Unbreaking India: Decisions On Article 370 & The CAA

Table of contents :
Contents
Foreword
Preface
PART I
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Chapter 8
Chapter 9
Chapter 10
Chapter 11
Chapter 12
Chapter 13
Chapter 14
Chapter 15
Chapter 16
Chapter 1 7
PART II
Chapter 18
Chapter 19
Chapter 20
Chapter 21
Chapter 22
Chapter 23
Chapter 24
Chapter 25
Chapter 26
Chapter 27
Chapter 28
Chapter  29
Chapter 30
Chapter 31
Chapter 32
Chapter 33
Chapter 34
PART III
Chapter 35
Chapter 36
Chapter 37
Chapter 38
Chapter 39
Chapter 40
PART IV
Chapter 41
Chapter 42
EPILOGUE
Chapter 43
APPENDICES
appendix 1
appendix 2
appendix 3
appendix 4
appendix 5
appendix 6
appendix 7
appendix 8
appendix 9
appendix 10
About the Author

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Published by Garuda Prakashan Private Limited Gurugram, Bharat www.garudabooks.com First published in India 2020 Copyright © 2020 Sanjay Dixit All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organisation acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Garuda Prakashan or the author. The content of this book is the sole expression and opinion of its author, and not of the publisher. The publisher in no manner is liable for any opinion or views expressed by the author. While best efforts have been made in preparing this book, the publisher makes no representations or warranties of any kind and assumes no liabilities of any kind with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the content and specifically disclaims any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness of use for a particular purpose. The publisher believes that the content of this book does not violate any existing copyright/intellectual property of others in any manner whatsoever. However, in case any source has not been duly attributed, the publisher may be notified in writing for necessary action.

Cover Design: Rakesh Chaudhary Printed in India

CONTENTS Foreword Preface: CAA–370

PART I 1.

Partition of Bengal

2.

World War I, Mahatma Gandhi and NonCooperation Movement

3.

Khilafat Movement and Malabar Killings

4.

The Aligarh School

5.

Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal

6.

The 1937 Elections and World War II

7.

The Pakistan Resolution and the Rahmat Ali Plan

8.

CPI and the Gangadhar Adhikari Report

9.

Ambedkar: The Army Question

10. Ambedkar: The Communal and Political Question 11. 1945–1946 Elections 12. Direct Action Day 1.0 and the Noakhali Riots

13. The Mountbatten Plan and the Indian Independence Act 14. Partition and its Aftermath 15. Minorityism in Independent India 16. The Liaquat–Nehru Pact 17. The Citizenship Act, 1955

PART II 18. A Brief History of Kashmir 19. 1931: The Beginning of Kashmir’s Islamisation 20. Maharaja and Partition 21. The Poonch–Mirpur Battles 22. Desertion and Treachery in the Jammu and Kashmir Army 23. Raid on the Valley 24. Sheikh Abdullah, the New Shah Mir 25. The Fall of Gilgit 26. Article 370 (Draft 306A) in the Indian Constitution 27. The Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly 28. The Presidential Order, 1954 and Article 35A 29. Constitutional Challenges 30. The Presidential Order, 1965 31. Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah and the Family

32. Political Chicanery and the Beginning of the Kashmir Jihad 33. End of Afghan War and the 7th Exodus of the Pandits 34. Stalemate

PART III 35. Nullification of Article 370 36. Impact of Nullification of Article 370 on Pakistan 37. CAA: Modification of the Liaquat–Nehru Pact 38. Direct Action Day 2.0: Failure and Impact 39. Fatal Blow to Pakistan’s New Medina 40. Sufism: Myth and Reality

PART IV POSTSCRIPT 41. Postscript 1: Street Riots and Mayhem in Delhi 42. Postscript 2: Way Forward in Jammu and Kashmir

EPILOGUE 43. One Nation Theory and ‘The 2nd Republic’

APPENDICES 1.

THE CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2019

2.

RESULT OF 1937 ELECTIONS

3.

RESULT OF 1945–46 ELECTIONS

4.

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION BY STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

5.

OBJECTIVES RESOLUTION OF PAKISTAN

6.

JOGENDRA NATH MANDAL’S RESIGNATION LETTER

7.

LIAQUAT–NEHRU AGREEMENT

8.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON ARTICLE 306A (ARTICLE 370) ON 17.10.1949

9.

THE CONSTITUTION (APPLICATION TO JAMMU AND KASHMIR) ORDER, 1954

10. JAMMU AND KASHMIR REORGANISATION ACT, 2019

FOREWORD his is a much-needed book, especially at the present time. The

T issues of Article 370, CAA, Ram Mandir and the general status of

Muslims in India have become over- politicized and been turned into an international sensation by certain people—appropriately characterized as Breaking India Forces. In response, several voices speaking on behalf of India’s integrity and unity have rejoindered, but often very emotionally. What is lacking, and what this book supplies, is a well-researched, fact-based authentic account that can be relied upon as the basis for serious debates. I congratulate the author for the seriousness of his research and the calm logic throughout the book. The book covers an eventful century of India’s tryst with Islam from the Khilafat Movement to Shaheen Bagh. It provides clarity and sharp insight into the complex gameboard with multiple players at various points in time, and how the game changed from one period to the next. Certain threads run consistently throughout this centurylong game: British agendas masked behind their cunning style; Nehruvian naivete and outright moronic behavior; and remarkable commitment and consistent hypocrisy of Muslim leaders. There are numerous controversial details, but the author can present them with courage because he uses well- documented evidence. For instance, the treachery of Muslims in the Jammu and Kashmir army battalions in 1947 is not an isolated incident. The author shows history repeating itself because Indians have failed to learn about the under-handed ways and brutality of their fellow Indians. He argues that a deep collusion has existed between some

Muslims serving the Indian side and the pan-Islam forces outside India. The dirty role of Sheikh Abdullah comes out clearly as he vacillates opportunistically to maximize his own power at all costs; he is appropriately described by the author as the “wily forked-tongue politician”. The book is an excellent reference for intellectuals and activists who wish to understand the historical origins of Jihad in Kashmir and the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits. The prior history of Kashmir’s gradual Islamization over the centuries provides a useful backdrop. Dr B.R. Ambedkar’s patriotism and audacity comes out loud and clear. He called the Muslim leaders’ behavior the “gangster’s method of politics”. He chided his own Congress party for its failure to understand the difference between appeasement (which they always succumbed to) and a genuine settlement of a dispute (which they failed to achieve). Mohandas Gandhi’s blunders and blind spots are taken apart point by point. It is clear that Gandhi misunderstood the meaning of Ahimsa. He assumed it meant unilateral surrender. Gandhi did not learn the basic lessons from the Mahabharata where Sri Krishna’s message is clear on when, why and how violence must be used. The sly hand of Lord Mountbatten is undeniable. Yet, Nehru relied on him and lived in awe of Mountbatten and his wife. The author makes good use of the archives to capture some of the moronic moments of Nehru that cost India heavily and irreversibly in many ways. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir played his cards hoping to secure for himself a position of power, which he failed to achieve, but in the process ended up sacrificing the safety of his own people. His son, the present Dr. Karan Singh, too has failed to perform a responsible role within India and on the world stage to help the cause of his Kashmiri people. Thoroughly researched and referenced, the book goes into minute details to explain the foolishness, deceit, blackmail and pressure tactics that led to Article 370. It then explains the logic of removing 370—both the legal due process as well as its ethical

and political merits. The book should be used as source material for its historical treatment of the recent controversies concerning CAA. “Article 370 kept the wet dream of separatism alive,” the author notes. Its removal will likely end the dream of cultural identity separation of Kashmiris, which was always a fig-leaf for Islamization. But might it escalate the separatism of religious identity to a new level out of desperation? Negotiating with Pakistan as a route to a solution has been an utterly misguided pursuit by the Indian government in the past. For, if India were to succeed in unifying Muslims and non-Muslims, it would void the two-nation theory and hence undermine the very existence of Pakistan. It has been Pakistan’s deepest and highest priority obsession to find ways that compromise India’s relationship with its Muslim citizens. Nothing short of India’s breakup will suffice as a permanent solution, and Pakistan’s own nation- building project will remain an unfinished project until this is accomplished. The Indian government’s inconsistencies in dealing with these issues come out loud and clear. India’s age-old tradition called purva-paksha calls for rigorous, analytical deconstruction of opponents with clarity and objectivity. But India’s policymakers failed to do this and took the easy roads to quick-fixes. Hence the zigzag approach that has been short-sighted and costly. I find the book written in a gripping style such that its minute details do not become boring. I am glad the author took the honest and courageous road and did not compromise for the sake of political correctness. I am especially glad to see no use of emotions to make any point and relying only on facts explicitly backed up with references. A seriously researched book should not be blindly accepted and parroted at face value, nor rejected ad hoc. It deserves to be debated in serious forums. I am sure many persons will find the book offending their deeply-held concepts, so I urge them to come forth and debate the author on the hard facts. Rajiv Malhotra, Princeton, USA October 6, 2020

PREFACE CAA–370 was having a conversation with a senior TV journalist (Madison Square Garden fame) on WhatsApp. Zee News had just then done a show on various kind of jihads, such as Physical Jihad (further sub-divided into population jihad, love jihad, education jihad, land jihad and direct violence), and Ideological Jihad (sub-divided into economic, history-writing, film and music, and secular disarming). This gentleman commented that ‘The unspeakable communal HATE that is being spread by this channel on daily basis is shocking, shameful, dangerous’, and also sent it to me. This is, of course, the standard staple of the secular- liberal class of India, brought up as they are on a severely doctored history and diluted reality of the Muslim world view. The entire conversation around the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, which subsequently became an Act is based on a version of secular-liberal dogma that completely ignores the realities of Islamic ideology, particularly the variant of this ideology that did prevail, and prevails till date, in India. To this WA message, I replied, ‘Have you ever cared to read the Hidayah of Deoband, and Fataawa-i-Razvia of Bareilly? Your statement doesn’t stand scrutiny in the face of these Islamic authorities.’ His response was along expected lines: ‘For which you demonise an entire community? Wake up and stop dividing India. Have a good day.’ I responded: ‘Entire community is bound by Taqlid. Learn some basics about Indian Hanafi Islam.’

I

He quit the conversation after this. What I have reproduced here, especially the last sentence, is the crux of the matter. It lies at the heart of the most fraudulent agitation in the history of modern India, viz., the anti-CAA agitation. You may try and appeal to the reason and to the rational instinct of an entire community, but it does not matter. The community is forbidden to use ‘aql’ or reason under the principle of Taqlid. Reason is supposed to be exercised in five of the six sects of Sunni Islam, and in all five sects of Shi’a Islam, by only the authorised clerics, called ‘mushtahid’, or ‘mujaddid’, or ‘muhaddis’ and usually designated as Muftis or high clerics authorised to issue fatwas. These are the worthies of Hanafi Islam who operate among the Indian Sunni Muslims, who constitute about 80% of the Indian Muslim population, and who form the bulwark of the anti-CAA agitation. The anti- CAA agitation is the culmination of what is a reaction riding on a felt emotion among the Islamic high priests, of a loss of Islamic veto on national issues such as nullification of Art. 370 and abolition of triple talaq, along with a failure to influence the judiciary into delaying a verdict on the Ram Mandir issue (realising that their legal position was completely untenable). The book attempts to analyse Muslim politics and national politics from this standpoint of deep understanding of Muslim theology and general behaviour. This behaviour is no different from the behaviour of the Muslim and national politics that prevailed for the best part of pre- independence India, and post-independence India. It is, therefore, my attempt to explore the historical events and ideologies that form the foundation of today’s agitational politics by Muslim groups, supported by the Left and the pseudo-secular class that goes by the fashionable term ‘liberals’. The book, therefore, cites copiously from record, and from the books of stalwarts. I have found Dr B.R. Ambedkar to be a particularly perspicacious scholar in analysing the idea of Pakistan and the inability of mainstream Indian leadership to counter it, because of what may at best be termed as ‘political correctness’. Pakistan is not a territory. Pakistan is an idea that fundamentally dictates that Muslims cannot live together with non-believers in general, and murti worshippers (mushrikeen) in particular. This idea

did not take root in the Muslim majority areas of undivided India, but in the areas where Muslims were in minority. United Provinces was the fulcrum, on which the ideologies fostered in Deoband, Bareilly and Aligarh rode high. The fundamental idea of Islam, that the sovereignty of the universe belongs to Allah alone (also enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan), manifests in its various sub-branches. One of the ideas that flows from it is that no Muslim should be ruled by a non-believer, and certainly not by a mushrik (murti- worshipper). Shirk, irtidad, nafaq and gustakhi (idol- worship, apostasy, hypocrisy and blasphemy) attract capital punishment in Islam, and it is the duty of every Muslim to constantly strive for Dar-ul-Islam (House of Islam), even when he is living in a land of non-believers, called Darul-Harb (House of War), by mentally being at war with such a rule. This is the idea that is taught by the two principal teaching centres in India, by Deoband (Deobandis), and by Ala-Hazrat, Bareilly (Ahl-eSunnat, or Barelvis). Barelvis are actually a federation of the four principal Sufi Tariqas—Qadris, Chishtis, Suhrawardys and the Ullaia faction of Naqshbandis, along with many smaller Tariqas and Sanads. The Hidayah of Deoband, and the Fataawa-i-Razvia of Bareilly lay emphasis on this exclusivist, separatist and supremacist idea of Islam, and give sanction to armed jihad. The Hidayah defines jihad as ‘shariat mein jihad deen-i-haq ki or bulane aur use qubool na karne wale se jang karne ko kahte hain’. This translates as ‘Jihad in Shari’a means inviting people to accept Islam and to fight those who do not accept it ’. The Fataawa-i-Razvia has a full set of fatwas grouped under a generic heading ‘nafrat ke ahkaam’ (Ordinances/Commandments of hatred), giving elaborate prescriptions on whom to hate and in what manner. The issue is not whether their interpretation is according to Qur’an or not. The issue is that the lay Muslim is not even authorised to do any interpretation different from that done by the ‘Ulama’, or the High Clerics. That is the essence of Taqlid. Once we understand this, and also understand the vast funds controlled by the Ulama donated under the holy tithe of Zakat, and increasingly earned by the deceitful practice of ‘Halal Certification’, we can easily understand why the Ulama wield such power over the masses even with totally irrational ideas such as Pakistan, or, ‘CAA is against Muslims’.

Political correctness only feeds into the power of this ‘mushtahid’ class. The book also discusses ways to deal with this class. The sane voices among Muslims have no chance in front of the muqallid (Taqlid following) class of Muslims as their voice simply does not count. They may be appreciated by the nationalist class, and by other communities, but within their community, they carry no weight. I had once asked this question to Arif Mohammad Khan in an interview, and he instantly acknowledged that Taqlid is ‘THE’ problem that insulates the Muslim masses from any rational discourse. The Article 370 quagmire was also the result of this inability in the national leadership to read the Muslim mind. To have first denied the principle of two-nations and then to have accepted a separate identity for the only Muslim-majority state of India was a betrayal of principles and an acceptance of expediency, but the Ulama class welcomed it, for ‘any’ separate identity is a victory for the Ummat. Though the leadership has finally nullified the Article, if they are not careful, they may trip up again on the quicksand of ‘political correctness’ and appeasement of the religious leadership. The book explores the two important legislative interventions of the new government in its first six months, and the predictable reactions to it against the backdrop detailed above. It has become a norm among public intellectuals to discuss the events impacting Pakistan (both in India and abroad) and our own secular establishment without any reference to the root causes. This book changes that paradigm of discussion. Through verifiable facts, the book is able to establish that the opposition to the nullification of Article 370 and the CAA is a mirror image of the pre-partition politics of the Muslim League, to which the newly developed secular-liberal class has added its voice. This latter class is a transmogrification of the earlier socialists-liberals who have lost their relevance and mojo after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its economic model. The loss of power to influence issues and events by the liberal media has added to the urgency it often exhibits. The Marxist destruction of the Indian epistemic and logic traditions has provided an easy ingress for masking the irrational stance of the Islamic clerical class.

The book is meant to be more in the nature of a generalist’s impression of the quickly unfolding events, rather than a scholarly account. The basic writing was completed in a period of less than a month. The project got delayed because of the corona pandemic lockdown. Further delay occurred because I had to change Bloomsbury as a publisher after the book had been listed for preorders on Amazon and other e-commerce market places, because of my principled stand on their reprehensible action in pulping of a book on ‘Delhi Riots’ under the influence of their white masters and Leftists. I have addressed this book to the general public, with the object of spreading the light of basic education, rather than to the demands of high academia. That is why the discussion has not wandered into abstruse theory, and has liberally borrowed from various sources. I must thank Rajiv Malhotra ji for writing the Foreword of the book, and Sandeep Balakrishna for permitting me to use material from his publications. I have to thank late Sitaram Goel and his Voice of India publications that have provided me with a beacon of light to navigate the labyrinths of the past. I thank the Jaipur Dialogues Forum for its invaluable help in helping me procure rare source material. I must also thank elections.in for providing me with the elections data from the pre-independence period.

PART I

CHAPTER 1

Partition of Bengal s I set out to write this book, I came across a news item. It said that a controversy had broken out in West Bengal over a tweet by the Governor of West Bengal, describing his relish at sitting at the table on which Lord Curzon had signed the papers that partitioned Bengal in 1905. There was an immediate outrage, and the Governor went on to delete his tweet. The incident encapsulates the sentiment on the western side of Bengal even today. Curzon, by consensus, partitioned Bengal in 1905 to weaken the Indian National Congress and counter Bengali nationalism, as he did not like even the minimalist petition politics that it indulged in. His famous statement, ‘The Congress is tottering to its fall and one of my ambitions while in India, is to assist it in its demise’, was certainly made in one of his more expansive moments. The Congress, then led by Surendranath Banerjee in Bengal, and the entire Hindu population staunchly opposed the partition of Bengal. Muslims under the leadership of Nawab Salimullah of Dacca, on the other hand, welcomed it. East Bengal and Assam—the proposed Muslim-majority provinces—suited the interests of the Muslim upper class greatly. They became a majority there and Assam became their playground. Hindus, on the other hand, started the Swadeshi movement. Curzon left soon after he had effected the Partition; however, the nationalist movement became so intense that the Partition was undone in 1911, but not before major mischief was done.

A

In 1906, the Muslim League was formed. The seeds of its formation lay in the Aligarh Movement started by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. However, its insistence on Muslims being treated as a separate class based on imagined and false fears and spun-out narratives met a very kind response from the British. Annoyed by the intensity of the Bengali nationalist movement, they thought it fit to sow the seeds of discord in the form of ‘divide and rule’. The Morley–Minto Reforms of 1909 followed soon after, with the incorporation of the Indian Councils Act, 1909 by the British Parliament, in which the British came up with the concept of separate electorates for the general classes and Muslims. The ‘special treatment for Muslims’ principle thus took root. If we examine the basis of the demand for separate electorates, the arguments given are found to be mostly specious. These are the kind of arguments that have become a staple now. These arguments remained in the fray during the Khilafat Movement, the Round Table Conferences, the 1937 elections, the Pirpur Report, the Cripps Mission, the Cabinet Mission and the movement for Partition, and have survived even to this day. In my opinion, Muslims have remained the aggressors, while expertly playing the victim. Quoting H.V. Seshadri, Sita Ram Goel writes in his seminal book, Muslim Separatism — Causes and Consequences (1995): To start with, we want to take up what we consider to be its most important contribution, namely, the unravelling of two behaviour patterns—Muslim and National— which collaborated closely for years and precipitated Partition in the final round. The Muslim behaviour pattern was characterised by acrimony, accusations, complaints, demands, denunciations and street riots. The National behaviour pattern, on the other hand, was characterised by acquiescence, assent, cajolery, concessions, cowardice, self-reproach and surrender. 1

This understanding of the Muslim psyche is important for understanding not only the Partition but also the present agitations against The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, 2 and the nullification of Article 370. As we move ahead in this book, we will find many great Indian thinkers, including Dr B.R. Ambedkar, who

understood this phenomenon and also warned the leadership about it. In 1911, the partition of Bengal was undone. It came with many mischiefs. Assam was given Sylhet, Goalpara and Silchar—erstwhile districts of Bengal. Orissa and Bihar were separated and Bengal became one province again. It is often speculated that the undoing of the partition of Bengal had less to do with the movement against the partition of Bengal and more to do with pragmatic considerations. The Congress had suspended the movement as soon as John Morley was appointed the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs in 1905, and the movement was carried on by the youth and the Bengali bhadralok. In 1911, the British shifted the capital of India to Delhi. It is a fair bet that the reunification of Bengal was a quid pro quo to the Bengalis for depriving them of their prized possession, of being the ‘Capital of India’. Bengal lost its pre-eminence in the national movement, as the main focus of the national movement, hereafter, shifted to Bombay and Delhi. The representation of Indians in the councils increased numerically up to the provincial level, but the poison seed had been sown in the form of separate electorates. References 1

Chapter 1.

2

Appendix 1.

CHAPTER 2

World War I, Mahatma Gandhi and Non- Cooperation Movement War I began in July 1914 and it did not take long for Britain W orld to join the war. Belgium had invoked their mutual defence treaty

(1839) after Germany invaded them to gain a direct short route to France. India was made to join the war on behalf of Britain. As a colony, no other course was possible. Even though dismayed by the event, there was little that the incipient political parties could do about it. Gopal Krishna Gokhale had a different idea. He wanted the Congress to transform into a party of the masses instead of remaining confined to elites, most of whom were advocates. Gokhale had heard of an Indian advocate in South Africa, M.K. Gandhi, who had become internationally known for successful civil disobedience movements against the British. With the help of C.F. Andrews, Gokhale persuaded him to come back to India and become a part of the Congress; Gandhi obliged—he returned to India and became a part of the Congress. Mahatma Gandhi successfully led the Champaran Movement against the British Indigo landlords in 1917. This raised his position within the party. The Kheda Agitation followed in 1918, which made Mahatma Gandhi the pre-eminent figure of the Indian National Congress. The Viceroy invited Mahatma Gandhi and sought his help in the war effort. Mahatma Gandhi canvassed for recruitment of

Indian youth into the British Indian Army in the hope that the British would grant his demand for Swaraj after the war was over. The war was over by the end of 1918, but the implementation of the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms was delayed, despite the cabinet approval given by the British government in 1917. When the war ended, the British came up with the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act (1919) , also known as the Rowlatt Act. The draconian provisions of the Rowlatt Act led to a call for civil disobedience by Mahatma Gandhi and culminated in the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre on 13 April 1919. This action by the British alienated the Indians completely. To assuage Indian sentiments, the British expedited the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms and enacted the Government of India Act (1919) in the British parliament. The Act fell far short of the expectations of Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress. Except for a few ‘transferred subjects’, most of the important matters remained under the category of ‘reserved subjects’. There were loud murmurs of dissent and Mahatma Gandhi prepared for a major confrontation with the British. In preparation for the Non-Cooperation Movement, Mahatma Gandhi took a step that would have a major impact on the history and geography of the Indian Subcontinent. World War I had a profound impact on two of the biggest empires in Europe—the Austro–Hungarian Empire of Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire of Turkey. In the aftermath of the war and the imminent deposition and irrelevance of the Sultan of Turkey, who also enjoyed the status of Caliph or the leader of Sunni Muslims worldwide ( ummah / ummat ), Indian Muslims like Mohammad Ali Jauhar, Shaukat Ali, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Hakim Ajmal Khan started an agitation to save his position. It was an ironical movement, as Turkey itself was agitating to throw out the decrepit and anachronistic Caliphate. The theological support for the movement came from Mufti-e-Azam Kifayutallah, but was vehemently opposed by Ahmed Raza Khan, the founder of the Barelvi Movement. Mahatma Gandhi, overly anxious to get the support of the Muslim leadership, lent his support to the Khilafat Movement. The results, in

the long run, would turn out to be disastrous. We would find an uncanny connection with the Partition of India and the Citizenship Amendment Act in this seminal event. In the Champaran and Kheda Satyagraha Movements, the masses had flocked to Mahatma Gandhi irrespective of their religious affiliation. By cementing a pact with the religious leaders of the Muslims, Mahatma Gandhi achieved the following: 1.

A recognition that Muslims would be approached only through their religious leadership; 2. A recognition that Muslims would prefer religious issues, however regressive, to secular issues like Home Rule or Swaraj; 3. A concession of respect for Islam to Muslims in the form of inclusion of Islam in sarva dharma samabhava as a dharma, without a reciprocal concession from Muslims, who steadfastly stuck to their principles of exclusivity of ummat ; 4. The normalisation of the aggressive behaviour of Muslims without seeking any concession for doing away with separate electorates. Mahatma Gandhi also extracted concessions from the Congress and asked it to support his methods unconditionally. That being done, Congress lent support to the Non-Cooperation Movement that was launched by the Khilafat Committee on 1 August 1920. Mahatma adopted Swadeshi (perfected during Bengal-partition days), Khilafat and abolition of untouchability as the three prongs of this movement. Khilafat was the regressive of the three. Initially, the movement progressed well. People were made to believe that independence was at hand. Hindus and Muslims came together in many places to boycott English goods; peaceful noncooperation even extended to many Indians who gave up their positions in the British bureaucracy, many instances of satyagraha, non-payment of revenues, etc. Large gatherings and processions worried the British, but not to an extent to unnerve them. The British suffered the loss of prestige and revenue, but their strategy of tiring out the movement was to prove successful soon enough.

The most painful chapter of the whole movement was about to unfold.

CHAPTER 3

Khilafat Movement and Malabar Killings be useful to look at the views of Maulana Azad as a prelude I ttomay the Khilafat Movement. It reflects how Indian Muslims viewed themselves in the global arena. Dr Abul Kalam Azad stated the following in his address at Kolkata on 27 October 1914: This biradari (community of Muslims) has been established by God. … All relationships in the world can break down but this relationship can never be severed. It is possible a father turns against his son, not impossible that a mother separates her child from her lap, it is possible that one brother becomes the enemy of [the] other brother. … But the relationship that a Chinese Muslim has with an African Muslim, an Arab Bedouin has with the Tatar shepherd, and which binds in one soul a neo-Muslim of India with the right-descendant Qureshi of Mecca, there is no power on earth to break it, to cut off this chain… If even a grain of the soul of Islam is alive among its followers, then I should say that if a thorn gets stuck in a Turk’s sole in the battlefield of war, then I swear by the God of Islam, no Muslim of India can be a Muslim until he feels that prick in his heart instead of [in his] sole because the Millat-e-Islam (the global Muslim community) is a single body. Today, if it is asked, where to search for [the] life of nations and evidence of life, then its answer will not come from [the] universities of education and arts, and ancient libraries. … Rather, it will be found in the metalled (war) ships which line up the coast… 3

Maulana Azad was the fulcrum on which were balanced the Congress and the Khilafat Movement, even though the latter was nominally led by Mohammad Ali Jauhar and his brother, Shaukat Ali.

As the Non-Cooperation Movement wore on, the rallying cry of the Muslim leadership became ‘jihad against the British infidel’. However, the illiterate masses did not know the distinction among different varieties of infidels. This unfortunate appeasement of the Muslim religious leadership begun by Mahatma Gandhi soon came to pass in Malabar. A fanatical Sufi of the Qadri tariqa, Ali Musliyar, preached jihad with such venom and hatred that the population was made to believe that the rule of the Caliph was going to be soon established in Malabar and their struggle was for the Shari’a Law. Their fury rose against all infidels and the result was large-scale rioting and massacre of Hindus in the Malabar. Annie Besant, who toured the area after the rebellion, described the scenes of devastation, rape, plunder, torture and atrocities in graphic detail. In light of the massacre, the Queen of Nilambur wrote a poignant letter to the wife of the Viceroy. Yoking a generally peaceful and orderly majority with an aggressive minority without clarity of narrative was always likely to have disastrous consequences, and it came to pass in Malabar. It paints a grim picture of the Congress leadership that it learnt nothing from similar movements against the British in the pre-1857 period in Bengal, by Shariatullah, Tutu Mian and Dodhu Mian, each of which was ostensibly a jihad against the British, but ended up in mass brutalities against the unsuspecting Hindus. Worse was the attempt by the Indian National Congress to whitewash the crimes of the Malabar. A session of the Congress in Ahmedabad, in December 1921, took note of the happenings in Malabar but adopted a resolution that virtually absolved the perpetrators of all crimes. Resolution No. 3 of the Ahmedabad Session read thus: The Congress expresses its firm conviction that the Moplah disturbance was not due to the Non-Cooperation or the Khilafat movement , especially as the Khilafat preachers were denied access to the affected parts by the District authorities for six months before the disturbance, but is due to causes wholly unconnected with the two movements and that the outbreak would not have occurred had the message of non-violence been allowed to reach them . Nevertheless, this Congress is of the opinion that the disturbance in Malabar could have been prevented by the Government of Madras accepting the proffered assistance of Maulana Yakub Hassan. 4 [emphasis added]

As if this was not enough, this resolution was endorsed by Maulana Hasrat Mohani in a Muslim League meeting: ‘Moplahs massacred Hindus because they were frightened.’ Why were they frightened? Because of an ‘English detachment’ that ‘suddenly appear[ed] in the locality’, which ‘somehow spread a rumour’ that the ‘Hindu inhabitants had invited the English army’. 5 Can we make the connection with the ‘scared minority syndrome’ that we hear even in today’s discourse? Yes, it originated in the 1920s. As the differences grew and the misunderstandings became more acute due to the failure of the Khilafat Movement to make an impact on Turkey or Britain, the jihad zeal started outflanking the national cause. Soon enough, another incident of violence in Chauri Chaura in February 1922 made Mahatma Gandhi abandon the NonCooperation Movement. It caused great dismay not only among Congressmen and Hindus but also among the Muslim religious leaders. The Ali brothers went their own separate way, while Maulana Azad and Hakim Ajmal Khan continued to be a part of the Congress. Further appeasement followed as Mohammad Ali Jauhar was even made the president of Congress in 1924, but he resigned after a few months. Participation in a national movement made no difference to their position on the Muslim religious issues. In 1924, Mohammad Ali publicly said in a speech in Aligarh: ‘However pure Mr Mahatma Gandhi’s character may be, he must appear to me, from the point of religion, inferior to any Mussalman even though he be without character.’ 6 In 1925, he escalated it further by saying, ‘Yes, according to my religion and creed, I do hold an adulterous and a fallen Mussalman to be better than Mr Gandhi. ’ 7 [emphasis added] In a manifesto on Hindu–Muslim relations issued in 1928, Khwaja Hasan Nizami declared: Musalmans are separate from Hindus; they cannot unite with the Hindus. After bloody wars the Musalmans conquered India, and the English took India from them. The Musalmans are one united nation and they alone will be masters of India. They will never give up their individuality. They have ruled India for hundreds of years, and hence they have a prescriptive right over the country. The Hindus are a minor community in the world. They are never free from internecine

quarrels; they believe in Gandhi and worship the cow; they are polluted by taking other people's water. The Hindus do not care for self-government; they have no time to spare for it; let them go on with their internal squabbles. What capacity have they for ruling over men? The Musalmans did rule, and the Musalmans will rule. 8

This pairing of a national movement with a religious movement achieved only one thing—it made Mahatma Gandhi a mass leader, but it also enhanced the separatism among the Muslims. The elusive Hindu–Muslim unity could not have been achieved by avoiding discussion on the essential differences between the natures of the two different world views—a mature discussion like what was attempted by Bal Gangadhar Tilak would have yielded longlasting benefits. Mahatma Gandhi’s approach only strengthened the bigots among Muslims, alienated the more liberal leaders like Jinnah and provided a template for the Muslim leadership for future negotiations with the Indian National Congress on the lines of the ‘Two Behaviour Pattern’ as described in the first chapter. It may be useful to excerpt a letter written by K.P. Keshava Menon, K. Madhavan Nair, T.V. Mohamad, K Karunakara Menon and K.V. Gopal Menon on the aforementioned resolution: Truth is infinitely of more paramount importance than Hindu– Muslim unity or Swaraj , and therefore, we tell the Maulana Sahib [Hasrat Mohani] and his coreligionists and India’s revered leader Mahatma Gandhi—if he too is unaware of the events here—that atrocities committed by the Moplahs on the Hindus are unfortunately too true and that there is nothing in the deeds of Moplah rebels which a true non-violent non-co-operator can congratulate them for . What is it for which they deserve congratulation? Their wanton and unprovoked attack on the Hindus, the all but wholesale looting at their houses in Ernad, and parts of Valluvanad, Ponnani, and Calicut Taliques [Taluks]; the forcible conversion of Hindus in a few places at the beginning of the rebellion and the wholesale conversion of those who stick to their homes in its later stages, the brutal murder of inoffensive Hindus, men, women, and children in cold blood, without the slightest reason except that they are ‘Kaffirs’ … the desecration and burning of Hindu Temples, the outrage on Hindu women and their forcible conversion and marriage by Moplahs; do these and similar atrocities proved beyond the shadow of a doubt by the statements recorded by us from the actual sufferers who have survived, deserve any congratulation? On the other hand, should they not call forth the strongest condemnation from all right-minded men and more especially from a representative body of Mohamedans like the Khilafat Conference pledged to non-violence under all provocation? Did the Moplahs, who committed such atrocities, sacrifice their lives in the cause of their religion? 9 [emphasis added]

Unfortunately, this template was to be played out again and again over the next hundred years; it was played out again as we watched the grotesque protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act unfold. References 3

Khutbat-e-Azad , published by Maktaba-e-Jamal, Lahore, 2010.

4

Proceedings of the AICC session, December 1921.

5 Ibid. 6 Quoted in Dr B.R. Ambedkar. 2013. Chapter XII (III). In Pakistan or the Partition of India , Samayak Prakashan. 7 Ibid. 8 9

Ibid. The Dharma Dispatch , 18 July 2019.

CHAPTER 4

The Aligarh School he Aligarh Movement is associated with Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who attempted to modernise education among Muslims. It was not to make them modern but to enable them to assert their Muslim identity better with the ruling British. He could see the benefits of education going almost exclusively to the Hindus. So, he fostered and promoted modern education to become as useful to the ruling class as the Hindus were. Otherwise, he stuck closely to the Muslim identity politics that was ushered in by Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi of the Naqshbandi tariqa, the self-same Mujaddid-Alf-i-Sani, during the time of Din-i-Ilahi (the new religion of Ilahi) under Emperor Akbar, carried to a new ferocity under Jahangir, who executed Guru Arjun Dev in 1606 CE under the Shaikh’s influence. It was successively carried on by Islamic zealots such as Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, his son Shah Abdul Aziz and Syed Ahmad Barelvi of Raebareli. I state this consciously because Sir Syed Ahmad Khan said in an 1883 speech in Patna: ‘Friends, in India there live two prominent nations which are distinguished by the names of Hindus and Mussulmans. Just as a man has some principal organs, similarly these two nations are like the principal limbs of India.’ 10 He went on to say in 1887:

T

Now suppose that all the English were to leave India— then who would be rulers of India? Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations, Mohammedan and Hindu, could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust

it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and inconceivable.11

The Anglo-Oriental College established by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan became Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) in 1920. Mohammad Ali Jauhar became one of the founder members of AMU. Under Mohammad Ali Jauhar, a group of scholars led by Mohammad Habib (father of Irfan Habib) formed a group that is popularly known as the Aligarh School. Mohammad Habib set out to whitewash the bad image of Islam due to their historical atrocities against the Hindus of India. These were meticulously recorded by H.M. Elliott and John Dowson in their seminal work The History of India, as Told by Its Own Historians (12 volumes written over the later decades of the 19th century), and further expanded by great scholars like Jadunath Sarkar in his seminal five- volume History of Aurangzib (1912-1924). With a background like this, there was no respect for Islam among Hindus who largely considered Islam to be adharma , with a barbaric past. This was also the consistent position of the Indian scholar swamis, such as Swami Dayananda, Swami Vivekananda and Shri Aurobindo. 12 Even Muslims were reconciled to this position taken by Hindus because they were well aware of the atrocities suffered by Hindus. Mahatma Gandhi gave Islam respectability by giving it equal status. However, as was predicted by perspicacious visionaries like D.V. Gundappa and others, little came by way of a reciprocal gesture to Mahatma Gandhi’s overture. On the other hand, the Aligarh School became busy in whitewashing the record of crimes committed by Islamic rulers in India. I have consciously included this chapter, because understanding this dimension of the Muslim scholarship is important to understanding the present-day orchestrated reactions of the leftists–Islamists to something as innocuous as the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. Mohammad Habib recruited Satish Chandra and Nurul Hassan as his academic disciples, and drafted his son Irfan Habib a little later. The Allahabad School of History, led by Rushbrook Williams, became his ally. He also joined the breakaway Swaraj-Khilafat Party of Motilal Nehru and became a member of the United Provinces

Legislative Council. Sandeep Balakrishna, founder and chief editor of The Dharma Dispatch , describes this project of Mohammad Habib beautifully in his book, 70 years of Secularism : After much thought, Mohammed Habib & Co. discovered an effective method— tactic is the apt word—to sanitise the savage record of the Muslim rule in India. This method was to ‘interpret’ the medieval Muslim chronicles in such a way that Islam’s image could be rescued from the pit it had fallen into. Accordingly, the blood-soaked record of the medieval Muslim rule in India was systematically recast in economic terms. Mohammed Habib was immensely helped by the deceptive theoretical framework of Marxism in this vile project. Working nearly in tandem, the history departments at Aligarh and Allahabad universities created and floated this new phoney, hot-air balloon which, as we can verify today, had longterm and far-reaching consequences in defacing and distorting the collective psyches of at least three generations of Hindus. Some fumes emitted by this noxious hot-air balloon include the following: 1. Islamic invasion of India was a myth. 2. Muslim invaders were not motivated by Islam in their conquests of India. 3. Forcible conversions of Hindus were a bigger myth because millions of ‘low caste’ Hindus voluntarily, joyfully accepted the universal brotherhood of Islam to escape ‘Brahminical oppression’. 4. Islam was a liberating force which for the first time introduced true social equality in India as a result of which lakhs of Hindus voluntarily helped build magnificent mosques and palaces for Muslim sultans. 5. Aurangzeb’s vast empire of Islamic bigotry imploded due to a ‘revenue crisis’ and not because of his industrialscale oppression of Hindus.13

Being close to Motilal Nehru also allowed him to influence his son, Jawaharlal Nehru. As Motilal Nehru merged his Swaraj Party with the Congress, the Aligarh School successfully infiltrated the Congress organisation as well. If we have found the national behaviour ‘apologetic, timid, full of self-reproach, appeasing and confused’ before the Muslim League’s approach of ‘acrimony, accusation, complaints, deceptions, denunciations and street rioting’, the Aligarh School’s successful Marxist/Islamist whitewashing of India’s history coupled with the appeasement practised by the national leadership only led the country down a path that would later prove to be disastrous.

References 10

Ram Chandra Guha. 2012. Chapter on Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. In Makers of Modern India , Penguin India.

11

Akmal Hussain. 1989. ‘ The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan ’. In The Challenge in South Asia: Development, Democracy and Regional Cooperation , edited by Ponna Wignaraja and Akmal Hussain. United Nations University

Press. 12 ‘Satyarthaprakash’, by Swami Dayanand, ‘Paper on Hinduism (1.1.3)’ (Collective Works of Swami Vivekanand) and The Life Divine by Sri Aurobindo. 13 Sandeep Balakrishna. 2018. 70 Years of Secularism . Indus University.

CHAPTER 5

Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal Muhammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah belonged to B oth families that had converted to Islam from Hinduism. Both of them began as eclectic and open- minded individuals but became radicalised as time went by. Muhammad Iqbal wrote the famous Qaumi Tarana or Tarana-eHind, ‘Saare Jahan Se Achchha Hindostan Hamara’. However, his respect for Hindus did not last long and within ten years, he had abandoned his song and graduated to ‘ Cheen o Arab hamara, Hindostan hamara / Muslim hain hum, watan hai, saara jahan hamara’. He also briefly experimented with ishtehad (Arabic ijtehad) or reform among Muslims, but, even this reform did not extend to the fundamentals of Islam and remained confined to modern education in the manner of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. In December 1930, the Muslim League held its all-India conference at Allahabad (now Prayagraj) with none other than Muhammad Iqbal presiding. The poet-philosopher emphasised what would become the underlining facet of the League’s Pakistan pitch. ‘The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified.’ Indeed, Iqbal went on to call for just that, specifically proposing the creation of a separate Muslim state in the

Subcontinent, carved out of the north- western regions (more or less equivalent to Pakistan’s present-day boundaries).14 ‘I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State.’ This, he said, was ‘the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India’. 15 Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a brilliant lawyer who had set up his practice in Bombay (now Mumbai) for mostly criminal cases. He later blossomed into a fine constitutional lawyer. He was a leading figure in the Indian National Congress, favouring the petition and constitutional approach towards getting more concessions from the British. His stature declined after the arrival of Mahatma Gandhi, and he finally quit the Congress over the involvement of the Muslim religious leadership with Congress in the matter of the Khilafat Movement. He stuck to constitutional methods, even as he maintained his distance from the religious leadership. Jinnah remained in Britain from 1930–1934, practising in the Privy Council. Iqbal, on the other hand, grew close to Jinnah, and, as mentioned earlier, actively canvassed for the Two-Nation Theory. He wrote to Jinnah in 1937: A separate federation of Muslim Provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of Non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to selfdetermination just as other nations in India and outside India are? 16

Jinnah took part in the Round Table Conferences in Britain as a representative of the Muslim League. He took counsel from Iqbal, seeing him not only as a senior leader of the Punjab Muslim League, but also as a man of letters and as a barrister senior to him. Iqbal was also part of the Muslim League delegation under Aga Khan that met the Viceroy in 1906. They projected Muslims as a class of people, separate from Hindus, and thus deserving of separate treatment. As we progress, we will find that ‘playing victim’ is a practised art of the Muslim leadership that comes up again and again.

Jinnah in his earlier years was not in favour of separate electorates. Yet, his acquisitive character is evident from the fact that he himself became a member of the Legislative Council from a Muslim seat in 1909. He was instrumental in drafting the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Muslim League and the Congress. The latter made a very reasonable case for separate electorates for minorities in every province, so as to have separate electorates for Hindus and non- Hindus in provinces such as Bengal and Punjab. Rationality dictated that too, but the League would stick to pan-India Muslim and non-Muslim constituencies, insisting on a privileged position for Muslims everywhere. The British were fine with this proposal as they preferred to have this divide. The famous ‘divide and rule’ policy of Britain always encouraged Muslims to demand more and more by highlighting grievances that were rarely real and were mostly imaginary. Jinnah was a rather unlikely leader of the Muslims. He was more British in his tastes and lifestyle than even the British themselves. It was a classic case of being a mental slave of the British. While Mahatma Gandhi wore the dress of a sadhu to identify himself with the masses, Jinnah made a deliberate attempt to stay as far away from the look of a religious Muslim as possible. He loved his whisky and ate pork. He never offered namaz. The joke is that he did not even know the difference between a Shi’a namaz and a Sunni namaz. When he did have to perform the namaz due to political compulsions, he was often seen offering Sunni namaz even though he was himself a Shi’a. He was born in an Ismaili Shi’a family but later converted to the Twelver Shi’a. It is said that even this conversion was probably an oversight because he would not have known the distinction between the two. It must be said that when it came to politics, the Muslims made no bones about whether the leader followed true Islamic practices or not. Unlike Mahatma Gandhi, Jinnah was under no compulsion to demonstrate a great moral character to his followers. Islam is a political religion, and it understands quite well who is most suitable to play its politics better than the politics of the Kaffir. It was against this background that the British enacted the Government of India Act, 1935, and called for provincial elections

granting suffrage to about one-sixth of the adult public. The Act itself was all hocus-pocus that did not satisfy anyone. Most of Jinnah’s Fourteen Points were accepted. It also proposed 11 provincial legislatures (six of them were bicameral). Sind, Orissa and Bihar were constituted as separate provinces. The provisions to establish a Federation gave 33% representation to the Princely States and kept a provision for accession. (This is the provision that was used by Sardar Patel to make the provinces accede to India). The Act was deliberately slanted against the Congress and thereby against Hindus. The British kept a diarchy at the centre while conceding a fair bit of autonomy at the level of the provinces. References 14

Allama Iqbal's Presidential Address at Allahabad, 1930, Available at: https://historypak.com/allahabad-address-1930 / (accessed on 25 February 2020).

15

Ibid.

16

Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah: A Collection of Iqbal's Letters to the Qaid-i-Azam Conveying His Views on the Political Future of Muslim India published by M. Ashraf, 1963.

CHAPTER 6

The 1937 Elections and World War II 1937 elections were a watershed in the history of Congress– T he League relations, and by extension, of Hindu– Muslim relations. About three crore Indians gained voting rights in 1937, which was about one-sixth of the adult public. The suffrage was limited by prescribing land holdings, income tax criteria and education criteria. The total number of seats was 1,585, out of which, 482 were reserved for Muslims. Congress won 707 seats, while the Muslim League could win only 109. Most of the Muslim seats were won by regional outfits—the Unionist Party in Punjab, the Sind Union Party in Sind and the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal— which were led by Muslims not affiliated to the Muslim League. However, Congress suffered a bad reality check. It could not even find enough candidates to field Muslim seats. It fielded barely 58 candidates for the 482 seats and won 26 of them. So much for a party that claimed to represent all sections of the Indian people. Congress won 707 out of 1,104 non-Muslim seats and formed governments in eight provinces. 17 Jinnah expected to be invited to join the government in the United Provinces, but the Congress dismissed his claim. This action changed Jinnah’s relationship with Congress forever. From being an adversary, he became an implacable foe of the party.

The discourse among Muslims had been divided between the concepts of Qaumiyat-e-muttahida (India as a united nation of Hindus and Muslims) and Qaumiyat-e- judagana (separate nations for Hindus and Muslims). A section in the clergy, led chiefly by Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani of Deoband favoured the former, whereas, another section within Deoband led by Ashraf Ali Thanawi favoured the latter. Later on, the Jamaat-e-Islami of Abul A’la Maududi also supported the idea of a united India. The Barelvis led by Hamid Raza Barelvi and Naeem-ud- Din Muradabadi completely opposed the independence of India without a separate future for Muslims. They were largely outside the Khilafat fold and cast their lot with Muhammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The renowned Sufi Pir Jamaat Ali Shah gave rousing sermons: ‘Dear Muslims, today there are two banners. One belongs to Islam and the other to infidels. Which will you choose?’ 18 After 1937, the Muslim League started a mass contact programme, emphasising religious identity in terms of the TwoNation Theory. I have already cited the letter that Muhammad Iqbal wrote to Jinnah. The Congress’s mass contact programme, on the other hand, was entrusted to socialist Muslims who had little influence on the masses. World War II started with the invasion of Poland by Germany on 1 September 1939, and Britain joined the war along with France on 3 September. Lord Linlithgow announced unilaterally that India would be a belligerent in the war. This was objected to by the Congress. The resignation of Congress ministries created a vacuum which was expertly exploited by the Muslim League. The Qaumiyat-ejudagana led by the Barelvis and the Muslim League gained the upper hand in the political space and promised full support to the British. The League also helped with the mobilisation of combat troops. The jury is still out as to who was more responsible for the resignations— Mahatma Gandhi or Nehru. The resignation of Congress ministries was a terrible mistake, because, not only did it allow the Muslim League to form a closer bond with the British, but it also allowed Jinnah to become the single node of Muslim politics for the British. The Deobandis, who had so

assiduously countered the Barelvi narrative of the Two-Nation Theory, felt cheated. This was their second setback in two decades. The first had been the calling off of the Non-Cooperation Movement. The Muslim League was elated at this political folly of idealism on part of the Congress. They celebrated a ‘Deliverance Day’ on 22 December 1939, in which the Barelvi maulanas took part wholeheartedly. Jinnah smelt the coffee. He had concluded that the easy pathway to Muslim masses lay through the Barelvi clerics. A representative quasi-federation of the major Sunni Sufi silsila s/ tariqa s—Chishti, Qadri, Naqshbandi and Suhrawardy— was always in the forefront of what Dr Ambedkar called ‘gangster’s method of politics’, 19 which was characterised by never-ending and ever new unreasonable demands, followed by acrimony, denunciations, street-rioting and victim-playing. In this, the Muslim League was not far behind, so their fates intertwined. The Deobandis followed the dictum laid down by Shah Waliullah, Syed Ahmad Barelvi (of Balakot fame), and were led by Maulana Azad. The Barelvis had found an able articulation from traditional clergy in Ahmed Raza Barelvi’s sons Hamid and Mustafa, in Naeemud-din Muradabadi, in Ali Azmi, in the Sufi Pirs and in the All India Sunni Conference of the Barelvis. The Barelvis constituted 80% of the Sunni population. Jinnah, nominally a Shi’a, found them useful for his cause and vice-versa. Deobandis nuanced their narrative tactically to gain the support of the Congress, as they were numerically much inferior to the Barelvis—barely 20% of the Sunnis. While the Congress leadership claimed to represent all sections of society including Muslims, it had remained an almost exclusively Hindu party, as was evident from the 1937 elections. However, its inability to claim the Hindu mantle made it a confused mass of leaders pulling in different directions. It became a big umbrella—modernists, constitutionalists, traditionalists, sanatanis , socialists, saints—all were clubbed together, and their appeasement of the clergy became their fatal mistake. In hindsight, the great hurry to pitchfork India into a mass movement made the Congress leadership give respectability to the

Muslim clergy instead of giving it to the constitutionalist Muslims who had always been a part of it. People who otherwise lacked respectability, except among radicalised sections of Muslim masses, were given respectability by the Congress in 1918–19. This approach continued right till the date a new government took an entirely fresh approach and did away with triple talaq 20 in a bold new legislation, taking the advice of the progressive sections of Muslims. Arif Mohammad Khan, presently the Governor of Kerala, has explained this phenomenon of Hindu guilt beautifully. 21 He says that the same people who used to say that they were an ‘equal and separate’ nation ( Milli Qaumiyat ) before 1947, and had forced the British and the Congress to concede their point, came back after the Shah Bano judgement in 1986 to say that they had a ‘separate identity’ ( Milli Tashakhhus ) and the Congress again conceded their point of view. These very people are now talking of Mazhabi Pehchan (Religious Identity). However, there was no Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru in 1986 to prevent Hindus from reacting, and Narendra Modi is merely the culmination of Hindu angst against this policy of appeasement that lasted nearly a century from 1916 (Lucknow Pact) to 2014 (Modi’s victory in the general elections with full majority). Arif Mohammad Khan also made an important point that the Muslim clergy keeps scaring the community by telling them that there will be a Hindu Rashtra. He pooh- poohed the idea, stating that even in a Hindu Rashtra, there is no scriptural sanction for denying equal rights to minorities. However, because there is the concept of zimmi in Islam for non-Muslims, the Muslims are made to think by ulema that they will similarly become zimmis in a Hindu Rashtra. 22 References 17 Appendix 2. 18 Sialkot, 22 April 1938. William Kesler Jackson. 2014. A Subcontinent's Sunni Schism: The Deobandi–Barelvi Rivalry and the Creation of Modern South Asia , Syracuse University.

19 Dr B.R. Ambedkar. 1945. Chapter XI. In Pakistan or the Partition of India . Location 5859, Kindle Edition. 20 Passed by Parliament on 30 July 2019, made retrospectively effective from 19 September 2018. 21 Interview with Rajat Sharma. Available at: https://www.youtube. com/watch? v=i_rnQkpgxUo&t=17 s (accessed on 20 February 2020). 22

Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y18jUF1lWXU&t=1108s (accessed on 4 March 2020).

CHAPTER 7

The Pakistan Resolution and the Rahmat Ali Plan fter the ill-advised resignation of the Congress ministries, Jinnah had the free space, British backing and Barelvi support to plan for the next elections. He had already learnt that the path to Muslim support in a separate electorate set-up lay through Muslim radicalisation. The irony was the fact that the more radical sect, the Deobandis, were against him, while the supposedly benign Sufis under the Barelvi 23 umbrella were fully with him. This phenomenon is mostly not understood by Hindus, who regard Sufis as peaceful and have no issues in praying at the dargahs of Sufi Pirs. The essence of understanding Sufism lies in one simple fact—Sufism is just a tariqa , or a different way, fully subordinate to the Shariat / Shari’a . In any conflict between tariqat and Shariat , Shariat shall prevail. The only difference between the Deobandis and the Barelvis in this matter is that Sufis regard Prophet Muhammad as divine, the Nur-ul-Allah , whereas, Deobandis follow the line of Shah Waliullah that Prophet Muhammad was just a messenger of Allah and a human being. Shah Waliullah was the one who invited Ahmad Shah Abdali and won the support of the Shi’a Nawab of Oudh, Asaf-ud-Daula, and the Rohilkhand ruler, Najibullah, who fought the Marathas together in 1761 at Panipat. He studied in Arabia with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and founded a sect that closely followed the Wahhabi ideology within the Hanafi

A

school of Islamic jurisprudence followed in the Indian Subcontinent. Among the disciples of his son, Shah Abdul Aziz, was Syed Ahmad Barelvi of Raebareli who went on a mission of jihad against Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and was killed in Balakot, in 1832. The Barelvis were under the influence of the Sufi Pirs and their silsila s. However, as explained, they had no different take in the matter of Da'wa or Jihad . Many people deliberately spread the trope of the ‘peaceful Sufi’, and the Sufi belief in atman and Brahman. All this is false propaganda, because, the notions of ‘immanence of the divine’ were firmly negated and cruelly killed off by the foremost Sufi of all time, Al-Ghazali. I have dilated on this topic in many other columns and videos. 24 Armed with Barelvi support and British indulgence, Jinnah began what was essentially a game of one- upmanship. He had his target cut out. Muslims had preferred the regional Muslim leadership over him in the provincial elections in 1937. He had to ensure that this did not happen once another election took place after the war ended. World War II had come as a great blessing for him. Congress had left a vacuum for him to exploit, and he was not one to let it go. Till then, his politics had been based on minority politics of Muslims in the provinces where Muslims were a minority. Now, he had to play majority politics in the provinces where Muslims were a majority, by projecting the identity of Muslims as a national minority and not just provincial minorities. The Pakistan Resolution was passed on 23 March 1940. I quote a passage from a study: Lahore Resolution—(was) a clear-cut statement of purpose on the part of Jinnah and his party. As Hindus and Muslims were two different nations, ‘the only course open to us,’ Jinnah declared on the occasion of the resolution’s passing, ‘is to allow the major nations separate homelands.’ The goal was now an unambiguously separate, absolutely independent (i.e. from Hindu India) Muslim polity (or polities) on the subcontinent; ‘the Muslim-majority provinces in northwestern and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states,’ the Resolution announced, ‘in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.’ Before this momentous resolution, the idea of Pakistan had been the domain of a small group, and the destiny of India’s Muslims had remained a hotly contested topic possessed of a long spectrum of opinion voiced by a wide variety of both secular and religious leaders. Post-Lahore

Resolution, however, an increasing number of Muslims appear to have been drawn to the League’s new, simple and infinitely measurable aim. This trend continued despite efforts by the JUH, the Ahrars, Shi’a political groups and others to challenge the League’s claim to represent all Muslims. In April 1940, for example, the JUH— together with the Shi’a Political Conference and the Majlis-eAhrar—organised an Azad [‘Free’] Muslim Conference, accusing the AIML of ignoring the real Muslim minority in the Hindu majority areas of India in favour of the Muslims who already enjoyed majority status in their respective areas; Jinnah responded that these minority Muslims would be minorities whether Pakistan was created or not—it was a choice between all Muslims under Hindu Raj, or only some. 25

The Resolution was drafted by Zafarullah Khan, an Ahmadiyya, and was embellished by a map of the Subcontinent in the future, as fantasised and prepared by Chaudhary Rahmat Ali.

Figure 7.1: Chaudhry Rahmat Ali’s Map

26

It may be noted that this map conforms to the Islamic fantasy of having Islamic rule in the whole world. Both the Barelvis and Deobandis agreed on the larger objective of Islamising the whole of the Subcontinent. Only the methodology was different. The Qaumiyat-e-muttahida 27 proponents wanted to do it from within, in the manner of normal proselytisation, whereas, the Barelvis wanted to follow Prophet Muhammad’s hijarat (emigration) model, in which he went away from the land of kufr (a great sin) and shirk (idolatry),

gained strength, and through sheer will power, deception and superior tactics in war and peace, won over not just Mecca but went on to conquer a large part of the pagan and Christian world. The Barelvis called their strategy the ‘Medina Strategy’ and Pakistan was to be the ‘New Medina’, which would be used as a staging post for conquering and converting to Islam the rest of Hindu India.

References

23

Official name: Ahl-e-Sunnat.

24

Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0QtUbHyLok&t=2413 s — Is Sufism a Message of Peace? (accessed on 26 Fe b ruary 2020).

25 William Kesler Jackson. 2014. A Subcontinent's Sunni Schism: The Deobandi-Barelvi Rivalry and the Creation of Modern South Asia , Syracuse University. 26 Source: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325953542_ Choudhary_Rahmat_Ali_and_his_political_imagination_Pak_plan_ and_the_Continent_of_Dinia/link/5df09b74a6fdcc2837178800/ download 27

Composite nation.

CHAPTER 8

CPI and the Gangadhar Adhikari Report he reason for giving this lengthy background to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, is to underscore a simple point repeatedly and forcefully—that the ultimate aim of the ummat is not just to gain Pakistan, but the whole of India. The ummat draws from the history and imagery of the Arab conquests and makes no bones about the conquest of Anatolia and Constantinople. From the 8th century onwards, Muslims waged a relentless war on the great Byzantine city until it finally fell in the 15th century. The defensive war which lasted for 750 years could not save Constantinople. Muslim and Barelvi clerics argue that Pakistan would be one such staging post from where they would launch an unremitting struggle against infidels and finally beat their defences, no matter how much time it took. The Communist Party of India had a similar aim. Functioning nominally as an Indian party, but in reality an extension of the Soviet Union Communist Party, through the British Communist Party under the Comintern umbrella, it fancied its chances of bringing all of India under communist rule if India could be divided up into several small states. It developed a theory, articulated by its ideologue Gangadhar Adhikari, that argued that India was a conglomeration of nationalities, each of which deserved a separate nation-state.

T

Communism follows the same binary logic that is followed by Islam and Christianity, the Western world and even the capitalists. The binary logic possesses two values, true and false, and unlike the Eastern logic systems, does not admit any grey areas, or the multivalued logic of intermediate stages between true and false, such as may be, or as in Hinduism and Buddhism, that of sanshay (neither true nor false) and shraddha (both true and false). Marx is its prophet and Das Kapital , its Bible. Falsehood is to be destroyed by any means, including violence, so that the truth of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ can be established. In its world view, the communists are always right, and the capitalists are always wrong. From being a purely economic theory, it invaded the cultural field by morphing into Cultural Marxism in the 1930s through the 1950s, when it further morphed into what is now known as postmodernism. Gramsci was the proponent of Cultural Marxism and Jacques Derrida of postmodernism. The binary logic, the pursuit of power by all means and the permissible use of violence are common to all three. Based on the communist and Cultural Marxist binary, Gangadhar Adhikari defined nation-state narrowly in terms of shared ethnicities/languages/narrowly defined culture. The Hindu world view, on the other hand, viewed Indian culture in terms of shared values of common concepts of cyclical time, multi-valued logic, an epistemology that values direct experience over the dogmatic word, a vast cosmology and death as a quest for liberation. While all binary-logic-based religions emphasise Islamic values or Christian values, and even communist values, there is a lot of grimacing whenever India is defined in terms of its timeless culture that is based on relatively more scientific concepts of time, logic, inductive and empirical proof, infinite cosmos and death that liberates (and not binds one to permanent hell or heaven). 28 Given this background, it is easy, in my opinion, to see why communists can make common cause with Islamists and evangelists against Hindus and other Indic religions like Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism (though the British did invest in Abrahamising Sikhism, with good success, by patronising the Tat Khalsa Movement).

Sandeep Balakrishna sums up some of the more nefarious activities of the communist deplorables in this memorable sentence: A sense of history informs us that it was this nihilistic, unqualified evil that operated behind the Communists sabotaging the Indian freedom struggle and the unstinted benison they gave to Partition. Of course, this climactic disgrace is apart from their incessant terrorism that includes the notorious Meerut Conspiracy Case, their active collaboration with the Razakars, their inveterate abuse of nationalists, patriots and icons like Subhas Bose, Sardar Patel, Mahatma Gandhi, and Dr K.B. Hedgewar . 29

The position paper of Gangadhar Adhikari was brought out at about the same time as Dr B.R. Ambedkar wrote his memorable paper on the idea of Pakistan. Sandeep Balakrishna best summarises this paper, again: ‘ Adhikari Thesis’, was a position paper authored by Gangadhar Adhikari, who was briefly Secretary of the (undivided) Communist Party of India. The ‘position paper’ titled ‘Pakistan and National Unity’, in reality was simply two things: an endorsement of the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan and the willingness of the CPI to fully back it. The CPI passed a resolution to the effect based on this paper. But the premise of G Adhikari in the paper is what is interesting: one, he holds that India was never a united country ‘from Kashmir to Kanyakumari’ and that the idea of ‘one nation, one people, one language’ never existed at any point in India’s long history. Two, he characterises the various regions of India as ‘different individual nationalities’. It is highly instructive to read the entire paper in full. This premise enables him, for example, to pen this: ‘The Lingayat peasantry of Karnatak wakes up to anti- imperialist consciousness and develops a natural yearning for a free Karnataka. So it is with the Andhra, Tamils and with the Sindhis, Punjabis and the Pathans.’30 And soon enough, this: ‘…as soon as we grasp that behind the demand for Pakistan is the justified desire of the people of Muslim nationalities such as Sindhis, Baluchis, Punjabis (Muslims), Pathans to build their free national life … there is a very simple solution to the communal problem in its new phase.’ [Page 5, same book. Emphasis added] But more decisively: ‘…nationalities such as Sindhis, Baluchis, Pathans and Punjabi Muslims have the right to secede if they so desire… wherever people of Muslim faith living together in a territorial unit, form a nationality … they certainly have the right to autonomous state existence…. [Page 8, same book] How different is this from ‘Hindustan ke tukde tukde’ slogans? If anything, Adhikari’s work provides the ideological basis and justification upon whose strength these ‘martyrs’ enact their drama unimpeded on a sprawling campus

created, sustained and subsidised by the Indian taxpayer who’s only recently becoming aware of the exact sort of danger this institution poses. ‘The communists’ support to the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan— not to mention the orgy of bloodshed they unleashed in Telangana in 1946 in support of yet another vivisection of India—eventually tarnished their image nationwide.

This Stalinist endorsement gave the Muslim League the intellectual heft it was desperately looking for. From this point onwards in 1942, the communists were as enthusiastic about the Pakistan project as Jinnah himself.

References 28

Sanjay Dixit. 2019. ‘All Religions Are Not the Same’. Available at: https://medium.com/@Sanjay_Dixit/all-religions-are-not-the-same- hindudharma-has-a-scientific-temper-50132d91907b (accessed on 1 March 2020).

29 The Dharma Dispatch , 24 December 2018. 30 G. Adhikari, ed. 1942. Pakistan and National Unity , People’s Publishing House, Bombay.

CHAPTER 9

Ambedkar: The Army Question r B.R. Ambedkar does not need any introduction to any Indian, or to anyone even remotely interested in the affairs of India. A few months after the Lahore Resolution, he started writing his Thoughts on Pakistan , which was first published in 1942. The same book was enlarged and published as Pakistan or the Partition of India in 1945. It was one of the most dispassionate and pragmatic analyses written on the question of Partition. Ambedkar was probably the only politician or administrator who analysed the district-wise demography of Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). He then analysed the most significant aspect of them all, which almost all our historians forget to analyse—the constitution of India’s military. He concluded that with 34% of the British Army being Muslim, India’s safety could not be guaranteed if a Muslim power were to attack India. He based this conclusion on his reading of the nature of Muslim politics. Dr Ambedkar had made this analysis then, and the essential nature of Muslim politics continues to be the same, that is:

D

1. When in minority: to air made-up grievances, make absurd demands for equal treatment and indulge in violence pretending to be frightened; 2. When in majority: enforce Shari’a law over the minority, treat them as second-class citizens

and even indulge in religious cleansing or genocide, as in Malabar in 1921, Bengal in 1946, Punjab in 1947, or Kashmir in 1989– 1995. He discussed the nature of Muslim politics in a full chapter. Some of his passages merit being quoted here: These invasions of India by Muslims were as much invasions of India as they were wars among the Muslims themselves. This fact has remained hidden because the invaders are all lumped together as Muslims without distinction. But as a matter of fact, they were Tartars, Afghans and Mongols. Muhammad of Ghazni was a Tartar, Mahommed of Ghori was an Afghan, Taimur was a Mongol, Babar was a Tartar, while Nadirshah and Ahmadshah Abdalli were Afghans. In invading India, the Afghan was out to destroy the Tartar and the Mongol was out to destroy the Tartar as well as the Afghan. They were not a loving family cemented by the feeling of Islamic brotherhood. They were deadly rivals of one another and their wars were often wars of mutual extermination. What is, however, important to bear in mind is that with all their internecine conflicts they were all united by one common objective and that was to destroy the Hindu faith. 31

Read the above passage, and then place the conflict between the Deobandis and Barelvis in perspective. We will soon see that both of them were united in their ultimate objective of achieving what is mentioned in the Qur’an 2:286—‘O Allah, grant us victory over the qaum-ul- kaffrein, or the infidels’. Discussing the attitude of the Muslim soldiery, Dr Ambedkar had this view, which may be found to be politically incorrect, even in today’s India: Can the Hindus depend upon such an Army to defend the country against the invasion of Afghanistan? Only the so-called Indian Nationalists will say *yes* to it. The boldest among the realists must stop to think before he can give an answer to the question. The realist must take note of the fact that the Musalmans look upon the Hindus as Kaffirs, who deserve more to be exterminated than protected. The realist must take note of the fact that while the Musalman accepts the European as his superior, he looks upon the Hindu as his inferior. It is doubtful how far a regiment of Musalmans will accept the authority of their Hindu officers if they be placed under them. The realist must take note that of all the Musalmans, the Musalman of the North-West is the most disaffected Musalman in his relation with the Hindus. The realist must take note that the Punjabi Musalman is fully susceptible to the propaganda in favour of Pan-Islamism. Taking note of all these considerations, there can be very little doubt that he would be a bold Hindu who would say that in any invasion by Muslim countries, the Muslims in the Indian

Army would be loyal and that there is no danger of their going over to the invader. Even Theodore Morrison, writing in 1899, was of the opinion that: The views held by the Mahomedans (certainly the most aggressive and truculent of the peoples of India) are alone sufficient to prevent the establishment of an independent Indian Government. Were the Afghan to descend from the north upon an autonomous India, the Mahomedans, instead of uniting with the Sikhs and the Hindus to repel him, would be drawn by all the ties of kinship and religion to join his flag. And when it is recalled that in 1919 the Indian Musalmans who were carrying on the Khilafat movement actually went to the length of inviting the Amir of Afghanistan to invade India, the view expressed by Sir Theodore Morrison acquires added strength and ceases to be a matter of mere speculation. How this Army composed of the Muslims of the Punjab and N.W.F.P. will behave in the case of an invasion by Afghanistan is not the only question which the Hindus are called upon to consider. There is another and equally important question on which the Hindus must ponder. That question is: Will the Indian Government be free to use this Army, whatever its loyalties, against the invading Afghans? In this connection, attention must be drawn to the stand taken by the Muslim League. It is to the effect that the Indian Army shall not be used against Muslim powers. There is nothing new in this. This principle was enunciated by the Khilafat Committee long before the League. Apart from this, the question remains how far the Indian Muslims will, in future, make it their article of faith. That the League has not succeeded in this behalf against the British Government does not mean that it will not succeed against an Indian Government. The chances are that it will, because, however unpatriotic the principle may be from the standpoint of the Hindus, it is most agreeable to the Muslim sentiment and the League may find a sanction for it in the general support of the Muslim community in India. If the Muslim League succeeds in enforcing this limitation upon Indians[’] right to use her fighting forces, what is going to be the position of the Hindus? This is another question, which the Hindus have to consider. If India remains politically one whole and the two-nation mentality created by Pakistan continues to be fostered, the Hindus will find themselves between the devil and the deep sea, so far as the defence of India is concerned. 32

Thus, considering the nature of the Muslim religion and their position in the Indian Army, Dr Ambedkar was of the view that a united India with the ‘two-nation’ mentality remaining unchecked because of the League, would be an untenable entity for defence. It is a pity that nothing was done to eliminate this ‘two- nation’ mentality even in independent India where it was allowed to fester in the name of whitewashing of Islamic atrocities by granting a special status by way of Article 370 to Jammu and Kashmir, and by recognising the clergy as the authentic mediating authorities between the government and the Muslim community. Even today,

there is an implicit recognition of this Milli Tashakhhus (Special Community Identity) by the government and media. In any TV debate, you will only find maulanas, maulvis or Islamic scholars of hardline nature representing Muslims. References 31 Dr B.R. Ambedkar. 1945. Pakistan or the Partition of India . Kindle Edition. 32 Dr B.R. Ambedkar. 1945. Pakistan or the Partition of India . New Delhi: Samayak Prakashan.

CHAPTER 10

Ambedkar: The Communal and Political Question Ambedkar analysed the question of Partition quite D rdispassionately. On the political question, he had clearly shown that the British indulgence of Muslim demands had created a situation where any Hindu insistence on keeping the country united would have to be on the principle of ‘equal and separate status’ of Muslims. His views can be summarised as follows: 1. On political questions, the Muslim leadership has a lesser intent and a greater intent; 2. The lesser intent is to secure a Communal Award (separate electorate in this instance) in their favour in a way that is quite unjust to Hindus where they are in a minority; 3. Muslims demanded and got within three years of the formation of Muslim League, not only separate electorates and proportional seats where they were in a minority, but they also secured a statutory majority in provinces where they were in a majority, thus creating a permanent subjugation for Hindu minorities; 4. Hindus were quite prepared for joint electorates in provinces where they were in a

minority while conceding separate electorates to Muslims in places where they were in a majority. However, Muslims demanded and got a statutory majority even in these places; 5. Dr Ambedkar described the perversion in the following terms: This is what constitutes the fundamental wrong in the Communal Award. That this is a grave wrong must be admitted. For, it offends against certain political principles, which have now become axiomatic. First is, not to trust anyone with unlimited political power. As has been well said, ‘If in any state there is a body of men who possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule can never be free. For, the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably poisonous to those who possess it. They are always tempted to impose their canon of good upon others, and in the end, they assume that the good of the community depends upon the continuance of their power. Liberty always demands a limitation of political authority. The second principle is that, as a King has no Divine Right to rule, so also a majority has no Divine Right to rule. Majority Rule is tolerated only because it is for a limited period and subject to the right to have it changed, and secondly because it is a rule of a political majority, i.e., a majority which has submitted itself to the suffrage of a minority and not a communal majority. If such is the limited scope of authority permissible to a political majority over a political minority, how can a minority of one community be placed under the perpetual subjection of a majority of another community? To allow a majority of one community to rule a minority of another community without requiring the majority to submit itself to the suffrage of the minority, especially when the minority demands it, is to enact a perversion of democratic principles and to show a callous disregard for the safety and security of the Hindu minorities’. 33

6. Describing the greater intent of the Muslim politics, Dr Ambedkar noted the deliberate creation of more Muslim majority provinces, Sind and the North- West Frontier Province (NWFP) in this case. The intent of the Muslim parties is quite clear, he averred, that they would like to exercise a veto on every national activity. It is necessary to relate Dr Ambedkar’s observation with what is going on in the name of anti-CAA protests, and it is difficult to miss

the similarities. On the communal behaviour of Muslims, with particular reference to the Muslim League, Dr Ambedkar was even more trenchant. He demolished the equal and separate nation argument warranting Partition by the simple example of Switzerland and Canada where multiple nationalities live together. He traces the communally aggressive behaviour of Muslims in this very book: According to Muslim Canon Law the world is divided into two camps, Dar-ul-Islam (abode of Islam) and Dar- ul-Harb (abode of war). A country is Dar-ul-Islam when it is ruled by Muslims. A country is Dar-ul-Harb when Muslims only reside in it but are not rulers of it. That being the Canon Law of the Muslims, India cannot be the common motherland of the Hindus and the Musalmans. It can be the land of the Musalmans—but it cannot be the land of the ‘Hindus and the Musalmans living as equals’. Further, it can be the land of the Musalmans only when it is governed by the Muslims. The moment the land becomes subject to the authority of a nonMuslim power, it ceases to be the land of the Muslims. Instead of being Dar-ulIslam, it becomes Dar-ul-Harb. It must not be supposed that this view is only of academic interest. For, it is capable of becoming an active force capable of influencing the conduct of the Muslims. It did greatly influence the conduct of the Muslims when the British occupied India. The British occupation raised no qualms in the minds of the Hindus. But so far as the Muslims were concerned, it at once raised the question whether India was any longer a suitable place of residence for Muslims. A discussion was started in the Muslim community, which Dr Titus says lasted for half a century, as to whether India was Dar-ul-Harb or Dar-ul-Islam. (p. 294). He then points out another injunction, Jihad (crusade), by which it becomes ‘incumbent on a Muslim ruler to extend the rule of Islam until the whole world shall have been brought under its sway’. ‘Technically, it is the duty of the Muslim ruler, who is capable of doing so, to transform Dar-ul-Harb into Dar- ul-Islam. There are instances showing that they have not hesitated to proclaim Jihad. The curious may examine the history of the Mutiny of 1857 and if he does, he will find that, in part, at any rate, it was really a Jihad proclaimed by the Muslims against the British, and that the Mutiny, so far as the Muslims were concerned, was a recrudescence of revolt which had been fostered by Sayyed Ahmad who preached to the Musalmans for several decades that owing to the occupation of India by the British the country had become a Darul-Harb. The Mutiny was an attempt by the Muslims to reconvert India into a Darul-Islam. Not only can they proclaim Jihad but they can call the aid of a foreign Muslim power to make Jihad a success, or if the foreign Muslim power intends to proclaim a Jihad, help that power in making its endeavour a success (pp. 295– 296). He then draws attention to the third tenet ‘that Islam does not recognise territorial affinities’.

This background analysis will come handy when we analyse the happenings in 2019–20. Suffice to say that hardly any Indian

intellectual analysed Islam with the objectivity that Dr Ambedkar did. He was critical of Hinduism as well, but his sharpest analysis was reserved for Islam. He could see the imperialistic and irrational side of Islam without a hint of political correctness, unlike those in the Congress, including Mahatma Gandhi. References 33 Dr B.R. Ambedkar. 1945. Pakistan or the Partition of India . Kindle Edition.

CHAPTER 11

1945–1946 Elections Provincial Elections of 1946 finally put paid to INC’s claims of representing T he all Indians (vanity didn’t allow them then, nor does it allow even now to accept), while boosting the League[’s] position in the negotiations for freedom and partition. [The] Executive Council and Constituent Assembly were to be formed following the elections. Pakistan and its possible forms became the main points of discussion everywhere. Casting your vote became an Islamic act. While Congress won 90% of Hindu seats, [the] League romped home in 87% Muslim seats. 4.5 million Indian Muslims out of a total of six million voted for Jinnah’s outfit, which ran a single-minded campaign for Pakistan. The League swept all Muslim seats in Bombay, Madras and Orissa, and most of the seats in Bengal, Assam and Central Provinces. Only in NWFP (North-West Frontier Provinces) did it fare poorly, and that is because Frontier Gandhi supported the Congress. Despite winning 923 seats out of the total 1,585, the INC emerged as an overall loser because Pakistan was by now a certainty. 34

In the Central Assembly Elections for 102 elected seats that preceded the provincial elections, the Muslim League won every single one of the 30 Muslim seats, but failed to win any other seat. Congress won 59 seats and claimed a majority. This is a telling commentary on those Muslims, who claim today that their ancestors chose India over Pakistan. The 1945–1946 elections became a virtual referendum on the question of Pakistan among the Muslims. It also became a test of strength between the Deobandis and the Barelvis. Deobandis suffered a major blow when the prominent Deobandi ulema Shabir Ahmed Usmani broke away from the mainstream and formed an independent faction. At the same time, Abu Ala Maududi of Hyderabad, an important voice among India’s Muslims in his own

right, had formed the Jamaat-e-Islami and supported the Deobandi position of quamiyat-e-muttahida . What Jinnah and the League needed, then—perhaps desperately —was a religious leader who could throw ‘theological weight’ (in the words of one Pakistani historian) behind the idea of Pakistan to counter the efforts of the anti- League Muslim parties like the Jamiate-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH). True, the Barelvi leadership provided this on a certain level, but their lack of organisation and unity was an issue, not to mention the fact that it was the highly organised Deobandi opposition, aforementioned, that represented the League’s greatest Muslim threat. Jinnah’s answer came in October 1945, when Shabbir Ahmad Usmani founded the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. The 1945–1946 elections witnessed the League being actively supported by the Barelvi groups fighting the elections on Muslim seats for the twin purposes of establishing the League as the only voice of the Muslims and for establishing Pakistan as an Islamic State. The Congress actively used the Deobandis in Punjab and the NWFP to oppose the creation of Pakistan. The results of the elections sealed the issue at least among Muslims. Congress effectively forfeited its claim of representing Muslims, inspite of a Muslim being its president.35 The Congress lost a great chance of keeping the country united by not voicing the full population exchange plan of Dr Ambedkar, and kept hoping till the end that, somehow, they would be able to run the government with the League’s participation. While the Muslim League practised realpolitik, using every means and stratagem including violence, enlisting the help of the religious clerics and its biggest faction of Barelvis, Congress remained stuck in the wishywashy quicksand of secularism with the make- believe idea that it represented all sections of the Indian population. Congress lost all its claims to Muslim representation after a bad loss in United Provinces (UP), where it could win barely 12 out of the 66 seats, a grand downturn from the 26 out of 58 it had won in 1937. Its Deobandi support was no match for the vocal Barelvi campaign backed by the students and faculty of the Aligarh Muslim University, whom Jinnah called the ‘Arsenal of Muslim India’. That people like

Naeem-ud-Din Muradabadi, Hamid Raza Barelvi and Mustafa Raza Barelvi (sons of Ahmad Raza Barelvi of Ala Hazrat, Bareilly) who had campaigned most stridently for the Muslim League stayed back in India after the Partition is a travesty that was not addressed by independent India. Thus, the territory of Pakistan was accomplished by its protagonists, and the virus of Pakistan was left behind in India to fester and germinate at another time. To this effect, the sentiment was expressed thus by Kaif Benarasi: Hans ke liya hai Pakistan, lad ke lenge Hindustan . If Congress had adopted the Ambedkar formula of demanding a complete exchange of population, it would have considerably strengthened its position not only vis-a-vis the British but also among those sections of Muslims within India who would be faced with the prospect of relocation. After all, it must be remembered that Muslim League politics was primarily the politics of minority Muslims. Wherever Muslims were in majority, such as in Punjab, the NWFP, Sind and Bengal, the Muslim League had tasted much lesser success than in the provinces where Muslims were in minority. By playing the idealist, Congress lost its bargaining position and also let down those factions of the Deobandis who had supported them to the very end. Poor Hussain Ahmed Madani had to retire to full-time theology after Congress accepted the Mountbatten Plan in its Working Committee meeting on 14 June 1947. In the many Barelvi–Deobandi–Jamaat-e-Islami reconciliation meetings, the common end of complete Islamisation of India was repeatedly emphasised. The only difference lay in the strategy. Other than the exceptions like Hussain Ahmed Madani and his JUH, there was a general agreement on the grand purpose. The Deobandis wanted to stay inside and convert India to Islam, whereas, the Barelvis wanted to do hijrat (exile) to a New Medina in the manner of Prophet Muhammad, gain strength and come back to conquer Delhi from its staging post of the New Medina of Pakistan. To this was added Jinnah’s total commitment for power at any cost. This became a deadly cocktail when faced with the vacillation of the Congress at crucial times.

References 34

Abhinav Pancholi, 22 December 2019, blog.

35

Appendix 3.

CHAPTER 12

Direct Action Day 1.0 and the Noakhali Riots A

fter the visit of the Cabinet Mission to India 36 in March 1946 to discuss the transfer of power to the Indian leadership, the Muslim League revelled in being intractable. They simply practised the old Islamic art of being a nuisance to extract maximum concessions. However, Jinnah did agree to participate in the interim government and to join the Constituent Assembly on an understanding that they would get the status of an ‘equal’ despite having only 30 seats in the Central Assembly (out of 102) and having a government in only Bengal and Sind. They also managed to form a government in Punjab after the Unionist Party government fell. The League openly proclaimed that not only were the Muslims a separate nation but were also an equal nation—a fantastic and positively absurd claim from a ‘body of converts and their descendants being a nation separate from their parents’ as Mahatma Gandhi put it. 37 The understanding with Jinnah on the Cabinet Mission proposal was reached by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as the Congress president. In June 1946, Congress elected Jawaharlal Nehru as its president in a famous election which is rumoured to have been guided entirely by Mahatma Gandhi throwing the weight of his

personality behind Nehru despite Sardar Patel enjoying near unanimity in the Congress Working Committee. On 10 July 1946, Pandit Nehru held a press conference in Bombay (as it then was) and asserted that the Constituent Assembly would function based on majority. That was a direct blow to Jinnah’s claim of ‘equal’ status. He had agreed to the Cabinet Mission Plan with some reluctance and was already under tremendous pressure from the Barelvi clergy, his principal support. He used this as an excuse and pitched with his fullest energy the motion to carve out Pakistan. He had a crafty ally in Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, then the Premier of Bengal. Jinnah swore that there would either be a ‘divided India or destroyed India’. He employed Islamic symbolism and called for Direct Action on 16 August 1946, 17th Ramzan—this is celebrated as the Battle of Badr day (17 Ramzan) to mark the most significant victory for the Prophet’s Medina Army. The intent was unmistakable for anyone except the naive. And Congress played the naive. I am not rep roducing the horrors of Direct Action Day. Islamist violence of the worst kind, complete with Islamic slogans similar to that being cited in the anti-CAA protests were used to motivate rampaging crowds in a planned slaughter of Hindus. The Muslim League government under Suhrawardy played favourites and ensured that the marauders had a free run. Suhrawardy, incidentally, was a Barelvi Sufi and belonged to one of the four main silsila s of the Sufis in India, the self-same Suhra wardy silsila . Gopal Patha organised a famous resistance with the help of Hindus and Sikhs. The honours were nearly even when the government decided to step in. Nehru had not yet taken over as the Prime Minister of the Interim government. What Direct Action Day achieved was to completely unnerve and demoralise the Congress leadership. Horrible riots occurred in Rawalpindi and Lahore as well. The horrors of Kahuta in the NWFP is another gory story of religious

cleansing. Soon after Nehru took over as the prime minister of the interim government, on 3 September 1946, the Noakhali massacres took place in a remote area of Eastern Bengal, close to Chittagong. A Qadri Sufi, Ghulam Sarwar Hussaini belonging to the family of the Pir of Diarah Dargah, led another massacre of Hindus. Mahatma Gandhi himself camped there and failed to stop the violence with his counter-message of non-violence. The Bengal government and the interim government completely failed to protect the lives of the 20% Hindus of that area. There was a Hindu reaction to the riots in Noakhali in Bihar and the prime minister threatened the protesters with aerial bombing. Compounding the problem was the way Liaquat Ali Khan, the finance minister, made the functioning of the interim government virtually impossible. Yet, it never dawned on the Congress leadership to be pragmatic and accept the Ambedkar formula. They missed the bus in the provincial and Central Assembly elections by playing secular messiah and continued on the same path. It appeared as if they were prevented from facing the reality of the Islamic narrative. References 36 Comprising Lord Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander. 37

Gandhi–Jinnah correspondence (1944). In The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi . Available at: https://www.gandhiservefoundation. org/aboutmahatma-gandhi/collected-works-of-mahatma-gandhi/ (accessed on 20 February 2020).

CHAPTER 13

The Mountbatten Plan and the Indian Independence Act ord Louis Mountbatten joined as the Viceroy and GovernorGeneral of India in February 1946. His mandate was to achieve a smooth transition to an independent India, preferably undivided, by no later than June 1948. There are many versions on Mountbatten’s decisions, but it is clear that his decision to rush into partition without sufficient preparation was triggered by his fears about the safety of the Europeans. The intransigence of the Muslim League and street rioting by the Muslim League in various parts of India convinced him of the need to rush the British out of a cauldronlike situation. He thought that civil war would erupt if he delayed getting out of India. So, he played right into the hands of Jinnah. The bully had his way through bluff and bluster. Congress, as usual, was stuck in the cleft of secularism versus a pro-Hindu stance. In the end, they had no cards left up their sleeves. All along, they had kept up the pretence of an undivided India, even to the extent of agreeing to share power with the Muslim League, despite having a full majority in the Central Assembly. As predicted by Dr Ambedkar, by confusing appeasement and settlement, the Congress ended up not being able to protect Hindu interests in a partition based on communal principle and was also not able to keep up the claim of representing all sections of India. This caught the Hindus in the

L

would-be Pakistan territory unawares and was one of the major reasons for the Partition holocaust. Jinnah played for the maximum and demanded the whole of Punjab and Bengal. Mountbatten was able to coax, cajole and inveigle Jinnah to agree to the following plan, to which the Congress was only too ready to acquiesce: 1. Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims in Punjab and Bengal legislative assemblies would meet and vote for partition. If a simple majority of either group wanted partition, then these provinces would be divided. 2. Sind and Baluchistan were to make their own decision. 3. The fates of the North-West Frontier Province and Sylhet district of Assam were to be decided by a referendum. 4. India would be independent by 15 August 1947. 5. No separate independence would be given to Bengal. 6. A boundary commission would be set up in case of partition. This was called the 3 June Plan, or the Mountbatten Plan, and was announced by the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee on the floor of the British Parliament on 3 June 1947. On 14 June 1947, the Congress Working Committee accepted the Mountbatten Plan. This sent a shock wave throughout India and, in particular, to the Hindus and Sikhs of Punjab and Bengal. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee had led a spirited challenge to the nefarious League plan of avoiding the partition of Bengal. Hindus in Bengal constituted 44% and constituted 46% in Punjab. Yet, Suhrawardy tried to avoid the partition demanded by Mukherjee by floating a plan of an independent Bengal. Mukherjee was able to see through this plan. He contended that this would only be a transitional

measure and there was nothing to prevent this unified Bengal from joining Pakistan at a later date in the name of the millat / ummat . The decision of partition was thus sealed. It must be said to the credit of Mountbatten that he did help Patel in using a rarely used provision in the Government of India Act, 1935, to make more than 560 Princely States sign the Instrument of Accession with the Dominion of India before 15 August 1947 after the passing of the Indian Independence Act. Only J&K, Junagadh, Bhopal and Hyderabad did not sign. Pakistan, on the other hand, was slow off the mark and started the process of integration of its Princely States only after the transfer of power. The partition of Punjab and Bengal became possible because of the practical approach of Patel. He was greatly helped by the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS campaigns in the two provinces. Even as all the Congress stalwarts moved to the safety of Indian Punjab and Delhi, RSS stalwarts stayed back in Punjab and Sind, forming defence committees, and ultimately enabled safe evacuation of lakhs of Hindus and Sikhs. Had Patel not moved to accept Partition quickly, the whole of Bengal and Punjab falling into the hands of the Muslim League would not have been an unlikely event. Patel reached this conclusion after he was thwarted by the Viceroy from helping out the Hindu victims of Noakhali in the name of constitutionalism. Just imagine what Congress could have accomplished had they accepted the principle before the 1945–1946 elections and then campaigned based on total population exchange suggested by Dr Ambedkar. In my personal opinion, such an early outright espousal of the Hindu cause would have prevented the partition of India. The Indian Independence Act was passed on 15 July 1947 in the British Parliament and received royal assent on 18 July. Patel and Mountbatten accomplished accession of 562 Princely States in a short period. The salient features of the Act were as follows: 1.

It fixed the date of 15 August 1947 for the establishment of the two dominions of India and Pakistan;

2.

It indicated the territorial divisions of India into India and Pakistan and the constitution of the two provinces each in Bengal and Punjab. India would comprise all the British India Provinces excepting the areas that were to go to Pakistan; 3. Pakistan would comprise East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind and there would be a referendum in NWFP and in the Sylhet district of Assam; 4. The responsibility of His Majesty’s government in India and the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian Princely States would lapse on 15 August 1947; 5. The Princely States would accede to either of the two dominions or choose to stay independent; 6. There would be a separate Governor-General for each dominion who would be appointed by His Majesty and would represent His Majesty for the government of the dominion; 7. There would be a separate legislature for each dominion with full authority for making laws unhindered by the British Parliament; 8. The Act also laid down temporary provisions for the governments of the dominions by giving to the two constituent assemblies the status of Parliament with the full powers of dominion legislature; 9. It authorised the Governor-General to issue temporary orders for making provisions as appeared to him to be necessary or expedient to bring the Act into effective operation. 10. It prescribed the conditions and terms of the Secretary of State’s Services and the Indian Armed Forces for the continuance of the jurisdiction or authority of His Majesty’s government over the British Army, Navy and Air Force. The Indian Independence Act, 1947, was repealed in Article 395 of the Constitution of India. However, it continues to be a part of the statute in Britain. The moot point, only for the sake of academic interest, is that if ever the UK were to challenge India on this point, what would the constitutional position be?

CHAPTER 14

Partition and its Aftermath nlike in 1946, the scene of street rioting shifted to the Punjab theatre as the day of Partition approached. The Hindus and Sikhs of Punjab remained wedded to Mahatma Gandhi’s promise that India would be partitioned over his dead body. This moralising and soft-pedalling of the issues, unwillingness to face uncomfortable truths and, above all, the prohibition of any scrutiny of Islam created a death trap for the minorities in the new dominion of Pakistan. RSS and Hindu Mahasabha activists were the only ray of hope for these unfortunate people who had opposed Pakistan all along, but were now trapped with no choice except to evacuate, even as the Muslims in India had the choice of staying back or moving to Pakistan. We have noticed the fulminations of the Barelvi maulanas throughout the Pakistan movement. The All India Sunni Conference (AISC) appointed Naeem-ud-Din Muradabadi as the head of a committee in May 1946, who formulated his eleven points for the New Medina of Pakistan.

U

In Benaras, an enunciation of a hoped-for goal of ‘Pakistan’, or a land of purity was made. The newly elected AISC president Muhammad Ashrafi Kachhuchhavi (d. 1961) told the assembled thousands, ‘Pakistan is an independent state of Islam and the Qur’an, in a small part of India...’ And then the crux of Muhammad Ashrafi’s point: ‘But we [the AISC] are working for a grand “Pakistan”… the rule of Islam all over the world’. This was where Muslim League goals diverged from those of the Barelvis, (and where Deobandis, in a future independent Pakistan, could later find some common ground with their long-time theological rivals). The

overarching message of the Varanasi (then called Benares) gathering was that the Barelvis would be much more revivalist…38

Naimuddin Moradabadi’s ‘Eleven Points’ showcased the general Barelvi point-of-view, at the time, vis-à-vis Pakistan as an Islamic State. The document defined ‘Pakistan’ as a ‘free Islamic government’ in Hindustan, established ‘according to Shariat and the principles of fiqh . What this meant in practical terms was outlined in Moradabadi’s eleven points, which underscore not only the role of the ulama in government but also the right kind of ulama. In fact, the first nine points, if implemented, would have effectively shut out any meaningful Deobandi participation in Pakistan’s governance. 1.

(‘This government will be ruled by a Sunni amir ’) would have placed a ‘Sunni’ (read: Barelvi) amir at the head of the state. That an amir of the proper sectarian persuasion be elected would be ensured by Point #2, 2. (‘This amir will be elected by the majority of the Sunni [ ahl-esunnat ] Muslims’), which not only excluded non-Muslims, but also Shi’a Muslims and, potentially, all ‘Sunni’ Muslims who failed to meet a state requirement of orthodoxy. Based on the AISC’s membership criteria, the Deobandis would have fallen far outside such a requirement and may, therefore, have been unable, under Naimuddin Moradabadi’s constitution, to vote for the amir . Once a Barelvi (or ‘Sunni’) amir had been elected, he would create a shura (‘advisory council’), as per Point #3. 3. (‘That amir will appoint a group of pious [Muslim] people and statesmen for a shura’), almost certainly, of course, stacked with those of the Ahl-e-Sunnat persuasion—and traditionally made up mostly of the ulama . 4. 5.

The jama’at-e-shura will be directed by the amir . The suggestions of the jama’at-e-shura will be considered final after the amir’s acceptance. He assured the Barelvi religious leadership a powerful place within the political apparatus—that is, direct access to the head of state, with

6.

7. 8. 9.

that head’s general compliance with their suggestions (as implicit in Point #5) constitutionally binding. Pakistani government would be in good ‘Sunni’ hands by having the (almost certainly Barelvi) amir in charge of appointing a Prime Minister. PM will have ‘responsibility’ ( nizam-w-nigrani ) over ‘all internal and external affairs’. Department heads would be nominated by the Prime Minister. Nominations would be only after approval by the amir himself.

10. Taxes shall be levied according to Shari’a. 11. Status of non-Muslims shall be in accordance with Shari’a. If the eleven points were to be conceded, Moradabadi’s constitutional framework would become more like the present Iranian Constitution where the Supreme Council exercises the real power. Barelvi leadership believed that they did indeed represent the ‘Sunni majority’, and could thus rest easy that in a true Islamic state like the ‘Pakistan’ they envisioned, one incorporating democratic mechanisms (like voting), they would naturally emerge electorally victorious and thus occupy high places of power. In Benaras, an enunciation of a hoped-for goal of ‘Pakistan’, or a land of purity was made. The newly elected AISC president Muhammad Ashrafi Kachhuchhavi (d. 1961) told the assembled thousands, ‘Pakistan is an independent state of Islam and the Qur’an, in a small part of India...’ And then the crux of Muhammad Ashrafi’s point: ‘But we [the AISC] are working for a grand “Pakistan”… the rule of Islam all over the world’. This was where Muslim League goals diverged from those of the Barelvis, (and where Deobandis, in a future independent Pakistan, could later find some common ground with their long-time theological rivals). The overarching message of the Varanasi (then called Benares) gathering was that the Barelvis would be much more revivalist… Naimuddin Moradabadi’s ‘Eleven Points’ showcase what might be considered the general Barelvi point-of- view, at the time, vis-à-vis Pakistan as an Islamic State. The document defined ‘Pakistan’ as a ‘free Islamic government’ in Hindustan, established ‘according to Shariat and the principles of fiqh . What this meant in practical terms was outlined in Moradabadi’s eleven points, which underscore not only the role of the ulama in government but also the right kind of ulama. In fact, the first nine points, if implemented, would have effectively shut out any

meaningful Deobandi participation in Pakistan’s governance. Point #1. (‘This government will be ruled by a Sunni amir ’) would have placed a ‘Sunni’ (read: Barelvi) amir at the head of the state. That an amir of the proper sectarian persuasion be elected would be ensured by Point #2 (‘This amir will be elected by the majority of the Sunni [ ahl-e-sunnat ] Muslims’), which not only excluded nonMuslims, but also Shi’a Muslims and, potentially, all ‘Sunni’ Muslims who failed to meet a state requirement of orthodoxy. Based on the AISC’s membership criteria, the Deobandis would have fallen far outside such a requirement and may, therefore, have been unable, under Naimuddin Moradabadi’s constitution, to vote for the amir . Once a Barelvi (or ‘Sunni’) amir had been elected, he would create a shura (‘advisory council’), as per Point #3 (‘That amir will appoint a group of pious [Muslim] people and statesmen for a shura’), almost certainly, of course, stacked with those of the Ahl-e-Sunnat persuasion—and traditionally made up mostly of the ulama . Point #4 (The jama’at-e-shura will be directed by the amir ) and Point #5 (The suggestions of the jama’at-e-shura will be considered final after the amir’s acceptance) assured the Barelvi religious leadership a powerful place within the political apparatus—that is, direct access to the head of state, with that head’s general compliance with their suggestions (as implicit in Point #5) constitutionally binding. Point #6 further ensured that a Pakistani government would be in good ‘Sunni’ hands by having the (almost certainly Barelvi) amir in charge of appointing a Prime Minister with ‘responsibility’ ( nizam-w-nigrani ) over ‘all internal and external affairs’ (according to Point #7). Department heads would be nominated by the Prime Minister (as per Point #8)—but only after approval by the amir himself (Point #9). Rounding out the ‘Eleven Points’, #10 and #11 dealt with taxes and the status of non-Muslims, respectively. Moradabadi’s constitutional framework underscores the Barelvi leadership’s belief that they did indeed represent the ‘Sunni majority’, and could thus rest easy that in a true Islamic state like the ‘Pakistan’ they envisioned, one incorporating democratic mechanisms (like voting), they would naturally emerge electorally victorious and thus occupy high places of power. 39

This background is important for understanding the forces that were unleashed against the Hindus and Sikhs of Pakistan. The Barelvis were an overwhelming majority among Muslims in Punjab and Bengal with a huge network of Sufi dargahs and khanqah s dotting the landscape. The ‘Land of Pure’ propaganda was drilled into Muslims. With the AISC propagating the myth of a land of Shari’a Law, the Hindus and Sikhs were immediately reduced to the status of zimmi s, the second-class citizens of Dar-ul-Islam (abode of Islam) unlike the equal citizens of Dar-ul-Harb (abode of war) that India had been until recently in the Barelvi world view. Under Islamic Law, a non-Muslim is a zimmi, and a zimmi has no rights, except the right of survival upon paying the jizya tax.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah had no intention to bring in the Shari’at Law, but the people in the new nation of Pakistan had different ideas. So, they tried to enforce the Shari’a state all by themselves. The people of Lahore suffered the most. They had somehow been given to understand that Lahore would remain with India under any circumstances. Riots had broken out, but what happened after the Radcliffe Award, which was made public two days after independence, can only be described as the most horrific. The proud capital of Maharaja Ranjit Singh was handed over to marauders. Tension had been brewing in Lahore for over a decade with the Sikhs over the Shahidganj Mosque. The full fury of the mob from the entire countryside engulfed this thriving and bustling Hindu–Sikh centre of trade, commerce, industry and culture. It was devastated, and in a most shameful episode that was to recur over many parts of Punjab in the summer of 1947, Hindu and Sikh women were paraded naked in the main market of Lahore, raped and converted. Howsoever repugnant and abhorrent the acts may be, it finds sanction in the Shari’a Law. 40 Worse was to follow when, in a frenzy of religious bigotry and hate, escaping Hindu and Sikhs were cut down in trains, and trainloads of mutilated corpses started turning up in India, mostly in the main railhead of Amritsar. It replicated the template that had been set up in the Amritsar Riots that had lasted since March 1947 till the day of independence. 41 The Punjab Border Force and the governments of India and Pakistan seemed powerless to do anything about this Shari’ainspired violence, till patience gave way and the Indian side of Punjab started replying in kind. As soon as the Indian side sent its first trainload of mutilated corpses of Muslims, the train killings stopped on the other side of Punjab. The displacement continued much longer. Nobody has the exact figures, but it is estimated that some one million were killed on both sides of the border, and 10 to 15 million were either displaced forcibly or relocated. Had Congress faced the reality and prepared for the eventual exchange of population, the killings would not have happened. This population exchange happened only in Punjab in the immediate aftermath of Partition. This tragedy would have been many times

greater if the only pragmatic man on the Congress side, Sardar Patel, had not smelt the coffee and settled for Partition and insisted on dividing Punjab and Bengal. It may be recalled that the Muslim League had won its mandate by projecting to Muslims that not only the whole of Punjab but even Delhi and Aligarh would form a part of the ‘New Medina’ of Pakistan. If only Ambedkar had been heeded, and Congress had given up the pretensions of being the representative of all classes of Indians after the 1945–1946 elections and cared for the class of Indians who supported them in the cause of undivided India and demanded full population exchange, they would have faced the situation with far more pragmatism and resolve. Terrible bloodshed could have been avoided and the hypocrisy that sought to whitewash the purely communal nature of Partition would not have occurred. The vapidity of the rest of the Congress leadership was stark. This would have also prevented many unfortunate events on the other side of India, in East Pakistan, that would follow in the next few years. References 38

The Sunni Schism (ibid.).

39 The Sunni Schism (ibid.) 40 Suhas Majumdar. 1994. Chapter 3: Plunder (Ghanimah) in the Koran and Chapter 4: Plunder (Ghanimah) in the Hadis. In Jihad: The Islamic Doctrine of Permanent War . Voice of India. 41

Sanjay Dixit. 2020. ‘Delhi Riots: 1947 Amritsar Riots Re-run’. Available at: https://medium.com/@Sanjay_Dixit/delhi-riots-1947- amritsar-riotsre-run-86d949349af8 (accessed on 10 March 2020).

CHAPTER 15

Minorityism in Independent India ne of the curious events that took place after independence was the continuance of those members who were elected to the Constituent Assembly as members of the Muslim League and their staying back in India. They continued to remain members of India’s Constituent Assembly. At least three of them, Sir Saadulah of Assam, Mohammad Ismail Sahib of Madras and Mohammad Ismail of United Provinces actively pursued the same League policies of separate electorates that led to separatism and the creation of Pakistan. The issue of minorities got so heated that a member from Bihar, Tajamul Hussain, had to castigate them in the Constituent Assembly:

O

Mr. Tajamul Husain: I have to say all this because the challenge has been thrown. I will finish in a minute. I have here a list of all the members. Briefly, it shows that there are 31 members from the Provinces and 2 from the States, making a total of 33 Muslims. Out of these, 4 are from Madras and I must say that many of the members are permanently absent. As they have migrated to Pakistan, especially all the members from Punjab, they have gone, and out of the 5 from Bengal 3 have migrated. Now, coming to the list, 4 from Madras are for separate electorates. There are only 23 members on the role of the Constituent Assembly. 4 are of separate electorates, 4 for reservation of seats, 1 for cumulative voting, 1 unknown and 13 entirely for a joint electorate, with no reservation of seats. If you add those who are not with me, they will come to only 10 and we are 13, and if I add Mr Lari who too is not for reservation of seats or separate electorates, our number would be 14. Today there are 15 members present. And of them, 4 are for reservation of seats, 3 for separate electorates and the rest 8 are with me. Even then I have a majority…

Out of the 31 members from the Provinces, I have the honour to be the sole Shi’a in this House. Out of the 2 members from the States, it is fifty-fifty, as one comes from one State and he is Shi’a and the other is a Sunni. And I would like to tell you that throughout, the Shi’as have been opposing separate electorates, and have been opposing reservation of seats. They have always been nationalists. I was president of the Bihar Provincial Shi’a Conference for ten years, and throughout we have consistently said that we want joint electorate, pure and simple. Recently on 31 December 1948, there was the All India Shi’a Conference, the 35th session in Muzaffarnagar in U.P. which was presided over by Sir Sultan Ahmed, whom everybody knows. And the resolution was unanimously passed there that there should be no separate electorates and no reservation of seats. 42

The astounding bit is that the four Muslim members from Madras, who were instrumental in the Muslim League getting 100% Muslim seats from that province (Madras province comprised Malabar, present Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu) were not only attending the Constituent Assembly but were still battling for separate electorates. This should be seen in the context of the anti-CAA narrative being put forward by ‘minority’ institutions like AMU and Jamia Millia Islamia and by Marxist-dominated institutions like JNU and Jadavpur University. As traced through the history of Muslim politics discussed in this book, it never moves too far from the essential Islamic principles of separate identity. Sardar Patel captured this facet in his reply to the debate on minorities: Well, when I brought those proposals and place[d] them before this House, there was another group of people who had found it difficult to get out of the mire in which they had gone very deep. Here a proposal was brought forward by one friend from Madras, for reservation and for communal electorates. Now when the separate communal electorate motion was moved, it was supported by the great Muslim leader, who swore loyalty to the Constitution in this House and immediately after packed off to Karachi. He is now carrying on the work of the Muslim League on that side. He has left a legacy here—a residuary legacy perhaps in Madras. Unfortunately, there is still a very large amount of funds belonging to the old Muslim League, which was the All-India Muslim League, which has yet to be settled, and some of our friends still claim that they might get some big chunk of those funds if they still persist in continuing the old League here. Even if the money, or a good portion of it, could be brought here, I doubt if it would do any good to those who get it. Those who claim that in this country there are two nations and that there is nothing common between the two, and ‘that we must have our homeland where we can breathe freely’, let them do so. I do not blame them. But those who still have that idea that they have worked [for] it, that they have got it and therefore they should follow the same path here, to

them I respectfully appeal to go and enjoy the fruits of that freedom and to leave us in peace. There is no place here for those who claim separate representation. Separate representation, when it was introduced in this unfortunate country, was introduced not by the demand of those who claim to have made those demands, but as Maulana Muhammad Ali once said, it was a ‘command performance’ that has fulfilled its task and we have all enjoyed the fruits of it. Let us now for the first time have a change of chapter in the history of this country and have a ‘consent performance’… We have the first amendment—the main amendment which was then rejected in the August Session of 1947— moved by the same group. I do not know whether there has been any change in their attitude to bring forward such an amendment even now after all this long reflection and experience of what has happened in this country. But I know this that they have got a mandate from the Muslim League to move this amendment. I feel sorry for them. This is not a place today for acting on mandates. This is a place today to act on your conscience and to act [for] the good of the country. For a community to think that its interests are different from that of the country in which it lives, is a great mistake…. I remember that the gentleman who moved the motion here last time, in August 1947, when asking for separate electorates, I believe, said that the Muslims today were a very strong, well-knit and well-organised minority. Very good. A minority that could force the partition of the country is not a minority at all. Why do you think that you are a minority? If you are a strong, well-knit and well-organised minority, why do you want to claim safeguards, why do you want to claim privileges? [emphasis supplied] It was all right when there was a third party: but that is all over. That dream is a mad dream and it should be forgotten altogether. Never think about that, do not imagine that anybody will come here to hold the scales and manipulate them continuously. All that is gone. So the future of a minority, any minority, is to trust the majority. If the majority misbehaves, it will suffer. It will be a misfortune, to this country if the majority does not realise its own responsibility. If I were a member of a minority community, I would forget that I belong to a minority community. 43

I would think that if the present Home Minister were to repeat the same words in the context of the protests going on, most likely stage-managed, it would fit the situation to a T.

References 42 Constituent Assembly Debates , 26 May 1949, Government of India, 1950. 43

Constituent Assembly Debates , 26 May 1949, Government of India, 1950.

CHAPTER 16

The Liaquat–Nehru Pact The eastern part of India was quiet during the Partition. East Pakistan had a large Hindu population, with a huge Dalit segment. In the 1945–46 elections, the Muslim League had won a majority in alliance with the Dalit leader Jogendra Nath Mandal. He was honoured with the position of the Law Minister in the League ministry. However, it did not take long for things to unravel. The Barelvi element was strong in East Pakistan too. The Chishti and Suhrawardy silsila s of the Sufis were active in this area. The Noakhali massacre was carried out under the guidance of Nizami Chishtis and the Calcutta killings under Suhrawardy himself. Chishti and Suhrawardy were the two major Sufi tariqas in Bengal. In the Radcliffe Award, some of the Muslim majority areas like Malda and Murshidabad went to India, whereas, Jessore with Hindu majority went to Pakistan. A referendum in Sylhet of Assam was won by the League. The Chittagong Hill district went to Pakistan under the contiguity principle even though it had only 3% Muslim population. This created complications. While Muslims in India stayed put, Jessore Hindus started feeling the pressure. They were mostly Dalit Namashudras and Rajabongshis, both marginal communities. The bhadralok relocated themselves fairly smoothly to Calcutta, which was the natural capital of Bengal. Most well-to-do Bengalis had a place to stay in Calcutta. The miseries of the Dalits started increasing as the jihadi pressure on them started increasing.

In 1949, Pakistan passed its Objectives Resolution, 44 in which it proclaimed that the sovereignty of the universe belonged to Allah alone. With such a blatantly communal pronouncement in its constituent assembly, untold atrocities began mounting on the Hindus of East Pakistan. Even Jogendra Nath Mandal resigned and fled to India. His letter of resignation to the PM of Pakistan 45 reflects his frustration at the failure of Liaquat–Nehru Pact and can be treated as the foundational ground for today’s Citizenship (Amendment) Act. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee was of the firm view that either a population exchange or a separate enclave for the Hindus of East Pakistan was the solution. After all, these people had not chosen Pakistan, but they were forced to live there under an unequal status. However, Pandit Nehru once again chose to trust Pakistan and entered into the Delhi Agreement of 8 April 1950, also known as the Liaquat–Nehru Pact. 46 Shyama Prasad Mukherjee resigned from the cabinet in protest. The agreement envisaged protection of minorities in both dominions, and also allowed for a free flow of migrants wanting to move from East Bengal into India, and from India to East Bengal. An interesting bit from Clause B of this agreement is cited here : In respect of migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, where communal disturbances have recently occurred, it is agreed between the two governments: (i) That there shall be freedom of movement and protection in transit; (ii) That there shall be freedom to remove as much of his moveable personal effects and household goods as [the] migrant may wish to take with him. Moveable property shall include personal jewellery. The maximum cash allowed to each adult migrant will be Rs 150 and to each migrant child Rs 75; (iii) That a migrant may deposit such of his personal jewellery or cash as he does not wish to take with him with a bank. A proper receipt shall be furnished to him by the bank for cash or jewellery thus deposited and facilities shall be provided, as and when required for their transfer to him, subject as regards cash to the exchange regulations of the Government concerned; (iv) That there shall be no harassment by the Customs authorities. At each customs post agreed upon by the Governments concerned, liaison officers of the other Government shall be posted to ensure this in practice.

In all the debates on CAA, this point has been missed by both sides. The Liaquat–Nehru Pact is a valid agreement even today, and India is committed to free harbour to the minorities from Pakistan, as this agreement is to be read with the Inter-Dominion Agreements made earlier with Pakistan. Dr S.P. Mukherjee objected to the Liaquat–Nehru Pact, rightly pointing that the earlier Inter-Dominion Agreements had not prevented Pakistan from oppressing its minorities, mostly Hindus. He insisted on a full population exchange even at this stage, as he considered it useless to leave the Hindus in the hands of Pakistan. His counsel was not heeded. However, the Liaquat–Nehru Pact, read with the Inter-Dominion Agreements, opened a clear path for the minorities to migrate freely, as also to return to their original lands by 31 December 1950. The moot point remains whether this binding agreement, in the nature of an international treaty, should be followed or not. In my opinion, the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, is only the fulfilment of the promise made to the minorities in 1950 in this pact. An Islamic State views every treaty or pact in the image of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah that Prophet Muhammad entered into with the people of Mecca. Even a humiliating treaty is a gain as it gives time for the Islamic states to regroup and consolidate. It can be broken later using any excuse once the interregnum has been utilised to gain power and to lull the opposition into thinking peace. That Pakistan does not honour any pact unless it derives benefits from it is borne out from experience, and this flows from its belief in the infallibility of Islamic history. From 1951 onwards, it stopped granting citizenship to the Muslim migrants from India. It did the same to the Simla Agreement, 1972. However, India continues to honour the Indus Waters Treaty in the face of these wanton violations of international law. This Hindu trait of ‘ready to be hoodwinked’ can be seen right from the days of the Khilafat Movement. Even the fact that the Pakistan Army now openly proclaims itself to be wedded to the doctrines of ima’n, taqwa , jihadfi-sabilillah (faith in Islam, trust in Allah, jihad in the way of Allah), making Pakistan a de facto jihadi state, did not stir the Indian

establishment enough until recently. The fact is that Pakistan follows the nazaria-e-Pakistan that makes it anti-Hindu by its very foundational doctrine. References 44

Appendix 5.

45

Appendix 6.

46

Appendix 7.

CHAPTER 1 7

The Citizenship Act, 1955 Constitution of India was brought into effect on 26 January T he 1950. The citizenship provisions are contained in Part II of the constitution, in Articles 5 to 11. It may be noted that till 19 June 1948, there was free migration between India and Pakistan. A provision of permit was brought in through an Ordinance on 19 May 1948, after which anyone coming from Pakistan had to apply for citizenship in India. The matter of citizenship was finally discussed in the Constituent Assembly of India on 12 August 1949 and incorporated after disposing of 130 to 140 amendments. The parliament retained the right to make the law of citizenship. The intractable problem of citizenship could not be resolved satisfactorily as India’s lack of clear understanding of the status of Hindu–Sikh minorities (Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians could be counted on one’s fingertips) in an Islamic State. Once Pakistan had declared its intent to derive its sovereignty delegated from Allah, they could only have the status of zimmi s (often pronounced as dhimmis by ‘educated’ Indians, whose education does not permit them to distinguish between Arabic and Indian pronunciations), or second-class citizens. All the pacts, treaties and agreements made by Pakistan with India would ultimately have to be subordinated to the reality of Shari’a. The Citizenship Act was enacted by the parliament in 1955, incorporating the promises made in the speech made in the

Constituent Assembly by Dr Ambedkar. The question of citizenship got further complicated after the creation of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh genocide by the Pakistani Army had Hindus as their main targets. The official line of the Pakistan Army was that the Bengali Muslims had become corrupted due to Hindu influence, and had to be brought to mainstream Islam, West Pakistan style. This led to a huge influx of Hindu refugees into Assam, Tripura and West Bengal. After the liberation of Bangladesh, Indira Gandhi made a concession to Mujib-ur-Rahman in her munificence, without realising that generosity in international relations can come to bite the very hand that feeds it. Even though there was no provision in the Nehru– Liaquat Pact for the illegal immigrants of the majority community of East Pakistan/Bangladesh, it was agreed that citizenship in Assam would be counted with a cut-off date of 25 March 1971. It was the date on which the Pakistan Army started its infamous Operation Searchlight or the Bengali genocide. Effectively, it meant that all the illegal Muslim immigrants before the genocide would be absorbed in India, but the Hindus who fled the genocide in 1971 would not be absorbed. That was the full import of this lopsided agreement. There was a by-election to Mangaldoi Lok Sabha constituency in Assam in 1979. Once the electoral rolls were published, the public realised that a large number of foreigners had managed to get themselves enrolled. This was the beginning of the Assam Movement. It may also be recalled how the partition of Bengal in 1905, and its later annulment, had resulted in three Bengal districts going to Assam—Goalpara, Sylhet and Silchar. Sylhet went to East Pakistan through a referendum in 1947, but a sub-division of Sylhet, Karimganj, remained in Assam on the contiguity principle. The open borders and the trend of migration from East Bengal into Assam, started in the 1920s by the British continued unabated, getting further compounded due to the Indira–Mujib Treaty. The Assam Movement led to the Assam Accord and a commitment on the part of the Government of India to detect and deport Bangladeshis who entered India after 1971. However, the Illegal Migrant Detection Tribunal Act, 1985, was planned so

defectively that the onus to prove citizenship was shifted (as in the original Foreigners’ Act) to the agencies. That made the entire exercise a non-starter and the Islamisation of Assam continued unabated. The Act was finally struck down in the Sarbananda Sonowal 1 and 2 Judgements. The National Register of Indian Citizens was later mandated by the Supreme Court but was not carried out properly. More Hindus became non-citizens than Muslims in the Assam exercise. That brought the question of persecuted minorities of Bangladesh to the fore again in terms of the Liaquat– Nehru Pact. A major amendment to the 1955 Act was carried out in 2004 when provisions of the National Population Register (NPR) and National Register of Indian Citizens (NRC) were added to the statute. The NRC is designed to be a sub-set of the NPR. The interesting bit is that the first NPR exercise was carried out in 2010 by the very people who are currently the most vocal against the NRC. What this Act does is to recognise the Medina– Hudaybiyyah– Mecca route of the Islamic ummat/millat and places a sword through it. The additional problem of the whole plot coming into bold relief in this information age is even more stark. What it also does is to energise the nascent Hindu renaissance by bringing into their ken the real history of Partition, the real intent of the Medina project and to wear off the anaesthesia applied to the still-open wounds by a deliberately distorted leftist history. The distress among the Islamists is palpable. Pakistan sounding even more distressed than at the time of nullification of Article 370 is because it can see that while the nullification of Article 370 meant termination of the Medina Project, this new 2019 Act means a reversal, in which Mecca is coming for Medina, instead of a mere status quo. Dr Ambedkar had famously said in his book, Pakistan or the Partition of India (1945) that Muslim politics is like ‘gangster’s method of politics’, in which they make more and more unreasonable demands and use riots as a tactic in the overall strategy while playing victim all the while. The present government seems to have called this bluff. This must be bad news for Islamists, as both Britain and the secularists had played along with this brand of Jinnah’s politics, conceding almost everything.

Only Patel and Shyama Prasad Mukherjee stood between the Islamists and total surrender. Only Gopal Patha of Calcutta and the Sikhs stood between the Islamists and the total annihilation of nonMuslims in Pakistan. A plain reading of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 47 is sufficient to make out for anyone with a modicum of common sense that there is nothing in this act to cause alarm for Muslims, as it is an enabling act and not a disabling act. One of the major criticisms of the Act of 2019 is that it does not even mention the term ‘persecuted’ communities. It is a specious argument, because the term persecution and persecuted figures prominently in the ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ of the Act of 2019, and also in the 2015 amendments to the Passport (Entry Into India) Rules, 1950, 48 and Foreigners’ Order, 1948 49 —to both of which the Act of 2019 refers directly in the proviso to S.2 of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019. While the above is casus belli for the Islamists, ummat and millat, the pain of the secularists is purely from the point of view of electoral considerations. The BJP had got 37.76% votes in the 2019 General Elections by itself with 22.9 crore votes and over 45% vote for the NDA. This is higher than Congress’s vote share in the 1952 Elections. This has led to two apprehensions. First, if the secular parties are not able to protect the fortress Medina, the Islamic vote would gravitate to a more militant Islamic outfit, in the manner it shifted between 1937 and 1946. However, today, there is no Britain to aid them, and no situation like one-third of the army being Muslim exists today, as it existed in 1947. Second, the freshly added voters, particularly in Bengal and Assam, have the potential of taking the BJP vote share beyond 40% and the NDA vote share close to 50%, making it virtually invincible for many years to come. Hence the life and death kind of noise and attempts at mayhem. References 47

Appendix 1.

48 GSR, 685(E), Gazette of India, Extraordinary, 7 September, 2015.

49 GSR, 686(E), Gazette of India, Extraordinary, 7 September, 2015.

PART II

CHAPTER 18

A Brief History of Kashmir ashmir is unique at least in one respect. This is one geography within the Indian Subcontinent that has a recorded history that fits the norms of Western historiography. Kalhana’s Rajatarangini is a classic in its own right. It records the history of Kashmir over several centuries. Even though Kalhana starts the history of Kashmir from the time of Gonanda I, in about the 7th century of the Kali Era, 50 its correct chronology is established during the times of the Karkota Dynasty. Its most illustrious king, Lalitaditya Muktapida (697–733 CE), is reputed to have extended the Karkota Empire from the edge of the Caspian Sea to Prāgajyotisha (Assam) in the East and the boundary of the Rashtrakutas (Deccan) in the South. The reign of the Karkota, Utpala and Lohara dynasties were marked by great renaissance in the fields of art, literature, science, mathematics, spirituality and logic, and all-round material development. The greatest polymath Abhinavagupta shines as the brightest gem of Kashmir, having lived there in the 10th and 11th centuries. He is also credited with having taken the practice of Kashmir Shaivism to its peak. He was also a great scholar in many other fields. The Utpala and Lohara dynasties succeeded the Karkotas and had a clear run till 1315 CE. The period between 1315–1339 CE is a period of strife marked by changing kings and much instability. Suhadeva, the last stable king of the Lohara dynasty ruled till 1320

K

CE. He too made the mistake that many kings have made throughout the history of India. He gave shelter and position to Shah Mir from Swat Valley (some other versions dispute this origin), to the Chaks from Dardistan near Gilgit and to Bulbul Shah and Rinchan from Ladakh. After a Turkish invasion in 1320 and the death of Suhadeva, Kashmir Valley fell into confusion. Scheming aliens brought the Valley to its knees. Queen Kota Rani, the widow of Suhadeva’s brother, Udayanadeva, offered resistance for a while. There are conflicting accounts about her end. The popular version among Kashmiri Pandits has it that she married Shah Mir and died on the wedding night. Whether she was treacherously killed by Shah Mir or committed suicide is disputed. Shah Mir took the throne in 1339 CE. He took the name Shamsud-Din. In the reign of Qutub-ud-Din, the Kubrawiya Sufi, Sayyid Ali Shah Hamadan (Shah-e-Hamadan) came to the Valley and pursued the Islamisation project in right earnest. He got the later sultans to enforce the famous code of Shah-e-Hamadan on the lines prescribed by the 2nd Sunni Caliph, Umar. It may be educative to read the code: 1. The Muslim ruler shall not allow fresh constructions of Hindu temples and shrines; 2. No repairs to the existing Hindu temples and shrines shall be allowed; 3.

Hindus shall not use Muslim names;

4.

They (Hindus) shall not ride a harnessed horse;

5.

They shall not move about with arms;

6.

They shall not wear rings with diamonds;

7.

They shall not deal in or eat bacon;

8.

They shall not exhibit idolatrous images;

9. They shall not build houses in neighbourhoods of Muslims; 10. They shall not dispose of their dead near Muslim graveyards, nor weep nor wail over their dead; 11. They shall not deal in or buy Muslim slaves;

12. No Muslim traveller shall be refused lodging in the Hindu temples and shrines where he shall be treated as a guest for three days by non-Muslims; 13. No non-Muslim shall act as a spy in the Muslim state; 14. No problem shall be created for those non-Muslims who, on their own will, show their readiness for Islam; 15. Non-Muslims shall honour Muslims and shall leave their assembly whenever the Muslims enter the premises, and 16. The dress of non-Muslims shall be different from that of Muslims to distinguish themselves. Try and find similarities with Hitler’s code for the Jews. The worst was to come when Sultan Sikandar Shah (1389–1413 CE), known famously as Sikandar Butshikan (destroyer of idols), teamed up with Muhammad Hamadan, son of Shah-e-Hamadan, to let loose a reign of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-like terror. Hindu temples were demolished and built over with mosques all over the Valley. Forcible conversions, loot, plunder, rapes and every form of atrocity was inflicted. Thus began the ‘First Exodus’ of Kashmiris. The reign of Zain-ul-Abidin (1420–1471 CE) was relatively moderate. He is said to have abolished jizya, stopped cow slaughter and allowed restoration and rebuilding of temples. The Chaks managed to get the reins of power during the reign of Fateh Shah II (1505–1514 CE). He came under the influence of the Noorbakshi Shi’a Sufi Shams-ud-Din Araqi, who restarted the vile practices of oppressing the Hindus. The ‘Second Exodus’ of Kashmiri Hindus occurred in this period. The Shah Miri dynasty disintegrated by 1561 CE. It was finally taken over by Akbar in 1585 CE, who inaugurated another period of relative moderation. Jahangir was particularly fond of Kashmir and spent many summers in the cool climes of the Valley. Jahangir and Shahjahan partially reversed the policy of toleration practised by Akbar. ‘Noor Jehan had the steps leading from Shankaracharya Temple to Jhelum dismantled and used them in building the Pather mosque in downtown Srinagar. Jahangir’s notorious lieutenant,

Sardar Itquad Khan, particularly revelled in converting Hindus at gunpoint’. 51 Aurangzeb and his notorious governor, Iftekhar Khan, resumed the reign of terror inflicted on the Kashmiri Hindus earlier in the times of Sikandar/Mir Muhammad Hamadani and Fateh Shah/Shams-udDin Araqi. This inaugurated the ‘Third Exodus’ of Kashmiri Hindus. In 1753, the Kashmir Valley passed into the hands of the Durranis of Afghanistan. They were as cruel as Aurangzeb. The ‘Fourth Exodus’ of Hindus took place in this period. In 1819, the Kashmir region passed into the hands of Sikhs. After the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the conquering British sold the region to the Dogra king, Gulab Singh. The original Kashmiri culture flourished once again. It may be noted that during the Sikh and Dogra rule, the majority Muslims of the Valley did not suffer from any disability or discrimination on account of religion. This peace lasted till 1931 CE. The fifth, sixth and seventh exoduses of Hindus from the Kashmir Valley occurred in 1931, 1950–1980 and 1989–1990. References 50

Beginning 3102 BCE.

51 Prof. K.L. Bhan. 2003. Paradise Lost — The Seven Exoduses of Kashmiri Pandit s. Available at: http://www.koausa.org/exodus/index.html (accessed on 16 February 2020).

CHAPTER 19

1931: The Beginning of Kashmir’s Islamisation ontrary to popular belief, communal politics in Kashmir is not a recent phenomenon. It was around the turn of the century that fundamentalist maulanas started preaching jihad against the Hindu Dogra ruler. Plenty of justification was available under Shari’a law against an infidel king ruling the faithful and the indoctrination was accordingly taken up. The political correctness emanating from the political class often talks about Kashmiriyat and the syncretic Sufi culture of Kashmir Valley. Nothing is farther from the truth. The year 1931 marks a watershed in the history of communalisation of the Valley. It was in July 1931 that the first major riot in the Valley occurred. It was aimed at the Kashmiri Pandits and was well orchestrated from the mosques. It started with a meeting by Sheikh Abdullah and fanned into violence by an invited Ahmadi. 52 Kashmiri Pandit activist Sushil Pandit has also given a detailed account of the truth 53 behind the riots. Hindus were set upon, killed, maimed, thrown into the river, their properties burnt, some forcibly converted to Islam and were subjected to every kind of unimaginable atrocity. All this happened in the kingdom of a Hindu King with absolute powers. Around the same time as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) was founded by Abul Ala Mawdoodi who later teamed with Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood to fashion a completely new narrative, the

C

seeds of Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu Kashmir (JEIJK) was established in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). JEI, as well as JEIJK, had the establishment of an Islamic State as its avowed goal. JEIJK’s establishment was formalised in the Indian J&K in 1953 with its seat in Shopian in South Kashmir. The JEIJK has spread these ideals, principally the establishment of Shari’a law in J&K based on it being a Muslim majority country. (They do treat it as a country). The Hizbul-Mujahideen was only a militant arm of the JEIJK, which has now taken an independent route as it accused the JEIJK of moderating its stance on the issue of taking part in elections. Why I am giving this background is because there is an overwhelming opinion in mainstream India that Kashmir always had a great tolerant Sufi tradition and was governed by a culture of Kashmiriyat. This is only as true as the fake narrative of Kashmiris being secular in outlook. The opinion in mainland India blames the militancy on what it calls the growth of Salafism in the Valley. India was partitioned on the basis of the Two-Nation Theory. The Muslim League was not a Salafi organisation. The principal force behind the radicalisation of the Valley has been the Muslim Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah in the early 1930s (Sheikh Abdullah later quit to form his own National Conference) and JEIJK till the turn of the century. After that, the reins have gone into the hands of the Hurriyat Conference, which is also not a Salafi organisation. Armed jihad in the cause of Islam, in the Islamic doctrine, is not a monopoly of the Salafis. It is part and parcel of the Quran and the Shari’a Trilogy. There is great confusion in the minds of Indians that Sufis are a tolerant people. They do follow singing and dancing traditions, but along with the Shi’a nobility and the Ahamadiyas, they were in the forefront of India’s Partition, as also in various blasphemy riots in the sub-continent. Killers of Swami Shraddhanand, Mahashay Rajpal and Salman Taseer for blasphemy were all Barelvi Sufis, as were the rioters protesting the persecution of Rohingyas in Bombay, or those creating a ruckus on Kamlesh Tiwari. Sufis are as much for Dar-ulIslam as the Salafis or the Muslim Brotherhood. Salafism is an ideology, whereas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) are organisations.

Be that as it may, Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of JEI, actually opposed the partition of India along with the Deobandis. Both were as much Hanafi school followers as the Barelvi Sufis. Maududi opposed Pakistan as the Muslim League did not guarantee a Shari’a-ruled state and opposed Partition; his goal was Islamisation of the entire Subcontinent, a goal which would be thwarted if Partition took place along religious lines. Abul Ala Maududi went on to found Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JIP) even as the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH) went on the moderate path and accepted democracy after Partition. JIH pursues the goal of Dar-ul- Islam by teaching its followers the principles of tactical voting to grab power. JEIJK, on the other hand, radicalised Kashmiris on the Shari’a principle until recently. The Hurriyat is the successor of JEIJK in Kashmir and follows the JIP line. An additional problem is related to the fiqh divisions in Islam. Indians follow the Hanafi fiqh (school) in which religious interpretation can only be given by authorised clerics. The principle is called taqlid and the followers are called the muqallid een. The principle implies that only the authorised high clerics are allowed to use ‘aql’ or reason, and others have to simply conform and follow with unquestioned acceptance. Salafis are typically ghair muqallideen (non-denominational Muslims who do not do taqlid ). Indian maulanas criticised and issued fatwas against Zakir Naik for being a ghair muqallid , and not for the content of what he was preaching. However, Salafism, being an ideology, can always influence the clerics of all taqlidi fiqh s, who do use it to radicalise their followers. Salafis can be found across all the main schools of Sunni Islam (Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanafi and Hanbali) but are most pervasive among Hanbalis, whose subcontinental branch is called Ahl-e- Hadis. Tablighi Jamaat is one such neo-Salafi group that cuts across the various schools/fiqhs. Taqlid does act as a barrier to Salafism in India. Saudi Arabia follows the Hanbali fiqh, which does not follow the principle of taqlid . That makes it easier for the Saudi Muslims to self-radicalise and fan out to preach the Salafi ideology. This ideology preaches literalism and puritanism, holding only the first three generations of Islam as

the true model to follow. That results in dubbing any talk of reform as haram . Now let us look as what the Jamaat and its offshoots, including most of Hurriyat Conference, have been teaching the Kashmiris since the 1930s, based on Shari’a. 1. Muslims are obliged to live under Allah’s law— Shari’a; and shirk (idolatry), kufr (unbelief), irtidad (apostasy), nafaq (hypocrisy) and gustakhi (blasphemy) are serious offences punishable by death. 2. A Muslim is supposed to submit only to Allah’s nominee on earth—a Caliph. Democracy (equal rights and votes) is haram , as there can be no equality between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, a man and a woman, and a master and a slave, under the Islamic state; it is an un-Islamic concept, so India as a democratic nation is unacceptable. Muslims must capture power and impose Shari’a over entire J&K, starting with the Valley. That being the case, any solution for tackling Kashmir militancy will fail unless it targets this long-standing indoctrination. Islamists regard the establishment of a Shari’a State in Kashmir as just the first step towards the ultimate goal of establishment of Dar-ul-Islam in the whole of India. Jammu is going to be the next stop. Assam and Bengal would be next on the radar. The whole philosophy finds resonance with the Two-Nation Theory of Pakistan’s establishment. The Two-Nation Theory had two components. First, Hindus and Muslims were separate nations; and second, Hindus and Muslims were equal nations. Its first target was achieved with Partition. The second target could not be achieved because India turned out to be much bigger and got its economics right since the 1990s. Hence the asymmetric warfare by the Pakistanis concentrates on strengthening the Shari’a ideology in Kashmir and the rest of India. Separatism and integration of Pakistan is not the main issue, but simply an adjunct of this quest for equality. As this quest for equality is rooted in this ideology, which is now called the nazaria-e-Pakistan, it makes Pakistan a revisionist State. Kashmir is the point of beginning for this

long-term goal. That is why, even if India were to gift Kashmir to Pakistan on a platter, the long-term goal would not be met. Even if they win this battle, the civilizational war would continue. The more radical elements in Pakistan describe this in terms of Ghazwa-eHind, a Hadis 54 in one of the six accepted compilations of Hadis, by an-Nissa’i. The violence in Kashmir is only incidental, as armed jihad is a valid means under Shari’a. Indians have often wondered why mainland Indian Muslim clerics opposed the abolition of Article 370 and remained silent over the ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits. The secular opposition to the nullification of Article 370 takes its cue from the Islamic opposition to a virtual Shari’a land being integrated into mainland India. This is because no Islamic cleric worth his salt can place democracy above Shari’a. To recall Christine Fair in her much-acclaimed book Fighting to the End: Pakistan Army’s Way of War , Given the ostensible centrality of the Kashmir dispute to Pakistan’s behaviour in the region, some analysts (e.g., Rubin and Rashid 2008) believe that the only way to bring peace to India, Pakistan, and even Afghanistan is by resolving the Kashmir dispute. They argue that Pakistan will cease its adventurism in Afghanistan and India and will abandon its dangerous reliance on Islamist militant proxies only when the Kashmir issue is given closure in some way that accommodates Pakistan’s preference. Unfortunately, this appreciation of the problem and the best resolution of it dangerously misstate the underlying structure of Pakistan’s struggle with India. 55

An unstated part of the Two-Nation Theory has always been jihad explained in terms that ‘we shall continue our advance into Kashmir and India until the laws of Allah are implemented globally and the whole world comes under the rule of one Muslim Khalifah’. 56 Politically correct analysts call it fools’ talk, only that it isn’t. Pakistan’s Army and ulama treat it as the philosophy of Shari’a. References 52

Source: http://www.ibtl.in/column/1383/research-paper-on-1931- kashmirriots/

53

Available at: https://www.dailyo.in/politics/july-13-jammu-and- kashmirkashmiri-pandits-martyrs-day/story/1/4963.html

54 Sunan an-Nasa'i 3173. 55 C. Christine Fair. 2014. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War , Oxford University Press. 56 Husain Haqqani, quoting an ISIS member in ‘Prophecy and Jihad in the SubContinent’, Hudson Institute.

CHAPTER 20

Maharaja and Partition

Figure 20.1: Routes into Jammu and Kashmir State

Figure 20.2: North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir Courtesy: Survey of India

the seeds of communalism had been sown by the Sufi Pirs T hough in the Valley in the beginning of the 20th century itself, which culminated in the 1931 uprising, the malaise had spread to the Muslim majority areas of Poonch and Mirpur bordering Punjab and NWFP. The resignation of Congress ministries and their shortsighted non- cooperation with the war effort resulted in heavy

recruitment of Muslims. Nearly 60,000 men were recruited from Poonch and Mirpur. At the end of the war, all these men were demobilised from the British Army, mostly with their arms. Demands were made to absorb them in the J&K state forces, but the Princely State did not have the means to absorb a large force, especially because its strength was barely 12,000, 57 with just eight infantry battalions distributed into four brigades. Even though Maharaja was the ruler, it must be said that the British exercised close control over the affairs of J&K because of their special interest in the Gilgit region. The Great Game with the Russians, and later, with the Soviet Union was on in full swing at that time, and the British exercised near-total administrative control through their appointed officers. At one time, during the reign of Pratap Singh, they had English officers as Prime Minister and three important ministers, including Home and Revenue Ministers. It was virtually a joint British–Dogra state. This would have important repercussions in the Gilgit Agency, where the forces were nearly exclusively under British control, reporting to their headquarters at Peshawar. In Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah had launched a ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement in 1944, which ultimately led to his arrest. The Muslim Conference was the majority party in the Praja Parishad, but Sheikh Abdullah was also the President of the All India States’ Conference and, hence, a very influential person in the country. He was supported by the Congress and had very poor relations with the Maharaja. So, there were essentially three players in the game. The Maharaja, Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference and the Muslim Conference, the latter two centred in the Valley. The fourth player was the Prime Minister of J&K, Pandit Ram Chandra Kak, who was sitting in the lap of Jinnah. After the 1946 Provincial Elections in Punjab, the Unionist Party formed the government with help from the Congress and the Akali Dal. Congress formed the government in NWFP. Undeterred by the reverses, the Muslim League put into place an armed militia called

Muslim League National Guard and started large-scale disturbances. The Qadri Pir of Manki Sharif, Amin-ul- Hasanat, aided the League in NWFP. The League and its cohorts were never deterred by any constitutional and legal setback. They continued their mission to undermine both the governments, largely by heavy communalisation of the situation. The Unionist government in Punjab fell in March 1947, and all hell broke loose in Punjab. Rawalpindi, Multan, Lahore and Kahuta experienced heavy rioting against the minority Hindu– Sikh population. The neighbouring district of Poonch and Mirpur, Rawalpindi in Punjab and Hazara in NWFP, caught the virus. A communally charged atmosphere started a full-fledged rebellion in Poonch and Mirpur in June 1947 itself. The 60,000 ex-servicemen with their arms expected J&K to join Pakistan, as the state was 75% Muslim, but Maharaja was having grandiose dreams of an independent ‘Switzerland of Asia’. It is said that the Maharaja was mindful of the gathering storm, and he wanted to induct Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Chief Justice of Lahore High Court as the Prime Minister of J&K, but the Interim Government of India did not give its consent. Justice Mahajan was ultimately inducted just before J&K acceded to India. Mahatma Gandhi visited J&K in July 1947, which resulted in the sacking of the Pakistani-aligned Prime Minister of J&K, Ramchandra Kak, on 12 Aug 1947, and was replaced by Major Janak Singh, a relative of the Maharaja. J&K sought to sign a standstill agreement with both India and Pakistan. Pakistan signed it, while India refused. Mahatma Gandhi played a very positive role in the ultimate accession of J&K with India. It may be educative to discuss the geographic position of J&K on 15 August 1947. The all-weather road from India to Jammu was through Sialkot. The only railway line was a light railway via Sialkot from Wazirabad junction on the main broad-gauge railway line from Peshawar to Delhi via Lahore and Amritsar. Sialkot to Jammu is 44 km, with barely 22 km of this route being within the state of J&K. The main all-weather route to Srinagar lay from Rawalpindi and Jhelum, both via Muzaffarabad. The Jammu to Srinagar road via Banihal Pass usually remained closed for at least four months in a year. The

road to Amritsar and Jalandhar via Pathankot was not an all-weather road and also lacked a bridge over the Ravi near Lakhanpur. Thus, the Princely State of J&K was dependent for all its communications, supplies and transport on the dominion of Pakistan after the ‘Transfer of Power’ took effect as a consequence of the ‘Indian Independence Act, 1947’. Pakistan did accept the Standstill Agreement, but the Radcliffe Award sowed seeds of great apprehension in Pakistan. Pakistan was comfortable with the knowledge that even on the contiguity principle, J&K would ultimately have to choose Pakistan, as Gurdaspur district was the only link of Indian Punjab plains to J&K, and it was a Muslim majority district, though only by a few percentage points. However, when the Award was made public on 18 August 1947, Pathankot, Gurdaspur and Batala sub-divisions of Gurdaspur district went to India and only Shakargarh sub- division remained with Pakistan. This provided a direct land link-up through the plains to J&K for India. Though Radcliffe justified it based on a contiguity principle, Ravi River being the dividing line, Pakistan smelt conspiracy in this. Till this day, Pakistan accuses Pandit Nehru of manipulating Mountbatten to accomplish this land bridge to J&K. Pakistan became apprehensive, and with members of ex-INA and ex-British Army, started plotting the takeover of J&K. When the British Commander-in-Chief, Douglas Gracey, refused to help Pakistan, Pakistan imposed an economic embargo on J&K, and used its irregulars to mount an offensive, first on Poonch–Kotli– Mirpur sector, and then used the tribal raiders to enter the Valley. The J&K State was ill-equipped to deal with an armed confrontation with Pakistan-supported trained troops that had been recently demobilised. As the disaffection among the Muslims spread, the meagre army of the state of J&K started disintegrating. It got divided along communal lines. Most of the Muslim elements of the Maharaja’s army either deserted or played truant. References 57 Col (R) M.N. Gulati. 2000. Military Plight of Pakistan , Manas Publications.

CHAPTER 21

The Poonch–Mirpur Battles he Muslim League National Guards in conjunction with the Barelvi clerics preached the communal doctrine of Fataawa-iRazvia with gusto and openly announced that Pakistan was going to be a Shari’a State. Inspired by Nuruddin Moradabadi’s elevenpoint doctrine, the Shari’a State was virtually taken for granted, and that too a Shari’a State of the Ahl-e-Sunnat variety. Ahmad Raza Barelvi’s doctrine posed Deobandis as his biggest enemy, followed by the Wahhabis and then the Mushrikeen 58 . However, in practice, the Muslims of Pakistan thought that only the Hindu and Sikh Mushrikeen would be present in their future Shari’a State. The orgy of violence, the savagery, the terror that flowed from the supposedly peaceful Sufi teachings brought out the worst in human nature. Starting 7 March 1947, a total understanding between the Muslim League and the Muslim masses carried out terrible planned atrocities on Hindus and Sikhs. Punjab had 56% Muslims, and as if by a planned providence, 74% of the police constabulary was Muslim, that acted in a partisan manner. S. Gurbachan Singh Talib has published a research paper for SGPC on the planned atrocities, which was published as a book by Voice of India. 59 The riots started immediately after the collapse of the Unionist government on 2 March 1947. The Amritsar Riots were the longest drawn of all the riots (4 March 1947 to August 1947).

T

Independence Day of Pakistan, 14 August 1947, was the signal for free assault on the Hindu and Sikh minorities, especially in the Jhelum and Gujranwala districts adjoining the state. A reaction ensued in Eastern Punjab. Raiders in the form of militias consisting of ex-INA and ex-British Army elements became active all along the state border with Pakistan. The raids started along the Jhelum front, whence the armed raiders became bold enough to pursue fleeing Hindus and Sikhs into the state of J&K. It was a free- for-all, where the raiders had the implicit consent of the Pakistani authorities to wear Pakistani Army uniform. Mirpur was flooded with refugees fleeing from the savage atrocities on Hindus and Sikhs in the Oghi area. Chichian to Manawar area on the Poonch border had already become inflamed as the Poonch Rebellion gained in momentum. The general situation had become extremely grave with the local Muslim population conniving with Pakistani agents, spreading poisonous propaganda including provocative posters and leaflets amongst the gatherings in mosques, inciting social and communal unrest. Those who have seen the Kashmir situation in 1989–90 would be able to relate to this very easily. Even a small area like Shaheen Bagh was resonating with the same sentiment in 2019–20, except that it did not have official connivance. Throughout the history of the Subcontinent, it has been established that demography is a very important facet of the security aspect. River Jhelum, which formed the natural boundary of the state with Pakistan from Kohala in the north to Mangla in the south, could be easily crossed at numerous points where regular ferries used to operate. To arrest further Pakistani infiltration into the state, as a first step, with effect from 4 September, all boats that came to the eastern bank of the river were captured and destroyed after payment of compensation to the ferrymen. As they reached the border, the Hindus and Sikhs had to be protected from their pursuers, fed, organised and led to safety, towards destinations of their choice. Similarly, Muslim refugees going in the opposite direction had to be protected and given safe passage. Colonel Akbar Khan, DSO, Director, Weapons & Equipment at GHQ Pakistan, is credited as the prime mover behind the raiding plan. Akbar Khan had formulated the basic plan under the title of

‘Armed Revolt Inside Kashmir’ and was the moving spirit behind organising, equipping and financing the ‘raids’ in Kashmir. This subject was exercising his mind even before Partition. In anticipation of the events yet to unfold, while he was in General Headquarters (India), he had withdrawn a large number of maps of Jammu and Kashmir from the Survey of India. He astounded everyone when he was taken off from the Army and was appointed Military Adviser to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, thereby, upsetting the entire hierarchy. Soon after the Principal Raid was launched in the Valley, Akbar Khan assumed command of all major operations, especially in the Valley under the grandiose pseudonym of ‘General Tariq’. As has been the habit of the Pakistani military establishment throughout its history, this name was styled on the general who had captured Spain for the Muslims. In this connection, it may be recalled that, initially, Zaman Kiani was to be in charge of operations from across the Punjab border, and Khurshid Anwar, a commander of the Muslim League National Guards, was in command of the sector north of Rawalpindi. The J&K state forces had 2 JAK battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hamid Khan deployed in penny pockets at Owen Pattan, Saligram, Rajauri, Kotli, BanBridge and Sensa, with headquarters and one company at Naushera. 3 JAK battalion under Lt Colonel Puran Singh Thapa was thinly spread over Hill–Begam, Mangla Fort, Chachian and Jatley–Alibeg, with headquarters and the rest of the sub-units at Mirpur. The first major 'guerilla' incident occurred in Bagh Tehsil on 27 August 1947, when Jemadar Khurd Singh and four state force signallers were kidnapped by a Muslim crowd, bound hand and foot, and thrown into the Mahal River. Two days later, the Sikh gurudwara at Ali Beg was threatened by a big Muslim gathering although a Gorkha platoon was posted there for the specific purpose of protection of the gurudwara. In Bagh–Poonch area, more tribesmen reinforced the Poonch rebellion. Tribals from the Kurram, a lashkar from Dir, Zadarans and even Tajiks from Afghanistan and Ghilzais formed the largest part. Sometime after the first wave of raids had started from the southern sector of the state, the Maharaja of Patiala visited Srinagar in July 1947. As a consequence of the personal relationship between the two

Maharajas, one infantry battalion, the 1st Patiala Infantry, and one battery of mountain artillery from the Patiala State Forces arrived in Jammu and Kashmir during the first fortnight of October 1947. The most significant fact in this wave of raids starting June 1947 was that, unlike later in the Valley, the local population was almost totally with the raiders. Poonch, Mirpur, Kotli and Mangla has a population of an ethnicity that is locally known as Mirpuri Muslims, extending up to Muzaffarabad. This stock of people identified themselves more with the Pakistanis than with the Kashmiris. As we will see later, Sheikh Abdullah was not greatly popular among these people. Whether Sheikh Abdullah’s lack of enthusiasm in having these people integrated into J&K had something to do with Pandit Nehru’s decision to approach the United Nations, even as the war had turned decisively in favour of India, will always be a matter of speculation. References 58 Idol-worshippers, or Hindus and Sikhs in this case. 59 Sardar Gurcharan Singh Talib. 1991. Muslim League Attack on Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 1947 . Voice of India.

CHAPTER 22

Desertion and Treachery in the Jammu and Kashmir Army n the night of 15/16 October 1947, raiders besieged Tharochi Fort where two companies of 2 JAK Battalion— one Gorkha and one Muslim—had taken refuge after fighting in the area. Brigadier Chhattar Singh in command of the Mirpur Brigade ordered his Brigade Major (BM), Major Nasarullah Khan, to take two platoons of 3 JAK Battalion to deliver supplies and ammunition to the garrison in the fort. On the way, he also assumed command of two companies sent earlier to relieve the besieged garrison. He deployed the Muslim Company on perimeter defence duty outside the fort and gave time off to the Gorkhas to rest. Major Nasarullah Khan then called a meeting of all Muslim junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and hatched a plan to eliminate the non-Muslim elements of the force. 60 During the night, the Muslim Company butchered the sleeping Gorkhas. The Gorkha Company Commander, Captain Prem Singh, was strangled to death by Muslim ‘brother officers’ of his battalion. Two Gorkha JCOs and 30 soldiers managed to escape the massacre and fled to Jhangar to report the incident. Major Nasarullah Khan led the Muslim troops to Tharochhi Fort, where the garrison, blissfully ignorant of the developments of the night before and unaware of what was to befall them soon, received the relieving column with joy. And at night, the unsuspecting Gorkhas were all

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murdered in a lurid repeat act. Their commander, Captain Raghubir Singh Thapa, was tortured to death. This is the worst kind of treachery that occurred in the annals of Indian military history in the 20th century. It also speaks of the nature of training that the state forces had received. No such incident occurred after the Indian Army joined the operations. Brigadier Mohammad Usman immortalised himself in the Nowshera sector in the defence of Nowshera and Jhangar. A large well-armed force of raiders attacked the Bhimber– Munawar area on 18/19 October and again on the 27th. In this instance, the attacking force was supported by tanks and mechanised vehicles. Bhimber fell to the enemy on the 29th. The period of this particular action highlights the level of planning and coordination between various sectors in which Pak forces had suddenly become overactive. This just goes to prove—since proof was very much required at that point of time, even though it is completely irrelevant at this point of time—that Pak Army contingents were in the forefront at a very early stage of the hostilities. Rajouri was a small town whose population was mostly of the Hindu business community. It was garrisoned by two platoons of 2 JAK Battalion—one Gorkha and the other, Dogra. During October 1947, this town was invested by the Muslim elements of the town, aided in target measure by their co-religionists from the nearby rural areas and reinforced by the Qabailis. The small beleaguered garrison held out repeated attacks but finally capitulated on 11 November 1947, resulting in the usual orgy of loot, killings, abductions and rape which was the ‘standard operating procedure’ adopted by the enemy in all such cases. Major Angrez Singh, with two platoons of troops from the Training Battalion at Jammu, managed to extricate the inhabitants and succeeded in rescuing many thousands from the clutches of sure torture and death. But the Garrison Commander, Subedar Major Bhim Singh was killed in action. Mangla Fort was of considerable civil and military significance in as much as the headworks of the Upper Jhelum Canal were located there. Its importance also lay in the fort’s temple dedicated to Goddess Durga, the Regimental Deity, on whom the 'war cry' of the Regiment is based—'Durga Mata ki Jai’. And the fort had a

gurudwara too. One platoon of 3 JAK Battalion was posted there for general duties. On 7 November 1947, an old woman sought admission into the fort. She was carrying two letters, one for Jemadar Khajoor Singh, and the other for the Zaildar, Girdhari Lai, one in Urdu and the other in English, sent by Captain Mohammed Azam of the State Forces asking the garrison commander, Jemadar Khajoor Singh to surrender. By this time, Mangla Fort garrison had been under siege for some weeks and was low on ammunition but had plenty of gunpowder and a stock of muzzleloaders of ancient vintage. The situation had become so grave that the garrison commander decided to accept the risk of using these guns to fire pebbles on the enemy, perhaps the only instance of such desperation in recent military history. By November, the situation inside the fort had become quite unbearable. The enemy had sealed all routes of withdrawal. The small garrison under a valiant JCO had held on for one month and 20 days against heavy odds when it capitulated to overwhelming enemy strength. As was customary for the raiders and the erstwhile comrades in arms, loot, arson, torture and death were the only fate that awaited the garrison and the civilians in Fort Kotli. Similarly, Kotli was a predominantly Hindu business-community inhabited prosperous town situated on the Mirpur–Poonch ‘forward’ road. About 300 hostiles had occupied all the heights around the town. The besieged garrison of 9 JAK Battalion was attacked on the night of 16/17 November by a strong enemy force numbering about 3,000, supported by MMGs and mortars. One Muslim platoon commander, posted on a tactical feature for the defence of the town, defected to the enemy before the main attack. The state forces garrison repulsed the attack despite being heavily outnumbered, and 200 enemy soldiers left behind were counted dead on the littered battlefield. One Sher Tamroz with a mixed force of local Muslims and Qabailis surrounded the small state forces garrison at Jhangar on the Naushera–Mirpur Road. This place was administratively a good campsite with plenty of water. The garrison here held on for many weeks against numerous enemy assaults, which lacked punch. Fortunately for the Kotli garrison, 50 Para Brigade under Brigadier Y.S. Paranjpye reached Jammu on 28 October 1947, just one day after India intervened militarily to save

Srinagar by airlifting the first fighting contingent. But this brigade came with only one infantry battalion—and that too considerably under strength. 3 Rajput commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dharam Pal had only six officers and 460 other ranks, while its second battalion, 1 Punjab, joined only on 13 November. Fortunately, the brigade had one Company of Mahar MGs and one Patiala Infantry in location—this battalion having been sent earlier by the Maharaja of Patiala as a gesture of friendly assistance. These troops relieved the Jhangar garrison on 19 November. The next day, the relief column commenced their advance to Kotli, which was relieved on 27 November—having faced numerous enemy assaults during a siege lasting six weeks. After evacuating about 900 refugees, the relief column withdrew to Jhangar on 28 November and, thereafter, to Jammu. References 60 Col (R) M.N. Gulati. 2000. Military Plight of Pakistan , Manas Publications.

CHAPTER 23

Raid on the Valley 24 October, a full-fledged raid began on the Valley through O nDomel and Muzaffarabad. The signs were all there. Intelligence was available. After Mahatma Gandhi visited J&K, the Maharaja was all but ready to accede. According to Shri Arun Kumar, a seasoned Kashmir expert, written documents are available to corroborate the same. The Government of India had not allowed the Maharaja to get the Prime Minister of his choice—Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan. He was finally able to join as PM on 15 October 1947 only. It was obvious by July that Pakistan would move to take J&K by force. The Maharaja was anticipating the attack from Pakistan after the raids in the Poonch–Mirpur area had started in June 1947. He asked for weapons and arms from India. On 2 October 1947, the Cabinet Committee for Defence met under the chairmanship of Sardar Patel and approved the request. General Sir Roy Bucher was directed to supply weapons. However, the Supreme Commander of the British Army, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck overruled Bucher. When the Committee met again on 26 October under Pandit Nehru, this fact was revealed. On 21 October 1947, Pandit Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel that Sheikh Abdullah’s position in the future J&K polity was more important to him than the accession of J&K. Sheikh Abdullah was scheming to keep the Mirpuri Muslims out to consolidate his power.

On 21 October, the full-fledged invasion of Kashmir Valley had begun. On the same day, a plot to abduct and kill the Maharaja and Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan at Bhimber failed due to their good fortune. This has been recorded by Mahajan himself in his book, Looking Back (1969), outlining ‘the bitter truth of Kashmir’. 4 JAK, commanded by Lt Col Narain Singh consisted of both Poonchi Muslims as well as Dogra Hindus. The CO had been warned by the state headquarters to be mindful of the Muslim elements of his battalion, but as is often the case with Hindus who have no grounding in Islamic methods, he protested and reposed full trust in his battalion. On the fateful day, he was betrayed and the raiders were provided with a free run. He and the Dogras were killed by their Muslim compatriots, led by Captain Azam of 2nd company. ‘General Tariq’ aka Akbar Khan had established contacts with sympathetic Muslim elements of Maharaja’s Army. He had planned to capture Srinagar airfield before moving to Srinagar. Brigadier Rajinder Singh, Chief of Staff of the J&K Army, organised a heroic resistance with the few hundred men he had. Heavily outnumbered, he was finally killed in action but not before delaying the advance of the raiders by at least three days. On 26 October, the raiders reached Baramulla and let loose an orgy of rape, plunder, loot and killings, as was the ‘standard operating procedure’ of any Islamic Army of the past in the Subcontinent. Collusive action of the Muslim elements of the Maharaja’s Army and the Muslim Army from Pakistan was once again in evidence. The action of Lt Col Narain Singh in fully trusting his Muslim officers and soldiers was in keeping with military tradition and chivalry, but suffered from the same ‘Prithviraj Chauhan Syndrome’ that felled so many trusting Indian kings. The Vijayanagara Empire—one of the greatest in the history of India—lost a war it was winning (Battle of Talikota) because the Geelani brothers, two of his principal commanders, chose to side with Islam. Raja Dahir of Sind was betrayed by the very Mohammad bin-Allafi, whom he had given shelter; Muhammad bin- Qasim was sent to attack Dahir only because he refused to surrender bin-Allafi to the Ummayad Governor of Persia, Hajjaj bin Yusuf, yet, bin-Allafi refused to assist Dahir against a lashkar of Islam. What Hyder Ali did to his Wodeyar

king, and what the Sufi Pirs did to the Hindu kings who gave them shelter are subjects for another time. Suffice to say that those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it. On 25 October, the Maharaja abandoned Srinagar. On 26 October, he acceded to the Union of India. The Instrument of Accession (IoA) was provided in List I of the Schedule VII of the Government of India Act, 1935. 61 Contrary to the assertions made by the various apologists for Article 370, the same IoA was executed by every acceding state, including the Nizam of Hyderabad. There is a fine account by Late Field Marshal Manekshaw who was then the Director of Military Operations in the Army headquarters in the rank of a Colonel. General Sir Roy Bucher, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, sent him to accompany V.P. Menon who was flying to Srinagar to get the Instrument of Accession signed. The Kabaili tribals were hardly 10–12 km away from the Srinagar airfield. They came back on 25 October, and it is worth recalling in Manekshaw’s own words what happened the next morning in a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee:62 At the morning meeting he handed over the (Accession) thing. Mountbatten turned around and said, ‘Come on Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the military situation?’ I gave him the military situation, and told him that unless we flew in troops immediately, we would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn’t fly troops in. Everything was ready at the airport. As usual, Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away.’ He [Nehru] said, ‘Of course, I want Kashmir [emphasis in original]. Then he [Patel] said, ‘Please give your orders.’ And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, ‘You have got your orders.’ I walked out, and we started flying in troops at about 11 o’clock or 12 o’clock. I think it was the Sikh regiment under Ranjit Rai that was the first lot to be flown in. And then we continued flying troops in. That is all I know about what happened. Then all the fighting took place. I became a brigadier, and became director of military operations and also if you will see the first signal to be signed ordering the cease-fire on 1 January (1949) had been signed by Colonel Manekshaw on behalf of C-in-C India, General Sir Roy Bucher. That must be lying in the Military Operations Directorate.

After the accession, India was able to salvage a large part of Kashmir and Jammu, but Sheikh Abdullah kept playing his dirty role. Uri was liberated on 15 November 1947, but a further direction to liberate Mirpur and Kotli was not given. Between 15 November 1947 and 25 December, 32,000 Hindu and Sikhs were massacred by the Pakistanis even as the Indian leadership dithered. A large number of RSS activists, who were in the forefront of helping out Indian forces, were also killed. Mirpur and Kotli fell to Pakistan, and Sheikh Abdullah’s objective—of keeping the elements of Muslim conference opposed to him on the other side of the border—was achieved. References 61

Appendix 4.

62

As told to Prem Shankar Jha.

CHAPTER 24

Sheikh Abdullah, the New Shah Mir very other state finally signed Covenants of Merger and Merger Agreements, and extended the Constitution of India to their Princely States in full. However, Maharaja Hari Singh was exiled to Bombay on 20 June 1949. Nobody even asked him whether he was willing to sign a Covenant of Merger on the lines of the other Princely States and extend the Constitution fully to J&K. Effective power was with Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Minister forced upon the Maharaja, who played the role of the Shah Mir reincarnate with consummate expertise. The person who understood the skullduggery inherent in this proposal of special status to J&K was Dr B.R. Ambedkar. Recall his famous words to Sheikh Abdullah when he went to persuade Dr Ambedkar to grant special status to J&K: ‘You want India to defend Kashmir, feed its people, give Kashmiris equal rights all over India. But you want to deny India and Indians all rights in Kashmir. I am a Law Minister of India, I cannot be a party to such a betrayal of national interests.’ 63 Yet, Article 370 came to be, because, no effort was made by the leadership to get a Full Merger from the Maharaja. Unlike all other Princely States where the rulers were the prime movers, J&K had been virtually handed over to Sheikh Abdullah in March 1948 itself, when Sheikh Abdullah graduated from the head of Emergency Administration of Kashmir to the post of Prime Minister in place of

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Mehr Chand Mahajan (who later became the third Chief Justice of India). Due to his proximity with the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the pivotal role of Kashmir Muslims, Sheikh Abdullah began his great saga of blackmail that lasted till 5 August 2019, when the bluff was finally called and Article 370 stood nullified. Sheikh Abdullah must be given top billing in any pantheon of blackmailers. Some of his seminal achievements are as follows: 1.

Del ayed the accession of J&K through his contacts in the Congress as the Maharaja was not willing to make him the Prime Minister of J&K;

2.

Using the foolhardy indirect invasion of Kashmir Valley by Pakistan to his advantage, and winning a position of de facto administrator of Kashmir Valley; Getting Pandit Nehru to separate J&K from the State Department under Sardar Patel, and getting his con fidante N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar to head J&K affairs; Blackmailing Pandit Nehru into stopping the Indian march into Muzaffarabad and Baltistan as he did not trust the Mirpuri Muslims and the Shi’a of Baltistan and Gilgit, forcing the hands of Nehru into going to UN under the cover of a letter by Mountbatten in which he had promised plebiscite; Persuading the Government of India to exile Maharaja Hari Singh to Bombay in 1949, and getting a callow Karan Singh appointed as the Maharaja’s regent; Blackmailing Nehru into not agreeing to the merger, and giving special status to J&K through Article 370, citing the plebiscite promise; Becoming virtually independent and rigging the election to the J&K Constituent Assembly to such an extent that 73 out of 75 National Conference candidates were elected unopposed as the nominations of all other candidates were rejected, and there was no recourse to justice as the Election Commission of India had no jurisdiction in J&K;

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Arresting Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and keeping him in Jammu jail despite requests to shift him to Delhi; Sheikh Abdullah’s hubris knew no bounds at this point; 9. Bringing the Land Reform Law to exclusively benefit the Muslims of Kashmir and Chenab Valley; 10. Refusing to accommodate the Hindu refugees from West Punjab, but accommodating the Tibetan Muslims; 11. Deifying the Two-Nation Theory in Kashmir, by approving the principle of two prime ministers, two flags, and two constitutions; 12. Continuous blackmail of Nehru by pretending to be the man who would win the plebiscite for India and 13. Hobnobbing with the Pakistan leadership for a quasiindependent status. The final coup-de-grace: getting his Cabinet to propose to India that the defence of J&K would be the joint responsibility of India and Pakistan. According to Gourinath Rastogi, What to speak of India, the Sheikh was not even interested in the protection of the entire state. His sole aim was to protect the Kashmir Valley. The events of Gilgit, Kotli, Baltistan, Mirpur, Muzaffarabad and Bhimber lend evidence to it. Soon after the state’s accession with India on October 27, 1947 the Indian Army had reached Srinagar by air. The Indian troops had liberated the entire valley from the occupation of Pakistani invaders within 10 days upto November 7. The troops had to march ahead to liberate the remaining areas of the state. The Military Governor of Gilgit, Brigadier Ghansara Singh, people of Mirpur, Bhimber, Kotli and Muzaffarabad and the Hindu leaders of the Jammu region were imploring in front of the officers of the Indian Army, requesting the troops to liberate these areas from the clutches of Pakistanis. But the Indian forces were not allowed to move forward. The Army commander of Jammu province, Brigadier Pranjaype, told Hindu leaders of Jammu the reason behind this, saying ‘Nehru had given the overall command of the Indian Army to Sheikh Abdullah and, therefore, the Army cannot move forward without his orders’. While giving information about the fundamentalist and conspiratorial attitude of Sheikh Abdullah[,] Maharaja Hari Singh wrote a long letter to Sardar Patel. The Maharaja had written that even after the elapse of two months, the Indian troops were still in Uri. The main spots of Mirpur and Kotli have been lost after a defeat and the defeat ‘is a major blow for us. It has wounded the image of the Indian soldiers. Till now the Indian troops have not captured even a single town. In this context my position is precarious’. The Maharaja wrote to Patel that he had supported the Indian Union under the belief that the Indian Union ‘will not allow us to stoop’. There was no purpose of keeping the State with India if the Indian Union

is not able to restore ‘to us our lost territory and if it is prepared to hand us over to Pakistan under the Security Council resolution’. He even told the Sardar that he was prepared to take the command of the Kashmiri and the Indian troops because the country that cannot be understood by ‘your generals for months and years is better known to me’. 64

Sheikh Abdullah blackmailed Nehru on the issue of Plebiscite. Having painted himself into a corner, Nehru needed Sheikh for winning the Plebiscite. Sheikh knew this. He was not interested in the Mirpuri Muslims either. So, he played the whole scenario to get the major concession of Article 370. Like all good men whose only weakness may be a lust for great legacy, Sardar Patel fell into the trap of his honour over the ultimate interest of the country when he persuaded a CWC on the verge of a revolt at N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar’s proposal on Article 370. He did get the word ‘Temporary’ added to it in the article title, though. V. Shankar has referred to this in detail in his book. Sheikh Abdullah professed to implement land reforms. Since it was a Congress policy too, not much fault could be found with this policy. However, since all the affected landlords were Hindus, his zeal was also driven by his deeply imbibed anti-Hindu and antiDogra sentiment. He made it the most oppressive and most discriminatory land reform programme by making it the only such programme in the country that took away lands of landlords without paying compensation. Lord Mountbatten castigated Pandit Nehru for choosing Gopalaswamy Ayyangar to represent India in the United Nations. His incompetence resulted in the complaint and request from India against the aggression of Pakistan turn into arbitration by the UN Security Council, which has no such jurisdiction. Yet, Nehru never made a move to withdraw his complaint, as Sheikh Abdullah guaranteed him victory in the Plebiscite. I have already detailed how Sheikh Abdullah was virtually the commander-in-chief of the Indian Army in J&K as mandated by the PM of India, and how deliberately he delayed action on certain key sectors. The Praja Parishad agitation that revolved around the anti-Hindu perception of Sheikh Abdullah ultimately led to the final call.

Due to all these reasons, Pandit Nehru had to take the decision of arresting Sheikh Abdullah and keep him detained for the next 11 years. However, the art of blackmail had been well learnt by the politicians of the Valley. The natural culmination of this was the Presidential Order of 1954 that provided for institutionalised discrimination against Dalits, tribals, women, minorities and even against the Gurkhas who had been in the Dogra Army for over a century. Article 35A was an artifice that excluded the Fundamental Rights enjoyed by the rest of the country from J&K. It was a betrayal achieved through the same route of blackmail. This deceit and blackmail were to become a practised art with the Valley politicians. Special constitutional status, special political status and special financial status did nothing to integrate the Muslim population of Kashmir Valley. Instead, it fuelled the feeling of separatism with even greater intensity. The Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir struck root under the influence of Abul Ala Maududi and built a separate branch for Kashmir as distinct from Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. It got busy doing what it does best—preparing for Dar-ul-Islam, also known as Nizam-e-Mustafa. The Muftis and Farooq and Omar Abdullah were a natural denouement of this process. Fanning the religious feeling among the public, and then blackmailing the Indian leadership into perpetuating their cycle of aggrandisement became a practised art of great finesse. So, when the ethnic cleansing of the Kashmiri Hindus happened in 1989–90, it was a culmination of this long process. References 63

Dr S.N. Busi. 2016. Dr B.R. Ambedkar: Framing of Indian Constitution.

64

Narendra Sehgal. 2018. Vyathit Jammu Kashmir . Prabhat Prakashan.

CHAPTER 25

The Fall of Gilgit he initial Himalayan Blunder was concerning the Gilgit Agency and the Wazarat, which many may not even remember. Gilgit– Baltistan, as we know it today, comprised the Gilgit Agency and Gilgit Wazarat back in 1947. A lot has been written about the Himalayan Blunder committed by India in 1962. Even more has been written about the blunders committed in the prosecution of the Kashmir War of 1947, notably the reference to the United Nations by Jawaharlal Nehru at a time India was gaining momentum in the war. Poonch had been secured. Enemy forces had been chased away from the outskirts of Leh, and Kargil had been won back. The Poonch–Uri road had been secured. India only needed the last push to capture Skardu back and take Muzaffarabad and Mirpur. History would also tell you that Jammu and Kashmir was also the only Princely State which was not under the charge of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Kashmir was a separate ministry under the Government of India and was directly under the charge of Prime Minister Nehru. One more event of great momentous consequence had already taken place. The Maharaja’s forces broadly comprised 50% Muslims and 50% Hindus. Manekshaw records that the Muslim elements of Maharaja’s forces had revolted.

T

This position was known both to the army and to the political leadership. However, they got so busy looking after Srinagar that they forgot completely about both the Gilgit Agency and the Wazarat. A bit of background may be called for at this point. The Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (as opposed to J&K of today), had five main regions—Jammu with Jammu as headquarters, Kashmir with Srinagar as headquarters, Ladakh with Leh as summer headquarters and Skardu as winter headquarters , Gilgit Wazarat with Astore as headquarters and Gilgit Agency on a 60-year lease to the British from 1935. Gilgit Agency comprised Chilas, Gilgit, Yasin, Ghizr, Iskoman, Hunza and Nagar Valley. All areas east of Bunji were in Wazarat which was directly administered by the Maharaja. As the Great Game was unfolding in Central Asia, and Britain was getting more and more obsessed with the threat of Communist Soviet Union, they thought it fit to administer the Gilgit Agency part of the Maharaja’s State directly, and accordingly took it on lease in 1935. As the Indian Independence Act was passed by the British Parliament on 15 July 1947 and the date of transfer of power to India and Pakistan was set for 15 August, Mountbatten decided to let go of the Gilgit Agency lease. On the 1st of August, administration of Gilgit passed back into the hands of Maharaja, a responsibility he was simply not up to discharging. He had a British Chief of Army Staff, Major General Scott. Scott had just two battalions around Gilgit, a battalion of Gilgit Scouts which was a British force and another battalion of the 6th Kashmir Infantry stationed around 50 km away at Bunji on the eastern bank of the Indus in the Wazarat area. Gilgit Scouts was a 100% Muslim force. It had one headquarter company stationed in Gilgit and ten platoons contributed by the various Rajas. The 6th Kashmir Infantry at Bunji on the left bank of the Indus had two Dogra and Sikh companies and one Muslim company. General Scott sought a British officer to command the Gilgit Scouts as the force was 100% Muslim and a Hindu might have found it difficult to command it, and, for obvious reasons, a Muslim could not be trusted in the situation that prevailed.

So, Scott marshalled his resources and got a British captain who was then posted in Chitral and also accepted his recommendation to have another British officer working under him at Chilas. The biggest advantage that Pakistan had over India in Kashmir was that there was not a single road or rail route that connected India with J&K. Srinagar was accessed from Rawalpindi, through Murrie and Muzaffarabad (The road to Muzaffarabad bypasses Murrie today). The Poonch road was through the town of Gujrat after crossing the Chenab at Wazirabad. Even the road to Jammu was through Amritsar–Sialkot–Jammu. Jammu had a light railway too. It ran from Wazirabad Junction on the main Lahore–Rawalpindi line through Sialkot to Jammu. Gilgit and Skardu were both accessed through the Rawalpindi– Abbottabad road which crossed into Gilgit Agency at the 4,200 metre-Babusar pass and joined the Indus at Chilas. If the Babusar pass was closed due to snow, then, there was the alternative route along the Indus Valley, which is the present alignment of the Karakoram Highway. From Chilas, the road went through Bunji up to the place where the Gilgit River joins the Indus, from where the Indus goes upstream further north until it hits the Karakoram Range and turns south-southeast near Sassi. It went on to Skardu, from where another road along Indus, Shingo and Suru valleys joins up with Kargil. The other route took off from the Gilgit–Indus confluence and went up to Shandur Pass in the West, from where it crossed into Chitral, a Muslim Princely State. River Hunza meets the Gilgit River at Gilgit. The road along Hunza Valley led to the vassal states of Hunza and Nagar. The present Karakoram Highway is along this alignment, going further into Chinese Turkestan over the Khunjerab pass. The Gilgit–Indus confluence has the unique geographical feature of three of the greatest ranges—the Himalayas, the Karakoram and the Hindukush—meeting at one place. The route from Jammu to Gilgit and Skardu via Srinagar was open only during the summers, as it was not possible to cross the Pir Panjal during winters. Also, going to Gilgit Wazarat’s capital, Astore,

involved crossing the rivers Sind and Kishanganga, before going up to the Burzil Pass through Mini Margh.

Figure 25.1: Map of Jammu and Kashmir Source: Drawn by the author

Even the flights in small planes, mostly piston-engined transport planes, had to first go to Peshawar from Srinagar before refuelling, and took the route up along the Indus Valley. It is here that the big blunder took place. Major William Alexander Brown, the commander of the Gilgit Scouts had one singular merit, not unlike many other Englishmen. He kept a diary. This was later published as his memoirs. A look through the memoirs reveals his mindset. Right from day one of his taking over as Commander at Gilgit, he had a political agenda. When the lease of Gilgit Agency was prematurely terminated by Mountbatten and the Maharaja formally resumed his territory, Major Brown was inducted as an officer of the J&K Army.

Brigadier Ghansara Singh of the Maharaja’s army was sent in as the Governor. Brown derides him as incompetent and lazy. Brown’s memoirs cannot be taken at their face value as he was always scheming against the Maharaja. In early September, he had decided to support Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. He has mentioned in his diary that he had his mind made up, that, in case the Maharaja decided to accede to India, he would be with his Muslim soldiers and would mount a mutiny. Brigadier Ghansara Singh did not size up the situation well. The 6th Kashmir Infantry based at Bunji had three battalions, one of which was a Muslim battalion. Everyone knew how Muslim battalions had deserted the Kashmir forces in the various mutinies which occurred from Poonch to Muzaffarabad to Baramulla. Gilgit Scouts had an unconventional formation of an HQ company and ten platoons. These were widely distributed at Gupis, Chilas and Gilgit. After the accession had been achieved and Indian troops had taken control, Gilgit should have been immediately secured through an air bridge, as was Srinagar. Indeed, every other garrison in Gilgit Baltistan would have become safe including the Skardu and Ladakh Agencies. This blunder was committed as much by the Kashmir Army, as by the Indian Army and India’s political leadership. Gilgit had a small airstrip which could have taken small aircraft, but Skardu had a fairly long airstrip. An airlift of the size which occurred in Srinagar was militarily not possible, but induction of Indian Army and its commanders was an urgent imperative. As things transpired, later on, Major Brown led the mutiny of Gilgit Scouts as he had intended to, right from November onwards. The Kashmir Governor, Brigadier Ghansara Singh, was arrested by Major Brown. The Muslim company of the 6th Kashmir Infantry also mutinied, as they had already been compromised by Major Brown. The remainder of the 6th Kashmir Infantry were chased away from Bunji, the Pakistan flag was unfurled at Gilgit on 1 November 1947, and for three weeks, Gilgit was an independent entity, until Pakistan sent its Governor there. Thus, the way was opened for the

whole of Gilgit and a major part of Baltistan to be occupied by Pakistan. Major Brown directed the entire operations into Gilgit- Baltistan until he was relieved in January 1948. After the fall of Gilgit, every man in Kashmir knew that Skardu would be the next target. General Thimayya is on record that he considered Skardu to be the last frontier in the battle to save Ladakh. Yet, no airlift occurred till the Kashmir Forces in Skardu under that great soldier Sher Jung Thapa had been besieged in February by Gilgit Scouts and Chitral Bodyguards. This failure to re-supply and relieve the garrisons at Gilgit and Skardu immediately after the airlift of Srinagar were great military blunders, besides political ones. A sagacious army commander, which General Sir Roy Bucher probably was, should have proceeded to defend Skardu and Gilgit through an air bridge. We are, however, not sure how much of his heart he had in this war. Pakistanis similarly blame General Sir Douglas Gracey, the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief. It was a great error of judgement on part of the Maharaja to entrust his forces to English officers and to place trust in Muslim companies and battalions when they were deserting everywhere. The saga of rape and murder of Indians in Bunji and Skardu need to be retold to all Indians today, so that they would know how Pakistan forces fight, and how misplaced our sense of fair play is when it comes to Pakistan, whether with their forces or their public. Narendra Modi and Doval have sized up the situation correctly. It is well worth debating that if it had been Modi and Doval in 1972, would they have let the advantage of having 90,000 POWs melt away without wresting away some major part of Pakistan, or without breaking up Pakistan? A War Crime Tribunal would have broken up Pakistan at that time. My two bits about the present situation is that this great ummah feeling has completely disappeared from Gilgit– Baltistan today. Shi’as and Ismailis are persecuted, and Sunnis are being increasingly seen as a colonising force.

We need not have any illusions about the population in these parts, but, certainly, the way to conquer POK is not through Muzaffarabad, but through Khapalu and Skardu. This is true not only in territorial terms but also in terms of the minds of its peoples. The quick occupation of Turtuk by Ladakh Scouts in 1971 war lends credence to this line of thinking. A few days more, and Khapalu and Skardu would have fallen in 1971.

CHAPTER 26

Article 370 (Draft 306A) in the Indian Constitution rticle 306A in the draft Constitution (later renumbered as Article 370 in the approved Constitution) was moved by N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar on 17 October 1949, the final day of the Second Reading of the Constituent Assembly Debates. Dr B.R. Ambedkar was present in the House, but he neither introduced the Article nor made any intervention. This was in keeping with the rebuff that he had given to Sheikh Abdullah when he had approached him on the advice of Pandit Nehru. N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar was a member of the 13-member Drafting Committee. He had been the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir from 1937 to 1943 and was accorded the highest title in British India—Diwan Bahadur. He was appointed as a minister without a portfolio, and was asked to look after Kashmir affairs after Pandit Nehru detached J&K from the State Department (under the Ministry of Home Affairs) and brought it directly under him soon after the accession of J&K to India. This had caused a lot of friction between Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel as noted earlier. After a while, Ayyangar was given charge of the Railway Ministry while continuing to look after Kashmir affairs. He was also made to lead the Indian delegation to the United Nations. There was considerable disquiet on the proposal before it saw the light of day in the Constituent Assembly. The Congress Working

A

Committee itself was opposed to the proposal. It was on the request of Pandit Nehru that Sardar Patel got the CWC to approve the measure. Sardar Patel gave the argument of J&K having become an international issue. He was mindful of the fact that Sheikh Abdullah was in a position to blackmail the Indian Union on the question of Plebiscite. The UN Security Council Resolution No. 47 65 had envisaged that, 1.

Pakistan would withdraw all its forces and tribesmen from the erstwhile Maharaja’s territory; 2. India would keep sufficient forces to maintain law and order; 3. A Plebiscite would be held to decide its future. Though technically Indian sovereignty was fully affirmed pending Plebiscite, the Indian government had no idea that Pakistan would not fulfil the precondition to the Plebiscite. This was exploited to the hilt by Sheikh Abdullah in getting the Indian Union to concede Article 370. Thus, India found that the initial mistake of approaching the UN Security Council to stop Pakistani aggression had landed it from the Pakistani frying pan into the Sheikh Abdullah fire. Thus the motion to add Article 306A to the Constitution was moved with a prior understanding. Despite that, there were strong voices that opposed the move. 66 In the Constituent Assembly, Maulana Hasrat Mohani opposed the introduction of the article on the ground that it sought to discriminate among the various Princely States. He gave the example of the State of Baroda, a very well- governed state, whose ruler was sought to be pensioned off after he agreed to merge the state fully with the Union of India. He asked whether J&K was special that it is sought to be invested with so much of power. However, not much discussion took place and Article 306A was passed in a hurry. It was later renumbered as Article 370 in the final Constitution. The finally introduced Article read as follows:

306A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution. (a) the provisions of article 211A (Article 238 in the Constitution, now repealed) of this Constitution shall not apply in relation to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. (b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the State shall be limited to (i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India are the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State; and (ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify; Explanation: For the purposes of this article, the government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the union as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers, for the time being in office, under the Maharaja’s Proclamation, dated the fifth day of March, 1948. (c)

the provisions of Article 1 of this Constitution shall apply in relation to the State;

(d)

such of the other provision[s] of this Constitution and subject to such exceptions and modifications shall apply in relation to the State as the President may by order specify:

Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State aforesaid shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State: Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government. (2)

If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in sub-clause (b) (ii) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of clause (1) was given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon. (3) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding clause of this article, the President may, by public notification declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify: Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.

It may be noted that no consultation took place between the Government of India and the ruler, the Maharaja, as the Maharaja had already been forcibly exiled to Bombay (as it then was) on 20 June 1949. He was quite willing to sign on any covenant or instrument that would keep J&K at par with the other Princely States.

The other States were merged, and/or signed covenants of the merger with the Union of India as Part B States (Article 238 of the Constitution, later repealed with the integration of Part B States as full States). Sheikh Abdullah had by now become the Prime Minister-cumRuler of the State of J&K with a full hold on the Prime Minister of India. With the wisdom of hindsight, it must be said that even though Pandit Nehru opposed the Two-Nation Theory in principle, he was beset by too much of guilt about the Muslim majority nature of Jammu and Kashmir. Besides, the Kashmiri Pandit and Dogra elites were also quite possessive about the State Subject Rule introduced by Maharaja Hari Singh in 1927 under elite pressure. As was evidenced later, the democratic Prime Minister agreed to introduce measures in a State that he regarded as virtually his home state even though it would work against the masses and would protect elite interests. His well-known opposition to feudalism was nowhere to be seen when it came to Jammu and Kashmir. This very Article was later used to introduce protectionist and discriminatory provisions against West Punjab refugees, Dalits, Gorkhas, tribals, women and against Indian citizens. It was also used to block many laws of the Union from J&K, including the Delimitation Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The net operation of this Article was to perpetuate elite rule and increase the feeling of separatism in the Valley. It also allowed the majority of Muslims to monopolise the state power in a way that the Hindu population had to live in constant dread. Sheikh Abdullah is best described by Joseph Corbell, a member of the UN Commission on India and Pakistan, in his 1954 book, Danger in Kashmir : In May 1949 Sheikh Abdullah had assured Jawaharlal Nehru that ‘I want you to believe that Kashmir is yours. No power in the world can separate us. Every Kashmiri feels that he is an Indian and India is his motherland’. From time to time he made a repeated mention about the total independence of Kashmir and on other occasions he announced that the idea of independence was not practicable. In 1952 he declared that ‘our state is neither under the legal domination of the Indian Parliament nor that of any Parliament from outside the state. India or Pakistan, any country cannot be a spike in our wheel of progress’. After some days he described Kashmir as such a bridge between India and Pakistan that can

unite the two in one country. Two days later he said that the relations between Pakistan and India were strong and stable and no power on the earth can separate us. Again he announced that ‘Kashmir's existence does not depend on India's money, trade or security forces and he does not attach any importance to the strings of Indian assistance. He cannot be forced to stoop by threats’. The fact is that[,] he[,] while raising Kashmir, step by step, carried it far away from India. One of his political rivals has described him as communal in Kashmir, communist in Jammu and a nationalist in India . [emphasis added]

References 65

UN Security Council. Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/ doc/47

(accessed on 28 February 2020). 66

Appendix 8.

CHAPTER 27

The Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly electio ns to the Constituent Assembly of J&K took place in T he 1951. The Election Commission’s writ did not run in J&K as all the provisions of the Constitution of India had not been extended to the State in the Presidential Order, 1950, that was promulgated along with the promulgation of the Constitution of India. In this first Presidential Order under Article 370, 235 articles of the Indian Constitution were inapplicable to the state of Jammu & Kashmir, nine were partially applicable, and 29 were applicable in a modified form. The September–October 1951 Constituent Assembly elections were an exercise in great farce. In a rather improbable feat that reminded one of the elections in communist countries, National Conference won all 75 seats, 73 of them unopposed. The opposition Muslim Conference and Jammu Praja Parishad were either not allowed to file nominations, or in the few cases they were able to file nominations, they were rejected. The J&K Election and Franchise Commissioner did a fine job. Worse was that the paragon of democratic virtue, the Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, actually defended this. Always more concerned about international opinion than domestic rectitude, he defended these events by saying that J&K politics

revolved around personalities, and ‘there is no material for democracy here’. Sheikh Abdullah became more and more difficult to deal with after he gained this 100% majority. Soon afterwards, he prevailed upon the Government of India to promulgate the Presidential Order, 1952, by which the Maharaja was replaced by Sadr-i-Riyasat, but the nomenclature of Prime Minister remained. The background of this was that the Assembly set up a Basic Principles Committee, which recommended abolition of the monarchy. The Assembly approved the recommendation on 12 June 1952. At the same time, the Jammu Praja Parishad demanded the full extension of the Constitution of India to Jammu and Kashmir. The Praja Parishad was also agitating against the draconian Land Reforms without compensation, a unique legislation by Sheikh Abdullah. The conflict was resolved by the 1952 Delhi Agreement between delegations from J&K and the Union of India. Sheikh Abdullah did not do much towards implementing the agreement. Instead, in August 1952, the Assembly adopted a resolution abolishing the monarchy and replacing it by a Sadr-i-Riyasat appointed on the recommendation of the Assembly. Yet, Delhi once again bent over backwards in accommodating Sheikh Abdullah and promulgated the Presidential Order, 1952, on 15 November 1952. The Order replaced the phrase ‘recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir’ by ‘recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadr-i-Riyasat’. The surrender to Sheikh Abdullah was now near-total. As is nearly always the case, appeasement never results in gratitude. It only breeds contempt for the appeaser in the appeased. Once Sheikh Abdullah had succeeded in having his way, he became ever more imperious. He started having dreams of independence. The Praja Parishad agitation had a final denouement in Shyama Prasad Mukherjee getting arrested in May 1953. The entire country erupted in anger. Yet, Pandit Nehru was not able to get him shifted to a jail in Delhi from Jammu, such was his helplessness. The Prime Minister of India even visited Srinagar in May 1953, only to be

rebuffed by Sheikh Abdullah. After his return to Delhi, he even sent Maulana Azad to Srinagar to get Sheikh Abdullah on the right path. Finally, Mukherjee died in custody on 23 June, and even Jawaharlal Nehru had to abandon his friendship with Sheikh Abdullah—a onesided friendship in which only Sheikh Abdullah was the beneficiary, and the Indian Union the loser—and had to dismiss him and arrest him on 8 August 1953. The ostensible reason was the loss ofconfidence of the cabinet, a weak reason but even that could pass muster in those days. It also brought to fore the dithering that marked the six years in which Sheikh Abdullah actively mocked, subverted, misused and held to ransom the Indian Union. The then Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, B.N. Malik, has lifted the curtain from this in his book Chinese Betrayal : My Years with Nehru (1971). He writes: Then suddenly to our utter surprise Pandit Nehru started talking bitterly against Sheikh Abdullah's communalism. He traced the Sheikh's history from 1930 onwards and mentioned how he had started his career with the Muslim Conference, which was an out and out communal organisation. He said that as a result of pressures from outside and also seeing the development of the People's Movement in the rest of India and for purely tactical reasons and probably under the advice of some of his more liberal followers, the Sheikh had converted the Muslim Conference into the National Conference to give it a non-communal appearance. At this time Pandit Nehru suddenly looked at me and enquired whether I had come across some information of possible British connivance in that movement. I replied in the affirmative. He continued his talk against the Sheikh and mentioned all his communal activities throughout the period he had acted as the National Conference leader. It was the Pakistani aggression which had mellowed him a little for a short time, because the tribals had committed gruesome atrocities on the Muslim population in the valley. But, as soon as he became the Prime Minister, he came out in his true colours once again and started his antiHindu activities. In contrast, he praised Bakshi and Sadiq for their completely noncommunal outlook and said that these two were really secular-minded persons who required all support from India. Pt. Nehru said that all trouble in Kashmir was due to the Sheikh's communal outlook and it was he who was not allowing the state to settle down to peace and stability. The Sheikh always talked about the rights of the Muslims, forgetting that the Hindus also formed nearly 35 per cent of the population of the state … communalism was a disease with him and he could never get rid of it and his entire outlook and behaviour were based on the fact that Kashmir Valley had a Muslim majority. Therefore, he was not at all surprised that the Sheikh had conspired with Pakistan to overthrow the non-communal and secular Government of Bakshi and Sadiq. What Pt Nehru said was factually correct and was similar to what Sardar Patel had stressed to me in 1949…. What

would one describe this as? Naïveté? Incompetence? Idealism? Whatever it might have been, the result for India was disastrous.

Once Sheikh Abdullah had been detained, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was made the Prime Minister. Though the immediate threat of Kashmir going away from the Indian Union had receded, it still did not occur to the Indian leadership that Article 370 was at the centre of the separatism in the Valley, and they should heed what Shyama Prasad Mukherjee had been saying, and what the Jammu nationalists like Pandit Prem Nath Dogra were saying all along.

CHAPTER 28

The Presidential Order, 1954 and Article 35A would have thought that the perfidy of Sheikh Abdullah would O ne have taught a lesson to the Indian leadership, which they would have imbibed. However, it was soon apparent that nothing of that sort had happened. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad presided over the same assembly that comprised 75 out of 75 National Conference members. The Shari’a-indoctrinated Muslim leadership of the Kashmir Valley continued to play the duplicitous role that it had been playing since the days of the Maharaja. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad managed to convince the Indian leadership that he was indeed secular in his outlook. He kept Sheikh Abdullah in detention for more than four years, and even when he was released in 1958, he managed to gather enough evidence of conspiring with Pakistan against him that Pandit Nehru had to acquiesce to Sheikh’s re-arrest. He and Mirza Afzal Beg, along with several other members of the National Conference, were charged under the famous Kashmir Conspiracy Case (1958). In the meantime, Bakshi was able to convince the Indian leadership of the need for maintaining a separate Constitution for J&K, and not just this, he was even able to get the Constitution amended through the Presidential Order, 1954, 67 and to have an Article 35A included in the Constitution as an Appendix. It was a

flagrant abuse of the Constitutional process. Even the President, Dr Rajendra Prasad objected to it, but Pandit Nehru had his way. Ostensibly, the Presidential Order, 1954, was promulgated to implement the Delhi Agreement of 1952. However, when the source is sullied, the stream is bound to be polluted. Large-scale exemptions from certain Fundamental Rights, important laws of the country and a pernicious State Subject Rule (initially brought in by the Maharaja in 1927) introduced through the Presidential Order, 1954, and later backdated to 1944, were all implemented in a way to discriminate against the Hindu minority of J&K. The special expertise of the Muslim community, playing victim to extract unequal privileges, was in full evidence in J&K. The major provisions were as follows: 1.

Indian citizenship was extended to the ‘permanent residents’ of Jammu and Kashmir (formerly called ‘state subjects’). Simultaneously, Article 35A was added to the Constitution, empowering the state legislature to legislate on the privileges of permanent residents concerning immovable property, settlement in the state and employment. 2. The Fundamental Rights of the Indian Constitution were extended to the state. However, the State Legislature was empowered to legislate on preventive detention for internal security. The State's land reform legislation (which acquired land without compensation) was also protected. 3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India was extended to the state. 4. The Central Government was given the power to declare a national emergency in the event of external aggression. However, its power to do so for internal disturbances could be exercised only with the concurrence of the State Government. Also, the following provisions, which were not previously decided in the Delhi Agreement, were implemented: 1.

Financial relations between the Centre and the State were placed on the same footing as the other states. The state’s

custom duties were abolished. 2. Decisions affecting the disposition of the state could be made by the Central Government, but only with the consent of the State Government. However, the sweep of the Presidential Order was enormous. It amended 17 parts of the Constitution and inserted Article 35A in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. So much so that, even Article 395 of the Constitution which had repealed the Government of India Act (1935) and the Indian Independence Act (1947) was also omitted. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir 68 was promulgated in 1956, and soon afterwards, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved. However, nothing was done to change the term ‘Constituent Assembly’ in the proviso to Article 370(4) that made it obligatory to get its concurrence before repealing Article 370. Forty-seven more amendments to the 1954 Presidential Order were issued till 1994, with the final Order being issued in 2019. The Presidential Order, 1965 was another major one, which amended Article 267 (Interpretations) to add that references to Sadri-Riyasat were to be construed as references to the Governor. Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, the Prime Minister, became the first Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. He also became the first Head of Government who openly started giving 70% quotas in admissions to Muslims, making it the first instance of its kind in India. In 1964, barely a month before his death, Pandit Nehru was so unnerved by the disturbances in the Valley over the Prophet’s hair going missing from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar that he resorted to his favourite appeasement tactic, and released Sheikh Abdullah from detention. Sheikh, as was his favourite pastime, once again started playing his double game. His seditious speeches continued, but the setbacks to Pakistan in the Operation Gibraltar (1965) and the Operation Grand Slam (1965) were a disappointment to him. From 26 December 1962 to 16 May 1963, India and Pakistan held talks on ‘Kashmir and related matters’, in which India offered to cede 1500 sq miles more to Pakistan to convert the cease-fire line

(CFL) to an international border and accept a permanent partition of J&K. Talks broke down when Bhutto suggested that India should be satisfied with just the Kathua district of Jammu, with the rest of the Valley, Jammu and Ladakh going to Pakistan! 69 Dr Karan Singh suggested, at the time of reorganisation of Punjab, that Jammu may be merged with Himachal Pradesh, Ladakh be made a Union Territory (UT), and Kashmir be a separate state. It was opposed by both Jan Sangh and Valley politicians. 70 After the 1971 war, the Sheikh promptly changed his tune. Opportunist as he was, he did not see any hope from Pakistan in the changed scenario, and suddenly started talking the language of a nationalist. In 1974, Indira Gandhi brought him back as the Chief Minister. He utilised his reign to groom his son, Farooq Abdullah, as his political heir. Farooq Abdullah became the Chief Minister in 1982. His brother-in-law, Ghulam Mohammad Shah, brought him down in 1984, and then went on to run one of the most communal governments in the history of Kashmir, even by Kashmir standards. The 1986 riots in South Kashmir, often said to be his handiwork, were the immediate seeds that led to the tragedy of 1989. References 67 Appendix 9. 68 Appendix 9. 69 Dr Karan Singh mentions it in Karan Singh Autobiography , Oxford University Press (1982). This book was first published as ‘Heir Apparent’. 70 Ibid.

CHAPTER 29

Constitutional Challenges The Presidential Orders and amendments to the Constitution by way of Presidential Orders, bypassing the Parliament, have been the subject of many a legal battle. We will discuss some of these cases in this chapter. It is important to know these judgements, because, it is only based on these judgements that the final nullification of Article 370 was done through the Presidential Order, 2019. The important Judgements are: 1.

P.L. Lakhanpal v. the State of J&K, AIR 1956 SC 197;

2. 3.

Prem Nath Kaul v. the State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749; Puranlal Lakhanpal v. President of India, AIR 1961 SC 1519; 4. Sampat Prakash v. the State of J&K, AIR 1970 SC 1118; 5. Mohd Maqbool Damnoo v. State of J&K, AIR 1972 SC 963. These five Constitutional Bench Judgements sum up the constitutional position as settled by the Supreme Court of India in respect of Jammu and Kashmir. Let us take a look at the pronouncement with respect to the position of Article 35A, also referred to as Article 35(c) in the various judgements. The amendment to Article 35 makes fine reading: (i) In Article 35 — (i) references to the commencement of the Constitution shall be construed as references to the commencement of this Order; (ii) in clause (a) (i), the words, figures and brackets ‘clause (3) of Article 16, clause (3) of

Article 32’ shall be omitted; and (iii) after clause (b), the following clause shall be added, namely; — '(c) no law with respect to preventive detention made by the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, whether before or after the commencement of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Part, but any such law shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, cease to have an effect on the expiration of five years from the commencement of the said Order, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof’. (j) After Article 35, the following new article shall be added, namely: — 35A. Saving of laws with respect to permanent residents and their rights — Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no existing law in force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and no law hereafter enacted by the Legislature of the State — (a) defining the classes of persons who are, or shall be, permanent residents of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; or (b) conferring on such permanent residents any special rights and privileges or imposing upon other persons any restrictions as respects — (i) employment under the State Government;(ii) acquisition of immovable property in the State; (iii) settlement in the State; or (iv) right to scholarships and such other forms of aid as the State Government may provide, shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any rights conferred on the other citizens of India by any provision of this Part.

A plain reading would be sufficient to tell how this deception had been wrought on the Republic of India. However, as the power was given by the Constitution itself, nothing much could be done. All the judgements cited above upheld the power to amend the Constitution by way of Presidential Orders. A five-judge bench headed by Chief Justice Hidayatullah delivered a definitive judgement on the Presidential Order, 1954, discussing inter alia, the twin Lakhanpal Judgements: 71 14.

It was also urged that the power of making modifications and exceptions in

the orders made under Article 370(1)(d) should at least be limited to making minor alterations and should not cover the power to practically abrogate an article of the Constitution applied in that State. That submission is clearly without force. The challenge to the validity of Article 35(c) introduced in the Constitution as applied to Jammu & Kashmir on this ground was repelled by this Court in P.L. Lakhanpal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir. Subsequently, the scope of the powers of making exceptions and modifications was examined in greater details by this Court in Puranlal Lakhanpal

v. President of India. Dealing with the scope of the word

‘modification’ as used in Article 370(1), the Court held: ‘But, in the present case, we have to find out the meaning of the word “modification” used in Article 370(1) in the context of the Constitution. As we have

said already, the object behind enacting Article 370(1) was to recognise the special position of the State of Jammu & Kashmir and to provide for that special position by giving power to the President to apply the provisions of the Constitution to that State with such exceptions and modifications as the President might by order specify. We have already pointed out that the power to make exceptions implies that the President can provide that a particular provision of the Constitution would not apply to that State. If therefore, the power is given to the President to efface in effect any provision of the Constitution altogether in its application to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, it seems that when he is also given the power to make modifications that power should be considered in its widest possible amplitude. If he could efface a particular provision of the Constitution altogether in its application to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, we see no reason to think that the Constitution did not intend that he should have the power to amend a particular provision in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It seems to us that when the Constitution used the word “modification” in Article 370(1), the intention was that the President would have the power to amend the provisions of the Constitution if he so thought fit in their application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.’ Proceeding further, and after discussing the meaning of the word ‘modify’, the Court held: ‘Thus, in law, the word “modify” may just mean “vary” i.e. amend, and when Article 370(1) says that the President may apply the provisions of the Constitution to the State of Jammu & Kashmir with such modifications as he may by order specify, it means that he may vary (i.e. amend) the provisions of the Constitution in its application to the State of Jammu & Kashmir. We are, therefore, of opinion that in the context of the Constitution we must give the widest effect to the meaning of the word ‘modification’ used in Article 370(1) and in that sense it includes an amendment. There is no reason to limit the word ‘modifications’ as used in Article 370(1) only to such modifications as do not make any radical transformation.’ This decision being binding on us, it is not possible to accept the submission urged by counsel. 15.

Lastly, it was argued that the modifications made in Article 35(c) by the

Constitution (Application to Jammu & Kashmir) Orders of 1959 and 1964 had the effect of abridging the fundamental right of the citizens of Kashmir under Article 22 and other articles contained in Part III after they had already been applied to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, and an order of the President under Article 370 being in the nature of law, it would be void under Article 13 of the Constitution. Article 35(c) as originally introduced in the Constitution as applied to Jammu & Kashmir laid down that no law with respect to preventive detention made by the legislature of that State could be declared void on the ground of inconsistency with any of the provisions of Part III, with the qualification that such a law to the extent of the inconsistency was to cease to have effect after a period of five years. This means that, under clause (c) of Article 35, immunity was granted to the preventive laws made by the State Legislature completely, though the life of the inconsistent

provisions was limited to a period of five years. The extension of that life from five to ten years and ten to fifteen years cannot, in these circumstances, be held to be an abridgement of any Fundamental Right, as the Fundamental Rights were already made inapplicable to the preventive detention law. On the other hand, if the substance of this provision is examined, the proper interpretation would be to hold that, as a result of Article 35(c), the applicability of the provisions of Part III for the purpose of judging the validity of a law relating to preventive detention made by the State legislature was postponed for a period of five years, during which the law could not be declared void. As already stated, Article 370(1)(d), in terms, provides for the application of the provisions of the Constitution other than Articles 1 and 370 in relation to Jammu & Kashmir with such exceptions and modifications as President may by order specify. It was not disputed that the Presidential Order of 1954, by which immunity for a period of five years was given to the State is preventive detention law from challenge on the ground of its being inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution was validly made under, and in conformity with clause (d) of Article 370(1). We have already held that the power to modify in clause (d) also includes the power to subsequently vary, alter, add to or rescind such an order by reason of the applicability of the rule of interpretation laid down in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. If the Order of 1954 is not invalid on the ground of infringement or abridgement of Fundamental Rights under Part III, it is difficult to appreciate how extension of period of immunity made by subsequent amendments can be said to be invalid as constituting an infringement or abridgement of any of the provisions of Part III. The object of the subsequent Orders of 1959 and 1964 was to extend the period of protection to the preventive detention law and not to infringe or abridge the Fundamental Rights, though the result of the extension is that a detenu cannot, during the period of protection, challenge the law on the ground of its being inconsistent with Article 22. Such extension is justified prima facie by the exceptional state of affairs which continue to exist as before. 16.

The provision made in Article 35(c) has the effect that the validity of the Act

cannot be challenged on the ground that any of the provisions of the Act are inconsistent with Article 22 of the Constitution. 17. As a result the grounds taken to challenge the validity of the Act fail and are rejected. The petition will now be set down for hearing arguments, if any, on the facts of the case.

References

71 Extract from Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K (1969) 2 SCR 365: AIR 1970 SC 1118.

CHAPTER 30

The Presidential Order, 1965 is important to understand the above ratio of this judgement in the I tSampat Prakash case (Chapter 29) to understand how it was utilised to nullify Article 370 by using Article 370 itself. Another judgement ‘Mohd Maqbool Damnoo v. State of J&K’ upheld the amendment of Article 367 of the Constitution of India using Article 370, by which the interpretation of Sadr-i-Riyasat was amended to mean Governor. The judgement held: On April 10, 1965, J ammu and Kashmir Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1965 received the assent of the Sadar-i- Riyasat. On November 24, 1965, the President, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 370 of the Constitution, with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, made the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Second Amendment Order, 1965. Under this Order, for sub-cl. (b) of cl. (4) of Article 367 the following clauses were inserted’ (aa) references to the person for the time being recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office, shall be construed as references to the Governor of Jammu & Kashmir; (b) references to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers;

Provided that in respect of any period prior to the 10th day of April, 1965, such references shall be construed as including references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers.’ The main point of dispute between the parties is the position, and importance of the Explanation in Article 370 of the Constitution. According to the Attorney-General this is a mere definition inserted for the purpose of the article in accordance with the constitutional conditions prevailing at that time. According to Mr Garg, this is the kingpin of the whole relationship between the Union of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir. According to him neither the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly nor the President were competent to impair the functioning of the Sadar-i-Riyasat and insofar as the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1965 replaced the Sadar-i-Riyasat by the Governor it is ultra-vires. According to him, either there has to be an amendment of the Constitution of India under Article 369 and Article 370(3) or a fresh Constituent Assembly has to be convened to amend the Explanation. He said that if the text of the Constitution is explicit, effect must be given to it and it is not the duty of the Courts to improve upon the Constitution because the constitutionmakers had not anticipated such a change. It seems to us that the essential feature of Article 370, sub- clauses l(b) and (d) is the necessity of concurrence of the State Government or the consultation of the State Government. What the State Government is at a particular time has to be determined in the context of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The Explanation did no more than recognise the constitutional position, as it existed on that date and the Explanation, as substituted from November 17, 1952, also did no more than recognise the constitutional position in the State. We have, therefore, no difficulty in holding that Article 370(1) (b) and Article 370(1)(d) place no limitation on the framing or amendment of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. If there is a limitation it must be found in the Constitution of the State. Section 147 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir itself provides that under that section the Indian Constitution cannot be amended. The learned counsel, relying on Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1) contended that the only way of modifying Article 370 is specified in Article 370(3) itself. He said that this was (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R.365 expressly laid down by this Court in the decision just referred to. We are not concerned with the question whether Article 370(3) can now be utilised to amend the provisions of Article 370(1) and (2), and therefore we do not express any opinion on that point. We are now not concerned with an amendment of Article 370(1). We are concerned with the situation where the explanation ceased to operate. It had ceased to operate because there is no longer any sadar-i-riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir. If the definition contained in the Explanation cannot apply to the words ‘government of the State’ then the meaning given in Article 367(4), as amended, will have to be given to it. If this meaning is given, it is quite clear that the Governor is competent to give the concurrence stipulated in Article 370 and perform other functions laid down by the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution.’

The Mohd Maqbool case put paid to all further challenges to Presidential Orders, and the power of the President to amend the Constitution without reference to the Parliament in respect of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, which engaged in a long tussle with the Executive over the absolute power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was much more lenient with the Executive concerning the absolute powers wielded by it under Article 370. The Governor being the ‘Government of the State’ clause was skillfully used to accomplish nullification of Article 370, because the case-law allowed it, possibly, as the only way out. Above all, the conclusion is inescapable that what was being done in Jammu and Kashmir in the name of constitutionalism was a travesty of democracy.

CHAPTER 31

Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah and the Family of the abiding mysteries of modern Indian history is the O ne incredible failure to build upon the gains of the 1971 war— despite the formidable Indira Gandhi being in command. The 1971 war was the empirical blow to the much- vaunted TwoNation Theory and the ummat of the ‘Muslim Nation’. However, the way India went about negotiating the Simla Agreement (1972), betrayed the same weakness in India’s national character that H.V. Seshadri had mentioned—‘acquiescence, assent, cajolery, concessions, cowardice, self-reproach, and surrender’. 72 Here was an opportunity of a lifetime to settle the Kashmir issue, defang the sworn enemy and insulate India from any further mischief. We had 93,000 of their men with us. We had the option of trying them for war crimes in Bangladesh. We had the even better option of handing over nearly all their officers to Bangladesh for war crimes. I am given to understand that Bangladesh wanted this. However, it was not Pakistan that succumbed. The pressure on Pakistan was real. Ninety-three thousand Momins in Kafir detention was a situation without a parallel in Islamic history. Pakistan was not just demoralised, but traumatised. We had 5,000 sq km of their territory in our occupation in areas other than J&K. Yet, we could not gain anything. Pakistan had killed three

million people in East Pakistan/Bangladesh, most of them Hindus. But we could not bring ourselves to put pressure on them. Instead, we applied imaginary pressure on ourselves. International pressure to bail out Pakistan was there, as would be the case most times. The Soviet Union and the United States of America would not have been interested in a complete break-up of Pakistan military, but that was only to be expected. For any country, the long-term national interest is paramount. In the end, all the gains on the battlefield won with the blood and sweat of our soldiers were gifted away on the vague promise of bilateralism. The cease-fire line was converted into Line of Actual Control, giving a psychological victory to Pakistan. Secularism and socialism can be a deadly cocktail if foreign policy is not actuated by long-term national interests. The Simla accord had the additional demerit of providing a breather to the Pakistan Army. The army that had been consigned to barracks was out again and let loose against the Baloch nationalists. India was in a position to seek demilitarisation, and even seek a cap on any future nuclear programme of Pakistan. It was not to be, as the leaders had little idea of the long term. Indian secular leadership has been handicapped by a complete lack of knowledge about Islam, its history, its theology and its aspirations. Right from the blunder made by Mahatma Gandhi in joining the Khilafat movement, this has been in evidence. This is also the reason that the Muslim leadership, whether moderate or fundamentalist, is very comfortable with Hindu seculars, as they know that they can be easily made fool of, sent on a guilt trip, and influenced with a fake show of victimhood. This charade has played on and on and on, and is still going on, among the great seculars of India. As if all this was not enough, Sheikh Abdullah was resurrected again in 1974. The Indira–Sheikh accord paved the way for Sheikh Abdullah to become Chief Minister again. He continued as Chief Minister till his death in 1982. It is intriguing how gullible Indian nationalist politicians can be. One is reminded of H.V. Seshadri again and again. They seem to crawl before anti-national politicians

where even the least acquiescence is not required. That an antinational Sheikh Abdullah, who had remained under detention for nearly 17 years at different times under the previous three Prime Ministers, could suddenly wash off his sins and become secular in the eyes of the national leadership is one of those tales that we have seen unfolding in Jammu and Kashmir ever so often. Sheikh Abdullah, the wily forked-tongue politician that he was, had not lost any of his Islamising zeal. He planned to have an exclusively Muslim Kashmir and create a Muslim majority in Jammu as well. He introduced the famous Resettlement Bill, 1982, 73 that would allow Muslims from the other side of the border to come and freely settle—in the Jammu region. He was the person who settled the Tibetan Muslims in Ladakh and not in the Valley. For Sheikh Abdullah, Islam was everything—beginning, middle and end. The Governor rejected the Resettlement Bill. Sheikh Abdullah passed away in 1982. His son, Farooq Abdullah ascended to the Chief Ministership of Jammu and Kashmir. This, however, created a rift in the family. Sheikh’s son-in- law was Ghulam Mohammad Shah or just Gulshah, and he felt that he should have been the rightful heir to the family throne. Sheikh Abdullah had encouraged a secessionist organisation ‘Al Fatah’ during this part of his rule—between 1974–82. He released 30 hardcore militants of this organisation by withdrawing sedition charges against them. Sheikh Abdullah had perfected a style of politicking that relied on incitement of easily provoked religious feelings among Muslims. For him, neither India nor Pakistan nor even Kashmir was important. Power was his only goal. He also bequeathed this trait to posterity, as would be evidenced later in his son, son-in-law and grandson. Meanwhile, another momentous event had taken place in neighbouring Pakistan. In 1977, Z.A. Bhutto was deposed by General Zia-ul-Haq and later hanged. General Zia-ul- Haq inaugurated a Martial Law regime that became hyper- Islamic. For all its Barelvi support, the Pakistan Establishment (the Military– Bureaucracy–Landlord combine) was quite Western in its attitude and used the Islam card to keep the public fooled. Deobandis gained

over Barelvis in the ‘New Medina’ of Pakistan. The Islam card also helped in oppressing the minorities, who were always the ‘other’ in the Islamic country. With Zia-ul-Haq, an overt process of Islamisation was kick-started. The General introduced Shari’a Law in many aspects of Pakistani society and won the Mullahs to his side. He also inaugurated the ‘thousand cuts’ strategy to bleed India, as he thought it was neither wise nor beneficial to have a direct war with India. Kashmir was to become the fulcrum of this new strategy of his. References 72

See Chapter 1.

73 Enacted as The Jammu & Kashmir Grant of Permit for Resettlement in (or Permanent Return to) the State Act 1982 .

CHAPTER 32

Political Chicanery and the Beginning of the Kashmir Jihad pointed out the nature of secular politics in India over and I have over again. They are the best suckers for any non- Hindu fundamentalist organisation to have. The free run granted to the various fundamentalist organisations and individuals bears testimony to this uncomfortable truth. Deoband, Bareilly, Tablighi, All India Muslim Personal Law Board, Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir, JKLF and Verrier Elwin of the North-East fame are all examples of this selfdelusional politics of Indian leaders, from all parties. This would be in evidence again as the region underwent a major churn when the Soviet Union invaded and took over Afghanistan. General Zia-ul-Haq was quick to seize upon the opportunity. He dangled before the US the bait of using jihad to win back Afghanistan from the Soviets. The US took the bait and General Zia made Pakistan the jihad factory for the region. The US funded and sponsored this jihad, and also turned a blind eye towards the nuclear proliferation activities of Pakistan. The Pakistan Army by now had turned into a fully indoctrinated army by itself. Sporting the Islamic motto of ‘ Ima’n, Taqwa, Jihad-fi-sabilillah ’ (Faith, Trust and Jihad in the way of Allah), it threw itself with gusto into the Afghan theatre. The Pakistan Army had developed a doctrine of ‘strategic depth’. It was a defensive doctrine. The Pakistan Army has always felt that the depth of the country was insufficient in case of a full-fledged war

with India. In its northern part, the distance between its Indian border in the east and its Afghanistan border in the west, is not more than 400 km anywhere, while being as little as 250 km at its narrowest. So, a doctrine was developed that Afghanistan should always be under Pakistani influence so that the Pakistan Army may withdraw there in case of emergency. This quest of ‘strategic depth’ has distorted its military vision significantly, and has caused it to overreach and underperform. Zia also found the Kashmiri leadership foolish enough and Islamist enough to make them start accepting the Pakistani overtures. Farooq Abdullah became the Chief Minister of J&K in September 1982 after Sheikh Abdullah’s death. He had no idea of politics and even less idea of Kashmir. He had done his medicine course from Jaipur, lived most of his life in London, and even acquired British citizenship. He was friendly with the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and many secessionists in London, and was patronising towards them. He had good contacts with JKLF’s Amanullah Khan, Hashim Qureshi and even Maqbool Butt. Infiltration from Pakistan began during this period. Farooq Abdullah kept his eyes closed. His major effort was directed at remaining in the good books of Indira Gandhi. Pakistan had already stoked the embers of insurgency in Punjab. Bhindranwale was being supplied with arms and ammunition by Pakistan. In 1983, Pakistan started concentrating on Kashmir Valley also. The Awami Action Committee headed by the then Mirwaiz, Maulvi Farooq was assiduously wooed and courted by Farooq Abdullah. This made the situation worse. It was during this period that infiltrators even found their way to government jobs. The West Indies–India match on 13 October 1983 was the first big indicator, but nobody took cognisance of the indications that were present in full public view. It was the first ever international match in Srinagar. What happened on that day is somewhat similar to what happened in Shaheen Bagh the other day. The crowd was not merely hooting the Indians, but also shouting pro-Pakistan slogans.

Sunil Gavaskar later wrote in Runs ’n’ Ruins : ‘Being hooted at after a defeat is understandable, but this was incredible. Moreover, there were many in the crowd shouting pro-Pakistan slogans which confounded us, because we were playing the West Indies and not Pakistan.’ This was only to be expected because the Chief Minister had remained silent even when Pakistan flags were hoisted in his presence in an event at Bakshi Stadium in Srinagar; police arrested the offenders, but he got the accused released. On 26 January 1984, a call to observe ‘Black Day’ was given. The then Governor, Jagmohan, has described the situation in his book 74 ‘My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir’ (1992) in the following words: The call for observing January 26, 1984 as a black day evoked full response and total hartal was observed. Communal, narrow minded and subversive elements are getting more active and the administration losing its grip. Neither the National Conference (Farooq) nor any other party has any interest in facing this challenge on the political level. The heavy quantities of arms and ammunition smuggled from across the border are yet to be recovered. The local intelligence sources are not proving as much competent as is needed during such eventualities. Besides this, the subversive elements have clear support from a major section of the politicians, especially those elements who are connected with Jamaat- e-Islami, Peoples' Conference, Peoples' League and Mahaz-i-Azadi.

Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir (JIJK) needs a special mention here. This group is now different from Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. The founder of the original JIH was Abu Ala Maududi of Hyderabad, who migrated to Pakistan and became influential among the nonBarelvi groups. JIJK took inspiration from Maududi and constituted itself as a separate group in J&K, even though it had been established as a branch of the JIH. Headquartered in Shopian, this outfit is the one that bears the maximum responsibility for the radicalisation of South Kashmir. Though wearing the mask of Sufism, JIJK bridged the gap between separatism and radicalism. They did, however, succeed in bringing all the factions—Sufis, Ahl-i-Hadis, Shi’a and Deobandi—under their umbrella. They brought Deobandi madrasa teachers into South Kashmir. This brood did much to radicalise the Kashmiri youth. How the Indian state failed to curtail its

menace is evident from the fact that JIJK never attracted any coercive measure until 28 February 2019 when it was banned. It was a founder member of the Hurriyat Conference. After the horrific spectacle of Black Day on 26 January 1984, and the intelligence reports that Farooq Abdullah had facilitated setting up of four training camps for Punjab terrorists, Indira Gandhi became upset with Farooq. Soon after Operation Bluestar in June 1984, she turned her attention towards J&K. His brother-in-law, Ghulam Mohammad Shah, rebelled and walked out of the National Conference with 12 MLAs. Congress supported him to form a government. He continued to rule till 1986 when the Rajiv–Farooq Accord enabled Farooq Abdullah to become Chief Minister again. Gulshah (as Ghulam Mohammad Shah was popularly known) turned out to be worse. It appears that every Kashmiri politician is convinced that the route to power lies only through Islamic radicalisation. Accordingly, Gulshah inaugurated a new chapter in Islamisation of the State; he built a mosque in the Civil Secretariat, throwing the entire Jammu region into agitation. He conspired with the separatists, and targeting of Hindus began in right earnest. The extent of his communal mindset can be gauged from one of his speeches reported in the newspapers, as excerpted from the 1986 National Conference Pamphlet ‘Why Governor’s Rule is Required’: I had to face 20 difficulties in my 20-month rule[.] I accompanied President Venkatraman to Vaishno Devi pilgrimage. There the President offered prayers according to his religion and the priest of the Shrine applied Tilak on his forehead. When he approached me with Tilak I stopped him and told him: ‘I am a Muslim and my religion does not permit application of Tilak on the forehead.’ I was invited to attend the Dussera festival. I had been told in my childhood that this festival and function is not in line with our religious principle. That is why I refused to attend the function.

In February 1986, locks of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya were opened. On 20 February, Gulshah came back to Srinagar, having been chased away by the agitation in Jammu. The agitation demolished the Shah Masjid in the Civil Secretariat in Jammu. Shah mobilised the radical elements and the first organised anti-Hindu riot took place in the Valley in February 1986, virtually under the

directions of Gulshah. More than 500 Hindus found themselves on the streets as they were forcibly evicted from their homes. Many had to leave the Valley. This was to be a precursor for the events that were to follow later. This led to the Gulshah government being dismissed in March 1986. The worst period for Kashmiri Hindus was just about beginning. References 74 Jagmohan. 1992. My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir . Allied Publishers Ltd.

CHAPTER 33

End of Afghan War and the 7th Exodus of the Pandits is often said that rigging of the 1987 elections was the trigger for I tinsurgency in Kashmir. This theory has too many loopholes. For one, Farooq Abdullah was fully complicit with the separatists, secessionists and the insurgents. As a hedonist, he never had enough time for administering the state. He was enjoying a motorbike ride with Zeenat Aman in Sopore when the plan for his ouster was being given final touches in Srinagar in 1984. So, the pandering to the separatists continued unabated. This is what Hindustan Times had to say on 17 December 1986: The powerful National Conference, which claims to have its workers in all the villages of the Valley, has pitiably failed to face terrorism and violence during the last two years. When the terrorists arrived on the scene, party workers, instead of campaigning against them and of mobilising public opinion against them, preferred to remain inactive and allowed the situation to take its own course. This is the reason for the support the terrorists got from villages and towns. Besides this, the inactive administration allowed the situation to deteriorate. The Chief Minister delivered bold speeches before the public calling for an end to violence and the arrest of disruptionists. But all this proved fruitless. During the last two years about 100 people have been killed by militants and the police. Even before the 1983 elections, there was a charge against the Government of Jammu and Kashmir that it had recruited many youths in[to] the police who had links with the militant organisation ‘Al Fatah’.

The Muslim United Front that challenged Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference was not an innocent organisation. It simply

went beyond the soft separatism of the National Conference. Instead of protecting Article 370 and a separate flag and a separate Constitution, it espoused the rule of Shari’a and Sunnat—by Islamic Law and having Nizam-e-Mustafa, the ideal reign of Prophet Muhammad. It simply translates into a second-class subservient status for all non-Muslims. The reply from Farooq was not the reply of a nationalist—it simply proclaimed that Farooq was a bigger Islamist than the Front. There are so many takers for the theory that the youth migrated in large numbers after the polls were rigged in favour of Farooq Abdullah. It is wrong on two counts. First, there had never been an election in the Valley that had not been rigged. Till 1967, as many as 39 seats had been won without a contest. In 1977, Sheikh Abdullah presided over another rigged election. Till 2002, not a single election had taken place in J&K that had not been rigged. So, this was no reason for it to become a trigger. Second, the exfiltration and infiltration had started during the first stint of Farooq Abdullah with his passive or active connivance; so there was nothing unusual about youth going to Pakistan to receive arms training. The Pakistan Army had become free from Afghanistan, so it simply set up more centres from early 1989 onwards. After Farooq Abdullah became the Chief Minister for the third time, the jihadis won the Soviet–Afghan war in February 1989. This was a great morale booster for the Islamists of the region. This was also a time when the Rajiv Gandhi government in Delhi had started losing legitimacy. Once the jihadis became free from Afghanistan, Pakistan redeployed them in Kashmir. The morale of the separatists and terrorists was on a new high after the victory of jihad against the mighty Soviet Union. Pakistan felt encouraged to try the same tactic in Kashmir. The Farooq Abdullah government was allowing a full run to the infiltrators and separatists. Every wing of the government was infiltrated with Pakistan sympathisers. Twelve dreaded terrorists escaped from the Srinagar Central Jail with the active connivance of authorities. Besides, Farooq Abdullah let free another 70 separatists. Almost the entire population was in the grip of the frenzy of jihad.

The Kashmiri Pandits and Hindus were labelled as enemy agents. The Doordarshan station was openly telecasting the namaz-e-janaza of terrorists. It was in this climate that the terrorists started sending letters to Hindus to leave the Valley. Barbaric killings started soon afterwards. Then the ultimate indignity occurred. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, himself a soft separatist, was made the Home Minister of the newly elected V.P. Singh government on 2 December 1989. Two days later, Rubaiya Sayeed, his elder daughter, was abducted and many top terrorists were released in exchange for her release. Farooq Abdullah was merely watching the events unfold, as if from the sidelines. He had little interest in combating the situation. After all, he was the man who had started it all. Even Sheikh Abdullah’s separatism was more political than criminal. Here was a situation in which every criminal element was given respectability in the name of jihad. It was under these tragic circumstances that Pakistan decided that the time was ripe for it to take over Kashmir by force. It decided upon 26 January 1990 as the date on which the Pakistan flag would be unfurled from Srinagar. Farooq Abdullah simply abdicated. Jagmohan was appointed Governor once again. Even as Jagmohan was taking over as Governor in Jammu on 18 January 1990, there was an orchestrated campaign to drive out the Kashmiri Hindus from the Valley. The famous ‘ Raliv, Chaliv, Galiv ’ (Convert, leave or die) slogans were chanted throughout the night of 18/19 January. Contrary to what is propagated, the majority Muslim population participated in this heinous crime of genocide. Neighbours gave away the locations of their Hindu neighbours. The often-cited tales of Sarita Tikkoo, B.K. Ganjoo and Justice Neelakantha Ganjoo are just the more famous ones. The nearly 2,000 documented murders were all accompanied by extreme barbarism to give a signal to all Kashmiris, and also to the rest of India, that the march of Islam was inevitable. The genocide of Kashmiri Pandits is well documented and widely available. It is not my intention to repeat those events here. It was nothing more than the Pakistani assertion of its ‘New Medina 2.0’

strategy by which it intended to conquer India through salami slicing, Kashmir being just the first outpost. As has been asserted by several strategic experts, even if India were to hand over J&K to Pakistan as a goodwill gesture, it would not abate Pakistani hostility towards India, because Pakistani antipathy towards India is neither territorial nor economic. It is a pure and simple Islamic ideology of global conquest. In other words, it is ‘Ghazwa-e-Hind’—the mythological dream of conquering India as a part of conquering the world—so that the ‘ roz-e-qayamat ’ or the Armageddon leading to the ‘Day of Last Judgment’ could be reached.

CHAPTER 34

Stalemate and the Indian Army, along with other security forces, J agmohan managed to retrieve the situation for India to the extent that a contained insurgency simmered in a well- defined orbit for over 20 years. It managed to suffer four governments, two of which happened to be of the National Conference. This was also a period during which another soft separatist, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, managed to hoodwink the Kashmiri public and the Indian State. Using mainly Jamaat-e-Islami cadres, Mufti managed to create a situation in Kashmir in which it became impossible for one political party to hold the fort. The Valley became trifurcated between the National Conference (NC), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the Indian National Congress (INC), and the Jammu region became bifurcated between Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and INC, until in 2014, BJP became the single pole in Jammu. INC had the great merit of being the only party that had a footing in all the three regions of the state. However, the emergence of PDP as the third pole reduced the space for INC in the Valley. In 1977, the 43rd Constitutional Amendment had changed the election tenure for Lok Sabha and other Vidhan Sabhas from five to six years. The J&K Constitution was also amended by Sheikh Abdullah to reflect the change. However, when the Janata Party government came to power in 1977, it amended the Constitution to restore the status quo antè, and bring the tenure back to five years.

However, true to the Kashmiri politicians’ trait of maximising their gains, the J&K Assembly tenure remained at six years. Elections had accordingly taken place in 1983 and, thereafter, a mid-term election took place in 1987. In 1996, the President’s Rule was revoked and elections held. The National Conference won the farce of an election. These elections were conducted more as an exercise for gaining international acceptance and as a way of demonstrating to the rest of India that J&K was still a part of the Indian nation and that democratic values were still somewhat intact there. The 2002 elections were the first elections with any semblance of fair play. The crafty blackmail of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed fetched him a 50–50 shot at the Chief Minister’s chair despite having just 16 seats. Both the parties agreed to hold the post for three years each. Mufti’s tenure was marked by yet another spell of appeasement towards the separatists. The ‘healing touch’ strategy became one more saga added to the litany of encouragement to the soft and hard separatists. Pakistan had wound down its jihadi factory after a hard response from India in 2002–2003. The formal cease-fire agreement in November 2003 was implemented quite strictly by Pakistan for a change. The Mufti government got a breather, which it utilised in fanning radicalisation within its JIJK-inspired constituency. In 2005, Ghulam Nabi Azad became the Chief Minister of the Congress–PDP coalition. However, after Parvez Musharraf had to quit his position as the Chief of Army Staff in 2007, the ceasefire violations began again. General Kayani started the movement towards ramping up the jihadi bases again. Raheel Sharif took it to a new high. The peak was reached in General Bajwa’s time. Finally, the bluff was called out in a major strategic shift by the government, when it removed its selfimposed shackles and crossed the LoC twice in quick succession— in Uri and Balakot—the second one by going across the international border. The eternal fear of escalation ladder proved to be a nonstarter. After 2007, once the jihadi bases became active again, the coalition partner PDP destabilised the Congress Chief Minister. It is

the consensus in J&K that the Ghulam Nabi Azad government was probably the best ever in J&K. It did not have any overt connections with the Valley separatists because its base had shifted to Jammu, but PDP did not spare any chance of embarrassing its coalition partner. Finally, the coalition government fell on the question of allotting some land to the Amarnath Shrine Board for pilgrim facilities, as PDP communalised the simple issue to such an extent that riots broke out in the Valley, and a blockade ensued in Jammu. PDP withdrew its support and rued it in the next elections, when it would have repeated the coalition otherwise. In 2008, the NC repeated its 2002 performance of 28 seats, but PDP got 21 and Congress got 17 seats. If PDP had not queered the pitch for INC at the fag end of their six years, they would have easily formed a coalition for another six years. But instead, NC formed the government with INC, with Omar Abdullah as the Chief Minister. Young and enthusiastic, he held much promise in the beginning, but Pakistan had been increasing its footprint among the separatists. He was unable to keep the administration geared up to combat the militants and their influence. As a result, there were large-scale disturbances in 2010 which derailed the governance. His ineffectiveness resulted in PDP winning 28 seats in 2014, but an earth-shaking event in the state was BJP winning 25 seats, including two seats in Ladakh. The resulting PDP–BJP coalition was the final chapter in the separatist-run governments of Jammu and Kashmir. A word about the All Parties Hurriyat Conference is necessary. This was formed in 1993 as a federation of 26 separatist organisations, with Mirwaiz Umar Farooq becoming its head. It was an umbrella of both types of organisations—those that wanted an independent J&K, and also those who wanted to join Pakistan. Over the years, it has suffered two splits, with the JIJK leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani becoming the leader of the alternate faction of 12 parties and becoming the mouthpiece of Pakistan. The latest split occurred when Mirwaiz expelled four parties from his moderate faction. Almost all these leaders have now been released. Article 370 kept the wet dream of separatism alive among the public at large.

This kept the idea of independent Kashmir and the idea of a separate identity of Kashmir alive as a reality. Now that this reality is no more, it will be difficult for the leaders to keep the Kashmiri identity-based separatism going. However, religious-identity-based separatism is more difficult to eradicate.

PART III

CHAPTER 35

Nullification of Article 370

Figure 35.1: Map of New Union Territories Source: Government of India

It is a moot point whether BJP’s gambit of forming a coalition with PDP was a carefully crafted long-term plan. By being part of the

government, they got an important perspective into the working of the J&K government. Later, they pulled out strategically when PDP started moving into Jammu with its Islamisation projects, including the Roshni Act implementation to gift away lands to Muslims to change the demography in Jammu. The covert amalgamation of Rohingyas earlier settled in and around Jammu by the PDP–Congress government was also a major sticking point. First, BJP withdrew support, and the Assembly was kept under suspended animation. NC and Congress did not try to form a government as they expected a landslide in a future election. When the Valley politicians grew apprehensive that Art. 35A could be removed as Centre was taking an ambivalent position in a Supreme Court case, PDP and NC tried to come together. The move was thwarted by the Governor by dissolving the Assembly. Alarm bells rang when the Centre extended reservation for SC/STs and the economically weaker sections by acting as the government in terms of the J&K constitution and the 1954 Presidential Order, as amended from time to time. It was a trial balloon. It was challenged in the Supreme Court, but the challenge was unsuccessful. The trial was successful. The lesson was used subsequently in the nullification. Article 370 was not repealed but nullified. In the catena of judgements, as cited in Chapter 29, one thing was made clear by the Supreme Court—that Article 370 could not be repealed by using Article 370 (1); that action could only be undertaken by using Article 370 (3) along with its proviso. So, the repeal, or more appropriately, the nullification, was done in the following stages: 1. The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, under the power given to the President by Article 370, to apply all the provisions of the Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir, and to amend Article 367 to change the term ‘Constituent Assembly’ in the proviso to Article 370(3) to read ‘Legislative Assembly’; 2. Parliamentary Resolution to repeal Article 370(2) and 370(3), and replace Article 370(1);

3. Passing of ‘The Reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir Act, 2019, and 4. Passing of ‘The Jammu and Kashmir Reservation (Amendment) Act, 2019. We must understand that the Presidential Order (PO), 2019, was passed using the power conferred on the President by way of Article 370 itself. There were two important catches because of which it had become impossible to amend Article 370. One, Article 370 (2) made the consent of the government mandatory for any Presidential Order, and two, the Proviso to Article 370 (3) made it mandatory to have the consent of the Constituent Assembly of the State for repealing Article 370. This is where the 1965 Presidential Order, and the two precedents—change of the word Maharaja to Sadr-i-Riyasat in 1952, and the amendment in Article 367 in 1965 to interpret Sadr-iRiyasat as Governor and to read Governor aided by the Council of Ministers as the Government—came in handy. Let us read the Presidential Order, 2019, now: The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019 C.O. 272 In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 370 of the Constitution, the President, with the concurrence of the Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir, is pleased to make the following Order: 1. (1) This Order may be called the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019. (2) It shall come into force at once, and shall thereupon supersede the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 as amended from time to time. 2. All the provisions of the Constitution, as amended from time to time, shall apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the exceptions and modifications subject to which they shall so apply shall be as follows:— To article 367, there shall be added the following clause, namely:— ‘(4) For the purposes of this Constitution as it applies in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir— (a) references to this Constitution or to the provisions thereof shall be construed as references to the Constitution or the provisions thereof as applied in relation to the said State; (b) references to the person for the time being recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the

State as the Sadar-i- Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office, shall be construed as references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir; (c) references to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers; and (d) in proviso to clause (3) of Article 370 of this Constitution, the expression ‘Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2)’ shall read ‘Legislative Assembly of the State’.

This is a brilliant legal strategy. It has to be viewed in the context of the fact that a writ petition had been pending in the Supreme Court in respect of Article 35A that had been appended to the Constitution vide Presidential Order, 1954. Article 35A was a black chapter in the constitutional history of India. It legitimised and institutionalised discrimination against women, refugees and SC/STs in total disregard of what is now being called ‘constitutional morality’ by even the Supreme Court of India. In the 1965 Presidential Order, the Governor was to be construed as the ‘Government’ aided by his Council of Ministers. In the Governor’s Rule and President’s Rule (According to J&K Constitution, the first six months was Governor’s Rule, and after that, it used to be President’s rule), the Governor is aided by his Advisory Council that doubles up as his Council of Ministers. So, the Governor’s consent was legitimately the consent of the Government under Article 370 (2). 1.

Presidential Order can be promulgated with the consent of the Government (1965 PO); 2. Repeal can be done with the consent of the Constituent Assembly (original 370); 3. Constituent Assembly means Legislative Assembly (2019 PO) and 4. Parliament is the Legislative Assembly during President’s Rule. Hence, the Resolution in Parliament. Once the PO 2019 had fully applied the Constitution to the State of J&K, it became subject to Part I of the Constitution, and it could be

reorganised in terms of Article 3 of the Constitution of India. Full points to the Government of India. A problem of separatist sentiment that had taken such a heavy toll on the resources of the country and given leeway to the implacable enemy, Pakistan, was cremated in a brilliant flash of constitutional brilliance. The challenges to these constitutional measures now rest on the very same contentions that had been adjudicated finally by the two five-judge constitutional benches in the cases of Sampat Prakash and Mohammad Maqbool Damnoo. The former relied on two earlier judgements of the constitutional benches in Lakhanpal-I and Lakhanpal-II cases (Chapter 29). I, therefore, see no relief coming the way of challengers. It may be recalled that the State of J&K was using these very judgements to oppose the challenge to Article 35A filed by the Jammu organisations. The impact on the vast sections of deprived people of J&K has been salutary. Women will no longer have to face the unique discrimination they had to face in J&K. Article 35A enabled a grotesque provision whereby a J&K woman citizen lost all her rights available to permanent residentship (PR) holders if she married a non-citizen of J&K. Abolition of twin citizenship was a natural outcome of the application of all provisions of PO 1954 that had built up the unholy edifice of institutionalised discrimination. The application of the full Indian Constitution also enabled extension of political reservation to Scheduled Tribes like Gujjars and Bakarwals, who had remained disempowered because of the total monopolisation of power in the Valley by the Ashraaf upper-caste Muslim politicians. It also enabled delimitation of all constituencies, including Parliamentary and Assembly constituencies. This would enable Jammu to come at an even keel with the Valley. Moreover, a long-standing demand of Ladakh to get Union Territory (UT) status was also fulfilled. Ladakh was being ruled as a colony of the Valley. Jammu was also badly discriminated. Both have now been emancipated.

The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, 75 takes away some major catalysts for the sentiment of separatism. It abolishes 153 State Laws and 11 Governor’s Laws in the two UTs of J&K and Ladakh. It extends 106 Central Laws to the two UTs and retains seven State Laws with amendments. One of the major amendments is to make reservation for backward classes mandatory, and make additional reservations for the economically weaker sections as well. One hundred and sixty-six State Laws, including Governor’s Laws, have been retained in the present form. Thus, the two UTs now stand fully integrated with the Indian State. References 75

Appendix 10.

CHAPTER 36

Impact of Nullification of Article 370 on Pakistan looked at the background of Article 370, an overall H aving perspective on why Pakistan is worried about its impact is necessary. The spectacle of Pakistan tying itself in knots over the nullification of Article 370 may appear curious to Indians and the world at large, but we need to understand the fundamentals underlying this unusual behaviour. On the face of it, one would find it highly unusual that the change of an internal arrangement within the Indian Constitution should excite its perpetually hostile neighbour so much. Yet, if you go behind the reasons for the creation of Pakistan, it would make perfect sense. Pakistan was born out of the frustrations of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in the 1936–37 Provincial Elections held under the constitutional scheme laid out under the Government of India Act, 1935. Mohammad Ali Jinnah expected to win a majority in the 482 Muslim seats, and then bargain with the Congress for a coalition. The Muslim League managed to win only 109. Its top performance was in the United Provinces (UP) where it won 26 out of the 35 seats it contested, out of a total of 62 Muslim seats. The Congress did not win a single Muslim seat in UP, though it had a clear majority with

133 out of the total of 228 seats in its kitty. Jinnah offered to form a coalition with the Congress but was rebuffed. The League, therefore, was not able to form a single government in the 11 provinces that went to polls in 1936– 1937. The Congress formed governments in 8 out of 11 Provinces, including in the Muslim-majority North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). In Muslimmajority Punjab and Bengal, regional parties formed the governments. The League did well only in the provinces where Muslims were a minority and where it could project itself as a protector of Muslims. In all the Muslim-majority provinces, it did quite badly. Jinnah had contested the 1936–37 elections on a quasinationalist plank. His poor performance even in the Muslim seats convinced him that he had to do something to become the exclusive spokesman for Muslims, much like what Asaduddin Owaisi tries today. Jinnah sulked and was persuaded by Mohammad Iqbal to espouse the Two-Nation Theory. According to this theory, Muslims were a separate and equal nation or qaum as distinct from the Hindu nation. This concept of nation is based on the Muslim concept of ummat , or Islamic brotherhood ( ummah in Arabic). Unlike the Hindu concept of the nation as a civilisation and the Western concept of an ethnic nation-state, this concept of qaum is purely religious. Jinnah celebrated 22 December 1939 as Deliverance Day. He had already pledged allegiance to the British in the war effort. The British were obliged by this action of Jinnah, and they returned the favour by recruiting heavily from the Muslims of Punjab and NWFP. This, among other causes, was a major cause for the bloody riots of Partition in the areas that were to become Pakistan. In 1940, the Pakistan resolution was passed by the League in its 1940 session in Lahore. The Muslim League transformed into a communal outfit. The Two-Nation Theory not merely sought a separate area for the ‘Muslim Nation’ within the Indian Subcontinent, but also had the basic Islamic theology in mind as in the Hidayah (guidance) issued by Deoband and fondly approved by the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board: the earth is created by Allah for the

enjoyment of his believers alone—infidels are mere squatters. It quotes the Prophet and lays down, ‘We are directed to make war upon Men till such time that they confess that “there is no other God but Allah”.’ Fataawa-i- Razvia of the Barelvis expresses a similar idea. Thus, the original map of the Subcontinent drawn by Chaudhary Rehmat Ali included every part of India having more than 20% Muslim population in Pakistan, or made it an independent state—to be included in the commonwealth of Pakistan later. The original idea of the Two-Nation Theory was to take a nearly equal area out of India and to later subsume the remaining smaller states into its imperial fold to be able to fulfil the holy task that remained unfulfilled during the Mughal Rule. The League contended that India was many nations, and the Muslim nation was the biggest of them all. They were supported in this endeavour by the Communists, who acted at the behest of the Soviet Union through the British Communist Party and struck a new-found friendship with the British after Germany got into war with Britain in World War II. The Gangadhar Adhikari papers on behalf of the CPI were exactly on the same lines. The CPI even submitted a plan for vivisecting India into Pakistan and 17 other countries based on ethnicity and language. Even Jinnah did not seriously think of his plan for Partition to be feasible. He was merely playing for the maximum. The British, however, were keen to maintain a foothold in the areas abutting Afghanistan and Central Asia as a part of The Great Game they were playing with the Soviet Union for influence in Central Asia. The 1946 elections changed the plans of the League. In the 1936–37 Elections, Jinnah had failed badly in his mission to become the single voice of Muslims. In 1946, he achieved his dream. The Muslim League won 89.5% of the Muslim seats. The League swept every province where Muslims were a minority. In Punjab, it fell short, and in Bengal, it formed the government, with the help of Jogendra Nath Mandal, a Dalit leader. In Sind, it fell short of a majority by three seats, but with help from the British and through some infamous defections, the Muslim League managed to form the government in Sind with a wafer-thin majority.

When Nehru rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan for a weak centre and strong provinces with an option to secede, Jinnah openly used the religion card. He used riots and communal violence fanned by the Muslim ulama , as well as by the organised hordes of the Muslim League to make the partition of India inevitable. Having achieved Partition based on the Two-Nation Theory, the Muslim League was disappointed at not having achieved its objective of getting the full provinces of Punjab and Bengal. As I pointed out in the map, the original plan was a grand commonwealth of Pakistan, with the whole of Assam, Bengal and Punjab within Pakistan, with even Delhi in Pakistan, and the rest of India divided into many parts. The Muslim ulama was divided into two shades of opinions—the Sufi Barelvi group, supported by the Shi’a and the Ahmedi, favoured the Medina approach that Muslims should perform a voluntary exile to the Medina of Pakistan, gather strength, and then reconquer the Mecca of India and complete the conquest of the Subcontinent by Islam. Deobandis, on the other hand, supported by the Jamaat-e-Islami of Abu Ala Maududi, favoured the traditional approach. They argued that it would become impossible to convert India to Islam in a partitioned India. The ultimate objective of both the groups was the same—complete conversion of India to Islam. The believers and Allah do not allow any accommodation as the Earth is supposed to have been created by Allah for believers. Given this background, and the long-term objective of the vivisection of India and its complete conversion to Islam, it was quite intolerable for the Pakistan establishment, which got reinforced by the large induction of the discharged Second World War decommissioned army personnel and a large army, to even think about letting a Muslim-majority Princely State accede to what they looked at as Hindu India. So, when Sheikh Abdullah was able to use his deception to carve out a separate status for J&K, Pakistan saw this as a validation of the Two-Nation Theory. That India had to accord special status to its only Muslim-majority state vindicated the Two-Nation Theory in the eyes of Pakistan and its establishment, and they could sell this snake oil to the Pakistani public. As the Pakistan dream kept fading, this spurious fantasy kept the public hooked to the dream of

Ghazwa-e-Hind, and kept providing the Pakistan military with its essential life support from the public. When Pakistan came into being, it had got one-seventh of India’s resources, one-sixth of the area, one-sixth of the population and one-third of its army. This overbloated army perfected the art of keeping itself relevant by becoming the protector of what is called Nazaria-e-Pakistan, which is nothing but a euphemism for the Two-Nation Theory. This complicated relationship between the various organs of the Pakistani establishment and the army’s self- styled role of protector of Nazaria-e-Pakistan has meant that it even espoused jihad to pretend to fulfil the raison- détre behind the existence of Pakistan— conquer the Mecca of India from its stronghold of Pakistani Medina. The army did try, but failed, so it changed the narrative in its textbooks and spun all its defeats as victories. In the world view of the Pakistani army, a defeat in the conventional sense is not a defeat. A defeat will happen only when it loses its anchor and will to fight. When India rectified the mistake it made in 1949 by incorporating Article 370 and scrapped its provisions, the Islamisation project received a terminal jolt. After cleansing the Valley, Pakistan’s next project was Jammu. Even if India had offered J&K to Pakistan, they would have targeted other parts of India, because the Two-Nation Theory ultimately seeks to end all plurality and diversity and make the whole world subservient to Allah. Pakistan lost a part of this anchor when it lost Bangladesh. That took away the unity of ummat ( ummah ) part and deflated the TwoNation Theory as well as the Medina project, but the Pakistan Army recovered it by replacing J&K as the Battle of Badr project in its ultimate conquest of the Mecca of India. With J&K slipping away irrevocably by Article 370 getting nullified, the remaining part of the anchor has drifted away. That is why the lament in Pakistan is as full of grief as it was after the loss of Bangladesh. Because that anchor is now gone with the scrapping of the Article 370 provisions, and J&K is now reduced to a mere Union Territory, Pakistan is facing an existential crisis. This Pakistan globally includes those who believe in the ultimate global Islamic supremacy,

including in India. The Medina Project has suffered an irredeemable jolt. The Two-Nation Theory is gone from India. The Medina project is over from Pakistan. The Pakistan Army does not have anything left to protect. Pakistan’s reason for existence is gone. Understand their predicament!

CHAPTER 37

CAA: Modification of the Liaquat– Nehru Pact eft with the moth-eaten option, Jinnah and his followers convinced the Muslims of India—in every nook and corner—that a separate Pakistan was just a temporary hijrat (exile) into a Medina, where the believers will gather strength, and then in the manner of their Prophet, reconquer the Mecca of mainland India. So, they set about to accomplish their task with a single-minded passion by either driving away most of the non-Muslim population out of the territories they had occupied or by forcibly converting them. When the international uproar became too much, and Indians started retaliating, a pact known as the Delhi Pact, or the Liaquat– Nehru Pact was signed on 8 April 1950 to mutually protect the minorities in both countries. Using this as an excuse, Pakistan stopped taking in any more Muslims from India in 1951, leaving nearly 9% population of Muslims in India, even as they had reduced non-Muslims in West Pakistan to less than 4%. The pact was hailed as the new ‘Treaty of Hudaibiyyah’ by the New Medina. The Quranic imagery was played out in full measure, leaving only the task of reconquering the Mecca that the believers had temporarily left. This background is necessary to understand the handicap that a non-Muslim is bound to suffer in an Islamic State, due to which the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, covers these three neighbours exclusively. It should also be remembered very clearly that undivided

L

India was split into a Muslim and a non-Muslim State (and not into Muslim and Hindu) according to the Mountbatten Plan of 3 June 1947, as signed by both the Congress and the Muslim League, and announced the same day in the British Parliament by Prime Minister Clement Attlee. The Indian Independence Act, 1947, as approved by the British king on 18 July 1947 made clear provisions for splitting India into majority-Muslim and non-Muslim districts based on the 1941 Census. It is, therefore, disingenuous to quibble about why non-Muslims of the neighbouring Muslim majority countries are the target of this 2019 Act. I must repeat the points made in Chapter 17 that what this Act does is to recognise the Medina–Hudaibiyyah– Mecca route of the Islamic ummat / millat and places a sword through it. The additional problem of the whole plot coming into bold relief in this information age is even more stark. What it also does is to energise the nascent Hindu renaissance by bringing into their ken the real history of Partition, the real intent of the Medina project, and to wear off the anaesthesia applied to the still-open wounds by a deliberately distorted leftist history. The distress among the Islamists is palpable. Pakistan sounding even more distressed than at the time of nullification of Article 370 is because it can see that while the nullification of Article 370 meant termination of the Medina project, this new 2019 Act means a reversal, in which Mecca is coming for Medina, instead of a mere status quo. Dr Ambedkar had famously said in his book Pakistan and the Partition of India (1945) that Muslim politics is like ‘gangster’s method of politics’, in which they make more and more unreasonable demands, use riots as a tactic in the overall strategy while playing victim all the while. The present government seems to have called this bluff. This must be bad news for Islamists as both Britain and the secularists had played along with this brand of Jinnah’s politics, conceding almost everything. Only Patel and Shyama Prasad Mukherjee stood between the Islamists and total surrender. Only Gopal Patha of Calcutta and the Sikhs stood between the Islamists and the total annihilation of nonMuslims in Pakistan. Approximately 15% of the Pakistani population in the West was Hindu and Sikh at the time of Partition, which has been continuously

declining ever since. Approximately 30% population in the East was Hindu, comprising largely of Rajbongshi and Namashudra Dalits, who had in a remarkable spell of delusion, followed their leader Jogendra Nath Mandal to support the Muslim League in the 1946 provincial elections in Bengal. This was to be their permanent undoing. The Bengali bhadralok had the resources to either migrate to India or to buy peace in East Pakistan. The Dalits were not so lucky. After Partition, they bore the brunt of the Islamic zeal. Jogendra Nath Mandal was a part of the Liaquat Cabinet but could not prevent the ongoing Islamist onslaught on his brethren. He had to ultimately resign and run away to Calcutta where he spent the rest of his life in anonymity and ignominy. So much for the fake sympathy for Dalits that many Islamist parties like the All India Majlis-e-IttehadulMuslimeen (AIMIM) display even today in the quest for votes. Hindus in West Pakistan live mostly in rural Sindh today and in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad. A few lakh Hindus live in the district of Rahimyar Khan in Southern Punjab. About 20,000 Hindus live in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), which are the south- western and north-western parts of Pakistan. The Sikh population mainly lives in and around Peshawar in the KPK province. They number between twenty to thirty thousand there. A few thousand Sikhs reside in Baluchistan and Sindh as well. Faced with a hostile population and an indifferent state, most Hindus and Sikhs have migrated to India, the Middle East or the West. Many have been converted. Scores have been killed. A very special category amongst these persecuted Hindus are teenage girls in Sindh who are abducted, raped, converted to Islam and then married off to some retard or cripple, all at gunpoint. These acts are carried out by so-called ‘Vaderas’ who are rich and powerful Muslim landlords of the local area. They are a government unto themselves and control the local madrasas that are centres for conversions of underage Hindu girls. Two such notorious Vaderas are Miyaan Mitthu of Bharchundi Sharif and Ayub Sirhindi. Both, Sufi leaders, openly claim that they

aim to convert all the remaining Hindus to Islam. After this systematic genocide for seven decades and continues even today, Hindus and Sikhs constitute about 2% of the Pakistani population now. In Bangladesh, their population is down to 8–9%. There is no reliable way of knowing the exact number of Hindus living in Pakistan today, because, not only is the census held at very irregular intervals in Pakistan, the government machinery is also too corrupt and inefficient to record and compile the data correctly. Besides, the Pakistani establishment downplays the number of Hindus living there for obvious reasons. Most of the Hindus live in rural Sindh and a lot of them are bonded labourers of the rich landlords who are not very compliant with the government officials. Rural Sindh is also not very easily approachable. The newspaper Dawn has reported that 51% Hindus, mostly Dalits, are bonded labourers in Pakistan and are kept in chains. Thus, the Liaquat–Nehru Pact has been flagrantly violated by Pakistan. Even in Bangladesh, the situation has been little different. Whenever there is an Islamist government in Bangladesh, especially the one under Begum Khaleda Zia, the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh becomes active and starts persecuting the minority Hindu community, most of whom are again from the lower classes. Thus, the Liaquat–Nehru Pact was under tatters, and it had become essential to make necessary changes so that effective protection to the minorities of Pakistan and Bangladesh could be provided. The Government of India also took care of the 75,000 Sikhs who had to relocate to India when it was run over by the Taliban and made it impossible for minorities to exist. This, of course, is in addition to the promises made by Mahatma Gandhi and various governments, that, Hindus and other non-Muslim minorities had every right to relocate to India. From the point of logic, the Muslims of India supported the Muslim League in its demand for Pakistan and then stayed back in India. The Hindus of Pakistan chose an undivided India and then got stuck in a new nation that they had not chosen.

While the CAA is a cause for alarm for the Islamists, ummat and millat for their quest of theological supremacy, the pain of the secularists is different. It stems purely from the point of view of electoral considerations. As mentioned in Chapter 17, the induction of the Bengali Hindu immigrants in Assam and Bengal can alter the electoral college somewhat in the short-term, and set a pattern for the long-term. In the 72 years since Independence, this appears to be one great opportunity that has been taken by the ruling dispensation, unlike the many missed opportunities of the past. No wonder, this flew in the face of a conscious strategy on part of the Islamists to Islamise Bengal and Assam. Coupled with the nullification of Article 370, this is a body blow.

CHAPTER 38

Direct Action Day 2.0: Failure and Impact irect Action Day on 16 August 1946 (17 Ramzan 1365 Hijri), was a seminal event in the history of the Indian Subcontinent. Till that point, Pakistan was a remote possibility, despite the resurgence of the Muslim League in the 1945–1946 central and provincial elections. The Direct Action Day riots so unnerved the Congress leadership, then in the hands of the idealistic Jawaharlal Nehru, that it conceded Pakistan to Jinnah as if under duress. The British were always comfortable with the idea of partition anyway. Had the Congress leadership acted resolutely and faced up to the bully that was Muslim League, the denouement may have been different. A civil war may have ensued, but my hunch is that a civil war would probably have killed far fewer people than the so-called ‘peaceful transfer of power’ eventually did. A civil war is a traumatic event, but what followed the Partition was no less than a civil war, but with Hindu–Sikhs disproportionally facing the brunt. What would a Krishna do in the situation? In my book Krishna Yogeshvara , I have discussed a similar situation that faced Krishna when the Kauravas had become intransigent and Yudhishthira baulked at the thought of war. Yet, war looked inevitable. Krishna then said that he wanted to try his hands at reconciliation one more time. The narration goes like this:

D

In Upaplavya, Krishna suggested that he wanted to have one more attempt at reconciliation. When Draupadi learnt of this, she went on a hunger strike. Krishna went to assuage her. Draupadi threw a fit, ‘Do you remember, Keshava, what you had promised me at the time of my humiliation at the hands of Dushasana?’ Krishna kept smiling, ‘Of course, I do. How can you even think that I would forget my promise to you?’ ‘And yet you are going to Hastinapura as an envoy to talk peace with those brutes. Have they repented even once on the excesses that they have committed against us? Yet, you have given your army to them, strengthened them and discounted all the possibility of an easy victory. I do not understand your ways, Achyuta. Are you a friend, or a foe?’ Krishna patted Draupadi softly on her head. ‘I solemnly swear on your head, Krishnā, that I will avenge your humiliation. Yet, it has to be avenged in a way that it sets an example. As far as possible, our processes should be commensurate with the nobility of the objectives they set to achieve. Objectives, however, are greater than the process. I will do right by you but let me at least make an attempt to try a great process to achieve a great objective. The objective will always be uppermost in my vision. Be absolutely sure and be absolutely assured.’

Our leaders, in contrast, kept harping on the purity of process, even to the complete obfuscation of objectives. Ahimsa of the Gandhian kind became more important than a clear vision for an independent country. Dr B.R. Ambedkar understood the nature of Islamic politics better than everyone else. He is on record in his seminal book, Pakistan or the Partition of India (1945) that ‘Muslim politics is “gangster’s method of politics”.’ H.V. Seshadri amplified the same point when he said that Muslim political behaviour revolves around ‘acrimony, accusations, complaints, demands, denunciations and street rioting’. This is followed by playing victim. It is a practised routine. Yet, the leadership always sought to dissemble, appease, bend and surrender. This had become their hallmark right from the days of the Khilafat movement. In Direct Action 1.0, only the Muslim League had a clear vision. It had a clear Islamic doctrine that was put out as the ‘Two-Nation Theory’, in terms of the Islamic ummat being one trans-border nation, and non-Muslims being the second nation. Jinnah articulated it in the terms ‘you will have either a divided India or a destroyed India’. Congress leadership had no clear vision except getting the British out. They were not prepared to stake their all for a strong India. The result was, therefore, a foregone conclusion. We finally

got an India that was both divided and destroyed. The destruction did not remain limited to the immediate aftermath of the Partition but has stretched right into today with a hazy idea of nationhood that kept wallowing in self- loathing and appeasement of the same intransigent forces that had caused the partition. Let us now examine the post-Citizenship Amendment Act rioting. It was done with the intent to overawe the national leadership under Narendra Modi. The cause was clear. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leadership was intent on pursuing the cultural agenda for which it had received a massive mandate. The opposition was used to a perpetual subversion of the Indic values that had sustained a status quo for over 70 years. Narendra Modi had a clear vision of a strong and unified India proud of its ancient culture and history. The opposition was stuck in the namby-pamby world of a local variant of secularism that had got distorted into anti-Hinduism at most times, and positive Hindu bashing quite often. It sustained a mutant of the Muslim League’s Two-Nation Theory in Article 370 for 70 years. It halted the population exchange in the name of the Liaquat–Nehru Pact, 1950. It conceded virtual recognition of PoK as Pakistan’s territory with the Indus Waters Treaty. It handed over 93,000 PoWs without anything significant in return. It did not even try the Pakistani generals for war crimes in the then East Pakistan, and, it bent over backwards to appease a newly carved out country like Bangladesh by conceding 1971 as the cut-off date in an Indira–Mujeeb Pact that allowed illegal East Pakistanis to stay back in India. Each of these actions displays muddled thinking. It had to culminate in the Assam agitation, and an increasingly strident Indian Muslim population coupled with an increasingly militant Pakistan. Narendra Modi has displayed remarkable resoluteness in matters of national security and national interests. So, a series of actions, starting with surgical strike 1.0 and the Balakot strike that called the Pakistani nuclear bluff, to legislations on Triple Talaq, Article 370 and the resolution of the Ram Temple issue destroyed the Muslim veto completely. CAA was only a trigger to unleash a last- ditch attempt in the manner and style of Direct Action 1.0. This Direct Action had many factors missing. There was no Jinnah to lead it. There was no British Indian Government to shield it,

and there was no weak-kneed leadership that would let matters drift. The riots were carefully orchestrated in the BJP-ruled states. They were handled in an exemplary fashion. The leadership refused to give in, and all the action petered out within a week without even causing any Hindu–Muslim confrontation. It remained police versus rioters for the most part, and some innovative actions—like confiscation of properties based on videography—brought it under control in no time. The most effective Muslim veto, street rioting, was neutralised with steely will power and there is little to fall back upon. To me, Direct Action 2.0 is likely to be another seminal event in the annals of the Indian nation. The ultimate weapon of what Dr Ambedkar called ‘gangster’s method of politics’ is street rioting, and it has not just spectacularly failed, but the failure has had a hugely demoralising effect on the street thugs. The future of Muslim politics has come to a crossroads, which leads in many different directions. The future of incendiary politics has also come to a crossroads, from where the Cultural Marxism and Activism routes look perpetually doomed. Failed Direct Action 2.0 has given India a trial by fire from which it has come out more strong-willed and ready for a strong future. The very recipè that got Muslims a divided nation may have landed us a united nation—the only difference being the leadership of the two warring sides.

CHAPTER 39

Fatal Blow to Pakistan’s New Medina akistan is not a territory. It is a fundamental Islamic idea that Muslims shall not live in subordination anywhere, even if they are in a minority. The world is accordingly divided into Dar-ul-Islam, or House of Islam, where Muslims are the rulers, and Dar-ul-Harb, or House of War, where they are in a minority. The concept is that even if they are in a minority, they must be mentally at war all the time. The history of Partition, that I have carefully described in Part I, clearly shows that the entire Partition politics was conceptualised, executed and led by the minority Muslim population in majority nonMuslim provinces. That is why the failure of Direct Action 2.0 was a significant event in the annals of Indian history. It was after a very long time that the national leadership had acted differently from what had become the practised routine right from the days of Khilafat. Just as the new national leadership had demonstrated that the settled wisdom did not bar it from charting a new route in dealing with the external aggression of Pakistan in Uri and Balakot, or in the case of annulment of Article 370, or in legislating banning of triple talaq in the face of an Islamist outcry of mazhabi pehchan or religious identity, it showed similar resolve in dealing with the bullying tactics, or what Dr Ambedkar had called ‘gangster’s method of politics’. As it happens in the case of bullies, they had to back down. However,

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under encouragement from political dispensations that depend on those who count upon Muslim vote banks and are, therefore, susceptible to ‘gangster’s method of politics’, a new methodology was devised. The radical leadership found that it would not be able to cut much ice with Direct Action type tactics. It was not only producing a reaction, but it was also becoming an embarrassment for even friendly governments like West Bengal to defend. The Shaheen Bagh protests hark back to the non- cooperation movement started by the Khilafat Movement on 1 August 1920. Yes, the Non-Cooperation Movement that is usually credited to Mahatma Gandhi was started by the Khilafat Committee headed by Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar and his brother, Maulana Shaukat Ali, coordinated by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Congress joined the NonCooperation Movement in mid-September 1920. So much for the whitewashing of history. After the Direct Action 2.0 failed because unlike the national leadership in 1946, the present leadership did not lose its nerve and dealt with the protests with a firm but patient hand, the protests went to the fall-back option of Khilafat 2.0. We must remember that Khilafat was a strategy against a very powerful British in 1920, whereas, Direct Action was the strategy against a faltering rule during the transition. In 2019–20, the organisers, who seem to be a loose federation of many parties, Islamic clerics and fundamentalist organisations, made a significant blunder in trying the Direct Action 2.0 first, before reverting to Khilafat 2.0. The underpinning philosophy continues to be the establishment of a dispensation that would facilitate the Nizam-e-Mustafa or the ‘Rule of Mohammad’. The same tactic in the Kashmir Valley succeeded magnificently until the leadership gathered its wits and confronted the bullies squarely. The violence that was witnessed in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and parts of Delhi was beaten back in next to no time. West Bengal was the most instructive, where even a sympathetic government had to ensure that it did not let the Islamic violence spiral. Anarchy and intolerance

inherent in this strategy was something even West Bengal could not take. So, what do we get—all the slogans of Khilafat 1.0, Direct Action 1.0 and Nizam-e-Mustafa of Kashmir came crawling out of the woodworks. The leadership let the protests go on, and out came all the worst pictures of rank Islamism—the Faiz poetry that decries idolatry, the flagrant desecration of Hindu symbols and the worst—a demand from everyone to chant the Islamic shahada— La ilaha lillillah —forgetting that the Islamic shahada is an exclusivist chant; it is only the most totalitarian countries—Afghanistan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Afghan Taliban—that sport the shahada on their flags, waving the tricolour with the shahada replacing the Ashok Chakra that signifies Dharma. No wonder that the anti-CAA protests have been reduced to a spectacle being propped up by rank Islamists and a ragtag band of leftists and political opportunists. The situation is exactly like the 1940s when the communists and Islamists were campaigning for Partition and an ‘equal and separate’ status for Muslims. The love for special entitlement is the same as it was in the mid-1940s. It was made more than clear when the Islamist wet dream of supremacism in a Hindu India by rulers of Islam started leaking out in the form of Sharjeel Imams and Arfa Khanums. The difference is that, unlike in 1947, there is no third party now to tilt the scales. The 1940s slogan by the Islamic supremacists was Qaumi Nazaria , or Do-Qaumi Nazria (Two-Nation Theory); the 1980s slogan was Milli Tashakhhus , (Special Community identity), and today, the slogan is Mazhabi Pehchan (Religious Identity). The impulse comes from the same root. The first two were met with capitulation by the national leadership. The third one is being met with a firm resolve. As Dr Ambedkar said, and I quoted in an earlier chapter, ‘appeasement and settlement are different’. The first and second were jihad actions, so is the third. However, the third one has had to go into the mode of low-intensity jihad. Jihad cannot be met with convincing arguments. It is violence that requires a response of the kind Krishna preached in the Bhagwad Gita. So, what happens to the ‘New Medina Strategy’ of Pakistan? To recall, the Medina strategy was a Barelvi construct in opposition to

the Deobandi construct for the same goal—complete Islamisation of India. Barelvis built it in the image of the Quranic events—the majority of Indian Muslims leaving the Mecca of India, equivalent to hijrat of the Prophet; consolidating themselves in the new Islamic nation of Pakistan, equivalent to the consolidation by the Prophet in Medina; and then launching an attack on India from Medina utilising its assets in the Mecca of India, the proverbial Ghazwa-e-Hind. 76 On the way, Pakistan could fool India by some peace initiatives like the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. The ummat or the Muslim nation remaining back in India would assist the attack on this Indian Mecca by the ‘New Medina’. The x-factor in this strategy was the premise that the new Indian leadership would be as gullible and trusting as the Ummayad leadership of the Quraish of Mecca. This is where the Pakistan gambit has come a cropper. The new Indian leadership is decisive and clear in its intent. Moreover, it understands the ‘New Medina’ strategy. It showed its intent in Uri and Balakot, and now in its response to ‘Direct Action 2.0’ and ‘Khilafat 2.0’. They understand that ahimsa is not physical non-violence, but an attitude of supreme equanimity with complete commitment to save dharma by any means. The new leadership’s ideal is not Martin Luther King, but Krishna Yogeshvara. References 76

A mythical conquest of India, as in the Hadis of Nassa’i.

CHAPTER 40

Sufism: Myth and Reality THEOLOGICAL HISTORY normal misconception about Sufism is that it is very much like T he the mystic way of the Indian Sadhu, and shows a peaceful path to

a Union with God/Allah. Nothing can be farther from the Truth. In the Sufism of today, and since the victory of the greatest Sufi, AlGhazali, over the Mutazzalis in the late 11th century, the separation between the Creator and the Created is so clear that, to aver anything else is to invite a charge of blasphemy. Whether Sufism began within Islam or Islam adopted it is not very clear, because the Islamic expansion in the 7th and 8th centuries into the Sassanian and Turkic territories was so swift that Islam hardly had a chance of consolidation, and a course of adaptation was probably the normal outcome. What we do know is that there was a huge churn within Islam against Arab conservatism in the form of the Mutazzali movement. Another strand was the Tahqiqi strand that borrowed from the Sufism that emphasised ‘immanence of divine’. While Mutazzalis laid stress on a synthesis between rationalism and revelation, and refused to recognise the Hadis exegeses, the Tahqiqis and Sufis alternated between complete fusion with the divine and reflection of the divine within the human soul—something akin to Advaita and Dvaita of Hinduism. However, it stopped short of the ‘One material unity with myriad manifestations'. Mutazzalis also did not recognise Qur’an as co-

eternal with Allah, stating that the Created cannot precede the Creator. Both Mutazzalis and Tahqiqis honoured the role of free will. The high point of the rationalist school was 833–848 CE, whereas the high point of the Tahqiqis was Mansour Hallaj, who was executed in 922 CE for his pronouncement of Ana’l Haq (I am the Truth). Both the schools, more particularly the Mutazzalis, asserted the principle of ‘free will’ in gaining Allah’s favour. The counter movement consisted of the Asharites, who regarded Shariat (Shari’a in Arabic) as the Word of Allah, and commandments to be followed. However, the Hadis part of the Shariat (a Trilogy consisting of the Qur’an, Hadis—traditions of the Prophet, and the Sirat-e-Rasool Allah—biography of the Prophet) was written in the face of the challenge from the Mutazzalis. The compilation of the Shariat went well into the 10th century, and the first instance of Sirat being made public is from Al Tabari around 900 CE, though he credited it to Ibn Ishaq of the 7th century. The compilation of Hadis was accelerated because of the Mutazzali challenge and was on in 848 CE when the Caliph al-Mutawwakil ordered the Mutazzali privileges withdrawn. The principle of wahadat-ul-wujud (Existential Unity of God, or, God is reflected in all), similar in essence to Dvaita principle of Vedanta, was propounded by the Sufis of the early era, later to be propounded in detail by ibn-Arabi of Spain, or al-Andalus. However, the most definitive intervention was made in the 11th century by Al-Ghazali (1058–1111 CE), who had the favour of the Abbasid Empire. He firmly favoured the Asharites. His treatise ‘Tahaffut-e-Falasafa’ (Confusion of Philosophy) put paid to the principle of free will. He propounded the principle of ‘ontologically (metaphysically) broken Time’, in which Allah is creating and destroying the Universe every moment. Thus, Allah controls even the smallest action and event in the Universe. This was a complete antithesis of ‘free will’, and inaugurated extreme determinism among the Muslims. He also put paid to the principle of ‘wahadat-e-wujud’, and favoured ‘wahadat-e- shuhud’ (Observed Unity of God, or, there

is ‘One God’ without the ‘Oneness’ preached by the early Sufis). Thus, he placed a firm barrier between the Creator and the Created. Till the time of Al-Ghazali, Sufis (Tariqa) were often considered to belong to different sects. After him, this difference was sought to be obliterated until it vanished completely. In the 12th century, Ibn Rush (Averroes) wrote a critique of Al-Ghazali titled Tahaffut-e-Tahaffut (Confusion of Confusion). For this impudence, he was condemned by the Spanish branch of the Caliphate, and he was condemned to be spat on by the believers in front of the Grand Mosque of Cordoba at regular intervals. The advent of Sufism in India occurred against this background of a churn in the Abbasid scholarly space, with an emphatic victory for the Asharite Ulama (Clergy) with help from the devotional Sufis. The intellectuals who believed in spirituality were roundly defeated. The mantle was kept up in Spain by the likes of Ibn Rush and Ibn Arabi for a while, before Ibn Taymiyyah came out firmly in support of the Sufi Al-Ghazali (13th century) and all signs of ‘free will’ and a separate sectarian identity for the Sufis were eliminated. Sufis were indeed considered to be a separate sect in the beginning of the Islamic history, but they got subsumed later. Tariqat and Shariat were differently comprehended till the time of Al-Ghazali, after which Tariqat became totally subordinated to Shariat. Anybody who has studied even a smattering of Shariat Trilogy regimen would know that it is an exclusive supremacist creed with no space for the unbeliever. It also resulted in the obliteration of the Sufis as separate sects, and they simply became religious orders within their respective fiqh mazhabs (Hanafi, Shafi’I, Maaliki and Hanbali), fully subordinated to the Ulama. That is how someone like Rumi (1207– 1273 CE) could dare to be different in his Tariqat from the Shariat. This became rarer and rarer after Ibn Taymiyyah (1267–1328 CE). Sufism was marked and distinguished by ihsān, or seeing Allah. After Al-Ghazali’s intervention, ihsān was relegated in importance to the third position. Imān or Belief became paramount, and Din or Religion and its observances came next. Reason and rationality were banished completely, and direct experience of the divine was relegated to a subsidiary position.

2. HISTORY IN INDIA Advent of Sufis in India was mixed. After Al-Ghazali, their independent existence as independent sects had been obliterated. They had to be a part of the mazhab in which they operated, which in India’s case was the Hanafi mazhab. The Chishtis accompanied the invading Army of Mohammad of Ghur and set base in India. The line of Moinuddin Chishti– Nizamuddin Auliya and Bābā Farid is the Chishtiyya Tariqa, that later got sub divided into many silsilas along Nizami and Sābri divisions. Suhrawardys had come to Sind even earlier. Next was the turn of Kashmir where Sayyid Mir Shah Hamadani (Shah Hamadan), a Kubrawi, wrought such untold misery for the Kafirs that it resulted in the Code of Umar 77 being applied there, and was instrumental in forced conversions and the First Exodus of Kashmir. The Noorbakshi Shi’a silsila of Shams-ud-Din Araqi was even worse, leading to the Second Exodus. There were still a handful of Sufis who continued to espouse the ‘immanence of divine’ and kept treating the Tariqat as different from Shariat. Some Qadri Sufis were the main ones among them. Bulleh Shah was the last of them. However, they were just the exceptions, and these exceptions only prove the rule of the intolerance of the Sufis, who had by then fully subordinated themselves to the Shariat. However, saints like Bulle Shah, Waris Shah and Sarmad were denounced as heretics by the Ulama, exactly in the manner that Raskhan, who was a devotee of Krishṇa, was. The definite turn towards full resolution of Tariqat– Shariat became important to the Ulama after Akbar’s drift away from hardline Islam into Din-e-Illahi. This effort was led by the Mujaddid Alf-i-Sāni, Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi of the Naqshbandi Tariqa. The Naqshbandis are the only Tariqa that claims their descent from the 1st Caliph, Abu Bakr, unlike all other Sunni Tariqas, the Qadriyya, the Suhrawardy, the Chishtiyya and the Kubrawiyya (including Owaissiya), that claim their descent from the 4th Sunni Caliph/1st Shi’a Imam Ali ibn AbiTaleb.

As soon as Jahangir ascended the throne, the charismatic Ahmad Sirhindi, who claimed descent from the 2nd Caliph, Hazrat Umar Farooq ibn al-Khattāb, prevailed upon him to move hard against unbelief and shirk. Guru Arjun Dev was a target of Sirhindi. He was arrested and brought to Delhi in 1606 shortly after Jahangir took over, and executed when he refused to convert to Islam. As a Faroqui hardliner (Hazrat Umar’s descendant), his effort was to enforce the Code of Umar (detailed in Chapter 18) in the Mughal Empire. The Mughal Court politics between the Muhaddis of the Mughal Court would cause a brief setback to Sirhindi, when Jahangir put him under house arrest in 1619 in the Gwalior Fort, but released him under pressure from the Naqshbandis and due to some clever manoeuvrings from the Sheikh himself. So much so that, before he died in 1624, he was rewarded twice and put in charge of educating the Mughal Army. Not just that, his son Sheikh Muhammad Masoom got an exalted position, first in the remaining three years of Jahangir, and later in Shajahan’s Court till Dara Shukoh became important. Dara was more under the influence of Qadris of Tariqat persuasion. Sheikh Masoom made his son, Saif-ud-Din, the mentor of Aurangzeb, at his request. Saif- ud-Din was instrumental in inspiring Aurangzeb to launch the massive project of Fataawa Alamgiri, with 500 scholars and countless support staff, which would be completed long after his death. One of the main architects of this project, Shah Abdul Rahim would also swear allegiance to the Mujaddidi Naqshbandis, and his son Shah Waliullah, and grandson Shah Abdul Aziz would play such oversized roles that the entire Sufi pantheon would be coloured in a pro or anti hue of their legacy. It was, therefore, not a surprise, that the Mujaddidi silsila of Naqshbandi Tariqa became the flavour of the season in the remaining period of the Mughal Empire. The Ulaia Naqshbandis drifted apart, and as we would see, would join the Barelvis, while the Mujaddidi faction would influence the Deobandis. Shah Waliullah was terribly distressed by the decline of the Mughal Empire and the ascent of the Marathas. He was the one who played the traitor to India, in the classic Dar- ul-Islam/Dar-ul-Harb binary, and invited Ahmad Shah Abdali, set up an alliance for him

with Najibullah of Rohilkhand and the Shi’a Asafuddaulah of Avadh, and triggered the 1761 Battle of Panipat. The gains of Panipat did not last long and Abdali had to go back, with the Marathas chasing him and winning Delhi and Najibabad back in 1771. Shah Abdul Aziz then declared India Dar-ul-Harb in 1803, alarmed by the power of the Marathas, the British and the Sikhs. Shah Abdul Aziz had two principal lines of disciples. Syed Ahmad Barelvi, with his disciple Shah Ismail Dehlawi, who was also Abdul Aziz’s grandson on the one side, and Maulana Fazle Haq Khairabadi Chishti and Fazle Rasool Badayuni on the other side. The former followed the Mujaddidi Naqshbandi’s hardline Sufi ways, and the latter followed the Prophet’s divinity doctrine. The immediate cause of dispute was an 1826 book by Shah Ismail titled ‘Taqwatul Iman’, in which he belittled the Prophet as just an ‘Insan-e-Kamil’ or the perfect human being. He was opposed by the Fazle Haq faction with a Fatwa signed by 14 scholars denouncing the book, and, as is customary among various factions, labelling Shah Ismail as a Kafir. Syed Ahmad Barelvi and Shah Ismail died fighting a Jihad against the Sikhs in Balakot, but the schism persisted. The Fazle Haq faction insisted on the three attributes of the Prophet, viz. that he was the ‘noor-e-Allah’, that he was hazir-nazir, or ever present, and that he had the ilm-e- ghaib, or knowledge of the things unseen. After the 1857 revolts, Fazle Haq was transported to the Andamans, and the followers of Shah Ismail founded the Deoband sect. Followers of the opposing sect comprised all other Sufi Tariqas and even the other silsila of Naqshbandis (Ulaia). Under Ahmad Raza Barelvi, they would set up the Barelvi sect in 1904 in Bareilly. Today, both Deoband and Barelvi sects regard Sufi Tariqat as subordinate to Shariat. Not just that, there is no difference of opinion among them on Da’wa and Jihad. The position is the same as that of Hanbalis, and by extension, same as Al Qaida and ISIS. This is what is taught in madrasas, and the Indian government tolerates it in the name of religious rights.

The Barelvi sect is owed allegiance to by every Sufi Tariqa and silsila, except the Mujaddidi silsila of Naqshbandi Tariqa, who are theologically much closer to Deobandi, influenced as they are by Ahmad Sirhindi and Shah Ismail. All one needs to do is to have a look at the ‘nafrat ke ahkām’ (Ordinances/Commandments) contained within the 30-volume magnum opus Fataawa-i-Razvia of its founder Sheikh Ahmad Raza Barelvi Qadri. 3. BEHAVIOURAL HISTORY We saw what the Sufis did in the Kashmir Valley in the 14th and 15th centuries. We have also seen how Ahmad Sirhindi became instrumental in the killing of the 4th Sikh Guru. The influence of these Sufis became all pervasive in Aurangzeb’s time, whose bigotry will need a separate article by itself. We have also seen the activities of Shah Waliullah and his bigoted disciples, including Syed Ahmad Barelvi, who was unique in the sense that he was an Ulema, a Sufi, and a Ghazi—all rolled into one. The 1857 revolt was turned into a jihad by the Sufis. Fazle Haq Khairabadi Farooqui Chishti issued a fatwa of jihad from Delhi. The Sufi aspiration from the 1857 revolt was to re-establish the glory of the Mughal Empire by ousting the British. Except the Faraizi movement of Bengal, whose leaders Shariatullah, Titu Mian and Dhondu Mian were influenced by Wahabbism, in the 19th century, every major massacre of Hindus had a Sufi sub-text to it. The 1921 Mappilla rebellion and massacre were led by a Qadri Sufi, Abu Musliyar, aided by VK Kunjahammed Haji of the same denomination. Today, the Grand Mufti of India, who doubles up as the Chief of Barelvi-Sufis, is a descendant of Ali Musaliyar, namely Sheikh Abubakr Ahmad aka Kanthapuram Aboobacker Musaliyar. He is also the head of the influential organisation Markaz based out of Calicut (Kozhikode). The 1946 Calcutta Killings were led by the able Premier belonging to the Suhrawardy Tariqa, Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy.

The 1946 Noakhali Massacres were initiated and led by Ghulam Sarwar Husseini, a Nizami Chishti and a member of the Pir family of Diara Sharif Dargah in Noakhali. The 1947 massacres in NWFP and the bordering J&K areas of Poonch and Mirpur were inspired by the Qadri chief of Manki Sharif in Nowshera district, Amin-ul- Hasanat. The conversion and abduction being done by the Qadri Pir, Mithu Mian of Bharchundi Sharif in Sind, Pakistan, are well known to all. Thus, violence and fanaticism does not go away just because Sufis like to sing and dance in fulfilment of ‘ihsān’, which is subordinate to Imān and Din. CONCLUSION It needs just a few simple questions to any votary of Sufi syncretism to demolish any claim of peaceful coexistence: • Do Sufis have an existence apart from their Fiqh (Mazhab)? • • •

Do Sufis not follow Shariat? Does Tariqat (tasawwuf/Sufi way) supersede Shariat? Is there a single verse in the entire Shariat Trilogy (Qur’an, Hadis and Sirat) corpus that appreciates the Dharmik way?

• Can a Sufi bless any unbeliever? Since the answer to each of these questions is an emphatic ‘No’, you have your answer. QED References 77

Chapter 18.

PART IV POSTSCRIPT

CHAPTER 41

Postscript 1: Street Riots and Mayhem in Delhi the submission of manuscript and editing, my analysis of B etween the situation in the book came out exactly correct with a severe bout of street rioting in Delhi. The police investigation is now nearly concluded, and the riots have a familiar ring. The riots seem to be a direct result of the failure of Khilafat 2.0 of Shaheen Bagh to make an impact, leading to what may be called Direct Action 3.0. Dr Ambedkar’s prognostication of ‘gangster’s politics’ and H.V. Seshadri’s prognostication of ‘denunciations, and street rioting’ has played out exactly like that. Add to it the expertise in victim playing. However, the other prognostication of appeasement and surrender has not happened. Instead, the riots were brought under control quickly, and the investigations seem to be throwing up a web of funding, planned incitement, and intent to wrest back the lost ‘Muslim Veto’. The assertion of mazhabi pehchan seems to have acquired a new urgency. If the conspiracy angle turns out to be correct, as the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha debates seem to indicate, the riots would fall into the familiar pattern of communal rioting in India. As with the overwhelming majority of riots, the reaction from the other side has been fierce. In Direct Action Day 1.0 too, the eventual losses suffered by the aggressors were higher than those of the defending community. The template in the 1.0 event was the same

followed by Islamic communities over 14 centuries, with the 1922 division of Turkey and Greece serving as the most proximate instance. However, the Muslim leadership is always a winner; even if the Muslim public suffers, the clerical leadership gains by radicalising the public and preparing them for retaliation. The tactic goes into fortifying the strategy of maintaining the power of the clerics over the faithful. The ISIS tactics are a good indicator. Their leadership has always been the gainer in terms of maintaining their hold, whether their followers die or live. The classic Muslim leadership tactic is to provoke strife and invite counterattacks. If the riots result in an upper hand for the clerics, the leadership ascribes it to the grace of Allah. If it results in a setback, the opportunity for playing victim and radicalising the youth is always there as a prize. To understand this mindset, a little peek into Islamic theology is warranted. Islam, like other Abrahamic religions, views life on earth in the following fundamental way: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

Time flows linearly and has a definite beginning and an end. In other words, Time has a finite existence; Time is created by the Creator, Allah, and will be brought to an end by Allah; Logic is bivalued, either true or false. Whatever is said by Allah through his Rasool (Prophet) is true. Everything else is false; The only correct proof is the proof of scripture, it prevails over empirical proof (epistemic concept); Human beings have only one life, at the end of which they will be judged by Allah on the Day of Last Judgement ( akhirat or qayamat ) with the help of prophets; Based on the judgement, a human being will be cast into eternal heaven of perpetual carnal enjoyment or a perpetual hell of terrible hellfire;

7.

Only human beings have souls, the rest of creation is for their enjoyment; 8. Non-believers in Islam will be compulsorily cast into hell, irrespective of their merits. The entire Islamic theology is built on these premises. The clerics ensure that the layperson is kept under the fear of hell, and made to conform to every absurd idea that they throw up. The development of the exegeses of Quran that form 86% of the Shari’a Trilogy (Quran 14%, Hadis 70% and Sirat-e-Rasool 16%) serves to enhance the power of the clerical and ruling classes and keep the public under thrall. How does this work out in practice? The leadership is fully in the hands of the clerics. The Urdu press is a particularly dark side of this mazhabi politics. Arun Shourie quotes Maulana Wahiduddin Khan in his seminal book, The World of Fatwas : Events having shown that Muslims clash not only with Hindus but also with the police[,] we should now ascertain where to lay the blame. The greatest offenders are the journalists and leaders of the Muslim community itself. After every riot they cannot find words enough to describe the ‘brutality and savagery’ of the police; in consequence, Muslim sentiments are kept perpetually on the boil. Their anger against and hatred for the police are never allowed to simmer down. As a result, whenever policemen appear on the scene, they become enraged and hit out at them, trying by all possible means to humiliate them. This belligerent attitude on the part of Muslim newspapers and leaders is the root cause of the intense mutual hatred between Muslims and the police.78

You may check the utterances of the Muslim leadership after the Delhi riots of 2019 and 2020 and juxtapose them against this quote. One can easily see that the response and reaction exactly fit the template. That the ‘gangster’s method of politics’ is projected as jihad by other means by the leadership, which mostly consists of the upperclass ashraaf , has been noted by many people. Let us understand the classic meaning of jihad in the Indian context because every Muslim ruler in India has styled himself as the ‘Emir of Islam’, his army has invariably been called the ‘Lashkar of Islam’ and the chief theologian has always been called the ‘Sheikh-ul-Islam’.

The nature of ‘jihad’ is often asserted to be that of an ‘inner struggle’. However, one look at the various Hadis and the final Surah of the Quran, At-Tawba (9th), and its immunity verses would make it clear that the nature of jihad in a land where the faithful are in a minority would necessarily lead to religious riots. Suhas Majumdar says in his insightful work— Jihad — The Islamic Doctrine of Permanent War —that, in a place where the faithful are in a minority, any Imam can take up the mantle of issuing a call for jihad: By the same token, non-Islamic states with a large body of Muslim population must of necessity give rise to religious riots, if the ulema declares these states to be Dar- ul-Harb . The Immunity Verses of the Koran must, in the nature of things, come into full play in such states. In this restricted sense at least, jihad and religious riot are one. Who would give the call for such riots? It has been shown in the previous chapter that jihad cannot start without the Imam pronouncing a call for it. It has also been pointed out that in Islamic states, the king is the person best qualified to pronounce such a call. But in Dar-ul-Harb, such an Imam is not available. So any person with the requisite Islamic qualifications can give the call for jihad , and even the Imam who leads the congregation in Friday prayers can very well undertake the job. Needless to say, such a jihad can hardly turn out to be anything but a species of religious riot.79

Jadunath Sarkar is even more explicit: Islamic theology, therefore, tells the true believer that his highest duty is to make exertion (jihad) in the path of God by waging war against infidel lands ( Dar-ulHarb ) till they become a part of the realm of Islam ( Dar-ul- Islam ). After conquest, the entire infidel population becomes theoretically reduced to the status of slaves of the conquering army (Muslims). The men taken with arms are to be slain or sold into slavery and their wives and children induced to servitude. 80 The murder of infidels (even if they are innocent) is counted [as] merit in a Muslim…. He has only to slay a certain class of his fellow-beings (non-Muslims) or plunder their lands and wealth and this act is itself would raise his (Muslim’s) soul to Heaven. A religion where followers are taught to regard robbery and murder as a religious duty is incompatible with the progress of mankind or with the peace of the world. 81

The understanding is essential because Pakistan was the outcome of minority politics of Muslims in UP, CP, Bombay, Madras and Orissa and not of the majority politics of Punjab and Bengal. The Shaheen Bagh and Delhi riots are an exact template of the above-mentioned phenomenon, with the minor difference that a

certain secular theocracy has joined hands with the Islamic theocracy. Cut to the recent incident involving the Tablighi Jamaat. Its Chief is a descendant of a Deobandi cleric, who went even more conservative than the Deoband’s austere creed. However, the essentials remain the same—absolute faith in the Word of the Shari’a and the inevitability of the Last Judgment Day. If anything, they try and hasten the arrival of the day of Qayamat. To this end, an epidemic like the COVID-19 or Corona Virus Epidemic becomes a gift from Allah, as they feel that it would kill kafirs in great numbers and bring the Akhirat/Qayamat closer. Even if 90% of the infected are from among the faithfuls, it does not matter because the Chief says that it is the kafirs who are getting killed in larger numbers. In the ‘World of Faithfuls’, i.e., the ones with ‘Iman’, facts do not matter. What matters is the assertion of the Amir, or the worldly leader of their death cult, whom they regard as next only to Allah and the Prophet. References 78 Arun Shourie. 2012. The World of Fatwas or The Sharia in Action . India: Harper Collins. Location 3922–3930, Kindle Edition. 79 Suhas Majumdar. 1994. Chapter 10. In Jihad — The Islamic doctrine of Permanent War , Voice of India. 80 Jadunath Sarkar. 1912–1924. Vol. 3. In History of Aurangzib . Location 163– 164. 81

Ibid.

CHAPTER 42

Postscript 2: Way Forward in Jammu and Kashmir transition of J&K to twin Union Territory (UT) status has been T he surprisingly smooth. It only goes to show that the assumptions and presumptions on which the entire state philosophy was based were remiss and reprobate. That jihad could be bought over is a historical folly that was attempted by many in the past, but each one came to grief. The only way to fight Islamic jihad is to crush it. Spain provides the only successful model of reversing jihad. India provides a good model of long successful resistance, but the reversal model has not yet been developed and attempted. It would be another folly to think that the same methods of democracy under a full statehood would be the panacea to the ills of J&K. Ladakh has become secure because it has made a clean break from the Kashmir Valley. There is a thinking that full statehood may be given to J&K at an early date. Nothing would be more disastrous. There is another line of thinking that the Government of India could seed new parties by rehashing the old actors such as Altaf Bukhari. One only needs to look at past experience to conclude that no Valley-based politician can ignore the Islamic forces of the Valley. From all accounts, the public in the Valley is quite happy with the change that the UT status has brought to the Valley. The separatist sentiment has been nearly killed by full integration, levels of

corruption are down, violence is at a very low ebb, and development is picking up. As such, there is no hurry to go to full statehood. The UT of J&K has the provision of an elected assembly. That should be elected first after the delimitation is over. The Lt Governor’s control over the full state apparatus, as provided in the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, is critical in J&K. Jammu has been discriminated against by the Valley Muslims ever since the time of Sheikh Abdullah, who never made any secret of his dislike of the Dogras and Kashmiri Pandits. This has been captured in detail. The next step should be to grant full state status to Jammu. The ‘Medina Strategy’ of Pakistan visualises the capture of Jammu through Islamisation as the first step of the Ghazwa-e-Hind strategy. The Valley politicians have been willing hostages to this Pakistan ploy. The J&K High Court is currently hearing a petition against large-scale state-sponsored encroachment and regularisation of land by Muslims in Jammu. The intent of the demographic change is only too stark. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that Jammu be completely insulated from the Islamic politics of the Valley. For a start, Kashmiri and Dogri, spoken by 56% and 30% population of J&K respectively, should replace Urdu as the state languages, as Urdu is spoken by just 0.16% of the population, but is the language of Islamic imperialism in the state. 82 The Government of J&K has now given the status of State language to four languages —Urdu, Kashmiri, Dogri, and Hindi. Though most leaders have been released as the situation becomes normal in the Kashmir Valley, their past should never be forgotten. I have documented their dalliance with Pakistan and Islamic terror in this book. They have used democracy, never practised it. Democracy has only gifted J&K with two or three superrich dynasties, which would have eked out a middle- class existence in any other set-up. To sum up, J&K has been rescued with great foresight, perspicacity and courage. It is time for our planners, intelligence community, and strategic thinkers to put their heads together and ensure that they do not commit the same mistakes committed in the past.

It is also time to strategise ahead internationally. The US–Afghan Taliban pact has materialised, for whatever it is worth. The Pakistan Army and the Pakistan-based terror machine is viewing this as a victory for jihad-fi-sabilillah 83 . The Indian move on the chessboard was timely. One has to be fully prepared for a full-blown assault on Kashmir by the Pakistan terror machine with high morale and motivation. A defensive war can never be won. The undeclared war with Pakistan has to incorporate an offensive strategy. Break-up of Pakistan is not desired by the West, including the US. However, this break-up is a desirable strategy from the Indian point of view. India has to get out of the stranglehold of the secular theocracy and must treat demographic security as an essential part of its ‘security doctrine’. The country’s integrity comes ahead of everything else, and even the Constitution recognises it. The Constitution itself provides that parts of it can be made inoperative in national emergencies, the ‘liberal’ noise notwithstanding. This is the ultimate proof that national integrity and sovereignty ranks ahead of even the Constitution. This should be drilled into every Indian citizen. India has also to set right the Leftist stranglehold on the academia and its history-writing. Left is no friend of India’s. It cannot be allowed to use democracy to keep subverting democracy. All necessary measures must be taken to recognise and set this right. It would be fitting to end this chapter by once again recalling Dr Ambedkar in the matter of appeasing and giving concessions to an aggressor: It seems to me that Congress has failed to realise two things. The first thing which the Congress has failed to realise is that there is a difference between appeasement and settlement and that the difference is an essential one. Appeasement means buying off the aggressor by conniving at his acts of murder, rape, arson and loot against innocent persons who happen for the moment to be the victims of his displeasure. On the other hand, settlement means laying down the bounds which neither party to it can transgress. Appeasement sets no limits to the demands and aspirations of the aggressor. Settlement does. The second thing the Congress has failed to realise is that the policy of concession has increased Muslim aggressiveness, and what is worse, Muslims interpret these concessions as a sign of defeatism on the part of the Hindus and the absence of the will to resist. This policy of appeasement will involve the Hindus in the same fearful

situation in which the Allies found themselves as a result of the policy of appeasement, which they adopted towards Hitler. 84 References 82 Union Cabinet has now approved inclusion of Dogri, Kashmiri and Hindi as state languages in addition to Urdu and English. 83

As described in Qur’an 61.10–11.

84

Dr B.R. Ambedkar. Chapter XI. In Pakistan or the Partition of India . Location 5869–5878, Kindle Edition.

EPILOGUE

CHAPTER 43

One Nation Theory and ‘The 2nd Republic’ writing this chapter after I decided to pull this book from I am Bloomsbury, after they had listed it for sale on Amazon and other e-commerce market places, in the wake of their suppression of the Freedom of Speech of the authors of a book lined up for release, the now famous ‘Delhi Riots 2020—The Untold Story’. Whatever has transpired between the final proof reading of the book sometime in June, its review copies being printed in July, and my termination of the contract with Bloomsbury, one thing has become absolutely clear—whatever I have written in the book about the motivations and intent of the Indian Ashraaf class has been proved correct, and even admitted as such. The Indian Hanafi Sunni Muslim class is actually a deeply racist society. The Ashraaf, who form the bulwark and frame all the rules and provide all the contact points, comprise the clerical class, the high maulanas and Muftis, as well as the rich landed and business class. They also include the upper class converts. This is the class that chanted the Pakistan slogan and achieved the Partition in their quest for complete Islamisation of the Indian Subcontinent. The longterm goal of converting the whole world into Islam is never lost on this class of Muslims. It is also fallacious to blame the Two-Nation Theory on people like Syed Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah

alone. The two nations of Ummat and Kuffar are built into the very grain of the Islamic doctrine. After all, Maulana Azad, supposedly a great nationalist, espoused the cause of Ummat all the while, and opposed the concept of Qaumiyat Judagana (Separate Nations) only for expediency, and never opposed the basic doctrine. The case in point is the recent admission of Asaduddin Owaisi that Indian Hanafi Muslims follow the Fataawa-i- Alamgiri of the fanatical Aurangzeb. Other than splurging money on the vast Mughal Army and his own durbar and harem, the greatest amount squandered by Aurangzeb was on this project. It was headed by a Sufi, Naqshbandi muhaddis, Nizam Burhanpuri. He was assisted by Shah Abdul Rahim, another Naqshbandi. Shah Abdul Rahim is also famous for his Madarsa Rahimiya of Delhi. He is even more famous for being the father of Shah Waliullah, who is famous for inviting Ahmad Shah Abdali and forging an alliance with the Rohilla, Shah Najibullah, and the Shi’a ruler of Avadh, Asaf-ud-Daula. Waliullah is hailed as a great Muslim for this act by the Muslims, even as they call Mir Jafar a traitor for teaming up with Hindus to throw off the oppressive Siraj-ud-Daula. The Tipu Sultan freedom fighter trope is also similar, even though he was also writing letters to Shah of Afghanistan, and to the Caliph to invade Hindustan and convert it into Dar-ul-Islam. Details of the ‘Myth of Sufi Syncretism’ 85 have been documented in detail in the piece given at the footnote. Waliullah’s son, Shah Abdul Aziz, continued this policy of extreme bigotry and supremacism, declaring India as Dar-ul-Harb in 1803. It was in pursuance of this declaration that Syed Ahmad Barelvi Shaheed and Shah Ismail Shaheed went to NWFP to fight jihad against Maharaja Ranjit Singh. They were both killed in action in 1932 at Balakot. The Deobandi-Barelvi schism happened in 1826 on the question of the Prophet’s divine status, leading ultimately to the establishment of Deobandi and Barelvi sects in the 1860s and 1900s, respectively. Their principal doctrinal books, Hidayah, and Fataawa-i-Razvia, are both founded on the Alamgiri doctrine. From the beginning of 20th century till today, the doctrine is being chanted from the pulpits, yet, the fatal discourse that the Indian National Congress adopted in 1920 down the precipice of a flawed doctrine of ‘sarva dharma

samabhava’ served to blind the larger Hindu population towards the natural violent hate that Islam harbours against all non-believers, and in particular against the mushrikeen 86 . That it culminated in the partition of India, and thence went on to officially confirm the TwoNation Theory in the form of Art. 370 was but a natural consequence. That India survived even in its present form in the face of total capitulation to Muslim League by the Congress is owed to only three persons—Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Subhash Chandra Bose and Vallabhbhai Patel. Left to Gandhi, Nehru and Azad, the trio that was at the helm through the early forties, the Rahmat Ali Map (the one on the cover of this book)—and the Communist Party of India dream of Gangadhar Adhikari, of having one Pakistan and 17 divided countries—would have become a reality. After the transfer of power through the Indian Independence Act, 1947, an Act of the British Parliament, India could have proudly reclaimed its heritage and could have held its head aloft in the comity of nations. However, the effete leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru chose a course that was to further degrade the genius of the Indian people. The fatal practice of Nehruism, which was a cocktail of Hindu hatred, Islamic exaltation, English imitation, Communist infatuation and Socialist evisceration, took away the vitality of the new politically independent India. India never attained mental and cultural independence. The same forces had sapped Indian vitality to such an extent that they swallowed the cowardice preached as ahimsa by the Mahatma, and never once thought of rising to at least ring-fence the new Republic from the pernicious forces of Islamism, Cultural Marxism and Evangelism. Even though the BJP has been in power for more than six years now, it has been unable to shake off the narratives put in place by Nehruism and its cheerleaders. As the venerable Sitaram Goel said, ‘I view Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as a bloated Brown Sahib, and Nehruism as the combined embodiment of all the imperialist ideologies — Islam, Christianity, White Man’s Burden, and Communism that have flooded this country in the wake of foreign

invasions. And I do not have the least doubt in my mind that if India is to live, Nehruism must die. Of course, it is already dying under the weight of its sins against the Indian people, their country, their society, their economy, their environment, and their culture. What I plead is that a conscious rejection of Nehruism in all its forms will hasten its demise, and save us from the mischief which it is bound to create further if it is allowed to linger.’ Such is its hold that even those who criticise Nehru day in and day out, are unable to distinguish between Nehru and Nehruism. To expect them to recognise the full contours of the dystopia wrought by Nehruism would, therefore, be a vain hope. Even the present ruling party, while criticising Nehru with all its might, is unable to extricate itself from the iron shackles of Nehruism. The colonisation brought by the British may have gone in its physical form, but the colonisation perpetuated by Nehruism shows no signs of abatement. Nehruism continued to divide India, with its popular appeal cutting across parties and ideologies. It also provided the fertile soil in which the ever-willing ideologies of division, i.e., Communism, Islamism and Evangelism, would reap a rich harvest. Nullification of Article 370 and enactment of CAA is recognition of the need to get rid of the imprint of Nehruism on our polity. Its impact on identity, education, religion, environment and gender is such as to create permanent resentments, and yet it fosters and promotes mindless pursuit of rights to the neglect of duties and creates an entitled class of minorities, who are portrayed as victims in spite of being the successors of India’s historical oppressors. The two welcome moves are the beginning of what may ultimately lead to a renewal, a renaissance and ‘The 2nd Republic’. References 85 Busting the Myth of Sufi Syncretism: Singing and Dancing as a Cover for Jihad. Available at: https://kreately.in/busting-the- myth-of-sufi-syncretismsinging-and-dancing-as-a-cover-for-jihad/ (accessed on 29/06/2020). 86 Murti worshippers (often called idol-worshippers in the West).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

THE CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2019

APPENDIX 2

RESULT OF 1937 ELECTIONS

Leglslatlve Councils

APPENDIX 3

RESULT OF 1945–46 ELECTIONS

APPENDIX 4

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION BY STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR Appendix A INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION Instrument of Accession executed by Maharajah Hari Singh on October 26, 1947. Whereas the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up an independent Dominion known as INDIA, and the Government of India Act 1935, shall with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor General may by order specify, be applicable to the Dominion of India. And whereas the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by the Governor General, provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof. Now, therefore, I Shriman Inder Mahinder Rajrajeswar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Jammu & Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipati, Ruler of Jammu & Kashmir State, in the exercise of my Sovereignty in and over my said State do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession and

l.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of Jammu & Kashmir (hereinafter referred to as 'this State') such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India, on the 15th day of August 1947, (which Act as so in force is hereafter referred to as 'the act'). I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession. I accept the matters specified in the schedule hereto as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make law for this State. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance that if an agreement is made between the Governor General and the Ruler of this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Dominion Legislature all be exercised by the Ruler of the State, then any such agreement shall be construed and have effect accordingly. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by me by Instrument supplementary to this Instrument. Nothing is this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this State authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the purpose of a Dominion law which applies in this State deem it necessary to

acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense, or, if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India. 7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into agreement with the Government of India under any such future constitution. 8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my Sovereignty in and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State. 9. I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors. Given under my hand this 26th day of October, nineteen hundred and forty seven. Hari Singh Maharajadhiraj of Jammu & Kashmir State. ACCEPTANCE OF ACCESSION BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession. Dated this twenty-seventh day of October, nineteen hundred and forty seven. Mountbatten of Burm a Governor General of I ndia.

APPENDIX 5

OBJECTIVES RESOLUTION OF PAKISTAN Objectives Resolution was presented in the Constituent Assembly by Liaquat Ali Khan on March 7, 1949, and was debated for five days by members from both the treasury and opposition benches. The resolution was ultimately passed on March 12. Following were the main features of the Objectives Resolution: 1. Sovereignty of the entire Universe belongs to Allah alone. 2. Authority should be delegated to the State through its people under the rules set by Allah. 3. Constitution of Pakistan should be framed by the Constituent Assembly. 4. State should exercise its powers through the chosen representatives. 5. Principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as ensured by Islam, should be followed. 6. Muslims shall live their lives according to the teaching of Quran and Sunnah. 7. Minorities can freely profess and practice their religion. 8. There should be Federal form of government with the maximum autonomy for the Units.

9.

Fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality should be given to all the citizens of the state. 10. It would be the duty of the state to safeguard the interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes. 11. Independence of judiciary should be guaranteed. 12. Integrity of the territory and sovereignty of the country is to be safeguarded. 13. The people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honored place amongst the nations of the world and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity.

APPENDIX 6

JOGENDRA NATH MANDAL’S RESIGNATION LETTER My dear Prime Minister It is with a heavy heart and a sense of utter frustration at the failure of my lifelong mission to uplift the backward Hindu masses of East Bengal that I feel compelled to tender the resignation of my membership of your cabinet. It is proper that I should set forth in detail the reasons which have prompted me to take this decision at this important juncture of the Indo–Pakistani subcontinent. It is to share just a truth. 1.

Before I narrate the remote and immediate causes of my resignation, it may be useful to give a short background of the important events that have taken place during the period of my cooperation with the League. Having been approached by a few prominent League leaders of Bengal in February 1943, I agreed to work with them in the Bengal Legislative Assembly. After the fall of the Fazlul Haq ministry in March 1943, with a party of 21 Scheduled Caste MLAs, I agreed to cooperate with Khwaja Nazimuddin, the then leader of the

Muslim League Parliamentary Party who formed the Cabinet in April 1943. Our cooperation was conditional on certain specific terms, such as the inclusion of three Scheduled Caste Ministers in the Cabinet, sanctioning of a sum of Rupees Five Lakhs as an annual recurring grant for the education of the Scheduled Castes, and the unqualified application of the communal ratio rules in the matter of appointment to Government services. 2. Apart from these terms, the principal objectives that prompted me to work in co-operation with the Muslim League were, first that the economic interests of the Muslims in Bengal were generally identical with those of the Scheduled Castes. Muslims were mostly cultivators and labourers, and so were members of the Scheduled Castes. One section of Muslims were fishermen, so was a section of the Scheduled Castes as well, and secondly that the Scheduled Castes and the Muslims were both educationally backward. I was persuaded that my cooperation with the League and its Ministry would lead to the undertaking on a wide scale of legislative and administrative measures which, while promoting the mutual welfare of the vast bulk of Bengal’s population, and undermining the foundations of vested interest and privilege, would further the cause of communal peace and harmony. It may be mentioned here that Khwaja Nazimuddin took three Scheduled Caste Ministers in his cabinet and appointed three Parliamentary Secretaries from amongst the members of my community. SUHRAWARDY MINISTRY 3.

After the general elections held in March 1946, Mr H.S. Suhrawardy became the leader of the League Parliamentary Party in March 1946 and formed the League Ministry in April 1946. I was the only Scheduled Caste member returned on the federation ticket. I was included in Mr Suhrawardy’s

Cabinet. The 16th day of August of that year was observed in Calcutta as ‘The Direct Action Day’ by the Muslim League. It resulted, as you know, in a holocaust. Hindus demanded my resignation from the League Ministry. My life was in peril. I began to receive threatening letters almost every day. But I remained steadfast to my policy. Moreover, I issued an appeal through our journal ‘Jagaran’ to the Scheduled Caste people to keep themselves aloof from the bloody feud between the Congress and the Muslim League even at the risk of my life. I cannot but gratefully acknowledge the fact that I was saved from the wrath of infuriated Hindu mobs by my Caste Hindu neighbours. The Calcutta carnage was followed by the ‘Noakhali Riot’ in October 1946. There, Hindus including Scheduled Castes were killed and hundreds were converted to Islam. Hindu women were raped and abducted. Members of my community also suffered the loss of life and property. Immediately after these happenings, I visited Tipperah and Feni and saw some riot-affected areas. The terrible sufferings of Hindus overwhelmed me with grief, but still, I continued the policy of co-operation with the Muslim League. Immediately after the massive Calcutta Killing[s], a no-confidence motion was moved against the Suhrawardy Ministry. It was only due to my efforts that the support of four Anglo–Indian Members and of four Scheduled Caste members of the Assembly who had hitherto been with the Congress could be secured, but for which the Ministry would have been defeated. 4. In October 1946, most unexpectedly came to me through Mr Suhrawardy the offer of a seat in the Interim Government of India. After a good deal of hesitation and being given only one hour to make my final decision, I consented to accept the offer subject to the condition only that I should be permitted to resign if my leader Dr B.R. Ambedkar disapproved of my action. Fortunately, however, I received his approval in a telegram sent from London. Before I left for Delhi to take over as Law Member, I persuaded Mr Suhrawardy, the then Chief Minister of Bengal, to agree to take two Ministers in his

Cabinet in my place and to appoint two Parliamentary Secretaries from the Scheduled Case Federation Group. 5. I joined the Interim Government on November 1, 1946. After about a month when I paid a visit to Calcutta, Mr Suhrawardy apprised me of the communal tension in some parts of East Bengal, especially in Gopalganj Sub- division, where the Namahsudras were in majority, being very high. He requested me to visit those areas and address meetings of Muslims and Namahsudras. The fact was that Namahsudras in those areas had made preparations for retaliation. I addressed about a dozen largely attended meetings. The result was that Namahsudras gave up the idea of retaliation. Thus an inevitable dangerous communal disturbance was averted. 6. After a few months, the British Government made their June 3 Statement (1947) embodying certain proposals for the partition of India. The whole country, especially the entire non-Muslim India, was startled. For the sake of truth, I must admit that I had always considered the demand of Pakistan by the Muslim League as a bargaining counter. Although I honestly felt that in the context of India as a whole Muslims had legitimate cause for grievance against upper-class Hindu chauvinism, I held the view very strongly indeed that the creation of Pakistan would never solve the communal problem. On the contrary, it would aggravate communal hatred and bitterness. Besides, I maintained that it would not ameliorate the condition of Muslims in Pakistan. The inevitable result of the partition of the country would be to prolong, if not perpetuate, the poverty, illiteracy and miserable condition of the toiling masses of both the States. I further apprehended that Pakistan might turn to be one of the most backward and undeveloped countries of South East Asia. LAHORE RESOLUTION 7.

I must make it clear that I have thought that an attempt would be made, as is being done at present, to develop Pakistan as a purely ‘Islamic’ State based on the Shariat and the injunctions and formulae of Islam. I presumed that it would be set up in all essentials after the pattern

contemplated in the Muslim League resolution adopted at Lahore on March 23, 1940. That resolution stated inter alia that (I) ‘geographically contiguous areas are demarcated into regions which should be constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the northwestern and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign’ and (II) ‘adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the Constitution for minorities in these units and these regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them’. Implicitly in this formula were (a) that north-western and eastern Muslim zones should be constituted into two independent states, (b) that the constituent units of these states should be autonomous and sovereign, (c) that minorities’ guarantee should be in respect of rights as well as of interest and extend to every sphere of their lives, and (d) that Constitutional provisions should be made in these regards in consultation with the minorities themselves. I was fortified in my faith in this resolution and the professions of the League Leadership by the statement Qaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah was pleased to make on the 11th August 1947 as the President of the Constituent Assembly giving solemn assurance of equal treatment for Hindus & Muslims alike and calling upon them to remember that they were all Pakistanis. There was then no question of dividing the people on the basis of religion into full- fledged Muslim citizens and zimmis being under the perpetual custody of the Islamic State and its Muslims citizens. Every one of these pledges is being flagrantly violated apparently to your knowledge and with your approval in complete disregard of the Qaid-e-Azam’s wishes and sentiments and to the detriment and humiliation of the minorities.

PARTITION OF BENGAL 8.

It may also be mentioned in this connection that I was opposed to the partition of Bengal. In launching a campaign in this regard I had to face not only tremendous resistance from all quarters but also unspeakable abuse, insult and dishonour. With great regret, I recollect those days when 32 crores of Hindus of this Indo–Pakistan Sub-continent turned their back against me and dubbed me as the enemy of Hindus and Hinduism, but I remained undaunted and unmoved in my loyalty to Pakistan. It is a matter of gratitude that my appeal to 7 million Scheduled Caste people of Pakistan evoked a ready and enthusiastic response from them. They lent me their unstinted support, sympathy and encouragement. 9. After the establishment of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, you formed the Pakistan Cabinet, in which I was included and Khwaja Nazimuddin formed a provisional Cabinet for East Bengal. On August 10, I had spoken to Khwaja Nazimuddin at Karachi and requested him to take 2 Scheduled Caste Ministers in the East Bengal Cabinet. He promised to do the same sometime later. What happened subsequently in this regard was a record of unpleasant and disappointing negotiation with you, Khwaja Nazimuddin and Mr Nurul Amin, the present Chief Minister of East Bengal. When I realised that Khwaja Nazimuddin was avoiding the issue on this or that excuse, I became almost impatient and exasperated. I further discussed the matter with the Presidents of the Pakistan Muslim League and its East Bengal Branch. Ultimately, I brought the matter to your notice. You were pleased to discuss the subject with Khwaja Nazimuddin in my presence at your residence. Khwaja Nazimuddin agreed to take one Scheduled Caste Minister on his return to Dacca. As I had already become sceptic about the assurance of Khwaja Nazimuddin, I wanted to be definite about the time-frame. I insisted that he must act in this regard with a month, failing which I should be at liberty to resign. Both you and Khwaja

Nazimuddin agreed to the condition. But alas! You did not perhaps mean what you said. Khwaja Nazimuddin did not keep his promise. After Mr Nurul Amin had become the Chief Minister of East Bengal, I again took up the matter with him. He also followed the same old familiar tactics of evasion. When I again called your attention to this matter before you visited Dacca in 1949, you were pleased to assure me that Minority Ministers would be appointed in East Bengal, and you asked 2/3 names from me for consideration. In deference to your wish, I sent you a note stating the Federation Group in the East Bengal Assembly and suggesting three names. When I made enquiries as to what had happened on your return from Dacca, you appeared to be very cold and only remarked: ‘Let Nurul Amin return from Delhi’. After a few days, I again pressed the matter. But you avoided the issue. I was then forced to come to the conclusion that neither you nor Mr Nurul Amin had any intention to take any Scheduled Caste Minister in the East Bengal Cabinet. Apart from this, I was noticing that Mr Nurul Amin and some League leaders of East Bengal were trying to create disruption among the Members of the Scheduled Caste Federation. It appeared to me that my leadership and wide-spread popularity were considered ominous. My outspokenness, vigilance and sincere efforts to safeguard the interests of the minorities of Pakistan, in general, and of the Scheduled Caste, in particular, were considered a matter [of] annoyance to the East Bengal Govt and few League leaders. Undaunted, I took my firm stand to safeguard the interests of the minorities of Pakistan. ANTI-HINDU POLICY 10. When the question of partition of Bengal arose, the Scheduled Caste people were alarmed at the anticipated dangerous result of partition. Representation on their behalf was made to Mr Suhrawardy, the then Chief Minister of Bengal who was pleased to issue a statement to the press declaring that none of the rights and privileges hitherto

enjoyed by the Scheduled Caste People would be curtailed after partition and that they would not only continue to enjoy the existing rights and privileges but also receive additional advantages. This assurance was given by Mr Suhrawardy not only in his capacity but also in his capacity as the Chief Minister of the League Ministry. To my utter regret it is to be stated that after partition, particularly after the death of Qaide-Azam, the Scheduled Castes have not received a fair deal in any matter. You will recollect that from time to time I brought the grievances of the Scheduled Castes to your notice. I explained to you on several occasions the nature of inefficient administration in East Bengal. I made serious charges against the police administration. I brought to your notice incidents of barbarous atrocities perpetrated by the police on frivolous grounds. I did not hesitate to bring to your notice the anti-Hindu policy pursued by the East Bengal Government especially the police administration and a section of Muslim League leaders. SOME INCIDENTS 11.

The first incident that shocked me took place at a village called Digharkul near Gopalganj where on the false complaint of a Muslim, brutal atrocities were committed on the local Namahsudras. The fact was that a Muslim who was going in a boat attempted to throw his net to catch fish. A Namahsudra who was already there for the same purpose opposed the throwing of the net in his front. This was followed by some altercation and the Muslim got annoyed and went to the nearby Muslim village and made a false complaint that he and a woman in his boat had been assaulted by the Namahsudras. At that time, the SDO of Gopalganj was passing in a boat through the canal, who without making any enquiry accepted the complaint as true and sent armed police to the spot to punish the Namahsudras. The armed police came and the local Muslims also joined them. They not only raided some houses of the Namahsudras but mercilessly beat both men and women , destroyed their properties and

took away valuables. The merciless beating of a pregnant woman resulted in abortion on the spot. This brutal action on the part of the local authority created panic over a large area. 12. The second incidence of police oppression took place in the early part of 1949 under PS Gournadi in the district of Barisal. Here a quarrel took place between two groups of members of a Union Board. One group which was in the good books of the police conspired against the opponents on the plea of their being Communists. On the information of a threat of attack on the Police Station, the OC Gournadi requisitioned armed forces from the headquarters. The Police, helped by the armed forces, then raided a large number of houses in the area, took away valuable properties, even from the house of absentee-owners who were never in politics, far less in the Communist Party. A large number of persons over a wide area were arrested. Teachers and students of many High English Schools were Communist suspects and unnecessarily harassed. This area being very near to my native village, I was informed of the incident. I wrote to the District Magistrate and the SP for an enquiry. A section of the local people also prayed for an enquiry by the SDO. But no enquiry was held. Even my letters to the District authorities were not acknowledged. I then brought this matter to the notice of the highest Authority in Pakistan, including yourself but to no avail. WOMEN FOR MILITARY 13. The atrocities perpetrated by the police and the military on the innocent Hindus, especially the Scheduled Castes of Habibgarh in the District of Sylhet, deserve description. Innocent men and women were brutally tortured, some women ravished, their houses raided and properties looted by the police and the local Muslims. Military pickets were posted in the area. The military not only oppressed these people and took away stuff forcibly from Hindu houses, but also forced Hindus to send their women-folk at night to the camp to satisfy the carnal desires of the military. This fact

also I brought to your notice. You assured me of a report on the matter, but unfortunately, no report was forthcoming. 14. Then occurred the incident at the Nachole in the District of Rajshahi wherein the name of suppression of Communists not only the police but also the local Muslims in collaboration with the police oppressed the Hindus and looted their properties. The Santhals then crossed the border and came over to West Bengal. They narrated the stories of atrocities wantonly committed by the Muslims and the police. 15. An instance of callous and cold-blooded brutality is furnished by the incident that took place on December 20, 1949, in Kalshira under PS Mollarhat in the District of Khulna. What happened was that late at night four constables raided the house of one Joydev Brahma in village Kalshira in search of some alleged Communists. At the scent of the police, half a dozen young men, some of whom might have been Communists, escaped from the house. The police constable entered into the house and assaulted the wife of Joydev Brahma whose cry attracted her husband and a few companions who escaped from the house. They became desperate, re-entered the house, found four constables with one gun only. That perhaps might have encouraged the young men who struck a blow on an armed constable who died on the spot. The young men then attacked another constable when the other two ran away and raised alarm which attracted some neighbouring people who came to their rescue. As the incident took place before sunrise when it was dark, the assailants fled with the dead body before the villagers could come. The SP of Khulna with a contingent of military and armed police appeared on the scene in the afternoon of the following day. In the meantime, the assailants fled and the intelligent neighbours also fled. But the bulk of the villagers remained in their houses as they were innocent and failed to realise the consequence of the happening. Subsequently, the SP, the military and armed police began to beat mercilessly the innocents of the entire village, encouraged the neighbouring Muslims to take away their

properties. A number of persons were killed and men and women were forcibly converted. House-hold deities were broken and places of worship desecrated and destroyed. Several women were raped by the police, military and local Muslims. Thus, a veritable hell was let loose not only in the village of Kalshira which is 1–1/2 miles in length with a large population but also in a number of neighbouring Namahsudra villages. The village Kalshira was never suspected by the authority to be a place of Communist activities. Another village called Jhalardanga, which was at a distance of three miles from Kalshira, was known to be a centre of Communist activities. This village was raided by a large contingent of police on that day for the hunt of the alleged Communists, a number of whom fled away and took shelter in the aforesaid house of village Kalshira which was considered to be a safe place for them. 16. I visited Kalshira and one or two neighbouring villages on the 28 February 1950. The SP, Khulna and some of the prominent League leaders of the district were with me. When I came to the village Kalshira, I found the place desolate and in ruins. I was told in the presence of SP that there were 350 homesteads in this village, of these, only three had been spared and the rest had been demolished. Country boats and heads of cattle belonging to the Namasudras had been all taken away. I reported these facts to the Chief Minister, Chief Secretary and Inspector of General of Police of East Bengal and you. 17. It may be mentioned in this connection that the news of this incident was published in the West Bengal Press and this created some unrest among the Hindus there. A number of sufferers of Kalshira, both men and women, homeless and destitute had also come to Calcutta and narrated the stories of their sufferings which resulted in some communal disturbances in West Bengal in the last part of January. CAUSES OF THE FEBRUARY DISTURBANCE

18. It must be noted that stories of a few incidents of communal disturbance that took place in West Bengal as a sort of repercussion of the incidents at Kalshira were published in exaggerated form in the East Bengal press. In the second week of February 1950, when the Budget Session of the East Bengal Assembly commenced, the Congress Members sought permission to move two adjournment motions to discuss the situation created at Kalshira and Nachole. But the motions were disallowed. The Congress members walked out of the Assembly in protest. This action of the Hindu members of the Assembly annoyed and enraged not only the Ministers but also the Muslim leaders and officials of the Province. This was perhaps one of the principal reasons for Dacca and East Bengal riots in February 1950. 19. It is significant that on 10 February 1950 at about 10 o’clock in the morning a woman was painted with red to show that her breast was cut off in the Calcutta riot, and was taken around the East Bengal Secretariat at Dacca. Immediately the Government servants of the Secretariat struck work and came out in procession raising slogans of revenge against the Hindus. The procession began to swell as it passed over a distance of more than a mile. It ended in a meeting at Victoria Park at about noon where violent speeches against the Hindus were delivered by several speakers, including officials. The fun of the whole show was that while the employees of the Secretariat went out [on] the procession, the Chief Secretary of the East Bengal Government was holding a conference with his West Bengal counterpart in the same building to find out ways and means to stop communal disturbances in the two Bengals. OFFICIALS HELPED LOOTERS 20. The riot started at about 1 p.m. simultaneously all over the city. Arson, looting of Hindu shops and houses and killing of Hindus, wherever they were found, commenced in full swing in all parts of the city. I got evidence even from the Muslims that arson and looting were committed even in the presence

of high police officials. Jewellery shops belonging to the Hindus were looted in the presence of police officers. They not only did not attempt to stop loot but also helped the looters with advice and direction. Unfortunately for me, I reached Dacca at 5 o’clock in the afternoon on the same day, on 10 February 1950. To my utter dismay, I had occasion to see and know things from close quarters. What I saw and learnt from firsthand information was simply staggering and heart- rending. BACKGROUND OF THE RIOT 21. The reasons for the Dacca riot w ere mainly five: (i)

To punish the Hindus for the daring action of their representatives in the Assembly in their expression of protest by walking out of the Assembly when two adjournment motions on Kalshira and Nachole affairs were disallowed. (ii) Dissension and differences between the Suhrawardy Group and the Nazimuddin Group in the Parliamentary Party were becoming acute. (iii) The apprehension of the launching of a movement for the reunion of East and West Bengal by both Hindu and Muslim leaders made the East Bengal Ministry and the Muslim League nervous. They wanted to prevent such a move. They thought that any large-scale communal riot in East Bengal was sure to produce reactions in West Bengal where Muslims might be killed. The result of such riots in both East and West Bengal, it was believed, would prevent any movement for the reunion of the Bengals. (iv) Feeling of antagonism between the Bengali Muslims and non-Bengali Muslims in East Bengal was gaining ground. This could only be prevented by creating hatred between Hindus and Muslims of East Bengal. The language question was also connected with it and

(v)

The consequences of non-devaluation and the Indo– Pakistan trade deadlock to the economy of East Bengal were being felt most acutely first in urban and rural areas and the Muslim League members and officials wanted to divert the attention of the Muslim masses from the impending economic breakdown by some sort of Jihad against Hindus.

STAGGERING DETAILS — NEARLY 10,000 KILLED 22. During my nine days’ stay at Dacca, I visited most of the riot-affected areas of the city and suburbs. I visited Mirpur also under PS Tejgaon. The news of the killing of hundreds of innocent Hindus in trains, on railway lines between Dacca and Narayanganj, and Dacca and Chittagong gave me the rudest shock. On the second day of the Dacca riot, I met the Chief Minister of East Bengal and requested him to issue immediate instructions to the District authorities to take all precautionary measures to prevent spreading of the riot in district towns and rural areas. On 20 February 1950, I reached Barisal town and was astounded to know of the happenings in Barisal. In the District town, a number of Hindu houses were burnt and a large number of Hindus killed. I visited almost all riot-affected areas in the District. I was simply puzzled to find the havoc wrought by the Muslim rioters even at places like Kasipur, Madhabpasha and Lakutia which were within a radius of six miles from the District town and were connected with motorable roads. At the Madhabpasha Zamindar’s house, about 200 people were killed and 40 injured. A place, called Muladi, witnessed a dreadful hell. At Muladi Bandar alone, the number killed would total more than 300, as was reported to me by the local Muslims including some officers. I visited Muladi village also, where I found skeletons of dead bodies at some places. I found dogs and vultures eating corpses on the riverside. I got the information there that after the wholescale killing of all adult males, all the young girls were distributed among the ringleaders of the miscreants. At a place called Kaibartakhali

under PS Rajapur, 63 persons were killed. Hindu houses within a stone’s throw distance from the said thana office were looted, burnt and inmates killed. All Hindu[s] of Babuganj Bazar were looted and then burnt and a large number of Hindus were killed. From detailed information received, the conservative estimate of casualties was placed at 2,500 killed in the District of Barisal alone. The total casualties of Dacca and East Bengal riot were estimated to be in the neighbourhood of 10,000 killed. The lamentation of women and children who had lost their all including near and dear ones melted my heart. I only asked myself ‘What was coming to Pakistan in the name of Islam.’ NO EARNEST DESIRE TO IMPLEMENT DELHI PACT 23. The large-scale exodus of Hindus from Bengal commenced in the latter part of March. It appeared that within a short time all the Hindus would migrate to India. A war cry was raised in India. The situation became extremely critical. A national calamity appeared to be inevitable. The apprehended disaster, however, was avoided by the Delhi Agreement of April 8. With an aim to reviving the already lost morale of the panicking Hindus, I undertook an extensive tour of East Bengal. I visited a number of places of the districts of Dacca, Barisal, Faridpur, Khulna and Jessore. I addressed dozens of largely attended meetings and asked the Hindus to take courage and not to leave their ancestral hearths and homes. I had this expectation that the East Bengal Govt and Muslim League leaders would implement the terms of the Delhi Agreement. But with the lapse of time, I began to realise that neither the East Bengal Govt nor the Muslim League leaders were earnest in the matter of implementation of the Delhi Agreement. The East Bengal Govt was not only ready to set up a piece of machinery as envisaged in the Delhi Agreement but also was not willing to take effective steps for the purpose. A number of Hindus, who returned to their native village immediately after the Delhi Agreement, were not given

possession of their homes and lands which were occupied in the meantime by the Muslims. MOULANA AKRAM KHAN’S INCITATIONS 24. My suspicion about the intention of League leaders was confirmed when I read editorial comments by Moulana Akram Khan, the President of the Provincial Muslim League in the ‘Baisak’ issue of a monthly journal called ‘Mohammadi’. In commenting on the first radio broadcast of Dr A.M. Malik, Minister for Minority Affairs of Pakistan, from Dacca Radio Station, wherein he said, ‘Even Prophet Muhammad had given religious freedom to the Jews in Arabia’, Moulana Akram Khan said, ‘Dr Malik would have done well had he not made any reference in his speech to the Jews of Arabia.’ The Jews in Arabia had indeed been given religious freedom by Prophet Muhammad, but it was the first chapter of history. The last chapter contains the definite direction of Prophet Muhammad which runs as follows: ‘Drive away all the Jews out of Arabia’. Even despite this editorial comment of a person who held a very high position in the political, social and spiritual life of the Muslim community, I entertained some expectation that the Nurul Amin Ministry might not be so insincere. But that expectation of mine was shattered when Mr Nurul Amin selected D.N. Barari as a Minister to represent the minorities in terms of the Delhi Agreement which clearly states that to restore confidence in the minds of the minorities one of their representatives will be taken in the Ministry of East Bengal and West Bengal Govt. NURUL AMIN GOVERNMENT’S INSINCERITY 25. In one of my public statements, I expressed the view that the appointment of D.N. Barari as a Minister representing the minorities not only did not help restore any confidence but, on the contrary, destroyed all expectations illusions, if there was any in the minds of the minorities about the sincerity of Mr Nurul Amin’s Govt. My reaction was that Mr Nurul Amin’s Govt was not only insincere but also wanted to defeat the

principal objectives of the Delhi Agreement. I again repeat that D.N. Barari does not represent anybody except himself. He was returned to the Bengal Legislature Assembly on the Congress ticket with the money and organisation of the Congress. He opposed the Scheduled Caste Federation candidates. Sometime after his election, he betrayed the Congress and joined the Federation. When he was appointed a Minister he had ceased to be a member of the Federation too. I know that East Bengal Hindus agree with me that by antecedents, character and intellectual attainments Barari is not qualified to hold the position of a Minister as envisaged in the Delhi Agreement. 26. I recommended three names to Mr Nurul Amin for this office. One of the persons I recommended was an MA., LL.B., Advocate, Dacca High Court. He was Minister for more than four years in the first Fazlul Huq Ministry in Bengal. He was chairman of the Coal Mines Stowing Board, Calcutta, for about six years. He was the Senior Vice-President of the Scheduled Caste Federation. My second nominee was a BA, LL.B. He was a member of the Legislative Council for seven years in the pre-reform regime. I would like to know what earthly reasons there might be for Mr Nurul Amin in not selecting any of these two gentlemen and appointing instead a person whose appointment as Minister I strongly objected to for very rightly considerations. Without any fear of contradiction I can say that this action of Mr Nurul Amin in selecting Barari as a Minister in terms of the Delhi Agreement is conclusive proof that the East Bengal Govt was neither serious nor sincere in its professions about the terms of the Delhi Agreement whose main purpose was to create such conditions as would enable the Hindus to continue to live in East Bengal with a sense of security to their life, property, honour and religion. GOVERNMENT PLAN TO SQUEEZE OUT HINDUS 27. I would like to reiterate in this connection my firm conviction that the East Bengal Govt is still following the well-planned

policy of squeezing Hindus out of the Province. In my discussion with you on more than one occasion, I gave expression to this view of mine. I must say that this policy of driving out Hindus from Pakistan has succeeded completely in West Pakistan and is nearing completion in East Pakistan too. The appointment of D.N. Barari as a Minister and the East Bengal Government’s unceremonious objection to my recommendation in this regard strictly conform to name of what they call an Islamic State. Pakistan has not given the Hindus entire satisfaction and a full sense of security. They now want to get rid of the Hindu intelligentsia so that the political, economic and social life of Pakistan may not in any way be influenced by them. EVASIVE TACTICS TO SHELVE JOINT ELECTORATE 28. I have failed to understand why the question of the electorate has not yet been decided. It is now three years that the minority Sub-Committee has been appointed. It sat on three occasions. The question of having joint or separation electorate came up for consideration at a meeting of the Committee held in December last when all the representatives of recognised minorities in Pakistan expressed their view in support of a Joint Electorate with reservation of seats for backward minorities. We, on behalf of the Scheduled Castes, demanded joint electorate with reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes. This matter again came up for consideration at a meeting called in August last. But without any discussion whatsoever on this point, the meeting was adjourned sine die. It is not difficult to understand what the motive is behind this kind of evasive tactics in regard to such a vital matter on the part of Pakistan’s rulers. DISMAL FUTURE FOR HINDUS 29. Coming now to the present condition and the future of Hindus in East Bengal as a result of the Delhi Agreement, I should say that the present condition is not only

unsatisfactory but hopeless and that the future completely dark and dismal. Confidence of Hindus in East Bengal has not been restored in the least. The Agreement is treated as a mere scrap of paper alike by the East Bengal Government and the Muslim League. That a pretty large number of Hindus migrants, mostly Scheduled Caste cultivators are returning to East Bengal is no indication that confidence has been restored. It only indicates that their stay and rehabilitation in West Bengal, or elsewhere in the Indian Union have not been possible. The sufferings of refugee life are compelling them to go back to their homes. Besides, many of them are going back to bring movable articles and settle or dispose of immovable properties. That no serious communal disturbance has recently taken place in East Bengal is not to be attributed to the Delhi Agreement. It could not simply continue even if there were no Agreement or Pact. 30. It must be admitted that the Delhi Pact was not an end in itself. It was intended that such conditions would be created as might effectively help resolve so many disputes and conflicts existing between India and Pakistan. But during this period of six months after the Agreement, no dispute or conflict has been resolved. On the contrary, communal propaganda and anti-India propaganda by Pakistan both at home and abroad are continuing in full swing. The observance of Kashmir Day by the Muslim League all over Pakistan is an eloquent proof of communal anti-India propaganda by Pakistan. The recent speech of the Governor of Punjab (Pak) saying that Pakistan needed a strong Army for the security of Indian Muslims has betrayed the real attitude of Pakistan towards India. It will only increase the tension between the two countries. WHAT IS HAPPENING IN EAST BENGAL TODAY 31. What is today the condition in East Bengal? About 50 lakhs of Hindus have left since the partition of the country. Apart from the East Bengal riot of last February, the reasons for such a large-scale exodus of Hindus are many. The boycott

by the Muslims of Hindu lawyers, medical practitioners, shopkeepers, traders and merchants has compelled Hindus to migrate to West Bengal in search of their means of livelihood. Requisition of Hindu houses even without following due process of law in many and non- payment of any rent whatsoever to the owners have compelled them to seek Indian shelter. Payments of rent to Hindu landlords was stopped long before. Besides, the Ansars against whom I received complaints all over are a standing menace to the safety and security of Hindus. Inference in matters of education and methods adopted by the Education Authority for Islamisation frightened the teaching staff of Secondary Schools and Colleges out of their old familiar moorings. They have left East Bengal. As a result, most of the educational institutions have been closed. I have received information that some time ago, the Educational Authority issued circular in Secondary Schools enjoining compulsory participation of teachers and students of all communities in recitation from the Holy Koran before the school work commenced. Another circular requires Headmasters of schools to name the different blocks of the premises after 12 distinguished Muslims, such as Jinnah, Iqbal, Liaquat Ali, Nazimuddin, etc. Only very recently in an educational conference held at Dacca, the President disclosed that out of 1,500 High English Schools in East Bengal, only 500 were working. Owing to the migration of Medical Practitioners there is hardly any means of proper treatment of patients. Almost all the priests who used to worship the household deities at Hindu houses have left. Important places of worship have been abandoned. The result is that the Hindus of East Bengal have got now hardly any means to follow religious pursuits and performance of social ceremonies like a marriage where the services of a priest are essential. Artisans who made images of gods and goddesses have also left. Hindu Presidents of Union Boards have been replaced by Muslims by coercive measures with the active help and connivance of the police and Circle Officers. Hindu Headmasters and Secretaries of Schools

have been replaced by Muslims. The Life of the few Hindu Govt servants has been made extremely miserable as many of them have either been superseded by junior Muslims or dismissed without sufficient or any cause. Only very recently a Hindu Public Prosecutor of Chittagong was arbitrarily removed from service as has been made clear in a statement made by Srijukta Nellie Sengupta against whom at least no change of anti-Muslim bias prejudice or malice can be levelled. HINDUS VIRTUALLY OUTLAWED 32. Commission of thefts and dacoities even with murder is going on as before. Thana offices seldom record half the complaints made by the Hindus. That the abduction and rape of Hindu girls have been reduced to a certain extent is due only to the fact that there is no Caste Hindu girl between the ages of 12 and 30 living in East Bengal at present. The few depressed class girls who live in rural areas with their parents are not even spared by Muslim goondas. I have received information about a number of incidents of rape of Scheduled Caste Girls by Muslims. Full payment is seldom made by Muslims buyers for the price of jute and other agricultural commodities sold by Hindus in market places. There is no operation of law, justice or fair- play in Pakistan, so far as Hindus are concerned. FORCED CONVERSIONS IN WEST PAKISTAN 33. Leaving aside the question of East Pakistan, let me now refer to West Pakistan, especially Sind. West Punjab had after partition about a lakh of Scheduled Castes people. It may be noted that a large number of them were converted to Islam. Only four out of a dozen Scheduled Castes girls abducted by Muslims have yet been recovered in spite of repeated petitions to the Authority. Names of those girls with names of their abductors were supplied to the government. The last reply recently given by the Officer-in- Charge of recovery of abducted girls said that ‘his function was to

recover Hindu girls and “Achhuts” (Scheduled Castes) were not Hindus’. The condition of the small number of Hindus that are still living in Sind and Karachi, the capital of Pakistan, is simply deplorable. I have got a list of 363 Hindu temples and gurdwaras of Karachi and Sind (which is by no means an exhaustive list) which are still in possession of Muslims. Some of the temples have been converted into cobbler’s shops, slaughterhouses and hotels. None of the Hindus has got back. Possession of their landed properties was taken away from them without any notice and distributed amongst refugees and local Muslims. I know that 200 to 300 Hindus were declared non-evacuees by the Custodian a pretty long time ago. But up till now, properties have not been restored to any one of them. Even the possession of Karachi Pinjirapole has not been restored to the trustees, although it was declared non-evacuee property some time ago. In Karachi, I had received petitions from many unfortunate fathers and husbands of abducted Hindu girls, mostly Scheduled Castes. I drew the attention of the 2nd Provisional Government to this fact. There was little or no effect. To my extreme regret, I received information that a large number of Scheduled Castes who are still living in Sind have been forcibly converted to Islam. PAKISTAN ‘ACCURSED’ FOR HINDUS 34. Now, this being, in brief, the overall picture of Pakistan so far as the Hindus are concerned, I shall not be unjustified in stating that Hindus of Pakistan have been rendered ‘Stateless’ in their own houses. They have no other fault than that they profess the Hindu religion. Declarations are being repeatedly made by Muslim League leaders that Pakistan is and shall be an Islamic State. Islam is being offered as the sovereign remedy for all earthly evils. In the matchless dialectics of capitalism and socialism, you present the

exhilarating democratic synthesis of Islamic equality and fraternity. In that grand setting of the Shariat Muslims alone are rulers while Hindus and other minorities are zimmi s who are entitled to protection at price, and you know more than anybody else Mr Prime Minister, what that price is. After an anxious and prolonged struggle, I have come to the conclusion that Pakistan is no place for Hindus to live in and that their future is darkened by the ominous shadow of conversion or liquidation. The bulk of the upper-class Hindus and politically conscious scheduled castes have left East Bengal. Those Hindus who will continue to stay accursed in Pakistan will, I am afraid, by gradual stages and in a planned manner be either converted to Islam or completely exterminated. It is amazing that a man of your education, culture and experience should be an exponent of a doctrine fraught with so great a danger to humanity and subversive of all principles of equality and good sense. I may tell you and your fellow workers that Hindus will allow themselves, whatever the treat or temptation, to be treated as zimmi s in the land of their birth. Today they may, as indeed many of them have already done, abandon their hearths and homes in sorrow but in panic. Tomorrow, they strive for their rightful place in the economy of life. Who knows what is in the womb of the future? When I am convinced that my continuance in office in the Pakistan Central Government is not of any help to Hindus I should not with a clear conscience, create the false impression in the minds of the Hindus of Pakistan and peoples abroad that Hindus can live there with honour and

with a sense of security in respect of their life, property and religion. This is about Hindus. NO CIVIL LIBERTY EVEN FOR MUSLIMS 35. And what about the Muslims who are outside the charmed circle of the League rulers and their corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy? There is hardly anything called civil liberty in Pakistan. Witness, for example, the fate of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan than whom a more devout Muslim had not walked this earth for many years and of his gallant patriotic brother Dr Khan Sahib. A large number of erstwhile League leaders of the north-west and also of the eastern belt of Pakistan are in detention without trial. Mr Suhrawardy to whom is due in a large measure the League’s triumph in Bengal is for practical purpose a Pakistani prisoner who has to move under permit and open his lips under orders . Mr Fazlul Haq, that dearly loved grand old man of Bengal, who was the author of that now-famous Lahore resolution, is ploughing his lonely furrow in the precincts of the Dacca High Court of Judicature, and the so-called Islamic planning is as ruthless as it is complete. About the East Bengal Muslims general, the lesser said the better. They were promised of autonomous and sovereign units of the independent state. What have they got instead? East Bengal has been transformed into a colony of the western belt of Pakistan, although it contained a population which is larger than that of all the units of Pakistan put together. It is a pale ineffective adjunct of Karachi doing the latter’s bidding and carrying out its orders. East Bengal Muslims in their enthusiasm wanted bread and they have by the mysterious working of the Islamic State and the Shariat got stone instead from the arid deserts of Sind and Punjab. MY OWN SAD AND BITTER EXPERIENCE 36. Leaving aside the overall picture of Pakistan and the callous and cruel injustice done to others, my own experience is no

less sad, bitter and revealing. You used your position as the Prime Minister and leader of the Parliamentary Party to ask me to issue a statement, which I did on the 8th September last. You know that I was not willing to make a statement containing untruths and half-truths, which were worse than untruths. It was not possible for me to reject your request so long as I was there working as a Minister with you and under your leadership. But I can no longer afford to carry this load of false pretensions and untruth on my conscience and I have decided to offer my resignation as your Minister, which I am hereby placing in your hands and which, I hope, you will accept without delay. You are of course at liberty to dispense with that office or dispose of it in such a manner as may suit adequately and effectively the objectives of your Islamic State. Yours sincerely, Sd./—J.N. Mandal 8 October 1950.

APPENDIX 7

LIAQUAT–NEHRU AGREEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN REGARDING SECURITY AND RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (NEHRU–LIAQUAT AGREEMENT) New Delhi. A.

The Governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall ensure, to the minorities throughout its territory, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and morality. Members of the minorities shall have equal opportunity with members of the majority community to participate in the public life of their country, to hold political or other office, and to serve in their country's civil and armed forces. Both Governments declare these rights to be fundamental and undertake to enforce them effectively. The Prime Minister of India has drawn attention to the fact that these rights are guaranteed to all minorities in India by its Constitution. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has pointed out that similar provision exists in the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. It is the policy of both Governments that the enjoyment of these democratic rights

shall be assured to all their nationals without distinction. Both Governments wish to emphasise that the allegiance and loyalty of the minorities is to the State of which they are citizens, and that it is to the Government of their own State that they should look for the redress of their grievances. B. In respect of migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, where communal disturbances have recently occurred, it is agreed between the two Governments: (i) That there shall be freedom of movement and protection in transit; (ii) That there shall be freedom to remove as much of his moveable personal effects and household goods as [the] migrant may wish to take with him. Moveable property shall include personal jewellery. The maximum cash allowed to each adult migrant will be Rs. 150 and to each migrant child Rs. 75; (iii) That a migrant may deposit such of his personal jewellery or cash as he does not wish to take with him with a bank. A proper receipt shall be furnished to him by the bank for cash or jewellery thus deposited and facilities shall be provided, as and when required for their transfer to him, subject as regards cash to the exchange regulations of the Government concerned; (iv) That there shall be no harassment by the Customs authorities. At each customs post agreed upon by the Governments concerned, liaison officers of the other Government shall be posted to ensure this in practice; (v) Rights of ownership in or occupancy of the immoveable property of a migrant shall not be disturbed. If, during his absence, such property is occupied by another person, it shall be returned to him provided that he comes back by the 31st December, 1950. Where the migrant was a cultivating owner or tenant, the land shall be restored to him provided that he returns not later than the 31st December, 1950. In exceptional cases, if a Government considers that a migrant's immoveable property cannot be returned to him, the matter

shall be referred to the appropriate Minority Commission for advice. Where restoration of immoveable property to the migrant who returns within the specified period is found not possible, the Government concerned shall take steps to rehabilitate him. (vi) That in the case of a migrant who decides not to return, ownership of all his immoveable property shall continue to vest in him and he shall have unrestricted right to dispose of it by sale, by exchange with an evacuee in the other country, or otherwise. A committee consisting of three representatives of minority and presided over by a representative of Government shall act as trustees of the owner. The Committee shall be empowered to recover rent for such immoveable property according to law. The Governments of East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura shall enact the necessary legislation to set up these Committees. The Provincial or State Government, as the case may be, will instruct the District or other appropriate authority to give all possible assistance for the discharge of the Committee's functions. The Provisions of this sub-paragraph shall also apply to migrants who may have left East Bengal for any part of India, or West Bengal, Assam or Tripura for any part of Pakistan, prior to the recent disturbances but after the 15th August, 1947. The arrangement in this sub-paragraph will apply also to migrants who have left Bihar for East Bengal owing to communal disturbances or fear thereof. C. As regards the Province of East Bengal and each of the States of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura respectively the two Governments further agree that they shall: (1) Continue their efforts to restore normal conditions and shall take suitable measures to prevent recurrence of disorder. (2) Punish all those who are found guilty of offences against persons and property and of other criminal offences In view of their deterrent effect, collective fines shall be imposed, where necessary. Special Courts will, where necessary, be appointed to ensure that wrong doers are promptly punished.

(3) Make every possible effort to recover looted property. (4) Set up immediately an agency, with which representatives of the minority shall be associated, to assist in the recovery of abducted women. (5) Do not recognise forced conversions. Any conversion effected during a period of communal disturbance shall be deemed to be forced conversion. Those found guilty of converting people forcibly shall be punished. (6) Set up a Commission of Enquiry at once to enquire into and report on the causes and extent of the recent disturbances and to make recommendations with a view to preventing recrudescence of similar trouble in future. The personnel of the Commission, which shall be presided over by a Judge of the High Court, shall be such as to inspire confidence among the minority. (7) Do not allow moves calculated to rouse communal passion by press or radio or by any individual or organisation. Those guilty of such activity shall be rigorously dealt with. (8) Not permit propaganda in either country directed against the territorial integrity of the other or purporting to incite war between them and shall take prompt and effective action against any individual or organisation guilty of such propaganda. D. Sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8) of C of the Agreement are of General scope and applicable according to exigency to any part of India or Pakistan. E. In order to help restore confidence, so that refugees may return to their homes, the two Governments have decided (i) to depute two Ministers, one from each Government, to remain in the affected areas for such period as may be necessary; (ii) to include in the Cabinets of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam a representative of the minority community. In Assam the minority community is already represented in the Cabinet.

Appointments to the Cabinets of East Bengal and West Bengal shall be made immediately. F. In order to assist in the implementation of this Agreement, the two Governments have decided, apart from the deputation of their Ministers referred to in E, to set up Minority Commissions, one for East Bengal, one for West Bengal and one for Assam. These Commissions will be constituted and will have the functions described below: (i) Each Commission will consist of one Minister of the Provincial or State Government concerned, who will be Chairman, and one representative each of the majority and minority communities from East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam, chosen by and from among their respective representatives in the Provincial or State Legislatures, as the case may be. (ii) The two Ministers of the Governments of India and Pakistan may attend and participate in any meeting of any Commission. A Minority Commission or any two Minority Commissions jointly shall meet when so required by either Central Minister for the satisfactory implementation of this Agreement. (iii) Each Commission shall appoint such staff as it deems necessary for the proper discharge of its functions and shall determine its own procedure. (iv) Each Commission shall maintain contact with the minorities in Districts and small administrative headquarters through Minority Boards formed in accordance with the Inter- Dominion Agreement of December, 1948. (v) The Minority Commissions in East Bengal and West Bengal shall replace the Provincial Minorities Boards set up under the Inter- Dominion Agreement of December, 1948. (vi) The two Ministers of the Central Governments will from time to time consult such persons or organisations as they may consider necessary. (vii) The functions of the Minority Commission shall be:

(a)

To observe and to report on the implementation of this Agreement and, for this purpose, to take cognizance of breaches or neglect; (b) to advise an action to be taken on their recommendations. (viii) Each Commission shall submit reports, as and when necessary, to the Provincial and State Governments concerned. Copies of such reports will be submitted simultaneously to the two Central Ministers during the period referred to in E. (ix) The Governments of India and Pakistan and the State and Provincial Governments will normally give effect to recommendations that concern them when such recommendations are supported by both the Central Ministers. In the event of disagreement between the two Central Ministers, the matter shall be referred to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan who shall either resolve it themselves or determine the agency and procedure by which it will be resolved. (x) In respect of Tripura, the two Central Ministers shall constitute a Commission and shall discharge the functions that are assigned under the Agreement to the Minority Commissions for East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam. Before the expiration of the period referred to in E, the two Central Ministers shall make recommendations for the establishment in Tripura of appropriate machinery to discharge the functions of the Minority Commissions envisaged in respect of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam. G. Except where modified by this Agreement, the InterDominion Agreement of December, 1948 shall remain in force.

APPENDIX 8

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON ARTICLE 306A (ARTICLE 370) ON 17.10.1949 Article 306A Mr. President: We go to 306A. It is suggested that we had better begin the Preamble. It may be moved. Shri T. T. Krishnamachari: It is not necessary to move it. The Preamble may be taken into consideration. Mr. President: The Preamble is moved. I shall have to take up the various amendments to the Preamble now. I have a large number of amendments—many of them printed in the printed list. Maulana Hasrat Mohani (United Provinces: Muslim): I understand that you have already decided that the Preamble will be taken up last. How is it that there are some articles remaining undiscussed and you pass to the Preamble? Mr. President: Not many articles left. Maulana Hasrat Mohani: Even one article—unless you finish the articles, you cannot take up the Preamble. Mr. President: Very well, let us take up 306A.

The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha (Bihar: General): Sir, are you taking up the Preamble? Mr. President: No, Maulana Hasrat Mohani objects to the Preamble being taken up before all the other articles are finished. There is one more article of which notice was given and it has been standing over, amendment No. 472 by Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad. And I understand it is the same as another article of which notice was given by Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: Sir, it was held over on the 3rd June, by your order. Mr. President: Then shall we take it up now? Which of them shall we take up. Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad's or that of Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava? Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: Sir, I beg to move that... Shri R. K. Sidhva: Sir, there are other articles also of which notice has been given by other Members. Mr. President: There is no other amendment by the Drafting Committee. Shri R. K. Sidhva: But there may be other Members who may have amendments besides these two. Mr. President: Amendments for the addition of new articles? Shri R. K. Sidhva: Yes. Mr. President: I do not think they will arise now. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: Sir, I understand Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar has just come and so I may be allowed to move, after he has done. Mr. President: There are so many articles of which notice was given and which are dropped now. We have dealt with the whole Constitution from every point of view and we cannot begin now taking up new articles. I know Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava's amendment was held over, but it has been covered by other amendments. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava: It is not covered, Sir. Mr. President: Very well. We take up article 306A now. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

The Honourable Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar: (Madras: General): Sir, before I read out the motion. I would request your permission, Sir, not to move item 379, but to move item 451 instead. Sir, I move: "That with reference to Amendment no.379 of List XV (Second Week), after article 306, the following new article be inserted: '306A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, (a) the provisions of article 211A of this Constitution shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir; (b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the State shall be limited to (i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State; and (ii) such other matters in the said List as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify; Explanation —For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the Union as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers..." I am making, Sir, with your permission, a change here. Instead of the word "appointed" I am substituting the words, "for the time being in office"—"under the Maharaja's Proclamation, dated the fifth day of March, 1948." Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru: We could not hear the honourable member correctly. The Honourable Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar:

"Explanation —For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the Union as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the council of Ministers, for the time being in office, under the Maharaja's Proclamation, dated the fifth day of March, 1948." I have there substituted the words "or the time being in office," for the word "appointed". "(c) the provisions of article 1 of this Constitution shall apply in relation to the State. (d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution and subject to such exceptions and modifications shall apply in relation to the State as the President may by order specify; Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State aforesaid shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State; Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government. (2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in sub-clause (b) (ii) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of clause (1) was given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon. (3) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding clauses of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify: Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification." Sir, this matter, the matter of this particular motion, relates to the Jammu and Kashmir State. The House is fully aware of the fact that

the State has acceded to the Dominion of India. The history of this accession is also well know. The accession took place on the 26th October, 1947. Since then, the State has had a chequered history. Conditions are not yet normal in the State. The meaning of this accession is that at present that State is a unit of a federal State, namely, the Dominion of India. This Dominion is getting transformed into a Republic, which will be inaugurated on the 26th January, 1950. The Jammu and Kashmir State, therefore, has to become a unit of the new Republic of India. As the House is aware, accession to the Dominion always took place by means of an instrument which had to be signed by the Ruler of the State and which had to be accepted by the GovernorGeneral of India. That has taken place in this case. As the House is also aware, Instruments of Accession will be a thing of past in the new Constitution. The States have been integrated with the Federal Republic in such a manner that they do not have to accede or execute a document of Accession for the purpose of becoming units of the Republic, but they are mentioned in the Constitution itself; and, in the case of practically all States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, their constitutions also have been embodied in the Constitution for the whole of India. All those other States have agreed to integrate themselves in that way and accept the Constitution provided. Maulana Hasrat Mohani: Why this discrimination, please? The Honourable Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar: The discrimination is due to the special conditions of Kashmir. That particular State is not yet ripe for this kind of integration. It is the hope of everybody here that in due course even Jammu and Kashmir will become ripe for the same sort of integration as has taken place in the case of other States. (Cheers) At present it is not possible to achieve that integration. There are various reasons why this is not possible now, I shall refer again to this a little later. In the case of the other Indian States or Unions of States there are two or three points which have got to be remembered. They have all accepted the Constitution framed for States in Part I of the new Constitution and those provisions have been adapted so as to

suit conditions of Indian States and Unions of States. Secondly, the Centre, that is the Republican Federal Centre will have power to make laws applying in every such State or Union to all Union Concurrent Subjects. Thirdly, a uniformity of relationship has been established between those States and Unions and the Centre. Kashmir's conditions are, as I have said, special and require special treatment. I do not want to take much of the time of the House, but I shall briefly indicate what the special conditions are. In the first place, there has been a war going on within the limits of Jammu and Kashmir State. There was a cease-fire agreed to at the beginning of this year and that cease-fire is still on. But the conditions in the State are still unusual and abnormal. They have not settled down. It is therefore necessary that the administration of the State should be geared to these unusual conditions until normal life is restored as in the case of the other States. Part of the State is still in the hands of rebels and enemies. We are entangled with the United Nations in regard to Jammu and Kashmir and it is not possible to say now when we shall be free from this entanglement. That can take place only when the Kashmir problem is satisfactorily settled. Again, the Government of India have committed themselves to the people of Kashmir in certain respects. They have committed themselves to the position that an opportunity would be given to the people of the State to decide for themselves whether they will remain with the Republic or wish to go out of it. We are also committed to ascertaining this will of the people by means of a plebiscite provided that peaceful and normal conditions are restored and the impartiality of the plebiscite could be guaranteed. We have also agreed that the will of the people, through the instrument of a constituent assembly, will determine the constitution of the State as well as the sphere of Union jurisdiction over the State. At present, the legislature which was known as the Praja Sabha in the State is dead. Neither that legislature nor a constituent assembly can be convoked or can function until complete peace

comes to prevail in that State. We have therefore to deal with the Government of the State which, as represented in its Council of Ministers, reflects the opinion of the largest political party in the State. Till a constituent assembly comes into being, only an interim arrangement is possible and not an arrangement which could at once be brought into line with the arrangement that exists in the case of the other States. Now, if you remember the viewpoints that I have mentioned, it is an inevitable conclusion that, at the present moment, we could establish only an interim system. Article 306A is an attempt to establish such a system. I shall now proceed to take the House through the provisions of this article. As honourable Members will remember, the constitution of Indian States is mainly governed by article 211A of this Constitution which applies the Constitution to Indian States, subject to the modifications contained in Part VI-A read with the Schedule. So far as that provision in concerned, I have already indicated to you that the provisions regarding the Constitution of other States could not at present be applied to Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, clause (1) (a) of this article says that the provisions of article 211A of this Constitution shall not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Second portion of this article relates to the legislative authority of Parliament over the Jammu and Kashmir State. This governed primarily by the Instrument of Accession. Broadly speaking, that legislative power is confined to the three subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications, but as a matter of fact these broad categories include a number of items which are listed in the Instrument of Accession. I believe they number some twenty to twenty-five. Now, these items have undergone a change in description, in numbering, in arrangement, as amongst themselves, in List I and List III of the new Constitution. It is therefore necessary that the items mentioned in the Instrument of Accession should be brought into line with the changed designations of entries in Lists I and III of the new Constitution. So, clause (1) (b) of article 306A says that this listing of the items as per the terms of the new Constitution

should be done by the President in consultation with the government of the Sate. Clause (b) (ii) refers to possible additions to the List in the Instrument of Accession, and these additions could be made according to the provisions of this article with the concurrence of the government of the Sate. The idea is that even before the Constituent Assembly meets, it may be necessary in the interests of both the Centre and the State that certain items which are not included in the Instrument of Accession would be appropriately added to the List in that Instrument so that administration, legislation and executive action might be furthered, and as this may happen before the Constituent Assembly meets, the only authority from whom we can get consent for the addition is the Government of the State. That is provided for. Then, there is the Explanation, which defines what the Government of the State means. The Government of the State is defined both in the Constitution which is now supposed to be in force in the Jammu and Kashmir State as well as in the Proclamation which the Maharaja issued on the 5th March, 1948. The terms of the Proclamation, to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution Act of the State, will prevail over that Constitution Act, and therefore it is that in this Explanation it is the Proclamation which is referred to. Under the terms of that Proclamation the Maharaja constituted an interim popular Government, and he said:— "I hereby ordain as follows:— (1) My Council of Ministers shall consist of the Prime Minister and such other Ministers as may be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister. I have by Royal Warrant appointed, Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah as the Prime Minister with effect from the 1st day of March 1948. He proceeds— "The Prime Minister and other Ministers would function as a Cabinet and act on the principle of joint responsibility."

Then there was no Legislature functioning, and so he instituted a kind of responsible Government with a Prime Minister and colleagues who would own collective responsibility for their acts and regard themselves as jointly responsible for all the acts of the Government. Now, that is brought out in this Explanation. The Honourable Shri K. Santhanam: The Explanation says that the Maharaja will be recognised by the Union instead of by the President. The Honourable Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar: Perhaps we may leave it to the Third Reading. As you know the scheme of the Constitution Act is that the Rajpramukh must be recognised by the President. So, this also says that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir should be a persons recognised for the time being by the Union. As regards the Council of Ministers, this Proclamation set up a system under which this Council was to be established, viz. , that the Maharaja first finds the Prime minister and then on his advice appoints his colleagues, and the Explanation as now amended by me says that whatever Council of Ministers is in being at the time will, along with the Maharaja to whom they are responsible give their concurrence or give their advice on such matters as are referred to them under this article. Clauses (c) and (d) refer to the provisions of the Constitution other than the matters listed in Lists I and III. These various provisions have been divided into certain categories. The first according to this draft is that article 1 of the Constitution will automatically apply. As you know, it describes the territory of India, and includes amongst these territories all the States mentioned in Part III, and Jammu and Kashmir is one of the States mentioned in Part III. With regard to the other provisions in the Constitution, these will apply to the Jammu and Kashmir State with such exceptions and modifications as may be decided on when the President issues an order to that effect. That Order can be issued in regard to subjects mentioned in the Instrument of Accession only after consultation with the Government of the State. In regard to other matters, the concurrence of that Government has to be taken.

Now, it is not the case, nor is it the intention of the members of the Kashmir Government whom I took the opportunity of consulting before this draft was finalised—it is not their intention that the other provisions of the Constitution are not to apply. Their particular point of view is that these provision should apply only in cases where they can suitably apply the only subject to such modifications or exceptions as the particular conditions of the Jammu and Kashmir State may require. I wish to say no more about that particular point at the present moment. Then we come to clause (2). You will remember that several of these clauses provide for the concurrence of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State. Now, these relate particularly to matters which are not mentioned in the Instrument of Accession, and it is one of our commitments to the people and Government of Kashmir that no such additions should be made except with the consent of the Constituent Assembly which may be called in the State for the purpose of framing its Constitution. In other words, what we are committed to is that these additions are matters for the determination of the Constituent Assembly of the State. Now, you will recall that in some of the clauses of this article we have provided for the concurrence of the Government of the State. The government of the State feel that in view of the commitments already entered into between the State and the Centre, they cannot be regarded as final authorities for the giving of this concurrence, though they are prepared to give it in the interim periods but if they do give this concurrence, this clause provides that that concurrence should be placed before the Constituent Assembly when it meets and the Constituent Assembly may take whatever decisions it likes on those matters. The last clause refers to what may happen later on. We have said article 211A will not apply to the Jammu and Kashmir State. But that cannot be a permanent feature of the Constitution of the State, and hope it will not be. So the provision is made that when the Constituent Assembly of the state has met and taken its decision both on the Constitution for the State and on the range of federal jurisdiction over the State, the President may on the recommendation of that Constituent Assembly issue an order that

this article 306A shall either cease to be operative, or shall be operative only subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified by him. But before he issues any order of that kind the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly will be a condition precedent. That explains the whole of this article. The effect of this article is that the Jammu and Kashmir State which is now a part of India will continue to be a part of India, will be a unit of the future Federal Republic of India and the Union Legislature will get jurisdiction to enact laws on matters specified either in the Instrument of Accession or by later addition with the concurrence of the Government of the State. And steps have to be taken for the purpose of convening a Constituent Assembly in due course which will go into the matters I have already referred to. When it has come to a decision on the different matters it will make a recommendation to the President who will either abrogate article 306A or direct that it shall apply with such modifications and exceptions as the Constituent Assembly may recommend. That, Sir, is briefly a description of the effect of this article, and I hope the House will carry it. (Amendment Nos. 459, 460 and 461 were not moved) Shri Mahavir Tyagi: (United Provinces: General) I am not in concurrence with the wording of the clauses, but I do not wish to move the amendments. (Amendment No. 462 was not moved) Mr. President: There is one more amendment of which notice was received this morning. That is by Shri Mahavir Tyagi to the effect 'that in amendment No.451 of List XX (Second Week), in the proviso to clause (3) of the proposed new article 306A" for the word "recommendation" the word "consultation" be substituted. Shri Mahavir Tyagi: I am not moving that too. Mr. President: The article is now open to discussion. Maulana Hasrat Mohani: Sir, I want to make it clear at the very outset that I am neither opposed to all these concessions being granted to my Friend Sheikh Abdullah, not am I opposed to the acceptance of the Maharaja as the ruler of Kashmir. And if the

Maharaja of Kashmir gets further powers and concessions I will be very glad. But what I object to is this. Why do you make this discrimination about this Ruler? Mr. Ayyangar has himself admitted here that the administration of Kashmir State is not on a very good basis... The Honourable Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar: That is a wrong statement. I never said so. Maulana Hasrat Mohani: That it will assume independence afterwards. But may I ask a question? When you make all these concessions for Kashmir I most strongly object to your arbitrary act of compelling the Baroda State to be merged in Bombay. The administration of Baroda state is better than the administration of many other Indian P rovinces. It is scandalous that you should compel the Maharaja of Baroda to have his raj merged in Bombay and himself pensioned off. Some people say that he himself voluntarily accepted this me[r]ger. I know it is an open secret that he was brought form England and compelled against his will... Mr. President: Maulana, we are not concerned with the maharaja of Baroda here. Maulana Hasrat Mohani: Well, I would not go into any detail. But I say that I object to this sort of thing. If you grant these concessions to the Maharaja of Kashmir you should also withdraw your decision about the merger of Baroda into Baroda into Bombay and allow all these concessions and many more concessions to the Baroda ruler also. Mr. President: The question is: "That with reference to Amendment No. 379 of List XV (Second Week), after article 306, the following new article be inserted:— '306A. 1 (1) Not withstanding anything contained in this Constitution. (a) the provisions of article 211A of this Constitution shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the State shall be limited to

(i)

those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India are the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State; and (ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify; Explanation: — For the purposes of this article, the government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the union as the maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers, for the time being in office, under the Maharaja's Proclamation, dated the fifth day of March, 1948. (c) the provisions of article 1 of this Constitution shall apply in relation to the State; (d) such of the other provision of this Constitution and subject to such exceptions and modifications shall apply in relation to the State as the President may by order specify: Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State aforesaid shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State: Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government. (2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in sub-clause (b) (ii) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of clause (1) was given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon. (3) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding clause of this article, the President may, by public notification declare that

this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify: Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification'." The motion was adopted. Article 306A was added to the Constitution.

APPENDIX 9

THE CONSTITUTION (APPLICATION TO JAMMU AND KASHMIR) ORDER, 1954 (Amended 47 times, superseded in 2019) MINISTRY OF LAW NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 14th May 1954 S.R.0. 1610— The following Order made by the President is published for general Information:— THE CONSTITUTION (APPLICATION TO JAMMU AND KASHMIR) ORDER, 1954 In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of article 370 of the Constitution, the President, with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, is pleased to make the following Order:— 1. (1) This Order may be called the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954. (2) It shall come into force on the fourteenth day of May, 1954, and shall thereupon supersede the Constitution (Application

to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950. 2. The provisions of the Constitution which, in addition to article 1 and article 370, shall apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the exceptions and modifications subject to which they shall so apply shall be as follows:— (1) THE PREAMBLE. (2) PART I. To article 3, there shall be added the following further proviso, namely:—"Provided further that no Bill providing for increasing or diminishing the area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or altering the name or boundary of that State shall be introduced in Parliament Without the consent of the Legislature of that State." (3) PART II. (a) This Part shall be deemed to have been applicable in relation to this, State of Jammu and Kashmir as from the 26th day of January, (b) To article 7, there shall be added the following further proviso, namely:—"Provided further that nothing in this article shall apply to a permanent resident of the State of Jammu and Kashmir who, after having so migrated to the territory now included in Pakistan returns to the territory of that State under a permit for resettlement in that State or permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law made by the Legislature of that State, and every such person shall be deemed to be a citizen of India." (4) PART III. (a) In article 13, references to the commencement of the Constitution, shall be construed as references to the commencement of this Order. (b) In clause (4) of article 15, the reference to Scheduled Tribes shall be omitted. (c) In clause (3) of article 16, the reference to the State shall be construed as not including a reference to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (d) In article 19, for a period of five years from the commencement of this Order:—(i) in clauses (3) and (4) after the words "in the interests of the words "the security of the State or" shall be inserted; (ii) in clause (5), for the words "or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe" the words "or in the interests of the security of the State" shall

be substituted; and (iii) the following new clause shall be added, namely:—'(7) The words "reasonable restrictions" occurring in clauses (2), (3), (4) and (5) shall be construed as moaning such restrictions as the appropriate Legislature deems reasonable.' (e) In clauses (4) and (7) of article 22, for the word "Parliament", the words "the Legislature of the State" shall be substituted. (f) In article 31, clauses (3), (4) and (6) shall be omitted; and for clause (5), there shall be substituted the following clause, namely:—"(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect—(a) the provisions of any existing law; or (b) the provisions of any law which the State may hereafter make—(i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or penalty; or (ii) for the promotion of public health or the prevention of danger to life or property; or (iii) with respect to property declared by law to be evacuee property." (g) In article 31A, the proviso to clause (1) shall be omitted; and for sub-clause (a) of clause (2), the following sub-clause shall be substituted, namely:—'(a) "estate" shall mean land which is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture, and includes—(i) sites of buildings and other structures on such land; (ii) trees standing on such land; (iii) forest land and wooded waste; (iv) area covered by or fields floating over water; (v) estates of jamindars and ghairats; (vi) any jagir, inam, muafi or mukairari or other similar grant; but does not include—(1) the site of any building in any town, or town area or village abadi or any land appurtenant to any such building or site; (ii) any land which is occupied as the site of a town or village; or (iii) any land reserved for building purposes in a municipality or notified area or cantonment or town area or any area for which a town planning scheme is sanctioned.' (h) In article 32, clause (3) shall be omitted; and after clause (2), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:—" (2A) Without prejudice to the powers conferred by clauses (1) and (2), the High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any

Government within those territories, directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandarnus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part." (i) In article 35—(i) references to the commencement of the Constitution shall be construed as references to the commencement of this Order; {ii) in clause (a) (i), the words, figures and brackets "clause (3) of article 16, clause (3) of article 32" shall be omitted; and (iii) after clause (b), the following clause shall be added, namely:—"(c) no law with respect to preventive detention made by the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, whether before or after the commencement of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Part, but any such law shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, cease to have effect on the expiration of five years from the commencement of the said Order, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof". (j) After article 35, the following new article shall be added, namely:—"35A. Saving of laws with respect to permanent residents and their rights.— Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no existing law in force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and no law hereafter enacted by the Legislature of the State,—(a) defining the classes of persons who are, or shall be, permanent residents of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; or (b) conferring on such permanent residents any special rights and privileges or imposing upon other persons any restrictions as respects—(i) employment under the State Government; (ii) acquisition of immovable property in the State; (iii) settlement in the State; or (iv) right to scholarships and such other forms of aid as the State Government may provide, shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any rights conferred on the other citizens of India by any provision of this Part."

(5) PART V. (a) In articles 54 and 55, references to the elected members of the. House of the People and to each such member shall include references to the representatives of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in that House; and the population of the State shall be deemed to be forty-four lakhs and ten thousand. (b) In the proviso to clause (1) of article 73, the words "or in any law made by Parliament" shall be omitted. (c) Article 81 shall apply subject to the modification that the representatives of the State in the House of the People shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Legislature of the State. (d) In article 134, clause (2), after the words "Parliament may", the words "on the request of the Legislature of the State" shall be inserted. (e) Articles 135, 136 and 139 shall be omitted. (/) In articles 149 and 150, references to the States shall be construed as not including the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (flf) In article 151, clause (2) shall be omitted. (6) PART XI. (a) In article 246, the words, brackets and figures "Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3)" occurring in clause (1), and clauses (%), (3) and (4) shall be omitted. (b) Articles 248 and 249 shall be omitted. (c) In article 250, for the words "to any of the matters enumerated in the State List", the words "also to matters not enumerated in the Union List" shall be substituted. (d) In article 251, for the words and figures, "articles 249 and 250" the word and figures "article 250" shall be substituted, and the words "under this Constitution" shall be omitted; and, for the words "under either of the said articles", the words "under the said article" shall be substituted, (e) To article 253, the following proviso shall be added, namely:—"Provided that after the commencement of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, no decision affecting the disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be made by the Government of India without the consent of the Government of that State." (f) In article 254, the words, brackets and figure "or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the

Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2)" and the words "or as the case may be, the existing law", occurring in clause (1), and the whole of clause (2) shall be omitted. (g) Article 255 shall be omitted (h) Article 256 shall be renumbered as clause (1) of that article, and the following new clause shall be added thereto, namely;—"(2) The State of Jammu and Kashmir shall so exercise its executive power as to facilitate the discharge by the Union of its duties and responsibilities under the Constitution in relation to that State; and in particular, the said State shall, if so required by the Union, acquire or requisition property on behalf and at the expense of the Union, or if the property belongs to the State, transfer it to the Union on such terms as may be agreed, or in default of agreement, as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of India." (i) Article 259 shall be omitted. (j) In clause (2) of article 261, the words "made by Parliament" shall be omitted. (7) PART XII. (a) Clause (2) of article 267, article 273, clause (2) of article 283, articles 290 and 291 shall be omitted. (b) In articles 266, 282, 284, 298, 299 and 300, references to the State or States shall be construed as not including references to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (c) In articles 277 and 295, references to the commencement of the Constitution shall be construed as references to the commencement of this Order. (8) PART XIII. (a) In clause (1) of article 303, the words "by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule” shall be omitted. (b) In article 306, references to the commencement of the Constitution shall be construed as references to the commencement of this Order. (9) PART XIV. In article 308, after the words "First Schedule", the words "other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir" shall be added.

(10) PART XV, (a) Article 324 shall apply only in so far as it relates to elections to Parliament and to the offices of President and Vice-President. (b) Articles 325, 326, 327, 328 and 329 shall be omitted. (11) PART XVI. (a) In article 330, references to the "Scheduled Tribes" shall be omitted. (b) Articles 331, 332, 333, 336, 337, 339 and 342 shall be omitted. (c) In articles 334 and 335, references to the State or the States shall be construed as not including references to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (12) PART XVII. The provisions of this Part shall apply only in so far as they relate to (i) the official language of the Union; (ii) the official language for communication between one State and another, or between a State and the Union; and (iii) the language of the proceedings in the Supreme Court. (13) PART XVIII. (a) To article 352, the following new clause shall be added, namely—"(4) No Proclamation of Emergency made on grounds only of internal disturbance or imminent danger thereof shall have no effect in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir (except as respects article 354) unless it is made at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of that State," (b) Articles 356, 357 and 360 shall be omitted. (14) PART XIX. (a) In article 361, after clause (4), the following clause shall be added, namely:—"(5) The provisions of this article shall apply in relation to the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir as they apply in relation to a Rajpramukh, but without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution of that State." (b) Articles 362 and 365 shall be omitted. (c) In article 366, clause (21) shall be omitted. (d) To article 367, there shall be added the following clause, namely:—"(4) For the purposes of this Constitution as it applies in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir—(a) references to this Constitution or to the provisions thereof shall be construed as references to the Constitution or the provisions thereof as applied in relation to the said State; (b) references to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including

references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers; (c) references to a High Court shall include references to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir; (d) references to the Legislature or the Legislative Assembly of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Constituent Assembly of the said State; (e) references to the permanent residents of the said State shall be construed as meaning persons who, before the commencement of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, were recognised as State subjects under the law in force in the State or who are recognised by any law made by the Legislature of the State as permanent residents of the State; and (/) references to the Rajpramukh shall be construed as references to the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Sadar-i- Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir and as including references to any person for the time being recognised by the President as being competent to exercise the powers of the Sadar-iRiyasat. (15) PART XX. To article 368, the following proviso shall be added, namely:—"Provided further that no such amendment shall have effect in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir unless applied by order of the President under clause (1) of article 370. (16) PART XXI. (a) Articles 369, 371, 373, clauses (1), (2), (3) and (5) of article 374 and articles 376 to 392 shall be omitted. (b) In article 372—(i) clauses (2) and (3) shall be omitted, (ii) references to the laws in force in the territory of India shall include references to hidayats, ailans, ishtihars, circulars rohkars, irshads, yadashts, State Council Resolutions, Resolutions of the Constituent Assembly, and other instruments having the force of law in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and (iii) references to the commencement of the Constitution shall be construed as references to the commencement of this Order. (c) In clause (4) of article 374, the reference to the authority functioning as the Privy Council of a State shall be construed as a reference

to the Advisory Board constituted under the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act, 1996, and references to the commencement of the Constitution shall be construed as references to the commencement of this Order. (17) PART XXII. Articles 394 and 395 shall be omitted. (18) FIRST SCHEDULE. (19) SECOND SCHEDULE. Paragraph 6 shall be omitted. (20) THIRD SCHEDULE. Forms V, VI, VII and VIII shall be omitted. (21) FOURTH SCHEDULE. (22) SEVENTH SCHEDULE. (a) In the Union List— (i) for entry 3, the entry "3. Administration of cantonments" shall be substituted; (ii) entries 8, 9, 33 and 34, the words "trading corporations including" in entry 43, entries 44, 50, 52, 54, 55, 60, 67, 69, 78 and 79, the words "inter-State migration" in entry 81, and entry 97 shall be omitted; (iii) for entry 53, the entry "53. Petroleum and Petroleum Produces but excluding the regulation and development of oil fields and mineral oil resources; other liquids and substances declared by Parliament by law to be dangerously inflammable" shall be substituted; and (iv) in entries 72 and 76, the reference to the States shall be construed as not including a reference to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (b) The State List and the Concurrent List shall be omitted. (23) EIGHTH SCHEDULE. (24) NINTH SCHEDULE: After entry 13, the following entries shall be added, namely:—"14. The Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act (No. XVII of 2007). 15. The Jammu and Kashmir Restitution of Mortgaged Properties Act (No. XVI of 2006). 16. The Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act (OSTo. II of 1980). 17. The Jammu and Kashmir Distressed Debtors Relief Act (No. XVII of 2006). 18. The Jammu and Kashmir Alienation of Land Act (No. V of 1995). 19. Order No. 6-H of 1951, dated 10th March 1951 regarding Resumption of

Jagirs and other assignments of Land Revenue etc. 20. The Jammu and Kashmir State Kuth Act (No. I of 1978)." RAJENDRA PRASAD, President, K. Y. BHANDARKAR, Secretary.

APPENDIX 10

JAMMU AND KASHMIR REORGANISATION ACT, 2019

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR anj

S ay

Dix it, who retired as Additio nal Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, graduated as a marine engineer and sailed the high seas for a few years before changing course to civil services. He is also well-recognised as a cricket administrator who once defeated Lalit Modi in a famous election for the post of the president of the Rajasthan Cricket Association. Dixit is a prolific columnist on contemporary topics. He has a deep interest in Indian languages, culture, economics, history, philosophy and spirituality. He is the author of the Krishna trilogy whose two parts “Krishna Gopeshvara” and “KrishṇaYogeshvara” have been released to critical acclaim. His six-part series—‘All Religions Are Not the Same’—has been widely read and referenced. Dixit also heads The Jaipur Dialogues as its Chairman.