stabilisation of the 30 buildings referred to here is financed by the HEF, while the CfW project extends further, with UNESCO Doha citing that it is engaged in 30 ongoing working sites in Sana’a alone, with additional future work spanning Zabid, Shibam and Aden.122 Due to a lack of information, it is unclear exactly to which sites the stabilisation measures have been applied. However, Interviewee B confirms that the stabilisation and urgent restoration work on Hawaiji House and House Raba’i is complete,123 while Interviewee C confirms stabilisation interventions in Al-Qasimi are also finalised.124 Beyond, the interventions supported by the HEF, it was also reported mid-April 2020, that action had commenced on the restoration of the National Museum in Sana’a, which, with EU funds, began with the stabilisation of the existing structure.125 Interviewee C confirms that, as of January 2021, Sana’a National Museum,

117

Public Works Project (n.d.). UNESCO (2020b), p. 42. 119 UNESCO (2020c). 120 Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 121 UNESCO (2020d). 122 UNESCO (2020e). 123 Interviewee B (2021), personal communication. 124 Interviewee C (2021), personal communication. 125 Al-Sayani (2020), personal communication. 118

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as well as Aden Sultan Palace Museum, had been successfully stabilised.126 No further information is currently available on these particular interventions. With regard to the historic houses however, more information is available, with the first phase of the intervention in the Old City of Sana’a realising the protection of the 40 identified priority buildings from collapse.127 Unfortunately, due to torrential rain, greater damage has since been caused in Sana’a, leading to the complete collapse of three neglected buildings, the partial collapse of another, 50 with serious damage to their roofs, 111 buildings with an opening in their roofs, 2000 buildings with water leakages, and the partial damage to two segments of the city wall.128 This generated a reassessment of the CfW project priorities, with the redirection of funds from other areas to support emergency interventions.129 It was concluded that 40 additional buildings would be stabilised and rehabilitated, and the vulnerable sections of the city wall would be restored.130 Given the constantly changing landscape in Yemen with the impact of the conflict on cultural heritage, whether that be via intentional targeting, collateral damage or neglect, the CfW needs assessment constantly has to adapt. With the limited funds available, UNESCO has resolved to capitalise on restoring more than 400 historical houses to a condition that will ensure their structural integrity, and allow the displaced owners to return. Objectives will therefore focus on repairs to roofs, walls and foundations.131 This decision to focus on providing structural restorations to a vast amount of housing, instead of extensive restorations to a fewer number of structures, will prevent the complete collapse of many more buildings, while allowing a greater number of locals the ability to return home, with access to better living conditions. The latest data available from UNESCO Doha show 50 sites will be restored across the four cities,132 encompassing 400 historical houses,133 with 100 located in Sana’a alone. Interviewee C records that, as of January 2021, 100 historic buildings had already been stabilised, including the Sana’a National Museum and Aden Sultan Palace Museum.134 It is also noted that, as well as select public spaces,135 these two recently stabilised museums remain prioritised for restoration.136 Aside from these interventions, in response to the Pandemic, the UNESCO Doha team has “engaged in reprogramming with the donor (EU) and national counterparts, to further invest in health and education, prior to any technical activities in relation to

126

Interviewee C (2021), personal communication. UNESCO (2020a). 128 UNESCO (2020a). 129 UNESCO (2020a). 130 UNESCO (2020a). 131 UNESCO (2020a). 132 UNESCO (2020f). 133 UNESCO (2020g). 134 Interviewee C (2021), personal communication. 135 UNESCO (2020f). 136 UNESCO (2020g). 127

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cultural heritage”.137 Funds previously assigned to cultural rehabilitation have been reallocated to hosting an awareness raising session on Covid-19, producing a video showcasing how young people in Yemen are coping with the Pandemic and supporting youth organisations in providing paramedic equipment, including gloves, masks and soap, for distribution, free of charge to the population.138 With the recent delays due to Covid-19, the first phase of the project would not achieve its proposed end-date of 31 August 2020. Initially, it was estimated that phase one would take an additional year to complete.139 However, this new estimation was made when Covid-19 was expected to affect Yemen for four to five months. This has not been the case, with Covid-19 still greatly affecting the global population into 2022. Therefore, further delays on the implementation of this project were expected. Although attention somewhat shifted throughout 2020, there is no suggestion that the sites and infrastructure identified for immediate intervention will be neglected. More so than buildings and historical monuments, the people of Yemen have been greatly affected by the conflict, which has worsened the pre-existing economic and social issues that have permeated the country. Many young people have lost their employment status, and many people do not have access to necessities, such as food and medicine.140 UNESCO Doha has clearly emphasised the significance of the local community to this reconstruction initiative, and the central role they have played in the development of the project. UNESCO aims for 500 of the 4000 urban youths to be employed under this project to be women constituting 12.5% of the total workforce. As of January 2021, the project had employed 1000 young skilled and unskilled workers (10% females) over 18,000 working days.141 While female representation remains low the project is only 2.5% short of its female inclusion target. It is not known why such a low target for female representation was set for this project. Regarding practicalities, in the reconstruction process, unskilled workers are paid US$9 per day and skilled workers are paid US$15 per day, a daily wage which Iamandi says is “reasonable”,142 with tasks ranging from cleaning to restorative activities; approximately US$8 million of the US$12 million is designated to go directly to local individuals.143 UNESCO Doha’s account of one skilled worker, Muhammed Abdullah, employed under the project as a stone carver, producing materials for the reconstruction of the Sana’a City Wall and historic houses, reveals he is paid US$10 per day.144 Those with the relevant skillsets in traditional building techniques, the production of traditional materials, carpentry, etc., will train

137

Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 139 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 140 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 141 Interviewee C (2021), personal communication. 142 Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 143 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 144 UNESCO (2020f). 138

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unskilled workers in each city, creating a strong value chain.145 Although “almost all of the traditional techniques, which are required in the particular sites, are still practiced. . .the masters of the techniques may not know how to use modern computer aided design processes,” which is a missing link.146 Although SFD is working to bridge such gaps with the necessary training, it is experiencing issues reaching the relevant people due to persisting divisions in the country.147 With the focus on traditional materials and techniques, the CfW project will likely employ an anastylosis technique in the reconstruction of major aspects of the WHSs and Aden. However, Leiermann states that when it comes to the reconstruction of private housing, there are “modernisation demands by the locals, which is understandable, given their living conditions are sometimes not appropriate for the times. . . [b]ut, that does not mean to say that these demands are in contradiction of preservation concerns.”148 He further states that the “type of damage inflicted on each city will be of a different nature, and so [the]. . . preservation methods must be tailored to each specific site”.149 There is a definite commitment to ensuring traditional materials and methods are employed in the reconstruction process, while improving drainage systems, etc. to provide improved living conditions for the owners of the homes being restored. In order to ensure maximum benefit to local Yemenis, the funds are not deposited with the national Yemeni Government.150 Instead, SFD is in control of the budget, which it is able to dole out to individuals employed under the project or use to run local youth councils to educate the Yemeni youths in the skills required for the project.151 Interviewee C states, “[w]e are very much aware of the fragmentation among communities, which is why we seek to ensure equal representation in our employment of the local population.”152 In order to implement this strategy, we “have come up with a Management Information System with SFD to monitor the distribution of funds”, which will ensure different factions of the communities are being represented and no more than one person from each household will benefit from the scheme.153 To mitigate any major discrepancies in the distribution of funds, and to ensure the implementing parties hear the local population’s views on a continual basis, UNESCO Doha and SFD have also established a grievance mechanism through which individuals can submit their complaints and concerns, and following consideration of such complaints, UNESCO would introduce any

145

Monassar (2020), personal communication. Leiermann (2019), personal communication. 147 Leiermann (2019), personal communication. 148 Leiermann (2019), personal communication. 149 Leiermann (2019), personal communication. 150 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 151 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 152 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 153 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 146

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necessary adjustments.154 The introduction of such a mechanism, which should function as a robust consultation system in the implementation phase,155 will likely bring greater accountability to UNESCO and SFD, and ensure an as-fair-as-possible distribution of the US$8 million designated for local community employment. However, this grievance monitoring system is seemingly dependent on the expansion of the volume of staff working on the ground. With the consolidation of the CfW team, now with three professionals working full-time in the project office in Sana’a, backstopped by the Doha office, in addition to a number of specialised consultants, it would seem there now exists the capacity to deal appropriately with such a mechanism. While there may be equality of representation in the employment of those in Sana’a, Zabid, Shibam and Aden, the selection of these cities alone automatically excludes communities of other Yemeni towns and cities affected by the conflict. Interviewee C states, We have received requests and proposals to work in other cities inventoried on the Tentative List for World Heritage, such as Sa’dah and Ta’izz, to make sure that the project will serve in these locations as well, especially when it comes to community involvement in the development of the recovery strategy and its implementation.156

Such expansion will undoubtedly require greater funds. Monassar believes that “due to the small funds available, it is a good idea to focus initially on the [WHS]s in danger. . .as well as Aden.”157 With regard to the budget of US$12 million for phase one, Monassar states that the “amount of funds allocated [was] not enough, and only constitutes around 2–3% of what is required for the three [WHS]s [in Yemen].”158 Interviewee C confirms however, that a further 20 million EUR has been granted by the EU, allowing the project to enter phase two in the summer of 2022, with a larger geographical scope.159 Moreover, Monassar states, [m]any Yemeni people are appealing to GOPHCY and the field team for more opportunities and involvement in the project process. We hope that in the near future, we will be able to involve most of them and provide training to unskilled young people, both men and women, who are in real need of support.160

Of course, UNESCO and its on-the-ground partners do not have the finances to provide a short-term income to all Yemeni youths. And yet, UNESCO is faced with the challenge of needing to provide equality of representation across all Yemeni cities, ensuring fair attention is given to various groups within the communities,

154

Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 156 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 157 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 158 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 159 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 160 Monassar (2020), personal communication. 155

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while providing a meaningful amount of restoration and reconstruction, which would make a real difference to the lives of many Yemenis. It seems that the latter will be jeopardised if any funds received are spread too thin across a multitude of cities. Monassar insists however that if UNESCO’s project is successful, it will encourage more donors to invest in similar initiatives in Yemen.161 To ensure this division of labour among those employed under the CfW project, Interviewee C confirms that for “the sake of representation and fairness, each worker cannot exceed a quota of three months’ work on a reconstruction site.”162 This approach seeks to provide training to a maximum amount of people on a one-in-oneout basis. With the three-month period acting as a training scheme for many of the workers, those who have received the training would, in theory, then possess the necessary skills to enter and become integrated into the labour market. In order to foster such integration, Interviewee C proffers that UNESCO is considering other mechanisms, such as small loans and microfinance, which would allow individuals to form an association or corporation of skilled people, capable of acting independently from the CfW initiative, on other reconstruction and rehabilitation projects.163 With the project only financed to a certain point, it makes sense to use the budget available to reach as many people as possible. In theory, this will allow for a higher percentage of the local population of youths to develop a transferable skillset, resulting in a higher possibility of sustained economic benefit to the community, than it would by providing a fixed term contract for a smaller percentage of people. However, Interviewee C acknowledges that the long-term benefit of the project is difficult to measure, stating, [t]he provision of livelihood is fragile; once the funding has stopped, it is difficult to know what will happen, and how individuals will capitalise on the skills and knowhow acquired. In order to ensure sustainability in the long-term, we need to start thinking about the financial return on investment for the CfW project,164

a sentiment seconded by Leiermann.165 In order to anticipate the credibility of the model proposed through the CfW project, the UNESCO Doha team is attempting “to evaluate what skills are being acquired through the civil works and to what extent they can enable youths and beneficiaries to integrate into the labour market once Yemen enters the recovery phase”.166 In doing so, Interviewee C states that “we will be able to understand, and help mitigate, the structural challenges that may be faced when the associations move to operate independently.”167 However, Interviewee D talks of many skilled Yemenis moving to neighbouring countries in search of better salaries and suggests those who are trained via the CfW project may do the same 161

Monassar (2020), personal communication. Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 163 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 164 Interviewee C (2020), personal communication. 165 Leiermann (2019), personal communication. 166 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 167 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 162

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thing, and therefore not reinvest their training in Yemen.168 The long-term success of this particular aspect of the three-pronged CfW scheme will be in the ability to mitigate such an exodus of skill and ensuring future employment for trainees is guaranteed. At this stage however, with the scheme ongoing, even the short-term benefits have yet to be ascertained. Reconstruction is often an activity associated with post-conflict recovery, with deep connection to politics, economy and culture.169 Munawar asserts that restoration or reconstruction of heritage sites should not take place during conflict and should neither be rushed nor controlled by one party. Munawar’s statement is made in the context of a discussion concerning the reconstruction of Palmyra; he is evidently referencing large monuments, which were destroyed for ideological reasons. Some experts view reconstruction projects during conflict to be premature, with Teijgeler stating that, “while people will be very content with jobs and payments, this could have been achieved through other projects”,170 while Interviewee F believes UNESCO would be better placed “engaging local community members, especially young people, by providing training programmes on intangible cultural heritage.”171 While the reasoning behind Munawar and Teijgeler’s statements when applied to large monuments is understood, when reconstruction centres on housing, as is the case with the CfW project, there seems little substantial reasoning to forestall until post-conflict, especially considering the human impact of lack of secure housing. Given Yemen’s WHSs comprise a large quantity of historic housing, from a purely World Heritage preservationist standpoint, the prioritisation of housing makes complete sense; in such locations as the Old City of Sana’a a variety of aspects contribute to its OUV. Moreover, Interviewee F states, in the context of Yemen, I definitely would view restorative projects as a secondary priority unless there is some indication that a structure will collapse or deteriorate further without intervention, in which case it is justifiable to stabilise the structure.172

The CfW project has consistently prioritised the stabilisation and restoration of those structures at greatest risk of collapse, be that due to intentional targeting, collateral damage, neglect or extreme weather, and has not engaged in unnecessary restorative activities, which can be delayed to the post-conflict phase. Although the risk of such sites being destroyed once again during the conflict persists, support for livelihoods and restoration of historic homes often cannot wait for the post-conflict recovery phase, especially given there is no guarantee of imminent conflict resolution, and when there is a constant direct impact on the safety and security of thousands of Yemenis. Rush sees the “[CfW] project as having multiple benefits, with the provision of work, financial support, improved living

168

Interviewee D (2020), personal communication. Munawar (2017), p. 42. 170 Teijgeler (2020), personal communication. 171 Interviewee F (2020), personal communication. 172 Interviewee F (2020), personal communication. 169

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conditions and restoration of cultural heritage.”173 Moreover, UNESCO Doha’s CfW programme serves to minimise the detrimental effects of the conflict on local Yemeni people, particularly Yemeni youths, through their involvement in each stage of the project, from, in a limited capacity, the damage assessment to, in a greater capacity, physical reconstruction. The UNESCO-led, SFD implemented, EU-funded CfW project in Yemen appears to be a win-win initiative. On the one hand, it restores aspects of the historic cities of Sana’a, Zabid, Shibam and Aden and their cultural heritage, and on the other, it provides livelihoods, opportunities, and creates capacities with the potential to benefit the participating individuals long after the termination of the project. Iamandi, while highlighting the existence of critiques which proffer that “the [CfW] project will solve some problems for a few people, but the rest of the population will remain living in very poor conditions”, concedes that it is better than having nothing to offer at all.174 Efforts to stabilise various buildings, even if only temporary measures, will allow multiple historic structures to remain standing until conditions in the country are stable enough to allow for more significant restoration work, with greater financial support. Interviewee D raises a crucial point regarding the lack of stable and consistent support received for heritage projects as a result of the conflict. They state, Sometimes you get US$150,000 [for a reconstruction or conservation project], sometimes you get US$200,000. It greatly depends on who is financing the project. Before the conflict, we used to receive US$200,000 every one or two years, but now, we do not have that stability because of the political conflict. Now, we are receiving roughly US$20,000 every six months, with which you can realistically work for two-three months. That is why UNESCO have become involved during this period of time; to save some part of the heritage, which those in the country cannot.175

Although Interviewee D speaks of more reliable international funding of heritage conservation projects in Yemen prior to the conflict, it remains that there is an absence of consistent and guaranteed government support during both peacetime and conflict, as is evidenced by Yemen’s under-funded SHIs. Iamandi asserts this manner of working, with no reliable source of income from a single source has led to there being large gaps in between phases of restoration and conservation projects run by Interviewee D.176 In the case of the CfW initiative, UNESCO, funded by the EU, is replacing other international bodies who have likely ceased or decreased engagement with Yemen while conflict is ongoing, and while sanctions are imposed on the country. Moreover, the adopted model of placing both livelihoods and culture at the centre of this project’s strategy ensures adherence, largely, to the CURE Framework. UNESCO Doha ensured the involvement of local community members in phase one (damage and needs assessment and scoping), while the local community is the crux of phase four (implementation), bringing employment and training to many.

173

Rush (2020), personal communication. Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 175 Interviewee D (2020), personal communication. 176 Iamandi (2020), personal communication. 174

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Nonetheless, there was negligence in ensuring the same involvement across phase three (financing), with this in the main being left for UNESCO Doha and SFD. It is recorded on the UNESCO website that phase one of the project concluded on 8 August 2021,177 while phase two, which will have larger geographical scope, was set to commence summer 2022 with a further 20 million EUR of EU funding.

6.3

Syria: Reconstruction

Unlike UNESCO’s involvement in Yemen and Iraq when it comes to reconstruction projects, the organisation has exhibited very little involvement in Syria in recent years. More specifically, UNESCO has not embarked upon a comprehensive reconstruction initiative, the likes of which are ongoing in Yemen with the CfW scheme and in Iraq with the Mosul initiative. Instead, UNESCO has, as previously discussed, facilitated a satellite-based damage assessment in 2015,178 a rapid assessment mission to Palmyra in April 2016179 and an emergency assessment mission to Aleppo in January 2017,180 which usually constitute precursors to the development of plans for a reconstruction mission. UNESCO also held an international coordination meeting for the recovery of Aleppo’s heritage in March 2017,181 as well as a ‘Technical Meeting on the Recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra’ in July 2020.182 However, there has been no suggestion as to when any technical recommendations or resolutions made at these two meetings regarding Aleppo and Palmyra will be implemented. In terms of physical restorative initiatives, since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, UNESCO has only been involved in one project, i.e. facilitating the conservation of the Lion of Al-lāt statue from the ancient city of Palmyra in 2017 that was previously damaged by Da’esh.183 As detailed in Chap. 4, explanations as to why UNESCO has a far lesser engagement with Syria, particularly post-2017, are majorly political in nature, with lack of access to the country and financial sanctions imposed on the Assad regime greatly complicating matters. The following considers UNESCO’s intentions when it comes to its meetings regarding the recovery of Aleppo and Palmyra, and deduces the organisation’s methodological approach to facilitating the conservation of the Lion of Al-lāt statue, as well as the reasoning set out for UNESCO’s election to conserve this particular cultural object. Consideration will also be given to any other efforts made to facilitate reconstruction or restoration of other WHSs in Syria.

177

UNESCO (n.d.-d). UNESCO (n.d.-e). 179 UNESCO (2016a). 180 UNESCO (2017b). 181 UNESCO (2017c). 182 UNESCO (2020h). 183 UNESCO (2017d). 178

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Ancient City of Aleppo

From 2 to 3 March 2017, UNESCO hosted the First International Coordination Meeting for the recovery of Aleppo’s heritage in Beirut, Lebanon.184 This meeting took place during Dr Maamoun Abdulkarim and Irina Bokova’s time in office as DG of DGAM and DG of UNESCO respectively, signalling that there remained a strong working relationship between the two parties. For this reason, the meeting saw the involvement of Syrian representatives, as well as international experts. Attendees included representatives of DGAM, the Aleppo City Council, the Ministry of Tourism, the Directorate of Aleppo Awqaf (Ministry of religious endowments), NGOs and universities.185 The purpose of the meeting was to evaluate damage recorded to key monuments such as the citadel, madrasa al-sultaniya, grand serail, and souq of the Ancient City of Aleppo, coordinate national and international initiatives in the area, and to develop a framework for the rehabilitation and safeguarding of Aleppo’s cultural heritage.186 The fact that this international meeting was held in Beirut is significant, as that is where UNESCO’s field office for Syria is located, a few hours’ drive from Damascus. In hosting the meeting in Beirut instead of UNESCO HQ in Paris, UNESCO was demonstrating that the organisation possibly intended to have on-the-ground involvement in Syria, therefore showing a willingness to engage with the Syrian Government. At the time, the then Deputy Director of the Division for Heritage and the WHC at UNESCO, Lazare Eloundou, expressed UNESCO’s full commitment to the protection, conservation and rehabilitation of the cultural heritage of Aleppo and the organisation’s intention to follow through on the support requested by the Syrian stakeholders.187 This expression of support unfortunately has not turned into direct action by UNESCO. This first international coordination meeting resulted in a Table of Actions for the Recovery of the Ancient City of Aleppo, completed by Syrian stakeholders, which details exactly where UNESCO made actionable commitments to aid in the rehabilitation of the WHS.188 The majority of the subsequently proposed roles for UNESCO in Syria, defined by the Syrian stakeholders, could be described as what Meskell terms ‘impasse management’.189 UNESCO’s role, particularly when it comes to Syria has retreated into the two responses of awareness raising and technocratic functionality,190 which, although not negative contributions in and of themselves, when paired with impasse management, depict UNESCO as an organisation in possession of solutions, but with no means to facilitate their implementation. The Syrian stakeholders are cited as the leading actor in the implementation of 184

UNESCO (2017c). UNESCO (2017c). 186 UNESCO (2017c). 187 UNESCO (2017c). 188 UNESCO (2017e). 189 Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 4. 190 Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 3. 185

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recovery actions, while UNESCO is cited as providing guidance or support on aspects such as the establishment of a management system for Aleppo, ensuring the compatibility of damage assessment data and archives, awareness raising and capacity building via the provision of training.191 This Table of Actions also includes five action points concerning emergency works and restoration, which involve clearing rubble, salvaging, consolidation and stabilisation of historic buildings, identification of restoration works to be carried out, and launching the consolidation and restoration campaigns of the Great Umayyad Mosque, Citadel and the surrounding souqs, among other sites.192 All such work was to be carried out with the support of UNESCO. Boccardi recounts, UNESCO aided DGAM financially in the restoration of the Gate to the Citadel, which had previously been broken, preventing access to the area.193 Abdulkarim also records that in his final year as DG of DGAM, “UNESCO allocated a small amount of money for the restoration of the bridge of the Aleppo Citadel,. . .[and] also provided a small amount of money to fund around 30 Syrians to initiate the documentation of Aleppo”.194 No further documentation is available on such financing. Apart from these assertions by Boccardi and Abdulkarim, there has been no further UNESCO support in relation to the recovery of Aleppo. It is worth noting that the vast majority of actionable points within this document were originally estimated to be completed by mid-2017, with the launch of the consolidation and restoration campaign set to start in 2017, but with no estimated end date.195 However, it was stated that partial funding was received from the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC).196 UNESCO record that the Syrian Ministry of Tourism in Aleppo organised a follow-up coordination meeting entitled ‘Aleppo, the responsibility and the challenge’, to take place on 15 March 2017.197 Aside from stating it was organised, UNESCO provided no further information or summary of the meeting. Given the fact that UNESCO is proactive in documenting any involvement it has in safeguarding cultural heritage, particularly if it was an on-the-ground meeting, it seems safe to say that such a meeting either did not occur or UNESCO did not attend. Aside from the appointment by UNESCO of one National Culture Officer in Aleppo “to ensure coordination with local and national authorities for the implementation of activities for the recovery of the property” around April 2017,198 which has likely since been withdrawn, UNESCO’s involvement in the recovery of the Ancient City of Aleppo remains unclear.

191

UNESCO (2017e). UNESCO (2017e). 193 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 194 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 195 UNESCO (2017e). 196 UNESCO (2017e). 197 UNESCO (2017f). 198 UNESCO (2017f). 192

202

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Previous DG of DGAM, Abdulkarim, confirms that UNESCO has not provided any support, in terms of fundraising, provision of expert teams or coordination, to the reconstruction of the WHSs of Aleppo and Palmyra, despite providing a large amount of support to the Old City of Mosul, Iraq, which does not have World Heritage status.199 He raises examples such as Al-Madina Souq and the Great Umayyad Mosque, stating, “[i]n recent years, nothing has happened to these sites”.200 Abdulkarim claims such discrepancy in allocation of funds and attention is politically motivated, with many sponsors refusing to give money to the Syrian Government.201 It should be acknowledged that the sponsor, AKTC, which was said to have contributed partial funding to the consolidation and restoration campaign, continued to engage with Syria beyond the termination of UNESCO’s engagement. AKTC were subsequently involved in the restoration work of Souq al-Saqatiyya, which comprises 53 shops, spanning an area of 1528 square metres, beginning on 1 November 2018.202 The restoration was estimated to have taken eight months and cost roughly US$400,000 to complete.203 AKTC were also reportedly contributing to the rebuilding of the Ayyubid Palace in the Aleppo Citadel, via the training of 40 Syrians in masonry, and another 59 in stone restoration.204 The provision of this training is said to have been made possible via a grant from UNESCO,205 but it is not known when such a grant was issued and the amount of money received by AKTC. Writing in May 2019, Qudsi states, “The AKTC. . . is one of the few international organizations able to carry out projects with the Syrian government’s approval while — so far — avoiding restrictions set by international sanctions”.206 However, given the then impending introduction of the Caesar Act, which has since come into force, there was concern that further restrictions and sanctions would impact AKTC’s ability to provide such support to reconstruction projects in Syria.207 This appears to have been the case. A current statement on AKTC’s websites states that given the current conditions in Syria, it has ceased all its cultural projects and is instead focusing all its efforts on the humanitarian crisis.208 Chris Ray states, “[w]ith reconstruction plans crippled by an all-round shortage of funds, equipment, and skilled labor, only a handful of Syria’s heritage rehabilitation projects have gone forward.”209 One such project is the restoration of the Great Umayyad Mosque. On 25 June 2017, it was announced that the Chechen Republic’s

199

Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 201 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 202 DGAM (2019), p. 10. 203 Ray (n.d.). 204 McGivern (2018). 205 McGivern (2018). 206 Qudsi (2019). 207 Qudsi (2019). 208 Aga Khan Development Network (n.d.). 209 Ray (2019). 200

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Akhmad Kadyrov Fund, a foundation linked to the family of Ramzan Kadyrov, ruler of Russia’s Muslim-majority republic of Chechnya, had provided funding for the restoration of the Umayyad Mosque and the Khalid ibn Walid Mosque in Homs.210 It is clear that the Akhmad Kadyrov Fund has a poor track record of corruption, and possesses strong government ties,211 while the foundation has received allegations of being “the Kadyrov family’s personal piggy bank filled by compulsory contributions from ordinary Chechens”.212 Moreover, those selected to lead the project have admitted to possessing no experience in heritage reconstruction.213 The amount donated by this foundation is said to be US$1.4 million.214 This is a significant indication that UNESCO is no longer involved in this project in collaboration with DGAM. Given Russia has been the most significant backer of the Assad regime in the course of the conflict, Russia’s new control over this reconstruction project as the primary donor, would possibly be too politically challenging a landscape for UNESCO to traverse. Regardless, it was the Regime’s choice to work with its ally, Russia, over UNESCO. The agreement forged between the Syrian Government authorities and the Russian foundation set an initial deadline of August 2018 for both mosques to reopen,215 leaving little over a year to complete the restoration and reconstruction work. This timetable was not achieved, with the Khalid ibn Walid Mosque not reopening until February 2019216—nonetheless a fast turnaround—and the reconstruction on the Umayyad Mosque appears to still be ongoing in 2022. Back in May 2020, it was documented by The Syrian Observer that the restoration of the facades of the mosque’s courtyards and interior work was almost complete, while repairs to the shrine of Zachariah, walls and pillars had been completed, along with ventilation, electricity and lighting systems. It further states that renovations to the eastern part of the mosque, interlinked with the antique souqs, had begun.217 In response to the international meeting held in Beirut, DGAM acknowledged that it had made some encouraging progress, particularly with regard to starting “the first phase of the Syrian Restoration code to establishing controls and guidance for restoration and rehabilitation of the damaged historical built heritage in a way that preserves its authenticity for the next generation”. However, as regards implementation, it was still experiencing a general lack of funds, equipment, trained personnel, as well as a lack of access to sources of information.218 This lack of access to key resources acts to inhibit Syria from implementing goals established at the

210

Sputnik News (2017). Bullough (2015). 212 Vasilyeva (2019). 213 Darke (2018). 214 DGAM (2019), p. 7. 215 Sputnik News (2017). 216 Vasilyeva (2019). 217 The Syrian Observer (2020). 218 DGAM (2019), p. 14. 211

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international meeting in Beirut in March 2017. Moreover, it signals that UNESCO has failed to provide the then agreed upon support. DGAM has, with its current limited resources, embarked upon reconstruction and restoration work on a multitude of key sites in Aleppo, including the National Museum of Aleppo, Souq al-Saqatiyya, the Aleppo Citadel and the Great Umayyad Mosque,219 without the support or guidance of UNESCO, but instead via small donations from charitable foundations. Nonetheless, as previously stated there is an increasingly restricted pool of organisations and charities able to or willing to provide support or collaborate with DGAM on reconstruction projects, due to restrictions imposed by sanctions.

6.3.2

Site of Palmyra

The report on the site of Palmyra following the aforementioned Technical Assistance Workshop in December 2016, made recommendations on possible restorative approaches. The report refers to the reassembling of existing, but dismembered, fragments via anastylosis, as per article 15 of The Venice Charter. Yet, the report also acknowledges that a minor contribution of new materials may be necessary for stability.220 An alternative, plausible option is also the extension of anastylosis beyond the state of the structures prior to their destruction in 2015.221 This would mean the reassembling of sorted archaeological remains, which were not attached to the structure in 2015, but had been at a previous point in said structure’s history. This would result in the creation of a closer representation to the original conception of the monuments in the WHS of Palmyra, inevitably a different condition to when it attained World Heritage status. Aside from the options of partial or complete anastylosis on all or certain aspects of the WHS, there also remains the option of rejecting anastylosis altogether in opting for virtual 3D restitution.222 Regardless, no decision was reached between the DGAM and UNESCO regarding the best approach. It is the view of Munawar,223 that there should be no restoration or reconstruction of Palmyra while conflict is ongoing, stating such activities should be confined to post-conflict and peacetime, to allow for deliberation among all local stakeholders on the correct approach, and for the reconstruction process to be incorporated into the reconciliation of Syrian society. When it comes to the WHS of Palmyra, the WHCo resolved in 2019 to request that Syria “limit restoration works to first aid interventions until detailed studies and extensive field work are conducted to assess the damage, and discussions on defining

219

DGAM (2019), pp. 7–14. UNESCO (2017g), p. 44. 221 UNESCO (2017g), p. 44. 222 UNESCO (2017g), p. 45. 223 Munawar (2017), p. 43. 220

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optimal restoration approaches are held with relevant experts”.224 However, as evidenced, there has been no movement from UNESCO or the international community, in general, on progressing any such first aid missions for damage assessment and consolidation of monuments on the site, all the while denying requests for funds from the State Party to carry out its own consolidation works. This request from the WHCo, combined with the lack of engagement between DGAM and UNESCO, would subsequently leave the State Party in a form of limbo, unable to move forward to save its own cultural heritage.225 The request that no reconstruction is carried out is reiterated at the ‘Technical Meeting on the Recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra’ on 18 December 2019. Regardless, the 34 experts who participated in the meeting still made varied recommendations pertaining to restorative or reconstruction work. Such recommendations include the restoration of Palmyra museum artifacts and objects vandalised or intentionally damaged, and the rehabilitation of the museum in Palmyra in general, with potential for retrofitted aspects.226 The CURE Framework urges any such reconstruction plans to apply a people-centred approach, utilising mechanisms such as consultations with the local community, in order to integrate them into the planning process.227 Moreover, it was recommended that the memorialising of recent traumatic events in the reconstruction of Palmyra should be at the discretion of the local community and reflect its needs, aspirations and desires.228 In terms of international cooperation and planning, the ‘Technical Meeting on the Recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra’ recommended an international coordination mechanism be established under UNESCO, which would allow for the collection and sharing of available data and documentation, and aid in the avoidance of any overlap of scientific studies on restoration and reconstruction.229 However, UNESCO’s attempt to be the umbrella organisation coordinating the recovery of Aleppo’s heritage was not sustained, as is evidenced by the absence of follow-up international coordination meetings and by DGAM who, in 2019, stated there is slow implementation of the recovery plan of Aleppo “due to poor coordination among stakeholders” among other things.230 There therefore is no indication that UNESCO will facilitate the coordination of the recovery of the WHS of Palmyra. If so, DGAM will have to find its own path to document, consolidate, reconstruct, and restore Palmyra, and that path would likely be via funding provided by Russian actors, as was the case with the reconstruction of the Khalid ibn Walid Mosque and is the case with the Great Umayyad Mosque. In November 2020, an MoU was signed

224

UNESCO (2019b). DGAM ultimately elected to work with its ally, Russia, on the reconstruction of cultural heritage sites, such as Palmyra. 226 UNESCO (2019c). 227 UNESCO (2019c). 228 UNESCO (2019c). 229 UNESCO (2019c). 230 DGAM (2019), p. 5. 225

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between DGAM and Russia’s Stone Industry Association.231 Thorough documentation of the surviving monuments of the site and subsequent 3D modelling will be used to inform future decisions regarding restoration and reconstruction.232 Given the political power Russia has over Syria, it seems likely that Russian actors will finance any subsequent restorative work at Palmyra, which, Danti states, may make it difficult for any organisation aligned with the EU or the US to operate in the country.233 Heritage reconstruction projects in Syria need to be viewed with skepticism, as it is highly likely it is only the regime and its Russian funding counterparts that have a say in which sites to prioritise, who to involve in the reconstruction process, and which geographical and ethnic groups the heritage will reflect. One particular restorative project that UNESCO has facilitated in Syria is the conservation of Lion of Al-lāt statue, also known as the Lion Statue of Athena, from the Ancient City of Palmyra. This 2000-year-old statue, measuring 345 centimetres in height and weighing 15 tonnes, once stood at the entrance to the Temple of Al-lāt, and following its discovery in 1977 by Polish archaeologists, has since been held at the Museum of Palmyra.234 During UNESCO’s Rapid Assessment Mission to Palmyra, which took place in April 2016, the Lion of Al-lāt was discovered to have been one of the statues deemed too large for earlier evacuation and which therefore succumbed to destruction at the hands of Da’esh in May 2015, when the force captured Palmyra.235 Originally covered with a metal plate and sandbags to shield it from ongoing combat,236 such efforts by DGAM were rendered futile by Da’esh intent to destroy the statues and sarcophagi within the museum. Once discovered by the damage assessment team, the statue along with other fragments were subsequently relocated to Damascus, where it would be restored.237 Abdulkarim states, “[a]fter telling UNESCO DGAM had no money to facilitate the evacuation, UNESCO provided a small amount . . .to fund 60 people to go to Palmyra and coordinate the evacuation of the collections.”238 This meant that when Da’esh occupied Palmyra for a second time, there were no artefacts in the museum. The restoration, which took two months to complete, is marked as an achievement under the Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage project,239 and was facilitated by EU funding. As evidenced from photographic documentation, the Polish restorer, Bartosz Markowski,240 employed a combination of the original stone material and new stone material, which stands in stark contrast. There is a clear

231

Kishkovsky (2021). Kishkovsky (2021). 233 Danti (2020), personal communication. 234 UNESCO (2017d). 235 UNESCO (2017d). 236 Agence France-Presse in Beirut (2015). 237 UNESCO (2017d). 238 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 239 UNESCO (2017d). 240 UNESCO (2017d). 232

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distinction between the components that comprise the original structure, and those modern additions, which give it structural integrity, demonstrating the use of partial anastylosis. Although a highly significant statue to the site of Palmyra, this restoration is majorly symbolic and constitutes a minute amount of the work that lies ahead to thoroughly document the monuments remaining in Palmyra, catalogue the rubble, and determine the correct course of action for reconstruction. This could mean 3D virtual restoration; reconstruction of specific monuments; or reconstruction of the entire site, be that via anastylosis to its condition immediately prior to destruction in 2015, or to a previous state, reassembling more of the rubble at the archaeological site, recreating the structure to near completion with a combination of old and new materials. It remains however, that this form of reconstruction during conflict should not be prioritised, as it does not directly benefit the local communities in terms of the provision of livelihoods or the immediate improvement of living conditions. Regardless, if the current status quo continues, it seems that UNESCO is likely to have minimal, if any, involvement in any future efforts to reconstruct the WHS of Palmyra.

6.3.3

Crac Des Chevaliers and Qal’at Salah El-Din

Most of the damage to Crac des Chevaliers is internal, in the lower courtyard, where ancient columns are blackened with soot and vaults have collapsed due to fire allegedly lit by rebels living inside the site. Most of the site’s external walls appear intact, yet bullet holes are visible on an information plate for visiting tourists.241 As part of the December 2016 Technical Assistant Workshop in Beirut, UNESCO produced a report on the Syrian WHS of Crac des Chevaliers (Qal’at Salah El-Din was not included, given it had experienced no damage having not been affected by the conflict). This report identified that the completion of proper and appropriate restorations already carried out between May 2014 and December 2016, under the supervision of DGAM, were impeded by the lack of funds available, and the urgency of the State Party to see results. With financial and time constraints placed on DGAM, inventorying of fragments for anastylosis was not completed, and improper dismantling of unstable structures, shoring and consolidation took place.242 Experts attending the meeting recommended moving forward on urgent interventions and restoration works to mitigate further degradation of the masonry, and detailed studies to be carried out on more complex, less urgent restoration projects (Table 6.2).243 All recommendations for immediate restorations demanded the DGAM ensured a maximum reuse of the original materials, while advocating for any new material to be sought from the same source as the original. For example, when it comes to the

241

AFP (2014). UNESCO (2017h), p. 3. 243 UNESCO (2016b). 242

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Table 6.2 Key interventions for Crac Des Chevaliers. Source: UNESCO 28 February 2017 Report on Crac Des Chevaliers Crac Des Chevaliers Immediate interventions (1) Destabilised pillar and collapsed vault (2) Vault of the cistern in the central courtyard (3) Vault and terrace of the chapel (4) Vault and terrace of the Leader’s Tower (5) Vault leaning against the upper wall in ruins (6) Parapet of the North curtain of the 2nd enclosure (7) Small staircase of the Tower Sultan Qualawun

Interventions to be studied in parallela (8) Rear of Tower Al Zahir Bybars (9) Wall above the Hall of the Knights (10) Hall of the Knights (Gallery) (11) Cannon staircase (12) Upper wall in ruins between the two towers (13) Bedrock at the NE of the 1st and 2nd enclosures

I understand this to mean ‘interventions that do not require immediate attention’, but will do so in the near future. For that reason reconstruction plans should be developed for each (items 8–13) in tandem with the execution of immediate interventions (items 1–7) a

restoration of the main pillar and the collapsed vault at the south of the gallery of the Hall of the Knight, any reused original material was to be supplemented “with identical new materials extracted from the quarry of origin”.244 This technical meeting demanded that DGAM carry out, among other things, extensive surveys of identified areas, redoing of unstable shoring work, salvaging and cataloguing of fragments, the painstaking creation of new materials to simulate original materials, prevention of water damage and reassembling of original materials to restore certain structures. With DGAM already working on a restricted budget, it was unlikely that the authority would be able to facilitate such work without substantial support. Such financial support, however, did not materialise. This is evidenced in Syria’s State Party 2019 SoC Report, which states “DGAM requested... international assistance on 22/11/2018 to finance the first phase” of the Crac des Chevalier recovery plan in response to the recommendations of the Technical Assistance Meeting discussed above.245 This request is not logged under Syria’s WHC profile,246 and so it must be assumed that it was either not formally registered by DGAM or the request was denied by UNESCO. If the former is true, then it is possible DGAM is falsely claiming to have requested international assistance for work that did not materialise in order to shift blame to UNESCO. If the latter is true—and it is understood that UNESCO must log all such international assistance requests on the WHC website, whether approved or denied—the absence of this request by DGAM then suggests that UNESCO is only recording those of Syria’s requests that it approves, while those denied go unrecorded. Since the start of the conflict, only three requests totalling US$90,000 (all approved) have been logged under Syria’s 244

UNESCO (2017h), p. 6. DGAM (2019), p. 17. 246 UNESCO (n.d.-f). 245

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WHC profile.247 Moreover, the 2019 SoC Report further stated that only preventative work had been carried out at Qal'at Salah El-Din, while an impending cable car project was “waiting for the perspective of the UNESCO expert during the proposed [visit] to the site, according to [. . .] our request letters sent to [the] WHC on 09 Aug 2018 and 29 Nov 2018”.248 This implies that DGAM has been continually requesting UNESCO’s approval, via an expert visit, on planned works. While UNESCO insists on granting such approval before any developments can go ahead, the organisation continually appears to stall engagement with Syria, consequently preventing any due progress. DGAM recorded in its 2018 State Party SoC report that the following had been completed at the chapel and adjacent courtyard in the site of Crac des Chevaliers: • Execution of a new isolation layer on the roof of the chapel, after the removal of the old roof, which was damaged by the shells; • Removal of the concrete layer of the roof; • Documentation of the stone roof; • Investigation into the water drainage system of the chapel roof; • Excavation works in the courtyard west to the chapel to study the original water drainage system in the area; • Documentation and photographing of fresco; and • Restoration and consolidation of the southwestern corner of the chapel tower.249 From consideration of DGAM’s 2018 and 2019 SoC reports, it would seem that the vast majority of recommendations from the December 2016 Technical Assistance Meeting have not been implemented. This is evidently down to insufficient access to funds, despite DGAM’s direct requests to UNESCO, specifically the WHCo for financial support, in addition to the exodus of trained staff during the conflict. Although UNESCO identified urgent interventions, essential for securing the structural stability of aspects of Crac des Chevaliers, there has been no collaborative movement with DGAM on such items. Meanwhile, with regard to Qal’at Salah El-Din, which was not affected by the conflict, only preventative works were required to be carried out.250 In 2019, aside from the presenting of some results from excavations carried out to gain more information about the water draining system, no more works were implemented.251 On 3 March 2020 UNESCO granted US$30,000, via the International Assistance mechanism, to aid the documentation and emergency structural intervention in Qal’at Salah El-Din,252 however this need not be considered reactive in the context of the 1954 Hague Convention as this site was not affected by the conflict (although this was not a foregone conclusion

247

UNESCO (n.d.-f). DGAM (2019), p. 17. 249 DGAM (2018), p. 18. 250 DGAM (2018), p. 18. 251 DGAM (2019), pp. 16–17. 252 UNESCO (2020i). 248

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pre-conflict). As there is no further documentation available on this project at present, it is not yet clear how much progress has been made with these particular interventions.

6.3.4

Ancient City of Damascus

On 23 April 2015, a large electrical fire broke out devastating dozens of shops in the souq of Asruniyeh, and burning the entire building of the Ottoman Bank, bringing UNESCO’s attention to the WHS of the Ancient City of Damascus.253 Although the destruction of the Ottoman Bank was not caused by on-the-ground combat or airstrikes, but instead possibly by neglect of maintenance and diversion of resources, such damage is considered an indirect result of the conflict. From the December 2016 Technical Assistance Workshop, UNESCO produced a review of the restoration project prepared by the Directorate of the Old City of Damascus. UNESCO concluded that the proposed project was “insufficiently in accordance with the old use of the building”, as it did not account for the use of original materials and the maintenance of a coherent appearance on all shop fronts.254 Moreover, it is concluded that the Directorate’s proposal did not address structural damage to the building, while there was insufficient information on the structural choices made and on the consolidation process.255 This UNESCO report, completed by PierreAndré Lablaude, then communicated clear recommendations, which would amend each of the issues with the original reconstruction proposal. Recommendations covered the following topics: • • • • • • •

Roofing of the building Façades of the first floor Façades of the ground floor Supporting structures of the building Project Owner and Project Supervisor Solving administrative difficulties Urgent implementation of the security and stabilisation measures.256

DGAM acknowledged such recommendations and stated that recovery plans had been altered accordingly.257 Regarding the restoration of the Ottoman Bank, DGAM further stated that work commenced in 2018, with the removal of rubble, the installation of metal columns and documentation of the site.258 In 2019, DGAM

253

UNESCO (2016c), p. 2. UNESCO (2016c), p. 4. 255 UNESCO (2016c), p. 5. 256 UNESCO (2016c), pp. 6–9. 257 DGAM (2018), p. 7. 258 DGAM (2019), pp. 20–21. 254

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flagged that due to a lack of funding and a conflict of interest among stakeholders, the authority would face difficulties in controlling the restoration work.259 It is also likely that corruption within the Syrian Government was a further issue. This signals that other stakeholders would have influence over how historically accurate the reconstruction would be, with faster and cheaper, less traditional methods and materials being favoured. Despite this voiced predicament, no further technical or financial support has been extended by UNESCO with regards to this particular site, despite it being within the boundary of the WHS of the Ancient City of Damascus. In the 2018 SoC report, DGAM records various other fires that have broken out in the Ancient City of Damascus, as well as a suicide bombing incident, over the period July to November 2017, causing severe damage and destruction to historic buildings, including traditional housing and souqs.260 Regarding such incidents, DGAM noted the completion of damage assessments, while some shops affected by the destruction were being reconstructed.261 However, there is evidence of incorrect use of building materials and techniques, which conflict with those historically used.262 In the 2019 SoC report, DGAM cited the reasons for the use of modern materials in such restorations as the rarity of traditional materials in the market, and the high cost of such materials when found.263

6.3.5

Ancient City of Bosra

At the time of writing, there has been no mention of any emergency response or restorative mission from UNESCO to the Ancient City of Bosra. This is despite the organisation’s condemnation of the destruction of sites there during combats on 22 December 2015.264 Following an initial rapid assessment conducted on the Ancient City of Bosra in late July 2018, the DGAM concluded that the impact of conflict ranged from minor effects, such as bomb fragments or bullet shots to the façades of various buildings to permanent impacts, such as the complete destruction of the Kalybe.265 DGAM requested US$305,000 for the implementation of a recovery plan from the UNESCO Beirut office on 29 August 2018, as well as a request for International Assistance of US$30,000 from the WHCo to implement the first phase (damage assessment and review of site boundary).266 While the latter request was approved on 21 December 2018, it is interesting to note, that the

259

DGAM (2019), p. 21. DGAM (2018), pp. 5–6. 261 DGAM (2018), p. 7. 262 DGAM (2018), p. 7. 263 DGAM (2019), p. 18. 264 UNESCO (2015c). 265 DGAM (2019), p. 22. 266 DGAM (2019), p. 23. 260

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WHCo267 called on UNESCO Member States to support Syria’s implementation of the DGAM Recovery Plan 2018–2019 for the Ancient City of Bosra, including through the UNESCO HEF. Nonetheless, these calls went unheeded, likely due to sanctions placed on Syria or an unwillingness of States Parties to engage with the Syrian regime. Once again, Syria is requested to “refrain from undertaking conservation and restoration work until the situation allows”, and to instead implement only “minimal first aid interventions to prevent theft, further collapse and natural degradation”.268 However, as has been made evident from the first aid efforts at Crac des Chevaliers, DGAM was under political pressure and facing budget constraints even when it came to such minimal efforts, which led to malpractice and inappropriate shoring and consolidation. It is important that substantial funds and continual support be guaranteed to minimise the pressure on DGAM to stretch a budget intended for measures such as inventorying and use it to also carry out major interventions such as demolition, shoring, consolidation and reconstruction, in order to reach the end goal demanded by the Syrian Government. If there is no guarantee of continued financial and intellectual support, shortcuts will be taken with the available budget.

6.3.6

Ancient Villages of Northern Syria

In terms of damage, DGAM record that local communities “report[ed] violations such as illegal excavations and constructions” affecting eight archaeological parks of the property, while UNITAR/UNOSAT comparative analysis of satellite images captured between 2017 and 2020 show damage to have increased across most of the archaeological parks.269 In addition, various archaeological buildings have been damaged and destroyed across the numerous villages within the property boundaries, including the complete destruction of the village of Batouta in Jebel Sem’an.270 There have been calls by the WHCo for UNESCO Member States to support emergency safeguarding and recovery of the WHS of the Ancient Villages of Northern Syria.271 As yet however, no funds have been committed to any of the villages within this site. Extremely limited information is available on the current condition of the site as there is restricted ground access for DGAM officials, given the control of the area is largely with armed groups,272 while any damage monitoring carried out is done by locals.273 It has been reported that terrorist groups have

267

UNESCO (2018a, 2019d). UNESCO (2019d). 269 UNESCO (2021a), p. 64. 270 UNESCO (2021a), p. 64. 271 UNESCO (2017i, 2018b, 2019e, 2021a). 272 DGAM (2018), p. 21; DGAM (2019), p. 25. 273 DGAM (2018), pp. 21–22. 268

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destroyed monasteries, churches and archaeological monuments.274 DGAM however, due to limited access, has not been able to verify such information and has likely not yet developed any first aid intervention strategy, never mind any reconstruction plan. With no proposal from the State Party and a lack of verified documentation on the site’s condition, UNESCO has shown no inclination that it will move soon to implement any recovery strategy, alongside DGAM, at the Ancient Villages of Northern Syria WHS. In 2016 and 2017, UNESCO demonstrated an intention to aid Syria in the recovery of WHSs, with particular focus on the Ancient City of Aleppo and the Site of Palmyra. Extensive damage assessments were carried out, documented and recommendations made. However, this statement of support from UNESCO soon evaporated, with Syria’s repeated requests for support at WHCo meetings being merely acknowledged, but ultimately ignored. For example, it has been fully acknowledged by the Committee that the primary inhibitor for DGAM being able to carry out essential emergency consolidation and restorative work, is lack of financial support, yet such insufficient support persists. UNESCO has instead held technical meetings, which only duplicate previous recommendations. Meskell refers to this continual unnecessary production of reports, guidelines and recommendations as UNESCO’s “prodigious technocratic output”,275 which will ultimately have wasted the organisation’s valuable financial and human resources, while allowing UNESCO to ignore the real issue of international political tensions. Such actions are representative of the stalling of the international community when it comes to Syria; ethically, there is a need to act, however political constraints force Member States and thus the international organisation to stop short of extending any meaningful practical or financial aid to DGAM. Member States are often the primary inhibitor of international organisations,276 as evidenced by the case of Syria, where gridlock has truly set in for UNESCO. Abdulkarim understands that it is currently “too risky to allocate money to the Syrian Government due to corruption”, but advocates that “UNESCO should instead put their efforts into researching the strategy[, plans and recommendations for]. . . the restoration of historical sites in Syria, so programmes may be implemented immediately when the situation permits.”277 It remains however, that mere recovery planning would still demand direct engagement with DGAM, to allow for a consensus among key stakeholders on decisions made, and any such interaction currently seems unlikely. As a result of embargos and sanctions against the Syrian Arab Republic, Abdulkarim is “not very optimistic that real initiatives will happen in Syria.”278 Throughout the Syrian conflict, the regime has had varying territorial control, with such control going down as low as 30%, with

274

DGAM (2018), p. 21; DGAM (2019), p. 25. Meskell (2018), p. 82. 276 Meskell (2018), p. 226. 277 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 278 Abdulkarim (2020), personal communication. 275

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much of its WHSs residing in areas outside its territory.279 Such circumstances placed significant restrictions on UNESCO concerning the regions of Syria with which it was able to engage. With Assad regaining much of the territory in recent years, greater sanctions have been made against the country, acting as a further inhibitor to UNESCO’s engagement. Moreover, the absence of a UNESCO-led reconstruction initiative in Syria, renders this research unable to comment on its application of the CURE Framework in this context.

6.4

Iraq: Reconstruction

Iraq presents a very different situation to those of Yemen and Syria as it is in the post-conflict phase. This is the phase during which UNESCO advocates for reconstruction activities to take place. It then follows that UNESCO is implementing its largest reconstruction project in Iraq, namely the Mosul initiative, with some activities also being carried out in Basra Old City. However, this reconstruction initiative is centred on cities with no World Heritage status. UNESCO seemingly elected the Old City of Mosul as a central focus for reconstruction due to the excessive amount of destruction it experienced during the conflict. Although the Old City of Mosul was inventoried on the Tentative List in 2018, focussing on this city, along with Basra, signals less attention being paid to Iraq’s cultural WHSs of Ashur (Qal'at Sherqat), Babylon, Erbil Citadel, Hatra and Samarra Archaeological City. The following provides in-depth insight into the Mosul initiative, from prioritisation of sites, to local community representation and involvement, to the implementation of reconstruction operations. The following also considers UNESCO’s comparatively low attention to the WHSs, listed above, with the aim of understanding whether the organisation’s efforts are well targeted across the country.

6.4.1

Revive the Spirit of Mosul

The destruction of Mosul, located in the north in Modern Iraqi Kurdistan, at the hands of Da’esh is well documented and, as established by earlier discussion on differing forms of destruction to cultural heritage in Iraq, during the conflict the city of Mosul assumed a symbolic role, being intentionally targeted by Da’esh. In 2017, the battle culminating in Mosul’s liberatation from Da’esh had a significant impact on both the local population and on the city’s heritage. Isakhan and Meskell record that in the face of imminent defeat, Da’esh detonated explosives inside the same mosque from which Baghdadi [leader of Da’esh from 2014 to his death in 2019], had declared his Caliphate in 2014, the Great Mosque of

279

Al-Azm (2020), personal communication.

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Iraq: Reconstruction

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[Al-Nouri]. The explosion flattened the mosque along with its famous gravity-defying leaning minaret, affectionately known to locals by the sobriquet [A]l-Hadba (‘the hunchback’).280

As previously established, SBAH is poorly supported by the Iraqi Government, both financially and politically,281 and so the institution has turned to UNESCO for international interventionist support for the restoration of some key cultural landmarks. UNESCO deplored the destruction of Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret in a statement released on 22 June 2017, the day after the explosions took place. Roughly eight months later, on 14 February 2018, the UNESCO DG, Audrey Azoulay, “announced the launch of a flagship initiative to revive the spirit of Mosul”,282 although plans for the initiative are said to have begun before Audrey Azoulay was elected DG, immediately following the liberation of the city in July 2017.283 On 23 April 2018, UNESCO announced that along with the UAE and Iraq, it had concluded an historic US$50 million partnership to reconstruct Mosul’s iconic Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret,284 with the money made available to UNESCO in September 2018.285 Haxthausen asserts there is a need to rehabilitate the destroyed heritage of the Old City of Mosul, to “bring back cultural and educational life to a city, which has always, in Iraq’s history, been a symbol of cultural and educational exchanges.”286 Today, the Mosul initiative is UNESCO’s largest programme in the world;287 it has certainly assumed the role of a symbolic location for a major reconstruction initiative, given its almost complete annihilation in 2017. Currently, UNESCO heads up this multimillion-dollar initiative, alongside an Iraqi National Contractor and Nineveh Department of Antiquities’ heritage office, which consists of seven staff members, including Abdulrahman Emad. Emad records, “around 75% of [Mosul’s]. . . buildings are destroyed”,288 while UNESCO’s multimillion dollar initiative sets to rebuild only a select few iconic structures. The significance of the Mosul initiative to UNESCO is evident merely from looking at the organisation’s homepage; under the ‘WHAT WE DO’ tab, it is also listed atop the organisation’s ‘Major Initiatives’, alongside Artificial Intelligence, Futures of Education, Fostering freedom of expression, Building knowledge societies, Sustainable Cities, Preventing violent extremism, Our commitment to biodiversity, and Advancing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.289 In a

280

Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 2. Kathem (2020). 282 UNESCO (2018c). 283 Antonelli (2019), personal communication. 284 UNESCO (2018d). 285 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 286 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 287 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 288 Emad (2020), personal communication. 289 UNESCO (n.d.-g). 281

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statement released on 1 July 2018, UNESCO confirm the Mosul initiative to be a “UNESCO priority and one of its most ambitious reconstruction and recovery campaigns”.290 The Mosul initiative, centring on the reconstruction of key sites, is taking place during the volatile post-conflict phase, and so will likely face many challenges in the process.291 This reconstruction of key sites intentionally destroyed by Da’esh could then also be viewed as symbolic of its defeat in the area. Although there is validity to symbolic restorations, having a people-centred approach, which ensures a direct path toward normalcy in everyday life for the local population, is crucial. This initiative, which was mobilised in February 2018, came to fruition in cooperation with the Iraqi MoC, via the Response Plan for the Safeguarding of Cultural Heritage in the Liberated Areas of Iraq, which ran from 2017 to 2019. UNESCO states, “the initiative is in line with the National Reconstruction and Development plan of the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Recovery and Resilience Programme (Iraqi RRP), launched by the [UNSG].”292 Within the Mosul initiative, there exists three main strategic areas of action, namely heritage, education and cultural life.293 This research addresses only those areas of heritage and cultural life, with greater focus given to aspects concerning built heritage. Following the launch of the Mosul initiative, US$90,674 was donated by UNDP for the establishment of an initial framework for the reconstruction of Mosul.294 This particular project, as part of the larger initiative, spanned September 2018 to February 2019, with the aim “to ensure a fast reconstruction, while projecting the heritage and historical characteristics of the Old City”, and address the “urgent need to support vulnerable returnees whose houses were completely destroyed”.295 Both the UAE and the EU chiefly fund the Mosul initiative. The former has provided US $50.4 million for the rehabilitation of Al-Nouri Mosque (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2) and Al-Hadba Minaret (Fig. 6.3), Al-Saa’a Church (Fig. 6.4) and Al-Tahira Church (Fig. 6.5). In the same 1 July 2018 statement discussed above, UNESCO detailed that total funds of US$50.4 million originated from the UAE and are allocated for the reconstruction of the mosque over a five-year period.296 On 10 October 2019, Azoulay and Noura bint Mohammed Al Kaabi, the UAE’s Minister of Culture and Knowledge Development, signed an agreement to include the Syriac Catholic Al-Tahira Church and the Latin Al-Saa’a Church in the Mosul rehabilitation plans.297 This decision to support the rebuilding of the two churches was made following the visit of Pope Francis to Abu Dhabi, UAE in 2018,298 despite no further

290

UNESCO (2018d). Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 2. 292 UNESCO (n.d.-h). 293 UNESCO (n.d.-i). 294 UNESCO (n.d.-j). 295 UNESCO (n.d.-j). 296 UNESCO (2018e). 297 UNESCO (2019f). 298 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 291

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Fig. 6.1 Mosul Old City, Al-Nouri Mosque: Detail of the alabaster decorated stones in ruins. 2017. Source: Giovanni Fontana Antonelli

funds being pledged or donated. This lack of further funding was also evident in the course of the international Mosul initiative meeting at UNESCO HQ on 10 September 2018, where, Daniels states, “no-one committed any new money,. . . but instead restated monetary commitments already made.”299 Daniels further suggests, “UNESCO is playing with a very limited amount of cash” when it comes to the Mosul initiative.300 Following his own assessments and cost estimations of Al-Saa’a Church and Al-Tahira Church, Michael Danti asserts “they need massive amounts of money”, however the final estimation is unclear.301 Danti further stated, unless we see more co-funding of larger projects, say those over [US]$2 million, UNESCO will remain the only viable option for the larger scale efforts. I think because of this, UNESCO is being stretched a little thin given its current project portfolio.302

Given the lack of additional funds to support additions to the UNESCO reconstruction proposal, Danti’s303 view that UNESCO will “fall short” of its reconstruction target, seems credible. In addition to the two churches, there is the possibility that a museum, focusing on the history of Mosul will be constructed.304 An interviewee

299

Daniels (2020), personal communication. Daniels (2020), personal communication. 301 Danti (2020), personal communication. 302 Danti (2021), personal communication. 303 Danti (2020), personal communication. 304 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 300

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Fig. 6.2 Mosul Old City, Al-Nouri Mosque: View from the street after the collapse. 2017. Source: Giovanni Fontana Antonelli

with prior involvement in the project recalls the initial iteration of the Mosul proposal only included “the reconstruction of the Mosque as a religious place, the restoration of the Minaret as a memorial [and]. . .as a symbol of the city, and the creation. . .of the museum”.305 The interviewee claims that with the later inclusion of the two churches, the museum proposal, which was allocated between US$12 million and US$14 million, was dropped.306 It remains to be seen whether the

305 306

Antonelli (2019), personal communication. Antonelli (2019), personal communication.

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Fig. 6.3 Mosul Old City, Al-Hadba Minaret: The remains of the minaret after its destruction. 2017. Source: Giovanni Fontana Antonelli

construction of the museum will indeed continue to be part of the project. The parallel construction of a memorial museum would allow for the proper acknowledgement of the atrocities committed in Mosul, memorialise the victims, and still allow for the complete reconstruction of cultural and religious sites destroyed during the conflict. Giblin proffers that memorial sites only present something of benefit to the community affected by a traumatic event if said memorial takes the form of something that would facilitate local development, such as a school or hospital.307 It

307

Giblin (2014), p. 512.

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Fig. 6.4 Mosul Old City, Church of the Clock (Al-Saa’a Church): The courtyard. 2018. Source: Giovanni Fontana Antonelli

could be said that a memorial museum, for education purposes, could come under this category of facilitating local development. Meanwhile, on 21 February 2019, the EU contributed US$22.8 million for the reconstruction of historic houses and schools in the Old City of Mosul and Basra.308 The allocated funds for this complementary project will be distributed across both cities, at opposite ends of the country, with a focus on engaging youth through training and job opportunities, aiming to foster reconciliation and social cohesion.309 One interviewee stated, “US$5 million out of the US$20 million of EU funds are designated to addressing the restoration of historic houses in the Old City of Basra”.310 It is clear however that with this project, UNESCO’s focus does not lie in southern Iraq, but in Mosul. In the context of Mosul, this EU funded project centres on rebuilding around 150 historic houses and the historic centre of the Old City (West Mosul).311 As there are insufficient funds to rebuild what is around 12,000 houses, UNESCO’s aim is to “rebuild a. . .heritage path that could possibly

308

UNESCO (n.d.-k). UNESCO (2019g). 310 Antonelli (2019), personal communication. 311 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 309

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Fig. 6.5 Mosul Old City, Al-Tahira Church: Rubble clearance for its restoration. 2019. Source: Giovanni Fontana Antonelli

unite... Al-Nouri Mosque area with the churches, which will then travel up to the Tigris River, completing a path from the Southwest to the Northeast of the city”.312 Despite the launching of the flagship Mosul initiative being announced by Azoulay at the International Conference on the Reconstruction of Iraq, held in Kuwait City from 12 to 14 February 2018,313 it was not until April 2018, that these key funds from the UAE were secured.314 UNESCO states that the “first year [would] focus on documenting and clearing the site as well as drawing up plans for its reconstruction”, while the following four years were set to focus on the restoration and historically faithful reconstruction of the site.315 The first year of the Mosul initiative (February 2018-February 2019) was led by Louise Haxthausen, former Director of the UNESCO Iraq office. The initial idea was to mobilise funds “for the physical renovation [and] reconstruction of major

312

Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. UNESCO (2018c). 314 UNESCO (2018d). 315 UNESCO (2018d). 313

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monuments, of all aspects of religious sites (including Christian, Muslim, Jewish, etc.), and to work on the rehabilitation of private houses in the Old City [as well as] urban planning”.316 During these early stages, UNESCO Iraq produced guidelines for the early reconstruction of Mosul and, with great assistance from Mosuli academics and civil society, carried out a thorough damage assessment of the Old City, through which buildings would be categorised according to their level of damage and destruction, to ascertain how to prioritise reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.317 Haxthausen recounts, the results of the damage assessment and building categorisation were discussed with the Iraqi authorities, civil society and Mosuli academia, who were consulted on what form reconstruction of the Old City should take.318 Regarding prioritisation of sites, Emad explains, the Nineveh Department of Antiquities “nominated the sites at the beginning”.319 He further states, “[w] e prioritised the most important buildings in Mosul, with Al-Nouri Mosque being of the top priority, followed by the two churches; we aimed to prioritise different kinds of buildings, such as churches, schools and private houses”.320 Interviewee A disclosed that Nineveh Department of Antiquities identified 25 monuments, including The Gate of the City of Mosul, some watchtowers from the Ottoman era, some old schools, churches, mosques, synagogues, etc., “all of which are relatively large and expensive to rehabilitate.”321 Interviewee A states, for the selection process involving these 25 identified sites “we have to make a decision based on cost, and on relevance, and then we will have some discussion back and forth until we arrive at a decision.”322 Although the full list of sites to be restored is yet to be disclosed including which additional sites, if any, from this selection of 25 put forth for reconstruction, on 12 January 2021, UNESCO Iraq named Al-Ekhlas school as one site that will be reconstructed in partnership with the EU.323 When it came to the selection of the two churches, there was “a consultation with the Christian Endowment. . .and the different components of the Christian Churches”.324 From this consultation, the decision was made to allocate Al-Saa’a Church and Al-Tahira Church for reconstruction, the former being of the Dominican Order and the latter of the Christian Endowment.325 For the historic houses, the Nineveh Department of Antiquities and the MoC were requested to identify “the most symbolic and the most important houses” they wished UNESCO to rebuild.326

316

Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 318 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 319 Emad (2020), personal communication. 320 Emad (2020), personal communication. 321 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 322 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 323 UNESCO Iraq (2021a). 324 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 325 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 326 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 317

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Following this the Sunni Endowment, which oversees many of the historic houses surrounding Al-Nouri Mosque, was requested to indicate select houses for reconstruction, and to permit the reconstructions to go ahead.327 This demonstrates the multiple official channels and authorities UNESCO must traverse in the development of each individual project, and its efforts to ensure all necessary actors, representative of different religious groups, are appropriately consulted in the selection process. Giblin proffers that UNESCO’s promulgation of ‘universal heritage values’, reflected in Western authorised heritage discourse, both contradicts the organisation’s promotion of cultural diversity and cultural pluralism, and speaks to the organisation’s preference to protect WHSs.328 The Mosul initiative’s focus on prioritisation of sites without World Heritage status, a decision which was reached via consultation and agreement with key local stakeholders, stands to challenge this view. However, it must also be acknowledged that the donor country is imparting its own values and influence onto the project,329 via the inclusion of the two churches, following the Pope’s visit to the UAE. As part of the development of the initial framework, funded by UNDP, UNESCO and UN-Habitat hosted the first public forum on the reconstruction of Mosul’s Old City.330 Held on 22 October 2018, this meeting was attended by 120 people, the backgrounds of which are unknown. In a press release on the topic, UNESCO provides various positive quotes from attendees regarding the organisation’s plans for reconstruction, while stating, “Overall, residents were receptive and encouraged.”331 UNESCO also stated that, “[t]he comments of the residents, where appropriate, will be incorporated into finalized versions of the proposal for the planning framework”, while it was promised the final document would be presented to the local community and the Iraqi authorities within a few weeks, opening it up to critique.332 Giovanni Boccardi states, the local people of Mosul expressed a desire for the expansion of Al-Nouri Mosque, to accommodate more people.333 Over two years following this forum, a worldwide competition for the architectural planning of Al-Nouri Complex in Mosul was launched. It is therefore clear such plans developed in late 2018 were not final. To increase outreach UNESCO held an international event in Château de Chambord, France on 26 June 2019 to rally experts and artists in solidarity with the communities of Mosul.334 The event, which assumed the form of a one-day conference, comprised ten contributors, including representatives from Mosul and Baghdad.335 The purpose of the event appears to have been to provide a

327

Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. Giblin (2014), p. 505. 329 Legnér (2018), p. 87. 330 UNESCO (2018f). 331 UNESCO (2018f). 332 UNESCO (2018f). 333 Boccardi (2019), personal communication. 334 UNESCO (2019h). 335 UNESCO (2019i). 328

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platform for Iraqi actors, representative of affected communities. Although this event will not have had practical benefit on the ground in Mosul, it was likely a positive experience for the diaspora and refugees. Isakhan and Meskell carried out a detailed study to produce empirical data “documenting how the myriad peoples of Syria and Iraq have reacted to and understood this destruction and subsequent reconstruction efforts”.336 They achieved this by carrying out 47 interviews with locals from various locations throughout Syria and Iraq, taking consideration to ensure an appropriate crosssection of religious affiliations.337 The study gleaned perspectives from the respondents on UNESCO’s Mosul initiative. Isakhan and Meskell state, “10 respondents, more than one-fifth of the total 47 interviews and over one-third of the 26 interviews after the February 2018 launch of the UNESCO-led [Mosul initiative], volunteered specific views about the project”.338 Specific focus from respondents was placed on the proposed reconstruction of Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret, the Nebi Yunis Mosque and the Assyrian Palace of Nineveh. Building on Isakhan and Meskell’s 2019 publication, the data gleaned from the semi-structured interviews conducted for the purpose of this research, of which there were 36, provide perspectives from the UNESCO Secretariat, UNESCO Baghdad Field Office, an Iraqi Government Official and various independent experts in the field of heritage protection, on the Mosul initiative. From Isakhan and Meskell’s (2019) collection of data, it is clear that Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret were highly significant to the people of Mosul and, more broadly, Iraq. One respondent stated the destruction of [Al-Nouri] Mosque and [Al-Hadba] Minaret . . . was an absolute disaster. I felt that we got the knock out [blow] to what remained of our civilisation. This was one of the religious edifices and the minaret tells the history associated with the city . . . [We watched on] TV how people were crying while watching the great mosque destroyed. (IN008).339

Another respondent, a Sunni Arab man, pointed out the symbolic significance of the site to Da’esh, and further stated that there “was a political agenda behind this destruction. . .Everything they did was deliberate and for a purpose’ (IN020)”.340 Nonetheless, regarding the Mosul initiative, more specifically the campaign to reconstruct the mosque and minaret, Isakhan and Meskell recorded “mixed reactions from the interviewees.”341 Several respondents expressed support with one Sunni Arab from Mosul, noting that the “main demand of the masses [in Mosul] is [for] the restoration and rehabilitation of the religious places, mosques and churches which were attacked”. This ‘will of the people’ view however, is also paired with the need for peace and security to be embedded in UNESCO’s strategy. As one respondent 336

Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 2. Isakhan and Meskell (2019), pp. 5–6. 338 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), pp. 6–7. 339 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 7. 340 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 7. 341 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 8. 337

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noted, “[i]t is useless to rebuild the mosque if there is no real peace and security”.342 Others were more critical of the move to focus attention on the reconstruction of the mosque and minaret with one affirming that heritage is simply not a priority, while there is a lack of sanitation, work, education, infrastructure and security. Others were mindful of the fact that the initiative is funded by the UAE, who allegedly indirectly funded Da’esh.343 Moreover, Rene Teijgeler expressed consternation at the involvement of the UAE in the Mosul initiative as they are currently one of the key warring parties in the Yemeni conflict.344 When it comes to Nebi Yunis, Isakhan and Meskell proffer testimonies from locals who used to visit the site, attesting to its significance to Mosul, and again, Iraq more broadly, as well as the sense of loss and trauma at its destruction.345 In terms of the reconstruction of the site, the local Muslim population wish for reconstruction of the mosque to take place as soon as possible. Moreover, the Imam of the Mosque, local politicians, engineers and the head of the Sunni waqf (religious endowment) have called for its reconstruction.346 Nonetheless, many locals and foreign archaeologists are calling for the thorough excavation and preservation of the now exposed archaeological ruins prior to reconstruction. Isakhan and Meskell state, “UNESCO is likely to see itself caught in a complex debate between those who want to see the mosque rebuilt and those who would study the ancient remains.”347 There are again mixed views among the respondents to Isakhan and Meskell’s study, with some very much in favour of the mosque’s reconstruction, while others believe reconstruction should not commence until the conflict has completely subsided. Others are more critical, with one Sunni Arab man from Damascus claiming UNESCO’s Mosul initiative “is just a marketing campaign”. He believes “UNESCO want to rebuild to use Mosul as a symbol to say ‘we defeated Da’esh and we are for peace’”. He concluded by saying, “[i]t’s just going to be a nice photo at the end and a political celebration. But it won’t bring real peace to Mosul (IN046)”.348 The inclusion of the local community is a clear contributor to the success of a reconstruction project.349 Isakhan and Meskell urge UNESCO to involve fully the local population at every stage of the Mosul initiative to ensure that there is a strong humanitarian element.350 A meeting of the Joint Steering Committee for the Mosul initiative on 2 May 2019 “discussed strategies to ensure consultation and engagement of the local community and the youth in the reconstruction process”.351 This

342

Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 8. Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 8. 344 Teijgeler (2020), personal communication. 345 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), pp. 9–10. 346 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 11. 347 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 11. 348 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 11. 349 Legnér (2018), p. 88. 350 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 12. 351 UNESCO (2019j). 343

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indicates that, at that stage, over one year following the launch of the Mosul initiative, UNESCO Iraq had yet to settle on a sound methodology to effectively engage with and involve the local population in the reconstruction of their city. Emad resolved that he and his colleagues at the Nineveh Department of Antiquities, and UNESCO, should better utilise “Facebook as a window to the community in Mosul, to be able to relay to them the important work that [they] are doing, and to keep them involved in our thought process behind the reconstruction of the Old City.”352 UNESCO Iraq has certainly employed this strategy to win over the public, by providing continual updates on UNESCO’s activities via social media, demonstrating its worth. For disseminating project updates to the public via social media, the project has a Public Information Officer, as well as a Photographer and Videographer in Mosul.353 It is interesting to note however, that, despite increased engagement on the UNESCO Iraq Facebook page with posts both in Arabic and English, UNESCO has maintained a standard policy of not engaging in the comment section, leaving many residents’ queries and remarks unanswered. For example, on 6 December 2020, UNESCO Iraq published a Facebook post announcing, “Today, Moslawis are back in the Al-Nouri Mosque! Moslawis are having a discussion about their heritage, the site is full of life!”354 The first comment decried that the image showed more media agencies than Moslawis, and questioned whether there were in fact any Moslawis in attendance, while the second comment complains that Professor of Archaeology at the University of Mosul, Dr Ahmed Qassan Al-Jumah, was denied entry, a move that the commenter suggests was ignorant.355 The lack of response from UNESCO to these comments in this public sphere, will likely give rise to greater distance between the organisation and the local community. Nonetheless, it may simply be that UNESCO Iraq maintains this social media policy because responding to individual comments would be time-consuming for personnel whose time could be better spent. Interviewee A claims they plan to ensure the involvement of local community members via the curation of an exhibition around the streets of Mosul, displaying photographs of select sites, and the organisation of visits to the sites, which would normally be closed to the public, for universities and schools.356 This plan was significantly delayed due to Covid-19,357 meaning that access to the sites remained completely restricted for locals for a long period of time. As of April 2020, the entirety of the Mosul initiative was responsible for hiring over 300 people, comprising architects, archaeologists, engineers, masons, stone carvers and carpenters, among other professions.358 Interviewee A states, around April 2020, a dozen new

352

Emad (2020), personal communication. Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 354 UNESCO Iraq (2020a). 355 UNESCO Iraq (2020a). 356 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 357 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 358 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 353

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Engineers, all of whom are Moslawi, hailing from nearby universities, joined the Mosul project. As of mid-April 2020, UNESCO had employed more than 280 people to work on the site of Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret, in the process of demining, salvaging and stabilising.359 As the aim is to work on four monumental landmarks, in addition to a museum and multiple historic houses, UNESCO envisions providing employment to thousands of people, which would also include short training schemes, classified as apprenticeships, so people will be able to get a monetary return.360 Moreover, those who receive training, and exhibit a good standard of technical expertise, may go onto be employed under the project.361 Dependent on the contingency of sustainable funding to this initiative from the UAE, the EU or an alternative sponsor, the Mosul initiative has the potential to stimulate economic recovery. UNESCO Iraq also views that it is engaging the local community on the project via the creation of a Technical Committee, which convenes regularly, around once every month.362 This Committee comprises 20 people made up of Moslawi and Iraqi people, including the Mayor, the Governor, representatives from the MoC, SBAH, the University of Mosul, the Sunni and Christian Endowments, as well as citizens, who are part of the reconstruction projects, such as historians, architects and engineers.363 The purpose of the Technical Committee is to discuss next steps of the project, based on a technical proposal from UNESCO; the Committee will either agree or disagree with UNESCO’s proposal, after which a decision is reached.364 The decisions are then put to the Steering Committee, which is “comprised of a number of stakeholders at the political level”.365 This includes people at a Ministerial level, top levels of Senior Management at UNESCO HQ, Head of UNESCO Baghdad Office (Brendan Cassar), the UAE Minister of Culture, the Iraqi Minister of Culture, the President of the Sunni Endowment and the President of the Christian Endowment.366 It is the purpose of the Steering Committee to approve decisions reached by consensus of the Technical Committee. After the approval of the Steering Committee, UNESCO Iraq may move to implement approved plans. The Steering Committee held its third session on 21 April 2020, marking the commencement of the second phase of Al-Nouri Complex project.367 Following this session, UNESCO Iraq was able to move ahead in finalising architectural documents for international bids, and then open the architectural competition for Al-Nouri Complex.368

359

Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 361 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 362 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 363 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 364 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 365 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 366 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 367 UNESCO Iraq (2020b). 368 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 360

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On October 2019, the Governor of Nineveh, Mansour Al-Mareed, formally announced the commencement of the reconstruction works of Al-Nouri Mosque in Mosul, under the supervision of UNESCO and Nineveh Governorate.369 These initial stages, commencing in October 2019, involved the stabilisation of the structure, through the installation of stabilising brackets, building of wooden pillars to act as a shoring system and securing tight bonds around the structure, as well as the clearing of the sites via demining of booby-traps, hazardous materials and unexploded ordnances (UXOs).370 This demining and subsequent stabilisation phase is reported to have concluded a few months later in January 2020.371 At a meeting on 11 September 2019 to review the progress of the Mosul initiative, the Iraqi Minister of Culture, Abdulameer Al-Dafar Hamdani, and the Governor of Nineveh Province, Mansour Al-Mareed, agreed a timetable whereby reconstruction could begin in the first half of 2020.372 Of course, this did not happen. It was confirmed mid-April 2020, that due to Covid-19, UNESCO staff were unable to get access to Mosul for at least two weeks while all work on all sites ceased, with only security guards permitted access.373 During the pandemic, while able to continue with the architectural bid for the Mosque, as well as some of the historic houses and first phase work on the two churches, UNESCO has been unable to launch the architectural competition for the Minaret. This is because the experts, chosen for their work on stabilising the Leaning Tower of Pisa, were—due to the pandemic—denied access to Mosul to carry out the necessary geotechnical explorations that would provide an assessment of the condition of the soil beneath the structure.374 Interviewee A asserts, “[d]espite having great people at our disposal here in Iraqi to work on this project, it is still necessary to have some supervision from international experts” when it comes to specific studies.375 With no further updates on Al-Nouri Mosque, Al-Hadba Minaret, Al-Saa’a Church, Al-Tahira Church or historic house projects throughout the course of 2020, it appears there remained a limited presence at the sites. A UNESCO press release on 23 January 2020 recorded that at a meeting with key Iraqi stakeholders, including the then Minister of Culture, Abdulameer Al-Hamdani, Paulo Fontani provided an update on “the work that UNESCO has been doing in Mosul including rubble removal and demining of . . .Al N[o]uri Mosque, stabilization measures and documentation and preservation of architectural remains”. Fontani also “emphasized that UNESCO is looking for a broader consensus among the local population and authorities regarding the future reconstruction

369

UNESCO (2019k). UNESCO (2019k). 371 UNESCO (2020j). 372 UNESCO (2019l). 373 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 374 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 375 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 370

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model of the Mosque and Minaret”.376 This suggests that at that point, there was not yet an agreed upon plan and no way of commencing implementation of reconstruction of the site. In a Facebook post by UNESCO Iraq on 3 March 2020, Fontani is reported to have again provided an update on UNESCO’s removal of rubble; demining and stabilisation of the site to the Iraqi Minister of Culture, and again emphasised UNESCO was still looking for a broader consensus on the reconstruction of the mosque and minaret.377 In the process of removing rubble from the site, archaeologists would separate and sift through it in an onsite warehouse, and catalogue that which was part of the historic structure.378 Moreover, Interviewee A explains, the archaeological team “salvaged almost all of the original columns of the mosque”, which are composed of marble specific to Mosul, in addition to many of the original bricks from the Minaret, as well as the façade.379 Unlike the marble columns of Al-Nouri Mosque, many of the bricks salvaged from Al-Hadba Minaret wreckage will not be useful because of their poor condition; where bricks cannot be used, new ones, with an appropriate colour, will be produced.380 On 22 April 2020, the UNESCO Iraq Facebook account proclaimed, “Reconstruction of . . .Al-Nouri Mosque Complex in Mosul moves ahead to architectural decisions after first phase is completed”.381 This is in contradiction to UNESCO’s earlier statement that this first phase was completed mid-January 2020, four months prior.382 This, along with the almost like-for-like updates in January and March of 2020, suggests a greater amount of reporting by UNESCO Iraq than concrete physical progress. On the other hand, it could simply be the case that these particular tasks are repetitive, yet UNESCO Iraq felt obliged to keep updating the public via social media. During an interview for the purposes of this research on 21 April 2020, Emad revealed that on that very same day a large mine was discovered in a house in the Old City—the area within UNESCO’s reconstruction remit. In such cases, Emad states, “we call upon the military to deactivate and remove it from the house”.383 With IEDs/UXOs still being located within the area designated for reconstruction, it is again dubious as to whether UNESCO could have declared the first phase of the project, which involved demining, salvaging and stabilisation, complete the following day on 22 April 2020. Emad spoke of having to cease work in the building where the IED was located for ten days.384 It is possible that the demining phase was believed to have been concluded, following which further IEDs were discovered. Nevertheless, with IEDs continually being discovered, an approach of extreme

376

UNESCO (2020k). UNESCO Iraq (2020c). 378 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 379 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 380 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 381 UNESCO Iraq (2020b). 382 UNESCO (2020j). 383 Emad (2020), personal communication. 384 Emad (2020), personal communication. 377

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caution must be adopted, which will inevitably lead to the slowing down of progress in the reconstruction of the sites in Mosul. At this stage, it is important to point out that UNESCO stated on two separate occasions (17 January 2020 and 22 April 2020), that the stabilisation of Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret was complete. Despite those statements, a further UNESCO Iraq Facebook post on 14 January 2021 states, “Now UNESCO is stabilizing the Al-Hadba Minaret! We have installed a monitoring system to detect the overall stability of the remains”.385 All of this only adds to the uncertainty around UNESCO’s clarity and transparency regarding the timescale of the reconstruction of Al-Nouri Complex. When asked if there was anything further he and his colleagues would want to see from UNESCO, Emad responded, [t]he most important thing we want is to reduce some of the bureaucracy. The planning of the [Mosul initiative] took one year, and it will take five years to finish the work. I think things moved very slowly in the beginning and so we lost a bit of time, but now things are starting to move more quickly.386

This view regarding the slow progress of work is supported by Kathem387 and Interviewee G, who states, we have seen some progress in UNESCO’s [Mosul initiative], but there tends to be many announcements and a lot less work. If you are actually there working with the engineers and sub-contractors. . .you can see that they are not happy. There is a lot of concern about the pace of UNESCO’s response and the lack of results with Al-Nouri Mosque in particular. . .What they have done with Al-Nouri Mosque [as of summer 2020] is prop it up and wrap the dome with rope to keep it from coming apart from collateral thrust. And they have not really done much work at other sites at all.388

Former Director of the initiative, Haxthausen acknowledges that the physical rehabilitation is advancing slowly, but is not surprised due to the difficulty of the situational context.389 Such time delays, particularly during the initial year of the project, will have been down to UNESCO’s need to ensure the security of the location. Those interviewed, who have spent time working on the project, discussed the lengthy, painstaking and highly dangerous process of removing IEDs from the location. Giovanni Fontana Antonelli states, as a UNESCO employee on the project, he was first able to enter Mosul in September 2017.390 He recalls, [i]t was extremely overwhelming, as it was a city that had been completely destroyed. It was not possible to go everywhere in the city. There were only a few roads cleared by the army, for safe passage. The city was contaminated with explosives and bodies.391

385

UNESCO Iraq (2021b). Emad (2020), personal communication. 387 Kathem (2019), personal communication. 388 Interviewee G (2020), personal communication. 389 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 390 Antonelli (2019), personal communication. 391 Antonelli (2019), personal communication. 386

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However, following painstaking efforts to secure the area, one person close to the project asserts that “consolidation measures went very well, and very quickly”, due to extremely good capacity found in Iraq such as masons, carpenters, archaeologists, engineers, with international expert supervision, which has inspired optimism for the speed at which future work may be carried out.392 The same interviewee stated in April 2020 that there is no pressure from the donor regarding the timescale of the project; since August/September 2019, we have demonstrated that we are able to deliver on time, what we promised we would deliver. We have brought in enormous capacity, and that capacity has been recognised by the Iraqi Government. . .so I think at the moment there is no more distrust and we are all working on the same project with the same goals. Of course, Covid-19 is not helping, but we cannot do anything about that.393

There is an assertion that the only factor, contributing to the slowing and significant delaying of the project, is Covid-19. The five-year agreed upon period for the reconstruction of Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret, between UNESCO the UAE, is said to have commenced at the end of 2018, yet it was not until February 2019 when UNESCO gained access to the Mosque compound.394 During communication on 21 April 2020 with Emad, he stated they would need more than four years to finish the reconstruction work outlined by UNESCO.395 He further stated, “Al-Nouri Mosque is the symbol of Mosul heritage, and so such a project should not be rushed”.396 With reconstruction of these sites still in relatively early stages as of November 2022, the project will inevitably go beyond its initial deadline. It therefore follows that there is only a very small chance of the reconstruction, or construction, of Al-Saa’a Church, Al-Tahira Church and a museum, with exhibitions focusing on the history of Mosul, being completed by the end of 2023. Given the Covid-19 Pandemic however, there will be no surprise from the donors or international community if the project endures a year or so beyond its agreed deadline.397 In actual fact, the person responsible for producing the UNESCO Mosul proposal for the UAE states, [w]hen I wrote the project document, I thought it would take 10 years, however I thought that if I wrote 10 years [on the proposal], they [the UAE] would not accept it, so in the end, I wrote seven years. They did not accept seven years. They suggested four years, which I refused. We then settled on a five year time frame.398

392

Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 394 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 395 Emad (2020), personal communication. 396 Emad (2020), personal communication. 397 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 398 Antonelli (2019), personal communication. 393

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This would mean that from the outset of the contract between UNESCO and the UAE, the timescale was underestimated by five years. When asked to estimate how long it would take to get Mosul back to its pre-conflict condition, Emad expressed that he does not think the city will return to its previous condition, due to the sheer scale of the destruction, particularly with respect to housing.399 He did however estimate that “it will take around 15 years to repair most of the Old City. . .only if we have the funds necessary”.400 With no guarantee of a continual flow of appropriate funds, a 15-year estimate is a best-case scenario. It is key to note that the Old City of Mosul cannot fully recover with stop-start funding, and small donations, which are reserved or bookmarked for only a select few buildings. On 21 April 2020, the architectural competition for the reconstruction of Al-Nouri Complex, including the mosque and prayer hall, was advertised via UNESCO Iraq’s Facebook page.401 The following day, a more formal announcement was made, alongside a promise that the competition would “take on board the input of the residents of Mosul who will be invited to take part in a large-scale consultation concerning the main reconstruction options for the Minaret and the Mosque”.402 The timetable for the event would depend on the then ongoing response to Covid-19 in Mosul. Later, on 11 June 2020, Fontani discussed the visit of Iraq’s Prime Minister to Mosul, stating, “[t]his visit comes at an important juncture of the project, as we have just completed the first phase and are about to launch an international competition for the architectural design and reconstruction of the mosque”.403 Over two years following the securing of funds from the UAE, UNESCO Iraq had not yet secured any plan for the reconstruction of Al-Nouri Complex. Moreover, it was not until 16 November 2020, that the global architectural competition was launched,404 for which applicants, invited via a worldwide outreach campaign,405 could register from 21 December 2020.406 All entries were due on 26 March 2021, following which the jury met on 4–11 April 2021, with the winner announced on 15 April 2021.407 Regarding the requirements, the proposed architectural design must retain the authenticity and integrity of the complex, create an integrated design, compatible with the surrounding traditional Mosuli architecture, create an oasis of peace and tranquility for worshippers, ensure an environmentally conscious design and integrate the newly designed aspects with the remains of the historical landmarks within the complex.408

399

Emad (2020), personal communication. Emad (2020), personal communication. 401 UNESCO Iraq (2020d). 402 UNESCO Iraq (2020b). 403 UNESCO Iraq (2020e). 404 UNESCO (2020l). 405 UNESCO (2020m). 406 UNESCO (2020m), p. 18. 407 UNESCO (2020m), p. 18. 408 UNESCO (2020n). 400

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The reconstruction of Al-Nouri Complex will require the complete rebuilding of indispensable components for it to assume its previous function. In this case, as per the Venice Charter,409 UNESCO should also ensure those aspects newly constructed are, in a way, distinct from the remains of the original structure. A UNESCO and University of Mosul-led survey of Moslawis of all ages and backgrounds found that 94% of people wanted Al-Hadba Minaret restored to its condition in 2017, prior to its destruction, while 83% also wanted it leaning as it was in 2017.410 It was also found that 70% wanted Al-Nouri Prayer Hall to be restored to as it was in 2017, albeit with some improvements, while 28% wanted it to be exactly as it was, without “improvements”.411 The results of the survey were published on 8 February 2021 and seemed likely to influence the judgement of the architectural competition submissions for the reconstruction of Al-Nouri Complex, thereby ensuring popular local opinion was included in the decision-making process. As planned, the winner of the architectural competition was announced on 15 April 2021.412 Of 123 entries, a team of eight Egyptian architects created the winning design. Under this design—in keeping with the results of the community survey results—the prayer hall would be restored to its condition prior to its destruction albeit with “notable improvements”.413 However, the overall design of the winning proposal was not well received by the local community, with reactions on social media highlighting that the design did not reflect Mosuli heritage.414 Once again, such complaints did not receive a response from UNESCO, who recorded that building was likely to commence autumn 2021.415 Following the announcement of the winners on 15 April 2021, UNESCO Iraq no longer mentions the design. A Facebook post on 7 November 2021 states, “Representatives from the Engineering Union in Baghdad (HQ) touring Al-Nouri Mosque in Mosul. UNESCO in partnership with the United Arab Emirates will rebuild this historical mosque.”416 The attached images showed the engineers at the mosque, which evidently had not experienced much reconstruction. It has become increasingly unclear as to when Al-Nouri Complex would be restored, ready to be frequented, once again, by the local community. On 4 January 2021, via Facebook, UNESCO Iraq reiterated its mission to rebuild Al-Tahira Church in Mosul. In a video dubbed with cheery music, UNESCO demonstrates the work carried out at the site, namely, the installation of lights and security cameras to the crumbling structure.417 It is not clear when exactly this installation took place, but it must be assumed that it was after the completion of the

409

Khalaf (2016), p. 264. UNESCO Iraq (2021c). 411 UNESCO Iraq (2021d). 412 UNESCO (2021b). 413 UNESCO (2021b). 414 UNESCO Iraq (2021e). 415 UNESCO (2021b). 416 UNESCO Iraq (2021e). 417 UNESCO Iraq (2021f). 410

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demining, removal and salvaging of rubble, and securing of the site for restoration, which was said to have been completed on 10 September 2020.418 To engage with the site prior to this by installing surveillance equipment, would have proved too great a risk. With the decision to include Al-Tahira Church in the Mosul reconstruction initiative having been taken on 10 October 2019, it therefore took almost 15 months to officially secure, and exercise the ability to monitor the site, albeit during the Covid-19 Pandemic. It should be noted that the video published by UNESCO Iraq shows an absence of stabilisation methods, such as stabilising brackets or wooden pillars for reinforcement.419 This could indicate that there is further work to complete before the commencement of phase two. When it comes to Al-Saa’a Church, the first announcement of any progress was made on 5 January 2021, around 15 months following its inclusion in the Mosul initiative, along with Al-Tahira Church. With this announcement, UNESCO stated that the first phase of rehabilitation was now happening.420 As has been established, this initial phase involves demining, removal and salvaging of rubble and the stabilisation of the site. Images of the site, shared by UNESCO, show a large amount of rubble still present, indicating the organisation is in the early stages of phase one.421 The only change noted as of January 2021, is the installation of lights on the structure.422 This possibly suggests that the site is, at least, secure from IEDs/UXOs. Mid-2020, the EU funded element of the Mosul initiative, concerning the renovation and reconstruction of historic houses and schools across Mosul and Basra, was in the midst of completing the survey of the city, as well as drawing up papers for the owners of said houses, to secure their permission to reconstruct.423 A key issue identified in this process is locating the homeowners, who likely relocated to another city to escape the conflict.424 Emad explains that we “cannot do anything to the private houses or buildings without the express permission of the owners.”425 This will undoubtedly cause substantial delays or changes to the EU-funded project within the Mosul initiative. With respect to the reconstruction of historic houses on the so-called heritage path from the southwest to northeast of the city, work will commence with those in the vicinity of Al-Nouri Mosque.426 Next steps would involve the EU and the Iraqi MoC financing the repairs for important buildings within the Old City, working down the priority list.427 The first indication of UNESCO moving on the reconstruction of historic houses in Mosul was on

418

UNESCO Iraq (2020f). UNESCO Iraq (2021f). 420 UNESCO Iraq (2021g). 421 UNESCO Iraq (2021g, 2021d). 422 UNESCO Iraq (2021d). 423 Emad (2020), personal communication. 424 Emad (2020), personal communication. 425 Emad (2020), personal communication. 426 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 427 Emad (2020), personal communication. 419

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11 January 2021, when the organisation announced via Facebook “43 residential heritage houses are being rehabilitated”.428 This is a substantial reduction from the initial proposal to reconstruct 150 heritage houses. Of course, there are multiple factors at place, such as budget constraints, timescale and the need to seek permission from homeowners prior to carrying out work. Consideration is now given to two small-scale projects part of the Mosul initiative, namely, ‘Inclusive Spaces for Reintegrating Returnees in Mosul’s Historical Urban Landscape’, commencing 31 January 2019, with a budget of US$36,000 donated by the Government of The Netherlands429 and ‘Protection of Religious Heritage as a Tool for Reconciliation’, commencing February 2018 and concluding December 2019, with a budget of US$250,000, donated by the Government of Flanders.430 The former set out “to establish a space for inclusive community dialogue in the city of Mosul, which would contribute towards restoration and reconstruction of the city’s cultural and urban heritage”.431 It is not clear how this was achieved, as there is no further information available on this particular project. The latter project also centres on promoting “inter-community reconciliation through the protection of cultural diversity in Iraq”.432 Via “cooperation with the [MoC and] close cooperation with the religious and civil society organisations representing minority groups, the project aims at providing protection to religious sites affected by [Da’esh] in Iraq’s liberated areas”.433 An aspect of this project involves a mapping and damage/needs assessment of the religious heritage in Iraq, with the aim of using the documentation as a “tool for comprehensive restoration”.434 It is important to acknowledge, “the peacetime preparation for the safeguarding of [cultural heritage] is not a linear endeavor, but a cyclical one”,435 something that is encouraged by Newson and Young, who advocate recovery planning during conflict to mitigate further destruction.436 This project is categorised under reconstruction/rehabilitation as it is part of the larger Mosul reconstruction initiative, taking place in the post-conflict phase and centring on reconciliation, although the project also bears some hallmarks of emergency response “first-aid”, albeit not completed in a manner consistent with an emergency. For example, this project’s documentation of destruction to religious structures, caused by Da’esh, commenced, at the earliest seven months after the liberation of Mosul, and supposedly concluded December 2019, two years and five months after the liberation.

428

UNESCO Iraq (2021h). UNESCO (n.d.-l). 430 UNESCO (n.d.-m). 431 UNESCO (n.d.-l). 432 UNESCO (n.d.-m). 433 UNESCO (n.d.-m). 434 UNESCO (n.d.-m). 435 McCafferty (2022), p. 178. 436 Newson and Young (2017), p. 9. 429

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A further smaller project with a focus on reconstruction, and which is part of the broader Mosul initiative, is titled ‘Restoration and rehabilitation of the Aghawat Mosque Complex in the Old City of Mosul’, with a total allocated budget of US $513,699, donated by the Government of Germany.437 The project commenced in February 2019 and was due to end in February 2020, and involved a damage assessment, and training of local experts in restoration and conservation techniques.438 However, an update published by UNESCO on 30 April 2020, reports the organisation as only then commencing the initial phase of activities, which involved working alongside the Iraqi Armed Forces to clear the rubble and UXOs from the complex, as well as securing the project site for reconstruction.439 At that point, UNESCO identified the next step would be to “take an inventory of the damage and the surviving historic architectural element of the mosque complex”, while local experts were provided the above-mentioned training.440 This suggests that no physical work took place on the restoration and rehabilitation of the Aghawat Mosque Complex from February 2019 to February 2020. Deep-seated tensions have arisen between the Iraqi MoC and the Nineveh Department of Antiquities over how UNESCO has navigated the situation resulting in levels of distrust among each of the stakeholders.441 It is now becoming apparent that similar feelings of frustration and distrust are permeating the space between UNESCO and the local Mosul residents.442 In comparison to the Yemeni CfW scheme, the UNESCO Iraq field office is applying the CURE Framework in a less successful manner in the Mosul initiative, with there being less evidence of direct benefit to the community through all four phases from damage assessment to implementation. There have been efforts on behalf of the UNESCO Iraq field office to include the local community, for example, in phase two (policy and strategy development), by holding forums with local representatives. However, discontent from Mosulis against the winning design of the architectural competition around Al-Nouri Complex is testament to the fact that there has not been parity in the representation of viewpoints on the form the reconstruction should take. Following the discovery of an ancient prayer hall beneathe Al-Nouri Mosque, via gaps in the foundations leading to four distinct rooms, the winning design recently had to be altered. The new design is said to accommodate the discovery which dates to the twelfth century, in order to amplify its importance to the overall site.443 In this reassessment of the design by the Egyptian architectural team, however, it does not appear that any prior concerns from the local community regarding the winning design have been addressed in the process.

437

UNESCO (n.d.-n). UNESCO (n.d.-n). 439 UNESCO (2020o). 440 UNESCO (2020o). 441 Kathem (2019), personal communication. 442 Kathem (2019), personal communication. 443 Solomon (2022). 438

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6.4.2

237

Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat)

Despite the site being liberated from occupation since mid-December 2016,444 no damage assessment has been carried out at Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) as of yet,445 and so the extent of the conflict impact, whether major or minor, on the site is unknown. In relation to Iraq’s cultural WHSs, there have been no logged requests for International Assistance under the 1972 Convention since 2010, meaning no such requests were made during and directly following the recent armed conflict of 2014–2017.446 There are currently no UNESCO restorative operations in Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat). However, in 2014, the WHCo urged “the State Party to develop, in consultation with the WHC and the Advisory Bodies, proposals for corrective measures”, which may lead to the property’s removal from the List of World Heritage in Danger.447 The Committee also urged “the State Party to submit a request for International Assistance to support the preparation of the conservation and management plans, to include the definition of an overarching conservation policy and to define a time schedule for conservation interventions”.448 Moreover, in 2015, the Committee expressed the need for the State Party to submit information on the SoC of the site, while also asserting the need for a rapid assessment mission to the site, security conditions permitting.449 Such concerns continue to be expressed by UNESCO.450 The lack of information provided by SBAH is likely due to the proximity of the site to Da’esh controlled territory during the conflict, and a persistent lack of funding for SBAH both during and post-conflict. No rapid assessment mission to Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) is reported to have been carried out by either UNESCO or SBAH.

6.4.3

Babylon

When it comes to Babylon, which was only awarded World Heritage status in 2019,451 UNESCO published a detailed damage assessment in 2009, in response to the 2003 conflict, during which time it had been used as a military base.452 Only as of September 2018, were all military remains, left by Iraqi, US and Polish forces, removed from the site.453 There has been no recorded further intentional damage to 444

UNESCO (2018g). SBAH (2020). 446 UNESCO (n.d.-o). 447 UNESCO (2014b). 448 UNESCO (2014b). 449 UNESCO (2015d). 450 UNESCO (2016d, 2017i, 2018g, 2019m). 451 UNESCO (n.d.-p). 452 UNESCO (2009). 453 Government of Iraq (2018), pp. 58–59. 445

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Babylon in recent years, thus there have been no further UNESCO activities at the site. Nonetheless, SBAH has voiced that “the recent political conditions in Iraq (change of political regime, civil war, war against [Da’esh], and difficult stabilization of a new government) have presented a challenge to the antiquity authorities in their work at Babylon”. Moreover, “natural factors, specifically the erosion caused by wind and rain” are affecting conservation of the site.454 As a result of both humanmade and natural factors, the SBAH has developed a restoration plan for five key sites within Babylon for general maintenance and conservation, with Ishtar Gate, Nabu-sha-Hare Temple, and the inner-city wall (north section) being awarded highest priority.455 The World Monuments Fund (WMF) is currently working in partnership with SBAH to aid in the implementation of such restoration works as outlined in the Babylon management plan.456 Funding for this WMF project stems from the US Department of State; Samuel H. Kress Foundation; Annenberg Foundation; and Estate of Paul Mellon.457 UNESCO is not currently involved in any reconstruction or conservation work at the site of Babylon, yet there is no particular need for greater support at this time.

6.4.4

Erbil Citadel

With there being no reported damage to Erbil Citadel as a result of the 2014–2017 conflict, and it not being on the In Danger List, only brief consideration is given to any recent restoration or reconstruction activities involving UNESCO carried out at the site. As previously mentioned, UNESCO has been involved in aiding the restoration of Erbil Citadel since prior to its inscription on the World Heritage List in 2014, with funding originally stemming from the Kurdistan Iraqi Government.458 This inscription constituted Iraq’s first WHS in the Kurdistan region.459 Following its inscription, the WHCo urged the State Party to carry out key activities at the site to ensure its preservation, such as: • Surveying, documenting and mapping surviving surface buried archaeological remains of all types; • Stabilising the slopes of the archaeological mound;

454

Government of Iraq (2018), p. 77. Government of Iraq (2018), p. 112. 456 World Monuments Fund (n.d.). 457 World Monuments Fund (n.d.). 458 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 459 UNESCO (n.d.-q). 455

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• Reconsidering the location of the Kurdistan National Museum or substantially revising the architectural design of the current project to harmonise with the Citadel and its relationship with its setting; • Elaborating a strategy to attract private investors and to build a solid public/ private partnership to implement the conservation and revitalisation programme; • Improving the existing legal framework by introducing mechanisms to support private investment; and • Strengthening involvement of former inhabitants and of Erbil’s civil society at large in the revitalisation of the Citadel.460 The High Commission for the Erbil Citadel Revitilisation (HCECR) coordinated any such subsequent activities in cooperation with UNESCO, as per an MoU signed by the HCECR and the UNESCO Office for Iraq in 2011.461 Following Iraq’s 2016 SoC report, it was deemed by UNESCO that, [t]he State Party has made progress in all areas to the extent feasible in relation to the current situation, strategizing and modulating its action on the grounds of the viable options and with a view to a future improved situation.462

Similar sentiments were conveyed in 2018.463 Scant information is available on UNESCO’s direct involvement in the revitilisation of Erbil Citadel, however on 10 December 2020, UNESCO declared, in collaboration with the HCECR, it had reopened Erbil Citadel for visitors, following its closure in March 2020 due to the Covid-19 Pandemic. This was carried out under the project, “Support to Livelihoods through Cultural Development”, funded by the EU.464 The overall, longstanding UNESCO initiative to restore the citadel will undoubtedly have been complicated by the recent conflict, but Interviewee A assures it is still ongoing, with UNESCO’s involvement likely to last a further two to three years, which will see the project through,465 indeed restoration of masonry works and architectural motifs, as well as the reconstruction of collapsed walls, using traditional materials, were carried out late 2022.

6.4.5

Hatra

Da’esh intentionally targeted the WHS of Hatra in 2015, and UNESCO vehemently condemned this act of destruction.466 Later in 2015, the site was placed on the List of

460

UNESCO (2014c). Al Yaqoobi (2015), p. 3. 462 UNESCO (2016e). 463 UNESCO (2018h). 464 UNESCO (2020p). 465 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 466 UNESCO (2015e). 461

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World Heritage in Danger.467 Once the site was declared liberated from Da’esh in April 2017, Bokova stated UNESCO would send an Emergency Assessment mission as soon as possible.468 Once again, in 2015, 2016 and 2017, the WHCo expressed concern at the lack of information provided by the State Party on the site, however this will have been due to restricted access, while it was still under the control of Da’esh.469 In 2018, the Committee acknowledged the damage assessment undertaken by Iraqi authorities, which was completed following the site’s liberation, and underlined “the need for a [more] detailed damage assessment followed by a comprehensive project for the conservation and protection of the site.” Only a limited damage assessment of the site of Hatra is currently available via the State Party’s 2019 SoC report,470 which possibly indicates that less damage occurred than was previously expected as a result of Da’esh’s actions at the site. Despite statements from UNESCO, there has been no emergency assessment mission carried out by the organisation, nor any subsequent restorative projects in cooperation with SBAH. As previously mentioned, Interviewee A has made it clear that with Da’esh still very much in control in this region, it would be too dangerous for UNESCO to operate in Hatra.471

6.4.6

Samarra Archaeological City

Samarra Archaeological City, which has been inscribed on the In Danger List since 2007, is another World Heritage property that has supposedly experienced destruction during the conflict; however, the extent is unknown due to a lack of damage assessment by SBAH.472 As a result, in 2015, Bokova announced that UNESCO had signed an agreement with the Iraqi authorities for the conservation and management of the site, which commenced with the restoration of the Great Mosque and Al Malwiyah Minaret. The first phase of this US$853,000 project, funded by the Governorate of Salah Al-Din, was set to last 18 months. This initial stage would: • Provide a SoC report of the site; • Strengthen local technical and managerial capacities; • Assist the Iraqi authorities in revising the design of ongoing work on visitor infrastructure and a museum at the site; • Draft a conservation plan for the Great Mosque and Al-Malwiyah Minaret; and

467

UNESCO (2015f). UNESCO (2017j). 469 UNESCO (2015g, 2016f, 2017k). 470 SBAH (2019), pp. 9–12. 471 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 472 SBAH (2020), p. 5. 468

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• Raise awareness of the local community on the importance of safeguarding historical and archaeological resources.473 This initial stage would not see the commencement of physical restoration work, with the established activities playing to UNESCO’s technocratic nature. It was later in its 2018 SoC report that the SBAH made clear that this project did not begin at all, despite commitments made by Bokova at the time.474 SBAH further states that the set of international initiatives and commitments made by UNESCO at the 24 February 2017 meeting of the International Coordination Conference on the Protection of the Iraqi Heritage in the liberated areas, have not translated into practical implementation on the ground.475 There was indeed no further mention of a reconstruction project in Samarra Archaeological City by UNESCO, and it appears that such a project is currently unlikely given most of UNESCO’s capacity in Iraq is occupied by the Mosul initiative. In 2019, SBAH stated that no conservation or restoration work had been carried out at Samarra, with any work being limited to damage assessments.476 With SBAH’s extremely limited capacity due to lack of funding by the Iraqi Government, it is clear that there is a reliance on UNESCO’s support for the provision of more human resources and expertise to allow such projects to progress, however UNESCO is not currently providing this necessary support to Iraqi WHS projects. In sum, UNESCO’s attention to Iraq currently lies with two cites (Mosul and Basra), which do not have World Heritage status, and one WHS, Erbil Citadel, which is not listed as In Danger, and therefore faces no imminent threat. Of course, there is evidently a real need to provide restorative action in the Old City of Mosul, to improve the lives of those living in the city. For this reason, UNESCO’s Mosul initiative is highly commendable. However, it must be acknowledged that the organisation has failed to follow through on previous promises to aid in the conservation, restoration or reconstruction of Iraqi WHSs. This failure of UNESCO to deliver on key agreements has been vocalised by SBAH and may well have negatively affected the level of trust between the two parties. Now in late 2022, three of Iraq’s five cultural WHSs remain on the In Danger List, at risk of losing their OUV, with no demonstrable conservation plan to restore the sites. Nonetheless, with access and security remaining the primary inhibitors in progressing conservation plans, SBAH are not able to attain satisfactory data on the condition of the sites of Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) and Hatra. As long as the relevant Iraqi authorities do not have sufficient control over such areas, to declare them secure, UNESCO will not

473

UNESCO (2015h). SBAH (2018), p. 9. 475 SBAH (2018), pp. 9–10. 476 SBAH (2019), p. 7. 474

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have any role in the preservation or restoration of Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat), Hatra or Samarra Archaeological City.477

6.5

Reconstruction Conclusions

Interviewee A states, there has been a trend, aided by Da’esh, in the funding of larger projects in the area of cultural heritage. They state that what they “saw in Afghanistan, as a result of this outrage [toward the intentional destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas], was for the first time a willingness to invest large amounts of money into a culture.”478 They further state that, [s]ince Afghanistan..., UNESCO has been able to start working on larger projects in the area of culture and heritage, reframing culture and heritage outside of the [1972] Convention itself, and the normative framework, and moving them back into economic and social development. So we have had quite a large amount of funding in Afghanistan for the first time to facilitate a large programme around culture, including the museum/cultural centre that we are building in Bamiyan.479

This reiterates this study’s viewpoint that, in the field of cultural heritage protection, UNESCO is deviating from its Constitution as well as its basic obligation of providing technical support under the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols (1954, 1999), and that by moving away from this normative framework, it is exhibiting greater tendencies toward single large reconstruction projects. When discussing the biggest gaps in heritage protection during armed conflict and heritage reconstruction in the post-conflict phase, Haxthausen acknowledged the major gap, i.e. lack of, or insufficient, funding and the “lack of alliances between actors involved in reconstruction and rehabilitation post-conflict”.480 She further suggests a “need to build broader alliances in this regard, with UNESCO maintaining a coordination role to ensure that the quality of that reconstruction and that restoration remain in line with international standards”.481 UNESCO is evidently making a concerted effort to move beyond the confines of technocracy by moving past being an organisation which provides training, or technical advice in the creation of a conservation or management plan. Through the reconstruction initiatives across Mosul, Basra, Sana’a, Zabid, Shibam and Aden, UNESCO is attempting to form a new identity as a key stakeholder in heritage recovery. The case of Yemen has demonstrated that UNESCO is willing to provide support during conflict, instead

477

This section has excluded The Ahwar of Southern Iraq: Refuge of Biodiversity and the Relict Landscape of the Mesopotamian Cities mixed WHS, also known as the Iraqi Marshlands, as it majorly pertains to the restoration of biodiversity, a subject beyond the remit of this research. 478 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 479 Interviewee A (2020), personal communication. 480 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 481 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication.

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of waiting for the post-conflict recovery phase to act. Currently, there is a complete lack of uniformity to UNESCO’s approach to cultural heritage safeguarding or reconstruction as is evidenced by its various approaches in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, which Antonelli has described as “ad hoc”.482 However, this “ad hoc” approach seems to be partially influenced by Member States’ political leanings and partially due to a lack of in-house, core funds, meaning the organisation is unable to make commitments to engage a consistent emergency response and reconstruction strategy across all countries experiencing conflict. Stone asserts, it is frequently the State Party who wants to put money into country X as opposed to country Y, as such countries will want to invest their money... where there is a better chance of success and a higher profile.483

By this logic, i.e. by contributing to one initiative rather than another, it is the donor, in this case, the UAE, who held the power in deciding Iraq, specifically Mosul, would benefit from the largest UNESCO programme. Although this is a significant determining factor, with the Mosul initiative being launched prior to the securing of UAE funds, it indicates that UNESCO also has a significant amount of power in determining which country will benefit from an investment; UNESCO can choose to campaign for funding for a specific project or country. When it comes to the significant discrepancy in the funding received by Yemen and Iraq for example, Interviewee C believes that the issue lies with the donor community; as many UNESCO Member States do not yet have a clear position on the conflict in Yemen, they will be unlikely to commit funds to any reconstruction initiatives.484 An interviewee with prior involvement in the Mosul initiative discusses the issues that such a large project brings. Speaking in November 2019, the interviewee stated, lately, the scale and importance of the [Mosul] project has begun to play a negative role in the sense that it is a concentration of attention, as well as interest. . . .This project has also raised the appetite of many people within or around UNESCO, such as consultants and staff who jumped on the project. They all wished to be the champion of that very visible and large project. . . .At some point, the political level within and around UNESCO overcame or superimposed their power, leverage and weight over technical matters.485

This view that everyone wants to be involved in the Mosul initiative, to the detriment of other worthy heritage properties destroyed in conflict, is seconded by Rush, who believes that when “you choose a flagship project like [the Mosul initiative], then all those other potential meaningful projects are just lost.”486 It cannot be assumed that all those who work on a major UNESCO project are careerists, who have no real

482

Antonelli (2019), personal communication. Stone (2020), personal communication. 484 Interviewee C (2019), personal communication. 485 Antonelli (2019), personal communication. 486 Rush (2020), personal communication. 483

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interest in technical matters or the real-life impact of their work. However, these words speak to the idea that UNESCO has used the Mosul initiative as a flagship project as a means to bolster the organisation’s reputation, reaffirming that it is indeed present in the region, and taking action. This focus of attention and finances could result in a dearth of human resource capacity for other countries who require similar support. Nevertheless, with UNESCO’s already limited resources, there appears to be no alternative. Cunliffe states, “I think that there is an element of flagship high-profile destruction providing an opportunity, rightly or wrongly, for flagship high-profile reconstruction.”487 Although the mission to ‘revive the spirit of Mosul’ is completely valid and of good intent, the continual promotion of it as the flagship heritage initiative will only incentivise personnel in and around UNESCO to focus their attention on Mosul, whether that be out of self-interest, or necessity, given the scale of the reconstruction portfolio the organisation has taken on. Cultural heritage destruction did not commence with Da’esh, but took hold in Iraq from 2003 onwards. Mehiyar Kathem questions why UNESCO did not launch any largescale intervention following the initial destruction of cultural heritage post-2003. He states, “They [UNESCO] only began to intervene with Da’esh”.488 Data presented in Chap. 4 illustrates that UNESCO has had extremely limited engagement or intervention in Iraq prior to Da’esh’s commencement of cultural heritage destruction. This supports Cunliffe’s assertion that UNESCO demonstrates greater responses to higher-profile forms of destruction, with such interventions being highly symbolic. Danti states that, by focusing on Mosul, “UNESCO set the tone, and everybody mimicked them.”489 Since the launch of the initiative, other key players in the heritage reconstruction field, such as the International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in Conflict Areas (ALIPH) and the US State Department, alongside the University of Pennsylvania, have embarked on significant, albeit smaller, projects in the city.490 Interviewee B states that Bokova’s strategy promoting the #Unite4Heritage campaign, elicited global attention for the protection of cultural heritage, whereas with Azoulay, there was “more focus on one flagship project, where a lot of the budget has been concentrated.”491 With this, the spotlight has moved away from countries such as Yemen and Afghanistan, centring instead solely on the city of Mosul.492 Interviewee B further recounts that Azoulay attended an expert meeting on the war in Yemen, but there was no follow-up, suggesting the priority had shifted.493 This is in reference to the two-day expert meeting held at UNESCO

487

Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. Kathem (2019), personal communication. 489 Danti (2020), personal communication. 490 ALIPH (n.d.) and Mott (2019). 491 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 492 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 493 Interviewee B (2019), personal communication. 488

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HQ, which resulted in the announcement of an Emergency Action Plan for the Safeguarding of Yemen’s Cultural Heritage. It is established, via consideration of Yemen’s SoC reports to the WHCo that such a plan was not implemented, due to lack of support to the State Party, and so no UNESCO follow-up was evidenced. Although each UNESCO DG has their own style of management and elected focus, it would appear that under the Azoulay administration, there is a disconnect between the UNESCO field offices and Paris HQ in terms of desired objectives. Antonelli states, [Azoulay] has not set any focus on work in Southeast Asia or Africa or Latin America or the Caribbean. Instead, she put all UNESCO’s focus on the Mosul project, to the extent that they have totally frozen the activities in Syria. The UNDP is taking over in Syria now, where it has completed an operation to renovate the Aleppo Museum, with funding from the Government of Japan.494

Although established that UNESCO ceased engagement with Syria for chiefly political reasons, it must also be considered that the organisation’s priorities have completely shifted towards Mosul, even to the detriment of other Iraqi towns and cities. The UNDP took on the mantel of rehabilitating cultural heritage in conflict zones, despite culture or heritage not being mentioned once in the “About us” section of the agency’s website. Throughout 2018 and 2019, UNDP worked with DGAM to remove 400 cubic-metres of debris, restore electricity networks and sanitary installations, restore the entrance to the museum, the Mari and Prehistoric exhibition halls and display cabinets on the ground floor, as well as carry out work to the Museum roof. This led to the reopening of the Aleppo museum on 24 October 2019.495 UNDP’s cooperation with UNESCO’s Syrian national counterpart, DGAM, on the restoration of a museum, demonstrates that UNESCO’s unwillingness to work in the country has left a void in funded projects and expertise; a gap which can apparently be filled by a UN agency with no mandate in culture. Nevertheless, among others, UNDP is one of four UN entities designated to provide humanitarian aid,496 and is therefore able to gain access to Syria far more easily than UNESCO. The work UNDP were carrying out on the Aleppo Museum does not constitute humanitarian work, however, as UNDP was likely already stationed within the country, carrying out its core programme, the organisation would be able to implement an additional operation without much difficulty. Cunliffe suggests the “reason Mosul is such a high priority is because [UNESCO] can access it, whereas large parts of Syria remain inaccessible.”497 This also appears to account for the extreme disparity in financial allocation between Iraq and Yemen; as Iraq has entered the post-conflict phase, greater capacities can be realised on the ground, while Yemen is still in the midst of an armed conflict. Yet, despite Yemen being amid conflict, UNESCO still resolved to implement a reconstruction 494

Antonelli (2019), personal communication. UNDP (2019). 496 United Nations (n.d.). 497 Cunliffe (2020), personal communication. 495

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programme in the country via employment of an intermediary organisation, while no such resolve has been made for Syria. Rush believes that UNESCO belongs “in the ‘shaping the environment’ phase, ‘pre-conflict’ phase and the ‘post-conflict’/ ‘stabilisation’ phase” but not “during the ‘kinetic’ phase, when bullets are actually flying.”498 UNESCO’s ongoing engagement with Yemen shows the organisation evidently views itself as having a role in the kinetic phase of armed conflict. Moreover, with the Assad regime more likely to win the war in Syria, only time will tell whether UNESCO will engage with the Syrian Government in the context of a stabilisation phase. There are parallels that can be drawn between the Great Umayyad Mosque in Aleppo, Syria, which was partially destroyed by different groups, and Al-Nouri Mosque in Mosul, Iraq, destroyed by Da’esh. As has been evidenced, UNESCO’s choice to reconstruct Al-Nouri Complex is viewed as a symbolic response to the violent acts, which led to its destruction. Despite the Great Mosque in Aleppo being greatly damaged in almost identical circumstances, UNESCO could not extend the same symbolic reconstruction to this site, as it would not be permitted by the regime.499 Haxthausen states that the lack of unity among the international community regarding interventions in Syria constitutes an impediment for UNESCO to act.500 Haxthausen further states “[w]e are bound by the [UNSCR] related to Syria in terms of very limited contact with the authorities, and if you want to launch a larger rehabilitation construction project, you need to have a strong relationship with said authorities.”501 Given the current political situation, UNESCO is truly limited in what it can facilitate in terms of reconstruction activities in Syria. It remains however, that any reconstruction ongoing in Yemen and Syria is taking place in an active conflict zone, against which the WHCo have frequently advised. Although such focus on a country like Yemen is undoubtedly welcome, UNESCO would perhaps do better to follow its own advice and focus on documentation, building capacity through financing national heritage institutions such as GOAM and GOPHCY, and developing a comprehensive recovery strategy alongside the relevant authorities. Despite the significance of the reconstruction programme being rolled out in Yemen across three citywide WHSs, and the historic centre of Aden, in comparison to the UNESCO initiative taking place in Iraq, there is extremely limited information available. While the Mosul initiative is publicised widely, with a large social media presence and extensive coverage on the UNESCO website, the Yemeni CfW initiative, although progressing at a similar, or possibly better, speed, receives minimal coverage. This may largely be down to differences in budget, with Iraq able to finance personnel to manage its online presence, but it may also be down to the organisation’s over-promotion of a single flagship project, to the detriment of all 498

Rush (2020), personal communication. Cunliffe (2021), personal communication. 500 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 501 Haxthausen (2020), personal communication. 499

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other initiatives. However, this discrepancy in the promotion of the Yemeni initiative and the Iraqi initiative could also be down to the fact that UNESCO may not wish to draw unnecessary attention to specific reconstruction projects. UNESCO’s approach to the Mosul initiative has a strong symbolic element centred on reclaiming heritage and identity from violent extremists. If such a strong narrative was also promoted on Yemen’s behalf, such heritage could easily become a target once again amidst the persistent conflict.

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UNESCO (2016c) Technical Assistance Workshop for the World Heritage Sites of the Crac Des Chevaliers, Palmyra and the Ancient City of Damascus, Beirut 13, 14, 15 December 2016: Ancient City of Damascus, Building of the Ottoman Bank. UNESCO, Beirut. Available: https:// whc.unesco.org/en/events/1386/ UNESCO (2016d) State of Conservation: Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) (Iraq). Available: https://whc. unesco.org/en/soc/3339 UNESCO (2016e) State of Conservation: Erbil Citadel (Iraq). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/ soc/3398 UNESCO (2016f) State of Conservation: Hatra (Iraq). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/ soc/3341 UNESCO (2017a) World Heritage Committee Decisions on State Party’s Report on the State of Conservation of the Historic Town of Zabid - Inscribed on the World Heritage List in Danger. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/4028/ UNESCO (2017b) UNESCO reports on extensive damage in first emergency assessment mission to Aleppo. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-reports-extensive-damage-first-emer gency-assessment-mission-aleppo UNESCO (2017c) UNESCO hosts First International Coordination Meeting for the recovery of Aleppo’s heritage. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1639 UNESCO (2017d) Conservation completed on Lion of Al-lāt statue from ancient city of Palmyra, damaged by ISIL. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1727 UNESCO (2017e) Table of Actions for the Recovery of the Ancient City of Aleppo Following the Technical and Coordination Meeting for the Ancient City of Aleppo, UNESCO Office in Beirut, 2-3 March 2017. UNESCO, Beirut UNESCO (2017f) State of Conservation: Ancient City of Aleppo (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3542 UNESCO (2017g) Technical Assistance Workshop for the World Heritage Sites of the Crac des Chevaliers, Palmyra and the Ancient City of Damascus, Beirut 13, 14, 15 December 2016: Site of Palmyra. UNESCO, Beirut. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/events/1386/ UNESCO (2017h) Technical Assistance Workshop for the World Heritage Sites of the Crac des Chevaliers, Palmyra and the Ancient City of Damascus, Beirut 13, 14, 15 December 2016: Crac Des Chevaliers. UNESCO, Beirut. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/events/1386/ UNESCO (2017i) State of Conservation: Ancient Villages of Northern Syria (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3545 UNESCO (2017j) State of Conservation: Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) (Iraq). Available: https://whc. unesco.org/en/soc/3531 UNESCO (2017k) UNESCO Director-General welcomes the liberation of Hatra and will send Emergency Assessment mission “as soon as possible”. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/ unesco-director-general-welcomes-liberation-hatra-and-will-send-emergency-assessmentmission UNESCO (2018a) State of Conservation: Ancient City of Bosra (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3796 UNESCO (2018b) State of Conservation: Ancient Villages of Northern Syria (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3798 UNESCO (2018c) UNESCO launches flagship initiative to revive the spirit of Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-launches-flagship-initiative-revive-spirit-mosul UNESCO (2018d) UAE, UNESCO and Iraq Conclude Historic $50m Partnership to Reconstruct Mosul’s Iconic al-Nouri Mosque and al-Hadba Minaret. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/ uae-unesco-and-iraq-conclude-historic-50m-partnership-reconstruct-mosuls-iconic-al-nourimosque UNESCO (2018e) Reconstruction and recovery in Iraq: Reviving the Spirit of Mosul. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1847

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UNESCO (2018f) UNESCO and UN-Habitat host first public forum on reconstruction of Mosul’s Old City. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-and-habitat-host-first-public-forumreconstruction-mosuls-old-city UNESCO (2018g) State of Conservation: Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) (Iraq). Available: https://whc. unesco.org/en/soc/3783 UNESCO (2018h) State of Conservation: Erbil Citadel (Iraq). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/ soc/3712 UNESCO (2019a) Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines/ UNESCO (2019b) State of Conservation: Site of Palmyra (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3871 UNESCO (2019c) Technical Meeting on the Recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra, 18 December 2019. UNESCO, Paris UNESCO (2019d) State of Conservation: Ancient City of Bosra (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3867 UNESCO (2019e) State of Conservation: Ancient Villages of Northern Syria (Syrian Arab Republic). Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3869 UNESCO (2019f) Director-General and UAE Minister of Culture sign landmark agreement for Mosul’s Christian heritage and cultural diversity. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/ director-general-and-uae-minister-culture-sign-landmark-agreement-mosuls-christianheritage-and UNESCO (2019g) The European Union contributes €20 million to UNESCO’s flagship initiative “Revive the Spirit of Mosul”. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/european-union-contrib utes-eu20-million-unescos-flagship-initiative-revive-spirit-mosul UNESCO (2019h) UNESCO rallies experts and artists at the Château de Chambord in solidarity with Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-rallies-experts-and-artists-chateauchambord-solidarity-mosul UNESCO (2019i) Mosul in Chambord, 26 June 2019, Chambord, France. UNESCO, Paris. Available: https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/mosul_in_chambord_programme_en_1 9jun19.pdf UNESCO (2019j) Youth and local communities at the heart of the rebuilding of Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/youth-and-local-communities-heart-rebuilding-mosul-0 UNESCO (2019k) Revive the spirit of Mosul: UNESCO in action. Available: https://en.unesco.org/ news/revive-spirit-mosul-unesco-action UNESCO (2019l) Commitment to the reconstruction of Mosul reaffirmed. Available: https://en. unesco.org/news/commitment-reconstruction-mosul-reaffirmed UNESCO (2019m) State of Conservation: Ashur (Qal’at Sherqat) (Iraq). Available: https://whc. unesco.org/en/soc/3854/ UNESCO (2020a) Situation Update: UNESCO’s Response to Torrential Rain Damage in Yemen’s Historical Centres. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/situation-update-unescos-responsetorrential-rain-damage-yemens-historical-centres UNESCO (2020b) Heritage Emergency Fund: annual progress report, 2019. UNESCO, Paris. Available: https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/hef_annual_report_2019_en.pdf UNESCO (2020c) Emergency Interventions on Track to Save Cultural Heritage in Two World Heritage Sites in Yemen. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/emergency-interventions-tracksave-cultural-heritage-two-world-heritage-sites-yemen UNESCO (2020d) UNESCO Mobilizes Funds and Expertise to Safeguard Yemen’s Cultural Heritage. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/2150/ UNESCO (2020e) UNESCO Mobilizes Funds and Expertise to Safeguard Yemen’s Cultural Heritage. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-mobilizes-funds-and-expertise-safe guard-yemens-cultural-heritage UNESCO (2020f) Youth of Sanaa Laying the Stones of Hope. Available: https://en.unesco.org/ news/youth-sanaa-laying-stones-hope

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UNESCO (2020g) Bringing back our Homes: Testimony from The Old City of Sana’a. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/bringing-back-our-homes-testimony-old-city-sanaa UNESCO (2020h) Recommendations of the Technical Meeting on the Recovery of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/2133 UNESCO (2020i) International Assistance: Documentation & Emergency Structural Intervention in Qa’lat Salah El-Din. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/intassistance/3150 UNESCO (2020j) Reaching a milestone to Revive the Spirit of Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco. org/news/reaching-milestone-revive-spirit-mosul UNESCO (2020k) Director of UNESCO Iraq, met with the Minister of Culture, Deputy Minister of Higher Education, representatives from the EU, Department of Antiquities of Mosul and Basra and the Sunni Waqf. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/director-unesco-iraq-met-ministerculture-deputy-minister-higher-education-representatives-eu UNESCO (2020l) The architectural competition for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Al Nouri Complex in Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/architectural-competitionreconstruction-and-rehabilitation-al-nouri-complex-mosul UNESCO (2020m) Reconstruction & Rehabilitation of the Al Nouri Complex in Mosul: Architectural Brief. Available: https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/architectural_bief_mosul_ competition_1.pdf UNESCO (2020n) Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of the Al Nouri Complex in Mosul: Competition Fact Sheet. Available: https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/mosul-competitionfactsheet.pdf?utm_medium=website&utm_source=archdaily.com UNESCO (2020o) UNESCO, with the generous support of Germany, initiates the first phase of activities at the Al-Aghawat Mosque in the old city of Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco.org/ news/unesco-generous-support-germany-initiates-first-phase-activities-al-aghawat-mosqueold-city UNESCO (2020p) UNESCO in collaboration with the High Commission for the Erbil Citadel Revitalization (HCECR) reopened the site for public visitors. Available: https://en.unesco.org/ news/unesco-collaboration-high-commission-erbil-citadel-revitalization-hcecr-reopened-sitepublic UNESCO (2021a) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. World Heritage Committee, Extended forty-fourth session, Fuzhou, China / Online meeting, 16-31 July 2021. UNESCO, Paris. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/archive/2021/ whc21-44com-7A-en.pdf UNESCO (2021b) UNESCO announces winning architectural design of competition to rebuild Al-Nouri Mosque complex in Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-announceswinning-architectural-design-competition-rebuild-al-nouri-mosque-complex-mosul UNESCO (n.d.-a) World Heritage List: Old Bridge Area of the Old City of Mostar. Available: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/946 UNESCO (n.d.-b) Cash for Work: Promoting Livelihood Opportunities for Urban Youth in Yemen. Available: https://en.unesco.org/doha/cashforworkyemen UNESCO (n.d.-c) Old City of Sana’a. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/385 UNESCO (n.d.-d) Cash for Work: Promoting Livelihood Opportunities for Urban Youth in Yemen. Available: https://en.unesco.org/doha/cashforworkyemen UNESCO (n.d.-e) Satellite-Based Damage Assessment of Cultural Heritage Sites 2015 Summary Report of Iraq, Nepal, Syria & Yemen. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/890/ UNESCO (n.d.-f) International Assistance. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/intassistance/? action=request&search_pattern=Syria UNESCO (n.d.-g) UNESCO Official Website. Available: https://en.unesco.org/ UNESCO (n.d.-h) About the UNESCO Office in Iraq. Available: https://www.unesco.org/en/ fieldoffice/baghdad/about UNESCO (n.d.-i) Revive the Spirit of Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/baghdad/ revivemosul

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UNESCO (n.d.-j) Initial Framework for Reconstruction of Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco.org/ fieldoffice/baghdad/initialframeworkmosul UNESCO (n.d.-k) Revive the Spirit of Mosul: Heritage. Available: https://en.unesco.org/ fieldoffice/baghdad/revivemosul/heritage UNESCO (n.d.-l) Inclusive Spaces for Reintegrating Returnees in Mosul’s Historical Urban Landscape. Available: https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/baghdad/mosulinclusivesspaces UNESCO (n.d.-m) Protection of Religious Heritage as a Tool for Reconciliation. Available: https:// en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/baghdad/mosulreligiousheritage UNESCO (n.d.-n) Restoration and rehabilitation of the Aghawat Mosque Complex in the Old City of Mosul. Available: https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/baghdad/mosulaghawatmosque UNESCO (n.d.-o) Iraq: International assistance. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ iq/assistance/ UNESCO (n.d.-p) World Heritage List: Babylon. Available: https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/278 UNESCO (n.d.-q) Safeguarding the Erbil Citadel to protect the soul of Iraq. Available: https://en. unesco.org/news/safeguarding-erbil-citadel-protect-soul-iraq-0 UNESCO & World Bank (2018) Culture in City Reconstruction and Recovery. Available: https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30733/9789231002885.pdf? sequence=11&isAllowed=y UNESCO Iraq (2020a) UNESCO Iraq. 6 December. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/4019215404758011 UNESCO Iraq (2020b) UNESCO Iraq. 22 April. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/3335811243098434 UNESCO Iraq (2020c) UNESCO Iraq. 3 March. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/3196262920386601 UNESCO Iraq (2020d) UNESCO Iraq. 21 April. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/3332807470065478 UNESCO Iraq (2020e) UNESCO Iraq. 11 June. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/3470679946278229 UNESCO Iraq (2020f) UNESCO Iraq. 10 September. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/3754333414579546 UNESCO Iraq (2021a) UNESCO Iraq. 7 March. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/videos/144211154236062/ UNESCO Iraq (2021b) UNESCO Iraq. 14 January. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/4122829521063265 UNESCO Iraq (2021c) UNESCO Iraq. 8 Febaruary. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/videos/150830190096181/ UNESCO Iraq (2021d) UNESCO Iraq. 11 January. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/4114100258602858 UNESCO Iraq (2021e) UNESCO Iraq. 15 April. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/4389168567762691 UNESCO Iraq (2021f) UNESCO Iraq. 4 January. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/videos/468104124590602/ UNESCO Iraq (2021g) UNESCO Iraq. 5 January. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/4098155013530716 UNESCO Iraq (2021h) UNESCO Iraq. 11 January. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/ UNESCOIraq/posts/4114464608566423 United Nations (n.d.) Deliver Humanitarian Aid. Available: https://www.un.org/en/our-work/ deliver-humanitarian-aid United Nations Development Programme (2019) Reopening of the National Museum in Aleppo: Saving Syria’s Cultural Heritage. Available: https://www.sy.undp.org/content/syria/en/home/ presscenter/pressreleases/2019/Reopening_of_the_National_Museum_in_Aleppo.html United Nations General Assembly (2016) Report of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on indicators and terminology relating to disaster risk reduction. Available:

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Chapter 7

Conclusions

Isakhan and Meskell take stock of the key reasons for UNESCO struggling to engage effectively in heritage protection in relation to armed conflict.1 They bring forth discourse from Van der Auwera (2013, 2014), Meskell (2018) and Cunliffe et al. (2016). The first reason brought forth is that UNESCO’s cumbersome bureaucratic procedures preclude it from calling out Member State perpetrators of cultural heritage destruction.2 This book has shown UNESCO’s bureaucratic procedures encompass the repetitive organisation and hosting of expert meetings and the production of duplicate recommendations, followed by a lack of implementation, as well as the organisation’s limitations on how it can communicate with Member States regarding the protection or destruction of cultural heritage in their respective territories. The second reason proffered is the agency’s reticence to name and shame powerful Member States responsible for the destruction of cultural heritage.3 This is evidenced by the absence of UNESCO’s condemnation of Member States, such as Saudi Arabia, for its role in the destruction of cultural heritage sites during conflict. The third reason is “the failure of conflict-prone developing countries to ratify or uphold the relevant UNESCO conventions on the protection of cultural property during conflict”.4 Of course, in today’s context, no country is immune to armed conflict, and so this statement should be rectified to—the failure of many countries to ratify, specifically the Second Protocol of the 1954 Hague Convention, and the failure of the majority to uphold their obligations thus. Concerning the 1954 Hague Convention, this book has addressed Yemen, Syria and Iraq’s lack of ratification of the Second Protocol, and more importantly, the absence of assigned funds to their respective SHIs, which has ultimately left them powerless to fulfil their obligations

1

Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 3. Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 3. 3 Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 3. 4 Van der Auwera (2014); Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 3. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. D. McCafferty, UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, Studies in Art, Heritage, Law and the Market 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19675-1_7

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as competent authorities under the Convention, both during peacetime and during conflict. The final reason proffered is “the difficulties faced by UNESCO, and international law more broadly, in holding [NSAs] to account”.5 Although this book has not engaged with the issue of criminal accountability and penal sanctions under the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols, it has reaffirmed which barriers UNESCO faces in facilitating financial and technical assistance to areas under the control of NSAs due to the political will of its Member States. Through consideration of UNESCO’s recent engagement with Yemen, Syria and Iraq in terms of cultural heritage protection and reconstruction, this research chiefly considers the organisation’s legal obligations to facilitate such work, as well as the various factors that can influence UNESCO’s level of engagement with a given country, particularly in relation to armed conflict. At the centre of identified issues stands Meskell’s (2019) theory concerning UNESCO’s adoption of a “centripetal approach”—whereby Member States work to accommodate its single vision—and Hale and Held’s gridlock theory, which Meskell later applied to UNESCO’s inability to act in Yemen. UNESCO’s centripetal approach has placed an obligation on Member States to implement heritage management, conservation and safeguarding measures according to the UNESCO, specifically World Heritage, devised system; a system that is disproportionately centred on the preservation, management and presentation of monumental sites. This lack of flexibility is further evidenced in UNESCO’s relationship with its Member States. Given UNESCO is legally bound to work with Member States, it is hugely influenced by the political motives of nation states, with some having greater influence than others. While Meskell has demonstrated the power Member States can have over UNESCO to promote their own national interests, this book has further demonstrated the power of Member States in negatively affecting the national interests of other nation states, ultimately causing gridlock to become a prominent issue for UNESCO when dealing with countries in conflict situations. The international community’s denouncement of the Assad Regime, particularly the subsequent introduction of financial sanctions against Syria, led to complete gridlock as far as UNESCO’s engagement with the country was concerned. The high level of interdependence within UNESCO has inevitably led to Member States being the primary inhibitor for the organisation. Regarding UNESCO’s legal obligations with regard to facilitating cultural heritage protection in its Member States’ territories in the condition of armed conflict, the key documents which informed the analysis were the UNESCO Constitution, Julian Huxley’s 1946 policy document and the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols (1954 and 1999). While the UNESCO Constitution and first DG, Julian Huxley’s 1946 policy document do not elicit any definite intentions for UNESCO to be directly involved in heritage protection specifically during armed conflict, there is nonetheless a definite emphasis on the importance of conservation of heritage in both documents. UNESCO is mentioned 37 times in 1954 Hague Convention, starting at Article 19, and again on 15 occasions in the Second Protocol, thereby determining

5

Cunliffe et al. (2016); Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 3.

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that UNESCO is most certainly part of the discourse of heritage protection during armed conflict. The UNESCO DG is the depositary of the Convention, meaning that if States want to become party to the Convention, and accept their obligations thus, UNESCO is the official organisation with which to consult. Consideration of UNESCO’s obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols shows the organisation to be primarily a standard-setting agency, which provides technical solutions to States Parties. UNESCO can play a central role in providing the support that allows all States Parties, who are interested, to achieve effective national implementation, but it is ultimately the responsibility of the individual States Parties to ensure appropriate protection is in place during peacetime. However, as was often the case, UNESCO encountered gridlock, chiefly imposed by other Member States’ political standpoints; this paralysis, however, must also be viewed alongside the need for sovereignty under IHL. O’Keefe brings forth the point that UNESCO will not inform a Member State on how it should implement the 1954 Hague Convention, citing “interpretation of the instrument was a matter for the Parties”.6 With military necessity being a clause within the 1954 Hague Convention, it is therefore unlikely UNESCO would encroach upon a State’s sovereignty in deciding when this clause should be applied to gain a military advantage at the expense of damaging cultural property. Moreover, as per Article 1(3) of the UNESCO Constitution (1945), in the interest of preserving this sovereignty, “the Organization is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.”7 It is UNESCO’s inability to practically engage with countries experiencing armed conflict that led many interviewees in the course of this research to express serious concerns as to how well-placed and equipped UNESCO is to engage in the area of cultural heritage protection during armed conflict. Given UNESCO’s woeful financial situation, and the political power of its Member States over the organisation’s operations, this research agrees with, and has further supported, Meskell’s statement that, “[e]thical critique is best directed toward the major power brokers, their circuits of influence, and the geopolitical intrigues that have ultimately produced winners and losers in the business of heritage.”8 UNESCO remains controlled by the nationalist government policies of its Member States, preventing it from being able to act objectively on academic research and ethical obligations. While this dominance by nationalist government policy over academic research and ethics persists, UNESCO is unlikely to emerge from its solace in impasse management or technocracy, rendering it incapable of having a significant impact on heritage crises.9 Lastly, with the complete severing of communication between UNESCO and Syria, and consequently DGAM, from 2017, it should be questioned whether the organisation has been, and is currently, able to

6

O’Keefe (2007), p. 174. Art. 1 (3) 1945 UNESCO Constitution. 8 Meskell (2018), p. 226. 9 Meskell (2018), p. 114. 7

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meet its basic obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention in terms of providing assistance, advice and solutions when requested by this State Party. Given DGAM, at a variety of WHCo sessions in recent years, has repeatedly cited issues of lack of finances and material resources impeding it in carrying out its basic duties as a SHI, UNESCO has evidently been negligent in its duties of working with DGAM to reach practical solutions. This is the prime example of why the current governance of UNESCO is ineffective; while Member States have political influence to dictate how and where UNESCO distributes its international assistance, the organisation is unable to say it promotes safeguarding of the cultural heritage of all humankind. Born out of the Second World War and subsequently shaped around a particular set of challenges then chiefly facing Europe, UNESCO has had to remould and adapt itself to the ever-changing global challenges we face today, particularly in terms of international conflict.10 Since 2011, when the US ended its financial contributions, which constituted around 22% of UNESCO’s total budget, the organisation has had to cut hundreds of positions, as well as innumerable programmes. In drafting the 2015 strategy, UNESCO acknowledged that its regular programme of financial resources for operational activities were limited and were mostly used to support post-disaster assessment missions, develop project proposals or for coordination meetings, with the majority of its initiatives relying entirely on extra-budgetary financial support. As of January 2020, 65% of UNESCO’s staff were financed by the organisation’s regular budget, while 35% were financed via extra-budgetary funds, thus indicating the regular budget cannot cover basic overheads. The three relevant departments in UNESCO HQ pertaining to cultural heritage protection boast 16 members of staff. Ninety-seven percent of the EPR Unit’s operational activities has to come from extra-budgetary sources, resultant of negotiations with an individual donor. Although UNESCO has no obligation to ensure on-the-ground access for its personnel during conflict, it has nonetheless sought to establish such a presence in Yemen and Iraq, albeit to varying degrees, while access to Syria has remained significantly limited. As detailed in Chap. 2, among interviewees for this research, there was a general consensus that UNESCO possessed insufficient resources to engage in cultural heritage protection during armed conflict and reconstruction post conflict, particularly with respect to how the organisation framed its role thus under its 2015 strategy. This was evidenced by the small number of staff allocated both to individual units pertaining to cultural heritage protection at UNESCO HQ and personnel responsible for culture related issues at individual field offices. Given Iraq boasts UNESCO’s flagship Mosul initiative, the UNESCO Iraq field office in Baghdad consequently posseses the greatest amount of human and financial resources. The data shown in Chap. 4 detailing the WHC’s media statements listed on the Yemen, Syria and Iraq WHC profiles reveal how, when, and why UNESCO would increase or decrease engagement with said countries, with each country registering

10

Meskell (2018), p. 223.

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greater engagement by UNESCO following the start of their respective conflicts and UNESCO exhibiting its highest degree of engagement during 2015. That level of engagement however quickly dropped off with figures showing that, even during its most prolific year (2015), the majority of UNESCO’s engagement was passive and highly reactive in nature, with most statements centring on condemnation of direct attacks on cultural heritage. Using Roth’s (2007) notion that passivity and agency are closely linked, with passivity being an action in itself, Chap. 4 proffers that UNESCO’s adoption of impasse management is indicative of the actions of other actors, such as its Member States. Following this logic, UNESCO does not so much objectively respond to world events and disasters but responds to the political shifts of its Member States, greatly limiting its autonomy, and consequently its capabilities. A standout data point is Yemen’s significantly lower average media engagement from the WHC during its conflict, when compared to both Syria and Iraq. Khalidi recognises the international community’s inept response to the destruction of Yemeni heritage,11 while Meskell and Isakhan suggest UNESCO has exhibited a disproportionately lower scale response to Yemen, despite there being extensive damage to Yemeni WHSs.12 The media statement data appears to support this assertion, however, as has been discussed throughout this book, UNESCO has ramped up engagement with Yemeni reconstruction projects across Sana’a, Zabid, Shibam and Aden, three of which are WHSs. Although progress has been made, there have been, and remain, significant roadblocks for UNESCO operating in Yemen, leading to the substantial gridlock referred to by Meskell, Isakhan and Khalidi. Yemen has endured severe fractionalisation, with territories shifting between the UN recognised government and the Houthi Rebels, the key shift being the control of Sana’a to the latter, limiting UNESCO’s capacity to engage across many geographical areas. Moreover, the persistent lack of one robust counterpart (i.e. GOAM or GOPCHY) created many difficulties for UNESCO in coordinating the development of programmes in the country. Due to limited communication with national counterparts, combined with a lack of access and the international restrictions imposed upon Yemen, UNESCO found a different avenue through SFD to ensure financial support, meaning on-the-ground implementation could proceed. Syria received the most media engagement across the three countries, most of which was between the years of 2012 and 2017 when Dr Maamoun Abdulkarim held the position of DG of the DGAM. However, following 2017, UNESCO’s engagement has reduced to almost nothing. Recent data covering UNESCO’s engagement with Syria during conflict, post 2017, reflects the organisation’s minimum engagement, prior to the outbreak of conflict in 2011, during peacetime. In other words, UNESCO’s current engagement with Syria is not reflective of the crisis the country is currently experiencing, but instead reflects the gridlock international politics can inflict on IGOs. The difficulty faced by DGAM is best described by Abdulkarim,

11 12

Khalidi (2019). Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 2.

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who stated, at the outset of the conflict, that he found himself “isolated by international partners, who left us because they viewed us as part of the regime.” Abdulkarim worked to legitimise himself within the international community, a move subsequently supported by Bokova. Nonetheless, once Abdulkarim was replaced in 2017, the status quo prevailed and UNESCO’s engagement ceased. With the introduction of the Caesar Act, which came into force on 17 June 2020, it is unlikely this gridlock will ease any time soon. While this is the case, Russia, as an ally of the Assad Regime, remains one of the only viable parties to provide any form of technical and financial support to DGAM to initiate significant reconstruction projects. Iraq presented a very different situation, whereby there was already an international coalition working hand in hand with the Iraqi Government and Army, making it possible for UNESCO to facilitate programmes and initiatives on the ground. UNESCO’s interest in Iraq however, only developed following the liberation of the areas occupied by Da’esh, allowing for greater access to heritage sites across the country and improved security conditions. Meskell’s assertion that UNESCO practices impasse management, whereby the organisation ignores or fails to engage in major issues so as to avoid fuelling further conflict,13 can also be considered in the context of Hale and Held’s gridlock theory. When applying Hale and Held’s gridlock formulae to the situation between UNESCO and Syria, it could be said that the Assad Regime’s rule in Syria constituted an unmet global challenge, which inevitably provokes a backlash from the Assad Regime, its allies and adversaries. The mounting sanctions have led to a reduced scope for international cooperation among Syria, other nation states and UNESCO, which has ultimately resulted in gridlock as part of which few countries are willing or able to technically or financially support UNESCO’s Syrian operations. This renders UNESCO with little leeway to act. Hale and Held describe this process as the undermining of the “operative capacity of global governance institutions.”14 This research is not implying that if UNESCO had not adopted an impasse management approach to Syria and the Assad Regime, the conflict, destruction or financial sanctions could have been prevented, as this issue is outwith the remit of UNESCO. However, a willingness, freedom and capability to condemn the actions of a Member State when it comes to issues such as the intentional destruction of cultural heritage during armed conflict, would serve to promote the process of such issues being addressed appropriately in the international arena, with the aim of reaching long-term, rather than short-term, strategies. Under Articles 3 and 8 of the 1954 Hague Convention, as well as Articles 5 and 8 of the Second Protocol, it remains that it is the responsibility of the State Party to enact safeguarding measures during peacetime, accounting for both in situ and secure removal, and storage of, movable cultural property. The Convention is also concerned with its dissemination during peacetime via training of military personnel and, if possible, civilians. It encourages that the principles of the Convention are

13 14

Meskell (2018), p. 162. Hale and Held (2018), p. 130.

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made known to the whole population, especially the armed forces and personnel engaged in the protection of cultural property. Moreover, States Parties must establish specialist personnel within their armed forces in peacetime, whose purpose is “to secure respect for cultural property and to co-operate with the civilian authorities responsible for safeguarding it”.15 The responsibility to ensure such obligations are met ultimately lies with the individual SHIs, namely GOAM, GOPHCY, DGAM and SBAH, all of which have experienced a distinct lack of financial support from their respective governments over many years. Many members of staff from GOAM and GOPCHY have gone unpaid throughout the conflict, while the instability, fragmentation of government and evident lack of security, has resulted in the loss of local authorities and local institutions, leaving GOAM and GOPCHY devoid of resources to implement measures in accordance with the 1954 Hague Convention. In Syria, the DG of DGAM (2012–2017), Dr Maamoun Abdulkarim, not only received no support from the Assad Regime to facilitate his emergency disaster contingency planning, but was also thwarted by its acting to impede any such efforts. Meanwhile, since 2003 in Iraq, SBAH has received diminishing amounts of both financial and political support from the Iraqi Government, with some of the lowest allocated budgets in the country. The agency of these SHIs has been utterly diminished, with each institution constantly conveying its lack of funds and inability to act at WHCo sessions and having to rely on sporadic international donations and heritage interventions to carry out any form of emergency work. The current model does not allow for the long-term protection of Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi cultural heritage, and the fulfilment of legal obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention. Moreover, UNESCO requires a viable national counterpart to deliver preparatory or emergency operations. The period 2012–2017 demonstrates that the international community is capable of separating DGAM from the political landscape within Syria; it is important that such non-politicised relationships are re-established and allowed to endure. As it stands, in the cases of heritage protection capability in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, neither the SHIs nor UNESCO are well-equipped. The relationships built and the progress made by Abdulkarim between 2012 and 2017, shows how much the current system relies on the individual as opposed to well-established national and international protocols led by responsible parties. Unless financial contributions to the UNESCO regular budget are significantly increased, the majority of UNESCO’s small cohort of staff will require to continue to focus much of its energy on fundraising for their respective units instead of directing all of it into safeguarding and restorative initiatives. It was determined that both UNESCO’s “preparedness” and “emergency response” programmes and initiatives should be collectively categorised as emergency response “first-aid”. Many UNESCO actions, which could be construed as preventative, if acted upon in the pre-conflict phase, such as calling on all parties to a conflict to protect a country’s cultural heritage, or the provision of no-strike lists, are often only instigated reactively, following the commencement of destruction of

15

Art. 7 (2) 1954 Hague Convention.

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heritage, and are therefore designated emergency response mechanisms. For example, in relation to Yemen, a no-strike list issued to warring parties following the destruction of heritage sites constituted an emergency response to slow down damages, instead of being employed as an entirely preventative tool. More significantly, many subsequent UNESCO interventions in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, carried out under the guise of emergency response, were not acted upon in a manner consistent with an emergency. Salam Al Quntar and Brian I Daniels identified key categories of projects enacted by the international heritage community in response to the destruction of Syrian cultural heritage, namely site documentation projects, mainly using satellite imagery, journalistic accounts and social media reports, public awareness raising projects, and emergency training and mitigation projects.16 Despite being inherently a preventative measure, which should ideally be carried out during peacetime, site documentation projects during conflict have become a major facet of UNESCO’s emergency response strategy. Such a strategy does however have value, in that it acts as an awareness-raising mechanism, with the potential of garnering funding. The list of key project categories prevalent in Syria as identified by Al Quntar and Daniels is reflective of UNESCO’s involvement in the country. Such a strategic and distanced approach has certainly meant less attention to emergency interventions to safeguard heritage at-risk. Meskell argues that this approach by UNESCO in Syria is evident across the organisation’s entire response to heritage protection, stating that it has retreated into two key responses, namely, awareness raising and technocratic functionality.17 It is argued that UNESCO’s recent approach to Syria is not necessarily typical of its actions across the board. Although this book highlights many similarities across UNESCO’s engagement with Yemen, Syria and Iraq, whether successful or not, it is evident the organisation is attempting a more practical approach in the reconstruction of Yemeni and Iraqi heritage sites. The Emergency Safeguarding programme commenced for Syrian cultural heritage in March 2014, centred on site documentation, public awareness raising projects, and emergency training and mitigation. Although this programme was declared “good practice” in UNESCO’s 2015 strategy, it was ultimately discontinued due to the termination of EU funding, which may have been resultant of the political landscape. It is important to note, however, the model was not subsequently deployed in Yemen. UNESCO continues to pursue this reactive model for implementing so-called “preventative” measures, despite acknowledging in the 2015 strategy that “acting in times of peace for the prevention of loss of cultural heritage. . .has often proven to be the most effective way to protect”.18 The majority of UNESCO emergency response “first-aid” measures in Yemen revolved around the provision of training with no follow-up, placing of WHSs on the In Danger List, and remote satellite monitoring alongside UNITAR-UNOSAT, which

16

Al Quntar and Daniels (2016), pp. 382–383. Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 3. 18 UNESCO (2015), p. 4. 17

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would primarily serve to raise awareness around destruction, instead of informing recovery strategies. Despite UNESCO developing an Emergency Action Plan relatively early in the Yemeni conflict, it was not financed, and ultimately never implemented. Similarly, in Iraq, in 2014, UNESCO held a consultation with Iraqi and international cultural heritage experts to agree upon an Action Plan; however, no commitment to on-the-ground emergency safeguarding intervention or remote monitoring was made. Any form of Action Plan for Iraq failed to have any real impact, with most of UNESCO updates stemming from international meetings held on the matter, demonstrating the technocratic nature of the organisation. UNESCO stated it would structure its activities around “preparedness, immediate response during conflict and mid- to longer-term recovery/reconstruction.”19 UNESCO has evidently failed in realising two of these three forms of activities since 2015, with no preparedness measures having been carried out during peacetime, and no emergency response works carried out when required. A key step for UNESCO would be to develop a mechanism for expediting emergency heritage interventions, especially now the financial infrastructure has been established with the HEF. With States Parties unable to implement the 1954 Hague Convention, UNESCO’s financial situation will not change, and its largely technocratic approach will persist, rendering it incapable of having a meaningful positive impact on the crisis facing cultural heritage in areas experiencing armed conflict. Based on consideration of UNESCO’s recovery initiatives, it was deduced that the organisation only engages in the reconstruction of historic structures in exceptional circumstances. Given UNESCO’s current involvement in recovery initiatives in Yemen and Iraq, it follows that it considers intentional targeting as an exceptional circumstance that permits the reconstruction of select historic buildings and districts. It is significant that while UNESCO only promotes recovery and reconstruction in the post-conflict context,20 only one of the initiatives discussed in the course of this book, namely the Mosul initiative, has been implemented thus, while all others have been attempted during conflict, in less than optimal conditions. In terms of recovery policy, UNESCO embraces the CURE Framework, which integrates culture as a core element for city reconstruction and promotes a more integrated approach to people-centred and place-based policies, as culture itself is synonymous with both approaches. UNESCO capitalised on this policy approach with the CfW scheme in Yemen; the project centred on the provision of livelihoods, with particular focus on reconstruction of historic houses, giving it priority to operate during conflict as per the UN’s Programme Criticality Framework. UNESCO is applying this integrated people-centred and place-based policy approach to recovery, in a less successful manner, to the Mosul initiative. Building on a study carried out by Isakhan and Meskell (2019) into Mosuli perspectives on UNESCO’s Mosul initiative, this research highlights the lack of trust among local community members and UNESCO, as well as the Department of Antiquities in Nineveh (UNESCO’s local

19 20

UNESCO (2015), p. 4. UNESCO (2015), p. 6.

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counterpart) and the MoC in Baghdad. There also exists the possibility of minor deception occurring via UNESCO’s social media platforms, showing a false timeline of events, to convince the local population the reconstruction is making good progress. It is acknowledged however that such inaccuracies are possibly due to human error, and therefore unintentional. Furthermore, in recent years, UNESCO failed to deliver on an agreement with the Iraqi authorities to conserve the Samarra Archaeological Site, which undoubtedly contributed to the current low level of trust between the two parties. A people-centred policy has not been successfully implemented in Iraq thus far, and Isakhan and Meskell have called on UNESCO to strengthen the humanitarian element to the Mosul initiative, for the sake of the Mosuli people.21 Lababidi and Qassar urged “UNESCO and its partners to acknowledge that the recommendations and plans that they are repetitively adopting are failing to fulfil the goals for which they were developed”.22 This research goes further, showing that many recommendations and plans proposed by UNESCO are rarely acted on in the first instance, as is evidenced repeatedly by the organisation’s reconstruction proposals and expert meetings regarding damaged and destroyed Syrian cultural heritage. For example, analysis of UNESCO’s response to the destruction of cultural heritage at Palmyra shows the organisation to have had multiple meetings, years apart to reach the same recommendations on how to progress with emergency response measures to document and stabilise surviving structures. A UNESCO staff member developed a plan with an accompanying budget proposal for the stabilisation of the Portico at the Temple of Bel, which was ignored on various occasions, with the organisation instead opting to host yet another international expert meeting only to reach the same recommendations for the structure. With UNESCO’s already constrained budget, it can ill afford to spend an inordinate amount of funds on international expert meetings and the development of emergency response action plans that will not be implemented due to the imposition of global governance restrictions. Regarding Palmyra, the WHCo resolved in 2019 to request that Syria limit work to emergency first-aid interventions until thorough documentation and deliberation had been carried out to inform an optimal restoration methodology. DGAM was consequently left in limbo, with neither financial support to carry out emergency works, nor the approval of the WHCo to progress with restorative efforts. Despite the lack of implementation of efforts at both Palmyra and Aleppo, such sites received the majority of UNESCO’s focus when it engaged with its Syrian counterparts, with little attention afforded any other forms of heritage. UNESCO’s pattern of expressing an intention to aid in recovery efforts in Syria, but ultimately failing to do so, is also evidenced across Crac des Chevaliers and Qal’at Salah El-Din, the Ancient City of Damascus, the Ancient City of Bosra and the Ancient Villages of Northern Syria WHSs.

21 22

Isakhan and Meskell (2019), p. 12. Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 355.

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Kalman asserts, “[r]econstruction is the default approach taken for post-conflict mitigation by the international community.”23 The Mosul initiative is, by far, UNESCO’s most prominent project in Iraq, and in the entire organisation. With this being the primary focus of the UNESCO Iraq field office personnel, it must be questioned how UNESCO is able to sustain any focus on preventative strategies for the protection of cultural heritage in other areas of Iraq. Preventative safeguarding measures work on a cyclical basis. Although Iraq is in a post-conflict phase, it is not necessarily in a state of peace, and so focus should be on how SBAH will be better able to fulfil its obligations as per the 1954 Hague Convention in the event of a further armed conflict, and how UNESCO can offer technical assistance. It is the view of Interviewee A that UNESCO has been doing prevention and advocacy for the last 75 years. The main branch of our job is advocacy. What has changed is, recently, we are also taking the responsibility ourselves by actually carrying out or facilitating the rehabilitation of heritage sites. But our work has always been done by using the conventions to advocate, and carry out preventative action.24

Nonetheless, while the reconstruction programme is ongoing, the vast majority of the Iraqi field offices’ resources is already accounted for, with little spare to allocate to such tasks as strengthening the capacity of SBAH, which continues to be highly underfunded. It is also possible that UNESCO cannot sustain its expansive programme in Iraq and it will have to recalibrate to address another conflict which will inevitably spring up. With UNESCO relying on extrabudgetary donations for projects such as the Mosul initiative, it cannot be expected that its current level of engagement with Iraq will be maintained beyond the completion of the key reconstruction projects. Following the termination of the Mosul initiative, such financial issues for the MoC, SBAH and, by extension, the Department of Antiquities, will remain one of the biggest problems facing Iraqi cultural heritage. In many instances, evidenced throughout this book, UNESCO has leapfrogged the implementation of preparedness or emergency response measures across Yemen, Syria and Iraq, moving directly to reconstruction, following destruction. Although UNESCO’s presence in Yemen and Iraq via reconstruction initiatives is highly commendable and necessary, the organisation continues to employ a linear view to conflict and cultural heritage protection, whereby destruction occurs and then there is an attempt to restore, reconstruct and rehabilitate. However, as has been evidenced by previous international heritage interventions, there is a need to employ a cyclical approach through strategic preparedness measures, such as aiding SHIs to fulfil their obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention. A key issue revealed through this research is that it is more difficult to get largescale donors to invest in preparedness or emergency response programmes, when there exists an option to support more prestigious high-profile reconstruction projects, such as Al-Nouri Mosque and Al-Hadba Minaret. 23 24

Kalman (2017), p. 544. Interviewee A (2020), personal communication.

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The ideal situation would be for the governments of Yemen, Syria and Iraq to appropriately fund their respective SHI(s). After all, there can be no long-term substitute, particularly in the form of international heritage interventions, for capable and financially supported SHIs. The current situation however is that neither GOAM, GOPHCY, DGAM nor SBAH are provided with sufficient funds via the Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi government budgets, a situation that is not likely to change in the near future. Meanwhile, in the case of Syria, persistent sanctions and political standpoints of UNESCO Member States, makes it less feasible for UNESCO to offer financial or technical support via international intervention. It therefore remains that, for Yemen and Iraq, once UNESCO heritage interventions terminate, GOAM, GOPHCY and SBAH will continue to be severely under-funded, and unable to offer the continuation of support to further restore and rehabilitate communities and cultural institutions. Weiss and Connelly state, in military terms, “prolonged occupation. . . has liabilities because external funds may create dependency and impede the restoration of a responsible state.”25 The same assertion can be applied to international heritage interventions with no follow-up. If the Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi governments resolve not to provide financial support to GOAM, GOPHCY, DGAM and SBAH, there will be a continued reliance on the international heritage community for support with no guarantee of a necessary consistent financial provision. This will result in a persistent inability to ensure resource allocation to museums and other cultural institutions, effective archaeological site management, restorative activities, and capacities to enable the State Party to fulfil its obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention. Lababidi and Qassar believe that there should be a “reconsideration of UNESCO’s conventions and their lack of effective protection to their state[s]-parties. . .due to gaps within their frameworks.”26 The 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols, along with the operational guidelines, are currently sufficiently informative on how, when and what effective safeguarding measures should be adopted. The problem lies with the lack of implementation and varying degrees of compliance by States Parties, a problem UNESCO is unable to solve through its own organisational and legislative reform. While the above represents the reality of UNESCO’s role in the protection and reconstruction of cultural heritage during armed conflict, as well as post-conflict, in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, it does not determine UNESCO’s legal obligation as such. For those countries who have ratified the Convention, UNESCO is evidently a part of the cultural heritage protection during armed conflict discourse. Due to such legislation, UNESCO has become the custodian of the international standards pertaining to cultural heritage protection, both in terms of conflict and peacetime, confirming it has a mandate to engage in such issues. Meskell has argued that UNESCO has moved toward being a technocratic agency,27 a view supported by the findings of this research, particularly in regard to the organisation’s avoidance of 25

Weiss and Connelly (2019), p. 7. Lababidi and Qassar (2016), p. 355. 27 Meskell and Isakhan (2020), p. 3. 26

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practical engagement with Syria through the hosting of multiple expert meetings. Citing the conflicts between India and Pakistan in 1971, in Cyprus in 1974, between Iran and Iraq in 1980, during the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and in former Yugoslavia in 1991, Clément is of the opinion that UNESCO “played a role much larger than what is included in the Convention.”28 The technocratic output demonstrated by UNESCO in terms of heritage protection in relation to armed conflict in Yemen, Syria and Iraq would suggest that UNESCO is adhering to its legal obligations as per the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols, which requires the provision of technical advice by UNESCO upon the request of the State Party. However, the problem remains that many of the programmes and initiatives, led by UNESCO, discussed throughout this book, are framed differently. For example, in the case of Syria, UNESCO claims its programmes and initiatives to be preventative or emergency response measures, connoting a hands-on, on-the-ground effort, but they were in fact reactive and technocratic strategies, often carried out remotely. The problem then lies with how UNESCO frames itself as an organisation and the difference between what it claims to be doing and the reality of its capability. UNESCO’s current self-determination stems from its 2015 Strategy, which demonstrates that it perceived its obligation to engage in cultural heritage protection during armed conflict would increase following 2015, due to the outbreak of conflict in Yemen, in addition to multiple ongoing conflicts, all of which would consequently result in an increase in requests for assistance from the organisation. The 2015 strategy solidified UNESCO’s intent to have an increased practical engagement with heritage protection and reconstruction activities in the context of armed conflict. While UNESCO is meeting its legal obligations, it is currently overstating what it is capable of achieving as an organisation given its limitations, both financially and politically. The types of programmes and initiatives UNESCO is operating is reflective of Meskell’s assertion that the organisation has moved from discovery to recovery, with the vast majority of its resources in this arena being dedicated to large-scale reconstruction initiatives,29 such as the CfW scheme across Yemen, and the Mosul initiative. UNESCO is keen to prove that it is capable of facilitating practical on-theground solutions, and it is argued that such initiatives are demonstrative of the organisation moving beyond technocracy. However, analysis of the Mosul initiative shows that the persistent existence of many bureaucratic and political barriers dictates that UNESCO must work at a slow and diplomatic pace, with most practical work being carried out via promotion of the project on social media platforms. Discrepancies exist between what UNESCO is legally obligated to do, what it claims to be doing, and the reality of what it is implementing. UNESCO may well be determined to move beyond its technocratic limitations and prove its validity and worth in the field of heritage protection during armed conflict and reconstruction in the post-conflict phase. Nonetheless, this is simply beyond the organisation’s

28 29

Clément (2016), p. 122. Meskell (2018), p. 25.

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capabilities, in terms of its human and financial resources, as well as how it is able to navigate the gridlock imposed by its Member States. Given the persistent attacks on cultural heritage in areas experiencing armed conflict, and the endemic lack of appropriate management and conservation of heritage sites across the world, it is clear that UNESCO’s mission to ensure the safeguarding of cultural heritage remains highly relevant. However, as long as cultural heritage protection is not considered a humanitarian concern, UNESCO will not be able to circumvent much of the political and bureaucratic barriers facing IGOs during conflict, which prevent emergency action from being implemented. The Yemeni CfW initiative may provide the solution for bridging this gap between cultural heritage protection and humanitarian aid during armed conflict. A peoplecentred approach, focusing on livelihoods and meaningful and practical connections between populations and their local heritage may be the optimal methodological approach for justifying cultural heritage protection as a humanitarian necessity. This however would require UNESCO to significantly reduce the attention given to the protection of WHSs and place greater focus on heritage sites, which provide tangible social and economic benefit to local communities in need.

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