Unconventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present [1 ed.] 0754629775, 9780754629771

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
PART I: INSURGENCIES, COUNTER-INSURGENCIES AND TERRORISM
1. K. P. Misra (1980) ‘Paramilitary Force s in lndia’
2. Rajesh Rajagapalan (2004) ‘Innovations in Counterinsurgency: The Indian Army’s Rashtriya Rifles’
3. Namrata Goswami (2009), ‘lndia’s Counter-lnsurgency Experience: The “Trust and Nurture” Strategy’
4. Moeed Yusef andAnit Mukherjee (2007) ‘Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Learning from lndia’
5. Pratul Ahuja and Rajat Ganguly (2007) ‘The Fire With in: Naxalite lnsurgency Violence in lndia’
6. Surnit Ganguly (1996) ‘Explaining the Kashmir lnsurgency: Political Mobilization and lnstitutional Decay’
7. Ashutosh Varshney (1991) ‘lndia, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinornies of Nationalism’
8. Lawrence E. CIine (2006) ‘The lnsurgency Environment in Northeast lndia’
9. Sanjib Baruah (2003) ‘Confronting Constructionism: Ending lndia’s Naga War’
10. Arijit Mazurndar (2005) ‘Bhutan’s Military Action against Indian Insurgents’
11. S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates (2005) ‘Spatiai-Horizontal lnequality and the Maoist lnsurgency in Nepal’
12. Brigadier S. P. Sinha (2001) ‘Prabhakaran as Leader of the L TTE’
13. Miranda Alison (2003) ‘Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’
14. Alok Bansal (2008) ‘Factors Leading to lnsurgency in Balochistan’
PART II: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND RELIGION
15. Apurba Kundu (1994) ‘The Indian Arrned Forces’ Sikh and Non-Sikh Officers’ Opinion of Operation Blue Star’
16. James L. Rowell (2006) ‘Gandhi and Bin Laden: Religious Conflict at the Polar Extremes’
17. Kaushik Roy (2007) ‘Just and Unjust War in Hindu Philosophy’
18. Michael Roberts (2005) ‘Tamil Tiger “Martyrs”: Regenerating Divine Potency?’
19. Richard Gombrich (2006) ‘Is the Sri Lankan War a Buddhist Fundamentalism?’
Name Index

Citation preview

Unconventional Warfare in South Asia, 194 7 to the Present

Critical Essays on Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present. Series Editors: Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy Titles in the Series: Conventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy The N u el ear Shadow over South Asia, 1947 to the Present Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy Unconventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy

Unconventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

Edited by

Scott Gates Peace Research Institute Oslo (P RIO) and Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

and

KaushikRoy Jadavpur University, India and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway

First published 2011 by Ashgate Publisbing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 ThirdAvenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright© 2011 Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy. For copyright of individua1 artides please refer to the Acknowledgements. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval s ystem, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Wherever possible, these reprints are made from a copy of the original printing, but these can themselves be of very variable quality. Whilst the publisher has made every effort to ensure the quality of the reprint, some variability may inevitably remain.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Unconventional warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the present. - (Critical essays on warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the present) t. lnsurgency- South Asia- History- 20th century. 2. lnsurgency- South Asia- History-21st century. 3. South Asia- History, Military- 20th century. 4. South Asia- History, Military -21st century. l. Series Il. Gates, Scott. III. Roy, Kaushik, Dr. 355'.0218'0954-dc22

Library of Congress Control Nu m ber: 2011920454

ISBN 9780754629771 (hbk) Transferred to Digital Printing in 2014

Contents Acknow/edgements Introduction

vii ix

PART I INSURGENCIES, COUNTER-INSURGENCIES AND TERRORISM

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 lO Il

12 13 14

K.P. Mi sra (1980), 'Paramilitary Force s in lndia', Arrned Forcesand Society, 6,pp.371-88. Rajesh Rajagapalan (2004), 'Innovations in Counterinsurgency: The Indian Anny's Rashtriya Rifles', Contemporary South Asia, 13, pp. 25-37. Namrata Goswami (2009), 'lndia's Counter-lnsurgency Experience: The "Trust and Nurture" Strategy', Small Wars and Insurgencies, 20, pp. 66-86. Moeed Yusef andAnit Mukherjee (2007), 'Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Learning from lndia', National Security Outlook, September, pp. 1-6. Pratul Ahuja andRajat Ganguly (2007), 'The Fire With in: Naxalite lnsurgency Violence in lndia', SmallWarsand Insurgencies, 18, pp. 249-74. Surnit Ganguly (1996), 'Explaining the Kashmir lnsurgency: Political Mobilization and lnstitutional Decay', International Security, 21, pp. 76-107. Ashutosh Varshney (1991), 'lndia, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinornies of Nationalism', Asian Survey, 31, pp. 997-1019. Lawrence E. C Iine (2006), 'The lnsurgency Environment in Northeast lndia', Small Wars and Insurgencies, 17, pp. 126--47. Sanjib Baruah (2003), 'Confronting Constructionism: Ending lndia's Naga War', Journal of Peace Research, 40, pp. 321-38. Arijit Mazurndar (2005), 'Bhutan's Military Action against Indian Insurgents', Asian Survey, 45, pp. 566-80. S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates (2005), 'Spatiai-Horizontallnequality and the Maoist lnsurgency in Nepal', Review of Development Economics, 9, pp. 121-34. Brigad ier S.P. Sinha (2001), 'Prabhakaran as Leader of the LTTE', Journal oftheUnitedServicelnstitutionoflndia, 131,pp.194-210. Miranda Alison (2003), 'Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam', Civil Wars, 6, pp. 37-54. A lok Bansal (2008), 'F actors Leading to lnsurgency in Baloch istan', Small Warsandlnsurgencies, 19,pp.182-200.

3 21 35 57 63 89 121 145 167 185

201 215 233 251

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Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

PART II UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND RELIGION 15 Apurba Kundu (1994), 'The Indian Arrned Forces' Sikh and Non-Sikh Officers' Opinion of Operation Blue Star', Pacific Affairs, 67, pp. 46-69. 16 James L. Rowell (2006), 'Gandhi and Bin Laden: Religious Conflict at the Polar Extremes', Journal ofCof!flict Studies, 26, pp. 35-54. 17 Kaushik Roy (2007), 'Just and U njust War in Hindu Philosophy', Journal of Military Ethics, 6, pp. 232-45. 18 Michael Roberts (2005), 'Tamil Tiger "Martyrs": Regenerating Divine Potency?', Studies in Conjlict and Terrorism, 28, pp. 493-514. 19 Richard Gombrich (2006), 'Is the Sri Lankan War a Buddhist Fundamentalism?', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Conjlict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 22-37.

Name Index

273 297 317 331

353 371

Acknowledgements The editor and publishers wish to thank the following for permission to use copyright material. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research for the essay: Moeed Yusef and A nit Mukherjee (2007), 'Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Leaming from lndia', National Security Outlook, September, pp. 1-6. The Journal of Conflict studies for the essay: James L. Rowell (2006), 'Gandhi and Bin Laden: Religious Confiict at the Polar Extremes', Journal of Confiict Studies, 26, p p. 35-54. MIT Press for the essay: Surnit Ganguly ( 1996), 'Explaining the Kashmir lnsurgency: Political Mobilization and lnstitutional Decay', International Security, 21, pp. 76-107. Copyright© 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia for the essay: Apurba Kundu (1994), 'The Indian Arrned Forces' Sikh and Non-Sikh Officers' Opinion of Operation Blue Star', Pacific Affairs, 67, pp. 46-69. Sage Publications for the essays: K.P. Misra ( 1980), 'Paramilitary Force s in lndia', Armed Forces and Society, 6, pp. 371-88; Sanjib Baruah (2003), 'Confronting Constructionism: Ending lndia's Naga War', Journal of Peace Research, 40, pp. 321-38. Copyright© 2003 Journal of Peace Research. Taylor & Francis Ltd for the essays: Rajesh Rajagopalan (2004), 'Innovations in Counterinsurgency: The Indian Army's Rashtriya Rifies', Contemporary South As ia, 13, pp. 25-37. Copyright © 2004 Taylor & Francis; Namrata Goswami (2009), 'India's CounterInsurgency Experience: The "Trust and Nurture" Strategy', Small War s and lnsurgencies, 20, pp. 66-86. Copyright© 2009 Taylor & Francis; Pratul Ahuja andRajat Ganguly (2007), 'The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India', Small Wars and lnsurgencies, 18, pp. 249-74. Copyright© 2007 Taylor & Francis; Lawrence E. Cline (2006), 'The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India', SmallWarsand lnsurgencies, 17, pp. 126--47. Copyright© 2006 Taylor & Francis; MirandaAlison (2003), 'Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam', Civil War s, 6, pp. 37-54. Copyright© 2003 Taylor & Francis; Al ok Bansal (2008), 'F actors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan', SmallWarsand lnsurgencies, 19, pp. 182-200. Copyright© 2008 Taylor & Francis; Kaushik Roy (2007), 'Just and Unjust War in Hindu Philosophy', Journal of Military Ethics, 6, pp. 232--45. Copyright © 2007 Taylor & Francis; Michael Roberts (2005), 'Tamil Tiger "Martyrs": Regenerating Divine Potency', Studies in Confiict and Terrorism, 28, pp. 493-514; Richard Gombrich (2006),

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Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

'Is the Sri Lankan War a Buddhist fundamentalism?', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modem Sri Lanka, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 22-37. United Service Institution ofindia for the essay: Brigadier S.P. Sinha (200 l), 'Prabhakaran as Leader of the LTTE', Journal of the United Service Institution oflndia, 131, pp. 194-210. University of California Press for the essays: Ashutosh Varshney (1991 ), 'In dia, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinornies of Nationalism', Asian Survey, 31, pp. 997-1019. Copyright© 1991 by the Regents of the University of California; Arijit Mazumdar (2005), 'Bhutan's Military Action against Indian Insurgents', Asian Survey, 45, pp. 566-80. Copyright© 2005 by the Regents of the University of California. Wiley and Sons forthe essay: S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates (2005), 'Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal', Review of Development Economics, 9, pp. 121-34. Copyright© 2005 United Nations University. Published by Blackwell Publishing. Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if an y have been inadvertently overJooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportun ity.

Introduction Unconventional war is an umbrella term which includes all sorts of conflicts other than conventional warfare. Unconventional war is a better term than asymmetric war because an asymmetric war can sometimes be an interstate war. For instance, the two wars between the USA and Saddam's lraq, though an interstate war, could be termed as asymmetric war due to the huge technical gap that existed in the weapon systems deployed by the USA and lraq. The term 'low-intensity conflict' is amisnomer because, in terms of number of troops deployed and the region over which unconventional war is fought, the conflict is at times as great as that of an interstate war. Furthermore, for the sol di er in the firing Iine, who risks his Ii mbs and Iife in maintaining 'law and order', the experience ofconflict is no way one oflow intensity. Unconventional wars are intrastate wars with transnationall inkages and include insurgencies, counter-insurgencies (COINs), terrorism and religious conflicts. Insurgents conduct both terrorist attacks and guerrilla warfare. We favour Azeem lbrahim's conceptualization of guerrilla warfare: It isthus generally employed: by small bands ofirregulars fightinga superior invading army or to weaken the latter's hold over conquered territory by a weaker side .... Guerrilla strategy is determined by the re bels' weakness in relation to the superior military forces that they confront (Ibrahim, 2004, p. 112)

For the Correlates of War (COW) Project: Civil war is defined as an interna! war in which (a) military action was involved (b) the national government at the time was actively involved (c) etfective resistance (as measured bytheratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides, and (d) at !east l ,000 battle deaths resulted. (Sarkees, n.d.)

The COW data have been widely employed in the statistical analysis of civil war. Two of the three most cited articles on civil war (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gate s and Gleditsch, 200 l; and Collier and Hoeffler, 2003) use these data. In recent years the Uppsala-PRIO arrned conflict data have become the standard dataset for quantitative analysis of civil war. These data are more comprehensive and include lowintensity arrned conflicts as weil as extremely deadly wars. Arrned confiict is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of arrned force between two parties results in at !east 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at !east one is the government of a state. (Gleditsch et al., 2002, p.618-19)

As for distinguishing a war from arrned conflict, the UppsalaArrned Conflict Data Programme applies the COW Project's 1,000 battle death threshold. From an Asian perspective, the l ,000 battle death threshold seems Eurocentric. A thousand battle deaths in a particular conflict would raise a hue and cry in the West, but it might not in

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Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

parts of Asia. This is because of overpopulation, malnutrition, poverty and hunger in Asia in general and lndia in particular. In lndia, which is home to one-fifth ofthe world's population, more than l ,000 people die du e to malnutrition, hunger and childbirth per y ear. Such fatalities do not result in the collapse of the central govemment, which should be a key element for defining civil war. When insurgencies spread from a particular regionacross the country and encompass several social groups, purting the central govemment on defensive, an insurgency could be termed as transforming into civil war. The problem with this focus isthat determining exactly what constitutes a 'threat' is difficult. lndeed, figuring out what is threatening and what is not is not straightforward. The focus on casualty thresholds is nonetheless also problematic, invalving two central definitional issues. What should the threshold be? And over what temporal period should these casualties be counted? The problem with intrastate arrned conflict battle casualties is that one of the sides is not representing the govemment. Identifying who is or is not a member of arebel army is often difficult. Moreover, civilians often tend to be the targets of violence in civil wars (Azam and Hoeffler, 2002). Counting civilian deathsis even more prone to distortion. 8oth rebel and government forces will try to play up the other's 'atrocities' commirted against civilians-even after the fighting has stopped. Accounting for battle deaths alone could lead to an underestimation of the scale of violence in a civil war, nor does it clearly measure threat to those that rule. Some scholars argue forcefully that the twenty-firstcentury world is witnessing a new form of warfare or 'New Wars'. Antulio J. Echevarria Il (2007, p. 160) claims that winning bartles against shapeless formless opponents of today is not that important. The German scholar Herfried Munkler writes that these conflicts occur in failed states and are characterized by warlords and militia leaders waging private war for making personal profit. These conflicts have transnational linkages and are characterized by eonstant switching of friend s and foes (Munk! er, 2003, pp. 20-21 ). British General Rupert Smith describes what is transpiring as 'a radical shift in the very paradigm of war: instead ofindustrial war there is now a new paradigm of war amongst the people' (2007, p. 28, emphasis in original). These New Wars are termed by some as fourth-generation war (4GW), which are characterized by very small independent cells or groups acting on mission-type orders and depending less on logistics. Such elusive bands emphasize manoeuvrability and try to achieve psychological, rather than physical, goals. Advocates of a 4GW perspective contend that rather than physically destroying such bands, what is required is their moral and psychological dislocation (Osinga, 2007, pp. 174-5; Hammes, 2006). In the subcontinent, insurgencies and communal conflicts have not only continued from 1947, but are also gaining strength. In fact, more people havediedin South Asia as a result ofunconventional wars than conventional warfare. lndeed, about half of the Indian army, the fourth largest army in the world, is engaged in policing lndia. In Pakistan the greatest current threat to the state is posed not by lndia, but by the Taliban fighters who were once allies of the political and military establishment of Islamabad. Meanwhile, in Kashmir an Islamic insurgency continues, as does, a religious-cum-tribal insurgency in north-east lndia. Fighting alongside the horne-bom insurgents in Kashmir are volunteers from numerous foreign Islamic states. lnitially, the insurgents were trained and equipped by the Inter-Services lntelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. General Zia-ui-Haq's government diverted funds and weapons provided by the US Centrallntelligence Agency (CIA) to the insurgents in Kashmir instead of u sing them for their intended purpose w h ich was to equip and support the Afghan mujahidins,

Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

xi

who atthat time were fighting the Soviets. In the late 1980s, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, there was even an influx of som e Afghan insurgents into Kashmir. Identitypolitics have fed the conflict in n orth-east lndia. Christian identity and distinctiveness, encouraged by missionaries, and disaffection against Hindu agriculturists and traders from the plains have generated a sense of grievance and exclusion. Military and financial aid from China, as weil as the densely forested mountainous terrain which makes it difficult for the Indian govemment to deploy its security forces, are allowing the tribes of n orth-east lndia to continue the guerrilla struggle against the Indian state. Here, we find an intermeshing of religious conflict with tribal uprising. The US and NATOwar againstthe Taliban in Afghanistan and againstAI Qaeda and Islamic hardliners in lraq encourage Western commentators to posit Islamic orthodoxy as the principal propelling force behind insurgencies in the world today. Given that the most deadly ofthese conflicts -Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan andSomalia-are al so associated with foreign military intervention involving NATO and US troops, this sentiment is not too surprising. Moreover, 'over 25 percent (nine out of34) conflicts that startedor restarted in the period from 2004 to 2008 were associated with Islamist political violence' (Human Security Report Project, 201 O, p. 3). Islamist elements were also active in low intensity arrned conflicts in southern Russia, lndia, Israel (involving Lebanon), Uzbekistan, and Nigeria. lt is important to point out thatjust because so many conflicts today involve radieallslam ist groups, it does not reflect widespread popular support for violent Islamist extremism in the Muslim world as a whole. According to Pew public opinion polis, support for Al Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups has declined markedly in almost all Muslim countries over the past five years (Pew Research Center, 20 l 0). This is backed up by the Human Security Report Project (20 l O, p. 3): 'The growing popular rejection of the Islamists' indiscriminate violence -most ofwhich is directed against fellow Muslims- is areaction to their extremist ideology and the ir harshly repressive policies.' Nevertheless, it is too early to dismiss the ro le of communism in sustaining vi o lent revolt against the state. This is particularly the case in South A sia. lndia's prim e minister, Manmohan Singh, has asserted that the Maoist guerrillas pose the gravest threat to lndia's democracy. In Nepal the Maoists were successful in overthrowing the monarchy and capturing power. A small Marxist outfit is also active in Balochistan. The essays in this volume are organized into two sections. Part l deals with insurgencies, counter-insurgencies and terrorism; Part Il covers the religious aspects of the various intrastate conflicts that have marred the multi-ethnic societies of South Asia.

Insurgencies, Counter-Insurgencies and Terrorism From December 1989 a full-seale insurgency re-emerged in Kashmir. By the mid-1990s about 50 militant groups were operating there, necessitating the deployment of about 400,000 Indian army personneJ and paramilitary forces in the region during that decade (Blom, 2009, p. 135). As a point of comparison, in 1986 the USSR's 115,000 troops with the support of 40,000 Afghan govemment troops and 70,000 paramilitary forces fought 70,000 mujahidins. In ten years the Soviet casualties were 13,500 killed and 37,000 wounded (Ch in, 2003, p. 62). In 2006 there were on ly 45,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan (Orr, 2009, p. 94). Barack Obama, the US president, declared in 2009 that there would be at !east 55,000 American soldiers in

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Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

Afghanistan (Christia and Semple, 2009, p. 34). And in 2007 the USA maintained 140,000 troops and a paramilitary force ofabout 100,000 in lraq (Ch in, 2007, p. l, Christia and Semple, 2009, p. 42). Two essays - those by Ashutosh Varshney (Chapter 7) and Surnit Ganguly (Chapter 6) - in this volume focus on Kashmir. 8oth of these essays emphasize identity politics and international linkages to explain the rebell ion of the Muslims in the Kashmir Valley. There are 4 million Muslims in Kashmir. Hindus predominate in Jammu; Muslims eonstirute nearly the entire population ofthe Kashmir Valley; and Buddhists compose a majority in Ladakh. In 1965, when General Ayub Khan (then president of Pakistan) sent 7,000 infiltrators (regular soldiers and paramilitary personnel) to raise an anti-Indian rebellion in Kashmir (codenarned Operation Gibraltar), the Kashmiris turned them over to the Indian army personnel. However, the situation changed in the 1980s. Reconstruction of partisan histories emphasizing a sense of betrayal by the majority community of Kashmiri Muslims and political m ismanagement by New Delhi resulted in a groundswell of anti-Indian opinion among the Valley Muslims. 8oth Varshney and Ganguly note that the collapse of seeular institutional political channels resulted in political mobilization along ethno-religious Iines. In fact, many of the key Kashmiri insurgent leaders were politicians who had been forced out ofpolitics by New Delhi's political chicanery. Rigging of elections and the use of a communal language by the Congress Party polarized the situation. Military, financial and moral aid from Pakistan to the disgruntled Kashmiri Muslim youths led to a resurgence of anti-Indian militant activities, resulting in the aggressive Kashmiri militants not only attacking the paramilitary forces, but also the Indian army. In fear, the Hindus began to migrate from Kashmir Valley. At present, the militants are divided broadly into two groups: while the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front wants a seeular but independent Kashmir, the Hizbul Mujahidin aims to establish a caliphate. Ganguly comments that the Kashmir imbroglio is du e to a combination of two opposing tendencies: political deinstitutionalization by New Delhi (as noted above) and accelerated political mobilization of the Valley Muslims. lncreasing literacy, media exposure and access to higher education resulted in the growth of political knowledge among the Kashmiri Muslims. Kashmir not on ly witnessed a dramatic increase in newspaper circulation, but also growth of madrassos (lslamic schools). In contrast to Varshney, Ganguly places greater emphasis on the international scene. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan enabled the Afghan mujahidins to provide more intense support to the Kashmiri militants. In addition, the breakdown of the gargantuan Soviet state also encouraged the secessionist groups to contemplate that the disintegration of multi-ethnic lndia might also be a possibility. Ganguly, moreover, claims that the Kashmiris and the Pakistan is sympathetic to Kashmir's secession from lndia has been encouraged by the success of Palestinian intifada against the Israel i army. The Indians tend to accuse the Pakistanis offomenting trouble in Kashmir. Pakistan itself, however, is not free from the rabid insurgencies that threaten the very existence of the state. Alok Bansal's essay (Chapter 14) tums the limelight on the insurgency in Balochistan. The Baluchi insurgency first erupted in 1958, then in 1963--69 and again in 1973. In 1973, 55,000 insurgents fought 80,000 Pakistan i troops. Between 1973 and 1977, more than 5,000 insurgents and over 3,300 sol di ers di ed. In 2003 the Baluchi insurgency erupted again. Rather than tribal sirdars, urbanized educated Baluchi youth, influenced by Marxist philosophy, are leading the insurgency. The political and economic marginalization of the Baluchis is encouraging the new generation to tum against the state: the Baluchis have a negligible presence in the civil

Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

x iii

service and the Pakistan army. Furthermore, Balochistan's gas reserves supply the Pakistan's requirements, but the Baluchis claim that they derive no benefit from it. They also feel threatened by the influx of large numbers of Afghan refugees. The n et result isthat the Baloch Liberation Army is combating six brigades of Pakistan i troops in Balochistan. About l ,000 km east of Balochistan, n orth-east lndia is cluttered with insurgencies. Two principal factors are responsible for the ongoing insurgencies. First, continuous immigration of Muslims from Bangladeshand migration ofthe Hindus (Bengali, Bihari and Marwaris) has resulted in the indigenous tribes losing their land. Because of this demographic change, the tribes themselves are becoming culturally, politically and economically marginal in their own region (Subramanian, 2000, pp. 601-2). Second, the tribes have been demanding autonomy from the centralizing bureaueratic Indian state. They had previously enjoyed autonomy before 1947 and believe that political autonomy would free them from domination by the plains people. Lawrence E. Cline's essay (Chapter 8) provides an overview of the insurgencies in n orth-east lndia. There are about 200 tribal groupsand sub-elans in this region, and at !east 14 insurgent groups are operating against the Indian state. 1 The Naga National Council (NNC) started its arrned operation in 1956 with 15,000 guerrillas, receiving support from China and Pakistan and also establishing !inks with the Kachin guerrillas. The Indian govemment responded by declaring Nagaland a state in 1963. In the 1980s the NNC split into the Nationalist Socialist Council of N agalim led by l sak Swu and General Secretary Thuingaling Muviah (NSCN-IM) and the NSCN-K led by S.S. Khaplang. The NSCN-IM raises funds by indulging in drug trafficking through Myanmar and through 'revolutionary taxation'. Besides the NSCN, other insurgent groups in the n orth-east lndia al so raise money through extortions and kidnapping. A German anthropologist Marcus Franke analyses the lndian-Naga struggle as a tussie between a centralized state and a segmentary polity. The centralized post-independent Indian state, though a modem nation-state, is following a neo-imperialist policy. At a deeper leve!, the confrontation between the Indian polity and the N agas is a continuation of the struggle between the plains people and the h iii people of the pre-colonial period. However, conflict between the Nagas and the post-independent Indian state is not inevitable. The Naga leader A.Z. Phizo has claimed several times that he would have settled for autonomy short of complete independence. And Jawaharlal Nehru, lndia's first prim e minister, had the stature to push legislation through the Indian parliament that would have assured the N agas the greatest possible autonom y had he wished to do so. But Nehru and his politicaladvisors lacked political wisdom and settled for repressive measures which continue to have disastrous significance (Franke, 2009, pp. l, 145, 148). The vital ro le offractious identity politics in fuelling the N aga confrontation with the Indian state is the dominant interpretation. In his monograph, Franke states that the boundaries of the populations that the plains people considered as 'Nagas' had already been defined before the British arrived. The British were left on ly with the task of finding out the basis of this categorization and the finer divisions among these people themselves (Franke, 2009, p. 147). In contrast, Sanjib Baruah (Chapter 9) claims that north-east lndia is a special case with overlapping frontiers and hierarchical chiefdoms. The fluctuating and complex dynamic In 2003 one Indian army officer calculated the presence of 40 insurgent groups in north-east India. See Grewal (2003, p. 268).

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between the hill people (Nagas) and the lowland states (for example, Manipur) cannot be accommodated with strict notions of territoriality advanced by the Indian state. Historically, there was no sharp demareatian between the politico-cultural space of the Nagas in the hills and polities in the lowlands. Before independence there was no unitary N aga polity. Various chiefs ruled over different villages and various factions operated even within a single village. However, after independence, the centralizing tendencies of the Indian state strengthened the process of identity formation among the N agas. In addition, the spread of Christianity and literacy generated a sense of collectiveness among them. Christian N agas thus consider themselves to be different and separate from the Hindus and Muslims inhabiting the plains. The N agas share the idea of bringing all the N agas (that is, Nagaland, the N agas of Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and west Burma) under a single Nagalim. However, because any inclusion of N agas of Manipur w ou ld kind le insurgency am on g the Manipuris, Indian policymakers need to think out of the box in order to come up with a lasting solution to the Naga problem. In Baruah's view, lndia needs to take Burma in confidence and should try to conceive of a N aga federation. This federation, while providing cultural and political autonomy to the N agas, should also accommodate the territorial sovereignty ofboth Burma and lndia. The Burmese and Indian govemments are cooperating, but in an opposite vein. According to one estimate there are about 200,000 N agas in Burma and 300,000 Nagas in lndia. Since October 2004 the Indian and Burmese governments have been cooperating in their COIN campaigns against the Nagas. The Indian government has agreed to share intelligence and provide weapons to the Tatmadaw (Burmese arrned forces) (Egreteau, 2009, p. 118). Any attempt by lndia to force the Burmese junta to come to the negotiating table over giving concessions to the Nagas would result in Burma moving further towards New Delhi's traditional rival, Beijing. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) came into existence in 1979 in order to counteract the illegal immigration of Bangladeshis into Assam, which had resulted in a rise of 82 per cent in the state's population between 1951 and 1971 (Grewal, 2003, p. 269). lronically, the ULFA, in order to fight the Indian state, set up training camps in Bangladesh. Certain non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) functioned as facilitators between arms dealers and militant organizations like the ULFA, NSCN-IM and so on (Saikia, 2003, pp. 55, 58). In 1986 the National Demoeratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) demanded Bodoland in lower Assam. In November 1990 the Indian army launched Operation Bajrang against the ULFA and the NDFB, resulting in many insurgents escaping into Bhutan. The Bhutan government's response to these insurgents is the theme of Arijit Mazumdar's essay (Chapter l 0). In 1998 the monarchical Bhutan govemment entered into a dialogue with the insurgents asking them to leave Bhutan. Beginning in December 2000 the insurgents started to attack the Bhutanese in southern Bhutan. The Bhutan government was also afraid that the insurgents might provide aid to the Lhotshampa ethnic community. The Indian army agreed to provide weapons to the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) in case the community decided to move against the insurgents. On 15 December 2003 the 6,000-strong RBA launched Operation All C Iear against the insurgents. The Indian army provided logistical support to the RBA and sealed the lndia-Bhutan border to prevent the ingress of insurgents fleeing back into Assam. On 16 January 2004 the RBA ceased operation and the arrested insurgents were handed over to lndia. For the time being, the ULFA and NDFB have ceased to be a serious threat for New Delhi.

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Due to the presence of Tamils in Tamil Nadu, New Delhi was also drawn into the civil war in Sri Lanka, in which had 65,000 people had di ed by 2005 (Deegalle, 2006a, p. l). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were fighting for the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam (homeland) in north and east Sri Lanka. The extraordinary resilience of the LTTE was partly du e to the genius of Vellupillai Prabhakaran, and Prabhakaran's leadership capability is the subject of Brigadier S.P. Sinha's essay (Chapter 12). Prabhakaran u sed three forms ofwarfare- terrorism, guerrilla warfare and conventional war- in order to achieve the organization 's objective. During the 1970s the LTTE conducted 'hit and run' attacks targeted at govemment informants and policemen am on g the Tamil community. After the anti-Tamil riots of 1983 the LTTE began to supplement guerrilla attacks with a campaign of terrorism against Sinhalese civilians. From the 1990s onwards, the LTTE occasionally launched conventional attacks against the Sri Lankan army (SLA). However, conducting insurgencies required money, and Prabhakaran forced the international Tamil diaspora to finance his war machine. Any Tamilliving abroad faced great pressure to contribute financially under threat that, ifthey refused, the LTTE would take revenge on their relatives living in Sri Lanka. In addition, the LTTE, like the NSCN-IM, also engaged in the transnational drug (heroin) trade. The gender dimensions of insurgencies are greatly underresearched. Miranda Alison (Chapter 13) tums the spotlight on this issue by undertakinga case study of the female cadres of the LTTE. From the mid-1980s the LTTE began to systematically recruit women. Most of the females joined the LTTE voluntarily as teenagers. Rather than the LTTE's ideology, personal factors were crucial in recruitment. lndeed, one of the most common personal reasons among many women joining the LTTE was the fear of rape by the security forces. The best way to prevent this from happening was to take up a gun and join the rebel army. Another factor that propelled Tamil women towards the LTTE was a sense of vengeance. Many joined because mal e members oftheir families had been executed by the security forces or to take revenge after being raped by soldiers and policemen. Alison concludes that the female LTTE members definitely acquired a sense of power and confidence in the maledominated, traditional, conservative Tamil society. The Nepali Maoists also recruited !arge numbers of women to its combatant ranks. According to one account, by 2006 a quarter of the People's Liberation Army of Nepal's (PLAN) personnel were females (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009, p. 71). In comparison to the arrnies and paramilitary forces of the polities, the LTTE and the Nepali Maoists have !arge number of female fighters in their organizations. lndeed, this partern is reflected in other leftist revolutionary groupsin other parts of the world, such as the Revolutionary Arrned Forces of Colombia (FARC). Such groups often are regarded by female recruits as empowering and a way of escaping from repressive environments back horn e. In addition, the LTTE, the Naxalites (radical left-wing militants) of lndia and the PLAN have had man y teenagers in the ir ranks (Smith, 2009, p. 94). Chi ld soldiers are al so common ly employed in Burma (by both the govemmental army and the rebel groups), the Philippines and Afghanistan, as weil as by the rebel arrnies in Nepal, lndia and Sri Lanka. 8oth the Nepalese Maoists and the LTTE enforced a quota whereby every household had to provide a soldier. The implication often was that the eldest son was retained by the household to help economically and the seeond son or a daughter was sent away to fight. Boys and girls between the ages of 14 and 15 were typical, but 11-year-olds were not uncommon (Becker, pp. 111-12). The Maoists, especially in western Nepal, forcibly recruited at very young ages

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(8-year-olds were not uncommon) for indoctrination camp, but by adolescence some were engaged in combat. In the subcontinent, the most lethal insurgent threat at the beginning of the twenty-first century is probably the Maoist guerrillas. The Maoist 'Red Corridor' extends from the forest of Andhra Pradesh through the jungles of central In dia up to the hi Ils ofNepal. The Communist Party ofNepal was founded in Kolkata in In dia in September l 949 (Boquerat, 2009, p. 46). In 197 l som e communists in Jhapa, in spired by the Naxalite m ovement in west Bengal, attempted to start an arrned uprising, but it was swiftly crushed by the police. The Maoist insurgency intensified in 1999, and the Royal Nepal Army (under the directorship of the King) was deployed on 26 November 200 l (Nepali and Subba, 2005, pp. 84, 95). Rooted in bothits colonial legacy and decades of heavy-handed autocratic rule, the janayuddha (people's war) in Nepal between 1996 and 2005 claimed over 13,000 lives (Boquerat, 2009, p. 45). starting with a small base oftroops in the m id-western h iii region, the Maoists successfully combined Mao's strategies of guerrilla warfare with lessons learned from leftist revolutions in Peru and lndia to tailor a strategy that exploited local grievances in rural areas of Nepal to raise support and fighters for their cause. As the war progressed, the Maoists expanded their territorial control over Nepal. When the Maoists and Royal Nepal Army reached a period of stalemate, the Maoists all ied with Nepal's seven major political parties to spearhead peaceful protests that successfully pressured King Gyanendra to abdicate power on 24 April 2006. Subsequently a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, an interim constitution was adopted, and national elections were held. After the elections, the Maoists emerged victorious. In their essay originally published in 2005, S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates (Chapter l l) analyse the reasons behind the emergence of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Unlike in Africa (for example, Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone), the Nepalese insurgency did not occur in response to a desire to take contro l of natural resources. lt was not greed bu t, rather, grievance that was the major cause of conflict. Persistent patterus of social, political and economic exclusion feed apattern of growing inequality between gro u ps (or what is referred to as 'harizontal inequality'). These persistent patterus of relative deprivation served as an easy way for the Maoists to instil an 'us versus them' mentality against the elites of Kathmandu, encouraging groups in the western and mid-westem hills and later the Terai (the southem plains) to join the Maoists. George Graham (2007) supports the Murshed-Gates' thesis that grievance, rather than greed, is the motor behind the emergence of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. North Rolpa and Rukum districts where the insurgency first emerged have never seen any major development activity. However, Mahendra Lawoti (20 l O, p. 3) challenges this interpretation by claiming that the insurgency gained m omentum in Nepal when the country was experiencing economic growth even in the Maoist strongholds of the m id-western hi Ils. However, Graham also points to the concept of 'horizontal inequality' in order to understand the rise of the Maobadis. The expansion of primary and secondary schools resulted in increased literacy among the janjati (Nepal's ethnic nationalities). The improved road network increased migration to the Kathmandu Valley, thus raising the consciousness of relative deprivation among the migrants from the hi Ils. By joining the ranks of arrned militants, the hitherto powerless people al so felt a sense ofpower (Graham, 2007).

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Pratul Ahuja and Rajat Ganguly (Chapter 5) shift the focus to the radical left-wing extremists (Naxalites) operating in lndia. The two most dangerous radical left-wing outfits are the Peoples' War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Coordination Committee (MCC). Their cadres, equipped with AK-47 rifles, are expert in jungle warfare and ambush tactics. Ahuja and Ganguly claim that the Naxalite uprising is the latest manifestation ofpeasant struggles du e to poverty. Landless peasants and sharecroppers eonstirute the ma in support base of the Naxalites. The various land redistribution programmes of independent lndia's govemment have not been that successful. Most ofthe zamindars (roughly speaking, landed gentry) were paid hefty compensation, and they have been ab le to buy back most of the land. The economic prosperity of the rich peasantry during the 1970s and the 1980s further alienated the landless peasants. The authors conclude that the bourgeois Indian state fails to address the core issues of equitable development and social justice that lie behind the Naxalite movement. Up until the 1990s the Maoists ofNepal drew inspiration from the Maoists of lndia. Now, the apprentice has become the mentor. The various Maoist groups in lndia at present derive strength from the fact that Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka Prachanda, literal meaning: 'fearsome') has come to power in Nepal. This in tum has strengthened the resolve of the various splinter Naxalite groups to launch repeated intensive attacks on the Indian state. If anything, the Maoists have become more powerful with the passage of time. At present, the Maoists are operating in 12 out of the 28 states of lndia (Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2009, p. 4). In 1997 the various Naxalite factions, such as the MCC and Party Unity, fought with each other in Bihar. The Naxalites gained further strength in 1998 when the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of lndia (CPI(ML)) merged with the PWG in Andhra Pradesh (Jaoul, 2009, pp. 26, 32). From the 1990s onwards, a host of Western scholars have el airned that the era of interstate war has passed: as in the seeond hal f of the twentieth century, the twenty-first century will primarily witness intrastate wars. Furtherrnore, the rebel arrnies are going to win because the conventional arrnies of the polities have no effective means to counter the hit-and-run tactics of the guerrillas. Many proponents of the New War doctrine assert that, due to the post-heroic mentality in Western societies, European and American soldiers are no longer willing to die. In contrast, the 'New War' warriors are ready to risk their lives (Munk! er, 2003, pp. 9-1 O; Creveld, 1997). This assertion has not proven to be completely true, at !east in the South Asian context In the spring of 2009 the SLA (Sri Lankan arrny) was ab le to crush the LTTE. Moreover, despite a piethora of insurgencies, Pakistan and lndia are still holding out. And the soldiers and officers of the Indian army are willing to die. So, it makes sense to take stock of the forces at the disposal of the polities and the doctrines (if an y) they have evolved to counter the shadowy arrnies from the periphery. In order to tackle the various rebel armies, lndia re lies on a host of paramilitary forces. The Indian army is used only as the last resort. The aim is to use paramilitary forcesto deal with the intemal troubles, sothat the arrned forces remain insulated from societal cleavages and can focus on the externa! threats. K.P. Misra's essay (Chapter l) offers a bird's-eye view of the paramilitary forces at the disposal of New Delhi. In the 1970s, when lndia's arrned forces numbered about l million men, the various paramilitary forces amounted to 300,000 personnel. The government of independent lndia inherited the Assam Ritles and since 1947 they have been u sed to maintain law and order in the seven states of n orth-east lndia. The oldest Indian paramilitary force is the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) which is used

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to guard the sensitive border posts. In 1977 it numbered 66,500 men. In 1965 the Indian govemment created the Border Security Force (BSF) with about 75,000 personnel. Among the paramilitary forces, the BSF possesses the heaviest and most sophisticated equipment. In 1977 the govemment created the Coast Guard in order to police lndia's 3,400-mile coastline. In 1979 the 26,000-strong Central Industri al Security Force (CISF) was created. The BSF and the CRPF are headed by senior police officers. Hence, the training and ethos of the paramilitary forces are somewhat different from that of the Indian army. Furthermore, the paramilitary forces are under the contro l of the Ministry of Hom e Affairs and not the Defence Ministry. In the 1990s the Indian army came up with the Rashtriya Ritles (RR) for counter-insurgency (COIN) duties. The RR are actually light infantry. In Chapter 2 Rajesh Rajagapalan critiques this organizational innovation of the Indian army. The predecessors of the RR, the 1(insurgency) battalions, which were set up in the late 1960s, were lighter versions of regular infantry units. However, very soon the 1-battalions were reconverted into regular infantry battalions because the army perceived that they were useless for conventional warfare and morale was declining among the personnel. The plan for RR was revived towards the end of the twentieth century because more than 40 per cent of the Indian army's in fantry were engaged in COIN duties. The initial aim of the Indian army's topbrass was that 75 per cent of the RR would be composed of paramilitary personnel. The remaining 25 per cent would comprise army personnel, and the units would be commanded by military officers. In reality, paramilitary personnel are not included with in the RR. On e of the problems with the RR is the fact that these units are composed of soldiers deployed for on ly two years. Hence, the units fail to generate a strong regimentalethos which results in inadequate cohesion and low morale among the personnel. Rajagapalan concludes that, to date, the RR has failed to come up with any tactical or doctrinal innovations. Elsewhere, Rajagapalan offers a critique of the Indian army's COIN doctrin e. He defines military doctrine 'as a set ofviews on war and the principles concerning its conduct that are adopted by military leadership, taught in military academies and which provides the basis for war plans' (Rajagopalan, 2008, p. 36). He asserts that a strong conventional war bias reduces the effectiveness of the Indian army's COIN campaigns. Rajagapalan notes that, despite outnumbering the LTTE by l O to l, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (I PKF) failed to bring the LTTE to the negotiating table. The Indian army's big-unit, search-and-destroy missions were mostly ineffective. To counter the guerrillas successfully, he believes, the army needs to develop small high ly mobile patrol units. Rajagapalan also notes some other limitations of the Indian army: lack of initiative among the junior leaders and the soldiers' propensity to be overdependent on their officers. Hence, when the officers were targeted by the LTTE, the units stopped advancing (Rajagopalan, 2008, pp. l 7, 24, 56, 98-9). Another critique of the Indian army's COIN policy is advanced by D. B. Shekatkar. He argues that the Indian army was unprepared to wage COIN operations in Nagaland in 1955 and tri ed to copy the British COIN campaign of l 948-60 in Malaya. In this campaign, the British resettled villages and communities in order to isolate the communist insurgents from the population. The Indian army tried to apply a similar resettiement policy by uprooting the N aga villages, but this resulted in the further alienation of the N agas from the Indian state. The Indians, however, learnt slowly. Eventually, the harrowing experience in Nagaland led to the formation of the Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School in 1970 at Vairangte, Mizoram (Shekatkar, 2009, pp. 17, 20-21).

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In contrast to Rajagopalan, Namrata Goswami (Chapter 3) claims that the Indian army has a viable COIN doctrine. She termsit as 'a counter-insurgency strategy of"trust and nurture" based on demoeratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach' (p. 35). Nurture entails providing the necessary conditions for building trust between the COIN forces and the populace in the disturbed region. lt is always better to use specially trained police capable of countering guerrilla warfare and launching raids in the mountains against the insurgents. This is because, compared to the army, the local police are not only more capable of collecting intelligence, but also adept at accommodating local social and cultural norms. If at all, the arm y is u sed w hen measured military response en sures a proportionate and restrained military action. Goswami advocates that, for building trust, local networks should be tapped. For instance, the Indian government should approach civil society organizations like the N aga Hoho (council), Gaon Burahs (village headmen) in the case ofNagaland and the Asom Sahitya Sabha (Assam Literary Society) in the case of Assam, which have condemned insurgent violence. The success of the Indian army's Operation Sadhbhavana (honest thinking/goodwill), launched in 200 l in Kashmir, has gone som e way towards validating this strategy. Since the last-narned measure represents the 'humane' face of the Indian army, the scheme deserves a bit more detailed discussion. The objective was to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people in the disturbed region. lnitially, the programme was launched in l 999 by the 15th Corps in Kashmir with a budget of $700,000. lt airned to redress the hardships suffered by those people affected by militancy by supplying them with artificial limbs and undertaking developmental projects in Baramulla and Kupwara districts. The project was revitalized under Lieutenant-General Arjun Ray, who too k over command of the l 4th Corps in Ladakh in 200 l after the Kargil War. In his words, the army was to function as the facilitator, and not as the substitute for the state machinery, for undertaking developmental projects. Ravina Aggarwal and Mona Bhan assert that Operation Sadbhavana was a scheme to control the border inhabitants through a thin veneer of development and welfare. Furthermore, the military's forays into governance entrenched the army deeply into local society (Aggarwal and Bhan, 2009; Franke, 2009, p. 140--43). Nevertheless, the Indian army should not tum a blind eye towards certain stakeholders or key members of civil society in the disturbed region. For instance, from 2000 onwards the church and the triballeaders in N agaland put pressure on the NSCN-IM to continue negotiations with the Indian government (Franke, 2009, pp. 140--43). Despite certain limitations, one must accept that the Indian army's COIN campaigns are less brutal in comparison to the counter-insurgency campaigns of many other armies. Even the decades-long Indian army's COIN campaigns in north-east lndia and Kashmir have not resulted in !arge numbers of civilian casualties. Yesterday's friends can be today's enemies, the Machiavellian dictum, has proved to be the case for Pakistan i establishment. lncreasing pressure from the USA, as weil as aggressiveness of the Tal i ban, forced Pervez Musharraf (then military dictator of Pakistan) to order military operations into Pakistan's tribal areas in 2003. Pakistan's COIN is the subject of Moeed Yusuf's and Anit Mukherjee's joint essay. The Pakistan army uses the firepower-intensive approach characterized by the use of helicopter gunships and artillery. In fact, against the Baluchi insurgents, as Bansal asserts in Chapter l 4, the Pakistan government has u sed air power. Such an approach results in heavy collateral damage. Yusuf and Mukherjee claim

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that the Indian anny's COIN operation in Kashmir is being fought in a terrain similar to the tribal belt in which the Pakistan army is now operating. On the west of the tribal belt is Afghanistan and in the east lies Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The tribal belt is inhabited by the Pushtuns, who have an ethnic affiliation with those in NWFP and Afghanistan, including the Taliban. 8oth the Kashmiri Muslims and the Pushtuns hate their respective central governments led by New Delhi and Islamabad. The three critical elements of lndia's COIN are a sustained !arge military presence, effective civil administration and economic development in the disturbed region. About 70,000 Pakistani troops are deployed in Waziristan. In contrast, lndia deploys about 300,000 soldiers in Kashmir. Islarnabad would need to deploy many more troops in order to establish an effective presence in the tribal belt. The Pakistan anny should follow the principle of 'minimal use of force' rather than indiscriminate massive firepower. In fact, the Indian anny does not u se air strikes and artillery to target the insurgents. Gathering intelligence about their fonner comrades from surrendered insurgents and unpredictable cordon and search operations are also effective. To conduct these sorts of low-intensity ground operation, the Pakistani infantry would require nightvision devices, bulletproof jackets and so on. The last point makes sense because most of the guerrilla annies have light weapons and re ly on hit-and-run attacks and am bushes (Ibrahim, 2004, p. 113). AllanOrr (2009, p. 92) critiques the American COIN strategy in Afghanistan bynoting that theyre ly too much on air power rather than on infantry.

Unconventional Warfare and Religion The spurt of insurgencies in the post-Cold War era from the Middle East to Kashmir has encouraged several Western commentators to assert that followers of Islam are vulnerable to the concept ofjihad. Monica Duffy Toft claims: First, the percentage of civilwarsin which religion has become a central issue has increased over time. Second, these religious civil wars are much more destructive than wars fought over other issues: they result in more casualties and more non-combatant deaths, and they last longer. (Toft, 2007, p. 98)

She continues: 'Islam has a specific (and today very active) obligation-to-defend-by-force component' (ibid., p. l 05). James L. Rowell (Chapter 16) contrasts Mohandas Kararnehand Gandhi, the representative of Hinduism, with Osarna Bin Laden, the arch representative ofjihad. Gandhi equated Western civilization with violence and materialism. Bin Laden would somewhat agree with such an assertion. Gandhi, in accordance with his principles of peace, toleration and satyagraha (truthforce) advocated employing the too ls of non-violence to tack le violence. His philosophy of ahimsa (non-violence) is derived from Hinduism, Jainism and Christian pacifists such as Leo Tolstoy. Rowell warns that the West's 'War on Terror' largely depends on organized violence. Gandhi understood that violence is cyclical and to retaliate against violence with counterviolence merely results in spiralling violence with its concomitant evils. In contrast, Bin Laden and his supporters believe that the violence perpetrated on Muslims can be effectively countered only by inflicting greater violence on the perpetrators. The point to be noted is that Islamic suicide bombers operate in Chechnya and Afghanistan, as weil as in Kashmir. Although suicide is forbidden in Islam, Bin Laden and his supporters emphasize the use of

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suicide bombers in pursuit of jihad. Bin Laden focuses on a milder form of jihad, meaning the military defence of Islamic territory, rather than a stricter jihad which means striving to become a better Muslim. Rowell concludes on an optimistic note that in the twenty-first century, Gandhi's non-violent legacy is Iikely to show us the way out. Georg Sorensen (1992), however, offers a critique of Gandhian non-violence. He argues that the Gandhian concept of establishing peace through non-violent methods is full of contradictions. In fact, in his view, when faced with the actual problems ofusing non-violent techniques in a violence-prone situation, Gandhian thinkers prefer utopianism - that is, running away from the problem. Sorensen forcefully asserts that constructivist peace research should think of innovative ways of biending violence and non-violence. Kaushik Roy's essay (Chapter 17) notes that the idea of Hinduism as a pacific religion is erroneous. Gandhi interpreted the Bhagavad Gita as providing the message of peace and non-violence. His interpretation of this classical Hindu text was then popularized by several scholars. In fact, Gandhi's interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita was politically motivated. Interesting ly, during late nineteenth century B.G. Tilak, the Hindu militarist politician, idolized the use of violence for a just cause as propounded in the Bhagavad Gita (Jaffrelot, 2009, pp. l 99-200). In real ity, the ancient Hindu texts glorify warfare and violence. In Hinduism, writes Roy, there are two streams: dharmayuddha Uust/righteous war) and kutayuddha (the product of realpolitik). The representative of kutayuddha (based on deceit and subterfuge) is Kautilya's Arthasastra, composedaround 300 BCE, which takes a statist perspective, arguing that kapa (interna! rebellion) is more dangerous than externa! invasion. Kautilya goes on to say that kapa becomes dangerous when it finds support from the hostile neighbouring state. And, at times, kapa could escalate into a fully-fledged interstate vigraha (war). Because of these interconnections between kapa and inter-state vigraha, Kautilya, unlike Karl von Clausewitz is unwilling to establish a watertight campartment between interstate and intrastate vigraha. The Arthasastra and Kamadaka's Nitisara (composed around 600 CE) comesup with certain pacification techniques such as initiating economic development of the disturbed region, u sing a spy network to assess the leve l of the people's grievances, use of special forces for commando operations and such like, all ofwhich are relevant to today's COIN debate. The Hindu hardliner party-that is, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)- is showing much interest in Kautilya. Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot use the term 'martyropaths' to describe those militants who are guided by a self-annihilating death wish. This death wish is the product of either a staunch belief in the justness of his cause or to a sense of disillusionment and failure. Islam does not have a monopoly on voluntary death in combat. The Sikh insurgents and the Hindu Tamils were spurred by the same desire for martyrdom as the jihadist combatants in Kashmir (Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2009, p. 7). In Chapter l 8 Michael Roberts tums the limelight on the study of martyrdom am on g the Black Tigers of the LTTE. Although members ofthese suicide squads were drawn from the Hindus and Catholic Christians, the organization used Hindu symbols and imageries like the concepts of shakti (power) and so on. On joining the LTTE, the fighters had to take an oath of loyalty which involved the reiteration of the LTTE's ho ly aim (putantiram) in order to achieve motherland Tamililam. The concept of arppanippu (the dedication of gift by a human to god) is evoked to justify martyrdom. Those who achieved martyrdom were known as mavirar. The rnavirar cult, derived from the culture of hero stones prevalent in pre-modern Hindu south

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In dia, was u sed to mobilize the motivational strength of the LTTE recruits. Those Hindu cadres who became mavirars were buried rather than cremated. The LTTE propaganda claimed that the mavirars were not dead but planted (sown) in the soil to generate more martyrs for their ho ly cause. The rnavirar cult provided shakti to the other LTTE cadres, and its concepts were disseminated among LTTE supporters and cadres through poetry, songs, dramas and articles. Chris Smith (2009, p. 109) notesthat Prabhakaran himself was a worshipper of Kali (the Hindu goddess ofpower). 8oth insurgencies and COINs are influenced by religious ethos. Sometimes, a government's policy has the effect of aggravating grievances and al ienating a particular community, which might result in a military coup or an insurgency. Richard Gombrich (Chapter 19) assesses the religious dimension of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. In 1981 the religious divisions of Sri Lanka's population were as follows: 69 per cent Buddhists, 15.5 per cent Hindus, 7.6 per cent Christians, and the rest Muslims. All the Buddhists are Sinhalese and all the Hindus are Tamils. The Northern Province, centred round the town of Jaffna, is entirely Tamil. The 1972 constitution, which is still in operation, gives Buddhism the pride of place. Although Buddhism definitely constitutes an important constituent of Sinhala identity, the Sinhalese fought the LTTE not to save Buddhism, but to safeguard Sinhalese domination. Buddhist tradition is not non-violent, but Buddhism could not be accused for starting the civil war. The root of Tamil-Sinhala conflict goes back to 1956 w hen S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike came to power and replaced English with Sinhala as the official language. The ro le ofBuddhism in the confl iet, nevertheless, cannot be totally washed away. In contrast to Gombrich, P.D. Prernasiri (2006, p. 79) argues that the Sinhalese perceived the militant Tamil movement as attempting to destroy the Buddhist heritage. Hence, for the Sinhalese, the war against the LTTE was a righteous war for a just cause, a sort of dharmayuddha. The identification of national and religious issues is very common in Sri Lankan Buddhist thinking. The Buddhist monks do not conceptualize any separation between Buddhism and the nation (Deegalle, 2006b, p. 253). The general election heldon 5 December 2001 resulted in the first Buddhist monk being elected to the Sri Lankan parliament. In February 2004 over 260 Buddhist monks affiliated to the Jathika Sangha Sammelanaya (National Sangha Assembly (NSA)) vowed to save Sri Lanka from the ethnic turmoil by standing in the general election of2 April2004. They contested the election under a new ly formed all-monkpolitical party narned Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU (National Sinhala Heritage Party)). As a result, n in e Buddhist monks were elected to the parliament (Deegalle, 2006a). The JHU is demanding that Sri Lanka should be governed in accordance with the Iines of Buddhism (Buddhasasana) (Deegalle, 2006b ). Buddhism is playing an important role in the outer fringes of the subcontinent. To give an example, in October 1994 the Burmese junta co-opted the Buddhist elements of the Karen National Union to form the Demoeratic Karen Buddhist Army. The latter along with the Tatmadaw took part in the COIN operations against the Christian Karens, who have links with the NSCN (Egreteau, 2009, p. 127). And a narrow, rigid and radical interpretation ofreligious traditions seems to be on rise in South Asia. By 2000 about 30,000 shakhas (branches) of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS -the ideological father figure of BJP) have been preaching anti-Muslim propaganda among the Hindus of lndia (Jaffrelot, 2009, p. 207). To a great extent, the RSS is responsible for the communal riots in lndia. Bangladeshin the twentyfirst century is witnessing attacks on the non-fundamentalist components of Islam (tombs of

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Sufi saints, moderate political leaders and so on). The perpetrators of such attacks call their campaign a sort of intemal jihad- that is, an attempt to reform society by purging its iii s. Some madrassas in Bangladesh, having links with the militant groups in Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan, spew out hatred against the kafirs (Codron, 2009, pp. 177-80, 188). Between 1984 and 1995 the Sikh insurgency erupted in Punjab, resulting in about 30,000 people tosing their lives (Gayer, 2009, p. 251 ). Balbinder Singh Bhogal asserts that Sikhism represents two streams: violence derived from Sakta tradition and love from the Vaishnava tradition (Bhogal, 2007, p. 124). Apurba Kundu (Chapter 15) studies the grievances of the Sikh community du e to the Indian govemment's COIN response to Khalistani terrorism. The Sikhs, one of the most favoured 'martial races' ofthe British Raj, continue to dominate the Indian army. During the 1980s and the 1990s they constituted 2.5 per cent of lndia's population, but accounted for 15 per cent of the army's combatant forces. On 5 June 1984 Lieutenant-General K. Sundarji initiated Operation Blue Star, involving a night attack on the holiest of the Sikh shrines, the Golden Temp le of Amritsar, in order to flush out the Khalistani terrorists cooped up there under the leadership of Saint Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. The Para Commandos, l Oth Guards Regiment, 26th Madras Regiment, 9th Garhwal Rifles, 15th Kumaun and elements of the Special Frontier Force Units smashed their way towards the Akal Takht (etemal throne). However, even at dawn, the Sikh militants still held out. A desperate Sundarji with New Delhi's permission, used six tanks to blast the militants around the Akal Takht. As news of Operation Blue Star filtered out, mutiny broke out among the Sikh units. On 7 June 1984, 600 personnel of the Sikh Regiment's 9th Battalion mutinied in Bihar. Some other Sikh units also created disturbances at Jammu and Kashmir and in Bombay. The mutinies were suppressed with the aid of other ethnic regiments. The Sikh personnel reacted emotionally and lacked any premeditated plan to mutiny against the government. Although on ly 3 per cent of the Sikh soldiers participated actively in the mutiny, the incident was a grim reminder to the Indian govemment about what might have happened. Alison's and Roberts' essays (Chapters 13 and 18 respectively) open up a Pandora's box in terms of the million-dollar question as to why men (and also women) fight. This question is related to the issue of who joins arrnies and militant organizations. Here, one must differentiate between pre-combat motivation (factors which motivate individuals to join a fighting organization) and in-combat motivation (factors which motivate individuals to fight in a battlefield fire fight). Military historians differ about the role ofmacro-ideology in combat motivation. Catherine Merridale shows that the Red Army personnel during the Second World War were not motivated by Marxism (Merridale, 2006, p. 208; see also Merridale, 2005)). In contrast, Om er Bartov ( 1989) claims that the German soldiers in the Ostfront were definite ly motivated by Nazi anti-semitic ideology. However, religious ideologies, rather than seeular ideology, are probably more important for the militant organizations in the South Asian scenario. Arnelie Blom claims that the Hizb-ui-Mujahidin recruits from the heavily indoctrinated madrassa students in Kashmir. Most of these students are from poor social backgrounds: sons of small farmers, craftsmen, street traders and house employees (Blom, 2009, p. 147). Laurent Gayer claims that initially the Sikhs who joined the insurgency were committed and willing to die for a cause. Later, with the criminalization of the insurgency, recruits joined with the aim ofimproving the quality oftheir lives by acquiring land ed property and consumer goods through tooting (Gayer, 2009, p. 249). Marie Lecomte-Tilouine explains the motivation of the Nepalese joining the Maoist ranks as anger and fury. Even though the

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Maoists ofNepal follow the seeular ideology of Mao, they also tap into the inherent Hindu ethos ofmany of the recruits. For the kshatriyas, violence is no pap (sin). Rather, indulging in violence for a just cause results in punya (reward/merit). And death in su ch war is equivalent to sacrifice (yagya) in a holy cause. The Nepali Maoists consider the war with RNA as a just war (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009, pp. 67-68). Thus, it could be argued that the Nepali Maoists perceive their war as a sort of dharmayuddha.

Conclusion The unconventional wars in South Asia cannot be categorized as 'New Wars'. Not all the militant organizations are running private war as a lucrative business. The Maoists in Nepal fought with the traditional objective of capturing state power. Moreover, the issues behind the insurgencies in the subcontinent are also traditional. ldentity politics is definitely important, but it is interwoven with issues of economic improvement and religion like the double-hel ix structure of DNA. Ganguly's analysis of the rise of Kashmir insurgency (Chapter 6) and Bansal's analysis of the Baluchi insurgency (Chapter 14) are somewhat similar to Murshed's and Gates', (Chapter Il) and Graham 's (2007) paradigm for understanding the Maoist rebellion in Nepal. Rather than absolute poverty, increasing political consciousness generating a sense of relative deprivation and exclusion seems to be the motor behind the insurgencies in these two regions. Although Soviet Russia has disintegrated and China is following Deng Xiaoping's policy of 'get rich quick', it is too early to consider communism an ideology of the past. Communism has made a comeback in Balochistan, lndia and Nepal. lndeed, the politics of exclusion and religion are the two crucial drivers of insurgencies in South Asia. Religion, too, serves as a marker of identity politics, u sed to foster a sense of othemess, distinguishing one group from another. Even in cases where religion is associated with insurgencies, it would be erroneous to accuse on ly Islam for generating insurgencies and terrorism. At the same time, it would be simplistic to claim that Buddhism and Hinduism are non-violent religions. With regard to the exact ro le Buddhism plays in fuelling the SinhaleseTamil conflict, the jury is still out. At the nexus between religions and insurgencies, on e could say that rather than the texts, the nature of interpretations and their leve l of acceptance are more important in shaping the contours ofunconventional war. To a great extent, the successful rebel forces are a mirror image of conventional armies. The suicide squads in the rebel forces are somewhat equivalent to the highly indoctrinated personnel of the Waffen SS and those Japanese pilots who conducted kamikaze attacks towards the end of the Second World War. At the personallevel, the 'rape' factor played an important role in pushing young women towards the LTTE and the Maoists in Nepal. Overall, even professed seeular militant organizations like the LTTE and the Nepali Maoists tapped into the Hindu ethos whenever necessary. So, combat motivation for the insurgents represents a mixture of seeular and non-seeular ideologies. In several ways, the insurgent arrnies are also different from the regular annies of the polities. Besides possessing a large number ofwomen, they comprise mostly teenagers. The prophecy of the prophets of doom and gloom that the new millennium would betong to the insurgents has so far proven to be a bit overdrawn. The much vaunted LTTE has been completely crushed by the SLA. In comparing the scale and scope of the COIN operations

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in the subcontinent, one is struck by the sheer numbers used. About 400,000 Indian security personnel and 70,000 Pakistan i regulars are deployed in Kashmir and Waziristan respectively. These numbers exceed those of several European armies. lndeed, in terms of the number of troops deployed and casualties, these regional COIN operations could be compared to Russia's operation in Afghanistan in the last century, US COIN operations in post-Saddam lraq and the US-NATO operation in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Unconventional war is indeed particularly relevant for South Asia. References Aggarwal, Ravina and Bhan, Mona (2009), "'Disarming Violence": Development, Democracy, and Security on the Borders of lndia', Journal ofAsian Studies, 68(2), pp. 519-42. Azam, Jean-Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2002), 'Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?', Journal ofPeace Research, 39(4), pp. 461-85. Bartov, Om er ( 1989), 'Daily Life and Motivation in War: The We hrrnacht in the Soviet Union', Journal of strategic studies, 12(2), pp. 200-14. Becker, Jo (201 0), 'Child Recruitment in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Nepal', in Scott Gatesand Simon Reich (eds), Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States, Pittsburgh, PA: Bhogal, Balbinder Singh (2007), 'Text as Sword: Sikh Religious Violence Taken for Wonder', in John R. Hinnelis and Richard King (eds), Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice, London: Routledge, pp. l 07-35. Blom, Arnelie (2009), 'A Patron-Client Perspective on Militia-State Relations: The Case of the Hizbul-Mujahidin of Kashmir', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jatfrelot (eds), Arrned Militias ofSouth Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, trans. Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier, New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 135-56. Boquerat, Gilles (2009), 'Maoism and the Ethnic Factor in the Nepalese People's War', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), Arrned Militias of South A sia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, trans. Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier, New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 45-64. Chin, Warren (2003), 'Operation "Enduring Freedom": A Vietory for a Conventional Force Fighting an Unconventional War?', SmallWarsand Jnsurgencies, 14(1), pp. 57-76. Chin, Warren (2007), 'Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in Traq', SmallWarsand Jnsurgencies, 18( 1), pp. 1-26. Christia, Fotini and Semple, Michael (2009), 'Flipping the Tal iban: How to Win in Afghanistan', Foreign Affairs, 88(4), pp. 34-45. Codron, Jeremie (2009), 'The Islamist Militias of Bangladesh: Symptoms of a Weak State?', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), Arrned Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, trans. Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier, New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 177-96. Collier, Paul and Hoeffer, Anke (2004), 'Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars', Oxford Economic Papers, 56, pp. 563-95. Creveld, Martin van ( 1997), 'Technology and War: Postmodern War?', in Charles Townshend (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History ofModern War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 298-314. Deegalle, Mahinda (2006a), 'lntroduction: Buddhism, Conflict and Violence', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Confiict and Violence in Modern Sr i Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 1-21. Deegalle, Mahinda, (2006b), '.THU Politics for Peace and a Righteous State', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Confiict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 233-54.

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Echevarria II, Antulio J. (2007), 'The Future ofMilitary Theory: The Need for a Method ofVerification', in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), On New War s: Oslo Files, Oslo: Norwegian Institute ofDefence Studies, pp. 150-67. Egreteau, Renaud (2009), 'Burma's Militias: Between lnsurgency and Maintaining Order', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), Arrned Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, trans. Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier, New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 112-33. Franke, Marcus (2009), War and Nationalism in South Asia: The Indian State and the Nagas, London: Ro utled ge. Gayer, Laurent (2009), 'The Khalistan Militias: Servants and Users of the State', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), Armed Militias of South As ia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, trans. Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier, New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 237-57. Gayer, Laurent and Jatfrelot, Christophe (2009) 'Tntroduction', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe JatTrelot (eds), Arme d Mi/i tias ofSouth As ia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, trans. Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier, New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 2-18. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Wallensteen, Peter, Eriksson, Mikael, Sollenberg, Margareta and Strand, Håvard (2002), 'Armed Conflict, 1946--2002: A New Dataset', Journal of Peace Research, 39(5), pp. 61537. Graham, George (2007), 'People's War? Self-Tnterest, Coercion and Tdeology in Nepal's Maoist lnsurgency', Small Wars and lnsurgencies, 18(2), pp. 231--48. Grewal, Brigadier R.S. (2003), 'Ethno Nationalism in North Eastern lndia', Journal of the United Service Institution oflndia, CXXXIII(552), pp. 262-357. H am mes, Colonel Thomas X. (2006), The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, St Paul, MN: Zenith Press. Hegre, Havard, Ellingsen, Tanja, Gates, Scott and Gleditsch, Nils Petter (200 l), 'Towards a Demoeratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992', American Political Science Review, 95(1), pp. 33--48. Human Security Report Project (2010), 'Part lll: Trends in Human lnsecurity', Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War, at: http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/ Pub lications/HSR200920 l 0/200920 l OHumanSecurityReport-Part3-TrendslnHumanlnsecurity. pdf (accessed December 201 0). lbrahim, Azeem (2004), 'Conceptualization of Guerrilla Warfare', Small Wars and lnsurgencies, 15(3), pp. 112-24. Jaffrelot, Christophe (2009), 'The Militias of Hindutva: Communal Violence, Terrorism and Cultural Pol icing', in Laurent Geyer and Christophe JatTrelot (eds), Arrned Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, trans. Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier, New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 199-235. Jaoul, Nicolas (2009), 'Naxalism in Bihar: From Bullet to Ballot', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), Arrned Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, trans. Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier, New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 21--43. Lawoti, Mahendra (2010), 'Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Tnsurgency in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 3-30. Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie (2009), 'Fighting with ldeas: Maoist and Popular Conceptions of the Nepalese People's War', in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), Arrned Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, trans. Cynthia Schoch, Gregory Elliott and Roger Leverdier, New Delhi: Foundation Books, pp. 65-89. Merridale, Catherine (2005), Ivan s War: The Red Army 1939-42, London: F aber and F aber.

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Forther Reading Acharya, Avidit (2010), 'The Maoist lnsurgency and the Political Economy ofViolence', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Jnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 263-84. Ayres, Alyssa (2007), 'Religions Violence beyond Borders: Reframing South Asian Cases', in Lineli E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon (eds), Religion and Confiict in South and Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, pp. l 05-21. Bahadur, Kalim (2001), 'Pakistan and Afghanistan as Sources of Terrorism in the Region', in V.D. Chopra (ed.), Rise o/Terrorism and Secessionism in Eurasia, New Delhi: Gyan, pp. 107-12. Bajpai, Kanti P. (2002), Roats of Terrorism, New Delhi: Penguin. Banerjee, Dipankar (2009), 'The Indian Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine', in Surnit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 189-206. Ban sal, A lok (2005), 'The Revival oflnsurgency in Balochistan', Strategic Analys is, 29(2), pp. 250-68.

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Baruah, Sanjib ( 1994), "'Ethnic" Conflict as State-Society Struggle: The Poetics and Politics of Assamese Micro-Nationalism', ModernAsian Studies, 28(3), pp. 649-71. Bond, George (2006), 'Sarvodaya's Pursuit of Peace', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Confiict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 226--32. Chadha, Lieutenant-Colonel Vi vek (2005), Low Jntensity Conflicts in Jndia: An Analysis, New Delhi: Sage. Chauhan, Brigadier D.S. ( 1993), 'Low Tntensity Conflict in Tndia: Organization and Resources Required to Meet this Threat', National Defence College Journal, 15, pp. 136-61. Chopra, V. D. (200 l), 'Rise of Terrorism and Secessionism in the 21st Century: Confiicting Perceptions', in V.D. Chopra (ed.), Rise o/Terrorism and Secessionism in Eurasia, New Delhi: Gyan, pp. 81-8. Das, Gautam and Gupta-Ray, M.K. (2008), Sri Lanka Misadventure: Jndia s Military Peacekeeping Campaign, 1987-1990, New Delhi: Har Anand. De Silva, Chandra, R. (2006), 'Buddhist Monksand Peace in Sri Lanka', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Confiict and Violence in Modern Sr i Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 202-9. Eck, Kristine (20 l 0), 'Recruiting Re bels: lndoctrination and Political Education in N ep al', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Jnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 33-51. Fair, Christine C. (2009), 'Lessons from Tndia's Experience in the Punjab, 1978-93 ', in Surnit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), Jndia and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 107-26. Fidler, David P. (2009), 'The Indian Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations: Refiections from a US Counterinsurgency Perspective', in Surnit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), Jndia and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 207-24. Ganguly, Surnit (2007), 'The Roots ofReligious Violence in Tndia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh', in Lineli E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon (eds), Religion and Confiict in South and Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, pp. 70--84. Ganguly, Surnit (2009), 'Slow Learning: Lessons from lndia's Counterinsurgency Operations in Kashmir', in Surnit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), Jndia and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 79-88. Gill, John H. and Lamm, David W. (2009), 'The Indian Peacekeeping Force Experience and US Stability Operations in the Twenty-First Century', in Surnit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), Jndia and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 173-85. Gunawardana, R.A.L.H. (2006), 'Roots of the Confiict and the Peace Process', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 177-201. Gupta, Rakesh (2001), 'Towards a Political Economy oflntra State Confiicts', in V.D. Chopra (ed.), Ris e of Terrorism and Secessionism in Eurasia, New Delhi: Gyan, pp. 57-66 . .Toshi, Madhav (201 0), 'Between Clientelistic Dependency and Liberal M arket Economy: Rural Support for the Maoist Tnsurgency in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Jnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 92-111. Juergensmeyer, Mark (2007), 'From Bhindranwale to Bin Laden: A Search for understanding Religious Violence', in Lineli E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon (eds), Religion and Confiict in South and Southeast A sia, London: Routledge, pp. 21-30. Kantha, Pramod K. (2010), 'Maoist-Madhesi Dynamics and Nepal's Peace Process', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Jnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 156-72. Kumar, Ashwini (2001), 'Latest Trends in Terrorism', in V.D. Chopra (ed.), Rise of Terrorism and Secessionism in Eurasia, New Delhi: Gyan, pp. 67-80.

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Ladwig III, Walter C. (2009), 'Tnsights from the Northeast: Counterinsurgency in Nagaland and Mizoram', in Surnit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 45--62. Lawoti, Mahendra (2010), 'Ethnic Dimensions of the Maoist lnsurgency: lndigenous Groups' Participation and lnsurgency Trajectories in Nepal, Peru, and lndia', in Mahendra Lawoti and An up K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 135-55. Lawoti, Mahendra (20 l 0), 'Bu Ilets, Ballots, and Bounty: Maoist Electoral Vietory in Nepal ',in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist lnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 287-303. Lawoti, Mahendra and Pahari, Anup K. (2010), 'Violent Confiict and Change: Costs and Benefits of the Maoist Rebell ion in Nepal ', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 304-26. Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie (201 0), 'Political Ch ange and Cul tura! Revolution in a Maoist Mode! Village, Mid-western N epal', in Mahendra Lawoti and An up K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist lnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 117-32. Marston, Daniel (2006), 'Lost and Found in the Jungle: The Indian and British Army Jungle Warfare Doctrines for Burma, 1943-5, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60', in Hew Strachan (ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20th Century, London: Routledge, pp. 84-114. Marwah, Ved (2009), 'lndia's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Punjab', in Surnit Gangul y and David P. Fidler (eds), lndia and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 89-106. Mehta, Ashok K. (2009), 'lndia's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka', in Surnit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 155-72. Mehta, A sh ok K. and Lawoti, Mahendra (201 0), 'Military Dimensions ofthe "People's War": Tnsurgency and Counter-Tnsurgency in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist lnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 175-94. Merchant, A.K. (2001), 'Rise of Terrorism and Secessionism in South Asia: A Baha'i Viewpoint', in V.D. Chopra (ed.), Rise o/Terrorism and Secessionism in Eurasia, New Delhi: Gyan, pp. 89-95. Mir, Amir (2006), The True Face ofJehadis: Inside Pakistan 's Network o/Terror, New Delhi: Ro! i. Misra, Amalendu (2002), 'Subaltern and the Civil War: An Assessment of Left-wing Tnsurgency in South Asia', Civil Wars, 5(4), pp. 56-76. Mottin, Monica (2010), 'Catchy Melodies and Clenched Fists: Performance as Politics in Maoist Culturat Programs', in Mahendra Lawoti and An up K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist lnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 52-72. Mukherjee, Lieutenant-General J. R. (2005), An Insider 's Experience of Insurgency in India 's NorthEast, London: Anthem. Narahari, Lieutenant-General N.S. (2002), Security Threats to North-East India: The Socio-Ethnic Tensions, New Delhi: Manas. Nayak, Nihar (2007), 'The Maoist Movement in Nepal and its Tactical Digressions: A Study ofStrategic Revolutionary Phases, and Future lmplications', Strategic Analysis, 31( 6), pp. 916--42. Nepram, Binalakshmi (2002), South Asia 's Fractured Frontier: Armed Confiicts, Narcotics and Small Arms Proliferation in India 's North East, New Delhi: MittaL Obeyesekere, Gananath (2006), 'Buddhism, Ethnicity, and Tdentity: A Problem in Buddhist History', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 134-62. Oetken, Jennifer L. (2009), 'Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in lndia', in Surnit Gangul y and David P. Fidler (eds), India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 127-51.

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Pahari, Anup K. (2010), Unequal Rebellions: The Continuum of"People's War" in Nepal and India', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Jnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 195-215. Pandey, Nischal, N. (2008), India s North-Eastern Region: Insurgency, Economic Development and Linkages with South-East Asia, New Delhi: Manohar. Patankar, V. G. (2009), 'Insurgency, Proxy War, and Terrorism in Kashmir', in Surnit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), Jndia and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 65-78. Premasiri, P.D. (2006), 'A ''Righteous War" in Buddhism?', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Confiict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 78-92. Rajagopalan, Rajesh (2000), "'Restoring Normalcy": The Evolution of the Indian Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine', SmallWarsand Insurgencies, 11(1), pp. 44--68. Roy, Kaushik (2002), 'Goliath against David: Militaries against the Militias', Contemporary Jndia, l( l), pp. 133-52. Roy, Kaushik (2003), 'Mars Defeated? Conventional Militaries in Unconventional Warfare', Contemporary India, 2(2), pp. 79-101. Saikia, Jaideep (2004), Terror Sans Frontiers: Islamist Militancy in North East India, New Delhi: Vision. Santhanam, K., Sreedhar, Saxena, Sudhir and Mani sh (2003), Jihadis inJammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery, New Delhi: Sage in association with IDSA. Schober, Juliane (2007), 'Buddhism, Violence, and the State in Burma (Myanmar) and Sri Lanka', in Lineli E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon (eds), Religion and Confiict in South and Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, pp. 51-69. Shekatkar, D.B. (2009), 'lndia's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland', in Surnit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), Jndia and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, London: Routledge, pp. 9-27. Singh, Lieutenant-General Depinder (2001), Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Man o har. Singh, Major-General Harkirat (2007), Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold, New Delhi: Manohar. Snellinger, Arnanda (2010), 'The Repertoire of Scientific Organization: ldeology, ldentity and the Maoist Student Union', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Jnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 73-91. Subedi, Surya P. (2003), 'The Concept in Hinduism of "Just War"', Journal of Confiict and Security Law, 8(2), pp. 339-61. Tilakratne,Asanga (2006), 'The Ro le of BuddhistMonksin Resolving the Confiict', in MahindaDeegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 210-25. Tiwari, Bishwa Nath (201 0), 'An Assessment of the Causes ofConfiict in Nepal', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Jnsurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 241-62. Upreti, Bishuu Raj (2010), 'Externa! Engagement in Nepal's Arrned Confiict', in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (eds), The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, pp. 219-37. Veluppillai,Alvappillai (2006), 'Sinhala Fears ofTamil Demands', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Confiict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 93-113. Wickremeratne, Ananda (2006), 'Historiography in Confiict and Violence', in Mahinda Deegalle (ed.), Buddhism, Confiict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, London: Routledge, pp. 114-33.

PARTI INSURGENCIES, COUNTER-INSURGENCIES AND TERRORISM

[l] Paramilitary Forces in India

K. P. MISRA Jawaharlal Nehru University

Introduction India, the world's seeond most populous country, is also one of its most complex. Organized as a political federation comprising a central government, twenty-two states, and several centrally controlled territories, some of its states are themselves quite substantial. Uttar Pradesh, the largest, has a population of eighty million, others have forty and fifty million people. These states are characterized by highly complex patterns of religions, cultural, ca ste, class,language, and ideological gro u ps. Hence, the task of national integration-no less than that of economic development- has never been easy and cannot be taken for granted. The Indian constitution assigns the maintenance of la w and order to the various states. Each state is empowered to raise police forces, and a number of them have arrned constabulades as well. On the other hand, defense is a union subject. The central go vemment is empowered by the constitution to raise and organize forcesto proteet India and to maintain its territorial integrity. Despite this clear-cut demareatian of power and function, both the central and state governments have created over the years a number of paramilitary organizations. Of particular importance have been the paramilitary forces raised by the center-forthese have become deeply involved in domestic law and order issues-a state subject. Does this signal an erosion of democracy in lndia? How we re they used during the state of "emergency" imposed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, then the prime minister, in June 1975? What are the prospects for their continuance? Is India a special case among the so-called developing countries in that the expansion of paramilitary forces has not, as we believe, been linked to authoritarian regimes and that, in fact, such expansion may be compatible with the demoeratic process? 1

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Proflies In India, as in many other countries during the last decade, there has been a rather rapid increase in paramilitary forces. This can be gauged from the fact t hat in eleven years~ 1966 to 1977 ~expenditure on the centrally controHed forces alone shot up from $26.5 million to $375 million. The total number of all kinds of paramilitary forces has now risen to nearly one-third of the strength of the country's arrned forces, which is over one million men. As of I979, there were several central paramilitary forcesin India~ Central Reserve Police (CRP), Border Security Force (BSF), Central lndustrial Security Force (CISF), Coast Guard, and Assam Rifles. Therearea few points of general importance a bo ut all of the se forces: l. They are all maintained by the Ministry of Home Affairs and not the Ministry of Defense of the central government; 2. All of them were brought in to being to meet specific problems which arose from time to time. Their nomenciature indicates this; 3. Once established, their use was not confined to their original stated purpose and they were deployed to meet other situations; 4. The growth of paramilitary forces between 1965-76 has been rather rapid because of intemal as well as externa! circumstances. Internall y, in the latter half of the I960s, In dia faced a variety of socioeconomic and political problems which necessitated greater social controlin order to proteet the system. Externally, two maj or conflicts with Pakistan in I 965 and 1971 and continuing tension with both Pakistan and China required more effective paramilitary organizations, particularly at the horders. Of all the paramilitary forces in India the Central Reserve Police (CRP) is the oldest and clasest to the police. It was established by the British early in the Second World War. The British Indian Army could not effectively deal with the d ornestic la w and order situation because of the strong freedom movement. Hence, it was decided to create the CRP in order to assist the military in maintaining internalla w and order. Till India achieved independence, this force was frequently used in British lndia and the Indian States in an attempt to sustain the sagging British authority. Since 1947, the CRP has been entrusted with a variety of responsibilities. Working under the operational control of the army, it manned the border postsalong the Indo-Pakistani border in Jammu and Kash-

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mir for several years. l t played an important role during the 1965 Rann of Kutch conflict with Pakistan. To meet the insurgency situations created in the northeastern states ofNagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur, the CRP gave considerable assistance to other military and paramilitary forces. Within the country, it has often been sent to assist the state governments in maintaining law and order. In fact, in some of the sensitive areas like Jammu and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh, Maghalaya, Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, and Tripura, the force has remained continuously deployed for years. It is estimated that nearly half of the force is deployed in the northeastern part of India. The central government has also used the CRP for the purpose of protecting the security of Ministry of Defense and other centrally established installations, at times without the consent or concurrence of the state government concerned. The force has also assisted states in counteracting agitations by opposition political parties, students, workers, and other groups. Per ha ps the most outstanding example of the use of the CRP against political groups occurred during and after 1970 in West BengaL Their role in assisting the local police in containing the Naxalite activities received widespread attention. 2 In cases of rioting resulting from tensions between particular communities, the local police as weil as the state paramilitary forces are often ineffective. Sametimes they are considered to be partisan because of their contacts with one or another group in the local community. In such situations, the CRP has often been deployed to restore normalcy. It has been found that in many cases the force was greatly feared among the antisocial elements, and at the same time it inspired confidence in the riot-torn community. Since its physical base is elsewhere, the chances are good that the CRP will function more impartially than the local police. But this is not to sa y that it has always been used for nonpartisan purposes. Before March 1977 some of the state non-Congress governments criticised the deployment of the CRP to suppress their political opposition. lts coercive and intimidating character has often been used to the advantage of the center. Once a senior minister of the West Bengal government belonging to the Communist Party of India (Marxist) described it as the "country's Colonising force." This indicates how some political elements in India look at the CRP. The Border Security Force (BSF) was only created in 1965, after the Rann of Kutch conflict between India and Pakistan. lts charter says that "there shall be an arrned force of the Union called the Border Security Force for ensuring the security of the borders of India."

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Spelling out the reasons in immediate and concrete terms for the establishment of the BSF, its former director-general has stated: after the Kutch incident of March 1965, it was clear that Pakistan would attempt an attack on India, either on Kashmir, or some other place on the border where conditions were favourable, to utilize the arms that had been obtained from abroad. In order to meet such an eventuality it was felt t hat contro l of the border police in the states on the Pakistan border should be coordinated by the Centre and all its units trained, disciplined and equipped on a uniform standard.3 Though initially meant to look after the country's international horders, the BSF has been used by the center for numerous domestic purposes. On several occasions, it has assisted the army in a holding role. An important point is that of all the paramilitary forces the BSF has been given weapons which are more advanced and sophisticated than those of other paramilitary or police forces. Its management is computerized and its education and training are of a high level. Off and on it has been discussed within the government whether the BSF should be brought into the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense so that it could be used without the consent of the state governments. This suggestion has its own administrative and political pluses and minuses. If by acquiring controlling authority the center is no longer constrained in deploying the BSF by the views of the states, it w ou/d lose the political and psychological advantage which it gets by not deploying the military. By pretending that only the police have been used to meet a certain situation, the center's political dividends are not lost. For the Janata government-which in principle is wedded to the autonomy of states and which coneecles the primacy, almost exclusiveness, of states in dealing with law and order within their jurisdiction-this poses a real dilemma. All in all, the BSF enjoys a mixed reputation among the people of India. lts role during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971 in regulating the influx of millions of refugees and in rendering assistance to the liberatian forces in Bangladesh was nationally acclaimed. But its use for policing purposes has been criticised. lts coercive role during the railway strike of 1974, which threatened the entire transport system of the country, was observed and decried by many. The Central lndustrial Security Force (CISF) was created in 1979 by an act of Parliament. Initially it was a very small force, mostly taken

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over from the then existing watch and ward personneJ of some of the public sector undertakings. For some years the central government felt the absence of a well-trained and disciplined force which could better proteet such undertakings. The actual strength of the CISF in each undertaking is now decided after mutual consultation between the officers of the force and those of public undertakings, keeping in view its overall security requirements. The present strength of the force is around 26,000 men. Many sections of the public, including parliamentary groups opposed to the previous government, have not been happy with the establishment of the CISF. For instance, in April 1974, the Public Accounts Committee argued that the "Government should review the entire position to see whether it is necessary to have such a large number of forces each created for performing limited functions in addition to the one responsible for overall maintenance of law and order protecting government properties."4 lt was decided early in 1976 to establish another paramilitary force, the Coast Guard, under the administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs to look after the country's interests along its 3400 mile coastline. It was la unehed a year later. Its task is to proteet the territorial and contiguous waters with a view to enforcing the criminallaws ofthe country and protecting national interests in such waters. lt supplements the efforts of the customs authorities in curbing smuggling. lt also ensures compliance with nationallaws re la ting to shipping, fishing, and pollution. It will detect breaches of nationallaws in such waters. Further, the functions of the Coast Guard will include organising salvage, search and rescue operations, assisting in the security of istands or coastal areas where special assistance is required. Finally, during hastiiities or when there is serious danger, the force will carry out such duties as may be assigned to it by the Indian Navy, under whose operational command it will be placed. The Assam Rifles was established in 1866 for frontier defense in the northeastern areas, although it acquired this name only in 1917. According to an official report, "it renders assistance in the maintenance of intemal security in the North-Eastern region, and ensures security of the international borders in the area of its deployment."5 Just before fighting broke out in 1962 on the lndia-China horder, the force was pushed up to the MacMahon Line where it was ineffective for a variety of reasons. Its activities are mostly confined to Nagaland, Manipur, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, and Mizoram. 1t is among the lesser known paramilitary forces since its activities are confined to a particular and remote region.

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

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Expansion of Forces The manner in which the expenditure over the paramilitary forces increased six-fold during the late 1960s and the early 70s, eaused cancern to man y in India. This is reflected in the attitude of the Public Accounts Committee of the lower house of Parliament. lt is a prestigious group generally headed by an im portant member of the parliamentary opposition. lt serves as a watchdog on spending by various central government departments. The committee Concentrated its attention on the paramilitary forces while reviewing the expenditures of the financial year 1973-74. There was quite a dialogue between it and the Ho me Ministry. In its report, the committee expressed its "cancern" over large-scale and continuous increase in unproductive expenditure on police (the para-military forces are technically a part of this organization) in recent years. There has been a large scale increase in Central Reserve Police, Border Security force .... The Committee are surprised that police forces of such large strength should be necessary over and above the substantially large forces of the state governments who are required to do preciselythe same job and are responsible for maintaining the la w and order. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the increase in expenditure is justified in view of pressing requests from state governments for the deployment of Central police on account of one trouble or the other. The committee further stated: that expenditure on Police organization of different kinds has been increasing at such a rapid rate that it calls for an urgent review by an independent high powered commission. The expenditure on police ... has reached levels where clearly they are erading the resources available for development activities. Since this criticism was by the Public Accounts Committee, it was noted within and outside Parliament. Because it was also widely shared, the Ministry of Ho me Affairs offered its own justification of the expansion of India's paramilitary forces. Rejecting the demand for a review of the expenditure on police organizations by an independent highpowered commission, it pointed out:

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The maintenance of la w and order and security of the border is a pre-requisite for any socio-economic development. It is in this context that the increase in the police expenditure which has been dictated by the specific needs of intemal and border security should be seen.6 The committee, which was headed by an MP belonging to the Communist Party of India (Marxist), was not at all satisfied with the Ministry's reply. 7 Irregardless, the then government went ahead with the expansion program of the paramilitary forces. According to the figures made available by the central government to parliament on Jul y 13, 1977, the number of the BSF forces was 74,100 and that of the CRP 66,548.8 The estimates of the International Institute ofStrategic Studies indicate that the total number of parami1itary forcesin India is 300,000,9 in addition to 1,096,000 arrned forces. India's army ranks fourth in the world after China, the USSR, and the United States. With the expansion of the paramilitary forces, the expenditure has obviously increased manifold. Table l indicates the situation since 1968-69.

TABLE l

Expenditure on the BSF and the CRP BSF (in Rupees*)

CRP (in Rupees)

1968-69

254,354,183

134,288,402

1969-70

304,923,924

224,656,141

1970-71

339,777,337

266,242,627

1971-72

424,899,398

323,251,675

1972-73

441,200,000

352,617,000

1973-74

459,000,000

387,800,000

1974-75

614,445,000

461,690,000

1975-76

694,016,000

577,430,000

1976-77

719,393,000

548,241,000

*Roughly l US $ = Rs. 8.

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The Constitutional Dimension There is an interesting constitutional dimension to the subject of paramilitary forces in India. As we have noted earlier, in normal circumstances la w and order is the responsibility ofthe states. They have police and som e paramilitary forces at their disposal to discharge their responsibilities. On the other hand, the military is maintained by the central government to proteet lndia's national security from externa! threats. The status of the central paramilitary forces before the proclama tian of emergency in June 1975 was that they were maintained by the central government bu t could be made available to states at their request if their police forces were inadequate to meet the requirements of a given situation. This was in keeping with the country's federal structure, which guaranteed a certain autonomy to the states. There were, however, same exceptions to this general rule. Paramilitary forces were deployed on several occasions without the state's concurrence. The situations in the states of Kerala and West Bengal illustrate the point. In Kerala's capitol, Trivandrum, the CRP was deployed by the center in 1968 to proteet the office of the accountant general which had been surrounded by a threatening mab and for which, in center's view, the government of Kerala had not been able to provide sufficient protection. During 1969 in West Bengal, situations twice arose in which there was a difference of opinion between the central and the state governments. In the first case the center deployed the CRP to proteet the Farraka Barrage, a central government property, and did not withdra w it even after the state requested that it do so. The other case related to the law and order situation in West BengaL The center unilaterally deployed the CRP but when the West Bengal government protested, the center yielded and withdrew the force. Thus, though there was a difference of opinion in both cases, the center disregarded the view of the state in one. The significance of these exceptions lay in the fact that the ruling elite at the center was made aware of the problems of deploying paramilitary forces when the relevant state did not agree to the deployment. lt is this realisation which persuaded it to seek, and subsequently acquire, full powers to deploy these forces without an y regard to the wishes and rights of the sta tes. This aspect of center-state relations was changed by enlarging the power of the former and by abridging the rights of the latter in relation to the use of paramilitary forces through an addition of a new article, 257-A, as a part of the Forty-Second Amendment to the Constitution of

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lndia, made effective on February l, 1976. This amendment was in the nature of a blanket provision which gave extensive powers to the central govemment. The center govemment could deploy these paramilitary forces anywhere without reference to the state govemment, and these forces would discharge their duties under the direction and control of the former without conceding an y right to the states to have any sa y in the matter.' 0 Elsewhere in this article it will be shown how these paramilitary forces were used during the emergency as coercive instruments to p ut down political dissent and opposition to the central govemment. The significance of the provision lay in the fact that in addition to the military, which was already under the control of the center, paramilitary forces were also brought under its control and the relevant powers of the states were completely circumscribed. Thus the coercive machinery was considera bly augmented, resulting in the establishment of a near-authoritarian political system for about twenty months before it was voted out of power by the electorate. The use of paramilitary forces during the emergency unambiguously illustrated their potentialities in contributing to the stability and security of those who were heading the central govemment in India. Their role, though not decisive, did contribute to a qualitative change in the Indian political system for a period of time. This amendment was treated as a black la w by the opponents of the emergency. Hence the new govemment of lndia omitted this provision, along with a few other emergency provisions through the Forty-Fifth Constitution Amendment Act in 1978. Once again, the deployment of paramilitary forces became dependent upon the consent of the state govemments.

During the Emergency 1t has already been noted that the use of the paramilitary forces during

the emergency in lndia was widespread. They served as effective instruments of coercion without much re gard to the liberal-demoeratic values which bad been enshrined in the constitution by lndia's founding fathers in the late 1940s. The argument of the go vemment ofIndiathen was that paramilitary forces were being deployed in order to eliminate corruption, achieve accelerated economic growth, and defend the country' s political unity and territorial integrity against intemal as well as externa} enemies.' 1

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It merits mentio n that the BSF, as also the CRP forces, are headed by senior police officers belonging to the Indian Police Service. Hence, by training and temperament they are somewhat different from the arrned forces. During the emergency the paramilitary forces were called upon to perform tasks likely to subserve the domestic and somewhat narrow political objectives of the rulers. There were rumors (which are difficult to substantiate) that during the emergency the chief of the army staff refused to oblige the then rulers in a few cases where the arm y was to be used for narrow political ends. Thus he honored the trust the country had placed in the arrned forces. Describing the political scenario which began in June 1975, the Shah Commission has stated, "The freedom of the executive from all constraints of judicial scrutiny led directly to the large scale abuse of authority and misuse of powers during the emergency."12 As a consequence of this, the report points out, "Among the abuses and misuse of authority by the administration, the one single item which had affected the people most over the entire country, was the manner in which the powers assumed by the government, to detain persons ... were misused by the officials at various levels. 13 The number of people arrested during the period was:' 4

Detentions under MISA Arrests under DISIR Total

34,988 75,818 110,806

In order to undertake these operations effectively the executive branch of the government used all kinds of forces-military, paramilitary, and police. Figures are now available about the deployment of the two most important paramilitary forces in different parts of the country. They are shown in Table 2. The figures are instructive. If the first five or six states are studied, the eauses for deploying relatively larger paramilitary forces becomes evident. West Bengal, apart from being on a horder, has always been politically volatile and a nursery for revolutionary movements. Bihar is the home state of Jaya Prakash Narayan (who spearheaded the antigovernment movement in the preemergency period), and there was a tremendous youth and student upsurge in his support. In Uttar Pradesh the movement was comparatively less effective bu t since it is the most populous state of the country, perhaps a larger paramilitary force was needed to deal with the situation. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, bordering China and Pakistan,

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has been a theatre of conflict man y times; its security scenario is unique and requires special attention. Gujarat is the borne state of Prime Minister Desai and, like Bihar, the antigovemment agitation there was fairly strong. When the emergency was proclaimed, Tamilnadu was under the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam whose relations with the central govemment were not particularly friendly. lt was here that during the emergency many anticentral govemment leaders had taken refuge. The emergency was not very effective in this state, and as a consequence the Tamilnadu govemment was superserled by the central govemment in January 1976. There appears to be a limited correlation between the strength of the paramilitary forces deployed in the states (which is one measure of the coercion perpetuated during the emergency) and the electoral attitude towards lndira Gandhi's ruling Congress Party during the March 1977 elections. lt appeared incredible to some that her party drew a blank in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, politically the most important states and together accounting for 139 out of 542 seats in the Lok Sabba. The Congress Party lost all its 73 seats in Uttar Pradesh and all the 39 it held in Bihar. The prime minister herself was defeated decisively in Uttar Pradesh and her younger son, Sanjay Gandhi, was defeated by 75,844 votes in a neighboring constituency. The Congress Party's position went from bad to worse in West BengaL The state has 42 seats in the Lok Sabba. While in the 1971 election Congress secured 13 seats, it could win only 3 seats in 1977. This is how the electorate reacted in the three states where the two targest paramilitary forces were deployed. The rejection by the people of a regime which had used these forces as instruments of coercion and suppression of intemal dissent was indeed spectacular. l t is doubtful if a ny f uture go vemment of India, if it cares for liberal norms and demoeratic legitimacy, will ever run the risk of using these paramilitary forces to the extent and in the manner seen during 1975-77.

1977-79, Postemergency Reconsiderations After the March 1977 election, which also ended the emergency, there was a widespread criticism of many aspects of the previous regime, including the use of paramilitary forces for partisan and narrow d ornestic purposes. There were all sorts of demands within and outside Parliament: that the forces should be alt ogether abolished, that they should be

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TABLE2

Deployment of the Two Most lm portant Paramilitary Forces During the Emergency Number ofBSF Campanies

Number ofCRP Campanies

Total Numberof Campanies

Total Numberof Men

West Bengal

118

55

173

95950

Bi har

73

67

140

77000

Uttar Pradesh

42

97

53350

Jammu and Kashmir

55 31

51

82

45100

Gujarat

35

45

80

44000

Tamil Nadu

36

42

78

42900

6

48

54

29700

50

27500

Manipur N agaland Assam

7

39

50 46

Kerala

6

24

30

16500

13

12

25

13750

24

24

13200

16

22

12100

18

18

9900

18

9900

16

16

8800

4

Il

6050

8

8

4400

561

973

535150

Madhya Pradesh Andbra Pradesh Orissa

6

Tripura Punjab

18

Sikkim Rajasthan

7

Meghalaya Karnataka Grand total

25300

5500 412

SOURCE: For further details see Lok Sabhadebates, USQ III, April6, 1977, Annexures 2 and 3. A company consists of 500 to 600 men. In computing total number in this table, an average of 550 men in each company has been taken. The grand totals indicate the deployment of forces at different times in different states during the Emergency.

reorganised and their number reduced, that they should be put under the control of the arrned forces, and so on. The new government's response to these demands was to make it known that there was no question of doing away with these forces. Since they were created to meet specific needs and requirements of the country, and since in the preemergency period they had played a useful role

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

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in preserving order and promoting national integration, there was considerable support for their continuation. However, the government ofIndia appointed (in early 1978) a Committee of seeretarles to review the strength of various paramilitary forces with a view to effecting economy. In its interim report the committee recommended some reduction in the strength ofthe CRP. 1S Consequently, two ofits battalions were disbanded by March 1978 and further reductions were planned. But confronted with the bard realities of the country, the decision was reversed within months. The central government made it known that among its obligations laid down in the constitution was the maintenance of the unity of the country, which involved dealing with unrest and insurgency situations. All in all the CRP still bad a role to play. lt would not be surprising if the seeretarles made this recommendation to please their political bosses who were still basking in the glory of antiemergencyism. lt al so seems doubtful if the number of paramilitary forces can be reduced by any future government. Situations will always arise within India, not very infrequently, when the state forces, including police and paramilitary, either find the situation beyond their technical capacity to manage or lose their moral credibility before one or more important contending groups. At the same time the situation may not be so alarming as to warrant the summoning of the arrned forces. Underthese circumstances, the calling of the central paramilitary forces may be the only sensible answer. A couple of recent episodes are instructive. In October 1978 a communal riot broke out in Aligarh (Uttar Pradesh) which is a farnous seat of Muslim learning. As normally happens, the state police and its paramilitary force, known as the Provindal Arrned Constabulary (PAC) attempted to control the situation in its initial phase. But soon the state forces, at least in the eyes of the Muslims, lost their reputation of impartiality between different religious communities. This became abundantly clear when the president of the Aligarh Muslim University Students' Union alleged that the conduct of the local police and the PAC was reprehensible. He and some others complained that instead of firing at the rioting mob, the PAC often firedon the victims. Consequently, there was a demand that the local forces be replaced by the CRP, a suggestion which was immediately accepted and implemented by the central government, obviously with the consent of the state government. The deployment of the CRP had a salutory effect and there was general praise for its nonpartisan role. Here was a situation in which the state and central

16

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ARMED FORCESAND SOCIETY

governments were under the same political party, the Janata. Hence the political perspectives of the two were the same. In terms of confidencebuilding measures in a socially divided and tense situation, the CRP's ro le was reported to be very positive in terms of the peaceful evolution of relations between different religious communities. 16 A seeond episode was in November 1978, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi successfully contested an election from the Chikmaglur (in Karnataka state) Lok Sabha constituency and was opposed by a Janata Party candidate, Veerendra Patil. Since this by-election was an important event in the ex-prime minister's political revival it became a prestige contest for the parties concerned. As the election campaign pragressed tension mounted. Two major incidents dramatized the situation. One was at Ujjire (a small town within the constituency) where a college girl was killed as a result of police action. The other was at Kakkanji, again during the campaign, in which the daughter of an "emergency victim" was heaten up in a lathi-charge by the local police. Indian and foreign newsmen were also hurt in these incidents. To the Janata Party leaders these incidents indicated that the state police were partisan and vindictive against those who were politically opposed to the state government. Consequently, they demanded that the CRP be drafted in the constituency to avoid a crisis. Since in this case the central and the state governments were controlied by different political parties, the situation became particulart y controversial. A central minister of state for h orne affairs advised the chief election commissioner to suggest to the state government that the CRP be requisitioned in the constituency. At first the state government resisted the idea but-perhaps to give the impression of impartiality-it yielded reluctantly. The home secretary of the state government maintained that "we have enough force to deal with the situation," and that "left to it self the Karnataka government would not have asked for the Central force." In spite of this, the Karnataka government agreed to requisition the CRP on the ad vice of the election commission which was of the opinion that its presence would create more confidence among the electorateP The CRP battalions reached the tension-ridden constituency and, a coup le of days later, were joined by the BSF in order to make up a shortfall in the four battalions. The deployment of the CRP was, however, later criticized by the members of Partiament belonging to Mrs. Gandhi's political party.Is The t wo ep isodes belong to t wo different categories. In the first, there was a conflict between t wo religious communities in a town where one side lacked confidence in the state forces. Since the central and state

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

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385

governments belonged to the same political party, there was no difference of opinion as far as the summoning of the CRP was concerned. After its deployment, this force was able to help the community restare la w and order. Thus its role was that of harmonizing and integrating a torn social fabric. In the seeond situation an historie by-election was taking place, the political stakes were exceptionally high because Mrs. Gandhi herself was one of the candidates, and the central and the state governments belonged to opposing political parties-and the state government was headed by Mrs. Gandhi's party. The political system of the country could suffer severe strain if a mechanism were not available to ensure a fair and free election, and the main contenders saw it this way. Hence the ro le of the paramilitary forcesin this case was to act as a catalyst of India's functional and operational demoeratic institutions. In both cases this coercive instrument helped in the promotion of important sociopolitical objectives of the Indian political system.

Summation The above description and discussion of the most important central paramilitary forces in India lead us to certain conclusions. To begin with, in a vast and diverse country like India a paramilitary force of 300,000 men does not appear to be excessive. This number is in itself not important but what is of great significance is the role assigned to them by those who run the state apparatus. The ro le of the paramilitary force s during the emergency was indeed widely criticised, and the Indian people in general registered their disapproval through their vote in 1977. In normal times also, certain groups have been critical of the paramilitary's role when it did not suit their political convenience. This is not to sa y that the paramilitary forces have not been misused in same cases and that they have not been guilty of excesses and brutalities. Obviously, such excesses need to be corrected through appropriate measures. Since the Indian National Congress was in power at the center and in most of the states before March 1977, its leaders supported the deployment of paramilitary forces for the sake of maintaining peace and stability in the country. This attitude was opposed by several parties and groups which now constitute the Janata Party. Similarly, as was witnessed recently in a by-election, it was the former critics of these forces

18

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

386

ARMED FORCESAND SOCIETY

who demanded their mobilization, a move which was opposed by the Congress Party. In dia has always stood out as almost anisland of functional democracy in the vast Afro-Asian and Latin American sea of authoritarianism. At any rate, it did so until the advent of the emergency years, 1975-77 and has once again been restared to the ranks of the democracies since then. Unlike other Afro-Asian and Latin American states (where military and other varieties of dictatorships have mushroomed), India does not seem to be as susceptible to authoritarianism, whatever ma y yet happen to its demoeratic structure. However, it does share with these systems a substantial and recent rise in the nu m ber and ro le of its centrally controlied paramilitary forces. 19 But the ro le of the se force s in In dia has not been without advantage to a functioning democracy. Even a democracy needs instruments of coercion for the sake of its stability and self-preservation in the face of intemal and externa! threats to unity and national integration. In all of this the Indian paramilitary forces haveactedas a supporting east in a drama in which the main actors are the police forces of the several states or the army. The paramilitary forces of India's central government insulate the military from direct intervention in domestic disorder and permit it to concentrate upon externa! defense; they also stiffen the backbane of local police forces which must, after all, constitute the first Iine of defense against do mestic disorder and disruption. 20 We have shown that such paramilitary forces can be abused in India, but also that such abuses can be corrected. lt thus seems fair to conclude that India is something of an exception to the general movement toward authoritarianism in the world today and the im portant supporting ro le of paramilitary forcesinthat movement.

Notes l. The Military Ba/ance, 1977-78 issued by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, indicates the recent creation of paramilitary forces in most nations, including those of the "developed" world. 2. The Naxalites were and are a left-wing revolutionary movement with particular strength in West Bengal and Andbra Pradesh and with some support among Indian urban intellectuals. 3. F. K. Rustamj i, "India's Paramilitary Forces," Journal of the Institute of Dejense Studies and Analyses (New Delhi) 10, no. l (July-Sept. 1977): 6. 4. Public Accounts Committee (9173-74), Hundred and Thirty-Third Report (Lok Sabba Secretariat, New Delhi, 1974), p. 62. 5. Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 1977-78, New Delhi, p. 23.

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

Misra / Paramilitary Forcesin India

19

387

6. For details see the relevant parts of the Public Accounts Committee, 1973-74 and 1974-75, Hundred 1hirty-1hird Report and Hundred and Sixty-Second Report (Lok Sabba Secretariat, New Delhi, 1974, 1975). 7. This discussion in the two reports of the Public Accounts Committee was covered, among others by the New York Times Delhi Correspondent Bernard Weinraub, see International Hera/d Tribune (Paris) October 25, 1974. 8. These figures were given in response to a question in Parliament, Lok Sabha Debates, Sixth Series, vol. 4, USQ 3318, Col. 93. 9. See Military Balance, 1977-78. In this publication the number of the BSF forces has been given as 200,000. In computing this figure other paramilitary forces ma y have been included in BSF totals. 10. The text of Artide 257-A of the Constitution of India merits reproduction: (l) The Government ofIndia maydeploy any arrned force of the Union or any other force subject to the control of the Union for dealing with any grave situation oflaw and order in any state. (2) An y Arrned force or other force or an y contingent or unit thereof deployed under Clause l in any state shall act in accordance with such directions as the Govemment of lndia may issue and s hall not, save as otherwise provided in such directions, be subject to the superintendance or contro l of the State govemment or an y officer or a utbority subordinate to the state government. (3) Parliament ma y, by la w, specify the power, functions, privileges and liabilities of the members of an y force or an y contingent or unit thereof deployed under Clause (l) during the period of such deployment. Il. The Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, recommended to the president of India that a Prodarnation of Emergency should be issued because "information has reached us which indicates that there is an imminent danger to the security of lndia being threatened by intemal disturbance" see the text of the letter and related material in Shah Commission of Inquiry, Interim Report l, New Delhi, March Il, 1978, p. 25. The commission was appointed by the govemment ofIndia under section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act of 1972, to inquire into excesses, malpractices, and misdeeds during the emergency. Mr. Justice J. C. Shah, retired chief justice of the Supreme Court ofIndia was its chairman. 12. Shah Commission of Inquiry, 1hird and Final Report, New Delhi, August 6, 1978,

p. 41. 13. Ibid., p. 228. 14. lbid., p. 134. It may be mentioned that most of these persons were members of political parties and groups including members of the banned organizations. Some of them were criminals and antisocial types also. MISA stands for Maintenance of Intemal Security Act and DISIR means Defense and Intemal Security of India Rules. 15. Lok Sabha Debates, Sixth Series, Vol. 10 (February 22, 1978), USQ 249, Cols. 119-20. 16. For further facts see the Times of lndia (New Delhi), October 20, 1978. 17. A press comment based on the United News of lndia's coverage is interesting: "The CRP men have become popular ovemight. Wherever they go on duty, they are greeted by the people like the war heroes returning borne triumphant. The CRP presence, some voters claimed, had given them supreme confidence." See the Times of lndia, November 6, 1978.

20

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

388

ARMED FORCESAND SOCIETY

18. See the Statesman, November 3-4, 1978. 19. Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 9. 20. Stephen P. Cohen's, The Indian Army: Its Contribution.to the Developrnent of a Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) argues that civil supremacy not on! y obtains in India, but it is not Iikely to be disturbed in the face of normal socioeconomic strains. K. P. MISRA is a professor and Head of the Divison of International Politics in the

School of International Studies, Centre for International Politics and Organization, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

[2] Innovations in counterinsurgency: the Indian Army's Rashtriya Ritles RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN

Although the Indian Army has been engaged in counterinsurgency operations for over 50 years, it continues to see such campaigns as secondm·y to its primal)' task of defending India's frontiers. This has limited the army's capacity to innovate and modify its doctrines and force structures to deal with interna! insurgencies. This article examine s the origins and evolution of the Rashtriya Rifies, a force that the Indian Army created to fight insurgencies. However, the Rashtriya Rifies remains primarily an organisational innovation rather than a doctrinal one. Therefore, the Rashtriya Rifies has neither reduced the army's exposure to counterinsurgency operations, nor improved the army's capacity to fight insurgencies. ABSTRACT

The Indian Army has fought counterinsurgency campaigns for over five decades. Nevertheless, counterinsurgency remains a seeondm-y task for the army, and one it undertakes with considerable reluctance. The army's focus remains on preparing for a conventional large-scale conflict, and this has adversely affected its capacity to fight insurgencies. The army has attempted to improve its counterinsurgency capabilities with better training, and set up a special i sed Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Virengte, Mizoram, in the late 1960s. At that time, it also undertook a short-Iived experiment to create specialised units for counterinsurgency called 'I (insurgency)-battalions'. More recently, the army set up another specialised counterinsurgency force called the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), a unit formed out of deputed army personnel. Although India has a number of paramilitary forces that are also used in domestic counterinsurgency campaigns, the RR is not a paramilitary force. The RR is an infantry unit of the Indian Army, albeit a lighter one, with a very different organisational and administrative structure than most other army units. The RR has been a success, at least from the arm y high command' s point of view, as indicated by its steady growth over the past several years. Correspondence: Rajesh Rajagopalan, Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, 20 Rouse Avenue, New Delhi 110002, India. E-mail: [email protected]

22

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present R. RAJAGOPALAN

26

This paper examine s the origins, growth and effecti veness of the RR. It argues that the peculiar organisation of the RR, while adding to the overall strength of the Indian Army, has not substantially diluted the army's exposure to counterinsurgency-which was the stated objective for the creation of the RR. Moreover, although there are some actvantages to the manner in which the RR is structured, there are also deficiencies (such as a built-in limitation in its total strength). Most importantiy, the RR re mains an organisational rather than a doctrinal innovation, and is testimony to the army's reluctance to underrake a fundamental re-evaluation of its counterinsurgency doctrine.

The role of the Indian Army in counterinsurgency duties The RR is not the Indian Army's first experiment with creating a specialised counterinsurgency force. In the late 1960s, the Army set up 1-battalions to battle separatist guerrillas in northeast India. These battalions were lighter versions of standard army infantry battalions, shorn of their administrative and logistics tail and heavy artillery components. The I-battalions, however, were a short-Iived experiment. In less than two years, those units that had been converted to I-battalions were reconverted to regular infantry battalions. The scattered accounts of this experiment and recollections of former army officers suggest that the perceived inability of such units to fight in conventional wars, and the loss of morale of those units converted in to I -battalions, we re respons i ble for its termination. 1 After disbanding the I-battalions in the early 1970s, the army made no further attempt at doctrinal or organisational innovation for counterinsurgency operations for almost two decades. A number of factors might explain this stagnation. There were accelerated and moderately successful attempts in the 1970s to resolve some of India's domestic insurgencies through negotiations, which reduced the role of the army in these conflicts. 2 Also, the army's experience in the 1971 Indo-Pak War highlighted the continuing threat of large-scale conventional wars in South Asia. Both factors appeared to reduce the need for innovation in the army's approach to counterinsurgency, and may have even prevented the army from re-examining its existing counterinsurgency paradigm. By the late 1980s, however, India's intemal security situation began to warsen rapidly, and the army's counterinsurgency burden began to rise commensurately. In addition to the army's commitment of four infantry divisions to operations in Sri Lanka (1987-1990), the army also was dragged into counterinsurgency operations in several states in India's northeast and, more sporadically, into counterinsurgency and anti-terrorist operations in Punjab. By the end of the 1980s, with Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) also erupting, it was clear that the arm y' s commitments in counterinsurgency operations we re set to increase dramatically. By 1998, an astounding 44% (156 out of 356) of the army's infantry battalions were engaged in various counterinsurgency campaigns around the country. 3 As of 2001, as many as 117 army battalions were deployed in counterinsurgency duties in J&K alone. 4

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

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INNOV A TTONS IN COUNTERTNSURGENCY

These counterinsurgency commitments were growing without any conesponding dilution in the Indian Army' s conventional ro le. As Kashmir be gan to heat up over the next two years and fears rose of another conventional war with Pakistan, the army's cancerns increased. Moreover, the army's traditional reluctance to get engaged in domestic counterinsurgency campaigns only grew stronger with its increasing counterinsurgency commitments. 5 The army leadership continues to plead against its overuse in intemal security duties, and reacted with bemusement to calls that the army be called in to capture the forest brigand Veerappan. 6 Although some army officers have suggested that intemal security duties are normal for armies, especially in a developing nation such as India, this view is not widely heJd by many in the army. 7 In any case, the army has little choice in the matter.

The role of India's paramilitary forces in counterinsurgency duties One solution to the Indian Army's dilemma was to have the country's considerable paramilitary forces hear the burden of handling counterinsurgency duties. 8 This would free the army from this onerous task, and ensure that intemal rebellions were under the control of civilian forces. Both organisationally and temperamentally, paramilitary forces such as the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Border Security Force (BSF) have a police rather than military ethos. 9 Administratively under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), these central paramilitary forces (CPMFs) are largely commanded by officers of the Indian Police Service. The CRPF, BSF and other CPMFs were not unfamiliar with counterinsurgency duties; indeed, in most cases, these organisations were the ones that tackled insurgencies during their early stages. Despite their responsibilities, the CPMFs are considered incapable of handling full-blown insurgencies. 10 This is not because of any inadequacy in numbers; by a rough count, there are 338 hattalians of CPMFs under the MHA, including the 157 hattalians of the BSF, 154 hattalians of the CRPF, 38 hattalians of the As sam Ritles and 29 hattal ion s of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. (Not included in this total are lesser forces such as the 95,000-strong Central Industrial Security Force, the 31,000 personneJ of the Special Services Bureau, and the 7000-strong National Security Guards). 11 Even so, CPMFs are set to increase significantly by 2005 (see Table 1). However, the CPMFs are trained primarily for high-intensive police duties such as riot control, rather than dealing with insurgencies. This is true even for those CPMFs such as the As sam Rifles, the BSF and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police that are shaped and equipped more like the army than the police. Even the best-armed CPMFs are not as weil-armed as they should be, and cannot be expected to handie the rigaurs of a counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, most CPMFs were originally created for specific duties such as guarding the border and, although they have been frequently and extensively used in counterinsurgency campaigns, the general sentiment over the past decade is to have these forces revert to their original mandate. 12

24

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

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R. RAJAGOPALAN

Table l. The strength (in battalions) of selected paramilitary forcesand the Rashtriya Ritles

Force Border Security Force Central Reserve Police Force Assam Ritles Indo-Tibetan Border Police Total Rashtriya Ritles

Strength (battalions), 1999-2000

Projected strength (battalions ), 2005

Per cent increase

157 121 31 29 338 36

157 185 46 38 426 66

0% 53% 48% 38% 25% 83%

Source: Adapted from Government of lndia Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2002-2003, p 83 at http://mha.nic.in/annual-2002-2003/annua1_rep.htm, accessed 18 December 2003.

The evolution of the Rashtriya Ritles From the Indian Army's perspective, however, it was not just the numbers, or the weapons, or even the training that was the primary problem in having the CPMFs tackle counterinsurgency operations. What the army saw most lacking in the CPMFs was an army ethos, making them culturally incapable of fighting insurgencies. This required 'a paramilitary force with army ethos'; 13 in other words, an alternate army that could be devoted to counterinsurgency tasks, thus freeing the Indian Army from these duties. However, because only the army could instil this special ethos, such a paramilitary force would have to be officered by army personnel, and work under the command of the army rather than the MHA. What the army wanted is a force under its direct control. Just as the I-battalions were created during a period of doctrinal and organisational innovation in the Indian Army, the idea for the creation of the RR came about in the late 1980s, a time of considerable innovation in the military. During this period, the army was experimenting with new ideas about armoured warfare, and had created a new infantry organisational mode] called RAPID (Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division) more suited to such warfare. lt is possible to see the RR as the consequence of the organisational, if not doctrinal, innovations that were taking place within the army during this period, although it is difficult to conclusively demonstrate such a linkage. Former Chief of Army Staff General B.C. Joshi is generally credited with conceptualising the RR. He has subsequently recollected that, in December 1988 when he was the Director-General of Military Operations, he planned the creation of this new force to meet the rising counterinsurgency commitments of an army that was still enmeshed in Sri Lanka and becoming more embroiled in Punjab. 14 Then Indian Army Chief General K. Sundarji and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi gave this idea their initial approval quickly, although the proposal subsequently languished. However, other senior army officers suggest that the idea for the RR goes back to the Operation Brasstacks crisis of 1987, when the Indian Arm y began to worry about rear-area security. Their cancern was primarily about Punjab (then

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

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INNOV A TTONS IN COUNTERTNSURGENCY

still suffering an insurgency), which would have been a major theatre of operations if a war did break out with Pakistan. 15 A concept paper about the formation of the RR was prepared at this time, which saw the RR not as a counterinsurgency force, but as a rear-area protection force. No action was apparently taken on this paper. As the Kashmir insurgency began to heat up after 1989, this proposal was revived, hut with the RR now re-designated as a counterinsurgency force. Formal approval by the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs came in 1990, when the govemment sanctioned the creation of the RR as a paramilitary force under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence and the operational control of the army. Approval was given for the creation of a force of six battalions, two sector headquarters and some suppmt components. 16 The RR, as conceptualised by General J oshi, is not what the force has become today. According to Joshi's original plans, the RR was to be a paramilitary force outside of the arm y, bu t with an arm y ethos. 17 This was to be accomplished by manning the RR mainly with army ex-servicemen and personneJ deputed from various CPMFs, with on ly 25 per cent of the unit' s total strength coming through deputations from the regular army. 18 However, the force would be commanded by army officers, and would be under the army's operational control-a model samewhat similar to the Assam Rifles, 19 a CPMF operationally largely controHed by the arm y (see Figure 1). Such a force met the arm y' s pressing need of freeing it from counterinsurgency duties, while having a paramilitary force that would be more effective in such campaigns than any of the existing CPMFs. The RR would have an army ethos due both to the presence of ex-servicemen as soldiers and army officers as commanders. The aforementioned mode] ran into problems from the beginning as the army could not attract sufficient numbers of either ex-servicemen or CPMF personneJ into the new force. 20 Perforce, the army had to use its own personneJ to man the RR. This created other difficulties. Traditionally, whenever the army created new units, the pattem was either to raise entirely new units or to re-label an existing unit. Raising an entirely new unit would have increased the budget demands of the army while saddling it with a force that was trained for a mission that the army considered secondary. Re-labelling exiting units may have solved some of these problems, and the army had undertaken such exercises several times in the past with other units. For example, many of its mechanised infantry hattalians had been created by re-labelling existing infantry battalions, and re-training and re-arming them to deal with their new tasks. Similarly, the I-battalions were created by re-labelling existing infantry battalions. This procedure was not undertaken with the RR, presurnably because it would not have resolved the original problem of reducing the army's counterinsurgency burden. The solution decided upon was the creation of mixed infantry battalions in the RR; that is, units manned by personneJ deputed from various army regiments. Several such hattalians were raised in the early 1990s. But this mode] created some serious unforeseen problems. One was a bureaueratic headache: because each RR battalion included personneJ from all over the army, its administrative

26

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

30

R. RAJAGOPALAN

Ministry of Home Affairs

Ministry of Defence

f----+

Rashtriya Ritles

Ass am Ritles

........ ~

r-----

Administrative Control Only Operational Control Only

Central Reserve Police Force Border Security Force In do-Tibetan Border Police

_______.

National Security Guard s

_______.

Special Services Bureau

_______.

Central Industrial Security Force

...................................... ~

-----------~

Administrative & Opcrational Control Figure l. Organisation of Indian paramilitary forces.

branch had to co-ordinate recruitment and service issues-such as leave, salary and pensions-with a large number of regimental centres around the country. This was a serious administrative problem for the regiment-hased system of the Indian Army, and was acknowledged as such by General .Toshi. 21 The new RR hattalians faced two additional, operational problems. One was the lack of unit cohesion, one of the most important factors in determining combat performance. 22 Again, this problem can be traced to changing the existing regimental system to the mixed-regiment pattern of these early RR

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

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battalions. Throughout its history, the Indian Arm y has relied on the ethos and traditions of its various regiments to instil unit cohesion in its ranks. Mixed-regiment hattalians had no traditions of valour and sacrifice that could be used to instil unit cohesion. Moreover, because all of the personneJ were on short-term (two-year) deputation, nobody could 'belong' to the RR in the way they belonged to their individual regimental families. Another problem was what may be called 'the bad apple' syndrome. When the army commanders were asked to depute men to the RR, they frequently appeared to have taken this as a way of getting rid of 'trouble-makers' within the unit, 23 saddling the new force with troops who were less than fit for the hardships of counterinsurgency duties. These difficulties led to yet another change in the RR recruitment pattern. Although the RR still depended on deputation, the composition of its individual battalions was changed so that troops in a single battalion would largely come from a single infantry regiment rather than a mix of army units. Out of the six campanies of troops that make up an RR battalion, four would come from a single army regiment (although from different battalions), while the other two campanies would be made up of troops from support arms such as the artillery, Army Supply Corps, and so on. 24 This pattern largely resolved both the administrative and unit cohesion issues. Administratively, because a single army regiment raises each RR battalion, the hattalian does not have to communicate with dozens of regimental centres regarding the administrative issues of its men. Operationally, since most of the RR battalion personneJ belong to a single army regiment, they share the traditions and values of the regiment, thus enabling greater unit cohesion. The final problem of ensuring the quality of troops coming to the RR appears to have been largely managed by imposing strict qualitative requirements, including being in the best physical condition, having adequate combat/service experience, and no disciplinary action in the previous two years. 25

The expansion of the Rashtriya Ritles One way to analyse whether the RR has been successful is to look at how it has fared organisationally. By this crude measure at least, the RR has been a resounding success. Where the I-battalions were wound up in less than two years, the RR has continued to survive and thrive. Indeed, the strength of the RR has grown almost 1O-fold since 1990, on e of the fastest expansions in the peacetime history of the Indian Army. As stated earlier, the original sanction given by the Indian government in 1990 was for the raising of six battalions, two sector headquarters and supporting components. Three of these hattalians (4, 5, and 6) were originally deployed in Punjab, and took part in the final stages of the counterinsurgency campaign in the state, while the other three battalions (l, 2 and 3) were moved directly to J&K for counterinsurgency operations there. 26 Subsequently, the government sanctioned another 30 battalions, l O sector headquarters and a force headquartersY By the mid-1990s, 30 of these hattalians and l O sector headquarters were

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deployed in J&K, with the remainder (six hattalians and two seetar headquarters) were deployed in the northeast. 28 Subsequently, all RR hattalians were rnaved to J&K, where they remain deployed today. In 2001, approval was grantedfor the raising of 30 additional RR battalions. 29 When these raisings are completed, the total force of the RR will stand at 66 battalions. As of 2002, 48 hattalians in all have been raised? 0 Battalions are controlied by brigade-level seetars that, in turn, form part of division-strength formations called forces. Currently, five such division-strength formations exist: Delta (Doda) Force, Victor (Valley) Force, Kilo (Kupwara) Force, Romeo (Rajouri) Force, and the newest one, Uniform (Udhampur) Force. Assessing the Rashtriya Ritles The creation and expansion of the RR has given rise to a concomitant increase in the strength and size of the Indian Army. To prevent the dilution of their regular strength, army units that contribute troops to the RR are allowed to compensate for their loss of personneJ through additional recruitment. Thus, if a particular hattalian with a sanctioned strength of l 000 is required to contribute 30 men to the RR, their sanctioned strength is increased to 1030. 31 At least in terms of personnel, the 66 hattalians of the RR therefore mean the equivalent of 66 additional battalions-some six divisions-for the army. The development of the RR also has financially benefited the army. The RR budget comes as an additional line item in government expenditure for the Indian Army. In 1990/91, the creation of the RR necessitated an increase of Rs.5.2 million in the budget for the army. This figure has soared as the RR has continued to expand. In 2000/01, the RR budget stood at Rs.6265.5 million. For 2001/02, expenditure for the RR was put at over Rs.7280 million? 2 It is difficult to judge whether the RR hattalians have performed better than regular army infantry units deployed in counterinsurgency operations. Opinion within the army, and even among those who have served in the RR, varies. 33 Nevertheless, RR hattalians have several advantages over regular infantry battalions. One is that, as a force upon which the army has lavished attention, RR hattalians are the best-equipped counterinsurgency hattalians in India. Also, unlike some infantry and other units that are asked to undertake counterinsurgency operations in an ad hoc manner, all RR personneJ undergo several weeks of special counterinsurgency-oriented pre-inductian training at corps hattie schools, and additional training from the units that they join. The most important operational advantage that the RR has over regular army units is that, while RR troops rotate in and out of a unit, the hattalians themselves do not shift between field and peace stations, but are permanently deployed in their area of operations. This pattem is unusual for the army-although, previously, s orne formations such as the 8th and 57th Mountain Divisions had long-duration counterinsurgency deployments. However, even in such cases, hattalians had always rotated through these formations as a complete unit. The permanent deployment of RR hattalians provides them with a

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continuity and familiarity with an area that is sorely missed by regular army units rotated through insurgency-affected areas. No time is wasted on getting the feel of an area, and no knowledge and goodwill gained, or investments made in terms of connections to the locality are lost because the unit has to move away after its tenure. This is particularly important in terms of intelligence operations, probably the most vital part of any counterinsurgency campaign. The creation and expansion of the RR has freed regular army infantry hattalians from counterinsurgency operations. The current 48 hattalians of the RR make up close to one-half of the total number of army hattalians deployed for counterinsurgency operations in J&K. 34 Thus, 48 army hattalians that might otherwise have had to be deployed in counterinsurgency operations are now available for their primary task of preparing for conventional war. Once all 66 hattalians of the RR are raised, even more hattalians will be freed from such intemal security duties. lndeed, there have been unconfirmed reports that the entire army might be withdrawn from counterinsurgency duties in J&K over a period of five years, and replaced with 209 additional hattalians of the RR and selected CPMFs such as the CRPF. 35 Despite such plans, it is undear whether the creation and expansion of the RR will ever be able to free the army from its burdensame counterinsurgency duties. Given the organisational structure of the RR, it would be difficult to expand the force much beyond the 66 hattalians that have already been sanctioned without seriously unbalancing the army infantry. Already, on average, infantry hattalians contribute about 14 per cent of their normal strength to the RR, and this figure will increase when all 66 hattalians are raised. Although this strength is made up through additional recruitment, it could put a strain on the hattalians to have an even larger percentage of their troop continuously away on deputation. Even if the RR is heJd to the currently sanctioned total of 66 battalions, this would be far fewer than the 150-odd total battalions36 the army needs if all its counterinsurgency operations (assuming the situation in J&K does not improve) are to be handed over to the RR. A more serious problem is that, unlike the original mode! that envisaged a non-army cadre-based counterinsurgency force for campaigns bolstered by regular army personnel, the unavailability of non-army recruits has led the RR to become manned fully by Indian Army soldiers and officers. In effect, this means that, while regular army hattalians have reduced their exposure to counterinsurgency duties, individual soldiers and officers have not. Far from isolating the army from counterinsurgency campaigns, the RR has institutionalised the army's role in such campaigns. In addition to these organisational difficulties, the RR also has faced certain operational problems. The most serious of these cancerns relations between the RR, CPMFs and the MHA. Differences arose when the MHA questioned the need for the new force, apparently claiming that its creation would suggest that intemal rebellions were a permanent feature in India. 37 There were additional disagreements about the funding of the new force, with the MHA resisting the argument that:

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[S]ince the maintenance of law and order as well as combating militancy is primarily the responsibility of the respective State Governments and the Ministry of Home Affairs, it appears logical that a force which has been raised for this task should have its expenditure borne by the Ministry of Home Attairs or cancerned State Government. 3H

Although the MHA successfully avoided budgetary responsibility for the RR, the new force has not become an extra burden on the army's finances because, as mentioned earlier, it has been carried in the army budget as a separate Iine item with additional funding. In effect, the govemment resolved the thomy issue of who should pay for the RR by sanctioning an additional amount specifically for the force. There were similar disputes over command-and-eontroi issues. According to a number of reports, the BSF was unwilling to serve under the RR, which they saw as not only just another CPMF, but worse, a younger one. 39 An example of their dissatisfaction came during the 1999 Kargil War when the BSF protested the replacement of Lieutenant-General Krishan PaJ, head of 15 Corps, with Lieutenant-General Avtar Singh, Director-General of the RR, as the security advisor to the J&K govemment and head of the Unified Command. 40 Similarly, in August 2000, then Chief of Army Staff V.P. Malik publid y spoke up against what he claimed were moves to put the RR under the MHA. 41 A resolution of sorts appears to have been reached on this issue by putting BSF units under BSF seetar formations. 42 Other operational problems also have cropped up, although opinion is divided among RR officers about the importance, and even veracity, of these issues. 43 Problems that have been mentioned include unit cohesion and the difficulties that personneJ have in adjusting to a mixed hattal ion (even though most be Iong to the same regiment). Others include the difficulties faced by feeder hattalians in finding proper recruits for the RR (especially given its stri et quality requirements), and the burden these personneJ face of continuous, multiple tennres in the highly stressful counterinsurgency environment. Despite these problems, it not clear whether there is any good alternative to the RR. The possibility of creating a specialised CPMF under the MHA, which will be as capable as army battalions, seems unlikely. Some in the army have suggested creating a cadre-based force, similar to the Assam Rifles, which will be officered and controlied operationally by the army. 44 This idea is samewhat similar to the original RR concept, b ut the force' s current structure c am e about precisely because of difficulties with the earlier model. Moreover, the creation of an entirely new CPMF might be difficult, given the recent trend of consolidating existing paramilitary forces. What does the RR say about the Indian Army's approach to doctrinal innovation? Unfortunately, not much. The RR is an interesting and innovative organisational innovation. The army experimented with a number of organisational models for the RR, and appears to have finally found one that meets most of its requirements. This suggests a certain amount of flexibility in the army's attitude towards organisational innovation. However, no such flexibility or

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innovation is evident in the army's operational doctrines for dealing with counterinsurgency campaigns. The RR has used established tactics and strategies, and there is little indication that its experience has led to any modification in these. The RR has benefited samewhat because its hattalians are permanently deployed in specific counterinsurgency areas, but there is little to indicate any attempt at any further doctrinal innovation. Conclusion

The I-hattalians and the RR we re created at different points in time and in different circumstances, which accounts for same of the differences between these two innovations. The I-battalions were created by the Indian Army during a period of experimentation with new ways of fighting counterinsurgency campaigns. In contrast, the RR was an attempt by the army, facing the prospect of fighting expanding and seemingly unending counterinsurgency campaigns, to unburden itself from such commitments. While the army disbanded the I-battalions in less than two years, the RR is seen as a success. Yet, whether the RR has succeeded in its original objective of freeing the army from its counterinsurgency burdens is unclear. Although the army has earned 66 new hattalians that can conduct such operations in peacetime and ensure rear-area security in wartime, the exposure of its rank-and-file to counterinsurgency operations has been reduced only marginally. There also is little to indicate that the RR has been significantly more effective in these intemal security operations than the army's standard infantry battalions. As always, the successes of individual hattalians appear to owe more to the quality of its leadership-a factor that the RR shares with other hattalians deployed in counterinsurgency operations-than its organisational structure. Nonetheless, the permanent deployment of the RR in counterinsurgency operational areas offers the unique advantages of familiarity and continuity. Finally, although the RR might not have the perfeet organisational structure for dealing with India' s counterinsurgency problems, it is a working compromise between the theoretical ideal and practical limitations. There are also same revealing similarities between the I-battalions and the RR. The I-battalions were designed to be more effective in counterinsurgency operations, hut all the army did to achieve this effectiveness was reduce the size of the hattalian to make it lighter; essentially an organisational modification to the existing hattalian structure. Despite the establishment of the CIJWS, and a greater awareness within the army about the need for doctrinal innovations for counterinsurgency operations, there was little change in the way that the I-battalions were trained, deployed, or operated. With the RR, there was no attempt to aim for any doctrinal innovation; the new force was purely an organisational innovation. Although administratively and organisationally there are significant differences, the RR is like any other regular army infantry hattalian in the way it operates. This was not for lack of any recognition within the army about the need for doctrinal change, or even about the shape of such doctrinal change. The CIJWS, for example, has repeatedly emphasised the

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futility of large-scale operations in a counterinsurgency environment and the need for small unit operations. This has never been fully translated into practice. The experience of the RR suggests is that the Indian Army finds it easier to make organisational changes than doctrinal ones. Taking this Iine of argument a step further would suggest that there are deep cultural obstacles within the army to such doctrinal changes. Until these cultural sources of the army's resistance to doctrinal innovation are identified, it will be difficult for the army to develop a more appropriate counterinsurgency doctrine.

Acknow ledgements The author would like to thank Kulbir Krishan, Brigadier Devinder Singh, Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, Colonel D.K. Jamwal, Commandant N.S. Jamwal, and Major Sudhir Nair for their considerable assistance with the research presented in this essay, and the two anonymous reviewers for Contemporary South Asia for their comments. None should be blarned for any errors or other shortcomings that might still remain.

Notes and references l. K. C. Praval, Valour Triumphs: A History of" the Kumaon Regiment (Faridabad: Thomson Press, 1976), p 296; A.M. Sethna and Valmiki Katju, Traditions of A Regiment: 1he Story (if the Rajputana Rijies (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1983), p 87; Major-General Dipankar Banerjee, interview by author, 24 June 1996, New Delhi, written notes; Lieutenant-General (retd.) V.K. Singh, comments to the author, 28 September 2002; and Lieutenant-General (retd.) Kadyan, comments to the author, 28 September 2002. 2. These included the peace agreements with the Nagas in 1975. and the Mizos in 1976. Although neither brought immediate peace (because some factions of the Nagas refused to accept the agreement and the final settlement with the Mizos too k another full decade ), the ultimate direction of the insurgencies seemed fairly clear. 3. The army does not routinely release such figures and, although the 1988 number is now several years old, it is a good indicator of the extent of the army's commitment to counterinsurgency. See 'Bringing up the infantry: interview with Lt.Gen. Shankar Prasad', Tim.es of" India, 13 October 1998, p 8. 4. Vishal Thapar, 'Army to raise 30 new Rashtriya Ritles battalions', Hindustan Times, 24 April 200 l at < http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/240401/detNAT05.asp >, accessed 15 April 2002. 5. Rajesh Rajagopalan, "'Restoring nonnalcy": the evolution of the Indian Army's counterinsurgency doctrine', SmallWarsand Jnsurgencies, Vol Il, No l, 2000, pp44-68. 6. 'Pak exploiting our weaknesses: Malik' at < http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/26mal.htm >, accessed 3 December 200 l. 7. For such an unusual view, see Lt. Gen. V.K. Nayar, Low filtensity Conjiicts in Jndia (New Delhi: United Services Institution, 2000), p 14. 8. In principle at !east, this has now been accepted by the Group of Ministers' report on reforming the national security system. How far this principle would be converted into practice remains to be seen. See Government of India, Refl!rming the National Security System: Recommendations of" the Group of" Ministers (New Delhi: February 2001), p 50. 9. Other para-military forces operating under the Ministry of Home Affairs include the Assam Riftes, Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Central Industrial Security Force. National Security Guards and Special Services Bureau. 10. Nayar, op cir, Ref 7, p 15. 11. Government ofIndia Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2002-2003 at < http:!/mha.nic.in/annual2002-2003/annual_rep.htm>, accessed 18 December 2003. 12. Governemnt of India, op cit, Ref 8, p 50. 13. RR officers and other army officers write and talk about the RR as a 'para-military force with Army ethos'. See, for example, 'Letter from the Editor', Rashtriya Rijies Magazine, Vol l. No l, 1993, p l; and Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 1995-1996 (New Delhi: Govemment ofIndia Ministry of Defence, 1996), p 18.

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14. 'Address by the Chief of Army Staffto the Rashtriya Ritles Commanders, 6 October 1994', as reproduced in Colonel Harjeet Singh, Doda: An Insurgency in the Wilderness (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1999), pp 291-301. 15. Lieutenant-General Singh, comments to the author, op cit, Ref l. 16. Ministry of Defence, Amma/ Repor!, 1994-1995 (New Delhi: Government ofIndia Ministry of Defence, 1995), p 13. 17. Harjeet Singh, 'The Rashtriya Ritles: an appraisal', Trishul, Vol 9, No l, 1996, pp 61-68. 18. B. Bhattacharya, 'The Rashtriya Ritles', B ha rat Rakshak Monitor, Vol 3 No 2, 2002 at < http:// www.bharat-rakshak.com/MON1TOR/1SSUE3-2/batt.html >, accessed 3 December 200 l; and Brigadier Bikramjit Singh, Deputy Director-General of the Rashtriya Ritles, interview hy author (New Delhi), 15 May 2002, written notes. 19. On the history and evolution of the Assam Ritles, see Major General D.K. Palit, Senlinels of' the Northeast: The Assam Rifies (New Delhi: Palit & Palit, 1984). 20. Brigadier Singh, interview by author, op cif, Ref 18. 21. Singh, op cit, Ref 14, p 296; and Singh, op cit, Ref 17, p 63. 22. Bhattacharya, op cit, Ref 18; and Nayar, op cit, Ref 7, p 70. 23. Bhattacharya, op cit, Ref 18. 24. See ibid; Brigadier Singh, interview by author, op cit, Ref 18; and Lt. Col. S.B. Nair, Directorate-General of the Rashtriya Ritles, interview by author, New Delhi, 13 September 2002, written notes. 25. Colonel Dushyant Singh, 'A new concept of Rashtriya Ritles battalions', The Infantry (lndia), December 2001, p 21. 26. 'News from our Bns (Battalions)', Rashtriya Rifies Magazine, Vol l, No l, 1993, pp 27-28. 27. Ministry of Defence, op cit, Ref 16, p 13. 28. Ministry of Defence, Jinmwl Repor!, 1996-1997 (New Delhi: Government ofIndia Ministry of Defence, 1997), p 20. 29. Thapar, op cit, Rcf 4. 30. Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 2001-2002 (New Delhi: Government ofIndia Ministry of Defence, 1997), p 29. 31. Brigadier Singh, interview by author, op cit, Ref 18; and Lt.Col. N air, interview by author, op cit, Ref 24. 32. Government of India, Dej'ence Services Estimates 1991-92 (New Delhi: Government ofIndia Press, 1991), p 6; Government of India, Defence Services Estimates 2001 (New Delhi: Government of Tndia Press, 2001), p 6: and Government of India, Defence Services Estirnates 2002-2003 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2002), p 6. 33. Singh, op cif, Ref 25; Singh, op cit, Ref 17: Capt M.P. Singh, 'Memories RR tenure', The Infanfl)' (India), J une 1999, pp 48-51; Major-General Mono Bhagat, former commander of RR's Delta Force, interview by author, 2 September 2002; LL. Col. Ajay Sharrna, interview by author, 9 September 2002; and interviews with other army and RR officers, New Delhi, August-September 2002. 34. lt is not clear exactly how many army units are deployed in counterinsurgency operations in J&K currently, but the number is thought to be lo wer than the 117 battalions stated in one Indian newspaper report last year. See Thapar, op cit, Ref 4. 35. 'Phased withdrawal of army from J&K: Zee' at , accessed 3 December 200 l; and Go vemment of India, op cit, Re f 8, p 50. 36. The 150 figure is from 'Bringing up the infantry: interview with Lt.Gen. Shankar Prasad', Times oflndia, 13 October 1998, p 8, and is for 1998. But there has been no appreciable decline in the army's counterinsurgency commitments since 1998 and, therefore, the army's current counterinsurgency load could be expected to be similar. 37. Singh, op cit, Ref 17, p 62. 38. lbid, p 65. 39. Praveen Swami, 'An offensive strategy', Frontline, Vol17, No 3, 2000 at < http://www.hinduonnet.com/ fline/fll703/ 17030220.htm >, accessed 9 April 2004. 40. 'Lt.Gen. Krishan Pal returns to crucial posts in Kashmir' at < http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/sep/ 06josy.htm >, accessed 4 December 2001: and 'Differences crop up between BSF, army in Kashmir' at < http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/sep/15kash.htm >, accessed 4 December 200 l. 41. 'Pak exploiting our weaknesses: Malik' at < http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/26mal.htm >, accessed 3 December 200 l. 42. Interviews with BSF and army officers, New Delhi, August-September 2002. 43. The following is based on Singh, op cit, Ref 25; Singh, op cit, Ref 33; Bhagat, op cit, Ref 33; Shanna, op cif, Ref 33; and Nair, op cif, Ref 31. 44. Singh, op cit, Ref 25; and interview with a former senior RR officer by author, New Delhi, 3 September 2002.

[3] lndia's counter-insurgency experience: the 'trust and nurture' strategy Namrata Goswami* Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, lndia The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in intemal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a Iong innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging subconventional warfare in India's demoeratic political context. At best, the Army continnes to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from externa! conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of 'trust and nurture', this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in lndia's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of 'trust and nurture' based on demoeratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India' s interna! security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation 'Sadhbhavana' in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the 'trust and nurture' strategy. Keywords: Indian Army; insurgency; Naga; counter-insurgency; doctrinal; paramilitary; trust; nurture; attrition; military; guerrilla; special forces; strategy; democratic; culture; Mizoram; Nagaland; Assam; Punjab

The Indian Army has dealt with intemal insurgencies since independence. Oldest among these insurgencies is the N aga insurgency, against which the Armystarted counter-insurgency operations as early as the 1950s. Yet like most other conventional arrnies in the world, the Indian Arrnytreats counter-insurgency as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external threats. Consequently, little serious thought has been given to doctrinal innovations within the Army with regard to insurgent contingencies. Earlier organizational innovations like the Insurgency (I) battalions and the present paramilitary force, the Rashtriya Ritles (RR) was/is mostly of a light infantry variety composed of deputed army personnel trained within the rigour of the conventional regimental ethos. 1 Hence, these units were/are ill-equipped to deal with insurgents whose strategy is airned at protracted war by small guerrilla bands.

*Email: namygoswami@ gmail.com

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Organizationally, India has established paramilitary forces under the aegis of the Ministry of Ho me Affairs (MHA) like the As sam Rifles, the Border Security Force (BSF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), etc. Incidentally, the Assam Ritles are given special counter-insurgency training at the CounterInsurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairangte, Mizoram, but this training is limited to developing operational skills in the personnel, which mostly enables them to identify insurgents through locallanguage leaming coupled with bard core military knowledge. Such training, however, fails to equip the personnel with doctrinal aspects attuned to counter-insurgency in order to activate 'trust and nurture' in the mission area, which is a crucial asset for population reassurance and their support for the mission itself. The BSF and the CRPF have also failed to handie the camplexity of insurgencies in a consequentially effective manner due to their focused training on 'cordon searches' and 'riot control' disabling them from waging their operations in a culture sensitive manner. 2 More often than not, counter-insurgency operations are based on an informal 'community of military knowledge' drawn upon experiences of personnel stationed in insurgency zones and not on any formally codified body of knowledge attuned for unconventional warfare. Consequently, such unconventional military action is open to various interpretations. At best, orre could argue that such informality could perhaps result in adaptability and flexibility in the mission area. At wors t, it might result in fuzzy understanding of the conflict zone, the strategic context and the political issues at stake. There is also a discemible lack of self-criticality within army circles to acknowledge counter-insurgency failures and leam from past mistakes. Sadly enough, the Army continnes to follow a strategy of attrition, the principal go al of which is the number of insurgents killed vis-a-vis army fatalities over a period of time? Ironically, amid this strategy of attrition, 'winning hearts and minds' of the local population is utilized by the army despite a contextual situation of high distrust between the personnel and the affected population. 4 The end result is, therefore, sub-optimal. Also, the winning 'hearts and minds' strategy fails to garner support of the local population since it is mostly viewed as espousing certain vestedstate interests. 5 This artide makes a case for doctrinal innovation in the Indian Army by conceptualizing a new counter-insurgency strategy of 'trust and nurture'. By military doctrine is meant a codified body of thought geared towards developing a 'formal engagement with thinking' about the use of force at the operational level with significant educational benefits. 6 Trust is defined as 'the belief that a person follows up on promises, willnot behave to sameorre else's disadvantage, bu t rather to his advantage' .7 Nurture entails providing the necessary conditions for building that trust. 8 The most im portant element to nurture trust is the ability to deliver on commitments, be it infrastructural development, democracy or security to the insurgency affected population. 9 This ability to deliver is crucial to ensure the population's support for counter-insurgency operations as the available choices for the former are intertwined with a certain degree of risk.

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Consequently, the choice made by the local population to cooperate with the counter-insurgency unit has a direct hearing on information and knowledge sharing - fundamental factors for the success of any counter-insurgency operation. It has been routinely observed that India's counter-insurgency operations, though successful in the short term, have a long-term harmful impact on the local population due to their inability to carry the population with them. Consequently, the counter-insurgency culture is fraught with poor initiative, faulty intelligence, de-motivated soldiers, inadequate training and a lack of creativity. These structural deficiencies have a direct co-relation with the insurgent actors' ability to run parallel governments, establish clandestine networks across national and international horders, which subsequently endsup alienating the local population from the state due to its inability to thwart these illegal activities. 10 Local communities al so argue that they do not trust their lives with either the state' s arrned forces or the insurgent actors but reach a 'hurting compromise' due to the lack of any better alternative. The situation is dire in remote areas where the penetration of state forces is minimal. 11 This artide seeks to actdress the following questions: • What are the relevant factors required for a successful 'trust and nurture' counter-insurgency strategy? • What are the plausible factors that could stand in the way for an optimized implementation of the 'trust and nurture' strategy? This artide is divided into two sections. The first section builds upon the conceptual base of the 'trust and nurture' strategy. The variables identified for such a strategy are: a demoeratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness, and an integrative nation-building approach. In order to huttress the conceptual map, the artide utilizes four cases of counter-insurgency in India, viz., Assam, Mizoram, N agaland and Punjab, and a peace initiative, Operation 'Sadhbhavana', by the Army in Jammu and Kashmir. It must, however, be noted that this artide is not an attempt at detailed case study. For anyone interested in the cases, abundant literature is available. 12 The cases, at best, are alluded to in order to enforce a eausal argument to indicate its operational logic. Second, the artide highlights certain caveats that hinder counter-insurgency operations despite a strategy based on 'trust and nurture'. The 'trust and nurture' strategy

Beforegetting onto the 'trust and nurture' strategy, a definition of insurgency is offered. Insurgency is protracted politico-military violence by non-state arrned groups airned at controlling the resources of a particular area. 13 It involves guerrilla tactics, political mobilization, heightened propaganda activity, organized-hierarchical rebel structures, dandestine arms and financial networks,

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and the establishment of base areas. 14 The difference between insurgent groups and terrorist organizations lay in the desire of the former to control a given area; terrorist groups mostly do not advocate territorial control: their sole motive is spectacular acts of violence airned at non-combatants for political signaling. 15 Though insurgents use 'terror' or 'intimidation' at the tactical level, they rarely do so at the strategic lev el. 16 Usually, insurgency affected societies suffer from high stress levels and genuinely fear destructive social forces prevalent among them. Individuals tend to mistrusteach other leading at timesto an incentive either by the state forces or rival insurgent factions to initiate violence rather than be attacked by surprise. Therefore, it is in the interest of the state vis-a-vis violen t social forces to ensure that the strategy informing its counter-insurgency operations be somewhat predictable, competent, and benevolent to the affected population. Also, the affected population inhabits remote inaccessible terrain still not penetrated by the state in equal measure as other more accessible terrain. This adds to the insurgent actor' s propaganda about the state' s discriminatory practices with re gard to the affected population compared with more developed other groups resulting in a feeling of relative deprivation. 17 It is in situations such as thesethat the 'trust and nurture' strategy can play a vital role in reassuring the population by building on security and development into their lives in a 'brick by brick' genuine manner. Significantly, an element of 'risk taking' is always connected to 'trust building' as one cannot be sure that the other person will always act in one's interest In fact, building 'authentic' trust is a complex dialectical process accounting for the possibilities of disappointments and betrayals. Here, unlike simple or blind trust (unreflective and self- deceptive), the focus of authentic trust is on the relationship that trust builds; trust by itself is open to vulnerabilities, betrayals and risks. 18 Consequently, in intemal conflict situations, authentic trust building and nurturing by state forces breaks the cycle of cordial hypocrisy maintained by the affected population towards the state forces mainly arising out of fear and a desire for 'self-preservation' .19 The notion of 'self- preservation' is indeed very strong among the insurgency affected population as they are caught in the cross-fire between the state forces and the insurgents most of the time. As a result, helping the state fight insurgents could spell disaster for the local population as the insurgents belong to the same area and enjoy a wide social network, which informs them about those civilians hobnobbing with the state. Govemments also pressurize civilians by assuming their loyalty to the state without understanding the logic of 'self-preservation', which might be informing their choices. Indeed, situations such as these where the legitimate state authorities have largely failed to guarantee security to the individual sothat helshe can pursue private beneficial interests tantamount to loss of trust in the state capabilities by its citizens. 20 Also, procuring the trust of the local population by the state forces amid ethnic insurgencies requires a deep and genuine understanding of their local customs, social behaviour, habits and political ideologies. 21

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However, trust is not a one-time affair; it is a continuous dynami c process that requires state forces to engage in an ever evolved competent, predietable and benevolent role performance. Subsequently, such state behaviour rendersit easy for the insurgency affected population to take risks and accept misunderstandings, disappointments or even betrayals? 2 Finally, trust and nurture enables engagement with positive projects of progress, development, security and nationbuilding. Illustrating the 'trust and nurture' strategy through the Indian counterinsurgency experience The independent variables on which the strategy of 'trust and nurture' is based are: demoeratic political culture, measured military methods, special counterinsurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nationbuilding approach. The intervening variable is the resultant 'trust and nurture' strategy evolved out of a combination of the independent variables, which has a significant hearing on the dependent variable - the outcome of counterinsurgency operations. Demoeratic political culture means that the dominant political atmosphere of the state is based on rule of law, constitutional rightsand constraints, freedom of expression and representative govemments. Measured military response ensures a proportionate and restrained military action in order to counter insurgencies. Special counter-insurgency forces are specifically trained for functioning in insurgency-affected areas with an excellent understanding of local social and cultural values. A vision for integrative nation-building is a project where both central and local actors see high stakes for themselves in inclusive institutional frameworks. 23

Extrapolating the variables Demoeratic political culture

India is a demoeratic country according to the Constitution of India. It holds periodic elections to Parliament and the state legislatures. Decision making is undertaken by elected peoples' representatives buttressed by a civil and military bureaucracy. It possesses a free media and an open dynamic society. Investigating counter-insurgency operations and their consequences for the affected population in this demoeratic context is crucial in explaining either successes or failures of such missions. In this regard, the successful case of counter-insurgency in Mizoram provides the most fitting example of the state-society linkage rooted in India' s demoeratic ethos?4 After suffering from over two decades of violent insurgency led by the Mizo National Front (MNF), 1961-86, Mizoram has effectively enjoyed peace after the signing of the Mizo Peace Accord in 1986. Due to extensive negotiations (1968-86) conducted by the Union govemment with the MNF largely based on a flexible approach, Pu Laldenga, the leader of the MNF was persuaded by 1986 to

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+Outcome for Counter-Insurgency Operations

Information and

Knowledge sharing

D

i)

Classic counter-insurgency

principles---location, isolation and eradication

Demoeratic Political Culture

ii) Measured Military Methods iii) Special counter-insurgency Forces iv) Social and Cultural Awareness v) Vision of an integrative Nation building

Annexure Figure l.

Trust and nurture strategy: the lay out chain.

forsake insurgency and take part in state elections. Incidentally, Mizoram was made a full- fledged state within the Indian Union in 1987 thereby meeting one of the MNF's demands for greater political autonomy. 25 The Accord was further buttressed by an inclusive local society, whose pan-Mizo identity base succeeded in integrating minority groups like the Hmars, Reangs and Chakmas into the state' s institutional 'district council' framework. 26 Mizoram has al so been capable of providing justice, enforce laws and maintain order effectively due to its inclusive demoeratic institutional mechanisms. A case in point is the success of its Public Distribution System (PDS). The reason behind this success is the extensive involvement of elected local bodies and social organizations in the management

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and monitoring of the PDS. These institutional successes have gradually strengthened peoples' loyalty to state agencies. 27 However, the Indian counter-insurgency tactic of 'grouping villages' in order to isolate the insurgents from the population base is a glaring caveat in this otherwise success story?8 A strong collective memory of hurt exists even today among the Mizos about this grouping strategy. From 1967 to 1972, 80% of the Mizo population were uprooted from their homes and placed in 102 new villages known as 'Protected and Progressive Villages' ?9 The re-grouping started on 3 January 1967 under an army-driven Operation 'Accomplishment' and by 1972, the 102 new grouping villages housed 240,000 people. The Army contended that population control was important for counter-insurgency. However, the re-grouping resulted in forced displacement of people, human rights violations, and destruction of centuries old traditional villages. Hence, for 'trust and nurture' to work in a counter-insurgency situation, such a grouping strategy is best avoided. The Punjab insurgency (1970s-90s) had a turbulent beginning with the Indian state' s response oscillating between limited and excessive use of force. Due to a rather brutal counter-insurgency operation in the early years devoid of any elements of 'trust and nurture', fears arose among the local population that the Panth (greater Sikh community) was in danger. 30 This resulted in a piethora of insurgent groups, namely, Khalistan Liberation Force, the All India Sikh Student's Federation (AlSSF), the Khalistan Commando Force and the Bahbar Khalsa? 1 Consequently, violence peaked during 1983-91 killing nearly 21, 000 people? 2 It was only from 1992 onwards that violence abated indicating improved understanding between civilians, military and local police. In this context, Operation 'Black Thunder' of May 1988 undertaken to flush out insurgents from the sacred Sikh Golden Temple complex in Amritsar was successful as it involved a joint command of military, police and civilians. The media broadcasted the operation on live television subsequently dispelling many local myths about state excesses. 33 Interestingly, India's counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland also followed a similar trajectory as in Punjab. The 1950s, 1960s and 1970s witnessed intense violent exchanges between the security forces and the rebel N aga National Council (NNC) resulting in innocent deaths. The rising death toll created a social memory of heavy-handedness by the Indian Army, which the insurgents utilized to their full advantage by constructing narratives about India's discriminatory policies towards the Nagas. Though Nagaland was granted statehood within India in 1963, violence continued. 34 The NNC broke off into two factions in 1980 with the formation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which further split into two leadership-based factions in 1988. The one led by Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah is known as National Socialist Council of Nagalim-IsakMuivah- NSCN (IM) and the other led by S. S. Khaplang is known as National Socialist Council of N agaland - NSCN (K). Though violence between the state forces and the rebel outfits have ceased since the Union government signed ceasefires with both outfits in 1997 and 2001 respectively, inter-factional killings

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have increased due to the non-existence of a ceasefire between rival outfits. 35 Such killings have resulted in more than 50 deaths in 2008 alone and social violence is on the increase in Naga areas. Though periodic elections to the Nagaland State Assembly have been held, this demoeratic process has failed to deter insurgent violence especially since N aga politicians !ink up with insurgent leaderships for purposes of power and control over the population' s choices. 36 Perhaps a counter-insurgency operation based on India's constitutional provisions of effective and inclusive institution building and the rule oflaw could have resulted in a Naga society positively engaged with Indian democracy. Therefore, civil society organizations like the N aga Hoho (Council), United N aga Council and Goan Burahs (village headmen) organization must be tapped by the counter-insurgency forces if local trust is to be built and nurtured from the ground leve!. 37 Nagaland's neighbouring state, Assam, is also reeling under incessant insurgent violence unleashed by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), and the Dima Halarn Daogah led by Jewel Garlosa-DHD (G). Though counterinsurgency operations like Operations 'Bajrang' and 'Rhino I and II' were undertaken in the 1990s against the ULFA, they had to be abandoned half way due to the local population' s resistance as these operations were undertaken in civilian areas. Perhaps, a more effective response in the future will be to factor in civil society bodies like the Asom Sahitya Sabha (literary society), the Dirnasa Apex Body, etc., who have openly condemned insurgent violence. 38 In order to increase legitimacy in the eyes of the people, India's counter-insurgency operations must account for the local peoples' aspirations and address the benefits of violence for insurgent actors like extortion networks, illegal real estate business, and drugs and small arms smuggling from neighbouring countries. It must be noted that India's federal structure enables a mixed response to insurgent violence especially in the North East. Political accommodation and institutional frameworks like territorial district councils have been offered to Boda insurgent groups in Assam and ceasefire agreements have been signed with the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K). Formal state structures have also been granted to the N agas in the 1960s and to the Mizos in the 1980s. These are indeed steps in the right direction for peoples' demoeratic empowerment through legal mechanisms and are to be strengthened.

Measured military methods Disproportionate use of violence by the state inevitably adds to the insurgent's strength by alienating the affected population whose support is important for the success of any counter-insurgency operation. 39 Therefore, counter-insurgency must utilize measured military methods, which add to the total strategy of 'trust and nurture'. As mentioned earlier, during the Punjab insurgency, the years 1983-91 witnessed a brutal suppression of the insurgency. The Akali Dal government led by Prakash Singh Badal was dismissed by the Indira Gandhi

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govemment on the mere suspicion that it was supporting pro-Khalistan groups and military operations were intensified with little regard for human rights. 40 This led to a steep fall in trust and strengthened the hands of militants like Jamail Singh Bhindranwale who, taking advantage of the widespread hardships of the local people, further radicalized the people on the pretext that Sikh religion was under threat. 41 Operation 'Wood Rose', an army operation airned at wiping out Bhindranwale's supporters in the aftermath of his death in June 1984 ended up further alienating the population due to its use of indiscriminate force, widespread human right abuses and criticallack of knowledge of the terrain and its people. As a result, the Army ended up arresting people with little connection to the extremists, actding insult to injury. 42 It serves the purpose of democracies best when the military measures are limited. In this context, Assam has witnessed the gradual change in its overall counter-insurgency strategy due to the measured military respanses by the Army after the 1990s. The ULFA has tried to provoke the military to respond disproportionately by targeting non-combatants since 2000 onwards but the restraint shown by state forces has led to a public outcry against ULFA's violence discrediting the group to a !arge extent. 43 Similarly, the populations of Diphupar and Chumukidima villages in N agaland are of the firm vie w that their safe passage through certain state highways, which is ensured by the Army's presence, has been a respite. Otherwise, insurgent actors would routinely stop public transport and demand exorbitant taxes from passengers, non-payment of which results in either grave physical injury or death. 44 This indicates a definite shift in Naga public attitude based on fear towards the Army during the 1950searly 1990s to gradual acceptance from the late 1990s onwards. In this regard, the image of the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir has enjoyed a definite positive shift after it launched Operation 'Sadhbhavana' in 2001. Earlier, the Army was routinely accused of human rights violations. Since 2001, local Kashmiri narratives have been more favourably disposed due to the positive effects of 'Sadhbhavana'. Originally conceptualized by Lieutenant General Arjun Ray, General Officer Commanding, Headquarters XIV Corps of the Northem Command, 'Sadhbhavana' involves the Army in local development projects, where a village is taken as a central focus area for development. 45 To date, 50 crores ($11 million) have been spent on the operation. The local media has gradually acknowledged the positive effects of this operation towards creating a trusting environment in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. 46 Significantly, such operations also help to assuage the painful consequences of the use of force by the Army in insurgency infested areas: an unavoidable occurrence at times due to violent insurgent adversaries.

Special counter-insurgency units

The case of Punjab since 1992 amply demonstrates the success of a well trained, highly motivated and localized state police force in countering insurgency.

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This is not happening in Assam or N agaland where the state police forces are in disarray due to the lack of reforms. Police infrastructure in the North East also lacks focused attention campramising the force' s ability to counter insurgencies. 47 The North East Police Academy established in 1978 remains largely ineffective du e to lack of funds. 48 Interestingly, the 2007-2008 Ministry of Ho me Alfairs Report on Intemal Security has pledged l 00% funds for police modernization in the region. 49 Hopefully these recommendations will be implemented in letter and spirit lt is rather important that the local police are given the task of fighting insurgents rather than the Army. The advantages enjoyed by local police in this regard are twofold: locally recruited and permanent tenures. Consequently, their intelligence gathering and assessment skills are better evolved than the arm y personnel with a limited two to three years pasting in a given area. This 'special police' capability in countering insurgents was vividly visible in the 1948-60 Malayan experience where the British Army, at best, played a supportive role. 50 However, special oversight mechanisms (similar to the British Committee System in Malaya) 51 are necessary to keep possible police corruption in check and guide their actions. Same argue that the RR is the Army's answer to counter-insurgency. To my mind, the RR is primarily an organizational innovation without doctrinal support suited to counter-insurgency. 52 lt is further handicapped by the fact that the personnel belonging to different infantry army regiments are posted on RR duty on a rotational two-year basis. This limits their ability, unlike the police, to create a well-honed culture for counter-insurgency operations based on continuous field experience. Neither are they capable of acquiring cultural knowledge of an area in such a short posting. According to Rajesh Rajagapalan 'the RR is like any other regular army infantry hattalian in the way it operates' .53 Ironically, most counter-insurgency operations are manned by massive force concentration ill-suited to counter a small band of insurgents. In Assam, Operation 'Bajrang' and Operation 'Rhino' were intensive military operations against the ULFA, which included other paramilitary forces like the Assam Ritles (AR), the CRPF, etc., as well. The operations' size was a massive 30,000 to 40,000 men in order to fight an arrned ULFA guerrilla force of a 1000 men and women! Tactically, of course, these operations were successful as they flushed out the ULFA headquarters at Lakhipathar, Assam and also succeeded in arresting same ULFA cadres. Strategically, however, these operations were disastrous. Not only did the massive deployment of troops alienate the local people b ut also most ULFA leaders and cadres were able to flee to neighbouring Bhutan to the north. The plethora of forces also created immense confusion with regard to efficient coordination. Realizing the problem of coordination, the Central Government has now set up the Unified Command Structure under IV Corps in Assam. This step, which upgrades the Army to operational dominance over the local police, is however, seen as hastile to local demoeratic procedures. 54 Indeed, this is a flawed approach. What is actually required is a 'special police' branch trained in guerrilla tactics and adept at mountain warfare. Equipped with

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adequate terrain knowledge and enjoying permanency of tenure in the insurgency affected area, these special police forces stand a better chance to activate 'trust and nurture'. The Mizoram police are a case in point. The trust they enjoy in Mizo society has enabled optimal safeguard of the 'rule of law'. Local youth organizations like the Young Mizo Association (YMA) and Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) cooperate with the local police enthusiastically in fighting social or political violence. Interestingly, during the November 2007-April 2008 bamboo fl owering and the resultant rodent population explosion in Mizoram, 55 leading to widespread food crop damage and shortage, the local police in coordination with the YMA and the MZP directed relief efforts and was able to reach out to famine-struck families in remote areas. This cooperative behaviour, however, stands in stark contrast to the local people's apprehensions about the Assam Ritles (AR), which is a paramilitary unit. Trained in the CIJWS at Vairangte, Mizoram, the AR is viewed rather sceptically with re gard to its intent. The training in CIJWS includes courses in the local langnages yet native discourses view this exercise as mere measures to identify the adversary through the dialect he or she speaks rather than as an attempt to gain local cultural knowledge. 56 In Punjab, the strengthening of the Punjab State Police in 1989 with 25,000 new ly inducted officers brought new Iife to the force and it controlied the situation to a large ex tent. However, the fl ip side of the police action in Punjab was that the local population accused the police officers of fake encounters, disappearances and human rights violations. 57 This approach, perhaps, had something to do with overall police training, which was not infused with elements of conscious trust building. lt was understandable that these police units were fighting arrned militants bu t the latter were limited to less than 5000. To alienate a population of two million Punjabis in order to counter 5000 guerrillas does not make much political sense when orre views the operations with the benefit of hindsight Counter-insurgency is a difficult task; the individual personnel invalved in such duties are required to project a combination of a policeman, a guerrilla fighter, an intelligence officer, a peace negotiator and a giver of humanitarian aid. 58 The new police units formed in Punjab in 1989 should have been guided by the following key factors: high initiative, visible motivation, passion for the job, local trust building and nurturing, terrain awareness, effective intelligence, 59 creative leadership, and political awareness. 60 Most importanti y, special counterinsurgency units must be adept at both intelligence gathering and population reassurance. The 57th Mountain Field Artillery Brigade stationed in Haflong, Assam, despite its reluctance to shoulder counter-insurgency duty, has been successful in population reassurance by patrolling thickly forested and mountairrons areas at night. The local village communities are grateful for the security brought into their otherwise high-risk lives through these efforts. 61 However, since this brigade will be stationed in the area for not more than two years, it is necessary to instill the local police with such practices coupled with better pay and incentives. At present, the salaries received by police personnel in

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The Core Base

Special Counter-Insurgency Pollee Units Insurgency

Local Bases and Recruits

/

Local Bases and Recruits

Mobilization

\

Social N etwork Ambushes

/~

Frequent Patrols

Propaganda and Social Networks

Propaganda

Provocation, Intimidation, Extortion, Political Goals, Terrain Knowledge,

Social Worker

Visible Motivation

Annexure Figure 2.

High Initialive

Trust and Nurture Process.

Passion for the Job

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the North East are so miniscule that they are at times forced to join the insurgents' extortion nexus simply to keep their families from a 'hand to mouth' existence. 62 In Nagaland, the local villages have undertaken counter-insurgency measures by forming their own small groups of arrned young men for security against insurgent raids especially at night. 63 Though not completely successful, these measures have brought in some succour to the local people from factional fighting between the NSCN (IM), the NSCN (K) and the NSCN (U). Instead of small village defence units, which are without any steady payroll and ill-equipped to fight highly arrned insurgents, speciallocal police units must be established. Social and culturat awareness

Insurgencies are inherently cultural, being deeply embedded in traditions and emerging from a local social base. Respect for local traditions would therefore increase the possibility of counter-insurgency success. 64 However, the approach to cultural training for counter-insurgency units has to be carefully designed. Otherwise, it can have harmful consequences, both for the personnel and the local population. The CIJWS, Mizoram has special courses on local culture for personnel deployed to the area. However, the school suffers from a disadvantage. The short term courses on cultural awareness are insufficient to instill a deep sense of 'culture respect' in the personnel. Moreover, this is intermixed with hardcore counter-insurgency training. Consequently, paramilitary units like the AR, despite having drawn in local recruits, naturally tends to view the population with suspicion, especially those speaking the local dialects they are taught in the school as these are viewed as the dialect of the insurgents. In Punjab, Operation 'Blue Star' of June 1984 was seen by the local Sikh communities as an assault on their religion. Worse still, it was undertaken on 5 J une, the day that marked the death anniversary of the founder of Amritsar's Golden Temple, Guru Arjan Dev. An estimated 10,000 pilgrims were present in the temple site that day. 65 In a full scale counter-insurgency operation involving six tanks, heavy artillery, four infantry fighting vehicles and three armoured personnel carriers, 4712 civilians as well as Bindhranwale were killed. 66 Several old manuscripts of the Sikhs as well as the temp le itself suffered severe damage. The entire Sikh community was outraged, if not by Bhindhranwale's death, but definitely by the attack on its holy site. This discontentment culminated in the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi in October 1984 by her two Sikh body guards. According to K. P. S. Gill, Operations 'Blue Star' and 'Wood Rose' 'in combination, gave new lease of Iife to a movement that could have been easily contained in 1984 itself' .67 Vision of an integrative nation building

In India, the exercise of nation building, especially in the insurgency infested areas, mostly appears to be a 'tops down' approach with the Centre deciding on the allocation of development funds and state govemments deciding where funds should

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go. Local communities are not given a decisive role in planning for development. Counterfactually, in order to build trust during counter-insurgency, the idea of nation-building between the state and social forces must be a cohesive 'bottoms up' approach. Mizoram, which witnessed human suffering during the 'grouping of villages' strategy, has pragressed peacefully due to a 'bottoms up' approach. Psychological studies indicate that after the Mizoram State was established in 1987, Mizo society has developed excellent grassmot institutional structures of accommodation and inclusiveness. 68 This is largely due to the involvement of local level institutions in socio-economic development rather than a 'tops down' development policy conceptualized in New Delhi or Aizawl, the state capital. 69 Operation 'Sadhbhavana' in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh is another fit example of integrative nation-building crucial for counter-insurgency. In order to ensure the reach of Sadhbhavana, the Army has involved district administrations, civic bodies and non-govemmental organizations in remote areas like Tyakshi, Bagdang, Partapur, Hunder, Batalik, Drass, Kargil, Leh, Karu in Ladakh region and Rajouri, Udhampur, Pahalgam, Kupwara, Baramulla, Markut and Aragam in Jammu and Kashmir for development purposes, which has benefited the local population directly? 0

A few caveats Though counter-insurgency operations are poised to benefit immensely from the strategy of 'trust and nurture', optimal outcomes might pro ve difficult due to the following caveats. These are as follows: 1. Non-inclusive structures of govemance. 71 2. N on-integration of violently mobilized group s into demoeratic institutional frameworks. For instance, in states like Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Nagaland, the insurgent groups are yet to be integrated into the demoeratic process, which could create obstacles towards building trust. 3. Lack of state penetration in to inaccessible terrain in insurgency pro ne areas. 4. Extemal influence on insurgent movements. For instance, the ULFA, the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN (K) are running underground camps in Bangladeshand Myanmar respectively. 5. A population's susceptibility to insurgency. Due to economic backwardness and fear of group extinction vis-a-vis dominant others, a population might decide either to join or provide active support to insurgent groups. 6. Insurgent cross-fire (rival f actions fighting one another). If the violence has descended into ethnic or tribal cross-fires, then there is little chance that counter-insurgency will succeed unless negotiations are utilized by the state forces to pressure warring actors to give up violence and arrive at a peace agreement. This is the present situation in Nagaland plagued by inter-factional fighting with the state forces adding to the violence by doing little to deter it.

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7. Fragmentation of social and political control among various groups other than the state. This explains the society-insurgent nexus. 72 Sadly enough, most of the Indian counter-insurgency operations have scored low onthese caveats. The modus operandi is most! y limited to containment of an insurgency, and not on rooting out insurgencies per se. The blame game for counter-insurgency failures is easily pinned by the Army on the limitations of India's demoeratic ethos, which decries the disproportionate use of force, or the naivety of politicians in matters tactical and strategic. The propensity of a society to insurgent movements also depends on the leve! of inclusiveness of the state structures. Assam and N agaland suffer from the absence of efficient, competent and reliable local administrative structures. The district councils in Assam are high! y corrupt untrustworthy bodies !east capable ofbeing responsive to people's needs. Consequently, though the 'rule of law' mechanism exists on paper, it is hardly implemented in practice creating further alienation and fragmentation of population loyalties. Subsequently, arrned movements in Assam, Nagaland and Jammu and Kashmir have e volved into Iong drawn-out insurgencies with no sign of 'let-off' in the near future. Conclusion

The Army needs to realize that doctrinal training in conventional warfighting when used for counter-insurgency is a recipe for disaster. 73 Doctrinal changes are, however, hard to digest, especially when the suggestions for change are coming from outside the Army. Among the institutional obstacles to change within the Army itself are the firmly held beliefs that counter-insurgency is an aberration rather than the rule and therefore the army's present conventional structure must not be tampered with. Last but not the !east, the career paths and promotions in army ranks are based on the conventional experience. 74 Interestingly, this author' s convietians about not using the Army as a counter-insurgency force have been shared by serving arm y officers and personnel in insurgency affected areas? 5 This article has laid out preliminary ideas on this new concept of 'trust and nurture'. In a brief analysis, it is clear that a deeper stud y needs to be conducted on each of the variables to fine-tune the concept and refine the responses. Significantly, two variables play a key role in the fruition of this concept intelligence gathering and population reassurance. Population reassurance and security in conflict situations is the key as uncertainty and insecurity results in sub-optimal counter-insurgency outcomes. Finally, this discussion is only the beginning. Purther elaboration of this mode! awaits future research. No tes l.

For more details, see Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and its Annies, 212 and 243. For an understanding of the Army's reluctance to shoulder counter-insurgency duties, see Rajagopalan, "'Restoring Normalcy": The Evolution of the Indian Army's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine', 44-68.

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4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Il. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

81

Rajagopalan, 'Innovations in Counter-Insurgency: The Indian Army's Rashtriya Riftes', 25-37. Interview by the author with K. Padmanabhaiah, Government ofIndia interlocutor, Naga Peace Talks, Shillong, Meghalaya, 12 July 2007. See 'Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations', Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence (Army), Headquarters Army Training Command, December 2006. For an understanding ofthe 'hearts and minds' strategy, see R. W. Komer, The Malayan Insurgency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful CounterInsurgency Effort, (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1972), Il- 22. lbid. See Mcinnes, 'The British Army's New Way in Warfare: A Doctrinal Misstep?' 127-41. See Van der Kloet, 'Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon against Terrorism?' 424. Byman, 'Friends likethese Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism', 79-115. Butler, 'Towards Understanding and Measuring Conditions of Trust: Evolution of a Conditions of Trust lnventory', 643-63. Also see Mishra, 'Organizational Responses to Crisis: The Centrality of Trust'. See Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, lnsurgency, and Civil War', 75-90. lnterviews conducted by the author with local insurgency-affected communities in Dhansiripar, Diphupar, Besumpui Kam and Maihiram villages in Nagaland and Haftong, Assam in July 2007 and February 2008. See Nayar, The North East and Jammu and Kashmir from Real Politik to Ideal Politik; Verghese, India's Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development; Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India's North East; Baruah, Durable Disorder Understanding the Politics of Northeast India; Mitra, Understanding Indian Insurgencies: Implications for CounterInsurgency Operations in the Third World; Latimer, What Can the United States Leam from India to Counter-Terrrorism?; Gill, Terror and Commitment: Perspectives of India's Intemal Security; Thomas, Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots ofConfiicts in South Asia; Marwah, Uncivil Wars: Pathology of Terrorism in India; Brar, Operation Blue Star: The True Story. Kiras, 'Terrorism and Irregular Warfare', 208-32. Fordetails on insurgent strategy, please see Goswami, 'Unraveling Insurgent Groups' Strategy: The Case of the National Socialist Council of N agalim in In dia', 413-38. Kiras, 'Terrorism and lrregular Warfare', 208-32. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and their Opponents Since 1750, iii-iv. See the classic thesis by Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 317-20. Also see Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 15-17; Schopol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World. Solomon and Flores, Building Trust in Business, Politics, Relationships and Life, 1-15 and 91-151. See Millen, 'The Bobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behaviour during an lnsurgency', 4-13. lbid., 5-11. See Galtung et al., Searching for Peace The Road to Transcend, 3-9. See Kloet, 'Building Trust in the Mission Area', 424-34. Most importantly, see the special issue of Daedalus journal on violence (Winter 2007): 5-119. See Tanham and Duncanson, 'Some Dilemmas of Counter-Insurgency', 113-22; Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency; Meron, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 42-1. Annexure Figure l demonstrates the casual chain.

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

82 24.

25. 26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

N. Goswami See Hassan, 'Understanding the Breakdown in North East India Exploration in State Society Relations', 15 -19; Das, A Study of Administration of Justice A mon g the Tribes and Races ofNorth Eastem Region, 32-50; Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossjire: Northeast India, 159-60; Egreteau, Instability at the Gate: India's Troubled Northeast and its Externat Connections, 34-9. See Mizoram at http://mizoram.nic.in/aboutlhistory.htm (accessed 3 August 2007). District councils are autonomous institutional grass root frameworks provided by the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Minorities are ensured representation in local decision making through their elected representatives on a five-year basis. The ongoing bamboo famine and consequent explosion in the rodent population could harm the state's positive image. See Goswami, 'Mizoram on the Verge of another Mautam?' at http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/ NarnrataGoswarni010408.htm (accessed l April 2008). This strategy was based on the classic Maoist strategy of 'isolating the insurgents from the support b ase'. Mao argued that to counter the guerrilla, one has to separate the fish (guerrilla) from the sea (support base/population). See Griffith, On Guerrilla Warfare, 32-3. Singh Jafa, 'Counter-insurgency Warfare, The Use andAbuse of Military Force' at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume3/Fault3-JafaF.htm (accessed 6 February 2008). Also see Nunthara, 'Grouping of Villages in Mizorarn: Its Social and Economic Impact', 1237-40. See Latimer, What Can the United States Leamfrom India to Counter-Terrrorism?, 14-16. Also Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs Volume 2, 1839-1988, 185-90. Kohli, 'Can Demoerades Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self Determination Movements in lndia', 325-44. See Gill, Terror and Commitment: Perspectives ofIndia 's Intemal Security, 48. Vajpayee, 'Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's Address to US Congress', Washington, DC, 14 September 2000, at http://www.usindiafriendship.net/ statements/vision/vision.htm (accessed on 2 September 2007). Also see Gill, 'End Game in Punjab, 1988-93', Faultlines, at http://www.satp.orgtp/publication/ faultlines/volume/articles3_htm (accessed 5 January 2007). See Fair, 'Military Operations in Urban Areas: The Indian Experience', 67. Formoreon the subject, see Goswami, 'The Naga Narrative of Conflict: Envisioning a Resolution Roadrnap', 287-313. The NSCN (IM) split on 23 November 2007 with a new outfit, National Socialist Council of Nagaland-(Unification) - NSCN (U) emerging from within its fold. Consequently, inter-factional killings have been on the rise. Goswami, 'Behind the Surge in N aga Violence', 13. Interviews by the author with local Naga leaders, society organizations, and rebel outfits in 2007 and early 2008. Also interviews with the Assam Regiment, Shillong, Meghalaya state, September 2006. Also see 'Public Rally in Dimapur', N agaland Post, 13 December 2008 at http://www.nagalandpost.com/statedesc.asp?section ID=52404 (accessed 13 December 2007). lnterviews conducted by the author with Dirnasa Apex body, Haflong, Assam, July 2007. Al so see 'Fight against freedom to kill', The Telegraph, Kolkata, 14 August 2007. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 198. See Kiras, 'Terrorism and Irregular Warfare', 208-32. See Committee for Coordination on Disappearances in Punjab, Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab, 11-60.

51

52

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

Small Wars & Insurgencies 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

83

See Marwah, Uncivil Wars, 159; also see Joshi, Bhindranwale Myth and Reality, 126-34; Kang, Counter-Terrorism Punjab: A Case Study, 39-52. Marwah, Uncivil Wars, 177 and Gill, Endgame in Punjab, 30. Field visittoAssam in July 2007, January and June 2008 and interviews with local media, people and villagers. Interview with Naga Hoho, Apex Naga tribal body, Diphupar, Nagaland, July 2007. Also interviews conducted with Naga villagers in Diphupar and Chumukidima, Nagaland, 24-28 July 2007. Parmar and Parmar, 'Operation Sadhbhavana: A Culture of Peace Process in Kashmir', 1-23. See S.P. Sarma, 'Operation Sadhbhavana evokes good response', The Tribune, 29 August 2007 at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20050202/j&k.htm#2 (accessed 12 September 2007). See Shujaat Bukhari, 'Winning People Over in Ladakh', The Tribune, 2005 at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050202/j&k. htm#2 (accessed 12 September 2007). See Marwah, Uncivil Wars, 224-30. See Latimer, What Can the United States Leamfrom India to Counter-Terrrorism? 53. Also North East Police Academy, North East Training Academy Background Information at http://nepa.nic.inlmain.html (accessed on 12 August 2007). See Govemment of India, Status Paper on Intemal Security Situation, New Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, (31 March 2007), 23. See Komer, The Malayan Insurgency in Retrospect, 38-52. lbid., 12-17. The RR was originally conceptualized by former Chief of Army Staff, General B.C. Joshi around 1988 to meet the growing demands for the Army's engagement in counter-insurgency. However, others within the Army argue that it was created in order to provide rear area security in Punjab during Operation 'Brasstacks' against Pakistan in 1987. lt was later made into a counter-insurgency force when Jamrnu and Kashmir erupted with insurgent violence in 1989. See Rajagopalan, 'Innovations in Counter-Insurgency: The Indian Army's Rashtriya Rifles', 28-9. See ibid., 35. See Marwah, Uncivil Wars, 224-30. The bamboo flowering cycle follows a 49-50-year cycle. lt had flowered last in 1959, whi ch h ad led to rapid rodent population increase, devastation of crops and f amine. Ineffective state relief was the proximate cause of the then MNF insurgency. See Linda Chhakchhuak, 'Whose War Game is it Anyway?' Grassmots Options, Spring 2005 at http://zoram.com/lndexphp// (accessed 3 August 2007). See Punjab Disappearances Report, 100-7 and 205-534. See Byman, 'Friends likethese Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism', 90. See. Gompert, Reads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN), 35-51. See Annexure Figure 2 for a graphic presentation of these factors. Author's interviews with village communities in Mpuielo, Jatinga and Sonpijang villages, North Cachar Hills, Assam, 17-21 July 2007. Author' s interviews with Hatlong police personnel, Haflong, As sam, 19 Jul y 2007. See interviews conducted with Naga villagers in Diphupar and Chumukidima, Nagaland, 24-28 July 2007. Also interviews conducted with villagers at Maihiram village, Dhansiripar, Nagaland, 28 July 2007. See Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, 3-20. See Brar, Operation Blue Star, 49-58. Latimer, What Can the United States Learnfrom India to Counter-Terrorism? 22. See Gill, The Knights of Falsehood, 95-7.

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

84 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

N. Goswami See Zokaitluangi, 'Acculturation and Developmental Programme: A Psychological Analysis', in Das and Goswami, India's North East: New Vistasfär Peace, 71-94. See Chandra, 'Understanding the Problem of Northeast India', 46-56. See 'The Army for the People Operation Sadhbhavana Army in Development in J and K' at http://www .armyinkashmir.nic.in/v2/articles/art_develop.shtml (accessed 4 August 2007). For more see Hassan, Reconstruction from Breakdown in Northeastern India: Building State Capacity, 1-28. See Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, 265-6. See Midgal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 39-40. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe state that the capabilities and forces required for counter-insurgency are bound to ditler from other sort of contingencies. See Leites and Wolfe, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Confiicts, 74. See Jenkins, The Unchangeable War, 1-10. Interviews conducted with The Assam Regiment, Shillong, Meghalaya and 57th Mountain Field Artillery Brigade, Hafiong, Ass am, 19 Jul y 2007.

Bibliography Baruah, Sanjib. Durable Disorder Understanding the Politics of Northeast India. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Beckett, Ian F.W. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerillas and t/wir Opponents Since 1750. London: Routledge, 2001. Bhaumik, Shubir. insurgent Cross.fire: Northeast lndia. New Delhi: Lancer, 1996. Brar, Lieutenant General K.S. Operation Blue Star: The True Story. New Delhi: UBSPD, 1993. Butter, J.K. 'Towards Understanding and Measuring Conditions of Trust: Evolution of a Conditian s of Trust Inventory'. Journal of Management 17 ( 1991 ): 643-63. Byman, Daniel L. 'Friends like these Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism'. International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 79-115. C han dra, Sudhir. 'Understanding the Problem of Northeast In dia'. India Review 6, no. l (January-March 2007): 46-56. Chhakchhuak, Linda. 'Whose War Game is it Anyway?' Grassmots Options (Spring 2005) at http://zoram.com/Indexphp// (accessed 3 August 2007). Committee for Coordination on Disappearances in Punjab. Reduced to Ashes: The lnsurgency and Human Rights in Punjab. Kathmandu, Nepal: South Asian Forum for Human Rights, 2003. Das, J.N. A Study of Administration of Justice Among the Tribes and Races of North Easte m Region. Guwahati, As sam: Law Research Institute, 1997. Egreteau, Renaud. Instability at the Gate: India's Troubled Northeast and its Externat Connections. New Delhi: Centre de Sciences Humaines, 2006. Fair, Christine. 'Military Operations in Urban Areas: The Indian Experience'. India Review 2, no. l, London 2001. Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War'. American Political Science Review 97, no. l (February 2003): 75-90. Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press, 1995. Galtung, Johan, et al. Searching for Peace The Road to Transcend. London: Pluta Press, 2002. Gill, K.P.S. 'End Game in Punjab, 1988-93'. Faultlines, at http://www.satp.orgtp/ publication/faultlines/volume/articles3_htm (accessed 5 January 2007). Gill, K.P.S. The Knights of Falsehood. New Delhi: Har Anand, 1997.

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Gill, K.P.S. ed. Terror and Commitment: Perspectives of India's Intemal Security. New Delhi: Gyan, 2001. Gompert, David C. Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN). Occasional Paper, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007. Goswami, Namrata. 'Behind the Surge in N aga Violence'. The Hindu, 13 June 2008. Goswami, Namrata. 'Mizoram on the Verge of another Mautam?' at http://www.idsa.in/ publications/stratcomments/N amrataGoswamiO l0408.htm (accessed l April 2008). Goswami, Namrata. 'The N aga Narrative of Conflict: Envisioning a Resolution Roadmap'. Strategic Analysis 31, no. 2 (March 2007): 287-313. Goswami, Namrata. 'Umaveling Insurgent Groups' Strategy: The Case of the National Socialist Council of N agalim in In dia'. Strategic Analys is 32, no. 3 (May 2008): 413-38. Govemment of lndia. Status Paper on Intemal Security Situation. New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 31 March 2007. Griffith, Samuel B. On Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Praeger, 1962. Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. Hassan, M. Sajjad. Reconstructionfrom Breakdown in Northeastern India: Building State Capacity. Tokyo: United Nations University, 2006. Hassan, M. Sajjad. 'Understanding the Breakdown in North East India Exploration in State Society Relations'. London School of Economics, Development Studies Institute, Working Paper Series, London (May 2007). Hazarika, Sanjoy. Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peacefrom India's North East. New Delhi: Penguin, 2000. Headquarters Army Training Command. Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations. New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry ofDefence (Army), December 2006. Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Morrison Taw. A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992. Jafa, Vijendra Sing h. 'Counter-insurgency Warfare, The U se andAbuse of Military Force' at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlineslvolume3/Fault3-JafaF.htm (accessed 6 February 2008). Jenkins, Brian M. The Unchangeable War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970. Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966. Joshi, Chand. Bhindranwale Myth and Reality. New Delhi: Vikas, 1984. Kang, Charanjit Singh. Counter-Terrorism Punjab: A Case Study. Burnaby, BC, Canada: Simon Fraser University, 2005. Kiras, John D. 'Terrorism and Irregular Warfare'. In Strategy in the Contemporary World An Introduction to Strategic Studies, ed. John Baylis et al., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002: 208-32. Kohli, Atul. 'Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self Determination Movements in In dia'. Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 2 (May 1997): 325-44. Komer, R.W. The Malayan Insurgency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counter-Insurgency Effort. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972. Krepinevich Jr, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1986. Latimer, William S. What Can the United States Learnfrom India to Counter-Terrrorism? Monterey, CA: US Naval Post Graduate School, 2004. Leites, Nathan, and Charles Wolf Jr. Rebellian and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts. Chicago: Markham, 1970. Mclnnes, Colin. 'The British Army's New Way in Warfare: A Doctrinal Misstep?'. Defence & Security Analys is 23, no. 2 (J une 2007): 127-41.

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Marwah, Ved. Uncivil Wars: Pathology of Terrorism in lndia. New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 1996. Meron, Gill. How Democracies Lose Small Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Migdal, Joel. Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Millen, Raymond. 'The Bobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behaviour during an Insurgency'. Parameters 36, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 4-13. Mishra, A. 'Organizational Responses to Crisis: The Centrality of Trust'. In Trust in Organizations, Frontiers of Theory and Research, ed. R. Kramer and T.R. Tyler. London: Sage Publications, 1996. Mitra, Durga Madhab (John). Understanding Indian lnsurgencies: Implications for Counter-Insurgency Operations in the Third World. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College/Strategic Studies Institute, 2007. Nayar, Lieutenant General V.K. The North East and Jammu and Kashmir from Real Politik to Ideal Politik. New Delhi: Shipra, 2005. Nunthara, C. 'Grouping of Villages in Mizoram: Its Social and Economic Impact'. Economic and Political Weekly, 25 July 1981: 1237-40. Parmar, Dr Leena and Major Daljit Singh Parmar. 'Operation Sadhbhavana: A Culture of Peace Process in Kashmir'. Seminar paper, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 2002: 1-23. Rajagopalan, Rajesh. 'Innovations in Counter-Insurgency: The Indian Army's Rashtriya Rifies'. Contemporary SouthAsia 31, no. l (March 2004): 25-37. Rajagopalan, Rajesh. 'Restoring Normalcy': The Evolution of the Indian Army' s CounterInsurgency Doctrine'. Small Wars & Insurgencies 11, no. l (Spring 2000): 44-68. Rosen, Stephen. Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies. New York: Cornell University Press, 1996. Singh, Khuswant. History of the Sikhs Volume 2, 1839-1988. New York: Columbia University Press/South Asia Books, 1999. Skocpol, Theda. Social Revolutions in the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Salomon, Robert C. and Fernando Flores. Building Trust in Business, Politics, Relationships and Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Tanham, George K., and Dennis J. Duncanson. 'Some Dilemmas of Counter-Insurgency'. ForeignAlfairs 48, no. 2 (1970): 113-22. Thomas, Raju G.C. ed. Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Confiicts in South Asia. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. Vajpayee, Atal Vihari. 'Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's Actdress to US Congress'. Washington, DC, 14 September 2000, at http://www.usindiafriendship.net/statements/ vision/vision.htm (accessed 2 September 2007). Van der Kloet, !rene. 'Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon against Terrorism?'. Small Wars & Insurgencies 17, no. 4 (December 2006). Verghese, B.G. India's Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development. New Delhi: Konarak, 1996. Zokaitluangi. 'Acculturation and Developmental Programme: A Psychological Analysis'. In India's North East: New Vistasfor Peace, ed. Pushpita Das and Narmata Goswami. New Delhi: Manas, 2008: 77-94.

55

[4] Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Learning from lndia By Moeed Yusuf and Anit Mukherjee Pakistan is facing tremenclous jJressure to take on the threat jJosed by the Talihan-al Qaeda nexus in its "trihal belt" along its border with Afghanistan. Topping the list of U.S. demands is the concerted use of the Pakistan arm y to stem and roll back extremist infiuence. What is required is a classic counterinsurgency campaign wirhin Pakistani territory. Pakistan's neighbor and traditumal rivalindia jmwides a model for tackling this challenge. Recent statements from high-ranking Bush administration oftlcials as weil as several presiden tia! candichtes f3.voring military action wirhin Pakistan reflect growing ffustration with Islamabad's inability to deliver on its promises to curb militant activities.l Washington realizes-correctly-that while it is leading the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan, vietory in the war on terror depends on Pakistan's performance in dealing with the militant presence in its tribal region. Much of the clment discussion has revolved around the sincerity of Islamabad's cotnmitment to rake on the Islamist militants whom it has Iong treared as proxy allies. Most observers suggest that Pakistani policymakers have not been entircly forthcoming, instead choosing to play both sides in which they do just enough to stave off American criticism while allowing the militants to retain thcir sanctuaries. Whilc this may we Il have been true, recent events in Pakistan seem to have forced a strategic shift in the Pakistani mindset. Moeed Yusuf ([email protected]) is rhe director of strategic studies at Strategic and Economic Policy Research in Islamabad and a teaching fellow at Boston University. Anit Mukherjee ([email protected]), a former Indian armv officer, is a doctoral candidate at the Johns Hopkin; Univerlzl

Marginal effect

-0.1905 -1.505 16.6702 1.88209 -25.47 -0.0215 4.4713 -6.5367 -11.034

0.08393 0.59489 7.19407 1.01157 6.48825 0.01053 3.37231 3.4469 6.44902

0.012 0.005 0.010 0.032 0.000 0.021 0.092 0.029 0.044

-3.6494 -28.838 31.942 3.606 -48.805 -0.412

Independent variable

Life expectancy gap Schooling gap HDI gap(%) Landless gap Road Jensity gap(%) Natural resource index Mountain area (%) Mountain area (%) squared Constan t

No. of observations= 74 (districts) Wald ;C (8) = 81.12 Prohability = o.oooo Log-Iikelihood = -1929.3594 Pseudo R 2 = 0.5069

>r

Nate: The dependent variable is an event-a count oi the number oi people killed in each district oi Nepal. Thep-values are for one-tailed tests.

citizenry can lead to a marked reduction in the predicted degree of violence in a district. Other indicators of harizontal inequality (measured in terms of the gap between a district and Kathmandu) play a notably strong role in increasing the propensity for

212

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

132

Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates

increased civil conllicl. The gap in the human development index and landlessness both pussess strong coeflicient values. The effect of increasing the HDI gap is especially strong. We find the greater the degree of inequality in a district relative to Kathmandu, the greater the intensity of confiict. These results lend strong support to our central hypothesis. An increase in the gap in inequality between a district of 10% is associated with an increase of 32 killed by political violence on average. Resource availability is associated with lower level of civil violence. This result tends to contradiet the proposition that resource abundance leads to confiict. Indeed, it appears that resource-rich districts are likely to experience fewer deaths due to civil confiict than resource-poor districts, but the substanlive effects are modest. We also examirred the effect of geography, and find evidence of a curvilinear pattern evidenced by the statistical significance of the squared term for the portion of mountainous tcrrain in a district. Our rcsults indicatc that the cxtrcmcly mountainnus and the vallcys are less pronc to violcncc. The areas in bctwccn are most vulncrablc. The rcsults from the Poisson regression analysis provc to be quitc robust and significant. In addition to numbcr killed (incidcncc of civil violcncc ), wc also examirred the incidcncc of civil confiict in general (bombings and other forms of propcrty destruction in addition to acts of violcncc that rcsultcd in dcaths). The rcsults wcrc quitc similar to thosc prcscntcd here.

5. Conclusions and Policy lmplications As presented in seetians 3 and 4 above, harizontal inequalities in Nepal robustly explain the intensity of the Maoist insurgency. Many of these inequalities have warsened in recent years, and group differences based on caste and ethnicity are central to explaining the genesis of the present confiict. 1he caste dimension to harizontal inequality appears to exceed the spatial dimension. Reducing harizontal inequalities is part and parcel of the strategy of overall poverty reduction. 1he difference with conllict countries like Nepal isthatthere needs to be an equal focus on tackling horizontal inequalities in addition to the general strategy of poverty reduction. 1he twin strategies of poverty and harizontal inequality reduction are complementary and do not compete with orre another. H has also to be remembered that poverty, the lack of employment opportunities, and other forms of harizontal inequality assist Maoist recruitment and retention, making life in Maoist cadres a relatively attractive option. The key areas of harizontal inequality that need to be addressed include landlessness, the debt burden of the rural poor, as well as greater non-upper-caste access to stateseetar j obs. Donor support and aid can play a pivotal role in reducing confiict intensity. Despite the fact that aid is fungible and money allocated for social seetar expenditure can be diverted to military use, aid might prove useful in reducing the intensity of fighting. This is because military expenditure is very resilient in the presence of civil war. Without aid, social-seetar expenditure might be even lower than in the presence of a id. The peace party within the state needs to be encouraged, and improvements in matters relating to human rights could be a condition of aid. Development assistance needs to be related to "commitment technologies," actions that promate lesser conflict intensity (Addison and Murshed, 2002). At a fundamental leve] there is a tradeoff for the state involving fighting the insurgents or appeasing them. It is, therefore, unfortunate that some donors are encouraging military solutions, providing military aid and tolerating Nepal's slide back to autocracy based on an inapplicable excuse: fighting international terrorism. Outright

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL

213 133

mililary vietory for eilher side is unlikely. A narrow focus on the proseculion of war also serves lo dislracl all cancerned from the rool eauses of lhe insurgency: in lergroup inequality, poverty, and widespread human rights abuses. 8 Military strategies also do not assist the process of the removal and redress of human rights abuses, so central to eliminating the ordinary Maoist guerrilla's intrinsic motivation to fight.

References Addison, Tony and S. Mansoob Murshed, "Credibility and Reputation in Peace Making," Journal of Peace Research 39 (2002):487-50. - - - , "From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract," UNU/WIDER discussion paper 48. Available at www.wider.unu.edu (2001). Addison, Tony, Philippe Le llillon, and S. Mansoob Murshed, "Conllict in Africa: the Cost of Peaceful Hehaviour," Journal of !l frican Fconomies 11 (2002):365-86. - - - , "Finance in Conftict and Reconstruction,'' Journal of International Development 13 (2001 ):951-64. Amnesty International, "Nepal: a f)eepening Human Rights Crisis," ASA 31/072/2002. Available at www.amnestyinternational.org (2002). Berdal, Mats and David Malone (eds). G re ed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil W ars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner (2000). Hista, Dor Hahadur, Fatalism and Development: Nepal's Struggle for Modernisation, Patna: Orient Longman (1991); 2nd edn 1999. Bourguignon, Francois and Thierry Verdier. "Oligarchy. Democracy, Inequality and Growth," Journal of Development Economics 62 (2000):285-313. Buhaug, Halvard and Scott Gates, "Geography and Civil War,'' Journal of Peace Research 39 (2002):417-33. Bray, John, Leiv Lunde, and S. Mansoob Murshed, "Economic Drivers in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency," in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds), Beyond Greed and Grievance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner (2003):107-32. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffter, "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars." Available at www. worldbank.org (2001). Easterly, William, ''lnequality Does Cause Underdevelopment," unpublished. World Bank (2001). ESP, Enabling State Programme: Pro-Poor Governance Assessment in Nepal, Kathmandu: Polyimage (2001 ). Gates, Scott, "Recruitment and Allegiance: the Microfoundations of Rebellion," Journal of Confiict Resolution 46 (2001):111-30. Gates, Seott and Håvm·d Strand, "Military Intervention, Democratization, and Post-conftict Political Stability," mimeo. Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO (2004). Gautam, Shobha, Women & Children in the Periphery of Peoples War, Kathmandu: Institute of Human Rights Communication Nepal (IHRICON) (2001). Gouriereux, Christian, Alain Monfort, and Alain Trognan. "Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Application to Poisson Models," Econometrica 52 (1984):701-20. Grossman, Hersehel I., "A General Equilibrium Mode! of Insurrections," American Economic Review 81 (1991):912-21. Gurung, Harka, Nepal Social Demography and Expressions, Kathmandu: New Era (1998). Hegre, Hävard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates. and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Towards a Demoeratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Civil Change, and Civil War 1816-1992," American Political Science Review 95 (2001):17-33. Karki, Arjun K., "The Politics of Poverty and M ovements from I3elow in N ep al,'' doctoral dissertation, University of East An glia, Norwich, UK (2001 ). Lee, Lung-Fei, "Specification Test for Poisson Regression Models," International f:conomic Review 27 (1986):689-706.

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Murshed. S. Mansoob, '·Civil War. Conftiet and Underdevelopment," Journal of Peace Research 39 (2002a):387-93. ---,"On Natural Resource Abundance and Underdevelopment," background paper, World Development Report 2003, World Bank. Availablc at www.worldbank.org (2002b ). Olson, Maneur, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1965). - - - , "Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Som e Nations are Rich, and Others Poor." Journal of Economic Perspectives l O (1996):3-24. Stewart, Frances, "Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal lnequalities," Oxford Development studies 28 (2000):245-62. Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, "CLARIFY: software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results," version 2.1. See http://gking.harvard.edu (2003). UNDP, Human Development Reports, Nepal, Kathmandu (2001 and 1998). Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conftict 1989-1999," Journal of Peace Research 37 (2000):635-49. Walter, Barbara F., Committing to Peace: the Successful Sertiement of W ars, Princeton: Princeton University Press (2001 ).

Notes 1. See Hray et al. (2003) for further details on the origins and time-line of this conftict. 2. Low-intensity armed conftict: at !east 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1000 hattle-relaled dealhs during the course of the connict. Medium-inlensil y armed conftict: alleast 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at !east 1000 deaths, but fewer than 1000 deaths per year. High-intensity armed conftict: at !east 1000 battle-related deaths per year. 3. In traditionallndian Hinduism there are five castes: Brahmins, Kashtriyas, Vaishyas, Sudras, and outcastes (untouchables or Dalits). The first two correspond to the upper strata of society. In Nepal they are known as Bahun and Chetri. respeetively. to whieh the Newari group is added to form the upper caste group. Ethnic groupsin the hills, mountains. and the Tarai constitute the lower castes. Nepal also has its untouchables or Dalit group who are frequently referred to as the ·'occupational" castes. 4. There is very little variation in the Gini coefficient for different regions. For the eastern region it is 32.1, in the central region it is 35.0, 32.6 for the west, 29.4 for the mid-west and 36.2 in the far-west.1l1is makes the far-western region the most unequaland the mid-west region the most equal, both of which are the most conftict-prone areas of Nepal. But these figures pertain to within-region inequality and not inter-regional inequality. 5. To check this assumption of independence, we also estimated these results using a negative binomial regression and a generalized event count mode!. We found no evidence of overdispersion or under-dispersion. Moreover, the results remain robust across estimations. 6. See Gourieroux (1984, p. 702-3) and Lee (1986, p. 690-1 ). 7. These valnes were calculated using the statistical package. Clarify (Tomz et al., 2003). 8. Som e of the fiercest Maoist guerrillas are women who have been rap ed by the N epalese army or security forces. This fact serves to iiiostrate that people fight notjust for material gain (extrinsic motivation), bu t also out of a sense of injustice (intrinsic motivation).

[12] Prabhakaran as Leader of the LTTE

H

BRIG (DR) S

P

SINHA (RETD)

ow does on e evaluate Prabhakaran? The mystique of the man is phenomenal. The Sri Lankan Tamils regard him as a great freedom fighter possessing motivation, fighting skills and couraga the world has rarely seen. On the other hand, he is seen by his detractors as a revilad terrorist, a megalomaniac with a "Pol Potist" streak. Whatevar may be the vardiet of posterity, Prabhakaran today controts the destiny of Tamils in Sri Lanka. His role in the Tamil insurgency is central. In assessing an as enigmatic a personality as Prabhakaran, one is Iikeiy to stray into streams of factors and constructs and in the process the result may get diffused. To facilitate the evaluation, l have used the structured frarnawork recommended by Bard O' Neil in his book lnsurgency and Terrorism. The frarnawork is designed to bring togetherfactors that have critical bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgent conflicts. The strategic factors which have a profound bearing on the outcome of any insurgent movement are the Environment, Popular and Externat Support, Organisation and Unity, and 1 Government Response . Before taking up each of the above factors separately for analysis in the context of the Tamil insurgency, it will be useful to clarify the goals, techniques and strategies of Prabhakaran's insurgent war. lt must be said about him that he has spett out his goal in unambiguous words- the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam in the North and East of Sri Lanka. To achieve his goal Prabhakaran has used all three forms of warfare, namely. terrorism. guerrilla warfare and conventional war, with skill but with diminishing returns. ln the early years of the insurgency in the 1970s. the LTIE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) carried out low-level guerrilla war characterised by the typical "hit and run" tactics. The Brig S P Sinha (Retd) was the Deputy GOC of a division at Trincomalee in OP PAWAN, and later served at the IPKF HOs at Madras as Brig (Civil Affairs). He is now a freelance writer on security matters.

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targets of guerrilla attacks during that period were mostly Tamil po11cemen and officials considered government sympathisers and informers. The anti-Tamil riots of 1983 brought about a paradigm shift in the type of violenes used by the LTTE. lt now used a mix of guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks on Sinhaless civilians. In on e of the first acts of terrorism carried out by the LTTE on 14 May 1985 in Anuradhapura, 146 civilians. many of them Buddhist monks, were killed in cold blood. The LTTE displayed brutality on an unprecedented scale. In consequence the moral supsriority of the Tamil campaign lay in shambles after a series of brutal killings of Sinhaless civilians as weil as rival members, mainly by the LTTE. 2 In recent years, the LTTE has acquired long-range artillery and heavy mortars, many captured from the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), which has enabled it to carry out some spectacular conventional attacks. The Battle of Ponneryn in Kilali lagoon erossing point south of Jaffna was a brilliant operation. 400 LTTE cadres attacked a fortified SLA camplex on the night of 11 November 1993, after wading through a mile or so of mangrove swamps, and captured it killing hundreds of soldiers. The capture of the Elephant Pass in April 2000 was another example of the LTTE's ability to launch conventional attacks on well-fortified defences with its trademark emphasis on mobility and surprise. We will now tum to strategic factors that are central to the outcome of any insurgency and show how in many of these areas Prabhakaran's leadership has been a dismal failure in exploiting the advantages with which he started his struggle to gain an independent Eelam.

THE ENVIRONMENT Terrain Although Eelam is the ancient Tamil name for the island of Sri Lanka, modern Tamil separatism is confined to the territorially contiguous Tamil-dominated Northern Province, which includes the Jaffna Peninsula (96 per cent Tamil), and the Tamil majority Eastern Provines including Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai districts. The Northern rnainland of Wanni comprises the districts of Mullaitivu, Mannar, Killinachi and Vavuniya. Jaffna Peninsula is criss-crossed

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with lagoons that hamper movement, and is thus ideally suited for guerrilla warfare. lt is however very vulnerable to a naval blockade. The only land route from the south to Jaffna Peninsula is through the Elephant Pass. The scrub jungles of Vavuniya and thick tropical forests of Mullaitivu and the eastern seaboard are ideal as guerrilla basas, and this is where Prabhaka,.ran's main basas are located. Jaffna Peninsula is separated from the Indian rnainland by a string of islets 35 kms Iong and known as Adam's Bridge. Vadaraniam and Point Galamera on the Thanjavur coast are the nearest points from Jaffna and are only 35 minutes sailing across the Palk Strait in high powered boats. Prabhakaran has used the terrain to great advantage. The LTIE has established a wide network of landing points and contacts all along the Thanjavur coast. lt has the advantage of using the fishing fleet as cover for its clandestine movement. Dernograp hy Tamils are a majority in the Northern Province. In the Eastern Province they are only 33 per cent of the population in Trincomalee, but taken tagether in Trincomalee and Batticaloa they are 42 per cent. Demography has a profound effect on the status of insurgency and the type of warfare. Whereas the overwhelming number of Tamils in the North would like to seeeda from Sri Lanka, the same is not the case in the Eastern Province. Despite speaking the same language, the Tamils of Sri Lanka are not a hornoganous Iot. There are differences between Jaffna Tamils, Ceylon Tamils and Eastern Tamils. Jaffna Tamils eonsidar themselves suparior and look down upon Ceylon Tamils. Eastern Tamils are suspicious of Jaffna Tamils. Then there is a substanfial Muslim population in the Eastern Province (33 per cent in Trincomalee) whose support for a unified North and East is crucial. We will take up the Muslim dimension in our discussion on popular support. Prabhakaran has cleverly considered the implications of the demographic distribution in selecting the type of violence in the North and south. Most of the terrorist and suicide attacks on civilian targets by the LTIE have been in the Sinhalase majority South, particularly the capita! Colombo. But the terrorist attacks in the

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South have lett Tamils living in Sinhalase majority areas vulnerable to reprisals. In the North, Prabhakaran has preterred guerrilla warfare. In choosing the South for terrorist attacks, Prabhakaran has shown that he is preparad to leave the Tamil population in the south at the mercy of Sinhalase marauders. However, it must be admitted that in recent years there have been hardly any largescale reprisals against Tamils in retaliation against acts of terrorism by the LTTE in the South.

POPULAR SUPPORT Prabhakaran started his fight against the Sri Lankan Government with a groundswell of popular support. In the early 1970s, when he was engaged in organising low-level guerrilla warfare, Tamil support for the militants was passive. But as the government responded to guerrilla attacks with senseless and indiscriminate violence against innecent Tamil civilians, it began to turn active. Young Tamils were now ready to make sacrifices by either joining the militant groups or providing intelligence information. The main separatist group, the LTTE, capturad the imagination of the Tamil masses by its resistance to the Sri Lankan Arrned Forces and·were seen as the proteetors of Tamil interests and a shield against government brutalities. The training and support provided to Tamil militant groups by lndia consequent to the 1983 anti-Tamil riots had a profound effect on Tamil insurgency. There was a mad rush to join the militant ranks. At one level the Indian support was a boost to Tamil insurgency, but at another it proved counter-productive. The increasing primacy given to the cult of violence produced contempt for law and established norms. As the militant ranks swelled, personal ambitions of insurgent leaders came into the open and a straight-forward struggle for supremacy ensued. In this struggle, Prabhakaran became convinced that it was his destiny to become the sole representative of Sri Lankan Tamils. This obsession resulted in the massaera of hundreds of Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) cadres by the LTTE.

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Bloody internat feuds coupled with "lamp post killings" summary punishment meted out to alleged criminals by tying them to electric poles and shooting them to death - produced revulsion amongst the Tamils. The mood of a large section of Tamils is best articulated by an ex-TELO rnember who agreed to fight for the LTTE when the SLA was getting the better of the LTTE during Operation Liberation in May 1987: "The reason l fought for LTTE was not because of any love for the Tigers. In fact l hate them. But we - l and my friands - did not want Tami l people to suffer at the hands of the SLA."3 Clearly, Tamil support for Prabhakaran was on the wane. Gone were the days of adulation; now there was fear. The intelligentsia was alienated, the Muslims had become suspicious and no longer trusted the LTTE, forced conscription of women and children had Jett deep scars on the Tamil psyche, and the suicida culture amongst LTTE cadres was more a symptom of their traumatisad childhood and manipulation of their minds than any indictor of their abiding commitment to Prabhakaran's vision of the future. The emphasis on death and sacrifice has become an integral part of the LTTE psyche and raised to the level of religion. We will discuss the adverse effects of each of these on popular support in some detail.

Support of the Intelligentsia The support. of intellectuals is crucial for insurgents' success because they provide strategic vision to the movement. Prabhakaran's strategic approach has been military-focused, which makes political action subordinate. His disdain for the intelligentsia was evident even in the torrnative years of his Iife as a guerrilla. When peopfe argued that it is necessary to prepara people before they are asked to take up the gun, he is reported to have commented, "You (armchair) intellectuals are afraid of blood. No struggle will take place without killings." 4 The LTTE has systematically eliminaled an entire generation of Tamil intellectuals, politicians and dissenters. Amrithalingam and Yogeshwaran were shot dead in cold blood on 13 July 1989 in

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Colombo. Amrithalingam was the leader of the opposition and a moderate TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front) leader. Yogeshwaran was the Member of Parliament from Jaffna. 8oth were killed because they opposed the LTIE and held pro-India views. In a sensational massaera in the heart of Madras, K Padmanaba of the EP RLF and 13 of his colleagues were shot and killed by a LTIE hit squad in June 1990. Padmanaba had supportad the IPKF (Indian PeaceKeeping Force) in Sri Lanka. Other prominent Tamilleaders killed were Sam Sambimuttu, MP from Batticaloa (June 1990), V Yogasangri, MP from Jaffna (June 1990), Ganeshlingam, Provincial Minister for North East (January 1990), K Kangaratnam, MP from Eastern Province (15 July 1990), two TULF Mayors of Jaffna, Mrs Sarojini Yogeshwaran and Pon Sivapalan in May and September 1998, respectively. 5 The latest Tamil moderate leader to fall prey to a LTIE suicide bomber was Neelan Tiruchelvam (July 1999). Dr Tiruchelvam had taught at Harvard in the USA and was the Director of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies and a Member of Parliament. Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, while making an obituary statement, commented: "[LTIE] should pause to eonsidar whether their cause can be truly advanced by eliminating these men and women who carry aloft the banner of community's history, culture and achievements." Conscription of Women and Children There have been many reports about child conscription by the LTIE. University Teachers Human Rights (UTHR), in one of their more important reports, have revealed the recruitment of children by LTIE to fight the SLA. The veracity of the report has not been questioned. The United Nations Special Representative on Children and Arrned Conflict, Mr Olara Otunnu, visited Sri Lanka in 1998 in the context of a finding in an UN-sponsored study- The Graca Maehel Report-that the LTTE was known to recruit children as you ng as 1O years. Although the LTTE promised to stop recruiting child warriors, its pledge has been treated with scepticism. 6 The LTIE is perhaps the first rebel group with cadres drawn mainly from children. An assessment of the LTTE fighters that have been killed in combat reveals that 40 per cent of its force are, both male and female, between nine and 18 years of age. Adele

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Balasingham in her book Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers gives credit to Prabhakaran for the creation of the women's unit, "the most fierce, highly disciplined and courageous women combatants the world has ever produced." According to her, Prabhakaran claims "that the birth, growth and expansion of the women's military wing is a remarkable achievement of our liberation struggle." But the fact that women's participation in combat has been sought in the absence of a sufficient number of male fighters is ignored~ Anna Brenchley's review of Adele Balasingham's book postulates, "If there were to be an Eelam state governed by the LTTE, there is no reason at all to believe that women, once they were no longer required as cannon fadder, would not revert to their previous status, where they were punished by whipping for deviating from the LTTE's Ten Commandments for women (no western clothes, no short hair, no riding bicycles, no going about unchaperoned, no leaving off the pottu), which was challenged by Jaffna's Mothers Front in 1985."7 The conscription of women and children has outragad Tamils of all seetians of society, but their protests have been muted due to fear of reprisals.

The Suicide Culture The suicida culture was adopted in the LTTE ranks in the early 1970s to escape arrest or to erase vital evidence. The first militant to commit suicide by swallowing cyanide was Siva Kurnar in 1974. The trend ca me in to prominenes w hen 13 LTTE cadres, who had been arrested at sea in 1987 by the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) and were about to be flown to Colombo for interrogation, swallowed cyanide capsulas and died. The masterminds behind Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, Sivarasan and Subha, killed themselves along with five others when Indian Gommandos stormed their hideout near Bangalare in August 1991. Sivarasan chose to shoot himself in the head but the others with him consurned cyanids. Unfortunately, this trend was seen by many as something of a heroic act and a manifestation of their commitment to the cause of Eel am. The LTTE is also known for ·its suicide attacks on enemy targets. The first such attack was made in July 1987, when Capt Miller of the LTIE drove an explosive-filled truck into an army

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camp near Jaffna. The LTIE is not the only group to indulge in suicide attacks. Other groups with such capability are the Palestine lslamic Jihad and the Hamas in Palestine, the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Kurdistan Workers Party of Turkey, to name a few. Among the contemporary terrorist groups, the LTIE has committed the largest nuniber of suicide attacks. lt must, however, be conceded that suicide attacks by Black Tigers (LTIE suicide bombers have been formed inta a group narned Black Tigers; the Naval wing is called Sea Tigers) have been used to deadly effect. Rajiv Gandhi, R Premadasa, Gamini Dissanayake and Ranjan Vijeratne were all killed by suicide bombers. The LTIE, however, has not accepted responsibility for their killings. By adopting this position it wants to send a signal that it is a liberation movement and not a terrorist organisation. Other than political leaders, the country's economic and cultural infrastructure have been damaged by suicide attacks. Suicide bombers have destroyed the Joint Operation Command of the military, the Central Bank and the World Trade Centre at Colombo, the temple of the Tooth Relic, a revered Buddhist shrine, and oil storage installations in Kolonnawa. The mindset behind these attacks is best understood by a reported Prabhakaran statement: "With perseverance and sacrifice, Tamil Eelam can be achieved in 100 years. But if you conduct Black Tiger operations, we can shorten the suffering of the people and achieve Tamil Eelam in a shorter period of time." 8 The LTIE suicide bomber is motivated by many factors. l t will be too simplistic to assume that the motivation comes primarily from the commitment to the cause or loyalty to Prabhakaran. The death and disappearance of Tamils, many when in SLA's custody and fake encounters, have lett deep scars on the psyche of Tamil youth. Young boysand girls scarred by such personal losses and tragedies see self-immolation as a form of revenge and martyrdom. Muslim support

Muslims conslitute a considerable percentaga of the population of Sri Lanka- nearly 7.1 per cent. The majority are concentrated in the Eastern Province. Although Muslims, they speak Tamil. There is a sharp divide on the merger of the North and the East along

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ethnic fines. While the Northern Provines is entirely Tamil-dominated, the Eastern Provines has a considerable Muslim population. In Trineomales district Tamils, Sinhaless and Musl.ims have each a population share of around 33 per cent. Muslim support is obviously crucial for the merger. According to U Gen Depinder Singh, who was the Overall Force Commander of IPKF in 1987, "in the event of a referendum, the Sinhaless were expected to vote against the merger, the Tamlis for and Muslim community was expected to vote with Tamils ... Logically Tamils should have been expected to woo the Muslims assiduously to keep them on their side. In fact the opposite appeared to happen as terrorists purporting to be LTTE startad terrorising the Muslims and a few were massacred, resulting in alienation of Muslims from Tamils."9 In an incident on 30 January 1990, the LTTE abducted nearly 80 Muslims from predominantly Muslim areas of Kalmunai, Kattankuddy and Sammanthurai as they were suspected to be supporters of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). The Muslim population is today so alienated from Tamils that they now demand a separate provincial council for themselves. ORGANISATION AND UNITY

Organisation Here we are talking of organisation in the sense of the skills an individual or a group displays in the effective use of people to organise functions for a Iong drawn out struggle; functions such as logistics, medical care, finances, information, diplomacy, etc. The record of the LTTE in some areas has been exceptionally effective whereas in many fundamental areas its performance is dismaL The LTTE's strategy being military-focused, it has displayed a remarkable innovativeness with weaponry and has started to manufacture hand grenades, claymore mines, mortars and improvised explosive devices. lts cadres have also acquired excellent proficiency in signal communications. The LTTE's record in creating a parall el political and administrative hierarchy has been uninspiring. lt consciously worked to undermine the structures of Tamil self-govemment and the merger of the North and the East, which have been the major

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demands of the Tamils since the days of Chelvanayakam. By allying itself with Premadasa to precipitate the withdrawal of the IPKF in March 1990, the LITE ensured the collapse of the NorthEast Provincial Council headed by Varadaraja Perumal, which had been painstakingly set up through the Indian diplomatic effort. The North-East Provincial Council which embodied the administrative unity of the Northern and Eastern Provinces was eventually dissolved, bringing the region under Colombo's authority once again. The withdrawal of the IPKF also ensured the marginalisation of the only power that could ensure the structure of Tamil selfgovemment For nearly five years (1990-94) the LTTE had de facto control over Jaffna but did little to develop a parailet hierarchy of political structures and institutions to administer Jaffna and other pockets of territory under its control. lt could have made use of the existing state and local structures to perform various administrative functions, but chose to destroy the existing ones. In Jaffna, the IPKF had left behind the structures of the organisation called "The Town Commandant, Jaffna," which could have been exploited to administer the Peninsula. But all the LTTE did was to raise money by taxing people. "lnterestingly, the Sri Lankan Government never stopped paying civil servants and teachers working in the North, although there was not a shadow of doubt that by so doing it was supporting the LTTE." 10

Unity T ami l insurgency has been marked by hestile rivatry between militant groups, not on any ideological grounds but to gain supremacy. Lack of unity has many deleterious effects on the insurgent movement. For example, it gives the government apportunities to infittrate the groups, dissipate resources and undermine externat support. Prabhakaran's antipathy for other militant groups is weil known. We have atready noted how the LTTE emerged as the most important insurgent group by eliminating or silencing its opponents through brutal force and intimidation. The rivatry between the LTTE and other militant groups enabled the Special T ask Force to employ the ir cadres in covert operations against the Tigers.

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In order to mitigate the effects of group rivalries and to foster a modicum of cc-operation, an umbrella organisation called the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) was formed in April 1984 with the blessings of lndia's externa! intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing. 11 The ENLF was not a unified command but a plattorm that gave the feuding groups a sense of strategic direction. After the massacre of TELO cadres by LTIE in April-May 1986, the organisation broke up. Prabhakaran never felt comfortable in this organisation. Disunity amongst the militant groups provided the government an opportunity to infiltrate the rival groups. The government's infiltration of PLOTE is a case in point. Prabhakaran's ambition and his fascist tendencies were the main eauses of disunity among the major Tamil militant groups. EXTERNAL SUPPORT lndia's Support

Externa! support is one of the decisive factors for the success of an insurgency. lt is all the more important when the struggle is Iong. lndia's support for the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka is crucial. Prabhakaran had a great advantage in securing lndia's support for the struggle against Sinhalese hegemony. Tamilnadu, the Indian state closest to Sri Lanka is home to 55 million Tamils who have a natural sympathy for Prabhakaran's fight for the legitimale rights of Sri Lankan Tamils. Unfortunately some of Prabhakaran's actions have eaused dismay and revulsion fowards the LTIE in lndia. Developments such as the LTIE fighting the IPKF and the support given by LTIE to some of the militant organisations in North-East lndia and in the state of Andhra Pradesh have dismayed all Indians. The brutal assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a LTIE suicide bomber eaused revulsion in Tamilnadu and resulted in the total loss of sympathy for it. The recent complicity of LTIE sympathisers in Tamilnadu in the kidnapping of Karnataka film star and icon, Rajkumar, by the bandit Veerappan has also outraged Indian public opinion. Changing Pattern of lndia's support

In the early days of insurgency, in the 1970's and the early

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1980's, Tamil guerrillas could flee to Tamilnadu to escape arrest by the Sri Lankan police. Prabhakaran himself took refuge in 1ndia to escape arrest on several occasions. LTTE cadres were even helped by a Tamilnadu politician to obtain Indian passports to trave! abroad for training in Lebanon by the PL0. 12 The nature of Indian support for Tamil militants underwant a profound change after the 1983 riots. Prior to 1983, Tamil insurgents found a sate sanctuary in Tamilnadu, but post-1983 the Indian Government decided to give moral, political, material and military support to the insurgents. The training of Tamil insurgents by lndia started in 1984 and continued till the lndo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed in July 1987. The Indian Government intervened directly on the side of Tamil insurgents when they were fighting against a massive SLA offensive (between January and May 1987}, preceded by the eecnornie blockade of Jaffna, which forced an exodus of refugees into Tamilnadu. The outcry in Tamilnadu and demand for direct Indian intervention to save the Tamils of Sri Lanka from genocide forced the Indian Government to send an unarmed flotilla of small sea craft with supplies and medicines. When these craft were challenged by the SLN, transport aircraft of the Indian Air Force escorted by fighter aircraft dropped supplies over Jaffna. The motivations for lndia's intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 were two-fold. In the short term, it could not overlook the overwhelming public opinion in Tamilnadu against the killings of Tamils in Sri Lanka. In the Iong term. it was concerned about Sri Lanka seeking support from a number of countries to provide training facilities for its arrned forces and the possibility of Trincomalee port being made ava1lable to the USA. The lndo-Sri Lanka Accord, therefore, sought to achieve the territorial integrity of Sri lanka, while at the same time ensuring autonomy to the Tamils and preserving Indian security interests. Clearly, the Indian motivation for providing support and Prabhakaran's aim of an independent Eelam were incongruent. The dilemma of the Indian Government was accurately illustraled "when lndia allowed its southern state of

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Tamilnadu to provide all four types of support to Tamil secessionists in Sri Lanka while the central government in New Delhi actually opposed the goal of secession (because its achievement could lead lndia's Tamils to pursue a similar aim at some point). When it appeared that the short term political benefits of placating the population of Tamilnadu might be overweighed by Tamil success in Sri Lanka, the Indian government accepted an invitation to deploy peace keeping forces in Sri Lanka, which ended up conducting counter-insurgency operations against Tamil insurgents." 13 Prabhakaran failed to grasp the crucial role of lndia's support for the attainment of his aim. The repudiation of the lndo-Sri Lanka Accord, his temporary allying with Premadasa to compel lndia to withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka and, finally, the folly of assassinating Rajiv Gandhi cost Prabhakaran his greatest asset the sympathy and goodwill of Tamils in tndia. Even more disastrous was the loss of sanctuary in Tamilnadu.

The Effect of Globalisatian on Externa! Support We have examined the centrality of lndia's support to the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka. The advent of globalisation has, however, detracted from this centrality. Peter Kloos has argued that there is farmorethan an Indianconnection to Tamil insurgency. In his view transnational (rather than international) aspects are strategic for secessionist movements like the LTIE. He connects the resilience of the LTIE to the circumstances of its going beyond the boundary of Sri Lanka and becoming a transnational enterprise. While aiding the LTIE to become a transnational enterprise, globalisation has al so exposed the true character of the LTIE as an extortionist, coercive and fascist organisation. The July 1983 anti-Tamil riots in Colombo forced thousands of Tamils to leave Sri Lanka, mostly to Tamilnadu but also to Europe, Canada and Australia. Some youngTamils fled the country to avoid conscription by the LTIE, while others, especially Tamils from Colombo, fled because the Sri Lankan arrned forces suspected them to be LTIE sympathisers and harassed them. The migrants were supportive of the LTIE and made spontaneous contributions. But the LTIE began to tax Tamils living abroad (as it did in Sri Lanka) to finance the struggle. 14 Over a period of time spontaneous

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contribution has turned to extortion. Many have relatives as weil as property in Jaffna. "Given the proclivity of the LTIE to kill, it is regarded as risky to refuse requests to financially support the movement." The LTIE is also neck deep in heroin trade. Tamil drug runners have been arrested in such places as Sri Lanka itself, Rome, Mumba1, Warsaw and Canada, confirming the existence of a large scale drug network. 15 The money is spent on the acquisition of weapons, explosives, telecommunication equipment and even naval craft. The LTIE is said to possess six small freighters, one of which was sunk in 1993 by lndia. lt is supposed to have contained $ 1,00,000 worth of weapons. On 14 February 1996 another ship sank after an attack by the SLN. International maritime law comes handy for terrorist outlits like the LTIE to avoid punishment in international waters since their vessels could only be attacked when they enter the territorial waters of a country. The LTIE has made u se of global networks and regimes for extortion and propaganda. Tamil Co-ordinating Committees of the LTIE have a chain of offices in Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia, Sweden and Switzerland. These offices distribute propaganda material but the main aim is to collect money for the LTIE, preferably via contributions but increasingly through extortion. The LTIE has also made its appearance on the Internet over which governments have no control. Peter Kloos who has researehed the LTIE' s operations abroad observes that "the outfine and nature of transnational regime of (illegal) taxing, fraud, money laundering, drug and weapons trade, threat and killing that support the LTIE in Sri Lanka should be sufficiently clear. lt seems Iikeiy tt1at the LTIE would be unable to continue its operations in Sri Lanka without the financial support collected via the transnational regimes." 16 The extortions and rnafia-like operations of its activists in countries like Canada, the UK and Sweden have begun to tarnish the image of the LTIE amongst the expatriate Tamils. DBS Jeyraj, a Tamil journalist working in Canada, has exposed the misdeeds of LTIE front organisations like the World Tamil Movement in his Toronto-based Tamil weekly, Muncharie. Muncharie was

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subsequently forced to close down as a result of intimidatian and threats by LTTE operatives. 17 Government Response

There is a Iong history of discrimination against, and betrayals of, Tamils by successive Sinhalese majority governments. Protest by Tamils against the discriminatory policies were seen by the government as rebellion and excessive force and repression were employed to silence them. These measures only gave an impetus to the sense of alienation amon g Tamils. The lndo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 provided a window of opportunity to address the Tamil grievances. Had the Government of Sri Lanka devolved adequate legislative and financial powers to the North-East Provincial Council which was formed under the provisions of the Accord, the bloody ethnic strife would have been arrested. Unfortunately obsessive Sinhala suspicion of Tamils and the obduracy of Prabhakaran frustrated that bold attempt. Equally disruptive has been the role of the Buddhist clergy. lts belief that religious and national interests are coterminous has had a negative impact on the Sri Lankan polity. Lack of unity and consensus amongst various political parties of Sri Lanka even on national issues has checkmated President Chandrika Kurnartunga in her attempt to devolve adequate political power to minority Tamils. These have combined to make Prabhakaran more implacable. Conclusion

lt is evident that Prabhakaran is losing support amongst Sri Lankan Tamils. In Jaffna, the populace, which was evacuated forcibly by the LTTE at the time of the SLA's advance in 1996, could not be retained in junglesand returned to their homes soon after the government established its control. An indisputable fact of the current situationisthat Tamils are opting to live in the 'Sinhala' South- a phenomenon that is a blow to Prabhakaran's legitimacy. Equally disastrous has been his handling of the Muslim populace in the East, whose support is crucial for the unification of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The loss of popular support for the LTTE amongst the Sri Lankan Tamils is compounded by the loss of externa! support as

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weil. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi resulted in the loss of support amongst Tamiiians in lndia- a factor central to the success of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka. The conscription of children and women, assassination of politicalleaders, involvement in heroin trade, gun running and manipulation of laws of many Western countries by its operatives for extortion and intimidation of Tamil expatriates have combined to give the "mafiaJ' tag to the LTIE. The organisation is already banned in the USA, lndia and Malaysia. Recently, the LTIE has been placed on the list of terrorist organisations in the UK and is Iikeiy to be formally banned soon after the list is approved by the Parliament. The European Union is seriously considering similar action. Russia has labelled the "LTIE a threat to peace in South Asia. " 18 Not-withstanding the support from some fringe political parties of Tamilnadu, Prabhakaran and the LTIE are today isolatad as never before in the international arena. Today Sri Lanka is on the ed ge of an abyss. The LTIE under the leadership of Prabhakaran has destroyed all alternative Tamil leadership, both militant and moderate. There are voices, both in Sri Lanka and lndia, which say that there is no alternative to peace talks with Prabhakaran. But the past experience of negotiating with the LTIE has been discouraging. Peace talks have invariably been used by Prabhakaran to lull the other side and to consolidale his position. The only alternative for Sri Lanka is to hold out and work out a consensus for granting maximum autonomy to Tamils and hope that the asealating violence will lead to abandonment of Prabhakaran by the Tami ls. Notes 1

Bard E O'Neill, lnsurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare {Brasseys lnc., 1990), pp. 160-64.

2

M R Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka : Boys to Guerrillas {New Delhi : Konark, 1994), p. 223.

3

ibid., p. 5.

4

ibid., p. 69.

5

For a more exhaustive list of Sinhala and Tamil leaders assassinated by the LTTE, see htto.ilrealitv.Lanka.com.

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6

P K Balachandran, "l t' s Crime to Recruit Kids, LTIE T old," The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 1 June 1999.

7

Anna Brenchley, "Lady Macbeth in the Jungles of Eelam," Frontline (Chennai), 23 February 1996. Pottu is the Tamil word for the tilak on the forehead.

8

See Rohan Gunaratna, "The LTIE and Suicide Terrorism," Frontline, 18 February 2000.

9

Lt Gen Depinder Singh (Retd), The IPKF in Sri Lanka (Noida : Trishul), p. 73.

10

See Peter Kloos, "Secessionist Movement in an Age of Globalisation," in Nancy Jetley, ed., Regional Security in South Asia : The Ethno Sectarian Dimension (New Delhi, Lancers), pp. 403, 404.

11

ENLF was formed in 1984 with TELO, EPRLF and PLOTE as constituents; LTIE joined it nearly a year later in 1985. Narayan Swamy, op. cit., pp. 124, 143.

12

ibid., p. 66.

13

Bard O'Neill, op. cit., p. 120.

14

Peter Kloos, op. cit., pp. 389-406.

15

16

For LTTE's heroin connection and gun running, see ib id., pp. 404-06.

ibid., p. 406.

17

See D B S Jeyraj, "LTIE targets Independent Tamil Newspaper in Canada," Frontline, 31 May 1996.

18

P K Balachandra~. "LTIE Threat to Peace in South Asia," The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 5 May 2000.

231

[13] Cogs in the Wheel? W omen in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MIRANDA ALlSON

This article examine s w omen' s involvement as combatants in the Sri Lankan Tamil guerrilla organisation the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It addresses women's motivations for choosing to join the organisation, then examines the debate over the LTTE's brand of nationalist feminism before Zooking at how women' s experiences in the movement have affected their views on gender in society. The article hopes to shed same light on the feminist debate about these women, and through this on the broader global feminist debate about women's roles in nationalism and war. The article argues for an analys is of w omen' s involvement in the movement that accords the women agency and is open to certain positive results stemming from their participation, yet recognises the problematic nature of nationalist feminism. Qadri Ismail has noted that members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the hegemonic Sri Lankan Tamil guerrilla organisation, have frequently been referred to as 'the boys' or 'our boys' by many Sri Lankan Tamils.' This gendered description is interesting when reftected upon in light of the prominent ro le of women in the LTTE, particularly since the 1990s, and the Iively debates on women's involvement that have been conducted bothin academic circles and within the Tamil communities in the northeast of Sri Lanka. This article challenges the label 'the boys' and the gendered assumptions underpinning it by looking at 'the girls' in the movement. It draws on fieldwork conducted in the north and east of Sri Lanka in 2002, including in-depth qualitative interviews with 14 female LTTE combatants and ex-combatants. The article first outlines a brief background to the conftict and history of women's involvement in the LTTE, then addresses the reasons some women have ehosen to join the organisation. It then examines the debate over the LTTE's brand of nationalist feminism before looking at how women' s experiences in the movement have affected their vie w s on gender in society. The article hopes to shed some light on the feminist debate about these

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women, and through this on the broader global feminist debate about women' s roles in nationalism and war. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT AND W OMEN' S INVOL VEMENT

Sri Lanka currently has an ethnically diverse population of about 17.5 million. There has been no census since 1983 so exact current figures are hard to come by hut it is estimated that around 74.6 per cent of the population are Sinhalese, 12.6 per cent are Sri Lankan Tamil, 7.4 per cent are Muslim, and 5.5 per cent are Indian Tamil. There are also very small minorities ofBurghers (Eurasians, mostly descended from Portuguese and Dutch colonisers), Malays and descendants of other trading peoples from East Asia and the Middle East, and a tiny indigenous population of Veddas. 2 The Sinhalese are predominantly Buddhist, with a Christian minority, while Tamils are mostly Hindu, also with a Christian minority. Christians make up about seven per cent of the population overall. The foundations for the late twentieth century war were laid during the colonial period, which is beyond the scope of this article to discuss. Various ethnically Tamil group s (of mixed religion) have been fighting against the predominantly Sinhala-Buddhist state, and Sinhalese and Muslim civilians, for an independent state in the north and east of Sri Lanka. The confiict has been increasingly violent since the 1970s, leading to war from 1983. There have been at least five main militant Tamil separatist groups, which generally have not agreed with each other on their demands or on appropriate strategies and have frequently fought amongst themselves. The most powerful group, the LTTE, attained hegemony in the mid-1980s by destroying their competitors. In 2002 it was estimated that around 70,000 people havediedas a result of the confiict. Up to 500,000 people may have left Sri Lanka and 600,000 have been displaced, with about 75,000 living in camps for intemallydisplaced people. W omen have been active in all the Tamil nationalist groups but research on their military participation has focused on the LTTE because their presence as combatants in substantial numbers has primarily been a phenomenon of the 1990s, by which point the LTTE had achieved hegemony among the organisations. Women's participation as combatants was not at all widespread in the 1970s hut in the 1980s appeals were made by the different groups for them to join the struggle. From the mid-1980s the LTTE has aggressively recruited women into their fighting cadres. Initially these women were involved in propaganda work, medical care, information collection, fundraising and recruitment, hut were soon given military training and participated in combat. In 1983 the LTTE founded a special section for women called

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the Vituthalai Pulikal Munani (Women's Front of the Liberation Tigers) but they did not begin battle training for another two years. The first group of women were trained for combat in Tamil Nadu (India) in 1985 and their first battle was against the Sri Lankan military in July 1986. In October 1987 the LTTE' s leader Velupillai Prabhakaran3 set up the first all-women training camp in Jaffna, for the seeond and subsequent groups. By 1989 this unit had its own leadership structure. 4 Until June 1990 the proportion of female fighters in the LTTE was small but it then increased rapidly. The women's military wing is a well-organised and highly disciplined force. Apparently the LTTE's naval force, the Sea Tigers, is primarily female and the suicide squad, known as the Black Tigers, has a large number of women in it. The number of female combatants is naturall y a military secret b ut estimates vary between about 15-20 per cent to one third of their core combat strength, with some less realistically claiming 50 per cent. MOTIVATIONS OF FEMALE COMBATANTS

It is weil known that the LTTE asks each Tamil family to contribute one

member to the organisation. Notwithstanding this and the persistent allegations of forcible conscription, most recruits do seem to be voluntary. The initial 'pull factor' of the LTTE's active recruitment of women seems Iikely to be, as many have suggested, primarily a pragrnatic response to the need for more fighters created by the loss of men through death, as refugees and as emigrants, rather than stemming from an ideological commitment to equality and women's rights. 5 However, this does not account for the 'push factors' of the female combatants. There are a variety of different and intersecting reasons why women have ehosen to join the militants; some of these are common to both female and male combatants, while others are gender-specific to women. Nationalist Sentiment Sumantra Bose argues that LTTE women, like LTTE men, are primarily motivated by 'nationalist fervour.' He suggests that by the time of the mid1980s drive for women to join the LTTE, 'Tamil nationalism, in its radical form, had been transformed into a mass phenomenon ... and women of the yo ung er generation of Tamils were as alienated from the state, and as in spired by the vision of a liberated Eelam, as their male counterparts' .6 This was borne out in my own research as the majority of LTTE women I interviewed referred to ideas of freedom for the Tamil nation, self-determination, land and rights for Tamils as part of or as the main reason for them joining

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the movement. Krishna, 7 now the Women's Political Wing Leader for Trincomalee District, maintained that in Sri Lanka 'there are three communities: Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims. Either you must be paraBel to the Sinhalese and live together in harmony with the same status; if not, the Tamils must be separated and live happily with their own self-determination'. Barathy, currently a soldier, asserted that 'the Sri Lankan Govemment did not respect our rights, they did not respect us, the Tamil people. We have to have a homeland for u s, a separate homeland. W e have rights like Sinhalese and W estern countries.' Suffering and Oppression Notwithstanding the above, I view nationalist sentiment as a sort of metareason for enlisting; beneath this ideological motivation there are also more specific, more personal factors operating. One such factor, intertwined with nationalist ideology, is the communal perception of suffering, oppression and injustice. Sometimes this is related to a personal experience; in other cases it has been received as part of the Tamil narrative of oppression and suffering, made tangible by witnessing the experiences of friends and neighbours. Adel e Aun 8 argues that '[g]rowing national oppression ... brought about a situation where Tamil women took to arms'.~ Thus, '[c]onstant exposure to oppression has had a profound effect on the life and thinking of youngTamil women' . 10 Aun claims that the female combatants are often from families particularly affected by the war and in some cases are motivated by personal experience. 11 Other research has found evidence to back this up. In an interview with Margaret Trawick, Sita made it clear that she and many of the other combatants were motivated to join the LTTE because of their anger over the deaths of loved ones at the hands of the Sri Lankan military and police. Her older brother was killed by the Special Task Force of the Police in 1985 and another brother was killed at Vantarmollar University in 1990. After the so-called 'troubles' of 1990 she and her sister joined the LTTE. Sita clearly emphasised that it was the death of her brothers that prompted her decision: 'my brothers were killed, and out of rage, I jo ined the movement'; 'I wanted to die as my brothers died.'~ 2 This notion of personal suffering as a motivation to join the movement was also substantiated in my own research. Four of the 14 LTTE women I interviewed mentioned the death of a family member as a motivating factor. Banuka's father was killed by the Sri Lankan army in 1990, which she gave as a primary reason for enlisting. She joined in 1993 at the age of 16 and is now the Women's Political Wing Leader for Batticaloa-Amparai District. Malarville's father was killed by the army in 1987, which affected her deeply; she was about 11 at the time. In 1990 she enlisted in the LTTE and she

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stated to me that the death of her father was one of the main reasons for this. She is currently in charge of the video section in Batticaloa-Amparai District. Thamilnila's father was killed in a boat massacre in Jaffna in 1985, allegedly perpetrated by the Sri Lankan navy in plainclothes. When I asked why she joined the LTTE, the first thing she said was 'one thing that affected me was I was deprived of a parent, of my father, and that was eausing me agitation.' However she did not enlist until 1998, at the age of 22. She is a photographer for the LTTE and has been to the hattiefield documenting the war. Finally, Thamilachi's brother died as an LTTE 'martyr' in 1990. Her family was already supporting the organisation by sheltering and assisting cadres hut her brother's death hastened her personal decision to enlist, which she did in 1991 at the age of 21. She is currently a Public Relations Officer. Six of the women mentioned that their families had been displaced and/or their areas attacked in the war and this was clearly a contributory factor for many in their decision to join. Thamilvily's familywas displaced in 1995 after her village in Jaffna was bombed and she enlisted laterthat year, at the age of 17. She is now the Women's Political Wing Leader for Jaffna District. Like Thamilvily, Barathy's family was displaced in 1995 when the army retook much of the Jaffna peninsula. When asked why she joined the LTTE she mentioned this displacement and the occupation of Jaffna, the subsequent food deprivation and the deaths of fellow students through aerial bombing. She joined the movement in 1996 at the age of 16. Sudarvili's family, also from the Jaffna peninsula, was displaced more than once. While on the move during one displacement she witnessed a horrific massacre, which also contributed to her desire to stop the insecurity and suffering her community was experiencing by joining the LTTE. She maintained that 'we feel this is the only way to keep fighting against the military and safeguard the people'. She joined in 1998 at the age of 19 and currently is a soldier. Many combatants I spoke to enlisted because of their anger over the suffering of others in their communities; eight of the women gave this as a partial or their main reason for joining. Sudarvili stated that 'our people have been suffering. The common places and the churches and the kavils [Hindu temples] were bombed by the government, without any reason. We don't have anybody to save us and what we feel is if we have someone to safeguard us then there won't be any problem.' Prasanthi stressed that at the time she enlisted at the age of 14 in 1990, Trineomake was constantly under attack by the military. Thefamily of one of her dassmates was killed, she saw people being c ut and thrown in to fire s and others being dragg ed off buses and killed. Thamilachi explained that 'the time I joined, about 1990, was perhaps the worst in this ongoing war. W e had seen with our own eyes children who had been orphaned, parents who had lost their children. And there was no

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question ofthese children getting minimum education. So what we saw, atthat juncture, only convinced u s that something must be done.' Educational Disruption and Resfrietians Given the importance accorded in the literature on Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism to the go vemment scheme known as 'standardisation', which has effectively discriminated against Tamils in university entrance, I was expecting this to be given by some of my interviewees as part of their reasons for joining the LTTE. However, what was revealed in my own research was that perhaps even more significant than the standardisation system has been the general disruption to secondary school education eaused by the war, partieulafly linked to experiences of displacement If one is prevented from even completing high school it is impossible to get access to tertiary education for this reason, without even factoring in the impact of standardisation. Five of the interviewees discussed disruption to their education as a result of displacement, three of them including this as part of the reason they enlisted in the LTTE. Sudarvili was taking A Levels but was unable to sit her exams because of displacement. 'I wanted to continue my studies but I was unable to [because of] the army operations. Again and again we were displaced. When I was studying AL I was unable to take the exams, so I decided to join our movement.' She does not want this disruption to education to happen to future generations and wanted to do something to help end this. Thamilini, now the overall W omen' s Political Wing Leader for Tamil Eelam, was also studying for A Levels when she joined the movement at the age of 18, and wanted to go on to university. Unfortunately this was in 1990 and the war situation was so bad that it was extremely difficult to study. Sexual Violence Against Women lt seems clear that as weil as motivational factors common to both women and

men there are some reasons for taking up arms that are gender-specific to women. Adele Ann claims in regard to women's recruitment that the presence of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) 'was a water shed. The Indian army was brutal and male chauvinist. The rapes, and malesting made a bitter impact.' 13 Bose al so suggests this, noting that the IPKF presence in the northeast in 1987-90 'was marked by hundreds of rapes and assaults on women by Indian soldiers, yet another instance of the violence of the state abetting oppositional strategies of social mobilisation'. 14 When I raised the issue of sexual violence against women by the IPKF and the Sri Lankan military, seven of the interviewees discussed this as a reason for women in general to join the LTTE and fear of or anger about this was part of their

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own reasoning for four of them. Thamilachi and Shanthi (no longer an LTTE member) both reported that although this was not part of their own reasons for joining, they have met many female combatants who have suffered rape, were extremely angry and enlisted forthat reason. Thamilachi also mentioned the infamous case of the rape and murder of schoolgirl Krishanthi, claiming that 'had she been in the movement she would have been safe.' Barathy volunteered the information that 'particularly in the Jaffna peninsula, Tamil girls are raped by the Sri Lankan army. I am a female; I have to liberate the Tamil women from the occupation. So I, we are, also fighting for the women' s liberation.' When I then asked if fear of rape was part of her reason to join the LTTE, she answered 'yes, i t was part of the reason for joining. Everyone has to proteet themselves. And also I have to proteet the Tamil people'. Similarly, Thamilini ans we red that the fear of sexual violence was part of her motivation. She felt that there was nobody who could proteet her, so she had to be able to safeguard herself. She also reported that in normal Tamil society women are usually blarned for their own rape. She claimed that the LTTE does not do this and instead views sexual violence as an 'accident', meaning that it was not the victim's fault. W omen' s Emancipation

As well as the fear of or anger about rape, it has been suggested that perhaps some women have joined the LTTE for a variety of reasons surmunding ideas of women' s emancipation and increasing their life opportunities. Bose suggests that it is possible 'that many women have joined the movement at least partly because they see their participation as a means of breaking taboos, and, in particular, destroying the stultifying straitjacket of conformity and subservience traditionally imposed upon them by a rigidly and selfrighteausly patriarchal society' . 15 Peter Schalk asserts that '[t]he main belief of the Tamil women fighters is that their participation in arrned struggle will bring them advantages in future, in a society at peace. This is one of their principal motives for taking up arms.' Obviously another of their fundamental objectives is the independence of Tamil Eelam, thus, '[i]n their minds, these two objectives are connected: there will be no equality for women without an independent state' . 16 I disagree with what I believe to be Schalk's over-emphasis on future advantages for women as a 'principal motive' for joining the movement, but certainly he is right that according to the ideology of the LTTE the only way for women to gain equality is through the nationalist movement. The majority of the women I interviewed said that they had not been aware of issues surrounding women's social conditions, women's rights or

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equality before the y joined the movement. However, all of them have h ad this awareness raised since being with the movement and many of them now seem to have a clear commitment to wanting to improve Iife for Tamil women (discussed in the next section). Interestingly, five of the interviewees did report that they had had same ideas about the social problems facing Tamil women before they enlisted in the LTTE; however, only two of them reported that this was part of their reason to jo in the movement. Sumathi, who writes for the LTTE's women's journal, Birds of Freedom, was 14 when she joined the LTTE in 1990. When asked why she joined, alongside seeing many people killed by shooting and shelling and wanting to help achieve 'Tamil rights', she also said that w hen she was growing up at borne there were same 'superstitions' surmunding female behaviour - that girls should not climb trees, go out alone or ride bicycles, for example. She rebelliously 'wanted to break everything', so she joined the movement. She stated that even at a young age she had had a desire to help 'deliver' women from their problems. She heard about the female cadres in the LTTE and felt 'they are doing everything, so why can't I?' When she finally met same LTTE women with their weapons, she knew she wanted to join the movement. Sudarvili said of herself and other female combatants that despite societal expectations, 'we are able to see that the boys have joined the LTTE so we thought, if they can, why can' t we do the se things?' She asserted that 'through our struggle for liberation we are fighting for the women's liberation also. Not only within the movement, outside also.' When I asked if she had had these ideas before joining the movement, she answered 'I had these ideas before, bu t most of the women cadres did not. I had a question why these girls were oppressed by these men'. She hoped to assist the struggle for women' s liberation as weil as Tamil national liberation but was unsure whether or not she could; once she enlisted she became convinced that she could do this within the movement.

COGS IN THE WHEEL ~ THE DEBATE OVER 'WO MEN' S LIEERA TIO N' AND THE LTTE

All the Tamil militant groups, particularly the LTTE, have expressed same form of commitment to women' s liberation within their commitment to national liberation. For the LTTE it is their female combatants who are the supreme symbol of women's liberation and the utilisation of feminist ideas and terminology seems in same (though my research suggests perhaps only a minority of) cases to have been a factor attracting women to the organisation. The Women's Front of the LTTE has tried to publicise

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the unequal position of Tamil women in their society. The aims of the Front, formulated in 1991, were: to secure the right to self-determination of the Tamil Eelam people and establish an independent demoeratic state of Tamil Eelam; to abolish oppressive caste discrimination and divisions, and semi-feudal customs like dowry; to eliminate all discrimination against Tamil women and all other discrimination, and to secure social, political and economic equality; to ensure that Tamil women contra! their own lives; and to secure legal protection for women against sexual harassment, rape and domestic violence. Thus, it is the independence struggle that frames the struggle for women's rights. This is clear in all speeches by LTTE leader Prabhakaran on the matter and in the views of the W omen' s Front - the Tamil struggle is prioritised and women's emancipation is seen as dependent on the struggle. According to Prabhakaran himself, '[t]he ideology of women liberation [sic] is a child bom out of the womb of our liberation struggle' ,17 it 'is the fervent child that had its genesis in the matrix of our national liberation movement. Its rise and progress is an incomparably unique chapter in history.' The women' s liberation movement is, h e claims, an integral part of the greater Tamil struggle. 1R He states that 'Tamil women are subjected to intolerable suffering as a consequence of maJe chauvinistic oppression, violence and from the social evils of casteism and dowry' and suggests that some of these problems 'can be resolved if men and women recognize each other' s liberty, equality and dignity and enter into a cordial relationship based [on] mutual understanding and share the responsibilities of family Iife and also contri bu te to the development of society'. Prabhakaran is careful to state, however, that '[t]he struggle against maJe chauvinistic oppression is not a struggle against men. It is an ideological struggle against the ignorance of men.' Significantly, he implies that only women who are invalved with the Tamil nationalist struggle can achieve liberation for women, asserting that '[i]t is only the women with a revolutionary consciousness who could become a revolutionary force. Only such a revolutionary force can destro y the shackles of oppression.' 19 Therefore, '[t]he Tamil Eelam revolutionary woman has transformed herself as a Tiger for the Liberation of our land and liberation of women. She, like a fire that bums injustices, has taken up arms. ' 20 Schalk, however, notesthat although Prabhakaran's speeches on women's liberation are very radical in many ways, they are missing 'some statement to

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the effect that the common struggle of men and women is a training in and model for ca-operation in a future society at peace. ' 21 Feminist Critiques of Tamil Nationalist Feminism and Female Combatants

Mu ch has been written about the question over the possibilities for women' s emancipation and empowerment within the LTTE. Kumudini Samuel views female arrned Tamil militants as one group of women who have rejected traditional nations of femininity, but in common with others she notes that the national liberation struggle is the primary issue for them and alleges that women's subordination within the national struggle is not a question they have addressed. 22 Slightly more optimistically, Sitralega Maunaguru maintains that even though the major Tamil nationalist groups have addressed women's equality largely from within a conventional Leftist ideology that does not recognise the specific oppression or problems of women within the nationalist movement, 'the acceptance of the concept of women' s liberation, even in this very limited form, provided an important space for issues relating to gender, power and oppression to be debated by feminists.' 23 Many feminists (and others) have questioned the ideology of 'women's liberation' expounded by the LTTE, challenging its militant and militarist nature as inherently anti-feminist and being sceptical of the idea that participation in the LTTE or the other militant groups can or has brought improvements for Tamil women as a whole. Radhika Coomaraswamy asserts that '[u]nless feminism is linked to humanism, to non-violence, to hybridity and a celebratian of life over death, it will not provide society with the alternatives that we so desperately seek' .24 As Darini RajasinghamSenanayake has poignantly suggested in regard to the varying ways that women's agency has changed and expanded as a result of the war, '[t]he argument that 18 years of arrned conftict might have resulted in the unintended empowerment of women ... is dangerous and disturbing for those of us who believe in and advocate the peaceful resolution of conf'licts arising from social injustice .... We have been wary of analysing the unintended transformations brought by war, of seeing positives in violence, lest we be branded "warmongers".'25 For many feminists committed to peace, this nation has been particularly painful in regard to women who become combatants. Hoole et al. assert that 'it would be a positive result if a few of those [female combatants] who come out, with a richness of experience and selfcriticism, become a catalyst for the further advancement of the position of women in this land.' They suggest that 'after a decade-long history of the freedom struggle, and with major liberation movements even boasting of arrned women's sections, one would have expected tangible eraeks

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in the ideology of Tamil society and some liberating experience for the women' .Z6 They themselves are pessimistic about what has actually been the reality hut it is worth hearing in mind that their book was published in 1990, only five years after women first be gan joining the LTTE as combatants. One reason for the pessimism of many is the presurned lack of women in highly placed decision-making positions within the LTTE. Chandra de Silva maintains that although there is a women' s military wing and the y are weil known as suicide bombers, there is no evidence of their participation in policymaking, decision-making or planning at the highest lev els. 27 Samuel als o asserts that despite their strong military involvement, 'no woman was allowed into the patriarchal male echelons of political decisionmaking of the LTTE' .2 R Finall y, Radhika Coomaraswamy has said ofLTTE women that '[t]hey are not initiatars of ideas, they are only implementers of policy made by someone else, by men .... The y become cogs in the wheel of someon e el se' s designs and plans .... They are the consumers, not the producers of the grand political project' .29 However, Bose claimed in 1994 that three of the LTTE's Central Committee, its top decision-making body, were women. 30 In 2002, Thamilini told me that there were currently 12 members on the Central Committee, five of whom were women. There is also a separate women-only committee on women' s development, with members drawn from vari ous seetians of the organisation. When I asked her about the allegation that women are much more represented in the military activities than in political activities, Thamilini agreed that in the past women were not so invalved in the Political Wing hut argued that this is changing. She explained that since men have been in vol ved in the LTTE and in the military activities for longerthan women, they have had many more apportunities than women to rise to high political positions. Women are not obstructed from political activities, so according to the LTTE once they have developed the necessary capabilities they are able to participate in such roles in greater numbers. Cynthia Cockburn has maintained that in her opinion, the political culture of the organisation is more important than mere numbers of women. 31 While I accept this is highly significant I think that exactly what that political culture is, and whether or not i t will ultimately produce positive or negative results for Tamil women, is still an open question and that numbers are important. Bose argues that 'given the extreme conservatism that has historically been the hallmark of Sri Lankan Tamil society ... it is difficult to disagree with the LTTE' s assessment that the mass participation, in a variety of ro les, of women constitutes "the most remarkable feature of our national struggle'". In addition, he suggests that 'the high-profile participation of women has served to impart to the Tiger Movement a general, popular character that might otherwise have been absent from it.' 32 This mirrors Nira Yuval-Davis's suggestion that

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incorporating women into militaries within nationalist movements conveys the notion that all members of the collectivity are symbolically incorporated into the military. 33 Bose maintains, therefore, that the 'liberating impact' ofthe Tiger movement on the lives of young Tamil women should not be underestimated and comments that '[t]he confidence and poise of leading Tiger women is impressive indeed.' 34 This was something I al so noticed during my field work. Tiger women have an air of quiet assurance and confidence that is not necessarily obvious in other women; even the way they carry themselves is different. In light of historical experience, however, Bose nonetheless suggests that we should be cautious in pursuing this argument. He asserts that the changes within the Tamil social formationinregard to women (and in other social areas) maynot have been consciously intended by LTTE leaders but have been a concrete res u! t of their strategies of mass mobilisation. He believes that overall the changes to the preexisting Tamil social order are seen by the LTTE leadership as being simply incidental to the ultimate goal of an independent state of Eelam which, he claims, is all the LTTE truly cares about. Social changes within the Tamil nation are welcomed and encouraged on! y 'so Iong as that process flows parallel to the national cause. '" 5 In re gard to the changing status and ro les of women this suggests, as in so man y other cases of nationalist mobilisation, the uneasy and constan t! y contested relationship between nationalism and feminism. Intellectual Changes in Female Combatants of the LITE Vidyamali Samarasinghe argues that through women's part1c1pation in arrned struggle in civil war, they also become actors in the public sphere. The question is whether this public sphere activity is temporary and transitory, ending with the war, or whether wartime gains can be Consolidated in peacetime. She reminds us that 'women's participation in the public arena of the arrned struggle is certainly no guarantee that women have finally penetrated into the public sphere of activities on a basis of gender equality' .36 Even Adele Ann herself notesthat '[t]he overall impact made by the fighting girls on Tamil society is yet to be assessed. It is also too early to prediet the future in relation to the position in Tamil society after the war is over' .37 The question of the imp act of the female cadres on other Tamil women and on Tamil society generally, and whether or not their current gains will or can be Consolidated in peacetime, is extremely important but cannot be addressed here. I do agree, however, with those who argue that in post-revolutionary states 'the priorities of governance and statehoad change, and with that the agenda for women may also change. Evidence from other liberation movements illustrates that often times women are politely told to go back into the reproductive sphere and to the kitchen' .38 I focus here on changes

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in the thinking of female combatants as a result of their experiences in the LTTE. Such participation has brought about significant changes in the roles and actions of these women and does seem to have radicalised many of them and altered their thinking about 'women's liberation'. The majority of the female combatants I interviewed stated that they had been unaware of the social problems facing Tamil women before they joined the LTTE, and as discussed earlier only two ofthe five who said they had had some awareness had actually joined in part with ideas of achieving liberation or empowerment for women. However, all but one reported being taught in political classes in the LTTE about women's social oppression and nine of them appeared to now possess a strong commitment to changing this aspect of society. The depth of their intellectual conceptualisation of and ability to articulate on such issues varied from woman to woman b ut the depth of their commitment to women in their communities was unquestionable. In terms of their own personal experiences in the LTTE, four of the interviewees discussed social restrictions on women such as not riding bicycles, not going out alone, not going in the sea or on boats; they were all happy that within the LTTE they have had the opportunity to do these things that they were raised to believe were inappropriate or dangerous for women. Krishna and Banuka both mentioned that far from their childhood of being prevented from even riding bicycles, they can now ride motorbikes and drive armoured vehicles. Krishna described being told not to go into the sea, as it would 'take' her; now she can swim for Iong distances. She was also told that women should not go on boats as they will make the seas rough; now female cadres make up a large percentage of the Sea Tigers. Thamilini reflected the frequently implied problem of the social construction of gender (though none of the women used those terms) when she stated that: I wanted to join but at that time I was not sure whether I can .... A girl, she is a very soft person - we were treated like that. I knew that we have to go to the jungles and we have to fight and we must go alone in the night. I knew that I can do that, I wanted to do that, but a small suspicion was in my mind, w hether I am capable of doing these things, because of the way I was brought up in my house. But I was able to see the other military cadres, the girls, who were doing all sorts of things. So then I thought, if they can do that, why can't I do these things? She went on to say that: In our society, they have separated the work for the men and the women, so from childhood the girl is brought up by a - that you can't do certain things. The girl feels that she can't take some decision on behalf of

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herself, so she needs others to do that on behalf of her. Because she doesn't know herself. You know, we have been brought up in this LTTE movement that we have to take decisions for ourselves. She added that 'now I have the self-confidence, now I don't need anybody. Now I won' t allo w any others to take decisions for my Iife.' She feel s that women and their abilities should be respected by others and to get that respect women 'must develop themselves and they must make others respect them.' In regard to the social problems facing Tamil women, many combatants emphasised the need to help women become independent, particularly economically independent. Sailajah,"~ who enlisted in 1990 at 21 and is the Cultural Affairs Leader for Batticaloa-Amparai District, told me 'the ladies are always depending on others, that is the main problem.' Barathy also said that women should not depend on others, they need to 'live freely and independently' and eam money for their families. Sudarvili maintained that 'we want to free the girl s in this country, not only within the movement, outside also. They must come to positions in which they can do the things which have been done by males in the country.' Krishua told me that women must be free. When I asked her what 'freedom' meant to her in this context, she replied that 'here women do not come forward for anything, they have been asked to keep quiet and do the housework. So the future generation should not be like that, women must be free, socially and economically and they must have a place, equal rights with men.' Sudarvili mentioned that young widows in particular need to be able to be independent and live alone. The problems of widows, particularly young widows, were recurring themes. Prasanthi claimed that the LTTE wants 'the women in society also to come forward and do everytbing - especially the widows and unmarried women, old rnaids who are still inside the house without working. So the aim is to bring them out and let them get self-confidence and look after themselves'. She works forming women's societies in the Trincomalee area. Through these societies they organise sports events for women, put on cultural shows, and encourage women to engage in self-employment. Banuka mentioned people speaking iii of women who attempt to go into selfemployment as a severe social problem. Thamilvily told me that in the Vanni (an LTTE-controlled area in the north) there are 'various projects we have for the women, especially women who have been affected [by the war]. There is an organisation, a project, where women are given training in auto-mechanics, which has been a domain of men. And we have encouraged them to start an auto-repair shop of their own and they are doing it weil.' Three combatants also mentioned dowry practices as a problem. This was a smaller number than I had expected, given LTTE declarations on

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the evils of the dowry system, but may reflect their discussions with Tamil women outside the organisation who complained that the LTTE prohibition on dowries had negative effects on women in terms of property inheritance. Interestingly, only Thamilini mentioned aleobolism and domestic violence as problems facing women. Although this is problematic I also found it intriguing since I know from what many nonLTTE women told me that the organisation opposes domestic violence and punishes offenders. In the LTTE-controlled areas victims of domestic violence report this to LTTE cadres, who deal with it through their de facto judicial system. Rajasingham-Senanayake was told by a young woman in one such area that at the first complaint of domestic violence the abuser is given a warning, at the seeond he is fined, and at the third he may be put in an LTTE prison. 40 This policy is supported by all the Tamil women who told me about it, including by women who in all other ways are opposed to the LTTE. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Kamala Liyanage argues that the pattem of women's participation in the LTTE is similar to that of women's participation in liberation struggles in Algeria, China, Eritrea, Namibia, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Palestine and Zimbabwe. As in these movements, the LTTE 'recognised the importance of mobilising women and formed the women's front. ... [However,] [s]imilar to mostofthese liberation movements, the LTTE has considered women's issues as secondary and their assumption has been that the emancipation of women will automatically be achieved by the vietory of the struggle.' In reality, the experience of these other struggles has shown that after war ceased, usually women were expected to resume their traditional roles or were restricted to supportive political and public positions. Liyanage asserts, therefore, that 'one is justified in concluding that the LTTE movement has been projected and defined by men particulady by Prabhakaran, executed by men and that women fight to fulfil men's nationalistic aspirations' .41 Although I would agree that so far the main thrust of the LTTE project has been defined by men, I would not go as far as Liyanage does. It is worth clearly emphasising that women have 'nationalistic aspirations' as weil and women in the LTTE generally view these as being of primary importance. It is equally true, however, that their specific nationalist aspirations may sometimes vary from those of men, as may their vision of an independent state. Joke Schrijvers asserts that '[t]he feminist discourse is the only one in which women are defined in their own right, without being linked to the interests of nationalist and ethnic struggles' .42

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I would contend, however, that this is equally problematic. Which feminist discourse does she mean? The LTTE's female cadres and W omen' s Political Wing do express a form of feminism but clearly not a form Schrijvers is comfortable with. Further, it seems that she is implying that being a woman in one's 'own right' entails being samehow 'unethnicised', as though concepts of nation and nationalism are unimportant (or should be unimportant?) if one is a woman (sisterhood is global?). Many whitewestern feminists in countries not directly or obviously affected by nationalism or political violence have been particularly guilty of assuming this; my experiences living in N orthem Ireland in recent years and researching in Sri Lanka have forced me to challenge this. W omen invalved in nationaliststruggles all over the world have shown that in their position, for many the above assumption is not only untrue and impossible but is also undesirable; commitment to the perceived needs of one's perceived nation or ethnic group is viewed as just as important, or more so, than one's needs 'as a woman'. Similarly, the debate over whether LTTE women are agents or victims, liberated or subjugated, emancipated or oppressed strikes me as an unnecessary and unsophisticated binary. Ultimatel y RajasinghamSenanayake's phrase 'ambivalent empowerment' seems to fit best. She argues that: [t]he reality of LTTE women is probably samewhere in-between. For while they may have broken out of the confines of their allotted domesticity and taken on new roles as fighters, i t is indeed arguable that they are captive both to the patriarchal nationalist project of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran and the history and experience of oppression by the Sri Lankan military. However, to deny these Tamil nationalist women their agency because they are nationalist is to once again position them within the "victim" complex, where the militant woman is denied her agency and perceived to be acting out a patriarchal plot. 4 "

NOTES A version of this article was published as 'Uneovering the Girl s in "the boys": Female Combatants in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam', Nivedini: A Journal on Gender Studies (Colombo), 10 (2003) pp. 41-70. l. Qadri Ismail, 'Boy s Will Be Boys: Gender and National Agency in Fanon and the LTTE', Fravada 1/7 (1992) p. 6. 2. Kumudini Samuel, 'Gender Difference in Conftict Resolution: The Case of Sri Lanka', in Inger Skjelsb:cek and Dan Smith (eds.) Gender, Peace and Conflict (London: SAGE Publications 200 l) p. 185. 'Sri Lankan Tamils' are somelimes referred to as 'Ceylon Tamils'. 'Indian Tamils' are also known as 'hill country Tamils', 'plantation Tamils', or 'Up-Country Tamils'; they are the descendents of south Indians brought over as indentured labour by the British to work

Unconventional Wmfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present WO MEN IN THE L TTE

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Il. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

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the British-owned plantatians in the centralhillsin the mid-nineteenth century. 'Muslims' are considered a separate ethnic group in Sri Lanka, sometimes referred to as 'Moars'. Somelimes spelt 'Pirapaharan'. For a history of the women's wing see Adele Ann, Women Fighters r!f Liheration Tigers (Jaffna: LTTE Publication Section 1993). See, for example, Mangalika de Silva, 'Women in the LTTE: Liberalian or Subjugation?', P ra vada 317 ( 1994) p. 28, Vidyamali Samarasinghe, 'Soldiers, Housewi ves and Peace Makers: Ethnic Conflict and Gender in Sri Lanka', Ethnic Studies Report 1412 (1996) p. 213 and Sitralega Maunaguru, 'Gendering Tamil Nationalism: The Construction of "Woman" in Projects of Protest and Control', in Pradeep Jeganathan and Qadri Ismail (eds.) Unmaking the Nation: The Politics of ldentity and History in Modern Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social Scientists' Association 1995) p. 163. Sumantra Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, lndia and the Tamil Eelam M ovement (New Delhi: Sage Publications 1994) pp. 109 and l l l. All name s given for LTTE members are the ir m ovement names. Adel e Ann is an Australian woman, married to LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham, and has been invalved in the Tamil struggle since 1975. She has been an arrned fighter and has trained Tamil women in guerrilla warfare. Adel e Ann, 'Women Fighters of Liberalian Tigers: W omen & the Struggle for Tamil Eelam' (EelamWeb 1990 [cited 10 May 2002]) available from http://www.eelamweb.com/women/. Ann, Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers (note 3) p. ii. Ann, 'Women Fighters of Liberalian Tigers' (nate 8). Margaret Trawick, 'Reasons for Violence: A Preliminary Ethnographic Account of the LTTE', in Siri Gamage and I B Watson (eds.) Cm1flict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka: 'Pearl of the East' or the 'Island ofTears'? (New Delhi: Sage Publications 1999) pp. 151-3 and 157. Ann, 'W omen Fighters of Liberation Tigers' (note 8). Bose (note 5) p. 109. Bose (note 5) p. III. Peter Schalk, 'Women Fighters of the Liberation Tigers in Tamil !lam. The Martial Feminism of Ate l Palacinkam', South Asia Research 1412 (1994) p. 163. V Pirapaharan, 'Tamil National Leader Hon. V. Pirapaharan's Women's International Day Message' (EelamWeb 8 March 1993 [cited 21 May 2002]) available from http://www. eelamweb.com/leader/messages/women/1993/. V Pirapaharan, 'Tamil National Leader Hon. V. Pirapaharan's Women's International Day Message' (EelamWeb 8 March 1996 [cited 21 May 2002]) available from http://www. eelamweb.com/leader/messages/women/1996/. V Pirapaharan, 'Tamil National Leader Hon. V. Pirapaharan's Women's International Day Message' (EelamWeb 8 March 1992 [cited 21 May 2002]) available from http://www. eelamweb.com/leader/messages/women/1992/. Pirapaharan, 'Women's International Day Message 1993' (note 16). Schalk (note 15) p. 168. Samuel (note 2) p. 196. Mannaguru (note 4) p. 164. Radhika Coomaraswamy, 'Tiger Women and the Question of Women's Emancipation', Pravada 419 ( 1997) p. l O. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, 'Ambivalent Empowerment: The Tragedy ofTamil W omen in Conflict', in Rita Manchanda (ed.) Women, War and Peace in South Asia: Beyond Vierimhood to Agency (New Delhi: Sage 2001) pp. 106-7. Rajan Hoole, Daya Somasundaram, K Sritharan and Rajani Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka - An inside Account (Claremont, CA: Harvey Mudd College Press 1990 revised edn.) pp. 330 and 323. Chandra de Silva, 'A Historical Overview of W omen in Sri Lankan Politics', in Sirirna Kirimabune (ed.) Women and Politics in Sri Lanka: A Comparative Perspective (Kandy: International Centre for Ethnic Studies 1999) pp. 61-2.

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28. 29. 30. 31.

Samuel (note 2) p. 195. Coomaraswamy (note 23) p. 9. Bose (note 5) pp. 108-9. Thanks to Cockbum for her feedback on an earlier conference paper draft of this piece at the PSA Women and Politics Group Annual Conference, Birkbeck College, London, 22 February 2003. Bose (note 5) pp. 110-1. Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender & Nation (London: Sage 1997) p. 98. Bose (note 5) p. 112. Bose (note 5) pp. 112 and 115-6. Samarasinghe (note 4) pp. 217 and 213. Ann, 'Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers' (note 8). Samarasinghe (note 4) p. 218. Sailajah was the only married cadre I managed to meet b ut many ofthe others were quick to tell me that they are allowed to marry while in the movement, providing they are over the accepted age (23 for women and 28 for men) and have permission from the leadership. The LTTE even has a body to arrange marriages for cadres. They refuted the common 'armed virgin' image of themselves (though unsurprisingly pre-marital or extra-marital sex is unacceptable). I was also told about chiideare centres in the Vann i, where cadres can leave their children to be cared for while they go to work or to fight. Rajasingham-Senanayake (note 24) p. 114. Kamala Liyanage, 'Women in Political Parties: The Sri Lankan Experience', in Sirirna Kirimabune (ed.) Women and Politics in Sri Lanka: A Comparative Perspective (Kandy: International Centre for Ethnic Studies 1999) pp. 131 -2. Joke Schrijvers, 'Fighters, Victims and Survivors: Constructions of Ethnicity, Gender and Refugeeness among Tamils in Sri Lanka', Journal of Refitgee Studies 1213 ( 1999) p. 328. Rajasingham-Senanayake (note 24) p. 113.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

[14] Factors leading to insurgency in Halochistan Alok Bansal* Institute for De{ence Studies and Analyse s, New Delhi, India Balachistan has been in the midst of a full ftedged insurgency for over five years now. Pakistani establishment has tried to project the current insurgency as a tribal mischief being perpetrated by a few feudal lords but the widespread support that the insurgents have been enjoying and the impunity with which they have been targeting symbols of government authority not only across the entire length and breadth of Balachistan but even outside, indicate that there are deep rooted, weil defined eauses that have led to this insurgency. The paper attempts to analyse the factors that have led to current round of insurgency in Balochistan. Keywords: Pakistan; Balochistan; Baloch; intemal disorders; Gwadar; Bugti; insurgency; BLA

Balochistan, which has been relatively peaceful for three decades, is once again in the mi d st of a full y fledged insurgency. It has been the scene of vi olent protest in the form of bomb blasts, random killings and acts of sabotage at vital installations for som e time. The current bout of violence in Balachi stan, whi ch was triggered in late 2003, refuses to subside and keeps resurfacing with amazing regularity. In December 2005, the government troops launched a fully fledged operation against the Baloch insurgents in Kohlu District, a region dominated by Marri tribesmen, the most belligerent of various Baloch tribes. This was the third time in 2005, when security forces confronted the Baloch nationalists in an open arrned confrontation. However, the scene of action in previous instances was the contignous Dera Bugti District dominated by the Bugti tribe - the largest Baloch tribe. Subsequent killing ofNawab Akbar Bugti the chieftain ofBugti tribe in an arrned action in August 2006 further infuriated the Baloch and brought disparate tribes on to one platforrn. The Baloch are too miniscule a part ofPakistan's population to inflict a direct defeat on the state forces, but despite their overwhelming military superiority the state forces have not been able to establish their writ in the region. Although the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, subsequent political developments in Pakistan and the rising tide of fundamentalism have pushed the happenings in Balachistan away from the media glare, the violence has continued unabated. Even the assassination of Nawabzada Ballach Marri in November 2007, believed to be the commander of the Baloch

*Email: [email protected]

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z

J < ('NorthWest/,' '} Frontier.;''

AFGHANISTAN

t (1999) on the Iife of the present President, Mrs Kumaratunga, failed, though she sustained an eye injury and bystanders were killed. Mostly, however, the LTTE have killed Tamils known to be working for reconciliation, including at least l OMPs and 2 mayors of Jaffua. This excludes their many savage attacks, often indiscriminate, on humble civilians. No words are adequate to describe the toll in terms of suffering and loss of Iife. Figures for those killed and disabled in the war are not available, but certainly huge; an unofficial estimate is that 60,000 people have been killed. Amnesty International has vast dossiers on atrocities committed by both sides. The LTTE seem to take no prisoners, the Sinhalese very few. Tigers who are captured are supposed to bite on a cyanide capsule, and evidently many follow instructions. They may be wise to do so, for Sri Lankan forces evidently torture on a considerable scale. While I was preparing the first draft of this artide (June 2000) I ieceived an appeal from a British charity, The Medical Foundation for the Victims ofTorture, saying: 'Last year more survivors of torture came to us from Sri Lanka than from any other country.' Though they do not make this explicit, Sri Lankan soldiers carried out that torture on Tamils. Violence breeds violence, and despair. It is interesting to look at the suicide statistics; the picture is so dramatic that it does not matter that these figures do not differentiate between Sinhalese and Tamils. In 1960, the rate for males in Sri Lanka was 13.2 per 100,000, for females 6.0. Now, Sri Lanka has one of the highest suicide rates in the world. According to figures issued by the World Health Organisation the rate of suicide among males in 1995 was 44.7 (16.6 for females). Only a few countries, almost all of them parts of the former Soviet Uniori, have higher rates. For comparison, the rate for India is 11.4 (women 8.0), Thailand 5.6 (2.4), Japan 24.3 (11.5), and UK 11.0 (3.2). (Not all the figures are for the same year.)

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26

RICHARD GOMERICH

What is the relationship between Buddhism and ethnicity? In 1956, the year in which Mr S.WR.D. Bandaranaike came into power, Buddhists were celebrating the 2,500th anniversary (by traditional dating) of the Buddha's passing away. However, the part of his programme, which inflamed civil discord mainly, cancerned language, not religion. He had a policy known as 'Sinhala only', by which Sinhala was to become the sole official language, whereas until then it had been understood that English was to be replaced as the officiallanguage by both Sinhala and Tamil. In the mainly Sinhala-speaking areas Sinhala was to replace English as the medium of instruction in higher education and elite secondary schools. Sinhalese chauvinists obliterated the Tamil writing on some road signs. This led to the first serious Sinhala-Tamil riots in 1956 and, worse, in 1958. In Nations and Nationalism (1983), Ernest Gellner has argued that as an economy rnademises the issue of language assumes paramount importance for those seeking employment. White-collar jobs, bothin public and in private enterprises, demand competence in the language of the state, and this in tum will be the language of the public education system. The group, which can make their language the medium of instruction, will gain a great economic advantage. In a democracy with universal suffrage that group is of course Iikely to be the majority. The 'Sinhala only' programme of Bandaranaike and his supporters, and their successors, was surely a textbook example to corroborate Gellner's analysis. It was also a tragic miscalculation. The local economy is far too small to flourish independently; English, the main world language, is bound to be the main avenue to white-collar employment. University gradnates educated in the Sinhala medium found themselves unemployed while English 'tutories' flourished in most villages. The frustrated expectations of the Sinhala-educated led to their arrned uprising in 1971, and their unemployment has only been mitigated by the demands of the war. The hypothesis that language, not religion, has been the relevant marker for affiliation in this terrible conflict can be tested by Jooking at the only large religious group to include speakers ofboth Sinhala and Tamil: the Roman Catholics. On this, let me quote R.L. Stirrat: Since the early 1980s there has been an increasing gap between the church in the north of Sri Lanka and that in the Sinhala-dominated south of the country. The result has been in effect a split between a Tamil Church and a Sinhala Church. During the 1983 riots Catholics were invalved alongside Buddhists in attacking Tamils, no matter what the latters' religions affiliation. In the north, the Catholic Church is closely identified with the LTTE (Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam) and many individual priests and members of the laity identifY themselves with what they see as a war of liberation against the Sri Lankan state. The

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statements of the Catholic bishops calling for peace have little impact on the generality of the laity ... Thus throughout even the most uniformly Catholic areas of southern Sri Lanka, people see themselves first and foremost as Sinhala; only secondly do they identify themselves as Catholics. So as far as the war is concerned, most Sinhala Catholics are much more shocked by reportedLITE atrocities against Sinhalathan they are by government military attacks on churches in the north or the deaths ofTamil Catholics. Whilst a shared religious affiliation is recognized, this does not generate any strong sense of identification with the Catholics of the north. (1998: 151-52) One should also look at the statements of the combatants themselves. Neither the LTTE nor their opponents identify themas Hindus, and indeed they appear to be largely secular. While being Buddhist is a major component of the Sinhalese identity, as we shall see later, and the Sinhalese do make allusions to their Buddhist tradition, nobody seems to have said that this war is being fought for Buddhism as against other religions: it is being fought for the Sinhalese. Why, then, do people brand the civil war in Sri Lanka as an example of Buddhist violence? Before I answer this question, I need to say more about my own understanding of communal violence, and how I would apply it to contemporary Sri Lanka. It is clear throughout the animal kingdom that if one starts from equilibrium, violence is not the normal means of getting one's way- it is too risky. Violence is rather used as a defence, a response to what is perceived as a threat. If I think that you are coming to kill me, or to hum my house down, I may weil take vialent action to forestall you. In a word, violence is commonly pre-emptive. And this is especially so when general law and order has broken down and one sees no chance of protection hut 'to take the law into one's own hands', as the saying goes. The pre-eruptive violence of a whole group will often be a response to a perceived threat to that group. Repeatedly throughout the last few centuries of European history, groups ranging from bands of thugs to whole societies have attacked Jews because they were perceived as a threat, even though they were a weak and helpless minority. I must here ignore many aspects of the history of anti-Semitism. It remains true that because the Jews were held to have murdered Jesus, they were believed to prey on Christians whenever the opportunity arose, and fantastic conspiracy theories were widely believed, from the story that they stol e children for ritual sacrifice to the forgery of the 'Protocol of the Elders of Zion', a document purporting to show that Jewish financiers were planning to take over the world. Like mediaeval witch-hunters, the persecutors felt themselves to be in imminent danger from their victims. What is it that eauses a social group to be perceived as a threat, so that it elicits a pre-emptive strike? I do not pretend that human affairs can be reduced to any kind of mathematical formula. But one cannot help noticing how many

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large-scale conflicts within states follow one particular pattern. This is that within a given political boundary the majority comrnunity has a minority complex, because the largest minority within that boundary has the same social identity as the community, which is in the majority next door. One finds this situation all over the place, and it is evidently very hard to deal with, not !east because it tends to replicate itself. Moreover, the fears of rnajonties in this position may even be realistic. In Ireland we have a double dose of this problem: the Irish Catholics who form two thirds of the population of the island are afraid of the Protestant minority in Ulster wbose loyalty lies with the rest of Britain, hut tben within Ulster the Protestants who are in a similar majority are frightened oftheir Catholic minority, who identify with the Catholics in the rest of the island. I regard it as no accident that the appallingly violent break-up of the formerYugoslavia bas shown this pattern again and again. In Sri Lanka the Sinbalese account for nearly three quarters of the population, which is still weil under 20 million, while the Tamils account for lessthan a quarter; but the Sinbalese are acutely conscious that just across a narrow stretch of water there are over 50 million Tamils. Moreover, the Sinbalese are well aware of their historical tradition, which goes back to ancient times, that they took possession of the island in the time of the Buddha, while the Tamils were later invaders and a eonstant threat. In (act many Tamils must have settled peaceably and relations have been good far more than they have been bad. N evertheless, Sinbalese fears of vi olent interference from the Indian rnainland are by no means unrealistic. There is no doubt in my mind that the Tamil Tiger insurgency could only establish itself in the early 1980s because the leaders found a safe haven in Tamilnadu (South India). They would come across to the Jaffna peninsula by boat at night to recruit and perform acts of violence. As already mentioned, the Tigers established training camps in India and collected arms from that base, none of which could have taken place without the connivance of the Indian government. A particularly relevant concept that we owe to modern psychology is that of displacement. Most people nowadays know about the worker who is given a bard time at work by his boss, comes borne in a foul mood, and hits his wife. Hitting the person who has made him angry would have disastrous consequences, so he displaces his anger and vents his violence on someone who cannot hit back. In choosing a vierim simply by availability, such displacement is opportunistic. Not all displacement of anger is opportunistic, hut very often it is. This simple and by now well-understood mechanism is surely of enormous importance for the study of mass violence. Let me take what I think would be a little contested example. Black people in the United States suffer many indignities, and it is hardly surprising if many of them often feel angry. This applies particularly to the many blacks that are also poor and live in run-down neighbourhoods. Black people in the United States commit a lot of violent crimes; the majority of their targets, however, are other black people. Similarly, and perhaps even more tellingly, when a black neighbourhood erupts into

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violence, the main sufferers are the local people. The rioters do particularly target non-black local shopkeepers; but by and large their anger is vented on the most available victims, those who are defenceless and near at hand. The riots of July 1983 marked a decisive stage in the outbreak of the Sinhala-Tamil civil war. The popular impression, not surprisingly, and the impression conveyed by the foreign media, was that the riots were an act of revenge wrought by the Sinhalese on their Tamil neighbours. From many eyewitness accounts, however, it is evident that that picture is so over-simplified as to be virtually false. True, it was the funeral of Sinhalese troops killed by Tamil Tigers, which provided the occasion for the riots. The rioting began among the Sinhalese crowd at the cemetery, who bad passive support from the authorities, and it seeros that an important reason why it was not brought under control was that some of the senior police officers were Tamils and were frightened of trying to take finn action against them. Moreover, it was reliably reported that during the ensuing days of arson and looting Sinhalese thugs, henchmen of nationalist politicians, used electoral registers to identify Tamil bornes and property. Even so, I believe that what followed was less a race riot than an uprising of the slums against the propertied classes. Colombo contains vast areas offilth and degradation in which poor people of all communities live side by side. Like other capital cities, it also contains relatively wealthy residential areas, and in fact the wealthiest are quite central. It appears that most of the tooting and arson was opportunistic. The perpetrators were Tarnils as weil as Sinhalese, and the victims were the wealthy, not just the Tamil wealthy. Gangs stopped and burned, or at least damaged, many cars, often without bothering to inquire whether the owner or occupier was Tamil or Sinhalese. They simply wanted to profit from a time when the forces of law and order were incapacitated to vent their rage on those they perceived as their rich oppressors. And some of the aggression was clearly displaced onto available targets. Once we start to examine the motives of the perpetrators of violence, we find that the kinds of mass violence are not actually organised typically by govemments but are full of opportunism, some of it perfectly rational, however nasty. When law and order breaks down so that criminal behaviour seeros Iikely to go unpunished, people seize the opportunity not merely to give vent to their frustrations, as by buming any ear within reach, but al so to get rich quick or to pay off old scores. I have heard detailed accounts from impeccable sources of how, during the atrnosphere of terror in 1958, Tamillandlords took the opportunity to get rid of inconvenient Tamil tenants by sending them anonymens threats which they would assume came from Sinhalese thugs. (I hope I need not say that I do not wish to single out the Tamils or any other group; I just happen to know of these cases.) The longer the breakdown in law and order persists, the more opportunism of this rational criminal kind will flourish. If your unscrupulous neighbours have got away with sacking a shop, you may overcome your usual inhibitions and take a chance likewise. This is clearly what has been happening in many parts of the fonner Yugoslavia.

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This leads to an important point. When criminal violence goes unpunished a vicious circle will develop, so tbat mo re and more people are tempted- or, in the ca se of initial victims, even forced- into further violence. For this to happen the breakdown oflaw and order need not be total. If the government allows violence against a particular social group to go unpunished, this too will suck more and more people into the vortex. In such cases of discrimination by the government, the violence may not be technically crirninal, in the sense of illegal, but it is still criminal by generally accepted norms. I suggest that vialent conflict between religious groups is mostly pre-emptive and/or opportunistic in origin, and that displacement of aggression onto scapegoats and available victims often plays a part. There must be many marginal cases, as when an act by one community is seen as a provocation by the other for Muslims to kill a cow or Hindus to carry an idol in noisy procession through a Muslim quarter will provoke the other community, and one can argue about the extent to which a violent reaction would be defensive or what I have called preemptive. Nevertheless, I think it is a valid generalisation that the kind ofviolence that concems us here is rarely the result of unprovoked and premeditated aggression - except by governrnents or comparable political powers. It is often thought that violence breeds war, but the reverse is more often the case. Once your government (or the LTTE, where it is in control) has told you to fight, you usually have little choice. If you refuse, you will be severely punished, perhaps even shot as a mutineer or deserter, and you will probably lose the respect of your peers and be socially ostracised. Here again, violence breeds violence.

Is Buddhism responsible for this war? At this point I feel l am in a position to answer the first of my three questions. Buddhism is not responsible for this war. But let me tum to consicter why people think that it might be. Sri Lanka has a national chronicle, written in Päli by Buddhist monks in several instalments over the centuries. It is called the Mahäva1{1sa, which simply means 'Great Chronicle'. Sometimes this name is reserved for the first part of the chronicle, which was probably completed early in the sixth century CE. The Mahäval!lsa regards the Sinhalese people as the rightful owners and rulers of the entire island of Sri Lanka, and identifies their fortunes with the forturres ofTheraväda Buddhism. The Buddha, the Mahäval!lsa (7: 3-5) tells us, paid three flying visits to the island during his lifetime, and on his deathbed entrusted the fortunes of the island, people, and religion to the king of the gods (who in tum put the god Vi~I}.U in charge). The dominant figure in this first part of the chronicle, to whose achievements many chapters are devoted is a king called Durthagämar_U (Sin. Dutugämm.m), first century BCE. When Durthagämai}.I was bom, a Tamil king called Elära ruled Anurädhapura, the capita] of Sri Lanka. Durthagämai}.I waged a successful war against Elära. killed him, and ruled in great pomp and piety from Anurädhapura.

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While the who le Mahäva'!lsa is written in a nationalistic spirit, and the Tamils frequently figure in it as enernies of the Sinhalese and hence of Buddhism, the most famous/notorious passage in it comes shortly after Dutthagäma:Q.I has won his war. His new luxurious Iife gives him no pleasure because something is on his mind. He asks a Buddhist monk: 'How can I be consoled? For I have eaused the slaughter of a huge army.' The monk replies: 'That deed is no obstacle on your path to heaven. You know, O King, that you have eaused the death of one and a half men. One had taken the refuges, 2 the other the five precepts as weiL The rest had wrong views and bad morals; they are considered to be on the level of domestic animals. And you will illuminate Buddhism in many ways. So stop worrying, O King.' 3 (25: 108-11) I am not aware that anyone has previously pointed out that this episode has a kind of model or precursor earlier in the same chronicle. The chronicle relates that when the great 1ndian Emperor Asoka (c.300-232 BCE) had been converted to Buddhism he was worried about events in the principal monastery in his capita!, Pätaliputra (modern Patna), and sent a minister to tell the monks to perform a communal ceremony together. For valid reasons the monks refused- whereupon the minister had some ofthem beheaded. On learning ofthis Asoka was deeply cancerned and asked the chief monk, Tissa Moggaliputta, whether he had incurred evil karrna because of his employee's act. The monk reassured him: 'Without evil intention, there is no karmic result' (Mahäva'!lsa 5: 264). I am not equating the two incidents or the two verdicts. No humane person today can regard the monk's statement to Durthagäma:Q.I that non-Buddhists are no betterthan animals without disgust. The historian however must recognise that the idea that the ends may justify the means, and the further idea that the preservation of Buddhism is a supremely worthwhile end, are both quite widely found in the Buddhist tradition. With this in mind we tum to our seeond question: whether their religious tradition predisposes Buddhists to being less vialent - that is, in public affairs than other people. When one looks at the historical record one begins to wonder how anyone ever came by the idea that it might. Robert Heinemanu writes of mediaeval Japan: The state had lost its formerly strict control over the Buddhist clergy ... many roamed through the land in anned gro ups plundering. Some temples raised their own arrnies from the so-called Söhei, 'warrior monks', to proteet themselves ... and to settie their disputes with other temples. Often temples were set on fire and destroyed. At the beginning of the 12th century the most influential temples and Shinto

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shrines ... would storm the capita! in thousands to force the court to grant their demands. Often on these occasions the Sohei would carry with them the precious litter ... containing the Shinto divinity, which Buddhism equated with a Buddha or bodhisattva. (Bechert and Gombrich 1984: 221) When the Japanese invaded Korea in the sixteenth centur-y they killed Buddhist monks and pillaged monasteries on a massive scale. In fact, most of the masterpieces of early Korean Buddhist sculpture to survive are now in Japan. If we tum from Far Eastem to N orthem Buddhism we find that in Tibet, as recently as the frrst half of the twentieth century, 'Even such areas as military command were divided [between religious and seeular authorities] and the army had two commanders-in-chief, one a lama, the other a civilian' (Bechert and Gombrich 1984: 250). 4 What about the Theraväda Buddhist tradition? When the Theraväda Buddhists from the kingdom of Ava (in modem Burma) destroyed the Theravadin city and kingdom ofAyutthaya in Thailand in 1767, they sacked the monasterles and broke open all the magnificent stilpas to extract the valuables there enshrined. This example, like thatof the Japanese invading Korea, is a clear case of ethnicity ovefriding religious affiliation. Even more remarkable is the story of how Theraväda Buddhism gained a firrn faoting in Burma. According to the chronicles, a Mon monk converted the king of Pagan, Anuruddha (B. Anawrahta) to Theraväda Buddhism soon after he gained the throne in l 044. He sent to Thaton, the Mon capita! in southem Burma, for copies of the Päli scriptures. When the Mon king refused to send them, Anuruddha invaded his kingdom, destroyed Thaton (in 1057), 'and brought back to Pagan not only the scriptures, hut Buddhist monks, and the Thaton royal farnily.' (Keyes 1977: 71). King Anuruddha 's success was of cardinal importance for the history ofTheraväda Buddhism. At that time Sri Lanka had been so devastated by the Cöla invasions that it was no longer possible to assemble the five monks necessary for holding a valid ordination ceremony. So the Sinhalese king, Vijayabähu I (1055-1110 CE), borrowed monks from Anuruddha to restare the Sri Lankan tradition. 5 One could multiply instances of how vialent Buddhists have been in practice, hut maybe one rather different example will suffice: According to the Dipavm·{!sa [another ancient chronicle], the yakkhas [ghouls] were the original inhabitants of the island. At the time of the first visit of the Buddha they had all assembled at Mahiya:rigana. The Buddha appeared in the sky over the assembly and afflicted the yakkhas with rains and cold winds. Then he addressed them to ask for a place to sit in return for dispelling these calarnities. The yakkhas readily consent to this and beseech him to provide heat to overcome the cold. The Buddha sits on his rug and makes it diffuse heat, unbearable in its intensity,

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compelling the yakkhas to flee ... In the variant version found in the Mahävaf!lsa, the yakkhas offer the Buddha the whole island ifhe would only relieve them of their distress. (Gunawardana 1978: 97) As Gunawardana (1978: 98) points out, this story is in sharp contrast to stories in the Päli canon in which the Buddha invariably wins over yakkhas by displaying tolerance and kindness towards them. Yet again, we have to tum the question round and ask why anyone should assume that Buddhists might be less vi o lent than others. My answer to this question has three parts: (l) non-violent, or at least moderate, elements in the Buddhist tradition; (2) the monastic/lay distinction; and (3) the fundamentalism of modem schalars.

Non-violence in the Buddhist tradition The tradition of Buddhism in politics and public Iife goes back to the Indian Emperor Asoka, who ruled over most of the sub-contirrent in the middle of the third century BCE. It was Asoka who was primarily responsible for the success of Buddhism and its diffusion beyond the part ofNortheast lndia where it began. He left a series of edicts inscribed on rocks and pillars. The most farnous one of all is Rock Edict XIII. He begins this edict by telling of a war he has waged against Käliiiga, in eastem India, in which thousands of people have been killed, deported, and eaused great suffering; and he declares how deeply he regrets this. He does not wish to wage war. He says of himself: The beloved of the gods thinks that even if someone does him harm, h e should tolerate it if it can be tolerated. The jungle-dwellers in his realm he also wishes to conciliate ... but points out to them his power, so that they may be modest and not get killed. tn this remarkable edict, Asoka is not entirely abjuring the use of violence. What he seems to promise is the renunciation of aggressive violence. This distinction between vi olent aggression and violence in self-defence seems to me to be crucial. Though they acted badly in many ways before the war began, and since it began have committed many atrocities, I think one could at least argue that the current Sinhalese war against the LTTE is not an aggressive but a defensive war. Moreover, though there is one claim in their chronicles that the Sinhalese invaded the Tamils on the rnainland (under Gajabähu (1132-1153)), this is probably mythical, and usually it has been the Tamils who have invaded Sinhalese areas, not vice versa. The arrival of Buddhist pacifism in public affairs I believe to be quite modem. The Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu constructed in the early 1950s a 'World Peace Pagoda on the edge ofRangoon. Through the construction of this pagoda, it was believed that peace would come not only to Burma but to the whole world'

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(Keyes 1977: 296). In Japan, Buddhism lost power in the late nineteenth century in the Meiji Restoration, and some of the smaller sects became pacifist; so me Buddhist leaders were even imprisoned for this reason during the Second World War. Undoubtedly the most farnous Buddhist pacifist in modem politics, however, is the Dalai Lama; be is the most impressive figure whose values, to say notbing of bis intellect, fit bim mucb better to be regarded as a hero in the West than would those of his predecessors. Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma has over the last decade adopted a similar stance, probably learning more from Gandbi (1869-1948) than from her native Buddhism. I do not wish to decry the courage and nobility ofthese pacifist figures when I point out tbat, unlike Asoka, tbey are in any case in no position to gain anything by resorting to force.

Lay/monastic distinctions More fundamental to this misunderstanding is the Protestant assumption that norms and values are the same for all adherents of a religion. A modern reading of what the Buddha taught would assume that bis prescriptions apply to everyone. If one is more alert to historical clues, however, one sees that he expected those who really wanted to aim for salvation (nirvii7Ja) in this life to join the sangha, the community of monks and nuns; much less was expected of the laity. To Protestants, this made no sense, and under their in:fluence some Buddhist laity in Sri Lanka started to develop a more Protestant view of their own role, The monastic bierarchy reacted to this so stronglythat in 1904 they stated, in a Memorial to King Edward VII, 'By the laws of Buddha the laity forms no part of religion,' I would call this an exaggeration, hut I quote it to show what was at stake. I have already written extensively on this topic in chapter three of my book Theraviida Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo (Gombrich 1988). I showed there that from the outset Buddhism provided for the laity what Max Weber came to call an 'insufficiency ethic ', and that it was assumed that at best the good layman would go to heaven. It was only monksand nuns who could lead such livesthat they would attain nirviil}a. Note that the sycophantic monk only proroised even King Dutj:hagämrup heaven, not nirvii7Ja. Moreover, I assume that the Emperor Asoka in his edicts mentions the attainment of heaven, not of nirvii!Ja, for much the same reason. I have shown in my book that although Buddhists in ancient times were as aware and cancerned as anyone with the difference between a good king and a bad king, they considered that his royal duties, since they involved such things as condemning criminals to death, precluded the attainment of nirvii!Ja. Monks have certainly taken part in public affairs, and some have even argued that they should do so. In Sri Lankan elections it has become normal to find monks on public platforms and they tend to believe that they have an influence, while politicians flatter them by seeking their support. My own investigations, however, suggest that such participarian costs monks the respect of the voters, and I have found that their in:fluence on votes east is probably zero (Gombrich 1973: 257-66). In the

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present crisis monastic leaders are able to command publicity in the media, at home and even abroad, and those who oppose any concession to Tamil separatism allow the politicians who do not want to make the concessions to plead the opposition of 'Buddhism' as an alibi, but my own conjecture (alas unverifiable) isthat it is no more than that: the politicians really care next to nothing for monastic opinion. If we look at the modem Buddhist pacifists I have mentioned we note that the XIVth Dalai Lama is first and foremost a spiritualleader, whose lack of temporal power may save him from certain acute dilemmas. In Japan, some of the leading pacifists have been monks. But in modem Japan the protestanisarian of Buddhism advanced further than elsewhere, in line with the advance of the modern Japanese economy, so that lay Buddhist leaders arose in a way impossible in other Buddhist countries, and correspondingly assumed certain values, which had traditionally been monastic. U Nu of Burma is an interesting case, which leads me into my fmal topic: fundamentalism.

The fundamentalism of modern scholars My seeond question at the beginning of the chapter was whether the Buddhist tradition is non-violent, and I have answered it in the negative. My third question concemed the concept of 'Buddhist fundamentalism' and how it could be applied to the current situation. At the same time, a discussion of the same concept constitutes the third and final part of my answer to the counter-question: why do people think of Buddhists as non-violent? The term 'fundamentalism' is derived from Christianity. There it has much the same meaning as the more modern term 'inerrantism': it is a claim that the Bible, the foundation of the Christian religion, is a sufficient guide for all aspects of a Christian's religious life, and is to be understood as literally true. Even if one gives to 'fundamentalism' a somewhat weaker sense, the term refers not merely to a claim to return to the foundations of a religion, as embodied in its earliest sacred texts - for probably all religious reform movements claim to do that- but at the same time a rejection of tradition. Nor is fundamentalism mere idealisation of the past; that again is extremely common, and probably part and parcel of every nationalist movement. Fundamentalists seem to be just what most Sinhalese Buddhists are not. In so far as they use any text or charter, it is a local chronicle whi ch all acknowledge to have been composed a millennium after the time of the Buddha and the foundation of Buddhism. In so far as they are aggressive we can describe themas 'militant' or even 'chauvinist'. But to call them 'fundamentalist' when they are just the opposite not only deprives the term of all heuristic value b ut, to my mind offers a completely misleading picture of the situation. The fundamentalists here are we western scholars and our acolytes, the too much maligned 'Orientalists', who have exhumed from manuscripts and published for all to read the inspiring and noble words in which the Buddha preached how to live an ideallife andescape the cycle of rebirth. It is quite understandable

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that in the nineteenth century Protestant missionaries to Sri Lanka attacked the Buddhists by the standards of their own scriptures and accused them of not practising what they preached. It is perhaps not quite so permissible more than a hundred years later to confuse the ideal code of ethics laid down for renunciates with the real historical tradition of Buddhist politics and societies. Perhaps it is the ecologists who have particularly romanticised Buddhism, a form offlattery to which the Buddhists themselves are naturally not immune. I am not entirely denying that fundamentalism exists in modern Buddhist societies. Western missionaries and schalars have influenced the bourgeoisie in Theravada societies. Gustaaf Houtman has shown how in Burma the revival of Buddhist 'insight' meditation associated with the Mahä Satipaffhäna Sutta has been intertwined with political developments: The experience of dispossession of domain coincided with an emphasis on the quest for enlightenment in the company of skeletons ... The Le-di Hsa-ya-daw [a leading monk] withdrew for the first time in the forest to practise mental culture in 1887 in direct reaction to the 1886 British annexation of Upper Burma, when he expressed fear of the 'destruction of the era'. He wrote and preached a Iot about insight and had many pupils who became themselves nationally renowned and was thereby indirectly responsible for a substantial number of the insight centres that populate Burma today. (1993: 5) U Nu was a devoted practitioner and member of this movement, 6 and tried hard to bring Buddhist values into public Iife. Unfortunately hisfate-in 1962 he was deposed by a military coup under Ne Win - illustrates all too vividly why this idealism will not work in practice; indeed, Burma has suffered the consequences ever since.

How will Buddhism be preserved? A final word. I do not wish to leave the impression either that I condone the misbehaviour of Sinhalese Buddhistsorthat it is entirely the work of the laity. The 'religious' militancy that we are witnessing in many parts of the world is first and foremost political, that is, cancerned with power, and has usually arisen as a reactian to what is seen as a threat. Sinhalese Buddhists have Iong felt threatened by Christian colonial powers, and later by India and by those (the Tamils) w hom they consicter to have close ties with India. Their aggressive response has indeed hurt the Tamils, and to a lesser extent other minorities so that they have suffered the usual fate of paranoids and made real, or aggravated, the dangers they feared. They have set up a vicious circle. As for the parts played by the Sinhalese Buddhist clergy today, they are as varied as any sensible person might expect. There are monks who are doing all

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they can to achieve peace and reconciliation. But alas, it is not they who catch the headlines. My friend Professor H.L. Seneviratne, a Sinhalese Buddhist, has recently published a fine book entitled The Work ofKings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka (1999) in which he bitterly criticises the chauvinism of certain individual monks. One in particular, Elle7 GUJ}.avaqlSa, seems to defy all traditiona1 manastic norms by composing songs for soldiers to sing in battle. It is enough to quote: My brave, brilliant soldier son Leaving [home] to defend the motherland That act of merit is enough To reach Nirvana in a future birth. When you march to hattie Like the son ofVihara Maha Devi May the gods of the four directions proteet you My son, defender of the land (Seneviratne 1999: 272) The son of Vihära Mahädevi was DutJ:hagäma~P. The idea that defending the motherland (not, note, defending Buddhism) may lead one to nirväl}a - albeit only in a future life - is certainly alien and repulsive to the mainstream of Buddhist tradition. But even Buddhists are only human.

No tes

2 3 4 5 6 7

Initially, this paper waspresentedat the symposium on 'Religion and Violence in South Asia' organized by Professor Axel Michaels of the Siidasien Institute of Heidelberg University in July 2000. The three refuges are the Buddha, the Dharnma, and the Sailgha. Taking the three refuges one declares himself to be a Buddhist. All transtations are my own. By 'civilian' I assume 'laymen' is meant. Geiger and Rickmers (1980: 214-15). See Hautman (1994: 16-21). Though he is thus spelt in the book, I believe that the flfSt name should strictly be Älle.

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Bibliography Bechert, Heinz and Richard Gombrich (eds) ( 1984), The World of Buddhism, London and N e w York: Thames and Hudson. Ge liner, Ernest ( 1983), Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Gombrich, Richard E ( 1973), 'Le clerge bouddhiste d'une circonscription kandieune et les elections generales de 1965', Social Compass 20 (2), pp. 257--66. Gunawardana, R.A.L.H. ( 1978), 'The Kinsman of the Buddha: Mythas Political Charter in the Ancient and Early Medieval Kingdoms of Sri Lanka), in Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka, edited by Bardweil L. Smith, pp. 96-106, Chambersburg, PA: Anima Books. Houtman, Gustaaf ( 1993), 'Sight and Insight: G lobalisation, Dishabit, and the Experience ofNon-Self', paper read at Association of Social Anthropologists' Decennial Conference, July 26--30, 1993, at St Catherine's College, University of Oxford. Keyes, Charles F. ( 1977), The Golden Peninsula: Culture and Adaptation in Main/and South East Asia, New York: Macmillan Mahävamsaya (1967), translated by H.S. Sumangala, Kolamba: Ratnakara Pot Velanda Salava. Seneviratna, H.L. ( 1999), The Work ofKings: The New Buddhism in Sr i Lanka, Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press. Stirrat, R.L. (1998), 'Catholic ldentity and Global Forces in Sinhala Sri Lanka', in Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority ldentities in Sri Lanka, edited by Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R. de Silva, 147-66, Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press.

Name Index Abdullah, Farooq 117-18, 138-40 passim Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammed 95, 104, 106-9, 112, 113, 115-16, 117, 118, 123, 128-31passim, 132, 133-4passim, 135-8passim, 140 Addison, Tony 202,203,204,212 Adhikary, Tom 195, 197 Aggarwa1, Ravina xix Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 264 Ahuja, Pratu1 xvii, 63-88 Akbar (Mughal Emperor)122 Alamgir, Aurangzeb 99 Alison, Miranda xv, xxiii, 233-50 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab 300, 306 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 308, 309 Ambal (Pattini) 340 Amrithalingam, A. 219-20 Anderson, Benedict 122 Angami, Sakhrie 177 Ann, Adele 236, 238, 244 Anuruddha, King 363 Asif, M. 76 Asoka, Emperor 323-4, 326, 362, 364, 365 Atwal, A.S. 278 Aurangzeb (Mughal Emperor) 122 Aurora, Jagjit Singh 287 Azam, Jean-Paul x Azzam, Abdullah 307, 308, 309 Babur (Mughal Emperor)122 Bada!, Praksah 42 Balasingham, Adele 220-21 Baloch, Abdul Hakim 260 Banabhatta 324, 325 Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D. xxii, 355, 357 Bandyopadhyay, D. 78 BaneDee, S. 66,67,68, 69, 70, 80,81 Bansal, Alok xii, xix, xxiv, 251--69 Banulm236 Barathy 236, 237, 239, 246 Bartley, Caleb M. 327 Bartov, Omer xxiii Barua, Paresh 195, 199 Baruah, Sanjib xiii, xiv, 167-84, 170, 181

Bastin, Rohan 338, 339, 340 Bajaj, Prem Nath 114 Bechert, Heinz 363 Becker, Jo xv Beg, MirzaAfzal 107 Berdal, Mats 202 Bergen, Peter 301,302,307,309 Bhadrakali (Kali) 340 Bhan, Mona xix Bhatta, Somadeva 324 Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh xxiii, 43, 47, 277, 278,279,280,282,285,286,287,288 Bhogal, Balbinder Singh xxiii Bhullar, Jaswant Singh 287, 290 Bhutto, Benazir 251, 261, 264 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali 137 Bin Laden, Osarna xx-xxi, 57, 297-314 passim Bi sta, Dor Bahadur 204 Blackburn, Stuart 344 Blom, Arnelie xi, xxiii Boquerat, Gilles xvi Bose, Manila! 171 Bose, Sumantra 235, 238, 239, 243, 244 Bourguignon, Francois 203 Brar, Kuldip Singh 294, 295 Brekke, Torkel 317, 318, 319 Brenchley, Anna 221 Bugti, Nawab Alebar 251, 257, 265 Buhaug, Halvard 204 Bukhari, Imam 125 Buragohain, Bhimkanta 195 Burling, Robbins 168, 175 Burman, B.K. Roy 182 Burman, Milton 195, 197 Bush, George W. 57, 301 Butler, Captain 172-3 Chandrakanthan, A.J.V. 341-2,343 Chandran, S. 71,79 Chassie, Charles 181 Chelvanayakam, S.J.V. 224 Chin, Warren xi, xii Choudhury, Sasbadhar 75, 199

372

Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

Christia, Fotini xii Clausewitz, Carl von xxi, 322 Cline, Lawrence E. xiii, 145-66 Cockburn, Cynthia 243 Codron, .Teremie xxiii Cohen, Stephen 292 Collier, Paul ix, 202, 203 Coomaraswamy, Radhika 242, 243 Cornish, P. 321 Creveld, Martin van xvii, 323 Crocker, Ryan 263 Dädimunda 340 Dahal, Pushpa Kamal (Prachanda) xvii Daimary, Mithinga 195 Daimary, Ranjan 199 Dal, Akali 278 Dalai Lama 365, 366 Daniel, Val 344 Das, A. 74 Das, Bolin 195 Das, Debananda 195 Das, Harshavardhan 195 Das, R..T. 64, 69, 72, 79, 81 Davis, G.S. 318 Dayal, Ranjit Singh 295 Deegalle, Mahinda xv, xxii Deka, Biju 195 Desai, Moraji 13 Dev, Guru Arjan 47 Devahuti, D. 321 Deviyo, Devol 340 Dhillon, S.S. 194 Dissanayake, Gamini 222 Dorji, G.G. Lam 194 Durga 336 Dutthagämanf, King 361-2, 365, 368 Easterley, William 203 Eaton, Richard M. 173, 174-5, 176 Echevarria TT, Antulio J. x Edward VIT, King 365 Egreteau, Renaud xiv, xxii Elära, King 361 Ellingsen, Tanja ix, 203-4 Erakadao, B. 195 Esposito, John 313 Fernandez, George 327 Franke, Marcus xiii, xix

Fiirer-Haimendort~

Christoph von 173, 175-6

Gajabähu 364 Gandhi, Tndira 3, 13, 16, 17, 42, 47, 97, 113, 117, 137,138-9,277,278,279,282,286,293 Gandhi, Mahatma (Mohandas) xx, xxi, 96, 128, 131, 148, 297-314 pass im, 365 Gandhi, Rajiv 24, 97, 118, 139,221,222,225, 227,230,278,355,356 Gandhi, Sanjay 13, 277, 282 Ganeshalingam, P. 220 Ganguly, Rajat xvii, 63-88 Ganguly, Surnit xii, xxiv, 89-120 Garbett, Kingsley 338 Garlosa, .Tewel 42 Gates, Scott ix-xxx, 201-14 Gau tam, Shobha 201, 209 Gayer, Laurent xvii, xxi, xxiii Gellner, Ernest 357 Gerges, Fawaz A. 301 Gilbert, G. 321 Gill, Kanwar Pal Singh 47, 85, 180 Gleditsch, Nils Petter ix, 203-4 Gogoi, Amarjit 195 Gombrich, Richard xxii, 338, 339, 353-68 Gopal, S. 326 Goswami, Namrata xix, 35-86 Graham, George xvi, xxiv Grahavarnman ofKanyakubja 325 Grewal, R.S. xiv Grossman, Hersehel T. 207 Gu!Javamsa, Elle 368 Gunawardana, R.A.L.H. 364 Gupta, Tilak D. 80 Gurung, Harka 207 Gyanendra, King xvi Habib, M. 325 Hammes, Thomas X. x Handel, M.T. 323 Hanson, Victor Davis 317 Harrison, Sarah 171, 175 Harsa 324-5 Hart, George L. 344 Hashavardhana, King 324 Hayden, Matthew 343 Hazarika, Sanjoy 182 Hegre, Håvard ix, 203-4 Heinemann, Robert 362 Henderson, Loy 129

Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

Hersh, Seymour 264 Hitler, Adolf 304 Hoeffler, Anke ix, x, 202, 203 Hoole, Rajan 242 Houtman, Gustaaf 367 Hrangkhawl, Bijoy Kurnar 158 Huniyam 339 Huntington, Samuel 90, 113, 307 Hussein, Saddam ix, 306, 309 Hutton, John Henry 168-9 passim, 173 Tbrahim, Azeem ix, xx Indra 324 Trwin, A. 327 Tsmail, Qadri 233 Tyengar, U. 326 Jacob, Satish 278 Jacobs, Julian 171, 175 Jatfrelot, Christophe xvii, xxi, xxii Jagmohan, Governor 139 Jamali, Zafarullah Khan 254 Jamir, S.C. 176, 177 Jaoul, Nicolas xvii Jayewardene, J.R. 355 Jha, Prem Shankar l 04 Jinnah, MohammedAli 107, 123, 131,253, 306 Johnson, Michael 343 Johnstone, James 173 Joseph, M. 71, 79 Joshi, B.C. 24, 25, 26 Juergensmeyer, M. 319 Kadavara 340 Kadirgamar, Lakshman 220 Kailasapathy, K. 344 Kaldor, Mary 147 Kamandaka xxi Kamandikiya 324 Kangaratnam, K. 220 Kangle, R.P. 321-2, 323 Kannaki (Kannagi) 338 Kapferer, Bruce 338, 343 Karim, Prince 253 Karki, Arjun K. 208 Karmakar, Rahul 177 Karnad, Bharat 326 Karra, Mohiuddin l 07 Karzai, Harnid 261

373

Kautilya (Chanakya) (Vishnugupta) xxi, 317, 318, 320--23 pass im, 324, 326-7 Kazhagam, Dravida Munnetra 13 Keishang, Rishang 179 Kelsay, John 308 Keyes, Charles F. 363, 365 Khan ofKalat 253, 265 Khan, Ayub xii, 93-4, 135, 254 Khaplang, S.S. xiii, 41, 150 Kimball, Charles 311 King, Martin Luther, Jr. 297, 299, 300, 30 l, 313, 314 Kittu (Krishnakumar Sathasivam) 332 Kloos, Peter 227, 228 Krishna 236, 246 Krishna Shastri, H. 344 Kumar, Shiv 221 Kumarappa, 336 Kumaraswamy, Krishanthi 239 Kumaratunga, Chandrika 356 Kundu, Apurba xxiii, 273-96 Kurumbara, Gini 340 Kyi, Aung San Suu 365 Laldenga, Pu 39, 158 Lam b, Alistair l 04 Lawoti, Mahendra xvi Lawrence, P. 338 Le Billon, Phillipe 202, 204 Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie xv, xxiii, xxiv Liyanage, Kamala 247 Longowal, Harehand Singh 278, 287, 288 MacFarlane, Alan 171, 175 MacKenzie, Alexander 172-4 Madmaiviran 338 Mahadevf, Vihara 368 Mahmud ofGhazni 325 Majumdar, B.K. 319, 320 Malarville 236 Malik, V.P. 30 Malik, Yasin 118 Malone, David 202 Manikumar, K.A. 73 Manu 324, 325 Manz, B.F. 325 Marri, Nawabzada Ballach 251 Mascaro, Juan 319 Masoodi, Maulana l 07 Maunaguru, Sitralega 242

374

Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

Maurya, Chandragupta 320 Mazari, Shireen 261, 264 Mazumdar, Arijit xiv, 185-99 Mazumdar, Charu 80 Mehra, A.K. 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 78, 80, 84 Mehta,A. 72 Mengal, Abdul Rauf255 Mengal, Sardar Ataullah 254, 260, 265 Merridale, Catherine xxiii Miller, Captain 221,335,342 Mills,J.P.I68 Mines, Diane 344 Mir, Javed 118 Mishra, Brajesh 192 Misra, K.P. xvii, 3-20 Moggaliputta, Tissa 362 Mohammed 94 Mohammed, Bakshi Ghulam 134 Mohanty, J.N. 318 Mookerjee, S.P. 133 Mubarak, Muhammad Hosni Sayyid 300 Muivah, Thuingaleng xiii, 41, 150, 167, 177, 178 Mukherjee, Anit xix, 57-62 Munkler, Herfried x, xvii Murali, K. 82 Murshed, S. Mansoob xvi, xxiv, 201-14 Murukan 341 Musharraf, Pervez xix, 57, 58, 264 N aray an, Jay Prakash 12 Narayana 324 Nayak, N. 76 Nayar, Kuldip 287 Nayyar, K.K. 326 Nehru, Jawaharlal xiii, 94, 97, 107, 114, 123, 126, 128-9, 131, 132, 134, 135,317,326 Neog, Robin 195 N ep al i, Praksh xvi Niebuhr, Reinhold 304, 311 Nojeim, Michael 303 Nu, U 364, 366, 367 O'Neill, Bard E. 215 Obama, Barack xi Oberoi, T.S. 288, 295 Obeyesekere, Gananath 338, 339, 340, 341 Olson, Mansur 202, 209 Orr, Allan x i, xx Osinga, Frans x

Otunnu, Olara 220 Packenham, Robert 112 Padmanaba, K. 220 PaJ, Krishan 3 Palit, D.K. 274 Pant, G.N. 325 Patil, Veerendra 16 Perumal, Varactaraja 224 Pfaffenberger, Bryan 338, 341 Phizo, Angami Zapu xiii, 148, 149 Posen, Barry l Ol Prabhakaran, Charles Anthony 333 Prabhakaran, Velupillai xv, 215-30 pass im, 235, 241,332,333,335,342 Prasanthi 237, 246 Premadasa, R. 222, 224, 227, 356 Premasiri, P.D. xxii Priyadarshi, Rajan 73 Pulendran, 336 Pupati, Annai 335, 336 Puri, S.C. 288 Qasim, Syed Mir 138 Qutb, Muhammad 307 Qutb, Sayyid 302, 306, 307, 309 Rabha, Bening 195 Rahim (Canagaratnam) 332 Rajagopalan, Rajesh xviii, xix, 21-33,44 Rajasingham-Senanayake, Darini 242, 247, 248 Rajkhowa, Arabinda 195, 196, 199 Rajkumar 225 Rajyashri 325 Ram, Lord 122 Ramanujan, A.K. 344 Rangarajan, L.N. 322 Ratan, Khumajam 180 Ray, Arjun x ix, 43 Reddy, Chandra Pulla 80 Reddy, Rajasekhara 83 Roberts, Michael xxi, xxiii, 331-52 Rosen, Stephen P. 317 Rowell, James L. xx, xxi, 297-316 Roy, A. 76 Roy, Kaushik ix-xxx, 317-30 Ryan, S. 83 Sabha, Lok 278 Sadiq, G.M. 107

Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

Saikia, Jaideep xiv Sailajah 246 Samarasinghe, Vidyamali 244 Samuel, Kumudini 242, 243 Sangh, Jan 133 Sarkees, Meredith Reid ix Sasanka of Bengal 324 Sayeed, Rubiya 89 Schalk, Peter 239, 241, 334, 335, 336, 343 Scott, James C. 170-71 Seelan (Charles Anthony) 332 Sema, Kaito 149 Semple, Michael xii Sen, A. 85 Seneviratne, H.L. 368 Shah oflran 262 Shah, A. 72 Shah, G.M. 117-18 Shah, Mirwaiz Yusuf 115 Shah, Shabir 118 Shaiza, Yangmasho 179 Shanthi 239 Sharma, D. 75, 76 Sharma, S.D. 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75 Shekatkar, D.B. xviii Sheth, D.L. 71,83 Shimray, Ungshungmi 179 Shukla, S. 85 Shulman, David Dean 338, 342, 344 Sibal, Kanwal 192 Siddiqa, Ayesha 261 Sihavatuka 340 Silva, Chandra de 243 Singh, Arjan 287 Singh, Avtar 30 Singh, Depinder 223 Singh, Gambhir 171 Singh, Gurdial 295 Singh, J. 327 Singh, Khushwant 287 Singh, Maharaja Hari 95, 103, 106, 108, 123 Singh, Manrnahan xi, 63 Singh, R.K. Ranjit 179 Singh, Samarendra 156 Singh, Shahbeg 287, 290 Singha, Jibon 195, 199 Singha, Pabitra 195 Singha, Purandar 172 Sinha, S.K. 294 Sinha, S.P. xv, 215-31

Sita 236 Siva (Astara Devata) 340, 342 Sivapalan, Pon 220 Sivarasan, 221 Smith, Chris xv, xxii Smith, Rupert x Sollenberg, Margareta 201 Sorensen, Georg xxi Stewart, Frances 202 stirrat, R.L. 338, 340, 357 Strand, Håvard 204 Subba, Phanindra xvi Subha 221 Subramanian, K.S. xiii sudarviii 237, 238, 240, 246 Sukra 318 Sumathi 240 Sun Bin 323 Sun Tzu 323, 327 Sun Tzu II 323 Sundarji, K. xxiii, 24, 279, 285, 295 Suny, Ronald Grigor 169 Swu, Tsak Chisi xiii, 41, 150, 167 Syse, H. 318 Tambimuttu, Sam 220 Tanaka, Masakazu 338, 339, 341 Tanham, George K. 317 Taylor, Charles 170 Taymiyya, Tbn 308 Thamilachi 237, 239 Thamilini 238, 239, 243, 247 Thamilnila 237 Thamilvily 237, 246 Thinley, Lyonpo Jigme 189, 193 Thomas, Raju G.C. 326 Tilak, B.G. xxi Tilipan, 'Tiyaki' (Thileepan) 335 Tiruchelvam Neelan 220 Tod, James 325 Toft, Monica Duffy xx Tolstoy, Leo xx, 303 Trawick, Margaret 236, 343, 344 Tse-tung, Mao xvi, xxiv, 78 Tully, Mark 278 Vaas, Chaminda 343 Vaidya, A.S. 288, 289, 293, 296 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari (Behari) 193 Varshney, Ashutosh x ii, l 03, 121-43

375

376

Unconventional Warfare in South A sia, 1947 to the Present

Vatavyadhi 321 Veerappan, Muniswamy 23, 225 Verdier, Thierry 203 Verghese, B.G. 182 Victor (Marce1in Fuselus) 332-3 Vij, N.C. 192, 195 Vijayabahu, King 363 Vijeratne, Ranjan 222 Vincent, Lieutenant 173 Virk, S.S. 296 Wallensteen, Peter 201 Walter, Barbara F. 204 Walzer, Michael 180 Wangchuck, Jigme Sigmye 192, 193, 194, 199 We ber, Max 331, 365 Weiner, Myron 91 Whitehead, Henry 338

Wilson, A.J. 341 Win, N e 367 Winichakul, Thongchai 170 Xiaoping, Deng xxiv Yadav, Mulayam Singh 85 Yadava, B.N.S. 325 Yogasangri, V. 220 Yogeshwaran, Sarojini 220 Yogeshwaran, V. 219-20 Yunuo, Asoso 174 Yusuf, Moeed xix, 57-62 Yuval-Davis, Nira 243 Zail Singh, Giani 277, 282, 289 Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad x, 140, 253, 255, 256 Zvelebil, K.V. 344