Understanding civil-military interaction: lessons learned from the Norwegian model 9781409449669, 9781409449676, 9781409474036, 1409449661, 9781315549262, 1315549263

Table of contents :
Cover......Page 1
Contents......Page 6
List of Figures......Page 8
Acknowledgements......Page 12
List of Abbreviations......Page 14
Part I Introduction, Theory, Core Concepts and Actors ......Page 16
1 Introduction ......Page 18
2 Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction: Security, Legitimacy, Authority and Obligation ......Page 44
3 Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship......Page 68
Part II Norwegian Experiences in Civil-Military Interaction ......Page 92
4 Norwegian Humanitarian Policy, the Norwegian Model and Irresponsible Idealism......Page 94
5 CIMIC: The “Function-that-shall-not-be-named” ......Page 112
Part III Challenges, Lessons-Learned and Recommendations ......Page 124
6 “Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums......Page 132
7 The Politics of Humanitarian Space......Page 156
8 Why Civil-Military Interaction? Some Recommendations ......Page 168
9 A Norwegian Future in Civil-Military Interaction?......Page 180
10 Conclusion......Page 192
Appendix: Methods and Parameters......Page 200
Bibliography......Page 204
Index......Page 216

Citation preview

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Military Strategy and Operational Art Edited by Professor Howard M. Hensel, Air War College, USA The Ashgate Series on Military Strategy and Operational Art analyzes and assesses the synergistic interrelationship between joint and combined military operations, national military strategy, grand strategy, and national political objectives in peacetime, as well as during periods of armed conflict. In doing so, the series highlights how various patterns of civil–military relations, as well as styles of political and military leadership influence the outcome of armed conflicts. In addition, the series highlights both the advantages and challenges associated with the joint and combined use of military forces involved in humanitarian relief, nation building, and peacekeeping operations, as well as across the spectrum of conflict extending from limited conflicts fought for limited political objectives to total war fought for unlimited objectives. Finally, the series highlights the complexity and challenges associated with insurgency and counter-insurgency operations, as well as conventional operations and operations involving the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. Also in this series: Clausewitz’s Timeless Trinity A Framework For Modern War ISBN 978 1 4094 4287 5 British Generals in Blair’s Wars Edited by Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan ISBN 978 1 4094 3735 2 Britain and the War on Terror Policy, Strategy and Operations Warren Chin ISBN 978 0 7546 7780 2 Confrontation, Strategy and War Termination Britain’s Conflict with Indonesia Christopher Tuck ISBN 978 1 4094 4630 9 Joining the Fray Outside Military Intervention in Civil Wars Zachary C. Shirkey ISBN 978 1 4094 2892 3

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction Lessons Learned from the Norwegian Model

Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv University of Tromsø, Norway

© Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv 2014 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company 110 Cherry Street Wey Court East Union Road Suite 3-1 Farnham Burlington, VT 05401-3818 Surrey, GU9 7PT USA England www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows: Hoogensen Gjørv, Gunhild, 1966Understanding civil-military interaction : lessons learned from the Norwegian model / by Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv. pages cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4094-4966-9 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-1-4094-4967-6 (ebook) -- ISBN 9781-4094-7403-6 (epub) 1. Civil-military relations. 2. Civil-military relations--Norway. I. Title. JF195.H66 2014 322'.5--dc23 2013033197 ISBN 9781409449669 (hbk) ISBN 9781409449676 (ebk – PDF) ISBN 9781409474036 (ebk – ePUB)

III

Printed in the United Kingdom by Henry Ling Limited, at the Dorset Press, Dorchester, DT1 1HD

Contents List of Figures   Acknowledgements   List of Abbreviations   

vii xi xiii

Part I  Introduction, Theory, Core Concepts and Actors 1

Introduction   

3

2

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction: Security, Legitimacy, Authority and Obligation   

29

3

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship  

53

Part II Norwegian Experiences in Civil-Military Interaction 4

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy, the Norwegian Model and Irresponsible Idealism  

79

5

CIMIC: The “Function-that-shall-not-be-named”   

97

Part III Challenges, Lessons-Learned and Recommendations 6

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums  

117

7

The Politics of Humanitarian Space  

141

8

Why Civil-Military Interaction? Some Recommendations   

153

9

A Norwegian Future in Civil-Military Interaction?  

165

vi

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

10 Conclusion  

177

Appendix: Methods and Parameters    Bibliography    Index  

185 189 201

List of Figures 2.1 3.1 5.1 6.1 6.2 7.1

Multi-actor security framework   The actors   Civil-military wheel   Hearts-and-minds related to force protection   Civil-military interaction throughout an operation   Humanitarian space in political context  

42 57 98 125 136 152

This page has been left blank intentionally

To Anders, Many of our conversations are in this book. You would have read this book and found them. Many more conversations were meant to follow. The boy with the great big smile, sprawled on the couch chatting about anything and everything, in Moods of Norway pyjamas is so sorely missed. I am grateful to you, your parents Gerd and Viggo, and your brother Stian, that you shared your smile with us and that you opened your heart to become a part of our family as well. This is your book. Anders Kristiansen 30 January 1993–22 July 2011

This page has been left blank intentionally

Acknowledgements This project and resulting book would not have been possible were it not for the full financial and research support of the UiT The Arctic University of Norway. I am very thankful for the enormous support provided by all the respondents who contributed to increasing my understanding and analysis of civil-military interaction, and of the Norwegian experiences in civil-military operations. I would particularly like to thank the Norwegian Army Land Warfare Centre (Hærens Våpenskole), Brigade North, the Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarters, the Norwegian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE), the Norwegian delegation and international participants of Multinational Experiment 6 (objective 4.3 on cultural awareness), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Central Asia Institute (CAI), the Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), the Norwegian National Contingent Commander (NCC) and PRT Meymaneh (more commonly written as ‘Maimana’ in Afghanistan) for being so supportive during my various trips to Afghanistan. A special thank you and dedication to the Afghan people I met who have been willing to share their thoughts and experiences regarding international efforts in their country. Lastly I owe enormous thanks to my husband, Jardar Gjørv, who has tolerated endless questions and comments – positive and negative – about his profession in the military, has been supportive during my trips to Afghanistan, and has long wondered when this book would be finished. Jardar has been (and continues to be) the ultimate source of support, inspiration and love.

This page has been left blank intentionally

List of Abbreviations ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief ACT Allied Command Transformation AJP Allied Joint Publication ANSO Afghanistan NGO Safety Office AOG Armed Opposition Group CA Civil Affairs CCOE CIMIC Centre of Excellence CERP Commander Emergency Response Program CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO function) CMC Civil-Military Fusion Centre CMCoord Civil-Military Coordination (UN function) COIN Counterinsurgency CREN CIMIC Requirements and Education in Norway EBAO Effects Based Approach to Operations ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection ETEE Education, Training and Evaluation EU European Union FET Female Engagement Team FFI Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment) FFOD Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine (Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine) FOH Forsvarets Operativ Hovedkvarter (Norwegian National Joint Headquarters) FSTS Forsvarets stabskole (Military Staff College) GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan HN Host Nation HVS Hærens Våpensskole (Army Land Warfare Centre) ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IEA Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) IGO Intergovernmental Organization IHL International Humanitarian Law IO International Organization ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance JALLC Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre

xiv

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

MDG Millennium Development Goals MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOT Mentoring and Observation Team MSF Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCC National Contingent Commander NCO Non Commissioned Officer NGDO Non-governmental development organization NGHA Non-governmental humanitarian agency NGO Non-governmental organization NORDCAPS Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation NRC Norwegian Refugee Council NUPI Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OMLT Observation Mentoring Liaison Team PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team PSKOI US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute PSYOPS Psychological Operations QIP Quick Impact Project RC Regional Command SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation TU Task Unit UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDG United Nations Development Group

Part I Introduction, Theory, Core Concepts and Actors

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 1

Introduction Military operations are planned and conducted in ways that are unique to their specific contexts. There are also common elements that need to be accounted for in any operation, including coordination if not synchronization of effort by “governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations” (Army 2011). In a quick review of the twentieth century, one can observe and reflect upon the fact that the ways in which military operations have been conducted have evolved in accordance with the changing contexts and (to a degree) the lessons learned from previous efforts. Two World Wars were heavily dependent upon large scale deployments of troops (ground, air and sea), national army against national army; the Cold War in many respects was characterized by a heavy emphasis on technology and the weapons of nuclear arms race, while the 1990s seemed to be the age of humanitarian interventions. Debates continue about what is most effective, what is most efficient – the technology of the “shock and awe” (quick, incisive) variety, or the more direct presence of “boots on the ground”, or various combinations of both. The past two decades have been characterized by what has been perceived as expensive, personnel/troop heavy operations that have often relied upon close military contact with civilian actors (local populations as well as civilian organizations and local to national authorities). UN and NATO operations in Somalia, the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan been the source of inspiration behind the ways in which civil-military operations have developed, generating doctrinal developments in counterinsurgency (COIN) and military functions like Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept, notions like “human terrain” and more. More recently, discussions regarding military interventions look to Libya and the lessons-learned (so far) from this UN/NATO operation, some arguing that the future lies in shared (between NATO allies) burdens, rapid execution, , a combination of high technology (like air strikes or precision targeting) and special forces, and otherwise an avoidance of the political quagmire that comes with interaction between military and nonmilitary actors (Baumann et al., 4 April 2012). If states and their militaries have become weary of the past two decades of large scale, troop heavy intervention, this might be welcome news to a number of civilian actors who have been operating simultaneously, sometimes despite of, or coordinated with, military efforts. In a recent online article for a Brussels-based organization called “Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection” (PHAP), the author Gloria Martinez relayed her frustration with militaries encroaching upon civilian activities, particularly humanitarian activities, for military purposes (Martinez, 28 March 2013). Martinez’s article is important,

4

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

because despite the decades of experience that has passed and all the many lessons that allegedly have been learned, she repeats now long held concerns by the humanitarian community regarding the civil-military interface where militaries are perceived as improperly conducting “civilian” activities like humanitarian and/or development projects for military purposes. She distinguishes between UN approaches to civil-military interaction (CMCoord) that focuses on a principled approach to humanitarian action and on community needs, versus NATO’s CivilMilitary Cooperation (CIMIC) function that prioritizes the military mission in the civil-military interface, potentially increasing harm to civilian communities (ibid.). Martinez notes that kinetic military activity is addressed and controlled in international humanitarian law (IHL) and the laws of war, but non-kinetic activity is not. Martinez calls for a more focused debate that does not “ignore the difficult questions”, and which addresses the legal implications of non-kinetic activity (such as CIMIC). What have we learned about civil-military interaction from past experience and what, if anything, do we need to take with us into the future? If there is at least one lesson to be learned, it is that the nature and scale of intervention, when intervention with militaries is called upon, will continue to adjust according to context, and the demands in each case will therefore be different. Another lesson learned, despite the differences between interventions, pertains to the elements of continuity throughout all of these eras or phases of warfare. When we look more deeply into the immediate and long-term needs and practices of operations over time, a constant factor is the contact and/or impacts between civilians and militaries, and since the development of laws of war, a level of responsibility of the latter (employing force) to the former. The contact between civilians and militaries might take place on a small or large scale, but it is, and has been, everpresent. What has changed however is the ways in which we think about the contact between civil and military actors, where previously (during the Cold War and before) militaries could prioritize “strictly military” objectives over the needs of civilians, as that is what engaging in conflict demanded. The notion of a purely “military” solution is largely irrelevant now. Aside from a wholesale conquering of a nation by another militarily and politically, it is not possible to legitimately argue that future solutions to international crises will not include diplomacy, negotiation with and between regimes and humanitarian and development support, demanding therefore broadly political and humanitarian efforts. Part of that effort may or may not be military. When militaries are called upon, they are by no means the only relevant actor to the crisis or conflict situation. At the same time, today’s militaries (and their deploying governments) are being held more and more accountable for their actions and how these actions affect civilians and civilian/human security. A good example of this is the development of the UN Security Council resolutions on women and security, including the ground breaking UNSC 1325 agreed to in 2000, to the most recent UNSC 2122 agreed to in October of 2013. Militaries therefore need to be increasingly cognizant of “civil-military interaction” regardless of the nature of the operation be it air strikes,

Introduction

5

or extensive face-to-face contact between troops and local populations, knowing what to be aware of in each instance, including the effects of the military presence in the specific operational context, the presence and role of civilian actors, and how to balance politico-military goals of the troop-deploying nation with the needs of the non-combatants (civilians) they, in the end, are mandated to protect. Thus in addition to being the primary tool deployed for the purposes of national/ state and international security, military actors are often also the ones responsible for human security while they complete a difficult, complex, and political mission. Civil-military interaction thus plays a role in the responsibility multiple actors have towards each other to ensure minimal negative impact on human security, but it also plays a role in the military overall strategy and operational and tactical activities. Civil-military interaction can be very influential for the success or failure of an operation where negative impacts on local communities can kickback as resistance to the military objective and to any gains made in providing a secure area of operations. In this book I examine how national and international mandates are operationalized by deployed militaries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental/ministerial actors during civil-military operations with a particular focus on the challenges faced by the actors “on the ground” or at the tactical level. My interest is primarily with the military though I must pay considerable attention to civil actors as well. The military is one of the actors that often have the most controversial role in complex civil-military operations as they are one of the few actors sanctioned to carry and use weapons. They are often held directly responsible for, and having extensive power over, the lives and deaths of others, particularly unarmed actors (non-combatants/unarmed civilians). This responsibility does not take place in a vacuum, and is further coloured by the politics of the operation, the mandates of the troop contributing/donor countries involved in the intervention, the politics of the host nation, the mandates of civilian organizations, and the politics and activities of the people living in the area where the operations are taking place. In this book I wish to raise, discuss, and at times challenge, some of the principles and practices circulating within the civil-military interface. I will discuss some of the assumptions made by military as well as by civilian actors, and uncover some core principles and learning-moments that we can draw from as we prepare for the possibility of future engagements. Many rules, principles, and “models” of behaviour have already been designed to attempt to address the complexities of relationships taking place during an operation, to the point where some may think enough has been done for the operational and tactical levels. On this point, I would argue that not enough has been done, and in agreement with Martinez in her March 2013 article referred to above, a number of difficult questions have not been adequately addressed. To this end, I examine the civil-military interface through the policies and experiences of the Norwegian government and military. Norway employs what can be considered a principle-based “model” of civil-military interaction that is meant to inform the practices of their military when deployed on an operation. This model reflects

6

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

the principles and concerns of humanitarian practitioners not unlike Martinez cited above, and in this respect represents a national civil-military policy that lies at one end of the civil-military spectrum where humanitarian principles figure most prominently. This is a significant policy move for a NATO member to take, a state that has participated actively in an extensive civil-military operation in Afghanistan where other participating NATO members have taken decidedly different approaches to the civil-military interface. As such, reflecting on civilmilitary interaction from the Norwegian position is useful not just for Norway but all states engaging in, or contemplating engagement in, civil-military operations. Does the Norwegian model work best? If so, how can the Norwegian approach inform processes and policies in civil-military interaction for NATO and other operations? And if not, what can we learn from past experiences to arrive at an approach that is flexible and responds to the needs of the complexities and multiple actors in an operation? I believe it can be argued that the Norwegian policy or model is on the right track in many respects, and the research and discussions to follow in this book will provide evidence of that. The Norwegian approach to civil-military interaction employs a necessary precautionary approach that should serve as a primary lens through which military activities (primarily non-kinetic) take place. At the same time however, the Norwegian approach is inflexible and immature or not well developed, and as much as one needs to address the “difficult questions” surrounding military practices like CIMIC, one also has to acknowledge that there are difficult questions surrounding the practices and principles of humanitarianism and how they are used (and sometimes abused). The model does not account for many of the challenges that arise due to different contexts, and rather than resulting in best practices the model can be seen to result in a form of irresponsible idealism that places ideals and principles ahead of the difficult questions and realities. Until recently with the change in government, discussions about civil-military interaction at the tactical and operational levels in Norway seemed to have reached their conclusion. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Norway, Espen Barth Eide, stated during a September 2011 conference on Afghanistan that coordination at that tactical (ground) level did not really need attention, and efforts should be placed on coordination at the political and strategic levels (Barth Eide 2011). Although he was right to highlight the problems of coordination amongst governments and ministries (host and international) both in terms of action and policy, the evidence I provide in this book intends to demonstrate that there are also very serious challenges at the operational and tactical levels. What happens on the ground matters as much if not more, as it is these actors who interpret and operationalize the ideals within strategy and policy. The recent election of the “Blue” government (consisting of the Conservative party and the Progress party), with the appointment of Ine Eriksen Søreide as the Minister for Defence, suggests that there might be room again to open this debate.

Introduction

7

The Complicated World of Civil-military Interaction The international community, a collection of states ideally represented through the UN or other international and regional organizations, has been deploying militaries under mandates to protect civilians who have no protection otherwise, or to encourage democracy, or to protect perceptions of national and international security, or more often, all of the above. It means that as an international community, we occasionally agree that we should use force to provide protection, encourage regime change and defend national security. Often the deployment of militaries is invoked as a last resort, although not always, as it has also been pre-emptive. As well, that “last resort” has appeared with some regularity (Rwanda being one of the poignant exceptions here). Under some circumstances the international community appears willing to risk lives of their military actors to protect a certain set of values (rooted in democracy, human rights, and so forth), to protect civilians, as well as to ostensibly, and some argue primarily, protect the national security and national interests of the individual participating nations. In the past two decades militaries have been deployed on large scales to different operational theatres, but once they get there, some nations (like Norway) are uncomfortable about what they indeed should be doing, particularly when the objectives are complex, and the tensions mount. Debates about “what are we doing in Afghanistan” have not been uncommon within participating NATO member states at some time during the intervention, which is slated to end in 2014. The deployment of a military means that the use of force is condoned, but to what extent, in which ways, and how can it be justified according to the norms and interests of the participating nations, as well as the “host” nation? Do so-called “peaceful” nations and those that support negotiation and diplomacy, which argue for a “political solution”, also deploy militaries? And when they do, how do they address the amount of contact civilians will have with the militaries that use force ostensibly on their behalf, as well as with the civilians who may not condone the use of force at all? Civil-military interaction speaks to that untidy place where the ethics, ideals, practicalities, and realities regarding the relations between militaries and civilians meet up and often struggle with each other’s goals and mandates. Civilmilitary interaction1 refers to the range and nature of contact, from coexistence to coordination, and/or cooperation between national (local) and international (foreign) civilian (ranging from government officials to NGOs both humanitarian and development, to local populations) and military actors in crisis situations. This umbrella concept includes many different concepts, doctrines and relationships, 1 Civil-military interaction as applied here does not refer to the interaction between militaries and civilian nationals within the same state, for example the balance between military actors and civilian governing structures and actors within the USA or Norway etc. which is more often referred to as civil-military relations (this is consistent with other work on the subject, see Rietjens and Bollen (eds) (2008). Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability. Military Strategy and Operational Art. Aldershot: Ashgate.

8

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

from “Comprehensive Approach” to “CIMIC” or “CMCoord”, from military commanders talking with local governors to female soldiers connecting with women local villagers (see Chapter 2). Civil-military interaction has been relevant to operations to varying degrees since the World Wars of the twentieth century, but it has played a central, and controversial, role in complex operations since the end of the Cold War. The concept is grounded upon assumptions about security (by whom, for whom), legitimacy (mandate and authority), and ethical foreign policy (balancing the need to “do something” for vulnerable populations while maintaining national security priorities). At the tactical and operational levels, civil-military interaction depends upon, at a minimum, a comprehensive-aspossible knowledge of all actors relevant to or engaged within the crisis situation, including different mandates and goals. Beyond this, and depending on the context of the crisis (humanitarian, natural disaster or conflict, peacekeeping, military operations, etc.), interaction consists of a balance of security considerations, capacity and logistics, and competence between actors. In today’s operations, civil-military interaction is extremely difficult to manage, but impossible to avoid. Many of the actors involved in today’s operational environments, often referred to as complex emergencies (Keen 2008), struggle to find a satisfactory balance between roles and mandates while they operate in close proximity to one another. This is the case whether or not the different actors wish to acknowledge each other and their relevance to the operation, such as whether or not political or military actors reduce or increase their focus on civilian actors during an operation that is quick and incisive (an air strike, for example), or during the long term, focusing on stabilizing a situation. Many actors have a poor understanding of one another, and there is a lot of mistrust. Some typical assertions about different actors include: 1. the military cannot be trusted because they will use and abuse other actors in the pursuit of their own military objectives (including force protection and so-called “hearts-and-minds”); 2. militaries and their political counterparts avoid responsibility to civilians by framing operations as “purely military”; 3. military specialists in civil-military interaction, CIMIC officers, are particularly incompetent as “wanna-be” NGOs; 4. CIMIC is synonymous with soldiers building schools and hospitals; 5. NGOs are corrupt disaster/conflict magnets looking for ways, and funding, to maintain their existence; 6. NGOs mismanage donor funding; 7. NGOs use principles of independence and impartiality to prevent project monitoring and oversight by local governing bodies and donor nations; 8. local populations will only tell you what they think you want to hear so that they can get something out of you; 9. donor nations use NGOs for their own political goals to make themselves look good and to meet their own political goals.

Introduction

9

Ideally, a model of civil-military interaction needs to rise above the mistrust, allow for open dialogue between actors and flexibility between contexts and mandates, and assist actors towards compromise and coexistence if not coordination or cooperation. This book addresses a number of the challenges involved in civil-military interaction generally speaking and with NATO CIMIC in particular, using Norwegian policy, politics, and experiences in Afghanistan as a context and backdrop from which to illustrate and discuss this subject matter. The Norwegian experience in civil-military interaction in Afghanistan is particularly instructive in illustrating the difficulties surrounding the civil-military interface, particularly at the tactical and operational levels. Norwegian military and civilian actors are required, according to a so-called “Norwegian model”,2 to operate in such a way that there is a clear division between their activities, largely out of respect for humanitarian principles, but are required to have tight coordination between these actors. The insights of the model regarding humanitarian work are important and continuously relevant, however the approach is not well developed, does not account for complex contexts, and has resulted in a significantly reduced civilmilitary capacity (in knowledge and training) for the military, while solving only a few of the challenges for the civilian actors. The Norwegian approach is embedded with a critical message to military actors to think through a principled lens, but lacks a recognition for some of the more complex demands made upon militaries and troop-contributing nations in multinational operations (particularly “peace enforcement”), and it uncritically assumes a range of mobility, capacity and legitimacy of civilian actors that is not always accurate. As such, the model’s acontextualized departure point (not recognizing different demands in operations or the important differences between actors) takes an important message and weakens it. Other countries and military organizations like NATO have practiced variations of this “model” or theme, where there has been a recognition of the difficulty some civilian actors might have in working closely with military, or for militaries to conduct what are considered to be “civilian” activities. Some countries have chosen a very different approach to Norway, where military and civilian not only work closely together, but where military engage in tasks that can appear to be well beyond a military mandate (engaging in development projects) with the blessing of civilian political actors. Current NATO doctrine may guard against militaries engaging in what are perceived as civilian projects or activities, 2 The term “Norwegian model” is used in Norwegian government policy documents with regard to the Norwegian approach to civil-military interaction. This term is used in a number of instances where it is assumed/claimed within Norwegian policy (and to some degree academic) circles that a particular approach or idea is somehow particularly “Norwegian” (or in some cases “Nordic”). In the case of civil-military interaction, the use of the word “model” is not used in scholarly or analytical terms as it is not employed as an analytical or explanatory tool, but rather as a word that ideally provides legitimacy for a political ideal.

10

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

but nevertheless is significantly flexible and accepting of a civil-military overlap where necessary (NATO AJP-3.4.9). The Norwegian approach represents, in a way, one of the more stringent approaches to civil-military interaction in support of humanitarian principles. For these reasons the Norwegian experiences in civil-military interaction provides the case upon which this analysis focuses, because it lies at an important “pole” in a polarized debate about how to deal with civil-military interaction in international operations. The rationale behind Norway’s position, and the resulting experiences, provide important lessons for all militaries and their deploying governments exploring various approaches to continuously preparing military expertise in this field. Norway’s approach to civil-military interaction has resulted, in part, in a particularly negative attitude towards the military function of CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) which operationalizes many activities within the civil-military spectrum. CIMIC has been a primary target as Norway has struggled with how militaries and civilians should and do interact, and the “division of labour” between actors in theatre. The Norwegian military (as well as other NATO militaries) have been subject to criticism for not adequately respecting the needs and space of civilian actors, and in the Norwegian context the military function of CIMIC in particular has often been blamed for this. Although CIMIC is not the only military function that plays a role in the civil-military interface, it is a function that has been specifically designed to take a primary responsibility for this interface on behalf of the military. The way this function is developed can, in principle, say a lot about the nature of civil-military education and training in the military, and how the civil-military interface is integrated into military planning. In the Norwegian case, the military function CIMIC has encountered serious criticism for specific practices that threatened the distinctions between civil and military activities in an operations area. The Norwegian government has been very concerned about ensuring that non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly humanitarian organizations, are granted the respect and space they need to carry out their duties in safety and in accordance to humanitarian principle. The resulting tensions between actors, mandates and needs are not irrelevant, and raise the following question: can we reduce these tensions and if so, how? Although the empirical basis for the discussion on civil-military interaction is focused on the Norwegian experience in Afghanistan, the controversies, challenges and debates that civil-military interaction inspires are relevant beyond Norway. At a seminar held in November 2013 at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) that examined the relationships between UN integrated missions and humanitarian organizations, many of the same scenarios and challenges of civil-military interaction that are addressed in this book were also raised (SWEDINT 2013). The problems of identifying actors, understanding their mandates, and addressing the challenges that arise in the civil-military interface were confirmed as complex issue areas that are going to affect future operations for a long time to come, for NATO, the UN, the EU, the AU, and other regional or international organizations that engage in conflict mitigation. The introductory

Introduction

11

chapters in Part I on theory and actors, as well as the discussion chapters in Part III are equally relevant to any nation engaging in civil-military interaction. The Afghanistan context is where civil-military interaction has been played out in many different ways, and is where different militaries have obtained much of their most recent training and experience. These experiences need to be mapped and discussed to draw out relevant lessons. The Norwegian case provides a backdrop for the purposes of sharing the concerns as well as lessons learned from this experience. Civil-military interaction will also be relevant in future operations. We need to extrapolate from the lessons of the past to plan for the future. Thus I suggest some core recommendations for future developments. Due in large part to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (and at the end of the twentieth century, the operations in Bosnia, Kosovo etc.), civil-military interaction has become associated with heavy ground troop deployments engaging in messy and complex environments that appear to have limited success at best. Western militaries which have participated heavily in these operations, seem to be retracting if not recoiling from these experiences, and current rhetoric suggests that operations need to become tighter, cleaner, quicker – and more “military”, with a focus on effective uses of force and avoiding the mess of actually having to interact with civilians. This is what Norway has attempted to do more or less, by restricting the abilities of its military to engage more directly with diverse civilian actors and attempting to keep military activities to strictly “military”, as in the use of force.3 Although much can be said about what activities should likely not be done by military actors (the now classic picture of soldiers handing out candy or footballs to children comes quickly to mind) in the civil-military context, a reduction of focus and awareness of the challenges in civil-military interface is not a solution, and the Norwegian experience demonstrates this. We cannot avoid the effects militaries have on civilians – either local populations or host/international civilian organizations, and we cannot state carte blanche that such effects are only negative or positive in every single instance. We can, however learn how to work towards the latter, and away from the former. Some of the issues raised in this book are not new to scholars and practitioners, demonstrating that key problems have been ongoing (Pugh 2000, Frerks et al. 2006, Rietjens and Bollen 2008). As noted by Hugo Slim in his Forward to Thomas Weiss’ critique of humanitarian actors in a civil-military interface, “That this critique is hardly new makes it the more frustrating” (Slim in Weiss 2013: xii). Too little policy and practitioner focus has been paid to the analyses that have been done thus far, and a more comprehensive debate is needed about how civil-military interaction should and does function, what are appropriate tools and 3 Although supporters of the Norwegian model would argue that the model concerns itself solely with military actors conducting civilian activities (such as development projects), the research presented here will show that the model extended to many instances of just contact between military and civilian, where a military presence was articulated as a threat to humanitarian principles, if not to civilians generally.

12

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

why, and what responsibilities militaries have towards civilians regardless of the operation (be it air strikes, heavy ground troops, incisive actions by special forces, etc.). The Norwegian experiences of nearly a decade in Afghanistan demonstrate that this discussion still needs attention, and these experiences provide a good case upon which to tackle contradictions and controversies that to date have not been adequately addressed, and which can have implications for future operations. This includes increased self-awareness amongst military actors regarding how civilian actors perceive and respond to their actions, the tensions embedded in the dual role of donor as well as troop contributing nations, the different demands between peacekeeping and “peace enforcement”/combat operations, as well as the contradictions inherent within humanitarian/“civilian” categories. It is important to note that not all donor/troop-contributing nations engage in civilmilitary interaction with the same concerns as Norwegian actors, in part because the Norwegian debate is (by some) considered old or no longer relevant. Equally important is the fact that in the particular case of Afghanistan, Norway was not capable of fulfilling the NATO objective of COIN (counterinsurgency) which was problematic for a number of military actors as they attempted to reconcile their activities with the overall NATO/ISAF initiative (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). Part of what this book will examine is in what ways Norwegian concerns about the humanitarian/civilian/military nexus can be made more relevant and influential in the international context (as these concerns reflect on-going interests amongst humanitarian actors), while at the same time that doctrine and policy can be made more functional (if at all) for multiple actors in the civil-military context. It is the responsibility of the troop contributing nation to ensure that its military can conduct its mandated task with the required skills necessary when deployed to a civil-military context. Civil-military interaction also requires knowledge and preparation by both civilian and military actors. This book focuses primarily upon military actors, with the purpose to examine and improve military capabilities, practices and engagement with civilian agencies and populations once the decision is made to deploy a military. In the Norwegian case this is important, as nonkinetic (non-lethal) functions crucial to civil-military interaction have not been prioritized even though problems on the civil-military interface persist. This trend indicates that an examination and evaluation of the needs of the civil-military environment are necessary, to further determine what knowledge and skills need to be (re)developed. In other words: Which principles and what knowledge informs military responsibilities and practices in relation to civilian actors and a civil-military environment, and are these principles and knowledge effective?

Based on the concerns of the Norwegian government for civilian welfare in conflict zones, reflective of a broader international concern for the protection of civilians, the above questions further imply an investigation into the following:

Introduction

13

How can we maximize, as best we can, the protection and security of civilians and civilian agencies when military measures are deemed necessary by troop contributing nations? What responsibilities do militaries have in relation to civilian actors, and upon what basis can and should military planning and practices take place given these responsibilities?

This main finding of this book is that the Norwegian approach to civil-military interaction has an important precautionary mechanism that should be integrated into international practices (including NATO doctrine), but which, due to lack of development, has significantly reduced the civil-military interaction capacity within the Norwegian military without providing alternative tools to solve problems within a civil-military interface. This should serve as a warning to all nations that continue to consider their potential for deploying to international operations. Conducting a “re-militarization” of operations, emphasizing kinetic and/or high technology force approaches whereby one wishes to reduce contact with civilians, if not reduce their relevance as well, will do little to solve complex political problems in the long run. This does not mean that we should think that military actors engage in a myriad of indiscriminate “civilian” activities in an attempt to address all concerns of local communities affected by the operation, but at the very least that a responsibility to civilian actors needs to be maintained, including approaches to minimize the impact of military operations on civilians through liaison, understanding of the non-enemy civilian environment including cultural, political, economic issues, and preparedness for addressing acute impacts (injuries, destruction) in lieu of any immediate civilian humanitarian aid/ development presence. In order to discuss developments in civil-military interaction through Norwegian experiences and policy, this book addresses two central elements. The first element consists of an analysis a Norwegian model of civil-military interaction that exemplifies a polarized approach to a complex problem. The second element focuses on the military function of CIMIC, demonstrating a need for increased knowledge and capacity in the field of civil-military interaction within militaries (and lessons learned that can be shared with other militaries, through militarymilitary cooperation), in particular by focusing on the CIMIC function to renew and strengthen civil-military priorities. An examination of the Norwegian model, both its strengths and weaknesses, can contribute to a reorientation and strengthening of civil-military knowledge and practice in the military, as well as make clearer the roles and responsibilities of all actors in future operations.

14

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

The Norwegian Model: Irresponsible Idealism or a Model for Future Operations? The message emanating from Norway about the right “model” by which to conduct civil-military interaction is an important one. It reflects the thinking behind many humanitarian organizations, as well as the UN (as represented by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – OCHA). A number of Norwegian officials, including the previous Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide (who stepped down after the recent September 2013 national election), have also claimed that it is a model that other NATO nations are moving to adopt (Eide, 20 February 2010). If the former Foreign Affairs minister is at all correct that NATO or individual NATO nations are gravitating towards a similar framework, then it is all the more important that critical discussions take place about the future of civil-military interaction. Norway, as both a donor nation (UN, NGOs, World Bank) and a troop-contributing nation (NATO, UN), directly and simultaneously contributes to multiple dimensions within the civil-military interactive sphere. The Norwegian government, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has attempted to front a civil-military “model” that ensures respect for and prioritizes the safety of civilians (both local, civilian populations as well as humanitarian workers) during times of crisis. As noted earlier, the “Norwegian model” advocates a clear divide between “political authorities” and “humanitarian” activities in theatre while at the same time expecting tight coordination between these same actors (Kristoffersen 2006, Utenriksdepartement 2009). Often this model has been expressed in such a way where the divide is not necessarily and explicitly between political and humanitarian actors, but between military and civilian actors, which presenting a much more vague distinction of and between actors. The model is predominantly informed by humanitarian principles and the notion of humanitarian space. Indeed, that this model ensures that civilian efforts are placed front and centre as a concern for civil-military interaction; this is an important contribution to the discussion of how civil-military interaction can and should be operationalized. This central tenant should be considered at all times possible when operationalizing any civil-military strategies or activities. What I hope to show in this book however, is that although the principles behind the model are valuable, the lack of negotiation about how this model should function (and the fact that it has not actually functioned as proposed) has hindered its potential, not just for Norwegian policy and practice, but also as a contribution to the debate on civil-military interaction. Thus this model, though rooted in important humanitarian principles, has not necessarily contributed to better civil-military interaction as it should, but has all too often exacerbated mistrust and polarized debate by restricting constructive dialogue. The way in which this model has been articulated makes assumptions about civilian actors that can be misleading (i.e. that all civilians all can be equated with “humanitarian”) and assumptions about humanitarian space and international humanitarian law (IHL) that need considerably more explanation (IHL does not

Introduction

15

exclude military actors from delivering aid to vulnerable populations whereas the debate on the Norwegian model appears to make the opposite claim). The model has not contributed to development or improvement in military education and training in civil-military interaction based on lessons-learned, nor does it allow for the adjustments and difficult choices that must be made by all actors in specific conflict contexts. The model lacks important content, contextual awareness, and guidance. Some Norwegian (and other international) civilian actors have expressed satisfaction with the Norwegian approach because the result has been that the Norwegian military stays out of their way and does not encroach on NGO activities, in other words, the military keeps to “military” activities. This is opposed to, for example, the perceptions that have been generated about the ways in which American military and their ministerial/departmental and aid civilian actors operate, where they appear far more closely linked and cooperative. In the Norwegian case the policy and media rhetoric enforce the assumption that military activities consist of the use of force, and largely only that. This shows very little recognition for the range of military activities that consist of kinetic (use of force) and non-kinetic functions, both of which are crucial to military operations. Part of the problem is that civilian and military activities have not been clearly defined, particularly in relation to the model fronted by the Norwegian government. It refers negatively to militaries engaging in humanitarian and development projects (which are perceived as “civilian” territory), but the model has also been invoked when referring to militaries operating in close proximity to civilian activities, and/or having visible contact with civilians. The ways in which the model has been invoked (which I will discuss more in depth in the forthcoming chapters) has had an effect on the manoeuvrability of militaries in the civilian environment, and has raised the question as to what sort of non-kinetic military activity is not acceptable (Patrols in or near civilian project areas? Liaison with civilian actors?) Interestingly, the Norwegian military, among other NATO militaries, appears to be moving towards a greater emphasis towards kinetic capabilities, downplaying the non-kinetic (aside from Intelligence). Whether this is an indirect response to the Norwegian rhetoric that rejects military activities that might be interpreted to blur the lines between military and civilian, or a response more broadly speaking to the troop-heavy, complex and time-consuming operation in Afghanistan, is unclear. However, an unexplored result of both the Norwegian model and the emphasis on kinetic skills could be a military that takes less consideration for civilian concerns and needs, as this is not the military’s “role”. The lack of clarity of the Norwegian model leaves practitioners to deal with the practicalities of this approach in an ad hoc if not awkward manner. Reducing military knowledge and skills in civil-military interaction does not reduce the need for this knowledge or for better practices. As will be discussed later in this book, Norwegian civil-military activities, particularly those associated with CIMIC, have in fact been carried out but without trained personnel and with little basis

16

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

in “lessons-learned”.4 Thus commanders wishing to engage in projects or have contact with civilians have in large part been denied the expert military advice about what measures will be potentially effective, or which will be detrimental.5 For example, in 2007 Norwegian CIMIC was criticized for participating in the construction of a hospital in the Norwegian PRT’s area of responsibility, as that hospital did not meet local needs or take into account local capabilities (Gompelman 2011). Norwegian CIMIC, however, had never been a part of the PRT at that time (CIMIC was introduced to the PRT in 2011). The choice to engage in a hospital project was not only not a product of Norwegian CIMIC advice, it additionally did not benefit from or take into account the possible lessons learned of 2003–2004 by CIMIC experts, as by 2007 Norwegian CIMIC officers were considerably more aware of the problems and challenges of engaging in such projects (Kristoffersen 2006). It is possible, due to past experiences such a project might have been more deeply problematized, perhaps acknowledging and even addressing at least some concerns that are reflected in the Norwegian policy position that was developing at the same time.6 Thus, the Norwegian model reflects important principles, but there has been no debate or development of guidelines about what these principles actually imply for all actors in specific contexts, what compromises need to be made to when addressing potentially opposing goals between actors, and under which contexts this particular model is or is not relevant. The Norwegian model has thus produced an unbalanced and uncritical approach to a Norwegian contribution to complex operations based on irresponsible idealism rather than a more principled realism. This does not have to be the future of the Norwegian model however. It has the potential to be made operational and influential amongst Norwegian and other international actors if it is developed in better cooperation with civilian and military actors, and if efforts are made to use of multi-actor experiences and lessons learned shared in part through training and education. As will be discussed further, CIMIC has, ideally and according to doctrine as one of its responsibilities, the role of 4 Exceptions were made at times when Latvian military personnel trained in CIMIC assisted the military command of the PRT, both in advice and logistics in conducting some activities. 5 A few commanders I spoke with felt that intelligence officers provided enough of the information they needed and other military functions outside of CIMIC were able to address any of their other civil military needs. Most, however, experienced a gap in knowledge and abilities that could have been better supported. More on this in Part III. 6 “Hospital” projects conducted by militaries are not unknown and even have made some positive contributions. The Norwegian military itself has been supporting one such “hospital” project by sharing knowledge between military and civilian medical practitioners in Afghanistan, with considerable success. Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (forthcoming, working title) Civil-Military Interaction between the WHO, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, and the Afghan Ministry of Public Health: Sharing Medical Knowledge between Military and Civilian Medical Practitioners. Tromsø: University of Tromsø.

Introduction

17

integrating non-military perspectives and needs into the military planning process, to ensure that the military can conduct their operation in a civilian dominated area while at the same time ensuring that the military footprint has minimal negative impact on the civilian environment. That being said, the function is not a civilian advisory role. It is a military function that serves military goals. Within the differing military mandates that reflect overall political goals of the deploying/ troop-contributing nation at different times and in different contexts, militaries need the best developed tools possible to know how to negotiate the minefield of the civil-military interface. Focus on CIMIC, Focus on Actors I place a particular emphasis on the military function of NATO CIMIC, which requires further explanation. My interest in CIMIC evolved out of an interest in different military mechanisms that on the surface seemed to contribute to an increasing responsibilizaton of the military to civilian actors and populations in the theatres of operation to which they were deployed. The CIMIC function is not the only military function that engages in civil-military interaction. It is, however one military function that is specifically designed to focus on the civil-military relationship, particularly the military’s relationship to civilian actors like NGOs, as well as for ensuring as little negative impact on civilians as possible within the military mandate. That CIMIC is ideally meant to operate in this way does not mean that it has done so at all times, and in a manner that make the function attractive or useful to all actors (civilian and military). Indeed, it is not difficult to find examples of CIMIC practices, and military practices in the civil-military interface in general, that can and should be subject to critique. This means that there is still much discussion and learning to be had. This does not mean that, in the specific case of CIMIC, the function’s purpose and potential can be negated, and it is this purpose and potential that I argue deserves some critical attention to determine its contribution to future operations. Ideally, as a tactical and operative function CIMIC is one that deploys “players” on the ground, in theatre. CIMIC is a “bottom-up” function where its focus is upon people from various organizations and the area of operation, how they interact with each other, and how to best interact with them with the intention to meet the overall military/political goal. It ideally, according to doctrine, should enhance civil situational awareness amongst military personnel, not least to ensure that core needs of the civilian population are adequately addressed before, during and after an operation. From a normative standpoint, it is a function that employs nonviolent means by military actors to work in concert with civilian actors in the creation of security in localized contexts, within the framework of the political/ military mandate. Using critical security theoretical analysis, a CIMIC function can be seen to normatively move military action from negative (predominantly forcedbased) security that reflects traditional state-based security approaches, to positive

18

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

(predominantly non-force-based) security that reflect human security approaches, although this is not an uncontroversial move (Hoogensen Gjørv 2012). The function has potential for those interested in attaining peace, despite employing military force, but the dilemmas arising at the nexus between positive and negative security needs to be better addressed, assessing when it contributes to human security, and when it does not. If done carefully with increased analytical skill, CIMIC could potentially be a tool that from the military side supports security from the “bottom-up”. Such potential normative “goals” need to be reflected upon within the practices of the function itself, as a tactical/operational function that is in significant part responsible for interaction between military and civilian actors. CIMIC has an explicit role, even if limited, to “support the civilian environment” in a context where it is also responsible to the military mandate and commander. In principle, if not practice, it is one of the military functions that has a direct responsibility for human security, acknowledging local needs and responding to them when appropriate as determined by the military and political mandate. It is important to assess this function for itself, and not immediately conflate it with the grander political/strategic plans of “Integrated missions” or “Comprehensive Approach”, although I would argue that these strategic plans need to be better informed by civil-military practices taking place on the ground. Thus the important connections between the practices and principles of CIMIC to national and international strategies are important and should not be downplayed. However, focusing on the function itself enables us to pay attention to and examine some of the security practices taking place in the area of operations. Focusing on CIMIC and assessing its relationship and relevance to national mandates is a methodological and normative choice, using a “bottom-up approach” that acknowledges the importance of the roles of individuals in creating or threatening human security. When it comes right down to it, no matter what the national or international mandate is, it is individual human beings who are responsible for how mandates will play out in reality. This is increasingly apparent from the empirical evidence collected regarding what happens on the ground in operations, but also at the political and strategic level where individuals are also important despite the power of structure (government mandates, etc.).7 The successes, failures, and lessons of these roles expose the challenges of practice and the ways in which we endeavour to provide security. I also focus upon CIMIC because despite the potential normative positioning of the function itself as well as for civil-military practices more broadly speaking, there is remarkably little effort to investigate the relevance of this positioning within operations. In other words, a critical security theory analysis that exposes both challenges as well as potential for the dynamics of civil-military interaction through CIMIC are by no means adequately thought through by the very actors (and their institutions) engaged in civil-military interaction. Case in point is Norwegian 7 Gaskarth, J. (2011). “Where would we be without rules? A virtue ethics approach to foreign policy analysis”. Review of International Studies 37: 393–415.

Introduction

19

CIMIC, which has played a significant role in the way civil-military interaction has (or more importantly, has not) developed in the Norwegian context. During the earlier phases of Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan, Norwegian CIMIC, in large part at the behest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, operationalized this role through a heavy emphasis on “projects” (humanitarian or development oriented) designed to support civilian populations (Kristoffersen 2006). This earlier approach has permanently influenced perceptions about CIMIC, reducing it to a military competitor for NGOs that are considered the usual providers of aid and so-called “project” support. The Norwegian model appeared in government documents in 2008 and 2009, after the controversies (humanitarian and development project focus) of the 2003–2004 CIMIC experiences.8 The Norwegian model appears to be, among other things, an indirect attempt to address criticisms of CIMIC by demanding that military actors will not replicate or encroach upon that which is deemed to be “civilian activities”, namely, “projects”. This approach has had pretty direct consequences upon Norwegian non-kinetic functions, particularly CIMIC. The criticism embedded within the Norwegian model has led not to a re-direction or improvement of the CIMIC function, but almost a complete withdrawal from anything to do with CIMIC, up until most recently when CIMIC was introduced late in the development of Norwegian operations at its PRT in Faryab province in Afghanistan.9 The Norwegian model could benefit from stronger cooperation and knowledge sharing with Norwegian CIMIC and other military actors, using this function to reflect Norwegian concerns through practice, while at the same time meeting its obligations to diverse civilian actors as a troopcontributing nation. The Norwegian concerns around CIMIC and its potential encroachment upon humanitarian space (as well as encroachment by other military actors), has also necessitated a focus on humanitarian work and its relation to the civil-military interface, as well as on the role of political actors such as donor/troop contributing nations, who must perform a sometimes precarious balancing act between the diverse interests of militaries and humanitarian and development agency actors. Here too the complexity of the different roles become quickly apparent, exposing challenges that are inadequately addressed by the Norwegian model that advocates clean divisions of labour combined with an apparent unproblematic coordination between these actors. Where CIMIC and other military actors have been (and sometimes justifiably) criticized for practices that can exacerbate problems on the ground, humanitarian and civilian political actors have not been equally evaluated within this same context, leaving open or implying that somehow civilian actors can or should be less problematic. The practices of all actors in the civil-military 8 Such practices such as the implementation of projects, usually of a short-term nature, are not isolated to Norwegian CIMIC, nor to just the CIMIC function as other military functions and units have also engaged in similar practices, with even less analytical problematizing of these practices than perhaps CIMIC operators would have. 9 CIMIC arrived for the first time in Norwegian PRT history in 2011.

20

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

interface need to be examined. By applying a “bottom-up” approach, going to the field and the practitioners, it is possible to better inform principle and strategy. Debate? Soldiers, Saints, Virgins and Whores The debate in Norway, to the extent that one can call it a debate, has reified a polarized and largely unexplored view of what it is to be “civilian” and “military”, and what these categories embody. These distinctions are also inadequately explored within NATO itself, as many of the challenges of interaction are too easily bypassed (NATO 2013). In her 2006 report examining the challenges of soldiers (CIMIC officers in particular) engaging in “projects”, Lene Kristoffersen aptly captured the dynamics of this polarized view within her chosen title “Soldiers or Saints” suggesting that to be a soldier is to be the opposite of a saint: holy, virtuous, including helping the vulnerable. As noted by Kristoffersen: Are Nato CIMIC officers supposed to act like soldiers or saints? Should they stick to the military mindset of mission primacy, or also be able to venture into the civilian-humanitarian field if the opportunity arises and means allow for it? Nato CIMIC calls for soldiers, not saints. (Kristoffersen 2006: 27)

The “saints” are equated to the civilian-humanitarian field, and thus set in opposition to soldiers. In general, soldiers are trained to kill people and destroy things (Smith 2005). As stated in the Norwegian White Paper of 2009: “Operating as an armed soldier at one moment and aid worker the next can create confusion for both civilians and warring parties” (Utenriksdepartement 2009: 21). The armed and potentially deadly soldier is therefore pitted against the work of providing aid, suggesting the two cannot and should not mix. The same document describes aid work, particularly humanitarian work, as such: “The core of humanitarian efforts is to save individual human lives, reduce suffering and secure human value independent of ethnic background, gender, age, religion or political association” (ibid.: 5). Based on this polarized logic, does this mean that the job of a soldier then to threaten human lives, increase suffering, and devalue humans in accordance to ethnicity, gender, age, religion and political association? Are soldiers the “opposite” of those who provide aid and help? This is at one and the same time an extreme assumption to draw, but reflective of a line of thinking in the arguments against militaries providing assistance of any time. I would argue that the polarization is not helpful, nor realistic. Soldiers, as part of a fighting “machine” (the military) threaten lives, and their planning and operations reflect and enforce specific political objectives. This does not mean however that they lack the capacity to provide aid or help where necessary, or that they are relieved of the responsibility to do so. The polarization offered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) White Paper referred to above suggests that, at the very least, we need to more deeply examine

Introduction

21

what “soldier” means, particularly to Norwegian society but also amongst NATO and UN nations more generally. Without examination, the Norwegian government document implies that soldiers are by definition (the “armed nature of the soldier”) unable to show humanity or provide support to struggling communities that are within their area of operations. For most this is clearly not the case. Just as this polarization negatively reflects upon the capacities and/or purpose of the military, it assumes rather exceptional if not unfailing capacities of the role of civilians combined with a lack of clarity about “who” civilians are and what they represent. In Norwegian discussions about civil-military interaction, virtually all civilian organization work is all too often mistakenly categorized as “humanitarian” when civilians in fact reflect multiple and diverging mandates, and by virtue of the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, virtually all civilian organizations are thereby implicitly endowed with a specific legitimacy embodying a moral authority and competence to serve host nation populations. A resulting problem of just assuming the legitimacy and authority of civilian organizations (and the lack of legitimacy of military actors) is that the reality of some difficult choices are not reflected, when humanitarian organizations might decide to compromise on their own principles to be able to nevertheless assist vulnerable populations. The concept of humanitarian space, supported by the principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality, can be seen to embody a type of “virginal” quality whereby humanitarian-defined actors can claim if not demand a distance from other actors and practices, or rather, cannot be tainted by the politics of other actors. This virginal or saint-like quality to follow the thinking of Lene Kristoffersen, becomes severely compromised when these principles cannot be maintained in practice. How do we address those situations when, in return for access to vulnerable populations, humanitarian work will be used to increase the credibility of one or some of the warring parties? The mantra of humanitarian space is employed actively in regard to NATO/ISAF forces and these forces may be further pressured to honour humanitarian space by their own governments, but is it possible to employ the principle of humanitarian space in the same fashion towards all warring parties, towards different insurgents that may not abide by international agreements and guidelines? When a humanitarian organization makes the choice to work in a region according to the demands of the local power brokers, whereby the humanitarian organization suspects that their work will be used to increase the power and credibility of these local authorities, is this a case of “the ends justify the means”, whereby an NGO breaks with “neutrality” and “independence” but for a good cause (helping people)? How can and should it be interpreted when humanitarian organizations are willing to forego their principles and be used by local power brokers in order to gain access? Do humanitarian organizations have to move between a principled distance with one warring party but “sell” their work to another to be allowed access? How should a donor/troop contributing nation react when NGOs are placed in situations whereby their activities will be used to the benefit of an opposing warring party, against which that troop-contributing nation has engaged in conflict? These questions

22

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

themselves need a thorough analysis in their own right, an exercise that goes beyond the parameters of this book. However, these questions need to nevertheless be in the back of one’s mind when thinking about military choices and actions and these impacts on the civilian environment. Impacts go both ways, and military operators need to be equally aware of how their mission is impacted by all actors in the area of operations. These challenges are however seldom discussed, leaving us nothing but to accept the assumptions behind polarized standpoints – soldiers or saints? virgins or whores? There is little reflection upon the diversity of capacities of, and restrictions upon, the actors on the ground (civilian or military), nor the struggles and challenges that all these actors experience. This is not an effective and productive approach to examining and evaluating the roles of different actors in complex operations, and it does not help the people dealing with reality on the ground. My own interest in this subject has been the investigation of what different actors do to create security (or insecurity) during complex operations. As mentioned earlier, I have focused on the military, both because the military is often assumed as the “traditional” tool of security, but also because of my own interest in those military functions that are designed for negotiating the relationships between civilian and military. This book is the result of my initial but in-depth investigations, which consisted of a five year project (CRENCIMIC Requirements and Education in Norway) located at and supported by the University of Tromsø. The project is based on interviews and discussion groups with over 120 respondents, conducted with NGO, ministry, and military actors located in Norway, the Netherlands, the USA as well as in theatre in Afghanistan. It is further supplemented by conversations with Afghan citizens living in Afghanistan. Inspiration for the project was initially generated through discussions with the Norwegian Army Land Warfare Centre (HVS or Hærens Våpenskole, previously known as TRADOK). The original mandate of the CREN project was to obtain an overview of civil-military related education and training in Norway, and thereafter, to provide recommendations for improvements, if necessary. As the project proceeded, it became increasingly difficult to fulfil the original mandate due to initial findings of significant misunderstanding surrounding the function of CIMIC and civil-military interaction more broadly speaking, and how either should be understood and employed. A central finding for the project came early on, when it was clear just how negatively politicized the concept of CIMIC was in Norway, combined with considerable misunderstanding about what the function actually was meant to address, at least according to NATO and national doctrine. In general, respondents located in Norway (working in offices primarily in Oslo) tended to reflect more so the principled rhetoric of the institution or organization that they represented, whether civilian or military, rather than reflecting the challenges on the ground for the military including CIMIC and also for the myriad of civilian roles. In other words, little of what Norwegian governmental or NGO interviewees reported reflected attempts to address how

Introduction

23

interaction actually took place and why, but was fixated on political principles of the respective organization. In contrast, many of the interviewees representing these same organizations in Afghanistan reflected a more complex presentation of civil-military interaction. During four separate trips to Afghanistan10 I had the privilege of speaking with and experiencing moments of life with both NGO and military actors, where the reality of how they could and should interact with each other was made more visible, and more complex than the principled standpoints I heard in interviews in Norway. These experiences, in combination with many discussions and interviews, emphasized that the complexity of the context (in this case, Afghanistan) played a much stronger role in the nature of the responses about what civil-military interaction is about as well as its accompanying challenges. I would like to make clear what this book is not about. First of all, the arguments presented here are not meant to be interpreted as arguments in favour of military intervention. That is a complex and controversial choice made prior to these discussions and the debate that follow here. My focus includes what sort of responsibilities military actors have with regard to civil-military interaction after a troop-contributing nation has made the choice to deploy troops. I neither argue in favour of militaries taking upon themselves all manner of civilianassociated activities, like building schools or hospitals (the classic examples). The tendency towards “military NGOs” should be avoided by all means, and the role of “projects”, insofar as they are deemed to be absolutely necessary, needs to be much more carefully assessed and conducted in cooperation with multiple actors with a clear understanding of the complexities of the context. In this respect, I am in full agreement with the precautionary principle upon which the Norwegian model is based, and would argue that this is an important principle for all military actors operating in the civil-military interface. However, a deeper examination of the role of military-initiated projects is necessary, not least regarding those circumstances when no other actors are present and/or willing to support local civilian communities where militaries are located (the “vacuum” problem). Lastly, although the experiences that serve as the primary data for analysis come from over a decade of military and civilian (broadly speaking) experience in Afghanistan, this is not a book about Afghanistan itself, nor professes any sort of expertise on Afghanistan. The core focus of this book is about theory and practice of civilmilitary interaction, and the extent to which it contributes (or can contribute) to responsibilizing militaries and promoting human security. Afghanistan is however the context in which most respondents have themselves had experience, and to which most respondents referred, being the largest mission for the Norwegian forces and exemplifying many of the challenges of civil-military interaction for Norway as well as the international community. Afghanistan thus offers an important, but very specific, case of civil-military interaction that differs from other important contexts such as UN operations in Africa or the Middle East, or 10 The three trips were in October/November 2010, May 2012, June 2012 and November 2012.

24

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

operations in the Balkans. Each of these different contexts have required different things of civil-military actors, as well as have generated different but important experiences. This book does not include a formal study of Afghan perceptions of the crisis, but does include anecdotal reflections by Afghan respondents to assist in understanding some of the impacts and relevance of civil-military interaction in this complex operation. I draw therefore on “snapshots” of experiences, both my own as well as those of people who live and work in Afghanistan, to illustrate the principles, practices and challenges accompanying civil-military interaction. There are many different actors that play varying roles in a civil-military crisis situation, from host governments and local NGOs, to IOs, international NGOs, intervening donor/troop-contributing nations and their militaries, private organizations (for-profit aid organizations, security, businesses), international and national information and media organizations, armed opposition groups (insurgents, criminals), as well as local citizens. I will focus primarily on three actors here as they have been central to the challenges of the Norwegian model and CIMIC: policy makers (the foreign affairs and defence ministries), the military, and NGOs, followed by an analysis of the combined effects of these actors on civil-military interaction at the “ground level”. Most of the actors I have interviewed are Norwegian based, but I have also included insights from interviews of non-Norwegian actors that have been useful for comparison. I also pay particular attention to NATO CIMIC doctrine and practice as this military function has been singled out as a problem in the Norwegian context. An Overview of the Book and Key Findings The book is divided into three parts. The first part is general, including the introduction, theoretical approaches to civil-military interaction, and an overview of some of the central and different actors who are usually involved. The second part looks specifically at the Norwegian case, discussing the Norwegian model and what it implies for military functions like CIMIC. The third part bases itself largely upon the empirical research conducted in Afghanistan and draws out some core questions relevant not only to the Norwegian experience, but to civil-military interaction more generally. The following nine chapters therefore all address specific themes relevant to civil-military interaction. In Chapter 2 I present some theoretical foundations behind civil-military interaction generally speaking, demonstrating its relevance as a tool for understanding and operationalizing different perceptions of security (and insecurity), based on the legitimacy and authority of different actors, combined with the role of “ethical” foreign policy. Two key factors are highlighted here. The first is the relevance of civil-military interaction to the shaping and the maintenance of security, particularly beyond the use of physical force. The second factor focuses upon the responsibility of key actors in the civil-military interface, but in particular the

Introduction

25

responsibility of the governments (ministries) of donor/troop-deploying nations, and the tensions that need to be addressed concerning potential conflicts between humanitarian agendas and military efforts. The concepts raised in this theory chapter play an analytical role throughout the book, but also a practical role, as I hope this can contribute to broader theoretical discussions and debates about what civil-military interaction implies in terms of actor roles, responsibilities, and practices. This chapter argues for a more complex understanding of security that involves multiple actors. Chapter 3 attempts to break down and provide an outline of some of the key actors in the civil-military interface. The actors in focus here are the military, various civilian actors such as humanitarian and development organizations, as well as political officials from international organizations and donor/troop-contributing nations. In this chapter I attempt to show that the range of civilian actors is very diverse and cannot be conflated into one category of “civilians”. Two key objectives are carried out in this chapter, the first in providing a description of some of the central actors in civil-military interaction, and the second is to make more visible the varying political objectives of civilian actors. If one is to pay heed to what are referred to as “humanitarian” principles, not least neutrality and independence, the political weight of the different civilian roles become very important. In principle, humanitarian organizations are the least political, as they should appear neutral to all parties. Development organizations on the other hand are more politicized, and civilian governments (both host government as well as donor/troop-deploying nation governments) are the most political, having specific agendas that can be considered provocative to some warring parties in a complex emergency. In Chapter 4, Norwegian humanitarian policy is in focus, in particular the differing messages contained within government policy, how this policy is represented in the media, and the challenges associated with a humanitarian policy assumed by a political actor like Norway, which is also responsible for ensuring that its military carries out its political goals. Two central issues arise in this chapter, or better said, one key issue with one marginalized side issue. The key issue surrounds the controversial potential use of humanitarian and development work to front a “moral superpower” profile for the Norwegian state. As noted by a former international (non-Norwegian) NGO worker, Norway’s second largest natural resource (the first being oil) are NGOs. The second issue is the apparent marginalization or silence of the Ministry of Defence in any debate about civil-military interaction, and raises questions about the roles of and interaction between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. One is led to wonder about the possibility of discussing the merits and pitfalls of the Norwegian model, as a “culture of silence” appears to permeate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it comes to challenging or criticizing (and potentially improving) the Norwegian model. Instead, it remains a static, inflexible, and idealistically irresponsible policy.

26

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

In Chapter 5 I examine the military function of CIMIC, the way in which it has developed particularly but not exclusively in Norway, and the challenges that are raised in this politically-loaded function. The tensions between ministries, NGOs and military become very clear when understood through the requirements of this particular military role. Assumptions about the role have not always been reflected in reality. The chapter ends with an overview of the current status of CIMIC in Norway, which demonstrates that civil-military interaction, at least through CIMIC, has been deprioritized. Chapter 6 addresses a central critique embedded within the Norwegian approach to civil-military interaction, namely “hearts-and-minds”. In this chapter I investigate what is meant by the term hearts-and-minds by looking at how it has been employed by both civilian and military actors, and how it serves as a critique of military activities towards civilians. I examine the intention behind heartsand-minds, and show how it can only be adequately understood in relation to the politicization of and level of conflict within the context. Insofar as the concept appears to relay a cynicism surrounding the motivations of military actors for supporting civilian populations, the same cynicism ought to be waged to the troopcontributing nations themselves, as they are party to the same politics and attempt to implement an agenda in part via their militaries. Militaries have themselves their own politics however, particularly on the ground between their own forces and diverse civilian actors, where their civil-military activities serve as a form of force protection. I further investigate more directly the role of the military and their responsibility to civilian populations during an operation, including basic support if no other actor is present to do so (the so-called “vacuum” problem). In Chapter 7 I investigate the challenges and politics of humanitarian work and humanitarian space. I examine the difficulties of humanitarian NGOs in upholding humanitarian principles, not least neutrality and independence, with warring parties that want to make use of humanitarian work to increase their credibility in a region. In this case, NGO concerns regarding NATO forces and government officials threatening their humanitarian space does not appear to apply equally to Taliban forces and their “shadow” governing structures through the IEA (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan). The more conflictual the context in which military and civilian actors find themselves, the more likely that their agendas and mandates not only do not support each other, but may also work against each other. I additionally discuss the use of the term “humanitarian” and how it is employed in practice by agencies or NGOs that engage in both humanitarian and development type of activities, blurring the lines between politicized and apoliticized work. These problems are rarely discussed though they contribute to some of the most serious issues confronting civil-military interaction. It is necessary to have direct and open discussions about crucial difficulties experienced by many civil-military actors that go unacknowledged in the Norwegian model.

Introduction

27

I focus on “military-military” cooperation in Chapter 8, and come with three primary recommendations. I argue that military-military cooperation regarding the development of civil-military interaction, both with regard to CIMIC but also to civil-military interaction overall, is crucial to future policies and practices in civilmilitary interaction and overall operational planning for individual nations, NATO and the UN. Although the CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE), a NATO accredited education and training organization specializing in civil-military cooperation, is mandated with revisions and updates of relevant doctrine and education and training, far too few nations contribute directly to the organization resulting in reduced critical capacity in doctrinal development. I come additionally with three recommendations relating to future civil-military interaction development. My first recommendation is for tighter cooperation between those developing gender adviser and gender field adviser functions, and CIMIC, as all these functions require a similar knowledge base in complex civil-military relationships, as well as are challenged by the civil-military interface in similar ways. My second recommendation focuses on an issue that has received far too little attention in the civil-military literature (and which I hope to write more about in following publications) and that is regarding the use of civil-military competencies in high intensity operations. I focus upon “targeting” as an area in which civil-military knowledge is especially crucial. My last recommendation regards the development of education and training in the area of civil-military interaction. In Chapter 9 I turn my focus back to Norway, as an example of one NATO member that ought to revisit its policies in civil-military interaction. I draw on a number of examples of how Norwegian authorities have claimed the Norwegian model has been successful, and compare these to some on-the-ground experiences by Norwegian civilian and military personnel. The assumed advantages accrued by the model are not borne out by experience in Afghanistan. I further explore what are the potential results (based on previous experience) of eliminating a civilmilitary capacity like CIMIC. What advantages or disadvantages result? It is my contention that reducing civil-military capacities brings little to no advantage to future operations. In the concluding chapter, Chapter 10, I review some of the main arguments presented in the previous chapters, and draw on some final examples that illustrate further the complexity and challenges of this civil-military field of theory and practice that cannot be reduced to a weak policy that calls simply for a “divide but coordinate” approach to all civil-military contexts. Many times this simplistic approach will be impossible, and will instead need adjustment according to context. The challenges of the Norwegian model do demonstrate however that far more discussion is needed to address the civil-military interface for future operations, and not just for Norway.

28

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

The goal of this book is first and foremost to contribute to knowledge, particularly for military actors, regarding how to best respect the principles of humanitarianism within civil-military interaction as the Norwegian model recommends, while at the same time recognizing the realities of differing contexts on “the ground” that civil-military actors must face. A second and closely related goal is to foster debate, particularly between the national (particularly Norwegian) ministries and the armed forces, as well as other actors relevant to civil-military interaction. In this case it is the Norwegian government, in the end, that is responsible for providing adequate guidance as well as flexibility for those who will represent its political goals in crisis situations and complex operations, and it is therefore the experiences, interests, and thoughts of actors on the ground, even those thoughts that are contrary to government rhetoric, that need to be engaged and addressed appropriately. In a 2010 issue of the journal “Samtiden” Jonas Gahr Støre, one of Norway’s previous Ministers of Foreign Affairs, expressed a wish to encourage debate and dialogue over the core issues challenging Norway today (Støre 2010). In this article the former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005–2012) specifically noted the importance of role clarity and coordinated engagement of civil and military actors, emphasizing the importance of the Norwegian model to Norway’s foreign policy practices civil-military approaches are an important facet of Norwegian international engagement. However, as already noted, and as will be demonstrated, neither the model nor the relevant ministries have supported debate, nor been an effective support for those who must operationalize the Norwegian model in the field. As noted by senior researcher Ståle Ulriksen at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), “Those of us who investigate these issues continue to say things about it, but nothing ever results” (translation mine) (Akerhaug 2010a).

Chapter 2

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction: Security, Legitimacy, Authority and Obligation The practice of militaries interacting and coordinating with civilian groups or organizations has a long history (Zaalberg 2006). However, it was a crisis situation in Europe that spurred on a renewed evaluation and enthusiasm for the notion of civil-military interaction, although the importance and influence of the civilmilitary relationship, and the importance of non-kinetic activities, has long been relevant to military strategy and tactics (Sun Tzu 1993). It was clear during the Balkans crisis that security involved much more than a use of force by the military to create a safe and secure environment, and that an adequate response to the crisis “exceeds the coping capacity of any single agent or institution” (Rietjens and Bollen 2008). The notion of “civil-military interaction” (or “cooperation”) was therefore re-born in Europe during the Balkans crisis, and it was here in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina that the importance of a civilian role, in combination with the military, once again came to the fore (Pugh 2000). What this meant however, both conceptually and practically, remained in many ways unclear. It can refer to the relations between militaries and the citizenry of the same state itself, or to those relations between a “foreign” military and a “local host population” and civilian institutions (local and international), all of whom are relevant to international peace operations and complex emergencies. Much of the theorization of civil military relations focuses on the democratic control of armed forces as an aspect of security sector development and reform (Bland 1999, Bland 2001). Work is has also been done regarding the civil-military relationship between foreign militaries, humanitarian agencies, development organizations, government ministries and the local populations to whom they are ideally meant to provide security. Michael Pugh (Pugh 2001: 109) defines this second approach to civil-military relations broadly, stating that it consists of “relations between external military forces and internal civilian authorities or society; between internal regular or irregular forces and external civilian agencies; and between the external military and civilian components of interventions”. These multiple actor relationships are not uncontroversial. Relations between actors are characterized by power dynamics and structural discontinuities and “based upon the parties’ different roles in society, normative values, resources, authority positions and social interests … they have turned civil-military cooperative relations into multi-level, highly complex dynamics on their own” (Rietjens and Bollen 2008). At the same

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

30

time, all of these actors are crucial to security (from state-based and international to human security) and require a carefully negotiated balance to ensure that the needs of multiple actors are heard (politics) and provided (security). What makes these relationships all the more complex is their employment by institutions such as NATO, the UN or the EU, where the institutions themselves have different mandates, but are dependent upon many of the same national militaries working together with many civilian organizations and populations. Concerns have been raised, largely by NGOs but also by some international organization agencies such as OCHA regarding military incursions upon areas that are considered civil domain. These concerns highlight a number of challenges: the “divisions of labour” between militaries and civilian organizations, the use of humanitarianism to justify military action, the relationship between a military presence and attacks on civilian organizations, distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, how to share information between civilian organizations and military, and armed escorts of civilians (Winslow 2002, Damen and Olislagers 2004, Mockaitis 2004, Donini 2007). Additional concerns include the balance between local ownership of security production and the imposition of external forces and/or military forces, the ability of external forces to support local efforts in meaningful and productive ways, and the extent to which external forces further disrupt patterns of social cohesion within and between local communities and civilian organizations in times of crisis (Donini 2007). The following four sections of this chapter briefly outline some important theoretical concerns that should be taken into account when thinking about civilmilitary interaction in general. Paramount considerations include context (what is the situation in which civil-military interaction should be taking place?), the politics of security (the level of politicization of the context and the political positions of the actors), and the roles of legitimacy, authority and obligation. Context … one of the challenges with peacebuilding is both understanding context and measuring impact. (Harborne 2012: 50)

The concerns delineated in the previous section often reflect the particular dynamics of the crisis situation/context in question, ranging from natural disasters such as earthquakes, tidal waves or hurricanes, to man-made crises including large-scale conflict and war. Civil-military interaction becomes more controversial the more “political” the situation is: efforts to save people from a tidal wave are perceived as less politically motivated by intervening actors than complex emergencies or conflict that embody one or more political dimensions. A model of civil-military interaction needs to address the challenges that arise between actors of different and often unequal power in an environment that is characterized by extensive loss of life and violence, massive displacement of people, damaged and/or dysfunctional

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

31

economies, and where there is a clear and large-scale need for humanitarian assistance but it is hindered by political and military “constraints” as well as by “significant security risks” (Keen 2008). The latter characteristics, political and military constraints coupled with security risks, largely distinguish natural catastrophes from crises of conflict or complex emergencies. UN organizations and humanitarian and development NGOs have been increasingly employed in these crisis situations as primary relief providers (Harris and Dombrowski 2002). Mary Kaldor refers to these complex emergencies as “new wars”, where there exists a blurring of distinctions between war, organized crime and large-scale violations of human rights (Kaldor 2007). The trend therefore has been a focus, by combatants, on “population control or even elimination as a strategic objective” (Harris and Dombrowski 2002). The apparent focus on populations and population control by combatants/insurgents, the intervention of multiple actors such as donor/ troop contributing nations, militaries and aid organizations, and the impacts on and reactions by local populations living in war-torn and aid dependent societies (Hughes 2009), have made civil-military interaction blurry, confusing, and all the more relevant and important to understand how it functions according to the specific context. The ways in which donor/troop-contributing nations characterize the conflict or post-conflict settings they engage in can either help or hinder when attempting to determine contexts. A good example is the characterization of the conflict in Afghanistan by the Norwegian government and others, whereby the activities in Afghanistan have mostly been characterized as a “peace operation”. Counterinsurgency doctrine also characterizes operations such as in Afghanistan as stability operations, equates this with “peace support” operations (US Army 2007), which are in turn equated largely with low-intensity operations. Already in the Afghan case, as well as Iraq, such assumptions (peace operations = stability = low intensity) have been challenged, as the context often changes rapidly from low to high intensity fighting, and the needs of the civil-military relationship shift accordingly (see below). Though it is arguably the case that peace is the end goal, and therefore the operation can be characterized as such, this characterization is very general and vague, and often unhelpful when determining context and understanding needs on the ground. Peace operations (starting with the definition used by the Norwegian government) are defined as those operations which contribute to international stability and security, in solidarity with the international community and in accord with the obligations of membership in the UN and NATO.1 This definition allows for a wide mandate, but not necessarily the consent of the host nation. Therefore cases like Afghanistan, the case of air strikes in Libya, and even to some degree Iraq, would qualify as peace operations though all three are considerably different 1 See the government of Norway website on peace operations (fredsoperasjoner): http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/tema/sikkerhetspolitikk/fredsbevarende-operasjoner. html?id=441848 (accessed April 2011).

32

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

interventions. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, is not considered a UN force, but has a “peace enforcement” mandate through Chapter VII of the UN Charter.2 Although the Norwegian government refers to the conflict in Afghanistan as a “peace operation”, it does little to go further regarding in what way this is a peace operation and how the term “peace” is used when endorsing the use of force, particularly when that use of force is supporting one particular warring party. Such details toward characterizing the context are very important to better understand the demands placed on the civil-military interface. Variable, acceptable uses of force follow from different approaches from peacekeeping to peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcement. These are distinct activities, ideally assumed by distinct actors (DPKO 2008). Peacemaking and peace enforcement generally take place when conflict is still active, or rather, when things are still unstable enough that conflict flares up quite easily (ibid.). Peacemaking employs diplomatic action to bring the parties of a conflict to the negotiating table and eventually to a peace agreement. This activity relies largely on government, ministry, IO officials, NGOs and/or other independent officials to bring warring parties to the table and to agreement (in accordance with the UN Chapter Chapter VI) (Forsvarets stabskole 2007). Peace enforcement allows for coercive measures including the use of force. Peace enforcement is generally (but not always) authorized by the Security Council mandated through the UN Charter Chapter VII, at times employing other regional organizations (such as NATO) which operationalize the enforcement of peace (ibid.). Not only does peace enforcement involve the use of kinetic tools or the use of force, but just as important, such operations do not require the consent of all parties (ibid.). Peacekeeping on the other hand is designed to preserve a peace that is already established, albeit possibly weakly established through the deployment of military forces, under the auspices of UN Charter Chapter VI. At times force is applied in peacekeeping, often referred to as “robust” peacekeeping. However this is force applied usually as self-defence measures and with “the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict” (ibid.: 19). Peacebuilding is the long-term and complex process of providing stabilization through strengthening national capacities and addressing the root causes of conflict in that society (ibid.). Most of these approaches (aside from peace enforcement) assume a semblance of consent by most parties, but today’s operations are, of course, more “complex”. The United Nations refers also to “multi-dimensional” peacekeeping operations employing multiple actors and relevant to a wide variety of scenarios, including falling back into violent conflict. As such, peace operations are increasingly complicated and blurred as they are composed of all of these different activities, which do not occur in a linear fashion and can often fluctuate repeatedly between activities and stages of conflict. What it also means is that peace enforcement, although potentially mandated by the United Nations Security Council in the name 2 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-FAB4AC4D-B7B4C844/natolive/topics_6936 6.htm (accessed April 2011).

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

33

of international peace and security, can nevertheless resemble taking sides in a conflict (either the side of the governing body which requires support to gain control and establish governance, or on the side of group(s) fighting against repressive regimes that are identified as a threat to international peace and security). In the UN context however, all of these activities presuppose an assumption of a postconflict status (even if violence still erupts on occasion) (ibid.). Multi-dimensional operations are also acknowledged to be considerably more political than so-called traditional peacekeeping consisting of observation and supervision of cease-fires and acting as a buffer between parties (ibid.). This also affects the perception of the United Nations as a potential neutral actor in these conflicts, as well as the perceptions of actors acting on its behalf, at least in the eyes of the conflicting parties. All of these activities will affect the ways in which different actors can interact with each other, how they will be perceived by other actors, and their room to manoeuvre. These activities also raise the question regarding how we interpret the notion of “peace” and what activities can be related to it. NATO refers to the above activities under a more broad category called “crisis management operations” which includes both collective defence crises (Article 5 operations), and crisis response operations (non-Article 5 operations) “loosely” referred to as peacekeeping operations.3 Under the heading of “peace support operations” NATO includes peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacebuilding, as well as conflict prevention and humanitarian operations. The definitions are similar to those of the UN, but here NATO is more explicit under “peace enforcement”, whereby it is explicitly acknowledged that consent amongst all of the conflicting parties has not been established or at least remains uncertain. This makes peace enforcement even more political as it implies establishing peace with the use of force against the will of at least one warring party (or at least without the consent of that party). In looking for recent examples, this most resembles the situation in Afghanistan, as well as in Libya. The various definitions that relate to and nuance the notion of “peace operations” become even more complicated by the use of terms like “high intensity”, “low intensity”, “asymmetrical” and “stability” conflicts, and whether the resulting operations are focused at the political, strategic, operational or tactical levels. The terms “high” and “low” intensity have been frequently used to describe the context (the conflict level) of operations taking place over the past two decades, but their use has been unclear in relation to each other and to the peace operations jargon that is often simultaneously employed. Formally defined, high intensity operations pertains to conflicts where the existence of the state is 3 See the NATO website “Crisis Management” for definitions: http://www.nato.int/cp s/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed September 2011). Article 5 is found in the NATO Washington Treaty and states that an armed attack on a NATO member is considered an armed attack on all members, and that collectively the members will respond to such an attack if deemed necessary. See “What is Article 5?” at http://www.nato. int/terrorism/five.htm (accessed 7 June 2013).

34

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

under threat and all societal and technological means, civilian and military, are engaged in war, usually in a traditional state-on-state (may include allies) conflict between conventional military forces, and has the potential to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons (Forsvarets stabskole 2007, Norheim-Martinsen et al. 2011). In contrast, low intensity conflicts are defined in relation to political/military conflicts designed to fulfil a variety of goals that can be defined as political, military, social, economic or psychological objectives (ibid.). These conflicts can often be long term, and “ranges from diplomatic, economic and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency” (TRADOC 1988: 2).4 Low-intensity conflicts are generally restricted to a limited geographical area, and are limited in their use of weapons, tactics, and level of violence as compared to high intensity conflicts (ibid.). The terminology can be misleading however, as low intensity conflicts can generate the impression that the violence level or conflict level is low, reducing the kinetic/combat demands of a military operation, exemplified by one analysis that claims: “In low intensity conflicts, the international forces will typically be engaged in non-military assignments such as minor law enforcement tasks, support to the civilian community and building local or national institutions” (Norheim-Martinsen et al. 2011: 12). Asymmetrical warfare generally falls under the same or similar definition as low intensity conflict as it refers to the unequal balance in capacities between combatants (warring parties), additionally including potentially significant differences in strategy and tactics. Counter-insurgency is commonly characterized in this way, where regular and/or special military forces fight against insurgencies and/or uprisings that are not organized in the same way as regular (state-based) forces. Many conflicts that are characterized as “low intensity” however have experienced levels of violence that are high, at least reaching levels of middle intensity (regional conflicts employing conventional weapons) (Forsvarets stabskole 2007), resulting in significant and regularly occurring casualties and damage. Asymmetrical warfare, implies a mixed intensity (from high to low) of fighting or combat, in a so-called “low intensity conflict”. Low intensity conflict can still be characterized by a regularity of high intensity operations that are heavily focussed upon war fighting. In some cases, the above – low intensity conflicts involving asymmetrical warfare – have been handled through what are called “stability operations”, which are intended to reduce the conflict level between two or more parties with the intention of creating or maintaining peace, and are often long-term in duration requiring a mix of efforts from both civilian and military actors (Forsvarets stabskole 2007). The tasks of the operation are broad, ranging from maintaining agreements between conflicting parties, providing security through surveillance and policing-type activities, and when necessary engaging in fighting in the event of escalating conflict (ibid.). The definition for stabilization operations is 4 This 1988 definition has been used in various military and academic sources, including the 2007 Norwegian Combined Operative Doctrine (translated directly to Norwegian).

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

35

very similar to peace operations (and the various permutations embedded within that concept). Thus, there is considerable overlap between concepts, though with limited clarity within and between them. Much of the emphasis thus far has been on lowintensity conflict which is handled through the vast majority of the operation types discussed above, all of which imply considerable interaction between civilian and military actors, as many of the operation types count on civilian input, either to a small or a significant degree. Future operations may be moving towards a different combination of actors, and different combinations of intensity, than what we have been used to in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here I refer to operations in low intensity conflicts that rely heavily upon military actors, where local/target region civilian actors have far less room to manoeuvre (if at all), or operations that are reliant upon political/defence civilian actors (like civilian defence and/or intelligence agencies) (Crisis Group 2013). These operations (as opposed to the conflicts themselves) are characterized as “high intensity”, employed in relation to shortterm, deadly conflict between conventional military forces and non-conventional combatants associated within stability, low intensity, or asymmetrical warfare contexts, which can be called “short-term high intensity operations” (NorheimMartinsen et al. 2011: 10). Another characteristic is the increasing reliance upon technology and special forces rather than large troop deployments. This operation type recognizes the potential for and frequency of intense combat operations outside of the high-intensity conflict context, and acknowledges the likelihood for a stronger military presence (in comparison to civilian) during periods of low intensity conflict. The likelihood for such operations is very relevant for civilmilitary interaction, not least when conflict or fighting intensity is high and civilian actors are limited in their abilities to manoeuvre. Interaction between the different types of civilian actors and military actors become all the more crucial. In other words, civil-military interaction is relevant in all operation types. The purpose of the above discussion is to illustrate the ways in which our terminology that tells us about the context are so very important. “Peace operation” is a broad catch-all term that covers many different scenarios but might be too vague, not least when it is difficult to establish what is meant specifically, and if consent has been given by all parties. If the end goal is “peace”, does that make any use of force a “peace” operation? Despite a “peace enforcement” mandate, ISAF refers to its operation in Afghanistan as a military operation, not a peace operation. These distinctions are important, as they determine the nature and potential of the civil-military interaction that will or could take place in a given context. It also means it is not possible to have a “one-size-fits-all” approach to civilmilitary interaction. We see this problem in the development of an overarching universalized “comprehensive approach” (strategic/political level) that reflects the ideal goals of organizations, agencies and ministries but is often inflexible and does not function well on the ground (where civil-military interaction is practiced) in different contexts. A move towards finding synergies in comprehensive approaches rooted in mutual principles but based on how these approaches are

36

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

practiced on the ground, can be achieved when analysed through a multiple actor security framework. Questions of legitimacy, authority, and obligation arise and operate differently in fluctuating contexts of security. It also means that key actors in the civil-military interface require enough training and competence to be able to understand the differences and operate accordingly. Visions of the Political and Security: A Multi-actor Security Framework Defining security is a political process, which means there is no single definition which corresponds to a reality ‘out there’ across time. (Fierke 2007)

Civil military interaction is often perceived instrumentally, as a feature of complex emergencies which require a variety of techniques, practices and approaches to allow cooperation or coordination to go as smoothly as possible between actors (Rietjens 2006, Coning 2007, de Coning 2007, Rietjens and Bollen 2008). Such approaches to civil-military interaction are necessary as they have a practical utility for those operating in the field, as well as insights for those interested in the dynamics of complex emergencies. Often these analyses focus on the role of the military function CIMIC as it is a key tool with which to operationalize civil-military interaction. It is also valuable, however, to take a step back from the field and discuss the broader implications of civil-military interaction and what it means to the overall operation, the strategic goals of nations, and not least, its relevance to the people most affected in complex emergencies. Civil-military interaction has been analysed in particular in relation to performance measurement, complexity and coherence (ibid.). Links to security theory have also been made, in particular human security, and positive security (Knight 2008, Hoogensen Gjørv 2012). I argue here that understanding civilmilitary interaction in light of security is crucial to understanding the relevance and role of civil-military activities and functions such as CIMIC during all different types of operations. Often non-kinetic functions (aside from Intelligence) are relegated to secondary support tasks and concerns in relation to the “main” job of the military, that of war fighting (kinetic). There is no question that war fighting is a core task of the military, but it is not a task that is conducted without considerable planning, preparation and follow-through, which relies upon nonkinetic activities and functions. Part of the planning and preparation needs to include a complete as possible picture of the operational environment. This includes not just knowledge about combatants (including warring parties such as organized state-based armed forces as well as insurgents and also, at times, private military and security contractors), but also non-combatants who often play significant and influential roles in creating security or insecurity in various ways such as international organizations, NGOs, and not least local civilians. Ideally, civil-military functions such as CIMIC contribute to the monitoring and understanding of diverse security dynamics taking place in the area of operations

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

37

so that combat, when it needs to take place, will have the least negative overall impact, reducing collateral damage and potential backlash. The concept of human security draws attention to the security dynamics taking place at the level of civilians/non-combatants/non-state actors (UNDP 1994, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, Wibben 2008). The focus is the individual, that is, focusing on how individuals and communities perceive and understand their own security as well as how these non-state actors contribute to enhancing their security on the basis of their perceptions. The development of this concept was in large part a response to a lack of acknowledgement of the civilian experience of security in so-called “traditional” approaches to security. These traditional approaches have focused on the state as the primary security referent (or target) for security, as well as the primary security actor, the one which creates or shapes security (Walt 1991, Hough 2008). It was clear in the 1990s that the fixation on the state and its existence often had little to do with the way security was experienced “on the ground”. It also had become increasingly clear that the state was by no means the sole security actor, particularly in conditions of weak or failed states where civilians have had to rely on other sources, including themselves, to establish some semblance of security to manage their day-to-day existences. Understanding the needs and capacities of civilians, and how they understand and manage their security needs, is crucial for any other security actor who will operate in the same environment. The notions of positive and negative security can help the civil-military security analyst (CIMIC, gender adviser, etc.) to reflect upon human security. Negative security relies considerably upon state actors and use of force, and positive security includes non-violent measures and non-state actors, and to theorize what this distinction might imply for civil-military interaction (UNDP 1994, Knight 2008, Hoogensen Gjørv 2012). Positive and negative security reflect the tensions within the ways security has been conceptualized, who provides security and how, and how scholars and practitioners themselves place a “value” on security. Negative security relates to the treatment of security as a concept we wish to avoid, a concept that should be invoked as little as possible. We value it negatively because it represents the use of force. On the other hand, the concept of security has also been known to represent something that is positively valued, or as something that is good or desired, providing a foundation to pursue our needs and interests and enjoy a full life (Roe 2008, Hoogensen Gjørv 2012). Negative security thus can be understood as “security from” (a threat) and positive security as “security to” or enabling. Negative security is often associated with what is often called “traditional security” that assumes a universally defined actor called “the state” with state-centric security issues and interests, addressed by a universally agreed upon tool of security – the military. In other words – security is about the state and its preservation through the use of the military. All states are assumed to operate with the same security interests, and therefore threats to states (and the use of the military to mitigate against these threats) are universalized on the basis of generic, state-based characteristics. However, the identification

38

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

of threats and the subsequent understanding about the use of violence plays a significant role in how we understand and practice security. A sole focus upon the state gives us only part of the security picture if we ignore other actors. It also gives a distorted view of security as a concept that is solely and intimately linked with the use of force/violence. The link between the use of force and security thus reduces the possibilities for recognizing multiple actors because we do not acknowledge multiple actors employing violence. Thus negative security has been dominated by a “uni-actor” understanding of security, whereby the concept ought to be a limited, one-actor, state-centric concept as it invokes the deployment of the most extreme measures (usually the military) to address issues of immediate and existential danger. When the state invokes security-producing measures to protect the state however, these same measures may or do have a deleterious effect on other actors, like individuals and communities, who may feel inclined to respond to ensure their own security. Positive security reflects a different, but also central, foundation for security: a concept that is enabling, and based on a foundation of trust. Trust is established more easily through non-violence means, through negotiation, compromise, and dialogue. “Everyday” security (associated with individuals and communities), which reflects positive security, assumes the existence of trust created through good governance, respect for the law, cooperation, and an open society. In an environment of trust, security actors (individuals, communities) can further build (enabled) upon those values and priorities that contribute to their own understanding of what makes them secure. Positive security asks how, for whom, and by whom, security is produced, exposing the values and contexts behind practices of security. It makes visible and prioritizes non-state actors, attempting to “know” security that affects individuals every day. Positive security therefore has much in common with some of the human security literature that recognizes individuals and communities as security actors (Hoogensen and Stuvøy 2006, Stern 2006, Scharffscher 2011). These actors endeavour to seek security, not just in relation to avoiding threats, but also to building their capacities. Many of the practices to avoid threats and build capacities are non-violent in character, including measures ranging from humanitarian and development aid, to economic, education, environmental, and other social network supports. Thus even when the state disappoints (which is not insignificant, as the state will always play a crucial role in creating a secure environment for its citizens), individuals and communities often employ their own non-violent practices to ensure security, building upon whatever resources they might have at their disposal at the time. Non-state actors also employ violence however, often to gain control where the state “is not” – where the state is unable or unwilling to be present, or to compete with the state for control of power and the monopoly of violence, at least with regard to a particular space or group of people. In this respect non-state actors compete and challenge the state on the level of negative security. They also operate in ways that reflect an understanding of what is important in positive security – by understanding how local communities function (cultural awareness,

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

39

affinity to certain communities), armed non-state actors use “everyday security” measures such as education (restricting or allowing access), economic activities, and humanitarian aid, affecting trust within and between local communities. State actors such as the military respond in kind, also acknowledging the importance of positive security and the measures associated with it, and are competing with nonstate actors for space in this area of warfare that employs no weapons. Understanding the core assumptions within positive and negative security allows us to observe and assess the field where multiple actors play a role in conflict and post-conflict settings. The ways in which conflict has developed also has a direct bearing upon how we perceive and operationalize civil-military interaction. The Napoleonic inter-state understanding of war that has dominated military and political thinking particularly since the influential work of Carl von Clausewitz published in 1832 no longer well reflects war and conflict as we see it today (Clauswitz 1976 (1832)). Although insurgencies, and guerrilla warfare has been present throughout history, state-based perceptions involving large scale, professional armies have dominated at least western political thinking until the end of the Cold War. This dominant view must increasingly, and I would say permanently, share space with the complex conflict formations we have seen over the past two decades, moving from large armies fighting against each other to a complex combination of a variety of actors vying to gain control (host nation military, intervention militaries, combating political opponents, criminals), while other “civilian” or non-combatant actors are more actively engaging within the same area of operations (Kaldor 2007). The increase of acknowledged actors as well as the complexities behind interventions (consent-based or support to one side of a conflict) also affects the ways in which third parties or international organizations are able to interact with other actors as well as how they are perceived, rendering now classical notions such as “peacekeeping” as less relevant (Soderlund et al. 2008). In many instances combatants have no intention of responding to diplomatic efforts or laying down arms at the behest of international actors which claim a moral authority on behalf of the international community (ibid.). Even though the playing field has changed or expanded regarding actors, tactics and strategies, Clausewitz’s insights about the link between politics and conflict/war, whereby the latter is the extension of the former (“war is a mere continuation of politics by other means”) remains not only relevant, but perhaps even more significant. The politics of multiple actors in a complex emergency has affected the nature and development of civil-military interaction, and these politics play a central role in the analysis of how civil-military interaction is understood or operationalized. In fact, the politics of the intervening actors themselves has become a source of conflict. Even if the international community attempts to move towards a dominant state-on-state warfare focus again, it will be impossible to ignore the ever-present complexity of these multiple actors and their various political agendas and goals in the conflict. The relationship between the political and military machinery cannot be underestimated, as it has been a constant factor in the development of conflict.

40

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

The “political”, however, refers not only to state-based bodies and actors, but includes the political goals of non-state actors vying for power (Smith 2005). In a complex emergency the host-nation and local non-state actors use the conflict to achieve political goals, as do international intervening actors, such as troopcontributing nations, using military strategy and tactics to achieve their political agendas. Private military and security contractors may represent multiple agendas from that of their employers (which can be state or non-state actors in the region) to that of their own agencies (Ulam Weiner 2005–6). Not all actors involved in the complex emergency are politicized in the same way, whereby, for example, development NGOs may reflect political agendas without overtly “choosing sides” as combatants or intervening states might do. Media (print, radio, television, internet) also reflect political biases in their reporting of the crises, having the capacity to influence their public (local actors or international actors) to varying degrees. Then there are those whose politics are impartial or neutral, at least, where the warring parties (combatants) are concerned. Humanitarian NGOs, which are distinct from development or other more directly politically inclined NGOs, struggle particularly to maintain a necessary political distance from other actors in order to have better access to those they deem most vulnerable. Lastly, but not least, are the people (local populations) themselves, who are often the subjects of focus of all of the above actors, either as beneficiaries of humanitarian or development aid, or as citizens/subjects who are convinced, influenced, coerced, or forced to be a part of the political agendas that play a role in the conflict. This does not mean that the local population is a passive recipient of such influence, or are apolitical – members of a population can and do play central roles in providing a sense of security, stability, and direction for a community. All of these actors embody a set of values that they prioritize and which informs their vision of the political, or rather their perception of security (Wibben 2011). Some actors, both military and civilian, engage in positive-security oriented projects or activities to attempt to build trust, and/or attempt to contribute to a semblance of security that people have the capacity to build upon and stabilize their lives once again. Others might create insecurity (political and military actors with regime-changing or state-building goals) with a purpose to generate a new system that prioritizes their own values and political projects, creating a different vision of the political, a different framework for security. Thus one’s understanding of security depends upon the political agenda or political vision of the relevant actors. Why should we care? Should it not suffice to think of security largely in terms of military action and the protection of the state, and leave other actors out of the security picture? There are some who might still argue for this, not least for the simplicity and elegance of an approach that restricts itself to only a few possible variables and scenarios. Experience has shown however that both military as well as their political leadership need to be aware of who and what else is influencing security and security perceptions in their area of operations. The multitude of operation types and scenarios (see above) provide just one demonstration of

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

41

this. Civil-military interaction need to include the operationalization of a multiactor security perspective, by including if not prioritizing the roles and security perceptions of citizens who can be influential (in a helpful or detrimental manner) during all phases of an operation. Civilians across the political spectrum (from humanitarian to government to local populations) are also security actors, and function alongside the “traditional” (read: dominant) tool of security; the military. Using an actor-based security framework, various actors, from communities and individuals to researchers, policy makers, state-based security practitioners (military, police), AOGs (Armed Opposition Groups), and private security agencies/NGOs/industry participate and articulate their perceptions of threats and assess their capacity to cope address these threats, in concert with others. In other words, the state and the military are no longer the only “security” actors, particularly where human security is concerned (Hasegawa 2007). Government, military and policy makers are not always the leading actors of security, nor need to (nor should) intervene at all levels of identified human in/security, however they can act as important conduits for the facilitation of knowledge between communities and actors (liaison), as well as respond to human in/securities when communities can no longer effectively respond to threats (UNDP 1994). The framework attempts to illustrate the complexity of different actor categories in relation to each other (military category as opposed to local communities, and so forth), but it should be clear that there is also diversity within each category, where national and international leadership in ministries and international organizations (embassies, diplomats) might be distinguished from ground-level operators such as UN office personnel, development advisers, PRT commanders or Mobile Observation Team (MOT) members. These actors might be working in close proximity, in the same region, or they may be wide spread in the event of air strikes or the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). They still will impact each other, either before, during or after an operation or throughout the conflict. There is not always agreement on security perspectives between these different levels of actors, or within the different actor “categories”. A multi-actor security framework tries to reflect an image of security that includes non-state or sub-state actors when the state is not always the primary actor. A human/citizen-centred approach enters the dialogue with the supranational and global levels. This also allows the security analyst or civil-military practitioner to more explicitly recognize the relationship between non-state actors and regional/ global geopolitics (in the case of Afghanistan, the influences and manoeuvrings of Pakistan and India, Iran, and the United States, and their impacts on human security). The dialogue or communication between actors is that which we see taking place during liaison efforts on the ground, or diplomatic negotiations – not all actors are included at all times, and the power between them is rarely equal – but the interactions are taking place on various levels in different ways (Milliken and Krause 2002, Krause and Jütersonke 2005). It is necessary that these different actors, despite their power differences, will interact. Without doing so, security will be far more difficult to achieve, particularly if we rely on the military alone.

42

Figure 2.1

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Multi-actor security framework

Note: These are some of the core actor categories that are relevant to a broader understanding of security in a given context. This “dialogue” takes place in different contexts characterized by gender, race, ethnicity (see vertical axis) and political processes, resources, level of conflict (horizontal axis). It is also influenced by geopolitical factors, as well as by international and regional organizations.

The practice of civil-military interaction is thus dependent upon the nature of the crisis itself, or rather, the context (addressed in the section above), as well as upon the capabilities and priorities (security goals) of the actors themselves. If the crisis is a natural disaster where the primary objective is to take people out of immediate danger and provide them with basic security in the form of first aid, food, clothing and shelter (the March 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan serves as recent examples), the dynamics of and reaction to a civil-military response is often considerably different than if the crisis involved competing political agendas, by both those who shaped the crisis locally as well as those who are intervening. In addition to the crisis itself, and having an overview of the different relevant actors, the civil-military interface demands a knowledge about the influential factors that will affect the development of the crisis situation, and actors’ abilities to operate in the situation. These include factors relating directly to affected and affecting populations, factors of gender, ethnicity, class, age, and race. It also includes the additional circumstances of the crisis regarding, for example, resources, economies, political processes, and levels of violence (see

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

43

Figure 2.1 above). The context determines the extent to which actors can effect change or provide support in the area of operation. The context plays a significant role in determining the legitimacy, authority and obligations of multiple actors and their contributions to security. Legitimacy, Authority, and Obligation NATO has political legitimacy, military strength and logistic capabilities, but it has to accomplish its missions within timeframes that are sometimes comparatively short. NGOs have ethical legitimacy, greater freedom of action in the medium and long term and are often familiar with local cultures and contexts, but in an insecure situation they may be unable to act effectively. (Borgomano-Loup 2007: 19)

Practices in civil-military interaction require an understanding of the processes behind establishing legitimacy amongst and between actors, and their authority to act. In other words, who has the authority to act, how, and on what basis. Legitimacy and authority are both context dependent and role dependent. Civilmilitary interaction requires a level of transparency and reciprocity between actors, where there is a certain understanding/comprehension between civilian and military actors for the role of their counterparts in a given context. Legitimacy, authority and obligation imply transparency and reciprocity. Legitimacy refers to the general consent and approval of the target group (local populations, constituencies, etc.) where authority is to be exercised. Legitimacy is central to control and power either over, shared with, or supporting, for populations. Authority can be defined as legitimized power, acknowledging that legitimacy is often fluid, and authority is sometimes wielded without wide spread or popular acceptance (Hurd 1999). There are different forms of authority, depending upon the “source” of legitimacy. These include political authority (“a fusion of power with a legitimate social purpose” (Hurd 1999)), moral authority (power combined with a philosophical, religious, metaphysical, natural or any other value-based set of principles or foundation), and legal authority (power established by law). The different actors of the security framework are endowed with differing forms of legitimacy and authority according to their roles, sometimes with multiple foundations for authority. Questions about the legitimacy and authority of the host nation (questioned either by the host population and/or external actors) are used to justify/legitimate decisions to intervene in a complex emergency, at which time political and/or legal legitimacy and authority are conferred to external actors, including both military and civilian. This however can create relationships of dependency by local populations upon external actors (where external actors become service providers from everything to schooling and medical aid, to veterinary care), particularly upon long-term actors such as NGOs and IOs, and sometimes militaries. Over time, external actors working in the host nation might

44

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

still have authority, but their legitimacy reduced if the popular feeling is that there is not a timely transfer of authority to “more legitimate” institutions such as the host government, or if host populations do not see an increase or an improvement in their own security. In other words, legitimacy and authority are not static, and change over time depending on the circumstances. Recent conflicts have been characterized by a focus on populations, in particular population control (Harris and Dombrowski 2002). Ian Hurd examines control in terms of currencies of power, identifying three broad categories, coercion, selfinterest, and legitimacy (Hurd 1999). Thus control can be exercised through use of force (to the point of eliminating populations), intimidation with the threat of use of force, and/or influence through a range of tactics or approaches, including meeting the needs of local/host populations. Coercion relates to the various uses (including threats) of force, whereas meeting the needs of the local population can be construed as either self-interest (prevent insecurity “spill over” like terrorism, or generate “hearts-and-minds” benefits for military and donor/troop contributing nations), or legitimacy (often perceived as the domain of NGOs which help vulnerable populations). All of these currencies of power are forms of control, which either occur in combination with each other, or where one dominates over the others in specific contexts (ibid.). Some actors wish to have control without necessarily having legitimacy (ibid.), whereas other actors are concerned about levels of legitimacy that inform the extent of authority and power that they can wield. Control in the civilmilitary setting is complex, as it is spread unevenly amongst the different actors in the security dynamic. All actors, from military, to government/ministerial to NGO and local community leaders, attempt to exercise forms of control over populations, either to win them over or to protect them or both. This is particularly the case in the civil-military relationship, where different actors vie for control through the use of force (military) or use of claims to competence (various civilian organizations) to argue for the legitimacy and authority of their roles in relation to civilian populations. Sometimes competing claims for control over populations (between militaries and NGOs, for examples) will work to disenfranchise or depower local populations, even if that is not the intended consequence. The debates between external actors like militaries and NGOs/IOs about control and legitimacy need to be constantly vigilant over how their own legitimacy functions in relation to other actors, and that determination over legitimacy and authority ought to rest, ultimately, in the hands of local populations. Thus, civil-military interaction is often characterized by a mix of moral, political and legal authority. Militaries are endowed with the political and legal authority to act, but sometimes due to a lack of moral authority and legitimacy amongst affected constituents (local populations), they might meet with resistance. Often NGOs are considered to have a legal (IHL) and moral authority, particularly when acting on the basis of a humanitarian mandate to help people in need, but may also suffer legitimacy issues if they have not convinced their potential beneficiaries of their merit (Hilhorst 2003), or regarding their relationships with donor countries and the challenges of national/international aid systems (Tvedt 2007).

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

45

Governments, both host nation and donor/troop contributing nation, employ political and legal authority, but also to some degree moral authority when making claims and pronouncements regarding the need (their perceived responsibility) to protect civilians from harm and suffering. The extent of authority is connected to legitimacy with the local population, but is not always dependent upon it. At times, the political authority of the host government, despite its weaknesses, might hold more weight with communities than does the moral authority of NGOs, if in the end the host nation government means greater long-term stability and independence. Thus legitimacy and authority to act are important components of the civil-military relationship and depend greatly upon the context of the crisis situation. An example of how legitimacy and authority function in the civil-military interactive sphere is with regard to the notion of “competence”. The type of authority an actor has says a great deal about the alleged competence that actor has in a given situation. During a natural disaster, for example, where the military is not identified as having a partisan or highly political role (combatant), the military may be seen as having considerable competence to assist in humanitarian efforts in rescuing vulnerable populations. Rapid mobilization, logistical and organizational skills, manpower, available emergency supplies, and the ability to evaluate the security of a situation may be very welcome military assets in a natural disaster humanitarian operation. However, the same skills are not always applauded in a context where the military are additionally combatants in a complex emergency. In the latter context militaries have been accused of not having the competence to carry out humanitarian efforts, both for lack of a capacity to determine needs, as well as for blurring a combat role with a humanitarian role. This critique of competence often has less to do with the actual capability of doing the work, than it has to do with the legitimacy of the particular actor in question (the military) doing the work. Thus legitimacy plays a very large role in assessments of competence and how different actors can wield authority. Lastly I would like to address one of the more challenging factors that also play a role in civil-military interaction, that of “obligation”. Ideally actors will be able to carry out their duties prescribed by the mandates, resolutions and principles that are meant to guide their actions. Even when doing so however, tensions can arise between actors given conflicting mandates and perceptions of what is needed in the operations area. But complex operations are not black and white processes. There are a lot of grey zones, and though it is important to keep close to clear operating procedures and well-defined principles, it is not always possible. Complex emergencies are rife with compromise, due to the unpredictable and insecure nature of the situation. Less than ideal solutions may have to replace ideal plans that are not possible. It may mean that a military temporarily provides humanitarian support although they are by no means the ideal actor to do so; it may mean that a humanitarian NGO compromises its principles of neutrality and independence to ensure that it reaches the vulnerable population that needs help; it may mean that donor/troop contributing nations must make hard choices between supporting NGO efforts or supporting military efforts when these actors come into

46

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

conflict. There will be occasions where actors, and more to the point, individuals within a particular organization or actor community, will have to rely on a sense of obligation, or action prescribed by a set of values based on perceptions of individual responsibilty, when legitimacy or authority are not enough to guide action. To support actors who are confronted with grey zone problems in complex emergencies and are confronted with difficult decisions where legitimacy and authority seem unclear, they may end up relying on gut instinct, rooted in a value system or institutional culture that they have been exposed to and/or followed for an extended period of time. Education and training thus play a crucial role in supporting decisions that are necessary when individual judgment is necessary. Theory Operationalized: Some Core Concepts in Practice The term “civil-military interaction” is a broad concept that is reflected through a number of specific doctrines, models, guidelines and policy approaches. Often these approaches are developed and applied by military institutions like NATO, but also by civilian organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). Thus the concept is not exclusively military, and nor should it be. Of the many approaches that abound, one can see that they range from the tactical and operational to strategic and political, including the so-called “Oslo Guidelines” (Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil-Defence Assets in Disaster Relief), NATO CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation), UN CIMIC and/or CMCoord (Civil-Military Coordination and Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination), the ICRC Code of Conduct, COIN (Counterinsurgency), the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies”, PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team), NATO Comprehensive Approach, EU Comprehensive Coordination, and the UN’s Integrated Missions, among others. These terms are all relevant to civil-military interaction, however they are by no means synonymous and do not serve similar purposes. Often however there is considerable confusion between and about these approaches, for example where the military function of CIMIC is confused with the political/military strategy of COIN or an operational unit like the PRT, or where humanitarian guidelines are assumed to be similar to, or reflective of, military approaches. Civil-military interaction is further complicated by the vague slogans it elicits in popular media. Typical statements on civil-military interaction include: “there is no military solution”; “we need a unified approach”; “there needs to be a political solution”, “civil and military activities should be separate”, and references to and criticisms of gaining the “hearts-and-minds” of local populations in complex emergencies. What is clear, however, is that civil-military interaction is a key concern for both civilian and military actors, and that the proliferation of models and guidelines demonstrate a desire for better preparation in this field.

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

47

Some of the concepts that lie under the civil-military interaction umbrella are a part of strategy, some are understood and practiced as doctrines, guidelines or units within a given operation, and some civil-military concepts are instead functions (roles or positions) that are relevant in all operations but may not play a role at all levels (strategic, operational, tactical).5 In which ways these doctrines and functions are relevant depends on the context of and the strategy behind the operation, but as long as the operation has an impact on civilian actors, civilmilitary functions would have a role to play. Concepts that are relevant to the strategic level include the “Comprehensive Approach” or Integrated missions”, whereas those concepts that are more operation specific include counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) that is additionally fine-tuned to the context (Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.). Bridging the operational (planning) and tactical levels (implementation of tasks) one finds military functions such as CIMIC. The comprehensive approach reflects a broad (but often vaguely or poorly defined) strategy for ensuring that critical but diverse efforts from civilian and military actors can ensure a stable and secure society in what is considered to be a problem area, for example, a country that either is considered a weak or failed state which one or more other nations wish to stabilize according to their own premises for the purposes of national and/ or global security (Wendling 2010). NATO and the European Union (EU) have played significant roles in attempting to define and operationalize this strategy. The UN has focused on a similar strategy that is referred to as “Integrated Missions” but which also is characterized by a lack of agreement about how this strategy is to be defined. In general and overall, these different approaches attempt to ensure that they are sensitive to the needs of core actors such as humanitarians, as well as prioritize human rights and development. At the same time it is recognized that there is a need for coordination between multiple actors and stakeholders to achieve the overall strategy of peace and security (particularly human security) and stability (Barth Eide et al., May 2005). As noted above, the manifestations of civil-military interaction at the operational level include COIN (counterinsurgency) doctrine, and the PRT structure which has been used in Afghanistan and Iraq, though operationalized somewhat differently and with different success rates as the two contexts differ considerably. Afghanistan has been considered to be a more complex and difficult context (Ollivant, 22 August 2012). COIN bridges the strategic and operational. It is so broad and implies so many factors for the operational level that it also requires 5 Simply defined, the different levels are: the strategic level where one or more nations (such as in an alliance) determine the strategic security objectives for that nation/group of nations and direct national resources towards achieving these objectives; the operational level where campaigns and operations are planned and carried out in a specific area of operations or theatre of operations for the purpose of achieving the strategic objectives; the tactical level is where specific battles or tasks are carried out as part of the operation (DOD Dictionary of Military terms, at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/, accessed 27 August 2012).

48

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

the articulation of an overarching strategy and set of goals. The process of defining COIN illustrates this bridge, where it is understood as the “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (US Army 2007: 2). The doctrine “incorporates stability operations, also known as peace support operations, reconstruction, and nation building” (ibid.: xxiii) which further implies participation of diverse civilian actors and consensus between military and civilian actors toward the overarching goal. COIN doctrine appears as an attempt to serve both operational level requirements providing guidance for carrying out COIN operations, but at the same time takes on the appearance of a “global strategic concept” (ibid.: xxiv). COIN operations are also considered to be part of “broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare” (ibid.: 2). Although COIN is presented as a political and military strategy to engage in a particular type of warfare, providing operational guidelines for doing so, it is also a strategy that is heavily dependent upon cooperation with civilian counterparts, and a legitimate host nation government towards whom all of these efforts are focused. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept refers to a joint and integrated civilian and military structure intended to support a host-nation (HN) government by supporting HN activities in a given area, establish and further develop trust and unity between a HN and local populations (NATO 2009). It is a structure that can be (and has been) employed as a part of any number of measures in pursuit of a COIN strategy, although it is not necessary to COIN. The military arm of a PRT is usually responsible for establishing and maintaining physical security in a region as well as supporting the training of local security forces, while the civilian arm of a PRT would have connections with various civilian actors for humanitarian and more so development purposes, as well as potentially supporting different governance needs (establishing rule of law). Here, too, the PRT is dependent upon civilian as well as military efforts, including troopcontributing nation government officials/civilians, which ideally interface with their host nation equivalents. The above approaches and concepts are thus not relevant to or employed within each and every circumstance or complex emergency – the PRT concept and COIN have been particularly relevant to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they may or may not be directly linked to broader political goals including regime change and nation building, and may very well not be employed outside of those contexts in the future. When we get closer to the ground however, where the interactions between people take place, the military functions like CIMIC or Gender Advisers will often have relevance regardless of the type of operation and/or strategy, as they are mandated to provide an overview of the civil situation where the operation will take place no matter what the operation. Questions should be raised, before, during and after an operation, regarding goals and how to implement them, who benefits and why, and how this serves either the broader political cause and/or local populations. Lessons-learned from previous operations, even if they are not of the same type as those for the future, are crucial. Even though the context may change

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

49

(no longer in Iraq or Afghanistan), it does not mean that civil-military interaction becomes irrelevant, as this relationship manifests itself under any situation where civilian and military operators may come into contact and the ways in which they ought to coordinate, co-exist, or cooperate. Specific Military “Civil-military” Functions This book focuses on the way in which we understand civil-military interaction broadly speaking, but also how we understand specific military operational and tactical level functions, in particular the function called CIMIC. A focus on the functions is different than a focus on different strategic and operational doctrines like COIN or a PRT. One can (and should) debate the efficacy of these strategies for future operations, but such debates should not be equated to positions in the military that have as part of their assignment the security of and knowledge about civilians, regardless of the operation or strategy behind the operation. CIMIC has, as mentioned above, been conflated and confused with COIN and PRT objectives (at least in the case of Afghanistan), often without understanding this function as an independent and adaptive function that is relevant to a civil-military interface in any operational context, and not just within PRT contexts or COIN or other stability operations. CIMIC is well known for its role in international operations, but it also has potential for national/domestic civil-military operations, an issue that will be discussed later in the conclusion. In some instances NATO CIMIC is conflated with the function Civil Affairs (CA). Civil Affairs is a well-known, but largely American, function in civilmilitary interaction. It is a military function that has much in common with CIMIC but has a broader mandate than what CIMIC doctrine allows for within the NATO CIMIC function, not least that Civil Affairs can engage in activities that are specific to nation-building and governance. In other words, military personnel are then mandated to pursue activities that they interpret to be relevant to governance. Otherwise, the function is quite similar to CIMIC. Recent NATO CIMIC doctrine (the latest revision) as well as discussions coming out of the CIMIC Centre of Excellence (http://www.cimic-coe.org/) suggests however that governance issues may play a more dominant role in CIMIC activities as well, perhaps being influenced by the Civil Affairs function in the US. American Civil Affairs officers are generally found in the Army and Marine Corps, and are also included amongst Special Operations Forces (SOFs). In this book I have chosen to focus on NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), as it is this function that has been subject to considerable debate and criticism in Norway, which reflects broader critiques and debates on civil-military interaction as a whole. It is a function that increases awareness about human security issues within military planning, but at the same time, as a military function, can be considered to have too close contact with civilian communities and agencies, potentially increasing their insecurity. As I will discuss later on, CIMIC is not the

50

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

only function that is, or should be, vulnerable to these critiques. However, it can be argued that CIMIC has gained the most attention in this regard. What is CIMIC and on what assumptions did this function develop? Civilians in complex emergencies are impacted in many ways by conflict, from physical harm (death or injury) to impacts on political, social and economic structures (governance, religion, gender) upon which people rely (security of expectations) (Hoogensen 2005). Warring parties have been perceived as not being traditionally concerned with the impacts of their activities on civilians, chalking such impacts up to “collateral damage”. However, there has been an increasing recognition that warring parties, and state-based armed forces/militaries in particular, have a responsibility towards civilians and that the actions of armies are not devoid of ethical conduct. Within such a context militaries must also carry out the tasks of conflict (combat, intelligence), as well as protecting their own troops as much as possible, while other actors in the area of operation are vying for power, protection, security. This context in which civil-military interaction operates relates to the multiactor security approach where multiple actors, including civilians, negotiate a security compromise for that time and place, including negotiations with militaries. Militaries have, at the same time, become aware of the benefit of operating amongst a relatively “content” population. Keep the people content, particularly with “quick impact projects” (QIPs), and they will not resist or act against you. This latter type of interaction with local populations has been known as a form of “force protection” as well as “hearts-and-minds” and has been criticized for a lack of ethical basis, as it appears that the military use and abuse a relationship with civilians to effect their military goals (Gompelman 2011). There are many different military functions that engage in civil-military interaction. From PRT commanders, to mobile observation teams and liaison officers, reconnaissance, FETs (female engagement teams), intelligence, combat engineers, and information operations including psychological operations (PSYOPS). One function, however, has been specifically designed to address the complex nexus between civilian and military actors in complex emergencies, in part with a focus upon the support and protection of civilians. This function has been developed and employed by NATO, the EU and the United Nations, albeit in different ways. I will briefly compare the NATO and UN definitions, and then focus on NATO CIMIC, as it is the NATO approach that is reflected in the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD) (Forsvarets stabskole 2007). NATO CIMIC doctrine (AJP-3.4.9) has been recently revised and was declared in effect on 8 February 2013, and it differs somewhat from the previous NATO doctrine on civil-military cooperation (AJP 9). I will refer to both doctrines as AJP 9 was most relevant to the experiences in Afghanistan, whereas AJP-3.4.9 has significance for the future of civil-military cooperation. The definition of CIMIC has not changed from the previous doctrine and remains defined in the following way:

Theorizing Civil-Military Interaction

51

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies … The aim and purpose of CIMIC is the interaction between military and civil actors within a comprehensive environment to support the military commander’s plan. Ideally all actors will work to a common goal, but where this is not possible this interaction will ensure that activities to support each plan are harmonized as far as possible. This will minimize interference or unintended conflict between all actors. This interaction might consist of, but is not limited to, coordination, cooperation, mutual support, coherent joint planning and information exchange, covering the political mandate. It includes NATO military forces, governance and civil actors. (NATO 2013: 2–1)

NATO has additionally explored multiple additional operational and strategic civil-military interaction concepts such as the Comprehensive Approach, EBAO (Effects Based Approach to Operations), and “enhanced” CIMIC, to name a few. The UN, which has also developed concepts at both the strategic (Integrated Missions) and the tactical/operational level, defines tactical civil-military coordination as: The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to interaction. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. (Coning 2007)

The UN approach to civil-military interaction is known as Civil-Military Coordination or CMCoord and UN CIMIC (as opposed to NATO CIMIC). Both NATO and UN definitions recognize and emphasize the importance of interaction between different actors in a complex emergency context, and both demonstrate the roles between actors are defined in the overall mission to provide security and support the local environment. However UN operations are generally assumed to be “consent-based operations”, whereby the conflicting parties have agreed to a ceasefire or peace agreement and need support to maintain peace (ibid.). As well, UN operations have a civilian led approach, a role often taken by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) which works to ensure that humanitarian principles and goals guide both civilian and military activities during an emergency or natural disaster.6 The NATO definition is distinctly framed from a military perspective, whereby activities conducted by CIMIC operatives are in support of the commander and the mission. 6 See “Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)”: http://www.un ocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview (accessed 5 June 2013).

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

52

Confusion has surrounded these definitions. Not only has there been little to no discussion about the different implications of UN and NATO operations and their respective CIMIC definitions for Norwegian or other militaries who might have to engage in both functions, there has also been little to no efforts to clear up what these definitions mean in practice. This has led to multiple approaches to CIMIC by different nations. One military respondent noted that many military practitioners misunderstood the intention with the word “coordinate” thinking that “suddenly their responsibility was to facilitate and coordinate cooperation between actors” (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a).7 This was not the intention, according to the respondent. It is not the military’s responsibility to coordinate (ibid.). However, the military needs to be an actor which is included in the coordination process with information sharing where appropriate so as to shape operational planning in such a way as to minimize civilian casualties. In Part III I will discuss more about NATO CIMIC doctrine and some of the specific challenges encountered in operationalizing it in the Afghanistan context, as well as what challenges might arise in future operations.

7 All respondent quotes are translations from Norwegian to English, unless otherwise

noted.

Chapter 3

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship The previous section has addressed some of central theoretical assumptions that need to be considered when assessing and analysing approaches to civil-military interaction. I highlighted the importance of a multi-actor approach to security, and the roles of legitimacy, authority and obligation, towards understanding the complexity of civil-military interaction. These different elements of civil-military interaction will be drawn into the following discussion about the actors. The decision to focus on actors is the result of two factors relevant to the research process behind this project and book. The first factor pertains to my own background within a “widened” security studies perspective. I was interested in working with empirical examples of complex security constellations, whereby more than just the state or military were present in determining the nature and consequences of security practices. Civil-military interaction, and more specifically CIMIC, caught my attention as it was interesting to see multi-actor awareness and practices developing within and by the dominant actor in security studies – the military (Walt 1991). The claim made by military actors (including the NATO alliance) was that militaries were not capable of ensuring security alone in complex emergencies. This was, as noted earlier, connected directly to the way conflict had developed, particularly complex emergencies, requiring a greater recognition of the contributions to security by multiple actors (Rietjens and Bollen 2008). CIMIC doctrine requires that practitioners are familiar with the nature and mandates of as many actors as possible in the complex emergency context, although more often than not many of these actors are thrown together into the vague and non-distinguishable category of “civilian”. This is useful for neither for the military nor the diverse civilian actors that potentially interact with or impact one another. The second factor that highlighted the importance of actors was the interview process for this project when discussing civil-military interaction, and particularly CIMIC, from a Norwegian perspective. The importance of actors was very clear in the Norwegian context, in that role delineation was directly connected to the perceptions (images) about, and categorization of, the actor in question. An awareness of role delineation was not absent from other national perspectives (Dutch, American or Spanish, for example), but in the Norwegian context the role of actors has escalated to “turf wars” based on claims of authority (political and moral), competence and legitimacy, and lastly, security. In the period 2007–2012 the statements by representatives within the Norwegian ministries, particularly Foreign Affairs, have also been very much guided by assumptions about actors,

54

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

with a significant preference for humanitarian actors evidenced not least by the humanitarian profile in Norwegian foreign policy. I focus on the so-called Norwegian model, but this model or way of thinking also reflects the thinking behind some of the influential, humanitarian-oriented civil-military guidelines, therefore it serves as a concrete example of a more general challenge in civil-military interaction. In many of these guidelines, and additionally the Norwegian model, usually only two categories of actors are isolated. These actors were initially distinguished as “humanitarian and political” but more often reduced to “military and civilian”. The vague categorization of two types of actor leads to considerable confusion and conflation of civilian actors, often where all civilians are somehow assumed to be protected under humanitarian principles. The Norwegian discourses are by no means the only ones that encourage confusion and conflation however. The simplistic duo of the “military” and “civilian” distinction without further elaboration is often applied by many countries that operationalize civil-military interaction, including other NATO nations as well as by NATO itself and the UN (NATO 21 May 2012, UNSC 2011). It is imperative to investigate what these categories mean. One of the challenges surrounding the Norwegian model, as mentioned in the introduction, a is lack of debate about what such a model implies in practice, and to what extent the ideals of the model, which are based upon assumptions about what “military” and “civilian” mean, reflect and/or support the realities on the ground. The Norwegian model is rooted in underlying claims about security (particularly of civilians, which is reflected in the multi-actor security framework in Chapter 2), and the lack of capacity and legitimacy (moral authority) of the military to carry out certain tasks (beyond physical security) that are deemed necessary to civilian/human security. The justification of this model has not been adequately debated, rather, it is just repeatedly pointed out that militaries can cause problems, not least insecurity, for civilian actors. Although there is a degree of justification to these claims which will be explored further in subsequent chapters, they do not cover the complexity of the difficulties faced in civil-military interaction, and in particular the relations between civilians themselves and the implications of the different civilian roles. As will be discussed, despite the differences found between different national militaries, there are still many shared features that characterize military as being “military”, enabling one to identify features of a military culture that in turn has influenced perceptions about the military. This is far less the case for the category “civilian”. The common characteristic shared by civilians is that they are “not military”. Otherwise, civilian actors have diverse goals and mandates that are difficult to subsume within one vague category called “civilian”. A model that purposefully distinguishes between only two actors such as military and civilian, necessarily begs the question of who these categories must include. Civilian actors are very diverse, and represent diverse interests. The term “civilian” should not be understood as synonymous with “humanitarian”, although these two terms are all too often conflated. Civil-military interaction includes interaction between militaries and humanitarian actors, as well as with

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

55

development actors, civilian government (ministerial) actors, and not least, civilians in the community in which the military is deployed. The role of private militarized security companies (PMSCs) add another, very complex dimension as these are not military actors, might technically still qualify as civilians just because they are not military (illustrating the problem with a simplistic duality), but they have the mandate to use force. In an attempt to get a sense of the similarities and differences amongst civilian actors I have divided them into rough categories: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs),1 and state actors which include government policy makers, government-based development agencies – DA, the police (Pol), and the military (Mil) all of whom are relatively tightly linked to each other as they are equally all apparatuses of the state. Host nation communities, or the general population in the area of operations, also constitute one important category of actor. NGOs can be further distinguished between non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies (NGHAs) (IFRC/ICRC 1994, O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007).2 Private militarized security companies are a distinctive category of actor that are difficult to call “civilian” because of their use of force, but are not military either. They are also becoming an increasingly large presence in a number of complex emergencies (Higate 2012). The purpose of these categories is to be able to organize the discussions in the following chapters, but it should not be understood as the only way to organize and understand the diversity within the civilian or “non-military” sphere. My focus in this section is largely the military and the NGO/IO sector as these actors are most often referred to when discussing civil-military interaction within the Norwegian model and some of the civil-military guidelines (see Chapter 2). Government actors and local populations are also mentioned here, but more briefly. I likewise will include a brief description about the police and PMSCs, but both of these are highly complex actors requiring a more in depth focus, which I am not able to take up here. More will be said about the Norwegian government’s role as an example of a government involved in a conflict, its humanitarian policy, and the Norwegian model in Chapter 4. Civilian governmental actors, both in the host nation as well as from the donor/troop contributing countries, represent governments that have deployed these very militaries that are central to the civil-military interface and challenge. Embassy and other ministerial actors from donor/troop contributing

1 The ICRC includes International Organizations (IOs) within the category Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), perhaps to directly compare with NGOs (nongovernmental organizations). However, IO is a very familiar concept and to prevent any confusion I choose to use the term international organization and/or IO in this book. 2 More details of these distinctions can be found in Chapter 4. Otherwise, the categories I have chosen are those employed by the ICRC. I have not chosen to investigate the ICRC distinction between their use of the words “organizations” and “agencies” as employed in the terms NGHA, and NGDO, but instead focus on the content of these concepts.

56

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

nations share the political goals of their military counterparts, where the former uses diplomacy, and the other uses combinations of force. That military actors are explicitly linked to key civilian actors is no doubt pointing out the obvious. But this point is also grossly neglected and underdiscussed in debates about civil-military relationships, and has been lacking in any debate about the Norwegian model. This is largely because these debates do not adequately examine what “civilian” really means and by extension, what sorts of activities they engage in. Political civilian actors engage in activities that are closely connected to their military counterparts. Other civilian actors however, require a distance from military actors, claiming the title humanitarian with all that implies (abiding by humanitarian principles). We need to have a more concrete discussion about which actors play a more significantly political role, which politically motivated civilian actors have negative impacts on humanitarian space if at all (and if not, why not), and how these different internationally-based civilian actors can cause significant confusion for local populations regarding who is “neutral” and who may include extra social/political agendas. The term “civilian” is taken for granted by most parties; by NATO where the complicated and controversial connection between civilian and military actors is often to easily disregarded, and by those civilians who wish to take on the mantle of humanitarian principles and the advantages this implies, regardless of their actual role. What is clear is that the complexity of the military and diverse civilian roles needs elucidation. Few actors are able to operate in a complex emergency in a completely uncontroversial way. The more we understand the implications of various actions, military and civilian (and all that the word “civilian” entails), the better we can determine how to make each role more effective. There is a need for a more extensive debate about where the divide lies for independence and neutrality, and who has the right to invoke humanitarian principles. (Utenriksdepartement 2009: 20)

As will be discussed in Part II, not only is there little debate about these different roles, there is little possibility for engaging such a debate. Determining who among civilian actors have the right to invoke humanitarian principles is crucial towards moving towards concrete, respectful practices that allows actors on all sides to more effectively do their jobs under extremely challenging circumstances. In Chapter 8 I will discuss some of the challenges associated with a “blanket” use of the humanitarian space arguments for NGOs and civilians more generally. The figure below attempts to distinguish between some of the most central civilian actors. The distinction in Figure 3.1 between NGHAs and NGDOs is not an easy one, as many NGOs have been known to assume both humanitarian and development profiles simultaneously. The process of providing aid follows a slippery slope ranging from core, emergency needs (that are provided regardless of political or other affiliation of beneficiary) to development aid that might link basic needs to political agendas of human rights, sometimes more specifically

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

Figure 3.1

57

The actors

Note: Some of the core actors relevant to the civil-military interface. The arrows indicate paths of interaction.

women’s rights, or other social or economic development agendas that could be interpreted politically. Thus, the combination of humanitarian and development aid approaches blurs lines between activities which might be perceived as politically neutral and those which are more politically loaded, as development aid tends to be. The following section will focus upon four of the above actors in broad terms; the civilians of the host nation, the NGOs and IOs, the donor/troop contributing nations and finally the military. The Civilians of the Host Nation Although this book focuses on primarily the international actors involved in civilmilitary operations, and in particular the military, the arguably most important actors “on the ground” are the people who live in the “host” nation, or that nation where international actors deploy to provide assistance and establish security (be it for host nation populations or for the intervening national interests, or both). In today’s complex operations, troop-contributing/donor nations and NGOs share a common interest in the welfare of “host nation” civilians where the complex emergency is occurring. The protection of the host-nation civilians may not be always the primary reason for an intervention (at least by foreign governments), but

58

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

often their security and well-being, their human security, is invoked by donor/troopcontributing nations as a key concern by those who chose to engage themselves in complex emergencies. Civilians of the host nations are often used as the raison d’être behind ethical foreign policies and principles such as Responsibility to Protect (R2P). These are the people who become the “beneficiaries” of NGOs, or are the “local population” with whom militaries will interact. Not all civilians are beneficiaries of course, nor will all civilians have direct contact with governmental or military personnel. However, many if not most might be impacted in either direct or indirect ways. Often the civilians of the host nation are portrayed as those who need help or protection: we can draw from the Norwegian government itself for evidence of this concern, in the government explanation as to why Norway has been in Afghanistan.3 Depending on the circumstances, civilian non-combatants might be additionally described as “victims” and “beneficiaries”, often when a traumatic event has occurred and a civilian community needs assistance. Such framing of civilians has an impact on how they are perceived. Often as those without a voice, those who need support, often those who cannot help themselves. The language of “victims” and “beneficiaries” often does not assist in giving civilians a voice either – they are rendered passive recipients. Although there is no question that people at given times need assistance when their own resources are tapped or they are in critical condition, civilian communities are also always actors, with a voice, and with interests. First and foremost, host nation civilians are the frontline of effort and support for their own communities when crisis arises, as they themselves must find ways to cope and survive, sometimes with little to no resources and supplies, before any NGO, military, or official presence arrives in their area. These civilians are by far the best “experts” on their culture and customs, and while foreigners (militaries and NGOs) may compete about “who has been in the area the longest” or who can best identify local population needs when making claims about competency and expertise, these civilians have been onsite and aware of their own needs for generations. These same civilians are a mix (as any population) of people who are biased, politically motivated, restricted/ influenced/coloured by the knowledge-base and skills available to, and developed by, their communities and cultures, and play roles in complex power arrangements based on gender, class, ethnicity and other social classifications. Thus it was not surprising that even amongst the few Afghan citizens I spoke with about the impact of the civil-military interface on their own sense of security and future well-being, I was met with a wide range of opinions and thoughts about the future of their families, their communities, and of Afghanistan. To even 3 Norway cites three priorities: preventing the growth of international terrorism, secure peace and stability, and contributing to development and prevention of suffering. Two of the three have civilian needs in focus. Please see http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ ud/kampanjer/bistand_afghanistan/situasjonen.html?id=573476 (accessed 23 April 2011) (there is no English translation of this webpage).

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

59

write about “civilians” in this sense, the people living in and amongst complex emergencies (in Afghanistan or otherwise), becomes extremely difficult. There are no unified principled or political positions here as people’s expectations for the future, their sense of security, vary according to the diverse values they hold. There may be some uniformity of values along religious and/or ethnic lines (though not always), and education access and levels will also play a significant role (and cause simplistic divides between the “educated” and “non-educated”). It is thus difficult to try to capture the “civilian position” in a complex emergency, but this group of civilians have the most to gain or lose in the civil-military interface, and play a crucial role, if not the most crucial role, in a multi-actor security dynamic. Certain questions need to be raised when assessing the potential impacts of, and consequences for, local civilians as a result of contact between various actors, including between militaries and host nation civilians. Not all civilians will initiate or react to contact with different actors in the same way. In interviews with numerous international NGOs (in particular those associated with Norway), it became clear that almost any contact between military and civilians was contentious, and it was claimed that contact between militaries and local civilians posed security problems for the civilian population. Though there was evidence of such threats (that contact between militaries and local civilians resulted in decreased security for civilians as they were targeted by opposing warring parties), the perception that contact with militaries was always negative was not confirmed by civilian respondents. Some civilians indeed confirmed that their security could be compromised through contact with militaries, however, others made explicit choices to have contact with the military given their (the civilian’s) own personal political interests and assessment of what was safe for them at a given time. As well, it is very difficult for militaries to avoid civilians, and many cases it would be inappropriate for them to do so (avoid civilians) as they need to be knowledgeable about the civilian environment and security to be able to do their job, aware of how their actions impact the civilian environment, and rely on such knowledge to effect as little negative consequences (collateral damage) as possible. The most common comment I did receive from civilian (host nation) respondents regarding civil-military interaction had to do with their own expectations of what the military should be doing for them and their society. More often than not the civilian respondents felt that the military efforts were not sufficient. This thinking was justified on the basis that the military actors were the most visible of the international actors, and were perceived as having the best chances of moving around the country and supporting different security and rebuilding efforts. As such, considerable weight was placed upon military actors to perform or demonstrate results to the local populations. Locally-based Organizations (NGOs, Movements) A general definition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is provided in the next section on international civilians, but I would like to first consider non-

60

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

governmental organizations and various movements present in a host-nation that are indigenous, or rather, founded by and grounded in local efforts. In contrast to many international NGOs (usually based in more prosperous countries that are generally conflict free),4 local organizations are often very specifically designed for and by the local context, they may be less bound to notions of general guidelines between humanitarian, development, political, and social organizations and are more focused on one or more key issues that might embody perspectives and principles from any or all such organizations. Probably one of the most important features about locally originated NGOs is that they (ideally) represent local people supporting their own communities. Such support may not always be the result however, as corruption and manipulation can affect home-grown organizations just as they might international ones, maybe at times even more so. However, even in the presence of corruption and manipulation there are locally-driven groups and organizations that make efforts to build and support their own communities, and these efforts should not be negated. A good recent example of local organizations attempting to gain recognition for their efforts is during the so-called “Kony 2012” campaign and “viral” video where an American-based organization called Invisible Children tried to raise awareness about child soldiers in Uganda and the abuses of Joseph Kony, the militant leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). A very complex round of responses to this campaign ensued, not least from Ugandan organizations that emphasized that they had been working for years on many of the issues highlighted by the American group; an equally viral video was sent by Ugandan journalist Rosebell Kagumire arguing for Ugandan efforts.5 Local organizations have the potential to mobilize local individuals towards supporting their own communities, which has the further potential to create increased trust between local actors as they have a personal investment in the security of the community. Since the living situations for civilians in complex emergencies can be so diverse, and their individual roles so different, it takes considerable skill to assess the ways in which civil-military interaction can, will and should take place. 4 For example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has its international office in Geneva, Switzerland, Oxfam has its head office in Oxford, UK, the Norwegian Refugee Council has its headquarters in Oslo, Norway, and the international organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has its head office in Geneva, Switzerland. This is not always the case of course, as there are also international NGOs that are based within countries experiencing conflict and economic challenges, for example Church World Service located in Pakistan. But a quick review of NGOs operating in Afghanistan, for example, shows that most of the internationals are located in less conflictual and more affluent parts of the world (see The Afghan Analyst: http://afghanistan-analyst.org/ngos/ (accessed 17 June 2013), this is not necessarily an exhaustive list, but does provide a good idea over the number of NGOs active in Afghanistan and where they are based). 5 See “My response to KONY2012” at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KLVY5 jBnD-E (accessed 3 June 2013).

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

61

Protecting civilians does not necessarily mean depoliticizing civilians, and nor can we ignore the possibility that the political interests of many civilians can cause challenges and problems for both militaries and NGOs in fulfilling their respective mandates. The “International” Civilians The need to differentiate civil from military efforts is often in focus for this discussion in, among others, Afghanistan. But the grey zones between humanitarian aid, development aid, political and diplomatic work, and other forms of civil efforts do not make it any easier to ensure clear boundaries for humanitarian space on the civil side. (Utenriksdepartement 2009: 20)

The following section briefly explores some key differences between civilian “international” actors, examining terms that are often used without clarification, and which can be problematic in different contexts. The “international” civilians are those who belong to organizations of various types, non-governmental to international organization (like the UN) but are not organizations that are based/ founded within the host-nation. Local civilians are often hired within these organizations at the local level or maybe national (host-nation) level, but represent the mandates of their international employers. The following definitions are general and may not reflect some of the specific characteristics of specific NGOs or international organizations. Non-governmental Organizations Non-governmental organization, or NGO, is a generic terms that refers to organizations which are constituted independently from government, or rather, have no government status. NGOs funded partially or fully by governments nevertheless retain non-governmental status as governmental representatives are assumed not to be members, or influential in these organizations. NGOs are often otherwise referred to as civil-society organizations. NGOs have been subject to various perceptions or images. This world of NGOs is often perceived as the arena of the “do-gooders”, where in the face of weak, failing or failed governments, “NGOs are the only source of relief for the common people” (Biswas, 25 December 1996). NGOs have had a tradition for working from the “bottom-up” or grassroots, working closely with communities and meeting local needs, therefore being “most accountable to the poor” (Kamat 2003). Additionally, the NGO “culture” is a culture that can draw upon backgrounds in the peacemovement, where solutions should not be found in violence but in cooperation, support, and empowerment. The NGO focus on the vulnerable often reflects (either purposefully or not) a critical, gender-aware approach to security, which exposes power dynamics between groups and individuals, and which attempts to

62

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

make space for the voices of marginalized (Hoogensen and Rottem 2004). It is not uncommon to be greeted with generally negative views about the military, or an outright anti-militarism, within NGO communities, although this is not always the case (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). NGOs can at the same time suffer from stereotypes as disorganized hippie peaceniks, including “descriptions such as ill-disciplined, unfocused, poorly led, inefficient, overly subject to the whims of donors, and media driven” (Watkins 2003). In general however, NGOs have had the ability to play the “do-gooder” card, and often for good reason, as many civilian organizations have stepped up to the plate when governments or other official structures have not supported their populations adequately, or even threatened them. NGOs often gain their legitimacy through a moral authority generated through their mandates to provide support to vulnerable groups. Although it is important to distinguish between the different mandates of NGOs (as will be discussed below), it is equally important to mention a principle that is relevant to all NGOs, and in fact, all who intervene in some way, shape, or form in the affairs of another country and/or population, that is the principle of “do no harm”. The importance of this principle to NGO work was highlighted to me in my research almost immediately by a number of NGO respondents. The principle “do no harm” acknowledges that aid (humanitarian or development) is not neutral in conflict, and can either exacerbate hostilities or mitigate against violent escalation. In other words, aid can support peace, but it can equally support war (Anderson 1999). One of the greatest challenges to aid workers, according to author Mary B. Anderson, is to do good without “inadvertently undermining local strengths, promoting dependency, and allowing aid resources to be misused in the pursuit of war” (ibid.: 2). It is a principle rooted in self-awareness and selfcriticism, whereby NGOs need to be constantly vigilant about their actions and activities in conflict zones, and how these activities can be perceived and used by warring parties, as well as by the very people they intend to help. The “do no harm” principle does not distinguish between NGO mandates (humanitarian and development assistance can both do their share of harm or good), but it does distinguish between contexts, whereby the harm caused or harm prevented has direct and indirect effects upon violent conflict. In other words, the principle is less invoked in contexts of natural disasters where there are no warring parties or contending political factions to negotiate between. It demonstrates that context needs to be addressed specifically, and that the effects of aid are far less neutral in contexts of conflict, and can even exacerbate conflict or reward human rights violators including those partaking in genocides (Hilhorst 2003, Polman 2011). I will come back to this principle in a later section when examining some of the dynamics of civil-military interaction in the case of Afghanistan. Non-governmental Humanitarian Agencies and Humanitarian Space Humanitarian aid actors, or NGHAs, and the assistance they provide play a central and very specific role within a complex emergency. Humanitarian work

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

63

must be quite specific to limit the possible confusion about how this aid is to be interpreted by others, and to ensure the freedom and security to deliver such aid even in politically volatile circumstances, referred to as “humanitarian space” (see more on humanitarian space below). Humanitarian actors provide critical and immediate aid. Humanitarian assistance is defined as: “aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisisaffected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality” (OCHA 2007). The principles also include independence, unity, voluntary service, and universality (OCHA 2012). The principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence have been subjected to the most scrutiny, as these have been the most difficult to maintain in all contexts. More on this will be discussed below and in Chapter 7. These principles, which are core to such humanitarian agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),6 need clarification as they play a significant if not primary role in the argument for distinctions between civil and military work in a complex emergency. Humanity pertains to the purpose of protecting and respecting human life. It further attempts to engender “mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples” (ICRC 1996). Impartiality ensures that assistance is provided to affected populations without prejudice, regardless of religion, race, ethnicity, gender, nationality and political affiliation and/or opinion. The primary focus is the alleviation of suffering, guided solely by the needs of those suffering (and not by politically determined needs). Neutrality means that the humanitarian agency does not take sides in hostilities or engage in any controversies of a political, religious, racial or ideological nature, to build trust and confidence between themselves and other actors on the ground (ibid.). Assistance must also be seen as independent. This means that the humanitarian organization, although subject to national laws, is beholden first and foremost to the principles of humanitarianism, and is not swayed by the political agendas of its national homebase/country, nor public opinion (ibid.). Just as humanitarian aid actors should not distinguish between “beneficiaries” (people receiving aid), so must they also be perceived as apolitical by their beneficiaries as well as by other actors in the operational area. As such, the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence are primary defining principles guiding how humanitarian actors must operate. These principles are invoked in the interest of creating and maintaining humanitarian space, and in providing security for both beneficiaries as well as the humanitarian actors themselves.

6 The ICRC is not considered a non-governmental organization or NGO however. The ICRC holds a special position as a humanitarian, neutral and independent but private organization that is supported by the international community and has a permanent international mandate. The ICRC is the custodian of the Geneva Conventions agreed to by every state (see http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/overview-who-we-are.htm).

64

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

The concept of humanitarian space, crucial to the work of NGHAs, requires some attention here also, as it plays a pivotal role in the debate over civil-military interaction. There is no agreed-upon definition for humanitarian space, as different humanitarian actors focus upon different priorities according to their own mandates or principles (Hubert and Brassard-Boudreau 2010). Rony Brauman, former president of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), has been credited with coining the phrase “humanitarian space” stating that it is “a space of freedom in which we are free to evaluate needs, free to monitor the distribution and use of relief goods, and free to have a dialogue with the people” (Grombach Wagner 2005). Generally speaking however, humanitarian space pertains to at least three expectations: respect for international humanitarian law (IHL), the safety of humanitarian workers, and access to vulnerable populations (Hubert and BrassardBoudreau 2010). It is expected that all parties to a conflict will respect IHL and therefore will avoid civilian casualties as much as possible, as well as ensure that humanitarian aid can reach vulnerable populations without hindrance. The safety of the humanitarian workers themselves, as well as their ability to access populations in need, are indeed connected to respect for IHL, but are highlighted specifically over concerns that humanitarian workers are increasingly targeted by warring parties. Additionally it is claimed that civilian populations themselves are targeted if they are perceived to have any sympathy for one warring party over another. For this reason, it is argued, warring parties should have as much distance as possible from humanitarian workers and civilians in need so as to ensure their safety and access to aid. A distinction between civilian and military functions is often cited in reference to humanitarian space, whereby a fear over military actors performing “humanitarian” work plays a central role in determining whether or not such space is protected: “Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organizations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely” (emphasis mine) (Grombach Wagner 2005, citing OHCA Glossary of Humanitarian Terms). Non-governmental Development Organizations Development aid actors, or NGDOs, in many respects mirror the work conducted by humanitarian aid actors by providing relief, but often this aid has either direct or indirect political overtones or goals. For example, assistance can include “health, education, agriculture, or industrial sectors, or they may be concerned with wider human rights, gender or environmental issues” (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007: 446). Such activities imply a positioning as to what sort of health, education, agricultural or industrial development, gender or environmental issues, and the accompanying values that underlie these issues, are prioritized and desired. A good example can be found in gender issues, where women’s rights and human security are tied to laws against violence against women (including rape as a war crime), equal treatment

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

65

under the law (where women are recognized as equal persons and not property), and women’s participation in political processes including peace negotiations (see for example unwomen.org for one such overview of such initiatives). These processes imply an empowerment of women which is not welcome in all cultures and societies, and can be construed as attempts to change such cultures and their respective laws. Thus these processes can be highly politicized, and potentially controversial in settings where different political agendas are competing with one another. These goals may or may not be always consistent with the political agendas of combatant actors, or those attempting to gain power in contested areas. Since NGOs consist of unarmed civilians, there is often an assumption that they would not be considered a threat to combatants despite their politicized undertones. This is not always the case though. NGOs can be associated with platforms that do not sit well with local populations, as illustrated by a demonstration in 2010 where Afghans protested against organizations that they believed were active in proselytizing or attempting to convert people to another opinion or belief (Dagbladet 2010). The NGO Norwegian Church Aid (Kirkens Nødhjelp) has periodically been confronted with such accusations (ibid.). In response however, the leadership of the NGO noted that their own view of the demonstration was more so a protest against Western intervention, including that of the USA, Great Britain, and Norway. Either way, it is important to note that many NGOs can be easily interpreted as being a part of a political agenda, particularly if the scope of the work moves beyond the immediate alleviation of suffering provided by humanitarian aid (Weiss 2013). International Organizations Added to the mix are the civilians representing international organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations, all of its agencies, and regional organizations (IFRC/ICRC 1994). It is not uncommon to see these organizations, not least the UN, playing an important coordination role between the various actors present in a complex emergency (ibid.). NGHAs consider the coordination efforts of IOs to be acceptable as long as they comply with international humanitarian law, respecting the independence and integrity of their NGHA partners. Often the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) assumes this coordination role. If it does not or cannot, other UN bodies, like mission offices such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as an example, may play a similar role, particularly if they have regionally or municipally located offices. At the same time however, IOs are not necessarily impartial or neutral actors in all emergency situations. Whereas organizations like the UN play a more neutral role in providing peacekeepers under the core principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force (Coning 2007), their position changes when involved in an on-going conflict where the UN supports one of the warring parties (for example, the Government of Afghanistan), as well as the international forces (ISAF) mandated to “reduce the capability and will of the insurgency”

66

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

(UNSC 2007, UNSC 2011). Although not directly combatants themselves and even when the focus is protecting civilians, international organizations that play an explicit role in recognizing one warring party over another are politically implicated in a conflict setting. Thus it is important to examine the claims of IOs in relation to the host country and host populations. There is no possibility to claim neutrality, but at times “impartiality” is invoked. The claimed impartiality of international organizations such as the UN needs to be carefully balanced with stated preferences for one of the warring parties: Stressing the central and impartial role that the United Nations continues to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading the efforts of the international community, including, jointly with the Government of Afghanistan, the coordination and monitoring of efforts in implementing the Afghanistan Compact … (UNSC 2007)7

In the case of Afghanistan, it is clearly difficult for the UN to achieve a balance between a desire to be a coordinating and peace-supporting organization for all parties (impartial) while clearly supporting one of the competing (combatant) parties, such as in this case with the Government of Afghanistan. Maintaining distance from militaries who are deployed as a part of the broader UN mandate to reduce the insurgency in Afghanistan may appear to be important for UN impartiality, but also seem contrived given that there are unavoidable linkages between them. There are other difficulties as well. In discussions with OCHA, there was considerable mention about trying to keep a distance from military actors. However, there was also the reality of logistics in cases where NGOs just were not capable of reaching some people in need (for example, in cases of natural disasters like landslides occurring within a conflict area), and where OCHA was soliciting the help of military actors to provide access (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). The Donor/Troop-contributing Nation In documents, conferences/seminars, and discussions I have had with various respondents about civil-military engagement and interaction, I would argue that one of the least addressed issues involve the roles of those civilians representing either the host government or troop-contributing governments, and their impact and relevance to civil-military interaction. These civilians are arguably the most politically implicated in complex emergencies, and those who are most tightly 7 The Afghanistan Compact is a product of the 2006 London Conference on Afghanistan (31 January–1 February 2006) and outlines the priorities of the Afghan government (GIRoA) in relation to security (including support by ISAF), governance and human rights, and economic and social development. A copy can be found at http://www. nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf (accessed 15 April 2010).

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

67

connected to the deployed military efforts. The civilians working on behalf of governments represent the political agendas of their governments. This is no easy task, both for those representing host governments, but also for those representing the nations that have decided to intervene/support/assist the host government. These “assisting nations” often play a dual role by contributing to NGO activity as donor nations, as well as to military activity given that these are the very governments that have deployed militaries to the conflict in question. This challenging role requires both an understanding for the complexity of their own role with multiple priorities (NGO donor as well as military contribution, plus diplomatic efforts) as well clear guidelines as to how government representatives will deal with the often difficult task of having to prioritize needs on the ground. The weight of responsibility associated with the decision to deploy a military to a foreign setting necessarily influences the perceptions of other actors (including combatants) towards civilian government actors, as well as their capacity to act in relation to other actors. Government actors might, by association with their militaries (either direct, visible association or just by virtue of representing the same politics), be labelled as threats or compromising the security of NGO actors in the same way that militaries have been. For example, American government representatives (as well as American aid organizations such as USAID), although civilian actors, have been heavily criticized for their close cooperation with their military counterparts (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). Problems cited include the possible confusion for local populations in differentiating NGO civilians from government civilians, or American NGOs from Norwegian NGOs, and who amongst them seem willing to support military efforts (Staveland and Akerhaug 2010a). More on the government role, and more specifically that of the Norwegian government, will be covered in Chapter 4. The balancing act between being a donor nation and a troop-contributing nation is difficult, a viewpoint that was largely confirmed during interviews. It was clear when speaking with the civilians that must represent national viewpoints and goals (both in the Foreign Affairs as well as Defence departments), often of an idealistic and/or principled nature, in a setting that is long from idealistic. Donor/troop contributing nations experience complications right from the start, within and between different departments, organizational structure and cultures of government ministries and how they are formally related to one another, and how these ministries are formally represented both within and outside of the home nation. The inter-departmental relations alone exacerbate and complicate the power and manoeuvrability of representatives abroad, requiring an additional analysis of inter-departmental relations that cannot be covered here. However there are a number of assumptions about the role of government representatives that should be made clear. First and foremost the government ministry civilians represent the same political goals, and though they may at times disagree on method (interdepartmental discrepancies), they all have a relationship to their national militaries deployed to the region in question. Coordination between the civilian and military components coming from the same deploying nation is crucial, which includes the

68

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

clarification of shared political goals and the methods employed to achieve these goals. Further, the civilians who represent donor/troop contributing nations in host countries, usually working within their national embassies (but not exclusively), can, and should, play an important connector/coordinator/interlocutor role between other civilians (NGOs, IOs, etc.), and their own national militaries when possible or if necessary. By so doing however, the political position of these governmental actors must be clear to the other civilian actors with whom they are interacting. In this respect, the divide between political and apolitical/neutral actors must also be made increasingly clear. The role of government actors is to mediate between contending actors when necessary, and to make the hard decisions about what is to be prioritized when actors cannot or do not agree. It is all fine and well for the Norwegian government to support an approach like the Norwegian model in a context where all parties to a conflict agree on how to treat both the military and humanitarians as neutral actors (where militaries act as peacekeepers with consent of all parties), but what sort of decisions should be made when they are not? It is the difficult but important decision to take a stand – in this case it might be that humanitarian actors would distance themselves in some areas from both military and government actors, where politicized civilians take on civilian humanitarian and development type tasks that are important for the overall mission to which they belong. Of interest here is the politics represented by government actors (in particular the role of donor/troop contributing nations), and how the government actor affects civil-military interaction. Norway provides a useful example. Although many nations have been supportive of humanitarian and development efforts, and have reflected this support within their foreign policies to a degree, Norway has played a particularly significant role in emphasizing and prioritizing humanitarian work (see Chapter 4). Should the Norwegian government been seen to be so closely aligned to NGOs, particularly those that espouse humanitarian principles? Or is the best support for humanitarian organizations to ensure a distance from the political machinery of the donor nation? Lastly, and on a practical note, the actual mobility (or lack thereof) of government actors in a theatre of operations needs to be acknowledged. Depending on the crisis in question, the ability of government actors to in fact have a clear and detailed overview of events and activities in their region of responsibility can be quite limited. Again taking Afghanistan as a case, the abilities for government officials to move around was limited, much more so than for their military counterparts, as well as the NGOs that operated in the region. Governmental actors were often dependent upon the insights of others to report back and provide situation reports when the security-risk was determined too high for them to actually go out themselves. Depending on the situation, government officials might end up being the “middleman” with the least information.

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

69

The Military Then, achieving victory in every battle is not absolute perfection: neutralizing an adversary’s forces without battle is absolute perfection. (Sun Tzu, Book 3, a.2)

Norwegian civil-military interaction, and in particular CIMIC, has been the focus of analysis in a previous work by Lene Kristoffersen where she identified early on (in 2006) some of the challenges Norway faced in its civil-military divide, with an aim to clear up ambiguities and encourage improved practices amongst Norwegian civil-military actors – military, NGO and government (Kristoffersen 2006). Kristoffersen framed her report around the images of “soldier” or “saint”, images that are persistently relevant and which captures some of the problems that are articulated by civilians about working with the military. I will discuss further the contributions of Kristoffersen’s report below in Part III, but wish to first discuss the role of “images”, like that of a “soldier or a saint”, and how they affect the way in which military actions are perceived as legitimate or not. What assumptions are made about the capacity, legitimacy and authority of military forces? It very much depends on the operational context. If and when civilmilitary interaction is discussed in Norway, the focus is mostly about what sort of activities the military should or should not engage in, that is, militaries should not be engaging in “civilian” activities and more specifically providing humanitarian or development aid. Clearly each actor/institution has its special capacities, and intuitively one can see that organizations that specialize in providing humanitarian and development aid would be superior in their analyses, impact assessments and delivery of such aid than would be a military organization. Underlying these claims however are broader questions about the ability of militaries to cast a wider security net (beyond the application of force), and their legitimacy and their authority to act outside a sphere of force. It is not just the Norwegian context that is influenced by the images reducing militaries to the use of force, as it is not uncommon to read about how different military units are valued, not least for their capacity to wield force. I will first discuss military culture which has at times given rise to stereotypes and assumptions about military capacities. This will be followed briefly by a clarification of kinetic and non-kinetic tools, both of which are employed by military forces. Who are the Military? The military constitute a specifically defined group, distinct from other possible combatants in a conflict situation. The military actor, and in particular “regular forces”: “refers to official military forces, i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or intergovernmental. This may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers,

70

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops” (OCHA 2008). To try to meet the unpredictability and complexity of potential operation environments, militaries are divided between land, air and naval forces, with a fourth distinction being “special operations forces” (Berli 2012). It is this actor that is relevant to the discussion of civil-military interaction, although the military is not the only the only potential combatant actor in an operations area. “Irregular forces”, or rather other armed groups, “armed opposition groups” (AOGs) or insurgents, are those that are party to an armed conflict but are not part of the government forces. These can include militias, resistance movements, terrorists, and criminal groups who take advantage of conflict, who will also influence the security of other actors on the ground (Forsvarets stabskole 2007). The debates about civil-military interaction generally do not include the actions or responsibilities of these other combatants, even though they play a significant role in complex emergencies. The distinction between “military” and “AOG” or insurgent is thus relevant. This distinction plays a significant role in determining who is expected to adhere to models or principles of civil-military interaction, and who is not. Not all parties to a conflict, such as AOGs, are represented in all models of civil-military interaction, and in particular are not specifically included in the Norwegian model. The militaries involved in NATO and/or UN complex operations are very diverse, and reflect as much their own national, subnational and ethnic cultures as they do an overarching, universalized military culture. At the same time, militaries tend to share features that distinguish them as “military” as opposed to “civilian”. The first, very important, and probably most obvious distinguishing feature is a uniform. The uniform signifies openly and directly the role and capacity of the person in the uniform; military personnel who are on the job and out of uniform have generated controversy in that they are potentially misleading other actors (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). Beyond the uniform, one of the most significant features is the ability and occasional necessity of militaries to use force to effect their goals. At the most basic level the military exists to kill people and destroy things (Braudy 2003, Smith 2005). This has been the core feature of militaries throughout history, and despite expanding mandates, including humanitarian to some degree, this core has not changed (ibid.). It is also this raison d’être which has played a central role in the development of military culture, the concept of militarization, and not least, civilian responses to military actors (Schofield 2007). With the use of force as its purpose, discipline, physical strength and perseverance are the values that make up the bedrock of most military cultures. The military create security and/or threats in the name of the state that has chosen to apply this tool. It is an occupation that is veiled in a degree of secrecy and beyond the reach of civilian culture and norms (Durant 2007), as it is charged with the defence of the nation and to that end, will engage in activities not normally condoned by civilian cultures. Those employed or recruited and trained as part of

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

71

the military machine are sometimes regarded with a degree of suspicion or allure as they are “of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it … The culture of the warrior can never be that of civilization itself” (Keegan 1993). The range of perceptions about the military are often linked to the qualities embedded within the idealized and hegemonic masculinities of the military, which in turn create competing images of the military institution. The institution is male dominated, and for some, should be a domain restricted to males (Mitchell 1998, Eden 2013). Images of courage, strength, protection, responsibility, professionalism and discipline compete with other images of aggression, dominance, violence, and a lack of vulnerability, sympathy and grief (Whitworth 2004, Fierke 2007). Though these masculinities exist within civilian cultures as well, they differ from the military, as civilian boys and men need to undergo a new socialization through training to change them from boys to trained killers (Burke 2004, Whitworth 2004, Smith 2005, Skarpskyttere 2010). The recruitment of women into the military has been fraught with challenges not least because of images of what a soldier is supposed to be and do (Burke 2004). Thus a different culture develops beyond civilian norms. How do the people who become the soldiers embedded in this culture, move “in and out” of such a powerful structure, into civilian life but also in regard to civilmilitary interaction? This range of images, with all their nuances in between, often play a role in how the military can successfully or unsuccessfully interact with other actors. It should be noted that these images and perceptions are generally associated with the institution rather than individuals per se. Many (though not all) of the civilian respondents for the research which informs the empirical basis of this book, both NGO and from government ministries, found that they did not have difficulty working directly with specific individuals in the military, while at the same time expressed stereotypical impressions of the institution as a whole (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b, Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). Nevertheless, NGO/IO and government ministerial responses included impressions of military personnel as being stubborn, lacking understanding or interest about NGO/IO mandates, authoritative, arrogant, and inflexible (ibid.). These impressions and images did not enhance trust between military and civilian actors. Assumptions about the military, accurate or not, often take their departure point from what the military appears to represent, value and embody. This is particularly the case by those outside of the system, but was somewhat surprisingly the case also by those “inside”. Military respondents themselves expressed assumptions about other units or branches in their own armed forces in terms of who was “military enough” or “essential”, whereby those with well-honed kinetic skills (“sharp”, or those highly capable with a weapon) were more valued and praised over those who focused on non-kinetic (non-force based) skills. This also applied to assumptions about other NATO militaries and their capabilities (Americans were often portrayed as culturally

72

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

unintelligent and thuggish; Germans were often characterized as do-gooders and development officers, Dutch and Norwegian soldiers were characterized somewhat in between these two poles, etc.) (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). Representations of the military are usually a mix of stereotypes, ideals, and examples of behaviour. Confusion and uncertainty about the nature and role of military culture in Norway was apparent as recently as the fall of 2010 when statements by individual soldiers were published comparing war to sex and demonstrating the military’s coarse and uncivilized ways (“ukultur”), which reportedly “shocked” the then Norwegian Defence Minister Grete Faremo (Heyerdahl and Akerhaug 2010, Akerhaug 2010c). Other reports revealed that some military units employed symbols such as Viking helmets and skull and crossbones, which were argued as reflecting a negative culture in the military (Berg Bentzrød 2010, Akerhaug 2010b). Major Rune Wennerberg became the “poster boy” for negative military culture as a Facebook picture showing him in sunglasses, battle fatigues, and a Viking helmet was splashed across Norwegian newspapers (ibid.). Wennerberg stated: “… there are two debates taking place. How we are perceived – and what we actually need to change regarding our attitudes and values” (Berg Bentzrød 2010). Wennerberg was correct in identifying the two separate themes of perceptions of the military (images) and the values that the military ought to represent (culture). What is unfortunate is that contrary to what Wennerberg suggests, little debate ensued. This lack of debate causes confusion, creates unrealistic if not irrelevant expectations, and ignores the different roles of militaries in different conflict contexts, not least when peacekeepers in blue berets (UN missions) are expected to become warriors (NATO/ISAF mission). The legitimacy of military activity is under constant surveillance, by NGOs and media as well as donor/troop contributing nations. There are two main arguments as to why the military is considered ill-suited for providing emergency relief or humanitarian aid, which is perceived to be activities for the civilian domain. Militaries partake in the following: (1) They kill/harm and/or destroy; and (2) They represent a political agenda (against the other warring party). An additional argument against the military pertains to development aid, such as building wells, schools, hospitals and the like, and that is that they are not competent to do so, which also undermines their legitimacy. Thus the military are perceived as illegitimate actors with regard to many activities taking place within complex operations due to what the military represents. Kinetic vs. Non-kinetic The Armed Forces most important contribution to Norwegian security is to not shoot … its largest relevance for Norwegian security lies in the time period before the use of military force becomes necessary. (Børresen 2007)

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

73

Militaries have a variety of tools that they can employ to win a war, which I will simply divide into kinetic and non-kinetic.8 Defining these terms is not always straight forward, particularly non-kinetic, as it sometimes seems to be the category for “everything else”. Kinetic can be briefly defined as those capabilities focused on “physical force and systems that immediately support the use of physical force”, and non-kinetic as those capabilities “relevant to irregular warfare” (Hurley et al. 2009). But this definition misleads one to think that non-kinetic pertains solely to irregular warfare, and is very broad and vague. As well, the above definition addresses means, but not effects (Teo 2007). In terms of effects, kinetic refers to the resulting physical damage, whereas non-kinetic approaches do not result in physical damage (ibid.). Kinetic actions therefore include “those taken through physical, material means like bombs, bullets, rockets, and other munitions. Non-kinetic actions are logical, electromagnetic, or behavioural, such as a computer network attack on an enemy system or a psychological operation aimed at enemy troops” (Air Force Document Doctrine 2 in Teo 2007). Nonkinetic functions and activities are relevant to intelligence operations, influence and information operations, are central to counter insurgency, as well as to efforts to protect and support non-combatants. These activities can include direct contact between militaries and non-combatants/civilians, or be indirect through continued situational awareness about civilian activity (particularly NGO activity) in an area targeted for an operation and planning regarding where kinetic activity should not take place (determining what should not be targeted in air strikes, for example). The Breadth of Military Functions The primary object of the military is to fight, and this is the core feature that differentiates it from civilian organizations. Not all military functions are strictly combat functions however, and some functions have potentially “civilian”related, non-combat (non-kinetic) tasks/services and consequences. Different national militaries are organized in different ways, in part dependent upon the size of the forces as well as the national priorities. Not unlike the roles found amongst civilian actors, it is also difficult to place military actors into cookiecutter categories. However, for my purposes here which focus on the civil-military interface, I can use one broad approach to try to illustrate the breadth of military functions, and how this breadth implies a differentiation of the ways in which “being a soldier” can be understood, and the ways in which these roles impact the civilian environment. The different forces (land, air, sea) will all have contact with, or impact upon, civilians although to varying degrees, through different means, both kinetic and 8 One can also distinguish between “lethal” and “non-lethal”, and these terms appear to be coming more frequently into use. For the purposes of this book however I have decided to use “kinetic” and “non-kinetic”.

74

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

non-kinetic. It can be argued that land forces, however, have the most considerable contact with civilians and they have been the most forward thinking in ensuring that there are specific functions designed for contact with civilians (such as CIMIC). In general, most land forces are further divided into the categories of “combat forces”, “combat support”, “combat service support”, and “command and control” (ibid.). However military forces are not combined in precisely the same way in all countries, therefore it is difficult to generalize the ways in which militaries are specifically structured. Since the ways in which these categories are further organized can differ according to country, I draw on the Norwegian case as an example. “Combat forces” include those functions that engage in direct combat such as infantry and cavalry forces (armoured vehicles) and those battalions designed with the primary assignment to go into battle (in Norway this includes Telemark Battalion and the 2nd Battalion). These battalions are nevertheless combined units with both kinetic and non-kinetic skills, able to function as a fully functioning and independent unit with information collection, logistics and medical support. “Combat support” includes artillery, engineers, and air defence. “Combat service support” includes logistics, medical support, transportation, while command and control includes the military staff and leadership, communications, intelligence, military police, CIMIC, and psychological operations (PSYOPS). It is difficult to distinguish the kinetic from the non-kinetic within these categories, as the kinetic and non-kinetic are tightly linked. But whereas operations conducted by these different units often require a combination of the kinetic and non-kinetic (kinetic tasks cannot be conducted without some sort of non-kinetic support, not least information collection/intelligence), some operations can be purely non-kinetic, such as many forms of information operations (Forsvarets stabskole 2007). The combination of kinetic and non-kinetic efforts therefore depends upon the operative approach or method taken, ranging from combat to attrition (no longer extensively applied, if at all) to stabilization (ibid.). The difficulty of distinguishing military roles, and of stereotyping such roles within a narrow, solely combat figure, comes to light, for example, with the role of military medical personnel. This role complicates the attempt to make a clear distinction between civilian and military, particularly for those in these roles themselves. Military doctors and nurses have mandates to save lives and provide assistance where needed. Many are recruited from civil society and though they have some training, may never have had combat experience at all, nor desire it. Being employed in the military, their first obligation is to provide for the healing and health of military personnel, but there are many examples in Afghanistan where military medical personnel have provided their skills and services to the local populations in addition.9 9 The German-run military hospital at Regional Command (RC) North in Mazar e Sharif provides one example of such interaction between military and civilians, where civilians have been able to access the hospital services there when the hospital is not busy with military patients (as I understood it, the hospital was not often busy with military

Actors in the Civil-Military Relationship

75

Military functions related to civil-military interaction fall under core nonkinetic competencies. A fundamental issue with civil-military interaction is the legitimacy of the military actor engaging in non-kinetic activities, and determining what these activities can and should include. What activities are legitimate and appropriate to assist the mission and gain victory, and which constitute illegitimate or inappropriate activity and contact with civilian actors? When an activity does not include the use of a weapon or physical force, does that make it a civilian activity? Some non-kinetic activities and functions might mirror some civilian activities but will have a different purpose – that is, to assist the military itself (logistics, situational awareness, etc.), protection and security for locals, and/or influence the population that is the target. The tactics used to address these purposes are in part defined by the nature of the conflict and the military role. A peacekeeper that is assigned a neutral role between conflicting parties will not interact with local populations the same way as a soldier that is mandated to engage in offensive, kinetic operations against an enemy. Non-kinetic skills, in particular CIMIC, were not prioritized in the Norwegian contribution to the civil-military operation taking place in Afghanistan.10 This was evident particularly in discussions with both the Provincial Reconstruction team (PRT)11 commanders as well as respondents from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. A small number of these respondents indicated that CIMIC was an unwanted function in the PRT. The majority of these respondents stated however that CIMIC would have been an asset, but could not be prioritized as there were only a limited number of positions at the PRT, and they needed enough positions for kinetic-oriented functions (combat). However, amongst those commanders needs). Military medical personnel have also gone to civilian hospitals to share skills and expertise (for example, Norwegian medical personnel have engaged in sharing of knowledge and training in anaesthesiology at Balkh hospital in Mazar e Sharif, as well as at Faryab Provincial Hospital in Maimana). These interactions between civilian and military have been by and large successful, at least insofar as some extra help is provided to the local community. Like in any case however, there are stories of failure along with the success stories (take, for example, the report regarding an American military hospital that has been abusive of its civilian patients (Mulrine, A. (2012). Afghan war: Did US Commanders cover up “horrific” conditions at hospital? The Christian Science Monitor, http://www. csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2012/0725/Afghan-war-Did-US-commanders-cover-uphorrific-conditions-at-hospital). 10 Note that the function of “Intelligence” is generally not included in discussions about civil-military interaction, largely as the function lacks transparency and reciprocity with civilian actors. Intelligence is a function that provides the background/justification for operations. Intelligence is an enormous and complicated field in and of itself, but briefly, it combines both information collection and information analysis about other nations, about enemies or potential enemies, or about potential operations areas Forsvarets stabskole (2007). Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine. Forsvaret. Oslo, Forsvarsstaben. 11 The Provincial Reconstruction Team is a civil-military structure designed to assist in stabilization operations in particular in Iraq and Afghanistan.

76

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

who would have included CIMIC if there was a designated position to be found, few were actually familiar with CIMIC doctrine and what CIMIC offered to the operation, assuming largely that CIMIC would focus almost solely on quickimpact projects or QIPs. A core challenge in the civil-military interface is then image versus reality, where a “divide” between civilians and militaries are perceived as being between two poles: apolitical humanitarians and combat-ready military forces. These images appear to have more influence on perceptions about civilian and military rather than the more complex, grey-zone realities that exist, where civilians can and do include very politicized actors who make the decision to employ force and who carry out activities with a clear political goal (to support the host-government (Afghanistan), or to support opposition groups (Libya), etc.), and military includes civilian-oriented/educated actors who nevertheless are part of the military framework (such as medical or legal personnel). The diversity of military and civilian roles in civil-military interaction should be explored more fully.

Part II Norwegian Experiences in Civil-Military Interaction

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 4

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy, the Norwegian Model and Irresponsible Idealism We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. (IFRC/ICRC 1994) … NGOs have been used as instruments of foreign policy and have called into question their own principle of independence. (Shannon 2009: 32)

The lessons from Norway are lessons for the international community. Many different countries, as well as international organizations like the UN and regional organizations like NATO, attempt to reconcile narrower, state-based security interests with a broader responsibility for civilians and for humanitarian goals, but not without encountering problems and contradictions along the way (Chandler 2007, Bulley 2010, Gaskarth 2011). Norway is one case among many, and due to its long standing interest in humanitarianism, it makes for an excellent illustration of the challenges confronted by states when trying to bridge state and humanitarian interests. The Norwegian approach to civil-military interaction is one that reflects important principles of action and behaviour towards and between civil and military actors, supporting and mirroring the concerns of many civilian (particularly humanitarian) organizations. These concerns continue to be important, and in this case Norwegian policy and the Norwegian experience in attempting to implement policy that is sensitive towards largely humanitarian concerns play an important role in increasing our general understanding about how civil-military interaction does or does not function. At the same time, Norwegian politics (as will be discussed below) on this issue appear to be out-dated or not even relevant, from the perspective of other NATO nations or civil-military practitioners. The Norwegian approach is not well reflected, for example, in the work coming out of the CIMIC Centre of Excellence in the Netherlands which has had responsibility for NATO doctrinal development in this area. Despite this, the Norwegian position provides a necessary and important precautionary approach to civil-military interaction where a military presence and effect upon civilians cannot be underestimated or taken for granted. This precautionary approach could be more effectively embedded within NATO doctrine than it is now. The principled precautions, however, can also lead to an unintended irresponsibility in civil-military interaction where militaries are virtually relinquished of their responsibility for civilians and for reducing their

80

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

negative footprint in civilian environments. At the same time, more examination is needed regarding the state’s own role in humanitarian activities. As the opening quotes above illustrate, humanitarian organizations do not wish to be co-opted by national foreign policies, but there is considerable evidence that the opposite is largely the case, where many states employ humanitarian (and development) work and agendas to suit their own foreign policy agendas. Norway is no exception: As we have demonstrated, the Norwegian partner organizations deliver above average, good humanitarian programs in those areas where they have access. At the same time we must contribute to effective and good humanitarian coordination to meet unaddressed needs and avoid duplication of humanitarian efforts. The humanitarian coordination must however be based on actual delivery capabilities, and not upon visions about universal humanitarian access or acceptance. This will strengthen the combined humanitarian effort in Afghanistan and improve delivery capacities.1

The use of humanitarianism has suited Norway, as “Norwegian foreign policy has a highly idealistic profile” (Østerud 2006). The co-optation of humanitarian politics and policies into foreign policies however has been argued to make humanitarian organizations just as vulnerable as they are if they are associated with military actors: … states have co-opted humanitarian NGOs into the foreign policy apparatus and this has made them the targets of non-state actors (such as al-Qaeda) who reject humanitarian norms including elements of the Geneva Conventions. (Reiffer-Flanagan 2009: 889)

The political agendas of states, along with their militaries, is equally important to the civil-military interface as is the more narrow dynamic just between militaries and humanitarians. Civil-military interaction should be about seeking a balance between all actors in each different context. Such a balance requires both a precautionary approach as well as a decisive and responsible approach. To frame the discussion to follow, I want to examine recent comments made by the former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Espen Barth Eide, where he evaluates the Norwegian contribution to the NATO ISAF efforts (Eide, 4 June 2013). The Norwegian military engagement in Afghanistan is now in its final phases. The PRT that Norway led in Maimana in Faryab province was turned over to Afghan forces in October of 2012, with a small number of remaining troops in Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul until the end of 2014 focused upon training the Afghan police (ibid.). Norway intends to continue its development and humanitarian aid 1 Humanitær rapport Afghanistan 2010 (Humanitarian Report Afghanistan 2010). Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/rapporter_planer/rap porter/2011/humanitar-rapport-afghanistan-2010.html?id=637473 (accessed 27 April 2011).

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy

81

support to Afghanistan until at least 2017 (which includes aid for the Afghan police), with separate and additional financial support to the Afghan army (ibid.). Espen Barth Eide (who was also previously Minister of Defence, as noted elsewhere in this book) made a point of referring to the Norwegian approach in Afghanistan in a recent speech to the Norwegian Parliament, claiming that Norway took the appropriate path by largely rejecting a civil-military format within the PRT structure. A number of his criticisms were valid ones, one of the most important being the lack of coordination and synergy between PRTs. Among the many nations that led PRTs within the different provinces in Afghanistan, few nations operationalized the concept in the same way, leading to disjointed, fragmented and uneven approaches across the country. Barth Eide noted also that a number of NATO led nation PRTs prioritized short term or “quick impact” projects over long term sustainable development, the latter which would be difficult to achieve by the PRT model, and in particular military actors. Barth Eide noted that some PRTs functioned so that they virtually (if not literally) replaced local governance processes and actors instead of supporting local governance mechanisms, making some regions vulnerable to a governance gap due to a resulting lack of capacity, with the withdrawal of the PRT. He further claimed that many of the NATO countries that are transferring PRTs to Afghan forces are having difficulty in finding appropriate actors to take over so that aid can be continued in a “post-PRT situation” (ibid.). The above criticisms need to be taken seriously, and will be examined further in the pages to follow. At the same time however, the former Minister’s presentation of the complexity of the dynamics of the PRT situation was still limited. Barth Eide characterized the PRT as a model that was “first thought of as small military outposts” (ibid.: 6), as opposed to how PRTs had been defined in the PRT handbooks as “a joint, integrated, military-civilian organization” (NATO 2009). Indeed, the Norwegian PRT was composed of a significant majority of military (at times up to 500 troops) as opposed to roughly three to five civilian advisers and a coordinator (including American civilian advisers) and a small contingent of police. The Norwegian model dictated (and is implied in Barth Eide’s statement) that civilian efforts took place via civilian humanitarian and development organizations outside of the PRT, whereby the military-dominated PRT were part of an “overall understanding and good cooperation” with outside civilian actors (ibid.: 6). As such, the Norwegian model ensured that its PRT was largely reduced to a military outpost, rather than a combined civilian-strong and military organization that was in principle meant by the PRT Handbook and NATO objective. The Norwegian approach, with the weight of civilian effort taking place outside of the PRT, through NGOs, has considerable merit in principle, but it demands significant coordination between the different actors. Such coordination did not materialize, and the Norwegian model has been criticized in a recent assessment of Norwegian aid in Afghanistan, not least due to the lack of coordination (Ecorys 2012). At the same time, the core critique from Norwegian authorities regarding civil-military interaction in Afghanistan was based on a critique of quick impact projects (QIPs) –

82

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

or what Barth Eide characterizes as “quick fix” projects, that were carried out by military actors to meet short-term military needs (ibid.: 4). QIPs have been subject to various valuable critiques, as many of these “projects” had been poorly thought through and executed (Hoogensen and Gjørv 2010, Gompelman 2011). The critique does little to discriminate between short-term projects however. Building a culvert in cooperation with local authorities that meets military transportation needs and addresses civilian interests would be equated with “projects” where military personnel hand out candy to local children with little operational benefit other than to “win over” (so-called “hearts-and-minds”) the population, an approach which has demonstrated itself to be a largely ineffective tactic (ibid.). It also does not address the obligations that military forces have under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that may require them to provide short-term, lifesaving aid under certain circumstances. The Foreign Minister’s comments provide an important background from which to examine Norwegian policy over the last decade, and to examine the nature of civil-military interaction more broadly speaking. The Norwegian critique of certain practices that have taken place within the civil-military interface, whether operationalized through the PRT or through specific functions like CIMIC, are valid critiques and need to be taken on board, and as I will argue in subsequent chapters, this critique has not been adequately addressed in recent doctrinal development. It is at the same time questionable to reduce civil-military interaction to “heartsand-minds” projects that are driven by short-term military needs. Lastly, the statement by the former Norwegian Foreign Minister focuses heavily upon what has always been a Norwegian policy focus, the benefits of civilian humanitarian and development efforts. Barth Eide acknowledged that improvements in this area could also be made, particularly regarding the challenges with engaging in aid concurrently with an “armed conflict and in a politically unclear situation” (Eide, 4 June 2013: 5). I argue here that indeed, a deeper examination of the relationship between aid organizations, local communities, militaries and political agendas needs to be conducted. To this end, in this chapter I will examine Norwegian humanitarian policy as it has developed over the past decade, discuss the emergence of the “Norwegian model”, and assess the political climate in which these developments have taken place. The political climate, based on noncontextualized principles of humanitarianism, has affected the potential for the Norwegian model to become more mature and more influential internationally, and instead results in an approach that I characterize as “irresponsible idealism”. Norway has had a long-standing interest in humanitarianism and has been a leading aid donor for decades (Rieff 2002). Norway employs humanitarianism as a significant part of its policy profile, calling itself a “humanitarian policy actor” (Utenriksdepartement 2009: 30, my translation). Even when involved in military operations, Norway ensures that the framing of their military activities (as “peace”

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy

83

operations) will be perceived as consistent with a humanitarian prioritization.2 Making humanitarianism a core feature of a state’s foreign policy portfolio can be construed as a controversial move as the opening quotes to this chapter indicate. There are some scholars that argue that politicizing humanitarianism in this way amounts to co-opting humanitarianism, jeopardizing the principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality. The “rejection of politics” approach to humanitarianism has been called “classic” humanitarianism, where the top priority is saving lives, regardless of the politics of the situation (de Torrenté 2004, O’Brien 2004). At the same time, others argue that humanitarianism has always been political, where aid is linked to broader goals for human rights, democracy and notions of a common good (O’Brien 2004). In the Norwegian case, this was clear in 2002 when the then Minister of International Development Hilde Frafjord Johnsen claimed that: “We have to evaluate the tendencies of young democracies over time. But if a country systematically … moves in the wrong direction, without showing the will to change, we won’t want to be a partner” (Rieff 2002: 317). This stance reflected the rhetoric of new humanitarianism, where it is no longer just about saving lives, but about punishing or rewarding host governments in the way they treated their own people. “If anything, the Norwegian argument was crueller than even the Victorian conception of the deserving poor had been” as it was difficult to see how populations would benefit if their human-rights abusing governments were sanctioned in this way (ibid.). Today’s Norwegian approach to humanitarianism appears to have gravitated towards a classical approach, with a focus on humanitarian principles, but it still retains vestiges of a “new” humanitarianism through various emphases of political goals (Utenriksdepartement 2009). The “Norwegian Model” As noted in the Introduction (Chapter 1), the Norwegian model advocates a clear divide between “political authorities” and “humanitarian” activities in theatre (Kristoffersen 2006, Utenriksdepartement 2009).3 Confusion around this Norwegian approach to civil-military interaction occurs on at least two levels. The first is pertaining to the understanding of the “Norwegian model” itself. The 2 According to the Norwegian document on humanitarian policy (Utenriksdepartement 2009) humanitarian-military interaction (Box 3.9) is relevant to “peace” operations (fredsoperationer). See Chapter 2 regarding some of the blurred distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. 3 As notes in Chapter 1, the Norwegian model provides no analytical or explanatory force, it does not represent an observed reality, but instead serves to legitimize a political ideal. Thus to call this a model is indeed inaccurate. However, as it is a common term in the Norwegian discourse, I have chosen to continue to use the particular term “model” within the text.

84

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

second is the perceptions and earlier practice of non-kinetic military functions and in particular CIMIC, versus CIMIC doctrine and the potential for improvement. I will address the latter in Chapter 5. Here, however, I will examine the blurring of definitions and roles in the articulation of the Norwegian model, both in government documents, but also within media representations of the model. The version of the Norwegian model that appears to most adequately reflect the concerns of humanitarian actors and humanitarian principles is one that differentiates between political actors and humanitarian actors. In the government White paper on Norwegian humanitarian politics (2009), the Norwegian government claims that “saving individual lives, decreasing suffering and ensuring human worth independent of ethnic background, gender, age, religion or political association” is a “central part of Norwegian engagement policy” (Utenriksdepartement 2009: 4).4 This policy is further understood to include “the Norwegian model”, which consists of “a close cooperation – but also a clear delineation of roles – between Norwegian authorities and the voluntary humanitarian organizations” (ibid.). These political actors are further described as including those actors engaged in political or peace building activities, and/ or those involved in international military efforts (ibid.: 20). Given the nature and tone of humanitarian principles, particularly those of independence and neutrality, the separation of political-oriented authorities (which includes anyone representing or deployed under the auspices of the government) and humanitarian actors makes sense, and reflects the delineations and concerns of humanitarian organizations, such as in the OCHA document “Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies” (OCHA 2008). The White paper further recognizes the importance of distinguishing between different civilian actors, particularly humanitarian and long-term development actors, which requires an understanding of the differences between humanitarian aid, transition aid, and long-term development aid (ibid.: 10), a recognition reflected in the categorization of different civilian actors found in Chapter 4. The implications of possible role conflict between these civilian actors, blurring of principles and mandates, is not further explored in the 2009 White Paper. The paper makes the claim that Norway has been consistently engaged with attempting to clearly delineate the dividing lines between humanitarian, other civilian, and military actors, and in particular through the Norwegian Faryab Strategy (Faryab, June 2009).5 When reading the Faryab strategy however, this is not the impression one gets, as humanitarian and development aid are not addressed as separate entities requiring separate approaches, but are instead considered as a combined entity, addressing concerns from strengthening police and justice institutions, education and rural development, to health, de-mining, refugees, and human 4 All quotes from Norwegian documents are translations from Norwegian to English, unless otherwise stated. 5 Faryab is the province in which Norway was the lead nation for the provincial reconstruction team (PRT), located in Northern Afghanistan.

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy

85

rights. Further, in this document, the central role delineation becomes that between civilian and military actors, thus creating a divide between the Norwegian military and the political civilian actors representing the Norwegian government (Faryab June 2009). In this case it is stated that: The roles of the civilian and military actors will be made more clear and coordination between all the actors will be strengthened and efforts coordinated. The civilian component will therefore be removed from the PRT and instead be more tightly associated with the local Afghan authorities and the UN (UNAMA), as soon as the security situation allows. (Faryab, June 2009: 4, my italics)

The logic here suggests that given that civilian and military roles should be more clearly delineated, all civilians,6 including those which share the same political objectives as the military, should be distanced from the military and moved out of the physical confines of the PRT base. Thus, the dividing line has moved from between political actors (military, government and development actors included) and humanitarians, to between military alone, and civilian actors (thereby combining political and non-political/humanitarian actors). To a certain degree, based on the discussions I had with a number of Afghan citizens, a more visible role for the PRT civilians (and for that matter the military), particularly in relation to development and governance, was a desirable goal, and moving the PRT civilians closer to the community (Maimana) would be positive. This would indeed address some of the coordination issues as well, if the PRT-based civilians were able to move more freely between different organizations for the purpose of ensuring a coordinated effort in the area. However, removing PRT civilians from the PRT would not suddenly make their association with the politics of the PRT disappear. Not only would they, in principle, have to have regular contact with the PRT (there is no justification here for claims to “humanitarian space”, not least because they are politically motivated by the same goals), but local actors such as local population, authorities, etc. would still very likely be aware of their role as Norwegian government representatives. As with all actors, role definition and delineation should be clear. Ironically, for all the possible benefit that relocating the “PRT” civilians would have had, the possibility of their moving outside of the PRT was not realistic. In the end, they were beholden to the protection offered by the civil-military structure. Thus, what begins in the 2009 White paper on humanitarian policy as a complex array of actors, humanitarian, political civilian, and military, becomes 6 It is not clear, but it does not appear that the police are included amongst those referred to as “civilians”, although they are in principle considered a part of the civilian effort at the PRT. The police are in fact addressed in a different section of the Faryab strategy, and there is no indication there that they are to be relocated. In fact, the Faryab strategy envisions creating a team of civil police advisers and military policy to assist in mentoring Afghan police. In this case, the divide between civil and military is not so clear.

86

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

reduced to “civilians” and the “military” as categories in opposition, where military must refrain from engaging in “civilian” activities or have as little contact as possible with civilians. At the same time, the White paper acknowledges the position of other guidelines on civil-military interaction such as the so-called “Oslo Guidelines” or the OCHA guidelines for complex emergencies (Oslo Guidelines 2006/2007, OCHA 2008). In these guidelines it is advocated that there be a clear divide between civilian and military efforts, but in the instances where it is not possible for civilians to provide aid, in the last resort, military actors can respond. This is also the case in international humanitarian law or IHL, where military actors are not prevented from providing necessary aid, but are obliged under certain circumstances (Grombach Wagner 2005). However, they cannot use it for political/military purposes (i.e. to influence the beneficiaries in any way). The above Oslo guidelines also apply largely to natural disasters (where there generally are no influential actors vying for political power), or to UN peace operations where it is assumed that the military are present on the basis of consent by all parties, and are not participating as combatants for one particular side in a political battle for power. Afghanistan presents different challenges not least because it is not a peacekeeping operation, which was also recognized by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre in his article in the journal Samtiden at the end of 2010 (Støre 2010). Throughout the Norwegian White Paper and the Faryab Strategy, cooperation and/or at least coordination – suggesting a type of logic behind the interaction but does not assume all actors have similar goals – is claimed to play a central role in the success of a multi-actor mission, but there is a lot of confusion as to how to treat the different actors, in particular the civilian actors. Insofar as one can say that some form of “cooperation” or “coordination” of efforts is important, given the official statements, there is no evidence that all parties in the Norwegian context know what this is supposed to mean. It is this lack of clarity that appears to have spread into the more general dialogue about civil-military interaction, where positions are reified and polarized between static and stereotypical understandings of both military and civilian roles. Up until very recently, “dialogue” has been largely a misnomer, reduced to pronouncements in the media that reflect the government emphasis on the civil-military divide, but which have been additionally confusing or misleading and blurring policy, arguing that the Norwegian model does not endorse coordination between actors: The Norwegian government has, among other things, confirmed that, in contrast to the USA, one does not wish a coordination of the civil and military effort in Afghanistan. (Staveland and Akerhaug 2010c)

This would be a misrepresentation of the Norwegian model, which indeed does endorse coordination, although, as already stated, it is by no means clear as to how that is to be achieved, nor is coordination defined as something different from

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy

87

“cooperation”. Even more misrepresenting is the following quote referring to a divide between civilian and military aid: While the Norwegian forces work on the basis of a clear divide between civil and military aid, the American forces coordinate aid together with emergency assistance … (Staveland and Akerhaug 2010a)

The Norwegian model does not endorse military aid, in addition to explicitly calling for tight coordination. Coordination became a significant tension point, and continues to be, not just in Norway, but internationally. It seems on the surface that “coordination” makes a lot of sense: by coordinating all of the efforts by different actors on the ground, it is possible to build towards a coherent foundation upon which the society in question could thrive. “Coordination” does not always necessitate that each actor has the same goal, but that the work done by various actors are taken into account by others so as to, at a minimum, not reduce the effect of different efforts (supporting a “coexistence” between actors) and at a maximum, positively multiplying the effects of different contributions as they directly or indirectly support each other. Coordination is about management, which can be done by a lead actor (host nation government, OCHA) or a consortium of actors. Thus work on medical services in one area would be coordinated with medical services in another, road work (infrastructure) would ensure that these services were as accessible as possible, policing and business would be encouraged along these networks of increased accessibility and so on. But coordination is political. At one stage, when coordination moves beyond coexistence and gets tighter between actors (as expected by the Norwegian model), it can imply similar goals between actors. It implies power dynamics, the “coordinator” and the “coordinated”. One comment which was frequently expressed throughout the project process was that “everyone calls for coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated”. This is most probably true for humanitarian organizations that, despite all the efforts to placate them with a “humanitarian-friendly” model (that calls for the divide between actors), are not interested in the overarching goals of politically motivated actors like the Norwegian government, and are therefore not on board with regard to any form of coordination, and definitely not in a politically volatile armed conflict situation. In other words, we really need to discuss what the Norwegian model implies for all actors. To the degree that the concerns and implications for actors are addressed, most often the emphasis has been placed on the concerns of humanitarian actors and humanitarian space. But there is no discussion as to what is meant by coordination and how this is to be operationalized on the ground. How? By whom? Under what conditions? There is also little to no discussion surrounding the impacts of humanitarian work on the political and military objectives, which appear to take an implicit second place to humanitarian concerns. Neither Norway, nor the international community, has solved this coordination conundrum, but the challenge remains.

88

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Given the political goals of the Norwegian and other governments involved in both the ISAF and UN missions in Afghanistan, as well as other operations, coordination is clearly important. The Norwegian model recognizes this. To the degree that this it is possible, and depending on the extent to which actors trust the coordinator or coordinating body, it is important to explicitly highlight whom would be well placed to conduct such a role and ensure that more effective coordination takes place. Options for lead actors in coordination include international agencies and individual state-based officials for the most part. In the case of Afghanistan, and likely for many future operations, Norwegian government civilians are restricted as to what they can do given uncertain security situations. In Afghanistan, Norwegian government officials were subjected to the strictest security regulations when compared with military and the NGO actors. American government officials also working at the Norwegian PRT had more freedom of movement. It is difficult for Norwegian government actors to play a significant coordinating role if they are not able to gain first hand situational awareness. UN agencies should be a good choice, not least because they are often mandated to play a coordination role, and have indeed played a role here (such as UNAMA and OCHA), but according to interviews, these efforts have had lukewarm and mixed results at best (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b, Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c, Hoogensen Gjørv 2010).7 This appears to be a chronic condition whereby UN agencies have not been as effective as expected in a coordination role (Pugh 2000). Militaries are not the ideal actors to become coordinators due to the lack of legitimacy amongst civilian actors as well as the power dynamics that can result, but they should in any case be kept well informed as to determine current and future planning – both on what to do but perhaps even more important what not to do that could potentially affect the surrounding civil environment, within the context of the operation. The Relationship between the Norwegian Government and Humanitarian Agencies It has been “difficult to differentiate between the rhetoric or, in many cases, the policies, of humanitarian NGOs, the UN system, and Western governments” (Rieff 2002: 322). The difficulty of differentiating is well illustrated by the Norwegian model itself. The call for a distinction between civil and military activities has been long advocated by humanitarian agencies, and though 7 Assessing the contribution of the UN agencies such as OCHA and UNAMA is a significant project in and of itself, and there is no space for that here. A number of civilians I interviewed mentioned the role and success or failures of the UN agencies, most recognizing that it was a difficult situation, but in general, that there was little substantive assistance or guidance coming. These agencies were locally located and often the personalities of the few people who worked there had more to do with the possible successes and failures than did the fact that these were UN agencies.

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy

89

supported by Norway, is not particularly Norwegian. However, as the government of Norway has adopted this call as a foreign policy mantra, it becomes much more closely associated with Norway itself, rather than a policy solely advocated by humanitarian agencies. The White Paper acknowledges Norway’s role as a political actor, but claims that this is not a problem in relation to humanitarians as long as the humanitarian need for independence is respected.8 As stated in the White Paper, “the key to a good relationship between Norwegian authorities and the humanitarian organizations lies at this nexus between policy and humanitarian principles” (Utenriksdepartement 2009: 12). As such, the government of Norway respects the independence of humanitarian organizations while at the same time practicing its politics by promoting its own humanitarian profile as a nation there to help others. People in need would receive the protection and assistance they require, from Norway as a leading donor to humanitarian agencies, that will actively encourage the international community to address global humanitarian challenges, as well as work to prevent, respond to, and initiate rebuilding during and after humanitarian crises (ibid.: 5). Practically speaking, this is a very large undertaking promised by Norwegian policy, that itself blurs a number of lines between humanitarianism and development. The government of Norway addresses humanitarian crises to a large degree through the Norwegian humanitarian agencies it funds, counting on these organizations as “important cooperating partners” (ibid.: 15) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The cooperation between the Norwegian authorities and humanitarian organizations was indeed an assumption that lay behind the creation of the Norwegian model, and this same cooperation has ensured that Norway has become a leading “donor nation and humanitarian actor …” (ibid.: 15). Thus the political actor has become also, through cooperation, a humanitarian actor as well. But how does this work? Is it such that respecting the humanitarian space of humanitarian organizations can also include Norwegian civilian political actors, as they too have become humanitarians? Or has Norway now politicized humanitarian space? Does Norway’s adoption of the role of “humanitarian policy actor” or “humanitarian actor” (both terms have been employed) in any way contravene or at least challenge humanitarian principles? Although the differences between civilian actors is recognized, and the Norwegian model seems to reflect these differences by advocating a divide between political and humanitarian actors, how are these differences maintained when at the same time the government of Norway emphasizes all the ways in which it closely cooperates with humanitarian actors, adopts the term “humanitarian” for its own politics, and even claims to be a member within, as well as donor to, humanitarian organizations? (ibid.: 15). There is considerable emphasis placed upon cooperation between Norwegian authorities which implies political civilian actors and possibly their military actors, and humanitarian organizations in particular, but there is little said about the 8 Recall the principles of humanitarianism – see Chapter 3 on humanitarian agencies.

90

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

practicalities of how this would function “on the ground” without compromising the independence and impartiality of humanitarian organizations, most importantly for their own security as well as the security of their beneficiaries. Humanitarian organizations need to appear impartial and neutral to different armed groups (this would mean, presumably, all armed groups including national and international militaries), as well as to local populations. There are some who argue that the ideals embodied within the humanitarian NGO movement that work at the local level, representing and meeting the needs of the most vulnerable, has been compromised by the activities of donor governments, but also that an intricate system between an international aid system and government elites blurs the lines considerably between donor and NGO (Kamat 2003, Tvedt 2007). The network of actors behind the international aid system is too complex to analyse here, but some of the challenges need to be addressed. The extensive funding by states to NGOs has undermined the symbol and practice of the humanitarian NGO as the independent actor, instead raising questions about their patronage, whether it is to the beneficiary or to the donor itself in attempts to comply with donor targets (Cooley and Ron 2002, Weiss 2013). The obligations of NGOs to their donor countries can be demanding, in some cases for the better as these obligations can ensure better transparency within and accountability of NGOs. Although calls for tighter monitoring and accountability have been warranted, the connection between donor nations and NGOs seem to have gone beyond this, where NGOs become an informal arm of the donor nation, implementing projects that suit the donor’s political agenda (as illustrated by the Norwegian government’s 2009 White paper referred to earlier, and noted by Weiss 2013). This can include influencing NGOs, even those that abide by humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence, to carry out projects that reach a political goal. The relationship between donor governments and NGOs is one rife with contradictions. On the one hand, NGOs want and need the financial support of the donor, without whom the NGO could not fulfil its mandate. As noted in one newspaper article, “The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) receives almost all of its money from the Norwegian state. The Norwegian model is to use them, and other organizations, as a tool in Norwegian foreign and security policy” (Dragnes 2010). The claim that the NRC was almost solely funded by the Norwegian state was later refuted by the secretary general of the NRC, Elisabeth Rasmusson, as was any suggestion that the NRC was beholden to Norwegian security and foreign policy agendas (Rasmusson 2010). The situation nevertheless raised concern that the relationship between a humanitarian NGO and the state was at best “blurry”. Although this relationship between government funding, government agendas, and NGO activities were not the focus of this project, it was interesting to learn from a number of NGO respondents that there was not always a clear divide between government priorities and NGO activities. One NGO respondent noted that there was some pressure to demonstrate that Norway was doing its part in Afghanistan (particularly Faryab), and therefore although

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy

91

Faryab was not the most critical region according to that NGO’s own assessments and priorities, they made sure that they had a functioning office there in Faryab to address the interests of their primary donor (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). Another NGO respondent noted that pressure also comes in the form of “lists” of activities or goals that the Norwegian government wishes to support, from which the NGO can choose (ibid.). The NGO therefore decides for itself, according to its mandate, what activities will be undertaken, but it is restricted to the overall interests of the donor. At least some, if not all, of the money follows projects desired by the Norwegian government. This can have the consequence of a distinct politicization of the NGO, whereby NGOs have become the service-providers “in line with development priorities agreed between the Afghan government and foreign donors” (Howell and Lind 2009: 727, Shannon 2009). Given that “donors are content that civil society organizations act solely as implementers of aid-funded development projects” (ibid.), NGOs become disempowered in their advocacy role, as watchdogs on the state and advocates for political deliberation (ibid.). This was apparent in the Norwegian case as well, when discussing the relevance of the civil-military debate with some of the Norwegian-supported NGOs in Afghanistan. Dismay was expressed by some NGO respondents at the realization that considerable focus in Norway was on the issue of a divide between military and civilian actors, rather than on the NGO advocacy role and the concrete advocacy issues NGOs were trying to raise, for example issues of family law and gender-based violence (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). At times the donor nations themselves contribute to the blurring of the understanding of civil-military interaction by not only using NGOs as service providers, but also due to their multiple uses of militaries in diverse contexts. In some contexts civil-military interaction is not controversial but instead welcomed: Egeland suggests that it was the combination of military and civilian aid that made it possible for help to arrive quickly to those who had the most acute needs. One of the big challenges we had was to avoid an even larger humanitarian crisis after the tidal wave. By using soldiers and military vehicles we were able to deliver first aid equipment and food quickly. General Secretary Jonas Gahr Støre of the Norwegian Red Cross has no doubt that the military efforts ensured that many lives had been spared … We must become smarter in our use of military resources in areas hit by natural disasters. But even more importantly, there must be a clear divide between the organizations and parties involved in war. (Aftenposten 2005)

The above quote demonstrates directly the tensions that are built into a civilmilitary relationship, and the necessity for a complex understanding of how processes should work, and which outcomes are desired. It is recognized that interaction between military and civilian organizations will differ according to context, as the above quote demonstrates (distinguishing between natural disaster and war). There has been no demonstration however about how interaction can

92

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

be practiced in these different contexts. First and foremost we need to listen to practitioners – not just one actor, but all, and wrestle with the contradictions. The term “humanitarian” cannot be used lightly or uncritically. David Keen notes (Keen 2008) that the term comes with its own dangers, that many conflate humanitarian aid with the fight for human rights, or that it couches the motives of the interveners (such as donor nations) in terms of altruism, which is misleading as the motives are often much more complicated. This is also noted in work on ethical foreign policy, that also acknowledges the complex set of motives behind an intervention, which can include a sensitivity towards humanitarianism as one of many reasons for intervening (Bulley 2010). Given that the motives are complicated, and also very political, the adoption of humanitarianism itself as a foreign policy might be considered inappropriate. The Norwegian government, as a result of its attempt to be a humanitarian actor as well as a military one, is trying to maintain a precarious balance in its policy towards its engagement in complex operations. By not explicitly addressed and problematizing this balancing act, and acknowledging when it is not effective, the model becomes irresponsibly idealistic. By emphasizing the separation of military and civilian actors, it denies its own politicization of the humanitarian agenda, as well as for the occasional necessity for political, military, humanitarian, and development actors to find different and realistic ways to coexist, coordinate or cooperate. The 2009 Faryab strategy is a case-in-point. The rhetoric focuses upon the future, “when” security is achieved, and how civilian efforts will dominate with little to no military support (as it is assumed to be no longer necessary). This approach assumes first of all that security is a static condition that once achieved can be maintained with little to no effort of the military – an assumption that has not been borne out by reality, as Faryab is reaching disturbing highs in levels of violence since the withdrawal of Norwegian troops and their civilian counterparts. Nearing a decade in Afghanistan therefore, there are considerable indications that security can be fleeting, that it takes more than a few military skirmishes to establish and maintain a secure environment. Evidence from Afghanistan has also demonstrated that the military cannot be considered the only actors for ensuring security which shows a clear need for coordination if not cooperation between various actors that have a role to play in establishing and maintaining security. Thus while attempting to achieve an often elusive, dynamic (sometimes non-existent) condition of security, military and civilian actors have to interact, cooperate, coordinate, while constantly re-negotiating and establishing the necessary boundaries between them, under these unstable circumstances. This they must often do in the absence of any support and/or coordinated efforts at the home offices and the higher levels. An Absent Department of Defence and a Culture of Silence Dialogue has two opposites – silence and monologue. (Støre 2010)

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy

93

It is silence and monologue that has dominated the topic of civil-military interaction in Norway, but also internationally, as the dynamics of the civil-military interface have received little attention given its significance to the success/failures of Afghanistan and Iraq. This silence has affected the politics in Norway such that it is unclear when the Norwegian model is, or is not, relevant. It, as well as related guidelines, has relevance and application for some complex emergencies, but not all, and it is not well enough developed to provide a framework for different contexts and needs, or to promote to international venues that are deliberating these questions. Up until recently there has been a culture of silence in Norway surrounding debate on this model, particularly within the Norwegian Foreign Affairs community, as well as the Ministry of Defence. Although many respondents, ministerial, NGO and military, give credit to the model for its insights into the protection of humanitarian space, there have been even more respondents who despair over the lack of opportunity to discuss weaknesses and improve a system of interaction between diverse actors during an operation. During the interview process I noted a remarkable silence that was found at the Department of Defence, a silence that did not mirror the interest in the topic. A number of respondents I spoke with at this ministry were not only interested, but also had a goal to try to clear up the rampant confusion around the complex concept of civil-military interaction. However, it was clear that discussion on this matter was a virtual nonstarter. In some cases respondents requested that the door to the meeting room be closed before anything was said on the subject (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b). Respondents from either of the two ministries (Defence and Foreign Affairs) often equated the Norwegian model with a rejection of the military function CIMIC, and from there, they were usually of two minds – either opposed to the notion of CIMIC (as almost anything to do with civil-military interaction or cooperation was equated with CIMIC), or aware of the complexities of the problem but unable to take the discussion forward. Over a five year period of speaking with Norwegian government employees who either worked only in Oslo, or had worked abroad, including Afghanistan, it became clear that Norwegian government officials experienced a “disconnect” between bureaucrats and field practitioners who, although working for the same department had significantly different agendas which collided rather than coalesced. Jonathan Moore, a previous adviser to the UNDP, wrote the following about similar disconnects: Another difficulty is the void between officials at the lower bureaucratic levels and in the field – whose job it is to know what they are doing and with whom, to comprehend the specifics and to take practical action – and those at higher political levels in capitals, people whose incentive-and-reward system emphasizes the need to accommodate other interests and priorities and to deal with macropolicies for which details simply get in the way. (Moore 1999)

In other words, Oslo rhetoric often did not reflect the specific challenges and frustrations experienced by many lower echelon ministry colleagues working

94

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

in Afghanistan. The following quotes (translated from Norwegian in all but the first case) exemplify, or provide “snapshots” of some of the comments made that expressed frustration with the politics of the Norwegian model and the lack of being able to engage in debate: ‘I feel like a freak’ (government respondent referring to moments when she/ he had to represent the Norwegian model to other troop-contributing nations); ‘What is the Norwegian model? Very immature, even after all these years, and not made operationally relevant’; ‘We cannot demand that NGOs follow up where we like, and we are made to be so dependent upon NGOs to do the projects’; ‘There should not be only one type of organization that is allowed to save lives’; ‘The debate reflects the ideas of people who have never been there’. (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b)

Some government respondents (both in Oslo as well as deployed in Afghanistan) were frustrated that they could not get the information the needed as they, in some respects, were not trusted by the NGOs. Because of their government/political affiliation, NGOs did not wish to reveal project information to government officials for fear that such information would be used, or passed to military sources. At the same time, some government respondents felt handicapped, some relating the experience of having to abide by NGO wishes rather than work towards the alleged political goal that had sent them to Afghanistan in the first place. Many of these constraints were associated with a framework of politics that was guided by the model, and which led to a significant lack of communication never mind coordination, between actors. This is not to say that all governmental officials I spoke to were sceptical or negative towards the Norwegian model. Many had serious concerns about the interaction between actors on the ground in Afghanistan and these concerns were also well founded. The difficulty appears to be, however, that if only those who argued in favour of the Norwegian model could be heard, then the result is a model that is weakened by scepticism that cannot be expressed, which would otherwise contribute to strengthening the model. During the project process it became clear that the Norwegian model has been largely pitted against the military function of CIMIC, as this function appeared to embody the greatest threat to the interests and principles behind the model. With little to no debate, the former was raised as an ideal and unquestioned politic that is meant to inform all activity in theatre. The latter, CIMIC, was largely taken out of the game, also with little to no debate (despite Kristoffersen’s well-written report from 2006 about potential improvements). In fact, it appears that to the extent that “improvement” was the goal, the improvement of the one (the Norwegian

Norwegian Humanitarian Policy

95

model) has been based on the reduction or elimination of the other (CIMIC), but little more. In both cases, improvement, lessons learned, and discussion between different relevant actors, have played a very small role.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 5

CIMIC: The “Function-that-shall-not-be-named” CIMIC – that is something we don’t talk about here in the Ministry of Defence. (Government respondent, Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b)

CIMIC is not the equivalent of “civil-military interaction” as a whole, which is a much broader practical and analytical concept, including and integrating other concepts such as security, legitimacy, authority and obligation. CIMIC cannot take responsibility for the civil-military interface alone, and nor should it. However, it is a military function that can play a central role for the military as a whole in how the civil-military interface operates, as it is ideally supposed to act as a key conduit between the commander of the operation, and other actors in the area of operation, not least governmental and NGO actors. One of the first and rather surprising finds during the project period was the heavily negative politicization of the term CIMIC amongst a number Norwegian practitioners (military and civilian), combined with a confusion surrounding the definition of CIMIC, and concept of civil-military interaction overall. Many did not want to talk about it, or talked about it with what can be best characterized as distaste. Like “Voldemort” of the popular Harry Potter series, CIMIC seemed to be the “function-that-shall-not-be-named”. CIMIC became a dirty word. The dominant impression of CIMIC by many Norwegian civilian actors, and even by some military actors, is that this function is peripheral if not largely unnecessary, has little to do with the core operation per se, and has not demonstrated its addedvalue. At the same time, it became equally clear that both civilian and military actors noticed gaps due to a lack of knowledge (on the parts of both military and civilian actors, primarily about each other) and a lack of power to manoeuvre in the civil-military interface. A key finding was that indeed, some sort of a CIMIC function was needed, but has not been operationalized in accordance to expectations of different actors, if not doctrine. Contrary to how CIMIC is often perceived and/or previously operationalized, two of the most important roles of this function is liaison with other actors relevant to the operation, and training and education for the military about the civilian environment and needs. Neither of these aspects had been recognized or prioritized. The Norwegian military’s Joint Doctrine (FFOD) adopts a NATO approach to CIMIC whereby the function should support the Commander and mission (Forsvarets stabskole 2007). Norwegian doctrine further stipulates that CIMIC is a function that has increasing relevance in operations, it ensures a focus on long-term goals, and is “a very important function for all operations” (ibid.: 141). As noted

98

Figure 5.1

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Civil-military wheel

Note: CIMIC participates in a broader civil-military interface with actors who have responsibilities that are important to, but not necessarily conducted by, CIMIC. Source: Nils Steinvik 2008 with modifications by Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv 2011.

in Chapter 2, NATO CIMIC has three core functions according to the AJP-3.4.9 (pages 2–4): civil-military liaison, support to the force, and support to the civil actors and their environment. Although CIMIC is primarily designed to provide liaison capacity, conduct open information collection and to generate civilian situational assessments that assist operational planning, it has become known mostly for “projects” where military personnel attempt to provide humanitarian and development support (Kristoffersen 2006, Hoogensen and Gjørv 2010). There have been projects carried out by military personnel, CIMIC or other military, that largely mirror development projects and which have often gone above and beyond that which is advocated by doctrine, even contradicting both NATO doctrine and FFOD. According to doctrine, military time and resources should only be devoted to such civilian needs if no other assets (read: civilian) are capable of providing support, and insofar it is necessary and consistent with overall mission requirements and time lines (ibid.: 2–5).1 In other words, military efforts will preferably be used towards civilian needs only in the event of a humanitarian or development needs “vacuum” where civilians have neither the ability nor capacity to meet these needs themselves. At the moment civilians can meet these needs, military efforts are to be transferred to civilian control. This is a 1 The current AJP-3.4.9 appears to have become more lenient towards military engagement into projects than the previous doctrine AJP 9. I will address this further in the subsequent chapters.

CIMIC: The “Function-that-shall-not-be-named”

99

“last resort” approach, not unlike that which is advocated in the Oslo Guidelines that pertain to humanitarian operations, although these guidelines focused on natural disasters or peacekeeping operations where foreign militaries are present by consent of all conflicting parties (OCHA 2007). CIMIC, in Norway as well as other NATO countries, had developed a stronger project focus than doctrine advocates (Kristoffersen 2006, Hoogensen and Gjørv 2010). “Projects” in this instance refer to military actors engaging in activities such as delivering food, blankets and clothing to local populations, or building schools, hospitals, and wells, all of which fall under the sort of work conducted usually by humanitarian and development organizations. These projects have often been referred to as “QIPs” or quick-impact-projects, designed with the intention of appeasing local populations and winning them over to the political objectives that the military represent (“hearts-and-minds”). As noted in Chapter 4, it is QIPs that have largely captured the attention and critique of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The migration of CIMIC activities towards projects was already well illuminated in the 2006 report by Lene Kristoffersen, where the author examined some of the reasons as to why Norwegian CIMIC took a larger projectoriented focus. Kristoffersen’s analysis published in 2006 warrants mention here, as her research is still relevant. Kristoffersen identified six explanations for why Norwegian CIMIC became more project oriented in its short-lived (2003–2004) existence as part of the Norwegian military effort in Afghanistan. One central explanation included the fact that “available funds and directions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs … had a strong impact on the Norwegian approach to CIMIC” (Kristoffersen 2006).2 Kristoffersen noted that the political objective of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to show visible effects of Norwegian efforts in Afghanistan, helped to generate the project focus in CIMIC. In this respect, the Ministry “aimed at promoting the saints”, not soldiers, to Norwegian and Afghan audiences (ibid.). This political objective was further supported, argues Kristoffersen, by Finnish CIMIC approaches, a lack of NGO efforts in the areas where Norwegian CIMIC was deployed, a conflation with American Civil Affairs (a nation-building function within the American Armed Forces that is distinct from CIMIC), and lastly, the possibility of a “feel and do good syndrome” among CIMIC officers that made them less critical of the project focus, though the Kristoffersen admits that she did not have evidence demonstrating this “syndrome”. Kristoffersen provided a useful report in 2006 that could have been used as a departure point for the development and improvement of a Norwegian CIMIC function and capability, that could at the same time have integrated the insights that were important to the “Norwegian model”, thereby designing a “Norwegian CIMIC model”. Instead CIMIC has been all but marginalized. The “project” 2 Norwegian CIMIC had a very brief reappearance in the Norwegian military effort in 2011 and 2012, where CIMIC was allowed for the first time to operate at the PRT in Maimana.

100

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

component of CIMIC, which in principle should be quite minor, has dominated the image of Norwegian CIMIC, and has significantly impacted the impression of CIMIC by both civilian and military actors. Two of the explanations highlighted by Kristoffersen have played a further and significant role in the recorded perceptions of Norwegian CIMIC during the research period that informs this book. The first explanation that has dominated the overall impression of CIMIC was the connection with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). After 2003–2004, a backlash occurred as a result of the relationship between MFA and CIMIC regarding the fact that funding was funnelled directly through military channels to do projects that civilian organizations felt was rightly their domain (Kristoffersen 2006, Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a, Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). It was argued that projects conducted by military actors like CIMIC amounted to a militarization of civilian work, confused local populations, and put both local, beneficiary populations as well as foreign civilian workers in danger by being associated with the military (ibid.). Kristoffersen’s last explanation regarding the “feel-and-do-good syndrome” had also played a role in generating negative perceptions of CIMIC. Kristoffersen could not demonstrate that this “syndrome” actually existed amongst CIMIC officers, but she raised it as a possibility. In many of the interviews conducted during the project process, this “syndrome” was raised as an issue by NGO and Ministerial/government respondents about the motives of the military in general, and CIMIC in particular. CIMIC personnel were targeted as those who did projects to “do and feel good”. This argument was often connected to an assumed lack of competence and legitimacy to conduct such projects, and a lack of understanding for the civilian environment. Combined, the image of CIMIC became one of a group of military practitioners who had no competence but just wanted to help out. The take-away message was that military personnel should not be a part of humanitarian or development efforts no matter how much they wish to help people in need, because that was really the only reason they did projects (or to win “heartsand-minds” – see Chapter 6). But just as what was reflected in Kristoffersen’s research, the CIMIC personnel I spoke with did not articulate this “syndrome” as a rationale for the work conducted either in 2003–2004 (the period when Norway had deployed CIMIC teams to Afghanistan), nor in their work generally speaking. However, this sentiment to “do good” was expressed by a few other military personnel (non-CIMIC), demonstrating that this “syndrome” does exist, if not amongst CIMIC personnel specifically (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). However, the vast majority of military respondents were not motivated in this way. This “syndrome” was expressed by a few military respondents from other nations, although again, it was not a sentiment that dominated discussions either by CIMIC officers or other military personnel. Indeed, particularly Norwegian CIMIC personnel have possibly developed a precautionary approach towards “feel good” operations given their previous experiences and the resulting critique. If such a precautionary approach exists among CIMIC personnel whereby they are wary of conducting any sort of project so as to make deployed troops or their

CIMIC: The “Function-that-shall-not-be-named”

101

own units feel good and feel like they are contributing something, it does not appear that this wisdom has been transferred to the broader military framework, demonstrating a lack of integrating lessons learned. Blurring of Lines: Images vs Reality? Perceptions, evidence-based or not, stick. Both inside and outside of Norway, CIMIC in general has been often perceived as too military by civilian organizations, “militarizing civilian work”, or not military enough by some military actors. CIMIC has suffered from an image problem, much of which has come from the heavy focus on projects rather than on the core, doctrinal activities of CIMIC such as liaison, information collection and sharing, civilian situational awareness (with a focus on NGO demands/needs as well as protection/support of civilians), operational planning and advising the commander. The “saint” image that, according to Kristoffersen, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished to profile through CIMIC projects in Afghanistan, challenged the image of NGOs as the “real” do-gooders, as well as challenged the hard, masculine “risking lives and taking lives” foundation of military culture. Amongst more than 120 respondents that I interviewed for this project, few had a neutral view about CIMIC. One civilian respondent suggested that the problems associated with the CIMIC role are that it is politically motivated and designed to meet the goal of the military (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b). As such a military position that is designed to implement “projects”, as the CIMIC position is often understood, is less desirable than just a civil-military contact that has no project (read: political) agenda. It was interesting that other military activities, by comparison, were not considered “political” according to this respondent. Politics, in this case, was embedded within the projects themselves. The less the military have to do with anything remotely humanitarian or development oriented, the less political and the better it is. One civilian respondent felt better talking about civilmilitary interaction rather than CIMIC itself – CIMIC was too politically burdened (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). The struggle over what the military (not just CIMIC) is supposed to represent and how to operate has also been visible in the Norwegian media. As noted in a recent e-article about the awarding of the highest military honour to one of Norway’s fallen: “One does not get the War Cross for building schools for girls”. The “Krigskors” (war cross) is the highest ranked distinction for exceptional performance and/or loss in battle. Coordinating with civilian actors will not get an officer the “Krigskors”. The greatest military honours go to combat, not coordination or communication. At the same time however, the emphasis on protecting civilians has only increased (largely coming from the political machinery), setting the role of combat in an increasingly precarious position and in principle increasing the importance of functions that focus on the civilian environment. This was exemplified during the increasing concerns for civilians during the March 2011 air

102

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

attacks in Libya: “Norwegian jets have carried out bombing in Libya both Friday night and Saturday morning. No civilians were killed, according to the Norwegian Armed Forces” (Skjæraasen 2011). Although still fighting enemies, the focus has become civilians, which in turn demands a military competency to know and understand civilian security: “[Øystein Kvarving] states that he had seen a video recording of Friday’s bombing. From what he could see, there were no civilians near the targets that were hit” (Aftenposten 2011). This suggests that the toll that combat takes on civilians is becoming increasingly intolerable to many. The UN and NATO, both to which Norway is beholden, continue to deploy troops and/or military equipment in the name of protecting civilians. Thus militaries need more preparation than ever before, to be both tough and battle ready, as well as cautious and mindful of any potential to cause harm to civilians. Knowledge and capacity building in the field of civil-military interaction appears to be ever more crucial, but it is instead is confused and conflated with “projects” because of how CIMIC has at times been operationalized. It is not just the CIMIC function that is burdened by confused perceptions, but also the very people who do CIMIC. A variety of perceptions exist about who actually does and should do CIMIC. Dominating these perceptions, inside and outside of Norway, is that CIMIC is often performed by personnel at the end of their career (soon retiring) and therefore older, which is at the same time connected with no longer being skilled in traditional military terms (not sharp or combat ready) as they were in their youth. Images of slow, overweight, older men drinking tea with the locals all too frequently came to the fore during interviews and focus group discussions. CIMIC was portrayed as soft and unessential as opposed to the essential, hard, combat roles. One military respondent expressed frustration with this image: “Don’t take old guys who have an interest to do something new, they think CIMIC is a safe environment. We need younger, sharper personnel to do this” (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). However, for some, CIMIC is perceived as an easier, pseudo-military, strictly low-intensity task that offers little in the way of a career path for ambitious and enthusiastic military personnel. Insofar as one can consider it a career path, it is assumed to be suitable to women – not just because women may have access to various parts of the civil community that men may not (i.e. access to other women who would otherwise not wish to or be allowed to speak with men), but also due to stereotypes about women’s communication and people skills (ibid.). A significant part of the problem is that few, even in the military, are familiar with CIMIC doctrine – either in NATO or in the Norwegian Total Defence Policy – FFOD, and in political circles this military function is almost solely labelled as a military attempt to do NGO work. Such confusion perhaps warrants the avoidance or eradication of such a function. However, it is not so simple. Removing the label “CIMIC” does not mean that so-called CIMIC-type activities are not conducted, or needed, nor that unwanted military “civilian” activity is not taking place. Avoiding the CIMIC function only ensures that potential support and knowledge

CIMIC: The “Function-that-shall-not-be-named”

103

is not developed, less available, and that activities that do take place in operations do so without training and education, or insights from lessons-learned. Part of the difficulty appears to revolve around a prevailing anachronistic view on conflict and security today. There is still a prevalence to talk about today’s operations as “unconventional”, based on “irregular” and/or “asymmetric threats”. In fact, today’s conflicts that involve multiple, non-state security actors are more “conventional” now than state-on-state conflict, and need to be treated as such. As noted by General Rupert Smith, “War as battle in the field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs, such a war no longer exists” (Smith 2005: 1). NATO acknowledges that “irregular”, complex and/or stability operations are operations that have to be in focus. In a recent speech to the Royal United Services Institute in London, General David H. Petraeus (Rtrd) stated that “Insurgencies, or so-called small wars, are among the oldest forms of warfare, and remain the most prevalent … we do need to preserve the understanding and skills gained from the past decade”.3 Today’s conflicts therefore demand a significant increase in non-kinetic skills and knowledge that deal more directly with multiple actors (both civilian and military) in a conflict setting. Reduced or incomplete attention to continued development of non-kinetic competence to meet the challenges of a civil-military environment only serves to, on the one hand, reify an ahistorical militarized approach to the mission (back to “traditional” warfighting, ibid.), while at the same time reduces the capacity of the military forces to develop or adapt, as they cannot respond adequately or sufficiently to mission demands. Responding adequately does not mean taking on humanitarian or development tasks, but to work in concert with, or at least have an awareness of, non-military actors to succeed in its politically mandated task and in creating security. Another difficulty is an assumption that “anyone” can do CIMIC. It is assumed that specific training and education are not necessary to making an adequate assessment of the civilian environment insofar as it has relevance to the military operation. As such, a number of so-called CIMIC activities still took place throughout the duration of the Norwegian-led civil-military operations at PRT in Afghanistan, although no official CIMIC position existed prior to 2011.4 At the same time, however, the assumption that “anyone can do CIMIC” is contradicted by personnel who observe and experience inadequacies in preparation and the operationalization of such activities.

3 General David Petraeus Awarded RUSI Chesney Gold Medal, RUSI News, 11 June 2013: http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N51B95EC0BC246/#.UcGBKevRxlt (accessed 18 June 2013). 4 Prior to the deployment of a Norwegian CIMIC officer in 2011, there was no official CIMIC position in the PRT. However, there were some trained CIMIC officers from other national militaries that also resided at the PRT during specific periods.

104

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

CIMIC – Don’t Ask Don’t Tell CIMIC happens in Afghanistan, but we are not allowed to call it CIMIC. (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b)

Many of the military respondents stated that CIMIC activities were taking place in Afghanistan even though there was no formal CIMIC element allotted to the Norwegian area of responsibility. It was clear that certain CIMIC doctrine practices were in place, and operationalized by other functions. MOTs or Mobile Observation Teams, employed many of the principles and tasks found in CIMIC doctrine, including placing well experienced people in teams when meeting with civilian actors. The MOTs included experienced and older liaison officers as a crucial part of the team. Older or more experienced officers contributed to establishing an environment of respect when meeting with civilian counterparts, but in contrast to the stereotypes generated around older CIMIC officers, there was no question about their military skills or capabilities otherwise, where age was associated with reduced combat skills. When asked if CIMIC educated personnel could have contributed in the role as the liaison officer, the responses reflected the negative assumption that the CIMIC officers were not well trained enough: “MOTs have a bigger portfolio, they can take care of themselves, are sharp, have pretty high protection abilities because they are in high risk zones, they have a very high military level, over the normal level” stated one military respondent (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). The same sort of response was noted amongst other military personnel who had more direct contact with local populations, whereby CIMIC skills (based on how they described their own skill sets and needs) were necessary, but not CIMIC trained officers. Interestingly many military respondents reflected upon the fact that military personnel had very little contact with the civil society generally speaking, and that this was a disadvantage to the operation. One respondent in particular described the positive benefits of having military personnel located in closer proximity to local populations to make the military more accessible. The respondent described setting up a room or a station in the centre of the town/city so that the military personnel could have daily contact with civilians both to hear more about civilian needs, but to also be “present” so that local populations had a better sense of what the military was doing, if not additionally become convinced that the military presence was a good thing. What this respondent described was what is known as a “CIMIC centre”, a practice and task in which CIMIC personnel have been trained, for the purposes of increasing accessibility for both military and civilians. The impressions and reputation of CIMIC seemed to be an obstacle to thinking inclusively amongst military functions, and taking advantage of diverse specializations and benefits of a “multidisciplinary” approach, including different perspectives and insights from CIMIC. Within many of the interviews with military respondents I noted considerable frustration with a lack of ability to ensure that ongoing contact with civilian actors

CIMIC: The “Function-that-shall-not-be-named”

105

was functioning optimally, or a frustration that they had little to no contact with civilian actors, local or national and international, to have a better idea of what was happening within the operations area. This was not always the case though – there was no cart-blanche answer from this entire field of respondents. Some military respondents felt that the less contact with civilian actors at all, the better. Some felt that whatever contact they had, they were managing the liaison quite well and had an adequate understanding of the civilian situation. Some respondents held specific assumptions about the abilities and practices of other functions (for example, the assumptions about CIMIC personnel being incapable to do a job, liaison, for which they have specifically trained), as well as assumptions and confusion about how contact should take place at all with civilians, either locals, NGOs, or even “their own”, that affected their overall perception of the operation. The following are moments during interviews which illustrate mistrust, confusion about how to deal with civil-military issues, and frustration. A military respondent noted that he had little contact with the civilian component of the PRT: Connections with the civil side of the PRT is very personality based. If you want something you will get in touch. You might be able to avoid them also.

Another respondent stated: Little is channelled through the PRT. The civilians do their projects according to what they think are the needs, and the military do their own thing.

Many military (and some government) respondents were sceptical of the NGO projects, not least because they were poorly informed, or had heard of negative results: One project that was Afghan driven seemed to have some visible effects. Seemed to be the first sort of project where this was the case. Some development projects have worked against the political goal of the international efforts, supporting the opposition. Put gas on the conflict because you strengthen the enemy.

These impressions were not unknown to NGO personnel either, as one NGO respondent noted: The Norwegian model is completely the opposite of what the military wanted. They need tight cooperation with other actors to complete the assignment, and this they cannot do.

106

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

CIMIC (of a sort) was operating, albeit on a basis where past experiences were not included, lessons learned were not integrated, and more knowledge was needed. It is a hit and miss approach, bad at overlapping and continuity, don’t have good enough preparations for non-kinetic operations, about conflict understanding, power understanding, COIN, comprehensive approach, and CIMIC. The PRT is a big CIMIC operation.

While CIMIC as a function has been hard hit, it has been clear that there has been a need for some sort of civil-military expertise in Norway’s most significant out-ofarea operation, and more than likely for future operations. CIMIC-like activities have been present, and have been practiced, as long as it was not admitted that these practices actually fell into the CIMIC specialization. Afghanistan is one specific example. The way of doing things in Afghanistan will likely not be repeated, as each situation demands unique and specific measures. But this is why we develop expertise, so that practitioners within civil-military interaction, in the field of CIMIC particularly, can draw on past experiences and think critically about the specific problems in the civil-military interface when new situations arise. This does not exclude the insights of the Norwegian model. It means that the Norwegian model cannot develop fully without insights from all parties, not just insights from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGOs. The Ministry of Defence needs the insights of the people on the ground, including CIMIC personnel, to know how to best contribute to the Norwegian model. What is needed is a further developed model that follows through with an awareness of the challenges, contradictions, and ethics of civil-military interaction, and that also allows for second best and last resort solutions when necessary, is adjustable to mandate (UN, NATO, etc.), and is able to mediate between actors to ensure the security and protection of the civilian environment to the best degree possible. Current Status of CIMIC Positions in Norway At the moment (June 2013) there are four (4) CIMIC (NATO defined) positions in the Norwegian military. Located in the Norwegian Land Army Warfare Centre (HVS), one position at the rank of Major is allotted to curriculum development and design, including support for international training. In Norway’s only Brigade, Brigade North, there is one CIMIC position located in the G9 branch,5 this is the Branch Chief who has the rank of Major. One position at the rank of Lieutenant 5 G1–G9 distinguishes between different functions/specialities: G1 human resources; G2 Intelligence; G3 operations; G4 logistics; G5 long term planning; G6 Communication and Information Systems; G7 Education and Training; G8 Economy and Budget ; G9 civilmilitary cooperation.

CIMIC: The “Function-that-shall-not-be-named”

107

Colonel is located in the National Joint Headquarters (FOH) in operational planning, and finally there is one Lieutenant Colonel position as CIMIC Instructor at the Military Staff College (FSTS). The G9 Branch in Brigade North was recently reduced from two officers to one, as well as reduced in rank.6 At the moment, the G9 branch will likely be eliminated, placing a CIMIC officer under the G5, for long term planning. This ensures that civil-military interaction will no longer be included as an equal amongst the branch chiefs in the Brigade. The position in HVS, in charge of training and education for CIMIC, will be reduced from Major to Captain. The position of CIMIC Instructor at the Staff College was threatened to be eliminated, but instead performs a dual role in CIMIC and Gender. The position in the National Headquarters is also slated to be moved under the J5 designation. The significance of rank reductions means that the Norwegian armed forces believe that CIMIC can be led by lesser experienced/qualified people, who might also have less operational experience. The elimination of possibly more positions amongst a vulnerable four, provides fairly conclusive evidence that Norway is not planning improvements in this specialized function for civil-military competency, but slowly but surely the opposite.

6 All other branches, G1–G8, retain the rank of Lieutenant Colonel for the Branch Chief. Only the G9 Branch will be reduced to Major, and it is the only branch to be manned by only one person.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Part III Challenges, Lessons-Learned and Recommendations ‘War is cruelty’, US General William Tecumseh Sherman remarked in his memoirs. ‘There’s no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over’. The so-called total wars of the twentieth century, which aimed at securing victory by destroying civilian infrastructure and populations, were seen by both pacifists and proponents of this way of war as the very opposite of the humanitarian’s ethic of kindness, benevolence, and commitment to reduce suffering and respect the sanctity of individual life. (Gilman 2012: 173) … American soldiers and USAID now cooperate on emergency aid in the area … it becomes difficult for the civilian population to understand who is who … (Staveland and Akerhaug 2010a)

A core issue raised by the civil-military debate, either explicitly or implicitly, is the image and resulting role of the soldier. The image portrayed by the US General Sherman in the above quote says much about what a soldier contributed to, total war, which is the opposite of any humanitarian ethic or agenda. At the same time, as the following quote illustrates, we have seen soldiers participating quite heavily in what would be considered humanitarian work. These contrasts are both relevant to the civil-military interface. The following chapters in Part III draw on a combination of some general insights about civil-military interaction, further supported and illustrated through specific experiences observed within the Norwegian civil-military operation in Afghanistan. This section is intended to highlight some core challenges of civil-military interaction, but will also try to highlight some possible recommendations towards assisting the civil-military interface. As the focus of this book has been an evaluation of the assumptions behind the Norwegian model, the recommendations will pay particular attention to the relationship between military actors and civilians – humanitarian and development NGOs – but also to a degree local populations in areas of operation. Norway profiles an ethically oriented foreign policy that prioritizes civilian welfare. The Norwegian government fronts an image as a “Peace Nation” (Ecorys 2012: xviii). Norway is also an active NATO and UN member, and deploys military personnel when required as a part of multi-agenda plan that includes support to civilian populations. This combination of priorities necessitates a flexible plan whereby Norwegian actors are well-trained and

110

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

knowledgeable in civil-military operations. Civil-military interaction involves practices and knowledge that need to be learned, trained, requires quick analytical response while at the same time needs to adapt as need requires and context changes. Civil-military interaction is not a process that should rely on luck and charming personalities, but requires thoughtful preparation, analysis, and critical awareness for every step taken. This necessary knowledge and skill has been reduced within the toolbox of the Norwegian armed forces. There is also a demonstrated confusion over what civil-military interaction indeed implies for different contexts: “The rhetoric around Norway’s contribution in Afghanistan is still characterized by attempts to disguise warfare with digging wells and building schools for girls” (Ørjasæter 2011). This quote, like many other expressions of frustration that can be found in the media, demonstrates that we still do not understand the dynamics of multiple actors in a complex security situation and how the roles of these actors interact and conflict in relation to the broader political goal. This confusion also clouds the need for specialized education and training in this field. The likelihood that there will be a complete cessation of international deployments by NATO or the UN can be safely estimated to be low. Future operational contexts that will be encountered will in some respects be totally unique, while at the same time will reflect similarities with previous operations. Be these operations based on heavy ground troop deployments, or air strikes (jet fighters, or unmanned aerial vehicles), or some sort of combination, the civilmilitary interface will not disappear. As such, the security of civilians in the operations area need to be of primary importance, and in an ideal sense, it is the security of civilians that the Norwegian model prioritizes. The prioritization of human security by militaries not only meets the requirements of an increasing focus on the protection of civilians through international law and norms, but also addresses the core and long standing success of any operation. In the operational context, human security is intricately linked to national and international security objectives, as local populations in targeted areas will and can react, sooner or later, when their security is threatened or reduced. A multi-actor, human security based framework provides an important lens for military operators when they are planning any operation, from both a strategic and political standpoint as well as at the tactical and operational levels. The focus on security is important. At the heart of war is the intricate interplay between power and security. In its simplest form, it is about the protection/ preservation of a state (and the reigning power structure), in other words, the dominant perception of security (usually state-based security). War is also typically hell. Militaries play a primary role in the hell and horror of war. As Smith states quite plainly: “Military force does not have an absolute utility, other than its basic purposes of killing and destroying” (Smith 2005: 18). The Gilman quote above opens with the classic quote by the US General Sherman as he also laments, as well as accepts, the horror of war. From Sherman’s point of view, let war be awful and horrible, but hopefully done with quickly. Two very horrible and total world

Part III

111

wars demonstrated that there was not much correlation between level of cruelty and duration, as two very cruel wars carried on for years. The wars of today, where the emphasis is on cooperation with, if not co-optation of, civilian populations through “hearts-and-minds” have been characterized as “humanitarian wars” (Gilman 2012). Rather than annihilate and destroy people and infrastructure, militaries use humanitarian and development aid to “win” over populations. In fact, more recent strategies like those informed by COIN doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq have been assessed to be a more “feminine” form of warfare – a kinder, gentler approach to war, that is reminiscent of colonial warfare (McBride and Wibben 2012). It is, nevertheless, war. From peacekeeping to peace enforcement or war fighting in a large scale conflict, the engagement of the military always implies an imposition of potential or actual force. A kinder gentler form of warfare that relies on extensive civilmilitary interaction and buy-in from local populations does not make it less subject to critique, or less unpalatable for many because of the military association with violence. Militaries are still imposing their power upon civilians, power which nowadays represents the dominance of the West over the global South (Duffield 2007). Kinder, gentler forms of warfare are thus no less insidious as they nevertheless are meant to take over a population (Gilman 2012). The more political and violent the conflict, the more that civil-military interaction can be controversial. But it is also during such conflicts that the need for skilled civilmilitary interaction is at its highest. Civil-military interaction is problematic because of who the actors are, and who we perceive the actors to be. The actors make a difference, and militaries are at a significant “image” disadvantage because of the power they wield and the politics they represent. Contact between military/political actors and local populations/ civilians becomes more and more contentious the more volatile a conflict becomes. Conversations between military and civilian pose a threat to the lives of everyday Afghans, or local populations more generally speaking. Talking to civilians can be construed as “using” civilians for intelligence, which will place them in danger if the military is not there to protect them afterwards. This argument has been used with regard to CIMIC officers interacting with civilian organizations, CIMIC officers interacting with civilians in general, and military patrols that travel near to NGO projects (and worse, taking pictures of the projects), and Female Engagement Teams (FETs) talking to women. The critique also covers civilian aid agencies or donor nation ministries that have cooperated with the military that by virtue of this contact, the civilian aid agencies will also put civilians in danger (such as USAID or the US Department of Agriculture cooperating with the US military). When a decision is made to engage the services of militaries, one of the first thoughts needs to be about the impact on civilians and how to minimize a negative footprint. Contact between military and civilians in complex emergencies is impossible to avoid, and we cannot ignore our political role in operations where we have deployed a military to support and fight alongside one of the warring parties in a conflict. When the military is made to limit its contact with and knowledge

112

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

of civilians and civilian interests, it is reduced to half (or less) of the machine, using predominantly kinetic measures. This does not mean that the alternative is for militaries to engage in development projects. It does mean understanding and managing the military’s obligations before, during and after contact. Lost in the debates about the ways in which civil-military interaction might bring harm to civilian populations is any discussion with the very people within the affected populations themselves. How do local populations themselves feel about the foreign presence on their soil? Are some in favour of it, and some against? How do the opinions within the local populations affect the debate regarding the civil-military interface, and affect perceptions of security, locally, nationally and internationally? The experiences of local populations in times of crisis are important, and provide lessons to be learned about understanding human security. Looking at the experiences in Afghanistan, it seems that at times there appears to be a devaluation of the perceptions of and roles for local populations in a lot of civil-military discussions that are preoccupied with who has the authority and legitimacy to do what in a given area. Little is said (or acknowledged) about the ways in which local populations might perceive of all of the different actors, many of whom are international, that are in their home territory (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Wardak et al. 2008). Local civilians are themselves negotiating their way through the civilmilitary interface, making decisions to the best of their ability (which at times may be limited) about who to trust, when, and why. Some make the choice to work in close cooperation with intervening militaries and might be themselves perceived as threats or “the enemy” (at least to opposing forces). Others make choices to cooperate with insurgents or opposing forces, which also has an effect on their own security and the security of their surroundings. Others attempt to negotiate a path in between, which may still be a political path but one that draws less attention to them with the hope that their own security is increased. The choices of civilians during times of conflict are of paramount importance. These choices might be influenced by “hearts-and-minds” tactics employed by one or all of the warring parties, or may be influenced by their own local political dynamics, or a combination of both. The choices taking place in local communities, often being made in relation to individual/local perceptions of security, play a significant role in the success of an operation, and the long term success of governance in a region or nation. The debates in Norway about civil-military interaction have lacked a local community perspective, where others (military and civilian) speak for local interests. The lack of focus on direct input or inclusion of voices from affected communities undervalues local capacities to understand and articulate their security concerns, and differentiate between actors, as well as make political choices themselves. Thus an important discussion point is the way in which donor/troop contributing nation participants speak about the host populations they are interacting with. Often NGOs, militaries, and to some degree donor/troop contributing nations (or their representatives) speak of civilians in host nations

Part III

113

with care, but these conversations seem to assume that local civilians have little to no capacity themselves to assess situations and make decisions (good or bad) for themselves. This was clear when talking with many of the NGO respondents as well as government ministry respondents, who often spoke about the people in Afghanistan with a particular authority, not least an authority that they knew better than their military counterparts about what the real needs of Afghans are, and who could provide that need. Military actors, on the other hand, expressed general opinions about their understanding of the civilian situation but did not usually claim to have an overriding authority about it as they were not there long enough to establish such authority. They still had knowledge about the situation that civilians did not have, given their expertise on insurgent movements and overall physical security. This authority of knowing about Afghan needs was not always echoed by the Afghan respondents I spoke with, even though most whom I spoke with chose to speak positively about an international NGO and donor nation/ military presence. The security of civilians is integral to international civilian and military activities, but local input about needs seemed variable at best. Discussions about civil-military interaction by international actors gave me the impression that local civilian actors have a limited ability to assess their own security needs or are limited in contributing to their own security. At the same time however, contact with local civilians was not without controversy for some internationals. Contact with local communities by international actors is influenced by an ethical or moral dimension. The ethics of security pertaining to collecting information from civilians was an important issue highlighted by a number of respondents, on the military side by Intelligence and CIMIC (which engages in open and transparent information collection (NATO 2003), but also by civilian organizations/NGOs. Information collection through military functions such as Intelligence is nothing new. What has been highlighted as controversial is when militaries are more open about their information collection, are willing to share information as well, and wish to talk to those who are perceived to know best, such as local residents, to gain information. This is well exemplified in the debate about women, women’s rights, and the protection of women, and the extent to which the military should or should not interact with female citizens of a population (a challenge that is very relevant in Afghanistan, but not all operation areas). A Norwegian radio program examined the implications of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) talking to Afghan women (Reinert Omvik 2011). The FET program is an initiative originally designed by the US Marines to assess needs for aid and to gather intelligence (Bumiller 2010, McBride and Wibben 2012). The fact that militaries directly target women as information sources has become contentious. The role of FETs can of course appear very instrumental, as one military source put it: you use gender information to get what you need, you understand how they behave to find out how to deal with them (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). Talking to women for information can appear as though the military are attempting to take advantage of women, or exert power over them to extract information, even if done “nicely” over a cup of tea. The relationship between militaries and locals

114

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

are far more complex however. These dynamics of power exist, but it is important to be aware that power operates on both sides in many ways. There are indeed civilians who no longer have the ability and capacity to act on their own behalf, who are helpless, who are vulnerable, and powerless. Many civilians are made so by war, by society and its cultural and gender norms, by the context in which they find themselves. It is important to be aware (as a military) who amongst the civilians might fall into such a category. But not all citizens are “the vulnerable”, and more specifically, nor are all women vulnerable. In the same radio program mentioned above, an NGO representative expressed concerns that local civilians and particularly women were put at grave risk by the military and the FETs, as locals could be potentially targeted after speaking with them. In contrast to that argument however, the program ended with a conversation with an Afghan woman who stated that she did what she could to inform the ISAF militaries of what she saw, heard and understood about her surroundings, as she felt her security depended upon this presence (ibid.). Not all of the radio respondents shared her view though, as other women made the decision to not speak with militaries, also for reasons of their own security. These same interviews also, however, seemed to conflate the military with foreigners and with men generally speaking. At times, in other words, local civilians may be very wary of speaking to anyone who is foreign for fear of their own security, and likewise for a woman speaking with any man, and it may have more so to do with those issues, than that the conversation takes place with a military person. International actor impressions of local populations can vary, and can be contradictory. Amongst the many claims arising during interviews about vulnerable civilians whose security would be threatened by contact with militaries, there were almost equally as many claims about how civilians were making use of a bad situation to the extent that local civilians misrepresent their situation in order to get more (aid, support) out of the foreigners. I came across one such example regarding a transit camp for returning Afghan refugees. In the summer of 2009 almost 400 families were being moved from a refugee camp outside of Afghanistan to their village of origin. Most of these families had not been back to their original village for over 20 years, and the village was in no condition to receive them as years of war had damaged the original homes, or their homes had been taken over by other families in the mean time. A temporary camp (transit camp) was set up for the families with the intention that they would shortly move onward to their original village when provisions had been set up there. The intention was that they would be there approximately three months. By the fall of 2010, the majority of families were still at the transit camp. The camp had to be winterized the year before so that they could survive the winter. According to the respondent informing me of this camp (which I also visited), a large part of the challenge was political. Many families did not want to move, preferring to have both the land at the original village but also at the transit camp. Getting families to move on was difficult. At the same time, there was little for many of these families to do there. Women I spoke to, through a translator, complained

Part III

115

that they had nothing to do, that there was a weaving project that was run for them the year before but that lasted only a couple of months, and that they would love to do something if only they had the materials. I, as a foreigner visiting the camp, was asked to bring help and assistance. I was informed by the NGO that assisted at the transit camp that it was not uncommon to be asked for things every time new visitors arrived, as some communities tried to get whatever resources they could even if they were capable enough to acquire these things on their own. The interests of this community came into conflict with the objectives of the NGOs attempting to return them to their original village. Similar scenarios were reported to me, from both NGO and ministry respondents who appeared to have developed a “healthy scepticism” about the relations between some local populations and the broader aid community. One non-Norwegian former ministry respondent (from a Ministry of Foreign Affairs of an EU nation) noted that local communities were well known for requesting and stockpiling supplies coming from humanitarian agencies that they really did not need themselves, but sold afterwards. Linda Polman has collected numerous anecdotes about the ways in which aid has been misused by various actors, reflecting the challenges of “do no harm” that persist within the aid community (Anderson 1999, Polman 2011). The politics of the donor nations and aid agencies was to ensure the provision of aid, but the reality of the need, according to my respondents, was something quite different. Lastly, a few respondents, particularly those who had been working for an extended period of time in Afghanistan within NGOs, were just tired of working with local communities. These respondents expressed frustration with their experiences with locals, where they felt local communities were not doing anything to improve the situation, that there was no willingness for change or improvement. These comments illustrated an important disconnect that could also occur between international and local actors. Although it was not the purpose of the research project to directly examine the experiences of local communities, I was given insights into these experiences just by virtue of talking to whoever I could while I visited different agencies and international actors in Afghanistan. Generalizations regarding the vulnerability/ passivity of local communities contradicted much of what I saw and heard, as the capacities of people were much more complex than generalizations. It was clear that it is not possible to make general statements about the willingness, ability or vulnerability of local civilian populations and their relations with national and international militaries, and/or political civilians. The context is complex, requiring considerable insight on the part of the international personnel (military and civilian) about how to interact with local people and what this might mean. There is considerable rhetoric expressed by donor/troop contributing nations, militaries, and NGOs that development and assistance should have “an Afghan face” (and more recently, in an informal meeting with Norwegian government officials I heard the same rhetoric about Mali, that any intervention needs both a military and a civilian effort, but should be led by a “Mali” face). Notions of “local ownership” are thrown into the mix, reflecting the importance of local

116

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

participation, self-governance, and fate-control. Such engagement within a mix of political agendas takes risk and a willingness to communicate if not coordinate, from all sides. Such communication is frustrating and fraught with problems and misunderstanding even between diverse civilian actors, let alone between militaries and civilians, emphasizing even more the importance of a solid knowledge base and skill set in civil-military interaction. Despite the complications of communication, and the necessity to improve communication and coordination (where relevant), the Norwegian model has resulted in a reduction of communication between military and diverse civilian actors. Advocating limited contact in the name of civilian protection can imply that civilians are (1) apolitical; and (2) less capable of determining their own security risks or making their own decisions. Civilians may appreciate and respect apolitical principles of some NGOs, but are not necessarily apolitical themselves. Military actors need to know how to engage in dialogue with civilians without creating threatening circumstances, which may at times mean knowing when not to talk to certain civilians. They also need to be available to civilians that do want to engage in dialogue, and know the civil environment well enough to have as good an idea as possible about the possible power dynamics surrounding such dialogue, without assuming that civilians are somehow persistently vulnerable or powerless in the process. Many citizens have a political interest in how their land or region will be governed, both men and women. People are put at risk. At the same time, people choose risk if they believe their values are at stake. In this respect the model of security (multi-actor security framework) reflects just this type of dynamic, whereby citizens themselves have very much a say in what should be protected for their future, and how that will be achieved. Speaking with Afghans who worked independently of NGOs and militaries, or those who worked for/with NGOs and militaries, one gets a vast array of viewpoints, unsurprisingly. Occasionally I discussed the problem of the civil-military interface with Afghan respondents, but the “problem” I was trying to raise became quickly awkward to discuss, largely because those I spoke with did not see this as a pressing or important issue. The following chapters examine a number of challenges in the civil-military interface, challenges that have much to do with the perceptions of militaries and NGOs about local actors, as well as the perceptions, needs and capabilities of local actors regarding their own security, and the way all of these perceptions affect interaction in civil-military operations.

Chapter 6

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums Soldiers are not aid workers. (Stangeland 2010)

The above quote illustrates a typical response, based on a perceived identity of the “soldier”, to what a soldier’s tasks should be. When soldiers stray from direct combat or warfighting, it is as if their activities become suspect, as they are potentially manipulating populations when they are not fighting amongst them. One of the most controversial issues raised in civil-military interaction, and what is particularly highlighted in the justification of the Norwegian model, is the idea that by interacting with civilian populations in non-kinetic ways that may have an effect on the needs in communities (either meeting needs or not), that the military engage in what is called “hearts-and-minds”. It depends upon with whom you speak as to how this notion is defined or understood. At the level of states, Western governments have used aid and economic support since World War II in large part to increase their own influence in particular regions and reduce the influence of their opposition, that is, communist regimes (Morrow 2012). More recently, the “hearts-and-minds” argument has been framed around the claim that aid assists in stabilization and the creation of security (Gompelman 2011). The integration of development projects into a strategy of warfare has been a cornerstone to the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq (US Army 2007). Instead of relying primarily on the use of force and kinetic tools to wage and win a war, counterinsurgency assumes that the battle has to be addressed on multiple fronts, by multiple actors including civilians, to ultimately ensure that local populations are able to function and thrive, or “take care of their own affairs” but at the same time accept the rule of the government in power, as opposed to accepting an alternative ruling power allegedly fought for by insurgents (ibid.). This strategy acknowledges that security cannot be established through force or by military might alone. Thus civilian activities such as development and governance play a crucial role in establishing stability and security over the long term. Although arguably a more “gentle” form of warfare (McBride and Wibben 2012), it is nevertheless warfare. Ideally, civilian agencies participate in the war effort by strengthening economic, political and social development in the region that is to be won over. Instead of decimating a population and using the fear of death and destruction to win a war, the population is made to be convinced of the merits of the government (waging the counterinsurgency) through the services it provides (Gilman 2012). These services, not least the provision of aid, thus become a part of the war machine. This approach to warfare thus uses both military and civilian actors acting on behalf of state interests to achieve influence at a local, if not national, level. Since

118

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Iraq and Afghanistan, the term “hearts-and-minds” has been associated strongly with military activities, where aid provides measures for force protection and is used to secure an area by ensuring that the population supports the operation (roughly speaking ensuring a popularity for the military), and for gathering intelligence (Frerks et al. 2006). Where militaries have not been able to cooperate with the appropriate civilian actors who would provide services to achieve the overall military and political goals, military actors have engaged in the provision of some services themselves. Military actors, however, are rarely onsite for the long haul – they are required to move between different areas of operation and contingents or tours of duty operate on relatively short time periods (often with six month rotations between contingents). Their ability to actually provide any sort of aid is very limited, but many militaries have done so nevertheless. This has often resulted in short-term “projects” (including quick impact projects or QIPs) which have had questionable efficacy towards achieving the end goal of stability and security (Gompelman 2011). Using aid, humanitarian or development, as a part of a war effort, is not an approach to which all actors agree, and considerable resistance has been voiced by aid actors themselves, who do not wish to be associated with a war effort, but wish to provide aid on their own terms. This is particularly the case for humanitarian actors, as has been discussed in previous chapters. Thus the use of aid to convince populations of a political agenda or accepting the rule of the government, in conjunction with the use of force by military actors, is not considered acceptable by some civilian agencies and actors. They do not want to be a part of, or associated with, the war machine. Some civilian actors regard hearts-and-minds, or the promise of security through aid in exchange for political allegiance, as the “buying” of individuals or a community by the military. Hearts-and-minds is perceived such that military actors provide goods and services to communities in the form of humanitarian and development projects, and the community becomes “thankful” or grateful for having received these goods from the military and will subsequently support the political cause the military are fighting for. The way in which the criticism is framed, a sort of “buying off” of citizens, which in itself suggests a vulnerability about local populations that they can be susceptible to this, demonstrates a moral distaste for the process, and implies that hearts-andminds approaches are unethical. The notion of hearts-and-minds has played a significant role in informing much of the debate surrounding civil-military interaction. The focus, at least in Norway, has been an almost sole focus on short term, quick-impact projects or QIPs intended to “buy” the loyalty of local populations. The critique about the inefficacy of some short term projects has been shown to be valid, or at least worthy of critical examination regarding where military actors should or should not focus efforts. However civil-military interaction necessarily goes well beyond issues of short term projects or QIPs. Not only is civil-military interaction a much more complex field of knowledge and practice, it is also arguable that a strong knowledge base or background in civil-military interaction (which, as it develops,

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

119

needs to take seriously the criticisms about hearts-and-minds), has the potential to ensure that militaries think twice before operationalizing a hearts-and-minds approach through QIPs, thinking through the potential backlash of what can be interpreted as a superficial buy-off. This is significant for both CIMIC operators as well as military practitioners in general, and needs to be better embedded within training and education. This point was made clear in a 2008 report that assessed Afghan impressions with the civil-military experience. CIMIC was perceived to be too short-sighted, engaging in short term projects that operated more like shortterm charity rather than something useful that furthered development (AzarbaijaniMoghaddam, Wardak et al. 2008). Hearts-and-minds techniques, either understood as methods to generate more support, or the attempt to win over a population to ones’ political will, are not the sole domain of the military. Donor/troop contributing nations wish to “win” over the population, and have thus deployed militaries to effect this agenda, as well as provide input to aid organizations as to what sort of projects they wish to fund. Militaries make areas of operation ripe for just such “winning” of hearts-and-minds as their task is to make an area clear of a competing political/combatant view (the opposition/insurgency) so that certain civilian organizations or agencies can inject and establish a specific political will into the region. This political will is often supported through aid in the way of humanitarian and development assistance at the behest of donor/troop contributing nations, similarly with the intent to ensure that the receiving population is safe and content with the political approach the donor/troop contributing nation is supporting, or the way in which governance is being established. Thus this is the goal of not only the host government (the original or “new”), but also the donor/troop contributing nations that are claiming to support the host government. Analyses that have examined this approach from the position of the donor/troop contributing nation have not referred to this process as hearts-and-minds, but as “new humanitarianism” whereby communities benefit from humanitarian and development aid when they abide by or accept the political goals of those providing the aid (Rieff 2002, de Torrenté 2004, O’Brien 2004). The tactical/operational/political/strategic linkages are more often than not forgotten or not addressed, leaving the hearts-and-minds critique to focus solely on tacticalor operational-level military operators. Hearts-and-minds is most relevant and applicable, and most glaring, in instances where the goal of the host nation and supporting intervening nations, is confronted by opposition such as an opposing political movement or group (like the Taliban). This is not the same as the peacekeeping mission where, again, international forces generally have the consent of all parties to be there, and usually do not assume a combat role on behalf of one side or another (Coning 2007). Thus development and humanitarian aid actors might have less of an opposition to working in near proximity to military actors in a peacekeeping context, than in a peace enforcement or conflict context. A key source of confusion, or at least a neglected aspect of the debate, regarding the role of hearts-and-minds is the very context in which this concept is applicable and why. The role of hearts-and-minds

120

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

has direct implications for the Norwegian model of civil-military interaction, which in its aim to respect, support and lead with a humanitarian framework, does not account adequately for the complexity of a non-peacekeeping context. According to Norwegian policy, as well as to many of the guidelines that reflect similar principles and practices, the Norwegian model pertains to activities undertaken by NGOs and “peacekeeping forces”.1 Peacekeeping implies a level of across-the-board consent by the various parties involved in a conflict zone that legitimizes the presence of outside militaries for the local populations. Not all complex emergencies are “peacekeeping operations” however, as discussed in earlier chapters. Afghanistan is by no means a peacekeeping operation. Neither ISAF nor UNAMA make any pretences that the situation in Afghanistan is anywhere near a peacekeeping operation.2 The Norwegian model acknowledges the problems with militaries conducting QIPs, framed in the model as “civilian activities”, and provides the necessary respect for some civilian actors to have a clear distance from military activities, but these are problems that arise largely when the context is highly politicized and conflictual. As noted earlier in chapter 4, tight cooperation between military and civilian, to the extent where militaries provide aid, is not problematic during natural disasters. During conflicts or war, however, coordination (never mind cooperation) is highly problematic, and often extremely difficult to accomplish, if not at times impossible. With all the respect towards civilian aid organizations, NGOs both humanitarian and development, that the Norwegian model attempts to embody, it in fact also engages these same organizations within the war strategy by demanding tight coordination, as it is only during the politicized and volatile contexts of conflict where the division of civil and military activities becomes most important and coordination most problematic. We need to discuss the role of hearts-and-minds in peace-enforcement/military operations and determine to what extent hearts-and-minds tactics are important to the broader political goals as well as to the more immediate military ones, as well as discuss which hearts-and-minds activities are never acceptable, regardless of the context. The Norwegian model confuses contexts. How do we reconcile the insights and criticisms of humanitarian civilian actors (reflected in the Norwegian model) with the non-kinetic measures taken by international militaries in peace enforcement/military operations? When militaries need to create or employ support mechanisms to ensure security is provided to 1 A broader application of contexts, including peace enforcement and combat operations, are recognized in the Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies OCHA (2008). New York, United Natons Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). See Chapter 2 for more details. 2 See, for example: www.unama.unmissions.org, in particular: http://unama.un missions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1783&ctl=Details&mid=1882&Itemid=12724, where it is stated that “The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which Mr de Mistura heads, is not a peacekeeping mission …”.

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

121

the local area in which they are operating? This is a politicized, militarized task, resulting from the overall mandate of the international community or individual foreign state providing the military troops. This means, for the military to complete their mandated task, either the militaries cooperate with agencies or institutions that can ensure that the local population in question obtains the necessary goods and services to get the community up-and-running during and after the kinetic phase of an operation and less likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, or that militaries themselves must engage in aid/support activities (least desirable to all parties). From a humanitarian and development standpoint the latter scenario is unpalatable, entering into problems of “picking” aid recipients, creating competition between local communities (those that receive aid and those that do not), and of course politicizing and militarizing aid work, increasing the chances for retaliation. Thus, for intervening nations like Norway which shares an ideological interest for providing aid to those most in need in the world, supporting and enforcing limited-to-no-contact between aid agencies and the Norwegian military at first glance appears to be an appropriate response. Practicing this response is considerably more difficult, and at present there does not exist any mechanism or function by which actors on the ground can adequately operationalize this model of division-with-coordination. Challenges in coordination and cooperation have long been known, therefore to a certain degree it is remarkable that the challenges remain and so significantly so. Coordination, to the extent that it can be found, is based on a heavy reliance upon the personalities of the military commanders and civilian leaders who are on the ground at that moment, producing ad hoc solutions. We can either say that there needs to be a full-stop of all so-called heartsand-minds activities by military practitioners which, despite on-going critique by some civilian actors, has not happened so far, or we can examine these activities in light of the context in which these activities occur, as well as ensure that military practitioners learn more about the implications of these activities from civilian perspectives. The challenges are many, and it is clear that military practitioners need to analyse to what extent it is worth it to pursue certain non-kinetic activities which are assumed to be of benefit to the local community in their area of operation while at the same time meeting the needs of the military operation. These activities also need to be examined in light of the broader political goals of the troop-contributing nation, which might also be a donor nation for humanitarian organizations. A decision needs to be made whether it is better that the military carry out some non-kinetic activities which are clearly linked to the overall political goals of the peace-enforcement operation, rather than that the donor nation encourage civilian organizations, both humanitarian and development NGOs, to carry out the same or similar work, which is intended to effect the same goal. Alternatively donor nations could themselves take responsibility for such activities through their own governmental aid agencies. Donor nations pursuing a “new humanitarian” approach that links political goals with humanitarian aid (see Chapter 4) would

122

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

thus be working closely with their military counterparts as certain phases of the military operation would require the implementation of such tasks. The different possibilities outlined above will not satisfy all actors on the ground, as any politicized aid or relief activity, be it conducted by the military or a government agency, works contrary to the humanitarian principles that humanitarian NGOs abide by, particularly in volatile contexts. The ICRC has claimed that military actors blur civilian/military dividing lines and roles by doing humanitarian work for political gain. According to IHL military actors are able to, and responsible for, providing immediate aid if necessary however without any accompanying political/military agenda (Grombach Wagner 2005)). There is a fear amongst humanitarian and some development organizations that those who are receiving the aid (local beneficiaries) cannot and/or do not distinguish between aid providers, thus blurring the military actors with humanitarians if both provide some sort of aid. This is a very clear problem particularly in the instances when military actors provide aid while dressed in civilian clothes (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a).3 The debate over the impact of hearts-and-minds projects, and who should do projects at all, takes place largely between the different intervening actors, be they military, foreign government, or international (and sometimes national/host nation) NGOs. All of these actors claim to speak on behalf of, and therefor know, the views and experiences of the beneficiaries or civilians themselves. What actually is the extent to which local populations differentiate between aid providers, and to what extent are they even concerned by it? During the interview and participatory observation processes for the research that informs this work, a number of Afghan respondents I spoke to referred on their own accord to “hearts-and-minds” and the projects that they associated with this, the quick-impact-projects or QIPs. These respondents, it needs to be said, were largely urban-based and amongst those Afghan citizens who have a relatively high of education and have worked largely in the northern part of Afghanistan where conditions are different than the south of Afghanistan, with less fighting, although not consistently. These respondents were for the most part indifferent to QIPs and hearts-and-minds, understanding in any case the political purpose behind the projects. They just did not see the value in them for Afghanistan however. For these respondents, and this includes also Afghans I spoke to who worked for international NGOs and IOs, any project was welcome, but what they really needed was solid economic support in the way of factories, places to work that had a future and were not short term 3 None of the Norwegian military respondents I spoke with had ever conducted activities in civilian clothing stating that this was against the rules as military personnel were obliged to go in uniform at all times. Some respondents mentioned that they were aware that other national militaries, and the American military was explicitly mentioned, did appear to allow their personnel to go in civilian dress on occasion, when going into communities. One non-Norwegian military respondent that I spoke with (European) admitted to entering communities in civilian dress.

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

123

(Hoogensen Gjørv 2010). Similar comments and criticisms were made about some NGO projects that were equally short-term and had minimal added-value for the beneficiaries, in their view (ibid.). There is a significant difference between small, short-term projects by NGOs and the QIPs by the military, as the latter is usually more openly politicallymotivated. There is also a difference when militaries engage in non-kinetic politically-driven QIPs and when political civilian actors (such as host government officials or donor/troop contributing nation officials) attempt to do the same. As noted in chapters 3 and 4, militaries are not perceived as neutral actors, and civilian actors (from government, NGO, to local civilians) may question the legitimacy if not the authority of military actors in particular contexts, especially where nonkinetic activities are concerned. At times there is a lack of insight amongst military actors, not least CIMIC actors, about the repercussions and ramifications of the “project” profile, where QIPs go unquestioned and “hearts-and-minds” lacks critical assessment. The hearts-and-minds approach is not restricted to just projects. Various measures can be taken to increase popularity, to attempt to generate trust in the work being done by the intervening military and/or the international political machinery operating in the host country. As an example, previous CIMIC tasks in Afghanistan at the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) HQ and RC (Regional Command) in Afghanistan include liaison with diverse civilian representatives to promote the activities of the ISAF forces and maintain close communication with the communities which are affected, and being available to explain activities and address any concerns of civilians before, during and after operations. ISAF CIMIC is also responsible for visibly promoting the militaries’ activities in the regions, developing “good news” stories of the day at the behest of their commanders (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). Granted, ISAF, as any military operation, needs good public relations, but this activity does make assumptions about the local population (and the extent to which they are influenced by military public relations), as well as makes assumptions about the role of CIMIC and how to best employ this function in relation to the civil environment in question. CIMIC practitioners, among others, need to assess how militaries behave towards civilians (support), but also what militaries should and should not be doing (superficial or ineffective PR, or problematic “humanitarian” QIPs). Numerous respondents, both military and civilian (NGO, government, local population) noted that the most important role provided by the military was physical security. Knowing that a region is secure and will likely not come under attack enables local populations to receive aid from whomever the locals consider to be the best provider, or from whoever is in the region. It also means that aid and assistance can be provided by civilian agencies in safety. If the region is secure, then the chances that more civilian actors enter the region increases. This is really the most effective hearts-and-minds of all, when civilians from government to NGOs to local populations feel that they can move freely and go about their business without fearing for their security or the security of the area. As such, no

124

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

QIP could ever “buy” the loyalty of a citizen if he or she knows that the benefits of that QIP will be short-lived. What this does mean however is that militaries have to figure out how to provide an ongoing and long term physical security so that other security actors who have diverse on-the-ground capacities and capabilities (following a multiactor security framework – Chapter 2), including amongst the local population itself, can operate effectively. That these activities could and should be conducted preferably by civilian actors does not eliminate the need for a solid knowledge base in civil-military interaction by military actors – quite the opposite. Exactly these issues regarding the relationship that the military should have with local and other civilian actors, how military activities can and will be interpreted regarding their overall effect on the operation and the population, and the relationship between force protection and hearts-and-minds needs to be examined within the specific context of the complex emergency and the mandate of the deployed military. This last point regarding force protection and hearts-and-minds is important. Often hearts-and-minds activities (ranging from QIPs to information campaigns, etc.) are invoked by military actors for the purposes of force protection or minimizing the amount of negative response the military will get from local populations regarding their actions in an area. In operations taking place in Macedonia at the turn of the twenty-first century, for instance, military actors handed out footballs to local school children to encourage them to play football during their free time rather than throwing stones off a bridge to passing convoys below (an activity that resulted in the death of one soldier at the time) (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). This indeed was a QIP, that had the primary goal of protecting the troops. A possible negative consequence of this is that other children at nearby schools would also expect footballs and create tension that they hope the military would respond to in kind, but such consequences were not registered at the time. This is just one example of a measure taken for force protection. Depending on the situation, force protection measures might include different possible support services, material or immaterial (such as information, or being present to ensure physical security). Force protection is a part of the inevitable relationship between military and civilian actors. It is also, as noted in Chapter 3, a core task of the CIMIC function. As noted earlier, militaries and troop-contributing nations involved in peace enforcement which often resemble combat operations, even if not officially acknowledged as such, are under more pressure to convince local populations of the benefits and advantages of the “side” they are supporting (such as the GIRoA in Afghanistan). Peacekeeping situations require far less military effort to convince local populations of the benefits of their presence as the political agreements have already been ostensibly achieved or at least initiated. The extent to which hearts-and-minds activities are relevant before, during, and after an operation has much to do with the politicization of the context, and the vulnerability of the political goals of the intervening forces which are linked to the political goals of the local governance structures they are supposed to be supporting. These activities are not necessarily relevant to force protection if the

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

Figure 6.1

125

Hearts-and-minds related to force protection

Note: Hearts-and-minds practices depend on the level of violence and political salience of the context.

level of violent activity is low and the competition between political goals occurs only amongst civilian political actors. On the other hand, the level of violence might be high, necessitating a stronger focus on force protection, but without an overarching political goal (as with fighting criminal activity that might also be occurring within an operations area). However, when levels of violence increase as well as political activity/vulnerability, it is in the military interest to “win over” local populations while at the same time engaging in kinetic (violent) activity as part of its force protection measures. It then needs to be discussed what sort of force protection is preferable. As much as intervening forces are mandated to protect and/or support civilians, they are not willing to sacrifice their own troops unnecessarily.4 Thus, in areas of high political vulnerability and contestation (a battle between political “sides”) and high intensity conflict, militaries need effective analyses to determine what methods will both save their own lives, as well as make the operation more of a success. Such analysis must necessarily include a civil-military interaction focus. Force protection is not all about hearts-and-minds and projects, as it can also include pre4 The sacrifice of NATO or foreign troop lives has been raised as a factor that has changed the way wars are waged. There are many issues that can be raised regarding this trend, but I do not take up this debate here.

126

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

emptive kinetic responses directed towards civilian actors, but given the COIN strategy, a “support to the community” focus is not uncommon. A video report by PBS followed Canadian forces in Kandahar province in Afghanistan, which illustrated the tensions between force protection methods, hearts-and-minds, and ultimately the road to a successful operation (Kiley, 10 April 2007).5 Wanting to help one local community in the Kandahar region, a region subjected to considerable high intensity conflict, a Canadian officer needed to obtain spark plugs to fix local water pumps. To do so, it became necessary to drive towards Kandahar city to see if spark plugs could be bought there. As the Canadian troops were not in a position to trust local vehicles coming towards them, they stopped them, either by yelling or by firing their weapons alongside of vehicles. The local civilians did not appear to responded favourably to the presence of the Canadian troops, as acknowledged by the narrator of the video. The Canadians were unsuccessful in acquiring spark plugs but additionally created tension in this region just outside of Kandahar city. Driving back to their base, Canadian soldiers fired warning shots at oncoming traffic for fear that cars driving too close to the Canadian convoy might be planning an attack, and caused a truck to overturn, resulting in injuries and a death (ibid.). This one effort, getting spark plugs to improve the relationship between local populations and the military, ends up conflicting with other force protection measures (firing at oncoming traffic) that in turn threaten and cause harm to civilians, rendering useless any of the efforts that were made to gain trust in the first place. Thus “hearts-and-minds” or conducting activities for the purpose of force protection have to be very well thought out – even what appears as a small shopping trip for a community can turn completely awry and threaten the efforts of the operation. At the same time, force protection will always be an issue, so interacting with the community in some way for the purpose of such protection will often be a necessity particularly in the case of ground troops. In the Canadian case, a subsequent attempt to gain trust amongst civilians included the offer of medical services to local villagers. Though a worthwhile endeavour in that people who otherwise would not get medical attention would be able to benefit from this, it also was recognized that in this region, such a “service” could put these same civilians in danger, as opposing forces (insurgents/Taliban) might retaliate and punish civilians for accepting the help of ISAF forces. Force protection and hearts-and-minds need to be assessed according to context. Such initiatives are not doomed to failure in all instances, although most if not all hearts-and-minds (trust building, such as obtaining spark plugs and fixing water pumps) would be preferably done by political civilian actors working towards the same goals as their military counterparts. It is not always possible to work in ideal conditions however, and under all circumstances it is necessary that experts in civil-military interaction including CIMIC at the operational and tactical levels, need to think through who is realistically available to conduct non5 The program “Afghanistan: The Other War” is available at http://www.pbs.org/ frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/ (accessed 1 September 2011).

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

127

kinetic measures, how these different tactics for force protection (kinetic and nonkinetic) will likely affect civilians and attempt to predict possible results, in the end determining if certain measures are worth it. The “Vacuum” Problem There are no areas where no NGOs are going but there are vast areas where very few NGOs are going. (Anja de Beer, former director of ACBAR, Mirwais 2006)

Given the challenges for military actors to engage in support activities that can be construed as hearts-and-minds or a popularity/public relations stunt, it could be argued that they should avoid any non-kinetic activities that can in any way be interpreted as such. Since it is difficult to determine how these activities are interpreted and understood by different actors, a possible solution is to downplay most if not all non-kinetic activities by military actors. The Norwegian model encourages this approach amongst the Norwegian military. When the decision is made to deploy troops, it is done on the basis of arguments of the politics of providing or establishing security, either for the deploying nation, the host nation, or both. We cannot divorce military activity from the overall political agenda of the troop-contributing nations and the politics of what and whom they support. Security cannot consist or rely entirely on the efforts of militaries using force, however – this is not just a claim of COIN doctrine, but also established within the field of security studies theory (Winslow and Eriksen 2004, Burgess 2010, Wibben 2011). There are often tensions between establishing security with the use of force, and establishing security through governance (rule of law), infrastructure and economy, and social trust, which further enables individuals in society to enhance their welfare, but all of which are politically laden activities as they embody particular interests and values about the good life (Hoogensen Gjørv 2012). In other words, the use of force reflects only one side of the security coin (negative security), while the political processes, the creation of mechanisms and structures (from family to societal levels) that encourage enabling and the establishment of trust are equally if not more important to providing security (see positive security in Chapter 2) (ibid.). Military practitioners are most often associated with negative security and the use of force, but they cannot be considered incapable of contributing towards positive security, and in fact part of their responsibility should be that they do so (Pugh 2000, Hoogensen Gjørv 2012). The question remains as to how military actors contribute to positive security, in what ways do they have the authority and legitimacy to do so, and what are their obligations to civilians in their area of operations. The use of force may eliminate or reduce some immediate physical threats, but the use of force alone does not produce a stable and secure society. Establishing security, or at least laying a foundation for security, involves more than the kinetic phrase of an operation, and would require meeting some basic needs by military

128

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

personnel in the event that no other actors are available or willing to do so. This situation is probably one of the most central challenges for civil-military interaction and civil-military operations generally speaking, determining which actor is responsible for what, when, and why. The politics of jurisdiction, legitimacy, authority, obligation and capacity collide with the needs on the ground. This challenge is most acute when there is a lack of necessary actors in an operations area, either due to lack of capacity, lack of security, or lack of legitimacy. Locals may lack capacity, NGOs may lack the proper security to work in an area, and/ or military may lack legitimacy to provide for certain needs without causing additional problems for that community in the area of operations. In the case of Afghanistan, civil-military interaction has become tightly associated with specific civil-military approaches like the COIN strategy (counterinsurgency) and the PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team). These approaches reflect a commonly held, but nevertheless contested, belief that security and development go hand-in-hand, and that it is not possible to work on the one without a simultaneous or at least closely linked concentration on the other.6 In this case the “security” of the security-development nexus is understood in terms of negative security, or the identification of threats and a response by force. The security-development combination thus requires multiple actors with different skills working simultaneously. When military actors have determined that a military operation needs to be conducted in a specific area, an operation that can have varying consequences upon the local population in that area (destruction of property, wounded and/or killed, reduced infrastructure, etc.), there needs to be follow-up for non-combatant/civilian needs before, during and immediately after the operation. These needs can be diverse, varied and complex, and ideally actors of varied skill sets are on hand to address these needs. A “vacuum” occurs however when one or more actors are not present, meaning that some of the immediate (and even long term) needs of communities cannot be met. This may have consequences for both the community in question (that the civilians in the region suffer, possibly both as a result of the military operation but also 6 Much of the discussion surrounding the controversies of the development-security nexus focuses upon policy and the ways in which nations link these two concepts together for political purposes Chandler, D. (2007). The security-development nexus and the rise of “anti-foreign policy”. Journal of International Relations and Development 10: 362–386; Duffield, M. (2007). Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples. Cambridge: Polity. Less focus has been placed at how this nexus operates at the tactical or ground level. The critique against understanding security through development is often generated by a scepticism regarding the interests of the nation that pursues such a foreign policy. However it is additionally acknowledged that these linkages do play a role, even if manipulated by government policy, at the ground level. In other words, human security needs depend on this linkage. Thomas, C. (2001). Global Governance, development and human security: Exploring the links. Third World Quarterly 22(2): 159–175; Duffield, M. and N. Waddel (2006). Securing Humans in a Dangerous World. International Politics 43: 1–23.

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

129

as a result of lack of follow-up afterwards) and/or that the military operation that took place quickly loses ground as the local population reacts negatively. A number of military respondents noted that the military must react and do so-called humanitarian work when they have finished an operation in an area, in the event that there are no humanitarian organizations to address the post-kinetic phase of the operation (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). This situation has long been recognized in NATO policy as well: In exceptional circumstances, the military may be required to take on tasks normally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority, organisation or agency. These tasks will only be taken on where the appropriate civil body is not present or is unable to carry out its mandate and where an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise. The military should be prepared to undertake, when requested by the cognizant civil authority and approved by NATO, such tasks necessary, until the mandated civil authority, organisation or agency is prepared to assume them.7

In relation to the CIMIC function, which is based upon the above understanding of what might be needed in an area of operations, CIMIC does not play a “nationbuilding” function designed to do broader social projects. Any such activities are also purely a last resort. It is, however, usually CIMIC that needs to have a comprehensive awareness of the needs on the ground under all possible eventualities. When militaries create or employ support mechanisms to ensure that security is provided to the local area during the post-kinetic phase of an operation, their work is a politicized, militarized task, reflecting the overall mandate of the international community or individual foreign state providing the military troops. If civilian actors follow into an area of operation closely on the heels of the kinetic phase, there is a strong likelihood that the civilian actor will be associated with the political agenda of the military actors. As should be now clear, many civilian organizations, particularly humanitarian organizations, do not and cannot be associated with the mandates and actions of the military. This means, for the military to complete their mandated task during the non-kinetic phase of the operation (particularly during COIN, but it is relevant to many other operations as well), either they cooperate with a civilian actor which is not compromised by such cooperation, or the military must engage in initial support activities themselves. The core concern is that the local population obtains the necessary goods and services to get the community up-and-running after the kinetic phase of the operation where damage/ injuries and death may have occurred, or at least are supported in getting basic services running themselves. Post-kinetic activities attempt to ensure that the area of operation is less likely to fall into the hands of the enemy while the community 7 MC411/1 NATO military policy on Civil-Military Cooperation: http://www.nato. int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm (accessed 10 September 2011).

130

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

establishes security on the basis of support from the political machinery (including military) that sanctioned the operation. In a highly politicized and high intensity context, the military efforts can be weakened if they are not followed up with stability activities for local communities. Of course, a lack of military success cannot be attributed solely to a lack of post-kinetic operational activities. A number of respondents, both military as well as NGO, remarked that a significant problem was that there were just not enough military troops who could stay within the area of operations long enough to establish a sense of physical security in the community and ensure that opposing forces did not return (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a, Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). This was indeed noted to be a core issue. Given that there are often not enough international troops to maintain a longer-term physical security, and at least up until recently, indigenous troops are either too few or not wellenough trained, the alternative is relying on other security-building measures, primarily those that do not rely on the use of force (positive security). These nonkinetic measures transfer considerable responsibility for security to civilian actors, at times in concert with military actors, and are developed according to “need”. Determining Needs and Access Positive security/non-kinetic measures following the kinetic phase of an operation are determined on the basis of “need”, but it makes a difference which actor determines that need. Ideally, the people living in the region are the ones who determine what their own needs are. If those people do not have the resources themselves to meet these needs, they rely upon other actors to support them until that time that the community members can manage the situation themselves. Humanitarian organizations are often those who are positioned in areas of need, often long before any other actors are present, including military. As such, humanitarian organizations generally have time to build a relationship with the communities they are in contact with, and have the potential to draw on a long and well-developed institutional/community memory when understanding and determining the needs for the region.8 Humanitarian organizations additionally determine need in a way that is differentiated from the needs associated with the political mandates of other actors, not least donor/troop contributing countries who often arrive on the scene much later, usually in the heat of conflict or post-conflict. When political/military actors arrive, and the military conduct operation that necessarily include both kinetic and non-kinetic phases, this can and does cause a

8 This is generally the case that NGOs which are well established over a long time period have a history and background with communities and are therefore well placed to address local needs. This is not always, or is less so, the case however if organizations experience high employee turnover. Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (2007–2010c). Interviews NGO/ IGO respondents. Oslo/Geneva/Kabul/Mazar e Sharif/Meymaneh.

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

131

strain on the work being done by humanitarians and other civilian organizations that might already be in the area. Close proximity to political/military actors risks compromising the principles of humanitarian NGOs (NGHAs), and as well, they may not see a particular need to go into the same locations as the military. NGHAs do not have the same political goals, they are not preoccupied with securing the area against insurgents or opposing forces, and therefore will not support an operation just because the military has identified this need in the region where they are operating. Additionally, not every “need” should even be responded to, as humanitarian organizations sometimes must say “no” because they have determined that the situation is not appropriate for their response. A key basis for needs-assessment is the “do-no-harm” principle (Anderson 1999). This principle alerts practitioners to potential negative results even though the intention is to do good (ibid.). Providing aid should not exacerbate social or other divisions in a society or create new conflicts. In accordance with that principle a “do nothing” approach might be the most appropriate. Assuming that something must be done in every instance presupposes that the local population is thoroughly incapable of providing support and aid themselves, or that “doing something” is always associated with “something good”. One NGO respondent noted that the most important humanitarian work is actually conducted by people in the communities themselves, the neighbour, the son-in-law, the women in the street – the locals (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). Such insights, including understanding how tension and conflict can arise in a given context, gives humanitarian agencies that have a long-standing presence an edge in determining needs. It is often not so simple however. A recent debate regarding the ability of humanitarian NGOs to reach those in need illustrates the tensions inherent within complex emergencies and how actors can be limited in their actions by the context in question. In this case, Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) has criticized other aid organizations for misleading donors about the realities of reaching people in need (Moshiri 2011). MSF argues that due to the severity of conflict in some regions, NGOs (humanitarian or otherwise) have limited-to-no access, and therefore are incapable of reaching everyone who is in need. Other NGOs, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), have responded to this critique by claiming otherwise, that access is not limited (at least not to all NGOs, such as the NRC), and that such statements by MSF will curtail much needed funding and cost lives (Opseth 2011). Perceptions of access are contested, and these in turn rely on perceptions and responses to levels of conflict and interaction with warring parties. The willingness and ability of NGOs to engage in areas of conflict speaks to a broader issue of legitimacy, responsibility and obligation amongst military actors who may have increased ability to reach vulnerable populations than do civilians. As noted throughout this book, the dynamics between actors change significantly depending on whether the region is subject to on-going conflict, and the role the intervening militaries play in that conflict, or whether the region is subject to a post-conflict/peacekeeping arrangement. The former presents a

132

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

higher physical security risk to civilian actors (humanitarian, development and government/IO) meaning that access is limited. Military actors on the other hand may have better access, but reflect a politicized presence in accordance with their mandate, endowing them with authority but contested legitimacy if they represent one side in the conflict (as is the case in Afghanistan). The latter situation, postconflict accompanied by peacekeeping, reorients the power dynamics between actors. The legitimacy and authority these actors have, in turn determines access. In the latter case civilian actors may have increased access and authority, and military actors may have increased legitimacy as they are present on the basis of consent of the conflicting or warring parties in the region. The Vacuum: Who Supports Communities in the Midst of Conflict? The military employs force and violence to obtain their military, and more broadly speaking political, goal. When the military does not employ force, the institution and its personnel (individual military actors) nevertheless represent the use of force and violence, particularly from the standpoint of non-military actors. This was exemplified by the comment by Norwegian Church Aid’s Atle Sommerfeldt that a former Norwegian PRT Commander (Rune Solberg) was just a “civilized version of a warlord” (Tømte December 2010). Sommerfeldt’s statement captures the ways in which legitimacy is linked to identity and perceptions of authority, which will further affect the ways in which security can or cannot be practiced by different actors. Militaries may be handicapped by not being able to provide adequate support for comprehensive security that employs measures within negative and positive security. Sommerfeldt reduces the military effort to that of “civilized warlords”, giving an impression that no matter how civilian-friendly/ aware the military efforts, the military are only purveyors of violence. This image reflects the polarized position that no civilian organization will cooperate or coordinate with the military, and also that the military are fully incompetent to address civilian needs. To what extent do local communities bear the burden of these tensions between intervening and supporting actors? In the case of Afghanistan, a number of the civilian organization respondents who were interviewed noted that they specifically chose to operate where the military were not, in part because, as they argued, humanitarian and development organizations are just better placed to understand which communities are most vulnerable and needy, pointing out that these were not necessarily those communities where the military has operated, as well as that they know what the real needs of the community are. From a military and political actor perspective, NGOs were not forthcoming about where NGOs were operating. From the point of view of many humanitarian and development aid organizations, any needs assessment that came from military practitioners was only “hearts-and-minds”. Aid activities can be conducted by militaries either with a goal of providing security for humanitarian reasons, or for reaching their military/political goal. Time and time again, the core arguments waged by many civilian organizations against military actors interacting

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

133

with civilians was: 1) the military lack of competence and thus legitimacy to deliver aid compromising efficiency and effectiveness of aid delivery; and 2) that civilian proximity to a military presence also compromised physical security, making organizations and civilians vulnerable to attack by opposing warring parties. But the security dynamic is not that simple. The military threatened their security. At the same time however, many civilian organization respondents admitted that they did not (or could not) operate outside of militarily secured zones as it was often too dangerous to do so. This was also noted by a number of military respondents who claimed that most humanitarian and development projects took place along the “ring road” which was regularly patrolled by military actors, whereas other large regions were neglected because these regions were considered unsecure (Solberg December 2010, Tømte December 2010).9 In the end, gaining an understanding of the extent to which NGOs are distributed throughout the regions in Afghanistan, if they are located where the greatest needs are or located where their security is best, depends on an analysis of the tensions between actors and context. Thus the role of the military is frequently criticized for attempting to take on what are perceived as non-military tasks, despite a lack of clarity as to how these tasks are related to in/security. This has been the most significant critique of the CIMIC function, and probably the most misunderstood, even by the military itself. As noted already, it is argued that the military is not well-placed nor trained to conduct development-type projects, particularly the likes of building schools and wells. Many within the military establishment would agree, including CIMIC officers themselves. Such projects however, although not necessarily a central feature of CIMIC work, have been referred to by various military, both CIMIC and other military actors, as necessary in the event that no civilian actor is present to carry out such work. Projects ranged from basic or more advanced medical aid, to repairing infrastructure, providing better roads, building bridges, access to clean water and sanitation, and basic medical facilities, or even building schools and hospitals. Not all projects have been delegated to CIMIC. Some 9 In Faryab province, where the Norwegian PRT is located, it was indicated that there were no projects being conducted in what was referred to as the “Pashtun belt”, a mountainous region populated by a number of Pashtun communities, which are considered marginalized in a province heavily populated by Tadjiks and Uzbeks. Military respondents who referred to this region claimed that it was here that a lot of aid was needed, but no organization was forthcoming as it was also a region subject to significant infighting. Norwegian military actors were discouraged from attempting to access the area themselves to provide assistance. NGO actors, however, claimed that aid was being delivered to the appropriate recipients or beneficiaries. A recent report by the Brookings Institution noted that security in the northern part of Afghanistan (which includes Faryab, Baghlan and Kunduz provinces) has significantly deteriorated in part because of the Taliban’s success in recruiting Pashtuns who feel discriminated against in relation to other ethnic groups FelbabBrown, V. (2011). Afghanistan Ten Years after 9/11: Counterterrorism Accomplishments while a Civil War Is Lurking? Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0906_ afghanistan_felbabbrown.aspx.

134

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

projects have been run by medical experts (nurses and doctors) who are at the same time military personnel, and have related more so to training or to building infrastructure (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). In discussions with military actors there was usually no distinction made between humanitarian aid and development aid. This should be seen as a weakness for military actors, as they need to know the difference, not least as the military are obligated (under IHL) to provide humanitarian aid or relief under certain circumstances. It would also make clearer that development projects could be more problematic, and ideally should take place when civilian actors are available to do it themselves. Should military actors be discouraged from engaging in any of these activities? As part of an evaluation of the civil environment, one must include the needs of the local community, but also the political goals and aspirations of the local/ regional/national governing structures, as well as of the IOs (NATO, UN) and of the troop-contributing nation itself. It is this latter issue, the political goals of the governing bodies and/or troop-contributing nations and the broader international community, which complicates the “who”, “what”, “when” aspects of a peace enforcement operation. Aside from providing immediate basic essentials required under IHL, development projects have political meaning and relevance, and are often supported or encouraged by the political machinery (regional, national and international), which makes these sorts of projects potential targets by opposing forces which want to replace the politics operating in that area. If military actors engage in development oriented projects it appears that they are even more politically loaded than if politicized civilian actors do the same. Legitimacy, authority, and obligation are all important elements of civilmilitary interaction that come to a head as the military operation transitions from a dominant kinetic to a largely non-kinetic phase.10 After the kinetic phase of a military operation has been completed, it is necessary that resources are immediately available, including both material and human capacities, to sustain, maintain and strengthen the initial creation of a secure environment (the creation of physical security) by the military. The non-kinetic phase can be designed to focus upon positive security measures, or that which helps to ensure human security. To some degree the measures taken can be perceived as political, but not all are, as basic medical attention and access to food, water, and shelter are important obligations required of IHL. In the context of peace enforcement and/or combat operations, and so as to not repeat the operation in the same area multiple times, the political/military actors have the goal to create a more secure environment that serves the community as well as ensures the community’s allegiance to the political/military agenda. This means more than just the creation of physical security is necessary against any further attacks although that is still paramount – 10 Even during a heavily kinetic/combat phase of an operation, non-kinetic activities are on-going regarding information collection and analysis, situational assessments and planning. Kinetic phases are short-lived in comparison to non-kinetic which take place before, during and after operations.

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

135

infrastructure ranging from basic medical and food supplies to schools, roads, wells, religious institutions, etc. are necessary to fill out economic, social, societal, environmental (clean water, agricultural sustainability), food, health, personal and political (governance) security – broadly speaking human security. However, not all of these elements need to, or should, be prioritized right from the start, or by military actors. Knowledge about the civil-military interface contributes to making better decisions in this regard. In the immediate aftermath of the kinetic phase of an operation, it is ideally the local leaders, agencies and government and/or national host government agencies and departments who would be prepared to come in and provide the first line of support in establishing human security. In a multi-actor security dynamic these would be the central positive security actors supporting governance and trust according to local needs and premises, provided by the local/national authorities that rely upon the trust of the local population. They (local government and agencies) must be considered the most important actors in this instance as popular support is best maintained when it is located in local and national structures that are recognizable and legitimate with the local population relying upon these organizations for their security. However, it is also these actors that are often weakest, unwilling and/or least capable to provide positive security measures. International organizations (IOs) as well as international and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), donor/troop contributing governmental departments and agencies, and other civilian actors actively supporting the host nation should otherwise be ready to “fill” the vacuum left by the military after the kinetic phase,11 and immediately contribute to positive security measures, building trust within the local community and between that community and local/regional/ national governance. The problem, as seen through the eyes of many military actors, is that these IO/NGO civilian agencies are often not in place, and therefore no one is there to fill the vacuum and continue the establishment and facilitation of security in the area. Often the reason for a lack of these civilian actors is that the insecurity level is too high for these actors to safely operate. As such, it is considered necessary from a political/military standpoint, although not desired, that the military provide some temporary solutions that jump start the next phase of security creation (humanitarian aid and development), and it is here where the QIPs have been most noticeable.12 11 The transfer of activity from military kinetic and non-kinetic to civilian “nonkinetic” is a process that should be well-coordinated between all actors during this phase. 12 The notion of quick impact projects (QIPs) is not confined to military efforts, as these are also associated with projects by development or humanitarian organizations when their efforts to contribute with schools, clinics and food distribution are at best ineffective over the long term and worst unintentionally undermining state-building Morrow, D. (2012). Aid: A development perspective, in Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison, J. Spear and P.D. Williams. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. That being said, a common response (by some NGO actors) to the above situation

Figure 6.2

Civil-military interaction throughout an operation

Note: A simple illustration of operational phases where civil-military interaction skills and knowledge are relevant. The 3 “x”es with question marks indicate moments where contact between civilian and military actors is highly relevant, but where contact may not always be an option for some civilian actors.

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

137

In summary, the oft-heard civilian response to the above scenario is that the civilian actors are indeed on location (there is no “vacuum” because of their absence, in other words) and are doing the work they ought to be doing, and that the military should indeed stay away from anything resembling development or humanitarian work (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). The criticism is not a carte blanche critique, as there are degrees of acceptability of military involvement, at least with regard to some immediate humanitarian aid issues. However, generally speaking, the military are criticized for not having the capacity to adequately identify needs, and more significantly, can endanger the work of civilian actors by doing their work, and thereby associating civilians much too closely with military activity (i.e.: a potentially threatening and hostile actor). Civilian agencies and institutions are in place, but not blindly following the military as they complete operations, but identifying where the most acute needs lie (which may or may not be associated with military operations). One option is to just leave the “vacuum” as it is. Complete the kinetic operation, and withdraw when this phase of military activity (fighting) is largely over. This does not address security in its entirety however. If the host nation has not or will not create security for the individual living within the state, other actors, often “insurgents” or other groups that wish control, are present who “fill the vacuum”. Security is created, but on terms that are not necessarily consistent with the values and political goals of the host nation and/or the international community that are also attempting to create security based on their terms, values, and political goals. The important issue is that we recognize how and who creates that security, and that the state or state apparatus is not always the actor who does so. As such, what this case demonstrates is that: 1. the creation of security cannot be accomplished by one actor (military) but by a variety of military and non-military actors; and, 2. that the final result (that security which is created) is highly dependent upon the political goals of the actors themselves, including the community at large. involving military actors, where security is low, there are only military actors in the region, but humanitarian and possibly already development assistance is already needed, is that not only will the military fail in any support efforts but that the military should not be there in the first place. If the deployed troops are not enough to be able to be in the region over a long period of time to ensure physical security, but instead they try to address both negative (physical) and positive (trust/support) security through quick measures (a kinetic operation followed by QIPs) then there is no point in their being there as it causes just more disruption and harm than gains. This is not an invalid criticism, and it goes to the heart of the decision to deploy at all (a very important question). The focus of this book is how to prepare particularly military actors after that political decision is taken to deploy, meaning that given these less-than-ideal circumstances, we have to prepare these actors in the best way possible.

138

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

If civilian actors cooperating with the host nation or operating on behalf of the international community were to fill the vacuum, how will their participation look to other warring parties? Are NGOs that cooperate with the military in any way, shape, or form also a possible target? This is possible, but it is also possible that they are viewed with suspicion, and are targets, no matter what, given the political climate. Those that will target them will likely be those with a political agenda who do not like the agenda of the military intervention, and may associate internationally associated civilian actors with a hostile political agenda. As noted earlier, one key reason to separate the military from civilian actors, in particular from humanitarian actors and their beneficiaries (civilian populations), is because any association with the military, be it just close physical proximity, could jeopardize the safety of the civilians. Close proximity to military actors was cited by NGO respondents as a concern, and some respondents could cite examples where they saw a direct connection between contact with military and subsequent attacks by opposition groups on the humanitarian workers and/or their beneficiaries (Hoogensen Gjørv 2010c). One such example included a situation where military actors drove past an area where an NGO project was taking place and where a sign was posted indicating which organizations contributed to the project. The military personnel took a picture of both the project and the sign. This project was later attacked, according to the NGO respondent (ibid.). For this respondent, the fact that the military paid attention to their project was enough to generate an attack by another warring party. Some NGO respondents, humanitarian largely, noted that they are also conflated with politicized civilians or those who cooperate with militaries, and therefore are placed in danger. This was addressed by the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) which argued that such confusion was not borne out by the evidence: “ANSO believes that AOG (Armed Opposition Groups) are perfectly able (and willing) to distinguish between genuinely impartial NGOs and contractors who overtly participate in COIN” (ANSO 16–30 June 2010:1). ANSO acknowledged that the security argument has been a powerful one, but further stated that: “After analysis, though, one sees that there is no general intent to target for execution either NGOs or their foreign staff” (ANSO 1–15 August 2010: 1). Perhaps the strongest argument for some civilian actors to not have a close physical proximity to militaries is the argument of principles. True enough, principles of neutrality and independence are very important to humanitarian work, and these should not be compromised (although sometimes they are, even by the NGOs themselves – see Chapter 7). The question remains then for other civilian organizations that are not guided by the same principles but have open political agendas. To what degree can and should such civilian actors contribute to a civil-military operation, or at least engage the civil-military interface? In the event that civilian actors are not present as a military operation transitions from kinetic to non-kinetic, regardless of the reason for this absence, it is nevertheless necessary to have skilled operators on the ground to find the best possible approaches to ensure success. This means military operators who

“Hearts-and-Minds” and Vacuums

139

are capable of making needs assessments, identifying the best possible actors on the ground who can provide for or support needs, or determine when nonaction might be the most preferable action. All of these tasks require military competency regardless of the operation. It is when some non-kinetic action is required, resembling humanitarian or development-oriented work, that the question arises as to whether or not military actors are the best choice to conduct such actions. Consistent with other principles of civil-military interaction, having military operators take up the slack temporarily should be a last resort choice (OCHA 2008), usually when the military itself must take some action due to a lack of other actors available. No matter what, friction is often a result. Ensuring that military actors are prepared for a variety of eventualities, including taking up the slack during a last resort, assumes that there exists a military knowledge about other actors in conflict settings. In other words military actors become familiar with non-military actors, their mandates, their assessment methods, and how to best operate with and around them. In many respects NGO respondents agreed that military actors need to increase their knowledge about the civilian environment, in particular that militaries are better familiar with the mandates of different NGOs, what those NGOs do and stand for, why they do what they do, and finally to respect the work of NGOs by adhering to their principles. At the same time a mixed message was sent by a number of NGO respondents. While they did require militaries to have a better knowledge about the role of NGOs in different settings, these respondents at the same time stated that they preferred that the military did not know what they were doing or where, for fear that the military might make use of the NGO activities to support the military operation. Additionally, while a number of the NGO respondents criticized the lack of knowledge and capacity of military actors to know the civilian environment and criticized military competency to provide support to civilians, there was little in the way of suggestions for alternatives. One NGO respondent said that this civil-military conundrum (transitioning between military and civilian) demonstrated that such operations were futile, and should never take place to begin with (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c).

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 7

The Politics of Humanitarian Space The saviour rhetoric of humanitarianism constitutes a powerful force that often claims unquestionable moral certainty and superiority, and therein lies its danger. (Ali 2011, my emphasis) … the Norwegian civilian aid provided to [Afghanistan] can point to good and visible results … (Zachrisen 2010)

Humanitarian work, as the above quotes demonstrate, has been perceived to be surrounded by an aura of “goodness” and saint-like qualities (or “saviour” as noted above), tapping into a moral authority that few others can claim. This moral authority for doing good, perhaps like no other can, lies behind the notion of humanitarian space. It also supports demands for neutrality and independence. Neutrality, as articulated by numerous Norwegian aid organizations in the Norwegian media, is to be maintained via a strict adherence to maintaining a distance between military and civilian work. The close proximity of military personnel to aid workers compromises the safety and security of aid beneficiaries as well as of the aid workers themselves. Claims of neutrality are not intended as critiques per se of military intervention (in principle, humanitarian organizations do not take a stand on the rightness or wrongness of the conflict, but are there to help the most vulnerable regardless of which side they may represent). However, as noted in an editorial in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, Elisabeth Rasmusson, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council, stated that their greatest concerns were that the military kept to assignments that lay within their own mandate, that is, to create stability and security (Rasmusson 2010). More specifically, it was made clear that any association with military forces or warring parties can have dire and negative consequences: When the military forces conduct ‘humanitarian’ work there can be negative consequences for the civilian population. They can be seen as a military target when they accept such help. Further, aid workers themselves might be understood to belong to a warring party. (Ibid.)

It is the close proximity of the military to humanitarian efforts that is most oft reported in the Norwegian media when regarding civil-military interaction. But it is not only military proximity, but also “other” civilian proximity (or at least certain types of civilians). Some civilians do work closely with militaries, as noted earlier, one example being civilians cooperating with the American military:

142

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction While the Norwegian forces work on the basis of a clear divide between civil and military aid, the American forces coordinate aid together with emergency assistance … we end up with a militarization of assistance work. For us it is problematic primarily because they place civilian recipients of such aid in danger. In addition such a blurring of roles influences our own security and our ability to reach out to those that require assistance. (Staveland and Akerhaug 2010a, my translation)

Thus, in sum, it is made quite clear that warring parties shall neither engage in humanitarian or development work themselves, or make use of such work by aid agencies, for the purposes of appeasing or winning over local communities. Such practices potentially contravene IHL, as well as can cause confusion for local communities as to who is providing what, and why. It also compromises the neutrality of humanitarian actors, a central tenant of the humanitarian principles, whereby humanitarian actors do not engage in activities that can be construed as politically significant or influential. Given the importance of humanitarian principles, how can we explain those situations when humanitarian actors accept or cannot resist that their work will, in fact, be manipulated for political gain by other actors? As noted earlier, many of the guidelines for civil-military interaction as developed by the UN (OCHA) or ICRC do not specifically or adequately take up the challenges met by humanitarian actors in peace enforcement operations or more specifically combat operations. In other words, there is not adequate discussion regarding the challenges for humanitarian actors in circumstances where the warring parties are vying for political power. Precisely because there are warring parties (including the host government and the intervening governments and their militaries) attempting to gain control over populations and territory, every move made by other actors (even non-military or unarmed) in the region will be potentially interpreted as activities that could influence the balance of power in a town, city or region. One NGO, Médecins San Frontières (MSF) recently accused many other NGOs of “taking sides” in Afghanistan. According to MSF, NGOs that are funded by Norwegian or other NATO nations are perceived by the other warring party (the Taliban or IEA) as supporting one side in a war, contravening the principles of neutrality and independence.1 An interesting and illustrative case of the difficulties of ensuring and maintaining neutrality, impartiality and independence as a humanitarian actor can be found when examining the role and analyses of the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), identified as a “non-profit humanitarian activity” that works to “inform and advise humanitarian organizations on safety conditions across Afghanistan”. ANSO provides safety information and analyses on a day-to-day basis to member NGOs. It also provides a website with an archive of monthly and quarterly reports, available to “anyone with an interest 1 Bistands Aktuelt (web article): http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/Nyheter+og+report asjer/Arkiv+nyheter+og+reportasjer/-+Har+tatt+side+i+Afghanistan.252196.cms.

The Politics of Humanitarian Space

143

in a genuinely impartial view of the Afghan conflict and the impact on NonGovernment Humanitarian Organizations”.2 The project is supported by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a quarterly report issued by ANSO, the challenges of working amongst the warring parties were apparent: Although there is clearly no single purpose applicable to all cases [of NGO abductions] a growing number seem oriented around simple situational awareness with the IEA stopping, questioning, and assessing all the actors in their area of operations. In releasing NGO workers then they send a strong signal that an NGO is an acceptable actor but only to the extent that it is engaged in genuinely impartial humanitarian activity which the community supports. We must be cautious not to be too starry-eyed here however as we suspect that this acceptance is mostly driven by the IEA’s own need to project credibility towards the communities the NGO is serving. If that dynamic changes, to one of hostility for instance, the acceptance can disappear quickly with it. (ANSO 2010: 8, original author’s emphasis in bold, my italics)

The above quote demonstrates a recognition that impartiality as a principle may not be the overall determining factor behind relationships that are developed with some of the warring parties in a region. Nor should it be expected that warring parties respect neutrality, as another report further noted that, “Also in [Faryab], an NGO-run clinic was approached by AOG who sought to establish their dominance in the area by granting clinic staff the ability to continue working” (ANSO 1–15 March 2010: 1). Thus humanitarian work can and is likely be used to enhance the credibility and power (dominance) of a warring party, which is vying for power and legitimacy, in a particular area and with a particular community. In other words, vying for the hearts-and-minds of the population. Not all parties to a conflict will treat other, particularly civilian actors, with the respect and distance required by international humanitarian law. “A Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade or a Mullah Omar in Kandahar are not going to permit NGOs to operate as anything but givers of charity” (Rieff 2002: 323). In the same ANSO Quarterly Report of October 2010 the Director of the project, Nic Lee, suggested that NGOs should engage with the IEA as they are certain to play a permanent, and increasingly political, role in the future we recommend that NGOs start developing strategies for engaging with them rather

2 See the ANSO website at afgnso.org (accessed 19 June 2013). The website is still up, but with a link to a new website that is for a new manifestation of the organization called International NGO Safety Organization (INSO) where ANSO reports and updates will be located.

144

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction than avoiding them. We understand that the IEA are increasingly desirous of this engagement and, if handled correctly, will respond to it coherently and nonviolently. It is not coincidental that a number of the released abductees have been asked to ‘register’ their NGO activities to avoid future incidents. We recommend that, for our own safety, we all follow their advice and urge the IEA to make the process for doing so clear and safe. (Ibid.: 1)

In the name of security and access (providing assistance and supporting human security for vulnerable populations), therefore, NGOs should consider engagement with one of the warring parties, which includes a relationship with the warring party through a registration service and a monitoring of their work, as it is the desire that NGOs do so to further cement the credibility of the warring party amongst the population. On the one hand, humanitarian NGOs (in particular) need to negotiate access to vulnerable populations through whatever governing or controlling authorities are present in the region. This requirement, to discuss access with local authorities, was mentioned numerous times by NGO respondents during interviews, and was additionally considered relatively unproblematic (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). Humanitarian organizations must keep channels of communication open with all actors who operate in the same area as they do. Part of the difficulty lies in the allegiances of the local authorities themselves, if they (in the case of Afghanistan) are operating as representatives of GIRoA, or IEA, or any other. NGOs favouring communication with just one warring party should be considered, in principle, to be breaching neutrality. As noted in the above ANSO report, ideally humanitarians gain access to vulnerable populations because the authorities in the region (no matter who they represent) are convinced of the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of the humanitarian organization. In reality however, this assumption is probably too “starry eyed”. What then does this sort of contact with the local authorities (in this case the IEA) imply? If one of the warring parties is likely to use the activities of humanitarian NGOs to its advantage, to gain credibility and legitimacy (or win hearts-and-minds?) amongst the local population, an important question is whether or not NGOs should be protesting this with equal vigour as their similar protests against any such similar relationship to other warring parties who might also wish to increase their credibility in the region? Is it acceptable to allow the (in this case) IEA use humanitarian activities for their own political purposes? Should humanitarians ensure that no warring party will do so, or should all warring parties, in this case the GIRoA, its NATO allies, as well as the IEA, be able increase their credibility through the work done by humanitarian organizations? It is undoubtedly difficult to control if and how the activities of NGOs, both humanitarian and development, will be used and manipulated by warring parties to the advantage of warring parties. And the authors of the ANSO report clearly recognize, NGO actors cannot expect that all warring parties respect humanitarian space, and by extension, even acknowledge that some or all NGOs are neutral,

The Politics of Humanitarian Space

145

independent, impartial actors. An example of a possible misuse of a humanitarian project regards the way in which ANSO itself appears to have been referred to by an apparent IEA website: According to a report by Reuters news agency, an European security firm which is responsible for the security of NGOs in Afghanistan has mentioned in their investigated report; that the claims made by the American military Generals about the military progress in Afghanistan is contradictory to the reality on the ground, according to report there is no doubt that in 2010 there was 2/3 increase in armed resistance compare to 2009, and in some northern provinces there is a threefold increase in armed resistance …. The above mentioned reports are according to a western media firm and I believe that if we make an even independent survey it will be more damaging to the invading forces.3

Thus analyses provided by a European security firm responsible for the security of NGOs in Afghanistan (the European-backed ANSO answers well to this description) are used by at least one warring party to convince readers of their military and political gains. Is this a problem? Perhaps not from a humanitarian perspective. What is crucial for the humanitarian actor, according to respondents, is access and acceptance. Thus, when examining how NGOs do and/or should react in relation to AOGs or the IEA, claims for humanitarian space seem to be less relevant in the hope of being able to access target groups. In fact, skirmishes by other warring parties such as GIRoA or NATO forces are implicitly implicated as being a more significant problem. For example, the effects of any attacks of one warring party against the other (NATO forces against insurgents or IEA forces) can have negative consequences for NGOs: “While such operations tend to result in limited short term degradation in AOG capacity, for NGO the effects may be longer term as it may serve to disrupt negotiated access and acceptance” (ANSO 1–15 October 2010: 1). In this case NATO operations against insurgents or AOGs are considered to be detrimental to the long term operating capacity of NGOs. If NATO has had a “short term” military success against an AOG, it is claimed that the NGO will pay the price as the AOG will likely rescind access for the NGO. In some instances, the willingness of some warring parties (such as the IEA) to allow NGOs to carry out their work depends on the acquiescence of NGOs and how much the latter is willing to comply with demands of the former. In the 3 The following website claims to be an English version of a news/information website on behalf of the IEA. The content includes reports about fighting taking place throughout Afghanistan. The citation above was taken from an apparent interview with a spokesman for the IEA, Zabihullah Mujahid, regarding the status of Afghanistan: http://www. shahamatenglish.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5259:intervi ew-with-the-spokesperson-of-islamic-emirate-zabihullah-mujahid-regarding-afghanistanscurren&catid=7:interview&Itemid=17.

146

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

particular case of Afghanistan, “neutrality” and independence appears to be more relevant to one warring party than to another. In other words, NGOs and NGO advocates emphasize the necessity for NGOs to fight for and invoke humanitarian space to gain access to vulnerable populations while at the same time ensuring their neutrality and independence from Afghan National Army (ANA) and/or NATO forces. In the event that Afghan (GIRoA) or NATO forces attempt to use or manipulate NGO work to their political advantage, such attempts will be quickly and soundly condemned. This is possible in part because formal militaries are obliged by the laws ratified by their states. The same does not apply, however, to the IEA warring party. In this case NGOs are advised as to how to maintain access, despite the ways in which their work might be used politically. Why is this the case? One likelihood is that NGOs can in fact condemn the actions of Afghan (ANA/GIRoA) and NATO forces without suffering severe repercussions for it. Despite the many hurdles that continue within the civilmilitary interface, including militaries that provide services, food, supplies and infrastructure to local populations, Afghan-NATO forces have not engaged in kidnapping, threatening or killing NGO personnel if they do not comply with GIRoA or NATO strategies to gain power in the country. Even though NATO forces generally welcome all forms of cooperation with NGOs often, but not solely, for the military benefit, they are aware that they cannot force NGOs to do so. NGOs have not had to buy their access to NATO held regions at the cost of their principles. NATO and other state-based forces are bound by the conventions to which their states are party (Weiss 2013). The security of NGO personnel in Afghanistan (and in other similarly constructed complex emergencies) depends on at least two, and conflicting, strategies therefore. On the one hand, “humanitarian space” needs to be supported and maintained, but the expectation is that this is only possible in interactions with other actors that have a respect for this space. This space is necessary to ensure that NGOs can have contact or establish trust with other warring parties in the region. However, when it comes to some other warring parties, once established that the NGOs are not supporters of GIRoA or NATO forces, the security of NGOs is dependent upon an almost wholly opposite approach, and that is a likely further acquiescing to the political interests of local power-holders. It can be argued in this case that throughout such a process, NGOs that have negotiated with local powerbrokers make pains to distribute the aid themselves, and make plain that the aid is coming from the NGO in question and not the local powerbrokers (to try and distance their work from political manipulation). Even so, as noted above, the efforts of NGOs to demonstrate their distance from the politics of the region may not have an impact on the ways in which local powerbrokers or insurgents make use of the work to increase their own credibility (Rieff 2002, Polman 2011, Weiss 2013). In looking back again to Chapter 2 regarding the nature of security and how different actors have at times different security perspectives, we can see the importance of recognizing these complex security dynamics. In this case, situations

The Politics of Humanitarian Space

147

arise such as when NGOs interact with certain warring parties, whereby the needs for maintaining the security of the NGO will contradict, oppose, and possibly hinder the security needs and objectives of other actors, not least other warring parties (militaries) and their political leadership (GIRoA, troop-contributing nations). However, the lines of legitimacy, authority and obligation are less clear. There is as of yet no agreement as to the legitimacy of the different security strategies of NGOs to both protect themselves or potentially protect their beneficiaries at the potential cost of the political goals of the GIRoA or ISAF/NATO. Can or should principles of neutrality and independence apply differentially to different warring parties? Challenges of Humanitarianism Humanitarianism, and particularly humanitarian space, is a central driving force behind the Norwegian model. Although humanitarian space is very important for the reasons already outlined above, it also is subject to considerable challenges that call into question the way in which it can be used, by whom, and under what circumstances. Under examination it becomes clearer that humanitarianism and humanitarian space are complex concepts. Upon examining some of the different civilian roles that are present in complex emergency situations, it is apparent that humanitarian goals are not always compatible with other civilian goals, some of which include humanitarianism as part of a broader but political solution to the problems of complex emergencies. For someone like James Orbinski, the former president of MSF-International, to insist to the UN officials and NGO colleagues with whom he otherwise shared so many core assumptions that for its own moral coherence humanitarianism needed to remain independent, seems almost perverse … His stance was all well and good, they told him, but after all, the NGOs, liberal Western governments, and the UN were ‘all in this together’. And, he said, they tended to look at him with disbelief when he told them that he did not believe this was always true. (Rieff 2002: 306)

There is considerable confusion created within the civilian sector as many different civilians invoke “humanitarianism” as a shield or a ground for legitimacy. The term “humanitarianism” is used by many different actors, in many different ways, going beyond the intentions and boundaries of the fundamental principles outlined in Chapter 3, breaching notions of neutrality, impartiality and independence. Humanitarianism has become more clearly political because of this use, although some argue that humanitarianism has always been political (O’Brien 2004). A clearer understanding of the differences between civilian actors, including, concrete discussions about the implications of decisions made in the name of neutrality, impartiality and independence, are needed. This is important for those

148

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

civilian actors who engage in humanitarian work, and/or for those working in organizations that profess to cover both humanitarian and development needs. Humanitarian and development aid work are not the same thing. They do, however, have a tendency to merge, not least as evidenced by the ways organizations themselves handle the “division”; many NGOs engage in both humanitarian and development work. In this respect, few NGOs address directly the potential complications of merging two diverse agendas and instead subsume develop-oriented work under the rubric of humanitarianism. An example of such merging or a lack of clarification between NGO mandates can be seen in the Code of Conduct for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) whereby NGOs generally speaking (humanitarian or development) are subsumed within the category of NGHAs which front a humanitarian profile. It was also apparent when I was interviewing and speaking with representatives from selfidentified humanitarian organizations. Some of the NGO respondents from these organizations noted that their work addressed both humanitarian as well as development work, while others claimed the organization’s work was more or less just humanitarian (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). One might argue that the distinction does not really matter in the end – the work is still “good” and important work. This does not address the potential challenges this attitude poses to the fundamental principles of humanitarianism however. When all NGOs are declared humanitarian regardless of their mandate or profile, or if they front multiple-agenda profiles, it is not surprising that confusion will arise regarding the motivations and activities of civilian actors. This is potentially a problem as it could conflate more politicized aid work with aid that needs to be understood as impartial, independent and neutral, with the sole intent of alleviating immediate human suffering. The politicization of aid can vary. An example of this can be the building of schools, a type of project that militaries have frequently been accused of doing improperly (Zachrisen 2010).4 However, building schools is not a clear-cut neutral case for NGOs either. It is not merely the construction of a building that is involved, but also involves a series of decisions about who will go to school there and how the education program should be structured. Politically, the local population and local governance structures may decide that the school will only cater to one ethnic or racial group in the region, or one gender, or that the curriculum and/or teachers must meet particular religious, 4 The “school project” scenario was often raised by critics of military “development” efforts. Respondents were not specific about the location of the school in question, nor of the military behind it. I was aware of concrete examples of such military project projects, however the “school project” has morphed into a stereotype of military efforts, expressed as a vague but oft repeated story of military failure. The same can be said for an the “hospital” example, where a hospital is built but does not take into account the sort of machinery that can be supported in an Afghan environment. Concrete examples of such project miscalculations and failures became general warnings against all sorts of military support efforts.

The Politics of Humanitarian Space

149

ethnic, political, or social criteria. The building of this school may be consistent with or in opposition to various political factions operating in the area (potential or active warring parties; regional and/or national governments, etc.). An NGO that contributes to developments in education, for example, may do so on the basis of comprehensive needs assessments and the principle of “do no harm”, but this does not make the activity apolitical, neutral, or independent of government/governing authority influence. In some cases it was reported that various projects were made visible by signs indicating who the different project partners were, including NGOs. Such visible associations can demonstrate political links. Some NGOs will not make their participation visible for reasons of security, not least because the building of schools can be politically volatile (Ilyas Khan and Sarwary 2011). This is just one example that illustrates only a few of the challenges. Many NGOs are well organized, experienced and well placed to negotiate their way through these political, religious and ethnic/racial minefields. At least that is usually the case, though they are not always equally graceful, nor always capable of avoiding negative consequences (Anderson 1999). More importantly, there is little discussion as to how this is done (negotiating access and support to people in politically contentious environments), or whether in all cases it is appropriate that NGOs in general can invoke “humanitarianism” as a claim to legitimacy, or that all NGO activities are subsumed under the humanitarian banner. Humanitarian work must necessarily be distinguished from more politically loaded development and social work as humanitarian aid and workers must rely on trust between all parties to safely conduct their operations. The fundamental principles of humanitarianism are crucial to the safe delivery aid meant to alleviate immediate suffering. Development aid is also very crucial but also very different, focusing on the long term progress a community or nation will hopefully be able to build upon and enjoy. Long-term development planning is based upon political goals and aspirations for the region or nation as a whole. We see this in the case of Afghanistan, where good governance and long term development is regularly emphasized, both of which are directly connected to a specific political platform (of the GIRoA or Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).5 To conduct this work, other operational principles may apply, but cannot include principles of humanitarianism. In any case, it is clear that the implications behind the distinction “humanitarian” and “development” when it comes to NGOs requires further discussion and guidelines. UNICEF has attempted to draw a distinction between humanitarian and that which it calls “programming” principles, whereby the latter includes the coordination of activities and gender equality, citing these as being more relevant to “solid programming” in emergencies. Programming principles follow the recommendations of the UN Development Group (UNDG) with the goal of contributing to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and are relevant 5 See for example the National Solidarity Programme which is a large scale development program under the leadership of GIRoA and supported by 28 facilitating partners of both development and humanitarian NGOs: http://www.nspafghanistan.org/.

150

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

under both humanitarian emergencies as well as post-conflict situations. The programming principles include human rights, gender equality, environmental sustainability, capacity development, and results-based management (UNDG 2010). Distinguishing these more long-term, development/politically oriented principles from humanitarian principles demonstrates a recognition for the important differences between development and humanitarian goals, and the need to specify the one from the other. A distinction has also been made between “classic” humanitarians and “new” humanitarians (Rieff 2002). As discussed earlier, classic humanitarians appear to be most resistant to civil-military interaction, not just at the operational tactical levels of CIMIC and the like, but including the developments taking place at the strategic/political levels within international organizations, not least the UN and such initiatives as “Integrated Missions”. A number of respondents at ICRC had difficulties with the notion of “integrated missions” as this implies a level of cooperation that does not reflect the mandate of the ICRC. The notion of “integrated missions” blurs the lines – it might be practical and make sense that all actors cooperate, but then it is not at all clear who is working on what basis because everyone appears to be adopting the same principles and goals. Classical humanitarianism has been further distinguished as an approach that insists on independence and neutrality to be able to access their victims (treating them as objects of relief) and differs from a human-rights based and politicized humanitarianism that supports victim access to their rights (treating them as subjects) (Rieff 2002). The link between humanitarianism and human rights was articulated as a “new humanitarianism” that moved far beyond just ensuring that victims were enabled by gaining access to rights, but wished to support only those situations where it seemed humanitarian efforts would have the most effect. In other words, suddenly one was looking for “deserving” beneficiaries (ibid.). Foreign-funded civil society groups should be alert to the politics framing their own position and roles in stabilization and stat-building efforts. However, the past unwillingness of NGOs to recognize that they too are actors in a deeply politicized drama points to the dangers for NGOs for trying to maintain a guise of neutrality. Afghanistan shows well the need for NGOs to reflect more deeply on their own positions in the highly charged situations in which they intervene, and where neutrality may be nothing more than illusory. (Howell and Lind 2009)

Recalling the changing nature of conflict discussed previously in Chapter 2, humanitarian actors are aware that the way they operate needs to adjust to these contextual changes: At the same time, due to the changing nature of modern complex emergencies, the humanitarian community has faced increased operational challenges as well

The Politics of Humanitarian Space

151

as greater risks and threats for their workers in the field, which at times have compelled some of them to seek the support or protection by military forces on a case-by-case basis. Thus, practical realities on the ground have gradually necessitated various forms of civil military coordination for humanitarian operations. (OCHA 2008)

The challenges of civilian organizations need to be discussed by donor/troop contributing nations with civilian and military actors, to gain a better understanding of the impacts of each in the field of operation. The use of violence is part of the military toolbox. Militaries take lives and/or cause injury, either on purpose or as “collateral damage”. Militaries need to be extremely careful, not least because their every move is analysed in international media, but also because their impact on the lives of others is so profound. Constant vigilance and critique of military action is thus warranted because of this profound impact. It also makes the military an easier target for critique. But as noted by many scholars over the years, civil organizations must be better held accountable. They cannot claim holier ground so to speak, because their work is not predicated upon a potential use of violence (Hilhorst 2003, Kamat 2003, Weiss 2013). It becomes extremely difficult to simplify things to good-bad/saint-soldier dichotomies – so long as we, the international community, decide that we will send in actors of whatever form, military or civilian, we must also acknowledge that this is not an unproblematic endeavour, and that all of these actors have the potential to complicate if not worsen some situations. At the same time, ALL of these actors have the potential to improve the situation, including the military (TLO 2010). This is the challenge of civil-military interaction. Respondents from both humanitarian and development NGOs were for the most part not negative towards the military itself, but rather towards a military “solution” or even partial solution to problems they thought, in the end, did not warrant military intervention. This was particularly mentioned in criticism of the COIN doctrine in use amongst NATO/ISAF forces. The comments illustrated is a decided lack of neutrality or impartiality about the political/military agenda of NATO forces, exposing a political position. But that aside, it also represents an issue that donor/troop contributing nations, like Norway, need to explicitly address. When making the decision to deploy a military to engage in conflict while at the same time supporting if not insisting that a civilian or humanitarian presence also be maintained, then more explicit guidelines are needed that address the complexity of these roles and how each reflects and deals with the politics. The complexity of the civilian landscape means that militaries need to have a specialized knowledge about civilian actor diversity and the respective mandates that follow these actors. Only in this way can they establish a more sophisticated understanding and true respect for humanitarian space. This was also the core message coming from humanitarian organizations: militaries require a better

152

Figure 7.1

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Humanitarian space in political context

Note: The more politicized the context, the greater the need for humanitarian space.

knowledge about who the different organizations are, what they stand for (mandate) and how they operate. The challenges of humanitarianism, the distinctions between humanitarianism and development, and the relationships different organizations have to other actors, are all important to the background knowledge all actors should have in the civil-military interface, including the military.

Chapter 8

Why Civil-Military Interaction? Some Recommendations … it would appear that the British Army went through a series of campaign specific learning-cycles in the twentieth century, in each case to correct an approach that was overly military and kinetic approach, and develop a more comprehensive and (what would today be called) population-centric approach. (Farrell 2010: 591)

As Theo Farrell notes in the above quote, militaries are required to build and maintain core kinetic and non-kinetic competencies that can be employed in a variety of contexts. The military task, in other words, is not just limited to direct warfighting (kinetic skills). Militaries must be prepared for conflicts ranging from total war, to UN peacekeeping operations, COIN operations, and other complex emergencies with their attendant strategies, as well as natural disasters. The British Army had a COIN doctrine in place already in 1995, but due to a focus on peacekeeping operations, the knowledge was neglected and the British Army was not able to recover core competencies in COIN when it was needed, but had to relearn (Farrell 2010). Routinized training and education play an important role in maintaining these core competencies. To accomplish such objectives, however, will require military personnel to acquire a greater appreciation and understanding of the unique missions and cultures of the NGO and UN communities involved in providing humanitarian assistance. (Harris and Dombrowski 2002)

The civil-military interface is challenged not least because there is no consensus existing between actors (NGOs, departments, military) about whether or not it is “necessary” that the military engage in some form of non-kinetic work during critical moments or how, and what form this work should take in different contexts. IHL does give some indication here, but not all actors refer to IHL. Another challenge is continuity, and to ensure continuity of knowledge, continual evaluation of best practices, and smooth transfer of both during military and civilian rotations, expert civil-military advisers are necessary. If we assume that civilians are the best for running projects or having more extensive contact with civilian communities, this implies much better coordination, not less, between military and civilian actors – we need to coordinate to ensure humanitarian space, we need to coordinate to ensure physical security, we need to coordinate to ensure a broader spectrum of security. A division between actors, where coordination – at the very least at the

154

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

level of communication – is not central, does not serve anyone’s purpose as it means that the military will have to continue acting on its own to ensure things are done to be effective in their mission, and civilians (international and local) might continue to feel encroached upon. Given the political and conceptual confusion, it is no wonder that at present there is no clear, formal civil-military interaction, or more specifically CIMIC, education available in Norway. What exists is a more or less ad hoc, fragmented inclusion of civil-military themed training within the various military schools (officer candidate school, military academy, staff college, etc.), military exercises, as well as participation in CIMIC education offered by external or non-Norwegian, independent institutions such as UNOCHA, CCOE, or NORDEFCO (previously NORDCAPS). A lack of consistent, continual, on-going formal training in civilmilitary interaction has the potential to perpetuate a vicious cycle of reduced competency in this field. It further becomes difficult to find qualified teaching personnel and leadership within the upper echelons of the Norwegian Armed Forces, thereby creating a gap in military education (exemplified in an earlier difficulty to find a qualified CIMIC Head Instructor at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College). It is necessary to have a pedagogical process in place that allows students to update knowledge and respond to the dynamics and changes of the operational environment (lessons learned-based). This education and training is significant for both the protection of deployed Norwegian forces, greater respect for civilian needs, as well for the successful completion of international operations. On the basis of the findings of the project that informs this book, it would be recommended that the Norwegian government carry out an open and critical evaluation of the “Norwegian model”, so that it adequately reflects and supports the needs of those having to operationalize the policy. This means building a policy that not only represents the political aspirations of the country, but is rooted in the field experience of actors on the ground – that is, those who have worked in international operations, both as military as well as civilian. By training and educating in processes of coordination on the ground that support and recognize the realities there, it will be possible to more concretely protect humanitarian space while at the same time ensuring that the military are not handicapped in conducting their mission. This includes using, developing and improving mechanisms from cooperation to coexistence between military and civilian actors. These mechanisms need to be embedded within the military system so that they become normalized within the military and encourage a dynamic learning and engagement with the civilian environment. Developing such mechanisms is one of the core features of the CIMIC function, though it has been severely underutilized. Greater focus on procedures and processes of cooperation/coexistence ought not imply an inevitable “take-over” of civilian activity by the military. The military need to normalize mechanisms of contact with civilians, and need to normalize the prioritization of civilian needs, so that their civil-military engagement will be less ad hoc and personality (commander) based, and more institutionalized. Only

Why Civil-Military Interaction? Some Recommendations

155

thus can we better ensure that the military contribute to protecting humanitarian space. However, on some occasions, the military and humanitarian agendas will inevitably clash and come into conflict. When this happens, the government of Norway, as with all governments and international organizations that choose to engage in international missions, must make a choice and prioritize its efforts. Either Norway contributes to a solely humanitarian effort supported by civilian organizations, or Norway deploys its military, engaging in a civil-military operation, with all the consequences that this implies. Given those consequences, it is important to ensure that the military and civilian components are as prepared as possible to work in close proximity with each other. Military-military Cooperation It is recommended that Norway, as well as other engaged NATO nations, contribute more directly to civil-military doctrinal development, discussions, and training and education. This means strengthening ties with organizations that are responsible for civil-military doctrine at the UN and, possibly more importantly, at NATO since NATO operations are more likely to engage in a wider range of operations. Equally important to engaging in regular dialogue between military and civilian NGO and government actors is keeping up dialogue with other military actors to ensure that experiences, concerns, and practices can be shared, and contribute to further doctrinal development, as well as training and education. Norway’s capacity to contribute to any dialogue regarding NATO CIMIC doctrine, which is a core doctrine for civil-military interaction, was greatly reduced when Norway withdrew its participation in 2007 in the NATO accredited CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) located in Enschede, Netherlands, which has played a central role in training and education in the field of NATO CIMIC, as well as doctrine development. By withdrawing from the CCOE, the Norwegian government rendered its own influence in the development of NATO doctrine virtually to null and void. In 2008 custodianship of CIMIC doctrine was transferred from SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) to the CCOE, which in turn began immediate work on revising the AJP 9 CIMIC doctrine from 2003.1 Norwegian officials, including Norwegian CIMIC officers, were afforded the opportunity to comment on drafts of the revision as it progressed in its development. In discussion with one CIMIC officer however, a number of the main concerns expressed within the Norwegian comments were not subsequently taken up in final drafts of the doctrine (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). The recently revised AJP-3.4.9, which replaces the 2003 CIMIC doctrine AJP 9, retained the core definition and tasks of CIMIC, but expanded in more detail than 1 See “NATO CIMIC doctrine (AJP-3.4.9)” at http://www.cimic-coe.org/content/ scope/doctrinal.php.

156

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

previously on the expected contexts CIMIC might be employed within, planning and execution, and the role of civil actors. The new doctrine was designed with “major” civil actors, both IOs and NGOs, engaged with the development of the doctrine.2 In contrast to the previous AJP 9, the new AJP-3.4.9 comes with a much heavier focus on non-Article 5 operations or crisis response operations. The design of the AJP-3.4.9 appears to significantly mirror the experiences of the recent past in Afghanistan and Iraq with a strong focus on stabilization and reconstruction operations. As a result, the new doctrine explicitly accounts for the possibility, if not probability, of CIMIC projects. “Projects” are included as a specific issue in CIMIC execution (NATO 2013: 4–5), and in contrast to previous doctrine which cautioned against the use of military resources/finances towards projects to support civilian activities, the new doctrine includes guidelines for funding and processes for the transition of projects (or “CIMIC related fieldwork”) to civilian hands. Additionally, and in contrast to the previous doctrine, the AJP-3.4.9 explicitly notes several activities that NATO forces can anticipate to be involved with including capacity building whereby “the aim is to cultivate sufficient authority within local, regional and national institutions that their governance becomes selfsufficient” (ibid.: 1.8) as well as “Interim governance” where the “key will be to build authority, restore order, encourage respect for due political process, and the hand over to the indigenous authority as soon as possible” (ibid.). Discussing the role of military actors in interim governance processes during an operation is a topic that warrants its own book, and I do not have the space to address it here. However the topic is an extremely important one, and that a NATO doctrine opens up for this possibility should be rigorously and openly debated to address the potential implications of this trend. Not that military actors have not, informally, been a part of such processes in practice – often they have. That does not negate the necessity for debate, and an evaluation over what goals and intentions the international community has when engaging in an operation. In this case, a stronger presence by Norwegian representatives at the drafting table, as a participating nation at the CCOE, might have ensured that Norwegian concerns would have been better reflected in the document. I have already discussed extensively some of the concerns around the notion of CIMIC projects in Chapter 5. The concept of interim governance also has the potential to raise some concerns for some civilian and military actors, who might see this in a more critical light regarding the role of foreign militaries from western nations governing people in the global South, for example (McBride and Wibben 2012). The Norwegian government approved of the doctrine. Due to the different experiences and opinions of military personnel regarding the “do’s and don’ts” of civil-military interaction, tighter cooperation on this issue is warranted. As mentioned now frequently throughout this book, although the Norwegian model has not been well developed, it nevertheless serves as a 2 The involvement of civil actors is explained on the same NATO CIMIC doctrine website: http://www.cimic-coe.org/content/scope/doctrinal.php.

Why Civil-Military Interaction? Some Recommendations

157

useful precautionary lens that could be applied to all questions of civil-military interaction. In any case, it provides a necessary critical look at some of the assumptions that might be circulating about what militaries can and should do in the civilian environment and when. This is particularly important as it is a lens that is not gaining much ground. In meetings with Dutch and American policy and military representatives, the rhetoric of the Norwegian model generated responses of “We thought that way a few years ago, but we have moved past that now” (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b). The Netherlands has developed a CIMIC battalion. In Afghanistan, the Dutch PRT used CIMIC extensively in its initial operations in Uruzgan, one of the provinces that has experienced considerable high intensity clashes with opposing forces (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b). CIMIC personnel worked in tandem with civilian actors, in large part Dutch government officials, among others, to support the civilian community as much as possible while applying military kinetic measures when necessary (ibid.). The efforts at the Dutch PRT were independently evaluated with a relatively positive outcome given the time they were deployed (TLO 2010).3 The Dutch approach was not problem free, as is the case with any military development, but it demonstrated one concrete attempt to reconcile the national priority to intervene militarily with civilian efforts through government officials and NGOs. At the same time, it was apparent that the Dutch attitude to “hearts-and-minds” was by no means as critical as the Norwegian approach, where the former took hearts-and-minds as largely a given part of the process.4 Sharing knowledge at the levels where it can really count, amongst those military actors who are working in theatre and between nations, should be a priority. This is true for establishing lessons learned, but even more so when thinking ahead to future possible operations. A key challenge, particularly after over a decade of two large-scale “stability” operations where relevant actors have become accustomed to a static understanding of civil-military interaction (only in a stability operation context), is looking towards the future and determining how civil-military interaction will look in different types of operations. Civil-military interaction has been strongly associated with face-to-face, boots-on-the-ground activities, where military and civilian actors are in close physical proximity with each other and with local populations. There is a significant pullback now amongst a number of NATO nations from participation in such personnel-heavy and long-term operations, and this reaction against such operations seem to be affecting attitudes towards civilmilitary interaction. What needs to be remembered is that civil-military interaction 3 The Dutch forces and their civilian counterparts managed to find a combination of efforts that were starting to generate positive effects prior to their withdrawal in 2010 (due to the Dutch government refusing to extend the mission). Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (2007–2010b). Interviews Government Ministries. Oslo/Den Haag/Kabul/Mazar e Sharif/Meymaneh. 4 The Netherlands’ Approach to its PRT operations in Afghanistan? April 2007. Heinrich Böll Stiftung: http://www.boell.de/downloads/worldwide/PRT_20.04.05.pdf (accessed 18 June 2013).

158

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

is relevant in any context where military actors interact with or influence civilian actors. This means that the responsibilities, principles and dynamics inherent within civil-military interaction need to be understood and operationalized for different operational needs, including high intensity operations. Gender Advisers vs CIMIC? Also falling into the domain of military-military cooperation, but to highlight it as a specific concern, it is recommended that there be improved coordination between CIMIC and the efforts towards integrating gender awareness into the armed forces. To a degree such coordination has slowly begun, but it has been very slow. The most recent revision of the CCOE publication of “Gender Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission” benefitted from significant dialogue with leading institutions and personnel (such as the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations), as opposed to the first version of the publication in 2008 (Groothedde 2013). Although Gender advisers (Gender Advisers, Gender Field Advisers and Gender Focal Points) play a very important role in the civil-military domain, the extent to which these roles have been understood and accepted has been limited (Fleming 2013). These roles are also vulnerable to some of the same critiques waged against CIMIC. Gender awareness plays an important role in the military organization as well as in its activities. There is considerable recognition now that gender awareness is important to military operations, and particularly civil-military operations and civil-military interaction (NATO 2009). Gender awareness is relevant from a human resources point of view by increasing the numbers of women in the organization, reducing sexual discrimination, harassment and violence within and by the organization, as well as to civil-military interaction. Gender is becoming an increasingly important topic for militaries and military training. This field, like any other, needs to jockey for position and gain the attention of military commanders and leadership at the Ministry of Defence, not least because competition is fierce for resources and time. Particularly relevant for non-kinetic functions, many are in a position where they have to argue their own relevance or else be marginalized or cut. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, CIMIC despite its attendant broader understanding of civil-military interaction, has been subject to significant marginalization. As such, it has appeared that other fields, like gender adviser, which are “up and coming” want to stay well away from any field or branch like CIMIC that looks like it is “on its way down”. Some of the key criticisms waged CIMIC, including problems with “winning hearts-and-minds”, using information collected by CIMIC teams towards intelligence for the military operation, as well as employing CIMIC for force protection purposes (implying a use of the civil-military relationship to protect military forces), were turned on their head when arguing for gender perspectives in the military. These three factors – hearts-and-minds, intelligence, and force protection – are often cited as key and concrete benefits behind integrating gender

Why Civil-Military Interaction? Some Recommendations

159

awareness into the military particularly in a civil-military interface through the use of FETs or similar all-female liaison teams (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). In other words, a number of the negative elements of CIMIC were argued as positive attributes and benefits for the military when done through a “gender awareness” type of framework, or more specifically, the role of a military gender adviser. Gender advisers specifically examine the complex issues related to gender, and although the focus has been particularly on women in the Afghanistan context, there appears to be an increasing awareness of the relevance of male/masculine based expectations and roles in the broader social context. The impact of gender on the civil situational environment warrants a dedicated function. At the same time however, many of the tasks of gender advisers as compared to CIMIC are similar. CIMIC is, in principle, meant to be a link and information site from the military side to diverse actors in the area of operations, whereas gender advisers monitor gender awareness and inclusion in the operation as well as operate as an information site. Thus both include awareness of the civilian environment and civilian needs, a knowledge of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), awareness of the “do no harm” principle and its applications, and that such awareness (a broader civilian awareness including gender and cultural awareness) needs to be part of the operational process. It has been noted however, both in interviews as well as during conferences, that gender experts were not keen to be associated with CIMIC. This appeared to be due to the low prioritization of CIMIC within the military hierarchy, and the perception that CIMIC operators do not have the ear of the commander. Gender experts and CIMIC encounter many similar obstacles in the military setting, where each have noted that gender awareness and expertise has often been low priority, is considered an “after the battle” issue, a cultural issue (thus not relevant as “gender” per se), or just not relevant in a military setting that prioritizes and focuses upon kinetic skills. The claim of gender experts is that this low prioritization demonstrates a lack of insight and awareness on the part of the military for an increased understanding of the social and political issues affecting the civilian environment in which the military must operate. Often there are cries for better resources (grossly underfunded as an activity) for this deprioritized activity (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a, Fleming 2013). CIMIC respondents, as well as other military respondents, noted the same when it came to supporting civil-military engagement. What is interesting however is that there has been little attempt for gender and CIMIC to cooperate more significantly if not join forces, raise better awareness for the necessity for non-kinetic skills that these analytical positions have to offer. In the Norwegian context, the reorganization of functions within the G and J1–9 branches appears to be indeed “lumping together” CIMIC and gender, but it is unclear if this is being done for its force multiplying effects which would act to explicitly operationalize the benefits of these combined analytical and information functions, or as just part of a budgetary and management scheme. The end result should be positive however, as both functions will be working more closely together due to the restructuring.

160

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Gender awareness was also highlighted as an important factor in training and capacity on the ground. Gender awareness is relevant to those working in the humanitarian field and part of their training, and thus should be equally if not more so a factor in training within a traditionally masculine-oriented organization such as the military. Gender awareness makes visible the roles of both women and men and the ways in which both genders are limited and enabled within these roles. By being gender aware, and knowledgeable about gender roles, one avoids stereotyping such as “women have no power”, or “men have all the power”, or that all women are vulnerable. Where women may have limited power in some public spaces, they may have otherwise increased power in private spaces and within and amongst family settings that men often do not have access to. In spaces of overall reduced power, women still have access to networks and markets that are essential in building/re-building communities, and they must also be recognized for the security roles they play in ensuring to the best of their ability that families are taken care of and removed from harm. It is also important to recognize the ways in which men are reduced of their power within their own societies, where joblessness can have an overwhelming impact on the vulnerabilities of men, reduce their freedom and sense of contribution to their families and communities, resulting in (potentially) increasing violence both at home as well as in the community through insurgent recruitment or criminal activity. Given the diversity of roles that women and men play, and the attendant power that is associated with all of these roles, one does not obtain a clear picture of the civil situation without having the analytical clarity that gender awareness brings to a situation. High Intensity Operations The operations that have been taking place over the past two decades have been largely characterized by multi-actor/civil-military low intensity conflicts that have demanded both low (conflict management) and high intensity (warfighting) operations. It is highly recommended that a larger focus be placed on the relevance of CIMIC, and civil-military interaction more broadly speaking, to high intensity operations. The focus of discussion during low intensity conflicts has been on nonwarfighting tactics and operations, where non-kinetic skills have come largely into play, with an emphasis on stability and capacity building (including “projects”). These skills have been the foundation for the civil-military interface. It is also this context – low intensity conflicts (or in NATO speak, non-Article 5 crisis response operations) with a focus on stability and reconstruction – that appears to have informed the revision of CIMIC doctrine, AJP-3.4.9. The relevance of CIMIC in high intensity (warfighting) operations has been largely neglected. In the previous CIMIC doctrine AJP 9 a section was devoted to Article 5 operations that acknowledged the role of CIMIC in high intensity warfighting contexts, including not just out-of-area operations but also near-area operations or within NATO member nations themselves (NATO 2003). The older doctrine recognized the importance of a “robust CIMIC capacity” in this context, including

Why Civil-Military Interaction? Some Recommendations

161

the management of refugees and evacuees when no other organizations are able to assist with this, as well as being a crucial link to IOs and NGOs when these organizations have limited to no access to an area of operations during different stages of combat (ibid.: 3–5). Early planning for such eventualities were recommended for such operations. A focus on high intensity operations and the role for CIMIC has received increased attention amongst the few working with CIMIC in Norway. Focus has been directed towards the importance of CIMIC in the process of “targeting”, in this case land targeting (though it has relevance for air targeting as well). Targeting is defined in AJP-3.9.2 NATO doctrine as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate effect to them taking account of the operational environment and capabilities” (NATO 2006: 2–2). A target is defined as “an area, complex or installation, force, equipment, capability, function or behaviour identified for possible action to support the formation/manoeuvre commander’s objectives, guidance and intent” (ibid.). The process of targeting requires significant planning, drawing on as much information as possible so that the room for error is reduced as much as possible. Such planning demands a complex overview of the civilian environment, beyond an enemy assessment that comes with intelligence information. In addition an understanding of the civilian environment from cultural artifacts to gendered practices in the civilian environment in question, to IO and NGO activities in the area that could be affected (Gjørv 2013). In a recent master’s thesis, CIMIC officer and Brigade G9 branch chief Jardar Gjørv argues that the CIMIC focus on identifying important elements in the civilian environment that should not be included as a potential target is equally important to identifying what should be targeted. He suggests that the CIMIC contribution increases support for human security (reducing collateral damage and potential kickback from local communities), which in turn supports the operation and a national security agenda (ibid.). In February 2013 the Brigade North (led by G9), in cooperation with the Norwegian Red Cross, organized a “Targeting seminar” bringing together civilian (Red Cross and Norwegian Institute for International Affairs – NUPI) and military actors (Norwegian National Joint Headquarters, the Army Staff (Hærstaben), Norwegian Defence University College, and the Norwegian Army Land Warfare Centre) to discuss what priorities need to be taken into account by the military when engaging in targeting activities (Aarbough 2013). Issue areas that were addressed included military responsibilities under IHL, how to distinguish between relevant (warfighting) and non-relevant targets (including cultural artefacts, crucial civilian infrastructure, protected persons such as civilians, war prisoners, sick and wounded, medical personnel and journalists), proportionality of an armed response, and precautionary principles that require constant monitoring of the civilian situation in relation to context (Harlem 2013). Additional topics presented included the targeting processes used in the 2011 Libya operation, Norwegian resources for increasing familiarity on the laws of war including persons who are legitimate targets versus those persons who are protected, technological developments in

162

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

targeting, the challenges of determining who is “the enemy” by examining the case of child soldiers, media perspectives on military operations, as well as personal experiences in Afghanistan (Aarbough 2013). The seminar was not intended to focus solely on CIMIC but instead was designed more broadly to bring various military functions together in a discussion where a multiple actor planning process (within and outside of the military) is necessary for future operations, in particular targeting. This sort of cooperative effort increases the chances of a more effective operation while protecting human security as best possible. Norwegian CIMIC has been active, despite its limited capacity, to work with military and civilian counterparts in discussing specific civil-military tasks in high intensity operations, thinking somewhat “outside of the box” in comparison to the dominant stabilization focus in current CIMIC doctrine. Education and Training Despite there not being any cohesive or coordinated plan of education in CIMIC or CIMIC related subjects in Norway, each military school/college that was interviewed has included CIMIC oriented educational material and content, in this case largely cultural and religious studies courses. During the course of the research for this project, gender issues were rarely explicitly addressed (despite the political focus on this approach), or only included on a relatively superficial level, focusing largely on the treatment of women in the armed forces.5 During interviews with military personnel, there seemed to exist an implicit recognition for the importance of increasing educational awareness and training in CIMIC related topics amongst military students, thus leading to a type of “general education” in the field, some schools covering CIMIC related subjects with considerably more depth and intensity than others. However, there is no explicit and/or coordinated learning plan for civil-military interaction throughout the schools, making the education and training fragmented and non-cohesive, and thus contributing to a lack of clarity around civil-military interaction in general, of the role of CIMIC as a military skill and branch and its relationship to other civil-military functions, how CIMIC is complementary to but distinct from planning or intelligence, as well as that CIMIC is an area of specialization. To the extent that any specific or specialized training in CIMIC exists, this is offered primarily through international institutions and organizations. The “who” and “what” of CIMIC education is thus not very clear – as a military tool it is assumed that military personnel should receive such training, 5 This approach to gender might change for the better, where gender training and education will be increasingly included in military training. A book on gender and the armed forces, particularly the understanding of gender during operations, has been recently published in Norwegian to support such educational efforts. Schjølset, A. (ed.) (2013). Gender i Forsvaret: Fra teori til praksis [Gender in the Armed Forces: From theory to practice]. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag.

Why Civil-Military Interaction? Some Recommendations

163

but it is acknowledged amongst many respondents, military and civilian, that civilian organizations need to be equally trained and educated in cooperating/ coordinating with other actors at the political and “ground” levels. This raises the question of whether or not CIMIC training ought to attempt to bring various actors together as soon as possible, to learn about each other’s organizations in a shared environment. One suggestion at the ICRC was to ensure that lessons are learned and shared across and between actors on the ground, through a database accessible to all, for example. This would be an objective all actors would have “in the interest of the victims” (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010c). As well, respondents have expressed widely diverse needs and skills for the so-called ideal CIMIC officer or a military function that is focused on the civil-military interface. The characteristics that were identified as important for this function ranged from engineering to communication, data analysis, to anthropology and culture studies. A broader discussion about what these “ideals” imply on the ground, how they compare to doctrine and military goals, and to whom these characteristics are important, is vital if we wish to improve the interaction that takes place between civilian (in all their diversity) and military actors. Can CIMIC personnel be educated in such a way that their education is not a confrontation against humanitarian work? One of the respondents at the ICRC mentioned that retired military delegates are very much welcome into the ICRC delegate family, in that they have experience with the military, can analyse the military environment, can inform fellow delegates of military functions, and can also serve as liaisons particularly with the higher-ranks in the military. Amongst those retired military delegates who are most difficult to train, however, are previously CIMIC military personnel, as it is very difficult to re-train them from thinking about humanitarian work from a military perspective into thinking about a purely humanitarian approach. It is challenging working with delegates who think they already know the system, but in fact know it from a very specific perspective, that of the military. Current CIMIC training gives CIMIC officers a non-humanitarian understanding of the mission based on political/military goals. The solution is not removing CIMIC, as it does not solve the operational need for increased reflective training in the civil-military interface. The critique of CIMIC by ICRC respondents reflects the importance of different perspectives – through a multi-actor security framework for example – becoming more clear in training and education for both CIMIC as well as across the military spectrum in general education. As noted frequently, the civil-military interface will not disappear in future operations, and eliminating or reducing a CIMIC function will not assist in making the civil-military interface easier to negotiate. In the Norwegian case, but likely for other NATO and UN operations contributing nations, there needs to be an increase in education and training for civil-military interaction, and include specialists like CIMIC and gender advisers. Non-CIMIC military actors also carried assumptions about civilian actors that “lumped them” all together, where the important distinctions between them are severely blurred, exemplified by a frequent statement from military respondents that “we all have the same goal”

164

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

(Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). This demonstrated a lack of understanding for the different mandates of different civilian organizations, and for the complexity of the civil-military interface. Civil-military Dialogue This book has been devoted to an argument to increase civil-military dialogue and understanding, and this is undoubtedly my core recommendation. I have tried to identify a number of misconceptions, contradictions and gaps in knowledge in the civil-military interface, ranging from assumptions in doctrine and policy to understanding the civil-military environment and who is operating within it. The Norwegian model has served as a departure point for this discussion, both highlighting an important precautionary principle with regard to the importance of respecting the different mandates and work of different actors, but also in demonstrating a lack of discussion and critical assessments regarding how interaction can and should function in different contexts. I have yet to see that this dialogue has adequately taken place. Instead, different actors continue to draw upon fairly inflexible notions about the other, based on reified and narrow assumptions about identity and role as security actors.6 The challenges in the civilmilitary interface over the past couple of decades, and particularly in Afghanistan, demonstrate that the guidelines that exist to date may have held part of the answer, but have not yet been adequate to the task. Further discussion is crucial to be able to make the civil-military interface more open and comprehensible, if not easier to manage for all parties, with the respect that each much have to conduct their work. The Norwegian response has been to reduce functions and competency in this area, with the apparent hope that somehow a focus on “core military tasks” (read: combat skills and functions) can alleviate future challenges. Unless the Norwegian authorities stop engaging in operations that take place in or near areas that are populated by civilians, there is little to indicate that this will be the case.

6 I should mention however that there has been good contact between the Norwegian military and the Norwegian Red Cross, in support of increased knowledge sharing.

Chapter 9

A Norwegian Future in Civil-Military Interaction? In discussions with central Norwegian civilian actors after the Norwegian PRT withdrawal from Faryab province and regarding the success or failure of the Norwegian model, it was claimed that the Norwegian model clearly functioned well. The Norwegian military (who made up the largest part of the PRT staff) left Faryab province cleanly, without having to tie up loose ends with any short or medium term projects that may or may not have been successful, unlike what the British PRT was experiencing, it was claimed (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010b). As such, the clear divide between military and civilian actors was considered a success. In the discussion where the above comments were made, civil-military interaction was tightly linked to the COIN doctrine, and tied to an argument that COIN did not, in the end, appear to work. It was stated that Norwegian military actors demonstrated a loyalty to the Norwegian model rather than to the COIN doctrine, resulting in a successful withdrawal from their area of responsibility. It was also claimed that basic “after operation” considerations were well enough addressed during operations (battle reparations), and the idea that any other efforts would be necessary after the operation (in the COIN doctrine referred to as “hold” and “build” phases of the operation) was in fact wrong. The problem was that militaries, in particularly foreign militaries, would never be able to “win” the hearts of local populations no matter what they did after the operation, therefore the value of following up after the kinetic phase of an operation was limited if not counterproductive. The above claims were made by governmental civilian actors, and from some angles their claims were not necessarily wrong. The Norwegian military actors did not conduct any projects (although other militaries in the PRT or in the region did do so), they did not therefore raise any local expectations, and nor were they involved in any well-meaning but ineffectual efforts at humanitarian or development aid. Thus this model was indeed a success in their view. This claim raises a number of issues however. Not least, a success for whom? Norwegian military actors are professionals who are required by their own leadership to operate in a particular way (according to the “Norwegian model”). They were bound to act accordingly. This model was not consistent with the NATO/ISAF mandate however, which endorsed the implementation of a COIN doctrine. Other military actors in the area followed up on this latter doctrine without Norwegian military support. This was a source of contention for a number of Norwegian military actors as they were unable to follow through on the NATO/

166

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

ISAF mandate. As such, it cannot be claimed that militaries did not engage in project-like activities within the local landscape. It was just not Norwegian militaries, at least not directly. The claim of success needs to be nuanced, if not tempered. Norwegian forces were working closely with other NATO forces both located within the PRT as well as outside of it. The US military were also working in the region. For the claim of success to have some merit, Norwegian military activities need to be isolated from other military activities taking place in the same area, with a concrete demonstration that the other military activities created ineffectual practices, while the Norwegian approach somehow either created no impression or mitigated against the ineffectual efforts of other militaries. The claim of success for this model means that the Norwegian civilian political position is one of “we know/knew best”, and better than NATO/ISAF strategists. If this was indeed the case, a deeper analysis is needed. If one can cite failures of COIN in other provinces, was it solely because of COIN or in part because of COIN in combination with other contextual factors – some provinces were far more unstable and violent than other provinces, Faryab being one of the more stable provinces when Norwegian forces took over in 2005. Faryab province also experienced increasing instability over time. Was this due to COIN? Was this due to lack of COIN? A deeper analysis of the COIN approach as one way of conducting civil-military interaction is required, from which we can draw lessons learned and develop flexible and context dependent policies and practices for civil-military interaction. COIN, however, does not define all the measures and approaches relevant to civil-military interaction. It is one strategy that relies on a specific type civilmilitary relationship. The Norwegian model claims to be a model for civil-military interaction across the board, rather than just a replacement for COIN doctrine. In this respect, we need to evaluate the model as a model that would be satisfactory under a variety of circumstances and approaches, not just one scenario where COIN played a dominant role. We also need to include civilian awareness and flexibility in the model so that we do not reify our understanding of the functions of “civilian” and “military”, particularly in such ways that somehow civilian efforts are without fault or problem, while military are exceptionally prone to failure. A Norwegian Civil-military Interaction Model: Humanitarian-political Divide? How do we move from a well-meaning but simplistic mantra: “divide between civil and military activities with tight coordination between them”, towards a model that can be relevant for different contexts (not just Afghanistan) and can be used to prepare our armed forces to meet the challenges of multiple contexts while adhering to a principled and realistic approach to civilian actors? That which made the Norwegian model a more unique concept initially was its recognition of the complexity of actors that are made to interact with each other,

A Norwegian Future in Civil-Military Interaction?

167

and the distinction between political actors (including a wide range of civilian actors, from governmental to development NGO, to military) and humanitarian, as it is the politicized nature of actors that is, in essence, a core concern for the maintenance of humanitarian principles, particularly in contexts of violent conflict. It also acknowledges, at least to some degree, the role of the donor state as a political actor that also must be held accountable to upholding humanitarian space, distancing itself from humanitarian efforts. This recognition and problematization of both military and political civilian roles sets the Norwegian model apart from what otherwise is just a repetition of that which is found in a myriad of civilmilitary guidelines available today. This recognition quickly fades however, and the military become the sole political actor of concern, whereby politicized civilian actors become somehow neutral, or at least unproblematic, for humanitarian work. There is no explanation for this shift. The Norwegian White Paper on Humanitarian Policy represents a recognition by the Norwegian government of the complexity of a multi-actor security dynamic, the complexity of the civilian environment, and the challenges faced by these actors in complex emergencies. It does not convincingly argue the claim, however, that Norway can assume the title of “humanitarian”. What the White paper does do is set humanitarian work in a political context relevant to how states appear to be arguing for humanitarian/civilian causes today, mirroring Responsibility to Protect (R2P) rhetoric. Norway’s humanitarian role is set in the following context: Each state has the responsibility to protect and help its own population when it is affected by a humanitarian crisis. This is not a choice, but a legallybinding obligation according to a range of international conventions. Often during humanitarian crises however, a state’s ability or will to honour its obligations are reduced. In such a situation the international community has a clear responsibility to contribute with the necessary protection and lifesaving assistance. (Utenriksdepartement 2009)

Norway lacks a comprehensive plan for civil-military interaction that is a central element of any international response to a crisis, and has out-of-hand rejected a significant tool it has at its disposal to attempt to contribute to such a system. The Norwegian model does not include any specific functions, procedures or processes that can facilitate its operationalization. The government ministries that have assumed most responsibility for the discussions pertaining to the Norwegian model, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, have due to lacking coordination and cooperation between them, not managed to re-design the military component (CIMIC) in a civil-military interaction system in such a way to reflect the values and goals to which they aspire. At the same time, those working within the function of CIMIC in the military (G9, HVS) have lacked the capacity to bring convincing arguments forward to decision-makers in ensuring that CIMIC should develop from “the bottom-up” drawing on lessons learned, reflecting both

168

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

the needs of the military mission, the expectations of civilian actors, as well as reflect the experience on the ground. Role clarity applies not only between humanitarian and military organizations, but also and equally important between civilian organizations themselves, which are not a homogenous group but very different according to methods and goals. A definite divide needs to be established, for example, between humanitarian and political organizations. In this respect, political civilian organizations may often have similar political goals as do the military, which may not be shared by humanitarians. In this sense some civilians might work very well with the military. For the military actor, this will involve both military innovation and adaptation (Farrell 2010). Military adaptation, the change of tactics, techniques and technologies is a bottom-up approach to addressing operational challenges. Adaptation can be used to inform innovation, changes at institutional levels such as doctrine (ibid.). Ministries need to pay attention to adaptation and the degree to which practices on the ground differ from doctrine or policy. On what bases have these adaptations been made? Are these changes warranted or not? The answers to these questions must first be linked to the mandate of the military itself, its purpose and design. If the adaptation is deemed necessary from a military point of view (i.e. the change is warranted) it can then be measured against other criteria, such as foreign policy initiatives. The Norwegian model reflects culturally loaded perceptions of what it is to be a warrior and what it is to be a civilian, whereby the divide is distinct and clear, not just by virtue of a uniform, but through knowledge, training, education (military education vs civilian) and the development of military and civilian cultures themselves. The Norwegian model, as a result, applies only to those that share that culture. We cannot assume that the divide between warrior and non-warrior is so distinct amongst all cultures, and often, it is not. That is indeed part of the struggle, as the expectation about who will adhere to this model is based on an assumption that the actors share the same perspective about what is military and what is civilian. This does not mean that such models should not be developed or employed, but it does mean that we need to be more transparent about to whom such models apply, why, and for those who are not expected to follow the model, why not. There has frequently been talk of the necessity of a “political” solution, or that the military cannot provide a solution. There is rarely a solely military “solution” however. All solutions must invariably have a political/strategic/civilian element that goes beyond the military effort. We need to ask why we deploy militaries at all, and does a military effort contribute to a solution. Militaries are able to provide a temporary physical security, but a long-standing condition of security can only exist in an environment of trust through governance, and economic and social development. Additionally, we need to be more open about when a political solution is indeed not sufficient – that civilian efforts are not able to solve the problem at a given moment, and that either the solution is to let the status quo continue and perhaps escalate to more violence and/or decreasing security, or apply the use of

A Norwegian Future in Civil-Military Interaction?

169

force via the military. When we make that decision, what sort of responsibility do we have towards civilians, local populations in the area of operations? If We Say “No” to CIMIC, What are We Saying “Yes” to? The focus in this work has been on CIMIC as one element of the civil-military interface. Again, civil-military interaction is not solely CIMIC, nor is it solely COIN, nor are COIN and CIMIC synonymous. But what they all have in common is that they attempt to address the nexus between civilian and military actors in an operational setting. CIMIC has been in focus in this project because it has been targeted by Norwegian politics on civil-military interaction. I would like to examine some of the impacts of “saying no to CIMIC” as a function that is otherwise supposed to be an integral part of an operation. This assessment is based on how CIMIC could have operated with a “Norwegian model” precautionary approach, functioning as a foundation, in combination with doctrine. On that basis, CIMIC is the military function that has as its task to have an overview of the civilian situation at all times, including local population needs as well as NGO and local government activities. The function conducts its interaction with these civilian actors in a transparent and open fashion. The goal of this interaction is to ensure transparency about the operation for the local population to the degree that is possible, as well as to ensure as small a footprint as possible on the local environment so as to mitigate against any potential local backlash against the military. Additionally it represents, in theory and doctrine in any case, a responsibility the military has towards local populations and other civilian actors to do as little harm as possible, within the parameters of the mission commander’s mandate. As a last resort, CIMIC is mandated to support the local population (when no other actors are available) if considered necessary to the operation. CIMIC has not always functioned according to doctrine, and doctrine can always be improved. This does not mean that doctrines, theories and practices for civilmilitary interaction should be eradicated. In fact, quite the opposite. There is a lot of room for improvement. It was already clear in 2006 (if not earlier) that Norwegian CIMIC engaged in activities that were controversial and not consistent with NATO CIMIC doctrine (Kristoffersen 2006, Hoogensen and Gjørv 2010). The general response by both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not to improve CIMIC however, or at least attempt to operationalize it in accordance with NATO and national doctrine (FFOD), but to largely reject it and largely ignore important lessons learned. Since that time, there has been little to no evidence that the perceived ills of CIMIC (not least project work) have been avoided. Quite the opposite in fact. The Norwegian model has not been integrated into military thinking beyond a mere avoidance of civilian activity. CIMIC is by no means a saviour or saint in civil-military operational contexts. It is however a function that should house a knowledge base that in principle is meant to bridge the gap

170

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

in communication and understanding between the civilian and military worlds, not least so that military actors have a much better sense of their operational environment. CIMIC is not the only tool to provide civilian situational awareness and understanding, but it appears that not employing this function has not resulted in any value-added to either military or civilian actors. Saying “no” to Norwegian CIMIC has not resulted in a cessation of projects or controversial contact with civilian actors, nor has it addressed the continual need for militaries to have a better knowledge of the civilian situation and needs, both those of NGOs as well as local populations (Holo and Dehli Andreassen 2010). Saying “no” to CIMIC has meant saying “yes” to, or at least supporting, a lack of continuity of operational agenda setting (with regard to civilian needs) between contingents, and an ad hoc approach to civilians. Many of the military respondents noted and criticized a strong reliance on the personal preferences and agendas of individual Commanders for each PRT rotation (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). Efforts on the ground have been frequently criticized as being too personality driven, that objectives are re-defined with the rotation of each new Commander, as each Commander feels that he has six months to make his “mark” on the mission (ibid.).1 Respondents noted a lack of continuity, of following through an agenda as it pertained to the local population, and connecting efforts between commands. The six month intervals of each tour was often criticized, by both military and non-military respondents, as there was little time to really become familiar with the operational context before having to make decisions and then go home again. Some respondents suggested that not only would introducing CIMIC into the operation be helpful to supporting continuity with civilian actors, but that this should include extending the tour for CIMIC officers (to one year, for example) so that at least some military actors can establish a stronger and potentially more effective relationship with civilian actors. “No” to CIMIC reduces the few opportunities for the military to listen to local stakeholders, not just governing officials of the region, but the people of and living in the community. The military is a very top-down organization, and the operations that they conduct are driven on the basis of political agendas designed within the upper echelons of the host nation, donor/troop contributing nations, and the international community. Militaries cannot rely on third-hand information (via “coordinating” institutions or government officials) coming from grassroots NGOs or other actors to know what local actors are thinking and doing. Community members must have a line of communication with military actors if and when they wish it. There is little involvement of local communities in the discussion of what peace entails in different contexts (Aguirre and van der Borgh 2010). Both military actors on the ground, and local population actors should have regular and active dialogue about the progress (or not) of peace enforcement in their region. At the same time, liaison efforts can always increase and improve. 1 All the PRT Commanders were male.

A Norwegian Future in Civil-Military Interaction?

171

Evidence of liaison challenges for Norwegian soldiers was presented in a televised program called “Norge i Krig” (Norway at War).2 Journalists from the Norwegian broadcaster “NRK” followed Norwegian soldiers for half a year, during one of the PRT rotations. This was PRT 15, or the 15th rotation. Norway had therefore been in the region for over seven years. The journalists followed a Task Unit that patrolled the region, and had contact with local stakeholders. In one instance the Task Unit had a meeting with a village council. A number of Afghan men were waiting at the outskirts of their village as the Norwegian Task Unit (TU) arrived. It was unclear whether the Norwegian forces had visited this specific village in the past or not. However, as this was the 15th PRT rotation for the Norwegians in Faryab (Maimana) there was probably a good chance that the villagers were familiar with the Norwegian presence, if not yet formally introduced to this particular Task Unit. The Task Unit leader was a 24-year-old man. The scene, as it is presented in the program, was fairly awkward. The TU Leader began talking to the village council members, no formal greeting preceded his comments: Ok, since we have a lot of powerful men here, proud men, I can introduce myself. I am a Team leader with the Norwegian forces. We’re here on a mission and um our mission is to secure your situation here, ah to rid this land of criminals, and to ah make it possible for you to grow your crops in peace and ah, and ah … (ibid.)

At that point an elder behind the Task Unit Leader greeted the newcomers by saying “Salam”. The team leaders turned around to look behind him saying “Salam” in return, at which point the elder passed the TU Leader so as to greet the Afghan National Army (ANA) Commander who was also present, asking: “Commander, is it going well with you?” (translated from the Norwegian translation) (ibid.). The TU team leader continued, and did not acknowledge the ANA Commander. Yeah, um we’re here from Norway, we’re on a mission, we are not here to stay, uh, we’re here to uh, to uh, make sure that the police uh and the army, they’re made up of uh Afghanis, uh can do their job. So that we can uh, you can live happily without interference from any other country. And we know that you don’t want anything to happen to the crops, uh so we’re very careful so that we don’t damage your crops, you know, start a fire. (ibid.)

The response of one of the elders was: “Thank you. It is calm here. The wheat is not burnt down” (ibid.). You seem like proud and wise men, so uh I will leave you with the Commander now, and I hope to speak with you again. (ibid.)

2 NRK.no “Norway at War” (Norge i Krig): http://www.nrk.no/nett-tv/klipp/732926/.

172

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

The TU leader noted to the TV program that this was the first contact and he felt it was successful. The TU leader felt it was not necessary to ask any questions. If this was an actual meeting and not staged (and the program advertised itself to be a documentary and supposedly following actual events), then this exchange could be considered a very poor example of liaison and contact with local actors. Not only was the TU leader much younger than the elders or the ANA Commander, he did not greet the elders before beginning his speech, and he also appeared unknowledgeable about the area, about the security, in this case whether or not crops were in fact burned. He gave a speech which, after 15 different PRT rotations, the village elders had likely heard many times before. The TU leader gave no indication that he had been briefed beforehand about the needs of the village or their interests, their political position in the region, nor was he efficient in addressing any of their immediate concerns during this first meeting. Having spoken with other military respondents who acknowledged the importance of including older members within their patrols, it was unfortunate that this was not the case here. Assuming that there were not older, more experienced (and higher ranked) officers available to join the TU, the TU leader should at least have been better briefed on how to approach this initial situation, which would have considerable impact on local perceptions of legitimacy and authority of the Norwegian forces. More than likely he should have allowed the ANA Commander to take the lead, and played a support role for the ANA Commander. In interviews with some of the MOTs (mobile observation teams) and one of their interpreters, it was emphasized that some of the contact with civilian communities was more effective than that captured by the Norwegian TV program, although this had a lot to do with the fact that one leader of a MOT could speak the local language, and he took time with local leaders in ways that was not characterized as common for most MOTs (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a). The knowledge generated within the MOTs about civil-military practices, both the good and the bad, should ideally be transferred to an established function that focuses on these issues and which could analyse lessons learned for future operations, as well as share Norwegian lessons within the broader NATO civilmilitary community. Saying “no” to a CIMIC function potentially reduces such an opportunity. “No” to Norwegian CIMIC appears to also have contributed to interventions by other national military and political/aid actors to fill the Norwegian gap (Staveland and Akerhaug 2010c). In other words, “no” to Norwegian CIMIC has meant “yes” to, for example, American approaches to civil-military interaction, approaches which the Norwegian Foreign Minister had stated Norway did not support (Staveland and Akerhaug 2010b). American military personnel, as well as American funding (CERPs – Commander Emergency Response Program) have been employed or perceived to be employed very much in a manner for which Norwegian CIMIC was earlier criticized, that is, towards delivering goods and services to local populations (ibid.). Instead of integrating the important lessons learned from Norwegian experience into the military functions that are relevant

A Norwegian Future in Civil-Military Interaction?

173

in civil-military operations including Norwegian CIMIC, the Norwegian military was placed in the position of allowing other military actors to intervene into controversial domains (projects) without the influence of Norwegian insights. Another problem was that instead of ensuring that CIMIC methods and activities would reflect heightened Norwegian concerns for civilian, particularly humanitarian, actors thereby integrating lessons learned and building a Norwegian CIMIC approach, the US military assumed responsibility for what it saw as necessary activities in the Norwegian jurisdiction, potentially compromising civilian actors. “No” to CIMIC has meant “yes” to duplication of efforts, and the reinvention of the wheel. Important knowledge and training from the CIMIC function have not been adequately integrated into planning. Interestingly, those things that CIMIC has been criticized for (older personnel, soft job for women) are in fact some of the things that have been in demand by militaries themselves. Female military personnel who are able to gain access to civilian women in host nations have been much in focus since 2009 and the creation of an ad hoc all-woman liaison team later to be known as Female Engagement Teams (FETs) (McBride and Wibben 2012). CIMIC operatives had already been employing mixed gender teams for a couple of years, where female officers had opened a door to greater contact with local populations (Houdijk, Teijgeler et al. 2008)). CIMIC practices have not been unaware of this asset although it took the US Marines to put the significance of female liaison officers on the map. As well, CIMIC practices have recognized the asset of engaging older, more experienced personnel when dealing with local populations, reflecting an awareness for the needs and practices of many different cultures. Older CIMIC officers have been criticized for not being very sharp in their core military skills. This problem does not seem to be relevant for older liaison officers who have accompanied MOTs (Mobile Observation Teams), though it was unclear why. “No” to a CIMIC function can lead to a reduction of contact between civilian and military actors, which although desirable for humanitarians (and which should be respected), is not necessarily desirable for all. Such contact is not just about generating “projects” but about keeping informed, and sharing information with local populations, but also appearing accessible. This was a need expressed by a number of military respondents in Afghanistan (Hoogensen Gjørv 2007–2010a), but also by Afghan civilians I spoke with (Hoogensen Gjørv 2010). It has been a previous practice that CIMIC officers have approached civilian organizations and populations with a minimum amount of protective gear and weaponry with the intention to establish trust and reduce any unwarranted fear of the already controversial presence of a military officer. The “CIMIC centre”, a post stationed outside of the main military base for the purpose of having closer contact with civilian actors, is one such example of this practice. It is a practice that needs to be established early on in an operation. This CIMIC practice of making the military more approachable to civilians included reducing the amount of protective coverage they use for their personal security, a practice that was criticized heavily by one

174

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

military respondent (ibid.). This was tantamount to “asking for it” and putting one’s life unnecessarily at risk. However, another military respondent noted that the military was far too distanced from civilian actors and particularly the local population, and that it was perhaps dangerous but necessary to establish better and more accessible contact (ibid.). Such contact has also been mentioned by J5 staff involved in planning, whereby a more “permanent presence” is required in areas with dense populations to ensure that the population has access and contact with military operators. Neither of these respondents were thinking of a CIMIC centre however; they both described the necessity of the concept without appearing to realize that the concept has been operationalized through CIMIC. So a practice that was considered irresponsible and uninformed (poor military training) as a CIMIC officer by one military respondent, was considered brave and necessary by another military respondent, although this latter respondent was critical to CIMIC (again, thinking CIMIC was just about projects). Saying “no” to CIMIC says “yes” to less attention to civilians and civilian activities in the security dynamic. Downplaying the importance of trained and knowledge-based civil-military interaction by eliminating or reducing functions designed to focus on interaction, has the consequence of ensuring a reduced prioritization of civilian interests and needs of both civilian organizations like NGOs as well as the general population amongst military actors. As also noted in a Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) report, the Norwegian military has significantly turned its focus to purely kinetic activity, deprioritizing nonkinetic knowledge such as cultural awareness (Holo and Dehli Andreassen 2010, Staveland 2010). According to an ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) platoon commander, “The solution in Afghanistan is simple! We need bigger weapons, more armour and more people when we drive out of the base” (Holo and Dehli Andreassen 2010: 14). This sort of thinking was frequently demonstrated in conversations with a number of military actors, who simultaneously indicated that contact with civilians, even with the civilian advisers within the PRT, was negligible. Not only might civilian needs not be addressed properly, but it was also clear that misguided impressions about some civilian actors dominate in the military. One such impression was the idea that “we are all there for the same reason, to help people in Afghanistan” (ibid.). This was a very frequent expression by many military respondents (and not only Norwegian), which did not reflect the claims and interests of most of the civilian (both humanitarian and development) organizations. Insofar as military actors should have an understanding about the civilians actors in theatre, there is still a significant amount of misunderstanding about how NGOs operate and/or their diverse mandates. Although I argue what would be lost if we “say no” to CIMIC, the CIMIC function itself needs to be sharpened up, not just in Norway, but across NATO. The debate that should be taking place in Norway, critically examining all roles in international deployments and the relations between militaries and diverse civilian groups, should be shared with NATO and UN allies. The blurring of lines

A Norwegian Future in Civil-Military Interaction?

175

between civilian and military, and more specifically between humanitarian and military and civilian political actors, is not adequately problematized in many NATO CIMIC circles. A case in point is the 2008 gender awareness brochure published by the CCOE (CIMIC Centre of Excellence) (Houdijk et al. 2008). Amongst many positive insights about gender awareness and training for military personnel, is a lack of insight about the repercussions and ramifications of the “project” profile, where QIPs go unquestioned and “hearts-and-minds” lacks critical assessment (ibid.). In this case, Norwegian thinking could possibly serve as a useful guide. Given the critique waged against CIMIC in Norway, much of which contains important lessons-learned, Norwegian CIMIC has the potential to develop, support, strengthen and inform NATO doctrine and practice. This is clearly needed. This also means however that Norway needs to have a clearly developed CIMIC approach.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 10

Conclusion In a class discussion about civil-military interaction at the Norwegian Naval Military Academy in Bergen, one student reflected upon the “Norwegian model” by stating that perhaps there was no need to change the model because the goal was never to actually support local populations in an operations area in the first place. Employing a realist reading of the situation, he suggested that the Norwegian government was only in Afghanistan to demonstrate its solidarity to its allies in NATO and nothing more, which would in turn result in a stonewalling (the culture of silence) in the policy corridors regarding any interest in developing or improving this model. During the course of this investigation, it has become clear that for military actors in any case, civil-military knowledge needs to be integrated into military planning and processes in at least three specific ways.1 The first approach to integrating civil-military interaction is the provision of a general knowledge for all military personnel, with additional focus on civil-military skills in pre-deployment training that is context specific. The second measure should be directed towards increasing knowledge and training for commanders, to increase their awareness of core civil-military concerns and the resources that should be available to them to address these concerns if need be. Lastly, it is important to have civil-military expertise in the form of specialists (such as CIMIC and gender advisers, for example), as a necessary resource for commanders and planning. Some respondents argued for other solutions as alternatives to engaging military civil-military interaction specialists in theatre. During the course of this project period I heard with regularity that the best advisers to the commander on the civil-military interface are civilian advisers. Civilian advisers, though beneficial in many ways, do not (usually) have the military background to best translate civilian concerns to a military context which is a crucial phase of the information/integration process for military planning. Without such a dedicated function, the translation of civilian information ended up being integrated by the military position receiving the information, which was often the Commander. Alternatively, it was assumed that the sort of civil-military information normally collected by CIMIC could or would be addressed by the intelligence branch, which plays the primary role in information gathering and analysis for the operation, and which provides, according to a number of military respondents, the best possible 1 It was very clear that many civilian actors need improved training and education with regard to the civil-military interface, an issue which deserves further attention than that which I was able to do during the course of this project.

178

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

civilian situational awareness without a reliance on other civil-military experts. Although the potential “competition” between Intelligence and CIMIC has not been taken up here, there are some indications already that demonstrate that a total reliance on the usual intelligence services has not been adequate to the task. Nor do these two functions (Intelligence and CIMIC) serve the same purpose. The creation of “Human Terrain” teams, as well as an increased focus on “cultural awareness” for militaries has demonstrated that there has been a gap in knowledge that the intelligence function was not able to integrate sufficiently.2 As well, it is difficult to say to what extent Intelligence focuses upon civilian activities such as NGO work, the ways in which civilian activities can complement the military operation, and how to lessen the collateral damage for the civilian environment, which are equally important to the security dynamic but approach security in a significantly different way. Other solutions are offered, including creating “centres” of knowledge collection and information sharing such as the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) which play important roles.3 However, these centres are usually located at a distance, and commanders cannot count on the constant or immediate availability of pertinent information coming from other institutions or from research sources (often referred to as “reachback”), and need to draw on immediate advice and knowledge that is located on the ground. Without these assets, militaries are less 2 A dedicated focus upon the ways in which cultural awareness could be enhanced through various non-kinetic functions such as CIMIC, PSYOPS, KLE (key leader engagement), as well as Intelligence was the focus of the Multinational Experiment (MNE) 6 program, objective 4.3, led by USJFCOM. During this particular experiment the strengths and weaknesses of these different functions were examined, resulting in suggestions and potential solutions to assist increased awareness in theatre. The experiment itself was a good demonstration over how these skills, among others, were still lacking as they were not considered as relevant to military training. Even for functions like CIMIC where cultural awareness was already a core educational element it was noted that certain gaps existed. Solutions such as “Human Terrain” have been suggested, which included both embedded as well as reachback experts including anthropologists. Part of the challenge has been in determining just how much cultural awareness military operators require to ensure the success of the operation without having to become anthropologists themselves. A recent Norwegian-specific example of a gap in cultural awareness knowledge is found in the report titled “Kultur på ville veier: En gjennomgang av Forsvarets satsing på kulturforståelse” [“Culture off Track: An examination of a cultural awareness focus within the Ministry of Defence”] by Holo, T. and M. Dehli Andreassen (2010). Security in Practice. Oslo, NUPI, 11. The authors call for a specialized function within the military that would be responsible for increased cultural awareness, but did not note that CIMIC is, in principle in any case, tasked with this role. 3 See the Civil-Military Fusion Centre: Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises: https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/v6/welcome.html (accessed 18 June 2013). The CFC also has a Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/cimicweb.org (accessed 18 June 2013).

Conclusion

179

able to respond to the whole range of challenges of the civil-military interface. This includes the ability to be adequately knowledgeable and aware of humanitarian space, of IHL, and of negotiating different civilian needs in relation to the given military mandate. The Norwegian Armed Forces needs to take a critical look at how it is able to manage these multiple levels of knowledge and skill-development. One of the benefits of critical examination is that it can be used to debate, to learn, and to improve. There is a lot of criticism waged towards Norwegian CIMIC, and to a certain degree civil-military interaction in general, which resulted in a clear de-prioritization of CIMIC, as a primary civil-military interface function. CIMIC, like many different military and civilian functions, is prone to poor decision-making and practices. An earlier emphasis on projects, particularly of a “development” nature, has demonstrated itself to be a questionable choice (made clear by earlier reports as well as in this book), although this choice is not a decision in which CIMIC operatives or the Norwegian military stood alone. The extent of the negative reaction to CIMIC does not appear consistent with the extent of the “damage done”. The damage assessments concerning earlier decisions (to do projects) have either not been done or are not clear, and responsibility for the decisions to do such projects has not been adequately distributed amongst all the responsible actors.4 Just as humanitarian and development aid themselves can and have caused negative consequences, “we do not condemn aid for its failures” (Anderson 1999: 2), we need to learn from mistakes or poor choices of the past, and these past choices did not demonstrate a need to eliminate a function for civil-military knowledge and planning. De-prioritizing CIMIC capabilities has not solved the challenges of civil-military interaction in complex emergencies. At best, militaries have learned to stay away from or avoid civilian actors, many even avoiding their own government civilians housed in the same PRT, as was admitted in the Norwegian case. However challenges still exists, and there is still a need for military education and training in civil-military interaction. The lack of debate in Norway has reified and polarized mythologies of military and NGO work. Soldiers who try to address civilian concerns while meeting their own mandated objectives are met with cynicism and condemned for “buying off populations” (by no means “saints”), and NGOs are hardly examined at all, but placed in an unrealistic position of principled “do-gooders” whose only real challenge is keeping a respectable distance from militaries (“virginal”). The realities that meet NGO workers on the ground, not least that principles sometimes need to be breached in the interest of helping beneficiaries, need to be recognized. NGOs face different challenges in their interactions with militaries in a combat or 4 Arguments against the military conducting projects ranged from financial (project funding funnelled through the military should have been funnelled instead through NGOs) to competence claims (militaries not capable of assessing needs) and/or hearts-and-minds (see Chapter 6) and causing harm to local populations (raising expectations, linking locals to militaries, etc.). There is little clarity amongst and between these arguments, not least getting a sense of what in fact has had the greatest impact and upon whom.

180

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

war situation than they do in a peacekeeping situation. NGOs and militaries are organizations, both supported by the same governments, meeting harsh realities. It is necessary to push the debate in Norway and at NATO generally about civilmilitary interaction, what it means and how it should be guided within different contexts, a debate which includes the concerns of the Norwegian model to reflect a necessary respect and awareness for humanitarian actors in complex emergencies, but also one which openly problematizes this approach in light of Norwegian and allies’ political/security goals. The lack of discussion has not resulted in a cessation of military and civilian interaction in out-of-area operations (even after Afghanistan), but that it occurs as unstructured, ad hoc, personality-dependent solutions that are satisfactory to few. It also has ensured a retreat to practices which produce “detachment, suspicion and ignorance”, whereby interaction is reduced to “a duality of roles and culture” (Pugh 2001: 109). A functional model should be designed that exposes, recognizes and in the end attempts to reconcile if possible, the often contradictory, political choices made by governments to both deploy militaries (where political success depends, in part, on military victory) AND support the political needs of humanitarian organizations (to maintain a neutrality from military/political goals, and maintain a distance from the military). I would argue that this balance was not achieved, ensuring that Norwegian policy within civil-military operations such as that taking place in Afghanistan are guided by a form of irresponsible idealism, where the importance of looking like a global humanitarian leader while at the same time placating its military allies outweighs the practical challenges this policy presents to actors on the ground. The mantra of the Norwegian model ensures however that little can be done to prepare militaries in their interactions with various civilian actors through institutionalized processes and procedures, because such procedures cannot be adequately developed. This, in turn, has its impacts on any ability to generate and/or improve an education and training system that is progressive, unified, and builds up competence in the area of civil-military interaction. The lack of focus on civil-military interaction (like CIMIC) does not result in a reduced need or use of civil-military knowledge and/or skills, but instead results in ad hoc solutions relying on individual skills and capacities. Additionally, a military that is explicitly required to focus on “just military” tasks will more than likely do just that. Civilian actors will find it increasingly difficult to have their interests recognized by the military agenda when the military is requested to keep to itself and/or to not cooperate with, or engage in, assistance which is intended to help the broader civil-military mission. The work in this book takes its departure point from the assumption that the international community and troop contributing nations have decided that the deployment of troops contributes in part to the solution of identified global security challenges. The question as to whether or not militaries can or should provide the solutions the world needs is a different question, and not addressed here. Once that choice is made however, responsibilities follow. The day that we stop deploying militaries to NATO, UN or EU (or other regional organizations) operations is the

Conclusion

181

day we can say we do not need to pay attention to civil-military interaction. Until that day arrives, we need to have an evolving and flexible understanding of this process, both based on lessons learned as well as impressions about what we can anticipate for the future. The ways in which we conduct operations will adjust according to context, but contact with civilians will be a remaining feature. It is often said that many of the conflicts today need a political solution, not a military one. There is a lot of truth to this. It does not stop us from deploying our armed forces however. To do so responsibly means that at the very least, we ensure our forces are as prepared as they can be to address the challenges they will confront. Many of these challenges will involve civilians – local populations where the forces are deployed, diverse NGOs, private agencies, government ministries, media, and diverse commands (civilian-run or military-run). It is not possible (or rather it would be irresponsible) to predict precisely what sort of operations we will be confronted with in the future. One might say “never another Afghanistan” meaning that structures like the PRT (also used in Iraq), or strategies like COIN, will not be repeated. Possibly. But that does not reduce the importance of having a base of knowledge and principles for civil-military interaction that can provide structure and guidelines while still being able to adjust to specific contexts. It is not an easy task. For this reason education and training, lessons learned and sharing of experiences, and open debate are crucial for future preparation. We may not get involved in another Afghanistan, but instead end up with a “Libya”, without being entirely sure what that might entail. Since CIMIC has a central role in civil-military interaction, and has also been a key target in Norway for the ills of civil-military interaction, the CIMIC function has served as a primary example and focus in this book. Key issues that have been identified in the project that informs this book include the importance of conceptual clarity and development. Most respondents spoke to a NATO based definition of CIMIC, though few are familiar with what the actual definition says. There is a discrepancy between those who associate CIMIC with liaison, and those who think CIMIC is largely preoccupied with projects in general or QIPs. A number of military respondents believed that CIMIC personnel were engineers. There has been also considerable disagreement about competence: is the military capable of carrying out projects in communities? Can the military actually identify needs adequately? Are NGOs in fact in the areas that need help or largely keeping to the bigger cities, the ring road, Kabul, where they believe they are more secure? Is the military doing “humanitarian” work because there are no other organizations in the area to do the work? In this case, “role overlap” is highlighted as a central problem. QIPs are not always well received, and there is the question of whether or not the full consequences of such projects are fully understood. In addition, the assumption that NGOs will “take over” projects started by the military (were the needs appropriately identified to begin with?) reflects a failure of communication between civilian and military actors as to coordination of roles. There exists also considerable confusion as to which level CIMIC actually speaks to – tactical, operational and/or strategic. The courses offered by the CIMIC

182

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Centre of Excellence and the NATO School, Oberammergau for example explicitly design training for both the tactical and operational levels. Many respondents see the importance and relevance of a coordination between an overarching civilmilitary cooperation/coordination agenda at the strategic/political level and the more “hands-on” operationalization of CIMIC at the operational and tactical levels, while others do not see a necessary connection between the two. This also speaks to what sort of goal the various actors aspire to – the military are focused on a military goal, and CIMIC operates “in support of the mission”. This is not always interpreted favourably by other actors who may not necessarily share similar political goals, and thus connect cooperation with the military, through CIMIC, as implicit approval of a particular military/political goal that many do not sympathize with. Some military respondents recognized that CIMIC knowledge was important right from the pre-planning stage of an operation, while others viewed it as an “extra” or add-on function after the real work of the military was done but “important” nonetheless, at least in the post-kinetic phase context. The tasks of CIMIC also varied, as some viewed it to be completely project-oriented (building schools and bridges) while others saw the tasks focused situational awareness and even akin to (but not entirely) human intelligence (HUMINT). Two of the military respondents were very negative about CIMIC, claiming that CIMIC personnel do not work as a team in an operation but conduct their own little side-line operations that do not consider the overall military objective. However, the majority of military respondents were favourable towards CIMIC, but noted that a choice had to be made, and with minimal resources CIMIC could not be prioritized, not unlike the decisions made around gender advisers as well. Amongst the wide variety of civilian respondents there existed a considerable ambivalence around the notion of CIMIC. One respondent thought CIMIC was not necessary to their own organizations’ work but that a CIMIC contact person could be useful if knowledgeable enough about civilian organizations. Another respondent stated that “CIMIC was here to stay” and therefore their organization had to find the best way to live with it. On the whole however, despite a wide discrepancy about what CIMIC is and/or ought to be, most expressed a necessity for such this area of expertise within the military, as an information source that is ideally well informed about the civilian environment and NGOs especially. As such the general view thus far is that CIMIC is necessary, and that their ought to be CIMIC oriented training and education for ALL soldiers, as well as specific training for CIMIC specialists. One issue that CIMIC must, however, overcome is the “hearts-and-minds” stereotype, which is a key source of negative feedback. Education and training can likely facilitate a more specific and professional approach to CIMIC that might distinguish it from a “hearts-andminds” tool, if that is indeed what is desired in the Norwegian context (this appears to be the case). It can also eliminate the perception of CIMIC creating insecurity rather than security, such that, for example poor or purely politically motivated communication and project work can undermine rather than support a mission.

Conclusion

183

The respondents almost universally indicated that cooperation takes place on the ground regardless of the rhetoric “back home” that dictates that there should be a clear divide between military and civilian actors. This was clear from both military as well as NGO respondents, including both humanitarian as well as development-oriented NGOs. Forms of interaction, coordination and even cooperation must take place, they have no choice. Currently cooperation is not coordinated nor organized after an institutional structure, but remains ad hoc based upon the personalities that drive it, based on the individual capacities of the people deployed at the ground level. Sometimes it goes well, sometimes not so well. In my findings, it also turns out that almost all of the military respondents “do CIMIC” or some form of civil-military cooperation. This is despite the fact that CIMIC itself has not been prioritized nor included in the Afghanistan context, at least on the part of the Norwegians. However, insofar as CIMIC is defined in terms of liaison, support to the civil environment and support to the force (force protection), it is clear that almost all military personnel must and do contribute. Even when CIMIC is not present, CIMIC activities are being conducted. The function of PSYOPS had been employed to cover the need for situational (including gender) awareness at times when there was no other function available to carry this out (Olsson, Tejpar et al. 2009). Intelligence has done this function (making CIMIC personnel seem superfluous) but has been confounded by the image and nature of intelligence work as a whole – secret, potentially manipulative, enemy-oriented. CIMIC on the other hand is meant to provide open source, transparent information to intelligence where intelligence approaches have not been appropriate or suitable, such as getting information from NGOs or IOs. Engineers have conducted CIMIC activities by doing “projects”, often related to infrastructure. Commanders must do CIMIC in their interactions with civilian personnel and local communities, as well as obtaining situational awareness for the purpose of planning. At the very least, average infantry “do” CIMIC, as they are in the streets, they are the front line of contact. At the same time, there is little to no recognition of this, either in practice or in terms of an integrated training and education program. The underlying assumption therefore is that CIMIC is just something one does, is based on common sense, that everyone has enough capacity to carry out such tasks. In this respect, one could argue that CIMIC as a function is not necessary. At the same time, the findings indicate that the majority of respondents feel that CIMIC knowledge must be given to everyone – everyone needs cultural (if not gender) awareness, situational awareness. Gaps in knowledge have been experienced, increasing the insecurity of practitioners themselves in the area of operations as they are uncertain about whether they are taking the right measures, making the right analyses. But there is no cohesive, coordinated education and training system in place that recognizes this fact. Instead, the political level (ministerial, and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) assumes that CIMIC can be effectively replaced if not removed, and that the solution is in separation, not coordination or cooperation (MFA and et al. 2009, Utenriksdepartement 2009).

184

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Militaries therefore do not need to learn about the civil environment in which they are deployed, or at least, do not need to bother themselves with too much about it. Civilian operators are better equipped to deal with civilian concerns. This is true most of the time, but it denies the “vacuum” argument when civilians organizations are not present to provide adequate support to affected communities. It also denies the reality of what security is (that it is not a static condition but a dynamic process), and who are the necessary security actors (going well beyond military actors). Norway, along with its NATO allies, needs to critically examine the contradictions within regarding the nature and use of civil-military interaction. There is no doubt that Norwegians, military and civilian alike, are in fact doing a reasonably good job in international operations because the people deployed are generally well educated and are generally empathetic and socially competent. But it is clear that Norway relies considerably upon the individual personalities of those it deploys, and does not sufficiently support these same people with all the tools it could to ensure these same people make it safely back home, while having moved the mission forward.

Appendix: Methods and Parameters This book is based upon the results of the CIMIC Requirements and Education in Norway (CREN) project which has consisted largely upon document and interview analyses. Over 120 respondents contributed to this project. The information provided by respondents was further complemented by and compared with Norwegian as well as international policy documents, scholarly articles, and relevant doctrine and guidelines (see bibliography). The interviews usually took place with one respondent at a time. On a few occasions, two or three respondents were present during one interview. Interviews usually lasted between one and a half to two hours each (very few were only one hour). In addition, discussions were conducted in eight group sessions or meetings, one consisting of Norwegian CIMIC officers (CIMIC Seminar), one consisting of Dutch CIMIC officers and NCOs (Dutch CIMIC Battalion), two with representatives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, four with Afghan NGO workers (all conducted with interpreters). These focus discussions were in addition to the interviews. All interview responses were recorded by hand (written notes). The process was respondent-led, in that the information provided by respondents, guided in part the development of the interview list. The interviews and discussion groups were supplemented by independent but complementary research conducted (by this author) through participation in the Multinational Experiment (MNE) 6 in the form of observation, discussions, and survey data collection. Most interviews focused on Afghanistan as the context in which respondents understood CIMIC, however an Afghanistan focus was not a predetermined direction. What made this problematic was that other operations were less in focus, such as UN operations. Many interviews were conducted during this project, but in the end, it is a very small community of people that is involved in this specific topic and/or work. Referring very specifically to time periods and/or units/organizations would make it very easy to identify the respondent, which would compromise anonymity. Individual names of respondents are withheld, and reference is made only to the institutions/target groups (4) represented by respondents. Names are mentioned only when the names have been published or made public already. All interviews with Norwegian respondents took place in Norwegian. I have also used many Norwegian documents and newspaper sources. All translations of interviews and documents/newspapers included in this report are mine. Where interviews took place with Afghan respondents who did not speak English,

186

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

translation was provided by translators present during the interview/discussion. Explanation for the acronyms used are found on page xiii at the beginning of this book. Interviews were conducted with the following institutions/target groups. Locations in brackets refer to the locations where I spoke with the respondents (for example I spoke with MFA respondents in both Norway and Afghanistan, etc.): 1. Military – 49 respondents 1. Norwegian and Dutch officers (CIMIC, Intelligence, Info Ops, MOT, OMLT) (Norway, Netherlands) 2. Human Terrain (USA, Afghanistan) 3. Norwegian PRT Commanders (Norway, Afghanistan) 4. Norwegian Battalion commanders (Norway) 5. Norwegian Officer candidate school (Norway) 6. Norwegian Military Academy/War college (Norway) 7. Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (Norway) 8. CCOE CIMIC Centre of Excellence – (Netherlands) 9. PSKOI US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (USA) 10. NATO ACT, including Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), Education, Training and Evaluation (ETEE), CivilMilitary Fusion Centre (CMC). (USA) 2. IO/NGOs – 34 respondents 1. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Switzerland) 2. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) (Switzerland, Afghanistan) 3. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (Afghanistan) 4. Norwegian Red Cross (Norway) 5. Doctors without Borders (Norway) 6. Norwegian Refugee Council (Norway, Afghanistan) 7. Norwegian People’s Aid (Norway) 8. Norwegian Church Aid (Norway) 9. Afghan Women’s Network (Afghanistan) 10. Central Asia Institute (CAI) (Afghanistan) 3. Research Institutes – 10 respondents 1. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) (Norway) 2. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) (Norway) 3. Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) (Norway) 4. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) (Switzerland) 5. Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) (Switzerland)

Appendix: Methods and Parameters

6. George Madison University – Peace Operations Policy Program (USA) 7. US National Defence University (USA) 4. Government Ministries – 25 respondents 1. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway, Afghanistan, USA) 2. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Afghanistan) 3. Dutch Ministry of Defence (Netherlands) 4. Norwegian Ministry of Defence (Norway) 5. Afghan Respondents (discussion groups as well as anecdotal/ informal) – 25 respondents 1. NGO associated/employed Afghan citizens 2. Local residents

187

This page has been left blank intentionally

Bibliography Aarbough, E. (2013). Seminar om targeting – målvalg: Norges Røde Kors og Brigade Nord. Bardufoss, Norway, Brigade Nord. Aftenposten (2005). Egeland takker for militær hjelp. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Aftenposten (2011). Ingen sivile drept av norske bomber i Libya. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Aguirre, M. and C. van der Borgh (2010). Building peace, states and hybrids: International operations in post-conflict countries. The Broker: Connecting Worlds of Knowledge. Akerhaug, L. (2010a). Offiser: Norsk politikk styrker opprøret i Afghanistan [Officer: Norwegian policy strengthens the insurgency in Afghanistan]. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Akerhaug, L. (2010b). Frykter ukultur kan ramme norske soldater [Fear that negative culture can affect Norwegian soldiers]. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Akerhaug, L. (2010c). Faremo sjokkert etter soldat-uttalelser. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Ali, N. (2011). Three cups of sincerity. The Express Tribune. Karachi, The International Herald Tribune. 19 April 2011. Anderson, M. (1999). Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace – Or War. Boulder, CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers. ANSO (1–15 August 2010). The ANSO Report. Kabul, The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office. ANSO (1–15 March 2010). The ANSO Report. Kabul, The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office. ANSO (1–15 October 2010). The ANSO Report. Kabul, The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office. ANSO (16–30 June 2010). The ANSO Report. Kabul, The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 52. ANSO (2010). ANSO Quarterly Data Report Q.3 2010. ANSO Quarterly Data Report. Kabul, The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, October 2010. Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, S., M. Wardak, I. Zaman and A. Taylor (2008). Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of civil-military relations. London, British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG). Bajpai, K. (2004). An Expression of Threats Versus Capabilities Across Time and Space. Security Dialogue 35(3): 360–361.

190

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Barth Eide, E. (2011). Ti år i Afghanistan-hva nå?: sikkerhetspolitisk konferanse 2011 [10 years in Afghanistan – what now?] Panelist. Oslo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Barth Eide, E., A.T. Kaspersen, R. Kent and K. von Hippel (May 2005). Report on Inegrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. New York/ Geneva, ECHA/OCHA. Baumann, A.B., B. Berti and F. Galamas (4 April 2012). Between Libya and Afghanistan: NATO Needs a New Intervention Model. World Politics Review: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11806/between-libya-andafghanistan-nato-needs-a-new-intervention-model, EBSCO Publishing. Berg Bentzrød, S. (2010). Avstanden til Norge- Majoren snakker ut [The distance to Norway – The Major speaks out]. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Berli, E. (ed.) (2012). Innblikk i Fellesoperasjoner: synergi gjennom felles innsats [Insight into Joint Operations: Synergy through joint effort]. Lillehammer, Forsvarets høgskole/Forsvarets stabsskole (Norwegian Defence University College). Biswas, A.K. (25 December 1996). Curbing Do-gooders. Outlookindia.com. West Bengal, Outlookindia: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?202757. Bland, D.L. (1999). A unified theory of civil-military relations. Armed Forces and Society 26(1): 7–26. Bland, D.L. (2001). Patterns in liberal democratic civil-military relations. Armed Forces and Society 27(4): 525–541. Borgomano-Loup, L. (2007). Improving NATO-NGO Relations in Crisis Response Operations. Forum Papers Series. J. Dufourcq. Rome, NATO Defense College. Børresen, J. (2007). Forsvar- før bruk av militær makt. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Braudy, L. (2003). From Chivalry to Terrorism: War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity. New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Bulley, D. (2010). The politics of ethical foreign policy: A responsibility to protect whom? European Journal of International Relations 16(3): 441–461. Bumiller, E. (2010). Lettng Women Reach Women in Afghan War. New York Times. New York, New York Times. Burgess, P. (ed.) (2010). The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies. London, Routledge. Burke, C. (2004). Camp All-American, Hanoi Jane, and the High-and-Tight: Gender, folklore, and changing military culture. Boston, Beacon Press. Chandler, D. (2007). The security-development nexus and the rise of “anti-foreign policy”. Journal of International Relations and Development 10: 362–386. CHS (2003). Human Security Now. New York, Commission on Human Security. Clauswitz, C. von (1976). On War. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Cooley, A. and J. Ron (2002). “The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action”. International Security 27(1): 5–39.

Bibliography

191

Crisis Group (2013). Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan. Asia Report No. 247. Brussels, Belgium, International Crisis Group. Dagbladet (2010). Ny protest mot misjonering i Afghanistan. Dagbladet. Oslo, Dagbladet. Damen, R. and M.S.F. Olislagers (2004). Development of a decision framework for the Dutch military to inventory and prioritize humanitarian tasks in a complex emergency. Masters thesis. Enschede, University of Twente. de Coning, C. (2007). Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations. Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa, African Centre for the Construction Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). de Coning, C. (2007). Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10(1). de Torrenté, N. (2004). Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’s False Promise. Ethics and International Affairs 18(2): 3–12. Donini, A. (2007). Local Perceptions of Assistance to Afghanistan. International Peacekeeping 14(1): 158–172. DPKO (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. D.o.P. Operations. New York, United Nations. Dragnes, K. (2010). Strategien i Afghanistan er å sikre afghanernes og dermed vår egen sikkerhet. Hvorfor slåss da sivile organisasjoner mot de militære? Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Duffield, M. (2007). Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples. Cambridge: Polity. Duffield, M. and N. Waddel (2006). Securing Humans in a Dangerous World. International Politics 43: 1–23. Durant, R.F. (2007). The Greening of the US Military: Environmental Policy, National Security, and Organizational Change. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press. Ecorys (2012). Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2001–2011. N.E. Department. Oslo, NORAD. Report 3/2012. Eden, J. (2013). “The Problems of Women in Combat – From a Female Combat Vet.” The Western Center for Journalism 2013. Eide, E.B. (20 February 2010). Flyktninghjelpen har et poeng [The Norwegian Refugee Council has a point]. Adresseavisen. Trondheim, eAdressa: http:// www.adressa.no/meninger/article1447484.ece. Eide, E.B. (4 June 2013). Redgjørelse om utviklingen i Afghanistan og Norges engasjement i landet [An account of the development in Afghanistan and Norway’s engagement in the country]. Oslo, Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/eide_taler/ 2013/redegjorelse_afghanistan.html?id=728861. Farrell, T. (2010). Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan 2006–2009. Journal of Strategic Studies 33(4): 567–594.

192

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Faryab (June 2009). Strategi for helhetlig norsk sivil og militær inssats i Faryabprovinsen i Afghanistan. Oslo, Utenriksdepartementet Forsvaretsdepartementet Justisdepartementet. Felbab-Brown, V. (2011). Afghanistan Ten Years after 9/11: Counterterrorism Accomplishments while a Civil War Is Lurking? Brookings: http://www. brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0906_afghanistan_felbabbrown.aspx. Fierke, K.M. (2007). Critical Approaches to International Security. Cambridge, Polity Press. Fleming, C. (2013). Erfaring fra norske Gender Advisere i ISAF-operasjonen [Experience from Norwegian Gender Advisors in the ISAF Operation]. Oslo, Forsvarets Stabsskole. Forsvarets stabskole (2007). Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine. Forsvaret. Oslo, Forsvarsstaben. Frerks, G., B. Klem, S. van Laar and M. van Klingeren (2006). Principles and Pragmatism Civil-Military Action in Afghanistan and Liberia. den Haag, Cordaid: 119. Gaskarth, J. (2011). Where would we be without rules? A virtue ethics approach to foreign policy analysis. Review of International Studies 37: 393–415. Gilman, N. (2012). Preface: Militarism and Humanitarianism. Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 3(2): 173–178. Gjørv, J. (2013). Bruk av CIMIC i høyintensitetsoperasjoner: Hvorfor det norske Forsvaret fortsatt har bruk for dette militære verktøyet i nasjonale operasjoner. Master of Arts, University of Tromsø. Gompelman, G. (2011). Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Faryab Province. Medford, MA. Grombach Wagner, J. (2005). An IHL/ICRC perspective on “humanitarian space”. Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, December(32): http://www.odihpn.org/ report.asp?ID=2765. Groothedde, S. (2013). Gender Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission. C.C.o.E. (CCOE). Enschede, NL, CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE). Harborne, B. (2012). AID: A Security Perspective. Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison. J. Spear and P.D. Williams. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press. Harlem, M. (2013). Internasjonal humanitær rett – Targeting. Seminar om targeting – målvalg: Norges Røde Kors og Brigade Nord. Setermoen Leir, Norway, Røde Kors (Norwegian Red Cross). Harris, A. and P. Dombrowski (2002). Military collaboration with humanitarian organizations in complex emergencies. Global Governance 8(2): 155–178. Hasegawa, Y. (2007). Is a Human Security Approach Possible? Compatibility between the Strategies of Protection and Empowerment. Journal of Refugee Studies 20(1): 1–19.

Bibliography

193

Heyerdahl, N. and L. Akerhaug (2010). Krisemøte i forsvarsledelsen etter soldatintervjuer [Crisis meeting amongst defence leadership after soldier interviews]. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Higate, P. (2012). Drinking Vodka from the “Butt-Crack”. International Feminist Journal of Politics 14(4): 450–469. Hilhorst, D. (2003). The Real World of NGOs: Discourses, Diversity and Development. London, Zed Books. Holo, T. and M. Dehli Andreassen (2010). Kultur på ville veier: En gjennomgang av Forsvarets satsing på kulturforståelse. Security in Practice. Oslo, NUPI, 11. Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (2007–2010a). Interviews Military Respondents. Oslo/ Bardufoss/Mazar e Sharif/Meymaneh. Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (2007–2010b). Interviews Government Ministries. Oslo/ Den Haag/Kabul/Mazar e Sharif/Meymaneh. Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (2007–2010c). Interviews NGO/IGO respondents. Oslo/ Geneva/Kabul/Mazar e Sharif/Meymaneh. Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (2010). Conversations Afghan Respondents. Kabul/Meymaneh/ SariPul/Mazar e Sharif. Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (2012). Security by any other name: Negative security, positive security and a multi-actor security approach. Review of International Studies 38(4): 835–859. Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (forthcoming, working title). Civil-Military interaction between the WHO, the Nowegian Ministry of Defence, and the Afghan Ministry of Public Health: Sharing medical knowledge between military and civilian medical practioners. Tromsø, University of Tromsø. Hoogensen, G. (2005). Gender, Identity, and Human Security: Can we learn something from the case of women terrorists? Canadian Foreign Policy 12(1): 119–140. Hoogensen, G. and J. Gjørv (2010). Sivil-militært samarbeid: Er CIMIC relevant? [Civil-military cooperation: is CIMIC relevant?]. Norsk militært tidsskrift (Norwegian Military Journal) 1/2. Hoogensen, G. and K. Stuvøy (2006). Human Security, Gender and Resistance. Security Dialogue 37(2): 207–228. Hoogensen, G. and S.V. Rottem (2004). Gender Identity and the Subject of Security. Security Dialogue 35(2): 155–171. Houdijk, P., R. Teijgeler, R. Stoffers and M. Feddema (2008). Gender Makes Sense: A way to improve your mission. Enschede, CIMIC Centre of Excellence: 40. Hough, P. (2008). Understanding Global Security. London, Routledge. Howell, J. and J. Lind (2009). Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society after 9/11 in Afghanistan. European Journal of Development Research 21(5): 718–736. Hubert, D. and C. Brassard-Boudreau (2010). Shrinking Humanitarian Space? Trends and Prospects on Security and Access. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, Feinstein International Center (24 November 2010): http://jha.

194

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

ac/2010/2011/2024/shrinking-humanitarian-space-trends-and-prospects-onsecurity-and-access/. Hughes, C. (2009). Dependent Communities: Aid and Politics in Cambodia and East Timor. Ithaca, New York, Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Hurd, I. (1999). Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. International Organization 53(2): 379–408. Hurley, W.J., C.R. Bucher, S.K. Numrich, et al. (2009). Non-Kinetic Capabilities for Irregular Warfare: Four Case Studies. Alexandria, Virginia, Institute for Defense Analyses. IDA Paper P-4436. ICRC (1996). The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. ICRC publication 1966 ref. 0513. I. Cross. Geneva, ICRC. IFRC/ICRC (1994). The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief. Geneva, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Ilyas Khan, M. and B. Sarwary (2011). Three Cups of Tea: the Pakistan and Afghan side. BBC News South Asia. London, BBC, 20 April 2011. Kaldor, M. (2007). New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd ed. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press. Kamat, S. (2003). The NGO Phenomenon and Political Culture in the Third World. Society for International Development 46(1): 88–93. Keegan, J. (1993). A History of Warfare. New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Keen, D. (2008). Complex Emergencies. Cambridge, Polity Press. Kiley, S. (10 April 2007). Afghanistan: The Other War. FRONTLINE/World. Boston, WGBH Boston. Knight, A. (2008). Civil-military coopeation and human security. Civil-military cooperation in post-conflict operations: Emerging theory and practice. C. Ankersen. Abingdon, Routledge: 15–30. Krause, K. and O. Jütersonke (2005). Peace, Security and Development in PostConflict Environments. Security Dialogue 36(4): 447–462. Kristoffersen, L. (2006). Soldiers or Saints?: Norwegian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Afghanistan. IFS Info. A.T. Klingstedt. Oslo, Institutt for forsvarsstudier. Martinez, G. (28 March 2013). Re-balancing the civil-miltiary dialogue towards the humanitarian side. Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and protection: http://phap.org/articles/re-balancing-civil-military-dialogue-towards -humanitarian-side (accessed 4 May 2013). McBride, K. and A. Wibben (2012). The Gendering of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 3(2): 199–215. MFA et al. (2009). A strategy for comprehensive Norwegian civilian and military efforts in Faryab province, Afghanistan. Oslo, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice and the Police: 10.

Bibliography

195

Milliken, J. and K. Krause (2002). State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies. Development and Change 33(5): 753–774. Mirwais, A. (2006). No end in sight to Afghan’s years of violence. eAriana. Kabul, Reuters. Mitchell, B. (1998). Flirting with Disaster. Washington, DC, Regnery Publishing. Mockaitis, T. R. (2004). Reluctant Partners: Civil-Military Cooperation in Kosovo. Small Wars & Insurgencies 15(2): 38–69. Moore, J. (1999). The humanitarian-development gap. International Review of the Red Cross 833: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jpt52. htm. Morrow, D. (2012). Aid: A development perspective. Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison. J. Spear and P.D. Williams. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press. Moshiri, N. (2011). Somalia famine spreads “beyond reach of aid”. Al Jazeera, 6 September 2011. Mulrine, A. (25 July 2012). Afghan war: Did US Commanders cover up “horrific” conditions at hospital? The Christian Science Monitor. Washington, Christian Science Monitor: http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2012/0725/Afgh an-war-Did-US-commanders-cover-up-horrific-conditions-at-hospital. NATO (2003). AJP-9 NATO civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) doctrine. Brussels, North Atantic Treaty Organization. NATO (2006). AJP-3.9.2 Land Targeting. Brussels, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA). NATO (2009). Bi-SC Directive 40–1: Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives in the NATO Command Structure including Measures for Protection during Armed Conflict. Brussels, NATO. NATO (2009). ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook Edition 4. Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO (2013). AJP-3.4.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation. Brussels, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA). NATO. (21 May 2012). Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan: http://www. nato.int/cps/en/SID-9008E8DF-D65F2D1E/natolive/official_texts_87595. htm? Norheim-Martinsen, P., T. Nyhamar, A. Kjølberg, et al. (2011). Fremtidens internasjonale operasjoner [The future’s international operations]. FFI Rapport. Kjeller, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt. O’Dwyer, B. and J. Unerman (2007). From functional to social accountability: Transforming the accountability relationship between funders and nongovernmental development organisations. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 20(3): 446–471. O’Brien, P. (2004). Politicized Humanitarianism: A Response to Nicolas de Torrente. Harvard Human Rights Journal 17: 31–39.

196

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

OCHA (2007). Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines” (Revision 1.1 November 2007). New York, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. OCHA (2008). Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies. New York, United Natons Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Ollivant, D. (22 August 2012). An Iraq Vet Commanding in Afghanistan. Time Magazine: http://nation.time.com/2012/08/22/an-iraq-vet-commanding-in-afg hanistan/. Olsson, L., J. Tejpar, B. Andreassen, et al. (2009). Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 – Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan. Stockholm, FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency: 151. Opseth, H. (2011). Refser kolleger: – Når ikke de som er hardest rammet [Punishes colleagues: They do not reach those who need aid most]. Bistandsaktuelt. Oslo, Norad. Ørjasæter, E. (2011). Krigskorset kom for sent [War Cross came too late]. www. e24.no. Oslo. Oslo Guidelines (2006/2007). Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence assets in Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines”. Oslo, UN OCHA. Østerud, Ø. (2006). Lite land redder verden [Small country saves the world]. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Polman, L. (2011). The Crisis Caravan: What’s Wrong with Humanitarian Aid? London, Picador. Pugh, M. (2000). Civil-Military Relations in the Kosovo Crisis: An Emerging Hegemony? Security Dialogue 31(2): 229–242. Pugh, M. (2001). Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations. Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives. K.R. Spillmann, T. Bernauer, J.M. Gabriel and A. Wenger. Bern, Peter Lang. 9: 109–133. Rasmusson, E. (2010). Ulike roller i Afghanistan [Different roles in Afghanistan]. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Reiffer-Flanagan, B.A. (2009). Is Neutral Humanitarianism Dead? Red Cross Neutrality: Walking the Tightrope of Neutral Humanitarianism. Human Rights Quarterly 31: 888–915. Reinert Omvik, O. (2011). Informater i Burka [Informants in Burkas]. S. Martinsen Wettre. Norway, NRK. Rieff, D. (2002). A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis. New York, Simon & Schuster. Rietjens, S. (2006). Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill? PhD thesis. Enschede, University of Twente. Rietjens, S. and M.T.I.B. Bollen (eds) (2008). Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability. Military Strategy and Operational Art. Farnham, Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Bibliography

197

Roe, P. (2008). The “value” of positive security. Review of International Studies 34: 777–794. Scharffscher, K.S. (2011). Disempowerment through disconnection: Local women’s disaster response and international relief in post-tsunami Batticaloa. Disaster Prevention and Management 20(1): 63–81. Schjølset, A., Ed. (2013). Gender i Forsvaret: Fra teori til praksis [Gender in the Armed Forces: From theory to practice]. Oslo, Abstrakt Forlag. Schofield, J. (2007). Militarization and War. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. Shannon, R. (2009). Playing with principles in an era of securitized aid: Negotiating humanitarian space in post-9/11 Afghanistan. Progress in Development Studies 9(1): 15–36. Skarpskyttere (2010). Med Mandat til å Drepe [With a Mandate to Kill]. Oslo, Kagge Forlag AS. Skjæraasen, M. (2011). Norske Fly i flere bombeoppdrag i Libya [Norwegian jets in numerous bomb operations in Libya]. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Smith, R. (2005). The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London, Penguin Books. Soderlund, W.C., E.D. Briggs, K. Hildebrant and A.S. Sidahmed (2008). Humanitarian Crises and Intervention: Reassessing the Impact of Mass Media. Sterling, VA, Kumarian Press. Solberg, R. (December 2010). Bistand på ville veier [Aid going in misguided directions]. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Stangeland, S. (2010). Soldater er ikke bistandsarbeidere [Soldiers are not aid workers]: http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2010/desember/273920. Staveland, L.I. (2010). Soldater får for dårlig opplæring in afghansk kultur [Soliders receive poor training in Afghan culture]. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Staveland, L.I. and L. Akerhaug (2010a). Frykter USA-nærvær setter norsk bistand i fare. Aftenposten. Olso, Aftenposten. Staveland, L.I. and L. Akerhaug (2010b). Norge og USA vurderer bistand ulikt. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Staveland, L.I. and L. Akerhaug (2010c). Frykter norske soldater mister styringen. Aftenposten. Oslo, Aftenposten. Stern, M. (2006). Naming Security- Constructing Identity: “Mayan-Women” in Guatemala on the Eve of “Peace”. Manchester, Manchester University Press. Støre, J.G. (2010). Utenrikspolitikk i forandringenes tid [Foreign policy in changing times]. Samtiden 4(2010): 4–19. Sun Tzu (1993). Sun Tzu: The Art of War. New York, William Morrow. SWEDINT (2013). UN Integrated Missions and the Relationship with Humanitarian Organizations. A Partnership at Risk? A seminar for national and international participants. November 18-19 2013, Kungsängen, Sweden, Swedish Armed Forces International Centre. Tadjbakhsh, S. and A.M. Chenoy (2007). Human Security. Concepts and Implications. London and New York, Routledge. Teo, C.H. (2007). The Acme of Skill: Non-Kinetic Warfare. Air University.

198

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Thomas, C. (2001). Global Governance, development and human security: Exploring the links. Third World Quarterly 22(2): 159–175. TLO (2010). The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010. Kabul, The Liaison Office. Tømte, E. (December 2010). Ordkrig om Afghanistan-bistand [War of words on aid to Afghanistan]. Bistandsaktuelt. Oslo, Norad. TRADOC (1988). Operational Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict. Washington, DC, GPO. Tvedt, T. (2007). International Development Aid and Its Impact on a Donor Country: A Case Study of Norway. The European Journal of Development Research 19(4): 614–635. Ulam Weiner, R. (2005–06). Private Military Contractors Come with Strings Attached. Belfer Center Newsletter. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Winter. UNDG (2010). Guidance Note: Application of the Programming Principles to the UNDAF. UNDG. New York, UNDG. January 2010. UNDP (1994). Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York, United Nations Development Programme. UNSC (2007). Resolution 1746 (2007). S/RES/1746 (2007). UNS Council. New York, United Nations. UNSC (2011). Resolution 1974 (2011). S/RES/1974 (2011). UNS Council. New York, United Nations. UNSC (2011). Resolution 1974 (2011). SC/10203. UNS Council. New York, United Nations. US Army (2007). The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual: U.S. field manual no. 3–24: Marine Corps warfighting publication no. 3.33.5. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. US Army (2011). ADP 3–0 Unified Land Operations. Army. Washington, DC, Department of the Army. Utenriksdepartement (2009). Norsk humanitær politikk. St.meld. nr. 40 (2008–2009) Norsk humanitær politikk. UD. Oslo, Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement. Walt, S.M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly 35(2): 211–239. Watkins, C. (2003). Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): An analysis of their contribution to security in Afghanistan. MSc, Oxford Brookes University. Weiss, T.G. (2013). Humanitarian Business. Cambridge, Polity. Wendling, C. (2010). The comprehensive approach to civil-military crisis management: A critical analysis and perspective. The IRSEM Reports. Paris, Institut de recherche stratégique de l’école militaire. Whitworth, S. (2004). Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping. Boulder, CO, Lynne Reinner. Wibben, A. (2011). Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach. London, Routledge.

Bibliography

199

Wibben, A.T.R. (2008). Human Security: Toward an Opening. Security Dialogue 39(4): 455–462. Winslow, D. (2002). Strange bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crises. Civil-Military Cooperation: A marriage of Reason. M.T.I.B. Bollen, R.V. Janssens, H.F.M. Kirkels and J.L.M. Soeters. Breda, Royal Netherlands Military Academy: 49–64. Winslow, D. and T.H. Eriksen (2004). A Broad Concept that Encourages Interdisciplinary Thinking. Security Dialogue 35: 361–362. Zaalberg, T.B. (2006). Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting Or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press. Zachrisen, G. (2010). Sier nei til militarisert bistand [Says no to militarized aid]. Bistandsaktuelt. Oslo, Norad, 6.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Index

Afghanistan 3, 6, 9, 11, 23–4, 92, 128, 149, 181 ANSO 138, 142–3, 144–5 IEA 26, 143–4, 145, 146 ISAF 12, 21, 32, 35, 88, 114, 120, 123, 165–6 peacekeeping 31–2, 33, 120 aid, see development aid; humanitarian aid AJP-3.4.9 (NATO CIMIC doctrine) 9–10, 50, 98, 155–6, 160 AJP 9 (NATO CIMIC doctrine) 50–51, 155, 160–61 American Armed Forces 15, 49, 99, 172, 173 ANSO (Afghanistan NGO Safety Office) 138, 142–3, 144–5 AOGs (Armed Opposition Groups) 70, 138, 145 Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UN), see UNAMA asymmetrical warfare 33, 34, 35 authority 21, 30, 36, 43–5, 46, 69, 123, 127, 132, 134 Balkans crisis 3, 29 CA (Civil Affairs) 49, 99 Canadian Armed Forces 126 CCOE (CIMIC Centre of Excellence) 27, 49, 79, 155, 156, 158, 175, 181–2 CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) 10, 16–20, 49–50, 52, 97–103, 98, 104–6, 119, 129, 169–70, 172–5, 179, 181–3 AJP-3.4.9 doctrine 9–10, 50, 98, 155–6, 160 AJP 9 doctrine 50–51, 155, 160–161 CCOE 27, 49, 79, 155, 156, 158, 175, 181–2

education 22, 27, 103, 154, 162–4, 182, 183 gender awareness 27, 158, 159 NATO 4, 9, 17, 24, 46, 49, 50–51, 97–8, 155–6, 175 Norway 16, 18–19, 99–101, 106–7, 155, 162, 169, 170, 172–3, 175, 179 PRT 16, 19, 75–6, 157 CIMIC Requirements and Education in Norway, see CREN Civil Affairs, see CA civil-military interaction 3–6, 7–13, 21–4, 29, 30–31, 36–7, 46–52, 54–5, 109–13, 136, 153–5, 157–8, 177–81; see also Norwegian model civil-military interface 4, 6, 10, 11, 29–30, 42–3, 57, 58–9, 76, 97, 98, 163–4, 178–9 civilian actors 3, 8, 9–10, 12–13, 25, 54–6, 57, 104–5, 132, 136, 137–8, 147–8, 180 Norwegian model 9, 11, 14–15, 120 civilian organizations 5, 21, 30, 62, 129, 132–3, 151, 168, 184 civilians 4, 21, 37, 41, 50, 73–4, 85, 98–9, 111–16, 117, 153 host nation 55, 57–61, 74, 112–16, 129–30, 141–2, 170 Clausewitz, Carl von 39 CMCoord (Civil-Military Coordination, UN) 4, 8, 46, 51 coercion 32, 40, 44 COIN (counterinsurgency) 3, 46, 47–8, 49, 111, 117, 126, 151, 153, 165–6, 169 competence 45, 100 Comprehensive Approach (NATO) 18, 46, 47, 51

202

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

conflict management, see low intensity operations consent-based operations 31, 32, 51, 86, 120 cooperation 27, 36, 86–7, 89–90, 92, 111, 112, 120, 154–5, 183 coordination 6, 47, 52, 67–8, 86–8, 92, 120, 121, 153–4, 182 counterinsurgency, see COIN CREN (CIMIC Requirements and Education in Norway) project 22, 185–7 crisis management operations 33 crisis situations 8, 24, 29, 30–31, 42–3, 45–6 development aid 56–7, 64–5, 69, 72, 84–5, 118, 119, 132–4, 148, 149; see also NGDOs development NGOs 25, 31, 40, 109, 121, 151; see also NGDOs “do no harm” principle 62, 115, 131, 149 Doctors Without Borders, see MSF donor nations 8, 12, 31, 55–6, 57–8, 66–8, 90–91, 112–13, 119, 121–2, 151 Dutch PRT 157 education 10, 15, 46, 153, 155, 179, 180 CIMIC 22, 27, 103, 154, 162–4, 182, 183 emergency situations 8, 30–31, 36, 39–40, 45–6, 53, 57–8, 131 Faryab Strategy (Norway) 19, 80–81, 84–5, 86, 90–91, 92, 165, 166, 171–2 “feel and do good syndrome” 99, 100–101 FETs (female engagement teams) 111, 113, 114, 158–9, 173 force protection 26, 50, 118, 124–7, 125, 158–9, 183 gender advisors 27, 48, 158, 159, 182 gender awareness 27, 61, 64–5, 113, 158–60, 162, 175 government, Norway 28, 55, 68, 88, 92, 93–4, 154, 155, 156, 167

Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil-Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, see Oslo Guidelines hearts-and-minds activities 26, 50, 82, 111, 112, 117–20, 121, 122, 123–6, 125, 132, 175, 182 high intensity operations 27, 31, 33–4, 35, 125, 130, 158, 160–62 host nation civilians 55, 57–61, 74, 112–16, 129–30, 141–2, 170 human security 5, 37, 38, 41, 57–8, 110, 112, 128n6, 134–5 CIMIC 18, 49, 161, 162, 163 humanitarian 26, 46, 54, 56, 92 humanitarian activities 3–4, 14, 80, 83 humanitarian actors 25, 63, 64, 68, 118, 138, 142, 145, 150–51 Norwegian model 84, 87, 89, 92, 180 humanitarian aid 40, 56–7, 62–4, 65, 84–5, 92, 118, 121–2, 132–4, 137, 149; see also NGHAs humanitarian crises 89, 167 humanitarian NGOs 10, 26, 31, 40, 45, 90–91, 121–2, 131, 144–5, 151; see also NGHAs humanitarian organizations 10, 21, 25, 63, 80, 84, 87, 89–90, 129, 130–31, 141, 151–2, 168 humanitarian policy, Norway 20, 25, 79, 80, 82–3, 84, 85–6, 88–90, 167 humanitarian principles 21, 25, 26, 51, 54, 56, 63, 84, 90, 122, 142, 150 Norwegian model 6, 9, 10, 14, 83, 84 humanitarian space 14, 19, 21, 26, 56, 63–4, 141, 146, 147, 151, 152, 154–5 humanitarian work 9, 20, 26, 62–3, 64, 87, 122, 129, 141, 143, 149, 167 humanitarianism 28, 30, 63, 83, 92, 141, 147–50, 152 Norway 79, 80, 82–3, 89 humanity 63 ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) 46, 55n1, 55n2, 63, 122, 142, 148, 150, 163

Index IEA (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) 26, 143–4, 145, 146 IHL (International Humanitarian Law) 4, 14–15, 44, 64, 82, 86, 122, 134, 142, 153, 159 impartiality 21, 63, 66, 83, 90, 143, 144, 147, 148, 151 independence 21, 25, 26, 45, 63, 83, 84, 89, 90, 139, 144, 146, 147, 150 insurgents 31, 39, 70, 117, 131, 137, 145, 146 Integrated missions (UN) 18, 47, 51, 150 Intelligence 75n10, 113, 177–8, 183 interim governance 156 international civilians 61; see also NGOs IOs 55, 65–6, 71, 135, 161 NGDOs 55, 56, 57, 64–5 NGHAs 55, 56, 57, 62–4, 65, 131, 148–9 International Committee of the Red Cross, see ICRC international community 7, 31, 39, 79, 121, 134, 151, 180–81 International Humanitarian Law, see IHL IOs (International Organizations) 55, 65–6, 71, 135, 161 Iraq 3, 11, 31–2, 47, 48, 75n11, 93, 111, 117, 156 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan) 12, 21, 32, 35, 88, 114, 120, 123, 165–6 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, see IEA kinetic activities 4, 15, 34, 71, 73–5, 101, 103, 129, 132, 134, 138–9, 153 Kristoffersen, Lene 20, 21, 69, 99, 100, 101 legitimacy 8, 21, 30, 36, 43–6, 69, 72, 75, 123, 127, 128, 132, 134 Libya 3, 31–2, 33, 101–2 local populations, see host nation civilians long-term development aid 84, 145, 149–50 low intensity operations 31, 33, 34, 35, 160 Macedonia 124 Martinez, Gloria 3–4

203

Médecins Sans Frontières, see MSF militaries 3–5, 7, 29, 44, 69–72, 111–12, 120–121, 132–3, 151–2, 153, 170, 184 military actors 5, 12, 23, 25, 53, 56, 69–72, 132–3, 136, 138–9, 156, 168 CIMIC 98–9, 104–5, 173–4 military-military cooperation 27, 155–9 military operations 3, 35, 73–6, 128–9, 130–31, 132, 158, 159, 180–81 MOTs (Mobile Observation Teams) 41, 104, 172, 173 MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières) 131, 142 multi-actor security framework 41, 42, 50, 53, 59, 110, 116, 135, 167 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 3, 9–10, 14, 33, 50, 103, 145, 146, 151, 155, 157 AJP-3.4.9 doctrine 9–10, 50, 98, 155–6, 160 AJP 9 doctrine 50–51, 155, 160–61 CIMIC 4, 9, 17, 24, 46, 49, 50–51, 97–8, 155–6, 175 Comprehensive Approach 18, 46, 47, 51 negative security 17, 18, 37, 38–9, 127, 128 neutrality 21, 25, 56, 63, 83, 84, 90, 139, 141, 143, 146, 150 new wars 31 NGDOs (non-governmental development organizations) 55, 56, 57, 64–5 NGHAs (non-governmental humanitarian agencies) 55, 56, 57, 62–4, 65, 131, 148–9 NGOs (non-governmental organizations) 8, 21–2, 44, 59–60, 61–2, 65, 94, 135, 139, 149, 179–80, 181 development 25, 31, 40, 109, 121, 151 humanitarian 10, 26, 31, 40, 45, 90–91, 121–2, 131, 144–5, 151 MSF 131, 142 NGDOs 55, 56, 57, 64–5 NGHAs 55, 56, 57, 62–4, 65, 131, 148–9 security 133, 138, 144–5, 146, 147

204

Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

non-kinetic activities 4, 12, 15, 36, 71, 73–5, 101, 103, 121, 126–7, 134, 138–9, 153 non-violence 37, 38 Norway 11, 20–21, 31, 32, 53–4, 72, 74, 80–82, 109–10, 155, 156, 159, 184 CIMIC 16, 18–19, 99–101, 106–7, 155, 162, 169, 170, 172–3, 175, 179 civil-military interaction 6, 9, 10, 12–13, 22–3, 26, 69, 75–6, 79–80, 110, 154, 167 Faryab Strategy 19, 80–81, 84–5, 86, 90–91, 92, 165, 166, 171–2 government 28, 55, 68, 88, 92, 93–4, 154, 155, 156, 167 humanitarian policy 20, 25, 79, 80, 82–3, 84, 85–6, 88–90, 167 humanitarianism 79, 80, 82–3, 89 PRT 16, 19, 80, 81, 165 White Paper 20, 84, 85–6, 89, 167 Norwegian Armed Forces 10, 15, 106–7, 165–6, 167, 171–3, 174, 179 Norwegian model 5–6, 9, 13, 14–17, 25, 28, 83–8, 93–5, 106, 156–7, 166–8, 177, 180 hearts-and-minds activities 119–20 humanitarian actors 84, 87, 89, 92, 180 humanitarian principles 6, 9, 10, 14, 83, 84 NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) 90, 131, 141 obligation 30, 36, 43, 45–6, 127, 134 OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN) 30, 46, 51, 65, 66, 86, 142 Oslo Guidelines (Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil-Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, 2006/2007) 46, 86, 99 peace enforcement 12, 32–3, 35, 119, 120, 121, 124, 134, 142, 170 peace operations 29, 31–3, 35, 83n2 peace support operations 31, 33 peacebuilding 32, 33 peacekeeping 12, 31–2, 33, 65, 72, 75, 111, 119, 120, 124, 132

peacemaking 32, 33 PMSCs (private militarized security companies) 40, 41, 55 political actors 8, 19, 40, 56, 68, 84, 85, 89, 124–5, 167 positive security 18, 36, 37, 38–9, 40, 127, 130, 134, 135 programming principles (UNICEF) 149–50 PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) 3, 46, 47, 48, 49, 75n11, 81, 85, 128, 170, 171–2 CIMIC 16, 19, 75–6, 157 Norway 16, 19, 80, 81, 165 QIPs (quick impact projects) 50, 76, 81–2, 99, 118–19, 120, 122, 123–4, 135, 175, 181 Red Cross, see ICRC security 8, 24–5, 29–30, 36, 40–41, 59, 123–4, 127–30, 146–7 human security 5, 37, 38, 41, 57–8, 110, 112, 128n6, 134–5 multi-actor security framework 41, 42, 50, 53, 59, 110, 116, 135, 167 negative 17, 18, 37, 38–9, 127, 128 NGOs 133, 138, 144–5, 146, 147 positive 18, 36, 37, 38–9, 40, 127, 130, 134, 135 security actors 37, 38, 41, 124, 135, 137, 164, 184 PMSCs 40, 41, 55 security-development nexus 128 short-term projects 81, 82, 118–19, 122–3; see also QIPs soldiers 20, 21 stability operations 31, 33, 34–5, 48, 103, 117, 157 Taliban, see IEA targeting 27, 161–2 training 10, 15, 46, 153, 155, 179, 180 CIMIC 22, 27, 103, 154, 162–4, 182, 183 troop-contributing nations 9, 12, 31, 55–6, 57–8, 66–8, 112–13, 119, 121, 151 trust 38, 40, 60, 127, 135, 168

Index UN (United Nations) 4, 31, 32–3, 50, 51, 66 CMCoord 4, 8, 46, 51 Integrated missions 18, 47, 51, 150 OCHA 30, 46, 51, 65, 66, 86, 142 UNAMA 65, 120 UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) 65, 120 UNICEF 149–50 use of force 7, 11, 15, 32, 33, 37, 38, 44, 70, 127, 132

205

violence 34, 38–9, 61, 111, 124–5, 125, 132, 151 war 4, 31, 36, 39, 110–11, 120 warfighting, see high intensity operations warring parties 21, 32, 50, 62, 64, 65–6, 142, 143, 144–7 White Paper on humanitarian policy (Norway, 2009) 20, 84, 85–6, 89, 167