Unconditional Surrender: The Impact Of The Casablanca Policy Upon World War II

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. . new jnaterial uncovered by Miss Armstrong enables her ... to give the clearest and most convincing account to date of the interaction of Allied and German policies during the Second World War.”—Dankwart A. Rustow, International Social Forces, Columbia University

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy upon World War II by ANNE ARMSTRONG Did the concept of Unconditional Surrender announced by President Roosevelt at the conclusion of the Casablanca conference in 1943 actually prolong the Second World War? No question about Allied policy and conduct of the war has produced more debate, more expression of emotional and political bias—and less dispassionate judgment based upon the’facts. This has been so partly because we have not had access to all the facts. In spite of the remarkable coverage of the war given us at the time by our newspapers and our radio reporters and subsequently by historians, we have lacked detailed, author(Continued on back flap) Photograph on jacket shows Germans and Allies signing Uneonditional Surrender document at Reims.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY PRESS New Brunswick, New Jersey

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Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/unconditionalsurOOarms

Unconditional Surrender

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER The Impact of the Casablanca Policy upon World War II

ANNE ARMSTRONG »* »

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY PRESS New Brunswick New Jersey

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Copyright © 1961 by Rutgers, The State University Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 61-10253 % Manufactured in the United States of America by Quinn & Boden Company, Inc., Rahway, N. J.

107863

To the Memory of C. C. H.

George had heard it said that good books could no longer be published and read in Germany. This, he found, was not true, as some of the other things he had heard about Germany were not true. And about Hitler s Germany he felt that one must be very true. And the reason one needed to be very true was that the thing in it which every decent person must be against was false. You could not turn the other cheek to wrong, but also, it seemed to him, you could not be wrong about wrong. You had to be right about it. You could not meet lies and trickery with lies and trickery, although there were some people . who argued that you should.—Thomas Wolfe, You Cant Go Home Again

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