Understanding Contemporary China 9781685859688

Table of contents :
Contents
Maps, Tables, and Figures
Photographs
Preface
Acknowledgments
1 Introduction
2 China: A Geographic Preface
3 The Historical Context
4 Chinese Politics
5 China's Economy
6 China Beyond the Heartland
7 International Relations
8 Population Growth and Urbanization
9 China's Environmental Problems
10 Family, Kinship, Marriage, and Sexuality
11 Women and Development
12 Religion
13 Literature and Popular Culture
14 Trends and Prospects
The Contributors
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY CHINA

UNDERSTANDING Introductions to the States a n d Regions of t h e C o n t e m p o r a r y World Donald L. Gordon, series editor

Understanding Contemporary Africa, 2nd edition edited by April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon Understanding Contemporary China edited by Robert E. Gamer Understanding Contemporary Latin America edited by Richard S. Hillman Understanding the Contemporary Middle East edited by Deborah J. Gerner

UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY

CHINA edited by

Robert E. Gamer

LYN N E RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Cover photo by Lu Huoye, Yunnan Zhuang Studies Association, from Katherine Palmer, Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in the People's Republic of China (forthcoming).

Published in the United States of America in 1999 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 1999 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Understanding contemporary China / edited by Robert E. Gamer, p. cm. — (Understanding) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-687-0 (he. : alk. paper). — ISBN 1-55587-686-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. China. I. Gamer, Robert E„ 1938- . II. Series: Understanding (Boulder, Colo.) DS706.U53 1999 951—dc21 98-24305 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

• Contents • L i s t o f M a p s , T a b l e s , and F i g u r e s

ix

List of Photographs

xi

Preface

xiii

Acknowledgments 1

Introduction

xv

Robert

E.

1

Gamer

Creative Tensions New Challenges 2

China: A Geographic Preface

Stanley

W. Toops

11

Space Regions The Natural Landscape 3

The Historical Context

Rhoads

Murphey

29

The Peopling of China Political Patterns of the Past Chinese Attitudes and Ours About China 4

Chinese Politics

Robert

E. Gamer

63

A Legacy of Unity and E c o n o m i c A c h i e v e m e n t A Century of Turmoil Unity Nearly Restored T w o D e c a d e s of Turmoil Into the World E c o n o m y M a i n t a i n i n g Unity W h a t Will Endure and W h a t Will C h a n g e ? 5

China's E c o n o m y

John

Wong

103

China's Dynamic Growth C h i n a ' s Traditional M i x e d E c o n o m y From R e v o l u t i o n to R e f o r m T h e S u c c e s s f u l Transition to a M a r k e t E c o n o m y Is High G r o w t h Sustainable? O v e r c o m i n g P r o b l e m s and Constraints Muddling Through v

vi

6

Contents

C h i n a B e y o n d the Heartland

Robert

E. Gamer

141

Overseas Chinese Hong Kong Taiwan Tibet Conclusion 7

International R e l a t i o n s

Robert

E. Gamer

179

China's Foreign Relations Before the Opium Wars From the Opium Wars to the People's Republic Foreign Policy Under Mao The Cultural Revolution Joining the World Community Conflicting Priorities: Unity or A c c o m m o d a t i o n 8

P o p u l a t i o n G r o w t h and U r b a n i z a t i o n

Ma Rong

207

City and Countryside in History Population and Food City and Countryside Today Ethnic Minorities Challenges 9

China's Environmental Problems

Richard

Louis

Edmonds

237

Contemporary Environmental Problems Nature Conservation The Three Gorges Dam Prospects for China's Environment 10

F a m i l y , K i n s h i p , Marriage, and S e x u a l i t y

Zang

Xiaowei

267

Family Structure Marriage Marital Breakdown Family Relations Sexuality Conclusion 11

W o m e n and D e v e l o p m e n t

Laurel

Bossen

The "Traditional" Portrait of Chinese Women Women in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries W o m e n ' s Status After the C o m m u n i s t Revolution Women and Economic Reform Women and Politics Conclusion

293

Vil

Contents

12

Religion Chan Hoiman and Ambrose Y. C. King First Configuration: The Rise of Humanistic Religion Second Configuration: The Axial Age and the Rise of Confucianism Third Configuration: Foreign Impetus and Neo-Confucianism Fourth Configuration: The Foreign Impetus of Christianity and Communism Religion and Chinese Society

321

13

Literature and Popular Culture Charles Writing: The Human Pattern Singers and Poets Storytellers and Novelists Priests and Playwrights Resisting Modern Orthodoxies Conclusion

355

14 Trends and Prospects The Contributors Index About the B o o k

Robert

E. Gamer

A. Laughlin

391 399 401 416

• Maps, Tables, and Figures • •

MAPS

Map Map Map Map Map

•

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1

12 17 17 19 30

TABLES

Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

1.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 5.2 7.1 8.1 8.2

Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

8.3 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 12.1

•

Regional Map of Asia Provincial Map of China Population Map of China Physical Features of China Historical Boundaries of China

Romanization of Chinese Terms China's Imperial Dynasties and Beyond Important Dates in Modern Chinese History Asia Pacific Economies: Performance Indicators Asia Pacific Economies: Social Indicators Important Dates in China's Foreign Policy Regional Variation in Demographic Indicators Selected Development and Demographic Trends in China Ethnic Minorities with a Population over 4 Million Family Structure of G r o o m s ' F a m i l i e s Family Structure of B r i d e s ' F a m i l i e s Postmarital Residence Groom Age at First Marriage Bride Age at First Marriage Changes in Aspects of Freedom of Mate Choice Divorce Rates in Cities, Towns, and Countryside The Development of Chinese Religions

4 36 68 104 119 185 213 217 231 270 271 274 276 277 278 282 323

FIGURES

Figure 8.1 Figure 8.2

Historical Changes in China's Population Demographic Dynamics During China's Family Planning Campaigns

IX

210 214

Maps, Tables, and Figures

X

Figure Figure Figure Figure

12.1 12.2 12.3 13.1

Yin and Yang in Harmony The Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate A Traditional Representation o f a Daoist Deity Depiction of a Crowd Gathered Around a Storyteller

332 340 342 366

• Photographs • Wet-rice agriculture in Z h e j i a n g An early Chinese invention, the carrying pole T h e Great Wall north of Beijing T h e 1989 demonstrations took place for several weeks "Wall n e w s p a p e r " T i a n a n m e n Square, 1994 An entrepreneur in Hangzhou, Zhejiang, collects scrap metal for recycling Many small enterprises bring raw and recycled materials and manufactured pieces to and f r o m factories Carrying merchandise to the retail store M a n y now support themselves f r o m small sidewalk stalls Being self-employed or working f o r a smaller enterprise can mean the loss of day care Chinese sampans and shophouses in Singapore, 1964 Hong Kong boat dwellers, 1964 Hong Kong harbor, 1964 and 1996 T h e old European treaty port enclave on Gulangyu island, Xiamen, and the Q u e m o y islands Tibetan monk with prayer wheel Tibetan monastery at Bodnath in Nepal Old city street in Chengdu, Sichuan Billboard promoting the one-child policy in C h e n g d u , Sichuan Shanghai's busiest shopping street, N a n j i n g Lu This day clinic set up on a busy street gave workers convenient access to healthcare Rural and urban housing contrasts, Yunnan province and northern Beijing This temporary migrant laborer sleeps on a sidewalk in Xiamen, Fujian Building one of Shanghai's m a n y new elevated highways O n e of the five new bridges linking Shanghai with the Pudong Development Z o n e Student parking at Nankai University, Tianjin Chongqing, 1997 Factories in the Yangtze's Three Gorges spew out air pollution XI

13 51 53 81 85 95 111 112 116 128 129 143 149 151 157 163 168 211 216 219 221 223 225 226 226 227 229 248

xii

Photographs

Household stoves generally burn coke Giant panda, Wolong, 1989 Wu Gorge, the center of the Three Gorges A dam project in Fujian province flooded many villages Early morning dancing and mahjong in the park A young Shanghai couple returns from work Two elderly farm women and a middle-aged teacher-farmer, holding her grandson, rest at midday A village factory worker brings her child to work with her A university research scientist One of the seated Buddhas carved into the Feilai Teng A Beijing acrobatic performance Traditional Song drama performed in modern Hangzhou A streetside bookstall

248 255 257 260 272 280 307 308 311 337 368 371 385

• Preface • As China's importance in the world's economy and political structure grows, so too does the number of books discussing it. For the teacher of introductory courses, that is a mixed blessing. Keeping current with the research requires increasing amounts of time, and bibliographical searches reveal that most of these works pertain to topics too particular and advanced for students with little prior knowledge of China. Few are designed especially for such students. Understanding Contemporary China was conceived to address this problem. It brings together a group of scholars who both have published extensively on China within their varied disciplines and teach introductory courses on China. We all began this enterprise with a strong sense that such a book was missing and needed. As we have worked on it over the past three years, we have become even more aware of the important niche we are filling. We have created a single text with readable chapters that introduce China from the perspectives of a number of disciplines. These chapters not only give overviews but also emphasize issues currently being researched—complete with bibliographical citations, so students can look into those sources themselves and also find other introductory texts offering additional information on different topics—and are highlighted with facts, narratives, experiences, and observations derived from the authors' close personal contact with China. Because the chapters are designed to be complete in themselves they can be assigned individually. Yet they cover a number of complementary themes, introduced in Chapter 1, to which each succeeding chapter adds form, focus, and nuance. This makes the book useful for courses offering broad multidisciplinary coverage of China, as well as courses that approach it from the perspective of a particular discipline. Some of the topics covered—geography, history, politics, economy, family and kinship, religion, literature, and international relations—are essential components of any introduction to China. Others—such as discussions of the environment, the roles and problems of women, popular culture, sexuality, demographics, and urbanization—are important topics that are often ignored in introductory works. All chapters give historical overviews along with a discussion of the most current events and the problems and prospects facing China in the future. Chapter 1 introduces the book's themes and how they relate to our lives and concerns in the West and to Chinese living outside of China. The Xlll

XIV

Preface

next two chapters introduce China's geography and long history. Readers will find some useful reference points here to which they can return when reading later chapters of the book: the maps in Chapters 2 and 3 and the dynastic chart in Chapter 3. The rest of the book covers topics of major interest regarding China today. Each chapter gives historical background but focuses on current behavior, issues, and trends. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the evolution of China's political institutions and entrepreneurial traditions and how they interface with the current reforms. Chapter 6 is about four topics of special concern to China: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and the large number of overseas Chinese. Chapter 7 gives an overview of China's foreign policy. The rapid political and economic changes in today's China have contributed to and been affected by population growth, urbanization, and environmental problems—the topics of Chapters 8 and 9. Then we turn to an examination of China's culture. Chapter 10 looks at China's family structure and the rapid changes currently taking place in sexual behavior and family relations especially in urban China. Far more than in most countries, the family plays a central role in economic relations and political ideology, which makes these changes especially consequential. Chapter 11 focuses especially on how women are involved and affected, both positively and negatively, as the economy grows. Chapter 12 provides a historic overview of how China's indigenous religions and those of nearby neighbors shaped Chinese society and how these traditions are being challenged by Christianity and communism. Chapter 13 discusses how China's literature and performance art have always had their roots in popular culture and what people are reading and watching today. This chapter, too, elucidates the rapid changes taking place in contemporary China's social and family life. The closing chapter on trends and prospects returns to the themes introduced in Chapter 1 and points briefly to how they may play out in the near future. It gives alternative scenarios of where China's reforms may lead and also indicates some outcomes that are unlikely to occur. Robert

E.

Gamer

• Acknowledgments • I have been the sole author of my prior books. Collaborating with others in writing one has been a new and pleasant experience. I have e n j o y e d passing c h a p t e r s a r o u n d a m o n g the authors so they could m a k e c o m m e n t s to one another. With their diversity of backgrounds and wealth of experience in both t e a c h i n g and research, this has been an enriching e x p e r i e n c e . Email has m a d e it possible to instantly transmit chapters to one another and exchange data and comments when making revisions, even with fellow authors h a l f w a y around the world in China, S i n g a p o r e , and Australia, and across the Atlantic in Britain. During the writing of this book, People to People International, a visiting lectureship at Shanghai University, a grant f r o m University Associates at the University of M i s s o u r i - K a n s a s City, and the E d g a r Snow Memorial Fund have helped me m a k e trips to k e e p abreast of current developments in China. As usual, I have many people there to thank for leading me to i n f o r m a t i o n and insights f o u n d in these pages. I have r o o m to mention only some of them: C h e n Zhenya, Chen Qiuji, and Wang Junyi at Beijing University; Chen Hui of People's Daily and his wife, Chen Xiuxia, of the C h i n a Society for P e o p l e ' s Friendship Studies; H u a n g H u a of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Fan Hengshan of the State Planning C o m m i s sion; Shao Lei of the Ministry of Civil Affairs; Zhu Yukun of the Ministry of Labor; Li Yanping of the China International Travel Service; Jonathan Lange, H. Y. Cheung, and Lina Ting of Hong Kong G o v e r n m e n t Services; Deans Liu D e z h o n g , Wang X i m e i , and Jiang Yongkong in S h a n g h a i ; Guang Shi Long of the Zhuhai N a n f a n g International Trade and E c o n o m y College; and Li Jian of the S h e n z h e n E c o n o m i c Trade C o m m i t t e e . All were generous with their time and rendered assistance beyond the call of duty. In addition to our own e x c h a n g e s of o p i n i o n s on d r a f t s of chapters, our authors b e n e f i t e d f r o m several a n o n y m o u s r e v i e w e r s w h o read individual c h a p t e r s and two w h o read the entire m a n u s c r i p t with great care. Along with skillfully directing that p r o c e s s — a n d creating the innovative model on which this book is b a s e d — D o n a l d and April G o r d o n p r o v i d e d considerable help in improving the book. John Condra, David Sprick, and Jessie J o h n s o n also contributed their skills in editing individual chapters. Cheng De and Jane Cheng helped assure consistent transliteration. The Geographic Information Systems Lab at Miami University created XV

XVI

Acknowledgments

the m a p s in the volume. At the early stages, Wang Junyi, Max Skidmore, E. Grey D i a m o n d , Timothy Cheek, Gregory Veeck, Perry Link, and Rubie Watson gave valuable assistance in getting the ball rolling. James Durig, dean of the School of Arts and S c i e n c e s at the University of M i s s o u r i K a n s a s City and d e p a r t m e n t chairs R o b e r t E v a n s o n and Dale N e u m a n helped m e with a reduced load during part of the project. M y f r i e n d and colleague Henry Mitchell devoted m u c h of his life to reopening dialogue between the United States and China. I am frequently reinvigorated by his boundless energy. My wife, May Lim Gamer, collaborated on this volume in many ways. She located many v o l u m e s and facts f r o m libraries, shared o b s e r v a t i o n s f r o m her reading and experience, maintained regular contact with a host of Chinese friends here and in China, helped me achieve cultural immersion in China (and rescued me when I did not), helped me create the index and review the m a n u s c r i p t , and patiently abided m a n y long e v e n i n g s w h e n I was in the house but not of it over the past three years. R. E. G.

• 1Introduction Robert E. Gamer Twenty years ago China seemed very distant to most of us. That is no longer the case. The c h a n c e s are great that right now you are wearing or sitting near an item m a d e in C h i n a or Taiwan. T h e r e is probably at least one Chinese restaurant in your town. S o m e o n e you k n o w has been studying martial arts. You have Chinese or overseas Chinese classmates. Your local mall would look bare if all the goods m a d e in China were removed. A high school or college not too far f r o m you may be offering courses in Mandarin. A few years ago, none of this would have been likely. But today China has the world's fastest-growing economy, a fifth of the w o r l d ' s population, and escalating trade and travel through its borders. It has a highly m o t i v a t e d populace spreading to all corners of the world, a m o d e r n i z e d army, world-class movie m a k e r s , and competitive O l y m p i c teams. It is a m a j o r market f o r Coke, Pepsi, B o e i n g , Avon, Butler, Sprint, Black and Veatch, Warner Brothers, and a host of other Western companies. It has bec o m e a presence in our lives. Yet, while China has been moving in around us, our comprehension of it often remains mired in the past. We think of Mao, Red Guards waving little R e d Books, water b u f f a l o e s in paddy fields, laborers wearing Dixie C u p hats, pagoda temples, the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, c r o w d s of people riding bicycles, c o m m u n i s t officials with red stars on their caps ordering around workers in great factories, schoolchildren singing socialist songs, and a lone student stopping a tank on Tiananmen Square. All these are true images of China past or present, but c o n t e m p o r a r y China o f f e r s other images as well: modern o f f i c e buildings filled with rows of computers; village streets lined with industrial parks; shantytowns for temporary workers; urban f r e e w a y s j a m m e d with buses, Jeep C h e r o k e e s , and V W sedans; and engineering p r o j e c t s t r a n s f o r m i n g entire valleys and islands f r o m s w a m p into metropolis. All help China achieve the dubious distinction of being among the w o r l d ' s greatest purveyors of air and water pollution. China is also l u n c h t i m e c r o w d s lining up in f r o n t of Pizza Hut and

1

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Robert E. Gamer

M c D o n a l d ' s , businessmen talking on their cellular phones over lunch, construction workers wearing Calvin Klein jackets and Nike Air athletic shoes produced in sweat shops up the road, u n e m p l o y e d youth chatting or begging on street corners or running in gangs, shopping malls and skyscrapers g l e a m i n g , p o p u l a r talk radio shows discussing sex and relationships, steamy n o v e l s selling at corner bookstalls, and young p e o p l e d a n c i n g to rock music late at night in discos. C h i n a is u b i q u i t o u s — i t s clothes, electronics, f o o d , people, and even its air are ever-present in all places. And this presence has another unique element: China still regards the 55 million Chinese living overseas as part of China. Although many of those overseas Chinese have b e c o m e loyal citizens of other countries, they are often tied to C h i n a ' s 1.2 billion inhabitants by c u s t o m , family, and tradition. T h e richest of those f a m i l i e s in H o n g K o n g (now part of China), Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Australia, and North America control almost as m u c h investment capital as Japan; m u c h of that money is invested directly or indirectly in China and in the Pacific Rim, including the coast of North America. This investment constitutes a m a j o r bond linking China to the Americas and Southeast Asia, one that the United States can ignore only at its own peril. It is important to note that 21 million of these overseas Chinese live in Taiwan. In the words of Sing a p o r e ' s senior minister Lee Kuan Yew, speaking before the 21st Century F o r u m in Beijing, "Taiwan cannot win i n d e p e n d e n c e , not even if the A m e r i c a n s want it to. It is not possible for Taiwan to be i n d e p e n d e n t against the will of a united and economically strong C h i n a " (p. 30). Lee (1996) has stated an o b v i o u s and central truth about China. It must be understood in the context of Chinese living outside its borders. C h i n a ' s prosperity has depended upon the investment of overseas Chinese; their prosperity, in turn, depends upon C h i n a ' s prosperity. Lee warns that "any clumsy, high-handed, or apparently brutal action can arouse resentment or f e a r in Hong K o n g or T a i w a n " (p. 30) and thus seriously a f f e c t C h i n a ' s unity and prosperity and hence its hold on Taiwan. That, in turn, would have p r o f o u n d e c o n o m i c and strategic e f f e c t s a r o u n d the globe. Such interdependency explains a lot about how the c o m m u n i s t nation of China can be as immersed in free markets as it is; those m a r k e t s are e m bedded in the social structure of this widely dispersed Chinese community. The dispersed community shares some attitudes and habits that have been passed from generation to generation for thousands of years. It is also quite diverse. As you read Understanding Contemporary China, you will see these attitudes and habits, along with social divisions, showing up in a variety of contexts. The rest of this chapter will give you an overview of those attitudes, habits, and divisions. But before we get to that, we should say a bit about something that can confuse you without a brief introduction: Chinese words. China has no alphabet. Its written language, which is t h o u s a n d s of years old, consists of single characters that represent entire words. O f t e n

Introduction

3

these began as a simple stick drawing of a man, the sun, or another object that gradually became more complex and stylized over time. People had to memorize the individual characters for thousands of words. Only the educated scholar-officials and families of merchants in cities were in positions to devote the time it took to m e m o r i z e these characters and learn to create them with careful brush strokes. A f t e r the c o m m u n i s t s came to power, they created about 2,200 simplified characters that could be taught to schoolchildren and used in newspapers, so as to spread literacy. But when Westerners arrived in C h i n a during the nineteenth century, they n e e d e d to transliterate the sounds of Chinese words into their R o m a n alphabet (rom a n i z e them). Two English sinologists, Sir T h o m a s Wade and Hubert A. Giles, devised a system (Wade-Giles) to do that. For geographical names, some other romanizations fell into c o m m o n usage. During the 1930s a new system, pinyin, came closer to replicating the sounds of the words as they are p r o n o u n c e d in the M a n d a r i n (literary) C h i n e s e used around C h i n a ' s capital, Beijing. In 1958 this system was adopted by the P e o p l e ' s Republic of China for its official publications, and in 1979 Xinhua (the C h i n a N e w s Agency) began using pinyin for all dispatches. T h e New York Times and many other newspapers and scholarly publications now use pinyin\ we use it throughout this b o o k , except f o r a f e w w o r d s still c o m m o n l y transliterated in other spellings (e.g., Yangtze, Sun Yat-sen) and when referring to people and m o v e m e n t s in Taiwan, where Wade-Giles is still in vogue. S o m e fields like history still use a lot of Wade-Giles, and it is used often in transliterating literature. So you will encounter it in other books. Table 1.1 c o m p a r e s the pinyin n a m e s of s o m e p r o v i n c e s and cities with transliteration c o m m o n on o l d e r m a p s , and the n a m e s of dynasties and some other words in pinyin and Wade-Giles. It includes many of the Chinese words used in this book. It is c o m m o n for C h i n e s e w o r d s to have only o n e or t w o syllables; when there are two, they are given equal emphasis in pronunciation. Words with similar sounds (and identical transliterations) m a y be differentiated by inflection of the voice up, d o w n , d o w n - u p , or flat as you p r o n o u n c e each syllable; each would h a v e a d i f f e r e n t character in written C h i n e s e script. W h e n looking at names, C h i n e s e give their f a m i l y n a m e first and then their personal name; M a o Z e d o n g ' s f a m i l y n a m e was Mao, and his personal n a m e was Zedong.

•

CREATIVE T E N S I O N S

A rubber band's ability to stretch helps it hold things together; its elasticity actually lets it wrap tightly around objects. C h i n a has m a n y traditions that c o m b i n e those traits, pulling apart while u n i f y i n g . Chapters in Understanding Contemporary China highlight m a n y tensions between

4

Robert E. Gamer

Table 1.1 Romanization of Chinese Terms Pinyin

Older Geographical Transliteration

Pronunciation

Provinces Fujian Gansu Guangdong Guizhou Hainan Hebei Hubei Jilin Shaanxi Shanxi Sichuan Xinjiang Zhejiang

Fukian Kansu Kwangtung Kweichow Hainan Hopeh Hupeh Kirin Shensi Shansi Szechwan Sinkiang Chekiang

foo jian gahn soon gwong doong gway joe hi! nanh hii bay hoo bay gee lin shahn shee shehn shee six chwahn sheen jyang juh jyang

Cities Beijing Chengdu Chongqing Hangzhou Nanjing Qingdao Tianjin Xi'an

Peking Chengtu Chungking Hangchow Nanking Tsingtao Tientsin Sian

bay jing chung doo chawng ching hong joe nahn jing ching daow tien jin shee ahn

Pinyin

Wade-Giles

Pronunciation

Dynasties Han Qidan Qin Qing Song Tang Xia

Han Ch'i-tan Ch'in Ch'ing Sung T'ang Hsia

hahn chee don chin ching soohng tahng shah

Names Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Mao Zedong Zheng He Zhang Xueliang Zhou Enlai Zhuang-zi

Teng Hsiao-p'ing Chiang Tse-min Mao Tse-Tung Cheng Ho Chang Hsiieh-liang Chou En-lai Chuang-Tzu

dung sheeaow ping jyang dze min maow dze doong jung huh jang shuey lyahng joe un lie jwong dz

Other terms baojia danwei

pao-chia tanwei

bough dja don weigh (continues)

5

Introduction

Table 1.1 continued Piny in Dao guanxi Guomindang Tiananmen Xinhua Zhong guo

• • • • •

Wade-Giles

Pronunciation

Tao kuan-hsi Kuomintang T'ienanmen Hsin-hua Chung-kuo

dow gwahn shee gwaw min dahng tien ahn mun sheen hwa djohng gwaw

Confucianism and both petty and modern capitalism Confucianism, Christianity, and communism Popular culture and formal traditions Regions and the capital city T h e heartland and its global outreach

China is slightly larger than the United States but has four times the number o f people. Its rivers cross high, dry plateaus to connect the world's highest mountains with enormous floodplains. Its eastern provinces are among the world's most populous, its western provinces among the world's least inhabited. It first b e c a m e a unified nation 2 0 0 years before the birth o f Christ, with the north conquering the south; that unity has waxed and waned ever since. At the time o f Christ, China was abandoning feudal states and starting to adopt both petty capitalist trade among family-run enterprises (often associated with the south) and a Confucian ethic (coming from the north). S i n c e that ethic emphasizes family loyalty and hard work on the one hand and interfering government bureaucracy and unquestioned loyalty to northern-based leaders on the other, it both benefits and interferes with capitalism. Daoism (deriving from folk culture) and Buddhism (from India) helped individuals cultivate their inner personal lives while conforming to the rigid social conventions associated with Confucianism and family enterprises. S o did popular forms o f entertainment, which at the same time provided inspiration for China's highly refined art and literature. China developed some o f the world's earliest large cities, which sent Chinese to ports and oases in distant parts o f Asia to establish a lively trade. B y the late eighteenth century, these cities were in contact with the emerging capitalism of western Europe, which increasingly competed with China's petty capitalist enterprises. T h e s e foreigners also brought with them Christianity and Western ideas about human freedom and progress, which competed for favor with China's established religious traditions. As large factories and cities began to widen the divide between city and countryside and among social classes, communist ideology began to compete with

6

Robert E. Gamer

Christianity and capitalism for favor among workers, urban intellectuals, and peasants. Like m a n y p r e v i o u s m o v e m e n t s , those ideologies developed some C o n f u c i a n traits as they adapted to China, especially those associated with strong rule emanating f r o m the north. Today, as China strengthens its ties with international capitalism and capitalist nations, weakens its actual and ideological ties to international c o m m u n i s m , and experiences rapid social change, traditions of both C o n f u c i a n i s m and popular culture help fill its spiritual void. And overseas C h i n e s e help fill its investment coffers. Thus, China blends many traits and traditions, which seem to pull people apart and at the same time bring them together. People are expected to give their highest loyalty to their families and f r i e n d s with w h o m they have special guanxi (relationships); yet the same traditions simultaneously bid them to follow the directives of the nation's top leaders. For thousands of years, China has both e n c o u r a g e d and strictly controlled small m a n u facturers and traders. C h i n a ' s regions have held closely to their own traditions while sharing in a c o m m o n Chinese culture. That culture viewed itself as civilized and the outside world as b a r b a r i a n yet continuously absorbed civilization f r o m the barbarians. Today C h i n a has dazzlingly m o d e r n cities short d i s t a n c e s f r o m peasants tilling fields with primitive plows and water buffaloes to supply those cities with food. China has vast numbers of laborers toiling with simple tools to support their families and the w o r l d ' s highest level of e c o n o m i c growth. Younger computer-literate leaders compete for p o w e r with old men in M a o jackets. These diverse traits and traditions have c o m e to support one another. T h e i r distinctions and c o m p e t i t i o n create tensions but do not hold back progress. That has not a l w a y s been so. B e t w e e n the 1839 arrival of the Christian West in the first Opium War and the introduction of c o m m u n i s m after World War II, and during the cataclysms of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural R e v o l u t i o n , m a n y millions lost their lives in conflict a m o n g contending social forces. But China has learned to use conflict as a m e a n s of adapting to c h a n g e . It has a disciplined social core w e a k e n e d but not basically destroyed by television, c o n s u m e r i s m , crime, and other assaults of m o d e r n culture. Its f a m i l i e s have shown an ability to control their size, save, work hard, e n g a g e in creative entrepreneurship, and divide labor between the sexes. C h i n a ' s civilization has f o cused on an attachment to the land that has survived amid many centuries of urbanization. People who have migrated to C h i n a ' s cities are w e l c o m e to return to their h o m e regions, keeping alive rural social bonds and safety nets even as people m o v e out to the e n d s of the earth. W h e n the Central Pacific Railway found its European immigrant laborers fleeing the arduous task of building a transcontinental railway across the United States in the 1860s, it turned to C h i n e s e laborers, w h o arrived already organized into disciplined work units under their own f o r e m e n . For millennia, China has

Introduction

7

used this labor and considerable scientific skills to channel its vast amounts o f water, mine rich seams of coal, enclose its cities and borders with walls and towers, and manufacture a variety o f goods prized for their excellence around the planet. Even when divided by ideology or temporary political division or separated by vast distances after migration, families and clans deriving from the same villages have habits of cooperation to further such enterprises by sharing capital, labor, markets, and special connections. They hold together tightly even while stretching to take on global challenges. As a result, China can contribute to global capitalism without being absorbed by it. These traits that help make it a great producer also make it a great consumer; its enormous population produces ever-increasing amounts o f goods not only for world markets but also for itself. Extensive use of low-skilled labor holds down the cost of manufacturing while providing millions o f people with income to buy these new goods. Unlike many third world countries, China has not developed large trade imbalances because it can produce much of what it needs. If China continues to sustain its current rates of growth, world capitalism might increasingly have to answer the reverse question: Is it ready to be absorbed by China or at least adapt its structure and mores to those of China?

•

NEW CHALLENGES

China, however, still has great challenges ahead of it. Like many third world countries, China's traditions offer little support for democracy. With its focus on obeying family and community leaders, China has suppressed individual expression. It has never allowed independent interest groups to form. Although it has long had laws, it has no tradition of rule o f law. Competing political parties clash with Chinese traditions of harmony and unquestioning obedience to authority. This lets all elements of Chinese society support movements rejecting foreign influences even as they adapt to world technology, trade, and popular culture, yet this balancing act is becoming increasingly harder to maintain. China's development has resulted in m a j o r problems. Deforestation, removal o f ground cover and wetlands, water and air pollution, and giant engineering projects pose serious threats to China's food and water supplies, health, and standard o f living. Despite the " o n e - c h i l d " policy, a growing population increasingly moving to cities is a growing strain on resources. Women made many advances during the twentieth century; fast development enhances some o f those advances but brings setbacks to others. The growing economy widens the gap between rich and poor individuals and regions and brings new opportunities for corruption; as a result, much capital that should go into development ends up in nonproductive

8

Robert E. Gamer

pursuits. This inefficiency, fast economic growth, and reduction in central planning h a v e caused inflation, resource shortages, u n e m p l o y m e n t , and declines in social services. T h e inefficient state industries are hard to phase out b e c a u s e they e m p l o y large n u m b e r s of w o r k e r s and still m a k e essential goods, but they constitute a m a j o r drain on national treasuries already depleted as political and taxation powers devolve to the provinces. These p r o b l e m s are a m p l i f i e d by an u n p r e d i c t a b l e legal system that leaves business contracts and individual liberties unprotected and makes both foreign investors and educated Chinese uneasy. In addition, China has put inadequate resources into educating a w o r k f o r c e with skills to run all the new enterprises; m a n y with education seek to leave China for higher wages abroad. Hong Kong and Taiwan, both critical to C h i n a ' s economic f u t u r e , are especially sensitive to these c o n c e r n s . T h e coastal provinces that have been experiencing the world's fastest e c o n o m i c growth resist directives f r o m central government and party organizations. Meanwhile, ethnic minorities living in interior provinces are a m o n g those receiving the fewest benefits f r o m economic growth; they are politically and culturally marginal. China has in the past split apart into regions controlled by warlords, and c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n C h i n a ' s center and regions f o r support f r o m the military r e m a i n s intense. Military threats to Taiwan or o f f s h o r e islands and crackdowns on dissidents and ethnic minorities frighten away foreign investors. These problems challenge China as it struggles to retain its fast-paced e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . Can it adapt d e m o c r a c y or d e v e l o p nondemocratic alternatives to address them? If growth slows radically, can it stay unified? Since 1842, when C h i n a ' s defeat in the first O p i u m War opened it to European i n f l u e n c e , China has been e x p e r i e n c i n g p r o f o u n d cultural crisis—a crisis has never been m o r e intense than at present. Young people who marched in the 1989 demonstrations and elders w h o once fought for a w o r k e r ' s revolution are p r e o c c u p i e d with m a k i n g m o n e y and e n j o y i n g consumer goods. M a n y y o u n g e r Chinese also revel in n e w f o u n d f r e e d o m s to express t h e m s e l v e s in music, dress, sexuality, and other nonpolitical ways. Many older Chinese worry that the social trends a c c o m p a n y i n g all the new market ventures in which they are engaging will threaten the jobs, housing, and social services that their work units still guarantee them. Increasing n u m b e r s of people cannot find full-time work, and it is c o m m o n for men and w o m e n to have t w o or three sources of i n c o m e . Families worry about the rising costs of goods they p u r c h a s e and how they might fare if the e c o n o m y should stagnate. They are profoundly torn by whether to follow traditional Chinese w a y s or trends f r o m the outside world. For many, the f u t u r e looks c o n f u s i n g . Confusion can lead people to choose authoritarianism as a safe alternative to chaos. C o n f u s i o n also creates a climate for rebellion and a c c e p t a n c e of change. T h e spread of m o n e y can

9

Introduction

have the same two effects. Will China find creative or destructive ways to deal with these tensions? We explore all these matters in the pages ahead.

•

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lee Kuan Yew. 1996. "China S h o u l d be Patient." Ear Eastern (September 19).

Economic

Review

•2-

China: A Geographic Preface Stanley W. Toops China is moving onto our horizon. Though most of us know little about it, we are increasingly aware that s o m e h o w it is going to be a big factor in our lives. With over a billion people, C h i n a has more than a f i f t h of the w o r l d ' s population (Li, 1987). Just slightly larger than the United States, c o v e r i n g 3.7 million square miles, it is territorially the w o r l d ' s thirdlargest country. And its economy, already among the world's ten largest, is g r o w i n g faster than that of any other country; soon its overall e c o n o m i c output could surpass our o w n ( G r e e n h o u s e , 1993:1). O n c e isolated f r o m the outside world, C h i n a ' s goods, people, and culture are rapidly penetrating all corners of the globe and heavily affecting our own economy and society. T h e next few pages will quickly introduce you to how it c o n n e c t s with its neighbors, how it is inhabited, and the features of its natural envir o n m e n t . T h e s e facts will prepare you f o r an o v e r v i e w of its history in Chapter 3 and give you a c o n v e n i e n t r e f e r e n c e point w h e n g e o g r a p h i c places and features are mentioned in later chapters. We start by looking at where China is located on the m a p and its historical c o n n e c t i o n s with n e i g h b o r i n g states. Historically, C h i n a ' s culture and imperial p o w e r strongly i n f l u e n c e d its closest n e i g h b o r s , Korea, Japan, and the countries of Southeast Asia; in modern times, neighboring Russia, Japan, and Southeast Asia have had a p o w e r f u l effect on C h i n a ' s political and economic development. Then we look at C h i n a ' s internal divisions, north and south, and east and west. Those regions have starkly different histories, and the d i f f e r e n c e s persist. Finally, we e x a m i n e C h i n a ' s natural l a n d s c a p e , which c o n t a i n s the w o r l d ' s highest m o u n t a i n s , huge deserts, and m a j o r rivers e m p t y i n g into the w o r l d ' s most abundant floodplains. China e n c o m p a s s e s a great diversity of cultures and physical features (Geelan and Twitchett, 1974:vii). It consists of m u c h more than peasants tilling rice fields.

11

Stanley W. Toops

12

Silk Roads

G e o g r a p h k Information Systems Lab. Miami University, 1W7 M A.

Map

2.1

Regional

Alap

oj

Asia

In simplest terms, w e ' r e talking about space (Linge and Forbes, 1990:1), region ( G o o d m a n , 1989:xi), and l a n d s c a p e (Pannell and Ma, 1983; Tuan, 1969:6). What space do China and its neighbors occupy on the map? H o w do its regions vary? How does C h i n a ' s natural landscape affect the way its people live?

•

SPACE

W h e r e is this place, and how is it linked to its neighbors? China is located on the eastern end of Eurasia, the planet's largest continent (see M a p 2.1), but its land connections on that continent consist of poor roads over harsh terrain. To the west are expanses of Central Asian dry lands and to

/] Gfogmp/iii

Preface

13

the north is the cold steppe o f R u s s i a (see M a p 2 . 4 ) . To the south are the high mountains o f the H i m a l a y a , and to the east is the P a c i f i c O c e a n . C h i n a o c c u p i e s an area not e a s i l y a c c e s s i b l e to travelers and traders. T h e distances are far and the physical barriers f o r m i d a b l e ( S i v i n

1988:

78-79). C h i n a ' s closest cultural and physical c o n n e c t i o n s are with Japan and K o r e a . T h e s e three countries are not separated by high mountains, deserts, or long stretches o f ocean. T o g e t h e r they constitute East Asia. S o m e t i m e s Westerners call this the Far East, but that term only refers to the distance from Europe. East Asia is a better term for this region, describing its location at the eastern end o f E u r a s i a : It is only far from p l a c e s that are far from there. Southeast Asia (from Vietnam down to Indonesia) is situated to the southeast ( K o l b .

1971:21-24).

T o situate China, look at the country in an East Asian context. China, J a p a n , and Korea have very distinct cultures, histories, and natural experie n c e s . T h e i r religions are quite different. Unlike C h i n a , K o r e a is located on a peninsula, whereas J a p a n o c c u p i e s a series o f islands. B u t all three have been heavily influenced by C o n f u c i a n i s m , a philosophy that began in C h i n a and has guided its ruling elite for centuries (about which you will read much more in subsequent chapters), and by C h i n e s e art. Though their spoken languages are radically different, both Japan and K o r e a used Chinese characters (discussed in a m o m e n t ) to write words before they developed their own alphabets;

the J a p a n e s e

Wet-rice agriculture

in

still

use C h i n e s e

Zhejiang

characters

14

Stanley IV. Toops

blended with words written in their alphabet, and many Koreans use Chin e s e characters for scholarly writing. This diffusion o f philosophical ideas, artistic e x p r e s s i o n , and writing practices c o n n e c t s the people of East A s i a (Kolb, 1 9 7 1 : 5 3 1 ) . T h e c o n n e c t i o n s to China's other neighbors are not as strong, but these linkages are not insignificant for China. The Buddhist religion began in India and c a m e to China via the "Silk Roads" (see Map 2.1), w h i c h also brought China's silks and other luxury g o o d s to other parts of the continent. C o n f u c i a n i s m i n f l u e n c e d bordering countries in S o u t h e a s t A s i a , w h i c h in turn d e v e l o p e d the technology of wet-rice (planting s e e d l i n g s in w e t paddy f i e l d s ) agriculture that spread throughout south China. Islam, born in the Middle East, has a stronghold in western China. From the north c a m e historically p o w e r f u l external threats, the M o n g o l and the M a n c h u (Sivin, 1988:80).

•

The M i d d l e K i n g d o m

C h i n a ' s name has historical and g e o g r a p h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e ( C a n n o n and Jenkins, 1990:269). The Chinese call their country Z h o n g guo. In the simplified characters used in the People's Republic of China, it looks like this:

T h e first character (ihong) m e a n s middle or central. N o t i c e h o w it l o o k s like a b o x or cake cut through the middle. The s e c o n d character (guo) m e a n s country or k i n g d o m . The outside square is the wall of d e f e n s e for the country. S o China is the Middle K i n g d o m , the k i n g d o m located at the most central position. The very name of the country imparts an idea of centrality. China has seen itself as central to the world, both in terms of looking up and l o o k i n g out. The C h i n e s e w o r l d v i e w placed the emperor at the connection b e t w e e n h e a v e n and earth. The emperor resided in the capital, at the center o f the world, s o it was natural that this should be the prime c o n n e c t i n g place bet w e e n land and sky. Around this center, other countries or d o m i n i o n s were far a w a y in the periphery. T h o s e faraway p e o p l e were barbarians (Freeberne, 1 9 9 2 : 1 4 9 ) . T h e name China c o m e s from the first dynasty to unify China. The Qin (pronounced "chin") dynasty unified the country in 221 B.C. The C h i n e s e p e o p l e o f that t i m e c a l l e d their country after that dynasty ( B o r t h w i c k , 1 9 9 2 : 1 7 ) . T h e ancient G r e e k s k n e w of China as Seres, the land o f silk. Silk w a s part of the trade a c r o s s the v a s t n e s s of Eurasia on the "Silk Road." Another name for China is Cathay. This c o m e s from Khitai, an ethnic group that o c c u p i e d northern China in the e l e v e n t h century. M a r c o

A Geographic

Preface

15

P o l o wrote about Cathay. P e o p l e in S lavic-speaking areas still call C h i n a Khitai ( F a i r b a n k , R e i s c h a u e r , and C r a i g , 1 9 7 3 : 1 2 3 ) . T h e C h i n e s e p e o p l e call t h e m s e l v e s Han, after the Han dynasty that immediately succeeded the Qin and adopted Confucian policies as its base. T h e Han are the dominant group in C h i n a . A l t h o u g h they l o o s e l y share s o m e c o m m o n physical features, their looks and average height vary from r e g i o n to r e g i o n , and they c o m e f r o m m a n y distinct l i n e a g e s . T h e y are united by their c o m m o n a c c e p t a n c e o f the C o n f u c i a n cultural norms that e m e r g e d during the Han dynasty (Cannon and J e n k i n s , 1 9 9 0 : 6 7 ) . Chapters 3 and 12 discuss this further. A c c o r d i n g to C o n f u c i u s , you should l o o k c a r e f u l l y at the name o f a person to understand what that p e r s o n ' s role is ( F a i r b a n k , Reischauer, and C r a i g , 1 9 7 3 : 4 4 ) . T h e same can be said for the name o f a country. C h i n a or Z h o n g guo, Qin dynasty or Middle K i n g d o m , these two names describe a country that is unified and located at the center o f civilization. Its people, the Han, grant the country loyalty on the basis o f traditional values.

•

Challenging the Middle Kingdom

C h i n a and its very view o f itself were both fundamentally challenged when the P a c i f i c O c e a n was opened to the fleets o f E u r o p e . C h i n a i t s e l f had sent ships as far as the Indian O c e a n . B u t o n c e European ships entered the P a c i f i c in numbers, C h i n a b e c a m e vulnerable militarily, culturally, and e c o n o m i c a l l y ( S i v i n , 1 9 8 8 : 8 4 - 8 9 ) . C h a p t e r s 3, 6 , and 7 all have much m o r e to say about this. W h e n C h i n a found it could not resist those onslaughts, many in C h i n a began to question whether they were any longer the names they had been calling t h e m s e l v e s , the people o f Han traditions living in the center o f the c i v i l i z e d world. T h e i r space had been invaded.

•

REGIONS

C h i n a is a land o f enormous internal contrasts. It is slightly larger than the U n i t e d S t a t e s ( P a n n e l l and M a , 1 9 8 3 : 1 ) . If a map o f C h i n a were sup e r i m p o s e d on one o f E u r o p e , C h i n a would stretch from the North S e a south to the southern edge o f the Sahara, east from Portugal to as far as the Ural M o u n t a i n s . A s the United S t a t e s or E u r o p e vary regionally, so does C h i n a . It is easy to approach this s u b j e c t by f o c u s i n g on two m a j o r divisions, east-west and north-south.

•

East and West

A historical division is between China Proper and the Frontier ( L e e m ing, 1 9 9 3 ) . T h i s is a distinction between the east and the west. China Proper

16

Stanley W. Toops

is east of a line from Yunnan in the southwest looping around Beijing and Hebei to the sea (see Map 2 . 2 ) . As Map 2 . 3 helps you quickly comprehend, this region has the heaviest population densities; 9 0 percent o f the country's population lives here. Most of those people are Han and live in a Confucian society. Much of this area is suitable for agriculture in river basins and China also focused its industrial might here. T h e people who live within China Proper consider themselves the center of China's civilization (Leeming, 1 9 9 3 : 1 2 - 1 3 ) . T h e Frontier is west of that line bisecting the country. Western China includes Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia, Gansu, western Sichuan, Tibet, Qinghai, and X i n j i a n g (see Map 2 . 2 ) . Western China has far fewer people. Much of the population—including Mongols, Tibetans, and Uygurs—does not consider itself Han. Most o f them adhere to Islam or Lama Buddhism. This region consists of mountains and deserts and has low rainfall. Traditionally, people were nomadic herders or farmed in oases. There is still very little industry here, even though this is one o f China's richest sources for oil and coal (Cannon and Jenkins, 1 9 9 0 : 6 5 - 6 7 ; Goodman, 1 9 8 9 : 1 6 4 ) .

|

Northeast and Southeast

Another regional difference exists within China Proper. A line following just north o f the Yangtze River separates the northern and southern portions o f China Proper (Borthwick, 1 9 9 2 : 5 4 - 5 5 ) . The Yellow River waters northern China (see Map 2 . 4 ) . This is the cultural heart o f China. Rainfall is adequate for agriculture. People raise wheat, which they eat in the form of noodles or steamed bread. Much of China's heavy industry is in the north because of the coal and oil here. The northern Mandarin dialect is the basis for the standard language (Leeming, 1 9 9 3 : 1 2 ) . The Yangtze River and West River are the lifelines o f the southern region (Map 2 . 4 ) . Southern China is lush compared with the north. Paddy (wet-field) agriculture is practiced here, and rice is the main food crop. Tea is grown in the hillsides. The south focuses on light industry such as textiles; it has few fuel resources. Southern dialects of the standard language, such as Cantonese, are spoken here (Leeming, 1 9 9 3 : 1 3 ) . Part of this regionalization is expressed in the food styles o f China. Cantonese style in the Guangdong province has a delicate flavor and sensibility, a more subtle approach. Sichuan food is spicy hot and numbing because o f the combination of peppercorns used in preparation. Food from Hunan, Mao's home province, is the spiciest. Shanghai style makes liberal use of seafoods and is slightly sweet. Northern China style is plainer, using onions, garlic, and cabbage but few other vegetables. Beijing style is exceptional because of the imperial dishes like Beijing duck. In the north, noodles are the staple food for people, whereas rice is the staple in the south. Except

leilongjianj

Inner longolia

• Urumqi

^hangchurv [Ajiiin y

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^ ^

Hohhot

Ningxia

Í^inchuan

(

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Jiangsu

.anzhoi

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Nanjing HÙEêïU «Vuhan«

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^-Shanghai Jhejiang Hangzh^t-'

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(£)

•FFuzhou

Kunming 0

Capital

•

Municipality

0

Province Capital

Autonomous

Miles

Regions

Provinces iitogliphic Informalion Systems Lab. Miami University. 1997 M A

Map 2.2

Provincial

Map of

China

Heilongjiang

I n n e r Mongolia BEIJING]

Xinjiang Gansu

Ningxia

landong I Jiangsu Tibet ihanghai

Persons Per S q u a r e Mile

I iuangxi

Taiwan luangdong

Miles Geographic Information Systems l.ab. Mi

Map 2.3

Population

Map of

China

I

2 to 100

H

101 to

200

•

201 to

400

•

401 to 2200

18

Stanley

IV. Toops

in Muslim areas, pork is the main meat all over China. In northwestern China, rice pilaf, spicy noodles, and lamb kebabs are c o m m o n . In Tibet roasted barley flour is the staple, supplemented by some yak meat. All over China, tea is the preferred beverage (Sivin, 1988:120-121). Chinese love f o o d and savor the specialties of their regions. H o w d i f f e r e n t are the dialects? They are as different as the f o o d s of China. I love you is expressed in these three characters:

T h e first character means "I," the second "love," and the third "you." Anyone w h o can read Chinese characters knows this. But they do not all pronounce the words in the same ways. Although the Chinese use these same characters e v e r y w h e r e , in the north people say wo ai ni in M a n d a r i n dialect. Cantonese living in G u a n g d o n g province to the south say ngoh oi lei in Cantonese dialect—quite a difference. Eventually, people have to write love notes to understand each other. A Cantonese writing these three characters to a lover in the north would immediately convey the m e a n i n g on paper, even though the words sound entirely different when spoken (Pannell and Ma, 1 9 8 3 : 6 3 - 6 4 ) . In Uygur, a Turkic language spoken in northwest China, men sizni yahxi koremen means "I love y o u " — q u i t e different indeed. But since U y g u r has its own written language, c o m m u n i c a t i o n with outsiders b e c o m e s more complicated than it is among literate Chinese w h o can read the same characters but speak different dialects. T h e regions of C h i n a are different in climate, culture, topography, agriculture, and industry (Toops and Andrus, 1993). Not only regional differences but regional identities are important. When you meet other people in China, you ask where they are f r o m . In this fashion identity is set up: "I am a Beijing person." "I am a Sichuan person." Regional identities are strong (Cannon and Jenkins, 1990:62).

•

THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE

C h i n a ' s regional d i f f e r e n c e s have their roots in physical geography. C h i n a is a land of e x t r e m e s , of diverse t o p o g r a p h i e s and varied landscapes. T h e highest point, Mt. Everest ( Q o m o l a n g m a ) at 29,029 feet (8,848 meters) is on the border of Tibet and Nepal. The lowest point, the Turpan Depression at 505 feet (154 meters) below sea level, is in the f a r west of China ( G e e l a n and Twitchett, 1974:1). T h e Chinese people h a v e been working this land f o r 4,000 years, constantly shaping and forming it. T h e terraces and waterworks are a good example of this. The Chinese have sculpted the landscape, but they are not masters of it. Floods and droughts

A Geographic

19

Preface

still p l a g u e C h i n a . T h e C h i n e s e h a v e not t r a n s f o r m e d f i e r c e a n d a u s t e r e m o u n t a i n s and deserts into fields o f grain (Tuan,

1969:1).

T h e C h i n e s e h a v e a p h r a s e , " v a s t in t e r r i t o r y a n d rich in r e s o u r c e s " da

wu bo).

(di

O n e p e r c e p t i o n o f C h i n a is o f u n l i m i t e d l a n d a n d r e s o u r c e s .

A n o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e o f C h i n e s e r e a l i t y is that " t h e l a n d is s c a r c e a n d t h e p e o p l e are m a n y " (di

shao

ren

zhong)

(Leeming,

1993). Ten percent o f

C h i n a ' s v a s t t e r r i t o r y is c u l t i v a t e d ( Z h a o , 1 9 9 4 : 3 4 ) ; 9 0 p e r c e n t o f its 1 . 2 b i l l i o n p e o p l e live on terrain a b o u t the s i z e o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s to t h e e a s t o f the Mississippi River.

• Three Tiers It is e a s i e s t to a p p r o a c h C h i n a ' s p h y s i c a l g e o g r a p h y b y v i s u a l i z i n g t h e c o u n t r y in t h r e e parts. A s M a p 2 . 4 s h o w s , n a t u r e o r d e r s t h i s l a n d s c a p e in t h r e e t i e r s , r a n g i n g f r o m m o u n t a i n s to f l o o d p l a i n s ( Z h a o , 1 9 9 4 : 1 5 ) . P o w e r f u l r i v e r s h a v e t h e i r o r i g i n s h i g h in the m o u n t a i n s o f w e s t e r n C h i n a a n d then f l o w e a s t to the s e a . T h e r i v e r s run t h r o u g h s e v e r a l t i e r s o f m o u n t a i n s , h i l l s , and then b a s i n s . O v e r t w o - t h i r d s o f C h i n a is m o u n t a i n o u s , h i l l y , o r h i g h p l a t e a u s . T h i s m o u n t a i n o u s n a t u r e is a m a j o r c o n s t r a i n t o n h u m a n use o f t h e land ( G e e l a n and T w i t c h e t t ,

1974).

Height of Land (ft.) j [

J » -

600

j 600 - 6000

6000 -16000 IbOOO + Geographic [nfoimalion Systems L.ab, Miami Univeisily. I W

M A

Map 2.4

Physical

Features of China

20

Stanley IV. Toops

T h e h i g h e s t tier is t h e m o u n t a i n s , s h o w n o n M a p 2 . 4 w i t h t h e t w o d a r k e s t g r a d a t i o n s of s h a d i n g , r e p r e s e n t i n g l a n d r a n g i n g f r o m 6 , 0 0 0 t o 2 9 , 0 2 9 f e e t ( 1 , 8 2 9 to 8 , 8 4 8 m e t e r s ) in e l e v a t i o n . Tibet lies in t h e h e a r t of this r e g i o n , but it also e x t e n d s into Q i n g h a i , X i n j i a n g , S i c h u a n , G a n s u , a n d G u i z h o u p r o v i n c e s (see M a p 2.2). T h e H i m a l a y a r a n g e , at the s o u t h e r n e n d of t h i s s y s t e m , c o n t a i n s t h e w o r l d ' s h i g h e s t m o u n t a i n s , E v e r e s t a n d K 2 . Shan m e a n s " m o u n t a i n . " You will n o t i c e s e v e r a l o t h e r r a n g e s o n M a p 2 . 4 that a r e less f a m i l i a r to y o u . T h e i n t e r m e d i a t e s h a d i n g r e p r e s e n t s a l t i t u d e s f r o m 6 , 0 0 0 to 1 6 , 0 0 0 f e e t ( 1 , 8 2 9 t o 4 , 8 7 7 m e t e r s ) ; k e e p in m i n d that ( e x cept f o r 2 0 , 3 2 0 - f o o t M t . M c K i n l e y ) t h e h i g h e s t m o u n t a i n s of N o r t h A m e r ica a r e u n d e r 1 5 , 0 0 0 f e e t . All the m a j o r r i v e r s of C h i n a h a v e t h e i r o r i g i n s in t h e s e r e g i o n s . A l t i t u d e is a m a j o r c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e h a b i t a t i o n of p e o p l e , p l a n t s , and a n i m a l s ( C a n n o n a n d J e n k i n s , 1 9 9 0 : 8 5 ) . T h e m i d d l e tier is the hilly area, r e p r e s e n t e d in the lightest s h a d i n g — a b r o a d e x p a n s e of b a s i n s , hills, a n d p l a t e a u s b e t w e e n 6 0 0 a n d 6 , 0 0 0 f e e t ( 1 8 3 a n d 1,829 m e t e r s ) . To the north are the T a r i m a n d J u n g g a r B a s i n s a n d t h e O r d o s P l a t f o r m ( M o n g o l i a n P l a t e a u ) . P o p u l a t i o n in t h e n o r t h e r n p o r t i o n s of this tier ( T a r i m a n d M o n g o l i a ) is q u i t e s p a r s e b e c a u s e it is so dry. T h e d e s e r t s a n d t h e m o u n t a i n s c o m b i n e to f o r m e f f e c t i v e b a r r i e r s t o t h e o u t s i d e . B e l o w t h e m is the L o e s s P l a t e a u , and east of Tibet are t h e S i c h u a n B a s i n a n d t h e Y u n n a n P l a t e a u ( s o u t h of t h e H e n g d u a n S h a n ) . H e r e t h e r e is m o r e rainfall. T h e s o u t h e r n p o r t i o n of this tier ( S i c h u a n and Y u n n a n ) h a s a d e n s e p o p u l a t i o n . A l o n g t h e c o a s t r i s e f o u r r a n g e s of h i l l s — C h a n g b a i , S h a n d o n g , H u a n g , a n d W u y i . H a i n a n I s l a n d to t h e s o u t h c o n t a i n s a n o t h e r range (Zhao, 1994:15). T h e l o w e s t tier ( w i t h o u t s h a d i n g ) , w i t h f l o o d p l a i n s a n d l o w l a n d s , is both the smallest and most populous. Notice from c o m p a r i n g M a p s 2.3 a n d 2 . 4 h o w this p o r t i o n of C h i n a s u p p o r t s the h i g h e s t p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t i e s — t h e land is s c a r c e and the p e o p l e are m a n y . T h i s s e g m e n t f o l l o w i n g t h e c o a s t lies l o w e r t h a n 6 0 0 feet ( 1 8 3 m e t e r s ) . T h e N o r t h C h i n a P l a i n f o l l o w s t h e p a t h of t h e Y e l l o w R i v e r , w h i l e t h e Y a n g t z e R i v e r a n d t h e c o m b i n e d p a t h s of t h e L i a o a n d S o n g R i v e r s f o r m p l a i n s to t h e s o u t h a n d n o r t h . T h e s e p l a i n s with their m a n y p e o p l e are the a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d i n d u s trial h e a r t of C h i n a . T h e N o r t h C h i n a P l a i n h a s less w a t e r , a n d t h e p l a i n f o r m e d by the L i a o a n d S o n g R i v e r s is q u i t e c o l d in w i n t e r ; as o n e m o v e s s o u t h t o w a r d t h e d e l t a of the West R i v e r the w a r m , wet, f e r t i l e p l a i n s p r o vide the principal basis for C h i n a ' s rich agricultural output (Pannell and Ma, 1983:119). T h e t w o h i g h e s t tiers are t h e result of t e c t o n i c activity, t h e - m o v i n g of t h e e a r t h ' s p l a t e s . T h e H i m a l a y a s a r e still g r o w i n g ; e a r t h q u a k e s s t r i k e C h i n a r e g u l a r l y . B a s i n s are u s u a l l y not v u l n e r a b l e , but the t e c t o n i c b o u n d aries (fault lines) b e t w e e n plateaus and the m o u n t a i n ranges h a v e earthq u a k e s f a i r l y o f t e n . T h e m o s t d i s a s t r o u s e a r t h q u a k e s h a v e b e e n t h o s e in p o p u l a t e d areas. In 1976 an e a r t h q u a k e in T i a n j i n , n e a r B e i j i n g , k i l l e d o v e r 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e ( C a n n o n and J e n k i n s , 1 9 9 0 : 8 7 - 8 9 ) .

A Geographic

•

Preface

21

The Rivers Linking China

T h e mountains and deserts may divide China, but the river basins link it together. T h e natural landscape of China sometimes is summed up as Huang He Chang Jiang, the names for the two largest rivers, the Yellow and the Yangtze. These river systems connect the three physiographic tiers we just discussed. Over long spans of time, the rivers flowed through the mountains and plateaus carrying eroded material that washed into the sea to form and then build up the lowlands; they still break through dams and dikes during flood seasons to lay down more silt from upstream, contributing to the fertility of the soils in eastern China (Cannon and Jenkins, 1990:84). T h e river of greatest historical importance is the Yellow River, since imperial C h i n a had its origins along its banks and those of its tributaries (see Chapter 3). As M a p 2.4 shows, the Yellow River (Huang He) starts in the high mountain areas, runs north, cuts south through the Loess Plateau, and f l o w s into the Bo Sea (Bo Hai) and out to the Yellow Sea (Huang Hai). T h e Yellow River and Yellow Sea gained their n a m e s f r o m the fine fertile loess ( y e l l o w - b r o w n soil) the river carries in its m u d d y waters. W h e n the Chinese speak of "the River," it is this one. The Yellow River is also called " C h i n a ' s Sorrow." A c c o r d i n g to Chinese historical records, it has changed its course twenty-six times in the past 4,000 years. Since the North China Plain is very flat, people have built dikes and then more dikes to control it. Over the years, it has deposited m u c h silt on its bottom, raising the riverbed. People in turn raised the dikes to hold up the banks. Now the riverbed is higher than the s u r r o u n d i n g plain. W h e n dikes break, the flood carries for miles. This is the sorrow. The river also brings joy by irrigating fields along its floodplain. W h e n the ancient Chinese organized to build the dikes and irrigation channels, their agricultural surplus increased, and Chinese civilization developed (Pannell and Ma, 1983:27). T h e longest liver in C h i n a and the third longest in the world is the Long River (Chang Jiang). This river is also k n o w n as the Yangtze (Yangzi in pinyin); technically, this refers only to the estuary (mouth) of the river, but E u r o p e a n s and A m e r i c a n s w h o were introduced to it w h e n arriving f r o m the ocean adopted that n a m e — w h i c h w e use in this b o o k — t o describe the whole river. As you can see on Map 2.4, the Yangtze starts in the high mountain areas not far f r o m the headwaters of the Yellow River, but the rivers take different paths to the sea. Out of Tibet, the Yangtze passes t h r o u g h S i c h u a n and then goes through the n a r r o w T h r e e G o r g e s in Wu Shan b e f o r e c o m i n g out into the Yangtze Plain. Unlike the Yellow River, this river is very important f o r transportation, linking the interior to the East China Sea (Zhao, 1994:110). T h e Yangtze is also prone to flooding that affects millions of people, especially since this area gets plenty of rainfall. T h e government has built large d a m s and reservoirs to lessen flood d a m a g e and to generate hydroelectricity. N o w the government is building the Three Gorges Dam, which

Stanley W. Toops

22

will be the world's largest dam. The reservoir will fill much of the spectacular Three Gorges (Edmonds, 1992, 1994:144-150), and many people are concerned about the impact of such a dam on the environment (see Chapter 9). The West River (Xi Jiang) drains southern China. As you can see from Map 2.4, this river rises out of the Yunnan Plateau and cuts through the South China Hills before it reaches the South China Sea. The Pearl River Delta, the estuary of the West River, has been an important economic area for China. Hong Kong is located there. The area is hilly, but peasants have built terraces over the years for paddy (wet-field) agriculture. This southern section of China has more than adequate moisture for wet-rice fields, and the hillsides are also good for tea. The Chinese have a saying, "when you drink water, think of the source" (yin shui si yuan). These rivers are very important for China. Without water, the land is worth little (Pannell and Ma, 1983:141).

•

Climate, Soil, and Vegetation

The monsoon controls China's climate. The winter monsoon blows dry, cold air out of the northern Siberian steppes, bringing no moisture. The summer monsoon blows in hot and humid air masses from the South and East China Seas (see Map 2.4); by the time these air masses reach the interior, they have rained themselves out but are still hot. This north-south monsoon mechanism drives the climate process in China. It keeps south China warm and wet, whereas the north is cold and dry—relieved only by the Yellow River flowing from the south and winds from the East China Sea and Sea of Japan (Geelan and Twitchett, 1974:xx). The Chinese designate their soils by color. Red soil is in the southeast, and the marshy areas of the south are blue. The loess of the north is yellow-brown, and the northeast has black soil. The deserts of the west have white soil. No soils anywhere in the world have fed so many people for so many generations (Tuan, 1969:23-31). Because of China's size and diversity, it helps to examine each region of the country to understand the linkage among climate, soils, and vegetation (Zhao, 1994:30). The southeast, the wettest part of China, receives over 60 inches (152.4 centimeters) (sometimes nearly 80) of rain, most in the summer. The southeast portion of the United States, by comparison, has a similar climate but receives 4 0 - 6 0 inches (101.6-152.4 centimeters) of rain. China's southeast is subject to typhoons in the summer. Summers are extremely hot and sticky, and winters are cool and damp. In much of this part of China, people do not have heating, so the winter feels cold. Since the growing season is quite long, it is common to cultivate two crops of rice a year. On Hainan (see Map 2.2), a tropical isle, three crops are possible (Sivin, 1988:48).

A Geographic

Preface

23

Soils in the southeast are thick and sticky. This area was originally covered by broadleaf evergreen forests. Now much of the region grows rice, on fields immersed in water to nourish the young paddy shoots, and the sticky soils hold the roots firmly. They have been farmed for a long time and leached of much of their nutrients, but the farmers add night soil (human waste from outhouses and buckets) to provide humus (Pannell and Ma, 1983:33). North of the Yangtze, the climate begins to change. The North China Plain (see Map 2.4) gains enough precipitation for crops. The yearly variability of precipitation is marked; some years may not reach 20 inches (50.8 centimeters), whereas others get closer to 40 inches. Wheat, rather than rice, dominates. Water is at a premium; some have suggested diverting part of the Yangtze's flow northward. Summers are hot and winters are quite cold. In the winter, dust storms sometimes come off the Gobi Desert, blanketing Beijing with a fine dust. Heilongjiang and Jilin (see Map 2.2) are cold indeed, especially in the long winter. Summers are short but warm, with enough moisture for crops such as corn and soybeans (Pannell and Ma, 1983:41). The sediment left by river flooding in the North China Plain is quite fertile, though dry. This area was originally covered by forest, although now fields of wheat are most common. Some of the soils have been irrigated so much that they have become salty. Wet-field paddy cannot be formed in the dry fields of the north, and so less rice can be grown here. Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning (see Map 2.2) have poor soils except in the floodplains of the Song and Liao Rivers. Conifer forests still cover much of the mountain region. Aridity (lack of rainfall) begins to increase in the interior of the country; half of China's territory gets less than 20 inches of rainfall a year (Cannon and Jenkins, 1990:82). The Loess Plateau and Mongolian Plateau (Ordos Platform), shown on Map 2.4, are part of the 20 percent of China that is semiarid, with 1 0 - 2 0 inches ( 2 5 . 4 - 5 0 . 8 centimeters) of rainfall a year. Wheat and some corn and millet are grown here with irrigation from the Yellow River. Summers are very warm and dry, and winters are quite cold and dry. The loess (the brownish-yellow soil that gives the Loess Plateau its name) is very deep and fertile, but erosion is a major problem in this area. The original vegetation was grassland and shrub; much that remains is overgrazed by cattle, and most has been plowed into fields. When the rains come, they fall hard and fast. Much of the surface loess ends up in the Yellow River (Pannell and Ma, 1983:36). Over 30 percent of China is almost completely arid, with under 10 inches of rainfall a year (Cannon and Jenkins, 1990:82). The Takla Makan Desert in the Tarim Basin (Map 2.4) is the most extreme case, with less than 1 inch (2.54 centimeters) of rain per year. In the local language, Takla Makan means " i f you go in, you do not come out." Turpan has recorded

24

Stanley IV. Toops

temperatures up to 118 degrees Fahrenheit (48 degrees Celsius). In this dry stretch of land, only the s n o w m e l t from the mountains can g i v e any water for sustenance. Even though the temperature is high, it is not humid, s o the s u m m e r s are bearable. B e c a u s e Siberia, where the winter m o n s o o n s b l o w in, is immediately to the north, winters are severely cold. T h e many o a s e s m a k e the desert livable; they are h i g h l y productive, g r o w i n g s p e c i a l t y crops such as m e l o n s , grapes, and cotton. In the northern portions o f this arid area, steppe grasslands afford livestock grazing. T h e mountains have c o n i f e r forests also (Pannell and Ma, 1983:43). T h e Tibetan Plateau ( M a p 2 . 4 ) has a unique and harsh c l i m a t e . A l t i tude and location on the interior of a continent c o m b i n e for a dry, c o l d climate, much like the polar extremes. Every month has temperatures b e l o w f r e e z i n g . T h e interior of the area r e c e i v e s less than 4 i n c h e s ( 1 0 . 1 6 c e n timeters) of precipitation per year. The s u m m e r is quite short, but if y o u stay in the sun it is warm. S o i l s are poor in Tibet because there is not much plant life to d e c a y into h u m u s . Barley is g r o w n in the south. T h e y a k s , sheep, goats, and dzo (a cross b e t w e e n a yak and an o x ) are the only livestock in this harsh climate. The yaks provide meat, milk, and hides for the Tibetans ( G e e l a n and Twitchett, 1 9 7 4 : 1 0 9 ) . T h e y also k e e p d o n k e y s and horses, and w i l d asses roam the countryside. China's 1.2 billion p e o p l e have many challenges. O n l y 10 percent of the land will grow crops. Deserts and mountains make up m u c h of western China. Northern China d o e s not have e n o u g h water. Only the southeast has a climate that provides an abundance of food. Raising the e c o n o m i c w e l l b e i n g of the p e o p l e will require careful m a n a g e m e n t of the natural resources.

•

Economic Resources

W h e n Marco P o l o c a m e to China, he f o u n d the C h i n e s e burning "black rocks"; the abundance of coal and other fuel has long contributed to China's high e c o n o m i c output. China has several sources for energy. In the rural areas, the energy of the sun and of plants is the major source for most peasants. T h e burning of coal and oil provide energy for m o s t urban areas (Smith, 1 9 9 1 : 1 8 4 ) . In areas with great rivers, hydroelectric p o w e r c o n tributes increasing amounts o f electricity. Peasants use minimal amounts of oil. Coal is the fuel in the north, and p e o p l e also burn rice straw, w h e a t straw, cornstalks, and cotton stalks to c o o k f o o d and boil water. It takes a lot of straw to boil water. S i n c e this material is burned, it is not p l o w e d back into the ground to enrich the soil. Peasants scour the c o u n t r y s i d e l o o k i n g for sticks, t w i g s , bark, and grass to use as f u e l b e c a u s e s o m u c h of the natural landscape is o v e r c u t . T h i s causes the hill slopes to erode without their natural cover. Manure piles are

A Geographic

Pre/ace

25

o f t e n used to g e n e r a t e m e t h a n e gas for c o o k i n g and light. Small-scale hydroelectric power plants provide enough electricity for lighting in many h o m e s (Pannell and Ma, 1983:116). In the city a different pattern emerges. Coal supplies much energy, both for industrial and for residential use. China has the world's largest coal reserves, located mainly in northern China. Coal is processed into charcoal for cooking in urban households, and China's heavy industry relies largely on coal. Because northern China has water shortages, m u c h of the coal is u n w a s h e d and thus burns less efficiently. Shipment of coal to other areas is a m a j o r difficulty for China. As China's industrialization increases, it will burn more coal, adding to air and water pollution (Leeming, 1993:21-23; Veeck, 1991:125). See Chapter 9 for a discussion of these problems. China is a m a j o r producer of oil but uses most of its oil for its own industry. Much of the oil is in northeastern China; newer sites include the Bo Hai region in the northeast ( M a p 2.4) and Hainan Island in the southeast (Map 2.2). The biggest potential lies in the Tarim Basin of the northwest. Exploration of this desert area has been a major focus. These sites are far f r o m industrial areas, h o w e v e r , so transporting the oil is a p r o b l e m . As C h i n a increases its use of cars, the d e m a n d for oil products will also increase (Cannon and Jenkins, 1990:181-183). Another energy source is hydroelectric power. Strong potential exists for electricity production on rivers of the south such as the Yangtze. Here the p r o b l e m s lie in m o v i n g p e o p l e and in f l o o d i n g large f a r m l a n d areas. This power, however, will serve the needs of industry and the urban population (Cannon and Jenkins, 1990:186). China's iron ore reserves lie mostly to the north and northeast. The Chinese have mined iron for thousands of years, and many mining operations are small scale and locally run. The reserves should be adequate in coming years if used more efficiently. China is looking for more minerals in western regions as it advances into the twenty-first century. Many of them are in outof-the-way places to the north and west, so transportation to the heavy industry located in the north will be a problem (Zhao, 1994:45). With better soils, water supplies, transportation, and terrain, the eastern portion of China has been more hospitable f o r living and e c o n o m i c production than the west. The northeast is well suited for heavy industry, and the southeast is ideal for agricultural production. Hence the e c o n o m y of China Proper to the east has far surpassed that of Frontier China to the west. In Chapter 3 we observe that this disparity goes far back in time, and in Chapters 4 and 5 we discuss whether it might be reduced in the future. The Yangtze River can play a pivotal role in helping to m o v e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h w e s t w a r d . T h e C h i n e s e like to view the coast as a bow and the Yangtze River as an arrow that can shoot industry and e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s into C h i n a ' s interior. A f t e r all, as the next chapter says, it was the Yellow

26

Stanley W. Toops

R i v e r that shot China's imperial civilization out to the coast (Cannon and Jenkins, 1 9 9 0 : 2 9 ) .

•

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blunden, Caroline, and Mark Elvin. 1983. Cultural Atlas of China. New York: Facts on File. Borthwick, Mark. 1992. Pacific Century. Boulder: Westview Press. Buchanan, Keith. 1970. The Transformation of the Chinese Earth: Perspectives on Modern China. London: G. Bell and Sons. Cannon, Terry, and Alan Jenkins (eds.). 1990. The Geography of Contemporary China: The Impact of Deng Xiaoping's Decade. London and New York: Routledge. Cheung, Peter T. Y., Jae Ho Chung, and David S. G. Goodman (eds.). 1996. "The 1995 Statistical Yearbook in Provincial Perspective." Provincial China 1 : 3 4 68. Edmonds, Richard Louis. 1992. " T h e Sanxia (Three Gorges) Project: The Environmental Argument Surrounding China's Super Dam." Global Ecology and Biogeography Letters 4, no. 2 : 1 0 5 - 1 2 5 . . 1994. "China's Environment." Pp. 1 4 3 - 1 7 0 in William Joseph (ed.), China Briefing, 1994. Boulder: Westview Press. Fairbank, John King, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig. 1973. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Freeberne, Michael. 1992. "The Changing Geography of the People's Republic of China." Pp. 1 2 2 - 1 5 9 in Graham Chapman and Kathleen Baker (eds.), The Changing Geography of Asia. London and New York: Routledge. Geelan, Peter J. M., and Denis C. Twitchett (eds.). 1974. The Times Atlas of China. London: Times. Goodman, David S. G. (ed.). 1989. China's Regional Development. London and New York: Routledge. Greenhouse, Steven. 1993. "New Tally of World's Economies Catapults China into Third Place." New York Times (May 20). Institute of Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences. 1994. The National Economic Atlas of China. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kolb, Albert. 1971. East Asia: Geography of Cultural Region. London: Methuen. Leeming, Frank. 1993. The Changing Geography of China. Oxford: Blackwell. Li Chengrui (ed.). 1987. The Population Atlas of China. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Linge, Godfrey J. R., and Dean K. Forbes (eds.). 1990. China's Spatial Economy. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Murphey, Rhoads. 1992. A History of Asia. New York: HarperCollins. Pannell, Clifton, and Laurence J. C. Ma. 1983. China: The Geography of Development and Modernization. New York: John Wiley. Sivin, Nathan (ed.). 1988. The Contemporary Atlas of China. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Smith, Christopher. 1991. China: People and Places in the Land of One Billion. Boulder: Westview Press. Toops, Stanley W., and Simone Andrus. 1993. "Social Intelligence in China." Journal of Economic & Social Intelligence 3, no. 1:3-20. Tuan, Yi-fu. 1969. China. Chicago: Aldine.

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Veeck, Gregory (ed.). 1991. The Uneven Landscape: Geographical Studies in Post Reform China. Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University. World Bank. 1992. World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment. New York: Oxford University Press. Zhao Songqiao. 1994. Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population, and Development. New York: John Wiley.

•3"

The Historical Context Rhoads Murphey In Chapter 2, Stanley Toops showed how China is situated within Asia and how its people blend into the three tiers of its natural landscape. He also introduced some of the cultural diversity that has resulted from the blending. In this chapter, too, we will emphasize how nature both limits and encourages human occupancy of the land, but now our focus is on the history of human settlement, conquest, and government in China. As we begin half a million years ago and move forward to the present, another kind of blending becomes evident: China's isolation from much of the rest of the planet let it develop a unique culture that contributed extensively to civilizations elsewhere. At the same time, this culture was able to absorb conquests, technology, migrations, and religions from outside without losing its own identity. Even periods of disunity and conquests by Europeans and Japanese during the past two centuries have left China's unique culture and institutions fundamentally intact. C h a p t e r 2 introduced you to the distinction b e t w e e n Frontier China and China Proper and between southeastern and northeastern China. As we review the histories of C h i n a ' s imperial dynasties in this chapter it will quickly b e c o m e evident that C h i n a ' s imperial civilization began in Frontier China but has its base in China Proper. Periodically, parts of northern China have been c o n q u e r e d by g r o u p s of invaders c o m i n g in f r o m the Frontier, and the M o n g o l s (briefly) and the M a n c h u s (more e n d u r i n g l y ) conquered the whole country. Yet those invaders themselves soon adopted the habits and institutions of China Proper. And China Proper itself has a long historical division; southeastern C h i n a ' s culture is as old and solid as that of the northeast. Those in the northeast conquered those in the southeast. That conquest has not been forgotten. This chapter introduces a number of other themes that, like those in the prior two paragraphs, are treated more fully in subsequent chapters. China experienced feudalism and developed a centralized state long before those social and political processes came to Europe. It developed some unique relationships b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t officials and m e r c h a n t s that often pitted

29

30

Rlionds

Map 3.1 Note:

Historical

Murpliey

Boundaries

of

China

A l t h o u g h t h e Z h o u d y n a s t y d i d n o t f a l l u n t i l 2 2 1 B . c . , its t e r r i t o r y w a s s i g n i f i c a n t l y

d e c r e a s e d in 2 5 6 B . c . b y t h e b a r b a r i a n

invasion.

south against north and region against region yet encouraged agriculture, c o m m e r c e , and and the early growth o f cities. It repeatedly tried to c o n q u e r and control people in adjoining territories. It has s o m e t i m e s w e l c o m e d traders from around the world and s o m e t i m e s kept them m o r e at a r m ' s length. T h e early parts o f new dynasties often brought exciting growth and innovation; the latter parts often brought decline and stagnation. W h e n the European powers first tested the empire with the 1839 Opium War, the e m pire was in a period o f d e c l i n e . That war e x p o s e d C h i n a ' s t e c h n o l o g i c a l b a c k w a r d n e s s and r e s i s t a n c e to c h a n g e and opened up a century o f c o n quest and humiliation by outside powers. Yet China has o n c e again found the strength to rebound as it seeks to bring its technology to world levels.

•

THE PEOPLING OF CHINA

•

Early Inhabitants

A s far as we know, the ancestors o f the Chinese have lived for the past h a l f - m i l l i o n years in the area now covered by the modern p r o v i n c e s o f

The Historical

Context

31

China Proper. China Proper is—as Chapter 2 explained—the area south of the Great Wall (which is just north of Beijing) and east of the Tibetan massif (the uplifted highlands with the two darkest shadings on Map 2.4). The earliest remains of Homo credits found in China Proper are of Peking (Beijing) Man, dated approximately 500,000 B.C.; since they are fossilized, it is hard to differentiate physical characteristics from those of fossilized Homo erectus remains discovered elsewhere in the world. There is, however, some evidence that by about 200,000 B.C., after Homo erectus had merged with other humanoid species, the population, at least of northern China, had developed certain physical features associated with modern Chinese. The handheld stone choppers and knives these people fashioned were similar to those at other Paleolithic sites in East Asia but different from the stone tools made in Paleolithic Europe, India, and Africa (Chang, 1986:22-70; Gernet, 1968:19-39; Watson, 1961:22-55; Howells, 1983). This suggests that China had by then become quite isolated within its mountain and desert borders. China was to remain largely isolated f r o m areas and cultures to the west until Portuguese adventurers arrived by sea in the sixteenth century and British naval guns finally opened China's ports to residence by foreigners in the nineteenth century. Though isolated, the Chinese borrowed extensively from neighboring regions (March, 1974:61-67), developed many inventions of their own, and united large populations and regions while central Asian and European states and empires rose and fell (Lattimore, 1940:27-39). The Chinese have always been very conscious and proud of their long and glorious past. That consciousness and pride remain true today, and one really cannot understand contemporary China without considerable knowledge of its history.

•

North a n d S o u t h

China covers a huge area, larger than the United States if one includes Tibet (Xizang), Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning), where cultures and physical types remain basically different from those of China Proper (Lattimore, 1940:53-80; Cheng, 1966; Pulleyblank, 1983). Even the provinces within China Proper (which itself originally contained a wide but closely related variety of cultures and physical types) cover territory large enough to hold most of the countries of western Europe. In the third century B.C., with the creation of empire under the Qin dynasty (221 B . C . ) , the people and culture of northern China conquered the central and southern regions of China Proper. Soon they were spreading their culture and then themselves southward. From the time of the Han dynasty (202 B.C.-220 A.D.) and its consolidation of empire, the inhabitants called themselves "people of Han." Map 3.1 shows you how the Han dynasty moved into territory farther south and west than previous dynasties. The southernmost people conquered by the

32

Rlioads

Murphey

Han were distantly related to but distinct f r o m them. Qin and Han expansion also took place at the expense of the several more closely related but distinct peoples and cultures of central and southern China. S o m e of these southerners had almost certainly created what we may call "civilization"— settled agriculture, metals, writing, and cities—at least as early as or earlier than these developments in the north, where in the dry climate the evidence is better preserved (Chang, 1 9 8 6 : 9 5 - 1 0 6 , 1 9 2 - 2 4 2 , 3 6 8 - 4 0 8 ; Li, 1 9 8 5 : 1 8 9 - 2 2 1 ) . Such early d e v e l o p m e n t s in the south would be a logical result of its proximity to the original sources of cultivated rice, pigs, chickens, water b u f f a l o e s , and early m a k i n g of bronze, all in a d j a c e n t Southeast Asia (northern Vietnam and northern T h a i l a n d ) , probably well b e f o r e they appeared in what is now China. Transmittal was easy, and there was probably also some m o v e m e n t of peoples. B e f o r e the Qin conquest forcibly united all Chinese into a single empire, the G u a n g d o n g (see M a p 2.2) area was joined in a single state with what is now northern Vietnam, the state of Yueh, which spoke a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e ( M e a c h a m , 1983). But it is hard to imagine historical China without even one of the key elements derived from Southeast A s i a — b u f f a l o e s for plowing the soil, rice and pigs as staples in the diet (Te-Tzu C h a n g , 1 9 8 3 : 7 0 - 7 7 ) , and b r o n z e for casting (Li, 1 9 8 5 : 2 6 5 - 3 1 4 ; Barnard, 1983; Franklin, 1983). These presumably spread in time into central and northern China, but the north was generally too dry for rice and b u f f a l o e s and only marginally hospitable for pigs and chickens. In the course of the Qin and Han conquests, a single written language was imposed as well as a c o m m o n spoken language, the ancestor of modern standard spoken Chinese, for the o f f i c i a l s who administered the empire. Originally, northern culture overlaid the widely different cultures of the south. With the fall of the Han dynasty in A.D. 220 began the long migration of northerners southward over some 2,000 years, which, of course, added further pressures toward a national mode, in addition to the northern troops and administrators w h o had been operating in the south since the third century B.C. Distinct traces of different regional cultures and speech patterns remain among Han Chinese in the south, including differences in diet and cuisine as well as strong provincial identity amounting almost to clannishness. But the southward wave of Han Chinese c o n q u e s t and settlement has taken all of the good agricultural land and greatly reduced the original n o n - H a n population, w h o now live only in m o u n t a i n o u s areas mainly unfit for agriculture, to which they have been driven by Han pressures. In a few subprovincial areas of this sort they constitute a majority, yet their n u m b e r s are small, and they are divided a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s by cultural and linguistic differences. S o m e 91 percent of C h i n a ' s people are Han, with the r e m a i n d e r widely scattered and f r a g m e n t e d . As C h a p t e r 8 explains, these percentages are somewhat inaccurate because many Han in recent years have married n o n - H a n or asserted non-Han identity to avoid

The Historical

33

Context

t h e o n e - c h i l d p o l i c y o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h d o e s not a p p l y to n o n - H a n . O v e r t h e c e n t u r i e s s i n c e t h e Q i n a n d H a n c o n q u e s t o f t h e s o u t h , there h a s b e e n w i d e s p r e a d i n t e r m a r r i a g e as w e l l a s p r e s s u r e s f o r c u l t u r a l c o n f o r m i t y , s o that the m a n y o r i g i n a l l y quite separate and distinct cultures o f central and southern C h i n a have been overlaid by a c o m m o n imperial

stamp.

T r a c e s o f t h e o r i g i n a l l y w i d e v a r i e t y o f p h y s i c a l t y p e s as w e l l as a s p e c t s o f l o c a l o r r e g i o n a l c u l t u r e c o n t i n u e to b e a p p a r e n t b e n e a t h that s t a m p . C h a p ter 4 w i l l tell y o u m o r e a b o u t t h e s e d i v i s i o n s .

•

The Outer Areas

T h e o u t e r a r e a s — t h e F r o n t i e r , w h i c h w a s i n t r o d u c e d in C h a p t e r

2—

a r e a s e p a r a t e c a s e , o r i g i n a l l y i n h a b i t e d b y p e o p l e o n l y s l i g h t l y r e l a t e d to the Han C h i n e s e (Lattimore,

1940: 2 5 5 - 2 7 9 ; "Mysterious," 1998). The

c l e a r e s t c a s e s are t h e T i b e t a n s , M o n g o l s , a n d U y g u r s , the l a t t e r the d o m i nant inhabitants o f X i n j i a n g . S i n c e 1 9 5 0 the C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t has not o n l y f o r c i b l y o c c u p i e d t h e s e a r e a s but p r o m o t e d l a r g e - s c a l e

settlement

t h e r e o f H a n C h i n e s e as a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d t e c h n i c i a n s , w h o n o w c o n s t i tute the l a r g e s t p o r t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f X i n j i a n g a n d a g r o w i n g p r o portion o f the population o f Tibet. Outer M o n g o l i a ( L a t t i m o r e ,

1940:489-

5 1 0 ) , n o r t h o f the G o b i D e s e r t , d e c l a r e d its i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m C h i n a in 1 9 2 1 as t h e M o n g o l i a n P e o p l e s ' R e p u b l i c , but I n n e r M o n g o l i a , a l o n g t h e s t e p p e f r o n t i e r , w a s h e a v i l y o c c u p i e d b y H a n C h i n e s e , m a i n l y as f a r m e r s d e p e n d e n t o n n e w i r r i g a t i o n a n d r o a d a n d rail l i n e s . T h e y n o w o u t n u m b e r t h e r e m a i n i n g M o n g o l s b y s o m e t h i n g l i k e 2 0 to 1, a n d t h e d i s t i n c t M o n g o l c u l t u r e is f a d i n g , and s i g n i f i c a n t n u m b e r s o f H a n C h i n e s e h a v e a l s o s e t t l e d in O u t e r M o n g o l i a a s t e c h n i c i a n s . M a n c h u r i a ( L a t t i m o r e ,

1940:

1 0 3 - 1 5 0 ) , k n o w n in C h i n a s i m p l y as " t h e N o r t h e a s t " in an e f f o r t to s o f t p e d a l the a r e a ' s c o n t e n d e d h i s t o r y as a t a r g e t o f R u s s i a n and J a p a n e s e a m b i t i o n s ( s e e C h a p t e r 7 ) , h a s b e e n o v e r w h e l m e d by m a s s H a n C h i n e s e m i gration s i n c e the late nineteenth century. T h i s i m m i g r a t i o n has

almost

o b l i t e r a t e d t h e o r i g i n a l T u n g u s i c , M a n c h u , and M o n g o l p o p u l a t i o n as t h e n o r t h e a s t r e c e i v e d r e f u g e e s f r o m o v e r c r o w d e d and d r o u g h t - r i d d e n n o r t h ern China and developed

its o w n s u r p l u s a g r i c u l t u r a l

s y s t e m and the

l a r g e s t h e a v y industrial c o m p l e x in E a s t A s i a , t h a n k s to its m a j o r r e s o u r c e s o f c o a l , iron, oil, and hydro ( w a t e r ) power. T h e C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t ' s " s o l u t i o n " to the p r o b l e m o f n o n - H a n m i n o r i t i e s w a s to e s t a b l i s h a u t o n o m o u s a r e a s in t h e f e w p o c k e t s in t h e s o u t h w h e r e n o n - H a n p e o p l e s r e m a i n e d a m a j o r i t y a n d in T i b e t , X i n j i a n g , a n d I n n e r M o n g o l i a . " A u t o n o m o u s " is a b a d j o k e , s i n c e t h e r u l i n g h a n d o f t h e C h i n e s e s t a t e is o m n i p r e s e n t , a n d n e a r l y all p o s i t i o n s o f a u t h o r i t y a r e h e l d b y H a n o r b y c o l l a b o r a t o r s . In T i b e t ( a s C h a p t e r 6 e x p l a i n s ) , t h e C h i n e s e s t a t e has tried to e r a d i c a t e a s e p a r a t e T i b e t a n i d e n t i t y a n d s o v i c i o u s l y r e p r e s s e d T i b e t a n e f f o r t s to a s s e r t it o r to s e e k a v o i c e in t h e i r o w n a f f a i r s

Rhonds Murphey

34

that China has been repeatedly accused of genocide. The " a u t o n o m o u s " f o r m u l a has convinced n o one and in Chinese parlance is best referred to as "great Han c h a u v i n i s m . " Since minorities are such a small and f r a g m e n t e d percentage of the total population, o f t e n o c c u p y i n g strategically sensitive borders where neighboring states like to play on their discontent, the Chinese state feels free to ride roughshod over them and their interests.

•

POLITICAL PATTERNS OF THE PAST

•

Feudalism

C h i n a ' s recorded history begins with the Shang dynasty (ca. 1 6 0 0 1027 B.C.; see M a p 3.1 and Table 3.1), whose authenticity was questioned by Western scholars until excavations in the 1920s uncovered the remains of the last Shang capital, Anyang, and a great n u m b e r of inscriptions giving the n a m e s of S h a n g kings (Li, 1957). Later e x c a v a t i o n s (Keightley, 1983; Maspero, 1978:24-33) rounded out the picture of the Shang as being dependent upon slaves captured in chronic wars with surrounding groups, already referred to as "barbarians," and as managing a productive agricultural system on the fertile loess (wind-laid, yellow-brown soil) of northern China. T h e chief S h a n g crop was millet, probably native to northern China, slowly supplemented by rice as rice moved northward. The m a j o r technological a c h i e v e m e n t of the Shang was in the w o r k i n g of bronze, producing o b j e c t s w h o s e technical perfection has never been equaled (Cheng, 1960; Creel, 1937:57-218; Leslie, Mackerias, and Wang, 1 9 7 3 : 9 14; Gernet, 1968:43-66; Watson, 1961:57-101; Levenson and Schurmann, 1969:4-26). Excavations in central and southern China, where high temperatures and humidity have tended to obliterate much of the e v i d e n c e , have nevertheless m a d e it clear, as hinted at earlier, that S h a n g achievements were paralleled, perhaps even preceded, farther south, where writing, bronze, and a surplus-producing agriculture based mainly on rice were used (Chang, 1980; Hsu, 1995:1-32). The Shang built large and ornate palaces whose remains can tell us a good deal about the wealth generated by agricultural surpluses, including the richly decorated chariots that were buried in the royal tombs with their horses and large n u m b e r s of followers or slaves. Writing, clearly the ancestor of modern written Chinese, slowly evolved and expanded to include abstractions; m a n y of the characters can still be read, and the system was inherited by the next dynasty, the Zhou (Te-Tzu C h a n g , 1 9 8 3 : 8 1 - 9 4 , 1 0 7 - 1 2 9 ; Chang, 1 9 8 6 : 2 9 5 - 3 0 7 ; Leslie, Mackerias, and Wang, 1 9 7 3 : 1 5 22; Li, 1 9 8 5 : 4 4 2 - 4 5 9 ) . T h e Z h o u ' s successor, the Qin dynasty, would impose this northern script on all of China, replacing the different scripts already in use farther south.

The Historical

Context

35

In about 1027 B.C., a great slave revolt was joined by one of the Shang feudal vassals, the Zhou who guarded the western frontiers (Hsu, 1 9 9 5 : 3 3 67). Originally a " b a r b a r i a n " group, the Zhou had acquired most of Shang culture and technology and used what became the traditional Chinese justification f o r rebellion, citing the injustices and oppression of the Shang rulers and declaring that " h e a v e n c o m m a n d s us to destroy it" (Te-Tzu C h a n g , 1 9 8 3 : 4 4 - 5 5 ; M a s p e r o , 1 9 7 8 : 8 6 - 9 2 ; Hsu, 1 9 9 5 : 6 8 - 1 1 1 ) . The last S h a n g king, alleged to have been a m o n s t e r of depravity, died in the flames of his palace. The S h a n g had ruled f r o m successive capitals, f r e q u e n t l y m o v e d , in the central Yellow River valley, including the site of modern Z h e n g z h o u , capital of Henan province (see M a p 2.2). This was the heartland of early agriculture, but the Zhou established their new capital near modern X i ' a n (see Map 3.1 and Shaanxi province on M a p 2.2), their old base. Warfare continued with other groups around the fringes of the Zhou d o m a i n s and periodically with groups to the south, all still called "barbarians." The Zhou adopted the f e u d a l solution used by the Shang, a network of s u p p o s e d vassals o w i n g loyalty to the Zhou k i n g ( M a s p e r o , 1978: 3 4 - 6 3 ; Li, 1 9 8 5 : 4 6 0 - 4 7 6 ; Hsu, 1 9 9 5 : 1 1 2 - 2 5 7 ) . T h i s r e s e m b l e d the system in medieval Europe, whereby a central state with pretensions to wider p o w e r but without the means to e n f o r c e it m a d e alliances with local and regional g r o u p s , s y m b o l i z e d by ritual h o m a g e , p r o v i s i o n of troops, and periodic gifts, in e x c h a n g e f o r their control over their regional lands as f i e f s granted by the king. For p e r h a p s the first two or three centuries of Z h o u rule, this system s e e m e d to work r e a s o n a b l y well ( L e v e n s o n and S c h u r m a n n , 1 9 6 9 : 2 7 - 5 5 ; Watson, 1 9 6 1 : 1 0 9 - 1 4 6 ; C h a n g , 1 9 8 6 : 3 3 9 - 3 6 0 ; Creel, 1 9 3 7 : 2 1 9 - 3 8 7 ) . But C h i n a was c h a n g i n g as regional vassals increased their p o w e r and ambitions beyond the ability of the central state to control.

•

The D e c l i n e of F e u d a l i s m

More basically, the spread of iron tools greatly increased f a r m production, hastened the clearing of remaining forests with iron axes as well as with fire, expedited new irrigation systems, and taken together supported a m a j o r increase in population, f r o m perhaps 5 or 10 million under the late Shang to perhaps 20 million by mid-Zhou, spurred by rising food output, which also provided s u r p l u s e s to be e x c h a n g e d in trade (Li, 1985:16-58). Towns and cities began to dot the plain and the Yangtze valley, and a merchant class of some size emerged. As in m e d i e v a l Europe, n o n e of this fit well with the f e u d a l system based on f i x e d serfdom and the d o m i n a n c e of a hereditary aristocracy (Elvin, 1973:23-34). Serfs could escape to the new towns and begin a new life. We d o n ' t know much about the life of the c o m m o n people in the first

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and 45 percent in Taiwan. About two-thirds of the 220,000 or so students sent abroad for studies have not returned to China. This will in time constrain attempts to restructure and upgrade the Chinese economy into more skill-intensive and higher value-added activities. In short, C h i n a ' s human resource gaps, in quantitative as well as in qualitative terms, could well operate to moderate its long-term growth potential (see Watson, 1992). Of greater importance, C h i n a ' s pattern of growth in the longer term will critically d e p e n d on how C h i n a c o m e s to grips with a n u m b e r of specific problems and constraints.

•

Constraints from Unfinished Reform

In 1994 China carried out a c o m p r e h e n s i v e package of e c o n o m i c ref o r m — a n outgrowth of the 1993 Third Party Plenum discussed earlier in this chapter. In the areas of taxation and foreign exchange, the reform has been quite successful. T h e tax reform, aimed at unifying the tax code and simplifying the tax system and administration, came into effect on January 1, 1994. It seems strange that a country as big as China has never had a nationwide tax administration; the bulk of its tax collection has been delegated to local governments. T h u s the 1994 tax reform, by separating the tax authority between central and local g o v e r n m e n t s , marks a truly significant m o v e for Beijing. Henceforth, a new revenue-sharing arrangement between the central and local governments is to replace the complex contract-based intergovernmental revenue system, historically called "tax f a r m i n g " (Ma and Luo, 1994). Whether the reform can significantly increase central tax revenues remains to be seen. If they do not increase, it will be hard for the government to support social safety net programs, reform of state initiatives, unemployment insurance, and efforts to bolster sags in the economy. The currency exchange reform started in 1994 with unification of the dual e x c h a n g e rate system that had operated f r o m 1986 to 1993. D u r i n g that period C h i n a had t w o c u r r e n c i e s — f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e certificates (FECs) for use by f o r e i g n e r s and for transactions to convert foreign currencies into Chinese currency, and renminbi for doing b u s i n e s s within China. Since renminbi could not be converted on international exchanges, in a growing currency black m a r k e t its value began to diverge sharply f r o m that of F E C s (which could be e x c h a n g e d f o r foreign currency only through Chinese g o v e r n m e n t b a n k s at rates artificially set by t h e m ) ; though the two currencies officially had the same value, black marketeers operating on street corners and in back rooms could trade many renminbi f o r one FEC, showing that f o r e i g n currency was worth more to Chinese traders than the g o v e r n m e n t - c r e a t e d e x c h a n g e rate reflected. This disadvantaged businesses that had to operate on regulated current accounts (for

China s

Economy

121

day-to-day transactions) and capital accounts (for longer-term investments) using the legal foreign exchange currency; competitors who had connections that let them disguise their transactions more easily than was possible for most foreign investors could use renminbi and the black market to purchase many times more goods for the same amount of foreign exchange. That is because the black market rate of renminbi could "float" to the level that Chinese currency was actually worth in international trade. The exchange reform eliminated the FECs; renminbi now convert into foreign currencies through "managed floats." This change paves the way for China to target full renminbi convertibility (also free exchange on capital accounts) by the year 2000. Recently, there were official hints that China would step up the final process in order to support its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), though the Southeast Asian currency speculation problems could slow that down (Yee and Shan, 1996). Progress on reforming China's 300,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the financial sector is still falling short of targets. Efforts to reform state enterprises were initially directed at improving their efficiency by restructuring management, including measures to define enterprise rights under law and to free management from government supervision. This culminated in the promulgation on July 1, 1994, of a new Company Law, which was supposed to provide the needed legal framework for the formation of "shareholding companies," which is the Chinese method of privatization. However, progress has been very slow. A handful of state enterprises are run efficiently; the majority of them are heavily debt-ridden and cannot be easily converted into shareholding companies until they have gone through drastic financial restructuring and recapitalization. Furthermore, mere focus on ownership reform cannot ensure the efficiency and profitability of state enterprises, which eventually have to go through a fundamental management reform in order to learn how to behave like true profit-maximizing enterprises. In other words, state enterprises would ultimately have to operate under real budget constraints. Hopelessly unprofitable state enterprises would have to be shut down. China passed a bankruptcy law as early as 1986, but the government has been extremely reluctant to allow the ailing state enterprises to fold up for fear of social instability that would result from the loss of large numbers of jobs. The problem of reforming state enterprises in all transitional economies is enormously complicated, involving larger political and social issues. For China, in particular, its large state enterprises exist like miniwelfare states, whose main objective is not confined to making profits but also includes taking care of such social responsibilities as housing, education, health care, and other services for their workers on behalf of local governments. Effective reform of state enterprises must, therefore, start

122

John

Wong

with d e c o u p l i n g their production f r o m their n o n p r o d u c t i o n social f u n c tions. This w o u l d ultimately entail breaking the so-called three i r o n s — iron rice bowl, iron j o b position, and iron w a g e s — w h i c h are deep-rooted social institutions, politically difficult to uproot. T h u s , prior to the provision of a new social safety net or social security r e f o r m , any serious attempt to reform state enterprises by subjecting them to the necessary hard b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t s could run the risk of t h r o w i n g millions of r e d u n d a n t w o r k e r s into the street along with creating social unrest (see Walder, 1986; Wu, 1996). By 1998, 12 million urban workers were already unemployed; only half had found new jobs. In 1998, those figures could double (Wong, 1997a: 10, 1998:14; Yatsko and Forney, 1998:46; "East A s i a ' s , " 1998:37). Beijing's latest strategy for reform of state enterprises is zhua-da fangxiao (free smaller state enterprises first while hanging on to large ones). By avoiding the political risks of tackling the large state enterprises, the government is actually not attacking the main problem. A large n u m b e r of state enterprises report losses year after year. In the first half of 1996, for instance, 49 percent of China's industrial state enterprises were reported to be in the red. 6 This means that the state banks had to help the ailing state enterprises, leading to the a c c u m u l a t i o n of many bad loans (Solinger, 1993; Forney, 1996). C h i n a ' s government vows not to continue doing t h a t — a vow hard to keep (White, 1 9 9 3 : 1 2 1 - 1 4 6 ) . Nine-tenths of the U.S.$600 billion of bank loans outstanding in China, equivalent to 70 percent of GDP, are to state industry; half or more will never be repaid ("The Death," 1997; "East Asia's," 1998). And the problem of bad debts hinders banking reform in China. China's T V E s , which have generated much of the growth and account for 30 percent of industrial output, also need reform. The low-value-added, labor-intensive items they m a k e now face stiff competition f r o m bettermade goods, and these firms do not have the capital or skills to incorporate new technology. Their average growth of 30 percent a year had dropped to 12 percent in 1997 (Yatsko, 1998:52). The government is encouraging privatization of those that cannot compete. From the standpoint of macro economic management, banking reform constitutes the most vital component of the whole economic reform package (see Huang, 1996; Kam, 1995). For the proper operation of the socialist market e c o n o m y , China needs a proper financial f r a m e w o r k f o r its monetary policy. In other words, the government must be able to use such key monetary instruments as m o n e y supply and interest rates in a f u n c tioning financial system for maintaining macroeconomic stabilization. Prior to e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , C h i n a operated with a single bank. Since 1984 it has evolved a two-tier banking system: T h e P e o p l e ' s Bank of China (PBC) became the country's central bank, and policy and commercial

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lending were assigned to four specialized state b a n k s — t h e Bank of China, the Industrial and C o m m e r c i a l Bank of China, the P e o p l e ' s Construction Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China. The annual credit plan was the cornerstone of C h i n a ' s m o n e t a r y policy; extension of credit was m o n o p o l i z e d by these f o u r institutions. A s e c o n o m i c r e f o r m took hold and the role of the market e x p a n d e d , the shortcomings of such an administratively controlled annual credit plan, both in its formulation and implementation, became increasingly apparent. M a n y businesses in m a n y parts of the country needed credit. W h e n a bank gave too m a n y bad loans, it did not have enough money left for worthy recipients who might be better able to repay. In fact, the lack of a marketbased monetary policy tool has been the root cause of the violent fluctuation of the Chinese economy prior to 1993. Hence the need for banking reform. T h e main thrust of the latest banking reform aims at (1) setting up a strong and i n d e p e n d e n t central b a n k , w h o s e primary responsibility is to m a i n t a i n m o n e t a r y and e x c h a n g e rate stability, and (2) letting the f o u r state-owned specialized banks operate on a purely commercial basis, leaving "policy lending" (i.e., loans of noncommercial nature) to three newly created "policy b a n k s " — t h e State Development Bank, the Export and Import Bank, and the Agricultural Development Bank. T h e passing of the Central Bank Act in 1994 provided the legal basis for the P e o p l e ' s Bank of C h i n a to operate as the c o u n t r y ' s central bank, which is now supposed to have operational autonomy for conducting m o n etary policy. But doubt r e m a i n s whether the PBC has acquired real indep e n d e n c e to operate as a truly central bank. It is even more doubtful that the specialized banks have c o m e near to operating like true c o m m e r c i a l b a n k s b e c a u s e most of their loans are still not based on c o m m e r c i a l assessment, and the interest rates are still not determined by market forces. A principal concern is their huge amount of n o n p e r f o r m i n g loans (called "triangular debt") contracted by state enterprises. According to Asia Times, "By some estimates, about 70 percent of loans by state banks, to both industrial and other enterprises, are irrecoverable" ( " H o w to Save," 1996). According to Standard and Poor's, those bad loans total 60 percent of G D P ("East A s i a ' s , " 1998:37). In this way, the economic woes of the near-bankrupt state enterprises translate into a m a j o r problem for the banks. B e c a u s e the crucial b a n k i n g and state enterprise r e f o r m s (which are actually i n t e r d e p e n d e n t ) have failed to achieve important breakthroughs, the g o v e r n m e n t ' s p r i m e o b j e c t i v e of establishing a market-based macroe c o n o m i c m a n a g e m e n t system r e m a i n s u n f u l f i l l e d (Wong, 1995a). This m e a n s that the C h i n e s e e c o n o m y , without the usual built-in m a c r o e c o nomic stabilizers, will continue to experience violent fluctuation. Until the transition to a full m a r k e t e c o n o m y is completed, China will suffer f r o m the inefficiency of a partially r e f o r m e d economy.

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Institutional Constraints

T h e m a j o r c h a l l e n g e f a c e d b y C h i n a t o d a y is not j u s t to transform its e c o n o m i c s y s t e m but a l s o to modernize its i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . C h i n a ' s existing institutional setup and political system were developed primarily to serve the socialist e c o n o m y b a s e d on c e n t r a l p l a n n i n g a n d d o m i n a t e d by the CCP. They are clearly inappropriate for a market economy. L i b e r a l d e t r a c t o r s w o u l d h a s t i l y j u m p to the c o n c l u s i o n that f o r political r e f o r m C h i n a m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y call f o r a W e s t e r n style of d e m o c r a c y . T h i s is c l e a r l y u n w a r r a n t e d in t h e E a s t A s i a n t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h h a s f o l l o w e d i n s t e a d t h e s e q u e n c e of " d e v e l o p m e n t f i r s t , d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n l a t e r . " F u r t h e r m o r e , s u c h d r a s t i c p o l i t i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n as f u l l d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n f o r a b i g a n d d i v e r s e c o u n t r y l i k e C h i n a is p l a i n l y u n r e a l i s t i c at t h e p r e s e n t s t a g e : it will s i m p l y b r i n g m o r e c h a o s (luan) to C h i n a , if t h e d e m o c r a c y e x p e r i m e n t s in s e v e r a l A s i a n c o u n t r i e s c a n s e r v e as a g u i d e . N o r will political d e m o c r a c y n e c e s s a r i l y f a c i l i t a t e C h i n a ' s p r e s e n t e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d s o c i a l p r o g r e s s . It is to be r e m e m b e r e d that S o u t h K o r e a ' s i n d u s t r i a l takeoff took place under a military dictatorship, Taiwan's under martial law, a n d H o n g K o n g ' s u n d e r c o l o n i a l rule (see C h a p t e r 6). At the s a m e t i m e , h o w e v e r , a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t state is f u n d a m e n t a l l y incompatible with a f u n c t i o n i n g market system. Market forces, operating o n t h e i r o w n , o n l y r e c o g n i z e e c o n o m i c s i g n a l s , not the " C a r d i n a l P r i n c i p l e s " of the C C P d e d i c a t e d to m a i n t a i n i n g c e n t r a l p o w e r and g u a r a n t e e i n g all c i t i z e n s e c o n o m i c r i g h t s . E i t h e r t h e f r e e m a r k e t p r o c e s s of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t would e v e n t u a l l y u n d e r m i n e the Marxist-Leninist state, or t h e r i g i d M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s y s t e m w o u l d resist c r u c i a l c h a n g e s by g i v i n g w a y to a h a l f - r e f o r m e d m a r k e t s y s t e m , w i t h all its i n e f f i c i e n c i e s w e h a v e j u s t b e e n d i s c u s s i n g . In e i t h e r c a s e , the C C P m u s t adapt a n d c h a n g e . A s s u m i n g that n o r u l i n g p a r t y is w i l l i n g to s h a r e p o w e r on its o w n volition, the m o s t f o r m i d a b l e c h a l l e n g e f o r the C C P is h o w to s k i l l f u l l y m a n a g e i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s w i t h o u t l o s i n g its total p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e p a r t y h a s to s t e p u p i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m to f a c i l i t a t e the d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e s o c i a l i s t m a r k e t e c o n o m y ; but on t h e other, it has to e n s u r e that t h o s e c h a n g e s will not u n d e r m i n e its o w n r u l e . T h i s is a h i g h l y d e l i c a t e b u s i n e s s , w h i c h will test the true s t a t e c r a f t of t h e future C C P leadership. T o r e t a i n p o w e r , t h e C C P o b v i o u s l y h a s to r e n e w itself by a t t r a c t i n g more younger and better-educated members. This would c o m p r o m i s e the p a r t y ' s past e m p h a s i s f o r its m e m b e r s h i p on the class b a c k g r o u n d of w o r k e r s a n d p e a s a n t s , r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e i r s k i l l s a n d e d u c a t i o n . In t h e l o n g e r r u n , it h a s got to t r a n s f o r m itself into a m o d e r n , d e v e l o p m e n t - o r i e n t e d p o litical organization based on m e r i t o c r a c y rather than ideological d o g m a . A n a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e d o m i n a t e d by a r u l i n g p a r t y w i t h a m o d e r n a n d p r a g m a t i c o u t l o o k c a n still f o s t e r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , b u t o n e w i t h a rigid ideology cannot.

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It is now clear that rapid e c o n o m i c and social changes in China have already brought about a decay in the C C P ' s local organizations, especially in the rural areas. This was inevitable once it had lost its original revolutionary ideological fervor amid the spread of prosperity and materialism. O n e p o s s i b l e scenario f o r the f u t u r e is that a f t e r the passing of the old guard, the C C P might well split into factions. With China getting more developed and the population better educated, some C C P factions may even assume a new label such as social democrats. For the likely shape of C h i n a ' s future political system, China scholars f o r e s e e the weakening of the party's authority along with the gradual erosion of the s t a t e ' s direct control over the e c o n o m y and society. In the longer run, although the C C P will continue to be an important institution, it is not likely to retain its d o m i n a n c e over the overall political system. Rather, the party, the military, the provincial and municipal bureaucracies, the p e o p l e ' s assemblies, and the central e c o n o m i c b u r e a u c r a c i e s will all c o m p e t e in a largely p e a c e f u l m a n n e r f o r supremacy. As Michel O k s e n berg says, " N o n e of these institutions is likely to emerge as a clear victor, resulting in a complex system of several overlapping yet competing centers of power, with the relative power of each institution varying over time and f r o m place to place" (1996:2). W h a t e v e r is the more likely scenario, political pluralism is bound to follow e c o n o m i c development. In the short run, however, the C C P cannot renounce its Marxist doctrines without immediately losing its own legitimacy, as h a p p e n e d in Eastern E u r o p e . T h e r e f o r e , it has to be e x t r e m e l y cautious in its political reform; initially perhaps it will focus on improving the system of g o v e r n m e n t such as separating the party f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t , which in turn will pave the way f o r the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a professional civil service. It should also r e f o r m its present cadre system, with p r o f e s s i o n a l s and technocrats gradually replacing the old "socialist bureaucrats," w h o are appointed by the C C P ' s organization department, not by open recruitment based on competition. The role played by technocrats in managing successful economic development in the East Asian newly industrializing e c o n o m i e s is well k n o w n to the C h i n e s e leadership, which has also started to stress the importance of civil service reform. All these political r e f o r m s may weaken the C C P ' s m o n o p o l y on power. But at the same time, it is buying time as the resultant improvement in administrative efficiency and government p e r f o r m a n c e will help it stay in power. T h e potential gain in popularity as a successful modernizer can offset the loss of its old legitimacy. In the process, m u c h still depends on w h e t h e r or not the top leadership retains its political skills in m a n a g i n g these changes. For the i m m e d i a t e future, however, the other aspects of institutional c h a n g e s i n v o l v i n g legal r e f o r m are more urgently n e e d e d . All m o d e r n states have clear rules and regulations to set out the limits of authority and define the general behavior of market participants. T h e absence of the rule

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of law, d u e to the C h i n e s e tradition of " r u l e of m a n , " is the w e a k e s t link in the C h i n e s e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . N e e d l e s s to say, a s t r o n g a n d t r a n s p a r e n t legal f r a m e w o r k c a n d e f i n i t e l y p r o m o t e b u s i n e s s a n d f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t by r e d u c i n g t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s in the f o r m of r e n t - s e e k i n g and c o r r u p t i o n activities. So long as b u s i n e s s e s m u s t pay bribes to e n s u r e that contractual o b l i g a t i o n s are m e t a n d c a n n o t take c a s e s to an impartial court w h e n cont r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s are b r o k e n , d o i n g b u s i n e s s in C h i n a r e m a i n s h i g h l y risky. S i n c e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , C h i n a h a s e n a c t e d o v e r 160 n e w l a w s , o v e r half of w h i c h are related to c o m m e r c e . But legal r e f o r m g o e s b e y o n d the simple process of m a k i n g laws or setting up law courts. It has to build up an effective legal infrastructure with an independent judiciary that is f r e e f r o m control by the party (see Keith, 1994). F u r t h e r m o r e , C h i n a , as p r i m a r i l y a C o n f u c i a n state with n o G r e c o - R o m a n legal traditions, n e e d s to u n d e r t a k e g r e a t e r e f f o r t s to f o s t e r the n e c e s s a r y " l e g a l c u l t u r e . " A g a i n , legal r e f o r m is not w i t h o u t its political risk to the CCP. T h e legal r e f o r m c o u l d lead to the w e a k e n i n g of the c o m m u n i s t rule b e c a u s e it w o u l d m e a n that the party c o u l d n o l o n g e r r e m a i n a b o v e the law. T h e clim a x of the legal r e f o r m will be r e a c h e d w h e n the C C P a g r e e s to w r i t e a new constitution f o r C h i n a that r e m o v e s all its special privileges. All in all, political and institutional c h a n g e s will h a s t e n the e m e r g e n c e of s o m e kind of d e m o c r a c y in C h i n a .

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Social C o n s t r a i n t s

A s C h a p t e r s 1 a n d 4 i n d i c a t e d , the cultural tradition of C o n f u c i a n i s m creates a "savings ethic," a "learning ethic," a "work ethic," cooperation a m o n g e n t r e p r e n e u r s and p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s , and other b e h a v i o r patterns that c a n f o s t e r e c o n o m i c g r o w t h ( W o n g , 1996). O t h e r n e w l y i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g e c o n o m i e s of A s i a that s h a r e this c u l t u r e — T a i w a n , S o u t h K o r e a , H o n g K o n g , and S i n g a p o r e — h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d an inherent social c a p a b i l i t y to s u s t a i n e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t (see S k o g g a r d , 1996). T h e s e p r e c e d e n t s s h o u l d b o d e well f o r C h i n a ' s e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t as well. H o w e v e r , C h i n a ' s r a p i d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h in r e c e n t y e a r s h a s g i v e n rise to a lot of n e g a t i v e social externalities, f r o m rising social e x p e c t a t i o n s and w i d e s p r e a d social e n v y to rising c r i m e , w h i c h h a v e c o n s t a n t l y w o r r i e d the C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p . A s e n s e of a g e n e r a l " m o r a l c r i s i s " is s w e e p i n g C h i n a . To be sure, such a m o r a l crisis is also prevalent (or actually w o r s e ) in R u s s i a and o t h e r E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s . H o w f a r d o e s it r e p r e s e n t a transitional p h e n o m e n o n ? Will it g o a w a y by itself o n c e t h e s e socialist c o u n t r i e s h a v e c o m p l e t e d their e c o n o m i c and social t r a n s i t i o n s ? M o s t C h i n a e x p e r t s t a k e the v i e w that m a n y of t h o s e n e g a t i v e s o c i a l externalities m a y c r e a t e f r i c t i o n s in the e c o n o m i c g r o w t h p r o c e s s , but t h e y will not, on their o w n , be s e r i o u s e n o u g h to d i s r u p t t h e p r o c e s s . T h e

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C h i n e s e authorities u n d e r s t a n d a b l y place a high priority on m a i n t a i n i n g social order, which is crucial f o r e c o n o m i c growth and e c o n o m i c reform. It is often the case that the best way to deal with the by-products of rapid e c o n o m i c g r o w t h is to continue with rapid e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , which will generate more resources to deal with social problems. For e x a m p l e , take the case of e m p l o y m e n t . Between 1978 and 1993, C h i n a ' s labor f o r c e increased by 2 1 3 million, with 75 percent e m p l o y e d in m a n u f a c t u r i n g and services. As a result of high economic growth since the r e f o r m , a m a j o r i t y of all new entrants into the labor force f o u n d productive e m p l o y m e n t outside agriculture. N o w state enterprises are laying off m o r e urban w o r k e r s , and some 15 percent of the rural p o p u l a c e — p e r h a p s 150 million p e o p l e — a r e e x p e r i e n c i n g r e d u n d a n c y or "disguised u n e m p l o y m e n t , " contributing to the 70 million " f l o a t i n g p o p u l a t i o n " in C h i n a ' s cities (only 20 percent of w h o m have jobs) discussed in Chapter 8. If the Chinese e c o n o m y continues to grow at 8 percent or 9 percent a year, p r o b l e m s like u n e m p l o y m e n t would be taken care of. If it does not, with the general s l o w d o w n in Asia's economy, u n e m p l o y m e n t could rise to as high as 20 percent (Wong, 1 9 9 7 a : l l - 1 3 ; Yatsko and Forney, 1998:46). H o w e v e r , there are other critical p r o b l e m s that will create strains in C h i n e s e society even with c o n t i n u i n g high e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . First, the leadership must mobilize all its institutional resources to c o m b a t corruption, which is rampant in China today. Economic reform in all transitional e c o n o m i e s generates opportunities f o r extortion, p r o f i t e e r i n g , and open graft and corruption. The problem is getting so serious that it threatens to undermine the social fabric of the country as well as the moral authority of the CCP. So far there has been a lot of rhetoric about corruption f r o m the Chinese leaders, who have yet to demonstrate a determined political will to tackle this issue. T h e Chen Xitong affair, in which a top o f f i c i a l (the m a y o r of B e i j i n g ) was r e m o v e d for corruption, is more the o u t c o m e of high-level p o w e r struggle than a deliberate attempt by the leadership to crack d o w n on widespread corrupt practices of its high officials. 7 Municipalities, townships, and provinces all over China are raising a lot of r e v e n u e by selling land in special e c o n o m i c zones, operating joint v e n t u r e s , c o l l e c t i n g i n c o m e taxes, setting up d u m m y c o r p o r a t i o n s in H o n g K o n g , cooperating with smugglers, collecting port tariffs, and regulating the e c o n o m y . T h e y still d e p e n d on the central g o v e r n m e n t to conduct interprovincial c o m m e r c e , k e e p order, and run m a n y g o v e r n m e n t a l operations, which o f f e r s t r e m e n d o u s opportunities f o r those with special guanxi relationships to reward one another (see Oi, 1989a; Myers, 1989). T h e s e r e w a r d s help explain why a good deal of the tax m o n e y the provinces are supposed to be collecting for the central g o v e r n m e n t never reaches Beijing. M o r e than a mere social evil, corruption hampers economic growth by increasing transaction costs and reducing efficiency. R a m p a n t corruption

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a l s o s l o w s t r a d e a n d i n v e s t m e n t . Guanxi

retards business. Any contract pro-

v i s i o n c a n b e c i r c u m v e n t e d by a b r i b e ; t h e c o u r t s c a n n o t be c o u n t e d o n to g i v e r e s t i t u t i o n in t h e c a s e of f r a u d o r b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t . I n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y r i g h t s c a n n o t b e g u a r a n t e e d f o r f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e s that b r i n g in p a t e n t e d t e c h n o l o g y ( A l f o r d , 1995; M u r p h y , 1996); c o u n t e r f e i t m e r c h a n d i s e a b o u n d s . I n v e s t m e n t c a p i t a l g e t s d i v e r t e d i n t o u n p r o d u c t i v e u s e s , like i m p o r t e d M e r c e d e s f o r o f f i c i a l s t o r i d e a r o u n d in. A s a r e s u l t , g o v e r n m e n t s d o n o t h a v e p r e d i c t a b l e r e v e n u e s to c a r r y o u t p r o j e c t s a n d p a y b a c k l o a n s , a n d p r o j e c t s r e m a i n u n f i n i s h e d or g o w a y o v e r b u d g e t . H o n g K o n g , T a i w a n , K o r e a , a n d S i n g a p o r e h a v e all m a d e s e r i o u s a t t e m p t s to t a c k l e t h e p r o b l e m of c o r r u p t i o n . C h i n a t o o m u s t m a n a g e this p r o b l e m p r o p e r l y a n d t a k e c a r e that it d o e s n o t c r e e p t o o d e e p l y i n t o H o n g K o n g n o w that it is a part of C h i n a . A second m a c r o social issue with serious e c o n o m i c and political c o n sequences

is t h e g r o w i n g

income disparity between

the

fast-growing

coastal zones and the b a c k w a r d interior provinces, b e t w e e n urban and rural areas, or b e t w e e n industrial and agricultural sectors. T h e recent Ninth Five-Year Plan ( 1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 0 ) has e m p h a s i z e d the need for a new developm e n t s t r a t e g y to n a r r o w i n c o m e g a p s in C h i n a , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t B e i j i n g c a n n o l o n g e r s h r u g o f f t h i s p r o b l e m . T h e p e r c e n t a g e of t h e p o p u l a t i o n e a r n i n g l e s s t h a n U . S . $ 0 . 6 0 a d a y h a s d e c l i n e d f r o m o v e r 2 5 p e r c e n t in 1978 t o 7 p e r c e n t . B u t a f o u r t h of t h e p o p u l a c e — m a n y , b u t b y n o m e a n s all, l i v i n g in i n l a n d p r o v i n c e s — e a r n less t h a n U . S . $ 1 a d a y ( L y o n s , 1 9 9 4 ) .

Many

now support

The individuals

themselves

in this photograph

from

small

sidewalk

repair shoes and

stalls. umbrellas.

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Being self-employed or working for a smaller enterprise can mean the loss of day care facilities like this, offered by many larger employers.

Underlying the regional development gaps is the deep-rooted interregional political rivalry and the political tension between the center and provinces. Both pose a threat to China's national unity. Some provinces have, from time to time, undertaken unilateral measures to protect their vested economic interests by obstructing the flow of resources (e.g., interprovincial "trade wars"), and this affects the efficient operation of the Chinese economy as a single market. 8 When coastal provinces can pay more for commodities than the central government, they can corner the market and deprive other provinces of these goods (Yabuki, 1 9 9 5 : 3 1 - 4 0 ; Shirk, 1 9 9 3 : 1 4 4 ) . Suffice it to say that China needs greater political and economic integration to boost its economic growth, which in turn depends on closing the regional development gaps. Third, China has to step up the social security reform, which was actually one of the unfulfilled key areas in China's 1994 reform package. As pointed out earlier, the crucial state enterprise reform could not take off because of the lack of a new social safety net. China's old social security system is based on the danwei (work unit), which was developed for the

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highly regulated society under M a o ' s time (see Walder, 1986; Oi, 1989b; and C h a n , M a d s e n , and Unger, 1984, f o r excellent closeup studies of these units). But the r e f o r m has since eroded the danwei system before a new social security system to suit the operation of market e c o n o m y is in place. Millions of workers now work for township and village enterprises that do not o f f e r full housing, health care, pensions, day care, and other e m p l o y e e b e n e f i t s . A new social security system is needed to deal with such p r o b l e m s as labor mobility, the aging p o p u l a t i o n , and so on. The g o v e r n m e n t is e x p e r i m e n t i n g with private i n s u r a n c e s c h e m e s and other i n n o v a t i v e strategies to fill this g a p (Nann, 1995; Forney and Yatsko, 1997). Few people have adequate i n c o m e or savings to pay for these necessities t h e m s e l v e s . M u n i c i p a l i t i e s , t o w n s h i p s , and other units of government are spending increasing a m o u n t s on building and subsidizing the operation of these facilities.

•

Resource Constraints

China is a huge country with a vast and diverse natural resource base, but it also has a population of 1.2 billion. Continuing economic growth in the f u t u r e will certainly stretch C h i n a ' s natural resources to their limits, giving rise to acute supply and d e m a n d imbalances. Agriculture is now worrying the Chinese leadership, as a result of a 2.6 percent drop in grain production in 1994. Is China "starting to lose the capacity to feed itself," as the American environmentalist Lester Brown recently warned? 9 There are, at present, no concrete signs that China is heading for a full-blown food crisis. Following B r o w n ' s sensational statement, Chinese specialists have recently reassessed China's agricultural resource base and its technological f o u n d a t i o n and c o n c l u d e d that by and large C h i n a will be able to feed itself (Wong, 1995d). H o w e v e r , the Chinese government still has cause for real concern over the current state of Chinese agriculture, not least because of rising peasant discontent. 1 0 Because China is the world's largest producer of grain, it is correct to say that C h i n a ' s f o o d problem can also b e c o m e a world food problem. If C h i n a were to import 5 percent of its c o n s u m p t i o n needs, this would amount to the total grain trade of the European Union, and a 10 percent import would seriously disrupt the world grain market! In other words, China must maintain its high level of food self-sufficiency; it is simply too big to specialize in m a n u f a c t u r e d exports and import food, as is the case with Japan or Asia's other newly industrializing economies. Chinese agriculture really faces a n u m b e r of daunting challenges. C h i n a ' s 1.2 billion population will increase a further 200 million by 2010 and some 300 million by 2025. Over 200 million peasants are illiterate and unsuited f o r city j o b s other than hard manual labor. With continuing urbanization and rising per capita i n c o m e and hence changes in f o o d

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c o n s u m p t i o n patterns, China will have to increase its grain p r o d u c t i o n f r o m its present level of 450 million tons to well over 600 million tons by 2020. T h e increased p r o d u c t i o n has to be done with no substantial inc r e a s e — m o r e likely a decline—in arable l a n d . " T h e switch to more profitable crops and environmental degradation has leveled off the wheat and rice crop (Yabuki, 1995:91-97). For an effective long-term solution to the agricultural problem, h o w ever, the g o v e r n m e n t has to properly m a n a g e agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t amidst rapid industrial g r o w t h — t h e agricultural sector is set to decline as industrialization increases. There should be a balanced agricultural development strategy that will not squeeze farmers too hard and too fast, while it promotes agricultural productivity by stepping up technological progress. Even though energy is less important than agriculture in socioecon o m i c terms, ready energy resources are a necessary c o m p o n e n t of economic development. And China's energy sector is giving out early warning signals. China's present consumption of energy on a per capita basis is still very low. Its per capita energy use for 1994 was equivalent to only 647 kilograms (kg) (1,426 lb) of oil, compared to 3,825 kg (8,432 lb) for Japan and 3,000 kg (6,614 lb) for South Korea. Also, C h i n a ' s total energy demand grew at the annual rate of only 5.5 percent during 1980-1990, which is significantly below its G D P growth (World Bank, 1996). However, f u ture e c o n o m i c growth will certainly raise C h i n a ' s overall energy consumption level, with serious implications for the world energy market because of C h i n a ' s huge d e m a n d potential. C h i n a ' s share in world primary energy demand will increase from 8.9 percent for 1993 to 10.9 percent for 2000 (Priddle, 1996). Despite being the w o r l d ' s sixth-largest oil producer (146 million tons in 1994, or 5 percent of the w o r l d ' s oil output), C h i n a has b e c o m e a net importer of oil since 1993. By 1998, China has begun to buy extensive oil f i e l d s in Central Asian countries. C h i n a may have to import 50 million tons of crude oil a year by 2000. Beyond 2000, the situation will depend on C h i n a ' s investment in oil and gas exploitation. Similarly, C h i n a ' s d y n a m i c economic growth is already exerting a lot of pressure on its existing water and land resources as well as on its environment. The Chinese themselves will mainly bear the costs of pollution: Only about 20 percent of industrial waste and 15 percent of sewage flowing into C h i n a ' s rivers are treated. But there is also c o n s i d e r a b l e crossborder pollution due to C h i n a ' s heavy reliance on coal for most of its energy needs. In many parts of China, airborne levels of sulphur dioxide in winter have exceeded World Health Organization guidelines. Richard Edm o n d s discusses all these problems in Chapter 9. Accordingly, the Chinese government has started to pay serious attention to the environmental issue. But its investment in pollution control is only a small fraction of government expenditure; and e n f o r c e m e n t is lax,

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Wong

especially in the rural areas. In the long run, C h i n a ' s economic development is much like a race, whereby new resources have to be quickly created so that the government can use them to cope with the problems and by-products of development such as pollution.

•

M U D D L I N G THROUGH

Each of the constraints discussed earlier presents a formidable challenge to the Chinese leadership, and they all can, in varying degrees, operate to moderate China's long-term growth capability. No one can foresee exactly how the Chinese leadership will respond to them, or how long it will take to overcome those problems. Many China experts take the view that China can somehow "muddle through." The point is that C h i n a ' s dynamic economic growth can be slowed but not stifled. Given continuing peace and stability, China will ultimately realize its major economic development objectives, certainly by 2025, if not by 2015. By then China will clearly be a middle-income economy in terms of its per capita income, but its total G D P will make it the world's largest economy. It is thus important for all international organizations to start engaging China now on all major global and regional issues. That is why Singapore and many other Asian countries support C h i n a ' s bid to join the World Trade Organization, so that China can learn to play by global rules.

•

NOTES

1. It m a y be noted that since the s e c o n d part of 1994, the g o v e r n m e n t has taken measures to recontrol the prices of certain f o o d or important consumer items as a m e a n s to fight the rampant inflation. Such stabilization measures are not antireform in nature. A c c o r d i n g to the data released by the State Planning C o m m i s s i o n , the number of industrial products to be produced under state mandatory planning d e c r e a s e d from 120 in 1980 to twenty-nine in 1995 and, in value term, from 4 0 percent of the total industrial output in 1980 to 4.5 percent in 1995. For price control, the "overw h e l m i n g majority of c o m m o d i t i e s now (by 1995) have their prices formed by the market." B y the end of 1 9 9 5 , o n l y s e v e n t y - f o u r important c o m m o d i t y i t e m s of heavy industry were still subjected to state control, of w h i c h f i f t y - o n e items were on "state-guided prices." China Economic News (Beijing), 1995. 2. For the full text of the plan in English, see Xinhua News Agency ( B e i j i n g ) 1995. 0 7 0 2 G M T (October 4). 3. S e e , for e x a m p l e , the June 1994 issue of the Journal of Comparative Economics, " E x p e r i e n c e s in the Transition to a Market E c o n o m y , " with Jeffrey S a c h s and Wing T h y e Woo as guest editors. For a more recent analysis, s e e Rawski, 1995. 4. G e r m a n correspondent Peter S e i d l i t z i n t e r v i e w e d Pieter P Bottelier, the World B a n k ' s country representative in China. S e e Seidlitz, 1995.

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5. This official growth rate tends to overstate China's actual growth as it was estimated by revaluing Chinese G D P at 1980 prices rather than earlier year prices and hence inflates the contribution of industry to G D P growth. A more realistic average growth should be around 4 . 5 - 5 . 0 percent, which is still quite a respectable growth performance, at least higher than that of India. 6. " C h i n a ' s E c o n o m y Was Stable in First Half." 1996. Though just over 100,000 of China's state-owned industries account for a third of China's industrial output, and 70 percent of C h i n a ' s industrial workers are in state-owned factories, those industries generate less than 1 percent of China's industrial profits and rely on huge grants from the national government that are seldom repaid. Forney, 1996. 7. Chen Xitong is party secretary of Beijing and a m e m b e r of the Politburo. Chen is, so far, the highest official to be disgraced for corruption. 8. According to a recent World Bank study, China's economic fragmentation is very serious, as manifested in its lower degree of industrial specialization and market integration as c o m p a r e d to the European Union and the United States. World Bank, 1994. 9. Brown argues that with C h i n a ' s population growing by 14 million a year and increasing meat consumption amidst the rapid shrinkage of croplands, by 2030 China could face a serious grain shortfall of 384 million tons, or at least 263 million tons, which would exceed the world's entire grain exports of about 200 million tons in 1993. Brown, 1994a, 1994b. 10. C h i n a ' s agricultural e c o n o m i s t s have since m a d e more realistic d e m a n d projections, which show that C h i n a ' s import demand will rise steadily. By 2000, imports are expected to reach 40 million tons, which will affect the world grain market by ending the historical decline in grain prices but will not disrupt the world grain market itself. After 2000, C h i n a ' s grain imports are expected to stabilize on account of China's declining population growth and increases in grain supply from higher productivity. See Lin, Huang, and Rozelle, 1996. 11. Ibid.

•

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-6China Beyond the Heartland Robert E. Gamer We have now had an overview of C h i n a ' s geography, history, politics, and economy. In this chapter, we take a closer look at four special topics: overseas Chinese, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet. These elements are all part of China, and yet not. They figure prominently in C h i n a ' s defense, foreign policy, economy, and culture. Even b e f o r e reading this b o o k , you were p r o b a b l y already aware that Hong K o n g reverted to C h i n a in 1997, that Taiwan and China are engaged in vigorous diplomatic and military competition, and that Tibetans have resisted China's presence in their territory. T h e o u t c o m e of these issues will have e n o r m o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s in determining China's future. We look at some historical background on each and then examine present and future trends. But we begin with another topic, perhaps less familiar to you, that will help you c o m p r e h e n d C h i n a ' s extraordinary economic growth and some of the threads that tie together China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan: overseas Chinese. As Chapter 1 indicated, there are 55 million Han who have left or whose ancestors left China, including those in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The richest among them control nearly as m u c h investment capital as Japan (Seagrave, 1995:285). As you will see, most of C h i n a ' s direct foreign investment comes f r o m them. Hong Kong alone accounted for 16 percent of all Asia's trade in 1995 (Gilley, 1997). H o w have they b e c o m e so wealthy? How have they c o m e to figure so prominently in China's affairs?

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For thousands of years, Chinese merchants have been trading in Indochina (Vietnam), Cambodia, Siam (Thailand), Malaya (mainland Malaysia), and Java (part of Indonesia)—all in Southeast Asia (see M a p 2.1)—and in

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Korea and Japan. Their trade brought great prosperity to C h i n a ' s leading families during the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing empires (Table 3.1). Most simply traveled there on business trips; a few settled, married native w o m e n , and b e c a m e absorbed into local society. When the Europeans arrived in the sixteenth century, they created or captured M a c a o (across the bay f r o m H o n g K o n g ) , Manila in the Philippines (the big island g r o u p north of Indonesia; see M a p 2.1), M e l a k a (Malacca) in M a l a y a , and Batavia (Jakarta) and other ports in Java and e n c o u r a g e d C h i n e s e merchants and artisans (largely f r o m the southern provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Z h e j i a n g ; see M a p 2.2) to m o v e there. These settlers brought C h i n e s e wives and established or e x p a n d e d Chinese c o m m u n i t i e s ; m a n y b e c a m e prosperous f r o m their trading activities (Wang, 1991). As C h i n a ' s population b u r g e o n e d during the nineteenth century, relatives f r o m their h o m e provinces and unemployed urban youth moved to those communities and to the newly f o u n d e d ports of Penang and Singapore in Malaya. They filled j o b s as laborers, miners, plantation workers, teachers, j o u r n a l i s t s , traditional opera performers, house servants, and retailers. Others went to the Americas and Australia to construct railroads and work on farms. S o m e settled in Tokyo, smaller Pacific islands, Sydney, Calcutta, Paris, London, Vancouver, the West Indies, and L i m a . T h o s e working on f a r m s , plantations, mines, and railroads often e x p e r i e n c e d cruel treatment and harsh conditions. Those who did not perish or return home stayed to set up laundries or small shops or work for other Chinese in " C h i n a t o w n s , " which began to emerge even in cities b e y o n d the port of original entry into the country. The principal source of income for overseas Chinese communities was trade with China. T h e wealthiest families m a d e their fortunes serving as middlemen in trade transactions between China and non-Chinese in Asia, Europe, or the A m e r i c a s . T h e y b e c a m e patrons to C h i n e s e - l a n g u a g e schools, newspapers, temples, festivals, and other cultural activities; welfare and legal aid societies; and cemeteries. Siam and the Philippines encouraged Chinese to intermarry and m i n g l e with i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e in places of work; elsewhere, they met with greater wariness and prejudice. T h e British in M a l a y a and S i n g a p o r e hired Chinese and other ethnic g r o u p s for some b u r e a u c r a t i c posts; most of the r e m a i n i n g C h i n e s e in these settlements worked f o r themselves or for other Chinese. Most Chinese sent money h o m e to poorer relatives in China. In the second half of the nineteenth century, prominent Chinese f a m i lies began sending some of their children abroad to study. Those students discovered that except in the Philippines, where the S p a n i s h had established schools and universities f o r native inhabitants, f e w C h i n e s e born overseas were studying outside their own communities. Most who attended school were taught in C h i n e s e dialects. In contrast, U.S. m i s s i o n a r y schools in China introduced their students to English and a modern Western

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c u r r i c u l u m ; t h e i r best g r a d u a t e s w e r e w e l c o m e d into l e a d i n g U . S . , B r i t i s h , a n d E u r o p e a n c o l l e g e s and u n i v e r s i t i e s . J a p a n , t o o , w e l c o m e d s t u d e n t s f r o m C h i n a . U p o n t h e i r r e t u r n h o m e , m a n y of t h e s e g r a d u a t e s b e c a m e p r o m i n e n t in C h i n a ' s g o v e r n m e n t , c o m m e r c e , a n d c u l t u r a l life. T h e i r e x p o s u r e to J a p a n e s e , U . S . , a n d E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e s a n d c u l t u r e s w a s f a r d e e p e r than that of m o s t C h i n e s e l i v i n g a b r o a d . T h e C h i n e s e s t u d y i n g a b r o a d r e t u r n e d h o m e w a n t i n g to i n t r o d u c e C h i n a to t e c h n i q u e s a n d i d e a s t h e y h a d l e a r n e d on t h e i r s o j o u r n s — t o c h a n g e C h i n e s e c u l t u r e . In c o n t r a s t , l e a d e r s of C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t i e s a b r o a d w i s h e d to p r e s e r v e C h i n e s e t r a d i t i o n s a m o n g their f a m i l i e s , w o r k e r s , and n e i g h b o r s . In e x c h a n g e f o r c a s h r e m i t t e d t o t h e i r f a m i l i e s in C h i n a , t h e y a s k e d C h i n a ' s l e a d e r s f o r a s s i s t a n c e in d e a l i n g w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t s a n d s o c i e t i e s of t h e i r a d o p t e d l a n d s . B o t h t h e s e r e s p o n s e s w e r e v e r y n e w . U n t i l t h e s e c o n d h a l f of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , e d u c a t e d C h i n e s e did not v e n t u r e a b r o a d to study, a n d C h i n a did not c o n c e r n itself w i t h the n e e d s of C h i n e s e w h o had m o v e d a b r o a d . To c o n t r o l p i r a c y and r e b e l s , the Ming and Q i n g g o v e r n m e n t s had forbidden emigration under penalty of d e a t h . T h e t r e a t i e s i m p o s e d a f t e r the O p i u m W a r s ( d i s c u s s e d b e l o w a n d in C h a p t e r 7) c h a n g e d that. T h e y f o r c e d the e m p e r o r s to a l l o w e m i g r a t i o n , w h i l e g i v i n g C h i n a the right (as a n e w p a r t i c i p a n t in E u r o p e a n - c r e a t e d int e r n a t i o n a l l a w ) to p r o t e c t its s u b j e c t s l i v i n g a b r o a d . F o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , C h i n a sent a m b a s s a d o r s a n d c o n s u l s to f o r e i g n c a p i t a l s and t r a d i n g c i t i e s . T h e r e t h e y d i s c o v e r e d t h e g r e a t p r o s p e r i t y of t h e o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e . T h e Q i n g g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n to s u p p o r t s c h o o l s f o r C h i n e s e in S o u t h e a s t A s i a n

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countries and conferred citizenship on overseas Chinese and their children. Chinese consular officials were available to assist Chinese w h e n they enc o u n t e r e d p r o b l e m s in their adopted countries and to intercede against abuses of laborers. A f t e r centuries of being cut off f r o m their h o m e l a n d , under threat of the death penalty imposed since the Ming dynasty for being illegal emigrants, overseas Chinese were being treated as compatriots. In exchange, the Qing government encouraged them to send money h o m e to relatives. This created p r e c e d e n t s that c o n t i n u e to a f f e c t C h i n a ' s f o r e i g n relations and the lives of overseas Chinese. It encouraged the predisposition of overseas Chinese to isolate themselves f r o m the social and political life of their adopted lands and to interest themselves in the politics and e c o n o m y of China. It reinforced the inclination of C h i n a ' s governments to treat the overseas Chinese as c o n t i n u i n g s u b j e c t s of C h i n a and the lands w h e r e some of them reside as part of C h i n a ' s d o m a i n . Most i m p o r t a n t , it also helped end the Qing dynasty. The K u o m i n t a n g and the Republican movements were born a m o n g Chinese studying abroad and benefited f r o m substantial financial contributions from overseas Chinese. After the Qing dynasty was overthrown in 1911, all political factions in China sought financial and moral support among overseas Chinese, who helped set up schools for their children. The K u o m i n t a n g government promoted equal treatment for overseas Chinese in their countries of residence, helped them send their children to China for study, and g a v e special incentives to overseas Chinese for establishing businesses in C h i n a . It focused heavily on establishing schools, training teachers, and setting standards for the children of overseas Chinese and criticized the g o v e r n m e n t s of those countries for "interfering" in this education, which was conducted entirely in the Chinese language, when they sought assurance that it would help integrate pupils into their adopted lands (Fitzgerald, 1972:8). From 1921 to 1927, the c o m m u n i s t s and Nationalists cooperated in a "united f r o n t " in China; after that, they vied with each other and with the warlords for control of territories. All these factions sought financial and moral support f r o m the overseas Chinese. In 1936, to counter the Japanese, they once again declared a "united f r o n t , " with both the K u o m i n t a n g and the communists proclaiming that overseas Chinese were included in their e f f o r t s to cooperate. By giving their attention and resources variously to the K u o m i n t a n g and the c o m m u n i s t s , overseas C h i n e s e r e m a i n e d within China's orbit and roused suspicions a m o n g their new compatriots that they were not entirely loyal to their adopted lands. They also f o u n d themselves caught up in the ideological battle b e t w e e n c o m m u n i s m and the Western d e m o c r a c i e s , even though m a n y of them had thought little about such issues. As you will see in Chapter 7, that problem of divided loyalties would continue after War War II. Both China and Taiwan, now ruled respectively

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by the c o m m u n i s t s and the K u o m i n t a n g N a t i o n a l i s t s , w o u l d need the d e e p p o c k e t s a n d the e c o n o m i c c o n n e c t i o n s of t h e s e o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e as they s o u g h t to spread their e c o n o m i c and political i n f l u e n c e in the region. A n d an island that w a s barren w h e n C h i n a s o u g h t to control the o p i u m trade in 1839 w o u l d play a pivotal role in this. S o w e fit it into the story here.

•

HONG KONG

•

Beginnings

In 1839, the Q i n g e m p e r o r a p p o i n t e d Lin Z e x u as s p e c i a l c o m m i s s i o n e r in G u a n g z h o u , the only port open to f o r e i g n trade (as C h a p t e r 7 explains), and o r d e r e d him to s t a m p out the o p i u m trade. T h u s b e g a n C h i n a ' s h u m i l i a t i o n by f o r e i g n p o w e r s . G u a n g z h o u ( C a n t o n ) is located on the West R i v e r near the Pearl R i v e r delta of the West R i v e r (see M a p s 2.2 and 2.4), j u s t u p s t r e a m f r o m the P o r t u g u e s e - f o u n d e d city of M a c a o . Lin sent troops to the f o r e i g n w h a r v e s w h e r e trading took place and r e f u s e d to let a n y o n e leave until they s u r r e n d e r e d the o p i u m inside and p r o m i s e d not to import m o r e . A m o n g t h o s e in a t t e n d a n c e w a s C a p t a i n C h a r l e s E l l i o t , B r i t a i n ' s trade r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . A f t e r six w e e k s of s t a n d o f f , Elliot s u r r e n d e r e d 3 million p o u n d s of o p i u m to Lin, w h o had it f l u s h e d into the sea. Elliot ret r e a t e d d o w n s t r e a m to M a c a o , w h e r e the P o r t u g u e s e did not w i s h to bec o m e i n v o l v e d . H e n c e he h e a d e d a c r o s s the Pearl R i v e r delta to a sparsely i n h a b i t e d island c a l l e d H o n g K o n g . It c o n t a i n e d an e x c e l l e n t p r o t e c t e d h a r b o r , w h e r e he and his c o m p a n i o n s s t a y e d on b o a r d ship. W h e n s o m e C h i n e s e war j u n k s tried to expel his c r e w s f r o m the h a r b o r , E l l i o t ' s ships sank t h e m . T h e f o l l o w i n g s u m m e r , the British sent a fleet c o m m a n d e d by E l l i o t ' s cousin, A d m i r a l G e o r g e Elliot, to a v e n g e the action. B e c a u s e they w o u l d not sign p l e d g e s declaring they w o u l d no longer trade in o p i u m , Lin h a d t h e m all e x p e l l e d f r o m M a c a o . T h e y , too, h e a d e d a c r o s s the bay w h e r e , by now, Captain Elliot had established a village on H o n g K o n g harbor. T h o u g h the British had d e c l a r e d an e m b a r g o on t r a d e with C h i n a , the A m e r i c a n s were acting as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s f o r the British and signed b o n d s p r o m i s i n g to o b e y the C h i n e s e laws. A d m i r a l Elliot b l o c k a d e d G u a n g z h o u ' s harbor, h e a d e d north to b l o c k a d e t h e m o u t h of the Y a n g t z e R i v e r , and t h e n e n t e r e d the city of T i a n j i n u n o p p o s e d ( s e e M a p 2.2). T h i s w a s the f i r s t O p i u m War. In the n e g o t i a t i o n s that f o l l o w e d , C h i n a c e d e d the island of H o n g K o n g to Britain and o f f e r e d to pay s o m e w a r i n d e m n i t y and r e o p e n G u a n g z h o u ' s t r a d e with Britain. W h e n the word reached Britain, f o r e i g n secretary L o r d P a l m e r s t o n w a s f u r i o u s a b o u t these terms; the only real c o n c e s s i o n of the C h i n e s e was m o d i f i e d rights to " a b a r r e n i s l a n d with h a r d l y a h o u s e on it." H e dism i s s e d Elliot, r e f u s e d to sign the treaty, a n d sent a n o t h e r e x p e d i t i o n that

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r e o p e n e d hostilities, decisively d e f e a t i n g Q i n g forces and leading to the 1842 Treaty of N a n j i n g (Hibbert, 1970:73-182). This treaty b e c a m e the basis f o r all C h i n a ' s relations with foreign p o w e r s . It o p e n e d G u a n g z h o u , F u z h o u and X i a m e n in Fujian province, N i n g b o in Z h e j i a n g province, and Shanghai f o r residence by British subjects, created British consulates there, and let British merchants carry on trade with w h o m e v e r they chose and not merely with official trading organizations ( c o h o n g s ; see Chapter 7). It let Chinese subjects reside with and work f o r the British and promised to protect British living in China, along with their property. It limited taxation on imported goods to "a fair and regular t a r i f f ' at customs halls in the five "treaty p o r t s " and stipulated that f o r e i g n e r s need no longer use terms like "I beg y o u " in c o r r e s p o n dence with Chinese officials (Spence, 1 9 9 0 : 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 ) . Deviating f r o m his instructions, the British negotiator also f o r c e d the C h i n e s e to cede Hong Kong island to Britain "in perpetuity." Further treaties would increase the n u m b e r of treaty ports, extend these privileges to other nations, and allow missionaries to c o m e to China and f o r e i g n e r s to learn Chinese. Foreign countries would also be able to establish e m b a s s i e s in Beijing. And the treaties would expand the principle of extraterritoriality, that any foreigner accused of a crime should be turned over to officials of his or her own government for punishment. Chapter 7 will tell you still more about all this. A m o n g the treaty ports, only one would maintain prominence: Shanghai. 1 Its chief rival was that " b a r r e n island," Hong K o n g . I m m e d i a t e l y after Elliot's arrival, operators of trading ships like Alexander M a t h e s o n , Lancelot Dent, and William Jardine began to build w a r e h o u s e s there, where they could store opium and other goods they traded with China, away f r o m the reach of Chinese o f f i c i a l s . Soon a f r o n t i e r c o m m u n i t y , c o m p o s e d of C h i n e s e and a few British subjects, was g r o w i n g a l o n g the harbor. The many islands on the seacoast north of the Pearl River delta had provided r e f u g e f o r pirates and smugglers, w h o had plied these waters for centuries. During the decades following establishment of Hong K o n g , the island c o m m u n i t y b e c a m e a neutral place where British and C h i n e s e traders, pirates, b a n k e r s , and o f f i c i a l s could meet to d o business. M o r e wars and skirmishes were to ensue b e f o r e diplomatic and trade relations with China stabilized; even when they were at their m o s t intense, ships moved in and out of Hong Kong harbor carrying goods between China and the rest of the world. C r o w d e d streets e m e r g e d on the hillsides that rise steeply f r o m the harbor.

•

Rising Stature

In 1860, the British received a lease on K o w l o o n , the small, flatter peninsula on the mainland just across f r o m Hong Kong harbor. There they had room to lay out military barracks. In 1896, the Chinese (smarting f r o m

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the Treaty of Shimonoseki after their defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War; see Chapter 7) signed a secret a g r e e m e n t with Russia, agreeing to take c o m m o n action against the J a p a n e s e in case of attack and a l l o w i n g Russian ships to use any Chinese port. The G e r m a n s then used the m u r d e r of t w o missionaries as an excuse to send in w a r s h i p s and f o r c e C h i n a to lease them the port of Q i n g d a o on the S h a n d o n g peninsula ( M a p 2.2) f o r ninety-nine years. Across the bay, the R u s s i a n s seized L u s h u n in M a n churia and negotiated a treaty ceding it to t h e m (they r e n a m e d it Port Arthur) for twenty-five years. South of the Pearl River on Hainan Island ( M a p 2.2), the French signed a lease ceding F r a n c e a harbor f o r ninetynine years. Feeling the need for more land to d e f e n d Kowloon harbor f r o m the Russian and French warships now plying Chinese waters, in 1898 the British obtained a n i n e t y - n i n e - y e a r lease f o r the N e w T e r r i t o r i e s — 3 6 5 square miles of land north of K o w l o o n and 235 surrounding islands. The K o w l o o n - C a n t o n railway, c o m p l e t e d in 1912, linked K o w l o o n with the New Territories and China. It helped encourage more of Hong K o n g ' s expanding populace (now surpassing a quarter million) to m o v e across into Kowloon. Hong K o n g ' s unique position as a meeting place between China and the outside world was maturing. The 90,000 inhabitants of the New Territories had a history of independence f r o m C h i n a — t h e r e is little record of them being under Chinese rule b e f o r e the eleventh century. Since m a n y had been engaged in smuggling activities and rebelled fiercely against the new Qing dynasty, the emperor forced them to move inland f r o m the sea in 1662. Later on, coastal f i s h e r m e n and f a r m e r s f r o m farther north j o i n e d them. By the end of the nineteenth century, other rebels had gravitated to the area. Hong Kong had already become a place where China and the outside world could meet. The H o n g K o n g and C h i n e s e Bank, f o u n d e d in 1865, had grown into the biggest bank in China by the end of the century. Hong K o n g and M a c a o facilitated contact, r e m i t t a n c e s , i n v e s t m e n t , and trade with overseas Chinese in countries that did not have diplomatic relations with China. Hong K o n g ' s n o n - C h i n e s e p o p u l a c e still did not exceed 20,000; fewer than 1,500 were British. Chinese in Hong Kong could study and discuss new ideas without w o r r y i n g about political c o n s e quences; they could learn about parliamentary government and speak English as their principal language. T h e Red House, located in the New Territories, b e c a m e the center where several coups against the Qing dynasty were planned. Hundreds of individuals involved in those aborted attempts sought refuge there. Sun Yat-sen studied medicine at Hong K o n g ' s College of M e d i c i n e f o r the Chinese, which would e x p a n d into H o n g K o n g University in 1911, the year he f o u n d e d the republic (see Chapter 4). The Suez Canal opened in 1869, making the voyage from western Europe to India and the Far East much shorter. Between 1880 and 1890, Britain's foreign investment rose to three-quarters of its domestic investment.

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Its foreign trade was greater than that of France, Germany, and the United States combined. Still, by the end of the century British exports to China constituted only 1.5 percent of its total exports; Britain and all its colonies combined exported less to China than to Holland (Welsh, 1993:282, 318). This would not c h a n g e markedly b e f o r e the end of World War II. Hong K o n g ' s trade in o p i u m and other g o o d s m a d e it basically p r o f i t a b l e , but not among Britain's greatest sources of colonial income. Britain decided to c o n c e n t r a t e its military forces in S i n g a p o r e , rather than H o n g K o n g . Shanghai's v o l u m e of trade came to match that of Hong Kong. Many Chinese b e c a m e wary of Britain's imperialism and the strict social segregation it maintained between Chinese and white inhabitants of its colonies. T h e W h a m p o a Military A c a d e m y just outside G u a n g z h o u became the launching ground in 1925 for Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to take C h i n a back f r o m the warlords, w h o had r e m o v e d p o w e r f r o m Beijing. Using w e a p o n s and advisers supplied by the Soviet Union, he swept out f r o m G u a n g z h o u to take territory f r o m the warlords. This was a c c o m p a nied by strikes and student d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . On May 30, 1925, British troops fired on some demonstrators in Shanghai, killing and wounding several, and this precipitated strikes against the British in many cities. During one of those strikes in Hong Kong, British troops killed over fifty Chinese and w o u n d e d a hundred more. For sixteen months China boycotted Hong Kong ships and goods, crippling its economy. Soon C h i n a ' s united front had split apart, Japanese aggression grew, and the republic sought aid from the United States and Britain. Hong K o n g ' s trade resumed. W h e n Japan occupied Hong Kong in 1941 after a short battle, it had 1.6 million inhabitants. Britain returned to liberate the island in 1945 and quickly restore law and order, a stable currency, public utilities, adequate supplies of f o o d , and a stable business climate. This contrasted sharply with the situation in Chinese cities. And Britain's policy of c o n t i n u i n g good relations with the Kuomintang while establishing early diplomatic relations with the n e w c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e contrasted with the b e h a v i o r of other Western p o w e r s in the region. That set the stage for a new and important phase in Hong K o n g ' s history. As civil war erupted in China hundreds of t h o u s a n d s of r e f u g e e s poured across H o n g K o n g ' s border, until both sides shut off the flow by 1950. M a n y of these r e f u g e e s , f l e e i n g Shanghai and other f o r m e r commercial centers, were experienced in business. T h e immigration created a huge housing p r o b l e m , spurring H o n g K o n g ' s g o v e r n m e n t into a massive housing construction p r o g r a m . T h o u sands of small industries employed many of the new workers.

•

Living w i t h the People's Republic

China c o n t e n d e d that H o n g K o n g had been the result of treaties i m posed on C h i n a and was t h e r e f o r e a part of China temporarily u n d e r foreign occupation. There was always a conflict between the new Chinese

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R e p u b l i c ' s a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m and its relations with Britain ( J a i n ,

1976:158-

1 8 3 ) . A l t h o u g h the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a ( P R C ) was slow to c r e a t e full diplomatic links with Britain due to B r i t a i n ' s refusal to break o f f relations with T a i w a n , it never broke the relations it established early on. Britain reluctantly went along with the United S t a t e s ' call for an e m b a r g o o f China; yet trade c o n t i n u e d through H o n g K o n g ( B o a r d m a n , 1 9 7 6 ) . T h e B a n k o f C h i n a building in Hong K o n g housed the New C h i n a N e w s A g e n c y ; in the a b s e n c e o f formal diplomatic relations, it acted as the representative o f the P R C for relations with Britain. T h e A m e r i c a n c o n s u l a t e in Hong K o n g bec a m e the largest in the world, gathering intelligence on C h i n a and seeking to k e e p c o m m u n i s t goods from reaching the United States through Hong K o n g . T h e c o n s u l a t e ' s presence helped e n c o u r a g e c o o p e r a t i o n between smugglers and Hong K o n g revenue o f f i c e r s . M e a n w h i l e , m a n y prominent S h a n g h a i businesspeople opened small workshops producing clothing and small c o n sumer goods. In contrast to Britain and China, they were free to m a k e purc h a s e s in stable U . S . dollars. T a x e s were low, w a g e s were rising, and profits could be sent out o f the c o l o n y freely. T h e c i v i l d i s t u r b a n c e s o f the Cultural R e v o l u t i o n (see Chapters 4 and 7 ) spread into Hong K o n g in 1 9 6 7 and disrupted the e c o n o m y briefly. T h e island gradually increased its exports to the outside world and r e m a i n e d the easiest point o f entry f o r visitors to C h i n a . Hong K o n g m a n u f a c t u r e r s , s e e k i n g m o r e c h e a p labor, b e g a n to establish factories in the nearby province o f G u a n g d o n g . W h e n C h i n a ' s o p e n i n g to the world b e g a n in 1 9 7 8 , H o n g K o n g w a s p e r f e c t l y p o s i t i o n e d to b e c o m e the hub o f the r e f o r m s taking p l a c e in the s p e c i a l e c o n o m i c z o n e s d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r s 4 and 5 . T w o o f the first

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four zones to be e s t a b l i s h e d — S h e n z h e n and Zhuhai (adjoining M a c a o ) — are close to Hong Kong. A Hong Kong resident who had m a d e billions on the H o n g K o n g real estate market, G o r d o n W u , immediately began construction on a six-lane turnpike linking Shenzhen to Hong Kong, using his own money. At that point, Shenzhen was just a f a r m i n g village. T h e colossal g a m b l e spurred colossal growth. Today Shenzhen is filled with factories, skyscrapers, a m u s e m e n t parks, hotels, and o f f i c e buildings. H o n g K o n g ' s new U.S.$7 billion airport includes highways, bridges, tunnels, and new towns. G u a n g d o n g ' s government is building roads, bridges, airports, and vast s w a m p r e c l a m a t i o n projects. H o n g K o n g and K o w l o o n are packed with new luxury o f f i c e c o m p l e x e s , hotels, c o n v e n t i o n centers, wharves, and shopping malls. The Pearl River delta and the Yangtze River delta around Shanghai, farther north, are the fastest growing economic regions in the world, often surpassing 20 percent increases in gross d o m e s tic product ( G D P ) a year (see Lyons, 1994). H o n g K o n g has b e c o m e the w o r l d ' s eighth-largest trading e c o n o m y , accounting for about a sixth of C h i n a ' s total G D P (Patten, 1997). H o n g K o n g is the largest f o r e i g n investor in the Philippines, the second-largest in Vietnam, and third-largest in Indonesia, Thailand, and Taiwan (Gilley, 1997). B e t w e e n 1970 and 1993, H o n g K o n g ' s e c o n o m y q u a d r u p l e d in size (its per capita G D P surpasses those of Britain, Australia, C a n a d a , and Italy), but the percentage of its G D P deriving from manufacturing dropped f r o m 31 to 11 percent. Over 80 percent of Hong Kong manufacturers have set up production facilities elsewhere in China, where they employ some 5 million people (more than double Hong K o n g ' s workforce). 2 Hong K o n g ' s trade in goods expanded thirty-seven-fold since 1970 ( H o n g Kong, 1995: 6 5 - 6 6 ) . 3 Eighty percent of its exports are either to or f r o m the rest of China; more than half of C h i n a ' s exports are handled through H o n g K o n g . 4 Over half of C h i n a ' s foreign investment c o m e s f r o m or through H o n g Kong; C h i n a is the third-largest investor in H o n g K o n g ( U . S . $ 1 4 9 billion in 1996). 5 H o n g K o n g ' s airport is the w o r l d ' s second busiest in terms of cargo tons carried and the third busiest in terms of p a s s e n g e r s , and H o n g Kong h a r b o r is the w o r l d ' s busiest container port; with 1998, airport traffic grew 10 percent a year and harbor cargo by 20 percent. To adapt to its new roles as C h i n a ' s financier, marketer, raw materials supplier, quality controller, packager, and shipper, H o n g K o n g ' s g o v e r n ment has invested heavily in developing harbor and airport facilities, office and convention space, education, housing, and health care. 6 Between 1963 and 1995, the portion of government expenditures devoted to health, education, housing, and social welfare grew f r o m 21 percent to 48 percent. Since 1970, expenditures on public housing have grown over 6 percent a year (Welsh, 1993:478; " T h e I m p o r t a n c e , " 1997); over half the populace lives in subsidized public housing, paying low rent or purchase fees ( H o n g Kong, 1995:209). Health care at f a m i l y planning, child and m a t e r n a l

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health centers, social hygiene clinics, tuberculosis clinics, and emergency wards is provided free of charge, and other health services are heavily subsidized by the g o v e r n m e n t ( H o n g Kong, 1995:176). 7 T h e g o v e r n m e n t spends 21 percent of its recurrent budget and 5 percent of its capital budget on education to ensure that the workforce adapts to the new d e m a n d s of technology and the service e c o n o m y . Students with inadequate m e a n s receive grants to pay for school fees, travel, and textbooks f r o m primary school through university. H o n g K o n g had one university at the end of World War II; six have been f o u n d e d since (four since 1985), specializing in business, technical, and adult education. Secondary schools o f f e r many technical, industrial, and business courses, with apprenticeships and training for the disabled. Buildings and equipment are m o d e r n and advanced. In 1987, only one young person in thirty-three pursued a higher education; by 1997, one in four did (Patten, 1997). M o r e than half the r e v e n u e s for this derive f r o m a corporate p r o f i t s tax, i n c o m e taxes, and the tax on land sales. Seven percent c o m e f r o m taxes on bets at the H o n g Kong J o c k e y Club (which generates twice the r e v e n u e of all U.S. race tracks c o m b i n e d ) . T h e rest c o m e f r o m various s t a m p duties, fees, duties on imports (cars, gasoline, cigarettes, liquor), utilities, hotel rooms, airport use, motor vehicles, estates, and many other transactions. There is no capital gains tax. Still, government expenditures account for only 16 percent of GDP, compared with 42 percent in Britain and 68 percent in Sweden (McGurn, 1996). Hong Kong is a useful place to evade authority. Officers of Chinese state-owned firms use assets derived f r o m listing on the Hong Kong stock exchange to buy their parent c o m p a n i e s at deep discounts—avoiding C h i nese taxation and secretly diverting f u n d s to their own pockets. W h e n exporting through Hong Kong, they leave profits behind in Hong Kong firms they control by undervaluing the exported good as it enters Hong Kong and is sold to their puppet firm. Over a thousand Chinese state-owned firms have created such Hong Kong "joint ventures"; many relatives of China's senior government ministers sit on the boards ("The Chinese," 1994). 8 This gives them an especially strong personal, as well as political, incentive to k e e p Hong Kong's economy healthy, but it also puts them in a position to h a r m C h i n a ' s economy. Some of these companies, like Everbright, have been sending cadre officials f r o m the mainland to manage firms they have c o m e to control in Hong Kong; others, like Citic Pacific, have largely left H o n g Kong managers in charge of the business. The former approach has proven disastrous (Sender, 1996; M c G u r n , 1996). As increasing n u m b e r s of c o m panies sell shares to members of China's State Council, this problem grows.

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The Transition to Chinese Rule

Hong Kong was ruled by a governor appointed by Britain f r o m 1841 to 1997. Initially, he was assisted by a Legislative Council also c o m p o s e d

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o f appointed individuals. In 1 8 8 4 , one C h i n e s e was appointed to the c o u n cil; the n u m b e r grew to three (out o f e i g h t e e n ) in 1 9 2 9 . In 1 9 8 4 , the British and C h i n e s e governments issued a j o i n t declaration on the future o f Hong K o n g . At that point, all m e m b e r s o f Hong K o n g ' s L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n cil were still appointed (though e l e c t i o n s for s o m e m e m b e r s o f a sanitary board, later broadened into an urban c o u n c i l , had been held since 1 8 8 3 ) . T h e S i n o - B r i t i s h J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n agreed to return H o n g K o n g to C h i n a on J u l y 1, 1 9 9 7 . Never in modern history has a handover o f territory been agreed on so far in a d v a n c e . Hong K o n g would be a special administrative region guaranteed an " o p e n and free plural s o c i e t y " with its own laws, institutions, and freedoms f o r fifty years ( B u e n o de M e s q u i t a , N e w man, and R a b u s h k a , 1 9 9 6 ) . It c o u l d maintain its liberal p o l i c i e s on e x change controls; j o i n international trade and cultural organizations; c o l l e c t its own taxes and use them f o r its own purposes; and d e t e r m i n e its own p o l i c i e s on international air travel, land rights, passports, and shipping rights. Hong K o n g would be part o f C h i n a but would maintain a separate s y s t e m — " o n e country, two s y s t e m s . " A j o i n t liaison group would conduct consultations to prepare for the turnover. In 1 9 8 5 , for the first time in Hong K o n g ' s history, the governor agreed to hold elections for some seats on the Legislative Council (twenty-four o f its f i f t y - s i x m e m b e r s ; by 1 9 9 1 , fifty o f sixty). S o m e other m e m b e r s were appointed by newly created district boards and regional councils as well as the urban councils; a majority o f m e m b e r s o f the district boards and a minority o f the m e m b e r s o f the regional and urban c o u n c i l s were c h o s e n by elections. T h e governor did not get approval from the j o i n t liaison group, and Chinese leaders were angered by the move. T h e y remembered that the 1 8 9 8 lease on K o w l o o n and the New Territories had provided for Chinese to retain control o f local government there; the following year the British voided that part o f the agreement and took direct control o f local government. And the 1 9 8 4 offer o f " o n e country, two s y s t e m s " in the S i n o - B r i t i s h J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n , as with the similar o f f e r to Taiwan in 1981 discussed shortly, had assumed that both systems would restrain democracy. In 1 9 9 4 C h i n a ' s government indicated that, after the transfer in 1 9 9 7 , it would ignore Hong K o n g ' s r e f o r m s . In 1 9 9 6 C h i n a appointed a preparatory c o m mittee to c h o o s e the g o v e r n o r ' s replacement; a third o f the m e m b e r s were owners o f major Hong K o n g companies, and another third were Hong K o n g professional people, while the rest c a m e from China. T h e c o m m i t t e e c h o s e the owner o f a m a j o r shipping c o m p a n y to r e p l a c e the g o v e r n o r and endorsed B e i j i n g ' s plan to cancel all the new changes in the legislature, but to elect a new one the following year on its own terms. That election in 1 9 9 8 brought a record 5 3 percent o f the electorate to the polls to directly elect twenty o f the new b o d y ' s sixty m e m b e r s ; thirty m o r e were

indirectly

elected by corporate and professional voters. Parties critical o f the government won over two-thirds o f the votes (and a third o f the legislature's seats under c o m p l e x voting rules) and called for a speedup o f electoral reform.

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U n d e r H o n g K o n g ' s B a s i c L a w , it will hold direct e l e c t i o n s for a m a j o r i t y o f l e g i s l a t i v e seats and f o r its c h i e f e x e c u t i v e by 2 0 0 7 ( " U n i n t e n d e d C o n s e q u e n c e s , " 1 9 9 8 ) . A n e w Court o f F i n a l A p p e a l s was c r e a t e d in H o n g K o n g to r e p l a c e the B r i t i s h High Court in L o n d o n , w h i c h had f o r m e r l y b e e n the h i g h e s t court o f a p p e a l s , though C h i n a ' s N a t i o n a l P e o p l e ' s C o n gress retains the ultimate right to a m e n d Hong K o n g ' s B a s i c L a w should it wish to do so. T h e C o m m i t t e e o f T w e l v e (with six m e m b e r s chosen by B e i j i n g and six by H o n g K o n g ) will review the constitutionality o f legislation passed by Hong K o n g ' s legislature. B r i t i s h troops garrisoned in Hong K o n g were replaced by troops f r o m the P R C . Hong K o n g ' s professional c i v i l servants, w h o had b e e n running the g o v e r n m e n t , retained their j o b s so long as they declared loyalty to the n e w r e g i m e . O v e r h a l f o f H o n g K o n g ' s c i t i z e n s hold B r i t i s h p a s s p o r t s ; they are t e c h n i c a l l y v i o l a t i n g C h i n a ' s c i t i z e n s h i p l a w s , but in 1 9 9 6 the C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t a n n o u n c e d a " d o n ' t ask; d o n ' t t e l l " p o l i c y toward t h e m . M a n y o f those B r i t i s h passport holders also have p a s s p o r t s , h o u s e s , a p a r t m e n t s , and i n v e s t m e n t s in V a n c o u v e r , the U n i t e d S t a t e s , A u s t r a l i a , B r i t a i n , and e l s e w h e r e and can t h e r e f o r e m o v e their m o n e y at will. C h i n a has succeeded in attaching Hong K o n g to China. However, C h i n a has had d i f f i c u l t y c o n t r o l l i n g the b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r p r o v i n c e s and s p e c i a l e c o n o m i c zones, and Hong K o n g , with a long history o f independence and many wealthy leaders, may be even m o r e difficult to control. Although the g o v e r n m e n t in B e i j i n g o b v i o u s l y has a strong interest in letting Hong K o n g fulfill functions that have been essential to C h i n a ' s growing prosperity, it is also wary o f how political activities by Hong K o n g ' s c i t i z e n s might a f f e c t groups e l s e w h e r e in C h i n a . During the opening months o f Hong K o n g ' s absorption into C h i n a , however, B e i j i n g resisted any temptations to overtly interfere in Hong K o n g ' s affairs. T h e 1 9 9 7 Asian e c o n o m i c turndown brought a sharp drop in H o n g K o n g ' s real estate prices, e x p o r t s , and tourism. In places like S h a n g h a i ' s Pudong special e c o n o m i c zone, mainland China is inc r e a s i n g l y d e v e l o p i n g the infrastructure and talents to b y p a s s Hong K o n g when doing business with f o r e i g n e r s . W h i l e Hong K o n g ' s trade and assets remain formidable, these p h e n o m e n a provide warning that it will need to develop new e c o n o m i c strategies, such as working with firms on the mainland to develop c o m m u n i c a t i o n s y s t e m s and other h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y applications.

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TAIWAN

W e turn n o w to the o t h e r f o c a l point f o r o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e — T a i w a n , f o r m e r l y F o r m o s a ( M a p 2 . 2 ) . At the end o f World War II, overseas C h i n e s e took power there. L i k e Hong K o n g , it is heavily involved in C h i n a ' s e c o n omy. B u t is it a part o f C h i n a or a separate n a t i o n ? W h y does this small island figure so p r o m i n e n t l y in C h i n e s e and world a f f a i r s ?

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China has never succeeded in establishing cultural or political dominance over the island of Formosa. In the seventeenth century, Chinese traders from Guangdong and Fujian began crossing the straits to Formosa, purchasing deer hides and horns f r o m hunters and traders there (Rubinstein, 1997). These Chinese established some small settlements along Formosa's southwest coast. Chinese and Japanese pirates and Spanish traders also sought refuge in nearby harbors, and in 1624 Dutch traders established the fort of Zeelandia on one of them. Chinese settlers moved to these towns. During the following two decades, the Ming dynasty was falling to Manchu invasion. A Fujian pirate with a trading empire extending to Japan had a son, Koxinga, by a Japanese wife. Koxinga turned his f a t h e r ' s home of Xiamen (in Fujian; see Map 2.2) into a m a j o r trading port, but as the Qing armies moved toward his city, he set his eyes and guns on Zeelandia. Although the Dutch resisted his assault for several months, in 1662 they surrendered. When the Qing conquerors pursued their policy of removing coastal Chinese of Fujian and Guangdong inland to cut off their independent trading activities, tens of thousands of them fled to Zeelandia. In 1683 a large Qing fleet finally brought it under submission. The Qing established a new city, Tainan, near Zeelandia, and declared it the capital of the island, which would now be a part of Fujian province. They largely left it alone, restricting further Chinese immigration and declaring that the lands belonging to the native Formosans should be retained by them. After a revolt during the eighteenth century, hoping to make it less of a frontier society, the emperors allowed wives and children to join the Chinese men on the island and the Chinese to rent land from the native islanders. In 1858 an "unequal treaty" (see Chapter 7), the Treaty of Tianjin, opened additional treaty ports, including two on Formosa. By that time, numerous Chinese were crossing the straits to settle cities and farms there. In 1871, Formosan aborigines killed fifty-four shipwrecked Ryukyu sailors (the Ryukyu Islands are located between Taiwan and Japan; see Map 2.1). Japan asserted its right to seek justice for the Ryukyuans. The Ryukyu Islands had been paying tribute to China since 1372 but had also been paying tribute to Japan since 1609 (without China's knowledge). The Japanese sent a fleet to Formosa in 1874. The Chinese fleet defending Formosa contained guns for firing salutes that would burst if real shells were fired; it could not mount a defense. The treaty that followed gave Japan the right to build barracks on Formosa, paid for by China (Welsh, 1993: 3 1 5 - 3 1 7 ; Hsu, 1980:84-88). The Japanese then occupied Formosa but, after protests from the British, retreated. In 1879, they annexed Okinawa and the other Ryukyus. In 1885, China declared Formosa a full province. Within a decade, the Japanese soundly defeated the Chinese navy in the Sino-Japanese War. The Treaty of Shimonoseki (Cameron, 1975:155-162), signed in 1895, forced China to give Japan Formosa (which they renamed

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Taiwan), the P e s c a d o r e s Islands (in the straits between F o r m o s a and the mainland), and the L i a o d o n g peninsula of Manchuria (the southern tip of Liaoning; see M a p 2.2). T h e J a p a n e s e f o r c e d the C h i n e s e inhabitants of Taiwan to learn the Japanese language and customs. They used the island to supply Japan with f o o d , w o o d , minerals, and chemicals; its e c o n o m y prospered as J a p a n ' s Co-prosperity Sphere took over Asia. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, anticipating J a p a n ' s d e f e a t , Franklin D. R o o s e v e l t and Winston Churchill agreed to the d e m a n d of C h i a n g Kai-shek that Taiwan be awarded to his Kuomintang Nationalists. Nationalist troops entered the island in 1945, but their corruption and i n e f f i c i e n c y soon eroded its stability and e c o n o m y . W h e n riots erupted in 1947, they suppressed them brutally, e x e c u t i n g thousands of intellectuals and p r o m i n e n t citizens and contributing to enduring resentment of the Nationalists by the native Formosans. By 1949, the communists were overwhelming the Nationalist troops on the mainland (see Chapter 4); 2 million of them fled to Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-shek set up his g o v e r n m e n t in exile. H a v i n g cleared him and his armies f r o m the mainland, the c o m m u n i s t s vowed to take Taiwan as well and complete their victory. The Nationalist base closest to mainland was on the island of Q u e m o y , part of a g r o u p of fourteen islands just outside A m o y Bay, outside the old Chinese treaty port of Xiamen. Just beyond Quemoy lies the Taiwan Straits that separate Taiwan f r o m the mainland. The c o m m u n i s t s began shelling that island group in October 1949 but did not have the military capability to mount an immediate invasion of those islands or of Taiwan. In the m o n t h s that f o l l o w e d , both the c o m m u n i s t and Nationalist forces ceased hostilities while they assessed their options. The U.S. secretary of state, Dean A c h e s o n , gave a speech outlining U.S. strategic interests in the area without mentioning South Korea and Taiwan. Then, on June 25, 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea. Two days later, the United States extended protection to Taiwan. It gave Taiwan military assistance and patrolled the straits between Taiwan and the mainland (Accinelli, 1997; Cheng, Chi, and Wu, 1995; Tucker, 1994). In 1954 China shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits; in response, the United States signed a treaty with Taiwan guaranteeing to defend it and the Pescadores Islands just to the west of it within the straits f r o m invasion, in e x c h a n g e f o r a pledge that Taiwan would not attack the mainland without approval by the United States. Six months later, China pledged it would use only p e a c e f u l m e a n s to liberate Taiwan and declared that K u o m i n t a n g m e m b e r s were even w e l c o m e to visit China. Until the Cultural Revolution began, China gave official receptions for all visiting groups of overseas Chinese, but this did not stop f u r t h e r hostilities. W h e n C h i n a began b o m b a r d i n g the o f f shore islands of Q u e m o y and Matsu in 1958, the United States sent in troops (Hinton, 1 9 7 2 : 6 7 - 9 2 ; Jain, 1 9 7 6 : 8 2 - 1 1 1 ) . In 1962, Chiang Kaishek threatened to invade the mainland; the United States restrained him, and the Soviet Union threatened to support China against an invasion.

Chimi Beyond the Heartland

The old European Xiamen

(upper

treaty port enclave

left), and Amoy

on Gulangyu

Bay and the Qneinoy

157

island islands

(forei)round), (upper

right).

T h e United States initiated a massive program o f military and civilian aid to Taiwan (Tucker, 1994). Chiang Kai-shek initiated land reforms to give land to native Formosan farmers, restricted imports, and helped foreign industries in a special e c o n o m i c zone obtain credit and avoid taxes and regulations on exports. (This zone, created in the 1960s, would b e c o m e a model for mainland C h i n a ' s special zones after 1 9 7 8 , which were discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 . ) With exports o f manufactured goods surging, T a i w a n ' s gross national product ( G N P ) quadrupled between 1 9 5 0 and 1 9 8 0 (Marsh, 1 9 9 6 ; Gold, 1 9 8 6 ) . When U . S . president Richard Nixon visited B e i j i n g in 1 9 7 2 , he agreed to leave how to work out the integration between Taiwan and the mainland up to both sides. W h e n the United States resumed full diplomatic relations with China in 1979, it broke o f f formal relations and its defense treaty with Taiwan. Taiwan also lost its seats on the International Monetary Fund and the World B a n k . S i n c e Taiwan c l a i m s to represent all o f China (calling itself the Republic o f China, not the Republic o f Taiwan), and mainland China also claims Taiwan as one o f its provinces, the bodies had to c h o o s e which regime represented China. R e c o g n i z i n g the P e o p l e ' s Republic o f C h i n a as the government o f China required breaking o f f formal relations with the Republic o f China. This was a dramatic switch.

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Robert E. Gamer

By 1979, T a i w a n ' s per capita G N P was six times that of m a i n l a n d China. 9 But discontent was growing on the island. Riots in 1971 and 1972 had protested T a i w a n ' s loss of its United N a t i o n s seat and special relationship with the United States, as the United States and the P e o p l e ' s Republic of China w a r m e d relations. People were angry over corruption and lack of f r e e d o m s under K u o m i n t a n g rule, and native F o r m o s a n s were expressing resentment over the takeover of their island by Chinese f r o m the m a i n l a n d ; m a n y of t h e m wanted Taiwan to declare itself i n d e p e n d e n t of the m a i n l a n d , with no aspirations to b e c o m e a part of or to take over China. T h e n it could gain d i p l o m a t i c recognition and join international bodies like any other nation. T h e K u o m i n t a n g c l a i m e d the right to put d o w n these d e m o n s t r a t i o n s with strict military m e a s u r e s b e c a u s e it was still engaged in a civil war to regain the mainland. In 1975, Chiang Kaishek died and was succeeded by his son, Chiang C h i n g - k u o . He, in turn, died in 1988. M e a n w h i l e , investment c o n t i n u e d to pour into Taiwan, and its trade rose markedly. Two of C h i n a ' s first four "special e c o n o m i c z o n e s " created in 1980, Shantou (in G u a n g d o n g ) and X i a m e n (in Fujian), are on the coast opposite Taiwan. The initial investment response was slow, but by the end of the decade it was picking up speed rapidly. Due to the political tensions, T a i w a n e s e trade and investment on the m a i n l a n d h a d to be d o n e quietly through H o n g K o n g . In 1987, just b e f o r e his death, C h i a n g C h i n g - k u o lifted the ban on travel to the mainland, opening a flood of Taiwan investment and tourism there. He also lifted the strict martial law that had tightly restricted civil liberties for years, which allowed opposition parties to form and the press to print opposing views; for the first time, native F o r m o s a n s could win legislative seats. Many of them backed the Democratic Progressive Party. C h i a n g ' s successor to the presidency and control of the K u o m i n t a n g , Lee Teng-hui, was born and raised in T a i w a n . He held the first open elections f o r a fully elected national legislature, w h i c h left the K u o m i n t a n g with a slim majority of seats, and later (as discussed in Chapter 4 and later in this chapter) held elections for president. One of the most controversial issues raised by a n u m b e r of leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party, now the principal opposition party, is a call for total independence for Taiwan. Even the new legislature contains seats for districts on the mainland and f o r overseas C h i n e s e in Southeast Asian c o u n t r i e s — a strange p h e n o m e n o n discussed f u r t h e r in C h a p t e r 7. Those seeking independence would simply declare Taiwan a sovereign nation, with no formal links to overseas Chinese and no claim over the mainland. In 1991, President Lee sought to d e f u s e this issue by putting the shoe on the other foot. He called on Beijing to recognize Taiwan as a separate, independent nation. T h e n Taiwan would negotiate with China over reunif i c a t i o n , providing it r e n o u n c e s the use of military f o r c e against Taiwan and introduces democracy and f r e e enterprise on the mainland (terms L e e

China Beyond the Heartland

159

k n o w s are not a c c e p t a b l e to the c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e ) . First there would be informal contacts, then official governmental contacts, and finally steps toward reunification. In 1 9 8 1 , B e i j i n g suggested that Taiwan might b e c o m e a special region o f C h i n a with its own s y s t e m o f g o v e r n m e n t ( c o n t i n u i n g under K u o m intang rule) and military f o r c e s . B e i j i n g is not inclined to retreat from that position, though it may accept a greater T a i w a n e s e presence within international e c o n o m i c and trade b o d i e s . M e a n w h i l e , m i l l i o n s o f T a i w a n e s e visit relatives on the mainland, and billions o f dollars o f investment c a p i tal f l o w a c r o s s the straits. B i l l i o n s o f dollars in indirect trade f l o w s b e tween the two p l a c e s through Hong K o n g . N i n e percent o f direct foreign investment in C h i n a c o m e s from Taiwan, making it the second-largest foreign investor in C h i n a ; two-thirds o f foreign investment in C h i n a c o m e s through Taiwan and Hong K o n g ( " T h e I m p o r t a n c e , " 1 9 9 7 ) . 1 0 Nongovernmental organizations have been created to consult on repatriation o f mainlanders who have illegally migrated to Taiwan, youth e x c h a n g e s , protecting i n v e s t m e n t s , control o f s m u g g l i n g and f i s h i n g , intellectual property rights, and other issues. Still, Taiwan persists in seeking recognition by international bodies as the l e g i t i m a t e g o v e r n m e n t o f C h i n a . It has sought r e a d m i s s i o n to the United Nations, formal visits by its president to other nations, admission into international trade organizations, and unofficial and informal relations with as m a n y c o u n t r i e s as p o s s i b l e . O n l y t w e n t y - n i n e c o u n t r i e s (largely poor nations from Central A m e r i c a and A f r i c a ) still maintain d i p l o m a t i c relations with it rather than with the P R C . It has o f f e r e d e c o n o m i c aid to those poor nations in e x c h a n g e f o r d i p l o m a t i c relations. T h e most prosperous among them, South A f r i c a , switched recognition to B e i j i n g in 1 9 9 8 . B e i j i n g strongly resists all m o v e s by other countries to maintain relations with T a i w a n . W h e n the president o f the United S t a t e s invited President L e e to visit the United States for an informal, unofficial visit in 1 9 9 5 , B e i j i n g raised the level o f tension. It sent its fleet into the T a i w a n Straits shortly b e f o r e T a i w a n ' s first presidential e l e c t i o n in 1 9 9 6 and talked o f threatened invasion. T h e s e actions may have dampened enthusiasm for independence, but they also frightened foreign investors, brought denunciations from g o v e r n m e n t s around the world, and failed to prevent T a i w a n ' s voters from returning President L e e to o f f i c e . A w e e k later, B e i j i n g — s t i l l trying to s h o w t o u g h n e s s — a n n o u n c e d that Hong K o n g ' s l e g i s l a t i v e reforms would be abandoned after 1 9 9 7 and that the popular c h i e f secretary o f Hong K o n g ' s c i v i l s e r v i c e would b e r e m o v e d f o r o p p o s i n g this m o v e (she was later asked to stay). C h i n a had indicated two years e a r l i e r it would abandon the reforms, so that c a m e as no surprise; but the timing and tone o f the f o r m a l a n n o u n c e m e n t and a c c o m p a n y i n g dismissal ( f l y i n g in the face o f its assurances that Hong K o n g ' s civil service would remain independent and c o m i n g i m m e d i a t e l y after the crude attempts to i n f l u e n c e

160

Robert

E.

Gamer

T a i w a n ' s election) p u s h e d panic buttons. During the week that f o l l o w e d , as many people applied for British passports as had applied during the five previous years combined; sports arenas were hastily requisitioned to hold the lines of applicants. This gave over half of Hong K o n g ' s populace these escape documents (Gilley, 1996a). Taiwan, whose president and legislature were now democratically elected, weighed in with an announcement that it would give r e f u g e to political dissidents after 1997. Shortly thereafter, Beijing d e m a n d e d that some j u d g e s it did not like step d o w n and h a n d e d Hong K o n g ' s g o v e r n m e n t a list of "ten d e m a n d s " it must carry out b e f o r e the turnover; w h e n asked to c o m p r o m i s e , it ref u s e d to do so. It threatened to r e i m p o s e British laws passed b e f o r e the a g r e e m e n t to turn over H o n g K o n g , including those allowing severe repression of political dissidence and censorship of the media. It called the H o n g K o n g Alliance in Support of Patriotic D e m o c r a t i c M o v e m e n t s , w h o s e m e m b e r s include legislators, " s u b v e r s i v e " and implied that its m e m b e r s could not serve in f u t u r e legislatures (Gilley, 1996b). T h e fact that H o n g K o n g ' s new Court of Final A p p e a l s and its C o m m i t t e e of T w e l v e ' s p o w e r to review the constitutionality of legislation passed by H o n g K o n g ' s legislature can be overruled by C h i n a ' s National P e o p l e ' s Congress underscores the seriousness of those demands. Younger residents do not respond cordially to such uses of blunt military and political instruments; Beijing did not return to such tactics after Hong Kong became a special administrative region in July 1997, adopting instead a deliberate policy of remaining publicly silent on Hong Kong issues. Efforts to undermine the independence of Hong K o n g ' s bureaucracy and courts would frighten the b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y and bring a flight of capital. The m a n y b a n k s m a i n t a i n i n g h e a d q u a r t e r s in Hong Kong can m o v e to Singapore and elsewhere. Since Hong Kong has been the principal provider of capital to fuel C h i n a ' s reforms, such flight could threaten the entire reform process. T h e issue of T a i w a n ' s relationship with China inextricably enmeshes the 55 million overseas C h i n e s e , most of w h o m live in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. S o m e of them are billionaires, leading guilds and trading associations that dominate the economies of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, B u r m a , and China itself. They can m o v e themselves and their money at will. They have intimate connections with the leaders and bureaucracies of all these governments. As mentioned earlier, together they may hold almost as much investment capital as Japan (Seagrave, 1995:285). Even Chinese living in other Southeast Asian countries who are seeking to assimilate as citizens must face the hatred of many fellow citizens who resent Chinese d o m i n a n c e of their economies; Chapter 7 pursues this issue further. The lives of all expatriate Chinese are tied together (see Suryadinata, 1985; Lever-Tracy, Ip, and Noel, 1996; Robison and G o o d m a n , 1996). Leaders of both mainland China and Taiwan k n o w

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161

they cannot go it alone without the full input from this overseas C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t y ; their prosperity depends on the investment capital and trading links o f that widely dispersed community. A n y political disintegration o f mainland China would also divide the loyalties o f the overseas Chinese, and any civil war there would spread to Taiwan. O v e r s e a s C h i n e s e would be asked to c h o o s e sides, further endangering their positions in their own adopted lands. In an incident that highlights this interdependence, a week after Taiwan's presidential election, President L e e and Premier Jiang Zemin reestablished informal contacts. Taiwan's business community, with ever-increasing indirect investment in C h i n a via Hong K o n g and other ports, encourages such dialogue and an end to Taiwan's ban on direct investment and trade ( B a u m , 1 9 9 7 ) . And as the D e m o c r a t i c Progressive Party shows increasing strength (winning twelve o f twenty-three local government seats in 1997 elections), Beijing has opened dialogue with its leader, Hsu Hsin-liang; he talks o f creating better business links with China, softening the message o f those in his party who demand complete independence.

•

TIBET

China, Hong K o n g , and Taiwan carry out a shadow play with thrusts and parries o f d e f i a n c e , although they in reality share many cultural ties and c o m m e r c i a l transactions. Tibet represents a sharp contrast: It is an area without such cultural or e c o n o m i c ties to China. Here the thrusts and parries are far more real. T i b e t ' s ties to C h i n a are c o m p l e x , as are the animosities that separate them. T h e T i b e t a n s are a people living on a high, sparsely settled plateau (see Chapter 2, especially M a p 2 . 4 ) . Along the drier northern portions o f the p l a t e a u — i n K h a m , A m d o , and C h a n t a n g — t h e y made their living by herding sheep and yak. Along the river valleys and mountain passes to the south, a feudal nobility and the king p a r c e l e d out lands in e x c h a n g e f o r rent and labor services. T h e king presided over the region, while B o n p o s , storytellers and singers o f riddles, propagated religious b e l i e f s associated with totemism, animism, and o c c u l t i s m (see Chapter 12). T h e seventh to tenth centuries A.D. brought power and culture to T i b e t ( S t e i n , 1 9 7 2 : 5 6 - 7 5 ) . In the seventh century, B u d d h i s m (also e x a m i n e d in Chapter 12) was introduced to T i b e t from India. T h e country developed a written alphabet, based on the script o f Kashmir. Tibetan kings, beginning with

the legendary

Songsten

Gampo,

conquered

territory

in

Nepal,

Turkestan, and far north and east into what is now Yunnan, S i c h u a n , X i n j i a n g , Qinghai, Gansu, and S h a a n x i ( M a p 2 . 2 ) ; married daughters o f Chinese e m p e r o r s and o f rulers from other surrounding p r i n c i p a l i t i e s ; and w e l c o m e d s c h o l a r s from Iran, C h i n a , and e l s e w h e r e . T h e y signed p e a c e treaties delineating borders with C h i n a in A.D. 7 3 4 and 8 2 2 .

162

Robert E. Gamer

In about a.d. 7 7 5 the king presided over the construction of a great Buddhist monastery at S a m y e , brought in a monk from Nepal to be its abbot, ordained several noblemen as monks, and arranged for monks from China to come in and preach. In 791 he decreed Buddhism to be the official state religion. M o n k s would have special privileges and were to receive gifts. Several hundred people took religious vows. In the succeeding centuries, disputes severely weakened the power o f the kings. S o m e nobility resisted the adoption o f Buddhism, whereas others (sometimes claiming divine descent) took charge o f the monasteries that sprouted up all over Tibet and surrounding regions, passing the post of abbot from uncle to nephew. Many people j o i n e d these monasteries, which began to acquire much land and wealth. Doctrinal disputes arose among the monks; some became morally decadent. Traditional Bonpo religious practices continued and were absorbed into Buddhism. At the start of the thirteenth century, Genghiz Khan, who was to conquer China (see Chapter 3), sent his troops deep into Tibet, whose leaders agreed to send him tribute and thus symbolically recognized his power. Genghiz Khan, in turn, invited the Tibetan scholar Sakya Panchen to M o n golia, where he helped him devise an alphabet. In 1 2 7 0 Kublai Khan granted Sakya's followers rulership of all Tibet; meanwhile, Genghiz's descendants were fighting among themselves for control of Mongolia, and various Tibetan monasteries allied with some of them to contest for power, often joining in with their own fighting forces. Two orders, the B l a c k Hats and Red Hats, started looking in villages shortly after the death of a holy individual (a bodhisattva, which we discuss more later) to seek a baby into which his soul had been reborn, or reincarnated; those individuals were brought into monasteries to be raised as lamas (superior ones). In 1283 the Red Hats declared one of these lamas ruler of Tibet. In keeping with Tantric traditions popular at the time in India, these orders used mantras (repetition o f mystical words and revolutions o f prayer wheels) and marídalas (sacred diagrams) in rituals and meditations. Concerned with these two orders' emphasis on worldly power and wealth, in 1403 a monastic scholar founded the Geluk-pa (Yellow Hat) order that also emphasized the need for monastic discipline, personal morality, and good works as part of the search for total liberation from the world. Armed with this reforming zeal, armies from its monasteries fought with the Red Hats, the followers o f S a k y a and the remaining B o n p o orders, and the weak kings and princes for political control. In 1578 the Mongol ruler Altan Khan, seeking an ally among the contending forces, declared the head o f the Yellow Hats to be the Dalai (oceanwide, all-embracing) Lama; Altan's influence was extended further upon the death of this Dalai Lama, when the monks found his reincarnated successor to be none other than a great-grandson of Altan Khan! But this did not stop the bitter fighting for control among the various sects and the

China lieyonil the llearllaiul

Tibelan

monk

¡villi prayer

wheel

k i n g s , w h o in t u r n a l l i e d w i t h rival M o n g o l p r i n c e s . In the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a M o n g o l r u l e r sent his a r m i e s into T i b e t , killed the k i n g , h e l p e d t h e f i f t h D a l a i L a m a b u i l d t h e g r e a t P o t a l a p a l a c e that still d o m i n a t e s the v a l l e y a b o v e the c a p i t a l of L h a s a , and in 1641 d e c l a r e d h i m the s o v e r e i g n of T i b e t ( w i t h a g o v e r n o r n o m i n a t e d by t h e M o n g o l s to a s s i s t h i m ) . T h e

164

Robert E. Gamer

M a n c h u ruler w h o founded the Q i n g dynasty in 1 6 4 4 also was his ally. A f t e r his death, bitter fighting broke out among various Tibetan f a c t i o n s , M o n g o l p r i n c e s , and C h i n e s e e m p e r o r s over his s u c c e s s o r s and who should c h o o s e them. W h e n Dzungar M o n g o l f o r c e s invaded Tibet in 1 7 1 7 to drive out another M o n g o l prince w h o had killed the sixth D a l a i L a m a and was trying to r e p l a c e him with his own c a n d i d a t e , C h i n a a t t a c k e d Tibet and established small military garrisons there. T h e Dalai L a m a ruled with assistance from ministers, a c o u n c i l c o m posed o f monks and nobles, another monastic c o u n c i l , and a National Ass e m b l y c o m p o s e d o f high o f f i c i a l s ; important d e c i s i o n s required the approval o f all these bodies ( R a h u l , 1 9 6 9 : 2 2 - 7 2 ; R i c h a r d s o n ,

1984:14-27).

B e t w e e n the death o f a Dalai L a m a and the growth into m a n h o o d o f the next, regents were chosen to assume his o f f i c e . Nobles held power and supervised administration in various regions o f Tibet; K h a m and A m d o to the northeast remained under M o n g o l control. China sent to L h a s a two formal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s (ambans),

w h o e x e r t e d i n f l u e n c e over g o v e r n a n c e o f the

kingdom; when they killed a Tibetan official in 1 7 5 0 , Tibetans m a s s a c r e d C h i n e s e living there ( H o f f m a n , 1 9 7 1 : 5 9 - 6 3 ) . Chinese troops intervened to restore order. C h i n e s e troops a l s o helped T i b e t repel an i n v a s i o n

by

Gurkhas (from Nepal) in 1 7 8 8 to capture Ladakh (east Kashmir, on T i b e t ' s western border), dictated the p e a c e t e r m s , and c l o s e d the borders to the B r i t i s h — w h o may have instigated the invasion. T h e C h i n e s e also s u c c e s s fully helped the Tibetans resist invasions from Dogras (out o f K a s h m i r ) in 1 8 4 1 . In 1 8 4 7 , despite that loss, the B r i t i s h marked the boundaries between T i b e t and D o g r a ; the C h i n e s e did not r e c o g n i z e that boundary, which later b e c a m e the f o c u s o f C h i n a ' s dispute with India. B u t a n o t h e r G u r k h a attack in 1 8 5 5 was m o r e s u c c e s s f u l , f o r c i n g T i b e t to g i v e them trading rights. T h e Dalai L a m a is believed (along with Songsten G a m p o , T i b e t ' s first centralizing Buddhist king) to be the indirect reincarnation o f Avalokitesvara, Tibet's patron bodhisattva (one who has achieved a degree o f enlightenment but has returned to earth to help living mortals a c h i e v e spiritual progress). T i b e t ' s second great lama is the Panchen L a m a , abbot o f one o f the great monasteries, who is the reincarnation o f Amitabha, before w h o m Avalokitesvara took his original bodhisattva vow to return to Tibet and help all beings ( R i c h a r d s o n , 1 9 8 4 : 3 8 - 6 0 ) . In e x c h a n g e for helping repulse the 1 7 8 8 Gurkha invasion, China demanded the right to dictate the candidates from whom the Dalai L a m a and Panchen L a m a would be chosen. T h e y also allowed those two worthies to open new monasteries in M o n g o l i a and China and welcomed lamas in the imperial court at B e i j i n g . Panchen L a m a s began to make that trek, developing ties to C h i n a ' s emperors. T h e Tibetans continued to ignore the Chinese when choosing Dalai L a m a s . T h e thirteenth Dalai L a m a , who lived from 1 8 7 5 to 1 9 3 3 , befriended a Russian lama who put him into contact with the Russian czar ( R i c h a r d s o n ,

China Beyond the Heartland

165

1 9 8 4 : 7 3 - 9 0 , 2 6 8 - 2 7 3 ) . T h i s frightened the B r i t i s h , who tried to enter into n e g o t i a t i o n with C h i n a and T i b e t to d e f i n e T i b e t ' s western and southern b o r d e r s . W h e n this failed, they sent a military e x p e d i t i o n that captured L h a s a in 1 9 0 4 . T h e Dalai L a m a fled to M o n g o l i a , but the British government ( b e f o r e withdrawing its troops) forced his o f f i c e r s to sign a c o n v e n tion d e l i n e a t i n g the borders it preferred and o p e n i n g T i b e t to trade with B r i t a i n . T w o years later the B r i t i s h signed a treaty with C h i n a , to w h i c h T i b e t was not a party, r e c o g n i z i n g the 1 9 0 4 treaty and C h i n a ' s suzerainty (see Chapter 7 ) over Tibet, and in 1 9 0 7 Britain concluded a similar treaty with R u s s i a . T h e n in 1 9 1 0 a C h i n e s e general began to c o n q u e r territory in eastern T i b e t and then L h a s a itself, forcing the Dalai L a m a to flee to India. W h e n the new republic was formed in China in 1 9 1 1 , it declared that Tibet was n o w an integral part o f C h i n a , but it could not c o n t r o l or d e f e n d C h i n a ' s troops there, now under attack f r o m T i b e t a n f o r c e s . C h i n a withdrew its troops, and the Dalai L a m a expelled the C h i n e s e ambans

and re-

nounced all C h i n e s e c o n n e c t i o n s with Tibet. In 1 9 1 4 S i r Henry M c M a h o n obtained a T i b e t a n , but not a C h i n e s e , signature on a convention signed in S i m l a , India, which defined boundaries and s t i l l — o v e r T i b e t ' s continuing o b j e c t i o n s — d e c l a r e d C h i n a suzerain over T i b e t and even declared large portions o f f o r m e r Tibetan territory to be a part o f C h i n a ( S h a k a b p a , 1 9 6 7 : 246-259). E x c e p t for the continuing B r i t i s h representative in L h a s a , who had a radio transmitter, Tibet largely cut itself o f f from the outside world. T h i s isolation was e n f o r c e d by a ban on selling food to outsiders and reinforced by the a b s e n c e in T i b e t o f any roads or w h e e l e d v e h i c l e s ; only about twenty E u r o p e a n s and A m e r i c a n s are known to have entered T i b e t during this entire period. In 1 9 1 5 the K h a m s rose in revolt and captured b a c k s o m e o f the terrain taken from them by C h i n e s e troops in 1 9 1 0 . T i b e t created no ministry o f foreign affairs and e x c h a n g e d no ambassadors. F e w Tibetans s p o k e any foreign l a n g u a g e . F o u r students were sent to study in E n g l a n d , and in 1 9 4 8 a few m o r e were selected to study in India. An E n glish school begun in L h a s a in 1 9 4 5 had to c l o s e when the monasteries o b j e c t e d that it might interfere with religious b e l i e f s . T i b e t did not issue a passport until 1 9 4 8 , when it sent out a trade d e l e g a t i o n in an attempt to alert the world to its pending troubles ( S h a k a b p a ,

1967:289-290).

After the death o f the thirteenth Dalai L a m a in 1 9 3 3 , C h i n a sent an informal delegation to L h a s a with a radio transmitter. T h e y stayed until the T i b e t a n c o u n c i l seized the radio transmitter and e x p e l l e d them in 1 9 4 9 , after the leader o f the S e r a monastery, which had ties to the C h i n e s e , attempted a c o u p to o v e r t h r o w the young Dalai L a m a ' s regent ( S h a k a b p a , 1967:290-294;

Harrer, 1 9 5 4 : 2 2 2 - 2 3 1 ) ,

and after the new

communist

r e g i m e in C h i n a declared again that T i b e t was a p r o v i n c e o f C h i n a . In 1 9 5 0 , with s o m e assistance from K h a m rebels who resented L h a s a ' s rule, Chinese troops entered Tibet, defeated the Dalai L a m a ' s troops, and forced

166

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his g o v e r n m e n t to sign a 1951 a g r e e m e n t on "the p e a c e f u l liberation of Tibet," declaring it an integral part of China. The Dalai L a m a and the "existing political system in T i b e t " would stay in place and f r e e d o m of religion would be guaranteed, but foreign affairs would be handled by Beijing (Richardson, 1 9 8 4 : 2 9 0 - 2 9 3 ) . El Salvador wanted the topic placed on the agenda of the United Nations, but other c o u n t r i e s — f o l l o w i n g India's lead in contending that C h i n a ' s right to suzerainty over Tibet was already est a b l i s h e d — r e f u s e d to allow such a debate (Richardson, 1984:186). C h i n a ' s new government wished to repudiate the treaties imposed on C h i n a ' s e m p e r o r s by Britain and other imperial p o w e r s (see C h a p t e r 7). The 1914 Simla convention had declared that the Dalai L a m a had spiritual authority over all believers in his faith but removed his political authority f r o m Nepal, Ladakh, Bhutan, and Sikkim; the Dalai L a m a had been reluctant to accept that latter provision, and China had refused to sign the convention. W h e n India achieved independence in 1947, its g o v e r n m e n t , led by Pandit J a w a h a r l a l N e h r u , m o v e d quickly to establish good relations with China ( M o r a e s , 1 9 6 0 : 1 1 7 - 1 4 3 ; Patterson, 1960; Rahul, 1 9 6 9 : 8 8 100). After initial objection, it acquiesced in the agreement signed between China and Tibet in 1951 and signed an agreement in 1954 giving up rights British India had claimed in Tibet, c o n t e n d i n g that China had long had suzerainty over Tibet. This treaty, h o w e v e r , did not precisely d e f i n e the border between Tibet and India. Nehru was somewhat disturbed when he discovered that C h i n e s e m a p s still s h o w e d large portions of India and those border states within Chinese territory; C h i n a ' s foreign minister Zhou Enlai assured him the m a p s were simply old (Richardson, 1984:199, 215). Under Tibet's traditional social system, about a third of the land had belonged to the state, a third to the nobility, and a third to the monasteries w h o parceled these out to f a m i l i e s (Stein, 1 9 7 2 : 9 3 - 1 6 3 ; H o f f m a n , 1971:175-192; Carrasco, 1959; Cassinelli and Ekvall, 1969). C o m m o n e r s (i.e., those not monks, nuns, or nobility) turned over portions of their agricultural output for rent and taxes and were asked to contribute labor to civic projects; otherwise they were free to move about Tibet and engage in c o m m e r c e with the traders w h o regularly traversed the k i n g d o m . T h e y could also serve as a d m i n i s t r a t o r s or rise within the hierarchy of the monasteries, though top positions usually went to nobility. Local administrators settled civil disputes and tried criminal cases, often with an ear to local public opinion; severe p u n i s h m e n t s were rare (Cassinelli and Ekvall, 1 9 6 9 : 1 5 3 - 1 8 5 ; R i c h a r d s o n , 1 9 8 4 : 1 6 - 1 7 ; Stein, 1 9 7 2 : 1 3 4 - 1 3 8 ; Harrer, 1 9 5 4 : 8 8 - 9 0 ) . T h o u g h p e o p l e lived on m e a g e r diets, starvation was unc o m m o n because granaries and seed supplies were maintained by public authorities for distribution in time of need or emergency (Cassinelli and Ekvall, 1969:98, 115; Stein, 1 9 7 2 : 1 0 9 - 1 2 5 ; Harrer, 1954:234). A l t h o u g h the Dalai Lama was both the chief sovereign and leader of his own religious

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order (the Yellow Hats), many m o n a s t e r i e s belonged to other Buddhist orders or f o l l o w e d traditional B o n p r a c t i c e s , and s o m e adhered to I s l a m , Hinduism, and other religions, which they were free to do. M a n y regions were headed by nobility or m o n a s t e r i e s that did not belong to the Y e l l o w Hat order ( C a s s i n e l l i and E k v a l l , 1 9 6 9 : 6 5 - 7 2 ; Harrer, 1 9 5 4 : 1 7 9 ) . T h e m o n a s t e r i e s , which s u b j e c t e d nuns and m o n k s to stern d i s c i p l i n e , m a i n tained their own militias and stored large quantities o f w e a p o n s (Harrer, 1 9 5 4 : 2 4 6 - 2 4 7 ) . Young men were c o n s c r i p t e d to serve in the army and m o n a s t e r i e s ( C a s s i n e l l i and E k v a l l , 1 9 6 9 : 2 9 4 - 3 0 1 ) . T h e vast m a j o r i t y o f people inside and outside the monasteries were illiterate. T h e monasteries r e s i s t e d the introduction o f modern m e d i c i n e , f e a r i n g it would e n d a n g e r their hold on power; infant mortality in Tibet was among the highest in the world. T h e y also resisted introducing m o t o r v e h i c l e s , e l e c t r i c i t y , and industry. People moved from village to village on foot or h o r s e b a c k and carried goods on the backs o f yaks. Around L h a s a and along the southern river valleys o f T i b e t , China initially left this s o c i a l s y s t e m largely intact, though it i m m e d i a t e l y began d e m a n d i n g the appointment o f its supporters within the administration (Richardson,

1984:191-192).

It opened new c l i n i c s and s c h o o l s

and

rapidly proceeded to build T i b e t ' s first road, through the A m d o and K h a m regions o f eastern Tibet. T h e road soon brought in new settlers from other parts o f C h i n a as well as reforming c o m m u n i s t s . In the regions along the road, C h i n a began to take traditional grazing lands and pastures f r o m monasteries and nobility for redistribution to c o m m o n e r s and new settlers. C h i n e s e leaders talked about r e s c u i n g serfs f r o m e x p l o i t a t i o n by feudal lords and corrupt and cruel religious leaders and returning land to the people ( S t r o n g , 1 9 7 6 ) . T h e K h a m and A m d o people have a history o f f i e r c e independence and r e b e l l i o u s b e h a v i o r and resented these attacks on their r e l i g i o n and traditional way o f life (Harrer, 1 9 5 4 : 1 0 9 - 1 3 1 ) . T h e y b e g a n p h y s i c a l l y and verbally a t t a c k i n g C h i n e s e troops sent to their outposts (Patterson, 1 9 6 0 : 1 2 5 - 1 2 8 ; R i c h a r d s o n , 1 9 8 4 : 2 0 0 - 2 0 5 ) . B y 1 9 5 4 the road r e a c h e d L h a s a , and the signing o f the treaty b e t w e e n C h i n a and India proved that Nehru would not c o m e to T i b e t ' s rescue. In 1 9 5 5 , B e i j i n g e s t a b l i s h e d a Preparatory C o m m i t t e e f o r the A u t o n o m o u s R e g i o n o f Tibet, headed by the Dalai L a m a , to plan for new adm i n i s t r a t i v e procedures in T i b e t ; many traditional leaders feared this m e a n t a further w e a k e n i n g o f their powers. B y 1 9 5 6 open r e b e l l i o n had broken out among the K h a m and A m d o ; C h i n e s e troops struck b a c k with brutal f o r c e , shelling m o n a s t e r i e s and j a i l i n g and killing r e b e l s . L i t t l e m e r c y was shown by either side (Patt, 1 9 9 2 : 5 0 - 5 3 ; Patterson,

1960:125-

1 3 5 ) . Guerrilla forces and stockpiles o f arms grew in number and strength. In 1 9 5 9 c a m e a final showdown; the Dalai L a m a fled to India (Patterson, 1 9 6 0 : 1 4 8 - 1 9 1 ; Richardson, 1 9 8 4 : 1 9 9 - 2 1 4 , 2 4 2 ; Moraes, 1 9 6 0 : 1 - 3 1 ; Strong,

Robert E. Gamer

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1 9 7 6 : 5 7 - 8 6 ; Patt, 1 9 9 2 : 1 4 3 - 1 6 6 ; S h a k a b p a , 1 9 6 7 : 3 2 2 - 3 6 3 ) . F r o m his new e x i l e h o m e in India, the Dalai L a m a announced that 6 5 , 0 0 0 T i b e t a n s had died in the fighting and 1 , 0 0 0 monasteries had been destroyed. T h e repression extended into war between China and India. C h i n a was displeased that India offered asylum to the Dalai L a m a and growing numbers o f T i b e t a n e x i l e s . C h i n a contended, probably on good e v i d e n c e ( s e e U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , 1 9 9 6 ) that Indian i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s c o o p e r ated with the Central Intelligence A g e n c y and T a i w a n ' s S p e c i a l Operations unit to e n c o u r a g e and arm the Tibetan rebels, and complained that T i b e t a n guerrillas still were receiving supplies from Nepal and India. C h i n e s e authorities declared that Ladakhi residents o f T i b e t were there illegally and had to return to India; C h i n a wanted territory f r o m L a d a k h , in order to build a new road between B e i j i n g and L h a s a . India insisted on sticking to the border defined in the 1 9 1 4 S i m l a treaty. India withdrew trade with China. In 1 9 6 2 heavy fighting broke out between India and C h i n a on the L a d a k h border. C h i n a c a m e away with m i n o r territorial gains o f land it had c l a i m e d (North, 1 9 7 4 : 9 3 - 9 6 ; O j h a , 1 9 6 9 : 1 4 6 - 1 7 3 ; R i c h a r d s o n , 1 9 8 4 : 224-243). L a r g e n u m b e r s o f m o n k s , l a m a s , m e m b e r s o f the nobility, and o t h e r educated people were imprisoned, e x e c u t e d , and subjected to brutal treatment (Patt, 1 9 9 2 : 2 0 5 - 2 0 9 ) . M o s t m o n k s were removed from m o n a s t e r i e s , the m o n a s t e r i e s ' wealth was taken, and the people were discouraged f r o m religious practices. Public rectification c a m p a i g n s forced people to attack

Tibetan monastery

at Bodnath

in Nepal. Ml. Everest is in the

background.

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Beyond

the

Henriland

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their family members and village notables. Tibetans were restricted to their villages and organized into c o m m u n e s and into teams to carry out public works projects. Food was strictly rationed, and many suffered f r o m hunger and starvation. Large n u m b e r s of Chinese troops were stationed throughout Tibet. Despite all this, resistance activities c o n t i n u e d ( R i c h a r d s o n , 1984:194, 2 3 7 - 2 5 8 ; Patt, 1992:210; Barnett, 1994; Dawa, 1987). In 1965 the Preparatory C o m m i t t e e for the A u t o n o m o u s Region of Tibet changed Tibet's administration: The new Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) would be divided into eight military zones. The Panchen L a m a , w h o had previously been used to counter the Dalai L a m a , r e f u s e d to c o o p e r a t e f u r t h e r and was placed in custody. T h e onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 brought in the Red G u a r d s , w h o looted and razed t h o u s a n d s of the rem a i n i n g monasteries (there had been 2,700 in Tibet and 3,800 m o r e in Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan) and dismissed the military government. They finally turned on themselves in factional fighting, and the People's Liberation Army tried to restore order. Some nobility and f o r m e r Tibetan o f f i c i a l s were called back to positions of p r o m i n e n c e and some monasteries and holy places restored. In 1987, Tibetans staged another uprising (Schwartz, 1994). China declared martial law, which it has continued with varying degrees of intensity since that time. N e w s and travel f r o m the outside world are strictly censored and controlled. The Dalai Lama travels throughout the world urging support for Tibet, and many socially prominent individuals support his cause. Heads of state (including the prime minister of Mongolia) continue to support China's claims over Tibet while urging C h i n a ' s leaders to show restraint in their treatment of Tibetans and a reopening of d i a l o g u e with the Dalai Lama. They are under pressure from some constituents to press Tibet's case for independence more firmly. China contends that Tibet is its internal affair, not the business of foreign nations that have sought to dominate Tibet themselves in the past or have asserted the right to impose their authority on A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e , Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Q u e b e c , N e w foundland, Inuit, American Indians, Hawaii, or the rebelling c o n f e d e r a c y in the U.S. South. In 1988, China and the Dalai L a m a began using informal channels to explore ways to resume dialogue. M e a n w h i l e (except for the Potala of the exiled Dalai L a m a l o o m i n g above the city as an empty m o n u m e n t , the Jokhang temple, and some ruins of monasteries destroyed in the Cultural Revolution and a f t e r the uprising), nearly all the original structures of Lhasa have been torn d o w n and replaced with dull new office buildings and apartments. To maintain dominance, China has steadily increased Han immigration into Lhasa. Nearly all the shops, hotels, and offices there and in other Tibetan towns and cities are run by immigrant Han, w h o now constitute a majority of the capital's inhabitants. They have c o m e f a r f r o m their h o m e provinces to this harsh land for the traditional reasons C h i n e s e have always migrated overseas:

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T h e y c a n m a k e f a r m o r e m o n e y , with f e w e r taxes and political restrictions on their c o m m e r c e . M e a n w h i l e , m a n y T i b e t a n s , u n a b l e to adapt to the new e c o n o m y , are reduced to p e r m a n e n t u n e m p l o y m e n t . B e f o r e 1959, high perc e n t a g e s of the m a l e p o p u l a c e w e r e m o n k s ; n o w very f e w b o y s b e c o m e m o n k s , a n d t h e y o f t e n d o not p r o g r e s s f a r in s c h o o l . R e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e s are o n c e again a l l o w e d but d i s c o u r a g e d ; it is u n l a w f u l to d i s p l a y a picture of the D a l a i L a m a . T h e C h i n e s e c o m p l a i n that their r e l i g i o n l e a v e s Tib e t a n s w i t h attitudes not c o n d u c i v e to d i s c i p l i n e and e c o n o m i c e n d e a v o r ; w i t h o u t liberation, the m o n k s w o u l d h a v e d e n i e d m o d e r n i z a t i o n to Tibet. M o s t of T i b e t ' s p e o p l e live o u t s i d e L h a s a , a w a y f r o m the e c o n o m i c b o o m . M a n y are a m o n g C h i n a ' s p o o r e s t inhabitants.

•

CONCLUSION

T h e n e w H a n i n h a b i t a n t s of L h a s a are a n e w b r e e d of o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e , this t i m e living in their o w n land. T h e y b r i n g with t h e m e c o n o m i c skills and n e t w o r k s and t r e m e n d o u s p e r s o n a l drive. T h e y f o m e n t vast econ o m i c c h a n g e , but they a l s o l e a v e in their w a k e r e s e n t m e n t s f r o m local p e o p l e s . Since they o f t e n m a k e little a t t e m p t to m i n g l e with or u n d e r s t a n d t h o s e w h o s e c u l t u r a l z o n e s they h a v e e n t e r e d , the s o u r c e of that r e s e n t m e n t is hard f o r t h e m to c o m p r e h e n d . In C h a p t e r 7 w e e x p l o r e this f u r t h e r w h i l e e x a m i n i n g C h i n a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y in S o u t h e a s t Asia. In this chapter, w e h a v e n o t e d similar t e n s i o n s in the relations of Taiw a n ' s H a n rulers with the native F o r m o s a n s , w h o s e land was c o n q u e r e d by the J a p a n e s e and then h a n d e d o v e r to the H a n by the v i c t o r i o u s A l l i e s . M u c h of T a i w a n ' s e c o n o m y d e p e n d s on i n v e s t m e n t s in a n d by o t h e r reg i o n s of Asia a n d on s e l l i n g g o o d s on the w o r l d m a r k e t ; h o w e v e r , this h e l p e d the Han i m m i g r a n t s m o r e than the native F o r m o s a n f a r m e r s , until they r e v o l t e d and r e c e i v e d U.S. aid. L h a s a ' s n e w e c o n o m y , t o o , d e p e n d s h e a v i l y o n the world m a r k e t of t o u r i s m and p r e c i o u s m e t a l s ; t h i s m o n e y f l o w s m o r e to H a n i m m i g r a n t s than to n a t i v e T i b e t a n s . O n c e e s t a b l i s h e d , this inherent e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c e on the o u t s i d e world can h e l p restrain the h a r s h e s t b e h a v i o r and p a r o c h i a l instincts of H a n rulers; it is h a r d , f o r e x a m p l e , to m a i n t a i n the strictest m a r t i a l law w h i l e i n c r e a s i n g t o u r i s m . B u t s u c h e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a l s o w i d e n s the g a p b e t w e e n rich a n d p o o r , H a n and native. Hong Kong provides a unique environment for interaction between H a n a n d o u t s i d e r . L a r g e l y u n i n h a b i t e d until recent t i m e s , l y i n g on the s h o r e s of C h i n a , and p r o v i d e d with a large and s e c u r e h a r b o r area, it w a s able to d e v e l o p its own culture. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , its entire e c o n o m y r e v o l v e d a r o u n d e n t r e p o t t r a d e , s e l l i n g g o o d s to the o u t s i d e w o r l d . It w a s o u t s i d e C h i n a and s m o o t h l y c o n n e c t e d with the world b e y o n d . It c o n t a i n s n o hostile natives w h o s e e c o n o m y o n c e d e p e n d e d on s o m e t h i n g else; m o s t

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of its i m m i g r a n t s c a m e b e c a u s e t h e y w a n t e d m o r e f r e e d o m to carry out such c o m m e r c e . Still, its p r o s p e r i t y h a s d e p e n d e d on r e m a i n i n g apart f r o m the r u l e s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s that restrict c o m m e r c e in C h i n a . F o r t h o u s a n d s of y e a r s , C h i n a h a s d e p e n d e d on m e r c h a n t s w h o w o u l d v e n t u r e o u t s i d e its s h o r e s , u s i n g their c u l t u r a l skills to m a k e d e a l s and c o n n e c t i o n s f o r t h e h o m e l a n d . Its o w n c u l t u r e z o n e h a s e n c o u r a g e d i n v e s t m e n t a n d trade but also c o n f i n e d it w i t h i n a r e g u l a t o r y grid and circle of o b l i g a t i o n s that limits t h e i r s i z e a n d s c o p e (see C h a p t e r s 4 a n d 7). T h e real m o n e y can be m a d e in p l a c e s w h e r e t h o s e r e g u l a t i o n s a n d o b l i g a t i o n s are not in f o r c e . P u l l i n g H o n g K o n g inside the orbit e n d a n g e r s that a r r a n g e m e n t . It is e s sential that t h e " o n e c o u n t r y , t w o s y s t e m s " f o r m u l a in the S i n o - B r i t i s h Joint D e c l a r a t i o n of 1984 w o r k . In C h a p t e r 7, w e shall take a b r o a d e r look at C h i n a ' s c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h the o u t s i d e w o r l d as w e s u r v e y its o v e r a l l f o r e i g n policy. A s i m i l a r q u e s tion p e r s i s t s . Is C h i n a s e e k i n g to t a k e e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , a n d s t r a t e g i c control of this o u t s i d e e n v i r o n m e n t ? Or is it s e e k i n g to j o i n a c o m m u n i t y of n a t i o n s that e n c o u r a g e s both i n d i v i d u a l and n a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i o n , with r e s p e c t f o r the s o v e r e i g n t y of o t h e r n a t i o n s ? T h e f i g h t b e t w e e n the P R C and the R e p u b l i c of C h i n a o v e r w h o r e p r e s e n t s all of C h i n a a n d (as w e will e x a m i n e m o r e in C h a p t e r 7) all the o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e h i g h l i g h t s this d i l e m m a . D o C h i n a and the o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e insist on b e i n g o n e cultural and political z o n e , with a giant grid of interlocking e c o n o m i c c o n n e c t i o n s ? Or can the e c o n o m i c grid coexist a m o n g c o m p e t i n g s o v e r e i g n nations, be they C h i n a a n d T a i w a n , or C h i n a a n d the U n i t e d States and R u s s i a ? T h i s d e b a t e is in p r o g r e s s .

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NOTES

1. Shanghai, at that time a fishing village, is today China's largest city with 1 percent of its population producing 4.3 percent of its GDP, 12 percent of its industrial output, and 11 percent of its financial services. "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors." 1997. Far Eastern Economic Review 160, no. 6 (February 6):36. 2. Research Department. 1995. The 132,000 enterprises in China backed by Hong Kong money account for two-thirds of foreign-funded enterprises there. 3. In 1970 manufacturing provided 47 percent of jobs; in 1994, 20 percent (Research Department, Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 1995). 4. When a firm ships components of goods through Hong Kong before they are manufactured elsewhere and then brings the finished goods through Hong Kong, this classifies as a re-export. Eighty percent of Hong Kong's exports consist of such re-exports, 92 percent of which are to or from China. Fifty-six percent of Hong Kong's re-exports are of Chinese origin, and a third are destined for sale in China. Research Department, 1995. 5. Japan (U.S.$191 billion) is first, Britain (U.S.$166 billion) second, and the United States (U.S.$94 billion) fourth. Many township and village enterprises send money to Hong Kong so they can bring it back as "foreign capital"; this may account for a fourth to a third of Hong Kong's investment in China. The Bank of

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China and its twelve sister banks are the second-largest b a n k i n g g r o u p in Hong Kong. Research Department, 1995; Gilley, 1997. 6. More than half the revenues for this derive from a corporate profits tax, income taxes (with a top rate of 17.5 percent), and the tax on land sales. The rest come f r o m various stamp duties, fees, duties on imports (cars, gasoline, cigarettes, liquor), taxes on bets at the race track, utilities, hotel rooms, airport use, motor vehicles, estates, and many other transactions. 7. Hospital ward patients pay a flat U.S.$7 a day for all services, including surgery; fees may be waived for those without funds. Outpatient services at the 291 clinics generally cost under U.S.$4. Home visits by community nurses and sessions at psychiatric or geriatric centers cost less than U.S.$6. 8. Of the 10,000 firms the People's Liberation Army admits owning, about a tenth are in the Shenzhen special economic zone, just across the border from Hong Kong. 9. Taiwan's per capita income rose from U.S.$200 in 1952 to U.S.$10,000 in 1993 (Bellows, 1994:119) C h i n a ' s 1992 per capita income was U.S.$1,900, and Hong K o n g ' s was U.S.$20,000 (Noland, 1995). 10. Nearly 59 percent of foreign investment comes through Hong Kong and Macau and 8.7 percent from Taiwan (which largely enters through Hong Kong). T h e United States contributes 8.1 percent and Japan 7.8 percent.

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Naughton, Barry. 1997. Economics and Technology in the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Washington: Brookings Institution. Noland, Marcus. 1995. "Implications of Asian Economic G r o w t h . " Working Paper Series No. 94-95. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. North, Robert C. 1974. The Foreign Relations of China. 2d ed. E n c i n o , CA: Dickenson. Ojha, Ishwer C. 1969. Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair. Boston: Beacon. Reid, A n t h o n y (ed.). 1997. Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese. London: Allen and Unwin. Robison, Richard, and David S. G. G o o d m a n (eds.). 1996. The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds, and Middle Class Revolution. London: Routledge. Seagrave, Sterling. 1995. Lords of the Rim. New York: G. R Putnam. Simon, Denis. 1995. The Emerging Technological Trajectory of the Pacific Rim. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Suryadinata, Leo. 1985. China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension. Singapore: Singapore University Press. Takaki, Ronald. 1989. Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of AsianAmericans. New York: Little, Brown. Wang, G u n g w u . 1991. China and the Overseas Chinese. Singapore: T i m e s Academic Press. Yahuda, Michael. 1996. The International Politics of Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995. New York: Routledge.

• Hong Kong Berger, Suzanne, and Richard K. Lester (eds.). 1997. Made by Hong Kong. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boardman, Robert. 1976. Britain and the People's Republic of China, ¡949-74. London: Macmillan. Brown, Judith M., and R o s e m a r y Foot. 1997. Hong Kong's Transitions, 1842-1997. New York: St. Martin's Press. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, David N e w m a n , and Alvin Rabushka. 1996. Red Flag over Hong Kong. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. Chan, Kam Wah. 1997. Social Construction of Gender Inequality in the Housing System: Housing Experiences of Women in Hong Kong. B r o o k f i e l d , VT: Ashgate. Chan, Ming K., and Gerard A. Postiglione (eds.). 1996. The Hong Kong Reader: Passage to Chinese Sovereignty. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Chan, Ming K., and John D. Young. 1994. Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain, 1842-1992. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Chan, R a y m o n d K. H. 1996. Welfare in Newly-Industrialized Society: The Construction of the Welfare State in Hong Kong. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. Chang, David Wen-Wei Chang, and Richard Y. Chuang. 1997. The Politics of Hong Kong's Reversion to China. New York: St. Martin's Press. Chung, Stephanie P. Y. 1997. Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Changes in South China, 1900-I920s. New York: St. Martin's Press. Cohen, Warren I., and Li Zhao (eds.). 1997. Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule: The Economic and Political Implications of Reversion. New York: C a m b r i d g e University Press. Enright, Michael, Edith Scott, and David Dodwell (eds.). 1997. The Hong Kong Advantage. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Flowerdrew, John. 1997. The Final Years of Hong Kong. New York: St. Martin's Press. Gilley, Bruce. 1996a. " D a r k n e s s D a w n s . " Far Eastern Economic Review 159 (April 11): 14-15. . 1996b. "The Sound of Silence." Far Eastern Economic Review 159 (April 18):26. . 1997. "Regional Politik." Far Eastern Economic Review 160 ( M a y 29): 22. " G o o d Fences Make Good Neighbors." 1997. Far Eastern Economic Review 160, no. 6 (February 6):36. Hibbert, Christopher. 1970. The Dragon Awakes: China and the West 1793-1911. New York: Harper. Hong Kong 1995: A Review of 1994. 1995. Hong Kong: G o v e r n m e n t Printing Department. Jain, J. P. 1976. China in World Politics: A Study of Sino-British Relations 1949-1975. New Delhi: Radiant Press. K w o k , Reginald Yin-Wang, and Alvin Y. So (eds.). 1995. The Hong Kong-Guangdong Link: Partnership in Flux. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Lo, Shui-Hing. 1997. The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong. New York: St. Martin's Press. Lyons, T h o m a s P. 1994. Poverty and Growth in a South China County: Anxi, Fujian, 1949-1992. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Lyons, T h o m a s P., and Victor Need (eds.). 1994. The Economic Transformation of South China: Reform and Development in the Post-Mao Era. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. M c G u r n , William. 1996. " D i m i n i s h i n g R e t u r n s . " Far Eastern Economic Review 159, no. 24 (June 13):62-68. Miners, Norman. 1996. The Government and Politics of Hong Kong. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morris, Jan. 1997. Hong Kong. Rev. ed. New York: Vintage. Patten, Christopher. 1997. "Farewell to My Hong Kong." Newsweek (March 3). Research Department, Hong Kong Trade Development Council. 1995. " H o n g Kong Economy Profile no. 188" (June 6). Sender, Henny. 1996. "Tarnished Luster." Far Eastern Economic Review 159, no. 21 (May 16). Skeldon, Ronald (ed.). 1994. Reluctant Exiles? Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese. A r m o n k , NY: M. E. Sharpe. Spence, Jonathan. 1990. The Search for Modern China. New York: Norton. Sung, Yung-wing. 1991. The China-Hong Kong Connection: The Key to China's Open-Door Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. "The Chinese Takeover of Hong Kong Inc." 1994. Economist (May 7). "The Importance of Foreign Devil Money." 1997. Economist 342, no. 8007 (March 8): 10. Tsai, Jung-fang. 1993. Hong Kong in Chinese History. New York: C o l u m b i a University. "Unintended Consequences." 1998. Economist 347, no. 8070 (May 30):41. Wang, Enbao. 1995. Hong Kong, 1997: The Politics of Transition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Wang, Gungwu. 1996. Hong Kong's Transition: A Decade After the Deal. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Welsh, Frank. 1993. A History of Hong Kong. London: HarperCollins.

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Aberbach, Joel D., David Dollar, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (eds.). 1994. The Role of the State in Taiwan's Development. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Accinelli, Robert. 1997. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Baum, Julian. 1997. Far Eastern Economic Review 160, no. 45 (November 6):22-26. Bellows, T h o m a s J. 1994. "Politics, Elections, and Political C h a n g e in Taiwan." Asian Journal of Political Science 2, no. 1 (June): 114-148. Chang, David W. 1994. "Taiwan's Unification with Mainland China: Problems and Prospects." Asian Journal of Political Science 2, no. 1 (June):149-168. Chang, Parris H., and Martin L. Lasater (eds.). 1993. If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. C h e n g , T u n - j e n , and Stephan Haggard (eds.). 1992. Political Change in Taiwan. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cheng, Tun-jen, Chi Huang, and Samuel S. G. Wu. 1995. Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Chiou, C. L. 1996. Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990. New York: St. Martin's Press. C l o u g h , Ralph N. 1993. Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: People to People Diplomacy. Boulder: Westview Press. Copper, John F. 1995. A Critique of Beijing's "White Paper" on China's Reunification. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. . 1996. Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? 2d ed. Boulder: Westview Press. . 1997. The Taiwan Political Miracle: Essays on Political Development, Elections, and Foreign Relations. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Dickson, Bruce. 1997. Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties. Oxford: Oxford University Press. G o l d , T h o m a s B. 1986. State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. A r m o n k , NY: M. E. Sharpe. Harrell, Stevan, and Huang Chun-chieh (eds.). 1994. Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan. Boulder: Westview Press. Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. 1997. Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Hinton, Harold C. 1972. China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949. New York: Macmillan. Hood, Steven J. 1996. The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan. Boulder: Westview Press. Hsing, You-tien. 1997. Making Capitalism in China: The Taiwan Connection. New York: Oxford University Press. Hsu, Immanuel C. Y. 1980. "Late C h ' i n g Foreign Relations, 1 8 6 6 - 1 9 0 5 . " Pp. 7 0 - 1 4 1 in John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 11, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 2. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press. H u g h e s , Christopher. 1997. Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society. London: Routledge. Klintworth, Gary. 1995. New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan's Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region. New York: St. Martin's Press.

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Tibet

Avedon, John F. 1994. In Exile from the Land of the Snows: The Definitive Account of the Dalai Lama and Tibet Since the Chinese Conquest. New York: HarperPerennial. Barnett, Robert (ed.). 1994. Resistance and Reform in Tibet. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press. Beckwith, Christopher I. 1987. The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for Great Power Among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese During the Early Middle Ages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bell, Charles. 1924. Tibet, Past and Present. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Carnahan, Sumner. 1995. In the Presence of My Enemies: Memoirs of Tibetan Nobleman Tsipon Shuguba. Santa Fe: Clear Light, 1995. Carrasco, Pedro. 1959. Land and Polity in Tibet. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Cassinelli, C. W„ and Robert B. Ekvall. 1969. A Tibetan Principality: The Political System of Sa sKya. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Craig, Mary. 1997. Kundun: A Biography of the Family of the Dalai Lama. Washington, DC: Counterpoint. Dawa, Norbu. 1987. Red Star over Tibet. 2d ed. New York: Envoy Press. Feigon, Lee. 1996. Demystifying China: Unlocking the Secrets of the Land of the Snows. Chicago: I. R. Dee. French, Rebecca Redwood. 1995. The Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Ginsburgs, George. 1964. Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

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Goldstein, M. C. 1989. The History of Modern Tibet. Berkeley: University of California Press. G r u n f e l d , A. Tom. 1996. The Making of Modern Tibet. Rev. ed. A r m o n k , NY: M. E. Sharpe. Gyatso, Palden. 1997. The Autobiography of a Tibetan Monk. New York: G r o v e Press. Harrer, Heinrich. 1954. Seven Years in Tibet. Trans. Richard Graves. New York: E. P. Dutton. H o f f m a n , Helmut. 1971. Tibet: A Handbook. Bloomington, IN: Asian Studies Research Institute. Karan, P r a d y u m n a P. 1976. The Changing Face of Tibet. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Lhalungpa, Lobsang P. 1983. Tibet: The Sacred Realm: Photographs 1880-1950. Millerton, NY: Aperture. Moraes, Frances Robert. 1960. The Revolt in Tibet. New York: Macmillan. Patt, David. 1992. A Strange Liberation: Tibetan Lives in Chinese Hands. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications. Patterson, George N. 1960. Tibet in Revolt. London: Faber and Faber. Rahul, Ram. 1969. The Government and Politics of Tibet. Delhi: Vikas Publications. Richardson, Hugh E. 1984. Tibet and Its History. 2d ed. Boulder: Shambhala. Schwartz, Ronald David. 1994. Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising. 1987-92. New York: Columbia University Press. Shakabpa, Tsepon W. D. 1967. Tibet: A Political History. New Haven: Yale University Press. Smith, Warren W. Jr. 1996. Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations. Boulder: Westview Press. Stein, R. A. 1972. Tibetan Civilization. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Strong, Anna Louise. 1976. When Serfs Stood Up in Tibet. 2d ed. San Francisco: Red Sun Publications. U.S. Department of State. 1996. Foreign Relations of the United States 19581960. Vol. 19. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

-7International Relations Robert E. Gamer At the end of Chapter 6, we suggested that China is torn between its new desire to become a part of the world c o m m u n i t y and its traditional wishes to establish cultural and political d o m i n a n c e over its surrounding territories. The notion of being part of a world c o m m u n i t y c o m p o s e d of sovereign nations is something that has c o m e into f o c u s in China only during your lifetime. For most of its long history, China had little contact with the outside world. Its southern coastal communities developed trading contacts through the South C h i n a Sea. Its northern capitals sought to conquer, or protect t h e m s e l v e s f r o m conquest by, groups in the regions on C h i n a ' s borders. Abruptly and unexpectedly, all that changed in the nineteenth century w h e n Beijing was brought to its knees by a small fleet of British ships. China spent the next century trying to free itself f r o m domination by countries about which it had little prior k n o w l e d g e and with which it had little prior contact. T h e n it spent three d e c a d e s trying to reestablish rule without outside domination. Now, suddenly, during the last decades of the twentieth century, C h i n a has e m e r g e d as a p r e m i e r participant in world trade and a player in regional crises of importance to the m a j o r powers; it is surrounded by small, newly independent nation-states dependent on its economic output and competes with Taiwan for seats on international bodies and the investments of enormously wealthy overseas Chinese families. It is scrambling to take full advantage of those opportunities while maintaining unity and stability at home. Those goals sometimes conflict, especially in a nation so recently thrust upon the world stage.

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CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS BEFORE THE O P I U M WARS

Throughout most of its history, C h i n a ' s leaders had little contact with regions b e y o n d those on the western borders. Largely isolated f r o m the

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rest of the world, it had m u c h reason to think of itself as the " M i d d l e K i n g d o m " in the universe. But, as Chapter 6 indicated, long b e f o r e the time of Christ, its m e r c h a n t s began trade with Java (in the Indonesian archipelago; see M a p 2.1), Europe, India, and points b e t w e e n . In the twelfth century B.C., towns stretching from Guangzhou (Canton) to Fuzhou began extensive sea trade with Southeast Asia (see Maps 2.1, 2.2). In the fourth century B.C. a kingdom along C h i n a ' s southern coast, and during the third century B.C. the Qin dynasty (Chapter 3) sent out fleets of rafts full of settlers who might even have reached North America ( N e e d h a m , 1971). Early in the Han dynasty, Chinese garrisons began to protect traders along the Silk Roads into inner Asia (Map 2.1). In the sixth century A.D., Arab, Jewish, Christian, and Turkish merchants started settling in C h i n a ' s coastal cities. Chinese ship captains (most notably, Admiral Z h e n g H e ' s expedition into the Indian Ocean early in the f i f t e e n t h century, d i s c u s s e d in Chapter 3) accepted gifts f r o m local rulers that they passed on as tribute to Chinese emperors. Merchants coming overland brought the emperors tribute, as did emissaries f r o m some kings of bordering states. As we saw in Chapter 6, C h i n a sought to control the administration of Tibet. B e y o n d this, China had no formal relations with foreign governments. Like those of Siam (Thailand), Tibet, Japan, and Turkey, traditional Chinese leaders received tribute f r o m lesser kingdoms around them. This solemnized their trade and foreign relations (Fairbank and Teng, 1941). Emissaries or m e r c h a n t s f r o m the lesser k i n g d o m s brought g i f t s to the leader of the dominant one; the leader of the d o m i n a n t k i n g d o m reciprocated with gifts of greater value. C h i n a ' s e m p e r o r s a s s u m e d these g i f t s were an indication that the k i n g d o m s sending them r e c o g n i z e d C h i n a ' s cultural superiority. To emphasize this, emissaries carrying the gifts were required to kneel b e f o r e the e m p e r o r , hit their heads against the ground three times, and then lie flat (prostrate themselves) on the ground nine times. This was called the " k o w t o w . " A f t e r that, the e m p e r o r would hold a banquet f o r the emissaries, give them gifts of greater value than those they had brought, and accord them the right to trade with China. The emperors interpreted this to mean that the barbarians w h o brought this tribute had "come to be t r a n s f o r m e d " and were recognizing China as the center of world civilization. T h e emperors believed any kingdom sending such gifts was a " v a s s a l " r e c o g n i z i n g C h i n a ' s " s u z e r a i n t y " ( d o m i n a n c e ) over it. Korea, the kingdom of Melaka (Malacca) on the Malayan Straits (near the southern tip of peninsular Malaysia; see Map 2.1), Siam (Thailand), Burma, and Vietnam (all in Southeast Asia; see M a p 2.1), Japan, the Ryukyu islands (stretching between Taiwan and Japan, containing Okinawa), and bordering k i n g d o m s of central Asia all sent emissaries to C h i n a ' s e m p e r o r s bearing tribute; in e x c h a n g e , C h i n a traded with them. Several ports were open for this trade; foreigners had to reside and stay within neighborhoods reserved for them. Ships came f r o m as far as India and Arabia.

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T h e sixteenth century brought m a j o r challenges to this system; new outside forces, coming by sea, challenged C h i n a ' s suzerainty. In 1511 Port u g u e s e ships took over one of C h i n a ' s vassal states, the k i n g d o m of Melaka, and then established a fort on an island off southern China. T h e emissary they sent to B e i j i n g was r e b u f f e d and jailed. By 1557, in the Pearl River delta below G u a n g z h o u (see Map 2.2), the Portuguese had established the colony of M a c a o that was sending emissaries to Beijing with tribute in exchange for trading privileges. In 1555 Japanese pirates sacked the city of N a n j i n g , near the mouth of the Yangtze River ( M a p 2.2). In 1592 and 1597, the Japanese e m p e r o r Hideyoshi invaded C h i n a ' s vassal Korea and some Chinese ports; the threat subsided with H i d e y o s h i ' s sudden death. These provocations caused China's emperor to close most ports to trade. M a c a o b e c a m e the principal port for C h i n a ' s trade with Japan, until Japan closed its ports to Portugal in 1639. In 1637 a British flotilla shot its way up the Pearl River toward G u a n g z h o u , hoping to open the port. T h e n in 1685 China decided to open all its ports to foreign trade, and they remained open until 1757. During the seventeenth century, the expanding Russian empire arrived at C h i n a ' s eastern border; the Ming emperors granted trading rights. When the Mongols, whose territories had bordered those of Russia, took Beijing and established the Qing dynasty in 1644, they created the Lifan Yuan, an a g e n c y (staffed entirely by M a n c h u s and M o n g o l s ) to deal with Russia. The Russian emperors were not comfortable having their embassies prostrate themselves before the Chinese emperors; they preferred a relationship b e t w e e n e m p i r e s of equal stature. A f t e r some protracted w r a n g l i n g over k o w t o w i n g and some border skirmishes, Jesuit court advisers helped the Lifan Yuan negotiate a t r e a t y — C h i n a ' s first—to demarcate C h i n a ' s western boundaries and stabilize China's relations with Russia. It was signed in Nirchinsk in 1689 and followed by another at Kiakhta in 1729. The treaties prescribed that, in e x c h a n g e for k o w t o w s in Beijing by R u s s i a ' s emissaries, China's emissaries would kowtow at the c z a r ' s court in St. Petersburg. T h e trade missions that crossed the borders in increasing n u m b e r s would simply exchange gifts without court appearances. In a great break f r o m precedent, Russia was allowed to send a p e r m a n e n t emissary to reside in Beijing, but it was not allowed to trade by sea. As the v o l u m e of outside trade began to e x p a n d rapidly during the eighteenth century, C h i n a ' s g o v e r n m e n t found it necessary to create new w a y s of dealing with the outside world. In 1720 G u a n g z h o u m e r c h a n t s f o r m e d the first of the trading organizations (cohongs), which b e c a m e the official points of contact b e t w e e n China and E u r o p e a n m e r c h a n t s . A f t e r 1757 G u a n g z h o u (Canton) b e c a m e the only port legally open f o r foreign trade. But no foreigners were allowed to live there; the e m p l o y e e s of their firms had to reside in nearby Macao. By 1784 Americans began trade with Guangzhou.

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The cohongs had to pay government officials large sums of money from their profits; they recovered this by d e m a n d i n g bribes and arbitrary fees f r o m the foreigners. And the Chinese government kept creating new regulations to control the personal behavior of foreigners, restricting their movement outside Macao. In 1741 a disabled British ship pulled into Hong Kong harbor and was refused assistance. In 1757 the emperor restricted all foreign trade strictly to Guangzhou; w o m e n were not to be allowed in the foreigners' warehouses (confining w o m e n to their residences downstream in Macao) and men could leave the warehouses, for an escorted walk in a park, only three times a month. Complaints about unfair trade practices had to be mediated by the very merchant associations with which the foreigners were trading. In 1759 Britain's East India C o m p a n y sent an emissary to the emperor to complain about trade restrictions with the cohongs; he was imprisoned. With Britain now the largest seafaring trader in China, King George III sent an expedition to Beijing in 1793 to complain about these conditions and ask for the right to exchange ambassadors, let British live in Guangzhou and create warehouses to trade in other ports, allow missionaries to preach Christianity, and establish an outpost on an island near the mouth of the Yangtze River. Its leader, Lord Macartney, came laden with tribute consisting of Britain's latest manufactures. Qianlong, China's longest-serving emperor and one of its greatest, greeted him warmly (dispensing with a kowtow) and sent him home with many boxes of gifts and a long letter addressed to King George (Schurmann and Schell, 1967:104, 113; C a m e r o n , 1975: 2 2 ^ 5 ) , turning down all his requests. It explained the following: • All foreigners living in China live in special neighborhoods that they cannot leave wear Chinese garb, cannot open businesses or interact with Chinese subjects, and are never permitted to return h o m e . A m b a s s a d o r s could not function that way, and China does not need other religious doctrines. The letter adds, " T h e distinction between Chinese and barbarian is most strict" (Cameron, 1975:33). • E u r o p e a n s are permitted to reside in M a c a o and trade through G u a n g z h o u cohongs. They can buy what they want there and are making large profits. Provisions have been made for settling disputes to the satisfaction of E u r o p e a n s . R u l e s f o r b i d d i n g E u r o p e a n s to set foot in G u a n g z h o u and other parts of China cut d o w n on the chance for disputes b e t w e e n C h i n e s e and b a r b a r i a n s and give foreign trading organizations control over their own people.

•

FROM THE O P I U M WARS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

These rules prevailed until the British fleet forced the Chinese to sign the Treaty of N a n j i n g in 1842, ending the first O p i u m War, which is

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discussed in Chapter 6. During the subsequent half-century, European powers invaded China on numerous o c c a s i o n s ; after the peace negotiations that followed, China signed twenty more treaties reinforcing the new rules created by the Treaty of Nanjing and extending them to interaction with Japan, the United States, Peru, B r a z i l , Russia, and all the m a j o r European nations (Tung, 1 9 7 0 : 1 9 - 3 1 ; B a u , 1 9 2 1 : 9 3 - 1 8 0 ; C a m e r o n , 1 9 7 5 : 4 5 - 5 2 ) . Though it was greatly weakened, none o f these countries acquired China as a colony. But its sovereignty and interaction with foreign lands had been completely transformed. Suddenly foreigners were able to reside in special neighborhoods in a variety o f "treaty ports." They were able to learn Chinese, dress and behave as they pleased, open businesses, trade with anyone, travel in other parts o f the cities where they lived, interact with Chinese subjects and propagate their religion, and travel to their homelands whenever they wished. They built industries and railroad lines and hired Chinese workers for j o b s at home and overseas. Their boats plied inland waterways. Consuls appointed by foreign governments communicated directly with Chinese officials. Under new rules of "extraterritoriality," foreigners accused o f crimes were tried under their own laws. T h e new rules required China, for the first time, to establish a national customs office and foreign affairs ministry (in 1861) and to open a school (soon transformed into a college) to train interpreters for Chinese officials dealing with foreigners. B y the 1 8 7 0 s China was sending ambassadors abroad and no longer requiring ambassadors received by the emperor to kowtow (Hsu, 1 9 8 0 : 8 1 - 8 2 ) . Smarting from its military defeats and loss of sovereignty, the Qing government took steps at "self-strengthening" by acquiring a modern navy, establishing naval and military academies, and sending students abroad to learn about modern technical subjects (Liao, 1 9 8 4 : 2 1 - 3 7 ; Wang, 1 9 6 6 : 4 1 , 9 9 ; Schurmann and S c h e l l , 1 9 6 7 : 2 0 6 - 2 4 8 ; Cameron, 1 9 7 5 : 9 5 - 1 1 1 ) . Meanwhile (as Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 8 explain), China faced civil wars, disintegration of B e i j i n g ' s control from the center, extensive migration by many able people, and social and e c o n o m i c problems caused by rapid population growth and e c o n o m i c change. Seeing its weakness, foreign powers took control of countries that had once been China's vassals and of territory within China. •

As we discussed in Chapter 6, the Japanese took Formosa (Taiwan), the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaodong peninsula in Manchuria. • T h e French took control of Vietnam. They also demanded and received a lease for a port on Hainan Island (Map 2 . 2 ) . • T h e British took Burma. They also leased a port city on the north side of Shandong (Map 2 . 2 ) and Kowloon and the New Territories on the mainland opposite Hong Kong.

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•

•

G e r m a n y forced the Q i n g to lease it the port of Q i n g d a o (now famous for its beer) and surrounding territory on the Shandong peninsula ( M a p 2.2). Nearby in Manchuria, the Russians received a lease for Port Arthur (Lushun, on the southern tip of Liaoning; see M a p 2.2).

In retaliation for some missionaries killed during the Boxer Uprising (see C h a p t e r 12), f o r e i g n troops actually occupied B e i j i n g ' s F o r b i d d e n City f r o m 1900 to 1901, forcing the emperor and empress dowager to flee. S u p p o r t e d by France and G e r m a n y , Russia used the chaos to occupy M a n c h u r i a ( H e i l o n g j i a n g , Jilin, and Liaoning; see M a p 2.2), which p r o m p t e d an alliance between Britain and Japan to protect their interests (Hsu, 1 9 8 0 : 1 1 5 - 1 3 8 ; Tung, 1 9 7 0 : 5 1 - 5 6 ; Liao, 1 9 8 4 : 4 0 - 5 2 ; C a m e r o n , 1975:163-186). In 1905 Japan defeated Russia in a war; the two signed a peace treaty in P o r t s m o u t h , New H a m p s h i r e , mediated by President T h e o d o r e R o o sevelt. Roosevelt and the European powers were concerned about protecting the territorial integrity of China. T h e treaty acknowledged that Korea was under Japan's sphere of influence and agreed to the withdrawal of all foreign troops f r o m Manchuria, except for some territory containing railway lines w h o s e lease R u s s i a was to transfer to Japan. Both R u s s i a and Japan were to be allowed to station some troops in M a n c h u r i a to protect the railway. The Japanese received Port Arthur. This set the stage for fortyfive years of conflict (Hsu, 1 9 8 0 : 1 3 8 - 1 4 1 ; S c h u r m a n n and Schell, 1 9 6 7 : 2 4 9 - 2 6 0 ; C a m e r o n , 1 9 7 5 : 2 0 1 - 2 3 1 ) in which Japan would play a major role (see Table 7.1). In 1910 Japan annexed Korea. For supporting Britain in World War I (and despite C h i n a ' s strong objection), the 1919 Treaty of Versailles gave G e r m a n y ' s land leases in C h i n a ' s S h a n d o n g peninsula to Japan, kicking off the May Fourth M o v e m e n t of protest discussed in Chapter 13 (Tung, 1970:154-190; Wang, 1 9 6 6 : 3 0 6 - 3 6 1 ; Bau, 1921:181-283). To counter the Soviet takeover of Russia, Japan occupied land bordering Manchuria. T h e Soviets kept claim to R u s s i a n railroad lines running through M a n c h u r i a , which angered Japan. In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria and set it up as the puppet state of M a n c h u g u o . In 1937, Japan attacked China and occupied large portions of it (as C h a p t e r 4 discussed) until J a p a n ' s surrender to the Allied Forces in 1945.

•

FOREIGN POLICY U N D E R M A O

During the "united f r o n t " b e t w e e n the c o m m u n i s t s and C h i a n g K a i shek's Nationalists, which lasted f r o m 1936 until the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet U n i o n could deal with the c o m m u n i s t s

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Table 7.1

I m p o r t a n t D a t e s in China's F o r e i g n Policy

1842 1861 1895 1900 1905 1919 1931 1945 1950 1953 1955 1956 1960 1962 1964 1965 1970 1972 1975 1979 1987 1989 1997

Treaty of Nanjing ends first Opium War Founding of Customs Office and Foreign Affairs Ministry Treaty of Shimonoseki cedes Formosa to Japan British occupy Forbidden City after Boxer Uprising Treaty of Portsmouth allows Japanese troops in Manchuria Treaty of Versailles gives Japan Shandong land leases Japan occupies Manchuria End of World War II brings KMT-communist combat Start of Korean War and U.S. Seventh Fleet in Taiwan Straits Korean War armistice Bandung Conference of "nonaligned" states Tibetan rebellion Break in relations with USSR Sino-Indian border war China explodes atomic b o m b United States enters Vietnam War China takes Taiwan's United Nations seat U.S. President Richard Nixon visits China End of Vietnam War United States and China establish diplomatic relations Tibetan rebellion U S S R General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev visits China Hong Kong joins China

185

and the Nationalists at the same time. Even when the united front broke down, both gave technical and military assistance to the Nationalists while maintaining friendly contact with the communists (Sheng, 1998). As the Japanese surrendered, the Nationalist and communist armies turned to fight one another for control of China. The United States assisted only the Nationalists, while Joseph Stalin attempted to play both sides. He turned over control of enormous arms stockpiles and the city of Harbin to the communists and trained and supplied Mao Z e d o n g ' s troops; he gave the Nationalists command of all the other Manchurian cities (after dismantling many industries and seizing many assets for shipment to the Soviet Union) and maintained good relations with Chiang Kai-shek. Thus, once he captured Beijing and the K M T fled to Taiwan in 1949, Mao felt uneasy taking on Stalin as an ally, but he had nowhere else to turn because he found himself isolated diplomatically (see Hunt and Niu, 1995, for revealing insights into his foreign policy during this period). Britain quickly recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Jain, 1976:24-47) but also continued to recognize the legitimacy of C h i a n g ' s regime in Taiwan. Though he made overtures to President Harry Truman, the United States did not respond (Garver, 1993:40). The spread of c o m m u n i s m in Eastern Europe was making the United States hesitant to carry on further relations with

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c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e s . T h e r e f o r e , n e e d i n g foreign a s s i s t a n c e , M a o a c c e p t e d aid f r o m the S o v i e t U n i o n ; this uneasy relationship lasted until 1 9 6 0 , when P r e m i e r N i k i t a K h r u s h c h e v withdrew R u s s i a n advisers f r o m the P R C . T w o days after North K o r e a attacked S o u t h K o r e a in J u n e 1 9 5 0 , the U . S . S e v enth F l e e t m o v e d into the T a i w a n S t r a i t s to protect the N a t i o n a l i s t s f r o m invasion by M a o ' s f o r c e s ; the U n i t e d S t a t e s would not r e c o g n i z e the P R C until 1 9 7 9 . W e shall say m o r e a b o u t all this in a m o m e n t , but first w e should a s s e s s M a o ' s strategic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as he a s s u m e d p o w e r . A f t e r 1 0 0 y e a r s o f d i v i s i o n and f o r e i g n i n t r u s i o n , M a o s o u g h t to reestablish C h i n a ' s traditional borders and to reassert i n f l u e n c e o v e r all the r e g i o n s that o n c e paid t r i b u t e to C h i n a . T h a t tribute had

recognized

C h i n a ' s m o r a l and cultural superiority as well as its p h y s i c a l d o m i n a n c e . A s a c o m m u n i s t , M a o wanted to rid C h i n a and its n e i g h b o r s o f i m p e r i a l i s t m a s t e r s and to p e r s u a d e its n e i g h b o r s o f the superiority o f C h i n a ' s c o m munist s y s t e m . At the s a m e t i m e , he w a n t e d to c o n t i n u e to attract c a p i t a l ist i n v e s t m e n t so as to r e b u i l d C h i n a ' s e c o n o m y and to d e v e l o p f r i e n d l y trade relations with f o r e i g n nations. T h a t c o m b i n a t i o n o f g o a l s c a l l e d f o r a d e l i c a t e b a l a n c i n g act that i n v o l v e d several e l e m e n t s . • T h e 11 m i l l i o n o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e , m o s t l y residing in S o u t h e a s t A s i a , m i g h t p r o v i d e t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s and i n v e s t m e n t capital. B u t as t h e i r c o u n tries r e c e i v e d i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m the c o l o n i a l p o w e r s , they w i s h e d to inc o r p o r a t e their C h i n e s e p o p u l a c e into their own citizenry. I f the P R C w e r e to c o n t i n u e t r e a t i n g t h e s e o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e as its own c i t i z e n s , it r i s k e d alienating the g o v e r n m e n t s o f these new nations. • G u e r r i l l a m o v e m e n t s were c h a l l e n g i n g the legitimate g o v e r n m e n t s in m a n y o f these c o u n t r i e s . A s C h i n a ' s leader, M a o realized they c o u l d help h i m assert C h i n a ' s d o m i n a n c e o v e r the r e g i o n . A s a c o m m u n i s t , he w a s sympathetic to their revolutionary aspirations o f returning p o w e r to the e x p l o i t e d l o w e r c l a s s e s , but he a l s o w a n t e d p e a c e on his b o r d e r s w h i l e he c o n s o l i d a t e d p o w e r and f o u g h t o u t s i d e c h a l l e n g e r s . He did not w a n t to f o r c e n e i g h b o r i n g g o v e r n m e n t s into t r e a t i e s that w o u l d g i v e the U n i t e d S t a t e s b a s e s on C h i n a ' s b o r d e r s or into r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i r C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t i e s . He w a n t e d the support o f the w e a l t h y C h i n e s e l i v i n g in t h o s e c o u n t r i e s , w h o h a t e d the g u e r r i l l a s and were a l s o b e i n g w o o e d by C h i a n g K a i - s h e k to support the K u o m i n t a n g in Taiwan. A n d the g u e r r i l l a s also had loyalties to their o w n c o u n t r i e s and might not u l t i m a t e l y side with China. • T h e P R C wanted a d m i s s i o n into the United Nations and other b o d i e s that could provide it with a c c e s s to world markets and p a r t i c i p a t i o n in international d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . B u t it was d e t e r m i n e d to d e f e a t C h i a n g K a i s h e k ' s N a t i o n a l i s t f o r c e s that had fled to the island o f T a i w a n while insisting (as C h a p t e r 6 e x p l a i n e d ) that they w e r e still the rightful g o v e r n m e n t o f all C h i n a . O n l y o n e c o u l d h o l d C h i n a ' s U n i t e d Nations seat, and both had supporters there.

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• M a o wanted to abrogate "unequal treaties" drawn up between imperial powers and former Chinese governments, but he also wanted trade, investment, and assistance f r o m those imperial powers. Overseas Chinese stood squarely at the center of all those concerns, so M a o ' s g o v e r n m e n t could not walk away f r o m them. M o r e overseas Chinese had contact with the K u o m i n t a n g and other parties in China than with the c o m m u n i s t s ; both sides n e e d e d their m o n e y and support to c o n t i n u e fighting one another. Many overseas Chinese were facing political repression and finding it hard to get education or employment; some were joining guerrilla m o v e m e n t s in their own countries. T h e new c o m m u n i s t regime initially responded with a simple offer: C o m e back h o m e and help rebuild China. It offered them inexpensive education if they stayed to become residents of China and higher salaries than locals. It created special banking arrangements, housing, shops, grain allotments, and travel privileges for overseas Chinese and for local relatives of overseas Chinese receiving monetary remittances f r o m them. It urged them to create enterprises in China. Nearly half a million Chinese c a m e back (Fitzgerald, 1972:33). In addition, the g o v e r n m e n t encouraged Chinese families with relatives abroad to write them soliciting money. It still looked upon all these overseas Chinese as C h i n a ' s citizens; they could become citizens of other nations and still retain (dual) citizenship in China. By 1957 the People's Republic had discovered the amount of technical talent and money and political support it could attract through these policies was limited, and many Chinese who had stayed h o m e resented the special privileges accorded those w h o had left, so it reversed course, unleashing a rectification c a m p a i g n (see C h a p t e r 4) to limit the rights of these returnees and urge Chinese to cut off their contacts with overseas relatives. By then, it also was negotiating a g r e e m e n t s with B u r m a and Indonesia, the only Southeast Asian countries with which it had diplomatic relations, allowing (for the first time in history) overseas Chinese who became citizens of those nations to break their affiliation with China, if they chose to do so. Those choosing this course would no longer receive favors or protection f r o m China and no longer be considered C h i n e s e citizens. Furthermore, China now encouraged schools built for Chinese students by wealthy Chinese in Southeast Asian countries to teach local languages and history and skills that would prepare them for local e m p l o y m e n t . Events in Korea and Vietnam m a d e this normalization possible. North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950. Until then, M a o ' s g o v e r n m e n t had shown little interest in Korean affairs; the Soviet Union was North K o r e a ' s principal ally. China had been i n f o r m e d by those t w o countries shortly b e f o r e the invasion took place and let North Korean troops stationed on its territory return h o m e to participate. But the entry of United Nations forces on the side of South Korea and the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits as well as imposition of a trade blockade roused China's

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c o n c e r n (Chen, 1 9 9 4 ; Garson, 1 9 9 5 ; C u m i n g s , 1 9 8 1 , 1 9 9 0 ) . In August, the United Nations proposed to C h i n a that it mediate a truce in e x c h a n g e for a United N a t i o n s S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l seat. H o w e v e r , in O c t o b e r G e n e r a l Douglas M a c A r t h u r ' s troops crossed into North K o r e a and headed toward the Yalu R i v e r (the same river the J a p a n e s e had crossed when they invaded M a n c h u r i a ) . B e i j i n g lies within 4 0 0 m i l e s o f that border. C h i n a i m m e d i ately mobilized troops and sent them secretly into North K o r e a ; they succeeded in pushing the United Nations f o r c e s b a c k into South K o r e a (Hinton, 1 9 7 2 : 4 0 - 4 9 ; G a r v e r , 1 9 9 3 : 2 8 5 - 2 8 6 ; G i t t i n g s , 1 9 7 4 : 1 8 1 - 1 8 4 ;

Jain,

1 9 7 6 : 4 9 - 7 0 ) . A truce was signed three years later, leaving K o r e a divided. T h e United States suffered 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 casualties and C h i n a nearly a million (including one o f M a o ' s sons), leaving deep antagonism and suspicion on both sides. T h e United States was now firmly c o m m i t t e d to " c o n t a i n i n g " China, holding it within its boundaries and isolating it diplomatically. B u t C h i n a was also angry at the S o v i e t Union for starting a war on its borders in which C h i n a — n o t the U S S R — s u f f e r e d deep c a s u a l t i e s . H e n c e C h i n a now made an all-out effort to improve relations with smaller neighboring Asian countries. In V i e t n a m , Ho Chi Minh began guerrilla warfare against the F r e n c h at the end o f World War II. In 1 9 4 9 , C h i n e s e R e d Army troops m o v e d to the Vietnamese border to chase remaining K u o m i n t a n g Nationalist troops from China ( C h e n , 1 9 6 9 : 2 1 2 - 2 7 8 ) . In the next few years, C h i n a ' s government gave H o ' s forces small amounts o f technical assistance. After the K o rean War armistice was signed in 1 9 5 3 , this aid grew dramatically. Ho was attacking governments supported first by the French and then by the A m e r icans, who now were m o v i n g to e n c i r c l e China. T h o u g h many leaders o f n e w l y independent nations had t h e m s e l v e s begun by resisting c o l o n i a l rulers and t h e r e f o r e might have sympathy for H o ' s attempts, they also were wary o f attempts by the S o v i e t U n i o n , the United States, or C h i n a to involve them in the C o l d War. And c o m m u n i s t guerrillas threatened their r e g i m e s as w e l l . S o C h i n a was c a r e f u l to restrict its support to the Viet M i n h in Vietnam, declaring that c o m m u n i s t forces in L a o s (an area o f interest to India) and in C a m b o d i a , where C h i n a lent support to P r i n c e S i hanouk, should seek separate settlements. M e a n w h i l e , remnants o f K u o m intang troops remained in those areas, supported by the United States. In 1 9 5 5 C h i n a agreed to end support for c o m m u n i s t guerrillas operating in B u r m a (which, in 1 9 4 9 , had been the first Asian g o v e r n m e n t to r e c o g n i z e M a o ' s r e g i m e ) ; C h i n a g a v e little support thereafter

(Tung,

1 9 7 0 : 3 5 7 - 6 2 ; Gurtov, 1 9 7 1 : 8 9 - 1 1 8 ; North, 1 9 7 4 : 9 3 - 9 6 ) . During talks in 1 9 6 0 B u r m a and C h i n a agreed to s o m e c o n c e s s i o n s on territory they c l a i m e d . W h e n a m o r e radical s o c i a l i s t g o v e r n m e n t gained p o w e r in B u r m a in 1 9 6 3 , defeating the M a o i s t guerrillas, it took a harder line against China.

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In 1955, leaders of African and Asian nations held a conference in Bandung, Indonesia, to declare a neutral path toward " p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , " avoiding alliance with either the Soviet Union or the United States. Zhou Enlai (Shao, 1996), representing China, was a m a j o r presence at this conference, declaring China's intent to sign agreements with these nonaligned nations to settle d i f f e r e n c e s over dual citizenship by overseas Chinese, guerrilla warfare waged against independent nations, border disputes, and other contentious issues. As part of these efforts, China distributed hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to developing nations (Garver, 1993:221; Hinton, 1 9 7 2 : 2 4 8 - 2 6 2 ; Jain, 1 9 7 6 : 1 1 2 - 1 5 6 ; O j h a , 1 9 6 9 : 1 7 4 - 2 0 9 ) . Zhou Enlai was also competing for allegiance of these nations with India, which also declared its neutrality while seeking aid f r o m the Soviet Union. T a i w a n ' s continuing insistence that f o r e i g n g o v e r n m e n t s allow Chinese residents to fly Nationalist flags and obey their policies strengthened the P R C ' s position on normalizing relations. Even today, T a i w a n ' s legislature contains seats representing o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e . As late as 1970, the K u o m i n t a n g kidnapped two Manila n e w s p a p e r m e n of Han ancestry in the Philippines w h o did not consider themselves citizens of Taiwan and placed t h e m on military trial for violating T a i w a n ' s e m e r g e n c y regulations (Fitzgerald, 1972:76). Many Southeast Asians saw these assertions and actions as interference with the sovereignty of their own nations. By taking steps to break off ties with overseas Chinese, the P R C was attempting to distance itself f r o m this approach (which had been habitual with Chinese governments during the past century) and thus gain more confidence among governments that feared subversion by overseas Chinese. In addition, few Chinese were now emigrating f r o m the mainland into Southeast Asia. Acts by surrounding countries m a d e the P R C ' s attempts at normalization more difficult. Thailand had outlawed separate educational institutions for overseas Chinese (Gurtov, 1 9 7 1 : 5 - 4 8 ) . M a n y Southeast Asian countries suppressed Chinese newspapers. T h e 1955 nationality treaty with Indonesia allowed Chinese w h o had accepted Indonesian citizenship to regain Chinese citizenship by m o v i n g out of Indonesia, leaving m a n y Indonesians wondering whether naturalized Chinese would remain loyal to their adopted country. In 1956 South Vietnam forced all Chinese to declare V i e t n a m e s e citizenship and e x c l u d e d them f r o m C h i n e s e e d u c a t i o n and most retail trade. In 1960, Indonesia also banned Chinese f r o m retail trade, their principal source of livelihood, and closed many Chinese schools and newspapers. The heat over this controversy sparked riots; the Chinese gove r n m e n t sent ships to carry 100,000 r e f u g e e s to a s y l u m in China. A f t e r 1963, China also extricated refugees when repression in India followed the Sino-Indian border skirmishes (discussed in the last section of Chapter 6). To quell these fears about the loyalty of overseas Chinese, Zhou Enlai announced that Chinese everywhere were free to choose their own citizenship;

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he encouraged t h e m to b e c o m e citizens of and obey the laws of the lands where they resided and to marry local people. Overseas Chinese w h o chose to retain C h i n e s e citizenship would be expected to obey the laws of the lands where they resided, but ultimately they were subject to the jurisdiction of the P R C and not of Taiwan. And no Chinese should be forced to accept citizenship against their will (Fitzgerald, 1972:112-114, 140-161). In 1960, C h i n a and the Soviet Union broke off relations (Hinton, 1 9 7 2 : 2 0 5 - 2 3 0 ; Ojha, 1969:111-145; Jones and Kevill, 1985:17-25; North, 1 9 7 4 : 1 0 9 - 1 2 7 ) . T h e Soviet Union, c o n c e r n e d about C h i n a ' s Great L e a p F o r w a r d (see C h a p t e r 4) and d e v e l o p m e n t of an atomic b o m b , r e f u s e d it f u r t h e r aid. S e e k i n g to gain influence in South and Southeast Asia under its own policy of " p e a c e f u l coexistence," Khrushchev supported Indonesia and I n d i a — w h i c h was also developing atomic weaponry—in their disputes with China (see Chapter 6 on the dispute with India). Cut off now f r o m all the great p o w e r s and arguing with its neighbors, China gave even higher priority to b e c o m i n g a nuclear p o w e r (Lewis and Litai, 1988; Lin, 1988; Ryan, 1989). By 1963, the Soviet Union had m o v e d troops to protect the Outer Mongolian border (see Mongolia on M a p 2.1) f r o m uncertainties in China; m e a n w h i l e , it w a s airlifting supplies to North Vietnam and Laos. An increasingly militant China was sending aid to forces f i g h t i n g white colonialists in R h o d e s i a and M o z a m b i q u e , to Albania, and to the neutral Sihanouk r e g i m e in C a m b o d i a (Gurtov, 1 9 7 1 : 4 9 - 8 2 ) . In 1964, China exploded an atomic b o m b . This helped it restore dignity and greatness in the eyes of smaller countries of the region but heightened the determination of the United States to halt its projection of p o w e r and caused some Americans to regret not invading China when they had the chance. In the fall of 1964, K h r u s h c h e v was removed f r o m o f f i c e in Russia; his successors returned to a militant c o m m u n i s m closer in spirit to that of M a o . T h e new leaders invited Zhou Enlai to see whether relations could now be improved and to enlist C h i n a ' s support in the Soviet U n i o n ' s new resolve to substantially aid North Vietnam, but Mao remained suspicious. Soviet troops remained on the Mongolian border. In the s u m m e r of 1965, regular U.S. forces entered the Vietnam War for the first time. Once again, the United States was actively countering an invasion backed by the Soviet Union in a country on C h i n a ' s border. Hard lines were being drawn.

•

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

In 1966, M a o launched the Cultural Revolution (Hinton, 1 9 7 2 : 1 2 7 162; Chapter 4). For a time in 1967, elements of the e x t r e m e left within the Red G u a r d s took over the Foreign Ministry. By the end of that year, Zhou Enlai r e e m e r g e d as a conciliator to begin restoring order, but f o r m u c h of the next d e c a d e , C h i n a ' s d o m e s t i c and foreign policy had to

Inlernntionnl

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191

accommodate the wishes of the extreme left (Barnouin and Yu, 1997). This brought mistrust even among nations who had begun to feel more c o m fortable with China's policies. T h e radical elements were holding rallies and pillorying officials throughout China, talking about extending permanent revolution to all the rest o f the world. Pol Pot in Cambodia, Sendero L u m i n o s o guerrillas in Peru, and the Naxalite rebels in India sent emissaries to B e i j i n g . S u c h militant behavior and rhetoric helped the United States amass more support in the region for fighting the Viet Minh in Vietnam. Ironically, China was trying hard to stay out of the Vietnam War. Having sustained enormous losses in Korea, fearing an attack by the Soviet Union on its western border, and facing disruption at home from the Cultural R e v o lution, M a o hoped to avoid sending in Chinese troops (Karnow, 1 9 8 4 : 4 5 2 - 4 5 3 ) . T h e main proponents of greater intervention were professional elements o f the military displeased that their troops were bogged down at home carrying out public works and propaganda. They advocated spending more on weapons and equipment that could be used for armed conflict. T h e radicals' desire for worldwide revolution caused problems for the Chinese in Indonesia. In the confusion surrounding a 1965 military coup in Indonesia, local inhabitants in many places slaughtered Chinese neighbors. Initially, refugees were welcome in China; China's policy was to repatriate Chinese rather than encourage them to revolt. After the 1967 seizure o f the Foreign Ministry, however, this policy changed (Liao, 1 9 8 4 : 1 6 9 - 1 8 8 ; Gurtov, 1 9 7 1 : 1 1 3 - 1 2 4 ) ; the radicals now encouraged overseas Chinese to rebel. This only increased resistance abroad. B y the end o f 1 9 6 7 , Outer Mongolia was expelling overseas Chinese. Chinese in Burma, Cambodia, Penang, M a c a o , and Hong Kong clashed with authorities. Red Guards harassed overseas Chinese visiting China from abroad on trade missions and wrote to some o f them, informing them that their houses and property in China were being seized. Letters and parcels from abroad were confiscated, and Chinese were discouraged from writing to relatives abroad. B y 1 9 6 9 , suspicion o f China in Indonesia grew so great that its government declared the 1955 nationality treaty null and void. T h e radicalization of China's Foreign Ministry was short-lived, however. B y late 1 9 6 7 M a o was calling upon Zhou Enlai and the army to reestablish some order and restrain the Red Guards (Gurtov, 1 9 7 1 : 1 2 5 158). Overseas Chinese engaged in rebellion would not receive material support from China. A 1 9 6 9 border incursion by radical Chinese troops was decisively trounced by Soviet troops (Jones and Kevill, 1 9 8 5 : 9 2 - 9 6 ) . Slowly, China sought to restore normal relations with the outside world. In 1970, Mao asked U . S . journalist Edgar Snow to stand with him on the viewing stand for National Day. T h e following year, Zhou Enlai met cretly with Henry Kissinger; in October, China took Taiwan's seat in United Nations. Richard N i x o n ' s visit to B e i j i n g in 1 9 7 2 dramatized

resethe the

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c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . S o o n J a p a n and a host o f other nations e s t a b l i s h e d d i p l o m a t i c relations. J a p a n was e s p e c i a l l y well poised to take advantage o f the n e w era. E v e r s i n c e the end o f W o r l d W a r II, it had q u i e t l y r e s u m e d trade and d i p l o m a t i c c o n t a c t s with C h i n a . N o w those relations w e r e legiti m i z e d , and J a p a n e s e b u s i n e s s m e n had a head start on setting up n e w enterprises in C h i n a . In 1 9 7 5 , North V i e t n a m e s e t r o o p s e n t e r e d S a i g o n , and the last U . S . t r o o p s w e r e a i r l i f t e d out. T h e f o l l o w i n g year, both Z h o u E n l a i and M a o p a s s e d away. O n J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 7 9 , the U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a e s t a b l i s h e d full d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . W e e k s later, r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n V i e t n a m

and

C h i n a w e r e in d i s a r r a y . C h i n a c r o s s e d the b o r d e r with t r o o p s ; within a m o n t h , their p o o r l y e q u i p p e d and trained troops were beaten b a c k by superior V i e t n a m e s e f o r c e s . T h i s was the ultimate p r o o f o f how w e a k M a o ' s p o l i c i e s had m a d e C h i n a . A f t e r t h r e e d e c a d e s o f h o s t i l i t y , C h i n a and the U n i t e d S t a t e s were r e n e w i n g r e l a t i o n s , both smarting f r o m defeat by a nation that had long pitted them as a d v e r s a r i e s ( R o s s , 1 9 9 5 ) . I r o n i c a l l y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s had f o u g h t North V i e t n a m as part o f an e f f o r t to stop C h i n a f r o m e x t e n d i n g its p o l i t i c a l p o w e r into S o u t h e a s t A s i a ; now V i e t n a m was holding b a c k C h i n a ' s troops f r o m entering V i e t n a m .

•

JOINING THE WORLD COMMUNITY

C h a p t e r s 4 - 6 d i s c u s s e d the e n o r m o u s e c o n o m i c growth C h i n a has e x p e r i e n c e d s i n c e D e n g X i a o p i n g t o o k the reins o f p o w e r by 1 9 8 0 . D e n g b r o u g h t an end to the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n within C h i n a , f r e e i n g it to try his e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s . C h i n a ' s n e w p o s i t i o n in the international c o m m u nity a l s o f a c i l i t a t e d r e f o r m . It was now a m e m b e r o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and had d i p l o m a t i c relations with the U n i t e d S t a t e s . And the C o l d W a r was c o m i n g to an end. C h i n a was f r e e to a s s u m e a n o r m a l position in world affairs ( L i a o , 1 9 8 4 : 2 1 1 - 2 3 3 ) . It c o u l d press a g g r e s s i v e l y to e s t a b l i s h trade ties f o r its r e f o r m i n g e c o n o m y . W i t h the S o v i e t U n i o n d i s i n t e g r a t i n g , large n u m b e r s o f traders w e r e c r o s s i n g the b o r d e r s o f its f o r m e r r e p u b l i c s to buy g o o d s for their depleted e c o n o m i e s . C h i n a set out to e a s e trade a c r o s s the borders with N e p a l , M o n g o l i a , B u r m a , L a o s , and T h a i l a n d ( b r i n g i n g a f l o o d o f u n w e l c o m e opium along with other g o o d s ) . In 1 9 8 9 S o v i e t l e a d e r M i k h a i l G o r b a c h e v v i s i t e d B e i j i n g , and in

1992

C h i n a settled part o f a b o r d e r dispute with R u s s i a ( w h i c h r e s u l t e d in the signing o f a f o r m a l b o r d e r a g r e e m e n t in 1 9 9 7 ) and started importing R u s sian t e c h n o l o g y . C h i n a helped T h a i l a n d fight M o s c o w - b a c k e d V i e t n a m e s e and C a m b o d i a n f o r c e s until a C a m b o d i a n p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t in 1 9 9 1 allowed it to withdraw support f r o m K h m e r R o u g e guerrilla f o r c e s there and cut all ties with T h a i c o m m u n i s t s . N o l o n g e r a military ally or adversary,

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Relations

193

Vietnam gradually emerged as a trading partner with China and the West; China opened trade across its border in 1990. In 1989 China ended support for Malaysian communist guerrillas, and in 1990 Singapore and Indonesia established diplomatic relations with China. Businesspeople f r o m around the world began to explore the " C h i n a market." The military intervention at Tiananmen Square in 1989 brought a chill to China's foreign relations for a time. But after Deng toured the Pearl River delta region early in 1992 and announced that in the new "socialist market e c o n o m y " the reform efforts would be speeded and that C h i n a ' s people should explore capitalist techniques, investment began to pour in (see Chapter 5). N o w China carries on trade and diplomatic relations with virtually every foreign nation. It belongs to the World Bank and signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in 1984 (though it still works behind the scenes increasing its own nuclear capacity and selling nuclear materials abroad). Only North Korea remains a hard-core communist nation. China treats it with r e s p e c t f u l reserve, urging restraint when South Korea (which established diplomatic relations with China in 1992) or the United States has sought serious retaliation against its nuclear program or military threats. It has cut off aid to North Korea and has not impeded U.S. e f f o r t s to inspect nuclear facilities there. It is disturbed by the disorder but does not want to see total collapse of North Korea as a b u f f e r state against South Korea. In 1997, China joined with the United States and South Korea in formal negotiations with North Korea to bring a formal end to the Korean War. C h i n a ' s continuing support for the repressive military junta in Burma remains its only close formal tie with a bordering nation still cut off f r o m normal relations with the rest of the world. As we saw in Chapter 6, Hong Kong and Taiwan have become C h i n a ' s biggest partners in investment and trade. Japan, the United States, Western Europe, and Singapore joined in more slowly but have grown into sizable partners as well. By the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , C h i n a ' s gross national product was g r o w i n g at a double-digit pace, and this continued in the 1990s. That growth d e p e n d e d on maintaining good relations with these new partners, but three unusual factors threaten these good relations: the "most favored nation" clause and China's approach to international law; the status of Taiwan; and C h i n a ' s ongoing propensity to maintain traditional tributary relations with some border regions.

•

Most Favored Nation Status

The " u n e q u a l treaties" imposed on China during the nineteenth century by the European powers contained clauses indicating that any privilege granted any other foreign p o w e r (i.e., the p o w e r "most f a v o r e d " ) in another treaty should extend to the nation signing this treaty. Since China

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was forced to sign m a n y treaties, the privileges e x t e n d e d were considerable. Since the U.S. Congress still had strong reservations about extending diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, it created another kind of most f a v o r e d nation clause, indicating that the United States would extend the same trading rights to China as it did to any other nation. This meant the United States would treat China as it did all nations except those with w h o m it had a trade e m b a r g o — C u b a , North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and (until 1994) North Vietnam. But the United States added a stipulation that m a d e China an exceptional case: C h i n a ' s most f a v o r e d nation status w a s to be reviewed each year. If its treatment of its own people or its behavior in the international arena was deemed unacceptable to the president of the United States this "most f a v o r e d " status would be withdrawn. This has never happened, even a f t e r the c r a c k d o w n at T i a n a n m e n Square in 1989, but each year the president must formally declare that the status continues, putting pressure on C h i n a to release occasional prisoners and initiate small changes in domestic policies. China strongly resents being singled out for this treatment. Trade relations have grown so enormously between the two nations that the threat i m p l i e d — w i t h d r a w a l of trading p r i v i l e g e s — h a s ceased to seem realistic. Both sides have too much at stake. However, m a n y b e h a v i o r s that p r o m p t e d the c l a u s e c o n t i n u e . China signs agreements promising not to sell certain arms abroad or goods m a d e in prisons or g o o d s violating copyright laws; then it a p p e a r s to wink as these practices occur. M a n y in the West are disturbed by c r a c k d o w n s on political expression, treatment of children in orphanages, official corruption, and other d o m e s t i c activities. T h e increased f l o w of tourists, press c o v e r a g e of h i g h - p r o f i l e events like visits by f o r e i g n heads of state designed to promote normalized relations with the outside world, China's bid f o r the Olympics, and hosting the United Nations C o n f e r e n c e on W o m e n often draw attention to those abuses and fuel calls in the United States for restricting trade with C h i n a . So do news reports about the death of Haitian babies f r o m mislabeled health products produced in China, the mislabeling of textiles to circumvent trade quotas, restrictions on foreign c o m panies, or restrictions on U.S. imports to China. China has discovered that the b e n e f i t s of such i n d e p e n d e n t behavior may not always o u t w e i g h the costs. Iraq f o u n d out, and s u r r o u n d i n g nations noticed, that a r m s supplied by China were i n e f f e c t i v e during the 1991 Desert Storm operations against sophisticated U.S. weaponry. T h i s poor p e r f o r m a n c e hurt C h i n a ' s arms sales in the Middle East and Algeria. China strongly desires to join the World Trade Organization ( W T O ) so it can benefit f r o m the reciprocities m e m b e r s share with one another on trade allowances, credit terms, and the like. But the W T O also d e m a n d s that China abide by some of these agreements and terms. And India and other countries are competing for business investment; with so m a n y countries

International

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Relations

wooing investors, China's corruption, violations o f copyright laws, uncertain l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n s on c o n t r a c t s , a n d t h r e a t s o f p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y c a n c a u s e b u s i n e s s i n v e s t o r s to s h y a w a y . T h e u n c e r t a i n t y that g r i p p e d A s i a n m a r k e t s in t h e w a k e o f 1 9 9 7 c u r r e n c y c r i s e s in S o u t h e a s t A s i a c a u s e d a d e c l i n e in Asian investments and markets, w h i c h underscores the i m p o r t a n c e

of

maintaining a favorable d o m e s t i c i n v e s t m e n t c l i m a t e and o p e n i n g markets fully on the basis o f international rules.

• Taiwan T a i w a n r e m a i n s a p u z z l i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y c h a l l e n g e , as C h a p t e r 6 e x p l a i n e d . C h i n a ' s g o v e r n m e n t i n s i s t s T a i w a n is part o f m a i n l a n d C h i n a ; T a i w a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t i n s i s t s it is t h e r i g h t f u l r u l e r o f C h i n a . T h o u g h B r i t a i n r e c o g n i z e d t h e P R C in B e i j i n g e a r l y o n , its s i m u l t a n e o u s r e c o g n i t i o n o f T a i w a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t p r e v e n t e d it f r o m e x c h a n g i n g a m b a s s a d o r s

with

C h i n a for many years. C o u n t r i e s e s t a b l i s h i n g diplomatic relations with C h i n a a r e f o r c e d to e n d r e l a t i o n s w i t h T a i w a n . T a i w a n is a d i s p u t e d a n d d i s p u t a t i o u s b o r d e r r e g i o n d i s p l a y i n g m a n y i r o n i e s . It is t h e l a r g e s t inv e s t o r in C h i n a , a n d its trade v o l u m e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m a t c h e s that o f China. In 1 9 9 6 , the i s l a n d h e l d its f i r s t p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . B o t h the l e a d e r o f t h e K u o m i n t a n g , L e e T e n g - h u i ( w h o w o n ) , and t h e l e a d i n g o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y p r o p o s e d e n d i n g that c l a i m o n t h e m a i n l a n d . T h e i s l a n d h a s b e e n ind e p e n d e n t a n d f r e e f r o m o u t s i d e i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r h a l f a c e n t u r y . T h e r e is growing support, especially a m o n g y o u n g e r generations, for simply dec l a r i n g T a i w a n an i n d e p e n d e n t n a t i o n p r e p a r e d to l i v e at p e a c e w i t h C h i n a as a n e i g h b o r . C h i n a , h o w e v e r , c o n t i n u e s to i n s i s t that it s h o u l d r u l e T a i w a n . It s c h e d u l e d m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s j u s t b e f o r e the e l e c t i o n a n d r e n e w e d t h r e a t s to i n v a d e t h e i s l a n d . W i t h c o m m u n i s m f a d i n g a s an i d e o l o g y to c e ment China

together,

nationalist

appeals

like this gain

strength,

and

China's military fuels such rhetoric, which provides a reason for higher m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g b o t h in T a i w a n a n d C h i n a .

• Border Regions C h i n a m a i n t a i n s a t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e r n a b o u t the r e g i o n s to its s o u t h (in S o u t h e a s t A s i a ) and w e s t (in C e n t r a l A s i a ; s e e M a p 2 . 1 ) . S i n c e t h e s e c o n d c e n t u r y B.C., s o m e o f C h i n a ' s g r e a t e s t e m p e r o r s h a v e e x t e n d e d its b o r d e r s in t h o s e d i r e c t i o n s .

Its m a i n

traditional

enemies—the

Annamese

and

Champas (from Vietnam), Turks, Mongols, Manchus, Zunghars, Tanguts, T a r t a r s , R u s s i a n s , and T i b e t a n s ( f r o m C e n t r a l A s i a ) — l i v e d in o r i n v a d e d t e r r i t o r y t h e r e . T h o s e a r e a s r e m a i n o f g r e a t s t r a t e g i c c o n c e r n to C h i n a . A s j u s t i n d i c a t e d , C h i n a h a s r e c e n t l y a c c o m m o d a t e d s o m e o f its d i s p u t e s in

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Southeast Asia, although its relations with Tibet remain tense (see Chapter 6). It also faces unrest among Muslims and other minorities in Xinjiang A u t o n o m o u s Region, who are influenced by Islamic fundamentalists in regions to the west of China. C h i n a ' s sales of arms to Iran, Pakistan, and I r a q — w h i c h disturb m a n y g o v e r n m e n t s — a r e partly premised on keeping good relations with r e g i m e s in those territories in the hope that they can help China keep security on those borders. And China is outbidding U.S. oil c o m p a n i e s f o r rich oil fields in K a z a k h s t a n , which will take on increasing strategic importance when its new oil pipelines become operative. S o m e of C h i n a ' s historical disputes with India in connection with Tibet were discussed in Chapter 6. The relations between the two countries remain tentative and c o m p l e x . India and China have competed over control of strategic passes on C h i n a ' s western borders, d o m i n a n c e over Tibet and Nepal, and leadership a m o n g third world nations. W h i l e India was courting support f r o m the Soviet U n i o n , C h i n a was supplying a r m s to I n d i a ' s adversaries in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq and helping A f g h a n f o r c e s fight the Soviet invasion there (an incursion that also harmed Soviet-Indian relations). In 1986 India and China were once again engaged in a border dispute; G o r b a c h e v (trying to patch Soviet relations with both countries) acted as mediator. W h e n it became apparent in 1989 that China, in violation of the 1984 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was selling Pakistan nuclear materials India stepped up its a r m s race with China. That same year China, breaking a treaty obligation with India, sold arms to Nepal; w h e n India set up a blockade, China trucked in the supplies. In 1990, however, N e p a l ' s g o v e r n m e n t was o v e r t h r o w n by forces that capitulated to India. In 1994 India and China signed an a g r e e m e n t lessening tensions over (but not fully solving) border disputes. In 1997 China agreed to cut back on arms sales to Pakistan. But it still will not accede to U.S. and Indian d e m a n d s that it sign a nuclear test ban treaty, and it remains angry that the Dalai L a m a , along with many Tibetan r e f u g e e s , has political asylum in India. The South China Sea is dotted with many islands, which are potential launching points for military assaults and control of the petroleum reserves on the ocean floor. The Portuguese began the eventual European d o m i n a tion of China by o c c u p y i n g islands there. Both China and Taiwan lay claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands north of Borneo and to the South China Sea s u r r o u n d i n g t h e m (including seabed near the N a t u n a Islands, where Indonesia is developing a huge natural gas project), in violation of the United Nations Law of the Sea convention, to which China is a signatory (Valencia, 1966). For the first time since the Ming dynasty, China has sent a navy into the open sea as part of its improved training and deployment of troops during the 1990s. Visits by those ships to the Spratly, Paracel, and Natuna Islands cause concern to the governments of Malaysia, the

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Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan (Catley, 1997). Meanwhile, China, Taiwan, and Japan all claim ownership over the Diaoyu Islands in the East China S e a (Map 2.4). After a radical nationalist Japanese group erected a lighthouse there in 1996, Japan (declaring the islands their "exclusive economic z o n e " ) set up a coast guard patrol nearby, which in 1998 sank a vessel carrying twenty-five Hong Kong protesters who were rescued by accompanying Taiwanese protest ships ( " C h i n a Warns J a p a n , " 1998). To ease some of these concerns, in 1998 U . S . secretary o f defense William Cohen signed an accord with the People's Liberation A r m y — t h e first between the two entities—designed to avoid naval and air conflicts at sea. China has also worked to support other Asian countries that need help. In 1997 banking and investment deficiencies in Thailand, combined with speculation by foreign investors, caused a collapse in the value of its currency (see Chapter 5). Soon Malaysia, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian countries had similar difficulties, and stock markets fell in Hong Kong, Japan, and other countries of the region. China rapidly stepped in to offer Thailand U . S . $ 1 billion in loans to help keep the value o f its currency stable and promised aid to Indonesia as well before the International Monetary Fund stepped in with its many billions o f dollars in loans. Because of its large trade surpluses, China's government has extensive cash reserves. Its workers have long experience in producing textiles, shoes, toys, and other goods important to the international market, which gives it an advantage competing with Southeast Asian countries, even when manufacturing costs are lower there. But China's collective firms and township and village enterprises, which have accounted for much o f China's growth, have slowed their output as international competition for markets increases (see Chapter 5). And China's banks, which have lent large amounts to inefficient state enterprises and real estate ventures whose property prices have tumbled and to now-bankrupt firms in Southeast Asia, have more bad loans than Southeast Asian banks. Furthermore, the value of real estate and the volume of tourism (heavily dependent on surrounding Asian countries experiencing tightened e c o n o m i e s ) in Hong Kong dropped precipitously. And the value of Japan's yen, the other major currency o f the region, also plunged. If China and Hong K o n g continue their resolve to maintain the value o f their currencies while others stay deflated, investors may take their money elsewhere. All this tempted China and Hong Kong to lower the value of their currencies so the price o f their goods on world markets would drop to compete with those o f the region and tourists could afford to return. Knowing, however, that devaluation might further deflate all the region's currencies and standards o f living, they chose to raise interest rates and take other uncomfortable measures to hold the value of their currencies firm. Unlike Japan, they cooperated closely with the International Monetary Fund and other major powers to

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b o l s t e r A s i a ' s c u r r e n c i e s . T h a t h e l p e d s u r r o u n d i n g c o u n t r i e s , a l o n g with o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e w h o invest h e a v i l y in C h i n a . S h o u l d C h i n a or H o n g K o n g find a need to d e v a l u e its c u r r e n c y so C h i n a ' s b u s i n e s s e s ( o f t e n partially o w n e d by o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e f r o m s u r r o u n d i n g c o u n t r i e s ) c a n c o m pete with l o w e r - c o s t g o o d s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l m a r k e t s , it m i g h t f u r t h e r deflate all the r e g i o n ' s c u r r e n c i e s and l o w e r the b u y i n g p o w e r and standard o f l i v i n g o f e v e r y o n e in t h o s e c o u n t r i e s . A n d , with C h i n e s e c o n t r o l l i n g m u c h o f the r e g i o n ' s w e a l t h — C h i n e s e c o n s t i t u t e 4 percent o f I n d o n e s i a ' s p o p u l a t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , but control 7 0 % o f its private a s s e t s — e c o n o m i c downturn can p r o v o k e rioting and v i o l e n c e against o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e ( M y dans, 1 9 9 8 ) . C h i n a c a n n o t ignore these c o n c e r n s at its i m m e d i a t e doorstep, e v e n w h e n its i n t e r e s t s c o n f l i c t with t h o s e in o t h e r parts o f the w o r l d . It has e v e r y r e a s o n to c o o p e r a t e with the I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d and other m a j o r p o w e r s to b o l s t e r A s i a ' s c u r r e n c i e s . Its r e s p o n s e s on s o m e o f the o t h e r issues d i s c u s s e d in this s e c t i o n , however, m a y b e less u n i v e r s a l l y acclaimed.

•

CONFLICTING PRIORITIES: UNITY OR ACCOMMODATION

B e i j i n g ' s g o v e r n m e n t wants to restore unity and p o w e r to C h i n a , and it wants to m a k e its p e o p l e prosperous. T h e t w o o b j e c t i v e s are hard to a c c o m p l i s h s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . It wants its o w n p o p u l a c e to f e e l — a f t e r the era o f " u n e q u a l t r e a t i e s " and J a p a n e s e o c c u p a t i o n — t h a t their nation is strong and a b l e to resist o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e . Yet it d o e s not want to f r i g h t e n o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e and E u r o p e a n i n v e s t o r s and traders. A f t e r the K o r e a n and V i e t n a m Wars, and d e c a d e s o f U . S . military aid to T a i w a n , it remains wary o f U . S . m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l i n t e n t i o n s in the r e g i o n . Y e t it w a n t s U . S . e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l support, and it b e n e f i t s f r o m s e l l i n g to the U . S . m a r k e t , which a b s o r b s about a fourth o f its e x p o r t s . It wants to attract inv e s t m e n t both f r o m T a i w a n b u s i n e s s p e o p l e and from o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e investors e l s e w h e r e ; at the same time, it d o e s not want those investors to f e e l that an independent T a i w a n would be a safe place to site their f a c t o r i e s and export their g o o d s . W h e n it threatens to invade T a i w a n , C h i n a ' s g o v e r n m e n t a p p e a s e s o f f i c e r s in its own military w h o b e l i e v e in unification or want a greater role f o r the military, appeals to the n a t i o n a l i s t i c s e n t i m e n t s o f its p e o p l e , warns T a i w a n e s e w h o are t e m p t e d to support party f a c t i o n s a d v o c a t i n g i n d e p e n d e n c e that this c o u l d bring serious c o n s e q u e n c e s , warns the U n i t e d S t a t e s that it will not t o l e r a t e any w a r m i n g o f r e l a t i o n s with T a i w a n or n e w e x pansion o f its m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e in the r e g i o n , and warns o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e that i f they side with T a i w a n they are d a n g e r o u s l y i n v o l v i n g t h e m s e l v e s

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in C h i n a ' s i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s a n d u p s e t t i n g e c o n o m i c s t a b i l i t y in t h e r e g i o n ( S u t t e r , 1 9 9 8 ) . It a l s o g i v e s P r e s i d e n t L e e T e n g - h u i s u p p o r t a g a i n s t f a c t i o n s in his o w n party and t h e o p p o s i n g D e m o c r a t i c P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y w h o a d v o c a t e that T a i w a n b e c o m e an i n d e p e n d e n t n a t i o n s e p a r a t e f r o m C h i n a ; v o t e r s k n o w that c a l l s f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e m i g h t b r i n g war. H o w e v e r , t h r e a t s to t a k e o v e r T a i w a n o r t h e S p r a t l y I s l a n d s a l s o t e m p t U . S . p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s to c a l l f o r r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t r a d e a n d c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a and g r e a t e r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to T a i w a n . T h e y b r i n g c a u t i o n to U . S . , E u r o p e a n , J a p a n e s e , and o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e i n v e s t o r s in C h i n a ; t h e y c o m p l i c a t e C h i n a ' s e f f o r t s to j o i n a n d w o r k w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade a n d f i n a n c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; and they raise doubts about w h e t h e r C h i n a c a n b e t r u s t e d as a p a r t n e r in i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . W i l l it u s e its t r a d e to s u p p o r t s u b v e r s i v e g u e r r i l l a o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s a g a i n s t its t r a d i n g p a r t n e r ? M i g h t it e v e n r e v e r t to the e x t r e m e s o f t h e C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n ? Y e t , i f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d E u r o p e a n n a t i o n s w e r e f r e e to e s t a b l i s h full d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h T a i w a n and f r e e l y s u p p l y it w i t h a r m s , f e a r s c o u l d b e r o u s e d in the m i n d s o f C h i n a ' s c i t i z e n s that t h e i r s e c u r i t y is t h r e a t ened. T h i s could strengthen those w h o advocate once again closing C h i n a to o u t s i d e r s . T a i w a n ' s split f r o m the m a i n l a n d c o n t a i n s m a n y s t r a n g e e l e m e n t s that d i f f e r e n t i a t e it f r o m s i t u a t i o n s l i k e the d i v i s i o n o f K o r e a o r G e r m a n y a f t e r World War II. T h e mainland has 1.2 billion inhabitants, Taiwan 2 0 million. Y e t t i n y T a i w a n is n o w t h e l a r g e s t f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r in C h i n a . C h i n a a n d T a i w a n b o t h e x p o r t s i m i l a r v o l u m e s o f g o o d s to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . B o t h have rapidly growing e c o n o m i e s , which benefit from involvement

with

o n e a n o t h e r . A l t h o u g h C h i n a ' s a r m y is n o w t h e l a r g e s t in t h e r e g i o n , t h e l e v e l o f its t e c h n o l o g y still l a g s f a r b e h i n d that o f T a i w a n ' s , J a p a n ' s , and S o u t h K o r e a ' s m i l i t a r y . (In

1 9 9 6 , North K o r e a spent U . S . $ 2 . 4

China U . S . $ 8 . 4 billion, Taiwan U . S . $ 1 3 . 6 billion, South Korea

billion,

U.S.$15.6

billion, and Japan U . S . $ 4 5 . 1 billion on d e f e n s e ; see S h i n n , 1 9 9 7 : 1 8 . ) T h e l e a d e r s o f both c o u n t r i e s c a n u s e h o s t i l e a c t i o n s b y t h e o t h e r a s a m e a n s o f gaining support f r o m their own people and fighting o f f internal rivals for p o w e r w h o m i g h t be m o r e i s o l a t i o n i s t and l e s s i n t e r e s t e d in g r o w t h a n d inv e s t m e n t . S o , i r o n i c a l l y , the h o s t i l i t y , c o m b i n e d w i t h o f f e r s o f c o n c i l i a t i o n e a c h s i d e k n o w s the o t h e r w i l l not a c c e p t , h e l p s b o l s t e r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t a n d w a r d s o f f p o l i t i c a l e x t r e m i s m in b o t h c o u n t r i e s . T h i s s h a d o w b o x i n g helps keep the two r e g i o n s e c o n o m i c a l l y interdependent, but the d a n g e r is that it a l s o f o s t e r s c o n t i n u i n g distrust that c o u l d b l o w up into c i v i l w a r and e c o n o m i c c h a o s , s h o u l d C h i n a , T a i w a n , o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s s p a r k it t h r o u g h a rash m o v e . T h e s h a d o w b o x i n g c o u l d turn to real b o x i n g . It is i m p o r t a n t f o r A m e r i c a n s to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t is a n d is n o t s h a d o w b o x i n g , a n d the d y n a m i c s o f t h i s g a m e . T h e p o w e r s t h a t p l a y e d t h e m o s t d o m i n a n t r o l e s in o p e n i n g

C h i n a to i n t e r n a t i o n a l

relations—Portugal,

200

Robert E. Gamer

Spain, Britain, Japan, Russia, France, and G e r m a n y — h a v e stopped exerti n g m a j o r m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i t i c a l p o w e r in t h e r e g i o n . T o d a y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is the p r i n c i p a l p l a y e r . U n l e s s J a p a n t a k e s on a g r e a t e r m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i t i c a l role, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s t a n d s as t h e p r i n c i p a l p o w e r t h a t c a n p r e v e n t C h i n a f r o m d o m i n a t i n g its o w n r e g i o n b e c a u s e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n t r o l s C h i n a ' s e n t r y into i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a c c e s s to t e c h n o l o g y , a n d a c c e p t a n c e as a part of t h e w o r l d c o m m u n i t y . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d i s t r u s t e d C h i n a ' s m o t i v e s in t h e K o r e a n a n d Vietn a m W a r s , f e a r i n g it w a n t e d to d o m i n a t e t h e r e g i o n . C h i n a , in t u r n , f e a r e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m i g h t i n v a d e it. M a n y C h i n e s e n o w f e a r t h a t c a l l s u p o n C h i n a to b e h a v e in c o n f o r m i t y w i t h w o r l d s t a n d a r d s a r e t h i n l y d i s g u i s e d d e m a n d s t h a t C h i n a g i v e u p its t r a d i t i o n a l m o r a l c o d e s a n d a d o p t U . S . s t a n d a r d s i n s t e a d . D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d s of g r e a t e s t t e n s i o n , A m e r i c a n s h a v e f e a r e d that C h i n a w a n t s to i m p o s e its s y s t e m on t h e w o r l d , a n d C h i n e s e h a v e f e a r e d that t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a n t s t o i m p o s e its s y s t e m o n C h i n a . W h e n e v e r t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t s p e a k s o r a c t s to c o u n t e r w h a t it c o n s i d e r s to b e C h i n a ' s p r o v o c a t i o n s , n u c l e a r b u i l d u p , a r m s s a l e s , i n f r a c t i o n s of c o n t r a c t or i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, o r v i o l a t i o n s of h u m a n r i g h t s , it rei n f o r c e s t h o s e f e a r s . M a n y in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e u n d e r t h e i m p r e s s i o n that C h i n a ' s c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t h a s e x t e n s i v e c o n t r o l o v e r its p e o p l e ; t h e y f e e l j u s t i f i e d in t h r e a t e n i n g s a n c t i o n s w h e n C h i n a b r e a k s t r e a t i e s . C h i n a ' s g o v e r n m e n t o f t e n c a n n o t c o n t r o l t h e a c t i o n s of its c i t i z e n s . At a t i m e w h e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s t h r e a t e n i n g to r e t a l i a t e a g a i n s t B e i j i n g ' s g o v e r n m e n t b e c a u s e G u a n g d o n g m a n u f a c t u r e r s w e r e p r o d u c i n g g o o d s in d e f i a n c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o p y r i g h t l a w s , a s t u d y in G u a n g d o n g ' s l e a d i n g e c o n o m i c z o n e , S h e n z h e n , f o u n d that t w o - t h i r d s of t h e 3 5 , 0 0 0 c o m p a n i e s r e g i s t e r e d t h e r e lie to the g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t their b o a r d s of d i r e c t o r s and b u s i n e s s activities ( " C h i n a in T r a n s i t i o n , " 1996). B e i j i n g m u s t p e r s u a d e f o r e i g n p o w e r s that it is t r y i n g to a b i d e b y its o w n a g r e e m e n t s in a d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n a n d c o n v i n c e its o w n p r o v i n c e s that it is not c a v i n g in to f o r e i g n p r e s s u r e to d i s c o n t i n u e t r a d i t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s w h e n it a s k s local g o v e r n m e n t s a n d b u s i n e s s e s to a b i d e by t h e law. T h i n g s g e t m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d w h e n l o c a l guanxi n e t w o r k s i n c l u d e m e m b e r s of p r o m i n e n t B e i j i n g f a m i l i e s . C h i n a is b e i n g a s k e d to c o n t r a v e n e an a n c i e n t s t a n d a r d in o r d e r t o e n f o r c e a n e w a n d alien o n e ; h o w e v e r m u c h its l e a d e r s see t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r this n e w b e h a v i o r , t h e y f e e l the p r e s s u r e to c o n t i n u e in the old w a y s . C o n f u c i a n " r e c t i f i c a t i o n of n a m e s " c a l l s f o r p e o p l e to s t a y t r u e to t h e m s e l v e s by m a i n t a i n i n g p r o p e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . P e o p l e d o n o t m a i n t a i n a p r o p e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h s o m e o n e to w h o m t h e y o w e d e f e r e n c e if t h e y c h a l l e n g e a d i r e c t o r d e r f r o m t h e m . In W e s t e r n t e r m i n o l o g y , t h a t w o u l d c a u s e t h e p e r s o n w h o i s s u e d t h e o r d e r to " l o s e f a c e . " T h i s g o e s b e y o n d m a c h i s m o o r p e r s o n a l hurt f r o m b e i n g c h a l l e n g e d ; it p u t s t h e p e r s o n i s s u i n g t h e o r d e r i n t o an i m p r o p e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e p e r s o n to w h o m t h e

International

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order was issued. They must reject the improper challenge to their authority in order to maintain a proper relationship with the person who is expected to obey them. A more proper way to redress grievances is to quietly send back word through third parties that you are unhappy; this gives your superior a chance to quietly issue new orders m o r e acceptable to you. Those third-party messages are delivered formally through carefully coded language. O p e n confrontation is generally reserved for top leaders fighting over w h o will control the n a t i o n — t w o m e n arm wrestling to show e v e r y o n e w h o is boss. No top leader can allow ordinary m e m b e r s of society to openly challenge him because that would prove he was no longer capable of holding onto his rightful place in society. And there is no way to reach a c c o m m o d a t i o n in such battles; either one individual wins, or the other. But international diplomacy, which China has entered in such recent times, depends on nations, on a regular basis, issuing direct challenges to one another's policies before working things out behind the scenes. M u c h is a c c o m p l i s h e d through f r a n k , quiet c o n v e r s a t i o n s a m o n g key participants. But first there is f r a n k , open debate. M o d e r n democracies work in this m a n n e r as well. China has the skills for negotiating behind the scenes (Blackman, 1997), but it has little familiarity with negotiating amid a sea of criticism. As a result, a threat by a foreign nation to impose trade sanctions if h u m a n rights violations do not cease may be met by a threat by China (now in a r m - w r e s t l i n g m o d e ) to explode an atomic b o m b or send troops s o m e w h e r e for an exercise; to the outside world, this seems irrational at best and threatening at worst. To break this impasse, both sides must learn to adapt to the o t h e r ' s techniques of negotiating (Irwin, 1997). For example, the Western nations wishing to impose trade sanctions in response to human rights violations are learning to deliver those threats more quietly and indirectly, and the C h i n e s e learn to ignore criticisms f r o m Western media arid public officials not directly involved in the negotiations. In an atmosphere inevitably breeding distrust, such adaptations in tactics by either side are hard to achieve. With neither side fully c o m prehending the rules of the other's game, the chances for conflict are great. T h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d live radio broadcasts of debates (and public expressions of mutual regard) between General Secretary Jiang Zemin and U.S. president Bill Clinton during the latter's 1998 visit to China may indicate that both sides are learning some of these lessons. T h e great Tang e m p e r o r s presided over an e m p i r e that extended, for brief periods during their reigns, f r o m Vietnam to the Aral Sea. Caravans and ships brought them offerings of the greatest cultures and trade items of their day. Today, C h i n a ' s e m p i r e can be even m o r e dramatic. It presides over a land mass rich with fertile fields and natural resources. Its populace is the largest in the world, highly resourceful and organized to sustain its

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needs and produce for the marketplace. Its leading entrepreneurs have the deepest investment pockets on the planet. And its people have migrated to every corner of the globe. China is faced with a great irony. To maintain its unity, it must continue to accommodate the needs of the planet, enriching its e c o n o m y through its compatriots at h o m e and abroad. A bad e c o n o m y at home means dissatisfaction and disintegration. The recent era of good economic growth has been accompanied by a weakened center at Beijing as provinces gain more economic power. But ultimately Chinese k n o w that their prosperity depends on holding their regions and resources together for physical security and economic strength. In fact, C h i n a ' s greatest foreign policy challenge is holding them together, and it will require a combination of ancient and modern skills. The challenge is much greater than keeping the sea lanes or the Silk Roads open and marauders away f r o m the capital city or inspiring awe and fear among subjects. And it is much greater than learning the fundamentals of European diplomacy. China must learn more about the rest of the world, and the rest of the world must learn more about China. President T h e o d o r e Roosevelt brokered the Treaty of P o r t s m o u t h because he felt it was not in the U.S. national interest for China to be divided up among Japan and the European powers. If that is the consensus within t o d a y ' s m a j o r f o r e i g n policy c o m m u n i t y , C h i n a ' s leaders in B e i j i n g and Taipei (Taiwan's capital) can continue a working relationship; amid all the sound and fury, their actual policy d e m a n d s on one another over investment, c o m m e r c e , travel, and other important matters often are compatible. If, however, other powers want China or its government to disintegrate or c h a n g e faster than it is prepared to, or if both sides distrust each o t h e r ' s f u n d a m e n t a l motives, those capitals are on a collision course. Even if all m a j o r players agree on goals, d a n g e r lurks. Traditional posturing a m o n g China's leaders has crossed over into bloodshed in the past. So has modern diplomacy. W h e n those t w o traditions meet, a misstep or m i s r e a d i n g of body language can have disastrous results. This is why it is important for each side to learn the rules of the o t h e r ' s game.

•

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8

Population Growth and Urbanization Ma Rong Each of the prior chapters has dealt with some c o m m o n themes that, taken together, provide a basis for understanding the growth and dispersion of C h i n a ' s populace. China has long been divided between more prosperous and p o p u l o u s coastal regions and interior regions with f e w e r people, harsher conditions, and vast untapped natural resources. It has long had entrepreneurs in cities and the c o u n t r y s i d e p r o d u c i n g an a b u n d a n c e of crops and goods, mostly in those coastal regions. And the market e c o n o m y they supply has been at its liveliest when effective rulers unify great portions of the country; since those rulers usually have emerged f r o m interior parts of the continent, this creates both a tie and a tension between the interior and the coast. C h i n a ' s prosperity has hinged on three balancing acts that I discuss in this chapter: between city and country, between population and food, and between regions of hardship and regions of prosperity. M a n y A m e r i c a n s have heard of C h i n a ' s spectacular building boom in its cities, its controversial " o n e - c h i l d " birth control policy, and the contrast b e t w e e n life in modern areas like Shanghai and H o n g Kong and the more traditional life in minority areas of the interior. China had extensive urbanization long bef o r e the rest of the world; but cities have always d e p e n d e d on the countryside for their prosperity, and the line between city and countryside has always been blurred. O n e c a n n o t thrive without the other. At the end of Chapter 5, John Wong indicated that China must grow enough food to feed its rising population and find ways to spread prosperity inland if its current boom is to continue. These are not new problems or new solutions, but the magnitude of both is far greater than ever in the past. Food production and population have long risen simultaneously, but ultimately they reach a point where they cannot sustain one another, b r i n g i n g social crisis. A n d China has never been able to survive with two nations, one rich and one

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p o o r ; it n e e d s social s e r v i c e n e t w o r k s l i n k i n g the c a p i t a l a n d r e g i o n a l cities to k e e p that kind of polarization f r o m o c c u r r i n g . C h i n a ' s f u t u r e success d e p e n d s on m a i n t a i n i n g these fine b a l a n c e s , but it will not be easy.

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CITY A N D C O U N T R Y S I D E IN HISTORY

C h i n a h a s a l w a y s b e e n a c o u n t r y on the m o v e . Its h i s t o r y b r o u g h t a s u c c e s s i o n of d r o u g h t s , f l o o d s , p l a g u e s , f a m i n e s , r e b e l l i o n s , c o n q u e r o r s , and great p u b l i c w o r k s p r o j e c t s . All of t h e s e i n v o l v e d m o v e m e n t of great n u m b e r s of p e o p l e . E m p e r o r s and s o l d i e r s built cities, m o v i n g p e o p l e by f o r c e f o r their c o n s t r u c t i o n and o c c u p a t i o n ; in t i m e s of r e b e l l i o n , a n g r y p e a s a n t s b u r n e d t h o s e cities. P e o p l e in leaner r e g i o n s of the north m o v e d south and west to seek greater prosperity, o f t e n creating n e w cities in the r e g i o n s they e n t e r e d or settling close to e x i s t i n g ones. Cities w e r e g e n e r ally built by s o l d i e r s a n d r u l e r s , but they w e r e s u s t a i n e d by c o m m e r c e , w h i c h m o v e d both p e o p l e and g o o d s . In The City in Late Imperial China ( 1 9 7 7 ) , W i l l i a m G. S k i n n e r m a k e s the c a s e that a p r i n c i p a l role of cities in late imperial C h i n a w a s as c o m mercial centers. In these cities, public o f f i c i a l s and m e r c h a n t s interacted to tap and regulate m a r k e t s and m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , creating wealth both for c i t i z e n s and g o v e r n m e n t . H o w e v e r , the cities were not the only p l a c e that g e n e r a t e d wealth. M a n y villages, in fact, p r o d u c e d g o o d s in c o t t a g e industries a l o n g with r a i s i n g c r o p s and h e l p e d m a i n t a i n c a n a l s , r o a d s , and s t r e a m s that served as t r a n s p o r t a t i o n n e t w o r k s to m o v e their g o o d s to and f r o m the cities. Nearly e v e r y o n e in and a r o u n d the u r b a n i z e d areas h e l p e d supply, and p u r c h a s e d f r o m , this trade. Cities were o f t e n located along m a j o r c a n a l s or rivers. T h e short Mira c l e C a n a l (Ling Qu) linked the X i a n g River, w h i c h f l o w s into the Yangtze, with the G u i R i v e r that f l o w s t o w a r d G u a n g z h o u ; it w a s b e g u n in the third century B.C. T h e G r a n d Canal (begun m u c h later, in the sixth century A.D., u s i n g t w o or t h r e e m i l l i o n l a b o r e r s ) linked the Y a n g t z e R i v e r valley with the Yellow R i v e r and later B e i j i n g . O v e r the c e n t u r i e s , t h e s e and other canals were f r e q u e n t l y rerouted to fit the n e e d s of c o m m e r c e and c o n q u e s t , and their m a i n t e n a n c e r e q u i r e d e x t e n s i v e l a b o r (Van S l y k e , 1 9 8 8 : 6 9 - 7 2 ) . H u g e q u a n t i t i e s of g r a i n m o v e d a l o n g t h e s e w a t e r w a y s , a l o n g with t r o o p s , all m a n n e r of m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s , s m a l l m e r c h a n t s , and t h o u s a n d s of b o a t m e n and their f a m i l i e s . O f f i c i a l s e x t r a c t e d taxes and tolls, and m e r c h a n t s p r o f i t s , f r o m this t r a d e . T h e r o a d s a n d w a t e r w a y s h e l p e d rulers hold C h i n a t o g e t h e r and c o n q u e r p e o p l e a l o n g the p e r i p h e r y . To keep their rule alive, o f f i c i a l s also e s t a b l i s h e d t o w n s in areas with less c o m m e r c e to control the p o p u l a c e and m a i n t a i n d e f e n s e n e t w o r k s . In c o n t r a s t to the c o m m e r c i a l centers, m a n y of these centers cost the g o v e r n m e n t a good deal of m o n e y to m a i n t a i n while g e n e r a t i n g little r e v e n u e . A s

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Urbanization

209

one moved inland, the n u m b e r of such cities tended to increase (see Skinner, 1977:221). It was not the case that these centers were associated with poverty and the commercial cities were associated with wealth. M a n y of the laborers who contributed to the prosperity of the c o m m e r c i a l cities worked very hard for little income. Many of the clans living around the administrative towns engaged in little c o m m e r c e b e y o n d their villages but may have supported themselves adequately on their small farms. City inhabitants had to garner money either f r o m the capital or f r o m outside c o m merce to prosper. Threats of outside attack or social unrest could help attract such f u n d s to cities that had little outside c o m m e r c e ; the capital might also send money if the town f o r m e d a useful link to control neighboring regions. T h e role of cities as centers of trade and administration began very early in C h i n a ' s history. In Chapter 3 R h o a d s Murphey discussed the rise of cities as early as the Shang dynasty (see Table 3.1); his mention of the battle for dominance between the commercial towns and cities of the state of Qu in the Yangtze River valley and the frontier feudal f i e f d o m of Qin, which finally unified China, highlights their dual role as political and c o m m e r c i a l centers. Cities surrounded by tall walls and " d e f e n s e - r i v e r s " were the settlements f o r g o v e r n m e n t a l o f f i c e s and the army. Cities were built to protect both urban and rural residents during wartime. Towns with no significance in administration, whose main occupation was trade, did not have walls and large populations (Elvin and Skinner, 1974). Since the Qin unification of China in 221 B.C., the country has needed to establish a strong administration system to m a n a g e the large territory. Therefore, big cities developed in China much earlier than in Europe. In the Tang dynasty (A.D. 752), the population of the capital city C h a n g ' a n (present-day X i ' a n ; see Map 3.1) was around 2 million ( C h a o and Xie, 1988:191); it was a center of both governance and c o m m e r c e . In comparison, big cities developed in Europe much later, and their main expansion occurred after the industrial revolution in the eighteenth century. As Chapters 3 and 4 indicated, the Song dynasty was a period of great c o m m e r c e , with a fifth of the populace moving to towns and cities to engage in these pursuits (Chao, 1987:56). In the centuries following, urbanization increased as overall population began to rise rapidly (see Figure 8.1). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, China had 1,400 cities of over 3,000 people; more than half of the cities with a population a b o v e 10,000 were the seats of prefectures and provincial administrations (Rozman, 1982:209). C h i n a ' s population exceeded 300 million people by 1800 (Chao and Xie, 1988:378). In western and northern China, where the economy is less developed and population density is low, the main function of cities and towns is still administrative (Chang, 1981). M a n u f a c t u r i n g and services are limited there, and a large proportion of the urban labor force works in governmental institutions.

MaRotig

210

Figure 8.1

Historical Changes in China's Population

In contrast, many "market towns" in the coastal regions (especially in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong provinces) have a more prosperous economy and high population densities. Trade, manufacture, handicraft, transportation, and services are important functions played by these "market towns." Some of them grew up rapidly and even became large cities. After the Opium Wars (1839-1842), the population of the treaty ports along the coast began to rise rapidly. Shanghai was only a country town with a few thousand people at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but it became the largest city in East Asia a century later since it served as the main trade center and transportation port between China and other countries. Today, although the general level of urbanization in China is lower than in most other countries, China has a number of big cities in its coastal regions. Among the seven cities in the world with a population over 10 million in 1975, Shanghai was the fourth largest, with 11.6 million (World Bank, 1984:68). By 1995, the population of Beijing exceeded 10 million, and Shanghai's population reached 13.3 million (Population Census Bureau, 1993:13). There were ten cities in China with a population over 2 million in 1993 (State Statistical Bureau, 1994:22).

•

POPULATION AND FOOD

It is well known that China is the most populous country of the world. On February 15, 1995, the government announced that its population had reached 1.2 billion—about one fifth of the total world's population, which stood at 5.5 billion in 1993 (World Bank, 1995:163). The population of China was greater in 1995 than the c o m b i n e d populations of the United States (258 million), Russia (149 million), Japan (125 million), and all of Europe and Middle Asia (495 million) (World Bank, 1995:163). The country with the world's second-largest population is India, with 898 million in 1993. Because of India's higher annual birthrates (twenty-nine per thousand versus nineteen per thousand in China), its population is expected to surpass C h i n a ' s during the twenty-first century.

/'o/m/ii/ion Groivlh and Urbanization

Old city street in Chengdu,

211

Sichuan.

By w o r l d s t a n d a r d s , C h i n a ' s p o p u l a t i o n h a s b e e n h i g h t h r o u g h o u t r e c o r d e d h i s t o r y ; but its a b s o l u t e n u m b e r s h a v e b e e n m u c h l o w e r t h a n at p r e s e n t . A g l a n c e at F i g u r e 8.1 will q u i c k l y s h o w you that C h i n a ' s p o p u lation e x c e e d e d 100 m i l l i o n in 1685, b a s e d on c e n s u s and o t h e r r e c o r d s of p o p u l a t i o n a c c o u n t i n g d u r i n g d i f f e r e n t d y n a s t i e s f o r the p u r p o s e of tax c o l l e c t i o n and a r m y r e c r u i t m e n t , w h i c h a r e not e n t i r e l y a c c u r a t e but g i v e s o m e g e n e r a l sense of p o p u l a t i o n sizes. F r o m the first " c e n s u s " ( h o u s e h o l d a c c o u n t i n g ) in A.D. 2 to the o n e in A.D. 1400, C h i n a ' s p o p u l a t i o n e x p e r i e n c e d a l o n g p r o c e s s of instability. S o m e t i m e s the p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e d at an a n n u a l rate of 4 to 5 p e r c e n t u n d e r p e a c e f u l a n d p r o s p e r o u s social c o n d i t i o n s , p e r h a p s e v e n e x c e e d i n g 100 m i l l i o n d u r i n g t h e t w e l f t h c e n t u r y at t h e h e i g h t of the S o n g d y n a s t y ; s o m e t i m e s w a r s a n d f a m i n e s d e c r e a s e d it by 3 0 to 4 0 p e r c e n t . By t h e h e i g h t of t h e M i n g d y n a s t y in t h e f i f t e e n t h c e n t u r y it had risen to 150 m i l l i o n , d i p p e d a g a i n w i t h the w a r s that b r o u g h t it to o f f i c e , a n d then m o v e d into s t e a d y g r o w t h a f t e r t h o s e w a r s e n d e d in 1681. It t o o k s e v e n t y - n i n e y e a r s to e x c e e d 2 0 0 m i l l i o n (in 1759), a n o t h e r t w e n t y - e i g h t y e a r s to e x c e e d 3 0 0 m i l l i o n (in 1787), and a n o t h e r f o r t y - t h r e e y e a r s to e x c e e d 4 0 0 m i l l i o n by 1 8 3 0 — d o u b l i n g in s e v e n t y - o n e y e a r s ( C h a o a n d X i e , 1 9 8 8 : 3 7 8 ) . B e c a u s e of f o r e i g n i n v a s i o n ( s u c h as t h e O p i u m W a r a n d t h e 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 4 5 J a p a n e s e o c c u p a t i o n ) a n d civil w a r s (the " T a i p i n g H e a v e n l y K i n g d o m , " a n d the w a r b e t w e e n t h e C o m m u n i s t Party

212

Ma

Rong

and Kuomintang; see Chapter 4), "the century between 1851 and 1949 was one of societal breakdown . . . an annual average population growth rate of only 0.3 percent" (Banister, 1987:3). T h e n China entered into a period of spectacular rise in population. Food was a m a j o r factor in determining population. As R h o a d s M u r phey pointed out in Chapter 3, C h i n a ' s civilization was able to sustain itself b e c a u s e of the cultivation of rice and wheat. Wars, e p i d e m i c s , and f l o o d s killed p e o p l e directly. A l o n g with droughts, they also d e s t r o y e d fields and crops, leading to starvation, lowered fertility rates, and infanticide (killing babies at birth) to avoid having to share f o o d with n e w b o r n infants. For many centuries, China's population rose and fell on the basis of how much grain it could grow and store. Then in the eighteenth century, new plants arrived f r o m the New World and Europe: sweet potatoes, maize (corn), Irish potatoes, and p e a n u t s — a l l of which could grow a b u n d a n t l y on previously unused terrain—along with new, more productive strains of rice f r o m Southeast Asia. Especially in southern China, more people could marry at earlier ages and have more children, who had an increased chance to live because of better nutrition for both mother and infant. One tactic used by armies in the civil wars and foreign invasions f r o m which China suffered f r o m the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h to mid-twentieth centuries was to break dikes and cause flooding. Bad weather also brought periodic droughts. G r a n a r y storage s y s t e m s were emptied and extended f a m i l i e s and communities scattered. Combined with the disease, direct killings, and other hardships brought by war and social disorder, these losses of crops brought great loss of life. C h a p t e r 4 gave you some estimates of those losses. Yet despite all this hardship, C h i n a ' s population crept upward during this period, adding more people than all of China had supported b e f o r e the seventeenth century. The new crops helped this to happen. The arrival of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 brought peace, the e c o n o m i c stabilization m e a s u r e s discussed in C h a p t e r 4 that ended the high inflation of food prices, the return of peasants to the land, and m e a s u r e s to provide basic m e d i c i n e and hygiene. The first m o d e r n census, conducted in 1953, showed a population of 582 million. T w e n t y nine years later, in 1982, it surpassed 1 billion. From 1958 to 1961, there was a serious famine in China. Both natural disasters (drought) and policies of rural development (the " c o m m u n e syst e m " and the Greap Leap Forward) had impact on the f a m i n e and resulted in negative population growth rates in the early 1960s. The mortality rate was very high (Banister and Preston, 1981). The high birthrates in the late 1960s and 1970s are called " c o m p e n s a t i v e births" by demographers, since many people w h o did not bear children during the famine wanted to have them right after (Tien, 1983:16). The total fertility rate (expected average n u m b e r of children per w o m a n at the end of her childbearing years) decreased to 3.3 in 1960 and j u m p e d back to 5.8 in 1970.

Population

Growth

and

213

Urbanization

Great regional variation in demographic dynamics exists among different areas of China. Table 8.1 shows the demographic indexes of several selected provinces and autonomous regions. For example, the birthrate was as high as 5.27 percent in Sichuan in 1970, but it was only 1.38 percent in Shanghai that same year. The death rate was very high in Sichuan in 1970 (1.26 percent), but it was as low as 0.5 percent in Shanghai. Variation also exists between urban and rural areas and between rich areas and poor areas within each province or autonomous region (Caldwell and Srinivasan, 1984). But the general trend is for the birthrate to exceed the death rate and for population to rise faster in rural areas than in urban. There has always been a basic argument or debate within the government and among demographers in the PRC over whether family planning is necessary and what should be the "proper standard" or limitation in family planning programs. In other words, how many children should a couple have? The most f a m o u s debate was between the president of Beijing University (Ma Yinchu) and Chairman Mao Zedong in 1957. Based on his study and population projections, Ma (an economist) called on China to control births and encourage family planning. At a meeting of the National People's Congress, he warned that China's population would reach 1.5-2.6 billion (at an annual growth rate of 2 to 3 percent) in fifty years and that such a huge population would become an intolerable burden preventing China from becoming a prosperous industrialized nation. To solve the problem, he suggested setting up a goal of two children per family (Ma Yinchu, 1957). His suggestion was supported by some senior officials, including Zhou Enlai; a movement was organized,

Table 8.1 R e g i o n a l Variation in D e m o g r a p h i c I n d i c a t o r s C r u d e Birth Rate (% increase)

C r u d e Death Rate (% decrease)

Region

1970

1980

1990

1970

1980

1990

Tibet Xinjiang Guangdong Jiangsu Inner M o n g o l i a Sichuan Heilongjiang Beijing Shanghai C h i n a as a w h o l e

1.94 3.67 2.96 3.07 2.89 5.27 3.48 2.07 1.38 3.34

2.24 2.18 2.07 1.47 1.85 1.19 2.36 1.56 1.26 1.82

2.76 2.47 2.40 2.05 2.01 1.78 1.75 1.34 1.13 2.10

0.76 0.82 0.60 0.69 0.58 1.26 0.58 0.64 0.50 0.76

0.82 0.77 0.54 0.66 0.55 0.68 0.72 0.63 0.65 0.63

0.92 0.64 0.53 0.61 0.58 0.71 0.53 0.54 0.64 0.63

Source: China Population and Information Research Center, 1985:848-850; China Population and Information Research Center, ed., 1991.

214

Ma Rong

mainly to call people's attention to population issues without policy enforcement. This was the first family planning campaign, f r o m 1955 to 1957, just before the terrible famine (Figure 8.2). At the time, Mao was worried about the possibility of war between China and the United States. The Korean War was not formally ended, and the situation on the Taiwan Straits was hostile and fragile, as Chapters 6 and 7 explained. He believed China needed to maintain a large population to survive a nuclear war, since it had no nuclear weapon to deter such an attack. Mao said that even if nuclear bombs killed half of the population, China would still have millions left to continue fighting. Mao rejected Ma's suggestion on the basis of this strategic thinking. Then Ma was criticized very seriously as "the new Malthus" and lost his position and influence. Malthus was an eighteenth century thinker who gave a gloomy forecast that the world's population is destined to grow faster than food supplies. But China was not involved in nuclear war with either the United States or the Soviet Union. As you can see from Figure 8.2 the birth rate shot up after the period of famine during the Great Leap Forward ( 1 9 5 8 1960) and the government called for a second family planning campaign. Fertility rates declined again during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). After those periods of chaos they rose once more, as Ma Yinchu had predicted. The government announced the third family planning campaign with a new slogan: wan, xi, shao (late marriage, long birth intervals, and fewer births) (Lyle, 1980). As the population pressure on land, urban jobs, housing, and social spending became more serious, it was clear that a rapidly growing population would make the "four modernizations" (of agriculture, industry, the military, and society and technology) announced in 1978 an impossible

Figure 8.2

D e m o g r a p h i e D y n a m i c s D u r i n g China's Family Planning Campaigns

-

M

jACX \

v,,,,/

v.-

••.,.

V1 1950 1955 I960 1965 1970 1975 1980 (985 1990 1995 birth rate *

Source:

r a t e of natural increase (births minus deaths) death r a t e

State Statistical B u r e a u . 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 9 5 .

Population

Growth and

Urbanization

215

dream. So in the 1980s, the Chinese government finally set up a more restrictive birth control policy, the one-child c a m p a i g n (Tien, 1973, 1983). Under this policy, China's fertility rates and mortality rates both stablized (as F i g u r e 8.2 shows), resulting in a low natural rate of population increase. U n l i k e the e x p e r i e n c e s of industrialized countries, w h e r e social and economic development gradually lead to low fertility, government policy and e n f o r c e m e n t have played a key role in this transition in China (Aird, 1978; Chen and Kols, 1982). S o m e argue that low fertility will be s p o n t a n e o u s l y adopted by p e o ple after e c o n o m i c and societal d e v e l o p m e n t and that no policy e n f o r c e ment is really needed (see Beaver, 1975). But in C h i n a ' s case, the huge population and a high birthrate obviously hinder social and economic dev e l o p m e n t . In 1982, 80 percent of C h i n a ' s population were traditional farmers and over 32 percent of the populace over the age of twelve illiterate. Such individuals are apt to have large families, straining food supplies and government support services at a time when resources need to be devoted to building an infrastructure for modernization that could bring societal and economic development. Generally, urban residents accepted the one-child policy. First, equal education and work opportunities for women had already encouraged them to have f e w e r children. Second, the pension systems of governmental institutions and state-owned enterprises m a d e people less worried about needing children to support them after retirement. Third, the expenses of k i n d e r g a r t e n , schools, and other costs related to child raising increased very rapidly, and it became really difficult to raise more than one child if the parents wanted their o f f s p r i n g to e n j o y satisfactory and c o m p e t i t i v e living and study conditions. In rural areas, however, especially poor ones where m a n y farmers want more boys to carry on their family name, no pensions are available, and the expenses of raising children are still low, people want two or three children. Under the incentives of the household responsibility system, added o f f s p r i n g also provide field help to increase f a m i l y i n c o m e . So it is hard to e n f o r c e the family p l a n n i n g p r o g r a m in rural areas (Goodstadt, 1982), especially because local authorities in many rural regions are sometimes lax about doing so. Since Han people, especially farmers, have a strong preference for boys, the sex ratio at birth (the ratio between males and females, with females as 100) increased from 108.5 in 1982 to 110.2 in 1990. O n e of the reasons is the higher possibility that couples will decide to have an abortion when they learn the new baby will be a girl. But it is also very likely that many rural households did not report the births of girls, which may in turn m a k e the ratio more even (Zhen Yi et al., 1993). In regions where local administrators are more zealous about enforcing birth control, people often fail to report births of both sexes, and it is difficult to estimate the total number who were not reported to administration and registered by censuses.

Ma Rong

216

Billboard

promoting

the one-child

policy in Chengdu,

Sichuan.

W h e n the C h i n e s e government recognized the difficulties in enforcing the one-child policy in rural areas, it made many local adjustments in birth regulations to allow farmers to have more than one child. For e x a m p l e , if the first child is a girl or has s o m e disease or if the father is the only son o f his family, a second child is allowed. B y estimation, there are generally two children per family in most rural areas in China, whereas the one-child policy is generally f o l l o w e d in cities ( P e n g , 1 9 9 1 ) . In Chapter 11, Laurel B o s s e n discusses this topic further. A s you can see from T a b l e s 8 . 2 and 5 . 2 , the C h i n e s e population has two m a j o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : large size and low education. A m o n g the total population a b o v e age six in C h i n a in 1 9 9 0 ( 9 9 4 m i l l i o n ) , 2 0 . 6 percent were illiterate and another 4 2 . 3 percent received only primary school education. B e c a u s e many rural primary schools have very poor teaching conditions and many teachers only r e c e i v e d primary school education t h e m selves, the quality o f education for a large proportion o f graduates o f rural primary schools is considered very low. With such a low quality in education, skill training, and social e x p e r i e n c e s , a huge population will have a more negative than positive impact on C h i n a ' s development. T h e importance o f family planning becomes even clearer if we carefully examine the connection between natural resources in China and population growth. Arable land in C h i n a c o v e r s less than 2 5 0 million acres ( 1 0 1 . 2 hectares) and has continually d e c r e a s e d because o f urban expansion and construction o f dams, roads, bridges, and new factories. T h e arable land per capita in 1991 was 0 . 2 7 acres (0.11 hectares) in China, one-ninth that o f the United States, one-twentieth that o f Canada, and one-thirty-fourth that in

Population

Growth

and

Urbanization

217

Table 8.2 S e l e c t e d D e v e l o p m e n t a n d D e m o g r a p h i c Trends i n China

Total p o p u l a t i o n (in m i l l i o n s ) G N P per capita ( U . S . $ ) % urban 2 Infant mortality per 100 births b C r u d e birthrate (% increase) C r u d e death rate (% d e c r e a s e ) Rate o f p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h (%) Total fertility rate per childbearer"Life expectancy (female)b Life expectancy (male)b

1950

1960

1970

552.00

662.00

830.00

—

11.20 13.80 3.70 1.80 1.90 5.80 49.20 46.70

—

—

1980

1990

987.00 290.00

1,120.00 370.00

19.70

17.40

19.40

26.00

8.56 2.09 2.54

5.15 3.34

3.76 1.82

3.70 2.10

0.76 2.58

0.63

0.63 1.47

-0.45 3.30

5.80

1.19 2.20

58.00 56.00

63.20 61.10

69.20 66.20

2.30 71.10 67.80

Source: World Bank. 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 9 5 . Notes: a. W a n g , 1986:284. b. Lin, 1986:238. c. Yan and C h e n g , 1993; Huang. 1993.

Australia (Qu and Li, 1992:53). India, with 432 million acres (174.4 million hectares) of arable land, has fewer people than China. Therefore, the pressure of population on grain production is worse in China than in India. The Chinese government argues that, with 7 percent of the world's arable land and the need to feed 22 percent of the world's population, there was no other choice for China to maintain its social stability and proceed into modernization except practicing family planning. The outlook for other natural resources in China is equally grim. Only 13 percent of China's territory has forest cover compared to 32 percent for the United States, 68 percent for Japan, 71 percent for Finland, and 31 percent for the world as a whole (Qu and Li, 1992:70). The indicator of forest area per capita is even lower for China: 0.27 acres (.1 hectares) compared with 3.3 acres (1.33 hectares) in the United States and 12.3 acres (4.97 hectares) in Finland. Water is one of the most important natural resources. The per capita surface water runoff—the amount of water that flows on the surface to use for drinking, agriculture, sanitation, and industry—is only one-fourth the world average and one-fifth that of the United States (Qu and Li, 1992:117). Furthermore, C h i n a ' s water resources are unequally distributed. Most of the cities in northern China experience serious water shortages, whereas southeastern China is often threatened by floods. (In Chapter 9, Richard Edmonds discusses all these problems in greater detail.) With such shortages and imbalanced geographic distribution between population and natural resources, birth control and family planning are necessary measures. In Chapter 5, John Wong discussed Lester B r o w n ' s concerns that China will be unable to feed itself and the growing consensus that although Brown's fears may be overblown, the difficulties of increasing

218

Ma Rong

food production for a growing population are substantial. Though ample food does not automatically bring population increases (Harris and Ross, 1987; Gates, 1 9 9 6 : 5 4 - 6 0 ) , history has shown that when the Chinese have enough food to eat, their population grows. If it keeps growing, food supply may not be able to keep up with population, and money would have to be diverted from other projects to import food. Despite the one-child policy, China's population continues to grow and is predicted to become stable around 2 0 3 3 , after reaching 1.5 billion (Lu and Lin, 1994:104). Researchers in western China suggest that one of the most important reasons for the poverty problem there is the region's continuing high fertility (Zhou, 1994). China's population was 723 million in 1964; if the fertility rate, mortality rate, and natural growth rate had stayed the same as they were that year, China would have had a population of 2 . 0 7 5 billion by 1995. Even under the strongly enforced family planning program, the annual number of newborn babies in China ( 2 4 . 6 million) still exceeds the total population of Australia (17.6 million), which has a territory equal to 8 0 percent of China's territory.

•

CITY AND COUNTRYSIDE TODAY

Given the necessity of feeding its people, China must have enough people in the countryside to maintain the food supply while managing the gravitation to towns and cities that naturally accompanies modernization. Because of the geographic characteristics and distribution of natural resources, China's population is not equally distributed. The plateau and deserts in the western part of China can support only a very small population. As you can easily grasp by looking at Maps 2.2 and 2.3 and drawing a diagonal line from western Heilongjiang to western Yunnan, 9 4 percent of the total population lives in the southeastern part of China (about 3 6 percent of the total territory), whereas 6 percent live in the northwestern part (about 64 percent of total territory). This pattern has not changed for centuries. Furthermore, the most populous cities lie to the southeast. Although China's average density is 125 persons per square kilometer, its coastal regions are considered among the most crowded places in the world, with a population density of over 6 0 0 - 1 , 0 0 0 persons per square kilometer. Anyone who visits Beijing, Shanghai, or even rural areas in the coastal regions will certainly have a very strong impression about the high population density there. It is even difficult for urban people to move on streets and in shops in weekends and holidays, and there are very short distances between villages in rural areas. In 1949, the P R C established a centrally planned economic system on the model of the then Soviet Union. In order to manage food and housing supplies, employment, education, and other public facilities under the

Population Growth and

Shanghai's

busiest shopping

Urbanization

street, Nanjing

in.

g o v e r n m e n t a l p l a n s , a r e s i d e n t i a l r e g i s t r a t i o n s y s t e m w a s c r e a t e d in 1 9 5 3 to c o n t r o l the s i z e o f u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n s and t h e v o l u m e o f r u r a l - u r b a n m i g r a t i o n ( G o l d s t e i n and G o l d s t e i n , 1 9 8 5 : 9 - 1 2 ) . U n d e r t h i s p o l i c y , the p r o p o r t i o n o f u r b a n r e s i d e n t s in the total p o p u l a t i o n w a s k e p t a r o u n d 2 0 p e r c e n t f o r a l o n g p e r i o d o f t i m e , m u c h l o w e r than in o t h e r n a t i o n s . T h e urban p o p u l a t i o n o f C h i n a r e a c h e d 2 9 p e r c e n t o f the total in 1 9 9 3 , c o m p a r e d to 7 6 p e r c e n t in the U n i t e d S t a t e s and 4 4 p e r c e n t in t h e w h o l e w o r l d ( W o r l d Bank,

1995:222).

T h e G r e a t L e a p F o r w a r d , w h i c h b e g a n in 1 9 5 8 ( s e e C h a p t e r 4 ) , r e s u l t e d in a b o u t 2 0 m i l l i o n rural p e o p l e m i g r a t i n g i n t o c i t i e s to p a r t i c i p a t e in an u r b a n industrial e x p a n s i o n . S i n c e the f a c t o r i e s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d in a hurry a n d t h e r e w e r e m a n y p r o b l e m s in m a n a g e m e n t a n d t h e q u a l i t y o f the l a b o r f o r c e , m a n y n e w f a c t o r i e s did n o t m a k e p r o f i t s a n d h a d to b e c l o s e d . T h e n t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d to tell t h e 2 0 m i l l i o n n e w u r b a n r e s i d e n t s to m o v e b a c k to rural a r e a s ( T i e n , 1 9 8 3 : 2 8 ) . A f t e r this c r i s i s , the g o v e r n m e n t set up a v e r y r e s t r i c t e d s y s t e m o f u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l . A n y o n e w h o w a n t e d t o m o v e f r o m o n e p l a c e to a n o t h e r h a d to a p p l y f o r an o f f i c i a l t r a n s f e r , a n d it w a s d i f f i c u l t to o b t a i n a p p r o v a l f o r a m o v e f r o m the c o u n tryside into a town or city, e s p e c i a l l y into big c i t i e s . K a m W i n g

Chan

( 1 9 9 4 ) a r g u e s that t h i s s y s t e m h e l p e d s t a b i l i z e c i t i e s as t h e y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d . During

the

Cultural

Revolution

(1966-1976),

the

government

arranged a special type o f urban-rural migration for city middle school g r a d u a t e s . T h e y w e r e sent to rural a r e a s in the p e r i p h e r y , a r m y r e c l a m a t i o n

Ma Rong

220

f a r m s , and urban suburbs f o r " r e e d u c a t i o n " ( B a n i s t e r , 1 9 8 7 : 3 0 8 ) . T h e y were c o m p e l l e d to learn f r o m f a r m e r s and herders and work as one o f them. T h e total n u m b e r o f these students was around 1.2 million. A f t e r the Cultural R e v o l u t i o n , a large part o f these students returned to the cities o f their origin, resulting in a rural-urban return migration. F o l l o w i n g the new e c o n o m i c reforms in the 1 9 8 0 s , migration control has l o o s e n e d . T h e grain c o u p o n s ( w h i c h could only be used in e a c h p r o v i n c e ) and hotel c l e r k s ' requests for "travel approval" for c h e c k i n g into hotels were abandoned. N o w people may travel anywhere in the country, though o f f i c i a l local residential status is still needed when applying for a formal j o b in governmental institutions. Migration abroad has also b e c o m e m o r e c o n v e n i e n t if the visa is approved by foreign c o u n t r i e s . A c c o r d i n g to the 1 9 9 0 national census, 2 3 7 , 0 2 4 persons were living abroad and had temporarily c a n c e l e d their local residential registration (Population Census B u r e a u , 1 9 9 3 : 7 ) . In 1 9 9 4 , 1 9 , 0 0 0 students went abroad for advanced study (State Statistical Bureau, 1 9 9 5 : 5 8 9 ) . Yet all this new freedom o f m o v e m e n t c o m e s with a price: the s o c i a l guarantees and stability o f n e i g h b o r h o o d s and c o m m u n i t i e s that the regulations helped establish are not as firm.

•

Health Care

One guarantee under pressure is health care. L i f e e x p e c t a n c y at birth has increased significantly in China since 1950. At that time, life expectancy was only 4 9 . 2 years for women and 4 6 . 7 years for men; by 1 9 9 0 this had risen to 71.1 years and 6 7 . 8 years (see Table 8 . 2 ) . T h e improvements in inc o m e and housing have had a positive impact on people's nutrition and health. T h e general improvement o f mass education has also had some indirect impact on reducing mortality. More children attend school; only 1.5 million children graduated from primary school in 1952, whereas 19 million did so in 1 9 9 4 (State Statistical Bureau, 1 9 9 5 : 5 8 8 ) . Students learn about biology, nutrition, sanitation, infectious diseases, and simple medical treatments, which in turn help them to manage their life in a more healthy way. T h e health care facilities managed by the government also play an important role in r e d u c i n g m o r t a l i t y and increasing life e x p e c t a n c y . A f t e r 1 9 4 9 , u n i v e r s i t y - e d u c a t e d d o c t o r s and nurses b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e to urban workers. " B a r e f o o t d o c t o r s , " who received basic paramedical training and were supported by their local v i l l a g e s , proved very helpful in controlling infectious d i s e a s e s and offering simple treatment o f urgent c a s e s in rural areas. B u t the gap b e t w e e n the quality o f health care f a c i l i t i e s in rural areas and c i t i e s r e m a i n e d wide. B e f o r e the r e f o r m s o f the 1 9 8 0 s , there were two different health c a r e s y s t e m s in rural and urban C h i n a . In rural areas, a system called the " c o l l e c t i v e health care s y s t e m " was in practice. At that time, all rural d w e l l e r s b e l o n g e d to c o m m u n e s , w h i c h c o n t r o l l e d m a n a g e m e n t o f the land; they were divided into brigades and finally into

Population Growth and

221

Urbanization

smaller production teams. Brigade m e m b e r s all contributed equal levies to a fund that supported their health c a r e . W h e n they b e c a m e ill, the fund paid half their bill; they paid the rest. Urban workers had better c o v e r a g e than that. T h e ministries, schools, and state-owned factories and shops for which over 9 0 percent o f urban e m p l o y e e s worked paid all their medical e x p e n s e s and provided them with doctors and hospitals near their workplace. T h e work units also covered 7 0 to 8 0 percent o f the health care e x penses o f their dependents. S o urban workers had better a c c e s s than rural dwellers to hospitals and fully trained doctors and paid few o f their own medical bills. S i n c e the system reform in the 1980s, the collective health care system has lost its financial base b e c a u s e all lands and properties were redistributed among peasants. Now the peasants pay health care expenses by themselves. T h e former " b a r e f o o t d o c t o r s " now either open their own private clinics and make money from their services or have switched into other activities. T h e s e clinics are under the regulation o f county bureaus o f public health care. In s o m e poor areas, local d o c t o r s with m e d i c a l d e g r e e s left their villages and moved to rich regions and even cities in order to earn a

This day clinic set up on a busy street gave convenient

access

to health

care. Hangzhou,

workers

Zhejiang,

1989.

222

Ma Rang

higher income. P o o r e r regions are s u f f e r i n g f r o m a serious shortage of doctors and health care services. In urban areas, state-owned enterprises are now facing serious financial problems as they compete with private companies and joint ventures. Often they must cut back drastically on the health coverage they o f f e r their e m p l o y e e s . Fifty-eight cities have established health insurance programs, which they e n c o u r a g e all factories to join; their e m p l o y e e s must pay m o n t h l y p r e m i u m s in e x c h a n g e for coverage. In rich regions along the eastern coast w h e r e t o w n s h i p enterprises prosper, local health insurance s y s t e m s are s u c c e s s f u l l y established at town and even village levels. In other regions of China, the urban and rural health care facilities have been largely m a i n t a i n e d by subsidies f r o m central or provincial g o v e r n m e n t s w h o s e b u d g e t s are increasingly strained. M a n y individuals working f o r small cooperative enterprises have no medical coverage and must pay fees for medical care.

•

Housing

The housing system in rural China, like health care, differs f r o m that in towns and cities. With the exception of a few private houses that residents built or bought b e f o r e 1949, all houses and apartment buildings in urban areas have been managed by government institutions. These apartments are assigned to e m p l o y e e s who need to pay only a small amount f o r rent. In rural areas, the peasants built their houses themselves after obtaining official permission f r o m village, town, and county authorities for land use. When the economic reforms were first instituted after 1978, this worked to the advantage of rural dwellers. Under the household responsibility system that let them lease land and sell crops in markets, many of them acquired savings that they used to build themselves houses; these are often quite large (especially in more sparsely populated areas like Yunnan). Meanwhile, urban dwellers remained confined to the apartments assigned t h e m — often only one or two rooms for a family, with a tiny kitchen and toilet sometimes shared with another family. Since low rents cannot cover the expenses of maintenance, the buildings are often in poor repair. Sometimes young workers live in dormitories for several years, even after marriage, before they are assigned an apartment. Hence reform of the urban housing system became one of the key issues in the 1980s. During the 1990s, urban governments rapidly accelerated the building of tall housing blocks with larger, more modern apartments. Beginning in 1998, all workers moving to new apartments must purchase them, while rents will gradually rise for those in older apartments. T h e final goal of housing reform is to sell most apartments to the residents with subsidies from the institutions that employ them. Urban families have begun to buy air conditioning, carpets, kitchen appliances, and many other improvements for their apartments, and attempts are being made to improve maintenance of apartment blocks.

One oj eight rural

Public

buildings

minority-culture

housing

in llie housing

compound

of one

extended family,

Yunnan

province.

estates dominate

this northern

Beijing

skyline.

224

Ma Rong

M e a n w h i l e , m a n y v i l l a g e s l o c a t e d c l o s e to larger cities are c r e a t i n g n e w f a c t o r i e s a n d o t h e r c o o p e r a t i v e e n t e r p r i s e s u n d e r the r e f o r m s . T h e y , too, are u s i n g the i n c o m e to b u i l d b l o c k s of a p a r t m e n t b u i l d i n g s , a l o n g with schools, retirement homes, hospitals, and other amenities. Hence these rural areas are c o m i n g to look m o r e like cities, and their i n h a b i t a n t s are b e i n g a s s i g n e d h o u s i n g in a m a n n e r r e s e m b l i n g cities.

•

Blurring the Distinction Between City a n d Countryside

T h e relaxation of restrictions on travel f r o m the c o u n t r y s i d e into cities a n d t o w n s h a s r e s u l t e d in large n u m b e r s of t e m p o r a r y m i g r a n t s m o v i n g f r o m v i l l a g e s into cities; these p e o p l e are not c o u n t e d as " p e r m a n e n t u r b a n r e s i d e n t s " ( G o l d s t e i n and G o l d s t e i n , 1991:1 —4). It is e s t i m a t e d that a b o u t 3 m i l l i o n t e m p o r a r y r e s i d e n t s or m i g r a n t s live in B e i j i n g ; S h a n g h a i h a s a b o u t that n u m b e r as well. S o m e of t h e m h a v e lived and w o r k e d in cities f o r several years and h a v e n o intention of returning to villages. R e f e r r e d to by city folk as " p e a s a n t w o r k e r s , " they are hired for construction t e a m s , by city f a c t o r i e s , and as d o m e s t i c servants in r e s i d e n t s ' h o u s e s , or they set up s m a l l s h o p s and b u s i n e s s e s . A p r o p o r t i o n of t h e s e t e m p o r a r y m i g r a n t s s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d urban since they j o i n the u r b a n e c o n o m y and u r b a n life in m a n y aspects. T h e s e w o r k e r s are not entitled to h o u s i n g in the cities w h e r e they h a v e c o m e to w o r k a n d m u s t o f t e n live in m a k e s h i f t h o u s i n g they c o n s t r u c t t h e m s e l v e s or in d o r m i t o r i e s p r o v i d e d by their p l a c e of w o r k . H a v i n g g r o w n u p in the c o u n t r y s i d e , t h e y m a y f i n d it d i f f i c u l t to a d a p t to u r b a n life. T h e y o f t e n leave their f a m i l i e s at h o m e initially; if they bring or a c quire s p o u s e s and c h i l d r e n , they m a y not be entitled to full health care a n d e d u c a t i o n b e n e f i t s . S o m e of t h e m m a y e n g a g e in c r i m e or e v e n b e c o m e inv o l v e d in c r i m i n a l s y n d i c a t e s . R e s e n t m e n t s against t h e m by l o n g - t e r m city r e s i d e n t s s o m e t i m e s leads to c o n f r o n t a t i o n . W h e n they travel b a c k to villages f o r spring f e s t i v a l and then return to cities w h e r e they usually w o r k , the trains and r a i l w a y stations all a r o u n d C h i n a b e c o m e a m e s s . S t u d y i n g t h e s e t e m p o r a r y m i g r a n t s a n d t h e i r a d j u s t m e n t to cities is o n e of the h o t topics in p o p u l a t i o n studies in C h i n a today. T h e s e " p e a s a n t w o r k e r s " are part of e v e n bigger c h a n g e s in u r b a n life. W r e c k i n g balls a n d the tall c r a n e s ( o f t e n j o k i n g l y r e f e r r e d to as the " n a tional b i r d " ) rising f r o m c o n s t r u c t i o n sites h e r a l d a c o m p l e t e t r a n s f o r m a tion in the way u r b a n p e o p l e live and the way cities b l e n d with s u r r o u n d ing t o w n s and villages. U n l i k e E u r o p e or the U n i t e d States, city p l a n n e r s n e e d not c o n t e n d with l o n g l e g a l battles to a c q u i r e p r o p e r t y f o r d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s . M u c h of the land is not private and is a v a i l a b l e f o r c o n v e r sion to p u b l i c u s e s . S o e n t i r e city s t r e e t s a n d b l o c k s are f r e q u e n t l y t o r n d o w n to m a k e way f o r p u b l i c d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s .

Population Growth ami Urbanization

This temporary

migrant

laborer

sleeps

on a sidewalk

225

in Xiamen,

Tujian.

Many o f C h i n a ' s ancient cities had walls, which were still in place in 1949. Most urban dwellers then lived in small low-rise houses within those walls. To make way for new roads, public squares, government buildings, f a c t o r i e s , and high-rise housing, many s e c t i o n s o f those walls were torn down, and building extended outward from the center. S t i l l , many o f the older urban neighborhoods remained. Today, such old-style buildings and houses are being rapidly torn down and replaced with modern high-rise offices, shopping centers, hotels, and apartment buildings. T h i s has provided residents with better housing and hygiene, but it has also scattered the population and made it harder to maintain neighborhood activities. Often people are m o v e d to an apartment miles from where they work, requiring them to use buses, b i c y c l e s , or subways to c o m m u t e long distances. With new cars rapidly being added to the m i x , traffic j a m s grow in intensity; e x tensive new construction o f elevated highways, subways, and large bridges is seldom adequate to keep up with the rising demand. In Shanghai, the entire rural area to the east o f the city is being converted into the Pudong Dev e l o p m e n t Z o n e , transforming the farms that f o r m e r l y o c c u p i e d the land into industrial parks, apartment and o f f i c e blocks, m o t o r w a y s , and port fac i l i t i e s ; begun in 1 9 9 0 , this already c o v e r s an area as large as that o c c u pied by S h a n g h a i itself (Yeung and S u n g , 1996; G a m e r , 1 9 9 8 ) . T h e same p h e n o m e n o n is occurring in all o f the new special e c o n o m i c zones along the coast and inland and around all major cities (Davis et al„ 1995). Workmen are constructing ring roads that are soon clogged with traffic and surrounded

Building one of Shanghai's

many new elevated

highways.

One of the five new bridges linking Shanghai with the Pudong Development Zone.

Population

Student

parking

Growth anrl

at ,\ankai

Urbanization

University,

Tianjin.

by new h i g h - r i s e b u i l d i n g s , airports, a m u s e m e n t p a r k s , and o t h e r urban amenities. W i t h i n this m a z e o f c o n s t r u c t i o n may lie the o u t l i n e s o f o l d e r t o w n s and v i l l a g e s , caught up in a m e g a l o p o l i s ; surrounding the c o n s t r u c t i o n are villages a few m i l e s away that are carrying out s i m i l a r c o n s t r u c t i o n to support new t o w n s h i p e n t e r p r i s e s . M u c h o f the d e v e l o p m e n t is, in f a c t , dir e c t e d by local a u t h o r i t i e s rather than the national g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s c a n result in c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n f u s i o n about what is local and what is m e t r o p o l itan. T h e r e has b e e n a d e b a t e on the s t r a t e g y o f future u r b a n i z a t i o n in C h i n a for several years. T h e o f f i c i a l strategy put forth by the g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 8 0 is to " c o n t r o l the population size o f large c i t i e s , properly d e v e l o p m i d d l e - s i z e d c i t i e s , and e n c o u r a g e the d e v e l o p m e n t o f s m a l l c i t i e s and t o w n s " ( M a , 1 9 9 2 : 1 4 1 ) . S o m e e x p e r t s e m p h a s i z e the i m p o r t a n c e o f small t o w n s since they c a n a b s o r b surplus rural laborers by d e v e l o p i n g t o w n s h i p enterprises and can depend on their own revenues without m u c h p r o v i n c i a l or national governmental investment. A n o t h e r group c r i t i c i z e s this strategy in f a v o r o f d e v e l o p i n g large c i t i e s . T h e y e m p h a s i z e the e f f i c i e n c y o f large c i t i e s in m a n a g e m e n t and land use. C h a n g e s in the g o v e r n m e n t ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f what c o n s t i t u t e s an urban area e m p h a s i z e the difficulty o f c o m i n g to grips with these p r o b l e m s . T h e definition may c h a n g e to a c c o m m o d a t e p o l i c y needs. F o r e x a m p l e , in 1 9 6 3 when 2 0 million people were asked to return to rural areas after the failure

228

Ma

Rang

of the Great L e a p Forward, the criteria for setting up a " t o w n s h i p " and a "city" b e c a m e more restricted (to b e c o m e a township, a village needed at least 2,100 nonagricultural residents, rather than the prior 750), so that villages could not declare t h e m s e l v e s one of these to keep out migrants. Cities were required to have 100,000 inhabitants rather than the 2 0 , 0 0 0 needed previously, so that suddenly the portion of the populace officially living in towns and cities was radically reduced, showing " c o m p l i a n c e " with the shift back to the countryside. After 1980, however, the government wished to encourage the f o r m a tion of townships so that they could set up township enterprises and take over responsibilities like education and health care, which were formerly handled by c o m m u n e s . U n d e r the law i m p l e m e n t e d in 1984, any seat of county government could b e c o m e a town, as could any former rural c o m m u n e with a nonagricultural population over 2,000, and many border posts, mine settlements, tourist places, and villages in minority ethnic group regions. U n d e r the new standards, the total n u m b e r of towns increased f r o m 2,781 in 1983 to 6,211 in 1984. And by 1986, towns with a permanent nonagricultural population over 60,000 and whose total value of annual domestic production exceeded 200 million yuan could apply for city status—down f r o m 100,000 (Ma, 1992:120,128-129). Suddenly, many more people officially lived in towns and cities that could include them in plans for t o w n s h i p and urban enterprises, health care, education, new housing blocks, and other initiatives. In the 1980s, some provinces in China began practicing a new system called "city m a n a g i n g c o u n t y . " T h e n it b e c a m e a trend to change prefectures (an administrative level b e t w e e n province and county) into "cities." Those new "cities" actually cover many rural areas and their population cannot be classified as urban residents. A parallel trend is to change xiang (former c o m m u n e s ) into towns, and these towns also include a large n u m b e r of rural people. If these " c i t y " and " t o w n " residents are classified as " u r b a n , " China's "urban population" would exceed 50 percent of the total. Under the 1990 national census, only people in areas directly managed by town or city governments or under urban districts or street committees can be designated as u r b a n — a b o u t 26 percent of the total population, or 211 million and 85 million for cities and towns respectively, which is closer to world standards for c l a s s i f y i n g urban population (Population Census Bureau, 1993:2, 14-17). But it is clear that cities, towns, and villages in China are increasingly intertwined in their g o v e r n a n c e , e c o n o mies, and social connections. As cities grow out f r o m their former boundaries, towns build m o d e r n buildings and amenities, and factories in the countryside produce expanding quantities of goods for the world market, the populations and social support programs of villages, towns, and cities will increasingly need to coordinate their efforts. Finding a balance here,

229

Population Growth anil Urbanization

like finding a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n a rising population and food supply, will not be easy. As urban construction covers arable land and new urban j o b s b e c o m e available, millions o f agricultural workers are switching to urban pursuits; the government estimates there are 100 million migrant rural workers seeking such employment in cities ( " C h i n a , " 1997). Often they are leaving the land to work for cooperative enterprises that do not offer them health care coverage, housing, and other amenities available to settled rural or urban dwellers affiliated with state enterprises, neighborhoods, or most joint-venture businesses. This places great pressure on urbanized areas to provide them with housing, schools, health care, electricity, transportation, and other services. And migrations to towns and cities can leave villages with fewer resources to offer such services for those who remain, especially when they are far from urban markets where they can sell their produce and if they have marginal dry or hilly land. S i n c e much o f this migration involves movement from poorer inland areas toward the coast and since those most in need o f such public services are those who have left the villages without regular j o b s in state enterprises or the new joint ventures, failure to adequately address these problems can increasingly leave China polarized between rich and poor.

In 1997 Tianjin,

Chongqing,

and Shanghai the central

urbanized

situated

within

as a special

government.

Sichuan

municipality

It has 2.5 million

core, but 14 million

with

province, directly

joined

inhabitants

its surrounding

Beijing,

administered rural

in

this territory.

under

Ma Rong

230

•

ETHNIC M I N O R I T I E S

D e e p l y e n t w i n e d in these a t t e m p t s to f i n d b a l a n c e b e t w e e n u r b a n and rural is the n e e d to k e e p the less u r b a n i z e d inland p r o v i n c e s , l a r g e l y inh a b i t e d by ethnic m i n o r i t i e s , f r o m f a l l i n g b e h i n d the m o r e u r b a n i z e d and p r o s p e r o u s coastal p r o v i n c e s as m o d e r n i z a t i o n c o n t i n u e s . C h i n a is a multiethnic country. T h e r e are f i f t y - f i v e ethnic g r o u p s in C h i n a (93 p e r c e n t are Han a n d the rest are m i n o r i t i e s ) , a c c o r d i n g to criteria e s t a b l i s h e d by the P R C (Dreyer, 1976, gives an e x c e l l e n t introduction to this topic). T h e central g o v e r n m e n t of C h i n a e s t a b l i s h e d m a n y a u t o n o m o u s areas f o r the diff e r e n t e t h n i c m i n o r i t y g r o u p s : f i v e a u t o n o m o u s p r o v i n c e s ; s i x t y - t w o aut o n o m o u s p r e f e c t u r e s (an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e unit b e t w e e n p r o v i n c e and c o u n t y ) , and 659 a u t o n o m o u s cities and c o u n t i e s . T h e s e a r e a s — m o s t l y in inland a r e a s a w a y f r o m the c o a s t a l p l a i n s — c o v e r o v e r 6 0 p e r c e n t of C h i n a ' s total territory. E v e n in those a u t o n o m o u s areas, m u c h of the population is f r o m the Han m a j o r i t y g r o u p , w h o also tend to be a m o n g those in the m o s t m o d e r n i z e d sectors of the e c o n o m y . N i n e t y - o n e p e r c e n t of C h i n a ' s total p o p u l a t i o n in 1995 w a s H a n ; the n o n - H a n portion of the p o p u l a c e g r e w f r o m 6 percent in 1953 (35 million) to 9 p e r c e n t in 1995 (108 million). In 1990 there were nine e t h n i c m i n o r ity g r o u p s with p o p u l a t i o n s o v e r 4 million, as you can see f r o m Table 8.3, w h i l e t w e n t y - t w o g r o u p s c o n t a i n e d f e w e r than 10,000 p e o p l e . Table 8.3 m a k e s it a p p a r e n t that several g r o u p s had a very high g r o w t h rate b e t w e e n 1982 and 1990. T h i s s t e m s largely f r o m the fact that ethnic m i n o r i t i e s are e x e m p t f r o m the n e w f a m i l y p l a n n i n g p r o g r a m . Not only are they h a v i n g m o r e children than the rest of the p o p u l a c e , but i n v e s t i g a t i o n s h a v e f o u n d that m a n y individuals w h o had been classified as H a n , but had a blood rel a t i o n s h i p with a m i n o r i t y , r e g i s t e r e d t h e m s e l v e s as a m i n o r i t y ( M a n c h u , T u j i a , Miao, M o n g o l i a n , etc.) so as to be e x e m p t f r o m f a m i l y p l a n n i n g and to take a d v a n t a g e of other special p r i v i l e g e s e n j o y e d by ethnic m i n o r i t i e s . T h e central g o v e r n m e n t a l l o w s ethnic m i n o r i t i e s to enter c o l l e g e s and univ e r s i t i e s with l o w e r s c o r e s , g i v e s t h e m priority f o r p r o m o t i o n s in g o v e r n m e n t institutions, and a f f o r d s t h e m o t h e r a d v a n t a g e s to h e l p t h e m rise economically. T h e central g o v e r n m e n t and the National P e o p l e ' s C o n g r e s s established a basic law for the a u t o n o m y of ethnic minorities, which pledges respect for the language, religion, and traditional clothing of ethnic minorities and guarantees t h e m equal rights. A m o n g the f i f t y - f i v e ethnic minority groups, t w o ( M a n c h u and Hui) use the M a n d a r i n l a n g u a g e of the Han m a j o r i t y ; f i f t y three g r o u p s speak their o w n l a n g u a g e s . B e f o r e 1949, only e i g h t e e n had written l a n g u a g e s . In 1956, the g o v e r n m e n t h e l p e d t w e l v e g r o u p s create a new written language and helped three others revise their written language. T h e r e is also diversity of religion a m o n g ethnic minority g r o u p s in C h i n a . Of the f i f t y - f i v e minorities, f o u r are largely Tibetan B u d d h i s t s , a n o t h e r f o u r

Population Growth and Urbanization

231

Table 8.3 Ethnic Minorities with a Population over 4 Million (in millions) Annual Growth Rate

Ethnic Minorities Zhuang Manchu Hui Miao

1990

G r o w t h (%)

13.38 4.30

15.49 9.82

15.7

1.8

128.2

7.23 5.02

8.60

19.0

10.9 2.2

7.40 7.21

46.9 21.0 20.4

5.0 2.4 2.4

Uygur Yi

5.96

Tujia

2.83 3.41

4.81

3.85

4.59

Mongolian Tibetan Sources:

(%)

1982

5.45

6.57 5.70

101.2

9.1

40.7 18.6

4.4 2.2

Population C e n s u s Bureau, 1985, 1993.

H i n a y a n a B u d d h i s t s , and ten are M u s l i m ; others a d h e r e to p r i m i t i v e religions such as s h a m a n i s m . T h e g o v e r n m e n t has also instituted p r o g r a m s to p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u b s i d i e s and i n v e s t m e n t to a u t o n o m o u s r e g i o n s a n d to g i v e m o r e f a v o r a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n in e d u c a t i o n , h o u s i n g , e m p l o y m e n t , cadre s e l e c t i o n , social w e l f a r e , and c h i l d b e a r i n g to i n d i v i d u a l s b e l o n g i n g to ethnic m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . U r b a n i z a t i o n in m i n o r i t y r e g i o n s d e v e l o p e d r a p i d l y a f t e r 1949. T h e p o p u l a t i o n of H o h h o t (the capital city of Inner M o n g o l i a A u t o n o m o u s Region) and U r u m q i (the capital city of X i n j i a n g U y g u r A u t o n o m o u s R e g i o n ) m o r e t h a n d o u b l e d as they b e c a m e n e w l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d cities. In I n n e r M o n g o l i a A u t o n o m o u s R e g i o n as a w h o l e , urban p o p u l a t i o n was 15.1 percent in 1953 a n d i n c r e a s e d to 2 8 . 9 p e r c e n t in 1982 a n d 3 6 . 3 p e r c e n t in 1990. T h e u r b a n a r e a s of L h a s a (the capital city of T i b e t a n A u t o n o m o u s R e g i o n ) e x p a n d e d e l e v e n times since 1952, w h e n the A g r e e m e n t on M e a sures f o r the P e a c e f u l L i b e r a t i o n of Tibet ( K a r a n , 1976:89) was s i g n e d . T h e r a p i d g r o w t h of u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n s in e t h n i c m i n o r i t y r e g i o n s is d u e partly to i n - m i g r a t i o n f r o m Han m a j o r i t y regions, partly to natural increase of urban r e s i d e n t s , and partly to r u r a l - u r b a n m i g r a t i o n of local minorities. By m o v i n g into cities and living with H a n u r b a n r e s i d e n t s — w h o h a v e lived in c i t i e s and t o w n s in m a n y m i n o r i t y r e g i o n s f o r c e n t u r i e s — these e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s g r a d u a l l y a d a p t to urban life and integrate with the Han ( M a c k e r r a s , 1995). T h e i r l a n g u a g e , religion, culture, a n d c u s t o m s are r e s p e c t e d by o t h e r s u n d e r the law, but w h e n they a d o p t a m o d e r n u r b a n l i f e s t y l e , s o m e of their c u s t o m s g r a d u a l l y d i s a p p e a r . M a n y of t h e m n o w w e a r suits, use t e l e p h o n e s and c o m p u t e r s , listen to p o p u l a r m u s i c , and believe that m o d e r n i z a t i o n is the o n l y w a y f o r the f u t u r e of their g r o u p s .

232

Ma Kong

S o m e e l d e r l y p e o p l e h a v e d i f f i c u l t i e s adapting to urban life, and the generation gap that e x i s t s a m o n g all C h i n e s e p e o p l e e x t e n d s to C h i n a ' s ethn i c m i n o r i t i e s as w e l l . A l t h o u g h the b a s i c situation in c o a s t a l areas and c i t i e s has greatly imp r o v e d with regard to i n c o m e , h o u s i n g , and p u b l i c health c a r e f a c i l i t i e s , about 7 0 m i l l i o n p e o p l e in C h i n a still live b e l o w the poverty line (annual per c a p i t a i n c o m e o f less than 2 0 0 C h i n e s e yuan, or U . S . $ 2 5 ) . T h e s e people u s u a l l y h a v e high b i r t h r a t e s , high m o r t a l i t y rates, and a l o w l i f e e x p e c t a n c y . M a n y o f them live in these a u t o n o m o u s r e g i o n s , largely outside the m o n e t a r y e c o n o m y . P r o m o t i n g the d e v e l o p m e n t o f these " p o v e r t y reg i o n s " is a k e y issue in C h i n a today.

•

CHALLENGES

At the b e g i n n i n g o f the c h a p t e r , I r e f e r r e d to three " b a l a n c i n g a c t s " C h i n a must p e r f o r m — b e t w e e n c i t y and country, b e t w e e n p o p u l a t i o n and f o o d , and b e t w e e n r e g i o n s o f hardship and r e g i o n s o f prosperity. B y now it must b e evident that these three issues are t h e m s e l v e s interrelated. T h e main c h a l l e n g e s f a c e d by C h i n a in the twenty-first century regarding population and urbanization are as f o l l o w s : 1. C h i n a ' s p o p u l a t i o n will c o n t i n u a l l y i n c r e a s e e v e n under the o n e c h i l d p o l i c y d e s i g n e d to k e e p it d o w n , r e a c h i n g 1 . 5 - 1 . 6 b i l l i o n in the 2 0 3 0 s . T h e s e p e o p l e must have f o o d , j o b s , h o u s i n g , and social services. 2. B e c a u s e o f f a m i l y planning and the o n e - c h i l d policy, C h i n a is f a c ing the p r o b l e m o f d e a l i n g with an aging population. It is e x p e c t e d that 6 . 7 2 percent o f the total population o f C h i n a (about 87 m i l l i o n ) will be 6 5 or o l d e r by the y e a r 2 0 0 0 ( L i , 1 9 9 3 : 1 0 7 ) ; i n c r e a s i n g l y , a s i n g l e child will be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r aging parents. 3. A b o u t 2 5 0 - 3 0 0 m i l l i o n l a b o r e r s will s w i t c h f r o m a g r i c u l t u r e into the n o n a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r in the n e x t ten to f i f t e e n y e a r s , w h i c h will result in a huge v o l u m e o f rural-urban m i g r a t i o n . 4 . B e c a u s e o f the rapid g r o w t h in the urban p o p u l a t i o n due to both natural i n c r e a s e and m i g r a t i o n , the pressure on h o u s i n g and p u b l i c s e r v i c e s ( i n c l u d i n g health c a r e , s c h o o l s , transportation, the e n e r g y supply, e t c . ) will b e c o m e very serious. 5 . S i n c e m o s t h u m a n r e s o u r c e s and c a p i t a l m o v e f r o m the p o o r reg i o n s to p r o s p e r o u s r e g i o n s under the m a r k e t e c o n o m y

system,

p o v e r t y in western C h i n a and e t h n i c minority r e g i o n s will i n c r e a s e . Whether

the n a t i o n a l

goal

o f modernization

o f China can

be

r e a c h e d in the t w e n t y - f i r s t century will largely depend on how s u c c e s s f u l l y the C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t handles these c h a l l e n g e s .

Population Growth and Urbanization

•

233

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Gamer, Robert E. 1998. "The C o n t i n u i n g T r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the Welfare State: Planning and Funding Housing and Transportation in Shanghai, London, Paris, and Kansas City." Political Crossroads (Australia) 6:1. Gates, Hill. 1996. China s Motor: A Thousand Years of Petty Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gaubatz, Piper Rae. 1996. Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Goldstein, Melvyn C., and Cynthia M. Beall. 1991. " C h i n a ' s Birth Control Policy in the Tibet A u t o n o m o u s Region: Myths and Realities." Asian Survey (March). Goldstein, Sidney. 1985. Urbanization in China: New Insights from the 1982 Census. Papers of the East-West Population Institute no. 93. Honolulu: East-West Center. Goldstein, Sidney, and Alice Goldstein. 1985. Population Mobility in the People's Republic of China. Papers of the East-West Population Institute no. 95. Honolulu: East-West Center. . 1991. Permanent and Temporary Migration Differentials in China. Papers of the East-West Population Institute no. 117. Honolulu: East-West Center. Goodstadt, Leo F. 1982. "China's One-Child Family: Policy and Public Response." Population and Development Review 8, no. 1:37-58. Graubatz, Piper Rae. 1996. Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontier. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Harris, Marvin, and Eric B. Ross. 1987. Death, Sex, and Fertility: Population Regulation in Preindustrial and Developing Societies. New York: Columbia University Press. Henriot, Christian. 1993. Shanghai, 1927-1937. Berkeley: University of California Press. Huang, Rongqing. 1993. "The Mortality of China in the 1980s." Pp. 1 3 7 - 1 4 3 in Chinese Association of Population Studies (ed.), Selected Papers Presented at the Sixth National Conference on Population Science of China. Beijing: Chinese Association of Population Studies (in Chinese). Ikels, Charlotte. 1996. The Return of the God of Wealth: The Transition to a Market Economy in Urban China. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Jefferson, Gary H., and Thomas G. Rawski. 1992. "Unemployment, Underemployment, and E m p l o y m e n t Policy in C h i n a ' s Cities." Modern China 18 (January):42-71. Karan, P r a d y u m n a P. 1976. The Changing Face of Tibet. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Li, Li. 1993. "The Present Situation, Characteristics of Aging in China and Countermeasures." Pp. 105-110 in Qu Geping (ed.), Population and Environment in China. Beijing: Chinese Press of Environmental Science (in Chinese). Lin Fude. 1986. " A n Analysis of C h i n a ' s Birth Rates." Pp. 2 3 7 - 2 4 6 in Almanac of China's Population 1985. Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Publishing House (in Chinese). Lu, Lei, and Lin Fude. 1994. "The Future of Population Growth with a Low Fertility Rate." Pp. 101-106 in Chinese Association of Population Studies (ed.), Selected Papers Presented at the Sixth National Conference on Population Science of China. Beijing: Chinese Association of Population Studies (in Chinese). Lyle, Katherine C h ' i u . 1980. "Report from China: Planned Birth in Tianjin." China Quarterly 8 3 : 5 5 1 - 5 6 7 . Ma, L. J. C., and E. W. Hanten (eds.). 1981. Urban Development in Modern China. Boulder: Westview Press.

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Ma Rong. 1992. " T h e Development of Small Towns and Their Role in the Mode r n i z a t i o n of C h i n a . " Pp. 1 1 9 - 1 5 4 in Gregory E. Guldin (ed.), Urbanizing China. N e w York: Greenwood Press. Ma Yinchu. 1957, 1981. " N e w Essay on P o p u l a t i o n . " Pp. 1 7 4 - 1 9 5 in Collected Works of Ma Yinchu on Economics, Vol. 2. Beijing: Peking University Press (in C h i n e s e ) . M a c k e r r a s , C o l i n . 1995. China's Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration Since 1912. New York: St. Martin's Press. Peng, Xizhe. 1991. Demographic Transition in China. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Population C e n s u s Bureau. 1985. Tabulation on the 1980 Population Census of the PRC. Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House. . 1993. Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the PRC. Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House. Poston, Dudley L., Jr., and David Yaukey (eds.). 1992. The Population of Modern China. N e w York: Plenum Press. DevelQian, Wenbao. 1996. Rural-Urban Migration and Its Impact on Economic opment in China. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. Qu Geping, and Li Jichang. 1992. Population and Environment in China. Beijing: Chinese Press of Environmental Sciences (in Chinese). Rozman, Gilbert (ed.). 1982. The Modernization of China. New York: Free Press. Salaff, Janet W. 1973. "Mortality Decline in the P e o p l e ' s Republic of China and the United States." Population Studies 27, no. 3 : 5 5 1 - 5 7 6 . S a n d e r s o n , Warren C., and Jee-Peng Tan. 1996. Population in Asia. Brookfield, VT: A s h g a t e . Skinner, William G. (ed.). 1977. The City in Late Imperial China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. State Statistical Bureau. 1950-1995. Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing: Chinese Statistical Publishing House. . 1995. Urban Statistical Yearbook of China 1993-1994. Beijing: Chinese Statistical Press. Tien, H. Yuan. 1973. China's Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic. 1949-1969. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. . 1983. "China: Demographic Billionaire." Population Bulletin 38:2. . 1984. "Induced Fertility Transition: Impact of Population Planning and Socio-economic Change in the People's Republic of China." Population Studies 3 8 : 1 - 1 6 . Van Slyke, L y m a n P. 1988. Yangtze: Nature. History, and the River. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Wang X i a n g m i n g . 1986. "Urbanization of China's Population." Pp. 2 8 3 - 2 9 2 in Almanac of China's Population 1985. Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Publishing House (in Chinese). Wenlin, Z h a o , and Xie Shujun. 1988. History of China's Population. Beijing: People's Press. Wolf, Arthur P. 1984. "Fertility in Pre-Revolutionary Rural China." Population and Development Review 10, no. 3 : 4 4 3 - 4 8 0 . World Bank (ed.). 1982-1995. Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. Yan, Rui, and C h e n g Shengqi. 1993. " A g e - S p e c i f i c Death Rates and Life Expectancy in the Past 40 Years." In Chinese Association of Population Studies (ed.), Collected Papers Presented at International Conference on Fertility Sampling Surveys of China. Beijing: Population Press of China (in Chinese). Yeung, Y. M.. and Sung Wun-wing. 1996. Shanghai: Transformation and Modernization Under China's Open Policy. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.

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9

China's Environmental Problems Richard Louis Edmonds Chapter 8 discussed human problems; this one discusses the environment in which h u m a n s live and their interaction with it. The quality of China's e n v i r o n m e n t has deteriorated at an increasing pace since the f o u n d i n g of the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of China ( P R C ) in 1949. D o u b l i n g the population since 1949 has hastened deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, water shortages, and pollution. Pessimistic observers say that the current population of 1.2 billion already may have exceeded the number that the country can hope to support at a good standard of living. Negative predictions suggest that the population could reach a point above which minimal living standards cannot be sustained (1.5—1.6 billion people) as early as 2015 (Zhongguo Kexue Bao She, 1989:9, 17). Even the most positive observers see the c o m b i n a t i o n of population and e c o n o m i c growth placing serious strains on C h i n a ' s geography. Modification of China's environment, however, goes back a long way in time, as Rhoads Murphey explained in Chapter 3. When humans first arrived on the Loess Plateau in north-central China (see M a p 2.4), this area, generally considered to be the earliest h o m e of C h i n e s e civilization, was probably covered with a mixture of forests and grasslands. Intensive use of some of these lands led to a reduction in vegetation and serious erosion on the plateau c e n t u r i e s ago. Similar p r o b l e m s o c c u r r e d e l s e w h e r e as the proto-Chinese people proliferated, spread out f r o m the Loess Plateau and the North China Plain, and incorporated other groups over the past 2,000 years ( E d m o n d s , 1 9 9 4 : 2 8 - 3 5 ) . Even though the Han C h i n e s e did evolve some ecologically sound agricultural practices that improved the quality of the soil, they stripped the land of forests as they spread southward (Ruddle and Zhong, 1988:14-17). As they spread to the north and west (at a much slower pace), they began to farm virgin land and substantially degraded many of these cool, dry, or fragile areas. Since the m i d - e i g h t e e n t h century,

237

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Edmonds

the pace of f a r m i n g has intensified as the population grows. D u r i n g the 1950s, the Chinese f o c u s e d on reconstructing a war-torn country and devising means to p r o m o t e rapid e c o n o m i c growth. Although these e f f o r t s led to better attempts at h y g i e n e and health care, natural resources were generally viewed by the c o m m u n i s t s as a c o m m o d i t y to be exploited to create wealth for the state and, in theory, the Chinese people. After the creation of c o m m u n e s during the mid-1950s, many hillsides were cleared and wetlands filled to create new f a r m l a n d . During the years of the so-called Great Leap Forward ( 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 6 1 ) , huge n u m b e r s of trees were felled for fuel to produce low-quality steel in small, highly polluting h o m e furnaces. F r o m 1960 to 1962, C h i n a was hit with a drought that, c o m b i n e d with these policies, p r o d u c e d the so-called T h r e e Bad Years ( 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 2 ) of widespread famine. In 1966, just as the country was devising policies designed to avoid recurrence of such a catastrophe, Chairman M a o Z e d o n g proclaimed the Cultural Revolution. A decade of political unrest and lawlessness followed, during which ecological degradation became c o m m o n place. Recent efforts to deal with ecological problems began in a modest way around 1972 after the P R C sent a delegation to the First United N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on the H u m a n E n v i r o n m e n t . In 1973 the government created the National E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection Agency, and e n v i r o n m e n t a l planning became included in national plans. S o m e Chinese academics and policymakers argued that e c o n o m i c development could not continue without considering its impact upon the e n v i r o n m e n t ; others argued that China must follow the "pollute first and clean up later" phase that the developed world had experienced b e f o r e pollution control received high priority. In 1979 the government promulgated an Environmental Protection Law (for trial implementation). U n d e r this law, the agency began to write environmental impact statements on proposed heavy industry, manufacturing, and infrastructure projects. H o w e v e r , the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of these impact statements were often ignored. From 1982, discussions began on a development strategy calling f o r low w a s t e - h i g h efficiency planning. The concept of harmonious development (xietiao fazhan), similar to the idea of sustainable development f o r mulated by the Bruntland C o m m i s s i o n , was adopted as official policy. It was supposed to increase efficiency by initiating recycling and pollutionabatement m e a s u r e s . H o w e v e r , the new small entrepreneurs w h o h a v e flourished after e c o n o m i c r e f o r m have not complied with the plan, and it has been difficult to implement. Poverty and the lack of education also make it hard for China to overc o m e its e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s . Half of C h i n a ' s counties still do not have rural extension services. This fact, c o m b i n e d with high illiteracy rates, makes it hard to teach the rural populace how to preserve the environment. A f u l l - f l e d g e d E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection Law was a d o p t e d in

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1 9 8 9 , but e n v i r o n m e n t a l p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s c o n t i n u e to b e held b a c k w h i l e the g o v e r n m e n t a t t e m p t s to r e a c h c o n s e n s u s a m o n g v a r i o u s f a c t i o n s on how to p r o c e e d .

•

CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

P o l l u t i o n is g r o w i n g rapidly in C h i n a , as w e shall d i s c u s s presently. T h e m o s t threatening environmental problems, though, are the reductions in water supply, v e g e t a t i o n , soils, and o t h e r natural r e s o u r c e s . C h i n a already has o n l y 3 6 p e r c e n t o f the land area, 13 percent o f the forest c o v e r , and 2 5 p e r c e n t o f the w a t e r r e s o u r c e s per p e r s o n f o u n d in the a v e r a g e c o u n t r y ( W a n g et al., 1 9 8 9 : 1 ) . C r o p l a n d a c c o u n t s f o r o n l y 10 p e r c e n t o f C h i n a ' s total area, and b o t h the per capita level and the total quantity o f arable land are d e c r e a s i n g d e s p i t e s o m e recent attempts to r e c l a i m wastelands.

• Water Shortages C h i n a c u r r e n t l y supports 2 2 p e r c e n t o f the w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n with o n l y 8 p e r c e n t o f the w o r l d ' s water. M a n y r i v e r s , l a k e s , r e s e r v o i r s , and a q u i f e r s are s h r i n k i n g or have dried up during the last quarter-century, and C h i n a has s t o p p e d e x p a n d i n g its irrigated area s i n c e the b e g i n n i n g o f the 1 9 8 0 s . T h i s p r o b l e m is at its worst north o f the Huai R i v e r (roughly, in a line due west a l o n g the mouth o f the Y a n g t z e R i v e r ; s e e M a p 2 . 4 ) w h e r e 6 4 p e r c e n t o f C h i n a ' s cultivated land has a c c e s s to only 19 percent o f the c o u n t r y ' s water, and there is c o n s i d e r a b l e annual variation in precipitation. During the 1 9 9 0 s , the g r o u n d w a t e r table in northern C h i n a has b e e n dropping at a rate o f 2 0 i n c h e s ( 5 0 c e n t i m e t e r s ) per a n n u m , and in p l a c e s it is 2 0 0 f e e t ( 7 0 m e t e r s ) b e l o w w h e r e it w a s in the 1 9 5 0 s ( L i u , 1 9 9 3 ) . S o m e e a s t e r n and n o r t h e r n c i t i e s such as S h a n g h a i and T i a n j i n ( M a p 2 . 2 ) are s i n k i n g as the earth s e t t l e s to a d j u s t to this l o s s o f water. In s o u t h e r n C h i n a , this reportedly is happening in f o r t y - f i v e c i t i e s . T h e s u b s i d i n g can lead to f l o o d s during storms and can destroy building f o u n d a t i o n s . T h e water supply p r o b l e m is m o s t acute around big c i t i e s in northern C h i n a , where p r e c i p i t a t i o n l e v e l s are l o w e r than in the south. M a j o r efforts to save water b y r e c y c l i n g or to i n c r e a s e water through diversion p r o j e c t s b e g a n o n l y in t h e 1 9 8 0 s . P l a n s are under d i s c u s s i o n to m o v e w a t e r north via the G r a n d C a n a l or from the future T h r e e G o r g e s ( S a n x i a ) p r o j e c t disc u s s e d later. N o r t h e r n C h i n a ' s w a t e r s h o r t a g e s , h o w e v e r , will w o r s e n before these p r o j e c t s are c o m p l e t e d . C o n s e r v a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g water r e s o u r c e s is o f p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e . B e c a u s e irrigation water is often used in an ine f f i c i e n t m a n n e r , the g o v e r n m e n t has m o d e s t l y i n c r e a s e d c h a r g e s . W a t e r q u o t a s a s s i g n e d to i n d u s t r i e s h a v e r e s u l t e d in s o m e s a v i n g s .

Increased

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recycling of wastewater by industry should also help. So far, household water use has not been very wasteful. As incomes increase, however, and more people move from older housing into homes with modern plumbing, domestic water consumption will increase.

•

Forest Loss and Recovery

Official statistics indicate that in 1994 China had forest cover equal to 13.39 percent of the country's total area, which was far below the world average of 31 percent. Vegetation cover has been decreasing since 1949, with occasional rises noticeable only since the 1980s. All major basins now experience annual floods and drought, in good part due to forest loss. By the 1980s, the average area affected by such disasters had increased by two-thirds compared with the 1950s (Han, 1 9 8 9 : 8 0 4 - 8 0 5 ) . A Basic Forestry Law was ratified in 1986, but like other basic laws, this law still reads more like a wish list than concrete legislation. In recent years, planned cutting levels have been greatly exceeded. In some remote areas, lack of state control rules out enforcement of laws. Illegal logging activities have been widespread, especially as the market economy makes it easy to sell timber. The state wood-supply system has been excessively wasteful due to a lack of realistic pricing mechanisms. However, recent moves toward higher, more appropriate timber prices and other economic measures eventually may discourage such waste. Fire and disease also continue to seriously reduce vegetation cover. Efforts since the 1950s to replant forests have not been very successful. Forest management has been corrupt and inefficient; the natural forests that remain today have been saved largely by inaccessibility. In the early 1980s, a complex forestry responsibility system was established, with individuals or households contracting to plant trees or manage a portion of forest. Several large projects are being implemented. The Three Norths Shelterbelt project (sanbei fanghulin) begun in 1978 is northern China's major reforesting project, expected to account for over a third of all trees planted during the 1990s. It is creating small tree belts, shrub plantings, grasslands, fuel wood forests, timber forests, and plantations of " e c o n o m i c " trees that produce fruit or nuts on 7 5 , 0 0 0 square miles ( 1 9 4 , 0 0 0 square kilometers) of land—38,500 square miles ( 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 square kilometers) by the year 2 0 0 0 — t o halt soil erosion and to keep desertlike land from developing around Beijing. The Greening of the Plains project, administered at the county (xian) level, is doing similar planting on ten of China's major plains, river valleys, and deltas. The Greening of the Taihang Mountains project aims to plant trees on 1,500 square miles ( 3 , 9 0 0 square kilometers) of barren mountains and fields by the year 2 0 0 0 . The 11,000-mile-long ( 1 8 , 0 0 0 - k i l o m e t e r ) Coastal Protective Forest project begun in 1988 covered an area of more than 2 6 , 0 0 0 square miles ( 6 7 , 0 0 0

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square kilometers) by the end of 1992. Plans are in the works to create 13,750 square miles (36,000 square kilometers) of coastal forests by 2010. With these plans, China hopes to have 15 or 16 percent of its total area planted in trees by the year 2000, up f r o m the 13.39 percent in 1994 (National Environmental Protection Agency, 1994:69). China covers 3.69 million square miles (9.56 million square kilometers). It remains to be seen w h e t h e r these p r o j e c t s meet their goals and whether they add more trees than those being cut d o w n in the interim. China's Agenda 21 aims to have C h i n a ' s forests fully sustainable for production and ecosystem protection by the m i d - t w e n t y - f i r s t century. T h e Obligatory Tree Planting P r o g r a m , adopted in 1981, requires all Chinese citizens above eleven years old to plant three to five trees each year or do other relevant forestry work. Most Chinese cities show the benefits of urban tree planting programs, many of which have been obligatory. However, the total area of public greenery in Chinese cities c o n t i n u e s to decrease as building construction receives priority. A shelterbelt project of 77,000 square miles (200,000 square kilometers) began in 1990 along the m i d d l e and upper reaches of the Yangtze River. This soil erosion control p r o g r a m , k n o w n as the C h a n g (Yangtze) River Middle and Upper Reaches Protective Forest Construction Project, is not due to be completed until the year 2030. By the mid-1990s, enthusiastic reports suggested that the project was e n j o y i n g high tree survival rates, improving microclimates, and generating timber revenue. The Continual Production T i m b e r Forest Base Construction Project was set up in 1988 to create 77,000 square miles (200,000 square kilometers) of timber forests over a thirty-year period. Efforts up to 2000 will concentrate on creating timber forests in the Lesser and Greater Hinggan Mountains of the northeast and in the hills of the southwest, as well as in the southeast, where possible. T h e g o v e r n m e n t hopes that by 2010 these forests will be contributing enough timber to satisfy C h i n a ' s timber needs (National Environmental Protection Agency, 1994:70-73). In addition, four reforestation projects are planned to begin during the Ninth Five-Year Plan ( 1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 0 ) in the Yellow River valley, the Huai River-Tai Lake area, the Pearl River valley at the mouth of the West River, and the Liao River valley ("Programme," 1996:6). You can find most of these rivers on Map 2.4.

•

Soil Erosion and Nutrient Loss

China has one of the most serious soil erosion problems in the world. Conservative estimates suggest one-sixth of the nation's arable land is affected. Between 5,000 and 10,000 million metric tons of soil are washed d o w n rivers each year. The loss in fertility is about equal to that supplied by the 40 million tons of chemical fertilizer China produces each year (Wang et al., 1989:ii). Rapid soil erosion has contributed to China's overall

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e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e g r a d a t i o n in s e v e r a l w a y s . R i v e r b e d s , l a k e s , and reservoirs are silting up and have had their h y d r o e l e c t r i c and f l o o d control stora g e c a p a c i t y reduced. T h e loss o f g o o d - q u a l i t y topsoil has reduced arable land and threatens to c a u s e serious f o o d s h o r t a g e s in the near future. S o m e o f the m o s t s e v e r e e r o s i o n o c c u r s in northern p o r t i o n s o f the s e m i a r i d L o e s s Plateau o f n o r t h - c e n t r a l C h i n a (see M a p 2 . 4 ) . A c c o r d i n g to s o m e reports, the plateau l o s e s about a third o f an inch ( 0 . 8 3 8 c e n t i m e t e r s ) o f t o p s o i l e a c h year. T h e Y a n g t z e R i v e r v a l l e y in c e n t r a l C h i n a and H e i l o n g j i a n g and eastern Inner M o n g o l i a in the north are o t h e r badly a f f e c t e d a r e a s . E v e n a r e a s in the f a r south that o n c e had little e r o s i o n — l i k e Yunn a n , H a i n a n , and F u j i a n — h a v e had s e v e r e soil e r o s i o n in recent years. C h i n a has m a d e c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t to s t e m the flow o f topsoil. O v e r h a l f o f the 2 1 0 , 0 0 0 s q u a r e m i l e s ( 5 4 4 , 0 0 0 s q u a r e k i l o m e t e r s ) o f e r o d e d land that has b e e n i m p r o v e d s i n c e the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s has b e e n p l a n t e d with t r e e s , and a n o t h e r fifth has b e e n terraced. In addition, about 3 0 , 0 0 0 c h e c k d a m s h a v e b e e n built a c r o s s s m a l l g u l l i e s to c o n t r o l e r o s i o n . In r e c e n t y e a r s , the p l a n n i n g f o c u s has shifted f r o m individual plots to entire r i v e r b a s i n s and f r o m c e n t r a l to l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t . T h e p r o b l e m is the m a s s i v e s c a l e o f the e f f o r t required. A s the e r o s i o n is being c h e c k e d in o n e area, it m a y be i n c r e a s i n g in another. T h e i n c r e a s e d e r o s i o n has largely resulted from p o l i c i e s i m p l e m e n t e d during the 1 9 5 0 s that o p e n e d s t e e p s l o p e s , f o r m e r l y f o r e s t e d a r e a s , and wetlands to f a r m i n g . N o w m a n y o f those areas must be returned to forests and herding, w h i c h a f f e c t s the peasants using the land. T h e h o u s e h o l d res p o n s i b i l i t y s y s t e m g i v e s individual h o u s e h o l d s c o n t r o l o f land m a n a g e m e n t . E n f o r c e m e n t o f r e g u l a t i o n s to t a k e steep s l o p e s out o f c u l t i v a t i o n , r e p l a c e c r o p s with p r i v a t e l y m a n a g e d f o r e s t s , and introduce new c o n s e r vation t e c h n i q u e s requires their c o o p e r a t i o n . H o w e v e r , the areas in w h i c h the policy needs to be carried out are generally poor and hard to reach with grain shipments during the transition from agriculture to forestry or herding. T h e r e f o r e , it is hard to persuade peasants to c h a n g e or to e n f o r c e policies. E v e n w h e r e they are not yet d e g r a d e d to a point that c r o p s will not g r o w , C h i n a ' s s o i l s are o f p o o r nutrition. F o r e x a m p l e , the rich y i e l d s o f s o u t h e r n C h i n a h a v e b e e n o b t a i n e d o n l y t h r o u g h h e a v y l a b o r inputs and the widespread use o f m a n u r e and c o m p o s t e d matter. T h e natural o r g a n i c c o n t e n t o f C h i n a ' s soil a v e r a g e s less than 1.5 p e r c e n t . It has b e e n e s t i m a t e d that i f C h i n a adds n o f e r t i l i z e r to its s o i l s , n i t r o g e n w o u l d be e x h a u s t e d in t w e n t y to forty y e a r s , p h o s p h o r u s in ten to t w e n t y years and potassium in eighty to 1 3 0 years ( Z h a o , 1 9 9 0 : 1 5 5 ) . T h e s e c o n d national soil survey undertaken in the 1 9 8 0 s found overall s o i l fertility d r o p p i n g , partly b e c a u s e f a r m e r s w e r e l e a v i n g f e w e r f i e l d s f a l l o w for s h o r t e r periods as t h e y sought to m a x i m i z e output and i n c r e a s e their incomes in the marketized rural economy. Today, particularly in eastern provinces, s o m e peasants are beginning to practice " e c o l o g i c a l a g r i c u l t u r e , "

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c o m b i n i n g f a r m i n g , animal husbandry, and forestry with local f o o d proc e s s i n g and reuse o f residual materials. On H a i n a n Island ( M a p 2 . 2 ) and nearby regions o f the south, peasants g r o w t h r e e r o u n d s o f c r o p s a y e a r in a f i e l d . W h e n t h e o n l y c r o p t h e y g r o w is r i c e in f l o o d e d w e t - p a d d y f i e l d s a n d d r a i n a g e is p o o r , g l e i z a t i o n ( d e p l e tion o f o x y g e n f r o m iron c o m p o u n d s in t h e s o i l ) c a n r e d u c e the l a n d ' s a b i l ity to g r o w r i c e o r o t h e r c r o p s . A p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - s i x t h o f C h i n a ' s p a d d y l a n d s s u f f e r f r o m t h i s . In a d d i t i o n , t h e m a j o r i t y o f s o i l s in t h e p o p u l o u s southeast are acidic, rendering crops susceptible to acid pollution, more commonly

k n o w n as acid rain. T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y

is i n c r e a s e d b y

large

a m o u n t s o f industrial p o l l u t a n t s in t h e a t m o s p h e r e . In s o m e c a s e s , t h e d r o p in s o i l f e r t i l i t y h a s b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d b y d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n o r b y s e v e r e w a terlogging and secondary salinization.

® Desertification and Salinization-Alkalinization E a c h year, the C h i n e s e e s t i m a t e f r o m a e r i a l p h o t o g r a p h s t a k e n in 1 9 7 5 a n d 1 9 8 6 , 8 0 0 s q u a r e m i l e s ( 2 , 1 0 0 s q u a r e k i l o m e t e r s ) o f arid to s e m i a r i d land b e c o m e s " d e s e r t i f i e d , " degraded into a desertlike barren l a n d s c a p e ; t h i s is a f a s t e r p a c e than in p r i o r y e a r s ( Z h u a n d W a n g , Approximately

1990:431-433).

1.7 p e r c e n t o f C h i n a ' s t o t a l l a n d a r e a c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d

h u m a n - i n d u c e d desertified land. An almost continuous belt o f degraded l a n d s t r e t c h e s f o r 3 , 4 0 0 m i l e s ( 5 , 5 0 0 k i l o m e t e r s ) f r o m n o r t h w e s t to n o r t h east China (see M a p 2 . 4 ) . Desertification already affects nearly 5 5 million p e o p l e and n e a r l y 4 0 , 0 0 0 s q u a r e m i l e s ( 1 0 4 , 0 0 0 s q u a r e k i l o m e t e r s ) o f pasturage while threatening 1 5 , 0 0 0 square miles ( 3 9 , 0 0 0 square kilometers) o f cropland,

1 9 , 0 0 0 square miles ( 4 9 , 0 0 0 square kilometers) o f rangeland,

and railway lines as well as roads ( G u o , W u , and Z h u , 1 9 8 9 : 7 9 0 ;

Han,

1 9 8 9 : 8 0 5 ) . S a n d s t o r m s related to desertification caused about 4 . 5 billion y u a n ( a b o u t U . S . $ 7 5 0 m i l l i o n ) o f d i r e c t e c o n o m i c l o s s p e r a n n u m in t h e early 1990s ( " 1 9 9 2 Report,"

1993:5).

D e s e r t i f i c a t i o n o v e r the past d e c a d e has largely o c c u r r e d on a g r i c u l tural land that c a n b e r e s t o r e d . H o w e v e r , the n o r t h w e s t arid r e g i o n is a l s o s h o w i n g a m o d e s t i n c r e a s e in d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n that will b e hard to r e c t i f y . B y 1 9 9 1 t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l f e l t that d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e z o n e w h e r e p a s t o r a l i s m a n d a g r i c u l t u r e m e e t in n o r t h e r n C h i n a , w a s d a m a g i n g e n o u g h to c a l l f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t

of a National Sand Control

Aid

G r o u p . In 1 9 9 2 t h e M i n i s t r y o f F o r e s t r y b e g a n a N a t i o n a l S a n d C o n t r o l T e n - Y e a r P l a n , a n d in 1 9 9 4 C h i n a s i g n e d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n v e n t i o n on C o m b a t i n g D e s e r t i f i c a t i o n . A l t h o u g h C h i n a has i m p r o v e d an e s t i m a t e d 1 5 , 0 0 0 s q u a r e m i l e s ( 3 9 , 0 0 0 square k i l o m e t e r s ) o f salinized-alkalinied land since

1949, problems

of

s a l i n i z a t i o n a n d a l k a l i n i z a t i o n a r e g e t t i n g m o r e s e r i o u s d u e to i n e f f i c i e n t

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d r a i n a g e and e x c e s s i v e irrigation, w h i c h have i n c r e a s e d the l e v e l s o f salts in the soil. Various e s t i m a t e s indicate a fifth o f C h i n a ' s irrigated cropland has b e c o m e s a l i n i z e d . C r o p s s e n s i t i v e to salt c a n n o t g r o w on this land. It a p p e a r s that the total a r e a a f f e c t e d by s a l i n i z a t i o n is c o n t i n u i n g to grow. O v e r p u m p i n g in c o a s t a l areas has a l s o a l l o w e d s a l t w a t e r to s e e p into the g r o u n d w a t e r supply. T h e m a j o r land r e c l a m a t i o n p r o j e c t s carried out during the G r e a t L e a p F o r w a r d in the late 1 9 5 0 s d e s t r o y e d m a n y w e t l a n d s , w h i c h had h e l p e d dissipate e x c e s s water during f l o o d periods. T h i s led to i n c r e a s e d f l o o d i n g and salinization o f f l o o d e d areas. Today, m o r e wetland areas are b e i n g f i l l e d f o r industrial d e v e l o p m e n t and h o u s i n g , m a k i n g this problem worse.

•

Pollution

C h i n a ' s industries are m a j o r polluters. B y 1 9 9 2 , j u s t under h a l f o f the total length o f C h i n a ' s s e v e n m a j o r r i v e r s y s t e m s w a s c a t e g o r i z e d in the l o w e s t two grades o f water quality, the worst rivers b e i n g the L i a o , Huai, and Hai ( " 1 9 9 2 R e p o r t , " 1 9 9 3 : 5 ) . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 5 , 0 0 0 m i l e s ( 2 5 , 0 0 0 k i l o m e t e r s ) o f rivers fail to m e e t standards f o r f i s h i n g , and the fish c a t c h for f o u r m a j o r fish types in the Y a n g t z e R i v e r d e c l i n e d f r o m 2 0 b i l l i o n in the 1 9 7 0 s to 1 billion in 1 9 9 2 . Pollution o f s u r f a c e water in the c i t i e s is serious and c o n t i n u e s to worsen. S o m e rivers are getting w a r m e r f r o m all the wastewater dumping. W a t e r pollution is m o r e serious in populous eastern C h i n a than in the w e s t . In g e n e r a l , o n l y l a k e s and r e s e r v o i r s that p r o v i d e d r i n k i n g w a t e r have been p r o t e c t e d , and even s o m e o f t h e s e , such as G u a n t i n g R e s e r v o i r n e a r B e i j i n g , h a v e l e v e l s o f a m m o n i a n i t r o g e n h i g h e r than the n a t i o n a l standards. A b o u t a quarter o f l a k e s s u r v e y e d are a s s e s s e d as s e r i o u s l y or m o d e r a t e l y polluted, and a n o t h e r quarter lightly polluted. P o l l u t i o n is esp e c i a l l y s e v e r e in lakes near urban areas such as J i n a n , N a n j i n g , S h a n g h a i , and W u h a n . T h e r e h a v e b e e n s o m e a l a r m i n g r e c e n t c a s e s o f p o l l u t i o n o f the c o a s t a l s e a s and s o m e e s t u a r i e s and b a y s . P o l l u t i o n f r o m o r g a n i c c h e m i c a l s and h e a v y m e t a l s has b e e n s e r i o u s in p l a c e s , a l t h o u g h h e a v y m e t a l p o l l u t i o n has b e e n r e d u c e d in r e c e n t y e a r s . I n o r g a n i c n i t r o g e n and p h o s phorus g e n e r a l l y e x c e e d the C h i n e s e m a x i m u m limit in c o a s t a l waters. Oil c o n c e n t r a t i o n s a b o v e fishery standards h a v e b e e n found in c o a s t a l waters l i k e the P e a r l R i v e r delta area around G u a n g z h o u ,

Dalian

Bay,

and

J i a o z h o u B a y . In 1 9 9 4 the L a i z h o u B a y and Z h o u s h a n f i s h i n g g r o u n d s w e r e deteriorating, with s o m e aquatic o r g a n i s m s reportedly on the verge o f e x t i n c t i o n ( N a t i o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o t e c t i o n A g e n c y , 1 9 9 5 : 6 ) . R e d tides, w h i c h refer to s e a w a t e r d i s c o l o r e d by certain types o f m a r i n e plankton that f e e d on p o l l u t i o n and are fatal to m a n y f o r m s o f m a r i n e l i f e , a l s o h a v e b e e n on the i n c r e a s e along C h i n a ' s c o a s t l i n e .

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T h e g r o u n d w a t e r around some cities has been f o u n d to contain phenols, c y a n i d e s , c h r o m i u m , chlorides, nitrates, sulfates, and an increasing degree of hardness. Wells have had to be shut d o w n . In recent years, this pollution has improved in some cities and grown worse in others. Lowered water t a b l e s around some coastal cities have added to salinization of groundwater. Water pollution problems are by no means confined to urban areas. In suburban and rural areas with relatively high densities of farm animals, an increase in nitrates can be detected in the soil and water. Many small rivers have b e c o m e a n o x i c — n o longer able to sustain aquatic life. During the 1980s and 1990s, many highly polluting small industries have been created by t o w n s h i p enterprises in rural areas. Because enterprises in the densely populated lower Yangtze River valley and the Pearl River delta are often located in small towns and villages with rivers or canals connecting them, the water pollution f r o m one town often affects the drinking and irrigation water supplies in nearby villages and the surrounding farmland. Although China has undertaken many efforts to improve soils in a wide range of environments, soil pollution has negated much of this initiative. The Ministry of Agriculture estimates that nearly 4 0 , 0 0 0 square miles (104,000 square k i l o m e t e r s ) of good cropland is polluted, eliminating f r o m p r o d u c t i o n enough grain to feed 65 million people, the current official n u m b e r of Chinese not being adequately fed. Increased and i m p r o p e r applications of chemical fertilizers, coupled with g r o w i n g livestock production, have also led to degradation of soil quality in rural areas. C h i n a ' s average annual fertilizer usage is estimated to be 1,130 pounds per acre (208 kilograms per hectare), twice the world average (Han, 1989:806). Peasants often use nitrogen-rich human and animal wastes as fertilizer. Combining human and animal wastes with fertilizer m a d e of plant and rock materials results in balanced enhancement of crop output, but when human and animal wastes are combined with nitrogen-rich chemical fertilizer, the soil receives too much nitrogen and crop yields drop (Liang, 1989:254). W h e n chemical nitrogen fertilizer b e c a m e available, m a n y simply added it to the mix, actually reducing yields and sometimes caking the soil. Since the mid-1980s, such peasants have been encouraged not to mix chemical fertilizers with human and animal waste. Although the production of organochlorine pesticides was banned by the government in 1983 and the percentage of cereal grains with residues exceeding permissible limits went down by the second half of the 1980s, overall pesticide use is still increasing. In recent years, cases of illness and death caused by eating vegetables treated with large doses of the chemical methamidophos have been reported. The extensive use of pesticides in the past also means that pests have developed stronger resistance to chemicals. D u r i n g the period of c o m m u n i z a t i o n , the C h i n e s e had c o n s i d e r a b l e success using various combinations of plants and animals as a m e t h o d of

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integrated pest m a n a g e m e n t instead of pesticides. Such integrated pest m a n a g e m e n t can only be effectively practiced over a wide area; by 1979 they were using this m e t h o d over a larger area than any country in the world. With the d e m i s e of c o m m u n e s and the return to f a m i l y f a r m i n g , however, individual f a r m e r s have reverted to using pesticides. Research into pest control is advanced in China, although practice in the field lags behind the model research stations. W h e n chemical fertilizers b e c a m e more available around 1980, many peasants stopped using human waste as fertilizer, and "night soil" collection became a problem in cities used to disposing of waste by carrying it out to the fields. T h e use of manure and human wastes as fertilizer has increased again since the mid-1980s, but there are worries that now more industrial wastes f r o m the increasing n u m b e r of rural enterprises are mixed in. Moreover, the consumption of imported and domestic chemical fertilizers roughly doubled between 1980 and 1990. A partial solution to both the solid waste and the energy shortage problems in rural China has been biogas. Biogas, also k n o w n as marsh gas or gobar gas, is methane produced by the decomposition of organic matter. T h e gas can be g e n e r a t e d in reactors into which crop waste, animal and human excrement, and a fermenting agent are placed. T h e residual sludge f r o m this process is organic and makes an excellent fertilizer. In 1978, the Chinese said there were 7 million biogas reactors in use, mostly in southern China. T h e s e reactors, while important locally, produced less than 2 percent of C h i n a ' s total energy supply (Glaeser, 1990: 262). The transformation to family farming generally has hurt the production of biogas, since the c o m m u n e s provided a larger scale operation for reactors, and the labor force needed to maintain them. Although biogas has m a d e a small c o m e b a c k in the early 1990s, in 1992 the n u m b e r of reactors in use was still below the totals for the late 1970s, and it is not likely ever to play more than a minor role in C h i n a ' s total energy production. As the e c o n o m y e x p a n d s , so does the a m o u n t of h o u s e h o l d rubbish. Trash in Shanghai and m a n y other urban areas contains almost as m u c h heavy metals and other inorganic matter as that f o u n d in the cities of developed countries. Around mining sites in rural areas, tailings of milled ore residues create reservoirs of polluted water. A considerable proportion of the urban waste released by large industry is d u m p e d directly into rivers and streams. To counter this, the National E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection Agency began trial solid waste licensing in 1991 and has now begun to enforce a solid waste licensing system throughout China. C h i n a ' s urban r e f u s e also contains a large a m o u n t of coal ash. Although some of this is being put to use for paving roads, m o r e is generated than can be used. A shift f r o m solid f u e l s to gas would r e d u c e daily per capita rubbish output significantly. About 60 percent of C h i n a ' s urban population now has access to gas. However, domestic natural gas production has stagnated.

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Kitchen wastes m a k e up about 31 percent of C h i n a ' s total urban refuse, creating high humidity that makes it difficult to transport and to incinerate. Most urban refuse is removed to f a r m s or rural dumping sites at e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g distances f r o m cities by truck or boat; very little of it is sorted or treated. Plastic c o n t a i n e r s and other n o n d e g r a d a b l e f o r m s of r e f u s e are increasing; one positive step has been the decision of the railw a y s to start using b i o d e g r a d a b l e p a c k a g i n g f o r f o o d s sold on trains. C h i n a has a serious shortage of incinerators and of systems f o r lining d u m p sites to prevent polluted water f r o m the trash seeping into the surrounding groundwater. Research into how to bury rubbish in lined landfills began only in 1986. Recently China completed its first garbage treatment plant using fermentation technology to produce energy and reduce the bulk of trash. In Jiangsu, a new method of incineration is now reducing incinerator fuel costs and secondary air pollution (Gao, 1995). A b o u t 2.5 percent of industrial solid waste in C h i n a is classified as " d a n g e r o u s . " China only recently began to set up toxic waste storage sites. In 1991, the Standing C o m m i t t e e of the Seventh National P e o p l e ' s Congress approved a motion to adopt the Basel Convention on the Control of T r a n s b o u n d a r y D a n g e r o u s Wastes and T h e i r Disposal, and in 1992 the State Council promulgated the "Environmental Policies on the Disposal of M e d i u m - and L o w - L e v e l R a d i o a c t i v e Wastes." It could be some time, however, before these measures take hold. O n e report suggests that people living within 95 miles (150 kilometers) of a nuclear testing site in Xinjiang ( M a p 2.2) are showing s y m p t o m s of radiation pollution similar to those f o u n d a m o n g Japanese near H i r o s h i m a and Nagasaki at the end of World War II ( Z h o n g y a n g ribao, 1991:4). A nuclear power station became operational at Qinshan in Zhejiang Province during 1991, a station at Daya Bay in G u a n g d o n g is now running, and several in Liaoning are scheduled to be c o m p l e t e d during the 1990s ( M a p 2.2). T h e proximity of the Daya Bay plant to Hong Kong is a sensitive issue in the special administrative region because the PRC lacks experience in nuclear power generation and has not had a good safety record in many other industries. So far the Chinese say that monitoring at Q i n s h a n and Daya Bay has indicated no perceivable impacts on the surrounding environment. In 1997 China signed an agreement with Russia to build a nuclear power station north of Shanghai. Air pollution plagues most urban areas, although the types of pollutant and their sources vary f r o m region to region. It is estimated that industry accounts for over 80 percent of C h i n a ' s total waste gas emissions. In recent years, some state-controlled enterprises have improved their gas cleaning. H o w e v e r , since growth of the state sector has stagnated while nonstate enterprises expand rapidly, such improvements do not necessarily indicate reductions in air pollution. Particle levels in Chinese cities are far worse than in most urban areas in industrialized countries. The push for industrial development has caused C h i n a ' s coal consumption to rise steadily throughout the 1980s. As of the

These factories

in the Yangtze's Three Gorges spew out air

Household

stoves generally

bum

coke.

pollution

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late 1 9 8 0 s , over 7 6 percent o f C h i n a ' s energy was produced by burning coal. T h i s ratio is not likely to go down m u c h until at least 2 0 2 5 . In addition to the s h e e r quantity o f coal burned, C h i n a ' s severe particle pollution problem is in part due to the fact that less than 2 0 percent o f the c o a l u n d e r g o e s w a s h i n g to r e m o v e particle impurities, and m o s t c o a l is burned in small to m e d i u m - s i z e d furnaces, often with rather poor e f f i c i e n c y . Progress made in particle control has been largely offset by increased coal c o n s u m p t i o n . T h e p e r c e n t a g e o f p a r t i c l e s e m i t t e d f r o m h o u s e h o l d c h i m n e y s that is r e c o v e r e d by p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l d e v i c e s is m u c h l o w e r than in industry. M o s t h o m e s in C h i n e s e c i t i e s use c o a l , and c o a l c o m b u s t i o n is r e s p o n s i ble for 6 9 percent of China's particle emissions (Cao, 1 9 8 9 : 7 6 3 ) . Lung c a n c e r r a t e s a m o n g h o u s e w i v e s are h i g h e r than in any o t h e r o c c u p a t i o n , with the s m a l l c o a l stoves found in m o s t k i t c h e n s and the h e a v y use o f hot oils f o r c o o k i n g the most likely c a u s e s . T h e low s m o k e s t a c k s on household s t o v e s further i n t e n s i f y the street p a r t i c l e p r o b l e m , with c o m b u s t i o n e f f i c i e n c y in nonindustrial uses running as low as 2 0 to 3 0 p e r c e n t ( v e r s u s 9 0 p e r c e n t in a U . S . h i g h - e f f i c i e n c y f u r n a c e ) . P a r t i c l e l e v e l s are particularly high in the c i t i e s o f the north. In 1 9 9 4 the a v e r a g e daily p a r t i c l e l e v e l s in northern C h i n e s e c i t i e s w e r e 4 0 7 m i c r o g r a m s p e r c u b i c m e t e r ( p g / m 3 ) , with l e v e l s in s o u t h e r n c i t i e s around 2 5 0 p g / m 3 . T h e worst annual daily a v e r a g e urban p a r t i c l e l e v e l in C h i n a during

1 9 9 4 was 8 4 9 p g / m 3 ; L o n d o n n o r m a l l y h a s 4 8 p g / m 3 , and the

W o r l d H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W H O ) r e c o m m e n d s 9 0 p g / m 3 as the m a x i m u m p a r t i c l e level f o r safety. A s C h i n a c o n t i n u e s to industrialize, various e l e m e n t s have b e e n added to the p a r t i c l e p o l l u t i o n . Dust in urban air e x c e e d s permitted l e v e l s in o v e r h a l f o f C h i n e s e c i t i e s s u r v e y e d in 1 9 9 4 and has b e e n f o u n d to c o n t a i n b e n z e n e s o l u b l e matter, lead, z i n c , c o p p e r , ars e n i c , m a n g a n e s e , iron, c a d m i u m , and m o l y b d e n u m . C h i n a is the third-largest e m i t t e r o f sulfur d i o x i d e ( S 0 2 ) in the world after the f o r m e r S o v i e t republics and the United S t a t e s . S u l f u r d i o x i d e , like p a r t i c u l a t e , is c l o s e l y c o n n e c t e d with c o a l s m o k e . E s t i m a t e s s u g g e s t that C h i n a ' s sulfur d i o x i d e e m i s s i o n s d o u b l e d b e t w e e n 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 9 0 . A s with p a r t i c l e s , l e v e l s o f sulfur d i o x i d e are m o r e s e v e r e during w i n t e r in the northern C h i n e s e cities than in the south. B e i j i n g , X i ' a n , and S h e n y a n g (all on M a p 2 . 2 ) are a m o n g the w o r l d ' s ten worst c i t i e s f o r sulfur d i o x i d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s . H o w e v e r , in the s u m m e r m o n t h s , certain southern c i t i e s such as C h o n g q i n g , G u i y a n g , and C h a n g s h a ( a l s o on M a p 2 . 2 ) c a n h a v e h i g h e r S 0 2 l e v e l s than northern c i t i e s . N o r t h e r n C h i n a urban S 0 2 daily a v e r a g e l e v e l s w e r e 8 9 p g / m 3 and southern C h i n a 8 3 p g / m 3 in 1 9 9 4 , with the highest urban daily a v e r a g e level b e i n g 4 7 2 p g / m 3 . T h e W H O ' s s a f e level f o r S 0 2 is 6 0 p g / m 3 . All C h i n e s e c i t y c e n t e r s h a v e S 0 2 e m i s s i o n l e v e l s that e x c e e d the C h i n e s e legal limits. T h e r e are plans to bring S 0 2 l e v e l s in the worst northern c i t i e s b e l o w 1 3 0 - 1 5 0 p g / m 3 by the y e a r 2 0 0 0 . In line with this, f i n e s w e r e initiated for S 0 2 e m i s s i o n s on a trial b a s i s in late 1 9 9 2 .

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Coal combustion is also responsible for two-thirds of the nitrogen oxides ( N O x ) emitted in China. Nitrogen oxide pollution is not yet serious when compared with particles and sulfur dioxide. In 1994 the urban daily average nitrogen oxide level for a sample of northern cities was 55 pg/m 3 , and southern cities had 39 jig/m 3 . Those levels are roughly the same as in recent years and in the early 1980s and are close to Chinese safety standards. Use of gasoline for cars and industry is increasing rapidly, so emissions of carbon m o n o x i d e , hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides will grow during the 1990s. Traffic congestion in cities has created levels of N O x at intersections that often exceed the safety level. Preparing for an increasing n u m b e r of p h o t o c h e m i c a l smog problems and ozone alerts, the National Environmental Protection Agency and the police put together regulations for managing the supervision of auto emissions in 1990. C h i n a is one of the f e w areas in the d e v e l o p i n g world with a m a j o r acid pollution p r o b l e m . Nearly 30 percent of the c o u n t r y ' s total area is subject to acid rain. Acid pollution in China is caused largely by high levels of domestic sulfur dioxide emissions f r o m burning coal. T h e problem is most serious in the area east of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, including the Sichuan Basin and south of the Yangtze River (see M a p 2.4). It is particularly serious in the far south because the high temperatures in the atm o s p h e r e there help s u l f u r dioxide convert to acid faster than in most northern industrial countries; indeed, the areas with the most severe acid pollution—Changsha, Nanchong, Ganzhou, Huaihua, and W u z h o u — a r e all in the south (National Environmental Protection Agency, 1995). More than half of the rainfall in southern China is now overly acidic. T h e situation b e c a m e so serious in the Pearl River delta that the government decided to build no more thermal p o w e r plants there after 1995 (Ke, 1995). Chlorine and hydrogen fluoride pollution as well as sulfur dioxide have been found to be seriously affecting vegetation. By one estimate, in the second half of the 1980s, over 10,000 square miles (27,000 square kilometers) of crops are polluted by sulfur dioxide, and 5,000 square miles (13,500 square kilometers) were polluted by fluoride (Cao, 1989:772). Serious corrosion of metal and d a m a g e to concrete also has been thought to be caused by acid pollution. The Chinese have been trying to c o m b a t the impact of air pollution on vegetation cover by testing various plant varieties for resistance to specific compounds. Until recent years, noise has received low priority c o m p a r e d with other forms of pollution. Prior to 1975, China produced virtually no noise testing equipment and had no factories producing noise control equipment. B e f o r e 1982, there were no standards set for construction materials. Many buildings were built with steel-reinforced concrete panels only an inch (3 or 4 centimeters) thick. W h e n one walks on the stairs in these buildings, the noise produced sounds like drumbeats. In 1979 the Sanitation Ministry and the National Labor Bureau decided on 85 decibels on the A scale (85

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d B A ) as the w o r k p l a c e s t a n d a r d , with 9 0 d B A the a b s o l u t e p e r m i s s i b l e h i g h . At c o n s t a n t e x p o s u r e , the level c o n s i d e r e d d a m a g i n g to the ear is 7 5 d B A ; serious h e a r i n g i m p a i r m e n t can o c c u r a f t e r e i g h t h o u r s of e x p o s u r e at 100 d B A ( J o n e s , F o r b e s , a n d H o l l i e r , 1 9 9 0 : 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 , 3 0 0 ) . M a c h i n e s o u n d l e v e l s in C h i n e s e f a c t o r i e s h a v e o f t e n e x c e e d e d 9 0 d B A ( F a n g , 1989:177), and noise in most C h i n e s e cities e x c e e d s the s u g g e s t e d C h i n e s e s t a n d a r d s , w i t h the 1994 a r e a w e i g h t e d a v e r a g e f o r t h i r t y - n i n e cities at 5 7 . 4 d B A and road traffic noise b e t w e e n 68.7 and 75.7 d B A . T h e pollution p r o b l e m is c o m p o u n d e d by the f a v o r i t i s m that m a n y ind u s t r i e s receive f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h allows t h e m to operate inefficient e q u i p m e n t without s c r u b b e r s or s e w a g e treatment. In C h i n a ' s paperm a k i n g industry, for e x a m p l e , a v e r a g e o u t p u t of w a s t e w a t e r is six times the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a v e r a g e . O f f i c i a l statistics s u g g e s t that s o m e p r o g r e s s w a s m a d e in the treatment of industrial w a s t e s during the 1980s and early 1990s a n d that levels of air, water, and n o i s e p o l l u t i o n in m a n y m a j o r C h i n e s e cities dropped b e t w e e n 1989 and 1994. Most official statistics, however, are not likely to include pollution f r o m rural s m a l l - s c a l e industries. O f f i c i a l statistics suggest that industrial w a s t e levels g e n e r a l l y stabilized d u r i n g the s e c o n d half of the 1980s, and real p r o g r e s s has been m a d e in c o n t r o l l i n g w a s t e f r o m large and m e d i u m - s i z e d u r b a n e n t e r p r i s e s . A s it a p p e a r s that rural industrial w a s t e s are not included in these o f f i c i a l n u m b e r s and m a n y w a s t e - p r o d u c i n g i n d u s t r i e s h a v e b e e n r e l o c a t e d f r o m the urban areas to the c o u n t r y s i d e o v e r the past d e c a d e , these e s t i m a t e s could be overly o p t i m i s t i c . T h e r e has been s o m e m o d e r a t e success in the control of rural p o l l u t i o n , particularly w a t e r p o l l u t i o n , in recent years. M a n y rural a r e a s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a l o n g the p r o s p e r o u s east c o a s t , h a v e e m p l o y e d c o m plex and intensive w a s t e - r e c y c l i n g s y s t e m s to p r o d u c e h i g h - v a l u e products such as silk and f r e s h w a t e r fish. In s o m e cases, pollution in rural areas has been r e d u c e d by c o n s o l i d a t i n g small plants so their w a s t e s can be treated and m i n e r a l s r e c y c l e d . H o w e v e r , the n u m b e r of s e r i o u s cases of untreated rural w a s t e s b e i n g d i s c h a r g e d is still g r o w i n g . E s t i m a t e s f r o m 1994 sugg e s t that rural t o w n s h i p i n d u s t r i e s a c c o u n t f o r 16 p e r c e n t of C h i n a ' s ind u s t r i a l w a s t e w a t e r and solid w a s t e s a n d half of i n d u s t r i a l d u s t — a l l of w h i c h represent substantial p r o p o r t i o n a l increases c o m p a r e d with a similar survey in 1989 (National E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection A g e n c y , 1995:2). M o n i t o r i n g has increased but is still i n a d e q u a t e . Since 1982, 2 9 6 acid p r e c i p i t a t i o n m o n i t o r i n g stations h a v e been e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h o u t C h i n a , w h i c h is c o m m e n d a b l e but still not u p to par. B y the e n d of 1988 t h e r e w e r e only 2 2 0 m u n i c i p a l - s e w a g e - m o n i t o r i n g stations, and the local industrial w a s t e m o n i t o r i n g n e t w o r k w a s not c o m p l e t e d until 1 9 9 0 ( V e r m e e r , 1 9 9 0 : 4 0 - 4 1 ) . H o w e v e r , o v e r a l l m o n i t o r i n g has b e e n e x p a n d i n g rapidly, with 2,172 m o n i t o r i n g stations e s t a b l i s h e d at various levels by 1992. As we h a v e seen, pollution p r o b l e m s continue to g r o w in C h i n a despite s i g n i f i c a n t e f f o r t s in recent y e a r s to a d d r e s s t h e m . T h e c o s t s of p o l l u t i o n

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have been tremendous in e c o n o m i c terms. T h e m e s s a g e that pollution control can be profitable as well as healthy got h o m e to the Chinese leadership during the 1 9 8 0 s . T h e task f o r the future is to experiment with methods to regulate e m i s s i o n s e f f e c t i v e l y and to get the g o v e r n m e n t to raise its inv e s t m e n t in pollution c o n t r o l to a higher proportion o f gross d o m e s t i c product ( G D P ) than in the late 1 9 8 0 s . B e t w e e n 1 9 8 0 and 1 9 9 2 the amount o f G D P spent on pollution control already increased from 0 . 4 0 percent to 0 . 6 7 percent (World B a n k , 1 9 9 4 ) .

•

NATURE CONSERVATION

C h i n a is known as a treasure house for many rare species o f wildlife. T h e first nature reserve and laws directly dealing with nature conservation appeared in 1 9 5 6 ; by 1 9 6 5 , several more reserves had been established. In the early 1 9 8 0 s , the government set up a wildlife protection bureau, an off i c e to control import and export o f e n d a n g e r e d s p e c i e s , and the C h i n a Wildlife

Conservation

Association.

By

1987

the State C o u n c i l

was

alarmed enough about the hunting and smuggling o f wildlife to issue a directive to local g o v e r n m e n t s admonishing them to increase their surveill a n c e and punishments. In 1 9 8 8 the g o v e r n m e n t devised C h i n a ' s first wildlife protection law, which stipulated details o f administration and punishments. In 1 9 9 2 the State Council promulgated Regulations on the Protection o f Terrestrial W i l d F a u n a o f the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , and the government published the first v o l u m e o f C h i n a ' s Redbook Rare and Endangered

Flora.

on

Flora:

L o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s have followed suit with

similar laws and regulations, but many species continue to dwindle. At the end o f 1 9 9 3 , there were 7 6 3 nature reserves in C h i n a covering about 6 . 8 percent o f C h i n a ' s national territory, with plans to increase the number to 1 , 0 0 0 and their area to nearly 9 percent by the year 2 0 0 0 , and then to 1 , 5 0 0 and over 13 percent by 2 0 5 0 . B y the end o f 1 9 9 4 , there were also 6 4 0 forest parks, 2 3 4 o f w h i c h were n a t i o n a l - l e v e l forest parks. In addition, nearly three-fourths o f the territory in Hong K o n g S A R

remains

forested, with twenty-two national parks. T h e administration o f nature r e s e r v e s in C h i n a is not uniform, h o w ever. Ninety o f mainland C h i n a ' s nature reserves are considered national nature preserves, and 3 3 2 are c l a s s i f i e d as provincial. D i f f e r e n t r e s e r v e s are often administered by different organizations and at different government levels. On the whole, the forestry bureaus tend to dominate because nature conservation work began in the Ministry o f Forestry. A p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 7 9 v e r t e b r a t e s p e c i e s are protected in the P R C at first-class or s e c o n d - c l a s s levels o f protection (Zhu, 1 9 8 9 : 8 2 9 - 8 3 1 ) . China has 3 8 9 protected species o f plants, protected in three categories. A n i m a l s and plants receiving f i r s t - c l a s s protection are those that are e n d e m i c , rare,

China s Environmental precious,

or threatened. T h o s e

accorded

Problems second-class

253 protection

are

s p e c i e s whose numbers are declining or whose geographical distribution is b e c o m i n g more restricted. T h e third-class s p e c i e s are plants o f e c o n o m i c importance, and thus harvesting is to be limited. In general, the method for preserving wildlife has been to establish nature reserves in the areas where they live and breed or to establish artificial breeding centers. Certain endangered species are recovering. H o w e v e r , s o m e animal populations c o n t i n u e to r e m a i n low or dec r e a s e . F o r e x a m p l e , birds tend to be s c a r c e in C h i n a . E x p l a n a t i o n s f o r their disappearance include the destruction o f their habitats for agriculture, industry, and housing; government eradication policies for certain species; e x c e s s i v e hunting; and pollution f r o m p e s t i c i d e s and industry. L i k e w i s e , increased nutrient loading and industrial pollution in lakes along with the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f dams and weirs have led to reductions in fish and c r u s tacean yields and species. Often, in order to increase food production, crab and c a r p e g g s have been s t o c k e d in l a k e s , leading to a reduction o f indigenous species. International w i l d l i f e o r g a n i z a t i o n s have b e e n interested in w o r k i n g with China because o f its varied environments as well as their concern that many aspects o f nature conservation in C h i n a could be better managed. In 1 9 7 9 C h i n a b e c a m e a m e m b e r o f the United Nations E d u c a t i o n a l , S c i e n tific, and Cultural Organization's ( U N E S C O ) Man and the B i o s p h e r e Prog r a m , and ten C h i n e s e nature r e s e r v e s are now part o f the M a n and the B i o s p h e r e Program Network. In 1981 C h i n a signed the C o n v e n t i o n on International Trade in E n d a n g e r e d S p e c i e s ( C I T E S ) o f Wild F a u n a and Flora. O f the plant and animal species protected under this treaty, over 6 4 0 are found in China. China also has ten sites on the U N E S C O World Heritage C o m m i s s i o n ' s list, and six nature reserves were included on the International Important Wetlands List. In 1 9 9 2 the C h i n a C o u n c i l for International C o o p e r a t i o n on E n v i r o n m e n t and D e v e l o p m e n t was established, and in 1 9 9 5 a nongovernmental organization, the International A s s o c i a t i o n o f Artificial Plant L i f e C o m m u n i t y and B i o d i v e r s i t y in T r o p i c a l R e g i o n s , set up its headquarters in K u n m i n g , capital o f Yunnan province ( M a p 2 . 2 ) . M a n y o f the larger reserves h a v e research organizations attached, s o m e times with international cooperation. In 1981 an agreement was signed with the World W i l d l i f e Fund to protect and study the giant panda, with an initial p r o j e c t c o m p l e t e d in 1 9 8 8 . Although a r c h a e o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e indicates that pandas o n c e were distributed widely over southern C h i n a , their range n o w has shrunk to small areas in southern S h a a n x i , G a n s u , and S i c h u a n . During 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 7 6 , 1 3 8 giant pandas were found dead along the S i c h u a n - G a n s u border ( M a p 2 . 2 ) . T h e c a u s e o f their death was the deterioration o f the arrow b a m b o o and square b a m b o o groves that provide their f o o d ( E n d e r t o n ,

1985:13).

T h i s panda f a m i n e stimulated a series o f attempts to preserve the a n i m a l ' s

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lidiiioiids

habitat. However, in 1983 about 965 square miles (2,500 square kilometers) of arrow b a m b o o groves (47 percent of the total arrow b a m b o o groves along the same mountainous border) again started to die out, and several dozen pandas died f r o m starvation. The total giant panda population of China is now estimated to be about 1,000. As of 1992 there were thirteen nature reserves that protect the giant panda. Of these, the Wolong Nature Reserve in Sichuan is by f a r the largest, o c c u p y i n g one-third of the total area of the panda reserves and containing perhaps one-seventh of the total n u m b e r of giant pandas found in China (Estacio, 1989:56-57). At Wolong there are two major studies of the giant panda currently being undertaken—one related to their breeding in captivity and the other to their behavior in the wild. Keeping track of this solitary animal is a difficult task, even though the panda's food range is limited in the Wolong area. Pandas are difficult to capture, and identification of individual animals is not easy. T h e work is made more difficult by the 4,000 f a r m e r s and lumberjacks who live within the nature reserve and s o m e t i m e s deliberately harm pandas. In 1987 two groups of people were caught and punished, some with life imprisonment, for killing pandas and trying to sell the skins. Panda killings are still being r e p o r t e d — t h e number lost in some districts has exceeded those saved despite the fact that Sichuan provincial authorities say they saved 128 giant pandas b e t w e e n 1980 and 1995. T h e range of the animal has continued to decrease f r o m about 7,500 square miles (20,000 square kilometers) in 1970 to half that in 1990. The Chinese government has announced plans to establish another fourteen panda reserves to help preserve the panda's habitat. Cooperation between China and other countries in conserving animals other than the giant panda also increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s. For e x a m p l e , in 1983 the Japanese joined efforts to protect birds; construction on a Sino-Japanese Friendship Center for Environmental Protection began in 1992. China, Nepal, and Pakistan have discussed establishing "international p a r k s , " and in 1994 China signed an a g r e e m e n t to establish joint nature reserves with Russia and Mongolia. However, as ecotourism grows, the desire to bring in tourist revenue could compromise the conservation aspects of such parks. Cases of national parks being turned into tourist spots are now all too common (Dangerfield, 1995:10-11). The e f f e c t s of tourism on C h i n a ' s nature preserves have rarely been positive. For example, some protected areas were opened to foreign hunters in the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s for a fee. Even though China is a signatory to C I T E S , which gives all wildcat species protected status, quotas of skins are regularly set by the C h i n e s e Ministry of Trade. Wealthy Hong Kong and Taiwan citizens pay large amounts for tiger bones, elephant tusks, and parts of other endangered species, risking these species all over Asia. Most environmentalists would argue that China's efforts at nature conservation are too little, too late. The total area for nature reserves is still

Chiiiti's I'nviromiieiilal

Giant

panda,

Wolong,

Problems

255

1989.

n o t w h a t it s h o u l d b e . O t h e r t y p e s o f n a t u r e r e s e r v e s b e s i d e t h o s e a l r e a d y in e x i s t e n c e a r e n e c e s s a r y . A l s o , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r e r e s e r v e s is o u t of b a l a n c e . T w o a r e a s a r e c r i t i c a l l y s h o r t o f n a t u r e r e s e r v e s : t h e d e n s e l y p o p u l a t e d e a s t e r n p o r t i o n s of t h e c o u n t r y a n d t h e Q i n g h a i - T i b e t a n P l a t e a u , where leopards, bears, wolves, wild asses, deer, m o u n t a i n sheep, m o n k e y s , and other w i l d l i f e — p r o t e c t e d by the B u d d h i s t respect f o r l i f e — r o a m e d f r e e l y b e f o r e p e o p l e i m m i g r a t e d t h e r e f r o m o t h e r p a r t s of C h i n a . T h e C h i n e s e a d m i t t h a t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e i r n a t u r e r e s e r v e s is u n e v e n . T h e v a r i o u s u n i t s that a d m i n i s t e r t h e n a t u r e r e s e r v e s h a v e a t e n d e n c y to l o o k f o r s h o r t - t e r m e c o n o m i c a d v a n t a g e o r p r o t e c t o n l y t h o s e a s p e c t s of t h e e n v i r o n m e n t b e n e f i c i a l to t h e i r b u r e a u ' s i n t e r e s t s . T h e W o l o n g N a t u r e R e s e r v e in S i c h u a n e s t a b l i s h e d its o w n s p e c i a l d i s t r i c t g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h h a s p r o v e d h e l p f u l in f a c i l i t a t i n g m a n a g e m e n t o f t h e r e s e r v e . H o w e v e r , e v e n in t h e s h o w c a s e W o l o n g r e s e r v e , o n e a u t h o r f o u n d w i d e s p r e a d e v i d e n c e of illegal tree felling ( R i c h a r d s o n ,

1 9 9 0 : 1 0 7 ) . In 1 9 8 9 ,

Robert

G a m e r f o u n d u n a t t e n d e d p a n d a s l o c k e d in t h e i r c a g e s at t h e W o l o n g b r e e d ing station, e c h o i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s by G e o r g e S c h a l l e r ( 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e s e disc o v e r i e s r a i s e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e m a n a g e m e n t of o t h e r r e s e r v e s . In a d d i t i o n , t h e s c a l e of s o m e of C h i n a ' s n a t u r e r e s e r v e s is t o o s m a l l to b e e f f e c t i v e .

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O f t e n , state forests or forest parks are located next to nature reserves; joint m a n a g e m e n t of these could bring increased conservation benefits. Sometimes reserves are zoned for various revenue-generating or productive purposes, c o m p r o m i s i n g their conservation role. The lack of laws relating specifically to nature reserves prior to 1988 created c o n f u s i o n . N o w that laws standardizing procedures for establishing nature reserves, m a n a g e m e n t procedures, and penalties for violations have appeared, there is a need for clear enforcement of local versions pertinent to specific circumstances. Serious instances of killing and smuggling endangered species still occur. A case in point was the mid-1990s discovery in the northeast of a large shipment of frozen bear paws for export. For laws and their e n f o r c e m e n t to be successful, the nature reserve managers must consider solving the economic and social problems of the local inhabitants. Attempts have been m a d e in some of the nature reserves to compensate local dwellers. At Wolong, farmers have resisted relocation to nontraditional village housing. T h e government has been trying to solve e m p l o y m e n t p r o b l e m s for some local people by training them as forest rangers or nature reserve staff. E n f o r c e m e n t problems are c o m p o u n d e d by the low level of environmental education a m o n g the inhabitants of areas surrounding the reserves. Low levels of education also m a k e it very difficult to find well-qualified staff to m a n a g e the reserves. U n d e r such circumstances, some nature reserves are reserves in n a m e only. In many cases, logging and hunting are still going on in areas where such activities are prohibited by law. Although nature reserves are now a part of C h i n a ' s national annual plans, their overall finance is not included in the annual national or local budgets. Nature reserve officials are expected to maximize income f r o m the reserve lands while preserving their function and character. However, because there has been very little economic assessment of Chinese nature reserves, activities aimed at exploiting renewable resources within reserves, such as forestry, often b e c o m e excessive. Most C h i n e s e e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s point to the long-term economic value that improved m a n a g e m e n t of nature conservation brings. This is the only argument that will attract the attention of a government intent upon rapid economic d e v e l o p m e n t . C h i n a ' s policymakers must come to understand that nature c o n s e r v a t i o n is a necessity for the c o u n t r y ' s long-term survival.

•

THE THREE GORGES D A M

The most environmentally controversial project in China today is the construction of the T h r e e G o r g e s (Sanxia) Dam on the Yangtze River in western Hubei province. T h e S a n x i a area, which extends for 125 miles

Chiiui's Hnviroiiinenlal

Problems

257

( 2 0 0 kilometers) along the river, is rich in historical sites and e v o k e s many ancient Chinese legends (see Hengduan S h a n on M a p 2 . 4 ) . It contains six historic walled cities, ancient plank roads cut in c l i f f s , S t o n e A g e archaeological village sites, many old temples and burial sites, and miles o f s p e c tacular c a v e s . It is also h o m e to a multitude o f plants and a n i m a l s . T h e s u b l i m e beauty and strategic s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the three g o r g e s have been celebrated for centuries in the works o f C h i n a ' s poets and travelers. Today a boat trip through the gorges still offers one o f the most breathtaking j o u r neys in China. To build a dam in an area o f such cultural and natural treasures is bound to cause irredeemable damage. T h e proposal for building a dam at S a n x i a dates to the 1 9 2 0 s , and arguments for and against the p r o j e c t have persisted a m o n g various ministries and provinces since the 1 9 2 0 s ( E d m o n d s , 1 9 9 2 ; Luk and Whitney, 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e c l i m a t e o f repression demonstrations

in

in the aftermath o f the T i a n a n m e n

1 9 8 9 helped to stifle public opposition. T h e

1991

Yangtze and Huai River floods brought the issue to the fore; since a principal o b j e c t i v e o f the dam was flood control, the stance o f proponents was strengthened. Defiant gestures in the National P e o p l e ' s C o n g r e s s during formal approval in the spring o f 1 9 9 2 over the dam issue included a

Wu Gorge,

the center of the Three

Gorges.

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Louis

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record-breaking n u m b e r of delegates voting against the project or abstaining and an unprecedented walkout by two delegates. Formal official construction began in December 1994, and the Yangtze River was f o r m a l l y severed in N o v e m b e r 1997. T h e contracts are being awarded on a bidding system, and foreign companies have been invited to bid. In 1994 the State Council also approved establishment of a Sanxia Open E c o n o m i c Zone with all the policies and priorities given to special economic zones. The city of Chongqing, standing at the western end of the p r o p o s e d reservoir, has been separated f r o m Sichuan province and given the same national municipal status as Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. The cities of Yichang (Hubei), Wan Xian, and Fuling (Sichuan) have been designated as "open cities," and a large n u m b e r of projects have begun. China hopes to use this opportunity to bring coastal prosperity inland. Arguments as to whether the dam should be constructed at all concentrated on several key questions: flood control, water supply, navigation, energy supply, safety, human dislocation, and ecological damage. A d a m at S a n x i a would control about half of the Yangtze River valley's annual volume of flow. The 12 million people and 2,000 square miles (5,200 square kilometers) of good fields in the Jianghan Plain just below the dam site will receive the greatest flood protection. The dam supposedly will give the Jianghan Plain 100-year flood protection instead of the fortyyear flood protection calculated to be the optimum obtainable from further investment in existing dikes. In addition, water will be diverted to waterdeficient northern China. With construction of the Sanxia Dam, 10,000 dead-weight-metric ton (dwt) vessels will be able to get as far as Chongqing for more than half the year, reducing present river freight costs f r o m W u h a n (Map 2.2) to C h o n g q i n g by a p p r o x i m a t e l y 36 percent. Without the dam, no vessels larger than 2,000 dwt can m a k e the voyage (Wang, 1990:95). The Sanxia Dam is expected to have an 18,200-megawatt generating capacity, making it the w o r l d ' s largest hydroelectric generating plant (and the world's largest in terms of tons of concrete). When completed, it would supply an estimated one-eighth as m u c h electricity as was generated in China during 1991. Proponents stress that building a large dam at Sanxia would be more cost-effective than building a series of small dams on tributaries upstream or constructing coal-fired plants, and that the site is best for distributing electricity up and d o w n the Yangtze River valley as well as north to Beijing and south to G u a n g z h o u . Proponents estimate it will cost about U.S.$8.7 billion, although some specialists project the costs as being up to 50 percent higher. O n c e generating electricity, the dam supposedly should pay for itself with f e e s f r o m its electricity, which will be supplem e n t e d by r e v e n u e s g e n e r a t e d by the G e z h o u b a h y d r o p o w e r station j u s t downstream. Proponents say the dam would be safe f r o m military attack, deny it lies in an earthquake zone, and assert it would not burst in case of an earthquake.

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Problems

259

They also argue that construction will not involve large-scale h u m a n dislocation. Resettlement costs will be low because more than half those displaced c o m e f r o m small towns, and their i n c o m e s are s k y r o c k e t i n g through the sale of goods and services to construction workers. Proponents also feel that ecological d a m a g e will be minimal. Because only 4 percent of the land to be flooded consists of plains, the loss of good agricultural land will not be serious. Moreover, paddy land for rice is irrigated during the summer, when nutrient-rich silt loads would be least affected by impounding water at the dam. Air and water pollution that would have been g e n e r a t e d by coal-fired p o w e r plants w o u l d be avoided, and there is also little e v i d e n c e to suggest that the reservoir w o u l d create breeding grounds for disease-carrying parasites. T h e reservoir would have great fish-raising potential and a positive e f f e c t on local m i c r o c l i m a t e s . S o m e historical artifacts currently sited below the new water level can be moved to higher locations before the reservoir fills. O p p o s i t i o n to the Sanxia D a m f r o m within C h i n a has persisted, though with little airing in the press (for one rare airing by scientists, see Chen and Chen, 1993). Overseas opposition has been considerable. Opponents argue that flood control would only be relevant to the area directly below the d a m . M a j o r rainstorms upstream could f l o o d areas there, and clear-water releases f r o m the dam could lead to undercutting of dikes d o w n s t r e a m . S o m e suggest that dikes already being raised in height on lower portions of the river c o m b i n e d with several d a m s on tributaries would be a f a r m o r e e f f e c t i v e and less e x p e n s i v e m e a n s of controlling flood control, with less aesthetic and e n v i r o n m e n t a l harm. For the first time in the history of any hydraulic project, manila grass is being grown on Sanxia project dike banks to stop e r o s i o n — a cheap and simple solution that opponents say should be used more widely b e f o r e more drastic solutions as this dam are attempted. They also point out the mutually exclusive f u n c t i o n s of a flood prevention d a m and a power-generating dam: a dam used for h y d r o p o w e r generation should have its reservoir largely full of water, w h e r e a s one used largely f o r flood control should be kept almost empty. Others argue that building a series of small d a m s along the Yangtze, using smaller ships, and extending hours of navigation would increase efficiency without as big a risk. O p p o n e n t s also suggest that the buildup of silt upstream (accelerated by the loss of vegetation there in recent years) could lead to increased flooding above the dam or actually burst it. Considerable a m o u n t s of electricity could be lost in t r a n s m i s s i o n over long distances, and there are questions about the e f f i c i e n c y of such large generators. Critics cite past big dam construction experiences that do not inspire confidence. G e z h o u b a D a m just d o w n s t r e a m took eighteen years to finish at a cost close to four times the original estimate. Its locks have been experiencing serious failures that appear to be due to basic design f l a w s and lack of maintenance. In early August 1995, a p a s s e n g e r vessel

260

Richard Lou is lidmoiuls

A dam project in I:njian province flootled many villages. Here the village below is flooding as the water rises above. and is being replaced by a new village

n e a r l y s m a s h e d t h r o u g h a l o c k g a t e . I f this h a p p e n e d at t h e f u t u r e S a n x i a D a m , w i t h w a t e r d e p t h s o f o v e r f i v e t i m e s m o r e on e i t h e r s i d e o f its l o c k s , s u c h an i n c i d e n t c o u l d r e s u l t in a g r e a t d i s a s t e r . S o m e 1 . 1 3 m i l l i o n to 1.6 m i l l i o n p e o p l e l i v i n g in t h e a r e a that w i l l b e f l o o d e d w i l l h a v e to b e r e l o c a t e d b y the y e a r 2 0 0 9 . c o s t i n g up to a t h i r d o f t h e total e s t i m a t e d b u d g e t ; c o m p e n s a t i o n c o s t s w i l l r i s e a l o n g w i t h rural i n c o m e s a n d i n f l a t i o n ( t h o u g h a third o f t h e p e o p l e w h o h a v e b e e n r e l o c a t e d f o r d a m c o n s t r u c t i o n in C h i n a s i n c e 1 9 5 0 a r e s t i l l e x t r e m e l y

poor

a n d s h o r t o f f o o d , a n d a n o t h e r third a r e n o b e t t e r o f f t h a n t h e y w e r e b e fore). O v e r 1 5 0 t o w n s and a portion o f C h o n g q i n g will be f l o o d e d .

Fur-

t h e r m o r e , t h e l a n d b e i n g s u b m e r g e d is m o r e p r o d u c t i v e t h a n t h e l a n d b e i n g p r o p o s e d to c o m p e n s a t e p e a s a n t s b e i n g m o v e d ; t h e y u n d o u b t e d l y w i l l b e f a r m i n g on steeper s l o p e s with m o r e potential for soil e r o s i o n . C o n s t r u c t i o n o f the S a n x i a D a m m e a n s there will be little f u n d i n g left to c a r r y out any o t h e r w a t e r - m a n a g e m e n t p r o j e c t s . O p p o n e n t s point o u t that t h e o f f i c i a l c o s t a n a l y s i s d o e s not i n c l u d e c h a n g e in t h e f u t u r e v a l u e o f C h i n a ' s c u r r e n c y o r c e r t a i n s o c i a l and e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o s t s . S o m e a l s o s u g gest that during the long c o n s t r u c t i o n could have serious e c o n o m i c

period, disruption o f

navigation

consequences.

S o m e p o s t u l a t e that the r e s e r v o i r might c a u s e the w a t e r t a b l e to r i s e and trigger l a n d s l i d e s ( L i n , 1 9 8 9 ) . O p p o n e n t s a l s o point out that there a r e

Chinn's Environmental

261

Problems

three g e o l o g i c a l fault belts near the r e s e r v o i r area. E a r t h q u a k e s g r e a t e r t h a n 4 . 7 5 on the R i c h t e r s c a l e h a v e b e e n r e c o r d e d , a n d i n c r e a s e d p r e s s u r e u p o n t h e b o t t o m o f t h e n e w r e s e r v o i r c o u l d c a u s e s t r o n g e r e a r t h q u a k e s in the future. U p to 8 0 0 h i s t o r i c a l s i t e s w i l l b e i n u n d a t e d b y t h e n e w

reservoir.

T h e r e are worries about the e f f e c t o f the d a m on c l i m a t e , the c r e a t i o n o f disease-fostering habitats, pollution from submerged mines, impacts on downstream

e c o s y s t e m s , and the future o f s o m e f o r m s o f w i l d l i f e .

A

s l o w e d flow rate m a y r e d u c e the a b i l i t y o f t h e r i v e r to flush out p o l l u t a n t s . It c o u l d a l s o r e s u l t in land b e i n g lost a l o n g t h e c o a s t b e c a u s e t h e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n s i l t b e i n g d e p o s i t e d f r o m the r i v e r a n d w a v e e r o s i o n w i l l

be

altered. T h e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n in t h e P R C is s u c h that d o m e s t i c p u b l i c o p i n i o n c a n n o t b l o c k a p r o j e c t s o l o n g as the l e a d e r s h i p is in f a v o r o f it. T h i s p r o j e c t s e e m s to b e y e t a n o t h e r a t t e m p t b y C h i n a to c a t c h up to d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s a n d s o l v e p r o b l e m s with g r a n d p r o j e c t s , as o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e G r e a t L e a p F o r w a r d , w h i c h w a s d i s a s t r o u s in t e r m s o f h u m a n s u f f e r i n g a n d e c o l o g i c a l d a m a g e . S t a t e m e n t s b y p r o p o n e n t s o f the d a m a c k n o w l e d g i n g that there are p r o b l e m s with the p r o j e c t do not inspire c o n f i d e n c e . L e s s s p e c t a c u lar m e a s u r e s such as p r e v e n t i n g soil e r o s i o n b y replanting f o r e s t s , c o n s t r u c t ing r e s e r v o i r s o n tributaries, d r e d g i n g the r i v e r and a d j o i n i n g l a k e b e d s , imp r o v i n g the c e n t r a l - and l o w e r - c o u r s e d i k e s , e x p a n d i n g f l o o d w a t e r - r e t e n t i o n districts, improving

flood-warning

s y s t e m s , and e d u c a t i n g the l o c a l p o p u -

l a c e are s u p p o s e d to b e i n c l u d e d in the p r o j e c t . A l t h o u g h t h e y m i g h t b e m o r e e f f e c t i v e s t a n d i n g a l o n e as e l e m e n t s o f a s u s t a i n a b l e r i v e r m a n a g e m e n t p r o g r a m , t h e i r faithful i m p l e m e n t a t i o n c a n h e l p r e d u c e the e c o l o g i c a l , e c o n o m i c , and social costs o f a super dam while improving

flood

control,

r a p i d l y g e n e r a t i n g h y d r o e l e c t r i c p o w e r , and f a c i l i t a t i n g n a v i g a t i o n .

•

PROSPECTS FOR CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT

T h e C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t ' s stand on i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o o p e r a t i o n c a n b e s u m m e d up b y the C h i n e s e d e l e g a t e ' s s p e e c h e s at t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on E n v i r o n m e n t and D e v e l o p m e n t , h e l d in R i o de J a n e i r o d u r i n g J u n e 1 9 9 2 . In h i s v i e w , p o v e r t y is t h e m a i n c a u s e o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e g r a d a t i o n in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , a n d thus it is n o t r e a s o n a b l e to e x p e c t t h e s e c o u n t r i e s to m a i n t a i n l o w e r e m i s s i o n l e v e l s o r i n s t a l l e x p e n s i v e e q u i p m e n t to c o n t r o l e m i s s i o n s o n t h e i r o w n . I n s t e a d , the d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s s h o u l d t r a n s f e r f u n d s and t e c h n o l o g y to h e l p p o o r e r c o u n t r i e s r e d u c e e m i s s i o n l e v e l s . It is t h o u g h t t h a t b y 2 0 5 0 g l o b a l w a r m i n g

may

s u b m e r g e all o f C h i n a ' s c o a s t a l a r e a s , w h i c h are c u r r e n t l y l e s s than 13 f e e t (4 meters) above sea level, forcing relocation o f about 67 million people. R a t h e r than t a l k o f s h a r e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r g l o b a l w a r m i n g , t h e C h i n e s e

262

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Louis

Edmonds

g o v e r n m e n t argues that it is up to the d e v e l o p e d nations to acknowledge that they emit the majority of greenhouse gases (though, as I indicated, the f o r m e r Soviet republics and China have the world's first- and third-largest sulfur dioxide emissions). This viewpoint echoes the position China took at the 1991 e n v i r o n m e n t a l conference of d e v e l o p i n g countries hosted in Beijing and in all environmental conferences since then. It is part of a foreign policy initiative to assume leadership of developing countries' environmental bloc. At the same time, China has joined in global environmental change p r o g r a m s and set up its own organizations (National Research Council, 1992:23-36). T h e State Council rapidly approved its own Agenda 21 (emulating the objectives issued at the Rio C o n f e r e n c e ) on March 25, 1994, making it one of the first developing countries to do so. China wants developed countries to contribute large amounts of money and technology to improve its e n v i r o n m e n t . Such improvement will require both internal political stability and international support. Even then, it is unlikely that China will be able to reverse its ecological degradation within the next couple of decades. As previously m e n t i o n e d , the most threatening of C h i n a ' s environmental problems is the continuing destruction of resources, particularly in poor western and central areas. The fragile ecosystems of the western and border areas are under great strain. Since the 1950s, considerable numbers of Chinese have been relocated westward in order to d e v e l o p poor areas and reduce population pressure in the east. The expansion of settled agriculture and industry in traditional herding pastures and oases of the west has led to serious degradation. These areas must no longer be seen as destinations for surplus population. Instead, population densities in parts of the west must be reduced and emphasis put on animal husbandry and forestry where possible. Although resource degradation also is serious in the east, the immediate problem facing the better-off population of eastern China is pollution. As small-scale t o w n s h i p and village enterprises rapidly proliferate with virtually no g o v e r n m e n t regulation, pollution is becoming widespread in rural areas. Most rural enterprises use outdated equipment, cannot afford to spend money on pollution abatement, and are inefficient energy users. In particular, rural industries have caused serious water quality degradation. The central government can only guess at the seriousness of the total picture. Not until 1989 did any province c o m p l e t e a basic survey of the levels of pollution f r o m rural small-scale industries. Dealing with the rural industry pollution p r o b l e m will require a t r e m e n d o u s investment by the Chinese government, as well as strict enforcement of regulations. T h e best that can be hoped for China as a whole is that the pace of water depletion, deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification will slow in c o m i n g years. If e f f o r t s at reforesting and population control during the 1980s and 1990s prove successful, we can expect to see benefits sometime

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263

a f t e r 2 0 1 0 . E f f i c i e n t m a n a g e m e n t also w o u l d h e l p r e d u c e e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s . P o l l u t i o n a b a t e m e n t e q u i p m e n t is o f t e n not installed properly or r e g u l a r l y m a i n t a i n e d , and p o l l u t i o n - r e l a t e d a c c i d e n t s are c o m m o n , with o v e r 3 , 0 0 0 s e r i o u s incidents r e p o r t e d b e t w e e n 1989 and 1992 ( " 1 9 9 2 R e p o r t , " 1993:5). T h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o t e c t i o n L a w calls f o r e n v i r o n m e n t a l a s s e s s m e n t s as part of c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s . H o w e v e r , s u c h a s s e s s m e n t s are o f t e n not carried out f o r s m a l l - s c a l e p r o j e c t s , and until the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s their r e s u l t s o f t e n w e r e ignored in l a r g e - s c a l e p r o j e c t s . In addition to m o r e f u n d s a n d p e r s o n n e l , there is n e e d f o r m o r e p u b l i c o p e n n e s s to a s s e s s m e n t information. M a n y a n a l y s t s feel that raising prices of p o l l u t i n g f u e l s and industrial i n p u t s will i n c r e a s e e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y a n d i m p r o v e C h i n a ' s e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s ( R o s s , 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 2 ) . S u c h p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s h a v e h e l p e d to c o n t r o l s o m e f o r m s of d e g r a d a t i o n , such as p o l l u t i o n by the s t a t e - r u n ind u s t r i e s , a n d h a v e a i d e d in the p r o m o t i o n of e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y f r i e n d l y p r o d u c t s . A l t h o u g h an array of price r e f o r m s has b e e n i n t r o d u c e d d u r i n g the p a s t d e c a d e , p r e s s u r e f r o m g o v e r n m e n t n o n e t h e l e s s r e m a i n s the m a i n f o r c e r e g u l a t i n g i n v e s t m e n t in e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n t r o l s i n c e m a n y i n p u t s , such as w a t e r , timber, and coal, are still artificially u n d e r p r i c e d . U l t i m a t e l y , t h o u g h , C h i n a ' s e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s c a n n o t be solved solely t h r o u g h price r e f o r m or r e g u l a t o r y policies. If the c o u n t r y is to f e e d a n d c l o t h e all its p e o p l e and p r o v i d e a g o o d s t a n d a r d of living in the next century, C h i n a n e e d s strict p o p u l a t i o n control, e x t e n s i v e e n v i r o n m e n t a l edu c a t i o n , i n c r e a s e d w e a l t h and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , political stability, and a m o r e o p e n s o c i e t y w h e r e i n f o r m a t i o n c a n be o b t a i n e d a n d o p i n i o n s f r e e l y e x p r e s s e d . T h e d e g r e e to w h i c h t h e s e g o a l s are m e t in the c o m i n g d e c a d e will h a v e f a r - r e a c h i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s not only f o r C h i n a ' s e n v i r o n m e n t but f o r the w h o l e earth.

•

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"1992 Report on the Environment in China." 1993. China Environment News (Beijing). (June):5. Cao Hongfa. 1989. "Air Pollution and Its Effects on Plants in China." Journal of Applied Ecology 26:763-773. Chen Guojie, and Chen Zhijian. 1993. Sanxia gongcheng dui shengtai yu huanjing yingxiang de zonghe pingjia yanjiu [Research into comprehensive assessment of the ecological and the environmental influence of the Sanxia Project]. Beijing: Kexue Chubanshe [Science Publishers]. Dangerfield, Lara. 1995. "Growing Treasures." China Now 153:11-12. Edmonds, Richard Louis. 1992. "The Sanxia (Three Gorges) Project: The Environmental Argument Surrounding China's Super Dam." Global Ecology and Biogeography Letters 4, no. 2:105-125. . 1994. Patterns of China's Lost Harmony: A Survey of the Country's Environmental Degradation and Protection. London: Routledge.

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E n d e r t o n , C a t h e r i n e Shurr. 1985. " N a t u r e Preserves and Protected Wildlife in the P e o p l e ' s Republic of C h i n a . " China Geographer 12:117-140. E s t ä c i o , A n t o n i o J u l i o E m e r e n c i a n o . 1989. " N a Terra do P a n d a G i g a n t e (2): o P a n d a em L i b e r d a d e " [The land of the giant panda (2): the panda in f r e e d o m ] . Macau 1 5 : 5 6 - 5 7 . F a n g D a n q u n . 1989. " W o g u o z a o s h e n g kongzhi j i n z h a n " [Noise pollution control and prospects in our country]. Pp. 1 7 1 - 1 8 0 in Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue Xuehui [China E n v i r o n m e n t a l Science Institute] (ed.), Zhongguo huanjing kexue nianjian [China E n v i r o n m e n t a l Science Yearbook], Beijing: Z h o n g g u o H u a n j i n g C h u b a n s h e [China Environmental Publishers]. G a o Jie. 1995. " A N e w Incinerator Achieves Success in Jiangsu Province." China Environment News (Beijing). (June 15):3. Glaeser, Bernhard. 1990. " T h e Environmental Impact of E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t : Problems and Policies." Pp. 2 4 9 - 2 6 5 in Terry Cannon and Alan Jenkins (eds.), The Geography of Contemporary China: The Impact of Deng Xiaoping's Decade. L o n d o n and N e w York: Routledge. G u o H u a n c h e n g , Wu D e n g r u , and Z h u H o n g x i n g . 1989. " L a n d R e s t o r a t i o n in C h i n a . " Journal of Applied Ecology 2 6 : 7 8 7 - 7 9 2 . Han, C h u n r u . 1989. " R e c e n t C h a n g e s in the Rural Environment in C h i n a . " Journal of Applied Ecology 2 6 : 8 0 3 - 8 1 2 . Jones, Alan R o b e r t s o n , Jean Forbes, and Graham Hollier. 1990. Collins Reference Dictionary: Environmental Science. London and Glasgow: Collins. Ke We-hong. 1995. " N o More Thermal Plants for Delta." China Environment News (Beijing). (June): 1. L i a n g , X i a o y a n . 1989. " A n a l y s i s of the Stability of the NPK E f f e c t s on Rice in G u a n g d o n g P r o v i n c e . " Pp. 2 4 9 - 2 5 4 in E. Maltby and T. Wollersen (eds.), Soils and Their Management: A Sino-European Perspective. London: Elsevier Applied Science. Lin, C h e n g k u n . 1989. Chang Jiang Sanxia yu Gezhouba de nisha ji huanjing [Sediment and e n v i r o n m e n t in (sic) T h r e e G o r g e s and G e z h o u b a of the Yangtze River]. N a n j i n g : N a n j i n g University Press. Liu C h a n g m i n g . 1993. " U n d e r g r o u n d Water Table Under Heavy Pressure." China Environment News 44:6. L u k , S h i u - h u n g , and J o s e p h B. R. W h i t n e y (eds.). 1993. Megaproject: A Case Study of China's Three Gorges Project. A r m o n k , NY: M. E. Sharpe. National E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection Agency. 1995. Report on the State of the Environment in China 1994. Beijing: National Environmental Protection Agency. National E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection Agency; National Long R a n g e Planning Instinian tute. 1994. Zhongguo huanjing baohu xingdong jihua 1991-2000 [China's E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection Activity Plan 1991-2000]. Beijing: Z h o n g guo H u a n j i n g K e x u e C h u b a n s h e [China Environmental Science Publishers]. N a t i o n a l R e s e a r c h C o u n c i l . 1992. China and Global Change: Opportunities for Collaboration. W a s h i n g t o n , DC: National A c a d e m y Press. " P r o g r a m m e M a k e s C o u n t r y G r e e n e r . " 1996. Beijing Review ( B e i j i n g ) . ( M a r c h 25-31):6. Q u , G e p i n g , and W o y e n Lee (eds.). 1984. Managing the Environment in China. Dublin: Tycolly International. R i c h a r d s o n , Stanley Dennis. 1990. Forests and Forestry in China: Changing Patterns of Resource Development. W a s h i n g t o n , DC, and C o v e l o , C A : Island Press. Ross, Lester. 1988. Environmental Policy in China. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

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R u d d l e , K e n n e t h , and Z h o n g G o n g f u . 1988. Integrated Agriculture-Aquaculture in South China: The Dike-Pond System of the Zhejiang Delta. C a m b r i d g e : C a m bridge University Press. Schaller, George. 1993. The Last Panda. C h i c a g o : University of C h i c a g o Press. Smil, Vaclav. 1993. China's Environmental Crisis. A r m o n k , NY: M. E. Sharpe. Vermeer, E d u a r d B. 1990. " M a n a g e m e n t of E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o l l u t i o n in C h i n a : P r o b l e m s and Abatement Policies." China Information 5, no. 1 : 3 4 - 6 5 . W a n g , X i a n p u , Jin Jianming, Wang Liqiang, and Yang J i s h e n g . 1989. Ziran baohuqu de lilun yu shijian [Theory and p r a c t i c e of n a t u r e r e s e r v e s ] . B e i j i n g : Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue Chubanshe [China Environmental Science Publishers]. W a n g , Z u o g a o . 1990. " N a v i g a t i o n on Yangtze R i v e r a n d the T h r e e G o r g e s P r o j ect." Bulletin of the Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses/Bulletin de TAssociation Internationale Permanente des Congres de Navigation 70:86-96. World Bank. 1994. China Urban Environmental Service Management. Report no. 1 3 0 7 3 - C H A . Washington, D C : World Bank. Yuan, G u o l i n . 1995. " S a n x i a g o n g c h e n g de x i n g j i a n dui C h a n g j i a n g liuyu j i n g j i f a z h a n de ladong z u o y o n g " [The push e f f e c t of c o n s t r u c t i o n of the S a n x i a Project on regional e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t f o r the C h a n g R i v e r v a l l e y ] . Zhongguo Sanxia jianshe [China Three G o r g e s C o n s t r u c t i o n ] 5 : 5 - 7 . Zhao, Qiguo. 1990. " W o g u o de tudi ziyuan" [Land resources of C h i n a ] , Dili xuebao [Acta Geographica Sinica] 45, no. 2 : 1 5 4 - 1 6 2 . Z h o n g g u o K e x u e Bao She (ed.). 1989. " S h e n g c u n yu f a z h a n " [Survival and development], Beijing: unofficial report of the C h i n e s e A c a d e m y of Sciences. Zhongyang ribao [Central Daily N e w s , international edition, T ' a i - p e i ] . 1991. vol. 6, no. 4 (November). Z h u , Jing. 1989. " N a t u r e C o n s e r v a t i o n in C h i n a . " Journal of Applied Ecology 26:829-831. Z h u , Zhenda, and Wang Tao. 1990. " C o n g ruogan dianxing diqu de y a n j i u dui j i n shiyunian lai Z h o n g g u o tudi s h a m o h u a y a n b i a n qushi de f e n x i " [An analysis on the trend of land d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n in northern C h i n a d u r i n g the last d e c a d e based on examples from s o m e typical areas]. Dili xuebao [Acta G e o g r a p h i c a Sinica] 45, no. 4 : 4 3 0 - 4 4 0 .

•10"

Family, Kinship, Marriage, and Sexuality Zang Xiaowei T h e f a m i l y is a f u n d a m e n t a l social unit in every society. In no aspect of culture are the diversities of human societies more striking than in the institutions of the family and marriage. Families meet basic human needs of mating, reproduction, the care and upbringing of children, care for the aged, and the like, but families in d i f f e r e n t societies meet these needs in d i f f e r i n g ways (see, for e x a m p l e , G o l d t h o r p e , 1987:163; G o o d e , 1963). Likewise, families across societies vary in their responses to new trends in e m p l o y m e n t , education, recreation, travel and relocation, c o n t r a c e p t i o n , housing, child care, and labor saving devices. For example, a majority of Americans begin sexual activity before marriage—a radical change from the past. In a 1988 study, half of fifteen- to nineteen-year-old females reported having sexual intercourse (Brook-Gunn and Furstenberg, 1989:249-259; Day, 1992:746-749; Small and Kerns, 1993: 941-952). The number of unmarried couples living together has tripled in less than two decades (Giddens, 1992). The divorce rate in the United States is believed to be the highest in the world, with about half of recent marriages expected to end in divorce (Moore, 1989, 1992). New alternatives to traditional marriage, such as single parenthood, are becoming commonplace. In China, too, premarital sex, divorce, and staying single are also on the increase—but at a much slower rate. Hollywood, rock music, and individual paychecks sing their siren songs there, too, but have been slower to disrupt f a m i l y life. Loyalty to o n e ' s family takes p r e c e d e n c e over all other obligations, perhaps more than in any other culture. 1 E v e n C h i n a ' s constitution contains detailed provisions about the family, discussing the care of the elderly and the upbringing of young children. In d o i n g so, it echoes the e m p h a s i s of C o n f u c i u s on the primary role of the family. That emphasis is weakening in C h i n a ' s culture, but its roots are so deep that the changes are likely to remain gradual.

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S o c i o l o g i s t s usually divide f a m i l i e s into four b a s i c structural c a t e g o r i e s : t h e first c a t e g o r y is s i n g l e m e n and w o m e n l i v i n g a l o n e , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e w h o h a v e not m a r r i e d and t h o s e w h o are w i d o w e d o r d i v o r c e d . T h e s e c o n d c a t e g o r y , the n u c l e a r f a m i l y , c o n s i s t s o f a c o u p l e and t h e i r u n m a r r i e d c h i l d r e n . It a l s o i n c l u d e s c h i l d l e s s c o u p l e s o r o n e o f t h e p a r e n t s ( t h e other either dead or d i v o r c e d ) living with one o f their married or u n m a r r i e d c h i l d r e n . T h e t h i r d c a t e g o r y is a s t e m s t r u c t u r e o f an e x t e n d e d f a m ily, c o n t a i n i n g an a g e d p a r e n t o r p a r e n t s , o n e m a r r i e d c h i l d a n d h i s o r h e r s p o u s e , and perhaps g r a n d c h i l d r e n as well. Finally, the e x t e n d e d f a m i l y differs b y h a v i n g t w o or m o r e married s i b l i n g s living t o g e t h e r with their children and a grandparent or two. In t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n a , t h e ideal f a m i l y w a s an e x t e n d e d f a m i l y c o n s i s t ing o f f i v e g e n e r a t i o n s l i v i n g t o g e t h e r u n d e r o n e r o o f , s h a r i n g o n e c o m m o n p u r s e and o n e c o m m o n s t o v e , u n d e r o n e f a m i l y h e a d . C o n f u c i a n i s m e x p r e s s e d a p r e o c c u p a t i o n with f a m i l i a l r e l a t i o n s and e t h i c s . F a m i l i e s o r g a n i z e d on the b a s i s o f " p r o p e r " r e l a t i o n s h i p s w e r e c o n s i d e r e d b y C o n f u c i a n s c h o l a r s to b e f u n d a m e n t a l to t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f s o c i a l h a r m o n y a n d p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y in C h i n a . T h e y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n w a s e t h i c a l l y b o u n d to s u p p o r t , l o v e , a n d b e o b e d i e n t to t h e i r s e n i o r s . 2 T h e C h i n e s e i m p e r i a l state, w h i c h r e l i e d on C o n f u c i a n i s m as its i d e o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n , s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t e d the t r a d i t i o n a l f a m i l y i n s t i t u t i o n . A local magistrate, for e x a m p l e , might erect a large m e m o r i a l arch testifying to a w i d o w ' s virtue f o r h e r r e f u s a l to r e m a r r y o r g i v e an e x t e n d e d f a m ily a p l a c a r d o f h o n o r to p r o m o t e the ideal o f f i v e g e n e r a t i o n s l i v i n g h a r m o n i o u s l y u n d e r o n e r o o f . D i v i d i n g the e x t e n d e d f a m i l y , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n a g i n g p a r e n t s w e r e still a l i v e , w a s s t r o n g l y d i s c o u r a g e d b e c a u s e it w e n t against Confucian ethics (Mann,

1987).

Parents arranged marriages for their offspring, sometimes before they w e r e o l d e n o u g h to l i v e t o g e t h e r a n d c o n s u m m a t e t h e m a r r i a g e . W h e n a b o y m a r r i e d he b r o u g h t h i s b r i d e to l i v e with h i s p a r e n t s . W h e n the f a t h e r d i e d , he d i v i d e d h i s e s t a t e e q u a l l y a m o n g h i s s o n s . T h u s m a r r i a g e did n o t l e a d to t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n e w h o u s e h o l d . U s u a l l y , n e w f a m i l i e s w e r e c r e a t e d t h r o u g h p a r t i t i o n o f t h e f a m i l y e s t a t e a f t e r the d e a t h o f t h e f a t h e r . E a c h son m i g h t use his share as the e c o n o m i c f o u n d a t i o n f o r a new, s m a l l e r f a m i l y he n o w h e a d e d , m o v i n g out o f t h e p a r e n t ' s h o u s e to e s t a b l i s h a n u c l e a r f a m i l y . O n e s o n m i g h t s t a y w i t h o r t a k e in t h e w i d o w e d m o t h e r t o c r e a t e a s t e m f a m i l y . B e c a u s e o f t h i s c y c l i c a l p r o c e s s , at a n y given time most families were small. S o m e included parents (or one surv i v i n g p a r e n t ) l i v i n g with o n e o r m o r e m a r r i e d s o n s and p e r h a p s t h e i r c h i l d r e n . O t h e r s w e r e l i m i t e d to p a r e n t s a n d t h e i r u n m a r r i e d c h i l d r e n a n d w e r e t h u s s i m i l a r to m a n y p r e s e n t - d a y W e s t e r n f a m i l i e s in s i z e a n d c o m p o s i t i o n . 3 E x t e n d e d f a m i l i e s w i t h f i v e g e n e r a t i o n s l i v i n g t o g e t h e r w e r e rare.

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F a m i l y size was restricted not only b e c a u s e o f divisions but also bec a u s e o f high infant mortality rates in imperial C h i n a and low life e x pectancy. However, rich families were m o r e successful than the less wellto-do in raising their children to maturity. R i c h families also tended to have higher birthrates than the less well-to-do b e c a u s e o f better nutrition and the p r a c t i c e o f p o l y g a m y (i.e., a man having two or m o r e wives at the same time); the presence o f additional women greatly increased the likelihood o f more children. Although polygamy was generally acceptable in precommunist China, rich families were far better able to afford it. Consequently, rich families were larger than average in size; many o f them were extended families including several generations and could be extremely large. F o r e x a m ple, in 1 9 4 8 two U . S . scholars c l a i m e d after their fieldwork in a C h i n e s e village that " t h e K w o c k and Cheung families are very nearly o f equal size, having an estimated 5 0 0 to 7 5 0 m e m b e r s e a c h , while the smallest unit is Choy, with about 2 0 0 to 3 0 0 m e m b e r s " ( B a k e r 1 9 7 9 : l ) . 4 In the late nineteenth century, b e c a u s e o f Western penetration into C h i n a , new b o u r g e o i s and working c l a s s e s e m e r g e d in C h i n e s e c o a s t a l cities along with a new intellectual elite. S i n c e they obtained their i n c o m e s through e m p l o y m e n t outside the family, these individuals were freed from control by family elders. T h e y were e x p o s e d and receptive to the new cultural and intellectual f o r c e s entering C h i n a from J a p a n and the W e s t . H e n c e they agitated for legal and cultural reforms to promote the ideals o f marriage based upon free and romantic a t t a c h m e n t s and equality o f men and w o m e n with respect to m a r r i a g e , property, and i n h e r i t a n c e . 3 T h e ref o r m s led to an increasing trend in urban C h i n a toward s m a l l e r n u c l e a r family units and growing freedom o f c h o i c e for men and women in c h o o s ing marriage partners. S i n c e the 1 9 3 0 s , most urban C h i n e s e have resided as n u c l e a r f a m i l i e s ( Z a n g , 1 9 9 3 ; Tsui, 1 9 8 9 ; W h y t e and Parish,

1984:

chap. 6). T a b l e s 10.1 and 10.2 show that by 1 9 0 0 , over h a l f o f urban Chinese f a m i l i e s included in those surveys took the nuclear form. Chapters 4 and 8 discussed the increasing urbanization and rapid industrialization that f o l l o w e d e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a ( P R C ) in 1 9 4 9 . T h o s e trends contributed further to the separation o f nuclear f a m i l i e s from control by their elders, especially in cities. T h e r e nuc l e a r f a m i l i e s tend to m a k e d e c i s i o n s about and e n g a g e in r e p r o d u c t i o n , residence, food preparation, consumption and expenditure, and child rearing with little i n v o l v e m e n t by their elders (Parish and W h y t e ,

1978;

W h y t e , 1 9 9 2 : 3 1 7 - 3 2 2 ; W h y t e and Parish, 1 9 8 4 : c h a p . 6 ) . T h e stem f a m i l y structure has not disappeared in urban C h i n a , h o w ever. Young couples may c h o o s e to live with their retired parents f o r free child care; housing shortages may f o r c e young couples to live, at least for a f e w years, with their parents who have housing units. T h e s e c o n s i d e r a tions may stabilize or even increase the n u m b e r o f stem h o u s e h o l d s temporarily ( R i l e y , 1 9 9 4 : 7 9 8 - 8 0 1 ; Tsui, 1 9 8 9 ) .