Understanding Schopenhauer through the Prism of Indian Culture: Philosophy, Religion and Sanskrit Literature 9783110271584, 9783110271492

Table of contents :
Introduction
(I) Understanding
Philosophizing Under the Influence - Schopenhauer’s Indian Thought
The Upanisads - Schopenhauer’s Solace of Life and Death
Suspected of Buddhism - Śaṅkara, Dārāṣekoh and Schopenhauer
“The Ancient Rhapsodies of Truth” -Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Max Müller and the Hermeneutics
(II) Philosophemes
The Overcoming of the Individual in Schopenhauer’s Ethics of Compassion, Illustrated by the Sanskrit Formula of the ‘tat tvam asi’
The Relationship between Will and Intellect in Schopenhauer with Particular Regard to His Use of the Expression “Veil of māyā”
The Indian Context of Schopenhauer’s ‘Holy Man’ or ‘Beautifu Soul’
All Is Suffering — Reexamining the Logic of ‘Indian Pessimism’
The Denial of the Will-to-Live in Schopenhauer’s World and His Association between Buddhist and Christian Saints
(III) Philosophers
Transcending Egoism through Moral Praxis - Schopenhauer and Vivekānanda
Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein and Indian Philosophy: Some Forgotten Linkages
(IV) Literature
Schopenhauer and Tagore on the Key to Dreamland
Bibliography
Contributors
Author Index
Subject Index

Citation preview

Understanding Schopenhauer through the Prism of Indian Culture

Understanding Schopenhauer through the Prism of Indian Culture Philosophy, Religion and Sanskrit Literature

Edited by

Arati Barua Michael Gerhard Matthias Koßler

De Gruyter

Printed with financial support of the Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft e.V., Frankfurt am Main

ISBN 978-3-11-027149-2 e-ISBN 978-3-11-027158-4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

© 2013 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Michaela Habelitz, On duty in India, 2010 (www.michaela-habelitz.de) © Michaela Habelitz, 2010 Printing: Hubert & Co. GmbH und Co. KG, Göttingen ∞ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Preface The increasing interest in the relationship between the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer and Indian philosophy and culture has given rise to a series of conferences and publications both in India and Germany. The international Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft with its Indian Division, founded in 2002, played and is still playing a leading role in these academic activities. The latest highlight of that international collaborative endeavour was the international congress on Understanding Schopenhauer through the Prism of Indian Culture – Philosophy, Religion and Sanskrit Literature which was organized by the Indian Division of the Schopenhauer Society in collaboration with the Schopenhauer Research Centre, University of Mainz, and the Centre for Sanskrit Studies of the Jawarhalal Nehru University in New-Delhi during March 4th and 5th 2010. This event was the occasion to celebrate the 150th death anniversary of the philosopher. The contributions collected in this volume go back to papers held at the conference by scholars from India, Germany and England. Looking at the level of international participation of scholars and also to the intense involvement of students in the debates made the congress a great success. We are indebted to many scholars and institutions for this success and for the achievement of this volume. In particular, I wish to acknowledge our sincere thanks to Dr. Arati Barua (Indian Division of the Schopenhauer Society), Prof. S. R. Bhatt (University of Delhi), Prof. Shashiprabha Kumar (Centre of Sanskrit Studies, JNU) and the Research Associates and the students who had tirelessly worked for days to make the event a success. We are as well solemnly indebted to many institutions, namely, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), the Jawarhalal Nehru University, the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (ICPR), the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) and the Max Mueller Bhawan for generously giving us financial assistance. Our special thanks are due to Michael Gerhard who had the lion’s part of working on the volume and to Jana Hatakova for the final editing. Last but not the least, we wish to thank De Gruyter for taking the book into its program. Matthias Koßler (President of the Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft)

Abbreviations English [German] Title TfP[E] FR [G] [GBr] [Gespr] [L] MSR [HN] ON PP [P] [S] [W] WN [N] WWI WWP WWR

The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason Gesammelte Briefe (Collected Letters) Gesprche (Talks) Werke in fnf Bnden (Works in Five Volumes) Manuscript Remains On Human Nature Parerga and Paralipomena Senilia Smtliche Werke (Collected Works) On the Will in Nature The World as Will and Idea The World as Will and Presentation The World as Will and Representation

Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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(I) Understanding Gnter Zçller Philosophizing Under the Influence – Schopenhauer’s Indian Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ram Nath Jha The Upanisads – Schopenhauer’s Solace of Life and Death . . . . ˙ Michael Gerhard Suspected of Buddhism – S´an˙kara, Da¯ra¯sekoh and Schopenhauer ˙ Thomas Regehly “The Ancient Rhapsodies of Truth” – Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Max Mller and the Hermeneutics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 19 31

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(II) Philosophemes Margit Ruffing The Overcoming of the Individual in Schopenhauer’s Ethics of Compassion, Illustrated by the Sanskrit Formula of the ‘tat tvam asi’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

Matthias Koßler The Relationship between Will and Intellect in Schopenhauer with Particular Regard to His Use of the Expression “Veil of ma¯ya¯” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Raj Kumar Gupta The Indian Context of Schopenhauer’s ‘Holy Man’ or ‘Beautifu Soul’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

119

Ankur Barua All Is Suffering – Reexamining the Logic of ‘Indian Pessimism’

129

Jens Lemanski The Denial of the Will-to-Live in Schopenhauer’s World and His Association between Buddhist and Christian Saints . . .

149

(III) Philosophers Indu Sarin Transcending Egoism through Moral Praxis – Schopenhauer and Viveka¯nanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

187

Ramesh Chandra Pradhan Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein and Indian Philosophy: Some Forgotten Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

201

(IV) Literature Sitansu Ray Schopenhauer and Tagore on the Key to Dreamland . . . . . . . . .

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Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

233

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

247

Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction In four major attempts we make always another try at understanding Arthur Schopenhauer through the prism of Indian culture, particularly ‘Understanding’, ‘Philosophemes’, ‘Philosophers’, and ‘Literature’. In our first section – Understanding – Gnter Zçller starts with his article Philosophizing Under the Influence – Schopenhauer’s Indian Thought. He analyses the influence of Indian and specifically Hinduist philosophy and religion on the formation of Schopenhauer’s philosophical system. In his opening part Zçller draws on Schopenhauer’s own account of causation for discussing the conditions of the possibility of philosophical influences. Then he documents the proximity of Schopenhauer’s systematic outlook on The World as Will and Representation to the German idealist tradition and locates Schopenhauer’s originality in his atheistic transformation of the idealist metaphysics of the absolute into the nihilistic drama of the self-affirmation and self-denial of the will. Finally Zçller places Schopenhauer’s selective appropriation of Hinduist philosophy and religion into the systematic context of his critique of religion and his conviction of Europe’s Indian spiritual origins. Ram Nath Jha goes back to the roots of the original Upanisads when ˙ he elucidates Schopenhauer’s remarks “In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupnekhat (Upanisads). ˙ It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death!” through the Eyes of Principal Upanisads in his paper The Upanisads – ˙ The purpose of his topic ˙ first Schopenhauer’s Solace of Life and Death. is to analyze Schopenhauer’s remarks and then to substantiate them through the relevant texts of the Upanisads. In his view the remarks in ˙ main imports: The study of themselves are inherent with the following the Upanisads is unique; death is not the nullification of life; knowledge enshrined˙in the Upanisads, in fact, is the bridge between life and death. ˙ Michael Gerhard – Suspected of Buddhism – The next paper from ´San˙kara, Da¯ra¯sekoh and Schopenhauer – examined the influence of Da¯ra¯sekoh’s and S´˙an˙kara’s ideas on the translation of the Upanisads Schopen˙ ˙ the Europehauer had read, called the Oupnek’hat. Gerhard depicts that ans got a taste of Indian classical teachings long before Friedrich Max Mller and others translated the tenets into European languages in the 19th century. It was the Persian translation undertaken by Prince Da¯ra¯se˙

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Introduction

koh who is known to the world for his unorthodox and liberal views. His Persian translation attracted any attention from European scholars. Abraham Hyacinth Anquetil-Duperron undertook the task of translating Da¯ra¯sekoh’s Oupnek’hat /Upanisads into Latin. Nevertheless, this became the ˙ ˙ framework for Schopenhauer, who discovered the thread of sanity through the labyrinth of unintelligible jargon written by Anquetil-Duperron. Oupnek’hat also became the basis on which many more Europeans could now dwell into the study of the Upanisads. Schopenhauer did ˙ not doubt the authenticity of Oupnek’hat, as translated by Anquetil-Duperron. Da¯ra¯sekoh had retained many Sanskrit words intact and un-trans˙ lated. Anquetil-Duperron also left those words and other Persian syntaxes intact, but explained them in a glossary. The Chandogyopanisad formed ˙ the basis of Schopenhauer’s work The World of Will and Representation. Da¯ra¯sekoh’s most important legacy is the translation of fifty Upanisads, ˙ under the title of Sirr-i akbar. It was completed in 1657, together ˙ known with paraphrases and excerpts from commentaries which in various cases, though by no means throughout, can be traced back to S´an˙kara and forward to Schopenhauer on the line of Buddhism and Sufism. Thomas Regehly’s paper ‘The Ancient Rhapsodies of Truth’ – Schopenhauer, Friedrich Max Mller and the Hermeneutics deal with Schopenhauer, Mller and the Upanisads. It is a well-known fact that Mller ˙ he wrote a brief report about this meetonce met Schopenhauer, and that ing. When he published the first volume of his famous edition of The Sacred Books of the East in 1900 he appraised Schopenhauer’s efforts very much, referring to several pages of the main work and of the Parerga as well. It is interesting to state that he absolutely disagreed in respect to the high value Schopenhauer was attributing to Anquetil-Duperron’s translation into Latin Gerhard sowed above. Regehly will elucidate the kind of ‘hermeneutics’ Schopenhauer applied to arrive at his interpretation of his favorite text Oupnek’hat /Upanisad, which inspired and com˙ forted him throughout his lifetime in an extraordinary manner. In the second section – Philosophemes – Margit Ruffing starts with her paper The Overcoming of the Individual in Schopenhauer’s Ethics of Compassion, Illustrated by the Sanskrit Formula of the ‘tat tvam asi’. Ruffing shows that Schopenhauer’s ethics can be considered as a part of his theoretical philosophy and that the priority of the metaphysics of will, consequently apply to all disciplines of philosophy, to religion and even to other sciences, characterises his philosophical system. She reduced Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will itself to one single phrase: The

Introduction

3

world is the self-knowledge of the will. It is obvious that a phrase like this has to be interpreted, and that it allows for many different interpretations, but it can also be helpful to comprehend the deeper sense of the metaphysical thought as well as its different possible interpretations. Ruffing find the same sort of concentrated and compact one-phrase-explication of a central thesis concerning the ethical theory, given to the use of one of the maha¯va¯kyas, the ‘Great Words’ of the Upanisadic tradition, ˙ of his ethical the ‘tat tvam asi’. In the context of several central passages texts, Schopenhauer reverts to this set phrase to give a short and pregnant definition of seeing through the principium individuationis, that is the essential knowledge. Matthias Koßler is concerned with The Relationship between Will and Intellect in Schopenhauer with Particular Regard to his Use of the Expression ‘Veil of ma¯ya¯’. In his paper he shows how will and intellect in Schopenhauer’s philosophy relate to each other with special respect to the question of a comparability of his metaphysics to Indian thought. His starting point is the statement of the coincidence or identity of the subject of cognition and the subject of willing which in his early dissertation Schopenhauer calls “incomprehensible” while in the mature The World as Will and Representation he tells us that this main work in its entirety is the “explanation” of this identity. The investigation follows the path through all parts of the main work in order to reconcile two seemingly contradictory theories which both Schopenhauer claims to be “fundamental truths” of his philosophy, namely that on the one hand cognition is conditioned by will (theory of the primacy of will over the intellect) and on the other hand that will and cognition are absolutely separate. Since also the individuation of the subject is connected with the identity of subject of cognition and subject of willing some clarifying results – f.i. in regard to the unity of will as thing in itself and to the concept of through seeing the principle of individuation – will help to make a comparison to Indian thought, namely to the unity of brahman and the uncovering of the ‘veil of ma¯ya¯’, more exact. Raj Kumar Gupta deals with The Indian Context of Schopenhauer’s ‘Holy Man’ or ‘Beautiful Soul’. For Schopenhauer the way to salvation lies in the denial of the will to live through renunciation and holiness. Gupta stated that the ‘holy man’ or the ‘beautiful soul’ who denies the will through asceticism represents highest knowledge, wisdom, and virtue. So Schopenhauer finds many examples of holiness in the lives of Christian saints, mystics, and penitents. But his most important source for defining and illustrating holiness remains the Indian scriptures and

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Introduction

the lives of Hindu and Buddhist saints and mystics. He calls Indian mythology “the wisest of all mythologies” and the Vedas “the fruit of the highest knowledge and wisdom”. This is one source to which Schopenhauer returns again and again, can hardly keep away from for any length of time. Schopenhauer often uses the metaphor of the ‘veil of ma¯ya¯’ to indicate the fleeting and delusive nature of the phenomenal world. The ‘holy man’ must transcend the ‘veil of ma¯ya¯’and abolish the distinction between his own individuality and that of others. The Upanisadic precept ‘tat tvam asi’ best expresses for Schopenhauer the idea of the ˙essential identity of all living beings in their inner nature. It may well be that Schopenhauer’s basic concepts had already been formed when he came in contact with Indian religious and philosophical literature. But in his analysis of holiness he shows himself thoroughly steeped in his Indian material, making extensive use of ideas, images, metaphors, symbols, and allusions drawn from this source. It is perhaps in his analysis of holiness that Schopenhauer shows closest affinity to Indian scriptures he admired so deeply and praised so lavishly. The charge that the Indic world-views are permeated by a ‘pessimistic’ spirit is quite common in some circles, and the various responses that have been offered to this allegation are also fairly well-known, Ankur Barua pointed out in her article All Is Suffering – Reexamining the Logic of ‘Indian Pessimism’. However, the discussion of these issues often overlooks the finer shades and meanings of the term ‘pessimism’, and consequently does not sufficiently distinguish between pessimism/optimism as a temperament (psychological pessimism/optimism PsP, PsO) and pessimism/optimism as a correlate of a fully-developed metaphysical system (philosophical pessimism/optimism PP, PO). Barua analyze four possible combinations, namely, PsO/PO, PsP/PO, PsO/PP, and PsP/PP. Then she applies the results of this analysis to an examination – partly through a dialogue with Schopenhauer – of the types of pessimisms/optimisms which she can detect in Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga, Nya¯ya and early Buddhism. Jens Lemanski pointed out The Denial of the Will-To-Live in Schopenhauer’s World and his Association between Buddhist and Christian Saints. The project of a ‘Description of the Universe’ has Schopenhauer outlined the principles underlying the world, both as will and as representation. When it comes to the principles of ethics, this necessitates a description of the pessimist point of view and the denial of the will-to-live, one which Schopenhauer thus does not simply identify himself with, but which figures as one element in his greater project. Lemanski sketches out how the Romantic and Humboldtian idea, that such a description it-

Introduction

5

self has to give a genuine impression of the world, requires Schopenhauer to find real examples for his ethical principles. Schopenhauer finds those, Lemanski says, in Buddhist and Christian traditions of asceticism. He tries to show that the way in which Schopenhauer understood and conceived the Buddhist denial of the will-to live stood under the strong influence of the mystical tradition of the imitatio christi-doctrine. Imitatio Christi provides the underlying typology for Schopenhauer’s concrete understanding of the denial of the will-to-live. In the third section – Philosophers – Indu Sarin explores Schopenhauer’s perspective on the realization of morality through transcending egoism and compares it with Viveka¯nanda’s understanding of morality in her article Transcending Egoism through Moral Praxis. Schopenhauer and Viveka¯nanda. For both, moral praxis is the realization of intrinsic values and is based on love, sympathy and compassion, which express the unity of oneself with others. Both of them share the point of view that ego is the source of all vices, creating divisions, generating conflicts and leading to suffering. The ego produces all kinds of illusions. The renunciation of ego is the disappearance of illusion and the emergence of morality. Like Viveka¯nanda, Schopenhauer also advocates metaphysical foundation of morality because it is to be realized through renunciation of will-tolive, which is phenomenal in nature. The foundation of morality for both of them rests on ‘tat tvam asi’, which implies metaphysical identity of all beings, Sarin stated out. Viveka¯nanda shows the path of yoga for exercising self-restraint and overcoming egoism. However, such specific path has not been given by Schopenhauer. Nevertheless, both of them hold that moral action generates a tranquil state of mind; in this sense morality comes closer to spirituality setting aside all the exclusions and divisions. Schopenhauer and Viveka¯nanda extend the meaning of morality even to non-human beings of the universe making room for the environmental ethics, which is of great relevance in the contemporary scenario. Ramesh Chandra Pradhan explores the links between two famous European philosophers, Schopenhauer and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Indian Philosophy, especially Veda¯nta and Buddhism – Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein and Indian Philosophy: Some Forgotten Linkages. Both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein had deep appreciation of Indian philosophy, the former directly and the latter indirectly, in their own systems of thought. Schopenhauer was deeply involved in the Indian approach to the problems of life. This is reflected in his own view of life as depicted

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in his work The World as Will and Representation. He has laid down a vision of life and world which closely resembles the world-view laid down in Buddhism and Veda¯nta so Pradhan. Schopenhauer shares with the Indian thinkers the metaphysical urge to overcome the life of suffering based on the individual will. nirva¯na or moksa has been the goal of life ˙ pointed˙ out, and this has inspired in Buddhism and Veda¯nta Pradhan Schopenhauer’s philosophy of life. Wittgenstein, who has been inspired by Schopenhauer, has laid down a world-view in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus which aims at the life free from desires of the individual will and thus makes man transcend the individual will and the world. He shares the Buddhist and the Veda¯ntic ideal of freedom from the mundane world as the ultimate goal of life. Pradhan higher suggestion is that if we explore the cross-cultural and philosophical links across traditions, it may help us in understanding other philosophers and our own tradition better. In the fourth and last section – Literature – Sitansu Ray is concerned with Schopenhauer and Tagore on the Key to Dreamland. Schopenhauer and Rabı¯ndrana¯th Tagore belong two different times and cultures, yet, while studying on dream, they deserve parallel study since both them had had immense introspection in this phenomenon as revealed in their works Ray stated out. Schopenhauer’s philosophy of dream precedes Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung and Neo-Freudians. He never uses the term sub-conscious, nor does he give any undue emphasis on sex. As a former student of medical science (though he did not complete the course), Schopenhauer is well-versed in anatomy, physiology, nervous and vascular systems, function of the heart, the digestive system all leading to the dream-phenomena of the brain from within. Schopenhauer establishes ‘will’ on the core of dream, obviously subjected to his ‘principle of sufficient reason’. In the depth of ‘thing-in-itself ’, the East and West do not differ much, though their way of presentation differ much. Tagore exploits dream in his creativity. Ray discusses some of Tagores stories, viz. Kankal, Kshudhita Pashan, Manihara, and Nishithe, all based on dream. Thereafter, he deals with some of his excellent poems on the theme of creative dream, viz. Swapna, wherein we enjoy the poet’s dreamy journey to the bygone golden age of India. By virtue of dream the intangible is brought into tangibility, the past into the present. The consort of the dreamland is not bonded with factuality. Yet, the truth behind dream has its own reality, as per Schopenhauerian philosophy. The philosopher’s discourse and the poet’s artistic intuition, combined together, make the harmonious, complimentary and over-all study of dream.

(I) Understanding

Philosophizing Under the Influence – Schopenhauer’s Indian Thought Gnter Zçller […] religions are like lightning bugs. They need darkness in order to glow. 1

The paper analyses the influence of Indian and specifically Hinduist philosophy and religion on the formation of Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical system. The opening section draws on Schopenhauer’s own account of causation for discussing the conditions of the possibility of philosophical influences. The middle section documents the proximity of Schopenhauer’s systematic outlook on the world as will and representation to the German idealist tradition and locates Schopenhauer’s originality in his atheistic transformation of the idealist metaphysics of the absolute into the nihilistic drama of the self-affirmation and self-denial of the will. The final section places Schopenhauer’s selective appropriation of Hinduist philosophy and religion into the systematic context of his critique of religion and his conviction of Europe’s Indian spiritual origins. (I) The Causality of Influence Doxographical wisdom has it that Schopenhauer was the first Western philosopher whose intellectual development and resulting system was deeply influenced and extensively shaped by Far Eastern thinking, to be precise, by Indian philosophical and religious thought under the twin forms of Hinduism and Buddhism. In Schopenhauer’s work Western philosophy, so the communis opinio goes, for the first time thoroughly opened itself to non-Western intellectual and spiritual traditions and had its assumptions and presuppositions challenged by alien views and values. The received view of Schopenhauer’s primal encounter with Indian thought has much to recommend it. Schopenhauer was exposed to Indian 1

P II, p. 366.

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philosophy and religion in 1814, after having completed his dissertation on the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1813) and at the point of beginning work on his early opus magnum, The World as Will and Representation, published in late 1818, with the year 1819 indicated on the title page. Schopenhauer’s extant literary remains (Handschriftlicher Nachlaß) contain references to classical Indian texts – in Latin translations from Persian, with interspersed Sanskrit – taken in Dresden and dating from 1814.2 Some months earlier in the same year, while still in Weimar, Schopenhauer had borrowed this Latin-Persian translation-edition of the Upanisads /Oupnek’hat, published in 1801, from the Ducal Library for seven ˙weeks (26 March through 18 May) and subsequently purchased the two volumes, comprising some 1,900 pages,3 in order to take them with him to Dresden. In the published main work, which in its first edition of 1818 consisted of a single volume divided into four books and an appendix on the Critique of the Kantian Philosophy, Indian thought figures prominently in Book Four, devoted to the affirmation and denial of the will and containing Schopenhauer’s ethics of “compassion” (Mitleid) and metaphysics of “redemption” (Erlçsung).4 Further substantial references to Indian philosophy and religion are to be found in Schopenhauer’s late collection of essays, Parerga and Paralipomena (literally, Byworks and Things Left Aside; 1851), especially in the chapters entitled On Ethics, On Religion and Something on Sanskrit Literature. 5 While Schopenhauer’s exposure and enthusiastic reaction to Hinduist philosophy can be traced to the early formative phase of his philosophical development, his acquaintance with Buddhist philosophical and religious thought seems to date from later in Schopenhauer’s life. In the second edition of The World as Will and Representation, which appeared a quarter of a century after the work first was published (1844) and added a substantial second volume with chapters correlated thematically with what now became the first volume of the revised work – in the section entitled On the Metaphysical Need of the Human Being (ber das metaphysische Bedrfniß des Menschen) – Schopenhauer refers to the paucity of knowledge about Buddhism in Europe when The World as Will and Representa2 3 4 5

HN I, p. 106, 120. HN V, p. 338 et seq. W I, p. 419 – 421, 442. P II, p. 236 et seqq., 404 et seqq., 420 et seqq.

Philosophizing Under the Influence – Schopenhauer’s Indian Thought

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tion was first conceived and published.6 But rather than tracing the Buddhist affinities of his philosophical outlook to later developments in his thinking, Schopenhauer insists on the “agreement” (bereinstimmung) between the results of his own philosophy in its early presentation of 1818 and the Buddhist outlook on the world and the human being in it, which Schopenhauer came to know and appreciate only years later. Schopenhauer’s point about the relation between his own thinking and Buddhist thought is the shared truth value of both outlooks on life, which yet were obtained independent of each other and which thus function as mutually effective modes of confirmation. Schopenhauer’s rejection of causal categories such as biographical “influence” (Einfluß) and “effect” (Wirkung) for his own assessment of his relation to Buddhism, in favor of a claimed objective agreement between the two outlooks only discovered ex post, calls into question the suitability of a causal-biographical account in the parallel case of Schopenhauer’s relation to Hinduist thought. The fact that Schopenhauer knew about Hinduist philosophy and religion when working on the first edition of The World as Will and Representation does not by itself establish an essential formative influence of Hinduism on Schopenhauer’s philosophical outlook and its articulation in a system of philosophy centered on the prevalent affirmation and the rare denial of the “will to life” (Wille zum Leben). And even if one were to consider such an early shaping influence on the part of Hinduist thought, there would have to have been a predisposition in Schopenhauer’s thinking at the time in order for the influence to have an influence and for the effect to have an effect. Put in term of Schopenhauer’s own account of causality,7 for causation to occur, it is necessary but not sufficient that there is a cause present. There also has to be the susceptibility on the part of the entity to undergo causation for such a cause to take effect. Drawing on Immanuel Kant’s earlier account of causation in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Schopenhauer terms the predispositional, virtual basis for actual causation, “character.”8 The term “character” is to be taken generically and is employed to designate the potential of a being for undergoing specific causal influences. In the case of the human character the cause

6 7 8

W II, p. 186. E, p. 29 et seqq. E, p. 47 et seqq.

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my take the form of a motive, in which case the causation is operative through the medium of cognition.9 By analogously extending the relation between cause and character from beings, including human beings, to the creative process and to the production of cultural artifacts, the intellectual predisposition of Schopenhauer’s emerging philosophical system to a possible causal influence by Hinduist thought can be considered the underlying character of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Only if the characteristic preparation was in place on the part of Schopenhauer’s basic mode of thinking, could there be, or have been, a causal and, more specifically, motivational influence of Hinduist thinking on Schopenhauer’s thinking. By definition such a prior philosophical potential for subsequent influential activation precedes any specific influence by the future activator. In his theory of causation Schopenhauer maintains that the systematic priority of character over cause attests to character, including the human character, being innate and constant. Analogously, the character of a philosophical system may be considered comparatively fixed with regard to its subsequent articulation and modification. No matter how far reaching the later influences on it may turn out to be, they will not change the system’s basic outlook – its character, so to speak – but only bring it out and possibly aid in developing it more fully. To be sure, unlike in cases of natural causation, including the causation involved in human action, the basic character of the philosophical system that Schopenhauer eventually developed need not have inborn in a literal sense. For purposes of critically rethinking the nature and extent of the influence of Hinduist thought on the early Schopenhauer, it suffices to assume the prior formation of his thinking, in advance of his acquaintance with Indian philosophy and religion and, as it were, in preparation for such subsequent occasioning influence. (II) The Empire of the Will In looking for the prior philosophical outlook that predisposed Schopenhauer to his enthusiastic and affirmative reception of Indian thought in general and of Hinduist philosophy and religion in particular, one has to take into account the genesis of Schopenhauer’s philosophical system in classical German philosophy, especially in Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Its petu9

E, p. 31 et seq.

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lant polemics against the “professor philosophy of the philosophy professors” (Professorenphilosophie der Philosophieprofessoren) notwithstanding, Schopenhauer’s system of philosophy, as completely contained in the first edition of The World as Will and Representation from 1818, is an integral, if aberrant part of the post-Kantian philosophical development known as German idealism. Not only does Schopenhauer, who was born in 1788, share with his rough contemporaries, Fichte, born in 1768, Schelling, born in 1775 and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, born in 1770, the ambition of transforming Kant’s critique of reason into a critical system of philosophy. Schopenhauer was in effect the first one among them to actually present and publish a complete philosophical system, comprising epistemology, natural philosophy, aesthetics and ethics. Moreover, Schopenhauer shares with Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel the conviction that human existence in its final purpose or “vocation” (Bestimmung) is not exhausted by the natural world in space and time. Finally, the focus of Schopenhauer’s philosophy on the will, is prepared by the central role of the will and of willing in Kant, Fichte and Schelling, for whom willing and the will figure as the factual and normative core of human existence. Even Schopenhauer’s extrapolation of the will from an anthropological (or psychological) principle to a cosmological principle – from the human will to the “world as will” – and the concomitant dissociation of the will from practical reason, and all reason, is prefigured in Schelling’s voluntaristic metaphysics according to which “willing is the prototype of being” (Wollen ist Ursein; On Human Freedom [1809]). What Schopenhauer adds to the contemporary post-Kantian development is a resolute atheism and the resulting philosophical ambition to keep his entire system free of religious and theological prejudices and presuppositions. The very title of Schopenhauer’s main work indicates the systematic absence of God or the divine being from the conception and execution of his philosophy. Of the three traditional metaphysical themes that had oriented and motivated Western thought throughout the modern era – God, the soul and the world – only the world is left over as the object of Schopenhauer’s philosophy with its dual cosmological perspective of will and representation. God is entirely left out of the picture of the world as will and representation, and the soul is transformed from an independent metaphysical entity into the subject of representation always to be considered in its essential correlation with the object so represented.

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To be sure, Schopenhauer’s atheism is not a reductive naturalism or materialism that denies the existence of anything other than matter located in space and time and moving or being moved in space and over time. Following Kant (as well as Fichte and Schelling), Schopenhauer conceives of the spatio-temporal realm (“world as representation”) as limited and enclosed by a surrounding and encompassing realm outside of space and time – and independent of the latter’s laws, chiefly among them the principle of sufficient reason (“world as will”). But unlike Kant and his earlier successors, who had tied the supersensible realm to a superhuman, divine ground (“the unconditional”, “the absolute”) and so maintained the inherent rationality of the world, Schopenhauer dissociates the cosmic will and its world from the basic law of rationality, i. e., the principle of sufficient reason, and maintains the world’s basic character as aimless and endless striving. With the absence of a divine being and an overall rational plan, the world as seen by Schopenhauer is in need of alternative forms of relief from the will’s endless self-affirmation and the ensuing antagonistic particularization of the will in its world and as its world. For Schopenhauer it is the artistic and the ethical forms of life that provide such relief and, for that matter, rescue, salvation or “redemption” (Erlçsung), from the eternally striving and eternally frustrated will. Schopenhauer holds that the transgression of individuality achieved in rare aesthetic and ethic experience removes the aesthetically or ethically deindividualized, “pure” subject of such extraordinary experience from the world as will, thereby also freeing it from the suffering tied up with striving willing. According to Schopenhauer, the systematic basis for the possible evasion from the will is the status of the subject of cognition as the originally independent cognitive function with regard to which the will is an object and hence possibly subject to quasi-logical procedures of abstraction and negation. But Schopenhauer also suggests that the will is not removed from without but suspended in a logically contradictory and really dramatic act of selfdestruction, self-denial or self-negation. Throughout Schopenhauer refers his readers to their own and others’ relevant experiences in the presence of great art, especially tragic art, and under the impression of grave suffering, including one’s own, that may result in the annihilation of the will. Alternatively, the negation of the will may result from the intellectual insight, by means of philosophical analysis and reflection, into the nature of the world as will and that of the will as constitutively frustrated and hence inducing suffering. Lacking any entity that might be known to survive the demise of the will,

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Schopenhauer refers to what remains or appears after the eventual aesthetically, ethically or cognitively achieved removal or suspension of the will as “nothing” (Nichts) – the very word with which also the last book of The World as Will and Representation ends in the work’s original edition.10 (III) Indo-European Thinking While Schopenhauer’s avowed atheism eliminates specifically theological concepts and arguments from the foundation and elevation of his philosophical system, religiously dimensioned terms and teachings are not altogether absent from his philosophy. In particular, the very notion of ethical “salvation” (Erlçsung) from life’s suffering and the final orientation of ethical practice toward the ascetic life and the attitude of “resignation” (Entsagung) is informed by religious traditions, most prominently the teachings of Christianity about the otherworldly destination of human life. Yet Schopenhauer’s affirmatively resorting to religious traditions and teachings is not to be taken as an endorsement of the religion involved. Rather Schopenhauer is selectively appropriating elements of a particular religion, while leaving aside other features of it, thereby subjecting the religion in question to instrumental use for purposes of Schopenhauer’s own philosophical agenda. It is precisely in this context of a selective philosophical appropriation of religious thought that Schopenhauer resorts early on and also later in his work to Hinduist philosophical and religious thought. Rather than engaging with the full spectrum of Hinduist religious practices, he focuses throughout on those aspects of Indian autochthonous philosophy and religion that agree with his own prior position and thereby are suitable to lending support to his own philosophical system. This hermeneutic practice not only removes Schopenhauer’s engagement with India from any attempt to encounter an alien religious culture. It also integrates the selectively appropriated elements of Hinduist philosophy and religion into an essentially Western philosophical system. Most importantly, though, in Schopenhauer Hinduist philosophy and religion, like Christian philosophy and religion, are subject to a critical account of religion in general – and thereby of any and all religion – that assesses the phenomenon of religion with a triple focus on the epis10 W I, p. 487.

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temological status, the ethical purpose and the socio-political function of religion. On Schopenhauer’s analysis, religion responds to the human “need for a trans-empirical significance of life” (metaphysisches Bedrfnis),11 an ultimate dimension of meaning that transcends our banal everyday existence and equally banal eventual disappearance. Religion offers such a philosophical perspective on life in the shape of a “metaphysics of the people” or “popular metaphysics” (Metaphysik des Volkes, Volksmetaphysik), a philosophy (“metaphysics”) tailored to the comprehension level of its recipients and therefore capable of instructing and guiding their ethical conduct and of providing them with solace in the hardships of life and in death.12 Strictly speaking, though, and metaphorically put, religion is never more than “the truth in the cloak of the lie” (die Wahrheit im Gewande der Lge),13 and the priests have to be considered “a strange middle thing between imposters and ethical teachers” (ein sonderbares Mittelding zwischen Betrgern und Sittenlehrern).14 For Schopenhauer Hinduist philosophical and religious thought offers a prime example of the dual nature of religion. The Vedic scriptural traditions are said to represent the esoteric side of Hinduist thought, while the polytheistic popular beliefs manifest its exoteric aspect.15 Schopenhauer shows particular interest in the exoteric, allegorical or mythical teachings of the need for salvation from the “misery of being” (trauriges Daseyn) and of the “transmigration of the soul” (Metempsychose) to its morally conditioned reincarnation based on the individual’s ethical comportment in the previous life.16 He stresses that the dogma of the transmigration of the soul has a moral sense according to which all evil done eventually will be undergone by its very doer and all evil received reflects a prior evil done by the very sufferer.17 The two Hinduist dogmas – or rather “mythological fictions”18 – singled out by Schopenhauer serve the same moral function as the two basic Christians teachings concerning the resignation from the life in this world and the expectation of reward or punishment in the afterlife.19 Schopen11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

P II, p. 355. P II, p. 344, 358 et seq. P II, p. 353. P II, p. 356. P II, p. 235 et seq., 240. P II, p. 424. P II, p. 425. N II, p. 426. P II, p. 405.

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hauer ventures the hypothesis that the exact correspondence between Christianity and Hinduism in that particular but essential regard points to the former’s “somehow Indian origin” (irgendwie indischer Abstammung).20 For Schopenhauer, who here stands in a German tradition dating back to Johann Gottfried Herder (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1784 – 91) and Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel (ber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier; 1806), India is to be regarded as the “fatherland of humankind” (Vaterlande des Menschengeschlechts).21 Hence the significance of Indian thought for the genesis of Schopenhauer’s philosophical system does not reside in specifically Hinduist dogmas and teachings but in a shared outlook on life that links Christian Europe with Hinduist India but that also reduces the specifics of both religious traditions to a generic philosophical core. The Indian influence that Schopenhauer’s thinking underwent is not an event in his own intellectual biography but the, historical or mythological, Indian shaping of European Christianity, which is thus severed from its roots in Judaism and the Near East in general and traced back to India and the Far East.22 References Schopenhauer, Arthur (1988): Parerga und Paralipomena II. In: Arthur Schopenhauer. Smtliche Werke. 4th Ed. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Vol. VI. Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1975): Der Handschriftliche Nachlaß. Vol. I, V. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Frankfurt am Main: Kramer. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1988): Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I. In: Arthur Schopenhauer. Smtliche Werke. 4th Ed. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Vol. II. Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1988): Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung II. In: Arthur Schopenhauer. Smtliche Werke. 4th Ed. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Vol. III. Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1988): Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik. In: Arthur Schopenhauer. Smtliche Werke. 4th Ed. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Vol. III. Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1988): Ueber den Willen in der Natur. In: Arthur Schopenhauer. Smtliche Werke. 4th Ed. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Vol. IV. Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus. 20 N II, p. 404. 21 P II, p. 236. 22 P II, pp. 236, 241.

The Upanisads – ˙ Life and Death Schopenhauer’s Solace of Ram Nath Jha The Upanisads profess: ˙

The Supreme Reality reveals itself to a chosen few. Blessed ones are thus a few.1 Some wise man, however, seeking life eternal, with his eyes turned inward, saw the Self.2

The Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ says: Among thousands of persons, a few endeavour for perfection. Even amongst those, who diligently make effort, know Me a few.3

Arthur Schopenhauer is one of the blessed souls. An inspired person when speaking, his words are simple, comprehensive and inspirational to others. Schopenhauer’s remarks, on the completion of the study of the Upanisads, bear all such characters. ˙ In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupnekhat (Upanisads). It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death!4 ˙

These words are very simple and comprehensive. Though spoken spontaneously and abruptly, they speak everything of the Upanisads. The re˙ marks in themselves are inherent in the following principles: (1) The study of the Upanisads is unique. ˙ (2) Death is not the nullification of life. (3) Death is just a switch over to new life.

1 2 3 4

Kathopanisad I.II.23: “yamevaisa vrnute ten labhyah tasyaisa a¯tma¯ vivrnute ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ tanum swa˙¯m j”. Kathopanisad II.I.1: “kas´ciddhı¯rah pratyaga¯tma¯namaicchat a¯vrttacaksuramrtatva˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ micchan j”. Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ VII.3: “manusya¯na¯m sahasresu ks´cidyatati siddhaye j yatata¯mapi ˙ siddha¯na¯m kas´cinma¯m vetti tattvatah j”. ˙ ˙ Mller 2011, p. 13.

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(4) Knowledge enshrined in the Upanisads, in fact, is the bridge between ˙ life and death. (5) The knowledge of the Upanisads bestows solace in life and also after ˙ life. When a right and ripe person handles something extraordinary; it does not benefit him only, but equally he benefits the thing and also makes it beneficial to others. In literary, especially in philosophical area and even more particularly in spiritual kingdom, if an inept person handles such knowledge, he makes a mess of it and spoils the broth. Keeping this thing in view, an enlightened tradition of interpreters of the inspirational texts of the Vedas reminded and cautioned that such tradition must be understood through interpretations of the perfect scholars otherwise it is likely to sabotage the tradition as well as to oneself. The great Maha¯bha¯rata warns and cautions that we must understand the Vedas through the help of Itiha¯sa (Ra¯ma¯yana and Maha¯bha¯rata) and Pur˙ to misinterpret the Vedas. 5 a¯nas otherwise we are likely to be led stray ˙ Schopenhauer’s remarks just quoted above never fail to get at the essence of the Vedas, hence he deserves to be amongst the worthy traditions of such interpreters. William Butler Yeats who studied the Upanisads under the guidance ˙ of Rabı¯ndrana¯th Tagore and thereafter when he concluded his own world renowned book A Vision he wrote to S´rı¯ Purohit Sva¯mı¯, “Before the end of summer A Vision will be out and only in India can I find anybody who can throw light upon certain of its problems.”6 It also applies to Schopenhauer. After a worthy tradition of interpreters on the Indian side in the form of the Ra¯ma¯yana, the Maha¯bha¯rata and the Pura¯nas and a few oth˙ sa, ers like Ba¯dara¯yana ˙Vya¯sa, A¯di S´an˙kara¯ca¯rya, Ra¯makr˙sna Paramaham ˙ Maharsi Ramana,˙Swa¯mı¯ Viveka¯nanda, Swa¯mı¯ Abheda˙¯˙nanda, Swa¯mı¯ Yo˙ ˙ Sarvepalli ga¯nanda, Ra¯dha¯krisnan and so on, Schopenhauer can be ˙˙ ranked with them from the western world. The purpose of my topic first is to analyze his remarks and then to substantiate them through the relevant texts of the Upanisads. What Arjuna saw in Lord Krsna and Lord Krsna saw˙in Arjuna that ˙ ˙˙ Schopenhauer saw in Upanisadic˙˙seers and their ˙words and Upanisadic ˙ ˙ seers and their words saw in Schopenhauer. An arduous and devoted study of a particular knowledge reveals the real mind of the author of 5 6

˙ hayet j Maha¯bha¯rata, A¯diparva I.1.267: “itiha¯sapura¯na¯bhya¯m vedam samupabrm ˙ jj”. ˙ vibhetyalpas´ruta¯d vedo ma¯mayam praharisyati Sikka 2002, p. 11.

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the subject studied. When Schopenhauer studied the Upanisads with acute curiosity, he as if became face to face with the Upanis˙adic seers ˙ actually, and Upanisadic seers became face to face to Schopenhauer. It, ˙ happens as it is also recognized by the Yogasu¯tra of great PataÇjali.7 The Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ also says that by nourishing one another, one attains the supreme goal.8 When there is such a rendezvous between a devout disciple and divine preceptor, then there is abiding glory, victory, prosperity and enduring morality.9 The coming across of Schopenhauer with the lore of the Upanisads ˙ can be compared with the warm union of the passionate beloved with her intense lover, when they meet, they neither know inside nor know anything outside. Similarly, a realizer identified with the ‘Highest Intelligent Principle’ neither knows anything inside nor anything outside.10 Unless one has realized the depth and height of a particular study, one cannot spontaneously utter the above remarks. In fact, when Schopenhauer got at the culmination of the study of the Upanisads, his curiosity ˙ knew no bound. As the realization of the ‘Highest Principle’ as the ‘Ultimate Reality’ is limitless so the realizer is also expected to have been uplifted to that level of realization. The Brhada¯ranyaka-Upanisad says that ˙ unless you rise to the level of God, ˙you cannot realize ˙God.11 This state is achieved by perpetual prayer and arduous effort as elaborated in the 18th chap. of the Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯. 12 Actually, when he was having pathetic anxiety to get at such lore, he was lucky enough to be chanced by the nature to study of the Upanisads. The nature does bless the seeker what he seeks after. I must say here˙that the scheme of the nature is such as a lover happens to get a lover and a flower happens to get an appropriate garden.13

7 Yogasu¯tra II.44: “sva¯dhya¯ya¯t istadevata¯samprayogah j”. ˙ ˙˙ ˙ bha¯vayantah ´sreyah 8 Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ III.11: “parasparam paramava¯psyatha jj”. ˙ ˙ 9 Ibid. XVIII.78: “yatra yoges´varah krsno yatra pa¯rtho dhanurdharah j tatra ´srı¯rvi˙ ˙jj”. ˙ ˙˙ jayo bhu¯tirdhruva¯ nı¯tirmatirmama 10 Brhada¯ranyakopanisad IV.III.21: “yatha¯ priyaya¯ striya¯ samparisvakto na ba¯hyan˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ samparisvakto kincana veda na¯ntaram evameva ayam purusah pra¯jÇena¯tmana ˙ ˙ ˙ na ba¯hyan˙ kincana veda na¯ntaram […]”. 11 Ibid. IV.I.5: “devo bhu¯tva¯ deva¯napyeti ya evam vidva¯netadupa¯ste”. 12 Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ XVIII.51 – 55. 13 A popular Urdu verse in India: “Dila dhundha leta¯ hai dil-e-dilada¯ra ko j Gula dhundha leta¯ hai gul-e- gulaja¯ra ko jj”.˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙˙

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Upanisads, in fact, were in want of such a student from the west. That ˙ was such a result of the study as can be said to have excelled is why there the study done by eminent scholars of the east and the west. In the above-mentioned remarks Schopenhauer combines intuition and rationality, east and west, world and world beyond. Unless one has gone up to such a highest level of spiritual experience, one cannot synthesize trends, cultures and thoughts. The attitude of synthesis is regarded to be the highest purpose of life even according to the great saintly scholar Ba¯dara¯yana Vya¯sa.14 A very˙ few scholars of the level of Ya¯jÇavalkya, Ba¯dara¯yana etc. have ˙ words of achieved such a caliber which is again found glittering in the Schopenhauer. The researcher knows little of the biography and the works of the great German philosopher, except his remarks about the Upanisads. The researcher does not grumble to have been deprived of the ˙ chance of knowing all about him, for the very brief remarks given by him about the Upanisads are more than sufficient to know the philosoph˙ ical, spiritual and literary depth of this stalwart, because that all is concisely abridged in his remarks. Actually these remarks are the flowering and fruition of Schopenhauer’s intellectual and spiritual development. If someone is well known of the climax of something or a person he can well imagine earlier stages of development of that particular object or person. Is there any need to light a lamp during the midday noon? Generally, it happens during the course of life of every arduous aspirant and also in the course of the history of aspirants of every country which are devoted to the cause of the higher bliss of life. In fact, everyone wants peace in life. Some of them in their endeavours are lucky to get right direction and some of them take such a direction which lands them in further confusion. In India so many attempts were made to search peace in life and life beyond. All except Upanisadic or Veda¯ntic philosophy in their efforts to ˙ find out the summum bonum were led stray and met doom. Ca¯rva¯ka in their search for truth of life reduced themselves to the four elementary bricks i. e. earth, water, fire and air. They found intelligence rising from non-intelligence. What an irrational and abnormal conclusion which reduces man to utter darkness of nihilism. Intelligent individuality as per them evolves suddenly and dissolves suddenly. There is no perpetuity. The universal law ‘As you sow so you reap’ is meaningless 14 Brahmasu¯tra I.I.4: “tattu samanvaya¯t”.

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to them. In fact, philosophy is for solution in life. Instead of solving the problem it adds to peril which is clear from the conclusions of the critique about this system of philosophy. Live happily as long you live. The transient body is to be reduced to ashes. It can never be revived again. Hence borrow and enjoy to your satisfaction.15

The Nya¯ya-Vais´esikas are known for their art of logic and rationality, but ˙ these tools have been used to such destructiveness that in their search for liberation they reduce men to non-conscious state which is almost the same as death, for non-consciousness is also a non-perpetuation of existence. The Sa¯n˙khyas and Yogas in their pathetic anxiety find a final goal of life where man is completely cut off from the world and put into complete isolation (kaivalya). The Upanisads brand this stage as death;16 ˙ hence they never relished this type of achievement. He, verily, had no delight. Therefore he who is alone has no delight. He desired a second.17

The Jainas in their arduous endeavour of austere path of search neither enjoy this world nor the deliverance. In their concept of freedom, a mukta jiva (liberated one) with ananta dars´ana, ananta jÇa¯na and ananta vı¯rya, is of what use if he is confined in isolation. Who will appreciate the dance of a peacock or the singing of a bird in the wilderness? An achievement or an art is of what avail, if it does not serve the purpose. A very popular saying of Hindi goes to appropriate on them.18 Again the Bauddhas in their search for the deliverance first discard the world as full of misery, nothingness and illusion. What they seek after is such which cuts them off from the universal activity. Out of the seven schools discussed above Ca¯rva¯ka is confined to this world. The western world in general sense can also be ranked with Ca¯rva¯ka. The rest of them discarding this world either rush to unconscious state or isolation or to somewhere unknown. 15 A popular verse in Indian philosophical tradition for Ca¯rva¯ka view of life: “ya¯˙ jı¯vet rnam ˙ krtva¯ ghrtam pibet j bhasmı¯bhu¯tasya dehasya punarvajjı¯vet sukham ˙ ˙ ˙ kutah jj”. ˙ ˙ a¯gamanam ˙ ad I.II.1, I.IV.1 – 3; Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ III.23 – 24; Sharma 2011, 16 Brhada¯ranyakopanis ˙ p.˙ 84. ˙ 17 Ibid. I.IV.3: “sa vai naiva reme tasma¯deka¯kı¯ na ramate sa dyitı¯yamaicchat”. 18 A popular saying in Indian knowledge tradition: “Jan˙gala main mora na¯ca¯ kisane dekha¯.”

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However, the final goal, a summum bonum of various schools of Indian philosophy discussed above is not feasible and appealable as even some of their propounders themselves discarded that, as in the case of Navya-Nya¯ya etc. They cut off the chapter of metaphysics and liberation (moksa) from their system and restricted themselves to the theory of epis˙ temology. Nevertheless, the positivistic and practical attitude of Ca¯rva¯ka; the analytical approach of Vais´esikas; the logical theory and procedure of Naiya¯yikas; the discretional ˙ approach of Sa¯n˙khyas; the introspective and yogic theory of Yoga School; the attitude of harmony with all things and ideas and the resolute attitude of Jainas; and the detach-mental attitude of Bauddhas cannot be overlooked and ignored as these when are utilized appropriately are valuable assets for the search of the truth. The truth, according to the Upanisads and the Bauddhas, is indefina˙ nor that nor both nor neither’. ble. Bauddhas say ‘that it is neither this The Upanisads say ‘that it is neither this nor that’. Both of them mean ˙ truth is indescribable and non-comprehensible. But the that the final Bauddhas are amiss somewhere when they discard the world declaring it miserable and transitory (duhkhamaya and ksanabhan˙gura) and thus ˙ of something˙ unknowable. ˙ rush themselves into the confines While on the other hand, the Upanisads viz. Veda¯ntas realize truth as dimensionless ˙ that, is an opportunity for upliftment. and the world evolved from If here [a person] knows it, then there is a truth, and if here he knows it not, there is great loss; hence, seeing or [seeking the Real] in all beings, wise men become immortal on departing from this world.19

The intention of the Upanisads is to direct seeker after truth to realize ˙ ‘Existence-Consciousness-Infinite’ ‘Ultimate Reality’ (brahman) in every animate and inanimate being. Sarvepalli Radha¯krsnan summarizes that ˙˙ ˙ If here on earth, in this physical body, we arrive at our true existence, and are no longer bound down to the process, to the becoming, we are saved. If we do not find the truth, our loss is great, for we, then, are lost in the life of mind and body and do not rise above it to our supramental existence.20

˙ sa¯ and Uttara-Mı¯ma¯m ˙ sa¯ are, in fact, complementary. The Pu¯rva-Mı¯ma¯m ˙ sa¯ guides for the milking of the natural forces of the The Pu¯rva-Mı¯ma¯m world through the peculiar and manifold karmans (yajÇa-, vaidika- and 19 Kenopanisad II.5: “iha cedavedı¯datha satyamasti na cediha¯vedin mahatı¯ vinastih j ˙ ¯ tesu vicintya dhı¯ra¯h pretya¯sma¯lloka¯damrta¯ bhavanti jj”. ˙˙ ˙ bhu¯tesu bhu ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 20 Radhakrishnan 2010, p. 587.

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laukika); as modern scientists are doing these days through their experi˙ sa¯, the Upaments and observations. The knowledge of Uttara-Mı¯ma¯m nisads or Veda¯ntas guide action and behaviour of man after the nature ˙ pattern of ‘Highest Truth’. They say there is no need to discard and the world but to lead here the life on the pattern of ‘Highest Reality’. Truth which goes on creating it but is never stuck anywhere. The Atharvaveda says: The ‘Eternal Truth’ is never bereft of the worldly manifestation nor he beholds them constantly [had he been engrossed, world would have not been changed]. See this wondrous poetry of the world of Divine which neither dies, nor gets old.21

Baldev Raj Sharma, the celebrated author of the newly published book ¯I´sadars´anam (Mananopanisad) beautifully presents the above-mentioned ˙ thought. The continuous cycle of inclination and declination, and equanimity towards attachment and detachment are the way of working of the ‘Supreme Reality’ who neither is stuck up anywhere nor without world.22

The Upanisadic thought was introduced to the western world in the first half of 19th˙ century and this thought influenced scholars of different disciplines especially modern scientists. John Archibald Wheeler (1911 – 2008), a Princeton University physicist, expresses his view about the Upanisads: ˙ My wonderful mentor, Niels Bohr, had gone into deep interest into the Upanishads – more, he told me, in the questions than in the answers. I like to think that someone will trace out how the deepest thinking of India made its way to Greece and from there to the philosophy of our times.23

The answer lies in the great effort of Schopenhauer, who went through the first Latin translation of Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron on Oupnek’hat/Upanisad published in 1801 and 1802, in two volumes and made it his own ˙philosophy. Friedrich Max Mller writes: Schopenhauer not only read this translation carefully, but he makes no secret of it, that his own philosophy is powerfully impregnated by the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads.24 ˙ na jaha¯ti anti santam ˙ na pas´yati j pas´ya devasya 21 Atharvaveda X.8.23: “anti santam ˙ na mama¯ra na jı¯ryati jj”. ka¯vyam ˙ yo na tallı¯no na taddhı¯nah j”. 22 Sharma 2011, p. 152: “jaganna¯thasya¯nusa¯ri sarvam ˙ 23 Jitatmananda 2006; Wheeler’s letter published on the second flap. 24 Mller 2011, p. 12.

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Schopenhauer’s analysis and presentation of Upanisadic thought in west˙ ern terminology attracted a number of modern scientists. Erwin Schrçdinger, one of the founding scientists of Quantum Physics, goes on saying: I had accepted a post as a lecturer in theoretical physics in Czernowitz and had already envisaged spending all my free time acquiring a deeper knowledge of philosophy, having just discovered Schopenhauer, who introduced me to the Unified Theory of the Upanishads.25

A similar view finds mention in the writing of Albert Einstein, though not naming Schopenhauer directly: It has been my greatest ambition to resolve the duality of natural laws into unity. The purpose of my work is to further this simplification, and particularly to reduce to one formula the explanation of the gravitational and electromagnetic fields. For this reason I call it a contribution to ‘a unified field theory.26

It was so because Einstein had great respect for Schopenhauer. Quoting Schopenhauer’s saying ‘A man can do as he wills, but not will as he wills’, Einstein said, It has been the real inspiration to me since my youth; it has been a continual consolation in the face of life’s hardship, my own and others and an unfailing wellspring of tolerance.27

Einstein and his spiritual initiator, Schopenhauer, were both not only inspired by the study of the Upanisads (Veda¯nta) but like Vedic seers, both ˙ to unfold its mysteries. They looked took up the world as a great book into the world, its beings, things, forces and all phenomena and finally got at the key to open the complicated and gigantic lock of world of nature to unfold the mysterious essence underlying it. They realized that beginning, change and the end of the things in the world, rather of the whole world, are very significant keys to get to the mysterious principle. The Vedic seers directly saw that the beginning, sustenance and end of the things are here, it is there (in other world) and it is everywhere. The orderliness, in this scheme of worldly change, points to some in-lying, underlying and constantly controlling conscious principle which is beyond all comprehensions and worldly limitations. Einstein presents above thought through his own words: 25 Schrçdinger 2010, p. 169. 26 Isaacson 2007, p. 342. 27 Isaacson 2007, p. 391.

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To sense that behind anything that can be experienced there is something that our mind cannot grasp, whose beauty and sublimity reaches us indirectly: this is religiousness. In this sense and in this sense only, I am devotedly religious man.28 We are in the position of a little child entering a huge library filled with books in many languages. The child knows someone must have written those books. It does not know how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. The child dimly suspects a mysterious order in the arrangement of books but does not know what it is. That, it seems to me, is the attitude of even the most intelligent human being toward God. We see the universe marvelously arranged and obeying certain laws but only dimly understand these laws.29

The parallel of the above-mentioned statement and thought of Einstein can be clearly explored in the preaching of the Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ : The ear, the eye, the skin, the tongue, the nose and the mind, using these instruments, the ‘Supreme Reality’ enjoys the sense-objects. Abiding in the body, departing from one body to another body and enjoying the object of the senses of gunas [three dynamic principles of the Nature] are not seen by the deluded,˙ but those who are endowed with the eye of knowledge they alone can see.30

Thus the words of Schopenhauer, inspired by the Upanisads, became bea˙ con light for some of the great modern physicists such as Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrçdinger, Robert Oppenheimer, Fritjof Capra and so on and they were inspired to take up the study of the Upanisads. After having studied the Upanisads some of the scientists ˙ ˙ realized during their probe that what they aspire to enquire from mysteries of the nature, they are already in the seeric words of the Upanisads. ˙ The statements of Oppenheimer are worth-mentioning in this context: The general notions about human understanding […] which are illustrated by discoveries in atomic physics are not in the nature of things wholly unfamiliar, holly unheard of, or new. Even in our own culture they have a history, and in Buddhist and Hindu thought a more considerable and central place. What we shall find is an exemplification, an encouragement, and a refinement of old wisdom.31

Schopenhauer gets credit of this all by unlocking the treasure of wisdom of the Upanisads and inspiring some of the great minds of western world. ˙ 28 29 30 31

Isaacson 2007, p. 387. Isaacson 2007, p. 386. Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ XV.9 – 10. Capra 1991, p. 22.

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The quest for Upanisadic thought among modern scientists and their di˙ towards spiritual kingdom validates the following rection of experiments statement of Schopenhauer: In India, our religion will now and never strike root: the primitive wisdom of the human race will never be pushed aside there by the events of Galilee. On the contrary, Indian wisdom will flow back upon Europe and produce a thorough change in our knowing and thinking.32

In conclusion, it can be said that the remarks of Schopenhauer link rationality and intuition, world and world beyond, east and west together, rather he visualizes an inter-stellar and multi-cosmic relations (vasudhaiva kutumbakam). See the depth of the remarks, see the unifying force, and see˙ the synthesis which refutes all differences because of religion, caste, creed, races, countries, nationalities and because of political conflicts. How relevant are his remarks in the present state of affair of turmoil. He shows a beacon light in the utter darkness where and when the aspirant is groping in the dark. O Schopenhauer! You are great, your thoughts are great, your words are illuminating and they show a path to the utterly confused world. Thank you and thank to Germany which was really fortunate to have a distinguished personality to have been born there. The seeric knowledge of the east was grasped and realized by you and it was transferred to the western world in their language, style and according to their cultural stereo-type set up. The researcher once again thanks the rsis (seer) like philosopher of the ˙˙ west, particularly of Germany that it is because of his remarks that he got inspired and took up his remarks as desideratum and the result is this paper. References Capra, Fritjof (1991): The Tao of Physics. London: Flamingo. Gambhı¯ra¯nanda, Swa¯mı¯ (Transl.) (1993): Brahmsu¯trabha¯sya of S´¯ı S´an˙kara¯ca¯rya. ˙ Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama. Gambhı¯ra¯nanda, Swa¯mı¯ (Transl.) (2000): Bhagavadgı¯ta¯ with the Annotation Gu¯d˙ ha¯rthadı¯pika¯. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama. Isaacson, Walter (2007): Einstein: His Life and Universe. New York: Pocket Books. Jitatmananda, Swami (2006): Modern Physics and Vedanta. Mumbai: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. 32 Mller 2011, p. 14.

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Mller, Friedrich Max (Ed.) (2011): Upanishads. Delhi: Vijay Goel Publisher. Prabhava¯nanda, Swa¯mı¯/Isherwood, Christopher (1981): PataÇjali Yogasu¯tra. Transl. by Sri Ramakrishna Math. Hollywood, CA: Vedanta Press. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli (2010): The Principal Upanisads. New Delhi: Harper ˙ Collins. Schrçdinger, Erwin (2010): What is Life? London: Cambridge University Press. Sharma, Baldev Raj (2011): ¯I´sadars´anam (Mananopanisad). Delhi: Shivani Pra˙ kashan. Sikka, Shalini (2002): W.B. Yeats and the Upanisads. New York: Peter Lang. Vedavyasapranita (2009): Maha¯bha¯rata of Vedavya¯sa. Vol. I-VI. Gorakhpur: Gita Press.

Suspected of Buddhism – ´San˙kara, Da¯ra¯sekoh and Schopenhauer ˙ Michael Gerhard In March, 1814, Schopenhauer encounters the Oupnek’hat. For him, its reading appears as a signal of the “self-killing” of individuality and “better consciousness”, and thus he writes: Anyone, however, who desires this kind of supplement to the negative knowledge to which alone philosophy can guide him, will find it in its most beautiful and richest form in the O u p n e k h a t […].1

At the time of young Schopenhauer, neither the chronological relation of individual Indian texts to each other was known nor was there any knowledge of development steps of Indian philosophies. Accordingly, Schopenhauer had to imagine the philosophy of the Veda¯nta as a unity, of which, however, he was only interested in ma¯ya¯ and brahman. Then, he essentially understands Brahmanism and Buddhism, which teach man, to regard himself as Brahman, as the original being himself, to whom arising and passing away are essentially foreign […]2

and writes, “the Brahma of the Hindus, who lives and suffers in you and me, in my horse and in your dog”.3 So to speak, Schopenhauer makes brahman a parallel of his own concept of will, when formulating: Brahma produces the world through a kind of original sin, but himself remains in it to atone for this until he has redeemed himself from it. This is quite a good idea!4

But let us turn to Schopenhauer’s reading of 1814 and thus to the Oupnek’hat which has top priority on his reading list. For a sufficient judgment on Schopenhauer’s way of understanding Indian philosophical sys1 2 3 4

WWR II, p. 612 [book I.vi, chap. 48]. Ibid. p. 463 [book II.vi, chap. 41]. FR, p. 184 [chap. V, § 34]. PP II, p. 300 [book II, chap. XII, § 156].

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tems in general and the Upanisads it is not at all enough to compare our present, philologically secured,˙ knowledge of and about the latter, instead it is necessary to pursue Schopenhauer’s own sources, that is AnquetilDuperron’s Oupnek’hat 5 and Da¯ra¯sekoh’s Sirr-i akbar 6, to be able to comprehend the considerations which˙made Schopenhauer develop his ideas. For, Schopenhauer is deeply convinced […] that a real knowledge of the Upanishads and thus of the true and esoteric dogmas of the Vedas, can at present be obtained only from the Oupnekhat; we may have read through the other translations and yet have no idea of the subject. It also appears that Sultan Dara Shikoh had at this disposal much better and more complete Sanskrit manuscripts than had the English scholars.7

Schopenhauer uses the famous Sanskrit-Persian-Latin translation, the Oupnek’hat, a compilation of the texts of 50 Upanisads which, based on a Persian manuscript, was translated into Latin by ˙the French Orientalist Abaham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1737 – 1805), which the latter had been given in 1775 by the French ministerial envoy in Oudh (i. e. Faiza¯ba¯d), Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Gentil.8 One century before, this compilation had been published in the Persian language by the Mogul prince Da¯ra¯sekoh (also Muhammad Da¯ra¯ S´iko¯h, Da¯ra¯ S´uko¯h, Da¯ra¯ ˙ S´iku¯h) with ˙the help of Brahman Panditas and Samnya¯sins. Anquetil˙ ˙ French but ˙does not complete Duperron starts a first translation into it; instead in 1801/02 he presents a complete Latin translation of the Persian manuscript. For all his life Schopenhauer stays to be more than convinced of the honesty and exactness of both translators, however in various contexts he states:

5 6 7 8

Cf. Anquetil-Duperron 1801/02. Cf. Da¯ra¯ Shukoh 1957. PP II, p. 398 [book II, chap. XVI, § 184]. A copy coming from the French traveller to India, Francois Bernier (1620 – 1688). At about 1670, Bernier stays in the Indian Empire of the Moguls. Shortly after this, Anquetil-Duperron receives another manuscript of this translation which he collates with Bernier’s and then makes a first translation into French. It is published incompletely, as a sample of four pieces in Anquetil-Duperron 1786, p. 297 – 344. There he also announces the forthcoming publication of the rest of the translation. However, it is delayed by another one and a half decade, as he comes to the insight that Latin is closer to Persian and that thus a better adjustment of the language is possible.

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All this lessens my confidence in such translations especially when I remember that the translators pursue their studies as a profession, whereas the noble Anquetil-Duperron did not seek a living here, but was urged to undertake this work merely through love of science and knowledge. I also reflect that sultan Dara Shikoh’s reward was to have his head cut off by his imperial brother Aurangzeb, in majorem Dei gloriam [‘For the greater glory of God’ – M.G.].9 Further, when I see with what profound veneration, in keeping with the subject, Anquetil-Duperron handled this Persian translation, rendering it word for word into Latin, accurately keeping to the Persian syntax in spite of the Latin grammar, and content merely to accept the Sanskrit words left untranslated by the Sultan in order to explain these in a glossary, I read this translation with the fullest confidence, which is at once delightfully confirmed.10 [334] I believe that the whole of von Bohlen’s11 discredited falsification of the Oupnekhat is traceable to a few Moslem marginal notes which a transcriber [Previously struck out: “the translator or” – M.G.] incorporated into the text. But this text itself seems to be more complete and coherent and also more accurately translated than Colebrooke’s12.13 Now if I compare this with the European translations of sacred Indian texts or of Indian philosophers, then (with very few exceptions, such as the Bhagavadgita by Schlegel and some passages in Colebrooke’s translations from the Vedas) these have the opposite effect on me. They furnish us with periods whose sense is universal, abstract, vague, and often indefinite, and which are disjointed and incoherent. I get a mere outline of the ideas of the original text with little pieces of padding, wherein I notice something for9 PP II, p. 397 et seq. [book II, chap. XVI, § 184]. 10 Ibid., p. 396 [book II, chap. XVI, § 184]. 11 “[60] With the migration of the German tribes, the Goths probably brought from India the German language and the Gothic style of architecture. The old German Himilon and Himile for Himmel (heaven) and the Himilaya, as it were, Olympus, Himmel, the seat of the gods, – are certainly cognate. Himalaya means snow-clad mountains, from Hima (snow) and Alaya (dwelling), from Bohlen’s Indien Vol. I, p. 11 [Peter von Bohlen, Das alte Indien, Kçnigsberg 1830].” MSR IV, p. 105 [HN IV, p. 84]. 12 “–, –: Miscellaneous Essays. Vol. I.II. London: Wm. H. Allen & Co. 1837. […] By this is appears that the content of a Veda may be resolved, in its Sanhita & its Upanishad, or liturgical & dogmatical part. – p. 47: This H e stands for i t , referring to the soul i. e. Atma, but ‘H e ’ is an odious Jewish insinuation. The Oupnekhat version is infinitely better throughout. – p. 48: Terms of Jewish adulation, foreign to the text & spirit of the holy Veda. – p. 84: This English version seems to be more correct, in several places, than the Latin; yet it is spoil’d in the main point, by having ‘soul’ for A t m a which confers a false notion: therefore the Latin version very wisely retains the word A t m a , as likewise all other appellations for notions not current in Europe.” [HN V, p. 324]. 13 MSR IV, p. 152 [HN IV, p. 128].

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eign. Contradictions appear from time to time and everything is modern, empty, dull, flat, destitute of meaning, and occidental. It is Europeanized, Anglicized, Frenchified, or even (what is worst of all) enveloped in a fog and mist of German. Thus instead of furnishing us with a clear and definite meaning, they give us mere words that are diffuse and high-sounding.14

And it is precisely these “Moslem marginal notes”, a transcriber’s distortion according to Schopenhauer, at which we would like to have a closer look. The Latin translation presented by Anquetil-Duperron is based on the Persian transcription of a selection of Upanisads which in the 17th ˙ Mogul ruler Akbar century are due to the environment of the liberal ‘The Great’ (1556 – 1605). The translation itself is related to the oldest son of Mogul ruler S´a¯hg´aha¯n˙ (1592 – 1666), Da¯ra¯sekoh (1615 – ˙ programme 1659),15 who feels obliged to Akbar’s religious-philosophical and as early as in 1654/55 writes a work on the theological reconciliation of Hinduism and Islam, the Majma’ al-Bahrayn (Two Oceans Flowing into ˙ himself not only as a supOne). Furthermore, Da¯ra¯sekoh distinguishes ˙ porter of the arts, of architecture and literature, but is himself a skillful calligrapher, poet, author of religious-philosophical texts on Sufism16 as 14 PP II, p. 397 [book II, chap. XVI, § 184]. “The genuineness of the Oupnek’hat had been disputed on the grounds of some marginal glosses that were added by Mohammedan scribes and got into the text. But its genuineness is wholly vindicated by the Sanskrit scholar F. H. H. Windischmann (Junior) in his Sancara, sive de theologumenis Vedanticorum [Sancara, or Concerning the Sacred Literature of the Vedas], 1833, p. XIX, and similarly by Bochinger, De la vie contemplative chez les Indous [On the Contemplative Life of the Hindus], 1831, p. 12. – Even the reader unfamiliar with Sanskrit can convince himself clearly, by comparing the recent translations of individual Upanishads, by Rammohun Roy, Poley, even the one by Colebrooke, and also the most recent Rçer, that Anquetil’s strictly literal rendering into Latin of the Persian translation by the martyr of this doctrine, Sultan Dara Shikoh [Darashakoh], was based on a precise and complete understanding of the words; and that, by contrast, those others have been helped to a great extent by groping and guessing, so that they are quite certainly much more imprecise. – More detail on this can be found in the second volume of Parerga, ch. 16, § 184.” TfP, p. 251 [E, § 22]. 15 Cf. Narain 1913 – 1914; Chand 1943; Qanungo 1952; Hasrat 1953. 16 (1.1) Safı¯nat al Awliya¯’: 1049; 1639 (Ship of Saints) contains more than 400 short biographies Su¯fi saints of various Orders, of Muhammad the Prophet as well as ˙ ¯’: 1052; 1642 (Tranquility of of his wives ˙and daughters; (1.2) Safı¯nat al’ Awliya Saints, cf. Da¯ra¯ Shukoh 1965) includes 28 biographies, most of all of contemporary Qa¯dirı¯ Su¯fi, Da¯ra¯sekoh’s teacher and other disciples; (1.3) Hasana¯t al’A¯rifı¯n: 1062; 1652 ˙(Values of ˙Gnostics) contains a collection of ecstatic ˙announcings (s´athiyya¯t) of Su¯fi-Saints from the 11th century up to in zu Da¯ra¯sekoh’s lifetime; ˙˙ ˙ ˙

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well as a remarkable translator of some important Sanskrit works into the Persian language. Since childhood he has been interested in the Order of the Qa¯diriyya Su¯fi Silsila, to which he is indeed admitted at about 1639/ ˙ 40 by Hazrat Mian Mir under the name of Qa¯dirı¯.17 In his religious-philosophical writings he reveals himself as a supporter of the Islamic wahdat ˙ al-wuju¯d-doctrine, the “doctrine of the unity of being”.18 Finally, Da¯ra¯se˙ koh’s basically tolerant attitude towards religious-philosophical questions makes him study Hinduism, as well as have a number of inter-religious talks with the Hinduist Yogi Ba¯ba¯ La¯l Da¯s (also Ba¯ba¯ La¯l Baira¯gi).19 Accordingly, between 1657 and 1659, together with Hinduist Sanskrit scholars from Va¯ra¯nası¯, he translates the above mentioned 50 Upanisads ˙ ˙ (1.4) Tarı¯qat al-haqı¯qat (?), Poetry and prose of mystic doctrines; (1.5) Risa¯la-i ˙ 1646 (Clime of Truths, cf. Da¯ra¯ Shukoh 1956.), a text sketchHaqq ˙numa¯’: 1056; ˙ Su¯fi-meditation in theory and practice; (1.6) a Dı¯wa¯n (incomplete) and a ing ˙ compilation of Ruba¯‘ı¯s give evidence to interest in poetry and calligraphy; (2.1) Majma’ al-Bahrayn: 1065; 1655 (Two Oceans Flowing into One), reli˙ on Muslim and Hinduist mysticism; (2.2) Yogava¯sista gious-scientific study and Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯, two translations; (2.3) Muka¯lama-i Ba¯ba¯ La¯l wa Da¯˙˙ra¯ S´ukoh, conversation between the Hindu saint Ba¯ba¯ La¯l and Da¯ra¯ S´ukoh; (2.4) Sirr-i akbar: 1067; 1657 (The Great Secret, cf. Da¯ra¯ Shukoh 1957.). 17 However, Mulla¯ S´a¯h Badakhs´i from Kas´mı¯r is given as Da¯ra¯sekoh’s spiritual men˙ Qa¯diriyya Su¯fi Siltor, the spiritual successor of the famous Hazrat Mian Mir in ˙ sila. The notes on this in App 2006, 41 and in the preface of the Oupnek’hat are incomprehensible. For reasons of his biography, Da¯ra¯sekoh (1615 – 1659) cannot have “known” Muhyi id-Din al-Saykh al-Akbar Ibn ˙’Arabi (1165 – 1240); also, ˙ Guru”, nevertheless his religious-philosophMulla¯ S´a¯h Badakhs´i is not a “Hindu ical orientation follows the great tradition of a (neo)-Platonic-Plotinic-ancient Persian mixture. 18 The doctrine of wahdat al-wuju¯d supports the position that only “this one truth” is true and that it is˙ God. The world of phenomena emerges from ’adem (Pers.), from non-being, to wuju¯d (Pers.), being an idea which is already formulated by Muhyi id-Din al-Saykh al-Akbar Ibn ’Arabi, however not yet terminologically ˙ not mix up this doctrine with Pantheism; for if in Panthegrasped. But we may ism God is within everything, in wahdat al-wuju¯d God stays to be God and the ˙ and phenomenology has no existence by phenomenon stays to be phenomenon, itself or without the existence of God. 19 From these conversations there emerge the writings Su¯’a¯l-o-jawa¯b Da¯ra¯ Shuko¯h-o Ba¯ba¯ La¯l Da¯s (1652, The Conversation of Da¯ra¯ Shuko¯h and Ba¯ba¯ La¯l Da¯s) and Majma’ al-Bahrayn (1654/55, Two Oceans Flowing into One, cf. Da¯ra¯ Shukoh ˙ 2006), two important comparative, religious-philosophical works of a kind of Islam of the time which is oriented towards reconciliation. Later, Da¯ra¯sekoh is accused of this as an alleged heresy and (apart from others) it results in ˙his execution.

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and publishes this compendium under the title of Sirr-i akbar (The Great Secret). For Da¯ra¯sekoh, these Upanisads and the Qur’a¯n represent both sides of one coin,˙ as they reflect the˙ one absolute by its different ways of expression.20 Accordingly, in the preface to Sirr-i akbar he attributes the status of the Upanisads a kita¯b-i maknu¯n, a work “deserving protec˙ tion”, a kind of appreciation which in the orthodox sense is reserved to the Qur’a¯n only.21 The Persian target text of the Oupnek’hat is characterized by a high degree of Sanskritized Persian artificial terms, as probably Da¯ra¯sekoh himself uses them for his own understanding.22 Anquetil-Duperron˙ will later give a list of these artificial terms for his Latin translation.23 But many Sanskrit terms are so artificially transliterated into Persian that there are hardly recognized as such. Also, the translation partly contains longer paraphrases and commenting excerpts which, as far as being im-

20 However, in India in the mid-17th century this thought is neither unique nor new, as it had been stated by Muhyi id-Din al-Saykh al-Akbar Ibn ’Arabi, as early as in the 13th century, as mentioned above. ˙It seems as if Da¯ra¯sekoh was familiar neither with the contemporary Hinduistic terminology of the˙ na¯tha, a heterodox siddha samprada¯ya-tradition (an oral tradition of “self-realization”) ˙ “one master” (S´iva, maha¯deva, mahes´vara – play on who seek refuge with words: skrt. na¯tha means masculine “master” and feminine “refuge”) nor with that of dvaita¯dvaitava¯da respectively the philosopheme of Quddus Gangohi (also Alakhbani, a Su¯fi-saint of the 15th century) and his Rusdnama, although ˙ ˙ in respect of the history of thought he is based on these traditions. 21 What makes this honorary title conspicuous is the singular for kita¯b-i maknu¯n? That what these days appears as a selection of 50 Upanisads, must have been con˙ thought by Da¯ra¯sekoh. sidered a unity, one work, at least a closed complex of ˙ Also Schopenhauer follows this wrong interpretation. 22 Examples for this are Upanisad for Oupnek’hat (muna¯ja¯t is the common term, Oupnek’hat may come from a˙ North Indian dialect), Rgveda for Rak Beid, purusa ˙ Om ˙ ˙ for Allah also. for pors´, avidya¯ for aoudia, acha¯rya for tsaredj or even ˙ ˙ 23 Anquetil-Duperron 1801/02, p. 7 – 12, excerpt, abecedarian: Athrban Beid for liber quantus alhi (divinus), Atma for djan (anima) animarum, Aoudi for insipientia et non scientia (inscitia), Brahm for creator, Brahmand for orbis mundi, Brahmen for narratio () Beid (excerpta), Dji tma for spiritus (anima) universalis, cum corpore (conjunctus corpori), Maxa for voluntas æterna, quod causa ostensx sine fuit (existenti) est, Mantr for optimum (pars purion) ty˜ Beid, Pram tma for djan (anima) magna, Pran for respiratio (halitus, anima, t» Nnμm), Sak’hepat for mundus djabrout (empyrium, angelico superior), quod status somni cum quiete est, Tschat for khatter (cor, animus, desiderium, amor). Also Schopenhauer will make such a list, now, however, extended by Latin. m

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portant for Schopenhauer, can be related to the advaita-veda¯nta-philosopher S´an˙kara (ca. 788 – 820).24 Furthermore, somewhat neglected is the fact that Sirr-i akbar and also Da¯ra¯sekoh himself belonged to a long intellectual tradition of a debate ˙ Islam and Hinduism which eventually results in Su¯fi mysticism. between Its beginnings are to be found in Persia in the 9th century˙ with the antipodic Persian mystics Husayn Mansu¯r-e Halla¯g (858 – 922), Abu Yazid ˙ as well as G ˙ unaid of Bagal-Bista¯mı¯ (also Ba’ezid Bista¯mı¯, died in 875) ˙ ˙ dad (died in 910). With these Su¯fi mystics as his background, Da¯ra¯sekoh ˙ ˙ in the 17th century is at the intellectual peak of a long and fruitful debate between Persian-Indian Islam and Buddhism and Brahmanism, which can be summarized as follows:25 (1) The influence of Buddhist speculation: non-inherence26 (Sanskrit: nirva¯na, Persian: laisı¯’ah / fana¯’), (2) The ˙influence of Brahmanic speculation: illusion (Sanskrit: ma¯ya¯, Persian: hud’ah), ˙ (3) The identification of the single and the whole: “this is you”, “He is He” (Sanskrit: tat tvam asi, Persian: huwa-huwa), (4) Eternal living/experiencing within the original unity (Sanskrit: a¯nanda, Persian: baqa¯ wahda¯nı¯’ah), ˙ within diversity” (Sanskrit: bheda¯bheda, Per(5) The doctrine of “unity sian: wahdat al-wuju¯d). ˙ 24 Namely, these are the ‘Great Upanisads’, commented on by S´an˙kara, just as Brha˙ ¯ ndogyopanisad(bha¯sya), but also the ‘Small ˙ da¯rananyakopanisad(bha¯sya) and Cha ˙ Aitareya-, ¯I´sa-, Katha-, ˙ Kena-, ˙ Upanis˙ads’ like ˙Taittirı¯ya-, Mundaka-, Pras´na-, ˙ du¯kyopanisad(bha¯sya) are found in the ˙ text. Cf. Hasrat ˙ ˙ 1953, p. 258 and Man ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ et seqq. In my opinion, Bikrama Jit Hasrat gives good evidence to influence by S´an˙kara, even if Wilhelm Halbfass marginalizes him (cf. Halbfass 1981, 49). However, the objective recipient will not at once recognize that in most cases exchanging the original text for the actual comment even serves for making the statements clearer. However, of course the comment by S´an˙kara is an interpretation, and thus this exchange prescribes a certain philosophical interpretation, that is that of advaita-veda¯nta-philosophy and not the original text anymore. Even if Da¯ra¯sekoh himself is in principle closer to the Hinduistic doctrine of dvaita¯dvai˙ (“dual-non-dual-doctrine”, also bheda¯bhedava¯da: “difference-non-differtava¯da ence-doctrine”) of Nimba¯rka or Kes´ava Kas´mı¯rin, advaita-veda¯nta (“non-dualdoctrine”) meets Schopenhauer’s intentions. 25 Cf. Gerhard 2008a, p. 119 et seqq. 26 Cf. also Gerhard 2011.

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“Praised be the Being, that among whose eternal secrets, is the dot in the (@) of the Bismilla¯h […].”27 Da¯ra¯sekoh’s translating work is done without ˙ of Islamic dogmatic orthodoxy. The being noticed, as he lives in a period religious-philosophically and religion-politically liberal atmosphere under Akbar and his work as a translator28 were over, and that what he had ˙ aha¯ngı¯r achieved was step by step reversed under his successors, G ´ (ruled 1605 – 1627) und Sa¯hg´aha¯n˙ (1627 – 1658). Stimulated to study non-Islamic writings by Mulla¯ S´a¯h, son of Mulla¯ Abd Muhammad Badah´sa¯nı¯, whom he meets during a journey to Kasmı¯r, ˙ starts familiarizing ˙ ˙ Da¯ra¯sekoh himself with the writings of Hinduism, ˙ apart from the Thora, the Gospels and Psalms, in order of achieving sophistication of the doctrine of tauh¯ıd, the “viewing of perfect unity”. Not only does he consider the Veda to ˙be equal to the Ahl-i kita¯b, a writing of prophetic revelation, but among all writings of revelation he considers the Veda the oldest and the Upanisads the essence of the latter and of tauh¯ıd. ˙ For him, the Upanisads are a ˙comment on the Qur’a¯n. Da¯ra¯sekoh trans˙ ˙ lates the Upanisads also “to solve the mystery which underlies their effort ˙ to conceal it from the Muslims.” This gigantic work of translation is completed after only half a year, on “26. Ramada¯n 1067 [9. July ˙ 29 1657]”, Delhi, Da¯ra¯sekoh’s Palace (Manzil) Nigambodh. ˙ Although Da¯ra¯sekoh’s introductions to several of his works also al˙ ways include autobiographical notes, in none of them he tells how he achieved Sanskrit language skills. In the introduction to Sirr-i akbar he just writes: “[…] he himself […] translated the essential parts of tauh¯ıd, which are the Upanekhat”,30 which does not include a real trans˙ However, he is the author and not the client, as some European lation. scholars believed due to Anquetil Duperron’s rather bad translation of “hod […] tarjomÞ […] na¯mudÞ” as “ipse […] translatum cum ostendisset ˙ 31 (reddidisset)”, so (1) Albrecht Weber (1825 – 1901):

27 Cf. Appendix (I) Hasrat 1953, p. 264; Appendix (II) Anquetil-Duperron 1801/ 02, vol. I, p. 1. 28 Akbar translated the Arthavaveda. 29 Cf. Appendix (I): Hasrat 1953, p. 266; Appendix (II): Anquetil-Duperron 1801/ 02, vol. I, p. 5. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.

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Schah Jehan, disciple of Babu Lal had Hejra 1067 (1656) […] several Pandit [s] come from Benares up to Delhi and had them translate fifty of the most excellent Upanishad into the Persian language to connect the Vednta Doctrine with C ¸ fismus.32

(2) Friedrich Max Mller (1823 – 1900): The Upanishads were translated from Sanskrit into Persian by, or, it may be, for Dr Shukoh, the eldest son of Shh Jehn, an enlightened prince, who openly professed the liberal religious tenets of the great Emperor Akbar, and even wrote a book intended to reconcile the religious doctrines of Hindus and Mohammedans.33

Indeed, Da¯ra¯sekoh had earlier published translations, such as the Yogava¯˙ sistha (1066; 1656/57), but what about his Sanskrit language skills if, ac˙˙ cording to his own evidence, he is not interested in “Arabic, Syrian, Hebrew and Sanskrit”? Indeed, he studies the Qur’a¯n (Arabic), the Gospels and Psalms (Syrian) and the Thora (Hebrew), but of works in Sanskrit he saw only “slovenly translations”34 – was he thus dependent on translations and translators from Sanskrit? Also, his interest in the Upanisads is ˙ stimulated by dealing with Hinduism as a religious community and not by studying Sanskrit texts. However, it may well be that he acquired basic Sanskrit skills by way of already written texts, such as Abu ’l-Fadls A¯’ı¯n-i ˙ akbarı¯ and earlier translations. Thus, the question is: Where the Pandits ˙ and Samnya¯sins from Va¯ra¯nası¯ advisors on translating problems or the ˙ac˙ ˙ tual translators? For the Akbar period, Bikrama Jit Hasrat describes two basic ways of proceeding with translations: (1) the Narrative Method, i. e. the employment of a Pandit by the translator to help him translate a Sanscrit work (2) the Retranslation Method, i. e. to retranslate a Sanskrit work, making an early translation as the basis of the work.35 Da¯ra¯sekoh knew already four translations of the Yogava¯sistha, for exam˙ ˙˙ ple, (a last one by Akbar 1007; 1598/99), so that here we must suggest the “retranslation method”; the situation is similar with his BhagavadGı¯ta¯ translations (1065 – 67; 1657 – 59). For the time being, for his trans32 Weber 1850, p. 254. 33 Mller 1879, vol. I, p. LVII. 34 Cf. Appendix (I): Hasrat 1953, p. 265; Appendix (II): Anquetil-Duperron 1801/ 02, vol. I, p. 4. 35 Hasrat 1953, p. 191.

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lation of Sirr-i akbar only the “Narrative Method” can be taken into consideration, as still today nobody has ever found any earlier translation. Now, if Da¯ra¯sekoh learned about the complete volume of the content ˙ of Sirr-i akbar only after the translation and before had just “heard about” it, as he writes in his introduction to Sirr-i akbar, the (unanswerable) question is left if at the court in Delhi he had a text manuscript or if the Panditas and Samnya¯sins brought – one or several –, which seems to ˙ ˙ suggest ˙itself, due to the extravagant style and composition of the Upanisads of Sirr-i akbar. Also, for one person the span of time of six months is ˙ extremely short for the translation of after all 50 Upanisads. Thus, two ˙ opinions contrast each other: (1) Da¯ra¯sekoh had good Sanskrit language skills, did the translation him˙ for this reached back to Brahmanic advisors. self and (2) Da¯ra¯sekoh used the “Narrative Method”, reached back to Panditas ˙˙ ˙ nya¯sins whose names are not mentioned and who presented and Sam ˙ the text to him in the form of a pre-translation, oral or in writing, so that he was able to translate it into elegant Persian. Most Panditas and Veda scholars at the time spoke Sanskrit as well as Per˙˙ sian, so that at the court in Delhi Da¯ra¯sekoh is well able to reach back to ˙ a philologically educated environment.36 Even if Da¯ra¯sekoh writes in his introduction that he translates into ˙ the Persian language “without any worldly motive, in a clear style, an exact and literal translation of the Upanekhat”,37 we must nevertheless state that precisely in the case of the Pras´nopanisad it is possible to ˙ prove that he made intentional cuts and additions. Indeed, he is intellectually without prejudice towards the “Brahmanic followers of a different faith”, but he approaches the Upanisads with a tauh¯ıd attitude, which of ˙ ˙ course influences his translations. Accordingly, he or the collective of pre36 “The find of a letter by Da¯ra¯sekohs in Sankrit and the translation of the Mag´ma‘ ˙ al-bahrain into Sanskrit underpins sufficiently the environment of Hindu schol˙ ars at the court. When looking through the Mag´ma‘ al-bahrain, a compilation of ˙ we gain the expresPersian-Sanskrit equivalences is conspicuous. However, here sion that Da¯ra¯sekoh just completes a Sanskrit term by an Islamic equivalent as an ˙ the side of Sanskrit he never uses quotations, whereas on the explanation. On side of the Islamic explanations there are conspicuously many of them. For this, lexicographic knowledge is enough; knowledge of the language, its syntax and grammar is not necessary.” Narain 1913 – 14, p. 224. 37 Cf. Appendix (I): Hasrat 1953, p. 265; Appendix (II): Anquetil-Duperron 1801/ 02, vol. I, p. 4.

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translators respectively adjust Vedic stanzas to the thought of the Upanisads and S´an˙kara’s advaita-veda¯nta thought.38 ˙ With the exception of Mundakopanisad I.8, Da¯ra¯sekoh does not give ˙˙ ˙ ˙ any S´an˙kara quotation. This leads to the assumption that maybe at all other passages Da¯ra¯sekoh is not aware of comments by S´an˙kara. He ˙ does not recognize that there he follows less the source than rather the comment on it, if the pre-translating Panditas and Samnya¯sins do not in˙˙ ˙ form him about this. This might explain why in Sirr-i akbar we find passages which are really translated as opposing S´an˙kara. Accordingly, it seems as if partly the Panditas and Samnya¯sins from Va¯ra¯nası¯ follow S´an˙˙˙ ˙ ˙ kara but that also they include their own interpretations, either without Da¯ra¯sekoh being able to notice this or this even meeting his interests if ˙ it happens according to the tauh¯ıd. What now was taken directly from ˙ ´San˙kara, what comes from the sub-comment of A¯nandagiri (9th century), and what is common interpretative knowledge of contemporary Va¯ra¯nası¯ ˙ circles, cannot be decided anymore. That Da¯ra¯sekoh had been provided with a compilation of Upanisads ˙ ˙ and not of different texts becomes obvious from his introduction as well as from consequently using the term Upanisad in the singular.39 It is not ˙ known if this particular compilation is still existent these days. In his Life and Miscellaneous Essays Henry Thomas Colebrook tells: 38 Already Kalika-Ranjan Qanungo points out to this, but he overshoots the mark when suggesting that Da¯ra¯sekoh translated the comment instead of the text: “Instead of translating directly˙ the cryptical sentences of the original text of the Upanishads, he has rendered into Persian the commentary of Sankara on those passages for the sake of accuracy free from ambiguity. It is also interesting to notice his slight adaption of some passages to make things intelligible to Muhammadans for whom particularly this translation was meant. He took much pains to make his work easily intelligible to men of average intellect who had no grounding in Hindu mythology and philosophy. We must say he has eminently succeeded in his attempt. The Sirr-i akbar of Dara Sikuh has not only all the merits of a good translation, but also the compactness and charm of an original work.” Qanungo 1952, vol. I, p. 151. 39 All important and known Upanisads were available for Da¯ra¯sekoh. From viewing ˙ the Upanisads of the Naini manuscript it becomes obvious ˙which Upanisads the ˙ ˙ tradiPanditas and Samnya¯sins from Va¯ra¯nası¯ believed to be important for the ˙ ˙ and to be of˙ interest for Da¯ra¯s˙ekoh. On the other hand, those Upanisads tion ˙ which were not mentioned allow for˙ conclusions in respect of their significance ´ for these circles, namely there are missing: Purusasu¯kta-, Sivasamkalpa-, Tadeva-, ˙ S´aunaka-, A¯˙rseya-, Pranava-, S´atarudriya-, Mrtyula¯n˙gu¯la-, Ba¯skala-, Cha¯galeya-, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ and Pain˙gala-Upanisad. ˙

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[…] in two other copies, which I also obtained at Benares, the arrangement differs, and several Upanishads are inserted, the genuineness of which is questionable; while others are admitted, which belong exclusively to the Yajurveda.40

When translating Sanskrit terms as transcriptions into the Persian language, Da¯ra¯sekoh made some typical mistakes, which allow for conclu˙ sions. If we leave out mistakes in respect of transcribing diacritical marks and copying mistakes, the following aspects are conspicuous: (1) All cerebrals are reproduced as dentals, (2) All differences between guttural, palatal, cerebral and dental nasal sounds have disappeared, (3) v is reproduced as b, y as j, s as kh, ks as ch and jÇ as gy, ˙ ˙ (4) Different groups of consonants are assimilated (sarga from svarga, ¯ı´sar from ¯ı´svara). All these characteristics indicate a text which was listened to and not read. Da¯ra¯sekoh seems to have written the Sirr-i akbar according to his listen˙ ing. At least the way of reproducing is exactly according to the pronunciation of Sanskrit words as it must be expected from Indians speaking Benga¯lı¯ and Avadhı¯.41 Due to all the reasons given, I believe it is possible that Da¯ra¯sekoh ˙ had enough knowledge of Hinduism and relevant Sanskrit terms to have been able to understand pre-translations he was presented, orally 40 Colebrooke 1873, vol. I, p. 84, n. 1; Colebrooke’s observations may actually refer to an original text in Sanskrit, even more as Naini manuscript based his edition also on the oldest manuscript: kita¯b serr akbar, tasnif Da¯ra¯ S´oku¯h, pa¯ds´a¯hsa˙ by Prince ˙ dy Qa¯dirı¯, seney hez´dahom Muhammad S´a¯hı¯ (Sirr-i akbar, a work ˙ Da¯ra¯sekoh Qa¯dirı¯, in the year 18 [after his accession to the throne: 1150; 1737] ˙ ammad S´a¯h [rul. 1719 – 1748]). Other known manuscripts are: Supplof Muh ˙ ment persan 15, Bibliothque Nationale, Paris. Indisches Nasta‘lı¯q, ed. 1162; 1749/50 and Wilson 400, Bodleiana Library, Oxford. Indisches Nasta’lı¯q, ed. 1201; 1787/88 and Jaipur 1852/53 [1910/11 Samvat-Aera], based on manu˙ in three vols. and Sirr-i script 9th century of Muhammad S´a¯h [1193; 1726/27] ˙ akbar, ya’nı¯ targ´uma-i Upanis´adha¯-i har ´caha¯r Ved-i gira¯mı¯, bi-zaba¯n-i fa¯rsı¯ az Muhammad Da¯ra¯ S´ukoh S´a¯hza¯da Dihlı¯ (1909), ed. by Muns´¯ı Brag‘ Mo¯han La¯l,˙ hissa-i awwal, Upanis´adha¯-i Rigved wa Yag´urved. Benares: Medical Hall Press.˙ ˙˙ 41 Almost without exception, those transcriptions as used by Da¯ra¯sekoh belong to ˙ in respect of the important termini technici of Sanskrit, knowledge of which, even their sounds, may well come from his reading of earlier translations, even more as important Sanskrit terms which would definitely have needed to be taken into consideration, are missing.

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or in writing, and to make commenting and explaining additions to them. In this context, the text he had was prepared by a collective of editors, consisting of Panditas and Samnya¯sins from Va¯ra¯nası¯, and accord˙ ˙ background˙ which was oriented ˙ at S´an˙kara’s aing to their educational dvaita-veda¯nta. This topical orientation meets Da¯ra¯sekoh’s ideological in˙ tention, tauh¯ıd, and original understanding. ˙ a question stays open which as far as I know has never been However, asked for the time being, that is how Da¯ra¯sekoh the Muslim succeeded with making orthodox Brahmanic Panditas˙ and Samnya¯sins from Va¯ra¯˙˙ ˙ nası¯, the stronghold of orthodox Hinduistic scholarship, translate sacro˙sanct texts written in the upmarket (because reserved for Brahmins) language of Sanskrit into the profane, as worldly, Persian language for him and together with him. Could it be that they accepted Da¯ra¯sekoh the Qa¯˙ spiritually diriyya Su¯fi on his search for tauh¯ıd as a bhakti pious who was ˙ ˙ akin and that thus they had less prejudices than Western scholars from their Western scientific point of view, are ready to assume? A legend of the great mystic Kabir (1440 – 1518) says that after his death in Maghar near Gorakhpur there had been an argument among his Muslim and Hindu disciples about the question of how he should be laid to rest: burying or cremating? When they drew off the linen cloth, they found only flowers beneath it, which they distributed among themselves. The Muslims buried them, the Hindus cremated them, and both kept his memory. Thus, apart from Anquetil-Duperron’s further highly interpreting and interest-guided translation into Latin, with the Oupnek’hat Schopenhauer in 1814 has a panoptic of a Persian-Islamic-(advaita-)Veda¯ntic mix of ideas in his hands. And all these apparent and true “Vedic truths” tell him that one unicum principium spiritual by its various names: will, fana¯’, brahman, nirva¯na – nothingness; and he writes: ˙ To a certain extent, it can be seen a priori, vulgo it is self-evident, that that which now produces the phenomenon of the world must also be capable of not doing this and consequently of remaining at rest; in other word, that to the present diastok¶ there must also be a sustok¶ [‘Expansion’ and ‘contraction’]. Now if the former is the phenomenon of the will-to-live, the latter will be that of the will-not-to-live. Essentially this will also be the same as the magnum Sakhepat 42 [Sanskrit mah sushuptih, the great and profound ˙

42 “19. Next, when he is in profound sleep, and knows nothing, there are the seventy-two thousand arteries called Hith (charitable), which from the heart spread through the body. Through them he ˙moves forth and rests in the surrounding body. And as a young man, or a great king, or a great Brahmin, having reached

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sleep, the periodical entry of the world into the Brahman.] of the Veda teaching (in the Oupnekhat, vol. i, p. 163), as the Nirvana of the Buddhists, and also the 1p´Áeima [‘The Beyond’] of the Neoplatonists. Contrary to certain silly objections, I observe that the denial of the willto-live does not in any way assert the annihilation of a substance, but the mere act of not-willing; that which hitherto willed no longer wills. As we know this being, this essence, the will, as thing-in-itself merely in and through the act of willing, we are incapable of saying or comprehending what it still is or does after it has given up that act. And so for us who are the phenomenon of willing, this denial is a passing over into nothing.43

However, Schopenhauer could not find this Sakhepat of Veda teaching in Oupnek’hat vol. I, p. 163, as Paul Deussen remarks,44 but only in Oupnek’hat vol. II, p. 128 – 151, i. e. in the Pras´nopanisad IV.7 – 11:45 ˙ the summit of blissfulness, might rest, so does he then rest.” Deussen 1897, p. 411 according to “Brihdaranyaka-Upanishad II, 1, 20” (ibid.) with a view to Anquetil-Duperron 1801/02, vol. I, p. 163. Critical and philological reading: “However, if [the man] is in deep sleep, [susupta] and is not aware of anything ˙ [veda], [the person full of cognition] rests outside, in the heart sac, into which it has slipped through arteries [na¯d¯ı]. These are called hita¯, [their number] is ˙ 72,000, and they run from [the inside of ] the heart towards the outside, to the heart sac. [21] There, [the person] lies at rest in such a [relaxed state] as the young man or a great brahman would lie after having reached the climax of sexual exstacy. [22]” (Brhada¯ranyakopanisad II.1.19 (sic!): “atha yada¯ susupto bhavati yada¯ na kasya cana˙ veda, ˙hita¯ na¯ma˙ na¯dyo dva¯saptatih sahasra¯ni hr˙daya¯t ˙ yatha¯ kuma ˙ ˙¯ro va¯ purı¯tatam abhipratisthante ta¯bhih pratyavasrpya˙ purı¯tati ´sete sa ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ maha¯ra¯jo va¯ maha¯bra¯mano va¯tighnı¯m a¯nandasya gatva¯ ´sayı¯ta evam evaisa etac˙ vol. VIII.V.1 – 2. ˙ chete ||19||”. S´an˙kara 1910, “ – The characteristic of the dream is the condition of sleep peculiar to it, that is to say of a rest from the brain’s normal activity and the resulting unconsciousness for the external environment. Only after the brain’s normal activity has died out and become extinct does the dream first become visible, in just the same way as the picture of the laterna magica first appear after the lights in the room have extinguished. – […] [64] NB. There is the question whether the brain is entirely awake or in normal activity during a vision. It is true that we correctly perceive the environment; but is this done with the eyes in our head? Does there not perhaps exist a state of sleep-waking (Schlafwachen) by dint whereof we really dream the environment, although quite accurately? […] I believe that, in the state of the vision […] we simultaneously perceive the objects of the environment with the inner and outer eyes, but that the pictures are identical precisely as with simple vision with two eyes.” MSR IV, p. 106, 108 [HN IV, p. 86 et seq.]. 43 PP II, p. 312 [book II, chap. XIV, § 161]. 44 “Oupnek’hat Brehdarang,  Djedjr Beid (excerptum)”; “ipso hoc modo omnes sensus, quos cum intr (porsch) tulerat, extr ut superattulit, (homo) experrectus fit, et apparens (exteris) agit.”; “Ipso hoc modo,  pram tmax, qui forma scientiæ est, in tempore magni sak’hepat, [qud (ubi) pram tma] cum figur [origina-

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And as birds go to a tree to roost, O friend, thus all of this rests in the Highest [para-] a¯tman, – [7] […] the mind [manas] and what can be perceived [mantavya], the intellect [buddhi] and what can be conceived [boddhavya], the personality [ahan˙ka¯ra] and what can be personified [ahan˙ka¯rtavya], […] [8] But the spiritual person [purusa]46 here is recognizing by its nature ˙ feeling, hearing, smelling, thinking, [vijÇa¯na¯tman]. He is the agent of seeing, judging and acting. He settles down within the absolute original subject which stays, [9] enters the absolute, the staying. For he it is who sees, hears, smells, tastes, perceives, conceives, acts, he whose essence is knowledge [I ought to read agnaya iva], the person, and he dwells in the highest, indestructible a¯tman, – He who knows that indestructible being, obtains [what is] the highest and indestructible, he without a shadow, without a body, without colour, bright –, yes, O friend, he who knows it, becomes all-knowing, becomes all. On this there is this ´sloka: [10] He, O friend, who knows47 that indestructible being wherein the true knower, the vital spirits [pra¯na¯], to˙ gether with all the powers [deva], and the elements [bhu¯ta]48 rest, he, being all-knowing, has penetrated all. [11].49

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46 47 48 49

li] su manserat, rurs s cum simul vit (comitatu) ty˜ maxa,  capite novo (de novo), post resurrectionem magnum, omnes sensus et omnes mundi, et omnes mokelha (prœpositi), et omnia elementa; qud significatio est, Brahma [In meo ms. Brahmand, orbis muni. Supra N.O II, p. 12.] ad paleam, assurgunt, [In margine: id est, ty˜ sak’hepat subactio (destructio).] et experracta fiunt.” Anquetil-Duperron 1801/02, vol. I, p. 163. “magnum Sakhepat, sanskr. mah sushuptih, ‘the great deep sleep’, the periodical entering of the world into the Brahman. (Oupnek’hat, vol. I, p. 163, accordingly Brihdaranyaka-Upanishad II, 1, 20, where, however, only physical deep sleep is mentioned, and where the Persian commentators inserted the application on the great deep sleep of the world from the dogma of Vednta, cf. Sechzig Upanishad’s, p. 411 and System of Vednta, p. 256, as well as Deussen, Gesch. d. Phil. Abt. II, p. 202 und III, p. 47.).” Schopenhauer 1913, p. 739. “Oupnek’hat Porsch [Supr, Tom. I, N.O III, p. 13, Pors.] Ex Athrban Beid (desumptum); Id est, in hoc Oupnek’hat quæstio et responsum multum est [Brahmen, CXV] [= Vol. II, p. 128 – 151 – M.G.]”. Note: Pras´nopanisad IV, 7 – 11 = 14. Upanisad, Porsch, vol. II, p. 148; XIV = 3. Segment instead˙ of 4. Segment ˙ Anquetil-Duperron denote, p. 145 – 146. “the spiritual person”: the term purusa connects to the Sa¯n˙khya terminology. ˙ relative pronoun “yas tu somya” in the “who knows”: the dilate iteration of the same sentence is an interpolation. Bçhtlingk 1891, p. 191. “the elements”: when taking the enumeration in IV.8 into account, here “bhu¯ta¯ni” can only be a variant expression of “ma¯tra¯”, i. e. ‘matter’ and mean the elements (of rough matter). Pras´nopanisad IV.7 – 11: “sa yatha¯ somya vaya¯msi va¯sovrksam sampratisthante j ˙ ||7|| […] ˙ ˙ manas ˙ ´˙ca mantavyam ˙˙ evam ha vai˙ tat sarvam para a¯tmani sampratisthate ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ca buddhis´ ca boddhavyam ca ahamka¯ras´ ca¯hamkartavyam ca cittam ca cetayita˙ ta¯ spras ˙ ta¯ ´srota¯ ghra ˙ ¯ta¯ rasayita ˙ ¯ manta¯ ˙boddha¯ karta¯ vyam ca […] ||8|| esa hi dras vijÇa¯˙na¯tma¯ purusah˙j sa pare˙˙’ksare ˙a¯˙tmani sampratisthate ||9|| param eva¯ksaram ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙˙ ˙ ˙

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In the Pras´nopanisad, the S´an˙kara’s influence is almost exemplarily omni˙ present. For if, while assuming a critical reading of the Upanisads, with IV.8p one must state a rather irreconcilable Sa¯n˙khya-dualism, ˙with Da¯ra¯sekoh manas, “mind”, becoming dil, “heart”, the “the mind [manas] and ˙ can be perceived [mantavya]” becomes the “heart and the wishes of what the heart”.50 “The mind [manas] and what can be perceived [mantavya]” and those mental functions such as buddhi and ahan˙ka¯ra of the critical reading, which are next in the text, in the later Sa¯n˙khya comment of this Upanisad consequently become cosmogony forms of original matter ˙ the one hand and kinds of insight (buddhi: judging recogniz(prakrti) on ˙ ing, ahan˙ka¯ra: I-conceptualized reflectivity, manas: willing) on the other. However, at this early stage we cannot assume a defining separation of these terms according to later systematic philosophy. Now Da¯ra¯sekoh (and/or the Panditas and Samnya¯sins) does not read ˙ ˙ refers to ˙original Vedic ideas, as ˙ way but consequently Sa¯n˙khya in this they are reflected by the Brha¯daranyakopanisad II.1.19. Here we find an˙ in the hollow of ˙ the heart. The fact that here cient ideas, of a purusa living ˙ Da¯ra¯sekoh contradicts the source text is balanced by him in IV.9j to ˙ by way of a S´an˙kara comment and an extension of the text in IV.10k, the Persian version. It is remarkable that also Da¯ra¯sekoh does not translate the part with the verses, which is already missed˙ by Weber. Imagines (mant), recognizes, acts, he is delighted with knowledge (vijnntm, forma scientiae), the spirit (purushah): he again is supported by the highest, eternal tman, thus he unites with it***”; “***The words sa pare’xara tmani sampratishtate, param evaxaram pratipadyate are missing in A B (text and comm.), they are found only in I and are possibly a later addition which seemed to be postulated by the following words, so that indeed one would distinguish between the (j v)tman, existing by appearance, and (param)tman who is completerly separated from appearance.51 pratipadyate sa yo ha vai tad acha¯yam as´arı¯ram alohitam ´subhram aksaram ve˙ vijÇa ˙¯tma¯ ˙ ¯na dayate yas tu somya sa sarvajÇah sarvo˙ bhavati ˙j tad esa ´s˙lokah ||10|| ˙ ˙ ˙ saha devais´ ca sarvaih pra¯na¯ bhu¯ta¯ni sampratisthanti yatra j tad aksaram vedayate ˙ ´a iti ||11||”. ˙ S´an˙˙kara ˙ yas tu somya sarvam˙ eva¯vives 1910, vol. IV.1.˙ ˙ Cf. also Appendix (III): Pras´nopanisad IV.7 – 11. 50 Cf. also Appendix (IV): Interposition˙and Transcription. 51 “Vorgestellt (mant), erkennt, handelt, er ist Wissensseelig (vijnntm, forma scientiae), der Geist (purushah): er wieder findet Halt in dem hçchsten unvergnglichen tman, er vereinigt sich damit***”; “***Die Worte sa pare’xara tmani sampratishtate, param evaxaram pratipadyate fehlen in A B (Text und Comm.), sie stehen nur in I und sind mçglicher Weise ein spterer Zusatz, der durch die fol-

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According to Weber, IV.9k and IV.10a are possibly later additions, meant for making the distinction between the jı¯va¯tman, described in IV.9, that what “is appearing”, and the parama¯tman described in IV.10, “that what is completely separated from appearance” easier. Now however, the fact that this sentence is missing results in Da¯ra¯sekoh’s misinterpretation ˙ which shall be prevented by the later addition. Wrongly, Da¯ra¯sekoh refers IV.9 to the parama¯tman (a¯tmaye bosorg), while not objecting˙ to the fact that according to his version the parama¯tman, which in IV.10 is described as being completely without any quality, conducts all of jı¯va¯tman’s actions. Accordingly, in IV.9a he transcribes: “And this illustrious a¯tma¯ is the seer.” In analogy to this, then the following nomina actionis are related to the parama¯tman, just as vijÇa¯na¯tman and purusa in IV.9j. ˙ For giving purusa, however, he uses an etymologic trick when trans˙ lating with the help of A¯nandagiri’s comment: “and is the purusa, i. e.: he is full in everything”,52 as in the Persian language por(s´) means ˙also “full”. This now is also translated by Anquetil-Duperron by “por” equal “full”, to which Schopenhauer then adds: Rather, we freely confess it: what remains over after complete nullification of the will, for all those who are still full of will, is indeed nothingness. But also conversely, for those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this our so very real world with all its suns and galaxies – is nothing. […] reabsorption in Brahman, or in the Nirvana of the Buddhists.53

It is only that this “full nothingness” goes back to Da¯ra¯sekoh and Anque˙ ¯nta and Budtil-Duperron and not to something which Advaitaveda 54 dhism have in common, as Schopenhauer assumes elsewhere when writing: “Essentially this will also be the same as the magnum Sakhepat […] of the Veda teaching […], as the Nirvana of the Buddhists”. Indeed, S´an˙kara distances himself clearly from this when stating: In [deep] sleep everything [buddhi (reason), manas (willing), ahan˙ka¯ra (conceptional I)] rests within its own potential cause, just as the tree rests potentially within the seed. [586] The world rests within its own nature, it is not a genden Worte postulirt schien, damit eben zwischen dem in der Erscheinung seienden (j v)tman und dem ganz von der Erscheinung getrennten (param)tman unterschieden wrde.” Weber 1850, p. 451. 52 Pras´nopanisad-t¯ıka¯ IV.9j: “purusa ka¯ryakaranasamgha¯toktopa¯dhipu¯rnatva¯t j”. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ A¯nandagiri˙ 1881. 53 WWP I, p. 478 [book I., p. iv, § 71]; ibid.: “in […] Buddhists”: in A, “in the primal spirit [in den Urgeist], or the Nieban [Burmese, form of the word nirva¯na] of the Buddhists.”; in B, “Brahman [Brahm]” replaces “the primal spirit.” ˙ also Gerhard 2009. 54 Cf.

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nothingness. […] [587] […] Whereas the state of mind of [deep] sleep is called potential, the self is absolutely awake. It is the epitome of ignorance if one speaks of the self [just because buddhi (reason), manas (willing) and ahan˙ka¯ra (conceptual I) are at rest] as of non-existence. [594].55 It cannot, moreover, be said that the a¯tman is at any time not united with brahman –for its true nature can never pass away–; but considering that in the state of waking and that of dreaming it passes, owing to the contact with its limiting adjuncts [upa¯dhi: surrogate; manas, buddhi and ahan˙ka¯ra are attributed to the a¯tman as surrogates by non-knowledge], into something else, as it were, it may be said that when those adjuncts [upa¯dhi] cease in deep sleep it passes back into its true nature. […] Well, then, great distance, etc., residing in the adjuncts [upa¯dhi] may be the reason of noncognition! [I.e.: brahman is being and the identification brahmana¯tman is also being] […] We, on the other hand, do want to prove that that brahman is the lasting abode of the a¯tman in the state of deep sleep; that is a knowledge which has its own uses, viz. the ascertainment of brahman being the Self of the a¯tman, and the ascertainment of the a¯tman being essentially non-connected with the worlds that appear in the waking and in the dreaming state. Hence the a¯tman alone is the place of deep sleep.56

Indeed, S´an˙kara really polemicizes against Buddhism and its idea of ‘nothingness’ as S´an˙kara understands it: From whatever new points of view the [bauddha] system [system of nothingness, non-inherence: ´su¯nyata¯] is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly. Moreover, Sugata [Buddha] by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, j has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced

˙ ˙ grahah, 586 et seqq.: “buddhya¯di sakalam 55 S´an˙kara, Sarvaveda¯ntasiddha¯ntasa¯rasam ˙ svaka¯rane j avyakte vatavad ˙bı¯je tisthatyavikrta¯tmana¯ ||586|| tissupta¯vanulı¯nam ˙ ˙˙ ˙ thatyeva svaru¯pena na ˙tu ´su¯nya¯yate ˙jagat […] ||587||”; “[…] avyaktas´abdite ˙ ˙pra¯jÇe satya¯tmanyatra ˙ siddhyati ´su¯nyatvam ˙ tasya bhra¯ntas´iroja¯grati j katham mane ||594||”. S´an˙kara 1910, vol. XV.I. ˙ pat56 S´an˙˙kara, Brahmasu¯trabha¯sya III.2.7: “api ca na kada¯cijjı¯vasya brahmana sam ˙ ¯t svapnaja¯garitayostupa¯dhisam ˙ parkavas´a¯t ˙ pararu¯pa¯tirna¯sti svaru¯pasya¯napa¯yitva pattimiva¯pes´ya tadupas´ama¯tsusupteh svaru¯pa¯pattirvivas´yate […] tatha¯pyupa¯d˙na vija¯na¯tı¯ti yuktam j […] brahma tu ana˙ ˙ pannah heru¯pas´a¯ntatva¯t satyena sam ˙ pa¯yi suptistha¯nam – ityetatpratipa¯daya¯mah tena tu vijÇa¯nena prayojanamasti ˙ ¯garitavyavaha¯ravimuktatva¯vadha¯ra˙ svapnaja jı¯vasya brahma¯tmatva¯dadha¯ranam ˙ ´ ˙ ca j tasma¯da¯tmaiva suptistha¯nam ||”. San˙kara 1910, vol. II. nam ˙

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him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused.57

Nevertheless on closer deliberation, the roots of similar statements can be found in the view of those passionate advocates of Veda¯ntic tradition who suspected even S´an˙kara himself of hidden sympathies for Buddhism. These views go back to S´an˙kara’s junior contemporary, the Veda¯ntist Bha¯skara (1114 – 1185), who thought that S´an˙kara’s notion of ma¯ya¯, derived from Buddhism, was undermining the authority of Vedic thought. Later Ra¯ma¯nuja (ca. 1050 – 1137) was call S´an˙kara a pracchanna-bauddha, a ‘crypto-Buddhist’.58 Schopenhauer himself, when speaking of the Veda¯nta, does not refer to S´an˙kara as an individual, because as an individual he considers him less important. Schopenhauer identifies the Veda¯nta by Vya¯sa (Veda Vya¯sa, Ba¯dara¯yana) of Maha¯bha¯rata: 59 ˙ “The world is a presentation to me” – […] How early by contrast this fundamental truth was recognized by the sages of India, appearing as it did as the fundamental principle of the Vedanta philosophy ascribed by Vyasa, is attested by W. Jones in the last of his treatises, “On the Philosophy of the Asiatics” (Asiatic Researches, vol. 4, p. 164): “The fundamental tenet of the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms.” These words adequately express the conjunction of empirical reality and transcendental ideality.60

S´an˙kara and Schopenhauer agree in respect of their idealistic epistemology – however, this is also the case with many other Indian philosophers, such as in the Madhyamaka, the Yogava¯sistta (also translated by Da¯ra¯se˙ ˙ concerns their ideologies ˙ koh), the S´ivadrstya¯locana and others. What ˙˙˙ ˙ baduna¯ sarvapraka¯rena – yatha¯ ya57 S´an˙kara, Brahmasu¯trabha¯sya II.2.32: “kim ˙ ˙ vaina¯´sikasamaya upapattimattva tha¯yam ¯ya parı¯´syate tatha¯ tatha¯ – ˙sikata¯ku¯pavad˙ cidapyatropapattim ˙ pas´ya¯mah ata ca¯nupapanno vaina¯´sikatanvidı¯ryat eva na ka¯m ˙ travyavaha¯rah j api ca ba¯hya¯rthavijÇa¯nas´u¯nyava¯datrayamitaretaraviru ¯ ddhamu¯pa˙ ´ ˙ disa¯ta¯ sugatena spast¯ıkrtama¯tmano’sambaddhaprala¯pitvam pradveso va¯ praja¯su ˙˙ ˙ ¯ vimuhyeyurima¯h praja¯ iti j”. S´an˙kara 1910, ˙ – viru¯ddha¯rthapratipattya vol. I. ˙ 58 Ra¯ma¯nuja, Brahmasu¯trabha¯sya II.2.27; Ra¯ma¯nuja 2000. ˙ 59 While the earlier commentators like S´an˙kara a treat Ba¯dara¯yana, the author of the Brahmasu¯tra, as the jÇa¯na-s´akti avata¯ra (knowledge-power˙ incarnation) of God, Vaisnavite tradition identifies him with Krsna Dvipayana Vya¯sa the author ˙˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ bha¯rata. of the Maha 60 WWP I, p. 31, 32 [book I.i, § 1].

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of ens realissimum and their idea of the nature of “redemption”, the contradiction between Schopenhauer and S´an˙kara is irreconcilable. S´an˙kara’s brahman does not mean redemption, he is eternally redeemed by his nature. Thus, the striving of the Veda¯nta is not aimed at negating something which “lives and suffers within” but at breaking through ma¯ya¯ and recognizing the only true reality, the being of the brahman. Furthermore, at many passages Schopenhauer identifies ma¯ya¯ as the principium individuationis: 564 [158] The “Maya” of the Vedas, […] and Kant’s “phenomenon” are one and the same thing, are this world in which we live, are we ourselves in so far as we belong to it.”61 And, “Brahma produces the world through a kind of original sin, but himself remains in it to atone for this until he has redeemed himself from it. This is quite a good idea!62

brahman cannot be compared to Schopenhauer’s ‘will of life’, as being “incognizant and only a blind ceaseless pressing”63 but, if at all, to the result of the latter’s unification.64 All this belongs to Schopenhauer’s early reading experience in 1814: Thus, the Oupnek’hat supports Schopenhauer’s final consciousness “within which the will has changed and negated itself ”, the experience of subject and object dissolving within nothingness. But as far as Schopenhauer’s system is not completely reshaped in essential points, it is not at all possible to claim with Deussen that S´an˙kara and Schopenhauer, living 1,000 years later, were spiritually akin. For, what Schopenhauer reads in the Oupnek’hat is neither the Upanisads nor S´an˙kara, it is the intellectual mixture of Panditas and Samnya¯˙sins from Va¯ra¯nası¯, of Da¯ra¯sekoh ˙ ˙ on their search ˙ ˙ ıd and ens realisi˙ and Anquetil-Duperron for bhakti, tauh ¯ ˙ mum against the background of a philosophia perennis and in place an early example of crossculture (mis)understanding.65

61 62 63 64 65

MSR I, p. 419 [HN I, p. 564]. PP II, p. 300 [book II, chap. XII, § 156]. WWP I, p. 326 (book I. iv, § 54]. Cf. also Gerhard 2008b, p. 68 et seq. Cf. also Gerhard 2012.

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Appendices (I) Hasrat (1953: 264 – 69): Life and Works (Translation) ‘Praised be the Being, that among whose eternal secrets, is the dot in the (@) of the Bismilla¯h in all the heavenly books, and glorified be the mother of books. In the holy Qur’a¯n is the token of His glorious name; and the angels and the heavenly books and the prophets and the saints are all comprehended in this name. And be the blessings of the Almighty upon the best of His creatures, Muhammad and upon all his children and upon his companions universally! ‘To proceed: whereas this unsolicitous faqı¯r, Muhammad Da¯ra¯ Shi˙ ku¯h in the year A.H. 1050 went to Kashmir, the resemblance of paradise, and by the grace of God and the favour of the Infinite, he there obtained the auspicious opportunity of meeting the most perfect of the perfects, the flower of the gnostics, the tutor of the tutors, the sage of the sages, the guide of the guides, the unitarian accomplished in the Truth, Mulla¯ Sha¯h, on whom be the peace of God. ‘And whereas, he was impressed with a longing to be hold the gnostics of every sect, and to hear the lofty expressions of monotheism, and had cast his eyes upon many books of mysticism and had written a number of treatises thereon, and as the thirst of investigation for Tawh¯ıd, which is a boundless ocean, became every moment increased, [264]˙ subtle doubts came into his mind for which he had no possibility of solution, except by the word of the Lord and the direction of the Infinite. And whereas the holy Qur’a¯n is mostly allegorical, and at the present day, persons thoroughly conversant with the subtleties thereof are very rare, he became desirous of bringing in view all the heavenly books, for the very words of God itself are their own commentary; and what might be in one book compendious, in another might be found diffusive, and from the detail of one, the conciseness of the other might become comprehensible. He had therefore, cast his eyes on the Book of Moses, the Gospels, the Psalms and other scriptures, but the explanation of .monotheism in them also was compendious and enigmatical, and from the slovenly translations which selfish persons had made, their purport was not intelligible. ‘Thereafter he considered, as to why the discussion about monotheism is so conspicuous in India, and why the Indian theologians and mystics (‘Ulema’i za¯hirı¯ wa ba¯tinı¯) of the ancient school do not disavow the Unity of God˙ nor do they˙ find any fault with the unitarians, but their belief is perfect in this respect; on the other hand, the .ignoramuses of

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the present age – the highwaymen in the path of God – who have established themselves for erudites and who, falling into the traces of polemics and molestation and apostatizing from and disavowing the true proficients in God and monotheism, display resistance against all the words of unitarianism, which are most evident from the glorious Qur’a¯n and the authentic traditions of indubitable prophecy. ‘And after verifications of these circumstances, it appeared that among this most ancient people, of all their heavenly books which are the Rig-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sama-Veda and the Atharva-Veda, together with a number of ordinances, descended upon the prophets of those times, the most ancient of whom was Brahma¯n or Adam, [265] on whom be the peace of God, this purport is manifest from these books. And it can also be ascertained from the holy Qur’a¯n, that there is no nation without a prophet and without a revealed scripture, for it hath been said: Nor do We chastise until We raise an a/postle (Qur’a¯n: XVII, 15). And in another verse: And there is not a people but a warner has gone among them (Qur’a¯n: XXXV, 24). And at another place: Certainly We sent Our apostles with clear arguments, and sent down with them the Book and the measure (Qur’a¯n: LVII, 25). ‘And the summum bonum of these four books, which contain all the secrets of the Path and the contemplative exercises of pure monotheism, are called the Upanekhats and the people of that time have written commentaries with complete and diffusive interpretations thereon; an being still understood as the best part of their religious worship, they are always studied. And whereas this unsolicitous seeker after the Truth had in view the principle of the fundamental Unity of the Personality and not Arabic, Syriac, Hebrew and Sanskrit languages, he wanted to make without any worldly motive, in a clear style, an exact and literal translation of the Upanekhat into Persian. For is a treasure of Monotheism and there are few thorough conversant with it even among the Indians. Thereby he also wanted to solve the mystery which underlies their effort to conceal it from the Muslims. ‘And as at this period the city of Benares, which is the centre of the sciences of this community, was.in certain relations with this seeker of the Truth, he assembled together the pandits and the sannya¯sis, who were the most learned of their time and proficient in the Upanekhat, he himself being free from all materialistic motives, translated the essential parts of monotheism, which are the Upanekhat i. e. the secrets to be concealed, and the end of purport all the saints of God, in the year 1067 A.H.; and the [266] every difficulty and every sublime topic which he had desired or

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thought and had looked for and not found, he obtained from these essences of the most ancient books, and without doubt or suspicion, these books are first of all heavenly books in point of time, and the source and the fountain-head of the ocean of Unity, in conformity with the holy Qur’a¯n and even a commentary thereon. And it becomes clearly manifest that this verse is literally applicable to these ancient books: Most surely it is am honoured Qur’a¯n; in a book that is protected. None shall touch it save the purified ones. A revelation by the Lord of the worlds (Qur’a¯n: LVI, 77, 78, 79, 80). ‘It is evident to any person that this sentence is not applicable to the Psalms or the Book of Moses or to the Gospel, and by the word “revelation”, it is clear that it is not applicable to the Reserved Tablet (Lauh-i˙ Mahfu¯z); and whereas the Upanekhat, which are a secret to be concealed ˙ ˙ and are the essence of this book, and the verses of the holy Qur’a¯n are literally found therein, of a certainty, therefore, the hidden book is this most ancient book, and hereby things unknown became known and things incomprehensible became comprehensible to this faqı¯r. ‘At the commencement of the translation, he opened the pages of the holy Qur’a¯n to take an augury and the Sura al-A‘ra¯f came up of which the first verse is thus: I am Alla¯h, the best knower, the Truthful. A Book revealed to you – so let there be no straitness in your breast on account of it – that you may warn thereby and a reminder to the believers (Qur’a¯n: VII, 1, 2); and he had no intention and no purpose except for the spiritual benefit of his own self and of his children, his friends and the seekers of Truth. ‘Happy is he, who having abandoned the prejudices of vile selfishness, sincerely and with the Grace of God, renouncing all partiality, shall study and comprehend this [267] translation entitled the Sirr-iAkbar (the Great Secret), knowing it to be a translation of the words of God, shall become imperishable, fearless, unsolicitous and eternally liberated.’ (II) Anquetil-Duperron (1801/02: I, 1 – 6): Præfatio Interpretis Persici OUM Vox pes (fundamentum) est, sicut secretum antiquum, ty˜ in nomine Dei miseratoris, misericordis. Laus dzati (enti), quod, vox pes ty˜ bismillah (in nomine Dei), in omnibus libris sumari (cœlestibus),  secretis antiquis ejus est, et alham am alketab (inspiratio primœ souratœ), quod Koran majid (gloriosa), designatio (illius) cum esm (nomine) su premo ejus est; et cuncti malaxek (legati Dei,

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angeli) et libri samavi ex anbia ve aolia ( prophetis et amicis Dei emissi); et omne (id omne) comprehensum in hoc esm (nomine) est. Ver m, poste quam b fakir absque tristiti Mohammed Daraschakoh, in anno mille et quinquaginta (1050) ty˜ [1] hedjri [Æræ christianæ 1640], quo c m Kaschmir (in tau Kaschmir), paradiso simili, iverat; cum vi attractiv eenaxet Alhi (favoris Dei) et beneficio na monteha (non terminato, infinito) faustæ (ejus) voluntatis, perfectum Kamalan (perfectorum) cremorem aarfan, ostad ostadan, pir piran, peischvax peischvaxan, mohed hakaxek agah (decus doctorum, magistram magistrorum, senem senum, ducem ducum, unitarium (unitatis Dei assertorem), veritatum conscium), Molaschah, pax ty˜ Allah (Dei) et excelsi (super illum)! invenit. Et c m gustus (voluptus) ty˜ videre doctos cujuslibet sectæ, et audire verba excelsa unificationis, simul (ei) provenisset, et plurimos libros mysticos cum conspectu (in conspectum suum) attulisset, et resalha (scripta breviora) composita fecisset; et sitis ty˜ petere tohid (unificationem), quod mare est sine fine, momento cum momento (in dies) amplior (aucto) fieret; et sententiæ (opiniones) subtiles (arduœ) cum corde (ad cor ejus) pervenirent, qud status earum, nisi cum verbo Alhi (Dei), et magisterio (documento) dzat na monthax (entis non finiti) possibilitatem non habet : et c m (in) Koran venerando (augusto), et Fourkan nobili (benigno) plurima ænigmatic [2] dicta (tectta) sint, et hodi scientes illa pauci inveniri queant; (Daraschakoh) voluit, qud omnes libros samavi (cœlestes) cum conspecta (in conspectum suum) afferrent, ut ab ipsis illis (eliceret) verbum Alhi (Dei), quod ipsum interpretatio su ipsius est; et si in (uno) libro contractum sit, in libro altero fus expositum inventum fiat, et ex ill fus expositione istud compendium scitum efficitur. Intuitum super Toret (legem Moysis), et Andjil (evangelium J. Christi), et Zabour (psalmos Davidis), et alios codices conjecit : ver m expositio tohid (unificationis) in illis etiam (libris) compendiosa et ænigmatica (tecta) erat; et ex interpretationibus paucis, quas homines  commentariis fecerant, petitum cognitum non redditum est. In pede illius fuit (hinc evenit), qud,  quo respectu (qu caus) in Indoustan, unitatis contemplatore, sermocicatio tohid (de unificatione) multa est; et theologis externis et internis sectæ antiquæ indicæ, super vahedat (unitate) negatio, et super mohedan (unitariis) sermo non est; quin poti s pes æstimationis (illis) est super t` (prœ cipuum ducunt) contradicere (repugnare) insipientibus hujus temporis, qui se ipsos doctos (esse) firmatum dederunt; et, in pede (victimis) occisionis, et vexationis, et impietatis, et negationis (veri), Deum cognoscentibus et unitariis lapsis, omnibus verbis tohid (unificationis), et cuncto (quod)  Fourkan laudanto, et

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oraculis authenticis prophetiæ puræ manifestum est, resistentiam ostendunt, (et) viam latronum viam Dei efficiunt. Post  verificatis his gradibus (his cognitis) compentum fuit, qud in medio hujus tribs antiquæ, præ omnibus libris samavi (cœlestibus), quatuor libri asmani (cœlestes), quod, Rak Beid, et Djedjr Beid, et Sam Beid, et Athrban Beid, sit, super anbiax [3] (prophetas) illius temporis; qud major illorum [Brahma, qui] Adam sefieullah (sectus Deo), et (super quem) pax! est, cum cunctis præceptis delapsi (sint) : et hæc significatio ex ipsis his libris apparens est. Et optimum (purior pars) horum quatuor librorum, omnia secreta selouk (religiosi instituti), et eschghal (applicationum animi) unificatini puræ, in illo contenta sunt; et illud oupnek’hat nominant. Et prophetæ illius temporis, c m illum (librum) separatum fecissent, super illo commentaria, expositones et explanationes (diductiones) integras scripserunt; et semper illum, melius (optimum) religionis opus (hoc) ut sciverunt, legunt (legebant). Huic (Principi) veritatis indagatori ipsi elacidatæ, c m intuitus super principium vahedat (unitatis) entis foret (fuisset), c m lingu arabic, et syrian, et eerakan (persik, et) sahnscret (sanskretic), voluit qu d hæc Oupnek’hata (ty˜ Oupnek’hat capita), quod thesaurus unificationis erat: scientes illum in ist tribu etiam pauci manserant: cum lingu persic (studio) animi, cum interpretatione, recto (sincero) cum recto, voce cum vove (de verbo ad verbum) cum translata ostendisset (fecissset), intelligerent, qud hæc collectio (synagoga), quæ illum (librum) ab homine islamico (fideli), [4] hoc quant m (tantoper) coopertum habent, hoc quodnam secretum est. Et, ut in his diebus, urbs Benars, quæ porta scientiæ hojus tribs est, dependentim cum (ab) hoc veri indagatore habebat, ty`s Pandetan et Saniasan, qui completo (convenienti) tempore [ty˜ Beid et] ty˜ Oupnek’hat scientes (facti) fuerant, c m congregatos fecisset, ipse (Daraschakoh) hoc kholasseh (optimum) unificationis, quod Oupnek’hatha, id est, secreta tegenda sit, et monthax (scopus) petitionis cunctorum aoulia Allah (amicorum Die) est, in anno mille, sexaginta et septem ty˜ hedjri [Æræ christianæ 1656, 1657], sine affectu animi (studio,  samskreto) translatum c m ostendisset (reddidisset); et quodlibet difficile, quodlibet verbum altum, quod volebat et petens illud fuit, et quærebat et non invenit; ex hoc kholasseh (optimo) libro antiquo, quod, sine dubio et ambiguitute, et primus liber samavi (cœlestis) et fons verificationis (agnitionis pro vero), et mare unificationis est, congruens Koran glorioso, quim im, explicatio illius est.

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Et manifest apparens fit, qud hoc axeteh (comma, versus) genuin in veritate hic liber antiquus est; qud axeteh cum (in) Koran benefaciente, in libro (est) abscondito, non perveniens nisi ad mundatos  rab (domino) mundorum: id [5] est, Koran benefaciens in libro est, qud ille liber absconditus est, (et) eum comprehensum non faciunt, nisi cor quod purificatum sit, et descendere factus (demissus)  nutritore (conservatore) [mundi et] mundanorum : et cui [cuivis] cognitum fit, qud hoc axeteh, in veritate, Zabour, et Toret, et Andjil non est; quim im,  verbo tanzil (descendere factu), hoc modo manifestum efficitur, qud in veritate, louh mahfouzz (tabula asservatorum, cui æterna rerum fata inscribuntur), etiam (axeteh) non est : (et) c m Oupnek’hat, quod secretum abscondendum, est, principium (originde exemplar) hujus libri sit, et t± axethax ty˜ Koran gloriosi, genuin in illo inventa fiant; proind cum verificatione (certum efficitur) qud liber absconditus, hic liber antiquus sit. Et ex hoc (libro), cum hoc (huic) fakir (Daraschakoh) non scita, scita; non intellecta, intellecta fuerunt. Et, nisi  t` (præter) utilitatem capientes fieri, ipsum (Daram) et natos ipsos ejus, et amicos ipsos ejus, et petentes veritatem, petitum et intentum c m non fuerit; fortunatus, qui, ut affectum animi infelicem (pravum) transire fecit (reliquit), pur (sincer), cum modo Dei (excelso) hanc translationem, quod cum secreto akbar (per secretum magnum) designatum redditum, translationem (esse) verbi Alhi (Dei), ut scivit, derelictionem partialitatis, ut monstravit, legit et intelligit, sine cessatione, et sine metu, et sine tristiti, et liberatus (salvus, beatus), et mavid (confirmatus) (in hoc statu) est futurus [6].” (III) Pras´nopanisad IV.7 – 11 ˙ Philological Sanskrit Edition (S´an˙kara, 1910, vol. IV.1)

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Da¯ra¯sekoh (Da¯ra¯ Shukoh, 1957) ˙

S´an˙kara and Pandits Commentaries (A¯nandagiri, 1881) ˙˙

Abaham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (Anquetil-Duperron, 1801/02) O purum desiderans! quemadmod m omnia volantia, super summan arboris, qud semper locus ty˜ esse illa (ibi) est, ut venerunt, quietem sumunt; ipso hoc modo, hæc omnia in pram tma, id est, magnum, qud anima animarum est, ingressa, quietem sumunt. [VII] […] voluptas illius : et cor, et volitio cordis : et intellectus, et qualitas intellects : et egoitas, et qualitas egoitas; qud : ego et ego, dicens sit : et tq tschat, et qualitas ty˜ tschat; id est cor (cogitans, khatter), et cogitatio accidens : lumen, et lumen (quod effundit) : vis (virtus, facultus), et actio vis (virtutis, facltatis) : hoc omne, in tempore ty˜ sak’hepat, in tmax magno quietem sumunt. Et ille tmax magnus, locus hujus omnis est. Et hic tmax magnus, videns est; et tactum faciens est; et audiens est; odoruns est; et gustans est; et faciens actiones cordis est; et faciens actiones intellects est; krtar est; id est, faciens omne est; et forma scientæ est; et porsch est; id est, in omni por ast (plenus est, omne replet). Hunc tma, qud umbram non habet; et corpus non habet; et colorem non habet; et purus, et subtilis, et immunis (ab omni) est; [quisquis] hoc modo scit, is omne scivit (scit), et omne est. Coforme huic significationi  mantr ty˜ Beid est, qud; hic tma forma scientiæ est: et dji tma, et omnes sensus, et mokelan illorum, elementa, in illo ente deleta (annihillata) fiunt. O purum desiderans! quisquis illud ens scit, is sciens omne fit, forma omnis fit. Absolutum est Brahmen. m

(IV) Interposition and Transcription

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References A¯nandagiri (1881): S´an˙karavijaya by A¯nandagiri. Ed. by Pandit Jibananda Vidyasagara. Calcutta: Sarasudhanidhi Press. Anquetil-Duperron, Abaham Hyacinthe (1786): Recherches historiques et gographiques sur l’Inde. [Description historique et gographiques sur l’Inde 2.] Berlin: C. S. Spener. Anquetil-Duperron, Abaham Hyacinthe (1801/02): Oupnek’hat (id est, Secretum tegendum). Opus ipsa in India rarissimum, continens antiquam et arcanam, seu Theologicam et Philosophicam, doctrinam,  quattuor sacris Indorum Libris, Rak Beid, Djedjr Beid, Sam Beid, Athrban Beid, excerptam; Ad verbum,  Persico idiomate, Samskreticis Vocabulis intermixto, in Latinum conversum; Dissertationibus et Annotationibus, difficiliora explanantibus, illustratum: studio et opere Anquetil Duperron, Indicopleustae. Vol. I, II. Strasbourg: Fratres G. Levrault. App, Urs (2006): “OUM – das erste Wort von Schopenhauers Lieblingsbuch und Nichts – das letzte Wort von Schopenhauers Hauptwerk”. In: Stollberg, Jochen (Ed.): “Das Tier, das du tçtest, bist du selbst …” Arthur Schopenhauer und Indien. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, p. 37 – 50. Bochinger, Johann Jakob (1831): La vie contemplative, asctique et monastique chez les indous et chez les peuples bouddhistes. Strasbourg: Fratres G. Levrault. Bçhtlingk, Otto Nicolaus von (1891): “Drei kritisch gesichtete und bersetzte Upanishad mit erklrenden Anmerkungen”. In: Berichte ber die Verhandlungen der kçniglich Schsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft zu Leipzig. Philologisch-historische Klasse [1890]. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, p. 127 – 197. Bohlen, Peter von (1830): Das alte Indien, mit besonderer Rcksicht auf Aegypten. Kçnigsberg: Gebrder Borntrger. Chand, Ta¯ra¯ (1943): “Dara Shikoh and the Upanishads”. In: Islamic Culture 17, p. 397 – 413. Colebrooke, Henry Thomas (1837): Life and Miscellaneous Essays. Vol. I-III. Ed. by E. W. Cowell. London: Wm. H. Allen. Da¯ra¯ Shukoh (1956): Muntakhaba¯t-i A¯tha¯r [1646]. Ed. by Sayyid Muhammad ˙ Riza¯ Jala¯lı¯ Na¯’ı¯nı¯. Tehran: Taban. Da¯ra¯ Shukoh (1957): Sirr-i akbar: The Oldest Translation of the Upanisads from Sanskrit into Persian [1657]. Ed. by Sayyid Muhammad Riza¯ Jala¯˙lı¯ Na¯’ı¯nı¯ ˙ and Ta¯ra¯ Chand. Tehran: Taban. Da¯ra¯ Shukoh (1965 [1642]): Safı¯nat al Awliya¯’. Ed. by Sayyid Muhammad Riza¯ ˙ Jala¯lı¯ Na¯’ı¯nı¯ and Ta¯ra¯ Chand. Tehran: Taban. Da¯ra¯ Shukoh (2006): Majma-ul-Barhain, or The Mingling of the Two Oceans by Prince Muhammad Da¯ra¯ Shikuh [1655]. Ed. and transl. by M. Mahfuz-ulHaq. New Delhi: Adam Publishers. Deussen, Paul (1894 et seqq.): Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie mit besonderer Bercksichtigung der Religionen. Vol. I/1 – 3, II/1, 2.1 – 2, 3. Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus. Deussen, Paul (1897): Sechzig Upanishad’s des Veda. Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus. Gerhard, Michael (2008a): “Im Spiegelkabinett des Nichts – Wille, Ungrund, fana¯’, brahman und nirva¯na”. In: Gnther Bonheim/Thomas Regehly ˙

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(Ed.): Philosophien des Willens – Bçhme, Schelling, Schopenhauer. Berlin: Weißensee, p. 105 – 40. Gerhard, Michael (2008b): “Metempsychose und Palingenesie. Begriffsgeschichte und Begriffsaneignung in Schopenhauers Buddhismusrezeption”. In: Matthias Koßler (Ed.): Schopenhauer und die Philosophien Asiens. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, p. 47 – 77. Gerhard, Michael (2009): “‘Was den Menschen leben lßt, zeigt allein ihm die Handlung’. Handlung im Buddhismus – exemplarisch bei Na¯ga¯rjuna”. In: Michael Gerhard/Stephan Grtzel (Ed.): Klassische Handlungstheorien. London: Turnshare, p. 55 – 104. Gerhard, Michael (2011): “Non-Personality and Still karuna¯ (Compassion)”. In: ˙ Arati Barua (Ed.): West Meets East. Schopenhauer and India. New Delhi: Academic Excellence, p. 179 – 211. Gerhard, Michael (2012): “Jesu Eintritt ins nirva¯na und Buddhas Kreuzestod – ˙ Irrungen und Wirrungen komparativer Philosophie am Beispiel asiatischer Kulturen”. In: Sylke Bartmann/Oliver Immel (Ed.): Das Vertraute und das Fremde. Differenzerfahrung und Fremdverstehen im Interkulturalittsdiskurs. Bielefeld: Transcript, p. 237 – 252. Halbfass, Wilhelm (1981): Indien und Europa. Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung. Basel, Stuttgart: Schwabe. Hasrat, Bikrama Jit (1953): Da¯ra¯ Shiku¯h. Life and Works. Allahabad: Munshiram Manoharlal. Mller, Friedrich Max (1879): Sacred Books of the East. Vol. I-L. Oxford: University Press. Narain, Sheo (1913/14): “Da¯ra¯ Shikoh as an Author”. In: Journal of the Punjab Historical Society 2, p. 21 – 38. Qanungo, Kalika-Ranjan (21952): Dara Shuko. Vol. I, II. Calcutta: S. C. Sarkar. Ra¯ma¯nuja (2000): S´a--riraka-parana-madheya-ni Bhagavad-tra-n. i S´ribhagavadra-ma-nujamuniviracitam ba--dara-yan. akrtabrahmasu S´a-riraka. -bha˙-syam S´ri-bha-syam, Sa-rajn˜as´iromani Cakravartya-ca-ryakrta S´ri-bmima-m sa . . . . ˚ ha-ca-ryah. . Chennai: ha--.syabha-vacandrika- ca sampa-daka Tirupulla-n. i Nrsim ˙ . S´rinrsim hapriya T rast in Chennai. . . . S´an˙kara ˙(1910): Complete Works of Sri Sankaracharya. Vol. I-XX. S´rı¯ran˙gam: Sri Vani Vilas Press. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1911 – 33): Arthur Schopenhauers smtliche Werke. Vol. V. Ed. by P. Deussen. Mnchen: R. Piper. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1913): “Parerga und Paralipomena, kleine philosophische Schriften von Arthur Schopenhauer.” Zweiter Band. In: Arthur Schopenhauers smtliche Werke. Vol. V. Ed. by P. Deussen. Mnchen: R. Piper. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1969): The World as Will and Representation. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1974): The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1974): Parerga und Paralipomena. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1986): Der handschriftliche Nachlaß. Fnfter Band. Randschriften zu Bchern. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Frankfurt am Main: Kramer.

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Schopenhauer, Arthur (1988): Manuscript Remains. Vol. I-IV. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Berg. Schopenhauer, Arthur (2008): The World as Will and Presentation. Vol. I, II. Transl. by D. Carus, R. Aquila. New York: Pearson. Schopenhauer, Arthur (2009): The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics. Transl. by Ch. Janaway. Cambridge: University Press. Weber, Albrecht (1850): “Analyse der in Anquetil du Perron’s Uebersetzung enthaltenen Upanishad”. In: Indische Studien 1, p. 247 – 302. Windischmann, Friedrich Heinrich Hugo jun. (1833): Sancara, sive de theologumenis Vedanticorum. Bonn: T. Habicht.

“The Ancient Rhapsodies of Truth” – Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Max Mller and the Hermeneutics Thomas Regehly (I) Preliminary Remarks I would like to start with a question. What kind of expectations does Arthur Schopenhauer have in respect to his readers? What are they expected to know before they start reading his works? In the Preface of the first edition of his main work, he writes: The reader should be acquainted with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, he should have dwelt in the school of Plato and, on top, he should have enjoyed the benefits of the Veda, i. e. the “ancient rhapsodies of truth”, represented in the Upanisads. He writes: ˙ Thus, for the purpose of my discussion, I do not presuppose that the reader has a complete knowledge of any philosophy besides that of Kant. – But if in addition the reader has spent time in the school of the divine Plato, then he will be that much more prepared for and receptive to what I have to say. And if he has even shared in the blessing of the Vedas, which have been made accessible to us through the Upanishads, and which, to my mind, is the chief advantage that this still-young century enjoys over the previous one (and in fact, I expect the influence of the Sanskrit literature to have as profound an effect on us as the revival of Greek literature had on the 15th century) – so, as I was saying, if the reader has also already received and been receptive to the consecration of the ancient Indian wisdom, then he will be in the very best position to hear what I have to say to him.1

Two years earlier, in 1816 in a remark he only confided to his Manuscript Book, the Upanisads had risen in rank to the first place: ˙ Moreover, I confess that I do not believe my doctrine could have come about before the Upanishads, Plato and Kant could cast their rays simultaneously into the mind of one man. But of course, as Diderot says, many statues were 1

W II, XII; L I, 11; cf. Cross 2008, p. 58.

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standing and the sun shone on all of them, yet only Memnon’s statue uttered a melodious sound. Le neveu de Rameau. 2

It is not yet absolutely clear why he referred to the Upanisads so emphati˙ time when he cally, and which influence they definitely had on him in the started writing his one and only work, in which his one and only thought was delivered. However, these appraisals, the official one as well as the private one, are in contrast to the communis opinio of the scholars, who accept the influence Plato and Kant had on the young thinker with good grace, but have troubles granting a comparable weight to the third source for the understanding and, especially, for the genesis of the main work. It is very surprising to see that the impact of the Upanisads on the genesis of his philosophy was not subject of research until˙ most recently. We are well aware that he first read the Oupnek’hat in 1814 in Weimar and then again in Dresden, because we are able to trace his borrowing the book from the libraries there. In the same year during summer he bought the volumes himself.3 But “the question, why the Upanishads appear in the first place was never answered sufficiently until now”, as Urs App states, who spurred on the research on the subject Schopenhauer and his encounter with Buddhism with his excellent article from 1998. His various studies published since then contributed very much to make this new area of research accessible for the ‘Schopenhauer-Welt’. In the introduction to his recent detailed study on this subject, he repeats his diagnosis: “The impact of the Upanishads remains unexplained until now.”4 This seems to be an astonishing fact because the Upanisads ˙ have to be considered without any doubt as the most important Asiatic source during the time the system was worked out. Now App’s study Schopenhauers Kompass sheds more light on the birth of the metaphysics of will out of the spirit of Indian wisdom, which according to Schopenhauer was incorporated in the Upanisads. Furthermore, he presents a ˙ large-scale, wide-ranging case study which elucidates the intercultural and multidisciplinary character of the philosophy of will.5 Surprisingly it was Schopenhauer’s appreciation of the Upanisads, by ˙ which he earned the honorary title “extraordinary hermeneutic”, given by one of the most renowned scholars of Sanskrit during the 19th century, 2 3 4 5

HN I, p. 422, no. 623. App 1998, p. 38; App. 2008, p. 49, n. 25. App 2011, p. 4. Cf. App 2011, p. 157 – 160.

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the famous Friedrich Max Mller. What did Mller mean by this, and to what extent is this attribute more than a superficial and honourable one, at least at that time? First I will outline the personal relationship between Mller and Schopenhauer. We will see that the Upanisads played a decisive role. Re˙ search had gone on since Schopenhauer’s favourite book was published in 1801/02, and, of course, progress had been made. However, Schopenhauer’s fascination with this book is still a fascinating theme. His appreciation remains a very important pre-supposition for understanding of his work, as App convincingly showed. In the second half of my paper, I am going to outline what kind of hermeneutics Schopenhauer had in mind, without his using this term at all. To put it in a nutshell: His hermeneutics are not a hermeneutics of texts, but a hermeneutics of being interpreted as will. I will try to further elucidate this to get a more precise meaning of the term “Daseinshermeneutik” (the “hermeneutics of being-here”) used by some scholars recently to label Schopenhauer’s approach to reality (Manfred Riedel, Rdiger Safranski, Dieter Birnbacher). (II) Friedrich Max Mller Meets Arthur Schopenhauer Friedrich Max Mller (1823 – 1900) was the son of the poet Wilhelm Mller (“Winter Journey”, set into music by the composer Franz Schubert (1797 – 1828)). Having studied in Berlin and Paris, he moved to Oxford where he got a chair for Comparative Linguistics in 1854. He is regarded as the founder of the science of Indology, primarily due to his wide ranging, monumental edition of the Sacred Books of the East in fifty volumes.6 Until now in India he is more renowned than the “poet of the Germans” (“Dichter der Deutschen”), as Schopenhauer called Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, with the result that the institution which advocates German culture abroad, elsewhere known as “Goethe-Institut”, in India acts as “Max Mller Bhavan”. To realize his enormous reputation we only have to cite Viveka¯nanda, who has visited “our Max Mller”, as he says, several times in Oxford. We Hindus, certainly owe more to him than to any other Sanskrit scholar in the West, and I am simply astonished when I think of the gigantic task which he, in his enthusiasm, undertook as a young man and brought to a successful 6

Mller 1876 et seqq.

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conclusion in his old age. Think of this man without any help, poring over old manuscripts, hardly legible to the Hindus themselves, and in a language to acquire which takes a lifetime even in India – think of this man, spending days and sometimes months in elucidating the correct reading and the meaning of a word or a sentence in the commentary of Svana (as he has himself told me), and in the end succeeding in making an easy road through the forest of Vedic literature for all others to go along; think of him and his work, and then say what he really is to us! Of course we need not all agree with him in all that he says in his many writings; certainly such an agreement is impossible. But agreement or not agreement, the fact remains that this one man has done a thousand times more for the preservation, spreading, and appreciation of the literature of our forefathers than any of us can ever hope to do; and he has done it all with a heart which is full of the sweet balm of love and veneration.7

This appraisal is important background; it helps us be able to evaluate the importance of the praise which Mller offered to Schopenhauer. We know that Mller met Schopenhauer in Frankfurt about 1845 on his way from Berlin to Paris. He himself gave a short review of this visit about forty years later.8 The young scholar, aged twenty-two, already knew that the Upanisads are a very special sort of texts, but definitely not the original source˙ of Indian wisdom. They have to be seen as leaning on older layers of texts, and the oldest layer, which we might try to arrive at, is represented in the hymns of the Rgveda. He had already studied the Upanisads but regretted having done ˙so.9 It appeared to him a waste of time, ˙because for him they seemed to be a kind of derivative, secondary stuff, “something modern”. Unfortunately we are not informed where he met Schopenhauer, who then was living in “Schçne Aussicht 16 in Frankfurt am Main”. Further details of the meeting are not available. In the report he gives, he first describes the massive prejudice the German scholars, especially those teaching at the universities, had against Schopenhauer and his “passage to India”. These scholastic prejudices blocked their understanding from the beginning. At the end, he sketched the main topics of misunderstanding: “[…] Schopenhauer wanted to know something about the Upanishads, I appraised the old hymns, which he considered to be priestly concoctions.”10 It is not hard to imagine how uncomfortable Schopenhauer felt listening to the talk of the young scholar who was not willing to join 7 8 9 10

Rolland 1928, p. 164 et seq. Gespr, p. 87, no. 120. Acc. Halbfass 1990, p. 486, n. 18; Cross 2008, p. 77, n. 25. Gespr, p. 87, no. 120.

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him in enthusiasm for the Upanisads. A disparaging remark about the translation by Abraham Hyacinthe˙ Anquetil-Duperron, which certainly was at hand and reference in the library, might have completed the misunderstanding. Mller concluded: “So we parted without having understood each other.” However, in his review written forty years later on, he stated his respect for the philosopher enthusiastically, saying: I have to confess, that if Schopenhauer had done nothing else than to make some sense out of Anquetil Duperron’s horrible translation, this would suffice to grant him an extraordinary place in the range of the great hermeneutics of the past, even by philologists.11

This is strong praise stressing the divinatory powers of the Frankfurt thinker. But, what is really strange is that Mller did not mention this meeting in his later autobiography, one teeming with scholars, poets, royal and other renowned persons, but Schopenhauer remains excluded.12 Some remarks of his review might be traced back to his Frankfurt visit. Mller there calls the Rgveda “the oldest book of the world”, but the context of this statement˙ is not a flattering one: It is, Mller says, a scripture “stemming from the childhood of mankind and therefore containing a lot of childish thoughts, nonetheless there are some brilliant insights.”13 If we continue to imagine that during the meeting Mller might have called the Upanisads, definitely Schopenhauer’s “favourite ˙ book” (App), not only a secondary source, but a childish derivative from a much more infantile past, we might understand why Schopenhauer was not really pleased by the visit and in the future never referred back to their meeting. His personal acquaintance with the young scholar is not mentioned, neither in the work nor in talks he had during the remainder of his life. Only in the Manuscripts Remains do we find some references to Mller: The first one is dated 1855. He cites a statement of the scholar without clearly being aware where it stems from. The sentence might have been picked up from Mller’s introduction to the Rgveda (1854) or from an article titled On the Veda and the Zend Avesta.˙ However, which is much more important than the provenance, it apparently strongly supported his own philosophy. “Brahma means originally force, will, wish, & the propulsive power of creation.” He underlined the whole sentence, the 11 Gespr, p. 87, no. 120. 12 Mller 1901, Schopenhauer is mentioned in some earlier works I have to review in a separate article. 13 Mller 1901, p. 266.

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word “will” is also written in bold.14 He annotated: “The Italian word bramare, where does it stem from? (This citation is from The Times.).” In his letter to a friend of his youth, Christian Karl Josias von Bunsen (1791 – 1860), with whom he had attended Arnold Her(r)mann Ludwig (von) Heeren’s (1760 – 1842) collegia on the History of the States 1809/10 in Gçttingen,15 he guessed that Mllers article was published in the Englischen Hippolytus of his friend,16 and he emphasized that he was especially interested in the deduction of the word “brahma” from the word “Wille”. Therefore he wrote his friend his request: “At the end you might do a favour to my paganism, if you bring this volume with you (sc. during the proposed visit in Germany)”, in which he thought Mller’s article was published.17 Whether the reunion which took place in the firstclass hotel “Englischer Hof ” where Schopenhauer used to have dinner, was really pleasant, might be doubted, as well as the chance to dwell on Indological subjects while having dinner. It is well known that in his later years Schopenhauer took a special interest in these etymological speculations. If a scholarly expert like Mller traced back the primary word of Indian wisdom, brahma, to “his” will, this could serve as a valuable confirmation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. One year later he again mentioned this discovery in a letter to a friend, which he got from his beloved The Times, as arises from his remark (12. 11. 1856).18 Once again Mller is mentioned. In the last year of his life Schopenhauer wrote down a remark concerning the chronology of the Vedas. “According to Mller the first writing of the Vedas took place about 1300 AD, the first writing of the Upanishads 600 – 800 AD”.19 That’s all we find in respect to Mller. But let’s come back to the strong praise which Mller gave to Schopenhauer for his ingenious reading, as Mller had stated in his report. When the scholar Mller, now renowned, started to publish the famous Sacred Books of the East in 1875, he himself made the first step with 14 HN IV (2), p. 18; S, p. 116. 15 Re. the impact the Heeren’s ethnography course of 1811 had on the young student cf. App 2008, p. 9 – 12. Heeren was a “noted authority in Germany’s nascent field of Asia-related studies” (ibid. p. 9), with reference note to his transcription of Schopenhauer’s records, cf. App 2003. 16 According to Gwinner 1910, p. 592 the title was Hippolytus and his Age (London 1852). 17 GBr, p. 414, no. 410; Bunsen 1852/53, p. 618. 18 GBr, p. 405, no. 401. 19 HN IV (2), p. 34.

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a translation of the Upanisads, introduced, edited and annotated by him˙ introduction is headlined First Translation of self. The first chapter of his the Upanishads. Dara Shukoh, Anquetil Duperron, Schopenhauer. The editor mentions straight away the translation Duperron had published in 1801/1802. “This translation, though it attracted considerable interest among scholars, was written in so utterly unintelligible a style, that it required the lynx-like perspicacity of an intrepid philosopher such as Schopenhauer, to discover a thread through such a labyrinth. Schopenhauer, however, not only found and followed such a thread, but he had the courage to proclaim to an incredulous age the vast treasures of thought which were lying buried beneath that fearful jargon.”20 Comparing this with Schopenhauer’s well known statement which declared “In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and as elevating as that of the Upanishads. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death”21 we might be inclined to ask if both are talking about the same book. But Mller goes on explaining his harsh judgement by giving a specimen of Aquetil-Duperron’s translation of the famous Cha¯ndogyopanisad, in which – as we all are certainly aware – the “tat tvam asi” occurs.˙He pleads to the favourable reader to judge by himself if it is possible to extract any meaning out of this enigma. He continues: Schopenhauer not only read this translation carefully, but he makes no secret of it, that his own philosophy is powerfully impregnated by the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads. He dwells on it again and again, and it seems both fair to Schopenhauer’s memory and highly important for a true appreciation of the philosophical value of the Upanishads, to put together what that vigorous thinker has written on those ancient rhapsodies of truth.22

As I said at the beginning, for details of the influence and the bias which the reading of the Upanisads had on the young thinker to get on his track, ˙ we have to refer to the elucidation given by App learned study Schopenhauer’s Kompass: Die Geburt einer Philosophie (Schopenhauer’s Compass: The Birth of a Philosophy). Going forward, Mller presents a lot of cita20 Mller 1876, p. LIX; App names other scholars who also had a comparable “perspicacity”, as Jean-Denis Lanjuinais (1753 – 1827) and the pupils of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744 – 1803), like Friedrich Majer (1772 – 1818), Johann Arnold Kanne (1773 – 1824) and especially Joseph Gçrres (1776 – 1848), furthermore Georg Friedrich Creuzer (1771 – 1858), cf. App 2011, pp 127 – 135; Cross 2008, p. 64. 21 W VI, p. 427; P II, p. 348. 22 Mller 1901, p. 266.

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tions from Schopenhauer’s works, starting with the main work and passing to the Parerga which clearly shows his excellent acquaintance with Schopenhauer’s writings, to conclude his analysis with the sentence: “This may seem strong language, and in some respects too strong.”23 Nonetheless, he declares that Schopenhauer’s enthusiastic estimation of the Upanisads as “products of the highest wisdom” (“Ausgeburt der ˙ hçchsten [sc. menschlichen] Weisheit”)24 has played a significant role for the coming reception of those documents. Therefore his ranking of Schopenhauer as a really great representative of hermeneutics seems to be a valid one and absolutely justifiable. It is worth mentioning, that Mller not only surprised the academic world with his warm appraisal of Schopenhauer’s achievements, but also joined the international group who signed an appeal for the erection of a Schopenhauer memorial in Frankfurt am Main. According to the plan the monument should have been disclosed to the public in 1888, at the centenary of his birthday, but in fact the fundraising was not very easy, so it was belatedly revealed in 1895.25 But not only the translation delivered by strenuous Anquetil-Duper26 ron was not readable, as Mller put it, also the structure of the texts itself remained an enigma, at least it was not in the focus of Schopenhauer’s philosophical endeavours. How they were set up, their background and their presuppositions remained completely in the dark. Schopenhauer did not know – and it is only fair to state that he didn’t have the chance to know – that Anquetil-Duperron’s published translation, which he so highly valued, was nothing else than a kind of “text-comment-amalgamation, painted in Vedantic-Buddhistic-idealistic colours”, as App concluded in his above mentioned article from 1998. Compared to this, the translations of Sanskrit texts he got to know later on, definitely represent the ancient wisdom of India without distortions of the texts by comments and explications from other times and several scholars. He definitely did not appreciate these translations and refrained from reading them, willing to stick to Anquetil-Duperron’s consoling translation.27 23 24 25 26

App 2011, p. LXII. W VI, p. 424; P II, p. 349. For details see Gwinner 1910, p. 413. Cf. Mischel 1882, VI et seq. and the biography of Raymond Schwab (1934) App 2011 is referring to. 27 Cf. W VI, p. 422 et seq.; P II, p. 348 et seq.

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To understand Schopenhauer’s hermeneutics and especially to get an idea of the enormous divinatory power which was necessary to decipher the Oupnek’hat I have to sketch the multi-fold refractions the documents published as Oupnek’hat gained on its stony way to the learned public. In doing this I can rely on the research done by the scholar Walter Slaje, who recently published a new translation of the twelve basic Upanisads into up ˙ to date German, which definitely belong to the corpus of Vedic scriptures.28 In his commentary he dwells at length on the intricate reception the Upanisads had to undergo, which were not only “imbued by the ideas ˙ of S´an˙kara, but have to be considered as a whole as the result of many refractions, caused by interpretation and translation”, which he then undertakes to entangle. The six refractions, incorporated into the book we are referring to when we are talking about Schopenhauer’s Oupnek’hat, might be segregated like this:29 First we have the different ancient layers of the Vedic Upanisads, and then we arrive at the Upanisads as S´an˙kara interpreted them, ˙ ˙ to bind them together into a system, which proved to be very influential. We have to add the oral comments by the 17th century scholars from Benares, who discussed S´an˙kara’s interpretation while working on the translation into the Persian language together with Dara Shukoh.30 Now Anquetil-Duperron translated this Persian version into Latin and Schopenhauer appraised this translation enthusiastically, as we all know, so this final result was able “to influence the European learned world and especially the Indologists in a significant way”.31 As we have to endorse, the sophisticated story went on. A few decades later a German translation of the Latin translation was published in 1882 by Julius Mischel, so we finally arrive at the number of seven refractions, with our own application and understanding of the corpus to be put on top of this. But now – in the second half of my paper – I would like to come back to the term, Mller put into the centre of his appreciation cited above: hermeneutics. “I have to confess, that if Schopenhauer had done nothing else than give the sense of the horrible translation of Anquetil Duperron, 28 Slaje 2009, p. 391; the citation from Schopenhauer in W VI, p. 422; P II, p. 348, §184. 29 Ibid. p. 406. 30 Re. the question if he was well equipped or not, cf. App 2011, p. 109 et seq., and ad personam ibid. p. 114 et seq. 31 Slaje 2009, p. 392.

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this would suffice to grant him a place of honour in the range of the great hermeneutics of the past, even by philologists.” By the way, he seems to take it for granted that the philosophers are more willing to apply this title to their colleagues than are philologists. What does “hermeneutic” (“Hermeneutiker”) mean here? To ask in a different way, what kind of hermeneutics helped Schopenhauer to get through the alleged rubbish per aspera ad astra, to arrive at the “inner meaning” of the texts? How did he manage this, without any knowledge of Sanskrit language and grammar, how did he succeed in grasping the spirit of Indian wisdom? Was he at all able to understand the texts correctly, if he was not equipped to understand the writings in their original tongue? Are also philosophers justified in addressing him as a “hermeneutic”, and if so, based on which reasons? Are we now allowed or almost expected to call him one, and why might it be correct as well, to label his metaphysics of will as a kind of hermeneutical approach to the reality of the world? Now we are leaving the sector of texts, to find out, what kind of world the documents might reveal. Hermeneutics are changing, and in going forward we will hopefully arrive at the hermeneutics of the world, as Schopenhauer framed it. (III) Schopenhauer as a Hermeneutic The attempt to reclassify Schopenhauer into the hermeneutical tradition, or at least to trace a relation to this tradition or the controversies connected with it, is not absolutely new. A few biographical facts might advise us of his “hermeneutical” background. We know that during his studies in Gçttingen he joined a Philologica, a circle of friends, with Karl Lachmann (1793 – 1851) as a member, the future editor of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s works.32 Having moved to Berlin he attended Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1768 – 1834) courses33, the founder of a new type of “general hermeneutics”, and the lectures which Friedrich August Wolf (1759 – 1824) gave, Goethe’s friend, who had established an analytical ‘close reading’ of Homer. Furthermore he was in contact with August Boeckh (1785 – 1867), an influential pupil of Schleiermacher, who lectured re32 Emme 1986, p. 154 et seq. 33 Schopenhauer 1812 attended Schleiermacher’s lecture Geschichte der Philosophie zur Zeit des Christenthums; for details cf. Regehly 1990.

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peatedly on the subject of Encyclopaedia of the Philological Sciences over a period of decades. In his Encyclopaedia the theory of hermeneutics plays a decisive role. Mller’s high estimation of Schopenhauer would be also a valuable argument, although he seems rather to emphasize the “insight” (“Durchblick”) Schopenhauer managed to achieve, and not his handling of details or familiarity with the documents which scholars have to adopt. But these are only biographical remarks, which have to be augmented by a short assessment of the various attempts to bring Schopenhauer and hermeneutics together. It will be evident, that a reflection on the history of the development of this discipline proves to be necessary, and to get a comprehensive, rounded up picture, we are obliged to look at it from the most advanced or radical perspective available, as comes up with Martin Heidegger’s “understanding of understanding”. The “hermeneutics of existence” as laid out by the “Freiburg lecturer” since 1923 gives us the key at hand to arrive at a more systematic understanding of the so called “hermeneutical sciences”, which might serve as a background for the various attempts, to discuss some hermeneutical indications presented in Schopenhauer’s writings.34 This might help us find out at last if and in what sense it might make sense to talk about a specific kind of hermeneutics which Schopenhauer delivered. However, it is not self-evident to proclaim an intimate relation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy to the hermeneutical way of thinking. In his writings the term “hermeneutic” does not occur, neither as noun nor as adjective. In Gustav Friedrich Wagner’s Schopenhauer-Register there is a huge gap between “Hermaphrodit” and “Hermes Trismegistos”.35 Arthur Hbscher’s inventory, which was set up on the basis of Wagner’s index-book, cites no incidence as well. Attempts, to begin with Schopenhauer’s concept of understanding, are somewhat futile and disillusioning. Understanding, he teaches us, is “an immediate and intuitive grasping of the causal relations, although it has to be put into abstract concepts straight away, to be fixed”.36 He claims “that all our understanding is based on the principle of sufficient reason, while being the mere application of this”.37 Therefore our understanding is definitely

34 35 36 37

Heidegger 1988. Wagner 1982, p. 167. W I; G, p. 77; S, p. 23. W III, p. 607; L II, p. 615.

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confined to the world of appearances.38 None of these sentences seems conducive to labeling his system as genuinely hermeneutical. However, a first attempt was made by Cay Baron von Brockdorff (1874 – 1946), who conceded Schopenhauer “an immersive pondering on hermeneutics”,39 referring mainly to the appendix of the magnum opus containing the critique of the Kantian philosophy, but without taking into account the details of this spirited interpretation. Apparently he had in mind a thorough interpretation according to specific rules, which might effortlessly be overridden by the genius. “The developed technique of interpretation consists of elaborated devices and rules, whereupon all arts and humanities might proceed, but there is an ingenious hermeneutics (“geniale Hermeneutik”) as well, which does not need them.”40 A very different twist is suggested by Walter Robert Corti (1910 – 1990) in 1968, who understands “Schopenhauer’s hermeneutics” as the interpretation of the person, i. e. the genius, himself. It is the human being Schopenhauer, who is promoted to the subject of research itself. There is no way to separate the subject from the person, the system from the existential background, because every interpretation of the work has to be referred to the hermeneutics of its author.41

With this statement the keynote of an existential hermeneutics was tuned, although Schopenhauer appears to be not the subject but rather the object and content of this approach. The first sophisticated attempt to interpret Schopenhauer’s philosophy as a genuine hermeneutical one within the context of the contemporary philosophy of science was presented by Manfred Riedel (1936 – 2009), who claimed in a concise characteristic of the system, that Schopenhauer’s philosophy seems to be not the realization of a metaphysical but of a hermeneutical program, suggesting it be called “interpretation of the world” (“Weltdeutung”).42 This was picked up by Rdiger Safranski (*1945), who presented his influential and widespread biography in the bicentennial year 1988, reprinted unchanged in 2010, entitled Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy where a whole chapter is dedicated to Schopenhauer’s “hermeneutics of being” (“Hermeneutik 38 39 40 41 42

Cf. W VI, p. 98; P II, p. 89. Brockdorff 1945 et seqq., p. 57. Brockdorff 1945 et seqq., p. 61. Corti 1968, p. 31. Schopenhauer 1981.

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des Daseins”).43 He claimed that Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of being does not render “an analysis of the empirical world, to be seen in competition with the natural sciences, but a hermeneutics of being.”44 This expression stems from Heidegger’s Being and Time (cf. § 7), where it has an important function in the context of the redefinition of philosophy as “universal phenomenological ontology”.45 Even in Heidegger’s work, this expression is far away from being all self-evident. Safranski picks up on the very common antagonism current at that time; in writing “It (sc. a “hermeneutics of being”) does not explain the causal relations of entities among themselves but asks what being itself is.”46 This kind of approach to reality bears the imprint of understanding, which is a characteristic of the metaphysics of the will as a whole. Thoroughly hermeneutical is Schopenhauer’s approach there where he carries out the decisive shift from representation to will. The not explaining but understanding insights into nature stem from the transference of the inner experience by means of analogy to the outward world.47

He is referring to the beginning of the second book of The World as Will and Representation, where in fact Schopenhauer tries to find out the real meaning of the representations we have to tackle with, which do not pass away like mere pictures, but call immediately for our attention and get an interest making demands on our whole being.48 Neither can mathematics shed light on this, nor any of the natural sciences, existing philosophy up to now, because those disciplines are only able to give us the exterior view and surface-knowledge of things. Safranski emphasizes the genuine hermeneutical perspective of this approach. If we do not take this kind of hermeneutics of questioning seriously, we will loose hold of one of the main points of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, i. e. that Schopenhauer faces reality in search of meaning, not looking for explanations, in order to be come to know when reading the ‘Book of Life’ that the world does not point to something outside of itself, but backwards to himself, the questioning person, the perfect immanence.49

43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Safranski 1987, p. 313 – 332. Safranski 1987, p. 330. Heidegger 1972, p. 38. Safranski 1987, p. 330. Safranski 1987, p. 323. W II, p. 113; L I, p. 145, § 17. Safranski 1987, p. 320.

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In stressing the existential character of this approach, which is explicated as a kind of Nietzschean “hermeneutics of the body” (“Leibhermeneutik”), he exemplifies his idea almost obsessively using the model of the text, applied to the metaphor of the “Book of the World” (“Buch der Welt”) to elucidate the specific character of this way of thinking. This conditioning, we are inclined to say, is very common and occurs very often; it encumbers not only the understanding of a more basic non-textual access to the world, but also every chance to differentiate the various forms of tackling with different objects of understanding in general according to their material contents. The main question, if and how being might be an object or a subject of hermeneutics, or both, and what kind of relation those contrary approaches might have, is not asked. The appealing, but too suggestive title “hermeneutics of being” is placed like a cork on a bottle, from where the spirit of hermeneutics is not able to escape.50 Following up on the remarks of Riedel and Safranski in 1988, Dieter Birnbacher (*1946) postulated in respect to the specific approach of the metaphysics of will as shown in § 17 (see above), that instead of explanation by causes, we find in Schopenhauer’s work the interpretation of “the world as meaningful within contexts” (“die Deutung der Welt als Sinnzusammenhang”).51 This means that the analogy with the natural sciences is superseded by an analogy with the “method of hermeneutics”. This shift of analogy remains nonetheless not completely plausible. It is somewhat surprising, how easy it seemed to Schopenhauer to make the transition from one concept to the other and how lightly he treated the problem of changing sides – f.i. in the famous chapter Concerning Mankind’s Metaphysical Need. 52 For every reader, who is educated in philosophy and well versed in the philosophy of science, there is no chance to cover both aspects in the line of one course. As his predecessors, Birnbacher emphasizes the statement, that Schopenhauer’s “hermeneutics of being”, for which he offers the term “expressive description”53, forms the kernel of his access to the world. As we see the pendulum has swung back again, holding distance to any kind of a hermeneutics of texts, which, from this point of view, is almost out of sight. However, this kind of hermeneutical approach to reality is not picked out by Schopenhauer as a central topic. 50 51 52 53

Koßler 1998, p. 177 et seq. comment. Birnbacher 1988, p. 12. W III; L II, § 17. Birnbacher 2009, p. 15.

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Schopenhauer’s metaphysics seems rather calculated to show that his metaphilosophical main concept complies with an inductive explanation of the world according to experience than with his sub-approach of an expressive description; this even though the distressing consequence emerges that this approach is not able to render an account of its own status or even to take the own status in account at all. Schopenhauer’s ‘hermeneutics of being’ is not belittled through this organizing.54

Birnbacher affirmed und outlined this interpretation later on repeatedly; so he can be credited for first bringing Schopenhauer in comprehensible and sustainable connection to hermeneutics. Schopenhauer’s concept of the world might be called a hermeneutical one, insofar as it does not direct one to discover a concealed sense behind phenomena, ascertain meaning lying in the phenomena itself. A bunch of questions arises: How is this meaning contained in the phenomena, which kind of materiality does it present, and especially how this “in-being” in the phenomena, i. e. the objects of interpretation, might be explained, furthermore, whether or not any questioning of the being of things or phenomena goes beyond them in some way, transcending them in proposing a recognizable being beforehand. These questions still have to be answered. That Schopenhauer was definitely not a versed interpreter of the Indian scriptures, due to his lacking of “cultural awareness of his (sc. European) point of view”, was argued by Johannes Gestering. On the other hand his freehanded and broadminded interpretation of great texts of the past earned him the title of an “anti-hermeneutic”55, who did not read books like the philologists do, but who simply used them to gain knowledge. Surprisingly especially this procedure is something from which the reviewer and pundits of the hermeneutics might learn, both in respect to hermeneutics as a whole and as in regard to all the different hermeneutical forms and branches which are covered with this name. So research went on, and the affinity to Heideggers “hermeneutics of facticity” was underlined,56 the expression “hermeneutics of the world” occurred en passant, with direct reference to the often cited § 17 of the magnum opus. Oliver Hallich talks about Schopenhauer’s “hermeneutical metaphysics” and debates the interesting question, whether in the course of a rehabilitation of metaphysical concepts within ethics we 54 Birnbacher 2009, p. 15. 55 Regehly 1992a, p. 79. 56 Steppi 1991, p. 92.

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might refer to Schopenhauer’s concept of a hermeneutical metaphysic”.57 However, at this point the adjective “hermeneutical” seems to be emancipated from all deliberations concerning the status of this discipline within the framework of a philosophy of science or in respect to the existing forms of scientific interpretation, in order to find a new home in exclusively philosophical heights. In his 2004 study Douglas Berger applied the label “comparative hermeneutic” to Schopenhauer.58 But his examination of Schopenhauer’s “inaccurate generalizations” differs little from the past verdicts. According to App “numerous indologists” up to now have taken great pains to show that Schopenhauer’s understanding of Indian philosophy was “flawed and inadequate”.59 At this point the question obstinately arises again: How, and in fact, did Schopenhauer understand? (IV) Short History of Hermeneutics Unfortunately, there is no authoritative history of hermeneutics, but I might trace a few leading ones. The attempt, to write the definitive history of this discipline arrives at a more or less reflected awareness of one’s own hermeneutical point of view rather than at a balanced delineation of the history of hermeneutical thought, one which might be approved without reservation by everyone interested in this subject. Therefore I have to constrain my sketch to the most essential points that are necessary to shed light on our topic ‘Schopenhauer and the hermeneutics’. For details please refer to the studies mentioned below.60 Deliberations regarding the interpretation and exegesis of texts go back to the ancient world. In medieval times the doctrine of the fourfold meaning of the Holy Scripture was developed. Also in the Renaissance and for the Humanists the interpretation of texts seemed to be the main task. A kind of general hermeneutics, “hermeneutica generalis” was developed during the Enlightenment, considered then to be a specific part of logic. This branch was neglected and partly not accessible, when Schleiermacher once again invented a general concept of hermeneutics, according to a set of new rules he put together, as a result of his cooper57 Hallich 2001, p. 48. 58 Berger 2004, p. 244 – 255; see especially the chap. “A Pessimist’s Comparative Hermeneutic” (sic). 59 App 2008, p. 7 et seq. 60 Dilthey 1914 et seqq.; id. 1981; Wach 1984; Regehly 1992b; Scholz 1999.

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ation with Friedrich von Schlegel (1772 – 1829) in working on a translation of Plato and based on his experience with the application of the Holy Scripture. Nonetheless, we claimed to colonize a new terrain, besides the philological and theological grounds of the specific hermeneutics. His radical axiom was: “[…] I do not understand anything, which I cannot explain as necessary and which I am not able to construe by myself.”61 Only “not understanding” results by itself; real understanding itself is everything else but self-evident, he proclaimed. Therefore understanding has to be wanted and searched for in respect to every item.62 The key term is an idealistic concept of construction. However, his notes make clear that he was not only imagining the various forms of scientific hermeneutics, but in a broader sense, something emanating from his dictum: “Every child comes to the meaning of words only by using hermeneutics.”63 The historian Johann Gustav Droysen (1773 – 1816), who attended Boeckh’s lectures as a student (see above), tried anew to lay the foundations for his science, history writing (“Geschichtswissenschaft”), in his attempt, “to establish the procedure and its task and to design its figuration as a whole, based on its own nature.”64 He did not looked for the essence of history with a side glance at the natural sciences and “that, which opened up their magnificent and convincing progress, i. e. the reduction of historical events into the mechanism of the atoms”, as he puts it in a review from 1875,65 but by referring to the theory of interpretation, made accessible by hermeneutics. The popular controversy between explanation and understanding and the self-assertion of the “humanities” (“Geisteswissenschaften”) with its explicit deliberation of presuppositions goes back to this point getting consolidated on their own scientific track. With the debate between Droysen and Henry Thomas Buckle (1821 – 1862) the “hermeneutic turn” of the humanities in the 19th century started.66 Going forward, we come to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 – 1911), for whom Schleiermacher’s re-start played a decisive role. Especially his most influential and formative essay on the Development of Hermeneutics (Entstehung der Hermeneutik) from 1900, formed the leading view on 61 62 63 64 65 66

Schleiermacher 1972, p. Schleiermacher 1972, p. Schleiermacher 1972, p. Droysen 1943, p. 324. Droysen 1943, p. 320. Riedel 1978, p. 122; cf.

31. 82. 40. Droysen 1943, p. 386 – 405.

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hermeneutics and their continuous emergence from poor beginnings. Although he confined the object of this discipline to “the understanding or interpretation of the sediments of human life, fixed by scripture”,67 we find some important hints at another kind of hermeneutics in his writings, i. e. a “hermeneutics of action”, which serves as a prelude to Heidegger’s “hermeneutics of being” (see above). Within the context of his lifelong project, outlining the foundations for the humanities, hermeneutics played a prominent role. His various, wide ranging insights are not understandable without having his systematic intention in mind. In 1923 Heidegger confronted the traditional concept of hermeneutics with the so-called “hermeneutics of facticity”, referring with this expression to the factual character of our own existence.68 In his early magnum opus, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), he definitely set up understanding as an “existential” for the various hermeneutical disciplines (understanding sciences), which are only possible on the basis of this foundation. According to the fundamental characteristics of understanding we have to take into account that understanding is always understanding of something as something. The small word “as” gets promoted to the pivot point of hermeneutics. While the primary hermeneutical “as” results in the relation to the world, the apophantical “as” of human speech appears to allow a secondary and derivative access only. This is a central insight which modern hermeneutics provide, which enables us to entangle what, at first sight, looked as a hardly separable intertwining of pragmatic connectivities (meaningful matters in contexts), which in toto make up the concept of the world. Besides, we might recognize the ambivalence of the genitive in the expression “hermeneutics of facticity”. Only because there is a “hermeneutics of facticity” (genitivus subjectivus), “hermeneutics of facticity” (genitivus objectivus) is possible in various forms, which then might gain another, i. e. scientific character. The humanities or interpretive sciences are forms with specific objects and areas, which range from sociology to aesthetics. Hans-Georg Gadamer, who was strongly impressed and influenced by Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures which he had attended, sticks, on the one hand, to the existential aspect of understanding as a mode of being in-the-world, and on the other hand narrows the scope once again to the understanding of what he calls “eminent texts”. 67 Dilthey 1914 et seqq., vol. V, p. 319. 68 Heidegger 1988, p. 7.

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(V) The Object (“Gegenstand”) of Understanding The short historical review should have made clear that the table of hermeneutics is richly set. We have theories of interpretation, various forms of general hermeneutics, as part of logic or rhetoric, philological disciplines, more anthropological attempts, fundamental research within the humanities up to the analytics of our being in-the-world. Now we have the problem, that this pleasant diversity might not be sorted out using the point of view a specific form gives at hand. However, the “hermeneutics of facticity” give the horizon for all variations and forms both in an historical as in a systematic perspective, which allows us to give a detailed and in-depth picture. Therefore I will propose a kind of arrangement of the different forms of hermeneutics we are facing, so that based on the insights which existential analysis of understanding presents, the scientific variations might be differentiated according to their specific object and object-areas. Schopenhauer himself gives us a hint in this direction, in calling the principle of sufficient reason the “law”, which takes different forms in accordance with the different “objects of knowledge”.69 The “objects of knowledge”, the “objects of our cognitive capacity” we might conclude, not only require a differentiation like this, but rather are predetermined by the realities. According to the specific objects and object-areas the various hermeneutical attempts might be unsorted. On the basis of the various external/material realities upon which one reflects, the different sciences may be differentiated. This is the framework of his “philosophy of science”, as sketched in § 12 of the second volume of his main work. He grants, that a differentiation with respect to human faculties or academic disciplines might be possible as well, but does not offer these for his subject matter, definitely preferring the objects as criteria. Now the general guideline reads: Understanding means “understanding something”. As for now, the hermeneutical disciplines or the sciences which adopt hermeneutical measures did not really emerge from the basic crisis which they had been made aware of since the mid-19th century. This was the “meteorological divide” (“Wetterscheide”, Friedrich Meinecke (1862 – 1954)). The confusion in respect to the character and the bias of hermeneutics contributed to this crisis significantly. But for all hermeneutical attempts we can state, disregarding specific particularities and features that they have to do with singularia, whose general singular69 W I; G 1, p. 86.

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ness might be explained as follows: “[…] the singularia they address are not at all natural facts nor cases of natural laws, but something, which man generates himself.”70 Equipped with this general statement we are able to conciliate the basic approaches which, at first sight, seem very different, ranging from Boeckh to Dilthey and Heidegger up to Gadamer. As Riedel suggests: “Singularia are ‘words and deeds, texts and works’” (“Worte und Taten, Texte und Werke”). In fact the various forms of scientific understanding might be differentiated according to the specific object and object-area. As we said, understanding is not merely understanding, but “understanding of something as something”. This “as” serves as the pivot of our account of hermeneutics. This little word “as” is crucial, the essential point for the efforts of understanding what understanding itself is. Heidegger had juxtaposed the existential-hermeneutical “as” to the apophantical “as” in Being and Time (§ 33).71 He outlined, that the first one allows a “pragmatic” access to the world we live in; the other one rather grants a secondary, derivative point of view. It is worth noting, that also the metaphysics of will Schopenhauer presents only functions on the basis of the small and inconspicuous word “as” in the title The World as Will and Representation. This nondescript basic or “basic term” (“Grundwort”) of the general and particular hermeneutic changes the “world”, so that it is firstly understood “as idea”, but then fundamentally “as will”. Now the different forms of hermeneutical understanding might be differentiated by the different objects, they have to tackle with. For details I refer to my detailed study.72 The different singularia and the respective sciences which follow the entangled hermeneutical way of understanding something now seem to be as follows: (1) In the social sciences and sociology hermeneutics deal with actions, especially social actions, as specific objects, which might be represented as texts, e. g. as interactive texts which then have to be interpreted; in this case the object is called “action text”. (2) In rhetoric e. g. we have speech as object, which proves as a kind of action itself, as addressed anew by Schleiermacher and as the “speech act” theory shows. (3) Within the humanities, especially the “historical sciences” texts are dealt with, i. e. “documents” of all sorts and kinds, and everything 70 Riedel 1978, p. 15. 71 Heidegger 1972. 72 Regehly 1992b.

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which can be considered as a document, because it bears some human traits. (4) While aesthetics, literary criticism and philosophical hermeneutics interpret works, which lead their own lives, i. e. have a designated status, distinguishing them from other texts so they must be handled with special care (“eminent texts”). Now it should be clear, how the way back from the philosophical hermeneutics to the hermeneutical sciences may look like. While Gadamer’s leading question was “How is understanding possible?”,73 our question has to be “How is understanding real?” The reference to the singularia constrains us to come from philosophical heights back down to earth. It envisages the decisive step for the various attempts, “whose consistent and consequent avoidance was an essential part of the tacit agreement underlying all the discussion regarding hermeneutics during the last thirty years: the step to become more concrete” – “der Schritt zur Konkretion” –, as Norbert Altenhofer put it 1991.74 Up to now, the step which may be called the “specific turn” is still outstanding. But without any awareness of the objectivity of understanding, which has to be a systematic one and also orientated on history, the inclination to end up with a pan-hermeneutical vision, which might be attractive but presumably not really helpful, keeps lurking in the background. Having sketched the history and systematics of hermeneutics very briefly, we are expected to turn back to Schopenhauer. In the next part I am going to trace and compile some indications, which argue for adopting him into the hermeneutic “Hall of Fame”, in tacit opposition to the representatives of the so called hard sciences, i. e. scientific reason. Initially, there seem to be at least four such pieces of evidence: The term “meaning”; the concept of decipherment; the opposition of philosophical understanding versus scientific explanation; the attempt at a metaphysical foundation of morals. (1) Meaning As mentioned several times before, the term “meaning” plays a crucial role for Schopenhauer when passing from the first book, The World as Representation, to the second, The World as Will, from the world as rep-

73 Gadamer 1975, p. XVII. 74 Altenhofer 1993, p. 17.

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resentation to the world as will. This has brought some scholars to classify Schopenhauer’s approach as a hermeneutic one. Is this really convincing? Having outlined representation as such in the first book, The World as Representation, a lot of questions, in fact, the most important ones still have to be answered. “We are especially interested shedding light on the proper meaning of representation.”75 Neither mathematics nor the natural sciences (morphology and etiology) are able to supply an answer. Nor is “philosophy up to now”, in the position to do more than deliver an external view, as Schopenhauer dares to say, using this impressive expression to sum up previous philosophy. If we surrendered ourselves to these forms of knowledge, the world would remain meaningless. But this is not the case. Why? Because the perceiving subject is not a phantom; consisting of an “angel’s head without a body”.76 The body is the principle of individuation which generates the meaningfulness of the world. In short, the term “will” is the right one to find a solution for the riddle which the first book, The World as Representation, presents. This term alone, the will, renders the key to the subject, which enables it to understand the representations, revealing the meaning, the inner workings of his character, of what he is doing in the world and why he is moving around.77 Not only that: Taking into account, that representation on the one hand, and will on the other, render an exhaustive disjunction, this key enables us to cover everything which is or might be get representation, everything which is imagined or imaginable, subsumed under the term. This applies to the social world and to animals as well, for the organic and for the inorganic realm alike. This use of reflection alone leads us to the thing in itself, which Schopenhauer deciphers as will. In fact we get a new view of human nature, no longer considered as animal rationale, a being governed by reason and intellect, but a creature which is dominated by will, tyrannized by the will to life and spellbound within the realm of will. It is perfectly clear that this approach has nothing to do with a hermeneutics of texts. To what extent this approach might be termed a genuine hermeneutical one, has to be clarified, unless we are willing to label psychoanalysis also “hermeneutics of the unconscious”. Of course this is not wrong, but it is doubtful if this label is really helpful. 75 W II; L I, p. 113; L I, p. 145. 76 Cf. the remarkable expression he cited from Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan c. 46 in HN I, p. 104: “Phantasma sine corpore”; W II, p. 118; L I, p. 150. 77 W II, p. 119; L I, p. 151.

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(2) Decipherment According to Schopenhauer, it is the task of philosophy – now I am passing on to the second indication – to decipher the world. This is also a famous trigger for the new label, and an obvious one. In the second volume of his main work, in the well-known chapter treating the “Metaphysical Need of Mankind”, he tells us: “Experience as a whole is comparable to a secret script, and philosophy is the decipherment of this script.”78 Philosophy in this sense is the art of deciphering. Whether a proposal is right or not has to be demonstrated by the evidence; this alone shows if the deciphering of the world as a whole succeeds or not.79 Not only professionals and scholars have a vivid interest in the valid decipherment of the riddle of the world, but also every single person sometimes has a disquieting need, which drives him forward to get some insight into life. The intimate connection between the “metaphysical need” of mankind and the need to cope using his understanding, absolutely necessary for human beings, is elucidated by a striking passage which was incorporated by the editor into the dialogue On Religion forming part of the Parerga: “[…] for men have an absolute need for an interpretation of life, and it has to be one they are capable of understanding.” Schopenhauer was convinced, that the “problems of metaphysics […] trouble everyone to a greater or less degree.”80 As we see, accommodation to the capacity of understanding and receptivity to the large number present is decisive not only for Schopenhauer’s account of religion, but also in respect to his hermeneutics. The reader might be inclined to re-define the metaphysical need as a hermeneutical need. Besides, in the high age of hermeneutics, when the main work of Gadamer, Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode), was very influential, the critics talked about a recently discovered disease, they called “morbus hermeneuticus”. This polemical title shows that these critics were in fact representatives of the post-metaphysical age, which according to Schopenhauer will never start. Although not every decoder is a hermeneutic; more interesting than the new label is the attempt, to make plausible a new exegesis of the world using the decipherment of a secret code as model. Schopenhauer devised a new readability of the world – this expression understood as a kind of successor of Kant’s 78 W III; L II, p. 202 et seq.; L II, p. 212 et seq. 79 Cf. Regehly 1992a. 80 W VI, p. 102; P II, p. 92.

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“expediency” (“Zweckmßigkeit”). The metaphor “Book of the World” is presupposed, and as the “Rosette Stone” helped Jean-FranÅois Champollion (1790 – 1832) to arrive at the readability of the hieroglyphs, the key “will” opens us the access to a hitherto unknown, half-known or ignored side of reality. Schopenhauer designed a new readability of things and relations, his kind of hermeneutics gazed at the world as a whole, and his view was verified, not immediately but with delay, starting in the fifties of the 19th century, and had a strong impact on psychology, the arts and philosophy as well. Referring to deciphering, he once again keeps the utmost distance to any specific form of hermeneutic, although he uses the model of the text as a means to make his idea plausible. But he, son of a wholesale trader in Danzig, prefers to think and understand en gros, not en dtail. 81 (3) Understanding The third indication is derived from Schopenhauer’s arguments against science and the scientific representation of the world (cf. Safranski, as cited above). This again is a quite popular trigger. He is arguing not only against the dangerous “chemical materialism”,82 which tends to skip all morals, but deciphering so against the generalization of the scientific approach to the world. Science is fixed into the borders of the principle of sufficient reason in its fourfold manner. The realm of science is constrained to the world of appearances. Therefore science is not able, not willing and not allowed to tell us anything about the essence of things. “Science does not think at all”, as Heidegger later put it. Again and again Schopenhauer emphasized the different approach of science and philosophy to reality, in a way which finally accords with the hidden antithesis in the title Truth and Method, which as we know, was broadly understood as “Truth or Method”. Physics and metaphysics stand for him in complementary relation. In his lecture on the Metaphysics of Nature he explains: “To trace the original forces and to sketch the laws of their effects is the job of the physician.” That’s one thing. “The recognition of the inner nature, the source of all appearances, of the thing as such, is what the philosopher should look at.”83 We are obliged to add: And this is the task of the philosopher only. Without him nature and world must remain without any meaning, reflected by concepts of concepts. 81 S, p. 73. 82 W IV, p. XII; L III, p. 173. 83 Schopenhauer 1984, p. 139.

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There is no sense in arguing against the attempt to call this view a hermeneutical view, but do we gain anything in doing this? All the sciences which are obliged to follow the principle of sufficient reason instead of the principle of understanding are not explanatory in the sense of the classical debate of explanation vs. understanding (see above). This contradiction has got an historical index; nowadays the expression “correlative concepts” seems to be preferable.84 Contradictory to the explanatory sciences is metaphysics itself, which creates desired clarity, as was written on the walls in the course of the “Frankfurt exhibition” 2010,85 but metaphysics is not expected to play a fundamental role within the realm of the contemporary philosophy of science. Hermeneutics would be nothing more than a fitting name instead of the old-fashioned term metaphysics, which is not at all in danger of becoming useless. Every questioning of the essence goes beyond the realm of experience and transcends everyday reality. Needless to say that also the interpretation of texts remains necessary for Schopenhauer, although his understanding of Plato and Kant f.i. is really en gros, at first glance shunning all philological details. The “inner sense” of the writings delivered by Plato and Kant has to be found; therefore it is absurd to stick to the letter. As Christopher Janaway puts it: “Although he did come to see that the positions of the two great philosophers were, in fact, distinct, the fusion created in his mind had acquired energy of its own.”86 This way he arrives at a new “common inner sense” of both systems, of Plato and Kant, to which the Indian wisdom of the Upanisads corre˙ sponds very well. Also this refers not to the letter but to the spirit of Indian wisdom. “[…] while others made greater contributions to philology none of his contemporaries matched Schopenhauer as a champion of Indian thought.”87 Compared to the traditional hermeneutics of texts he might therefore appear as a representative of the school of Anti-Hermeneutics (see article). But here again Kant makes a difference. Schopenhauer succeeded in spreading his view of the importance of the first edition of Kant’s first Critique. There is no hierarchy between philosophy and the natural sciences. He stipulates that every philosopher should pass the whole course of natural sciences, as he did. That only his philos-

84 85 86 87

Scholz 1999, p. 4, n. 7 referring to an article from Neil Cooper. Fleiter 2010. Janaway 1994, p. 17. Cross 2008, p. 70.

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ophy was able to name a common limiting point with the natural sciences convinced him that he was on the right track. (4) Foundation Looking at all the sciences set up systematically according to the principle of sufficient reason in § 12 of the second book, The World as Will, only ethics, psychology and jurisprudence seem to allow a hermeneutical approach, focusing on understanding. Is the author inclined to go this way? In his study concerning the foundation of morals Schopenhauer checks “the firm ground of our experience”88 very carefully, to enhance his empirical analysis by an extrapolation, which serves as a foundation for the experience of pity. Once again he refers to Indian wisdom, saying: “The dogma of the feigned multiplicity is to be found already as an essential rule in the holy scriptures of the Vedas, whose dogmatic part we have in form of the Upanishads.”89 Therefore the dogma of ma¯ya¯ may serve as the metaphysical basis of Schopenhauer’s ethics. This dogma allows us to understand how “one individual subject is intuitively able to recognize itself in the form of the other, as his own true being.”90 Every word of this statement is absolutely important. The interpretation is – as we might concede – on the verge of a hermeneutical “philosophy of otherness” (“Philosophie der Alteritt”). With serious reservation, because the world is “illusory, deception, camouflage”.91 In everyday life this opinion is exposed to practical tests again and again. We have sketched the “specific turn” in the history of hermeneutics, according to which the main question undergoes a transformation. The question was “How is understanding possible?” The question has to be: “How is understanding real?” According to this shift the popular question, if Schopenhauer was able to understand the Indian texts he referred to so enthusiastically is correct or not, or, the stronger version, if he had the chance to understand them at all, proves to be a side issue. In preparation of the conference on the subject “Europe and India”, which took place in Dresden 1927, Franz Mockrauer (director of the Schopenhauer Society 1923 – 33) delineated a set of questions, which should serve as a framework for further discussions. Not surprisingly 88 W IV, p. 264; L III, p. 621. 89 W IV, p. 268; L III, p. 625. 90 W IV, p. 270; L III, p. 627; cf. already the remark German 1818 in HN III, p. 4. 91 W IV, p. 270; L III, p. 626.

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the highest priority was given to the following question: “Did Schopenhauer correctly in the main, or essentially, understand the philosophical and religious thoughts which were accessible to him (mainly the Upanishads and Buddhism)?”92 The word “essentially” signals a kind of proviso and shows that certain scepticism was communis opinio, but is also the back door of an ingenious interpretation, not reducing it to philological details, was granted, at least as a last resort. A brittle and fatal contradiction between philological and philosophical interpretation opened up again, despite all the tremendous efforts made by the romantic school. The more philological the approach turns out, the less philosophical the result seems to be, and the more philosophical the thought appears, the fewer the chances are to bring this thought in congruence with putative philological “facts”. To refer to the text which is written down and printed black and white does not help at all. “What is written is nothing more than a self-evident and not openly discussed presupposition of the interpreter.”93 The implicitness of the interpretations forwarded by the interpreter resting, upon his tacit knowledge, remains an eminent philosophical issue. These four indications prove that Mller was right in including Schopenhauer into “the hall of fame of hermeneutics”. But one main problem persists. Hermeneutics, including Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is primarily concerned with texts or works, which are labeled “eminent texts”. Hermeneutics, as commonly understood, is “hermeneutics of texts”. Only if we take over the perspective of the “hermeneutics of facticity” do we arrive at a thorough understanding of understanding, considered first as the “hermeneutics of being” (genitivus subjectivus), then as various forms of hermeneutical approaches (genitivus objectivus), to be understood on the basis of the existential self-interpretation. Now Schopenhauer insisted upon the fact that he managed to solve the riddle of the world. Therefore he proposed in his youth engraving a sphinx which rushed into the abyss onto his signet. “Philosophy is the wisdom of the world; its problem is the world”, he says. His definite subject is the world, he writes in 1852 to his friend and pupil Julius Frauenstdt (1813 – 1879).94 In fact, there is no way to ascribe Schopenhauer’s hermeneutics to any kind of hermeneutics we are accustomed to. To repeat the two poles: His 92 Zint 1928, p. VI. 93 Heidegger 1972, p. 150. 94 GBr, p. 299, no. 287 (22. Nov. 1852).

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interpretation of eminent texts corresponds to a genial hermeneutics, and works en gros. This way he arrives at a unity of Plato and Kant, to which the Upanisads correspond absolutely well, as he proclaimed. In respect to traditional˙ hermeneutics fixed to the interpretation of texts he was a kind of “anti-hermeneutic” (see above). The other pole a hermeneutic of being remains somewhat colorless and, what is worse, “world-less”, because he did not dwell upon the interpretation of everyday life from a philosophical perspective. Apparently, Schopenhauer is not participating in any of the hermeneutical forms sketched above. Now which kind of hermeneutics is it which he was appraised for – given that this term has a clear and distinct meaning at all? Finally we have to ask ourselves, if the concepts of the world his work presents, lead to a better understanding of the world we live in. Do we have the chance to arrive at a better understanding of the world we have to cope with by reading Schopenhauer? Needless to say, a better understanding in philosophical terms is meant. The world as representation is not really a sufficient concept, as he himself stated. It is not far-reaching enough. The key to the meaning of the world is given by the term “will”. The “will” objectifies itself in distinct steps, the ideas, which form a separate world in between representations and the will as such. The main work tends to leave the world aside and to get rid of the highly differentiated world as will, idea and representation. The last word of the main work is “nothing” with a footnote referring to the “Pradschna-Paramita of the Buddhaists”.95 The negation of the will, and the negation of the world which is finally deciphered as “nothing” is the last aim or vanishing point. So the “world as will” is transcended. So starting from the “world as will” and the “world as representation” there is no way to arrive at a better understanding of the world we live in, i. e. our “being-in-world”. On the contrary: The principle of sufficient reason reigns in the world of representation and therefore the world of science, although the will itself is the only real thing, the “most real” reality. The principle of reason proves as a principle of unreality. In the realm which is reigned by this principle, we are confronted with a derived reality, a secondary world, containing only the “stuff our dreams are made ˙ sa¯ra seen through and overcome.96 off ”. It has to be deciphered as sam The “philosopher for the world” (“Philosoph fr die Welt”), remains “world-less”, without a world in a certain sense because the philosophical 95 W II, p. 487; L I, p. 528. 96 Wagner 1982, p. 182 – Index: “Indien”.

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tradition has laid hold on him and kept him under his spell. Even if the world as representation is completed and substantiated by the “world as will”, we cannot understand, what constitutes the worldliness of the world. Schopenhauer himself noticed this aporetical and precarious situation: The world, he states in chapter 46 of the second volume, “is a problem not to be solved – even the most perfect philosophy will always contain an unexplained element.”97 In the last chapter of the second volume, titled Epiphilosophy, he intertwines his hermeneutical approach with this doubting situation. Using the appropriate key to the essence of the world, the world of appearances might be deciphered as a whole and in all her parts, he says.98 As stated, he was convinced that he did succeed in having done this. While his “macro-hermeneutics” is apt to comprehend appearances, “but not the real essence of the things as such”, he frankly admits. “This is the reason, why it is not possible to give complete, to the bedrock, satisfying every requirement, understanding of the being, essence and origin of the world.”99 This is valid despite his revolutionary principle that “it is more correct to learn to understand the world starting from mankind than the other way round, or to understand mankind starting from the world.”100 This “revolutionary principle” was set up already in 1816 and he had stuck to it throughout his lifetime. “You are obliged to understand nature from yourself, not yourself from nature”, he tells us.101 “The wiser Indians commenced with the subject, Atma, DjiwAtma”. This was his “Gnothi sauton” (“know thyself ”). It remains a fascinosum how he joined this sentence to the main thought of Indian wisdom, which is represented in the “tat tvam asi” of the Cha¯ndogyopanisad. 102 But also the combination of wisdom from East and West does ˙ not allow us “to draw any conclusions on that which is beyond any experience”.103 So he “renounced the traditional demand of metaphysics”.104 The honour title of an extraordinary hermeneutic bestowed by Mller proves to be the highest praise for the deepest insight. 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104

W III, p. 664; L II, p. 673. W III, p. 738; L II, p. 746. W III, p. 738 et seq.; L II, p. 747. W III, p. 738 et seq.; L II, p. 747. HN I, p. 421; but cf. HN I, p. 107. Slaje 2009, p. 312 – 318. SW 3, p. 738; W II, p. 747. Birnbacher 2009, p. 1.

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But the “ground rule” (“Grundbass”) of wisdom is not a part of the textual reality or a phenomenon of a text. It is prescribed by the world we live in. Schopenhauer’s main achievement seems to be that he has opened the gate to the Eastern world, to India especially. This will endure, despite the fact, that his concept of the world is not apt to explain how we are able to open a door. But – let us pass through the gate he has opened for us. References Altenhofer, Norbert (1993): Poesie als Auslegung. Schriften zur Hermeneutik. Ed. by V. Bohn and L. M. Fiedler. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universittsverlag. App, Urs (1998): “Schopenhauers Begegnung mit dem Buddhismus”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 79, pp. 35 – 56. App, Urs (2003): “Notizen Schopenhauers zu Ost-, Nord- und Sdostasien vom Sommersemester 1811”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 84, pp. 3 – 39. App, Urs (2008): “Schopenhauer’s Initial Encounter with Indian Thought”. In: Arati Barua (Ed.): Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy: A Dialogue between India and Germany. New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, pp. 7 – 57. App, Urs (2011): Schopenhauers Kompass. Die Geburt einer Philosophie. Rorschach, Kyoto: University Media. Berger, Douglas L. (2004): The Veil of Maya – Schopenhauer’s System and Early Indian Thought. Binghamton, New York: Global Academics Publishing. Birnbacher, Dieter (1988): “Induktion oder Expression? Zu Schopenhauers Metaphilosophie”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 69, pp. 7 – 19. Birnbacher, Dieter (2009): Schopenhauer. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. Brockdorff, Cay Baron von (1945 et seqq.): “Schopenhauer und das Problem des Verstehens”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 32, pp. 55 – 61. Bunsen, Christian Carl Josias (1852/53): Hippolytus und seine Zeit. Anfnge und Aussichten des Christenthums und der Menschheit. Vol. I, II. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. Corti, Walter Robert (1968): “Systeme, Probleme, Leitmotive”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 49, pp. 30 – 51. Cross, Stephen Cross (2008): “Schopenhauer in the Context of the ‘Oriental Renaissance’”. In: Arati Barua (Ed.): Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy: A Dialogue between India and Germany. New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, pp. 58 – 80. Dilthey, Wilhelm (1914 et seqq.): Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. by G. Misch. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Dilthey, Wilhelm (1981): Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Droysen, Johann Gustav (1943): Historik. Vorlesungen ber Enzyklopdie und Methodologie der Geschichte. 2nd Ed. Ed. by R. Hbner. Munich, Berlin: Oldenbourg.

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Emme, Dietrich (1986): “Arthur Schopenhauer und Gottfried Brger”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 67, pp. 145 – 164. Fleiter, Michael (2010): Die Wahrheit ist nackt am schçnsten. Arthur Schopenhauers philosophische Provokation. Frankfurt am Main: Societts-Verlag. Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975): Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. 4th Ed. Tbingen: Mohr-Siebeck. Gwinner, Wilhelm von (1910): Schopenhauer’s Leben. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. Halbfass, Wilhelm (1990): India and Europe. Albany: Suny Press. Hallich, Oliver (2001): “Schopenhauers metaphysischer Universalismus und das Metaethische Universalisierbarkeitsprinzip”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 82, pp. 31 – 50. Heidegger, Martin (1972): Sein und Zeit. Tbingen: Max Niemeyer. Heidegger, Martin (1988): Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizitt). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Janaway, Christopher (1994): Schopenhauer – A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: University Press. Koßler, Matthias (1998): “Martin Kurzreiter, Der Begriff des Individuums in der Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers” (rev.). In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 79, pp. 177 – 180. Mischel, Friedrich (1882): Das Oupnek’hat. Die aus den Veden zusammengefasste Lehre von dem Brahm. Transl. by F. Mischel. Dresden: C. Heinrich. Mockrauer, Franz (1928): “Schopenhauer und Indien”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 15, pp. 3 – 26. Mller, Friedrich Max (Ed.) (1876 et seqq.): The Sacred Books of the East. Vol. IL. New Delhi: D. K. Fine Art Press [Reprint]. Mller, Friedrich Max (1876): “The Upanisads”. In: Id. (Ed.): The Sacred Books ˙ of the East. Vol. I. New Delhi: D. K. Fine Art Press [Reprint]. Mller, Friedrich Max (1901): Alte Zeiten – alte Freunde. Lebenserinnerungen. Transl. by H. Groschke. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes. Regehly, Thomas (1990): “Der ‘Atheist’ und der ‘Theologe’ – Schopenhauer als Hçrer Schleiermachers”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 71, pp. 7 – 16. Regehly, Thomas (1992a): “Schopenhauer, der Weltbuchleser”. In: SchopenhauerJahrbuch 73, pp. 79 – 90. Regehly, Thomas (1992b): Hermeneutische Reflexionen ber den Gegenstand des Verstehens. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. Riedel, Manfred (1978): Verstehen oder Erklren? Zur Theorie und Geschichte der hermeneutischen Wissenschaften. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. Rolland, Romain (1928): “Vivekananda et Paul Deussen”. In: SchopenhauerJahrbuch 15, pp. 163 – 165. Safranski, Rdiger (1987): Schopenhauer und die wilden Jahre der Philosophie. Eine Biographie. Munich: Carl Hanser. Schleiermacher, Friedrich (1972): Hermeneutik. 2nd Ed. Ed. by H. Kimmerle. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universittsverlag. Scholz, Oliver (1999): Verstehen und Rationalitt. Untersuchungen zu den Grundlagen von Hermeneutik und Sprachphilosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

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Schopenhauer, Arthur (1971): Gesprche. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1972): Smtliche Werke. 3rd Ed. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Wiesbaden: F. A. Brockhaus. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1974): Parerga und Paralipomena. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1981): “Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung”. In: Rdiger Bubner/ Manfred Riedel (Ed.): Geschichte der Philosophie in Text und Darstellung. Stuttgart: Reclam, pp. 130 – 202. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1984): Metaphysik der Natur. Philosophische Vorlesungen Teil II. Ed. by V. Spierling, Munich, Zurich: Piper. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1985): Der handschriftliche Nachlaß in fnf Bnden. Ed. by A. Hbscher (1966 – 1975). Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1987): Gesammelte Briefe. 2nd Ed. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Bonn: Bouvier. Schopenhauer, Arthur (2006): Werke in fnf Bnden. Nach den Ausgaben letzter Hand. Ed. by L. Ltkehaus. Frankfurt am Main: Zweitausendeins. Schopenhauer, Arthur (2010): Senilia – Gedanken im Alter. Ed. by F. Volpi and E. Ziegler. Munichh: C. H. Beck. Schwab, Raymond (1934): Vie d’Anquetil Duperron. Paris: Ernest Leroux. Slaje, Walter (Ed. and Transl.) (2009): Upanischaden. Arkanum des Veda. Frankfurt am Main, Leipzig: Verlag der Weltreligionen. Steppi, Christian R. (1991): “Schopenhauer und Heidegger. Der Anthropo-ontologe und der Existential-ontologe”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 72, ppp. 90 – 110. Wach, Joachim (1984): Das Verstehen. Grundzge einer Geschichte der hermeneutischen Theorie im 19. Jahrhundert. Vol. I-III. Hildesheim, Zurich, New York: Georg Olms [Reprint]. Wagner, Gustav Friedrich (1982). Schopenhauer-Register. 2nd ed. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.

(II) Philosophemes

The Overcoming of the Individual in Schopenhauer’s Ethics of Compassion, Illustrated by the Sanskrit Formula of the ‘tat tvam asi’ Margit Ruffing In a way, Arthur Schopenhauer’s ethics can be considered as a part of his theoretical philosophy. The priority of the metaphysics of will, consequently applied to all disciplines of philosophy, to religion and even to other sciences, characterizes his philosophical system. The metaphysics of will itself can be reduced to one single phrase: The world is the self-knowledge of the will. It is obvious that a phrase like this has to be interpreted, and that it allows for many different interpretations, but it can also be helpful to comprehend the deeper sense of the metaphysical thought as well as its different possible interpretations. We find the same sort of concentrated and compact one-phrase-explication of a central thesis concerning the ethical theory, given to the use of the repeatedly quoted “great word” of the Hindus’ sacred books, the ‘tat tvam asi’: In the context of several central passages of his ethical texts, Schopenhauer reverts to this set phrase to give a short and pregnant definition of seeing through the principium individuationis, that is the essential knowledge. The following quotation is the most significant: Individuation is mere appearance, arising by way of space and time, which are nothing more than the forms of all objects of my cerebral cognitive faculty and are conditioned by it; so the plurality and distinctness of individuals is also mere appearance, i. e. is present only in my representation. My true, inner essence exists in every living thing as immediately as it reveals itself in my self-consciousness to myself alone. – It is this knowledge, for which the standing expression in Sanskrit is the formula tat-twam asi, i. e. ‘You are that’ […].1

On the one hand, in its use of the terms ‘individuation’, ‘appearance’, ‘conditioned forms of objects’, ‘representation’, ‘inner essence’ and ‘selfconsciousness’, this passage contains all important aspects of the theoretical and epistemological foundation of Schopenhauer’s ethics of compas1

TfP, p. 253 – 254.

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sion; on the other hand, the quoted passage shows the exemplary use and, so to say, the didactical insertion of the formula. First, I will give an overview of the occurrence of the Sanskrit formula in Schopenhauerian texts;2 in the second part, I would like to explain why exactly this phrase seems to be optimally appropriate to express the central thought of the ethics of compassion: the overcoming of the egoistic point of view referring to knowledge as well as to action. (I) Overview of the Passages where Schopenhauer Uses the Formula ‘tat tvam asi’ In the second edition of Schopenhauer’s main work, The World as Will and Representation, we find the formula ‘tat tvam asi’ mentioned three times:3 once, in the third book’s treatment of the “Second Aspect” of the world as representation, which means art as a kind of knowledge independent of the principle of sufficient reason; twice more, Schopenhauer uses the Sanskrit standing expression in the context of the fourth book, dealing with moral philosophy, the ethics of compassion or sympathy as expression of the “Attainment of Self-Knowledge, Affirmation and Denial of the Will-to-live.” Furthermore, there are some passing mentions with introductory or repeating functions.4 The first important mention is made at the end of § 44, which forms a part of the doctrine of Ideas. Schopenhauer explains here the phenomenality of the will, its way to appear as single phenomena formed by Ideas – which means its objectity (Objektitt): This knowledge of the Ideas at higher grades, which we receive in painting through the agency of another person, can also be directly shared by us through the purely contemplative perception of plants, and by the observation of animals, and indeed of the latter in their free, natural and easy state. 2

3

4

It seems to me to be helpful to present, in the first part of the article, the context of the passages where Schopenhauer mentions the term tat tvam asi; otherwise, Schopenhauer’s way of using the Sanskrit formula and his introduction of it into his arguments cannot be illustrated adequately. The corresponding passages of the first edition (1813) mention the same argument; hence in spite of tat tvam asi, Schopenhauer makes use of the Persian term ‘tatoumes’; in one of the Berlin Manuscripts dated 1826, we find ‘tatoumes’ nearly consequently corrected to tat tvam asi. For ex. chap. VIII, On Ethics of the Parerga and Paralipomena, beginning of § 115; ibid. chap. XV, On Religion; several listings in appendices of lectures.

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The objective contemplation of their many different and marvelous forms, and of their actions and behavior, is an instructive lesson from the great book of nature; it is the deciphering of the true signatura rerum. We see in the manifold grades and modes of manifestation of the will that is one and the same in all beings and everywhere wills the same thing. This will objectifies itself as life, as existence, in such endless succession and variety, in such different forms, all of which are accommodations to the various external conditions, and can be compared to many variations on the same theme. But if we had to convey to the beholder, for reflection and in a word, the explanation and information about their inner nature, it would be best for us to use the Sanskrit formula which occurs so often in the sacred books of the Hindus, and is called Mahavakya, i. e., the great word: “Tat tvam asi”, which means ‘This living thing art thou.’5

The knowledge of the Ideas can be shared by us through the contemplation of ingenious art works or the “purely contemplative perception of plants or the observation of animals.” This special attitude of our consciousness, which Schopenhauer calls “aesthetic contemplation,” is the most important factor in seeing through the principium individuationis, the knowledge of the Ideas as the essence of the phenomena, or, at last, the deeper insight into the thing-in-itself, the will-to-live as the common ground of all beings. The objective contemplation of works of art, of vegetative forms or of animalistic behaviour and actions allows us to forget our individuality and its limited and dissociative harmful character. We see instead “the manifold grades and modes of manifestation of the will that is one and the same in all beings,” and reflecting this experience, we recognise the will-to-living as our common inner nature, essentially beyond any individuation. The condensed version of this insight is the tat tvam asi. The second mention of the Sanskrit formula can be found in § 63 of the World as Will and Representation, belonging to the fourth book, which deals with the moral theory based on the metaphysics of will, and which treats one of its central aspects – eternal justice: The vivid knowledge of eternal justice, of the balance inseparably uniting the malum culpae with the malum poenae, demands the complete elevation above individuality and the principle of its possibility. It will therefore always remain inaccessible to the majority of men, as also will the pure and distinct knowledge of the real nature of all virtue which is akin to it, and which we are about to discuss. Hence the wise ancestors of the Indian people have directly expresses it in the Vedas, permitted only to the three twice-born castes, or in the esoteric teaching, namely in so far as concept and language com5

WWR I, p. 220.

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prehend it, and in so far as their method of presentation, always pictorial and even rhapsodical, allows it. But in the religion of the people, or in exoteric teaching, they have communicated it only mythically. We find the direct presentation in the Vedas, the fruit of the highest human knowledge and wisdom, the kernel of which has finally come to us in the Upanishads as the greatest gift to the nineteenth century. It is expressed in various ways, but especially by the fact that all beings in the world, living and lifeless, are led passed in succession in the presence of the novice, and that over each of them is pronounced the word which has become a formula, and as such has been called the Mahavakya: Tatoumes, or more correctly, tat tvam asi, which means “This art thou.” For the people, however, that great truth, in so far as it was possible for them to comprehend it with their limited mental capacity, was translated into the way of knowledge following the principle of sufficient reason. From its nature this way of knowledge is indeed quite incapable of assimilating that truth purely and in itself; indeed it is even in direct contradiction with it; yet in the form of a myth, it received a substitute for it which was sufficient as a guide to conduct. For the myth makes intelligible the ethical significance of conduct through figurative description in the method of knowledge according to the principle of sufficient reason, which is eternally foreign to this significance. This is the object of religious teachings, since these all are the mythical garments of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect. In this sense that myth might be called in Kant’s language a postulate of practical reason, but considered as such, it has the great advantage of containing absolutely no elements but those which lie before our eyes in the realm of reality, and thus of being able to support all its concepts with perceptions. What is here meant is the myth of the transmigration of souls.6

In this passage, Schopenhauer comments in a direct and admiring way on the distinction between esoteric and exoteric teaching made by the “wise ancestors of the Indian people.” Here, he presents the maha¯va¯kya in its original didactic function, summarising a central Veda passage of the Upanisads, ˙ […] that all beings in the world, living and lifeless, are led passed in succession in the presence of the novice, and that over each of them is pronounced the word which has become a formula, and as such has been called the Mahavakya: Tatoumes, or more correctly, tat tvam asi, which means ‘This art thou’.7

Before the philosopher continues to explain the subject of “eternal justice” in the context of the metaphysical interpretation of his doctrine of rights, he gives some methodical explications of how to communicate 6 7

WWR 1, p. 355 – 356. WWR 1, p. 355 – 356.

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the ‘great truth’: According to the people’s mental capacity to comprehend, it is possible to ‘translate’ it into the way of knowledge following the principle of sufficient reason, otherwise, a surrogate of the truth can be communicated by the myth which “makes intelligible the ethical significance of conduct through figurative description.” Concerning the method of revealing the ‘great truth’ of the tat tvam asi through figural description, Schopenhauer refers to the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, which he considers to be a myth. Finally, the last mention of the ‘great word’ in the World as Will and Representation occurs in § 66 which forms a central part of Schopenhauer’s treatment of the foundation of moral principles. In a quite emotional way, the philosopher explains again the […] knowledge that our true self exists not only in our own person, in this particular phenomenon, but in everything that lives. In this way, the heart feels itself enlarged, just as by egoism it feels contracted. For just as egoism concentrates our interest on the particular phenomenon of our own individuality, and then knowledge always presents us with the enumerable perils that continually threaten this phenomenon, whereby anxiety and care become the keynote of our disposition, so the knowledge that every living thing is just as much our own inner being-in-itself as is of own person, extends our interest to all that lives; and in this way the heart is enlarged. Thus through the reduced interest in our own self, the anxious care for that self is attacked and restricted at its root; hence the calm and confident serenity afforded by a virtuous disposition and a good conscience, and the more distinct appearance of this with every good deed, since this proves to ourselves the depth of that disposition. […] Therefore, although the knowledge of the lot of man generally does not make his disposition a cheerful one, the permanent knowledge of his own inner nature in everything that lives nevertheless gives him a certain uniformity and even serenity of disposition. For the interest extended over innumerable phenomena cannot cause such anxiety as that which is concentrated on one phenomenon. The accidents that concern the totality of the individuals equalize themselves, while those that befall the individual entail good or bad fortune. Therefore, although others have laid down moral principles which they gave out as precepts for virtue and laws necessarily to be observed, I cannot do this, as I have said already, because I have no “ought” or law to hold before the eternally free will. On the other hand, in reference to my discussion, what corresponds and is analogous to that undertaking is that purely theoretical truth, and the whole of my argument can be regarded as a mere elaboration thereof, namely that the will is the in-itself of every phenomenon, but itself as such is free from the forms of that phenomenon, and so from plurality. In reference to conduct, I do not know how this truth can be more worthily expressed than by the formula of the Veda already quoted: Tat tvam asi (“This art thou!”). Whoever is able to declare this to himself

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with a clear knowledge and firm inward conviction about every creature with whom he comes in contact, is certain of all virtue and bliss, and is on the direct path to salvation. Now before I go farther, and show, as the last item in my discussion, how love, who’s origin and nature we know to be seeing through the principium individuationis, leads to salvation […], [a] paradoxical sentence must first be here stated and explained. This is not because it is paradoxical, but because it is true, and is necessary for the completeness of the thought I have to express. It is this: ‘All love (agape, caritas) is compassion or sympathy.’8

In this passage, Schopenhauer speaks metaphorically about the feelings of the heart, enlarged by love and compassion and contracted by egoism, which go along with this knowledge. As he did in the already quoted passages, Schopenhauer again points out the fundamental truth of his metaphysics, “that the will is the in-itself of every phenomenon, but itself as such is free from the forms of that phenomenon, and so from plurality,” declaring not to know how “this truth can be more worthily expressed than by the formula of the Veda already quoted: Tat tvam asi.” Furthermore, this “purely theoretical truth” corresponds to the undertaking of other thinkers’ search of moral principles. But in contrast to them, the principle of the sympathy ethics – tat tvam asi – is neither a precept of virtue nor a law, because there is no ‘ought’ vis- -vis the eternal will. Following this, however, Schopenhauer ties this to his former explanations of the esoteric teaching (which we just heard about in the last quoted passage); he continues with a reflection on the moral effect of this philosophical insight: Whoever is able to declare this to himself with a clear knowledge and firm inward conviction about every creature with whom he comes in contact, is certain of all virtue and bliss, and is on the direct path to salvation.9

Unlike the other passages, in this context Schopenhauer does not restrict the formula to a condensed version of knowledge, but rather places emphasis on it as a characteristic expression of the morality that is the sympathetic conscience. The truth of the tat tvam asi has to be completed by another sentence: “All love (agape, caritas) is compassion or sympathy,” as a practical interpretation of the theoretical principle of morality. In the supplements to the World as Will and Representation, chap. 47: On Ethics, Schopenhauer gives a summary of the essence of the fourth 8 9

WWR I, p. 373 – 374. WWR I, p. 373 – 374.

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book, impressively explaining the oppositional standpoints of human consciousness: [On the other hand,] from the universal standpoint, from that of the consciousness of other things, and thus from that objective knowledge, from the moment looking away from the individual to whom knowledge adheres, – hence from outside, from the periphery, nature speaks thus: ‘The individual is nothing and less than nothing. I destroy millions of individuals every day for sport and pastime; I abandon their fate to chance to the most capricious and wanton of my children, who arrases them at his pleasure. Every day I produce millions of new individuals without any diminution of my productive power; just as little as the power of a mirror is exhausted by the number of the sun’s images that it casts one after another on the wall. The individual is nothing.’ Only he who really knows how to reconcile and eliminate this obvious contradiction of nature has a true answer to the question concerning the perishableness or imperishableness of his own self. […] The above remarks may be further illustrated in the following manner. By looking inwards, every individual recognizes in his inner being, which is his will, the thing-in-itself, and hence that which alone is everywhere real. Accordingly, he conceives himself as the kernel and the centre of the world, and considers himself infinitely important. On the other hand, if he looks outwards, he is then in the province of representation, of the mere phenomenon, where he sees himself as an individual among an infinite number of individuals, and consequently as something extremely insignificant, in fact quite infinitesimal. Accordingly every individual, even the most insignificant, every I, seen from within, is all in all; seen from without, on the other hand, he is nothing. To this, therefore, is due the great difference between what each one necessarily is in his own eyes, and what he is in the eyes of others, consequently egoism, with which everyone reproaches everyone else. In consequence of this egoism, the most fundamental of all our errors is that, with reference to one another, we are not-I. […] To say that time and space are mere forms of our knowledge, not determinations of things-inthemselves, is the same as saying that the teaching of metempsychosis, namely that “One day you will be born again as the man whom you now injure, and will suffer the same injury,” is identical with the frequently quoted formula of the Brahmans, Tat tvam asi, “This thou art.” All genuine virtue proceeds from the immediate and intuitive knowledge of the metaphysical identity of all beings […]. But it is not on this account the result of a special preeminence of intellect; on the contrary, even the feeblest intellect is sufficient to see through the principium individuationis, which is the main point here.10

This paradoxical situation of human consciousness leads to egoism and, in consequence of this, to the error, that “with reference to one another, we are not-I.” Schopenhauer offers two doctrines to disabuse us of this 10 WWR II, p. 600.

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error: The Kantian sentence that time and space are mere forms of our knowledge, or the teaching of metempsychosis which he considers to be identical to the formula of the Brahmans, tat tvam asi. (The teaching is illustrated by the sentences “One day you will be born again as the man whom you now injure, and will suffer the same injury” or “One day you will be born again as the animal that you kill now, and you will suffer the same death”, which is the same as saying “You are the animal, that you are killing now – you are this animal now.”)11 At last, I would like to return to the passage quoted at the beginning of my talk, which is found in the Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals, in the context of the famous § 22 to which Schopenhauer himself refers several times in explicating the “metaphysical basis” of morality: Individuation is mere appearance, arising by way of space and time, which are nothing more than the forms of all objects of my cerebral cognitive faculty and are conditioned by it; so the plurality and distinctness of individuals is also mere appearance, i. e. is present only in my representation. My true, inner essence exists in every living thing as immediately as it reveals itself in my self-consciousness to myself alone.” – It is this knowledge, for which the standing expression in Sanskrit is the formula tat-tvam asi, i. e. “You are that”, that erupts as compassion, upon which, therefore, rests all genuine, i. e. all disinterested virtue, and whose real expression is every good deed. It is this knowledge, ultimately, that every appeal to leniency, to loving kindness, to mercy in place of right, conforms with: for such an appeal is a reminder of the respect in which we are all one and the same being.12

In direct use of a virtual ‘I’, Schopenhauer frames each opposite point of view; first, he formulates that of egoism, according to which individuation is real and the distinctness of individuals is an essential inner order of all being. The egoist consciousness is embodied as “every unkind, unjust and malicious action.” Following this, we find the position of the philosopher or the sage, concentrated on the standing expression tat tvam asi, saying that there is no true, inner existence of the ‘I’ but the immediate self-consciousness revealing identically in every living being. The descriptions of these two oppositional attitudes of consciousness constitute the keynote of Schopenhauerian thought, in a theoretical and in a practical respect; in the Supplements chapter quoted above, he says, characteristically sure of himself: “[…] to be just, noble and benevolent is nothing but to translate my metaphysics into actions.”13 11 WWR II, p. 600. 12 TfP, p. 253 – 254. 13 TfP, p. 253 – 254.

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(II) The Optimal Adequacy of the tat tvam asi in Schopenhauer’s Thought The passage of the § 22 seems to be particularly appropriated to make clear the adequacy of the application of the ‘great word’ in the context of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of will and his ethics of compassion. I would like to demonstrate this only with regard to Schopenhauerian thought. Not being able to read and to understand Sanskrit texts, I cannot appraise whether Schopenhauer’s recourse to the formula tat tvam asi is also used adequately in relation to its original significance based on the sacred Hindu book. It could be an interesting aspect of comparative research to investigate this point, referring to the etymological and philological origins of the Sanskrit expression. In what follows, I shall try to sum up the main aspects of Schopenhauer’s theory of morality. Its central thought comprises the possibility of overcoming the natural egoism which has its origin in the metaphysical determination of human consciousness. Therefore, an enduring change of this mental situation is only possible through recognising the “real truth”, that is by the way of knowledge. “Knowledge” means here a deep insight into the thing-in-itself (a term which Schopenhauer adopted from Kantian philosophy), or, otherwise, the seeing through the principium individuationis or the vanity of the appearances, respectively. On the one hand, the metaphysical knowledge of the will as inner nature of all beings can be comprehended as abstract philosophical doctrine – again, Schopenhauer refers to Immanuel Kant’s theory of the distinction between the thing-in-itself and appearances – that is, the formal intuitive character of time and space. But this insight is not necessarily a mere intellectual one. For, on the other hand, there is an ‘exoteric teaching’ method used to communicate the real truth as myth – in this respect, Schopenhauer refers to the doctrine of metempsychosis. The importance of the metaphysical knowledge is given by the fact that this knowledge is the condition of sympathy or compassion, and so the condition of moral behaviour, grounded in this sentiment; in Schopenhauer’s words: “All genuine virtue proceeds from the immediate and intuitive knowledge of the metaphysical identity of all beings […].”14 Although Schopenhauer does not cease to point out that there are and always will be lots of people who are not able to comprehend the philosophical truth of his metaphysics of the will, or any other form this truth 14 WWR II, p. 600 et seq.

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has taken, he also does not cease to look for expressions, formulations, metaphors, literary examples, etc. to make clear his deep philosophical insight and to facilitate access to it. The standing expression tat tvam asi is, in relation to Schopenhauer, a welcome confirmation of his own philosophical results; in relation to Schopenhauer’s readers, the ‘great word’ is one of these didactically used various formulations of the same central thought, but an esteemed one. To conclude, I would like to present to you my explication of this subjective esteem of the Sanskrit formula which is objectively grounded in its optimal adequacy. What Schopenhauer accentuates, the overcoming of the individuation, can be thought of as the oblivion of the ‘I’ (in the case of aesthetic contemplation), or as the transformation of the naturally egoistic self-consciousness to the knowingly sympathetic one. In both cases, we cannot continue to speak of ourselves as ‘I’; the specific knowledge, the deep insight into our common inner nature of willing and its consequences, requires a changed way of speaking, a formulation which renounces the ‘I’. Or, in other words, the morally transformed self-consciousness corresponds to that of the mere subject of knowing Schopenhauer describes in the context of aesthetic contemplation: The mere subject is a non-individual, a not-I-subject. Translated into grammatical terms, a sentence which renounces the ‘I’ as subject is required. In form and content, with regards to the grammar and the philosophical proposition, the expression tat tvam asi (translated “This being is you,” or “This art thou,” as Schopenhauer quotes) represents an extremely condensed version of a very abstract philosophical position, which proclaims the non-individual essential identity of all living and lifeless beings. Not the ‘I’, but the other, the ‘you’ takes the grammatical subject position, completing the non-verbal subject ‘this’ by intuition: all the phenomena the beholder can be aware of. All in all, Schopenhauer’s recourse to the Indian ma¯hava¯kya can be considered to be an ingenious idea to explain and to illuminate a central aspect of his compassion ethics based on the metaphysics of will. The extended passages quoted in the first part should demonstrate Schopenhauer’s contextual use of the Vedic formula that always follows the same scheme: after the description and explication of his own ideas, the philosopher concludes his argumentation with the “tat tvam asi” reference, culminating in the evidence of their congeniality. Considering that – for lack of subjective and objective opportunities to study original documents – Schopenhauer’s comprehension of the Indian philosophy must be an intuitive one, his reading cannot be the result of sci-

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entific researches in the classical meaning.15 Rather resembling an eclectic proof than a philologically correct analysis, Schopenhauer’s way of using the Sanskrit formula shows his ‘emphatic thinking’, according to his antiacademic self-conception as a thinker who is concerned by artfully arranged philosophical wisdom. If so, this could explain the huge effect of Schopenhauer’s thinking combining traditionally religious ethics and nearly unknown ideas of an Asiatic doctrine of wisdom, documented by the early reception of his writings by European intellectual of all kinds in search of a new and better spiritual life.16 On the other side, it seems that Schopenhauer comprehends the meaning of the term, maybe even the core of the matter, using the “tat tvam asi” formula in the way he does; if not, why Indian philosophers and Sanskrit researchers should be interested in this special reading of a classical Vedanta didactic play? Therefore, we can consider not alone the fact of Schopenhauer’s referring to the Mahavakya, but also the way he does, as a task to bridge the gap between western thinking in search of philosophical truth and eastern thinking illustrating the path of wisdom. References App, Urs (1998): “Notes and Excerpts by Schopenhauer Related to Volumes 1 – 9 of the Asiatick Researches”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 79, pp. 11 – 33. App, Urs (1998): “Schopenhauers Begegnung mit dem Buddhismus”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 79, pp. 35 – 56. App, Urs (2011): Schopenhauers Kompass. Die Geburt einer Philosophie. Rorschach, Kyoto: University Media. Koßler, Matthias (Ed.) (2008): Schopenhauer und die Philosophien Asiens. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Gerhard, Michael (2008): “Der Buddha in Frankfurt und seine Jnger in Deutschland”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 89, pp. 117 – 133. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1969): The World as Will and Representation. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F.J . Payne. New York: Dover Publications. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1974): Parerga and Paralipomena. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 15 About Schopenhauer’s examination of Eastern thought concerning the state of sources, see particularly the studies of Urs App 1998 & 2011. Arati Barua, Stephan Atzert, Erhard Guhe and Michael Gerhard present the results of their investigations in Koßler 2008, based on comparative analysis of philosophical concepts and the use of them in Schopenhauer and in traditional Buddhist writings. 16 See Gerhard 2008.

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Schopenhauer, Arthur (2009): The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics. Transl. by Ch. Janaway. Cambridge: University Press.

The Relationship between Will and Intellect in Schopenhauer with Particular Regard to His Use of the Expression “Veil of ma¯ya¯” Matthias Koßler One of Arthur Schopenhauer’s most prominent adoptions of Indian philosophy is the parable of the “veil of ma¯ya¯”, which he identifies with his “principium individuationis”1. As the use of the Latin term – which means “principle of individuation” – indicates, his view on the “veil of ma¯ya¯” itself is influenced by scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages in which the term played an important role2 not at least in connection with the Christian view of the world. I will not enter into an exposition of the complex relationship between Schopenhauer’s and the Scholastic use of this term3 but merely point to one aspect: Most of the Scholastic philosophers agreed in supposing matter as “principle of individuation”, referring to Aristotle. Schopenhauer follows this line but while in the Middle Ages matter is viewed metaphysically as something that belongs to things in themselves in Schopenhauer it is merely the product of the intellect. In connecting time and space the intellect creates “the world as representation” as an endless “complex”4 or network of relations in which a persisting part of connecting points makes the matter and others its changing states. So, time and space as subjective conditions – in Kantian terms as the forms of pure sensibility – are the principle of individuation, according to Schopenhauer, since placed in different positions in time 1

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WWP I, p. 303 [W I, p. 299], 410 [416], 424 [431], several times in § 66 and § 68. The writings of Schopenhauer are quoted in English. We refrained from giving the original German text in order to avoid an excessive amount of notes, but give the references to the German edition in brackets (see abbreviation). Schopenhauer received his knowledge about the principium individuationis in the Middle Ages mainly from the Disputationes metaphysicae of the late scholastic philosopher Francisco Suarez, particularly from the 5th disputation, section 3, where the theory of matter as principle of individuation is discussed. Cf. WWP I, p. 151 [W I, p. 134]. For detailed examination cf. Koßler 1999, p. 213 – 308; Koßler 2011, p. 19 – 39. FR, p. 47 [G, p. 47].

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and space the essence that is one becomes a multiplicity of individual presentations. However, different from Immanuel Kant, the world is thus mere pretence, an illusion, a dream like the creations of ma¯ya¯. Already 1814, a year before the term “principium individuationis” appears in the handwritten notes of Schopenhauer,5 he called the material world “Maya”,6 and a year later, 1816, he identified both.7 Taking this interpretation of the “veil of ma¯ya¯” for granted, the question arises: what is this that is covered by the veil and what is to be seen if it could be lifted? Since in the world of representation everything is existing ’for-another” for it is shaped by conditions of the cognizing subject, that what is lying under the veil as being independent of those conditions is “being-in-itself ”.8 It is well known that Schopenhauer called this thingin-itself “will”. However, it is not in the same way considered that with it Schopenhauer modifies the meaning and function of Kant’s “thing in itself ”. In Kant this term signifies no more than the limits of human knowledge. There are questions that are simply beyond the capability of our intellect, concerning God, the soul, the beginning of the world etc.: In theoretical philosophy we are not able to say anything about them, neither in positive nor in negative propositions, neither that they are nor that not. But the fact that theoretical reason cannot even deny their existence leaves space for assumptions that are justified by practical reason. In order to explain to ourselves the possibility of moral actions we are allowed to postulate the existence of God, the immortality of the single soul and freedom of will – even if we must concede not to have any knowledge about it. Thus the differentiation between thing-in-itself and phenomenon serves the purpose “to make room for faith”.9 For theoretical reason the

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MSR I, p. 309 [HN I, p. 282]: “The principium individuationis, a principal point of dispute of the Schoolmen, is space and time. Through these the (Platonic) Idea, that is to say the objectivity of will, is broken down into individual things.” MSR I, p. 113 et seq. [HN I, p. 104]. MSR I, p. 429 [HN I, p. 389], cf. p. 521 [HN I, p. 470]: “For even the present fortunate state of his [the wicked] person, brought about by chance, rests only on the principium individiationis, space and time that touch only the phenomenon, not the thing-in-itself, in short, on Maya. The Indians express this mythically through rebirth in the most unfortunate and unhappy beings throughout millions of years.” WWP II, p. 312, 543 [W II, p. 309, 556]. Kant 1998, p. 117.

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thing-in-itself has only a negative meaning: it is nothing but a limit. By practical reason alone it can get a positive meaning. Schopenhauer entirely rejects Kant’s concept of practical reason. To him practical reason is pragmatic reason and has no moral significance anyway.10 So it seems that there is no way to get beyond the negative meaning of the thing-in-itself. Nevertheless Schopenhauer sticks to a positive meaning which of course is not derived from reason but from the inner experience of will in self-consciousness. By self-consciousness we become aware of will as the inner side of our actions in the way of a feeling. And while we can see the actions as movements of the body and grasp them by the intellect this is impossible in regard of the will. Since we know the bodily actions but are their inner side11 the former are things for a knowing subject, phenomena, but the latter, the will, is the thing in itself. Before I will go on analyzing the relationship between will as thing-in-itself and its appearance it should be made clear that it is quite wrong to talk about “noumenon” in respect to the will as thing-initself – as has been done very often because the difference to Kant is underestimated. For, the intellect as being the correlate of the forms which constitute the world of representation, that is: of appearances, is bound to time, space, causality and matter: the will, however, is beyond those forms and thus beyond intellect, sense and reason. There are two conflicting determinations of the relationship between thing-in-itself and appearance in Schopenhauer: On the one hand there is a mutual exclusion dependent on the negative definition of the thing-initself; from this point of view will is the non-existence of all that which can be said of appearances. But on the other hand appearance is that through which will as the thing-in-itself becomes visible. The latter is no causal relation (which is restricted to “the world as representation”) but the relation between the inner and outer side of a thing – a relation of which Schopenhauer in a deleted passage of the first edition of The World as Will and Representation says that actually it can only be called a relation symbolically12 (for “inside” and “outside” are determinations within space but here space itself is the outside). Only on account of 10 WWP I, p. 122 et seq., 594 et seqq. [W I, p. 102, 610 et seqq.]. Already in Schopenhauer“s first handwritten statement On Kant (1812) the critique of the moral significance of practical reason is crucial (MSR II, p. 336 et seqq. [HN II, p. 302 et seqq.]). 11 Cf. WWP II, p. 221 [W II, p. 218 et seq.]. 12 Schopenhauer 1987, p. 692.

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the latter “relation” we can know something about the thing-in-itself. But this is no perfect cognition because the thing-in-itself in its first definition remains unknown. In the second book of The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer raises the question what the will as thing-in-itself is “quite apart from the fact that it displays itself as will, or makes its appearance in any way at all, i. e. is cognized in any way at all?” His answer is: “This question is never to be answered.”13 And in a letter to Frauenstdt he writes in open contradiction that the will “is thing-in-itself only relatively, i. e. in relation to appearance […] but I never said what the thing-in-itself is beyond this relation because I don”t know it: in this relation it is will-to-live”.14 The paradox of a relative thing-in-itself not only marks the depart from Kant but also the depart from traditional philosophical methods. The will as thing-in-itself is not the result but a means of cognition; it is, as Schopenhauer often writes, the “key” for the “decipherment” of the world.15 In Schopenhauer for the first time hermeneutics become a philosophical method for interpreting the world and shedding a light on the riddle of life.16 As we shall see, it is also important in respect to the relationship between will and intellect to keep this special kind of “cognition” of the thing-in-itself in mind. The relationship between will and intellect is connected with the relation between the thing-in-itself and appearance in two ways. On the one hand, as we have seen, the world as representation, the appearance of the will, is product of the activity of the intellect: The intellect makes will as thing-in-itself visible. On the other hand the intellect is bound to an organism; in particular to the brain which itself is an appearance of will. Therefore Schopenhauer claims that the intellect has only a third-rate rank since it is dependent on the organism which is secondary in respect to the will. The “intellect is as perishable as the brain of which it is the product, or rather action”, whereas “the will […] alone is imperishable”.17 The primacy of will over intellect which Schopenhauer calls “a fundamental doctrine” of his philosophy is the result of a combination of metaphysical assumptions and psychological observations. Metaphysically 13 14 15 16

WWP II, p. 224 [W II, p. 221]. GBr, p. 291 (transl. by M.K.). WWP II, p. 207 [W II, p. 203]. Rightly Schopenhauer is regarded as precursor of classical philosophical hermeneutics. For the most recent study of this relationship cf. Schubbe 2010. 17 WWP II, p. 226 [W II, p. 224].

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the will is the eternal essence and the intellect its transitory, accidental objectification. The will objectifies itself in a series of levels which correspond with an empirical and thus temporal evolution of species starting with inorganic nature and ending with human beings that are provided with intellect. In this sense the intellect is a “product” of the will, created in order to intensify the will-to-live and to make human beings fit in the struggle for life. (Note that the talk of “production” can only be taken metaphorically since all kind of causation is restricted to the realm of representation.) Psychologically the intellect in contrast to will is variable, limited, gets quickly tired and its judgement are subject to manipulations by matters of will like fright, fear, hope, love and hatred, in short expressed by Schopenhauer in the sentence: “What goes against the heart, the head does not let in.”.18 The doctrine of the primacy of will is founded in the positive meaning of the thing-in-itself as it has been explained. Yet the positive meaning cannot be the truth without the negative meaning. The latter is considered with the “total separation of will from cognition”, which Schopenhauer calls “a fundamental feature” of his philosophy as well.19 It takes effect in the claim that the will as thing-in-itself is blind, aimless and eternal, because as counterpart to appearance it cannot be provided with intellect, motives and temporality. By connecting the positive and the negative meaning the well-known picture takes shape of the blind and endless striving will as the essence of the world that rules its objectifications including the intellect. In this view the intellect is nothing but the servant of the blind will providing it with motives in order to increase its power. But this is not the only possible way of connecting positive and negative meaning of the will as thing-in-itself. There is also the idea to be found in Schopenhauer that the will in itself endeavours to become conscious. The will objectifies itself in grades of increasing visibility which are called (Platonic) “Ideas”. The highest grade is the human individual which is able to have a reflective knowledge of the will as the essence of the world. Thus, as Schopenhauer writes summing up his philosophy: “[…] the world is will’s self-cognizance.”20 While the knowledge of what the world is refers to the connection of will and intellect, the separation of both also occurs in this view. In self-cognition of will the intellect is 18 WWP II, p. 246 [W II, p. 244]. 19 WN, p. 35 [N, p. 19]. 20 WWP I, p. 476 [W I, p. 485].

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“tearing itself away from the service of will”.21 It is the final step of an increasing separation of will and intellect through the different grades of objectification of will.22 Obviously there are a lot of inconsistencies if one takes the “single thought”23 of which Schopenhauer talks in the preface of The World as Will and Representation in regard to his system as a single view. In this way Schopenhauer has often been criticized because the intellect’s tearing away from will contradicts the primacy of will, the unity of will contradicts its multiplicity as ideas, the blindness of will its capacity of selfknowledge and so on. There are well-known disputes in the literature that refer to these inconsistencies: The question whether Schopenhauer’s system is monistic or dualistic, the discussions about the circular relation between intellect and nature, the compatibility of the theory of ideas with the whole system – to count only the most famous ones.24 However, as we have seen, there is more than one view in Schopenhauer’s thought. This depends on a peculiarity of cognition as such. Cognition has the miraculous effect to change the whole view and the relations contained within it. Taking for granted that the intellect is originally in the service of will it is first of all a means to provide will with abstract motives, i. e. incentives that do not depend on the real presence of objects of desire. In Schopenhauer’s words the will has “lit a light for itself ” in its highest level of objectification.25 At first sight this only means the objects perceived by the individual are illuminated in order to become motives to will. But the intellect also throws its light back to the subject. The human being thus does no longer know merely what he is willing now and here but knows what he wills in general, knows what he is in itself. With this the self-knowledge of the will occurs and changes the view. Most striking is the change in the relation between will and reason. Before self-knowledge takes place reason is the lowest cognitive faculty because it has all content from perceptual understanding and means just thinking less than what is perceived by mind.26 Since intellect is third-rank-rated in relation to body and will, reason is most dependent. By contrast after reaching self-knowledge thoughtful awareness on the 21 22 23 24 25 26

WWP I, p. 221; cf. p. 209 et seq. [W I, p. 209; cf. p. 196]. WWP II, p. 330 et seqq. [W II, p. 329 et seqq.]. WWP I, p. 9 [W I, VIII]. Example given Magee 1983, p. 237 – 243. WWP I, p. 194 [W I, p. 179]. FR, p. 147 [G, p. 98].

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part of reason becomes the condition for the intellect to get rid of the service of will and even more, to deny will which by this seems to be dependent on intellect.27 However, intellect is no thing-in-itself like will and can only exert its power over will by refusing the service of will. So the modification of the relationship between will and intellect by self-knowledge is no change into the opposite but rather a kind of prioritization of the role that plays the objectification of will: At first sight a spin-off of a blind force it becomes a medium for the will which aims at en end, namely the cessation of striving after particular ends. In a conversation with Frauenstdt who asked for a further explanation of the changes by self-knowledge of the will, Schopenhauer presents a parable which – far away from being an exhaustive explanation – shows the difficulties of understanding the modifying power of cognition: “A traveller follows a path with a lantern in his hand; suddenly he realizes himself standing at the brink of a precipice and turns back. The traveller is the will, the lantern the intellect. In the light of the latter the will realizes that he is on the wrong track standing in front of an abyss, he turns and goes back”.28 The difficulties arise because in this picture the will is on the one hand the abyss which is realized in the light of intellect, namely the blind endless striving and splitting will; on the other hand will is also the traveller who gets a fright of the precipice, so will turns away from itself, denies itself. Schopenhauer uses a lot of metaphors and parables to grasp the relation that seems to be unexplainable logically. For instance the will as the strong blind man who carries the lame having eyesight, that is the intellect.29 With prioritization of will in this picture intellect depends on will as it has no power to act by its own. But one can also say that in contrary will depends on intellect as it cannot pursue its aims without being directed by intellect.30 27 WWP I, p. 469: “The possibility of freedom thus expressing itself [in the denial of will] is the human being”s greatest advantage, which is eternally absent in animals, because a condition of it is thoughtful awareness on the part of reason, which, independently of present impressions, allows for a survey of one“s life as a whole.” 28 Gespr, p. 93 (transl. by M.K.). 29 WWP II, p. 236 [W II, p. 233]. 30 Cf. WWP II, p. 235 [W II, p. 232 et seq.]: “As we see, the intellect plays the tune, and the will must dance to it; indeed, the intellect has it playing the role of a child who is arbitrarily put into the most various moods by its minder, through chatter and tales that alternate between joyful and sorrowful incidents.” But, on the other side “obviously, the master is the will, the servant the intellect,

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The use of metaphors indicates Schopenhauer’s conviction that the modifying nature of cognition cannot be grasped by reason alone. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel for instance agrees with Schopenhauer in acknowledging the fact that a modification of knowledge leads to a modification of the object of knowledge.31 But while he assigns it to the dialectic nature of reason, in Schopenhauer it is no more a matter of mere reason but a matter of conduct of life. The change of view is combined with a change of the attitude towards will.32 Schopenhauer calls it the change from affirmation of the will-to-live to the denial of the will-to-live. In the attitude of affirmation will is a blind striving force and the intellect its servant. In the attitude of denial however the striving has an end, namely its self-cognition; and intellect has the capability of liberating itself from the will. With affirmation and denial of the will a meaning of will as thing-in-itself occurs that Schopenhauer placed beyond the limits of theoretical philosophical knowledge: It is “that which has the freedom to be the will for life, or not”.33 This is exactly what Schopenhauer touched by rising the question what the will as thing-in-itself were, leaving aside entirely that it presents itself as will or appears at all. It never becomes known by philosophical investigation but it can be lived. Turning back to the “veil of ma¯ya¯” the role that plays the intellect in regard to the principle of individuation depends on the attitude to the will-to-live. By its affirmation the will brings forth the intellect in order to multiply motives. Since will is the essence of the world individuation is unavoidable. Thus Schopenhauer writes that individuality is inherent in the will as thing-in-itself only by affirmation of the will-tolive.34 In contrast, by denial of the will-to-live the individual is merely an illusion. The essence, having acquired self-knowledge, is one in all individual beings. This is what Schopenhauer calls “throughseeing through the principle of individuation” or “lifting the veil of Maya”. The essence

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for the former is, in its last instance, always in command, hence constitutes the real core, the essence in itself, of the human being.” In the Introduction of his “Phenomenology of Spirit” Hegel writes “[…] by the modification of knowledge for him [the consciousness] in fact also the object changes because the existent knowledge has been substantially a knowledge of the object; with the knowledge it becomes as well another one since it belonged substantially to that knowledge.” Cf. Hegel 1970, p. 78 (transl. by M.K.). Cf. Atwell 1995, p. 173 et seqq. WWP II, p. 523 [W II, p. 642]. WWP II, p. 678 [W II, p. 700].

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is not visible but through the principle of individuation or the “veil of ma¯ya¯”, even – or just because – its work is an illusion. References Atwell, John (1995): Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will. Berkeley: University Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1970): Phnomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Kant, Immanuel (1998): Critique of Pure Reason. Ed. by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood. Cambridge: University Press. Koßler, Matthias (1999): Empirische Ethik und christliche Moral: Zur Differenz einer areligiçsen und einer religiçsen Grundlegung der Ethik am Beispiel der Gegenberstellung Schopenhauers mit Augustinus, der Scholastik und Luther. Wrzburg, Kçnigshausen & Neumann. Koßler, Matthias (2011): “El principium individuationis en Schopenhauer y la Escol stica”. In: Faustino Oncina (Ed.): Schopenhauer en la historia de las ideas. Madrid: Plaza y Vald s, p. 19 – 39. Magee, Bryan (1983): The Philosophy of Schopenhauer. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schopenhauer, Arthur (21946 – 1950): Smtliche Werke. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Wiesbaden: F. A. Brockhaus. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1971): Gesprche. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt: Frommann. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1974a): The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1974b): Parerga und Paralipomena. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1985): Gesammelte Briefe. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Bonn: Bouvier. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1987): Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Autotype first Edition 1819 [1818]. Frankfurt am Main: Insel. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1988): Manuscript Remains. Vol. I-IV. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Berg. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1992): On the Will in Nature. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Berg. Schopenhauer, Arthur (2008): The World as Will and Presentation. Vol. I, II. Transl. by D. Carus and R. Aquila. New York: Pearson. Schopenhauer, Arthur (2009): The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics. Transl. by Ch. Janaway. Cambridge: University Press. Schubbe, Daniel (2010): Philosophie des Zwischen. Hermeneutik und Aporie bei Schopenhauer. Wrzburg: Kçnigshausen & Neumann.

The Indian Context of Schopenhauer’s ‘Holy Man’ or ‘Beautifu Soul’ Raj Kumar Gupta (I) […] the greatest, the most important, and the most significant phenomenon that the world can show is not the conqueror of the world, but the overcomer of the world […]1

The contours of Arthur Schopenhauer’s chilling message to suffering humanity are painfully clear. Life is for the most part insatiable, tormented willing which leads to pain and suffering. In the rare moments when one’s wishes are fulfilled, one is overtaken by ennui, an equally devastating state. Thus life swings like a pendulum between pain and ennui. Temporary respite from this general drama of pain is possible through disinterested contemplation of nature or art. But the temporary reprieve of aesthetic contemplation is accessible only to a very few since the great majority of men are incapable of purely intellectual pleasures. At any rate, the reprieve offered by aesthetic contemplation is at best a short-lived one, and the way to real salvation lies only through the denial of the will-to-live – what Schopenhauer calls “the euthanasia of the will”2 – and through attaining a state of holiness by means of renunciation and asceticism. Thus the denial of the will-to-live through renunciation leading to a state of holiness is a basic and important concept in Schopenhauer’s philosophical scheme. The ‘holy man’ or ‘beautiful soul’ who denies the will through renunciation represents for Schopenhauer the apotheosis of knowledge, virtue, and wisdom. To him goes the pride of place in Scho-

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penhauer’s pantheon. Schopenhauer, not given to lavish praise, waxes lyrical when elucidating the state of holiness and its attributes. As an exceptionally well read person and a master of as many as seven languages and their literatures, Schopenhauer scoured sources extensively to define holiness and its attributes. Since world history largely concerns itself with the assertion of the will, Schopenhauer turns to the biographies of saints and mystics for examples of the denial of the will. Schopenhauer finds that in spite of outward differences, saints and mystics from whatever religion – be they Hindu, Christian, or Buddhist – remain the same in their inward lives, though they may give their own separate and individual account of their conduct.3 Schopenhauer comes across many examples of holiness in the lives of Christian saints, mystics, and penitents. But his most important source for defining and illustrating holiness remains the Indian scriptures and the lives of Hindu and Buddhist saints and mystics. He calls Indian mythology “the wisest of all mythologies”4 and the Vedas “the fruit of the highest human knowledge and wisdom”.5 Access to the Vedas, he says in preface to the first edition of The World as Will and Representation, “is in my view the greatest advantage which this still young century has to show over previous centuries”.6 The denial of the will-to-live is “still further developed, more variously expressed, and more vividly presented in the ancient works in the Sanskrit language,” he says, than in the “Christian Church and the Western world”.7 Indian scriptures are one source to which Schopenhauer comes back again and again, and can hardly keep away from for any length of time. The life of the Hindu samna¯yasin or saint arouses his most profound veneration ˙ most deeply. He speaks of it in a fervent, ecstatic and touches him mode we find only rarely in him. The initial step in the process which leads to holiness is rising above the illusion of the phenomenal world. For this Schopenhauer’s favorite metaphor is that of the Indian concept of ma¯ya¯ – the ‘veil of ma¯ya¯’, the ‘web of ma¯ya¯’, the ‘delusion of ma¯ya¯’. Thus Schopenhauer often uses the metaphor of the veil or web of ma¯ya¯ to indicate the fleeting

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and delusive nature of the phenomenal world.8 In this context, he cites “the ancient wisdom of the Indians” which […] declares that ‘it is Maya, the veil of deception, which covers the eyes of mortals, and causes them to see a world of which one cannot say either that it is or that it is not; for it is like a dream, like the sunshine on the sand which the traveler from a distance takes to be water, or like the piece of rope on the ground which he regards as a snake’.9

For the ‘holy man’, however, the ‘veil of ma¯ya¯’ becomes transparent, and he comes face to face with the inner reality of the world. He realizes that the concept of his distinctive individuality is an illusion. This realization goes a long way towards freeing him from the servitude to will and its blandishments. In the words of Bryan Magee, he now achieves a condition in which “he is unseduced by willing, undiverted by it, unconcerned, uncorrupted, in other words just simply independent of it.”10 It is significant that Schopenhauer elucidates this idea in an Indian context. The Vedic precept tat tvam asi (This art thou!) best expresses for him the idea of the essential identity of all living beings in their inner nature. He who identifies himself and others as one and can say tat tvam asi is “certain of all virtue and bliss and is on the direct path to salvation”.11 The ‘veil of ma¯ya¯’ is lifted from the eyes of the ‘holy man’ to such an extent that “he no longer makes the egotistical distinction between himself and the person of others”.12 In the ‘holy man’, “only knowledge remains; the will has vanished”.13 We see in him “that peace that is higher than all reason, that ocean-like calmness of the spirit, that deep tranquility, that unshakable confidence and serenity” which is in sharp contrast to the “incurable suffering and endless misery”14 of the man who wills. Schopenhauer is struck with wonder when he contemplates “how blessed must be the life of a man whose will is silenced not for a few moments, […] but forever” and who therefore continues to exist only “as pure knowing being, as the undimmed mirror of the world”.15 8 References to ma¯ya¯ in the book are too numerous to list, but see WWR I, p. 253, 284, 330, 352, 365, 370, 373, 378, 379, 397 among others. 9 WWR I, p. 8. 10 Magee 1983, p. 222. 11 WWR I, p. 374. 12 WWR I, p. 379. 13 WWR I, p. 411. 14 WWR I, p. 411. 15 WWR I, p. 411.

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Schopenhauer refers to the Vedas, Colebrooke’s commentary on the Vedas, ‘Laws of Manu’, Sa¯mkhya-Ka¯rika¯, Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯, and the Upani˙ the essential attributes of the ‘holy man’ – sads / Oupnek’hat to bring out ˙complete chastity, voluntary and intentional poverty, self-abnegation, and compassion. However imperfect our knowledge of Hindu literature still is, as we now find it most variously and powerfully expressed in the ethics of the Hindus, in the Vedas, Puranas, poetical works, myths, legends of their saints, in aphorisms, maxims, and rules of conduct,16 We see that it ordains love of one’s neighbor with complete denial of all self-love; love in general, not limited to the human race, but embracing all that lives; charitableness even to the giving away of one’s hard-won daily earnings; boundless patience towards all offenders; return of all evil, however bad it may be, with goodness and love; voluntary and cheerful endurance of every insult and ignominy; abstinence from all animal food; perfect chastity and renunciation of all sensual pleasure for him who aspires to real holiness; the throwing away of all property; […] the forsaking of every dwelling-place and of all kinsfolk; deep unbroken solitude spent in silent contemplation with voluntary penance and terrible slow self-torture for the complete mortification of the will […].17

Following this path, the ‘holy man’ is […] full of inner cheerfulness and true heavenly peace, an unshakable peace, a deep calm and inward serenity, a state that we cannot behold without the greatest longing, when it is brought before our eyes or imagination, since we at once recognize it as that which alone is right, infinitely outweighing everything else […].18

(II) The holy man realizes that birth and death are correlatives, fleeting phenomena in the form of time. Schopenhauer finds that this idea of birth and death as correlatives is well expressed by the Hindus through S´iva who is presented not only as the god of destruction but also as god of generation. “Birth and death belong equally to life, and hold the balance as mutual conditions of each other […]”19 Indian mythology

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[…] expressed this by giving to the very god who symbolizes destruction and death, […] by giving, I say, to Shiva as an attribute not only the necklace of skulls, but also the lingam, that symbol of generation which appears as the counterpart of death.20

Fear of death, one’s own and that of loved ones, is a major attribute of the human individual. But Schopenhauer says that “life is always certain to the will-to-live.” Every individual is “transitory only as phenomenon; on the other hand, as thing-in-itself he is timeless, and so endless”.21 His “[…] exemption from death, which belongs to him only as thingin-itself, coincides for the phenomenon with the continued existence of the rest of the external world”.22 For this, the closest analogy that Schopenhauer finds is in the Veda, which says that “[…] when a man dies, his visual faculty becomes one with the sun, his smell with the earth, his taste with water, his hearing with the air, his speech with fire, and so on.”23 According to Schopenhauer, while the species is immortal and nature is solicitous of it, the individual is expendable: “For it is not the individual that nature cares for, but only the species”.24 The man who comprehends this can contemplate the prospect of death – his own and that of his friends – with equanimity, “by looking back on the immortal life of nature, which he himself is”.25 The ‘holy man’, who intuitively grasps the truth, is no longer terrorized by death, but “would look with indifference at death hastening towards him on the wings of time”.26 Thus “he would no more have to fear death than the sun would the night.”27 Schopenhauer finds “in India a confidence and a contempt for death of which we in Europe have no conception”.28 The Hindus, he points out, give to Yama, the god of death, “two faces, one very fearful and terrible, one very cheerful and benevolent”.29 Schopenhauer makes a detailed allusion to the Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ to show how the wise man does not fear death. He points out that 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

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In the Bhagavad-Gita Krishna puts his young pupil Arjuna in this position, when, seized with grief at the sight of the armies ready for battle, […] Arjuna loses heart and wishes to give up the fight, to avert the destruction of so many thousands. Krishna brings him to this point of view, and the death of those thousands can no longer hold him back; he gives the sign for battle.30

Schopenhauer’s use of the Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ is one example of how, on a number of occasions, Schopenhauer modifies the context in his use of Indian material to make it serve his purpose. Actually, Krsna’s exhortation ˙˙ ˙is imperishable to Arjuna is based on the conviction that the human soul and indestructible and thus not subject to death. Schopenhauer uses it to show how the wise man sees through the veil of ma¯ya¯ and is thus no longer terrorized by death. Another example of Schopenhauer modifying the context in his use of Indian material can be seen in his use of the Hindu doctrine of metempsychosis or transmigration. The doctrine of transmigration is Schopenhauer’s dominant analogy for elucidation of his own concept of immortality (and of eternal justice).31 Schopenhauer has repeated recourse to it to bring out his doctrine of the metaphysical ‘identity of all beings’, an intuitive knowledge of which leads to an elimination of the fear of death in the saintly or ‘holy person’. He says that The doctrine of metempsychosis […] deviates from the truth merely by transferring to the future what is already now. Thus it represents my true inner being-in-itself as existing in others only after my death, whereas the truth is that it already lives in them now, and death abolishes merely the illusion by reason of which I am not aware of this; just as the innumerable hosts of stars always whine above our heads, but become visible only when the one sun near the earth has set.32

The fact is that while Schopenhauer uses the doctrine of metempsychosis in a symbolic or allegorical mode, the Hindu doctrine is quite literal in its belief in a succession of rebirths until one achieves moksa or ˙ salvation.

30 WWR I, p. 284. 31 Gerhard 2008, p. 176 et seqq. 32 WWR II, p. 601.

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(III) The ‘holy man’s’ mortification of will through fasting and self-chastisement enables him to attain to a complete denial of the will-to-live. “It is the gleam of silver that suddenly appears from the purifying flame of suffering, the gleam of the denial of the will-to-live, of salvation.”33 The will is now “completely extinguished, except for the last glimmering spark that maintains the body and is extinguished with it.”34 Schopenhauer says that this idea is expressed by a fine simile in the ancient Sanskrit philosophical work Sa¯mkhya-Ka¯rika¯. ˙ Yet the soul remains for a time clothed with the body, just as the potter’s wheel continues to spin after the pot has been finished, in consequence of the impulse previously given to it. Only when the inspired soul separates itself from the body and nature ceases for it, does its complete salvation take place.35

The first step in the transition from virtue to asceticism is “voluntary and complete chastity” which “denies the affirmation of the will” beyond the individual life. In this context Schopenhauer refers to a passage in the Veda. ‘As in this world hungry children press round their mother, so do all beings await the holy oblation.’ […] Sacrifice signifies resignation generally, and the rest of nature has to expect its salvation from man who is at the same time priest and sacrifice.36

Schopenhauer says that “the knowledge from which results the denial of the will is intuitive and not abstract” and “finds its complete expression not in abstract concepts but only in the deed and in conduct.” Therefore, “in order to understand more fully what we express philosophically as denial of the will-to-live, we have to learn to know examples from experience and reality.”37 Schopenhauer finds examples in the biographies of Christian saints such as the life of St. Francis of Assisi by Saint Bonaventure. Schopenhauer also recommends the Autobiography of Madame de Guyon, “that great and beautiful soul, whose remembrance always fills me with 33 34 35 36 37

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reverence.”38 “Indian literature,” he remarks, “as we see from the little that is so far known to us through translations, is very rich in descriptions of the lives of saints, penitents, Samanas, Sannyasis, and so on.”39 Schopenhauer deeply admired and was endlessly fascinated by the austere life and ascetic practices of the Hindu samnya¯sin (saint) whom he came to ˙ regard as quintessentially exemplifying holiness, to the extent that he refers to him again and again in his analysis of the denial of the will-to-live. He speaks in superlative terms of Oupnek’hat, Anquetil-Duperron’s Latin translation of a Persian translation of the Upanisads: “With the exception ˙ of the original text, it is the most profitable and sublime reading that is possible in the world; it has been the consolation of my life and will be that of my death.”40 He also describes Hindus and Buddhists as “the wisest of mankind”,41 and speaks of “those sublime authors of the Upanishads of the Vedas, who can scarcely be conceived as mere human beings.”42 It may well be that Schopenhauer’s basic ideas had already been formed when in late 1813 he came in contact with Indian religious and philosophical literature through the orientalist Gottlob Friedrich Majer whom he met in his mother’s Weimar salon. Schopenhauer himself disclaimed dependence of his own basic philosophical system on the ideas expressed in sacred Hindu and Buddhist texts. In a marginal note dated 1849 he says, “already in 1814 […] all the dogmas of my system, even the subordinate ones, were established.”43 Schopenhauer, however, gives conflicting signals on the subject, commenting in Manuscript Remains in 1816: “I confess that I do not believe my doctrine could have come about before the Upanishads, Plato and Kant could cast their rays simultaneously into the mind of one man.”44 In her careful and meticulous study of Eastern influence on Schopenhauer, Nicholls takes him to mean that “while certain ideas were formed by 1814, they subsequently developed over the next four years.”45 Nicholls concludes that Schopenhauer’s “acquaintance with Hinduism had a significant input into the foundation of his own doctrines as they ap38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

WWR I, p. 384. WWR I, p. 384. WWR II, p. 397. WWR II, p. 529. WWR II, p. 475. Cited by Magee 1983, p. 15. Cited by Nicholls 1999, p. 180. Cited by Nicholls 1999, p. 181.

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peared in the first volume of The World as Will and Representation.”46 Similarly, Douglas Berger in an important study seeks “to reopen the possibility that his studies of the Indian tradition did have a measurable effect upon the formulation and thematization of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.”47 Even if we assume that Schopenhauer’s Indian reading did not significantly affect his basic conceptual framework, it does seem to have affected his expressive mode – the details, examples, illustrations, metaphors, symbols, allusions, and myths. And the conceptual framework can hardly be entirely independent of the expressive mode. At the very least it can be said that in the presentation, expression, and elaborate working out of his ideas, Schopenhauer drew extensively from his reading of Hindu, and later Buddhist, scriptures. In any event, in his analysis of holiness and its attributes, Schopenhauer shows himself thoroughly steeped in his Indian material, making extensive use of similes, metaphors, symbols, images, and allusions drawn from this source. Schopenhauer’s ‘holy man’, if not conceived, is at least defined, visualized, and characterized in a largely Indian context – a context which is persistently, determinedly Indian. Thus it is perhaps in his analysis of holiness, the ‘holy man’, the ‘beautiful soul’, that Schopenhauer shows closest affinity to the Indian scriptures he admired so deeply and praised so lavishly. References Berger, Douglas L. (2003): A Question of Influences: Schopenhauer, Early Indian Thought and a Critique of Some Proposed Conditions of Influences. [Unpublished paper presented at the National Seminar on “Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy,” New Delhi on 23 January, 2003]. Gerhard, Michael (2008): “Esoteric and Exoteric Buddhism in Arthur Schopenhauer’s View”. In: Arati Barua (Ed.): Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy: A Dialogue between India and Germany. Delhi: Northern Book Centre, p. 171 – 189. Magee, Bryan (1983): The Philosophy of Schopenhauer. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nicholls, Moira (1999): “The Influences of Eastern Thought on Schopenhauer’s Doctrine of the Thing-in-Itself ”. In: Christopher Janaway (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer. Cambridge: University Press, p. 171 – 212. 46 Cited by Nicholls 1999, p. 181. 47 Berger 2003, p. 1.

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Schopenhauer, Arthur (1969). The World as Will and Representation. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications.

All Is Suffering – Reexamining the Logic of ‘Indian Pessimism’ Ankur Barua (I) We may begin by noting the difference between experiencing an occasional sense of weariness instigated by specific things and people that one encounters in the round of everyday life, and the more comprehensive claim that all of such mundane existence is fatally flawed. This is broadly the distinction that is often made between psychological pessimism and philosophical pessimism: the former is roughly the negative (or ‘black’) mental coloration through which one sees things and evaluates them; and the second is usually embedded in a full-fledged doctrinal system about the nature of reality as not conducive to the realization of the values cherished by human beings.1 As an initial delineation of these two groups, let us say that a ‘philosophical optimist’ is an individual who holds that the whole world is basically perfect and a ‘philosophical pessimist’ is one who argues that it is intrinsically flawed. In other words, dispositional optimism/pessimism is a primarily a matter of individual mentality while philosophical optimism/pessimism is also a global claim about the class of all individuals: is this class gradually moving towards or away from the realization of values such as happiness, rationality, knowledge, beauty and freedom?2 The distinction introduced above between temperamental pessimism and pessimism as a correlate of a metaphysical system (and we may introduce a similar contrast on the side of optimism) can help to clarify some of the ambiguities that are supposed to infect the terms ‘pessimism’ and ‘optimism’.3 We shall analyse the four combinations: (a) temperamental optimism and philosophical optimism, (b) temperamental pessimism and philosophical optimism, (c) tempera1 2 3

Dienstag 2001, p. 924. Axinn 1954. Loemker 1981, p. 537.

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mental optimism and philosophical pessimism, and (d) temperamental pessimism and philosophical pessimism. To begin with (a), it is the belief that we are already living in the best of all possible worlds, that is, there could not be a state of affairs better than the one we find ourselves in today. Such an optimist argues that everything in the world is already so finely inter-connected, inter-twined and inter-balanced that if you change even one bit that you don’t like, the entire structure would collapse. In the Leibnizian theistic version, for instance, one starts with certain assumptions about the omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence of a God and tries to derive a contradiction from the claim that this world is not, in fact, the best of all possible worlds.4 Leibniz is said to have provoked the English philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley to make the following observation which neatly summarizes the master’s thought: ‘This is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil’.5 Moving on to (b), an individual can reject, in a mode of attitudinal pessimism, the everyday finite objects located in the spatiotemporal continuum as not possessing ultimate value, while affirming, at another level, the goodness of the residual substratum after the former are purified or purged away. Therefore, it is a meaningful activity that human beings engage in when they seek to eliminate these flaws from the world so that its goodness, now covered with various impurities and defilements, can shine through in the present and in the future. Instances of this position can be found in many theistic streams which claim, in their own contextualized vocabulary, that this imperfect world is not the place of true, everlasting rest. Religious believers are often found to express a pessimistic view of the world around them, while affirming at the same time that it is infused with the purposes of an omni-benevolent God. Margaret Boden highlights this connection through three illuminating examples: ‘Medieval Christian society was optimistic in looking to the next world for relief from the prison of this one. Others have looked for their relief on earth: Saint-Simon and Owen were unequivocal in expressing their disappointment and disgust with the world at the turn of the last century … but they all agreed that things could – indeed would – get better eventually’.6 An individual who lives by (c) holds that the world we are living in, when compared to the worlds depicted earlier in the ‘philosophical opti4 5 6

Wilson 1983. Magee 1987, p. 112. Boden 1966, p. 294.

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misms’ of (a) and (b), is truly a awful state of affairs, but, far from letting this be a counsel for despair, asserts that we must nevertheless positively affirm our lives, its projects and its goals.7 For instance, Albert Camus speaks about the ‘absurd’ which emerges from the confrontation between, on the one hand, the human desire for meaning and unity and, on the other, the universe devoid of God or eternal values.8 In The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus notes that our lives are abruptly cut short by death and we live in a strange world which is not fully explicable by science; but we must not seek to overcome this gap between our deepest longings and the brute realities of the silent, indifferent universe either through a religious leap of faith or through suicide. Instead Camus presents the absurd hero who lives in revolt and endures the contradiction without seeking to dissolve it in any way, but instead tries to live as fully, freely and creatively as possible within the mortal span. In combination (d), however, the two elements (the attitudinal and the metaphysical) are woven together much more tightly, so that here we have a pessimism that, so to speak, goes all the way down. Pessimists of this type often produce extensive catalogues to induce in us a deep sense of dissatisfaction: we are reminded that human life starts with the wailing of a baby, ends with the agony of death-bed, and is punctuated with various kinds of distresses, deprivations and debilities. They would also decisively nail this dispositional pessimism to a metaphysical grounding: the reason why discontent permeates our existence is that reality is such that it is either indifferent to or even inimical to the realization of that which humanity treasures and values.9 For instance, working with the Kantian metaphysical scheme, Arthur Schopenhauer held that the phenomenal world of appearance is an objectification of the noumenal Will which is a blind, self-conflicting impulse and an endless non-rational striving which is never satisfied. This tortured course of the Will is reflected at all levels of its multiple manifestations, and especially in the individual wills of human beings who are constantly moving through desire to attainment to temporary satisfaction to ennui. Happiness, therefore, is never positive but essentially negative, because it is but the satisfaction of some want or deficiency. “When everything is finally overcome and attained, nothing can ever be gained but

7 8 9

Mitchell 1931, p. 482. Camus 1960, p. 24. Harris 2002, p. 274.

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deliverance from some suffering or desire […]. What is immediately given to us is always only the want, i. e., the pain.”10 For instance, Schopenhauer holds that we feel pain but not painlessness; care but not freedom from care; and fear but not security – and puts forward these examples in support of his thesis that satisfaction is but a temporary interval of repose before we are plunged towards a new desire. Given this sort of a full-blown pessimism, one might be led to believe that suicide is the rational course of action to pursue, but, interestingly enough, Schopenhauer strongly opposes suicide, which, he holds, is a subtle affirmation of the will-to-life; what the suicide denies is not the will but the present circumstances of her life, and wishes to live in better conditions. For the true denial of the will, we must turn to those mystics and saints in whom the will to life has gradually become silenced through their voluntary renunciation, and for whom the whole world with its images floats in front of them as a fleeting appearance, as a nightmare they have awakened from.11 Thus Schopenhauer concludes his text with the word ‘nothing’. “[…] to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is – nothing.”12 (II) With these distinctions in mind, let us now examine the types of ‘pessimism’ we can detect in the metaphysical streams in Indian thought, referring particularly to the understanding and classifications of suffering (duhkha) in Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga with its doctrine of ‘cessation’ (nirodha) and ˙ in the four noble truths of early Buddhism which teach that all phenomenal existence is saturated with a deep disease. Such notions are, in fact, one of the bases of the fairly well-rehearsed complaint that Indian philosophical perspectives promote ‘negationist’ stances of world-renunciation, given the belief that the world is a vale of sorrowfulness, and seek to disvalue the empirical realm of interpersonal relations, history, nature and culture. In the middle of the last century, William Frederick Goodwin noted that the “[…] fact that Hindu philosophers have conceived of the goal of life as in some sense […] the negation of life has in itself con10 WWR, p. 319. 11 WWR, p. 379. 12 WWR, p. 412.

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stituted a major stumbling block to the humanistically oriented modern Western philosopher in his [sic] efforts to understand the thought of India.”13 Goodwin was writing against the backdrop of a debate between the German scholar-humanitarian Albert Schweitzer who had indicted Indian philosophies as founded on an abstract mysticism – which leads to withdrawal from activities geared to the improvement of earthly conditions – and Sarvepalli Ra¯dha¯krisnan who offered a spirited response to ˙ ˙ the terms of the debate almost along this accusation. Schweitzer set up the lines of a civilizational clash: while admitting the presence of world-denying streams in ancient and mediaeval western history, he stated that to modern Europeans such life-negation seemed ‘unnatural and incomprehensible’.14 Ra¯dha¯krisnan’s response, in effect, was that life-neg˙ ˙ be viewed not as opposed but as two ation and life-affirmation should phases of the same spiritual endeavour: the intellectual, emotional and aesthetic goods of phenomenal existence must be valued not because they possess intrinsic worth but for their integral role in taking us towards the goal of oneness with the supreme.15 We are not directly concerned here with the question of the extent to which Ra¯dha¯krisnan was successful ˙ ˙ of an ethical asin dealing with the charge that Indian thought is devoid pect, but his response highlights two crucial questions which seem to be at the heart of these debates over the nature of ‘Indian pessimism’. First, is ˙ sa¯ra, properly conthe ultimate goal, liberation from the bonds of sam ceived as a reconfiguration and reconstitution (at a ‘higher’ level) or as a thorough dissolution of the forms of empirical existence (with the residue being inconceivable and inexpressible), and, second, is this destination at our journey’s end correctly envisioned in personal or in transpersonal terms? Philosophical perspectives such as Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga, Buddhism and the different streams of Veda¯nta have offered different responses to these questions, and connected, on the basis of an intra-systemic logic, their metaphysical assumptions with the sort of ethical practice that they recommend. Therefore, instead of hastily sticking the label of ‘pessimism’ on to them, we need to underscore this logic, which will also enable us to better grasp the point why, for instance, within the framework of a particular perspective the dissolution of personality could be regarded not as ‘pessimistic’ but, in fact, as the summum bonum. 13 Goodwin 1955, p. 322. 14 Schweitzer 1951, p. 3. 15 Radhakrishnan 1939, p. 74.

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At first glance, Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga and Buddhism do seem to present a thoroughly ‘pessimistic’ analysis of the world: both seek to overwhelm us, as it were, with detailed descriptions of our lives as mired in pain, suffering and misery. But going back to our earlier discussion, we need to delve into the surface of the attitudinal pessimism that these systems seek to induce in us, and examine whether this exhortation to view the world as permeated with dissatisfaction is propaedeutic to the resolution of the ills that beset us. As a matter of fact, both Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga and Buddhism offer a diagnostic approach to the human condition: only after we have realized the true depths of our misery (which a certain sort of ‘facile’ psychological optimism may prevent us from achieving) shall we also wish to put an end to it, and reach out for the remedy that has been offered to us. That is, this sort of an experience-as, in which one learns to experience suffering as omnipresent, plays a therapeutic role: to put it bluntly, a physician may not be able to heal a patient who does not grasp the true extent of her disease. But the question: “How shall we characterize the existence of those who are finally cured – positively as a state of bliss or negatively as an absence of pain?”, is one to which Indian philosophical standpoints offer different responses, as we shall shortly note. (III) The set of beliefs and practices that are sometimes clubbed together as Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga makes the pessimistic-sounding claims that there is a preponderance of suffering over happiness in this world, and that even moments of happiness are, in fact, mixed with pain or tend to change into pain.16 According to its metaphysical picture, outlined in the Sa¯n˙khya. Ka¯rika¯ of ¯I´svakrsna (350 CE – 450 CE) and the earlier Yogasu¯tra of Pa˙˙ ˙ yoga) of two intaÇjali, the world˙ has evolved from the conjunction (sam dependent principles, purusa – or pure, inactive, contentless conscious˙ ness – and prakrti – or primordial matter which is made of three strands ˙ (gunas). The essential self (purusa), which is non-agential witness (sa¯ksin), ˙ that it is metaphysically ˙ distinct from the mind-body complex ˙ forgets which is a product of dynamic prakrti, and this misidentification leads ˙ to a succession of lives which are steeped in suffering. The distinction is brought out clearly by Burke in these terms: “purusa is consciousness ˙ 16 Warrier 1981, p. 55.

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pure and simple. It is not an entity which has the attributes of consciousness and witness. It is consciousness functioning in the system as a witness”.17 However, as long as the empirical self (a prakrti product) remains deluded about its true nature (svaru¯pa) as essentially˙ pure consciousness, ˙ sa¯ric stream in a state of spiritual ignorance it remains ensnared in the sam about its distinctness from the prakrti world. The remedy lies in learning ˙ between oneself as translucent witto discriminate or distinguish (viveka) ness and the ever-changing states of the psycho-physiological complex, so as to reach the final destination of isolation, detachment or dissociation (kaivalya) from all insentient prakrti evolutes. ˙ The therapeutic structure alluded to in the foregoing is announced at the very beginning of the Sa¯n˙khya-Ka¯rika¯ which states that because of the torment of the three types of suffering there arises the desire to know (jijÇa¯sa) the means to terminate them. These three are the internal produced by the individual’s psycho-physical composition (a¯dhya¯tmika), the external produced by the natural environment (a¯dhibhautika), and the cosmic (a¯dhidaivika) produced by divine forces. As one gains a deeper insight into the way that things really are, one sees all phenomenal-prakrti existence as suffused with suffering, as stated by PataÇjali’s Yogasu¯tra ˙(II. 15): to the one who discerns correctly, all indeed is suffering (duhkhameva sar˙ vivekinah). To facilitate the attainment and deepening˙ of this ‘healvam ˙ Yoga lays down a set of techniques – comprising of steps ing’ insight, the such as ethical rules and moral restraints (yama, niyama), yogic postures (a¯sanas), control of breath (pra¯na¯ya¯ma), withdrawal of attention from the ˙ ¯ ha¯ra), concentration on a particular obobjects of the sense-organs (pratya ject (dha¯rana¯), meditative attentiveness to the object focused on (dhya¯na) ˙ ˙ sa¯ra and awareness of oneself as pure witness and as liberated from sam (sama¯dhi) – which are geared to enable an individual to progressively distance one-self from the ephemeral products and uncover the transcendental purity of the purusa. More specifically, this last stage, when the purusa ˙ turns away from the ˙material world and re-turns to itself such that it attains a reflexive awareness of itself, consists of two steps: the first involves conceptualization (vikalpa) and focused attention on an external or inter˙ prajÇa¯ta-sama¯dhi), and the second is a fully interiorized nal object (sam ‘enstatic’ state where the karmic seeds (bı¯ja) are eliminated and the purusa ˙ ˙ prajÇa¯ta-sama¯dhi) (ibid. I.3; I.48). shines forth in its own form (asam Through this transformation of self-understanding there takes place the cessation of misidentification of oneself with the modifications of the 17 Burke 1988, p. 20.

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mind (citta-vrtti-nirodha¯h, ibid. I.2), and since this disassociation was the ˙ afflictions, ˙ the self-luminous purusa, restored to its priscause of earlier ˙ the world. In short, tine condition of wholeness, is no more bound to the diseased individual is led back to full health through this therapy, and some scholars have highlighted the parallels between the Sa¯n˙khyaYoga technique of the self and the structure of classical Indian medicine. A. G. Krishna Warrier, for instance, points out that “[…] the entire Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga Philosophy assumes a four-fold character like the medical science. Corresponding to the four main sections of the latter, the Sa¯n˙khyaYoga also deals with suffering, its cause, liberation from it, and the means thereof.”18 A similar diagnostic structure, founded again on the thesis of the ubiquity of suffering, is present in classical Buddhism which holds that all conditioned phenomena can only lead to a deep dissatisfaction (duh˙ kha). Indeed the first noble truth declares that ‘all is suffering’ (sarvam duhkham), and hammers home the point in the following clear terms. ˙ is painful [duhkha], old age is painful, sickness is painful, death “Birth ˙ is painful, sorrow, lamentation, dejection, and despair are painful. Contact with unpleasant things is painful, not getting what one wishes is painful.”19 Once again, however, when this statement from the Buddha’s first sermon is placed within the overall structure of the three other noble truths, its therapeutic thrust becomes clear. Having urged us to see suffering as woven into the very fabric of phenomenal existence, the Buddha goes on to identify the cause of suffering as craving (the second noble truth), specify that a remedy is available through the cessation of this craving in nirva¯na (the third noble truth) and lay down a path towards ˙ health comprising of the eight-fold path (the fourth the restoration of noble truth). In this connection, David J. Kalupahana has noted that “[…] a careful analysis reveals that what is defined as suffering belongs to three temporal periods, beginning with the past, moving on to the immediate present, and reaching out into the future for a possible solution.”20 The steps that lead to this solution are usually combined in three groups, relating to (a) moral virtue (right speech, right action and right livelihood), (b) meditative awareness (right effort, right mindfulness 18 Warrier 1981, pp. 56 – 57. 19 Radhakrishnan/Moore 1957, p. 274. 20 Kalupahana 1994, p. 86.

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and right concentration) and (c) wisdom (right understanding and right aspiration). These links are supposed to be integrally connected and mutually supporting, progressively leading the individual to higher levels on the virtue-meditation-wisdom spiral until the ‘approach’ of nirva¯na. As ˙ with Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga, then, a dispositional pessimism towards the empirical world is a requisite starting-point on the journey towards the ultimate overcoming of the intrinsic dissatisfaction that pervades our human existence. Peter Harvey’s response to the question as to whether Buddhism is ‘pessimistic’ in accentuating the painful experiences of our lives are, therefore, highly significant. “Buddhism’s reply is that the transcending of suffering requires a fully realistic assessment of its pervasive presence in life […] The path to the end of suffering, moreover, is one in which the deep calm and joy of devotion and meditation play an important part.21 In short, the phenomenal world is not a locus of lasting value but neither is it a purely illusory domain, and through ethical-meditative praxis, underpinned by the moral order constituted by the operation of karman, we can be gradually extricated from the mesh of rebirth and sorrow. ˙ sa¯ric action is driven, among other things, by the Moreover, though sam quest for happiness, beauty, prosperity and so on, human beings, deeply mired in misconceptions about who or what they truly are, need to realize that the final destination they should strive towards is not to be understood as a repository of one momentary thrill after another. Indeed, the summum bonum, which to be attained after strenuous efforts of mastering the various empirical ills that one is afflicted with, is usually described in a minimalist way in primarily negative terms. To probe deeper in to the shades of optimism and pessimism in Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga and early Buddhism, therefore, let us pick up these two issues for closer scrutiny: (i) should the thesis of the ubiquity of suffering be taken as an empirical generalization or as a value-judgment grounded in a metaphysical scheme?, and (ii) is the final destination a state of unalloyed bliss or merely the absence of pain? (IV) We have seen earlier that a common theme in combinations (c) and (d) is the detailed cataloguing of the various kinds of miseries that human beings undergo, sometimes even regarding values such as health, pleasure 21 Harvey 1990, p. 48.

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and well-being negatively as absences of pain. The Indian traditions, too, often emphasize that suffering is deeply entrenched in all aspects of empirical existence, and the following statement by Aniruddha (15th century) from the Sa¯n˙khya commentarial tradition is a good illustration. “The body is pain […]; the senses, objects, perceptions are suffering […]; pleasure itself is suffering, because it is followed by suffering.”22 The most striking part of this observation, the Schopenhauer-like equation of pleasure itself with suffering, is paralleled elsewhere in the Nya¯ya tradition where pleasure is again regarded as a type of pain (duh˙ kha) because it is invariably connected or intermingled with the latter. Arindam Chakrabarti has pointed out that Nya¯yikas such as Uddyotakara and Udayana understood the nature of this intermingling (anusanga) in ˙ that terms of ‘not being found in the absence of the other’23, and ˙held suffering preponderates over happiness because the latter, as a general rule, is found along with the former (but not vice versa). In other words, while every instance of well-being is tinged with an element of suffering (for instance, even in our moments of joy, we may feel uneasy that our delights will pass away), in times of (non-neurotic) distress we almost never experience any happiness. The conclusion, therefore, is that such an asymmetric relation between happiness and suffering demonstrates that suffering is a steady, ever-present background radiation which seeps into all our experiences and that happiness is but a fleeting respite from the suffering which permeates every dimension of our lives. However, if this statement of the ‘universality of pain’ (UOP) is taken as an empirical assertion, it must be able to respond to the objection of those who could reply that our lives are not, in fact, unmitigated pain, and if we are prudent enough we can learn to minimize the pains and maximize the pleasures. Such was indeed the response of the Ca¯rva¯kas (or the Loka¯yatas) who held a fully materialist position and rejected all supra-empirical entities such as the soul, God and the law of karma, instead endorsing a hedonistic ethic of attaining the greatest amount of pleasure in this life. More to the point, responding to a Nya¯ya-like argument about the intermingling of pain and pleasure, they held that it was “[…] wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasures as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which invariably accompanies it; […] just as the man who de-

22 Quoted in Eliade 1969, p. 11. 23 Chakrabarti 1983, p. 168.

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sires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists.”24 The ‘tough-minded’ Ca¯rva¯ka rejoinder highlights the difficulty of establishing the UOP thesis by regarding ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ as merely subjective feelings and branding objects as valuable or invaluable primarily in terms of the hedonic tones that they produce. The Ca¯rva¯ka mocks the individual aspiring for liberation (mumuksu) as a fool who would refuse ˙ or consume fish because they to eat rice because it comes encased in husks contain bones or grow crops because animals might destroy them. Now we may be urged, nevertheless, to perceive the pervasiveness of suffering by counting the number of our happy hours free from anguish, and consider how they constitute a small fraction of our misery-laden lives. Such a hedonistic calculus would not, however, unambiguously yield the conclusion of UOP, for different individuals would add up the pluses and the minuses in their own ways and place different weights on the entries in the two columns, depending on the circumstances of their lives. One response to such difficulties of connecting pessimism to matters of individual ‘sensibility’ is to disentangle it from its hedonist associations, and instead regard ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ primarily not as descriptive hedonic terms but as objective evaluative terms. That is, the pessimism underlying the UOP thesis can be regarded not merely as dispositional but as grounded in some deep truth that what is really valuable is not to be encountered in the confines of phenomenal existence. As Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller noted, to view pessimism through a hedonistic lens is a “narrowing of the issue”25, for one may hold a pessimistic position not because life affords us too little pleasure but because it does not seem to sustain a variety of intellectual, moral and aesthetic goods. Consequently, one can read the dispositional pessimism of Buddhism as based not on quasi-numerical considerations of the predominance of pains over pleasures, but in a deep insight into the very nature of phenomenal existence which is characterized by impermanence (anitya), suffering (duhkha) and not-self (ana¯tman).26 The term ‘suffering’ here refers not only to˙ occasional instances of physical and mental distress but also to a fundamental unease or frustration with all aspects of impermanent existence: states of happiness are never unconditioned or everlasting, objects of craving continually slip away from our grasp, and even happy times are 24 Radhakrishnan/Moore 1957, p. 229. 25 Schiller 1897, pp. 48 – 50. 26 Conze 1996, pp. 34 – 37.

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sometimes marred by the anxious thought that they are fragile, precarious and momentary. While specific instances of pain and pleasure are relevant to the outlook of temperamental pessimism (in that such experiences can sometimes heighten or weaken this disposition), the latter is also a valuejudgment about the ultimately negative worth of all conditioned phenomena. People who claim to have found some amount of happiness (though not entirely unmixed with pain) and view the whole as positively good, are in a state of spiritual ignorance, and in the same boat, so to speak, as those who are chewing a honey-coated cake without knowing that its ingredients are constituted of poisonous elements. This evaluative thesis, in turn, is related to an important metaphysical assumption that is common to some streams of Indian (and western) thought, namely, that which is impermanent or subject to transmutation is deficient in worth, and the supreme end is, therefore, conceived of in terms of an incomparably valuable state that can neither be lost nor superseded. As Yandell has pointed out: ‘There is a tendency in Indian metaphysics (as well as elsewhere) to think in terms of what exists permanently or everlastingly as really existing and of what exists only for a time as existing defectively or not at all’. It is this ‘tendency’ that operates in the Buddhist attempts at describing nirva¯na with a string of negations such as unborn, unbe˙ come, stopping (nirodha), unconditioned and deathless, and in the Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga description of the final goal as the state of ‘aloneness’ (kaivalya) from which there is no slipping back to the defilements of fleeting prakr˙ ti-products.27 We can now see that the UOP thesis encompasses two aspects at once: first, a statement of the facts about the world (such as ‘the body, sense-organs and sense-objects are short-lived and constantly passing away’) and, second, a yardstick for judging objects as valuable (for instance, what is impermanent is not intrinsically valuable). This thesis is consequently not simply an expression of a temperamental pessimism, but, within a certain metaphysical framework, also a statement of the impossibility of perceiving (and attaining) the source of true value until one has gained discriminative awareness into the character of reality. Nevertheless, once one has indeed acquired such a form of discernment, what is the nature of the summum bonum towards which these therapeutic practices are supposed to lead the individual? In common with some strands of early Buddhism (such as the Therava¯da), Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga too speaks of liberation in terms of a two-stage 27 Yandell 2001, p. 173.

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process: liberation during life and liberation beyond death. In the former stage (jı¯vanmukti), the yogi has attained the clear recognition of the purusa as ontologically distinct from prakrti but the physical body endures ˙ because of the momentum of operating˙(pra¯rabdha) karman; while in the latter (videhamukti) the Yogi attains absolute freedom from all types of embodiment.28 Now the first has sometimes been regarded in excessively negative terms as a cataleptic state in which the yogi suppresses the mind and its activities, and sinks into a form of indifference or apathy towards the world. Ian Ian Whicher29 has vigorously argued that this is a serious misunderstanding of the experience of ‘embodied liberation’, for the yogi is now characterized by a deep psycho-physical, moral and spiritual integration in place of the earlier dissensions in the state of ignorance (avidya¯) about one’s true identity. Regarding disembodied liberation, however, the descriptions are primarily of a negative character not in terms of a state of joy or bliss (a¯nanda) but simply as absence of pain as well as pleasure. In sharp contrast to the position of Advaita-Veda¯nta which, following texts such as the Taittirı¯ya Upanisad, holds bliss (a¯nanda) to constitute the in˙ nermost core of human personality, Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga seems to view happiness only through its empirical forms (where it is mixed with pain). While admitting that the term a¯nanda does occur in scriptural texts, it argues that it must not be accepted in its positive significance but must, in fact, be read in a figurative way to denote the absence of pain in the unbound purusa.. 30 ˙ This conceptualization of the highest end primarily in negative terms seems, on the face of it, rather ‘pessimistic’, and that an individual could feel motivated to strive towards a state characterized solely by the lack of pain was acknowledged as somewhat perplexing even within the Indian traditions. Va¯caspati Mis´ra (9th/10th century) records this sense of bafflement in the form of an inference. “moksa must be a state of happiness, ˙ but a state of happiness can because it is aimed at (ista) and nothing ˙˙ be aimed at.”31 But even here we must be somewhat cautious in applying the tag ‘pessimistic’ to such depictions of moksa without first examining the philo˙ sophical justifications offered to support the claim that scriptural references to joy should be read as referring to the lack of pain (duhkha¯bha¯va). ˙ 28 29 30 31

Fort 1998, pp. 80 – 83. Whicher 2002. Feuerstein 1980, p. 56. Quoted in Chakrabarti 1983, p. 176.

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The Nya¯ya school too offers what Chakrabarti32 has termed the No Joy (NJ) understanding of liberation, according to which the liberated self does not enjoy any positive bliss (or possess any cognitive or affective faculties) over and above the absence of pain. It holds that consciousness is not an essential but an adventitious attribute of the self; it is only when the self comes into contact, through the mind and the sense-organs, with the external objects that it is conscious. Consequently, in the state of liberation, when the self is freed from its body (through which it undergoes distress through contact with sense-objects), it is at once emptied of consciousness and freed from all experiences whatsoever – pleasurable or painful. At the heart of these debates over the conceptualizations of moksa lie certain metaphysical considerations regarding the constitution of˙ the human person and the type of ethical practices required to recover one’s transcendent purity. The Advaita tradition, as interpreted by Govind Chandra Pande, holds that non-dual Brahman is not only foundational being (sat) and foundational consciousness (cit), but also self-suffi˙ sa¯ric forms of happicient bliss (a¯nanda) which is distinct from the sam ness (laukika¯nanda, visaya¯nanda) that arise from subject-object interaction. There has been˙ a scholarly dispute regarding the importance given by S´an˙kara to the Upanisadic notion of a¯nanda (because it would ˙ seem to be associated with duality and desire), but Pande argues that a¯nanda must be understood not in terms of hedonic experiences but as the supreme supra-sensible felicity which is the essence of brahman.33 Armed with this distinction, the Advaitin can now argue that one should develop a higherorder desire, purified of the desire for transient sense-related sukhas, and set one’s vision on the eternal beatitude which is brahman. In contrast to Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga and Nya¯ya, moksa for the Advaitin, ˙ then, is a positive fulfillment and “not the mere absence of duhkha but ˙ also the presence of a¯nanda as the nature of brahman.”34 To return, however, for the last time to our other partner in this discussion, the early Buddhists, we note that their understanding of nirva¯na ˙ is couched in terms similar, in some respects, to the negative descriptions of the highest end offered by Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga and Nya¯ya. The Buddhist ‘middle way’ is said to be the mean between two extremes: first, that of the materialist Ca¯rva¯ka notion of complete annihilation after death 32 Chakrabarti 1983. 33 Pande 1994, p. 204. 34 Myers 1998, p. 557.

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(uccheda-va¯da) and the Veda¯ntic notion of substantial a¯tmanic continuity (s´a¯´svata-va¯da) across life-times.35 The Buddhist texts seek to steer such a middle course in the analysis of the two aspects of nirva¯na, namely, nir˙ va¯na in life-time in the presence of the five bundles (skandhas) that to˙ gether constitute personality and nirva¯na beyond death where these res˙ hand, we find negative descripidues fall away. Consequently, on the one tions of nirva¯na as the unmade, unconditioned, a stage beyond the mindbody complex˙ (na¯ma-ru¯pa) and beyond the arising and ceasing of phenomena, cessation of consciousness which is not supported by any mental object, and so on. On the other hand, even when more affirmative statements are offered, such as nirva¯na as the further shore, the island in the ˙ ˙ yutta-Nika midst of the flood, stable (Sam ¯ ya IV.370), permanent (Katha¯vatthu 121) and timeless (An˙guttara-Nika¯ya, I.158), the Buddhist tradition has by and large clarified that these are not to be understood in terms of the bliss of a substantival a¯tman which endures beyond the realm of rebirths. The Buddha is said to have rejected as idle speculations all questions relating to what happens to the enlightened one at death, and insisted that just it is not meaningful to ask for the direction in which a quenched fire has disappeared, there are no ways of expressing the immeasurable nirva¯n˙a, the termination of conditioned existence.36 (V) We have now traveled a significant distance from the commonsensical understanding of a ‘pessimist’ as an individual with a depressive mentality, and the various refinements of the term that we have explored have hopefully brought into clearer view the different types of pessimisms in ‘Indian thought’. Looking back at our earlier distinctions, the philosophical standpoints we have examined (Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga, Nya¯ya, Advaita-Veda¯nta and early Buddhism) seem to be moving somewhere in the region of combination (b), though with certain traces of (c) and (d) as well. To begin with, the notion that the ‘phenomenal world’ could not have been different from what it is now, and so we might as well look at it with a cheerful panglossian disposition (our first combination (a)), would be rejected by them as a possible hindrance to the search for the ‘ultimate world’. While maintaining that there is indeed a certain sense in which 35 King 1999, p. 77. 36 Harvey 1990, pp. 65 – 67.

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the structures of this world-order could not have been very different from what they are – given that they are causally connected through ka¯rmic ties to those of the previous world-order – our philosophers would rather emphasize that the psychological optimism of (a) fails to penetrate deep enough into the intrinsic unsatisfactoriness (duhkha) of all earthly ˙ modes of existence. The predominant note that they strike is that we must be trained to perceive everything around us as incapable of providing us with genuine contentment, but also stress that this psychological pessimism is, however, not the end of the road. For it must become a spring-board for further reflection into why this is so, reflection which, they argue, will lead us to a form of discriminative understanding that the world is a “training ground for another in which alone life is real, rich and abiding”.37 Though such a ‘two-stage’ understanding of human existence is sometimes associated with ‘pessimism’, we have seen that proponents of (b) do not condemn the empirical world as a domain of undiluted evil, agony and misery. An Advaita-Veda¯ntin could maintain that the happiness that we experience in our everyday lives is not simply unreal (in the absolute sense of being totally non-existent), but that they are imperfect reflections of brahman which is bliss; consequently, our finite, limited pleasures should only produce in us an intense hankering after that transcendent being. Even the Buddhist path should not be misread as a thorough denunciation of everything earthly as unequivocally evil, for by gradually developing the correct understanding of one’s constitution as selfless (ana¯tman), an individual can experience certain (relatively stable) joys which are distinct from the passing delights ˙ sa¯ric individual would seem to be attached. The Buddha to which the sam himself is said to have listed four characteristics of the ‘good life’: (i) wellbeing related to the possession of resources not gained through trickery, (ii) economic well-being, and happiness resulting from (iii) not being in debt and (iv) being free from blame.38 In short, then, though terms such as ma¯ya¯, trsna¯ and duhkha are often associated with overly pessimis˙ resignationist ˙ tic, anti-activist˙˙and stances, one should not ignore the fact that the traditions we have explored also speak of unitize bliss, the eightfold dharmic path to conduct, and so on. There are, however, some other concerns that have lead ‘Indian thought’ to be associated with pessimism, and these are connected with our earlier comment that the philosophical perspectives we have investi37 Radhakrishnan 1939, p. 75. 38 Kalupahana 1994, p. 107.

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gated contain some elements of combinations (c) and (d). These viewpoints agree with (c) that the final destination is not to be conceived of in personal terms, so that there is no transcendent governor who is working in, with and through the cosmic processes to bring them to a glorious fulfillment. However, unlike in (c), dystopia is not ultimately a possible option, for provided that human beings wake up to their true predicament, there is a deep moral order that will enable them – ˙ sa¯ric now or in a subsequent life – to disentangle themselves from the sam mess. When proponents of (c) complain about a sense of homelessness in an unfeeling universe, our philosophers would empathize with them to an extent, but also assert that if we bring ourselves in-sync with the innermost reality, our empirical resources are sufficient to attain the supreme trans-empirical end. And this, in turn, leads us to a deeper reason why ‘Indian thought’ is sometimes styled as pessimistic: it is held that the conception of the highest reality as transpersonal, which also offers no promise of personal immortality, bespeaks a pessimistic outlook. Schopenhauer is a case in point, given that, as we have seen, not only did he uphold what has been termed the ‘negativity of happiness’ thesis, namely, that satisfaction is but an absence of pain, but also, in fact, affirmed that ‘all life is suffering’.39 Now the extent to which Schopenhauer’s thought contains misinterpretations of (some non-theistic strands of ) ‘Oriental wisdom’ remains a vexed issue, but perhaps it is not entirely a coincidence that one reason why both are branded as pessimistic is because of the parallels in their understanding of the noumenal reality, which phenomenally appears to us through the ‘veil of ma¯ya¯’, as ultimately devoid of any personal qualities or attributes. For instance, in a discussion of Schopenhauer, Frederick Copleston links the optimism of the Christian world-view to its being ‘a religion of life […] which teaches that ultimate reality is a personal God and that human persons survive death in their individuality’.40 However, our discussion has highlighted that we are wading here in rather deep metaphysical waters, and disputes over the nature of ultimate reality and post-mortem existence cannot be prejudged by brandishing the labels of ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’. There are voices within the Indian traditions themselves that have attacked the conception of the transcendent in sub-personal terms (for instance, the well-known criticism of S´rı¯harsa ˙ that the state of liberation described by Nya¯ya is no better than that of a 39 Schopenhauer 1958, p. 310. 40 Copleston 1947, p. 179.

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piece of stone),41 but the schools we have studied have also offered sophisticated arguments in defense of their conception of moksa as transperso˙ with having a nal. Therefore, for instance, the Buddhist who is charged pessimistic view of the journey’s end might reply: “Well, you might choose to call it so, but this is a pessimism that is necessary for your liberation”.42 References Axinn, Sidney (1954): “Two Concepts of Optimism”. In: Philosophy of Science 21, pp. 16 – 24. Boden, Margaret (1966): “Optimism”. In: Philosophy 41, pp. 291 – 303. Burke, David B. (1988): “Transcendence in classical Sa¯n˙khya”. In: Philosophy East and West, pp. 19 – 29. Camus, Albert (1960): The Myth of Sisyphus. London: Oxford University Press. Chakrabarti, A. (1983): “Is Liberation (moksa) pleasant?” In: Philosophy East and ˙ West 33, 2, pp. 167 – 182. Conze, Edward (1996): Buddhist Thought In India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. Copleston, Frederick (1947): Arthur Schopenhauer: Philosopher of Pessimism. London: Burns Oates. Dienstag, Joshua Foa (2001): “Nietzsche’s Dionysian Pessimism”. In: The American Political Science Review 95, pp. 923 – 37. Dienstag, Joshua Foa (2006): Pessimism. Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Eliade, Mircea (1969): Yoga: Immortality and Freedom. New Jersey: University Press. Feuerstein, George (1980): The philosophy of Classical Yoga. Manchester: University Press. Fort, Andrew O. (1998): Jı¯vanmukti in Transformation: Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedanta. New York: Suny Press. Goodwin, William F. (1955): “Ethics and Value in Indian Philosophy”. In: Philosophy East and West 4, pp. 321 – 344. Harris, George W. (2002): “Pessimism”. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5, pp. 271 – 286. Harvey, Peter (1990): Introduction to Buddhism. Cambridge: University Press. Kalupahana, David J. (1994): A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. King, Richard (1999): Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought. Edinburgh: University Press. Magee, Bryan (1987): The Great Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy. Oxford: University Press. 41 Warrier 1981, p. 33. 42 Warrier 1981, p. 33.

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˙ kara¯ca¯rya and A¯nanda. In Philosophy East and Myers, Michael W. (1998): S´am West 48, pp. 553 – 567. ˙ kara¯ca¯rya. Delhi: MoPande, Govind Chandra (1994): Life and Thought of S´am tilal Banarsidass. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli (1939): Eastern Religions and Western Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli/Moore, Charles A. (Eds.) (1957): A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy. Princeton: University Press. Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott (1897): “The Relation of Pessimism to Ultimate Philosophy”. In: International Journal of Ethics 8, pp. 48 – 54. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1958). The World As Will and Representation. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications. Schweitzer, Albert (1951): Indian Thought and Its Development. London: A. & C. Black. Sutherland, Stewart R. (1981): “Optimism and Pessimism”. In: Religious Studies 17, pp. 537 – 548. Syse, Henryk (2000): “Augustinian ‘History’ and the Road to Peace”. In: Augustinian Studies 31, 2, pp. 225 – 39. Warrier, A. G. Krishna (1981): The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Veda¯nta. Madras: University of Madras. Whicher, Ian (2002): “PataÇjali’s Classical Yoga: An Epistemological Emphasis”. In: Swami Prabhananda (Ed.): Concepts of Knowledge: East and West. Kolkata: RMIC, pp. 322 – 340. Wilson, Catherine (1983): “Leibnizian Optimism”. In: The Journal of Philosophy 80, pp. 765 – 783. Yandell, Keith (2001): “Some reflections on Indian metaphysics”. In: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 50, pp. 171 – 190.

The Denial of the Will-to-Live in Schopenhauer’s World and His Association between Buddhist and Christian Saints Jens Lemanski In the history of philosophy, Arthur Schopenhauer’s system appears to be the first one which is concerned with Christian as well as Buddhist saints and claims that there is an association between them. In recent research, this association has been the source of many special problems, but it actually has never been discussed in general why this association is so important, or why it was necessary for Schopenhauer to relate to Buddhist or Hinduist as well as to Christian saints. Moreover, this issue seems to reveal other problems which are topics in recent discussion. The first point which demands attention is whether The World as Will and Presentation has been constructed in vitro or in vivo, viz. (1) if, analogous to the idealistic method, the author has first constructedmain principles, axioms and hypotheses, and has then tried to demonstrate them in the real world, or (2) if, analogous to the realistic method, he has taken the world as his point of departure and has then constructed the main principles by abstraction. The in vitro-method is deductive or top down, the in vivo-method is inductive or bottom up. The problem now is that Schopenhauer does not tell us explicitly which method he has used to write his main work. There are indications for both methods, and although we have many notes of the Handschriftlichen Nachlaß, they only tell us something about the influences on Schopenhauer’s main work, but not much about his methodological intentions. The reason for this problem lies in Schopenhauer’s personality, because he was not, in contrast to his contemporaries Johann Gottlieb Fichte or Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, a philosopher who thought in a way that could be described as ‘pure’ or ‘naked’. In other words, he does not tell his reader how he has obtained the results that are given in his works.1 The World as Will and Presentation in particular is one single and finished thought of the philosopher, albeit divided in 1

Cf. Lemanski 2011.

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many aspects. This thought is put down to be communicated,2 but is in this form not a living description of what Schopenhauer actually thought. Another question widely discussed in current research, however, is whether The World as Will and Presentation is (1) one normative and linear thought which begins with epistemology and ends with soteriology, illustrated by the last words, nothingness and nirva¯na, or (2) one thought ˙ which is divided in many parts pari passu. The normative and linear version suggests an implicit intention of Schopenhauer to guide his reader to conversion and at last to redemption.3 By steering the reader towards ‘nothingness’ or nirva¯na, Schopen˙ hauer turns out to be a mystical and pessimistic philosopher. Contrary to the linear theory I will try to demonstrate that Schopenhauer’s main work is mainly a description of the world with all its (epistemological, natural philosophical, aesthetical and ethical, i. e. mystical and holy) elements. I think that this is in accordance with the trend of Schopenhauer interpretation that can be observed in recent research (section I). I will defend this trend and attempt to vindicate the anti-linear and descriptive reading by focusing on the historical struggle of Schopenhauer and his school of thought against the normative and linear version (sect. I.1), on the one hand, and by showing, on the other hand, that the normative and linear interpretation is a misreading which has developed since Schopenhauer’s death and the decline of the early Schopenhauer school (sect. I.2). The success of this interpretation depends on the original understanding of the denial of the will-to-live by Schopenhauer and 2

3

Cf. WWP I, p. 9: “What is to be communicated through it [this book – J.L.] is a single thought. […] According to the various sides from which the one thought to be communicated is considered, it shows itself to be that which has been called metaphysics, that which has been called ethics, and that which has been called aesthetics; and of course it would have to be all of this, were it what, as I have already confessed, I take it to be.”; WWP I, p. 10 et seq.: “Precisely this construction [of the book – J.L.] […] has forced me to make do with four main divisions: as it were four main points of view on the one thought.” “On the linear reading in English research” cf. i.a. Atwell 1995, p. 126 – 27; Mannion 2003, p. 83 does not agree with the ‘linear progression’ and recognizes the descriptive character of Schopenhauer’s philosophy (pp. 11, 33, 195), but nevertheless interprets his soteriology as normative (pp. 30, 195, 215, 288); Wicks 2011, pp. 9, 16, 123. “On the linear reading in German research” cf. i.a. Malter 1991, pp. 46, 440; Papousado 1999, p. 174; Booms 2003, pp. 31 – 33, 299 et seq., 313 et seqq. In my first essay, I have tried to put the linear reading into a historical context, cf. Lemanski 2009.

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his scholars. In section II.I will try to demonstrate that the descriptive and representational requirement of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is a product of the Zeitgeist in which his system grew up. After that, we will see a mixture of the in vitro- and in vivo-method, but with a strong priority assigned to the empirical function of The World as Will and Presentation (sect. III). This means that in the main work, particular attention is paid to the concept of ‘world’ (sect. III.1). This historical analysis allows us to answer the question as to why there is in Schopenhauer’s main work an association between Buddhist and Christian saints for the first time in the history of philosophy (sect. III.2). (I) Reading Schopenhauer At the end of their research report, given in the second section of the article What is will?, Nicoletta De Cian and Marco Segala state that the whole Anglophone research debate about the dominant thing-in-itself problem in Schopenhauer’s reception of Immanuel Kant does not fit into an authentic history of philosophy.4 While one could consider that this slap in the face of English Schopenhauer scholarship sounds too harsh, I think Di Cian and Segala have not struck out enough. Concerning Arthur Hbscher’s comment on “interpreters’ ability to discover contradiction in Schopenhauer’s writings”, they fail to note that it is not only English scholarship which is in conflict with an authentic analysis of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Presentation. Even German research was captured by a negative influence of an interpretation which misconstrues Schopenhauer, on the one hand, as a mystical religious author who, on the other hand, is tattered by contradictions. 4

De Cian/Segala 2002, p. 16 et seq.: “Modern English-speaking commentators refer to some older English-speaking scholars (like Copleston and Gardiner), move from common assumptions and develop similar arguments. They propose their analysis and criticism as original. They do not consider the numerous studies, in German, French or Italian, which have discussed in different ways the questions arising from the doctrine of the will as thing-in-itself […]. They fit Richard Watson’s description of scholars producing a ‘history of philosophy based primarily on English translations of philosophers who do not write in English and on commentaries written only in English’. Watson’s judgement is severe: ‘this work on English texts is meant to be authentic history of philosophy. It is just deficient’; it ‘generates an Anglo-American school, in which interpretations of philosophers and systems evolve in isolation from the general body of scholarship in other languages’.”

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In recent years the interpretation of Schopenhauer in German research has begun to change. The current status of research regarding Schopenhauer himself has fought the mystical interpretation, and it has been pointed out that many of the alleged contradictions or aporias were originally meant as required characteristics and should not be seen as errors. This change slowly started with Volker Spierling5 and Hans Blumenberg6. Later, Matthias Koßler proposed an “empirical point of view” and stressed the exemplary status of Schopenhauer’s ethics, which are not prescriptive, but rather descriptive in nature.7 The linear reading of Schopenhauer with its focus on salvation (“salvation through knowledge”, “Erlçsung durch Erkenntnis”) has begun to falter. In 2007 and 2010, Kai Haucke and especially Daniel Schubbe broke with the tradition of solving the research problem of contradictions and aporias in Schopenhauer’s work by trying to argue better than Schopenhauer himself.8 Their predominantly unhistorical arguments are obviously based on a change of method: from asking “How can we solve the problematic antinomies and aporias?” to “Why are there aporias, or what function do they have in Schopenhauer’s work?” In both fields of problems, i. e. the linear vs. anti-linear reading, as well as the solution vs. acceptance aporias, the method and interpretation have changed to a descriptive reading of the intentionally heterodox The World as Will and Presentation. This revolution in German research was not a slap in the face, but a slowly emerging understanding that for over one hundred years the name ‘Schopenhauer’ was fraught with the prejudice of pessimism, negativity, mysticism and inconsistence. What Koßler and especially Schubbe have foreshadowed for German research, De Cian and Sagala have laid on the line. They focus on Schopenhauer’s main intention as a “discovery of what the world is, disclosure of the world’s essence”9. This intention seems to prohibit a linear or normative reading of the World as Will and Presentation, because any normative or prescriptive mystical philosophy of redemption becomes a part of Schopenhauer’s ‘higher’ destination, which is “a phenomenology of the world in its totality”10. According to these results of recent Anglophone 5 Cf. Spierling 1984, p. 60;Spierling 1987, p. 41; Spierling 1994, pp. 223 – 40; Spierling 1998, pp. 223 – 40; Spierling 2002, p. 46. 6 Cf. Blumenberg 1986, pp. 325 – 36. 7 Cf. Koßler 1999, pp. 427 – 447, esp. pp. 434, 442 n. 46. 8 Cf. Haucke 2007, p. 107 et seq.; Schubbe 2010. 9 De Cian/Segala 2002, p. 31. 10 De Cian/Segala 2002, p. 37.

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and German research, this is the question we should have been asking: Is this higher descriptive focus on The World as Will and Presentation just a trend of recent research or is it a genuine understanding of Schopenhauer himself ? And if it is the original intention of Schopenhauer’s main work, why has Schopenhauer scholarship interpreted it wrongly for over one hundred years? (I.1) The Weigelt-Becker-Controversy11 We can find an answer to this question in the early Schopenhauer school. In 1854, six years before Schopenhauer’s death, Georg Christian Weigelt published a book with the title Popular Lectures about the History of Recent Philosophy (Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Populre Vortrge). One of the contemporary philosophers Weigelt discusses is Arthur Schopenhauer. Weigelt observes that the linear reading of Schopenhauer’s philosophy leads to an aporia: You should not demand a refutation of the basic principle from me; I cannot endorse the relationship between will and knowledge, as Schopenhauer did. Hence I am unable to demonstrate any inconsequence in the course of our philosopher’s thinking; unless the impossibility to conclude the consequence is the inconsequence itself.12

Following that, Weigelt accepts Schopenhauer’s rejection of suicide,13 but goes further. But what does Schopenhauer‘s rejection amount to? Schopenhauer writes about the blind, non-rational and dynamic will which lights itself up in its human manifestation.14 In its human occurrence and manifestation – that is when the will is completed with intelligence and perception – the will has two possibilities of direction or intention, the realization of which can be controlled by man himself: either the affirmation or the denial of the will-to-live. For both directions, a distinction must be made between the process and the result. This means 11 This is a revised chapter which has already been published in Lemanski 2009/11, vol. II, pp. 497 – 505. 12 Weigelt 1855, p. 153 et seq. All translation (except Schopenhauer) in this chapter by the author. “Fordern Sie nicht von mir eine Widerlegung des Grundprincips; ich habe nicht umhin gekonnt, das Verhltnis des Willens zur Erkenntnis zu billigen, wie Schopenhauer dasselbe bestimmte. So bin ich auch außer Stande, unserm Philosophen im Fortgang seines Denkens eine Inkonsequenz nachzuweisen, es sei denn, daß die Konsequenz nicht vollstndig ziehen, Inkonsequenz ist.” 13 Cf. WWP I, p. 462 et seqq. 14 Cf. WWP I, p. 194.

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that the process of the denial of the will-to-live leads to the same result just like the affirmation of the will-to-live is the result of a process of affirmation.15 Schopenhauer claims that the ‘normal’ suicide has no moral legitimacy, because it is just an act of the affirmation of the will-to-live associated with lust and pleasure, which the person committing suicide misses in his miserable life. Thus, suicide turns out to be a strong affirmation and has nothing to do with the denial of the will-to-live. Weigelt accepts this account, but does not agree with Schopenhauer’s proposal to ascribe a different moral status to the denial of the will-to-live. For Schopenhauer, someone who denies his will-to-live is someone who has become aware that the affirmation of the will-to-live is an unending postponement of pain and suffering, which are the dominant moments between lack and satisfaction.16 With regard to this awareness, Christian and Indian saints seem to be indistinguishable. They draw the inference to this awareness that Schopenhauer calls ‘denial of the will-to-live’, and 15 This means that process and result exist in a dialectical relationship to each other. Sometimes ‘affirmation’ and ‘denial’ are used by Schopenhauer to denote a process and sometimes to denote a result. Some sentences in § 68 provide a perfect example for this problem: (1) “His body, healthy and strong, gives voice to the sex drive through genitals, but he denies the will and belies his body; he wants no sexual satisfaction under any condition. Voluntary, complete chastity is the first step of asceticism, or denial of the will to life.” (WWP I, p. 441 – emphasis by the author). “He denies the will” is an example of denial of the will-to-life as method or process; “asceticism, or denial of the will to life” is in contrast an example of denial of the will-to-life as result or effect. (2) Another statement shows that by recognizing this dialectical relationship, Schopenhauer stands in a long religious tradition: “We already see here the first levels of asceticism, or of real denial of the will, which latter expression means precisely what is in the gospels called renouncing oneself and taking up the cross (Matthew 16:24, 25; Mark 8:34, 35; Luke 9:23, 24, 14:26, 27, 33).” (WWP I, p. 448). Here, “asceticism, or of the denial of the will” are used to denote the results, and “renouncing oneself and taking up the cross” are first levels of these results. Then, Schopenhauer refers to the aforementioned scriptures, in which we can find the imitatio christi-doctrine, e. g. Luke 9:23: “And he [Jesus – J.L.] said to them all, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me.” Here, we also see the dialectical relationship of result and process: To become a follower of Jesus (result; “will come after me”), you have to follow him (process; “follow me”); “deny himself, and take up his cross daily” are paraphrases of the process. – Conclusion: In order to identify the semantic representation, we have to refrain from defining every term employed by Schopenhauer with the help of syntax. Thus, we have to take care how he uses these words in their context. 16 Cf. WWP I, p. 374.

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this conclusion concretely amounts to asceticism, which results in the death of the denier or saint. If death is the last consequence of this awareness, then the “denial of the will to live” is for Weigelt nothing else than a slowly committed suicide. The inconsistency or inconsequence he sees in Schopenhauer’s philosophy is that Schopenhauer tries to reject suicide, which is actually nothing short of a ‘fast-track-denial’, and thus has to be the real consequence for someone who has become aware of the eternal dialectic between lack and satisfaction. Moreover, Weigelt sees another mistake in Schopenhauer’s concept of the denial of the will-to-live, one that concerns Schopenhauer’s misunderstanding of Christianity: In fact, Christianity demands the denial of the world or the will, but not for its own sake, but because it is the way to an eternal life of bliss. Therefore the Christian denial is due to its own reason and nature the strongest affirmation of the will to live.17

Weigelt seems to make the following comment on Schopenhauer’s § 58: If, for Schopenhauer, satisfaction is the goal of the normal man’s affirmation of the will-to-live, then ‘satisfaction’ is another word for the denial of the will-to-live. This is to account for the way in which Schopenhauer defines the concept of life: will, or life, creates lust and is dominated by the lack thereof. The affirmation of the will-to-live is the eternal attempt to alleviate this lack. The short moment of satisfaction is the purpose of the affirmation in which there is no lack, lust or will. Thus it seems to Weigelt that the person who affirms her life is someone who always wants to negate the will and her life, but is unaware of this want. Hence, he takes it as a logical conclusion that conversely the denier is someone who wants to affirm his life. Weigelt justifies his objection to Schopenhauer’s ethical philosophy by referring to the Christian understanding: The Christian saint is someone who denies his life to reach the eternal life of bliss, and this precisely amounts to an affirmation of life. Weigelt argues against Schopenhauer that the real denial of the will-to-live is more of

17 Weigelt 1855, p. 154: “Das Christenthum fordert freilich Verneinung der Welt oder des Willens, aber diese ja nicht um ihrer selbst willen, sondern weil sie den Weg zu einem nie endenden seligen Leben ist. Die christliche Verneinung ist somit ihrem Grund und Wesen nach die strkste Bejahung des Willens zum Leben.”

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a natural degeneration of life, rather than a philosophical or religious awareness.18 This means that life will get tired through life: As long as the will forcefully manifests itself, in lust and agony aware of his being, it will act unconcerned towards that highest philosophical awareness. But in struggle and striving, in hope and achievement it starts to yearn for calmness, and life gets tired through life. This is the real, natural calm of a serene old age that comes after many rough days, rather than one caused by knowledge. This is a calmness and a denial of life like the pleasant sensation we have in the evening of a busy day. Every other kind of denying the will is a caricature, and all Asian and European saints are caricatures, because they are saints at the high noon of life.19

Weigelt’s ‘negative hedonism’ claims that the calm of life is the natural effect of a degeneration of will. For him, the holy status is the result of a natural vita activa. And because of this, he criticizes Schopenhauer for ascribing to a wrong interpretation of Christianity. Weigelt also claims that the last inconsistency in Schopenhauer’s system is his love for wisdom and truth, which is reflected in Schopenhauer’s personal life and his fight against Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and, of course, Hegel. “A man who knows, what value life has cannot seriously expect the denial of the will from himself and from others, not until he has been sated with life’s most precious goods.”20 This is an important quote. Weigelt claims that Schopenhauer is this man, a man who knows about the value of life and expects the denial of the will from himself and from others. Thus, of all the early interpreters of The World as Will and Presentation, Weigelt is the first one who attrib18 This theory would be supported by Hegel 1984, p. 42 = § 410, but criticized by Kephalos (cf. Plato, Politeia I, 329a et seqq.). 19 Weigelt 1855, p. 154: “So lange sich dieser [der Wille – J. L.] aber energisch ußert, in Lust und Leid seines Daseins gewiß, verhlt er sich gleichgltig gegen jene hçchste philosophische Erkenntniß. Aber ihm kommt in Ringen und Streben, in Hoffen und Erreichen von selbst die Sehnsucht nach Ruhe, und mde wird das Leben durch das Leben. Das ist die wahre, nicht durch irgend welche Erkenniß bewirkte, das ist die naturgemße Ruhe eines heitern Greisenalters nach vielen bewegten Tagen; das ist eine Ruhe und eine Verneinung des Lebens, wie wir sie wohltuend am Abend eines arbeitsvollen Tages empfinden. […] Jede andre Verneinung seiner [des Willens – J. L] ist eine Karikatur, und Karikaturen sind alle Heiligen Asiens und Europas, weil sie am hohen Mittag des Lebens Heilige sind.” 20 Weigelt 1855, p. 156: “Ein Mensch, der da weiß, was ihm das Leben werth ist, kann sich und Andern im Ernst nicht zumuthen, den Willen zum Leben frher zu verneinen, als bis er durch seine edelsten Gter gesttigt ist.”

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uted a linear and normative philosophy to Schopenhauer. From Weigelt’s point of view, it is Schopenhauer’s intention to guide the recipient gradually through the system of the world and into the denial the will-to-live as a result. No other inconsistency that Weigelt mentions, and no other quote from his Popular Lectures about the History of Recent Philosophy have gained the amount of attention from Schopenhauer and his school that those above have. However, it was not Schopenhauer himself who initiated the so called Weigelt-Becker-Controversy. On the 8th March 1854, Schopenhauer writes to his disciple, ‘apostle’21 and friend Johann August Becker that Weigelt has written an “enthusiastic illustration of my [sc. Schopenhauer’s – J.L.] doctrine”22. The criticism that Becker directs at Weigelt concerns the latter’s accommodations, methods of quotation and illustration: He [Weigelt – J.L.] is also completely in the wrong by accusing you [Schopenhauer – J.L.], on p. 154, of committing an inconsequence or, at least, a lack of consequence; and on p. 156, he insinuates that you expect people to negate the will before it is – sated.23

This sentence is the introduction to a multitude of Weigelt’s mistakes which Becker lists, and which are quoted here in a rudimentary fashion: He [Weigelt – J.L.] does not consider that you [Schopenhauer – J.L], with the sentence velle (even nolle) non discitur in mind, would, as a general attitude, never expect anything from anyone, but rather make the effort to interpret and describe the different appearances of the world, to repeat and fix its essence in abstract concepts (I pag. 439), recognizing that abstract awareness cannot be the kind of awareness from which the denial of the will-tolive can emerge, – that only an intuitive awareness can operate here, one that cannot be informed by concepts, but can only find its expression through deeds and moral conduct. […] [He does not consider] that you do not recommend asceticism to anyone, but point to it; and that you do not even identify asceticism with the denial of the will-to-live, but only regard it as 21 Schopenhauer called his disciples ‘apostle’or ‘evangelist’, cf. Fazio 2007, p. 74: “La scuola, che nel 1852 contava sette componenti, e dieci alla morte di Schopenhauer, risulta dunque composta da tre semplici apostoli – Becker, von Doss ed Emden – e cinque evangelisti attivi – Dorguth, Frauenstdt, Lidner, Asher e Bhr – ai quali dovrebbero aggiungersi l’apprendista Kilzer e l’evangelista postumo e apocrifo Gwinner.” 22 Becker 1883, p. 92, no. 22: Schopenhauer to Becker, 8th March 1884. 23 Becker 1883, p. 102, no. 27: “Auch hat er [Weigelt – J.L] sehr Unrecht, wenn er p. 154 Sie [Schopenhauer – J.L] einer Inconsequenz, oder wenigstens eines Mangels an Consequenz beschuldigt, und Ihnen p. 156 nachredet, daß Sie den Leuten zumuthen, den Willen frher zu verneinen, als bis er – gesttigt ist.”

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its symptom, as a struggle for the conservation of the attained Quietiv and the occurred negative direction of the will – which is still in effect. […] Thus, by no means is there a lack of consequence on your part (ad pag. 154); that there is no suggestion of suicide ‘on philosophical grounds’ but rather of slowly mortifying asceticism […] Philosophical awareness, being merely abstract, is, according to your doctrine, not fit to exert any influence on the actions (velle et nolle non discitur) of him who lacks intuitive awareness; Asceticism is not even the way to attain this awareness, rather an indicium that this awareness is present, and because of that, there is, in your theoretical doctrine, no suggestion of application to practice, and thus no lack of consequence with regard to this non-existent practical direction.24

Schopenhauer’s reaction is noteworthy, not only because he changes his opinion of Weigelt, but also because he praises Becker for being in total accord with his own interpretation of his The World as Will and Presentation. Thus, Schopenhauer starts his reply to Becker by complimenting him:

24 Becker 1883, p. 102 et seq., no. 27: “Er [Weigelt – J.L.] hat nicht bedacht, daß Sie [Schopenhauer – J.L] […] berhaupt, eingedenk des Satzes velle (also auch nolle) non discitur, niemanden etwas zumuthen, sondern nur bemht sind, die verschiedenen Erscheinungen der Welt zu deuten und auszulegen, ihr Wesen in abstracten Begriffen zu wiederholen und zu fixieren (I pag. 439), anerkennend, daß diese abstracte Erkenntniß nicht diejenige sey, aus welcher die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben hervorgehen kçnne, – daß hier nur eine intuitive Erkenntniß wirken kçnne, die nicht durch Begriffe mittheilbar ist, sondern ihren Ausdruck allein in der That, dem Wandel findet (I 433). […] Daß Sie die Askese nicht empfehlen, sondern sie nur andeuten, und daß Sie solche nicht einmal selbst als die Verneinung des Willens ansprechen, sondern nur als Symptom derselben, als einen Kampf um die Erhaltung des gewonnenen Quietivs und die eingetretene negative Richtung des Willens, – welcher immer noch wirkt. […] Es findet sich also (ad pag. 154) bei Ihnen mit Nichten der Mangel an Consequenz: daß nicht statt der langsam tçdtenden Askese der Selbstmord “aus philosophischer Erkenntniß” in Vorschlag gebracht wird: […] Die philosophische Erkenntniß als eine bloß abstracte ist nach Ihrer Lehre berhaupt nicht geeignet einen Einfluß auf das Handeln zu ußern (velle et nolle non discitur) bei demjenigen, welchem die intuitive Erkenntniß fehlt; Askese ist auch nicht der Weg, zu dieser Erkenntniß zu gelangen, sondern nur ein indicium, daß diese Erkenniß da ist, und darum findet sich in Ihrer theoretischen Lehre kein Vorschlag zur praktischen Anwendung, also auch kein Mangel an Consequenz in dieser gar nicht vorhandenen praktischen Richtung.”

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Your last letter has reinforced my conviction that you [Becker – J.L.] are the most thoroughgoing expert on my philosophy among the living, and that you know it like I do […].25

Here we can find the original interpretation and reading of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Presentation. Schopenhauer completely agrees with Becker that Weigelt has misconstrued his descriptive philosophy, and has turned it into a normative or linear reading by focusing on the denial of the will-to-live. Weigelt’s misreading overlooks that Schopenhauer merely describes two directions of the will in human conduct: the affirmation and denial of the will-to-live, without a focal point or judgment endorsed by the author. Of all the statements the author has made outside of his main work, it is the Weigelt-Becker-Controversy that shows how we must read Schopenhauer. And we can see that Becker is absolutely correct in his reading of Schopenhauer’s main work when we have a look at Julius Frauenstdt’s interpretation, which Frauenstdt changed after he had received a hint from his philosophical teacher.26 On the 31th May 1854, Schopenhauer wrote to Frauenstdt: The objection on p. 153 et seqq. has been nicely refuted by Becker, amongst other things tackling that he [Weigelt – J.L.] said I [Schopenhauer – J.L.] would expect asceticism and the denial of the will-to-live of people, whereas I – as Becker states quite correctly – generally do not expect anything of anybody, but rather reflect upon the world and show what everything is, and how it is connected; while everyone is left to his own discretion.27

I have translated the last subset “Jedem sein Thun anheimgehebend” with “everyone is left to his own discretion”, and this actually means that Schopenhauer’s system is not a linear and normative suggestion, finishing with the denial of the will-to-live, the idea of nirva¯na to which every reader ˙ what the world is and should be directed. Schopenhauer wants to show which opinions and options are offered in the world. But his system is 25 Becker 1883, p. 104, no. 28: “Ihr letzter Brief hat in mir von Neuem die Ueberzeugung befestigt, daß Sie [Becker – J.L.] unter allen Lebenden der grndlichste Kenner meiner Philosophie sind, solche verstehn, wie ich selbst, […].” 26 GBr, p. 343, no. 332 or Frauenstdt 1863, p. 618, no. 46. 27 “S. 153 ff.” relates to Weigelt 1855, pp. 153 – 56, quoted above. “Die Einrede S. 153 ff. hat Becker ihm [Weigelt – J.L.] sehr schçn widerlegt, unter Anderm ihm vorrckend, dass er sagt, ich [Schopenhauer – J.L.] muthete den Menschen die Askese, Verneinung des Willens zum Leben u. s. w. zu, whrend ich, sagt Becker sehr richtig, Niemanden irgend etwas zumuthe, sondern bloss die Welt abspiegele, zeige, was jegliches sei und wie es zusammenhnge, Jedem sein Thun anheimgebend.”

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ultimately a philosophy of freedom from which we can only learn the opportunities of human action. Frauenstdt agrees with Schopenhauer and therefore also with Becker. In 1856, two years after the climax of the Weigelt-Becker-Controversy, Frauenstdt claims in the Bltter fr literarische Unterhaltung that there are now more interpreters like Weigelt, who present versions of the normative interpretation.28 Against this contemporary state of research Frauenstdt writes: Firstly, it is wrong to accuse Schopenhauer of ‘expecting’ of us to deny the will-to-live. Schopenhauerian ethics do not expect anything of anybody, do not demand, do not know any categorical imperative and no ought; rather his ethics […] is a purely theoretical and objective demonstration of the two diametrically opposed behaviours of the will corresponding to the world and life, i. e. characterized as affirmation and the denial of the will-to-live. Schopenhauer does not proclaim: You shall renounce the world, die away from life, be a saint! just as little as he, in aesthetics, expects of anybody to become a genius; rather, as he describes, in aesthetics, in a purely objective fashion the nature of beauty and the character of the genius, he also describes the nature of virtue and the character of the saint in ethics. He shows the ethos from which asceticism emerges, but he does not expect this ethos of anybody, because he knows and repeatedly states: Velle non discitur, and because he realizes that where the conditions of world-denial are present […], it sets in on its own, but where the conditions are absent, all urging and demanding would not help. […] Secondly, as much as Schopenhauer praises the ethos from which asceticism emerges, it does not follow that he declares all the vile, disgusting and occasionally ridiculous forms, in which asceticism has appeared in history, as essential for the state of bliss, and that he recommends to imitate those saints which Weigelt deems necessary to call ‘caricatures’.29 28 Frauenstdt refers to Karl Rosenkranz Zur Charakteristik Schopenhauer’s (Gçdeke 1854, pp. 673 – 684 or Rosenkranz 1875, pp. 45 – 60). 29 Frauenstdt 1956, p. 156: “Zuvçrderst ist es falsch, wenn man Schopenhauer vorwirft, daß er uns ,zumuthe‘, den Willen zum Leben zu verneinen. Die Schopenhauersche Ethik muthet keinem etwas zu, sie fordert nichts, sie kennt keinen kategorischen Imperativ und kein Sollen; vielmehr ist sie […] nur die rein theoretische, objective Darlegung der beiden entgegengesetzten Verhaltensweisen des Willens zur Welt und zum Leben, deren eine er als die Bejahung, die andere als Verneinung des Willens zum Leben charakterisiert. Schopenhauer sagt nicht: Du sollst der Welt entsagen, dem Leben absterben, ein Heiliger sein! so wenig als er in der Aesthetik von Jemand fordert, ein Genie zu sein; sondern sowie er in der Aesthetik rein objectiv das Wesen des Schçnen und den Charakter des Genies beschreibt, ganz ebenso objectiv beschreibt er in der Ethik das Wesen der Tugend und den Charakter des Heiligen. Er zeigt die Gesinnung, aus der die Ascese hervorgeht, aber er muthet Keinem diese Gesinnung zu, da er wohl weiß und wiederholt sagt: Velle non discitur, und da er einsieht, daß, wo die Bedingungen der

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Even Frauenstdt’s reading of the The World as Will and Presentation is an anti-linear and descriptive interpretation. In this quote, we see that the saint and the genius should not be considered preferred types or characters in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. They are just unbiasedly, though concretely illustrated phenomena of what Schopenhauer has shown in abstract concepts beforehand. Given the fact that Becker’s interpretation of the purely descriptive The World as Will and Presentation is supported by Frauenstdt and by Schopenhauer himself, there remains, however, one question that we must address before we can develop this descriptive reading itself: Why has the research on Schopenhauer preferred Weigelt’s kind of normative interpretation instead of Becker’s descriptive one and, above all, authorized reading until the recent years? (I.2) Misreading Tradition – Schopenhauer as Educator In October 1874, the first prominent misinterpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy was published in an issue of 1000 copies by Ernst Schmeitzer in Chemnitz. The title of the book is Schopenhauer as Educator (Schopenhauer als Erzieher) and its author is Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche. As far as I am aware, no ‘apostle’ or ‘evangelist’ of Schopenhauer – except David Asher – took notice of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Schopenhauer,30 and, above all, no one of the early Schopenhauer school has criticized this misinterpretation. Because of the ever-expanding impact that Nietzsche’s interpretation had on early Schopenhauer scholarship, modern studies have had to work on many interpretative problems recently. Schopenhauer as Educator has a prelude.31 In late October 1865, Nietzsche discovered Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Presentation in Rohn’s antiquarian bookshop.32 A few days after this discovery, he gave Weltentsagung vorhanden sind […], dieselbe von selbst eintritt, wo diese Bedingungen aber fehlen, alles Fodern und Zumuthen nichts helfen wrden. […] Zweitens, so sehr auch Schopenhauer die Gesinnung, aus der die Ascese hervorgeht, preist, so folgt doch daraus noch nicht, daß er alle die widerwrtigen, ekelhaften und mitunter lcherlichen Formen, in denen die Ascese historisch aufgetreten ist, als zu Seligkeit nothwendig ausgibt und diejenigen Heiligen, die Weigelt ’Caricaturen‘ nennen zu mssen meint, zur Nachahmung empfiehlt!” 30 Cf. Krummel 1998, p. 44 et seqq.; Brown 1985, p. 12. 31 Cf. also Janaway 1998. 32 Cf. Nietzsche 1993, p. 512.

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a description in a letter to his mother, in which he repeats the main principles of Schopenhauer’s ethics: There are two ways, my dears: either we make efforts to live as narrowly as possible, accustoming ourselves to that, screwing down the flame of spirit as low as it will go and seeking riches to live with the pleasures of the world. Alternatively, we know that life consists of suffering, that the harder we try to enjoy it, the more enslaved we are by it, and so we [should] discard the goods of life and practise abstinence, being mean towards ourselves and compassionate toward everyone else, since we pity our comrades in misery.33

However, Nietzsche did not abide by these principles as he described them. Under the influence of Schopenhauer’s work, he began practicing a radical asceticism, self-torture and self-hatred.34 To me, Nietzsche’s actions are an indicator of a normative and linear interpretation of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche must have agreed with Weigelt, who also misreads Schopenhauer’s intention as an urgent demand on his reader. Nine years later, in Schopenhauer as Educator, we can see how Nietzsche has been partially freed from the grip of the denial of the will-to-live and of asceticism. In an autobiographical narrative in the third of his Untimely Meditations (Unzeitgemße Betrachtungen, publ. 1893), Nietzsche indicates that his interpretation of Schopenhauer is a personal one.35 As a disoriented and ‘homeless’ young man36 he had been looking for a philosophical educator37. Yet, in arguing against the ‘velle non discitur’ doctrine, Nietzsche still supposes that Schopenhauer 33 Nietzsche 2003, vol. II, p. 95: F. Nietzsche an Franziska und Elisabeth Nietzsche in Naumburg, 5th November 1865; Hayman 1980, p. 73 et seq. 34 Cf. Nietzsche 1993, p. 512 et seq. 35 Nietzsche 2007, p. 133: “[…] I understand him [Schopenhauer – J.L.] as though it were for me he had written.” 36 Cf. Nietzsche 2007, p. 133: “[…] for men have now become so complex and many-sided they are bound to become dishonest whenever they speak at all, make assertions and try to act in accordance with them. […] It was in this condition of need, distress and desire that I came to know Schopenhauer.”; Nietzsche 2007, p. 135: “If I were set the task, I could endeavour to make myself at home in the world with him.” 37 Cf. Nietzsche 2007, p. 130: “I believed that, when the time came, I would discover a philosopher to educate me, a true philosopher whom one could follow without any misgiving because one would have more faith in him than one had in oneself.” Nietzsche 2007, p. 133: “[…] I might discover a true philosopher as an educator […]”;Nietzsche 2007, p. 136: “I sensed that in him [Schopenhauer – J.L.] I had discovered that educator and philosopher I had sought for so long.”

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advises his reader like a father would advise his son.38 However, not only The World as Will and Presentation gives the correct advice, Nietzsche even transforms Schopenhauer’s personality and vita into a principle of education: As an isolated and desperate man of genius, he gives an example of virtuous living.39 This example is of utmost importance because Nietzsche holds that the age he lives in is degenerate. For this reason, he interprets Schopenhauer as an educator who analyzes the decline of Christianity and modern civilization to mediocrity.40 Against this decline to mediocrity Nietzsche sets the genius of man, which he sees as a central demand in Schopenhauer’s life and work: […] and just as his feeling of sinfulness makes him long for the saint in him, so as an intellectual being he harbours a profound desire for the genius in him. This is the root of all true culture; and if I understand by this the longing of man to be reborn as saint and genius, I know that one does not have to be a Buddhist to understand this myth.41 The Schopenhauerean man voluntarily takes upon himself the suffering involved in being truthful, and this suffering serves to destroy his own willfulness and to prepare that complete overturning and conversion of his being, which it [sic!] is the real meaning of life to lead up to.42

For Nietzsche, “the goal of all culture” is “the procreation of genius”43 which he compares – against Frauenstdt – with the saint, and this procreation finishes in the “reproduction of Schopenhauer” himself, the “rebirth of the philosopher”44. Like Weigelt, Nietzsche represents a normative and linear reading of Schopenhauer’s main work, whereby the negative process of denial leads to the positive result of holiness and saint38 Cf. Nietzsche 2007, p. 134: “Schopenhauer, on the contrary, speaks with himself: or, if one feels obliged to imagine an auditor, one should think of a son being instructed by his father.” 39 Cf. Nietzsche 2007, p. 134 et seq.: “I profit from a philosopher only insofar as he can be an example – But this example must be supplied by his outward life and not merely in his books […].”; Nietzsche 2007, p. 143: “That Schopenhauer can offer us a model is certain, all these scars and blemishes notwithstanding.” 40 Cf. Nietzsche 2007, p. 132: “The explanation of this spiriclessness and of why all moral energy is at such a low ebb is difficult and involved; but no one who considers the influence victorious Christianity had on the morality of our ancient world can overlook the reaction of declining Christianity upon our own time.” This interpretation of Schopenhauer is correct, cf. Lemanski 2009/11, vol. II, p. 358 et seqq. 41 Nietzsche 2007, p. 142 [KSA 1, p. 358, 1 – 8]. 42 Nietzsche 2007, p. 152 [KSA 1, p. 371, 20 – 25]. 43 Nietzsche 2007, p. 142 [KSA 1, p. 358, 12 – 13]. 44 Cf. Nietzsche 2007, p. 179 [KSA 1, p. 407, 16; 19].

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hood. Thus, Nietzsche can explain “how through Schopenhauer we are all able to educate ourselves against our age – because through him we possess the advantage of really knowing this age.”45 It is correct that it was Schopenhauer’s aim that we possess the advantage of really knowing the age we live in.46 However, Nietzsche can be seen as one of the first prominent interpreters who is in opposition to Schopenhauer’s intention and the reading of his disciples. Comparable to Nietzsche, Eduard von Hartmann47 and Philipp Mainlnder48 have paved the way for the misreading of the original Schopenhauer interpretation. It was Nietzsche, however, who had a major impact on subsequent works that deal with Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Notwithstanding all disagreements concerning smaller issues between him and the later Schopenhauer school (esp. Nietzsche),49 it was Paul Deussen who continued the linear and normative reading50 and introduced it into academic philoso-

45 Nietzsche 2007, p. 146 [KSA 1, p. 363,25 – 27]. 46 V.i., chap. III.2. 47 Cf. e. g. von Hartmann 1924, p. 54: “Neuerdings ist der spekulative Gehalt dieses Standpunktes [des Nichts, nirva¯na – J.L.] von Schopenhauer hervorgehoben und schrfer durchgefhrt worden˙ (vgl. Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Bd. I § 68 – 69, Bd. II Kap. 48 – 49; Parerga und Paralipomena Bd. II, Kap. 14), und von ihm selbst wiederholentlich und mit Nachdruck als der Gipfel nicht nur seiner Ethik, sondern auch seines ganzen philosophischen Systems bezeichnet worden.” – “As of late, the speculative content of this point of view [nothingness, nirva¯na – J.L.] has been evoked and sharply executed by Schopenhauer […], and ˙ repeatedly and emphatically established it not only as the climax of his he has ethics, but of his whole philosophical system as well.” (Transl. by the author). 48 Mainlnder 1989, p. 149: “Die schçnste Blte oder besser: die edelste Frucht der Schopenhauer’schen Philosophie ist die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben.” – “The most beautiful blossom, or better: the most precious fruit of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is the denial of the will-to-live. “ (Transl. by the author). 49 Cf. Feldhoff 2008, e. g. p. 57, 65 et seq., 69 et seqq. 50 The normative interpretation is given in Deussen 1917, p. 555: “Schopenhauer bekmpft die imperative Form der kantischen Ethik, ohne zu sehen, dass auch seine, wie jede Ethik, eine Imperativische Form hat. Sie liegt fr ihn darin, dass er die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben der Bejahung durchweg als das Hçhere, Bessere gegenberstellt, wie er denn sie sogar in seinen Erstlingsmanuskripten mit einem komparativen Ausdrucke bezeichnet als ,‘das bessere Bewusstsein’.” “Schopenhauer fights against the imperative form of Kantian ethics, but he does not recognize that even his ethics have an imperative form, like all ethics have. In his ethics, it consists in the fact that he consistently places a higher value on the denial of the will-to-live than he does on the affirmation, as he refers

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phy and the Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft.51 With regard to Becker’s, Schopenhauer’s and Frauenstdt’s original interpretation we can find the same misreading in English – shown by De Cian and Segala – and in American research – which can be verified with the help of Christa Buschendorf ’s study.52 To this very day, all proponents of the normative and linear interpretations have the same problem: they cannot explain why there is, for example, an association between Christian and Indian (Buddhist or Hinduist) saints. This means that every part of Schopenhauer’s philosophy appears to be negligible and arbitrary, except the denial of the will-tolive, nothingness, nirva¯na and redemption.53 If this was the case, would it ˙ for Schopenhauer to illustrate Christian saints not have been sufficient exclusively? Figuratively speaking, why should Schopenhauer have written a book like The World as Will and Presentation at all? Why did he not become a mystic instead of an author, and why did he not dedicate his whole work to the instruction of real mystical practice? (II) Background and Zeitgeist I think that we can answer the foregoing questions best by putting them into historical context. In the following, I will argue for the descriptive interpretation, one that is in agreement with Becker, Schopenhauer and Frauenstdt. Firstly, I will give a brief historical background of Schopenhauer’s descriptive theory (sect. II.1) in order to show the development of the Zeitgeist of his philosophy (sect. II.2). The historical context and the analysis of the Zeitgeist will demonstrate that the descriptive interpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is more plausible than the normative one. Only with this interpretation are we able to explain (in sect. III) why there is an association of Buddhist and Christian saints, and we can explain why this association is necessary for Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

to it by using the comparative phrase ‘higher consciousness’ in his first manuscripts.” (Transl. by the author). 51 Cf. Hansert 2010, pp. 11 – 45; Ciriac 2011; Koßler 1999, pp. 11 – 20. 52 Buschendorf 2008. 53 The same problem, in a version that depends on a goal-oriented interpretation, has been formulated in Hegel scholarship. Cf. Jaeschke 2002; Busche 2008.

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(II.1) From Dionysius to Reimarus – The Historical Background ‘Mysticism’ is a problematic term in recent research.54 In some of my studies about mysticism, I have distinguished between ‘mystical fields’ (‘Mystische Bereiche’) and ‘mystical aspects’ (‘Mystische Aspekte’).55 Mystical fields can be described as (1) ‘appellative-transforming’ (‘appellativ-transformativ’), (2) ‘descriptive-informing’ (‘deskriptiv-informativ’), (3) ‘exegetical-deciphering’ (‘exegetisch-dechiffrierend’). Mystical aspects are typical terms such as ‘unio mystica’, ‘ecstasy’, ‘imitatio christi’, etc. My assumption is: If there is at least one of these mystical groups in a certain text, combined with a mystical aspect, then we are justified to say that it is a mystical one. The first book of the first Summa theologiae in medieval Western Europe,56 The Divine Names by Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, starts with a sentence which provides an important key to understanding the ‘exegetical-deciphering’ field: By no means then is it permitted to speak, or even to think, anything, concerning the superessential and hidden Deity, beyond those things divinely revealed to us in the sacred Oracles.57

According to 2. Tim 3:16, the ‘sacred Oracles’, i. e. the Holy Scriptures, were given by divine inspiration. Thus, the original Hebrew and Greek Bible became accepted as God’s written revelation, and hence, as infallible truth. If any explanation concerning this world did not agree with the exact wording of the original Bible, then it considered to be false and therefore forbidden. It was not only Dionysius who advocated this ‘exegetical-deciphering’ kind of mysticism, but also Irenaeus Lugdunensis58, 54 55 56 57

McGinn 1992, p. XVI et seqq.; Ruh 1990, p. 26. Lemanski 2009/11; id. 2010a. Cf. Mali 1997; Lemanski (forthcoming). Dionysius Areopagita 1990 I, 1 (= 588 A): “Jah|kou toicaqoOm oq toklgt]om

eQpe?m oute lμm 1mmo/sa_ ti peq· t/r rpeqous_ou ja· jquv_ar he|tgtor paq± t± heiyd_r Bl?m 1j t_m Req_m koc_ym 1jpevasl]ma.” (transl. by Parker 1897)

58 Cf. e. g. Irenaeus Lugdunensis 1982 II 28, 2,21 – 29: “Si autem omnium quae in Scripturis requiruntur absolutiones non possumus inuenire, alterum tamen Deum praeter eum qui est non requiramus: impietas enim haec maxima est. Cedere autem haec talia debemus Deo qui et nos fecit, rectissime scientes quia Scripturae quidem perfectae sunt, quippe a Verbo Dei et Spiritu eius dictae; nos autem, secundum quod minores sumus et nouissimi a Verbo Dei et Spiritu eius, secundum hoc et scientia mysteriorum eius indigemus.”

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and many other church fathers and later medieval and humanistic theologians. Every world explanation had to be in perfect accordance with the Holy Scriptures. 59 In the age of Enlightenment, which started around 1670 in England and France and then spread to Northern Europe, this verdict slowly disintegrated, because many deists and philosophers discovered numerous contradictions in the Bible and began to doubt its infallibility. In Germany, this process did not begin until 1770, because the ‘exegetical-deciphering’ doctrine of inspiration was widely accepted in Protestantism, so that no one was able to criticize the Bible without being fluent in the original languages in which God’s Book was written. It was first and foremost due to the Thirty Years War that the education in classical languages was limited. Thus, the Bible and the German Protestantism in its entirety were immune to historical criticism and the influence of Enlightenment. Hermann Samuel Reimarus, professor of Hebrew and Oriental languages, had the fluency to criticize the original word of God. Due to censorship, the book which records his criticism of the Bible (written in 1735 et seqq.), remained unpublished until 1774, when Gotthold Ephraim Lessing printed parts of it as Fragments by an Anonymous Writer (Fragmente eines Ungenannten). As librarian in Wolfenbttel, it was Lessing’s duty to publish whatever he found in the archives. Thus, he was able to outsmart the censors. However, with the subsequent ‘Fragments Controversy’ (‘Fragmentenstreit’) the German enlightenment gained the upper hand and the Bible, as a text authored by God, lost its legitimacy in questions of science.60 (II.2) From Jacobi to Schopenhauer – The Zeitgeist Too often historians of philosophy forget that Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi is just as important as Kant to classical German philosophy. The Fragments Controversy widened into ‘Pantheism Controversy’ (‘Pantheismusstreit’) a few years later, around 1785. In this controversy, Lessing and Jacobi restored Baruch de Spinoza’s deistic philosophy to repute, and this fulfilled the hopes of rationalism61 to explain god and the world in its en-

59 Cf. Fernhout 1997. 60 Cf. Lemanski 2010b. 61 According to Blumenberg 2010, p. 1 et seq.

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tirety62 – even by means of an identical and monistic theory.63 Thus, it became the task of classical German philosophy to bring Spinoza’s substantial, static and therefore dead god to life, but without falling back into dualism.64 The early Fichte and the later Hegel attempted to describe all elements and categories of the mind and the world governed by a dynamic or living god.65 In 1803, Schelling based his On University Studies (Vorlesungen ber die Methode des akademischen Studiums) on the Enlightenment ideas of the French Encyclop distes such as Denis Diderot.66 In this book, Schelling tried to describe the “internal organic unity” of all science which “is expressed objectively in the external organization of universities”, and made the point that no element should be excluded from this unity:

62 Jacobi 1994, p. 180): “[…] even the greatest mind, if he wants to explain all things absolutely, to make them rhyme which each other according to distinct concepts and will not otherwise let anything stand […]” 63 Cf. Jacobi 1994, pp. 190, 198, 199. 64 Examples of this approach can be found in Fichte 2005, p. 69: “This is the difficulty with every philosophy that wants to avoid dualism and is instead really serious about the quest for oneness: either we must perish, or God must. We will not, and God ought not! The first brave thinker who saw the light about this must have understood full well that if the negation is to be carried out, we must undergo it ourselves: Spinoza was that thinker. It is clear and undeniable in his system that every separate existence vanishes as [something] independently valid and self-subsistent. But then he kills even this, his absolute or God. Substance = being without life – because he forgets his very own act of insight – the life in which the science of knowing as a transcendental philosophy makes its entrance.”; Hegel 1977, p. 9 et seq.: “In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject. At the same time, it is to be observed that substantiality embraces the universal, or the immediacy of knowledge itself, as well as that which is being or immediacy for knowledge. If the conception of God as the one Substance shocked the age in which it was proclaimed, the reason for this was […] an instinctive awareness that, in this definition, self-consciousness was only submerged and not preserved.” 65 Fichte’s early Wissenschaftslehre represents the mind’s system and develops the categories in a genetic way; Cf. Fichte 1993, p. 111: “[…] when we presuppose that such a Wissenschaftslehre is possible at all […], we are always presupposing that there really is a system in human knowledge […]” – Hegel’s Science of Logic “is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit” (Hegel 2010, p. 29) and develops the categories in it in a genetic and deductive way (p. 17). 66 Diderot 1755, vol. V, 635 A.

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“In a sense”, he continued, “this outline might take the place of a general encyclopaedia of the sciences.”67 Hegel followed Schelling’s approach in his own Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1817). Three years after this publication, he writes in his Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts), similarly to Schopenhauer: To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy […]. One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality has completed its process of formation and attained its finished state.68

Throughout this discussion, we can discover all of the general aspects of the Zeitgeist: (1) the attempt to formulate a monistic but dynamic theory, (2) the self-assertion of man to explain the world through itself alone, (3) the claim to take into account every element of the mind and world which should be represented in words, and (4) the preference for a descriptive philosophy. That these four aspects have to be considered a reaction to the fact that the Bible had lost its absolute authority on questions concerning the world can be seen in an another tradition along the lines of Lessing, Jacobi and Fichte: Romantic writers like Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel or Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenberg) even intended to write an ‘absolute book’ that would replace the bible. This absolute book was supposed to answer the most fundamental questions previously answered by the Christian Bible, and it was to describe the universal whole, i. e. the world, the cosmos and, of course, the history of mankind. In contrast to the concept of Holy Scripture that was prevalent before the ‘Fragments Controversy’, this absolute book was not considered to be a text authored by God through a prophet, an apostle or an evangelist – it is a text authored by a human author who tries to describe the whole.69 In all these cases we have found that it seems to be considered a necessity to write a new absolute book which answers all questions. Thus, 67 Schelling 1966, p. 41. 68 Hegel 2008, p. 15, 16. 69 Cf. Blumenberg 1986, pp. 233 – 281. – It is a pity that no English translation of Blumenberg’s The Legibility of the World – one of his most important works – has hitherto been published.

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the Zeitgeist of that age shows us that there is an “excessive longevity of a system of questions that extends across a change of epoch”70. After the decline of the Biblical literalism in Germany that was caused by the ‘Fragments Controversy’, ‘disoriented’ and ‘homeless’ people like Nietzsche were searching for a conceptual orientation provided in one single book. After Schelling’s On University Studies, Fichte’s Characteristics of the Present Age (Die Grundzge des gegenwrtigen Zeitalters, 1806) and Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, these people found answers concerning physical questions in Friedrich Wilhelm Heinrich Alexander von Humboldt’s ‘Kosmos’, and answers concerning metaphysical questions in Schopenhauer’s ‘World’. (III) Schopenhauer’s World Von Humboldt was neither one of these romantic writers nor one of the classical German philosophers, but it was also his aim to produce a book concerned with the world as a whole, one that would be able to make an impression on its reader similar to the one nature itself would make.71 In the following, I would like to outline how Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Presentation can be regarded as the pursuit of a similar project (sect. III.1). With the historical background in mind and with particular reference to the Zeitgeist,72 we can strengthen Becker’s descriptive, antinormative and anti-linear interpretation of Schopenhauer’s main work.73 On this basis, it will be possible to explain why Schopenhauer’s system appears to be the first one which is concerned with Christian as well as Buddhist saints, and which claims that there is an association between both (sect. III.2). (III.1) ‘Kosmos’ and ‘World’ The meaning of the title of Schopenhauer’s main work delineates a project similar to von Humboldt’s project with the title Description of the Universe. Ever since 1804, von Humboldt had the desire to write a book, one that was initially called Essai sur la Physique du monde, but later took its title from the medieval Buch der Natur (Book of Nature). Not later than 70 71 72 73

Blumenberg 1999, p. 65. V.i., chap. III.1. V.s., chap. II. V.s., chap. I.

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1834, that same book would appear under the title Kosmos and this fact points in the direction of the Zeitgeist: 74 The mad fancy has seized me of representing in a single work the whole material world, – all that is known to us […]. Each great and important principle, wherever it appears to lurk, is to be mentioned in connection with facts. It must present an epoch in the mental development of man as regards his knowledge of nature. […] Weltbeschreibung (description of the World), a term analogous to Weltgeschichte (history of the World), would, as an unusual word, be confounded with Erdbeschreibung (history [better: description – J.L.] of the earth). […] the title [i.e. Kosmos – J.L.] contains a striking word, meaning both heaven and earth, and stands in contrast to the Ga […] a true Erdbeschreibung). […] A book on Nature ought to produce an impression like Nature herself. […] I have endeavoured in description to be truthful, distinct, nay even scientifically accurate, without getting into the dry atmosphere of abstract science.75

This “po sie descriptive” is to give the “idea of the Universe – of the connection between all phenomena” by a truthful human author.76 Here, we can find all aspects of the Zeitgeist which are mentioned in section 2.2, and Humboldt’s absolute book seems to have the same intention as The World as Will and Presentation. What makes Schopenhauer’s main work into an absolute book in the sense of the Romantics becomes apparent in the title’s reference to the universal whole. Schopenhauer writes about the whole world, which he considers to be dominated by an epistemological principle called ‘presentation’, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by a natural philosophical principle called ‘will’. Unlike von Humboldt’s account, Schopenhauer’s ‘cosmography’ is not an account exclusively about the physical, but rather a philosophical and metaphysical one. He describes not only the “whole material world”, but also the ‘whole ideal world’. Both worlds, the jºslor aQshgtºr and the jºslor mogtºr, are interwoven, constituting a unit.77 This single world corresponds to Schopenhauer’s one single 74 Concerning Humboldt’s book cf. Blumenberg 1987, p. 91 et seqq. 75 Humboldt 1860, pp. 15 – 19, no. XVI: Humboldt to Varnhagen von Ense, Berlin, 27 October, 1834. 76 Humboldt 1860, p. 16. 77 I here adopt the theory which Atwell 1995, p. 21 et seq. calls “double-aspect theory”. Atwell argues that the double-aspect theory cannot answer the question, “What is the world apart from being will from one aspect and apart from being representation from another aspect?” (p. 22). I will make a brief remark about Atwell’s objection: What the world is in itself is not, as Atwell suggests, a question that could be answered by falsifiable statements. My answer is a therapeutic

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thought, and this thought is recorded in a single work – called “The World”78 –, divided into many aspects to be communicated to others. While authors who describe the earth (Erdbeschreibung) set the concept “of the succession of alterations in the surface of the earth [globe – J.L.]” at the head of their science, Schopenhauer uses the concepts ‘will’ and ‘presentation’ to arrive at a “complete cognizance in abstracto”79. The postulate of complete knowledge has different roots which are mentioned above in form of the five aspects of the Zeitgeist 80 : One root is the result of the Fragments Controversy; meaning that a human author who writes an absolute book must now give all the ultimate answers previously provided by the Bible. Another root is the claim that was, as a manifestation of complete human self-assertion, attached to science in the age of rationalism – and this claim can be subsumed under the prominent slogan of rationalism: “everything can be defined, therefore everything must be defined”.81 However, Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Presentation methodologically stands between science and art: The character of science is that knowledge is raised to consciousness as abstraction, because it is impossible to investigate every individual thing of the world by means of human memory.82 This is the reason why Schopenhauer, like Aristotle, sees philosophy or metaphysics as a meta-theory, a “basso continuo of all the sciences”83. This means that philosophy cannot describe the individual and concrete things of the world first; the primary objects are rath-

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one, because Atwell’s question is not a transcendental one, and therefore it is not a question Schopenhauer would discuss – Cf. Schubbe 2010, p. 195, n. 554. I think many interpreters of Schopenhauer’s main work would reduce its title to “Will and Presentation”. In contrast to this approach, I would argue that the title should be “The World”. In the title The world as will and Presentation the module conjunction ‘as’ (German: ‘als’) signifies representation, i. e. the fact that something appears as something else. Here it is the world which reveals itself once as will and once as representation, and not vice versa. This is the reason why I prefer “The World” as title. – Borrowing an expression from Martin Heidegger, we could say that there is a ‘forgetfulness of world’ (Weltvergessenheit) predominant in Schopenhauer scholarship. WWP I, p. 96 et. seq. (§ 14). V.s., chap. II.2. Blumenberg 2010, p. 1 et seq. WWP I, p. 97 (§ 14): “Were science to aim at knowledge of its object by individually examining all of the things thought through that concept, until it was eventually cognizant of the whole, then, for one thing, no human memory would suffice; for another, there would be no way to be certain of completeness.” WWP II, p. 145.

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er the first principles themselves, and this is the difference between a purely physical cosmography and a philosophical one. In other words, the concept of the ‘successive alterations of the surface of the earth globe’ cannot be a principle or an axiom for the description of the world in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, because, on the one hand, this concept must itself first be proven in a meta-theory and, on the other hand, it is not possible to give such a complete knowledge in the form of an abstraction. The physical concept is able to describe landscapes and the volcanic evolution of the world, but it is unable to describe human perception, aesthetics or ethics. Thus, Schopenhauer’s philosophy uses the much higher principles ‘will’ and ‘presentation’ to describe all kinds or species of both the material and the ideal world, and therefore his philosophy follows the in vitro-method which is deductive or top down. – The art-character of philosophy lies in the foreign intermediation of nature. Only the artistic genius is able to contemplatively find the platonic ideas underlying the individual and concrete things of the world. The genius sees what for normal man is hidden, and thus his claim is to make the undisguised ideas of all species visible through his work.84 When this genius has a philosophical nature, he uses the abstract concepts to show to his readers the true nature they are unable to see. Due to the fact that Schopenhauer had to search for these abstract concepts and principles he must have used the “in vivo”-method as well, which is inductive or bottom up.85 It is thus clear why Schopenhauer says that philosophy “is almost as much akin to art as to science”86 : The artistic character refers to the immediate relation between the world (or nature) and the philosophical genius; the science-character, in turn, refers to the meditated relation between the world (or nature) and the reader of the absolute book – the mediator in this case being none other than Schopenhauer through the text he offered. He uses science to present art to his readers, so that they can see the world through his eyes, so that they can see through the “clear eye of the world”87. Thus, we can find a combination of the 84 WWP I, p. 228: “It is art, the work of genius. It replicates the eternal Ideas that are apprehended through pure contemplation, that which is essential and enduring in all the world’s phenomena, and depending on the material in which it replicates them, it is plastic or pictorial art, poetry, or music. Its single origin is cognizance of Ideas, its single goal communication of this cognizance.” 85 The word ‘inductive’ here means not so much 1pacyc^ in the sense of Aristotle, but more !macyc^ in the sense of Plato. Cf. WWP I, p. 229. 86 WWP II, p. 145. 87 WWP I, p. 229.

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in vivo-(art) and the in vitro-method (science), but the artistic character of The World as Will and Presentation is inaccessible to us who have no genius. – Even then it is, in contrast to Nietzsche’s position, important to distinguish, with Frauenstdt, the genius from the saint88 : The character of Schopenhauer’s work displays its author as a philosophical genius, ‘genius’ used in the way established by Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. This philosophical genius is inspired by an intuitive single thought of what the world is.89 He is, however, not a saint or a mystic, because in Schopenhauer’s philosophy the saint is not someone who writes books – he denies his life and lets his hagiographers write about his life.90 (III.2) The Association of Buddhist and Christian Saints The world that Schopenhauer describes is not mainly a historical one or the world in historical progress. What he describes is supposed to be the totality of the world, but of course this description and the world it describes are necessarily situated in the year 1818, the year he first published his main work. This means that he gives us a complete conceptual description of the world of 1818, with everything in it, and of course with the primary focus on philosophical issues. Following Becker, Frauenstdt and the later Schopenhauer, it is my assumption that Schopenhauer describes the world neutrally and value-free – this means that he is not a philosophical advocate of pessimism and of asceticism etc. and that he describes the various interpretations and values of the world because they are also an element or ingredient of the world just like everything else is (such as the magnet, which “turns ever again to the North Pole”91 or the sublimeness the spectator feels by watching the rough sea92). When Schopenhauer tries to provide a complete philosophical account in an abstract fashion, he uses more concepts to describe the world in its unity than will and representation alone. In his theory of cognition, which is conceived in the framework of the concept of presenta88 V.s., end of chap. I.1. 89 The term ‘genius’ becomes popular in Weimar Classicism and refers to the preChristian period, in which an artist was thought to be inspired by his own genius (cf. Sloterdijk 2011, chap. 6). Schopenhauer himself insinuates that he was inspired by a Genius or Holy Ghost, which further supports the interpretation of The World as Will and Presentation as an absolute book (cf. MSR IV (2), p. 8; WWP I, p. 232). 90 Cf. Lemanski 2012; Ingenkamp 2005. 91 WWP I, p. 157. 92 Cf. WWP I, p. 250 et seq.

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tion, he distinguishes subject and object. In his theory of nature, conceived in the framework of the concept of will, he describes the “battle between the forces of attraction and repulsion”93. In his ethics, also based on his account of the will, he describes the moral world employing the concepts of affirmation and denial of the will-to-live. Particularly in the last book of The World as Will and Presentation, Schopenhauer underlines the fact that these concepts are the main principles to describe the world only because the philosopher is not in a position to speak to a developed and matured culture in the way one would talk “to children and to peoples still in their childhood”94 : Philosophy can never do more than interpret and explain what exists, than bring to the level of distinct, abstract, rational cognizance the essence of the world that expresses itself intelligibly to everyone in concreto, i. e., as feeling[,] [t]his, however, in every possible respect and from every point of view. Just as it was the aim of the preceding three Books to accomplish this from other points of view, with the generality peculiar to philosophy, so is human action to be considered in the same manner in the present Book […].95

In the first paragraphs of the last book of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Presentation, we see that the author’s intention is not to guide and direct his reader towards the denial of the will-to-live or towards pessimism. It is not the aim of philosophy “to become practical, to direct action, to transform character”96. In Schopenhauer’s view, these intentions are “old pretensions that, with matured insight, it should finally abandon”97. In these quote, we can see that Becker’s interpretation of The World as Will and Representation was not arbitrary but rather identical to the original intention of Schopenhauer, i. e. to write a descriptive and absolute book which was characteristic of the Zeitgeist. Thus, these concepts, for example of the denial of the will-to-live or of pessimism, are to be understood rather as points of view people can choose to fashion guidelines for their behaviour. However, according to Schopenhauer, there is no advantage or benefit attached to the denial of the will-to-live – it is just the main principle that is employed to describe human behavior together with the opposite principle, the affirma93 WWP I, p. 193. 94 WWP I, p. 323. – The word “maturity” is the translation of the german word “mndig”, which cannot be literally translated into English (cf. Lemanski 2009/11, vol. II, p. 386 et seqq., 527 et seq.). 95 WWP I, p. 322. 96 WWP I, p. 322. 97 WWP I, p. 322.

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tion of the will-to-live. All the pejorative descriptions we find in The World as Will and Presentation are not written from Schopenhauer’s overall point of view, but are rather intentional renditions of how a pessimist or a denier would describe the world. We have to conclude that most of the descriptions in The World as Will and Presentation are second-order descriptions, so that we have to view Schopenhauer, to a certain extent, more as a compiler than as an author or advocate. We find an example for this compilation work in § 68, a paragraph which I like to refer to as ‘the mysticism-paragraph’, because it deals with the mystical point of view of different religions, and especially of Indian Buddhism and Hinduism. Here, we find Master Eckhart von Hochheim together with Gautama Buddha, and Christian saints together with Buddhist ascetics. This paragraph presents Schopenhauer’s close association of Buddhist and Christian saints. Here, two obvious questions arise – to which no linear interpretation can provide satisfactory answers98 : firstly, why does Schopenhauer talk about saints at all, and secondly, why does he make this comparison? It must have been evident to Schopenhauer that there are, in general, two concepts in ethics – the denial and the affirmation of the will-to-live – because, on the one hand, he knew from his childhood the pietistic (and therefore ascetic) tradition which, though uncommon, was upheld in Germany and England,99 and, on the other hand, knew the more affirmative lifestyles of normal society, of “ordinary person, that factorywork of nature”100. If Schopenhauer wanted to cover the rationalistic and religious demand for complete abstract knowledge, he not only had to describe the affirmative but also the negative character. If he had not described the saint or the denier, his ‘cognizance’, given in his main work, would not have been a complete one. However, this leads to a problem. When, during the years around 1818, Schopenhauer tried to give a complete abstract theory, and a description of how “it concerns the actions of human beings”101 in particular, he had the task and the problem of finding examples for the concept ‘denial of the will-to-live’, because, as he says himself, the description of 98 V.s., end of chap. I.2. 99 Cf. De Cian/Segala 2002, p. 26: “Redemption exists, there is no doubt about this. For Schopenhauer this attested by the actions of the artist and the saint, which are realized in experience although they cannot be reduced to the forms and the laws of experience itself.” 100 WWP I, p. 231. 101 WWP I, p. 317.

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the denial of the will-to-live is only abstract and general.102 The problem was that Schopenhauer wrote his main work many years after he had experienced the pietistic way of life, and the most ascetic and pietistic tradition of the western civilization ended soon after the Fragments Controversy.103 Thus, in 1818, he was not able to provide “in vitro” or deductive examples for the principle ‘denial of the will-to-live’, which he had come to know “in vivo” some decades before. From his point of view, however, there is no reason to preach about the negative principle of human conduct. This is due to the fact that even in 1818, there were other living examples available which could be subsumed under the concept ‘denial of the will-to-live’. Although Schopenhauer tried to develop his complete abstract theory on the basis of his direct and immediate experience of nature and reality, he is able to inductively compile examples for the moral principle ‘denial of the will-to-live’ by quoting books about foreign lands with foreign religions, or about long forgotten times in which Christian saints lived in ascetic imitation of Jesus Christ. In the mysticism paragraph we find – after a concrete description of the denial of the will-to-live in form of fasting, self-castigation and selftorture104 – a long reflection about Schopenhauer’s problem and method, one that explains why he included these comparative studies of religion into his work: But likewise only abstract and general is my description of denial of the will for life above, or of the way of life of a beautiful soul, of a resigned, voluntarily penitent saint. Just as the cognizance from which denial of the will proceeds is intuitive and not abstract, so also it finds it complete expression not in abstract concepts, but only in deeds and one’s way of life. Therefore, in order more fully to understand what we express philosophically as denial of the will for life, one has to become acquainted with examples from experience and from actual reality. Of course, one will not meet with them in everyday experience: “nam omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt” [“for all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare” – J.L.], as Spinoza superbly says it. One will therefore – unless made an eyewitness by a particularly favorable fate – have to content oneself with descriptions of the lives of such human beings. Indian literature, as we see from the little we so far know of it through translations, is very rich in depictions of the lives of saints, of penitents, called samana, sannyasis, etc.105 102 103 104 105

The quote is given below. The ‘late pietism’ (germ. ‘Sptpietismus’) ended around 1815, cf. Brecht 1986. WWP I, p. 443 et seq. WWP I, p. 445.

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Now we can see how Schopenhauer’s problems come together and what his method is: (1) he wants to describe the whole world in abstract forms like the world as it could be experienced in the early 19th century, (2) he focuses on an abstract principle in his ethics, which is ‘as difficult as it is rare’ in daily experience, i. e. in the reality and nature he experienced. Schopenhauer is separated from the western ascetic tradition through time and from the Buddhist ascetic tradition through space. (3) Because he is not in a position to consult direct and immediate experience for his development of a complete theory, he has to perceive books as a part of nature. We have no other choice but to content ourselves with the biographies of these individuals, because they had been dead for a long time or lived (in the 19th century) outside of Europe, for example in India. Thus, the book (or the textual testimony) becomes a compensation for the missing experience of nature. (III.3) Conclusion The answer of the question of why is there an association of Buddhist and Christian saints can easily be given within the non-linear, but descriptive interpretation: There must be an association of Buddhist and Christian saints, because they are both following the same ethical principle. That is to say: The term ‘denial of the will-to-live’ is as a description of conduct applicable to Christian as well as to Buddhist and Hinduist saints. For Schopenhauer, they are two examples of one principle, a principle which cannot be preached about, because he requires examples to give a complete ‘cognizance’ of the world, with all its elements taken into account. In this effort, we can spot the same problem which Schelling detects in Hegel’s Science of Logic: If there is only one missing element, the whole project will be a failure.106 Schopenhauer compensates

106 Schelling 1994, p. 144: “In Hegel’s Logic one finds every concept which just happened to be accessible and available at his time taken up as a moment of the absolute idea at a specific point. Linked to this is the pretension to complete systematisation, i. e. the claim that all concepts have been included and that outside the circle of those that have been included no other concept is possible. But what if concepts can be shown which that system knows nothing about, or which

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and supplies the possible missing element through the quotation of biographical descriptions of the lives of saints, penitents, samana, samnya¯sin, ˙ and so on. Thus, he depends on the books in which the stories of˙ Christian or Buddhistic ascetics are told. Based on this strategy, we can assume that the historical, descriptive interpretation leads to another detail of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, one that we today ascribe to analytic philosophy: Considered from Richard Rorty’s point of view, Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Presentation would turn out to be one of the best examples of a philosophy of reference and representation.107 On the one hand, however, Schopenhauer extends, like John McDowell does,108 his concept of nature, because he perceives books and textual information as a part of nature. Therefore, on the other hand, Schopenhauer seems to be in opposition to philosophers because he integrates human intervention into the reference, and not vice versa, like Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom do. Thus, the historical and correct interpretation of the The World as Will and Presentation discloses a new dimension for a modern, but not misconstrued interpretation. References Atwell, John (1995): Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will. Berkeley: University Press. Becker, Johann August (1883): Briefwechsel. Ed. by J. K. Becker. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. Blumenberg, Hans (1986): Die Lesbarkeit der Welt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Blumenberg, Hans (1987): The Genesis of the Copernican World. Transl. by R. M. Wallace. Cambridge, Mass. et al.: MIT. Blumenberg, Hans (1999): The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. 7th Ed. Transl. by R. M. Wallace. Cambridge, Mass. et al.: University Press. Blumenberg, Hans (2010): Paradigms for a metaphorology. Transl. by R. Savage. New York: University Press. Booms, Martin (2003): Aporie und Subjekt: Die erkenntnistheoretische Entfaltungslogik der Philosophie Schopenhauers. Wrzburg: Kçnigshausen & Neumann.

it was only able to take up into itself in a completely different sense from their real sense?” 107 Rorty 1980; Brandom 2001, p. 7. 108 Cf. McDowell 2000, p. 78 et seqq. (= III, 7 et seqq.).

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Brandom, Robert (2001): Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. 2nd Ed. Cambridge, Mass. et al.: Harvard Press. Breazeale, Daniel (Ed.) (1993): “J. G. Fichte: The Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre”. In: Id. (Transl. and Ed.): Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. New York: University Press. Brecht, Martin (1986): “Sptpietismus und Erweckungsbewegung”. In: Ulrich Gbler/Peter Schram (Ed.): Erweckung am Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts. Amsterdam: University Press, p. 1 – 22. Brown, Malcolm B. (1985): Friedrich Nietzsche und sein Verleger Ernst Schmeitzner: eine Darstellung ihrer Beziehung. Stanford: University Press. Busche, Hubertus (2008): “‘Logik’, ‘Geschichte’,‘Teleologie’ – Wo liegt die Notwendigkeit in der Phnomenologie des Geistes?” In: Wolfram Hogrebe (Ed.): Phnomen und Analyse: Grundbegriffe der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts in Erinnerung an Hegels Phnomenologie des Geistes (1807). Wrzburg: Kçnigshausen & Neumann, p. 135 – 155. Buschendorf, Christa (2008): ‘The highpriest of Pessimism’: Zur Rezeption Schopenhauers in den USA. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universittsverlag. Ciriac, Fabio (2011): In lotta per Schopenhauer: La ‘Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft’ fra ricerca filosofica e manipolazione ideologica 1911 – 1948. Lecce: Pensa. De Cian, Nicoletta/Segala, Marco (2002): “What is Will?” In: SchopenhauerJahrbuch 83, p. 13 – 43. Deussen, Paul (1917): Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie mit besonderer Bercksichtigung der Religionen. Vol. II/3. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. Diderot, Denis (1775): “Encyclop die” (art). In: Encyclop die, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des arts et des m tiers. Vol. 5, 635 A. Paris. Dionysius Areopagita (1990): De divinis nominibus In: Beate Regina Suchla (Ed.): Corpus Dionysiacum I. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 107 – 231. Fazio, Domenico (2007): “La ‘scuola’ di Schopenhauer. Per la storia di un concetto”. In: Domenico Fazio (Ed.): Arthur Schopenhauer e la sua scuola. Lecce: Pensa. Feldhoff, Heiner (2008): Nietzsches Freund: Die Lebensgeschichte des Paul Deussen. Kçln et al.: Bçhlau. Fernhout, Rein (1997): “The Bible as God’s Word: A Christological View”. In: Hendrik M.Vroom/Jerald D. Gort (Ed.): Holy Scriptures in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: Hermeneutics, Values and Society. Atlanta et al.: Rodopi, p. 57 – 69. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (2005): The Science of Knowing: J. G. Fichte’s 1804 “Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre”. Transl. W. E. Wright. New York: University Press. Frauenstdt, Julius (1863): “Memorabilien, Briefe und Nachlassstcke”. In: Ernst Otto Timotheus Lindner (Ed.): Arthur Schopenhauer: Von ihm, Ueber ihm. Ein Wort der Vertheidigung. Berlin: Hayn. Frauenstdt, Julius (1956): “Populre Philosophie”. In: Bltter fr literarische Unterhaltung 1956:1. Gçdeke, Karl (Ed.) (1854): Deutsche Wochenschrift. Hannover: Rmpler. Hansert, Andreas (2010): Schopenhauer im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft. Kçln et al.: Bçhlau.

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Hartmann, Eduard von (1924): Phnomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins: Eine Entwickelung seiner mannigfaltigen Gestalten in ihren inneren Zusammenhange. 3rd Ed. Berlin: Volksverband der Bcherfreunde. Haucke, Kai (2007): Leben und Leiden: Zur Aktualitt und Einheit der Schopenhauerschen Philosophie. Berlin: Parerga. Hayman, Ronald (Transl.) (1980): A Critical life. Oxford: University Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1970): Phnomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1984): Philosophy of Mind. Transl. by W. Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2008): Outlines of the Philosophy of Right. Transl. by T.M. Knox. Oxford: University Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2010): Science of Logic. Transl. by G. di Giovanni. Cambridge: University Press. Humboldt, Alexander von (1860): Letters of Alexander von Humboldt: Written between the Years 1827 and 1858, to Varnhagen von Ense. London: Trbner. Ingenkamp, Heinz Gerd (2005): “Plutarch und das Leben der Heiligen”. In: A. P rez Jim nez et al. (Ed.): Valori letterari delle opere di Plutarco: Studi offerti al Professore Italo Gallo dall’ International Plutarch Society. M laga et al.: University Press, pp. 225 – 242. Irenaeus Lugdunensis (1982): Aduersus haereses. In: A. Rousseau, L. Doutreleau (Ed.): Contre les h r sies. dition critique d’aprs les versions arm nienne et latine. Livre II T. 1. Paris: d. du Cerf. Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (1994): “The Doctrine of Spinoza (1785)”. In: George di Giovanni (Transl.): The main philosophical writings and the novel Allwill. Montre´al, et al.: University Press, pp. 173 – 253. Jaeschke, Walter (2002): “Das absolute Wissen”. In: Andreas Arndt et al. (Ed.): Phnomenologie des Geistes: Berlin: Akademie. Janaway, Christopher (Ed.) (1998): Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator. Oxford et al.: Calderon. Koßler, Matthias (1999): Empirische Ethik und christliche Moral: Zur Differenz einer areligiçsen und einer religiçsen Grundlegung der Ethik am Beispiel der Gegenberstellung Schopenhauers mit Augustinus, der Scholastik und Luther. Wrzburg, Kçnigshausen & Neumann. Krummel, Richard Frank (1998): Nietzsche und der deutsche Geist. Vol. I. 2nd Ed. Berlin et al.: de Gruyter. Lemanski, Jens (2009): “Vom Alles zum Nichts: oder die berwindung des dogmatischen Spinozismus in der Ethik Schopenhauers”. In: SchopenhauerJahrbuch 90, pp. 19 – 45. Lemanski, Jens (2010a): “Die Rationalitt des Mystischen – Zur Entwicklung und Korrektur unseres Mystikverstndnisses am Beispiel von Dionysius Areopagita, Gottfried Arnold und Arthur Schopenhauer”. In: SchopenhauerJahrbuch 91, pp. 93 – 121. Lemanski, Jens (2010b). “Philosophia in bivio: ber die Bedeutung des Fragmentenstreits fr die Ausdifferenzierung von Rationalismus und Irrationalis-

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mus”. In: Britta Caspers et al. (Ed.): Georg Luk cs: Kritiker der unreinen Vernunft. Duisburg: Universittsverlag Rhein-Ruhr, pp. 85 – 107. Lemanski, Jens (2009/11): Christentum im Atheismus: Spuren der mystischen Imitatio Christi-Lehre in der Ethik Schopenhauers. Vol. I, II. London: Turnshare. Lemanski, Jens (2011): “Begriffsgeschwindigkeit und Gedankengeschwindigkeit”. In: Internationale Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Psychosomatik 1, pp. 1 – 24. Lemanski, Jens (2012): “‘Ich habe wohl gelehrt, was ein Heiliger ist, bin aber selbst kein Heiliger’: Schopenhauers hagioethischer Konsequentialismus im System der Welt als Wille und Vorstellung”. In: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 93 [forthcoming]. Lemanski, Jens [forthcoming]: Summa und System. Mnster: mentis. Mainlnder, Philipp (1989): Philosophie der Erlçsung. Ed. by U. Horstmann. Frankfurt am Main: Insel. Mali, Franz (1997): Eine erste Summa theologiae: Datierung, Werk und Pseudepigraphie des Dionysius (Ps.-Areopagita). Augsburg [Unpublished habilitation thesis]. Malter, Rudolf (1991): Arthur Schopenhauer: Transzendentalphilosophie und Metaphysik des Willens. Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog. Mannion, Gerard (2003): Schopenhauer, Religion and Morality: The Humble Path to Ethics. Aldershot: Ashgate. McDowell, John (2000): Mind and World: With a New Introduction. 5th Ed. Cambridge, Mass. et al.: Havard Press. McGinn, Bernard (1992): The Foundations of Mysticism. Vol. I. London: SMC. Nietzsche, Friedrich (1980): Smtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bnden. Ed. by G. Colli and M. Montinari. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter/Mnchen: dtv. [= KSA] Nietzsche, Friedrich (1993): “Rckblick auf meine zwei Leipziger Jahre”. In: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Ed. by G. Colli and M. Montinari. Berlin et al.: de Gruyter, I/4, pp. 506 – 39. Nietzsche, Friedrich (2003): Smtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 Bnden. 2nd Ed. Berlin et al.: de Gruyter. Nietzsche, Friedrich (2007): “Schopenhauer as Educator”. In: Daniel Breazeale (Ed.): Untimely Mediations. Transl. by J. Hollingdale. 11th Ed. Cambridge: University Press, pp. 125 – 195. Papousado, Denis (1999): Der Schnitt zwischen dem Idealen und dem Realen: Schopenhauers Erkenntnisphilosophie. Bonn: Sinclair. Parker, John (1897): The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite. London: Parker. Rorty, Richard (1980): Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: University Press. Rosenkranz, Karl (1875): “Kant und Schopenhauer”. In: Neue Studien 2, Studien zur Literaturgeschichte. Leipzig, Heimann, 1875, pp. 45 – 60. Ruh, Kurt (1990): Geschichte der abendlndischen Mystik. Vol. I. Mnchen: Beck.

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Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph (1966): On university studies. Transl. by E. S. Morgan. Ohio: University Press. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph (1994): On the history of modern philosophy. Transl. by A. Bowie. Cambridge: University Press. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1975): Der Handschriftliche Nachlaß. Vol. I-V. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Frankfurt am Main: Kramer. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1978): Gesammelte Briefe. Ed. by A. Hbscher. Bonn: Bouvier. Schopenhauer, Arthur (2008): The World as Will and Presentation. Vol. I. Transl. by R. E. Aquila and D. Carus. New York: Longman. Schubbe, Daniel (2010): Philosophie des Zwischen: Hermeneutik und Aporetik bei Schopenhauer. Wrzburg: Kçnigshausen & Neumann. Sloterdijk, Peter (2011): Spheres I: Bubbles – Microspherology. Transl. by W. Hoban. New York: Semiotext(e). Spierling, Volker (1984): Materialien zu Schopenhauers “Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung”. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Spierling, Volker (1987a): “Schopenhauers furchtbare Wahrheit”. In: Id. (Ed.): Schopenhauer im Denken der Gegenwart. Mnchen: Piper, pp. 27 – 51. Spierling, Volker (1987b): Schopenhauer im Denken der Gegenwart. Mnchen: Piper. Spierling, Volker (1994): Arthur Schopenhauer: Philosophie als Kunst und Erkenntnis. Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurter Verlagsanstalt. Spierling, Volker (1998): Arthur Schopenhauer: Eine Einfhrung in Leben und Werk. Leipzig: Reclam. Spierling, Volker (2002): Arthur Schopenhauer zur Einfhrung. Hamburg: Junius. Weigelt, Georg Christian (1855): Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Populre Vortrge. Hamburg: Meißner. Wicks, Robert (2011): Schopenhauer’s ‘The World as Will and Representation’: A Reader’s guide. London et al.: Continuum.

(III) Philosophers

Transcending Egoism through Moral Praxis – Schopenhauer and Viveka¯nanda Indu Sarin The present paper explores Arthur Schopenhauer’s perspective on the realization of morality through transcending egoism and compares it with Viveka¯nanda’s understanding of morality. For both, moral praxis is the realization of intrinsic values and is based on love, sympathy and compassion, which express the unity of one-self with others – considering their well-being. Both of them share the point of view that ego is the source of all vices, creating divisions, generating conflicts and leading to suffering. The ego produces all kinds of illusions. The renunciation of ego is the disappearance of illusion and the emergence of morality. Like Viveka¯nanda, Schopenhauer also advocates metaphysical foundation of morality because it is to be realized through renunciation of will-to-live, which is phenomenal in nature. The foundation of morality for both of them rests on tat tvam asi (“This thou art”), which implies metaphysical identity of all beings. Both of them are not interested in giving a theoretical analysis of morality but looking at morality from the subjective angle – how the individual feels when he confronts his fellow beings. The realization of morality is through direct access to the very being of the other individual and not indirectly, through maxims and moral principles. For Schopenhauer, the origin of morality is in the Will. Morally speaking the important point is the resolve that is taken by the Will and not what has happened. He holds that the origin of morality is not in the empirical but in the metaphysical, which is a priori and not a posteriori – that is, innate, and not acquired and has its root “not in the mere phenomenon, but in the thing-in-itself ”.1 The phenomenal expression of Will (thing-in-itself ) is will-to-live. Schopenhauer distinguishes between Will and will-to-live. The reality for him is Will – thing-in-itself. The will-to-live is phenomenal, which remains at the psycho-physical level and creates all kinds of illusions. The moral freedom is 1

Bax 1949, p. 292.

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the outcome of Will in contrast to will-to-live2, which is manifested in the character of the individual. It is not in principium individuationis but rooted in thing-in-itself.3 Every individual, when he looks within, recognizes in his nature, which is his will, the thing-in-itself, therefore that which everywhere alone is real. Accordingly he conceives himself as the kernel and centre of the world, and regards himself as of infinite importance. If, on the other hand, he looks without, then he is in the province of the idea the mere phenomenon, where he sees himself as an individual among an infinite number of other individuals, accordingly as something very insignificant, nay, vanishing altogether. Consequently every individual, even the most insignificant, every I, when regarded from within, is all in all; regarded from without, on the other hand , he is nothing, or at least as good as nothing. Hence upon this depends the great difference between what each one necessarily is in his own eyes and what he is in the eyes of others, consequently the egoism that which everyone reproaches everyone else.4

The “innermost” nature of man states Schopenhauer is will and not reason. He holds that the moral person is not guided by intellect or reason but by his inner impulse. […] a man may have weak reasoning powers and a weak understanding, and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently good; for the most important element in a man depends as little on intellectual as it does on physical strength.5

It is inner impulse that naturally impels a man to do actions. Morality is not concerned with the results of actions “but with willing, and willing itself takes place only in the individual”.6 It belongs to Will, which is innate. Immeasurable diversity of the innate moral dispositions of individuals […] moral goodness does not in any sense arise from reflection, the development of which is dependent upon intellectual culture; but directly from the Will itself, whose structure is innate [….].7

There are three incentives to actions – egoism, malice and compassion. Egoism impels the individual to increase his own well-being, malice harms the other, and compassion helps the other by removing the suffer2 3 4 5 6 7

Bax 1949, p. 290. Bax 1949, 291. WWI III, p. 417. ON, p. 111. WWI III, p. 404. Bax 1949, p. 293.

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ing of the other. Malice hurts others without any compensation to oneself and compassion helps others without any advantage to oneself.8 Egoism is the most powerful instinct in man and majority of people and most of the time are dominated by it – “For we too sometimes experience compassion, sometimes malice, and most of the time egoism […]”9 Out of all living beings, egoism is prevalent in human nature. Egoism is the distinctive feature of man in contradistinction to an animal.10 The nature of man is to see himself as an I, ego in distinction to others. Expressing Schopenhauer’s standpoint, Richard Taylor, says: Each of us by nature sees himself as an I, an ego, surrounded from the beginning by things that are ‘other’ and foreign, but are filled with threat and promise to this ego.11

The expression of will-to-live is egoism, which is dominated by the individual’s own gratification and he is hardly conscious of it. It remains “hidden […] clothed in gentle manners, usages, and customs […]”.12 For Schopenhauer, the natural condition of man is egoistic. The question: Why man is selfish? Schopenhauer gives the answer by saying that one has a direct relationship with one’s own self and indirect relationship with others through their representation “in one’s head”. Consequently, one regards oneself the whole world. Egoism is attachment to wrong (illusory) image of mine, which causes self-deception and constitutes false self-identity. It takes pride in selfglorification and pursues selfish interests. It is the phenomenal self that is engaged in materialistic pursuits and forgets the real self (noumenal self ). Consequently, the individual loses his right self-identity and indulges in wrong actions. First it starts with the wrong belief that one can control everything, which ultimately leads to frustration. Secondly, one entertains a wrong belief that he is independent and free to do anything. In reality the egoistic individual is not free; in the process of satisfying his ego, he becomes very much dependent on others and victim of the things around. Ego craves for having and possessing things and persons. The individual sees himself in terms of his possessions and how he stands in the estimation of others. He runs after his reputation, rank, honor and fame 8 9 10 11 12

Taylor 1980, 104. Taylor 1980, 97. Bax 1949, p. 279. Taylor 1980, p. 103 – 104. Taylor 1980, p. 104.

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and identifies himself with these worldly achievements. He wants to become great in the eyes of others so that they praise or flatter him. The hierarchical distinctions arise – I am superior and the other is inferior, I have a capacity to dominate the other. The more the person gets the materialistic achievements, the more he craves for them. Thus there is an endless desire to get more and more. To get those things he is ready to go to any extent – harming others, dominating them or making relationships with them only for utilitarian considerations. Egoism creates divisions and generates all kinds of conflicts. Ego gets hurt for small things, craves for others’ approval. It is dominated by the fear of losing things that leads to suffering too. It creates suffering for oneself as well as for others because the above materialistic achievements are only transitory. Hatred, anger, envy, rancor and malice emerge out of ego. These are present in human breast and manifest as any opportunity, great or small arises. Egoism inflicts cruelty on the other; exploits him and makes his life miserable. One enjoys the suffering of the other but this enjoyment is temporary and ultimately produces one’s own suffering. For Schopenhauer, ego in its extreme form produces malice leading to immoral actions. One gets pleasure in harming others because one thinks that one has a power to rule others. Malice is disinterested “nastiness” – the suffering of the other may not give me any advantage. The devilish character of man seeks pleasure in “purposeless teasing and disturbing” others – “mere pleasure in mischief is diabolical”13 – torturing others just for the sake of torturing. This malicious action leads to the gratification of one’s ego. “But the worst trait in human nature is the malicious pleasure in mischief which is nearly akin to cruelty […].”14 No doubt, all the materialistic achievements are mine but I am not merely this. For the sake of attaining them I may indulge into any immoral actions. The moral significance lies in how one has acted and not what one has gained. Morality is absence of the above ego-glorification. How to overcome egoism? It is through moral praxis – traversing the path of morality, which is the “source of all genuine righteousness and human love”.15 The anti-dote to egoism is compassion, which is inherent in man but sometimes overpowered by egoism. Compassion makes the individual transcend his petty and narrow selfish interests. It is “disinterested sweetness”. Ego wants to have more and more things 13 Bax 1949, p. 280. 14 Bax 1949, p. 280. 15 Bax 1949, p. 280.

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(endless desires) whereas compassion has a passion for giving everything to others. It emerges from Will (thing-in-itself ). Schopenhauer explores the questions: why people praise and blame, why they sometimes injure and sometimes help their fellows? For Schopenhauer morality is concerned with the individual relationship with his fellow beings and with the world as a whole. The moral individual feels the suffering of the other and makes efforts to remove it. The immoral man on the other hand either remains indifferent to the suffering of the other or increases it. Egoism is the expression of will-to-live, which is to be denied in order to transcend egoism – the denial of the will-to-live is denial of egoism. Schopenhauer holds that “the works of love” overcome the “veil of ma¯ya¯” – the vanishing of the principium individuations and recognize one’s own will “in every being and consequently in the sufferer”.16 […] to be cured of this deception of Maya and to do works of love, are one and the same […] our true self exists not only in our own person, this particular manifestation, but in everything that lives. By this the heart feels itself enlarged, as egoism it is contracted.17

Compassion is “the primary ethical phenomenon” and the basis of morality. The direct access to the being of the other individual is possible through feeling and not through reason. The latter accesses the other through representation. Compassion is the result of direct personal relationship with the other and not the indirect relationship of representation. It outflows from the heart and is not the outcome of obligation, duty or law. It is within human nature. For Schopenhauer, […] no genuine virtue can be produced though moral theory or abstract knowledge in general, but that such virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which recognizes in the individuality of others the same nature as in our own.18

The other is not different from me. This is the only way of eliminating ego and abolishing the distinction between I and non I.19 The relationship is not of having and possessing the others but rather of being with them.

16 17 18 19

WWI I, p. 482. WWI I, p. 482. WWI I, p. 474 – 475. Bax 1949, p. 269.

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The two virtues emerge out of compassion – justice and loving-kindness. Justice is doing no wrong to others (injure no one). “This natural justice is a bidding of the heart to refrain from injury to others, even when that injury would yield advantage to oneself, without any threat of bad consequences to oneself ”.20 Schopenhauer is not speaking of justice as a practical formula to live together fairly, as a necessary condition of social life through mutual adjustments – “a price one has to pay in order to satisfy one’s interests”. In order to benefit oneself, one has to benefit other, which is a practical formula for reducing suffering in the world – mutual advantage. It does not have moral significance but only the result of “practical intelligence”. The voluntary justice on the other hand does not demand anything in return. It is not imposed on the individual through external laws but comes through the elimination of principium individuationis (no distinction between himself and others – the suffering of others touches him as his own), which leads to “benevolence and well-doing, to love of mankind”. The loving-kindness is also not motivated by external duty, obligation and law. For Schopenhauer, prescription of duties, rewards and punishments do not really change the person because he may be doing them out of fear. For Schopenhauer, an action done out of fear is not a moral action. Even the rational procedures cannot make a man moral. The values spring from the heart naturally and are not the outcome of fear or practical intelligence. Nevertheless the individual’s actions are not motivated by egoism; he rather helps others and relieves their sufferings even at the cost of his own interests – the suffering may be of a rational or deaf and dumb person or that of the animal.21 Schopenhauer does not limit the concept of morality only to humans. The distinction which each of us draws between himself and others is accordingly an illusion [….] Each of us exists, not merely to perpetuate his own life, but to foster life itself […] the egoist is one who takes the apparent distinction between himself and others as a real, ultimate, and impenetrable difference. Malice is the exaggeration and perversion of this difference, the very turning of life against itself. It springs from an illusion comparable to that of a man who would attack his own body out of an erroneous conception of its identity. Compassion, on the other hand, penetrates the apparent distinction between oneself and others, and in fact simply the dim perception of the identity of their true nature. It is accordingly in this compassion, this percep20 Taylor 1980, p. 105. 21 Taylor 1980, p. 105.

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tion of the underlying identity of oneself with others, that one can make another’s suffering, and another’s well-being, his own.22

Morality for Schopenhauer culminates in asceticism – renunciation of worldly pleasures is the “truest wisdom of life, from a higher ethical standpoint”. It is visible in an ascetic whose life is a symbol of self-sacrifice and self-restraint. He transcends sensuous pleasures. The will as thing-in-itself denies the world as representation but this denial opens the door for moral human encounters. […] the foundation of morals rests with me finally on the truth which has its expression in the Veda and Vedanta in the established mystical formula Tat twam asi (this art thou), which is pronounced with reference to every living thing, be it man or animal, and is there termed the Maha-vakya.23 […] The INDIVIDUALITY does not rest alone on the principo individuationis, and hence is not through and through mere phenomenon, but that it has its root in the thing-in-itself, in the will of the individual, for even his character is individual.24

Schopenhauer holds that renunciation of ego does not lead to absolute nothingness as the concept of nothingness is relative, it implies something positive. The moral action generates “inviolable confidence and serenity” that is also the innate desire of human nature instead of “restless striving”, which is subject to causal chain and lands one “from joy to sorrow”. Schopenhauer argues that the moral action is not the outcome of the earlier process – the cause-effect relationship, it implies freedom otherwise the moral like the physical “would be a mere machine”25. Morality overflows naturally from the virtuous character. The responsibility of action falls on the agent who is performing it; he cannot avoid his responsibility by putting it on God. Therefore theism and moral responsibility do not go together. Theism and the moral responsibility of man are incompatible, because responsibility always falls back upon the author of the being as the place where it has its centre of gravity. The free being must also be the original being.26

The concept of loving-kindness to all beings, and establishing a direct relationship to fellow-beings through feelings of love, compassion and pur22 23 24 25 26

Taylor 1980, p. 105 – 106. Bax 1949, p. 283. Bax 1949, p. 291. Bax 1949, p. 301. Bax 1949, p. 230.

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gation of ego is common to Schopenhauer and Viveka¯nanda. The latter is called a “vibrant humanist” who synthesizes the East and the West. His path is to enter into realm of the Spirit, where all are united. His ideal of spiritual unity is not abstract. He is deeply inspired with the mission of concretizing it on the earth, thus making contribution to the whole humanity. He highlights the significance of karma-yoga in the domain of morality – “disinterested performance of action”. At the empirical level, the individual is controlled by his psychophysical impulses, mental functions on the one hand and external forces on the other. He is simultaneously witnessing to multiple levels of being, such as body’s passions, infirmities of mind, language, intellect and accumulated creations of growing corpus of human world. The individual becomes a victim of the social milieu. He remains mired in the web of his civilization-networks and seems to circumscribe his life to externalities of culture, tradition, class, nation and the typical roles imposed through one’s station and its duties in the society. Both the internal (psycho-physical) and external forces fetter man in the bondage and make chain of causation. Clinging to one’s psycho-physical nature and the world around, covers the true nature of the soul creating the ‘veil of ma¯ya¯’. The disclosure of true nature of the soul is the emergence of freedom. The covering of soul according to Viveka¯nanda is due to the following factors: (1) ignorance (not knowing the truth), (2) disturbed state of consciousness (citta vrrtti), ˙ (3) false (ego-centric) consciousness (ahan˙ka¯ra), (4) desire for possessions (va¯sana¯). When the mind is not concentrated on the specific object but drifts away from one to the other, is called the disturbed state of consciousness. It works for getting motivations from one’s psycho-somatic identity (ego); leading to a state of ahan˙ka¯ra. Since our real being is neither mind nor body but is pure consciousness that is divine in nature, ahan˙ka¯ra is the state of falsity. The most of our works in the world are done for the satisfaction of ego not only for gross material desires but very often apparently appreciable works are also done on the initiative of this false identity (ego, ahan˙ka¯ra). Desires (va¯sana¯) are the alluring occasions, which are necessary for the existence of false-identity (ego). In fact it is the crazy race for the fulfillment of desires one after another that gives rise to false identity. To get rid of the trap of va¯sana¯, is to get rid of ego or the other way round.

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Ignorance is the centre of ahan˙ka¯ra and va¯sana¯ resulting in disturbed state of consciousness. It is because of ignorance of one’s true nature that one falls prey to ego and runs like a crazy person in the cycle of desires (va¯sana¯). Ignorance appears as idleness, lethargy, which prevents one from making efforts by weakening the will to be on the path of self-realization. When the ignorance is dispelled by religious knowledge, the above demerits get dropped by themselves. To have religious knowledge means that the individual is able to discriminate between the sensuous and the super-sensuous, empirical and transcendental, profane and sacred, darkness and illumination. It can check the undesirable impulses, worldly possessions, the narrow self-identity that lead to the disturbed state of consciousness. To be religious is to be moral and to be moral is to be inspired by religion. Religion is practiced through traversing the path of morality. Viveka¯nanda defines morality in terms of unselfishness (self-abnegation). […] self-abnegation is the centre of all morality. And what is perfect self-abnegation? It means the abnegation of this apparent self, the abnegation of all selfishness.27

To be moral is to go beyond the empirical realm. It is to break the bondages of senses and the material forces working in the world. When one makes an effort to realize this aim, one enters into the sphere of morality. […] to become unselfish […] is the foundation of morality. It is the quintessence of all ethics preached in any language, or in any religion, or by any prophet in the world. ‘Be thou unselfish’ ‘Not I, but thou’[…] this is the recognition of non-individuality–that you are a part of me, and I of you; the recognition, that in hurting you I hurt myself , and in helping you, I help myself […].28

For him, it is “the infinite oneness of the Soul”, which is the “eternal sanction of all morality”. At the materialistic plane, there is a mad craze for the fulfillment of selfish interests at all cost even by roughing other beings. The result is immoral actions giving rise to vices like hatred, jealousy and violent struggle. The materialistic pursuits revolve around the ‘I’. When the center is ‘I’, it is called pravrtti, the other is only a ˙˙ ka¯ra and mamata¯) are means to serve my ends. ‘Me’ and ‘mine’ (ahan the sources of all evils.

27 Viveka¯nanda 2001, p. 26. 28 Viveka¯nanda 2001, p. 22 – 23.

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Pravrtti, which means revolving towards […] is what we call the world, the ˙ ‘mine’; it includes all those things which are always enriching that ‘I’ and ‘me’ by wealth and money and power and name and fame […] always tending to accumulate everything in one centre, that centre being ‘myself ’ […] the natural tendency of every human being, taking everything from everywhere and heaping it around one centre.29

In the realm of morality, the centre is ‘thou’, which Viveka¯nanda calls as nivrtti – revolving away. It is to rise above the narrowness of ‘me and ˙ mine’. pravrtti stands for ‘evil work’ whereas nivrtti stands for good ˙ ˙ work.30 nivrtti is the basis of morality, which leads to self-abnegation – to sac˙ selfish interests for the sake of the other. The aim of religion is rifice one’s the realisation of freedom that is attained through morality, which follows the path of nivrtti. The latter leads to selfless actions in search of intrinsic ˙ values. Love, charity, endurance, self-sacrifice, non-injury, fellow-feeling, sympathy, treating others as end-in-themselves are the moral values to be practiced. Morality consists of ‘do this’ and ‘do not this’ – positive and negative elements. ‘Do not this’ puts a check on the desires, which enslave the individual and ‘do this’ shows the way to freedom. Through purging one’s narrow ego, morality gives birth to the infinite expansion of one’s self that embraces the entire mankind. This is universal ethics that is culture-free and is to be distinguished from conventional morality. The different societies practice different moral codes. Despite the diversities and variation in moral codes, we should see what is universal in ethics. When one sees a man doing good work, helping others, it means that he cannot be confined within the limited circle of ‘me and mine’. There is no limit to, this getting out of selfishness. All the great systems of ethics preach absolute unselfishness as the goal.31

Unselfishness is the manifestation of power, which produces tremendous self-restraint. Religion for Viveka¯nanda is the groundwork of morality. If morality has a spark of divinity within it, there is spontaneous emergence of moral actions. If the inner being of the individual is transformed, one cannot help being a moral person. To be religious is to have faith in oneself. If one has faith in oneself, the gap between theory and praxis breaks down. In that case, there is no room for moral-weakness. With religious faith comes the “ocean of infinite power and blessedness”. It leads to 29 Sambuddananda 1963, p. 222. 30 Ranganathananda 2000, p. 50. 31 Ranganathananda 2000, p. 11.

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dropping away the veils on the soul and the real nature of man gets manifested. One is able to discriminate between right and wrong, truth and falsity. The ocean of love emerges and hatred vanishes. Love for yourselves means love for all, “for you and all are one”. This thought for Viveka¯nanda is the foundation of ethics. He holds that love is truth and unity is the test of truth. Hatred on the contrary, is false because it brings multiplicity with disintegration. Love establishes oneness with all other beings bringing harmony in the universe. Love is truth, and hatred is false, because hatred makes for multiplicity. It is hatred that separates man from man; therefore it is wrong and false. It is disintegrating power, it separates and destroys. Love binds, love makes for that oneness.32

Viveka¯nanda does not go for any supra-historical spiritual realization. The ordinary Sannyasin gives up the world, goes out, and thinks of God. The real Sannyasin lives in the world, but is not of it […] Live in the midst of the battle of life. Anyone can keep calm in a case or when asleep. Stand in the whirl and madness of action and reach the Centre. If you have found the Centre, you cannot be moved.33 Religion is realization; not talk, nor doctrine, nor theories, however beautiful they may be. It is being and becoming, not hearing or acknowledging. It is the whole soul’s becoming changed into what it believes. That is religion.34

Viveka¯nanda comes close to Sokratic way of thinking – “know thyself ” and “knowledge is virtue”. For Sokrates, knowing something means doing it, thus bridging the gap between theory and praxis, fusing “the givenness” of the world and its content as well as embodying ought in existential praxis. Religious knowledge is not a set of assertions about the objects. It rather knows how to generate meaning and sense of our presence in the world. The world is a grand moral gymnasium wherein we have all to take exercise so as to become stronger and stronger spiritually […] the calmer we are and less disturbed our nerves, the more shall we love and the better will our work be.35

32 33 34 35

Viveka¯nanda Viveka¯nanda Viveka¯nanda Viveka¯nanda

2001, 2001, 1972, 2001,

p. 73. p. 40. p. 41 – 42. p. 32.

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This self-control will tend to produce a mighty will, a character which makes a Christ or a Buddha.36 It is usually said that Schopenhauer’s ethics produces negativism as it is denying the will-to-live, which leads to the denial of the world through asceticism. In fact both Schopenhauer and Viveka¯nanda hold that asceticism does not mean denial of the world but it is the denial of egoism, which runs after materialistic pleasures that ultimately land the individual to miseries and frustrations because these pleasures are short-lived. Both of them aspire for lasting peace for both oneself and others and that is possible through serving others through love and compassion, which leads to a tranquilized state of mind that blesses both the giver and receiver. It is in a way more fruitful way of living in the world with the glow of humanism. Usually the concept of humanism is viewed in terms of insurance of justice and human rights. The external methods are employed to check their violations. However, these are only transitory solutions. The emphasis of Schopenhauer and Viveka¯nanda is on the virtuous character and not on a rational framework of rules, duties and obligations. It is the virtuous character that leads to the praxis of intrinsic values. The manifestation of divinity in praxis brings peace with one’s own self as well as with the whole universe resolving all the complexities of life. No doubt, Viveka¯nanda emphasizes the significance of religion as the foundation of morality and Schopenhauer’s interpretation of morality is viewed as secular, but both of them reject dogmatic morality and ritualistic forms of religion. Religion for Viveka¯nanda as analyzed earlier is realization and its realization is through moral praxis. However, Viveka¯nanda suggests the path of four yogas to overcome egoism and realize one’s real self: (1) ra¯ja-yoga: control over body-mind complex (yoga citta vrtti-nirodha) ˙ dharana, through eightfold path of ya¯ma, niya¯ma, a¯sana, pra¯na¯ya¯ma, ˙ ˙ dhya¯na, sama¯dhi, (2) karman-yoga: purification through actions without being influenced by the results, (3) jÇa¯na-yoga: path of knowledge through discriminating real from unreal, hearing the truth, reflecting on it and realizing it, (4) bhakti-yoga: developing emotional relationship with the Divine through love and devotion. 36 Viveka¯nanda 2001, p. 65.

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One may follow any of the above yogas depending upon one’s temperament or combine all of these. But such specific path has not been shown by Schopenhauer. The latter does not presuppose any transcendent reality as God. Nevertheless, both of them hold that moral action generates tranquil state of mind – “benevolence and a disposition to help all men, and at the same time a cheerful, confident and tranquil frame of mind”.37 Tranquility and inner stability are the characteristics features of spirituality. In the moral domain, good actions are performed but when these actions produce tranquility and equanimity, morality comes closer to spirituality. One can never be at tranquilized state of mind at the level of egoism. From the above discussion, it emerges that both Schopenhauer and Viveka¯nanda are for embracing universal humanity. The moral praxis through self-abnegation and non-dualism propounded by both would enlighten the mankind with the spark of spirituality, setting aside all the exclusions and divisions of class, race, sex, culture and nation. They extend the meaning of morality even to non-human beings of the universe, making room for the environmental ethics. The above perspectives are very much needed in the present crisis. References Bax, Belfort/Saunders, Baily (1949): Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. New York: Tuder. Fox, Michael (Ed.) (1980): Schopenhauer. His Philosophical Achievement. Sussex: Harvester Press. Ranganathananda, Swami (2000): Swami Viveka¯nanda, His Humanism. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama. Sambuddananda, Swami (1963): Parliament of Religions (1963 – 64). Calcutta: Swami Viveka¯nanda Century. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1897): On Human Nature. Transl. by T. B. Saunders. London: Swan Sonnenschein. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1948): The World as Will and Idea. Vol. I-III. Transl. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Taylor, Richard (1980): “On the Basis of Morality”. In: Michael Fox (Ed.) Schopenhauer. His Philosophical Achievement. Sussex: Harvester Press. Viveka¯nanda, Swami (1972): What Religion is. Kolkatta: Advaita Ashrama. Viveka¯nanda, Swami (2001): Universal Ethics and Moral Conduct. Kolkatta: Advaita Ashrama. 37 ON, p. 99.

Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein and Indian Philosophy: Some Forgotten Linkages Ramesh Chandra Pradhan In this paper I will focus on some of the linkages between Arthur Schopenhauer and Ludwig Wittgenstein on the one hand, and Indian philosophy on the other, so as to bring to light some seminal ideas which bring Eastern and Western thought together. Schopenhauer is remembered as one of the bridge-builders between the East and the West because he has brought some of the Western ideas very close to the Eastern philosophical ideas and attempted at a synthesis of both these ideas. Wittgenstein, who was very much influenced by Schopenhauer, has made some of the Indian philosophical ideas very deeply relevant to his own philosophical thinking. I will attempt to show that some very important Indian philosophical ideas like suffering (duhkha), liberation (moksa), the distinction between ˙ ˙ sa¯˙ra) and the transcendent ephemeral world (sam reality (brahman) have been echoed in the thoughts of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. Some of these thoughts have a perennial appeal so far as human thought and life are concerned. Hence they deserve our close attention. (I) Schopenhauer: Building Bridges between the West and the East Any student of the philosophy of Schopenhauer cannot miss the fact that Schopenhauer was deeply interested in the Indian philosophical systems, especially in Veda¯nta and Buddhism. He was not only greatly inspired by the Upanisadic thought1 in general, but also by the Buddhist ideas which trace their˙ origin to the life and thought of the Buddha. It is no wonder that a great confluence of ideas of the West and the East took place in Schopenhauer’s thought. In fact, Schopenhauer could be taken as the

1

Schopenhauer considered the Upanisads the solace of his life as he found in them ˙ the best approach to life and the world.

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builder of the bridge between the East and the West much before the age of globalization of thought could begin. Schopenhauer is deeply rooted in the European, especially the Platonic-Kantian rationalist tradition which had its origin in the Greek thought.2 In spite of that he rebelled against this tradition because it neglected the place of the will in the world and human life. The over-emphasis on reason had led to the rise of the Hegelian Idealism which Schopenhauer detested very much. Therefore he reached back to the sources of anti-reason within his own tradition, especially the tradition which can be traced back to Heraclitus’s philosophy of the flux and other little known traditions emphasizing the will and human life and action. However, he discovered a strand of this thought in Immanuel Kant who makes room for the moral will of man within the rationalist tradition. Kant’s idea of a thing-in-itself 3 had a great liberating effect on Schopenhauer because it opened the possibility of a non-rationalist philosophy of life and will. It is, however, the influence of Indian philosophy which gave the much needed impetus to Schopenhauer to unravel the mystery of the thing-in-itself in the form of a will as the universal consciousness. The idealistic thrust in his philosophy was strengthened by the Veda¯ntic idea of the ‘Self ’ or brahman as the ‘Ultimate Principle’ underlying all existence. This brought him to the discovery of the ‘Universal Will’4 as the consciousness-force which is the ‘Ultimate Principle’ of every form of existence, animate and inanimate. Thus Schopenhauer turns towards the Upanisadic idea of brahman or the ‘Universal Consciousness’ for ex˙ nature of the world as a form of the ‘Universal Will’.5 plaining the The system of philosophy which Schopenhauer builds is a convergence of two apparently opposite traditions, viz. the reason-based metaphysics of the world and the will-based metaphysics of man. While the one brings back the Platonic idea of the Forms to the centre of the explanation of the world, the other takes us back to the consciousness as the source of the worldly phenomena. It is the latter metaphysics which coincides with the Indian metaphysics of brahman. For Schopenhauer it is the latter metaphysics which succeeds in making a harmonious blend of reason and consciousness in the metaphysics of the world and 2 3 4 5

Cf. WWR. Cf. Kant, 1929. Cf. WWR II, chap. XXXV. WWR II, chap. XXXV.

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man. Schopenhauer’s metaphysics places the world and the will in a harmonious relation. (II) The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer’s magnum opus, The World as Will and Representation brings out the structure of his metaphysics of the will and the world in such a way that it shows that it is the will that is the source of the world. The unity of that will here allude to, which lies beyond the phenomenon, and in which we have recognized the inner being of the phenomenal world, is a metaphysical unity. Consequently, knowledge of it is transcendent; that is to say, it does not rest on the functions of our intellect, and is therefore not to be really grasped with them.6

Thus we are presented with metaphysics of the will that is transcendent to our intellectual knowledge and is available only to our inmost self-consciousness. It is the will-to-live which is the ‘Ultimate Principle’ of all existence, i. e. the source of all phenomena. Therefore in such phenomena it becomes evident that I have rightly declared the will-to-live to be that which is incapable of further explanation, but is the basis of every explanation; and that, far from being an empty-sounding word, like the absolute, the infinite, the idea and other similar expressions, it is the most real thing we know, in fact the kernel of reality itself.7

Thereby Schopenhauer shows that nothing can explain the will itself as it is the basis of every explanation. Thereby he also confirms that nothing could be more primordial ontologically than the will itself. In this sense, will is the ultimate metaphysical reality. It follows further that metaphysics is no more dependent on what we can know by our reason but on what we are self-consciously aware in our innermost being. Our own existence is itself a manifestation of the ‘Universal Will’ and therefore there is no reason to hold that the will is far away from our consciousness. It is thus through self-consciousness that we can have access to the will in us as well as in the universe. The world as representation is always dependent on our reason because this world is accessible to our categories, i. e. the principle of sufficient reason.

6 7

WWR II, p. 323. WWR II, p. 351.

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The metaphysical duality between the noumenal world or the thingin-itself and the phenomenal world which is a Kantian legacy becomes a distinction between the world as will and the world as representation in Schopenhauer. It is in fact the ontological duality between the underlying will-to-live and the phenomenal plurality of individual objects and beings. Everyone knows only one being quite immediately, namely his own will in self-consciousness. He knows everything else only mediately, and then judges it by analogy with that one being; according to the degree of his power of reflection, this analogy is carried further. Even this springs ultimately and fundamentally from the fact that there is really only one being; the illusion of plurality [ma¯ya¯ – R.Ch.P.], resulting from the forms of external, objective apprehension, could not penetrate right into the inner, simple consciousness; hence this always meets with only one being.8

Here Schopenhauer amalgamates the Kantian idea of the phenomenal world with the Veda¯ntic notion of ma¯ya¯ to suggest that the phenomenal world is itself a reality secondary to the primary reality of the will. The phenomenal world is in space and time and is shaped by the categories of the intellect, while the will, the thing-in-itself, is beyond space and time and the categories of the intellect. (III) Human Existence and the Wheel of Time: Reflections on Eternity and Ephemerality Schopenhauer pursues the Veda¯ntic notion of the wheel of time9 in characterizing the spatio-temporal world. The phenomenal world is not only a representation of our intellect in terms of its categories but is inherently an unstable and changing universe in comparison to the eternal reality called the will. The universe in space and time is verily a world of illusions or ma¯ya¯ because it does not promise any timeless existence of its own. In the Advaita-Veda¯nta, this world is called the illusory world superimposed on the eternal reality called brahman. 10 Schopenhauer makes use of the Veda¯ntic concept of ma¯ya¯ to suggest that the world we live in from

8 WWR II. p. 321. 9 In the Veda¯ntic literature, the world is represented by the metaphor of the wheel ˙ sa¯racakra. of time. This is also called the sam 10 Cf. Brahmsu¯trabha¯sya I.1. ˙

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birth to death is a world of illusory pursuits of desire and the resulting suffering. Schopenhauer is concerned with the ontology of human existence in view of his overall metaphysics of will. His ontology of the human existence consists in his idea that man as an individual being leads a very precarious life because of the ephemerality and transitoriness of the human life. This fear of time and its passing nature threatens human beings with their own end or annihilation. This sense of existential annihilation in death makes man rise above his own existential condition. It is true that eternity is a concept having no perception as its basis; for this reason, it is also of merely negative content, and thus implies a timeless existence. Time, however, is a mere image of eternity. […] and in just the same way, our temporal existence is the mere image of our true inner being. This must lie in eternity, just because time is only the form of our knowing; by virtue of this form alone we know our own existence and that of all things as transitory, finite, and subject to annihilation.11

Time thus symbolizes death and annihilation because of the fact that the temporal existence remains shrouded in the anticipation of death. ˙ sa¯ra or the Schopenhauer relates this to the Veda¯ntic notion of sam ephemeral existence of the world in time. However, Schopenhauer, like the Veda¯ntin, does not think that death is the end of life and the world, because there is a higher, transcendent world of the will beyond the temporal world. It is this eternal reality which promises the timeless existence beyond the present world of space and time. The deep conviction of the impossibility of our extermination by death, which, as the inevitable qualms of conscience at the approach of death also testify, everyone carries at the bottom of his heart, depends entirely on the consciousness of our original and eternal nature […].12

The idea of the immortality of the soul which is the mainstay of Veda¯ntic philosophy is ingrained in Schopenhauer’s doctrine of human life because there is an affirmation of the immortal will in his philosophy. Above and beyond the ‘Individual Will’ and self lies the ‘Universal Will’ or self which has a deathless existence on a timeless plane. Schopenhauer is inclined to believe that unless one realizes the transcendent reality beyond the temporal world, there can be no salvation from the misery of life. The fact that human life is full of misery cannot 11 WWR II, p. 484. 12 WWR II, p. 487.

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be denied because of the ‘Individual Will’s’ incessant clinging to desires. Thus Schopenhauer pessimistically observes: Everything in life proclaims that earthly happiness is destined to be frustrated, or recognized as an illusion. The grounds for this lie deep in the very nature of things. Accordingly, the lives of most people prove troubled and short […] Life presents itself as a continual deception, in small matters as well as in great.13

That is, the worldly life is bound to be the seat of suffering because of its inherent bondage to desires, so that “the world on all sides is bankrupt, and that life is a business that does not cover the costs; so that our will may turn away from it.”14 Schopenhauer’s pessimism, however, is countered by his own admission of a higher life that follows the denial of the ‘Individual Will’ itself. The ascetic denial of the pleasures of life and the desires thereof promise a state of being that is free from suffering. This state of freedom from suffering is called moksa in Veda¯nta and nir˙ va¯na in Buddhism. Schopenhauer appreciates the significance of the ˙ Buddhist-Veda¯ntic idea of salvation as a way out of the worldly life of suffering. He believes that looking beyond the miseries of human existence is a great philosophical need and in this lays the very necessity of the effort of philosophical contemplation on the conditions of the human existence. Like the Indian thinkers, Schopenhauer agrees that there is a better life than the present one when we transcend our limited life, i. e. deny the will that pushes us into the vortex of desires. Therefore the great fundamental truth contained in Christianity as well as in Brahmanism and Buddhism , the need for salvation from an existence given up to suffering and death, and its attainability through the denial of the will, hence by a decided opposition to nature, is beyond all comparison the most important truth there can be.15

This conception of salvation is the evidence of Schopenhauer’s appreciation of the Indian thinkers’ basic concern in philosophy to transcend the present state of life through the practice of spiritual contemplation. What he calls the denial of the will is the perfect counterpart of the Veda¯nticBuddhistic conception of the moksa or nirva¯na. It is on this point that the ˙ ˙ Christian morality meets with that of the Veda¯ntins and the Buddhists.16 13 14 15 16

WWR II, p. 573. WWR II, p. 574. WWR II, p. 628. Cf. WWR II, p. 633.

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(IV) Wittgenstein’s Schopenhauerian Legacy: Primacy of the Transcendental Will Wittgenstein’s early philosophy bears the mark of Schopenhauer’s influence in its metaphysical conception of the self and world. Wittgenstein appropriates the Schopenhauerian suggestion that the world and the will are independent of each other, since the world is the idea which is represented through language. It is this world that is contingent as it consists of facts which are themselves contingent. But the will is transcendental as it is not in the world, that is, it is not a part of the facts which constitute the world. The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists. If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the I and which is the bearer of ethics.17 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.18 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?19

Wittgenstein is determined to show that the transcendental self or the willing subject is the limit of the world and not a part of it. It is because he, like Schopenhauer, holds that the spatio-temporal world is transitory and ephemeral and hence the metaphysical will which is eternal cannot part of such a world. Wittgenstein’s metaphysics of the will is reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics precisely on the point that there is a transcendental self outside the realm of the temporal world and that we need to take the transcendental self as the “limit” of the world in the sense that it is the presupposition of the world rather than a part of it. Self is the center of the world in the metaphysical sense. Wittgenstein goes to the extent of claiming that “I am my world (the microcosm)”20 which means that “the world is my world.”21 At the transcendental level the world is identical with the metaphysical self. This self is the same as Schopenhauer’s ‘world as will’ making it clear that there is no metaphysical difference between the subject and object, and between the self and the world in the ultimate sense. 17 18 19 20 21

Wittgenstein Wittgenstein Wittgenstein Wittgenstein Wittgenstein

1979, 1961, 1961, 1961, 1961,

p. 80. 5.632. 5.633. 5.63. 5.641.

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This highly idealistic thrust of both Schopenhauer’s and Wittgenstein’s metaphysics bears the mark of the Veda¯ntic metaphysics22 of the identity between the self (a¯tman) and the world in the sense that the world itself is a projection of the conscious self which is the ultimate reality. The world is the phenomenal world given to our understanding, but in reality it is consciousness itself. Schopenhauer builds his metaphysics of the ‘world as will’ on the ground that the world in itself is a manifestation of the will. Similarly, Wittgenstein considers the world as non-different from the self or ‘I’ because, except in appearance, it is essentially the self or will or a¯tman. Given the above framework, one cannot miss the fact that both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein take a pessimistic stand regarding the phenomenal world which is the source of misery. For both, this world does not satisfy the spiritual aspirations of man unless it is overcome by the denial of the world or by the delimitation of the world: The world beyond signals, the possibility of a higher life which is the basic thrust of metaphysics and morality. How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of the world through the life of knowledge? The good conscience is the happiness that the life of knowledge preserves. The life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of the world. The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of the world. To it the amenities of the world are so many graces of fate.23

This shows that nothing in the world can ameliorate the miseries of life, except the denial of the world and one’s own desires. This is the same as Schopenhauer’s call for the ascetic denial of the individual self or the will for the salvation of our life. Wittgenstein’s ascetic approach to the world is evident in his refusal to accept the world of facts as final and his wish to lay down the limits of the world through the limits of language.24 Both Veda¯nta and Buddhism have declared the worldly life as the source of misery and suffering. This idea is rooted in the Indian psyche of accepting a higher life at the limit of this world. That is why there is a long history of the Vedic thinkers searching for the proverbial escape 22 Cf. Brahmsu¯trabha¯sya I.1. 23 Wittgenstein 1979,˙ p. 81. 24 Cf. Wittgenstein 1961, 5.6, 5.62.

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from the world of space and time which is taken as ma¯ya¯. The realization of the higher self is the motto of the most Indian schools of thought. This reverberates through the Indian writings on philosophy throughout all ages. Schopenhauer is in perfect sympathy with this approach to life and world. What gives our life its strange and ambiguous character is that in it two fundamental purposes, diametrically opposed, are constantly crossing each other. One purpose is that of the individual will, directed to chimerical happenings in an ephemeral, dreamlike, and deceptive existence, where, as regards the past, happiness and unhappiness are a matter of indifference, but at every moment the present is becoming the past. The other purpose is that of fate, directed obviously enough to the destruction of our happiness and thus to the mortification of our will, and to the elimination of the delusion that holds us chained to the bonds of this world.25

This truly captures the Veda¯ntic message codified in the age-old perennial philosophy of the Upanisads. ˙ (V) Metaphysics, Morality and the Doctrine of Salvation Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein come closer to Indian thought on the issues of metaphysics, morality and the doctrine of salvation because of their philosophical conviction that the meaning of human life is to be thoroughly investigated by anyone taking philosophy seriously. Indian thought in general has a tendency to accord the highest place to metaphysics and ethics as it is concerned with the meaning of life in the ultimate sense of the term. Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein have made metaphysics and ethics the mainstay of their philosophical enterprise. For Schopenhauer, it is metaphysics which unravels the mystery of the existence of the universe and of man because through the metaphysical inquiry alone can we reach the fundamentals of our own destiny and the destiny of the universe. By metaphysics, I understand all so-called knowledge that goes beyond he possibility of experience, and so beyond nature or the given phenomenal appearance of things, in order to give information about that by which, in some sense or other, this experience or nature is conditioned, or in popular language, about that which is hidden behind nature, and renders nature possible.26 25 WWR II, pp. 638 – 639. 26 WWR II, p. 164.

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Thus metaphysics goes beyond the phenomenal world to find out that which conditions the latter. For Schopenhauer, the will is the transcendental reality that makes nature or the world possible. Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will is the foundation of his ethics of the denial of the individual will for the sake of the possibility of moral life. Moral life is contingent on the possibility of denying the will and transcending the worldly desires. This denial of the ego leads to the identification with all beings and thus to the ideals of sympathy, compassion and fellow-feeling. Morality arises from the death of the individual ego and the rise of the higher self as identical with all beings. In consequence of this egoism, the most fundamental of all our errors is that, with reference to one another, we are not-I. On the other hand, to be just, noble, and benevolent is nothing but to translate my metaphysics into actions […] All genuine virtue proceeds from the immediate and intuitive knowledge of the metaphysical identity of all beings […].27

Thus metaphysics and ethics are bound together in giving the supreme significance to the virtues of compassion and sympathy to all beings. Schopenhauer builds up his metaphysical and moral system on the foundations of the identity of all beings, a doctrine much emphasized in the Veda¯ntic philosophy (tat tvam asi).28 The metaphysics of identity of all beings runs through the writings of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein because both believe that the will-to-live which is the essence of all beings is found not only in the human beings but also in animals and plants such that all beings belonging to the world of life have the same will manifest in them. This parallelism, then, really exists between my spirit, i. e., the spirit, and the world. Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is your spirit. For it is only from yourself that you are acquainted with the spirit at all. Now of course the question is why I have given a snake just this spirit. And the answer to this can only lie in the psycho-physical parallelism: If I were to look like the snake and to do what it does than I should be-suchand-such. The same with the elephant, with the fly, with the wasp. [….] Is this the solution of the puzzle why men have always believed that there was one spirit common to the whole world?

27 WWR II, p. 600 et. seq. 28 WWR II, p. 600.

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In that case it would , of course, also be common to lifeless things too.29

Wittgenstein echoes Schopenhauer further when he says: And in this sense I can also speak of a will that is common to the whole world. But this will is in a higher sense my will. As my idea is the world, in the same way my is the world-will.30

The idea of a world-will is the idea of the metaphysical substratum of all existence, animate and inanimate, because under this unifying principle alone can we explain how the world-as-idea can be made intelligible. Schopenhauer continued to believe that only through the will can we make sense of what is phenomenally given to the human intellect. The intellect itself is a powerful tool of the will to make the world a manifestation of the will. It is Veda¯nta which throws the maximum light on the metaphysics of will of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein because the former adheres to the doctrine of the identity of all beings as a¯tman. The Veda¯ntic way of thinking makes it clear that all that exists is a form of a¯tman, i. e. the spirit and is such that by knowing this spirit we can know everything.31 Such being the metaphysical assumption, it follows logically that there is nothing that is not a manifestation of the spirit. The monistic theory of a¯tman is the source of the metaphysics of the will in Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. So far as the ethics of salvation or liberation is concerned, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein are under the influence of both Veda¯nta and Buddhism because the latter espouse the idea that renunciation alone is the way to liberation from the worldly bondage. Renunciation is the renunciation not of the world as such, or of the worldly life, but of the desires that bind us to the world. Schopenhauer calls this the denial of the will-to-live that brings miseries into life. This in no way can be called pessimism or nihilism in Schopenhauer because he promises a life of peace and freedom in the state of salvation. Wittgenstein’s account of salvation is more Veda¯ntic in the sense that we can attain liberation only through knowledge of the higher kind. For him, “the life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of the world. The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the 29 Wittgenstein 1979, p. 85. 30 Wittgenstein 1979, p. 85. 31 Cf. Mundakakopanisad I.1.3. ˙˙ ˙

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amenities of the world.”32 In this there is no pessimistic tone at all; it looks forward to a happy life which renounces the amenities of the world but does not deny life itself. The Veda¯ntic salvation or moksa ˙ like the Buddhist nirva¯na is not a state of non-existence nor is it a case ˙ of utter denial of the world. It only hints at a higher level of existence free from desires, and the individual ego. This is reflected in the philosophy of life in Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. (VI) Conclusion The missing links between Indian philosophy, on the one hand, and the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, on the other, lie in the underlying philosophy of life which has remained unearthed so far. It is by looking into the fundamentals of life that we can recognize the meeting points on which the Western thinking on life and world and the Indian thinking agree. The most important meeting point is the one just discussed above, namely how life can be meaningful in spite of the miseries of the world. References Bodhasarananda, Swami (2008): “Mundakaka Upanisad”. In: Bodhasarananda, ˙ ˙ 16th ed. Kolkata: ˙ Swami: Eight Upanisads. Vol. II. Advaita Ashrama, ˙ p. 71 – 166. Gambhı¯ra¯nanda, Swa¯mı¯ (Transl.) (1993): Brahmsu¯trabha¯sya of S´¯ı S´an˙kara¯ca¯rya. ˙ Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama. Kant, Immanuel (1929): The Critique of Pure Reason. Transl. by N. K. Smith. London: Macmillan. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1958): The World as Will and Representation. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J Payne. New York: Dover Publications. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Transl. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979): Notebooks 1914 – 1916. 2nd Ed. Transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

32 Wittgenstein 1979, p. 81.

(IV) Literature

Schopenhauer and Tagore on the Key to Dreamland Sitansu Ray (I) Introduction Whenever I sing or hear my favorite Tagore song1 Swapan-parer dak shunechhi / jege tai to bhabi / Keu kakhono khnuje ki pay / swapnaloker chabi 2 it instantly reminds me that it is Arthur Schopenhauer who had traced out the key to dreamland by virtue of his penetrating ‘will’, the core reality, incorporating human brain, including the nervous system and its ganglionic sites, sometimes working as ‘deputy’ of the brain. The cardio-vascular system is also connected with dreaming. Even, the digestive system also has something to do with the dream phenomenon.

1

2

The whole discourse is arranged more as a lecture style to be addressed on the floor than as a paper style to be read. Some quotations are given in original Bengali with a view to retaining their original genius. Of course, meanings are given immediately in English. “I have heard the call of dreamland; while awake, I ponder whether anybody can find out the key to dreamland.” Swapan-Parer (Dreamland). Bangladesh Rabindra Sangeet, also known as Tagore Songs, are songs written and composed by Rabı¯ndrana¯th Tagore. It is a distinctive genre in the music of Bengal and popular in India. Rabindra Sangeet used Indian classical music and traditional folk music as sources. Tagore wrote some 2,230 songs. The collection of these songs is sometimes known as the Gitabitan (Garden of Songs). The four major parts of this book are Puja (Worship), Prem (Love), Prakriti (Nature) and Bichitra (Diverse). Quotations from Tagore poems and songs are given in original Bengali in order to recite/ sing them as illustrations of the discussions on dream. Of course overall meanings or translations (in English) are given. Thanks to Dr. Saswat Bhattacharya, English department, Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi who helped in transcription of the Bengali poem of Sitansu Ray’s paper.

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(II) Physiological Base of Dreaming Yes, the philosopher Schopenhauer has thorough knowledge of human physiology especially phrenology and we come to learn from his discourse on dream that it is both physiological and metaphysical at the same time. We may attribute dreaming as something paranormal or rather supernatural yet, it is a felt reality, but within our brain only, that is, without any outer embodiment. How is it? We see something of someone without any help of our retina; we hear some sound without any help of our eardrum. Let the slumber’s chain bind you; let the normal works of your senses be stopped. Then and then only the intuitive perception of the brain from within may start. That is dream. Sleep is a pre-condition of dream. The untiring heart constantly agitates the brain, the ‘efflorescence’ of the organism. (III) Difference between Imagination and Dream It is a misconception that imagination or thought-play is equal to dream. Schopenhauer asserts that the ‘graphic’ and ‘palpable’ reality of dream is far more powerful than imagination. Imageries out of imagination are products of association of ideas or our cherished motives, whereas imageries of dream are ‘foreign and extraneous’ in nature and force themselves on us without our intervention and very often against our will. The events of dream, stamped with temporal objectivity, significant or obscurely insignificant, may come to us quite unexpectedly. Of course, imagination may be available during dream also, but it is never an agent of the dream phenomenon. During conscious imagination, we are nominative as we imagine something. But, while we dream, the dream takes place, as it were, and we as the dreamers are passive spectators only. During dream our memory does not work at all. We see dead persons as still living. We quite forget that they are no more. We forget our present days and find ourselves in our earlier circumstances surrounded with our bygone associates. Sometimes absurd things appear to us as normal until we wake up.

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(IV) Dreaming and ‘Spirit Seeing’ On the whole, the dream apparitions are strange and sometimes even ghostly owing to the reason that our reasoning faculty is shunned and our faculty of recollection becomes inactive during sleep and dream. Actually, Schopenhauer counts ghost seeing or spirit seeing and dreaming in the same category of our cerebral function. The only difference is that spirit seeing may occurs during our waking state also but dreaming occurs only when we are asleep.3 However, ‘spirit seeing’ and day time trance occur when the intensity of our wakefulness is somehow lowered owing to unmindfulness of serious absorption in any kind of thought. (V) Cerebral Efflorescence from within Sleep causes cessation of external stimulation. During sleep the normal activity of our brain and senses is at nest. Dream can occur then only. Schopenhauer draws an analogy that the pictures of the magic lantern can appear only after the lamps of the hall are extinguished. During our unconscious state of sleep our brain can receive only physiological excitation from within our organism. The external impressions cease to operate. The conscious association of ideas also gradually ceases in the interior of our sensorium as we fall asleep. But the feeble impressions of the sensorium staring up from the inner nerve centre or ganglia and are faintly communicated to the efflorescent brain. Side by side, the inner sense of pulsation, throb of arteries, and sound of the heart-beat are also communicated to our brain-cells. To elucidate this kind of automatic process, Schopenhauer draws some different analogies. A burning candle does not shine only after sunset, when the atmosphere is cast with darkness. The murmuring of a rivulet, inaudible during daytime noise, can be listened to at night. The music lover Schopenhauer does not fail to draw an appropriate analogy of on timed harp. Its strings mildly re-echo strange tones even when it is kept still and not touched at all for playing. The sympathetically tuned strings of a harp are as if like our sensitive nerves. The re-echoing subtle tones are hardly heard when the harp is fully played. Similarly, cerebral impressions, too feeble to stir the alert and active brain, can induce faint stirring of its individual parts, when the brain 3

Unless, it is day dreaming or trance, like that of the opium eater Krishnakanta in Bankimchandra’s novel Krishnakanta Will.

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is at rest. The parts of the brain connected with the whole nervous system have a little power of representation by virtue of which feeble impressions seem to be vividly projected during dream or trance or spirit seeing though for a moment or a few. Apparently vivid pictures may sometimes be strange, abnormal, half-normal, super natural or marvelous according to the nature of the internal impressions. Schopenhauer compares these out of sort pictures with the ‘wild ravings’ of a ‘mentally deranged’ person. He considers madness as a prolonged kind of dream and conversely a dream as a kind of temporary madness. (VI) Kshudhita Pashan (The Hungry Stone) The most suitable illustration of this assertion can be found in Rabı¯ndrana¯th Tagore’s story Kshudhita Pashan where the young romantic officer dreams vividly of bygone royal amorousness and wakes up at the mad Meher Ali’s shout “Taphat jao, sab jhuth hai!”4 During sleep, the brain receives its nutrition. Sleep is the resting of the brain, yet it is ‘merely a relative activity’. Dream is also a certain activity of the brain but limited and partial. (VII) Sleep Waking and Sleep Walking: Manihara The dream organ, the term coined and used by Schopenhauer is peculiar in nature. There is a kind of dream, called sleep-waking (the German word being Schlafwachen),5 when we dream our surrounding reality. We see our bedroom with everything in order. We see someone entering into the room though our eyes are shut. It is as if our skull is transparent, the wall of the room is transparent. Though we are quite asleep, we dream that we are in our wakeful state. Such an example can be furnished from Tagore’s story Manihara (Parted from Mani). The forlorn husband Phanibhushan dreams of his wife Mani, returning to him and entering into his room. The story furnishes the example of a fatal somnambulism also. In search of Mani, Phanibhushan comes down from his bed. Mani’s ornamented skeleton leads him out and walks down towards the devastated river-bed. Phanibhushan 4 5

“Keep away, all are false!” Sleep waking and sleep walking (somnambulism).

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follows her. Mani’s skeleton vanishes. Phanibhushan cannot save himself from the forceful current of the river. This is an appropriate example of what Schopenhauer calls fatal somnambulistic sleep. Let me take they principles of different kinds of dream from Schopenhauer and find examples from Tagore. Otherwise Lady Macbeth’s somnambulism is a very common example. The nature and intensity of dream depends upon the dreamer’s background, mental disposition and personality. Actually, Phanibhushan is henpecked and victim of his merciless wife Mani, extremely narcissistic, selfish, should be and fond of her piles of ornaments. During her husband’s absence, she was exploited by her cousin with whom she fled away in a boat leaving no clue for tracing them out. Schopenhauer cites ample examples of different kinds of dream, second sight, nightmare, hallucination, ‘spirit seeing’ etc. from Greek, German and English works, especially from Homer, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and William Shakespeare. As the will is the source of all these and this very well is imperishable, deathless: timeless, infinite and common in every being, we have every scope of citing vital examples from Tagore for elucidating Schopenhauer as I did while elaborating on the will and the aesthetics of the art of music in our previous conferences. (VIII) Nishithe (Hallucination) Hallucinatory clairvoyance, a terrific function of the ‘dream organ’, as explained by Schopenhauer, can be best exemplified by citing Dakshinacharan’s case in Tagore’s dream story Nishithe (i. e. At the Dead of Night). “O ke, o ke, o ke go?” the painful interrogation of his dying wife pointing to Manorama, the newer consort of Dakshinacharan got imprinted and recorded in his brain-filaments. That is the sufficient reason of his tormenting nightmare after marrying Manorama. He hallucinates a sickly woman, pointing her thin forefinger towards Manorama and painfully interrogating him “O ke, o ke, o ke go?” As soon as he wakes up and lights the lamp, the supernatural figure of his first wife vanishes with a loud laughter. He blows out the lamp and tries to sleep again. But, in half sleep the rhythm of his heartbeat seems to utter the same syllables “O ke, o ke, o ke”, the clock on the shelf points its little hand towards his new bride Manorama and continuously sounds/utters “O ke, o ke, o ke go?” All the nocturnal environment seems to resound the same sound “O ke, o ke, o ke go?” through any kind of slightest resemblance,

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whether internal or external, whether heartbeat or tick of the clock. Dakshinacharan’s cerebral filaments are resonating that way. (IX) Kankal (The Skeleton) We have seen that Schopenhauer has argued that imagination and dream are two different phenomena, yet he is aware that the faculty of imagination may be active during dream also. This matter can be elucidated by Tagore’s dream story Kankal (The Skeleton). The Skeleton, hanging on the wall, resorts back to her previous youthful charm and appears by the bedside of the writer to tell her life story. She was a young widow. She fell in love with a young doctor. He also fell in love with her. But when he was going to marry another girl, she tactically mixed poison in his drink and consumed herself the rest of it. She wore the full set of bridal dress and ornaments and died with a smiling face. Now she is nothing but a skeleton, used as a tool for learning anatomy. The dream may be the imagination of a heated brain (ushna mastisker kalpana). The rapid blood-flow of the dreamer seems to be the sound of the footsteps of the charming girl. She sits very close to the bed and narrates the bygone events. (X) Permanence of the Will Apart from Schopenhauerian metaphysics of permanence of the will, time may be considered as objective and real. A man or a woman is thrown into it accidentally. So, he or she belongs to a transient or rather transitory reality. From this perspective, human life itself may be regarded as a dream and death as awakening. In other words, death is the return to our original state of which life is only ‘a brief episode’. In some of his works Schopenhauer regards human life ‘a loan received from death’, sleep as ‘the daily interest on that loan’. In some of Tagore’s congregation addresses, he asserts that during sleep our soul merges with the universal soul that is the brahman. Now, the nirguna˙ brahman, i. e., the brahman, without any attribute, may only be conceived and meditated, while the saguna-brahman, i. e., the brahman ˙ with attributes, is emanated throughout the creation, physical and metaphysical, natural and supernatural, wakeful and dreamy. As per Schopenhauer’s theorization the living phenomenon, the dreaming phenomenon

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and the ‘spirit seeing’ phenomenon can be traced back to the will, here the will-to-live, underlying all the phenomena, eminent or dominant. Schopenhauer leads his serious readers to the standpoint of the relation or rather verisimilitude between the apparent representation and the dormant will. No doubt, that verisimilar standpoint is idealistic in essence. This ideality is attached to the dream apparition, neither more nor less than to the living body, which is also subject to idealism, centered into the vibrating will-to-live. While explaining spirit apparition, Schopenhauer refers to the fact that “the difference between those who were formerly alive and those now alive is not absolute, but that are and the same will-to-live appears in both.”6 Furthermore, to quote Schopenhauer, “a living man, going back for enough might bring to light reminiscences that appear as the communications of one who is dead.”7 Tagore’s dream – narrative Kankal is the best example of this. (XI) The Supernatural Aura of the Natural From a transcendental level the natural and the supernatural cannot be fundamentally distinguished since both of them coexist and “nature herself rests on something supernatural”8. So are the very common sayings swapna haleo satyee 9 and bastab haleo swapnamoi. 10 Being charmed at the charm of Tagore’s Chitrangada, Arjum exclaims “Balo balo tumi swapan nao”.11 From his ‘standpoint of idealism’ Schopenhauer argues that “the world in the head and the world outside the head”12 together with moral freedom of knowledge from time and space lead us to realize that the empirical world is also akin to dream and must be classified with dream. Both the worlds are after all moulded in our efflorescent brain.

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

PP I, p. 309. Ibid. Ibid. p. 267. “True even if it is a dream.” “Dreamy even it is real.” Tagore, the dance drama Chitrangada. WWI II, p. 163 – 164.

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(XII) Arjun Chitrangada From this perspective let me cite once again Arjun in Chitrangada episode. Along with dreamy romance an irresistible, passionate and out bursting erotic tone is reverberated in Chitrangada’s dance song Swapna madir nesai nesa ki unmattata. 13 She feels a thunderous flow of frenzied passion throughout her body and mind, her nerves and veins. Out of frantic climax she dances an impassionate dance. Arjun wonders, “Kahare herilam, se ki satya. Se ki maya!”14 (XIII) Rabı¯ndrana¯th Tagore on the Miracle of Creation After following Schopenhauer’s philosophical discourse on dream many a psychologist, the most prominent being Sigmund Freud grows up both in academic and clinical fields.15 Tagore’s general remarks on them, without naming any one, may be quoted with a view to proceeding further in our present topic. Men of our own times have analysed the human mind, its dreams, its spiritual aspirations – most often caught unawares in the shattered state of madness, disease and desultory dreams – and have found to their satisfaction that these are composed of elemental animalistic tangled into various knots. This may be an important discovery; but what is still more important to realize is the fact that by some miracle of creation man infinitely transcends the component parts of his own character.16

Tagore asserts of human kind: “We are the music makers, we are the dreamer of dreams […] the designer of paradise.”17 (XIV) Swapna (Dream) Tagore never poses to be a dream philosopher, nor a dream psychologist. But, by virtue of his intuition he excavates the innermost zone of human mind. ‘The shattered state of madness’, ‘desultory dreams’, and ‘various 13 14 15 16 17

“What an excitement surcharged with dreamful intoxication!” “Whom do I see! Is she real or an illusion?” Freud 1990. Tagore 2000, p. 77 – 78. Ibid. p. 77.

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knots’ are obviously there in his stories, some of which are already discussed. He also shows us the brighter, happier, and fonder zones of the dreamland, wherein man is ‘The music maker’, ‘The designer of paradise’. Some of his poems and songs on dream are of this kind which may be considered as complementary to Schopenhauer’s essay on dream. Written in various phases, there are several poems under the same title Swapna (i. e. Dream). Let us first take into account the poem Swapna in Tagore’s poetical work Purabi. The poet ponders that in dream the intangible is brought into tangibility, the past into the present, the far into the vicinity, the pain of loss into the joy of gain. In a hyperbolic exclamation the poet wonders whether there is anything there than dream. The companion of the dreamland is not bonded into factuality. We can float with her in the vessel of recollection. If the whole creation is the imagination of the creator, our dreams are re-creation of ours. Dreams are greater than mere facts and figures. Dreams create Chalan chayar kuhelika,18 a novel kind of reality in our consciousness. The poem is written on October 20, 1924, while the poet is on board of the ship called Andes, anchored at the port of Lisbon. Listen to some times in original: Ki jani go hoyto bujhi / Tomar majhe kebol khnuji / Ei janomer ruper tale / Ar janomer bharer smriti / Hoyto heri tomay chokhe / Adi yuger indraloke / Shishu chander path-bholano parijater chhayabeethi! […] Parash tomay chhariye kaya baje maya beenar tare / Ami boli swapna jaha tar cheye ki satya achhe? / Je-tumi mor durer manush sei tumi mor kachher kachhe! / Chitte tomar murti diye bhabsagarer khyeyay chari, / Bidhir moner kalpanare apan mone notun gori! / Nitya praner satya tai, / Pran niye tui rochis jare, / – aseem pather pathya tai!19

So, in full confidence we may assume, what is thing-in-itself or essence in Kantian term, the will in Schopenhauerian term, is in Tagorean term the truth of the eternal life. The poem Swapna of the poetical work Kalpana is a beautiful dreamy journey to the bygone golden age of Ka¯lida¯sa (5th century) or, reversely it may be taken as a dreamy revival of the bygone days. After centuries of reparation the lover and the lady-love are again in close union in dream in the palace of Ujjayini by the riverside of S´ipra¯. Her hands take shelter in his. Her face drops on his chest. Their breaths share reciprocal aromatic pleasure from each other. She wears kundaka¯li (the buds of kunda-flower) ˙˙ ˙˙ 18 “The misty shade of Lisbon-Listen.” 19 Tagore 1961, vol. II, p. 666 – 667.

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as her ear ring. She applies lodhrarenu (pollen of lodhra) on her face. She has attached a kurubak-flower in her hair. A lotus is in her hand as the fashion of feminine playfulness. When they are in close union, darkness overcasts the sky of Ujjayini, the chamber lamp is extinguished and the bell of arati becomes silent at the temple of S´iva. Being a voracious reader of Ka¯lida¯sa’s works, Tagore cherishes nostalgia for the romantic atmosphere of Ka¯lida¯sa’s plots and characters. The dream is in connection with this nostalgia. Quite a different poem under the same title Swapna is there in the poetical work Shyamali – A rainy night at Shantiniketan reminds the poet of Ra¯dha¯’s dream – romance for Krsna, depicted by the Vaisna¯va lyricist JÇa¯nada¯sa (16th centu˙˙ ˙ also a rainy night. The ˙ dreamer Radha reappears in Tary).20 That was ¯ ¯ gore’s dreamy imagination. That past romance is further and further transcended through ages. The present day damsels are not replica of Ra¯dha¯. Yet, the poet finds some kind of sameness between the past dream and the present dream. It is a dream which pours meaning into our life. It is dream, which resounds nostalgic tune into our present day representation of life. It lifts us up above worldly chores. It assimilates the essence of history and memory in our heart, nay in our brain. Recollecting JÇa¯nada¯sa’s lines on “mone porechhe oi pad-ta”: “Rajanee shaon Ghana, / ghanadewa garjan / Swapan dekhinu heno kale”.21 Tagore adds, Sedin Radhikar chhabir pichhane / Kabir chokher kachhe / Kon ekti meye chhilo, / Bhalobasar knuri – dhara tar mon. / Mukhchora sei meye, / Chokhe kajal pora/ Ghater theke neel kori / ‘nibhari nibhari’ chala / Aaj ei moro rate / Take mone ante chai. / Shrabaner ratre emni korei royechhe sedin / Badaler hawaa / Mil roye gechhe / Sakal-er swapne aar e-kaler swapne.22

The key to dreamland is hidden in this transcendent level, in this metaphysical zone. Can we call it unreal? A thoughtless materialist will say so. There is one more poem entitled Swapna in the poetical work Chaitali. 23 The poet dreams a sweet dream of someone and after waking up in the still midnight wonders whether his dream consort also has dreamt of him in the like manner. Just a few lines of the poem may be quoted: Kaal rate dekhinu swapan / Devata ashish sama / Shiyare se bosi momo / Mukhe rakhi karun nayan / Komal anguli shire / Bulaichhe dhire dhire / 20 21 22 23

Tagore 1990, p. 105. Tagore 1961, vol. III, p. 396 – 397. Ibid. Adjective form of the month chaitra indicating the end of harvest, the passing away of spring season and the closing of the Bengali year.

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Sudhamakha priyo parashan / Kaal rate dekhinu swapan / Ki bolite giye pran / Fete holo shatakhan / Takhoni bhangilo ghum mor / […] Deep-nirbapita ghare / Shuye shunyo sajja pore/ Bhabite laaginu katakhhan – / Shikhane mathati thuye / Seu eka shuye shuye / Kee jani kee herichhe swapan, / Dwiprahara yamini jakhan.24

The point raised is very much pertinent. There is only space-gap and no time-gap. Whether two acquaintances may dream together about each other, whether there is any possibility of reciprocal communication in dream, whether two individual wills can react simultaneously. Should we seek Schopenhauer’s philosophy in such a case, he would say, […] the same animal magnetism to which the marvels are due, has for us testified to a direct action of the will on others and at a distance. But such a thing is precisely the fundamental characteristic of what is described by the notorious name of magic. For this is a direct action of our will itself which is faced from the causal conditions of physical action and hence of contact in the widest sense of the word.25

Schopenhauer would further argue that magical action is related to physical as the art of ‘soothsaying’ is to rational conjecture. It is a real and complete action in a distance in the same way as soothsaying or clairvoyance is affected from a distance. Freedom of knowledge and the will from the limitations imposed by space, time and causality is closely related to with ‘animal magnetism’, ‘sympathetic cure’, ‘magic’, ‘second sight’, ‘dream’, ‘clairvoyance’, ‘soothsaying’ and the like branches of the main stem, deep-seated in our being. These are quite different from the perceivable natural world around us. Doubt always comes and goes at the same time. So, in between rational doubt and willful assurance the dreams of two persons may coincide. At least, a cosy relationship expects so. The key to creative dream lies there. (XV) Kalpanik (The Disguise) A pensive tone is ringing throughout all the lines of the dream poem cum-song Kalpanik in the poetic work Kalpana. The lines in original run thus: 24 Tagore 1961, vol. I, p. 543. 25 PP I, p. 264 – 265.

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Ami keboli swapan korechhi bapan / Batase / Tai akash kusum korinu chayan / Hatashe / Chhayar matan milay dharanee, / Kul nahi pay ashsar taranee, / Manas pratima bhasiya beray Akashe. / Kichhu bnadha porilona sudhu e basabna – / Bnadhone/ Keha nahi dilo dhara shudhu e sudur / Sadhane. / Apanar mone bosiyaa ekela / Analshikhay ki korinu khela / Din sheshe dekhi chhai holo sob / Hutashe.26

The approximate meaning is as follows: I have sown the seed of dream in the air resulting in plucking fancy flower. My world vanishes like shadow. The vessel of my longing finds no shore. The image of my dear floats throughout the sky. My desire has failed to gain the real. What a fire play is my solitary estranged pensiveness! Out of dejection at my dayending I find everything burnt into ashes. Of course, this sort of pessimism and nihilism cannot be taken as Tagore’s usual tone. On the whole, blissful joy is in the core of his consciousness. He can turn every sphere of life into joy and fruitfulness. Numerous Tagore songs on dream lead us to this realization. Selected examples can be furnished. Several dream songs, Mor swapan-tarir ke tui neye,27 end with an earnest mystic appeal: “Do open your veil, cast your glance at me, let your smile spread throughout my soul.” Refer to the drama Raktakarabi, Bishu sings this dream song. Nondini’s affection makes him jubilant and buoyant. This dreamy buoyancy is artistically expressed in the metaphor Swapantari. Swapane donhe chhinu ki mohe, jagar bela holo,28 the painful parting at the end of nocturnal slumber turns into music. While Schopenhauer seeks out the internal physiological basis and process of dreaming, Freud interprets the individual dreams, Tagore dreams artistically and exploits the dreams towards further and further creativity. In the song Swapna amar mone holo the poet says: In my dream it seemed to me that you had knocked at my door. I could not wake up. You got vanished in darkness. In my unconscious the rain pattered, the sylvan shadow vibrated with the ringing crickets. They passer-by come at midnight along with the invitation/ summon of the path. I am unaware whether the silent Veena resonated or not. I could not wake up. The sylvan fragrance surrounded me while I was in slumber.29 26 27 28 29

Tagore 1961, vol. I, p. 727 – 728. “Who are you, the boatswoman of my dream-boat?” “In what illusion were we together? Now it is time to wake up.” Tagore 1961.

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This is a poem as well under the title (half conscious) in the poetical work Sanai. This is in conformation it with what Schopenhauer calls sleep waking or dream – waking of dreaming the reality. Ogo swapna-swarupini, taba abhisarer pathe pathe smritir deep jwala 30 is an excellent dream song tuned in the dreaming paraj. The fragrance of the bloomed Madhabi-grove is full of the same fragrance of the past. In this dozeless night the jingling of the cricket surcharging the wavy breeze provides the sense of your wary robe. The tonal flow of paraj from a distant flute seems to cast a rapturous trance. I hold my offering tray containing the garland of blooming mallika in your remembrance. In the song Jadi hai jivan puran nai holo tabo akripan kore the poet says: Though my life, bereft of your soulful touch remains unfulfilled, my mind knows well that the sudden and momentary glimpse of light and shade of your image decorates the courtyard of nursing. That much is my bountiful providence since my desire is timid.31

The sensitive poet composer is aware of the unconscious depth of human mid. The desires may remain unfulfilled, but a sublime level of fulfillment is reached by this kind of musing. The concluding lines are very much important for our present topic. Debaser dainyer sanchay jato / Jatne dhare rakhi, / Se je rajaneer swapner ayojon. 32 Lack of factual fulfillment does not matter to the poet because his fond musings overflow as surplus. This is the mystery of good dream. This is the key to dreamland. The steering of dream is at the hands of an artist and dreams are truer aids to artistic creativity than the achievement of factual life. (XVI) What a Pleasure in Dream The light mood conversation among Dahalani, Ikkani and Iskabani, the three card-women in Tasher Desh (The Land of Cards), reveals some noteworthy principles of the phenomenon of dreaming. Dahalani tells the other two, very secretly and shamefully, that just before daybreak she shed off her law bound cardhood and turned into a woman with carefree movements. She conceals the next portion of her dram. Iskabani com30 “O my dream incarnate, the way to your assignation is illuminated with the lamps of remembrance.” Tagore 1963/64, p. 233. 31 Tagore 1963/64, p. 228. 32 “Carefully I full all the tiny bits of my day time savings since these are the tools for the preparation of my nocturnal dreams.”

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munity that the bird caged during day time got released during nocturnal sleep. Dahatami hushes her. The orthodox Nahala would impose expiation/ penance in case the secret dream be disclosed. It is a sin indeed in the moral standard of the card-island. “But, what a pleasure in the dream!”33 she exclaims. There is a common saying that ‘Sesh ratri ba ushalagner swapna satya hoi’.34 Schopenhauer has a clear study about this when he quoting Horace: “Post medium noctem, cum somnia vera”35 Schopenhauer says that after midnight the truth is dreamed. What is the explanation of this? After a deep sleep throughout the night the brain gains full nutrition. The rested and restored brain is again capable of dreaming that kind of dream which “have a prophetic and fatidical significance.”36 Out of ‘phantasmagoria’ of Tasher Desh, Dahalani has dreamt the truth. All the inhabitants of the card-island would become human beings at last. A hint of ‘pleasure principle’ is also there in her dream. (XVII) Call of Dreamland: The Key to the Dreamland Let me come back to the very first dream song I started with: Swapan-parer dak shunechhi, jege tai to bhabi / Keu kakhono khnuje ki pay swapnaloker chabi. / Noyto sethay jawaar tare / Noy kichhu to pawaar tare, / Nai kichhu tar dabi – / Bishwa hote hariye gechhe swapnaloker chabi. / Chawaa-pawaar buker bhitor na-pawaa ful fote, / Dishahara gandhe tari – akash bhore uthe. / Khnuje jare berai gaane, / Praner gabhir atal pane / E jan gechhe nabi, / Sei niyechhe churi kore swapna loker chabi.37

Whom I do quest for in music, who has gone embedded in the unfathomable depth of my life, has stolen away the key to my dreamland. The inner meaning is as mysterious as the dreamland itself Our solace, may, assurance is that the key is not lost forever. It is hidden within our own spirit, within the storehouse of our sweet and sad memory, with33 34 35 36 37

Tagore 1961, vol. I, p. 32. ‘Dreams of the last quarter of night of daybreak come true.’ PP I, p. 236. Ibid. Bichitra: “I have heard the call of the dreamland. While awaken I ponder whether anybody can find out the key to the dreamland. Not to go there, nor to get anything from there, it has no claim. The key to dreamland has been lost from the world. Within the heart of desire and satiation blooms the flower of non-fulfillment. Its bewildered fragrance spreads throughout the sky.” (Tagore 1963/64, no. 22).

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in our sleep, siesta, doze, trance, imagination, unconscious and even in our consciousness in itself. The key to dreamland is within our reach since we belong to dreamland and the dreamland also belongs to us. We see that while in music and poetry on dream the poet Tagore infinitely transcends the ordinary level of existence; in dream stories the writer Tagore makes the characters duped in psychosis entangled knots and even in complicated horror situations. Musical tunes and poetical ethos belong to ethereal and loftier zone. Stories belong to familial and social environment. Music and poetry lead us to aesthetic reality. Stories make us one with social reality. Therefore, Tagore’s dream songs and dream poems on one hand and dream – stories on the other reveal to us all the dimensions of the dream land, its height and depth, in span and variegated hues, its light and shades. In Schopenhauer’s theorization, dream is also objectification of the will, but this kind of objectification is quite internal until and unless the dreamer narrates it. Creative artists can catch hold of the dream and use it in creativity. Dream is one of the sources of creativity in every culture. Bha¯sa’s (2nd/3rd century) drama Swapnava¯sadatta is based on dream. The inspiration behind almost all the Mangalaka¯vyas (auspicious poetical works) are founded on dream. Ra¯dhika’s dream in the Vais˙ na¯va lyric has already been discussed. Rabı¯ndrana¯th Tagore’s elder brother Dwijendrana¯th Tagore (1840 – 1926) has written Swapnaprayan (A Sojourn to dream). Schopenhauer refers to Homer who tells of “two portals of entry for dreams, one of ivory by which insignificant dreams enter, and one of horn for fatidical dreams.” (Odyssey, XIX. 560) Schopenhauer comments. “An anatomist might perhaps feel tempted to interpret this in terms of the white and grey matter of the brain.”38 Schopenhauer, before writing on dream, has thoroughly read Artemidor of Daldis’s (2nd century) Oneirocritica, the oldest of the western books on dreams. Schopenhauer derives the idea of ‘Theorematic Dream’, the rarest of all kinds of dreams. ‘Theorematic Dream’ takes place in deep sleep with no immediate waking up. As a result, no recollection of this dream becomes possible. When the content is of great importance, the dreamer repeats the dream in lighter sleep. The dream takes the form of allegory, which requires explanation or interpretation after waking up from lighter sleep. Yet, it is difficult to understand the allegory. We understand this fatidical allegorical dream only after its prediction has come true. If this is a universal 38 PP I, p. 253.

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truth, then the dreamer authors of medieval Bengali poetical works like Annandamangal, Raymangal and Manasamangal may be correlated with this discussion. Melancholy, morose disposition, misery, presentiment, foreboding, gloomy thoughts prevailed in the-then Bengali owing to famine, tiger menace, snake bite. Annada, the Goddess of food appeared in Bharatchandra’s dream and ordered him to write Annandamangal and worship Annanda to prevent famine. Dakshin Ray, the God of tigers gave dream to the author of Raymangal. Manasa, the Goddess of snakes appeared in at least four persons’ dream with a view to propagating her pu¯ja¯ and compose her eulogy, i. e. Manasamangal. The Gods and Goddesses are soothsayers to the dreamer authors. The dream given orders influenced very much the subjugated and god-fearing subjects of the then Bengal. Something must be said regarding allegorical resort of complicated dreams. Why allegory alone, various kinds of parables similes, metaphors and symbols are very much prone both to the dreamer and to the poets according to their individual sagacity. There are not mere figures of speech but of greater value towards founding homogenous relationship between two ‘widely varying’ things. These come on the spur of the moment. As for example, we have already seen that a bird is the simile/ metaphor/ symbol of Dahalani’s will/ keen desire/ suppressed wish, caged at daytime and set free in nocturnal dream. It may be judged as a sin in social code, but intensely pleasurable as long as the dream lasts, may, even after waking up as an excellent memory. That’s why Dahalani wants to share her dream experience by blushfully disclosing it to her near and dear ones. References Cooper, David E. (1996): World Philosophies: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Black well [Schopenhauer, p. 321 – 24]. Freud, Sigmund (1991): The Interpretation of Dreams. New Delhi: Penguin. Russell, Bertrand (1960): Wisdom of the West. London: Macdonald [Schopenhauer, p. 256 – 258]. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1907): The World as Will and Idea. Vol. I-III. Transl. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trbner. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1969): The World as Will and Representation. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1974): Parerga and Paralipomena. Vol. I, II. Transl. by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Tagore, Rabindranath (1961): Rabindra Rachanavali. Vol. I-XV. Calcutta: Saraswati Press. Tagore, Rabindranath (1963/64): Gitabitan. Vol. I-III. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati Press. Tagore, Rabindranath (1990): Padarthavali. Ed. by Srischandra Mazumder. Kolkata: A¯nanda Edition. Tagore, Rabindranath (2000: The Religion of Man. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati Press. Wallace, William (1890): Life of Arthur Schopenhauer. London: Walter Scott.

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Contributors Dr. Ankur Barua (University of Delhi, New Delhi) Michael Gerhard (Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz) Prof. (retired) Raj Kumar Gupta (Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur) Dr. Ram Nath Jha (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) Prof. Dr. Matthias Koßler (Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz) Dr. Jens Lemanski (Fernuniversitt Hagen, Hagen) Prof. Ramesh Chandra Pradhan (Hyderabad Central University, Hyderabad) Prof. (retired) Sitansu Ray (Department of Tagore music of Sangeet Bhawan,Visva Bharati) Dr. Thomas Regehly (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main) Dr. Margit Ruffing (Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz) Dr. Indu Sarin (Panjab University, Chandigarh) Prof. Dr. Gnter Zçller (Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich)

Author Index (Sva¯mı¯) Abheda¯nanda 20 Abu Yazid al-Bista¯mı¯ 37 ˙ Altenhofer, Norbert 83 ¯Anandagiri 41, 47, 57 Aniruddha 138 Anquetil-Duperron, Abraham Hyacinthe 2, 25, 32 – 34, 36, 38 – 40, 43 – 45, 47, 50, 53, 57, 67, 69, 70 f., 126 App, Urs 35, 64 f., 67 – 71, 78, 107 Aristotle 109, 172 f. Artemidor of Daldis (Artemidor of Ephesos) 229 Asher, David 157, 161 Ba¯dara¯yana 22, 49 ˙ Becker, Johann August 153, 157 – 161, 165, 170, 174 f. Berger, Douglas L. 78, 127 Bernier, Francois 32 Bha¯sa 229 Blumenberg, Hans 152, 167, 169 – 172 Boden, Margaret 130 Boeckh, August 72, 79, 82 Bohr, Niels 25, 27 (Saint) Bonaventure 125 Bradley, Francis Herbert 130 Brandom, Robert 179 Brockdorff, Cay von 74 Bunsen, Christian 68 Burke, David B. 134 f. Buschendorf, Christa 165 Camus, Albert 131 Capra, Fritjof 27 Chakrabarti, Arindam 138, 141 f. Colebrooke, Henry Thomas 33 f., 42, 122

Copleston, Frederick Corti, Walter 74

145, 151

Da¯ra¯sekoh (Dara Shikoh, Dara Shu˙ Muhammad Da¯ra¯ S´iko¯h, koh, ˙¯ h, Da¯ra¯ S´iku¯h) 1 f., Da¯ra¯ S´uko 31 – 43, 46 f., 49 f., 57, 69, 71 De Cian, Nicoletta 151 f., 165, 176 Deussen, Paul 44 f., 50, 164 Diderot, Denis 63, 168 Dilthey, Wilhelm 78 – 80, 82 Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite 166 Droysen, Johann G. 79 (Master) Eckhart (von Hochheim) 176 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 12 – 14, 149, 156, 168 – 170 Francis of Assisi 125 Frauenstdt, Julius 89, 112, 115, 157, 159 – 161, 163, 165, 174 Freud, Sigmund 6, 222, 226 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 80, 82 f., 85, 89 Galilee, Galileo 28 Gentil, Jean-Baptiste-Joseph 32 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 65, 72, 219 Goodwin, William Frederick 132 f. ˙ unaid of Bagdad 37 G Halbfass, Wilhelm 37, 66 Hartmann, Eduard von 164 Harvey, Peter 137, 143 Hasrat, Bikrama Jit 34, 37 – 40, 51 Haucke, Kai 152 Hazrat Mian Mir 35

248

Author Index

Heeren, Arnold 68 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 13, 116, 149, 156, 165, 168 – 170, 178 Heidegger, Martin 73, 75, 77, 80, 82, 86, 89, 172 Heisenberg, Werner 27 Herder, Johann Gottfried 17, 69 Homer 72, 219, 229 Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus) 228 Hbscher, Arthur 73, 151 Humboldt, Alexander von 170 f. Husayn Mansu¯r-e Halla¯g 37 ˙ Irenaeus Lugdunensis 166 Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich 167 – 169 Janaway, Christopher 87, 161 Jesus 154, 177 JÇa¯nada¯sa 224 Kabir 43, 224 Ka¯lida¯sa 223 f. Kalupahana, David J. 136, 144 Kant, Immanuel 11 – 14, 50, 63 f., 85, 87, 90, 100, 105, 110 – 112, 126, 151, 167, 202 Kephalos 156 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 130 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 72, 167, 169 Luke 154 Madame de Guyon (Jeanne Marie Guyon du Chesnoy) 125 Magee, Bryan 114, 121, 126, 130 Maharsi Ramana 20 ˙ ˙ Mainlnder (Batz), Philipp 164 Majer, Gottlob Friedrich 69, 126 Malter, Rudolf 150 Manu 19, 122 Mark 41 f., 112, 154, 207 f. Matthew 154 McDowell, John 179 Meinecke, Friedrich 81 Mischel, Julius 70 f. Mockrauer, Franz 88

Muhyi id-Din al-Saykh al-Akbar Ibn ’Arabi 35 f. ˙ Mller, Friedrich Max 1 f., 19, 25, 28, 39, 63, 65 – 71, 73, 89, 91 Mller, Wilhelm 65 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm 161 – 164, 170, 174 Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenberg) 169 Oppenheimer, Robert

27

Pande, Govind Chandra 142 PataÇjali 21, 134 f. Plato 63 f., 79, 87, 90, 126, 156, 173 (S´rı¯) Purohit Sva¯mı¯ 20 Ra¯dha¯krisnan, Sarvepalli 20, 133 ˙ sa 20 Ra¯makrsn˙a˙ Paramaham ˙˙ ˙ 49 Ra¯ma¯nuja Reimarus, Hermann Samuel 166 f. Riedel, Manfred 65, 74, 76, 79, 82 Rorty, Richard 179 Safranski, Ruediger 65, 74 – 76, 86 (A¯di) S´an˙kara (-aca¯rya) 1 f., 31, 37, 41, 43 f., 46 – 50, 56 f., 71, 142 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 12 – 14, 156, 168 – 170, 178 Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott 139 Schlegel, Friedrich 17, 33, 79, 169 Schleiermacher, Daniel E. 72, 78 f., 82 Schmeitzer, Ernst 161 Schrçdinger, Erwin 26 f. Schubbe, Daniel 112, 152, 172 Schweitzer, Albert 133 Segala, Marco 151 f., 165, 176 Sellars, Wilfrid 179 Shakespeare, William 219 Sharma, Baldev Raj 23, 25 Slaje, Walter 71, 91 Sokrates 197 Spierling, Volker 152 Spinoza, Baruch de 167 f., 177

Author Index

S´rı¯harsa 145 Suarez,˙ Francisco

109

Tagore, Dwijendrana¯th 6, 215, 218 – 229, 245 Tagore, Rabı¯ndrana¯th 6, 20, 215, 218, 222, 229 Taylor, Richard 189, 192 f. Va¯caspati Mis´ra 141 (Sva¯mı¯) Viveka¯nanda 5, 20, 65, 187, 194 – 199 Vya¯sa 20, 22 Vya¯sa, Ba¯dara¯yana 49 ˙

249

Wagner, Gustav 73, 90 Warrier, A. G. Krishna 134, 136, 146 Weber, Albrecht 38 f., 46 f. Weigelt, Greorg Christian 153 – 163 Wheeler, John Archibald 25 Whicher, Ian 141 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 5 f., 201, 207 – 212 Wolf, Friedrich August 72 Ya¯jÇavalkya 22 Yandell, Keith 140 Yeats, William Butler 20 (Sva¯mı¯) Yoga¯nanda 20

Subject Index absurd 49, 87, 131, 216 Advaita-Veda¯nta 37, 41 advaitin 142 aesthetic, aesthetical 13 f., 80, 83, 99, 106, 119, 133, 139, 150, 160, 173 f., 219, 229 ahamka¯ra, ahan˙ka¯ra 45 – 48, 194 f. Allah˙ 36 ˙ a¯nanda 37, 141 f. antinomy 152 aporias 152 f. appearance 46 f., 74, 86, 91, 97, 101, 104 f., 111 – 113, 131 f., 157, 208 f. Arjuna 20, 124 a¯sanas 135 ascetic, asceticism 3, 5, 15, 119, 125 f., 154 f., 157 – 160, 162, 174, 176 – 179, 193, 198, 206, 208 atheism 13 – 15 a¯tman, ana¯tman, atma, parama¯tman, jı¯va¯tman, brahmana¯tman 33, 36, 45, 47 f., 91, 139, 143 f., 208, 211 benefit, beneficial 1, 19 f., 53, 63, 69, 175, 192 Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ 19, 21, 23, 27, 35, 39, 122 – 124 bhakti 43, 50, 198 bheda¯bheda 37 book 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 – 27, 31 – 34, 39, 44, 47, 49 – 53, 63 – 65, 67 – 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 83 f., 88, 97 – 99, 103, 105, 112, 121, 150, 153, 161, 163, 165 – 175, 177 – 179, 215, 229 – of life 75 – of the world 76, 86 brahman, brahmans, brahma, brahmin, brahmanism, brahmanic, brah-

mana¯tman 3, 22, 24, 31 f., 43 – 45, 47 – 50, 55, 67 f., 142, 144, 201 f., 204, 220 Buddha 48, 136, 143 f., 176, 198, 201 Buddhism, Buddhist, bauddha, cryptoBuddhist 1 f., 4 – 6, 9 – 11, 23 f., 31, 37, 47 – 49, 64, 89, 132 – 134, 136 f., 139 f., 143, 176, 201, 206, 208, 211 Ca¯rva¯ka 22 – 24, 138 f., 142 character 11 f., 14, 19, 64, 76, 80 f., 84, 99, 105, 136, 140 f., 150, 160 f., 172 – 176, 188, 190, 193, 198, 209, 222, 224, 229 Christian, Christianity 3 – 5, 15 – 17, 54 f., 68, 109, 120, 125, 130, 145, 149, 151, 153 – 156, 163, 165, 169 f., 174, 176 – 179, 206 compassion 2, 5, 10, 97 f., 102, 104 – 106, 122, 187 – 193, 198, 210 conscious 6, 23, 26, 113, 142, 189, 208, 216 f., 227 consciousness 23, 31, 50, 99, 103 – 105, 116, 134 f., 142 f., 165, 172, 194 f., 202 – 205, 208, 223, 226, 229 – self- 97, 104, 106, 111, 168, 203 f. – universal 202 contemplation 99, 106, 119, 122, 173, 206 death 1, 5, 16, 19 f., 23, 43, 69, 104, 122 – 124, 126, 131, 136, 141 – 143, 145, 150, 153, 155, 205 f., 210, 220 denial of the will-to-live 4 f., 44, 98, 116, 119 f., 125 f., 150, 153 – 155,

252

Subject Index

157, 159 f., 162, 164 f., 175 – 178, 191, 211 dream (-land), dreamer 6 f., 44, 90, 110, 121, 215 – 230 duhkha 132, 136, 138 f., 142, 144, ˙ 201 ego, egoistic, egoism 5, 57, 187, 189 – 191, 193 – 196, 210, 212 ens realisimum 50 ephemerality 204 f. eternity 204 f. ethic 2, 4 f., 6, 10, 13 f., 77, 88, 97 f., 102, 105 – 107, 122, 138, 150, 152, 160, 162, 164, 173, 175 f., 178, 195 – 199, 207, 209 – 211 evangelist 157, 161, 169 existence 13 f., 16, 23 f., 35, 49, 73, 80, 99, 104, 110, 123, 129, 131 – 139, 143 – 145, 168, 194, 202 – 206, 209, 211 f., 229 – ephemeral 205 – non- 48, 111, 212 Existence-Consciousness-Infinite 24 fana¯’

37, 43

genius 74, 160 f., 163, 173 f., 215 globalization 202 gnostic 34, 51 God 13, 21, 27, 33, 35, 49, 51 – 53, 110, 122 f., 130 f., 138, 145, 166 – 169, 193, 197, 199, 230 Gospel 38 f., 51, 53, 154 Greek 63, 166, 202, 219 Hebrew 39, 52, 166 f. hermeneutic 2, 15, 63 – 65, 67, 70 – 91, 112 Hinduism, Hinduist, hinduistic 9, 11, 17, 34 f., 37 – 39, 42, 126, 176 holiness 3 f., 119 f., 122, 126 f., 163 holy man 3 f., 119, 121 – 123, 125, 127 ignorance

48, 135, 140 f., 194 f.

illusion, illusory 5, 23, 37, 88, 110, 116 f., 120 f., 124, 137, 187, 189, 192, 204 – 207, 222, 226 imagination 122, 216, 220, 223 f., 229 imitatio christi 5, 154, 166 individual, individuality 2, 6, 16, 31, 34, 49, 88, 97, 101, 103 f., 106, 110, 113 f., 116, 120, 123, 125, 129 – 131, 135 – 137, 139 – 141, 143 f., 172 f., 178, 187 – 196, 198, 204 – 206, 208 – 210, 212, 217, 225 f., 230 intellect 3, 41, 45, 57, 84, 100, 103, 109 – 116, 188, 194, 203 f., 211 Itiha¯sa 20 Jaina 23 f. Judaism 17 justice 99 f., 124, 192, 198 Krsna, Krishna 20, 24, 49, 124, 136, ˙˙ ˙224 karman, karmic 24, 135, 137, 141, 198 Katha¯vatthu 143 Latin 2, 10, 25, 32 – 34, 36, 43, 71, 109, 126 liberation 23 f., 133, 136, 139 – 142, 145 f., 201, 211 Loka¯yata 138 love, lover 5, 21, 33, 66, 102, 113, 122, 156, 187, 190 – 193, 196 – 198, 215, 217, 220, 223 Madhyamaka 49 Maha¯bha¯rata 20, 49 maha¯va¯kya, Mahavakya 3, 99 f., 107 ma¯ya¯, Maya 20, 31, 37, 49 f., 88, 110, 116, 120 f., 144, 191, 204, 209, 222 f. metaphysic 1 – 3, 9 f., 13, 16, 24, 64, 72, 75 – 78, 82, 85 – 87, 91, 97, 99, 102, 104 – 106, 140, 150, 172, 202 f., 205, 207 – 211, 220 metempsychosis 103 – 105, 124

253

Subject Index

moksa 6, 24, 124, 141 f., 146, 201, ˙ 206, 212 moral, morality 5, 16, 83, 86, 88, 98 f., 101 f., 104 f., 110 f., 135 – 137, 139, 141, 145, 154, 157, 163, 175, 177, 187 f., 190 – 193, 195 – 199, 202, 210, 221, 228 Muslim 35, 38, 43, 52 mystic, mystical, mysticism 3 f., 35, 37, 43, 51, 120, 132, 165, 174, 226 myth, mythical, mythology 100 f., 105, 122, 127, 131, 163 Naiya¯yika 24 Navya-Nya¯ya 24 nihilism 22, 211, 226 Nika¯ya 143 nirva¯na, nirvana, nirwana 6, 37, 43 f., ˙ 136 f., 140, 142 f., 150, 159, 47, 164 f., 206, 212 nivrtti 196 ˙ non-dualism 199 nothingness 23, 43, 47 f., 50, 150, 164 f., 193 noumenon 111 Nya¯ya, Nya¯yika 4, 138, 142 f., 145 Nya¯ya-Vais´esika 23 ˙ Odyssey 229 Oneirocritica 229 optimism, optimist, optimistic 4, 129 f., 134, 137, 144 f. Oupnek’hat 1 f., 10, 25, 31 f., 34 – 36, 43 – 45, 50, 55 f., 64, 71, 122, 126 pain 41, 78, 119, 132, 134, 137 – 142, 145, 154, 223 Pandita 32, 40 f., 43, 46, 50 ˙˙ Persian 1 f., 10, 32 – 37, 39 – 43, 45 – 47, 52, 71, 98, 126 pessimism, pessimist, pessimistic 4, 129 – 134, 137, 139 f., 144 – 146, 152, 174 f., 206, 211, 226 philosophia perennis 50 phrenology 216 pors´ 36

pra¯na¯ya¯ma 135, 198 Pras´˙nopanisad 40, 44 – 47, 56 ˙ f. pravrtti 195 ˙ principium individuationis 3, 50, 97, 99, 102 f., 105, 109 f., 188, 192 protestantism 167 Psalm 38 f., 51, 53 Pura¯na, Puranas 20, 122 purus˙a 21, 36, 41, 45 – 47, 134 – 136, ˙ 141 ˙ sa¯ 24 Pu¯rva-Mı¯ma¯m Qur’a¯n

36, 38 f., 51 – 53

Ra¯ma¯yana 20 reality ˙6, 25, 48 – 50, 65, 72, 75 f., 86 f., 90, 92, 100, 121, 125, 129, 131, 140, 145, 177 f., 187, 189, 203 f., 208, 210, 215 f., 218, 220, 223, 227, 229 – eternal 204 f. – supreme 19, 25, 27 – transcendent 199, 201, 205 – ultimate 21, 24, 145, 208 redemption 10, 14, 50, 150, 152, 165, 176 religion, religious 1 f., 5, 9 – 12, 15 f., 28, 38, 85, 97 f., 100, 120, 145, 177, 195 – 198 renunciation 3, 5, 119, 122, 132, 187, 193, 211 rsi 28 ˙˙ saint 3 f., 34 – 36, 51 f., 120, 122, 125 f., 130, 132, 149, 151, 154 – 156, 160 f., 163, 165, 170, 174, 176 – 179 sakhepat 43 – 45, 47 Sa¯n˙khya, Sa¯n˙khya-Yoga 4, 23 f., 45 f., 132 – 138, 140 – 143 salvation 3, 14 – 16, 102, 119, 121, 124 f., 152, 205 f., 208 f., 211 f. samana, samanas 126, 179 ˙ sama¯dhi 135, 198 Sanskrit 2, 5, 10, 32 – 40, 42 f., 52, 56, 63 – 65, 70, 72, 97 – 99, 104 – 107, 120, 125

254

Subject Index

samnya¯sin 32, 39 – 41, 43, 46, 50, ˙ 126, 179 ˙ sa¯ra, sam ˙ sa¯ric 90, 133, 135, 137, sam 142, 144 f., 201, 205 scholastic 66, 109 self 1, 3, 5, 9, 14, 19, 31, 36, 43, 48, 53, 73, 75, 79, 89, 97 f., 101, 103, 107, 113 – 116, 122, 125, 131, 134 – 136, 139, 142, 162, 168 f., 172, 177, 187, 189, 191, 193, 195 f., 198 f., 202 f., 205, 207 f. – higher 209 f. Sirr-i akbar 2, 32, 35 – 38, 40 – 42 S´iva, Shiva 36, 122 f., 224 sleep(-waking) 43 – 45, 47 f., 216 – 220, 227 – 229 solace 1, 16, 19 f., 69, 201, 228 somnambulism, somnambulistic 218 f. soul 3, 13, 16, 19, 33, 100 f., 110, 119, 124 f., 127, 138, 177, 194 f., 197, 205, 220, 226 spirit seeing 217 – 219, 221 suffering 4 – 6, 14 f., 119, 121, 125, 129, 132, 134 – 139, 145, 154, 162 f., 187, 189 – 193, 201, 205 f., 208 Su¯fi , Sufism 2, 34 – 37, 43 ˙ suicide 131 f., 153 – 155, 158 ´su¯nyata¯ 48 supernatural 216, 219 – 221 susupta 44 ˙ sympathy 5, 98, 102, 105, 187, 196, 209 f. tatoumes 98, 100 tat tvam asi 2 – 5, 37, 69, 91, 97 – 107, 121, 187, 210 tauh¯ıd 38, 40 f., 43, 50 ˙ ¯da 140 Therava thing-in-itself 6, 44, 99, 103, 105, 110 – 113, 115 f., 123, 151, 187 f., 191, 193, 202, 204, 223 Thora 38 f.

transcendent, transcendental 142, 144 f., 203, 205, 224 transmigration 16, 100 f., 124 unicum principium spiritual 43 unio mystica 166 Upanisad, Upanekhat, Upanisadic 1 –˙ 4, 10, 19 – 28, 32, 34 –˙41, 45 f., 50, 52 f., 64 – 67, 69 – 71, 87, 90, 100, 122, 126, 141 f., 201 f., 209 ˙ sa¯ 24 f. Uttara-Mı¯ma¯m Vaisna¯va 224, 229 Vais˙´esika 24 Veda,˙ Vedic 4, 16, 20 f., 26, 32 – 34, 38, 40 f., 43 f., 46 f., 49 f., 52, 63, 66 – 68, 71, 88, 99 – 102, 106, 120 – 123, 125 f., 193, 208 veil of ma¯ya¯ 3 f., 109 f., 116 f., 120 f., 124, 145, 191, 194 vita activa 156 wahdat al-wuju¯d-doctrine 35 ˙ will-to-live 5, 43, 99, 112 f., 116, 123, 154 f., 157, 160, 176, 187 – 189, 191, 198, 203 f., 210, 221 world 1 – 6, 9 – 11, 13 f., 16, 19 f., 22 – 28, 31, 35, 43 – 45, 47 – 50, 53, 69 – 72, 74 – 78, 80 – 86, 88 – 92, 97 – 103, 109 – 114, 116, 119 – 121, 123, 125 – 127, 129 – 137, 140 f., 143 – 145, 149 – 153, 155 – 163, 165 – 176, 178 f., 188 f., 191 – 198, 201 – 212, 221, 225 f., 228 – -as-idea 211 – ephemeral 201 – noumenal 204 – phenomenal 4, 120 f., 131, 137, 143, 203 f., 208, 210 – -will 211 Yama 123, 135 Yogasu¯tra 21, 134 f. Yoga, Yogi 5, 23 f., 35, 134 f., 141, 194, 198 f.